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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

TEMPORALITY AND REPRESENTATION:
A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SEMANTICS

presented by

Stuart L. Doneson

has been accepted towards fulfillment

of the requirements for
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TEMPORALITY AND REPRESENTATION:
A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SEMANTICS

Stuart L. Doneson

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1978

ABSTRACT

TEMPORALITY AND REPRESENTATION:
A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SEMANTICS

Stuart L. Doneson

This thesis presents a semantic approach to the problem of con-
ceptualizing basic theoretical terms in psychology, in this case
"temporality" and "representation". More specifically, a brief his-
tory of the theoretical treatment of temporal experience pointed to
the intimate connection between representation as cognitive structure
and function, and temporality as a condition of articulated experience.
The fate of this "intimate connection" in the course of psychological
theorizing was traced by schematizing the basic dimensions of repre-
sentation, viz., motivational, formal, modal, and temporal. This
schema of basic distinctions was then used to successively isolate
different aspects of representing, thereby raising questions concerning
the temporalizing potentials of different modes of representation.

With this background, the epilogue attempted to sketch a psychoanalytic
action language approach to temporality, as well as to indicate the
possibility of reconceptualizing the relations between primary and

secondary processes as figurative and literal modes of representation.

For Susan, Daniel and David.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Albert Rabin for giving me the time
and space I needed to follow the bent of my curiosity; Dr. Griffith
Freed for his unflagging interest in my conceptual excursions; and

Dr. Bertram Karon for sharing his points of view.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1
Statement of Purpose ........................................ l
METAPSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATION: THE SEMANTICS 0F TEMPORALITY ...... 5
On the Temporal Organization of Experience .................. 7
Temporality and Representation .............................. 8
PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS ....................................... ll
0N MAJOR THEORIES 0F REPRESENTATION:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION OF MODE ................... l4
CONCEPTUAL REORIENTATIONS: THE SEMANTICS 0F REPRESENTATION ...... 19
ON THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION OF REPRESENTATION ...................... 27
SUMMARY .......................................................... 32
EPILOGUE- RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT ................................ 35
On the Temporal Structure of Action ......................... 4l
On the Temporal Structure of Motives ........................ 42
On the Temporal Structure of the Formal and Modal
Dimensions of Representation ............................. 46
Conclusion: The Representation of Representation ........... 49
FOOTNOTES ........................................................ 52
APPENDIX ........................................................ 53
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................... 56

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose

Like every inquiry, the psychological investigation of temporality
and representation requires an orientation to the phenomenon in ques-
tion, a way of talking about the subject matter that enables us to
identify relevant instances and to organize them into a domain of
actual and possible facts. These ways of talking are inextricably
bound to the implicit or explicit terms and terminologies we employ.
Consequently, our access to the phenomena that interest us is governed
by the resources of the set of concepts and methods we use to take
hold of them and which inform the questions we ask and the answers we
seek and find acceptable.

Thus, we proceed with the realization that there is no single way
of pointing to what we're talking about when we speak of temporality or
representation. Instead we are confronted by a chorus of different and
competing voices, each claiming to organize and unify the deliverances
of experience, and each providing a language to talk authoritatively
about a selected range of facts. However, the existence of this basic
ambiguity of psychological theorizing raises a set of questions which
delineates a fundamental (and often neglected) task for psychologists,

viz. the removal of the ambiguities which surround basic terms by

spelling out their relevant meanings and regions of application as
these are developed by the semantic resources of a particular theory.
(cf. Carnap, R. l950).

By proceeding in this manner, "temporality" and "representation"
become thgmgÂ§_which hold the diverse theoretical voices together as
so many variations. Moreover, such an approach to a psychological
question is not empirical, but "pre-empirical". It asks the prior
question about what we think with_when we inquire abgut_these things.
Thus, we shall seek to elucidate these tools of inquiry by examining
the scope and limits of the leading frameworks and languages that
govern contemporary approaches to temporality and representation.

The subject matter and meaning of statements about "temporality"--
what temporality is and what one discusses when one discusses it-- will
be discovered by examining the terms in which the theories are stated.
The ambiguity of statements made and the manifoldness of things des-
ignated can be brought into coherence as they are arranged according
to systematic principles. Consequently, the discussion of temporality
begins with a history which traces the implications of deriving terms
and principles from "things", from "thought", and from "language and
action". With beginning points drawn from "things", discussions of
time are physically and metaphysically oriented; with beginning points
drawn from "thought", discussions of time are epistemologically orient-
ed; with beginning points drawn from "language and action", discussions
of time are symbolically and semiotically oriented. Intimately linked
to the fate of "temporality", the treatment of "representation" moves

though a similar sequence. In particular, the focus on the relation

between representation aÂ§_cognitive structure, and representation as
symbolic vehicle, provides a way of mapping out the continuities and
discontinuities of much contemporary theorizing in this area.

Close attention to the shifts in the basic terms of the leading
theories reveals the likenesses and differences in subject matter.
Although the wgrg_"representation" remains the same,different teÂ§mÂ§_
pick out and focus upon different aspects. Inevitably, particular
theories and families of theories select one set of facts out of all
possible facts and one set of languages out of the many available.
From this review of theories a four dimensional semantic schema was
constructed (see Appendixll) as a device for specifying the terms and
aspects taken as basic in approaching "representation? viz., motiva-
tional, formal, modal, temporal. The schema was used to clarify the
complicated relations between different theories and findings by
demonstrating how the basic dimensions of representing are transformed
in different theories. With the construction of the schema and the
locating of temporality as a dimension of representation, the work of
the main body of the essay drew to a close. The preliminary tasks of
psychological semantics had been achieved: (1) By a kind of concep-
tual housecleaning, order was restored to the chaotic chorus of
theoretical voices; (2) By showing the relevant sense and the appro-
priate region of their application, wherein the same ambiguous word
is used by different theories to develop different solutions to diff-
erent questions, the angry Babel of critical refutation and counter
refutation was replaced by a pluralistic (not syncretistic or rela-

tivistic!) conversation.

In an extended Epilogue, an attempt was made to indicate the
major conceptual impediments to a serious and whole-hearted approach
to temporality. Not merely the reign of S-R psychology and behaviorâ€”
istics, but the underlying committment to motion language, and ex-
planations in terms of antecedent causes and elements, tend to
obscure the role of temporality in the construction of wish, desire,
intention, purpose, will, etc. Consequently, the epilogue attempts to
situate in a preliminary way the dimensions of the semantic schema
within a descriptive or "action language" (Schafer, l976) context with
temporal terms taken as architechtonic of the schematism. In effect,
this amounts to a reappraisal of psychoanalysis as the archeology and
teleology of desire (cf. Ricouer, 1970). Consequently, the figure of
the Janus-faced structure of representation as projected backward
and forward in time is articulated. Finally, the epilogue sketches
the need for an adequate theory of sublimation, and more fundamentally,
of the relations between primary and secondary processes reconceptual-
ized as the relations between analogical and univocal terms, between
figurative and literal modes of representation. But this is another
problem and the task for another inquiry, e.g., a dissertation on the
role of literal and figurative modes of representation in the construc-

tion of temporal perspectives.

METAPSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATION:

THE SEMANTICS OF TEMPORALITY]

The aspects of things that are most important for
us are hidden because of their simplicity and fa-
miliarity. (One is unable to notice something
because it is always before one's eyes).

-Wittgenstein-

The history of psychology bears witness to an inveterate tendency
to conceptualize psychological processes by means of spatialized terms
and metaphors. Aviaries, telephone switchboards, computers--not to
mention Freud's hydroelectric power plants, icebergs, and buried cities
--are only more blatant instances of this ubiquitous habit of thought.
Less graphic perhaps, but even more profoundly ramifying, is the in-
evitable use of one or more of the following contraries in mapping out
the structure and function of personality: "internal-external", "sur-
face-depth", "boundary-core", "part-whole". Needless to say, these
terms help mark off crucial distinctions, without which theory and
practice would be greatly impoverished. It is precisely this massive
theoretical importance--reflecting as it does the spatial conditions
of life--that threatens to obscure, conceal, or distort the signifi-
cance of time, of temporality in human experience. Indeed, psycholo-

gists would be well advised to reflect on Kant's contention that while

space is the form of our "outer experience", time is the form of our
"inner experience" (Kant, l965). Developmentally, the differentiation
of inside and outside is an event only equalled in importance by the
differentiation of before and after.

There is no minimizing the profound and vertiginous conceptual
reorientation entailed by interpreting the organizing principles of
psychological processes in terms of time; that "psychic structures",
the "inner world", the "stream of thought", etc., are fundamentally
temporal rather than spatial in nature. Indeed, the history of psych-
ological theorizing may be productively viewed as the periodic rise
and fall of the predominance of spatial versus temporal root metaphors.
Thus, for the fourth century Greeks, the twelfth century Scholastics,
and the seventeenth century Rationalists, thought was oriented meta-
physically, i.e., things were taken as the measure of thought. Being
was represented by a spatially visualized and ordered cosmos. As a
result, time was viewed as transitory succession, mere becoming as
opposed to permanent, eternal Being. The task of both theory and
practice--of philosophy and religion--was to keep men attuned to
eternal things. Treatises on psychology sharply distinguished between
reason and imagination, one oriented to Being, the other to Becoming.
For the Stoics and Epicureans, for St. Augustine in the fifth century,
as well as for the great thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the skeptical and critical question of "how we know?"
took precedence over "what?", and epistemology superceded metaphysics
as the archetectonic discipline. It is no accident that many of the

greatest psychologists appeared during these epochs. Not only

Epictetus in Antiquity, and St. Augustine, but the emergence of psych-
ology as a scientific discipline in the nineteenth century, bear wit-
ness to the refocusing of inquiry from the modes of things and being
to the modes of thought and the psychological conditions underlying
knowing, doing and making.

It is under this epistemological dispensation that the role of
time in human psychology, (and correlatively, of history in human
affairs at large), became manifest. No longer just objective, cosmic
time--time as the general scheme of serial order and succession
comprising all events--but the time of experience, of consciousness,
of the human subject, became the locus of new questions and new dis-
coveries. Theorizing about psychic time was gradually freed of dis-
torting spatial analogies, (such as the image of a flowing river, or
a line moving ineluctably from past to future through a succession of
points existing one after the other), and was replaced by a psychologi-
cal appreciation of the active relation between past, present, and
future as grounded in the special distinction that the cognitive ca-

pacities of memory and anticipation confer on human existence.

On the Temporal Organization of Experience

"Le present est chargÃ© du passÃ©, et gros de l'avenir"
-Leibniz-

It was St. Augustine who recognized that man lived and moved and
had his being in time; that memory held the key to the structure of
temporality--and therewith to the continuity of identity as the basis

nu h

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V'Wâ€˜v

of selfhood (St. Augustine, 1962). More precisely, Augustine dis-
tinguishes three actions of the mind: memory, attention, and an-
ticipation; all of which exist as present actions. In this way, past,
present and future co-exist in the present. The past is the present
memory of the past; the present is present attention to the present;
and the future is present anticipation of the future. What is novel
about this approach is that it entails active relations between the
temporal modes in codetermining the articulation of experience. By
virtue of memory and anticipation our experience becomes connected;
"before", "now", and "after" linked into the particular continuity of
individual lives. From this perspective, memory and anticipation are
viewed as active and pervasive mental operations which organize present
experience by comparing it with what has been and with what might be.
In the broad, ambiguous sense, these activities establish and link--
or by virtue of repression, fail to establish and link--past, present
and future into an interpenetrating continuity which lays the founda-
tion for the meaningful articulation of the experience of identity and

reality, of the self and the object world.

Temporality and Representation

"All our knowledge is thus finally subject to
time, the formal condition of inner sense...
This is a general observation which, through-
out what follows, must be borne in mind as
being quite fundamental."

-Kant, Critique of Pure Reason-

As Rabin (Rabin, l976, p.3) has reminded us, "temporality, the
conception of and awareness of the passage of time--past, present,
and future--is a uniquely human characteristic which is closely re-
lated to a series of complex psychological aspects of persons". The
human capacity to transcend the present field of experience calls
attention to the epistemologically fundamental act of representing -
re present ing- experience. 0r put more strongly, the power of
representation is constitutive of man's human way of being. Thus
understood as the active process of making present-of re-presenting
or recreating the presence of something absent, representation comes
to light as "the common but to us unknown root" (Kant, l965) of human
cognition. Indeed, recollection and anticipation presuppose the poss-
ibility of distinguishing the present now from past or future "nows"
while bringing them both simultaneously to awareness (cf. Wm. James,
l950; Rabin, l974). Thus, the capacity to distinguish this now from
others, i.e., the capacity to render or re-present a present in gen-
eral--provides the principle for integrating experience. If we had
no way of knowing that what we think is the same as what we thought
before, we would be damned perpetually to Heracleitean purgatory in
which we could not step in the same river twice--or even once!, for
there would be no basis for referring to the river as the "sameâ€.

As Cassirer wisely notes:

"Everything that we call the identity of concepts and
significations, or the constancy of things and attri-
butes is rooted in this fundamental act of finding
again. Thus it is a common function which makes poss-
ible on the one hand language and on the other hand
the specific articulation of the intuitive world."

(Cassirer, l957, p. ll4)

Presentation and representation-~the capacities to "have" pre-
sent and absent objects--are basic to recollection and anticipation,
the processes which make past and future present. 'Moreover, because
it binds before, now, and after into the experience of ongoing
duration rather than instantaneous present points, representation is
inextricably involved with temporality. As an example, even the
simplest perception presupposes a time spread by which the chair that
I see is perceived as one chair "enduring" across several eyeblinks--
and which includes my own "enduring" as well. Thus, it is increasingly
apparent that the capacity of representation to rise up and go beyond,
to transcend, immediacy creates the possibility for the continuity o
the object as well as the subject, for the epigenesis of self and
object. The linking and ordering of "separate" perceptions, the
maintenance of continuity which is termed "object constancy", is
grounded in acts of representing the past and the future in relation
to the present which make recollection and anticipation possible.

A summary of this argument might be put as follows: the formal
structure of representation presupposes temporality as an experiential
time-field in which the differentiation of past, present, and future
makes possible the concurrent appearance of subject and object en-

during through change.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS

Thus far, the discussion of temporality has hinged on the re-
alignment of theorizing made possible by those recurring revolutionary
shifts in the history of thought away from the primacy of metaphysical
categories to the primacy of episemological categories. Kant's
â€œCopernican revolution" has been singled out as paradigmatic of this
shift from the modes of things and being to the modes of thought and
knowing. By virtue of this change of focus, the centrality of the
psychological dimensions of time comes into view. After Kant, dis-
cussions of time were no longer dominated by considerations of space
and motion. Instead the human time of duration and temporality re-
ceive vigorous attention in their own right. (Bergson and Proust are
probably the premiere embodiments of this development). Consequently
the codetermination of self and other, subject and object, was dis-
cussed in terms of the essential temporalizing function--the creation
of a time field--intrinsic to the act of representation.

At this juncture we are once again confronted by a fundamental
question. Just as metaphysics gave way to epistemology under the
assault of the question "How do we know?"; the potential for spinning
abstruse, autistic fantasies renders epistemological analysis vulner-
able to the question "How do we know that we know?" This question,

when taken seriously, results in a third and equally fundamental

realignment of the terms of inquiry. Instead of categories drawn from

the modes of things and Being as in metaphysics, or from the modes

of thought and knowing as in epistemology, this question marks the
shift to the primacy of the categories of Expression, the modes of
language and action. For speaking broadly and ambiguously, the answer
to the question, â€œHow do we know that we know?, is in terms of words
and deeds.

It is surely no accident that the twentieth century has witnessed
the appearance of the architectonics of language and action. Consider
the creation and veneration of such disciplines of language as: lin-
guistics, general semantics, symbolic logic, ordinary language
philosophy, communications, media studies, symbolic forms, "the new
criticism", and psychoanalysis, "the talking cure"; as well as such
disciplines of action as: pragmatism, Marxism, Existentialism, action
painting, operationalism, behaviorism and behavior modification, the
"action cure". Indeed, scientific experimentation itself, which makes
possible the basis of objectivity in the consensual validation of
trained observers-scientific communities--turns on the philosophical
importance of the public visibility of language and action.

In light of these considerations, the epistemologically oriented
interpretation of representation and temporality remains merely formal
unless complemented by a discussion of the vehicles or modes through
which representation is expressed. For representation is only given
as expression, as embodied or materialized in a specific modality.
This fact cannot be overemphasized. In an important sense it marks

the transition from metapsychology to psychology. The theoretical

skeleton that has been developed to understand the cognitive sig-
nificance of temporal experience raises a new set of questions which
cannot be solved by speculation and theory alone. Rather, an answer
is required from nature via empirical investigation. Thus, even if
representation is the mental activity that is presupposed in the con-
struction of temporal orientation and perspective, (and the human
psychological world in general), there remain open questions about
the kinds of representations--or representational systems--that the
organism has available for mediating these cognitive processes. Hence,
claims about the character of internal representations are empirical
in the sense that empirical data would tend toward confirmation or
disconfirmation.

That representation occupies the core of human mental life is a
thesis acknowledged by most cognitive, developmental, and psycho-
analytic theories. Yet the significance of this acknowledgement seems
to be more honored in the breech than in the commission of detailed
analysis of its implications. Thus, while representation is explicit
or implicit in virtually every explanation advanced by these psych-
ologists, the fact that representing presupposes a medium in which to
represent is not always made explicit. Perhaps more seriously, the
vital questions to which this assumption leads--e.g., what properties
does a system 0f representations have?, in what ways do different
media affect the process of representing?,--are rarely made explicit

and taken as the focus of sustained research.

ON THE MAJOR THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION :
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION OF MODE

In spite of the manifest differences in terminology, principles,
and methods, there is a surprising formal similarity in the model of
representation presupposed by many of the leading theories in the area.
With certain notable exceptions to be discussed below, the major theo-
retical approaches posit a two-tier structure of representation based
on an underlying organization or coding process which may be manifested
phenomenally, with varying degrees of distortion, by different media.
Thus, in the psychoanalytic tradition, Beres and Joseph, (1970), dis-
tinguish representation as "unconscious psychic organization" from
such conscious derivativees as "symbol, image, fantasy, thought,
affect or action" (1970, p.2). From the organismic-developmental per-
spective, Werner and Kaplan (1964), treat representation in terms of
the "intentional act of a human being and not in the material which is
utilized qua vehicle" (1964, p.333). The act of representing, or
symbol formation which is a synonym in this terminology, is exhibited
more or less adequately in different media, with imagery a poor
relation of language. Thus "it is only at levels of Tinguistic codi-
fication that one observes a progression towards the attainment of
full-fledged means for the differential articulation of the various
aspects of an event" (p. 498). In a similar fashion, Piaget views

the development of thought as the underlying process which he calls
â€representational intelligence", or representation "in its broader
sense" (1945). In the narrower sense, representation is restricted
to mental imagery. Although Piaget's treatment of imagery (Piaget
and Inhelder, 1971), is sensitive to the developmental possibilities
of the medium, these changes in the direction of greater abstraction
are attributed to the development of underlying operative structures.
As a result, imagery is viewed as essentially designative, figurative,
personalized, and preconceptual, whereas language is the medium in
which the potentialities of intelligence may ultimately reach fruition.
Notwithstanding other basic differences, the same pattern of ex-
planation may be detected in the work of cognitive experimental psych-
ologists and psycholinguists. Thus, in an influencial review article,
Plyshyn (1973), strenuously argues that "the need to postulate a more
abstract representation--one which resembles neither pictures nor
words, and is not accessible to subjective experience--is unavoidable.
As long as we recognize that people can go from mental pictures to
mental words and vice versa, we are forced to conclude that there must
be a representation (which is more abstract and not available to con-
scious experience) which encompasses both. There must be, in other
words, some common format or interlingua" (1973, p.5). Plyshyn's
view is echoed by other experimentalists who have fallen under the
spell of computer models. For computer simulations of artificial in-
telligence require an abstract coding base or programming language.
Also consonant with these approaches is Chomsky's view of language
learning as based on some innately specified system of language uni-

versals which is instantiated in the grammars of the different natural

languages. Indeed, there seems to be a pre-established harmony
between these views.

What is common to these admittedly diverse theories is a pattern
of interpretation in which representation as phenomena (as given in
appearance and statement) derive their character from a structure
assumed to underlie or transcend phenomena or statements. Moreover,
this underlying structure of representation achieves its fullest
realization in language--with imagery and action at best regarded as
privative cases.

Against the background of this conceptual unanimity, it is not
surprising to discover that the bulk of the research generated from
these theoretical positions has chiefly been focused on questions con-
cerning how adequately the surface expresses (or represses) the depth,
how the vehicles of representation reveal or conceal the underlying
structure of representation. Consider, for example, the psycho-
analysts' attempt to move from remote conscious derivatives to the
unconscious representation. In a like manner, Werner and Kaplan study
imagery and non-verbal media in order to shed light on "the genetical-
ly early stages of symbolization....that eventually culminate in the
autonomous symbol-systems of speech" (1964, p.355).

In contrast to the unitary or monistic model of representation,
which assumes a single underlying cognitive process expressed more or
less adequately in different media, a smaller number of theorists opt
for dualistic and even trinitarian approaches. Thus, in experimental
psychology, Paivio (especially 1971) has emerged as a prolific and
influential advocate of the "dual coding approach" to mental represen-

tation. He assumes that verbal and non-verbal information are

represented and processed in two distinct but interconnected symbolic

systems which are functionally independent (Paivio, 1974). Fur-
thermore, he regards the non-verbal or imagery system as specialized
for representing non-verbal information--concrete objects and events--
in an analog fashion via imagery. Whereas the verbal system is
specialized for dealing with linguistic units and generating speech.
From a psychoanalytically oriented perspective, Reyher's recent
analysis of the two incommensurate modes of information processing
based on the functional lateralization of the brain also develops a
dualistic approach to representation. Reyher distinguished two unique
modes of representation: the semantic-syntaxic and the analogic-
synthetic. The former finds expression in language, the latter in
imagery (Reyher, l976, pp.l4-l5). In his most recent theorizing about
daydreaming, Jerome Singer also adopts a dual coding point of view
(Singer, 1974).

Finally, there is the trinitarian approach to mental representa-
tion of Jerome Bruner and his coworkers in developmental psychology
(Bruner et al., 1964, 1966); an approach which has also been used by
Mardi Horowitz (1970, 1971), to rethink certain aspects of the psycho-
analytical theory of cognition. These authors distinguish three sep-
arable subsystems of processing information by which humans construct
models of their world: through action, through imagery, and through
language (Bruner, 1964, 1966). In Bruner's view, action--the enactive
mode of representation--is highly concrete, being under the immediate
control of particular environmental stimuli. Imagery--the iconic mode--

is seen as a somewhat more flexible and abstract system that is

relatively independent of action. At the same time, it is tied to the
"surface of things". Consequently, imagery is regarded as rela-
tively concrete and static, leaving only language--the symbolic mode
of representation--as capable of achieving the full range of cate-
gorical and hierarchical organization which produces the requisite
freedom for treating abstract problems and concepts. In Bruner's
rather vivid image, language is â€an extraordinary swift system in con-
trast to action and imagery, the two rather sluggish modes of rep-
resentation" (1966, p.40). Finally, for Bruner, action represents
"past events through appropriate motor responses", (1964, p.2);
images represent by "standing for" perceptual events; whereas language
represents by "design features" that include displacement and arbi-
trariness.

The existence of monistic, dualistic, and pluralistic theories of
representation testifies to the presence of serious ambiguities, not
to mention contradictions, surrounding the use of basic terms. Typi-
cally ambiguities and contradictions are dealt with in one of two
ways: they are eliminated by selecting one of several meanings of an
ambiguous term and by then showing the others to be ridiculous or
inappropriate; or they are used by discriminating different senses or
aspects of a term and the appropriate regions and limits of their
application. While the former approach tends to develop controversial
oppositions, the latter lends itself to more irenic resolutions. In any
event, the present discussion is offered as no more than a prolegomenon
to a proper conceptual analysis of the different principles and methods
that Contribute to the fertility as well as the productive ambiguity

and the need for conceptual housecleaning that characterize this field.

CONCEPTUAL REORIENTATIONS:
THE SEMANTICS 0F REPRESENTATION

In psychology there are experimental
methods and conceptual confusion.

-Wittgenstein-

In order to introduce some order into the Babel of competing
voices, of overlapping and contradictory theories that characterize
the discussion of mental representation, it is essential to find a
means of productively comparing the similarities and differences of
the various approaches. Since the activity of comparison involves
clarifying the respect or respects of comparison, it is
possible to exploit the resources of ambiguity surrounding the term
'representation' in order to delineate a set of respects, of dis-
tinctions, by which to schematize the parameters of a more rounded
approach. Such a procedure will facilitate the review of the confus-
ing array of predicates assigned to 'representation' in the context of
different theories, as well as their coordination based on a multi-
dimensional conceptual analysis. For in themselves differences and
ambiguities are not pernicious, but the tendenctho interpret them as
real contradictions is. That path leads to dogmatism and fanaticism,

relativism and nihilism; surely the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse

as far as science is concerned.

Since 'representation' can be addressed theoretically only to the
extent that the terms of discussion permit, every discussion is rela-
tive to its formulation. Consequently, attention to the aspects of
representation that are selected by different theories, provides the
starting point for this discussion. Thus, it has already been noted
that Bruner, Paivio, Reyher, Horowitz, and Singer have revitalized the
discussion of representation by making the media of representation
their basic consideration. By focusing attention on the potentiali-
ties of the media, these authors have argued that the different ve-
hicles have different intrinsic organizational tendencies. Perhaps
the crucial distinction is the one drawn between the sequential organ-
ization of information of verbal representations as contrasted with
the simultaneous arrangement of information of imagery representations.
Consequently, the structural features of the former system have a
special capacity for transforming abstract properties of linguistic
units and hierarchies, whereas the latter is better suited for trans-
forming information concerning the figural properties of concrete
events (cf. Paivio, 1975, p.635). Moreover, the spatial 'format' of
imagery representations would seem to allow simultaneous (or at least
very rapid), access to information, while the linear format of verbal
representations seems to permit a more sequentially ordered, discur-
sive access to information.

It is apparent from this discussion that although the modal_gj;
mension, (the media or vehicle) of representation is taken as basic,

other aspects of representation were brought in as derivative terms

to complete the analysis. Thus, in Paivio and Bruner the f2!ï¬‚Ã©l.Â§i:
mension of 'concreteâ€”abstract' was subordinated to the characteristics
of the modes. Nevertheless, Paivio goes on to elaborate the modes in
terms of three formal "levels of transformation or coding....these
levels of meaning reactions will be described here as (a) the 222227

sentational process (or representational meaning), (b) referential

associative reactions (or referential meaning), and (c) associative
chains or structures (or associative meaning)....This feature of the
model relates it closely to the abstractness-concreteness dimension of
stimulus meaning" (1971, p.52-53). Similarly, Reyher (1963, 1976),
Horowitz (1971), and Singer (1965, 1975), treat the motivational
dimension of representation in terms of the relative proximity of
imagery and language to affect and drive systems. Further, Reyher
introduces the formal dimension by distinguishing the indirect, refer-
ential "gradients of structural, functional, and qualitative similar-
ity" (1976, p.13) of "imagoic-depictive vehicles" from the semantic
representation of conceptual-verbal vehicles.

A realignment of like magnitude is seen when the formal dimension
--which might be called the level of processing dimension--is taken as
the basic term of analysis. Thus, both Werner and Piaget treat the
act of representing in terms of the "orthogenetic principle" of in-
creasing differentiation (Werner and Kaplan, p.40), or of the formali-
zation of operations (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, pp.152 ff.). From
this perspective, Werner and Kaplan view the modal dimension as hier-
archically ordered, with imagery the lisping anticipation of verbal

symbolization. By contrast, Piaget was able to demonstrate that the

formal dimension is operative even within the medium of imagery (as
well as the medium of language); that imagery also moves from con-
crete to abstract--from reproductive to anticipatory and transforma-
tional--in the course of cognitive development (Piaget and Inhelder,
1967).

Thus, it is not enough to claim that humans have access to a
variety of media for representing events; even when it is added that
the media of imagery and language have differing cognitive and emotive
assets and liabilities. For in addition to the media, it has been
advanced that humans also have access to a variety of formal levels
of processing, of representing information. To put it much too simply,
the media of representation may be viewed as coding input into words
or images, whereas processing events establish the formal level of
representing, particularly the conscious context or level of awareness
which regulates attentional processes and the field of consciousness,
(and presumably the underlying microstructural organization of brain
assemblies as well (cf. Globus, 1973; Schafer, 1967). Common exper-
ience, as well as controlled observation, recognizes a continuum of
awareness running from dreaming to hypervigilance, with such inter-
mediaries as hypnosis, sensory deprivation, free association, relaxa-
tion, meditation, etc. Various theoretical languages have been de-
veloped to call attention to and further differentiate the formal
level of processing dimension of representation. Freud's discrimina-
tion of the primary and secondary processes remains the most famous
as well as the seminal analysis of this phenomenon (Freud, 1900; Noy,
1969). In Werner's terminology, levels of differentiation and de-

differentiation cover similar ground (Werner, 1947). While Piaget

seems to get at the same process in terms of the relative primacy of
assimilation and accomodation (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). With ex-
plicit acknowledgement of Freud's contribution, the cognitive psych-
ologist Neisser (1963) distinguishes multiple and sequential informa-
tion processing based on analogies borrowed from computer programming.
Finally, Sperry et a1. (See especially Levy-Agresti and Sperry, 1968)
may have provided the neurophysiological basis of this distinction by
calling attention to the hemispheric differences in the modes of in-
formation processing.

It is interesting to note that those theories which make the
formal level of representing the basic dimension of analysis tend
to treat other aspects of representing as derivative. Thus, Werner
and Kaplan consider issues of media insofar as they reflect different
levels of symbolic differentiation. While Piaget detects the pro-
gressive formal development reflected in the media themselves, from
concrete to formal operations. Similarly, in his major "revision of
the psychoanalytic theory of the primary process", Pinchas Noy (Noy,
1969), traces the continuum of psychic organization from primary
process to secondary process as reflected in the shift from "thing
representations" (images) to "word representations" (p.169 and passim).
In this way, the psychoanalytic theory of cognition is recast from the
formal level of processing point of view. Furthermore, these theories
tend also to subordinate motivational considerations to formal ones.
Piaget argues for a "functional parallelism" whereby the development
of affectivity--the "energetics of behavior"--mirrors the form of

cognitive development (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p.158). In a similar

move, Noy as well as Schafer refer to Rapaport's "drive organization
of memory" and "conceptual organization of memory" as constituting
the progressive formalization of motivational structures from pri-
mary to secondary process (Noy, 1969, p.166; Schafer, 1967).

These comparisons of the diverse aspects of representation high-
lighted by the different theoretical frameworks may be thought of as
supplying the 'vertical' dimension (formal levels of processing),
which complements the previously discussed 'horizontal' dimension
(media) of representation. Against this background the character of
representation may be viewed as codetermined by modal and formal
dimensions. However, even this double aspect approach does not ex-
haust the dimensions of representation that have been taken as basic
in psychological theorizing. On more than one occasion, reference
has been made to the motivational dimension of representation. Piaget
captures this aspect very neatly in his recognition that affectivity
is an "irreducible" aspect of behavior, providing the "energetics
of behavior patterns whose cognitive aspect refers to the structures
alone. There is no behavior, however intellectual, which does not
involve affective factors as motives" (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969,

p.158). Perhaps nowhere is the motivational aspect of representation

more fully articulated than in psychoanalytic theory. Indeed, for thevï¬‚â€˜

classical position as developed by Fenichel, mental representation
originates out of the frustrated drive state of the organism as an
"hallucinatory wish fulfillmentâ€œ (Fenichel, 1945, p.47, ff). Rep-
resentations come into being as vehicles for the satisfaction of
wishes--psychic representatives of the instincts manifested as hallu-

cination, image, fantasy, and gradually sUblimated into the higher

forms of symbolic functioning. To the extent that the economic and
dynamic points of view provide the 'natural base' of the theory, the
other points of view may be seen as cultural elaborations of these
starting points in the direction of the reality principle and adapta-
tion. Without getting too involved in the finer points, it is
sufficient to call attention to the motivational basis of representa-
tion in psychoanalytic theory and to indicate its priority to other
aspects. Thus, contrary to the "formal" interpretation of Noy,
Schafer, Gill, and Holt, the distinction between primary and secondary
process originally referred to "modes of discharge of psychic energy
and not the manifestations of these discharge processes--thoughts,
dreams, fantasies, neurotic symptoms or motor acts" (Beres, 1960, p.259.
But compare Noy, 1969; Gill, 1967; and Holt, 1967). It is the energic
and dynamic vicissitudes that determine the "formal" level of rep-
resentation.

As Freud pointed out early in his investigations, "nothing but
a wish can set our mental apparatus at work" (Freud, 1900, p.567).
Consequently, "the urge to fulfillment of the wish is the motivating
force in human psychic activity or motor response" (Beres, 1960,
p.258). Primary processes are regulated by the immediate discharge
of the wish; secondary processes by delay of discharge. Similarly,
the various modes of representation are classified in accordance
with how they serve primary or secondary process discharge. Tradi-
tionally, imagery--"plastic representation"--is viewed as the special
province of primary process (cf. Freud, 1915). For present purposes,
(and notwithstanding the fact that the recent work of the ego analysts
Hartmann (1964), Arlow (1960), Beres (1960, 1961), Singer (1965), etc.,
have attempted to redress this one-sided emphasis by demonstrating

the role of imagery in secondary process thinking). classical

psychoanalytic theory remains the foremost example of the establish-
ment of the motivational dimension of representation as fundamental,

while formal and modal aspects are treated as derivatives of motiva-

tional consideratibns.

ON THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION OF REPRESENTATION

By sifting through the sometimes bewilderingly inconsistent
theoretical statements and experimental yield, three irreducible
aspects of representation were found to be presupposed in every
treatment of the topic. For all their ambiguity, the differences

between representation as modal, as formal, and as motivational run

through each discussion, and are still operative in generating theo-
retical and empirical problems. Indeed, so salient are these dimen-
sions in current controversy that they tend to overshadow the aspect
of representing set forth at the beginning of this study, viz., rep-
resenting as temporalizing. In spite of, or perhaps because of, its
very obscurity, the temporalizing function of representation lays

claim to a status equal to the other dimensions; therewith turning

the trio of basic aspects into a quartet: modal, formal, motivational,
temporal. Moreover, it can be argued that the temporal dimension
might properly be regarded as first among equals. As stated earlier

Â§g_present ing is interpreted as the active process of creating or

recreating presence; of making and keeping present, time past and time
future, things known and things unknown. Representation presupposes
the presence of what is absent: the "what has been" or the "what is
not yet". Furthermore, representing brings the nonactual (past or

future) into the present, thereby 'binding' time together; where the

nature of the 'binding' in any particular case depends, at least in
part, on the purposive orientation of the subject. Needless to say,
'purposing' itself--the "feedforward that structures all activity"
(Richards, l955)--is fundamentally temporal, constituting the syn-
thesis of the temporal field in the light of future representations.
It is this process of binding the presently possible future with the
presently recollected past into a unified field of experience, that
led Kant and Heidegger to regard the temporal dimension of representa-
tion as the ground of the purposive structure of experience.

In a more circumscribed usage, the term 'temporal orientation'
"refers to the preferential tendency discovered in individuals with
respect to past, present, and future" (Rabin, 1976, p.7). Thus, if
the shifting fields of our experience are structured in terms of
dominant interests and purposes at the moment, it might be expected
that different classes of purposing will presuppose different forms
of temporal orientation and perspective. More will be said about
this intriguing possibility when the other dimensions are reintroduced
to further articulate this aspect of representing.

It is interesting to note that while the three previously ob-
served dimensions of representation--modal, formal, motivational--
have vociferous champions on the present North American psychological
scene, the fourth dimension remains mutely and ingloriously obscure.
This is not to say that the other theories disregard time. On the
contrary, every theory makes some provision for temporality. Thus,
Piaget has written a complete book on the subject, as well as several

extended discussions scattered through the remainder of his works.

Werner and Kaplan also devotes several chapters to the subject. With-
in the purview of research on the functional laterality of the brain,
Efron has demonstrated in a series of articles that time concepts

tend to be mediated by the left hemisphere (Efron, 1963a, 1963b).
While Freud's remarks on time-~and timelessness!--are justly famous
(Freud, 1953). Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, it is seldom

appreciated that the distinction between the simultaneous organization

of imagery processing versus the sequential organization of verbal

processing, which figures so centrally in the work of Paivio, Neisser,
Reyher, and Singer, is clearly based on time, on two ways of repre-
senting temporality. Lest this discussion leave the impression that
time has been given its due, it is important to recognize that in
every instance temporality is considered in terms of other distinc-
tions taken as more fundamental. It is hardly an exaggeration to
assert that the treatment of the temporal dimension of representation
is conspicuous by its absence in current debates--if it was even
recalled that temporality constituted a dimension at all!

In this regard, Loewald's work deserves special mention precisely
because it exhibits in an exceptionally vivid way the new problems
and the new perspectives that are brought to light when temporality
is taken as the keystone of a theory of representation. More than
anyone else, Loewald appreciates the central role of temporality in

psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Here are some of the temporal phenomena and concepts that
most obviously are of importance in psychoanalysis: Mem-
ory, forgetting, regression, repetition, anticipation,
presentation, representation; the influence of the past on
the present in thought, feeling, and behavior; delay of
gratification and action; sleep-wakerIHeSS and other

rhythmicities in mental life; variations and abnormal-

ities in the subjective sense of elapsed time; the so

called timelessness of the id; the role of imagination

and fantasy in structuring the future; values, stan-

dards, ideals as future oriented categories; concepts

such as object constancy and self identity; not to

mention the important factor of time in the psychoâ€”

analytic situation itself, in technical aspects,

appointments, length of hour, etc. (Loewald, 1973, p.402).
Indeed, when viewed from this perspective, psychoanalysis offers
perhaps the most sustained consideration of the multi-leveled
temporality of human existence.

While this is not the place for an extended analysis of Loewald's
position, it is interesting to observe how the other dimensions of
representation are recast by taking temporality as the starting point,
the principle of explanation. As a result, motivational aspects are
viewed as "primitive" propelling forces of the past, as in early id
psychology, or as the pull of future possibilities and purposes as in
ego psychology and object relations theory. While this is clearly not
a case of either -or, it does allow Loewald to reconceptualize the
relations between the so called life and death instincts as marking
the motivational oscillation between future and past time orientations
(Loewald, 1973, p.404). Consider also the hypothesis that structural-
ization--the development of psychic structures--is not spatial but
temporal in organization. As Loewald phrases the issue: "it might
well be useful to explore further not only the superego in its rela-
tions to the temporal mode future, but also the time dimension of id
and ego and their relations to the temporal modes past and present"

(Loewald, 1962, p.502). In this way, the formal dimension of rep-

resentation is accounted for by assimilating it to the progressive

or regressive temporal differentiation of present experience (Loewald,
1962b; p.268; but cf. also 1972, p.407). Finally, Loewald addresses
the modal dimension of representation by distinguishing the uncon-
scious primary enactive memory system from the conscious secondary
representational memory system (Loewald, 1975, pp. 318-319). This

can be loosely described as a continuum from unconscious transferen-
tial acting out of the past--in which past isn't distinguished from
present (cf. Bruner and Horowitz on enactive representation)-- to

the "higher forms" of memorial activity of "thing presentation and

word presentation", i.e., of imagery and verbal modes (321 ff.).

SUMMARY

Even if any given terminology is a reflection of
reality, by its very nature as terminology it
must be a selection of reality; and to this extent
it must function also as a deflection of reality.

-Kenneth Burke-

The impetus for reexamining the meaning of 'representation' came
from recognizing the possibly under-appreciated fact that psychologi-
cal theorists do not mean the same thing when talking about 'repre-
sentation'---and most other basic terms for that matter. In order to
explore in some detail the different meanings, relations, and impli-
cations that have been assigned to the common term 'representation',

a four dimensional schema was constructed and employed as a device to
specify basic aspects of 'representing'. Consequently, it has been
possible to trace the way in which an initially ambiguous term is
given different meanings within the context of different theoretical
languages. This process occurs by establishing one dimension as basic
in terms of which the others are interpreted; and by further elabo-
rating that dimension in the context of the specific terminological
and methodological resources available in a given theory. Ambiguities
initially arise in the attempt to assimilate the other three dimen-
sions to the one taken as basic. The schema helps clarify the comp-
licated relations between different theories and findings by

demonstrating how the basic dimensions of representing are transformed

in different theories. Thus, theories such as Freud's and Fenichel's,

which take the motivational dimension of representing as primary,
endeavor to show how representation is constructed out of elements of
the 'representable', viz., the unconscious structure of instincts.
Whereas theories such as Piaget's and Werner's, which take the formal
dimension of representing as basic, attempt to assimilate the other
dimensions--motivationa1 (or the 'representable'), modal (or the rep-
resented), temporal (or the 'representer')--to the formal level of
representation (See Appendix.A fbr an attempt to graphically depict
these various schematizations of 'representing'). In a like manner,
Bruner, Paivio, Reyher, Horowitz, and Singer highlight the modal
dimension or vehicle (the represented), in terms of which they treat
the other aspects. Finally, theories such as Loewald's, that em-
phasize the temporal dimension of representing, discriminate the
other dimension as the products of the temporalizing activity of the
representer (cf. also Kant, 1965, Husserl, 1962, Heidegger, 1962).
The advantages of such a schematic device are twofold. On the
one hand, by revealing the different references, the different ques-
tions and meanings concealed behind a common term, apparent incon-
sistencies and contradictions are minimized; therewith undermining
the grounds for dogmatism and skepticism. Thus, in showing the
proper senses of a given usage of a term, it becomes apparent that
different theories focus on acceptibility obvious and different
aspects of the multivalent phenomenon of representation. On the
other hand, the schema of basic distinctions, by isolating different

aspects of representing, can articulate the four dimensions in

various ways, thereby raising new questions and new perspectives.

If there is any moral to be drawn from this semantic approach
to the ambiguities of 'representation', it lies in the recognition
that the multiplicity of theoretical languages-~0f subject matters
and systems of inference--faci1itates the differentiation of the
complex and richly diversified meaning of this fundamental concept.
That different terminologies direct attention to distinguishable
major aspects of the phenomenon of representing, precludes the
necessity for choosing one language and banishing all others--as if
salvation rested on the proper declaration of faith. Rather, the
different theoretical languages are more modestly and usefully viewed
as so many tools of the trade, each with its own assets and liabil-
ities for solving distinct kinds of problems. By the same token,
the fourfold dimensionalization of 'representation' constitutes yet
another analytical device, another tool of inquiry that will have
to prove its mettle in the only relevant arena: that working with
it produces positive and verifiable results concerning the questions

that interest us.

EPILOGUE - RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

A retrospective look at the movement of this preceding discussion
reveals the joints, the transition points of the argument, and inti-
mates the direction of its further elaboration. By puzzling about
the place of time in psychology we attempted to trace a kind of
recurring historical cycle, wherein time is treated first in terms
of "things", as the universal context of motion, then in terms of
"thought", as the formal structure of the knower; and finally, in
terms of "language" and "action", as the temporal structure of rep-
resenting. Thus, 'context', 'agent' and 'act' provided different
perspectives on the meaning of time and its placement in psychological
theory; and we had occasion to note that the temptation of using
models of time derived from the perspective of things tended to ob-
scure vital aspects of temporal experience; (but more about this
later). Thus, after passing from the psychological statuÂ§_of
temporality to the agt_of temporalizing, we sought a new perspective
by playing with a pun on the grammar of the term "representing" (as

re presenting). Following a suggestion of Kant's, we hoped to find

the "unknown root" of temporality by digging into the "ground" of

representation.

After a brief detour through selected philosophers as a way of
getting oriented to the complicated connections between temporality
and representation, we turned to the major psychological theorists of
representation, in the anticipation of finding there the conceptual
resources to make Kant's suggestion pay off; or, to change the
metaphor, sensing the "catch" that would justify the fishing expe-
dition. Surprisingly, the catch was neither fish nor fowl, but good
red herring. To begin with, the literature on representation is rife
with ambiguities-~if not downright contradictions. Further, and in
spite of the almost unanimous agreement that "representation" func-
tions as a pivotal concept, there are virtually no careful conceptual
analyses of the term to be found, certainly none that go beyond the

somewhat parochial boundaries of different schools. In order to fill

this vacuum, we attempted a provisional semantics of psychological
theorizing, focusing on the vicissitudes of meaning assigned to the
term "representation". Three basic terms were found to be featured

in the different theories: representation as formal, representation as
mgd_al_, and representation as motivational. Each of these terms pro-
vided a perspective on representing in which the other terms played a
secondary or derivative role. But while this finding was not without
intrinsic interest and implication, it failed to shed the desired
light on representing as the foundation of temporality.

Sometimes the failure to find what is expected can be more illumi-

nating than success. Rather than pass too hastily over the absence of
discussions linking time and representation, we might take heart from
the example of another student of representation, and above all, mis-

representation. In this, as in so many other things, Sherlock Holmes

points the way. When Holmes observed that the dog's barking held the
key to the mystery of The Hound of the Baskervilles, Watson protested
that the dog did not bark that night. And that, of course, was the
point. And that may be our point as well. The absence of discussions
of time in the context of theories of representation may not be adven-
titious, but instead prove to be the most revealing clue of all;
drawing attention away from the quarry of temporal experience, and
to the devices we have fashioned, the terminological nets and net-
works we use in taking hold of it.

From this vantage point, the theoretical obliviousness to time
as temporal experience may be traced to committments to concepts and
methods which dictate the acceptable categories of explanation (in-
cluding the criteria and rules for what counts as elements, facts, and
relationships), which in turn render certain kinds of evidence inexâ€”
pressible in its terms. Needless to say, such considerations touch on
profound and controversial issues in epistomology and the.philosophy of
science. With respect to the question at hand, we are witnessing
certain local effects of the more general decision about the nature of
science as it bears on the study of human behavior. The policy of
substituting "how" questions for "why"; of treating humans as "objects"
explicable by mechanisms and processes; the banishment of final causes
and the sovereignty of efficient causes, all point to the triumph of
"natural scienceâ€œ methods of approaching and organizing the domain of
psychology. The purpose of mentioning this is not to detract from the
hard earned successes of this approach in its proper place, but rather
it is, in the words of Whitehead, "to draw attention to the mass of

evidence...which is simply ignored in the prevalent scientific

doctrine. The conduct of human affairs is entirely dominated by our
recognition of foresight determining purpose, and purpose issuing on
conduct. Almost every sentence we utter and every judgement we form,
presuppose our unfailing experience of this element in life. The
evidence is so everwhelming, the belief so unquestioning, the evidence
of language so decisive, that it is difficult to know where to begin
demonstrating it" (Whitehead, 1966, p.13). In short, we are proposing
that the indifference to temporality stems from conceptual committ-
ments (we almost said "occupational psychosis") to what might be
called the project of replacing the "impure" language of intentional-
ity by a purified language of causality; a project which promises to
bestow the blessings of science on the heads of its practitioners.

But since blessings are dialectically related to curses, it would be
remiss to assume that this project is not without its cost, its

shadow side. Or, to quote Whitehead once more: "Scientists animated
by the purpose of proving that they are purposeless constitutes an
interesting subject for study" (ibid., p.16).

At the heart of this controversy, which is at least as old as
Galileo's (if not Democritus') rejection of final causality, is what
Roy Schafer (1976) has recently christened the debate between "action
language" (or as George Klein (1976) calls it, psychoanalytic 'clin-
ical theory') and "metapsychology" (construed as the translation of
meaning into the underlying dynamics of energy). In their stronger,
ontological form, action models presuppose the human body in con-
scious or purposive motion, whereas motion models seek to reduce

action to its antecedent internal or external causes. Thus,

behavioristic explanations seek to reduce or dissolve act and actor
into conditioned responses to environmental stimuli, while dynamic
explanations reduce act to actor who in turn is driven by motives
which have their foundation in such natural mechanisms of motion

as drive and instincts. Both internal (drives) and external (environ-
mental) causes reduce action to concatenations of motion, sheer
motion. (Consider such terminological strategies as 'instincts',
'drives', 'homeostatic regulators', 'information processors', etc.).

Moreover, motion models rely on tracing chains of antecedent causes,

thereby decomposing complex motions (behaviors) back to simpler
motions (instincts or reflexes), ultimately, in their ontological
forms, to the laws of chemistry and physics. In such theories, past
present and future are stretched out in an (external) sequential and
causally related order, with the explanatory power rooted in the past
(e.g., biological continuity and learning histories).

In its more cautious, semantic or "logological" forms (i.e.,
words about words), these models represent different policies about
the kinds of terms or "languages" that are most relevant for an ade-
quate psychological account of human behavior. Such policy decisions
establish the criteria for singling out elements of experience, for
classifying them into kinds based on relevant resemblances, and for
systematizing the coherences and relationships among them. Different
terms and languages will "feature" certain resemblances in certain
respects and neglect other resemblances and other respects. From
this angle, the paucity of attention to temporality takes on new
significance. When employed as a way of classifying theories of

representation, the "action-motion" dichotomy brings to light the

way different theories exploit the ambiguity in such terms as "beha-
vior", "movement", "instinct", "program", "homeostasis","information
processing" and even "representationâ€œ. For all these terms can mean
either action or sheer motion. Such accounts acquire a certain
plausibility by moving illicitly from one set of meanings to the
other, by sliding from an ostensibly rigorous theoretical language
of causes to the ordinary language of meaning and intention. These
conceptual sleights of hand provide the best of both worlds: theo-
rists can have their verisimilitude, and their scientific consciences
too!

Rather than giving a detailed account of the specific sins of
each theorist, or ranking their sins in order of magnitude (for this,
c.f., Schafer, l976), suffice it to say that the lure of causal ex-
planations of representation directs attention to the influence of
the past and therein obscures the radical way in which time enters
into human life, the way in which action can be seen as a time-struc-
ture that is intrinsically different from simple biological develop-
ment. In this vein, we will attempt to detail the conceptual trans-
formations entailed by extending the three dimensions of representa-
tion--modal, formal, motivational--from their original matrix in
various causal theories, and relocating them in an action model of
representation that takes temporal representation and perspective as

the semantic rock bottom of explanation.

On the Temporal Structure of Action

This epilogue has moved beyond the essay's original aim of
attempting to neutrally state the structure of different theories of
representations as a way of discovering basic conceptual dimensions,
and toward a restatement of those dimensions in an action language
framework. But even this project must be approached with circum-
spection lest it become merely the substitution of one set of crude
abstractions for another. For the distinction between causal and
intentional languages, and the action-motion polarity on which it is
based, is not without its own ambiguities. Once the smooth surface is
scratched, the concept of "action" seems to cover a multitude of sins,
stretching over a series of graduated differences in meaning and
shades of qualification. In this way our dramatic use of the action-
motion dichotomy may actually blur further necessary distinctions,
thereby becoming inadequate to the complexity of experience.

With these caveats firmly in mind, it will be nonetheless contend-
ed that time is implicit in the logic of the concept of action and
action language; that in contrast to need driven conceptions, temporal
perspective is a necessary condition of action. "Agtjggf presupposes
an ggtgr_who acts in various contexts with intentions, plans, ur-
pgsgs, foresight, etc., i.e., temporal perspective informed by the
past and oriented to future projects (both long and short term). Thus
time and temporal perspective become the fundamental dimension when
explanatory strategies shift from "metapsychological", "economic",
"drive discharge" constructs to those of an intentional, action

language. Moreover, the concept of temporality expands to include not

only the past but the future as well, i.e., not only the "objective"
literal history of environmental contingencies and antecedent causes
but above all the figurative history of personal meaning (e.g.,
dreams, wishes, fantasies, symptoms--the "symbolics of desire").

Such a project, if carried out, would bring to fruition the high
hopes with which we turned to 'representation' as a clue to under-
standing temporality. Not only would this vindicate that theoretical
gamble, but it would also proivde a satisfying symmetry to the argu-
ment; completing the movement from"time' to 'representation' and
back to 'time' again; but this time armed with the new perspectives ac-
quired as a result of the expedition into representation. Specifically,
it would require the coordination of the dimensions of representations
into a differentiated temporal organization consistent with an explan-
ation in terms of meanings, intentions and actions. Further, it would
provide a preliminary glimpse at what "the native tongue of psycho-
analysis" would look like if the spatial analogies in the service of
explanatory mechanisms and causes were replaced by the temporal
structuring of meanings and intentions. This would involve extend-
ing the claims staked out in Loewald's work, as amplified by recon-
ceptualizing the dimensions of representation as coordinate perspec-

tives on temporality.

On the Temporal Structure of Motives

Etymologically, motives and motivation are concerned with the
sources of human movement. It has been an abiding hope of scientifi-

cally minded psychologists to explain human motives according to the

prestigious paradigms established by the classic science of motion
viz. physics. As a result, it seems perfectly natural to find Piaget
appealing to the "energetics" of behavior as the focus of motivation.
Similarly, Freud's interest in the economics and dynamics of behavior
was the legacy of his earliest speculations in the "project of a
scientific psychology" (Freud, 1895). However, it is a tribute to
Freud's genius that he used terms that could double as both move-
ments and acts, causes and reasons. Thus, when he writes that it is
"the wish that sets the mental apparatus in motion", he leaves himself
the option of interpreting wishes as energies derived from instincts
or in their more ordinary sense as representations of desire. (At
this level of analysis, Freud joins up with that tradition of Western
Psychology that regards Eros (Plato), appetition (Leibniz), conatus
(Spinoza), i.e., desire, as definitive of human being). Treating the
motivational dimension of representation in terms of the modalities

of desire--rather than by adducing a more basic level of account in
terms of the regular laws governing movement, i.e., metapsychology--
is not to postulate an occult faculty. Rather, it draws attention

to the person wishing as engaged in the personal agt_par excellence.
For the idea of an unhindered wish contains the notion of a spon-
taneous disposition which comes from the agent rather than being im-
posed by others (cf. Taylor, p.51). The "I wish" is the person act-
ing and not being acted upon from outside; the person and not a
faculty or an underlying instinct. In this fashion, wishing, as

Freud wisely observed, is the principle, the origin; but not of motion

but of action--the paradigm of self-generated action.

In this fundamental usage, wishing is not the antithesis of
reality, but rather the basic act which relates the person to objects,
to the world. Or, as Fenichel (1945) would have it, "the first
signs of object representation must originate in the state of hunger"
(p.35) which is merely the obverse of his telling remark: "if every
need could be immediately taken care of, a conception of reality
would probably never develop" (p.34). It is this conjunction of
wishing, longing, frustration and satisfaction that enables Fenichel
to state that "the origin of the ego and the origin of the sense of
reality are but two aspects of one developmental step" (p.35). The
existence of desire implies an absence, a lack in the one who desires.
Thus desire testifies to the impossibility of the dream of self-
sufficiency, of that special kind of timeless solipsism that Freud
terms "primary narcissism". It is by virtue of desire and its aims
and objects that man is situated in the world. Yet the infant's in-
ability to satisfy his desires himself gives rise to "the most funda-
mental anxiety" (p.44). This cleavage opened between desire and
fulfillment is bridged by primitive forms of yearning and anticipa-
tion which are the precursors of a sense of time. This transition
from passive or reactive waiting to active anticipation marks the
simultaneous appearance of (rudimentary) action and temporal per-
spective (Hartocollis, 1974, p.299). Finally, in analytic theory,
"the first signs of object representation must originate in the
state of hunger" (Fenichel, 1972, p.35), which in turn presupposes
memory oriented toward future fulfillment of frustration. Thus,

even within psychoanalysis the priority of the future over the past

is acknowledged. In a paradoxical way which remains unthematized
within psychoanalytic theory proper, memory is first manifested as
anticipation of future satisfaction. The famous image of the "hal-
lucinated breast" as the paradigm of mental representation embodies
this bipolar temporal structure: presumably, the remembered repre-
sentation is experienced as futural, is projected into the future

as the satisfaction of desire. As a result, representing emerges
as Janus-faced, turned to the past as "archeology" and to the future
as "telelogy" (cf. Ricouer, 1970).

Thus far, this attempt to trace the temporal conditions of
motivation by reconceptualizing psychoanalytic theory in an "actional"
vocabulary, focused on the constellation of interlocking terms that
emerge from the "dialectics of desire" (Ricouer, 1970): satisfaction
and frustration, representation and reality, timelessness and time.
Focusing on the birth of desire out of an undifferentiated state
gives the impression that desire is prior to the other terms. Yet it
must be borne in mind that such descriptions of origins, of genesis,
are necessarily "mythological"--even when clothed in the respectable
garb of the latest fashionable vocabulary. The point of using myths,
of telling "likely stories" as Plato used to call them, is to "set in
motion", to place in the temporal order of becoming, the timeless
logical implications that inhere in the cycle of terms implicit in

this concept of action. As Freud said in a different context:

To be sure, this is only an hypothesis, like so
many others with which archeologists endeavor to
lighten the darkness of prehistorical times--a
"Just-So story" as it was amusingly called by
a not unkind critic (Kroeger); but I think it

is credible to risk a hypothesis if it proves
able to bring coherence and understanding into
more and more new regions.

-Freud, 1960, p.69-

In similar fashion, we have used the historical terminology of psycho-
analysis' genetic point of view to state something about the "gssgn-.
tigl" conditions of action, which may or may not have existed

ab initio, but which do exist ggw. Thus, temporal perspective, as
implicit in the Janus structure of representation, is the condition
whereby appetite (tension) transcends the moment and is projected

toward the future as desire and experimental action.

On the Temporal Structure of the Formal
and Modal Dimensions of Representation

Taking the motivational dimension of representation as a starting
point may have suggested that motives (as desire) are clearly sep-
arable from the other dimensions. But this is only the case at the
level of discourse. Our distinctions live in the words chosen to draw
them. In actuality, the dimensions are given together. Representa-
tion and action are seamless webs that are divided into dimensions
only in our theoretical talk about them. And, as we have had ample
occasion to observe, not only do we use words, but they also use us.
Hence, some of the tangles, paradoxes and ambiguities that keep in-
truding into the attempt to get clear about time and representation.

Even in so called action language, the temporal structure of
representation as the archeology and teleology of desire-~or less
presumptuously as the varieties of wishing and planning and willing--

is always qualified adverbally by the "formal dimension", e.g.,

"concretely" or "abstractly", "prudently" or "compulsively", etc;
and by the "modal dimension", e.g., "imaginatively" or "verbally".
To further thicken the plot, at the same time that they mediate
motives, the formal and modal dimension cross classify each other
as well.

In his own way and for his own purposes, but without naming it
as such, David Shapiro involves the dimensions of representation in

his account of action:

Conscious motives are generated by the experience of
needs (our archeological pole of the motivational di-
mension) in a mind that is aware of the possibilities
of action (the telelogical pole of temporal perspec-
tive). It is evident, then, that the particular form
and conscious motive will depend not only on the nature
of those needs but also on various other characteris-
tics of that mind: the style of thinking (an aspect

of our formal dimension), imagination (our modal
dimension without the additional division between
verbalizing and imaging), and anticipation (the
temporal dimension again); relevant attitudes or points
of view; and always, an existing context of other
motives, including relatively stable ones such as
long-range arms and intentions (temporal dimensions
qualified by abstract pole of formal dimension).

-Shapiro, 1970, p.336-
Shapiro goes on to observe that in the course of development "it is
no longer possible, even if it is desired, to act without imagination,
anticipation, and awareness of the self acting" (p.336). The pro-
jections of the self's action in the media of imagination become the
possibilities which are deliberated about in the process of decision
making. Shapiro has brilliantly delineated the formation and deforma-
tion of the experience of volition as it is affected by different

cognitive styles (Shapiro, 1966, 1970).2

From the perspective of the terminology developed in this essay,
the logic of desire terms unfolds into the archeology and teleology of
representations: with archeology as the genesis of the forms and
figures of desire grounded on the legacy of past identifications and
fixations; and teleology, as the transformation or sublimation of
desire into long and short range temporal perspectives as acculturated
plans, projects, goals and so forth. From the fgrmal_point of view,
archeology is regressive, characterized by "primary process" modes of
thought, while teleology is progressive characterized by the "sec-
ondary processes". That the transformation of the infantile wishes
from the primitive and the past, (with their repetition compulsions
enacted transferentially), into the realm of culture and the future is
a vastly complicated process goes without saying. An adequate accountï¬‚ï¬
of the transformation of desire (and its aims and objects) from the
base to the sublime would require a fully developed theory of sublima-
tion, one grounded in the language of action rather than economics. _

Finally, the modal dimension cuts across the others, with action,
images and words having inherently different temporalizing potentials
which are in turn modified by the formal levels of regression or pro-
gression. Since cultural experience is largely publicly codified in
verbal forms, it is to be expected that the forms of language (literal
and figurative) would mediate the development of both extended time
perspective and sublimation of aims and objects. Images, by virtue
of their greater privacy, appear to be in closer "proximity" to
earlier wishes (cf. Flugel, 1953). (Surely, the manipulation of

imagery to gain control of motivation has never been lost on those

who would control others: from Dostoevsky's grand inquisitor to
Madison Avenue, and from Plato's Philosopher Kings to Wolpean desen-
sitizers). But even here, care must be taken to distinguish the
primitive wish fulfilling images of infancy from the sublime images

of the "fine" arts and the high religions. It might be added that

the goal of psychoanalysis (and linguistic analysis as well) can

be described as breaking the blinding powers that certain pictures
(images) and words (concepts, habits, thought models) have to in-
fluence and distort our lives in the present. In this way the patient
is freed from neurotic bondage to models formed in the past and has
gained "the freedom to decide one way or another" (Freud, Standard
Edition XIX, p.50) in light of imaginatively entertained possibilities

of an open-ended future.

Conclusion: The Representation of Representation

In spite of the "imperialistic" tendency to present itself as an
all encompassing theory, the present study has been explicitly con-
cerned with exploring the psychological implications of the terms
"representation" and "temporality". It goes without saying that any
selection of terms is necessarily no more than a "point of view".
And, while different theories of representation have been analyzed
and reduced to a four dimensional semantic schema, this was never
meant to provide a definition of representation or even to set forth
a definitive doctrine of what representation "is" or what the word
"representation" means. Likewise for "temporality". For as we have
seen, representation and temporality are given together, codetermine

each other. Both of these concepts have the character of elementary

notions, not to be explained by translation into other terms; but
rather to be used themselves in any attempted explanation. Stated
paradoxically, representation, at least the way the term is used here,
is what makes language use possible; while at the same time, language
is required to explicate the nature of representation. The very
activity of explicating constitutes both an expression of and an
amplification of the capacity for representing. Consequently, the
different theories of representation are, when taken generically,
representations of representation. In this they testify to an
essential fact about human beings: man is that animal who can re-
present his experience, and in turn, re-present his representations._,/
This reflexive or second-level character of representation of
representations--including words about words, images of images, words
about images, and images of words, etc.--opens onto a specifically
human existence within the symbolic universe of cultural systems.
As the "symbolic animal"--which is the modern version of Aristotle's
"rational animal"--or "that being for whom being is in question"
(Heidegger)--man is the creature who asks questions and invents
theories about himself--as well as images, fictions, illusions, de-
lusions, etc.--and then attempts to live in their light. Moreover,
the term "symbolic animal" suggests that man is simultaneously the
citizen of two realms: the sumbolic and the animal, each with its
own source of motives and intentions. To make matters even more
complex, the coexistence in the two realms suggests two kinds of
explanations: 1) the reduction of the "animal" to bodily causes and

ultimately to motions, and 2) the elaboration of the "symbolic" into

meaning and action. That this dual character of human life has been
represented in terms belonging to each of these dimensions comes as
no surprise at this stage of the game. The perennial squabbles be-
tween mechanists and mentalists, behaviorists and cognitivists, causal
concepts and intentional concepts, motion and action bears witness to
the endless temptations of reducing one term to the other.

And yet the idea of a "symbolic animal" puts both orders of ex-
planation together. Similarly, the reflexivity of representation of
representation--of which this essay is an example-~puts active and
passive together, "representer representing" as cause, and "representer
represented" as caused in a way that suggests a third kind of explan-
ation, a mixed explanation wherein mechanism and meaning are dialecti-
cally assimilated to the active and passive dimensions of representa-
tion (cf. Ricouer and Whitehead). But be this as it may, these are
matters of the greatest difficulty and obscurity.

Suffice it to say that this study of representation and temporal-
ity, by selecting the terminology it did, directed attention to cer-
tain aspects of these phenomena--and inevitably away from others. In
one sense, it had no other aim than the re-exploration of "represen-
tation" and "time" without necessarily seeing them in the constella-
tions imposed upon them by old habits of thinking and talking. That
this new classification has its own limitations, its own blind spots,
points once again, to the invincibly perspectival character of repre-
sentation as both revealing and concealing. Consequently, there is u
no danger that this study constitutes a final, synoptic perspective on
perspectives, and no reason to believe that a definitive representa-

tion of representation has been achieved.

FOOTNOTES

In more ways than it would be possible to document, the discussion
which follows depends on the investigations of Augustine, Cassirer,
Heidegger, Wittgenstein and the "Chicago 'Neo-Aristotelians'" in

philosophy; and on Freud, James, Loewald, Paivio, Piaget, and Wer-

ner in psychology.

In our terminology, cognitive styles would be resolved into differ-
ent ratios of temporal, formal, motivational and modal dimensions.
Thus, the obsessive style would comprise a preponderance of the

verbal mode experienced as a necessity "often accompanied by such

phrases as 'I must', 'I should', 'I musn't', in inner speech" (Flu-
gel, 1961, p.18). Whereas the "impulsive style" would consist in
the primacy of wishful images (i.e., at the concretistic formal,
motivational, modal ratio) with the attenuation of long range aims
(temporal dimension) and the absence of a flexibly articulated yer:
bal_value hierarchy, etc. It would appear that Shapiro's schema
can be generated from the various ratios of dimensions. In prin-
ciple, such a reduction would eliminate much of the ambiguity in
Shapiro's treatment, while at the same time systematically high-

lighting basic aspects of each style for further study.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

1. Schema of basic terms used to interpret 'representing'.

Formal Level of Processing Dimension
(Representation)

Modal Dimension-4â€”-â€”â€”-â€”â€”Representing ;;Temporal Dimension
(Represented) (Representer)

Motivational Dimension
(Representable)

APPENDIX A - continued

2. Transformations of schema of basic terms:

a. Motivational terms as archetechtonic of schema;
e.g., Freud and Fenichel.

Representation
(Formal Dimension)

Represented Representer
(Modal Dimension) (Temporal Dimension)
Representable

(Motivational Dimension)

b. Formal terms as archetechtonic of schema;
cf., Piaget, Werner, Noy.

Representation
(Formal Dimension)

Represented Representer
(Modal Dimension) (Temporal Dimension)
1
Representable

(Motivational Dimension)

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