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The Theme of Desengaño in Spanish Dances
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Robert William Felkel

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ABSTRACT

THE THEME OF DESENGAÑO IN SPANISH DANCES OF DEATH FROM THE FOURTEENTH TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

By

Robert William Felkel

Although the Dance of Death is a theme which has been treated in every period of Spanish literature, it has inspired only a relatively small amount of critical study. Much of this study has not even concerned itself with the ideological content or literary style of these Spanish works, but rather with the problem of establishing a genealogy for the Dance of Death in European literature. Thus the question of whether the French poem of the cemetery of the Holy Innocents historically precedes the Spanish Danza general de la Muerte or vice versa has been much discussed, but there is a dearth of critical material which examines the specific texts of Spanish Dances of Death in order to draw conclusions about literary or ideological aspects of the genre's manifestation in Spain. Consequently, this thesis examines the most significant Dances of Death written in Spanish from the Middle Ages to the Baroque period in order to study the development of

a theme which unites them all and can be found, in fact, in every Dance of Death: desengaño.

The principal method used to effect this study of desengaño is that of explication de texte, with attention being given mainly to the significance of the content of the writings rather than to their style. The manner in which the ideological content of each Dance of Death reflects the ideological presuppositions of the period in which it was written is seen by comparing the content of the work with pertinent sections of the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas. This is supplemented by data from modern scholars, such as Bruce Wardropper, Marcel Bataillon, Ludwig Pfandl, and Stephen Gilman, in order to highlight the changes in the trajectory of desengaño from the Dança general de la Muerte (ca. 1393) to El gran teatro del mundo (ca. 1635) of Pedro Calderón de la Barca. A basic starting point is Carlos Blanco Aguinaga's distinction between a posteriori desengaño, which is desengaño experienced by a character in a given work as the result of certain experiences, and a priori desengaño, which is essentially the didactic purpose of the author who wishes to undeceive his readers.

The principal finding of this study is that desengaño is not a static element in Spanish literature but rather one which changes from period to period as a result of changing religious attitudes. In the medieval Dances

of Death (the Dança general de la Muerte, Coplas de la Muerte, Otras coplas ala Muerte, Razonamiento que faze Johan de Mena con la Muerte, and Sebastián de Horozcò's Coplas de la Muerte and Coloquio de la Muerte con todas edades y estados) it involves an almost exclusive emphasis on the virtue of charity. This emphasis on charity continues in the Renaissance Dances of Death (Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria, Diego Sánchez de Badajoz's Farsa de la Muerte, and Juan de Pedraza's Farsa llamada Danza de la Muerte), but with an added emphasis on faith and doctrine, qualities which could no longer be so strongly assumed as they were during the Middle Ages in Spain, when no mention of them was felt to be necessary. This new emphasis on faith and doctrine was not originally apologetic in nature, but it quickly became so as the ideas of the Protestant reformers began to gain acceptance in many parts of Europe, including Spain. Thus, desengaño in the Spanish Dances of Death from approximately the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century (Alfonso de Valdés's Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón, Micael de Carvajal and Luis Hurtado de Toledo's Las cortes de la Muerte, Francisco de Quevedo's El sueño de las calaveras, and Pedro Calderón de la Barca's El gran teatro del mundo) includes specific mention of or at least very strong allusions to particular Protestant reformers and doctrines. Therefore the ideological content of desengaño is not the

same in all Spanish Dances of Death. The specific form which desengaño takes in any given work is, of course, affected by the individual author's personal bias, perspective and purpose. However, probably equally important is the collective ideology of each historical period. It is essentially the force of these collective ideologies which has shaped the phenomenon of desengaño from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century in the Dance of Death.

THE THEME OF DESENGAÑO IN SPANISH DANCES
OF DEATH FROM THE FOURTEENTH TO THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

By

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INTRODUCTION

The Dance of Death is a literary motif which has been treated in several languages and in virtually every century since its beginning in the Middle Ages. This longevity is a testimony to its continuing vitality. Yet despite the abundance of excellent scholarship devoted to this subject over a period exceeding a hundred years, the Spanish Dances of Death in particular continue to merit careful study.

A large percentage of the critical study on the Dance of Death in the past has centered on the very large issue of its remote origins and possible sources. Consequently, these studies deal only incidentally with the Spanish Dança general de la Muerte. One of the first scholars to deal with the subject was Wilhelm Seelman¹ who maintained that a French morality play was the starting-point of the Spanish Dança general, as well as the Paris Danse macabre and the Lübeck Totentanz. He says that all texts were ultimately derived from this one source. Karl Künstle, on the other hand, as the title of his book suggests,² prefers to see the origin of the Dance of Death in the Legend of the Three Living and the Three Dead. He

therefore follows the ideas of P. Vigo,³ who was the first to print a twelfth century poem on this subject preserved in a manuscript of Ferrara. A similar emphasis on folkloric elements distinguishes the theory developed by W. Fehse in his book Der Ursprung der Totentänze.⁴ He noticed a discrepancy between the texts and the paintings of the Dance of Death: in the former a single figure of Death speaks, whereas in the latter there are many skeletons represented. These skeletons, he concludes, do not represent Death but rather the Dead, and the whole theme is inspired by a medieval folk superstition whereby the dead rise from their graves at night to dance in the cemeteries, attempting to entice others to join them. If the others do so, they will die on the spot. O. Ursprung's article⁵ anticipates future research by postulating a Catalonian origin for the Dances of Death. Ursprung bases his theories on the Latin song Ad mortem festinamus contained in the Llibre Vermell of the Benedictine convent of Montserrat in Catalonia. His theories would be partially confirmed later by Florence Whyte and most recently by José María Solá-Solé. This theory of a peninsular origin for the Dances of Death has not taken root easily, however, possibly because of the climate of opinion created by M. Menéndez y Pelayo in what Solá-Solé calls ". . . uno de sus pocos insubstanciados juicios"⁶: "La Danza de la Muerte es entre nosotros concepción totalmente exótica, y

de la cual ningún rastro hallamos en Castilla hasta la presente obra, ni en Cataluña hasta que en época aún más tardía. . . ."7 W. Stammer⁸ follows Seelman and Fehse in postulating an archetype from which all further texts spring, but he tried to come up with an eclectic solution to the problem. As a result, the outline he draws up for the development of the Dance of Death is complicated in the extreme. Basically he supposes the existence of a Latin poem of great perfection of which the three versions in vulgar languages are only reflections. The most complete work done so far on the Dance of Death in Spain has been Florence Whyte's The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia.⁹ In this book Miss Whyte refutes Seelman's theory that the Dança general is a translation of a lost French original and argues instead that traces of a peninsular background are abundant. She sees the various estates in the poem as a strong reflection of peninsular society and uses this approach to refute Seelman's translation theory. Seen from this perspective, Werner Mullertt's article "Sur les danses macabres en Castille et en Catalogne,"¹⁰ represents a regression since he attempts to refute the theory of Catalan origin and returns instead to follow Fehse and Seelman in supposing a French model. This judgement was confirmed by the great French hispanist Pierre Le Gentil in his book La poésie lyrique espagnole et portugaise a la fin du moyen âge. In this book he argues that the Danza general has no original elements and does not belong to an

an indigenous tradition,¹¹ thus following very closely the judgement of M. Menéndez y Pelayo, whom he quotes before beginning his analysis. The theory of the French original was reconfirmed by James M. Clark in his article "The Dance of Death in Medieval Literature: Some Recent Theories of Its Origin"¹² in which he states that nothing has been written that shakes the claim of the poem of the cemetery of the Holy Innocents, dating from 1424-25, to be the oldest known literary form of the Dance of Death. Helmut Rosenfeld also attempts to establish a parallel between the Parisian poem and the Dança general in his book Der Mittelalterliche Totentanz.¹³ The most recent contribution to scholarship regarding the problem of the origins of the Dança general has been done by José María Solá-Solé. In his article "En Torno a la Dança general de la Muerte"¹⁴ Solá-Solé comes to a conclusion similar to that of Florence Whyte, viz. that the source for the Dança general is peninsular and not French, although he bases his conclusions on linguistic evidence rather than on a consideration of the estates. Using a combination of linguistic and internal evidence he maintains that the Dança general is an adaptation (trasladación) of a Catalonian-Aragonese dance written around the end of the fourteenth century which in turn responds to an indigenous Catalonian-Aragonese preoccupation with the theme of death.

Studies dealing with some other specific aspect of the Spanish Dances of Death are rare. An exception is E.

Segura Covarsí's article "Sentido dramático y contenido litúrgico de 'Las danzas de la Muerte'."¹⁵ Although the author states that it can be proved with documents that these Dances were represented under the form of dramas, he does not furnish the documents to which he alludes. And in any case the theory that the Dance of Death originated in drama had been advanced almost a full hundred years earlier by E. H. Langlois,¹⁶ whom Covarsí does not mention. The liturgical aspect is seen in the didacticism of these works which expound a certain ideology of death. The major value of the article is that it is a good introduction to the various treatments this theme has received in Spanish literature.

Another good introduction to the Dance of Death in Spanish literature is a book by Angel Lasso de la Vega y Argüelles, La danza de la muerte en la poesía castellana.¹⁷ The author surveys most of the major contributions to the genre in Spain and even includes a section of Holbein's plates. By modern standards, however, the book is scarcely a critical study but rather a series of plot summaries.

This study will investigate Dances of Death from the period of the finest flowering of this theme in Spanish literature, beginning with the Danza general de la Muerte (ca. 1393) and ending with the works of Pedro Calerón de la Barca. Our concern will not be an examination of these works for the purpose of discovering the influence that any

given work may have had on subsequent works in this genre. Nor will it be our purpose to arrive at any conclusions regarding the very remote origins of the Dance of Death in European literature. Rather, the texts of each of these works will be studied in great detail in order to examine one single element which unites them all, and can in fact be found in every Dance of Death: desengaño.

Desengaño, one of the key concepts in Spanish literature of almost any period, has also been a central element in all of the Spanish Dances of Death, beginning with the anonymous Danza general de la Muerte. An examination of this concept in the Spanish Dances of Death can reveal at least two things: it can lead to a more coherent and unified understanding of each work itself and the manner in which it discloses its meaning; it can also provide a greater understanding of the historical period in which the work was written and of the ideological presuppositions underlying that period.

The concept of desengaño must be defined at least in its basic outlines before the study can proceed, and this preliminary definition will enable the changes in the concept from one period to the next to be grasped more easily.


One of the most useful articles for gaining an understanding of this concept is Stephen Gilman's monograph "An Introduction to the Ideology of the Baroque in Spain."¹⁸ In this article the author points out that desengaño

constituted the motive impulse of ascetic literature and that the ideal man of the period was "el caído en la cuenta."¹⁹ This provides a basic and very general definition of desengaño as the coming to a realization. There is of course a major variable in this definition since the reader may well ask "What realization?" The ideological substance of what the disillusioned man is supposed to realize is not the same from one historical period to the next, and this is why the concept of desengaño cannot be constant and unchanging.

Also of considerable value is Carlos Blanco Aguinaga's article "Cervantes y la picaresca: notas sobre dos tipos de realismo."²⁰ Blanco makes a distinction between a posteriori desengaño, which is desengaño experienced by a character in a given work as a result of certain experiences, and a priori desengaño, which is essentially the didactic purpose of the author who wishes to desengañar his readers. Although he is speaking primarily of desengaño in picaresque novels, his distinction may be applied equally to Dances of Death:

La experiencia del pícaro se ha convertido en juicio del novelista: todo lo que ha ido desentrañando a lo largo de su vida, le sirve ahora como ejemplo para que el lector aprenda a desentrañar la realidad. Así, aunque cuando vivía su vida de pícaro cada aventura le servía para descubrir, a posteriori, el engaño del mundo, la novela de esa vida es . . . pensada a priori como ejemplo de desengaño.²¹

It happens that in the Dances of Death all the characters do not undergo a process of desengaño, so that the presence



of a posteriori desengaño in a given work may be minimal or even nonexistent. Nevertheless, the very fact that certain characters do not become disillusioned and realize the error of their ways is itself intended to disillusion the readers, so that a priori desengaño is always present in the form of the author's didactic purpose. (To avoid linguistic confusion only the term desengaño itself will be used in Spanish, while derivative forms such as desengañar [and its conjugated forms], desengañado, engaño, and engañado will be rendered by English words and phrases which most nearly translate the meaning of the Spanish words, such as "to undeceive," "undeceived," "illusion" and "self-deception," and "self-deceived," respectively.)

This study is divided into three major sections: an analysis of those Dances of Death in which desengaño is essentially based on charity; an analysis of the Dances of Death in which it is based not only on charity but also on correct doctrine, but with no references to heterodoxy; and an analysis of works in which heterodox sects and doctrines are mentioned or at least alluded to. The purpose of this format is to show how the concept of desengaño in the Spanish Dances of Death changes in accordance with the prevailing ideological climate in Spain. Before proceeding, however, some definition of terms is called for, especially as regards the first section of the study.

In their Theological Dictionary Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler define charity in the following manner:

"In the New Testament charity is usually the term for love in general, primarily the love of God for men, but also the love of men for one another and for God."²² In this study the definition of charity used is the second one offered by Rahner and Vorgrimler, viz. the love of men for one another and for God. However, for a more precise explanation of the meaning that the term had for the Middle Ages, the student interested in that period can probably do no better than to consult the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas. He begins by explaining the fact that charity is a virtue since by it man attains God.²³ He then explains that "charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it. . . ."²⁴ This concept of charity as the foundation of all virtue makes it the logical choice for an explanation of desengaño that is based not on doctrine but on virtue. Aquinas goes on to point out that the theological virtues are higher than the moral or intellectual virtues and that charity is the highest of these theological virtues because it is the one which does most to attain the first rule of human acts, which is God.²⁵ At this point it is necessary to explain the sense in which it is stated that desengaño in the medieval Dances of Death involves an emphasis on charity but not on doctrine. Since charity is defined as one of the theological virtues, it is clear that an emphasis on doctrine is implicit in these early Dances of

Death. The element of doctrine is so strongly assumed, however, that overt statement is really unnecessary. This is not the case in the latter Dances of Death.

This emphasis on charity in the Dances of Death implies an emphasis on other virtues as well (since, as Aquinas explains, all virtues depend on charity), the most obvious of which is the cardinal virtue of justice, although extreme care must be taken to define this word in medieval rather than modern terms. Again, Aquinas can be taken as definitive here. He says that justice is ". . . the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right."²⁶ Many characters in the Spanish Dances of Death have failings in this area, especially since justice, as a cardinal virtue, includes other secondary virtues such as mercy and liberality which ". . . are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue."²⁷

After the Middle Ages, with few exceptions, the Dance of Death usually takes the form of drama. As such, its history is intimately related with the history of religious theater in Spain, especially the auto sacramental and its progenitors. An examination of that history may help to indicate why the element of desengaño begins to involve an emphasis on doctrine (in addition to charity).

At one time the auto sacramental was thought to have developed as a weapon of combat against the Protestant heresies, especially against those heresies which attacked the doctrine of the Eucharist and the real presence.


Lately, however, some critics, most notable Marcel Bataillon, have exposed the grave deficiencies in this thesis. In his article "Ensayo de explicación del auto sacramental" Bataillon states that this thesis does not correspond to any testimony of those who were contemporaries of the period in which the auto sacramental reached its full flowering.²⁸ He also mentions that of the ninety-five works published by Rouanet in the Colección de autos, farsas y coloquios only three attack heterodox doctrines, and even these three do not deal specifically with the doctrine of the Eucharist.²⁹ On the basis of these and other considerations, Bataillon decides to reject the theory which views Protestant attacks on the doctrine of the Eucharist as the factor which accounts for the rise of the auto sacramental. Instead, he feels that the birth of a Eucharistic theater designed specifically for the Corpus Christi celebrations belongs not to the Counter-Reformation but to the Catholic reform movement which preceded the Protestant schism. One of the important factors in this reform movement was the desire to give the faithful ". . . una instrucción religiosa que los hiciese llegar más allá de la fe del carbonero, que les hiciese sentir, si no comprender, los misterios fundamentales de su religión."³⁰ This desire to use the theater for the specific purpose of religious instruction in a doctrinal sense accounts in part for the shifting nature of desengaño as it changes from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. Originally the doctrinal focus

did not involve an emphasis on orthodoxy as opposed to heterodoxy because Protestantism was not even a reality when some of these Dances of Death were composed, such as Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria, written in 1519.

Nevertheless, as an awareness of the growing heresy became more widely diffused in Spain, the autos began to take on a more apologetic character and references to heretical sects and to specific heretics became noticeable around 1560 when the Catholic reform movement acquired new urgency as a result of the Protestant challenge to the faith.³¹ Shortly afterwards, on July 19, 1564,³² the decrees of the Council of Trent were authorized for publication in Spain and this influenced the development of a theater whose purpose was at least partly apologetic, as Bruce Wardropper points out:

El Concilio recomendó que se celebrara la fiesta (i.e. the Corpus Christi celebrations) como manifestación del triunfo de la verdad sobre la herejía, para que se confundieran los enemigos del Sacramento viendo el regocijo universal de la Iglesia, o bien para que se convencieran de sus errores mediante la saludable turbación que en ellos suscitara el espectáculo. Este nuevo aspecto del Corpus, arma de la Contrarreforma, triaca del veneno protestante, influyó mucho . . . en el desarrollo de la farsa sacramental de la última mitad del siglo XVI.³³

It is for the purpose of reflecting this changing doctrinal emphasis that part two of this study deals with desengaño based on doctrine but without reference to heresy, and part three with desengaño based on doctrine and including specific references to heresy.



Limitations of time and space force certain restrictions on this study which should be acknowledged from the outset. In the first place, although the Dance of Death could be traced from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century, such a broad scope would undoubtedly be unwieldy and would result in a superficial treatment of specific works and historical periods. In order to obviate this difficulty, this study has been limited to the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Baroque period. This is an appropriate limitation, since these three periods can in some ways be thought to form a single unit. One of the outstanding aspects of Spanish history is that medieval forms of thought persist well into the Renaissance and Baroque period. Of course this can also be applied in varying degrees to other countries, such as England, and Johan Huizinga has suggested that ". . . the line of demarcation between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been too much insisted upon."³⁴ Nevertheless, medieval ideas did flourish in Spain to a greater degree than in other countries, perhaps because, as Father Copleston suggests, "Spain was comparatively untouched either by the ferment of Renaissance thought or by the religious dissensions of the Reformation."³⁵ It is for this reason, for example, that Spain was the chief center of the revival of Scholasticism, a term loosely used to refer to medieval philosophy in general. Accordingly, this study begins with the Dança

general de la Muerte and ends with the works of Pedro Calderón de la Barca.

The second limitation placed on this study is a linguistic one: only Dances of Death written in Spanish will be discussed. This eliminates peninsular Dances of Death written in Portuguese or Catalan and accounts for the absence, for example, of a discussion of the entire Trilogy of the Ships of Gil Vicente, since only one of those plays, the Auto da barca da Gloria, is written in Spanish. Also eliminated on the basis of this linguistic limitation is Pedro Miguel de Carbonell, author of a Catalan translation (with variations) of the French Danse Macabre.

It must also be noted from the outset that this study deals with works of literature as documents in the history of ideas in general and of religious thought in particular. It does not purport to analyze the literary value of the Dances of Death to be discussed. Such an analysis would doubtless be fruitful and germane in another context, however, for each author freely adapts the Dance of Death theme to his own literary purposes. The element of satire, for example, can be most strongly perceived in Quevedo's El sueño de las calaveras, but it is also very noticeable in the Dança general de la Muerte, the Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón of Alfonso de Valdés, and Las cortes de la Muerte of Micael de Carvajal and Luis Hurtado de Toledo; it is somewhat more subdued in Horozco's Coloquio

de la Muerte and Pedraza's Farsa llamada Danza de la Muerte, and is entirely absent from the anonymous Coplas de la Muerte and Calderón's El gran teatro del mundo. Quevedo, on the other hand, merely hints at the concept of a procession of various estates, while Calderón and the author of the Danza general de la Muerte develop it quite fully. Cause and effect, as René Wellek and Austin Warren have noted,³⁶ are always incommensurate in a work of art, which always remains unpredictable regardless of the extrinsic causes which come to bear on it.

FOOTNOTES--INTRODUCTION

¹Wilhelm Seelman, "Die Totentänze des Mittelalters," Jahrbuch des Vereins für niederdeutsche Sprachforschung 17 (1892): 1-80. Discussed by James M. Clark in his "The Dance of Death in Medieval Literature: Some Recent Theories of Its Origin," The Modern Language Review, 45 (1950): 336 (hereafter to be cited by means of the short title "Recent Theories").

²Karl Künstle, Die Legende der drei Lebenden und der drei Toten und der Totentanz (Freiberg im Breisgau, 1908). Discussed by Florence Whyte in her The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931), p. ix (hereafter to be cited by means of the short title Dance of Death).

³P. Vigo, Le Danze Macabre in Italia, 2nd ed. (Bergamo, 1901). Discussed by Whyte, Dance of Death, p. x and p. 41.

⁴W. Fehse, Der Ursprung der Totentänze (Halle, 1907). Discussed by Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 46.


⁵O. Ursprung, "Spanisch-katalanische Liedkunst des 14. Jahrhundert," Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft 4 (1921-22): 136-160. Discussed by José María Solá-Solé in his "En torno a la Dança general de la Muerte," Hispanic Review 36 (1968): 313 (hereafter to be cited by means of the short title "En torno").

⁶Solá-Solé, "En torno," p. 313.

⁷Marcelino Meméndez y Pelayo, Antología de poetas lfrococos castellanos, 14 vols. (Madrid: Librería de la Viuda de Hernando y Compañía, 1892), 3: cxxxviii.

⁸W. Stammer, Die Totentänze des Mittelalters (Munich: Horst Stobbe, 1922). Discussed by Clark, "Recent Theories," pp. 340-342.

⁹Supra, note 3.



- ¹⁰Werner Mullertt, "Sur les danses macabres en Castille et en Catalogne," Hispanic Review 81 (1933): 441-455.
- ¹¹Pierre Le Gentil, La poésie lyrique espagnole et portugaise a la fin du moyen âge, 2 vols. (Rennes: Philon, 1949), 1:387-388.
- ¹²Supra, note 1.
- ¹³Helmut Rosenfeld, Der Mittelalterliche Totentänze (Munster: Böheau, 1954), pp. 162-169. Discussed by Solá-Solé, "En torno," p. 313, n. 35.
- ¹⁴Supra, note 5.
- ¹⁵E. Segura Covarsí, "Sentido dramático y contenido litúrgico de 'Las Danzas de la Muerte'," Cuadernos de literatura 5 (1949): 251-271.
- ¹⁶E. H. Langlois, Essai historique et pittoresque sur les Danses des Morts (Rouen, 1851), p. 138. Discussed by Clark, "Recent Theories," p. 336.
- ¹⁷Angel Lassq de la Vega y Argüelles, La danza de la Muerte en la poesia castellana (Madrid: Casa Editorial de Medina, 1878).
- ¹⁸Stephen Gilman, "An Introduction to the Ideology of the Baroque in Spain," Symposium 1 (1946): 82-107.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 96.
- ²⁰Carlos Blanco Aguinaga, "Cervantes y la picaresca: notas sobre dos tipos de realismo," Nueva revista de filología hispánica 11 (1957): 313-342.
- ²¹Ibid., p. 316.
- ²²Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, trans. Richard Strachan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 72.
- ²³Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Part II-II, Question 23, Article 3 (New York: Denziger, 1947), p. 1271. (N.B. Since page numbers are largely irrelevant in a discussion of the Summa, all subsequent citations from that work will use an abbreviated format identifying the specific section of the work. For example, the citation above would read: Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.23, Art.3.)

²⁴Ibid., Art.4, Reply Obj.1.

²⁵Ibid., Art.6.

²⁶Ibid., Q.58, Art.1.

²⁷Ibid., Art.11, Reply Obj.1.

²⁸Marcel Bataillon, "Ensayo de explicación del auto sacramental," in his Varia leccion de clásicos españoles, trans. José Pérez Riesco (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1964), p. 185.

²⁹Ibid., p. 186.

³⁰Ibid., p. 189.

³¹Bruce W. Wardropper, Introducción al teatro religioso del siglo de oro (Salamanca: Ediciones Anaya, 1967), p. 123.

³²Ibid., p. 125.

³³Ibid., pp. 42-43.

³⁴Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, trans. F. Hopman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 40.

³⁵Frederick Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy, 8 vols. (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1963), 3 (pt.2): 153.

³⁶René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1956), p. 73.

CHAPTER I

DESENGAÑO BASED ON CHARITY

Part 1:

La dança general de la Muerte

The first known Spanish Dance of Death is the anonymous Dança general de la Muerte. Although many attempts have been made to situate this poem in its proper historical context, none has succeeded so admirably as that of José María Solá-Solé. His most recent article (1968), "En torno a la Dança general de la Muerte,"¹ appears to solve some of the problems which have been puzzling scholars for years and to clarify many others. Therefore, a brief examination of some of his conclusions is essential to any discussion of this work.

Solé-Solé uses linguistic evidence to show that the original of the Castillian Dança was without doubt ". . . un texto catalano-aragonés o, por lo menos, con muchos más aragonesismos de los que aparecen en el MS único escurialense."² One of the perennial problems regarding the Dança is the meaning to be attached to the expression "Prólogo en la traslación" with which the poem

begins. Formerly, some scholars (e.g. James M. Clark,³ Pierre Le Genil,⁴ et al.) were of the opinion that the Dança general was a translation, or at least an adaptation, of a French original. Solá-Solé rejects this hypothesis to offer a theory of peninsular origin for the Dança general, a proposal which had been previously advanced (albeit on the basis of different types of evidence) by only two scholars, O. Ursprung⁵ and Florence Whyte.⁶ Solá-Solé admits that to a certain degree the work is adapted and even translated, but from a Catalan-Aragonese original, not from a French one:

La Dança española hubiera sido, pues, una de las primeras danzas de la Muerte europeas, si no la primera. Habría sido anterior en unos treinta o más años a la famosa del cementerio de los Santos Inocentes de París, empezada a pintar, según nos cuenta un cronista contemporáneo, en agosto de 1424 y terminada durante la cuaresma del año siguiente. Se adelantaría, por consiguiente, a todas las europeas conocidas, con lo que de ninguna manera podemos considerarla, como han hecho algunos autores, como directa o indirectamente inspirada en la francesa de los Santos Inocentes.⁷

These conclusions are important since they indicate that the Dance of Death is not an extraneous importation, a conception which is foreign to Spain, as M. Menéndez y Pelayo suggested,⁸ but rather a type of literature indigenous to Spain, the country in which, according to Solá-Solé, it had its most extensive flowering.⁹ Were this not so, the continuity in the development of desengaño in these Dances of Death would be less than convincing, if the progenitor of the entire series were nothing but a translation

of a basically French work. Since this is not the case and the Dança general is a genuinely Spanish work, we may begin our study in the hopes that any conclusions reached will reveal certain basic truths about the changing intellectual climate in Spain from the Middle Ages to the Golden Age.

The "Prólogo en la traslación"¹⁰ contains ideas crucial for a correct understanding of the poem. A narrator explains that all creatures are advised by Death to take notice of the "breuidad de su vida" (379:1). Awareness of the brevity of life carries with it the implicit threat of eternal punishment since it is stated that everyone must obtain forgiveness for his sins, and in the course of the poem itself Death mentions the reality of heaven and hell several times. Since life is brief and the threat of eternal punishment is omnipresent, the conclusion is that all people should "faser buenas obras" (379:1) in order to obtain the necessary forgiveness. Emphasis on good works constitutes the main moral message of the poem. The first step in the attempt to undeceive the readers is the arousal of fear, specifically the fear of punishment, which Saint Thomas Aquinas calls servile fear. This servile fear is intended to lead to a higher and nobler type of fear, and thence to repentance and charity, the love of men for each other and for God. Aquinas makes it clear that this fear of punishment is not necessarily excluded from, or contrary to, charity, for ". . . separation from God is a punishment,

which charity shuns exceedingly . . .",¹² since charity is the theological virtue which does most to attain God.

The awareness of the brevity of life should therefore cause people to follow the advice of the wise preachers who give them the "bueno e sano consejo," namely, to do good works. The narrator then explains that Death, wishing to demonstrate concretely the truth of what he says, calls upon all the estates to come to him, whether they are willing or not. This is Death triumphant that we see here, and it will be interesting to observe how he changes in some of the later Dances of Death.

Immediately after this short Prologue, the poem begins with a statement from Death identifying himself.¹³ The first adjective he uses to qualify himself indicates the inevitability of death, a common theme in all Dances of Death: "çierta" (379:1). It is evident that in these opening stanzas Death is trying to remove his listeners' or readers' illusions, for he says:

Demando y digo o omne por que curas
De bida tan breue en punto pasante. . . . (379:1)

No one can escape Death's grasp, and two symbols which are used in the first two stanzas express this power: the arrow in the first stanza: "esta mi frecha cruel traspassante," (379:2) and physical illness in the second:

Non eres çierto sy en punto berná
Sobre ty a dessora alguna corrupçión,
De landre o carbonco, o tal ynplisyon,
Porque el tu vil cuerpo se dessatará. (379:2)

In this second stanza Death attempts to correct one of the most persistent of human illusions, namely, that only others will die:

Qué locura es esta tan magnifiesta
 Que piensas tú omne, que el otro morrá,
 E tu quedarás por ser bien compuesta
 La tu complisyon e que durará. (379:2)

Death here is clearly an agent of denengaño, attempting to bring people to a realization of their destiny. Another illusion which he attempts to correct in the third stanza is the popular one that people die only when they are old and can, therefore, count on being safe from his clutches at least until they have reached an advanced age. His warning, directed primarily at the young, is very explicit:

Abisate bien que yo llegaré
 A ty a desora que non he cuydado,
 Que tu seas mançebo o biejo cansado,
 Que qual te fallare tal te leuaré. (379:2)

In these opening stanzas is a tangential reference to a theme that is more explicitly dealt with in other Dances of Death (e.g. Horozco's Coloquio de la Muerte con todas las edades y estados, to be discussed in Part 3), viz. the ages of man. In this poem the victims that Death calls, with the exception of the first two, the donsellas, are all primarily the representatives of a given estate, not of a specific age, such as infancy, youth, or middle age. However, this theme of the ages of man, revealing Death's complete indifference to age, is dealt with by implication in the third stanza.

In the fourth stanza Death's role as an agent of desengaño is even more clearly defined. He explains that Scripture reveals that everybody is living under the sentence of certain death and by way of solution says ". . . fased penitencia, / Que a morir abedes, non sabedes quando" (370:2). Death's message of desengaño is thus defined in Christian terms and this becomes even more evident when he introduces the preacher and exhorts his listeners or readers to pay attention to his "grand sabiençia," (379:2) indicating that he approves of the content of the preacher's advice and agrees with him.

When the preacher begins to speak, he bases his argument on an appeal to Scriptural authority, just as Death did before him. Death had already pointed out that the Bible indicates that all men must of necessity die and now the preacher tells why: "Ca [la] truxo al mundo vn solo bocado" (379:2). Death is a consequence of original sin, "bocado" referring to the eating of the forbidden fruit.¹⁴ The didactic intent of the poem (i.e. the element of a priori desengaño defined by Blanco Aguinaga) becomes very clear in the sixth stanza when the preacher explains that the solution to the problem is "faser buenas obras" (379:2). We will learn mainly be negative examples exactly which works are good in the course of the poem itself, as Death calls his victims and reprehends them for their vices. For the time being, the performing of good works is definitely contrasted with trusting in high estates or riches:

Non vos fiedes de altos estados,
 Que non vos valdrán thesoros nin doblas. . . .
 (379:2)

What is really important is not money or social position but rather obtaining forgiveness for sins. To trust in high social position is therefore to be deceived, whereas to repent and obtain forgiveness for sins is to see things in their proper order. Thus the preacher and Death are both agents of desengaño. Just before returning the action to Death, the preacher explains that Death is starting a dance from which it will be impossible to escape and that he is busy laying his traps.¹⁵

The stanza that follows indicates that Death is not entirely indifferent regarding the lives he claims and there is in fact a certain type of person who appears very iniquitous to him, specifically, the unrepentant sinner. Death appears to have a special preference for taking the life of this type of person, for he says:

Pues que ya el frayre bos ha pedricado
 Que todos bayaes [sic] a faser penitencia,
 El que non quisiera poner diligençia
 Por mi non puede ser mas esperado. (380:1)

These lines highlight Death's role as an agent of desengaño. They indicate that he is a spokesman for a Christian way of life and suggest that unrepentant sinners are more in danger of death than anyone else. Death here is trying to remove another common illusion, namely, that it is safe to trust in the possibility of a deathbed repentance.

Since many of the thirty-five victims have the same or similar vices, they will be grouped and analyzed under the sin(s) they represent. It will be shown that each particular sin in the Dança general is in some way a sin against charity and that each victim exemplifies his or her particular vice, making a priori (and occasionally a posteriori) desengaño based on charity a central element in each incident. Within the category of each particular sin, the victims will be discussed in order of their appearance in the poem. This will be followed by a short analysis of the one victim in whom charity is emphasized by positive rather than negative value, the hermit.

1. Folly

Folly is one of the most frequently committed sins in the Dança general due to the fact that it is very general, resulting from any kind of excessive solicitude about temporal matters. According to Aquinas it is the contrary of wisdom and denotes dullness of sense in judging.¹⁶ Also, at times, folly may be a sin. Aquinas' views on this subject are worth quoting in detail because of the frequency with which this sin is committed not only in the Dança general but in all subsequent Dances of Death as well:

Folly, as stated above, denotes dullness of sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is the last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect contract dullness in judgement in two ways.

First, from a natural indisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things . . . and such like folly is a sin.¹⁷

Now all this is related to charity since folly is the contrary of wisdom and wisdom presupposes charity.¹⁸ Therefore, if a man is criticized for folly, he is criticized for lacking wisdom and, by implication, charity. Thus the *a priori* desengaño in the incidents involving folly will necessarily include an emphasis on charity. Since folly is such a general vice, however, it will be convenient to subdivide it into five separate headings, viz. folly arising from a) greed, b) ambition and the desire for honor, c) gluttony, d) lust, and e) general hedonism. These are all "earthly things" into which man may "plunge his sense," thereby rendering it "incapable of perceiving Divine things."

The first victim to suffer from folly based on greed is the emperor. Death's very summons to him indicates that he is critical of his haughty, self-sufficient attitude: "Dançad imperante con cara pagada" (380:2). The emperor's reply does little to indicate the nature of his specific illusion, although he does appear to realize that he is now beyond temporal power and that there is nobody who can save him from Death's grasp:

Non ay ningund rrey nin duque esforçado
Que della me pueda agora defender. . . . (380:2)

(Some of the characters in the poem are too self deceived even to come to such a basic realization as this.) Death's

accusation tells us more about the emperor's specific failings, which really involve two related sins. The first is an inordinate solicitude regarding the acquisition of temporal goods. This is the sin that concerns us here since it is a sin of folly. The second sin is that of waging war for a sinful purpose (specifically the acquisition of riches) and will be discussed below. Both are revealed in the following lines spoken by Death:

Aqui perderédes el buestro cabdal:
 Que athesorastes con grand tyrania,
 Fasiendo batallas de noche e de dia. . . . (380:2)

Regarding the first sin, Aquinas tells us that solicitude about temporal matters may be sinful in three ways, and the first two of these are applicable to the emperor. These two ways are:

first on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search. . . .¹⁹

The emperor sought riches as an end in themselves rather than as a means to virtuous deeds, for his very methods of acquiring treasure suggest a worldly, self-seeking attitude. To use tyrannical means to acquire riches for the performance of a virtuous act would be blatant hypocrisy and a moral impossibility.

The a priori desengaño in the incidents involving greed also stresses charity in another way, however, since greed is a sin against justice, which in turn depends on

charity. As was indicated in the Introduction, justice, as a cardinal virtue, includes secondary virtues such as mercy and liberality which are ascribed to justice as their principal virtue. In another section of the Summa Aquinas states that liberality is a part of justice,²⁰ and that covetousness is opposed to liberality since ". . . it denotes immoderation in the interior affection for riches. . . ,"²¹ whereas liberality ". . . moderates these affections" ²² This lack of justice implies a lack of charity also, for Aquinas states that since love of charity extends to our neighbor,²³ ". . . so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due."²⁴ Since the greedy man is not willing to do this, he sins against liberality directly, and against justice and charity indirectly.

The bishop fares very poorly indeed. He appears to be guilty of worldliness of every type, including greed, for he says: "Yo era abastado de plata y de oro" (381:2). This greed and worldliness necessarily led him to the sin of folly. This in turn caused him to forget about his last end and concentrate exclusively on the pleasures of this life, which is why he is so anguished by Death's arrival:

Mys manos aprieto, de mis ojos lloro,
Por que soy venido a tanta tristura. (381:2)

The dean is guilty of many sins, but the most important is covetousness. He appears to be very proud of his wealth and position in life for he says:

Grand renta tenia e buen deanasgo
E mucho trigo en la mi panera. (382:1)

In the first four lines of his reply to the dean Death adduces further evidence of the former's covetousness:

Don rico avariento, dean muy hufano,
Que vuestros dineros trocastes en oro,
A pobres e a biudas çerrastes la mano,
E mal despendistes el vuestro thesoro. (382:1)

Covetousness is not always a mortal sin and is therefore not always opposed to charity, but it may be mortal depending on the circumstances.²⁵ If covetousness gives rise to robbery or any kind of illicit taking of what rightfully belongs to another, it will be a mortal sin,²⁶ and therefore contrary to charity. This type of covetousness is primarily opposed to justice,²⁷ and indirectly to charity. It is also contrary to charity by being a source of folly. It can be seen that the dean is guilty of covetousness of this type, for Death's words ". . . mal despendistes el vuestro thesoro" suggests the illicit acquisition of goods through his use of the verb "despender."²⁸ Also, covetousness may be opposed to liberality (which technically is a part of justice, as has been shown), denoting inordinate love of riches. This type of covetousness will remain a venial sin if it does not cause a man to prefer riches to charity, but it will be mortal if his love of riches becomes so great that he is not afraid to act counter to God and his neighbor, that is, to act uncharitably. Such is the case with the dean, for Death clearly accuses him of failing to give aid to the poor and to widows, thus adding to his sin that of insensibility

to mercy, which Aquinas lists as one of the daughters of covetousness.²⁹

The physician continues the procession and reveals that he has been deceived into thinking that he could indefinitely forestall Death's arrival by taking extremely good care of his health. His desengaño highlights a theme which is central to the Dance of Death as a genre and to which Death alluded in the fourth stanza, namely, that the hour when the death sentence will be executed is unknown to all men, and when the hour finally comes, escape will be impossible: ". . . a morir abedes, non sabedes quando" (379:2). The physician's sin is that of being unlawfully solicitous about temporal matters, specifically his health and wealth. He was so earnest about maintaining health and long life that he failed to take care of his spiritual health, which is a more fitting and proper concern since it directs man to his last end, which is happiness and which cannot consist in goods of the body.³⁰ The physician's indifference to his spiritual health is indicated by the fact that his solicitude about temporal matters is not directed toward charity as an end, as is the case in works of mercy,³¹ but rather to the acquisition of wealth, and this pertains to covetousness. As he says: ". . . Pensé conquistar/ Dineros e plata enfermos curando" (383:1). What is directly intended here is not the curing of the sick, but the acquisition of riches. Thus the folly of greed has made the physician's life style essentially

uncharitable since his love of temporal goods, health and money became an obstruction to his love of God, which is an act of charity.

The king's doorkeeper has forgotten about Death and is surprised by him, ironically, on the very day on which he was expecting a bribe from a count for having given him easy passage. He is essentially guilty of two sins, fraud and covetousness. Although the former is a consequence of the latter, it will be discussed below under a separate heading. Death accuses the doorkeeper of covetousness with the following words: "E vuestra cobdiçia por que modo suena" (384:1). Since it was covetousness that led him to accept the bribe, which was a mortal sin against charity (as will be shown in a subsequent section), it follows that covetousness itself is a mortal sin against charity, for, as Aquinas says: ". . . if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man . . . fear not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin."³²

The accountant is the final example of a worldly person whose attachment to power and money led him to folly and thence to the commission of unjust and uncharitable acts. He indicates his attachment to worldly goods:

Ally perderé toda mi balia,
Aberes y joyas y mi grand poder (384:1)

The accountant's sin is mortal and therefore contrary to charity since it lead him to the folly of committing a sin of fraud, which is itself contrary to justice and therefore to charity.

Folly can also result from ambition and the desire for honor. The first victim to exemplify this type of folly is the cardinal. He was living in a state of extreme illusion since he thought that he could stave off Death's advances: "Querria sy pudiese la muerte estorçer" (380:2). He is also guilty of worldliness, although the temporal good he desires is not money but power, for he is ambitious. Death accuses him of being inordinately desirous of honor:

Pensastes el mundo por vos trastornar
Por llegar a papa e ser soberano (380:2)

Now the desire for honor is not necessarily sinful in itself, but it may be under certain circumstances. Aquinas states that it may be inordinate in three ways:

First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin.³³

The first of these ways is certainly applicable to the cardinal since his machinations ("Pensastes el mundo por vos trastornar") suggest he would not be likely to obtain the honor of the papacy on the basis of his merit alone. We do not really know if the second way is applicable to him

or not, although it would seem that if a man desired an honor which he did not deserve, it would be impossible to desire it for the sake of referring it (i.e. offering it as a kind of tribute) to an omniscient God who would be conscious of the falseness of the gesture. The third point requires some clarification, for in a sense the cardinal does refer, or pass on, the honor that he has to the profit of others, as indicated by these lines:

Syempre trabajé noctar y escreuir
 Por dar beneficijos a los mis criados. . . . (380:2)

It is doubtful, however, that mutual favors and gifts is what Aquinas means by "profit." He is speaking about a more abstract type of profit such as the common good, since he states that the principal and final characteristic of the episcopal office is intending the good of our neighbor.³⁴ And in the same article he concludes that it is unlawful under almost all circumstances to desire the episcopal office because

to desire to do good to one's neighbor is in itself praiseworthy and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to do them good. . . . Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not the precedence in dignity.³⁵

Although Aquinas is speaking here of the episcopal state, we may by analogy extend his comments to the papal rank as

well, since what he condemns is the desiring of high office, especially if it is desired because of the incidental goods that go with it, such as ". . . reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of temporalities. . . ." ³⁶ Such is the case with the cardinal, since Death accuses him not only of wishing to be pope but also of desiring sovereignty: "Por llegar a papa e ser soberano. . . ." Thus the cardinal has also sinned against charity through his self-seeking attitude for, as Aquinas says, "charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him." ³⁷ His folly has resulted from an excessive solicitude about honor, a purely temporal consideration.

The patriarch reveals that he was living in a state of illusion because he thought he would never die:

Yo nunca pensé venir a tal punto
Nin estar en dança tan sin piedad. . . . (381:1)

His case is unique because, even though the arrival of Death cures him of his illusion that he would never die, his illusion carries with it another illusion, and then Death must disillusion him again. The patriarch, finally realizing the inevitability of death, admits that he lived in a state of blindness without taking note of the manner in which Death robs men of all ages, but he appears to feel that he has now seen the light. Such is not the case, however, and Death informs him that his conception of death as a thief in the night, robbing what does not belong to

him, is entirely false. Amplifying the words of the preacher at the beginning of the poem, he points out that death is a consequence of the sin of Eve. This is an idea which is common to all of the Spanish Dances of Death and which is in complete agreement with the teaching of Aquinas.³⁸ The patriarch's former illusion that he would never die can best be described as a kind of folly precipitated by an overly worldly attitude, as evidenced by his preoccupation with his privileges and dignity:

Ya me van priuando segunt que barrunto,
De beneficijos e de dignidad. (381:1)

The last victim whose folly results from a preoccupation with honor is the subdeacon. Death's summons to him provides a clue to understanding his character: "Venid subdiacono alegre e pagado" (384:2). On the surface the subdeacon seems to be motivated by pious considerations, but upon examination it can be seen that his desire to ". . . pasar el salterio resando" (384:2) is based not on a consideration of the importance of his religious calling but rather on a desire to continue enjoying the benefits of this life and of his profession. (This involves the sin of sloth and will be discussed below.) He has no desire to change his station: "Non he menester de yr a trocar," (384:2) especially since he is an ambitious man and wants eventually to be deacon:

Antes de ebangelio me quero tornar
Estas quatro temporas que se ban llegando.³⁹ (384:2)

This desire for honor is inordinate since the subdeacon does not refer the honor to God but only to himself. He apparently desires the honor of deacon in order to continue being "alegre e pagado," and this pertains to ambition, which is a sin by being ". . . in disaccord with the order of reason," as Aquinas says.⁴⁰ Since the proper act of charity is the love of God and our neighbor, it follows that any self-love which has the effect of turning us away from God will be uncharitable.

Another source of folly in the Dança general is the sin of gluttony. From the very way in which Death addresses the abbot it is evident that this is his vice: "Dançad, abad gordo, con vuestra corona" (381:2). The simple food of the religious community was not good enough for him: "De yr non curaua comer a conuento" (381:2). Aquinas states that gluttony is contrary to charity because "insofar as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved as our last end, above all things. . . ."41 The abbots gluttony definitely did turn him away from his last end, and moreover, Death also accuses him of sloth and the violation of his profession, both of which will be discussed below.

The situation of the priest is very similar since he is also accused of gluttony, sloth and neglect of duty. In answer to Death's summons he says:

Con mis perrochianos quero yr folgar,
Ellos me dan pollos e lechones. . . . (383:1)

In his reply Death accuses him of gluttony by saying

Ya non es tiempo de yaser al sol
Con los perrochianos beuiendo del bino. . . . (383:1)

His more serious sins, sloth and neglect of duty (which will both be discussed below), stem from folly or dullness of judgment, which in turn stems from the habit of plunging his senses into earthly things. Since this type of folly results from worldliness rather than from natural disposition, it is definitely a sin and is opposed to the gift of wisdom, which corresponds to charity.

The santero would rather continue begging for the hermitage than join Death's dance, for in spite of the fact that he is a beggar, he has a very "good" life. His sins are gluttony and drunkenness, the latter being a species of the former.⁴² He is a gluttonous man by his own admission, for he says to Death:

. . . como a las beses pollos e perdises.
Se tomar al tiempo bien las codornises,
E tengo en mi huerto asás de repollos. . . . (385:2)

The accusation of drunkenness comes from Death in his reply to the santero:

Non vesitarédes [sic] la bota de cuero
Con que a menudo soliades beuer. . . . (385:2)

According to Aquinas gluttony is a mortal sin (and therefore contrary to charity) to the extent that it turns man away from a consideration of his last end. Since the santero's life appears to be predicated on exclusively worldly standards, it may be reasonably assumed that his gluttony resulted in a type of folly which blinded him to spiritual

truth. The only factor which would seem to contradict this is his last minute confession: "A dios me encomiendo y a sennor san Helises," (385:2) but this confession appears to be motivated by servile fear (i.e. fear of punishment) more than anything else, and the servility of servile fear is contrary to charity, as will be shown below in the case of the duke. (It would be imprecise to say that servile fear is evil. Its servility is evil, but servile fear itself is good because it recognizes and fears the evil that results from sin.⁴³ The substance of servile fear remains after the advent of charity, but its servility does not.⁴⁴) Drunkenness is also a mortal sin according to Aquinas since through it ". . . a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin."⁴⁵

There is another type of worldly pleasure which gives rise to folly in the Dança general--lust. The first victim who falls into this category is the squire. Aquinas defines lust as an excessive attachment to venereal pleasures.⁴⁶ The definition applies to lust in general, however, and Aquinas goes on to enumerate six species of lust, one of which, fornication, applies to the squire more than the other five. That lust is his ruling passion is

evident both from his own statements and from those of Death in reply. By way of answering Death's summons the squire says:

Duennas e donzellas, abed de mi duelo,
Que fasen-me por fuerça dexar los amores. . . . (382:1)

Death corroborates this in his reply to the squire:

Escudero polido, de amor siruiente,
Dexad los amores de toda persona. . . . (382:1)

Aquinas shows that simple fornication is a mortal sin by being contrary to charity since ". . . it is opposed to the good of the child to be born . . . since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child."⁴⁷ Thus, if the author's didactic purpose is to condemn fornication, it necessarily implies an emphasis on charity.

Picaresque elements enter the poem in the form of the sacristan, a truly despicable character whose major sin is indifference to God's law resulting from sins of sexual excess. Death alludes to these sins of lust and specifically likens the sacristan to a type of pícaro through his use of the word "picanna," which may be rendered as "picardía":⁴⁸

Don sacristanejo de mala picanna,
Ya non tenes tiempo de saltar paredes,
Nin de andar de noche con los de la canna,
Fasiendo las obras que vos bien sabedes. (385:1)

The sacristan is aware of the evil he has done and tries to excuse himself, but his attempt falls far short of the mark:

Non conosçi a Dios con mi moçedad
 Nin guise tomar nin syguir sus vias. (385:1)

The second line gives the lie to the first, for if the sacristan were really ignorant of God, he would be incapable of refusing to follow his commandments. This contempt of God's law is totally opposed to charity, the virtue which does most to attain God. In addition, the sins of sexual excess are also mortal sins opposed to charity, and for two reasons: first, because they are an example of the type of culpable blindness of mind which results from plunging one's senses totally into the enjoyment of the pleasures of lust,⁴⁹ thus leading ultimately to a contempt for God's law which is opposed to the wisdom which corresponds to charity; secondly, because sins such as fornication, rape and seduction, as we have already seen, are acts of injustice against any children who might be born of such an illicit union.

The last victim whose dullness in judging is due to sins of lust is the alfaquí, a type of Moorish clérigo.⁵⁰ Death's characterization of the alfaquí as a man given over to sensual pleasures is evident from the very first line he speaks: "Venit alfaquí, dexad los sabores" (385:1). The alfaquí indicates that he is not really unwilling to die, but he would like Death to wait awhile and take him when he is too old to enjoy the pleasures of the flesh. Apparently unaware of Death's power, the alfaquí even tries to bargain with him, saying that if he

will wait until he is older, he can even take his woman too, if he likes. These lines are well worth quoting, for they contain all the clues to understanding the a priori desengaño of this incident:

Yo tengo muger discreta, graciosa,
De que he gasajado e assas plaser.
Todo quanto tengo quero perder,
Dexa-me con ella solamente estar,
De que fuere biejo manda-me levar,
E a ella con-migo sy a ty pluguier. (385:1)

The alfaquí is evidently not a covetous man, since he appears to be indifferent to worldly goods such as riches and property. The only thing of apparent interest to him is his woman, with whom he wishes to remain until he can no longer enjoy her. Solá-Solé explains that this portrayal represents a common stereotype of the Moor: "Esta caracterización del alfaquí como de un joven entregado a los placeres de la carne forma parte del tópico que retrataba al moro como a un ser extremadamente lascivo y a la fe musulmana como el exponente del hedonismo."⁵¹ In any case, the sin of the alfaquí is essentially the same as that of the sacristan and the squire, namely, lust, and it is a mortal sin opposed to charity.

There are two remaining victims who suffer from a type of folly, but the exact nature of the worldliness which precipitated that folly is not made clear. For lack of a more specific word, the general term "hedonism" will have to suffice. Although the duke's hedonism includes the sin of gluttony, as is evidenced by Death's summons to

him: "Sygase con vos el duque antes que mas beua," (381:1)
 his words ". . . abré de dexar/ Todos mis deleytes" (381:1)
 suggest that his hedonism is not confined to gluttony
 alone. The duke's primary concern is not God but rather
 the possession and enjoyment of all his worldly goods. We
 are left to imagine exactly what his "deleytes" are, but
 the fact remains that he is guilty of that folly which
 arises from willful indulgence in worldly pleasures.

The archbishop delineates and analyzes his own
 vices and illusions. Death seems to have brought a
posteriori desengaño to the archbishop, who admits from the
 beginning that he deserved to die:

Ay muerte cruel, que te merescí,
 O porque me llievas tan arrebatado,

 Bien se que el infierno tengo aparejado. (381:1)

He was able to protect himself against fear of death
 "biuiendo en deleytes," (381:1) and this is a perfect
 example of the kind of self-induced folly which Aquinas
 considers opposed to wisdom and therefore to charity, since
 the former is dependent on the latter. The archbishop
 himself states this when he says: "Fiando en la vida
 quedé engannado" (381:1). The fact that the archbishop
 knows he was deceived before, indicates that the experi-
 ence of death must have brought him to a state of desengaño
 in which he knows that his primary error was worldliness.
 This worldliness is a serious sin because it led him to the
 commission of a sin of injustice which he might not have

committed, had he not wilfully dulled his sense of judgment by indulging in worldly pleasures.

2. Injustice

Injustice is another relatively general type of vice which occurs frequently in the Dança general as well as in other Spanish Dances of Death. As noted in the Introduction, Aquinas defines justice as ". . . the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right." The general nature of justice is due to the fact that it is a cardinal virtue and therefore includes other secondary virtues such as mercy and liberality. Since the vices opposed to this virtue are naturally very general also, it will be useful to subdivide them into three separate categories: a) theft and robbery; b) neglect of duty; c) duplicity and fraud.

Theft and robbery are obvious sins against justice. Like greed, they are directly opposed to liberality, which is ". . . a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue."⁵² Theft and robbery are also both mortal sins opposed to charity. As Aquinas says, charity consists in the love of God and secondarily in the love of our neighbor, whereas ". . . theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings. . . ." ⁵³ He therefore concludes that theft is a mortal sin since it is opposed to charity.⁵⁴ Robbery also violates charity since it is a ". . . more grievous sin than theft."⁵⁵

The first person accused by Death of being a thief is the king. Upon hearing Death's summons, he vainly tries to call out for assistance from his knights and crossbowmen, without realizing the uselessness of such a gesture.

Death accuses him of robbery in the following lines:

Rey fuerte, tirano, que syempre rrobastes
 Todo vuestro rreyno o fenchistes el arca. . . .
 (380:2)

Robbery, as we have seen, is directly opposed to liberality. Every virtue has its opposing vice and in this case the king's vice is covetousness, defined as ". . . immoderate love of possessing."⁵⁶ Covetousness led the king to the robbery of other people's lands, and this is a mortal sin opposed to charity.

The knight also is a thief, for he says to Death:

Segunt estas nuebas, conuiene dexar
 Mercedes e tierras que gané del rrey. . . . (381:2)

These two lines taken by themselves do not necessarily suggest that the knight is a thief, but Death's reply requires such an interpretation:

E despues veredes como ponen freno
 A los de la banda que roban lo ageno. . . . (381:2)

Covetousness is one of the vices of the merchant, although after he speaks his first two lines, there is still some doubt as to whether his sin is mortal, like that of the dean, or only venial. He says:

Aquien dexaré todas mis riquezas
 E mercadurias que traygo en la mar? (382:1)

But his covetousness is a mortal sin, as is indicated by his next two lines:

Con muchos traspasos e mas sotilesas
Gané lo que tengo en cada lugar. (382:1)

Thus the merchant is guilty of theft arising from covetousness, and both are mortal sins contrary to charity.

In the incident with the farmer the emphasis on charity can be seen in the fact that Death mildly suggests that he may be guilty of a type of theft. He says:

Sy vuestro trabajo fue syempre syn arte
Non fasçiendo furto en la tierra agena. . . . (383:1)

The use of the "if" clause does not allow us to determine whether or not the farmer is actually guilty, but this does not affect the a priori desengaño, since Death clearly states that those who do take other people's land will be punished in the afterlife.

An emphasis on charity is definitely discernible in the episode of the tax collector. He is very greedy and feels that he should not be obliged to dance since he is busy collecting his money. He says to Death:

Quero yr agora apriessa priado
Por vnos dineros que me han prometido,
Ca he esperado e el plaso es venido. . . . (384:2)

His covetousness is a mortal sin since it led him to commit acts which are contrary to charity. Death's accusation is explicit:

Pagad los cohechos que aves leuado,
Pues que vuestra vida fue en trabajar
Como robariedes al omne cuytado. (384:2)

Neglect of duty is another vice which is contrary to justice (and therefore to charity also) since it involves a failure "to render to each one his right." The first victim accused of this vice is the one who leads the dance, the pope. Death explains that he will lead the dance because ". . . es muy alto sennor/ Que en todo el mundo non ay su par" (380:1), and at the same time he injects what may be a criticism of clerical worldliness when he tells the pope that this is not the time for celebrating "en grande aparato" (380:1). As soon as the pope begins to speak, we see the nature of his particular illusion: thinking he was to live indefinitely, he took great pride in his worldly possessions and power:

Benefiçios, e honrras e grand sennoria,
Tove en el mundo pensando beuir. . . . (380:1)

The confrontation with death brings the pope to a state of desengaño and, realizing that escape is impossible, he repents and throws himself on the mercy of Christ and the Virgin. Death replies in a characteristically sarcastic tone: "Non bos enojedes, sennor padre santo . . ." (380:1), and provides some clues regarding other defects of the Pope, promising him that he will get his reward, a threat that he repeats several times in the poem: "De lo que fezistes abredes soldada" (380:1). Death explains that it is now of no use for the pope to conduct crusades, grant indulgences or favors, or to do any of the things that he used to do, for: "Aqui moriredes syn faser mas bolliçios . . ." (380:1). The word "bolliçio" reveals the pope's most

serious sin; it means "alboroto, sedición o tumulto."⁵⁷

This is very definitely a sin, for Aquinas says that

. . . sedition, in its proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.⁵⁸

The pope is thereby guilty of detracting from "the unity and peace of a people" and it is for this reason that he is criticized by Death. In a sense, his sin is against justice since sedition certainly involves a failure "to render to each one his right," the definition of justice offered by Aquinas. Also, Aquinas states that

peace is the work of justice indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace.⁵⁹

Therefore, since sedition is opposed to peace, the sin of the pope is a sin against both the cardinal virtue of justice and the theological virtue of charity. This is also neglect of duty since, as we have already seen, Aquinas states that the principal and final characteristic of the episcopal office is intending the good of our neighbor.

The emperor, mentioned before, is accused of waging war for a sinful purpose, specifically the acquisition of riches:

Aqui perderédes el buestro cabdal:
Que athesorastes con grand tyrania,
Fasiendo batallas de noche e de dia. . . . (380:2)

Regarding the waging of war Aquinas tells us that three things are necessary for a war to be just, but in the case of the emperor only the first requirement is fulfilled, namely, that the war be waged by the authority of the sovereign. The second and third requirements are not fulfilled, however. Aquinas says:

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. . . .

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.⁶⁰

It is obviously impossible for the emperor to fulfill these last two requirements since he was operating on the principle of naked self-interest. The emperor's neglect of duty therefore involves a disruption of peace and the common good by "fasiendo batallas" (380:2) for purposes which are entirely illicit, and as noted above in the case of the pope, actions which are obstacles to peace are sins against charity and justice.

Neglect of duty is one of the vices of the king. His sin of robbery has already been analyzed, but Death goes on to accuse him of tyranny and injustice in his dealings with his subjects, as well as of being a source of scandal:

Rey fuerte, tirano, . . .

.

De faser justiçia muy poco curastes,
Segunt es notorio por buestra comarca. (380:2)

Since all of these defects basically stem from a lack of charity and justice, the ensuing desengaño is centered upon these virtues. In the first place, to be a tyrant is to be without mercy or compassion, and Aquinas states that mercy results from charity.⁶¹ While the tyranny of the king stems from a lack of charity, it results in a lack of justice, as Death states: "De faser justiçia muy poco curastes. . . ." Death's last line indicates that the king is also accused of being a source of scandal, which Aquinas defines as ". . . something less rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall,"⁶² since his covetousness and general injustice were not private but rather public sins which constitute bad example for others. In addition, the king is more highly susceptible to giving scandal through unjust actions than other members of society (excepting perhaps the emperor) since legal justice ". . . directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good . . . and thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a master-craft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects."⁶³ Since the sovereign is the chief carrier of legal justice, it follows that his failings in this area will be more serious than those of other members of society, and will constitute a greater source of scandal. Again, the emphasis on charity is implicit because, as Aquinas says, ". . . scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity."⁶⁴

Neglect of duty is one of the vices of the archbishop also (in addition to folly, as seen above). He is guilty of injustice in his dealings with his fellow man, for he failed to govern his bishopric properly. This means that he failed to render to his parishioners their due and for this reason he is extremely afraid to die:

Mas sy yo bien rrijera mi arçobispado,
De ty non ouiera tan fuerte temor. . . . (381:1)

Death's reply to the archbishop adds nothing new to the latter's already complete exposition of his sins, but merely confirms his injustice and worldliness.

The bishop is Death's next victim from the clerical estates. In addition to his covetousness, analyzed above, he is accused by Death of abandoning his flock:


Syempre anduistes de gentes cargado,
En corte de rrey e fuera de ygrehia [sic]
(381:2)

The conditions under which a bishop may lawfully abandon his flock, according to Aquinas, are very limited indeed, and the bishop in the Dança general does not qualify.

Aquinas says that

. . . when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some personal advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.⁶⁵

It is lawful for the pastor to withdraw from his parishioners only if their salvation can be adequately provided for in his absence by another person. These extenuating



circumstances are not present in the case of the bishop, however, for Death specifically tells him that he will be judged for his sins, especially for failing to govern his subjects. This is a case of neglect of duty very similar to that of the archbishop and consequently the a priori desengaño involves the same emphasis on justice and charity.

It has already been established that the abbot is guilty of folly induced by gluttony. In addition to this Death accuses him of sloth, general immorality, and the violation of his profession:

Don abad benedicto, folgado, biçioso,
Que poco curastes de bestir çeliçio. . . . (382:1)

All of these are serious sins. To begin with sloth, Aquinas states that it denotes ". . . sorrow about spiritual good, . . ." ⁶⁶ or, in other words, a kind of moral inertia which resists the performance of good acts. This too is a mortal sin since ". . . any sin which by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, . . . and such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy in God . . . while sloth is sorrow about spiritual good inasmuch as it is a Divine good." ⁶⁷ Therefore, with regard to sloth the didactic purpose involves an emphasis on charity. Death further accuses the abbot of failing to wear a hair shirt, and this may be considered an act of sloth, since it is a resistance to perform an act of penance, which is a spiritual good. Regarding the use of penance in the religious state, Aquinas has this to say:

The religious state was instituted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By removal of the obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious state is a most fitting place for penance.⁶⁸

The abbot declined to perform these acts of penance which were especially suitable to his profession because he was utterly given over to hedonism. This indicates a contempt for the religious state and a violation of his profession because one who enters the religious state is morally bound to at least strive to attain perfect charity, even if he does not actually have it.⁶⁹ Therefore, a religious who refuses to strive for perfection violates his profession,⁷⁰ and this is a mortal sin⁷¹ and contrary to charity.

The archdeacon is one of the poem's few examples of a posteriori desengaño (the archbishop is another). He reveals a concept of the world as an active agent of illusion:

O mundo bil, malo, e fallasçedero,
 Como me engannaste con tu promisyon,
 Prometiste-me vida, de ty non la espero,
 Syempre mentiste en toda sason. (382:2)

Even though this involves the personification of the world for poetic purposes, the basic idea is supported by Aquinas, who explains that, even though the act of tempting is proper to the devil,

the flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man

someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.⁷²

The personification of the world as an active agent of illusion is continued by Death, who says:

Ca quien en el mundo sus amores meta,
El mesmo le fase venir a todo esto. (382:2)

The fact that the archdeacon knows that he has been deceived by the world indicates that the experience of death must have brought him to a state of a posteriori desengaño whereby, looking back over his life, he can see how wrong he was. This idea is also supported by his last line: "Agora lo siento que fasta aqui non" (382:2). Like the pope, the patriarch, and the archbishop, the archdeacon realizes the error of his ways and repents, although it may be too late, since Death tells him that his fate in the afterlife will depend on how well he performed his office, which is the care of souls. It is here that the emphasis on charity can be seen, for if the archdeacon's worldliness led him to be so solicitous about temporal matters that he came to neglect his duties, as Death implies, this would necessarily involve a sin against charity indirectly and against justice directly, for it would represent a failure to render to his parishioners their due.

The canon is an exponent of the philosophy of hedonism. His life is so totally rooted in false principles that, far from repenting, he does not even appear to

realize that he has no choice but to go with Death; he ends his speech by saying to Death: "Vaya quien quisiere a tu bocaçion" (382:2). The canon is living a life of ease and comfort. He received his canonry as a gift from a certain prelate and up until this very day it has provided him very well. When Death tells him to turn back to God and do penance, the emphasis on charity becomes clear, especially if it is remembered that charity is the theological virtue which does most to attain God. The canon has apparently done nothing to attain Him, and his sin seems to be that of sloth, for he is indisposed to give up his physical pleasures in order to perform any acts of spiritual value. As he says: "En folgura biuo non he turbaçion" (382:2). The canon's situation is therefore similar to that of the abbot since his sloth makes him resist the performance of acts of penance. This also involves an uncharitable neglect of duty since acts of penance are required by the religious state.

The priest's case is almost identical to that of the canon. His major sins are sloth, gluttony, drunkenness, and neglect of duty, for which he is criticized by Death and warned of his impending punishment: ". . . muchas animas touistes en gremio, / segunt las registes abredes el premio" (383:1). His neglect of duty stems from folly, or dullness of judgment, which in turn stems from the habit of plunging his senses into earthly things. This type of folly, resulting from worldliness rather than

from natural disposition, is definitely a sin and is opposed to the gift of wisdom, which corresponds to charity. His neglect of duty is also a serious sin against justice directly and charity indirectly.

It is not possible to know with certainty whether or not the monk is personally guilty of neglect of duty. Nevertheless, the a priori desengaño in this incident emphasizes the virtue of fulfilling one's obligations. The monk is the only person in the poem who is gladdened by Death's arrival and his attitude seems rather presumptuous. (His lack of even moderate fear in the face of death will be discussed subsequently.) Seen in this light Death's reply to the monk may be taken as a kind of rebuke or warning against presumption, for he reminds him that his salvation depends on whether or not he has adhered to the regulations and obligations contained in the rule of his monastic order:

Pero sy fesistes lo que faser veo
 A otros que andan fuera de la regla,
 Bida vos darán que sea mas negra. . . . (383:2)

It must be understood that Death is here referring to transgressions of a serious nature, for, as Aquinas indicates, every transgression of the obligations contained in the rule is not a mortal sin.⁷³ Any transgression of the vows of poverty, continence, and obedience, however, will involve mortal sin, as will those which imply contempt for the rule.⁷⁴ Such transgressions constitute unjust (and therefore uncharitable) neglect of duty.

The mendicant friar's neglect of duty consists in having broken the vow of poverty: "Maguer mendigante biuo biçioso" (383:2). As we have just seen, this is one of the ways in which the transgression of the rule may be a mortal sin, and all mortal sins are by definition contrary to charity. Thus the a priori desengaño in this incident involves an emphasis on that virtue, even though the friar himself does not experience a posteriori desengaño and come to a realization that he has been living in sin. (His other vices, vainglory and duplicity, will be analyzed subsequently.)

Sins against justice in the Dança general occasionally take the form of duplicity and fraud. Such is the case in one of the most humorous incidents in the poem, that of the lawyer. He knows he is dying when he discovers that he cannot speak, surely the worst thing that could happen to one who practices law. The object of the lawyer's solicitude is not really wealth, but rather his acquired knowledge:

Que fue ora mesquino de quanto aprendy,
De mi saber todo e mi libelar?
Quando estar pensé, entonçe cay
Çego-me la muerte, non puedo estudiar. (382:2)

Studiousness is considered by Aquinas to be a virtue that is part of temperance,⁷⁵ but it may also be a vice if the intention of the individual is to study something in order to use his knowledge to engage in sinful activity, in which case studiousness is more properly called "curiosity."⁷⁶

But the lawyer is in fact guilty of duplicity in his professional conduct, since he accepted fees from both sides. Death says to him:

Don falso abogado preualicador
Que de amas las partes leuastes salario. . . . (382:2)

This is such an extreme sin against justice that Aquinas does not even mention it in his treatment of unjust advocacy,⁷⁷ possibly because he assumed that the injustice of such an action would be self-evident to all concerned. He does say, however, that the extortion of an immoderate fee is a sin against justice,⁷⁸ so the extortion of an immoderate fee by means which are themselves sinful (i.e. lying and cheating) must be an even greater sin against justice and against charity as well, since such an action does not suggest the love of our neighbor that is appropriate to charity. The lawyer is therefore justifiably afraid of the afterlife. He says:

Resçelo he grande de yr al lugar
Do non me valdrá libelo nin fuero. . . . (382:2)

Although the lawyer himself does not appear to become desengañado in this incident, a priori desengaño is present in the form of a didactic purpose that condemns unjust advocacy as a sin against justice and charity.

The usurer's injustice also takes the form of duplicity and fraud. He is another example of a person who has lived a life based so totally on wrong principles that even the experience of death is insufficient to bring him to a state of desengaño; he does not repent, nor does he

appear to realize that his death is now inevitable. In fact he even seems to glory in his evilness, since he delights in contrasting himself with the venerable Bede: "Otras obras fago que non fiso Beda" (383:2). Death's dance is totally unattractive to him since he can double his money every year. In the Middle Ages all usury was considered sinful even though it was occasionally permitted by civil law.⁷⁹ More specifically pertinent to civil practice in medieval Spain is the opinion of Alfonso el Sabio, who does not regard usurious agreements to be legally binding. This is indicated by the following passage from Las siete partidas:

Veynte marauedis, o otra quantia cierta, dando un ome a otro, recebiendo promission del, quel de treynta marauedis, o quarenta por ellos: tal promission non vale, nin es tenuto de la cumplir, el que la faze, si non de los veynte marauedis, que rescibio: esto es, porque es manera de vsura. Mas si diesse vn ome a otro veynte marauedis: e rescibiesse promission del que le diesse diez e ocho marauedis, o quanto quiera menos, de aquellos, que recibiesse, tal promission, dezimos, que vale, porque non ha en ella engaño de ysura: pues que rescibe menos de lo que dio.⁸⁰

Aquinas explains why usury is sinful: "To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice."⁸¹ What Aquinas means when he says that to take usury for money lent is to sell something that does not exist is that there are certain types of goods, such as wine, the use of which inherently involves their consumption. In things like these the use

of the thing cannot be considered apart from the thing itself, so that to sell wine separately from the use of it would be to sell the same thing twice, or to sell what does not exist, and therefore to commit a sin of injustice. But since the proper and principal use of money is its consumption, it is therefore unjust to accept interest for money lent.⁸²

One of the friar's sins, vainglory, will be analyzed in greater detail below. It is useful to refer to it here, however, since it has a direct bearing on his sin of duplicity and fraud. Even though all vainglory is not a mortal sin,⁸³ in the friar's case it is, since his desire for glory has become his last end, toward which he directs all his acts, and this desire for glory is so great that to obtain it he will even do what is against God.⁸⁴ This is indicated by Death's condemnation:

Maestro famoso, sutil e capás,
Que en todas las artes fuerdes sabidor. . . . (383:2)

The word "arte" has a pejorative connotation here, just as it had in Death's reply to the farmer: "Sy vuestro trabajo fue syempre syn arte" (383:1). Thus "arte" connotes deception, which is really lying. Since the friar was a preacher, the suggestion is that his deception took place in his sermons, which means that he was lying about divine things, and Aquinas considers this a mortal sin since ". . . it is contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie. . . ." ⁸⁵

Since it was the friar's excessive desire for fame and glory that led him to commit this sin, it follows that his vainglory was also a mortal sin and therefore contrary to charity.

The sin of the king's doorkeeper seems to be one of fraud, which Aquinas defines as ". . . the execution of craftiness by deeds,"⁸⁶ and Death confirms this when he says "Las vuestras baratas yo bien las entiendo" (384:1). To accept a bribe for performing an unlawful act is clearly to commit an injustice, and in this case the situation is aggravated since it is an injustice committed against royalty, and the sin is therefore more serious.⁸⁷

We have already seen that the accountant's covetousness is a mortal sin since it led him to the commission of unjust and therefore uncharitable acts. His injustice is a type of fraud, for he unlawfully excused certain parties from the payment of their legitimate debts. Death says to him:

Contador amigo ssy bien bos catades
 Como por fauor e a veses por don
 Librastes las cuentas, razon es que ayades
 Dolor e quebranto por tal occasyon. (384:1)

3. Vainglory

One of the most frequently committed sins in all of the Dances of Death is that of vainglory. Some types of vainglory are only venial sins, whereas others are mortal sins by virtue of their being contrary to charity.⁸⁸

Aquinas explains the circumstances under which vainglory may be a mortal sin:

Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to Ezech. xxviii. 2, Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God, and I Cor. (iv) 7, What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why does thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it? Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jerem. (ix). 23, 24): Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.⁸⁹

The first victims Death calls (although they do not lead the dance) are two young maidens who came "de muy mala mente" (380:1) to hear Death's sad song. Possibly the poet began with the young maidens for the purpose of establishing the macabre tone of the poem, and surely the image of young, female flesh in a state of putrefaction would evoke such a tone. This macabre spirit is characteristic of many (though not all) Dances of Death and Johan Huizinga believes that "at the close of the Middle Ages the whole vision of death may be summed up in the word macabre, in its modern meaning."⁹⁰ The fragility of human life had already been alluded to by the poet in the second stanza, but now he decided to go a step further, for, as Huizinga explains:

. . . the wistfulness of remembrance and the thought of frailty in itself do not satisfy the need of expressing, with violence, the shudder caused by death. The medieval soul demands a more concrete embodiment of the perishable: that of the putrefying corpse.⁹¹

To express this image in as violent and shocking a manner as possible the anonymous poet avails himself of the two young maidens:

E por los palacios daré por medida
Sepulcros oscuros de dentro fedientes,
E por los manjares gusanos rroyentes
Que coman de dentro su carne podrida. (380:1)

Perhaps a bit of medieval misogyny can be glimpsed in this passage,⁹² for although the error of the two maidens is not stated explicitly, it is implied in the allusion to the characteristically feminine practice of using cosmetics, thus suggesting that their sin was that of vainglory, of attaching too much importance to physical beauty, to the detriment of their spiritual well-being:

Mas non les baldrán flores e rosas
Nin las conposturas que poner solian. . . . (380:1)

Thus their desengaño emphasizes the virtue of charity since vainglory is opposed to that virtue whenever the temporal good in which one glories is preferred to God, as Aquinas indicates. But the maidens' resistance to Death ("De mi sy pudiesen partir-se querrian" [380:1]) suggests that their preoccupation with physical beauty has in fact become their ultimate concern, to borrow Paul Tillich's famous phrase, and is preferred to God, who should properly be the primary object of their solicitude.

Vainglory is also one of the sins of the constable, a victim apparently used by the author to introduce additional humor into the poem. His vices and errors are not stated explicitly, but an examination shows that they consist of two things: inordinate fear of death and vainglory. The first is the less serious sin and will be discussed subsequently. Death implies that the constable was attempting to flee in order to preserve his physical "fermosura," (381:2) and this brings us to a consideration of his second and more serious sin: vainglory. Aquinas explains that glory may be vain in three ways, and it is basically the first of these which applies to the constable, since he takes pride in his physical beauty: ". . . when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable. . . ." ⁹³ Also, the two conditions outlined by Aquinas under which vainglory may be a mortal sin are both applicable to the constable, for he glories in something which is false by virtue of its being perishable, and this vainglory must of necessity be an obstacle between him and God. He also appears to prefer the false good of physical beauty to God since it is the sole motive for his attempting to flee from Death; he does not repent nor does he ask the Virgin or Christ for help. His vainglory is therefore a mortal sin contrary to charity and even though he himself does not experience a posteriori desengaño, the

didactic purpose (a priori desengaño) nevertheless involves an implicit emphasis on charity.

The mendicant friar is also guilty of the sin of vainglory:

Dañar non conviene a maestro famoso
Segunt que yo so en la religyon

· · · · ·
E muchos desean oyr mi sermon. (383:2)

The friar's vainglory is opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, since

. . . it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this something great. . . . And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity as well as to other virtues.⁹⁴

Even though all vainglory is not a mortal sin, in the friar's case it is, because his desire for glory became his last end, toward which he directed all his acts, and this desire for glory was so great that to obtain it he acted against God by resorting to the use of deception in his sermons, as we have seen.

4. Fear

Four characters in the Dança general have vices which are related to fear. This is a complex issue, since certain types of fear are appropriate and virtuous, while others are inappropriate and sinful. The individual characters must be judged on a case by case basis.

As the duke speaks his eight lines, it becomes apparent that he is afraid, and his fear has two aspects:

the loss of worldly pleasures and eternal punishment. He says to Death:

Sy non te detienes miedo he que luego
 Me prendas o me mates: abré de dexar
 Todos mis deleytes, ca non puedo estar
 Que mi alma escape de aquel duro fuego. (381:1)

This fear requires a brief commentary because in the duke's case the emphasis on charity can be seen through an analysis of the specific type of fear that he feels. Aquinas divides fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear.⁹⁵ The duke's fear can accurately be described as servile since it involves fear of punishment and the loss of the "deleytes" to which the punishment is contrary. Even though, as Aquinas explains, ". . . servile fear as such is contrary to charity,"⁹⁶ some types of servile fear are consistent with charity while others are not. From Aquinas' analysis it can be seen that the duke's case is an example of servile fear without charity, since the duke appears to love his "deleytes" above all else and therefore fears as the greatest evil the punishment contrary to those "deleytes." Aquinas explains the distinction between types of servile fear:

Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who has charity.⁹⁷

The duke's lines indicate that he is "one who is devoid of charity," since his primary concern is the possession

and enjoyment of his worldly goods. Thus his self-deceit stems from a lack of charity, and the corresponding desengaño which the author wishes to elicit in the readers involves an emphasis on that theological virtue.

Two victims, the constable and the deacon, are accused of inordinate fear of death; with the former it is a mortal sin, whereas with the latter it is merely venial. This fear of death deserves a short analysis, since it appears that it is natural and inevitable in man. Aquinas explains that fear is only sinful when it runs counter to the rule of reason,⁹⁸ and he goes on to state that

if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body; and evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, . . . one would not be wholly excused from sin.⁹⁹

Yet this inordinate fear pertains to the constable since Death implies that he was attempting to flee in order to preserve his physical "fermosura," (381:2) which is related to his more serious sin, vainglory. Since he prefers the good of his physical beauty to God, the proper object of charity, his fear of death is a mortal sin.

The deacon's fear of death is not so serious a sin as that of the constable, however. The deacon alludes to Death's function as a didactic agent when he says:

Non vy en Salamanca maestro nin doctor
 Que tal gesto tenga nin tal paresçer. (384:2)

Desengaño does not appear to play a vital role in this encounter, since the deacon's only fault was trying to avoid Death. Death says to him:

. . . bien sabedes que es mi doctrina
 Matar a todos por justa rrason,
 E vos esquiudades oyr mi bosina. (384:2)

The deacon's sin is therefore one of inordinate fear of death, which is a sin contrary to fortitude,¹⁰⁰ but there is no specific internal evidence in the poem to suggest whether this fear is a venial or mortal sin, for it could conceivably be either.¹⁰¹ As a result, it cannot be said that the a priori desengaño in this incident involves a specific emphasis on charity, since it is not known if the deacon's fear led him to do anything which is forbidden. The most that can be said is that the didactic purpose here involves an emphasis on the fact that death is inevitable and that people should make an effort to prepare themselves for it.

The monk, as we have already seen, was criticized by Death for being somewhat presumptuous, for, in contrast with the constable and the deacon, he apparently does not fear death enough. He is the only one in the poem who is gladdened by Death's arrival. He is aware that death is only a passage from this life to the next and, unlike the others, he feels that he has tried to live his life in such a way as to be prepared for that passage. In the


stanza allotted to him the monk makes use of the metaphor of the "dark prison": "De cárcel oscura vengo a claridad" (383:2). The world is like a dark prison in which the soul is trapped for a period of time. But if the soul achieves salvation in exchange for "poco trabajo," (383:2) it passes from darkness to "claridad," the light of clear day. The use of the word "claridad" seems to be a thinly disguised allusion to the beatific vision, which is commonly described with metaphors of light. For example, Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler say:

That final grace which disposes the mind to receive the formal causality of God's being, theologians call the lumen gloriae, the light of glory: that created grace which is absolutely necessary for the beatific vision and the seed of which is already present in man by grace, and can grow because created grace is capable of growth.¹⁰²

Thus the monk appears to be reasonably sure of salvation and consequently regards death as something good rather than evil. Aquinas might possibly have found this attitude unique, for in his view ". . . the most fearful of all bodily evils is death. . . ." ¹⁰³ The monk's attitude toward death, however, finds corroboration later on in another book written by a Spaniard, Alejo Venegas, called Agonía del tránsito de la muerte. In this book Venegas says:

. . . la muerte no se deve poner entre los males, porque la muerte de los que mueren en gracia no es otra cosa sino una salida de cárcel. . . .¹⁰⁴

While Aquinas would probably not contradict the basic sense of this idea, it seems equally true that he would not attach



so little importance to temporal life, the shortening of which by death ". . . is an evil and consequently an object of fear."¹⁰⁵ Also, there is an aspect under which even the just should fear death as something more than a temporal evil. Karl Rahner explains:

Man is, rightly, afraid of death. Actually, he should not die, for he still possesses within himself, if not the reality, then the due demand, at least, for that vitality of divine life, which if it could assert itself, pure and unveiled, in this earthly life would completely eliminate death. That man dies, and does not simply consummate his life, is a consequence of the sin which lies at the beginning of human history, and of all the sins through which every man makes his own the sin of his first parents. . . . Death as suffering and destruction coming from without, like a thief in the night (which it will always be) is, obviously, subject to the free disposing will of God. It will always, therefore, include the character of a divine judgement among its notes. . . . The most prominent characteristic of death is that in it sin is revealed.¹⁰⁶

Aquinas would be substantially in agreement with this judgment, for he states that man is not naturally corruptible, at least as regards the nature of his form if not of his matter.¹⁰⁷ He further states that through original sin original justice was forfeited, and ". . . the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment Consequently death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin."¹⁰⁸ It is in this light that Death's reply to the monk may be taken as a kind of warning against presumption, for he reminds him that his salvation is by no means assured. Presumption is contrary to charity to the extent that through it a man



neglects to perform those acts which are necessary to effect his salvation.

5. Unbelief

The rabbi is the only victim who is criticized for unbelief. His own comments do nothing to illustrate or clarify this point, and so it is to Death's accusation that we must turn in order to find out why the rabbi is condemned:

Don rrabí barbudo que syempre estudiastes
En el Talmud e en los sus doctores,
E de la berdad jamas non curastes,
Por lo qual abredes penas e dolores. (385:1)

The rabbi is criticized for having resisted the truth, which is the same as resisting God, since God is truth.¹⁰⁹ This element of resistance is contained in the idea of unbelief, which, as Aquinas indicates, ". . . includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin."¹¹⁰ In the next article Aquinas categorically states that unbelief is a mortal sin,¹¹¹ so we may conclude that unbelief is contrary to charity, since Aquinas also proves that all mortal sins are contrary to charity insofar as they turn man away from his final end.¹¹² In order to avoid confusion, however, it must be remembered that unbelief is not opposed to charity directly, but rather to faith. At this point it is necessary to make mention of the distinction that Aquinas makes between the order of generation and the order of perfection in his explanation of the relationship among the theological virtues. In the



order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity, just as matter precedes form, because the appetite cannot tend toward anything by hoping in it or by loving it unless the thing itself is intellectually apprehended beforehand, and it is through faith that the intellect apprehends God, who is the object of hope and charity. But in the order of perfection charity is the principal virtue since ". . . both faith and hope . . . receive from charity their full complement as virtues."¹¹³ Without charity, faith and hope are not even virtues at all, at least not in the proper sense of the word.¹¹⁴ Therefore, unbelief is contrary to faith directly, but its most serious consequence is not to make faith impossible but to make charity impossible, for charity is the theological virtue that does most to attain God. The a priori desengaño in this incident therefore involves an indirect emphasis on charity.

The episode with the hermit is the only instance in the poem in which the emphasis on charity does not occur through negative example. Although the monk and the hermit are usually grouped together in discussions of the Dança general as the only two virtuous people claimed by Death, there are important differences between them. The moral position of the hermit seems to be more praiseworthy than that of the monk, who, it will be recalled, may have been guilty of a certain overconfidence. In the section dealing with the monk, Karl Rahner was quoted to show that, from a Christian standpoint, even just men

should fear death. The hermit is an example of such a man.

He says to Death:

La muerte reçelo maguer que so biejo
 Sennor Jesuchristo a ty me encomiendo

 Pues yo te seruí la tu gloria atiendolo. (384:1)

There is none of the overconfidence here that was evident in the case of the monk. The sense of the word "atiendo" is "I hope for,"¹¹⁵ which means that, although he has faith in God and trusts in Him, he realizes that he is a sinner and that his salvation is not assured. The emphasis on charity is contained in the words "yo te seruí," for charity is the theological virtue which does most to attain God by loving both Him and our neighbor and by acting in such a way as to actualize that love. Death approves the attitude of the hermit in a manner that is not duplicated elsewhere in the poem:

Fases grand cordura llamar-te ha el Sennor
 Que con diligencia pugnastes servir. . . . (384:1)

All of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity therefore find their highest expression in the hermit, and charity is the principal of these by order of perfection.

After Death calls his last victim, there are two more stanzas in which he addresses the people he has not called and they respond. In these closing stanzas, just as in the opening ones, the moral purpose of the poem is succinctly summarized, as Lasso de la Vega has pointed out.¹¹⁶ Death reiterates that he will inevitably come to all people and that he will tolerate no excuses. In

addition, he states more explicitly than at the beginning that those who do good will be saved and that the others will be damned. The answer to Death's threat is provided by the response of those who have yet to die:

Pues que asy es que a morir abemos
De necesidad syn otro remedio,
Con pura conçiencia todos trabajemos
En servir a Dios syn otro comedio. (385:2)

Here we find the emphasis on charity restated in direct terms. Since charity is the virtue which ". . . directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good,"¹¹⁷ it follows that to serve God is nothing more than to act in a charitable manner.

The analysis of the Dança general de la Muerte, far and away the most important of Spanish medieval Dances of Death, shows how pervasive is the emphasis on charity. In fact, in every episode in this poem desengaño contains a demonstrable emphasis on charity, with only one exception, that of the deacon. But even here it is not a case of another virtue being emphasized in preference to charity, but rather of a certain ambiguity regarding the gravity of the deacon's sin, which is inordinate fear of death. This sin is directly opposed to fortitude and may be indirectly opposed to charity if it is serious enough to be considered a mortal sin. So even here we have an emphasis on charity in potency if not in act, to use Aquinas' terms. In the case of the rabbi we see the beginnings of the emphasis on faith and doctrine which will become more

widespread in the Renaissance and the Golden Age. Here too, though, an emphasis on charity is implied, which is why we must be careful to say not that succeeding historical periods emphasize faith and doctrine to the exclusion of charity, but rather in addition to it. This stress on charity in the Dança general is probably not due to a conscious effort on the part of the author to emphasize that virtue to the exclusion of others, but rather to the fact that in medieval theology charity is considered the central virtue in so far as it is the form of them all.¹¹⁸ We will see in Chapters II and III of this study how this emphasis on charity continues in the Dances of Death of the Renaissance and the Golden Age, but with the important addition of an ancillary emphasis on faith and doctrine.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I, Part 1

¹ José Maria Solá-Solé, "En torno a la Dança general de la Muerte," Hispanic Review 36 (1968): 303-327.

² Ibid., p. 305.

³ James M. Clark, The Dance of Death in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Glasgow: Jackson, Son, and Co., 1950), p. 42.

⁴ Pierre Le Gentil, La poésie lyrique espagnole et portugaise a la fin du moyen âge, 2 vols. (Rennes: Philon, 1949), 1: 387-8.

⁵ O. Ursprung, "Spanish-katalanische Liedkunst des 14. Jh.," Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft 4 (1921-22): 136-60.

⁶ Florence Whyte, The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931), esp. Part I.

⁷ Solá-Solé, "En torno," p. 313.

⁸ Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, Antología de poetas líricos castellanos desde la formación del idioma hasta nuestros días, 14 vols. (Madrid: Librería de la Viuda de Hernando y Compañía, 1892), 3:cxxxviii.

⁹ Solá-Solé, "En torno," p. 314.

¹⁰ Dança general de la Muerte, in Biblioteca de autores españoles: poetas castellanos anteriores al siglo XV, ed. by Tomás Antonio Sánchez (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1952), 57:379. (N.B. Since this study will contain many quotations from the Dança general, it seems useless to footnote each one, especially since citations are taken from the same edition. Subsequent references will therefore be identified in the text by the page and column number in parentheses immediately after the quotation (e.g. 379:1). In subsequent chapters the source itself will be identified wherever necessary by the shortened title form Dança general followed by page and column numbers.

¹¹Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.19, Art.4.

¹²Ibid., Art.6.

¹³Solá-Solé has noted that the figure of Death in the Dança general is an abstract personified entity throughout the poem. This is different from the Danse macabre of the cemetery of the Holy Innocents in Paris and other poems based on it in which it is not Death who speaks but rather a dead person. This is a fact which has been noted by other scholars, but the concept of Death as an idea evoked by dead bodies has been taken as proof of antiquity (e.g. W. Fehse, "Das Totentanzproblem," Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 42 (1910): 276, quoted by Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 50). Solá-Solé contradicts this judgement and declares that the exact reverse is true: "Esta personificación de la muerte, más que resultado de una abstracción ulterior, es decir, "un muerto" > "la muerte," la consideraríamos nosotros como una forma más primitiva y originaria" ("En torno," p. 325). At this point some explanation is also required regarding the gender of Death. The poem is ambiguous here, for Death is masculine at the beginning but changes gender in the episode with the abbot. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience and uniformity I have chosen to refer to Death as masculine throughout the first chapter of this study. In subsequent chapters Death will be referred to as feminine only when it is consistently feminine throughout a particular work (e.g. in Horozco's Coplas de la Muerte, del auctor).

¹⁴Gen. 3: 6-7.

¹⁵Florence Whyte notes that this concept of Death as the Fowler is a Biblical conception which adds to the personification (Dance of Death, p. 50).

¹⁶Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.46, Art.1.

¹⁷Ibid., Art. 2.

¹⁸Ibid., Q.45, Art.4, Reply Obj.3.

¹⁹Ibid., Q.55, Art.6.

²⁰Ibid., Q.117, Art.5.

²¹Ibid., Q.118, Art.3.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., Q.25, Art.1.

²⁴Ibid., Q.58, Art.1, Reply Obj.6.

²⁵Ibid., Q.118, Art.4.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Julio Cejador y Frauca, Vocabulario medieval castellano (Madrid: Librería y Casa Editorial Hernando, 1929), s.v. despender: ". . . de dispendere, erudito, ant. por gastar y malbaratar."

²⁹Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.118, Art.8.

³⁰Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.2, Art.5.

³¹Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.55, Art.6, Reply Obj.3.

³²Ibid., Q.118, Art.4.

³³Ibid., Q.131, Art.1.

³⁴Ibid., Q.185, Art.1.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., Q.23, Art.6.

³⁸Ibid., Q.46, Art.1.

³⁹The interpretation of these two lines is that of Haydée Bermejo Hurtado and Dinko Cvitanovic, eds., Danza general de la Muerte (Bahía Blanca: Universidad Nacional del Sur, 1966), p. 37.

⁴⁰Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.131, Art.1, Reply Obj.1.

⁴¹Ibid., Q.148, Art.2, Reply Obj.2.

⁴²Ibid., Q.150, Art.1.

⁴³Ibid., Q.19, Art.4.

⁴⁴Ibid., Art.6.

⁴⁵Ibid., Art.2.

⁴⁶Ibid., Q.153, Art.1, Reply Obj.1.

⁴⁷Ibid., Q.154, Art.2, Reply Obj.4.

⁴⁸Cejador, Vocabulario, s.v. "picaña": ". . .
picardía, de picaño, pícaro."

⁴⁹Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.15, Art.3.

⁵⁰Solá-Solé defines an alfaquí by quoting the following passage from the Primera Crónica general (ed. by Menéndez Pidal), II (1955), 580b: "Et metiose en casa de un alfaquí-que quiere dezir 'clerigo' -que era omne onrrado" in his article "El rabí y el alfaquí en la Dánça general de la Muerte," Romance Philology 18 (1964): 277, n.36.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 278.

⁵²Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.117, Art.5.

⁵³Ibid., Q.66, Art.6.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., Art.9.

⁵⁶Ibid., Q.118, Art.1.

⁵⁷Diccionario de la lengua española (pub. by the Real Academia Española), s.v. "bullicio."

⁵⁸Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.42, Art.1.

⁵⁹Ibid., Q.29, Art.3, Reply Obj.3.

⁶⁰Ibid., Q.40, Art.1.

⁶¹Ibid., Q.30, Art.3, Obj.3.

⁶²Ibid., Q.43, Art.1.

⁶³Ibid., Q.58, Art.6.

⁶⁴Ibid., Q.43, Art.3.

⁶⁵Ibid., Q.185, Art.5.

⁶⁶Ibid., Q.35, Art.1.

⁶⁷Ibid., Art.3.

⁶⁸Ibid., Q.186, Art.1, Reply Obj.4.

⁶⁹Ibid., Art.2.

⁷⁰Ibid., Reply Obj.1.

⁷¹Ibid., Q.186, Art.9.

⁷²Ibid., Pt. I, Q.114, Art.2.

⁷³Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.186, Art.9.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid., Q.166, Art.2.

⁷⁶Ibid., Q.167, Art.1.

⁷⁷Ibid., Q.71.

⁷⁸Ibid., Art.4.

⁷⁹Ibid., Q.78, Art.1, Reply Obj.3.

⁸⁰ Alfonso el Sabio, Las siete partidas, 4 vols.
(Madrid: Casa de Juan Hafrey, 1611), 3:69.

⁸¹ Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.78, Art.1.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., Q.132, Art.3.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., Q.110, Art.4.

⁸⁶Ibid., Q.55, Art.5.

⁸⁷Ibid., Part I-II, Q.73, Art.9.

⁸⁸Ibid., Part II-II, Q.132, Art.3.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰ Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages,
trans. F. Hopman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Co., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 144.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 140.

⁹² Actually, neither the importance nor the extension
of misogyny in medieval Spanish literature should be
exaggerated. For a good analysis of the feminist debate
see Jacob Ornstein, "La misoginia y el profeminismo en la
literature castellana," Revista de filología hispánica
(Argentina) 3 (1941): 219-232.

- ⁹³ Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.132, Art.1.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid., Art.2, Reply Obj.1.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid., Q.19, Art.2.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid., Art.4.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid., Q.125, Art.4.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid., Art.3.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, trans. Richard Strachan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 51.
- ¹⁰³ Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q. 123, Art.4.
- ¹⁰⁴ Quoted by Marcel Bataillon in Erasmus y España, trans. Antonio Alatorre (Mexico and Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1966), p. 567, n. 24.
- ¹⁰⁵ Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.125, Art.4, Reply Obj.2.
- ¹⁰⁶ Karl Rahner, On the Theology of Death, trans. Charles H. Henkey (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961), pp. 61-62.
- ¹⁰⁷ Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.85, Art.6.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Art.5.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., Pt. I, Q.16, Art.5.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.10, Art.3, Reply Obj.2.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid., Art.4.
- ¹¹² Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.72, Art.5.
- ¹¹³ Ibid., Q.62, Art.4.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid., Q.65, Art.4.

¹¹⁵Cejador, Vocabulario, s.v. "atender": ". . .
esperar, de attendere."

¹¹⁶Angel Lasso de la Vega y Argüelles, La danza de
la Muerte en la poesía castellana (Madrid: Casa Editorial
de Medina, 1878), p. 31.

¹¹⁷Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.58, Art.6.

¹¹⁸Ibid., Q.23, Art.8.

Part 2:

Coplas de la Muerte; Otras coplas ala Muerte;
Razonamiento que faze Johan de Mena con
la Muerte

These three poems are examples of the tradition of the Dance of Death as it continued in Spain during the fifteenth century.¹ They are all very brief and of noticeably less literary value than the Dança general de la Muerte, so none will require so extensive a commentary as that poem.

Coplas de la Muerte

Death arrives at the home of a rich gentleman and informs the doorkeeper that he is a messenger sent from God² and that he must take the master of the house with him. The first error in the poem is that of the doorkeeper who doesn't realize that Death's call is an imperative:

Señor tiene combidados
no vos puede responder
tales son los hospedados
no se puede mas hazer. . . . (lines 9-12)³

Death disillusiones the doorkeeper by reiterating his command more forcefully and also be explicitly identifying himself: ". . . yo soy la triste muerte" (line 19). Death

emphasizes his function as a didactic agent when in the same stanza he refers to the necessity for contrition and repentance:

. . . que ordene bien su alma
y que mas no se detenga
porque la trayga bien calma
de pecados quando venga. (lines 21-24)

This is an example of a priori desengaño (or didactic purpose) which emphasizes charity, for, as Aquinas says:

". . . the sorrow of contrition results from the love of charity."⁴

When the master is finally informed of Death's presence, he gives us an idea of his own sin, which is vainglory, a willingness to trust riches and high estate:

Quien es esse que me llama
vaya se en hora buena
hombre soy rico y de fama. . . . (lines 41-43)

This type of vainglory is contrary to charity, as Aquinas shows, because it involves glorying ". . . in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God. . . ."⁵ Since the master actually becomes undeceived in the course of the poem and realizes that his haughtiness was out of place and even sinful, this may be taken as an example of a priori and a posteriori desengaño which both emphasize the virtue of charity. It is evident that desengaño does not come to the master at once, however, for two stanzas later he tries to bribe Death, indicating that he still places too much value on temporal things. Death has to disillusion him emphatically on this point and in the

process he alludes to the essential justness of his dealings with men:

Sabed que soy mandadero
del rey mayor de justicia
e que no tomo dinero. . . . (lines 73-75)

This involves a further emphasis on charity, for justice, as was seen in Part 1, consists in rendering to each one his due and is completely dependent on charity. The master learns very slowly, however, for at this point he invites Death to dine with him and tries again to bribe him.

The master gradually realizes the gravity of his situation and decides to take Death's advice when he tells him to put his estate in order: ". . . delibrad vuestra hazienda" (line 109). Several stanzas follow which are not immediately relevant for a consideration of desengaño, until the master finally comes to say his prayer to God in order to prepare himself to die. The very first three lines of the prayer reveal that the master was not sufficiently charitable, for he says:

Que nunca por tu amor
padre fiz lo que pudiera
delo qual tengo temor
porque nunca lo cumpliera. . . . (lines 193-196)

The emphasis on charity is contained here in the words "por tu amor," since charity involves love of God.⁶ The master has not performed the acts that he could have performed out of charity, and for this he is rightly afraid. It should be made clear, however, that his fear is not servile fear, since the object of fear does not appear to

be punishment, but rather the fault itself, and this type of fear Aquinas calls "filial."⁷ Since filial fear is ". . . the first effect of wisdom,"⁸ which corresponds to charity, it is not opposed to charity as is servile fear. On the contrary, Aquinas clearly states that the ". . . beginning of filial fear [results] from a beginning of charity. . . ." ⁹ This is therefore didactic purpose based on positive rather than negative example, and is another case of a priori desengaño emphasizing charity. The master ends his prayer with a specific reference to his sin:

yo hize vna fea cosa
 en leuar a tantos bienes
 que jamas desde pequeno
 trabaje por mas subir
 que jamas tome engaño
 para poder bien viuir. (lines 219-224)

This covetousness is a mortal sin because it involves a love of riches that is so inordinate as to be preferred to charity and "bien viuir."¹⁰

The Coplas de la Muerte is a much shorter poem than the Dança general de la Muerte and is also much more limited in scope, since it concentrates on one victim instead of on thirty-three. The concept of desengaño in the work is accordingly more limited also, but from the above analysis it may be concluded that the "caída en la cuenta" involves an emphasis on charity that is proportionately as pervasive as it was in the Dança general de la Muerte.

Razonamiento que faze Johan de Mena con la
Muerte¹¹ and Otras coplas ala Muerte

Before beginning our analysis it is necessary to understand that we are not dealing here with two distinct works, but rather with one common poem which belongs more to tradition than to any given poet. The Tangiers Endechas (v. note 1) quoted by Miss Whyte begin with the same lines:

Muerte, que á todos convida,
Dime qué son tus manjares:
Son tristuras y pesares. . . .¹²

This lends credence to the idea that this poem, or at least fragments of it, was common literary property in the fifteenth century. The only difference between the Razonamiento and the Otras coplas are differences of language and extension. The linguistic differences are very slight, often involving no more than the substitution of a definite article for a possessive adjective, for example. The difference in extension is somewhat more notable since the Razonamiento contains seven stanzas and a four-line finida that are not found in the Otras coplas. Thus our analysis of the former poem will implicitly include an analysis of the latter, except when we are dealing with those stanzas that are omitted in the Otras coplas.

The first eight-line stanza of the Razonamiento reveals a rather more terrifying concept of death than that in the Coplas de la Muerte. The first two lines are spoken by the narrator and the last six are Death's reply:

-Muerte que a todos conbidas,
dime que son tus manjares.
-Son tristezas e pesares,
llantos, bozes doloridas;
en posadas mal guarnidas
entran sordos, ciegos, mudos,
donde oluidan los sesudos
fueros, leyes, e partidas. (lines 1-8)

Death indicates that he takes all types of men, regardless of their condition: "sabios, rudos, esforçados" (line 15). In the next stanza Death refers to himself as a thief, an idea which Death in the Dança general was careful to refute:

-Los que son tus conbidados,
Muerte, dime lo que fazen.
-So la tierra dura yazen
para sienpre sepultados,
desnudos todos, robados,
caydos son en pobreza;
no los vale la riqueza,
ni tesoros mal ganados. (lines 17-24)

This apparently different concept of death is really not different at all, but merely views death under another aspect. Aquinas speaks of the two ways in which death may be considered:

First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God.¹³

Karl Rahner was quoted in Part 1 as saying that death is like "a thief in the night," (note 106) and this, because he was considering death under its aspect of evil rather than of good. The Dances of Death vacillate between two poles, some viewing death as good, others viewing it as evil, but both concepts are orthodox. The last two lines

of the above-quoted stanza refer to the futility and vanity of earthly possessions, another common theme in all Dances of Death. The last line is especially interesting, however, because of the use of the adverb "mal," which may give us a clue to one aspect of the a priori desengaño in this poem. Basically, Death says that treasures acquired by evil means are of no use to men when they die. But he says in the preceding line that treasures of any kind are of no use, so the key to understanding the last line is "mal," for Death is implying here that there is no sin in acquiring money by legitimate means and in using it well. In fact, this is a virtue rather than a sin, as Aquinas shows in his treatise on liberality.¹⁴ There is therefore a sense in which a "tesoro bien ganado" would be of use to a man who was dying, not in terms of the money itself, but in terms of the virtuous act of having acquired it legitimately and of having used it well, for as Death says later on:

no les vale ni aprouecha
saluo solo el bien que obraron. . . . (line 35-36)

Thus we see essentially the same emphasis on buenas obras in this poem that we saw in the Dança general and consequently the same emphasis on charity, which is the basis for good works by being the form of all the virtues.¹⁵

A seven-stanza catalogue of famous historical figures who have been Death's victims (three stanzas of which are omitted in the Otras coplas ala Muerte) has little

to do with desengaño except insofar as it suggests that fame, honor, power, and wealth are no safeguards against Death's hold.¹⁶

The didactic emphasis already seen in the poem is reiterated in the penultimate stanza, which is omitted in the Otras coplas ala Muerte. The emphasis on good works is effected here in a manner which forces us to think ahead to Calerón's El gran teatro del mundo, in which the World says to the characters who have just died:

No te puedo quitar las buenas obras.
Estas solas del mundo se han sacado. (lines 1374-5)¹⁷

This can easily be compared with Juan de Mena's lines:

. . . todo ha de quedar
saluo el solo bien obrar,
Muerte, quando tu viniere. (lines 126-128)

The only things which can aid a man in the passage from life to death are the good (i.e. charitable) works he has done during his life. The point is repeated for the third time in the finida of the poem:

Quien oyere mi tractado
a obrar bien se conbida,
pues la Muerte non oluida
a ninguno, mal pecado. (lines 137-147)

Thus, even though the desengaño in this poem is limited to the a priori variety, it can nevertheless be seen to contain the same emphasis on charity observed in the preceding works.

These three poems indicate that the didactic purpose underlying the Dance of Death did not change noticeably in the intervening decades between their composition

and that of the Dança general de la Muerte. Both the a priori and the a posteriori desengaño highlight the necessity for the virtue of charity, manifesting itself in the decision to "obrar bien, que Dios es Dios," to borrow once more from Calderón's El gran teatro del mundo.¹⁸

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I, Part 2

¹Although the purpose of this study is not to examine the complex interrelationships that can be traced among the various Dances of Death, a brief comment is required in order to justify placing these works in the fifteenth century. In the case of Juan de Mena's dialogue with Death no argument is necessary since the author lived from 1411 to 1456. The Coplas de la Muerte and Otras coplas ala Muerte are, however, extremely rare poems which only exist in a single print contained in the National Library in Madrid dated approximately 1530. They were reprinted by Miss Florence Whyte in her valuable study The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931), pps. 163-171. Since Otras coplas ala Muerte is substantially nothing more than a truncated version of Juan de Mena's poem, it is clear that its origins go back at least as far as the fifteenth century. In the third chapter of the first part of her book Miss Whyte shows that the Coplas de la Muerte must also pertain to the fifteenth century because it is "substantially the same" as another poem, the so-called Tangiers Endechas, fragments of which can be traced to that century (Whyte, Dance of Death, pps. 59-60).

²This idea of Death as a messenger is much more strongly emphasized in these poems than it was in the Dança general, and this emphasis will be seen over and over again in subsequent Dances of Death.

³All references to this poem are taken from Florence Whyte's reprinting (V. note 1) and are identified in the text by line numbers.

⁴Aquinas Summa Suppl., Q.3, Art.2, Obj.2.

⁵Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.132, Art.3.

⁶Ibid., Q.23, Art.4.

⁷Ibid., Q.19, Art.2.

⁸Ibid., Art.7.

⁹Ibid., Art.8.

¹⁰Ibid., Q.118, Art.4.

¹¹All quotations from the Razonamiento . . . will be taken from the ed. of R. Foulché-Delbosc in Revue Hispanique 9 (1902): 252-254, and will be cited in the text by line numbers.

¹²Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 59.

¹³Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.164, Art.1, Reply Obj.5.

¹⁴Ibid., Q.117, Art.1.

¹⁵Ibid., Q.23, Art.8.

¹⁶One humorous aspect of this catalogue of names which was noticed by Post is contained in the following stanza in which Juan de Mena attributes to Dante something he never really said:

Mataste al fuerte Anteo
e a don Ector el troyano,
rey Artus, e Carlo Magno,
rey Daudid, e Tolomeo,
Apolo e a Teseo,
a Ercoles el gigante,
segun Ouidio e Dante,
otros muchos bien lo creo.

Post comments: that this illegitimate appeal to authority is a "common peccadillo of fifteenth century Spanish littérateurs" (Chandler Rathfon Post, Mediaeval Spanish Allegory Cambridge: [Harvard University Press, 1915], p. 241).

¹⁷Pedro Calderón de la Barca, El gran teatro del mundo, in Autos sacramentales, ed. Angel Valbuena Prat, 2 vols. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967), 1:117.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 85.

Part 3:

Coplas de la Muerte, del auctor; Coloquio de
la Muerte con todas edades y estados
of Sebastián de Horozco

The exact dates of these works¹ are uncertain, but they could probably have been written between the years 1548 and 1570. They are analyzed along with the medieval Dances of Death because their tone, style, and ideological content link them to the earlier period, even though they were actually written in the middle of the sixteenth century. Florence Whyte, noting this aspect of the works, says: ". . . Horozco is a child of the Mediaeval world."³ The resemblance of these works to the Dança general de la Muerte is pronounced, and their use of desengaño in particular is strikingly similar to that in earlier poem.

Although Coplas de la Muerte, del auctor is written in décimas rather than in verses of arte mayor, its resemblance in the opening lines to the Dança general is obvious:

Yo soy aquella temida
de grandes y de menores,
en el mundo introduzida
por el pecado y caída
de vros. progenitores.

Ninguno de mi se escapa
 por mas que quiera huir
 qu' al Emperador y al Papa
 con el que no tiene capa
 estatuido es morir. (lines 1-10)

Death here, as in the Dança general, is eminently aware of her power and even seems to take pride in her function as the executor of God's justice and in the fact that nobody can escape her. The macabre tone that was observed in several stanzas of the Dança general is also present here:

Reynos, imperios mundanos
 no me bastan resistir,
 todos vienen á mis manos,
 y en podrición y gusanos
 yo los hago convertir. (lines 11-15)

The equalizing power of Death and her indifference to the age or social condition of her victims, a common theme in the Dança general, is also emphasized in this poem: "á todos los hago yguales" (line 35).⁴ There is no a posteriori desengaño in these Coplas since Death does not actually summon any victims. The didactic purpose, or a priori desengaño, can be observed, however, in the fifth stanza, as Death explains that the effect she causes in her victims depends completely on their moral condition:

Yo venço á los poderosos
 y á los soberbios amanso,
 y domo á los muy bravosos,
 y atormento a los viciosos,
 y á los buenos doy descanso. (lines 41-45)

This indirect emphasis on the need for good works has also been observed in other Dances of Death. The charitable man (taking charity in its fullest sense as a theological virtue) is the only one who can face death with equanimity.

For the others it is always seen as an evil because they must leave their worldly goods behind, and also because they must give an accounting to God of their actions, good or bad. As Death says:

Executo la justicia
qu' está por Dios ordenada. . . . (lines 46-47)

Death ends her harangue in the next stanza, with the warning that all resistance is useless and that she can be neither begged nor bought.

At this point our attention is directed to the Coloquio by means of a note in the manuscript, indicating that although the works are separated by six pages, they were considered to be complementary.⁵ The Coloquio is written in eight-line stanzas of eight syllables each which appear to be formed by the juxtaposition of two redondillas. The form of the dialogue is only slightly different from that of the Dança general. In that poem it will be recalled that Death summoned his victim in the eighth line of the stanza in which he had replied to his previous victim. Then the new victim would have eight lines to himself, Death would reply to him in seven, and summon a new person to the dance. Here, on the other hand, Death uses an eight-line stanza to summon her victims and usually to accuse them to some vice. They then respond in the first six lines of the next stanza and she answers in the remaining two lines, so that in every other stanza there are two speakers, rather than just one. Miss

Whyte feels that this is a more dramatic form than that of the Dança general de la Muerte and regards it as an intermediary between the earlier poem and Juan de Pedraza's Farsa llamada Dança de la Muerte.⁶

The opening stanzas of the Coloquio repeat some of the ideas contained in the Coplas de la Muerte, del auctor, such as the inevitability of death, death as an equalizing agent, death as the result of original sin, and the emphasis on a macabre tone. In addition the second stanza contains a metaphor which brings to mind the Coplas of Jorge Manrique, from which Horozco possibly took the idea. All men are like ". . . arroyos caudales/ que van á dar en la mar" (lines 13-14). This is almost an exact repetition of Manrique's metaphor:

Nuestras vidas son los ríos
que van a dar en la mar,
que es el morir.⁷

The Coloquio is divided into two main sections, the Ages of Man and the Estates. The Dança general contained allusions to the Ages of Man, but here the idea is fully developed. The infant child is the first to be called, and in her first four lines Death reveals herself as a figure who is almost bloodthirsty, at least in comparison with the relative moderation of her counterpart in the Dança general:

Quiero agora prestamente
usando de mi poder
grande matança hacer
de toda suerte de gente. (lines 25-28)

Death goes on to reemphasize the fact that her origin is due to original sin when she tells the infant that he must die because of "la culpa original" (line 31) even though he has not "obrado mal" (line 30), which refers to actual sin. The mother replies to Death since the infant is incapable of speech, and offers herself in his place. This is misconception, however, for it is impossible to revoke the sentence once it is given, so Death tells her.

Death then calls the boy to her dance, "el mochacho en la edad de la puericia." In addressing him Death makes use of the symbolism of the arrow ("arrecoje esta saeta" [line 43]) and explains that she is calling the boy so that he will not think that he occupies a privileged position just because he is young. This would be an error since Death is indifferent to the various ages of man, just as she is indifferent to the various estates. The boy, like most of the characters who are called, appeals to Death to change the sentence and grant him longer life so that he may come to understand the world and its duplicity. This is an allusion to the concept of the world as a source of illusion, which was also seen in the Dança general in the case of the archdeacon.

Since the first two ages represented, infancy and childhood, are generally characterized by moral innocence, they do not provide examples of sins against charity (i.e. mortal sins) and the desengaño in these incidents therefore

cannot really be said to emphasize that virtue. This is not the case with the young man, however, who is Death's next victim. Death accuses him of being "engolfado en mocedades" and of thinking that he could avoid her:

piensas con tus liviandades
 escusarte de la muerte. (lines 59-60)

The young man reveals that he is very desirous of life, but his desire is not in accord with right reason since he desires it only to be able to enjoy his "mocedades" and "liviandades," and his desire is therefore a sin against prudence, for, as Aquinas says:

Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require consideration in the act of prudence. In this respect imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends.⁸

Since the a priori desengaño of this incident emphasizes the virtue of prudence, it therefore also indirectly emphasizes the virtue of charity, since prudence depends on charity, as Aquinas states.⁹

The next incident involves a more direct emphasis on charity. Death calls the mature man and says to him:

. . . ofendes con gran malicia
 á quien la vida te dá. . . . (lines 75-76)

The adverbial phrase "con gran malicia" leaves no doubt that the mature man's offenses against God are mortal sins rather than venial ones for it suggests that his offenses

are both serious and deliberate. These sins blinded the man and caused him to forget about Death and consequently about his last end, happiness,¹⁰ to which death should properly be a passage. The man says:

¡ciego de gran ceguedad
nunca de tí me he acordado! (lines 83-84)

Death does not reveal exactly what the sins are, but if they are mortal sins, they must by definition be sins against charity. Both the a priori and the a posteriori desengaño in this incident therefore emphasize that virtue.

The old man is Death's next victim, but he is not quite ready to go. Death seems to feel that the old man's thirst for life is unbecoming at his age, for she says to him:

Tú, que la barba y cabeza
tienes ya lleno de canas,
y los deseos y ganas
como el qu' á vivir empieza. . . . (lines 89-92)

It is perhaps imprudent for the old man to resist Death's call and wish for a longer life, but in this case imprudence does not appear to be a mortal sin since it does not involve the contempt for the Divine Law which would make it mortal rather than venial.¹¹ The desengaño of this incident therefore does not emphasize charity, since venial sins are not contrary to the love of God and one's neighbor, but only involve a certain inordinateness.¹²

The very old man ("el viejo en la decrepita edad") is Death's next victim, and his case is almost a duplicate

of that of the old man, who preceded him. Death accuses him of being inordinately fond of life:

Ya tienes calva la sierra
y aun has del mundo cariños. . . . (lines 109-110)

The very old man is not happy to die and feels that if only he had not been so sick during his lifetime he might be able to live a little longer now. Death is critical of his attitude:

Anda, ya, viejo cuytado,
cesen esas vanidades. (lines 119-120)

This is essentially the same type of imprudence that was seen in the case of the old man. There is nothing to suggest that it is a mortal sin, and in the absence of such evidence one must conclude that the sins of the old man and the very old man are venial in nature. Since every venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin,¹³ the imprudence of which we speak may be considered a sin against charity in potency, but not in act.

This ends Death's dialogue with the ages, and the rest of the poem is taken up by her colloquy with the various estates. The pope, Death's first victim among the estates, is a victim of pride. He is eminently aware of the importance of his position in the church:

¿Muerte cruel y espantosa,
no ves que soy mayoral
de la iglia. [sic] universal
que me dió Dios por esposa?
No seas tan rigurosa
con quien no tiene segundo. (lines 129-134)

Line 132 ("que me dió Dios por esposa?") indicates that the pope realizes that God is the efficient cause of his fame and power, but the overall haughty tone of his address suggests that he believes that he is the cause of his power and fame meritoriously, meaning that he believes that God gave him his earthly position because of his own merits, and this is one of the four species of pride, as Aquinas explains.¹⁴ Aquinas also goes on to indicate that pride is always contrary to charity since it is ". . . always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought."¹⁵ The a priori desengaño in this incident therefore involves an emphasis on charity, even though the pope is too self-deceived actually to experience a posteriori desengaño as a result of Death's coming.

Pride is also the sin of Death's next victim, the emperor. He says to Death:

O muerte: ¿ tan atrevida
 quien hay, ni en el mundo oviera
 que así claro se atreviera
 a quitarme á mí la vida? (lines 145-148)

Now it belongs to humility to have knowledge of one's own deficiencies,¹⁶ since ". . . humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem,"¹⁷ and true self-esteem is clearly impossible unless it includes a knowledge of one's limitations. The emperor, however, has no humility, for he considers himself much greater than he is, inasmuch as he judges himself beyond

Death's grasp, and this is what Aquinas calls the third species of pride.¹⁸ Since pride is always contrary to charity, the a priori desengaño in this incident implicitly emphasizes that virtue.

The king's mistake is that of having forgotten about death:

Estando yo descuydado
d' aquesta triste embaxada,
muerte fiera y desossada,
de repente me has turbado. (lines 161-164)

Again there is a certain ambiguity regarding the king's specific defects, but his disturbed reaction to Death's arrival may perhaps be taken as an indication that he has something on his conscience, for Death has just informed him that his reward or punishment in the afterlife will depend on the good or evil that he has done on earth.

The imminence of Divine judgement and the promise of reward or punishment also characterizes Death's summons to the cardinal:

qu' en el alto consistorio
paracerá muy notorio
vro. bien, ó vro. mal. (lines 174-176)

The cardinal reveals in his reply to Death that he is under a false impression. He feels that it is basically unjust for Death to take him, a young man, while she leaves older people untouched. Death does not take the trouble to justify herself, but merely reiterates her command in a more forceful manner:

Cumpla lo que te es mandado
que poco sirve increparme. (lines 183-184)

Death's call to the archbishop reveals the same emphasis on justice (and consequently on charity) that was seen so many times in the Dança general. The archbishop is informed that he will be rewarded or punished depending on how he has fulfilled his duty as a pastor:

Y si bien ó mal usais
vro. oficio pastoral,
dareis quenta al mayoral
del rebaño que guardais. (lines 189-192)

It is not absolutely certain that this archbishop is actually guilty of neglect of duty, but the a priori desengaño with an emphasis on justice and charity is present nonetheless, for it will be recalled that Aquinas defined justice as rendering to each one his due, which is itself a consequence of the love of our neighbor which is proper to charity. The archbishop's response may indicate, however, that he was remiss in fulfilling his obligations, for he seems to describe himself as living a life of undisturbed ease and comfort:

O muerte, quando pensaba
en mi iglia. [sic] descansar,
te plugo de me llamar
quando mas seguro estaba. (lines 193-196)

The word "seguro" here can almost be taken as a synonym for "engañado," since the safer a man feels he is from Death's clutches the more he suffers from an illusion, given Death's total indifference to both age and estate.

The duke is guilty of injustices committed against his vassal and servant for the sake of maintaining his estate:

Vos Duque y gran caballero
 que por mantener estado
 al vasallo y al criado
 habeis hecho desafuero. . . . (lines 201-204)

In his response to Death he reveals his essentially worldly, greedy outlook:

Muerte tan aborrecida,
 ¿ agora qu' habia heredado
 gran señorío y estado
 me quieres quitar la vida,
 y al que la tiene aburrida
 disimulas y lo dexas? (lines 209-214)

This is an example of that type of covetousness which seeks riches as an end to the exclusion of spiritual things and which consequently is a mortal sin. The duke has committed injustices against his vassal and servant, which means that he does not love his neighbor as he would if he were a charitable man. The spiritual value to which his covetousness is opposed, therefore, is charity, and this leads him to the commission of injustices. Both the injustice and the covetousness are mortal sins against charity, so the a priori desengaño involves a very strong emphasis on that virtue.

Death really feels that she is doing the squire a favor by taking him away from his life of suffering and poverty to the "descanso verdadero" (line 224). The squire, however, who is a kind of gracioso, wishes to decline Death's offer. The didactic purpose in this incident can be discerned through an examination of the squire's motive for declining the offer. He is not afraid of Death as such, but of the judgment of God which will inevitably follow:

Muerte, yo te perdonara
 esa honra que me dizes,
 é aunque mas me lo matizes
 se me hace cosa cara;
 porque yo en fin, me pasara
 con mi bien ó con mi mal. . . . (lines 225-230)

This suggests that the squire is suffering from a guilty conscience, and the didactic purpose seems therefore to emphasize the same idea that was seen at the beginning and end of the Dança general, namely that the most judicious response to the threat of death is that of doing penance and, especially, good works. Since good works are virtuous and charity is in Aquinas's words ". . . the mother and root of all the virtues, . . ." ¹⁹ it follows that the didactic purpose in this incident contains an emphasis on that virtue.

The canon appears to be guilty of being unlawfully solicitous about temporal matters, namely money. Death says to him:

Canónigo y dignidad
 muy atestado de renta,
 andad luego á dar la quenta
 al juez de la verdad. . . . (lines 233-236)

The canon confirms this in his reply by admitting that the only reason he regrets to die is that he does not want to abandon his income:

O muerte, quan lastimera
 me es aquesa tu embaxada,
 que ha de ser por mí dexada
 la renta que Dios me diera. (lines 241-244)

This is an example of that solicitude which seeks temporal things as an end and which causes men to be drawn away

from a concern for spiritual things. To the extent that solicitude about temporal things turns man away from God, it is contrary to charity, the theological virtue which does most to attain God. Characteristically, the canon tries to offer Death a monetary bribe, but Death, acting as a true didactic agent, explains the vanity and futility of such pretensions:

Déxate de esa razon
que no es cosa duradera. (lines 247-248)

Money is not a lasting value. It is a means to an end and men should use it according to their needs, without seeking it as their end.²⁰ To do so is contrary to charity, which seeks God as the final end of human life.

Of a total of fifteen estates the next three represent the legal profession: the lawyer (letrado), the court clerk (escribano) and the attorney (procurador). Miss Whyte considers this ". . . a disproportion due to the desire of Horozco to subdivide the grades of his own estate."²¹ The lawyer is the first victim, and he is accused by Death of injustice in the exercise of his profession through fraud. Death says to him: "harto aveis ya trampeado" (line 253). Now fraud is the execution of craftiness by deeds,²² and since craftiness is a sin which is directly contrary to prudence,²³ fraud is also. In addition, fraud is indirectly contrary to justice and charity in the sense that it consists of plotting against others.²⁴ Fraud may also be seen to be contrary to charity in another way, for, as Aquinas says,

the execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.²⁵

It would seem that the fraud of the lawyer does in fact pertain to covetousness, for Death says to him:

veremos con que conciencia
aveis hazienda allegado. (lines 255-256)

Covetousness, it will be recalled, is a mortal sin against charity when it denotes not only an inordinate love of riches but also a willingness to act contrary to God for the sake of obtaining them. But since fraud is defined as the execution of craftiness by deeds, it is clear that in this case the covetousness of the lawyer has in fact reached the point of being a mortal sin against charity. There is therefore a definite emphasis on charity in the a priori desengaño of this incident, even though the lawyer does not actually experience a posteriori desengaño and repent of his sins.

The court clerk fares even more poorly than the lawyer, for he is guilty of theft and pride. In addition to these vices, he was also laboring under the illusion that he would never die, and in this respect Death brings him to a state of a posteriori desengaño. Death's summons is worth quoting in full, for she strongly condemns the court clerk for all his vices:

Vos, notario y escribano,
que pensais nunca morir,
y para rapar y asir
teneis muy suelta la mano,

de parte del soberano
 os notifico que vais,
 porque parece qu' estais
 muy triunfante y ufano. (lines 265-272)

The emphasis on charity is very pervasive here since all of the clerk's sins are contrary to that virtue. Theft is opposed to charity since it is ". . . a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings. . . ." ²⁶ Pride, as was shown in the case of the pope, is always contrary to the love of God (and therefore to charity) since it involves a refusal to subject oneself to God. Thus the emphasis on charity in the a priori desengaño of this incident can be seen to be very strong. ²⁷

The attorney is also very severely criticized by Death for his immoral actions. Basically his vices seem to be two: charging an unjust wage and exploiting the lawyer. Death says to him:

Vos, señor procurador,
 que procurais lo primero
 apañar mas de dinero
 qu'el negocio ha de valor,
 y os aplicais el sudor
 y el trabajo del letrado. . . . (lines 281-286)

The first sin, that of charging an excessive fee, is a sin against justice, as Aquinas shows in his treatment of unjust advocacy. Since an advocate is not always obliged to plead a case, he may take a fee for doing so without sinning against justice. This also applies to physicians and other persons in similar situations,

provided, however, they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against justice.²⁶

Therefore, the attorney clearly sins against charity by charging an immoderate fee, since every injustice is contrary to charity. His second sin is contrary to charity also, since it is connected with the first. In addition to charging an excessive fee, the attorney does not even do the work himself, but rather chooses to exploit the lawyer. Is this consistent with the love of our neighbor that is proper to charity? It is not, because exploitation of others for the purpose of furthering one's own self-interest involves a failure to render to each one his due. But the service of God includes the obligation to do this,²⁷ so that unjust actions are not only contrary to the love and service we owe our neighbor but also to the love and service we owe God. In this way it can be seen that the a priori desengaño in this incident involves a heavy emphasis on the virtue of charity.

The farmer is the next victim, and, compared to the incident with his counterpart in the Dança general, the emphasis on desengaño here is weak. The farmer does not appear to be guilty of any serious vice, nor does he represent any particular virtue which is praised by Death. The didactic purpose seems to be confined to suggesting that men should not be overly solicitous about the future

(an idea confirmed by Aquinas³⁰) since Death can destroy the best laid plans of all men. Accordingly it is more appropriate to be solicitous about our spiritual well-being. In this case the farmer was looking forward to a good harvest so that he could pay his debts. There is nothing in the text to indicate that he has definitely acted contrary to charity in any way, so the desengaño in this incident cannot really be said to stress that virtue.

This is also true in the incident with the soldier, Death's next victim. There is a certain irony here, for the soldier explains that he has escaped unharmed from all kinds of battles, and that now Death has taken him in an unguarded moment. His reply to Death reveals that his vice is boasting. He says to Death:

siendo yo el mejor soldado
de quantos sirven al Rey. . . . (lines 325-326)

Aquinas states that boasting arises from vainglory and that, like vainglory, it can be either a mortal or a venial sin, depending on the circumstances.³¹ Since there is no evidence in this passage to suggest that the soldier's boasting is contrary to love of God or neighbor, the a priori desengaño of this incident cannot be said to stress the virtue of charity.

The official has lived a life of hard labor and suffering and might therefore be expected to welcome death as a release from his labors. Such is not the case, however, for he says to Death:

. . . desta vida pagado
si me dexases seria. (lines 341-342)

Death mildly criticizes him for this attitude:

Serie muy vana porfía
pensar de ser relevado. (lines 343-344)

This is the same sin of imprudence that was noted earlier in the old man. Since there is no evidence of contempt for the Divine Law (in either incident), this imprudence must be assumed to be a venial rather than a mortal sin.

Death's last victim, the happy friar, is the only one who is perfectly content to receive her summons. Although in this case the didactic purpose functions through the use of positive rather than negative examples, it is essentially the same as the a priori desengaño in the incident with the abbot in the Danza general. It will be recalled that, among other things, the abbot was condemned for violating his profession by failing to perform those acts of penance which are especially suitable to the religious profession since they remove the obstacles to perfect charity toward which all religious are obliged to strive. The happy friar in Horozco's work, on the other hand, is praised by Death precisely for doing those things which the abbot failed to do. Death says to him:

Vos, religioso, que estais
contento en la religion,
y en ayunos y oración
toda la vida gastais. . . . (lines 345-348)

Prayer and fasting are examples of the type of exercises which Aquinas says are uniquely suitable for removing the

obstacles to perfect charity.³² Since Death praises the friar for performing these acts of penance, we can therefore conclude that a priori desengaño here stresses the virtue of charity, even though the friar himself was not engañado.

We are forced to conclude that although the didactic emphasis on charity is very strong in Horozco's works, it is not quite so pervasive as it is in the Dança general. This is not because some other virtue takes precedence over charity in Horozco's conception, however. It is merely because there are more examples in the Coloquio of the type of ambiguity which was seen in the Dança general in the case of the deacon, whose sin could have been either mortal or venial. Examples of this ambiguity in the Coloquio are the old man and the very old man, the king, the cardinal, the farmer, the soldier, and the official. Also there was no emphasis on charity in the incidents involving the infant and the boy, both of whom are at the age of moral innocence and are incapable of sin of any kind. The remaining incidents do involve an emphasis on charity, however, making it the only virtue stressed in the desengaño of this work. This is the last work to be examined in which the virtue of charity holds a position of unchallenged importance in the author's didactic purpose. Beginning with Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria the theological virtue of faith will be emphasized along with a continuing emphasis on charity,

with a concomitant emphasis on correct doctrine. This emphasis on faith does not contradict the emphasis on charity, but merely complements it.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I, Part 3

¹Sebastián de Horozco, Coplas de la Muerte, del auctor and Coloquio de la Muerte con todas las edades y estados, in Cancionero de Sebastián de Horozco, poeta toledano del siglo XVI, ed. by A. M. Gamero (Sevilla: Imprenta de D. Rafael Tarascó y Lassa, Sierpes 73, 1874), pp. 176-177 [Coplas]; 187-194 [Coloquio]. All quotes in the text will be identified by the use of line numbers.

²Florence Whyte, The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931), p. 80.

³Ibid., p. 92.

⁴Juan Ruiz uses the same idea in stanza 1521 of the Libro de buen amor:

Muerte, al que tú fieres, liévaslo de belmez;
al bueno e al malo, al noble e al rehez:
a todos los egualas e lievas por un prez;
por papas e por reis non das una vil nuez. . . .

Juan Ruiz, Libro de buen amor, ed. Joan Corominas (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1967), p. 569.

⁵The note reads: "Véase a seis hojas mas abaxo un coloquio de la muerte" (Cancionero, p. 176).

⁶Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 91.

⁷Joaquín de Entrambasaguas, ed., Los Manriques: poetas del siglo XV (Zaragoza: Editorial Ebro, 1966), p. 106.

⁸Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.53, Art.1.

⁹Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.65, Art.2, Reply Obj.3.

¹⁰Ibid., Q.1, Art.8.

¹¹Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.53, Art.1.

- ¹²Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.88, Art.2.
- ¹³Ibid., Art.3.
- ¹⁴Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.162, Art.4.
- ¹⁵Ibid., Art.5.
- ¹⁶Ibid., Q.161, Art.2.
- ¹⁷Ibid., Q.162, Art.3, Reply Obj.2.
- ¹⁸Ibid., Art.4.
- ¹⁹Ibid., Q.23, Art.8.
- ²⁰Ibid., Q.55, Art.6, Reply Obj.1.
- ²¹Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 84.
- ²²Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.55, Art.5.
- ²³Ibid., Art.3.
- ²⁴Ibid., Art.5, Reply Obj.3.
- ²⁵Ibid., Reply Obj.2.
- ²⁶Ibid., Q.66, Art.6.
- ²⁷The escribano is also an object of satire in the Sueños of Quevedo, as will be seen later.
- ²⁸Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.71, Art.4.
- ²⁹Ibid., Q.58, Art.1, Reply Obj.6.
- ³⁰Ibid., Q.55, Art.7.
- ³¹Ibid., Q.112, Art.2.
- ³²Ibid., Q.186, Art.1, Reply Obj.4.

CHAPTER II

DESENGAÑO BASED ON CHARITY AND CORRECT DOCTRINE WITH NO REFERENCE TO HETERODOXY

Part 1

Auto da barca da Gloria of Gil Vicente

With the closing of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance a basic shift in the ideological and psychological make-up of society begins to take place. William Barrett, in his study on existentialism, states that "the central fact of modern history in the West--by which we mean the long period from the end of the Middle Ages to the present--is unquestionably the decline of religion."¹ While this generalization has a ring of truth about it, it is nonetheless very broad and cannot be applied to all European countries without certain qualifications. Yet, there is some truth to the theory that in the first half of the sixteenth century in Spain there was felt to be a decline in devotional purity if not in the externals of religious celebrations. At least two outstanding hispanists, first Marcel Bataillon² and later

Bruce Wardropper,³ have attributed the origin of the auto sacramental to the need for internal reform in the Catholic church prior to the Protestant schism. Marcel Bataillon discusses in some detail the views of Martín de Azpilcueta, and outstanding canon lawyer of the period, who especially complained of the lack of religious fervor and sincerity in the Corpus Christi processions.⁴ In a key passage in his article Bataillon states that

el nacimiento de un teatro eucarístico destinado al Corpus nos parece que es no un hecho de Contrarreforma, sino un hecho de Reforma católica. Como que ese nacimiento pone de manifiesto la voluntad de depuración y cultura religiosa que animaba entonces a la capa selecta del clero, particularmente en España: voluntad de dar a los fieles una instrucción religiosa que los hiciese llegar más allá de la fe del carbonero, que les hiciese sentir, si no comprender, los misterios fundamentales de su religión. En resumen, las representaciones del Corpus comienzan a extraer y subrayar la lección religiosa de esta fiesta por la misma razón que comienzan entonces a propagarse las doctrinas, o sea catecismos que apelaban a algo más que a la memoria.⁵

This passage stresses the doctrinal nature and intent of the auto sacramental, a genre to which the Spanish Dance of Death is very closely related from the close of the Middle Ages onward, since almost all the subsequent Dances of Death are in the form of short theatrical pieces such as autos and farsas. An examination of these Dances of Death does in fact reveal an emphasis on faith and doctrine far beyond that which can be observed in the medieval Dances of Death and it is this emphasis which defines the

didactic purpose of the Spanish Dance of Death from the beginning of the Renaissance through the close of the Baroque period.

The way in which this new doctrinal emphasis works can be observed in Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria,⁶ first presented during Holy Week in 1519 before the King and Queen, Manuel and Leonor.⁷ Jack Horace Parker calls this work a Morality play, defining the genre as ". . . the allegorical representation of the conflict between good and evil, . . ."⁸ although the use of allegory in this play is not extensive, since the only personified character is Death. The others are either human beings or supernatural beings such as devils and angels, all of whom are presumed to have a real existence, unlike allegorical figures who personify pure abstractions such as Envy, Meekness, and Pride.

It is only in the third play of the trilogy of the ships that Death actually appears, dialoguing with her victims in the tradition of the medieval Dança general de la Muerte. This aspect of the play prompted Parker to refer to it as "Gil Vicente's own 'Dance of Death'."⁹ Of course there are certain features which distinguish this play from its medieval predecessor. Vicente's play does not present a wide range of estates, as did the Dança general, but rather concentrates exclusively on "los grandes de alto estado" (276). This is because the Devil criticizes Death for her willingness to claim the poor and let the rich

and powerful go free. The entire play is partly an attempt by Death to vindicate herself and she says to the Devil:

Verás como no me escapa
Desde el Conde hasta el Papa. (276)

Another factor which distinguishes this play from the Dança general is that the victims speak not only with Death, but also, and even to a greater extent, with the Devil. The usual procedure is for Death to bring the victim into the presence of the Devil and perhaps accuse him of some sin, and then leave in order to "hacer otra ceara" (293). From that point on the dialogue is sustained mainly by the Devil and Death's victim. These are both accidental rather than substantial changes, however, and they do not prohibit us from classifying the Auto da barca da Gloria generically as a Dance of Death. The central issue here is not the generic identity of the work, but the nature of the desengaño which characterizes it.

Even a superficial reading of the play reveals an emphasis on charity that is very similar to that observed in the Dança general (although the list of vices is not nearly so long, since Vicente's play contains only eight victims). However, while it is true that all the characters (with the possible exception of the bishop) sin against charity in some way, it is equally true that they are all firm believers in the saving powers of Christ and the Virgin and that they all repent of their sins. The

importance of the Virgin's intercession is indicated early in the play by the following lines spoken by the angel just before the first victim (the count) is brought forward:

O Virgen nuestra Señora,
Sed vos su socorredora
En la hora de la muerte. (276)

Let us first consider the evidence against the eight victims, namely, their sins against charity, and then look at the virtues which ultimately save them.

The count is accused by Death of pride:

Señor Conde prosperado,
Sobre todos mas ufano. . . . (276)

This, as we have already seen (Chapter I, Part 3), is a mortal sin since it is a refusal to subject oneself to God. Not to be subject to God is by nature a mortal sin because it involves turning away from God, so that "consequently, pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin."¹⁰ Related to the count's pride is the fact that he did not fear God: "Sin haber miedo de Dios" (278). Since fear is the beginning of wisdom,¹¹ and wisdom presupposes charity,¹² it may be concluded that the count's lack of fear implies a lack of charity also. The count is further accused of three more sins, all of which are very serious: sloth, lust, and illiberality:

Vos, Señor Conde agorero,
Fuistes á Dios perezoso,
Á lo vano muy ligero,
Á las hembras placentero,
Á los pobres riguroso. (279-80)

Sloth is a mortal sin by being contrary to charity, since ". . . the proper effect of charity is joy in God . . . while sloth is sorrow about spiritual good inasmuch as it is a Divine good."¹³ Lust is also contrary to charity since it is a capital vice¹⁴ giving rise to many other sins, which Aquinas calls the "daughters of lust," and these are: blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world.¹⁵ Since these sins all have the effect of turning man away from his last end, they are contrary to charity, which seeks to attain God. The count's refusal to aid the poor can be properly described as insensibility to mercy, which Aquinas lists as one of the daughters of covetousness.¹⁶ Covetousness is a vice opposed to liberality¹⁷ and liberality is a part of justice.¹⁸ Since "whoever acts against the due order of justice sins mortally,"¹⁹ it may be concluded that the count's insensibility to mercy is a sin opposed to charity.

The duke's sin is very vague, but three lines addressed to him by the Devil may provide a clue:

O mi Duque y mi castillo,
 Mi alma desesperada,
 Siempre fuisteis amarillo. . . . (280)

The difficult word to interpret here is "amarillo." However, in view of the overt reference to despair in the preceding line, the best solution might be to look upon the word as the diminutive form of amaro, an old form of

amargo used only in poetry during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.²⁰ (This usage is not foreign to Vicente, for it also occurs in a line spoken by the emperor, quoted below.) The sin of despair is directly contrary to hope and implicitly contrary to charity since by it men are ". . . drawn away from good works."²¹

The king is aware that he does not deserve salvation:

Pues vida desaparece,
Y la muerte es de tristura,
¿Adonde estás, gloria segura?
¿Cual dichoso te merece? (283)

His most serious vice is that of waging unjust war:

"Fulminando injusta guerra" (385), as the Devil says.

This makes his situation similar to that of the emperor in the Danza general. The waging of unjust war is indirectly contrary to the cardinal virtue of justice (which removes the obstacles to peace), but it is directly contrary to the theological virtue of charity, since charity by its very nature causes peace.²⁰

The emperor is very bitter at Death's arrival and he suggests that he was deceived by life:

¡Cuan estranos
Males das, vida de engaños,
Corta, ciega, triste, amara! (287)

He also alludes to an idea that occurs frequently in the Spanish Dances of Death, namely, that the only things a person can take with him beyond the grave are his good (or in this case evil) works:

Mi triunfo allá te queda,
 Mis culpas trayo conmigo. . . . (287)

This is both a reminder of Juan de Mena's lines from his Razonamiento and an anticipation of Calerón's lines from El gran teatro del mundo.

The emperor's first sin is pride, for Death says that he was "Quasi tenido por dios" (286). Since pride is always contrary to the love of God,²³ it is therefore contrary to charity and always a mortal sin. Secondly, he is accused of the related but less serious sin of vainglory. Death says to him: ". . . vana gloria os mató" (286). On the basis of the evidence in the poem it is difficult to conclude whether the emperor's vainglory is a mortal or venial sin, since it could conceivably be either. If we take the verb matar as referring to spiritual rather than physical death, however, we may conclude that vainglory in this case is a mortal sin, since a venial sin ". . . deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment."²⁴ The emperor is also accused of the related sins of cruelty and tyranny. The Devil says to him: ". . . usastes crueldad/ Y infinito desvarío" (287). The accusation of tyranny comes when the Devil informs him that he will occupy the same place as those other members of high estates who ". . . consintieron/ Cuanto quisieron tiranos" (288). Both these sins are contrary to charity since to be cruel and to be a tyrant is to be without mercy or compassion, and Aquinas states that mercy results from charity.²⁵

The bishop's opening statement adds to the macabre element in the play:

Muy crueles voces dan
 Los gusanos cuantos son,
 Adó mis carnes estan,
 Sobre cuales comeran
 Primero mi corazon. (290)

The bishop is the only victim who is saved prior to the ending of the play, for although his sin is serious, there are extenuating circumstances. His vice appears to be that of presumption ("fantasía")²⁶ and arrogance, for the Devil says to him:

Entre vuesa Señoría,
 Que este batel infernal
 Ganaste por fantasía,
 Halcones de altanería,
 Y cosas deste metal. (291)

Presumption, ". . . inasmuch . . . as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity. . . ." ²⁷

Arrogance is also contrary to charity since it is a kind of pride,²⁸ and, as we have seen, pride is contrary to charity by its very genus. Nevertheless, the bishop has some good qualities in addition to his vices. The Devil says to him:

Obispo honrado,
 Porque fuiste desposado
 Siempre desde juventud,
 De vuestros hijos amado,
 Santo bienaventurado,
 Tal sea vuestra salud. (291)

As a result of these qualities he is saved. The Devil says to him:

Obispo, paréceme á mí
 Que habeis de volver aqui
 Á esta santa embarcacion. (292)

Even though the bishop is saved, however, this incident involves a priori desengaño based on charity, since his vices were both contrary to that virtue.

The arrival of Death induces a cynical mood in the archbishop:

La vida nos cuesta cara,
El nacer no es provecho. (293)

He becomes undeceived by Death's arrival and realizes that all human effort directed toward the acquisition of wealth and power is useless and doomed to failure:

Qué aprovecha en el vivir
Trabajar por descansar?
Qué se monta en presumir?
De qué sirve en el morir
Candela para cegar?
Ni placer
En el mundo por vencer
Estado de alta suerte,
Pues presto deja de ser?
Nos morimos por lo haber,
Y es todo de la muerte. (293)

At this point the Devil provides some insight into the archbishop's vices. He was very worldly and ambitious, for the Devil says to him:

Moristes muy desatado,
Y en vida ahogado
Con deseos de papar. (294)

The words "en vida ahogado" suggest that the archbishop's desire for the honor of the papal state is not legitimate but rather inordinate, motivated perhaps by a longing for the incidental goods that go with it, such as ". . . reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of temporalities.

. . ."29 This attitude is essentially self-seeking and

therefore represents a sin against charity, for, as Aquinas says, "charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him."³⁰ In addition to desiring a higher office, the archbishop did not even properly fulfill the duties that he had. The Devil's accusation is specific:

Vos caistes con la carga
De la iglesia divina.
Los menguados,
Pobres y desamparados,
Cuyos dineros lograsteis,
Deseosos, hambreados,
Y los dineros cerrados,
En abierto los dejasteis. (294)

Here we see the sins of covetousness, insensibility to mercy (one of the daughters of covetousness), and neglect of duty. The latter is a sin against justice (and therefore against charity also) since it involves a failure "to render to each one his right." Covetousness may be contrary to charity if, through love of riches, a man is not afraid to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor. The archbishop is such a man, as evidenced by his indifference to the sufferings of the poor. He even admits his own guilt: "Eso y mas puedes decir" (294).

The cardinal appears to have been struck down by God as a direct punishment for the sin of ingratitude, for the Devil says to him:

. . . moristeis
Llorando porque no fuisteis
Siquiera dos dias papa,
Y á Dios no agradecisteis,
Viendo cuan bajo os visteis,
Y en despues os dió tal capa. (297)

Aquinas explains that "the debt of gratitude flows from charity,"³¹ but that the sin of ingratitude may be either venial or mortal.³² The sin appears to be mortal in this case, for the cardinal clearly desired the honor of the papacy for himself, without referring the honor to God. This is one of the ways in which the desire for honor may be sinful,³³ and it is contrary to charity, since "charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him."³⁴ The cardinal experiences a posteriori desengaño as a result of Death's arrival (as do all the characters in the play) and, immediately after the Devil's accusation, he goes on to enunciate the main theme of the play,³⁵ following the Book of Job very closely:

Todo hombre que es nacido
 De muger, tien breve vida;
 Que cuasi flos es salido,
 Y luego presto abatido,
 Y su alma perseguida.
 Y no pensamos,
 Cuando la vida gozamos,
 Como della nos partimos;
 Y como sombra pasamos,
 Y en dolores acabamos,
 Porque en dolores nacimos. (297-8)

The pope is Death's last victim, and in him virtue reaches its nadir. Death reveals that the pope was living in a state of extreme illusion, or folly, since he thought that he would never die:

Vos, Padre sancto, ¿pensasteis
 Ser immortal? Tal os visteis,
 Nunca me considerasteis,
 Tanto en vos os enlevasteis,
 Que nunca me conocisteis. (299)

The fourth line suggests that the pope's folly was not due to natural disposition, as in the case of idiots, but rather to self-inducement, and this kind of folly is a sin.³⁶ This involves an emphasis on charity, since folly is contrary to wisdom³⁷ and wisdom presupposes charity.³⁸ Pride, which is always contrary to charity, is in evidence when the pope says to the Devil:

¿Sabes tú que soy sagrado
Vicario en el santo templo? (300)

By way of response to this haughty statement, the Devil invokes the concept of noblesse oblige. His words are worth quoting in detail, for they provide a complete picture of the pope's vices:

Cuanto mas de alto estado,
Tanto mas es obligado
Dar á todos buen ejemplo,
Y ser llano.
A todos manso y humano.
Cuanto mas ser de corona,
Antes muerto que tirano,
Antes pobre que mundano,
Como fue vuestra persona.
Lujuria os desconsagró,
Soberbia os hizo daño;
Y lo mas que os condanó [sic],
Simonía con engaño. (300)

The pope, like the king in the Dança general, is accused of being a source of scandal, since he failed to give good example. The emphasis on charity is implicit here because, as Aquinas says, ". . . scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity."³⁹ Like the emperor, he is also accused of tyranny and cruelty, both of which are opposed to charity. He is also accused of being worldly, or, as

Aquinas would phrase it, "unlawfully solicitous about temporal matters." Such solicitude is sinful ". . . if we seek temporal things as an end."⁴⁰ He is further accused by the Devil of pride and lust, the former having already been analyzed. The sin of lust is related to the pope's sin of folly, since folly is judged by Aquinas to be a daughter of lust,⁴¹ and is therefore contrary to charity also. An awareness of the need for Church reform is contained in the Devil's accusation of simony.⁴² Simony is "an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with spiritual things,"⁴³ and it is a sin of irreligion.⁴⁴ The emphasis on charity is indirect here because the virtue of religion, to which simony is opposed, is not a part of charity, but of justice.⁴⁵ Religion is therefore a moral virtue, like justice,⁴⁶ although Aquinas concludes that it is the most excellent of the moral virtues since it approaches nearer to God than the others.⁴⁷ Therefore, a sin against religion, such as simony, is the greatest possible sin against justice, insofar as it represents a failure to render to God His due. But since "to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus,"⁴⁸ and every mortal sin is contrary to charity,⁴⁹ it follows that simony is also opposed to charity. Thus ironically, the Vicar of Christ turns out to be the most iniquitous character in the entire play.

So far the didactic purpose in this play has been substantially the same as in the Dança general. There are important differences between the two works, however, for in Gil Vicente's play all the characters repent and all are saved through the intercession of Christ himself. This provides a striking contrast to the Dança general in which there appears to be only one character whose salvation is assured, namely, the monk. Also, there is no Divine intervention in the Dança general; all are saved or damned exclusively on the basis of merit. Since this is not the case in the Auto da barca da Gloria, an examination of the way in which the characters are saved is essential to understanding the a priori desengaño of the play.

Gil Vicente raises some difficult theological questions. One of these is the problem posed by the repentance of the sinners after Death delivers them into the hands of the Devil. Although the play does not say so explicitly, it is necessary, in order to make theological sense out of the proceedings, to assume that the characters do not actually die until after their passage across the river Styx. Otherwise their repentance would be theologically impossible, for Aquinas says that "the mortal sin wherein a man perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since it was not remitted by repentance in this life."⁵⁰ Thus the certainty of impending death inspires the characters, through fear, of course, to repent of their sins.

All these characters have committed mortal sins and they therefore have no charity, since "charity is destroyed by one mortal sin."⁵¹ Nevertheless, they are all saved. It therefore seems that Vicente must posit some other virtues which would account for this fact. Examination of the play indicates that these virtues are primarily faith, and, to a lesser degree, hope. However, as far as these characters are concerned, the term "virtue" is applied to faith and hope only in a loose sense of the word, for "faith and hope can be without charity, but without charity they are not virtues properly so-called."⁵² This recalls the distinction that was made in Chapter I, Part 1 between the order of generation and the order of perfection in the theological virtues; faith must occur before charity, chronologically speaking, and so it is said to precede it in the order of generation; in the order of perfection, however, charity is said to precede both faith and hope, since these ". . . receive from charity their full complement as virtues."⁵³ The faith of the characters in this play is therefore, to borrow Aquinas' terminology, "lifeless faith"⁵⁴ (i.e. faith without charity).

That the characters all have at least this lifeless faith is evidenced by their responses to the threat of death. Each protests his piety and faithfulness, borrowing liberally from the Office of the Dead, in a mixture of Spanish and Latin.⁵⁵ Since the responses of all the

characters follow the same pattern, one example will be sufficient. The count responds to the Devil's threats and accusations with the following words:

Tengo muy firme esperanza,
Y tuve desde la cuna,
Y fe sin tener mudanza. (278)

The Devil in turn accuses the count of presumption, and affirms the position that faith without works is of no value:

¡Sin obras la confianza
Hace acá mucha fortuna! (278)

This is in line with the teaching of Aquinas, who says that "faith cannot produce a meritorious act without charity."⁵⁶ At this point the count launches into his plea for mercy:

O parce mihi, Dios mio,
Quia nihil son mis dias:
Porqué ensalza tu poderío
Al hombre, y das señorío,
Y luego del te desvias?
Con favor
Visitae eum al alvor,
Y súbito lo pruebas luego:
Porqué consientes, Señor,
Que tu obra, y tu hechor,
Sea deshecha nel fuego? (279)

All the characters make similar pleas, and the play ends with the following acotación:

Não fazendo os Anjos menção destas preces,
començarão a botar o batel ás varas, e as
Almas fizeram em roda hũa musica a modo de
pranto, com grandes admirações de dor; e
veio Christo da resurreição, e repartio por
elles os remos das chagas, e os levou comsigo. (304)

Although this ending appears to contradict one of the central ideas in the play, that faith without works is of no value, such is not the case. In fact, the real message of the play coincides with the teaching of Aquinas, who does not say that man cannot be restored after a fall, but only that he cannot merit restoration.⁵⁷ The play does not say, therefore, that these people deserved to be restored to grace because of their faith. Nevertheless, a consideration of their faith is not entirely irrelevant, for it does have a kind of causal connection with their ultimate salvation. The characters have, as mentioned, what Aquinas calls "lifeless faith," and this type of faith is incapable of merit. Yet, lifeless faith is the efficient cause of servile fear, "the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God."⁵⁸ Upon the arrival of Death, all the characters, because of their lifeless faith, experience this servile fear. (If they did not at least have lifeless faith in God, recognizing His existence, they could not fear His punishment. Also, if their faith were not lifeless, but living, it would not cause servile, but rather filial fear, which is fear of fault or separation from God.)⁵⁹ But servile fear, even though it is not so praiseworthy as filial fear, is nevertheless valuable because it is the beginning of wisdom. Aquinas explains:

. . . the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense

faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and filial fear in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. i. 27, The fear of the Lord driveth out sin.⁶⁰

It is too late for servile fear to dispose these victims of Death to refrain from sin, but it does dispose them to pray for mercy and restoration, and this is just, for Aquinas says that

the desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.⁶¹

Thus, as a result of the petitions of these souls, Christ appears at the end and, as an act of pure mercy, takes them all with Him to life everlasting. This is the sense in which Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria emphasizes the virtue of faith in addition to charity in its a priori desengaño, or didactic purpose. It is not the pure faith, as opposed to Protestant corruptions, that is emphasized here, for it was only two years prior to the writing of this play that Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the door of the chapel of the Wittenberg castle.⁶² The Protestant heresy was therefore not yet sufficiently

diffused to inspire specific attacks on the part of Spanish playwrights. These attacks are not noticeable until approximately the middle of the sixteenth century.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II, Part 1

¹William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1952), p. 24.

²Marcel Bataillon, "Ensayo de explicación del auto sacramental," in his Varia lección de clásicos españoles (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1964), p. 189.

³Bruce W. Wardropper, Introducción al teatro religioso del siglo de oro (Salamanca: Ediciones Anaya, 1967), pp. 122-124.

⁴Bataillon, "Ensayo de explicación," pp. 189-191.

⁵Ibid., p. 189.

⁶Gil Vicente, Auto da barca da Gloria, in Obras de Gil Vicente, 3 vols. (Lisbon: Escriptorio da bibliotheca portuguesa, 1852), 1:274-304. All references are to this edition of the play and are identified in the text by page numbers.

⁷Jack Horace Parker, Gil Vicente (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1967), p. 55.

⁸Ibid., p. 54.

⁹Ibid., p. 58.

¹⁰Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.162, Art.5.

¹¹Ibid., Q.19, Art.7.

¹²Ibid., Q.45, Art.4.

¹³Ibid., Q.35, Art.3.

¹⁴Ibid., Q.153, Art.4.

¹⁵Ibid., Art.5.

¹⁶Ibid., Q.118, Art.8.

¹⁷Ibid., Art.3.

¹⁸Ibid., Q.117, Art.5.

¹⁹Ibid., Q.59, Art.4.

²⁰Joan Corominas, Diccionario crítico etimológico de la lengua castellana, 4 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1954), s.v. "amargo."

²¹Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.20, Art.3.

²²Ibid., Q.29, Art.3, Reply Obj.3.

²³Ibid., Q.162, Art.5, Reply Obj.2.

²⁴Ibid., Part I-II, Q.88, Art.2.

²⁵Ibid., Part II-II, Q.30, Art.3, Obj.3.

²⁶Thomas R. Hart, ed., Gil Vicente: obras dramáticas castellanas (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1962), p. 112, n.

²⁷Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.130, Art.2, Reply Obj.1.

²⁸Ibid., Q.112, Art.1, Reply Obj.2.

²⁹Ibid., Q.185, Art.1.

³⁰Ibid., Q.23, Art.6.

³¹Ibid., Q.106, Art.6, Reply Obj.2.

³²Ibid., Q.107, Art.3.

³³Ibid., Q.131, Art.1.

³⁴Ibid., Q.23, Art.6.

³⁵Parker, Gil Vicente, pps. 62-63.

³⁶Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.46, Art.2.

³⁷Ibid., Art.1.

³⁸Ibid., Q.45, Art.4, Reply Obj.3.

³⁹Ibid., Q.43, Art.3.

⁴⁰Ibid., Q.55, Art.6.

⁴¹Ibid., Q.46, Art.3.

⁴²The word is derived from the name of Simon Magus, who attempted to buy the power of the Holy Spirit from the apostles Peter and John, and was severely rebuked by Peter for this gesture. Acts 8:14-24. The vice appears to have reached massive proportions in the second half of the sixteenth century, since ". . . in 1464 Paul II in his bull Cum detestabile decreed excommunication latae sententiae against those guilty of simony in granting benefices, together with their mediators" (New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "simony").

⁴³Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.100, Art.1.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., Q.81, Art.5, Reply Obj.3.

⁴⁶Ibid., Q.81, Art.5.

⁴⁷Ibid., Q.81, Art.6.

⁴⁸Ibid., Q.59, Art.4.

⁴⁹Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.71, Art.4.

⁵⁰Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.14, Art.3.

⁵¹Ibid., Q.24, Art.12.

⁵²Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.65, Art.4.

⁵³Ibid., Q.62, Art.4.

⁵⁴Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.4, Art.4.

⁵⁵Parker, Gil Vicente, p. 62.

⁵⁶Aquinas Summa, Pt. II-II, Q.2, Art.9, Reply Obj .1.

⁵⁷Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.114, Art.7.

⁵⁸Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.7, Art.1.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., Q.19, Art.7.

⁶¹Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.114, Art.7, Reply Obj.1.

⁶²H. Daniel-Rops, The Protestant Reformation, trans. Audrey Butler (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1961), p. 276.

Part 2:

Farsa de la Muerte of Diego

Sánchez de Badajoz

This short morality play¹ was written in all probability for performance during the Easter season of 1536,² seventeen years after Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria. The editor of the Recopilación en metro, D. V. Barrantes, classified it as a Resurrection play because of the lines in the copla referring to the death of Christ and the idea of death as the beginning of eternal life.³ There are allusions to the virtue of charity in this play, but the virtue of faith is much more heavily emphasized; it is this virtue upon which men must rely if they are to be successful in their struggle against everlasting death (i.e. death of the soul).

There are four characters. The shepherd doubles as a gracioso and commentator. The only characters who become victims of Death are the old man and the gallant. Miss Whyte has shown that "by making the Old Man poor and the Gallant rich Diego Sánchez has doubled the symbolism, giving the equivalent of four conditions of life."⁴ The only other character is Death herself, portrayed with the

conventional symbolism of a skull mask, bow, and quiver full of arrows.⁵ The shepherd begins with an excessively long "introyto" alluding to historical circumstances, unknown to us, surrounding the composition of the play.⁶

The play itself begins with the entrance of the old man. He is bitter about life, and through him the author introduces a sentiment which was unknown in the older Dances of Death, but becomes commonplace in the Baroque period (e.g. Calerón's El gran teatro del mundo):

World-weariness:

¡O pobre viejo afligido!
Lacerias me tienen muerto,
Verdad es que estoy despierto
Con los males que he sufrido;
Estuve como dormido
Teniendo prosperidad,
Agora el adversidad
Me muestra como he vivido. (256-257)

This world-weariness is part of a new attitude toward the world which anticipates the Counter-Reformation ascetic stance. Stephen Gilman explains this difference in his article "An Introduction to the Ideology of the Baroque in Spain." He begins by quoting Juan Eusebio Nieremberg's assessment of the world: ". . . no solo es el mundo una nonada vacía sino llena de ponzoña," and then goes on to explain that

in this "sino" is to be found all the difference between mediaeval asceticism and that of the Counter-Reformation. In the past the world had often been termed "vanity," but such metaphors as "cueva de serpientes donde todo pasa enrevesado" indicate a new hatred, a negativisation

of value. After the Renaissance the mundo was a far more formidable enemy than it had been before, and it was the object of far more bitter campaigning.⁷

Admittedly the attitude toward the world had not yet reached such Baroque extremes in this farsa, but a glance at the following words spoken by the old man will at least reveal an anticipation of Baroque sentiments:

Veo que el mundo es más malo
 Cuanto nos da más contento;
 Agora de nuevo siento
 Que cuanto he gozado en él,
 Á sido vuelto con hiel
 Y todo lo leva el viento. (257)

Thus the old man's desengaño involves a flight from worldliness, since his prosperity kept him in a state of spiritual stupor which he likens to sleep: "Estuve como dormido. . . ." The evilness of the world, as an agent of illusion, is in direct proportion to the amount of pleasure it provides. The world was also thought to have this power of deception in the Dança general (v. the incidents with the archbishop and the archdeacon), but it was not emphasized as it is in this play. This increased emphasis can be seen partly in the fact that the old man experiences desengaño prior to Death's arrival (which was unheard of in the Dança general) and also in the negativism of the language which Sánchez de Badajoz uses to refer to the world (e.g. ". . . Y todo lo leva el viento").

The arrival of Death terrifies the shepherd, who attempts to hide behind the old man. Like the sacristan

in the Dança general, he wants somebody else to die in his place:

Prega á Dios que dé la frecha
En aqueste viejo listo. (257-258)

Death's brief self-introductory remarks reveal that she has basically the same characteristics as her counterparts in previous Dances of Death, such as indifference to age and estate, an ability to inspire fear, and unpredictability:

Desde el mayor al menor
Teman todos los humanos
Las saetas de mis manos
Con yervas de gran dolor;
Que papa ni emperador
No escapa, flaco ni fuerte,
De mí, que yo soy la Muerte
Que á todos pongo temor.
Nadie se puede escapar
De mis rigurosos trances,
No hay quien entienda mis lances.
Cuando tengo de enclavar,
Salteo sin avisar
Á los alegres y tristes.⁸ (258)

In spite of the hideousness of Death's appearance, the old man welcomes her: "Tal cual es, yo la deseo" (258). This attitude is a result of the world-weariness into which he has fallen after his disillusionment. One of the play's central themes is that it is important always to be aware of the threat of death, that is, to remember that man is mortal. The old man introduces this concept with the following lines:

Pobre y viejo y con dolor
Aborrezco aquesta vida;
De tí jamas se me olvida,
Y esto me tira el temor. (258-259)

Again we see his abhorrence of life (a new theme in the Dances of Death) as well as the concept that Death is only to be feared when it is unexpected and catches man unprepared.

The shepherd is incapable of understanding the old man's attitude and asks him why he is seeking death. The author uses the old man's reply to introduce the emphasis on faith which characterizes the entire play:

Por que no me falta fé;
Que si muero viviré
En otra vida sin muerte. (259)

This emphasis on faith dovetails perfectly with the emphasis on the need always to remember and be aware of death, and both elements have an important place in the Spanish ascetic movement during the Renaissance and Baroque period. There is a passage in Ludwig Pfandl's Historia de la literatura nacional española en la Edad de Oro which is pertinent to a discussion of this dual emphasis and which helps to clarify the distinction between Sánchez de Badajoz's attitude and that of his medieval predecessors:

esta ascética española abre el camino a una nueva concepción, puesto que convierte en tránsito desde la muerte a la vida, el sentido medieval de la existencia, que era andar desde la vida hacia la muerte, seguida de premio o castigo. La ciencia medieval de la vida se encierra en esta sentencia: vive tan bien como puedas, pero procura que al fin, al ser pesado y juzgado, no seas hallado demasiado leve. En cambio, la ciencia de la vida del ascetismo español del Renacimiento contempla la totalidad de las acciones terrenas desde el ángulo



visual de la eternidad, pregunta sin
descanso el porqué y el cómo, y ya desde
el principio mira hacia el fin.⁹

Thus, given the basically ascetic outlook that informs this play, the lack of an overt emphasis on the virtues of charity and justice is understandable and predictable. Stephen Gilman would apparently agree with this generalization about the nature of the ascetic sensibility, for he states that

the ascetic would promise that, after death divine wisdom would correct life's lack of reason, its injustices and inequalities. "Lo enrevesado del mundo," would be put straight without the harsh insistence on social justice that characterized the Danza de la Muerte. . . .¹⁰

This accounts for the fact that the need for good works is never explicitly stated in this play, although it is mildly implied through the character of the gallant.

Instead of being terrified by Death's warning, the old man explains why he will never fear her:

Viejo. No te temeré
 Porque á los buenos que hieres
 Con tus saetas malditas,
 Más bien les das que les quitas,
 Que es contra lo que tu quieres;¹¹

 Nada es tu generación,
 No se halla tu creacion,
 En todo cuanto leyeres.

Muerte. Pues si soy sin ser criada
 Luégo, ¿dices que soy Dios?

Viejo. De culpa fueste engendrada
 Y tu padre fué el pecado,
 Y pues es nihil llamado,
 Tú quedas hija de nada. (259)

The notion that death is a boon to those who are good recalls the statement of Alejo Venegas in his book Agonía del tránsito de la muerte, quoted in Chapter I, Part 1

(note 104):

. . . la muerte no se deve
poner entre los males, porque
la muerte de los que mueren
en gracia no es otra cosa sino
una salida de cárcel. . . .

It must be understood that when Sánchez de Badajoz and Venegas say that death is good, rather than evil, they are not referring to the essence of death but rather to its effect on those who die in a state of grace. Death is essentially an evil, and the old man alludes to Augustinian moral theory when he speaks of the insubstantiality of death (e.g. "No se halla tu creacion," "Tú quedas hija de nada," etc.). According to Augustine, every being is good, and evil is not a being, for it is insubstantial and uncreated.¹²

At this point the gallant enters. His words reveal that he is completely self-deceived, for he is living a life wholly given over to hedonism and is unaware of the perpetual threat of death. Here there is an implicit emphasis on the virtue of charity, since the gallant is guilty of many sins which are contrary to charity insofar as they turn man's attention away from his last end. He is guilty of pride, which is always contrary to charity by its very genus:¹³

De nada me hallo falto,
 En todo tengo vitoria;
 Dame gran placer y gloria
 La gran linaje do vengo. . . . (260)

He is also guilty of covetousness, which is a mortal sin if the love of riches is so great that it is preferred to charity.¹⁴ Since the gallant is completely lacking in charity, it may be assumed that his covetousness is in fact a mortal rather than venial sin:

Huelga, mi alma, pues tienes
 Tantas riquezas y bienes
 Para vivir en hartura.

He is also guilty of lust, an excessive attachment to venereal desires and pleasures,¹⁵ as is indicated by the following lines:

Tú, mi carne muy querida,
 No pases un rato malo,
 Goza siempre con regalo
 De cuanto el mundo combida. . . . (260)

Since the sin of folly, or blindness of mind, arises chiefly from lust,¹⁶ and folly is opposed to wisdom, which corresponds to charity,¹⁷ it follows that lust is indirectly opposed to charity. Predictably, the gallant has forgotten about death:

Para cien anos de vida
 Jamás te podrá faltar,
 Comer beber y holgar
 Y deleites sin medida. (261)

Since, according to the old man, one must constantly remember the fact of death in order to be able to face it with equanimity when the time comes, it is understandable that the gallant's reaction upon encountering death should be one of abject terror and servile fear:

Galán. ¡Oh! válgame Jesucristo,
Ó que nunca tal he visto.

Muerte. Habeis de dejar el pato.

Galán. ¡Oh! déjame confesar
Y pedir á Dios perdon.

Muerte. No es esa mi condicion,
Ya se te pasó el vagar. (261)

Thus the gallant's desengaño (unlike that of the old man) comes too late, for Death's arrow strikes him down before he can adequately repent.

The death of the gallant provides the old man with the incentive he needs to launch an onslaught against Death and her arbitrary tactics. His complaint is that Death seems to have a spite motive, claiming those who are young and full of exuberance and confidence, and allowing those who really want to die to live on, seemingly forever. He says to Death:

Ó muerte llena de daños
Que á los más seguros matas,
Y a quien te llama dilatas
Con mil trabajos extraños;
Son tus lazos tan tacaños
Que á los alegres enlazas,
Y á los tristes amenazas
Y dejas vivir mil años. (262)

Rather than suffer this treatment, the old man decides to attack Death and engage her in hand-to-hand combat, probably knowing that he cannot emerge the victor from such a struggle.¹⁸ While struggling with Death, the old man sounds the battle cry for all Christians:

Aquí, aquí, fieles cristianos,
Á esta lucha que tenemos;
Aquí, aquí, no descuidemos
Ni la soltemos de manos,

Que los brazos soberanos
 Ya domaron á esta yerta,
 No mata sin quedar muerta
 Y a los buenos muy ufanos. (263)

"Los brazos soberanos" are, of course, the arms of Christ, and what the old man is suggesting is therefore not that Christians should struggle with Death in order to avoid dying, but that they should render the arrows of Death useless and even beneficial through faith in Christ and the grace that will insure their ultimate salvation, for "just as all have died with Adam, so with Christ all will be brought to life."¹⁹ It is in this sense that the following paradox (spoken by the shepherd, who watches the struggle between the old man and Death) is to be understood: "Ella vence y es vencida" (263). Thus the old man, by dying in Christ, was able to conquer death, whereas the gallant, dying in sin, was not. The copla at the end of the farsa sums up the didactic purpose of the author:

El que la vida nos dió,
 Por darla tomó la muerte,
 Por eso el hombre despierte
 Á morir por quien murió;
 Quien la muerte aborreció,
 Pues con ella Dios combida,
 Tiene olvido de la vida.
 La vida nos da la muerte,
 Y por eso quien la olvida,
 Tiene olvido de la vida. (265)

The word "vida" in the first line of the copla evidently refers to eternal life, since Christ did not have to die in order to give men human, terrestrial life. However, this raises a problem with the interpretation of the same word in the eighth line: "La vida nos da la muerte. . . ."

If "la vida" were the subject of the sentence, then it would be most logical to assume that it is terrestrial, rather than eternal, life of which the author speaks, since eternal life cannot result in death. Another interpretation is possible, however, for this line may be taken as a case of inverted word order, so that its real sense would be "la muerte nos da la vida." This has the advantage of preserving the sense of the word "vida" introduced in the first line, as well as of better fitting the overall meaning of the play, viz. that through faith in Christ death can become a passage to eternal life.

Both types of desengaño in this play stress the doctrine that it is primarily through faith, rather than charity, that men are able to effect their salvation. The a posteriori desengaño of the old man involves a realization of the importance of faith in Christ as a weapon against spiritual death, and since he is the author's creation, it follows that the a priori desengaño emphasizes the same virtue. This is not to be taken as a denial of the necessity of charity, just as the relative absence of an emphasis on faith in the Dança general should not be taken as a denial of the necessity of that virtue. Actually, the necessity of charity is indirectly emphasized in this play through the negative example of the gallant, whose life was founded on principles directly opposed to

charity. Nevertheless, Sánchez de Badajoz has chosen to emphasize faith over charity in this play, and this is a reflection of the changing historical climate in Spain. It represents, among other things, a reaction against what Stephen Gilman has termed "Renaissance horizontal apprehension of reality."²⁰ Faith may have seemed to be a more "vertical" virtue than charity to Sánchez de Badajoz since it has God as its exclusive object, whereas charity, as we have seen, in a sense has two objects: God and our neighbor. Charity cannot merely look to a future life of eternal bliss, for it must be externalized in this life in the form of good works. It was probably the bitterness that Sánchez de Badajoz felt toward the world and this life that prevented him from giving the virtue of charity the same emphasis that he gave faith.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II, Part 2

¹Diego Sánchez de Badajoz, Farsa de la Muerte, in Recopilación en metro, ed. by D. V. Barrantes in vols. 11 and 12 of Libros de antaño (Madrid: Librería de bibliófilos, 1886), 12:253-265. All references are to this edition of the play and are identified in the text by page numbers.

²Florence Whyte, The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931), p. 75.

³Ibid., p. 74.

⁴Ibid., p. 75.

⁵V. Part I, Chapter 1, note 15.

⁶It appears that the canons of Badajoz complained about a phrase in one of Sánchez de Badajoz's farsas which they found offensive, viz. "Dios mantenga." In the "introyto" the author takes the opportunity to explain the phrase and criticize the canons simultaneously.

⁷Stephen Gilman, "An Introduction to the Ideology of the Baroque in Spain," Symposium: A Journal Devoted to Modern Languages and Literatures 1 (1946): 94.

⁸The concept of Death as a highwayman is a fairly common one. It is somewhat more fully developed in Las cortes de la Muerte, falsely attributed to Lope de Vega and not to be confused with the identically titled play by Micael de Carvajal and Luis Hurtado de Toledo.

⁹Ludwig Pfandl, Historia de la literatura nacional española en la Edad de Oro, trans. Jorge Rubió Balaguer (Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo Gili, 1952), p. 47.

¹⁰Gilman, "Ideology," p. 96.

¹¹This line is somewhat vague. Perhaps Sánchez de Badajoz allowed himself to get carried away with his invective against Death and in the process attribute to her an attitude which would be proper to Satan, namely, that of desiring the damnation of her victims.

¹²Augustine Confessions (trans. John K. Ryan), 7.12.

¹³Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.162, Art.5.

¹⁴Ibid., Q.118, Art.4.

¹⁵Ibid., Q.153, Art.1.

¹⁶Ibid., Q.46, Art.3.

¹⁷Ibid., Q.45.

¹⁸Florence Whyte explains that, while dancing is not specifically mentioned, this play ". . . emphasizes a neglected aspect of the dancing element of Dances of Death, - the conflict" (Dance of Death, p. 76).

¹⁹1 Cor. 15:22.

²⁰Gilman, "Ideology," p. 89.

Part 3:

Farsa llamada Danza de la Muerte
of Juan de Pedraza

This play¹ is the first Dance of Death that can be classified as an auto sacramental.² As a logical consequence of this the emphasis on faith and doctrine noted in the two previous plays becomes more specific in Pedraza's work and involves an emphasis on the doctrine of the Eucharist.³ In this play, written in 1551, the author seeks to show that the sacrament of the Eucharist is the best safeguard against death and sin. This naturally includes a tacit emphasis on charity, since mortal sin is by definition opposed to that virtue.

The play is preceded by a loa spoken by the shepherd which summarizes the play's argument. The farsa itself begins in one of the chambers of the pope's palace. His lines indicate that his main vice is that of vainglory:

¡ Oh, cuán sublimada que fué mi ventura!
¡ Y cuán á sabor tan bien fortunado,
Venido de nada en tan alto estado. . . .

.
¡ Con cuánta humildad me sirven y acatan
Todos estados, acá en este suelo! (42:1-2)

The pope glories in the prestige that accompanies his high estate, forgetting for all practical purposes that he owes all this to God (even though he is intellectually aware of this fact). Thus he appears to prefer the testimony of man to that of God, and this is one way in which vainglory may be contrary to charity.⁴ The pope's attitude (as well as that of the next two characters, the king and the lady) is also representative of the fourth species of pride, which occurs "when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous," and pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin.⁶ Death's accusation confirms this and also mentions that the pope is guilty of not having given a good example to his flock, which is a type of scandal.

Death says:

¡Oh, cuán sin acuerdo de mí, y sin temor,
Yaces en vicios terrenos jatando,
La gloria posible de acá procurando,
Soberbia mostrando por ser gran señor;
En quien la humildad, según que á Pastor,
Había de ser grande ejemplo al ganado. (42:2)

The sin of scandal is also opposed to charity, for, as Aquinas states, ". . . scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity."⁷ The famous theme of the equality of all men in death is alluded to by Death herself when she says to the pope:

Aunque tu estado á todos hoy sóbre,
Muy breve serás igual con el pobre,
En solo este paso que llaman morir. (42:2)

Although the pope asks for time to repent and correct his life, his desengaño comes too late, for Death carries him off.

Vainglory and pride are also the king's most striking vices. He is proud of his lineage, which he traces back to the Visigoths, and of the fact that he has never lost a battle:

Yo, que en la tierra por rey elegido
 Fuí justamente, por ser de los godos
 Mi nombre en la fama delante de todos,
 Y en puesto y en mando jamás ser vencido. . .
 ¡Oh cuántos valientes á mí se han rendido! (42:2)

He was living in a state of illusion identical to that of the pope since he had forgotten about death. Death says to him:

¡Oh, cuán á sabor tu Alteza departe,
 De mí no teniendo acuerdo ninguno! (43:1)

The king's reply indicates that he is guilty not only of vainglory and pride, but also of fraud and deception, for he says:

¿No miras que son de grande memoria
 Mis fuerzas valientes y mañas sotiles? (43:1)

The phrase "mañas sotiles" suggests that the king resorted to illicit means of deception⁸ in order to win battles. This is a type of lying, which is a vice opposed to truth. Truth, in turn, is a part of justice, and since "to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus,"⁹ it follows that the "mañas sotiles" of the king are contrary to charity. He, too, finally decides that he wants to repent, but Death tells him ". . . tiempo has tenido sobrado, y lugar" (43:1).

The next scene takes place in a lady's dressing room. She is probably admiring herself in a mirror¹⁰ as she speaks the following lines:

De gracias dotada ¿quién tal como yo?
 En toda hermosura ¿quién tanto perfeta?
 Dispuesta, galana, no ménos discreta,
 ¿En quién la natura así se revió? (43:1)

Ironically, the lady's attitude is the antithesis of discretion, for she too is entirely given over to amour-propre, just like the pope and the king. This type of vainglory is contrary to charity as regards the love of God, since it has as its sole object "something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God."¹¹ She is also guilty of the fourth species of pride through her desire to be "singularly conspicuous," like the pope and king, and like them she was living in a state of illusion since she had forgotten about death. Death herself reminds her of this fact when she comes to claim her:

¡En cuánta jatanca de vanos dulzores
 Yaces, hermosa, de mi trasçordada,
 Que vengo con priesa por tí, que casada
 Estás con el mundo, compuesta de errores! (43:1)

Since the lady was exclusively concerned with her physical beauty, the arrival of Death inspires revulsion in her.

She tries to get off by saying:

Mira que en dama de tanta belleza
 Razon no consiente que falte la vida. (43:2)

This represents a false conception of reason, and Death explains this to the lady as she carries her off. Unlike the others, she does not even express a desire to repent.

So far the play has followed the Dance of Death tradition in a very conventional fashion, but with the arrival of the shepherd the author introduces a novel approach. This character is much more sympathetically portrayed than the previous three; Miss Whyte, speculating on this change, suggests that Pedraza, a cloth shearer, ". . . felt somewhat ill at ease in the company of popes, king, and ladies."¹² Thus the shepherd becomes a kind of gracioso, and his struggle with Death has humorous overtones.

The scene takes place in the mountains. The shepherd has evidently been walking a great distance, and decides that it is time to eat. The following lines which he addresses to his knapsack provide a preliminary indication of what his vice is:

Sin duda ninguna, de entrar hora en cuenta
 Con vos, mi zurron, yo traigo acordado.
 Pues es cosa cierta, según que he notado,
 Que Dios la salud nos da y acrecienta,
 No menos la vida también nos aumenta
 Comer con gran gana, muy huerte de todo:
 Que de otra manera, la Muerte de lodo
 Nos pone, y debajo de tal aposenta. (43:2)

Thus, his vice, gluttony, is entirely different from that of the preceding three characters. They were all guilty of sins which were more intellectual than physical,¹³ and Pedraza seems much less tolerant of them than of the shepherd. The latter appears to overindulge partly as a remedy against suffering; this is indicated by the fact that as he eats he exclaims: "; Oh qué sabor! ; Mal hayan

mis males!" (43:1). This is an attenuating circumstance which makes him less guilty than a man who eats and drinks excessively solely for the pleasure he can derive from the act.

Death arrives and reveals in her summons that she takes her orders directly from God:

¡ Levanta, zagal, que vengo por tí,
Que así me es mandado del alto Señor! (44:1)

The shepherd is initially frightened by the sound of Death's voice, but he soon regains his composure and innocently says to her:

¡ En algo entendés! Echaos, y dormí
Debajo esa peña, y seráos mejor. (44:1)

Death repeats her protestations of power, but it happens that the shepherd is not quite ready to go: "¡ Pardiobre, que tengo con vos de luchar!" (44:2). Thus the element of conflict and struggle seen in the Farsa de la Muerte by Diego Sánchez de Badajoz is continued in this play, for there now follows a long altercation between Death and the shepherd. The former becomes something of a comic figure during this struggle, for she is unable to convince the shepherd that he is subject to her. The first indication that the shepherd is going to emerge victorious is the use of the subjunctive in the following lines spoken by Death:

¿ Tú piensas, si dado me fuese lugar
De aquella divina y real Providencia,
Que fuerzas, sentido, con grave dolencia
Perder no te haria con gran turbación? (44:2)

This suggests that Death's visitation is only a warning this time, an act of God designed to give the shepherd a

chance to correct his life. The rest of the play supports this interpretation, for Death, unable to win the shepherd over to her way of thinking, gives up in despair and introduces him to Reason, at which point the play becomes allegorical:

¡ Oh, cómo huelgas hablar necedales,
 Echando por alto, Pastor, mis razones!
 No quiero contigo trabar más quisiones,
 Pues viene quien burle de tus liviandades.
 Escucha sus dichos, que son las verdades;
 Mediante los cuales, si estás muy atento,
 Muy presto vendrás en conocimiento
 De cuánto me deben temor los mortales. (44:2--45:1)

Reason enters and explains that she is glad to see the shepherd alive and well, since he will be a good example for sinners. Since Death's power is great and she claims her victims without even giving them a chance to appeal, the shepherd should, according to Reason, despise the things of this world and concentrate on service to God. In this way he will escape the punishments that the damned suffer in hell. It is at this point that the emphasis on faith begins to become apparent; Reason continues:

Ten esperanza contino, y temor
 De aquella que a todos los vivos aqueja,
 Pues cosa en el suelo, aunque fuerte, no deja. . . .
 (45:1)

The shepherd must have hope, the virtue which ". . . makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e., in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness."¹⁴ This, however, also involves an indirect emphasis on faith, since ". . . an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope."¹⁵

The shepherd tells Reason that Death wounded him, but that he escaped. Reason replies with an admonition to correct the error of his ways, and recommends to him a conception of the world which is scarcely less pessimistic than that which informs the Farsa de la Muerte of Diego Sánchez de Badajoz:

Por tanto da gracias, hermano, al Señor
Y mira que sientes le plugo, y qu'El quiso
Dejarte que emiendes la vida pasada:
Por ende las cosas del mundo en nonada
Tendrás, procurando acá el paraiso. (45:1)

The process of his desengaño is nearly complete as he makes a firm resolution not to sin again:

De aquí y'os prometo vivir sobre aviso,
Y nunca papar de hoy más pecados. (45:1)

Nevertheless, for the shepherd to be firm in his resolution there are more things he must know, and, for the purpose of teaching him, Pedraza introduces two more allegorical characters, Anger and Understanding.¹⁶ Anger alludes to the importance of Reason when she¹⁷ says ". . . ésta faltando, suceden mil males" (45:2). Understanding, in turn, explains that Anger corrupts the will. Since all of this is too complicated for the shepherd, Reason attempts to sum it up for him concisely:

Tú debes, hermano, sin duda saber,
Que aquesta es la Ira, muy grave pecado,
La cual me destierra de todo poblado,
Echándome fuera (segun su poder)
De aqueste, que agora su nombre a entender
(Senala al Entendimiento.)
Procuro de darte, por hacer contento;
El cual introduce por entendimiento,
Que por ser muy flaco, se deja vencer. (45:2)

This concept of anger as an obstacle to reason is thoroughly Thomistic. Aquinas says that ". . . of all the passions, anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason."¹⁸ Pedraza's highlighting of the vice of anger is thus due primarily to his desire to emphasize the importance of reason, since there are many vices which are more serious than anger.¹⁹ In the face of all these arguments the shepherd completely gives himself over to Reason and agrees to go wherever she takes him. The liturgical and Eucharistic element of the play now becomes manifest as Reason tells the shepherd where she will take him:

Muy cerca de aquí, á ver y adorar
 Á Dios sempiterno, en pan transformado;
 En cuyo servicio, con loor muy crecido,
 Hoy hace la Iglesia muy grande memoria. (46:1)

The reference, of course, is to the feast of Corpus Christi, but the shepherd did not know this since he was living in a state of illusion which he likens to sleep: ". . . he estado dormido" (46:1). The play ends with the shepherd's prayer to the Eucharistic bread. Following his union with Reason he is no longer the ignorant shepherd he used to be, but is now capable of penetrating even the subtleties of the Aristotelian distinction between substance and accident (refined and applied to the sacrament of the Eucharist by Aquinas, of course):²⁰

¡Oh, Pan excelente, divino manjar,
 En carne del Hijo de Dios convertido!
 ¡Oh sacro misterio, por quien soy venido
 Aquí do me trujo Razon sin errar,
 Sólo á te ver, Señor, y adorar;

Qu'en pan trasformado, segun tengo mientes,
 Yaces, por bien de todas las gentes
 Que quieren contigo sobir á reinar!
 Adórote, Verbo divino, sagrado,
 Que yaces debajo de aqueste accidente,
 Y á tu Majestad suplico humilmente,
 Puesto que indigno, de hinojos postrado,
 Nos libres y guardes, Señor, del pecado,
 Dándonos gracia acá, que alcancemos
 El reino de gloria, Señor, que atendemos,
 Por ti prometido á nos de buen grado.
 Y pues he gozado sin más resistencia
 Ver, cual he visto sin dubda hoy, por san,
 A Dios sempiterno en forma de pan,
 Manjar saludable de nuestra dolencia. . . . (46:2)

This emphasis on the necessity of a sacrament represents a new stage in the development of the Dance of Death,²¹ and the fact that it is the Eucharist which is emphasized gives the Dance of Death a role, albeit a minor one, in the development of the auto sacramental. The trend toward a priori desengaño based on faith and doctrine began with Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria, and now the emphasis on specific doctrine becomes explicit. That the specific doctrine emphasized should be that of the Eucharist is very appropriate, since the Eucharist ". . . is the greatest of all the sacraments . . . because it contains Christ Himself substantially. . . ." ²² The key point in the shepherd's final speech is that the Eucharist is a source of grace and a means of achieving the kingdom of glory. Aquinas makes identical claims for the sacrament. Regarding its power to bestow grace he states that ". . . by this sacrament grace receives increase, and the spiritual life is perfected, so that man may stand perfect in himself by union with God." ²³ He immediately goes on to make a

statement which indicates that the emphasis on doctrine and the emphasis on charity are not really distinct, but rather intimately connected: "this sacrament confers grace spiritually together with the virtue of charity."²⁴ This means that an emphasis on the doctrine of the Eucharist implies an emphasis on charity as well, so that the second half of the play really proposes the solution to the lack of charity that was observed in the first half in the episodes with the pope, the king, and the lady. Regarding the sacrament as a means of attaining glory, Aquinas states that

as Christ's Passion, in virtue whereof this sacrament is accomplished, is indeed the sufficient cause of glory, yet not so that we are thereby forthwith admitted to glory, but we must first suffer with Him in order that we also may be glorified afterwards with Him (Rom. viii. 17), so this sacrament does not at once admit us to glory, but bestows on us the power of coming unto glory.²⁵

This is the sense in which the shepherd's statement, "Dándonos gracia acá, que alcancemos / El reino de gloria," is to be understood.

In conclusion, Pedraza's farsa is the first work in which the Dance of Death theme takes the form of Eucharistic theater specifically destined for presentation on the feast of Corpus Christi. Yet this play celebrates the most important sacrament in the Catholic Church without making any reference to Protestant denials of the doctrine of the Real Presence. According to Marcel Bataillon,²⁶ this is because the purpose of the auto sacramental was originally not

anti-Protestant in nature; its purpose was to effect a reform within the Church, to give the faithful a deeper understanding of their religion. He says:

. . . el culto del Redentor vuelve por entonces a tomar la delantera sobre el culto de los Santos, lo esencial sobre lo accesorio. El misterio eucarístico reivindica el puesto que le compete en el centro de las diversiones populares del Corpus, pues el alegre tumulto de éstas lo habían hecho perder excesivamente de vista.²⁷

Thus the a priori and a posteriori desengaño in this play respond to a given set of historical circumstances. From this point on, however, because of the growing threat of Protestantism, the Dances of Death become apologetic in nature and contain specific references to heretical sects and doctrines.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II, Part 3

¹Juan de Pedraza, Farsa llamada Danza de la Muerte, in Biblioteca de autores españoles: autos sacramentales desde su origen hasta fines del siglo XVII, ed. by Eduardo González Pedroso (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1952), 58: 41-46. All references are to this edition and are identified in the text by page and column numbers.

²Although J. D. M. Ford, in his review of Florence Whyte's book on the Dance of Death (Hispanic Review 2 [1934]: 74-76), quarrels with her classification of the play as an auto sacramental, he admits to not having read the play, so that his objection need not be taken too seriously. The play is a true auto sacramental, at least according to the criteria adduced by A. A. Parker: it is a part of the public celebration of the Corpus Christi feast and has as its asunto the Eucharist; it is didactic in nature, a type of sermon in theatrical form; finally, it is allegorical (The Allegorical Drama of Calerón [Oxford and London: The Dolphin Book Co., 1943], Chapter 2, esp. pps. 58-80).

³For a concise summation of Catholic Eucharistic doctrine see Ronald Knox, The Belief of Catholics (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1958), p. 152.

⁴Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.132, Art.3.

⁵Ibid., Q.162, Art.4.

⁶Ibid., Art.5.

⁷Ibid., Q.43, Art.3.

⁸All deception in war is not necessarily illicit according to Aquinas, but only that kind whereby a man is deceived ". . . through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise" (Summa Pt. II-II, Q.40, Art.3).

⁹Ibid., Q.59, Art.4.

¹⁰ Florence Whyte, The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931), p. 96.

¹¹ Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.132, Art.3.

¹² Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 95.

¹³ Aquinas places pride partly in the sensitive and partly in the intellective appetite (Summa Pt. II-II, Q.162, Art.3), whereas he places gluttony exclusively in the sensitive appetite (Ibid., Q.148, Art.1, Reply Obj.3).

¹⁴ Ibid., Q.17, Art.6.

¹⁵ Ibid., Reply Obj.2.

¹⁶ Since these are equivocal terms, a certain amount of explanation is in order. The understanding of which Pedraza speaks is the characteristically weak natural power of understanding (not to be confused with the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, and not at all weak, since it exceeds the natural light of finite understanding- v. Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.8, Art.1): "Que por ser muy flaco se deja vencer" (45:2). Anger is a vice in this context since it stands in an antecedent rather than consequent relation to reason, and ". . . withdraws reason from its rectitude" (Ibid., Q.158, Art.1, Reply Obj.2).

¹⁷ The gender of the allegorical figures is taken from the gender of the Spanish word. Thus Reason and Anger are feminine, while Understanding is masculine.

¹⁸ Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.48, Art.3.

¹⁹ Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.158, Art.4.

²⁰ Ibid., Pt. III, QQ. 75-77.

²¹ The insistence on the necessity of penance noted in other Dances of Death does not refer to the sacrament of Penance, but rather to the virtue. Aquinas makes this distinction clear in Summa Pt. III, QQ. 84-85.

²² Ibid., Q.65, Art.3.

²³ Ibid., Q.79, Art.1, Reply Obj.1.

²⁴ Ibid., Reply Obj.2.

²⁵ Ibid., Art.2, Reply Obj.1.

²⁶ Marcel Bataillon, "Ensayo de explicación del auto sacramental," in his Varia lección de clásicos españoles (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1964), pps. 183-205.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 189.

CHAPTER III

DESENGAÑO BASED ON FAITH AND DOCTRINE INCLUDING REFERENCES TO HETERODOXY

Part 1:

Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón

of Alfonso de Valdés

Authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who present Dance of Death themes (i.e., Alfonso de Valdés, Micael de Carvajal and Luis Hurtado de Toledo, Quevedo, and Calderón de la Barca) are all aware of the growing challenge to the faith constituted by the Protestant schism. Therefore, in addition to the traditional emphasis on the theological virtue of charity, they have chosen to make a condemnation of heresy form part of the a priori desengaño which informs their works. Thus, while the emphasis on faith and doctrine noted in the three previous works continues through the Baroque period, it acquires a new urgency because of the wave of heterodoxy spreading through Europe. Bruce Wardropper, commenting on Marcel Bataillon's theory regarding the origin of the auto sacramental, alludes to this change of historical conditions and its effect on the auto sacramental:

La teoría de Bataillon es el complemento positivo a la teoría según la cual los autos surgieron como protesta contra la reforma. Contradice la opinión de que se originaron en oposición al luteranismo, a la vez que admite que a menudo representan una reacción ante el espíritu herético. La reforma católica nació, desde luego, independientemente de la protestante y anterior a ella. Empezó antes del cisma con la prerreforma en España y siguió en vigor durante toda la Contrarreforma. Pero empezó a adquirir una nueva urgencia desde 1560, en parte por el reto protestante: fue durante este período de su mayor vigencia cuando los autos empezaron consistentemente a demostrar su naturaleza sacramental.¹

Thus, just as the a priori desengaño of the three preceding works with its emphasis on faith and doctrine corresponds to what Wardropper describes as the "reforma católica," so the a priori desengaño of the following works with its emphasis on orthodox faith and doctrine and its condemnation of heresy belongs to the period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.²

The Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón³ by Alfonso de Valdés may on first consideration seem an unlikely book to be put forward as an example of orthodoxy in the first half of the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, while Valdés clamors for ecclesiastical reform in a tone that is frequently irreverent, the substance of what he says is basically orthodox. This can be seen by making a comparison of his proposals with statements of Saint Thomas Aquinas,⁴ who, in the words of Thomas Gilby, O.P., ". . . stands for a body of thought which for seven centuries has moved at the centre of Western Catholicism."⁵ Even Valdés's political theory

with its condemnation of absolutism implies a conception of natural and positive law which is very similar to that of Aquinas, as will be seen in the exchange between Carón and the king of the Galatians.

The Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón was written approximately ten years after Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria, and in some respects the works are quite similar. Leaving aside differences in literary form, we see that Carón in the Diálogo plays the same role as the Demonio, who was the boatman in Gil Vicente's auto. The format is also quite similar. Various departed souls arrive to be ferried across the river Styx and reveal something of their past to the boatmen who then speak for the author as they either praise or censure these souls for their past lives, and it is in this manner that a priori desengaño is introduced in both works. The Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón, however, is much more ambitious in scope than the earlier work. In fact, it is not mainly a Dance of Death at all, but rather a thinly disguised piece of anti-French propaganda on the subject of the war between Charles V and Francis I.⁶ In the opinion of E. Segura Covarsí, Valdés merely worked in the Dance of Death theme ". . . para dar amenidad a un tema interesante y actual. . . ." ⁷ Valdés himself affirms in the "Prohemio al lector" that his work is to be primarily an apologia on behalf of the Emperor:

La causa principal que me movió a scrivir este diálogo fué desseo de manifestar la justicia del Emperador y la iniquidad de aquellos que lo desafiaron. . . . (1)

He goes on to state that he introduced the Dance of Death theme for stylistic reasons, so that the book would be written ". . . en estilo que de todo género de hombres fuese con sabor leído" (1). His concern for doctrine is indicated immediately by his statement that the various souls will interrupt the story "con algunas gracias y buena doctrina" (1). This procession of souls is the only part of the work that can be properly called a Dance of Death and will accordingly be the only part of the work analyzed here.⁸

The book begins with allusions to social disruption. Mercurio comes to Carón⁹ pidiendo albricias for the news he brings about the defiant challenges that the kings of France and England issued against the Emperor Charles V. (This is good news to Carón because he will now have enough business to pay for his new boat.)

Valdés's only overt reference to heterodoxy occurs almost immediately. Explaining to Carón the causes of the social upheaval taking place, Mercurio says that "toda Alemania está preñada de otro mayor tumulto que el pasado, a causa de la secta lutherana y de nuevas divisiones que aún en ella se levantan" (7). While Valdés may have been sympathetic to the Reformation's protest against wealth and splendor in the Church,¹⁰ it is equally true that his work is informed by a sense of Catholicity, as Montesinos observes,¹¹ which prevented him from accepting the more radical and specifically religious proposals of the reformers.

At no point in the book, for example, does he deny the validity of the sacraments, of indulgences, or of the externals of religious devotion. Polidoro's advice to his son represents Valdés's view: "Procura de parecer en todas tus cosas christiano, no solamente con cerimoniaes exteriores, mas con obras christianas" (179). He does not state that external devotion is unnecessary, but only that it must be accompanied by internal devotion as well. This is an idea which recurs frequently throughout the Diálogo, and, in view of the fact that Valdés occasionally caricaturizes and satirizes Scholastic theology, it may not be totally useless to observe that it is not an idea which is opposed to the true spirit of the great schoolmen. Aquinas, discussing the question of whether or not there can be any excess in the worship of God, makes the following pertinent observation:

. . . if that which is done be, in itself not conducive to God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom - all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection with the internal worship of God [emphasis added].¹²

It thus seems probable that Valdés's satirical barbs were directed against philosophers and theologians who worked within a Scholastic frame of reference but who were no longer moved by a concern for truth. Father Copleston uses this line of reasoning in his attempt to explain the

disrepute into which medieval philosophy had fallen after the Renaissance and the inauguration of the so-called "modern" period of philosophy (i.e. from Descartes to the present). His views are worth quoting:

Apart from the fact that mediaeval philosophy naturally shared in the disesteem with which the Middle Ages in general were commonly regarded, one factor which was partly responsible for the attitude adopted toward mediaeval thinkers was doubtless the language used concerning Scholasticism by men like Francis Bacon and René Descartes. Just as Aristotelians are prone to evaluate Platonism in terms of Aristotle's criticism, so admirers of the movement apparently initiated by Bacon and Descartes were prone to look on mediaeval philosophy through their eyes, unaware of the fact that much of what Francis Bacon, for instance, has to say against the Scholastics could not legitimately be applied to the great figures of Mediaeval thought, however applicable it may have been to later and "decadent" Scholastics, who worshipped the letter at the expense of the spirit.¹³

Valdés's attitude toward Scholastic philosophy, possibly inherited from his father,¹⁴ should also be regarded in this light. This will be especially clear in the episode with the theologian, who cannot possibly represent any of the great Scholastics.

Mercurio wishes to enlighten Carón as to the condition the world is in and, so that they may discuss the matter at their leisure, Carón gives his assistant the job of handling the boat. He and Mercurio then sit down in a pleasant meadow¹⁵ where, as Carón says, they can "hablar y a veces reirnos con algunas ánimas que vendrán a passar" (11). While this procession of souls is our primary

concern, Mercurio's long statement to Carón is worth a brief examination since it contains an overview of the type of a priori desengaño which characterizes the work. He explains that he has travelled throughout the entire world and has found nothing in it but "vanidad, maldad, aflicción y locura" (11). Disillusioned by this experience, he struck upon the idea of seeking out the Christian communities, since he remembered ". . . lo que Jesu Christo instituyó" (11) and had seen ". . . aquellas sanctísimas leyes que con tanto amor tan encomendadas les dexó" (11-12). (This direct appeal to the words of Christ rather than to Church authority typifies Mercurio throughout the book, and may perhaps be construed as evidence of Protestant leanings in Valdés.) Carón's friend Alastor¹⁶ disillusioned Mercurio even further by informing him that the way to locate the Christian communities was to consider the doctrine of Christ and then look for those people who live exactly contrary to that doctrine: these would be the Christians he was seeking. Scarcely capable of believing what Alastor had told him, he decided to see for himself and went directly to certain provinces in Europe where he recalled that people lived directly contrary to Christian doctrine. Enumerating all the major points of this doctrine, he then observed that these people did in fact live in a contrary fashion. Their distinguishing characteristics were worldliness and an almost complete lack of charity: ". . . en todos ellos vi apenas una centella de caridad; de manera

que muy poquitos eran los que en sólo Jesu Christo tenían puesta su confianza" (13). This simultaneous emphasis on Christian doctrine and charity represents one of the differences between Valdés's Diálogo and the earlier Dança general de la Muerte. In the medieval poem charity was emphasized, but its vital dependence on Christian doctrine was never made explicit. This dependence was implied, of course, through the fact that, by order of generation, faith precedes hope and hope precedes charity, but the elements of faith and doctrine were so widely assumed that overt statement was probably unnecessary. It is more difficult to speak of commonly shared philosophical assumptions during the Renaissance, so that if a given writer in this period wished to emphasize the virtue of charity (i.e. the Christian theological virtue) it was also necessary for him to emphasize faith and doctrine, for these were no longer assumed to the degree that they had been in the Middle Ages. Father Copleston alludes to this changed outlook as he elaborates some of the differences between medieval and Renaissance philosophy:

When one looks at mediaeval philosophy, one certainly sees variety; but it is a variety within a common pattern, or at least it is a variety set against a common and well-defined background. There was certainly original thought; but none the less one gets the impression of a common effort, of what one may call teamwork. The thirteenth-century philosophers criticized one another's opinions; but they accepted not only the same religious faith but also, for the most part, the same metaphysical principles. . . . When one looks at Renaissance philosophy, however, . . . the over-all impression

is one of a pullulating individualism. And this impression is, in many respects, correct. The gradual breakdown of the framework of mediaeval society and the loosening of the bonds between men which helped to produce a more or less common outlook; the transition to new forms of society, sometimes separated from one another by religious differences [emphasis added]; the new inventions and discoveries; all this was accompanied by a marked individualism in philosophic reflection.¹⁷

This changed ideological climate is what is primarily responsible for the new type of a priori desengaño in the Spanish Dances of Death in the Renaissance and the Baroque period.¹⁸ Continuing his invective against the Christians, Mercurio enumerates some of their vices, most of which have been observed in Dances of Death from the Dança general on. They are: covetousness, robbery, fraud and deception, envy, lust, blasphemy, vainglory, ambition, pride, superstition, simony, scandal, and neglect of duty. All of these sins, with the exception of blasphemy and superstition, have already been analyzed and shown to be contrary to charity. Blasphemy is opposed to charity since ". . . it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity,"¹⁹ whereas superstition, like simony, is uncharitable indirectly. It is a vice contrary to religion,²⁰ which is a moral virtue.²¹ This involves an indirect emphasis on charity since religion, to which superstition is opposed, is a part of justice.²² Thus religion, like justice, is a moral virtue, although Aquinas states that it is the most excellent of the moral virtues since it approaches nearer to God than the others.²³ Thus

a sin against religion is the greatest possible sin against justice, insofar as it represents a failure to render to God His due. But since "to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus,"²⁴ it follows that superstition is also opposed to charity as well as to justice. Thus all the sins which Mercurio lists and attributes to the Christians are sins against charity, the highest theological virtue.

Carón, finding Mercurio's analysis of the situation almost beyond belief, asks him if, among so many Christians, he did not find at least some who truly practiced the teachings of Christ. Mercurio's reply is one of the key passages in the book upon which Doctor Vélez, the censor whose job it was to examine and pass judgment on the book, based his criticism:

Hallé tan pocos que me olvidava de hazer mención dellos, pero esos que ay dígo de verdad, que es la más excelente cosa del mundo ver con cuánta alegría y con cuánto contentamiento viven entre los otros, tanto, que me detuve algunos días conversando con ellos y me parecía conversar entre los ángeles. Mas como los cuitados, por la mayor parte, son en diversas maneras perseguidos, no osan parecer entre los otros ni declarar las verdades que Dios les ha manifestado; mas por esso no dexan de rogar continuamente a Jesu Christo que aparte del mundo tanta ceguedad, viviendo siempre con más alegría quando más cerca de sí veen la persecución. (20)

Vélez (v. the apéndice, ed. cit.) thought that he detected a reference to the alumbrados in this passage. He says:

. . . parece que aquesto se endereça a los llamados alumbrados y a mi ver no se pueden verificar ni entender estas palabras sino dellos y la perssecución que dize padescen, ansi mesmo no se puede entender sino de la santa ynquisición y de sus juezes, porque ellos son los que contra estos errores proceden, y este auctor llama esto perssecución, teniendo por perfectos y como ángeles a los susodichos. (243)

Vélez was probably right in his assertion, for in this period iluminismo and erasmismo are, while certainly not identical, at least related by virtue of their similar stances on several issues,²⁵ and Alfonso de Valdés is, in the opinion of José F. Montesinos, ". . . el más importante de los erasmistas españoles."²⁶ It is Valdés's allusion to the persecution of the good Christians that suggests to Vélez that he was talking about the alumbrados, for this sect was in fact opposed by the Inquisition and the Edict of 1525 directed against them denounces some of their propositions as savoring of Lutheranism.²⁷ Another possible allusion, albeit a less obvious one, to the alumbrados might be Valdés's constant emphasis on the joy of these Christians. Bataillon makes mention of the extreme importance of this factor in Spanish iluminismo:

No sólo en la doctrina de Lutero tiene la libertad cristiana dos fases, una exterior y negativa - liberación del temor servil y de las coacciones eclesiásticas - y otra interior y positiva - fe del alma regenerada en un poder divino del que ella es participante -: también en España muestra el iluminismo esa mezcla de libertad con respecto a las ceremonias y de confianza en un Dios que da la paz y la alegría [emphasis added]. También aquí las diferencias que se notan entre "recogidos" y "dejados"²⁸ son menores

que su común oposición a la piedad sierva y amarga. El ascetismo se humaniza porque se siente la gracia como una marea que va subiendo, pronta a llenar las almas que se han vaciado de amor propio. El cuerpo no es enemigo demasiado terrible para que se le trate con crueldad.

Por otra parte, el sufrimiento aparece como señal de un insuficiente acuerdo con Dios.²⁹

The Christian, if he has really given himself over completely to God, should therefore not be somber or lugubrious, but joyful. This idea is restated later in the Diálogo in a more direct and forceful manner.

Having painted this extremely bleak picture of contemporary society, Mercurio then begins to relate to Carón the details of the political friction between Charles V and Francis I; their discourse will be interrupted from time to time by several souls who come seeking passage across the river. The first soul in the procession is the preacher. Carón announces his arrival with these words: "Pero mira también tú aquella ánima con cuánta soberbia viene" (27). The word "sobervia" immediately introduces an emphasis on charity, since pride is generically contrary to that virtue.³⁰ The preacher seems to be especially proud of the fact that whenever he preached, the church was always full of people. Carón's question, "¿Qué arte tenías para esso?" (27), suggests a possible parallel between this preacher and the mendicant friar in the Danza general, to whom Death says:

Maestro famoso, sutil e capás,
 Que en todas las artes fuestes sabidor. . . .
 (ed. cit., 383:2)

The preacher's reply to Carón confirms this, for, like his counterpart, he is guilty of falsehood in his preaching:

Fingía en público sanctidad por ganar crédito con el pueblo y quando subía en el púlpito, procurava de endereçar mis reprehensiones de manera que no tocassen a los que estaban presentes, porque, como sabes, ninguno huelga que le digan las verdades. (27-28)

There are really two related sins here, the lying which took place in the sermons, and hypocrisy. The former is unquestionably a mortal sin contrary to charity, for, as Aquinas says, ". . . whoever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as he is concerned, makes faith void; and so sins mortally."³¹ Hypocrisy, on the other hand, is not always a mortal sin, for the intention of the hypocrite is to appear to be good, which is not contrary to charity.³² Some types of hypocrisy can be contrary to charity, however, and Aquinas's explanation makes it clear that the preacher's hypocrisy is a mortal sin:

There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to both of the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal

sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine [emphasis added]

. . . .³³

In the first place, the preacher makes it clear that he does not wish actually to be holy when he says to Carón,

Mira, hermano: si yo les dixera las verdades, quiça se quisieran convertir y vivir como christianos, y fuera menester que de pura vergüença hiziera yo otro tanto, y desto me quería yo bien guardar. (28)

Thus, because of his refusal to be holy in the true sense of the word, and because of the fact that he simulated holiness in order to "disseminate false doctrine," the hypocrisy of the preacher is a mortal sin contrary to charity. After having spoken with the preacher, Carón no longer is quite so astonished by the fact that the Christians live in such an un-Christian manner.

The adviser is the next soul to come for passage. He is an excellent concrete example of the type of individual about whom Marcel Bataillon generalizes in the following remark about the Diálogo:

Lo que impresiona, en la mayor parte de las almas que vienen a pedir paso, no es tanto la cínica inconsciencia con que exponen su conducta, cuanto su soberbia seguridad de haber rescatado las peores inmoralidades a fuerza de prácticas devotas.³⁴

The adviser can scarcely believe that he is being sent to Hell, as the following exchange indicates:

Carón: Mal podías gobernar a los otros si no te supiste gobernar a ti.

Anima: ¿Cómo no?

Carón: Porque si bien te gobernaras no vinieras al infierno.

Anima: ¿Cómo, que no viniera al infierno? ¿Párecete que venir aquí es venir al infierno?

Carón: A la fe, hermano, si te piensas otra cosa estás muy engañado.

Anima: ¡O desventurado de mí! Que al infierno tengo de ir?

Carón: Desto ninguna dubda tengas.

Anima: Apena [sic] te puedo creer. (36)

The adviser reveals that his incredulity is due to the fact that his entire life has been the exercise of one devout practice after another. Since the condemnation of mere devotional externalism is a key thread which runs through the entire book, it will be well to analyze it in detail here. The adviser says to Carón:

Cata que yo era christiano y recibí siendo niño el baptismo y después la confirmación; confessávame y comulgávame tres o quatro vezes en el año, guardava todas las fiestas, ayunava todos los días que manda la Iglesia, y aun otros muchos por mi devoción, y las vigiliass de Nuestra Señora a pan y agua; oía cada día mi missa y hazía dezir muchas a mi costa, rezava ordinariamente las horas canónicas y otras muchas devociones, fui muchas vezes en romería y tuve muchas novenas en casas de gran devoción, rezava en las cuentas que bendixo el Papa Hadriano,³⁵ dava limosna a los pobres, casé muchas huérfanas, edificué tres monasterios y hize infinitas otras buenas obras. Allende desto tomé una bula del Papa en que me

absolvía a culpa y a pena, in articulo mortis. Traia siempre un hábito de la merced, al tiempo de mi muerte tomé una candela en la mano de las del Papa Hadriano, enterréme en hábito de Sant Francisco, allende de infinitas mandas pías que en mi testamento dexé. (36-37)

It is necessary to delineate very clearly the author's attitude toward these externals, in order to distinguish it from the attitude of the man who most obviously influenced him here, namely, Erasmus. (As Montesinos says, "Lo más erasmiano en la actitud religiosa de Valdés es su repugnancia frente a ceremonias y supersticiones. . . ." ³⁶) For Valdés, the ceremonies and externals of devotion are good if they are used properly, with a correct attitude. As Mercurio says, "Mira, hermano, tú has contado muchas cosas buenas, mas a mi ver sabías dellas mal usar, teniendo más respecto a cumplir con tu voluntad que ni con la de Dios ni con tu oficio" (37). By indulging in these devout practices the adviser took time away from the fulfillment of his occupation and was thus detrimental to the good of the republic. As Mercurio says to him, ". . . no ay oración más grata a Dios que cumplir su voluntad; y sabiendo tú ser ella que se haga bien al próximo, ¿pensavas servirlo rezando, con daño del próximo?" (38). Mercurio is alluding here to the primacy of the virtue of charity. Valdés's stance seems to be that if the externals of devotion are performed in the spirit of charity, they will be efficacious. Erasmus was also critical of religious ceremonies, but he went farther than Valdés

was willing to go in his denunciation. Consider, for example, this statement from The Education of a Christian Prince, one of Valdés's most important sources, according to Montesinos:³⁷

. . . do not think that Christ is found in ceremonies, in doctrines kept after a fashion, and in constitutions of the church. Who is truly Christian? Not he who is baptized or annointed, or who attends church. It is rather the man who has embraced Christ in the innermost feelings of his heart, and who emulates Him by his pious deeds.³⁸

In another book, the Spanish translation of the Enchiridion Militis Christiani, he seems to take a more moderate position, not denying that externals may serve some useful purpose:

. . . este error de estimar las cosas exteriores y literales más que las interiores y espirituales es una común pestilencia que anda entre todos los cristianos. La cual tanto es más dañosa cuanto más cerca anda, al parecer, de santidad y devoción. Ca no hay vicios ningunos tan peligrosos como los que quieren parecer virtudes. Porque allende del peligro en que ponen aun a los buenos, que se pueden presto engañar y caer en ellos, tienen otro mal: que ningunos vicios son tan dificultosos de corregir ni emendarse, a causa que el pueblo sin discreción piensa que toda la religión cristiana se destruye cuando estas semejantes devociones exteriores en cierta manera se reprehenden; y también porque reclama luego todo el mundo, y ladran unos vocingleros predicadores que de buena gana les predicán estas cosas, teniendo por ventura mas respeto a su interese proprio que a la gloria de Jesucristo.³⁹ Cuya superstición grosera y santidad no verdadera me hace tantas veces protestar que yo no solamente no reprehendo los ejercicios de los simples ni las corporales cerimonias de los cristianos, especialmente las que por autoridad de la Iglesia están aprobadas, porque son algunas veces indicios y muestras de devoción y otras veces ayudan y aparejan e ella, pero aun digo que puesto caso que estas cosas sean en alguna manera más necesarias a

los principiantes que no han entrado por este camino y son como niños recientes en la doctrina y espíritu de Jesucristo, hasta que crezcan y se hagan varones perfectos, pero que todavía no cumple que los perfectos los desechen tampoco ni desprecien, por que a ejemplo suyo no se escandalicen los más flacos. Así que yo apruebo lo que haces, con tanto que el fin y la intención cuanto a lo primero no sea viciosa; y demás desto con tanto que no hagas hincapié ni te detengas en el escalón que está puesto para subir más arriba a cosas más apropiadas a tu salud.⁴⁰

Even in this more moderate statement Erasmus was positing a much more radical freedom from the externals of devotion than Valdés. While it is true that they may be of positive use to neophytes, as a kind of springboard into Christian doctrine, the only reason he can adduce for "los perfectos" to use them is to avoid giving scandal. On the other hand, the good married man, one of the characters Valdés puts forward as an example of a perfect Christian, avails himself of the sacraments, specifically the Eucharist (137) and Extreme Unction (140), and hears Mass on every holy day as well as on other days when he has time free from his professional duties (133). It is true that he is not slavishly tied to these externals, as are some of the other characters in the book. Nevertheless, he takes advantage of these things as a means to an end and he seems unwilling, as Valdés probably was, to prescind from them entirely. Thus, while both Erasmus and Valdés agree that externals must be infused by a spirit of charity to be efficacious,⁴¹ the former seems to lay the groundwork for a total independence from externals, whereas the latter could not posit such a radical liberty.

Returning now to the adviser, we see that he is guilty of a sin which has never before been observed in a Spanish Dance of Death: flattering a prince. Describing the method by which he got his way with the prince, the adviser says:

Procurava de andar siempre a su voluntad y nunca dezirle cosa que le pesasse. Si él dezía algo en consejo, aunque fuesse muy malo, dezía yo que era lo mejor del mundo, y como yo tenía opinión de sanctidad, los otros no osavan contradecirme, especialmente siendo el príncipe de mi parte. Con esto hazía dos cosas: ganava la gracia y amor del príncipe y mucha reputación con el vulgo. (39)

The influence of Erasmus is obvious here. In The Education of a Christian Prince this is what he has to say about flatterers of princes:

But the objective [i.e. of removing from the prince's spirit common vulgar ideas and replacing them with salutary thoughts] cannot be accomplished, unless every means is used to stave off abject flatterers. To this malicious tribe the good fortune of great princes is especially exposed. The very innocence of the prince's age makes it vulnerable to attacks of this evil, partly because by natural inclination it takes more pleasure in blandishments than in truth, and partly because of inexperience. The less one suspects trickery, the less one knows how to avoid it. Let no one think that the evil of flatterers (being a sort of minor evil)⁴² should be passed over: the most flourishing empires of the greatest kings have been overthrown by the tongues of flatterers. Nowhere do we read of a state which has been oppressed under a great tyranny in which flatterers did not play the leading roles in the tragedy.⁴³

This condemnation of flattery involves an emphasis on the virtue of charity, as can be seen by a consultation of Aquinas's analysis of the seriousness of the vice. His

views are quoted in detail, because of the frequency with which this vice is condemned in the Diálogo:

. . . a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isa. v. 20, Woe to you that call evil good. Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Prov. xxvii. 6): Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy. Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall. . . .⁴⁴

Since the adviser's flattery was a case of calling evil good, his sin is therefore mortal.⁴⁵ Furthermore, his simulation of holiness for the purpose of protecting himself from the criticisms of others is a type of hypocrisy, like that of the preacher, which is contrary to charity since it is performed for a purpose contrary to true holiness. The adviser knew that what he was doing was wrong, but claims that his confessors told him that it was a good way to "medrar y ganar honra en el mundo" (40) and that through indulgences gained by pious acts he could make reparation for the offense to God. It is not the concept of indulgences per se against which Valdés rails, but rather their abuse. Aquinas would certainly agree that

indulgences would not be of any use to Valdés's adviser, for he says that

indulgences have precisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have the authority, that the recipient have charity [emphasis added], and that as regards the cause, there be piety which includes the honor of God and the profit of our neighbor.⁴⁶

Thus charity, the highest virtue for Valdés, is the key to the efficacy of indulgences. The virtue of faith also plays a part in this incident, for Mercurio ascertains that the adviser was saddened upon realizing that he was to die. Explaining to him why he instead should have been glad, he suggests that his problem may have been due to lack of faith:

Si tú te acordaras que aquel cuerpo no era sino una cárcel en que estabas preso⁴⁷ y que no eras morador, sino caminante en aquel mundo, no solamente no te pesara, mas holgaras de salir dél. . . . Mas como tú no tenías respecto a más de aquella vida y quizá dudavas si había otra y para aquella endereçavas todas tus cosas, y por satisfacer al mundo hazías tus buenas obras, no me maravillo que se te hiziesse de mal dexarlo. (41)

Thus the adviser is criticized for doubting the reality of an afterlife, something unheard of in the medieval Dances of Death. The above lines indicate that Valdés's thought, like that of Erasmus, is strongly eschatological and has nothing to do with contemporary man-centered naturalistic humanism.⁴⁸ Compare the following quote from Erasmus's Enquiridion: "Y aun ternía por oración más perfeta que

deseasen ser sueltos ya deste cuerpo y unidos con Jesucristo en el cielo. . . ."⁴⁹

Since faith precedes charity by order of generation, it may be the adviser's lack of faith which prevented him from acting in a charitable fashion. Mercurio explains to the adviser why his pious acts could not prevent his ultimate condemnation. Regarding the matter of his burial in the habit of Saint Francis, he says:

Ven acá: ¿conocerías tú una raposa en hábito de hermitaño? ¿Y piensas que Dios no conoce un ruín aunque venga en hábito de bueno? Si tú bivieras como San Francisco, aunque no murieras en su hábito, te diera Dios el premio que dió a San Francisco, mas viviendo tú contrario a la vida de San Francisco, porque al tiempo de tu muerte te vestieses su hábito, ¿pensavas salvarte con San Francisco? Gentil necedad era la tuya. (42-43)

This may have been taken directly from Erasmus, who says in the Enquiridion that if you (the impersonal "you," directed to all Christians) want to be buried in the habit of Saint Francis, "ten por cierto que si cuando eras vivo no procuraste de seguir las costumbres semejables a las suyas, que no te aprovechará mucho después desta vida llevar vestidura semejante a la suya."⁵⁰ The adviser finally experiences a posteriori desengaño, and his final wish is that he be allowed to return to earth to take vengeance on those who deceived him. Of course Mercurio informs him that his desengaño has come too late.

The duke is the next to arrive. Mercurio alludes to one of his sins when he says: "Mira, mira, Carón, con

quánta arrogancia viene aquella ánima? (53). The emphasis on charity here is implicit in the use of the word "arrogancia," for Aquinas says that "arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride.

. . ."51 Since pride is a mortal sin by its genus, arrogance, a type of pride, must be contrary to charity. (Carón alludes to the equality of all men in death, a theme traditionally found in Dances of Death, when he says to the duke: "Pues, mira, hermano: duques, reyes, papas, cardenales y ganapanes, todos son iguales en mi barca" [53].) The duke is another example of a person who thought that he could save himself through exclusive dependence on devotional formulas, without any interior commitment to Christ. He says:

. . . diéronme a entender que rezando la oración del conde no moriría en pecado mortal ni podría venir al infierno. Pues para el purgatorio tenía yo diez o doze bulas del papa que me libravan dél,⁵² de manera que nunca pensé que el paraíso se me había de escapar de las manos. (53)

His life style, however, was completely un-Christian. His sins were gluttony, lust, covetousness, and hypocrisy. In answer to Caron's question about how he lived, he says:

Como los otros: comer y beber muy largamente, y aun a ratos no me contentava con mi muger, y todo mi cuidado era de acrecentar mi señorío y sacar dineros de mis vasallos. Y por que me toviessen por buen christiano, y por dexar memoria de mí, edificué y fundé muchos monasterios y hazía muchas limosnas a frailes, porque me publicassen por hombre de buena vida. (53)

The vices of gluttony, lust, and covetousness have been shown to be contrary to charity (supra, Chapter I, Part 1). Hypocrisy is a mortal sin to the extent that the hypocrite refuses to attempt actually to be holy, but chooses only to appear so. This describes the duke, since the only end his "good" works had was the praise of the world, not the approval of God. As Aquinas says: "Virtuous acts performed in an undue manner (i.e. out of unlawful superstition or for vainglory) constitute vices by excess."⁵³ Before he died the duke could have repented, made an act of contrition, confessed his sins and died in a state of grace, but the specific manner in which he died prevented this. He says:

Estando para morir, aunque me había confesado y comulgado y me parecía tener algún arrepentimiento de mis pecados, nunca acabé de dexar del todo la voluntad de tornar a ellos. Allende desto, había allí tanta gente llorando, que me tovieron muy ocupado en hazer mi testamento y en ordenar la pompa con que mi cuerpo se había de enterrar, juntamente con la angustia y congoxa de dexar tantos bienes de que veía no poder más gozar, que nunca me pude acordar de Dios ni demandarle perdón de mis pecados. Tenía también dos frailes, uno de una parte y otro de otra, que me estaban leyendo no sé qué oraciones, que ni ellos ni yo las entendíamos, y perturbábanme el entendimiento. De manera que muriendo con aquella congoxa, quando pensé subir al cielo me hizieron baxar acá al infierno. (54)

Aquinas says that "for the remission of sin . . . it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, . . ."⁵⁴ and ". . . the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition. . . ."⁵⁵ The duke's

attachment to his worldly pleasures indicates that he had not fully renounced his sins, and he even admits that he had not fully determined to renounce them. Without this sincere contrition it was impossible for him to receive absolution. Aquinas explains why this is so, and in the process alludes to the primacy of charity:

Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and though he does not receive the fruit of absolution, yet he will begin to receive it, when he is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments.
 . . .⁵⁶

But since this was the duke's last confession and he died immediately afterwards, there was no time for him to reach a state of full contrition, especially in view of the disturbing effect of the bedside prayers of the two friars.⁵⁷

The bishop has no redeeming qualities whatsoever. His definition of the episcopal state indicates how totally his mind is bound by a consideration of externals:

Obispo es traer vestido un roquete blanco, dezir missa con una mitra en la cabeça y guantes y anillos en las manos, mandar a los clérigos del obispado, defender las rentas dél y gastarlas a su voluntad, tener muchos criados, servirse con salva y dar beneficios. (61)

As Carón points out, by this definition not even Saint Peter was a bishop. Carón has his own philosophy of what a bishop should do: take good care of the souls that are entrusted to him, even laying down his life for them if necessary; instruct them with sound doctrine and the example of a holy life; as a prerequisite for the latter function, have a thorough knowledge of Sacred Scripture; be free from mundane interests; and finally, give aid to the poor. The bishop has never heard of any of these considerations, and he is particularly scandalized by the final one, as the following exchange reveals:

Anima: ¿Pobres? Gentil cosa sería que un pobre se sentase a la mesa de un obispo.

Caron: De manera que si viniera Jesu Christo a comer contigo, ¿no lo sentaras a tu mesa porque era pobre?

Anima: No, si viniera mal vestido. (62)

This is a very strong condemnation of the bishop; it includes an emphasis on charity because, as Aquinas says, mercy results from charity.⁵⁸ Carón elaborates further on the subject of the bishop's obligation to succor the poor, explaining that they have more right to the bishop's income and property (rentas) than his own servants: ". . . las rentas de los obispos sé que no fueron instituídas para sus criados, sino para que con ellas mantuviessen los pobres" (63). This is one point where a slight difference between Valdés and Aquinas may be observed. The latter would certainly agree that part of a bishop's obligation is to "distribute to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which

accrue to [him]."⁵⁹ He feels, however, that ecclesiastical goods are to be used for other purposes besides aiding the poor. He also makes a distinction between private property which bishops may own and ecclesiastical goods which they possess only as dispensers, and deals with the question of whether or not a bishop sins mortally if he does not distribute ecclesiastical goods to the poor.⁶⁰ Although Aquinas appears to give the bishops more leeway in the dispensation of goods to the poor than does Valdés, both concur in making the virtue of charity the main criterion by which such dispensation is to be judged. The bishop in the Diálogo is certainly guilty of what Aquinas calls bad faith, since he is positively indifferent to the poor. He says: "Sé que los pobres no me servían a mí" (63). His sins do not end here, however, He is also guilty of simony, for he gave benefices to his servants in payment for their services. Even though no exchange of money took place here, this was still simony, for, as Aquinas says:

. . . the term money denotes anything that can have a pecuniary value. Now it is evident that a man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any external thing which comes under the head of real remuneration, so too does he contract it by receiving oral remuneration or an equivalent in service rendered.⁶¹

Simony is a vice contrary to religion, which is a moral virtue and a part of justice. Justice depends on charity, however, so that the sin of simony, involving a failure to render to God His due, is directly opposed to justice and indirectly to charity.⁶² The bishop is also guilty of sloth. According to him, "el ayuno no se hizo sino para los necios y pobres" (64). Sloth is a kind of moral inertia which resists the performance of good acts and is a mortal sin since ". . . any sin which by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, . . . and such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy in God . . . while sloth is sorrow about spiritual good inasmuch as it is a Divine good."⁶³ Finally, he is also guilty of lust, for he kept a certain concubine by the name of Lucrecia for his pleasure (who he foolishly thinks will kill herself as soon as she finds out about his death). Lust is opposed to charity since it leads to folly and folly is the contrary of wisdom, which presupposes charity.⁶⁴

The cardinal continues the procession and is accused of bad faith in the dispensation of ecclesiastical goods, one of the bishop's vices. The cardinal used the income from churches, monasteries, and hospitals to sustain the war. Valdés condemns this very strongly when he has Mercurio ask the cardinal: "¿ No tenías vergüença de vender las rentas que fueron dadas para mantener pobres, porque sirviessen para matar homres?" (75). (This condemnation

suggests that Valdés assumed that the war the cardinal was supporting was unjust, although he does not say so in so many words.) Any action which is an obstacle to peace is also opposed to charity, since ". . . charity, according to its very nature, causes peace."⁶⁵

The despairing nun is the first soul in whom guilt is mitigated by extenuating circumstances. As a young woman she was placed in a convent, against her will, by her parents and brothers, who wished to be able to take her share of their estate for themselves. Her entry into the convent led her to despair. She says:

. . . después de entrada nunca tuve un día bueno, y así, maldiziendo a mis padres y hermanos y a todo mi linaje, nunca había sino decir: ¡O padre! ¿por qué me engendraste? ¿No valiera más que el mismo día que nací me ahogáredes y feneciera, que no que me criáredes para que viva malaventurada todos los amargos días de mi vida?. . . . En estos y en otros semejantes plantos estuve siempre hasta que yo misma fui causa de mi muerte. (82-83)

Her basic sin may be a type of sloth, for she introduces herself to Carón by saying "Yo soy la desdichada que, no gozando [emphasis added] del otro mundo, vengo ahora a penar en estotro" (82). Her sin is thus opposed to joy, which is an effect of charity,⁶⁶ and the sin which is opposed to the joy of charity, insofar as it has as its object the Divine good (as opposed to the good of our neighbor), is sloth.⁶⁷ (This is a continuation of the emphasis on joy observed in Mercurio's earlier remarks about the persecuted true Christians.) Her despair arises

from sloth, for Aquinas states that despair is one of its daughters.⁶⁸ Actually, however, the a priori desengaño in this incident condemns the parents and brothers much more than the nun herself. Carón promises her that her torment will be reduced⁶⁹ and that he will take vengeance on her parents and brothers by keeping them waiting for passage. The following exchange then takes place between him and Mercurio:

Carón : ¿Qué me dices, Mercurio, de la crueldad que usan los cristianos con sus propias hijas, encerrandolas en los monasterios con poca consideración y aun muchas veces contra su voluntad?

Mercurio: Téngolo por una grandísima abominación, y así tengo bien encomendado a los jueces que a los que tal hazen castiguen muy crudamente,⁷⁰ así como homicidas que matan y entierran sus propias hijas, también como a ladrones, que las privan de lo que por derecho avían de heredar de sus bienes, y así como los que andan a matar ánimas, pues las hazen desesperar.
(83-84)

The main sin of the nun's family was covetousness, and to satisfy this inordinate desire they acted contrary to charity by placing her in a convent so that she could not inherit her share of the family property. This is contrary to charity because their intention was to deprive the girl of her belongings. (If their intention had been to place her in a convent as an aid to her spiritual well-being, the action might be considered ill-advised but not sinful.) It happened, however, that the girl was harmed in more than just her belongings; convent life led her to despair, and so

she was damned. The girl's family is also accountable for this unfortunate result, even though it may not have been foreseen, for ". . . on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful."⁷¹

In the episode with the next victim, the English adviser, the political theme intersects with the Dance of Death motif. He informs Mercurio and Carón that the king of England (Henry VIII) and the king of France (Francis I) have publicly declared war on Charles V. The adviser is not presented as an entirely malevolent character; he explains that Henry had only one cause for declaring war against the emperor: "La avaricia y ambición de un cardenal que tiene cabe sí, por cuya mano se dexa gobernar" (84).⁷² He further explains, in response to Carón's questioning, that the cardinal was not moved by any love for the king of France, but rather by a strong hatred of Charles. This hatred, according to the adviser, had a double cause: the virtuousness of the emperor made him hateful to the cardinal, since evil people always hate good people; also, the refusal of the emperor to make the cardinal pope by force further infuriated him. It happens that the adviser was condemned for having cast his vote in favor of this unjust war:

Mercurio: Dime, ánima pecadora, ¿ y tú davas tu voto para que se hiziesse y moviesse una guerra tan injusta como ésta?

Anima: Sabe Dios cuánto me pesava de darlo, mas no podía hazer otra cosa, si yo no quisiera que me echaran del consejo.

Mercurio: ¿Por qué?

Anima: Porque si contradixera la volyntad del cardenal no quedara sólo un día en el consejo.

Mercurio: ¿No te valiera más estar fuera dél por bueno que venir al infierno por malo?

Anima: Sí, mas ¿ la honra?

Mercurio: Pues quesiste más la honra del mundo que la vida eterna, acá pagarás tu mala elección. (86)

Thus the adviser is condemned for having given his approval of an unjust war. This is a sin against charity, for Aquinas lists war as a vice contrary to peace,⁷³ which is the work of charity.⁷⁴ He was moved to do this by a false sense of honor, for, as Aquinas says, ". . . virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored."⁷⁵ The adviser mistakenly thought that he could secure his honor through a sinful act, and so he was condemned.

The next to interrupt Mercurio's narration is the king of the Galatians, a character whom Valdés uses to represent pure tyranny. Thus the a priori desengaño of this incident is primarily political and centers on the obligations of the good prince. (Valdés's most immediate source-book for political theory was Erasmus's Institutio principis christiani,⁷⁶ but his political ideas, at least in their broad outlines, can be seen to be not radically different from those of Aquinas.)

Carón has the privilege of interrogating the king, and the first question he asks is whether he was king for the good of the republic or for his own good. The king's answer: "¿Quién es rey sino para su provecho?" (90) causes Carón to respond in this way:

A la fe, hermano, el que piensa ser rey para su provecho y tiene más cuidado de lo que cumple a sí mesmo que a la república, aquel tal no es rey, sino tyrano. (90)

Erasmus and Aquinas would concur in this definition of a tyrant. Erasmus says:

. . . Aristotle differentiates between a prince and a tyrant on the basis that one is interested in his own pursuits and the other is concerned for the state. No matter what the prince is deliberating about, he always keeps this one thing in mind: "Is this to the advantage of all my subjects?" A tyrant only considers whether a thing will contribute to his cause.⁷⁷

Aquinas's remarks on the same subject could as easily have been written by either Valdés or Erasmus:

A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler. . . . Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the injury of the multitude.⁷⁸

It will be recalled (v. Chapter I, Part 1) that sedition is a sin against charity since it represents a "failure to render to each one his right," the definition of justice offered by Aquinas, and whoever acts against the due order

of justice sins mortally.⁷⁹ Seditio is also a sin against charity in a more direct way, since it is opposed to peace, and peace is the work of charity.⁸⁰ The king is also accused of waging unjust war, since war was the method he used for conquering new territories. This recalls the emperor in the Dança general, to whom Death says:

Aqui perderédes el buestro cabdal:
 Que atesorastes con grand tyrania,
 Fasiendo batallas de noche e de dia. . . .(ed. cit.,
 380:2)

As explained in the analysis of the emperor, three things are necessary for a war to be just: 1) it must be waged by the authority of the sovereign; 2) it must be waged for a just cause; 3) it must be waged with a right intention.⁸¹ Here, as was the case with the emperor in the Dança general, only the first condition is fulfilled. The people the king attacks do not deserve to be attacked, so that a just cause is absent. In addition, the king does not attack them with a proper intention, such as the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil,⁸² but only out of naked self-interest. This is against charity by being a sin against justice, for Aquinas says that ". . . tyrants who take great things by violence, are said to be . . . unjust."⁸³ He is also guilty of frivolousness and lust, for, when Carón asks him in what he occupied himself, he says: "En jugar, caçar, burlar y andar entre mugeres" (92). These sins are all at least potentially opposed to charity since they are examples of plunging one's senses into worldly

pleasures so that one's mind is led into folly and turned away from the love of God, which ought to be its primary concern. In the case of the king, however, they led to an even greater sin, scandal. Carón, wishing to know whether there are laws to punish people who behave as the king did, is told that there are, but that the king is above the law. To this Carón replies:

Dizes la verdad, porque el rey devría ser tan justo, tan limpio y tan sancto y tan apartado de vicios, que aun en un cabello no rompiesse la ley, y por esso dizen que ella no le comprehende; mas el que vive como tú hazías, muy más gravemente devría ser castigado de lo que la ley manda, porque assí como el buen rey haze mucho fructo con su exemplo, y, por tanto, deve ser de sus súbditos muy amado, y en más tenido y estimado, assí el malo haze mucho deño con el mal exemplo, y deve, por tanto, ser de los suyos aborrecido, castigado y aun del reino privado. (92-93)

Scandal is improper behavior which occasions another's spiritual downfall, and the king, because of his high station, is more susceptible to this vice than others (v. supra, Chapter I, Part 1). The emphasis on charity is implicit because, as Aquinas says, ". . . scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity."⁸⁴

Valdés, Erasmus, and Aquinas would all agree that a monarchy is the best form of government, but that it has dangers which must be avoided by having a good and virtuous man for king. That this is Valdés's opinion should be clear from the foregoing. Erasmus says:

Although there are many types of state, it is the consensus of nearly all wise-thinking men that the best form is monarchy. This is according to the example of God that the sum of all

things be placed in the individual but in such a way that, following God's example, he surpasses all others in his wisdom and goodness and, wanting nothing, may desire only to help his state. But if conditions were otherwise, that would be the worst form of state. Whosoever would fight it then would be the best man. If a prince be found who is complete in all good qualities, then pure and absolute monarchy is the thing. (If that could only be! I fear it is too great a thing even to hope for.) If an average prince (as the affairs of men go now) is found, it will be better to have a limited monarchy checked and lessened by aristocracy and democracy. Then there is no chance for tyranny to creep in. . . .⁸⁵

Aquinas's view is quite similar:

A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the virtuous man who conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity. . . . Now perfect virtue is to be found in few. . . . Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them.⁸⁶

Aquinas thus rejects absolutism.⁸⁷ For him the best form of government will be a mixed one in which one person is given the power to preside over all, but with others under him also having governing powers:

this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e., government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers.⁸⁸

Aquinas would not balk at the necessity of deposing a tyrant, but the king of the Galatians had guarded himself against such a development. He says:

Tenía mis súbditos en tanto temor y tan amedrentados que no osavan rebollirse, quanto más levantarse contra mí, por malo que yo fuesse. (93)

This, of course, merely confirms the absolute tyranny of the king. Valdés goes on to use him to iterate a point made earlier in the Diálogo, namely, that the prince should avoid flatterers. The king explains that there were all kinds of people in his court, good and bad, and that he treated the evil people very well but refused, as far as possible, even to speak with the good ones. Carón asks him why he felt that this was a suitable thing to do:

Porque los buenos nunca me hazían sino ladrar a las orejas, diziendo que tratava mal mis súbditos y que no hazía lo que devía, y por esto los tenía aborrecidos; los otros nunca me dezían cosa que me pesasse, mas todo lo que hazía, aunque fuesse lo peor del mundo, lo aprovavan ellos por muy bueno. ¿ No querías, pues, que yo hiziesse favor y mercedes a estos tales? (94)

Carón, of course, answers negatively because ". . . el príncipe mucho más se deve holgar con quien le reprehende que no con quien le lisongea" (94). Flattery is a mortal sin, as was seen above in the incident with the adviser. The difference between the a priori desengaño of that episode and this one is that the king is condemned for being a willing recipient thereof. The king claims to have done at least one thing for the love of God, and this would, by definition, be a charitable act, were it not for the fact that, upon examination, he reveals that it was his own interest that moved him more than the love of God. The specific act to which he refers is the waging of war against the Turks. When Carón asks him how he waged war

against them, he replies: "Haziéndoles todo el mal que podía" (96). Carón explains the method which the king should have used to induce the Turks to become Christians. His words indicate that, as Montesinos has observed,⁸⁹ Valdés's Christian republic is not really tolerant: it wishes to convert by persuasion, if possible, but by force if necessary:

Quando tú hovieras tan bien gobernado tus reinos que los tuvieras en mucha paz y sossiego, y que tú y ellos viviérades ya como buenos christianos, estonces fuera bien que procuraras de convertir los turcos, primero haziéndoles muy buenas obras para atraerlos a la fe con amor, como hizieron los apóstoles que predicaron la doctrina de Jesu Christo, y después, si por amor no se quisieran convertir y pareciera cumplir a la honra de Christo procurar de hazerlos convertir por fuerza, estonces lo havías de hazer con tanta moderación, que los turcos conocieran que no les hazías guerra por señorearlos ni por robarlos, mas solamente por la salud de sus ánimas.⁹⁰ (96-97)

This method, however, would have been incompatible with the king's true motive for waging war, as the following exchange indicates:

Anima: Bien creo yo que dizes verdad, mas juntamente con hazer servicio a Dios quería yo aprovecharme, acrescentando mi señorío en las tierras que tomasse a los turcos.

Carón: Dessa manera más te movía tu interesse particular que la honra de Jesu Christo.

Anima: No te lo puedo negar. (97)

Thus the war he waged against the Turks was waged for a just cause but with a wicked intention, and this renders it a sin against charity. Like so many other characters

in the Diálogo, the king thought that he could indulge himself liberally in all these vices and still be saved by purely external acts of devotion, such as building monasteries, reciting prayers which he couldn't understand, going to confession (without being sincerely repentant), and collecting indulgences granted him by popes. In addition to these purely ineffectual means, he also relied on the mercy of God. This is the sin of presumption which is contrary to the theological virtue of hope⁹¹ (as opposed to the presumption which is contrary to magnanimity). Aquinas says:

. . . as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits.⁹²

This type of presumption arises directly from pride,⁹³ and is a sin against charity to the extent that, by trusting in Divine mercy, a man does not refrain from doing that which is directly contrary to God and his neighbor. But this precisely describes the modus vivendi of the king of the Galatians, whom Valdés consigns to the torments of hell.

Valdés's "galofobia"⁹⁴ surfaces in his treatment of the next soul, the French adviser.⁹⁵ Carón alludes to one of his vices when he asks him "¿Dónde cobraste tanta sobervia?" (104). The adviser was a secretary to the king,

although his main claim is that he put together more than eighty thousand ducats in less than ten years. Although covetousness may be a mortal or venial sin, in the adviser's case it was mortal, since he satisfied it through uncharitable acts of duplicity and fraud. He explains the method by which he made himself rich:

Lo primero que yo hazía era dar a entender a todos que tenía tanta parte con el Rey, que hazía dél lo que yo quería y que ninguna cosa él determinava sin mí. Con esto hazía que todos los negociantes acudiesen a mí, y a los que me davan algo hablava yo con el bonete en la mano y les dava a todas horas audiencia; a los otros amostrava muy mala cara hasta que les sacava algo. Si vacava o se había de proveer alguna cosa y la pedían dos o tres, a todos prometía yo de ayudar, si me prometían ellos de pagármelo, y a las vezes no hablava por ninguno, mas cuando se proveían, aunque yo no hoviesse hecho nada, todavía levava por entero lo que habían prometido, dando a entender que yo lo había hecho, y muchas vezes había sido contrario. De manera que de quanto se proveía por mis manos, y aun a ratos por las ajenas, llevava yo mi repelón. Y con esta arte, prometiendo yo a entramas partes, no se me podían escapar. Allende desto, si se determinava alguna cosa en consejo en favor de alguno, luego se la hazía saber con diligencia, dándole a entender que tal y tal le habían sido contrarios y que yo solo lo había mantenido; siendo esto muchas vezes al contrario, que ellos lo favorecían y yo solo lo acusava. (105-106)

This is similar to the actions of the lawyer in the Dança general who took fees from both sides. The adviser's sin is basically that of lying, and any lie told for the purpose of injuring one's neighbor in his possessions is a mortal sin contrary to charity.⁹⁶ In order to get away with this in the council he resorted to discord, another sin also contrary to charity:

Procurava yo de tenerlos discordes. Iva al uno y dezíala que el tal havia dicho tal y tal cosa contra él y que lo quería mal, encargándole que no me descubriese, y después iva al otro y dezíale otro tanto, de manera que como yo sembrava discordia entre todos y no se osavan fiar unos de otros, cada uno procurava de agradarme por tenerme de su parte, y assí los traía a todos a mi voluntad y ninguno osava abrir la boca contra mí. (106)

Aquinas explains why discord is contrary to charity:

Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above . . . concord results from charity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.⁹⁷

All the adviser's sins were thus inspired by self-interest:

"Hiziesse yo mi provecho y fuesse como quiera" (107).

Yet his vices do not end here, for once again the political theme and the Dance of Death motif intersect. Carón, wishing to know if the adviser ever performed any notable service to the king, is proudly told that he was the one who came up with the scheme to free the king from imprisonment under Charles V. He advised the king to make promises to the emperor in order to be released from prison and then, once released, to renege on all the things he had promised. He thus advises the king to sin, and so shares in his guilt. As Carón says: ". . . de tal consejero tan [sic] consejo" (108). He is also guilty of promoting an unjust war, for he played a vital part in getting the pope and the king of England to challenge the emperor. He shamelessly admits that in all these actions his only motive was covetousness: ". . . todo mi intento era dexar

muy gran estado, y para hazerlo no tenía mejores medios que estos" (108). He attempts to justify himself by saying that his type of behavior is required for court life, at least if one wants to be praised as a "buen cortesano" (109) and not despised for his virtue. To solidify this rationalization he invokes the relativism of the law of custom:

Hermano, menester es vivir como en la tierra donde hombre se halla, y pues se requiere esto para vivir en las cortes de los príncipes, no te maravilles que yo me conformasse con la contumbre. (109)

Valdés will directly contradict this idea later on through the character of the married man. Aquinas, for his part, agrees that custom has the force of law,⁹⁸ but with a vital qualification, namely, that it cannot change natural and Divine laws.⁹⁹ But since all the adviser's sins are contrary to the theological virtue of charity (which has God as its object), they are against Divine and natural law,¹⁰⁰ so that his excuse is completely invalid.

The most overt emphasis on the virtue of charity in the Diálogo occurs in the incident with the hypocrite. He is under the mistaken impression that he is going directly to heaven, and he has a very inflated image of himself: "Fuí de los christianos que se llaman perfectos" (115). Mercurio accuses him of pride when he says "Muy gran señal es de no haverlo sido pensar tú que lo eras" (115). Predictably, the hypocrite's Christianity was composed exclusively of externals, such as being a priest, renouncing his possessions (according to Mercurio, poverty "más consiste

en la voluntad que en la posesión" [116]), saying Mass every day, fasting strenuously, and other similar acts. Mercurio explains that such externals are a means to true internal worship of God, and asks the hypocrite the vital question:

Mercurio: ¿Tenías caridad?

Anima: ¿A qué llamas caridad?

Mercurio: Si amavas a Dios sobre todas las cosas y a tu próximo como a ti mismo.

Anima: Eso era lo principal que yo hacía. (117)

Upon further questioning the hypocrite reveals that his life was not in fact infused by a spirit of charity. He sought to take vengeance on those who criticized his faults, saying that they were evil and persecuted the Christian religion, even though he knew these charges were false. Aquinas uses the word "vengeance" to refer to a virtue, namely, ". . . the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned."¹⁰¹ Consequently, it is necessary to use a word which, in Aquinas's language, more nearly describes the behavior of the hypocrite, and this word is "backbiting." This Aquinas defines as "the blackening of another's character by secret words."¹⁰² It is a sin against charity because

sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore, properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good name seems the most precious, since for lack

of it he is hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. xli. 15): Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great. Therefore, backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.¹⁰³

Some of the faults his critics attacked were lust, envy, and the spreading of superstitious beliefs for monetary gain. Lust is potentially contrary to charity since it is one means of inducing folly, or blindness of mind, whereby a man's attention is turned away from God and toward the enjoyment of worldly pleasures (cf. the squire, the sacristan, and the alfaquí in the Dança general). Aquinas explains why envy is contrary to charity:

Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life, according to 1 Jo. iii. 14, We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Now the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good, while envy grieves over it. . . . Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.¹⁰⁴

Superstition, as indicated above, is indirectly contrary to charity by being a sin against the highest moral virtue, religion, which is a part of justice. Thus, by encouraging superstition the hypocrite failed to render to God His due, and so sinned mortally. Mercurio suggests that it would have been better for the hypocrite to sustain himself by honest labor instead of these tricks. The latter replies: "No era honesto que siendo yo sacerdote trabajasse" (119). Mercurio counters immediately with the

example of Saint Paul, who labored with his hands by night in order to have enough to eat, so that he would not be a burden to his neighbor.¹⁰⁵ He also quotes Saint Paul in order to prove to the hypocrite that charity is the highest virtue:

Mercurio: ¿No has leído lo que escribió San Pablo a los corinthios: que aunque toviesse todas las otras virtudes, si le faltava caridad no le valía todo nada?

Anima: Assí lo dezían.

Mercurio: Pues assí te acaece agora a ti, que todos tus trabajos y todas tus buenas obras no te aprovechan, porque vinieron desnudas y vazías de caridad. (122)

Manuel J. Asensio states that this strong emphasis on charity as the manifestation of living faith is typical of the erasmistas.¹⁰⁶ To prove his point he quotes the above passage from the Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón and the two following passages, from Juan de Valdés's Diálogo de doctrina cristiana and Luis Vives's Socorro de los pobres, respectively: "Charidad no es otra cosa sino amor de Dios y del próximo . . . sin ella, no podemos ser cristianos . . ."; "No pueden subsistir la piedad ni el cristianismo sin el socorro mutuo. . . . El mandata más imperioso para el cristiano es la caridad."¹⁰⁷ The hypocrite's engaño was so thorough that, even faced with this irrefutable evidence, he cannot come to realize the error of his ways; his reply to Mercurio's explanation is "No te puedo creer" (122).

The theologian has already been discussed briefly in connection with Valdés's critical attitude toward Scholastic theology. By now the compatibility of Valdés's ideas and those of Aquinas should be obvious, so that it must be assumed either that Valdés had a false opinion of what Scholastic theology is, or that he was caricaturizing a specific theologian of his acquaintance. The theologian is in the Diálogo certainly bears no resemblance to a figure like Aquinas, for example. For him, to be a theologian "Saber disputar pro y contra y determinar quistiones de theología" (125). This is part of the truth, of course, but he goes on to add that he won his disputations using a true or a false argument, depending on what seemed most expedient at the time. He is thus criticized for being indifferent to truth (like the rabbi in the Dança general), which is the same as being indifferent to God, since God is truth.¹⁰⁸ His attempt to prove to Carón that he is a "cabrón" humorously illustrates this difference: "El cabrón tiene barbas y nunca se las peina, tú tienes barbas y nunca te las peinas, luego tú eres cabrón" (125). A theologian (or philosopher) who would blatantly misuse a syllogism in this fashion cannot possibly be motivated by a concern for truth.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the fact is that Valdés does not view Scholastic theology as being a suitable means of access to what he calls "la verdadera doctrina christiana" (127). The a priori desengaño of this incident contains a strong emphasis on what might be called

"evangelical theology." Karl Barth, the great German theologian, says that "'evangelical' refers primarily and decisively to the Bible. . . . What the word 'evangelical' will objectively designate is that theology which treats of the God of the Gospel."¹¹⁰ That this is the type of theology with which Valdés is primarily concerned is indicated by the following dialogue:

Carón: ¿Nunca leíste las epístolas de San Pablo?

Anima: Ni aun las oí nombrar sino en la missa.

Carón: ¿Y los evangelios?

Anima: Lo mismo.

Carón: Pues, ¿cómo eres theólogo?

Anima: ¡Como si para ser theólogo fuesen menester las epístolas ni evangelios!

Carón: Pues ¿qué leías?

Anima: Scoto, Sancto Thomás, Nicolas de Lira, Durando y otros semejantes doctores, y sobre todos Aristóteles.

Carón: ¿Y los Testamentos Viejo y Nuevo, San Gerónimo,¹¹¹ San Joan Chrisóstomo, Sanct Ambrosio y Sanct Agustín y los otros sanctos doctores ¿no los leías?

Anima: Algunas veces, mas pocas, porque no tienen esa sotileza destos otros.

Thus, according to Valdés, true Christian doctrine is to be derived primarily from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers of the Church.¹¹² This incident highlights again the fact, alluded to above, that in his mind there is an intimate and necessary connection between the virtue of charity and Christian doctrine.

With the arrival of the married man the a priori desengaño functions for the first time through positive rather than negative example,¹¹³ for this is the first soul who has merited salvation. He is also the first one who has experienced a posteriori desengaño during his lifetime. As a young man he kept bad company and thus acquired a number of vices of which he found it difficult to rid himself, but at the age of twenty-five he experienced a moral conversion which he describes in this manner:

Quando entré en los veinte y cinco años, comencé a considerar conmigo mesmo la vida que tenía y cuán mal empleava el conocimiento que Dios me había dado, y hize este argumento, diziendo: O esta doctrina cristiana es verdadera o no; si es verdadera, ¿no es grandisima necesidad mía vivir como vivo, contario a ella? Si es falsa, ¿para qué me quiero poner en guardar tantas cerimonias y constituciones como guardan los christianos? Luego me alumbró Dios el entendimiento,¹¹⁴ y conociendo ser verdadera la doctrina christiana, me determiné de dexar todas las otras supersticiones y los vicios, y ponerme a seguirla según devía y mis flacas fuerças bastassen, aunque para ello no me faltaron, de parientes y amigos, infinitas contrariedades; unos dezían que me tornava loco, y otros que me quería tornar fraile, y no faltava quien se burlasse de mí. Sufrialo yo todo con paciencia por amor de Jesu Christo. (130-131)

From this point on his life was a model of Christian perfection. Even more important than this, however, is the fact that this state of perfection was achieved by a man living in the mainstream of society.¹¹⁵ Although he considered at one time becoming a monk in order to flee the temptation of ambition, he decided not to do so on the

advice of one of his friends who was himself a monk and who told him that there was as much ambition in the monastery as outside of it. Instead he decided to marry, but without being sidetracked by considerations of exterior beauty or temporal goods, which he seems to regard as the source of most marital difficulties. Nor did he have any use for pilgrimages, for, as he says, ". . . me parecía simpleza ir yo a buscar a Hierusalem lo que tengo dentro de mí" (133).¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, although he exemplifies internal Christianity, the married man does not totally prescind from devotional externals. For example, he hears Mass every feast day and at other times when he is able, and he avails himself of the sacraments, particularly the Eucharist. Thus Valdés does not depart from orthodox Catholic teaching on the subject of the sacraments and celebrations, but only insists that, in order for them to be efficacious, they must be performed in the proper spirit, which is a spirit of charity. The married man's life is a model of charity, for everything that he does is motivated by the love of God and his neighbor. As he says: "Las cosas que tocavan a mi oficio exercitava como aquel que pensava ser puesto en él, no para que me aprovechasse a mí, sino para hazer bien a todos . . ." (136). In order to sustain in himself this charitable attitude, he spent his spare time reading sound doctrine. (This indicates again that Valdés has chosen to make the intimate connection between charity and doctrine explicit

rather than implicit [as in the Dança general].) In striving to attain the Christian ideal which he had set for himself, the married man took great care also to be a pleasant companion to his friends, ". . . porque ni me toviessen por hypócrita ni pensassen que para ser los hombres buenos christianos havían de ser melancónicos" (136). This is the same emphasis on Christian joy that was noted earlier in Mercurio's commentary about the persecuted Christians. It is perfectly consistent with Valdés's insistence that charity is the highest virtue, since ". . . spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity."¹¹⁷

But the most important aspect of Carón's interrogation of this particular soul is that it constitutes one of Valdés's contributions to the tradition of artes moriendi, which was quite popular in the sixteenth century.¹¹⁸ The married man's death is characterized by serene confidence and assurance - not the presumptuous confidence of the monk in the Dança general, but rather that which has as its source "[la] fe de los hombres en la gracia que los justifica. . .":¹¹⁹ he thus exemplifies Saint Paul's teaching that death without sin has no sting.¹²⁰ Since his entire life following his conversion had been informed by the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, he was indifferent about the external details of his funeral, such as the place of his burial, or how many times the bells should toll for him. Exasperated by the

priest's solicitousness about these trivialities, he rebuked him sharply:

Yo le dixere: Padre, por amor de Dios que no me fatiguéis agora con estas cosas. Yo lo remito todo a vos, que lo hagáis como mejor os pareciere, porque yo en sólo Jesu Christo tengo mi confiança. Sólomente os ruego que vengáis a darme la extrema unción. Díxome que si él no oviera confessado me toviera por gentil o pagano, pues tan poco caso hazía de lo que los otros tenían por principal. (139)121

He wanted his death to occasion no sadness on the part of his family, for he was ". . . muy alegre en salir de la cárcel de aquel cuerpo . . ." (140). His final hours, like those of Cornelius in Erasmus's Funus, were spent listening to readings from Sacred Scripture, and his last words were: "Jesu Christo, recibe ésta mi ánima pecadora" (141). Thus, for the true Christian death is not an evil but rather a boon, a liberation from the prison which is the human body.¹²² In order to prepare himself for this liberation, the Christian must fulfill his worldly duties to the best of his ability, for this is conceived by Valdés as an act of charity. This insistence on the importance of worldly duties should not be construed as a movement toward complete secularization, the creation of a human paradise on earth, for, in Valdés's view, as his treatise on Christian death reveals, ". . . todo lo terreno sólo adquiere sentido y valor sub specie aeternitatis."¹²³ When he has gone on his way, Mercurio says to Carón: "Mira, Carón, este es uno de aquellos que yo te dixere que seguían muy de veras la doctrina christiana" (141).

The married man was the last soul to be interrogated in the first book of the Diálogo. The a priori desengaño throughout the second book continues to function through positive rather than negative example, for in the second book all the souls are saved. Montesinos surmises that ". . . después de negar tanto, Valdés debió sentir la necesidad de afirmar."¹²⁴ Nevertheless, this tendency to affirm is counterbalanced by more than a modicum of pessimism underlying his treatment of most of the characters.

The first soul, the good king Polidoro, is the direct antithesis of the king of the Galatians, who was so roundly condemned by Valdés in the first book. It is in his treatment of Polidoro that Valdés's indebtedness to Erasmus's The Education of a Christian Prince is most noticeable. Polidoro's intention was to imitate the Divine attributes, for Mercurio says to him:

Tu presencia muestra tu poder, tu habla manifiesta tu saber y tu camino tu bondad, de manera que muestras bien cuánto cuidado toviste de parecer a aquel gran Dios de quien vas a gozar. (163)¹²⁵

However, like the married man, Polidoro did not always lead such a virtuous life, for, as he says, ". . . yo no supe antes de ser príncipe qué cosa fuese ser hombre . . ." (164).¹²⁶ He lays part of the blame for this situation on the fact that he was poorly educated:

. . . como fuí criado y doctrinado como los otros, la simiente de ambición que en mi ánimo echaron prendió tan presto, y se

arraigó de manera en mí, que todo mi pensamiento y todo mi cuidado era no en cómo regiría bien mis súbditos y gobernaría mis reinos, mas en cómo ensancharía y augmentaría mi señorío. (164)127

By being subjected to constant incitements to immoral behavior, Polidoro soon found himself trapped in a labyrinth from which it was almost impossible to escape. Waging constant war with neighboring princes he neglected the proper governing of his kingdom, which should have been his principal concern. Since he had already invested a great deal of time and money into his war enterprise, he felt that he could not abandon it for fear of the losses he would sustain, even though he sincerely wanted to do this. The process of his conversion is initiated by one of his servants, who whispers in his ear: "Torna, torna en ti, Polidoro" (166). This leads Polidoro to a lengthy examination of conscience in which he realizes that he has not treated his subjects as a father would treat his children nor as a shepherd his sheep, but rather as a master would treat his slaves.¹²⁸ As he says:

Mala señal es quando el pastor quiere
 más ovejas de las que el señor le quiere
 encomendar; señal es que se quiere
 aprovechar dellas y que las quiere,
 no para gobernarlas, mas para ordeñarlas. (167)129

Realizing how much suffering he has caused, at the end of his examination of conscience he makes a promise to God:

Desde agora, Señor, protesto que no quiero
 ser Rey para mi, sino para ti, ni quiero
 gobernar para mi provecho, sino para bien
 deste pueblo que me encomendaste. (168)130

The rest of Polidoro's statement explains the means by which he achieved this virtuous end. His first act was to rid himself of "viciosos, avaros y ambiciosos" (169), knowing that bad advisers can cause more evil than bad kings,¹³¹ and replace them with virtuous people upon whose integrity and judgement he could depend. He also insisted that all the children of his knights learn mechanical as well as liberal arts in order to ". . . evitar la ociosidad, de que nascen infinitos males . . ." (196).¹³² He enabled religion and Christian piety to flourish in his kingdom through ecclesiastical reforms, especially in handling of bishoprics and in reforming the bishops themselves.¹³³ Next he reformed the legal system and ordered punishment for lawyers who defended manifestly unjust causes.¹³⁴ Since justice is a moral virtue dependent on charity, actions undertaken to secure justice are, indirectly, charitable actions. An emphasis on charity is also discernible in the king's use of clemency with those who had sinned through ignorance or because of unfortunate circumstance, for, as Aquinas says:

As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good toward our neighbor, and hinder his evil.¹³⁵

Polidoro granted positions of preeminence to those who truly followed Christian doctrine, and soundly condemned those who, under the guise of religion, peddled superstitions. (Superstition, it will be recalled, is a vice indirectly contrary to charity.) Thus,

con esto procuravan todos en mi corte de vivir como cristianos y de allí se desparzió y derramó tanto esta buena doctrina [emphasis added] por todos mis reinos, que desde a pocos años los juezes eran los menos ocupados y las salas de mis audiencias se hallavan muchas vezes vazías, sin tener pleitos que ver, de manera que se vivía en todas partes con tanto plazer, amor y caridad [emphasis added], procurando cada uno vencer al otro con buenas obras, que desde allí començávamos a sentir aquella bienaventurança de que gozan los sanctos en el cielo. (173)

This passage highlights the fact that for Valdés there is a causal connection between Christian doctrine and charitable works. The remainder of Polidoro's discourse basically constitutes a reiteration of certain points that have already been made earlier in the Diálogo. The death of Polidoro, for example, gives Valdés an opportunity to restate his philosophy of death, which might properly be described as a kind of joie de mourir. Before he dies, he summons his son to his side and advises him about the way in which a good Christian prince should act. Most of the points he mentions have already been touched upon by Valdés earlier in the book. Some of these are: the good prince must seek true honor through good works;¹³⁶ he must govern well the territory he has, without trying to expand it needlessly;¹³⁷ he should discourage flatterers and encourage virtuous advisers to point out to him his defects;¹³⁸ he should try to be loved by his subjects rather than feared;¹³⁹ he ought to despise common opinion and adhere more to the ideas of philosophers;¹⁴⁰ he

should learn Christian doctrine by heart and follow it;¹⁴¹ as far as possible he must avoid war, for, ". . . más vale desigual paz que muy justa guerra" (183);¹⁴² and finally, the advice which sums up Valdés's political philosophy: "Si todas tus obras endereçares al bien de la república, serás rey, y si al tuyo, serás tyrano" (180).¹⁴³

This is, of course, a much more optimistic portrait than the vast majority of those in the first book, but Valdés chose to end it on a note of skepticism. After the king has departed to his reward, Carón says to Mercurio: "Quanto que si los otros príncipes fuessen como éste, bien podría yo tener vacaciones. Mas con todo esso, me huelgo de una cosa: que su hijo queda en el reino, porque quasi nunca se vió un señalado varón dexar hijo útil a la república [emphasis added]" (186-187). This vision of a utopia ending in cynicism is, for Montesinos, a very Spanish characteristic.¹⁴⁴ He says:

Todo depende del príncipe; la voluntad del príncipe moldea el Estado. Polidoro ha sido un gran rey; su hijo, ¿cómo será? . . . ¿Cómo garantir la continuidad? Los sistemas dependen de los hombres. Tocábamos las nubes; henos otra vez en el suelo. . . . Con las palabras de Carón . . . termina Valdés amargamente su fantasía política, derivada íntegramente de Erasmo, y con todo, tan personal y tan castellana.¹⁴⁵


This final note of skepticism strengthens rather than attenuates the emphasis on Christian doctrine and charity, for it indicates the need for personal commitment to Christ

on the part of the prince, given the fact that everything depends on him.

The good bishop is the next soul to interrupt Mercurio's discourse, and through him Valdés outlines his views on religious reform. The bishop emphasizes that he was elected to the episcopal office, for, as he says, ". . . ni aun me pasó por pensamiento dessearlo, conociéndome tan inábil y insuficiente para ello . . ." (194). It will be recalled that Aquinas states that it is unlawful under almost all circumstances for a man to desire the episcopal office (v. supra, Chapter I, Part 1, n. 35), for it would be presumptuous for a man to desire a position of preeminence over others in order to do them good. The bishop was finally forced to accept the position because of the constant insistence of his superiors. His action reveals an a priori desengaño with an emphasis on charity and humility, for Aquinas says that it is also unlawful for a man absolutely to refuse to accept an episcopal office, and for two reasons:

first, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time demand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, xix. 19) that the demands of charity undertake an honest labor. Secondly, because this is contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's commands. . . .146

Once he was installed in office, the bishop attacked the problem of immorality with a judicious combination of good example and Christian doctrine. The former was



necessary because he did not feel that he would be able to criticize vices in others, such as ambition, pride, lust, and greed, from which he also suffered, and the latter because ". . . no basta dar buen exemplo si no se amonesta al pueblo lo que ha de hazer. . ." (196). It is pure Christian doctrine in which he is interested, ". . . sin mezcla de vanidades ni supersticiones" (196). Another weapon of which the bishop made use of his reform effort was censorship. His argument supporting the need for censorship is not substantially different from Aquinas's justification of the non-toleration of heretics. The bishop says:

¿Cómo? Castigáis al que con cosas hediondas inficiona la ciudad, porque es cosa dañosa a los cuerpos, ¿ y no castigaréis a éstos que con sus abhominables palabras esparzen tanta ponçoña en las ánimas? (197)

Aquinas, on his part, makes the following similar remark:

. . . it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.¹⁴⁷

The bishop examined all the books in his district and forbade the selling of those dealing with "cosas prophanas" (197) and those of "historias fingidas" (197),¹⁴⁸ the former being injurious to the soul and the latter a waste of time. His task was more complicated regarding religious books, for base ideas are frequently covered up by

the guise of religion. Nevertheless, he examined them all and took out ". . . todo aquello que parecía ser en alguna manera contrario, no solamente a la fe, mas a la doctrina cristiana" (198). The bishop insisted that doctrine be orthodox, free from superstition and idolatry. He found many prayer books particularly offensive, and he explains why:

En otras oraciones quité los títulos, que dezían unos que el que la dixesse no moriría en pecado mortal, o que le serían perdonados todos sus pecados o que veería a Nuestra Senora tres días antes de su muerte o que le diría la hora della; hallando por mí cuenta que muchos, fiándose en estas oraciones y en otras semejantes devociones, o por mejor dezir, supersticiones que traen entre las manos, nunca dexan de pecar, pensando que sus devociones les darán la gloria, aunque por otra parte perseveran continuamente en ofender a Dios, engaño por cierto digno de llorar. (198)¹⁴⁹

As soon as he had banished all evil books from his district and replaced them with good ones, true Christian living began to flourish. This was due to the salutary effect of Christian doctrine, which is nowhere else in the Diálogo more strongly emphasized than here. Like the previous one, this interview also ends on a note of pessimism, for, in answer to Carón's question about how many such prelates Mercurio found in his travels among Christians, the latter replies: "¿Quántos, me preguntas? Dígote que anduve toda la cristiandad y ni aun éste pude hallar" (203).

The next to commence his journey to heaven is the good preacher,¹⁵⁰ Valdés's model of what a priest should

really be like.¹⁵¹ He is a divinely inspired preacher in the evangelical tradition¹⁵² who is burning with ". . . fuego de caridad y¹⁵³ amor de Dios y de aquellos mis próximos . . ." (209). The subtleties of theology he considers useless; his only purpose is to make manifest ". . . la grandeza y bondad de Dios" (211) for the sake of ". . . el bien universal" (211). Valdés reveals his indebtedness to Erasmus by using this character to speak to the necessity of internalizing Christianity. This can most profitably be seen in the preacher's views on prayer. He does not go so far as to condemn oral prayer out of hand,¹⁵⁴ for, as he says:

Antes la (i.e. la oración vocal) tenía por muy sancta y necessaria, mas también tenía por muy mejor la mental, porque hallava muchas vezes en la sagrada escriptura reprehendidos los que oravan con la boca teniendo el corazón apartado de Dios, y hallava en la doctrina cristiana que los verdaderos adoradores adoravan al Padre en espíritu y en verdad, porque, como Dios sea espíritu, quiere ser con el espíritu adorado. (210)

Erasmus has similar views on the value of mental prayer.

In his Enquiridion he says:

Tú, por ventura, cuando oras solamente tienes ojo a cuántos salmos mal rezados has pasado por la boca, y piensas que en el mucho hablar está puesta total¹⁵⁵ la virtud de la oración. Y éste es un vicio principalmente de aquellos que aún son como niños principiantes en la letra sin levantarse ni crecer a la madurez del espíritu. Mas oye lo que en este caso nos enseña Cristo por San Mateo: "Cuando oráredes no curéis de multiplicar muchas palabras, como hacen las gentes que no conocen a Dios, que piensan ser oídos por su mucho hablar. No queráis vosotros parecer a éstos, pues sabe vuestro Padre celestial

lo que habéis menester antes que se lo pidáis." Y Sant Pablo tiene en más cinco palabras bien sentidas y que salgan del corazón que diez mil pronunciadas así solamente por la lengua. No hablaba Moisés palabra por la boca, y decíale Dios: "¿Qué me quieres para que me llames tan recio?" A dar a entender que no el ruido de los labios, mas el deseo ardiente de las entrañas es el que toca las orejas de Dios más adentro que ningunos alaridos recios por acá defuera.¹⁵⁶

For prayer to be effective it must be sincerely felt and spring from true love of God, that is, it must be charitable, in the broad sense of the word. The preacher always spent part of his sermons admonishing his listeners, especially if they suffered from superstition or ignorance in doctrine, and in order to do this effectively he made a point of finding out as much as possible about the people in a particular area. In this way he could be sure that his admonitions would be germane, for he was outraged by the manner in which some preachers, such as the bad preacher in the first book, deliberately refused to speak to the point, ". . . reprehendiendo los vicios absentes y halagando, y aun a las vezes manteniendo los presentes" (212). To encourage one to continue in evil is contrary to charity in two ways, first by being contrary to the love of our neighbor, since he will suffer spiritually if he yields to the temptation, and secondly by being contrary to the love of God, insofar as it encourages the sinner to continue being a source of offense to Him. The common folk were as a rule reprehended by the preacher publicly, en masse, from the pulpit, but people holding high offices,

such as princes, prelates, and judges, were dealt with in a somewhat different fashion. He would first rebuke them in the privacy of their own homes, ". . . porque el vulgo no les perdiesse la reverencia, obediencia y acatamiento que les deve tener, de que conoscía seguirse muchos y muy grandes inconvenientes . . ." (212). But if they were obstinate in their evil ways, he would not fail to excoriate them publicly, in order to shame them into fulfilling their obligations. Bataillon calls this a "concepción atrevida, revolucionaria,"¹⁵⁷ but Aquinas's view is not far removed, for he says that the precept of fraternal correction ". . . requires a secret admonition to precede public denunciation."¹⁵⁸ In any case, this involves an emphasis on charity since fraternal correction is a precept of charity,¹⁵⁹ and one which chiefly concerns priests.¹⁶⁰

This episode, too, contains an undercurrent of pessimism, for the preacher was severely persecuted during his lifetime, and Valdés would have it that this persecution was a direct consequence of the preacher's true commitment to Christ. After he has gone his way, Mercurio says to Carón:

Ay entre cristianos un género de gente que tiene usurpado el nombre de perfición y sanctidad, y están muchos dellos tan lexos de lo uno y de lo otro como nosotros de subir al cielo. Y como éstos veen que alguno con obras o con palabras comienza a mostrar en qué consiste la perfición cristiana y la religión y sanctidad que los cristianos deven tener, luego aquellos

como lobos se levantan contra él y lo persiguen, interpretándole mal sus palabras y levántandole que dixo lo que nunca pensó, lo acusan y procuran de condennar por herege.¹⁶¹ De manera que apenas hay hombre que ose hablar ni vivir como verdadero christiano. (214-215)

Thus the true Christians are consistently outnumbered by those who wear the cloak of sanctity, but who secretly despise the Christian religion.

Valdés's pessimism also comes to the surface in his treatment of the good cardinal, one of the most briefly sketched characters in the Diálogo. The cardinal's case is somewhat curious, due to the fact that he attains salvation in spite of having been guilty of a rather serious sin, simony. Perceiving the fact that Christendom was nearly totally corrupt and hence desperately in need of reform, he decided that he wanted to have a hand in this holy enterprise and that the best way to do it was to have a position of great authority in the Church, such as that of cardinal. This would be a sin of presumption, except for the fact that the object of his desire was the good work of reform and not the "precedence in dignity."¹⁶² However, there is no way of excusing his next action: ". . . sabido que no se alcançava aquella dignidad sino o por dineros o por manos o por favores de príncipes o por luengo servicio, tomé por mejor partido comprarla, y de verdad me costó más de veinte y cinco mill ducados . . ." (220). The pessimism in this incident derives from the cardinal's discovery that the Church was utterly beyond

reform and that his only salvation was to flee the hierarchy and take refuge in a monastery. Thus, as Montesinos observes, "el cardenal renuncia . . . a reformar la Iglesia; se contenta con reformarse a sí mismo."¹⁶³ It seems strange that Valdés does not condemn the cardinal's sin of simony, especially since it is one of the sins against which he rails most frequently. Perhaps his abandonment of the hierarchy involves a tacit renunciation of his sin, although Valdés does not say so in so many words.

The good monk is the character Valdés uses to suggest that God can be served in monastic life as well as in a secular occupation, provided that the personality of the individual is truly suited to such a life and that he realizes that formalistic adherence to the monastic rule is not automatically equated with service to God. The monk is careful to explain that he is not one of

aquellos que piensan consistir la religión
en andar vestido de una o de otra color, o
en traer el hábito desta o de aquella hechura,
o en andar calçado o descalço, o en traer
camisa de lana o de lienço, o en tocar o
dexar de tocar dineros. (225)

Mercurio, playing the devil's advocate, then launches into an attack upon the monastic life, raising every sort of objection against it, every one of which is refuted by the monk. Mercurio, for example, objects to the concept of a monastic rule, basing his argument on the fact that there are so many different types of human personality and physical constitution that a single rule cannot apply to

them all. The monk replies that nobody is forced into monastic life; each person who wishes to enter a monastery should do what he did and examine very carefully the different orders of their respective rules and choose the one which most suits him:

La regla está aí; cada uno la puede ver y saber; el que se contenta della, pareciéndole conformasse con su condición, tómelas mucho en buena hora; el que no, déxela, que a ninguno se haze fuerça, y el que neciamente se mete fraile, neciamente se muere, y aun quiçá se va al infierno, y lo mismo podemos dezir del clérigo y del casado. (227)

He personally chose to avoid the corruption of the world by entering a monastery, ". . . no porque no conosciesse poder servir a Dios fuera dél, mas porque me inclinava más a aquella manera de vivir que a otra alguna" (227). Thus the primary consideration in one's choice of profession should be charity. Everybody must honestly ask himself how he can best serve God, and to adopt any other consideration as the primary one is uncharitable since it suggests that the person loves something else above God. The remainder of the monk's discourse consists primarily in demonstrating that the monastic life should not be condemned out of hand just because some people abuse it through their worldliness, sloth, gluttony, hypocrisy, backbiting, ambition, superstition, and other similar vices, all of which are opposed to the principal virtue of charity.

The final soul to dialogue with Mercurio and Carón is the good married woman. After her parents taught her to read, she immersed herself totally in Sacred Scripture and became determined to conform her life with what she read. Although she realized that virginity is a higher state than matrimony, she decided that marriage was more in keeping with her own inclinations and that she could best serve God in that capacity. Marriage is a charitable institution, according to Aquinas, since its primary and secondary ends are directed toward the good of our neighbor; the primary end is the good of the offspring and the secondary end is the mutual good of the married persons.¹⁶⁴

One of the married woman's most charitable acts was the gradual conversion of her husband to a life of virtue similar to hers. This is an act of charity because ". . . to do away with anyone's evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well."¹⁶⁵ Her other principal act of charity was the virtuous upbringing she gave her daughters. She says: "Las cosas que en sí son siempre y en todo lugar buenas, y que sin pecado no se pueden dexar, les encomendava yo sobre todo, procurando que solo un punto no se apartassen dellas" (238). She was very careful to make sure, however, that there should be no superstition or hypocrisy in her home, her desire being ". . . que hoviesse mucho más en lo interior de lo que se mostrava en lo exterior" (238).

In conclusion, the a priori and a posteriori desengaño in the Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón primarily emphasizes the virtue of charity. This is especially clear in the treatment of the hypocrite, in which charity is proved to be the greatest of the virtues by an appeal to the teachings of Saint Paul. Supporting this emphasis on charity is an ancillary emphasis on doctrine, especially noticeable in the treatment of the theologian, the good bishop, and the good preacher. It is orthodox doctrine that Valdés emphasizes, free from superstition and derived mainly but not exclusively from Sacred Scripture. That Valdés does not insist on an exclusive appeal to the Bible is evident from the fact that the a priori desengaño in the incident with the theologian contains an emphasis on the value of patristic theology. This implies that for Valdés truth can be found both in Scripture and in Church tradition. It must be admitted, however, that Mercurio and Carón support their arguments primarily by an appeal to the Old and New Testaments, so that it would be rash to go so far as to conclude that this incident implies a condemnation of the Reformers' motto of sola Scriptura.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, there is one point in the book, as we have seen, where the Protestant schism is, if not condemned outright, at least portrayed in an unfavorable light. It occurs when Mercurio refers to the social upheaval caused by the Lutheran rebellion in Germany. Valdés's political desires for "un monarca, un

imperio y una espada"¹⁶⁷ may possibly have had more influence on him here than strictly religious considerations; the fact that he does not elucidate the reasons for his stance makes it difficult to say with certainty. Irrespective of these considerations, this passage requires the Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón to be classified as a Dance of Death containing references to heterodoxy. This indicates that the concept of desengaño has one again been modified by changing historical circumstances.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III, Part 1

¹Bruce Wardropper, Introducción al teatro religioso del siglo de oro (Salamanca: Ediciones Anaya, 1967), p. 123.

²There is, of course, a certain amount of chronological overlapping regarding these two periods. Pedraza's farsa, for example, could have contained references to Protestantism, since it was written in 1551, the date of the beginning of the second stage of the Council of Trent (New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Spain: Reform and Counter Reform [1517-1700]"). Conversely, Alfonso de Valdés's work is an unusually early example of a Dance of Death containing references to specific Protestant sects, since it was probably completed between 1528 and 1530 (José F. Montesinos, "Algunas notas sobre el Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón," Revista de filología española 16 [1929]: 230). Nevertheless, the tendency of the Dance of Death in Spain to proceed from an emphasis on charity (Middle Ages) to an emphasis on faith and doctrine (Renaissance), and finally to an emphasis on orthodoxy in opposition to the Protestant schism (Renaissance and Baroque period) is basically a chronological development, even though there are certain exceptions to the rule.

³Alfonso de Valdés, Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón, ed. José F. Montesinos (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1965). All references are to this edition of the work and are identified in the text by page numbers.

⁴The use of Aquinas's thirteenth century philosophical system as a means of studying sixteenth century literature is not the anachronism it appears to be. Actually, Aquinas was beginning to acquire more importance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries than he had enjoyed in the thirteenth, due to the great revival of Scholasticism that was taking place in Europe, and especially in Spain. In fact, Cajetan (1468-1534) was ". . . the first to take Aquinas's Summa theologica as a theological textbook instead of the Sentences of Peter Lombard; and both Dominicans and Jesuits looked on Saint Thomas as their Doctor" (Frederick Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy, 8 vols. [Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1963], 3 [part 2] : 163).

⁵Thomas Gilby, O. P., ed. Summa Theologiae, by Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2 vols. (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1969), 1: 11.

⁶On the subject of Charles's political career see Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World Empire, trans. C. V. Wedgewood (London: Jonathan Cape Paperback, 1965).

⁷E. Segura Covarsí, "Sentido dramático y contenido litúrgico de 'Las danzas de la Muerte'," Cuadernos de literatura (Madrid) 5 (1949): 260.

⁸That this part of the Diálogo is in the Dance of Death tradition is the opinion of Marcel Bataillon, who says of Valdés that ". . . su primer designio fue pasar revista a los diferentes 'estados' de la sociedad para distribuirles sus críticas, según la tradición medieval de las Danzas de la muerte . . ." (Erasmus y España, trans. Antonio Alatorre Mexico and Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1966 , p. 391).

⁹On the subject of Charon as a Death figure in ancient Greece Leonard P. Kurtz has the following observations to make: "The popular opinion of Greece regarded the soul as a winged being, a butterfly flying away at death. The Greeks believed that Charon ferried the souls in a narrow two-oared boat over the Styx, Acheron or the Cocytus to the kingdom of Hades. Death was then not a being that killed, but simply one that fetched away and escorted to the underworld" (The Dance of Death and the Macabre Spirit in European Literature [New York: Columbia University Institute of French Studies, 1934], p. 3). Thus the possible objection that this work cannot be a Dance of Death since it lacks a Death figure is not really valid. Charon is just as much a Death figure in this work as his counterpart was in the Dança general and, to some extent, at least, it can be stated that he performs a similar function, namely, interrogating and reprimanding (and occasionally praising) the souls who have died.

¹⁰See J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1960), Chapter 6, passim.

¹¹Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 248.

¹²Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.93, Art.2.

¹³Copleston, History, 2 (part 1): 15.

¹⁴Manuel Carrasco says that ". . . Fernando de Valdés était du nombre de ces nobles espagnoles qui, repoussant l'oppression de l'Église et les méthodes stériles de la scolastique, s'étaient livrés avec passion à l'étude des lettres, que la Renaissance avait réveillé dans la péninsule" (Alfonso et Juan de Valdés. Leur vie et leurs écrits religieux. Étude historique [Geneva: Chez Les Principaux Libraires, 1880], p. 10).

¹⁵This appears to be a sparing use of the locus amoenus motif. For a history and analysis of this ancient topos of landscape description see Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 195-200.

¹⁶Alastor is one of the lesser known characters in Greek mythology. His name means "avenger." See Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955), 2:51.

¹⁷Copleston, History, 3 (part 1): 27-28.

¹⁸The fact that this new type of desengaño does not form part of the 1520 Seville printing of an enlargement of the Dança general de la Muerte does not really contradict this thesis. (For the text of this work see José Amador de los Ríos, Historia crítica de la literatura española, 7 vols. Madrid: Imprenta á cargo de Joaquín Muñoz, 1865, 7:507-540.) This is not a new Dance of Death, but rather a reprinting of the Dança general with the addition of twenty-five new characters. The opening and closing stanzas of the medieval poem, which contained a synthesis of its a priori desengaño, are retained more or less intact, with slight variations of placement. The author does not introduce a new type of desengaño through the new characters, for they all share the same types of vices as the characters in the Dança general, such as robbery, fraud, gluttony, and covetousness. The main difference between the original and the additions is one of style, or literary merit. The humorous metaphors of Death in the original, each one being uniquely applicable to the victim in question (as, for example, when Death, speaking to the merchant, pictures himself as having a store full of "buuas y landres" which he wishes to give away free rather than sell) are missing from the added stanzas. The author was also careless about maintaining the structure of the dialogue between Death and the victims, whereby Death called the next victim in the eighth line of his reply to the former. After the santero the author inadvertently drops this format but then, apparently realizing his error, returns to it thirteen victims later when he has Death

summon the atahonero (miller). Thus Florence Whyte can justifiably state of the author that ". . . his addition injures the literary effect of the poem as a whole . . ." (The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia [Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931], p. 26).

¹⁹ Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.13, Art.2.

²⁰ Ibid., Q.92, Art.1.

²¹ Ibid., Q.81, Art.5.

²² Ibid., Reply Obj. 3.

²³ Ibid., Q.81, Art.6.

²⁴ Ibid., Q.59, Art.4.

²⁵ Bataillon, Erasmus, pp. 206-214.

²⁶ Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 15.

²⁷ Bataillon, Erasmus, pps. 173-174.

²⁸ Bataillon distinguishes two more or less rival tendencies within the movement of iluminismo, recogimiento and dejamiento. Those who represent the tendency of recogimiento attempt to withdraw from the world and themselves in prayer in order to reach a state of quietude in which the soul, "sin pensar ya ni en sí misma ni en Dios, se unía sin embargo a Él" (Ibid., p. 169). On the other hand, the exponents of dejamiento, suspicious of methods of prayer of the recogidos and the occasionally ecstatic results obtained thereby, taught the value of complete surrender to God. They were suspicious of any visible manifestation of divine love and took pains to point out that the love of God is not only the end of spiritual life but also its beginning. For a detailed explanation of the differences between these two tendencies v. Erasmus, pp. 166-176.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 175.

³⁰ Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.162, Art.5.

³¹ Ibid., Supl. Q.25, Art.2.

³² Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.111, Art.4.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Bataillon, Erasmus, p. 393.

³⁵For historical data regarding this reference see Bataillon, Erasmus, p. 393, n.26.

³⁶Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 258.

³⁷Ibid., p. 245.

³⁸Desiderius Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, trans. Lester K. Born (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1968), p. 153.

³⁹These lines suggest the first soul to request passage, the bad preacher.

⁴⁰Quoted by Marcel Bataillon in Erasmus, p. 200.

⁴¹It will be recalled that Aquinas, too, states that mere externals have no connection with the internal worship of God (v. supra, n.12).

⁴²Perhaps Erasmus here has in mind Augustine's sermon on Purgatory in which he states that the flattering of a person of higher standing, out of choice or necessity, is a slight sin (quoted by Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.115, Art.2).

⁴³Erasmus, Education, p. 193.

⁴⁴Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q. 115, Art.2.

⁴⁵On the subject of the similarity between some of Valdés's ideas and those of Aquinas, it may be observed that the Spanish humanist condemns the adviser's flattery by availing himself of the exact same quote from Isaias used by the Doctor angelicus for that purpose. Mercurio says: "¿Tú no veías que esso era contra Dios, dezir bien de lo malo y mal de lo bueno? ¿Nunca leíste: Vae qui dicitis bonum malum [et] malum bonum?" (39).

⁴⁶Aquinas Summa Suppl., Q.25, Art.2.

⁴⁷Cf. Chapter I, Part 1, n. 104.

⁴⁸Corliss Lamont also makes this distinction in The Philosophy of Humanism (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1965), pps. 21-22.

⁴⁹Quoted by Bataillon, Erasmus, p. 198.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 199.

Obj.2. ⁵¹Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.112, Art.1, Reply

⁵²Valdés appears to believe in the efficacy of bulls, for Mercurio said to a previous victim, the adviser, "Sé que la bula del Papa no era sino contra las penas del purgatorio, y tú agora vienes al infierno" (41).

Obj.3. ⁵³Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.64, Art.1, Reply

⁵⁴Ibid., Suppl. Q.1, Art.1.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., Q.9, Art.1.

⁵⁷This criticism of formalistic, oral prayer may reflect the influence of the iluminismo movement, which favored a type of mental prayer that was independent of specific words and forms (Bataillon, Erasmus, p. 173).

⁵⁸Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.30, Art.3, Obj.3.

⁵⁹Ibid., Q.185, Art.7.

⁶⁰"The same is not to be said of their own goods which bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership.

On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or trustees. . . . Now dispensing requires good faith. . . . Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. . . . Accordingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keep back for himself part of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.

But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others according to the demands of charity.

On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods, their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be very great, he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin." (Ibid.)

⁶¹Ibid., Q.100, Art.5.

⁶²For a more detailed explanation of the opposition of simony to charity, v. supra, Chapter II, Part 1.

⁶³Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.35, Art.3.

⁶⁴Ibid., Q.45, Art.4, Reply Obj.3.

⁶⁵Ibid., Q.42, Art.1.

⁶⁶Ibid., Q.28, Art.1.

⁶⁷Ibid., Q.35.

⁶⁸Ibid., Art.4, Obj.2.

⁶⁹V. Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.73, Art.2, in which it is implicitly stated that there are degrees of suffering in hell.

⁷⁰V. supra, n. 69.

⁷¹Ibid., Art.8.

⁷²For the details and motives of Wolsey's machination against Charles see Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, pps. 231-232.

⁷³Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.39 (Introduction).

⁷⁴Ibid., Q.29, Art.3, Reply Obj.3.

⁷⁵Ibid., Q.63, Art.3.

⁷⁶Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 245.

⁷⁷Erasmus, Education, p. 161.

⁷⁸Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.42, Art.2.

⁷⁹Ibid., Q.59, Art.4.

⁸⁰Ibid., Q.29, Art.3, Reply Obj.3.

⁸¹Ibid., Q.40, Art.1.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., Q.118, Art.8, Reply Obj.5.

⁸⁴Ibid., Q.43, Art.3.

⁸⁵Erasmus, Education, p. 173.

⁸⁶Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.105, Art.1, Reply Obj.2.

⁸⁷According to Father Copleston, "the theory of the divine right of kings, as put forward by William Barclay in his De regno et regali potestate (1600), by James I in his Trew Law of Free Monarchies and by Sir Robert Filmer in his Patriarcha (1680) was not so much a theoretical reflection of practical absolutism as an attempt to support a challenged and passing absolutism. . . . The theory of the divine right of kings was not really a philosophical theory at all" (History, 3 [part 2]:124).

⁸⁸Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.105, Art.1. (N.B. A more detailed exposition of Aquinas's political theories may be found in his De regimine principum.)

⁸⁹Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 248.

⁹⁰Montesinos cites this passage as indicative of a difference between Valdés and Erasmus, stating that the former could not, because of the constant wars with the Turks, go as far as the latter, who condemned war in every case (Ibid.). Yet this does not seem to fit with the following statement from Erasmus himself, which is very similar to Valdés's position in the Diálogo: "Not even against the Turks do I believe we should rashly go to war, first reflecting in my own mind that the kingdom of Christ was created, spread out, and firmly established by far different means. . . . First let us see that we ourselves are genuine Christians, and then, if it seems best, let us attack the Turks" (Education, p. 256).

⁹¹Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.21, Art.3.

⁹²Ibid., Art.1.

⁹³Ibid., Art.4.

⁹⁴Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 234.

⁹⁵Marcel Bataillon states that this character is an allusion to Valdés's enemy, Jean Lallemand (Erasmus, p. 403).

⁹⁶Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.110, Art.4.

⁹⁷Ibid., Q.37, Art.1.

⁹⁸Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.97, Art.3.

⁹⁹Ibid., Reply Obj.1.

¹⁰⁰For Aquinas's analysis of the various kinds of law see Ibid., Q.91.

¹⁰¹Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.108, Art.1.

¹⁰²Ibid., Q.73, Art.1.

¹⁰³Ibid., Art.2.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., Q.36, Art.3.

¹⁰⁵Juan de Valdés speaks of Saint Paul in similar terms in his Diálogo de doctrina cristiana: "por sus propias manos ganaua de comer para sí y los que traía consigo" (quoted by Manuel J. Asensio, "La intención religiosa del Lazarillo de Tormes y Juan de Valdés," Hispanic Review 27 [1959]: 86).

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 84, n. 19. It scarcely need be mentioned that there is nothing radically new in these views, for they do not differ from the teaching of Aquinas on the subject of charity.

¹⁰⁸Aquinas Summa Pt. I, Q.16, Art.5.

109 Technically, this is the fallacy of the undistributed middle term. According to the third rule of the categorical syllogism the middle term must be distributed (the predicate of a negative proposition is said to be distributed) in at least one premise. V. Joseph B. Walsh, S. J., Logic (New York: Fordham University Press, 1940).

110 Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology, trans. Grover Foley (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Anchor Books, 1964), p. 3.

111 Given the fact that the a priori desengaño of this episode contains an emphasis on the importance of reading Sacred Scripture, Valdés's mention of Saint Jerome is particularly appropriate. The saint, having acquired a taste for profane authors, dreamed that he died and was ". . . dragged before the Judge's judgement seat. I was asked to state my condition, and replied that I was a Christian. But He Who presided said, 'Thou liest; thou art a Ciceronian, not a Christian. For where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also.' Straightaway I became dumb, and then I felt the strokes of the whip - for He had ordered me to be scourged. . . . At last the bystanders fell at the knees of Him Who presided, and prayed Him to pardon my youth and give me opportunity to repent of my error, on the understanding that the extreme of torture should be inflicted upon me if ever I read again the books of the Gentile authors. . . . This experience was no sweet or idle dream. . . . I profess that my shoulders were black and blue, and that I felt the bruises long after I awoke. . . . Henceforth I read the books of God with greater zeal than I had ever given before to the books of men." Quoted by Will Durant, The Age of Faith (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), p. 52.

112 Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler say that "according to the definition of Vincent of Lerins (mid-5th century), Fathers are those writers of Christian antiquity who each in his own time and locality were accredited doctors of the one faith in communion with the Church. They are distinguished in the following ways: (1) orthodox doctrine, which, to be sure, does not imply infallibility and does not exclude actual errors in particular matters; (2) a holy life in the sense of Christian antiquity; (3) recognition by the Church, which need not be explicit but may be expressed by quotation from their writings; (4) they must have lived in patristic times, that is, before the death of Isidore of Seville in the West or Saint John Damascene in the East (about the middle of the 8th century). They are of special authority when they teach a doctrine by unanimous consent, for then

they can be unreservedly taken to be transmitting and bearing witness to the teaching of the Church" (Theological Dictionary [New York: Herder and Herder, 1965], p. 171).

113 On the subject of the similarities between this character and the author himself see Bataillon, Erasmus, p. 396.

114 An appeal to Aquinas does not suffice to explain these lines, for the young man's conversion illustrates a doctrine which is more typically Augustinian than Thomistic, namely, the theory of illumination. As Copleston says, ". . . Augustine thought it necessary to postulate a special illuminative action of God, beyond His creative and conserving activity, in the mind's realisation of external and necessary truths, whereas St. Thomas did not" (History, 2 [part 1]: 81). A. A. Parker makes a similar observation about Calderón when he states that the general framework of his ideas is Augustinian rather than Thomistic. As he says, "man in the autos never attains to the knowledge of God's existence by means of his unaided reason, but always by an 'impulso divino'. Calderón, that is to say, accepts St. Augustine's theory of Illumination" (The Allegorical Drama of Calderón [Oxford and London: The Dolphin Book Co., 1943], p. 69). This establishes a nexus between Valdés and Calderón, for an "impulso divino" is precisely what accounts for the conversion of the young man in the Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón.

115 This may be a reflection of the influence of iluminismo, for in his Tercer abecedario espiritual Fray Francisco de Osuna is, in the words of Bataillon, ". . . muy lejos de considerar esta elevada vía espiritual (i.e. the method of recogimiento - v. supra, n.28) como reservada a los religiosos, o bien incompatible con el estado de matrimonio. Dirige su enseñanza, de manera expresa, a las personas que viven en el siglo" (Erasmus, p. 174-175).

116 Again, this passage seems to reveal the influence of iluminismo, for Bataillon states that recogimiento "es un método por el cual el alma busca a Dios en su propio seno . . ." (Ibid., p. 167). Cf. Augustine: ". . . my God, I would not be, I would in no wise be, unless you were in me" (Confessions [trans. John K. Ryan], 1.2). Also cf. 1 John 4:15-16: ". . . where a man acknowledges that Jesus is the son of God, God dwells in him, and he in God."

117 Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.28, Art.1.

118 Valdés's mentor, Erasmus, made two notable contributions to this genre, his Funus (a colloquy) and Praeparatio ad mortem. The latter was, according to Bataillon, the primary source of inspiration for ". . . la obra maestra de la literatura ascética española en la época de Carlos V, la Agonía del tránsito de la muerte del Toledano Alejo Venegas" (Bataillon, Erasmus, p. 565).

119 Ibid., p. 559.

120 1 Cor. 15:55-56.

121 Bataillon, after pointing out Valdés's indebtedness to the second part of the Funus for his treatment of the married man's death, observes that ". . . el personaje valdesiano llega a demostrar respecto a todos esos ritos más impaciencia que el de Erasmo. Es más abrupto en su discurso al cura de su parroquia" (Erasmus, p. 396). For purposes of comparison it might be useful to quote Cornelius's reply to his priest, for Bataillon does not do so: "Pastor, I'll be none the worse off if no bell tolls; or if you deem me worthy of one burial service, that will be more than enough. Or if there is anything else that because of the Church's public custom can scarcely be omitted without scandal to the weak, I leave that to your judgement. I do not desire to buy up someone's prayers or deprive anyone of his merits. There is sufficient abundance of merits in Christ, and I have faith that the prayers and merits of the whole Church will benefit me only if I am a true member of it. In two 'briefs' rests my entire hope. One is the fact that the Lord Jesus, the chief shepherd, took away my sins, nailing them to the Cross. The other, that which he signed and sealed with his own sacred blood, by which he assured us of eternal salvation if we place our whole trust in him" (The Colloquies of Erasmus, trans. Craig R. Thompson [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965], p. 371).

122 Cf. Erasmus: "Death is not to be feared, nor should we wail when it comes to others, unless it was a foul death" (Education, p. 149).

123 Ludwig Pfandl, Historia de la literatura nacional española en la Edad de Oro, trans. Jorge Rubió Balaguer (Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo Gili 1952), p. 47. Although Pfandl is not speaking here specifically of Valdés but rather of what he calls "la nueva [i.e. non-medieval] concepción, ascéticamente orientada" (Ibid.), his words perfectly describe Valdés's attitude.

¹²⁴Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 230.

¹²⁵Cf. Erasmus: "Christian theology attributes three prime qualities to God - the highest power, the greatest wisdom, the greatest goodness. In so far as you can [Erasmus is addressing a Christian prince] you should make this trinity yours" (Education, p. 158).

¹²⁶Cf.: ". . . there can be no good prince who is not also a good man" (Ibid., p. 189).

¹²⁷As Erasmus says, "since the natures of so many men are inclined toward the ways of evil, there is no nature so happily born that it cannot be corrupted by wrong training" (Ibid., p. 143).

¹²⁸Cf.: "Nature created all men equal, and slavery was superimposed on nature, which fact the laws of even the pagans recognized. Now stop and think how out of proportion it is for a Christian to usurp full power over other Christians, whom the laws did not design to be slaves, and whom Christ redeemed from all slavery" (Ibid., p. 177).

¹²⁹Cf.: "Christ himself, who is the one Prince and Lord of all, has most clearly set off the Christian prince from the pagan, saying, 'The princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you.' If it is the part of pagan princes to exercise dominion, it does not then become Christian princes" (Ibid., p. 168).

¹³⁰Polidoro is careful to explain that God, not himself, is the efficient cause of his conversion: ". . . dando gracias a Dios que me había librado de una tan ciega tiniebla y de una tan trabajosa ceguedad, queriendo executar el buen desseo que me dió . . ." (168-169). Thus, like the married man, Polidoro is converted by an impulso divino (v. supra, n. 113).

¹³¹Cf.: ". . . the condition of the state is more bearable when the prince himself is wicked than when he has evil friends" (Erasmus, Education, p. 211).

¹³²Cf.: ". . . the great mass of the worthless crowd in every state is created through idleness, which they all seek in different ways. Those who have once become accustomed to an idle life will resort to any evil course, if they have no other means of supporting it. The prince will therefore always be on the lookout to keep the proportion of idlers down to the minimum among his courtiers, and either force them to be busy or else banish them from the country" (Ibid., p. 225).

¹³³Erasmus believes that holy priests contribute to the strengthening of the state (Ibid., p. 248).

¹³⁴Cf.: "A good prince should punish none more severely than those who are corrupt in their administration of the laws, since the prince himself is the first guardian of the laws" (Ibid., p. 234).

¹³⁵Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.157, Art.4. Cf. Erasmus: "Clemency inspires to better efforts those who are aware of their faults, while forgiveness extends hope to those who are now eager to make recompense by virtuous conduct for the shortcomings of their earlier life and provides the steadfast with a happy reflection on human nature" (Education, p. 209).

¹³⁶Cf.: "No one gets more honor than the man who does not exact it. To no one are men more willingly obedient than to him who does not seek such attention. To no one do they more willingly pour out their wealth than to him whom [sic] they know will expend it for the development of the state and return it with interest" (Erasmus, Education, p. 180).

¹³⁷Cf.: "The prince will understand some day that it was useless to extend the territory of the kingdom and that what in the beginning seemed a gain was in reality tremendous loss, but in the meantime a great many thousands of men have been killed or impoverished" (Ibid., p. 250).

¹³⁸Cf.: "When asked what animal was the most dangerous of all, [Diogenes] said 'If you mean among the wild beasts, I will say the tyrant; if among the tame ones, the flatters'" (Ibid., p. 193).

¹³⁹Cf.: "The king rejoices in the freedom of his people; the tyrant strives to be feared, the king to be loved" (Ibid., p. 164).

¹⁴⁰Cf.: "Plato is nowhere more painstaking than in the training of his guardians of the state. He does not wish them to excel all others in wealth, in gems, in dress, in statues and attendants, but in wisdom alone. He says that no state will ever be blessed unless the philosophers are at the helm, or those to whom the task of government falls embrace philosophy. By 'philosophy' I do not mean that which disputes concerning the first beginnings, of primordial matter, of motion and infinity, but that which frees the mind from the false opinions and the vicious predilections of the masses and points out a theory of government according to the example of the Eternal Power" (Ibid., pps. 133-134).

141 Cf.: "There is only one Master of Christian men. Why, then, do those who assume His functions, prefer to take their pattern of government from anyone except Him, who alone is in all ways to be imitated?" (Ibid., p. 177).

142 Cf.: "Let the good prince always lean toward that glory which is not steeped in blood nor linked with the misfortune of another. In war, however fortunately it turns out, the good fortune of one is always the ruin of the other" (Ibid., p. 254).

143 Cf.: "The king [as opposed to the tyrant] judges everything by the standard of its value to the state" (Ibid., p. 165).

144 Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 249.

145 Ibid.

146 Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.185, Art.2.

147 Ibid., Q.11, Art.3.

148 The condemnation of "Historias fingidas" in a book which is itself an "historia fingida" seems quite remarkable. Perhaps this represents a carry-over of what Ernst Robert Curtius has called ". . . the medieval view of poetry" (European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask [New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1963], p. 591). He explains by saying that "poetry [Curtius appears to use this term to refer to imaginative literature in general] was viewed as part and parcel of the inheritance of paganism. It ranked with grammar, rhetoric, mythology, and the rest" (Ibid.). He says that "the great scholastics of the thirteenth century are not interested in poetry. You will look in vain for a scholastic vindication of it" (Ibid.). In any case, Valdés's discussion of the bishop's program of censorship is somewhat vague, for at one point (already quoted in the text) he has him condemn profane books, while at another point he has him tacitly approve of at least some of them: "Determinado, pues, qué libros se habían de leer y qué de vedar y dexar, y puesto en orden, emendado y adereçado lo que se avía de leer, assí de cosas sacras como profanas [emphasis added] . . ." (198-199).

149 Cervantes alludes to the same problem, albeit in a more humorous manner, in Rinconete y Cortadillo.

150 See Bataillon, Erasmus, pps. 298-299 for speculation on whether or not Valdés intended this soul to represent the preacher Pedro Ruiz de Alcaraz, whom his brother Juan had heard some years earlier. For additional information on Alcaraz see José F. Montesinos, ed., Diálogo de la Lengua, by Juan de Valdés (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1964), pps. xii-xv.

151 "Su calidad de sacerdote va implicada, sin duda, en el hecho de que predica libremente en el púlpito. No se menciona de ninguna otra manera" Bataillon, Erasmus, pps. 398-399, n. 49).

152 While the word "evangelical" has come to be identified primarily with the Protestant tradition, Karl Barth points out that not all Protestant theology is evangelical (Paul Tillich, for example, mentions the existence of Protestant scholastic theologians such as Johann Gerhard in his Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology [New York: Harper and Row, 1967], p. 10) and that there is evangelical theology in the Roman Catholic tradition (Evangelical Theology, p. 3).

153 The use of this conjunction is somewhat infelicitous, since it suggests that what follows is something distinct from caridad, which, of course, is not true.

154 Bataillon speculates that Valdés may have taken warning from the Edict of 1525 condemning the alumbrados (Erasmus, p. 399).

155 This word was added by the translator (Ibid., p. 194, n. 16). It has the effect of tempering Erasmus's view somewhat.

156 Quoted by Bataillon, Ibid., p. 194.

157 Ibid., p. 399.

158 Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.33, Art.7.

159 Ibid., Art.1.

160 Ibid., Art.3, Reply Obj.1.

161 Erasmus was also opposed to such irresponsible condemnations, as indicated by the following passage in Johan Huizinga's Erasmus and the Age of Reformation, trans. F. Hopman (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 143: "In April 1519 Erasmus addressed himself by letter to the elector Frederick of Saxony, Luther's patron. He begins by alluding to his dedication

of Suetonius two years before; but his real purpose is to say something about Luther. Luther's writings, he says, have given the Louvain obscurants plenty of reason to inveigh against the bonae literae, to decry all scholars. He himself does not know Luther and has glanced through his writings only cursorily as yet, but everyone praises his life. How little in accordance with theological gentleness it is to condemn him offhand, and that before the indiscreet vulgar! For has he not proposed a dispute, and submitted himself to everybody's judgement? No one has, so far, admonished, taught, convinced him. Every error is not at once heresy. The best of Christianity is a life worthy of Christ. Where we find that, we should not rashly suspect people of heresy."

¹⁶² Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.185, Art.1.

¹⁶³ Montesinos, "Algunas notas," pps. 252-253.

¹⁶⁴ Aquinas Summa Supl. Q.41, Art.1.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.33, Art.1.

¹⁶⁶ This heterodox view was condemned at Session IV of the Council of Trent, April 8, 1546 (Robert McAfee Brown, The Spirit of Protestantism [New York: Oxford University Press, 1965], p. 173).

¹⁶⁷ Montesinos, "Algunas notas," p. 248.

Part 2:

Las cortes de la Muerte of Micael de Carvajal
and Luis Hurtado de Toledo

Anti-Protestant invectives reach a fever pitch in this play,¹ begun by Micael de Carvajal and finished by Luis Hurtado de Toledo.² It was printed in Toledo in 1557,³ twelve years after the opening session of the Council of Trent (1545),⁴ and, even though the decrees of the Council were not authorized for publication in Spain until July 19, 1564, Bruce Wardropper surmises that ". . . fácilmente podían llegar a España noticias indirectas del sentido general del Concilio."⁵ Although it is true that the Council did not mention the reformers by name,⁶ one of its effects was to attack Lutheran teaching, especially on the subject of justification.⁷ It may well have been the influence on the author of this anti-Lutheran spirit of the Council that induced him to end his work with an auto de fe in which Luther is burned at the stake. In any case, this play is not informed by any kind of ambivalence toward the Reformers; they are soundly condemned while the authority of the Roman church is affirmed. The play is, in the words of J. P. W. Crawford, ". . .

too long and at times . . . dull, . . ." ⁸ but it is useful as a vast compendium of ideas and themes relative to the Dance of Death genre.

The desengaño motif is immediately introduced in the prologue (introito), spoken by a hermit. "Todos estados probé," (2:1) he tells us, but he was unable to find peace and contentment until he fled from ". . . el mundo y sus trajes" (2:2). As a result of his vast experience he has been chosen by the souls in Purgatory as a messenger to the world. His job is to remind them of the nearness of Death, the impending final judgment, and the reality of Heaven and Hell:

Oid los que estais dormidos,
 Despertad del sueño grave,
 Desatapad los oidos,
 Quitad la mundana llave
 Con que cerrais los sentidos.
 Entienda todo mortal
 Que tiene cerca la Muerte:
 Tenga en la memoria cual
 Será la trompeta fuerte
 De aquel jüicio final. (2:1)

He announces that Death will hold court and

. . . acortar camino
 A muchos que piensan ser
 Larga su estrella y su sino. (2:2)

He then exits and has no further part in the play.

In the first scene Death calls her two assistants, ⁹ Pain and Old Age, and explains that she wishes to hold court in order to undeceive the world:

Y pues que el mundo está ciego,
 Le quiero desengañar
 Y dar á entender el juego. (3:1)

She believes that these cortes generales are necessary because all people and all estates feel that they have a grievance against her and her two assistants who, in the opinion of the masses, quite unreasonably ravage the earth. Thus, when Death says that she wishes to "dar á entender el juego," she means that she wishes to explain to everybody that their complaints are unjustified; Time, the pregonero of the cortes, says that

Ella [i.e. la Muerte] quiere descargarse
 De la culpa que le es puesta,
 Y en este caso allanarse,
 Y por razones mostrarse
 Cuán con razon los molesta.
 Y así, sepan los mortales
 Que sintiendo esta injuria,
 Hace cortes generales. (3:2)

Two angels will protect the people who come to the cortes from the enemies, who are Flesh, Satan, and the World. Three attorneys are opposed to these enemies, Saint Augustine, Saint Jerome, and Saint Francis. Death's macebearer informs her that the solicitors of all the different estates have arrived and they wish to request the same favor that she granted the ancients, that is, longer life. Death then launches into her general address to the court in an attempt to justify herself to all those who feel they have a complaint against her. The essence of her argument is that those who are grieved by her arrival have nobody to blame but themselves:

Mezquinos, ¿de qué os quejáis?
 Quejaos, quejaos de vos mismos,
 Quede mí no os acordais
 Hasta el punto que llegais
 A los infiernos y abismos. (4:2)

They allow themselves to live in a state of illusion, unaware of death and the final judgment which must inevitably follow. Therefore, their tendency to view death as something unmitigatedly evil is a logical consequence of their failure to see things in their proper order and to recognize and live up to their moral obligations. Death views herself quite differently, however, and tends to look upon her activity as an act of mercy:

. . . ¿no es gran merced que os hago
 Sacaros de Babilonia?
 ¿No es gran dicha y gran ventura
 Y bienes nunca pensados
 Sacaros de niebla oscura
 Y llevaros al altura
 Para do fuistes criados? (4:2-3)

Thus men complain of Death because they have forgotten about their last end, which is happiness,¹⁰ and which ". . . can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence."¹¹ If they were not living in this state of illusion, they would not view the coming of Death with such apprehension, for, as she herself says, ". . . soy un sueño sabroso . . ." (4:3). She does not operate on her own power, but rather fulfills the Divine will:

De contino soy mandada
 Como instrumento de Dios. (4:3)

Thus, Death's message to mankind is

Que nadie duerma ni ciegue
 Con los deleites mundanos,
 Porque sabed, mis hermanos,
 Que no hay plazo que no llegue.

Y el alma en cuerpo venida,
 Mire cómo trata y vive;
 Contino esté apercebida,
 Que en el libro de la vida
 Todo se asienta y escribe.
 Y tengan por cosa cierta
 Que sin saber cómo y cuándo,
 Los llamaré muy despierta;
 Porque al viejo estó á la puerta,
 Y al mozo voy acechando. (4:3)

The threatening overtones in this passage are a logical consequence of the acknowledgement of the presence of sin in the world; Death will be a source of fear only to those who are self-deceived and living in a state of sin.

A brief hiatus in Death's analysis is caused by the entrance of Satan and his two friends, Flesh and the World. This scene indicates that a powerful condemnation of the Protestant heresy plays a major role in the a priori desengaño of this play: Satan has been ordered by Lucifer to attend Death's court as the solicitor for the "Estado/ De todos los infernales" (5:2), and the lawyer who will assist him in this enterprise is Luther. The following exchange between Satan, Flesh, and the World leaves little doubt as to the author's position vis-à-vis the Protestant reformers:

Satanás

¿No conoces al Lutero
 Fuente de las herejías?

Mundo

Ya, ya: este es el traidor
 Y pastor de aquella grey
 Que está fundada en error.

Satanás

Este es el profanador
De la evangélica ley.

.

Mundo

¿No es este el que confisiones
Ha quitado y sacramentos?

Satanás

Y aun misas y devociones,
Y el que sembró confusiones
Entre frailes y conventos.

Carne

Este es el que dió maridos
A monjas como á seglares.

Satanás

Y a los frailes recogidos
Que casen, y sean raídos
Los sanctos de los altares.
Con estas cosas, á osadas
El se ha hecho tan bien quisto,
Que se van tras sus pisadas
A banderas desplegadas.

Carne

¡Oh qué hermoso Antecristo! (5:2)

This simplistic and militantly anti-Protestant position, a classic example of what S. I. Hayakawa termed the "two-valued orientation,"¹² forms an integral part of the a priori desengaño of the play and reflects the growing fear of religious schism.

Satan is conceived as an enemy of Death, as she reveals upon encountering him:

¡Oh Satanás tentador!
Dime á qué, enemigo eterno,
Vienes á cortes, traidor,
El mayor perseguidor
Que se halla en el infierno? (5:3)

Death, continuing her explanation of death and the meaning it should have for Christians, affirms that all men must die because of original sin. Since death is inevitable, men must do battle with the World:

¿No miran que tienen guerra
 Con el mundo y su atadura,
 Y aquella carne tan perra,
 Y que un pié está ya en la tierra,
 Y el otro en la sepultura? (6:1)

Death defines herself in exclusively eschatological terms:

No soy sino un breve paso
 Puesto entre entramas las vidas. (6:1)

Basically, therefore, the philosophy of death outlined in this play is rather optimistic, but not euphorically so, for the threatening presence of sin is always recognized:

Por mí pasan los mortales
 A aquel precioso jardin
 De deleites celestiales,
 Si por sus culpas y males
 No pierden tal bien sin fin. (6:1)

Death concludes her presentation by reminding men that they were created for higher things than "ollas podridas" (6:1), a phrase she uses to symbolize the physical world in general.

The bishop is the solicitor for the clerical estates. Death mildly criticizes him for his showy and costly manner of dress and compares him unfavorably to Saint Peter, who dressed in a simple fashion, more suitable to a disciple of Christ. The bishop's request is that Death grant the clergy longer life, like that which the ancients enjoyed, since they are involved in an infinite

number of good works. Death explains why it is not in her power to grant the bishop's request:

. . . á la vida del hombre
 Tiene Dios término puesto.
 Y llegado ya aquel punto
 Que Dios le hubo señalado,
 Yo me parto, y allí junto
 Le hiero y dejo defunto,
 Porque el término ha espirado.
 Así, que no es en mi mano
 Alargar ni acortar vidas,
 Sino solo el Soberano
 Es el que tarde ó temprano
 Las quita o las da cumplidas.
 Para pasar la carrera
 Y esta vida de amargor,
 Desta jornada ligera
 No soy sino mensajera
 Y un ministro del Señor, (7:1-2)

Death thus affirms that her role is merely that of an executor of the Divine will. She reveals that she does not take pleasure from the performance of her function, as did her counterpart in the Dança general:

El que non quisiere poner diligencia
 Por mi non puede ser mas esperado. (ed. cit.,
 380:1)

Death in this play, however, does more than merely refrain from such incursions into vindictiveness; she is positively magnanimous, at least in comparison with Death in the Dança general, for she accepts the bishop's affirmation of the elevated morality of the clergy and agrees to intercede on their behalf with God, asking Him to grant them longer life. Thus Angel Lasso de la Vega y Argüelles was correct in his assertion that "la Muerte no es en este auto la fría ejecutora de sus sentencias, que es sorda á todo ruego, y solo atiende á descargar el golpe feroz que

extingue la existencia del viviente."¹³ Saint Augustine concurs in Death's decision to intercede on behalf of the clergy, but he adds a word of warning to the bishop, telling him to see to it that the clergymen are ". . . honestos y templados, /Castos y caritativos [emphasis added] . . ." (7:2). Saint Jerome also emphasizes the virtue of charity when he says that Satan, Flesh, and the World are adversaries of mankind who ". . . impiden la caridad . . ." (8:3).¹⁴

The knight is the solicitor for the military estate. His request is also for longer life for the members of his estate, but some of the reasons he adduces for this request are truly laughable:

Pidente todos postrados
 No les llesves como sueles,
 Ni derrueques sus estados,
 Porque están ahora ocupados
 En guerras grandes, crueles:
 Unos por acrecentar
 Sus principados y tierras,
 Y gentes á quien mandar. . . . (9:2)

Somewhat more valid is his request that Death grant the members of his estate time to correct their lives and make reparation for their sins. Death explains that a long life without such reparation increases the guilt due to the original sin and she tells the knight that the military estate is obliged to fight for God against the three enemies who send them cartas de desafío: the Devil, Flesh, and the World:

. . . el caballero cristiano
 Que contra el vicio no está
 Siempre la lanza en la mano,
 Con Cristo, rey soberano,
 Ninguna paz él terná. (10:1)

The solicitor for the rich indicates that he and those he represents are guilty of hypocrisy; they claim to want to use their riches to serve God, but they don't have a truly Christian attitude. All their effort is to accumulate more and more money and to enjoy it, strictly for its own sake:

Amontonan cada hora
 Ducado sobre ducado,
 Y en darse prisa á llegar
 Primero que otros lo cojan,
 Quieren ellos madrugar;
 A ver si pueden matar
 Su sed, el mundo despojan.

 Solamente les da penas
 Que otros tengan más ducados. (10:3)

These last lines indicate that the rich are also guilty of envy, a sin which is contrary to charity, since

. . . the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life. . . . Now the object of both charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good, while envy grieves over it. . . . Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.¹⁵

Death condemns the rich for their vanity and informs them that everybody is equal in death:

Que cuando el ojo se cierra,
 No lleva más pies de tierra
 El rico que el pobrecillo. (10:3)

Appropriately, it is Saint Francis who offers advice to the rich, encouraging them to undeceive themselves and realize how dangerous their estate is for the true Christian:

¡Oh, estado tan peligroso
 Para todo fiel cristiano!
 ¡Oh, robador del reposo
 Si aquel Alto Poderoso
 No os substenta con su mano! (11:3)

He advises them not to be diligent in attempting to acquire riches and to avoid the sin of avarice. He does not say that the rich are automatically condemned, but rather that they must have the proper attitude toward their wealth if they wish to be saved:

Usen bien dellas [i.e. las riquezas] le ruego;
 Porque rico fué Abrahan
 Y otros muchos (no lo niego),
 Mas miren que son un fuego
 Muy peor que de alquitran. (12:2)

This particular rich man and those on whose behalf he speaks are condemned very severely, however. Saint Francis explains that since they received their reward here on earth, it would not be appropriate for them to receive further rewards in heaven, but rather punishment and suffering in hell for their evil deeds. He accuses them of great evil (Vuestra maldad sobrepuja/ Tanto . . .") (12:2), so that it appears that their covetousness was not merely a venial, but rather a mortal sin. The mere inordinate desire of riches is not enough to condemn a man unless, through this love of riches, he does not fear to act counter to God's law.¹⁶ The rich man, upon hearing

this, experiences a posteriori desengaño and expresses it thus:

¡Oh, cómo voy despachado!
 Negras nuevas te daré.
 ¡Oh desventurado estado,
 Y como vas condenado
 Al infierno! Y ved por qué.
 Por un polvo, una basura,
 De que hacemos caudal;
 Noche de gran amargura
 Desdichada y sin ventura
 Nos espera y tanto mal. (12:2-3)

The attitude shown by the solicitor for the poor recalls that of the old poor man in Diego Sánchez de Badajoz's Farsa de la Muerte, for he comes seeking Death, rather than trying to avoid her. On behalf of all the poor he requests "Que les des la sepultura" (14:2). They are dying by the hour from sheer starvation and they want Death to end their sufferings. All the rich are criticized for the insensibility to mercy by which they allow such unmerited suffering to go uncorrected, but those who are most severely condemned are "aquellos que rigen/ La iglesia de Jesu Cristo" (14:3). They close their ears to the pleading of the indigent and refuse to remember that Christ himself was poor. All the rich who fail to succor the poor are thus accused of insensibility to mercy. This means that the a priori desengaño of this incident involves an emphasis on charity, since mercy results from charity.¹⁷ In the face of their extreme suffering the poor conclude that "el morir es el remedio/ Mas seguro" (15:1), although they are consoled to some degree by Saint Jerome and

Saint Dominic, who assure them that the final judgment is imminent and that they will be rewarded for their travails in heaven, while their oppressors will suffer for all eternity in hell.

The solicitor for the nuns very strongly recalls the despairing nun in Valdés's Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón. She has come to complain of the bitterness and remorse that causes so much dissension in the convents; she claims that there are very few, if any, nuns who do not wish to be freed from their vows, and she explains the reasons for this attitude:

Porque niñas y muchachas
 Nos metieron; que no vimos
 Tantos daños, tantas tachas;
 Mas estábamos borrachas
 Cuando tal yerro hicimos.
 Que nuestros padres, por dar
 A los hijos la hacienda,
 Nos quisieron despojar,
 Y sobre todo encerrar
 Donde Dios tanto se ofenda.
 Porque allí nos maldecimos
 Cada hora y cada rato,
 Desde el día en que nacimos,
 E que tristes entendimos
 La negra clausura y trato.
 Y ¡pluguiera á mi gran Dios
 Que al mas pobre guillote
 Que se hallara entre nos,
 Padre, me diérades vos,
 Y no á tal yugo y azote! (16:2-3)

The nun goes on to state that there are very few women who have been successful in guarding their virginity, and that those few who have been successful are fearful of going the way of the majority who have succumbed to temptation. Her request to Death, therefore, is that she intercede

with God and implore Him to protect this small contingent from the snares of temptation until their days are ended. The solution, according to Death, is resignation and perseverance:

Monja, en tanto que durare
 La vida, sin discrepar
 Trabajen, y nadie pare;
 Porque el que perserverare
 Hasta el fin, se ha de salvar.
 Flechen su arco, y flechado,
 No dejen de resistir;
 Pues está claro y probado
 Que ninguno es más tentado
 Que lo que puede sufrir. (17:2-3)

This is an oblique allusion to the traditional Catholic doctrine of free will, which maintains that man has it in his power to resist any and all temptations.¹⁸ The nun must therefore struggle constantly against the Devil's temptations, but she consoles herself with the consideration that ". . . en fin, la tempestad / Deste mundo poco dura" (8:1).

The next solicitor, the married man, indicates that marriage can be as difficult as celibacy. He has come to Death's court primarily on behalf of the mal casados, who are all living a life of unequalled torments. Their complaint is that Death continually ignores them, instead of delivering them from their life of misery. Death in this play has a broader range of emotional feelings than her counterparts in some of the earlier Dances of Death, for she sympathizes with some of her would-be victims. Upon hearing the message of the married man she says:

¡Oh, tristes y desastrados!
 Y ¿tantos males padescen
 Los miserables casados?
 Razón tienen los cuitados
 De llamarme, y lo merecen. (20:2)

She once again emphasizes, however, that it is not in her power to decide when an individual's hour has arrived, for that privilege belongs to God alone. She reminds them that it may well be that the sufferings they endure were sent to them by God as a means for them to achieve salvation; what they must do is resign themselves to God's will, for He knows what is best for each of them. An angel reminds them that matrimony is a holy state and that many saints achieved holiness while they were married. Then a chorus of angels sings a phrase from the Apocalypse of Saint John (14:13) which is central to the a priori desengaño of this work: "Beati mortui qui in Domino moriuntur" (21:2).

The widow contrasts the unhappiness of her present estate with the joy she knew while married. One of her major afflictions is gossip:

Todo el mundo os atalaya
 Con mil ojos, y está á ver
 Si pasais de aquella raya,
 Y qué manto, toca y saya
 Traeis y poder [sic] traer. (21:3)

The widows also complain of not being able to defend themselves from those who would take from them everything they own. Death admits that the widow is correct in everything she says and she agrees to intercede with God on her behalf, asking Him to give the widows the strength

to resist the temptations of Satan. Death advises the widow, however, that the demands of charity require a perfectly upright life:

Abracen la honestidad,
Y esos vicios y palacios
Se escusen por caridad. . . . (22:1)

Pride is the vice of the solicitor for the judges, who paints a picture of the activities of the members of his profession that is so flattering that it is literally incredible. As Death says to him,

Esos jüeces, hermano,
Dioses se pueden llamar. (22:3)

Saint Augustine attempts to temper the presumption of the judges somewhat, reminding them that they will be judged by God and that it will be impossible for them to deceive Him.

The lawyer is summarily dismissed by Death and handed over to Satan as soon as he tries to prove that it is inadvisable for Death to take the lives of the members of the legal profession. The vices of the lawyers are not mentioned specifically, but Saint Hieronymus accuses them of having destroyed many people; regardless of the manner in which this took place, it is a sin contrary to charity in so far as it damages a neighbor's spiritual or earthly well-being.

The solicitor for the doctors is possibly the most severely criticized character in the entire play. His argument is that the doctors are absolutely essential to

the well-being of society and that Death should therefore leave them in peace

. . . hasta que el mundo vaya
De un golpe terrible y grave,
Y aqieste artificio caya. (23:3)

Death will hear none of his arguments, however, but launches instead into a violent condemnation of doctors (who are traditionally the objects of some of the harshest attacks):

Diles que pues desbaratan
Todo este mundo á remate
Con sus purgas, y maltratan,
Que de cuantos ellos matan,
Justo es que yo los mate.
Que á un triste porque mató
Por desastre otro varon,
Luego en horca padesció,
Y ellos matan mas que yo;
Y que vivan no es razon. (23:3)

Death virtually promises the doctors eternal damnation for their abuses of the profession of medicine. Saint Francis severely denounces them for their covetousness and deception, reminding them that

. . . el Médico verdadero
A cada cual curará (23:3),

an allusion to the impending Divine judgment.

With the solicitor for the farmers, Death shows herself capable of considerable kindheartedness. When he arrives at the court and beholds Death, her appearance strikes fear into his heart, so that he is afraid to approach her, but she consoles him by saying

¡Oh, mezquino labrador!
 Ven acá: no temas verme.

 Pierde, pierde esos temores,
 Y dime ya tu embajada. (24:1)

The solicitor complains that the farmers are subject to extreme injustices, since they work harder than anybody but do not receive rewards for their labor. They always end up owing more than they have earned, and when they are able to keep a pittance for themselves, they are soon divested of it by exploiters and opportunists. What they want from Death is their final rest:

Y agora los miserables
 Querrian ya descansar
 De trabajos tan notables
 En las sillas perdurables,
 Si pudiesen alcanzar.
 Vengo á ver si por ventura
 En estas cortes se da
 Remedio a su desventura;
 Porque si mucho les dura
 Tal trabajo, ¿quién podrá? (24:2)

Death warns them against covetousness (which Aquinas considers the root of all sins)¹⁹ and advises them to resign themselves to their suffering, for their reward is in heaven.

Beatriz, the solicitor for the women of easy virtue, is shocked by the ugly appearance of Death:

¡Oh trago terrible y fuerte!
 Oh gesto tan desgraciado,
 Tan feo, triste y horrible!
 ¿Quién tan fea te ha parado? (26:1)

The answer is the traditional one: sin, for Death is not a creation of God. The harlots' request is

Que tú, Muerte, las esperes,
 A que lleguen á vejez;
 Y disimules con ellas,
 Hasta qu' esta mocedad
 Puedan gozar todas ellas;
 Que hayas lástima de vellas
 Morir en tan buena edad.
 Que allá en el tercio postrero
 De la vida enmendarán
 Sus vidas muy por entero,
 Y á su gran Dios verdadero
 Prometen que servirán. (26:2)

They are so self-deceived that their situation is almost laughable. Death marvels at the fact that these women do not discover their illusions until it is too late and advises them to change their way of living:

Déjense desas consejas,
 Y muden ya las pellejas,
 Busquen seguro reposo. (26:2)

Death in this play is thus placed in the very charitable role of helping her future victims to attain salvation. She disillusiones Beatriz by pointing out that the prostitutes are incapable of merit, which is chiefly a function of charity,²⁰ because they are living in sin with no desire for true repentance:

Estas tristes no han mirado
 Que no puede aprovechar
 Ningun bien que hayan obrado,
 Estándose en el pecado,
 Sin se querer enmendar. (26:3)

This means that salvation will surely escape them, unless they change their ways, since ". . . the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity."²¹ Death ends this scene on a rather macabre

note which recalls the words spoken by her counterpart in the Dança general to the two maidens:

Mujeres, no deis lugar
 A deleites en el suelo.
 Dejaos ya dese afeitar,
 Porque yo suelo quitar
 La tez muy al redropelo;
 Y porque desas locuras
 Os quiteis tan peligrosas,
 Veis aquí las hermosuras,
 Los colores y blancuras
 De dos infantas hermosas.
 (Aquí muestra dos calaveras.)
 Conocémelas si son
 Blancas o negras aquí;
 Dadme aquí cuenta y razon
 De su matiz, presuncion;
 ¿Qué se hicieron? decí.
 Mirad toda la frescura
 Si ha escapado de mis manos
 Aunque sea de mas altura;
 Y la falsa hermosura
 Si la comieron gusanos. (27:3)

Thus Death emphatically demonstrates the caducity of false (i.e. physical) beauty; true beauty is the spiritual perfection which will ultimately merit "seguro reposo."

An emphasis on correct doctrine comes to the fore in the next scene, in which two philosophers, Heráclito, the sad philosopher, and Demócrito, the happy philosopher, expound their views and make their requests of Death. Heráclito requests more time to live so that he can have his fill of weeping. The source of his sorrow is the moral decadence into which the world has fallen:

¿Quién no terná pesadumbre
 Y dará cient mil gemidos
 Viendo el mundo en tal costumbre,
 Los malos tan en la cumbre,
 Los buenos tan abatidos? (28:1-2)

Demócrito was similarly impressed by this "corrupcion de costumbres" (29:1), but his response was quite different: he blinded himself so as not to have to perceive it. His occupation is to laugh at the world's follies, especially those of women. Here he shows himself a thoroughgoing misogynist:

¿Quiéñ te dirá su locura,
Y aquella desenvoltura
Que ya tiene, y desvergüenza? (30:1)

Death, however, reproves both of the philosophers for being even more vain and presumptuous than those they condemn, and it is here that the emphasis on doctrine becomes clear:

. . . sabed, mis hermanos,
Que vosotros largamente,
Aunque vivís muy ufanos
Con vuestra ciencia, mas vanos
Sois que toda esotra gente.
¿Por qué quereis presumir
De sabios, habiendo visto
Que de vos se han de reir,
Pues que no quereis seguir
La escuela de Jesu-Cristo? (30:3)

Death's advice to the philosophers is a kind of memento mori, for he reminds them to

Memorar siempre el morir,
Considerar y medir
Esos cuerpos miserables,
Ver que los que por locura
De soberbia y presunción
No caben en gran anchura,
Yo en la chica sepoltura
Mido bien cuán chicos son. (31:1)

It is appropriate that it is Saint Augustine who most seriously rebukes the philosophers for their failure to

follow Christ, for the words spoken by the character in the play truly resemble the views of Saint Augustine himself:

¡Oh, filósofos perdidos,
 Sin luz ni sin fundamento,
 Cómo estais endurecidos,
 Que no quereis ser traídos
 Al sano conocimiento!
 Dejaos desas opiniones
 Errores, tras de que andais,
 Y os llevan las aficiones;
 Y fijad los corazones
 Dentro en Cristo, á quien dejais.
 Que no hay mas filosofia
 De ver que este es el Señor
 De las cosas, y las cria;
 y el que de aquesta armonía
 Ha sido fabricante. (31:2)22

Death implies that the philosophers must rid themselves of their errors if they are to hope for salvation. Thus both Death and Saint Augustine pass over a consideration of the many vices to which the philosophers alluded in their accusations of moral corruption in order to concentrate on a condemnation of the erroneous opinions of the philosophers themselves, thus indicating that correct doctrine forms an important part of the a priori desengaño of this play.

A totally new element in the Dance of Death tradition makes its appearance in the next scene: the Indian controversy. The author's sympathy is clearly with the Indians, for a cacique comes to Death's courts to complain of the treatment they are receiving at the hands of the Christians. He feels that it is ironic that when they were pagans they lived in peace, whereas now that they have become Christians

Parece que desafueros
 Homicidios, fuegos, brasas,
 Casos atroces y fieros,
 Por estos negros dineros
 Nos llueven en nuestras casas. (31:3)

The Indians provide a detailed account of all the abuses they suffer at the hands of the Christians, and Death sympathizes with them totally:

Oh cuánta razón teneis
 De quejaros, mis hermanos,
 Dese mal que padeceis,
 Porque no lo mereceis,
 Especial siendo cristianos. (33:1)

Nevertheless, her message is again one counselling resignation; they must trust in God to deliver them (by inference, in the afterlife) from these "lobos robadores" (33:1). Thus Death's advice to the Indians is essentially the same as her advice to certain other characters in the play, such as the nun, the farmer, and the widow, for example. The virtue that these people must cultivate is that of patience, which ". . . safeguard[s] the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow."²³ This emphasis on the virtue of patience contains a slight but perceptible ancillary emphasis on charity, since patience ". . . is caused by charity, . . ."²⁴ and is therefore impossible without grace.

Death is not so sympathetic toward the characters in the next scene: four Jews, two Moors, and a Portuguese Christian, all of whom are shown to be self-deceived in one way or another. Don Farón, one of the Jews, claims

that a certain rabbi has prophecied the coming of the Messiah in the year 1629, and his request of Death is

Que no nos hagás morir
 Con tu guadaña y lision
 Hasta ver si ha de venir
 El Mesía y redemir
 Aquesta hebrea nascion. (34:2)

Death accuses the Jews of being "llenos de errores" (34:2)²⁵ and turns them over to the saints, who undeceive them by explaining orthodox Catholic teaching on the subject. Satan is very disturbed by this turn of events and he thus reveals himself to be favorable to engaño and hostile to desengaño. He says to the saints:

Grande agravio me habeis hecho
 Que seais alumbradores
 Destos judíos traidores,
 Viniéndome tal provecho. (33:1)

Saint Francis makes the same point more directly when he says to the Jews

¿Qué os parece del pesar
 Que el Demonio tiene, hermanos,
 De veros desengañar?

Thus the a priori desengaño of this episode emphasizes orthodox doctrine as opposed to the Judaic heresy (Satan refers to the Jews as "cargados de herejías" [33:1]).

A similar emphasis on orthodoxy can be seen in the condemnation of Islam. The request of the Moors is that they be allowed to live until they see the unity of all religions in Islam:

Te pedimos ahincadoj²⁶
 Con toda la Berbería,
 Que de ti no jean llevadoj
 Hajta que todoj cuitadoj

Podamos ver aquel dia;
 Cuando te hacen jaber
 Que tienen muy gran señal
 Que las leyey han de jer
 Todas una, sin haber
 Mas de un pajtor y un corral.
 Y tenemoj por muy cierto
 Que nuejtra ley ha de jer,
 Por jer ley de mas concierto,
 Y por jer maj firme puerto,
 Do se pueden acoger. (33:2-3)

This statement provokes a heated altercation between the Moors and the Jews. In the middle of the dispute a Portuguese wanders on stage and is asked by Don Farón, one of the Jews, to settle the dispute and tell whether Judaism or Islam will be the triumphant religion. He soon reveals, however, that he is even more self-deceived than the others, for he replies:

Judeos, el que ha quemado
 Las çellas allá en la escola,
 Vos dará deso recado,
 Que yo todo mi cuydado
 Es en damas y viola. (36:3)

The Jews realize their error and convert when Saint Augustine explains Catholic teaching to them, but the Moors²⁷ and the Portuguese (the latter being a traditional object of scorn in Spanish literature) are not so easily undeceived. The latter instead proceeds to make his request to Death, namely, that she not go to Portugal to claim any "fidalgo honrado" (37:3) as a victim, and that she not enter Portugal at all without the express consent of the king. Such foolishness prompts a very harsh reply from Death, who condemns not only this individual but all Portugal as well:

¡Provincia tan desdichada,
Lusitania, en la verdad,
Que siempre fuiste notada,
De criar gente tocada
De locura y necesidad! (37:3)

These lines prompted Florence Whyte's remark that "Portugal is represented as an unfortunate country where all are mildly insane."²⁸

The only remaining characters to make requests of Death are two allegorical figures, Old Age and Youth, and the Auctor. Old Age wishes to know why Death mercilessly cuts down those who have finally attained wisdom and are therefore most valuable to society, whereas Youth predictably complains of having to die prematurely. Death, as usual, defends herself well:

¡Oh, hombres, que no entendeis
Lo que pedís en pedir
Las vidas que pretendéis!
Y ¿no es mejor que goceis
Del que es la vida y vivir?
Seguís tras ese apetito
Del mundo, y de su mal nombre.
Sancto Domingo bendito,
Respondedles con lo escrito
De la miseria del hombre. (38:3)

There follows a paraphrase of certain sections of the Book of Job, in which Death is seen to be a gift of God:

. . . el mayor bien que Dios dió
A los hombres fué la muerte.
Pues la vida peligrosa
¿A quién habrá que no asombre? (39:1)

The next scene is, in the words of Miss Whyte, ". . . a carelessly inserted dialogue between the Auctor and Death."²⁹ The former complains of the latter's fury, but Death once again defends herself, explaining that man's purpose on earth is to regain what was lost through

original sin and travel from this world to the next. Death's role as an agent of desengaño can be clearly perceived when she says that incorruptibility is a property of God alone³⁰ and explains that

. . . porque solo á Dios
 Este honor se debe eterno,
 Os los lleva d'entre vos
 Una á una, y dos á dos,
 Para el cielo y el infierno;
 Porque mejor conozcais
 Donde va vuestra esperanza,
 Y en el mundo no tengais
 Fe con lo que mas amais,
 Pues es vana confianza. (40:1-2)

Thus the function of Death is to bring men to a state of desengaño in which they abandon their attachment to the world and its pleasures. A bishop sums up this moral message precisely when he says to his listeners:

¡Oh, hermanos, qué buen consejo
 La Muerte aquí nos ha dado!
 Pues tenemos aparejo,
 Tengámosle por espejo
Y por un rico dechado [emphasis added].
 Qitemos las esperanzas
 Del mundo y su vanidad,
 Pues que en él no hay confianzas,
 Y con grandes alabanzas
 Se alabe su Majestad. (40:3)

The play ends with a violent auto de fe. Satan, Flesh, and the World decide to consult the record of the court proceedings which Luther was supposed to have made³¹ and discover that ". . . todo el registro va / Falsado por un traidor" (41:2). They therefore tie him to a stake and burn him alive, while Carón says:

¡Sus! ¡Sus! fenezca el maldito,
 De los malos el peor,
 Pues ha falsado lo escrito;
 Aquí do hizo el delito
 Pague la pena el traidor. (41:3)

It seems reasonable to assume here that lo escrito is a veiled reference to Sacred Scripture, which Luther is assumed to have falsified and betrayed through his heterodox interpretations. Thus the Protestant schism is manifestly condemned in the most emphatic way possible, a dramatic representation of an auto de fe.

In conclusion, the a priori desengaño of this play continues the tradition of the medieval and Renaissance Dances of Death with their emphasis on charity and doctrine, but adds a new element, the condemnation of specific heresies. The change in the concept of desengaño is due to a change in historical circumstances in Spain. In the year 1557, when the play was printed, there were Protestant communities in northern and southern Spain,³² and R. Trevor Davies states that in that year the suspicion of the Inquisition was finally aroused.³³ Las cortes de la Muerte reflects this growing awareness of the Protestant schism through its condemnation of Luther's innovations, specifically his abolition of certain sacraments, including penance; his suppression of the Mass and other devotional practices; his precedent-setting marriage with a nun (Katharina Von Bora); his unorthodox reading of Scripture; and, finally, his iconoclasm. Thus there is a dialectical tension (heterodoxy vs. orthodoxy) in the

emphasis on doctrine in the a priori desengaño of this work that was absent in the Renaissance Dances of Death, such as Gil Vicente's Auto da barca da Gloria.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III, Part 2

¹Micael de Carvajal and Luis Hurtado de Toledo, Las cortes de la Muerte, in Biblioteca de autores espanoles: romancero y cancionero sagrados, ed. by Justo de Sancho (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1950), 35: 1-41. All references are to this edition of the play and are identified in the text by page and column numbers. This work should not be confused with another play of the same title, falsely attributed to Lope de Vega. This auto could be adduced as an example of a Spanish Dance of Death with an a priori desengaño condemning heterodox sects and doctrines, as can be seen by the following partial list of errors which it condemns: Gnosticism, Manicheanism, Arianism, Apollinarianism, Calvinism, and Lutheranism. It will not be discussed in a separate chapter, however, for George I. Dale has proved that it was compiled by an anonymous plagiarist perhaps as late as the nineteenth century who borrowed lines from Lope, Mira de Amescua, Francisco Tárrega, Francisco de Rojas, Tirso de Molina, and Agustín Moreto. He concludes that ". . . the auto is a hoax, and should not merit our further consideration as a unified dramatic composition" ("Las cortes de la Muerte," Modern Language Notes 40 [1925]:280).

²For an analysis of the question of the respective contributions of each author, see Florence Whyte, The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931), pps. 109-111.

³Ibid., p. 100.

⁴Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 467.

⁵Bruce W. Wardropper, Introducción al teatro religioso del siglo de oro (Salamanca: Ediciones Anaya, 1967), p. 125.

⁶Rahner and Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, p. 467.

⁷A. G. Dickens, The Counter Reformation (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), pps. 114-115.

⁸J. P. Wickersham Crawford, Spanish Drama before Lope de Vega (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937), p. 153.

⁹This is the first Spanish Dance of Death in which Death has assistants. Miss Whyte traces the idea to Lucian's Charon (Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 101, n. 3).

¹⁰Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.1, Art.7.

¹¹Ibid., Q.3, Art.8.

¹²S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Action (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1941), pps. 164-185.

¹³Angel Lasso de la Vega y Argüelles, La danza de la Muerte en la poesía castellana (Madrid: Casa Editorial de Medina, 1878), p. 68.

¹⁴It is true that both saints mention other virtues in addition to charity, but, as my analysis in the preceding chapters indicates, these can ultimately be reduced to charity, the mother of all virtues.

¹⁵Aquinas, Summa Pt. II-II, Q.36, Art.3.

¹⁶Ibid., Q.118, Art.4.

¹⁷Ibid., Q.30, AVt.3, Obj.3.

¹⁸v. Ibid., Pt. I, Q.83, Art.1.

¹⁹Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.84, Art.1.

²⁰Ibid., Q.114, Art.4.

²¹Ibid.

²²Cf.: ". . . he (i.e. Christ) is meek and humble of heart, and he guides the meek in judgement, and he teaches the mild his ways, seeing our abjection and our labor, and forgiving all our sins. But those men who are raised up on the heights of some toplofty teaching do not hear him as he says, 'Learn of me, for I am meek and humble of heart, and you shall find rest to your souls.' 'Although they know God, they do not glorify him, or give thanks, but become vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart is darkened; for professing themselves to be wise, they become fools'" (Augustine Confessions [trans. John K. Ryan] 7.9).

²³Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.136, Art.1.

²⁴Ibid., Art.3.

²⁵ Although it is, strictly speaking, outside the province of this study, it might be profitable to compare the function of Death in these Medieval and Golden Age Dances of Death with her function in a modern work of the same genre, such as Ingmar Bergman's The Seventh Seal. In the older works Death is usually presented as a figure who is aware of her role as a messenger of God, a figure to whom eternal truth is transparently accessible. Such is not the case in The Seventh Seal, however, a work which is not Catholic in its philosophical presuppositions, but rather agnostic. Death cannot assuage the anxiety of the agnostic knight, for she herself knows nothing. This is made clear by the following exchange. The knight has been playing chess with Death in an effort to gain time to perform one meaningful act:

Death: Now I see something interesting.
 Knight: What do you see?
 Death: You are mated on the next move, Antonius Block.
 Knight: That's true.
 Death: Did you enjoy your reprieve?
 Knight: Yes, I did.
 Death: I'm happy to hear that. Now I'll be leaving you. When we meet again, you [sic] and your companions' time will be up.
 Knight: And you will divulge your secrets.
 Death: I have no secrets.
 Knight: So you know nothing.
 Death: I have nothing to tell.

(Ingmar Bergman, The Seventh Seal, in Four Screenplays of Ingmar Bergman, trans. Lars Malmstrom and David Kushner [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960], pps. 158-159.)

²⁶ The j's are used to simulate the speech of the Moors.

²⁷ The fact that the a priori desengaño of this work contains a condemnation of Islam as well as of Protestantism may respond to the fact that, as R. Trevor Davies notes, there was the possibility that during the reign of Phillip II ". . . Protestantism and Islam might join hands against their common enemy. For there are examples on record of Moriscos who became Protestants, and there is the ominous fact at the end of the century that Morisco conspirators turned naturally for help to the Huguenots of France and to the Protestant Government of England" (The Golden Century of Spain: 1501-1621 [New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1965], p. 141).

²⁸Whyte, Dance of Death, p. 108.

²⁹Ibid., p. 109.

³⁰This is theologically imprecise, since angels are also incorruptible by their nature (Aquinas Summa Pt. I, Q.50, Art.5).

³¹This function of Luther's was not made clear in the beginning of the play, and is further evidence of its careless construction.

³²Trevor Davies, Golden Century, pps. 141-143.

³³Ibid., p. 141.

Part 3:

El sueño de las calaveras of Francisco de
Quevedo y Villegas

As in Las cortes de la Muerte the a priori desengaño of this work¹ involves a condemnation of heterodoxy, although here the condemnation acquires more muted tones. This representative sueño is an example of the Dance of Death tradition in the seventeenth century, although strictly speaking, it might be more accurate to refer to it as a Dance of the Dead, based as it is on the ancient legend of skeletons rising from the cemetery.

The narrator, having fallen asleep reading Dante, has a vision of Judgment Day in which, at the sound of a trumpet, ". . . comenzó a moverse toda la tierra y a dar licencia a los huesos que anduviesen unos en busca de otros" (29). One of the ways in which Quevedo reveals the a priori desengaño in this sueño is by showing the aversion that the souls have to be reunited with certain parts of their bodies:

Después, ya que a noticia de todos llegó que era el día del juicio, fué de ver cómo los lujuriosos no querían que los hallasen sus ojos, por no llevar al tribunal testigos contra sí; los maldicientes, las lenguas; los ladrones y matadores gastaban los pies en huir de sus mismas manos. (30)

This a priori desengaño condemns some of the acharitable vices against which authors of earlier Dances of Death also railed, namely, lust, backbiting, theft and murder.² All these vices, with the exception of lust, are opposed to charity directly, while lust is indirectly contrary to charity to the extent that it contributes to folly, or blindness of mind. Quevedo condemns covetousness, another vice which is frequently an obstacle to charity, by ridiculing a man who was asking whether he would be likely to regain possession of some of his moneybags, since all the buried were to be resurrected that day. This lightly humoristic approach characterizes Quevedo's satire throughout this sueño: rather than denounce the vices of his characters with trenchant force, as does the author of the Danza general, he prefers to see them as a source of mirth. This does not mean, however, that his satire is strictly for comic effect and devoid of moral purpose, for the dedicatoria makes it clear that such is not the case: "A manos de vuecelecencia van estas desnudas verdades, que buscan, no quien las vista, sino quien las consienta" (25). Thus Quevedo is trying to convince his readers to avoid the vices he condemns, but his methods are relatively low-key compared with those of the authors of previous Dances of Death.

One of the most strongly condemned characters in Horozco's Coloquio de la Muerte con todas las edades y estados, the escribano, is also severely reproved by

Quevedo, and for the exact same vice: theft. The fact that the escribanos are held in lower esteem by Quevedo than some of the other targets for his satirical barbs is indicated by their inability to inspire him to laughter:

Riérame si no me lastimara a otra parte el
afán con que una gran chusma de escribanos
andaban huyendo de sus orejas, deseando no
las llevar por no oír lo que esperaban. . . (30-31)

He is not condemning all the escribanos, just those who had their ears cut off as punishment for theft. He adds that it is by sheer oversight, however, that they are not the majority. Theft is of course directly contrary to charity since it is ". . . a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings. . . ." ³

Quevedo also directs a great deal of criticism against the vanity of beautiful women, many of whom reproach the narrator-author for not having had more respect for women. They appear to experience a posteriori desengaño, but since they have already died, it is of course too late for them and they must simply await their fate in the final judgment:

Salieron fuera muy alegres de verse
gallardas y desnudas entre tanta gente
que las mirase; aunque luego, conociendo
que era el día de la ira y que la hermosura
las estaba acusando de secreto, comenzaron
a caminar al valle con pasos más entretenidos. (31)

This fear of final judgment suggests that the vainglory of the women was a mortal sin, which is the case whenever the temporal good in which one glories is preferred to God. ⁴

A doctor and a judge are both accused of neglect of duty, a vice which is contrary to justice (and therefore to charity also) since it involves a failure "to render to each one his right." The doctor is accused by the victims he dispatched from life "sin razón y antes de tiempo" (32). His motives for malpractice are not made clear, but his behavior is uncharitable by virtue of the fact that he did not render his patients their due, namely, his best effort on their behalf. The judge can be assumed also to be guilty of injustice since he is trying to wash his hands of the stains accumulated from his dealings in certain unspecified but definitely unsavory affairs, ". . . por no parecer con ellas de aquella suerte delante de la universal residencia" (32-33).

Several other souls are criticized in passing for their various faults before the beginning of the tribunal proper. A tavernkeeper is accused of having cheated his customers by watering his wine. A torturer says to him: "Harto es que sudéis el agua y no la vendáis por vino" (33). One of the tailors attempts to argue that he couldn't possibly be guilty of theft since he was always starving to death, upon which he is accused of neglect of duty: "Y los otros le decían, viendo que negaba haber sido ladrón, qué cosa era despreciarse de su oficio" (34). This is a vice which is very similar to theft except that it involves a failure to render rather than a taking away of some good. Both are contrary to charity.

The narrator's words "Al fin vi hacer silencio a todos" (35) indicate the beginning of the tribunal. The appearance of Jupiter⁵ depends upon the degree of moral rectitude of those who perceive him: "Júpiter estaba vestido de sí mismo, hermoso para los unos y enojado para los otros" (35). Thus the divine presence is a source of comfort for the truly pious and a cause for fear for the sinners, who are worried about what type of excuses they will be able to proffer. This dual effect of the divine presence forms the essence of the author's a priori desengaño.

One of the first souls to be examined in the tribunal is a pompous master of fencing, an allusion by Quevedo to Luis Pacheco de Narváez, one of his mortal enemies.⁶ The irony of his situation is that even though he is an acknowledged master of self-defense, he does not know any defenses against the enemies of the soul, only against those of the body. He is quickly dispatched, presumably to hell.

Quevedo uses a clever play on words to introduce a condemnation of theft into the a priori desengaño of the next incident, involving several stewards:

Y llegaron unos despenseros a cuentas,
y no rezándolas,⁷ y en el ruido con que
venía la trulla, dijo un ministro:

- Despenseros son.

Y otros dijeron:

- No son.

Y otros:

- Sisón. (40)

Thus the stewards are all accused of being petty thieves, for which they too are sent directly to hell.

They are soon followed by a pastry cook who is condemned for alimentary fraud:

. . . cuando él vió que se les probaba a sus pasteles haberse hallado en ellos más animales que en el arca de Noé, porque en ella no hubo ratones ni moscas, y en ellos sí, volvió las espaldas y dejólos con la palabra en la boca. (42)

This is essentially a sin against justice (and therefore against charity also) since it involves a failure to render to his customers their due.

Avarice is condemned in the person of a soul who is caught trying to get through the very narrow door leading to salvation. When he is told that ". . . los preceptos guardaban aquella puerta de quien no los había guardado," (43) he replies that ". . . en cosas de guardar era imposible que hubiese pecado," (43) thus revealing his avarice. His attempt to interpret the commandments in such a way as to make himself appear worthy of salvation fails and he too is sent on his way.

A verdugo accuses a doctor, a druggist, and a barber of malpractice:

- Ante este doctor han pasado los más difuntos, con ayuda de este boticario y barbero, y a ellos se les debe gran parte deste día. (46)

A solicitor speaks on behalf of the druggist and says that it should be considered that he gave liberally to the poor.

His argument is to no avail, however, for another verdugo replies that

habían sido más dañosos dos botes de su
tienda que diez mil de pica en la guerra,
porque todas sus medicinas eran espurias. . . . (46)

He is therefore condemned for a type of fraud similar to that of the pastry cook and the tavernkeeper, whereas the doctor and the barber are saved.⁸

Unjust advocacy is briefly condemned in the person of a lawyer who is sent to hell because ". . . tenía todos los derechos con corcovas . . ." (46). He is quickly followed by a group of innkeepers who watered their wine in order to increase their profits. They had been living in a state of illusion, for they always gave pure wine to a hospital for the sacrifice of the Mass, assuming that this supposedly charitable act would be enough to redeem them from their vices. A small group of rich foreigners is found guilty of theft, since "todos los demás hombres . . . dan cuenta de lo que es suyo; mas éstos, de lo ajeno y todo" (47). A knight stands condemned for covetousness, and a sacristan for a whole series of vices: stealing oil from the lamps, taking sections from the ornaments in order to make clothes for himself, making personal use of the tray and cruets (instead of reserving them for the ecclesiastical services), and abbreviating the services. These offenses are all contrary to charity since they stem from greed and self-interest. He is followed on the path to hell by a woman of easy virtue who had been an adulteress.

Adultery is simultaneously a sin of lust and injustice,⁹ and is therefore contrary to charity.

It is at this point that Quevedo introduces an emphasis on orthodox doctrine in opposition to the heresies of Luther and Muhammad. After all the previous souls have been judged, the only three remaining are Judas, Luther, and Muhammad. When a minister of the tribunal asks which one is Judas, the other two both identify themselves as him, obviously thinking that their punishment will be less severe if they pay for Judas's sin rather than for their own. This is Judas's thinking too, for he immediately rushes forth and declares in a loud voice:

-Señor, yo soy Judas, y bien conocéis
vos que soy mucho mejor que éstos: porque,
si os vendí, remedié al mundo, y éstos,
vendiéndose a sí y a vos, lo han destruido
todo. (50)

Judas thus sees himself as an important instrument in the Divine plan of salvation and the others as major obstacles of that plan. His defense is clever, but ultimately useless, for all three are condemned together. Thus Quevedo condemns heterodoxy absolutely, but without making detailed accusations regarding its specific evils.¹⁰

After the last victim is dispatched, the tribunal ends and nature once again takes on a pleasing appearance:

Huyeron las sombras a su lugar, quedó
el aire con nuevo aliento, floreció la
tierra, rióse el cielo, Júpiter subió
consigo a descansar en sí los dichosos
y yo me quedé en el valle. (51)

The sueño ends on a light note, in keeping with the gently humoristic tone maintained by the author throughout:

"Dióme tanta risa ver esto, que me despertaron las carcajadas, y fué mucho quedar de tan triste sueño más alegre que espantado" (52).

The a priori desengaño in this seventeenth century Dance of Death is very similar to its counterpart in the sixteenth century, as seen in works such as Las cortes de la Muerte. There is still a heavy emphasis on charity, which is appropriate in Christian didactic literature, since charity is the greatest of the virtues. But in addition, by way of response to the Protestant schism, there is an emphasis on orthodox doctrine, including specific condemnations of heresy. Quevedo has added very little ideological content to the tradition of desengaño in Dance of Death literature, but he has treated it with considerable style and wit.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III, Part 3

¹Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, El sueño de las calaveras, in Los sueños, ed. Julio Cejador y Frauca, 2 vols. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967), 1:21-52. All references are to this edition of the work and are identified in the text by page numbers.

²Most Dances of Death involve some kind of procession of characters who represent the various estates. Since, however, as E. Segura Covarsí has noted, "en Quevedo, esta galería humana se hace interminable," ("Sentido dramático y contenido litúrgico de 'Las danzas de la Muerte'," Cuadernos de literatura, 5 [1949]: 267) only those characters will be analyzed who are more than casually mentioned in the sueño.

³Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.66, Art.6.

⁴Ibid., Q.132, Art.3.

⁵The terminology of the Sueños was originally Christian rather than pagan. Cejador y Frauca surmises that Quevedo may have altered them to appease the Duke of Olivares (ed. cit., 1:xviii).

⁶Ibid., p. 38, n. 3.

⁷This is a play on two meanings of cuenta, a) an accounting, and b) a rosary bead.

⁸Cejador y Frauca notes that in the 1631 Pamplona edition the salvation of the doctor and the barber is effected by the intercession of Saints Cosmas and Damien (ed. cit., p. 46, note).

⁹Aquinas Summa Pt. II-II, Q.154, Art.1, Reply Obj.2.

¹⁰Quevedo is not so circumspect in his condemnation of heresy in all the Sueños, however, for in one of them, Las zahurdas de Plutón, he provides a detailed list of heretics, grouping them into three basic categories: heretics before the birth of Christ, heretics after the birth of Christ, and contemporary heretics. He is also more emphatic in his denunciations, as the following passage reveals: "Volvíme a un lado y vi todos los herejes de ahora, y topé con Maniqueo. ¡Oh, qué vi de Calvinistas arañando a Calvino! Y entre éstos estaba el principal, Josefo Scalígero, por tener su punta de ateísta y ser tan blasfemo, deslenguado y vano y sin juicio" (ed. cit., 1:180-181). For an analysis of Quevedo's condemnation of heresy in this sueño see Margherita Morreale, "La censura de la geomancia y de la herejía en 'Las Zahurdas de Plutón', de Quevedo," Boletín de la Real Academia Española 38 (1958): 409-419.

Part 4:

El gran teatro del mundo of Pedro Calderón
de la Barca

This auto sacramental¹ represents the zenith of theological precision in the Dance of Death tradition in Spain. The dual emphasis on charity and orthodox doctrine is presented here in a manner which reveals their interdependence; in former Dances of Death the emphasis on orthodoxy was often introduced in a somewhat random fashion, more as an afterthought than anything else. Calderón, however, without mentioning the names of specific reformers or heterodox sects, presents the outlines of a theology of grace and justification that is directly opposed to its Protestant counterpart at certain key points. He thus condemns Protestant theological deviations and at the same time affirms the importance of charity, since charity is a manifestation of grace.²

The auto is essentially based on a metaphor that compares human life from birth through death (followed by reward or punishment) with a play. El Autor (i.e. God), having already created the world, wishes to stage "una comedia" (71) using actors whose function it will be to "representar con estilo oportuno" (71). El Mundo is

simultaneously the stage upon which they will perform and the stage manager, and his function is to "fabricar apariencias" (71).

El Mundo's long romance which follows his reception of his instructions from el Autor is important since it presents the Thomistic distinction between three kinds of eternal law: natural law, written law, and the law of grace. Natural law is the eternal law as knowable by sound human reason without the aid of supernatural revelation,³ and its basic precept is "Do good - avoid evil."⁴ This type of law would be sufficient for man if he had a purely natural end to attain. But man has a supernatural destiny, the vision of the Divine Essence.⁵ In order for him to attain beatitude Divine revealed law is necessary. Calderón, following Aquinas, divides Divine law into two kinds, imperfect and perfect. The "ley escrita" (76) is the Old Law, the law of God expressed in the Old Testament. Its effect was to repress concupiscence and prevent sin, but it was incapable of conferring the grace that man needs to reach his supernatural last end; this was reserved to Christ.⁶ Thus, what Calderón calls the "ley de gracia" (77) is the law of the New Testament. It is mainly the law of grace given through faith in Jesus Christ,⁷ and it is this law and only this law that justifies.⁸ Since remission of guilt is impossible without this infusion of grace,⁹ and since grace is the principle of merit through the virtue of charity,¹⁰ it follows that the characters in the play

(i.e. the play within the play) who achieve salvation do so principally through charity and grace.

The characters are all assigned their roles by el Autor, for, as la Hermosura says,

los papeles puedes dar,
pues en aquesta ocasión
no tenemos elección
para haberlos de tomar. (80-81)

God realizes in His divine wisdom that if men were free to choose their stations in life, none would freely choose states involving poverty or hard work, but would rather prefer temporal power and riches,

sin advertir
que en acto tan singular
aquello es representar
aunque piense que es vivir. (81)

Thus a distinction is made between the part and the actor and, by extension, between social states and the men who pertain to them. This is further clarified by el Autor when he says:

En la representación
igualmente satisface
el que bien al pobre hace
con afecto, alma y acción,
como el que hace al rey, y son
iguales éste y aquél
en acabando el papel. (84)

The characters are therefore essentially equal since their function is to "representar con estilo oportuno" and accidentally unequal since the parts they are to play represent different and unequal levels in the social hierarchy. When the play is over, however, the characters will be rewarded or punished solely on the basis of how

well they acted their parts, not on the basis of which part they happened to play:

Y la comedia acabada
ha de cenar a mi lado
el que haya representado,
sin haber errado en nada,
su parte más acertada. (84)

If any character fails to achieve his last end, it will be his own fault, for, as el Autor says,

. . . yo, Autor soberano,
sé bien qué papel hará
mejor cada uno; así va
repartiéndolos mi mano. (81)

And later:

Justicia distributiva
soy, y sé lo que os conviene. (83)

Because God gives each man the part most suited for him to achieve his last end, no one will be able to complain that he would have achieved his salvation if only he had had a different role to play. As el Labrador says,

si yo errare este papel,
no me podré quejar de él,
de mí me podré quejar. (81)

A. A. Parker explains some of the consequences of these ideas for individual members of society:

. . . though the organization of society is pre-ordained, individuals are not sacrificed to this organization. It is, in a sense, adapted to them, for their welfare comes first. It follows that the purpose of society is fulfilled in and through the fulfillment of each man's individual purpose, and society exists to further the individual salvation of each of its members. Society, and social distinctions therefore exist for the individual, not the individual for society. . . . The good of the individual is inseparable from the good of society: by

neglecting or going counter to the good of others the individual will not be furthering his own.¹¹

The title of this play is to be "Obrar bien, que Dios es Dios," (85) and it must be performed successfully with no rehearsal. The only assistance the characters will have will come from la Ley de Gracia, who is to be the prompter:

Yo, que Ley de Gracia soy,
la fiesta introduzgo hoy;
para enmendar al que yerra
en este papel se encierra
la gran comedia, que Vos
compusisteis sólo en dos
versos que dicen así:
(Canta.) Ama al otro como a ti,
y obra bien, que Dios es Dios. (92)

With only this basic idea to guide them, the characters may be compared to the actors in the Italian Commedia Dell'Arte who worked primarily from skeletal scenarios and improvised the details of their performance.¹² Thus Calderón's actors know that they must achieve their salvation by acting their parts well through obeying the ley de gracia which has been revealed to them all. The exact details of how they will go about this task are unknown to them, however.

Once the ley de gracia has been revealed to the characters, they must use their libre albedrío, or free choice,¹³ to choose the real good that will lead to their salvation, as opposed to the apparent good that will lead to their condemnation. It is at this point that Calderón's condemnation of heresy might be most profitably brought

into sharp focus. William J. Entwistle has pointed out that "en cierto modo, todo auto sacramental es polémico"¹⁴ and that "la mayor parte de la polémica de Calderón se dirige contra el ladrón de casa, el Protestantismo."¹⁵ This auto is no exception: even though he does not mention Luther by name, Calderón posits a doctrine of grace, free choice, and justification which is offered as a criticism of the reformer's ideas. Calderón's theories would also have been acceptable, at least in their broad outlines, to the author of the Danza general, but he did not feel the necessity of stating those theories explicitly because they had never been seriously challenged, and so were more or less assumed to be valid. The problem of justification, however, was perhaps the key theological issue of the Reformation, due to the fact that it involved a conflict between two ways of conceiving the function of grace. The importance of the issue thus becomes clear if it is remembered that, for Catholics and Protestants alike, salvation is impossible without the grace of Jesus Christ.

Calderón's emphasis on freedom of choice provides a means of perceiving the difference between the two points of view, but it is not itself the main difference. He suggests that men are free for a purpose, namely, to be able to merit with their actions. At one point, after the play within the play has begun, el Autor says:

Yo, bien pudiera enmendar
 los yerros que viendo estoy;
 pero por eso les di
 albedrío superior
 a las pasiones humanas,
 por no quitarles la acción
 de merecer con sus obras. (101)

Catholics and Protestants at the time of the Reformation would agree on certain basic points in the theology of justification before parting ways:¹⁶ man is in a fallen state, due to original sin; he is thus in need of salvation and cannot effect it on his own, without supernatural assistance; the gospel message of the New Testament says that men are saved in Jesus Christ, and that justification is the application of the grace of Christ to individual persons. The key differences between the two views, at least for an understanding of this particular auto, are the role that each one assigns to God and man in justification and the different ways they each conceive the state of man after justification. For the Protestant, man does nothing but receive God's gift passively; he cannot co-operate freely with grace because he is a sinner incapable of any salutary act, even after his reception of God's grace. God, in the Protestant view, imputes justice to the sinner without changing him objectively. The Catholic view, on the other hand, admits that the initiative is God's and that justification is entirely God's work, but affirms that one of the effects of grace is to enable man to freely co-operate with grace.¹⁷ A logical consequence of these differences is that Protestantism

and Catholicism have two different views of good works and merit. Both agree that man cannot merit the first grace which justifies him; both also agree that good works should follow justification. The Protestant, however, denies that these good works are meritorious, while the Catholic affirms that, once justified, a man can merit an increase of grace, and therefore of charity also, since "grace is the principle of merit through charity."¹⁸ Thus the meaning of the words of el Autor (v. supra) becomes clear: the lines sung by Ley de Gracia immediately prior to the beginning of the play ("Ama al otro como a ti,/ y obra bien, que Dios es Dios." [92]) represent the first grace which justifies all the characters. From that point on, they are all capable of either freely co-operating with grace, thereby meriting an increase of grace and reaching their last end, or freely falling into mortal sin and cutting themselves off from God.¹⁹ Robert McAfee Brown has stated that the Protestant denial of the meritorious value of good works was partly a reaction against hollow formalism.²⁰ In this auto Calderón reaffirms the salutary nature of good works in a manner which shows how closely they depend on grace and charity. Thus he affirms the primacy of the virtue of charity and condemns Protestant heterodoxy.

After el Autor has assigned the roles and explained how the characters are finally to be judged, el Mundo distributes the trappings that each will need to play his

part. The only one to receive nothing at all is el Pobre; in fact, el Mundo even divests him of what little clothing he has, so that his poverty may be total. Prior to the beginning of the play la Discreción representing religion, reveals one of the standards of human behavior:

Alaben al Señor de tierra y cielo,
 el sol, luna y estrellas;
 alábenle las bellas
 flores que son caracteres del suelo;
 alábele la luz, el fuego, el yelo,
 la escarcha y el rocío,
 el invierno y estío,
 y cuanto esté debajo de ese velo
 que en visos celestiales,
 árbitro es de los bienes y males. (91-2)

All of nature exists for the purpose of glorifying God. Ley de Gracia sums up the morality which must guide men in their behavior: "Ama al otro como a ti,/ y obra bien, que Dios es Dios" (92). The last four words are the most important part of the ley de gracia for they reveal the aspect under which others are to be loved and good works performed. The love of one's neighbor is not a meritorious act unless it is done for God's sake, out of charity. This reveals man's dependence on grace, for neither charity nor any of the other theological virtues can be acquired by any act or effort of man; they must be supernaturally infused.²¹

There are two doors on the stage through which the characters will enter and exit. One bears the picture of a cradle and the other a tomb. The play begins with la Hermosura and la Discreción making an entrance through the

door with the picture of a cradle. La Hermosura tries to tempt la Discreción into admiring the beauties of nature as ends in themselves. She is reproved by la Discreción who explains the aspect under which it is appropriate to admire these things:

Gozarlas para admirarlas
 es justa y lícita acción
 y darle [i.e. a Dios] gracias por ellas,
 gozar las bellezas nó
 para usar dellas tan mal
 que te persuadas que son
 para verlas las criaturas
 sin memoria del Criador. (94)

The beauties of nature are not ends in themselves, and it is wrong to admire them as though they were, just as it is wrong to love our neighbor as though he were our last end instead of loving him out of charity for God's sake.²²

Through typically Baroque contrast Calderón shows that la Discreción and la Hermosura are moving in opposite directions, one of them being morally sound and the other reprehensible:

Discrec.: ¿Qué haré yo para emplear
 bien mi ingenio?

Hermos.: ¿Qué haré yo para lograr mi
 hermosura? (94)

At this point the prompter, Ley de Gracia, sings: "Obrar bien, que Dios es Dios," (95) but la Hermosura fails to hear. This ignorance is probably culpable, for it compounds her vainglory. In order to see how this is so, it is necessary to examine the four possible relations of will and object.²³ As noted above (n. 13), the will is not

totally free, for its function is to tend toward the universal good. The intellect apprehends objects and presents them to the will for choice. The four possible relations of will and object are therefore as follows: 1) When a finite good is correctly known by the intellect and presented to the will as finite, there is room for free choice, for the will is not limited to any particular good; 2) When an infinite good, namely, God, is not fully known by the intellect and is presented to the will as a partial good, there is also room for free choice. God is always apprehended this way (at least in this life) since the rational intellect operates through sense. It is thus possible that our attention can be turned to some finite good incompatible with God's friendship, which is how sin occurs; 3) Some finite good may be incorrectly known by the intellect and presented to the will as unlimited, in which case there is no room for free choice; 4) The final possibility occurs only in the beatific vision, in which God's infinite goodness is known directly as infinite. Here, too, there is no room for choice. These four possible relations mean that ". . . we have freedom of specification with regard to contingent means toward an end, but not with regard to happiness or the perfect good."²⁴ The third relation is the one that describes la Hermosura: she falsely perceives her beauty as an infinite good, and so she blindly tends toward it with her will. Her ignorance, however, is vincible and therefore

a sin, for she was obliged to know that her beauty was a temporal good and a means to a higher end. She was also obliged to know that her purpose was to "obrar bien, que Dios es Dios." Her failure to know these things is the consequence of a culpable refusal to co-operate with God's grace,²⁵ and this makes charity impossible for her.

El Rico reveals himself to be given over completely to hedonism:

Pues pródigamente el cielo
hacienda y poder me dió,
pródigamente se gaste
en lo que delicias son. (95)

He is aware that God is the efficient cause of his richness, but he declines to conclude from this fact that he is obliged to use his wealth in a charitable fashion. His only desire is to indulge himself in vice:

Sea mi lecho la esfera
de Venus, y en conclusión
la pereza y las delicias,
gula, envidia y ambición
hoy mis sentidos posean. (95)²⁶

El Labrador is a character who is not satisfied with his station in life:

¿Quién vió trabajo mayor
que el mío? (95)

He is not so morally culpable as el Rico and la Hermosura, however, for, as A. A. Parker notes, he is at least aware of the fact that his vestidura is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.²⁷ His bitterness and dissatisfaction, however, lead him to desire to exploit his fellow

man by forcing him to pay more than a just price for his produce:

Mas, pues trabajo y lo sudo,
 los frutos de mi labor
 me ha de pagar quien los compre
 al precio que quiera yo. (96)

At first glance this appears to be a sin of covetousness, but such is not really the case. A. A. Parker explains that "if he wishes to introduce discord into the harmonious working of the social hierarchy it is because others have already done so and singled him out as the victim.

They despise him as being of a lower order:

Soy a quien trata siempre el cortesano
 con vil desprecio y bárbaro renombre;
 y soy, aunque de serlo mas me aflijo,
 por quien en él, el vos y el tú se dijo."²⁹ (115)

His guilt is thus extenuated by the fact that he sees himself as a victim of injustice. Since he takes no real pleasure in the idea of possessing wealth,³⁰ he cannot be described as covetous in the normal sense of the word. Discord is a much more serious sin, however, for it is opposed to charity,³¹ whereas covetousness is opposed to liberality,³² a virtue connected with justice.³³ Aquinas considers discord a daughter of vainglory since it involves a man's holding fast to his own will to the exclusion of the will of other people.³⁴ This tendency to obstinacy also explains el Labrador's failure to hear the apunto:

Discrec.: ¿Cómo el apunto no oíste?

Labrad.: Como sordo a tiempo soy. (96)

Thus the only extenuating circumstance for el Labrador is that he perceives his would-be victims as themselves being perpetrators of discord, which does not excuse him entirely, of course, but does mitigate his guilt somewhat.

The attitude of el Pobre is perfectly in line with right reason, for he asks God for the patience to endure his sufferings. This itself reveals an emphasis on charity and grace, for patience is caused by charity, and charity is impossible without grace.³⁵ Calderón contrasts his attitude with that of el Rico:

Rico. ¿Qué haré yo para ostentar
 mi riqueza?

Pobre. ¿Qué haré yo para sufrir mis
 desdichas?

Ley. (Canta.) Obrar bien, que Dios es Dios.

Pobre. ¡Oh, cómo esta voz consuela!

Rico. ¡Oh, cómo cansa esta voz! (97)

El Rico hears the voice, but refuses to heed it; his heart is completely hardened. El Pobre finds in it his only consolation, for he has no worldly possessions whatever to bring him pleasure.³⁶

The first impression we receive of el Rey is one of vainglory, the object of his glory being his possessions and temporal power. He seems to have forgotten that these vestiduras came from God:

De cuanto circunda el mar
y de cuanto alumbra el sol
soy el absoluto dueño,
soy el supremo señor.

Los vasallos de mi imperio
 se postran por donde voy.
 ¿Qué he menester yo en el mundo? (98)

Like la Hermosura's, his intellect seems to falsely apprehend his political power as an unlimited good. His ignorance, like hers, is vincible and therefore culpable, because the ley de gracia has been sufficiently promulgated to secure the obedience of all the characters.³⁷

At this point el Pobre becomes the center of the action as we see whether or not the characters have taken seriously the admonition "ama al otro como a ti." He is the perfect choice for this function because, as A. A. Parker notes, he has no temporal goods which he can give to anybody else.³⁸ This by itself is an insufficient reason for using el Pobre in this role, however, based as it is on a too narrow conception of almsgiving as an act of charity.³⁹ In fact, almsgiving is divided into corporal alms and spiritual alms,⁴⁰ and el Pobre, in spite of his poverty, is capable of performing any of the spiritual alms. These are: "to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all. . . ."41

The other reason for using el Pobre to gauge the charity of the other characters is that his own charity is not in question, as we have seen; he and la Discreción are the only two characters who are totally beyond reproach.

When el Pobre approaches la Hermosura to ask for alms, the latter is so engrossed in a consideration of her beauty that she literally does not even hear him. El Mundo comments on this situation and offers two of the play's finest lines:

¿Por qué ha de cuidar de ti
quien de sí se descuidó? (99)

These lines suggest that the phrase "ama al otro como a ti" contains a very profound truth: without true self-love, based not on vainglory but on an awareness of one's self as a creature of God with a supernatural end to achieve, no true love of others is possible. The Biblical injunction might therefore be profitably interpreted not as "Love others in the same way that you love yourself" but rather "See to it that you do love yourself in a true Christian fashion, and then extend this love to your neighbor for God's sake."

El Rico refuses his petition, for he does not want to be made aware of suffering:

¿No hay puertas donde llamar?
¿Así os entráis donde estoy?
En el umbral del zaguán
pudier as llamar, y no
haber llegado hasta aquí. (99)

His refusal to give alms is a refusal to obey the precept of loving one's neighbor, since ". . . the love of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers. . . ." ⁴²

El Rey does not directly refuse el Pobre, for he has assigned a limosnero mayor who is in charge of giving his alms for him. Although Aquinas appears to consider this a legitimate means of almsgiving,⁴³ el Mundo's commentary suggests that el Rey, like el Rico, merely does not want to be made aware of suffering:

Con sus ministros el Rey
su conciencia aseguró. (100)

El Labrador dodges el Pobre's request by offering him a hoe with which to work for a living. He attempts to shame him out of his beggar's role:

Decid: ¿No tenéis vergüenza
que un hombrazo como vos
pida? ¡Servid, noramala!
No os andéis hecho un bribón.
Y si os falta que comer,
tomad aquesta azadón
con que lo podéis ganar. (100)

His behavior is by no means as reprehensible as that of la Hermosura or el Rico, but neither is it as praiseworthy as it seems on first glance, for, as Robert L. Fiore points out, "el Labrador sees in el Pobre his own greatest fault, laziness. . . ."44 He thus offers him his hoe more out of resentment than anything else, and this is not a charitable motive.

La Discreción is the only one who grants el Pobre's request, giving him bread. El Pobre's response indicates that the bread is here considered symbolic of the Eucharist:

Limosna de pan, señora,
era fuerza hallarla en vos
porque el pan que nos sustenta
ha de dar la Religión. (101)

Thus she is the only one who behaves toward el Pobre in a charitable manner. Presently it is her turn to require charitable assistance, however, for she begins to fall, suffering from an attack of some type. El Rey supports her, indicating that he is capable of charitable behavior.⁴⁵

At this point the Dance of Death begins. El Rey suggests some form of conversation as a diversion in the journey of life, and la Discreción recommends specifically that each one reveal his innermost thoughts ("qué está en su imaginación" [102]). El Rey is the first to speak. While he has not fully lost his vainglory, he ends his speech on a note of humility, asking for the wisdom to govern his subjects properly. Yet, as A. A. Parker notes, ". . . he gives no inkling of any realization that the order he envisages should rest on charity. His conception of his duty would therefore seem to be inadequate; but he is at least now aware of the fact that he has a duty and is desirous of fulfilling it, and this in itself is meritorious."⁴⁶ Also, it must be remembered that el Rey has proved himself capable of charitable behavior. This will help to explain his reaction to death, which functions in this play as a powerful agent of desengaño. From behind the door of the tomb, a voice summons el Rey:

Rey de este caduco imperio,
cese, cese tu ambición,
que en el teatro del mundo
ya tu papel se acabó. (103)

El Rey struggles against death by trying to walk in the direction of the cradle, but he cannot:

¿dónde, voy?
 Porque a la primera puerta,
 donde mi cuna se vió,
 no puedo ¡ay de mí! no puedo
 retroceder. ¡Qué rigor!
 No poder hacia la cuna
 dar un paso . . .! ¡Todos son
 hacia el sepulcro. . . . (103)⁴⁷

He ends his part by asking forgiveness:

Si ya acabó mi papel,
 supremo y divino Autor,
 dad a mis yerros disculpa,
 pues arrepentido estoy. (104)

El Mundo gives his approval:

Pidiendo perdón el Rey,
 bien su papel acabó. (104)

El Rey's action may be described as one of contrition. His line "dad a mis yerros disculpa" suggests that he is sorry for his sins themselves, not for the punishment which is due them, and this attitude is proper to contrition,⁴⁸ which springs from filial fear of God and is made possible by charity.⁴⁹

It is not immediately apparent how la Hermosura is capable of repentance. As she makes her final speech, it is evident that the vainglory which characterized her earlier is still present; she feels that her empire is even greater than that of el Rey, for he merely has dominion over lives, while she reigns in souls. Accounting for her repentance, A. A. Parker states:

She has subjected her own soul and the souls of men to her flesh, instead of leading them to God. She has enslaved not only them but herself. The distortion is complete, and there is no redeeming feature whatsoever [emphasis added]. How then is she capable of repentance, if she is still completely blind and deaf? Because she alone of all the six experiences the destruction of what the World gave her and is unable to return it; she alone ceases to be in life what she began as being. She cannot retain her conception of herself since she sees the dissolution of that on which it was based, for beauty fades with age and disappears with death.⁵⁰

Her desengaño in other words, is of a more radical type than that which is experienced by the other characters. Nevertheless, this may be the medium but not the efficient cause of her repentance, for she is in a state of mortal sin because of her culpable refusal to co-operate with God's grace, as we have seen. It is impossible to rise from sin without a renewal of grace,⁵¹ so that we must posit such a renewal in order to account for her repentance, contrition being an effect of charity. For dramatic purposes it may be possible to view this infusion as taking place when the voice from the tomb sings to her:

Que en el alma eres eterna
y en el cuerpo mortal flor. (106)

Her repentance follows immediately:

Mucho me pesa no haber
hecho mi papel mejor. (106)

El Labrador's décima reveals him to be in a much better moral position than any of the characters who preceded him. It appears that at some time during the comedia de la vida he co-operated with God's grace and merited a

future increase of grace, for he is now aware of his indebtedness to God and he has overcome his vainglory. He is also aware of the difference between first and second causality, for he reproves his soul for giving thanks to the earth for the new harvest when it is really God, as first cause, who gives all. He too tries to resist the summons of death, but his defense is better than that of el Rey or la Hermosura, for it is based on an awareness of obligation: he wants to put his estate in order:

No muera yo en este tiempo,
 aguarda sazón mejor,
 siquiera porque mi hacienda
 la deje puesta en sazón. (107)

Thus he too dies repentant, revealing that he is conscious of not having lived up to his obligation:

si mi papel no he cumplido
 conforme a mi obligación,
 pésame que no me pese
 de no tener gran dolor. (108)

El Mundo approves wholeheartedly:

Al principio le juzgué
 grosero, y él me advirtió
 con su fin mi ignorancia.
 ¡Bien acabó el labrador! (108)

El Rico has been living in a state of absolutely unmitigated illusion. His brief self-revelation shows that he is aware of the brevity of life and the inevitability of death:

¿A quién mirar no le asombra
 ser esta vida una flor
 que nazca con el albor
 y fallezca con la sombra? (109)

The conclusion he draws from this true premise, however, gives the lie to the saying "Qui ponit mortem ante oculos suos, facile vincit tentationem."⁵² His awareness of life's brevity does not lead to desengaño, as might be expected, but only to further deception:

Pues si tan breve se nombra,
de nuestra vida gocemos
el rato que la tenemos,
dios a nuestro vientre hagamos.
¡Comamos, hoy, y bebamos,
que mañana moriremos! (109)⁵³

As Parker notes, "the realization of the brevity of life can make no difference to his attitude, for there is in him not even a germ of a right conception of living for it to work on."⁵⁴

The voice does not summon el Rico to the tomb immediately, for Calderón wishes to contrast the reactions of el Rico and el Pobre to the experience of death. Thus the latter's speech of self-revelation comes immediately after the former's. He reveals that he has perceived things in their right order, for he is aware of the presence of original sin:

No porque así me he quejado
es, Señor, que desespero
por mirarme en tal estado,
sino porque considero
que fui nacido en pecado. (110)

El Mundo explains that el Pobre's attitude is not one of true despair, which of course would be a sin:

Bien ha engañado las señas
de la desesperación;
que así, maldiciendo el día,
maldijo el pecado Job. (110)

The voice now summons el Rico and el Pobre simultaneously:

Número tiene la dicha,
 número tiene el dolor;
 de ese dolor y esa dicha,
 venid a cuentas los dos. (110)

El Rico responds with abject terror and despair, and el Pobre with joy. His joy does not spring from the sin of presumption, however, for he admits that he is afraid:

. . . el estremecerse es
 una natural pasión
 del animo a quien como hombre
 temiera Dios, con ser Dios. (111)

This is a properly Christian attitude. It will be recalled that Karl Rahner was quoted in chapter one (n. 106) as saying that even the just should fear death, since "the most prominent characteristic of death is that in it sin is revealed." This is precisely what el Pobre has realized; a sense of joy is capable of co-existing with his fear because now he can leave behind his sufferings.

La Discreción is the last to be called. She, like el Pobre, has not succumbed to engaño of any kind in the course of her life. She perceived the inevitability of death, as did el Rico, but unlike him she drew from that perception the proper conclusions and prepared herself to die in a Christian manner.

In the next section of the play el Mundo takes from the characters the vestiduras that he gave them at the beginning. El Rey is shocked at el Mundo's temerity: "¿Cómo me quitas lo que ya me diste?" (114). The answer

of course is that the vestidura was given on loan, so to speak, not as a permanent possession. The surprise of el Rey is therefore due to his failure to have made a clear distinction between his role and his person. As noted above, la Hermosura cannot return what el Mundo gave her, for her beauty perished completely; it, of all the vestiduras el Mundo handed out, was the most fragile. El Labrador is somewhat chagrined at not being able to take his azadón with him. El Rico likewise must give up his jewels, but el Pobre, having received nothing in the beginning, has nothing to return. Neither can el Mundo take anything from la Discreción; the only things she takes from the world are her good works, and el Mundo can lay no claim on them, for they are the medium of merit through grace. In divesting the characters of their vestiduras el Mundo has equalized them: "Ya que he igualado cetros y azadones" (117). His function is therefore similar to that of Death in the medieval and Renaissance Dances of Death. Similar, but not identical, however, for he has a more complex role in that he first creates the inequality that he later eradicates. This is why he treats the characters differently at the end of the play:

Rey: ¿Cómo nos recibiste de otra suerte
 que nos despides?

Mundo: La razón advierte.

 Cuando algún hombre hay algo que reciba,
 las manos pone, atento a su fortuna,
 en esta forma; cuando con esquivá

acción lo arroja, así las vuelve; de una
 suerte, puesta la cuna boca arriba
 recibe al hombre, y esta misma cuna,
 vuelta al revés, la tumba suya ha sido.
 Si cuna os recibí, tumba os despido. (117-118)⁵⁵

There is nothing left now except for the characters to go to their final reward or punishment. El Rey, el Rico, and la Hermosura are offended by what they perceive as el Pobre's lack of respect, since he walks in front of all of them. As la Discreción explains, ". . . en una pobre mortaja/ no hay distinción de personas" (119). The accidental inequalities inherent in the social hierarchy are obliterated in death; all men are essentially equal and will be judged not in terms of what part they played, but how well they played, and the standard for good performance is charity.

In the eucharistic apotheosis el Autor judges each character and rewards or punishes him. El Pobre and la Discreción go directly to heaven, for they have not even incurred the stain of venial sin. El Rico, on the contrary, because of his total lack of charity, is sent to hell. El Niño, who died before being baptized, is guilty only of original sin and so does not deserve painful punishment;⁵⁶ he is therefore sent to limbo. La Hermosura, el Rey and el Labrador are all sent to purgatory, for their sins are only venial. They are in a state of grace but are not quite fit for heaven, a place where nothing defiled can enter.⁵⁷ La Discreción intercedes for el Rey,

since he sustained her in her time of need, and el Autor remits his punishment and he too goes to heaven, followed shortly thereafter by la Hermosura and el Labrador.

In conclusion, El gran teatro del mundo is the work within the Dance of Death tradition which contains the most precise theological treatment of the nature and importance of the virtue of charity, as well as the most theologically effective statement against Protestant heresy. Although the Reformers are condemned by implication rather than by direct frontal assault (as in Las cortes de la Muerte, for example), Calderón's theory of grace and justification leaves little room for doubt that it is being presented as an alternative to heterodox opinion on the subject. It contradicts Protestant theory at key points, such as the problem of merit, and simultaneously affirms the centrality of grace and charity in Catholic doctrine. One of the greatest achievements of the work is its ideological unity: its denials are logical consequences of its affirmations. Calderón does not merely hurl haphazard epithets at Protestantism, as others have done; rather, by affirming the central points of the Catholic doctrine of justification he implicitly condemns Protestant aberrations.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III, Part 4

¹Pedro Calderón de la Barca, El gran teatro del mundo, in Autos sacramentales, ed. Angel Valbuena Prat, 2 vols. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967), 1:67-124. All quotations are from this edition and are identified in the text by page numbers.

Obj.1. ²Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.110, Art.3, Reply

³Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.94, Art.1.

⁴Ibid., Art.2.

⁵Ibid., Q.3, Art.8.

⁶Ibid., Q.98, Art.1.

⁷Ibid., Q.106, Art.1.

⁸Ibid., Art.2.

⁹Ibid., Q.113, Art.2.

¹⁰Ibid., Q.114, Art.4.

¹¹Alexander A. Parker, The Allegorical Drama of Calderón (Oxford: The Dolphin Book Co., 1943), p. 122.

¹²This comparison with the Commedia Dell'Arte is offered as a possible alternative to Professor Parker's assertion that at this point the analogy between life and a play breaks down (Allegorical Drama, pps. 116-117).

¹³The term "free choice" is used here, rather than "free will," which is something of a misnomer in Catholic theology. There is a sense in which the will is naturally determined, for its nature is to tend toward the good in general, which is the last end. Even evil must be chosen under the aspect of good. Calderón dramatizes this idea in another auto, No hay más Fortuna que Dios, by having Malicia switch the cloaks of el Bien and el Mal. Thus, what is really good is perceived by man as undesirable, and what is evil seems pleasing. V. Aquinas Summa Pt. I, Q.82, Art.1.

¹⁴William J. Entwistle, "La controversia en los autos de Calderón," Nueva Revista de Filología Hispánica 2 (1948): 223.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁶This delineation of the differences between Catholic and Protestant theories of justification is based on an article in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., s.v. "justification." Robert McAfee Brown explains the Protestant position well in his The Spirit of Protestantism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pps. 53-66. A clear treatment of the so-called "paradox of grace" in Protestant theology can be found in D. M. Baillie's God Was in Christ (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), pps. 106-118. M. John Farrelly's Predestination, Grace, and Free Will (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press) is a modern Catholic analysis of the problem taking into account advances made in theology during the last half century. Also useful is Stephen Pfurtner, O. P., Luther and Aquinas on Salvation, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964).

¹⁷". . . there are five effects of grace in us: of these the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory" (Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.111, Art.3).

¹⁸Ibid., Q.114, Art.4.

¹⁹Ibid., Art.7.

²⁰Brown, Protestantism, p. 62.

²¹Aquinas Summa Pt. I-II, Q.62, Art.2.

²²Ibid., Pt. II-II, Q.25, Art.1, Reply Obj.3. This necessity of distinguishing between real and apparent goods is also the theme of No hay más Fortuna que Dios, an auto that has many points of contact with El gran teatro del mundo.

²³This analysis is based on James E. Royce, S. J., Man and His Nature: A Philosophical Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pps. 198-201.

²⁴Ibid., p. 201.

²⁵This raises the very complex theological problem of efficacious versus merely sufficient grace. The following quotation is offered as a relatively simple, concise statement of basic doctrine. For a fuller analysis of the problem, see Farrelly's Predestination, Grace, and Free Will: "It follows, from the fact of God's universal salvific will on the one hand and human sinfulness on the other, that there is an assistance of grace which is offered but does not take effect, that is, is merely sufficient. Its character therefore cannot be sought in God's irresistible omnipotence. The difference between merely sufficient and efficacious actual grace, according to the (almost) common teaching (of Banezianism as well as of Molinism), is grounded in God's election prior to man's acceptance or rejection of grace and despite man's freedom either to accept or reject it. Actual grace is an illumination and an inspiration. It is regarded not only as gratuitous but as supernatural in the same sense as justifying grace. Accordingly it does not consist merely in external circumstances which God's providence has shaped so as to favour man's religious activity, but it is an interior grace in the same sense of sanctifying grace.

"In spite of original sin and concupiscence man is free; thus he freely consents to prevenient grace or freely rejects it. To this extent we must speak of a 'collaboration' between God and man. But this does not signify any kind of 'synergism,' any apportionment of the work of salvation between them. For it is not only the ability to perform salutary acts (the infused habitus or the prevenient sufficient grace) but the very free consent to grace which is the gift of God. Thus it is grace itself which frees our freedom for salutary acts (giving us both the power and the deed), so that the situation whereby man is able to say Yes or No to God is not one of emancipation and autonomous choice; but rather, where man says No it is his own doing, and where he freely says Yes he must thank God because that is God's gift (Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, trans. Richard Strachan [New York: Herder and Herder, 1965]), pps.195-196.

²⁶He tends toward these things not as evil, which would be impossible, but as desirable, oblivious of or *indifferent* to the fact that their possession is incompatible with God's friendship.

²⁷Parker, Allegorical Drama, p. 133.

²⁸Aquinas Summa, Pt. II-II, Q.118, Art.4.

²⁹Parker, Allegorical Drama, pps. 134-135.

³⁰Ibid., p. 134.

³¹Aquinas Summa, Pt. II-II, Q.37, Art.1.

³²Ibid., Q.118, Art.3.

³³Ibid., Q.117, Art.5.

³⁴Ibid., Q.37, Art.2.

³⁵Ibid., Q.136, Art.3.

³⁶This lack of worldly possessions should not be considered a spiritual advantage that el Pobre has over the other characters in the play, for Aquinas states that ". . . spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary; because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of money getting, fall into many sins . . ." (Ibid., Q.186, Art.3, Reply Obj.2).

³⁷". . . promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force" (Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.90, Art.4).

³⁸Parker, Allegorical Drama, p. 136.

³⁹It must be noted that merely giving things (such as food, money, and clothing) to the poor is neither alms-giving nor is it charitable unless it is done for God's sake (Aquinas, Summa, Pt. II-II, Q.32, Art.1).

⁴⁰Ibid., Art.2.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., Art.5.

⁴³Ibid., Art.8.

⁴⁴Robert L. Fiore, "Calderón's El gran teatro del mundo: An Ethical Interpretation," Hispanic Review 40 (1972): 49.

⁴⁵Perhaps Calderón used this gesture to symbolize the union of Church and state which has characterized Spain.

⁴⁶Parker, Allegorical Drama, p. 139.

⁴⁷In La cena del rey Baltasar Calderón dramatizes this resistance to death by means of hand-to-hand conflict between Baltasar and la Muerte. Florence Whyte regards conflict as an essential aspect of the dancing element of Dances of Death (The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia [Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1931], p. 76).

⁴⁸Aquinas, Summa, Suppl. Q.2, Art.1.

⁴⁹Ibid., Q.1, Art.3.

⁵⁰Parker, Allegorical Drama, p. 140.

⁵¹Aquinas Summa, Pt. I-II, Q.109, Art.7.

⁵²Quoted by E. Segura Covarsí, "Sentido dramático y contenido litúrgico de 'Las danzas de la Muerte'," Cuadernos de literatura 5 (1949): 271. The author does not identify the source of the quotation.

⁵³In El nuevo hospicio de pobres it is el Ateísmo who makes a god of his belly (Obras completas, 3 vols. [Madrid: Aguilar, 1959], 3:1190).

⁵⁴Parker, Allegorical Drama, p. 142.

⁵⁵Cf.: "Son la cuna y la sepultura el principio de la vida y el fin della; y con ser al juicio del divertimento las dos mayores distancias, la vida desengañada no sólo las ve confines, sino juntas con oficios recíprocos y convertidos en sí propios: siendo verdad que la cuna empieza a ser sepultura, y la sepultura cuna a la postera vida" (Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, La cuna y la sepultura: para el conocimiento propio y desengaño de las cosas ajenas in Obras completas, 2 vols. [Madrid: Aguilar, 1961], 1:1191).

⁵⁶Aquinas, Summa Appendix I, Q.1, Art.1.

⁵⁷Ibid., Suppl Q.69, Art.2.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing consideration of Spanish Dances of Death that were written over a period of four centuries it can be seen that desengaño is not a static element in Spanish literature but rather one which changes from period to period as a result of changing religious attitudes. It begins with an emphasis on charity in the Middle Ages and then gradually reveals an increasing emphasis on doctrine in the Renaissance and Baroque period. (Naturally, some works seem more representative of the historical periods in which they occur than others, but from our study of the Spanish Dances of Death a definite pattern of ideological development has been seen to emerge.)

One of the principal theses of this study is that desengaño in the medieval Dances of Death involves an emphasis on charity, defined as the love of men for God and for each other. In all the typical medieval works studied, the Dança general, Coplas de la Muerte, Otras coplas ala Muerte, Razonamiento que faze Johan de Mena con la Muerte, and Horozco's Coplas de la Muerte and Coloquio de la Muerte, this virtue was emphasized to the almost total exclusion of all others. The various characters in these Dances of Death demonstrate the necessity of

this virtue, occasionally through positive but more frequently through negative example. With only two exceptions (the rabbi and the alfaquí in the Dança general) they are all assumed to have Christian faith, so that their intellectual assent to the basic truths of the Christian religion is really a foregone conclusion. However, this assent of the intellect to truth is only the intrinsic form of *fatih*; ¹ for the virtue to be operative it must be perfected by its extrinsic form, which is charity. ² When charity is not in the soul, faith itself is lifeless and inoperative, incapable of directing a man to his last end. ³ Now charity is by no means a foregone conclusion in the medieval Dances of Death, since most of the characters who sin do so against charity, that is, they sin mortally. Sometimes their sins are uncharitable by being contrary to the love of God and other times by being contrary to the love we owe our neighbor for God's sake. Sins of vainglory, for example, typically fall into the former category, while sins of injustice fall into the latter, yet both are contrary to charity. Since all the moral virtues are infused together with charity, ⁴ the authors were able indirectly to emphasize charity in an almost unlimited number of ways. The breadth of this theological virtue, coupled with the fact that faith was assumed to be a given factor, explains its preeminence in medieval Dances of Death.

During the Renaissance, however, faith ceases to be an assumed factor. Consequently, the Dances of Death written during this period reveal a type of desengaño that is slightly different from its medieval counterpart. Charity is still emphasized in these works, implicitly or explicitly, but an emphasis on faith and correct doctrine is added. Part of the reason for this shifting emphasis is that after the Middle Ages most Dances of Death took the form of autos or autos sacramentales, a form of literature extensively used for the purpose of religious instruction as well as for moral exhortation. Also to be taken into consideration is the incipient reaction against the formalism of good works that was ultimately to become a cause célèbre during the Protestant Reformation.

These Renaissance Dances of Death are not so uniform in the manner in which they emphasize faith and doctrine as were the medieval Dances of Death in the manner in which they emphasized charity. In Gil Vicente's Auto de barca da Gloria, for example, the problem that is posed is how man can be restored after a fall from grace. The resolution of the conflict reveals that even lifeless faith may have a kind of causal connection with such a restoration, since it enables the characters to experience servile fear. Servile fear is the beginning of wisdom and it disposes the characters, all of them victims of Death, to pray to God for mercy. The fact that they are restored and ultimately saved is due entirely to God's mercy and not at

all to the merit of the characters, each one of whom has by mortal sin deprived himself of the ability to perform any salutary act. But had they not at least possessed this lifeless faith, it would have been impossible for them even to pray for mercy. There is nothing in this play to countermand the emphasis on charity that was noted in the Middle Ages, for Vicente also emphasizes charity and makes it clear that faith without works is dead, lifeless faith. But, he seems to say, even this lifeless faith is better than no faith at all, since it may dispose a sinner to pray for restoration. Thus he emphasizes faith in addition to (but not to the exclusion of) charity.

Diego Sánchez de Badajoz's Farsa de la Muerte, written seventeen years after Vicente's play, contains a much heavier emphasis on faith. There is a pervasive bitterness in the play which may reveal on the author's part a declining faith in the salutary power of good works, a faith which is substituted by a faith in faith itself, so to speak. It is faith, rather than good works or merit, that guarantees the old man of the play eternal life without suffering or death, but to reach this life of bliss he must first die. This is why he seeks death; it is a passage to eternal life and a release from the irremediable suffering of earthly existence. This refusal to impute any true value whatsoever to terrestrial life accounts for the lack of emphasis on social justice that

was an integral part of the emphasis on charity in the medieval Dances of Death.

Juan de Pedraza's Farsa llamada Danza de la Muerte takes this development a step further, for it emphasizes not faith in general but faith in a specific doctrine, viz. the Eucharist. The threat of death carries with itself the threat of eternal damnation. Passive faith is not a sufficient response to this threat; man needs the spiritual nourishment that is provided by the Eucharist.⁵ As in Vicente's play, this emphasis on faith is not posited in opposition to charity, for it is precisely the grace that is infused with charity that is increased through the sacrament of the Eucharist. Thus by emphasizing the importance of a specific doctrine Pedraza emphasizes the virtue of charity as well. Pedraza did not include any condemnation of Protestant attacks on the doctrine of the Real Presence in his auto; his play has as its purpose the illumination for believing Catholics of one of the central doctrines of their faith. This tendency to provide religious instruction without reference to heterodoxy is, according to Marcel Bataillon, characteristic of the auto sacramental in its formative stages.⁶ Thus the desengaño of this and the preceding two works corresponds to a given historical climate. A need was felt for religious instruction as opposed to mere moral exhortation (as was found in the medieval Dances of Death) and these theatrical pieces partially answered that need.

Awareness of the Protestant schism and of its specific attacks on certain Catholic doctrines, however, could not remain forever outside the ken of the auto sacramental or of didactic literature in general. As the movement won new adherents and began to pick up momentum, Catholic authors were ultimately driven by this new historical situation to adopt a more apologetic tone in their writings, and this could not but affect the a priori desengaño, or didactic purpose, in a given work. Las cortes de la Muerte and El gran teatro del mundo are perhaps most representative of this new tendency. Of the two, the former is by far the more violent in its condemnations, denouncing Martin Luther by name and condemning him to be burned at the stake in a dramatic representation of an auto de fe. The play reduces argument to bald assertion; none of the views attributed to Luther are refuted theologically, they are merely condemned ex cathedra. (To a lesser extent Calderón's autos function in a similar fashion, which has led William J. Entwistle to hypothesize that they were not intended to be convincing to Protestants but only to Catholics who already accepted the basic tenets of Catholicism, and that Calderón's knowledge of Protestant theology was not particularly profound.)⁷ The desengaño of this play thus corresponds to that historical period when awareness of the Protestant schism began to spread through Spain and Catholic authors rallied to the defense.

By contrast El gran teatro del mundo seems quite restrained in its condemnation of heterodoxy. In fact, unless one is aware of certain central elements in the theology of the reformers, most notably Martin Luther, it is possible that he may not even be aware that heterodoxy is under attack, for no reformers are mentioned by name. Yet this is a post-Tridentine play which reflects in dramatic form one of the central concerns of the Council of Trent, viz. the positing of the Catholic doctrine of grace, merit and salvation as an alternative to Protestant deviations. The fact that the play was written long after Protestantism in Spain had ceased to be a threat⁸ may have contributed to its relatively subdued tone as well as to its sophisticated presentation of a theological problem, as distinct from the ad hominem denunciations of Las cortes de la Muerte. This theological self-assurance is partly due to the fact that Trent had already provided definite (at least for their time) answers to most of the problems posed by the Reformation, so that the desengaño of this play also is conditioned by the historical circumstances of its production.

The concept of desengaño is inherent in Dance of Death literature, since the reality of death, if it is honestly faced, forces one to reexamine all his basic presuppositions. It is, in the words of Karl Rahner, ". . . an event which strikes man in his totality."⁹ Yet the inevitability of the presence of desengaño in Dances

of Death does not suggest that the concept is static and unchanging. In its most basic terms, desengaño implies the coming to a realization, but the ideological content of what the disillusioned man is supposed to realize is not the same in all historical periods nor in all Dances of Death. (The Spanish Dances of Death from the Middle Ages to the Baroque period, for example, are all manifestations of Catholic didactic literature and therefore presuppose belief in an afterlife, yet this belief is not an inherent part of the desengaño of a modern Dance of Death such as Ingmar Bergman's The Seventh Seal.) Many factors affect the specific form which desengaño takes in any given work, and one of these, though certainly not the only one, is the collective ideology of each historical period. It is essentially the force of these collective ideologies which has shaped the phenomenon of desengaño in Spanish Dances of Death from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, giving it a trajectory that begins with an almost exclusive emphasis on charity and proceeds to an emphasis on charity and faith and doctrine simultaneously.

FOOTNOTES--CONCLUSION

¹Aquinas Summa, Pt. II-II, Q.4, Art.3.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., Art.4.

⁴Ibid., Pt. I-II, Q.65, Art.3.

⁵Ibid., Pt. III, Q.73, Art.1.

⁶Marcel Bataillon, "Ensayo de explicación del auto sacramental," in his Varia lección de clásicos españoles (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1964), pps. 183-205.

⁷William J. Entwistle, "La controversia en los autos de Calderón," Nueva Revista de Filología Hispánica 2 (1948): 223-238.

⁸R. Trevor Davies feels that ". . . the last spark of native Protestantism in Spain was virtually quenched" with the death at the stake of Leonor de Cisneros on September 28th, 1568 (The Golden Century of Spain: 1501-1621 [New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1965]), p. 143.

⁹Karl Rahner, On the Theology of Death, trans. Charles H. Henkey (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961), p. 21.

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