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ADAPTIVE REGRESSION. DOGMATISM,
AND CREATIVITY

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Irwin H. Cohen

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ADAPTIVE REGRESSION, DOGMATISM, AND CREATIVITY

By
IRWIN H. COHEN

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Studies
of Michigan State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Psychology

1960

Approved jkabfzzh 1%62Z(IACA('

Irwin H. Cohen

ABSTRACT

The study was undertaken to provide an empirical test
of the theory of adaptive regression as it functions in
creative artists. An operational measure of adaptive
regression suggested by Holt in relation to the Rorschach
test was utilized as the measuring instrument and hypotheses
were generated from the work of Rokeach regarding the relation-
ship of dogmatic thinking to adaptive regression and from
the work of Holt, Kris, Bellak and others regarding the
relationship of adaptive regression to creativity.

Twenty advanced undergraduate art students judged
as highly creative by their professors served as the
"creative” group, and were compared with 20 randomly selected
undergraduate art students with the same degree of art
training.

The Rorschach and Dogmatism Scale were administered
individually to all subjects. The Rorschach protocols were then
scored according to a manual which contains specific
directions and categories for evaluating the extent to which
primary process is manifest and control features associated
with primary process production. The inter—scorer reliability
for the over-all score derived from this system was shown to
be .945, significant beyond the .005 level. Intra—subject

reliability of the same measure was 0562, significant beyond

.~.——/ 0'

2
Abstract Irwin H. Cowen
the .01 level, using the split-half method.
The operational measure of adaptive regression is

given by the formula

= + + . . . .
ARS (DD X FL 4- DCl DC2 DC3 DCn)

where the ARS is the Adaptive Regression Score, DD the rating
assigned to each response indicating the amount of primary
process material contained, FL the form-level of the response,
and DCl . . . DCn the control features of the response. The
right hand portion is summed for all responses up to a
maximum of six responses per card, this limit set arbitrarily
by the experimenter prior to the experiment.

It was hypothesized that the two groups would not
differ in the amount of primary process material produced.
The creative group did produce more responses scorable
for primary process, but this difference was not significant
when the total number of responses was co—varied out. The
hypothesis was therefore accepted. It was also hypothesized
that the creative group would have a higher mean Adaptive
Regression Score, as an indication that these subjects were
better able to utilize the primary process material produced.
This hypothesis was accepted, the mean difference being
significant at beyond the .05 level, with number of responses
and number of primary process responses co—varied out

through the technique of multiple analysis of covariance.

3

Abstract Irwin H. Cohen

Further analysis of the ARS score reveals that the
form-level score is the only factor which differentiates the
two groups. The two groups do not differ significantly on
the factors DD or DC. It was proposed that the FL score
may be acceptable as an operational measure of adaptive
regression in itself, since it reflects the degree to which
perceptual accuracy is maintained during the production of
primary process material. This proposal is substantiated
by the finding that the form-level score of responses not
scorable for primary process does not differentiate the two
groups.

It was hypothesized that the creative group would have
a significantly lower mean Dogmatism Scale score than the
control group. This hypothesis was accepted. It was further
hypothesized that, regardless of classification as creative
or control, subjects scoring high and low on the D measure
would not differ on amount of primary process material
produced. This hypothesis was also accepted. Finally, it
was hypothesized that, regardless of classification as
creative or control, there would be a negative relationship
between the measure of adaptive regression and dogmatism.
Although the correlation between ARS-D is negative, it is
not significantly different from zero. The same result is
found for the relationship between FL-D. Further analysis

of the relationship for the control and creative groups

4
Abstract Irwin H. Cohen
suggests that the Dogmatism measure is positively related to
adaptive regression for the creative group, and negatively
related for the control group. Possible explanations for
such results are given, but further research is needed to
provide more conclusive answers to the questions raised.

The major conclusion drawn from the study is that
the form-level score (FL) is a useful diagnostic measure
worthy of further investigation, both in the study of
creativity with acknowledged artists, and as a diagnostic
instrument in clinical research and practice. Some
suggestions are given for possible research studies with the
score.

Analysis of the results of scoring the Rorschach
records by a traditional scoring method reveals no significant
differences of any of 28 variables, although four variables
are differentiating before equating the two groups for

number of responses produced.

ADAPTIVE REGRESSION, DOGMATISM, AND CREATIVITY

BY

IRWIN H. COHEN

A THESIS

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Studies
of Michigan State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Psychology

1960

6/5/2 ‘/
o/w/W

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In a project such as this, there are always more
individuals involved than may be given their due in a short
statement. I am indebted to the students and faculty of
the Department of Art, Michigan State University, who gave
up their valuable time to serve as subjects and judges; also
to the members of the Department of Psychology and The
Counseling Center who provided much needed "feedback"
during the difficult period of formulating the theory and
design presented in the following pages.

I am particularly appreciative of the helpful
suggestions and constructive criticism given by the members
of my doctoral committee. Although their comments usually
resulted in slightly more of an energy output than I thought
available at the time, the added effort proved to be that
much more worthwhile for their investment.

In partial exchange for their time and efforts, I

would like their names to appear here.

Dr. Milton Rokeach, Chairman
Dr. Paul Bakan
Dr. Charles Hanley
Dr. Gerald F. King
Dr. Albert I. Rabin
Thanks are alSo due to Dr. Robert R. Holt of the

Research Center for Mental Health, New York University, and

iii
to Dr. Martin Mayman of the Menninger Foundation, Topeka,
Kansas, for providing the manuals used in the study.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my
wife Addie, without whom I would not have started, and could
not have finished, the program of study which has ended

with this thesis.

Chapter

II.

III.

IV.

V.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . .

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REVIEW OF

LITERATURE . . . . . . . .

Theoretical Formulations
and Creative Thought

The Artist and Creativit
Studies

Y:

Regression

Empirical

The Relationship between Dogmatism,
and Creativity

Adaptive Regression,
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE .

Subjects
The Control Group
Testing

Reliability of the Dogmatism Scale
Scoring of the Rorschach:

Holt Versus Klopfer Scoring
Instrumentation and Scoring
Traditional Rorschach Scoring

The Dogmatism Scale
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

RESULTS . . . . . . . . . .

0 e 0

Composition of the Sample:
Intelligence and Art Training

Factors

Reliability

Age,

Rorschach: Adaptive Regression
Summary of Results: Rorschach

Variables

Creativity, Adaptive Regression and

Dogmatism

Summary of Results: Creativity,

Adaptive Regression,
Dogmatism

and

iv

22

38

38
4O
42
44
45
46
47
56
56

57

60-

6O
60

78

81

87

Chapter

VI.

VII.

DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SUMMARY

REFERENCES .

Psychopathology and the Artists
The Paradoxical Relationship between

the Adaptive Regression Score and
the Dogmatism Scale Score

Limitations and Suggestions for Future

“APPENDICES . .

Appendix

Appendix
Appendix
Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

A.

Research

Criteria sheet used by Art
Professors to recommend creative

students . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Information Blank . . . . . . . . .
The Dogmatism Scale . . . . . . . .

"Filled" Dogmatism Scale . . . . .

Primary Process categories used for
scoring the Rorschach Protocols, and
the Defense Demand (DD)_associated
with each . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Control and Defense categories used
to score the Rorschach protocols, and
the Defense Contribution (DC)
associated with each . . . . . . .

General criteria for rating Defense
Demand . .

Form Level scores (FL) and
explanation of Form Level categories

Rorschach Scoring Categories -
Klopfer System . . . . . . . . . .

Content Categories used to determine
"Number of Content Categories"
variable in Table 15 . . . . . . .

Raw data - Creative group . . . . .

Raw data - Control group . . . . .

Page
89

95

97
100

103
108

114

114
115
116

119

123

125

127

129

131

132

133

7134

Table

1.

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Page
Age, intelligence and number of art credits
for the creative and control groups . . . . . 61
Comparison of the Creative and Control groups
on number of Rorschach Responses (R), number
of Primary Process Responses (PPR), and total
Adaptive Regression Score (ARS) . . . . . . . 64

Intercorrelations among the Adaptive Regression
Score (ARS), number of Primary Process

Responses (PPR), and number of Rorschach

Responses (R) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups

on number of Primary Process Responses (PPR)
produced, with the number of Rorschach Responses
(R) produced held constant . . . . . . . . . 66

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups

on the total Adaptive Regression Score (ARSL,

with number of Rorschach Responses held

constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups
on the total Adaptive Regression Score (ARS),
with number of Primary Process Responses (PPR)
held constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups

on the total Adaptive Regression Score (ARS),

with number of Primary Process Responses (PPR)

and number of Rorschach Responses (R) held

constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Comparison of Creative and Control groups
on Defense Demand (DD) and Defense
Contribution (DC) scores . . . . . . . . . . 71

Comparison of Creative-and Control groups

on Defense Demand (DD) and Defense

Contribution (DC) with number of Primary

‘Process Responses (PPR) held constant in

each comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Table

10.

ll.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Comparison of the Creative and Control groupsy

on the Form Level Score (FL) . . . . . . . .

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups
on the Form Level Score for Primary Process
Responses (FL) with number of Rorschach
Responses (R) held constant . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups
of the Form Level Score for fesponses not
scorable for Primary Process (FL non PPR) . .

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups
on the Form Level Score for responses not
scorable for Primary Process (FL non PPR)
with number of Rorschach Responses (R) held
constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of the Creative and Control groups
on variables scored by the Klopfer system . .

Comparison of relatively high and relatively
low Dogmatic Subjects with respect to number
of Primary Process Responses (PPR) produced .

Correlation between Adaptive Regression
Score (ARS) and Dogmatism Scale (D) scores
for 40 subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Correlation between Adaptive Regression Scores

(ARSl and Dogmatism Scores (D) for the
Creative and Control groups . . . . . . . . .

Correlations between Form Level of responses
scorable for Primary Process (FL) and
Dogmatism Scale Scores (D) for the total
sample, and for the Creative and Control
groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

Page

73

75

75

76

79

84

86

87

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Creativity is a much discussed, much written about,
but little understood phenomenon. To substantiate this
statement, one need only draw attention to the multiplicity
of approaches used by experimenters and theoreticians alike
in their attempts to isolate, either empirically or speculatively,
variables operating in the creative person.

As Stein and Heinze (1960) have pointed out in their
recently completed summary of more than 300 articles and
books dealing with creativity,

The most striking features of the literature on
creativity are the variety of approaches that investigators
have followed, the variety of results that have been‘
obtained, and the numerous factors about which suggestions
and speculations have been made . . . . Creativity has
been studied in the arts and in the sciences, and a
variety of personality characteristics and factors
motivating creative individuals in these fields have
been pointed out. One person or another has argued for
the importance of pregenital drives, defense mechanisms,
defenses against defenses, insanity, sanity, the desire
for immortality, the need for order, the significance
of sublimation, and the importance of self-actualiza-
tion . . . . Indeed the reader will find as many points
of disagreement as of agreement among the authors
covered here (pp. 1-2).

The study of the creative individual has drawn a

great deal of attention in the second part of the twentieth
century. Since 1955, when the first University of Utah
Research Conference on the Identification of Creative

Scientific Talent was held, six major conferences have been

held in various parts of the country, producing 66 papers

addressed to various aspects of the problem (Gordon, 1956;
Gordon and Bruner, 1957a; Gordon and Bruner, 1957b; Newell,
Shaw, and Simon, 1958; Anderson, 1959; Smith, 1959).

However, it is not only of late that the area has
drawn the attention of investigators, and the introspections
of those involved in creative process itself. Ghiselin
(1952) points to the fact that both Plato and Aristotle wrote
on the creative process, and that early in the nineteenth
century interest in it increased as evidenced by the works of
Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, and Keats (p. 11).
Ghiselin's presentation of the introspective efforts of
38 painters, scientists, authors, composers, psychologists,
and philosophers again bears testimony to the degree of
interest in the topic.

However, despite the criticisms of Hutchinson (1931),
Markey (1935), Guilford (1950), Burchard (1952), and others
to the effect that very little in the way of experimental
work has been done to systematically validate the numerous
hypotheses proposed concerning the creative artists, very
little work has appeared since their writings. Even less is
available if one limits one's search to studies in which
projective techniques are utilized. Burchard (1952), for
example, reports in his presidential address to the Society
for Projective Techniques that he was "unable to discover a
single published research study in which any projective technique

other than the Rorschach has been successfully used, and

the Rorschach, by the most generous count, has been used in
only eight studies" (p. 421). He also deplores the fact

that of these eight studies, only four dealt with persons whose
creativity could be unequivocally demonstrated by an outside
criterion. Since 1952, a search of the literature reveals

only five works in which projective tests have been used to
study the creative artist (Eiduson, 1958; Hersch, 1958;

Pine, 1959; Pine and Holt, 1959; Myden, 1959). If one includes
experimental studies utilizing other than projective techniques,
the number rises to ten (Eindhoven and Vinackey, 1952;
Munsterberg and Mussen, 1953; Drevdahl, 1954, 1956; Rosen,

1955; Berlin, §§_gl., 1955).

While experimental studies have been relatively few,
theoretical contributions abound. In the previously quoted
review (Stein and Heinze, 1960) 84 per cent of the more than
300 works covered are concerned with one theory or another.
What seems needed at the present time is empirical verification
(or disproof) of the hypotheses generated from the vast
amount of introspection and speculation invested in the basic
question: What are the particular psychic constellations
Operating within creative artists which differentiate them
from those artists with similar training who are not recognized
as creative? It is this facet of creativity upon which the
study seeks to throw light.

The present study is based in part on the psychoanalytic

theoretical approach of Freud (1950a, 1950b, 1938), as later

71.11

expanded on by Hartmann (1951), Kris (1952), Bellak (1958)
and operationalized by Holt (1954, 1956, 1959), and in part
on the cognitive theory set forth by Rokeach (1960). I shall
attempt here to determine whether it is possible to empirically
differentiate a group of art students judged by their professors
as highly creative from a group of randomly selected students
upon whom no judgment has been made, and whether this
differentiation can be made on the basis of the degree to
which the artist is able to utilize "primary process" which,
for the most part, is usually suppressed in our society; further,
that the more creative artists are characterized by a degree
of "open-mindedness” (Rokeach, 1960) which exceeds that of
the randomly selected group.

Finally, I shall attempt to determine whether a
relationship exists between the degree of "open-mindedness"
and "primary process” utilization. In the course of
describing the methods used in the study, both "primary process”

and "open-mindedness” Will be operationally defined.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In this chapter I will review those theoretical works
dealing with the concept of adaptive regression as it pertains
to the creative process, theoretical and experimental works
dealing with the psychology of artistic production, and
present a formulation of the relationship between dogmatism,

*
adaptive regression, and creativity.

Theoretical Formulations: Regression and

Creative Thought

In the seventh chapter of Th§_lnterpretation of Dreams,
Freud (1938) distingushes three uses of the term ”regression."
These three uses follow from his discussion of his theory of
dreams, and the model of a psychic apparatus which he utilizes
to explain the coming to consciousness and eventual motor

discharge of impulses originating on the unconscious level.

 

*
No attempt will be made here to comprehensively cover

the literature in the field of creativity. The reader who is
interested in a more complete review of creativity as it has
been explored in music, literature, science, mathematics, and
poetry is referred to Stein and Heinze (1960), who have
annotated more than 300 works appearing since 1900, and to the
following bibliographical coverages: Terman and Chase (1920),
for a summary of works completed from 1914-1920; Cleeton (1926),
Hutchinson (1931), Markey (1935), Venning and Polder (1954)
who extend coverage through October, 1953. For a sampling of
current theoretical viewpoints on the processes involved in
creative thought and production, the reader is referred to the
recently published works of Anderson (1959), and Smith (1959).

I will attempt here to briefly review Freud's theory as
proposed in the chapter cited, and then describe the theories
which have resulted from one of his uses of the term "regression."

The model upon which Freud bases his theory of psychic
activity is taken from physiological theory, the core concept
of which is the reflex act. Briefly, a motor response occurs
as the last part of a chain reaction which starts With the
stimulation of sensory receptors. Nerve impulses originating
in the sensory receptors travel to the spinal cord where they
make connection with nerve fibers leading to effector fibers,
usually muscles. Freud believed that psychic activity too
could be explained using this model, the important aspects
being the "direction" which impulses followed in their course
from perception to motility, and the notion of energy which
moved along the prescribed pathways. He was quite explicit
in his use of the physiological model. "The reflex act
remains the type of every psychic activity" (Freud, 1938, p.
489).

Rather than attempt to localize the psychic process
in the anatomy, Freud preferred to speak of his concepts in
terms which in modern terminology would be called "intervening
variables." "We shall wholly ignore the fact that the psychic
apparatus concerned is known to us also as an anatomical
preparation, (referring here to its localization in the brain)
and we shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine the

psychic locality in any anatomical sense" (Freud 1938, p. 488).

7
His intention was to establish a definite sequence of events
through-which psychic activity passed, and based on the physio-
logical model, he proposed that "All our psychic activities
proceed from (inner or outer) stimuli and terminate in
innervations. We thus ascribe to the apparatus a sensory and.
a motor end; at the sensory end we find a system which receives
the perceptions, and at the motor end another which opens the
sluices of motility. The psychic process generally runs from
the perceptive end to the motor end" (Freud 1938, p. 488).
A number of modifications are then introduced into this simple
framework of a sensory and a motor end of the psychic apparatus.
At the sensory end he proposes that the first stage is a
memory system which receives the stimuli of perception, but
retains nothing of them. This leaves the first memory stage
free to receive new perceptions. Following the first stage is
a second system which "transforms the momentary excitation
of the first into lasting traces" (Freud 1938, p. 489). These
memories are unconscious, although they may be made conscious
given certain conditions. The first stage perceptions, how-
ever, are not unconscious. What is retained in the first
stage are the sensory qualities of the original perceptions.
"The P-system, which possesses no capacity for preserving
changes, and hence no memory, furnishes a consciousness the
complexity and variety of the sensory qualities . . . when
memories become conscious again they show no sensory quality,

or a very negligible one in comparison with the perception"

(Freud 1938, p. 490). At the other end of the apparatus is
postulated the "systems" of unconsciousness and preconsciousness.
These refer to blocking or ”criticizing” functions through
which impulses must pass before attaining consciousness or
motility.

This model is then used to explain the dream process,
and in the course of this explanation, the nature of "regression,"
in the sense in which we shall be using it, becomes clear.
Freud was troubled by the ”hallucinatory” quality of certain
dreams he had heard. By hallucinatory, he refers to the
fact that these dreams were not experienced as dreams, but
seemed to be reality itself to the dreamer. In this sense,
the dream seemed to be a first stage perception rather than a
memory which has achieved consciousness by passing through
the preconscious. He says:

Experience teaches us that the path leading through
the preconscious to consciousness is closed to the dream-
thoughts during the day by the resisting censorship.

At night they gain admission to consciousness; the
question arises, "In what way and because of what
;changes?” If this admission were rendered possible to
the dream thoughts by the weakening, during the night,
of the resistance watching on the boundary between the
unconscious and the preconscious, we should then have
dreams in the material of our ideas, which would not
disPlay the hallucinatory character that interests

us at the present (Freud 1938, p. 492).

Thus, if the dream process were the usual, progresSive
one, the dream material would be subject to awareness as a
dream. This follows from the positing of the function of

consciousness that of making rational decisions and comparing

ideation with reality factors ("secondary process thinking").

The fact that the dream has a hallucinatory character to it
led Freud to posit the "regressive" nature of the dream
process. However, this regression is of a different kind
than a regression of behavior. The individual in no way
behaves or feels as he did at an earlier stage of development.
It is the thought process itself which is involved in this
regression, and in this sense the energy flow is reversed
from its usual course, i.e., from original perceptions through
the memory stages, the unconscious, the preconscious, to the
conscious or awareness state. Freud states it as follows:

What takes place in the hallucinatory dream we can

describe in no other way than by saying that the

excitation follows a retrogressive course. It communicates
itself not to the motor end of the apparatus, but to the
sensory end, and finally reaches the system of perception.
If we call the direction which the psychic process

follows from the unconscious into the waking state
progressive, we may then speak of the dream as having

a regressive character (Freud 1938, p. 492).

Freud was aware that this "regressive" shift also
occurred to a degree during waking states, and spoke of
intentional recollection as involving such shifts. However,
he felt that during the waking state, the regression was
incomplete, involving a return to one of the memory-image
stages only. Therefore, in waking states, the regression
would be incapable of producing the hallucinatory revival of
the perceptual images.

It does not seem important to become involved with

Freud's concern with the extent of regression in our present

discussion. The important facet of his proposal is the theory

10
that the direction of the psychic process may, under certain
conditions, be reversed, and that more primitive processes
of thought might be used in an attempt to return to previously
recorded memory—images. That this form of regression would
not of necessity also involve a total primitivization of
functioning was also pointed out by Freud. "We may therefore
distinguish a threefold species of regression: (a) a topical
one, in the sense of the scheme of the (psychic)-systems here
expounded; (b) a temporal one, in so far as it is a regression
to older psychic formations; and (c) a formal one, when_
primitive modes of expression and representation take the
place of the customary modes" (Freud 1938, pp. 496-7).

It is (a), the topical, later called topographical
(Freud, 1950a, pp. 137-151) regression which is important
for the present discussion. In later papers, Freud makes
more explicit the essential differences between the topographical
and temporal forms of regression. The temporal forms he
viewed as characteristic of psychotic behavior, as in
schizophrenia, whereas topographical regression seemed much
more a part of normal behavior, and of dream formations. He
states (in topographical regression) ”there is free communication
between (pcs) word—cathexes and (ucs) thing-cathexes, while
it is characteristic of schizophrenia that this communication
is cut off . . . . In (schizophrenia) the actual language in
which the preconscious thought was expressed becomes the

subject of elaboration by the primary process; in dreams, it

11
is not the words, but the concrete ideas into which the words
have been resolved. A topographical regression takes place
in dreams, but not in schizophrenia" (Freud 1950a, p. 144).

I would interpret this to mean that in schizophrenia the
conscious ego process loses its control over unconscious drives,
whereas in topographical regression, contact is maintained
between conscious ideas and the more irrational thought
processes.' Therefore, the regression takes place not because
the impulses are so strong as to overcome realistic thinking
(drive-dominated thought), but as a more voluntary process
in which the ego can control the degree of regressionthrough
its undefended contact with the primary process. Another
quote from Freud may make this somewhat clearer. In 1915,
some 15 years following the original presentation of the
formulation in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud's paper
on "The Unconscious" (Freud 1950b, pp. 98-136) contains a
formulation which is later elaborated on by Kris in his paper
"On Preconscious Mental Processes? (Kris 1952), in which the
concept of creative ”regression in the service of the ego" is
presented. In discussing the relationship between conscious
and unconscious impulses, Freud states that
Co-operation between a preconscious and an unconscious

impulse, even when the latter is subject to a very strong

repression, may be established if the situation permits

of the unconscious impulse operating in harmony with

one of the controlling tendencies. The repression is

removed for the occasion, the repressed activity being

admitted as a reinforcement of the one intended by the

ego. In respect of this single constellation the unconscious
becomes ego-syntonic, falls into line with the ego,

.12

without any change taking place in the repression
otherwise. The effect of the unconscious in this
co-operation is unmistakable; the reinforced tendencies
reveal themselves in spite of all--they make possible
achievements of special perfection, and they manifest

‘ a resistance in the face of opposition similar to that
of the obsessional symptoms (Freud 1950b, p. 127).

This is clearly not a return to previously satisfying
modes of behavior due to external threat or an escape from
the intensity of internal impulses. It is, rather, a syntonic
process, in which impulses and the conscious reality testing
process are blended. The phrase, ”make possible achievements
of special perfection" was extended by Kris;

Topographically, ego regression (primitivization of
ego functions) occurs not only when the ego is weak--
in sleep, in falling asleep, in fantasy, in intoxication,
and in the psychoses, but also during many types of
creative processes. This suggested to me years ago
that the ego may make use of the primary process and

“unot only be overwhelmed by it . . . . However, the
problem of ego regression during creative processes
represents only a special problem in a more general
area. The general assumption is that under certain
conditions the ego regulates regression, and that the
integrative functions of the ego include voluntary and
temporary cathexes from one area or another to regain
improved control . . . . The clinical observation of
creators and the study of introspective reports of
experiences during creative activity tend to show that
we are faced with a shift in the cathexis of certain
ego functions (Kris, 1952, pp. 312-313).

.-

Kris posits that one of the functions of the ego is
that of controlling the degree of regression. He states,
"When the artist creates during inspiration, he is subject to
an ego—regression, but it is a partial and temporary ego-
regression, one controlled by the ego which retains the
function of establishing contact with an audience." Kris

feels that the creative artist produces his works of art in

13
an attempt to communicate his inner feelings to others, whereas
psychotic productions have as their goal the transformation
of the external world to conform to the needs of the creator.

Integrating Freud's formulations with those of Kris,
then, one might formulate artistic creation as follows. In
the creative, audience—communicating artist, raw memory stage
material is utilized in the production of his art. He is
able to gain access to this material by suspending his critical
function temporarily (regressing), and then organizing the
memory stage material by submitting it to the critical function
as it takes shape on the canvass or on paper. He gains feed—
back from the production as it goes along, and is able to
change it to conform to what he wishes to communicate. In
the more pathological process, the regression does not have
this oscillating character, and the regression follows more
the model proposed by Freud for his explanation of the dream.
The unconscious material is not transmitted to consciousness
through the preconscious and motility, but follows a retro-
gressive course and becomes "real" to the individual as a
hallucination, a new reality at the sensory or perception
stage. It is not submitted to realistic evaluation, nor
does any feedback occur. The perceptions themselves are
acknowledged as reality without any elaboration on the secondary
process level, and as such are subject to formal thought '
deviations such as dreams are, i.e., condensation, displacement,

disregard for time and space, symbolization, etc.

14
Kris furthered Freud's suggestion of the tie-up
between primary thought processes and secondary processes in
the creative act by integrating Hartmann‘s (1951) conception
of the "neutralization" of impulses. Neutralized energies
would be those which manifest themselves as socially directed
attempts at problem solving, i.e., rational thinking. Non-
neutralized energies are impulses which have not been subjected
to this focusing process. -Kris states;
The ego, we assume, has two kinds of bound energy
at its disposal: neutralized energy, and libido and
aggression in their non-neutralized form. Fantasic,
freely wandering thought processes tend to discharge
more libido and aggression and less neutralized energy;
purposeful reflection and solving problems, more neutralized
energy. In fantasy the processes of the ego are largely
in the service of the id . . . . The content of freely
wandering fantasies is extended over the pleasure-
unpleasure continuum; hence the probability that in
this kind of process, the discharge of nonneutralized
libido and aggression will be maximized. In reflective
thinking the contrary is likely. Refiective thinking,
according to Freud (problem solving, we would prefer to
say), serves to a higher degree the autonomous ego
interests. Discharge of libido and aggression is
therefore likely to be minimized, and that of neutralized
ego energy to be of greater relevance (Kris 1952, 311-2).
This conception, described by Rapaport as "The
single most important contribution to the understanding of the
difference between the primary and the secondary process since
Freud's statement of these concepts” (Rapaport 1951, p. 487),
has been operationalized in a scoring manual for the Rorschach
by Holt (1954, 1956, 1959) (also see Chapter III of this

work).E/Such an operationalized procedure makes possible the

testing of Kris' hypothesis that creative individuals tend

15
to be able to operate over a greater range of the primary-
secondary process continuum, i.e., they are able to regress
to a type of thought which utilizes libidinal and aggressive
impulses in non-neutralized form, this being the phase of
inspiration and phantasy, and also able to discharge the
neutralized energy relating to purposeful reflection,
integration and reality testing.

Schafer, working with the Rorschach, proposes that
this projective technique holds promise for demonstrating
what he terms "shifts in the level of psychic functioning"
(Schafer, 1954). By ”shifts,” Schafer has reference to the
primary-secondary process continuum, and location of thought
manifestations along such a continuum. He points to four
aspects of the Rorschach testing situation which, he feels,
allow the subject to demonstrate the level at which he is
operating. First, the instructions suggest to the subject
that his responses should fit the configurations and properties
of the blots. This is the secondary process or reality testing
factor. Second, that only a resemblance or approximation
is called for. This encourages relaxation of self-critical
striving for objectivity. Third, since the blots are clearly
not pictorial, the testing procedure asks the subject to
"summon up consciously his images of things and to rely heavily
in forming responses on his reorganizations of these images
and of the stimulus field.” The instructions therefore allow

for an element of "subjectivity, imagination and fantasy."

16
Fourth, the instructions reinforce the "inward—turning,
imaginative orientation stimulated by the non-pictorial stimuli
and by the need to search for approximations and resemblances."
Schafer summarizes his presentation by stating,
By encouraging the intensive interplay and intermingling
of imagination and perception, the instructions also tend
to obscure somewhat the line between subject and object,
self and not self, or image and percept. As a result,
the instructions tend to evoke subtle, complex, transitory
shifts in the patient's level of psychic functioning . . .
the level of functioning may range from the developmentally
advanced, realistic, differentiated and hierarchically
organized to the developmentally primitive, physiognomic,
autistic, diffuse and syncretic: or as Freud conceptualized
the difference, from thinking characteristiceof the
”primary process" (Shafer 1954, p. 77).
In terms of the adaptive regression hypothesis, the
creative process would then involve a temporary relinquishing
of the defensive and adaptive ego functions in favor of
discharge of instinctual impulses (a shift to primary levels),
with a second phase following in which adaptation occurs
(a return to secondary levels). Schafer, like Kris, makes
a differentiation between this adaptive regression and psychotic
functioning: ”This creative regression, when it is truly
creative and not predominantly a disguise for psychotic trends
or for unsocialized daydreams, remains essentially under the

control of the ego. It is primarily or largely an active

process of taking imaginative liberties and not an altogether

passive process of being overwhelmed by alien forces." The
sequential aspect is also emphasized by Schafer: "Its active

rather than passive nature is demonstrated by the fact that

17
the creative regression is always accompanied or succeeded by
critical, reality oriented and communication—oriented evaluation
and modification of the primary process material. The creative
process thus involves a more or less oscillating and partial
abandonment and re—instatement of higher level controls
and critical attitudes” (Schafer 1954, p. 80).

This oscillating or sequential process is emphasized
more recently in a paper by Bellak (1958) in which he states?
It might be useful to reformulate "regression in
the service of the ego” as ”a brief, oscillating,
relative reduction of certain adaptive functions of the'
-ego in the service of (i.e., for the facilitation of)
other, specifically, the 'synthetic' ego functions."
What happens is that the cognitive, selective- adaptive
functions are decreased; this weakens the sharply
defined boundaries of figure and ground, of logical,
temporal, spatial, and other relations, and permits them
to reorder themselves into new configurations with new
boundaries, under the scrutiny of the again sharply
functioning adaptive forces . . . regression in the
service of the ego will not be useful unless there is
a frequent oscillation to increased acuity, reality
testing, and a good measure of organizational capacity
as well as frustration tolerance (Bellak 1958, p. 367-69).
Bellak places greater emphasis on this phase following
regression, i.e., the adaptive phase. He talks of the "nine-
tenths hard work” involved in achievement, and attempts a
psychoanalytic interpretation of the inspirational phase of
creative achievement vs. the sustained effort phase. He posits,
like Kris, that the inspirational phase may be related to
the oral phase of development (passive acceptance of impulses)

and that the sustained effortjphase may be related to anal

traits; ("cleaning up, attention to small detail, high

18
frustration tolerance”). Bellak feels that in the second
phase of oscillation (the integrative, adaptive phase)
cognitive and synthetic functions may even be increased above
the normal operating level of the individual (Bellak 1959).
Addressing himself to the question of whether this form of
regression involves solely a topological process (i.e., "a
change from the conscious to the preconscious or unconscious)
or a temporal regression (i.e., "regression to earlier,
childhood legels of functioning”), Bellak concludes that,
”The distinction cannot be made quite definite since, by
definition, nonconscious thinking involves primary process
thinking of infancy and childhood. It will be more precise
to say that a topological regression of the adaptive, cognitive
processes (as one ego function) takes place which involves
simultaneously a temporal regression to primary process
levels; the synthetic function does not regress at all but
remains, or rises in fact, to optimal levels”f(Bellak 1958,
pp. 367-368).

Born (1945) also points to the role of unconscious
processes in artistic production, and suggests that the
unconscious provides the basic principles of design, while
the consciousness provides the formative processes.

Bychowski (1951) formulates the process in essentially
the same manner.

The extent to which it (the artistic mind) draws on

the primary processes and utilizes symbolism is a
sufficient proof that it operates closer to the system

of the unconscious. Moreover, like the dreaming ego,
the creative ego operates through the medium of topical

l9
regression which also demonstrates a mobility of cathexis
unparalleled by an "ordinary" mind . . . . Artistic
creativity is therefore an expression of the power of
the ego to bind energy released from the unconscious.

Bychowski also points to the fact that this formulation
was expressed quite independently of psychoanalytic theory
by Dewey (1934), who quoted Keats' description of the process
of artistic creation as the ". . . innumerable compositions
and decompositions which take place between the intellect
Iand its thousand materials before it arrives at that trembling,
delicate and snail-borne perception of beauty."

To summarize, then, the authors quoted are in basic
agreement that creative thinking, i.e., thinking involved in
the creation of original productions, involves a shift in
the thought process from that of reality oriented, critical,
evaluative thinking to that which Freud has described as
thinking characteristic of the dream process, i.e., a return
to the original memory images, a diSregard of time and place,
thinking which allows for fusion of images, discharging of
unsocialized impulses of a libidinal or aggressive character
and free interplay of associations. Kris has suggested, and
Schafer and Bellak developed, the hypothesis that this "return"
is but part of an oscillating process in which the primary
process stage is followed by a critical, or super-critical
phase in which the material ”liberated" by the decrease in
defensiVe. operations is evaluated, integrated, and made

communicable to others. Some question is raised as to whether

20
the regression described is similar to, either in quality or
kind, the kind of regression involved in psychotic functioning.
The key differentiation seems to be in the voluntary nature of
creative regression, as contrasted with regression forced
by the perception of internal or external threat. Creative
(regression seems to be a process which the ego utilizes for
its own purposes, i.e., the production of something new,
rather than one to which the ego involuntarily submits.

Finally, lest the impression be given that the theory
of controlled, psychic regression is so well accepted that it has
escaped criticism, two works bear mentioning.

Jung (1952), although agreeing that ”the creative
work arises from unconscious depth," feels that the conscious
ego forces play a limited role in the regression which facilitates
creative production.

'Whenever the creative force predominates, human life
is ruled and molded by the unconscious as against the
active will, and the conscious ego is swept along on a
subterranean current, being nothing more than a helpless
observer of events (Jung, 1952, p. 222).

Schactel (1959) criticizes Kris' notion that the genesis
of the work of art is in a regression to primary process thought.
Schactel feels that "the seeming similarity (between regression
due to ego weakness and regression in creativity) emphasized
by Kris is deceptive, and regression to primary-process
thought is not typical of the creative process." His point

is that the early stages of the creative process may resemble

primary thought process in that both involve a freedom from

21
"the rules and properties of the accepted, conventional,
familiar everyday world." The difference, he maintains, is
that Pprimary-process thought uses freely displaceable
cathexes in the unrestrained tendency toward full discharge
of the tension of id drives by the path of (fantasied or
hallucinated) wish fulfillment, that is, in the service of
striving to return to a tensionless state,” whereas creative
process centers on the particular object, idea, or problem
which is the focus of the creative endeavor. He concludes,
"what distinguishes the creative process from regression to
primary—process thought is that the freedom of the approach
is due not to a drive discharge function but to openness in
the encounter with the object of the creative labor."

To Jung's point there is little to be said. There
seems to be sufficient evidence, both logical and empirical,
to refute the possibility that the ego is overthrown during
the creative process. Schactel's criticism seems more
justified in response to Jung's theory than to Kris', for
Kris, Bellak and others have repeatedly emphasized the
"oscillating" nature of the process which does not strive
towards discharge of id drives, but strives toward communication
of the artist's formulation to Others. This communication is
certainly an ego function which could not be executed if the
ego was overthrown, or if the goal was one of full discharge
of instinctual tension. Freud himself makes this differentiation

(see page 10 of the present review) which Schactel has apparently

22

overlooked.

The Artist ahdyCreativitv: Empirical Studies

The first empirical work to appear in the literature
is that of Patrick (1937). She reports the results of an
intensive study of 50 artists and 50 hon-artiSts equated for
sex, age, race and vocabulary level. The study is of
particular interest because it is one of only two (see also
Eindhoven and Vinacke (1952) discussed below) in which artists
are studied in the process of producing the work of art.

Each subject was observed while he painted a picture that was
stimulated in himfl after reading Milton's L'Allegro. Records
were kept of their introspections while working, and although
the artists' productions were judged to be of a better quality
than that of non-artiSts, both groups gave evidence that the
creative process consisted of four stages. These stages were
labelled preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification.
It should be noted here that the conception of a series of
stages through which the artist proceeds is a widely accepted
one. Similar conceptions are found in the works of Hutchinson
(1949) who talks of the stages of preparation or orientation,

. frustration, moment of insight and verification; Wallas (1926),
from whom Patrick took her four stages, Vinacke (1952), and
Gordon (1956), who theorizes that involvement-detachment,
speculation, deferment, autonomy, purposiveness, and use of

the commonplace are the stages through which both individuals

23
and groups proceed in the formulation of a creative product.
Feibleman (1945), in addition to proposing that the motivation
for artistic productivity is unconscious, divides the process
into four stages also: that of gathering and selecting
impressions, revision and reconstruction by the unconscious,
flash of insight, and expression of result. Portnoy (1949)
propounds the theory that "artistic creation begins in
sensory perception: the impressions and memories received
through the senses undergo a period of unconscious elaboration;
after which the latent material riSes to a conscious level
in response to an external stimulus, or the artist may will-
fully indulge in reflection and introspection with the purpose
of evoking an emotional mood conducive to artistic creation.
The artist then symbolizes his feelings in a concrete art
form" (p. 266).

Eindhoven and Vinacke (1952) invited 13 artists and
14 non-artists to produce a painting after listening to an
excerpt from the poem.Night by Charles Peguy. As in Patrick's
study (see above), the subjects introspected while working,
and the groups were compared with respect to time relation-
ships, characteristics of the products, processes followed
while painting, and individual patterns of creative thought.
As opposed to all previous conceptions of a series of stages
operating, the authors conclude that ”an artificial and
incomplete conception of creative activity results from the

view that it is divisible into four successive stages. Rather,

24
creativity is a dynamic whole in which the processes which
have been labelled "stages" are interwoven in a complex and
continuous fashion.”

A study by Prados (1944) represents the first appearance
of an attempt to utilize projective techniques with artists.
Prados administered the Rorschach to 15 men and 5 women, all
of whom were professional painters. The findings are not
subjected to statistical analysis, although tables are
provided showing the frequency distributions of the Rorschach
scores. The author evaluates his findings in a clinical
fashion:

There exists a mental approach characterized by an
overemphasis in W and an underproduction of V with an
average use of other locations. The F%iis high but
entirely normal, with signs of good refined control.
There is a high number of M which outnumbers FM. The
ratio FC:CF is decidedly in favor of the color-form
type with an almost complete disregard for the form—
color response. The relationship of W and M shows a
tendency to W over production but within limits of
optimum efficiency (p. 182).

Two years later, Roe (1946) published a study which
also utilized the Rorschach. As a part of her study of
creative artists and alcohol for the Section of Alcohol
Studies at Yale, she obtained Rorschach protocols from 20
successful painters, all acknowledged as creative by Virtue
of their accomplishments in the field of art, i.e., membership
in the National Academy of Design, paintings in permanent

collection of Metropolitan Museum of Art, etc. The Rorschach

and TAT were administered to each painter, and the Rorschach

25
was then scored using the Inspection Technique Score developed
by Monroe. Roe concluded, on the basis of the "marked
prevalence of color shock and shading shock, and over production
of responses with sexual content . . . frequent use of vague
or poor forms . . . tendency toward excessive movement in

general, and other characteristics which we would now call
intrusion of primary process into the thought process, that
"few of them (the painters) could, by any criteria commonly
used, be called the records of 'creative' personalities."
To check on her impression, Roe had Klopfer, a reCOgnized
Rorschach expert, analyze the protocols ”blind," and he too
evaluated them as lacking in evidence for conC1usion of
creative productivity. Roe concluded, "Certainly, however, in
the light of these results, no one is justified in counseling
any subject against pursuit of a creative profession on the
grounds that his Rorschach does not show creative ability.
Few men have attained as much success as painters as these,
yet for a number of them no Rorschacher would have predicted
any creative ability at all. Study of the lives of these men
brings me to the conclusion that 'creativeness' is based in
much deeper levels of the personality than we have yet been
able to approach by anYthing but deep analysis and not always
then.”

Roe's study is of particular importance here since
it appears that the very material which so disturbed her

(presence of primary process, "overproduction of responses with

26
sexual content," etc.) combined with the adequacy of popular
responses and "unusually great W" are some of the same
variables which present theory holds are determining factors
§2£_creative productivity.

Steiner (1947) studied the Rorschach responses of
commercial artists in a large industrial organization and
found that these subjects were characterized by the large
number of original responses given. These results differed
from those of Prados (1944) who found no marked tendency to
original responses among successful non-commercial artiSts.
This discrepancy is noted as a paradox by Burchard (1952),
"Since serious creative artists, according to Rorschach,
should greatly exceed in originality the primarily commercial
artists." Harrower and Cox (1947), also studying commercial
artists via the Rorschach, report that they tend to seek whole
effects and regard details as quite incidental. The authors
also note that the artists' mental approach is undisciplined.

~7 Drevdahl (1956), using Cattell's Sixteen Personality
.Factor Questionnaire, Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities
Test, and Guilford's tests taken from his Factor Analytic
Study of Creative Thinking, studied a group of 64 graduate
and undergraduate art and science students who were rated
on a 7-point scale of creativity by their professors. Results
suggested that the more creative students are superior to the
less creative in their verbal facility, fluency, flexibility,

and originality. They are also more withdrawn and quiescent.

27

The creative artists, however, are more radical and self-
sufficient than either the creative scientists or the less
creative in both the science or arts groups. The author
concludes that the art group is more sensitive emotionally,
and more "bohemian" than any of the other groups studied,
regardless of classification as more or less creative.

‘eEideson (1958) also reports the results of a comparative
study of artists and non—artists. Using a 50-item rating scale
by which three expert judges globally rated the Rorschach and
TAT, Eideson compares 65 subjects divided into three groups.
Fifty of the subjects were tested in an out-patient psychiatric
clinic to which they had been referred for psychiatric treat-
ment. Twenty-five of these were successfully employed in
the arts, and twenty-five in various business fields. The
remaining 15 subjects were suCCessful artists who had never
been in the clinic. The author concludes that "it is primarily
in their ways of thinking and perceiving that artists show
the most marked differences from non-artists,” The results
also suggest that artists search for ways of thinking which
are unusual, their interests are wider, and they "accept
reality but perceive it in a way which is different from the
non-artists." The conclusion which seems most germane to
the persent study is that the artists were "able to tolerate
ambiguity in perception and have the ability to loosen or
relax their thinking without accompanying personality disorganiza-

'tion." Hersch (1958) reaches similar conclusions on the basis

28
of Rorschachs administered to 20 eminent artists, 20 non-artists
and 20 schizophrenics. Hersch divided the Rorschach scoring
categories into Mature indications (M, integrations and Form
Dominant Responses) and primitive indications (Form subordinate
responses, physiognomic and primitive thought processes).

The artists as compared to normals are reported to have
greater M, greater form dominant responses, primitive thought
responses and physiognomic responses. 0n the basis of the
results the author concludes that the primitive functioning
of the creator is manifested differently than that of the
normals or schizophrenics. "Creators have control functions
more readily available than either non-creative normals or
schizophrenics."

A study which sheds additional light on the control
factor mentioned by Hersch is that of Berlin, et a1. (1955).
These authors studied four artists of national prominence in
an experiment "designed to ascertain whether the action of
Mescaline and Lysergic acid would manifest itself in a
unique manner in persons with their specially cultivated
visual perceptions and skills, and to assess the effect of
the agents upon their creativity." The results of this
introsepctive report are most interesting for our purposes
here, for the artists report that "short of their infrequent
visual hallucinations of sparkling colored lights, they had
on previous occasions without the drug periods of heightened

visual awareness while engaged in their work which approached

29
those experienced during the action of the agent.” The authors
report that although the subjects reacted by an inhibition
or depression of their usual regulated activities, their
creations while under the drugs were of a greater aesthetic
value according to a panel of fellow artists. This was ’
associated with the relaxation of control in the execution
of lines and employment of color, so that both colors and line
were freer and bolder. However, "the benefits derived from
these agents were offset by the difficulty these subjects had
in mobilizing their perceptions and energies in the pursuit
of creative art."

Finally, two studies are of relevance to the report
to follow. Pine and Holt (1959) investigated a number of
hypotheses relative to the relationship between creative
productivity and the use of primary process material. They
administered a number of different tests to 13 male and 14
female undergraduate students who had been selected to participate
in an on-going research project. The subjects were selected
on the basis of approximate indications on the MMPI of
emotional stability and for intelligence (upper 60% of entering
college freshmen) on the Ohio State Psychological Examination.
The subjects were not selected for any particular excellence
in creative arts or science. All subjects were given the
TAT, which was rated on a number of attributes for literary
quality; a science test in which they were asked to resolve

scientific dilemmas, the quality of the theory being rated;

30
a humor test in which captions for cartoons were to be devised,
the quality of the captions then rated; an animal drawing
test, in which a "fantastic" animal was to be drawn, and then
rated for drawing ability and originality; Guilford's brick
uses test, Guilford's Consequences test, and the Rorschach, which
was scored using a system devised by Holt. (See Chapter III
of this paper.) Both individual ratings and an over-all
creativityrating was then correlated with the amount of
primary process material, the effectiveness of control, and a
score for adaptive versus maladaptive regression, all derived
from the Rorschach scoring. The results confirmed the hypothesis
that the amount of primary process expression is statistically
independent of the effectiveness of control exerted over
such expression. Also, the hypothesis was confirmed that
the degree of expression per se is independent of the quality
of the individual's created productions, i.e., amount of
primary process available to the individual does not in itself
constitute creativity. The major hypothesis, that quality
of creative productions is related to both the effectiveness
of control over primary process material and to a combined
indicator of expression and effectiveness of control, was
confirmed in both cases for the male sample and for control
only in the female (r = .80 and .90 for males; .52 for
females). The authors conclude, ”these results give general
support to the hypotheses of the study, and they indicate

further that Kris' concept of regression in the service of

31
the ego can be subjected to empirical study--that predictions
generated by this psychoanalytic concept can be studied with
operationally defined scores and quantitative techniques."

Goldberger and Holt (1958) attempted to experimentally
investigate the relationship between ability to creatively
regress and behavior in a perceptual isolation setting. They
administered the Rorschach and other tests to a group of 14
male college students several weeks prior to their participation
in the isolation experiment. Observational ratings were then
made on each subject according to a predetermined set of
variables. The variables included degree of unpleasant
affect shown, pleasant affect, stimulus bound thought, free
secondary process ("the amount of thinking devoted to logical,
relatively sustained and directed reflection on topics other_
than the immediate situationP), impaired secondary process
thought, controlled primary process thought, poorly controlled
primary process thought and other behavior ratings, e.g.,
restlessness, etc. Goldberger and Holt predicted that those
subjects who rated as high on mature handling of the primary
process on the Rorschach (adaptive regression) would also
be rated highly on the variables of controlled, anxiety free
manifestation of primary process during isolation; also would
be rated highly on amount of pleasant affect shown in isolation,
and would not be the subjects who prematurely quit during the
experiment (i.e., be unable to handle the primary process

material which invariably becomes manifest during such

32
experiments). The results were all consistent with the
hypotheses; adaptive regression scores correlated .47 with
pleasant affect, .54 with controlled primary process thought,
-.38 with quitting, .45 with free secondary process thought,
-.36 with impaired secondary process thought. The authors
conclude, "Finally, this predictive success contributes to
the construct validation of our method for measuring the
amount of primary process manifestations in the Rorschach test
and the effectiveness with which it is controlled. The way
has been opened up to the predictable laboratory production
and systematic study of the primary process, a concept and
phenomenon hitherto approachable only in the clinical

psychoanalytic situation" (Goldberger and Holt, 1958, p. 8).

The Relationship between Dogmatism, Adaptive

Regression, and Creatiyity

There are many dimensions along which personality
structure can be described. Hall and Lindzey (1957) list
18 dimensions along which current personality theory may be
‘evaluated. Crucial to most of the current theories is the
concept of the differentiation of the total personality into
structural parts. Freud emphasized the structural inter-
irelationship of the conscious and unconscious structures,
disregarding for the most part the specific "content" of the
structure except as it was necessary for operationalizing the

concepts. Lewin was perhaps the most emphatic among current

33
personality theorists who developed the idea of a structural
approach to conceptualizing personality, and his "topological"
representations of the differentiated and relatively non—
differentiated personality have been the basis for a number
of experimental investigations. Lewin conceptualized the
personality as being made up of a number of ”regions" or
tension systems which could communicate with one another if
the barriers between them were fairly flexible, or were
kept from communication if the barriers were rigid and
unyielding. More recently, Rokeach (1955, 1956, 1960) has
developed the theory of communication between regions of the
personality, making more explicit, for operational purposes,
the nature of the content of the regions. Rokeach believes
that the personality structure can be conceptualized in terms
of that which the individual accepts as true in his world
(beliefs), and that which the individual accepts as false
(disbeliefs). Like Freud and Lewin, deeach does not
emphasize the importance of the specific content of the
beliefs or disbeliefs, but is more interested in the structure
of the systems which contain the beliefs and disbeliefs. He
posits a distinction between a personality structure which
allows for free communication between beliefs and disbeliefs
and one in which there are barriers between beliefs or
[disbeliefs held. The former he calls "open," to differentiate
it from a relatively ”closed” structure. From this basic

differentiation, Rokeach goes on to develop the correlates

34
of closed and open systems, and makes a specific distinction
between persons called "rigid" and those called "dogmatic."
Briefly, rigid people are those who maintain strong boundaries
between specific beliefs, or who approach specific tasks in
a preconceived or set way. Dogmatic individuals, on the
other hand, are in part characterized by having a structure
which is marked by a lack of communication between whole
systems of beliefs and disbeliefs: "Thus, dogmatism is
seen as a higher-order and more complexly organized form of
resistance to change" (Rokeach, 1955). Dogmatic individuals,
therefore, possess a structure which prohibits the evaluation
and comparison of inconsistent beliefs, and therefore are
posited as unable to synthesize such beliefs into a more
realistic whole.

Rokeach has demonstrated that relatively low dogmatic
individuals as measured by the Dogmatism Scale have been
shown to more easily remember facets of problems they are
attempting to solve, able to transfer solutions from one
task to another more easily than high dogmatic individuals,
more frequently find ingenious, creative solutions to problems,
have greater speed of perceptual synthesis on a cognitive
task,have greater tolerance for new musical systems, and
show fewer anxiety themes in their TAT stories. Placement
on the scale seems to be unrelated to intelligence
measures (Rokeach 1960).

The over—all impression one gains from the research

35
completed to date is that the Dogmatism Scale is a reliable,
Sensitive instrument which has shown a great deal of construct
validity relative to the theory put forth. Much of the research
has been concerned with the performance of subjects on what
may be termed "cognitive" tasks, i.e., tasks involving the
use of powers of reasoning, judging, and learning ability
'rather than in-areas traditionally called "emotional" or
affective. Rokeach is not unaware of this, however, for he

Aregards the distinction between what is cognitive

(and what is emotional as a convenient one but by no
means a necessary one. It is possible to conceive of
eall emotional states as having their representation in
the cognitive belief-disbelief system (and vice versa)

. . . in closing the gap between what is emotional and
what is cognitive a way is paved for the more objective
study of complex, value-laden social phenomena which can
be more easily attacked by examining a personss
cognitions than his emotions. For all things a person
feels (and wants) must surely be represented by what

he believes and knows about the world he lives in.

In line with these ideas, we are presently entertaining
the notion that a full description of a person's belief—
disbelief system is also a full description of his
personality (Rokeach, 1956).

The Dogmatism Scale, then, is presented as an instrument
capable of measuring not only the cognitive aspects of the
personality structure, but the personality structure per se.
Even if one does not grant Rokeach's lack of differentiation
between the cognitive and the affective, research with the
scale suggests that it is sensitive to picking up not only
differences in cognitive performance, but to affective components

also. Although Rokeach feels that the affective and cognitive

can be operationalized as one and the same thing, he does

36
discuss the effects of an ”open," i.e., non-dogmatic,
structure in fairly affective terms. He states that one of
the characteristics of an open system is that it allows the
individual to evaluate information received from the external
world on "its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant
pressures arising from within and from without." By irrelevant
pressures we may assume that he means "impulses," or affective
intrusions into the cognitive processes. Granting this
assumption, we may posit that if structural openness and
closedness of the personality system is related to the degree
to which drive intrusion dictates testing of reality factors,
then it should follow that persons scoring high on the
Dogmatism Scale ("closed" persons) will also show more drive
intrusion in their thought processes relative to performance
on the Rorschach measure. However, it is possible to make
a further differentiation among those people who show a high
degree of drive intrusion, i.e., those who utilize it
effectively (adaptively regress) and those who do not (non-
adaptive regression). Therefore, it would appear logical
that individuals who are characterized as being able to
"adaptively regress" should score lower on the Dogmatism
Scale than those who are characterized as being unable to
"adaptively regress." Such a hypothesis takes into account
Rokeach's assertion that it is the inability to synthesize
which characterizes the highly dogmatic person, for it is

the secondary process (effectiveness of ulitization) which is

37
involved in the synthetic function, and consequently it is on
the secondary process level that the high and low dogmatic
should be differentiated even though both may have primary
process material intrude into their productions. In the less
dogmatic, this material is utilized for creative tasks; in the
more highly dogmatic, it is not utilized for this purpose but
intrudes despite attempts to defend against it. The hypothesis
also extends Rokeach's theory from what I choose to call the
horizontal dimension, i.e., the degree to which communication
exists between existing beliefs at the same level of
consciousness. However, the results of a study reported by
ROkeach (1960) suggest that more highly dogmatic subjects
manifest greater anxiety and produce a "greater existence of
threat themes" in their TAT stories. Such results lead to
the suggestion that the Dogmatism Scale also measures a
vertical dimension in the thought process, i.e., that the
communication barriers between unconscious, primary proceSs
expression, and conscious, rational secondary process

integration functions may also be measured using the scale.

38

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE

The basic design of this study involves the comparison
of a group of 20 art students judged by their professors as
highly creative with a group of randomly selected students.

The comparisons are made on a number of variables delineated
from the Rorschach and Dogmatism Scale administered individually

to each subject.

Subjects

Forty subjects were selected as follows: three
professors in the Department of Art at Michigan State University
‘were each asked to independently submit the names of 15
students who most met and 15 students who least met the
following criteria:

The student is a creative person, i.e., is able

to reorganize existing facts and his perceptions into
new and meaningful arrangements, and is able to communicate
.these arrangements to others; is able to perceive new
esolutions to problems; is not bound by previous judg-
ments to the extent that known solutions hamper his
desire to find better solutions; is able to interpret
his perception of reality to others through a medium,
e.g., painting, ceramicsp, design, sculpture, etc.
(Sée AppendinA, for a sample of the rating sheet used.)

Each professor was requested to choose from those

advanced students, i.e., juniors and seniors, known to him

-personally. The criterion of advanced students was decided

upon for two reasons. First, to increase the possibility

39
that a given student would be known by judges other than one
submitting his name, and secondly, to decrease the heterogeneity
of the sample in terms of art experience. What was needed
twas a sample of students differing on judged creativity, with
little or no difference in training or experience. Analysis
of the 27 names appearing on the ”most meeting the-criterion”
lists submitted revealed that ten of the 27 names appeared on
two professors' lists, but that no name appeared on all three
professors} lists. Only two names appeared on more than one
list of those least meeting the criteria.

Since the three judges were in only partial agreement
on those who most met the creativity criteria, and in very
'little agreement as to those students least meeting the
criteria, it was decided to submit the names of the 27
students appearing on the three "most.meeting the criteria"
liststo a larger group of judges for a rating, using the
same criteria. Accordingly, these 27 names were given to each
-member of the Art faculty, and each was asked to rate the
name appearing along a five point scale if they were acquainted
with the student, and to indicate "no information," if they
'were unacquainted with the-student. The instructions given
asked that a student be rated "five" if he, in the judgment
of the rater, met the requirements.of the criterion.to a
greater extent than the average student with whom the rater
had contact. ‘Similarly, to rate ”one” if the-student met

the requirement to a lesser degree than the average student,

40
and to rate "three" if the student met the requirement no more
and no less than the average student. In this way 11 additional
judges submitted ratings, and 23 students were selected from
the 27 names originally submitted. Inclusion in the final
selection was determined as follows:

1. Rating by at least three raters other than the three
originally submitting names.
2. An average rating of higher than "three."
3. No rating below three by any rater.
The 23 students finally selected were all juniors or
seniors, and all had been accepted into the advanced Art

program.

The Control Group

 

A conference with the three original judges revealed
that they all had found it difficult to select students least
meeting the criterion. Such students usually were not
remembered as were the more talented ones. For the most part,
the judges tended to dichotomize their students into two
groups: outstanding ones who might someday achieve eminence,
and the average students. Since it appeared unlikely that
agreements could be reached on a group of students least
meeting the criterion, it was decided to make a more stringent
test of the hypotheses by comparing the experimental group with
a random selection of all other non-mentioned advanced Art

students. Lists were obtained from the Art Department of

41

such students, and names drawn randomly from cards prepared
from the lists. Since the experimental group as finally
constituted consisted of 20 students equally divided among
males and females, it was decided to similarly constitute

the control group. Therefore, ten males and ten females were
drawn. No other criterion was utilized in selecting this
group other than admission into the advanced Art program of
the University.

After selection of the samples, each student was
contacted individually and asked to participate in a "general
study of creativity in the fine arts." Twenty of the 23
experimental subjects were located and agreed to participate,
and 41 names were eventually drawn from the control pool
before the 20 students needed for the control group agreed
to participate. There were many reasons for the difficulty
in final selection of the control group. Of those originally
selected and thereafter, 14 could not be located or contacted,
one had changed her major from Art to Sociology, and three
agreed to participate but later declined. 0f the 23
experimental subjects, two were student teaching and no longer
in the vicinity of the University, and one could not be.
located. All of the others agreed to participate. The final

20 control subjects were selected from a pool of 127 students.

42

Testing

Each student was seen individually for a period
ranging from two to three hours, this depending mostly on
the time required for administration of the Rorschach. In
each case, the first ten to 20 minutes was spent in establishing
rapport by discussing the general concept of creativity and
eliciting any ideas or theories the subject had about the
concept. None of this information was recorded, and none
used in the study. The discussion time was solely a means
of establishing contact with the subject and eliciting his
or her cooperation. Following the brief discussion, the
student was asked to fill out an information sheet consisting
of identifying data and art background. (See Appendix B.)
This sheet was then coded according to a prearranged random
assignment of numbers from one to 40 for all subjects which
served to mask whether the protocol was produced by a creative
or a control subject. All of the test data utilized this
code number. After the subject filled out the information
sheet, the Rorschach was administered following Klopfer's
(1954) system of obtaining free associations to all ten cards,
and then obtaining an inquiry of the associations produced.
One major change in Rorschach administration was made. All
subjects were limited to producing a maximum of six responses
per card. This limitation was imposed following a trial
period in which the first ten subjects were allowed to produce

an unlimited number of responses. A count of responses produced

43
by these ten subjects revealed that the average number of
responses per record was 56.9, with a range from 33 to 154.
The time of administration for some of these longer records
approached three hours for the Rorschach alone. Since the
subjects had been assured at the time of contacting them that
they would only be required to contribute two to two and
one-half hours for the entire testing, it was necessary to cut
down the time of administration. This was done by adopting
as a limit the average number of responses produced by the
first ten subjects. Succeeding subjects were then asked to
return each card after they had produced six responses, and
only the first six responses to each card were scored for
all subjects. It was not always necessary to do so, however,
as indicated by the average number of responses produced by
all subjects in the experiment (mean a 39.1).

Limiting the number of responses is a fairly standard
technique in clinical practice. Schafer (1954) provides the
rationale for doing so.

Much of the difficulty . . . begins with the tester's

assumption that every response is to be valued, and

that a patient should never be stopped in the midst of

a stream of responses. "Who knows," he may wonder and
hope, "the twenty—third response to the Rorschach

may express something of basic significance that was
avoided in the 22 that came before?" This is, of course,
a vain hope. An average of 10 responses per card provides
more than enough material for description of the major
personality characteristics and problems of the patients.

Of fine trends there is no end anyway; whether they are
seen in the test results or not (Schafer, 1954, p. 15).

44
Klopfer also notes,
For the busy clinician, the Rorschach test reaches
a point of diminishing returns after so many responses.
It may be necessary, under these circumstances, to point
out to the subjects that we are not particularly
interested in seeing how many responses he can give, but
more in the first few impressions that he gets. In
extreme cases, it may be even necessary to limit the
subject to a certain number of responses per card
(Klopfer, 1954, p. 8).
After the Rorschach was obtained, the 40 item Dogmatism
Scale was administered (see Appendix Cnfor a cepyfothhe

Dogmatism Scale used).

Reliability of the Dogmatism Scale

As reported by Rokeach (1960, pp. 87-88) the Dogmatism
Scale had always been administered with "filler" items from
other scales interspersed. Since the scale utilized in this
study was administered without such items, it seemed desirable
to test the reliability of the ”unfilled" scale with a "filled"
scale. A new scale was constructed using the original
Dogmatism Scale interSpresed with 22 items of the Gough-
Sanford Rigidity Scale (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 418-419) and 14
items taken from the ”L" scale of the MMPI (Hathaway and
McKinley, 1951) interspersed. This was then mailed to all
subjects approximately one month after each had participated
in the study. (See Appendix D for a cOpy of the reviSed

Degmatism Scale and instructions.)

45

Scoring of the Ropschach: Reliability

 

Since the author had had no prior experience with
the system of scoring developed by Holt (1956, 1959) and
Mayman (1959) which contains: some 113 categories dealing
with various aspects of primary process manifestations, controls,
defenses, and form level designations, it seems necessary to
establish the fact that the manuals provided could be used
with a degree of reliability which would insure that the scores
attained were consistent with the manual specifications. To
establish this, the efforts of a second scorer, also unfamiliar
with the manuals, were obtained. Both scorers read the manuals,
and, through discussion, and scoring of a number of non-
experimental protocols, became familiar with the scoring
procedure. Communication with Holt resolved a number of
points not immediately clear and, at one point, a Rorschach
record was scored jointly and forwarded to Holt, who rescored
it with comments about the scorer's errors. Up to this point
none of the experimental protocols were utilized.

To determine the reliability of scoring, 14 experimental
protocols were scored independently by each scorer, noting
the scores given by each and resolving differences by
discussion. For the first seven protOcols an "agreed on
scoring" was determined and this scoring utilized in the
study. For the remaining seven protocols, as well as the
other 26 scored solely by the author, the author's scoring was

used for the study. The reliability coefficient, based on

46
the total adaptive regression score (ARS) assigned independently
by each scorer, was .945 for 14 protocols, suggesting that
both scorers were scoring the protocols in essentially the
same manner. This result led the author to assume that he

was justified in scoring the remaining protocols himself.

Holt Versus Klopfer Scoring

A scoring procedure such as that proposed by Holt and
utilized in this study requires much more time than the usual
procedure followed by Klopfer (1954), Beck (1950) and others.
That the author found this so is probably in part due to his
unfamiliarity with the system, but it is also due to the
nature of the scores themselves. Whereas the traditional
procedures call for determining the locations, determinants,
and content of a response, the Holt procedure requires a
more extensive evaulation of the process by which the response
was produced. This is more true of the Formal Thought
Property Scores and the Control and Defense scores than of
the content scores. (See below.) For the purposes of a
study such as this, we may ask the question as to whether
such extensive procedures are necessary, i.e., is it necessary
to increase the time of administration and scoring for a
record which could be administered and scored more quickly
by a simpler method? Would the simpler method also differentiate
the two groups under consideration and provide much the same

information? To answer such questions all records were scored

47
using the Holt procedure and also scored using Klopfer's
system of scoring with form level determined from Hertz's
frequency tables (Hertz, 1951). The KlOpfer scoring was done
following completion of scoring all records for the Holt
procedure, and with all protocols still coded to mask their

identity.

Instrumentation and Scoring

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with basic
practices of Rorschach administration and traditional scoring.
For a description of the historical background of the
Rorschach test, the reader is referred to Ellenberger (1954),
and for a detailed description of administration.and scoring

procedures, to Beck (1950), Klopfer et a1. (1954), or

 

Piotrowski (1957), each of whom elaborates on his own
differences in scoring from that proposed originally by

Rorschach.

 

The following is adapted from Holt (1956, 1959).

FOrm-level.

Every response is scored for form quality. The
scoring follows the system of form-level scores described in
a manual provided by Mayman (1959). The manual contains

examples of the form-level score for every location on each

48
card. The Defensive contribution (see below) of each form-
1eve1 has been added by Holt (1959, p. 58), and is referred
to in the present study as the Form Level score (FL) (see
Appendix H for a.deSCriptive.statement of eachvformvleVel

designation).

Primary process.

Each response is examined for indications of primary
process manifestation. Such manifestation may be in the

content of the response, in its formal qualities, or in both.

 

If a response contains neither content nor formal indications,
it is assumed that it is mainly determined by secondary
process thinking, and is not scored for other than form
quality. (See examples below under Content and Formal

categories.

Content.

Twenty—five different categories are used in the
scoring of content. These are divided into ideational and
affective drive derivatives.‘ The latter consist of instances
where a display of affect occurs instead p§,a response.

Thus, the following is a scoreable example: "All I can say
is it looks like a horrible mess to me." Ideational drive
representations are divided into libidinal (anal, oral,
sexual, exhibitionistic—voyeuristic, homosexual), aggressive,
and a residual group, anxiety, "which is presumed to be a

reaction to instinctual threat even when its libidinal or

49
aggressive nature cannot be discerned” (Holt, 1959, p. 2).
.Each of these is further subdivided into two levels, and the
libidinal and aggressive categories are further differentiated
qualitatively. The two levels (Level 1, Level 2) refer to
points on the primary to secondary process functioning
continuum and are based on two criteria.

First, there is involved a primitive versus
civilized dimension: the more that the type of
drive—expression described or implied is socialized
and discussion of it is appropriate to social
communication between strangers in a professional
situation, the more the thinking concerned is secondary
and we score Level 2. Conversely, the more direct,
intense, raw or blatant the drive—expression, the
closer to the primary process, and we score Level 1.

The second criterion has to do with the degree to
which the response focuses on the drive-relevant

aspect of a larger percept, such as a particular

organ (Holt, 1956, p. 19).

Thus, an example of Oral, Level 1 is "an open mouth,"
whereas "two people kissing" is Oral, Level 2. Similarly,
"intercourse" is sexual Level 1, whereas "a bride and groom
standing, holding hands" is sexual Level 2 (Holt, 1956,

p. 19). (A list of the content categories is given in

Appendix.E).

Formal.

Thirty—four categories are provided for scoring the
formal thought indications of primary process. Holt reports
that, "they attempt to measure deviations from the logical,
orderly thinking grounded in experience with the real world

that characterizes the secondary process” (Holt, 1956, p. 21).

50
No attempt will be made here to describe further the rather
complicated categories for formal thought deviations. A
list of the categories used is given in Appendix,Ey
and, for further description the reader is referred to Holt

(1956).

Controls and defenses.

.Each response scoreable for pripgryyprocgpg
manifestation is also considered with respect to the kind
of control or its absence that goes along with it. There
are 40 such categories, many of which are subdivided into
positive and negative categories, depending upon whether their
use indicates an effective or ineffective use of the instinctual
derivative contained in the response. Contained in these
scores are a series of categories dealing with the sequential
aspects of scoring given to a particular card. For example,
scores are given to indicate a response scoreable for primary
process representation which is followed by, or follows, a
non-scoreable response. Again no attempt will be made to
further describe these categories. The reader is referred to
the Appendix F for a complete list of the control and.defense

categories used, and to Holt (1956).

Over—all scores derived from the system for each response.
1. ,Qefense Demand, (DD) Each response is rated on a
scale which reflects "the degree to which the very nature

of the underlying idea or (in the case of the formal variables),

51
the way it emerges, demands that some defensive and controlling
measures be undertaken in order to make it a sociably
acceptable communication" (Holt, 1959, p. 47). The scale
runs from one to six, with ratings at the upper end usually
given to blatant sexual or aggressive content, extreme formal
aspects, or a massing of content and formal aspects in one
response. The manual sets the demand for each category scored,
developed ad hoc on the basis of the "primitive-versus-
civilized dimension" described in connection with the Level 1-
Level 2 delineation of content categories (see page 49);

Examples of typical defense demands from 1 - 6:

DD : l : Mud or dirt as an indication of anal
libidinal drive representation. (Level 2 Anal)

DD : 2 : Blood, or persons or animals with parts
missing as an indication of aggressive drive representation.
(Level 2 Aggressive)

DD : 3 : Breasts, when seen as part of a person
ppg emphasized, as an indication of oral libidinal drive
representation (Level 2 Oral)

DD : 4 : Any reference to excretory organs,
defecation or feces, as an indication of anal libidinal
drive representation. (Level 1 Anal)

DD : 5 : Position response, e.g., "The North Pole,
because it was at the top," as an indication of Autistic Logic,
a formal thought deviation.

DD : 6 : No one aspect of a response is rated 6

52
in and of itself. However, a combination of two ratings of
”5" would justify the entire response being rated at 6.

2. .Qefenpive Contribution. (DC) Each response
produces a number which is the algebraic sum of the numbers
assigned to each defense or control utilized in connection
with that response. These sub-defense contributions for
each control or defense are set by the manual, and are based
on the belief that certain defensive operations are more
effective in controlling drive representation than others.

Examples: Placing the theme of a response in terms of
humans (DC of 0); animals (DC of +1); plants (DC of +1.5);
inanimate objects (DC of +2). The defensive contributions
in these instances reflecting the idea that "if an unacceptable
impulse is expressed in a response, it may be made more
acceptable if S puts distance between himself.and the response,
by making the latter remote in time, place, person, or level
of reality? (Holt, 1959, p. 37). Denying that a response
was given (DC of -2); modifying a percept so that it becomes
unscoreable, whereas previous to the modification it would
have been scored a Level 1 manifestation (DC of +1.5). (See
Appendix F for a complete list of.all defense and control
categories and the defensive contribution for each.)

3. Adaptive regression score (ARS). The adaptive
regression score for each response is the product of the
total defense contribution for each response and the defense

demand assigned to that responSe. For the purposes of this

53
study, the total defense contribution for each response has
been broken down into its two major parts: the DC's for each
control and defense used, and the rating given for form level
(FL). The Adaptive Regression score for each response may
then be represented as

ARS=DDX(DC1+DC2+DC3+. . . .DCn+FL)
and the total ARS for the protocol (see below) is the sum
of the right hand portion of the formula for all responses
scored.

This represents a change from the formula suggested
by Holt (1959} p. 58), although it does not change the ARS
score. Holt's original suggestion is that ARS = DD x DC.

As in the present study, the DC is determined as the sum of
the DC's for each control and defense used, and the rating for
form—level. I have broken the DC down here for the purposes
of statistical evaluation of the contribution of DC and FL

to the ARS score (See Chapter V, pp. 73-77).

High positive ARS scores, in this system, will indicate
adaptive regression (i.e., a response which is highly suggestive
of drive representation combined with a good deal of positive
controls and defenses) and high negative ARS scores will
indicate maladaptive regression (i.e., a response which
is highly suggestive of drive representation with a good deal
of negative controls and defenses).

4. Total adaptivegpegression score (Total ARS). The

adaptive regression scores for each response are algebraically

54
summed to provide a total adaptive regression score. This

score may be positive or negative.

5. Number of primary piecess responseg. Since only

 

a portion of the responses produced will be scoreable for
primary process manifestation (the others are assumed to be

a function of secondary process functioning) it is possible

to sum the numbers of responses containing primary process

and express this either as an entity in itself, or as‘a
percentage of the total number of responses. For the purpose
of this study, the former was done with a covariance technique
used to control for the number of responses given.

It is very difficult to communicate to the reader more
than the bare essentials of a system as complex as this with-
out reproducing the entire manual and examples of each of the
categories used. Since this is impractical, the manual
consuming a total of 79 single spaced typewritten pages, an
example of one response scored for its appropriate categories
will be given. For a more extensive description of the
historical background of the system and categories, the
reader is referred to Holt (1955, 1956, 1959).

Example: Response to card 2 (upside down) "without
these things (upper red) it looks like Japanese duelers,
looks like Japanese prints of men fighting a duel." (Inquiry)
"It's very stylized-~nobody will get hurt 'cause it's just a

game--it's a kind of dance-—they're wearing kimonos."

55
Scoring.
Form level-egg (popular and near popular forms;
fixed list in manual) (Mayman, 1960)
defensive contribution + 2 (Holt, 1959,
p. 58) (Also see Appendix,Hy _.
for the writer's changes in the defensive
contribution for Form Level designations).
Content. Aggpession peve1_gl (more secondary form of
aggressive representation). Actiye-subject. (Motor discharge
of aggression) (Holt, 1959, p. 12). Defensive demand 2
(slight need for defense; content and structure of responses
. . . are only slightly unusual in conversation and arouse
only slight degrees of tension (Holt, 1959, p. 48). Control
and defense: Esthetic context: (The aggression is controlled
by placing it in the context of the arts); DC + 2);
Cultural context: (Control achieved by depicting the actors
in a rite or ritual; DC + 2); Geographical remoteness (control
by depicting the action as occurring outside of the United
States; DC + 2); Depiction: (control by depicting the aggression
as portrayed in a print or picture; DC + 2); Negation:
(aggression poorly controlled by denying that the intentfis
aggressive; DC a 2).
Total score. DD : 2; DC a + 5; FL = + 2; ARS = 2 x

(5 + 2) =14.

56

Traditional Rogschach Scoring

The scoring procedures are taken from Klopfer,
et a1. (1954) exactly as presented therein. It is assumed
that the reader is familiar with the procedures of scoring and
no attempt will be made here to further describe them. Mean
scores were calculated for the creative and control groups
on 27 variables as follows: R, W%, D%, d%, F+, F-, F,
total F, M, FM, Fm + mF + m, FC + F/C, CF + C/F, c, PC + CF
+ c + k + Fk + kF + K, Fc' + C'F, H + (H), Hd, A, Ad, number
of content categories, P, F+%, M/sumC, W/M, A%, F%c (See
Appendix I for the proCedures by Which each was tabulated and
calculated, and for the rationale for combining some of the

categoriesl)

The Dogmatism Scalp

The Dogmatism Scale is a 40 item instrument described
by Rokeach (1956, 1960). It consists of a series of statements
to which the subject indicates his agreement or disagreement
along a 6 point Scale ranging from +3 to -3, with the zero
point excluded to force responses towards disagreement or
agreement. For scoring purposes, a constant of 4 is added
to each score, this eliminating minus numbers. Thus,!a score
of +40 represents the maximum low score and +280 the maximum
high score. The construction and description of the scale is

extensively covered by Rokeach (1956, pp. 6-11, 1960, pp. 71-80).

57

CHAPTER IV

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

It is assumed that the presence in the Rorschach of
a high degree of libidinal and aggressive content and/or
formal thoughideviations, and a high degree of control and
defense of such materials (as indicated by a high total
Adaptive Regression Score) constitutes an operational
definition of regression in the service of the ego. This
follows from the definition of adaptive regression, for if
a subject is able to allow such material into his productions,
yet is able to utilize it effectively while transforming it
into responses which are socially acceptable, he has
regressed for the purpose of facilitating a higher level of
functioning.

It is further assumed that a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for creative productivity is the
ability to adaptively regress, operationalized as discussed
above. This may be formalized as follows:

1. If a person is creative, then he will show evidence
of adaptive regression.

2. From 1., it follows that, given a creative person,
adaptive regression will be manifested; also, given

a person who does not manifest adaptive regression,

we may predict that he is not creative, i.e., we are

stating that creative productivity cannot occur

58

solely on the secondary process level.

Hypotheses

1. It is prOposed that mere presence of primary process
material does not constitute creativity, since the manifesta-
tion of a great deal of such material without adequate
controls may constitute psychosis. Therefore, Hl states that
there will be no difference between the creative and control
groups in the number of scorable primary process responses
proguced.

2. It is proposed that the presence of a high degree of
primary process material along with evidence of effective
control of such material constitutes an operational definition
of adaptive regression. Further, that such regression is a
necessary condition for creativity. Therefore, H2 states
that the Creative group will have a higher total Adaptive
Regression Score than the Control group.

374.It is proposed that the Dogmatism Scale constitutes
a measure of the degree to which individuals are able to
function unencumbered by drive intrusion. However, the
writer has further stated that it is possible to differentiate
two groups of individuals within those who manifest drive
intrusion, i.e., those who utilize it effectively and those
who do not. Two hypotheses are therefore genereated from

this formulation:

H3 states that there will be no relationship between

59
the number of repponses scorable fior primary process and
scores on the Dogpatism Scale, regardless of classification
apwcreative or control.

H4 states that there will be a negative relationship
pgtween the totaerdaptlye Regresslon Scores and scopes on the
Dogmatism Scale, regardless of clasSification as creative op
control.*

.61 It is proposed that the Dogmatism Scale measures the
degree to which the individual is "open" to external
perceptions and to internal drives. Since a number of
theories hold that this also constitutes a necessary condition

for creative thought, H5 states that the Creativepggoup will

have a lower Dogmatism Scale score than the Control group.

 

*

The negative correlation is predicted since a high
ARS score is taken as an indication of adaptive regression,
while a high Dogmatism Scale score is taken as an indication
of dogmatic thinking.

6O

CHAPTER,V

RESULTS

Composition of the Sample: Age, Intelligence

and Art Trainlng Factopp

No attempts were made to equate the creative and
cOntrol groups for factors of age, intelligence, or art
training. (Both groups were selected from the advanced
program in art, however). Therefore, the first step in the
analysis of data is to determine if any of these factors
differentiate the two groups. The results are presented in
Table 1.

From Table 1, it is evident that the subjects in the
creative and control groups do not differ in intelligence,
age or degree of art training as measured by number of art
credits taken. This being so, we may assume that differences
which occur on other variables cannot be accounted for in

terms of these three factors.

Rorschach: Adaptive Regression

The Adaptive Regression Score (ARS) is proposed as
an operational measure of creative regression in the service
of the ego. It has been discussed in detail on pages 52-54
and will be re-evaluated later in this chapter and the
succeeding chapter. At this point it is necessary to

demonstrate that the measure itself is a reliable one, since

61

TABLE 1

Age, Intelligence anngumber of Art Credits for
the Cgeative and Control Groups

 

 

1 Number of art
Group Age ACE credits

# .
Mean 0 Mean 6 " Mean 0

 

Experimental
23.15 5.15 116.79 16.38 55.90 11.79
(Creative) N = 20

Control
22.30 2.15 108.0 17.97 52.10 17.72
(random) N = 20

 

t. .680 1.592 .798

p. .6 > .05 .4

 

# Variances are homogeneous.

 

1The intelligence factor is measured in this study
by the raw total score of the American Council on Education
Psychological Examination. The test was not given as part
of the study, but scores were obtained from the tests
administered to students when they entered the University.
Such scores were available for 19 of the 20 experimental
subjects, and all 20 of the control group.

2The procedure suggested by Edwards (1954, p. 274)
will be followed throughout when the variances differ '
significantly. Edwards states that, when n1 equals n2, the
pooled estimate of the variance may still be used, but that
the significance of the difference should be calculated
with one-half the usual degrees of freedom.

62
much of what is to follow is based upon it.

The problem of determining reliability in the Rorschach
is a difficult one. Klopfer, pp_gl,‘(l954, pp. 44le461):discusses
the problems inherent. Although there is an alternate form
available (The Behn series), studies comparing the Rorschach
and Behn cards have revealed many differences between them.
Eichler (1951), for example, found that the Behn series
results in the production of more FM responses, fewer F, M
and H responses, and tends to facilitate the production of
more shading responses and animal responses.

Test-retest measures have been criticized because
of the memory factor involved (Klopfer, pp_gl., 1954, p. 443).
This leaves only the split-half procedure, which has been used
with varying success. Hertz (1934) reported an average
coefficient for all traditional scoring categories of .829
and concluded that "the various scoring categories and
relationships were reliable on the whole--enough so to make
the Rorschach test a reliable instrument" (reported in
Klopfer, §p_pl,, 1954, p. 442). However, Hertz later
suggests that the method is not an adequate one. "Because
of the global nature of the test, it is not possible to
split it and work with isolated variables" (Hertz, 1951,

p. 316).

Granting the above criticisms, the split-half method

still seems to be the best means of testing the reliability

of Rorschach variables. The problems involved in doing so,

63
however, are by no means solved. To split the cards so that
each half contains equal stimulus value is impossible,
primarily because it is difficult to determine the stimulus
values of any card, let alone its value compared with other
cards. Also, an odd-even split results in the assigning of
two chromatic cards to one half and three to the other.

Nonetheless, an odd-even split involves the least
number of difficult judgments, and this method was used to
attempt a determination of the reliability of the ARS score.
The correlation between the ARS determined from odd numbered
cards and ARS determined from even numbered cards is .562,
significant beyond the .01 level. It may be concluded that
the score is a reliable measure.

Hypotheses H1 and H have to do with the amount of

2
primary process manifested in the Rorschach records and the
effectiveness with which such material is utilized. The
hypotheses are that the creative and control groups will

not differ on amount of primary process manifested, but

will differ on the effectiveness measure. It should be
recalled that the measure of primary process is the number

of responses scorable for primary process (PPR) and the
measure of effectiveness of utilization is the Total Adaptive
Regression Score (ARS), computed as the algebraic sum of

all DD x (DC + FL) for each response. The results are

presented in Table 2.

64

TABLE 2

Compapison of the Creative and Control Groups on Number of
Rorscpach.Responses (R), Number of Primagprocess

Responses (PPR), and Total Adaptive
Rquession Score (ARS)

 

 

 

Group N R PPR ARS
Mean Q"I Mean 0—“ Mean 0"

#

 

Creative 20 45.40 12.40 26.25 7.23 145.12 62.85
Control 20 32.80 14.22 17.80 7.77 65.68 56.07

##

 

*
F 8.84 12.67 17.91

p .02 .02 .01

 

*
one-tailed test

#The F-ratio for all variances presented reveals that
Homogeneity of Variance is established.

##

Analysis of Variance used rather than a 't' test
to provide the mean square for the Analysis of Covariance
presented later.

Examination of Table 2 reveals that the creative
group differs significantly from the control group in number
of Responses given, number of Primary Process Responses given,
and total Adaptive Regression Score. However, the possibility
must be explored that since the two groups also differ
significantly in the number of responses given, differences
in mean ARS and PPR may be dependent on the number of responses
given and therefore may be accounted for in terms of,
productivity, i.e., responses, rather than in the meaning

of the ARS and PPR scores themselves. To provide a test of

65
this possibility, the data presented in Table 2 were further
analyzed.

The first step in testing the possibility that the
differences in the Adaptive Regression Score and number of
Primary Process Responses are related to the number of Responses
given is to calculate the correlation coefficient between
responses and each of the two variables. In addition, it
will also be of interest to inspect the correlation between

ARS and PPR. The results are presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Intepgogrelations among the Adaptive Reggession Score (ARS),
Number of Primary Process Responses (PPR), and
Number of Rorschach Responses (R)

 

~v

Variables N r p.

ARS-R 4o .43 < .01
PPR-R 40 .76 < .01
ARS—PPR 40 .55 < .01

 

The results of this calculation reveal that there is
a significant relationship between both the ARS and number of
Primary Process Responses and the total number of Responses
produced. The interpretation of such results is, of course,
that a high (or low) ARS, or a high (or low) PPR may be a
function of the number of responses given.

The difference between the two groups on number of

primary process responses produced holding the number of

66
total responses constant may be tested using the technique
of Analysis of Covariance described by Edwards (1956.

pp. 335-355). The result is given in Table 4.

TABLE 4

Comparison of the Creative and Control Groups on Number of
Primary Process Responses (PPR)§£pduced, with the
Number of Rorschach Responses (R)fl;oduced
‘Held Constant

 

 

Source of Variation Sum of squares of df Mean square F
errors of estimate

 

Total 1200.74 38‘

*
Within groups 1099.80 37 .29.72 3.399
Adjusted means 100.94 1 100.94
* .
p > .05

 

When the mean PPR for the creative and control groups
are compared, adjusting each for the total number of responses
given, the previously significant F ratio is no longer
significant. This is interpreted as meaning that it is the
correlation between PPR and R.which accounts for the
difference between the mean PPR for the two groups. In the

light of this result, hypothesis H may now be accepted,

1
i.e., it is concluded that there is no difference in the
amount of primary process produced by the creative and control

groups. when the total number of responses produced by the

two groups is held constant.

67

The ARS score may be similarly handled to answer the

question as to whether the number of responses given accounts
for the significant mean difference between the two groups.
‘Number of responses will again be held constant through the
Analysis of Covariance technique. The results are given in

Table 5.

TABLE 5

Comparison of the Creative and Control Groups on the Total
Adaptive Regression Score (ARS), with Number of
Rorschach Responses Held Constant

 

 

: ' Sum of Squares of .
Source of variation errors of estimate df Mean square F

 

Total 157313.2 38

Within groups 122280.92 37 3304.89 10.60*
Adjusted means 35032.22 1 35032.22

*p < .01

 

The interpretation of the significant F given in
Table 5 is that the difference between the means on the
variable ARS for the creative and control groups cannot be
accounted for in terms of the correlation between ARS and
number of responses, since the two means have been adjusted
for R through the covariance technique.

A further test regarding the ARS variable is necessary.
The results given in Table 4 are interpreted as evidence

for the conclusion that the two groups do not differ in

68
number of Primary Process Responses when the means are adjusted
for total Responses. However, the F-ratio of 3.399 is an
almost.significant figure (F of 4.11 is necessary for
significance at the .05 point). The question is raised now
as to whether the differences in the ARS are due to the
"near" significant difference on the PPR variable, since
the correlation between ARS-PPR indicates that the ARS will
vary with the number of responses scorable for primary
process. (r for ARS-PPR = .55, significant beyond the .01
level, see Table 3).

Since it has already been demonstrated that ARS
differences cannot be accounted for in terms of R, an analysis
of covariance for ARS with PPR held constant will suggest
an answer to the question. The result is presented in

Table 6.

TABLE 6

Comparison o§_the Creative and Control Groups on the Total
‘Agaptiye Regression Score (ARS), with Number of
Primary Process Responses (PERL Held Constant

 

====: 1.
Sum of Squares of

Source of Variance errors of estimate df Mean square F

 

Total 133907.84 38

*
Within groups 111661.75 37 3017.89 7.37
D’AdeSEed means 22246.09 1 22246.09

*
p < .01

 

69

The interpretation of the significant F—ratio given
in Table 6 is that difference in mean ARS for the creative
and control groups cannot be accounted for in terms of the
number of primary process responses produced, since each ARS
mean has been adjusted for PPR.

A final test of the difference between the means on
the ARS variable may now be made, holding both PPR and R
constant, as a final check on whether the ARS score is a
function of the productivity of the subjects, or a function
of the contributing factors contained in the ARS, i.e., FL,
DD, and DC. The procedure for holding two variables constant
while testing for the significance of the difference in mean
scores on a third variable is known as multiple analysis of
covariance, and is described in detail by Johnson (1949,
pp. 246-261). Johnson's procedures were followed exactly
as given therein. The result of this analysis is given in

Table 7.

TABLE 7

Compaiison of the Creative and Control Groups on the Totai
Adaptive Regression Score (ARS), with Numbe; of Primary
Process Responses (PPR) and Number of Rorschach

Responses (R) Held Constant

 

Sources of Variance df Sum of Squares of Mean square F
errors of estimate

 

Total 37 133858.00

*
Within groups 36 120101.53 3336.15 4.12
ITAdjusted means 1 13756.47 13756.47

*p < .05

 

70

The results given in Table 7 represent the final test
of the differences between the ARS for the creative and
control groups, independent of variation contributed by
number of Responses and number of Primary Process Responses
produced. The significant F-ratio presented in Table 7 is
interpreted as meaning that the mean ARS score does differentiate
the two groups, even when R and PPR.are held constant.
Hypothesis H2 may now be accepted with assurance that variance
due to differences in productivity have been controlled.

Having demonstrated that the ARS differentiates the
two groups, it will be fruitful at this point to examine the
contributing factors to this score. To refresh the reader's
’memory, the scores involved are those of Defense Demand (DD),
Defense Contribution (DC), and the Form—Level score (FL).

The ARS, it will be recalled, is represented by the-equation

= *
ARS DDX (FL + DCl + DC2 + DC3 + . . . . DCn)

The question is now raised as to whether these scores
contribute equally to the ARS. An answer will be provided
by comparing the creative and control groups for-mean score
on DD, DC and FL. The analyses for DD and DC will be
presented first, followed by the results of the FL comparison.

The significance of the differences for DD and DC are presented

 

*The reader may find it useful to refer to the
presentation in Chapter III, pp. 52-54 Which discusses the
scoring in greater detail.

71
in Table 8. Since both of these scores may be a function of
the number of responses scorable for primary process, the
results of an analysis of covariance for each, holding PPR

constant, is given in Table 9.

TABLE 8

 

Comparison of Creative and Control Grou s on Defense
Demand (DD) and Defense Contribution (DC) Scores

 

 

DD DC
Mean (7” Mean 0—“
Creative 61.70 20.77# 52.72 18.57#
Control 40.50 18.26 32.45 28.29
F 11.75 12.92
p < .01 < .01

#Variances are homogeneous.

 

The results presented in Tables 8 and 9 indicate that
although the two groups are differentiated significantly by
the mean DD and DC scores, in each case the significant F-ratio
obtained is non-significant when number of Primary Process
Responses is held constant. The interpretation of the
non—significant covariance F-ratios is that the two groups do
not differ in mean DD or DC and that the DD and DC scores
are a function of the number of Primary Process Responses

produced.

72

TABLE 9

Comparison of Creative and Control Groups on Defense
Demand (DD) and Defense Contribution (DC) with

Number of Primar Process Res onses PPR
Held Constant in Each Comparison

 

 

 

Source of variance Sum of squares of df Mean square F
‘errors of estimate

 

Defense Demangv(DD)

Total 3090.8 38
Within groups 3070.32 37 82.98 < 1.00, N-S.
Adjusted means 20.48 1 20.48

Defense Contribution (DC)

Total 6497.0 38
Within groups 6169.9 37 166.75 1.96*
Adjusted means 327.1 1 327.1

*p > .05

 

Since the ARS score is composed of three factors (DD,
DC, FL), and two of these (DD,DC) have been shown to lack
differentiating power regarding the two groups, it follows
logically that the third factor (FL) must be a large
contributor to the ARS. This follows since it has been
demonstrated that the ARS does differentiate the two groups
(see Table 7). Examination of Table 10 indicates that the
FL score does, in fact, Significantly differentiate the

creative and control groups.

TABLE 10

Comparison of the Creative and Control Groups
on the Form Level Score (FL)

 

Group Form Level Score (FL).
Mean 0"
Creative 12.30 12.68
Control .20 14.81
F 7.698
p (.01

 

Before presenting the needed result of holding the
number of responses constant while comparing the two groups
on the FL variable, it will be necessary to discuss the
meaning of the differentiating power of FL. If this is, in

fact, the only contributor to ARS which differentiates the

 

74
two groups, then it may be that the form level scoring rather
than the more complicated ARS variable is of importance
to the present study. Exploring this further, it will be
necessary to determine whether the form-level scoring is
differentiating only when utilized for primary process
responses (FL), or whether the form level of non primary
process responses also differentiates the two groups.

Taking into account the questions raiSed above, the
following analysis will be presented. The form-level score
for primary process responses (FL) will be analyzed holding
total number of responses constant through the covariance
technique (Table 11). The same analysis will be presented
for the form level score of non—primary process responses
(Tablesi12 and 13). A comparison of Tables 10 and 11 with
Tables 12 and 13 will then suggest the differentiating
facility of the form-level score.

The results presented in Tables 10 and 11 indicate
that the form-level score for primary process responses
differentiates the two groups, and continues to do so when
number of responses is equated for each group. The mean
score for the creative group is significantly higher than
that for the control group (12.30 vs .20). Examination of
Tables 12 and 13 reveals that the form level score of non—
primary process responses does not differentiate the two
groups, either before or after equating the groups for total

number of responses produced. It may now be concluded that,

75
TABLE 11

Comparison of the Creative and Control Groupg on the Form

Level Score for Primary;g;ocess Responses (FL)EWith
Number of Rorschach Responses (R) Held Constant

 

 

 

Sum of Squares of . _ .
Source of Variance érnors of estimates df Mean square F

 

 

Total 8329.52 ‘38
Within groups 7220.30 37 '195.14 5.68*
.L'Adested means 1109.22 1 1109.22
*p < .05
TABLE 12

Comparison of the Creatiye and Control Groups op the Form

Level Score forResponses Not Scorable for Primar
Process (FL non PPR)

 

 

 

 

 

Group FL Non PPR
Mean
‘Creative 13.65 17.00#
Control 8.90 11.65
F 1.06
p >.05

#Variances are homogeneous.

 

76

TABLE 13

Comparison of the Creative and Control Group§.on the Form Level
.Score for Responseppnot Scorable for Primary Procegg
jFL Non PPR) with Number of Rorschagp
Responses (R) Heid Cgpgtant

 

 

Source of variance .Sum of Squares of df 'Mean square F
errors of estimate

 

Total - 6724,56 38
Within groups 6718.28 37 181.58 (1.00 N.S.

Adjusted means 6.28 1 6.28

 

77
of all the Rorschach scoring presented, only the FL score
differentiates the creative from the control groups,,with
a higher FL score associated with the creative group. The
significance of this conclusion will be taken up in the
Discussion portion of the paper (Chapter VI).

There is no difference in the amount of primary
process material produced between the creative and control
groups when differences in total number of responses given
is held. There is a significant difference in the adaptive
regression score proposed as an operational measure of
creative regression, the creative group having a higher score.
Much of this difference seems to be due to the better form
quality manifested by the creative group in respOnses
scorable for primary process. The mean form quality score
for non primary process responses produces no Significant
difference between the two groups.

The answer to the question posed is evident from the
results presented. The creative and control groups do not
differ significantly on either Defense Demand or Defensive
Contribution. However, the creative group is differentiated
in having a higher mean Form Level for responses scorable
for primary process, and it appears that it is this variable
which contributes the greater part to the total adaptive
regression score.

The final question to be explored before moving on to

the results relative to the relationship between the

78
adaptive regression variable and the dogmatism variable is
that of the relationship between the scoring procedures
utilized here and traditional Rorschach scoring techniques.

Each of the 40 protocols scored for ARS was rescored
using Klopfer's method (Klopfer gp_3i., 1954). Mean
differences for each of the 27 variables presented in Table 14
were examined using the t-ratiomethod. Examination of the
results presented reveals that only four of the 27 variables
significantly differentiates the two groups: Mean number
of responses (R), mean number of pure form responses (F),
form-dominated color responses (FC + F/C), and animal
content responses (A). In each case, however, when the
variable is expressed as a percentage of the number of
responses produced, the difference between means is not
significant(F%, PC + F/C/R, A%). It may be concluded,
therefore, that the traditional scoring technique as
represented by the Klopfer system does not differentiate the

two groups used in the study.

Summary of Results: Rorschach Variables

Hypotheses H1 and H2 are both accepted. There is no
difference in the amount of primary process material produced
between the creative and control groups when differences in
the total number of responses produced are held constant.

There is a significant difference between the two groups in

the Adaptive Regression Score proposed as the operational

TABLE 14

Comparison pf the Creative and Control Groups on Variables

 

Scored by the Klopfer System

79

 

 

Variable

W%
0%
Dd%
F+

Total F

M

FM
Fm+mF+ma
Fc+F/ca
CF+c/Fa

C
Fc+cF+k+Ka
Fc'+c'Fa
H+(H)a

Hd

A

Ad
No.Content Cat
P a
F#%

M/EC

W/M

A%

F%

Creative
Mean 0"
42.90 14.14
41.70 17.31
50.55 15.17

7.55 6.56
16.20 8.43
4.15 .2.70
1.15
21.5 9.59
6.0 4.05
6.35 3.10
1.40
3.65 2.49
1.85 31.59
.10
1.45
.6
6.45 4.33
1.95
14.30 6.63
1.50
10.85 3.05
6.25
79.70 12.68
‘l.80 1.09
4.12
35.95

47.60

14.10

Control
Mean 0"
32.10 13.01
47.20 19.39
48.05 15.72

4.80 5.92
12.05 6.77
2.95 2.46
.55
15.55 9.27
5.05 3.45
4.60 2.78
.80
2.30 1.49
1.60 2.29
.10
1.40
.65
5.50 3.57
1.35
9.45 3.30
1.60
10.05 2.91
6.05
82.35 8.18
2.74 3.87
3.94
36.55
46.15 11.26

2.51*
.947
.511

1.39

1.72

1.46

2.39*
.81
1.88

2.08*
.38

.76

2.90*

*

80
Table 14, Continued

Variable Creative Control

Mean C7“ Mean 5” t
FC+F/C/R .08 .07 b
*p< .05
**p < .01

 

aCategories combined due to small frequencies.

bSignificance of the difference not computed, since
the difference is negligible.

81
measure of creative regression. Much of this difference
appears to be due to the ability of the creative group to
maintain better form quality in responses scorable for primary
process. The form—level score does not differentiate the
two groups when applied to responses non-scorable for primary
process. When the protocols produced by the Creative and
Control subjects are scored for the more conventional
scoring categories as represented by Klopfer, none of the
categories differentiate the two groups, although four
categories are differentiating before the number of responses

produced are equated.

Creativity. Adaptive Regression apngoqmatism

Before presenting the results regarding the hypotheses
proposed relative to the relationship of dogmatism to adaptive
regreSsion, an attempt will be made to answer the questions
raised concerning the adequacy of using a "filled" versus
an "unfilled" Dogmatism Scale.

The only previous use of the Dogmatism Scale without
filler items is that of Vidulich (1958) who reports a corrected
split-half reliability of .76 with a sample of .93. Since
this compared favorably with previously reported split-half
reliabilities of .78 and .81 using the scale with filler
items, Vidulich concluded that "padding" is not as essential
as previously supposed.

The result of the present test—retest using a "filled"

82
and "unfilled" scale-for 30 subjects support the conclusions
reached by Vidulich (1958) that it does not seem necessary
to use filler items, since the use of such.items does not
.make an appreciable difference in the reliability of the
scores obtained.(r = .881; p < .005).

Having demonstrated that the Dogmatism scale utilized
in the study is a reliable instrument, it is now possible to
examine the results regarding Hypotheses H3,H4 and H5.

Hypothesis H is to the effect that, regardless of

3
classification as creative or control, there will be no
relationship-betweenthe amount of primary process manifested

on the Rorschach and the Dogmatism Scale score. H4 states,
however, that there will be a negative relationship between

the Adaptive Regression score and the Dogmatism Score. These
hypotheses follow from the prOposal that the Dogmatism score
constitutes a measure of the degree to which individuals are

able to function unencumbered by drive intruSion. A number

of analyses were done to investigatethe:relationships posited

in Hypothesis H3. First, relatively high and relatively low
dogmatic subjects were compared on the number of Primary

‘Process responses produced. These subjects were classified

as high or low if they fell above or below the median

Dogmatism score for the 40 subjects, respectively. An additional

test of Hypothesis H is provided by comparing the mean PPR

3
for thetxnlsubjects scoring highest on the Dogmatism scale

with the mean for the tentsubjects scoring lowest on the

83
scale. These results are presented in Table 16. The
correlation between Number of Primary Process responses
produced and Dogmatism Scale scores is —.017, which is not

significant.

TABLE 15

Comparison of Relatively High and Relatively Low Dogmatic
Subjects with Respect to Number of Primary Process
Responses (PPR) Produqeg

 

 

 

 

Group N Mean Number PPRl Cy.»
High Dogmatic# 20 . 20.90 8.77
Low Dogmatic## 20 23.15 7.95
F ___
p. N.S.a
F#Above median for 40 subjects.
##

Below median for 40 subjects.

aMean square within groups higher than mean square
between groups.

1 . .

Comparison of the mean PPR for the ten highest and
ten 10west Dogmatism scores also.reveals no significant
differences. (Mean square within is greater than the mean
square between, F is non-significant).

The results presented in Table 15 and the correlation
of -.017 between Number of Primary Process Responses produced
and the Dogmatism Scale scores is sufficient evidence to

accept Hypothesis H It may be concluded that there is no

3.

 

84
relationship between the amount of primary process
material produced on the Rorschach and dogmatism as measured
by the Dogmatism Scale.

Calculation of the correlation coefficient between the
Adaptive.Regression Score (ARS) and the Dogmatism Scale
reveals that the relationship is negative as posited in
Hypothesis H4. However, it is not significant (r = -.175).
Examination of the scatter diagram for the ARS and D scores
suggests that the relationship is curvilinear. Since the
Pearson-r computed for such data will underestimate the
degree of relationship (Edwards, 1954, p. 197), a correlation
ratio ("eta") was utilized to investigate the regression of
ARS on D, and the regression of D on ARS. The results of
this analysis are presented in a note following Table 16.

As noted, although the correlation ratios are higher than

the correlation coefficient, neither is significantly different

from hero .

TABLE 16

Correlation between Adaptive Regression Scores (ARS)
and Dogmatism Scale (D) Spores for 40 Subjects

 

 

Variable r p.

ARS-D -.175* > .05

 

*Examination of the scatter diagram suggests that the
relationship is curvilinear. The Correlation-ratios (eta) for
the same data are not significantly different from zero.
(Regression of ARS on D is .381, F/< 1.00; D on ARS is .391,

F 1.00 .

85

Hypothesis H5 states that the creative group will have
a significantly lower mean Dogmatism Score than the control
group. The hypothesis stems from the proposal that the
Dogmatism score measures the degree of "openness" to external
perceptions and internal drives, a factor also proposed as
a necessary condition for creativity. The test of significance
for the two means reveals that the mean D score for the
creative group (129.6) is significantly lower than that of
the control group (147.05; P < .025).

Hypothesis H is accepted, since the difference

5
between the means is significant, and the creative group mean
is lower as predicted.

These results present what may be a paradoxical
situation. It will be recalled that the mean Adaptive
Regression Score for the creative group is significantly
higher than that of the control group. The results just
presented indicate that the mean Dogmatism score for the
creative group is significantly lower than that of the control
group. In view of this, one would expect a negative relation-
ship between the Adaptive Regression score and the Dogmatism
score. The correlation of —.175 indicates that although such
a relationship exists, it is not significant. The question
may then be posed as to whether the Adaptive Regression
Score and Dogmatism score are measuring two different things.
Another possibility is that the ARS and D scores operate

differently in the two groups. The data for examining the

 

86
latter possibility are available, and are presented in Table 17.
Here the correlations for ARS - D are given for the creative

and control groups separately.

TABLE 17

Correlation between Adaptive Regression Scores (ARS) and
Dogmatism Scores (D) for the Creative and

Control Groups

 

 

 

Group N r(ARS-D) p.
Creative 20 .425 < . 10
Control 20 -.321 > .10

 

Although neither correlation is significant, the
correlation for the creative group suggests that the Adaptive
Regression Score is positively related to the Dogmatism Score,
while for the control group it is negatively related. The
results are not conclusive in that neither correlation is
significantly different from zero, and the signiszance of»
the difference between the two correlations presented is
itself not significant (p = .19).

In view of the finding that the FL score for primary
process responses contribute the greatest amount of
variance to the ARS, the results of correlating the D score
with the FL score are presented in Table 18. Again the
results suggest that the D score is negatively related to

the measure of adaptive regression for the total sample,

 

87
negatively related for the control group, and positively
related for the creative group. Again, none of the
correlations are significantly different from zero. The
consistent reversal in sign of the correlations is striking,

and will be discussed further in the next chapter.

TABLE 18

Correlations between Form Level of Responses scorable for
Primary Process (FL) and Dogmatism Scale Scores (D)
for the Total.Sample, and for the Creative
and Control Groups

 

 

'1

,1

Group“5 Correlation FL—D p ,fg
Creative -170 I > '10 .0
Control -. 366 > . 10 1
Total -.243 > .10 1,

 

Summary of Results: Creativity, Adaptive

Regression, and Dogmatism

Results indicate that there is no relationship between
the amount of primary process produced on the Rorschach and
scores on the Dogmatism Scale. The Adaptive Regression
Score derived from the Rorschach does significantly
differentiate the creative and control groups, the mean ARS
being higher for the Creative group. The Dogmatism Scale
score also differentiates the two groups, the mean D score

being lower for the creative group. However, the correlation

88
between ARS and D is not significantly different from zero.
Further analysis of the relationship between ARS-D suggests
that the ARS is positively related to D in the creative
group and negatively related to D in the control group,
although neither relationship is significant. The same
relationships are obtained in correlating the D score with

the FL score for the respective groups.

89

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

The theoretical papers considered in Chapter II
indicate that considerable agreement exists regarding the
role of adaptive regression in creativity. The intent of
the present study is twofold: to demonstrate the operation
of this factor in art students evaluated by their professors
as highly creative and to evaluate a method prOposéd as
operationalizing the concepts involved. How well this
intention has been accomplished may be evaluated by
examining the results presented in Chapter V.

The ARS was presumed at the outset to be an operational
measure of adaptive regression. A high ARS, according to
the theory from which it is generated, signifies three things.
One, that the Rorschach responses produced contain a high
degree of primary process characteristics. This is
signified by the defense demand score (DD), which is, in
effect, a rating of the primary process manifestation.
Secondly, that the responses are produced with a minimum
amount of perceptual distortion as indicated by the form—
level rating (FL), and third, that the responses contain the
means by which the primary process material is made socially
acceptable. The latter is indicated by the DC scores which
are added to produce the total DC for each response. Thus,

the higher the ARS, the more the conditions necessary for

90
adaptive regression are met, i.e., a willingness to allow
primary process material into the thought process and the
effective utilization of such material without perceptual
distortion.

A comparison of the mean ARS thus derived for the
creative and control groups supports the hypothesis that the
creative group would have a significantly higher mean score
than the control group (Tables 3, 5, 6, 7). However, further
analysis of the ARS reveals that, of the three constituents,
DD, DC and FL, only the form level score (FL) differentiates
the two groups (Tables 8, 9, 10, 11). Two points may be
raised regarding these results. First, are they consistent
with the theory of adaptive regression as it relates to
creativity? And second, does the evidence raise serious
question about the usefulness of the ARS?

The latter question might best be discussed first. As
has been mentioned previously, the determination of DD and
DC scores involves considerable time and effort. A response
which is scorable for primary process may be categorized in
one or more of 60 possible Content and/or Formal categories,
and in one or more of 41 Control and Defenee_categories. It
would appear that such fine categorization does not contribute
to the ability of the ARS to discriminate the two groups in
the study. A more parsimonious approach is suggested by the
finding that only the FL score is significantly discriminative.

If the determination is made as to whether a given response

 

91
acontains primary process, and the form—level for such responses
is rated, this provides sufficient data to differentiate the
two groups. It should be noted again that it is only the
form—level of primary process responses which makes this
discrimination, and that rating either non-primary process
responses, or total responses, for form level is not
discriminative (see Tables 12 and 13).

This leads now to the second question. If the ARS is
heavily loaded with extraneous, non-discriminative factors,
and the FL score is accepted as the important factor, does
the latter fulfill the intention of the study, i.e., to find
an operational measure of adaptive regression, and to demonstrate
such in creative art students. This is an important point,
since it will be recalled that the total number of responses
(R) also discriminates the two groups (Table 3), and R is
far easier to determine than FL. It is obvious, however,
that R, although discriminating, does not enable one to say
a great deal about the differences between the two groups,
relative to adaptive regression. The most one would say
regarding R is that the creative group is more productive
than the control group. Certainly this is one of the necessary
conditions for creativity, as has been pointed out by
Guilford (1957) and others, but it does not throw light on the
adaptive regression hypothesis.

The point has been well taken (by Holt, 1959, p. 3)

that when we speak of primary process, we are referring to the

92
function of "intervening variables," rather than to manifest
behavior. An intervening variable, according to Mac Corquordale
and Meehl, is exemplified by the dispositional term resistance
in physics. It is defined by implication, and not conceived
as observable even with future developments in technique. In
this sense, it is an explanatory conception which bridges the
gap between physical stimulus and observable response or
behavior.a The point to be made here is that it is not
possible to "see” the primary process in operation. Likewise,
the term "adaptive regression" is not to be equated with
observable behavior. Both must be inferred from something
that is manifest.

Keeping the foregoing in mind, does the FL (an observable
on the Rorschach) qualify as an entity from which adaptive
regression may be inferred? Is it as much a measure of
adaptive regression as the more complicated ARS entity? A
re-examination of the necessary conditions for the conclusion
of adaptive regression leads to a positive answer. Adaptive
regression requires primary process, plus control over and
utilization of such material. There is no question but that
the FL indicates the presence of primary process material, for

by definition it is the form level assigned only to responses

 

aFor a more complete discussion of intervening
variables and other explanatory concepts such as hypothetical
constructs, see Tolman (1951) and Mac Corquodale and Meehle
(1951). The concept of the dispositional term and the
procedures by which they may be reduced to testable hypotheses
is discussed in detail by Carnap (1953).

93
scorable for primary process. Is a high-form level score an
indication of control and utilization? It is the general
consensus of Rorschach investigators that it is. Schafer
(1948) for example, indicates that "The low Ff% of a schizophrenic .
is indicative of the extent of the breakdown of reality-
testing and the suffusion of apperception with pathologically
autistic thought content" (p. 69). Williams (1947) found a
correlation of .61 between F¥% and a measure of control
(the digit symbol test of the Wechsler—Bellevue) in an
experimentally induced stress situation.

The form-level of responses may then be assumed as a
measure of control.

The operationalizing of form level as an indication of
utilization may be granted if one accepts the assumption
that the maintenance of adequate reality testing in the
presence of primary process manifestation is an indication
that such manifestation is not threatening to the individual.
Consequently it does not require extensive defensive measures
to contain it, and permits its utilization in creative (or
other) endeavors.

In View of the foregoing discussion, it seems reasonable
to propose at this point that the operational measure of
adaptive regression be restated in terms of the FL score,

i.e., the form quality of responses containing primary process
material.

The fact that the creative and control groups do not

94
differ in amount of primary process material produced when
number of responses is held constant (Table 4), but are
significantly differentiated by the FL score suggests the
following conclusion. The creative group manifests less
disturbance of perceptual accuracy in the manifestation of
primary process material, and thus is in a better position
to utilize such material effectively.

Brief mention should be made here as to why the
traditional scoring techniques for rating form quality fail
to demonstrate a significant difference between the two groups.
The answer may be found in two differences between the
traditional techniques and that utilized in the present study.
First, the usual F+ vs F- scoring involves a rating of aii
responses for form—level. No differentiation is made as to
the drive characteristics of the responses. The present
technique does differentiate responses scorable and non-
scorable for primary process before the form quality rating
is assigned. The results presented in Tables 10, ll, 12 and
13 reveal that it is only the scorable PPR which differentiate
the two groups. Secondly, the form-level scoring system
provided by Mayman (1959) and utilized in the present study
is a more highly differentiated system than the traditional
technique (see Appendix H for the form-fevel categories
proposed by Mayman). Such a system provides for greater
differentiation in rating form quality, and as such may be

more sensitive to perceptual disturbance as indicated by the

95

accuracy of the perceived forms.

Psychopathology ang the Artist

The production of responses which are drive-dominated
(primary process responses) is correlated with the total
production of responses, and therefore was co—varied out in
the re—testing of the hypothesis that creative artists and the
control group would not differ in primary process production
(H1). The co—variance results permitted the acceptance of
this hypothesis. However, a case can be made for the viewpoint
that regardless of co-variance lack of difference, and the
demonstration that the creative artists manifest greater
perceptual accuracy while producing primary process material,
they do manifest more of a thought process akin to that found
in a variety of psychopathologies, i.e., libidinal and
aggressive discharge, formal thought processes such as
condensation, symoblization, autistic logic, etc. The
viewPoint that the creative individual is "odd," "mentally-
unbalanced," "psychotic," etc., is one accepted not only by
the uninformed layman. Hyslop (1925), in a work entitled
"The Great Abnormals" points to the peculiarities of such
men of genius as Malhebes, Dante, Coleridge, Schiller and
Milton. Jacobson (1926) states that, "The genius is usually,
if not always, of insane temperament, but his creative work
reflects the man at his best, that is to say, sanest." Roe

(1946) suggests that some of the artists she studied were

96
alcoholics, and that they used alcohol as a means of relieving
the tension generated by their artistic endeavors.

The greater absolute number of primary process responses
in the creative group is not interpreted in this paper as
indicative of psychopathology. On the contrary, they may be
interpreted as indicative of mature strength of ego resources
since they appear with a higher form quality, suggestive of
less disturbance when dealing with primary process material.

Nevertheless, there is the possibility that when
primary process is available, as it seems to be in these
creative individuals, it may manifest itself in other than
creative productivity. Under conditions which facilitate
greater relaxation of control than that afforded by the
Rorschach testing situation, their ability to operate close
to the primary process end of the continuum may be reflected
in behavior. Since primary process, by definition, disregards
reality considerations, the creative artist may be less
threatened by unreality than the average individual, who
reacts to drive expression with anxiety and alarm.

Bellak (1958), makes a similar point in terms of
psychoanalytic theory.

The gifted person, by virtue of being able to regress
in the service of the ego, maintains relatively less
firmly defined boundaries-—of the self, of ideas than
does the average person. He makes less use of repression
and therefore is relatively more likely to experience
ego regression (which might lead to neurotic or
psychotic symtomatology). The answer to "madness and

genius" is then that the creative person and the disturbed
share the quality of ease of ego—regression, of adaptive

97

functions of the ego; they share the characteristic

of less rigidly defined conceptual and perceptual
boundaries and less strong counter-cathexis (by
repression). However, disturbance and creative ability
are not identical because the gifted person combines
the ability for partial regression with an ability for
synthesis, and an ability to increase again the
adaptive capaéity--to the point of reality testing,
criticism and an ability to communicate (p. 372).

The Paradoxical Relationship between the Adaptive

Regression Score and the Dogmatism Scale Score

If the foregoing is accepted as an interpretation, it
may be possible to explain the paradoxical relationship found
between the Adaptive Regression score and the Dogmatism scale
score. It will be recalled that the results (Table 17)
suggest a positive, although non-significant, relationship
between ARS and D for creative subjects, and a negative
relationship for control subjects. The same relationships
were found for FL and D. It is proposed now that the creative
group may appear pepp_adaptively regressive ape Dogmatic,
due to the fact that the Dogmatism Scale and the Adaptive
Regression measurements are measuring different things. The
Rorschach test is, as described by Rorschach, an "experiment
in perception." It requires visual perceptions of a type
similar to those required in the production of a painting. The
Dogmatism scale does not require such perceptions. It does,
however, require a "cognitive" appraisal of the self and of
social reality as perceived by the subject.

This may mean that when working in their own area,

98

i.e., visual perception, the primary process material available
to creative artists is not threatening or disturbing. However,
When asked to operate in other, more "cognitive" areas
involving self-appraisal and evaluation of social realities,
the availability of primary process which is so essential to
creative productivity results in the kind of "encumberance"
described by Rokeach as characteristic of dogmatic thinking.

There is still another question to be explored in
regard to the relationship between dogmatism and the
operational measure of adaptive regression. Bellak (1958) and
others point to the increased ability of the creative individual
to "synthesize" the primary process material made available
through regression. Rokeach (1960) posits, and presents
evidence in support of the contention, that the Dogmatism
scale also differentiates individuals who are able to
synthesize from those who cannot. (See particularly
Rokeach, 1960, Chapters 9 and 10.) r

In View of the fact that the two theoretical positions
described assume that the ability to synthesize is necessary
for satisfactory performance on the respective measures
under consideration, it is surprising that the measures do
not correlate more highly. The suggestion I would like to
make here is that both the ARS and FL score may be measuring
only what Bellak calls the "initial phase of oscillation,”
and not the second, or integrating, phase. It will be

recalled that Bellak proposes a rapid oscillation between the

99
regression function and the ego adaptive function (see pp. 17-18
this paper, and Bellak, 1958, p. 367). It is possible that
the Rorschach measures used in the present study provide
information about the ability of the creative artist to
regress without threat, but do not measure the synthesizing
or integrating aspects of the processes involved. Such an
interpretation would further support the proposal that there
are many necessary conditions for creativity, not all of which
may be measured by a single instrument.

Another possibility is that the Dogmatism scale and
the ARS or FL scores are measuring different aspects of
synthesis. The tasks set by Rokeach for his subjects may
possibly involve an integration on the secondary process level
only. On the ”Doodlebug" problem, for example (see Rokeach,
1960, pp. 171—181) the subject is asked to overcome previously
held beliefs and to then integrate a new set of beliefs into
a working solution. Low dogmatic subjects were found to
achieve this integration better than high dogmatic subjects.
The integration called for, however, may be of an intellectual
nature not involving the more affective components of the
personality structure. Rokeach's position would not support
such a conclusion, since he posits that there is no essential
difference between the affective and the cognitive (see page 35
this paper), but it is a possibility worthy of further
consideration. The other side of this argument is that the

synthesis called for in adaptive regression does call for an

lOO
integration of "affectively loaded" material which is not
necessary-in tasks such as the "Doodlebug" problem. If the
foregoing is true, then it may be possible-to explain the
failure of the Dogmatism scale and the ARS and FL scores
to correlate more highly. IThey may be measuring different

aspects of synthesis.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

The foregoing raises a number of questions for further
research. Why, for example, should the primary process
availability operate so differently in visual perception as
contrasted with personal-social-cognitive areas? Does it
in fact so operate? More importantly, if it so operates, why
should it do so differentially for the creative and control
groups? The answers to such questions can only be Obtained
through further research with more clearly defined groups
than were utilized in the present study. It is a severe
limitation that the subjects utilized here are not extreme
groups as far as the Dogmatism variable is concerned.
Vidulich (1958), for example, reports a mean Dogmatism score
of 145.21 for a group of unselected undergraduate students.
The mean D score of the control group in the present study
is 147.05, and therefore must be viewed as "average" rather
than "high." By the same standard, the mean D score of the
creative group in the present study‘is 129.6, and may be
considered as only relatively "low," rather than as extremely

*undogmatic.

101

Another limitation of the study is that presented
by the nature of the sample. Although the subjects in the
creative group were evaluated by their professors as showing
promise of success in the field, they are by no means
accomplished artists, nor have they had the opportunity to
accumulate the large breadth of experience posited as one
of the necessary conditions for creative accomplishment.

This limitation is somewhat offset by the fact that the
positive results presented were obtained by comparing a
judged group with a random group which, by the nature of its
randomness, may be assumed to contain some students as
creative or more creative than contained in the judged
creative group. The significant differences reported here
for the Adaptive Regression, Form Level, and Dogmatism scores
suggest that even with such assumed overlap, the measures
are discriminating and worthy of further use. They should,
however, be tested using known artists whose creativeness

is not open to question.

One of the more obvious studies needed is that
designed to determine whether known groups lacking in control
over primary process are discriminated by the FL score. A
schizophrenic sample would meet this criterion, and it may be
hypothesized that such a group would show a greater number
of primary process responses, but with lower FL scores than
a normal group. Responses not scorable for primary process

may not be as threatening to schizophrenics, and as such

<« "m

ci- .2

102
should not result in a breakdown of reality testing processes.
The FL score for non—primary process responses should, there-
fore, show no differences in the psychotic and control groups.
If such was the case, then a significant contribution may be

made to clincial diagnostic procedure.

 

103

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY

The study was undertaken to provide an empirical
test of the theory of adaptive regression as it functions in
creative artists. An operational measure of adaptive regression h
suggested by Holt (1959) in relation to the Rorschach test
was utilized as the measuring instrument, and the study
served as a test of the measures proposed. Further hypotheses
were generated from the work of Rokeach (1960) regarding the :3
relationships of dogmatic thinking with adaptive regression.

Twenty advanced undergraduate art students judged 1H
as highly creative by their professors served as the
”creative” group, and a sample of 20 additional art students
were randomly selected to serve as the control group. The
Rorschach test and Dogmatism scale were administered
individually to all subjects, and a Dogmatism scale interspersed p
with filler items was mailed to each subject approximately
one month after the individual administration. The
correlation between the ”filled" and ”unfilled” scales is
.881, significant beyond the .005 level. Comparison of the
two groups reveals no significant differences in age,
intelligence as measured by the A.C.E. test, and previous
art training as measured by number of art credits at Michigan
State University or elsewhere.

The Rorschach protocols were scored using a manual

104
provided by Holt (1959). The manual contains specific
directions and categories for evaluating the extent to which
primary_process is manifest and the control features
associated with primary process production. In order to
demonstrate the inter—scorer reliability of the scoring
system, the writer and another scorer independently scored
14 of the protocols, and a correlation was calculated for the
adaptive regression score derived. The inter-scorer
reliability is .945, significant beyond the .005 level. Intra—
subject reliability of the same measure was demonstrated, using
the split-half method, to be .562, significant beyond the f01
level.

The operational measure of adaptive regression is

given by the formula

ARS = (DD x FL + DC1 + DC2 . . . DCn)

where ARS is the adaptive regression score, DD is the rating
assigned to each response indicating the amount of primary
process material contained, FL is the form-level of the
response. The right hand portion of the equation is summed
for all responses produced up to a maximum of 60. The number
of responses permitted each subject was arbitrarily set by
the writer prior to the study at six per card.

The data were analyzed using the t-ratio, product-
moment correlation, analysis of variance, analysis of
covariance, and multiple analysis of covariance. The latter

were necessary to partial out the effects of the total number

105
of responses and number of primary process responses produced.
Both of these variables significantly differentiate the two
groups, although the latter is not significantly differentiating
when number of responses is held constant.

Five major hypotheses were presented for testing. Two
hypotheses dealt with the adaptive regression factor. It
was hypothesized that the two groups would not differ in
amount of primary process material produced, but would
differ in the effectiveness of utilization of such material
as measured by the ARS. Both hypotheses are upheld. It was
demonstrated that the creative group has a higher mean ARS
score than the control group, and that this difference remains
significant when number of primary process responses and
total number of responses are held constant.

Further analysis of the ARS score reveals that the
form-level score is the only contributing factor in
discriminating the two groups. The two groups do not differ
significantly on the variables DD or DC. It was proposed
that the FL score may be acceptable as an operational measure
of adaptive regression, since it reflects the degree to which
perceptual accuracy is maintained during the production of
primary process material. This proposal is substantiated
by the finding that the form-level score of responses not
scorable for primary process does not differentiate the two
groups.

Three hypotheses regarding the relationship between

0"“

106
dogmatism and adaptive regression were submitted for testing.
It was hypothesized that the creative group would have a
significantly lower mean Dogmatism Scale score than the control
group. This hypothesis was accepted. It was further hypothe-
sized that, regardless of classification as creative or
control, subjects scoring high and low on the D measure would
not differ on amount of primary process material produced.
This hypothesis was also accepted. Finally, it was
hypothesized that, regardless of classification as creative
or control, there would be a negative relationship between the
measure of adaptive regression and dogmatism. Although the
correlation between ARS—D is negative, it is not significantly
different from zero. The same result is found for the
relationship between FL-D. Further analysis of the relation-
ship for the control and creative groups suggests that the
Dogmatism measure is positively related to adaptive regression
for the creative group, and negatively related for the
control group. Possible explanations for such results are
given, but further research is needed to provide more
conclusive answers to the questions raised.

The major conclusion drawn from the study is that the
form-level score (FL) is a useful diagnostic measure worthy
of further investigation, both in the study of creativity
with acknowledged artists, and as a diagnostic instrument
in clinical research and practice. Some suggestions are given

for possible research studies with the score.

107

Although the operational measure of adaptive regression
originally proposed (ARS) was shown to contain factors which I'
are non—differentiating, the theory of adaptive regression
finds support in the results presented. The FL score,
however, provides as much information as does the ARS, and “
does so more parsimoniously. L

Analysis of the results of scoring the records by
a traditional scoring method reveals no significant
differences on any of 28 variables, although four variables
are differentiated before equating the two groups for number

:4
. 1
of responses produced. H*

 

108

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Volume IV. London: Hogarth Press, 1950, 98-136.
@original German edition, 1915). (b).

u/Feibleman, J. K. The psychology of the artist. J. Psychol.,
1945, 19, 165-189.

Ghiselin, B. (Ed.) The creative process. New York: New
American Library, 1955.

Goldberger, L and Holt, R. R. Experimental interference
with reality contact: individual differences.
New York: Research Center for Mental Health, 1958
(dittoed).

Gordon, W. J. J. Operational approach to creativity.
Harvarg Business Review, 1956, 41-51.

Gordon, W. J. J., and Bruner, J. S. Motivating the creative
-proces . Boston: The Institute of Contemporary
Art, 1954.

Gordon, W. J. J., Gifford, D. C., and Bruner, J.{S. Integrating
the creative process into indpetry. education, science
ape the'arts. Boston: Center for Design Studies of
the Institute of Contemporary Art, 1957.

Guilford, J. P. Creativity. Amer. Psychologist. 1950, 5,
444-454.

Guilford, J. P. Creative abilities in the arts. Psychol.
Rev., 1957, 44, 110—118.

Hall, C. S. and Lindzey, G. Theories of Personality. New
York: Wiley, 1957.

110

Harrower, G. and Cox, K. The results obtained from a number
of occupational groupings in the professional level

with the Rorschach group method. Bull. Canad. Peychol.
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Hart, H. H. The integrative factor in creativity. Psychiapiic.
Quart., 1950, 24, 1-16.

Hartmann, H. Ego psyChology and the problem of adaptation.
In Rapaport, D. Organization and pathology of
thought. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951,
362—398.

Hathaway, S. R. and McKinley, J. C. The Minnesota Multiphasic
Pereonality Inventory - manual. New York: The
Psychological Corp., 1951.

Hersch, C. The cognitive functioning of the creative person:
a developmental analysis by means of the Rorschach
test. Diss. Abstr., 1958, 18, 296-297.

Hertz, Marguerite R. Reliability of the Rorschach ink-blot
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Hertz, Marguerite R. Current problems in Rorschach theory
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Holt, R. R. Implications of contemporary personality theories
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Mary D., Klopfer, W. G., and Holt, R. R. Developments
in the Rorschach technique, Volpme I. New York:
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111

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112

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114

Appendix.a
Criteria sheet used by Art professors to recommend creative students

Please list the names of the l5 students majoring in your department
who you feel best meet the following criteria, and also the names of
the i5 students majoring in your department who you feel least meet
the criteria. Please note that the criteria stated are meant as
suggestive of the type of person we are interested in, rather than as
an exhaustive definition of creativity.

The student is a creative person, i.e., is able to

reorganize existing facts and his perceptions into

new and meaningful arrangements, and is able to

communicate these arrangements to others; is able

to perceive new solutions to problems; is not bound

by previous judgments to the extent that known

solutions hamper his desire to find better solutions;

is able to interpret his perception of reality to

others through a particular medium, e.g., painting,

ceramics, design, sculpture, etc.
Would you please choose your selections from the ranks of relatively
advanced students (juniors and seniors) in order that there be increased
chance that other members of your department would also know them. In
addition, may i suggest that these students need not be the most or the

'eaSt 'nte'l‘qen‘ students VON have AnntIHO'AI-QA so I a... an..- ..-.. .-!II

Appendix:B 115
INFORMATION BLANK

Please fill out the following accurately. The information called for is
essential to the research in which you have been asked to participate.
Assurance is given you that all information will be treated as confidential
and used for the purposes of this research only.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NAME: SEX:
LAST FIRST MIDDLE
PRESENT ADDRESS: PHONE:
AGE: DATE OF BIRTH: STUDENT NUMBER:
ENTERED MICHIGAN STATE: AS FRESHMAN TRANSFER FROML__
TERM YEAR

PRESENT CLASS (FRESHMAN, sorn., erc.):

 

MAJOR:

 

ART BACKGROUND:
PREVIOUS ART COURSES AT MSU (LIST BY NUMBER AND GIVE NAME OF INSTRUCTOR).
NUMBER INSTRUCTOR

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

\nkWN

 

 

PREVIOUS ART COURSES OTHER THAN MSU (GIVE COURSE TITLE AND INSTITUTION)
TITLE iNSTITUTION

I.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2
3
z,
5

 

 

What is your occupational or vocational goal? (For example: professional
artist, art teacher, illustrator, or other goal not associated with art.)

 

' p

Appendix C

The Dogmatism Scale 115

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels
about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer
to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover
many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with
others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree
with any statement, you can be sure that many other peOple feel the same as
you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree
or disagree with it. Please mark every one. Write +i, +2, +3, or -I, -2,
~3, depending on how you feel in each case.
+l: I AGREE A LITTLE -l: l DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH ~3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

I. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath
contempt.

2. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something
Important.

3. In a discussion i often find It necessary to repeat myself several
times to make sure I am being understood.

4. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

5. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers
his own happiness primarily.

6. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

7. I'd like it if I should find someone who would tell me how to solve
my personal problems.

8. Of all the different philosophies which have existed In this world
there Is probably only one which is correct.

9. It Is when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that his
life becomes meaningful.

l0. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is
going on is to rely upon leaders or experts who can be trusted.

ll. There are a number of persons i have come to hate because of the
things they stand for.

l2. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.
i3. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

lh. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among Its
own members cannot exist for long.

IS.

I6.

I7.

l8.

I9.
20.

2i.

22.

23.

24.

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

30.

3|.

32.

117

It Is only natural that a person should have a much better
acquaintance with Ideas he believes in than with Ideas he opposes.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself, I sometimes have
the ambition to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven,
or Shakespeare.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups Is a worthwhile goal,
It Is unfortunately necessary at times to restrict the freedom of
certain political groups.

If a man is to accomplish his mission In life It is sometimes
necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all”.

Most peepie just don't give a "damn" about others.

A person who gets enthusiastic about a number of causes Is likely
to be a pretty “wishy-washy" sort of person.

To compromise with our political opponents Is dangerous because
It usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

If given the chance I would do something that would be of great
benefit to the world.

In times like these It is often necessary to be more on guard against
Ideas put out by certain people or groups In one's own camp than by
those In the Opposing camp.

In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed In what I
am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

There are two kinds of peOpIe In this world: those who are on the
side of truth and those who are against It.

Man on his own Is a helpless and miserable creature.
The United States and Russia have just about nothing In common.

In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful
of really great thinkers.

The highest form of government Is a democracy and the highest form
of democracy Is a government run by those who are most Intelligent.

The present Is all too often full of unhappiness. It Is the future
that counts.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed Important
social and moral problems don't really understand what is going on.

.c.‘

 

33.
3th

35.

36.

37.

38.
39.

40.

Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely place.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on
until one has had a chance to hear the Opinions of those one respects.

The worst crime a person can commit Is to attack publicly the people
who believe in the same thing he does.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

Most of the Ideas which get published nowadays aren't worth the
paper they are printed on.

It Is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's
wrong.

When It comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from

the way we do.

119

Appendix’D
"Filled“ Dogmatism.$cale

CREATIVITY PROJECT: REVISED QUESTIONNAIRE

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels
about a number of Important social and personal questions. The best answer
to each statement below Is your personal opinion. we have tried to cover
many different and Opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with
others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree
with any statement, you can be sure that many other peOple feel the same as

you do.

Mark each statement In the left margin according to how much you agree
or disagree with It. Please mark every one. Write +l, +2, +3. or -I, -2,
-3, depending on how you feel In each case.

no.
n.
12.
I3.

+l: I AGREE A LITTLE -l: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness Is beneath
contempt.

I am often the last one to give up trying to do a thing.

The main thing In life Is for a person to want to do something
Important.

Everyone at times thinks about things too bad to talk about.

In a discussion I rarely find It necessary to repeat myself several
times to make sure I am being understood.

There Is usually only one best way to solve most iproblems.
Most people just don't know'what's good for them.
It is not always easy to tell the truth.

In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish If he considers
his own happiness primarily.

I prefer work that requires a great deal of attention to detail.
A man who does not believe In some great cause has not really lived.
Most people get angry sometimes.

I'd like it If I should find someone who would tell me how to solve
my personal problems.

IA.

IS.

l6.
I7.

i8.

I9.

20.
2|.

22.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

28.

29.

30.

BI.

32.
33.

l often become so wrapped up In something I am doing that I find
It difficult to turn my attention to other matters.

Of all the different philosOphies which have existed in this world
there are probably many which are correct.

l dislike to change my plans in the midst of an undertaking.

It is when a person devotes himself to an Ideal or cause that his
l Ife becomes meaningful .

If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not
seen I would probably do It.

In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is
going on is to rely upon leaders or experts who can be trusted.

I never miss going to church.

There are a number of persons I have come to hate because of the
things they stand for. '

i like to know some Important people because it makes me feel
important.

There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

i usually maintain my own Opinions even though many other peOple
may have a different point of view.

it is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.
i do not like everyone i know.

A group which tolerates difference of opinion among Its own members
will last longer than one which doesn't.

I find it easy to stick to a certain schedule, once I have started
it.

It Is only natural that a person should have a much better
acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he Opposes.

I gossip a little at times.

While i don't like to admit this even to myself, i sometimes have
the ambition to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven,

or Shakespeare.

i do not enjoy having to adapt myself to new and unusual situations.
Even though freedom of speech for all groups Is a worthwhile goal,

it Is unfortunately necessary at times to restrict the freedom Of
certain political groups.

 

3A.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

#0.
hi.

#2.
#3.

Ah.

#5.

#6.

#7.

1+8.
#9.
50.
51.

52.

53.
54-

Some peOple vote for men about whom they know very little.

If a man Is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes
necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all".

I prefer to stOp and think before I act even on trifling matters.
Most peOple just don't give a ”damn" about others.
Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke.

A person who gets enthusiastic about a number of causes is likely
to be a pretty ”wishy-washy” sort of person.

I try to follow a program of life based on duty.

To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because
It usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

At times I feel like swearing.

If given the chance I would do something that would be of great
benefit to the world.

i usually find that my own way Of attacking a problem is best,
even though it doesn't always seem to work In the beginning.

In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against
ideas put out by certain peOple or groups in one's own camp than by
those in the Opposing camp.

I do not read every editorial In the newSpaper every day.

In a heated discussion l generally become so absorbed In what I
am going to say that i forget to listen to what the others are saying

I am a methodical person In whatever I do.
Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.
i think It Is usually wise to do things in a conventional way.

There are two kinds of peOple in this world: those who are on the
side of truth and those who are against it.

My table manners are not quite as good at home as when i am out In
company.

Man on his own Is a wonderful creature.

The United States and Russia have just about nothing In common.

55.

56.
57.

58.
59.

60.

6|.

62.
63.
6h.
65.

66.

67.

68.
69.

70.

7|.

72.
73.
7A.

75.

76.

In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful
of really great thinkers.

I always finish tasks i start, even If they are not very Important.

The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form
of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

i would rather win than lose In a game.

The present Is all too often full of unhappiness. It is the future
that counts.

I often find myself thinking Of the same tunes or phrases for
days at a time.

Unfortunately, a good many peOple with whom I have discussed Important
social and moral problems don't really understand what is going on.

I have a work and study schedule which I follow carefully.
Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty happy place.
I find It hard to make talk when I meet new peOple.

it Is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on
until one has had a chance to hear the Opinions of those one respects.

i usually check more than once to be sure that l have locked a door,
put out the light, or something of the sort.

The worst crime a person can commit Is to attack publicly the people
who believe in the same thing he does.

l have never done anything dangerous for the thrill of It.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

I believe that promptness is a very important personality characteristic

Most of the ideas which get published nowadays aren't worth the
paper they are printed on.

I am always careful about my manner of dress.
It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
I always put on and take Off my clothes In the same order.

My blood bolls when a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's
wrong.

When it comes to differences of Opinion in religion we must be
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from
the way we do.

APPENDIX E

123

Primary Process categories used for scoring the Rorschach

Protocols, and the Defense Demand (DD)

associated with each

 

 

Content

L. Libidinal
L l 0. Oral 1
L 1 A. Anal 1
L 1 S. Sexual 1
1 E-V. Exhibitionistic—voyeuristic
L.1 H. Homosexual l
L.1 M. Miscellaneous libidinal 1
L 2 0. Oral 2
L 2 A. Anal 2
L 2 S. Sexual 2
2 E—V. Exhibitionistic-voyeuristic
L 2 H. YHomosexual.2
L 2 M. Miscellaneous libidinal 2
Ag. Aggressive
Ag 1 P—S. Potential--subject 1
Ag 1 P-O. Potential--object 1
Ag 1 A-S. Active--subject 1
Ag 1 A-O. Active--object 1

Ag 1 R. Results 1
Ag 2 P-S. Potential--subject 2
Ag 2 P-O. Potential-—object 2
Ag 2 A-S. Active--subject 2
AG 2 A-Q. Active—-object 2

Ag 2 R. Results 2
Anx. Anxietv and QUALE
Anx 1. Anxiety 1
Anx 2. Anxiety 2
Aff. Affective drive-derivatives
*DD = Defense Demand

(DD*)

(2-4)
(3,4)
(4)

(4)
(3.4)
(1-3)
(1-3)

(1)

(1-3)
(2,3)

(4.5)
(3-4)
(4-5)
(4,5)
(4,5)
(2,3)
(1,2)

(2)

(2)
(1-3)

(3)
(1-3)

(3)

APPENDIX E, Continued

Formal
C. Condensation
C f—p . Fusion of percepts
C i-e l. Internal—externai.view
C p-f 1. Partial fusion
C u—p l. Unrelinquished percepts
C-co 1. Composition 1
C-co 2. Composition 2
C a-l 2. Arbitrary linkage of percepts
C a-ci2. Arbitrary impossible comginations
C a-cu2. Arbitrary unlikely combinations
Arbitrary comifinations of color and form
FC arb 1. FC arb
F¢ 2. FC or F/C
Do 2. Fragmentation
Imp 2; Impressionistic response
Trans 1. Fluid transformation of percept
C-sym 1. Color symbolism
C-sym 2. Color symbolism
S-sym 1. Spatial symbolism
I—sym 1. Concrete image symbolism
I-sym 2. Concrete image symbolism
ML 1. Loosening of memory
Au Lg 1. Austistic logic
DW 1. DW
Ctr A l. Affective contradiction
Ctr L 1. Logical contradiction
Ctr In. Inappropriate activity
VS 2. Verbal slips
VP 2. Peculiar verbalizations
V0 1. Queer verbalizations
VC 1. Verbal condensation
VI 1. Verbal incoherence, confusion
Au E1 1. Autistic elaboration, Level 1
Au E1 2. Autistic elaboration, Level 2
S-R l. Self-reference
F—Msc l or 2. Miscellaneous formal aspects

124

:44

125
APPENDIX F
Control and Defense categories used to score the Rorschach

protocols, and the Defense Contribution (DC)
‘ associated with each

 

Seguence (DC)*
Recovery, modifying percept
S M 1—0. Level 1 — unscorable (+1.5)
S M 2—0. Level 2 - unscorable (+1)
S M 1—2. Level 1 - Level 2 (+.5)
S M R+. Rationalization of percept (+2)
S M R-. Rationalization of percept (—2)
Recovery, changing percept f
S C 1-0. Level 1 - unscorable (+1) I-
S C 2—0. Level 2 — unscorable ' (+1) f
S C 1—2. Level 1 — Level 2 “(+.5) ‘%
Regression, modifying percept ‘
s M 0-1. Unscorable - Level 1 (—1) I
S M 0-2. Unscorable - Level 2 (-1) I
S M 2—1. Level 2 - Level 1 (-.5) I"
Regression, changing percept ‘(
S C 2-1. Level 2 — Level 1 (-.5) 9
Delay
Inh. Inhibition (+1; 1.5) W 1

Reflection on response

R—fic n+. Non-specific fictional (+2)

Isp+,e. Introspection (+2; -1)
Crt+,O. Criticism of response (+2; -2)

Remoteness )
R-min. Minimal remoteness ‘(O) i
R-eth. Ethnically different ‘(+.5) ‘,‘

R-an. Animals (+1)
R—pl. Plants (+1.5) ,
R—ia. Inanimate (+2) 1
Redep. Depictions (+1) J
R—geo. Geographical remoteness (+2) -
‘R—tm. Remoteness in time (+2)
Remoteness in level of reality
R-fic s+. Specific fictional (+2)
R—fic s-. Specific fictional ' (—l)

126
APPENDIX F, Continued
R-fic n-. Non-specific fictional (-1)
R—fan+. Explicit fantasy or dream (+2)
R—fan-. Explicit fantasy or dream (-1)
Context of response (DC)
Cx C+,—. Cultural context (+2; -1)
Cx E+,-. Esthetic context (+2; -1) I
Cx I+,-. Intellectual context (+2; -1) ,
Cx H+,-. Humorous context (+2; -1)
Pathological defenses
Va—. Vagueness of percept (-3)
Prj—. Projection of responsibility {-3)
Neg+,—. Negation and undoing (+1 -2)
Eu-. Euphemism X-l)
Minz-. Minimization (-l)
ObS?. Obsessional defense (-1)
Den-. Attempted denial (—2)

 

*DC = Defensive Contribution

DD

APPENDIX G

General criteria for rating Defense Demand

The following is taken from Holt (1959, p. 48.)
Criteria
No apparent need for defense:

Here fall responses that contain aspects of the
primary process only implicitly, or teferences to
matters that would hardly be noticed if referred
to at a polite tea party.

Slight negd for defense:

The content and structure of the responses rated at
this level are only slightly unusual in conversation,
and arouse only slight degrees of tension. Also,

any response containing both Level 2 Content and
Level 2 Formal scores must be rated at least 2.

Moderate need for defense:

The Content and Formal deviations here scored are

at the level that might cause moderate tension or
social embarrassment if they occurred in conversation.
Also, any response combining Level 1 Content and
Level 2 Formal or Level 2 Content and Level 1 Formal
must be rated at least 3.

Considerable need for defense:

The level here is set by the example of sexual organs:
it is possible for most people to refer to such things
in a doctor-patient setting, but it is not permissible
in ordinary conversations. Also, any response combining
any kind of Level 1 Content and Level 1 Formal

material must be rated at least 4.

Great need for defense:

Shocking ideas which could under no circumstances be
introduced onto a social conversation without extensive
controls and defenséSJ. Such responses are almost
pathognomonic of psyéhosis, since they imply both a
serious breach of judgment in order to be mentioned,
and the availability to awareness of ideas that are
usually kept unconscious.

 

128

APPENDIX G, Continued

DD Criteria

6. Greatest need for defense:

 

Sometimes it happens that a response contains content
that would be rated 5 and also formal deviations

that are at the 5 level. The result is about as much
primary process and need for defense as can be packed
into a single response; responses rated 6 will occur
exclusively in psychotic records.

 

129

APPENDIX H

Form Level scores (FL) and explanation of Form Level Categories
ith slight revision (*), is taken from Holt

The follbwing, w

(1959,'p. 59),

Form Level Score

+3*

+2*

+1.*

-1

-2

-3

Category

F+

F0

Fw+

Fa

Explanation

Sharp, convincing forms, easily
seen by E.

Popular and near popular forms,
Fixed list in manual (Mayman,
1959).

Reasonably plausible, but not
terribly convincing forms;
takes a little stretching to
see.

Forms that bear only a slight
resemblance to the blot area;
not very plausible, or based on
one point of resemblance.

 

Vague, non-definitive forms—— fl
things that intrinsically dO' ”
not have specific shapes.

"Clouds”; "opening of a cave”;

”ink splash"; "blood stain, ; ‘
running down”; "pile of dirt"; ‘
"piece of dough”; "texture of i
cloth." '

Amorphous responses, in which 1

form plays pg role (and could

not, by the nature of the ‘
l

concept). Usually pure C, C',
or CH. § (
II sky III. "water"; ”night”; II Spring”; '1‘

i
(and other abstract concepts) ‘
"urine" (but "wine stain” seen

as having some sort of shape,

Fv; likewise, "blood” may be

.Fa but is usually Fv.

130
APPENDIX H, Contipued
Form Level Score Category Explanation
-3 Fs Spoiled form responses, to be

given where the subject gives
what is basically a familiar
and good response (which could
have been scored F0 or F) but
introduces some specification
that has the effect of markedly
lowering the acceptability of
the response as a whole.

-4 F- Arbitrary forms, bearing very
little or no resemblance.

*Holt (1959, p. 59) suggests scoring Fw+, F0, and F+
as 0, +1, +2, respectively. The present decision to eliminate
the 0 Form Level, and score +1, +2, +3 is based on the desire
to allow "good” form level to make a contribution to the
Adaptive Regression Score.

131

APPENDIX I

Rorschach Scoring Categories — Klopfer System

The means for the following Rorschach categories are presented
in Table 14. The explanation gives the formula by which each
category was calculated. '

Category Explanation
R The total number of Rorschach responses
produced.
F+% The sum of all Form-dominated responses

scored + (e.g., 39+, §m+) divided by

the sum of all Form—dominated responses.

M/sum C The sum of all M responses divided
by the sum of C responses, where FC =.5,
CF = 1.5, C = 1.5.

W/M The sum of all W responses divided
by the sum of all M responses, (e.g.,
3/4: .75).

F% The sum of all F responses (i.e., F,

F+, F-) divided by the total number
of responses produced (R).

In all other cases, the calculation is obvious from
the category itself. For example, Fm + mF + m is the sum
of these three categories combined due to the smallness of
the frequencies of each.

All other percentage categories are calculated as
the percentage of the total number of responses (R).

The category ”No. of content Categories" is
calculated as the total number of categories used. (See
Appendix J for a list of the content categories).

132

APPENDIX J

Content Categories Used to determine "Number of Content
Categories" variable in Table 15.
Human (H)
Human part (Hd)-
Human-mythological or fiction [(H)]
Animal (A)
Animal part (Ad)
Animal skin (Askin)
Sex (Sex)
Blood (Blood)
Inanimate objects (Obj)
Natural forms (Nat)
Landscapes (Ldsp)
Anatomy (A)
Clouds (cld)
Food (fd)
Architecture (Arch)
Art (art)
Symbolism (Symb)
Abstraction (Abstr)
Botony (Bot)
Mask (Mask)
Map (Map)

Miscellaneous (Misc)

 

133

 

 

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