OPINION-MAKERS AND FOREIGN POLICY:

THE CONCEPT OF AMERICA’S ROLE IN
WORLD AFFAIRS. THE 1920’8

A Disaerfoflon
for the Degree OI DII. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Michael James ConwelI

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WGILD AFFAIRS, THE 1920's

presented by

MICHAEL JAMES CONWELL

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ABSTRACT
OPINION-MAKERS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
THE CONCEPT OF AMERICA'S ROLE IN
wORLD AFFAIRS, THE 1920's
By

MICHAEL JAMES CONWELL

In this dissertation the concept of America's role
in world affairs as perceived by opinion-makers during the
1920's is explored. The Opinion-makers were selected from
five high-prestige occupational categories as suggested by
sociological studies; the five categories were business
executive, clergyman, college academic, editor, and military
officer. In addition to an examination of individuals, sig-
nificantperiodicals were included from each occupational
category; such publications as Christian Century, the New
York Christian Advocate, Army and Navy Journal, New York
Elmeg, Nation, flew Republic, World1§_york, Current History,
and flation's Business were important makers of opinion.

This study, therefore, is divided into five parts, each
focusing on one occupational group.

The fundamental argument of the thesis is that the
concept of America's role in world affairs during the 1920's
was characterized by the rejection of collective security-—
the doctrine of collectively enforced peace. There were no
exceptions to it: the United States avoided political-
military entanglements in Europe, the Far East, and in

Latin America. Consequently, the underlying concept of

Michael James Conwell

America's role in world affairs can be studied from a
cross-section of foreign policy events. The three primary
areas for discussion are the League of Nations and World
Court, United States-Latin America relations, and the
Kellogg-Briand Peace Treaty.

While it can be shown that opinion-makers agreed
across occupational lines on the theoretical concept of
America's role in world affairs--America should be free to
contribute when and how it desired to the advancement of
world peace and prosperity--they were unable to produce
a uniform approach at the operational level. Equally impor-
tant was the fact that opinion-makers did not regularly
speak for occupational groups, but rather for narrower
interests identified with particular ideals and perceptions
of world order. Because opinion-makers were unable to pro-
mote a united operational approach to world affairs, a
traditional foreign policy remained in effect: economic
advancement without commitments for a world political body
were foremost considerations.

During the 1920's few opinion-makers seemed able
or willing to realistically assess the relationship between
power and responsibility, the two most important considera-
tions in America's world role. Without a penetrating
analysis of the use of power and the responsibility of
world leadership, a foreign policy designed to meet the
needs of a rapidly changing world order was unlikely to

emerge. What is strongly suggested by the research is that

Michael James Conwell

to achieve a broad-based foreign policy on issues other
than abstract goals such as ”peace," ”morality,” or

”justice" is difficult at best.

OPINION-MAKERS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
THE CONCEPT OF AMERICA'S ROLE IN
WORLD AFFAIRS, THE 1920's

By

Michael James Conwell

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

’1977

CDCopyright by
Michael James Conwell
1977

For Marge, Paul, and Curtis,
whose contributions of time
and understanding were most

important.

11

II
III
IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHRISTIANITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
ACADEMICS' PERSPECTIVES

THE JOURNALIST AND AMERICA'S ROLE
BUSINESS, PROSPERITY, AND FOREIGN POLICY
FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

iii

“A
76
111
th
171
179

INTRODUCTION

This study explores the concept of America's role
in world affairs as held by American opinion-makers in the

1920's.1

The influence which these sources exerted upon
opinion-holders and decision-makers cannot be measured,
but the ability to transmit opinions provided the possi-
bility of influence.

Because the opinion-making role is predominately
an ascribed capacity attached to occupation,2 five high-
prestige occupational categories were selected from which
to sample opinion-makers. Sociological studies suggested
that the categories possessing the highest prestige, in
rank order, were elected government officials, business
executives, college academics, physicians, clergymen,

3

lawyers, engineers, editors, and military officers.

 

1The term "opinion—maker“ is based upon the defi-
nition in James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy (New York: Random House, Inc., 1961), p. U5;

21b1d.. pp. 56-57.

3These occupational categories and their prestige
levels are adapted from sociological studies using the
pioneering work by George S. Counts and the National
Opinion Research Center's findings of 1947 and 1963:
George S. Counts, ”The Social Status of Occupations: A
Problem in Vocational Guidance,” School Review 33 (January
1925):16-27; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupation§:and Social
Status (New York: The Free Press of Gléncoe, Inc., 19617}

 

 

 

l

Eliminating physicians, engineers, and lawyers because of
a lack of professional interest in the broad questions of
foreign policy, and by-passing elected government officials
to focus upon non-policymaking persons, the most pres-
tigious categories were business executives, clergymen,
college academics, editors, and military officers.

Because opinion-makers had access to the communi-
cation system for dissemination of their ideas and atti-
tudes, the periodical literature of the 1920's is signifi-
cant to this study. Extensive use was made of the mass
media, of which there are two types: (1) the "influential'
media consisting of prestige and large circulation news-
papers and periodicals; and (2) the I'representative'I media
of a class, section, ethnic group, and other subdivisions
of the larger pOpulation.‘I

Because this study covered a limited number of
years, I chose to examine as many expressions of opinion as
possible within those years. Among daily newspapers, where
continuous scanning would have been time-consuming and
most likely unrewarding compared with the effort, the

search was keyed to the time framework of the issues dis-

cussed. For weekly and monthly periodicals, indexes and

 

p. 263; Robert w. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H.
Rossi, “Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-
1963,“ American Journal of Sociology 70 (November 196“):
286-302.
“Lee Benson, 'An Approach to the Scientific Study
of Past Public Opinion,“ Public Opinion Quarterly 31
(Winter 1967-1968):558.

tables of content were available to select relevant edi-
torials and articles.

The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature for ‘
the years 1922-1928 revealed that of 222 articles under the
general heading 'United States - Foreign Relations," near
seventy-percent were included in twelve periodicals; those
served as a starting point. While not conclusive, it is
interesting to observe that only two of the initial twelve
sources, Saturday EveninggPost and Collier's, were listed
among the first twenty-five magazines received by the
9,200 families studied by Robert and Helen Lynd in
Middletown; it is equally interesting to observe that in
their study of working and business-class families, maga-
zines of the Atlantic, Harper's, and World's Work type,
which were more likely to publish analytical foreign policy
discussions, were subscribed to by none of the worker's
families and by two-thirds of the business-class families.5
Similar percentages existed for subscriptions to influen.
tial and large-circulation newspapers of the type included
in the following chapters.

The opinionpmakers were drawn from positions of
prominence within the five occupational categories. They
tend to be representative, not necessarily the most impor-

tant. Although they are divided by occupation, one must

 

5Robert s. and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown: A
Stud in American Culture (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
gorIH, Inc., 1929; Harvest Books, 1956), pp. 239-40,
71-72 0

a

constantly be aware that they often interacted profes-

sionally.

The concept of America's role in world affairs as
held by opinion-makers in the 1920's was characterized by
the rejection of collective security--the doctrine of

6 Collective security binds

collectively enforced peace.
nations together on the assumption that all states have a
stake in war no matter where it occurs and therefore should
Join to suppress it.7 From the post-war debate over the
League of Nations collective security provision in Article
X of the Covenant through the signing of the Kellogg-
Briand Peace Pact in 1928, official policy persisted in
avoidance of multilateral commitments which would bind the
nation's economic and military power to the whims, dic-
tates, and overt influence of other nations.

America's avoidance of collective security per-

sisted throughout the decade. For example, in 1921-1922

the Washington Naval Arms Conference convened to discuss

 

6See L. Ethan Ellis, Re ublican Forei Polic
1921-1933 (New Brunswick: Rutgers Un vers ty Press, )

and Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant: 1 21-1991 (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1965; CoIIIer BooRs, 1969).

7For discussion see the following works by Roland
N. Stromberg: ”The Idea of Collective Security," Journal of
the History of Ideas 17 (April 1956):250-63; Collecfive -"
Security andIAmerican Foreign Policy: From the League of

Nations to NATO (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1953).

 

 

disarmament and Far East issues. The Four, Five, and Nine-
Power treaties which resulted were based upon moral re-
straint rather than collective safeguards: the Four and
Five-Power pacts established a ratio for naval parity,
pledged respect for the status 329 in Pacific possessions,
and provided for consultation if disagreements occurred;
the Nine-Power Treaty pledged respect for the territorial
integrity of China, but provided no means for enforce-

ment.8

On the issue of war debts and reparations the
American government insisted on repayment of wartime loans
to the allies, but refused to officially recognize any
link between payment of those debts and the reparations
demanded from the defeated powers by the victorious
Versailles signatories. Although Americans participated
in international conferences to ease the burden of repara-
tions upon Germany, they did so as financiers rather than
governmental representatives, thus avoiding any direct
government responsibility for enforcement of the agree-

ments.9 In 1928 the United States and fourteen other

nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact condemning war

 

8The Washington Naval Arms Conference and its
results are discussed in John Chalmers Vinson, The
Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the
WaShington Cofiference I§ZI-I§22 (AEfiens: UnIversIty of
GEOrgia Press, 1955).

9Ellis, Republican Forei Poliey, 1921-1933,
pp. 191-211; an exhaustive sffidyo he war debts problem
was provided in Harold G. Moulton and Leo Paslovsky, War
Debts and World Pros rit (Washington, D. C.: The
Brookings Ins u on, 2).

as recourse in international relations; it provided abso-
lutely no enforcement other than the power of public

10 In Latin America the United States relied on

opinion.
unilateral action and the continued justification of the
Monroe Doctrine as a means to prevent internal disorder
and external interference; though the policy was tempered
during the decade, the region remained strictly defined
as an American interest.11
Because the rejection of collective security was
consistent through the decade rather than selective by
events, it suggests a basic, underlying concept respect-
ing America's role in world affairs. An examination of
opinion-maker attitudes concerning a cross-section of
events rather than all events of the decade should satis-
factorily reveal the conceptual framework of the five
occupational categories studied. To what extent did
Opinion-makers promote or criticize a policy which reserved

full sovereignty over the use of the nation's economic and

military power for international relations?

 

10For an account of the movement leading to the
Kellogg-Briand Treaty see Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in
Their Time: The Origins_of the Kellogg-Briand ac New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).

11The following accounts are recommended: Dexter
Perkins, A_gistory of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1991; 19637, pp. 277-316; Robert
Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionagy
Nationalism in MexicoJ 1916-1932 (Chicago: University of
CRIcago Press, 1972); Bryce WoOd, The Making of the Good
Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia UniverSity Press,
I961; W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 13-47.

 

 

 

 

 

The League of Nations and World Court, Latin
America, and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact are the primary
issues included in the following chapters. The League of
Nations and World Court, joined for discussion because of
their real and imagined association, offered opportunity
for participation in an international cooperative arrange-
ment; the response to that situation is instructive. In
Latin America, particularly in Mexico where revolutionary
governments attempted to assert state control over subsoil
possessions and landholdings of foreign companies and
nationals, America was responding unilaterally to a grow-
ing nationalism which threatened the economic and strategic
value of the region. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was the
result in part of a widespread peace crusade which ulti-
mately relied upon not economic or military sanctions but
the power of public opinion to stem the forces of aggres-
sion. The response to these issues and what it says
about the concept of America's role in world affairs is

examined in the following chapters.

CHAPTER I

CHRISTIANITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter presents the views of American
Protestant and Catholic opinion-makers on the concept of

1 Often

America's role in world affairs during the 1920's.
carrying forth the tenets of social Christianity at home,
how did they approach issues of imperialism, war, or inter—
national cooperation? To what extent could they escape
society's norms and explore possibilities for a new world
order to match the domestic restructuring urged through
social Christianity?

The selection of sources centered on periodicals
and individuals active in the discussion of foreign rela-
tions and America's role in world affairs. Among journals
the nondenominational Christian Century and World Tomorrow,

the Methodist Christian Advocate (New York edition) and
Zion's Herald, and the Bulletin of the Federal Council

 

1The five largest Protestant bodies--Baptist,
Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Protestant
Episcopal--plus the Roman Catholic Church accounted for
87 percent of all church membership over 12 years of age
in the United States during the post-war decade. U. S.,
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1935
(Washington, D.C.: UnitedPStates Government Printing
Office, 1935), p. 68.

of the Churches of Christ were beneficial for the

Protestant perspective, with America, Catholic World, and

 

Commonweal representing diverse segments of Catholic
opinion.2 Persons holding positions throughout the church
structure, or interacting with those who had such positions,
were included in the research.

The general tenets of Christian internationalism--
the belief that the United States had a moral obligation
to assist in restructuring the world order--were widely
disseminated by the Opinion-makers; but on closer exami-
nation those same spokesmen too often demonstrated parochi-
alism. They espoused anti-imperialist doctrine over United
States-Latin America relations, but in the midst of the
controversy over Mexico's assertions for greater control
of its minerals at the expense of foreign companies in
Mexico those churchmen and journals fell short in sup-
porting Mexico's right of expropriation (in fact, they
ignored the issue) and were critical only mildly of the
foreign oil companies. They debated collective security,
but on the specific issue of the League of Nations and

World Court there was considerable emphasis on the need for

 

2The following sources are valuable for dis-
cussion of the literature and activities of churchmen
during the 1920's: Charles Chatfield For Peace and
Jgstice: Pacifism in America 1919-1951 IKnoxville:
Universify OF Tennessee‘PPess, 1970); Donald B. Meyer, The
Protestant Search for Political Realismy_1919-1941
IBErkeley: University of CaIifornia Press, 1960); Robert
Meats Miller, “The Attitudes of the Major Protestant
Churches in America Toward War and Peace, 1919-1929,“ The
Historian 19 (November 1956):13-38.

 

10

reservations which would protect and enhance America's
position in relation to the other participants. As will
be seen below, the approach to world affairs was tempered
with self-interest.

Opinion-makers within the Protestant and Catholic
churches during the post-war decade projected the United
States as superior in moral tone and philanthropic spirit.
That attitude persisted despite disappointment and dis-
illusionment resulting from the World War. During the
1920's opinion-makers in the churches attempted to draw
attention to an obligation for restructuring international
relations along lines of Christian ethics--to retreat from
international affairs would have meant to surrender moral
obligation.

Opinion-makers believed that with.American leader-
ship the world political-economic structure would undergo
a positive transformation. The United States government
and people had to accept the responsibility of their new-
found potential in economic power. Foreign trade and
investments took on a new perspective when America emerged
from the war as a creditor nation. The churches insisted
the United States exercise its potential political power
for the benefit of the less develOped nations. Principles
of world interest were to dominate the international con-
siderations in United States foreign policy, at least in
theory.

11

Opinion-makers in the church community viewed the
international order of the 1920's in idealistic terms.
Phrases like "world justice" and "peace" were commonplace.
.Application of the Golden Rule, Christian principles, and
Christian ethics were common prescriptions for the ills of
the world. The World Alliance for International Friendship
Through the Churches typified the critique of the inter-
national situation: "We will not believe that mankind is
so deficient in character and intelligence as to make the
national solution of our international problems impossible
and to commit us to the continued rule of insane fear,
hatred and collective destruction."3 The General
Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 192A in-
cluded the following in its statement on war: ”We set our-
selves to create the conditions for peace. Selfish
nationalism, economic imperialism, and militarism must
cease. . . .‘u The influential Methodist Christian
Advocate, published in New York, included a charge to
America calling for application of "the Golden Rule to

international affairs“ and a fostering of ''that mutual

 

3"A Non Pacifist A
- ppeal Against War ” Literar
Digest 76 (27 January 1923): 36. ' —"""l

”Ernest Johnson, ed., The Social Work of the
Churches (New York: The Federal CouncII of Churches, 1930),

P. o

 

12

respect and love which can establish international ac-
cord."5 The Catholic journal America similarly charged
that future peace was attached securely to the will of the
people; if the people would persist in opposition to war,
the diplomats would be unable to promote it.6

In Christian Centugy, probably the most influen-

 

tial religious journal of the 1920's, editorials persis-
tently criticized the conditions of international relations.
While justice between states was mandatory for a stable
world order, that condition had been sacrificed during and
after the war. Evidence abounded: the French occupied the
Ruhr when Germany became delinquent in reparations pay-
ments in 1922-1923; Germany and Russia, international
villains, were excluded from membership in the League of
Nations; the attitude of the international powers toward
China during its years of internal struggle was destruc-
tive at best. The cure for such a world situation con-

sisted of, in the Christian Centugy view, "Democratic,

 

86 50hristian.Advocate (New York) 101 (15 July 1926):
7.

6America 30 (16 February 1924):429-30.

7Theodore Peterson, Ma azines in the Twentieth
Centur (Urbana: University of IIIInoIs Press, 1969),
p. 596; Miller, “The Attitude of the Major Protestant
Churches in America Toward War and Peace, 1919-1929,"
pp. 13-38; circulation statistics for most periodicals and
newspapers can be found in American Newgpaper.Annual and
2%§%%%g§y (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and'Son, 1929);
C e , For Peace and Justice, pp. 102, ion-5.

 

 

13

which means open, control of diplomacy . . . as a safe-
guard of the people's peace."8
Such broad statements as those above appeared not
only in editorials, but in the writings of individuals hold-
ing leading or influential positions within the church
structure of America. Robert E. Speer, Chairman of the
Federal Council of Churches, believed the solution to
international discord rested with the spirit of Christ
being brought to the world through the missionary enter-
prise.9 Speer was supported by Kenneth Scott Latourette,
Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Student
Volunteer Movement and professor of Missions at Yale
University, who described the purpose of foreign missions
as laying the foundation for a reorganization of civiliza-

tion along Christian lines.10

Reinhold Niebuhr, pastor of
Detroit's Bethel Church from 1913 to 1928, appointed
associate professor of Philosophy of Religion at Union
Theological Seminary in 1928, and an editor of £2519
Tomorrow, described a need to “challenge the nations to a
mutual trust, to do the building up of a new kind of inter
national system. We must go far beyond anything the na-

tions are willing to do today. We are still being dragged

 

8

9Report of the Ninth International Convention
(New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions,
192“). pp. 131-A6.

10

Christian Century #1 (28 August 1924):1102.

Ibid., p. #06.

1h

at the chariot wheels of the State. We will have to be

more heroic."11

Father John A.Ryan of Catholic University
and active member of the Catholic Association of Interna-
tional Peace believed that ”World peace is largely . . . a
matter of human faith” and nations could act morally as

did individuals.12

The Congregationalist provided a
summary statement: “The road to peace is the road to a
higher and greater concept of religion."13 The churches'
opinion-makers were adamant in the desire to achieve the
ideals of international peace and stability. They very
eloquently set forth the goals as moral obligations, as
right and responsibility for the Christian people of the
United States. But on specific means for achieving those
goals, they hesitated; being set on the ideal goal, they

failed to appreciate the value of available means which in

themselves were short of ideal.

Two agencies were available in the 1920's as
possible implementers of a stable world order. The League
of Nations and World Court presented legitimate

 

11Reinhold Niebuhr, "What Should Be the Major
Emphasis of the Churches on the Issue of War and Peace?"
Federal Council Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):16.

12John A. Ryan, "Christian Principles of War and
Peace,” Catholic World 12h (November 1926):213.

13"The Road to Peace,‘I Congregationalist 112
(13 October 1927):453-

15

alternatives for treatment of international concerns. The
United States Senate had twice rejected the Versailles
Treaty ending World War I with the League Covenant at-
tached; in November 1919 the vote was 39 to 55, and in
twaizmch 1920 it failed by only 7 votes, 49 to 35. In January
1926 the Senate voted to join the World Court, but with
reservations which delayed acceptance of America's con-
dit ions by other nations. Both agencies were operative
v11 thout America's formal participation. The attitude of
‘tlaear churches and individuals toward these two agencies, and
involvement in world affairs generally, exposed a weakness
111. 'tzhe sincerity of the ideals expressed above. ‘

With respect to involvement, the position that
the United States had a moral obligation toassist in the
building of a new world order remained largely unchal-
lenged. Charles Clayton Morrison, editor of the influen-
tial Christian Century, observed: “It is not a question of
'Fflilrtricipation versus isolation - isolation when world peace
18 at stake is as impossible as it is ignoblefl'w The
L 1011ng Christian Advocate charged that 'We must have
world-wide contacts; we must in some way contribute our
share towards the. world's progress and uplift."15

There were dissenting voices, particularly from

\

1“Charles Clayton Morrison, The Outlawry of War

(Chicago: Willett, Clark and Colby, 1927), p. 128.

1Sl‘llmer Mouser, "The United States and

tZernational Relations ," Michigan Christian Advocate 53

In
( 2
November 1926) :8 .

16

segments of the Catholic community. The Catholic World
expressed stern opposition at mid-decade to any involve-
ment in European affairs: ”It may be wisdom, but some of us
old-fashioned folk - old-fashioned as the Father of the
Country - are still stupid enough to imagine that the best
way we can contribute to the progress of the world is to

16 The Commonweal saw too much

set our own house in order.”
potential restriction in America's freedom of action if it
allied itself too closely with Europe: '18 not our influ-
ence most effective when it is practical and unhampered‘?"17
Also, America objected to involvement in the League of
Nations for the very reason that such participation would

18 But even

involve the United States in EurOpean affairs.
the praises for involvement did not extend automatically to
participation in the League of Nations and World Court.

The League of Nations received less support than
the World Court. Charles Clayton Morrison, an active ex-
ponent of American involvement in world affairs, rejoiced
OVer the Senate's rejection of the League. Looking back
from the perspective of 1927, Morrison saw the hand of God
in the decision: "More by divine providence than by her

Own intelligent virtue America has been preserved from

taking the course of international futility in which a

\—

16Catholic World 123 (April 1926):120.

17Commonweal 1 (11 March 1925):478.

18America 33 (22 August 1925):448-49.

17

policy of entanglement would have involved her.“19 Because
the League rested on a system recognizing the legitimacy of
war, America's involvement would subvert its own peace
tr'adition to the violence of war, thought Morrison. His
critique was inadequate, though, in that he failed to
seriously pursue the advantages of attempting to reform
the institution from within, a position more in line with
his position on domestic reform.

In spite of tradition, though, the League did
receive some sympathetic support in the churches. To
pr-omote international justice agencies dedicated to that
end must be utilized, and the League satisfied the re-
quirement, according to Sherwood Eddy the renowned evan-
gelist of the International YMCA and co-founder in 1921

20

0f the Fellowship for a Christian Social Order. Harry

Emerson Fosdick, the noted preacher and professor of
theology at Union Theological Seminary, considered the
League I'the most promising nucleus of organized inter-

21

nationalism in the world.“ Kirby Page, activist editor

or the World Tomorrow, a journal of Christian socialism,

and “the most influential pacifist author and speaker of

\

19Morrison, The Outlawry of War, p. 273.

( 20Sherwood Eddy, "A Convert to Pacifism,” Forum 73

wJLum 1925):811; Sherwood Eddy, “What Shall We Do AF‘Fou

(8-D? Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work
Chicago: University 3f Chicago Press, 1925), p. 61.

M 2I'Harry Emerson Fosdick, "What the War Did to My
13nd," Christian Century 1+5 (5 January 1928):10-11.

 

18

the interwar period,I saw a need to establish principles of
justice which dealt with complexities in the world struc-
‘ture. He included the League of Nations in his plans.22
Several church organizations spoke favorably for
islme League. The General Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal Church in 1924 pledged its support to United
States participation in the League.23 The Methodist
EpisCOpal Church, South, at its General Conference in 1926
tweetsolved that the United States should "cooperate“ with
titace League for promoting peace.2u The resolution adopted
1:1y' the National Council of Congregational Churches in 1929
was direct: “The sooner the United States joins the League
(>1? :Nations the better it will be for the world.'25 The
£31btmdent Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions considered
the League the best way to prevent war.26 The Executive
Committee of the Federal Council of Churches in 1928
expressed itself in favor of “more effective cooperation
with the rest of the world,“ and expressed its "gratifica-
tion" with United States' participation in the League's

Commissions and committees to which it was invited.”

22Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, p. 353; Kirby

Page, War Its Causes ’COnse uences anf Cure (New York:
George II. Doran Company, 192%T, p. 130.
23Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 162.
24

26
131). 253-61.

 

Ibid., p. 167. 251bid., p. 166.

Report of the Ninth International Convention,

27'A Message to the Churches on World Peace,"

19

Some proposals for adherence to the League charter
included warnings. The position taken by the National
Study Conference on the Churches and World Peace in 1926

took a representative position on adherence: the confer-
ence recommended adoption of a policy to allow full co-
operation with the various commissions and committees of
the League which invited United States participation.
However, on the issue of formal membership the Conference
adopted the following resolution:
Entry of the United States into the League of Nations
with the reservation that the United States will have
no responsibility, moral or otherwise, for partici-
pating in the economic or military discipline of any
nation, unless such participation shall have been
authorized by the Congress of the United States.28
The Christian Century would accept the League if basic
:r-e structuring occurred: “If war had been left out, America
vw<>1ild have been inside the League.'29 Early in 1926 that
Journal called upon America to "remove from the League the
Shadow of Mars who lurks behind its constitution and all
its councils."30

The World Court received less criticism and

Federal Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5; see also
SamueI McCrea Cavert, ed., Report of the Federal Council of
The Churches of Christ in Amer19a 1920-1324 (New York?
F'edera Council of Churches, 1925), p. .

F 28“ Message to the Churches on World Peace,“
£eral Council Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):12,

29Christian Century 42 (19 March 1925):372,
BOChristian Century 43 (4 February 1926):136-37,

20

greater direct support than the League of Nations. The
Christian Century began the decade opposed to United States
adherence to the World Court. Editorial objections cen-
‘tered on the Court's inability to compel submission of dis-
Iautes. The journal persisted in its position until mid-
JLSQZS. In July 1925 a conference between representatives
of elements of the peace movement agreed on a plan for
entry to the World Court. The "Harmony Plan,’I as it was
labeled, provided for immediate adherence to the Court
with the Harding-Coolidge-Hughes reservations. In addition,
within two years of joining, all signatories should de-
clare endorsement of the following principles and call an
1.11ternational conference of all “civilized“ nations to
draw a general treaty embodying them: (1) Outlaw war as a
13<Dod for settling international questions; (2) formulate
Ell: international code of laws for peace; and (3) grant af-
firmative jurisdiction to the World Court over controversies
between sovereign nations. If the signatories to the World
<3<>11rt failed to endorse the conditions within two years, or
if a general treaty failed ratification within five years,
the United States would terminate its adherence. The
SEkrristian Century based acceptance of the proposal on the
<3<Intinuance clause; as an editorial declared, I'Let Us

Ellter The Court!"31

The Commonweal joined in shifting positions on the

31Christian Century 42 (16 July 1925):911, 914-15.

21

Court question. As late as March 1925 the journal queried
the relationship between the Court and the League, fearing
that if the United States joined the judicial body it
would mean entering the League, which was too great a risk.
But by January 1926 the journal was criticizing the reser-
vations under which the nation would join the Court, charg-
ing the country with being unwilling to accept inter-
national responsibility.32

Sherwood Eddy, Kirby Page, and Harry Emerson
Fosdick supported the World Court. Eddy considered it im-
perfect, but American participation could contribute to a
proper restructuring.33 Page gave his support on the
assumption that history had clearly shown the need for
legislative, executive, and judicial agencies to guide the
relationships between persons, and therefore preservation
Of international peace equally demanded similar agencies.“
Foadick did not accept the Court as the final answer to
international problems, but he considered it the best how
for codification of international law, a need of great im-
Portance in his conception of a) stable world.

In 1926 eight outstanding religious leaders sent
a letter to President Coolidge urging adherence to the

\

( 32Commonwea1 1 (11 March 1925):u78; Commonweal 3
20 January I926):28I-82.

 

33Eddy, “What Shall We Do About War?“ p. 61.

G- 34xirbil Page, An American Peace Policy (New York:
eorge H. Doran Company, 19 . p. 1 .

22

World Court. The signers included S. Parkes Cadman,
President of the Federal Council of Churches, Bishop
ililliam T. Manning of the Episcopal Church, Charles E.
£3urton, General Secretary of the National Council of
Congregational Churches, and William F. McDowell of the
Methodist Episcopal Church. As the signatories expressed
themselves: “We are not willing to believe that American
efforts for so many years for so noble an ideal are to
end in failure.'35
Supporters of the World Court included the General
Conference of American Rabbis in 1924, the General
Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 192 5, and
the National Council of Congregational Churches in 1929.36
The National Study Conference of the Churches on World
Peace in 192 5 urged immediate entry by the United States
into the Court, and supported the reservations.37 The Ex-
¢3<=mxtive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches also
Supported adherence, and unconditionally.38
In reality there was little possibility that the
United States would join the League of Nations; hence,

a

 

35Christian Advocate (New York) 101 (16 December
1926):1683.

36Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 164.

F 37-A Message to the Churches on World Peace“-
c\e<}£%_1_§ouncil Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):12; also
ave ,

Report OTthe Federal Council of Churches of Christ
1\l’1America 1920-1924. P. 76

F 38"A Message to the Churches on World Peace,"
Qieral Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5.

23

widespread support for membership was anachronostic. Also,
an element of nationalism emerged in the position of the
ghristian Century, as seen above, and that Journal un-
doubtedly spoke for an important segment of social
Christianity; the Journal had taken the position that since
the League was not structured on the model preferred, mem-
be rship must be withheld.

The World Court received more support, but even
there the number of proponents for reservations suggested a
reluctance to expose America too openly to the possible
corruption of an international system.

In the case of both the League and Court, the
church community centered more on their faults than upon
Wo rkable alternatives to the inadequacies. The insularity
which pervaded much of America's actions in the decade was
3ynonomous with an air of superiority, and that view fil-

te red into the position taken on international questions.

During the 1920's United States—Latin America
relations were strained by the crisis with Mexico. In 1917
a new constitution in Mexico had declared that ownership
°f all lands and waters was vested in the nation which in
turn would transmit title to individuals under whatever
11Illitations it determined; in addition, foreigners granted

la3nd or concessions to exploit the soil must agree to be

°°nsidered Mexicans with respect to such property and not

21$

invoke protection of their own governments. The foreign

oil companies saw the potential danger to their control of

subsoil minerals if that article (27) of the constitution

‘became law. The issue was raised most seriously when in

December 192 5 the Mexican Congress passed the Petroleum
law and Mexican Land Law to implement Article 27. The

Petroleum Law allowed fifty-year concessions on properties
acquired before 1 May 1917 and upon which some "positive
acts' had been performed; oil companies had until 1 January
1927 to apply for the concessions.

The Mexican issue was exasperated by the appoint-

ment of James R. Sheffield as Ambassador to Mexico. In

November 192 5, the month following his appointment, he

Wrote to Nicholas Murray Butler, president of both
ColumbiaUniversity and the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, that Mexicans were “Latin-Americans
Who in the final analysis recognize no argument but force."39

Considerable attention was focused by the church community

on the settlement of the oil holdings question.
Sheffield remained United States Ambassador to
Mexico until mid-1927. The Christian Century expressed

slitepticism about his objectivity, questioning the extent
to which economic interests controlled him. At the same

‘3 11116, though, the Journal questioned Mexico's ability to

 

 

\
39Quoted in Robert Freeman Smith, The United

8"testes and Revolutionar Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-
322 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 232.

25

no The

develop its wealth without external assistance.
Christian Advocate warned against threats of interven-
tion into Mexico or withdrawal of recognition, because if
either one occurred, “American life and property are

41

rendered unsafe for another period of years." The

Commonweal saw the dilemma: while Latin.America would

 

suffer if it closed the doors to economic growth, it could

not allow “aggressive exploitation under the mask of

#2

rights." The Michigan Christian Advocate expressed

 

similar concern, observing that Mexico must respect the
"legitimate“ interests of Americans and the United States
government should safeguard American rights abroad: I'But
Uncle Sam cannot afford, and will not be Justified by
public sentiment at home, to browbeat Mexico, a weaker
nation, in order to pull from the fire the chestnuts of the
oil and other exploiters.”3
As the crisis over subsoil rights mounted in late
1926 and early 1927, an emphasis upon international law
emerged. The Christian Century in December 1926 asserted
that while a legal case existed against Mexico, the United

States should not lose its advantage in international law

by falling back on less respectable methods; the following

uoChristian Century #2 (25 June 1925):815-16.
41

#2

Christian Advocate 101 (30 December 1926):1751.
Commonweal 5 (2 March 1927):451.

“3'13 There Danger of a Break With Mexico?"
Ilighigan Christian Advocate 53 (2 December 1926);7,

26

month a lengthy editorial called for arbitration of the
dispute rather than resort to war. The Christian Advocate
in a 30 December 1926 editorial made a similar plea.

In mid-1927 a step was taken to bring the con.
troversy to a close. In August 1927 President Coolidge
appointed Dwight Morrow to replace James Sheffield as
Ambassador to Mexico, a move highly criticized by the
Catholic Journal America because it allegedly sacrificed

#4 Morrow assumed his new duties in

America's interests.
October. Morrow's former association with the large New
York banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company hinted at
the importance of economic considerations and represented a
victory for the "moderate" approach which Morrow and Thomas
Lamont of the J. P. Morgan company represented.

Within two months after Morrow's arrival in
Mexico City, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled against dis-
puted sections of the oil law. The Christian Century
hailed the decision as consistent with its past stand that
the law was unconstitutional, and praised Morrow for his
tact and friendship to Mexico.“5 The Catholic Journal
America was less receptive to the court decision. The
editors saw it offering no fundamental change—-property
rights would still have to be exchanged for concessions in

E

M'What Shall We Do About Mexico?“ America 37
(9 July 1927):293.

uSChristian Century #b (1 December 1927):1411-12.

27

most instances: “The so-called 'laws' still remain in ac-
cord with the 'Constitution.' And that instrument, be it
remembered, makes robbery a legitimate function of govern-
ment.”6

The larger question of a sovereign state's right
of expropriation, acknowledged by the United States
Government in the late 1930's, was not broached by the
church community. Such a position would not have been con-
sistent with the churches' general support of the capital—
ist system--1ndividual injustices were attacked, but the
system itself received little direct criticism.

There is no evidence that the churches had impact
on settling the crisis over subsoil rights. Their posi-
tion basically supported that of the Administration. In
April 1927 President Coolidge had laid forth a moderate
position and the opinion-makers seemed generally satisfied.
Coolidge emphasized pacific settlement without forfeiting
legitimate rights of foreign investors in Mexico, and to
that end the churches largely subscribed.

One dissenting voice came from the Catholic
Journal America. Catholics were particularly sensitive to
the Mexican situation because of the state's confiscation
of church property, control over selection and number of

priests, and general usurpation of Catholic authority over

“é"The Mexican Thimblerigger," Aggglgg 38 (2“
December 1927) :255.

28

the religious aspects of Mexican life. America reacted
strongly, criticizing Coolidge's April 25 speech as back—
ing away from full protection of American rights abroad,
and criticizing President Calles of Mexico for insincerity
and lack of faith in responding to American claims of in-
Justice.47
The approach to Latin America problems in general
gained exposure on the eve of the 1928 Havana Conference,

a meeting between North and South American nations for

discussion of mutual concerns. The Christian Century

 

offered a series of suggestions that few churchmen would
challenge. The initial suggestion called for President
Coolidge to admit the "unsatisfactory" nature of United
States-Latin America relations. The next step demanded
expression in word and deed of a comprehensive underb
standing of the Latin American point of view. The next
two suggestions had particular significance because they
pertained to economic interests. First, Coolidge should
clarify to the delegates the difficulties which instability
in some countries caused for American investments. Second,
the United States ought to plea for "united action" in
order to “restore and maintain order. . . .' When the

conference ended, the Christian Century criticized the

 

United States for not demonstrating more goodwill; such

8 step would have been sound from the standpoint of Justice

“7'Weasel Words in Mexico,“ America 37 (7 May
1 927) 3 77-780

29

and morality, as well as “The best thing for the business

interests of this country. . . ."48
The mixing of ideals and self-interest presented

a difficult problem for the churches to reconcile. The

Second Study Conference on the Churches and World Peace

dealt with the dilemma by advocating the abandonment of uni-

lateral intervention for the protection of lives and proper-

ty abroad, and the substitution of non-violent measures

administered collectively.“9 The Study Conference in 1926

asked for a reexamination of the Monroe Doctrine to seek a

restatement more meaningful to the conditions of the

1920's.50 A similar request for the purpose of "reshaping

on a multilateral basis an All-American Monroe Doctrine"

was made by Zion's Herald, a weekly publication of the

Methodist Episcopal Church: “If this were to take place,

the intervention issue would be cleared of its present

foggy implications."51 The Executive Committee of the

Federal Council of Churches requested an examination of

“The effect of . . . investments on international

 

uBChristian Centur #5 (19 January 1928):?2-73;
Christian Century 35 (I March 1928):275.76.

“9'Churches and World Peace," World Tomorrow 12
(April 1929):178.

50'A Message to the Churches on World Peace,.
Egderal Council Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):11-12.

51'Intervention in Latin.America,” Zion's Herald
:106 (in March 1928):32h.

 

30

understanding, goodwill and peace. . . ."52 The Reformed
Presbyterian Church presented its position: 'The govern-
ment should abandon the policy of armed intervention on
its own authority for the protection of the lives, proper-
ty, and interests of its nationals abroad and should sub—
stitute non_violent measures collectively administered."53
Zion's Herald set forth a worthy proposal: "The very least
that we might do would be to advocate the appointment of a
commission representing all the Americas, charged with the
responsibility of acting as international trustees for the
collective protection of these investments and for the
maintenance of peace.'54 The ideal of national sovereignty
and non-interference in a nation's domestic affairs gained
widespread support and may have contributed to a shift in
official government policy.

The world's political-economic future and America's
position in it received further definition in discussions
over war and peace, and in that context the church
community became involved most vocally. Movements for

disarmament and outlawry of war received the most attention.

52"A Message to the Churches on World Peace,“
Egderal Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5.

53Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 16.

5““Protecting Foreign Investments,” Zion's Herald
106 (13 June 1928):?52.

 

31

The general approach called for international cooperation
in the belief that for war to be effectively combatted, the
nations should work together.

The elimination of war captured the overwhelming
interest of opinion-makers. A few groups were skeptical

of the movement to abolish war. For Example, the Continent,

 

a Presbyterian Journal, declared, 'It is a fact that the
Churches do not dare to teach that all and every war is
sin . . . because it is not true."55 The Catholic Journal
America also held that while war was distasteful, it was
not necessarily criminal; war was not only not an evil,
but under some circumstances could be a duty.56 An essay
published in the Methodist Review, not representative of
the Journal's editorial position, observed that ”The life
of a man and the life of many men are less sacred than the

collective life of mankind."57 An editorial in Commonweal

 

declared that IIit is no more logical to expect public
opinion to keep a nation from international crime, than it
is to expect public opinion to keep a man from domestic

crime."58 But such attitudes were exceptions.

 

55Quoted in "War and Christian Ethics," New
Republic 29 (11 January 1922):168.

56'The Promise of International Peace,“ America
39 (8 September 1928):510-11.

”William M. Belch, "Peace, Pacifism, and
(Christianity,' Methodist Review 107 (November 192a):878.

5860mmonweal 2 (5 August 1925):298.

32

Reinhold Niebuhr expressed a predominant attitude
in 1922:

Every attempt to make war serve ideal causes is bound
to be overpowered by the elemental and primitive
passions which war unlooses. After witnessing the
tragic consequences of the world war and the pathetic
impotence of the liberals and idealists who tried to
gather grapes from thistles what reasonable alternative
has a conscientious Christian to a position of un-
equivocal opposition to all warfare759

Niebuhr's position gained support from the Methodist Review
in an editorial note: "To believe that war or physical
strength of any kind can be made an instrument for the vic-
tory of righteousness is a bit of practical atheism."60
Along a similar line of thought, Father John.A. Ryan de-
clared that a nation was but an organized group of human
beings, and as such the moral law applied to it as well as

61

to men individually. The Catholic World was convinced

 

that in the long run, the only thing to end war would be

62 War served

insistence by the people on its termination.
no legitimate or useful purpose in the opinion of most
church opinion-makers.

The Christian Century carried forth the campaign

 

to abolish war with an intensity unsurpassed by any other

59Reinhold Niebuhr, “Letter of Response," New
Republic 29 (22 February 1922):372.

60"Does God Have and Use a Sword?" MethOdiSt
Review 107 (November 1924):939.

61John A. Ryan, "Christian Principles of War and
lPeace," Catholic World 124 (November 1926):209-15.

62

 

 

Catholic World 128 (November 1928):229-34.

 

33

segment of the church community. Outlawry of war was the
core of the proposal by the Journal and its editor Charles
Clayton Morrison. That idea did not originate with
Morrison, having been proposed in 1918 by Chicago lawyer
Salmon 0. Levinson. Morrison's position received exposure
in both the Journal and his book The Outlawry of War.

The sanction underlying Morrison's scheme for
world peace rested with public opinion: ”there is not a
conceivable plan for world peace which must not at last
rest upon the plighted word."63 Such faith in the power
of public opinion was common among churchmen. The Boston
based Congregationalist Journal spoke of the need to
establish a "peace psychology" among the world's citizens.6u
Kirby Page insisted that the prevention of war depended
upon Iattitudes of mind“ which would transcend parochial,
national allegiances and incorporate international con-
cerns.65 H. E. Woolever, editor of the National Methodist
Pzggg, echoed the power of public opinion: "The most
needed and potent factor at this period is that of public
Opinion expressed in pulpit, press, forum, and conversa-
tion. The desire of the people for international amity

must be made articulate in order to effect peace," and that

 

63Morrison, The Outlawry of War, p. 185.

6l""Goals and Processes of Attainment,“
Cpngregationalist 110 (6 August 1925):163-64.

57 65Page, War, Its Causes, Consequences and Cure,
p. 1 .

34

66

would best be done through the churches. The Christian

 

Banner, a publication of the Michigan Christian Missionary
Society, in the words of its editor, suggested that “Peace
will . . . be found in . . . better understanding - in
practicing the law of love - in living the Golden Rule."67
Sherwood Eddy supported the objectives which
Charles Clayton Morrison expounded. Eddy had backed
America's participation in the World War in 1917, but soon
found war to be brutal, a killer of innocent people, and
the breeder of more war. He assumed a responsibility to
work for excommunication of war through the churches and to
public1y promote steps leading to outlawry of war: "I will
strive with a large and rapidly increasing number of
Christians to lead the Church to excommunicate [war], that
the state may finally outlaw it and make it as illegal as
slavery, the duel, highway robbery, or private murder."68
Kirby Page also supported Morrison's objectives,
but differed over the effectiveness of public opinion as an
enforcer. Page, more tough-minded and realistic, placed

emphasis on disarmament, abandonment of economic imperial-

ism, and establishment of international processes of

 

66H. E. Woolever, "Geneva Disarmament Conference,"
Michigan Christian Advocate 54 (14 July 1927):8.

67J. Frank Green, "Instead of the Briar,“
Christian Banner 22 (July-August 1924):13.

68Eddy, 'A Convert to Pacifism,“ p. 811; Eddy,
“What the War Did to My Mind,“ pp. 925-27.

35

Justice. Outlarwy of war, to be effective, needed to be
combined with the World Court and the League of Nations.
Page believed the deficiencies of outlawry eminated from
the reliance upon judicial action rather than political
action; because many of the serious causes of war were
political, arbitration and conciliation and political
organizations must supplement the judicial element.69
Page suggested as one important problem of outlawry its
failure to address the causes of war:

As long as the rank and file of the people continue

to believe that the supreme obligation of a nation

is to advance its own interests, that it has the

sovereign right to choose its won policies without

regard to the wishes or interests of other nations,

that it must be ready to avenge insults to its flag

by killing citizens of the offending nation, and

that it is the duty of the citizen to support his

government, whether it is right or wrong - Just so

long will the people of the earth slay each other,

outlawry or no outlawry.
For Page, any outlawry agreement failing to deal with ques-
tions of vital interest and national honor could not
achieve its ultimate aim. He was confident that IThe price
of peace and justice is the willingness of nations volun-
tarily to surrender that portion of their sovereignty which
stands in the way of creating effective agancies of inter-

national justice.'71

 

69Page, War, Its Causes, Consequences and Cure,
pp. 130. 157.

70

71Kirby Page, “The Pressures of Economic Elements
in.World Affairs,“ Religious Education 21 (April 1926):153.

Page, Dollars and World Peace, pp. 106-7, 114.

36

Harry Emerson Fosdick, pastor of Riverside Church in New
York City, considered outlawry the core of the churches'
mission in world affairs, and agreed with Page about the
insufficiency of Morrison's safeguards. Fosdick expressed
a need for a multiplicity of agencies to secure the out-
lawry effort. Nationalism, racism, and economic imperial-
ism caused war, wrote Fosdick, and outlawry alone failed
to deal with those problems.

Regardless of supplemental needs to affect out-
oawry, the act of renouncing war as an instrument of na-
tional policy met with wide public support. Even though
8. Parkes Cadman, President of the Federal Council of
Churches from 1924 to 1928, was probably correct when he
observed that IThe American people . . . believe war may
be moral when it redeems a state of things worse than it-
self,‘ there simply existed little public opposition to
banning war.73 The Federal Council of Churches accurately
observed that “the ending of war is one of the deepest
demands of the American people.'7u

More than a dream in the 1920's, the desire for
effective world peace seemed a reality in Ausust 1928 as
fifteen nations including the United States agreed by

 

72Fosdick, “What the War Did to My Mind,‘
pp. 10-11.

73S. Parkes Cadman, “The Churches and War,”
Christian Advocate 103 (13 Spetember 1928):1112.

7MA Message to the Churches on World Peace,"
Federal Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5.

37

treaty to outlaw war from their international relations.
Eventually, over 50 nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact
to outlaw war. While the churches made a significant con.
tribution to its realization, others outside the church
made more important contributions to its existence.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact was set in motion by
French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand in 1927 when he
proposed a bilateral treaty to outlaw war between the
United States and France. The Christian Century encouraged
the administration to respond with a proposal for a multi-
lateral pact to include all nations.75 When Secretary of
State Frank Kellogg accepted that widely supported pro-
posal in his official response of December 1927, the
Christian Century labeled the action 'a stroke of genius"
and declared that “the full moral responsibility . . . of

America has been restored."76 The Commonweal Joined in

 

praise: “the United States, being the most powerful of
nations, has brought its strength to bear upon solving a
problem that involves the stability of civilization. . . ."77
Commenting weeks after Kellogg's official response, the
Michigan Christian Advocate referred to it as "the greatest

move toward world peace the United States has ever

 

750hristian Century 44 (26 May 1927):646-u7,

76Christian Century 45 (19 January 1928):?2;
Christian Century 45*(23 Fébruary 1928):259-60.

 

38

initiated."78

With the peace pact reality in August 1928, the
Christian Century commented that the United States had
withheld previous involvement in international political
problems because prior solutions proposed some measure of
military force. Until that danger had been eliminated the
United States must remain outside the political system.
With the signing of the pact, America would undertake ”a
new moral responsibility" to make the pact ”understood by
all the world."79

The extent to which the United States had involved
itself in world affairs through the pact seemed clear. The
Catholic World observed that "we are now and forever bound
up with Europe in war and peace. Their problems are our
problems, their troubles are our troubles, and their wars

will be our wars. Another Catholic journal commented

that by signing the pact the United States had "definitely

entered the international drama."81

The Second Study
Conference on World Peace recommended United States par-

ticipation in the settlement of "all controversies'I without

 

78Elmer Houser, "United States Starts World Peace
Pact,‘ Michigan Christian Advocate 55 (19 April 1928):?.

79Christian Century 45 (20 September 1928):
1123-25.

80
81

Catholic World 128 (November 1928):133.
Commonweal 9 (30 January 1929):357.

39

82

qualification. The moderator of the Presbyterian Church,

U. S. A., saw in it the “rosy dawn of a new peace con-
sciousness. . . ."83
Widespread support for the pact existed among
spokesmen and official organs of the church community. The
General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church
approved the pact in 1928. The following year support came
from such groups as the Northern Baptist Convention, the
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, the General
Synod of the Reformed Church in America, the Synod of the
Reformed Presbyterian Church, and the Southern Baptist

Convention.8u

The importance of church support had been
recognized by Secretary Kellogg in June 1928 when he
appealed for such support in an address celebrating the
300th anniversary of the First Dutch Reformed Church on
Manhattan Island.

During Senate debates over the pact, the Committee
on Foreign Relations concluded the treaty did not abrogate
the right of self-defense, nor interfere with America's
right to uphold interests in Latin America. Adopted as an
interpretation, the report did not become a reservation.85

82"The Churches and World Peace,“ p. 178.
83Presbyterian Magazine 34 (November 1928):563.
8“Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 164.
85D. 5., Congress, Senate, Report of the Committee

on.Foreign Relations, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 January
1929, Congressional Record 70:1730.

40

Thus the treaty as approved by the Senate had no visible
reservations. Kirby Page considered the interpretations
destructive to the pact's significance and usefulness.86
Page's warnings did not match the attitude expressed by
the editor of Living_Church who labeled the pact a "futile
gesture, a jumble of high-sounding but meaningless words."87
Given the Senate's interpretations, the pact had little
impact on America's actions in areas where its self-interest
was paramount, and presumably other countries would inter-
pret the pact equally to their advantage. It was the ab-
sence of any enforcement plan calling for specific commit-
ments for action by the individual states that made the
pact acceptable to so many people in the United States.
America was skeptical because the real key to peace lay in
the spread of God and religion in national life, something
the pact did not provide or encourage.88
General agreement existed that the treaty alone
could not bring world peace. The Federal Council of
Churches proposed additional steps for the pact to be
wholly effective. Among the proposals was the promotion

of agencies for securing justice; that meant support for

the World Court, arbitration and conciliation, and the

 

86Kirby Page, “Should America Disarm?" Forum 81
(February 1929):?0-74.

87Living Church 79 (11 August 1928):484.

88"The Foundation of Peace,“ America 39 (15
September 1928):534.

41

codification of international law.89

Charles Clayton
Morrison favored the latter process. He considered codi-
fication essential for proper Junctioning of a world court
and world system based on Justice. In his view, "at least
three-fourths of the existing . . . mass of so-called
international law consists of laws and rules of war,"90
Thus codification would be simple because laws relating to
war could be eliminated if war as an institution was re-
moved.

The failure of the peace pact to prevent the
aggression of Japan and Germany in the 1930's rested not
solely on the pact, but on governments' failure to use and
honor the treaty. The churches and their spokesmen had
disagreed among themselves over the effectiveness of pub-
lic opinion as a controlling force in national behavior.
The inability of many people to look beyond immediate inte-
rest ls unquestioned, and in instances when the exception
rules, the optimist is euphoric. The churches tended to be
optimistic. Morrison probably spoke for many people when
he dedicated the pact with the following words: 'On this
natal day of peace, he who loves mankind will bow his
exultant head in gratitude that God had brought him to this
day and will gird his loins for vigilance and unremitting

service in any field where the Master of the Harvest calls

 

89Federal Council Bulletin 11 (October 1928):1-2.

90Morrison, The Outlawry of War, p. 162.

42

him to labor.'91 But he and others failed to foresee that
the world could produce the brutality of a Germany or
Japan, and they failed to see that Christians would one
day be forced into a situation where the Justice they so

dearly sought could be achieved only through war.92

The churches were not consistent in their promo-
tion of the ideals of Justice, morality, and Christian
ethics during the 1920's. In the Mexico oil crisis the
realities of exploitation went largely unchallenged and
unrecognized. There occurred little questioning of the
impact of foreign investments for the life of the average
Mexican. What would be the impact by foreign investors
on Mexico if a change in government at Mexico City chal-
lenged those holdings? The hard reality of the impact of
economic expansion simply escaped adequate examination by
the majority of the opinionamakers considered above.

Nor did the spokesmen considered here completely
free themselves from the desire to preserve America's com-
plete sovereignty; their attitudes toward the League of
Nations and World Court demonstrated that fact. If inter-

national understanding and trust were serious objectives,

 

91Christian Century 46 (24 January 1929):99.

92Robert Moats Miller, American Protestantism and

Social Issues 191 -19 9 (Chapel Hill: UniverSity of North
CaroIIna Press, I988), p. 332.

’43

as the churches stated, would a restricted adherence to
the Court or the League promote it? National sovereignty
must be compromised in fact as well as in theory if the
ideal world community is to be created.

Misunderstanding was an underlying problem for the
opinion-makers in the Mexico situation, in the response to
the League and Court, and in the pursuit of world peace.
Outlawry of war and substitution of a court on grounds
that Judicial settlement of disputes was more humane than
settlement of disputes by force ignored the element of
force lying behind Judicial structures-~it was the threat
of force that made the Judicial process functional.

The opinion-makers' failures reflected the fail-
ures of the society in which they functioned. The position
they assumed on foreign relations was commendable in most
instances, but it was unrealistic in that society was not
ready to support its more progressive elements. When con-
crete issues were examined, as in the Mexico crisis, spokes-
men fell short of a truly world perspective, but their posi-
tion did represent a significant movement in the positive

direction.

mmNERII

ACADEMICS' PERSPECTIVES

All academics in this study could have subscribed
to this statement by historian George Blakeslee: ”There is
no question as to the necessity of increased cooperation;
the only issue is as to the type of cooperation. . . ."1
Moreover, all were living in the shadows of World War I
with fresh memories of the horrors of that struggle; its
impact was seen partly by the proliferation of historical
writing questioning America's intervention in the war and
the war-guilt problem. There was a widespread grasping for
a solution to the perplexities of war and related topics of
international scope.

The opinion-makers considered here fall into two
groups: first, those academics who were actively involved
with governmental or international agencies, thus inti-
mately familiar with the type of machinery they promoted;
second, the teachers who occupied themselves with their

classroom duties and their writing. The first group, con-

sisting here of Nicholas Murray Butler, Manley 0. Hudson,

1George Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy of
the United States (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1925),
p. 350.

44

45

and James T. Shotwell, concentrated on promoting abolition
of war, involvement with the World Court and League of
Nations, minimized attention to economic difficulties that
played a role in promoting international strife, supported
the Anglo-Saxon tradition which emphasized law, and basi-
cally supported some form of international association.

The second group of academic opinion-makers, less closely
connected to the government or international agencies, went
beyond the first group frequently criticizing United States'
policy on economic issues, cautious on the extent to which
America's sovereignty could be sacrificed for international
involvement, and less tied to a collective approach to

international peace—keeping.

Among academic opinion-makers active in the pro-
motion of international cooperation in the 1920's, Nicholas
Murray Butler had prominence. His role as an opinion-maker
was secured as president of Columbia University from 1902
to 1945 and as president of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace beginning in 1925. His work for that
well-financed and most important of the older peace soci-
eties prompted an historian of the 1920's peace movement to
label him one of the organization's 'most publicized assets."2

2Robert H. Ferrell Peace in Their Time (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1952 . PP. 21-22; see also Charles
Chatfield, For Peace and Justice (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 19717, pp. 10, 98.

 

46

Butler's concept of international relations cen-
tered on the “civilized nations” cooperating in the pro-
motion of civilization, commerce and industry, science, and
education worldwide. Such cooperation, however, did not
extend to the political level; national sovereignty would
be preserved and promoted, but not to the extent of iso-
lation from the world community. Butler believed that
such an international atmosphere did not evolve naturally,
and America would have to assist in its creation.

Butler contended that from the presidency of
George Washington to that of Woodrow Wilson, America had
been a consistent leader in the strengthening of inter-
national relations, but since 1920 had fallen behind until
"through sheer paralysis [the United States is] one of the
chief obstacles that now exists in the world to these
movements."3 A display of "intellectual and moral courage
and power” had contributed to that earlier leadership,
which America should regain in the best interest of the
world.“ Here was the idealist speaking; intellectual and
moral leadership were amorphous goals to which everyone
could agree without having to commit themselves to a spe-
cific course of action.

Butler expressed concern about America's "good

 

3Nicholas Murray Butler, Addresses (Nicholas
Murraly Butler, 1927), p. 4.

uNicholas Murray Butler, The Path to Peace (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), pp. 20, 64.

 

47

repute today and in history, for its influence and for its
moral leadership in the great days of twentieth century de-
mocracy.'5 A nation which officially rejected collective
commitment of force might have difficulty providing the
leadership Butler sought. If morality and justice guided
international relations, Butler argued, conflict resolution

6 America had to

by force of arms would be unnecessary.
provide leadership to that end.

James Thomson Shotwell, an associate of Butler in
the Carnegie Endowment, was author of numerous articles
and books on history and international relations. As a
professor of history, participant at the conference ending
the World War, and as trustee and director of the division
of economics and history for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, he shared extensive experience and
knowledge.

Shotwell, like Butler, wanted the United States to
assume a leadership role for peace in international rela-
tions. Through its influence in international affairs,
America would promote peaceful relations between nations.
Shotwell referred to it as ”the uprooting of barbarism in
the world of international relations.”7 America was,

Shotwell affirmed, “schooling itself in the best of all

possible ways to take its place as a World Power” and would

 

6

51b1do, p. 55. Ibid., pp. 3-60

7James T. Shotwell, I'Ten Years After the
Armistice," Current History 29 (November 1928):179.

48

make an effective contribution to resolution of inter-
national conflicts.8

Professor Shotwell asserted that there existed
four peaceful means of resolving international problems--
court, arbitration, conciliation, and conference. The first
two were legal solutions which bound the participants and
allowed no extra-legal adJustment. The latter two were
political methods which allowed adjustment according to the
attitudes of the nations involved. Shotwell gave more con-
sideration to extra-legal means of conflict resolution than
Butler did, a consideration of importance because it moved
toward meaningful alternatives and supplements to resolu-
tion by force.

Among academics not so actively involved outside
teaching and writing, many supported the concept of
American involvement in world affairs, but with caution
urged on specific issues. George Blakeslee, professor of
history and international relations at Clark University,
lecturer at the Naval War College and the Army War College,
lecturer at Harvard University, wrote: "From its strength,
its century-long policy, and its governmental structure,
the United States is the best fitted of all nations to take
the leadership in bringing about a peaceful world."9

Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University,

 

81bid., p. 178.

9Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy of the
United States, p. 3590

49

wrote in 1922 that America's next contribution to civili-
zation would include “the opening for everybody of the de-
lightful and sustaining vision of freedom, aspiration, and

10 John Halladay Latane, professor of American

hope.'I
History and lecturer on International Law at Johns Hopkins
University, and dean of the college faculty, observed that
while the isolation of the past had been due to weakness,
isolation of the present was ”selfish and imperialistic;'
America could not continue to demand all that was due it

without giving something in return.11

These views, though,
were idealistic expressions which needed clarification and

definition through action.

The question of America's entry into the League
of Nations and World Court had been settled negatively in
1920, but there remained significant support for it as well
as for the World Court where the United States came close
to formal membership. One person who gave unlimited time
and attention to the promotion of both those agencies was
Manley 0. Hudson.

Hudson, professor of law and international law,

 

10Charles W. Eliot, :The Next American Contribution
to Civilization,’ Foreign Affairs 1 (15 September 1922):65.

11John Halladay Latane, A History of American
Forei Polic (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company,

9?. o

 

50

was a member of the American legal staff at the Paris Peace
Conference ending World War I, member of the legal section
of the Secretariat of the League of Nations on a part-time
basis from 1919 to 1927, and served as legal advisor to
several international conferences. In addition, he was

a member of the executive committee of the League of
Nations Non-Partisan.Association from 1922 to 1927 and
edited the American Journal of International Law. In 1936

 

he began ten years as Judge on the bench of the World Court.
Like Butler and Shotwell, Hudson believed in a

leadership position for America in world affairs, but he

had no illusions that the goal would be realized quickly.

He urged greater cooperation with the League of Nations,

preferably by joining, and formal entry to the World Court.

By such action, Hudson wrote, "We shall not have gained

our leadership in the movement to organize the world, but

we shall have got back into that procession."12
Hudson was a strong defender of the League of

Nations, not as a cure-all, but as a system for inter-

national relations. He emphasized the League's role as

'an agency for conference and consultation." Hudson

asserted that consent, not coercion, made the League effec-

tive, but it could not be totally effective without co-

operation from all nations. Hudson strongly desired

 

12Manley 0. Hudson, ”The World Court? Yes!"
Christian Century 42 (24 December i925):1603.

51

American participation "as a way of life, as a method of
social living-together.' Even after America's entry there
would be work to accomplish: "We shall . . . have the task
of informing and educating public opinion, in order that
America may play a 'liberal' role in the ordering of our
international life."13 8

When the Locarno treaties were signed in 1925
Hudson found fresh support to throw against opponents of
American participation in the League. The treaties sta-
bilized Germany's borders with France and Belgium, estab-
lished a series of arbitration treaties, and Joined
France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in a mutual assistance
pact against Germany; in addition, Germany was granted
membership in the League of Nations pending ratification
of the treaties. League opponents could no longer reject
adherence on grounds that Europe ought to clean house be-
fore the United States offered assistance in structuring a
peaceful world; no longer could opponents deride the
League as a tool for oppressing the vanquished, for
Germany's entry was only a matter of time.1u

America did not snub the non-political activities
of the League during the 1920's. Hudson chronicled the

participation of the United States on several commissions

 

13Manley 0. Hudson, "The Liberals and the League,"
Nation 116 (4 April 1923):384.

14Manley 0. Hudson, "The Significance of Locarno,"
Independent 115 (7 November 1925):5i7.

52

of the League, writing as early as 1924 that ”one finds it
difficult at times to believe that America is more than
formally outside the League of Nations."15 Hudson was
pleased that the United States no longer acted "as if any
substitute for the League were waiting around the corner."16
Later in the decade he made a similar survey of American
participation, concluding that, ”We simply cannot afford
to sit out when fifty other governments are sitting in."17
Regardless of his efforts to convince Americans that formal
participation would involve little more than what was al-
ready occurring, the United States remained a non-member.
In spite of his favorable attitude toward member-
ship in the League, he carefully separated it from member-
ship in the World Court. If he could not have both, he
preferred adherence to the Court. Hudson based his support
on the following criteria: (1) it promoted judicial settle-
ment, as against settlement by military confrontation;
(2) it served as the legal advisor for the League, giving
advisory opinions when requested to do so; (3) it could

have a fundamental role in the sound development of inter-

national law; and (4) it contributed to respect for

 

15Manley 0. Hudson, "American Cooperation With
theuLeagBe of Nations," American Federationist 31 (October
192 )380 0

16Ibid., p. 806.

17Manley 0. Hudson, “America's Role in the League
of Ngtions," American Political Science Review 23 (February
1929 :31.

 

tlw A;
(U It

.\

53

18 He clearly stated that adherence to

international law.
the Court in no way meant Joining the League. In fact,
Joining the Court meant no obligations at all except to
pay a fair share of expenses. He carefully warned that
the Court was not a cure-all: "With a Court alone I should
think our world very ill prepared to handle the current
international problems of our time, though a Court is to

me an essential part of any scheme on international organ-
19

Hudson agreed to the Senate reservations guiding

ization.”

an American entry to the Court, but thought one of them
unclear: that one stated that the Court could not enter-
tain a request for an advisory opinion on a matter involv-
ing the United States without its consent. He wondered
when or how the United States could make known to the
Court that a question affected America's interest; the
Council of the League, the body that would ask for an ad-
visory opinion, did not have an American representative to
determine when a question affected its interest.20
Hudson, like Butler, relied too heavily on the

faith of nations. The world's nations were not prepared

to turn their backs on one another as trusting entities.

 

18Hudson, "The World Court? Yes!" pp. 1602-3.

19Manley 0. Hudson, “The Relation of the United
States to the World Court," Proceedings of the Academy of
Political Science 12 (July 1926):437.

2°Ibid., pp. 435.44.

54

The emotional reaction to war was a strong force in pro-
moting international agencies for peace, but not to the ex-
tent that sovereignty would be significantly transferred
from the nation-state. Additionally, Hudson's efforts at
obtaining America's entry into the League had its support-
ers, but not sufficiently to force a change in Congress.
The World Court was another matter, for there existed some
mass support which expressed itself in Washington. Hudson
sacrificed much, though, when he agreed to support the
Senate reservations which served to weaken the impact of
membership. Hudson's single-minded approach to a solution
for international problems was overly simplistic, which he
partially realized but failed to adequately treat. At no
time did he openly support America's surrender of its
sovereignty in international decision-making or even hint
at such action. His acceptance of the World Court reser-
vations indicated his partial awareness of just how much
the American people could tolerate, and it was not much.
Also, like Butler, Hudson had no obvious appreciation of
the importance and role of force in the international sys-
tem. The mere presence of America in the League or on the
Court would somehow preclude force, or so it seemed.

Among the teachers existed a more realistic per-
spective of the League and Court, even to the point of
rejecting them as useful for America's position in world
affairs.

George Blakeslee argued that America would be

55

unable to avoid greater cooperation in world affairs due
to the very nature of a shrinking world, particularly from
the economic standpoint. In addition, as the world became
more interrelated there would be an increasing incentive
for the United States to involve itself in the political
affairs of Europe as those affairs touched America's inter-
ests. Purely European affairs, of course, would not con-
cern the United States, and if there could be developed
some sort of organization which would take continental
matters out of the League, the United States would be more
inclined to Join. Blakeslee thought America was becoming
more intimately involved with Europe on world questions,
and such cooperation was necessary if the United States
was to seriously work for a peaceful world:

To replace the war system of international peace
would be the greatest blessing which could be conferred
upon mankind. Here, then, is the world's greatest
opportunity for service. Does this not make an appeal
to America, to the power of the nation, to the organi—
zing genius of which we boast, and to the idealism
which had dominated our national life when we have
been at our best?

For Blakeslee the League or Court was not enough; no one
agency could deal with the complexity of achieving a peace-
ful world. He wished to see in addition periodic confer-
ences and greater participation with non-political agencies
of the League. It was his belief that America's most

important world policy was "the advancement of world

 

21Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy of the
United States, p. 360.

56

22

peace.” To realize that policy, "an essential means is

increased cooperation with other nations."23
Supporters of the League and Court were plentiful.
The President of Harvard University wrote that if the
League were to become ”an international clearing house"'
for all important matters “the United States would be
forced by events to participate in it;' he thought that
America would Join more quickly “if foreign nations do not
show excessive anxiety to have her in, and if Americans
do not urge it exclusively on altruistic grounds.'2u John
Latane noted that adherence to the Court was "a step in the
right direction," but it was a minor matter ”as compared
with our attitude toward the League."25 James Quayle
Dealey, professor of Social and Political Science at
Brown University, and a lecturer at the Naval War College,
wanted the United States to participate openly in the
League, “if not to the full extent, at least in all but

purely political issues."26

Robert McElroy, retired
professor of American History at Princeton University, the

first American Exchange Professor to China in 1916-1917,

 

22

2“A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Future of the League,"

Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926):534.

Ibid., p. 342. 231bid., pp. 349-50.

704 25Latane, A History of American Foreign Relations,
p. C

26James Quayle Dealey, Foreign Policies of the

United States (New York: Ginn and Company, 1926), p. 324.

57

and associate editor of Current History in 1924-1925, con-

 

sidered the World Court more acceptable because Judicial
adjustments would be more readily agreeable universally
than political settlements.27
Charles Beard, former Columbia University pro-
fessor of politics, recognized the weaknesses of the League
of Nations, but praised it anyway: “Let every indictment of
the League be conceded. But there it stands, whatever it
is, a novel structure in international relations."28
Beard's position was that while it suffered deficiencies,
it did provide a periodic meeting ground for the great
powers where questions bearing on war prospects would pass
before the Council. While public opinion was not the force
many people wished it to be, said Beard, it still had some
influence in deliberations. The weaker nations of the
world also had a voice through the Assembly meeting annual-
ly, thus providing an outlet for complaints against the
larger powers. Beard held that the League stood for a
policy of conciliation; its members had to beware of pos-
sible penalties if they betrayed its stipulations; the
League promoted a rhetoric less belligerent than the old

rhetoric of national prestige; it was world-wide in scope,

 

27Robert McElroy, “America's Duty in Promoting
International Justice," Current History 25 (November
1926):179-84.

28Charles A. Beard, "Prospects for Peace,"
Harper's Magazine 158 (February 1929):329.

 

58

touching members and non—members alike. Beard considered
the United States a “member” even though it refrained from
formal attachment, because of its economic power and its
position as “master stake—holder in every play."29 There
was no unanimity in the academic world on that position.

There were realists among the academic community
who questioned the willingness of nations to conform to a
system of arbitration, conference, conciliation, and
general peaceful settlement of international questions.
Albert Bushnell Hart, professor of history and government
at Harvard University and a writer for Current History,
theorized that “more than half the world's population
would rather fight than arbitrate on any serious question
in which they are deeply concerned."30 He asked whether
America would be willing to submit to arbitration such
things as its immigration policy, the right of the
Panamanian republic to control the Panama Canal, or the
Monroe Doctrine: Hart thought not.31

Harry Elmer Barnes, professor at Clark University
and Smith College in the 1920's, was critical of the League
because of its dominance by “a number of selfish, corrupt

and warlike states” which failed to promote justice in

 

29Ibid., p. 330.

3oAlbert Bushnell Hart, "Amateur Diplomacy,"
Current History 27 (November 1927):263.

31Albert Bushnell Hart, “Amateur Diplomacy,"
Current History 26 (July 1926):623-24.

 

59

international dealings.32 It was that need for undoing in-
Justices of the past and encouraging fair dealing in the
future that Barnes considered a major goal for an effec-

33 Just exactly

tive organization of international scope.
how such ends could be accomplished, however, was beyond
precise explanation.

John Dewey was representative of the opposition to
American involvement in the League and World Court.
Philosopher, university professor, and author, he charged
that the League was tied to the inequities of the Treaty
of Versailles, thus making it a defender of the status 339.
The important post-war questions, such as reparations, were
not being faithfully or Justly handled by it, Dewey charged.
The Court, intimately involved with the League, was equally
unable to deal in a meaningful way with the world's pro-
blems; only by removing the Court from the reigns of the

League and allowing it full Jurisdiction over what cases

could be brought before it would the Court function correct-
”.3“

 

32Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World
War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), p. 699. '

33Harry Elmer Barnes, Living in the Twentieth
Centur (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrell Company, 1928),
p. 345.

 

3“John Dewey, "Shall We Join the League?“ New

Repgblic 34 (7 March 1923):36-37; John Dewey, “A Reply
From Mr. Dewey,I New Re ublic 34 (28 March 1923):139-40;
John Dewey, “Shall the Enited States Join the World
Court?“ Christian Century 40 (18 October 1923):1329-34.

 

60

In spite of widespread promotion of an American
role in world affairs, the League and Court were not seen
uniformly as a viable means through which to accomplish

that end.

The role of economics in world affairs was appre-
ciated in varying degrees. Butler and Shotwell were avid
supporters of the capitalist system, seeing it as a force
for peace in international relations; they did not criticize
America's economic activities as imperialistic. The other
group of academics included here were considerably more
critical on the average, although some differences of
opinion certainly existed. '

James T. Shotwell equated peace with the capital-
ist-industrial system. In his book War As An Instrument of

National Policy he wrote that "The world of credit is

 

essentially a world of peace.'35 What he meant was that
activities of business were prominent in the interrelation-
ships of nations to the extent that as economic forces
increased the interdependence of nations, the need for con-
tinued stable relations increased. Recognizing the need
for some element of power to enforce stability, Shotwell

asserted that the world of business substituted economic

 

35James T. Shotwell, War As An Instrument of
National Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and'Company,
up. 0

 

61

power for military force; the process of industrialization
was a force that would require nations to preserve peace as
a prerequisite to their survival.

Shotwell expanded his thoughts in an essay sepa-
rate from the book.36 Reiterating his belief that business
and peace were intimately related, he also showed the self-
interest that motivated such a position. Shotwell argued
that through invested capital abroad America was building
an international community of interest which helped guaran-
tee peace. For Shotwell, the international financial
balance-sheet was 'a sort of international Magna Charta"
setting forth a fundamental principle of emancipation
from the tyranny of war: Ithe one danger which this new
structure of interdependent interests confronts is the dis-
ruption of its peace-time activities through a reversion
to international violence.'37 From Shotwell's perspective,
the more business expanded internationally, the greater the
possibility for preserving peace; the advantage was that
diplomacy would be increased in an age of international
peace because as business expanded beyond national bounda-
ries, frontiers became less real and created overlapping

interests between peoples of one nation and another.38

36James T. Shotwell, "Does Business Mean Peace?"
Outlook 151 (13 March 1929):405-7, 436-37.

37Ibid., p. 436.
38Ibid.

62

Shotwell defended continued investments abroad on grounds
that those investments were for the purpose of making indus-
tries prosper in order to pay the return on capital invest-
ment; given the role of business in peace, such activity by
any country was not synonomous with imperialism, and was
only considered an asset.

John Dewey had a very different perception of
economics in world affairs, at least as practiced by the
United States. One geographic area where economic interests
were pronounced was Central and South America. Dewey ac-
cused the government and business interests of practicing
imperialism in that region. The administration based its
Latin America policy on the Monroe Doctrine, the vehicle
through which it had assumed the protectorship of all
foreign property and citizens in Latin America, thus reap-
ing the collective wrath against all foreigners. The reason
the United States was able to involve itself so deeply in
Latin America, according to Dewey, was for two reasons:
first, many Americans accepted the Monroe Doctrine and the
principle of protecting American citizens and property
rights in foreign lands; second, too many people were ig-
norant of the true implications of such action. It was
Dewey's conviction that injustices by the United States
toward its southern neighbors could be prevented by a re-
statement of the Monroe Doctrine doing away with Justifica-
tion for intervention; he also believed that the govern-

ment should refuse to provide security for investors in

63

underdeveloped nations. It was Dewey's conviction that
foreign interference in a nation's affairs tended to pro-
mote instability, thus prolonging the very conditions which
intervention sought to arrest.39
Inperialist behavior could not be resolved easily.
Jerome Davis, professor of sociology at the Yale Divinity
School, candidly observed that “All trade is quite likely
to cause friction, particularly if one nation has access
to the sources of raw materials which are denied to an-

other.”0

Harry Elmer Barnes argued that there should be
a progressive movement toward more thorough international-
ization of the supply of raw materials and natural re-
sources, coupled with a renewal of a free trade movement.
One step in the right direction to end imperialism, thought
Barnes, was for the nations to refuse to place force behind
the activities of individual investors.“1

While some persons directly related imperialism
with trade or investments, others did not. For example,
Harry T. Collings, professor of economics and commerce at
the University of Pennsylvania, associate editor of Current

History magazine, delegate to the Congress of Panama in

 

39John Dewey, “Mexico's Educational Renaissance,“

New Re ublic 48 (22 September 1926):116-18; John Dewey,
“Imperialism is Easy,“ Ngw Republic 50 (23 March 1927):
133-34.

querome Davis, “Trade Rivalries That Lead to War,"

Current Hjstory 24 (June 1926):403.

ulBarnes, Living in the Tweggieth Century, p. 343.

64

1926 and the International Chamber of Commerce in 192? and
1929, pointed to the constructive value of United States'
investments in Latin America. He related the close scrutiny
and supervision imposed, and the increased levels of employ-
ment, wages, and standard of living enjoyed by Latin
Americans because of those investments. In his opinion,
those financial transactions represented ”constructive

““2 J. Fred

enterprise rather than exploitation. . . .
Rippy, professor of history at the University of Chicago
and Duke University, and associate managing editor of the
Higpanic American Historical Review, urged caution when
trying to resolve issues related to investments in Latin
America. Unjust pressure or exploitation would only serve
the cause of America's enemies and result in eventual reper-
cussions against the interests of the United States and
Latin America.“3
The academic community split on economic matters,
as would be expected. The country's prosperity had an im-
pact on all segments of society, but in ways not easily
identified. The capitalist system which provided that

prosperity was not easily assailed, even by educated, active

persons capable of seeing its damaging effects.

 

quarry T. Collings, “Billions of Our Capital
Invested in Latin America,“ Current History 26 (September

1927):853.

“BJ. Fred Rippy, “Mexico's Laws Against Foreign
Land Ownership,“ Current History 24 (June 1926):331-38.

65

If the 1920's had to be characterized by a single
driving force in international relations, it would be the
movement for peace. Butler, Hudson, and Shotwell were ar-
dent proponents of various peace efforts, with the out-
lawry movement gaining their widest attention, although
not unqualified support.

Butler sought elimination of war as an instrument
of national policy. Strongly desiring America's prominence
in that movement, Butler urged French Foreign Minister
Aristide Briand in that direction while the two conversed
in June 1926: “Why has not the time come for the civilized
governments of the world formally to renounce war as an
instrument of policy?“uu Ten months later Briand made his
address to the American people. When the United States

government failed to respond, Butler sent a letter to the

New York Times, writing in part, “Why should not the

 

American people hasten to use every means at their com-
mand to assure the Government of France that they have
heard, that they do understand and that they will act in

accordance with this progressive and constructive policy?“+5

 

uuNicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years,

2 vol. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), 22202.4.

 

“51bid., 2:204.

66

Shortly afterward, meeting with Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Olds, he learned that no official response
was planned. When Butler tried to impress Olds with the
importance of the proposal, the Assistant Secretary sug-
gested that Butler prepare a draft treaty, which he pro-
ceded to do with assistance of James T. Shotwell and
Joseph F. Chamberlain. That effort helped arouse public
opinion favorable to Briand's proposal, and public opinion
prodded Secretary of State Kellogg.

The eventual ratification of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact by the United States Senate in January 1929 repre-
sented for Butler both an end and a beginning. He wrote
to Secretary of State Kellogg that, “The Senate has now
enabled American public opinion to restore our country to
its place of leadership in the greatest movement of modern
times to establish and to maintain international peace."46
In a letter to French Foreign Minister Briand he urged
further work: IThe next task is to teach the people to
think and governments to act in honest and frank accord-
ance with its terms.”7

In an address at Columbia University in November
1928 Butler discussed the steps he felt were necessary for
giving full effect to the Pact of Paris. First, the estab-
lishment of a single Department of Defense, with subdi-

visions for the Army, Navy, and Air Force would provide

 

as 47

Ibid., 2:209. Ibid., 2:211.

67

both acadmeic and administrative gain and most important-
ly would help to remove the word I'war'l from the permanent
organization of government. Coincident with that step
compulsory military training would be abolished, reducing
military forces to police capabilities; included were the
scuttling of all ships larger than cruisers, maintaining
only peace forces, and resisting naval expansion. He also
believed that the World Court should be strengthened, but
would not rely on it alone. He promoted other institutions
of arbitration and conciliation to supplement diplomacy and
law, particularly the League of Nations which he considered
indispensable for international relations. Within the
Western Hemisphere he wanted closer cooperation between
nations on a formal basis, but without the dictation or
domination of any one power. Lastly, he wanted nations of
the world to engage international exchanges along

cultural, scientific, and literary paths because such con-
tacts were "the most potent instruments with which to
deveolp and to safeguard the International Mind."48
Butler's program for international accord was summed up
best by his assertion that the nation should function
under the same legal and moral codes operable in inter-
personal relations.“9

Butler failed, however, to examine that proposal

 

nsButler, The Path of Peace, pp. 161-69.

 

49Butler, The Faith of a Liberal. Pp. 171-82.

68

for morality in international relations. The legal code
which operated was supported with police and paramilitary
forces which only inadequately enforced it; would not an
international legal code require even more complex means
of enforcement? The moral code operative in America had
never produced a model of behavior worthy of wholesale ex-
portation, in spite of such efforts. The fact was that
interpersonal relations offered no better behavior pat-
terns; the theoretical model was not reality.

A fundamental problem with Butler's approach to
world affairs was his failure to provide sufficient in-
put from other nations or international agencies. While
he supported international cooperation, he approached it
from an American perspective rather than an international
position.

James T. Shotwell viewed the Kellogg-Briand Pact
as the result and example of America's crusading spirit,
so clearly evidenced early in the World War. After
ratification of the pact he urged that it be built upon
to secure the chief interests of America's national life,
"the undistributed maintenance of our full influence
throughout the world for the maintenance of peace."50 It
was America's leadership and capability, many people be-
lieved, that made the pact available. It was that cru-
sading spirit, that intense desire to lead the world in

 

5OShotwell, "Ten Years After the Armistice,“
p. 180.

69

the direction of cooperation that brought about the first
widespread renunciation of war. But it was also the
American characteristic of an attachment to ideals that
had little practicality in the real world which assisted
in gaining acceptance for the peace pact. The mere sim—
plicity of the pact's terms typified America's approach
to world affairs.

Shotwell's realism showed itself on the question
of international security during the period leading to the
pact and in the weeks and months that followed. He saw
no hope that the pact would abolish war immediately, nor
that the pact was an alternative to the League. The
Kellogg-Briand Treaty represented to Shotwell an addition-
al step toward the creation of full international coopera-
tion. He was careful to point out that the pact did not
outlaw war, rather it renounced war as an instrument of
national policy: "Outlawry would call for a whole new set
of provisions which lie entirely beyond the scope of the
present treaty.”1 In his opinion, because the treaty was
not outlawry, the United States was “able to avoid . . .
involvement . . . in the maintenance and guarantee of peace
throughout the world."52

Where outlawry had implied force against the law-

breaker, either police action or court action, the Pact of

 

51James T. Shotwell, "The Pact of Paris,"
International Conciliation 243 (October 1928):u5#.

521bid.

70

Paris required none of that. Since not all war was re-
nounced, only aggressive war, collective action by League
members remained intact. Shotwell considered it very im-
portant that the treaty not detract from the League's
efforts, but rather support them. If the pact included
the term "outlawry“ Briand could not have accepted it,
said Shotwell, because outlawry was an anti-League plan.
America had to work within the existing structure of world
leadership. That was shown by his criticism of the paci-
fist movement: _

It had never adjusted itself to the practical poli-

tics of a developing world, but, on the contrary,

tended to erect for itself . . . a City of God on

earth where perfect harmony should reign instead of

the discordant and incomplete but vaste symphony

of the historic civilization of to-day.
Shotwell was correct in his implication--the pacifist
critique was useful but not its proposed solutions. A
successful resolution to international conflict must take
civilization where it is, and move ever so slowly toward
reconstruction; anything short of a radical social revo-
lution, an improbable occurrence anyway, requires patience,
disappointment, and mixed success. Shotwell had some
sense of that.

Shotwell had no illusions that the treaty would

end war on its own, “the structure of peace is one that

 

53James T. Shotwell, ”The Slogan of Outlawry,“
Century Magazine 116 (October 1928):?13.

71
.5“

involves more than a mere denunciation of war. Involved
was a guarantee to the defenseless that they would not
become victims of an aggressor. According to Shotwell,

the United States recognized that if an aggressor emerged
'it would at least be our moral obligation to deny the
benefits of a renunciation of war to the violating State."55
But the pact did not require additional action by the
United States with respect to involvement in Europe: 'The
preamble states a moral obligation and nothing more."56
He believed, though, that the assurance to other nations
of America's moral influence was sufficient.

John Dewey's primary concern in international
affairs was the outlawry of war proposal. It was his con-
tention that certain attitudes were causing America's
aloofness from the world: the fact that people came to
America to escape Europe's problems; physical distance
aided psychological distance; the widespread belief that
Europe had not changed for the better because of the war;
and the different political systems. The means for over-
coming those blocks, said Dewey, were to devise measures
which "do not involve getting implicated in the heritage
of EurOpean war politics, and which will afford Europe

an opportunity to free herself from that incubus.'57

 

5uShotwell, I‘The Pact of Paris,” p. “52.
55Ib1d. 561b1d.. p. #53.

57John Dewey, "America's ReBPOHSIbillty,w
Christian Century #3 (23 December 1926):1583—84.

72

For Dewey the relations between nations would be
altered considerably by relegating war to an illegal sta-
tus. Economically, he asserted that the very presence of
a war threat prevented serious attention being directed
to the economic causes of war. Politically, Dewey believed
that after outlawry nations could relate to one another
on a level above mere offensive and defensive alliances.
Socially, he argued that outlawry would put conscience and
law on the same side and relegate war-like people to the
status of non-patriots while elevating pacifists to
patriot status. Diplomatically, outlawry would allow the
fullest use of peaceful methods of problem solving, be-
cause recourse to war would no longer be legal.58

When the Kellogg-Briand Treaty offered the world
a renunciation plan, Dewey was quick to warn that it should
not be considered the last step, but rather a beginning.
What additional steps were needed, according to Dewey, in-
cluded revision of international law to reflect the new
status of war and the institution of a World Court with
positive jurisdiction. He was critical of those people
who discussed the pact in terms of how the signatories
would act when another war came; he thought it best to dis-

cuss the pact only in terms of what additional steps were

 

58John Dewey, “If War Were Outlawed," New
Be ublic 3h (25 April 1923):234-35; John Dewey, 'What
0:9 gzry of War Is Not," New Republic 36 (3 October 1923):
1 - .

73

needed to insure its workability. Americans had to sup-
port the pact as an example to other nations, for only in
that way could it survive and prosper.59 The ”force” be-
hind the pact would be public opinion.

Harry Elmer Barnes did not share Dewey's preoccu-
pation with the outlawry movement. Recognizing that the
elimination of war was prerequisite to any hope for a de-
cent and stable world order dedicated to an enduring world
civilization, the causes of war were too complex for any one
plan to adequately treat.60 He was critiCal of pacifists
for their frequent attention to one or another cause of
war while apparently ignoring those of equal and greater
significance. Barnes supported the outlawry of war effort,
seeing it as a useful addition to the attempt to eliminate
war, but it must be only one of a multiplicity of efforts.
For Barnes, no plan to eliminate war could be complete
without providing an acceptable international organization
having "the power and inclination to enforce peace."61

Barnes recognized the realities of international politics.

America's interests not uncommonly were given

 

59John Dewey, 'As An Example to Other Nations,‘I
New Republic 5“ (7 March 1928):88—89; John Dewey, ”Two
Cfimmunications,' New Republic 5h (28 March 1928):194-96;
John Dewey 'Outlawing Peace By Discussing War," New
Republic 55 (16 May 1928):37o-72. ‘-
6oBarnes, Living in the Twentieth Century,
pp. 3géé 3AM; Barnes,'TheGenesis of‘the World War,
Pp. .

61Barnes, Living in the Twentieth Century, p. 344.

7h

first priority over the international community's concerns,
but who could argue that America's interests were not neces-

sarily adaptable to the world at large?

The fundamental problem which few academics faced
was that the primary cause of international conflict was
more emotional-psychological than economic-political.
George Herbert Head, University of Chicago philosOpher and
sociologist, looked at the human element operative in inter-
national relations. It was head's contention that people
felt unifying forces through negative or "anti" influences,
with war being the unification of negative responses to an
opponent. An underlying cause of that condition was the
psychological insecurity of the individual being projected
onto the nation--a questioning of one's masculinity at a
national level: “Can we find outside of the fighting spirit
that unifying power which presents a supreme issue to which
all others are subordinated, which will harden us to under-
go everything, and unite us in the enthusiasm of a common
end?"62 It was not that men loved fighting, said Head, but
that “they undergo its rigors for the sake of conjunction

with all those who are fighting in the same cause."63 The

 

62George Herbert Mead, 'National-Mindedness and
International-Mindedness,' in Andrew J. Beck, ed., SeleCted
Writi s (New York: The Bobbs-Merrell Company, Inc., 1955’.
p. o

631bid., p. 365.

75

society of man had been incapable of uniting around items
of positive value such as science, literature, art, or
political mechanisms. There seemed little hope for man-
kind to accept such positive forces as unifying factors so
long as a lack of self-confidence remained: “We are not
sure of our national selves, and a certain amount of na-
tional psychoanalysis would be very valuable if not very

probable.'6u

Mead held little hope for an immediate posi-
tive lateration in the international structure: "We cannot
attain international-mindedness until we have attained a
higher degree of national-mindedness than we possess at
present; and a rough guage of it will be found in the
necessity of retaining national honor and peculiar inter-
ests as causae‘bgll;,'65 I
Mead had addressed the heart of the issue: inter-
national relations was not defined only in political and.
economic terms, but involved the psychological-emotional
aspects as well. That was why all the grandiose plans
for international peace and international reform would
ultimately fail—-they simply refused to address themselves
to, and offer workable solutions for, the psychological and
emotional forces that had greater impact for international
disruption than most people seemed willing to recognize.

Even Head was unable to offer a means for implementing his

own recommendation.

 

6“Ib1d., p. 368. 651bid., pp. 368-69.

CHAPTER III

THE JOURNALIST AND AMERICA'S ROLE

In an oration at Avon, New York, in 1827, a
speaker included the following words: “Standing where we
now do, we may look forward to the period when the spark
kindled in America shall spread and spread, till the whole

'1 One hundred years later

earth be illumined by its light.
that spirit still illumined America's vision of its role
in world affairs. Walter Lippmann, editor of the New York
Egrld and associate editor of New Republic, in 1927 wrote
of Americans preparing "for the part that their power and

2 the New York Times

their position compel them to play;'I
in 1927 called upon citizens to bring into play .'all the
actual and latent practical idealism . . . and mobilize
American sentiment in behalf of the supreme cause of inter-
national understanding and goodwill;"3 the same year

Collier's magazine, reaching 1.6 million subscribers each

 

 

1Quoted in Ralph Henry Gabriel, "Constitutional
Democracy: A Nineteenth Century Faith,“ in Conyers Read,
ed., The Constitution Reconsidered (New York: Columbia
UniverSity Press, 19337:—§§T_233:36.

2
Walter Li pmann "America as an Empire ” Vanity
Fair 32 (April 1927 :128.’ '

3New York Times, 3 January 192?.

76

77

week, observed in an editorial that America was “in the
world, and the only question left for us to decide is what

part we shall play in it;'u and Edward Bok, former edi-

tor of the Ladies Home Journal, wrote in 1924 that
Americans “are a part of the world, and, as such, must play
our part in it.“5

That a voice for isolationism existed, however,
cannot be denied. The Chicago Tribune, selling almost
2 million newspapers weekly, chastised America for assum-
ing any effort at altruism; America's only moral obligation
was “to protect the interests of the United States."6 The
Saturday Evening_Post, circulation over 2 million weekly,
commended America's isolation “from the forces of evil and
.destruction,' and urged as a guide the spirit of “live and
let live."7 The San Francisco Examiner, owned by William
Randolph Hearst and selling over one-half million copies
weekly, stated directly that America must "stay where the
Lord evidently intended us to stay and thrive - in North

America.‘8 American Journalism vigorously carried forth

 

“Collier's 80 (8 October 1927):58.

5Edward w. Bok, "What I Expect,“ Atlantic Monthly
133 (January 192a):5u.

6"The Virtue of Minding Our Own Business,"
Chicagg Tribune, 28 March 1927; "The Conduct of Our
Foreign Affairs,’' Chicago Tribune, 3 January 1925.

7"America's Isolation," §gturday Eveninngost
197 (23 August 192a):20.

8"Keep Free of Entanglements,“ San.Francisco
Examiner, 4 February 1925.

78

the range of opinion respecting America's role in world
affairs.

The sources for this chapter are representative
of the mass media and the journalists. The magazines se-
lected fall into two categories--mass circulation and
opinion. Saturday Evening Post and Collier's are repre-
sentative of the first category, with Nation, New Republic,

Outlook, and World's Work examples of the second. News-

 

papers were selected on a regional basis with circulation
a prime consideration. Included in the research were
journalists who edited some of the newspapers and periodi—

cals or who acted as contributing and associate editors.9

The interest in self-preservation expressed
through restrictive immigration legislation, high tariffs,
emphasis on economic prosperity at home, served to hide
the reality of world affairs and America's role in them
for the mass of Americans. Walter Lippmann assessed the

predicament when he observed that the average American was

 

9For circulation numbers of newspapers and peri-
odicals refer to annual volumes of American Newspaper
Annual and Director (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son).
For discussion 0 see and other periodicals, see Frank
Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 5 vol.
(Cambridge: Harvard UniverSIty Press, 19577: Theodore
Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana:
University 0 Illinois Press, 1956); and James Playsted
Wood, Magazines in the United States (New York: The
Ronald Press, 1971}.

 

 

79

not aware of a United States empire or its manner of opera-

tion: "We continue to think of ourselves as a kind of great

peaceable Switzerland, whereas we are in fact a great, ex-

panding world power."10
Not all sources agreed with Lippmann's critique

of America's position in the world order. For example, the

New York Times, with a circulation of 1.1 million copies

 

weekly, at the time the United States sent military forces
to Nicaragua in 1926 argued that the United States was not
an imperialist nation because it did not maintain a large
army. Furthermore, while America admittedly did seek to
enlarge its commerce and influence, its motive sought to
aid and protect the weaker republics on the continent, not
impose its control over them. As the Mexico and Nicaragua
crises mounted at the end of 1926, the iiflfifi gave sanction
to America's actions in Latin America: "If this be imperial-

ism, make the most of it."11

The ability to perceive or
appreciate the perspective of the affected country was ab-
sent. Collier's magazine printed an editorial which stated
that America had become the financial capitol of the world,
but not the overseer of a world financial empire. Such was
America's ”destiny“ to be the financial capitol, and as

such the country had to ”adapt our manners and our morals

 

10Walter Lippmann, 'An Unconscious Empire," New
York World, 29 December 1926.

11"Imperialism," New York Times, 29 December

 

1926.

8O

12

to our new position in the world.“ Collier's had made

 

an assumption that expansion of international business and
the development of friendly relations were directly linked,
when in fact the success of one might preclude the other.
According to Walter Lippmann, the United States
government should have advised the Latin American republics
of its preference for governments which drew their strength
from the national will.13 Lippmann warned the United States
government against using the Monroe Doctrine to place it-
self in the position of the Holy Alliance of the 1820's
'prepared to use force to deny the right to that national
develOpment which a hundred years ago we helped Latin

America to win.'1n

He recognized that while democracy had
not become a reality in Latin America, national will exist-
ed, and “there can be no sound American policy which does
not accept it as a fundamental premise."15 The problem, as
Lippmann probably realized, was that the national will of

a sovereign Latin American republic and the self-interest
of the United States would be interpreted by many people as
incompatible, and self-interest would rule.

Supporters of America's policies were plentiful.

 

12Collier's so (17 December 1927):5o.

13Walter Lippmann, "Toward a Peace in Latin
America," New York World, 15 January 1927.

analter Lippmann, “The Ultimate Question," New
York World, 15 January 1927.

15Lippmann, “Toward a Peace in Latin America.“

81

World's Work, a magazine devoted to international concerns,

 

particularly Panquericanism and trade opportunities be-
tween North and South America, promoted a view that the
State Department had an obligation to protect American
lives and property in foreign lands. Respecting the
Hexican effort to enforce the Constitution of 1917 provi-
sions against foreign oil company holdings, the editor of
World's Work denied any official desire to intervene in the

 

internal affairs of any other nation, but he could not
"stand by and see the lives and property of our citizens
endangered. . . . As long as Latin.American governments

are weak, unstable, or corrupt, we must be constantly
ready to act.“16 World's Work had no sympathy for the
Hexican government or its situation, seeing it primarily as
an economic opportunity.

Collier's clearly exhibited the economic imperial-

 

ist views which prohibited development of international
cooperation. When Dwight Morrow received appointment as
United States Ambassador to Mexico, a Collier's editorial
expressed confidence in the financier, and noted that a
compromise agreement had to be reached because of financial
interests on both sides. Collier's saw no way to discon-
tinue the investments because fortunes would continue to be

sought where profits would be highest: “Consequently neither

 

16World's Work 53 (February 1927):353; World's
Work 57 (NovemSSr I9ZBS:1H; World's Work #7 (February

W) : 35""‘550

82

we nor any other people will abandon our claims in Mexico.“
Operating on the assumption that American intervention in
Lation.America was good, there were two Jobs to be done in
the Caribbean: first, provide security for.America by pre-
venting enemy military use of the islands; and second, exert
sufficient control over disorderly nations to prevent inter-
vention by any other strong government. The editor asserted
that if weak governments endangered United States' citizens,
the.American public would compel intervention. Looking upon
past action by the United States government in Latin America
as positive, Collier's had little doubt that future inter-
ventions also would be for the good of all concerned.17
Other sources supported the views in Collier's.
The Chicago Tribune, for example, charged the.American
government with protecting the general domain of the na-

18 The

tion, including its persons and property abroad.
Saturday Evening_Post denied any accusations of imperialism
on the grounds that if they existed the United States would
have annexed Mexico and Nicaragua years before.

Some opinion—makers were critical of businessmen
attempting to establish interests in Latin.America through

force or with government support. The Nation magazine,

 

17Coll1er's so (19 November 192?):62; Collier's
81 (31 March I928!:54.

18“Mexican Policy and Foreign Investments,“
Chica 0 Tribune, 1 December 1926; “The President's
.IEIFSss,' Cfiigggg Tribune, 26.April 1927.

83

referred to by one historian of American Journalism as

“the elder statesman among the journals of opinion in the
twentieth century,“19 charged complicity between government
and business: “By playing to the cupidity of small groups

in one Latin American republic after another, [businessmen]
are making loans on investments under favored conditions and
then calling upon a government at Washington - complacent

and hypocritical - to uphold their 'rights.'“20

Allegedly
such practices had been occurring since the World War under
State Department encouragement, and American investors were
increasing the area under their financial control. The
Nation considered such action as “significant because it
indicates the course which, unless the American people
awaken to conscious control of their foreign policy, we are

21 While official

likely to follow in other countries.“
government policy did not provide for support of foreign
investments, the investors would have been reluctant to
move into areas where their interests would fail to be pro-
vided with some assurances, direct or indirect, of protec-
tion.

Carleton Beals, author, lecturer, and special

correspondent to Central America, Africa, Europe, and the

 

19Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century,

 

p. #17.

20Nation 117 (12 December 1923):679.

21Nation 120 (27 May 1925):588.

8h

Middle East, dramatically summarized the effects of the
business-government association:

It corrupts governments, raises up unscrupulous dic-

tators and demagogues, creates intolerable popular

burdens, brings about protective raids on our own

Treasury, and, for the sake of a few financial groups,

jeopardizes our cordial relations with the entire

Latin American world.
The Opposition was directed at the form of financial activi-
ties, not to investments or trade themselves; in fact, trade
was thought to be “one of the greatest bonds to tie nations
together, to mingle their interests so that it should be
impossible for war to arise."23 Beals, like others, though,
failed to deal with the problem posed by the capitalist
system which demanded inequities among nations so that the
producers could control their sources of raw materials and
to some extent their markets. Without fundamental restruc-
turing, increased trade more likely would increase tensions
among competing nations and create greater opportunity for
war.

William Hard, newspaper and magazine writer and
political correspondent to the Consolidated Press
Association, saw clearly the imperialistic consciousness
of the American people: “I hold . . . that the average

American is naturally 'imperialistic' and that, when he

finds himself in the State Department, he just naturally

22Carleton Beals, “The Nicaraguan Farce,“ Nation
123 (15 December 1926):632.

23325222 123 (3 November 1926):442.

85

2“ That trait resulted from

acts 'imperialistically.'“
America's superiority complex. By attempting to pacify
others, Americans insinuated that only with their help
could others become peaceful, and that the American concept
of stability was just. In Hard's mind, then, business
interests need not push for an.American empire because the
people naturally moved in that direction.

Hard also counseled Americans against intervention
into domestic affairs of foreign nations: “Our security is
to never awaken any resentments or revenges arising from
any unnecessary exercises of our power.“ Hard suggested
that America's security “in the midst of our greatness and
grandeur“ based itself on a willingness to abstain from
arousing envy or enmity by exercising any opinions or ac-
tions “regarding the internal affairs of any foreign coun-
try at any time.“ Hard believed America's greatest assist-
ance to foreign countries would be to refrain from unsolici-
ted advice and action. Even in the case of solicited aid
he was hesitant unless it clearly represented consensus
opinion.25

As Mexico asserted its power over the property

and interests of foreigners, the question of alien rights

arose. Walter Lippmann rejected Secretary of State Frank

 

2“William Hard, “The Urge Toward Empire,“ Nation

12h (2 February 1927):109.

25William Hard “Nicaragua and The Nation,“
Nation 122 (2 June 19265:6oo.

 

86

Kellogg's assertion that those rights were immutable,
meaning the Constitution of 1917 could not legally alter
the status of the oil company holdings; Lippmann proposed
that such a theory sanctioned State Department control over
the internal affairs of the Mexican government--an absurd
and dangerous notion. Lippmann argued that while it would
be to Mexico's harm to actually injure the oil business,
there were considerations to be taken into account: for ex-
ample, America must not attempt to undermine a country's
right to engage in social change if it desired. Lippmann
warned that the security of American investments abroad
would have to ultimately rest on the faith of the borrow-
ing nations: “They must believe that American capital pro-
fits them, and is consistent with their own national inter.
est.“26 The use of force must be a last resort especially
when the threat was more ideological than physical.27

In the crisis with Mexico in 1926-1927 Lippmann,
as so many others, put his trust in the democratic system.
He called upon people to act “before the fatal decisions
are taken, before the war psychology is aroused and men

28

cease to be reasonable.“ He rejected leaving future events

 

26Walter Lippmann, “Vested Rights and Nationalism

in Latin-America,“ Foreign Affairs 5 (April 1927):363.

27Walter Lippmann, “Sheathe the Sword,“ New York
World, 17 January 1927.

28Walter Lippmann, “If You Want Peace -,“ New

York World, 13 January 1927.

87

completely controlled by the State Department, even warning
people against the actions of Secretary of State Kellogg
after the latter's assertion that Mexico was becoming a
seedbed of bolshevist activity. Lippmann said the memo-
randum was “written by a man who set out deliberately to
poison the mind of the American people,“ but what Kellogg
meant by bolshevism was “anything done by a weaker power
that American business interests do not like.“29
William Allen White, proprietor and editor of the
Emporia Gazette, one of America's most notable small papers,
believed that Mexico's position on the oil controversy was
wrong, but at the same time he criticized any threat of
force imposed by the United States: “My quarrel with the
policy of the State Department has been that the State
Department has been too quick to show force to a weaker
nation. . . .“ At the same time he criticized the oil com-
panies for their emphasis on the importance of property--
he opposed violence justified by reason of property alone.
White charged oil companies with attempting to buy proper-
ty with the “blood of American boys.“ White defended the
capitalist system, recognized threats to it, and saw those
threats eminating not from the masses but from “the mad,

greedy folly of the forces above.“ Mexico's position had

 

29Walter Lippmann, “A Crime Against Peace,“ New
York World, in January 1927; Walter Lippmann, “Toward
Peace With Mexico,“ New York World, 8 January 1927.

88

to be considered, he wrote, for in the end only that ap-
proach could “save all of the rights of your stockholders
and . . . stabliize the present economic system.“30
Support for‘White's view came from H. L. Mencken
who noted in review of Ernest Gruening's book Mexico and
Its Heritage that if widely read, the book would produce
greater understanding between Mexico and America “and with
that better understanding, it is to be hoped, there will
come a greater decency.“31 The Atlanta Constitution, a
newspaper reaching almost one-quarter million readers
weekly, saw only positive reasons for an amicable settle-
ment of differences.32 The New York World urged extreme
caution in promoting the rights of America's oil companies
in Mexico: the newspaper alleged that half of the land and
production of the disputed oil holdings were controlled by
Edward L. Doheny and his companies. Since Doheny had been
involved in the oil scandals earlier in the decade, motives

and methods needed to be carefully examined before

 

30Letter from White to Guy Stevens, Association
of Petroleum Producers in Mexico, 21 April 1927, in Walter
Johnson, ed., Selected Letters of William Allen White (New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1557). PD. 270471.

 

31H. L. Mencken “Across the Border,“ American
Mercur 15 (December 1928):509. See also Mencken's edi-
torial in American Merou¥y 13 (April 1928):“09-11 for a
more general criticism 0 American foreign policy in Latin
.America.

32"The Robinson Resolution,“ Atlanta Constitution,
28 January 1927; see also “The President's Address,‘
Atlanta Constitution, 27 April 1927.

 

89

33

proceeding to lend government support to such men.
The criticism of America's policy toward Latin

America did not mean preference for a policy of isolation.
Walter Lippmann criticized intervention, particularly uni-
lateral intervention. He scolded the United States for
failing to enlist support for its actions in Latin America.
Having nothing to hide with respect to its policy, the
United States should have sought to share its duties and
responsibilities with other disinterested nations to pre-
serve the goodwill of Latin America. Lippmann wrote:

We have great power. But we tend to exert that power

either to protect our narrowest interests or to pre-

serve it for a crisis. We ought rather to exert it

continuously upon the governments in power on bgnalf

of orderly administration and of social reform.
Still, one cannot escape asking the essential difference
between unilateral intervention and exerting one's power
upon a government for “orderly administration and . . .
social reform.“ The only answer can be found in the concept
of America's mission in world affairs; Lippmann's statement
was an example of the belief that America had a responsi-
bility to provide stability in the world, particularly the
underdeveloped regions.

The fundamental economic problem was not raised,

either by opinion journals like Nation or certainly not by

 

33"The Same Old Gang,“ New York World, 27 January
1927; “The Same Old Gang,“ New York World, 29 January 1927.

3“Walter Lippmann, “Second Thoughts on Havana,“
Foreign Affairs 6 (July 1928):553.

 

9O

supporters of an aggressive economic policy for American
prosperity. If America was going to assume a useful leader-
ship role in world economic affairs, it would have been
seeking ways to equalize the economic imbalances which en-
couraged conflict among nations. The journalistic trade,
obviously appealing to varying audiences, was in all cases
a product of the political environment, and the fact re-
mains that radicalism had no place among established circles
of journalism or among the people at large. While forums
for liberal and radical views existed, as in the Nation,

the predominant mood of the country which enjoyed the

“prosperity decade“ impacted even on those sources.

Few persons and sources seemed neutral on the
League of Nations and World Court. Each continued to be
much talked and written about during the 1920's despite
.America's rejection of the League through the Senate and
the delayed decision to enter the Court.

Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the League
of Nations was William Randolph Hearst, editor and pro-
prietor of two dozen newspapers including the San.Francisco
IExaminer, Los Angeles Examiner and Herald, Chicago gmerican,
.Atlanta Georgian, New York American, and Washington Herald.
One of the more forthright statements of opposition came in
1a Hearst editorial dated 2 January 1927. He began by pro-

fessing belief in international peace, but questioned the

91

devotion of other nations. He expressed opposition to the
League and the World Court not because of their professed
peaceful intentions, but rather “because we realized that
those professions meant nothing compared with the actual
principles and practices of their warlike members.“35
Hearst argued that the League evidenced an inability of
heterogenous elements to effectively function together;
it could not present a united front on any occasion nor pro-
mote peace effectively, and members did not heed its decla-
rations because “each one has its own objects, with which it
will not tolerate any interference and which are largely at
variance with the objects of the other members.“36
The Nation magazine carried forth a long and con—
sistent campaign against reconsideration of League member-
ship. The magazine objected to the League's pretension as
a preventer of war when in fact it was “so plainly con-
structed out of the late war.“37 To the Nation the League
exhibited the most dangerous element in the world, “sincere
moral passion so convinced of its righteousness that it

ceases to face the fact-data from which it draws its con-

clusions.“38 Oswald Garrison Villard, the Nation's

 

35William Randolph Hearst, Selections From the
Writings and Speeches of William Randolph Hearst (San
iFrancisco: The San.Francisco Examiner, 19E8i, p. 195.

36Ibid., p. 196.
37ygpgpp 116 (a April 1923):381.

38Es£isn 116 (6 June 1923):6uu,

92

editor, criticized the League for its failure to involve

the masses of the world: “we must face the fact that the
League is but a machine of the existing officialdoms in

the various countries, that its source is the governments,
and that it will only with great difficulty, if at all, rise
above its source.“39 Villard saw United States' adherence
to the League Covenant not as a revival of the comradeship
of the World War, but rather as a force for making America
decide if it was pro-British, prqurench, or any other
country: “Why . . . should any American wish to tie up

intimately to such a situation?“40

The Nation proposed an
alternative to League membership: “work out a foreign poli-
cy which shall . . . be founded upon the historic American
doctrine of keeping out of entangling alliances and politi—
cal commitments. Let us keep to ourselves politically.”1
William Randolph Hearst and the Nation, on such
different political wavelengths, were united in opposition
to American membership in the League of Nations. Hearst's
objections came from the political right which saw member-
ship as an infringement upon American sovereignty in inter-

national decision-making; the Nation and its editors came

 

390swa1d Garrison Villard, “What of the League?“
Nation 117 (2“ October 1923):“56. For a supporting view
see New Republic 29 (1 February 1922):266.

“OOswald Garrison Villard, “America's Crop of
Hate,“ Nation 123 (11 August 1926):127.

1:1

 

Nation 122 (31 March 1926):332.

93

from the political left which argued that the League was an
ineffective force for good in world affairs, hence American
participation would serve no immediate function for pro-
moting cooperation. Neither side was willing to take the
step of involving the nation in the League for purposes of
reform from within.

William Allen White wrote to an acquaintance that
“The golden moment has passed when America has any business
going into the League of Nations as it is today.“u2 White
could also say, however, that “While standing for the na-
tional defense, I also believe tremendously in peace and
believe in the League of Nations. . . .,u3 He typified a
state of mind which clung to the ideals of America's tra-
ditions and hesitated to take the final step toward complete
involvement in international organization.

The New York Times reflected the view of opinion.
makers desiring adherence to the League while recognizing
the improbability of success. The Tiggg wondered if the
United States had lost “some of that idealism which helped
to save Europe from destruction and ourselves from a like

an

ultimate fate?“ By questioning rather than accusing, the

 

quhite to W. D. Guthrie, 10 July 1923, Selected
Letters of William Allen White, p. 232.

43White to Mrs. Alfred Brousseau, 11 August 1927,
Selected Letters of William Allen White, p. 280. Mrs.
Brousseau was President General of the Daughters of the
American Revolution which placed White on their list of
“dangerous Reds;“ the letter challenged that action.

“ulnternational Idealism, New York Times, 28

9“

Times encouraged a subtle reexamination of the public mind
without offending the reader.

The magazine World's Work opposed adherence to

 

the League, fearing “dangerous liabilities“ if the United
States joined. The primary danger would be to limit
America's freedom of action anywhere that interests or prin-
ciples required.u5 The Outlook and Collier's supported that
view, as did the Saturday Evening Post; the latter cast
blame upon Europe for the unworkability of the League.46
The League of Nations received high praise from
Walter Lippmann. He affirmed that five years of the League
had brought “not disillusionment and not cynicism but
greater boldness than statesmen have ever before exhibited
in the cause of peace.”7 Lippmann charged that most of the
objections to joining the League and Court in 1920 had been
“nonsense;“ the only valid one had been objection to associ-

ation with the Versailles Treaty. But even that had lost

validity because the United States made a separate treaty

 

August 1924.
usWorld's Work 50 (June i925):132.

u60utlook 1W1 (30 December 1925):659; Outlook 142
(20 January I926!:98-99; Outlook 143 (6 January 1926):13-1u;
Outlook 1&3 (10 March 1926!:338; Collier's 72 (1 September
: 9; Collier's 7h (13 December 1924):2u; Collier's 75
(28 February 1925):22; “The Unknown Soldier,“ SaEuFdE
ggening Post 196 (6 October 1925):32; “Arms and the League,“
Saturday Evening Post 199 (26 February 192?):26.

 

“7Wa1ter Lippmann, “War As a Crime,“ New York
World, 2 October 1924.

95

with Germany and, according to Lippmann, the allies recog-
nized the need for revision of the treaty. The United ‘
States could now “associate itself with the construction
and maintenance of peace without prejudice of any kind.“u8
While he praised the League, Lippmann was reluctant to advo-
cate formal membership: “whether through the League or by
some other means is not of the first importance. What
matters is the will of the American people to do their part
in bringing peace to the world.”9 Thus America's mission
took precedence, and the League became important to the ex-
tent that it served to enhance that mission.

The World Court received similar attention from
opinion-makers. The Hearst papers opposed both the League
and Court because membership “would merely have involved
the United States in the conflicts of Europe without in any
way promoting the peace of the world. . . .“50 The Chicggo
Tribune expressed similar views. In simple language, the
Tribune preferred Europe to be let alone. Noninterference
by America in Europe, and vice-versa, would protect American
policy and interest from interference by European councils

or tribunals. When the United States Senate voted 76 to 17

“BWalter Lippmann, “Hold Fast,“ New York World,
17 June 192“.

“9Walter Lippmann, “Famine, Plenty - and Peace,“
New York World, 30 March 192“.

50Selections From the Writipgs and Speeche§_of
William Randolph Hearst, p. 195.

 

96

for adherence to the Court with reservations, the Tribune
reluctantly supported it but only because the conditions
attached would strengthen the position of nationalists in
the Senate and make it difficult for internationalists to
“surrender America's interest to intrigue or false altru-
ism.“51

Walter Lippmann joined the voices expressing sup-
port for the World Court and America's involvement in it.
Replying to three articles in the Nation by World Court
opponent William Hard, Lippmann argued that association with
Europe in time of peace posed negligible risks because
America would associate with Europe in time of war anyway.
Thus it would be more sensible to support any agency which
lent itself to the extension of peaceful adjustment of
international problems: “Since we cannot escape a great war
if it comes, we do not add to our peril, and we may lessen
it if we support institutions like the Court, which are in-
tended to make war less likely.“52

The Nation editorially presented a position clear-
ly exposing the dilemma faced by the “liberal“ community--
how to carry out progressive reform in international affairs
without surrendering the tradition of nonalliance for po-
litical or military purposes. The Nation would not support

 

51“0ur Debt to the World Court Opposition,“
Chicago Tribune, 28 January 1926.

52Walter Lippmann, “A Reply to Mr. Hard,“ Nation
122 (20 January 1926):61.

97

adherence to the World Court without “at least“ the four
Coolidge-Hughes reservations: (1) prevent amendment of the
World Court Charter without consent of the United States;
(2) give the United States a voice in the selection of
judges; (3) provide for payment by the American government
of a fair share of the Court's expenses; and (h) assurance
that acceptance would not be tantamount to joining the
League of Nations. In addition, the magazine proposed one
other condition which would in effect take from the judi-
cial body any semblance of power for enforcing its decrees:
If we enter the World Court we should see to it that
the conditions of entry are such that the court shall
be backed by no power except that of world opinion.
More than that, the United States should condition its
entry on effective agreements that neither the court
nor the League, nor any of its members, shall have
power to enforce the decrees of the tribunal by war
or by economic pressures of any kind. 3
The attitudes expressed toward the League and
Court represented more than feelings about those two insti-
tutions--they were comments on Europe. England and the con-
tinent lost some favor in the United States due to the
widespread feeling that Europe had somehow failed to live
up to America's expectations following the World War; the
Allies received special criticism in some circles. Thus
the rapprochement between England and the United States was
in jeopardy in the minds of some people. One must remember

that such feelings were not a consensus, and the majority

of persons were not concerned with the matter, but in

 

53§EE$22 121 (9 December 1925):637.

98

newspapers and journals discussion occurred.

Walter Lippmann and the Ngw Yorkgggmgg expressed
the attitude that Europe lacked ability to solve its pro-
blems without assistance from America. Lippmann, writing
after the success of the Dawes Commission which revised
the reparations payments imposed upon Germany through the
Versailles Treaty, suggested that the cooperative spirit
which presided in Europe during the work of the Commission
resulted from the presence of American participants: “The
fact is they were respected, the fact is that our wealth
and our power and our remoteness have helped to take a step
toward peace.“54

A New gork Timeg editorial in October 192# focused
on the positive development of a new international mind re-
sulting from.America admitting “her oneness with.Europe.“55
Later the Tiggs published an editorial pleading for America
to find a means through which “we can call into action all
the actual and latent practical idealism . . . and mobilize
.American settlement in behalf of the supreme cause of inter-
national understanding and goodwill.“56 By not involving

itself in.Europe's agencies, the editorial charged, America

 

SuWalter Lippmann, “Three Men Come Home,“ New
York World, 30 April 1924.

55“The Better Feeling,“ New York Times, 29
October 192a.

56“The American Attitude,“ We 3
January 1927.

99

was condemning Europe to failure. The IEEEE gave full
support to joining the World Court: any efforts to block
American association would cause “irreparable damage to
the cause of international justice and world peace.“57

The Boston Globe and Atlanta Constitution lent their sup-

 

port to the Court as well.58

William Randolph Hearst was not as charitable in
his attitude toward Europe. More cautious, he commented:
“I do not think that the welfare of foreign nations or the
opinion of foreign people is so important to us as the wel-
fare of our own Nation and the opinion of our own people.“59
Commenting on the Democratic Party, a party of “visionary
internationalism,“ Hearst charged the party with “sacrific-
ing the welfare of our own people for the interests of
foreign peoples who were alike unworthy and ungrateful."6o
While Hearst exhibited the classic concept of fear and sus-
picion about foreign relations, he exposed an attitude
which placed the United States in a position superior to
other nations, rather than a cooperating equal. That very

attitude was not uncommon among opinion-makers elsewhere.

 

h 57“Making Excuses,“ New York Times, 29 April
192 .

58“The Crux of the Matter,“ Boston Globe, 28
January 1926; “Well Done, America,“ Atlanta Constitution,
29 January 1926.

59$elections From the Writings and Speeches of
William Randolph Hearst, p. 159.

100

Behind attitudes about Europe, Latin America, the
League of Nations, and the World Court lay an overriding
concern for preservation of world peace. Responding to the
memory of the tragedy of 191h-1918, and to the traditional
abhorence of war which Americans possessed, world peace and
tranquility received considerable attention. William
Randolph Hearst was correct when he alleged that all
Americans were pacifists in that “we are all opposed to war
61

and in favor of peace for ourselves and for the world.“

World's Work and Collier's stressed the economic

 

 

motivation behind America's search for world peace. World's
W235 asserted that only in a peaceful world could America
“arrive at the greatest development of their trade and com-
merce - the 'business' in which Americans are undoubtedly

chiefly interested.“62

In a February 1927 editorial the
magazine wrote about American industries “stretching out
their hands for foreign markets“ in order to retain and ex-
tend the prosperity they were experiencing; to find and
hold those markets Americans must “take our full part - and
more - in world affairs.“ In March 1927 an editorial ob-

served that “trade, national defense, and diplomacy are a

 

61Ibid., p. 195.
62World's Work 56 (May 1928):3-u.

101

trinity, and should be treated as such instead of as sepa-
rate entities.“ Collier's on 12 November 1927 suggested
the best hope for the future peace of the world to be a
widening of international contacts and an increase in the
interrelatedness of the world's nations through the auto-
mobile, airplane, radio, railroads, and telegraphs.

While opinion-makers agreed on the need for
peace, not all agreed on the method. The views ranged from
Lippmann's support for “diplomacy of active cooperation“ to
Hearst's “cooperation of the English-speaking peoples“ to
H. L. Mencken's revival of the Pax Romans with the United
States the new Rome. The concept of America's role came
forth in part through a New York Times editorial preceding
Senate ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty: “To let
this opportunity pass is to invite not only the disgust and
scorn of the nations whom our official representative has
embraced in his multilateral proposal and who now await
her answer, but also the condemnation of generations un-
born.“63 America was the hope for the future.

The high point of the 1920's peace movement was
the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty in.August 1928.
iBut the pact did not receive universal praise. The Nation,
for one, expressed early support which subsequently waned.

Commenting after’Briand's proposal on 6 April 1927 for an

 

63“The United States and Peace on Earth,“ New
‘York Times, 25 December 1928.

102

outlawry of war agreement between France and the United
States, a Nation editorial called for an “immediate and
prompt“ response to the offer “whether it be official or
unofficial, inspired or made on the spur of the moment.“6l+
The magazine's editors wanted discussion to take place:
“The first step toward peace is to talk peace, will

peace.“65 The New Republic affirmed the need for discus-

 

sion and for arousal of public opinion, which if strong
enough would reduce need for such a treaty anyway.66
Skepticism took form as the treaty began to
emerge. The failure of the pact to ban defensive war
caused concern as did a statement by President Coolidge
that the pact would not bear on the question of armaments.
With the peace treaty finally signed at Paris, the Nation
expressed both skepticism and hope: the treaty reflected
“the people's voice for peace,“ but the next step, dis-
armament, would be up to the statesmen.67 The Nation con-
sidered a vote for the peace pact analgous to a vote for
the Ten Commandments: “Perfectly proper and in no wise
68 The Chicago

Tribune feared for naval forces, the mandatory defense

affecting the existing status of the world.“

 

6“Nation 12h (h May 1927):h89-90.

65Nation 126 (22 February 1928):200.

66N9' Republic 57 (28 November 1928):21u,
67222222 127 (5 September 1928):21u.

68Nation 127 (19 December 1928):671.

103

force against any attack on America and its standard of
living.69 The §t. Louis Post-Dispatch referred to the pact
as an empty gesture, charging that nations were glad to
sign peace treaties so long as they need not rally forth to
punish an offender.70 The New York World considered the
pact as renouncing war as an instrument of national policy
only where no national interests existed.71

World's Work questioned the value of the treaty.
It described its value as striking from America's hands the
most effective instrument with which to preserve peace. In
addition, the magazine expressed skepticism over Europe's
intentions, asserting that Europe sought hegemony, with
peace a secondary goal. The thought loomed that Europe
might take advantage of any United States' guarantee to re-
main our of hostilities: “we cannot yet overlook the fact
that the possibility_of war is a most potent instrument of
peace.“ World's Work warned against a false confidence
,gained from the treaty: “There is a real danger that it may
jproduce a false confidence that peace has been attained, and
‘thus put an end to the efforts to set up as an alternative

'to war a really effective machinery for the pacific

 

69“Betraying America to the Spoilers,“ Chicago
Tribune, 18 August 1928.

70mn Empty Gesture,“ St. Louis Post—Dispatch,
16 August 1928 .

7luTh, Treaty Ratified,“ New York World, 16
January 1929.

104

settlement of international disputes.“ The magazine did
not consider the Kellogg-Briand Treaty a panacea for
peace.72

The treaty had its supporters as well as detrac-
tors. Editors of the New Republic took a positive view;
they thought greater pressure now would be exerted on war-
makers to help drive away some militaristic propaganda.
In addition, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty would be beneficial
“for its general effect upon the moral tone of inter-
national relations.“73 The editor of the Survey, Paul
Kellogg, admitted shortcomings for the treaty, but hailed
it as “a declaration that puts us abreast of the hope of
the world.“7u The Atlanta Constitution labeled it “the
best one day's work since the world war. . . .“75

Walter Lippmann publicly argued that world peace
could be attained best by convening an international con-
ference on any occasion when war threatened; the object of
the conference was to align public opinion against the

76

aggressor, forcing him into arbitration. Lippmann saw

 

72World's Work 56 (May 1928):8-9; World's Work
Eg2(February I928!:33I; World's Work 56 (Septemttr 19285:
73New Republic 57 (5 December 1928):57.

7uPaul U. Kellogg, “Pacts Cruisers and - Then
What?“ Survey 61 (1 March 1929):?34.

75“Kellogg Treaty Ratified,“ Atlanta Constitution,
17 January 1929.

76Walter Lippmann, “The Problem of Peace,“ New
York World, 5 September 192k.

105

the central fallacy in the outlawry of war program to be
its failure to allow for diplomacy. Not all conflicts
could be adjudicated, asserted Lippmann, and “For them,
diplomacy is required, diplomacy working by conference,
compromise, bargaining, good offices, and also in the last
analysis . . . by the threat of force.“77 But the “threat“
of force rather than force itself seemed important; the
fear by an aggressor that overwhelming power faced him
seemed sufficient to bring the aggressor to the confer-
ence table. In his essay “The Political Equivalent of War“
Lippmann joined forces with Kirby Page and other Opinion.
makers by paralleling peace in civil society with inter-
national peace; since the former required legislative,
judicial, executive, social, and cultural institutions, “Is
there any reason to suppose that international peace is any
easier to attain than domestic peace?“78 For Lippmann
international government provided the most effective means
for developing peace, but the problem of convincing nations
to relinquish national sovereignty was difficult to re-
solve. Until people could accept reduced freedom in inter-
iuational decision-making, said Lippmann, they should not be
deceived about the readiness to outlaw war.

H. L. Mencken supported Lippmann's position: “The

 

77Walter Lippmann, “The Outlawry of War,“
A_tlantic Monthly 132 (August 1923):252.

78Walter Lippmann, “The Political Equivalent of
War,“ Atlantic Monthly 142 (August 1928):187.

106

theory that the way to keep out of were is to disband the
army and scrap the navy is as idiotic as the notion that
the way to get rid of burglars is to discharge the police
force.“79 Through disarmament, asserted Mencken, the United
States invited its enemy to attack, and “his temptation is
already almost more than he can bear.“ To prevent war,
temptations need be reduced, “either by arming to the teeth
or by going out of the swindling business. The latter, I
take it, is too much to hope for.“80
William Randolph Hearst pushed for multilateral
leadership by a small number of nations--the English-
speaking ones; he included the United States, Great Britain,
Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.
They would “cooperate to insure peace among themselves and,
as far as possible, to maintain the peace of the world.“
That alliance would be neither entangling or offensive, but
rather “an understanding, an agreement, a compact to pre-
vent the parties to the agreement from the warlike aggres-
sions of others. . . .“81
One could question Hearst's unwillingness to ex-
pand the alliance to other nations; to that query he had a

ready response. He contended that the English-speaking

 

79H. L. Mencken, “Goose-Step Days,“ Baltimore
Evening Sun, 5 May 1921+.

8olbid.

81Selections From the'Writings and Speeches of
gilliam Randolph Hearst. PP. 1W

107

peoples, because of language and exchange of literature,
possessed basically uniform ideals and objectives. In ad-
dition, none of the nations involved were militaristic,
while simultaneously the combination “constitutes the most
powerful influence in the world.“ If other nations joined,
nations with different language, characteristics, and ob-
jectives, the combination would be weakened by making unity
of action and purpose less easily achieved. Speculating on
the response of the Scandanavian countries, Germany, France,
and others, he envisioned no hostility because it was a
peace move, not a war move. Rather than attract the sus-
picion and animosity of other nations, “It should command
their respect both on account of its importance and on
account of its idealistic purpose.“82 I
The maintenance of a strong navy occupied an
important position in Hearst's concept of America's role in
world affairs. He consistently warned against failure to
maintain the United States Navy at less than full strength.
In a letter of instruction to the editor of the New York
{American, Hearst urged him to write editorials in favor of
a full strength navy and an air fleet of adequate protec-
tive size: “As we protect our cities from flames, our in-
dustrial property and security from the menace of the crim-
inal, so let us protect our whole people, our great country,

our national institutions, our American ideals, from

 

82Ibid.

108

destruction by a foreign foe.“83 Hearst had the support of
the SgturdayggveningPogg which warned that while brother-
hood was a fine thing, “a big brother, a strong brother,
has a much better chance of being heard internationally
for peace than a weak sister.“8u
Perhaps Hearst's most concise statement on

America's role in world affairs and its contribution to
international relations came through an editorial letter
of 23 February 1928:

We CAN keep out of war. All we have to do to keep

out of war is to do as we have done before - follow

the injunctions of the wise Founders of the Nation,

take advantage of our fortunate isolation, keep free

from foreign entanglements, refrain from meddling in

matters that do not concern us, avoid interfering in

a situation where we cannot do any good to gthers and

where we may do infinite harm to ourselves. 5
IFor Hearst, the traditions of the past provided the best
defense against uncertainties of the future.

Of those studied here, the views closest to

Hearst's attitudes came from H. L. Mencken. His national-
ism matched Hearst's, but without a strong anti-foreign
sentiment. Mencken thought world peace could be achieved
'through a plan that worked, not necessarily one that was
:fair. He proposed a revival of the Pax Romans with the

‘United States occupying center stage. Mencken promoted

 

83Ibid., pp. 381-82.

8““Oh Doctor!“ Saturday Evening Fee; 199 (29
January 1927) :22.

Bégelectggns From the Writings and Speeches of
William Randolph Heargt, p. 405.

 

109

America as the only power sufficiently strong to face a
combination of world powers. He asserted that if the
United States launched a naval building program to domi-
nate the world, it could be done in three years and no
nation would approach it; any nation attempting to chal-
lenge such a navy would find the effort financially devas-
tating. Disarmament presented the only alternative to
such a predicament. The fairness of such a program mat-
tered not to Mencken, only its workability.86
Mencken's plan did not capture large audiences,

but the desire for an America powerful enough to defend
itself existed widely. The New York Times reflected that

 

attitude in an editorial denouncing Senator Frazier of
Montana for his proposals to deny Congress the war-making
power and deny the people the right to possess and bear
arms: “a perverted pacifism is making itself heard in many
parts of the country. . . .“87 The same editorial lamented
inability of experienced military personnel to receive
fair hearing for preparedness and national security.
Diplomacy and compromise were not ruled out, as evidenced
by a later editorial praising the use of discussion as a

means to reduce the misunderstanding and ill-feeling

 

86H. L. Mencken, “Editorial,“ American Mercury

1? (August 1929):u17-19.

87“Abolishing the Defense Forces,“ New York
Times, 26.April 1926. "“““'

110

existent between Europe and the United States.88

Opinion—makers in the journalistic community pre-
sented views as divergent as the audiences addressed.
Throughout, though, there was a commonality: America's
role in world affairs was important. But as to the nature
of that role, as to relinguishing some sovereignty in
international matters or not, as to formal political in-
volvement, as to the proper relationship of America to the
rest of the world, diversity reigned. Only a handful of
people campaigned for important political, economic, or
social reforms which would alter international relations
significantly toward a more representative system of inter-
national cooperation. Few were willing to see the United
States surrender a portion of its newfound potential and
actual greatness or its independence in international
decision.making. Each cpinionpmaker assessed the extent
to which America could relinquish sovereignty for the
cause of peaceful international relations, with the ulti-
mate decision based on how best to preserve the world

position of the United States.

 

88“Afraid of Discussion?“ New York Times. 2“
November 1927.

CHAPTER IV

BUSINESS, PROSPERITY, AND
FOREIGN POLICY

The business community, particularly international
bankers, exporters, and companies with international hold-
ings, had a fundamental interest in America's role in
world affairs: prosperity was tied to how foreign policy
was interpreted and executed. This chapter will examine
the position_taken by Opinion_makers within the business
community on issues related to economics and imperialism,
international cooperation, and peace. To what extent did
attitudes reflect a desire for maintenance of the status
329 or for fundamental change; for political commitments or
for total sovereignty; for economic growth through uni-
lateral or cooperative efforts? How did the business
community view America's role in world affairs?

The journal sources include Banker's Magazine,

 

American Banker's Association Journal, the Commercial and

 

Financial Chronicle, the Magazine of Wall Street, and the
United States Chamber of Commerce publication Nation's
Business. Individuals from different segments of the
business community, each in excellent positions to be

Opinion.makers, are included.

111

112

In the 1920's, America's domestic market could,
not consume the excess production of the factories, nor
could many raw materials be sufficiently procured within
the United States. The rationale expressed for seeking
foreign markets and foreign sources of raw materials cen-
tered on the concept of America's superiority of purpose.
America's prosperity was projected as in the best interest
of the world's prosperity; foreign commerce meant recovery
and growth for all nations.

American business was tied closely to foreign mare
kets during and after the World War both in trade and access
to raw materials. For exports, the increase in value of the
five principal commodities from 1920 to 1929 showed the
economic importance of foreign markets: petroleum and its
products jumped from $107,000,000 to $560,000,000; iron and
steel mill products rose from $60,000,000 to $200,000,000;
copper and copper manufactures climbed from $90,000,000 to
$183,000,000; machinery, all classes, increased from
$117,000,000 to $613,000,000; and automobiles, engines, and

parts experienced a rise from $11,000,000 to $539,000,000.1

 

1U. 3., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 19 0 (Washington, 5. C.: United States Government
r n ng fice, 1931), pp. 50h-5.

113

Similar increases occurred among the four principal imported
commodities: crude rubber jumped in value from $101,000,000
in 1910 to $201,000,000 in 1929; petroleum and its products
rose from $960,000 to $103,000,000; copper ore and its
manufactures increased from $00,000,000 to $150,000,000;
and coffee and sugar almost doubled from $106,000,000 to
$209,000,000.2 According to a study of America's strategic
situation respecting national self-sufficiency in food-
stuffs, essential industrial products, and raw materials,
based on yearly averages for 1925-1929 the following criti-
cal raw materials heavily depended on imports: antimony--
100%; chromite--100%; rubber--100%; tin--100%; manganese-—
95%; nickel--95%; tungsten-~75%; mercury--60%; aluminum
and bauxite--50%; and wool--00%.3 An interruption in the
flow of those materials could impose serious complications
for America's industrial capacity and even for its sur-
vival.

Prosperity depended upon continued trade. Roy
Chapin, President of the National Automobile Chamber of
Commerce, defined the goal of foreign trade as increased
consumption with side effects of raising the standard of
living, better education, better medical care, and greater

personal happiness: “Commerce is the missionary that . . .

 

21bid., pp. 506-7.

3Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New
York:The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 22.

110

ministers to these wants.“u An article in the Harvard

Business Review observed candidly that by assisting Europe

 

in its economic recovery from the war, Americans would
“increase their own prosperity, by creating greater pur-
chasing power abroad.“5 The American Exports and Importers
Association heard a plea for the development of markets
abroad on the grounds that “If we are to maintain our pro-
duction in this country, we must have markets for our pro-
ducts.“6
James S. Alexander, President of the National
Bank of Commerce and member of the board of directors of
American Telephone and Telegraph, Pacific 011 Company, and
Prudential Insurance, alleged that the fullest development
Of domestic commerce was directly dependent upon overseas
trade, and trade was dependent upon world recovery.' More
extensive trade and advancing civilization were synonomous,
Alexander asserted: “we must have foreign trade because
the advancement Of civilization of the world demands it.“
But his primary concern was America's prosperity because
“unless the development of the United States along the

paths so successfully followed before the war is to be

 

“Roy D. Chapin, “What Is Our Goal in Foreign

Trade?“ Nation's Business 15 (20 May 1927):21.

5Henry Reed Bowser, “Economic Aspects of American
Foreign Trade,“ Harvard Business Review 5 (October 1926):63.

6“Urges Development of Markets Abroad,“ New York
Times, 10 January 1927.

115

permanently interrupted, we must develop a larger and
larger foreign trade.“ American industry had an excess
production capacity that Alexander thought must be absorbed
either through expansion of the domestic market or the
foreign market. Because the domestic market was incapable
of sufficient expansion, foreign trade had to absorb it.
In addition, by syphoning excess goods to a foreign market,
the domestic market was protected from “demoralization“ of
prices due to rapid accumulation of excess inventory. Thus
foreign trade would advance civilization, provide continued
expansion Of American industry, and protect the domestic
market.7

H. E. Miles, Chairman of the Fair Tariff League,
in testimony before Congress, supported the position that
domestic prosperity was the goal of foreign trade: “If the
factories Of the United States are to be kept busy, they
must go more and more after foreign markets;“ an additional
benefit of trade, Miles said, was that “Our own breadth of
intelligence and our influence will be largely in propor-

8

tion to our foreign investments.“ Domestic prosperity was

the goal, and foreign nations would provide the consumptive

 

7James 8. Alexander, Why We Must Have Foreign
Trade (New York: National Bank 0 Commerce, 1922), pp. 8,
1;-i80

8U. 8., Congress, Senate, Committee on.Finance,
Hearings on H. R. 7056, to provide revenue, to regulate
commerce with‘foreign countries, to encourage industries of
the United States and T3? other purposes,’67th Cong., 1921-

 

1922: pp. 3513; flit

 

116

capacity to make it possible. In a less tactful vein, an
assistant to the Secretary Of Commerce noted that “Americans
ransack the earth for any commodity, common or rare, cheap
or deer, that can add to the satisfaction of life or to the
efficiency of industry.“9
America's economic mission in world affairs was
to develop international commercial and financial Oppor-
tunities. Some person argued that America was the last hope
for the world's economic problems. Henry Morgenthau,
financier, ambassador, director of international relief
after the war, dramatized the circumstances: “The whole
world has . . . become a desert, whose one great oasis Of

prosperity and happiness is the United States.“10

By PPO-
viding assistance in food production, technical skills,
communication, and education, Morgenthau believed the
United States could set “the groundwork for a self-reliant,

successful democracy.“11

Herbert Hoover, Secretary of
Commerce from 1921 to 1928, in a letter to Secretary of
State Charles Evans Hughes, observed: “We are morally and
selfishly interested in the economic and political recovery

of all the world. America is practically the final

 

9Edward Dana Durand, American Industry and
Commerce (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 611.

10Henry Morgenthau, “Our Duty Abroad and at Home,“
Forum 61 (February 1919):221.

11

 

Ibid., p. 223.

117

12 Hoover also noted

reservoir of international capital.“
that civilization depended on foreign trade: “the whole
structure of our advancing civilization would crumble and
the great mass of mankind would travel backwards if the
foreign trade Of the world were to cease.“13 Julius Klein,
appointed by Hoover as Director of the Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, echoed the conviction that civili-
zation and commerce were intimately tied together: “How much
of Western civilization would have been possible had there
been no solid foundation of material prosperity in each suc-
cessive age upon which the lofty edifices of our culture
could have been erected?“1u
Henry Ford, President of the Ford Motor Company,
the world's largest manufacturer of automobiles, tied to-
gether business success and social progress while looking
at the role Of business in world affairs. He believed the
most productive and stable society would emerge through
industrialization. Ford saw progress stemming from advanc-

ing economic conditions within a country, even proclaiming

that the unstable, revolutionary conditions within Russia

 

12Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover,
3 vol. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1

13Herbert Hoover, The New Da : Cam 1 S eeches
of Herbert HooverI 1228 (Statfotd; stanfotd Unlverslty
P888, ’ p. 0
1“Julius Klein, “Business,“ in Charles A. Beard,
egéé)Whither Mankind (New York: Longmans, Green and Company,
1

. PP. 83-83.

118

and China were primarily economic: “Political boundaries and
political opinions don't really make much difference. It is
the economic condition which forces change and com-
pels progress.“15

The close association between segments of the
business community and the Department Of Commerce during the
1920's was instrumental in strengthening the claim of legit-
imacy for America's role in world affairs. The primary
agency within the Commerce Department to assist overseas
business activities was the Bureau Of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce. Created in 1912, the Bureau was extensively re-
organized and enlarged under Hoover's tenure. Reorganized
in 1922, by 1926 its number of domestic branches jumped
from 28 to 06, foreign offices increased from 23 to 02, the
number of representatives abroad climbed from 86 to 291,
and the number of trade circulars published for business
benefit and other forms of information increased from about
500,000 to over 0,000,000 annually.16 In the revamping,
37 divisions were established to deal with specific com-
modities and special services. Hoover called upon different
industries to appoint committees to work with the Bureau

in planning strategies for each particular commodity: “The

 

15Henry Ford, My Philosophy of Industr ry (London:
George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 19297 , p.

16U. 8., Department Of Commerce, Fourteenth
Annual Report of the Secreta_y of Commerce 1926(Washington,
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1926),
P. 35.

119

first duty imposed upon these committees was the selection
of a man from their own ranks who would head the divi-
sion.“17 Hoover described the Bureau as being “essentially
a business organization, its staff is made up largely of
men drawn from active commercial pursuits, and

to render the highest service they should work under busi-

18

nesslike conditions.“ All changes imposed upon the

Bureau had the Objective of assuring “a genuinely secure

and permanent position in the world's markets.“19

The most significant element in the entire scheme
for advancing American commerce probably was the overseas
staff of the Bureau. Their duties were extensive:

[The staff] supplies information and advice . . .
conducts such investigations as seem timely and
appropriate . . . adjusts commercial disputes be-
tween foreign Officials and firms on the one hand
and.American firms on the other . . . arbitrates
difficulties . . . warns of any illegitimate phases
of foreign competitiog or any possibly discrimina-
tory proposals. . . . 0

Hoover referred to those staff workers as “hounds for

possible American sales“ who sought out raw materials and

 

17Quoted in Isaac F. Marcosson, “Commercial
E§ploration,“ Saturday Evening Post 197 (13 February 1926):
1 3.

18U. S., Department of Commerce, Ninth Annual
Report of the Secretary 0: Commerce 1 21 (Washington, D. C.:
United States Government Printing 0 fice, 1921), p. 7.

19U. S., Department of Commerce, Thirteenth Appual
Re rt Of the Secretary o§_Commerce 1 2 (Washington, D. C.:
Unlted States Government Printing 0 cc, 1925), pp. 01-02.

2°Ibid., p. 88.

120

commodities which were less competitive with American in-
dustry, and stimulated their export tO the United States."21
The interest of the business community in foreign

policy partly resulted from a desire for the establishment
of conditions which would make economic expansion possible
and safe. American business interests looked favorably
upon efforts to stabilize world economic and political con-
ditions. Following the 1920 adoption of the Dawes Plan
which redefined the reparations payments imposed upon
Germany through the Versailles Treaty structure, Secretary
Hoover spoke for the financial community:

the recuperation of Europe will intensify compe-

tition in many industries, but paralleling it will

come expansion of consumption in European countries.

Recovery there will bring employment, and employment

:éiiaifindii‘ifii‘zz 2tassassins3132:3815“
Hoover, as so many others, related American prosperity with
world stability. The American Banker's Association, repre-
senting the views of the average banker, called upon
Europeans to recognize that they could experience the same
level of prosperity as America if they would suspend the
fears expressed through tariffs and other obstructions:
“Then, too, America also will have a better European mar-

ket."23

 

21Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 2:79.
ZZ"Hoover Sees No Peril to American Trade,“ New
York Times, 27 August 1920.

23“Would Make Better Markets For Us,“ American
Banker's Association Journal 19 (May 1927):?92.

121

Bernard Baruch, American businessman, broker, and
statesman, tried to add a slightly different perspective:
[The] annihilating power of war is now more widely
recognized than at any other time in history. . . .
Today the peace movement is led by the great cap-
tains of industry and finance and the most powerful

statesmen, and this is so because they were convinced

by one terrible concentrated lesson of a truth they

might have divined Sgt would never have accepted in

a century of peace.
What Baruch did not say directly, though, was that those
“captains of industry and finance“ saw a world of peace as
the best environment in which to prosper economically; un-
stable political and economic conditions interfered with
profitable development. Willis Booth, past-president Of
the Merchants Association Of New York, the International
Chamber of Commerce, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and
Vice-President of Guaranty Trust Company of New York,
Observed: “This industrial era is constantly expanding all
over the world. Our contribution in that direction is
going to be one of the most outstanding things we will do
in international cooperation.“25 Gerard Swope, President
of General Electric Company, insisted that among industry's
main responsibilities was “the duty of perpetuating itself
as an instrument Of production and as a source of liveli-

hood to its employees.“26 To meet that responsibility,

 

2“Bernard M. Baruch, “The Consequences of the War

to Industry,“ Current History 29 (November 1928):196.
25“Credit Men Hear Speeches,“ New York Times, 27
May 1926.

26Gerard Swope, “What Big Business Owes the

122

business had to be concerned about foreign policy; expan-

sion abroad was a necessity of modern industry.

Latin America held an important place in the eco-
nomic life of the United States. For the first half of the
1920's the countries Of southern North America alone con-
sumed an average of 10.1 percent Of American exports and
supplied 10.9 percent Of its imports annually; during the
second half of the decade the averages were 8.0 and 11.0
percent respectively.27 For all Latin America, the annual
averages over the decade for exports was 17.3 percent and

for imports 26 percent.28

More impressive and revealing
statistics can be found by examining the value of direct in-
vestments in Latin American republics: for the year 1929

the total was 3.5 billion dollars, compared with 2.0 billion
dollars in Canada and 1.0 billion dollars in Western
Europe.29

The administration's policy toward Latin America

 

Public,“ World's Work 53 (March 1927):561.

27U. 8., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1 (Washington, 5. C.: United States Government—
r n ng fice, 1935), p. 031.

28

 

Ibid.

29The Statistical Histor of the United States
(Staggord, tonnectlcut: Falttleld PubliSHers, Inc., 1965),
p. e

 

123

was important to the business community, at least for the
international bankers, some importers and exporters, and
companies with foreign holdings because of the economic
value of the region. Some countries to the south were eco-
nomically dependent upon the United States and virtually
all had the United States as their principle foreign mar-
ket.30

A series of articles in World's Work, a magazine
devoted to international concerns including the advance-
ment of trade between North and South America, told Of the
positive work American corporations performed abroad--recre-
ation for workers, housing, sewage and water facilities,
education, and an increased standard of living. Through
corporations' efforts people began to realize, the author
wrote, that “the huge investments of American capital in
foreign countries are there for purposes of development,
not exploitation.“31 As partial evidence the author sub-
mitted the work of the United Fruit Company which operated
throughout Central America (with exception of Nicaragua,
Salvador, and Mexico), Colombia, Jamaica, and Cuba.

The United.Fruit Company had extensive holdings in

Latin.America, thus raising concerns about exploitation

 

30G. Butler Sherwell, “Our Investments in Latin
American Government Securities,“ American Banker's
Association Journal 19 (July 1926):1.

31Gregory Mason, “Has the Dollar a Heart?“ World's
Work 50 (June 1927):197.

 

120

from those persons and groups unsympathetic to the business
philosophy of foreign development. The company allegedly
owned or leased 1,883,902 acres of land planted or destined
to be planted with bananas, sugar cane, cacao, coconuts, and
other foodstuffs; it allegedly owned and Operated 1,571
miles of railroad with 187 locomotives and 5,061 railroad
cars; it reportedly had total fixed assets of 130.7 billion
dollars and for the single year 1926 had net earnings of
19.5 million dollars; and its wages and salaries provided
support for over 67,000 people.32
Latin America was the principle producer of coffee
(over 90%) and sugar (65%), both strategic foodstuffs, for
importation to the United States; it also contributed sig-
nificantly to the American supply of bauxite (51%), plati-
num (02%), and manganese (25%), all strategic minerals.33
Due to its economic importance and sometimes unstable po-
litical situation, to which the United States government
responded militarily several times, the charge Of imperial-
ism Often faced the American government and the financial
community. Victor Cutter, President of the United Fruit
Company, and Otto Kahn, for over 30 years a partner in the
banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, were two Opinion-

makers who defended administration policy; Thomas Lamont,

 

32Gre ory Mason, “The Humanity of the Dollar,“
World's Work (July 1927):290-302.

33Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, Pp. 27-28.

125

member of the J. P. Morgan banking firm, exemplified an
approach far from imperialistic.
Victor Cutter believed that his company provided

a positive service for the poor nations: “Undeveloped
countries should welcome large developments backed by large
capital, for this means responsibility.“3u Cutter affirmed
that companies could serve the public interest by investing
in stable countries and engaging in practices which were
open and above board:

The era of exploitation is over and that of indus-

trial and commercial development has arrived. It

must be remembered that all past troubles involving

diplomacy have been caused by small, irresponsible

companies and individuals, and by unjust conces-

sions, sometimes improperly obtained; or by entrance

of foreigners into countries where governments were

unstable and revolutions too much frequent.
He did not feel that American companies should expect pro-
tection or intervention by the government if they experi-
enced problems in foreign lands; but at the same time
“there must be respect for universally recognized inter-
national law which has as a basic principle, the protection
Of life and property."36

In reality, the United Fruit Company had gained

such controlling interest over the people and economy of

the area in which it operated, that it seemed to serve as

 

3""Victor M. Cutter, “Relations of United States

Companies With Latin America,“ Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Sclence l32 (July 1927):

35Ibid. 36Ibid., p. 131.

126

a paragovernmental authority. Under such conditions it was
reasonable for Cutter to argue that exploitation had ended,
for there was little more advantage that the company could
take. Cutter did not realize that while emerging nations
did welcome large developments backed by large capital,
they did not welcome the control which those investments
Often brought.

Otto Kahn Offered assurances that the United
States was free of any imperialist activity. He confessed
to some possible errors in judgment and manners by the
government over the years, but the purpose Of America's
actions remained positive and good: “to end an inveterate
rule of tyranny, malefactions and turmoil, to set up decent
and orderly government and the rule of law, to foster pro-
gress, to establish stable conditions and with them the
basis for prosperity to the populations concerned.“ Due to
its proximity, Latin America had strategic value as well
as commercial worth, noted Kahn, thus it was important that
they “cease to be centers of perpetual disorder. . . .“
Nations found incapable of managing their own affairs “are
properly subject to reasonable measures of intervention . .
. in the spirit of the strong aiding the weak. . . ."
Capable management apparently would be defined by the
37

strong.

 

37Otto Kahn, Of Many Things (New York: Boni and
Liveright, 1926), pp. 160-632

 

127

Thomas Lamont, the dominant figure on the
International Committee of Bankers on Mexico, formed in
1918 to represent holders of Mexican bonds, exemplified the
nonpimperialist attitude among the business community. His
restrained, non-threatening approach tO the Mexico situa-
tion had a calming influence which served to lessen the
potential damage of the hard-line approach typified by the
American Oil companies in the 1920's.38 Lamont firmly
believed that an American financial presence, and at times
a military presence, had definite positive impact in Latin
America for political and financial stability;39 but he
did not see the threat of military force as useful in the
Mexico situation.“o

During times of specific conflict, as with Mexico
over oil deposits, the international bankers led by the
J. P. Morgan Company and Thomas Lamont had to contend with
the more aggressive attitude Of the oil companies. Guy
Stevens, Director of the Association of Producers of
Petroleum in Mexico, proclaimed that the controversy over
ownership rights of subsoil minerals arose “entirely from

the efforts and purposes of the Mexican Government to take

 

38Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and
Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1216-1232 (Cfilcago:
University 0 cago ress, , pass m.

39Thomas Lamont, “America's Foreign Investment
Policy,“ Bankers' Magazine 110 (June 1927):871-81.

uoSmith, The United States and Revolutionary
Nationalism in Mexlco, l9l5-l9 2. P. 206.

 

 

128

“1 Stevens

for itself properties which belong to others.“
asserted that the American government was responsible for
the protection of its citizens' lives and property no mat-
ter where located, a direct challenge to the spirit of
Article 27 Of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the
moderate position of Lamont and the international bankers.
Some consideration of national honor was involved, Stevens
argued:

History does not indicate that any nation at any

time has ever added to its prestige or to its own

self-respect or to the respect in which it has

been held by other nations by yielding and acquies-

cing in tng penetration of a wrong to itself or its

citizens.
The Oil companies objected to the conciliatory statements
coming from the administration early in 1927.

When President Coolidge delivered his 25 April

1927 speech calling for a negotiated settlement to the dis-
puted issues, he was representing the increasingly accepted
attitude of Opinion-makers. If the Oil companies had
rationally assessed the predicament, they could have real-
ized that any act of force would result in attempted de-
struction of the oil fields by the Mexican authorities with
a serious disruption or even termination Of production.

The mood of the business world reflected the position

voiced by Coolidge's speech. The Commercial and Financial

 

ulGuy Stevens, Current Controversies With Mexico
([no publisher named], 1929), p. 10.

“Z“Tells of Oil Bribes to Mexico Bandits,“ New
York Times, 28 February 1926.

129

Chronicle, a leading journal of financial interests, called

 

for “the application of the ordinary rules of fair dealing
and common sensed“3 That was exactly what was provided
when Dwight Morrow, a member of the J. P. Morgan banking
firm, replaced James H. Sheffield as ambassador to Mexico
in late summer 1927. His appointment represented a victory
for the conciliatory, moderate policy of the international
bankers and others over the hard-line approach of the oil

representatives.

For many concerned persons, America's prosperity
depended directly upon the extent of world recovery from
the financial and political repercussions Of the world War.
Before recovery and prosperity could be fully achieved,
though, order must prevail. Nation's Business, the organ
of the influential United States Chamber of Commerce, recog-
nized America's entanglement in the economic affairs Of the
world and called for “a definite and consistent internation-
al policy which shall have as its basis cooperation in a
dignified manner to bring about and maintain stable con-

00

ditions.“ Likewise, Julius Barnes, wheat exporter, one-

‘time president of the United States Chamber of Commerce,

”3nThe Financial Situation,“ Commercial and
Financial Chronicle 125 (20 September : .

“Q“Our Business and World Affairs,“ Nation's
Business 13 (5 June 1925): 21.

130

and Chairman Of the Board of the United Growers of America,
believed that American business should work for a “new and
more secure social order in the outposts of the world,
which so greatly need the influence Of industrial and busi-
ness development written into the living standards and
opportunity of their individual people.“u5 Involvement by
businessmen in governmental and diplomatic affairs, accord-
ing to the head of the Radio Corporation of America, pro-
duced a more favorable set of international relations
characterized as “more orderly, more stable, more peace—
fulfil."6
The desire for peace among the business community
resulted from forces other than pacifism: “To us, it is a
matter Of special interest that peace, tranquility, securi-
ty, and sound policies shall characterize the acts of
governments everywhere.“u7 Pacifism was something to be
shunned, in fact, because a nation unwilling to defend it-
self or its interests would only invite attack from the

08

nonpacifist nations. The effect Of war would be catas-

trophic for the United States economy: “every important

 

“51bid.
“6James G. Harbord, “The Dollar-a-Year Men of
Peace,“ Nation's Business 13 (March 1925):66.

n7John H. Fahey, “America's Job Across the Water,“
Nation's Business 13 (5 June i925):19.

l"88amuel Colcord, “Business and World Peace,“
Annals Of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science lug—(May 1930):67;

131

tendency of 'Coolidge prosperity' would be reversed.“49

The fullest development Of America's economy necessitated
peaceful international relations. In the words of Julius
Barnes, business should work for “a new and more secure
social order in the outposts Of the world which so greatly
need the influence Of industrial and business development
written into the living standards and Opportunity Of their
individual people.“50 The business community accepted the
Kellogg-Briand Treaty, but with mixed feelings:51 as the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle observed, “the will to
peace must still be cultivated. . . .“52 No other nation
could accomplish those ends: “Probably no nation has ever
reached so splendid a position in history as that which is
held by the United States at the present moment.“53 Nor
was there a better segment Of society to perform the ser-
vice, according tO business executive Charles K. Woodbridge:
“a common understanding among the business men of the na-

tions will do more for peace than all the leagues, courts,

 

ngJordan W. Pennington, “How Would War Affect the
Business Life of the Nation?“ Magazine Of Wall Street 39
(26 February 1927):809.

50Quoted in “Our Business and World Affairs,“
Nation's Business 13 (5 June 1925):21.

51Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign
Policy 1920-1933 (Boston: Beacon Fress,1973), p. 55.

52“The New Pact of Paris and the International
Outlook,“ Commercial and Fipancial Chronicle 128 (19
January 1929):301.

53Henry Morgenthau, “Our Duty Abroad and at Home,“
Forum 61 (February 1919):219.

132

and combinations of politicians the governments can de—
vise."5’4

On strictly economic grounds there were strong ad-
vocates for international cooperation. While present busi-
ness conditions were good, how long could Europe continue
to buy America's surplus products without a settlement of
the fundamental economic questions? The financial community
was “vitally interested in . . . the maintenance of
[Europe's] capacity to take from our abundance.“55 Reha-
bilitation of Europe as consumer and producer, Observed
Julius Klein, was critical for America's role in that re-
covery: “the reservoir of economic strength in the United
States constitutes an invaluable source of sadly needed
nourishment for Europe.“56 In Klein's Opinion, the pros-
perity of the United States would be the greatest contribu-
tor to international prosperity, thus making America's
economic strength contingent upon world economic growth.
American loans of private capital to European enterprises
had been a prime factor in that continent's general re-
covery into the late 1920's, and Europe was a major market

of United States agricultural products and increasingly for

 

5“Walls Trade Accord Basis of World Peace,“ New
York Times, 21 January 1926.

55Alvin W. Krech,“Keeping Faith With Europe,“
American Banker's Association Journal 15 (November 1922):
327.

56Julius Klein, “The Outlook for International
Business,“ World's Work 53 (February 1927):361.

133

manufactured goods.57

Banker's Magazine, representing commercial banking,
believed that “Considerations of trade, finance, and of
humanity all impel us to a more active participation in the
settlement of the difficulties in Europe.“58 How would
that fit with the traditional foreign policy of individuali-
ty? In his first Annual Message to Congress Calvin Coolidge
stated that America had one cardinal principle in its for-
eign policy: “We attend to our own affairs, conserve our
own strength, and protect the interests of our own citi-
zens. . . .“59 He also provided the justification for
possible involvement abroad when he added that “we recognize
thoroughly our Obligation to help others, reserving to the
decision of our own judgment the time, the place, and the

method."60

Such a posture allowed the United States to
pursue self-interest independently when it could, and al-
lowed cooperative efforts when independent means failed to
achieve their goals. A 1932 presidential commission re-
ported to President Hoover that postwar United States dip—

lomacy essentially had been Of that type, alternating

 

57Ibid., p. 360.

58“Foreign and Domestic Problems,“ Banker's
Magazine 108 (March 1920):309.

59Fred L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union
Messages Of the Presidents 1 90-1 33, 3 vol. (New York:
Robert Hector Putllsfiers, lgtt), 3:2602.

6°Ibid.

 

130

“between isolation and independence, between sharply marked
economic nationalism and notable international initiative
in cooperation, moving in a highly unstable and zigzag

61 It was not always easy to reconcile coopera-

course.“
tion and individuality. Norman H. Davis, American finan-
cier and diplomat, tried to reconcile the two: “It is not
necessary for a nation to give up its individuality to
join with other nations for the good of all, but it is the
way to develop its individuality.“62
Possibly the most serious international problem
with which American business interests had to deal was
reparations and war debts. While not directly involved in
the reparations issue because the nation had not exacted
reparations at the Versailles Peace Conference, repayment
Of loans from the United States to the Allies for war ef-
forts became tied to the reparations those countries re-
ceived from Germany. Any breakdown in such payments put
pressure on the United States' debt payments. Germany's
pre-war economy depended largely upon imports, earnings
from investments in colonies and foreign countries, and

shipping services. As a result Of the war, Germany lost

important regions of steel and other industry, colonies,

 

61Quoted in Wilson, American Business and.Foreign
Policy 1920-1933, p. x.

62Norman R. Davis, “The Locarno Pacts - Their
Meaning to Europe and to America,“ Current History 23
(Decenber 1925):320.

135

and most of its investments and foreign property holdings
were seized by its enemies during the fighting. It was ob-
vious that Germany would have difficulty meeting any pay-
ments; unable to meet demands through its gold supply,
Germany also lacked the industrial capability to produce
sufficient surplus products to serve as payment. Due to
those facts, the Versailles Treaty failed to set a definite
reparations total, leaving the decision to the Reparations
Commission composed Of representatives Of the Allies.63
When the Reparations Commission finally determined
the payments Germany would have to make, an initial payment
of 5 billion dollars was demanded before 1 May 1921, in
addition to bonds worth 10 billion dollars with an interest
of 2% percent annually from 1921 to 1925. With other pro-
visions included, Germany would be bound to pay 375 million
annually from 1921 to 1925 and 900 million dollars or more
each year thereafter. The commission could change interest
rates and reduce the debt, but only with unanimous consent.
In addition, international animosity remained alive by the
provision allowing for armed occupation of German territory
if it willfully defaulted on any payment. The inability Of
Germany to meet the payments characterized the decade, in

spite Of two revisions in the debt schedule.6l4

 

63George Soule Proaperity Decade (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1968 . PP. 259-61.

6ulbid., p. 260.

136

Further problems arose as England began to recog-
nize the impossibility for Germany to meet its payments.
In 1922 Arthur Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, addressed
a note to his country's debtors setting forth the principle
that Britain would attempt to collect from Germany only
what was necessary to meet the demands of its debt payments
to the United States. While the United States never Offic-
ially accepted such a linking of debts and reparations, the
practical connection was recognized widely.65

The importance of the reparations problem was high-
lighted by Willis H. Booth, banker and president Of the
International Chamber of Commerce. Booth wrote that the
United States had an important stake in seeing a rapid
settlement because “we will never be sure of our own pros-
perity or of our position in the world markets until this
very heavy element of uncertainty has been entirely re-

66 But he did not advo-

moved from the economic picture.“
cate cancellation Of debts. Open Opposition existed to any
linkage Of debts and reparations on grounds that if the
United States admitted the linkage between the two, the
debtor nations would step aside assigning their claims
against Germany, “Then this country would hold only one-

name paper, and the bag.“67

 

651bid09 Pp. 261-62.

66Willis H. Booth, “The Business Factor in World
Affairs,“ Nation's Business 11 (5 June 1923):17.

67“Reparations Bag-Holding,“ American Bankers'

137

Andrew Mellon, financier, bank president, and
Secretary of the Treasury from 1921 to 1932, saw no value
in cancellation of debts, particularly as a tool for gain-
ing favor with the European nations. He believed that can-
cellation would not change European dislike of America into
affection but rather would increase disrespect: “a nation
is hardly likely to deserve and maintain the respect of
other nations by sacrificing its own just claims.“68
Mellon's concern with the justice of United States' claims
was common to business attitudes toward the debt payments
question. Being businessmen, they held firm to the prin-
ciple of repayment of debts.

Although the United States government allowed par-
tial reduction of debts tied to reparations revisions in
the Dawes and Young Plans, it was insufficient to allow
cancellation or substantial reduction Of reparations pay-
ments. Bernard Baruch presented an alternative not Offic-
ially accepted, but more or less carried out in practice:
“The cancellation of debts is bad for the debtor and bad
for the creditor. Would it not be better to let each na—
tion pay what it can and defer payment on the balance?“69

While a recent historian has concluded that American

 

Association Journal 21 (November 1928):005.

68Andrew W. Mellon, “America's Attitude on War
Debt Cancellation,“ Current History 26 (May 1927):266.

 

69Bernard Baruch, “Popular Fallacies About
Reparations,“ World's Work 00 (July 1922):327.

138

businessmen assumed that Americans were vitally interested
in the debt question and would strongly oppose any proposal
for cancellation on their own, the impetus may have come
more from the business world.70 For example, consider the
editorial words of the American Bankers' Association
Journal: “In the times to come . . . students of history
and of statecraft might for all that any man now knows to
the contrary amply prove that the wholesale cancellation
which a small group has proposed had been an influence for

evil!“71

Good business practice did not include gratuitous
cancellation of a debtor's liabilities.

Matthew Woll, a vice-president for the American
Federation Of Labor, set forth the complexity of any debt
settlement: “International debts must be settled . . . in
such a rational way as to promote the prosperity of debtor,
creditor and all nations.“72 Woll inferred possibilities
for using the debts to achieve some international goals.
For example, debt cancellation might have been exchanged
for the removal of preferential trade systems abroad, to

encourage a revision in reparations, or even to bargain for

revisions of the Versailles Treaty. But the United States

 

7oWilson, American Business and Foreign Poligy
1920-1933. Pp. 155-35}

71“The 'Intolerable' 62 Years,“ American Bankers'
Association Journal 19 (April 1927):?13.

 

72Matthew Woll, “The Effect on American Workers of
Collecting Allied Debts,“ Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 126 (July 1926):03.

 

139

did not use the debt question to its best diplomatic ad-
vantage, nor did the financial community widely promote
such diplomatic maneuvering; that cancellation would have

been more advantageous for economic growth was not per-

ceived.73

The question Of the American position on the
League of Nations and the World Court drew much attention
from business interests because Of the need for world sta-
bility as groundwork for economic expansion. On the as-
sumption that the League could not function effectively
in a world of discord and vindictiveness, Banker's Magazine
attributed the cause of discord to the inability of the
Allies effectively to work together.7u Rather than a
League type of approach, Banker's Magazine proposed the
codification of international law along with the estab-
lishment of a new world court. Unlike the existing court,
its successor would have international authority to enforce

decrees becuase “moral opinion alone can not be relied

 

73Wilson, American Business and.Foreign Policy
1220-1223, p. 123. The study of the war debts issue by the
BrOO ngs Institution in 1932 concluded that “a complete
obliteration“ of reparations and war debts would be in the
best interest of world prosperity: Harold G. Moulton and
Leo Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity (Washington,
D. C.: The BrooElngs Inétitution, 19327, p.—022.

7“America and EurOpe,“ Banker's Magazine 108
(January 1920):3.

 

100

.75

on. . . .

The National Association of Manufacturers pro-
posed some planks for the Democratic National Party plat-
form in 1920; among them was a proposal that “we disapprove
entrance into the League Of Nations, but recognize that the
United States should enter into some closer relations with
other nations without the compromise of national indepen-
dence.“76 That position may have resulted from a fear
that membership in the League could threaten the economic
objectives of American financial interests by promoting
policy changes which Offered greater consideration to the
interests Of developing nations, adversely affecting the
flow and cost of raw materials into the United States.

Otto Kahn supported retention of America's sover-
eignty; he believed the League overstepped its bounds when
attempting to impose jurisdiction over the major nations.
In Kahn's view, the League had valuable work in furthering
“fair dealing, understanding, good will, and maintaining
peaceable relationships among the peoples,“ but any “exera
else and enforcement, through economic boycott or other-
wise, Of compulsory jurisdiction over great nations is not,
as a realizable fact, one of these functions in the hands

Of the League. . . .“77 Apparently the League should

 

751bid., p. 0.

76“Industry to Suggest Planks to Democrats,“ New
Ygrk Times, 23 June 1920.

 

77Kahn, Of Many Thinga, p. 400.

101

function as a body subservient to the major powers.

Opposition to the League was not a unanimous atti-
tude. Thomas Lamont, in 1920, wrote a letter to the New
York EveninggPost, of which he was part owner, saying that
“The League is admittedly not perfect. But it is the most
practicable instrument yet offered for the prevention of
future wars. . . ."78 Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the
National City Bank of New York from 1909 to 1919, gave
early support to the League on grounds that through partici-
pation the United States would be able to provide Europe
with the moral influence and help needed to regain its
stature and prosperity.79 Support for the League waned
over the decade as its ineffectiveness became apparent.

The World Court generally received a more gracious
reception. Nation's Business may have received it most
warmly while placing into perspective the Court's particu-
lar attractiveness:

The World Court is as domestic in its application as
trade, or manufacturing, or finance, or any other
aspect of our economic life, for every field Of busi-
ness activity is deeply rooted among the great com-
mercial and industrial nations Of the world, and as
go the fortunes of the people of other lands so will
go the fortunes of Americans. . . . American business
men have earned the world's respect for products

'made in the U. S. A.' No product of American genius
is more worthy of that mark than the World Court.80

78Thomas W. Lamont, Across World Frontiers (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951), p. 218.

79“What the Leaders Say,“ Forbes 12 (10 April
1923):02-03.

80“The World Court and America,“ Nation's Business

102

The World Court was attractive because it emphasized law,
a synonym for order and stability. The League, on the
other hand, was the outgrowth of a peace treaty which the
United States failed to ratify, and its effectiveness was
in doubt. America's long tradition Of adherence to law
made the Court appealing. The reliance on judicial settle-
ment rather than settlements by force was another impor-
tant aspect of the Court--prosperity depended on peace.
In fact, some business leaders considered economics the
greatest power for world peace: “The uniting of the nations
in this single act - an agreement to protect by an economic
embargo against the attacking power any nation attacked -
would at one stroke give the security that alone would jus-
tify and lead to large naval and army reductions.“81
Perhaps the isolationist-leaning journal American
Eeonomist was most correct with its analysis that courts
were useful only when nations wanted them to be, but “If
they are not so amenable, then no court or tribunal of any
kind will keep them from submitting their differences to
the arbitrament of war.“82 Besides, the World Court was
linked too closely with the League of Nations, and any
association with that organization meant losing sight of

10 (January 1926):31.
81

82"Why Any World Court?“ American Economiaa 72 (28
December 1923):211.

COlcord, “Business and World Peace,“ pp. 67-73.

103

dangers behind entangling foreign alliances.83 The League
was not a deterrent to war, argued the journal. If its
members wanted war they would have it; if they wanted

peace they would have that--League or no League.84

Segments of the business community had a signifi-
cant stake in American foreign policy. Attitudes reflec-
ted an overriding concern for protection of investments and
the promotion of trade relations for American benefit. The
superior economic position of the United States helped to
justify exploitation of economic disadvantages of other
nations, Often on grounds that the growth Of America's

economy would bring positive results for other nations.

 

83“The World Court,“ American Federationist 72 (1“
December 1923):193.

8‘4'“The Bok Peace Plan Fiasco,“ American.Economist
73 (18 January 1920):17-18.

CHAPTER V

FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH

The attitudes of the military opinion-maker relat-
ing to America's role in world affairs are found in the
statements by top-ranking military personnel and military
publications. Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy
(1920-1929). John W. Weeks and Dwight F. Davis, Secretaries
of War (1921-1925, 1925-1929 respectively), spoke from the
presidential cabinet level. Several branches of military
service published their own journals: Military Engineer,
Cavalry Journal, Coast Artillery Journal, Qaartermaster
Review, and Infantry Journal. Among military people the
.Agayand Navy Journal was popular because it was privately
owned, published by outside interests, and allowed some

anonymity for expression.1

The military personnel them.
selves provided additional sources for attitudes and Opin—
ions; not prolific writers, such views were scattered and

oftentimes presented only after retirement.

 

1For a discussion of the military press during the
1920's see Elbridge Colby, “The Military Press in America,“
Inland Printer 81 (June 1928):109-12.

100

105

The attitudes expressed by military opinion-makers
strongly suggested policies to promote America's military,
economic, and political strength in world affairs. Military
spokesmen sought the goal of superiority. William Howard
Gardiner, chief publicity writer for the Navy League in the
1920's and its president from 1928 to 1933, typified the
military viewpoint:

In military matters our national task is not only to
defend our territories and peoples but also to protect
our worldwide commerce and to secure respect for our
policies and for the rights of citizens wherever con-
ditions are still so backward that heed is given to
equity in proportion to the force supporting it.2
That statement provided the rationale for preparedness,
preservation Of stability, and intervention. It presumed
justice and fairness in America's policies and that other
countries should accept those policies without resistance.
It plainly showed the superiority complex allowing America
to remain outside the mainstream of international politics
while chastising others for their inability to provide sta-
bility.

The military opinion-makers conceived of America's
role in world affairs as the cornerstone for a peaceful and
prosperous world and a shield for weaker nations by giving
pause to potential aggressors. Secretary of the Navy

Curtis D. Wilbur expressed the Navy's perspective:
[The] American Navy is a great asset to all the

 

2William Howard Gardiner, “Insular America,“ Yale
Review n. s. 10 (April 1925):520.

106

nations of the world as a guarantee of peace and

order . . . by the mere existence of this great

Navy under the control of a Nation dedicated to

the maintenance Of peace on the Western Hemisphere

and committed to the maintenance Of world peace.
The concept of “peace and order“ was echoed by many people
connected with the military, as evidenced later in this
chapter.

The nation's military spokesmen wanted America to
survive and prosper, to have its influence extended through-
out the world, and to retain its newfound position as the
world's strongest nation. The military opinion-makers did
not seek an overwhelming military force for the task laid
forth. The manpower with which it worked remained fairly
steady throughout the 1920's at about four-tenths of one
percent of the total population.” Adequate preparedness
was demanded, but a large standing army was viewed in some
circles as “uneconomic and un-American.“5

A strong economic motivation existed in the plea

for adequate national defense. The Secretary of War was

representative with the following statement:

 

3U. 8., Department of the Navy, Annual Re rt of

the Secretar of the Nav i 20 (Washington, D. C.: Unlted
a as overnmen r n ng ice, 192 ), p. 67.

“U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States iggo (Washington, 5. 0.: United States Government

r n g fice, 1931), pp. 155-56.

5U. 8., Congress, Senate, Report of the Committee
on Military Policy Of the American Legion as entered in the
Official record by Senator Jones, 66th Cong., ist sess.,
0 December 1920, Congressional Record 59:110.

107

Our country is a well-established concern. We are
the wealthiest nation on earth. We have acquired
with our wealth the responsibilities which wealth
always brings. A small state can decay with slight
damage to civilization generally. A great state

in its collapse brings down with it countless other
states and communities. In the most altruistic sense
our greatest responsibility to other nations is that
we maintain our own conservatism and stability.
Criminal and destructive tendencies are generally
directed toward unprotected wealth. Our own safety
and liberty, as well as our duty to the world, demand,
therefore, even a greater attention to national defense
than we have ever devoted in the past.6

Rear Admiral William L. Rodgers, member of the advisory
council to the Washington Conference in 1921-1922, and mem-
ber of the General Board from 1920 to 1920, thought that
America's prosperity should not depend upon the goodwill
of other nations; Rodgers called for defense forces “suf-
ficient to ensure the Open door for.American commerce and
thereby to preserve the prosperity of America for
Americans.“7
The military establishment retained little isola—
tionism in its attitudes toward America's role in world
affairs, but protection of its freedom of action was cru-
cial. Tasker H. Bliss, former Chief of Staff, member of

the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and a president

Of the Army War College, wanted the United States to have

 

6U. S., Department of War, Repart of the Secretagy
of War to the President 1923 (Washington, D. C.: United
States Governmenthrinting Office, 1923), p. 7.

7William L. Rodgers, “Peace By Armed Might,“
Forum 73 (May 1925):600.

108

the moral leadership of the world;8 Dwight F. Davis,
Assistant Secretary Of War from 1923 to 1925 and Secretary
Of War from 1925 to 1929, spoke about “the will for peace
with honor;“9 Major General Henry T. Allen, appointed
Commander of the American Forces in.Germany at the end of
the World War, Spoke of a “policy of participation in world

affairs;“10

Rear Admiral William V. Pratt, President of the
Naval War College from 1925 to 1927, Commander-in-Chief of
the United States Fleet from 1929 to 1930, and Chief of
Naval Operations from 1930 to 1933, wrote about America

11 America's

striving to aid others in every way it could.
future was unhesitatingly linked with the world's future,
but the details of participation showed America's self-
interest to be the primary consideration.‘

TO resolve adequately international problems, co-
operation was necessary. Tasker Bliss observed that prob-
lems between states could be solved either by war or by

peaceful cooperative action, and he preferred the latter

method. Bliss wrote: “the world is an association of

 

8Tasker H. Bliss, “What Is Disarmament?“ Foreiga
Affairs 0 (April 1926):357-58.

9Dwight F. Davis to the West Point Class of 1925,
New York Times, 13 June 1925.

10Henry T. Allen, “We Must Not Secede From the
World,“ Survey 52 (1 August 1920):089.

11William V. Pratt, “America As a Factor in World
Peace,“ Annals of the American Academy of Political and
§9cial Seience 108 (July 1923):183.

109

states having common interests which can be guided and
controlled only by common and concerted action - and govern

12 Similarly, Major General

our own actions accordingly.“
Henry T. Allen observed history's lesson to be that isola-
tion would not keep America out Of war; therefore, “Why
not try a policy of participation . . . whereby we could
utilize our enormous moral and physical strength, not only
for the welfare of ourselves but for all other states Of
the world?“13 Newton Baker, Secretary of War from 1916 to
1921, thought industrial nations to be so integrated by
investment and trade relations that political isolation was
an impossibility. Baker recognized the economic advantage
and necessity of participation in world affairs: “Our indus-
tries must have access to the raw materials of the world,
our producers must have a world market and these necessi-
ties are of reciprocal advantage to us and the rest of the
world.“1u
Some Opinion-makers differed with the views ex-

pressed above. Rear Admiral Pratt, who advocated assis-

tance to others in every way possible, stopped at joining

 

12Tasker H. Bliss, “Peace By Cooperation,“ Forum
73 (May 1925):607.

13Allen, “We Must Not Secede From the World,“
p. 089.
1“James Thayer Gerould and Laura Shearer Turnbull,
Selected Articles on Interallied Debts anggRevision of the
fiett Settlements (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1928),
p. 332. Tfie article by Newton Baker originally appeared in
the September 1926 issue Of Trade Winds.

150

the League and World Court, seeing them as detrimental to
America's interests. He opposed the Court because it did
not reflect each country's international position; he

15

wanted America's preeminence duly recognized. Rear
Admiral William Rodgers took the view that America would be
better off by relying on its own strength for maintaining

its national welfare.16

The question of an American policy toward Latin
America received considerable attention in the mid-1920's
as the Mexico oil crisis became more pronounced. The posi-
tion held by military representatives strongly promoted an
imperialistic approach, economically if nOt militarily.
William Rodgers published an article in 1927 exploring the
Mexico situation in particular. Because Mexico possessed
materials essential to the economic well-being of the
world, Rodgers argued, Mexico had responsibility to main-
tain domestic order so that economic activity could con-
tinue uninterrupted. If Mexico could not bring its domes-
tic situation under control, he warned, outsiders must

intervene to maintain the world economy. Rodgers theorized

 

185 15Pratt, “America As a Factor in World Peace,“
p. .

16William L. Rodgers, “Can Courts and Tribunals
Maintain World Peace?“ Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 120 (July 1925):?6.

151

that a government was like a corporation, having responsi-
bility not only to its shareholders but to other corpora—
tions. A government which could not act responsibly risked
receivership, just like a corporation. The grounds for
intervention into politically unstable nations were clear—
ly laid. Any threat to the economic interests of the in-
dustrialized nations became a threat to their security.
Rodgers tried to justify his position with the rationale
that he was extending logically the democratic principle
of the rights of the majority over the minority; the in.
dustrialized nations were the majority and the smaller
nations the minority. In reality, he was promoting the
dominance Of the minority industrial nations over the ma-
jority underdevelOped states; the world's resources were
the property of the great powers, in Rodger's view.17
The Army and Navy Journal, an independent voice of
military opinion, echoed Rodger's words: “People who will
not or cannot establish orderly government, maintain it and
develop their own resources, cannot complain if ultimately
other peoples who can do so, and who badly need the resour-
ces, do it for them.“18 The Qaartermaster Review gave its
support to the protection Of United States interests abroad
on grounds that much of America's foreign trade had been

 

17William L. Rodgers, “Can Mexico Maintain Its
Isolation?“ Forum 7? (June 1927):880-91.

18

“Mexico,“ Army and Navy Journal 61 (29 December
1923):032.

152

developed through partial control of foreign interests:
“Surely this rich estate, the property Of our citizens, is
worth holding and protecting; this despite all weak, spine-
less, soporific contentions to the contrary.“19
The imperial attitudes which Rodgers and others

voiced gained support from the Secretary of War. Upon
retirement of General Leonard Wood after six years as
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Secretary Davis
offered the following tribute to him, with justification
for continued United States domination over the islands:

Never has the government of the Philippine Islands

been in so satisfactory and promising condition as

tO-day. Never have the people of the islands been

more prosperous. . . . This happy situation is the

result of the policies pursued by the United States

in its governance of the Philippines reinforced,

strengthened, and maintained By a sterling adminis-

tration of the islands. . . .
American dominance was a paternalistic model of behavior,
not just for the Philippine Islands but for Latin.America
as well.

Military Opinion-makers viewed the trouble spots

of Latin America as raising the question of peace and order
versus instability and violence. The Secretary of the Navy

defended the presence of American troops in some countries

 

19“Our Foreign Investments,“ Quartermaster Review
6 (may-June i927):58.

20U. S., Department of War, Report of the

Secretar of War to the President 1927 (washi ton, D. C.:
Unlted States Governmefit Printing Ottlce, 1927 , p. 2.

 

 

 

153

on the grounds that they could bring peace and order.21

The United States allegedly had inherited the duty Of pro-
viding stability abroad: “Humanity has to pay for order and
security. The greater the power of a Nation, the greater
is its responsibility not only to its own peOple but to the

world at large.“22

In addition, the United States had an
Obligation to protect its citizens and prOperty against
criminal acts: “murder and rapine are murder and rapine
wherever committed . . . so it is our Obligation to see
that punishment and reparation be obtained for our citi-
zens abroad.“23 Besides, there existed the feeling that by
opening the Panama Canal the United States had assumed a
duty “to give moral support to peaceful government in
Central America, and thus to promote the develOpment, com-
mercial, economic and political, Of the backward states of

that region.“2“

In his annual report for 1920 Secretary of
the Navy Curtis Wilbur summarized the importance of the
military role in Latin.America: it “performed valuable ser-

vices in protecting American interests in Mexico and

 

21“Wilbur Sees Reds Stirring Trouble in Little
Nations,“ New York Times, 13 February 1927. Secretary
Wilbur made his remarks to the National Republican Club.

22“The White Man's Burden,“ Army and Navy Journal
60 (21 May 1927):860.

23,
The Services as Agencies of Peace “ Army and
Navy Journal 60 (30 April 1927):800. ’

2““Editorial Comment,“ Army and Navy Journal 65

(10 January 1928):392.

150

Central America and in tending to stabilize political situ-
ations in Central American ports when outbreaks were immi-
nent.“25

Dwight Davis, as Assistant Secretary of War, con-
sidered the concern for domestic stability abroad as common
to the military and the peace organizations: “We are united
in our efforts to establish a reign of law and order

throughout every land."26

The peace groups would not have
welcomed the association. Major General Henry T. Allen
thought America should exert every means available to pre-
serve world stability: “We would be well advised to use our
great potential force and prestige in such an effort.“27
General Bliss called for the recasting of America's na-
tional policy to serve better peaceful international re-
lations; he asked for support for the Kellogg-Briand Treaty,
codification of international law, and reduction of arma-
ments for self-defense, but only so rapidly as interna-

tional goodwill would allow it.28

 

25D. S.. Department of the Navy, Annual Re ort of
the Secretar of the Nav 1 20 (Washington. 5. 0.: Halted
a es overnmen r n ng ice, 192 ), p. 9.

26Dwight E. Davis quoted in the New York Times,

27Henry T. Allen, “Possibility Of Disarmament -
Necessity for United States Co-operation,“ Annals of the

 

American Academy of Political and Social Sclence IZU (July
:66:
28

Tasker H. Bliss, “The DeveIOpment of American
Policy,“ Foreign Affairs 7 (April 1929):018-26.

155

From the military viewpoint, American foreign
policy had to be grounded on a base Of military power. In
a decade when budgets were being trimmed and the military
had made substantial sacrifices at the Washington Conference
in 1921-1922, a concern loomed large for America's level of
preparedness. Adequate preparedness was not easily defined;
for some it meant a larger.Army, for others it meant main-
taining the level of the Navy provided in the Washington
agreements.

The need for preparedness was based on the ration-
ale that “Regardless of how desirous we may be of living in
peace and amity with other nations, many of the forces
working against peace are beyond our control.“29 Major
General James G. Harbord, Chief of Staff of the Allied
Expeditionary Force in the World War’and president of the
Radio Corporation of America, reacted to critics who
claimed that preparedness was an aggressive act: he did not
believe that “a fire department causes fires or that a hos-
pital causes sickness or that a police force breeds crime.“30

Similarly, Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, former Commander»

 

29“National Defense,“ Cavalry Journal 30 (October
1925):082;

30James G. Harbord, “Our Place in the World,“
World's Work 56 (July 1928):328.

156

in-Chief of the United States Fleet, delegate to the Geneva
Conference on Limitation of Armaments in 1927, and member
of the General Board, did not see how the abolishment of
armaments would end war because “It is not the possession

or even the existence Of the instruments of war that causes

1

war. . . .“3 The cause of war, said Jones, lay in inter-

national mistrust, fear, and suspicion.32 Rear.Admiral
Thomas Magruder, COmmander of the Base Fleet of the United
States (1927-1929), considered the only effect of disarma-
ment would be to delay war's start, not eliminate it.

War's abolition would come only with “a universal spiritual
desire to that end."33 Admiral William v. Pratt offered
an explanation for the danger Of disarmament and the inade-
quate state of world affairs for its inauguration:

Until the people of the earth are educated to
make just laws, and learn to respect the sanctity
of law, the danger of civil and foreign wars will
not be minimized» Even so, war, like other great
natural forces, cannot always be avoided. War,
like diseases and death, is a scourge, but, in a
similar way, it is oftentimes a cleanser and healer.
Unfair commercial and industrial competition, like
excessive rivalry in armaments, is provocative of
war. A due regard for the rights of humanity and
for the sanctity of law will minimize war, but even
so the law of necessity and self preservation and a
lofty conception of national ideals may make war

 

31Hilary P. Jones, “Reduction and Limitation of

Armaments,“ Annals of the.American.Academ of Politica;_and
Social Science I38 (July I928):l75.

32Ibid., p. 178.

 

33Thomas Pickett Magruder, “Can Disarmament
Abolish War?“ Annals of the American Academy Of Political
and Social Science I38 (July 1928):170-72.

157

inevitable. The Christian gentleman has never
gagégatgg to fight for his religion or for his

Thomas S. Butler, Chairman of the House Naval
Affairs Committee, voiced a need for adequate preparedness
because the “spirit“ that prevailed at the time Of the
Washington Conference had vanished. The “spirit“ as he
understood it was Opposition to the build-up of auxiliary
ships which would afford any nation greater naval strength
than contemplated by the Washington Treaties. Butler
alleged that adherence to the letter Of the treaties while
planning building programs for auxiliary ships had been
the behavior of other signatories. Butler was concerned
that America would find itself in an indefensible position
if it did not launch a similar program, as well as maintain
the Washington Treaty limits. He considered further pro-
gress in disarmament virtually impossible because in 1921-
1922 America was arguing from a position Of strength and
made real sacrifices; the United States scrapped over
500,000 tons of existing battleships and cruisers, England
sacrificed about 100,000 tons of ships under construction,
and Japan scrapped about 110,000 tons of ships under con-
struction and 80,000 tons Of planned ships. But at the

time Butler wrote, since other countries enjoyed a superior

position in the eyes of many persons, similar sacrifices by

 

3“William V. Pratt, “The Case for the Naval
Treaty,“ Current History 18 (April 1923):1-2.

158

the United States would be unlikely. The United States had
little alternative in the chairman's view: “If the other
nations are building, what can the United States do but
keep pace. . . .“35 The National Commander of the American
Legion, Edward Spafford, supported Butler and others:
“Adequate preparedness is the best insurance of peace.“36
Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, a longtime critic
of inadequate preparedness who had been threatened with
court-martial during the World War for his criticism of
Secretary Daniel's policies, charged that foreign policy
must have force behind it. Since force was essential to
domestic security, Fiske responded that international secu-
rity should be no different. Recognizing that no one liked
to use force if avoidable, he asserted that “every student
Of history must realize . . . that it has often been found
necessary.“37 Fiske feared that the economic competition
in the Far East between the United States, England, and
Japan could lead to war. Because of that, America should
maintain a state of preparedness, but it must not provoke
war. Fiske was critical Of pacifist doctrine for prevent-

ing adequate preparedness. He could not understand the

 

35Thomas S. Butler, “Where the Arms Conference
Failed,“ World's Work 53 (April 1927):670-77.

36Quoted in “The Legion's Conscription Program,“
Literary Digest 95 (5 November 1927):10.

37BradleyA. Fiske, “Borah's Path to Peace,“ Forum
70 (October 1925):628. Fiske's essay was a response to an
earlier article by Senator William Borah, “The Fetish of

159

insistence on high standards of living without a willing-

38 The use of

ness to pay the price Of defending them.
force was only wrong when used for a wrong purpose, be-
lieved Fiske; for him, force and reason were not necessari-
ly antagonistic, thus international relations to be conduc-
ted with reason did not mean abandonment of force as an
alternative.

Secretary of War John W. Weeks urged.Americans, a
peaceloving people he said, to consider seriously their
needs for defensive preparedness: “[It] is no less true
that Americans like all other peoples, are subject to the
law which punishes those nations who fail to prepare for
defense, as well as those who fail to strive for peace.“39
Week's successor, Dwight Davis, continued the theme, ob-
serving that “The American people realize more than ever
before that the army and navy are their instrument to pre-
serve peace,“ and the desire to avoid future wars was be-
00

hind the clamor for national defense.

The Infantry Journal, with one of the largest

 

Force,“ Forum 70 (August 1925), in which he argued against
the use of force in relations between the United States and
Western Hemisphere countries.

38“Fiske Predicts War to Rise in the East,“ New
York Times, 22 March 1925.

39U. S.. Department of War, Report of the
Secretary of War to the President 1922 (Washington, D. C.:

United States Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 1-2.

uoDwi ht F. Davis “Our Place in the World,“
World's Work 5 (July 1928): 328-30.

160

circulations of any of the special service reviews, pub.
lished an article in which the author held the United
States government responsible for “maintaining its integ-
rity and guaranteeing to its citizens the privileges of
peacefully pursuing their vocations,“ and national defense

was mandatory to fulfill that task.“1

Another article in
the same journal referred to force as “the court of last
resort“ and the judgments of victory would be in force un-
til another resort to arms upheld or changed the decision:
“Even the most died-in-the-wool pacifist fanatic must

BCRnOWIOdge this. 0 e ..02

An editorial about preventing
war stated that “The United States . . . can best do its
part by refraining from aggression and by being able at all
times to make war against any aggressor.“l"3
The Coast Artillegy_gournal, a publication devoted
largely to tactics and techniques, presented a view similar
to the Infantry Journal: “Force, it must be remembered, is
the ultimate appeal today just as it has been through the
ages and just as it is likely to be for some little time in

a).

the future.“ The Military Engineer also responded to the

 

“1F. J. Williams, “Application of National Defense
Act,“ Infantry Journal 26 (May 1925):510.

uzFitzhugh Lee Minnigerode, “The Next War,“
Infantry Journal 20 (January 1920):320.

“3WJouma1 26 (March 1925):320.

“#Harold R. Enslow, “Preparedness - The Guarantee
of Peace,“ Coast Artillery Journal 66 (March 1927):225.
See also “What Has the eague o Nations Done?“ Army and
Navy Journal 61 (22 September 1923):80.

 

161

issue of force, noting that while force could be used for
both good and bad, the United States could be trusted to
use it for good.“5 The Qaartermaster Review strongly sup-
ported adequate defense because America's history time and
again showed the high cost of engaging in wars without ade-
quate preparedness.“6 Curtis Wilbur saw too many problems
that could be adjudicated only by war: “So long as men dif-
fer in their ideals concerning powers of Government, rights
of peOples and upon questions of religion, there are al-
ways potential questions or controversies which may lead to
war. . . .,07 Wilbur realized the World Court could pro-
vide settlement for many disputes, but not all controver-
sies could be adjudicated. President Calvin Coolidge
paralleled those ideas in a letter to the National Security
League: “In the interest of peace, in the interest of our
ideals we should properly maintain our national defense)“8

Force definitely had a role to play in the foreign relations
of the world.

 

45"Force,“ Military Engineer 1? (November-December
1925):086.

u6“National Defense - Its Necessity Proven,“
Quartermaster Review 18 (November-December 1928):68.

“7Quoted in “Roosevelt Denies Navy Is In Bad Way,“
New York Timea, 9 May 1920. See also L. M. Overstreet,
“Danger of Disarming America,“ United §tates Naval
Institute Proceediags 50 (September 1920):1092-98.

ueQuoted in “Roosevelt Denies Navy Is In.Bad Way,“
New York Times, 9 May 1920.

162

The American Legion, representing the Armed Forces
veterans of the World War, devoted its efforts throughout
the 1920's to encourage Congress to provide funds for
strengthening the United States Navy Fleet and other units
of national defense. The Legion was disheartened by the
pacifist wave sweeping the country, and acted to counter
it. The Legion labeled the failure of the United States to
keep a strong national defense posture as a barrier to
effective world affairs leadership.“9

Preparedness required more than the conscription
of man and ordnance. The entire industrial complex need be
conscripted:

That drastic control over all the essential elements
of industry is necessary in war was proven in this
country and all others engaged in the World War.
This control . . . must be exercised promptly. That
our resources may be used to support our combatant
forces and supply the essential needs of our civil
pOpulation, authoritative priorities must be enforced.
It is vital that there be a control over prices that
effect the living expenses of our peop$e who must
produce the supplies required in war.
TO promote the cooperation between military and industry
during times of war, necessary steps had to be taken in
time of peace. In March 1926 the War Department held the

first meeting of its newly formed War Department Business

 

49Roscoe Baker, The American Le ion and.American“
Foreiga Policy (New York: Boofiman Assoclates, I950),
P. e

50U. S., Department of War, Report of the

Secretar of War to the President 1 2 (Washington, D. C.:
Unlted States Government Printing ce, 1925 , p. 28.

 

163

Council, which consisted of outstanding industrial leaders.
The industrial companies represented included the General
Electric Company, Bank of America, Great Western Railway,
Parke-Davis, Carnegie Steel, and du Pont de Nemours.51 In
addition, officers from the supply branches were being
detached to Harvard University to pursue business adminis-
tration courses, and the Army Industrial College at
Washington, D. C., was established to provide further
efficiency during times of mobilization with minimal dis-
ruption.52
The American Legion strongly supported a policy of
broad mobilization. Prevention of profiteering, stabili-
zation of prices, and minimal economic disruption were ob-
jectives to which the Legion pledged itself. The American
Legion.Weekly explained the Legion's motivation: “the
American Legion must strive to create among citizens who
know nothing of actual war a sentiment for a sound and con—
tinuous defense policy. The keynote of that policy is not
militarism, but common business sense.“53 Edward Spafford,

the Legion's National Commander, spoke for the members:

 

51W. S., Department of War, He rt of the
Secretary_of War to the President 192 (Washington, D. C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1926), p. 30;
U. S. Department of War He rt of the Secretary of War to
me President 1223 (Washing‘fm'on, 0' . C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1929), pp. 35-36.

5zgepgrt of the Secretary of War to the_§resident
1226, pp. 30-31 0

53“The Circle of Unpreparedness,“ American Legion
Weekly 0 (16 June 1920):10.

160

“We believe one of the best preventives of war is the en-
actment of a bill which shall place the burden of war - if
it come - upon all. Let labor and capital be conscripted,
as well as men.“5u The Universal Draft Bill which the
Legion supported gave power not only to conscript men, but
power to stabilize prices in wartime and place under govern-
ment control the material resources of the country. Such a
bill would, according to a Legion spokesman, “prove in time
to be the greatest peace measure this country or the world
has ever known.“55

But_there is a thin line between one nation's con-
ception Of security and another's view of preparation for
aggression. Preparedness in an isolated context may be
virtuous, but when a powerful, rich natiOn competing for
and dominating international markets promotes preparedness,
it casts fear or suspicion into the consciousness of na-
tions which already feel threatened by economic competition.
Given the nature of America's potential economic, political,
and military position in the world order during the 1920's,
any military build-up could have been interpreted by out-
siders as a threat.

The Secretary Of the Navy, Curtis Wilbur, wrote
that the first duty of the Navy was to keep war away from

5““The Legion's Conscription Program,“ Literary
Digest 95 (5 November 1927):10.

55John R. Moguigg, “What the Legion Wants in
1926,“ Outlook 101 (1 December 1925):600.

165

America.56 Secretary of War Davis declared that America's
security against aggression would be guaranteed by imple-
menting the provisions of the National Defense Act of
1920.57 To the West Point Class on 12 June 1925 Davis
asserted: “Our military plans at the war Department are

based solely on security, not aggression. . . ."58

The question of disarmament and the Outlawry of
war presented serious concerns for military leaders. Rear
Admiral Bradley Fiske argued that effective disarmament de-
pended upon the reliability and dependability of agreements
among nations; he believed such agreements could last only
so long as vital interests went unaffected. In the case,
though, where vital interests were challenged and stability
broke down, Fiske thought the United States ought to rely -
on arms rather than diplomacy; he asserted that America was
most skilled at inventing and making arms, with diplomacy
its least developed talent.59

On the specific topic of outlawry of war the

 

56Curtis D. Wilbur, “Our Place in the World,“
World's Work 56 (July 1928):331. .

57Report of the Secretapy_of War to the President
1925, p. 11.

58New York Times, 13 June 1925.

”Bradley A. Fiske, “The Possibilities of
Disarmament,“ Annals of the American Acadegy of Political
and Social Science 120 (July I925):77-80.

 

166

opinion-makers discussed here generally agreed that such an
approach posed dangers because it failed to provide ade-
quate military safeguards for enforcement. In other words,
human nature and the good intentions of nations could hard-
ly suffice to provide adequate assurances for the success
of the outlawry scheme. The Infantry Journal warned that
such schemes to secure world peace through abolition of
armaments in the United States gained inspiration from the
“communistic influence“ and would “render the United States
helpless to defend herself. . . .“60

For some, the pursuit of outlawry and disarmament
was proceeding too rapidly without accurate assessment of
the consequences: “Before we eliminate preparedness let us
be sure that we have something better in its stead. Let us
be certain that we shall be at least equally secure. Let
us make certain that the weak and helpless and innocent

61 Admiral

shall be no more oppressed than at present.“
Hilary Jones voiced similar thoughts: “I beg of you not to
be deceived by a dream Of eternal peace. . . . If we are to
enjoy the fruits of the labors of our fathers, we must be

62 The Military

prepared to use the same instrument.“

 

6O
61

Infantry Journal 25 (September 1920):338.

2 8 Enslow, “Preparedness - The Guarantee of Peace,“
p. 2 .

62Hilary P. Jones, “A Just Man Armed Keepeth His
House in Order,“ United States Naval Institute Proceedinga
09 (May 1923):765.

167

Engineer lent its support to the idea of force in support
of peace.63
Tasker H. Bliss believed that outlawry of war was

suspect:

my own view as to our military policy is that we

should not disarm an American soldier nor lay up

an.American ship of war exce t'as the result of

such an agreement among compe ing nations, loyal-

iyeaigagzeghagdsaggeyagu:gioasiziiifgogyince
He noted that disarmament could come only after sufficient
security had been provided, and security could be achieved
only by “the substitution of force regulated by law, for
unrestrained, arbitrary force.“65

A treaty signifying an abolition of war would be

insufficient to achieve peace. Rear Admiral Rodgers had
opposed any unilateral reduction or total abandonment of
armaments--1t would leave America vulnerable. He also
opposed reduction because that in itself did not deal with
the causes of war: “We all know that great collective emo-
tions are only restrained by force, not by reason.“66
Reliance on international law, in his view, was ineffective

because it did not have extensive force behind it, as did

 

63“Aggressive and Passive Nations,“ Military
Engineer 19 (JanuaryaFebruary 1927):39.

6“Bliss, “Peace By Cooperation,“ p. 602.

65Tasker H. Bliss, “Disarmament,“ American Journal
of International Law 21 (January 1927):39.

66Rodgers, “Can Courts and Tribunals Maintain
World Peace?“ p. 71.

168

domestic law. General Allen charged that the possibility
of a widespread reduction of armaments rested with inter-
national cooperation to provide security for weak nations,

and the creation Of a meaningful arbitration project.67

Military Opinion-makers generally were uniform in
their approach to America's role in world affairs. Major
General Allen visualized “the role that destiny has imposed
upon us,“ and spoke of America utilizing its “enormous
moral and physical strength“ for the welfare of the world.68
Rear Admiral Pratt said that from the founding of America
to the World War the country had based its influence pri-
marily on “example and . . . the potential strength [of] a
young and growing nation.“69 The country was prepared to
do much for Europe, if only Europe would show evidence of
first helping itself. Pratt also believed America had
taken over England's former position as the world's balance-
of-power. General John J. Pershing, Chief of Staff, United
States Army, from 1921 to 1920, took a stand similar to

that of Pratt. Pershing wrote: “As a strong and reasonable

 

67Allen, “Possibility of Disarmament - Necessity
For United States Co-Operation,“ pp. 65-66.
08 68Allen, “We Must Not Secede From the World,“
P. 9.

8 69pratt, “America As a Factor in World Peace,“
p.150

169

nation, our power may be a decisive factor in keeping the
peace among nations.“ He went on to promote a neutral posi-
tion for the United States: “When other nations lose their
tempers, we should be able to keep ours in our friendly
detachment and goodwill toward all.“70 William Gardiner
saw the United States as an island in the middle of the
world able to reach out in all directions.71 Opinion.
makers directly associated with the military considered
America able to help the world by acting as an example for
others and being all-powerful.

America could not live in isolation, according to
military Opinionpmakers. The military presented no sur-
plus Of advocates for joining the League of Nations; Europe
has “a different set of interests from our own, and . . .
political independence is the wise policy for the United
States to continue to follow.“72 But the existence of wide—
spread support for.America's assistance in solving the world
problems defies the label of “isolationist.“ Any attempt
to remain outside of world affairs would not only defy
America's financial and moral position, but would threaten
its security by allowing others an opportunity to structure

a world environment potentially harmful to America's

 

7°John J. Pershi , “Our Place in the World,“
World's Work 56 (July 1928 :320.

71Gardiner, “Insular America,“ p. 520.
72Army and Nagy Journal 65 (1 October 1927):88.

170

interests. The status gag became an important concern,
expressed as preservation of world peace. No matter how
expressed, the message was clear-.America's future resided
with a stable world in which no nation threatened its pro-
eminence, and the commercial traffic flowed unimpeded.

The military supporters had greater interest in preserving
.America's status in the world than in a humanitarian effort

to better the conditions Of less fortunate nations.

CONCLUSION

This study began with the assumption of an under.
lying concept of America's role in world affairs common to
opinion-makers within five high-prestige occupational
categories. Such a concept exiSted on a theoretical level,
although opinionemakers as a group did not produce a uni-
form approach to foreign policy issues at the operational
level. Opinion-makers agreed that America's foreign policy
should leave the country free to contribute when it desired
to the advancement Of world peace and prosperity, but at
the practical level differences abounded. Within occu-
pational categories there normally existed opinions too
diverse to project unity--the church and military coming
closest to conformity. They normally did not speak as
representatives of occupational categories, but as rep—
resentatives of narrower interests identified with pare
ticular ideals and perceptions of world order. The evi-
dence strongly suggests that what characterized American
foreign policy equally as much as a theoretical concept
opposed to collective security arrangements, was an
opinion-making body normally incapable of producing uni-
formity on issues transcending basic economic interests
and posing the long-range, tough questions of national

goals.
171

172

Overall, opinionpmakers in the 1920's advocated
American participation in international life, but usually
short of political commitments. While opinion.makers
unanimously advocated a workable and peaceful international
system, there existed several solutions for consideration.
The idea that America must be free to determine its own
course independent of other nations' interests was destruc-
tive to the system advocated as ideal. Because opinion.
makers could not agree among themselves, a traditional
foreign policy remained to assure a reserved approach to
the political and economic conditions which caused inter.
national problems. The intricacies of foreign affairs
were approached with the intent of protecting, preserving,
and advancing America's position in the world order, more

than integrating that world order into a system of equals.

United States-Latin America relations exposed
conflicting views among opinion-makers. Protestant spokes-
men largely challenged an aggressive American policy toward
the underdeveloped nations. The Methodist Journal Zion's
Herald expressed the view of the less activist anti—imperi-
alist: "For the most powerful nation to be the general pro-
tector may be theoretically altruistic and noble, but in
the present status of society it is too likely to be inter-

173

1 But the issue was not always

preted as imperialism.”
simply imperialism versus anti-imperialism. Catholic
opinion-makers had to face the Mexican government's
usurpation of Catholicism's power and control over the
masses. Partly in response to the suppression of
Catholicism, the Journal America reacted strongly for a
hard-line approach to the oil question. ngmonweal, how-
ever, was able to separate the issues and stand for oppo-
sition to economic exploitation of Mexico. The extent to
which Protestants supported Mexico because of anti-
Catholic feelings cannot be Judged.

Opinion-makers among the military presented a
consistent approach to Latin American issues. Although
not overly expressive on the issues, a hard-line position
was advocated by.Admiral William Rodgers, secretaries of
the Navy and War, the Aggy and Navy gournal, and the
Quartermaster geview. Their position was explained by the
strategic importance attached to the Caribbean region;
too much self-sufficiency by those nations could pose a
threat to America's security through the vulnerable Panama
Canal and Gulf region.

Opinion-makers among Journalists, business inte-
rests, and academics expressed diverse views toward Latin

America. Thomas Lamont and Dwight Morrow, representing

 

1"Intervention or Cooperation?" Zion's Herald
(1 February 1928):133.

17#

international bankers, Joined with the Nation, William
Allen White, H. L. Mencken, Walter Lippmann, Harry Elmer
Barnes, and John Dewey, for example, to oppose a forceful,
uncompromising approach to Latin.American problems. The
Nation offered a most condemning criticism of American
imperialism:
The imperialists, the advocates of war are unceas-
ingly at work. Those who believe in international
morality and decency must likewise be unceasing in
serving notice upon President Coolidge that the
American people do not propose to be betrayed into
bloodshed in . . . Mexico, that they still believe
in the rights of small nations to self-determination,
and that they scorn the doctrine that war-might gives
us the right to say how peoplg shall live or think
or act in any weaker country.
Such an attack did not extend to advocating a ban on expor-
tation of merchandise and capital; but it was considered
imperative that any disputes over property rights be arbi-
trated and Americans investing money abroad enJoy no more
privileges than the citizens of those countries.
Opinion-makers such as Guy Stevens, Otto Kahn,
William Randolph Hearst, and the Chicago Tribune, were less
sympathetic to the plight of underdeveloped nations, seeing
them as sources of economic exploitation; in that perspec-
tive any approach had to give priority to economic and
political stability abroad, a situation not encouraged,
they would argue, by anything less than a firm and consis-
tent stand opposing anti-American economic and political

policies.

 

zNation 12h (26 January 1927):80.

-——-—.—-

175

The League of Nations had its critics and sup-
porters throughout society. Among its detractors were such
strange political bedfellows as William Randolph Hearst,
Admiral William Rodgers, the Chicago Tribune, and Otto
Kahn alongside Charles Clayton Morrison and the flgtggg;
while each had differing reasons for their views, they
could act together in opposition. Hearst and Rodgers
were representative of those who saw the League as an in-
fringement upon.America's flexibility in decision-making
as well as vital interests abroad--the last probably most
significant in their thinking.

While opposition to collective security had
undergirded the American rejection of the League in 1919-
1920, that issue subsided as the decade wore on; the
Locarno agreements in particular showed that what security
arrangements might exist would be regional, and it was
more representative of a spirit of arbitration than col-
lective security. Only those nations with an immediate
interest in security arrangements could agree to prear-
ranged commitments of armed action.

The League's supporters also represented a cross-
section of types; Thomas Lamont, Manley 0. Hudson, Kirby
Page, Sherwood Eddy, and the flgg_gork Timeg, as examples.
To them world peace and international cooperation seemed
more important than self-centered interests, although some
reservations arose. Kirby Page supported the League not

because he believed in its collective security provisions,

176

but because it would serve as a useful addition to other
instrumentation designed to promote peace; Thomas Lamont
had supported it as the best alternative to date; sup-
porters concentrated on its potential contributions to
peace and the responsibility America had to participate
in that endeavor, not on the collective security impli-
cations.

The World Court received similar divided reaction.
America's security was a primary consideration; ironically,
both supporters and opponents could point to preservation
of America's security as the rationale behind their posi-
tions. The Senate's attachment of reservations in 1926
exemplified the suspicion of political commitments which
threatened (or appeared to threaten) usurpation of United
States' control over its own use of force; opinion-makers
widely supported the reservations.

Peace was a much discussed topic during the
decade. All groups studied had a positive interest in
achieving lasting peace, from the churchman acting out of
a Christian morality to business interests viewing peace as
essential to the continued growth of a national and world
economy. Just as there were varied motives so were there
varied means extending from the outlawry of war to the*
strengthening of military preparedness. The adoption of
the Kellogg;Briand Treaty exemplified the power of emotion
to pursue and accomplish an obJective._ The international

events of the 1930's verified the inability of paper

177

agreements to transcend international tension and national
aggression. Peace was more easily defined than implemented.
But even on that issue, there was widespread variance on
how best to achieve it. With'exception of the military who
saw preparedness as more effective than outlawry, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact received almost universal backing, but
with differing interpretations as to its implications and
effectiveness-~from those who accepted it because it would
do no harm to those who saw it as the beginning of the
elimination of all wars.

While the pact did seem a departure from America's
avoidance of collective security arrangements, because the
United States in essence did agree by signing that it had
a stake in war no matter where it occurred, the absence of
specific provisions for enforcement preserved the free-

dom of political action.

The decade of the 1920's was the beginning of a
transition stage for the United States--from a nation of
altruistic, moralistic perceptions of the international
'order and America's role in it to a more sober, realistic
assessment of the relationship between power and respon-
sibility. In the 1920's there were few opinion-makers who
could proJect a balance between the nation's developing
economic-political strength and the implementation of a
policy based on a global order designed for the common

178

good. At a time when power and responsibility were needed,
America was unable to respond with energy or directedness.
The question of the proper balance between power and
responsibility still plagues the United States, and it must
be through the actions of opinion-makers that the alterna-

tives are made known and the choices determined.

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U. 8., Congress. Senate. Resolution adopted by the
national defense committee of the American Legion entered
by Senator Reed. 70th Cong., 1st sess., 13 March 1928.
Congressional Record, vol. 69.

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189

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Periodicals and Newspapers
The following sources were drawn upon extensively for

editorial comment during the years indicated. They
are listed separately as an aid to the reader.

America. 1925-1929.

(American Bankers Association Journal. 1922-1929.

Army and Nagy Journal. 1922-1929.

Atlanta Constitution. 1922-1929.

Catholic World. 1924-1929.

Cavalry Journal. 1922-1929.

Chicago Tribune. 1923-1929.

Christian Advocate. 1924-1929.

Christian Century. 1924-1929.

Collier's. 1922-1929.

Commercial and Financial Chronicle. 1922-1929.

190

Commonweal. 1924-1929.
Congregationalist. 1925-1929.
Infantry Journal. 1922-1929.
£22223. 1922-1929.

Nation's Business. 1922-1929.

New Republic. 1922-1929.

New York Times. 1922-1929.

New York World. 1922-1929.
Outlook. 1922-1929.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 1924-1929.
San.Francisco Examiner. 1923-1929.
Saturday Evening_Post. 1922-1929.
World's Work. 1922-1929.

Zion's Herald. 1924-1928.

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Prothro, James Warren. The Dollar Decade: Business Ideas
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"IWMEW‘E'EE‘T‘EIES