OPINION-MAKERS AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE CONCEPT OF AMERICA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, THE 1920'S

A Dissertation
for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Michael James Conwell
1977

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

OPINION-MAKERS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
THE CONCEPT OF AMERICA'S ROLE IN
WORLD AFFAIRS, THE 1920'S

presented by

MICHAEL JAMES CONWELL

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D. degree in History

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Date Feb. 16, 1977

O-7639

ABSTRACT

OPINION-MAKERS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
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By

MICHAEL JAMES CONWELL

In this dissertation the concept of America's role in world affairs as perceived by opinion-makers during the 1920's is explored. The opinion-makers were selected from five high-prestige occupational categories as suggested by sociological studies; the five categories were business executive, clergyman, college academic, editor, and military officer. In addition to an examination of individuals, significantperiodicals were included from each occupational category; such publications as Christian Century, the New York Christian Advocate, Army and Navy Journal, New York Times, Nation, New Republic, World's Work, Current History, and Nation's Business were important makers of opinion. This study, therefore, is divided into five parts, each focusing on one occupational group.

The fundamental argument of the thesis is that the concept of America's role in world affairs during the 1920's was characterized by the rejection of collective security--the doctrine of collectively enforced peace. There were no exceptions to it: the United States avoided political-military entanglements in Europe, the Far East, and in Latin America. Consequently, the underlying concept of

America's role in world affairs can be studied from a cross-section of foreign policy events. The three primary areas for discussion are the League of Nations and World Court, United States-Latin America relations, and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Treaty.

While it can be shown that opinion-makers agreed across occupational lines on the theoretical concept of America's role in world affairs--America should be free to contribute when and how it desired to the advancement of world peace and prosperity--they were unable to produce a uniform approach at the operational level. Equally important was the fact that opinion-makers did not regularly speak for occupational groups, but rather for narrower interests identified with particular ideals and perceptions of world order. Because opinion-makers were unable to promote a united operational approach to world affairs, a traditional foreign policy remained in effect: economic advancement without commitments for a world political body were foremost considerations.

During the 1920's few opinion-makers seemed able or willing to realistically assess the relationship between power and responsibility, the two most important considerations in America's world role. Without a penetrating analysis of the use of power and the responsibility of world leadership, a foreign policy designed to meet the needs of a rapidly changing world order was unlikely to emerge. What is strongly suggested by the research is that

to achieve a broad-based foreign policy on issues other than abstract goals such as "peace," "morality," or "justice" is difficult at best.

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1977

For Marge, Paul, and Curtis,
whose contributions of time
and understanding were most
important.

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INTRODUCTION

This study explores the concept of America's role in world affairs as held by American opinion-makers in the 1920's.[1] The influence which these sources exerted upon opinion-holders and decision-makers cannot be measured, but the ability to transmit opinions provided the possibility of influence.

Because the opinion-making role is predominately an ascribed capacity attached to occupation,[2] five high-prestige occupational categories were selected from which to sample opinion-makers. Sociological studies suggested that the categories possessing the highest prestige, in rank order, were elected government officials, business executives, college academics, physicians, clergymen, lawyers, engineers, editors, and military officers.[3]

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[1]The term "opinion-maker" is based upon the definition in James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, Inc., 1961), p. 45.

[2]Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[3]These occupational categories and their prestige levels are adapted from sociological studies using the pioneering work by George S. Counts and the National Opinion Research Center's findings of 1947 and 1963: George S. Counts, "The Social Status of Occupations: A Problem in Vocational Guidance," School Review 33 (January 1925):16-27; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social Status (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961),

Eliminating physicians, engineers, and lawyers because of a lack of professional interest in the broad questions of foreign policy, and by-passing elected government officials to focus upon non-policymaking persons, the most prestigious categories were business executives, clergymen, college academics, editors, and military officers.

Because opinion-makers had access to the communication system for dissemination of their ideas and attitudes, the periodical literature of the 1920's is significant to this study. Extensive use was made of the mass media, of which there are two types: (1) the "influential" media consisting of prestige and large circulation newspapers and periodicals; and (2) the "representative" media of a class, section, ethnic group, and other subdivisions of the larger population.[4]

Because this study covered a limited number of years, I chose to examine as many expressions of opinion as possible within those years. Among daily newspapers, where continuous scanning would have been time-consuming and most likely unrewarding compared with the effort, the search was keyed to the time framework of the issues discussed. For weekly and monthly periodicals, indexes and

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p. 263; Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-1963," American Journal of Sociology 70 (November 1964): 286-302.

[4]Lee Benson, "An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (Winter 1967-1968):558.

tables of content were available to select relevant editorials and articles.

The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature for the years 1922-1928 revealed that of 222 articles under the general heading "United States - Foreign Relations," near seventy-percent were included in twelve periodicals; those served as a starting point. While not conclusive, it is interesting to observe that only two of the initial twelve sources, Saturday Evening Post and Collier's, were listed among the first twenty-five magazines received by the 9,200 families studied by Robert and Helen Lynd in Middletown; it is equally interesting to observe that in their study of working and business-class families, magazines of the Atlantic, Harper's, and World's Work type, which were more likely to publish analytical foreign policy discussions, were subscribed to by none of the worker's families and by two-thirds of the business-class families.[5] Similar percentages existed for subscriptions to influential and large-circulation newspapers of the type included in the following chapters.

The opinion-makers were drawn from positions of prominence within the five occupational categories. They tend to be representative, not necessarily the most important. Although they are divided by occupation, one must

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[5]Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown: A Study in American Culture (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1929; Harvest Books, 1956), pp. 239-40, 471-72.

constantly be aware that they often interacted professionally.

The concept of America's role in world affairs as held by opinion-makers in the 1920's was characterized by the rejection of collective security--the doctrine of collectively enforced peace.[6] Collective security binds nations together on the assumption that all states have a stake in war no matter where it occurs and therefore should join to suppress it.[7] From the post-war debate over the League of Nations collective security provision in Article X of the Covenant through the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact in 1928, official policy persisted in avoidance of multilateral commitments which would bind the nation's economic and military power to the whims, dictates, and overt influence of other nations.

America's avoidance of collective security persisted throughout the decade. For example, in 1921-1922 the Washington Naval Arms Conference convened to discuss

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[6]See L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1968) and Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965; Collier Books, 1969).

[7]For discussion see the following works by Roland N. Stromberg: "The Idea of Collective Security," Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (April 1956):250-63; Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963).

disarmament and Far East issues. The Four, Five, and Nine-Power treaties which resulted were based upon moral restraint rather than collective safeguards: the Four and Five-Power pacts established a ratio for naval parity, pledged respect for the status quo in Pacific possessions, and provided for consultation if disagreements occurred; the Nine-Power Treaty pledged respect for the territorial integrity of China, but provided no means for enforcement.[8] On the issue of war debts and reparations the American government insisted on repayment of wartime loans to the allies, but refused to officially recognize any link between payment of those debts and the reparations demanded from the defeated powers by the victorious Versailles signatories. Although Americans participated in international conferences to ease the burden of reparations upon Germany, they did so as financiers rather than governmental representatives, thus avoiding any direct government responsibility for enforcement of the agreements.[9] In 1928 the United States and fourteen other nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact condemning war

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[8]The Washington Naval Arms Conference and its results are discussed in John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference 1921-1922 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955).

[9]Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933, pp. 191-211; an exhaustive study of the war debts problem was provided in Harold G. Moulton and Leo Paslovsky, War Debts and World Prosperity (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1932).

as recourse in international relations; it provided absolutely no enforcement other than the power of public opinion.[10] In Latin America the United States relied on unilateral action and the continued justification of the Monroe Doctrine as a means to prevent internal disorder and external interference; though the policy was tempered during the decade, the region remained strictly defined as an American interest.[11]

Because the rejection of collective security was consistent through the decade rather than selective by events, it suggests a basic, underlying concept respecting America's role in world affairs. An examination of opinion-maker attitudes concerning a cross-section of events rather than all events of the decade should satisfactorily reveal the conceptual framework of the five occupational categories studied. To what extent did opinion-makers promote or criticize a policy which reserved full sovereignty over the use of the nation's economic and military power for international relations?

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[10]For an account of the movement leading to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty see Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).

[11]The following accounts are recommended: Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1941; 1963), pp. 277-316; Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961; W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 13-47.

The League of Nations and World Court, Latin America, and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact are the primary issues included in the following chapters. The League of Nations and World Court, joined for discussion because of their real and imagined association, offered opportunity for participation in an international cooperative arrangement; the response to that situation is instructive. In Latin America, particularly in Mexico where revolutionary governments attempted to assert state control over subsoil possessions and landholdings of foreign companies and nationals, America was responding unilaterally to a growing nationalism which threatened the economic and strategic value of the region. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was the result in part of a widespread peace crusade which ultimately relied upon not economic or military sanctions but the power of public opinion to stem the forces of aggression. The response to these issues and what it says about the concept of America's role in world affairs is examined in the following chapters.

CHAPTER I

CHRISTIANITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter presents the views of American Protestant and Catholic opinion-makers on the concept of America's role in world affairs during the 1920's.[1] Often carrying forth the tenets of social Christianity at home, how did they approach issues of imperialism, war, or international cooperation? To what extent could they escape society's norms and explore possibilities for a new world order to match the domestic restructuring urged through social Christianity?

The selection of sources centered on periodicals and individuals active in the discussion of foreign relations and America's role in world affairs. Among journals the nondenominational Christian Century and World Tomorrow, the Methodist Christian Advocate (New York edition) and Zion's Herald, and the Bulletin of the Federal Council

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[1]The five largest Protestant bodies--Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Protestant Episcopal--plus the Roman Catholic Church accounted for 87 percent of all church membership over 12 years of age in the United States during the post-war decade. U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1935 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 68.

of the Churches of Christ were beneficial for the Protestant perspective, with America, Catholic World, and Commonweal representing diverse segments of Catholic opinion.[2] Persons holding positions throughout the church structure, or interacting with those who had such positions, were included in the research.

The general tenets of Christian internationalism--the belief that the United States had a moral obligation to assist in restructuring the world order--were widely disseminated by the opinion-makers; but on closer examination those same spokesmen too often demonstrated parochialism. They espoused anti-imperialist doctrine over United States-Latin America relations, but in the midst of the controversy over Mexico's assertions for greater control of its minerals at the expense of foreign companies in Mexico those churchmen and journals fell short in supporting Mexico's right of expropriation (in fact, they ignored the issue) and were critical only mildly of the foreign oil companies. They debated collective security, but on the specific issue of the League of Nations and World Court there was considerable emphasis on the need for

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[2]The following sources are valuable for discussion of the literature and activities of churchmen during the 1920's: Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America 1914-1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970); Donald B. Meyer, The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); Robert Moats Miller, "The Attitudes of the Major Protestant Churches in America Toward War and Peace, 1919-1929," The Historian 19 (November 1956):13-38.

reservations which would protect and enhance America's position in relation to the other participants. As will be seen below, the approach to world affairs was tempered with self-interest.

Opinion-makers within the Protestant and Catholic churches during the post-war decade projected the United States as superior in moral tone and philanthropic spirit. That attitude persisted despite disappointment and disillusionment resulting from the World War. During the 1920's opinion-makers in the churches attempted to draw attention to an obligation for restructuring international relations along lines of Christian ethics--to retreat from international affairs would have meant to surrender moral obligation.

Opinion-makers believed that with American leadership the world political-economic structure would undergo a positive transformation. The United States government and people had to accept the responsibility of their new-found potential in economic power. Foreign trade and investments took on a new perspective when America emerged from the war as a creditor nation. The churches insisted the United States exercise its potential political power for the benefit of the less developed nations. Principles of world interest were to dominate the international considerations in United States foreign policy, at least in theory.

Opinion-makers in the church community viewed the international order of the 1920's in idealistic terms. Phrases like "world justice" and "peace" were commonplace. Application of the Golden Rule, Christian principles, and Christian ethics were common prescriptions for the ills of the world. The World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches typified the critique of the international situation: "We will not believe that mankind is so deficient in character and intelligence as to make the national solution of our international problems impossible and to commit us to the continued rule of insane fear, hatred and collective destruction."[3] The General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1924 included the following in its statement on war: "We set ourselves to create the conditions for peace. Selfish nationalism, economic imperialism, and militarism must cease. . . ."[4] The influential Methodist Christian Advocate, published in New York, included a charge to America calling for application of "the Golden Rule to international affairs" and a fostering of "that mutual

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[3]"A Non-Pacifist Appeal Against War," Literary Digest 76 (27 January 1923):36.

[4]Ernest Johnson, ed., The Social Work of the Churches (New York: The Federal Council of Churches, 1930), p. 162.

respect and love which can establish international accord."[5] The Catholic journal America similarly charged that future peace was attached securely to the will of the people; if the people would persist in opposition to war, the diplomats would be unable to promote it.[6]

In Christian Century, probably the most influential religious journal of the 1920's, editorials persistently criticized the conditions of international relations. While justice between states was mandatory for a stable world order, that condition had been sacrificed during and after the war. Evidence abounded: the French occupied the Ruhr when Germany became delinquent in reparations payments in 1922-1923; Germany and Russia, international villains, were excluded from membership in the League of Nations; the attitude of the international powers toward China during its years of internal struggle was destructive at best. The cure for such a world situation consisted of, in the Christian Century view, "Democratic,

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[5]Christian Advocate (New York) 101 (15 July 1926): 867.

[6]America 30 (16 February 1924):429-30.

[7]Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 396; Miller, "The Attitude of the Major Protestant Churches in America Toward War and Peace, 1919-1929," pp. 13-38; circulation statistics for most periodicals and newspapers can be found in American Newspaper Annual and Directory (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son, 1929); Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, pp. 102, 104-5.

which means open, control of diplomacy . . . as a safeguard of the people's peace."[8]

Such broad statements as those above appeared not only in editorials, but in the writings of individuals holding leading or influential positions within the church structure of America. Robert E. Speer, Chairman of the Federal Council of Churches, believed the solution to international discord rested with the spirit of Christ being brought to the world through the missionary enterprise.[9] Speer was supported by Kenneth Scott Latourette, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Student Volunteer Movement and professor of Missions at Yale University, who described the purpose of foreign missions as laying the foundation for a reorganization of civilization along Christian lines.[10] Reinhold Niebuhr, pastor of Detroit's Bethel Church from 1913 to 1928, appointed associate professor of Philosophy of Religion at Union Theological Seminary in 1928, and an editor of World Tomorrow, described a need to "challenge the nations to a mutual trust, to do the building up of a new kind of inter national system. We must go far beyond anything the nations are willing to do today. We are still being dragged

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[8]Christian Century 41 (28 August 1924):1102.

[9]Report of the Ninth International Convention (New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1924), pp. 131-46.

[10]Ibid., p. 406.

at the chariot wheels of the State. We will have to be more heroic."[11] Father John A. Ryan of Catholic University and active member of the Catholic Association of International Peace believed that "World peace is largely . . . a matter of human faith" and nations could act morally as did individuals.[12] The Congregationalist provided a summary statement: "The road to peace is the road to a higher and greater concept of religion."[13] The churches' opinion-makers were adamant in the desire to achieve the ideals of international peace and stability. They very eloquently set forth the goals as moral obligations, as right and responsibility for the Christian people of the United States. But on specific means for achieving those goals, they hesitated; being set on the ideal goal, they failed to appreciate the value of available means which in themselves were short of ideal.

Two agencies were available in the 1920's as possible implementers of a stable world order. The League of Nations and World Court presented legitimate

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[11]Reinhold Niebuhr, "What Should Be the Major Emphasis of the Churches on the Issue of War and Peace?" Federal Council Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):16.

[12]John A. Ryan, "Christian Principles of War and Peace," Catholic World 124 (November 1926):213.

[13]"The Road to Peace," Congregationalist 112 (13 October 1927):453.

alternatives for treatment of international concerns. The United States Senate had twice rejected the Versailles Treaty ending World War I with the League Covenant attached; in November 1919 the vote was 39 to 55, and in March 1920 it failed by only 7 votes, 49 to 35. In January 1926 the Senate voted to join the World Court, but with reservations which delayed acceptance of America's conditions by other nations. Both agencies were operative without America's formal participation. The attitude of the churches and individuals toward these two agencies, and involvement in world affairs generally, exposed a weakness in the sincerity of the ideals expressed above.

With respect to involvement, the position that the United States had a moral obligation to assist in the building of a new world order remained largely unchallenged. Charles Clayton Morrison, editor of the influential Christian Century, observed: "It is not a question of participation versus isolation - isolation when world peace is at stake is as impossible as it is ignoble."[14] The Michigan Christian Advocate charged that "We must have world-wide contacts; we must in some way contribute our share towards the world's progress and uplift."[15]

There were dissenting voices, particularly from

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[14]Charles Clayton Morrison, The Outlawry of War (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Colby, 1927), p. 128.

[15]Elmer Houser, "The United States and International Relations," Michigan Christian Advocate 53 (25 November 1926):8.

segments of the Catholic community. The Catholic World expressed stern opposition at mid-decade to any involvement in European affairs: "It may be wisdom, but some of us old-fashioned folk - old-fashioned as the Father of the Country - are still stupid enough to imagine that the best way we can contribute to the progress of the world is to set our own house in order."[16] The Commonweal saw too much potential restriction in America's freedom of action if it allied itself too closely with Europe: "Is not our influence most effective when it is practical and unhampered?"[17] Also, America objected to involvement in the League of Nations for the very reason that such participation would involve the United States in European affairs.[18] But even the praises for involvement did not extend automatically to participation in the League of Nations and World Court.

The League of Nations received less support than the World Court. Charles Clayton Morrison, an active exponent of American involvement in world affairs, rejoiced over the Senate's rejection of the League. Looking back from the perspective of 1927, Morrison saw the hand of God in the decision: "More by divine providence than by her own intelligent virtue America has been preserved from taking the course of international futility in which a

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[16] Catholic World 123 (April 1926):120.

[17] Commonweal 1 (11 March 1925):478.

[18] America 33 (22 August 1925):448-49.

policy of entanglement would have involved her."[19] Because the League rested on a system recognizing the legitimacy of war, America's involvement would subvert its own peace tradition to the violence of war, thought Morrison. His critique was inadequate, though, in that he failed to seriously pursue the advantages of attempting to reform the institution from within, a position more in line with his position on domestic reform.

In spite of tradition, though, the League did receive some sympathetic support in the churches. To promote international justice agencies dedicated to that end must be utilized, and the League satisfied the requirement, according to Sherwood Eddy the renowned evangelist of the International YMCA and co-founder in 1921 of the Fellowship for a Christian Social Order.[20] Harry Emerson Fosdick, the noted preacher and professor of theology at Union Theological Seminary, considered the League "the most promising nucleus of organized internationalism in the world."[21] Kirby Page, activist editor of the World Tomorrow, a journal of Christian socialism, and "the most influential pacifist author and speaker of

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[19]Morrison, The Outlawry of War, p. 273.

[20]Sherwood Eddy, "A Convert to Pacifism," Forum 73 (June 1925):811; Sherwood Eddy, "What Shall We Do About War?" Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. 61.

[21]Harry Emerson Fosdick, "What the War Did to My Mind," Christian Century 45 (5 January 1928):10-11.

the interwar period," saw a need to establish principles of justice which dealt with complexities in the world structure. He included the League of Nations in his plans.[22]

Several church organizations spoke favorably for the League. The General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1924 pledged its support to United States participation in the League.[23] The Methodist Episcopal Church, South, at its General Conference in 1926 resolved that the United States should "cooperate" with the League for promoting peace.[24] The resolution adopted by the National Council of Congregational Churches in 1929 was direct: "The sooner the United States joins the League of Nations the better it will be for the world."[25] The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions considered the League the best way to prevent war.[26] The Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches in 1928 expressed itself in favor of "more effective cooperation with the rest of the world," and expressed its "gratification" with United States' participation in the League's commissions and committees to which it was invited.[27]

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[22]Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, p. 353; Kirby Page, War, Its Causes, Consequences and Cure (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923), p. 130.

[23]Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 162.

[24]Ibid., p. 167.

[25]Ibid., p. 166.

[26]Report of the Ninth International Convention, pp. 253-61.

[27]"A Message to the Churches on World Peace,"

Some proposals for adherence to the League charter included warnings. The position taken by the National Study Conference on the Churches and World Peace in 1926 took a representative position on adherence: the conference recommended adoption of a policy to allow full cooperation with the various commissions and committees of the League which invited United States participation. However, on the issue of formal membership the Conference adopted the following resolution:

> Entry of the United States into the League of Nations with the reservation that the United States will have no responsibility, moral or otherwise, for participating in the economic or military discipline of any nation, unless such participation shall have been authorized by the Congress of the United States.[28]

The Christian Century would accept the League if basic restructuring occurred: "If war had been left out, America would have been inside the League."[29] Early in 1926 that journal called upon America to "remove from the League the shadow of Mars who lurks behind its constitution and all its councils."[30]

The World Court received less criticism and

Federal Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5; see also Samuel McCrea Cavert, ed., Report of the Federal Council of The Churches of Christ in America 1920-1924 (New York: Federal Council of Churches, 1925), p. 78.

[28]"A Message to the Churches on World Peace," Federal Council Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):12.

[29]Christian Century 42 (19 March 1925):372.

[30]Christian Century 43 (4 February 1926):136-37.

greater direct support than the League of Nations. The Christian Century began the decade opposed to United States adherence to the World Court. Editorial objections centered on the Court's inability to compel submission of disputes. The journal persisted in its position until mid-1925. In July 1925 a conference between representatives of elements of the peace movement agreed on a plan for entry to the World Court. The "Harmony Plan," as it was labeled, provided for immediate adherence to the Court with the Harding-Coolidge-Hughes reservations. In addition, within two years of joining, all signatories should declare endorsement of the following principles and call an international conference of all "civilized" nations to draw a general treaty embodying them: (1) outlaw war as a tool for settling international questions; (2) formulate an international code of laws for peace; and (3) grant affirmative jurisdiction to the World Court over controversies between sovereign nations. If the signatories to the World Court failed to endorse the conditions within two years, or if a general treaty failed ratification within five years, the United States would terminate its adherence. The Christian Century based acceptance of the proposal on the continuance clause; as an editorial declared, "Let Us Enter The Court!"[31]

The Commonweal joined in shifting positions on the

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[31]Christian Century 42 (16 July 1925):911, 914-15.

Court question. As late as March 1925 the journal queried the relationship between the Court and the League, fearing that if the United States joined the judicial body it would mean entering the League, which was too great a risk. But by January 1926 the journal was criticizing the reservations under which the nation would join the Court, charging the country with being unwilling to accept international responsibility.[32]

Sherwood Eddy, Kirby Page, and Harry Emerson Fosdick supported the World Court. Eddy considered it imperfect, but American participation could contribute to a proper restructuring.[33] Page gave his support on the assumption that history had clearly shown the need for legislative, executive, and judicial agencies to guide the relationships between persons, and therefore preservation of international peace equally demanded similar agencies.[34] Fosdick did not accept the Court as the final answer to international problems, but he considered it the best hope for codification of international law, a need of great importance in his conception of a stable world.

In 1926 eight outstanding religious leaders sent a letter to President Coolidge urging adherence to the

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[32]Commonweal 1 (11 March 1925):478; Commonweal 3 (20 January 1926):281-82.

[33]Eddy, "What Shall We Do About War?" p. 61.

[34]Kirby Page, An American Peace Policy (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925), p. 19.

World Court. The signers included S. Parkes Cadman, President of the Federal Council of Churches, Bishop William T. Manning of the Episcopal Church, Charles E. Burton, General Secretary of the National Council of Congregational Churches, and William F. McDowell of the Methodist Episcopal Church. As the signatories expressed themselves: "We are not willing to believe that American efforts for so many years for so noble an ideal are to end in failure."[35]

Supporters of the World Court included the General Conference of American Rabbis in 1924, the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1925, and the National Council of Congregational Churches in 1929.[36] The National Study Conference of the Churches on World Peace in 1925 urged immediate entry by the United States into the Court, and supported the reservations.[37] The Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches also supported adherence, and unconditionally.[38]

In reality there was little possibility that the United States would join the League of Nations; hence,

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[35] Christian Advocate (New York) 101 (16 December 1926):1683.

[36] Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 164.

[37] "A Message to the Churches on World Peace," Federal Council Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):12; also Cavert, Report of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America 1920-1924, p. 76

[38] "A Message to the Churches on World Peace," Federal Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5.

widespread support for membership was anachronostic. Also, an element of nationalism emerged in the position of the *Christian Century*, as seen above, and that journal undoubtedly spoke for an important segment of social Christianity; the journal had taken the position that since the League was not structured on the model preferred, membership must be withheld.

The World Court received more support, but even there the number of proponents for reservations suggested a reluctance to expose America too openly to the possible corruption of an international system.

In the case of both the League and Court, the church community centered more on their faults than upon workable alternatives to the inadequacies. The insularity which pervaded much of America's actions in the decade was synonomous with an air of superiority, and that view filtered into the position taken on international questions.

During the 1920's United States—Latin America relations were strained by the crisis with Mexico. In 1917 a new constitution in Mexico had declared that ownership of all lands and waters was vested in the nation which in turn would transmit title to individuals under whatever limitations it determined; in addition, foreigners granted land or concessions to exploit the soil must agree to be considered Mexicans with respect to such property and not

invoke protection of their own governments. The foreign oil companies saw the potential danger to their control of subsoil minerals if that article (27) of the constitution became law. The issue was raised most seriously when in December 1925 the Mexican Congress passed the Petroleum Law and Mexican Land Law to implement Article 27. The Petroleum Law allowed fifty-year concessions on properties acquired before 1 May 1917 and upon which some "positive acts" had been performed; oil companies had until 1 January 1927 to apply for the concessions.

The Mexican issue was exasperated by the appointment of James R. Sheffield as Ambassador to Mexico. In November 1925, the month following his appointment, he wrote to Nicholas Murray Butler, president of both Columbia University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that Mexicans were "Latin-Americans who in the final analysis recognize no argument but force."[39] Considerable attention was focused by the church community on the settlement of the oil holdings question.

Sheffield remained United States Ambassador to Mexico until mid-1927. The Christian Century expressed skepticism about his objectivity, questioning the extent to which economic interests controlled him. At the same time, though, the journal questioned Mexico's ability to

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[39]Quoted in Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 232.

develop its wealth without external assistance.[40] The Christian Advocate warned against threats of intervention into Mexico or withdrawal of recognition, because if either one occurred, "American life and property are rendered unsafe for another period of years."[41] The Commonweal saw the dilemma: while Latin America would suffer if it closed the doors to economic growth, it could not allow "aggressive exploitation under the mask of rights."[42] The Michigan Christian Advocate expressed similar concern, observing that Mexico must respect the "legitimate" interests of Americans and the United States government should safeguard American rights abroad: "But Uncle Sam cannot afford, and will not be justified by public sentiment at home, to browbeat Mexico, a weaker nation, in order to pull from the fire the chestnuts of the oil and other exploiters."[43]

As the crisis over subsoil rights mounted in late 1926 and early 1927, an emphasis upon international law emerged. The Christian Century in December 1926 asserted that while a legal case existed against Mexico, the United States should not lose its advantage in international law by falling back on less respectable methods; the following

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[40] Christian Century 42 (25 June 1925):815-16.

[41] Christian Advocate 101 (30 December 1926):1751.

[42] Commonweal 5 (2 March 1927):451.

[43] "Is There Danger of a Break With Mexico?" Michigan Christian Advocate 53 (2 December 1926):7.

month a lengthy editorial called for arbitration of the dispute rather than resort to war. The Christian Advocate in a 30 December 1926 editorial made a similar plea.

In mid-1927 a step was taken to bring the controversy to a close. In August 1927 President Coolidge appointed Dwight Morrow to replace James Sheffield as Ambassador to Mexico, a move highly criticized by the Catholic journal America because it allegedly sacrificed America's interests.[44] Morrow assumed his new duties in October. Morrow's former association with the large New York banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company hinted at the importance of economic considerations and represented a victory for the "moderate" approach which Morrow and Thomas Lamont of the J. P. Morgan company represented.

Within two months after Morrow's arrival in Mexico City, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled against disputed sections of the oil law. The Christian Century hailed the decision as consistent with its past stand that the law was unconstitutional, and praised Morrow for his tact and friendship to Mexico.[45] The Catholic journal America was less receptive to the court decision. The editors saw it offering no fundamental change--property rights would still have to be exchanged for concessions in

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[44]"What Shall We Do About Mexico?" America 37 (9 July 1927):293.

[45]Christian Century 44 (1 December 1927):1411-12.

most instances: "The so-called 'laws' still remain in accord with the 'Constitution.' And that instrument, be it remembered, makes robbery a legitimate function of government."[46]

The larger question of a sovereign state's right of expropriation, acknowledged by the United States Government in the late 1930's, was not broached by the church community. Such a position would not have been consistent with the churches' general support of the capitalist system--individual injustices were attacked, but the system itself received little direct criticism.

There is no evidence that the churches had impact on settling the crisis over subsoil rights. Their position basically supported that of the Administration. In April 1927 President Coolidge had laid forth a moderate position and the opinion-makers seemed generally satisfied. Coolidge emphasized pacific settlement without forfeiting legitimate rights of foreign investors in Mexico, and to that end the churches largely subscribed.

One dissenting voice came from the Catholic journal America. Catholics were particularly sensitive to the Mexican situation because of the state's confiscation of church property, control over selection and number of priests, and general usurpation of Catholic authority over

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[46]"The Mexican Thimblerigger," America 38 (24 December 1927):255.

the religious aspects of Mexican life. America reacted strongly, criticizing Coolidge's April 25 speech as backing away from full protection of American rights abroad, and criticizing President Calles of Mexico for insincerity and lack of faith in responding to American claims of injustice.[47]

The approach to Latin America problems in general gained exposure on the eve of the 1928 Havana Conference, a meeting between North and South American nations for discussion of mutual concerns. The Christian Century offered a series of suggestions that few churchmen would challenge. The initial suggestion called for President Coolidge to admit the "unsatisfactory" nature of United States-Latin America relations. The next step demanded expression in word and deed of a comprehensive understanding of the Latin American point of view. The next two suggestions had particular significance because they pertained to economic interests. First, Coolidge should clarify to the delegates the difficulties which instability in some countries caused for American investments. Second, the United States ought to plea for "united action" in order to "restore and maintain order. . . ." When the conference ended, the Christian Century criticized the United States for not demonstrating more goodwill; such a step would have been sound from the standpoint of justice

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[47]"Weasel Words in Mexico," America 37 (7 May 1927):77-78.

and morality, as well as "The best thing for the business interests of this country. . . ."[48]

The mixing of ideals and self-interest presented a difficult problem for the churches to reconcile. The Second Study Conference on the Churches and World Peace dealt with the dilemma by advocating the abandonment of unilateral intervention for the protection of lives and property abroad, and the substitution of non-violent measures administered collectively.[49] The Study Conference in 1926 asked for a reexamination of the Monroe Doctrine to seek a restatement more meaningful to the conditions of the 1920's.[50] A similar request for the purpose of "reshaping on a multilateral basis an All-American Monroe Doctrine" was made by Zion's Herald, a weekly publication of the Methodist Episcopal Church: "If this were to take place, the intervention issue would be cleared of its present foggy implications."[51] The Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches requested an examination of "The effect of . . . investments on international

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[48] Christian Century 45 (19 January 1928):72-73; Christian Century 45 (1 March 1928):275-76.

[49] "Churches and World Peace," World Tomorrow 12 (April 1929):178.

[50] "A Message to the Churches on World Peace," Federal Council Bulletin 9 (January-February 1926):11-12.

[51] "Intervention in Latin America," Zion's Herald 106 (14 March 1928):324.

understanding, goodwill and peace. . . ."[52] The Reformed Presbyterian Church presented its position: "The government should abandon the policy of armed intervention on its own authority for the protection of the lives, property, and interests of its nationals abroad and should substitute non-violent measures collectively administered."[53] Zion's Herald set forth a worthy proposal: "The very least that we might do would be to advocate the appointment of a commission representing all the Americas, charged with the responsibility of acting as international trustees for the collective protection of these investments and for the maintenance of peace."[54] The ideal of national sovereignty and non-interference in a nation's domestic affairs gained widespread support and may have contributed to a shift in official government policy.

The world's political-economic future and America's position in it received further definition in discussions over war and peace, and in that context the church community became involved most vocally. Movements for disarmament and outlawry of war received the most attention.

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[52] "A Message to the Churches on World Peace," Federal Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5.

[53] Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 16.

[54] "Protecting Foreign Investments," Zion's Herald 106 (13 June 1928):752.

The general approach called for international cooperation in the belief that for war to be effectively combatted, the nations should work together.

The elimination of war captured the overwhelming interest of opinion-makers. A few groups were skeptical of the movement to abolish war. For Example, the Continent, a Presbyterian journal, declared, "It is a fact that the Churches do not dare to teach that all and every war is sin . . . because it is not true."[55] The Catholic journal America also held that while war was distasteful, it was not necessarily criminal; war was not only not an evil, but under some circumstances could be a duty.[56] An essay published in the Methodist Review, not representative of the journal's editorial position, observed that "The life of a man and the life of many men are less sacred than the collective life of mankind."[57] An editorial in Commonweal declared that "it is no more logical to expect public opinion to keep a nation from international crime, than it is to expect public opinion to keep a man from domestic crime."[58] But such attitudes were exceptions.

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[55]Quoted in "War and Christian Ethics," New Republic 29 (11 January 1922):168.

[56]"The Promise of International Peace," America 39 (8 September 1928):510-11.

[57]William M. Balch, "Peace, Pacifism, and Christianity," Methodist Review 107 (November 1924):878.

[58]Commonweal 2 (5 August 1925):298.

Reinhold Niebuhr expressed a predominant attitude in 1922:

> Every attempt to make war serve ideal causes is bound to be overpowered by the elemental and primitive passions which war unlooses. After witnessing the tragic consequences of the world war and the pathetic impotence of the liberals and idealists who tried to gather grapes from thistles what reasonable alternative has a conscientious Christian to a position of unequivocal opposition to all warfare?[59]

Niebuhr's position gained support from the Methodist Review in an editorial note: "To believe that war or physical strength of any kind can be made an instrument for the victory of righteousness is a bit of practical atheism."[60] Along a similar line of thought, Father John A. Ryan declared that a nation was but an organized group of human beings, and as such the moral law applied to it as well as to men individually.[61] The Catholic World was convinced that in the long run, the only thing to end war would be insistence by the people on its termination.[62] War served no legitimate or useful purpose in the opinion of most church opinion-makers.

The Christian Century carried forth the campaign to abolish war with an intensity unsurpassed by any other

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[59]Reinhold Niebuhr, "Letter of Response," New Republic 29 (22 February 1922):372.

[60]"Does God Have and Use a Sword?" Methodist Review 107 (November 1924):939.

[61]John A. Ryan, "Christian Principles of War and Peace," Catholic World 124 (November 1926):209-15.

[62]Catholic World 128 (November 1928):229-34.

segment of the church community. Outlawry of war was the core of the proposal by the journal and its editor Charles Clayton Morrison. That idea did not originate with Morrison, having been proposed in 1918 by Chicago lawyer Salmon O. Levinson. Morrison's position received exposure in both the journal and his book The Outlawry of War.

The sanction underlying Morrison's scheme for world peace rested with public opinion: "there is not a conceivable plan for world peace which must not at last rest upon the plighted word."[63] Such faith in the power of public opinion was common among churchmen. The Boston based Congregationalist journal spoke of the need to establish a "peace psychology" among the world's citizens.[64] Kirby Page insisted that the prevention of war depended upon "attitudes of mind" which would transcend parochial, national allegiances and incorporate international concerns.[65] H. E. Woolever, editor of the National Methodist Press, echoed the power of public opinion: "The most needed and potent factor at this period is that of public opinion expressed in pulpit, press, forum, and conversation. The desire of the people for international amity must be made articulate in order to effect peace," and that

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[63]Morrison, The Outlawry of War, p. 185.

[64]"Goals and Processes of Attainment," Congregationalist 110 (6 August 1925):163-64.

[65]Page, War, Its Causes, Consequences and Cure, p. 157.

would best be done through the churches.[66] The Christian Banner, a publication of the Michigan Christian Missionary Society, in the words of its editor, suggested that "Peace will . . . be found in . . . better understanding - in practicing the law of love - in living the Golden Rule."[67]

Sherwood Eddy supported the objectives which Charles Clayton Morrison expounded. Eddy had backed America's participation in the World War in 1917, but soon found war to be brutal, a killer of innocent people, and the breeder of more war. He assumed a responsibility to work for excommunication of war through the churches and to publicly promote steps leading to outlawry of war: "I will strive with a large and rapidly increasing number of Christians to lead the Church to excommunicate [war], that the state may finally outlaw it and make it as illegal as slavery, the duel, highway robbery, or private murder."[68]

Kirby Page also supported Morrison's objectives, but differed over the effectiveness of public opinion as an enforcer. Page, more tough-minded and realistic, placed emphasis on disarmament, abandonment of economic imperialism, and establishment of international processes of

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[66]H. E. Woolever, "Geneva Disarmament Conference," Michigan Christian Advocate 54 (14 July 1927):8.

[67]J. Frank Green, "Instead of the Briar," Christian Banner 22 (July-August 1924):13.

[68]Eddy, "A Convert to Pacifism," p. 811; Eddy, "What the War Did to My Mind," pp. 925-27.

justice. Outlarwy of war, to be effective, needed to be combined with the World Court and the League of Nations. Page believed the deficiencies of outlawry eminated from the reliance upon judicial action rather than political action; because many of the serious causes of war were political, arbitration and conciliation and political organizations must supplement the judicial element.[69] Page suggested as one important problem of outlawry its failure to address the causes of war:

> As long as the rank and file of the people continue to believe that the supreme obligation of a nation is to advance its own interests, that it has the sovereign right to choose its won policies without regard to the wishes or interests of other nations, that it must be ready to avenge insults to its flag by killing citizens of the offending nation, and that it is the duty of the citizen to support his government, whether it is right or wrong - just so long will the people of the earth slay each other, outlawry or no outlawry.[70]

For Page, any outlawry agreement failing to deal with questions of vital interest and national honor could not achieve its ultimate aim. He was confident that "The price of peace and justice is the willingness of nations voluntarily to surrender that portion of their sovereignty which stands in the way of creating effective agancies of international justice."[71]

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[69]Page, War, Its Causes, Consequences and Cure, pp. 130, 157.

[70]Page, Dollars and World Peace, pp. 106-7, 114.

[71]Kirby Page, "The Pressures of Economic Elements in World Affairs," Religious Education 21 (April 1926):153.

Harry Emerson Fosdick, pastor of Riverside Church in New York City, considered outlawry the core of the churches' mission in world affairs, and agreed with Page about the insufficiency of Morrison's safeguards. Fosdick expressed a need for a multiplicity of agencies to secure the outlawry effort. Nationalism, racism, and economic imperialism caused war, wrote Fosdick, and outlawry alone failed to deal with those problems.

Regardless of supplemental needs to affect outoawry, the act of renouncing war as an instrument of national policy met with wide public support. Even though S. Parkes Cadman, President of the Federal Council of Churches from 1924 to 1928, was probably correct when he observed that "The American people . . . believe war may be moral when it redeems a state of things worse than itself," there simply existed little public opposition to banning war.[73] The Federal Council of Churches accurately observed that "the ending of war is one of the deepest demands of the American people."[74]

More than a dream in the 1920's, the desire for effective world peace seemed a reality in Ausust 1928 as fifteen nations including the United States agreed by

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[72]Fosdick, "What the War Did to My Mind," pp. 10-11.

[73]S. Parkes Cadman, "The Churches and War," Christian Advocate 103 (13 Spetember 1928):1112.

[74]"A Message to the Churches on World Peace," Federal Council Bulletin 11 (February 1928):5.

treaty to outlaw war from their international relations. Eventually, over 50 nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war. While the churches made a significant contribution to its realization, others outside the church made more important contributions to its existence.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact was set in motion by French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand in 1927 when he proposed a bilateral treaty to outlaw war between the United States and France. The Christian Century encouraged the administration to respond with a proposal for a multilateral pact to include all nations.[75] When Secretary of State Frank Kellogg accepted that widely supported proposal in his official response of December 1927, the Christian Century labeled the action "a stroke of genius" and declared that "the full moral responsibility . . . of America has been restored."[76] The Commonweal joined in praise: "the United States, being the most powerful of nations, has brought its strength to bear upon solving a problem that involves the stability of civilization. . . ."[77] Commenting weeks after Kellogg's official response, the Michigan Christian Advocate referred to it as "the greatest move toward world peace the United States has ever

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[75] Christian Century 44 (26 May 1927):646-47.

[76] Christian Century 45 (19 January 1928):72; Christian Century 45 (23 February 1928):259-60.

initiated."[78]

With the peace pact reality in August 1928, the Christian Century commented that the United States had withheld previous involvement in international political problems because prior solutions proposed some measure of military force. Until that danger had been eliminated the United States must remain outside the political system. With the signing of the pact, America would undertake "a new moral responsibility" to make the pact "understood by all the world."[79]

The extent to which the United States had involved itself in world affairs through the pact seemed clear. The Catholic World observed that "we are now and forever bound up with Europe in war and peace. Their problems are our problems, their troubles are our troubles, and their wars will be our wars."[80] Another Catholic journal commented that by signing the pact the United States had "definitely entered the international drama."[81] The Second Study Conference on World Peace recommended United States participation in the settlement of "all controversies" without

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[78]Elmer Houser, "United States Starts World Peace Pact," Michigan Christian Advocate 55 (19 April 1928):7.

[79]Christian Century 45 (20 September 1928): 1123-25.

[80]Catholic World 128 (November 1928):133.

[81]Commonweal 9 (30 January 1929):357.

qualification.[82] The moderator of the Presbyterian Church, U. S. A., saw in it the "rosy dawn of a new peace consciousness. . . ."[83]

Widespread support for the pact existed among spokesmen and official organs of the church community. The General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church approved the pact in 1928. The following year support came from such groups as the Northern Baptist Convention, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America, the Synod of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, and the Southern Baptist Convention.[84] The importance of church support had been recognized by Secretary Kellogg in June 1928 when he appealed for such support in an address celebrating the 300th anniversary of the First Dutch Reformed Church on Manhattan Island.

During Senate debates over the pact, the Committee on Foreign Relations concluded the treaty did not abrogate the right of self-defense, nor interfere with America's right to uphold interests in Latin America. Adopted as an interpretation, the report did not become a reservation.[85]

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[82] "The Churches and World Peace," p. 178.

[83] Presbyterian Magazine 34 (November 1928):563.

[84] Johnson, The Social Work of the Churches, p. 164.

[85] U. S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 January 1929, Congressional Record 70:1730.

Thus the treaty as approved by the Senate had no visible reservations. Kirby Page considered the interpretations destructive to the pact's significance and usefulness.[86] Page's warnings did not match the attitude expressed by the editor of Living Church who labeled the pact a "futile gesture, a jumble of high-sounding but meaningless words."[87] Given the Senate's interpretations, the pact had little impact on America's actions in areas where its self-interest was paramount, and presumably other countries would interpret the pact equally to their advantage. It was the absence of any enforcement plan calling for specific commitments for action by the individual states that made the pact acceptable to so many people in the United States. America was skeptical because the real key to peace lay in the spread of God and religion in national life, something the pact did not provide or encourage.[88]

General agreement existed that the treaty alone could not bring world peace. The Federal Council of Churches proposed additional steps for the pact to be wholly effective. Among the proposals was the promotion of agencies for securing justice; that meant support for the World Court, arbitration and conciliation, and the

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[86]Kirby Page, "Should America Disarm?" Forum 81 (February 1929):70-74.

[87]Living Church 79 (11 August 1928):484.

[88]"The Foundation of Peace," America 39 (15 September 1928):534.

codification of international law.[89] Charles Clayton Morrison favored the latter process. He considered codification essential for proper junctioning of a world court and world system based on justice. In his view, "at least three-fourths of the existing . . . mass of so-called international law consists of laws and rules of war,"[90] Thus codification would be simple because laws relating to war could be eliminated if war as an institution was removed.

The failure of the peace pact to prevent the aggression of Japan and Germany in the 1930's rested not solely on the pact, but on governments' failure to use and honor the treaty. The churches and their spokesmen had disagreed among themselves over the effectiveness of public opinion as a controlling force in national behavior. The inability of many people to look beyond immediate interest is unquestioned, and in instances when the exception rules, the optimist is euphoric. The churches tended to be optimistic. Morrison probably spoke for many people when he dedicated the pact with the following words: "On this natal day of peace, he who loves mankind will bow his exultant head in gratitude that God had brought him to this day and will gird his loins for vigilence and unremitting service in any field where the Master of the Harvest calls

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[89]Federal Council Bulletin 11 (October 1928):1-2.

[90]Morrison, The Outlawry of War, p. 162.

him to labor."[91] But he and others failed to foresee that the world could produce the brutality of a Germany or Japan, and they failed to see that Christians would one day be forced into a situation where the justice they so dearly sought could be achieved only through war.[92]

The churches were not consistent in their promotion of the ideals of justice, morality, and Christian ethics during the 1920's. In the Mexico oil crisis the realities of exploitation went largely unchallenged and unrecognized. There occurred little questioning of the impact of foreign investments for the life of the average Mexican. What would be the impact by foreign investors on Mexico if a change in government at Mexico City challenged those holdings? The hard reality of the impact of economic expansion simply escaped adequate examination by the majority of the opinion-makers considered above.

Nor did the spokesmen considered here completely free themselves from the desire to preserve America's complete sovereignty; their attitudes toward the League of Nations and World Court demonstrated that fact. If international understanding and trust were serious objectives,

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[91] Christian Century 46 (24 January 1929):99.

[92] Robert Moats Miller, American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), p. 332.

as the churches stated, would a restricted adherence to the Court or the League promote it? National sovereignty must be compromised in fact as well as in theory if the ideal world community is to be created.

Misunderstanding was an underlying problem for the opinion-makers in the Mexico situation, in the response to the League and Court, and in the pursuit of world peace. Outlawry of war and substitution of a court on grounds that judicial settlement of disputes was more humane than settlement of disputes by force ignored the element of force lying behind judicial structures--it was the threat of force that made the judicial process functional.

The opinion-makers' failures reflected the failures of the society in which they functioned. The position they assumed on foreign relations was commendable in most instances, but it was unrealistic in that society was not ready to support its more progressive elements. When concrete issues were examined, as in the Mexico crisis, spokesmen fell short of a truly world perspective, but their position did represent a significant movement in the positive direction.

CHAPTER II

ACADEMICS' PERSPECTIVES

All academics in this study could have subscribed to this statement by historian George Blakeslee: "There is no question as to the necessity of increased cooperation; the only issue is as to the type of cooperation. . . ."[1] Moreover, all were living in the shadows of World War I with fresh memories of the horrors of that struggle; its impact was seen partly by the proliferation of historical writing questioning America's intervention in the war and the war-guilt problem. There was a widespread grasping for a solution to the perplexities of war and related topics of international scope.

The opinion-makers considered here fall into two groups: first, those academics who were actively involved with governmental or international agencies, thus intimately familiar with the type of machinery they promoted; second, the teachers who occupied themselves with their classroom duties and their writing. The first group, consisting here of Nicholas Murray Butler, Manley O. Hudson,

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[1]George Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1925), p. 350.

and James T. Shotwell, concentrated on promoting abolition of war, involvement with the World Court and League of Nations, minimized attention to economic difficulties that played a role in promoting international strife, supported the Anglo-Saxon tradition which emphasized law, and basically supported some form of international association. The second group of academic opinion-makers, less closely connected to the government or international agencies, went beyond the first group frequently criticizing United States' policy on economic issues, cautious on the extent to which America's sovereignty could be sacrificed for international involvement, and less tied to a collective approach to international peace-keeping.

Among academic opinion-makers active in the promotion of international cooperation in the 1920's, Nicholas Murray Butler had prominence. His role as an opinion-maker was secured as president of Columbia University from 1902 to 1945 and as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace beginning in 1925. His work for that well-financed and most important of the older peace societies prompted an historian of the 1920's peace movement to label him one of the organization's "most publicized assets."[2]

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[2]Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 21-22; see also Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1971), pp. 10, 98.

Butler's concept of international relations centered on the "civilized nations" cooperating in the promotion of civilization, commerce and industry, science, and education worldwide. Such cooperation, however, did not extend to the political level; national sovereignty would be preserved and promoted, but not to the extent of isolation from the world community. Butler believed that such an international atmosphere did not evolve naturally, and America would have to assist in its creation.

Butler contended that from the presidency of George Washington to that of Woodrow Wilson, America had been a consistent leader in the strengthening of international relations, but since 1920 had fallen behind until "through sheer paralysis [the United States is] one of the chief obstacles that now exists in the world to these movements."[3] A display of "intellectual and moral courage and power" had contributed to that earlier leadership, which America should regain in the best interest of the world.[4] Here was the idealist speaking; intellectual and moral leadership were amorphous goals to which everyone could agree without having to commit themselves to a specific course of action.

Butler expressed concern about America's "good

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[3]Nicholas Murray Butler, Addresses (Nicholas Murraly Butler, 1927), p. 4.

[4]Nicholas Murray Butler, The Path to Peace (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), pp. 20, 64.

repute today and in history, for its influence and for its moral leadership in the great days of twentieth century democracy."[5] A nation which officially rejected collective commitment of force might have difficulty providing the leadership Butler sought. If morality and justice guided international relations, Butler argued, conflict resolution by force of arms would be unnecessary.[6] America had to provide leadership to that end.

James Thomson Shotwell, an associate of Butler in the Carnegie Endowment, was author of numerous articles and books on history and international relations. As a professor of history, participant at the conference ending the World War, and as trustee and director of the division of economics and history for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he shared extensive experience and knowledge.

Shotwell, like Butler, wanted the United States to assume a leadership role for peace in international relations. Through its influence in international affairs, America would promote peaceful relations between nations. Shotwell referred to it as "the uprooting of barbarism in the world of international relations."[7] America was, Shotwell affirmed, "schooling itself in the best of all possible ways to take its place as a World Power" and would

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[5]Ibid., p. 55.

[6]Ibid., pp. 3-6.

[7]James T. Shotwell, "Ten Years After the Armistice," Current History 29 (November 1928):179.

make an effective contribution to resolution of international conflicts.[8]

Prefessor Shotwell asserted that there existed four peaceful means of resolving international problems--court, arbitration, conciliation, and conference. The first two were legal solutions which bound the participants and allowed no extra-legal adjustment. The latter two were political methods which allowed adjustment according to the attitudes of the nations involved. Shotwell gave more consideration to extra-legal means of conflict resolution than Butler did, a consideration of importance because it moved toward meaningful alternatives and supplements to resolution by force.

Among academics not so actively involved outside teaching and writing, many supported the concept of American involvement in world affairs, but with caution urged on specific issues. George Blakeslee, professor of history and international relations at Clark University, lecturer at the Naval War College and the Army War College, lecturer at Harvard University, wrote: "From its strength, its century-long policy, and its governmental structure, the United States is the best fitted of all nations to take the leadership in bringing about a peaceful world."[9] Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University,

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[8]Ibid., p. 178.

[9]Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States, p. 359.

wrote in 1922 that America's next contribution to civilization would include "the opening for everybody of the delightful and sustaining vision of freedom, aspiration, and hope."[10] John Halladay Latane, professor of American History and lecturer on International Law at Johns Hopkins University, and dean of the college faculty, observed that while the isolation of the past had been due to weakness, isolation of the present was "selfish and imperialistic;" America could not continue to demand all that was due it without giving something in return.[11] These views, though, were idealistic expressions which needed clarification and definition through action.

The question of America's entry into the League of Nations and World Court had been settled negatively in 1920, but there remained significant support for it as well as for the World Court where the United States came close to formal membership. One person who gave unlimited time and attention to the promotion of both those agencies was Manley O. Hudson.

Hudson, professor of law and international law,

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[10]Charles W. Eliot, :The Next American Contribution to Civilization," Foreign Affairs 1 (15 September 1922):65.

[11]John Halladay Latane, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1927), p. 703.

was a member of the American legal staff at the Paris Peace Conference ending World War I, member of the legal section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations on a part-time basis from 1919 to 1927, and served as legal advisor to several international conferences. In addition, he was a member of the executive committee of the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association from 1922 to 1927 and edited the American Journal of International Law. In 1936 he began ten years as judge on the bench of the World Court.

Like Butler and Shotwell, Hudson believed in a leadership position for America in world affairs, but he had no illusions that the goal would be realized quickly. He urged greater cooperation with the League of Nations, preferably by joining, and formal entry to the World Court. By such action, Hudson wrote, "We shall not have gained our leadership in the movement to organize the world, but we shall have got back into that procession."[12]

Hudson was a strong defender of the League of Nations, not as a cure-all, but as a system for international relations. He emphasized the League's role as "an agency for conference and consultation." Hudson asserted that consent, not coercion, made the League effective, but it could not be totally effective without cooperation from all nations. Hudson strongly desired

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[12]Manley O. Hudson, "The World Court? Yes!" Christian Century 42 (24 December 1925):1603.

American participation "as a way of life, as a method of social living-together." Even after America's entry there would be work to accomplish: "We shall . . . have the task of informing and educating public opinion, in order that America may play a 'liberal' role in the ordering of our international life."[13]

When the Locarno treaties were signed in 1925 Hudson found fresh support to throw against opponents of American participation in the League. The treaties stabilized Germany's borders with France and Belgium, established a series of arbitration treaties, and joined France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in a mutual assistance pact against Germany; in addition, Germany was granted membership in the League of Nations pending ratification of the treaties. League opponents could no longer reject adherence on grounds that Europe ought to clean house before the United States offered assistance in structuring a peaceful world; no longer could opponents deride the League as a tool for oppressing the vanquished, for Germany's entry was only a matter of time.[14]

America did not snub the non-political activities of the League during the 1920's. Hudson chronicled the participation of the United States on several commissions

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[13]Manley O. Hudson, "The Liberals and the League," Nation 116 (4 April 1923):384.

[14]Manley O. Hudson, "The Significance of Locarno," Independent 115 (7 November 1925):517.

of the League, writing as early as 1924 that "one finds it difficult at times to believe that America is more than formally outside the League of Nations."[15] Hudson was pleased that the United States no longer acted "as if any substitute for the League were waiting around the corner."[16] Later in the decade he made a similar survey of American participation, concluding that, "We simply cannot afford to sit out when fifty other governments are sitting in."[17] Regardless of his efforts to convince Americans that formal participation would involve little more than what was already occurring, the United States remained a non-member.

In spite of his favorable attitude toward membership in the League, he carefully separated it from membership in the World Court. If he could not have both, he preferred adherence to the Court. Hudson based his support on the following criteria: (1) it promoted judicial settlement, as against settlement by military confrontation; (2) it served as the legal advisor for the League, giving advisory opinions when requested to do so; (3) it could have a fundamental role in the sound development of international law; and (4) it contributed to respect for

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[15]Manley O. Hudson, "American Cooperation With the League of Nations," American Federationist 31 (October 1924):804.

[16]Ibid., p. 806.

[17]Manley O. Hudson, "America's Role in the League of Nations," American Political Science Review 23 (February 1929):31.

international law.[18] He clearly stated that adherence to the Court in no way meant joining the League. In fact, joining the Court meant no obligations at all except to pay a fair share of expenses. He carefully warned that the Court was not a cure-all: "With a Court alone I should think our world very ill prepared to handle the current international problems of our time, though a Court is to me an essential part of any scheme on international organization."[19]

Hudson agreed to the Senate reservations guiding an American entry to the Court, but thought one of them unclear: that one stated that the Court could not entertain a request for an advisory opinion on a matter involving the United States without its consent. He wondered when or how the United States could make known to the Court that a question affected America's interest; the Council of the League, the body that would ask for an advisory opinion, did not have an American representative to determine when a question affected its interest.[20]

Hudson, like Butler, relied too heavily on the faith of nations. The world's nations were not prepared to turn their backs on one another as trusting entities.

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[18]Hudson, "The World Court? Yes!" pp. 1602-3.

[19]Manley O. Hudson, "The Relation of the United States to the World Court," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 12 (July 1926):437.

[20]Ibid., pp. 435-44.

The emotional reaction to war was a strong force in promoting international agencies for peace, but not to the extent that sovereignty would be significantly transferred from the nation-state. Additionally, Hudson's efforts at obtaining America's entry into the League had its supporters, but not sufficiently to force a change in Congress. The World Court was another matter, for there existed some mass support which expressed itself in Washington. Hudson sacrificed much, though, when he agreed to support the Senate reservations which served to weaken the impact of membership. Hudson's single-minded approach to a solution for international problems was overly simplistic, which he partially realized but failed to adequately treat. At no time did he openly support America's surrender of its sovereignty in international decision-making or even hint at such action. His acceptance of the World Court reservations indicated his partial awareness of just how much the American people could tolerate, and it was not much. Also, like Butler, Hudson had no obvious appreciation of the importance and role of force in the international system. The mere presence of America in the League or on the Court would somehow preclude force, or so it seemed.

Among the teachers existed a more realistic perspective of the League and Court, even to the point of rejecting them as useful for America's position in world affairs.

George Blakeslee argued that America would be

unable to avoid greater cooperation in world affairs due to the very nature of a shrinking world, particularly from the economic standpoint. In addition, as the world became more interrelated there would be an increasing incentive for the United States to involve itself in the political affairs of Europe as those affairs touched America's interests. Purely European affairs, of course, would not concern the United States, and if there could be developed some sort of organization which would take continental matters out of the League, the United States would be more inclined to join. Blakeslee thought America was becoming more intimately involved with Europe on world questions, and such cooperation was necessary if the United States was to seriously work for a peaceful world:

> To replace the war system of international peace would be the greatest blessing which could be conferred upon mankind. Here, then, is the world's greatest opportunity for service. Does this not make an appeal to America, to the power of the nation, to the organizing genius of which we boast, and to the idealism which had dominated our national life when we have been at our best?[21]

For Blakeslee the League or Court was not enough; no one agency could deal with the complexity of achieving a peaceful world. He wished to see in addition periodic conferences and greater participation with non-political agencies of the League. It was his belief that America's most important world policy was "the advancement of world

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[21]Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States, p. 360.

peace."[22] To realize that policy, "an essential means is increased cooperation with other nations."[23]

Supporters of the League and Court were plentiful. The President of Harvard University wrote that if the League were to become "an international clearing house" for all important matters "the United States would be forced by events to participate in it;" he thought that America would join more quickly "if foreign nations do not show excessive anxiety to have her in, and if Americans do not urge it exclusively on altruistic grounds."[24] John Latane noted that adherence to the Court was "a step in the right direction," but it was a minor matter "as compared with our attitude toward the League."[25] James Quayle Dealey, professor of Social and Political Science at Brown University, and a lecturer at the Naval War College, wanted the United States to participate openly in the League, "if not to the full extent, at least in all but purely political issues."[26] Robert McElroy, retired professor of American History at Princeton University, the first American Exchange Professor to China in 1916-1917,

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[22]Ibid., p. 342. [23]Ibid., pp. 349-50.

[24]A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Future of the League," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926):534.

[25]Latane, A History of American Foreign Relations, p. 704.

[26]James Quayle Dealey, Foreign Policies of the United States (New York: Ginn and Company, 1926), p. 324.

and associate editor of Current History in 1924-1925, considered the World Court more acceptable because judicial adjustments would be more readily agreeable universally than political settlements.[27]

Charles Beard, former Columbia University professor of politics, recognized the weaknesses of the League of Nations, but praised it anyway: "Let every indictment of the League be conceded. But there it stands, whatever it is, a novel structure in international relations."[28] Beard's position was that while it suffered deficiencies, it did provide a periodic meeting ground for the great powers where questions bearing on war prospects would pass before the Council. While public opinion was not the force many people wished it to be, said Beard, it still had some influence in deliberations. The weaker nations of the world also had a voice through the Assembly meeting annually, thus providing an outlet for complaints against the larger powers. Beard held that the League stood for a policy of conciliation; its members had to beware of possible penalties if they betrayed its stipulations; the League promoted a rhetoric less belligerent than the old rhetoric of national prestige; it was world-wide in scope,

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[27]Robert McElroy, "America's Duty in Promoting International Justice," Current History 25 (November 1926):179-84.

[28]Charles A. Beard, "Prospects for Peace," Harper's Magazine 158 (February 1929):329.

touching members and non-members alike. Beard considered the United States a "member" even though it refrained from formal attachment, because of its economic power and its position as "master stake-holder in every play."[29] There was no unanimity in the academic world on that position.

There were realists among the academic community who questioned the willingness of nations to conform to a system of arbitration, conference, conciliation, and general peaceful settlement of international questions. Albert Bushnell Hart, professor of history and government at Harvard University and a writer for Current History, theorized that "more than half the world's population would rather fight than arbitrate on any serious question in which they are deeply concerned."[30] He asked whether America would be willing to submit to arbitration such things as its immigration policy, the right of the Panamanian republic to control the Panama Canal, or the Monroe Doctrine: Hart thought not.[31]

Harry Elmer Barnes, professor at Clark University and Smith College in the 1920's, was critical of the League because of its dominance by "a number of selfish, corrupt and warlike states" which failed to promote justice in

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[29]Ibid., p. 330.

[30]Albert Bushnell Hart, "Amateur Diplomacy," Current History 27 (November 1927):263.

[31]Albert Bushnell Hart, "Amateur Diplomacy," Current History 26 (July 1926):623-24.

international dealings.[32] It was that need for undoing injustices of the past and encouraging fair dealing in the future that Barnes considered a major goal for an effective organization of international scope.[33] Just exactly how such ends could be accomplished, however, was beyond precise explanation.

John Dewey was representative of the opposition to American involvement in the League and World Court. Philosopher, university professor, and author, he charged that the League was tied to the inequities of the Treaty of Versailles, thus making it a defender of the status quo. The important post-war questions, such as reparations, were not being faithfully or justly handled by it, Dewey charged. The Court, intimately involved with the League, was equally unable to deal in a meaningful way with the world's problems; only by removing the Court from the reigns of the League and allowing it full jurisdiction over what cases could be brought before it would the Court function correctly.[34]

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[32]Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), p. 699.

[33]Harry Elmer Barnes, Living in the Twentieth Century (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrell Company, 1928), p. 345.

[34]John Dewey, "Shall We Join the League?" New Republic 34 (7 March 1923):36-37; John Dewey, "A Reply From Mr. Dewey," New Republic 34 (28 March 1923):139-40; John Dewey, "Shall the United States Join the World Court?" Christian Century 40 (18 October 1923):1329-34.

In spite of widespread promotion of an American role in world affairs, the League and Court were not seen uniformly as a viable means through which to accomplish that end.

The role of economics in world affairs was appreciated in varying degrees. Butler and Shotwell were avid supporters of the capitalist system, seeing it as a force for peace in international relations; they did not criticize America's economic activities as imperialistic. The other group of academics included here were considerably more critical on the average, although some differences of opinion certainly existed.

James T. Shotwell equated peace with the capitalist-industrial system. In his book War As An Instrument of National Policy he wrote that "The world of credit is essentially a world of peace."[35] What he meant was that activities of business were prominent in the interrelationships of nations to the extent that as economic forces increased the interdependence of nations, the need for continued stable relations increased. Recognizing the need for some element of power to enforce stability, Shotwell asserted that the world of business substituted economic

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[35]James T. Shotwell, War As An Instrument of National Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), p. 31.

power for military force; the process of industrialization was a force that would require nations to preserve peace as a prerequisite to their survival.

Shotwell expanded his thoughts in an essay separate from the book.[36] Reiterating his belief that business and peace were intimately related, he also showed the self-interest that motivated such a position. Shotwell argued that through invested capital abroad America was building an international community of interest which helped guarantee peace. For Shotwell, the international financial balance-sheet was "a sort of international Magna Charta" setting forth a fundamental principle of emancipation from the tyranny of war: "the one danger which this new structure of interdependent interests confronts is the disruption of its peace-time activities through a reversion to international violence."[37] From Shotwell's perspective, the more business expanded internationally, the greater the possibility for preserving peace; the advantage was that diplomacy would be increased in an age of international peace because as business expanded beyond national boundaries, frontiers became less real and created overlapping interests between peoples of one nation and another.[38]

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[36]James T. Shotwell, "Does Business Mean Peace?" Outlook 151 (13 March 1929):405-7, 436-37.

[37]Ibid., p. 436.

[38]Ibid.

Shotwell defended continued investments abroad on grounds that those investments were for the purpose of making industries prosper in order to pay the return on capital investment; given the role of business in peace, such activity by any country was not synonomous with imperialism, and was only considered an asset.

John Dewey had a very different perception of economics in world affairs, at least as practiced by the United States. One geographic area where economic interests were pronounced was Central and South America. Dewey accused the government and business interests of practicing imperialism in that region. The administration based its Latin America policy on the Monroe Doctrine, the vehicle through which it had assumed the protectorship of all foreign property and citizens in Latin America, thus reaping the collective wrath against all foreigners. The reason the United States was able to involve itself so deeply in Latin America, according to Dewey, was for two reasons: first, many Americans accepted the Monroe Doctrine and the principle of protecting American citizens and property rights in foreign lands; second, too many people were ignorant of the true implications of such action. It was Dewey's conviction that injustices by the United States toward its southern neighbors could be prevented by a restatement of the Monroe Doctrine doing away with justification for intervention; he also believed that the government should refuse to provide security for investors in

underdeveloped nations. It was Dewey's conviction that foreign interference in a nation's affairs tended to promote instability, thus prolonging the very conditions which intervention sought to arrest.[39]

Inperialist behavior could not be resolved easily. Jerome Davis, professor of sociology at the Yale Divinity School, candidly observed that "All trade is quite likely to cause friction, particularly if one nation has access to the sources of raw materials which are denied to another."[40] Harry Elmer Barnes argued that there should be a progressive movement toward more thorough internationalization of the supply of raw materials and natural resources, coupled with a renewal of a free trade movement. One step in the right direction to end imperialism, thought Barnes, was for the nations to refuse to place force behind the activities of individual investors.[41]

While some persons directly related imperialism with trade or investments, others did not. For example, Harry T. Collings, professor of economics and commerce at the University of Pennsylvania, associate editor of Current History magazine, delegate to the Congress of Panama in

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[39]John Dewey, "Mexico's Educational Renaissance," New Republic 48 (22 September 1926):116-18; John Dewey, "Imperialism is Easy," New Republic 50 (23 March 1927): 133-34.

[40]Jerome Davis, "Trade Rivalries That Lead to War," Current History 24 (June 1926):403.

[41]Barnes, Living in the Twentieth Century, p. 343.

1926 and the International Chamber of Commerce in 1927 and 1929, pointed to the constructive value of United States' investments in Latin America. He related the close scrutiny and supervision imposed, and the increased levels of employment, wages, and standard of living enjoyed by Latin Americans because of those investments. In his opinion, those financial transactions represented "constructive enterprise rather than exploitation. . . ."[42] J. Fred Rippy, professor of history at the University of Chicago and Duke University, and associate managing editor of the Hispanic American Historical Review, urged caution when trying to resolve issues related to investments in Latin America. Unjust pressure or exploitation would only serve the cause of America's enemies and result in eventual repercussions against the interests of the United States and Latin America.[43]

The academic community split on economic matters, as would be expected. The country's prosperity had an impact on all segments of society, but in ways not easily identified. The capitalist system which provided that prosperity was not easily assailed, even by educated, active persons capable of seeing its damaging effects.

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[42]Harry T. Collings, "Billions of Our Capital Invested in Latin America," Current History 26 (September 1927):853.

[43]J. Fred Rippy, "Mexico's Laws Against Foreign Land Ownership," Current History 24 (June 1926):331-38.

If the 1920's had to be characterized by a single driving force in international relations, it would be the movement for peace. Butler, Hudson, and Shotwell were ardent proponents of various peace efforts, with the outlawry movement gaining their widest attention, although not unqualified support.

Butler sought elimination of war as an instrument of national policy. Strongly desiring America's prominence in that movement, Butler urged French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand in that direction while the two conversed in June 1926: "Why has not the time come for the civilized governments of the world formally to renounce war as an instrument of policy?"[44] Ten months later Briand made his address to the American people. When the United States government failed to respond, Butler sent a letter to the New York Times, writing in part, "Why should not the American people hasten to use every means at their command to assure the Government of France that they have heard, that they do understand and that they will act in accordance with this progressive and constructive policy?"[45]

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[44]Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years, 2 vol. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), 2:202-4.

[45]Ibid., 2:204.

Shortly afterward, meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Robert Olds, he learned that no official response was planned. When Butler tried to impress Olds with the importance of the proposal, the Assistant Secretary suggested that Butler prepare a draft treaty, which he proceeded to do with assistance of James T. Shotwell and Joseph F. Chamberlain. That effort helped arouse public opinion favorable to Briand's proposal, and public opinion prodded Secretary of State Kellogg.

The eventual ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Pact by the United States Senate in January 1929 represented for Butler both an end and a beginning. He wrote to Secretary of State Kellogg that, "The Senate has now enabled American public opinion to restore our country to its place of leadership in the greatest movement of modern times to establish and to maintain international peace."[46] In a letter to French Foreign Minister Briand he urged further work: "The next task is to teach the people to think and governments to act in honest and frank accordance with its terms."[47]

In an address at Columbia University in November 1928 Butler discussed the steps he felt were necessary for giving full effect to the Pact of Paris. First, the establishment of a single Department of Defense, with subdivisions for the Army, Navy, and Air Force would provide

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[46]Ibid., 2:209.

[47]Ibid., 2:211.

both acadmeic and administrative gain and most importantly would help to remove the word "war" from the permanent organization of government. Coincident with that step compulsory military training would be abolished, reducing military forces to police capabilities; included were the scuttling of all ships larger than cruisers, maintaining only peace forces, and resisting naval expansion. He also believed that the World Court should be strengthened, but would not rely on it alone. He promoted other institutions of arbitration and conciliation to supplement diplomacy and law, particularly the League of Nations which he considered indispensable for international relations. Within the Western Hemisphere he wanted closer cooperation between nations on a formal basis, but without the dictation or domination of any one power. Lastly, he wanted nations of the world to engage international exchanges along cultural, scientific, and literary paths because such contacts were "the most potent instruments with which to deveolp and to safeguard the International Mind."[48] Butler's program for international accord was summed up best by his assertion that the nation should function under the same legal and moral codes operable in interpersonal relations.[49]

Butler failed, however, to examine that proposal

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[48]Butler, The Path of Peace, pp. 161-69.

[49]Butler, The Faith of a Liberal, pp. 171-82.

for morality in international relations. The legal code which operated was supported with police and paramilitary forces which only inadequately enforced it; would not an international legal code require even more complex means of enforcement? The moral code operative in America had never produced a model of behavior worthy of wholesale exportation, in spite of such efforts. The fact was that interpersonal relations offered no better behavior patterns; the theoretical model was not reality.

A fundamental problem with Butler's approach to world affairs was his failure to provide sufficient input from other nations or international agencies. While he supported international cooperation, he approached it from an American perspective rather than an international position.

James T. Shotwell viewed the Kellogg-Briand Pact as the result and example of America's crusading spirit, so clearly evidenced early in the World War. After ratification of the pact he urged that it be built upon to secure the chief interests of America's national life, "the undistributed maintenance of our full influence throughout the world for the maintenance of peace."[50] It was America's leadership and capability, many people believed, that made the pact available. It was that crusading spirit, that intense desire to lead the world in

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[50]Shotwell, "Ten Years After the Armistice," p. 180.

the direction of cooperation that brought about the first widespread renunciation of war. But it was also the American characteristic of an attachment to ideals that had little practicality in the real world which assisted in gaining acceptance for the peace pact. The mere simplicity of the pact's terms typified America's approach to world affairs.

Shotwell's realism showed itself on the question of international security during the period leading to the pact and in the weeks and months that followed. He saw no hope that the pact would abolish war immediately, nor that the pact was an alternative to the League. The Kellogg-Briand Treaty represented to Shotwell an additional step toward the creation of full international cooperation. He was careful to point out that the pact did not outlaw war, rather it renounced war as an instrument of national policy: "Outlawry would call for a whole new set of provisions which lie entirely beyond the scope of the present treaty."[51] In his opinion, because the treaty was not outlawry, the United States was "able to avoid . . . involvement . . . in the maintenance and guarantee of peace throughout the world."[52]

Where outlawry had implied force against the lawbreaker, either police action or court action, the Pact of

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[51]James T. Shotwell, "The Pact of Paris," International Conciliation 243 (October 1928):454.

[52]Ibid.

Paris required none of that. Since not all war was renounced, only aggressive war, collective action by League members remained intact. Shotwell considered it very important that the treaty not detract from the League's efforts, but rather support them. If the pact included the term "outlawry" Briand could not have accepted it, said Shotwell, because outlawry was an anti-League plan. America had to work within the existing structure of world leadership. That was shown by his criticism of the pacifist movement:

> It had never adjusted itself to the practical politics of a developing world, but, on the contrary, tended to erect for itself . . . a City of God on earth where perfect harmony should reign instead of the discordant and incomplete but vaster symphony of the historic civilization of to-day.[53]

Shotwell was correct in his implication--the pacifist critique was useful but not its proposed solutions. A successful resolution to international conflict must take civilization where it is, and move ever so slowly toward reconstruction; anything short of a radical social revolution, an improbable occurrence anyway, requires patience, disappointment, and mixed success. Shotwell had some sense of that.

Shotwell had no illusions that the treaty would end war on its own, "the structure of peace is one that

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[53]James T. Shotwell, "The Slogan of Outlawry," Century Magazine 116 (October 1928):713.

involves more than a mere denunciation of war."[54] Involved was a guarantee to the defenseless that they would not become victims of an aggressor. According to Shotwell, the United States recognized that if an aggressor emerged "it would at least be our moral obligation to deny the benefits of a renunciation of war to the violating State."[55] But the pact did not require additional action by the United States with respect to involvement in Europe: "The preamble states a moral obligation and nothing more."[56] He believed, though, that the assurance to other nations of America's moral influence was sufficient.

John Dewey's primary concern in international affairs was the outlawry of war proposal. It was his contention that certain attitudes were causing America's aloofness from the world: the fact that people came to America to escape Europe's problems; physical distance aided psychological distance; the widespread belief that Europe had not changed for the better because of the war; and the different political systems. The means for overcoming those blocks, said Dewey, were to devise measures which "do not involve getting implicated in the heritage of European war politics, and which will afford Europe an opportunity to free herself from that incubus."[57]

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[54]Shotwell, "The Pact of Paris," p. 452.

[55]Ibid. [56]Ibid., p. 453.

[57]John Dewey, "America's Responsibility," Christian Century 43 (23 December 1926):1583-84.

For Dewey the relations between nations would be altered considerably by relegating war to an illegal status. Economically, he asserted that the very presence of a war threat prevented serious attention being directed to the economic causes of war. Politically, Dewey believed that after outlawry nations could relate to one another on a level above mere offensive and defensive alliances. Socially, he argued that outlawry would put conscience and law on the same side and relegate war-like people to the status of non-patriots while elevating pacifists to patriot status. Diplomatically, outlawry would allow the fullest use of peaceful methods of problem solving, because recourse to war would no longer be legal.[58]

When the Kellogg-Briand Treaty offered the world a renunciation plan, Dewey was quick to warn that it should not be considered the last step, but rather a beginning. What additional steps were needed, according to Dewey, included revision of international law to reflect the new status of war and the institution of a World Court with positive jurisdiction. He was critical of those people who discussed the pact in terms of how the signatories would act when another war came; he thought it best to discuss the pact only in terms of what additional steps were

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[58]John Dewey, "If War Were Outlawed," New Republic 34 (25 April 1923):234-35; John Dewey, "What Outlawry of War Is Not," New Republic 36 (3 October 1923): 149-52.

needed to insure its workability. Americans had to support the pact as an example to other nations, for only in that way could it survive and prosper.[59] The "force" behind the pact would be public opinion.

Harry Elmer Barnes did not share Dewey's preoccupation with the outlawry movement. Recognizing that the elimination of war was prerequisite to any hope for a decent and stable world order dedicated to an enduring world civilization, the causes of war were too complex for any one plan to adequately treat.[60] He was critical of pacifists for their frequent attention to one or another cause of war while apparently ignoring those of equal and greater significance. Barnes supported the outlawry of war effort, seeing it as a useful addition to the attempt to eliminate war, but it must be only one of a multiplicity of efforts. For Barnes, no plan to eliminate war could be complete without providing an acceptable international organization having "the power and inclination to enforce peace."[61] Barnes recognized the realities of international politics.

America's interests not uncommonly were given

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[59]John Dewey, "As An Example to Other Nations," New Republic 54 (7 March 1928):88-89; John Dewey, "Two Communications," New Republic 54 (28 March 1928):194-96; John Dewey, "Outlawing Peace By Discussing War," New Republic 54 (16 May 1928):370-72.

[60]Barnes, Living in the Twentieth Century, pp. 341, 344; Barnes, The Genesis of the World War, pp. 1028.

[61]Barnes, Living in the Twentieth Century, p. 344.

first priority over the international community's concerns, but who could argue that America's interests were not necessarily adaptable to the world at large?

The fundamental problem which few academics faced was that the primary cause of international conflict was more emotional-psychological than economic-political. George Herbert Mead, University of Chicago philosopher and sociologist, looked at the human element operative in international relations. It was Mead's contention that people felt unifying forces through negative or "anti" influences, with war being the unification of negative responses to an opponent. An underlying cause of that condition was the psychological insecurity of the individual being projected onto the nation--a questioning of one's masculinity at a national level: "Can we find outside of the fighting spirit that unifying power which presents a supreme issue to which all others are subordinated, which will harden us to undergo everything, and unite us in the enthusiasm of a common end?"[62] It was not that men loved fighting, said Mead, but that "they undergo its rigors for the sake of conjunction with all those who are fighting in the same cause."[63] The

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[62]George Herbert Mead, "National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness," in Andrew J. Reck, ed., Selected Writings (New York: The Bobbs-Merrell Company, Inc., 1964), p. 361.

[63]Ibid., p. 365.

society of man had been incapable of uniting around items of positive value such as science, literature, art, or political mechanisms. There seemed little hope for mankind to accept such positive forces as unifying factors so long as a lack of self-confidence remained: "We are not sure of our national selves, and a certain amount of national psychoanalysis would be very valuable if not very probable."[64] Mead held little hope for an immediate positive lateration in the international structure: "We cannot attain international-mindedness until we have attained a higher degree of national-mindedness than we possess at present; and a rough guage of it will be found in the necessity of retaining national honor and peculiar interests as causae belli."[65]

Mead had addressed the heart of the issue: international relations was not defined only in political and economic terms, but involved the psychological-emotional aspects as well. That was why all the grandiose plans for international peace and international reform would ultimately fail--they simply refused to address themselves to, and offer workable solutions for, the psychological and emotional forces that had greater impact for international disruption than most people seemed willing to recognize. Even Mead was unable to offer a means for implementing his own recommendation.

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[64]Ibid., p. 368.

[65]Ibid., pp. 368-69.

CHAPTER III

THE JOURNALIST AND AMERICA'S ROLE

In an oration at Avon, New York, in 1827, a speaker included the following words: "Standing where we now do, we may look forward to the period when the spark kindled in America shall spread and spread, till the whole earth be illumined by its light."[1] One hundred years later that spirit still illumined America's vision of its role in world affairs. Walter Lippmann, editor of the New York World and associate editor of New Republic, in 1927 wrote of Americans preparing "for the part that their power and their position compel them to play;"[2] the New York Times in 1927 called upon citizens to bring into play "all the actual and latent practical idealism . . . and mobilize American sentiment in behalf of the supreme cause of international understanding and goodwill;"[3] the same year Collier's magazine, reaching 1.6 million subscribers each

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[1]Quoted in Ralph Henry Gabriel, "Constitutional Democracy: A Nineteenth Century Faith," in Conyers Read, ed., The Constitution Reconsidered (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), pp. 255-56.

[2]Walter Lippmann, "America as an Empire," Vanity Fair 32 (April 1927):128.

[3]New York Times, 3 January 1927.

week, observed in an editorial that America was "in the world, and the only question left for us to decide is what part we shall play in it;"[4] and Edward Bok, former editor of the Ladies Home Journal, wrote in 1924 that Americans "are a part of the world, and, as such, must play our part in it."[5]

That a voice for isolationism existed, however, cannot be denied. The Chicago Tribune, selling almost 2 million newspapers weekly, chastised America for assuming any effort at altruism; America's only moral obligation was "to protect the interests of the United States."[6] The Saturday Evening Post, circulation over 2 million weekly, commended America's isolation "from the forces of evil and destruction," and urged as a guide the spirit of "live and let live."[7] The San Francisco Examiner, owned by William Randolph Hearst and selling over one-half million copies weekly, stated directly that America must "stay where the Lord evidently intended us to stay and thrive - in North America."[8] American journalism vigorously carried forth

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[4]Collier's 80 (8 October 1927):58.

[5]Edward W. Bok, "What I Expect," Atlantic Monthly 133 (January 1924):54.

[6]"The Virtue of Minding Our Own Business," Chicago Tribune, 28 March 1927; "The Conduct of Our Foreign Affairs," Chicago Tribune, 3 January 1925.

[7]"America's Isolation," Saturday Evening Post 197 (23 August 1924):20.

[8]"Keep Free of Entanglements," San Francisco Examiner, 4 February 1925.

the range of opinion respecting America's role in world affairs.

The sources for this chapter are representative of the mass media and the journalists. The magazines selected fall into two categories--mass circulation and opinion. Saturday Evening Post and Collier's are representative of the first category, with Nation, New Republic, Outlook, and World's Work examples of the second. Newspapers were selected on a regional basis with circulation a prime consideration. Included in the research were journalists who edited some of the newspapers and periodicals or who acted as contributing and associate editors.[9]

The interest in self-preservation expressed through restrictive immigration legislation, high tariffs, emphasis on economic prosperity at home, served to hide the reality of world affairs and America's role in them for the mass of Americans. Walter Lippmann assessed the predicament when he observed that the average American was

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[9]For circulation numbers of newspapers and periodicals refer to annual volumes of American Newspaper Annual and Directory (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son). For discussion of these and other periodicals, see Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 5 vol. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956); and James Playsted Wood, Magazines in the United States (New York: The Ronald Press, 1971).

not aware of a United States empire or its manner of operation: "We continue to think of ourselves as a kind of great peaceable Switzerland, whereas we are in fact a great, expanding world power."[10]

Not all sources agreed with Lippmann's critique of America's position in the world order. For example, the New York Times, with a circulation of 1.1 million copies weekly, at the time the United States sent military forces to Nicaragua in 1926 argued that the United States was not an imperialist nation because it did not maintain a large army. Furthermore, while America admittedly did seek to enlarge its commerce and influence, its motive sought to aid and protect the weaker republics on the continent, not impose its control over them. As the Mexico and Nicaragua crises mounted at the end of 1926, the Times gave sanction to America's actions in Latin America: "If this be imperialism, make the most of it."[11] The ability to perceive or appreciate the perspective of the affected country was absent. Collier's magazine printed an editorial which stated that America had become the financial capitol of the world, but not the overseer of a world financial empire. Such was America's "destiny" to be the financial capitol, and as such the country had to "adapt our manners and our morals

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[10]Walter Lippmann, "An Unconscious Empire," New York World, 29 December 1926.

[11]"Imperialism," New York Times, 29 December 1926.

to our new position in the world."[12] Collier's had made an assumption that expansion of international business and the development of friendly relations were directly linked, when in fact the success of one might preclude the other.

According to Walter Lippmann, the United States government should have advised the Latin American republics of its preference for governments which drew their strength from the national will.[13] Lippmann warned the United States government against using the Monroe Doctrine to place itself in the position of the Holy Alliance of the 1820's "prepared to use force to deny the right to that national development which a hundred years ago we helped Latin America to win."[14] He recognized that while democracy had not become a reality in Latin America, national will existed, and "there can be no sound American policy which does not accept it as a fundamental premise."[15] The problem, as Lippmann probably realized, was that the national will of a sovereign Latin American republic and the self-interest of the United States would be interpreted by many people as incompatible, and self-interest would rule.

Supporters of America's policies were plentiful.

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[12] Collier's 80 (17 December 1927):50.

[13] Walter Lippmann, "Toward a Peace in Latin America," New York World, 15 January 1927.

[14] Walter Lippmann, "The Ultimate Question," New York World, 15 January 1927.

[15] Lippmann, "Toward a Peace in Latin America."

World's Work, a magazine devoted to international concerns, particularly Pan-Americanism and trade opportunities between North and South America, promoted a view that the State Department had an obligation to protect American lives and property in foreign lands. Respecting the Mexican effort to enforce the Constitution of 1917 provisions against foreign oil company holdings, the editor of World's Work denied any official desire to intervene in the internal affairs of any other nation, but he could not "stand by and see the lives and property of our citizens endangered. . . . As long as Latin American governments are weak, unstable, or corrupt, we must be constantly ready to act."[16] World's Work had no sympathy for the Mexican government or its situation, seeing it primarily as an economic opportunity.

Collier's clearly exhibited the economic imperialist views which prohibited development of international cooperation. When Dwight Morrow received appointment as United States Ambassador to Mexico, a Collier's editorial expressed confidence in the financier, and noted that a compromise agreement had to be reached because of financial interests on both sides. Collier's saw no way to discontinue the investments because fortunes would continue to be sought where profits would be highest: "Consequently neither

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[16]World's Work 53 (February 1927):353; World's Work 57 (November 1928):14; World's Work 47 (February 1924):354-55.

we nor any other people will abandon our claims in Mexico." Operating on the assumption that American intervention in Lation America was good, there were two jobs to be done in the Caribbean: first, provide security for America by preventing enemy military use of the islands; and second, exert sufficient control over disorderly nations to prevent intervention by any other strong government. The editor asserted that if weak governments endangered United States' citizens, the American public would compel intervention. Looking upon past action by the United States government in Latin America as positive, Collier's had little doubt that future interventions also would be for the good of all concerned.[17]

Other sources supported the views in Collier's. The Chicago Tribune, for example, charged the American government with protecting the general domain of the nation, including its persons and property abroad.[18] The Saturday Evening Post denied any accusations of imperialism on the grounds that if they existed the United States would have annexed Mexico and Nicaragua years before.

Some opinion-makers were critical of businessmen attempting to establish interests in Latin America through force or with government support. The Nation magazine,

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[17]Collier's 80 (19 November 1927):62; Collier's 81 (31 March 1928):54.

[18]"Mexican Policy and Foreign Investments," Chicago Tribune, 1 December 1926; "The President's Address," Chicago Tribune, 26 April 1927.

referred to by one historian of American journalism as "the elder statesman among the journals of opinion in the twentieth century,"[19] charged complicity between government and business: "By playing to the cupidity of small groups in one Latin American republic after another, [businessmen] are making loans on investments under favored conditions and then calling upon a government at Washington - complacent and hypocritical - to uphold their 'rights.'"[20] Allegedly such practices had been occurring since the World War under State Department encouragement, and American investors were increasing the area under their financial control. The Nation considered such action as "significant because it indicates the course which, unless the American people awaken to conscious control of their foreign policy, we are likely to follow in other countries."[21] While official government policy did not provide for support of foreign investments, the investors would have been reluctant to move into areas where their interests would fail to be provided with some assurances, direct or indirect, of protection.

Carleton Beals, author, lecturer, and special correspondent to Central America, Africa, Europe, and the

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[19]Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century, p. 417.

[20]Nation 117 (12 December 1923):679.

[21]Nation 120 (27 May 1925):588.

Middle East, dramatically summarized the effects of the business-government association:

> It corrupts governments, raises up unscrupulous dictators and demagogues, creates intolerable popular burdens, brings about protective raids on our own Treasury, and, for the sake of a few financial groups, jeopardizes our cordial relations with the entire Latin American world.[22]

The opposition was directed at the form of financial activities, not to investments or trade themselves; in fact, trade was thought to be "one of the greatest bonds to tie nations together, to mingle their interests so that it should be impossible for war to arise."[23] Beals, like others, though, failed to deal with the problem posed by the capitalist system which demanded inequities among nations so that the producers could control their sources of raw materials and to some extent their markets. Without fundamental restructuring, increased trade more likely would increase tensions among competing nations and create greater opportunity for war.

William Hard, newspaper and magazine writer and political correspondent to the Consolidated Press Association, saw clearly the imperialistic consciousness of the American people: "I hold . . . that the average American is naturally 'imperialistic' and that, when he finds himself in the State Department, he just naturally

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[22]Carleton Beals, "The Nicaraguan Farce," Nation 123 (15 December 1926):632.

[23]Nation 123 (3 November 1926):442.

acts 'imperialistically.'"[24] That trait resulted from America's superiority complex. By attempting to pacify others, Americans insinuated that only with their help could others become peaceful, and that the American concept of stability was just. In Hard's mind, then, business interests need not push for an American empire because the people naturally moved in that direction.

Hard also counseled Americans against intervention into domestic affairs of foreign nations: "Our security is to never awaken any resentments or revenges arising from any unnecessary exercises of our power." Hard suggested that America's security "in the midst of our greatness and grandeur" based itself on a willingness to abstain from arousing envy or enmity by exercising any opinions or actions "regarding the internal affairs of any foreign country at any time." Hard believed America's greatest assistance to foreign countries would be to refrain from unsolicited advice and action. Even in the case of solicited aid he was hesitant unless it clearly represented consensus opinion.[25]

As Mexico asserted its power over the property and interests of foreigners, the question of alien rights arose. Walter Lippmann rejected Secretary of State Frank

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[24]William Hard, "The Urge Toward Empire," Nation 124 (2 February 1927):109.

[25]William Hard, "Nicaragua and The Nation," Nation 122 (2 June 1926):600.

Kellogg's assertion that those rights were immutable, meaning the Constitution of 1917 could not legally alter the status of the oil company holdings; Lippmann proposed that such a theory sanctioned State Department control over the internal affairs of the Mexican government--an absurd and dangerous notion. Lippmann argued that while it would be to Mexico's harm to actually injure the oil business, there were considerations to be taken into account: for example, America must not attempt to undermine a country's right to engage in social change if it desired. Lippmann warned that the security of American investments abroad would have to ultimately rest on the faith of the borrowing nations: "They must believe that American capital profits them, and is consistent with their own national interest."[26] The use of force must be a last resort especially when the threat was more ideological than physical.[27]

In the crisis with Mexico in 1926-1927 Lippmann, as so many others, put his trust in the democratic system. He called upon people to act "before the fatal decisions are taken, before the war psychology is aroused and men cease to be reasonable."[28] He rejected leaving future events

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[26]Walter Lippmann, "Vested Rights and Nationalism in Latin-America," Foreign Affairs 5 (April 1927):363.

[27]Walter Lippmann, "Sheathe the Sword," New York World, 17 January 1927.

[28]Walter Lippmann, "If You Want Peace -," New York World, 13 January 1927.

completely controlled by the State Department, even warning people against the actions of Secretary of State Kellogg after the latter's assertion that Mexico was becoming a seedbed of bolshevist activity. Lippmann said the memorandum was "written by a man who set out deliberately to poison the mind of the American people," but what Kellogg meant by bolshevism was "anything done by a weaker power that American business interests do not like."[29]

William Allen White, proprietor and editor of the Emporia Gazette, one of America's most notable small papers, believed that Mexico's position on the oil controversy was wrong, but at the same time he criticized any threat of force imposed by the United States: "My quarrel with the policy of the State Department has been that the State Department has been too quick to show force to a weaker nation. . . ." At the same time he criticized the oil companies for their emphasis on the importance of property--he opposed violence justified by reason of property alone. White charged oil companies with attempting to buy property with the "blood of American boys." White defended the capitalist system, recognized threats to it, and saw those threats eminating not from the masses but from "the mad, greedy folly of the forces above." Mexico's position had

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[29]Walter Lippmann, "A Crime Against Peace," New York World, 14 January 1927; Walter Lippmann, "Toward Peace With Mexico," New York World, 8 January 1927.

to be considered, he wrote, for in the end only that approach could "save all of the rights of your stockholders and . . . stabliize the present economic system."[30]

Support for White's view came from H. L. Mencken who noted in review of Ernest Gruening's book Mexico and Its Heritage that if widely read, the book would produce greater understanding between Mexico and America "and with that better understanding, it is to be hoped, there will come a greater decency."[31] The Atlanta Constitution, a newspaper reaching almost one-quarter million readers weekly, saw only positive reasons for an amicable settlement of differences.[32] The New York World urged extreme caution in promoting the rights of America's oil companies in Mexico: the newspaper alleged that half of the land and production of the disputed oil holdings were controlled by Edward L. Doheny and his companies. Since Doheny had been involved in the oil scandals earlier in the decade, motives and methods needed to be carefully examined before

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[30]Letter from White to Guy Stevens, Association of Petroleum Producers in Mexico, 21 April 1927, in Walter Johnson, ed., Selected Letters of William Allen White (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), pp. 270-71.

[31]H. L. Mencken, "Across the Border," American Mercury 15 (December 1928):509. See also Mencken's editorial in American Mercury 13 (April 1928):409-11 for a more general criticism of American foreign policy in Latin America.

[32]"The Robinson Resolution," Atlanta Constitution, 28 January 1927; see also "The President's Address," Atlanta Constitution, 27 April 1927.

proceeding to lend government support to such men.[33]

The criticism of America's policy toward Latin America did not mean preference for a policy of isolation. Walter Lippmann criticized intervention, particularly unilateral intervention. He scolded the United States for failing to enlist support for its actions in Latin America. Having nothing to hide with respect to its policy, the United States should have sought to share its duties and responsibilities with other disinterested nations to preserve the goodwill of Latin America. Lippmann wrote:

> We have great power. But we tend to exert that power either to protect our narrowest interests or to preserve it for a crisis. We ought rather to exert it continuously upon the governments in power on behalf of orderly administration and of social reform.[34]

Still, one cannot escape asking the essential difference between unilateral intervention and exerting one's power upon a government for "orderly administration and . . . social reform." The only answer can be found in the concept of America's mission in world affairs; Lippmann's statement was an example of the belief that America had a responsibility to provide stability in the world, particularly the underdeveloped regions.

The fundamental economic problem was not raised, either by opinion journals like Nation or certainly not by

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[33]"The Same Old Gang," New York World, 27 January 1927; "The Same Old Gang," New York World, 29 January 1927.

[34]Walter Lippmann, "Second Thoughts on Havana," Foreign Affairs 6 (July 1928):553.

supporters of an aggressive economic policy for American prosperity. If America was going to assume a useful leadership role in world economic affairs, it would have been seeking ways to equalize the economic imbalances which encouraged conflict among nations. The journalistic trade, obviously appealing to varying audiences, was in all cases a product of the political environment, and the fact remains that radicalism had no place among established circles of journalism or among the people at large. While forums for liberal and radical views existed, as in the Nation, the predominant mood of the country which enjoyed the "prosperity decade" impacted even on those sources.

Few persons and sources seemed neutral on the League of Nations and World Court. Each continued to be much talked and written about during the 1920's despite America's rejection of the League through the Senate and the delayed decision to enter the Court.

Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the League of Nations was William Randolph Hearst, editor and proprietor of two dozen newspapers including the San Francisco Examiner, Los Angeles Examiner and Herald, Chicago American, Atlanta Georgian, New York American, and Washington Herald. One of the more forthright statements of opposition came in a Hearst editorial dated 2 January 1927. He began by professing belief in international peace, but questioned the

devotion of other nations. He expressed opposition to the League and the World Court not because of their professed peaceful intentions, but rather "because we realized that those professions meant nothing compared with the actual principles and practices of their warlike members."[35] Hearst argued that the League evidenced an inability of heterogenous elements to effectively function together; it could not present a united front on any occasion nor promote peace effectively, and members did not heed its declarations because "each one has its own objects, with which it will not tolerate any interference and which are largely at variance with the objects of the other members."[36]

The Nation magazine carried forth a long and consistent campaign against reconsideration of League membership. The magazine objected to the League's pretension as a preventer of war when in fact it was "so plainly constructed out of the late war."[37] To the Nation the League exhibited the most dangerous element in the world, "sincere moral passion so convinced of its righteousness that it ceases to face the fact-data from which it draws its conclusions."[38] Oswald Garrison Villard, the Nation's

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[35]William Randolph Hearst, Selections From the Writings and Speeches of William Randolph Hearst (San Francisco: The San Francisco Examiner, 1948), p. 195.

[36]Ibid., p. 196.

[37]Nation 116 (4 April 1923):381.

[38]Nation 116 (6 June 1923):644.

editor, criticized the League for its failure to involve the masses of the world: "we must face the fact that the League is but a machine of the existing officialdoms in the various countries, that its source is the governments, and that it will only with great difficulty, if at all, rise above its source."[39] Villard saw United States' adherence to the League Covenant not as a revival of the comradeship of the World War, but rather as a force for making America decide if it was pro-British, pro-French, or any other country: "Why . . . should any American wish to tie up intimately to such a situation?"[40] The Nation proposed an alternative to League membership: "work out a foreign policy which shall . . . be founded upon the historic American doctrine of keeping out of entangling alliances and political commitments. Let us keep to ourselves politically."[41]

William Randolph Hearst and the Nation, on such different political wavelengths, were united in opposition to American membership in the League of Nations. Hearst's objections came from the political right which saw membership as an infringement upon American sovereignty in international decision-making; the Nation and its editors came

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[39]Oswald Garrison Villard, "What of the League?" Nation 117 (24 October 1923):456. For a supporting view see New Republic 29 (1 February 1922):266.

[40]Oswald Garrison Villard, "America's Crop of Hate," Nation 123 (11 August 1926):127.

[41]Nation 122 (31 March 1926):332.

from the political left which argued that the League was an ineffective force for good in world affairs, hence American participation would serve no immediate function for promoting cooperation. Neither side was willing to take the step of involving the nation in the League for purposes of reform from within.

William Allen White wrote to an acquaintance that "The golden moment has passed when America has any business going into the League of Nations as it is today."[42] White could also say, however, that "While standing for the national defense, I also believe tremendously in peace and believe in the League of Nations. . . ."[43] He typified a state of mind which clung to the ideals of America's traditions and hesitated to take the final step toward complete involvement in international organization.

The New York Times reflected the view of opinion-makers desiring adherence to the League while recognizing the improbability of success. The Times wondered if the United States had lost "some of that idealism which helped to save Europe from destruction and ourselves from a like ultimate fate?"[44] By questioning rather than accusing, the

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[42]White to W. D. Guthrie, 10 July 1923, Selected Letters of William Allen White, p. 232.

[43]White to Mrs. Alfred Brousseau, 11 August 1927, Selected Letters of William Allen White, p. 280. Mrs. Brousseau was President General of the Daughters of the American Revolution which placed White on their list of "dangerous Reds;" the letter challenged that action.

[44]International Idealism, New York Times, 28

Times encouraged a subtle reexamination of the public mind without offending the reader.

The magazine World's Work opposed adherence to the League, fearing "dangerous liabilities" if the United States joined. The primary danger would be to limit America's freedom of action anywhere that interests or principles required.[45] The Outlook and Collier's supported that view, as did the Saturday Evening Post; the latter cast blame upon Europe for the unworkability of the League.[46]

The League of Nations received high praise from Walter Lippmann. He affirmed that five years of the League had brought "not disillusionment and not cynicism but greater boldness than statesmen have ever before exhibited in the cause of peace."[47] Lippmann charged that most of the objections to joining the League and Court in 1920 had been "nonsense;" the only valid one had been objection to association with the Versailles Treaty. But even that had lost validity because the United States made a separate treaty

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August 1924.

[45] World's Work 50 (June 1925):132.

[46] Outlook 141 (30 December 1925):659; Outlook 142 (20 January 1926):98-99; Outlook 143 (6 January 1926):13-14; Outlook 143 (10 March 1926):358; Collier's 72 (1 September 1923):19; Collier's 74 (13 December 1924):24; Collier's 75 (28 February 1925):22; "The Unknown Soldier," Saturday Evening Post 196 (6 October 1925):32; "Arms and the League," Saturday Evening Post 199 (26 February 1927):26.

[47] Walter Lippmann, "War As a Crime," New York World, 2 October 1924.

with Germany and, according to Lippmann, the allies recognized the need for revision of the treaty. The United States could now "associate itself with the construction and maintenance of peace without prejudice of any kind."[48] While he praised the League, Lippmann was reluctant to advocate formal membership: "whether through the League or by some other means is not of the first importance. What matters is the will of the American people to do their part in bringing peace to the world."[49] Thus America's mission took precedence, and the League became important to the extent that it served to enhance that mission.

The World Court received similar attention from opinion-makers. The Hearst papers opposed both the League and Court because membership "would merely have involved the United States in the conflicts of Europe without in any way promoting the peace of the world. . . ."[50] The Chicago Tribune expressed similar views. In simple language, the Tribune preferred Europe to be let alone. Noninterference by America in Europe, and vice-versa, would protect American policy and interest from interference by European councils or tribunals. When the United States Senate voted 76 to 17

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[48]Walter Lippmann, "Hold Fast," New York World, 17 June 1924.

[49]Walter Lippmann, "Famine, Plenty - and Peace," New York World, 30 March 1924.

[50]Selections From the Writings and Speeches of William Randolph Hearst, p. 195.

for adherence to the Court with reservations, the Tribune reluctantly supported it but only because the conditions attached would strengthen the position of nationalists in the Senate and make it difficult for internationalists to "surrender America's interest to intrigue or false altruism."[51]

Walter Lippmann joined the voices expressing support for the World Court and America's involvement in it. Replying to three articles in the Nation by World Court opponent William Hard, Lippmann argued that association with Europe in time of peace posed negligible risks because America would associate with Europe in time of war anyway. Thus it would be more sensible to support any agency which lent itself to the extension of peaceful adjustment of international problems: "Since we cannot escape a great war if it comes, we do not add to our peril, and we may lessen it if we support institutions like the Court, which are intended to make war less likely."[52]

The Nation editorially presented a position clearly exposing the dilemma faced by the "liberal" community--how to carry out progressive reform in international affairs without surrendering the tradition of nonalliance for political or military purposes. The Nation would not support

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[51] "Our Debt to the World Court Opposition," Chicago Tribune, 28 January 1926.

[52] Walter Lippmann, "A Reply to Mr. Hard," Nation 122 (20 January 1926):61.

adherence to the World Court without "at least" the four Coolidge-Hughes reservations: (1) prevent amendment of the World Court Charter without consent of the United States; (2) give the United States a voice in the selection of judges; (3) provide for payment by the American government of a fair share of the Court's expenses; and (4) assurance that acceptance would not be tantamount to joining the League of Nations. In addition, the magazine proposed one other condition which would in effect take from the judicial body any semblance of power for enforcing its decrees:

> If we enter the World Court we should see to it that the conditions of entry are such that the court shall be backed by no power except that of world opinion. More than that, the United States should condition its entry on effective agreements that neither the court nor the League, nor any of its members, shall have power to enforce the decrees of the tribunal by war or by economic pressures of any kind.[53]

The attitudes expressed toward the League and Court represented more than feelings about those two institutions--they were comments on Europe. England and the continent lost some favor in the United States due to the widespread feeling that Europe had somehow failed to live up to America's expectations following the World War; the Allies received special criticism in some circles. Thus the rapprochement between England and the United States was in jeopardy in the minds of some people. One must remember that such feelings were not a consensus, and the majority of persons were not concerned with the matter, but in

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[53]Nation 121 (9 December 1925):637.

newspapers and journals discussion occurred.

Walter Lippmann and the New York Times expressed the attitude that Europe lacked ability to solve its problems without assistance from America. Lippmann, writing after the success of the Dawes Commission which revised the reparations payments imposed upon Germany through the Versailles Treaty, suggested that the cooperative spirit which presided in Europe during the work of the Commission resulted from the presence of American participants: "The fact is they were respected, the fact is that our wealth and our power and our remoteness have helped to take a step toward peace."[54]

A New York Times editorial in October 1924 focused on the positive development of a new international mind resulting from America admitting "her oneness with Europe."[55] Later the Times published an editorial pleading for America to find a means through which "we can call into action all the actual and latent practical idealism . . . and mobilize American settlement in behalf of the supreme cause of international understanding and goodwill."[56] By not involving itself in Europe's agencies, the editorial charged, America

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[54]Walter Lippmann, "Three Men Come Home," New York World, 30 April 1924.

[55]"The Better Feeling," New York Times, 29 October 1924.

[56]"The American Attitude," New York Times 3 January 1927.

was condemning Europe to failure. The Times gave full support to joining the World Court: any efforts to block American association would cause "irreparable damage to the cause of international justice and world peace."[57] The Boston Globe and Atlanta Constitution lent their support to the Court as well.[58]

William Randolph Hearst was not as charitable in his attitude toward Europe. More cautious, he commented: "I do not think that the welfare of foreign nations or the opinion of foreign people is so important to us as the welfare of our own Nation and the opinion of our own people."[59] Commenting on the Democratic Party, a party of "visionary internationalism," Hearst charged the party with "sacrificing the welfare of our own people for the interests of foreign peoples who were alike unworthy and ungrateful."[60] While Hearst exhibited the classic concept of fear and suspicion about foreign relations, he exposed an attitude which placed the United States in a position superior to other nations, rather than a cooperating equal. That very attitude was not uncommon among opinion-makers elsewhere.

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[57] "Making Excuses," New York Times, 29 April 1924.

[58] "The Crux of the Matter," Boston Globe, 28 January 1926; "Well Done, America," Atlanta Constitution, 29 January 1926.

[59] Selections From the Writings and Speeches of William Randolph Hearst, p. 159.

Behind attitudes about Europe, Latin America, the League of Nations, and the World Court lay an overriding concern for preservation of world peace. Responding to the memory of the tragedy of 1914-1918, and to the traditional abhorence of war which Americans possessed, world peace and tranquility received considerable attention. William Randolph Hearst was correct when he alleged that all Americans were pacifists in that "we are all opposed to war and in favor of peace for ourselves and for the world."[61]

World's Work and Collier's stressed the economic motivation behind America's search for world peace. World's Work asserted that only in a peaceful world could America "arrive at the greatest development of their trade and commerce - the 'business' in which Americans are undoubtedly chiefly interested."[62] In a February 1927 editorial the magazine wrote about American industries "stretching out their hands for foreign markets" in order to retain and extend the prosperity they were experiencing; to find and hold those markets Americans must "take our full part - and more - in world affairs." In March 1927 an editorial observed that "trade, national defense, and diplomacy are a

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[61]Ibid., p. 195.

[62]World's Work 56 (May 1928):3-4.

trinity, and should be treated as such instead of as separate entities." Collier's on 12 November 1927 suggested the best hope for the future peace of the world to be a widening of international contacts and an increase in the interrelatedness of the world's nations through the automobile, airplane, radio, railroads, and telegraphs.

While opinion-makers agreed on the need for peace, not all agreed on the method. The views ranged from Lippmann's support for "diplomacy of active cooperation" to Hearst's "cooperation of the English-speaking peoples" to H. L. Mencken's revival of the Pax Romana with the United States the new Rome. The concept of America's role came forth in part through a New York Times editorial preceding Senate ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty: "To let this opportunity pass is to invite not only the disgust and scorn of the nations whom our official representative has embraced in his multilateral proposal and who now await her answer, but also the condemnation of generations unborn."[63] America was the hope for the future.

The high point of the 1920's peace movement was the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty in August 1928. But the pact did not receive universal praise. The Nation, for one, expressed early support which subsequently waned. Commenting after Briand's proposal on 6 April 1927 for an

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[63]"The United States and Peace on Earth," New York Times, 25 December 1928.

outlawry of war agreement between France and the United States, a Nation editorial called for an "immediate and prompt" response to the offer "whether it be official or unofficial, inspired or made on the spur of the moment."[64] The magazine's editors wanted discussion to take place: "The first step toward peace is to talk peace, will peace."[65] The New Republic affirmed the need for discussion and for arousal of public opinion, which if strong enough would reduce need for such a treaty anyway.[66]

Skepticism took form as the treaty began to emerge. The failure of the pact to ban defensive war caused concern as did a statement by President Coolidge that the pact would not bear on the question of armaments. With the peace treaty finally signed at Paris, the Nation expressed both skepticism and hope: the treaty reflected "the people's voice for peace," but the next step, disarmament, would be up to the statesmen.[67] The Nation considered a vote for the peace pact analgous to a vote for the Ten Commandments: "Perfectly proper and in no wise affecting the existing status of the world."[68] The Chicago Tribune feared for naval forces, the mandatory defense

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[64]Nation 124 (4 May 1927):489-90.

[65]Nation 126 (22 February 1928):200.

[66]New Republic 57 (28 November 1928):214.

[67]Nation 127 (5 September 1928):214.

[68]Nation 127 (19 December 1928):671.

force against any attack on America and its standard of living.[69] The St. Louis Post-Dispatch referred to the pact as an empty gesture, charging that nations were glad to sign peace treaties so long as they need not rally forth to punish an offender.[70] The New York World considered the pact as renouncing war as an instrument of national policy only where no national interests existed.[71]

World's Work questioned the value of the treaty. It described its value as striking from America's hands the most effective instrument with which to preserve peace. In addition, the magazine expressed skepticism over Europe's intentions, asserting that Europe sought hegemony, with peace a secondary goal. The thought loomed that Europe might take advantage of any United States' guarantee to remain our of hostilities: "we cannot yet overlook the fact that the possibility of war is a most potent instrument of peace." World's Work warned against a false confidence gained from the treaty: "There is a real danger that it may produce a false confidence that peace has been attained, and thus put an end to the efforts to set up as an alternative to war a really effective machinery for the pacific

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[69]"Betraying America to the Spoilers," Chicago Tribune, 18 August 1928.

[70]"An Empty Gesture," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 16 August 1928.

[71]"The Treaty Ratified," New York World, 16 January 1929.

settlement of international disputes." The magazine did not consider the Kellogg-Briand Treaty a panacea for peace.[72]

The treaty had its supporters as well as detractors. Editors of the New Republic took a positive view; they thought greater pressure now would be exerted on warmakers to help drive away some militaristic propaganda. In addition, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty would be beneficial "for its general effect upon the moral tone of international relations."[73] The editor of the Survey, Paul Kellogg, admitted shortcomings for the treaty, but hailed it as "a declaration that puts us abreast of the hope of the world."[74] The Atlanta Constitution labeled it "the best one day's work since the world war. . . ."[75]

Walter Lippmann publicly argued that world peace could be attained best by convening an international conference on any occasion when war threatened; the object of the conference was to align public opinion against the aggressor, forcing him into arbitration.[76] Lippmann saw

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[72]World's Work 56 (May 1928):8-9; World's Work 55 (February 1928):351; World's Work 56 (September 1928): 462.

[73]New Republic 57 (5 December 1928):57.

[74]Paul U. Kellogg, "Pacts Cruisers and - Then What?" Survey 61 (1 March 1929):734.

[75]"Kellogg Treaty Ratified," Atlanta Constitution, 17 January 1929.

[76]Walter Lippmann, "The Problem of Peace," New York World, 5 September 1924.

the central fallacy in the outlawry of war program to be its failure to allow for diplomacy. Not all conflicts could be adjudicated, asserted Lippmann, and "For them, diplomacy is required, diplomacy working by conference, compromise, bargaining, good offices, and also in the last analysis . . . by the threat of force."[77] But the "threat" of force rather than force itself seemed important; the fear by an aggressor that overwhelming power faced him seemed sufficient to bring the aggressor to the conference table. In his essay "The Political Equivalent of War" Lippmann joined forces with Kirby Page and other opinion-makers by paralleling peace in civil society with international peace; since the former required legislative, judicial, executive, social, and cultural institutions, "Is there any reason to suppose that international peace is any easier to attain than domestic peace?"[78] For Lippmann international government provided the most effective means for developing peace, but the problem of convincing nations to relinquish national sovereignty was difficult to resolve. Until people could accept reduced freedom in international decision-making, said Lippmann, they should not be deceived about the readiness to outlaw war.

H. L. Mencken supported Lippmann's position: "The

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[77]Walter Lippmann, "The Outlawry of War," Atlantic Monthly 132 (August 1923):252.

[78]Walter Lippmann, "The Political Equivalent of War," Atlantic Monthly 142 (August 1928):187.

theory that the way to keep out of wars is to disband the army and scrap the navy is as idiotic as the notion that the way to get rid of burglars is to discharge the police force."[79] Through disarmament, asserted Mencken, the United States invited its enemy to attack, and "his temptation is already almost more than he can bear." To prevent war, temptations need be reduced, "either by arming to the teeth or by going out of the swindling business. The latter, I take it, is too much to hope for."[80]

William Randolph Hearst pushed for multilateral leadership by a small number of nations--the English-speaking ones; he included the United States, Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. They would "cooperate to insure peace among themselves and, as far as possible, to maintain the peace of the world." That alliance would be neither entangling or offensive, but rather "an understanding, an agreement, a compact to prevent the parties to the agreement from the warlike aggressions of others. . . ."[81]

One could question Hearst's unwillingness to expand the alliance to other nations; to that query he had a ready response. He contended that the English-speaking

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[79]H. L. Mencken, "Goose-Step Days," Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 May 1924.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Selections From the Writings and Speeches of William Randolph Hearst, pp. 194-97.

peoples, because of language and exchange of literature, possessed basically uniform ideals and objectives. In addition, none of the nations involved were militaristic, while simultaneously the combination "constitutes the most powerful influence in the world." If other nations joined, nations with different language, characteristics, and objectives, the combination would be weakened by making unity of action and purpose less easily achieved. Speculating on the response of the Scandanavian countries, Germany, France, and others, he envisioned no hostility because it was a peace move, not a war move. Rather than attract the suspicion and animosity of other nations, "It should command their respect both on account of its importance and on account of its idealistic purpose."[82]

The maintenance of a strong navy occupied an important position in Hearst's concept of America's role in world affairs. He consistently warned against failure to maintain the United States Navy at less than full strength. In a letter of instruction to the editor of the New York American, Hearst urged him to write editorials in favor of a full strength navy and an air fleet of adequate protective size: "As we protect our cities from flames, our industrial property and security from the menace of the criminal, so let us protect our whole people, our great country, our national institutions, our American ideals, from

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[82]Ibid.

destruction by a foreign foe."[83] Hearst had the support of the Saturday Evening Post which warned that while brotherhood was a fine thing, "a big brother, a strong brother, has a much better chance of being heard internationally for peace than a weak sister."[84]

Perhaps Hearst's most concise statement on America's role in world affairs and its contribution to international relations came through an editorial letter of 23 February 1924:

> We CAN keep out of war. All we have to do to keep out of war is to do as we have done before - follow the injunctions of the wise Founders of the Nation, take advantage of our fortunate isolation, keep free from foreign entanglements, refrain from meddling in matters that do not concern us, avoid interfering in a situation where we cannot do any good to others and where we may do infinite harm to ourselves.[85]

For Hearst, the traditions of the past provided the best defense against uncertainties of the future.

Of those studied here, the views closest to Hearst's attitudes came from H. L. Mencken. His nationalism matched Hearst's, but without a strong anti-foreign sentiment. Mencken thought world peace could be achieved through a plan that worked, not necessarily one that was fair. He proposed a revival of the Pax Romana with the United States occupying center stage. Mencken promoted

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[83] Ibid., pp. 381-82.

[84] "Oh, Doctor!" Saturday Evening Post 199 (29 January 1927):22.

[85] Selections From the Writings and Speeches of William Randolph Hearst, p. 405.

America as the only power sufficiently strong to face a combination of world powers. He asserted that if the United States launched a naval building program to dominate the world, it could be done in three years and no nation would approach it; any nation attempting to challenge such a navy would find the effort financially devastating. Disarmament presented the only alternative to such a predicament. The fairness of such a program mattered not to Mencken, only its workability.[86]

Mencken's plan did not capture large audiences, but the desire for an America powerful enough to defend itself existed widely. The New York Times reflected that attitude in an editorial denouncing Senator Frazier of Montana for his proposals to deny Congress the war-making power and deny the people the right to possess and bear arms: "a perverted pacifism is making itself heard in many parts of the country. . . ."[87] The same editorial lamented inability of experienced military personnel to receive fair hearing for preparedness and national security. Diplomacy and compromise were not ruled out, as evidenced by a later editorial praising the use of discussion as a means to reduce the misunderstanding and ill-feeling

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[86]H. L. Mencken, "Editorial," American Mercury 17 (August 1929):417-19.

[87]"Abolishing the Defense Forces," New York Times, 26 April 1926.

existent between Europe and the United States.[88]

Opinion-makers in the journalistic community presented views as divergent as the audiences addressed. Throughout, though, there was a commonality: America's role in world affairs was important. But as to the nature of that role, as to relinguishing some sovereignty in international matters or not, as to formal political involvement, as to the proper relationship of America to the rest of the world, diversity reigned. Only a handful of people campaigned for important political, economic, or social reforms which would alter international relations significantly toward a more representative system of international cooperation. Few were willing to see the United States surrender a portion of its newfound potential and actual greatness or its independence in international decision-making. Each opinion-maker assessed the extent to which America could relinquish sovereignty for the cause of peaceful international relations, with the ultimate decision based on how best to preserve the world position of the United States.

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[88]"Afraid of Discussion?" New York Times, 24 November 1927.

CHAPTER IV

BUSINESS, PROSPERITY, AND FOREIGN POLICY

The business community, particularly international bankers, exporters, and companies with international holdings, had a fundamental interest in America's role in world affairs: prosperity was tied to how foreign policy was interpreted and executed. This chapter will examine the position taken by opinion-makers within the business community on issues related to economics and imperialism, international cooperation, and peace. To what extent did attitudes reflect a desire for maintenance of the status quo or for fundamental change; for political commitments or for total sovereignty; for economic growth through unilateral or cooperative efforts? How did the business community view America's role in world affairs?

The journal sources include Banker's Magazine, American Banker's Association Journal, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the Magazine of Wall Street, and the United States Chamber of Commerce publication Nation's Business. Individuals from different segments of the business community, each in excellent positions to be opinion-makers, are included.

In the 1920's, America's domestic market could not consume the excess production of the factories, nor could many raw materials be sufficiently procured within the United States. The rationale expressed for seeking foreign markets and foreign sources of raw materials centered on the concept of America's superiority of purpose. America's prosperity was projected as in the best interest of the world's prosperity; foreign commerce meant recovery and growth for all nations.

American business was tied closely to foreign markets during and after the World War both in trade and access to raw materials. For exports, the increase in value of the five principal commodities from 1920 to 1929 showed the economic importance of foreign markets: petroleum and its products jumped from $107,000,000 to $560,000,000; iron and steel mill products rose from $60,400,000 to $200,000,000; copper and copper manufactures climbed from $90,000,000 to $183,000,000; machinery, all classes, increased from $117,000,000 to $613,000,000; and automobiles, engines, and parts experienced a rise from $11,000,000 to $539,000,000.[1]

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[1]U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1930 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 504-5.

Similar increases occurred among the four principal imported commodities: crude rubber jumped in value from $101,000,000 in 1910 to $241,000,000 in 1929; petroleum and its products rose from $960,000 to $143,000,000; copper ore and its manufactures increased from $40,000,000 to $154,000,000; and coffee and sugar almost doubled from $106,000,000 to $209,000,000.[2] According to a study of America's strategic situation respecting national self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, essential industrial products, and raw materials, based on yearly averages for 1925-1929 the following critical raw materials heavily depended on imports: antimony--100%; chromite--100%; rubber--100%; tin--100%; manganese--95%; nickel--95%; tungsten--75%; mercury--60%; aluminum and bauxite--50%; and wool--40%.[3] An interruption in the flow of those materials could impose serious complications for America's industrial capacity and even for its survival.

Prosperity depended upon continued trade. Roy Chapin, President of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, defined the goal of foreign trade as increased consumption with side effects of raising the standard of living, better education, better medical care, and greater personal happiness: "Commerce is the missionary that . . .

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[2]Ibid., pp. 506-7.

[3]Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York:The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 22.

ministers to these wants."[4] An article in the Harvard Business Review observed candidly that by assisting Europe in its economic recovery from the war, Americans would "increase their own prosperity, by creating greater purchasing power abroad."[5] The American Exports and Importers Association heard a plea for the development of markets abroad on the grounds that "If we are to maintain our production in this country, we must have markets for our products."[6]

James S. Alexander, President of the National Bank of Commerce and member of the board of directors of American Telephone and Telegraph, Pacific Oil Company, and Prudential Insurance, alleged that the fullest development of domestic commerce was directly dependent upon overseas trade, and trade was dependent upon world recovery. More extensive trade and advancing civilization were synonomous, Alexander asserted: "we must have foreign trade because the advancement of civilization of the world demands it." But his primary concern was America's prosperity because "unless the development of the United States along the paths so successfully followed before the war is to be

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[4]Roy D. Chapin, "What Is Our Goal in Foreign Trade?" Nation's Business 15 (20 May 1927):21.

[5]Henry Reed Bowser, "Economic Aspects of American Foreign Trade," Harvard Business Review 5 (October 1926):63.

[6]"Urges Development of Markets Abroad," New York Times, 14 January 1927.

permanently interrupted, we must develop a larger and larger foreign trade." American industry had an excess production capacity that Alexander thought must be absorbed either through expansion of the domestic market or the foreign market. Because the domestic market was incapable of sufficient expansion, foreign trade had to absorb it. In addition, by syphoning excess goods to a foreign market, the domestic market was protected from "demoralization" of prices due to rapid accumulation of excess inventory. Thus foreign trade would advance civilization, provide continued expansion of American industry, and protect the domestic market.[7]

H. E. Miles, Chairman of the Fair Tariff League, in testimony before Congress, supported the position that domestic prosperity was the goal of foreign trade: "If the factories of the United States are to be kept busy, they must go more and more after foreign markets;" an additional benefit of trade, Miles said, was that "Our own breadth of intelligence and our influence will be largely in proportion to our foreign investments."[8] Domestic prosperity was the goal, and foreign nations would provide the consumptive

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[7]James S. Alexander, Why We Must Have Foreign Trade (New York: National Bank of Commerce, 1922), pp. 8, 17-18.

[8]U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on H. R. 7456, to provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage industries of the United States, and for other purposes, 67th Cong., 1921-1922, pp. 5413, 5419.

capacity to make it possible. In a less tactful vein, an assistant to the Secretary of Commerce noted that "Americans ransack the earth for any commodity, common or rare, cheap or dear, that can add to the satisfaction of life or to the efficiency of industry."[9]

America's economic mission in world affairs was to develop international commercial and financial opportunities. Some person argued that America was the last hope for the world's economic problems. Henry Morgenthau, financier, ambassador, director of international relief after the war, dramatized the circumstances: "The whole world has . . . become a desert, whose one great oasis of prosperity and happiness is the United States."[10] By providing assistance in food production, technical skills, communication, and education, Morgenthau believed the United States could set "the groundwork for a self-reliant, successful democracy."[11] Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce from 1921 to 1928, in a letter to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, observed: "We are morally and selfishly interested in the economic and political recovery of all the world. America is practically the final

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[9]Edward Dana Durand, American Industry and Commerce (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 611.

[10]Henry Morgenthau, "Our Duty Abroad and at Home," Forum 61 (February 1919):221.

[11]Ibid., p. 223.

reservoir of international capital."[12] Hoover also noted that civilization depended on foreign trade: "the whole structure of our advancing civilization would crumble and the great mass of mankind would travel backwards if the foreign trade of the world were to cease."[13] Julius Klein, appointed by Hoover as Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, echoed the conviction that civilization and commerce were intimately tied together: "How much of Western civilization would have been possible had there been no solid foundation of material prosperity in each successive age upon which the lofty edifices of our culture could have been erected?"[14]

Henry Ford, President of the Ford Motor Company, the world's largest manufacturer of automobiles, tied together business success and social progress while looking at the role of business in world affairs. He believed the most productive and stable society would emerge through industrialization. Ford saw progress stemming from advancing economic conditions within a country, even proclaiming that the unstable, revolutionary conditions within Russia

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[12]Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 3 vol. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 2:87.

[13]Herbert Hoover, The New Day: Campaign Speeches of Herbert Hoover, 1928 (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1929), p. 119.

[14]Julius Klein, "Business," in Charles A. Beard, ed., Whither Mankind (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1928), pp. 83-84.

and China were primarily economic: "Political boundaries and political opinions don't really make much difference. It is the economic condition which forces change and compels progress."[15]

The close association between segments of the business community and the Department of Commerce during the 1920's was instrumental in strengthening the claim of legitimacy for America's role in world affairs. The primary agency within the Commerce Department to assist overseas business activities was the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Created in 1912, the Bureau was extensively reorganized and enlarged under Hoover's tenure. Reorganized in 1922, by 1926 its number of domestic branches jumped from 28 to 46, foreign offices increased from 23 to 42, the number of representatives abroad climbed from 86 to 291, and the number of trade circulars published for business benefit and other forms of information increased from about 500,000 to over 4,000,000 annually.[16] In the revamping, 37 divisions were established to deal with specific commodities and special services. Hoover called upon different industries to appoint committees to work with the Bureau in planning strategies for each particular commodity: "The

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[15]Henry Ford, My Philosophy of Industry (London: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1929), p. 24.

[16]U. S., Department of Commerce, Fourteenth Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce 1926 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1926), p. 35.

first duty imposed upon these committees was the selection of a man from their own ranks who would head the division."[17] Hoover described the Bureau as being "essentially a business organization, its staff is made up largely of men drawn from active commercial pursuits, and to render the highest service they should work under businesslike conditions."[18] All changes imposed upon the Bureau had the objective of assuring "a genuinely secure and permanent position in the world's markets."[19]

The most significant element in the entire scheme for advancing American commerce probably was the overseas staff of the Bureau. Their duties were extensive:

> [The staff] supplies information and advice . . . conducts such investigations as seem timely and appropriate . . . adjusts commercial disputes between foreign officials and firms on the one hand and American firms on the other . . . arbitrates difficulties . . . warns of any illegitimate phases of foreign competition or any possibly discriminatory proposals. . . .[20]

Hoover referred to those staff workers as "hounds for possible American sales" who sought out raw materials and

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[17]Quoted in Isaac F. Marcosson, "Commercial Exploration," Saturday Evening Post 197 (13 February 1926): 153.

[18]U. S., Department of Commerce, Ninth Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce 1921 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 7.

[19]U. S., Department of Commerce, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce 1925 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1925), pp. 41-42.

[20]Ibid., p. 88.

commodities which were less competitive with American industry, and stimulated their export to the United States."[21]

The interest of the business community in foreign policy partly resulted from a desire for the establishment of conditions which would make economic expansion possible and safe. American business interests looked favorably upon efforts to stabilize world economic and political conditions. Following the 1924 adoption of the Dawes Plan which redefined the reparations payments imposed upon Germany through the Versailles Treaty structure, Secretary Hoover spoke for the financial community:

> the recuperation of Europe will intensify competition in many industries, but paralleling it will come expansion of consumption in European countries. Recovery there will bring employment, and employment will mean a higher standard of living, and that high standard will mean a greater demand for goods.[22]

Hoover, as so many others, related American prosperity with world stability. The American Banker's Association, representing the views of the average banker, called upon Europeans to recognize that they could experience the same level of prosperity as America if they would suspend the fears expressed through tariffs and other obstructions: "Then, too, America also will have a better European market."[23]

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[21]Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 2:79.

[22]"Hoover Sees No Peril to American Trade," New York Times, 27 August 1924.

[23]"Would Make Better Markets For Us," American Banker's Association Journal 19 (May 1927):792.

Bernard Baruch, American businessman, broker, and statesman, tried to add a slightly different perspective:

> [The] annihilating power of war is now more widely recognized than at any other time in history. . . . Today the peace movement is led by the great captains of industry and finance and the most powerful statesmen, and this is so because they were convinced by one terrible concentrated lesson of a truth they might have divined but would never have accepted in a century of peace.[24]

What Baruch did not say directly, though, was that those "captains of industry and finance" saw a world of peace as the best environment in which to prosper economically; unstable political and economic conditions interfered with profitable development. Willis Booth, past-president of the Merchants Association of New York, the International Chamber of Commerce, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and Vice-President of Guaranty Trust Company of New York, observed: "This industrial era is constantly expanding all over the world. Our contribution in that direction is going to be one of the most outstanding things we will do in international cooperation."[25] Gerard Swope, President of General Electric Company, insisted that among industry's main responsibilities was "the duty of perpetuating itself as an instrument of production and as a source of livelihood to its employees."[26] To meet that responsibility,

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[24]Bernard M. Baruch, "The Consequences of the War to Industry," Current History 29 (November 1928):196.

[25]"Credit Men Hear Speeches," New York Times, 27 May 1926.

[26]Gerard Swope, "What Big Business Owes the

business had to be concerned about foreign policy; expansion abroad was a necessity of modern industry.

Latin America held an important place in the economic life of the United States. For the first half of the 1920's the countries of southern North America alone consumed an average of 10.1 percent of American exports and supplied 14.9 percent of its imports annually; during the second half of the decade the averages were 8.4 and 11.4 percent respectively.[27] For all Latin America, the annual averages over the decade for exports was 17.3 percent and for imports 26 percent.[28] More impressive and revealing statistics can be found by examining the value of direct investments in Latin American republics: for the year 1929 the total was 3.5 billion dollars, compared with 2.0 billion dollars in Canada and 1.4 billion dollars in Western Europe.[29]

The administration's policy toward Latin America

Public," World's Work 53 (March 1927):561.

[27]U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1935 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 431.

[28]Ibid.

[29]The Statistical History of the United States (Stamford, Connecticut: Fairfield Publishers, Inc., 1965), p. 566.

was important to the business community, at least for the international bankers, some importers and exporters, and companies with foreign holdings because of the economic value of the region. Some countries to the south were economically dependent upon the United States and virtually all had the United States as their principle foreign market.[30]

A series of articles in World's Work, a magazine devoted to international concerns including the advancement of trade between North and South America, told of the positive work American corporations performed abroad--recreation for workers, housing, sewage and water facilities, education, and an increased standard of living. Through corporations' efforts people began to realize, the author wrote, that "the huge investments of American capital in foreign countries are there for purposes of development, not exploitation."[31] As partial evidence the author submitted the work of the United Fruit Company which operated throughout Central America (with exception of Nicaragua, Salvador, and Mexico), Colombia, Jamaica, and Cuba.

The United Fruit Company had extensive holdings in Latin America, thus raising concerns about exploitation

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[30]G. Butler Sherwell, "Our Investments in Latin American Government Securities," American Banker's Association Journal 19 (July 1926):1.

[31]Gregory Mason, "Has the Dollar a Heart?" World's Work 54 (June 1927):197.

from those persons and groups unsympathetic to the business philosophy of foreign development. The company allegedly owned or leased 1,883,902 acres of land planted or destined to be planted with bananas, sugar cane, cacao, coconuts, and other foodstuffs; it allegedly owned and operated 1,571 miles of railroad with 187 locomotives and 5,461 railroad cars; it reportedly had total fixed assets of 134.7 billion dollars and for the single year 1926 had net earnings of 19.5 million dollars; and its wages and salaries provided support for over 67,000 people.[32]

Latin America was the principle producer of coffee (over 90%) and sugar (65%), both strategic foodstuffs, for importation to the United States; it also contributed significantly to the American supply of bauxite (51%), platinum (42%), and manganese (25%), all strategic minerals.[33] Due to its economic importance and sometimes unstable political situation, to which the United States government responded militarily several times, the charge of imperialism often faced the American government and the financial community. Victor Cutter, President of the United Fruit Company, and Otto Kahn, for over 30 years a partner in the banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, were two opinion-makers who defended administration policy; Thomas Lamont,

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[32]Gregory Mason, "The Humanity of the Dollar," World's Work 54 (July 1927):294-302.

[33]Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, pp. 27-28.

member of the J. P. Morgan banking firm, exemplified an approach far from imperialistic.

Victor Cutter believed that his company provided a positive service for the poor nations: "Undeveloped countries should welcome large developments backed by large capital, for this means responsibility."[34] Cutter affirmed that companies could serve the public interest by investing in stable countries and engaging in practices which were open and above board:

> The era of exploitation is over and that of industrial and commercial development has arrived. It must be remembered that all past troubles involving diplomacy have been caused by small, irresponsible companies and individuals, and by unjust concessions, sometimes improperly obtained; or by entrance of foreigners into countries where governments were unstable and revolutions too much frequent.[35]

He did not feel that American companies should expect protection or intervention by the government if they experienced problems in foreign lands; but at the same time "there must be respect for universally recognized international law which has as a basic principle, the protection of life and property."[36]

In reality, the United Fruit Company had gained such controlling interest over the people and economy of the area in which it operated, that it seemed to serve as

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[34]Victor M. Cutter, "Relations of United States Companies With Latin America," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 132 (July 1927): 132.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid., p. 131.

a paragovernmental authority. Under such conditions it was reasonable for Cutter to argue that exploitation had ended, for there was little more advantage that the company could take. Cutter did not realize that while emerging nations did welcome large developments backed by large capital, they did not welcome the control which those investments often brought.

Otto Kahn offered assurances that the United States was free of any imperialist activity. He confessed to some possible errors in judgment and manners by the government over the years, but the purpose of America's actions remained positive and good: "to end an inveterate rule of tyranny, malefactions and turmoil, to set up decent and orderly government and the rule of law, to foster progress, to establish stable conditions and with them the basis for prosperity to the populations concerned." Due to its proximity, Latin America had strategic value as well as commercial worth, noted Kahn, thus it was important that they "cease to be centers of perpetual disorder. . . ." Nations found incapable of managing their own affairs "are properly subject to reasonable measures of intervention . . . in the spirit of the strong aiding the weak. . . ." Capable management apparently would be defined by the strong.[37]

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[37]Otto Kahn, Of Many Things (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926), pp. 160-63.

Thomas Lamont, the dominant figure on the International Committee of Bankers on Mexico, formed in 1918 to represent holders of Mexican bonds, exemplified the non-imperialist attitude among the business community. His restrained, non-threatening approach to the Mexico situation had a calming influence which served to lessen the potential damage of the hard-line approach typified by the American oil companies in the 1920's.[38] Lamont firmly believed that an American financial presence, and at times a military presence, had definite positive impact in Latin America for political and financial stability;[39] but he did not see the threat of military force as useful in the Mexico situation.[40]

During times of specific conflict, as with Mexico over oil deposits, the international bankers led by the J. P. Morgan Company and Thomas Lamont had to contend with the more aggressive attitude of the oil companies. Guy Stevens, Director of the Association of Producers of Petroleum in Mexico, proclaimed that the controversy over ownership rights of subsoil minerals arose "entirely from the efforts and purposes of the Mexican Government to take

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[38]Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), passim.

[39]Thomas Lamont, "America's Foreign Investment Policy," Bankers' Magazine 114 (June 1927):871-81.

[40]Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932, p. 246.

for itself properties which belong to others."[41] Stevens asserted that the American government was responsible for the protection of its citizens' lives and property no matter where located, a direct challenge to the spirit of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the moderate position of Lamont and the international bankers. Some consideration of national honor was involved, Stevens argued:

> History does not indicate that any nation at any time has ever added to its prestige or to its own self-respect or to the respect in which it has been held by other nations by yielding and acquiescing in the penetration of a wrong to itself or its citizens.[42]

The oil companies objected to the conciliatory statements coming from the administration early in 1927.

When President Coolidge delivered his 25 April 1927 speech calling for a negotiated settlement to the disputed issues, he was representing the increasingly accepted attitude of opinion-makers. If the oil companies had rationally assessed the predicament, they could have realized that any act of force would result in attempted destruction of the oil fields by the Mexican authorities with a serious disruption or even termination of production. The mood of the business world reflected the position voiced by Coolidge's speech. The Commercial and Financial

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[41] Guy Stevens, Current Controversies With Mexico ([no publisher named], 1929), p. 10.

[42] "Tells of Oil Bribes to Mexico Bandits," New York Times, 28 February 1926.

Chronicle, a leading journal of financial interests, called for "the application of the ordinary rules of fair dealing and common sense."[43] That was exactly what was provided when Dwight Morrow, a member of the J. P. Morgan banking firm, replaced James R. Sheffield as ambassador to Mexico in late summer 1927. His appointment represented a victory for the conciliatory, moderate policy of the international bankers and others over the hard-line approach of the oil representatives.

For many concerned persons, America's prosperity depended directly upon the extent of world recovery from the financial and political repercussions of the world War. Before recovery and prosperity could be fully achieved, though, order must prevail. Nation's Business, the organ of the influential United States Chamber of Commerce, recognized America's entanglement in the economic affairs of the world and called for "a definite and consistent international policy which shall have as its basis cooperation in a dignified manner to bring about and maintain stable conditions."[44] Likewise, Julius Barnes, wheat exporter, one-time president of the United States Chamber of Commerce,

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[43]"The Financial Situation," Commercial and Financial Chronicle 125 (24 September 1927):1617.

[44]"Our Business and World Affairs," Nation's Business 13 (5 June 1925):21.

and Chairman of the Board of the United Growers of America, believed that American business should work for a "new and more secure social order in the outposts of the world, which so greatly need the influence of industrial and business development written into the living standards and opportunity of their individual people."[45] Involvement by businessmen in governmental and diplomatic affairs, according to the head of the Radio Corporation of America, produced a more favorable set of international relations characterized as "more orderly, more stable, more peaceful."[46]

The desire for peace among the business community resulted from forces other than pacifism: "To us, it is a matter of special interest that peace, tranquility, security, and sound policies shall characterize the acts of governments everywhere."[47] Pacifism was something to be shunned, in fact, because a nation unwilling to defend itself or its interests would only invite attack from the nonpacifist nations.[48] The effect of war would be catastrophic for the United States economy: "every important

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[45] Ibid.

[46] James G. Harbord, "The Dollar-a-Year Men of Peace," Nation's Business 13 (March 1925):66.

[47] John H. Fahey, "America's Job Across the Water," Nation's Business 13 (5 June 1925):19.

[48] Samuel Colcord, "Business and World Peace," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 149 (May 1930):67.

tendency of 'Coolidge prosperity' would be reversed."[49] The fullest development of America's economy necessitated peaceful international relations. In the words of Julius Barnes, business should work for "a new and more secure social order in the outposts of the world which so greatly need the influence of industrial and business development written into the living standards and opportunity of their individual people."[50] The business community accepted the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, but with mixed feelings:[51] as the Commercial and Financial Chronicle observed, "the will to peace must still be cultivated. . . ."[52] No other nation could accomplish those ends: "Probably no nation has ever reached so splendid a position in history as that which is held by the United States at the present moment."[53] Nor was there a better segment of society to perform the service, according to business executive Charles K. Woodbridge: "a common understanding among the business men of the nations will do more for peace than all the leagues, courts,

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[49]Jordan W. Pennington, "How Would War Affect the Business Life of the Nation?" Magazine of Wall Street 39 (26 February 1927):849.

[50]Quoted in "Our Business and World Affairs," Nation's Business 13 (5 June 1925):21.

[51]Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy 1920-1933 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 55.

[52]"The New Pact of Paris and the International Outlook," Commercial and Financial Chronicle 128 (19 January 1929):301.

[53]Henry Morgenthau, "Our Duty Abroad and at Home," Forum 61 (February 1919):219.

and combinations of politicians the governments can devise."[54]

On strictly economic grounds there were strong advocates for international cooperation. While present business conditions were good, how long could Europe continue to buy America's surplus products without a settlement of the fundamental economic questions? The financial community was "vitally interested in . . . the maintenance of [Europe's] capacity to take from our abundance."[55] Rehabilitation of Europe as consumer and producer, observed Julius Klein, was critical for America's role in that recovery: "the reservoir of economic strength in the United States constitutes an invaluable source of sadly needed nourishment for Europe."[56] In Klein's opinion, the prosperity of the United States would be the greatest contributor to international prosperity, thus making America's economic strength contingent upon world economic growth. American loans of private capital to European enterprises had been a prime factor in that continent's general recovery into the late 1920's, and Europe was a major market of United States agricultural products and increasingly for

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[54]"Calls Trade Accord Basis of World Peace," New York Times, 21 January 1926.

[55]Alvin W. Krech, "Keeping Faith With Europe," American Banker's Association Journal 15 (November 1922): 327.

[56]Julius Klein, "The Outlook for International Business," World's Work 53 (February 1927):361.

manufactured goods.[57]

Banker's Magazine, representing commercial banking, believed that "Considerations of trade, finance, and of humanity all impel us to a more active participation in the settlement of the difficulties in Europe."[58] How would that fit with the traditional foreign policy of individuality? In his first Annual Message to Congress Calvin Coolidge stated that America had one cardinal principle in its foreign policy: "We attend to our own affairs, conserve our own strength, and protect the interests of our own citizens. . . ."[59] He also provided the justification for possible involvement abroad when he added that "we recognize thoroughly our obligation to help others, reserving to the decision of our own judgment the time, the place, and the method."[60] Such a posture allowed the United States to pursue self-interest independently when it could, and allowed cooperative efforts when independent means failed to achieve their goals. A 1932 presidential commission reported to President Hoover that postwar United States diplomacy essentially had been of that type, alternating

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[57]Ibid., p. 360.

[58]"Foreign and Domestic Problems," Banker's Magazine 108 (March 1924):349.

[59]Fred L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 1790-1966, 3 vol. (New York: Robert Hector Publishers, 1966), 3:2642.

[60]Ibid.

"between isolation and independence, between sharply marked economic nationalism and notable international initiative in cooperation, moving in a highly unstable and zigzag course."[61] It was not always easy to reconcile cooperation and individuality. Norman H. Davis, American financier and diplomat, tried to reconcile the two: "It is not necessary for a nation to give up its individuality to join with other nations for the good of all, but it is the way to develop its individuality."[62]

Possibly the most serious international problem with which American business interests had to deal was reparations and war debts. While not directly involved in the reparations issue because the nation had not exacted reparations at the Versailles Peace Conference, repayment of loans from the United States to the Allies for war efforts became tied to the reparations those countries received from Germany. Any breakdown in such payments put pressure on the United States' debt payments. Germany's pre-war economy depended largely upon imports, earnings from investments in colonies and foreign countries, and shipping services. As a result of the war, Germany lost important regions of steel and other industry, colonies,

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[61]Quoted in Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy 1920-1933, p. x.

[62]Norman H. Davis, "The Locarno Pacts - Their Meaning to Europe and to America," Current History 23 (Decenber 1925):320.

and most of its investments and foreign property holdings were seized by its enemies during the fighting. It was obvious that Germany would have difficulty meeting any payments; unable to meet demands through its gold supply, Germany also lacked the industrial capability to produce sufficient surplus products to serve as payment. Due to those facts, the Versailles Treaty failed to set a definite reparations total, leaving the decision to the Reparations Commission composed of representatives of the Allies.[63]

When the Reparations Commission finally determined the payments Germany would have to make, an initial payment of 5 billion dollars was demanded before 1 May 1921, in addition to bonds worth 10 billion dollars with an interest of 2½ percent annually from 1921 to 1925. With other provisions included, Germany would be bound to pay 375 million annually from 1921 to 1925 and 900 million dollars or more each year thereafter. The commission could change interest rates and reduce the debt, but only with unanimous consent. In addition, international animosity remained alive by the provision allowing for armed occupation of German territory if it willfully defaulted on any payment. The inability of Germany to meet the payments characterized the decade, in spite of two revisions in the debt schedule.[64]

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[63]George Soule, Prosperity Decade (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 259-61.

[64]Ibid., p. 260.

Further problems arose as England began to recognize the impossibility for Germany to meet its payments. In 1922 Arthur Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, addressed a note to his country's debtors setting forth the principle that Britain would attempt to collect from Germany only what was necessary to meet the demands of its debt payments to the United States. While the United States never officially accepted such a linking of debts and reparations, the practical connection was recognized widely.[65]

The importance of the reparations problem was highlighted by Willis H. Booth, banker and president of the International Chamber of Commerce. Booth wrote that the United States had an important stake in seeing a rapid settlement because "we will never be sure of our own prosperity or of our position in the world markets until this very heavy element of uncertainty has been entirely removed from the economic picture."[66] But he did not advocate cancellation of debts. Open opposition existed to any linkage of debts and reparations on grounds that if the United States admitted the linkage between the two, the debtor nations would step aside assigning their claims against Germany, "Then this country would hold only one-name paper, and the bag."[67]

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[65]Ibid., pp. 261-62.

[66]Willis H. Booth, "The Business Factor in World Affairs," Nation's Business 11 (5 June 1923):17.

[67]"Reparations Bag-Holding," American Bankers'

Andrew Mellon, financier, bank president, and Secretary of the Treasury from 1921 to 1932, saw no value in cancellation of debts, particularly as a tool for gaining favor with the European nations. He believed that cancellation would not change European dislike of America into affection but rather would increase disrespect: "a nation is hardly likely to deserve and maintain the respect of other nations by sacrificing its own just claims."[68] Mellon's concern with the justice of United States' claims was common to business attitudes toward the debt payments question. Being businessmen, they held firm to the principle of repayment of debts.

Although the United States government allowed partial reduction of debts tied to reparations revisions in the Dawes and Young Plans, it was insufficient to allow cancellation or substantial reduction of reparations payments. Bernard Baruch presented an alternative not officially accepted, but more or less carried out in practice: "The cancellation of debts is bad for the debtor and bad for the creditor. Would it not be better to let each nation pay what it can and defer payment on the balance?"[69] While a recent historian has concluded that American

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Association Journal 21 (November 1928):445.

[68]Andrew W. Mellon, "America's Attitude on War Debt Cancellation," Current History 26 (May 1927):266.

[69]Bernard Baruch, "Popular Fallacies About Reparations," World's Work 44 (July 1922):327.

businessmen assumed that Americans were vitally interested in the debt question and would strongly oppose any proposal for cancellation on their own, the impetus may have come more from the business world.[70] For example, consider the editorial words of the American Bankers' Association Journal: "In the times to come . . . students of history and of statecraft might for all that any man now knows to the contrary amply prove that the wholesale cancellation which a small group has proposed had been an influence for evil!"[71] Good business practice did not include gratuitous cancellation of a debtor's liabilities.

Matthew Woll, a vice-president for the American Federation of Labor, set forth the complexity of any debt settlement: "International debts must be settled . . . in such a rational way as to promote the prosperity of debtor, creditor and all nations."[72] Woll inferred possibilities for using the debts to achieve some international goals. For example, debt cancellation might have been exchanged for the removal of preferential trade systems abroad, to encourage a revision in reparations, or even to bargain for revisions of the Versailles Treaty. But the United States

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[70]Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy 1920-1933, pp. 155-56.

[71]"The 'Intolerable' 62 Years," American Bankers' Association Journal 19 (April 1927):713.

[72]Matthew Woll, "The Effect on American Workers of Collecting Allied Debts," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 126 (July 1926):43.

did not use the debt question to its best diplomatic advantage, nor did the financial community widely promote such diplomatic maneuvering; that cancellation would have been more advantageous for economic growth was not perceived.[73]

The question of the American position on the League of Nations and the World Court drew much attention from business interests because of the need for world stability as groundwork for economic expansion. On the assumption that the League could not function effectively in a world of discord and vindictiveness, Banker's Magazine attributed the cause of discord to the inability of the Allies effectively to work together.[74] Rather than a League type of approach, Banker's Magazine proposed the codification of international law along with the establishment of a new world court. Unlike the existing court, its successor would have international authority to enforce decrees becuase "moral opinion alone can not be relied

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[73]Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy 1920-1933, p. 123. The study of the war debts issue by the Brookings Institution in 1932 concluded that "a complete obliteration" of reparations and war debts would be in the best interest of world prosperity: Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1932), p. 422.

[74]"America and Europe," Banker's Magazine 108 (January 1924):3.

on. . . ."[75]

The National Association of Manufacturers proposed some planks for the Democratic National Party platform in 1924; among them was a proposal that "we disapprove entrance into the League of Nations, but recognize that the United States should enter into some closer relations with other nations without the compromise of national independence."[76] That position may have resulted from a fear that membership in the League could threaten the economic objectives of American financial interests by promoting policy changes which offered greater consideration to the interests of developing nations, adversely affecting the flow and cost of raw materials into the United States.

Otto Kahn supported retention of America's sovereignty; he believed the League overstepped its bounds when attempting to impose jurisdiction over the major nations. In Kahn's view, the League had valuable work in furthering "fair dealing, understanding, good will, and maintaining peaceable relationships among the peoples," but any "exercise and enforcement, through economic boycott or otherwise, of compulsory jurisdiction over great nations is not, as a realizable fact, one of these functions in the hands of the League. . . ."[77] Apparently the League should

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[75]Ibid., p. 4.

[76]"Industry to Suggest Planks to Democrats," New York Times, 23 June 1924.

[77]Kahn, Of Many Things, p. 400.

function as a body subservient to the major powers.

Opposition to the League was not a unanimous attitude. Thomas Lamont, in 1920, wrote a letter to the New York Evening Post, of which he was part owner, saying that "The League is admittedly not perfect. But it is the most practicable instrument yet offered for the prevention of future wars. . . ."[78] Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank of New York from 1909 to 1919, gave early support to the League on grounds that through participation the United States would be able to provide Europe with the moral influence and help needed to regain its stature and prosperity.[79] Support for the League waned over the decade as its ineffectiveness became apparent.

The World Court generally received a more gracious reception. Nation's Business may have received it most warmly while placing into perspective the Court's particular attractiveness:

> The World Court is as domestic in its application as trade, or manufacturing, or finance, or any other aspect of our economic life, for every field of business activity is deeply rooted among the great commercial and industrial nations of the world, and as go the fortunes of the people of other lands so will go the fortunes of Americans. . . . American business men have earned the world's respect for products 'made in the U. S. A.' No product of American genius is more worthy of that mark than the World Court.[80]

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[78]Thomas W. Lamont, Across World Frontiers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951), p. 218.

[79]"What the Leaders Say," Forbes 12 (14 April 1923):42-43.

[80]"The World Court and America," Nation's Business

The World Court was attractive because it emphasized law, a synonym for order and stability. The League, on the other hand, was the outgrowth of a peace treaty which the United States failed to ratify, and its effectiveness was in doubt. America's long tradition of adherence to law made the Court appealing. The reliance on judicial settlement rather than settlements by force was another important aspect of the Court--prosperity depended on peace. In fact, some business leaders considered economics the greatest power for world peace: "The uniting of the nations in this single act - an agreement to protect by an economic embargo against the attacking power any nation attacked - would at one stroke give the security that alone would justify and lead to large naval and army reductions."[81]

Perhaps the isolationist-leaning journal American Economist was most correct with its analysis that courts were useful only when nations wanted them to be, but "If they are not so amenable, then no court or tribunal of any kind will keep them from submitting their differences to the arbitrament of war."[82] Besides, the World Court was linked too closely with the League of Nations, and any association with that organization meant losing sight of

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14 (January 1926):31.

[81]Colcord, "Business and World Peace," pp. 67-73.

[82]"Why Any World Court?" American Economist 72 (28 December 1923):211.

dangers behind entangling foreign alliances.[83] The League was not a deterrent to war, argued the journal. If its members wanted war they would have it; if they wanted peace they would have that--League or no League.[84]

Segments of the business community had a significant stake in American foreign policy. Attitudes reflected an overriding concern for protection of investments and the promotion of trade relations for American benefit. The superior economic position of the United States helped to justify exploitation of economic disadvantages of other nations, often on grounds that the growth of America's economy would bring positive results for other nations.

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[83]"The World Court," American Federationist 72 (14 December 1923):193.

[84]"The Bok Peace Plan Fiasco," American Economist 73 (18 January 1924):17-18.

CHAPTER V

FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH

The attitudes of the military opinion-maker relating to America's role in world affairs are found in the statements by top-ranking military personnel and military publications. Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy (1924-1929), John W. Weeks and Dwight F. Davis, Secretaries of War (1921-1925, 1925-1929 respectively), spoke from the presidential cabinet level. Several branches of military service published their own journals: Military Engineer, Cavalry Journal, Coast Artillery Journal, Quartermaster Review, and Infantry Journal. Among military people the Army and Navy Journal was popular because it was privately owned, published by outside interests, and allowed some anonymity for expression.[1] The military personnel themselves provided additional sources for attitudes and opinions; not prolific writers, such views were scattered and oftentimes presented only after retirement.

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[1]For a discussion of the military press during the 1920's see Elbridge Colby, "The Military Press in America," Inland Printer 81 (June 1928):109-12.

The attitudes expressed by military opinion-makers strongly suggested policies to promote America's military, economic, and political strength in world affairs. Military spokesmen sought the goal of superiority. William Howard Gardiner, chief publicity writer for the Navy League in the 1920's and its president from 1928 to 1933, typified the military viewpoint:

> In military matters our national task is not only to defend our territories and peoples but also to protect our worldwide commerce and to secure respect for our policies and for the rights of citizens wherever conditions are still so backward that heed is given to equity in proportion to the force supporting it.[2]

That statement provided the rationale for preparedness, preservation of stability, and intervention. It presumed justice and fairness in America's policies and that other countries should accept those policies without resistance. It plainly showed the superiority complex allowing America to remain outside the mainstream of international politics while chastising others for their inability to provide stability.

The military opinion-makers conceived of America's role in world affairs as the cornerstone for a peaceful and prosperous world and a shield for weaker nations by giving pause to potential aggressors. Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur expressed the Navy's perspective:

[The] American Navy is a great asset to all the

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[2]William Howard Gardiner, "Insular America," Yale Review n. s. 14 (April 1925):524.

> nations of the world as a guarantee of peace and order . . . by the mere existence of this great Navy under the control of a Nation dedicated to the maintenance of peace on the Western Hemisphere and committed to the maintenance of world peace.[3]

The concept of "peace and order" was echoed by many people connected with the military, as evidenced later in this chapter.

The nation's military spokesmen wanted America to survive and prosper, to have its influence extended throughout the world, and to retain its newfound position as the world's strongest nation. The military opinion-makers did not seek an overwhelming military force for the task laid forth. The manpower with which it worked remained fairly steady throughout the 1920's at about four-tenths of one percent of the total population.[4] Adequate preparedness was demanded, but a large standing army was viewed in some circles as "uneconomic and un-American."[5]

A strong economic motivation existed in the plea for adequate national defense. The Secretary of War was representative with the following statement:

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[3]U. S., Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1924 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1924), p. 67.

[4]U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1930 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 155-56.

[5]U. S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Committee on Military Policy of the American Legion as entered in the official record by Senator Jones, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 4 December 1920, Congressional Record 59:110.

> Our country is a well-established concern. We are the wealthiest nation on earth. We have acquired with our wealth the responsibilities which wealth always brings. A small state can decay with slight damage to civilization generally. A great state in its collapse brings down with it countless other states and communities. In the most altruistic sense our greatest responsibility to other nations is that we maintain our own conservatism and stability. Criminal and destructive tendencies are generally directed toward unprotected wealth. Our own safety and liberty, as well as our duty to the world, demand, therefore, even a greater attention to national defense than we have ever devoted in the past.[6]

Rear Admiral William L. Rodgers, member of the advisory council to the Washington Conference in 1921-1922, and member of the General Board from 1920 to 1924, thought that America's prosperity should not depend upon the goodwill of other nations; Rodgers called for defense forces "sufficient to ensure the open door for American commerce and thereby to preserve the prosperity of America for Americans."[7]

The military establishment retained little isolationism in its attitudes toward America's role in world affairs, but protection of its freedom of action was crucial. Tasker H. Bliss, former Chief of Staff, member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and a president of the Army War College, wanted the United States to have

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[6]U. S., Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1923 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 7.

[7]William L. Rodgers, "Peace By Armed Might," Forum 73 (May 1925):640.

the moral leadership of the world;[8] Dwight F. Davis, Assistant Secretary of War from 1923 to 1925 and Secretary of War from 1925 to 1929, spoke about "the will for peace with honor;"[9] Major General Henry T. Allen, appointed Commander of the American Forces in Germany at the end of the World War, spoke of a "policy of participation in world affairs;"[10] Rear Admiral William V. Pratt, President of the Naval War College from 1925 to 1927, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet from 1929 to 1930, and Chief of Naval Operations from 1930 to 1933, wrote about America striving to aid others in every way it could.[11] America's future was unhesitatingly linked with the world's future, but the details of participation showed America's self-interest to be the primary consideration.

To resolve adequately international problems, co-operation was necessary. Tasker Bliss observed that problems between states could be solved either by war or by peaceful cooperative action, and he preferred the latter method. Bliss wrote: "the world is an association of

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[8]Tasker H. Bliss, "What Is Disarmament?" Foreign Affairs 4 (April 1926):357-58.

[9]Dwight F. Davis to the West Point Class of 1925, New York Times, 13 June 1925.

[10]Henry T. Allen, "We Must Not Secede From the World," Survey 52 (1 August 1924):489.

[11]William V. Pratt, "America As a Factor in World Peace," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 108 (July 1923):185.

states having common interests which can be guided and controlled only by common and concerted action - and govern our own actions accordingly."[12] Similarly, Major General Henry T. Allen observed history's lesson to be that isolation would not keep America out of war; therefore, "Why not try a policy of participation . . . whereby we could utilize our enormous moral and physical strength, not only for the welfare of ourselves but for all other states of the world?"[13] Newton Baker, Secretary of War from 1916 to 1921, thought industrial nations to be so integrated by investment and trade relations that political isolation was an impossibility. Baker recognized the economic advantage and necessity of participation in world affairs: "Our industries must have access to the raw materials of the world, our producers must have a world market and these necessities are of reciprocal advantage to us and the rest of the world."[14]

Some opinion-makers differed with the views expressed above. Rear Admiral Pratt, who advocated assistance to others in every way possible, stopped at joining

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[12]Tasker H. Bliss, "Peace By Cooperation," Forum 73 (May 1925):647.

[13]Allen, "We Must Not Secede From the World," p. 489.

[14]James Thayer Gerould and Laura Shearer Turnbull, Selected Articles on Interallied Debts and Revision of the Debt Settlements (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1928), p. 332. The article by Newton Baker originally appeared in the September 1926 issue of Trade Winds.

the League and World Court, seeing them as detrimental to America's interests. He opposed the Court because it did not reflect each country's international position; he wanted America's preeminence duly recognized.[15] Rear Admiral William Rodgers took the view that America would be better off by relying on its own strength for maintaining its national welfare.[16]

The question of an American policy toward Latin America received considerable attention in the mid-1920's as the Mexico oil crisis became more pronounced. The position held by military representatives strongly promoted an imperialistic approach, economically if not militarily. William Rodgers published an article in 1927 exploring the Mexico situation in particular. Because Mexico possessed materials essential to the economic well-being of the world, Rodgers argued, Mexico had responsibility to maintain domestic order so that economic activity could continue uninterrupted. If Mexico could not bring its domestic situation under control, he warned, outsiders must intervene to maintain the world economy. Rodgers theorized

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[15]Pratt, "America As a Factor in World Peace," p. 185.

[16]William L. Rodgers, "Can Courts and Tribunals Maintain World Peace?" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 120 (July 1925):76.

that a government was like a corporation, having responsibility not only to its shareholders but to other corporations. A government which could not act responsibly risked receivership, just like a corporation. The grounds for intervention into politically unstable nations were clearly laid. Any threat to the economic interests of the industrialized nations became a threat to their security. Rodgers tried to justify his position with the rationale that he was extending logically the democratic principle of the rights of the majority over the minority; the industrialized nations were the majority and the smaller nations the minority. In reality, he was promoting the dominance of the minority industrial nations over the majority underdeveloped states; the world's resources were the property of the great powers, in Rodger's view.[17]

The Army and Navy Journal, an independent voice of military opinion, echoed Rodger's words: "People who will not or cannot establish orderly government, maintain it and develop their own resources, cannot complain if ultimately other peoples who can do so, and who badly need the resources, do it for them."[18] The Quartermaster Review gave its support to the protection of United States interests abroad on grounds that much of America's foreign trade had been

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[17]William L. Rodgers, "Can Mexico Maintain Its Isolation?" Forum 77 (June 1927):884-91.

[18]"Mexico," Army and Navy Journal 61 (29 December 1923):432.

developed through partial control of foreign interests: "Surely this rich estate, the property of our citizens, is worth holding and protecting; this despite all weak, spineless, soporific contentions to the contrary."[19]

The imperial attitudes which Rodgers and others voiced gained support from the Secretary of War. Upon retirement of General Leonard Wood after six years as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Secretary Davis offered the following tribute to him, with justification for continued United States domination over the islands:

> Never has the government of the Philippine Islands been in so satisfactory and promising condition as to-day. Never have the people of the islands been more prosperous. . . . This happy situation is the result of the policies pursued by the United States in its governance of the Philippines reinforced, strengthened, and maintained by a sterling administration of the islands. . . .[20]

American dominance was a paternalistic model of behavior, not just for the Philippine Islands but for Latin America as well.

Military opinion-makers viewed the trouble spots of Latin America as raising the question of peace and order versus instability and violence. The Secretary of the Navy defended the presence of American troops in some countries

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[19]"Our Foreign Investments," Quartermaster Review 6 (may-June 1927):58.

[20]U. S., Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1927 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1927), p. 2.

on the grounds that they could bring peace and order.[21] The United States allegedly had inherited the duty of providing stability abroad: "Humanity has to pay for order and security. The greater the power of a Nation, the greater is its responsibility not only to its own people but to the world at large."[22] In addition, the United States had an obligation to protect its citizens and property against criminal acts: "murder and rapine are murder and rapine wherever committed . . . so it is our obligation to see that punishment and reparation be obtained for our citizens abroad."[23] Besides, there existed the feeling that by opening the Panama Canal the United States had assumed a duty "to give moral support to peaceful government in Central America, and thus to promote the development, commercial, economic and political, of the backward states of that region."[24] In his annual report for 1924 Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur summarized the importance of the military role in Latin America: it "performed valuable services in protecting American interests in Mexico and

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[21]"Wilbur Sees Reds Stirring Trouble in Little Nations," New York Times, 13 February 1927. Secretary Wilbur made his remarks to the National Republican Club.

[22]"The White Man's Burden," Army and Navy Journal 64 (21 May 1927):864.

[23]"The Services as Agencies of Peace," Army and Navy Journal 64 (30 April 1927):804.

[24]"Editorial Comment," Army and Navy Journal 65 (14 January 1928):392.

Central America and in tending to stabilize political situations in Central American ports when outbreaks were imminent."[25]

Dwight Davis, as Assistant Secretary of War, considered the concern for domestic stability abroad as common to the military and the peace organizations: "We are united in our efforts to establish a reign of law and order throughout every land."[26] The peace groups would not have welcomed the association. Major General Henry T. Allen thought America should exert every means available to preserve world stability: "We would be well advised to use our great potential force and prestige in such an effort."[27] General Bliss called for the recasting of America's national policy to serve better peaceful international relations; he asked for support for the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, codification of international law, and reduction of armaments for self-defense, but only so rapidly as international goodwill would allow it.[28]

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[25]U. S., Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1924 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1924), p. 9.

[26]Dwight F. Davis quoted in the New York Times, 21 May 1925.

[27]Henry T. Allen, "Possibility of Disarmament - Necessity for United States Co-operation," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 120 (July 1925):66.

[28]Tasker H. Bliss, "The Development of American Policy," Foreign Affairs 7 (April 1929):418-26.

From the military viewpoint, American foreign policy had to be grounded on a base of military power. In a decade when budgets were being trimmed and the military had made substantial sacrifices at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922, a concern loomed large for America's level of preparedness. Adequate preparedness was not easily defined; for some it meant a larger Army, for others it meant maintaining the level of the Navy provided in the Washington agreements.

The need for preparedness was based on the rationale that "Regardless of how desirous we may be of living in peace and amity with other nations, many of the forces working against peace are beyond our control."[29] Major General James G. Harbord, Chief of Staff of the Allied Expeditionary Force in the World War and president of the Radio Corporation of America, reacted to critics who claimed that preparedness was an aggressive act: he did not believe that "a fire department causes fires or that a hospital causes sickness or that a police force breeds crime."[30] Similarly, Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, former Commander-

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[29]"National Defense," Cavalry Journal 34 (October 1925):482.

[30]James G. Harbord, "Our Place in the World," World's Work 56 (July 1928):328.

in-Chief of the United States Fleet, delegate to the Geneva Conference on Limitation of Armaments in 1927, and member of the General Board, did not see how the abolishment of armaments would end war because "It is not the possession or even the existence of the instruments of war that causes war. . . ."[31] The cause of war, said Jones, lay in international mistrust, fear, and suspicion.[32] Rear Admiral Thomas Magruder, Commander of the Base Fleet of the United States (1927-1929), considered the only effect of disarmament would be to delay war's start, not eliminate it. War's abolition would come only with "a universal spiritual desire to that end."[33] Admiral William V. Pratt offered an explanation for the danger of disarmament and the inadequate state of world affairs for its inauguration:

> Until the people of the earth are educated to make just laws, and learn to respect the sanctity of law, the danger of civil and foreign wars will not be minimized. Even so, war, like other great natural forces, cannot always be avoided. War, like diseases and death, is a scourge, but, in a similar way, it is oftentimes a cleanser and healer. Unfair commercial and industrial competition, like excessive rivalry in armaments, is provocative of war. A due regard for the rights of humanity and for the sanctity of law will minimize war, but even so the law of necessity and self preservation and a lofty conception of national ideals may make war

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[31]Hilary P. Jones, "Reduction and Limitation of Armaments," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 138 (July 1928):175.

[32]Ibid., p. 178.

[33]Thomas Pickett Magruder, "Can Disarmament Abolish War?" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 138 (July 1928):170-72.

> inevitable. The Christian gentleman has never hesitated to fight for his religion or for his ideals.[34]

Thomas S. Butler, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, voiced a need for adequate preparedness because the "spirit" that prevailed at the time of the Washington Conference had vanished. The "spirit" as he understood it was opposition to the build-up of auxiliary ships which would afford any nation greater naval strength than contemplated by the Washington Treaties. Butler alleged that adherence to the letter of the treaties while planning building programs for auxiliary ships had been the behavior of other signatories. Butler was concerned that America would find itself in an indefensible position if it did not launch a similar program, as well as maintain the Washington Treaty limits. He considered further progress in disarmament virtually impossible because in 1921-1922 America was arguing from a position of strength and made real sacrifices; the United States scrapped over 500,000 tons of existing battleships and cruisers, England sacrificed about 100,000 tons of ships under construction, and Japan scrapped about 114,000 tons of ships under construction and 84,000 tons of planned ships. But at the time Butler wrote, since other countries enjoyed a superior position in the eyes of many persons, similar sacrifices by

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[34]William V. Pratt, "The Case for the Naval Treaty," Current History 18 (April 1923):1-2.

the United States would be unlikely. The United States had little alternative in the chairman's view: "If the other nations are building, what can the United States do but keep pace. . . ."[35] The National Commander of the American Legion, Edward Spafford, supported Butler and others: "Adequate preparedness is the best insurance of peace."[36]

Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, a longtime critic of inadequate preparedness who had been threatened with court-martial during the World War for his criticism of Secretary Daniel's policies, charged that foreign policy must have force behind it. Since force was essential to domestic security, Fiske responded that international security should be no different. Recognizing that no one liked to use force if avoidable, he asserted that "every student of history must realize . . . that it has often been found necessary."[37] Fiske feared that the economic competition in the Far East between the United States, England, and Japan could lead to war. Because of that, America should maintain a state of preparedness, but it must not provoke war. Fiske was critical of pacifist doctrine for preventing adequate preparedness. He could not understand the

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[35]Thomas S. Butler, "Where the Arms Conference Failed," World's Work 53 (April 1927):670-77.

[36]Quoted in "The Legion's Conscription Program," Literary Digest 95 (5 November 1927):10.

[37]Bradley A. Fiske, "Borah's Path to Peace," Forum 74 (October 1925):628. Fiske's essay was a response to an earlier article by Senator William Borah, "The Fetish of

insistence on high standards of living without a willingness to pay the price of defending them.[38] The use of force was only wrong when used for a wrong purpose, believed Fiske; for him, force and reason were not necessarily antagonistic, thus international relations to be conducted with reason did not mean abandonment of force as an alternative.

Secretary of War John W. Weeks urged Americans, a peaceloving people he said, to consider seriously their needs for defensive preparedness: "[It] is no less true that Americans like all other peoples, are subject to the law which punishes those nations who fail to prepare for defense, as well as those who fail to strive for peace."[39] Week's successor, Dwight Davis, continued the theme, observing that "The American people realize more than ever before that the army and navy are their instrument to preserve peace," and the desire to avoid future wars was behind the clamor for national defense.[40]

The Infantry Journal, with one of the largest

Force," Forum 74 (August 1925), in which he argued against the use of force in relations between the United States and Western Hemisphere countries.

[38]"Fiske Predicts War to Rise in the East," New York Times, 22 March 1925.

[39]U. S., Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1922 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 1-2.

[40]Dwight F. Davis, "Our Place in the World," World's Work 56 (July 1928):328-30.

circulations of any of the special service reviews, published an article in which the author held the United States government responsible for "maintaining its integrity and guaranteeing to its citizens the privileges of peacefully pursuing their vocations," and national defense was mandatory to fulfill that task.[41] Another article in the same journal referred to force as "the court of last resort" and the judgments of victory would be in force until another resort to arms upheld or changed the decision: "Even the most died-in-the-wool pacifist fanatic must acknowledge this. . . ."[42] An editorial about preventing war stated that "The United States . . . can best do its part by refraining from aggression and by being able at all times to make war against any aggressor."[43]

The Coast Artillery Journal, a publication devoted largely to tactics and techniques, presented a view similar to the Infantry Journal: "Force, it must be remembered, is the ultimate appeal today just as it has been through the ages and just as it is likely to be for some little time in the future."[44] The Military Engineer also responded to the

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[41]F. J. Williams, "Application of National Defense Act," Infantry Journal 26 (May 1925):514.

[42]Fitzhugh Lee Minnigerode, "The Next War," Infantry Journal 24 (January 1924):324.

[43]Infantry Journal 26 (March 1925):324.

[44]Harold R. Enslow, "Preparedness - The Guarantee of Peace," Coast Artillery Journal 66 (March 1927):225. See also "What Has the League of Nations Done?" Army and Navy Journal 61 (22 September 1923):84.

issue of force, noting that while force could be used for both good and bad, the United States could be trusted to use it for good.[45] The Quartermaster Review strongly supported adequate defense because America's history time and again showed the high cost of engaging in wars without adequate preparedness.[46] Curtis Wilbur saw too many problems that could be adjudicated only by war: "So long as men differ in their ideals concerning powers of Government, rights of peoples and upon questions of religion, there are always potential questions or controversies which may lead to war. . . ."[47] Wilbur realized the World Court could provide settlement for many disputes, but not all controversies could be adjudicated. President Calvin Coolidge paralleled those ideas in a letter to the National Security League: "In the interest of peace, in the interest of our ideals we should properly maintain our national defense."[48] Force definitely had a role to play in the foreign relations of the world.

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[45]"Force," Military Engineer 17 (November-December 1925):486.

[46]"National Defense - Its Necessity Proven," Quartermaster Review 18 (November-December 1928):68.

[47]Quoted in "Roosevelt Denies Navy Is In Bad Way," New York Times, 9 May 1924. See also L. M. Overstreet, "Danger of Disarming America," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 50 (September 1924):1492-98.

[48]Quoted in "Roosevelt Denies Navy Is In Bad Way," New York Times, 9 May 1924.

The American Legion, representing the Armed Forces veterans of the World War, devoted its efforts throughout the 1920's to encourage Congress to provide funds for strengthening the United States Navy Fleet and other units of national defense. The Legion was disheartened by the pacifist wave sweeping the country, and acted to counter it. The Legion labeled the failure of the United States to keep a strong national defense posture as a barrier to effective world affairs leadership.[49]

Preparedness required more than the conscription of man and ordnance. The entire industrial complex need be conscripted:

> That drastic control over all the essential elements of industry is necessary in war was proven in this country and all others engaged in the World War. This control . . . must be exercised promptly. That our resources may be used to support our combatant forces and supply the essential needs of our civil population, authoritative priorities must be enforced. It is vital that there be a control over prices that effect the living expenses of our people who must produce the supplies required in war.[50]

To promote the cooperation between military and industry during times of war, necessary steps had to be taken in time of peace. In March 1926 the War Department held the first meeting of its newly formed War Department Business

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[49]Roscoe Baker, The American Legion and American Foreign Policy (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954), p. 142.

[50]U. S., Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1925 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 28.

Council, which consisted of outstanding industrial leaders. The industrial companies represented included the General Electric Company, Bank of America, Great Western Railway, Parke-Davis, Carnegie Steel, and du Pont de Nemours.[51] In addition, officers from the supply branches were being detached to Harvard University to pursue business administration courses, and the Army Industrial College at Washington, D. C., was established to provide further efficiency during times of mobilization with minimal disruption.[52]

The American Legion strongly supported a policy of broad mobilization. Prevention of profiteering, stabilization of prices, and minimal economic disruption were objectives to which the Legion pledged itself. The American Legion Weekly explained the Legion's motivation: "the American Legion must strive to create among citizens who know nothing of actual war a sentiment for a sound and continuous defense policy. The keynote of that policy is not militarism, but common business sense."[53] Edward Spafford, the Legion's National Commander, spoke for the members:

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[51]U. S., Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1926 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1926), p. 30; U. S., Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1929 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1929), pp. 35-36.

[52]Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1926, pp. 30-31.

[53]"The Circle of Unpreparedness," American Legion Weekly 4 (16 June 1920):10.

"We believe one of the best preventives of war is the enactment of a bill which shall place the burden of war - if it come - upon all. Let labor and capital be conscripted, as well as men."[54] The Universal Draft Bill which the Legion supported gave power not only to conscript men, but power to stabilize prices in wartime and place under government control the material resources of the country. Such a bill would, according to a Legion spokesman, "prove in time to be the greatest peace measure this country or the world has ever known."[55]

But there is a thin line between one nation's conception of security and another's view of preparation for aggression. Preparedness in an isolated context may be virtuous, but when a powerful, rich nation competing for and dominating international markets promotes preparedness, it casts fear or suspicion into the consciousness of nations which already feel threatened by economic competition. Given the nature of America's potential economic, political, and military position in the world order during the 1920's, any military build-up could have been interpreted by outsiders as a threat.

The Secretary of the Navy, Curtis Wilbur, wrote that the first duty of the Navy was to keep war away from

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[54]"The Legion's Conscription Program," Literary Digest 95 (5 November 1927):10.

[55]John R. McQuigg, "What the Legion Wants in 1926," Outlook 141 (16 December 1925):600.

America.[56] Secretary of War Davis declared that America's security against aggression would be guaranteed by implementing the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920.[57] To the West Point Class on 12 June 1925 Davis asserted: "Our military plans at the war Department are based solely on security, not aggression. . . ."[58]

The question of disarmament and the outlawry of war presented serious concerns for military leaders. Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske argued that effective disarmament depended upon the reliability and dependability of agreements among nations; he believed such agreements could last only so long as vital interests went unaffected. In the case, though, where vital interests were challenged and stability broke down, Fiske thought the United States ought to rely on arms rather than diplomacy; he asserted that America was most skilled at inventing and making arms, with diplomacy its least developed talent.[59]

On the specific topic of outlawry of war the

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[56]Curtis D. Wilbur, "Our Place in the World," World's Work 56 (July 1928):331.

[57]Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1925, p. 11.

[58]New York Times, 13 June 1925.

[59]Bradley A. Fiske, "The Possibilities of Disarmament," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 120 (July 1925):77-80.

opinion-makers discussed here generally agreed that such an approach posed dangers because it failed to provide adequate military safeguards for enforcement. In other words, human nature and the good intentions of nations could hardly suffice to provide adequate assurances for the success of the outlawry scheme. The Infantry Journal warned that such schemes to secure world peace through abolition of armaments in the United States gained inspiration from the "communistic influence" and would "render the United States helpless to defend herself. . . ."[60]

For some, the pursuit of outlawry and disarmament was proceeding too rapidly without accurate assessment of the consequences: "Before we eliminate preparedness let us be sure that we have something better in its stead. Let us be certain that we shall be at least equally secure. Let us make certain that the weak and helpless and innocent shall be no more oppressed than at present."[61] Admiral Hilary Jones voiced similar thoughts: "I beg of you not to be deceived by a dream of eternal peace. . . . If we are to enjoy the fruits of the labors of our fathers, we must be prepared to use the same instrument."[62] The Military

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[60]Infantry Journal 25 (September 1924):338.

[61]Enslow, "Preparedness - The Guarantee of Peace," p. 228.

[62]Hilary P. Jones, "A Just Man Armed Keepeth His House in Order," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 49 (May 1923):765.

Engineer lent its support to the idea of force in support of peace.[63]

Tasker H. Bliss believed that outlawry of war was suspect:

> my own view as to our military policy is that we should not disarm an American soldier nor lay up an American ship of war except as the result of such an agreement among competing nations, loyally accepted and adhered to, as will convince Americans that such reduction is safe.[64]

He noted that disarmament could come only after sufficient security had been provided, and security could be achieved only by "the substitution of force regulated by law, for unrestrained, arbitrary force."[65]

A treaty signifying an abolition of war would be insufficient to achieve peace. Rear Admiral Rodgers had opposed any unilateral reduction or total abandonment of armaments--it would leave America vulnerable. He also opposed reduction because that in itself did not deal with the causes of war: "We all know that great collective emotions are only restrained by force, not by reason."[66] Reliance on international law, in his view, was ineffective because it did not have extensive force behind it, as did

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[63]"Aggressive and Passive Nations," Military Engineer 19 (January-February 1927):39.

[64]Bliss, "Peace By Cooperation," p. 642.

[65]Tasker H. Bliss, "Disarmament," American Journal of International Law 21 (January 1927):39.

[66]Rodgers, "Can Courts and Tribunals Maintain World Peace?" p. 71.

domestic law. General Allen charged that the possibility of a widespread reduction of armaments rested with international cooperation to provide security for weak nations, and the creation of a meaningful arbitration project.[67]

Military opinion-makers generally were uniform in their approach to America's role in world affairs. Major General Allen visualized "the role that destiny has imposed upon us," and spoke of America utilizing its "enormous moral and physical strength" for the welfare of the world.[68] Rear Admiral Pratt said that from the founding of America to the World War the country had based its influence primarily on "example and . . . the potential strength [of] a young and growing nation."[69] The country was prepared to do much for Europe, if only Europe would show evidence of first helping itself. Pratt also believed America had taken over England's former position as the world's balance-of-power. General John J. Pershing, Chief of Staff, United States Army, from 1921 to 1924, took a stand similar to that of Pratt. Pershing wrote: "As a strong and reasonable

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[67]Allen, "Possibility of Disarmament - Necessity For United States Co-Operation," pp. 65-66.

[68]Allen, "We Must Not Secede From the World," p. 489.

[69]Pratt, "America As a Factor in World Peace," p. 185.

nation, our power may be a decisive factor in keeping the peace among nations." He went on to promote a neutral position for the United States: "When other nations lose their tempers, we should be able to keep ours in our friendly detachment and goodwill toward all."[70] William Gardiner saw the United States as an island in the middle of the world able to reach out in all directions.[71] Opinion-makers directly associated with the military considered America able to help the world by acting as an example for others and being all-powerful.

America could not live in isolation, according to military opinion-makers. The military presented no surplus of advocates for joining the League of Nations; Europe has "a different set of interests from our own, and . . . political independence is the wise policy for the United States to continue to follow."[72] But the existence of widespread support for America's assistance in solving the world problems defies the label of "isolationist." Any attempt to remain outside of world affairs would not only defy America's financial and moral position, but would threaten its security by allowing others an opportunity to structure a world environment potentially harmful to America's

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[70]John J. Pershing, "Our Place in the World," World's Work 56 (July 1928):324.

[71]Gardiner, "Insular America," p. 524.

[72]Army and Navy Journal 65 (1 October 1927):88.

interests. The status quo became an important concern, expressed as preservation of world peace. No matter how expressed, the message was clear--America's future resided with a stable world in which no nation threatened its pre-eminence, and the commercial traffic flowed unimpeded. The military supporters had greater interest in preserving America's status in the world than in a humanitarian effort to better the conditions of less fortunate nations.

CONCLUSION

This study began with the assumption of an underlying concept of America's role in world affairs common to opinion-makers within five high-prestige occupational categories. Such a concept existed on a theoretical level, although opinion-makers as a group did not produce a uniform approach to foreign policy issues at the operational level. Opinion-makers agreed that America's foreign policy should leave the country free to contribute when it desired to the advancement of world peace and prosperity, but at the practical level differences abounded. Within occupational categories there normally existed opinions too diverse to project unity--the church and military coming closest to conformity. They normally did not speak as representatives of occupational categories, but as representatives of narrower interests identified with particular ideals and perceptions of world order. The evidence strongly suggests that what characterized American foreign policy equally as much as a theoretical concept opposed to collective security arrangements, was an opinion-making body normally incapable of producing uniformity on issues transcending basic economic interests and posing the long-range, tough questions of national goals.

Overall, opinion-makers in the 1920's advocated American participation in international life, but usually short of political commitments. While opinion-makers unanimously advocated a workable and peaceful international system, there existed several solutions for consideration. The idea that America must be free to determine its own course independent of other nations' interests was destructive to the system advocated as ideal. Because opinion-makers could not agree among themselves, a traditional foreign policy remained to assure a reserved approach to the political and economic conditions which caused international problems. The intricacies of foreign affairs were approached with the intent of protecting, preserving, and advancing America's position in the world order, more than integrating that world order into a system of equals.

United States-Latin America relations exposed conflicting views among opinion-makers. Protestant spokesmen largely challenged an aggressive American policy toward the underdeveloped nations. The Methodist journal Zion's Herald expressed the view of the less activist anti-imperialist: "For the most powerful nation to be the general protector may be theoretically altruistic and noble, but in the present status of society it is too likely to be inter-

preted as imperialism."[1] But the issue was not always simply imperialism versus anti-imperialism. Catholic opinion-makers had to face the Mexican government's usurpation of Catholicism's power and control over the masses. Partly in response to the suppression of Catholicism, the journal America reacted strongly for a hard-line approach to the oil question. Commonweal, however, was able to separate the issues and stand for opposition to economic exploitation of Mexico. The extent to which Protestants supported Mexico because of anti-Catholic feelings cannot be judged.

Opinion-makers among the military presented a consistent approach to Latin American issues. Although not overly expressive on the issues, a hard-line position was advocated by Admiral William Rodgers, secretaries of the Navy and War, the Army and Navy Journal, and the Quartermaster Review. Their position was explained by the strategic importance attached to the Caribbean region; too much self-sufficiency by those nations could pose a threat to America's security through the vulnerable Panama Canal and Gulf region.

Opinion-makers among journalists, business interests, and academics expressed diverse views toward Latin America. Thomas Lamont and Dwight Morrow, representing

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[1]"Intervention or Cooperation?" Zion's Herald (1 February 1928):133.

international bankers, joined with the Nation, William Allen White, H. L. Mencken, Walter Lippmann, Harry Elmer Barnes, and John Dewey, for example, to oppose a forceful, uncompromising approach to Latin American problems. The Nation offered a most condemning criticism of American imperialism:

> The imperialists, the advocates of war are unceasingly at work. Those who believe in international morality and decency must likewise be unceasing in serving notice upon President Coolidge that the American people do not propose to be betrayed into bloodshed in . . . Mexico, that they still believe in the rights of small nations to self-determination, and that they scorn the doctrine that war-might gives us the right to say how people shall live or think or act in any weaker country.[2]

Such an attack did not extend to advocating a ban on exportation of merchandise and capital; but it was considered imperative that any disputes over property rights be arbitrated and Americans investing money abroad enjoy no more privileges than the citizens of those countries.

Opinion-makers such as Guy Stevens, Otto Kahn, William Randolph Hearst, and the Chicago Tribune, were less sympathetic to the plight of underdeveloped nations, seeing them as sources of economic exploitation; in that perspective any approach had to give priority to economic and political stability abroad, a situation not encouraged, they would argue, by anything less than a firm and consistent stand opposing anti-American economic and political policies.

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[2]Nation 124 (26 January 1927):80.

The League of Nations had its critics and supporters throughout society. Among its detractors were such strange political bedfellows as William Randolph Hearst, Admiral William Rodgers, the Chicago Tribune, and Otto Kahn alongside Charles Clayton Morrison and the Nation; while each had differing reasons for their views, they could act together in opposition. Hearst and Rodgers were representative of those who saw the League as an infringement upon America's flexibility in decision-making as well as vital interests abroad--the last probably most significant in their thinking.

While opposition to collective security had undergirded the American rejection of the League in 1919-1920, that issue subsided as the decade wore on; the Locarno agreements in particular showed that what security arrangements might exist would be regional, and it was more representative of a spirit of arbitration than collective security. Only those nations with an immediate interest in security arrangements could agree to prearranged commitments of armed action.

The League's supporters also represented a cross-section of types; Thomas Lamont, Manley O. Hudson, Kirby Page, Sherwood Eddy, and the New York Times, as examples. To them world peace and international cooperation seemed more important than self-centered interests, although some reservations arose. Kirby Page supported the League not because he believed in its collective security provisions,

but because it would serve as a useful addition to other instrumentation designed to promote peace; Thomas Lamont had supported it as the best alternative to date; supporters concentrated on its potential contributions to peace and the responsibility America had to participate in that endeavor, not on the collective security implications.

The World Court received similar divided reaction. America's security was a primary consideration; ironically, both supporters and opponents could point to preservation of America's security as the rationale behind their positions. The Senate's attachment of reservations in 1926 exemplified the suspicion of political commitments which threatened (or appeared to threaten) usurpation of United States' control over its own use of force; opinion-makers widely supported the reservations.

Peace was a much discussed topic during the decade. All groups studied had a positive interest in achieving lasting peace, from the churchman acting out of a Christian morality to business interests viewing peace as essential to the continued growth of a national and world economy. Just as there were varied motives so were there varied means extending from the outlawry of war to the strengthening of military preparedness. The adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty exemplified the power of emotion to pursue and accomplish an objective. The international events of the 1930's verified the inability of paper

agreements to transcend international tension and national aggression. Peace was more easily defined than implemented. But even on that issue, there was widespread variance on how best to achieve it. With exception of the military who saw preparedness as more effective than outlawry, the Kellogg-Briand Pact received almost universal backing, but with differing interpretations as to its implications and effectiveness--from those who accepted it because it would do no harm to those who saw it as the beginning of the elimination of all wars.

While the pact did seem a departure from America's avoidance of collective security arrangements, because the United States in essence did agree by signing that it had a stake in war no matter where it occurred, the absence of specific provisions for enforcement preserved the freedom of political action.

The decade of the 1920's was the beginning of a transition stage for the United States--from a nation of altruistic, moralistic perceptions of the international order and America's role in it to a more sober, realistic assessment of the relationship between power and responsibility. In the 1920's there were few opinion-makers who could project a balance between the nation's developing economic-political strength and the implementation of a policy based on a global order designed for the common

good. At a time when power and responsibility were needed, America was unable to respond with energy or directedness. The question of the proper balance between power and responsibility still plagues the United States, and it must be through the actions of opinion-makers that the alternatives are made known and the choices determined.

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