A STUDY OF INCIDENTS HAVING AN
IMPACT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
NEW AND EXPERIENCED PRESIDENTS
OF SELECTED COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES IN THE MIDWEST

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF INCIDENTS HAVING AN IMPACT ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF NEW AND EXPERIENCED
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By

William David Peterson

The central purpose of this study was to collect
and analyze incidents which new and experienced college
and university presidents reported as having had an im-
pact on their effectiveness as presidents. The Critical
Incident Technique was modified and used both for data
collection and analysis.

The sample consisted of twenty-six presidents of
four-year colleges and universities in five Midwestern
states. Twelve were classified as "new presidents,"
having been in office no less than six months but no more
than eighteen months. Fourteen were classified as "experi-
enced presidents," having been in office for more than two
years. The primary basis for selecting experienced presi-
dents was comparability of their institutions to those
represented by new presidents.

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Each president was interviewed in person or by telephone and was asked to report four incidents which he felt had had an impact on his effectiveness as president. Two of the four incidents were to be effective, meaning the president interpreted the results of his actions to have been desirable; and two were to be ineffective, meaning the president interpreted the results of his actions to have been undesirable. One hundred twelve incidents were reported, sixty effective, fifty ineffective, and two in which the final outcomes had not yet been determined.

Each incident was first categorized according to internal or external focus. A second categorization was based on the primary reference group or groups involved. Finally, each incident was categorized by the major precipitating factor. The researcher repeated each categorization three times to insure a measure of reliability. An independent judge also categorized 10 per cent of the incidents as a check on objectivity and validity of the researcher's categorizations. There was 95.5 per cent agreement on the repeated categorizations, and 83.3 per cent agreement between researcher and judge categorizations.

The great majority of incidents were internal in orientation (106 of 112 or 94.6 per cent). Of all incidents reported by experienced presidents, 96.6 per cent

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were internal in orientation as were 92.6 per cent re-
ported by new presidents.

Seven primary reference groups were identified.
The four internal primary reference groups were students,
faculty, administration, and governing boards. The three
external groups were local citizens, the press, and the
state. Ten incidents could not be categorized by primary
reference group. Students were the primary reference
group for more incidents (36) than any other group.
Faculty were primary referents in twenty-four incidents,
administration in eighteen, and governing boards in nine.
Local citizens were primary reference groups for two
incidents, the press two, and the state one.

Forty problem categories were initially isolated
from the 112 incidents. These categories were then exam-
ined to determine aspects of commonality, and were grouped
into fourteen Critical Problem Categories. These cate-
gories and the percentage of incidents they contained,
were as follows: Finance (15.18); Campus Unrest (15.18);
Staffing (13.39); Governance (10.71); Controlling (7.15);
Governing Board (6.25); Public Relations (6.25); Academic
General (5.36); Subordinate Ineffectiveness (4.46); Stu-
dent Relations (4.46); Planning (3.57); Organizing (2.68);
Compensation (2.68); and Employee Relations (2.68).

When incidents in the Critical Problem Categories
were tabulated by type of reporting president, no cate-
gory contained more than 16.67 per cent of all incidents

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reported by new presidents, or more than 20.69 per cent of all incidents reported by experienced presidents. Staffing contained more incidents than any other for new presidents (9), and Campus Unrest the most for experienced presidents (12). Finance and Governance ranked second in number of incidents for new presidents (7 each), and Finance ranked second for experienced presidents (10 incidents).

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A THESIS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Introduction

Leadership is vitally important to an organization or institution. Effective leadership becomes even more critical during periods of rapid change and institutional stress. Even a casual perusal of the popular and profession-al literature reveals that institutions of higher education are currently experiencing great stress as they seek to respond to both internal and external pressures. Much of this pressure focuses directly on the office of the President of the college or the university, for it is to this office that individuals within and without the college look for leadership. And rightly so, for "the history of American higher education strongly supports the contention that no college or university has made important progress except under the leadership of an outstanding president."[1]

At the present time, however, colleges and universities are experiencing increasing difficulty in

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[1] "Basic Rights and Responsibilities for College and University Presidents," a statement adopted by the Board of Directors of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, May 6, 1970.

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attracting and holding able persons as chief administrative officers.[1] The February 22, 1971, issue of <u>The Chronicle of Higher Education</u>, stated that as of that date a total of 139 colleges and universities were searching for presidents, and that in the previous twelve months, 266 college presidents were appointed.[2]

Thus, at a time when colleges and universities are having an increasing impact upon American society and upon the world, and at a time when American colleges and universities are confronted with major difficulties, a number of institutions are either without presidents or are operating with relatively inexperienced presidents.

We have a general awareness of the problems facing academic presidents today. We have witnessed or read about the student unrest. A Carnegie Commission has informed us of the financial plight of many institutions. Loss of public confidence in higher education has become more apparent through the acts of the state legislatures and the Congress. We know that these and other problems confront the collegiate president.

Much remains to be learned, however, about specific difficulties and successes which presidents of varying

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[1]<u>Ibid</u>. See also, Warren G. Bennis, "Searching for the 'Perfect' University President," <u>The Atlantic</u>, CCXXVII, No. 4 (April, 1971), 39.

[2]William A. Sievert, "139 Institutions Seek Presidents; . . . " <u>The Chronicle of Higher Education</u>, V, No. 20 (February 22, 1971), 1.

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tenures and from varying types of institutions are experiencing. Is it necessarily true that the problems facing new presidents are qualitatively different from those facing the more experienced ones? If it is true, what are the differences, and what are their ramifications for the selection and training of new presidents? May it not also be true, however, that new presidents are experiencing certain types of successes which are not being experienced by presidents with longer tenures, and if this is so what might this imply about the wisdom of extended tenures?

Statement of the Problem

The lack of information regarding the comparative types of situations confronting new and experienced presidents, and an interest in collecting data which would permit the formulation of tentative answers to the above questions, leads to the central question of this study, which is:

> What types of incidents do new and experienced presidents perceive as having had an impact on their effectiveness as presidents; and, in which types of incidents do they feel their actions have had effective consequences and in which ineffective consequences with respect to their objectives?

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Significance of the Study

A study of incidents which presidents perceive to
have been critical to their effectiveness is important for
a number of reasons. First, higher education "is fast
becoming the major industry in the nation."[1] Upon the
college presidents of this country, more than upon any
other group of persons, falls the responsibility for this
"major industry" of higher education.[2] In light of this,
knowledge of areas in which presidents are meeting with
success in accomplishing their objectives and those in
which they are having difficulty, may certainly be con-
sidered to be important.

Secondly, colleges and universities are growing
rapidly in number, size, and function. "Whenever an
organization is faced with pressures to grow and to re-
formulate the mix and nature of its major activities at
the same time that it is faced with rising costs and
diminishing budgets--at least on a relative, if not an
absolute basis--it is squarely up against a management
crisis."[3] The president stands at the center of this

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[1]Harold Hodgkinson, "Who Decides Who Decides?"
Agony and Promise, ed. by G. Kerry Smith (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1969), p. 141.

[2]Harold Stoke, The American College President
(New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p. vii.

[3]Richard H. Brien, "The 'Managerialization' of
Higher Education," Educational Record, LI, No. 3 (Summer,
1970), 274.

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crisis and his ability to "manage" the situation is of vital importance to the continued life and vitality of the institution. This study may yield insights into the collective measure of success presidents are having in meeting the crises.

Third, the literature reflects a tremendous power struggle in higher education, the outcomes of which could--and probably will--alter relationships within and without the institution. A study of critical incidents may give some clues as to how the president is faring in this struggle.

And finally, a study which results in the collection of a number of critical incidents from a variety of presidents can serve as a useful data base for study by current presidents with respect to the way their colleagues have handled situations they may also be facing; for study by those responsible for training educational administrators with respect to whether the programs they offer are preparing their graduates to cope with the types of situations the presidents have reported that they have had to face; and for study by individuals training to be educational administrators.

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Approach to the Design of the Study

The Critical Incident Technique[1] is the primary research tool that will be utilized in the study. This technique, with modifications to fit the scope of the study, will serve both as the method for collecting data and as an instrument for analyzing the data once it has been collected. Presidents from a variety of institutional types and with varying tenures will be asked to contribute four incidents which they feel have had an impact on their effectiveness as presidents. Incidents to be reported are both those in which they feel the consequences of their actions were desirable, and those in which they feel the consequences of their actions were undesirable or failed to have any impact on the situation. These incidents will then be analyzed on several dimensions to seek to gain a better perspective of the presidency and of the types of situations presidents are currently facing.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to twenty-six presidents of colleges and universities in a five-state region in the Midwest. The presidents were selected on the basis of their tenure in office and on the basis of the types of institutions they represented. Only presidents of four-year colleges and universities were included.

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[1]John C. Flanagan, "The Critical Incident Technique," Psychological Bulletin, LI, No. 4 (1954), 327-58.

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As mentioned above, the Critical Incident Technique is the primary research tool which is utilized in this study. Its strengths and limitations are discussed in detail in Chapter II.

The Critical Incident Technique is typically utilized as a job analysis procedure. Incidents of effective and ineffective role performance are collected until no new information is forthcoming, and it is then assumed that an analysis of the incidents will reveal all the critical elements or requirements of the position under study. It should be emphasized that the current study is <u>not</u> utilizing the Critical Incident Technique in this manner. Although elements in the role of the college and university president will become apparent in the incidents, no attempt is made to gain a sufficiently large number of incidents to insure that <u>all</u> critical requirements or elements will be revealed. Rather, the technique is being utilized to collect incidents that have an impact on the effectiveness of college and university Presidents, with the primary purpose in analysis being to determine whether the incidents show variations by presidential tenure.

This study is limited by the fact that only four incidents are to be collected from each of the presidents. There is little question that additional information could be gained if each president was asked to reflect on the

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period of interest and then report <u>all</u> of the incidents that he could recall that fit the specifications of the study. Presidential time limitations had to be taken into consideration, however, and the decision was made to limit the number of incidents requested with the hope that this would increase the likelihood that presidents would be willing to participate in the study.

An additional limitation of the study is that the reporting stipulations forced an even distribution between effective and ineffective incidents. This could lead to the impression that 50 per cent of a president's behavior is effective and 50 per cent is ineffective. This is not what the even distribution of responses is meant to imply. The presidents were asked to report two examples of effective and two examples of ineffective incidents because previous research indicates that extremities of effective and ineffective behavior can be more accurately identified than those which fall between the extremes.[1]

The methodology used in this study places great reliance on the perceptions of the respondent. This reliance on perception must be cited as a potential limitation, but (as will be further developed in Chapter III), it was felt that the benefits to be gained from having the presidents report on their own behavior and

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[1]John E. Corbally, Jr., "The Critical Incident Technique and Educational Research," <u>Educational Research Bulletin</u>, XXXV, No. 3 (March 14, 1956), 57-60.

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their own perceptions of their effectiveness, outweighed the dangers of self-reporting bias.

Assumptions of the Study

1. Incidents that have an impact on the effectiveness of college and university presidents can be studied in a scientific manner.

2. Even though the magnitude of the problems with which presidents must deal may vary due to institutional size or other institutional characteristics, it is assumed that there is a sufficient commonality in the skills required to cope with the problems to make analysis both possible and meaningful.

3. The president, by virtue of his position as chief executive officer, is the individual most able to assess the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of his actions, and is in the best position to determine whether an incident had desirable or undesirable outcomes with respect to the mission of the institution.

4. Incidents obtained by telephone interview will lend themselves equally as well to analysis as incidents obtained by personal interview. Accordingly, incidents obtained by either interview method can be interspersed for analysis purposes.

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Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined in accordance with the purposes of this investigation:

President.--The chief executive and operating officer of a four-year college or university; that person appointed by the governing body to represent it in day-to-day operations.

Experienced President.--A president who has been in office for twenty-four months or more.

New President.--A president who has been in office for no less than six months and no more than eighteen months and who previously has not been president of another college or university.

Critical Incident Technique.--A procedure used in the collection and analysis of incidents in which the holder of a position in a certain occupation has acted in a way which, according to some criterion, has been of decisive significance for his success or failure in a task.

Critical Incident.--An episode in role performance, the consequences of which are judged by the president to have had an impact on his effectiveness.

Effective Incident.--An episode where the president's own actions, or the actions he recommends, are

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judged by the president to have resulted in the desired outcomes.

Ineffective Incident.--An episode where the president's own actions, or the actions he recommends, are judged by the president to have resulted in undesired outcomes or have failed to have any effect on the situation.

Overview

A frame of reference for the entire study is developed in Chapter I. A description of the background and significance of the study is presented along with a statement of the research problem. The scope and limitations of the study are presented and important terms are defined.

The related literature is reviewed in Chapter II. Since the specific subject of this study is the college and university president, and since the Critical Incident Technique is the primary research tool, the literature on both the president and the Critical Incident Technique is reviewed.

The study design and procedures are described in Chapter III. Information is presented about the subjects, the instruments employed, and the procedures followed to collect and analyze the data. Questions are presented which serve as a base for the reporting of the data.

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Chapter IV contains an analysis of the data with descriptions of the findings pertaining to the questions of interest.

Comments which the presidents have made regarding the state of the presidency and the state of higher education today, which have great interest and relevance but which were not part of the main body of the study, are presented in Chapter V.

A summary of the study, the conclusions, and the implications for further research are presented in Chapter VI.

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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to review litera-
ture that has special relevance to the present study.
Since the primary subject of the study is the college and
university president, the first section of the chapter
will be devoted to literature on the presidency. The
second major section will be devoted to literature on the
Critical Incident Technique since this technique provides
the methodology for both the data collection and analysis.

Literature on the Academic President

Eells and Hollis,[1] have pointed out that more than
700 significant books, monographs, and magazine articles
were published between 1900 and 1960 which dealt with the
work of the college or university president. This number
alone would make an exhaustive review of the presidential
literature impractical for a study of this nature, but

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[1]Walter C. Eells and Ernest V. Hollis, The College
Presidency 1900-1960: An Annotated Bibliography (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1961).

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when one adds to that the number of books, articles and dissertations published between 1970 and 1971, an exhaustive review becomes non-productive.

Accordingly this review will report the views and findings of only selected literature contributing to a fuller understanding of the presidency and providing background upon which the present study may build.

History of the American Academic Presidency

Reeves informed us that the term "president" was American in origin. Harvard employed the title as early as 1640 and the College of William and Mary in 1693.[1] Although other titles such as rector, chancellor, and provost have been used to designate the chief executive officer, the title of president has continued to be the most common since these early days.[2]

The meaning of the title "president of the college," is dependent on the charter of the college, the statutes, the traditions, and the policy of the institution.[3] Rourke and Brooks have discussed what the title

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[1]The Very Reverend James A. Reeves, "The Office of the President," in College Organization and Administration, ed. by Roy J. Deferrari (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1947), p. 96.

[2]Ralph Prator, The College President (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1963), pp. 4-6.

[3]Reeves, op. cit.

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meant in the early days of American higher education.

They wrote:

> In these early days the college president was chief
> administrator in fact as well as name. Every detail
> of campus management came under his scrutiny. More-
> over, he was able to maintain an active involvement
> in academic affairs while performing these adminis-
> trative duties.[1]

Contemporary presidents of only our smallest institutions
would be able to operate in a similar fashion.

Schmidt examined the background of a large number
of early college presidents and found that nine-tenths of
the presidents who served before the Civil War were or-
dained ministers. The few who were not took office after
1779. With only one apparent exception, occurring at
Harvard from 1708 to 1724, there was not a single lay
president in the entier Colonial Period.[2] According to
Prator, "Even after laymen began entering the presi-
dential field, the barriers to nonclerics did not fall
rapidly."[3]

The image the literature has given of the nine-
teenth century president is one of an educational hero who

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[1]Francis E. Rourke and Glenn E. Brooks, The Mana-
gerial Revolution in Higher Education (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 4.

[2]George P. Schmidt, The Old Time College Presi-
dent (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), p. 3.

[3]Prator, op. cit., p. 6.

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founded an institution or lifted it to its first renown.[1]
Several authors pointed to the influence these educational
leaders have had on the history of higher education, indi-
cating that they have become models by which even con-
temporary presidents are measured and found wanting.[2]
Rourke and Brooks, and Henderson, felt the model has out-
lived its usefulness. Other writers, such as Dodds,[3]
however, longed for the return of the president as edu-
cational trailblazer.

The picture of the twentieth century president is
one of transition; from the pre World War II academic man,
through the post World War II "institution builder," to
the contemporary "crisis manager."[4] This transition was
reflected in the words of Harold Stoke:

> The transformation of colleges and universities
> reflects itself in the position of their presidents,
> and has brought to that position men whose training,
> interests, and skills are far different from those of
> their predecessors. The college president as the Man
> of Learning has given way to the Man of Management,

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[1]Rourke and Brooks, op. cit., p. 110.

[2]Ibid. See also, Algo D. Henderson, The Inno-
vative Spirit (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1970),
pp. 222-23.

[3]Harold W. Dodds, The Academic President: Edu-
cator or Caretaker? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com-
pany, Inc., 1962).

[4]Ian E. McNett, "A New Style of Presidential
Leadership is Emerging as 'Crisis Managers' Confront the
1970's," The Chronicle of Higher Education, IV, 36 (July 6,
1970).

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although the change has not taken place without strain and conflict.[1]

Current Status of the Presidency

The presidency of most colleges and universities today would obviously be quite different from the presidency of a college in the Colonial Period, or the nineteenth century, or even as recently as a decade ago. In spite of the changes that have occurred the literature, for the most part, still reflects high regard for the position. One of the reasons for this is the fact that, whether the institution is large or small, there is only one president.[2] Kerr, although affirming the concept that the president is no longer the central personage he was during most of the history of higher education, still called the president "the most important single figure in the life of the campus."[3] Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor called the presidency the "pivotal office" in the bureaucratic dimension of university organization.[4]

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[1]Harold W. Stoke, The American College President (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p. 3.

[2]Ibid., p. 2.

[3]Clark Kerr, "Presidential Discontent," in Perspectives on Campus Tensions, ed. by David C. Nichols (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1970), p. 137.

[4]Nicholas J. Demerath, Richard W. Stephens, and R. Robb Taylor, Power, Presidents, and Professors (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1967), p. 41.

Literature can also be found, however, expressing grave reservations about the state of the presidency today. Dodds, for example, saw a need for better definition in the office. He said:

> The office is in need of better definition; it has lost its uniform and consistent character. Today it finds itself suspended between two worlds. While it has moved away from the old world of relative simplicity; it has not yet come to terms with its new world of complexity.[1]

Stroup also evidenced this concern when he said:

> The president currently suffers from an unclear definition of his responsibilities . . . he has much that he is free to do. But he is not limited sufficiently as to what is expected of him. There are few standards to evaluate his effectiveness. . . .[2]

Other writers not only have felt that the office of the president has lost its distinctiveness, but that it has become virtually powerless. One such writer was McGrath.

> Under existing circumstances the office of the president is the weakest element in the complex of organizational controls. The current status of the chief executive is an almost complete reversal of the position of his predecessors. Typically they were the servants of neither the faculty nor the trustees.[3]

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[1]Dodds, The Academic President, op. cit., pp. v-vi.

[2]Herbert Stroup, Bureaucracy in Higher Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 81.

[3]Earl J. McGrath, "Who Should Have the Power?" in Power and Authority, ed. by Harold L. Hodgkinson and Richard L. Meeth (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1971), p. 189.

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Mooney, taking an even more pessimistic stance than McGrath, posited that no one in the university was in a position to take a leadership role or assume authority. Mooney wrote:

> The net effect of all these conditions is that no one has the power to take positive leadership in the development of the university as an integral enterprise--not the line administrator, his staff, the faculty councils, the departments or the colleges. Such power as any group possesses is functionally negative with respect to the whole, fully effective only in denying what others may try, destructive of initiatives and integration, self-propelling into further snarls and splits, productive of deeper paralysis.[1]

Whether the presidency and/or the university is powerful or powerless today is thus a debated point in the literature. That there has been dramatic change in the governance structures of the university is something few would deny. In the opinion of the presidents who participated in Hodgkinson's study, "changes in the internal governance and authority structure of the institution" were the most important changes that have occurred in American higher education in recent years.[2]

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[1]Ross L. Mooney, "The Problem of Leadership in the University," _Harvard Educational Review_, XXXIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1963), 56-57.

[2]Harold L. Hodgkinson, _Institutions in Transition_ (Berkeley: The Carnegie Commission, 1970), p. 3.

The Contemporary President

Just as the literature reflected a difference in the presidency today, it also reflected a difference in the contemporary president. A professor at Harvard University's Graduate School of Business, spoke as follows regarding the "new breed" of presidents:

> The 1970 class of new college and university presidents is a "very different group of people" from those who came to the presidency as recently as five years ago.
> Today's new presidents have "different styles and different values," from those of their precedessors.[1]

William J. McGill, president of Columbia University, also spoke to the change in the type of individuals now assuming the presidency:

> Most of [the] gentle and erudite men have been driven out, and thus the presidency has begun to pass to the hands of young, vigorous men with good fighting instincts; tolerant enough to deal with the profound changes that have occurred in the life styles of young people, understanding enough to respond thoughtfully to youthful emotions, firm enough to control the emotional tides flooding the campuses, and smart enough to avoid the worst extremes of overreaction.[2]

Literature on Training Needs for Presidents

A stated purpose of this study was to gain information that would contribute to the improvement of preparation programs for top-level administrators in higher

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[1]Arch Richard Dooley as quoted by McNett, op. cit.

[2]William J. McGill, "Courage to Lead," College and University Journal, IX, No. 4 (Fall, 1970), 37.

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education. That a need exists for such information--and,
indeed, a need for the training of presidents--was a view
supported by a number of authors. Prator, for one, ex-
pressed dismay over the lack of specific preparation of
the presidents.[1] Henderson was another writer who saw
this lack of training as a significant problem. He
stated:

> A major problem in governance is that the persons
> chosen for high administrative office seldom have any
> training for their roles or any knowledge of socio-
> logical concepts relating to organizational and insti-
> tutional processes. Inadequately prepared presidents
> assume too much detailed decision-making responsi-
> bility, become serious bottlenecks, and use
> authoritarian methods.[2]

In another publication, Henderson made the point
that scholarly eminence was no guarantee of administrative
prowess.

> The roles of the dean and the president carry them
> far afield from their academic specialization of
> history or mathematics. . . . Previous scholarship
> in Latin or in chemistry does not prepare a man to
> work with architects or to sell budgetary deficits
> to donors or legislators. Although success in
> these aspects may often be the result of special
> qualities of personality, the high rate of turn-
> over in presidencies may in part be caused by
> fumbling due in turn to lack of administrative
> training or experience.[3]

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[1]Prator, op. cit., p. 19.

[2]Henderson, Innovative Spirit, p. 248.

[3]Algo D. Henderson, "Finding and Training Academic
Administrators," Public Administration Review, XX, No. 1
(Winter, 1960), 19.

Dr. Charles F. Fisher, program director for the
Institute for College and University Administrators,
American Council on Education, seconded Henderson's obser-
vation that scholarship was not sufficient for the con-
temporary president. Fisher was asked, "How do you see
the successful college president within the foreseeable
future?" He replied:

> Recent years have seen a new administrative style
> emerging to meet the ever-mounting challenges to
> American colleges and universities--factionalism;
> discord; competition for resources, influence and
> power; and so on. Today's academic leaders must
> have more than scholarship. They must have an
> appreciation of the complex factors which enter into
> administrative decision-making and the formulation of
> academic policy. They must understand the basic
> principles of management by objectives, administrative
> efficiency and effectiveness, and personal leadership,
> and be able to apply these concepts with prudence and
> candor toward meeting the unique needs of each par-
> ticular institution and of the distinctive enterprise
> of American higher education in general.[1]

That the college or university president must be
professionally trained as a manager--no matter how big or
small the institution is over which he presides--was a
perspective taken by Richard M. Whitter, assistant execu-
tive director of The Council for the Advancement of Small
Colleges. He said:

> For too long now the terms "management" and "manager"
> to refer to college administration and administrators
> have been dirty words in the lexicon of higher

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[1]As quoted in E. Milton Grassell, "The President
Needs Training in Management," College Management, VI,
No. 8 (August, 1971), 28.

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education. The chief executive officer of any
institution of higher education today must be a
professional manager.[1]

Lahti also saw both the problem and the solution
management training terms. He wrote:

Facing the facts that (1) there is presently a
critical shortage of competent managers in the field
of education; (2) the need for well-trained managers
is going to increase drastically; (3) the primary
source of administrators will be upwardly mobile
academicians; and (4) these recruits lack experience
and training in the managerial skills, it becomes
apparent that our responsibility, in addition to
good recruitment selection, is to continue their
travel upward through a vehicle of management
development programs.[2]

As president of William Rainey Harper College,
i has instituted a vigorous management training pro-
for personnel at all levels. The reports of the
lts have been most encouraging with respect to the
fits of such an approach.[3]

Increasing support has thus been voiced for the
ning of college and university presidents. This sup-
was not unanimous, however, as illustrated in the
owing statement by Stoke:

. . . the college presidency is so unique, so
different from all other academic positions, that
a full appreciation of it requires personal

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[1]Ibid., p. 29.

[2]Robert Lahti, "Developing Leadership for the
gement of Higher Education," College and University
ness, XLVIII, No. 5 (May, 1970), 62.

[3]See Grassell, op. cit.

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initiation. It is among those for which experience
alone is the best teacher. The position of the
college president cannot be understood through the
techniques of research, statistical analysis, and
case studies.[1]

That these words should appear in a preface to

Mr. Stoke's own book on the presidency was something this

writer found to be somewhat paradoxical. That experience

is an excellent teacher and that one cannot fully appreci-

ate the position unless one has occupied it was something

the writer was willing to acknowledge. That one can make

no preparation for the position or that studies of the

position are futile, the writer was obviously not willing

to acknowledge or this study would not have been under-

taken.

Major Contributions to the Literature on the Academic President

It has been only in the past few years that major

empirical studies of the academic presidency have been

undertaken. Prior to this time the literature on the

American college and university president consisted pri-

marily of correspondence, memoirs, and speeches of former

presidents. Although these writings have provided rich

insights into aspects of the presidential role, they

generally have been limited to a discussion of one insti-

tution or have been lacking in knowledge of a factual

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[1]Stoke, op. cit., p. viii.

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rical nature.   Important studies have been done

tly, however, that have added to our knowledge of

president and the presidency.

In a study reported in 1960, Nelson[1] sought to

tify and analyze the role expectations which incumbent

idents and board of control members held for the

ce, position, and status of the college or university

ident, and to compare these expectations to determine

possible areas of agreement and disagreement held by

presidents and the board members.

Nelson surveyed twenty-six presidents and 104

d of control members in the state-controlled colleges

niversities in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New

shire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.   The board of con-

members were surveyed by questionnaire only and the

idents by both questionnaire and interview.

Nelson found that out of 120 role expectation

s, 19 "were revealed to have a χ^2 above 3.84 (which

the 5% level of significance), and therefore possibly

le of producing conflict in role expectations."[2]

Of particular interest to the present study were

implications Nelson felt that his findings had for

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[1]Lawrence O. Nelson, "Role Expectations for
ted College and University Presidents" (unpublished
dissertation, Michigan State University, 1960).

[2]Ibid., p. 114.

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graduate preparation programs in higher educational

administration.

1. Graduate preparation programs for higher edu-
   cational administration should include experi-
   ences in the development of adequate competencies
   in verbal expression. Board member and president
   majorities expected a president to be a good
   public speaker and able to express ideas clearly.
2. Graduate preparation programs for higher edu-
   cational administration should aid the develop-
   ment of enthusiastic leadership abilities. They
   should also intensify their consideration of the
   area of human relations. Incumbent president and
   board member majorities expected a president to
   be a dynamic leader and able to work well with
   people.
3. Graduate preparation programs for higher edu-
   cational administration should encourage inter-
   ested students to pursue advanced degrees. Both
   board member and incumbent president majorities
   expected a president to have a doctors degree.
4. Graduate preparation programs for higher edu-
   cational administration should promote the develop-
   ment of campus planning and educational planning
   skills. Board of control member and president
   majorities expected a president to have on paper
   a long range campus building plan and to have an
   educational development plan on paper.
5. Graduate preparation programs for higher edu-
   cational administration should continue to empha-
   size the importance of a democratic philosophy of
   administration. Incumbent president and board
   member majorities overwhelmingly expected a
   president to be democratic and to not be authori-
   tarian.[1]

Nelson's study illustrated that a regional study

uld result in findings which had implications that

ended far beyond the boundaries of the area covered in

study.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 128-30.

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In a more broadly based study of college adminis-
tration, Corson[1] found that the role of the academic
president focused around six essential activities: student
affairs, educational program, faculty selection, finance,
physical facilities, and public-alumni relations. Corson's
study, like Nelson's, was reported in 1960, and it will be
of interest to the present study to see the extent to which
the critical incidents reported by the presidents in 1971,
reflect a similar focus.

Prior to national studies by Ferrari[2] and Hodgkin-
son,[3] the most systematic study of the academic presidency
was done by Hemphill and Walberg.[4] Conducting their study
for the New York State Regents Advisory Committee on Edu-
cational Leadership, Hemphill and Walberg were interested
in gaining information on the following aspects of the
presidency: demands of the position; allocation of time
among activities; relative rank of important responsi-
ilities; influence of the president on the institution;

[1]John J. Corson, Governance of Colleges and Uni-
sities (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
0).

[2]Michael R. Ferrari, Jr., "A Study of the Careers
merican College and University Presidents" (unpub-
ed D.B.A. dissertation, Michigan State University,
.

[3]Hodgkinson, Institutions in Transition, op. cit.

[4]John K. Hemphill and Herbert J. Walberg, An
ical Study of College and University Presidents in the
of New York (Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing
ce, 1966).

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ademic background; formal training; administrative and

aching experience; prior positions; roadblocks to most

fective job performance; and satisfactions of the

sition.[1]

Ferrari,[2] seeking to expand the findings of Hemp-

l's and Walberg's study to a national level, used the

cupational mobility theory developed by Warner and

gglen to study the career patterns of college and uni-

sity presidents. The findings from Ferrari's doctoral

dy have since been published in book form.[3] As did

phill and Walberg, Ferrari reported on such aspects of

presidency as tenure, age, previous positions, and use

time. In concentrating on the career patterns of the

sidents, however, Ferrari also studied such aspects as

educational and occupational status of the parents of

presidents; the geographic origins of the presidents

elation to their present institutions; the occupational

ls of the presidents' wives; and the resemblance of the

er patterns and social origins of the academic presi-

s with those of business and government elites.

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[1]Hemphill and Walberg, op. cit.

[2]Ferrari, op. cit.

[3]Michael R. Ferrari, Jr., Profiles of American
ge Presidents (East Lansing: Michigan State Uni-
ty Business Studies, 1970).

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Ferrari developed and analyzed specific hypotheses with respect to each of the above aspects.[1]

Hodgkinson,[2] chose presidents as the respondents for an extensive Carnegie Commission study of change in higher education. He gave the following explanation for this choice:

> Presidents were chosen as respondents for two major reasons: first, it was felt they were in a position to be better aware of the changes occurring on their campus and of having a broader perspective of the institutional scene than other top administrators; and second, there was an interest in developing a profile of college and university presidents--who they were, what their mobility patterns looked like, and how they viewed the importance of various changes on their campus.[3]

With 1,230 responses to the questionnaire, or 46 per cent of the nation's college and university presidents, it was evident that the profile merited attention.[4]

Two other studies will be discussed which contribute to the information on the presidency. One, the work by Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor,[5] was of interest because of its inclusion of the major findings of Stephens'

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[1]Ferrari, "A Study of the Careers . . . ," op. cit., 42-44.

[2]Hodgkinson, Institutions in Transition, op. cit.

[3]Ibid., p. 37.   [4]Ibid.

[5]Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor, op. cit.

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ral dissertation on the role of the college presi-
[1] The other is a recently completed study by Alton

e reasons academic presidents resign.[2]

The aforementioned studies provided considerable

l information for an assessment of the current status

e college and university presidency in the United

s. In the review that follows, presidential quali-

desirable preparation; education; mobility; presi-

l effectiveness; satisfaction; organizational roles;

time; tenure; and reasons for resignation will be

ered.

ential Qualities

Earlier in this chapter the views of several

s were presented regarding the problems they felt

l in presidential selection procedures. A clue to

asons for these problems was given in the following

nt by Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor:

analysis of writings about presidential qualities
various groups that relate to the president, or
t participate in his selection, reveals several
eresting facts. Perhaps the most important is that
re is very little agreement on the essential quali-
s. For example, opinions are about evenly divided
to whether an academically trained man is likely
be a more effective president than one with

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[1]Richard W. Stephens, "The Academic Administrator,
of the University President" (unpublished doctoral
tion, University of North Carolina, 1956).

[2]Bruce T. Alton, "A Consideration of Motivating
in Resignation of the Academic Presidential Role"
shed Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University,

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experience in fields other than higher education,
such as business or the military.[1]

would seem reasonable to conclude that the selection

a president would be a most difficult and awkward pro-

ss when the qualities sought could not be agreed upon.

In the interview stage of his study, Nelson asked

nty-four incumbent presidents of state-supported col-

es and universities in New England to cite the three

sonal qualities they felt were the most important for

llege or university president to have. The twelve

onal qualities referred to most often and the frequency

esponse are given here.

A president should have these personal qualities.[2]

Total Response		Quality
10	1.	Intelligence
10	2.	Integrity
7	3.	Ability to work with others
7	4.	Leadership ability
6	5.	Physical vigor and vitality
6	6.	Administrative experience
5	7.	Vision and imagination
5	8.	Educational conviction
4	9.	Tolerance and be unprejudiced

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[1]Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor, op. cit., p. 57.

[2]Nelson, op. cit., p. 63.

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Total Response		Quality
4	10.	High moral character
4	11.	Skill in public relations
3	12.	A confident personality

eparation

Hemphill and Walberg asked the presidents in the :ate of New York to give their recommendations regarding esirable preparation for the position of the president.

> Administrative experience was the most common recommendation that presidents offered about desirable preparation for the position. Many of the presidents strongly endorsed experience in college administrative work for presidential aspirants. A number of presidents also mentioned special internships, workshops, case studies of accounting, and administrative planning. When asked specifically about the value of college teaching experience most of the presidents said it was extremely beneficial and some said it was necessary for acceptance by the faculty.[1]

Presidents in New York thus agreed with the New England presidents cited above regarding the value of administrative experience. According to Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor, the question of academic preparation was not new.

> It is rather significant that the academic-non-academic question is nothing new for selection committees. In 1906, President Andrews of Cornell University warned that the appointment of assistants to help the businessman president handle educational matters could not replace a true appreciation of the efforts of scholars by the president himself. . . .[2]

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[1] Hemphill and Walberg, op. cit., p. 50.

[2] Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor, op. cit., p. 58.

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On the other hand, as long ago as 1898 the value of the successful promoter type of president was being argued.[1]

Education

The educational attainment of the college and university president is an important indication of the qualifications and preparation with which selection committees are concerned. Hodgkinson's findings were of interest in this regard.

> Nearly half of all presidents (47 per cent) hold Ph.D.'s, and another 20 per cent hold Ed.D.'s. Only 5 per cent have a bachelors as their highest degree, with 21 per cent holding masters. The remainder are in law, medicine, or other fields, or did not respond.[2]

Hodgkinson reported that humanities was the major field of concentration for the largest number of presidents, "although presidents whose highest degrees are in the humanities are concentrated largely at private sectarian institutions."[3] For presidents of public institutions the highest degree of approximately half was in the area of education.[4]

Hodgkinson's findings squared with those of Ferrari, who indicated that, "About three-fourths of

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[1]Ibid., p. 59.

[2]Hodgkinson, Institutions in Transition, op. cit., p. 13.

[3]Ibid.   [4]Ibid.

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academic presidents have earned doctorates with the most prominent areas of study in the humanities and education."[1]

Mobility

Hodgkinson was concerned with the question of horizontal versus vertical mobility for presidents; i.e., did the president work his way up through the channels in the institution in which he is now president (vertical), or did he enter the presidency from another institution (horizontal).[2] Hodgkinson reported that his data suggested that presidents come from other institutions.

> Although 10 percent of the sample had held one other administrative position on the campus and 14 percent had held some combination of one administrative and one or more faculty positions, the vast majority of 739 (60 percent of the sample) had held no previous positions on the campus where they were presidents. This suggests that most presidents do not work their way up through the hierarchy but indeed are imported from outside; rather than vertical mobility the direction seems to be horizontal.[3]

Even though presidents are coming from outside their own institutions, they are still coming predominantly from other educational positions, as Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor indicated.

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[1]Ferrari, "A Study of the Career . . . ," op. cit., from the Abstract.

[2]Hodgkinson, Institutions in Transition, op. cit., p. 143.

[3]Ibid.

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Abstract

Contrary to popular belief, the proportion of presidents selected from occupations outside higher education does not seem to have increased materially since 1900. The decline in the number of ex-ministers was most pronounced before the turn of the century, and it has continued as a trend.[1]

One of the trends that several of the authors cited was the increased emphasis on previous administrative experience, particularly for university presidents.[2]

Although Hemphill and Walberg indicated that only 6 per cent of the presidents in their study moved directly from a faculty position to the presidential role,[3] they indicated that most of the presidents have at least some teaching experience in their backgrounds.[4] Ferrari was quite explicit regarding this, stating that, "Nearly all presidents had college teaching experience with a large proportion attaining the rank of professor."[5] Of significance was Ferrari's finding that, "Business and government fields directly supplied only 5 per cent of all presidents."[6]

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[1]Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor, op. cit., p. 63.

[2]Ibid. See also Hemphill and Walberg, and Hodgkinson.

[3]Hemphill and Walberg, op. cit., p. 50.

[4]Ibid., p. 48.

[5]Ferrari, "A Study of the Career . . . ," op. cit., Abstract.

[6]Ibid.

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Effectiveness

Hemphill and Walberg examined four major questions related to the effectiveness of college presidents. They were:

> What do college presidents regard as the most important "roadblock" preventing them from doing the job they would like to do? What factors relate to the satisfaction they obtain from the job? How do they maintain enthusiasm for their work? What characteristics are associated with their overall effectiveness?[1]

Hemphill and Walberg felt that their finding with respect to the question on roadblocks to effectiveness, was "one of the most important" of the study.

> . . . the roadblock checked far more frequently than any of the others was: "Time taken up by administrative detail (at the expense of more important matters)." Less than 10 per cent said that this factor did not interfere at all with their effectiveness; more than one-half said that it was a "minor roadblock," and more than one-third said that it was a "major roadblock."[2]

Interestingly enough, the presidents did not attribute this roadblock to their own lack of administrative ability, but rather to a lack of competence among their subordinate administrators.[3]

Hemphill and Walberg also obtained ratings on the effectiveness of the presidents they surveyed, and then compared the backgrounds of presidents with high and low ratings. One of the differences they found was related to the president's previous position.

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[1]Hemphill and Walberg, op. cit., p. 54.

[2]Ibid., p. 55.   [3]Ibid.

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If either one of his two prior positions was as head of an academic department or as dean, the odds are much better that the president is among those rated as highly effective. Also, if the immediate position was that of principal or superintendent, the president is likely to be in the High group. Overall, 81 of the 107 presidents who were rated as most effective were either faculty members, department heads, or deans in at least one of their two prior positions. In contrast, only 39 of the 73 presidents in the Low group had experience in one of these positions as one of their two positions before becoming president.[1]

Also of significance was the finding that presidents whose previous two positions have not been in education or related fields, "are much less likely to be among the highly rated presidents and make up more than one-third of the Low group (29 of 73)."[2]

Intimate contact with an involvement in higher education and academic administration are strong correlates of rated effectiveness as a president.[3]

Hemphill and Walberg's summary regarding the distinctive characteristics of the highly rated president was of sufficient importance to quote in entirety.

In summary, there are distinctive background differences between the highly rated and less highly rated presidents. There is also evidence that the more highly rated president is better able both to take initiative and to involve his associates in the solution of problems. Specifically, he tends to make use of opportunities to work with outsiders, to exert influence on what is taught, and to be concerned with efficient administration of internal affairs. He has a more liberal attitude toward academic freedom, and his influence on educational matters, although strong, appears to be focused upon general issues rather than specific problems.[4]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 64-65.   [2] Ibid., p. 65.

[3] Ibid.   [4] Ibid., p. 67.

Satisfaction

Hemphill and Walberg found that the presidents they surveyed did, for the most part, find their work satisfying. Via questionnaire they asked each president, "How frequently do you find your work highly satisfying or extremely rewarding?"

> More than half of them (97 out of 180) chose the most favorable alternative, "very often" in responding to the question. The remainder distributed their choices among the alternatives "Frequently" (33 per cent), "occasionally" (12 per cent), and "Seldom" (1 per cent).[1]

As with their overall finding regarding effectiveness, Hemphill and Walberg found that administrative experience made a difference in the area of satisfaction.

> The more satisfied presidents characteristically had longer administrative experience (17 years as compared with 12 years) and more experience in higher education (57 per cent have 12 or more years as compared with 36 per cent of the less satisfied presidents).[2]

There were other interesting comparisons as well.

> There are differences between the two groups in their undergraduate and graduate educational preparation. The less-satisfied presidents were more likely to have majored as undergraduates or graduates in the humanities (45 per cent as undergraduates and 29 per cent as graduates, compared with 28 per cent and 21 per cent for the more satisfied group). At the graduate level the more-satisfied presidents were more likely to have majored in professional education (37 per cent as compared with 17 per cent).[3]

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[1]Ibid., p. 57.   [2]Ibid., p. 60.

[3]Ibid., p. 61.

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A major finding that Demerath, Stephens, and

lor reported was that the presidency "characteristi-

ly entails five major organizational roles: Money

, Administrator, Father Figure, Public-Relations Man,

Educator to the Public."[1]

"The job inside" the university comprises the first
three roles, and "the job outside," the last two.
The second major finding is that these roles and
expectations are quite inconsistent and, thus, evoke
a variety of adjustment mechanisms, some of which
can hardly be classed as rational administration.
The role conflicts and adjustments are seen as
important factors in the hiatus between president
and faculty.[2]

Hemphill and Walberg asked the 180 presidents in

r study to list the relative importance of five

ral areas of responsibility, namely:

(1) to stimulate and facilitate the work of the
faculty, (2) to administer the affairs of the insti-
tution in a businesslike manner, (3) to take initia-
tive in shaping the purposes of the institution, (4)
to provide a positive image of the institution among
those outside of it, and (5) to secure funds and
facilities to make the institution grow and prosper.
A majority of the presidents (61 per cent) ranked
initiative in shaping the purposes of the institution
as first in importance.[3]

ty-eight per cent of the remaining presidents con-

red the first responsibility of the president to be

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[1]Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor, op. cit., p. 13.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Hemphill and Walberg, op. cit., p. 41.

"to stimulate and facilitate the work of the faculty."[1]

Hemphill and Walberg concluded:

> These two alternatives suggest educational leadership
> as contrasted with administrative flavor of the re-
> maining three alternatives. These three together
> attracted less than 10 per cent of the presidents'
> choices as areas of the first order of importance.[2]

If the presidents in Hemphill and Walberg's study
were to prove successful in actualizing their priorities,
the "hiatus" between the president and the faculty which
Demerath, et al. noted above should not exist. Evidence
to be introduced next regarding the presidents' use of
time tends to indicate, however, that even though the
presidents place such a high priority on their role as
educational leaders in their institutions, they actually
devote only a minimal amount of their working time to this
area. This may, of course, reflect the existence of the
"roadblock" to effectiveness that was discussed above,
and not any insincerity on the part of the presidents in
stating their primary objectives.

Use of Time

There is little question concerning the demanding
nature of the college presidency. As Hemphill and Walberg
stated:

> The first and most easily documented fact about the
> position of the college president is that its demands

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[1]Ibid.   [2]Ibid., pp. 42-43.

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on the incumbent are heavy. On the average, the president's work week is more than 60 hours. Typically, he spends 23 days each year away from campus on work related to the position and seven or eight additional days on activities he considers not related to his position. He makes about 16 addresses each year, spends 40 to 45 minutes each day on the telephone, and receives reports directly from five or six subordinate administrators. . . .[1]

Just as Hemphill and Walberg found differences in the backgrounds of more- and less-satisfied presidents,[2] they also found differences between these two groups in the use of time. Regarding these differences they stated:

This pattern of differences in time allocations suggests the hypothesis that the less-satisfied presidents spend more time on activities implying scholarly and professorial involvements, while more-satisfied presidents accept more completely the burden of administrative responsibilities. This hypothesis is supported by responses to other questions.[3]

Previously, it was implied that Hemphill and Walberg's study of the president's use of time indicated that he was unable to spend much time on those matters which he considered to be of primary importance. Their statement in this regard was:

Most incumbents testify that they find it difficult, if not impossible, to direct their efforts towards being most influential in the areas where they per-ceive their greatest responsibility--providing pur-pose and direction for their institution. Although they work a long and tiring week, they are forced to divide their time to attend to a multiplicity of

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[1] Ibid., p. 27.

[2] See above.

[3] Hemphill and Walberg, op. cit., p. 58.

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functions and, as a consequence, they find their success diminished by relatively inconsequential problems.[1]

Ferrari also studied the use of time by presidents and divided his findings between the use of time by presidents of public institutions and the use of time by presidents of private institutions. The table Ferrari used to illustrate the relative rankings of time-consuming activities is reproduced below.

Relative Rankings of Time-Consuming Activities[2]

Activity	Rank given by Presidents of Public Institutions	Rank given by Presidents of Private Institutions
General Administration	1	1
Meetings with faculty, students, alumni	2	2
Meetings with state legislators	3	7
Educational activities at state and national levels	4	4
Social occasions	5	5
Meetings with business leaders	6	6
Fund-raising	7	3

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[1]Ibid., p. 27.

[2]Ferrari, "A Study of the Careers . . . ," op. cit., p. 332.

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It was of great interest to note the similarity
of the use of time for presidents of public and private
institutions with the exception of the reversal of the
"Fund-Raising" and "Meetings with state legislators"
categories. Even in these instances, the meetings with
state legislators held by the public institution presi-
dents could be construed as fund-raising activities,
given the reliance of the public institutions on the
state legislature for the majority of their funding.

In describing the proportion of time that relates
to the above rankings, Ferrari noted:

> For general administration (including budget
> review, planning and evaluation, and policy meetings
> with central staff) 42 per cent of the presidents
> said they spent over 50 per cent of their time,
> while another 22 per cent of the presidents said
> that general administration required between 35 and
> 50 per cent of their time.
> . . . It is somewhat interesting to note that
> the importance and amount of time spent on general
> administration did not increase with the size of the
> institution, but is fairly consistent throughout.[1]

Another table from Ferrari's study was of interest
in that it broke down the percentage of time the presi-
dent spent with various constituents in an average week
(see p. 44).

Once again Ferrari found great similarities among
institutions and regions in the average amount of time
spent with various groups. "However, the small institution

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[1]Ibid., pp. 332-33.

Average (Mean) Time Spent with Persons Associated
with the Institution[1]

Person or Group	Rank (1 = highest)	Avg. (mean) per cent of time spent w/ each)
Board of Trustees members	5	8
Alumni	7	6
Students	3	13
Faculty (individually or as committees)	2	20
Administrative Staff	1	36
Civic Leaders	4	10
Others	6	7

presidents spend relatively more time with students and
faculty and less with their administrative staff than do
their counterparts in larger institutions."[2]

Ferrari also looked at the presidents' membership
on boards outside of the institution. Although the
specific tables regarding outside membership will not
be presented, it was of interest to note that, although
presidents were involved with outside commitments, the
involvement was not as extensive as has sometimes been
intimated by their detractors.

> . . . academic presidents are involved in outside
> policy-making boards, but the involvement varies
> with the type of board. For example, only 9 per
> cent of academic presidents serve on public

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[1]Ibid., p. 334.   [2]Ibid.

foundation boards, while 51 per cent of presidents
serve on high-level educational association boards.
    In general, the presidents of universities have
relatively greater involvement in outside boards
than do liberal arts college presidents. . . .[1]

Tenure

Much concern has been voiced recently about the

shortened tenures of college and university presidents.

Although the literature was divided on this point, several

of the major studies would seem to imply that the tenure

period has not decreased as dramatically as the popular

press would lead one to believe.

For example, W. K. Selden, in a 1959 survey of the

presidents of 1,300 college and university presidents,

found that the incumbent presidents of these colleges had

been in office an average of 8.1 years.[2] Selden compared

the tenure of these 1,300 academic presidents to that of

1,700 top executives of 600 major corporations and found

a close proximity. Of the 1,700 business executives

studied, "52 per cent had been in their jobs less than

six years; and fewer than 15 per cent had served more

than fifteen years."[3] These figures compared with 50 per

cent and 13.3 per cent for the academic presidents.[4]

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[1]Ibid., p. 335.

[2]W. K. Selden, as reported in Demerath, Stephens,
and Taylor, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

[3]Ibid.   [4]Ibid.

Ferrari, reporting in 1968, found an average number of years in office for all presidents to be 7.8 years,[1] only slightly less than the average of 8.1 years that Selden reported in 1959. Ferrari found, however, that the average differed by type of institution, with the lowest average for presidents of independent universities (5.6 years), and the highest for presidents of Protestant-related universities (11.8 years).[2]

Alton, in his study of forty-four college and university presidents who resigned in 1969 or early 1970, found the average tenure to have been 9.2 years at the time of resignation.[3] The 9.2 figure, coupled with the other data from Alton's study giving reasons for presidential resignations, certainly did not present a picture of instability for the position or its incumbents.

The most recent major study which presented findings related to tenure, was the Carnegie Commission Study reported by Hodgkinson. If one accepts Hodgkinson's conclusions, one would place average tenure at four to five years.[4] Hodgkinson desired to gain a perspective on the

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[1]Ferrari, "A Study of the Careers . . . ," op. cit., p. 180.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Alton, op. cit., p. 78.

[4]Hodgkinson, Institutions in Transition, op. cit., p. 144.

stability of the presidency and asked responding presidents to report the number of presidents their institutions had during the last ten years. The findings were as follows:

Number of Presidents During Last Decade[1]

Number of Presidents	Number	Percent
One	430	35
Two	565	46
Three	162	13
Four	51	4
Five or more	10	1
No response	12	1

Based on this table, Hodgkinson concluded:

> Thus approximately 71 percent of our institutions have had no more than two presidents during the previous decade; this suggests some stability, but as with our earlier findings, gives a presidential "life expectancy" of only four to five years.[2]

It would seem to this writer that one could take issue with the four- to five-year figure because no data was given on either the length of time within the ten-year period that the respective presidents served, or the tenure of the previous president upon retirement or resignation. The writer thus reserves judgment on what constitutes the average tenure for college and university presidents.

Hodgkinson did make allowance for variations in interpretation when he said:

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[1]Ibid., p. 144.   [2]Ibid.

It also may be that a reported decline in presidential longevity is most characteristic of the nonsectarian institutions. Under length of service of major administrative officers 18 percent of the public institutions reported an increase, and 20 percent of the sectarian, while only 9 percent of the nonsectarian institutions reported an increase.[1]

Reasons for Resignation

Some helpful indicators of the state of the college presidency are the reasons presidents give for their resignations. The principal source of information for this section was Alton's study of forty-four college and university presidents who resigned in 1969 or early 1970.[2] It should be noted that two-year college presidents were included in Alton's population. Alton reported:

Twenty-one general areas were cited as prompting presidential resignation among the group responding. However, within the twenty-one areas can be determined factors which have played more significant roles than have others.[3]

Alton divided these twenty-one general areas into five categories: Role Expectations, General Administration, Internal Relations, External Relations, and Employment Alternatives.

With respect to the category of Role Expectations, Alton found that "both a lack of specific role definitions as well as an inability to operate within the confines that do exist" contributed in a significant manner to a decision to leave the presidency.[4]

[1] Ibid., p. 62.   [2] Alton, op. cit.

[3] Ibid., p. 84.   [4] Ibid., p. 94.

A seemingly healthy finding was that a contributing factor in the decision of a number of presidents to resign was a desire to leave the position "prior to the time when their effectiveness had been exhausted."[1] To avoid serving either too short a time or too long a time, the presidents who resigned agreed that a period in office of from five to ten years is most desirable. "Periods shorter than that do not permit significant achievement; periods longer generally find the leadership becoming ineffectual."[2]

When Alton compared the position held immediately preceding the presidency, for those presidents who had resigned, with similar studies of active presidents, he found an interesting difference. "A larger percentage of those presidents who had resigned came from college teaching positions to the presidency than was the case with those persons active in the role at the time of previous surveys."[3]

Although a few of the presidents who had resigned indicated that they were resigning because they felt the presidency offered limited challenges (primarily presidents of two-year institutions), this was not the norm.

> It is not . . . the limited challenges of the position
> that are of most concern, rather the effect which the

[1]Ibid., p. 100.   [2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., pp. 79-80.

demands of the job have on the personal lives of the incumbents, specifically the inability to have significant control over the ordering of one's priorities.[1]

Contrary to what might be anticipated given the volatile campus setting in 1969 and 1970, student unrest did not play a significant part in the decision of these presidents to leave their positions. Alton reported this finding as follows:

> In a period of time when the student has come to be a more significant part of institutional governance, the influence which his presence has on the campus might appear to play a part in presidential termination. While it does to some extent, it does not play the role that might be expected. Three presidencies among the forty-four could be considered as having come to termination in part by student pressure, although in no case did it play a more important role than being one of three reasons cited for a particular resignation.[2]

Alton gave the following composite of the "average" individual who resigned from the presidency during 1969 and early 1970. This mythical average resignee was:

> Male, average tenure of 9.2 years, fifty-four years of age, holder of the earned doctorate, better than even chance to have earned all three degrees from private institutions, having no one specific discipline in terms of undergraduate or graduate training yet with greater possibility than it may have been in the social sciences, having come to his position from college academic administration or teaching and when leaving entering nonacademic college administration, teaching, or foundation or government administration.[3]

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[1]Ibid., p. 117.   [2]Ibid., p. 146.

[3]Ibid., p. 84.

Discussion of Literature on
the Academic President

From the review of the literature concerning the
college and university president insight has been gained
into the history of the academic presidency in the United
States, as well as a picture of the current status of the
presidency. This information serves as a useful basis
for evaluating the incidents collected from presidents in
the current study. Specific questions based on this
review of the presidential literature will be presented
in Chapter III.

Literature Related to the Critical
Incident Technique

A survey of the literature relating to the Critical
Incident Technique was conducted for two reasons: (1) to
gain sufficient knowledge regarding the technique to apply
it to an investigation of incidents having an impact on the
effectiveness of college and university presidents; and (2)
to insure that this technique had not already been used to
study the college and university presidency in this manner.

Origin and Development of the
Critical Incident Technique

The idea of the Critical Incident Technique was
conceived primarily through the efforts of John C. Flanagan
and his associates while working in the Aviation Psychology
Program of the United States Army Air Force during World

War II. Flanagan indicated, however, that the roots of

the methodology extend back even further.

> The roots of the present procedures can be traced
> directly back to the studies of Sir Francis Galton
> nearly 70 years ago, and to later developments such
> as time sampling studies of recreational activities,
> controlled observation tests, and anecdotal records.
> The critical incident technique as such, however, can
> best be regarded as an outgrowth of studies in the
> Aviation Psychology Program of the United States Army
> Air Forces in World War II.[1]

The Aviation Psychology Program was established

in the summer of 1941, to develop procedures for the

selection and classification of aircrews. In stating

what had been learned from this program, Flanagan wrote:

> Experience during the war emphasized the great im-
> portance of determining the critical requirements,
> as contrasted with those which had a negligible effect
> on success in the activity. Too often, job analyses
> have resulted in long lists, including the most de-
> sirable human traits, without any information as to
> which were essential and which were unimportant.[2]

Flanagan's method for determining critical require-

ments was to gather, on a systematic large-scale basis,

specific incidents of effective or ineffective behavior

regarding a designated activity. In the case of the flight

crew studies, combat veterans were asked to report inci-

dents they had observed that involved behavior "which was

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[1]John C. Flanagan, "The Critical Incident Tech-
nique," pp. 327-28.

[2]John C. Flanagan, "Research Techniques for Develop-
ing Educational Objectives," The Educational Record, XXVIII,
No. 2 (April, 1947), 143.

especially helpful or inadequate in accomplishing the
assigned mission."[1]

Although the Critical Incident Technique had its
origins in the Aviation Psychology Program, it was not
until after the second World War that the technique was
formally developed and given its present name. After the
war, Flanagan and a few of his associates from the Avi-
ation Psychology Program established the American Insti-
tute for Research in Pittsburgh. It was through the work
of the Institute, as well as through the work of advanced
graduate students at the University of Pittsburgh, whose
theses Flanagan directed, that the technique was adapted
to a variety of new situations.

Description of the Critical Incident Technique

Flanagan gave the following description of the
Critical Incident Technique:

> The critical incident technique consists of a set
> of procedures for collecting direct observations of
> human behavior in such a way as to facilitate their
> potential usefulness in solving practical problems
> and developing broad psychological principles. The
> critical incident technique outlines procedures for
> collecting observed incidents having special signifi-
> cance and meeting systematically defined criteria.[2]

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[1]Flanagan, "Critical Incident Technique."

[2]Ibid., p. 327.

A more concise definition of the technique, and one which gives a clearer indication of the applicability of the technique to this study, was given by Andersson and Nilsson.

> The Critical Incident Technique is a procedure used in the collection and analysis of incidents in which the holder of a position in a certain occupation has acted in a way which, according to some criterion, has been of decisive significance for his success or failure in a task.[1]

There are five basic steps included in the Critical Incident methodology. These are:[2]

1. Determination of the general aim of the activity.

2. Development of plans and specifications for observation of the activity or for collecting factual incidents concerning the activity of interest.

3. Collection of the Data.

4. Analysis of the data.

5. Interpretation and reporting of the data.

The manner in which these steps are applied in this study will be explained in detail in Chapter III.

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[1]Bengt-Erik Andersson and Stig-Goran Nilsson, "Studies in the Reliability and Validity of the Critical Incident Technique," Journal of Applied Psychology, XLVIII, No. 6 (1964), 398.

[2]Flanagan, "Critical Incident Technique."

Applications of the Critical
Incident Technique

An advantage of the Critical Incident Technique is its adaptability to a wide variety of studies. As of 1954, only some eight years after Flanagan and his colleagues began a systematic formulation of principles and procedures to be used in critical incident studies, a fairly large number of applications had been made. Flanagan grouped these under nine headings or functional areas:[1]

1. Measures of typical performance (criteria)

2. Measures of proficiency (standard samples)

3. Training

4. Selection and classification

5. Job design and purification

6. Operating procedures

7. Equipment design

8. Motivation and leadership (attitudes)

9. Counseling and psychotherapy

It should be noted that the above categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A single study may well involve more than one of the functional areas.

Although the Critical Incident Technique has been utilized to study a wide variety of occupations, the following review will concentrate on only a few of the

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[1]Ibid., p. 346.

studies that have been done within the field of education,

and that have specific relevance to the present study.

The Critical Incident Technique has been used in

education to study elementary and secondary school

teachers,[1] college instructors,[2] school board members,[3]

school principles,[4] and school superintendents.[5]

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[1]See: Edith P. Merritt, "Critical Categories for
Elementary Teachers in Selected Curriculum Areas" (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1955;
Lane B. Blank, "Critical Incidents in the Behavior of
Secondary School Physical Education Instructors," The Re-
search Quarterly, XXIX (1958), 1-6; Melvin Goldin, "Be-
havior Related to Effective Teaching" (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957; and Robert M.
Kessel, "The Critical Requirements for Secondary School
Business Teachers Based Upon An Analysis of Critical Inci-
dents" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Wisconsin, 1957).

[2]JoAnn Smit, "Study of the Critical Requirements
for Instructors of General Psychology Courses," University
of Pittsburgh Bulletin, XLVIII (June, 1952), 279-84.

[3]See: Richard E. Barnhart, "A Study of the Criti-
cal Requirements for School Board Membership Based Upon the
Analysis of Critical Incidents" (unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation, Indiana University, 1952); and John E. Corbally,
Jr., "A Study of the Critical Elements in School Board-
Community Relations" (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of California, 1955).

[4]Bernice Cooper, "Analysis of the Quality of the
Behaviors of Principals as Observed in Six Critical Inci-
dent Studies," Journal of Educational Research, LVI, No. 8
(April, 1963), 410-14. Also, Benjamin Dayton, "Critical
Behaviors of Elementary Principals in the Improvement of
Instruction" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford
University, 1955).

[5]See: George V. Kirk, "The Critical Requirements
for Public School Superintendents" (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1959); and,
Bruce J. Dunn, "An Analysis and Identification of

Studies by Rodgers,[1] Miller,[2] and Peabody[3] have each contributed to the structure and methodology of this study and thus will be reviewed in somewhat more detail.

Rodgers' study was of interest because of his application of the Critical Incident Technique to an administrative position in higher education. Rodgers had Professional Peers of the Student Personnel Dean report incidents in which the Dean's actions were especially satisfactory or unsatisfactory. From these critical incidents, specific behaviors were identified which were critical to the work of the Dean. Via an a posteriori analysis of the incidents Rodgers identified seven critical areas in which the Dean of Students operates. These were: Communication, Counseling, Cooperative Relationships,

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Instructional Leadership Acts as Performed and Perceived by the Superintendent of Schools" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1964).

[1]Allan W. Rodgers, "An Investigation of the Critical Aspects of the Function of the Student Personnel Dean as Seen by his Professional Peers Using the Critical Incident Technique" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1963).

[2]Richard E. Miller, "A Study of Significant Elements in the On-the-Job Behavior of College and University Foreign Student Advisers" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1968).

[3]Fred J. Peabody, "An Analysis of Critical Incidents for Recently Employed Michigan Cooperative Extension Agents with Implications for Training" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1968).

Diagnosis, Investigation, Leadership and Information, and Policy Making.[1] Twelve categories of problems which confronted the Student Personnel Dean were also identified as were fifteen categories of people with whom he was in contact in carrying out his responsibilities.

Miller[2] was concerned with identifying significant elements in the role behavior of Foreign Student Advisers. Miller's study was similar in structure and methodology to that of Rodgers', but with two key differences. First, instead of relying on Professional Peers to report the incidents in which the Foreign Student Adviser acted in an effective or ineffective manner, Miller had the Foreign Student Advisers report on their own role behavior. Secondly, Miller relied on personal interviews to obtain the incidents rather than relying on written report forms as Rodgers had done. Both the self-reporting method and the personal interview method will be utilized in this study for, as Miller noted:

> The Critical Incident Technique is most effective
> when the personal interview is used to gather the
> incidents. It is possible to obtain 100 percent
> response from the observers selected for the study
> compared to less than 20 percent responses commonly
> received from the mail survey method of collecting
> data. The interview is much easier for the observer,
> and more complete responses are given. Because of
> greater accuracy and precision of incidents gathered

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[1]Rodgers, op. cit., pp. 61-65.

[2]Miller, op. cit.

by an interview, fewer numbers of incidents are
necessary to obtain an accurate description of the
activity than when the mail survey method is used.[1]

The study by Peabody,[2] while concentrating on a
different occupational group than will be involved in this
study, was of interest because of its use of the Critical
Incident Technique to ascertain the impact of length of
employment on training needs. In a study of cooperative
extension agents Peabody found that agents' perceptions of
job requirements differ "only slightly" by agent tenure.[3]
In addition to having extension agents report examples of
effective and ineffective incidents, Peabody had them
report the importance and the difficulty of performing
the incidents. A very interesting finding was that
"experienced agents reported higher difficulty scores than
did inexperienced agents."[4] Agents also appeared to differ
in their perceptions of the importance of job require-
ments according to tenure.[5]

No literature was found which applied the Critical
Incident Technique to an analysis of the four-year college
and university presidency. Graham's study of the junior
college president was certainly of interest, however, in
terms of its methodology, its assumptions, and its findings

[1]Ibid., p. 219.

[2]Peabody, op. cit.   [3]Ibid., p. 151.

[4]Ibid., p. 152.   [5]Ibid.

about the role of this related occupational group.[1] Graham

said of the study:

> Basically the current study uses this technique [the
> Critical Incident Technique] but with a divergent con-
> ceptual orientation. It is posited that perception is
> reality to the observer, and thus if we wish to know
> what a junior college president perceives he does, we
> find out from a junior college college president, not
> from an observer--either interested or disinterested.[2]

In the present study a similar stance has been

taken regarding the propriety of going directly to the

college and university president to learn his perceptions

concerning the types of incidents that have had an impact

on his effectiveness as a president. This was not meant

to discredit studies which have used reliable observers

to report on the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of

persons in the job being assessed. The rationale was

that in certain positions as singular in nature as that

of the college presidency, or the junior college presi-

dency, the role incumbent may be in the best position to

judge the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of his actions.

One other contribution of Graham's study should be

noted here, and that is the parallel he found between

Flanagan's approach and that of the Ohio State University

Leadership Studies. The Ohio State studies were being

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[1]Robert G. Graham, "The Junior College President's
Job: An Analysis of Perceived Job Performance and Possible
Influencing Variables" (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Texas, 1965).

[2]Ibid., p. 94.

conducted during the same period that Flanagan was coordi-
nating the occupational research efforts of the American
Institute for Research. The Ohio State investigations
were designed to obtain leadership behavior descriptions
and they accomplished this by collecting from subordinates,
statements of acts by their superiors.[1]

The parallel nature of the Ohio State University
Leadership Studies and Flanagan's Critical Incident
Studies was considered significant in that at least two
separate groups of researchers felt that the best means
of moving beyond the "trait" approach to leadership and
occupational proficiency, was to obtain actual samples
of job performance and then to analyze these for critical
role behaviors.

Evaluation of the Critical
Incident Technique

Several important criticisms have been made con-
cerning the Critical Incident Technique. The criticism
that was most prevalent in the literature related to the
technique's reliance on subjective judgment. The Critical
Incident Technique does rely on subjective judgment both
in the observer or reporter's assessment of what consti-
tutes effective and ineffective behavior, and in the in-
vestigator's categorization of the data. Corbally re-
sponded to this criticism, however, when he wrote:

[1]Ibid., p. 13.

The method does depend to a great degree on . . .
subjective judgment. . . . To the statistically
minded, this fact may lead to some depreciation of
the use of the method in research. Too often, how-
ever, educational research has suffered from the
application of one or both of two assumptions. The
first is to assign a high degree of objectivity to
anything that can be brought under statistical treat-
ment. The second is to hesitate to push into an area
with research unless a method can be devised which
at least gives the appearance of complete objectivity.
To be sure, objectivity must be sought to the very
utmost of the ability of the researcher. However, a
method which provides useful and apparently valid
results should not be discarded because it seems to
have elements of subjectivity.[1]

Sax pointed to other limitations of the Critical
Incident Technique but, like Corbally, he did not feel
that these limitations warranted the rejection of the
technique.

The collection of data to gather critical incidents
is subject to the same sorts of distortion as are
other types of data collection procedures. Dis-
tortions of memory, for example, can yield inaccur-
ate descriptions of incidents. Even with incidents
which have recently occurred, such factors as per-
sonal bias may distort obtained reports. However,
a skilled interviewer can look for contradictions,
probe for errors of omission, and try to discrimi-
nate between the objective reporting of incidents
and an interpretation of these events.[2]

There are dangers in applying the Critical Inci-
dent Technique to as complex a job as that of the college
and university presidency. One must be mindful that the

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[1]John E. Corbally, Jr., "The Critical Incident
Technique and Educational Research," Educational Research
Bulletin, XXXV, No. 3 (March 14, 1956), 60.

[2]Gilbert Sax, Empirical Foundations of Educational
Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1968), p. 192.

technique had its origins in military and industrial settings where the primary concern was training, instrumentation and machine modification.[1] Encouragement to proceed with the present study, in spite of the limitations and dangers expressed above, was found in the successful application of the technique to such complex positions as those described earlier. Encouragement also was found in statements such as the following by Corbally:

> Research in education has placed increased emphasis on behavior, particularly in the areas of teaching and administrative competency. In the furtherance of investigations of this type, no method seems to hold more promise than the critical incident technique.[2]

Corbally went on to state:

> In spite of some disadvantages, the critical incident technique has much to offer the researcher in education and other social science fields. The technique offers an outstanding method of studying a task in terms of the behavior of those engaged in it. . . . It provides recommendations which can be utilized immediately by practitioners in the field. The data, which are gathered in terms of critical incidents, provide much insight into the problems facing individuals as they attempt to perform certain tasks and provide case-study material for use in training others to perform these tasks. Also, the data provide many examples of good practice in the field which are useful for both in-service and pre-service training.[3]

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[1]John E. Corbally, Jr., "A Second Look at the Critical Incident Technique," Phi Delta Kappan, XXXVIII (January, 1957), 141.

[2]Corbally, "The Critical Incident Technique and Educational Research," p. 61.

[3]Ibid.

Andersson and Nilsson performed a number of methodological checks on the reliability and validity of the Critical Incident Technique and found that it fared well. They stated:

> The methodological checks of the critical incident technique . . . give a positive impression of the method.
> The material collected seems to represent very well the behavior units that the method may be expected to provide. After a relatively small number of incidents had been classified, very few behavior categories needed to be added.
> According to the results of the studies reported here on the reliability and validity aspects of the critical incident technique, it would appear justifiable to conclude that information collected by this method is both reliable and valid.[1]

As has been noted elsewhere, the Critical Incident Technique will be adapted in the present study to reflect the nature of the population of interest. Support for adaptations of this nature was given by John C. Flanagan, the originator of the technique. Flanagan wrote:

> . . . the critical incident technique is essentially a procedure for gathering certain important facts concerning behavior in defined situations. It should be emphasized that the critical incident technique does not consist of a rigid set of rules governing such data collection. Rather, it should be thought of as a flexible set of principles which must be modified and adapted to meet the specific situation at hand.[2]

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[1] Andersson and Nilsson, op. cit., p. 402.

[2] Flanagan, "Critical Incident Technique," p. 35.

Discussion of the Critical
Incident Literature Review

From origins in military and industrial psychology, the Critical Incident Technique has developed to a point where its application has extended to a variety of settings. The technique has limitations, but it also has important strengths which made it particularly applicable to the type of study that has been proposed. In the design of this study every effort was made to maximize the strengths of the technique and minimize the limitations.

Summary

The literature on the college and university president and presidency has reflected the centrality of the position in American higher education. Given its centrality, however, the literature also reflected the need for increased preparation for presidents; the need for better identification and selection procedures; the need for better role definition; and the need for better vehicles for studying and understanding the role performance of incumbents in the position.

The literature supported the need for increased study of the presidency across institutional types. It revealed that the position is time consuming and demanding whether one is president of a very small or a very large institution. It also revealed that the manner in which

esidents spend their time is not always consistent with

eir own stated priorities.

Although the literature on the average tenure of

demic presidents was somewhat contradictory, a clear

ication was given of the recurrent need for qualified

ividuals to fill the vacancies that arise as a result

resignations and terminations. An encouraging feature

the presidential literature was the extent to which

imbent presidents and presidents who have resigned

icated that they have found or are finding their work

pe rewarding. This refutes somewhat the implication

nd in the popular literature that college and uni-

sity presidents today are finding their work unbearable

thus that there is a mass exodus from the position.

The literature on the Critical Incident Technique

ealed that the technique is a flexible research tool

h great promise for application to a study of situ-

Ons facing new and experienced presidential role in-

bents. The literature on the technique gave evidence

its application to studies of a wide variety of occu-

ions. The critical incident literature supported the

licability of the technique to studies of leadership

avior in education. Though the literature revealed

t the technique has limitations, its strengths were

ged to outweigh the weaknesses.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

In this chapter the design of the study is pre-sented. Included are the procedures used to: (1) identify the geographical area; (2) identify the types of insti-tutions; (3) identify the presidents to be surveyed; (4) describe the development and use of the Critical Incident interview format; and (5) describe the process to be used in the analysis of the data. The information which was gained by using this design and procedure is reported and analyzed in Chapter IV.

Selecting the Region and Institutional Types

The primary purpose of the study was to compare and contrast incidents which have had an impact on the effectiveness of relatively new or inexperienced college and university presidents, with incidents which have had an impact on the effectiveness of more experienced presi-dents. To investigate incidents of this nature a sample had to be developed which would yield a number of presi-dents fitting the description of "new" and "experienced,"

yet would not cover such a wide geographical area as to make personal interviews an impossibility. Accordingly, a five-state region of the Midwest was selected as the geographic area to which the study would be limited. The states included were Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

It was determined that the study would be limited to four-year institutions, and that a variety of institutional types and sizes would be included, both to insure a sufficient number of new presidents to make comparisons of incidents meaningful, and to allow for comparisons across institutional types and sizes.

Selecting the New Presidents

The first step in the selection process was to identify presidents who would have assumed office at such a time that their tenure would be no less than six months but no more than eighteen months at the projected time of the study. The "Higher Education Gazette," a feature of The Chronicle of Higher Education, was used as the primary resource for this first step, since recent appointees to college and university presidencies are listed therein. The "Gazette" does not, however, always list the date an appointment becomes effective, and, since presidential appointments may be made and announced as much as nine months to a year prior to the date the president actually assumes office, Chronicle issues covering a twenty-four

month period were reviewed to seek to insure that no new presidents who fit the specifications of interest were missed. This process identified twenty-one presidents in the five-state region who qualified as "new" presidents.

Selecting the Experienced Presidents

Once the "new" presidents were identified, it was necessary to identify individuals who were presidents of comparable institutions and who would have been in office at least twenty-four months at the time of the interview. The Education Directory, 1970-1971, Higher Education, was used in this process. The Directory lists institutions by type and size, and gives the name of the president. Twenty presidents were identified, each one representing an institution gaining a new president.[1] This represented one less experienced than new president because of the inability to find, within the five-state region, an institution which matched one very small school that had gained a new president.[2]

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[1]The Education Directory was also used to indicate institution type and size for institutions gaining new presidents.

[2]It turned out that the "new" president of this particular institution chose not to participate in the study so this did not prove to be a problem.

Eliciting the Participation of
the Presidents

The next step was to seek the participation of each of the new and experienced presidents who had been identified by the processes described above. The initial contact with the presidents was via a letter signed by the chairman of the writer's guidance committee. The letter briefly described the study; described what would be asked of the president if he chose to participate; identified the researcher; and included a reply form and a stamped self-addressed envelope (see Appendix A). The reply form asked the president to indicate whether he would participate in the study and, if so, whether he preferred a personal or telephone interview. The form also asked the president to indicate the date his appointment was effective. This helped determine that the new presidents were, in fact, "new" as defined in the study and gave an indication of the range of years in office represented by the experienced group of presidents. Presidents were also asked to send a copy of their vitae, both to alleviate the need to ask for identifying information in the interview and to serve as another check of the fact that the "new" presidents were indeed new to the presidency and had not previously served in that position at another institution.

Presidents whose response indicated a willingness to participate in the study were sent a letter signed by the writer giving further information regarding what would

be asked in the interview (see Appendix A). A call was then placed to their office to establish a date and time for the interview.

Presidents whose responses indicated that they would not be able to participate in the study were sent a letter thanking them for replying and indicating that, should they find at a later time that their schedules permitted participation, their inclusion in the study would be welcomed.

Three weeks after the initial letter had been sent, a follow-up letter, signed by the writer, was sent to each president who had not responded to the initial letter. Once again a reply form and a return envelope were included.

The Sample

Forty-one presidents--twenty-one new and twenty experienced--were sent the initial letter. Thirty responded, twenty-one agreeing to participate and nine indicating they would be unable to participate. Twelve of those responding positively were experienced and nine were new. Seven of the nine who indicated they would be unable to participate were new.[1]

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[1]One of the experienced presidents who indicated he would be unable to participate noted that he would like to, but that he was leaving his current institution to assume the presidency of an institution on the West Coast.

One of the new presidents who indicated that he would be unable to participate, gave as a reason the fact that he had been a president for such a short period that he doubted that he could be of help to the study. When the writer contacted him by letter and assured him that his responses would indeed be valuable, he did agree to participate. This brought to twenty-two the number of presidents who agreed to participate in the study based on responses to the initial letter.[1]

As indicated above, three weeks after the initial letter had been sent, the writer sent a follow-up letter to the eleven presidents from whom no response had been received. Six of the eleven responded at this time, five indicating they would be able to participate and one indicating he would be unable to participate. A seventh president responded at this time indicating that he was no longer at the institution where the letter had originally been sent, and further that he was no longer a president. Because his mail had obviously been forwarded to another state, it was impossible to determine whether this individual was replying to the initial letter or the follow-up letter.

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[1]One of the new presidents who initially agreed to participate, later had his secretary call the writer's office to indicate that he would not be participating. This also, however, related to his newness in the position, and after further written communication from the writer he once again agreed to participate.

This left only four of the original forty-one presidents from whom no response had been received. Five weeks after the follow-up letter had been sent, a second and more personalized follow-up letter was sent to these two new and two experienced presidents. A slightly revised version of the reply form was also sent. Two responses were received, both negative and both from new presidents. No additional attempts were made to contact the remaining two presidents from whom no response had been received.

Twenty-seven presidents had thus indicated a willingness to participate in the study. Fifteen of these were experienced presidents and twelve were new. Each of the twenty-seven presidents was then contacted to schedule an interview date and time. Upon contacting the office of one of the experienced presidents, it was learned that he was on vacation and would be unavailable until after the projected interview period. The president had left instructions to have his executive vice-president participate in the study in his absence, but the researcher did not feel that this would meet the criteria established for a critical incident reporter. This institution thus was not included in the study.

The final sample included twenty-six presidents, fourteen experienced and twelve new. The twenty-six presidents represented 63.4 per cent of the presidents

initially contacted. The fourteen experienced presidents represented 70 per cent of the presidents in this category who were initially contacted. The twelve new presidents represented 57 per cent of the presidents in this category who were initially contacted. In Table 1, the institutional types and sizes represented by the participating presidents are indicated.

As indicated in Table 1, five presidents, or 19.23 per cent of the sample were presidents of private independent institutions. Thirteen, or 50 per cent of the sample were presidents of private affiliated institutions. The remaining eight presidents, representing 30.77 per cent of the sample, were presidents of public institutions. All but one of the twenty-six participants were males, the one exception being a new president of a private affiliated college in the 2,000 to 3,000 size category.

Developing the Critical Incident Format

The Critical Incident Technique[1] was selected as the most appropriate method for obtaining and analyzing primary data regarding episodes in role performance which have had an impact on the effectiveness of the college and university president.

The CIT focuses attention on behavior. It is a technique that involves the reporting of incidents by

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[1]The abbreviation CIT will be substituted for Critical Incident Technique in sections where the terminology is frequently repeated.

TABLE 1.--Institutions by Size and Type of Control

Size	Private Independent		Private Affiliated		Public	
	New	Experienced	New	Experienced	New	Experienced
500- 1,000	1	2	2	2		
1,000- 2,000		1	2	3		
2,000- 3,000			2			
5,000-10,000				1	2	2
10,000-20,000	1		1		1	1
Over 20,000						2
Totals of Presidents Participating	2	3	7	6	3	5

qualified observers (reporters) who describe the behavior of the person being observed as either effective or ineffective according to the aims of the activity.

In discussing the development of the Critical Incident format, it is helpful to review the five basic steps of the CIT:

1. <u>Determination of the general aim of the activity</u> under study.

2. <u>Development of plans and specific procedures</u> for gathering critical incidents which have had an impact on the effectiveness of the college and university president.

3. <u>Collection of the data.</u>

4. <u>Analysis of the data.</u>

5. <u>Interpretation and reporting of the data.</u>

1. Establishing the General Aim of the Activity

The Critical Incident Technique requires the establishment of the general aim of the activity as the first step prior to the gathering of any incidents. As Flanagan noted, "It is clearly impossible to report that a person has been either effective or ineffective in a particular activity . . . unless we know what he is expected to accomplish."[1]

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[1] Flanagan, "Critical Incident Technique," p. 336.

This requirement takes on specific relevance in critical incident studies where observers are to be trained to report on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of role behavior in occupations other than their own. In the present study, however, it was felt to be presumptuous to seek to tell college presidents what the aim of their activity should be. Further, it was deemed desirable to avoid restricting the potential range of incidents that presidents might report. Accordingly, a very general aim of the presidency was adopted, namely, "To formulate plans and programs for, and to direct the administration of a college or university." This aim was in keeping with the description of the position given in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.[1]

2. Developing Plans and Procedures for Gathering the Critical Incidents

Once the general aim of the activity was determined, the next step in the Critical Incident Technique called for the development of specific plans and procedures for gathering the critical incidents. Basically, the choice was between the use of written report forms to be completed by the respondent, and personal or telephone interviews with the respondents. Previous critical incident studies which have utilized mailed report forms, have

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[1]Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Vol. I, "Definition of Titles" (3rd ed.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965).

evidenced a very low percentage of return. Also, the
literature on the college president reflected that presi-
dents are deluged with questionnaires and written requests
for information.[1] These factors, coupled with the indi-
cation by Flanagan that the interview method was by far
the most satisfactory means of gathering critical inci-
dents, and that other methods are merely substitutes,[2]
led to the choice of the interview method of collecting
the incidents.

Once the decision was made to collect all data by
interviews, the decision had to be made as to whether the
interviews would be conducted in person only, or whether
presidents would be given the option to choose an in-
person or telephone interview. The chairman and one
other member of the writer's guidance committee had had
favorable experiences with studies involving a mixture
of in-person and telephone interviews. This factor,
coupled with some feeling on the part of the writer and
members of the guidance committee that certain presidents
might be willing to participate by telephone whereas they
might not participate in an in-person interview, prompted

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[1]Charlene Gleazer, "The College President vs. the
Questionnaire," Educational Record, LI, No. 2 (Spring,
1970), 171-73.

[2]John D. Flanagan, Critical Requirements for Re-
search Personnel: A Study of Observed Behaviors of Per-
sonnel in Research Laboratories (Pittsburgh: American
Institute for Research, 1949), p. 6.

the inclusion of the telephone inverview option. Presidential preference for the options is cited in Table 2.

TABLE 2.--Presidential Preference for Interview Method

	Preferred a Personal Interview	Preferred a Telephone Interview	No Preference
New	7	2	3
Experienced	7	3	4
Total	14	5	7

One experienced president who initially indicated a preference for a telphone interview, when called, and after the instructions for reporting had been read, changed his preference to a personal interview. Although the President's Reply Form did not specifically give a "No Preference" option, there were seven presidents who indicated on their reply form that either a personal or a telephone interview would be satisfactory. Of the four experienced presidents who indicated they had no preference, three were interviewed in person and one by telephone. Of the three new presidents who indicated they had no preference, one was interviewed in person and two by telephone. In those cases where the option was left to the interviewer, the decision as to which interview method would be used was based on geographical distance and whether or not other personal interviews were scheduled in

the president's area at a time when he was available for an interview. In Table 3 the number of telephone and personal interviews are shown by presidential type.

TABLE 3.--Tabulation of the Use of Personal and Telephone Interviews

	Personal Interviews	Telephone Interviews
New	8	4
Experienced	11	3
Total	19	7

2a.   Developing the Interview Content

Several criteria were considered when developing the interview format. One criterion was brevity. It was considered desirable to keep the introductory comments as brief as possible, while still seeking to insure that the directions regarding the manner in which the presidents were to relate the incidents were as clear and precise as possible. The original interview format was shown to several people and alterations were made based on their suggestions.

A second criterion was accuracy. It was not anticipated that new presidents would have difficulty in correctly recalling the incidents they were relating since they, by definition, had not been in office more

than eighteen months. Experienced presidents were also asked to relate incidents that had occurred within the previous eighteen months, however, both to insure that the incidents they reported would have occurred roughly during the same time span as those reported by the new presidents, but also to limit the time span for recall. Flanagan[1] pointed out the importance of placing a time limit on the period of recall for incidents, since it tended to reduce unusual behavior to proper perspective and to reduce errors due to memory lapses and exaggeration.

An extremely vital criterion was the basis for judgment concerning effectiveness, i.e., what was being considered and who was doing the considering. In the present study, what was being considered was the president's effectiveness, or lack of same in responding to incidents that occur in the context of role performance. Since the presidency of a college or university is such a singular position, the researcher cannot impose his own standard of effectiveness but must rely upon the competence of the respondent to do the judging from his or her perspective. Flanagan argued for this approach when he stated: "It is important that these behaviors be identified by those who describe them as especially effective

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[1]Flanagan, Critical Requirements for Research Personnel, op. cit., p. 5.

according to their own standards, not those of any out-
side person or group. . . ."[1]

Given the above criterion and the critiques of
the interview format, the final interview format was
developed for use in the interviews (see Appendix B).

3. Collecting the Data:
Conducting the Interview

The interviews were conducted over a nine-week
period in the summer of 1971. It was necessary to extend
the interviews over this period due to presidential
vacation schedules. No more than two personal inter-
views were scheduled for any one day both to allow for
travel time between institutions and to allow the inter-
views to extend for as long a period as each president
desired. Similarly, no more than two telephone inter-
views were scheduled for any one day. Although travel
time was, of course, not a factor in carrying out the
telephone interviews, this scheduling still allowed each
interview to go for as long or as short a time as the
president's responses dictated.

The personal interviews averaged just over an hour
(63 minutes), while the telephone interviews averaged less
than half an hour (22 minutes). This would appear to cast
doubt on the advisability of interspersing the data from

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[1]Ibid., p. 6.

the two methods, but an analysis of the recordings of the two types of interviews revealed that the actual incident reporting times per incident were roughly comparable for the two methods. The average incident reporting time per incident was four minutes for telephone interviews and seven minutes for personal interviews. The major difference appeared to be due to a tendency on the part of both the interviewer and the respondent to spend less time on cordialities and general discussion regarding the presidency in the telephone as opposed to the personal interviews. Also, one president who was interviewed by telephone only related two incidents and another only three and this shortened the interview average. The quality of the incidents appeared comparable, however, whether collected by telephone or personal interview.

Each president was asked to relate four incidents which he felt had had an impact on his effectiveness as a president. Two of the incidents the presidents were asked to relate were to be of an effective nature, where the results of the president's actions were desirable. Two incidents were to be of an ineffective nature where the results of the president's actions were undesirable or where the president's actions failed to have any impact on the situation. While--as might be expected given the instructions--most presidents did relate four incidents, one president related eight incidents and left it to the researcher to select four; another seven; two related six;

another five; two related only three incidents; and one only two. One new president who related just three incidents, all of which were effective in nature, felt that it was still too early in his presidency for the ineffective consequences of his actions to begin manifesting themselves.

A total of 112 critical incidents were collected, 60 of an effective nature, 50 of an ineffective nature, and 2 which the respective presidents called "iffy," meaning they felt the incidents were significant but that the final outcomes were not yet known and they could prove to be either effective or ineffective.

4. Analysis of the Data

Once the data had been collected, the next step in the critical incident methodology was to analyze the data according to the procedure suggested by the CIT. This involved the development of a posteriori categories from the data.

All interviews were taped, and although an interview report form (see Appendix B) was utilized for note-taking during the interviews and for calling certain items to the interviewer's attention, the tapes became the primary source of data.

4a. Transferring Data from the Tapes to Critical Incident Abstracts

Although the presidents were given instructions as to the manner in which the incidents were to be reported, presidential reporting styles did vary. Therefore, both to establish consistency in the report format and to transfer the verbal material to written format, it was necessary for the researcher to transfer each incident from the tapes to what was termed a Critical Incident Abstract. The researcher listened to each incident at least twice and then wrote an "Abstract" for each incident. This consisted of presenting the background of the incident (as related by the president), what the president did, and the results of the president's actions. In certain of the more involved incidents there were several phases of presidential response and these were noted. The Abstracts were then typed on 8½" x 11" paper for later use in the analysis process. A sample Critical Incident Abstract is given on the next page.

The Critical Incident Abstract format served as a useful vehicle for taking the recorded information and placing it in written form in a consistent fashion. Additional items of information which identified the incident were also placed on the Critical Incident Abstract. From left to right across the top of each abstract were recorded:

CRITICAL INCIDENT ABSTRACT

President: E-3   Effective Incident One

Telephone Interview   Reporting Time: 2 minutes

When the Incident Occurred:
   Spring 1970

CIRCUMSTANCES:

        The college was in financial difficulty and the
board decided that it would be necessary to freeze faculty
salaries for the 1971 fiscal year. The board asked the
President to explain to the faculty the need for this
action.

WHAT THE PRESIDENT DID:

        The President wrote a very carefully worded page-and-
a-half letter in which he described the school's financial
circumstances and the reason the salary freeze was neces-
sary.

WHAT RESULTED:

        There was no griping whatsoever on the part of the
faculty. Even though the President considers the faculty
to be very political and even though the faculty tradi-
tionally has had great power on the campus, they rather
cheerfully accepted this necessity and made no attempt
to alter it.

First Row (left to right) 1. Code number of the President.

                                                  2. Whether the incident was effective or ineffective and the incident number.

Second Row 1. Type of Interview (Personal or Telephone).

                                                  2. Reporting Time.

Third Row 1. When the incident occurred (approximate date or period).

4b. Development of Work Cards

Even with the Critical Incident Abstracts, a system was needed to allow for categorization of the incidents. Accordingly, each incident was reduced to one or two descriptive sentences and these descriptions were typed on one side of a 3" x 5" card. An example is given below of the work card developed for the Critical Incident Abstract that was shown above.

```
+----------------------------------------------------+
|                                                    |
|    E3-2PA              Effective One               |
|                                                    |
|                                                    |
|          Sold a salary freeze to the               |
|      faculty via an effectively written            |
|      letter which interpreted the need             |
|      for the freeze.                               |
|                                                    |
|                                                    |
|                                                    |
|                                                    |
|                                                    |
+----------------------------------------------------+
```

Once again, identifying information was recorded on the card so that the incident could be properly categorized. The identifying information, from left to right, was as follows:

1. E3--Identified the president who related the incident as being Experienced President 3.

2. 2PA--Identified the institution the President represented as being a Private Affiliated institution in size category two.

3. Effective--Indicated whether the president classified the incident as being effective or ineffective.

4. One--Identified which effective incident (related by the specific president) was being described.

In working with this card, the researcher could thus quickly identify that this was Effective Incident One, reported by Experienced President Three, from a Private Affiliated institution, in size category two. The identifying codes for institutional types were as follows: Private Independent = PI; Private Affiliated = PA; Public = Pu. The size categories are given in Table 4.

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TABLE 4.--Size Categories for Participating Institutions

Size Category	Student Enrollment
1	500 - 1,000
2	1,000 - 2,000
3	2,000 - 3,000
4	5,000 - 10,000
5	10,000 - 20,000
6	over 20,000

4c. The Categorization Process

Having transferred the recorded data to the Critical Incident Abstracts, and having developed the work cards, the data were in a format which permitted the researcher to begin the categorization process. The a posteriori categorization process which is utilized when the Critical Incident Technique is being applied as a job analysis tool, typically calls for breaking the incidents into separate elements for each behavior which the role incumbent exhibits. Since the purpose of this study was to compare the types of incidents having an impact on the contemporary president, and not necessarily to analyze the job of the president, the researcher did not follow the above approach but rather continued to concentrate on the essential nature of each incident as a whole.

The first step in the categorization process involved making rather gross distinctions about each incident and then proceeded to more refined distinctions.

Thus the incidents were first sorted into two groups: one group representing incidents in which the presidents dealt with affairs and/or relationships which were internal to the institution; and the second group incidents in which the presidents dealt with affairs and/or relationships which were external to the institution. Not all incidents dealt solely with internal or external affairs or relationships, but in all cases the researcher felt there was a sufficiently predominant thrust in one direction or the other to allow for this type of categorization.

The manner in which this categorization was noted was as follows: (1) Based on the work card description of the incident, the researcher judged whether the primary emphasis of the incident related to internal or external affairs. If there was any question, the researcher referred to the Critical Incident Abstract for that incident in an effort to insure accuracy in the categorization. Once the judgment was made, the notation "Internal" or "External" was made on the back of the work card. The date the judgment was made was also recorded. A week later, for two successive weeks, this process of categorization was repeated to gain an indication of researcher reliability in categorizing the incidents. The extent of agreement between the first, second and third categorization, for this and the remaining stages in the analysis process is reported in Chapter IV.

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After all incidents had been categorized on the basis of internal or external orientation, each incident was then subcategorized on the basis of primary reference group. For example, if the initial determination had been made that an incident was primarily internal in orientation, it was further reviewed to seek to determine whether a particular reference group such as students or faculty had played a primary role in the incident. Similarly, if the initial classification had been made that the incident was external in orientation, it was further reviewed to seek to determine whether a principal reference group such as local residents or the state legislature or the press or other groups had been involved. Once again the distinction being made was noted on the back of the work card and the process was repeated per the schedule mentioned above.

The next step involved a subcategorization by problem category. The question the researcher sought to ask regarding each incident was whether some particular problem had precipitated the incident. Was a financial crisis a precipitating factor or an unpopular regulation or a national or international event such as the Kent State episode or the Cambodian invasion? The results of the above steps are reported in Chapter IV.[1]

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[1]Mr. John Lovell, candidate for the Ph.D., Purdue University, served as an independent judge of the objectivity of the researcher by categorizing 10 per cent of

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The final step in the review of the incidents was largely a mechanical one for it involved listening to all the taped incidents one final time and writing down each individual or group mentioned. This was felt to be a useful step to give an indication of the variety of individuals with whom the presidents interacted and, in turn, to gain some feeling for their impact on the president's effectiveness by noting the number of incidents in which they were mentioned. The results of this process should not, however, be confused with the categorization by primary reference group. This final step was simply a tally of individuals or groups mentioned, not an analysis of their role in the incidents.

5. Reporting the Data

The categorization process as described above was applied to all incidents reported by all presidents. Since certain of the presidents related more than two effective and/or ineffective incidents, and since two more experienced than new presidents participated in the study, a means was needed to make the data analysis equitable. To alleviate the bias that might develop if a disproportionate number of incidents were included for certain presidents, it was decided that no more than two

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the incidents per the steps noted above. The extent of agreement between Mr. Lovell's categorization and that of the researcher is noted in Chapter IV.

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effective and two ineffective incidents, reported by an individual president, would be used for the basic comparisons that were of primary interest to the study. To provide a matching number of new and experienced presidents for comparison of incidents on this dichotomy, it was decided that the incidents reported by the two experienced presidents representing institutions with over 20,000 students would not be utilized. As Table 1 indicates, there were no new presidents who agreed to participate in the study who represented institutions with over 20,000 students. Thus, both to gain greater proximity in the number of incidents to be reported by experience level, and to attain a more nearly matched sample of presidents by institutional size, the incidents reported by these two presidents were not included in a number of the comparisons.

All the incidents reported by the presidents, including those reported by the two experienced presidents mentioned above, were certainly still of interest, however, for they gave basic information on the variety of types of incidents which are confronting the contemporary president. Therefore, where appropriate, this information is also reported in Chapter IV. Efforts have been made to insure that in all the data reporting the reader is informed clearly as to the incident pool that is being utilized for the analysis.

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It is important to indicate the manner in which
the researcher selected the two effective or ineffective
incidents that would be used for the comparisons, when
more than two incidents had been reported. In some cases
the president's own qualifying remarks helped to serve as
a discriminating factor for the president would indicate
which incidents he felt had had more or less of an impact
on his effectiveness. In other cases certain incidents
tended to more closely fit the specifications regarding
what constituted a critical incident and this served as
a discriminating factor. Also, if one or more of the
incidents clearly involved circumstances peculiar to that
college or university, whereas the others were more
generalizable, these more generalizable incidents were
included. Finally, if all incidents were of comparable
importance to the effectiveness of the president, of com-
parable specificity with regard to the definitions of the
study, and of comparable generalizability, the researcher
arbitrarily selected two of them. This presented an ad-
mitted opportunity for bias, but it should be remembered
that only five of the twenty-six presidents reported more
than two incidents per category and one of these five,
the one who reported the eight incidents (four effective,
four ineffective) was one of the experienced presidents
from an institution with over 20,000 students, so the
selection of only two incidents per category was not
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Questions of Interest

The nature of the data collected, plus the possibility that particular categories or cells might contain a limited number of incidents, made the generation of statistically testable hypotheses an unsuitable approach for this study. There were, however, questions of interest which led to the development of the study, and to which the data reporting has been addressed. These questions were as follows:

1. Are new presidents facing essentially similar or different types of incidents than is the case for experienced presidents?

2. Will effective incidents as reported by experienced presidents show any marked differences from effective incidents reported by new presidents with respect to the reference groups involved and/or the types of situations confronted?

3. Will ineffective incidents as reported by experienced presidents show any marked differences from ineffective incidents reported by new presidents with respect to the reference groups involved and/or the types of situations confronted?

4. Do particular training needs become evident as a product of the types of incidents with which presidents are confronted and/or the measure of

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success or lack of same they are experiencing in handling these situations?

Certain questions, which arose from the review of the literature and which were considered in relation to the data as analyzed in Chapter IV, included the following:

5. In the Hemphill and Walberg study the presidents reported that a "major roadblock" to their effectiveness was the amount of time they had to spend on administrative matters. They considered this, in turn, to be a result of the incompetence of their subordinates. This led to the question of whether the incidents reported in the current study would reflect a similar appraisal of subordinate effectiveness.

6. Hemphill and Walberg asked selected presidents to relate some of their initial successes. Most of the responses had to do with the organizational development of the institution. This led to the question of whether the effective incidents related by the new presidents in the current study would reflect a similar tendency.

7. Several of the studies related information on the age, educational attainments, and mobility patterns of presidents. Would the demographic data collected in this study reflect similarities or differences with respect to these factors?

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8. Campus unrest received extensive publicity during
   the period for which the presidents were asked to
   relate the incidents having an impact on their
   own effectiveness. To what extent, if any, did
   campus unrest come to the forefront in the inci-
   dents the presidents reported, and did the presi-
   dents perceive their responses to have been pri-
   marily effective or ineffective?

These, then were some of the questions to which
it was hoped at least tentative answers could be formu-
lated as a result of the analysis of the incidents re-
ported by the twenty-six presidents.

Summary

In Chapter III a detailed description of the
design and procedure of the study was given so that the
reader might have a basis for evaluating the findings
which are to be presented in Chapter IV.

The purpose of the study was to compare and con-
trast incidents which have had an impact on the effec-
tiveness of new college and university presidents with
those having an impact on experienced presidents. The
Critical Incident Technique was selected as the methodology
for both collecting and analyzing the incidents.

The sample for this study consisted of twenty-six
presidents from colleges and universities in a five-state

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region of the Midwest. Fourteen of the presidents were experienced presidents, having been in office for more than two years; and twelve were new, having been in office no less than six months and no more than eighteen months. The presidents represented a variety of institutional types and sizes.

The presidents reported 112 incidents which they described as having had an impact on their effectiveness as a president. The incidents were reported in interviews conducted by the researcher. Sixty of the 112 incidents were of an effective nature and 50 were identified by the presidents as ineffective. Two incidents were unclassified as to effectiveness because all the results of the president's actions were not yet known. The presidents did, however, feel that the incidents were significant and merited reporting.

Since the analysis of Critical Incident data is quite subjective in nature, a detailed description was given of all procedures involved in the analysis process. An a posteriori analysis was made of the incidents following procedures suggested in the CIT literature.

Finally, questions were presented which had served as a basis for the development of the study and/or which had developed as a result of the review of the literature on the presidency. These questions served as a base for reporting the results of the analysis of the data which follows in Chapter IV.

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CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

The present study was designed to collect, analyze, and compare incidents which have had an impact on the effectiveness of new and experienced college and university presidents. The Critical Incident Technique was used as the model for the data collection, and the data were then analyzed on an a posteriori basis following procedures recommended by the CIT.

In this chapter the results of the data collection and analysis are presented. In the first section the characteristics of the twenty-six participating presidents are described. This is followed by an analysis of the critical incidents which these presidents reported. The procedure for this analysis was described in detail in Chapter III. Finally, the implications of the analysis for the "Questions of Interest" are discussed.

Characteristics of the Participating Presidents

Tables 5 through 7 present a summary of data regarding the twenty-six presidents and the types of

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institutions they represented. Twelve of the twenty-six presidents met the specifications for being classified as "new,"[1] and fourteen met the specifications for being classified as "experienced."[2]

TABLE 5.--President's Highest Degree

Degree	New		Experienced	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Ph.D.	8	67	9	65
Ed.D.	2	17	1	7
D.B.A.	1	8		
J.D.	1	8		
L.L.B.			1	7
M.A.			1	7
M.Ed.			1	7
B.D.			1	7
Total	12	100	14	100

From Table 5 one can see that the emphasis on the earned doctorate, which was reflected in the literature on the college president, was borne out in the current study. All of the new presidents had either an earned doctorate or, in the one case, a law degree.

In Table 6 the age of the presidents is shown by tenure. The average age of the new presidents was just over 44 while that of the experienced presidents was close

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[1] In office no less than six months and no more than eighteen months.

[2] In office no less than twenty-four months.

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TABLE 6.--

Age Grou
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45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64

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to 53. Both of the new presidents in the 35-39 age range, whose ages were 36 and 37, were presidents of private affiliated institutions.

TABLE 6.--Distribution of Presidents by Age and Tenure

Age Group	New	Experienced		
	(6 to 18 Months)	2-5 Years	6-10 Years	More Than 10 Years
35-39	2			
40-44	4			
45-49	6	2	1	1
50-54		4	2	
55-59		1		2
60-64				1
	N=12	N=7	N=3	N=4

Table 7 reflects the diversity of positions the participating presidents held immediately prior to their appointment as president of the institution they were serving at the time of the study. Although the presidents were previously in a wide variety of positions, twenty-one, or 81 per cent, were in positions in higher education. Of the remaining five presidents all but the one who came from the YMCA post could be considered as having entered the presidency from education-related positions. This is stated because even the president who is listed as coming from a missionary position was serving as the principal of a mission school.

TABLE 7.-

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Guidance

Educational
Consultant

Executive
Vice Preside

High School
Principal

Missionary

President

Professor

Provost

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TABLE 7.--Distribution of Presidents by Previous Position, Experience Level, and Type of Institutional Control

	Private Independent		Private Affiliated		Public	
	New	Experienced	New	Experienced	New	Experienced
Academic Dean			1			
Assistant to the President			1			
Chancellor						1
Dean of Administration						1
Dean of Arts and Sciences	1					
Director of Guidance		1				
Educational Consultant			1			
Executive Vice President			1			
High School Principal			1			
Missionary				1		
President				1		1
Professor			2	1		
Provost					1	
State System of Higher Educ. Post					1	
Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs						1
Vice President		1	1			
Vice President Academic Affairs				1	1	1
Vice President Univ. Relations	1		1			
YMCA National Council Position		1				

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This preponderance of experience in higher education supports the data in the recent literature regarding the mobility patterns of presidents in higher education. Another aspect of the mobility patterns of the presidents was checked, this being the number who had previous experience in the institution they were serving at the time of the study, and, for those who had previous experience, the extent of that experience or affiliation. Interest in this factor was keyed by Hodgkinson's finding that the vast majority (60 per cent) of the presidents in his sample had had no previous experience on the campus where they were president.[1] Thirteen of the twenty-five presidents on whom this information was available, had some previous affiliation with the institution at which they were president at the time of this study. Only in the category of experienced public college or university presidents was it the case that none of the respondents had had any previous affiliation. Four presidents of private affiliated institutions, three new and one experienced, had received their undergraduate degree, taught, and had administrative experience at the institution where they were the president. For others the range of previous affiliation or experience with the institution extended from having only received the undergraduate degree there

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[1]Hodgkinson, Institutions in Transition, op. cit., p. 143.

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(3); to having only been a faculty member (1); to having been a faculty member plus having served in an administrative post (2); to having only had previous administrative experience there (1); to having been a consultant to the institution (1); and, finally, to having previously been a member of the institution's governing board (1).

Analysis of the Critical Incidents

The twenty-six presidents reported a total of 112 critical incidents: 60 of an effective nature (53.6 per cent); 50 of an ineffective nature (44.6 per cent); and 2 which the two presidents who reported them felt were significant incidents but which could not yet be labeled as either effective or ineffective because the final outcomes were not yet known (1.8 per cent). These two incidents were labeled "iffy" since that is the way one of the presidents described the incident of this nature which he related. In Table 8 a summary is given of the number of incidents reported, by the size and type of control of the institutions the presidents represented.

Measures of Reliability and Objectivity

In Chapter III a detailed description was given of the methodology the researcher followed in categorizing the data. The categorization process is certainly one of the most important phases in any study which utilizes the Critical Incident Technique. At the same time, it is also

Size Category (See Table 1)	Type of Control	Experienced (E) or New (N)	Number of Incidents the President Reported			
			Effective	Ineffective	"Iffy"	Total

TABLE 8.--Sources of Critical Incidents by Institutional Size Category and Type of Control, and by Presidential Experience Level

Size Category (See Table 1)	Type of Control	Experienced (E) or New (N)	Number of Incidents the President Reported			Total
			Effective	Ineffective	"Iffy"	
1	PA	E	2	2		4
1	PA	E	1	1		2
1	PA	N	4	1	1	6
1	PA	N	2	2		4
1	PI	E	2	2		4
1	PI	E	2	2		4
1	PI	N	2	2		4
2	PA	E	2	2		4
2	PA	E	3	1	1	5
2	PA	N	2	4		6
2	PA	N	5	2		7
2	PI	E	2	2		4
3	PA	N	2	2		4
3	PA	N	2	2		4
4	PA	E	2	1		3
4	Pu	E	2	2		4
4	Pu	E	2	2		4
4	Pu	N	3			3
5	PA	N	2	2		4
5	PI	N	2	2		4
5	Pu	N	2	2		4
5	Pu	E	2	2		4
6	Pu	E	2	2		4
6	Pu	E	4	4		8
			N=60	N=50	N=2	112

PA = Private Affiliated; PI = Private Independent; Pu = Public

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TABLE 9.--

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Two steps were taken in this study to check on the reliability and objectivity of the researcher's judgment. In the first step the researcher categorized each incident on three separate occasions, each occurring one week apart. Although the categorizations were recorded on each of the three occasions, they were made independently. In Table 9, the extent to which the second classification[1] agreed with the first, and the third classification agreed with the second is shown.

TABLE 9.--Researcher Agreement in Classifying Critical Incidents

Second Classification Agreed with the First		Third Classification Agreed with the Second	
N	%	N	%
106	94.6	107	95.5

As shown in Table 9, there was a high percentage of agreement in the successive classifications of the incidents. While this check on the consistency of the classifications yielded encouraging results, it should be noted that consistency or reliability in classification is not a guarantee that the classifications are objective or valid.

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[1]The words "categorization" and "classification" will be used interchangeably when referring to the types of analyses applied to the incidents.

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To provide a check on the researcher's objectivity, an independent judge[1] was asked to listen to the tape recordings of 10 per cent of the incidents and to categorize each incident based on the procedures described in Chapter III. The incidents to which he listened were selected to give proportionate exposure to incidents which had been reported in person and by telephone, that had been reported by new and experienced presidents, and that were effective and ineffective in nature. The judge listened to twelve of the taped incidents and categorized them without prior knowledge of the researcher's categorizations. On ten of the twelve incidents there was perfect agreement between the researcher and the judge on the internal or external orientation of the incidents, and on the primary reference group. On one of the two incidents where there was disagreement, the disagreement occurred in the internal/external dichotomy. Whereas the researcher felt the incident was external in orientation and so classified it, the judge felt that while the major thrust of the incident was external, there was still sufficient reference to internal concerns to justify an external-internal label signifying the extent to which the incident involved both domains. The disagreement in the second incident was in the primary reference group subcategorization. The researcher categorized the incident as

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[1]Mr. John Lovell, candidate for the Ph.D., Purdue University.

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student-related whereas the judge categorized it as
"student-then faculty-then civil authorities," implying
the successive role each group played in the incident.

The researcher and the independent judge were thus
in perfect agreement on the categorization of ten of the
twelve incidents used as a test of the objectivity and
validity of the categorizations. This represented an
agreement on 83.33 per cent of the test incidents.

Reviewing the General Aim of the Study

Before relating the results of the analysis of
the incidents, it is important to recall the criteria the
presidents were given for reporting critical incidents.
Each president was told to reflect on his own experiences
as a president and report four incidents which he felt
had had an impact on his effectiveness as a president.
Two of the incidents he was asked to relate were to be of
a nature where he felt the results of his own actions or
the actions he had recommended were desirable. These were
called _effective_ incidents. Two of the incidents he was
asked to relate were to be _ineffective_, or of a nature
where the results of his own actions or the actions he
recommended were either undesirable or failed to have any
impact on the situation.

The presidents were informed that the incidents
they were to relate may have covered only a few minutes
or have extended over several weeks or even longer. The

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incidents were, however, to have been of such a nature that their outcomes could be determined. The presidents were also told that the incidents need not have been dramatic or crisis-centered, but merely that they fit the specification of having had an impact on the president's effectiveness.

The concern in the a posteriori analysis was thus on identifying characteristics which would provide insights into the nature of the incidents presidents related as having had an impact on their effectiveness.

Internal or External Orientation
of the Incidents

An initial indication of where participating presidents were focusing their attention, either by choice or by force, and/or the major arena for their actions, was gained through a review of the basic orientation of the incidents. The incidents were thus initially categorized into two groups; those that focused primarily on affairs or relationships which were considered to be internal to the institution, and those which focused primarily on affairs or relationships which were considered to be external to the institution. An incident was thus categorized as being "Internal" if the primary participants were governing board members, administrators, faculty, staff or students; and/or if the primary focus of the incident was on a fiscal or organizational or building

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TABLE 10

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decision. An incident was categorized as being "External" if the primary concern or contact was with the press, or the state legislature, or the federal government, or the community.

TABLE 10.--Summary of the Number of Incidents Relating to Internal and External Affairs*

	Experienced	New	Subtotal
Internal Affairs or Relationships			
Effective	29	28	57
Ineffective	26	21	47
Iffy	1	1	2
	N=56	N=50	N=106
External Affairs or Relationships			
Effective	1	2	3
Ineffective	1	2	3
	N=2	N=4	N=6

*Based on all incidents reported by all presidents.

The information in Table 10 clearly shows the overwhelming extent to which the presidents related incidents with an internal frame of reference. Ninety-six and six-tenths per cent of all incidents related by all experienced presidents concerned internal affairs or relationships. Ninety-two and six-tenths per cent of all incidents related by all new presidents concerned internal affairs or relationships. Ninety-four and six-tenths

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per cent of all the incidents related by all the presidents, were thus internal in orientation.

Primary Reference Groups

Once the incidents had been categorized with respect to internal or external orientation, they were further reviewed to determine whether a primary reference group, or primary reference groups, could be identified. Thus, if an incident had been categorized as internal, the question the researcher considered was whether students, or faculty, or students and faculty, or other groups or combination of groups could be considered to have been the primary focus of the president's attention or concern. When an individual was the primary referent, the incident was categorized according to the reference group of which the individual was a member. For example, if an individual governing board member had precipitated the incident or was the individual around whom the incident revolved, the incident was categorized as governing-board related. Table 11 contains the summary of the numbers of incidents which were categorized as primarily involving particular reference groups or particular combinations of reference groups. The information in Table 11 also shows the percentage of incidents in which the various reference groups were considered to have been the primary focus of attention.

TABLE 11

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TABLE 11.--Summary of the Primary Reference Groups

	AIAP*		SISP**	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Internal Reference Groups				
Students	36	32.14	30	32.96
Faculty	24	21.42	18	19.78
Administration	18	16.07	16	17.58
Governing Board	9	8.03	7	7.69
Students, Faculty, and Administration	3	2.68	2	2.20
Faculty and Administration	3	2.68	3	3.30
Students and Faculty	2	1.79	2	2.20
Students and Administration	2	1.79	1	1.10
External Reference Groups				
Local Citizens	2	1.79	2	2.20
Press	2	1.79	2	2.20
State	1	.89	-	--
No Reference Group				
(9 Internal 1 External)	10	8.93	8	8.79
	N=112	%=100.00	N=91	%=100.00

*AIAP stands for "All Incidents-All Presidents" and means that all incidents as reported by all presidents were used as the data base.

**SISP stands for "Selected Incidents-Selected Presidents" and means that only two incidents per president in the effective and ineffective categories were used as the data base and that the incidents reported by the two experienced presidents from institutions with over 20,000 students were excluded from the data base to give an equal number of new and experienced presidents.

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As shown in Table 11, students were the primary reference group for more incidents than was the case for any other reference group. The extent to which the presidents perceived these student-related incidents to have been effective or ineffective, and the extent to which the student-related incidents were reported by new and experienced presidents, is shown in Table 12. As is also indicated in Table 12, the one "iffy" incident that was reported by an experienced president, involved students as the primary reference group.

One-third of the selected effective incidents[1] for new presidents were student-related and over one-half of the selected effective incidents for experienced presidents were thus categorized (52.17 per cent). A lower percentage of the ineffective incidents involved students as the primary reference group. This was the case for both new and experienced presidents.

When the incidents were added in which the students shared the primary role with faculty and/or the administration (see Table 11), students played a major role in 38.46 per cent of the selected incidents and 38.84 per cent of all incidents.

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[1]Whenever the words "selected incidents" are used in this chapter, they are referring to the results of the analysis when no more than two effective incidents and no more than two ineffective incidents or one ineffective and one "iffy" incident were considered per president. In the case of the experienced presidents, the incidents reported by the two presidents from schools with over 20,000 students were not included in the "selected incidents."

TABLE 12.--Summary of the Number of Effective, Ineffective, and "Iffy" Incidents in Which Students Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Effective, Ineffective, and "Iffy" Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

TABLE 12.--Summary of the Number of Effective, Ineffective, and "Iffy" Incidents in Which Students Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Effective, Ineffective, and "Iffy" Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Student Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent		Number of Student Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
	New Presidents-- Selected Incidents				New Presidents-- All Incidents		
Effective	8	24	33.33		9	30	30.00
Ineffective	5	21	23.81		6	23	26.09
	N=13				N=15		
	Experienced Presidents-- SISP*				Experienced Presidents-- AIAP**		
Effective	12	23	52.17		13	30	43.33
Ineffective	4	21	19.05		7	27	25.93
"Iffy"	1	1	100.00		1	1	100.00
	N=17				N=21		

*Selected Incidents-Selected Presidents (refer to note on Table 11).

**All Incidents-All Presidents.

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After the students, the faculty were categorized as the primary reference group for the greatest number of incidents (see Table 11). The extent to which the presidents perceived their involvement with the faculty to have been effective or ineffective, and the extent to which the faculty-related incidents were reported by new and experienced presidents, is shown in Table 13. Experienced presidents reported more than twice as many effective incidents with faculty than ineffective, whereas the new presidents, reported more ineffective than effective incidents where faculty were the primary reference group. When all incidents reported by all new presidents were considered, however, only one more ineffective than effective incident was reported.

When the incidents were added in which the faculty shared the primary role with the students and/or the administration (see Table 11), the faculty played a major role in 27.47 per cent of the selected incidents and in 28.57 per cent of all incidents.

Administrative personnel also played a primary role in a number of the incidents the presidents reported as having had an impact on their presidential effectiveness (see Table 11). The extent to which the presidents perceived these administration-related incidents to have been effective or ineffective, and the extent to which these incidents were reported by new and by experienced

TABLE 13.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents in Which Faculty Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents ...

TABLE 13.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents in Which Faculty Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Faculty Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	3	24	12.50
Ineffective	5	21	23.81
	N=8	N=45	
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	7	23	30.44
Ineffective	3	21	14.29
	N=10	N=44	

	Number of Faculty Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	4	30	13.33
Ineffective	5	23	21.74
	N=9	N=53	
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	10	30	33.33
Ineffective	5	27	18.52
	N=15	N=57	

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presidents, is shown in Table 14. Both new and experienced presidents reported more ineffective than effective indidents in which members of the administration or the entire administrative team played a primary role. This was especially pronounced for experienced presidents where the ratio was three ineffective incidents to one effective incident.

When the incidents were added in which administrative personnel shared the primary role with the students and/or the faculty (see Table 11), the administration played a major role in 24.18 per cent of the selected incidents and in 23.21 per cent of all incidents.

The governing board was the only other single body or reference group to be identified as a primary reference group for the internal incidents. The extent to which the board-related incidents were perceived by the reporting presidents to have been either effective or ineffective, is shown in Table 15, along with the extent to which the board-related incidents were reported by new or experienced presidents. From the information in the table, one can see that the effective and ineffective incident breakdown was equal for experienced presidents, while new presidents reported one more effective than ineffective board-related incident.

Of the three incidents where both the faculty and the administration were considered to have shared the

TABLE 14.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents in Which Administrators Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifi-

TABLE 14.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents in Which Administrators Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

New Presidents-- Selected Incidents

	Number of Administrator Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
Effective	3	24	12.50
Ineffective	5	21	23.81
	N=8		

Experienced Presidents-- SISP

	Number of Administrator Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
Effective	2	23	8.70
Ineffective	6	21	28.57
	N=8		

New Presidents-- All Incidents

	Number of Administrator Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
Effective	4	30	13.33
Ineffective	6	23	26.09
	N=10		

Experienced Presidents-- AIAP

	Number of Administrator Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
Effective	2	30	6.67
Ineffective	6	27	22.22
	N=8		

TABLE 15.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents in Which Board
Members Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Inci-
dents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of ____

TABLE 15.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents in Which Board Members Were the Primary Reference Group (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Board Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	1	24	4.17
Ineffective	2	21	9.52
	N=3		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	2	23	8.70
Ineffective	2	21	9.52
	N=4		

	Number of Board Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	3	30	10.00
Ineffective	2	23	8.70
	N=5		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	2	30	6.67
Ineffective	2	27	7.41
	N=4		

primary role (see Table 11), two were effective incidents reported by a new president and one was an ineffective incident that also was reported by a new president. Similarly, of the three incidents which equally involved students, faculty, and administration, all were reported by new presidents. In this case, however, all three of the incidents were effective in nature.

Two incidents involved students and faculty equally as reference groups. One was an effective incident reported by a new president, and one an ineffective incident reported by an experienced president.

The two incidents which involved the press were both ineffective and both reported by one new president.

The two incidents which involved the community, or local citizens, were reported as follows: one effective incident by a new president, and one ineffective by an experienced president.

One "iffy" incident, reported by a new president, involved students and administration on an equal basis so both were considered to represent the primary reference group. One of the experienced presidents from the institutions over 20,000 also reported an incident that was considered to involve students and administrators equally so when all incidents reported by all presidents were considered there were two in this subcategory.

The one incident involving the state government was an effective one reported by an experienced president from an institution with over 20,000 students.

Tables 16 and 17 contain a summary of the effective and ineffective incidents by primary reference groups.

Problem Categories

Once the incidents had been categorized with respect to internal or external orientation, and with respect to primary reference groups, a further review was made to determine the nature of the problems which had precipitated these incidents. Forty categories were initially isolated from the 112 incidents. These categories of problems are shown in Table 18.

The forty categories were then examined to determine aspects of commonality. These categories which contained similar aspects were grouped into fourteen Critical Problem Categories which are shown in Table 19. To clarify the Critical Problem Categories, each is briefly defined here.

Critical Problem Categories Which the President Confronted

Finance: Includes responses to financial crises and budgetary decisions. Also includes decisions relating to new construction and capital outlay.

Campus Unrest: Involves building takeovers, sit-ins, rallies, and other types of disruptions and

TABLE 16.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffec-
tive Incidents by Primary Reference Group and
Experience Level of the Presidents (Selected
Incidents-Selected Presidents)

	Effective Incidents		Ineffective Incidents	
	New	Experienced	New	Experienced
Students	8	12	5	4
Faculty	3	7	5	3
Administration	3	2	5	6
Governing Board	1	2	2	2
Students, Faculty, and Administration	2	-	-	-
Faculty and Administration	2	-	1	-
Students and Faculty	1	-	-	1
Students and Administration	-	-	-	-
Local Citizens	1	-	-	1
Press	-	-	2	-
State	-	-	-	-
No Reference Group	3	-	1	4
	N=24	N=23	N=21	N=21

TABLE 17.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffec-
tive Incidents by <u>Primary Reference Group</u> and
Experience Level of the Presidents (All
Incidents-All Presidents)

	Effective Incidents		Ineffective Incidents	
	New	Experienced	New	Experienced
Students	9	13	6	7
Faculty	4	10	5	5
Administration	4	2	6	6
Governing Board	3	2	2	2
Students, Faculty, and Administration	2	1	-	-
Faculty and Administration	2	-	1	-
Students and Faculty	1	-	-	1
Students and Administration	-	1	-	-
Local Citizens	1	-	-	1
Press	-	-	2	-
State	-	1	-	-
No Reference Group	4	-	1	5
	N=30	N=30	N=23	N=27

TABLE 18.--Summary of the Categories of Problems Confront-
ing the Presidents

Problem Category	AIAP*		SISP**	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
1. Finance	10	8.93	9	9.87
2. Minority Concerns	9	8.04	7	7.68
3. Campus Unrest	9	8.04	6	6.57
4. Dismissals/Non-reappointment	7	6.25	7	7.68
5. Staffing	5	4.46	3	3.30
6. Mishandling by Subordinate	4	3.57	4	4.40
7. Academic Governance	4	3.57	4	4.40
8. Student Involvement in Decision-Making	4	3.57	3	3.30
9. Public Relations	4	3.57	3	3.30
10. Community Governance	4	3.57	2	2.20
11. Building Decisions	3	2.68	3	3.30
12. Student Relations	3	2.68	3	3.30
13. Board-President Relations	3	2.68	3	3.30
14. Reassignment (Demoting)	3	2.68	3	3.30
15. Organizational Structure	3	2.68	3	3.30
16. Academic Reform	3	2.68	2	2.20
17. Faculty Evaluation	3	2.68	2	2.20
18. Board Effectiveness	2	1.79	2	2.20
19. Property Decisions	2	1.79	2	2.20
20. Residence Hall Regulations	2	1.79	2	2.20
21. Grading Challenges	2	1.79	2	2.20
22. Press Relations	2	1.79	2	2.20
23. ROTC	2	1.79	1	1.10

TABLE 18.--Continued

Problem Category	AIAP*		SISP**	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
24. Faculty Compensation	2	1.79	1	1.10
25. Long-Range Planning	2	1.79	-	--
26. Institutional Continuance	1	.89	1	1.10
27. Placement	1	.89	1	1.10
28. Delegation of Authority	1	.89	1	1.10
29. Board-Student Relations	1	.89	1	1.10
30. Residence Halls-Security	1	.89	1	1.10
31. Employee Morale	1	.89	1	1.10
32. Faculty In-Fighting	1	.89	1	1.10
33. Academic Status	1	.89	1	1.10
34. Student Fee Utilization	1	.89	1	1.10
35. Computer Purchase	1	.89	1	1.10
36. Student Conduct Regulations	1	.89	1	1.10
37. Collective Bargaining	1	.89	1	1.10
38. State Relations	1	.89	-	--
39. Board-Faculty/ Administrative Relations	1	.89	-	--
40. Institutional Priorities	1	.89	-	--
	N=112	%=100.00	N=91	%=100.00

*AIAP = All Incidents; All Presidents.

**SISP = Selected Incidents; Selected Presidents.

TABLE 19.--Summary of the Fourteen Critical Problem
Categories

Problem Categories	AIAP		SISP	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Finance	17	15.18	16	17.59
Campus Unrest	17	15.18	13	14.29
Staffing	15	13.39	13	14.29
Governance	12	10.71	9	9.89
Controlling	8	7.15	7	7.69
Governing Board	7	6.25	6	6.59
Public Relations	7	6.25	5	5.49
Academic General	6	5.36	5	5.49
Subordinate Ineffectiveness	5	4.46	5	5.49
Student Relations	5	4.46	4	4.39
Planning	4	3.57	1	1.10
Organizing	3	2.68	3	3.30
Compensation	3	2.68	2	2.20
Employee Relations	3	2.68	2	2.20
	N=112	%=100.00	N=91	%=100.00

confrontations. May have been precipitated by unresolved concerns of minority group students, or by ROTC-related protests, or by reactions to national or international events.

Staffing: Refers to securing people with the appropriate skills and/or knowledge and placing them properly. Also involves transfers, demotions, promotions, and separations. Non-reappointments for non-tenured faculty were included in this category.

Governance: Involves efforts to establish, reorganize or maintain academic, student, or community governance structures.

Controlling: Refers to the process of evaluating performance in comparison to desired standards, and taking steps to bring performance in line with expectations. Also includes the president's involvement in establishing a student conduct code delineating acceptable standards of behavior, in establishing a judicial process for students, and in taking steps to insure residence hall security.

Governing Board: Involves relations between the governing board and the president, the faculty, the administration, and the students. Involves questions of appropriate board membership and efforts to increase the effectiveness of the board.

Public Relations: Involves contact with the press, the local community, the state legislature, the federal government, and other non-campus publics.

Student Relations: Includes efforts by the president to establish good relations with students, either on his own initiative or in response to student initiative. Also includes special efforts by the president to meet student needs.

Academic General: Involves matters of academic reform, student challenges to grades, and relations among the faculty.

Subordinate Ineffectiveness: Refers to incidents where the president was forced to become involved due to a subordinate's mishandling of an assigned task or the inability of a subordinate to accept delegated authority. Also refers to cases of inappropriate style on the part of a subordinate.

Planning: Involves the establishment of institutional priorities, long-range planning, and decisions related to institutional continuance (should the institution be maintained or closed).

Organizing: Includes efforts to modify or restructure the administrative organization of the institution.

Compensation: Refers to the process of determining salary schedules for faculty and administrators. Also includes collective bargaining-related incidents when bargaining was the means of determining compensation and benefits.

Employee Relations: Includes efforts by the president to positively influence employee morale and to work with the faculty to effect desired changes.

Analysis of Critical Problem Categories

"Finance" and "Campus Unrest" were the two Critical Problem Categories containing the greatest number of incidents. The extent to which finance-related incidents were effective or ineffective in the eyes of the reporting presidents, and the extent to which they were reported by new and experienced presidents is shown in Table 19. From the information in Table 20 it is evident that finance-related incidents constituted a higher percentage of the incidents related by the experienced presidents than was the case for the new presidents, although the difference in the actual number of incidents is slight. For experienced presidents the number of effective and ineffective incidents were identical, whereas new presidents reported one more effective than ineffective finance-related incidents.

As noted in the description of this Critical Problem Category, certain of the "Finance" incidents

TABLE 20.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Were Finance Related (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Finance Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent	Number of Finance Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
	New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			New Presidents-- All Incidents		
Effective	3	24	12.50	4	30	13.33
Ineffective	3	21	14.29	3	23	13.04
	N=6			N=7		
	Experienced Presidents-- SISP			Experienced Presidents-- AIAP		
Effective	5	23	21.74	5	30	16.67
Ineffective	5	21	23.81	5	27	18.52
	N=10			N=10		

involved institutional responses to financial crises.
These responses are of interest, given the financial
dilemmas in which many institutions of higher education
currently find themselves. In two private affiliated
institutions, the respective presidents and governing
boards determined that the financial difficulties facing
their institutions were of such magnitude that drastic
measures were called for, to and including the freezing of
faculty salaries for the next year (this was prior to the
National Wage-Price Freeze). In both institutions the
faculty accepted the freeze with little or no reaction,
but, interestingly enough, in both situations the presi-
dents reported subsequent ineffective aspects of their
actions. In one of the institutions the president had
made such a convincing statement to the effect that no
one would be receiving raises, that he later encountered
great reaction when he sought to raise the salaries of
certain individuals who had clearly been given increased
responsibilities. The second president found his faculty
to be personally generous but professionally stingy. In
spite of his pleadings for reduced budget requests, the
department chairmen continued to submit requests that
showed no effort whatsoever to reduce costs. When the
president had to make dramatic cutbacks there was much
unhappiness. Thus, whereas the faculty and department
chairmen alike had accepted without a murmur the freeze

on their own personal salaries, they were unwilling to accept similar constraints on departmental budgets.

At another private affiliated college, a new president also found himself facing a substantial budget deficit. His response was to put together a task force of students, faculty, one other administrator and himself and they fashioned a budget for the next fiscal year which pared $500,000 from the existing budget. It was this president's feeling that this reduced budget would have been far less acceptable if the task force which put it together had not been so representative.

At another small affiliated institution the president and his wife participated in a fund-raising event that the students were sponsoring. The event was a "walk-a-thon" and the president feels his involvement was effective in terms of the money raised for the college, in terms of public relations for the college, and in terms of enhanced relations between the president and the students.

In Table 21, a breakdown is given of the incidents related to campus unrest. As is shown, twelve of the seventeen incidents involving campus unrest were reported by experienced presidents, with three effective incidents reported for each ineffective one. Of the five incidents involving campus unrest that were reported by new presidents, three were ineffective and two effective. The

TABLE 21.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Were Campus Unrest Related (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Campus Unrest Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	2	24	8.33
Ineffective	3	21	14.29
	N=5		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	7	23	30.44
Ineffective	1	21	4.76
	N=8		

	Number of Campus Unrest Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	2	30	6.67
Ineffective	3	23	13.04
	N=5		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	9	30	30.00
Ineffective	3	27	11.11
	N=12		

nature of these incidents involving campus unrest provide
insights into the diversity of situations faced by the
presidents who participated in the study. Seven of the
seventeen incidents involved either a sit-in or a building
takeover. At one public university, a group of students
responded to the announcement of the Cambodian invasion by
taking over the building that housed the ROTC offices. At
another, a group of black students sought to dramatize
their demands by attempting to take over the adminis-
tration building. At yet another public institution,
black students took over a cafeteria in the student center
after a series of unrelated incidents had heightened
racial tension on the campus. At a smaller private
affiliated institution, a new president's efforts to block
a threatened sit-in by blacks led to increased tension and,
eventually, a takeover of the administration building.
At another small liberal arts college, students began a
sit-in in the administration building, but left before the
building was closed for the night. Miscalculation of what
it would take to satisfy black student demands resulted
in a strike that paralyzed one large public university.
A number of faculty joined in the strike and the president
became involved in writing a strike policy concerning
faculty strike action. At a private affiliated college,
a black faculty member engaged repeatedly in disruptive
behavior that in turn polarized the campus and the local

community. The effective handling of racial tension at a private independent college was called by its president, "the most important incident in the recent history of this college." Two presidents, one of a private independent college and the other of a public university, reported instances of campus unrest that occurred on their campuses in response to the Kent State and/or Jackson State killings. A third president felt that the disruption of a ROTC Presidential Review, although it occurred more than a year after the Kent State incident, could still be attributed as an attempt on the part of some of the students at this public university in Ohio to respond to what had happened at Kent.

The manner in which presidents responded to these instances of campus unrest reflects the diversity of the institutions and the presidents represented in this study. This can be illustrated by taking two of the incidents where black students took over a building. Both incidents occurred at public universities, although the sizes of the universities differed substantially. One of the presidents was new, the other experienced. In the one case, involving the new president in the smaller public university, he and the vice-president for student affairs met with the black students from 4:00 a.m. until noon, whereupon the blacks felt their concerns were satisfied and ended the takeover. In the case of the experienced

president, he had security guards stationed in the building in anticipation of the takeover. When the black students entered the building and put chains on the door, the security guards were instructed to use the bolt cutters they had with them to cut the chains and reopen the building. Any students caught resisting this operation or seeking to prevent free access to the building were arrested.

The actions of the above-mentioned presidents seem diametrically opposed, yet both presidents could and did consider their responses to the incidents to be effective given the outcomes.

Incidents involving some aspect of the Staffing process were perceived by twelve separate presidents as having had an impact on their own effectiveness. These twelve presidents, seven new and five experienced, reported fifteen incidents which involved staffing. In Table 22 a summary is given of the extent to which these presidents perceived their involvement in the staffing process to have been effective or ineffective. As shown in the table, new presidents reported two effective staffing incidents for each ineffective incident (for a total of six effective and three ineffective), whereas the experienced presidents reported five ineffective incidents and only one effective incident that pertained to this category.

TABLE 22.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Staffing Decisions (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Staffing Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	5	24	20.83
Ineffective	3	21	14.29
	N=8		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	1	23	4.35
Ineffective	4	21	19.05
	N=5		

	Number of Staffing Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	6	30	20.00
Ineffective	3	23	13.04
	N=9		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	1	30	3.33
Ineffective	5	27	18.52
	N=6		

The description of the staffing process given by French,[1] was used as the basis for the definition for this category. Incidents were thus included which covered the flow of events from manpower planning through separations. The incidents reported by the new presidents tended to concentrate on reassignments and the selection of their own administrative team, whereas experienced presidents tended to report incidents related to nonreappointment and other staffing problems. Dramatically different approaches to the question of staffing were exemplified, however, by two new presidents, one of whom related as effective his decision not to make any personnel changes during his first year in office, whereas the other reported as effective his decision to almost completely realign the cabinet and to begin to build "his own team."

Governance was the only other Critical Problem Category to contain more than 10 per cent of all the incidents. Hodgkinson,[2] found that the largest single category of institutional change reported by the presidents in his study, "had to do with changes in internal authority and in the governance structure of the institution." A clue as to the reasons for these changes may

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[1]Wendell French, The Personnel Management Process (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), p. 111.

[2]Hodgkinson, Institutions in Transition, op. cit., p. 139.

exist in the findings of the present study, in that in five

of the twelve governance-related incidents the presidents

themselves were the ones who were seeking to effect changes

in the governance structures of their institutions. The

direction in which the presidents desired to see the

change occur, was toward greater participation in decision

making by representatives of all members of the academic

community. In three of the five cases the presidents felt

their efforts were effective. One of the remaining presi-

dents reported as ineffective his inability to interest

students in a community government structure, and the

other president's efforts to initiate a proposal for a

joint student-faculty body were met with suspicion by

both groups. The seven remaining governance incidents

dealt with the president's relations with either the

academic or the student council. In Table 23 a summary

of the twelve incidents is given with respect to whether

the presidents reporting them were new or experienced,

and with respect to the extent to which the presidents

perceived their involvement in the governance incidents

to have been effective or ineffective.

The definition for the Critical Problem Category

of Controlling was based upon the "administrative pro-

cesses" model of the organization. Under this model,

controlling involves the process of evaluating performance

in comparison to some desired standard, and of taking

TABLE 23.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Governance (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Governance Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	4	24	16.67
Ineffective	2	21	9.52
	N=6		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	1	23	4.35
Ineffective	2	21	9.52
	N=3		

	Number of Governance Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	4	30	13.33
Ineffective	3	23	13.04
	N=7		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	3	30	10.00
Ineffective	2	27	7.41
	N=5		

steps to bring performance in line with expectations.[1] In
the present study, the concept was extended to also in-
clude incidents in which the president was involved in
establishing desired standards for student behavior, and
in establishing means to bring student behavior in line
with these standards or expectations. In Table 24, a
summary is given of the extent to which presidents per-
ceived their involvement in these control-related inci-
dents to have been effective, ineffective, or iffy. Of
seven incidents in this category, three were related to
faculty evaluation, three were related to student conduct
policies, and one was related to matters of residence hall
security which also included conduct implications. The
eighth incident, the "iffy" incident, related to a decision
by the president of a private affiliated college to con-
tinue a system of requiring students to earn a specific
number of "points" for graduation. The points could be
earned by chapel attendance and/or by attendance at cul-
tural events or lectures. A number of students had
agitated over the years for the abolishment of the point
system, but the president decided to retain it in that
he felt it helped to emphasize that for which the college
stood. Parents have overwhelmingly supported the presi-
dent's decision to stay with this system, but the president
was not certain that the incident could be considered

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[1]French, _op. cit._, p. 48.

TABLE 24.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Controlling (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Control Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	2	24	8.33
Ineffective	1	21	4.76
	N=3		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	3	23	13.04
Ineffective	-	21	---
"Iffy"	1	1	100.00
	N=4		

	Number of Control Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	2	30	6.67
Ineffective	1	23	4.35
	N=3		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	3	30	10.00
Ineffective	1	27	3.70
"Iffy"	1	1	100.00
	N=5		

totally effective because there was still strong student sentiment against the point system. The president thus classified the incident as "iffy."

The incidents which comprised the Governing Board Critical Problem Category were quite diverse in nature and illustrated the active roles presidents were assuming in relation to their governing boards. In two of the incidents the presidents were instrumental in bridging gaps which had existed previously between their boards and particular segments of the academic community. In one incident an experienced president of a small private affiliated college succeeded in convincing the board to accept a recently graduated alumnus as a voting member. In the second incident a new president of a private affiliated college was successful in having the board open its meetings to greater participation by faculty and administrators. The result has been enhanced trust and communication between the board and these groups. Two other presidents reported ineffective incidents with respect to the governing boards of their institutions. One, a new president of a private affiliated college, has been unsuccessful in involving his board in fund raising. The board has taken the stance that the president was hired to handle this. An experienced president of a similar institution reported that he had been ineffective in his efforts to change the status of his board from that

of a ceremonial body to that of a fully functioning,
vigorous working body. A summary of the effective and
ineffective classifications of the Governing Board inci-
dents is given in Table 25.

The Public Relations Critical Problem Category
contains incidents which occurred both inside and outside
the institution, but which had a decisive influence on the
public image or public relations of the institution. In
one incident, the president had not been in office even
a week when a delicate public relations problem arose
which threatened the well-being of the entire institution.
The problem related to a matter over which the new presi-
dent had had no control, but it illustrated the fact that
even presidents in their very first week of office are not
immune from problems that potentially have a significant
influence on their effectiveness. In this incident the
new president was able to delegate the responsibility for
handling the problem to the former acting president, and
the problem was successfully resolved.

Another new president reported two incidents in
which he felt the institution had acted appropriately,
but which he still reported as ineffective due to the
manner in which the press reported them and the resulting
damage to the institution's public image.

A new president of another public university re-
ported as effective his action to convince the governing

TABLE 25.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved the Governing Board (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Governing Board Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	1	24	4.17
Ineffective	2	21	9.52
	N=3		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	1	23	4.35
Ineffective	2	21	9.52
	N=3		

	Number of Governing Board Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	2	30	6.67
Ineffective	2	23	8.70
	N=4		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	1	30	3.33
Ineffective	2	27	7.41
	N=3		

board to substitute a public relations effort, which
benefited the entire university, for an expensive inaugu-
ration for himself. The president felt his action has
enhanced his reputation as a university president who was
concerned about the taxpayer's dollar.

A summary of the extent to which new and experi-
enced presidents considered their involvement in public
relations to have been effective or ineffective, and of
the percentage of effective and ineffective incidents
which this constituted, appears in Table 26. This infor-
mation for the Academic General Critical Problem Category
appears in Table 27. Two incidents which were placed in
the Academic General category because they involved aca-
demic grades, were of particular interest because of the
indications they give of the legalistic atmosphere now
pervading society and higher education.[1] In both incidents
individual students were threatening to bring suit against
a professor for having given them failing grades. In the
one incident a new president of a private affiliated
college was able to talk a male undergraduate out of
pressing charges. The president was thus able to report
this as an effective incident.

In the second incident, however, a female graduate
student in a large private independent university could not

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[1]The remarks of an experienced president on the
extent to which presidents must now concern themselves
with legal matters, appear in Chapter V.

TABLE 26.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Public Relations (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Public Relations Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent	Number of Public Relations Related Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
	New Presidents--Selected Incidents			New Presidents--All Incidents		
Effective	2	24	8.33	3	30	10.00
Ineffective	2	21	9.52	2	23	8.70
	N=4			N=5		
	Experienced Presidents--SISP			Experienced Presidents--AIAP		
Effective	-	23	---	1	30	3.33
Ineffective	1	21	4.76	1	27	3.70
	N=1			N=2		

TABLE 27.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Academic General Concerns (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Academic General Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	2	24	8.33
Ineffective	2	21	9.52
	N=4		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	-	23	---
Ineffective	1	21	4.76
	N=1		

	Number of Academic General Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	3	30	10.00
Ineffective	2	23	8.70
	N=5		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	-	30	---
Ineffective	1	27	3.70
	N=1		

be swayed in her determination to press charges and the case was in litigation at the time of the interview. Even though the president anticipated that the professor and the university would win the case, he reported the incident as ineffective because his efforts to prevent litigation had failed and because of the adverse publicity the school had already received over the case.

In the Hemphill and Walberg study, presidents in New York reported that a major roadblock to their effectiveness was the time taken up by administrative detail (at the expense of more important matters). Presidents reported that they were forced to spend their time in this fashion due to a lack of competence on the part of subordinate administrators.[1] In the present study at least five incidents so clearly represented instances where the president was forced to become involved because of subordinate ineffectiveness, that a Critical Problem Category was developed under this label. Other incidents in the study also reflected examples of subordinate ineffeciency or ineffectiveness, but the major thrust of the incidents lay in other problem areas and they were categorized accordingly. Two of the incidents in this category involved the student personnel dean, one the entire student personnel division, one an unidentified subordinate, and finally, a business manager. Each of the incidents was

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[1]Hemphill and Walberg, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

reported by a different president and four were classified
by the presidents as ineffective, one as iffy (see Table
28).

In the Student Relations Critical Problem Category,
four of the incidents were effective and one ineffective
(see Table 29). Two of the five incidents involved efforts
by the respective presidents to provide increased oppor-
tunities for the black students on their campuses to estab-
lish their identity. The new president of a small private
affiliated college enhanced his relations with students
by making it a practice to eat with them several times a
week in the student dining room. The new president of a
public university demonstrated his concern for students by
organizing a special effort to see that the placement
needs of graduating students were being met.

In the only ineffective incident in the Student
Relations category, the new president of a large private
independent university was seeking to facilitate student
interests by helping to bring the necessary parties to-
gether to set up a major event. The president felt the
students were deceitful, however, in that they turned
the event into a rock festival. This resulted in some
damage to the facility in which the event was held, as
well as in strained relations between the president and
the students, and between the university and the com-
munity.

TABLE 28.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Subordinate Ineffectiveness (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Subordinate Ineffectiveness Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent		Number of Subordinate Ineffectiveness Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
	New Presidents-- Selected Incidents				**New Presidents-- All Incidents**		
Effective	-	24	---		-	30	---
Ineffective	1	21	4.76		1	23	4.35
"Iffy"	1	1	100.00		1	1	100.00
	N=2				N=2		
	Experienced Presidents-- SISP				**Experienced Presidents-- AIAP**		
Effective	-	23	---		-	30	---
Ineffective	3	21	14.29		3	27	11.11
	N=3				N=3		

TABLE 29.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Student Relations (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Student Relations Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	2	24	8.33
Ineffective	1	21	4.76
	N=3		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	1	23	4.35
Ineffective	-	21	---
	N=1		

	Number of Student Relations Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	3	30	10.00
Ineffective	1	23	4.35
	N=4		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	1	30	3.33
Ineffective	-	27	---
	N=1		

The Critical Problem Category of Planning contained the only incident in the study which involved an event that occurred prior to the time the individual became president. The incident was included, however, because it led to the appointment of the individual as president and was a pivotal event in the life of the college. At the time of the incident the individual was a consultant to the college and he made a recommendation that the institution remain open. The governing board felt that, if the institution was to survive, it needed someone at its helm who believed in its future. They, therefore, asked this person to accept the presidency. This incident and the other three related by this president also represented the only incidents where the actual continuance of the institution potentially hinged on the outcomes of the incidents.

Two presidents, one the new president of a small private affiliated college and the other the experienced president of a large public university with over 20,000 students, reported as ineffective their inability to get their institutions to cope more effectively with long-range planning. The new president was specifically concerned with his inability to convince the dean of the college to move from an ad hoc method of operation to a method based on prior planning, whereas the experienced president was generally concerned about the lack of long-range planning for the institution as a whole.

The final incident in the Planning category was reported by an experienced president of another large public university with over 20,000 students. The president reported as ineffective his inability to persuade the faculty to reorder their priorities to what he felt should be the priorities for faculty in an institution of that nature. The summary for the number and per cent of effective and ineffective incidents in the Planning category appears in Table 30.

Two of the three incidents in the Organizing Critical Problem Category were reported by the experienced president of a public college, and were sequentially related. The first incident in the sequence extended back beyond the suggested eighteen-month time span, but it was retained as part of the data given its relationship to the more current incident. The first incident involved the president's attempts to put into practice a theory of administrative organization that he felt had validity. The president still felt that the theory had its merits, but his attempts to implement the theory at this college "failed quite dramatically." As a result, they have had to completely revise the administrative structure of the college. The revision process was reported as the second incident in the sequence and the outcome in this case was effective in the eyes of the president.

TABLE 30.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Planning (in Relation to the number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Planning Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	1	24	4.17
Ineffective	-	21	---
	N=1		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	-	23	---
Ineffective	-	21	---

	Number of Planning Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	1	30	3.33
Ineffective	1	23	4.35
	N=2		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	-	30	---
Ineffective	2	27	7.41
	N=2		

The remaining incident in the Organizing category was reported by the experienced president of a small private affiliated college and was an expression of his concern over the presence of a faculty representative on his cabinet. The president felt that there were occasions when the academic dean could not discuss his concerns regarding individual faculty due to the presence of this faculty representative. The president felt, however, that because he failed to take a firm stand on the cabinet organization when he first came to the institution, he now could not remove the faculty representative without severely damaging his relations with the faculty. Thus, while the initial instance of ineffectiveness fell outside the eighteen-month period, the president reported this as an "incident" in which he felt a continuing sense of ineffectiveness. The summary of the number and per cent of effective and ineffective incidents in the Organizing Critical Problem Category appears in Table 31.

Of the incidents that fell within the <u>Compensation</u> Critical Problem Category, one related to the stance one administrator took when the faculty began to move toward collective bargaining, and the other two illustrated the manner in which two presidents handled the establishment of new programs of faculty compensation at their respective institutions. All three of the incidents were perceived by the three experienced presidents who reported them to have been effective in nature (see Table 32).

TABLE 31.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Organizing (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Organizing Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent	Number of Organizing Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
	New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			New Presidents-- All Incidents		
Effective	--	24	---	--	30	---
Ineffective	--	21	---	--	23	---
	Experienced Presidents-- SISP			Experienced Presidents-- AIAP		
Effective	1	23	4.35	1	30	3.33
Ineffective	2	21	9.52	2	27	7.41
	N=3			N=3		

TABLE 32.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Compensation (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Compensation Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent	Number of Compensation Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
	New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			New Presidents-- All Incidents		
Effective	—	24	---	—	30	---
Ineffective	—	21	---	—	23	---
	Experienced Presidents-- SISP			Experienced Presidents-- AIAP		
Effective	2	23	8.70	3	30	10.00
Ineffective	—	21	---	—	27	---
	N=2			N=3		

The incidents in the final Critical Problem Category, <u>Employee Relations</u>, involved special efforts on the part of the presidents to influence faculty or faculty, staff, and administration actions. The presidents intimated that their effectiveness in these efforts depended to a great extent on their relations with these groups and this served as the basis for the label for the category. In two of the incidents, one involving the experienced president of a public university and the other the experienced president of a private affiliated liberal arts college, the respective presidents were effective in influencing faculty committees to reconsider actions they were proposing. The new president of a small private independent college, on the other hand, expressed disappointment in the fact that he had been ineffective in convincing all college personnel that their support was needed to maintain the corporate image of the institution. This president felt quite strongly that the optimism or pessimism which the employees reflected, could be a major factor in determining whether the institution survived. The summary for the Employee Relations Critical Problem Category appears in Table 33.

Tables 34 through 37 contain summary information which provide a synopsis of results of the incident analysis by Critical Problem Category. The tally of the references presidents made to specific individuals or

TABLE 33.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents Which Involved Employee Relations (in Relation to the Number of Incidents Used as the Data Base for the Respective Classifications of Incidents)

	Number of Employee Relations Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- Selected Incidents			
Effective	-	24	---
Ineffective	1	21	4.76
	N=1		
Experienced Presidents-- SISP			
Effective	1	23	4.35
Ineffective	-	21	---
	N=1		

	Number of Employee Relations Incidents	Number of Possible Incidents	Per Cent
New Presidents-- All Incidents			
Effective	-	30	---
Ineffective	1	23	4.35
	N=1		
Experienced Presidents-- AIAP			
Effective	2	30	6.67
Ineffective	-	27	---
	N=2		

TABLE 34.—Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents by Critical Problem Category and Experience Level of the Presidents (Selected Incidents-Selected Presidents)

	Effective Incidents		Ineffective Incidents	
	New	Experienced	New	Experienced
Finance	3	5	3	5
Campus Unrest	2	7	3	1
Staffing	5	1	3	4
Governance	4	1	2	2
Controlling	2	3	1	-
Governing Board	1	1	2	2
Public Relations	2	-	2	1
Academic General	2	-	2	1
Subordinate Ineffectiveness	-	-	1	3
Student Relations	2	1	1	-
Planning	1	-	-	-
Organizing	-	1	-	2
Compensation	-	2	-	-
Employee Relations	-	1	1	-
	N=24	N=23	N=21	N=21

TABLE 35.--Summary of the Number of Effective and Ineffective Incidents by Critical Problem Category and Experience Level of the Presidents (All Incidents-All Presidents)

	Effective Incidents		Ineffective Incidents	
	New	Experienced	New	Experienced
Finance	4	5	3	5
Campus Unrest	2	9	3	3
Staffing	6	1	3	5
Governance	4	3	3	2
Controlling	2	3	1	1
Governing Board	2	1	2	2
Public Relations	3	1	2	1
Academic General	3	-	2	1
Subordinate Ineffectiveness	-	-	1	3
Student Relations	3	1	1	-
Planning	1	-	1	2
Organizing	-	1	-	2
Compensation	-	3	-	-
Employee Relations	-	2	1	-
	N=30	N=30	N=23	N=27

TABLE 36.--Number, Per Cent, and Rank of Incidents Per Critical Problem Category for New and Experienced Presidents (Selected Incidents-Selected Presidents)

	New Presidents			Experienced Presidents		
	Number	Per Cent	Rank	Number	Per Cent	Rank
Finance	6	13.04	2	10	22.22	1
Campus Unrest	5	10.88	3	8	17.78	2
Staffing	8	17.39	1	5	11.11	3
Governance	6	13.04	2	3	6.67	5
Controlling	3	6.52	5	4	8.84	4
Governing Board	3	6.52	5	3	6.67	5
Public Relations	4	8.70	4	1	2.22	7
Academic General	4	8.70	4	1	2.22	7
Subordinate Ineffectiveness	2	4.35	6	3	6.67	5
Student Relations	3	6.52	5	1	2.22	7
Planning	1	2.17	7	-	--	-
Organizing	-	--	-	3	6.67	5
Compensation	-	--	-	2	4.44	6
Employee Relations	1	2.17	7	1	2.22	7
	N=46	%=100.00		N=45	%=100.00	

TABLE 37.--Number, Per Cent, and Rank of Incidents Per Critical Problem Category for New and Experienced Presidents (All Incidents-All Presidents)

	New Presidents			Experienced Presidents		
	Number	Per Cent	Rank	Number	Per Cent	Rank
Finance	7	12.96	2	10	17.24	2
Campus Unrest	5	9.26	3	12	20.69	1
Staffing	9	16.67	1	6	10.35	3
Governance	7	12.96	2	5	8.62	4
Controlling	3	5.56	5	4	6.90	5
Governing Board	4	7.41	4	3	5.17	6
Public Relations	5	9.26	3	2	3.45	7
Academic General	5	9.26	3	1	1.72	8
Subordinate Ineffectiveness	2	3.70	6	3	5.17	6
Student Relations	4	7.41	4	2	3.45	7
Planning	2	3.70	6	2	3.45	7
Organizing	-	--	-	3	5.17	6
Compensation	-	--	-	3	5.17	6
Employee Relations	1	1.85	7	2	3.45	7
	N=54	%=100.00		N=58	%=100.00	

groups, which was the final stage of the analysis, appears in Appendix C.

Questions of Interest

The results of the incident analysis led to the following conclusions regarding the "Questions of Interest" which have served as a basis for the study. These questions were listed in Chapter III but will be repeated here.

1. Are new presidents facing essentially similar or different types of incidents than is the case for experienced presidents?

Certain new presidents reported incidents which they felt were specifically related to their newness. Consideration of these incidents led the researcher to conclude that, while they may have been related to the presidents' newness in either or both the institution or the position in the institution, they were not incidents which were the result of newness to the presidency.

Although one new president indicated that he purposely planned to make no personnel changes in his first year, and to keep other changes to a minimum, many of the other new presidents reported that they felt they had both the opportunity and the obligation to make some dramatic changes in the operation and/or personnel of their institutions. Experienced presidents were also involved

in instituting changes, however, so involvement in change was not one-sided.

The information in Table 37 shows that, when all incidents were considered, all Critical Problem Categories contained at least one incident reported by an experienced president. Two categories, Organizing and Compensation, did not contain any incidents reported by new presidents. Both categories contained only three incidents, however, and in the Organizing category two of the three incidents were reported by one experienced president.

The overall impression that was gained from a thorough review of all incidents was that, while certain incidents did relate to transitions in administrations, and were thus different from the types of incidents experienced presidents were reporting, the majority of incidents reported by new and experienced presidents involved very similar problems and concerns.

Questions 2 and 3 will be considered together due to their similarity and the nature of the reporting.

2. Will effective incidents as reported by experienced presidents show any marked differences from effective incidents reported by new presidents with respect to the reference groups involved and/or the types of situations confronted?

3. Will ineffective incidents as reported by experienced presidents show any marked differences from ineffective incidents reported by new presidents with respect to the reference groups involved and/or the types of situations confronted?

The reader is referred to Tables 17 and 18 for a summary of the effective and ineffective incidents which involved specific reference groups, and to Tables 34 and 35 for the summary by Critical Problem Category. One of the more interesting findings of the study was that both new and experienced presidents reported more effective than ineffective incidents involving students. When selected incidents were considered (Table 17), new presidents reported three effective incidents for every two ineffective incidents with students, and the experienced presidents reported three effective incidents for each ineffective incident. This ratio was closer to two effective for each ineffective for the experienced presidents dealings with students when all incidents were considered (13 effective, 7 ineffective). With faculty-related incidents, the experienced presidents reported two effective incidents for each ineffective (when all incidents were considered), whereas the new presidents reported one less effective than ineffective incident. In incidents where administrators constituted the primary reference group, neither new nor experienced presidents reported as many effective as ineffective incidents.

When the types of incidents were considered as
represented by the Critical Problem Categories, the most
impressive finding concerned incidents involving campus
unrest, and was the fact that experienced presidents re-
ported three effective incidents for each ineffective
incident. New presidents reported fewer incidents involv-
ing campus unrest and they reported one less effective
than ineffective incident.

Staffing was a category where a distinct difference
appeared between the two groups of presidents in the
direction of success. Whereas new presidents reported
two effective incidents for each ineffective incident
(6 effective, 3 ineffective), experienced presidents
reported only one effective and five ineffective inci-
dents pertaining to staffing.

Differences did thus appear in the extent to
which new and experienced presidents were meeting with
success or difficulty in coping with various types of
incidents involving varying reference groups. The differ-
ences were by no means all in one direction, however.

4. Do particular training needs become evident as a
   result of the types of incidents with which presi-
   dents are confronted and/or the measure of success
   or lack of same they are experiencing in handling
   these situations?

The number and nature of the incidents involving
financial decisions, clearly revealed the need for presi-
dents with training in this area. The presidents in the
study reported as many effective as ineffective incidents
in this category (see Tables 34 and 35), but even some of
the effective incidents were in areas of deficit budgeting.

Although campus unrest currently appears to be on
the wane, the results of the study emphasize the importance
of training presidents to be able to cope with confron-
tation situations. The experienced presidents who partici-
pated in the study reported a large measure of success in
this area. Possibly this is the reason they survived the
unrest period.

Presidents definitely need to be sensitized to the
life style, feelings, and needs of minority individuals and
groups. Over 11 per cent of all incidents involved black
students and/or black faculty. While the presidents re-
ported more effective than ineffective incidents involving
blacks, the impact the minority student can have on the
effectiveness of the president was clearly demonstrated.
One president considered the effective handling of a
racially tense campus setting to have been the most criti-
cal incident in the life of the college in recent years.
He also felt that it was a pivotal point in his presi-
dency for he actually placed his job on the line with the
governing board, asking for a vote of confidence regarding
his handling of the situation.

In essence, each Critical Problem Category could
be said to represent a training need or multiple training
needs. The incidents presented by the twenty-six presi-
dents reflected the diversity of situations with which the
president must deal. They reflected the variety of consti-
tuencies or publics with whom the president must interact.
The president obviously needs extensive training as a
manager and a human relator.

5. In the Hemphill and Walberg study, the presidents
   reported that a "major roadblock" to their effec-
   tiveness was the amount of time they had to spend
   on administrative matters. They considered the
   necessity, in turn, to be a result of the incompe-
   tence of their subordinates. This led to the
   question of whether the incidents reported in the
   current study would reflect a similar appraisal
   of subordinate effectiveness.

The results of the incident analysis supported the
Hemphill and Walberg finding that subordinates constitute
a major roadblock to the effectiveness of many presidents.
There were differences, however, in the way the roadblocks
appeared in the incidents and the way the presidents in
the Hemphill and Walberg study reported them. In the
Hemphill and Walberg study, the roadblock was the need to
spend time on administrative detail (brought on by subordi-
nate incompetence), whereas in the incidents in this

study, the presidents felt they had to make decisions
that subordinates should have made but would not make, or
else they had to seek to resolve crises precipitated by
the incompetent handling of affairs by subordinates. For
additional information on this, the reader is referred to
the section in this chapter where the incidents in the
Subordinate Ineffectiveness Critical Problem Category were
discussed.

6. Hemphill and Walberg asked selected presidents
   to relate some of their initial successes. Most
   of the responses had to do with the organizational
   development of the institution. This led to the
   question of whether the effective incidents re-
   ported by the new presidents in the current study
   would reflect a similar tendency.

The analysis revealed that new presidents were much
more involved in staffing and in planning activities than
in organizing. Thus, this finding would not be supported
by the results of this study. Since presidents were only
asked to relate four incidents, they may have been in-
volved in organizing activities, but: (1) had not had the
opportunity to evaluate whether the changes were effective
or ineffective, or; (2) did not consider the incidents
involving organization to have had as significant an
impact on their effectiveness as the ones they reported.

7. Several of the studies related information on the age, educational attainments, and mobility patterns of presidents. Would the demographic data collected in this study reflect similarities or differences with respect to these factors?

The reader is referred to the first section of this chapter for a review of the demographic information on the participating presidents. This information reflected similarities in the age, educational attainment, and mobility patterns of the presidents in the current study, and those in the Ferrari and Hodgkinson studies.

8. Campus unrest received extensive publicity during the period for which the presidents were asked to relate the incidents having an impact on their own effectiveness. To what extent, if any, did campus unrest come to the forefront in the incidents the presidents reported, and did the presidents perceive their responses to have been primarily effective or ineffective?

Campus unrest was definitely perceived as having been critical to the effectiveness of numerous presidents. Finance was the only other area which involved as many incidents. The majority of the unrest incidents were reported by experienced presidents, and they perceived their involvement in confronting these situations to have been primarily effective.

Summary

The present chapter included three major sections. In the first section the characteristics of the twenty-six participating presidents were described. This was followed by an analysis of the critical incidents which these presidents reported. Finally, the implications the analysis held for the "Questions of Interest" were discussed.

Characteristics of the Presidents

Twelve of the twenty-six presidents met the specifications for being classified as "new," and fourteen met the specifications for being classified as "experienced." Eight of the new presidents held the Ph.D., two the Ed.D., and one each the D.B.A. and J.D. Nine experienced presidents held the Ph.D., one the Ed.D., and one each the L.L.B., M.A., M.ed., and B.D. The average age of the new presidents was just over 44; that of the experienced presidents close to 53.

Although both new and experienced presidents had been in a variety of positions prior to their appointment as president, 81 per cent were in other positions in higher education. Two of the experienced presidents had served as presidents of other higher educational institutions prior to their present appointment. No specific pattern of mobility, other than the emphasis on previous higher educational experience, was evident from this data.

Twelve of the twenty-five presidents on whom this information was available had had some prior affiliation with the institution which they were serving as president.

Analysis of the Critical Incidents

The twenty-six presidents reported a total of 112 critical incidents: 60 of an effective nature (53.6 per cent); 50 of an ineffective nature (44.6 per cent); and 2 which the presidents who reported them felt were significant, but which they could not yet classify as effective or ineffective in that the final outcomes were not yet known (1.8 per cent).

The researcher categorized all 112 incidents on three separate occasions. The second classification agreed with the first on 94.6 per cent of the categorizations, and the third categorization agreed with the second on 95.5 per cent of the categorizations. An independent judge with a strong research background independently categorized 10 per cent of the incidents (12 incidents) and was in perfect agreement with the researcher's categorizations on ten of twelve or 83.33 per cent of these test incidents.

The second judgment concerned whether a primary reference group or groups could be identified for each incident. Thus, the question which the researcher considered was whether a particular individual or group was the primary focus of the president's attention. Students

were judged to be the primary reference group for more incidents than any other group, having been considered to be the primary referent for 32.14 per cent of all incidents. The faculty was the primary referent in 21.42 per cent of all incidents and the administration in 16.07 per cent. The governing board was the only other single referent group for the internal incidents, and this body was considered to have been the primary reference group in 8.03 per cent of all incidents. For the external incidents, local citizens were the primary reference group for two incidents (1.79 per cent of all incidents), the press for two incidents, and the state for one (.89 per cent of all incidents). Ten of the incidents the presidents reported involved no specific reference group.

The third judgment concerned the nature of the problems which had precipitated these incidents. This was the heart of the analysis, for the major purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of the nature of the incidents with which new and experienced presidents were confronted, and which they identified as having been critical to their effectiveness.

Forty categories were initially isolated from the 112 incidents. These forty categories were then grouped into fourteen Critical Problem Categories. These fourteen Critical Problem Categories, and the percentage of incidents they contained were: Finance (15.18 per cent); Campus Unrest (15.18 per cent); Staffing (13.39

per cent); Governance (10.71 per cent); Controlling (7.15

per cent); Governing Board (6.25 per cent); Public Re-

lations (6.25 per cent); Academic General (5.36 per cent);

Subordinate Ineffectiveness (4.46 per cent); Student

Relations (4.46 per cent); Planning (3.57 per cent);

Organizing (2.68 per cent); Compensation (2.68 per cent);

and Employee Relations (2.68 per cent).

When the incidents in the Critical Problem Cate-

gories were tabulated by the type of reporting president,

no category contained more than 16.67 per cent of all

incidents reported by new presidents, or more than 20.69

per cent of the incidents reported by experienced presi-

dents. The category of Staffing contained more incidents

than any other for new presidents (9 out of 54), and

Campus Unrest contained the most incidents for experienced

presidents (12 out of 58). Finance ranked second in

number of incidents for both new and experienced presi-

dents, with Governance also containing the same number of

incidents for new presidents.

Implications for the Questions of Interest

Eight questions were presented in Chapter III as

examples of the types of questions which had initially

led to the development of the study or which had been

generated in response to the review of the literature.

In the present chapter the implications were discussed
which the results of the incident analysis held for these
questions. Question One asked whether new presidents were
facing essentially similar or different types of incidents
than was the case for experienced presidents. The data
suggested that new presidents may have certain freedoms
and/or obligations to implement change, and thus more of
the incidents they reported involved change, but incidents
involving significant changes were not limited to new
presidents.

Questions Two and Three were related to whether
differences would appear between the effective and in-
effective incidents reported by the new and experienced
presidents. The results of the analysis showed a number
of similarities and differences in this regard. With
some reference groups the experienced presidents reported
more incidents involving effective than ineffective out-
comes, whereas new presidents reported more ineffective
than effective outcomes. With other reference groups,
however, the ratio was just the reverse. Both new and
experienced presidents, however, reported more effective
than ineffective incidents in which students were the
primary reference group and this was a noteworthy finding
given the extremely tense period in student/administration
relations these incidents covered. The presidents were
not spared confrontation situations, obviously, given the
number of incidents of campus unrest which they reported,

but they were able to report three incidents where the
unrest was handled effectively for each incident involv-
ing ineffective handling or outcomes.

Question Four asked whether the results of the
incident analysis would identify particular training
needs for presidents. Training needs were identified in
the areas of finance, the handling of confrontation situ-
ations, and human relations.

Questions Five through Eight asked for comparison
of the results of the current study with the results of
previous studies on the academic presidency. The results
of the current study did support the Hemphill and Walberg
finding that subordinate ineffectiveness was a major road-
block to the effectiveness of the presidents (Question
Five). The results did not, however, reflect the emphasis
on organizational changes that the new presidents in
Hemphill and Walberg's study reported (Question Six).
The demographic data collected on the presidents partici-
pating in this study showed similarities to the demo-
graphic data collected in other major studies (Question
Seven), and, finally, campus unrest was perceived by
experienced presidents to have been a major factor deter-
mining their effectiveness. They perceived their in-
volvement in confronting these situations to have been
primarily effective (Question Eight).

Chapter V contains the statements selected presidents made on the state of the presidency and other topics which were of interest, but which were not part of the critical incident study, and Chapter VI contains the summary and conclusions for the entire study.

CHAPTER V

THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY

In essence, this entire study has concerned itself
with the state of the presidency, as reflected in the types
of incidents which presidents have been facing. By extrapo-
lation from these incidents we have been able to gain in-
sight into the world of the college and university presi-
dent.

When interview time permitted, however, the
interviewer asked selected presidents to make specific
comments on their perceptions of the state of the presi-
dency. The question was asked primarily of experienced
presidents, since they would have had more opportunity to
feel the impact of changes in the presidential role, but
several new presidents also commented on this topic.
Although these responses of the new and experienced presi-
dents were not a direct part of the critical incident
study, it was felt that they were of sufficient interest
to devote a separate chapter to them.

Has the Presidency Changed?

The question the presidents were asked was typically phrased as follows: "The literature reflects grave concern over the number of presidents who are resigning and over other symptoms which seem to be interpreted as a deterioration in the status of the presidential role. Would you have any comments to make on what you see to be the current state of the presidency?"

The responses to this question reflect the differences in the experience levels and institutional settings represented by the various presidents. One president, who is soon to retire after some fifteen years as president of a state university, feels that the extent to which the presidency has changed has been overstated. He said:

> I think for one thing, the difficulty of the presidency now, as opposed to the difficulty fifteen years ago when I started, has been overstated. At least that has been true here. We have had problems all the time. I don't think the problems here in the last two or three years have been noticeably more severe than those in my earlier years.

This president felt that, while they had certainly had problems throughout his tenure, and while the university had grown by some 7,000 students, they had avoided serious problems by carefully controlling the rate of growth. He says, " . . . in my view the problem is not so much size, but the rate at which size was achieved. We never took more students than we could handle well. . . ." One must keep in mind, however, that not all

state institutions have had the luxury of controlling their rate of growth due to open admissions requirements or other quota systems imposed by legislatures.

The above-mentioned president also commented that the presidential role had not changed dramatically for him because he had been careful to retain presidential preroga-tives. He cited an incident that occurred some years earlier as an example of a point at which, had he acted differently, his presidential authority could have been lessened appreciably. He spoke of presidential authority as operating under the "ratchet principle," and said, "Some things go in only one way and if you give them away you cannot get them back. Thus, in some schools the authority of the presidency has eroded in the last fifteen years."

The remarks of a president who is in his seven-teenth year as president of a liberal arts college, reflect agreement with the above president concerning the position. In response to the question, "Is the position deteriorat-ing?", he said:

> In my experience, and as I talk to my colleagues in the small colleges, I don't think it is. It is, however, important that you grow in the position and that you not abandon responsibility.

This president also had words of advice for any-one new who might be entering the presidency. He said, "I just think it is important for a fellow coming into

the position to realize that he is going to have a lot of
responsibility, and that he must demand authority that is
commensurate with the responsibility. . . ."

Another experienced president, who heads a state
university with over 20,000 students, felt differently
about the question of change in the presidency. He felt
that a president _is_ under greater constraints than used to
be the case. He stated:

> The opportunity today for a president to function
> is much more severely limited than it was ten years
> ago, for our authority role has eroded. We have the
> same amount of responsibility. Everyone gives us just
> as much hell for the decisions on which we don't have
> the opportunity to deliver the final clout. There is
> so much shared responsibility, but when the ineffec-
> tive aspects of a decision are known they don't bother
> to go to the committee, the committee is long gone.
> The "faceless committee" is what I call it--the
> anonymity of a committee--nobody wants to face up.
> But when the time comes to go on the stand, the presi-
> dent goes on the stand.

This same president made a strong statement about
the extent to which a president is a product of his en-
vironment. His remarks bore him out on this, for his
environment certainly was different from that of the
presidents previously quoted. His campus has been the
scene of volatile instances of campus unrest and he
intensely felt the pressure of the new legalism that now
confronts many institutions of higher education. He
remarked on this as follows:

> Another aspect that I wish some of you would
> study is the new life we have to lead by going to
> court all the time. I have been in Federal court
> four times this year and I will be in court again

soon over some faculty dismissals. . . . That whole
area of what I call the "legalistic environment"
that confronts the university requires us now to have
a university attorney. It requires us never to have
a conversation with a faculty member or student unless
a lawyer is sitting right there. You have to operate
with counsel all the time so that when you get into
court you will not be found guilty of having denied
the individual due process, or of having made immature
decisions based on insufficient evidence.

Not all presidents felt the pressure of the
legalistic environment to the extent voiced above, but
most presidents could at least empathize with the remarks.
The extent to which legal counsel is deemed a necessity
today was reflected in the incidents which were reported
by a new president of a Big Ten institution. At some
point in each of the four incidents, he mentioned the
advice and/or presence of the university's legal
counsel.

One new president reflected on how rapidly and
dramatically he felt the presidency has changed and can
change by reporting on the circumstances surrounding his
appointment. On a Friday in May of 1970, he was offered
the presidency of a state university in Ohio. It was the
following Monday that the four students were killed at
Kent State. Regarding this he said:

> On Monday evening I called the chairman of the
> governing board of the institution [which had offered
> him the presidency], and told him that if the board
> wanted to reconsider their offer I would understand.
> I knew that after the Kent episode no presidency in
> Ohio would be the same for several years, and I felt
> it only fair to give the board a chance to reconsider
> whether I was still the person they wanted for presi-
> dent.

The board did still wish to have this man as their next president, but they also gave him the option to reconsider his acceptance given the Kent incident and the likelihood of an altered campus atmosphere at their institution as well.

Has the presidency changed? Another Ohio president, this one a liberal arts president, felt it has. He said:

> In Ohio there are fifty-two presidents of accredited colleges. I start my eighth year as a president next week and I am about seventh in seniority in the state. We have had forty-five institutions change presidents in seven full years, and some of those as many as three times. And part of this relates to the confrontation situation. . . .

He related that most presidents have grown up in supportive environments. They are used to being surrounded by love and, accordingly, they have developed a good measure of confidence. But things have changed.

> All of a sudden we got to a place in life where traditionally we walked around campus and people said, "There's the old man," or "There's Prexy," and we were loved and respected by everybody. The deterioration started with all the attacks on higher education . . . and then the final blow was when these kids, whom we'd given our lives for, were walking around hating us. It was very difficult.

This president happened to be reading Alton's[1] dissertation on the reasons for presidential resignations at the time of the interview. He had his own theory about the resignations, however, and said:

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[1]Alton, op. cit.

>The major reason for the defection of so many presidents is this, I don't give a damn what they say. When you talk to them privately they say, "Psychologically I can't take it any more."

From the foregoing comments, it is evident that presidents differ among themselves with respect to the state of the presidency. On occasion, they even differ dramatically. One new president, commented on the demands the position made on his time and the extent to which he had had to alter his life style. As a result, he did not feel that he wished to stay in the position for more than a very few years. An experienced president, on the other hand, stated that he viewed the academic presidency as the third most desirable of all positions in the United States. The positions of Supreme Court Justice or United States Senator were the only positions that he felt might be higher in prestige and in presenting possibilities for self-fulfillment and self-satisfaction. As evidence that the state of the presidency has not declined to the extent that some writers have intimated, he pointed to the fact that there has been no shortage of qualified applicants when truly quality institutions have sought a president.

What one might conclude from these varying remarks is that the presidency has changed, but in varying degrees at varying institutions. This raises a question as to the type or types of individual(s) needed to fill the presidential role. A number of presidents spoke to this topic and some of their responses follow.

What Type of President Is Needed?

Men who are currently college or university presidents, whether they are new or experienced presidents, do have strong opinions as to the type of individuals who are, and who are not needed to fill this vital role. Once again, their views are not all identical, although more agreement was found on this topic than on the extent to which the presidency had changed.

The experienced liberal arts college president from Ohio, whose feelings about the "real" reasons for resignations are given above, also related the conclusion many people reached about the type of president who was needed to cope with the volatile campus of 1970. He stated:

> . . . finally, even those of us who were on the inside said, "We need a different kind of a guy. We need a John Lindsay who can walk among the people. Of course you know what's happening to New York City; John Lindsay relates beautifully with the people but the city is going to hell. . . . A lot of colleges rushed out and grabbed people . . . who talked a good game, who lived a good game of relating. And these people, with some notable exceptions, have been tragedies for the schools. They just have not related to some of the people that you have to relate to.

The problem, as this president went on to say, was that in concentrating on obtaining presidents who could relate to students, colleges and universities were overlooking and neglecting their other constituencies. The private college president must be able to relate well with donors, but this was not the interest or forte of the student relators. Many of the "student relator" type

of presidents also allowed themselves to "get in a box where they had to pretty much agree with the students or they were dead." And this, according to the experienced liberal arts college president, was disastrous. "What we forgot, in awe of their [the students] raw power and intelligence, was that they are young, and they have no continuity either prior to this time or in the future. They have no sense of responsibility for the college."

Another president felt that the campus unrest had not subsided completely and that this had implications of a somewhat different nature for the type of president we may see. He said:

> I don't see this [campus unrest] subsiding com-
> pletely. You may see it ebb and flow, but there is
> a radical caucus in higher education that by hook
> or crook will get into decision-making. You will
> see some presidents come out of this who will take
> the position, "Give it away. Let everyone have
> equal right to make the decisions."

This president did not feel that the above mentioned product of the radical caucus should reach the presidency. Rather, he felt that what was needed were presidents with courage; presidents who demonstrated the virtue of making decisions based on the university "mission" and sticking to the decisions even while continuing the dialogue.

What the above president called the "university mission," a liberal arts college president called the "profile of the institution." He felt the presidents'

main job was to "understand," "articulate," "further," and "protect" this profile. He said:

> So this calls for people who can develop this kind of perceptivity and who have the guts to make the kinds of decisions that once in a while they have to make. We have people who come into this job who don't understand it, or to whom the board says, "don't you worry about that." They're just walking into a fool's paradise.

Summary and Discussion

A number of the college and university presidents who participated in the critical incident interviews, commented on the state of the academic presidency, and on the types of individuals who are and who are not needed to fill the presidential role. This chapter has been devoted to a presentation of some of these comments.

Presidents were divided on the extent to which the presidency has changed. Some spoke of dramatic changes, while others felt that the extent to which there had been change had been overstated. Presidents also varied in the extent to which they had experienced self-fulfillment in the position. One longed for the life-style that had been possible in his previous position while another called the academic presidency one of the three most desirable and prestigeous jobs in America.

The presidents comments tend to reflect the experience they have had at their respective institutions. This is not particularly surprising, but it should serve as a caution against assuming that any one president

speaks for all. As one president indicated, "You need to study the president in his institutional environment, for he is a product of that environment."

The writer felt that the twenty-six presidents he interviewed reflected more optimism than pessimism, both with regard to the position of the president and higher education in general. The new presidents expressed the sentiment that they were well aware that they were assuming difficult positions in difficult times; thus the campus unrest and related problems did not particularly surprise or discourage them. The experienced presidents, while holding varying views on the extent to which the problems they were facing were new problems, had still weathered the campus unrest and other storms and several took the stance that they could always do something else if the presidency should become either unchallenging or untenable.

In the final chapter, a summary of the entire critical incident study will be presented along with conclusions and recommendations for further study.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Problem

Institutions of higher education have been under
great stress as they have sought to respond to both in-
ternal and external pressures. Much of this pressure has
focused directly on the office and person of the president.
Strong leadership in this position has been deemed vital
to the continuance of the college and university, yet the
literature has been replete with stories of presidential
resignations and vacancies. Major higher educational
bodies have claimed that colleges and universities were
facing increasing difficulty in attracting and holding
able persons as administrators, and the reports regarding
meetings held for new college presidents reflected an
atmosphere of crisis.

Although much was known about the global problems
facing higher education in general, and in turn the aca-
demic president, little was known about specific diffi-
culties and successes which presidents with varying
tenures and from varying types of institutions were
experiencing. Were new presidents facing similar or

different types of situations than experienced presidents?
What training should a new president receive to cope with
that which he must face? Might not new presidents be
experiencing certain types of successes that experienced
presidents were not realizing?

Questions such as these led to the central problem
investigated in this study, which was:

> What types of incidents do new and experienced
> presidents perceive as having had an impact on their
> effectiveness as presidents; and, in which incidents
> do they feel their actions have had effective conse-
> quences and in which ineffective consequences with
> respect to their objectives?

Use of the Critical Incident Technique

The nature of the problem led to the need for a
method of collecting and analyzing incidents of presi-
dential role behavior. The Critical Incident Technique
was selected as the primary research tool for the study.
The CIT served as both the method for collecting the data
and as the method for analyzing the data once it had been
collected.

Design of the Study

Twenty-six presidents from both private and public
four-year colleges and universities were interviewed either
in person or by telephone. These presidents represented
institutions which varied in size from over 500 students
to more than 20,000 students, and which were located in a
five-state region in the Midwest.

Fourteen of the twenty-six presidents met the specifications for being classified as experienced,[1] and twelve met the specifications for being classified as new.[2] Each president was asked to report four incidents which he felt had had an impact on his effectiveness as a president. Two of the four incidents were to be effective in nature, meaning that the president interpreted the results of his actions to be desirable; and two were to be ineffective, meaning the president interpreted the results of his actions to have been undesirable. The presidents reported a total of 112 critical incidents; 60 of an effective nature, 50 of an ineffective nature, and 2 in which the final outcomes had not yet been determined.

Each of the 112 incidents was first categorized on the basis of whether the primary focus was on affairs or relationships which were internal or external to the institution. A second categorization was based on the primary reference group or groups involved in each incident. Finally, each incident was categorized according to the nature of the problem or concern which had precipitated it. The researcher repeated each of these sub-categorizations three times to insure a measure of

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[1]In office not less than twenty-four months.

[2]In office no less than six months, but no more than eighteen months.

reliability. An independent judge also categorized 10 per cent of the incidents as a check on the objectivity and validity of the researcher's categorizations. The checks on both the reliability and validity produced very favorable results (95.5 per cent agreement on reliability; 83.3 per cent agreement on validity).

Summary of the Principal Findings

Internal and External Orientation of Incidents

Presidents, to an overwhelming extent, reported incidents that were internal in orientation. One hundred six of the 112 incidents, or 94.6 per cent, involved affairs and/or relationships which were internal to the institution. Ninety-six and six-tenths per cent of all incidents reported by experienced presidents were internal in orientation, and 92.6 per cent of all incidents reported by new presidents concerned internal affairs or relationships.

Primary Reference Groups

Seven primary reference groups were identified. The internal primary reference groups were students, faculty, administration, and governing boards. The three external reference groups were the local citizens, the press, and the state. Ten incidents could not be categorized by primary reference group.

Students constituted the primary reference group for more incidents (thirty-six) than was the case for any other group. The faculty were the primary referent in twenty-four incidents, the administration in eighteen, and the governing board in nine.

The combination of students, faculty, and administration shared the focus of attention in three incidents. Faculty and administration also shared the focus in three, students and faculty in two, and students and administration in one incident.

Local citizens were the primary reference group for two incidents, the press for two, and the state one. Of the ten incidents for which no primary reference group could be identified, nine were internal in orientation and one external.

Critical Problem Categories

Forty problem categories were initially isolated from the 112 incidents. These categories were then examined to determine aspects of commonality. Those categories containing common aspects were grouped, resulting in fourteen Critical Problem Categories. These categories, and the percentage of incidents they contained were: Finance (15.18); Campus Unrest (15.18); Staffing (13.39); Governance (10.71); Controlling (7.15); Governing Board (6.25); Public Relations (6.25); Academic General (5.36); Subordinate Ineffectiveness (4.46);

Student Relations (4.46); Planning (3.57); Organizing (2.68); Compensation (2.68); and Employee Relations (2.68).

When the incidents in the Critical Problem Categories were tabulated by the type of reporting president, no category contained more than 16.67 per cent of all incidents reported by new presidents, or more than 20.69 per cent of the incidents reported by experienced presidents. The Critical Problem Category of Staffing contained more incidents than any other for new presidents (9), and Campus Unrest contained the most incidents for experienced presidents (12). Finance and Governance ranked second in number of incidents for new presidents (7 each), and Finance alone ranked second for experienced presidents (10 incidents). The Campus Unrest, Public Relations, and Academic General Critical Problem Categories ranked third in number of incidents for new presidents (5 incidents each). For experienced presidents the Critical Problem Category of Staffing was third in rank with six incidents.

Evaluation of the Principal Findings

Two primary questions comprise the framework for the evaluation of the main findings:

1. To what extent were the purposes of the study realized?

2. To what extent were the findings useful, and to whom?

The Findings and Purposes
of the Study

The purpose of the study was to identify the types of incidents which new and experienced presidents perceived as having been critical to their effectiveness as presidents. A second purpose was to identify those incidents in which the presidents felt their actions had effective or desirable consequences, and those in which they felt their actions had ineffective or undesirable consequences. In meeting this purpose, the study has revealed that:

> When limited to reporting only four incidents, presidents overwhelmingly reported incidents which involved affairs and relationships that were internal to the institution.

> Fourteen categories or types of incidents were identified as having had an impact on the effectiveness of the reporting presidents. For new presidents, the category of Staffing contained the most incidents, whereas for experienced presidents the category of Campus Unrest contained the most incidents. For both new and experienced presidents, the Critical Problem Category of Finance was second in rank in number and per cent of incidents.

> Relationships with a variety of individuals and groups have an impact on the effectiveness of the president.

> Presidents often are the precipitators in the incidents having an impact on their effectiveness. Rather than being reactive, they are often proactive, but not always with effective outcomes.

> The incidents reported by new and experienced presidents reflected similarities and differences, both in their nature and in the patterns of effectiveness and ineffectiveness.

The purposes of the study could thus be considered to have been satisfied.

Applicability of the Findings

The findings in this study were drawn from actual incidents reported by practicing college and university presidents. These presidents were individuals whose talents and experiences had led to their appointment to the highest position education has to offer. They were well qualified to select incidents which had had an impact on their effectiveness as presidents. They had a keen sense of commitment to higher education, to their institutions, to the presidency, and sufficient interest in research on the presidency to give their time to this effort. They reported the incidents with great detail in the personal or telephone interview setting. This enabled the interviewer to ask for clarification of any aspect of an incident which was not entirely clear.

The findings have value to the presidents who participated and to their colleagues. They provide the opportunity to check the nature of their own successes and shortcomings with those of other presidents, and to learn from the experience of others.

Individuals who aspire to the presidency can benefit from the findings through seeing where presidents have been effective and ineffective. Accordingly, these aspirants may be better able to assess their own strengths, limitations, and training needs.

Other higher education administrators may be able to learn from the presidents' evaluation of their subordinates. Presidents tended to appreciate subordinates who could make their own decisions with respect to their area of responsibility, but who also had the best interests of the institution in mind.

Individuals responsible for the training of top level administrators in higher education can also use the information from this study. By reviewing the problem categories, they may better assess the extent to which their programs are adequately preparing future administrators. Several of the reporting presidents were not complimentary in their comments regarding current training programs for administrators in higher education. They stressed the need for field based research, such as this, to provide administrator educators with current information regarding what it is the practitioners are facing.

Evaluation of the Critical Incident Technique

The Critical Incident Technique has a number of advantages for a study of this nature. It is a method by which actual behavior can be studied. Furthermore, it allowed the researcher to identify the nature of the incidents under study, with minimal removal from the context of the situation in which they had taken place.

The personal interview, while proving to be time-consuming and expensive for the interviewer, proved to be a satisfactory and rewarding means of collecting the incidents. It was helpful to be able to see the presidents in their institutional environments and, in turn, to see the urban, suburban, or rural settings in which the institutions were located. The interviewer felt better able to gain an appreciation and understanding for the presidents and the incidents they reported when the personal interview was used.

At the same time, however, the telephone interviews also proved to be a satisfactory means of collecting incidents. The presidents who either selected the telephone interview option or who had no preference and were interviewed by telephone, demonstrated their own comfort and fluency in using the telephone as a communications medium. The incidents reported in the telephone interviews tended to be more concise and less time was spent on cordialities, so the telephone method could be considered to be a more efficient interviewing medium.

The use of the interview method required the extra step of transcribing the data from recorded to written format. The recordings, however, provided the researcher with a valuable data bank of incidents, each in the style of the reporting president, each containing the inflections, illustrations, and other verbal means the president used to convey the incident.

The use of the Critical Incident Technique, however, posed certain difficulties for the researcher. The a posteriori categorization process was long and tedious. It was, perhaps, the most crucial step in the use of the CIT. No simple rules were available, and the quality and applicability of the results were largely dependent on the skill and sophistication of the researcher. The use of an independent judge as a check on the categorization of a few incidents required an extensive time commitment on the part of another individual. The researcher was fortunate in gaining the assistance of an individual with a strong interest in administration in higher education, and a strong commitment to research. Others who have used the CIT have reported difficulty in obtaining competent independent judges willing to commit the necessary time.

The literature indicated that the CIT had many strengths, but also weaknesses. After using this method, the researcher would concur with this assessment. The job of a college or university president is a difficult and complex position, and any attempts to analyze either the position or the nature of the incidents affecting the role incumbent, can only result in partial understanding.

Conclusions

The principal findings of the study have been reviewed with respect to the internal versus external

orientation of the incidents, the primary reference groups, and the Critical Problem Categories. From these findings, several conclusions have been drawn. The following are of particular significance for those concerned with the state of the academic presidency, the training or selection of presidents, or higher education in general.

1. Presidents see their effectiveness or lack of it as being determined in their own institutional setting.

From the overwhelming extent to which presidents reported incidents that had an intra-institutional frame of reference, it would seem safe to conclude that their focus of attention, at least for the period covered by the study, was on the events and affairs occurring on their campuses. This, initially did not appear to be a dramatic conclusion. But, the literature has shown that there was a period in the fifties and early sixties when presidents were chosen and evaluated on the basis of their national connections and reputations, and on the extent to which they could "operate" effectively outside the institution. More recently, presidents were accused, particularly by students, of spending too much time away from campus or on extra-institutional affairs. The studies on use of time by Hemphill and Walberg, and by Ferrari, indicated that these criticisms may not have been fully justified.

The amount of time presidents were away from campus and
the priority they placed on extra-institutional affairs
and obligations were indeed minimal by contrast to their
on-campus involvement. The results of the present study
reinforce the Hemphill and Walberg, and Ferrari findings
for, while they were not based on time involvement, they
do give an indication of the focus of the presidents'
attention.

    2. New presidents are not afraid to take strong
        positive actions.

The literature has reflected an atmosphere of
crisis concerning the number of institutions being headed
by individuals who are new to the presidency. While
institutions may lose momentum if they are without a
president for a period, or if there is not a smooth
transition between outgoing and incoming presidents, the
incidents new presidents reported in this study showed
a willingness to take charge and to take positive action
to meet institutional needs. This reinforced the concept
that presidential success need not be measured by length
of tenure, but by the manner in which the institution
developed during an individual's term in office.

    3. Presidents can not be stereotyped easily.

Presidents fit few stereotypes. They differ in
age, sex, race, and background. Even in an interview
setting, their manner varied from quiet, soft-spoken and

almost shy, to assertive, aggressive and very much in charge. Their approaches to situations also varied considerably as the incidents revealed.

4. Presidents are more involved in terminating than in hiring faculty.

The literature has suggested than an important role of the president is involvement in faculty selection. If conclusions could be drawn by omission, the results of this study revealed presidents to be more involved in non-reappointment and termination of faculty, rather than in selection. Not one incident pertained to faculty selection, whereas five pertained to the non-reappointments of non-tenured faculty members. Each of these incidents was reported as being unpleasant or even disastrous experiences for the presidents, although in two of the five cases the presidents could report the outcomes as effective. The presidents reported incidents involving the selection of department chairmen and members of the administrative team, but not of faculty members.

5. Presidents believe in what they are doing.

Chester Barnard, in The Functions of the Executive,[1] pointed out that few leaders were able to consistently lead an organization or to consistently inspire morale,

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[1]Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 281.

unless they had the conviction that what they did for the good of the organization they personally believed to be right. In talking with presidents, this conviction came through quite clearly. It seemed to be what kept them going in the face of difficulty. They believed in higher education. They believed in their college or university. And, they believed that what they were doing as president they were not doing just for the sake of expediency, but because it was the right thing to do.

6. Presidents are both coping with and precipitating change.

Higher education has changed and is changing. Individual institutions of higher education are changing. Along with these changes there have been dramatic changes in the responsibilities and pressures placed on presidents. But, while the presidents in this study were not beyond making errors in judgment, the interviewer came to the conclusion that those presidents who were opting to be in that role were not only able to cope with the change, but were also change agents. They were involved in revising governance structures and pushing for new involvement by faculty or students in faculty evaluation, or seeking to change the institution's "image."

Implications

A clear implication of this study is that a college or university president needs to be an individual

with multiple abilities. Although he or she must be able
to relate to and with a number of different types of
constituencies, it is not enough for the person to be
just a relator. He must also understand finance and
budgeting, must be able to articulate the mission of the
institution, and must be adept at managing his own time
and resources.

A second implication is that, since no one person
can possess all the needed skills or can manage the insti-
tution by himself, the president needs to have a free hand
to develop a staff of subordinate administrators who
possess complimentary and/or supplementary skills.

There are certainly implications for subordinate
administrators. Presidents seek individuals who can make
their own decisions and take the responsibility for them
without making the president the scapegoat. This impli-
cation has two sides, however, for it also implies that
presidents must support risk-taking and independent
decision-making on the part of subordinates.

A strong implication is the need for presidents
trained to cope with confrontations, and trained to work
effectively with minority individuals and groups, and
those whose cultural backgrounds are different. The more
our institutions open their doors to segments of our
society which previously have been excluded, and whose
backgrounds have not rewarded a submissive or passive

approach to the attainment of knowledge or of identity,
the more they can anticipate a variety of behaviors which
are foreign to traditional academic life. This is not an
argument for continuing to exclude the poor, the black,
the Mexican-American, or the native American. It is an
argument for preparing all segments of the academic com-
munity and particularly the president, to be tolerant of
differences and to be able to work with all types of
people.

Recommendations for Further Research

The present study has demonstrated that the
Critical Incident Technique is a viable method for collect-
ing and studying incidents having an impact on the effec-
tiveness of academic presidents. The study, however, was
limited to twenty-six presidents in the Midwest. The
method should be applied to the study of presidents in
other sections of the country or, even more desirably, it
should be applied on a national basis. The collection of
incidents from presidents throughout the nation would
certainly form a valuable data base that could supplement
the information collected by other methods.

The study should be replicated each two years,
using, where possible, the same presidents as the incident
reporters. This would provide longitudinal information
on the nature of the incidents affecting specific presi-
dents at specific institutions. It would also provide

information on the nature of change, if any, in the types of incidents reported by presidents as they gain in tenure and experience.

A study is needed which differentiates between the incidents reported by very effective, effective, less effective, and ineffective presidents. The present research, while asking presidents to report effective and ineffective incidents, made no attempt to distinguish between the incidents reported by presidents based upon their relative effectiveness as presidents. A study of this nature would, almost by necessity, have to be limited to experienced presidents so that an assessment could be made of their effectiveness as chief executive officers.

A study is needed in which the incident participants, which the presidents have identified, are also interviewed to ascertain their perception of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the incident.

Future studies utilizing this method should ask presidents to rate the significance of the incidents they are reporting. Thus, in addition to learning whether a president views the incident as having been effective or ineffective, information would be gained on the level of significance the incident held for his effectiveness.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Our department sponsors research in various areas of higher education. Since we are involved in the graduate preparation of future leaders in higher education, research regarding administration in higher education is a primary concern.

The college and university president has received much attention in the current literature. There appears, however, to be a need for more systematic study of the presidency. The Critical Incident Technique is one means of analyzing positions and we propose a study utilizing a modification of this technique. More precisely, we are concerned with comparing incidents in role performance which presidents themselves perceive to have been critical to their effectiveness.

Your participation is being requested to provide four such incidents. The incidents will be collected by interview, to be conducted in person or by telephone depending on your preference. You would be involved for only a short time on just one occasion. Mr. William D. Peterson, who is a doctoral candidate in our department and also a staff member at Michigan State University, is responsible for this study and will conduct the interview.

To indicate your willingness to participate in this study please complete the enclosed form and return it in the stamped self-addressed envelope. Mr. Peterson will then contact you to arrange an interview time. Would you also please arrange to have a copy of your vitae sent to Mr. Peterson or enclosed with your reply. This would eliminate the need for soliciting identifying data in the interview.

Please be assured that your name and institution will in no way be identified with the incidents solicited and that all information will be held in strict confidence.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Johnson, Professor

WFJ/kpp

Enclosure

PRESIDENT'S REPLY FORM

Dear Mr. Peterson:

I would be happy to participate in your study of college and university presidents. I will look forward to a contact from you regarding an interview time.

_____ I would prefer a personal interview.

_____ I would prefer a telephone interview.

Name _____

Institution _____

Date of Appointment as President _____
                                 Month   Year

Telephone _____
          Area Code   Number

_____ Sorry, I will be unable to participate in your study.

Return in self-addressed envelope to:

Mr. William D. Peterson
Assistant Director of Graduate
    Education and Research
155 Student Services Building
East Lansing, Michigan 48823

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EAST LANSING

OFFICE OF STUDENT AFFAIRS · DEAN OF STUDENTS

Thank you for your willingness to participate in our study of college and university presidents. You may anticipate a contact in the near future regarding an interview date and time.

The purpose of this letter is to give you additional information regarding the study. As our initial letter indicated, we are interested in comparing incidents in role performance which presidents themselves perceive to have been critical to their effectiveness, and we are asking you to provide four such incidents. In the interview we will be asking for two effective and two ineffective incidents. An _effective_ incident would be one where your own action, or the action you recommended, resulted in the desired outcomes. An _ineffective_ incident would be one where your own action, or the action you recommended, resulted in undesired outcomes or failed to have any effect on the situation.

May we emphasize that this is an effort to analyze incidents that have an impact on presidential effectiveness, not to evaluate you as a president.

The interview will be recorded so that we can analyze the content at a later time and, hopefully, avoid the misinterpretation of your comments that might result if we tried to rely on memory or sketchy notes. The recordings will be retained in confidence and will only be used for purposes of this study.

I look forward to the interview.

Sincerely,

William D. Peterson
Assistant Director of Graduate
    Education and Research

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY east lansing

OFFICE OF STUDENT AFFAIRS · DEAN OF STUDENTS

Thank you for your willingness to participate in our study of college and university presidents. You may anticipate a contact in the near future regarding an interview date and time.

The purpose of this letter is to give you additional information regarding the study. As our initial letter indicated, we are interested in comparing incidents in role performance which presidents themselves perceive to have been critical to their effectiveness, and we are asking you to provide four such incidents. In the interview we will be asking for two effective and two ineffective incidents. An <u>effective</u> incident would be one where your own action, or the action you recommended, resulted in the desired outcomes. An <u>ineffective</u> incident would be one where your own action, or the action you recommended, resulted in undesired outcomes or failed to have any effect on the situation. The incidents you report should have occured within the past eighteen months.

May we emphasize that this is an effort to analyze incidents that have an impact on presidential effectiveness, not to evaluate you as a president.

The interview will be recorded so that we can analyze the content at a later time and, hopefully, avoid the misinterpretation of your comments that might result if we tried to rely on memory or sketchy notes. The recordings will be retained in confidence and will only be used for purposes of this study.

I look forward to the interview.

Sincerely,

William D. Peterson
Assistant Director of Graduate
    Education and Research

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EAST LANSING · MICHIGAN 48823

OFFICE OF THE DEAN OF STUDENTS · STUDENT SERVICES BUILDING   Area Code 517 355-8324

Earlier in June, Dr. Walter F. Johnson, Professor of Administration and Higher Education at Michigan State University, sent you a letter requesting your participation in a study of college and university presidents. To date we have not received your reply.

Responses from presidents have been encouraging, but it is essential that we have the cooperation of as many respondents as possible and we would certainly appreciate your participation. The presidents we have already interviewed have been most enthusiastic in their support of the aims of the study and have expressed the hope that a large number of presidents would participate.

It might be helpful if we gave you additional information regarding the study. As Dr. Johnson's letter indicated, we are interested in comparing incidents in role performance which presidents themselves perceive to have been critical to their effectiveness, and we are asking you to provide four such incidents. In the interview we would be asking for two effective and two ineffective incidents. An <u>effective</u> incident would be one where your own action or the action you recommended resulted in the desired outcomes. An <u>ineffective</u> incident would be one where your own action or the action you recommended resulted in undesired outcomes or failed to have any effect on the situation.

We want to emphasize that this study is an effort to analyze incidents that have an impact on presidential effectiveness, <u>not</u> to evaluate you as a president. May we also emphasize that your contribution is valuable whether you are quite new as a president or whether you are a "veteran."

May we hear from you via the enclosed response form? If possible, please respond prior to the end of July as we desire to complete our interviewing by mid-August.

Sincerely,

William D. Peterson
Assistant Director of Graduate
     Education and Research

Enclosures

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY East Lansing · Michigan 48823

Office of the Dean of Students · Student Services Building

August 5, 1971

We realize that summer is a time for vacations and extensive travel and that, as a result, our previous letters requesting your participation in a study of the college and university presidents, may not have come to your attention. Accordingly, we are once again writing to ask for your participation and to further explain the nature of the study.

This study, which is the basis for my doctoral dissertation through the Department of Administration and Higher Education at Michigan State University, is designed to collect and then analyze incidents that have an impact on the effectiveness of the president. We are particularly interested in comparing the types of incidents which have had an impact upon the effectiveness of new presidents with those having an impact on experienced presidents.

The willingness of presidents to participate in the study has been most gratifying. Currently, however, more experienced presidents than new presidents have agreed to participate and thus your involvement would be especially appreciated. The extent of your involvement would be one interview in which you would be asked to relate four incidents which you perceive as having had an impact on your effectiveness. We would ask that two of the incidents be of an effective nature, meaning that the results of your own actions or the actions that you recommended, resulted in the desired outcomes. The other two incidents, then, we would ask to be of an ineffective nature where your own actions or the actions you recommended resulted in undesired outcomes or failed to have any affect on the situation. As a participant you would receive an abstract of the results of the study.

May we hear from you via the enclosed response form?

Sincerely,

William D. Peterson
Assistant Director of Graduate Education and Research

WDP:me
encls

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY East Lansing · Michigan 48823
_____
Office of the Dean of Students · Student Services Building

August 6, 1971

We realize that summer is a time for vacations and extensive travel
and that, as a result, our previous letters requesting your partici-
pation in a study of the college and university presidents, may not
have come to your attention. Accordingly, we are once again writing
to ask for your participation and to further explain the nature of
the study.

This study, which is the basis for my doctoral dissertation through
the Department of Administration and Higher Education at Michigan
State University, is designed to collect and then analyze incidents
that have an impact on the effectiveness of the president. We are
particularly interested in comparing the types of incidents which
have had an impact upon the effectiveness of new presidents with
those having an impact on experienced presidents.

The willingness of presidents to participate in the study has been
most gratifying. We do, however, need your participation to insure a
representative sample of presidents. The extent of your involvement
would be one interview in which you would be asked to relate four
incidents that you perceive as having had an impact on your effec-
tiveness as a president. Two should be of a nature where you feel
the outcomes of your own action or the action you recommended were
desirable. Two should be of a nature where you perceive that the
outcomes of your own action or the action you have recommended have
been undesirable or have failed to have any impact on the situation.
As a participant you would receive an abstract of the results of the
study.

May we hear from you via the enclosed response form?

Sincerely,

William D. Peterson
Assistant Director of Graduate Education and Research

WDP/sz
encls

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW CONTENT

Personal Interview Introduction

As the presence of the tape recorder indicates, we plan to tape this interview. The research method we are using calls for an a posteriori analysis of the data so the recording is necessary to prevent distortion of your remarks. We are committed to maintaining confidentiality, however, and we can assure you that the recording will be used for analysis purposes only.

Telephone Interview Introduction

Good morning (afternoon) President _____. This is William Peterson calling from Michigan State University. We certainly appreciate the willingness you have expressed to participate in this study and to make this time available for a telephone interview.

This interview is being recorded. A pickup has been attached to the telephone and both our voices are being transcribed. The recording is for analysis purposes only and all information will be retained in confidence.

Both Methods

As our advance material has indicated, we are seeking to gain information from this study which will contribute both to a better understanding of the college presidency and to the improvement of preparation programs in higher educational administration.

We will be using an adaptation of the Critical Incident Technique for our interview method. The Critical Incident Technique is useful as a job analysis method and has been applied to a number of occupations including the junior college presidency.

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NEW   Would you please reflect on your experiences as a president and report four significant incidents which you feel have had an impact on your effectiveness as a president.

OLD   Would you please reflect on your experiences as a president and report four significant incidents which have occurred within the past eighteen months which you feel have had an impact on your effectiveness as a president.

ALL   Please report two effective incidents and two ineffective incidents. An effective incident would be one where your own action or the action you recommended resulted in the desired outcomes. An ineffective incident would be one where your own action or the action you recommended resulted in undesired outcomes or failed to have any effect on the situation. I will ask for one incident of each type at a time and will repeat the definition of the incident being requested. This is the final aspect of your involvement in this study so please feel free to take as little or as much time as you desire in relating each incident. If you can only think of one incident in the effective or ineffective category just relate one. May we repeat that this is an effort to collect and then analyze incidents that have an impact on presidential effectiveness--not to evaluate you as a person or as a president, so please feel free to be candid. We would ask that you use titles or descriptions of individuals as opposed to personal names, however, if you refer to individuals in the incidents.

To repeat, an effective incident is one where your own action or the action you recommended resulted in the desired outcome. Please begin by giving the approximate date of the incident so that we may assess when it occurred in your tenure. Include what occurred, what you did, and the results. The incident you report may have extended from a few minutes to several weeks or even longer, but it should be of a nature where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its effects. I will not interrupt unless I feel clarification is needed. Would you now please relate one effective incident.

To repeat, an ineffective incident is one where your own action or the action you recommended resulted in undesired outcomes or failed to have any effect on the situation. Would you now please relate one ineffective incident.

Would you now please relate a second <u>effective</u> incident?

Would you now please relate a second <u>ineffective</u> incident?

(After incidents have been reported)

Thank you so much for helping to make this study a reality. When the study has been completed and the results compiled we will be happy to send you an abstract if you so desire. Shall we put you on the mailing list for an abstract?

Good day, sir, and thank you again.

CRITICAL INCIDENT STUDY OF

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS

PRESIDENT INTERVIEW FORM

Name of President: _____   Tape Code: _____

Institution: _____   New ___   Experienced ___

Did we receive vitae? Yes ___ No ___   Appointed _____

Did he receive "purpose" letter? Yes ___ No ___   Tenure _____

Date of interview: _____   Personal ___ Telephone ___

Interview began at _____

Interview terminated at _____

Did the president make suggestions or comments or did he have questions about the study? No ___ Yes ___

_____

_____

_____

_____

Effective Incident 1 _____

Effective Incident 2 _____

Ineffective Incident 1 _____

Ineffective Incident 2 _____

Interviewer's impressions of interview _____

_____

_____

_____

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS MENTIONED BY THE

PRESIDENTS IN THE CRITICAL

INCIDENT REPORTS

Individual or Group	Number of Incidents in Which Involved or Mentioned
Administration	31[a]
Department Chairmen	22
Dean of Students	16
Dean of a College or School	12
Dean of the College	9
Student Affairs Vice President	5
University Attorney	4
Vice Presidents	4
Business Manager or Financial Officer	4
Financial Vice President	3
Administrative Vice President	3
Director of Development	3
Academic Dean	2
Assistant Dean of Students	2
Chief of Campus Security	2
Dean of Faculties	2
Dean of Instruction	2
Department Heads	2
Director of Admissions (and Records)	2

[a]In thirty-one incidents the presidents referred to the "Administration." When there are entries in the "Number of Incidents" column for the major categories, e.g., Administration, Faculty, Students, etc., the number is for that entry and is not a total of the numbers that follow for individuals and groups within the category.

Individual or Group	Number of Incidents in Which Involved or Mentioned
Director of Public Relations (or Services)	2
Low-Ranking Student Personnel Staff Member	2
President's Assistant	2
Provost	2
Academic Affairs Vice President	1
Assistant Vice President for Student Services	1
Athletic Director	1
Chief Operating Officer	1
Development Vice President	1
Director of Counseling and Human Relations	1
Director of Data Processing	1
Director of European Campus of University	1
Director of Placement	1
Director of Publications	1
Executive Vice President	1
Head of Building and Grounds	1
Ombudsman	1
Principal of Laboratory School on Campus	1
State Relations and Planning Vice President	1
University Prosecutor	1
Faculty	59
Black Faculty	3
Full Professors	3
ROTC Faculty (Officers)	3
Nontenured Faculty	2
Tenured Faculty	2
Militant Faculty	2
White Faculty	2
Assistant Professors	1
Associate Professors	1
English Department Faculty	1
Faculty Development Committee	1
Faculty Union	1
Personnel Policies Committee of Faculty	1
Senior Faculty	1
Theatre Department Faculty	1

Individual or Group	Number of Incidents in Which Involved or Mentioned
Governing Board	35
Chairman of the Board	7
Vice Chairman of the Board	1
Student Representative to the Board	1
Students	60
Black Students	12
Student Government President	6
Radical or Militant Students	5
Seniors	4
White Students	4
Black Student Association	3
Women Students	3
Black Student Leader	2
Freshmen	2
Liberal White Students	2
Peace People	2
SDS Leader	2
Student Leaders	2
Student Strike Group	2
Average Students	1
Black Women Students	1
Black Football Player	1
Black Intramural Basketball Team	1
Brilliant Students	1
Commencement Marshalls	1
Female Graduate Student	1
Fraternity Members	1
Freshman Women	1
Fundamentalist Students	1
Homecoming Student Emcee	1
Intramural Referees	1
Jewish Students	1
Juniors	1
Male Graduate Student	1
Moderate Students	1
ROTC Students	1
SDS	1
Senior Class President	1
Sophomores	1
Speaker of Student Senate	1
Students with Limited Educational Backgrounds	1

Individual or Group	Number of Incidents in Which Involved or Mentioned
Internal Organizations and Committees	
Student Council	10
Budget and/or Finance Committee	4
College or University Senate	4
Faculty Council	4
Community Government	2
Administrative Council	2
AAUP Local Chapter	2
Student Affairs Policy Board	2
Academic Affairs Committee	1
Curriculum Committee	1
Executive Council of Community Government	1
Faculty, Staff, Student Council on Prejudice and Discrimination	1
Judicial Board	1
External Individuals and Groups	
Outside Consultants	9
Alumni	7
City Police	7
Press	5
Local Industrial Community	4
Parents	4
Civil Community	3
State Legislature	3
Architects	2
Church Group from Supporting Church	2
Congressmen and Senators	2
Jewish Community	2
Local Attorney	2
Local Citizens	2
Off-Campus Blacks	2
State Police	2
ACLU	1
Assistant Prosecutor	1
Campus Minister	1
City Council	1
City Manager	1
City Officials	1
City Police Chief	1
Computer Corporation Personnel	1
Constituents of Institution	1
County Police	1

Individual or Group	Number of Incidents in Which Involved or Mentioned
Distinguished Educators	1
Donors	1
Governor	1
Huey Newton	1
Judge	1
Justice Department Emissary	1
Local District Attorney	1
Manpower Planning Staff (State)	1
Mayor	1
Non-University Males	1
Private Security Service	1
Regional Accrediting Association	1
Right-Wing Element in Community	1
School Superintendents	1
Sherriffs Deputies	1
Sly and the Family Stone	1
State Bureau of the Budget	1
State Labor Mediation Board	1
Vatican Officials	1
Volunteer Supporters of College	1
Internal Staff	
Campus Security Force	6
Coaching Staff	3
Employees	3
Librarians	2
Accounting Staff	1
Counseling Staff	1
Development Staff	1
Janitors	1
Resident Assistants	1
Student Personnel Staff	1
Lay Faculty/Staff in Religious Institution	1
Members of Religious Order Operating Institution	1
Individual With Particular Relationship to President	
President's Wife	4
President's Family	1
President's Lawyer	1
President's Mother	1
President's Physician	1

Individual or Group	Number of Incidents in Which Involved or Mentioned
Miscellaneous	
Previous President	6
Another President/Other Presidents	3
Former Acting President	2
ACE Intern	1
Previous Presidents	1
Wife of Faculty Member	1
College Community	1