THESIS Date MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 3129 3007013752 LIBRARY f Michigan State 1 University fl This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Changes in Spatial Patterns of Development In Iran: An Example of Regional Inequality 1966—1976 presented by Mohammad Kamiar has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph . D . degree in Geography jor pro ssor April 5, 1985 0-12771 l MSU LIBRARIES .l-I-c-I-IL ‘3 RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. I m. 95 I993 :57! CHANGES IN SPATIAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN: AN EXAMPLE OF REGIONAL INEQUALITY 1966-1976 bv Mohammad Kamlar A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State Unlverslty In partial fulflllment of the requIrements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Geography 1985 cifiSi/JijSJ7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation could have not been completed without the contribution and encouragement of many people. I would like to express my warmest gratitude to Dr. Gary A. Manson, the chairman of my committee, who provided valuable guidance throughout the entire research process. Special appreciation and thanks are due to the members of my committee, Dr. David J. Campbell, Dr. Bruce W. Pigozzi, and Dr. Robert N. Thomas, for their interest and advice. The consulting help that l have received from Dr. Joe T. Darden and the financial support from the Sage Foundation are also appreciated. I would also like to thank my parents, who have given me constant hope, and my brother, Hassan, who sent me the most recent census data from Iran. Finally, i would like to thank my wife, Molouk, and my children, Anahita and Arash, for their patience and understanding. 'ii Table of Contents Acknowledgemn+onoccfiooncoctcoicIon...not...IOU-IUOOOQOIOIOUCOO List of List of List of CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER TableSOOOOC0......ICOIOIIIIIOI.OOIOIIOIOIIOIIOOOIIOOOOI F'gureSOOOOOIIIIIOOICOOIIOIOIOOIOOIIIOIOIOCOOCOICIIOOOI ApmndICeSDcoo-cannulanloooloaoccacao-Ooooutunolo00.0.. l. INTRODUCTION........................................ lntroduction........................................... The Meaning of Development............................. General Theories of Development........................ Geography and Development.............................. SwthlGmnu.n.u.u.u.u.u.n.u.u.u.n.u.n.. PrOblan s+a*mn+aauoacoococoon--coaocoouoooo-coloaooao ll. DEVELOPNENT iN lRAN................................ Iran in the World Affairs.............................. Development Plans...................................... The White Revolution................................... Rural Dependency...’I....0U...OI...OIOIOIOOOIOIOOCIOII. II'. mmoDoLwYOICIonI.not...noocooooloooocolonvtlt... STUdY Areacooo.onColl.OI.0.000...OOIOOOOOOIOIOIICOIOOOI Geographical Regions........................... iii Page ii 10 16 20 20 24 28 36 4O 4O Political Subdivisions......................... Population..................................... Regional Variation............................. Time Dimension................................. Variables.............................................. Data................................................... Methodology............................................ HypofhesiSOI00...-0.0.0.0..tOOOIOOIOOQOOOIOIIOOOOOOOOOO CHAPTER IV. CHANGES IN SPATIAL PATTERNS OF IIVELOPIIENT. ... . . Patterns of Development................................ Changes in Spatial Patterns of Development............. Spatial inequality............................. Areal Assoclaflonoa...to...OIIOIODQOIOIOOOOOOOI CHAPTER v. SUMMARY AND CONCLUS'ONO00-1oilOOOQOIOOOICIIIOOIQIIOO summary Of fhe F'ndInQSIOIQOOOCIIOIIOOIOOOIOIOIOOOIOOIO ln+erpre+aflonICDOOOOIIO.IOCIOOOOOO'COOCCOOOOIIOICIOOOO Fu+ure Research-0.00.0...0.0.0.0....OICOCOOCICOCOOIOOOO APPEND'mSIOIICQOIIDOICOCIOOCCCOO00"...IOOOIIOCODIOCIIIOOICCII REFERmEs..0.IO0......-I0...OIOOCIOOIOIOOOOIOOI'IUCIOIOOOOICII 42 46 47 51 52 57 59 63 64 64 74 74 115 125 125 128 139 142 158 Tables 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 LIST OF TABLES Name, Location, and Capital City of the 23 Ostans............................................ Composite Development Value of the Twelve Variables, Ostan 1976............................. Primacy Rates of the Largest Cities, Ostan 1976... Value Added in Manufacturing, Ostan 1972.......... Gini Coefficients for Different Scales of Analysis in 1966........................................... Gini Coefficients for Different Scales of Analysis in 1976........................................... Percent Coefficient of Variation, 1966............ Percent Coefficient of Variation, 1976............ Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Ostan 1966.. Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Ostan 1966.. Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Ostan 1976.. Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Ostan 1976.. Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Shahrestan 1966.............................................. Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Shahrestan 1%GUCCC.O...0......C0.00.00.00.00..OIICOOIOOOCOOO PAGE 45 66 70 72 75 75 79 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 4.14 4.1 U! 4.16 4.18 4.19 4.2 bl 4.2 b 4.25 4.26 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Shahrestan 1976.............................................. Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Shahrestan 1976.............................................. Housing Units with Electricity, Shahrestan 1966... Housing Units with Electricity, Shahrestan 1976... Ratios Between the Gini Values of Rural and Urban Areas at Ostan and Shahrestan Levels........ Ratios between the Gini Values of 1966 and 1976 for Urban and Rural Areas of Ostan and Shahrestan........................................ index of Dissimilarity between Urban and Rural Areas............................................. Correlation Coefficients for Urban and Rural Areas of Ostan 1966............................... Correlation Coefficients for Urban and Rural Areas of Ostan 1976............................... Correlation Coefficients for Urban and Rural Areas of Shahrestan 1966.......................... Correlation Coefficients for Urban and Rural Areas of Shahrestan 1976.......................... Correlation Coefficients for Shahrestan in 1966... Correlation Coefficients for Shahrestan in 1976... vi 93 95 100 102 105 106 108 116 117 118 119 120 121 Figures LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.1 lranlan Administrative Subdivisions (Ostans)................................................ Figure 3.2 Shahrestans and Shahrs (Ostan Centers)....... Figure 3.3 Scales of Analysis and Time Periods.......... Figure 4.1 Development Value, Ostan 1976............... Figure 4.2 Lorenz Curve of Value Added in Manufacturing Ostan, 1972............................... Figure 4.3 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Ostan 1966........................................ Figure 4.4 Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Ostan 1966........................................ Figure 4.5 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Ostan 1976........................................ Figure 4.6 Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Ostan 1976........................................ Figure 4.7 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Shahrestan 1966................................... Figure 4.8 Housing Units with Electricity, Rura' snafu-951.8" 1%6000OIIOOOIICOIII...OOOIOOOCOOIII... PAGE 43 44 58 67 73 82 84 86 88 9O 92 Figure 4.9 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Shahrestan 1976................................... Figure 4.10 Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Shahrestan 1976................................... Figure 4.11 Housing Units with Electricity, Shahr 1966.............................................. Figure 4.12 Housing Units with Electricity, Shahr 1976.............................................. Figure 4.13 Percent Housing Units with Electricity in Ostan and Shahrestan, 1966 and 1976.................. Figure 4.14 Gini Coefficients of the Variables in Ostan and Shahrestan, 1966 and 1976..................... Figure 4.15 Gini Coefficients of the Variables in Ostan and Shahrestan, 1966 and 1976..................... Figure 4.16 Gini Coefficients of the Variables in Ostan and Shahrestan, 1966 and 1976..................... Figure 4.17 Gini Coefficients of the Variables in Ostan and Shahrestan, i966 and 1976..................... Figure 4.18 Gini Coefficients of the Variables in Ostan and Shahrestan, 1966 and 1976..................... viii 94 96 101 103 107 110 111 112 113 114 LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A..................................................... A.1 Twelve Variables used to Produce Composite Value of Development.................................... A.2 Twelve Variables of Composite Development, Ostan 1976.............................................. A.3 Z-Scores of the Twelve Variables.................. Appendix B..................................................... B.1 Variables used in the Study of Spatial inequality and Areal Association.................. B.2 Variables used for the Areal Association, Urban Ostan 1966.................................. 8.3 Variables used for the Areal Association, Rural Ostan 1966.................................. B.4 Variables used for the Areal Association, Urban Shahrestan 1966............................. 8.5 Variables used for the Areal Association, Rural Shahrestan 1966............................. 8.6 Variables used for the Areal Association, shahresfan1%6.IOICDUO...IIIOIOOOOOOCCOIIIOIOIOI. PAGE 142 142 143 145 147 147 148 149 150 151 152 B.7 Variables used for the Areal Association, Urban Ostan 1976.................................. 8.8 Variables used for the Areal Association, Rural Ostan 1976.................................. 8.9 Variables used for the Areal Association, Urban Shahrestan 1976............................. 8.10 Variables used for the Areal Association, Rural Shahrestan 1976............................. 8.11 Variables used for the Areal Association, Shahresfan1976.00.00Cloo...IIOIOIIOIOOIDIOOOOOCOO 153 154 155 156 157 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCT ION .LDIEQdJJCLlQn Spatial variation of economic development exists at all levels of geographic analysis and is a common feature of the development process in all countries, regardless of their economic system (Slater 1975, Stohr and Taylor 1981, and Smith 1982). Economic activity takes place in space and the way in which space is manipulated can be advantageous for some people in some places and disadvantageous to others. Based on initial local opportunities, available resources, division of labor and deliberate planning for development, economic activity may become concentrated and specialized in very few places (MabogunJe i980, Coates, Johnston and Knox 1977, and Stohr 1974). Through time, other related factors such as economies of scale and cumulative causation may reinforce and bring more activities to the privileged locations in any particular country, leaving the rest of the country relatively poor (Myrdal 1957). inequalities usually have spatial manifestations which may influence the patterns of social, economic and political disparity. The recognition of the spatial component may enable identification of underlying reasons producing these spatial inequalities and allow more precise spatial development planning. Although the analysis of spatial inequality and its contribution to the process of unequal distribution should be integrated with the overall analysis of the social relations of production and political economy of the country, the role of space as a dynamic variable that can be explained and reorganized to achieve policy objectives must be also recognized. This study examines changes in spatial patterns of development, with special reference to regional inequality, in Iran between 1966 and 1976. Basic research objectives are: 1) To describe spatial inequalities and their changes at three different scales, i.e., Provincial (Ostan), County (Shahrestan), and City (Shahr), in 1966 and 1976. 2) To identify changes in the areal association of the variables of development for the above scales of analysis and time periods. This chapter discusses the meaning of development, general theories of development, geography and development,the "spatial gap" concept, and the problem statement. Chapter il presents a general historical background on development in lran. Chapter III contains sections on the study area, variables, data, methodology, and the hypotheses. in Chapter lV changes In spatial patterns of development are presented and compared between 1966 and 1976. Chapter V is devoted to the summary and conclusions. WW While growth is basically concerned with output, development is concerned with the entire process of change which results in improvement of the standard of living of people as rapidly as possible, especially in less developed areas. As Samir Amin (1973A) points out, "Development is a historical process which encompasses not only production, but the entire economic and social life of a nation in transition" (p. 2). Some authors argue that evaluation of development should take into account the facts about reduction in poverty, unemployment and inequality, including regional inequality (Sears 1972 and 1973). Some scholars define development in terms of economic conditions. "Development implies profound change in the economic arrangements within as well as among societies" (Dadzie, 1980, p. 59). The essence of development is the "improvement through time of the economic wel I-belng of the people" (Lentnek, 1980, p. 82). For some geographers, development has been related to "those changes which involve some degree of spatial adJustment, that is changes which modify existing geographical distribution of social and econanlc activities or which affect the relations between different areas" (Gilbert, 1974, p. 12). For others, development only summarizes "the gap between the rich and poor" areal units (Cole, 1981, p. 8), while other geographers see development essential iy as a socio-spatlai process synonymous with spatial reorganization (MabogunJe, 1981, p. 68). It is along the lines of these definitions, especially those with a spatial dimension, that the present study refers to development as improvement in material wel l-being and standard of living and reduction in spatial inequality among regions through time. WWI There are four schools of thought about economic development: 1) dualism and modernization, 2) spatial polarization, 3) dependency, and 4) the role of the state. These schools of thought will be discussed first, and then geographers' contributions to the study of development will be presented. The idea of social and economic dualism probably originated with the writing of Dutch economist Boeke (1953). Drawing most of his examples from Indonesia, he divides the societies in LDCs, Less Developed Countries, into two sectors: modern and traditional. The modern sector is individualistic, materialistic, capitalistic, and rational, while the traditional sector is pro-capitalist, unresponsive to change, and non-profit oriented. Lewis (1954) calls these 'lndustrial' and 'agriculturai' societies. Dualism also could be observed in even advanced Western societies and is perhaps more outstanding in Italy than in any other country (Higgins 1956). The theory of modernization, which is closely related to the theory of social and economic dualism, has been employed primarily by sociologists and anthropologists. The appproaches of Deutsch (1953) and Lerner (1963), with assistance from Hagerstrand's diffusion theory, were applied to geography by SoJa (1968), Gould (1970), and Riddell (1970) who produced modernization maps of Kenya, Tanzania and Sierra Leone. The geography of modernization can be viewed as an approach to defining spatial dualism. This is exemplified by SoJa's recognition of the African and European subsystems in Kenya. The modernization geographers select variables to show the spread of modernization elements from their Euroamerican centers to colonial territories. The modern country is one in which the traditional sector has been replaced by the modern sector. As evaluated by Brookfield (1975) in the theory of modernization, "The dynamic forces are external, the patterns of modernization are imposed from above, and tradition must inevitably give way to modernity" (p. 79). Modernization geographers conclude that development is a function of the diffusion of modern elements. The theory of development as a process of spatial polarization, or concentration of economic activities, is derived mainly from the works of Perroux since the early 19505. This "growth pole" theory originally referred to a non-spatial polarization of the economy which has close ties with inter-industry linkages and multiplier effects. It was later applied to space by Boudeville and others. Perroux (1971) argues that growth appears only at certain points or "poles." Through different channels, this growth spreads and will affect the economy. Growth poles may be a firm, an industry, or a group of these firms and industries. Growth occurs within the pole and is spread through interaction with other centers. To dominate these interactions, the industry in the growth pole must be technically advanced, and have a high growth rate of production. Both Myrdai (1957) and Hirschman (1958) argue that economic development is polarized and that disparities between the regions, at least in the early stages of development, will increase. According to Myrdal, deviation-amplifying forces are responsible for widening the regional lnequai lty between the self-reinforcing center and poor periphery. Myrdal's circular and cumulative causation consists of spread effects and backwash effects. Spread effects refer to positive effects of a rich region on a poor region, such as increasing investment and diffusion of technology. Backwash effects are negative effects, such as exploitation of the poor region's human and natural resources by the rich region. Development occurs in a region when spread effects are stronger than backwash effects. The process of circular and cumulative causation points to the fact that once development is planned for a favored region based on investment, it will encourage inflows of labor, skills and more capital for investment, leading to further development. The theory of polarized development has been elaborated by Friedmann (1966) into the core-periphery model which is closely associated with the development of regional science in the United States. The advantage of this theory is its flexibility, general applicability, and independence of scale. This theory is applicable not only at the international and continental level, but within any national unit there exists another center-periphery structure. At the global scale, rich countries extract wealth from the global periphery, consisting of the LDCs. At the national scale, Friedmann distinguishes four ranks of centers within the national boundaries, namely: national metropolis, regional capital, subreglonal center, and local service center. He also defines four regions within the periphery which he calls upward transitional, downward transitional, resource frontier, and special problem region. The upward transitional regions are settled, have growth potential and net immigration. Downward regions, on the other hand, are in economic decline. Resource frontiers are regions of new settlement with large growth potential for agricultural or mineral activities. The last category of regions refers to areas that pose more policy difficulties than the other regions in the periphery. The relationship between the core and the center is one-sided, supporting the core at the expense of the periphery, which will stay undeveloped, exploited and unable to grow because it is continually feeding the growth of the core. The core grows rapidly and acts like a suction pump, pulling in dynamic elements of the periphery. The periphery will then be placed in a "quasi-colonial" relationship to the center and will experience a net outflow of people, capital and natural resources to the center. Friedmann believes that disparities between core and periphery eventually can be reduced through active government intervention. He associates the problem of disparity with the problem of urbanization and with interaction between cities and rural areas. Cities are the centers of industrial activity, technological innovation, focal points of transport networks, markets, commercial and financial firms. Under government supervision, diffusion of these elements to the peripheral areas may produce convergence. The core-periphery theory has been criticized as being strongly urban-oriented, not clarifying the nature of the periphery; furthermore, the core and periphery cannot act by themselves -- it is people who determine the relationships between the two regions. Friedmann's (1979 and 1981) recent "agropolitan approach" deals more directly with the periphery rather than the center. According to Friedmann, agropolitan districts ought to be located in areas where cultural, political, and economic spaces overlap. With little help from the outside and based on principles of self-reliance, ccmmunallzation of productive wealth and equalization of access to power, he believes that goals of economic development will be fulfilled. The third school of thought, dependency theory, mainly emerged in the late 19605 and early 19705. Amin (1973b), Szentes (1971), Dos Santos (1973), and Cardoso (1977) argue that underdevelopment is a product of the penetration of capitalism from more developed countries in the West. The industrial and capitalist countries organized an international division of labor in which the underdeveloped countries function as suppliers of raw material, a market of industrial products, and sources of income for direct investment by the more advanced countries. Furthermore, the demand for imports is increasing. The foreign currency they earn, if any, will be used to import consumer products at unfair terms of exchange (Emmanual 1972). Thus, many of them are caught in an international "debt trap". The first half of the 20th century witnessed two major changes in international economic relationships. During the World Wars imperialistlc powers were preoccupied by the war industry, and thus export of capital to the LDCs slowed down. This gave a chance to the national bourgeoisies to undertake some industrialization projects. Another major change was independence and liberation of many countries that were officially colonies. These changes were not without influence on the theory of dependency. Frank (1967 and 1979) argues that development and underdevelopment are opposite sides of the same coin; in other words the western world developed itself at the expense of LDCs. Dos Santos (1973) elaborates on this, saying that dependency is "a situation in which the economy of one country is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected" (p. 109). The fourth school of thought, the role of the state, is a more recent theory focusing on the role of the state in the process of economic development. A universal trend since the 19305 has been ever-increasing participation by the national government in the political and economic activity of their countries, both in the capitalist and socialist systems. This allowed social scientists to focus .on the function of the state which was omnipresent in almost all aspect of life. Recent attempts have been made to explain the nature of leadership, ideology and organization of the regimes. Among leading scholars are: Moore (1967), Horowitz and Trimberger (1976), Lowenthal (1977), Evans (1979), Skocpol (i979), and Smith (1982). At the state level, it is believed that the majority of the LDCs are both developmental ist and capital ist. it is argued that the regimes are nationalist, which could be dichotcmized as democratic-authoritarian, inclusionary-exclusionary of the lower classes in political power, and central ized-decentral Ized. Regimes also are evaluated on the basis of their stability and services to the interest of the upper-class. The state has been characterized as a farmer due to its policies in regard to agricultural activities and incentives (Stover 1969), as an industrialist and extremely important geographical factor in the centrally planned economies (French 1969), and as a spatial planner (Stohr and Taylor 1981). The role and structure of government authority has also been introduced into location theory (lsard 1969). Development plans in 14005 and LDCs have at least one thing in common which is that the governments, sooner or later, will be drawn into direct and detailed spatial decision-making. As one geographer indicates, "The understanding of the process of spatial reorganization may rest upon one's knowledge of the decision-making process" (Janel le,1966 p. 37). The overt spatial impi ication of the importance of the role of government as a spatial decision-maker has to be determined as ”direct location of a wide range of facilities and indirect policy guidelines that influence the siting and operation of economic activity" (Linge and Rimer, 1972, p. 2). A recent concern of many governments, however, has been to find ways and means to cope with regional inequality by 10 allocation of public funds and other resources, and imposing restrictions or encouragement on the movement ct the people. The role of the political organization of space (Soja 1971) on spatial inequality of political power (Gradus 1983) and regional development may prove to be an interesting subject in spatial analysis of economic and political decision-making. WWI Regional variation and spatial inequality are not new ideas. in the geographical literature of the Classical period and of the Middle Ages, some references to spatial variation in living standards of the residents in different localities can be found. Until the fourteenth century, most of the Moslem geographers, i.e., Edrisi, Birunl, lbn-Batuta, and lbn-Khaldun, paid more attention to the uneven geographical distribution of people and things in their known world. The age of exploration which began in the fifteenth century provided new information about unfamiliar parts of the world and, together with the impact of new discoveries in all sectors of science and technology, promoted more geographical studies of uneven distribution of phenomena. Among non-geographers, references to spatial inequality also could be found. Adam Smith (1776) compared agriculture, industry and wages of labor in England, France, Poland, China and North America. He argued that the magnitude of wealth in England was not important; more significant was its continuous increase compared with other nations. A century later, Friedrich Engels in a letter to Karl Marx wrote, "Between one country and another, one province and another, and even one locality and another, there will always exist a certain inequality in the. 11 condition of life, which it will be possible to reduce to a minimum but never entirely remove" (Marx and Engels, 1975, p. 337). Direct study of poor and rich countries began during the second half of the twentieth century, especially during the retreat of colonialism all over the world coupled with the United Nation's efforts to give advice on planning procedures to the newly independent countires. The UN-sponsored "Decade of Development" started in the early 19605 and continued up to the 19805. The general goal was to attain higher rates of economic growth, i.e., 5-71 annually. The structure and orientation of trade were studied by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) as the main causes of underdevelopment. During the post-World War ii period, geographers made important contributions to the study of economic development. As area experts, they dealt with evaluation of the resources and, more importantly, studied changing functions of the cities. Furthermore, it was asserted that "geographers are more apt, and perhaps better trained to deal with localized associations of phenomena" which are important to society's developmental process (Ginsburg, 1953 p.14). W W with contributions from Richard Hartshorne, Edward Ul lman and Brian Berry was published in 1960 and included the first use of multivariate analysis at the international level to define dimensions of development (Ginsburg 1960 and 1961). During the decade of the 19605, economic models were adopted more frequently by geographers (Keeble 1976). in addition, more participation of geographers in the study of economic development and planning was initiated (Steel 1967, Hay 1968, and Chapman 1969). This. 12 period perhaps ended with the studies of modernization geography carried out mainly on newly independent African countries (Soja 1968, Gould 1970, and Riddell 1970) and was followed by debate on the orientation of a "New Geography" of development (Connell 197i, and Gilbert 1971, 1974, and 1976). Here it was argued that underdevelopment is a dynamic process. While economic growth may result in concentration of income in a few places, development was to be characterized by the relief of poverty and reduction of spatial inequalities. To use developed models in the LDCs and deal with a wider range of cultures, more geographers from these societies must be included in the discipline (Connell 1971). Development then must be encouraged "for the poorest LDCs and for the poorest groups within LDCs" (Connell, 1973, p. 28). During the late 19605 and 19705, a radical movement spread to every academic field in the US. Studying different scales of geographical analysis, radical geographers arrived at the conclusion that spatial inequalities are the results of far deeper social processes. To most radical geographers, the solution to the problem of spatial inequality was a revolutionary change in the social relations of production. Sane of these geographers adopted dependency theory and concluded that underdevelopment results from overdevelopment of the western world (Buchanan 1964, Blaut 1973, Slater i974, and Feet 1975). Among most recent literature, research themes such as: underdevelopment and spatial inequality, geography and inequality, geographical perspectives on inequality, regional inequality and development, spatial analysis of world poverty and inequal ity, and spatial perspectives on the process of development are notable (Slater 1975, Coates and others 1977, Smith 1977, Bigsten 1980, Cole 1981, Mabogunje 1981). These authors seem to 13 agree that during the process of development, spatial structure and spatial competition are not neutral. "Spatial competition refers to processes of spatial organization which in part result in the resolution of the opposition among spatial elements" (Mabogunje, 1981, p. 58). Accordingly, all development planning in the advantaged region will be marked by corresponding worsening conditions in the disadvantaged regions as continuous spatial competition produces rich and poor regions. To avoid this during the process of development, spatial reorganization with a new set of social goals is suggested. Certain types of spatial rearrangements and changes in resource allocation such as land reform, can make better contributions to spatial and social equality. Reciprocal relations between these two fully justify more attention to the study of space as an active agent during the processes of development and economic planning. Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1978) classified most of the studies involving space and development into three categories: 1) treating space as a formal framework, 2) space as an explanatory variable, and 3) space as a variable to be explained. The first category refers to studies of growth centers and regional income differences. Wililanson (1965), for example, examined the hypothesis that regional income disparities are highly related to the national level of economic development. in the primitive subsistence stage of development, it was expected that spatial inequality would be smal I. As a country moves towards a transitional stage of industrialization, spatial inequality increases to its highest point ever, while in a more mature and complex socioeconomic system spatial disparity becomes small once'again. Although the conclusions drawn by Willianson are significant for most 14 neo-classical economists, major problans of this study concerning the reliability and presentation of data on regional income, and the size and number of areal units, still ranain unsolved. Chenery and others (1973) reached the conclusion that government policy, access to land, credit facilities, education and employment opportunities are important factors in economic growth and this growth increases regional inequalities. Studies by geographers such as Cole (1973), Henshall (1973), and Slater (1975) were carried out on spatial patterns of poverty in Peru and Brazil. They supported the idea that the unequal distribution of modern technology is the main cause of regional inequality. The second group of geographic researchers regard space as a variable that helps to explain disparity. Such studies focus on the size and the shape of the countries and distance as important factors influencing the patterns of urbanization and transportation network (Johnson 1965), diffusion of innovation (Hagerstrand i967, Berry 1972), the processes of modernization (Soja 1968, Gould 1970, and Riddell i970), and the processes of polarized economic development (Friedmann 1972). Most of these studies do not relate physical structures and spatial organization to broader social relations of economic production. The third group refers to space as the variable to be explained. Most of the studies of the dependency school of thought (Frank, 1969, Galtung 1971, Szentes 197i, Amln 19738, and Santos 1975), and some of the geographical analysis of inequality carried out by Buchanan 1964, de Souza and Porter 1974, Blaut 1975, Harvey 1975, Feet 1977, and Smith 1982 can be included in this group. in this approach, it is assuned that the utmost and fundamental cause of inequality should be sought in 15 the historical interpretation of political economy and social structures of production that advocate the type, nature, and function of the areal units. The linkage between the theory of accumulation and geographical expansion of the capitalist system affecting economic development in LDCs was explored by Harvey in 1975. Capital accumulation takes place in a geographical context which in turn creates distinctive types of geographical structure, for example regional inequality. Accumulation of capital is based on availability of surplus labor, a market to obtain means of production such as machinery and raw materials, and a market to absorb the products. Lack of any one of these factors can put accumulation, circulation, and reinvestment in jeopardy. Moreover, the capitalist system forms a contradiction by keeping wages down and expanding the value of commodities in an attempt to maximize the role of profit. This results in periodic crises, such as unemployment, underempioyment, lack of productive demand, bankruptcies and inflation. To cope with these crises, new levels of effective demand must be created. Capital then will be channellzed to new spheres of economic activity, for instance, transformation of subsistence agriculture into corporate farming. New social wants and needs can be created. The most important solution, however, is to expand geographically into new regions by increasing foreign trade and exporting capital. Different ways and means may be used to expand, but the general aim is to reach the areas of least resistance by the easiest means. The sphere of circulation must expand, otherwise accumulation, which assures the survival of the system, comes to a halt. 16 if it is capitalism which generates spatial inequality, then why can the same phenomenon be identified in most of the centrally planned social ist-type countries? Smith (1982) studied spatial disparities at almost all geographical scales in some Eastern European countries, the U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba. He found that spatial inequality has not been fully eradicated in these countries, and he gives the following reasons: imperfection in planning stemming from personal notlvation and bureaucratic bungling, and geographic distance and inaccessibility. Therefore, spatial inequality is a universal feature of the societies and the study of space through time on the social, political, and cultural factors for different scales appears more urgent. .SnaJLLaLfian Some of the previous literature has been concerned with the question of spatial convergence or divergence (Myrdai 1957, Hirschman 1958, Kuznets 1959, Williamson 1965, Koropeckyj i972, and Stohr and Taylor 1981). Convergence refers to the idea of achieving a greater degree of spatial equal lty, while divergence refers to increasing and widening spatial inequality. 0n the question of convergence, Hirschman believes that government actions such as progressive taxation and subsidies will solve the problem of regional disparity. Myrdal, on the other hand, concludes that the gap between regions in terms of econanic development will increase through time. His less optimistic point of view is based on the fact that the elitist nature of governments and circular and cumulative mechanisms in the LDCs even widens and deepens the disparities between the rich and poor regions. Once development is planned for a favored location, it will encourage influx of labor, . 17 skill, and increased investment. These, in turn, guarantee a continuous rate of development only in the preferred region and further widen the spatial gap. Myrdai (1957) believes that "the play of forces in the market normally tends to increase, rather than decrease, the inequalities between regions" (p. 26). The theme of "the widening gap" became a common ground for many scholars of developmental studies (Ward 1971). Furthermore, regional income convergence is related to the stages of development and is not an easy process which may only happen at a relatively advanced stage of industrialization (Kuznets 1959 and Williamson 1965). Yet, this hardly changes the rank-order of regions by income (Friedmann 1973). The same idea of widening spatial inequality is also held by some geographers (Feet 1975, Slater 1975, and Smith 1982). Empirical studies on changes in the spatial disparities for MDCs show more convergence than divergence (Jain 1975). Examples of such studies are for the United States (Cumberland 1973 and Sample 1977), Great Britain (Cameron 1974) and Japan (Mere 1977). in ltaiy, regional inequality widened through time (Sundquist 1975). Among twelve underdeveloped countries empirically studied, convergence was only recorded for China (Stohr and Taylor 1981). Other case studies on Asian, African, and Latin American countries showed increasing spatial inequalities which were more pronounced in the rural areas. A Peruvian case showed some improvements in both urban and rural areas, but when these two sectors were compared, the developmental gap between them has increased (Hilhorst 1981). The present study has benefited from the above theories which attempted to explain spatial inequality through time. The theories of polarization, center-periphery, and dependency not only agree that 18 spatial inequality exists at all scales of analysis but that the regional gap of development increases through time. This consensus provides the central question for this study: to what extent has the spatial gap changed between 1966 and 1976 in Iran? WM Within any specific country spatial differentiation of human life is a reflection of a distinct historical process as well as an outcome of how the economy works: for example, how surplus value is appropriated, distributed, and reinvested: how resources are allocated; what is the composition and geographical distribution of the labor force; what types of employment opportunities are offered, competed for, to what target populations and where they are offered; how political power and decision-making in economic planning is structured and controlled; and whether the country has been integrated into the world space economy or not. in most LDCs, urban concentration has been characterized by a disproportionately large primate city or cities. High primacy is associated with low urbanization, low income and econanic dependency. The primate city is not the product of domestic economic development alone, for many cases, even after independence it links the imperial mother country to the colony, or semi-colony in the case of lran. Urban areas are the centers of better life and attract more migrants through further industrialization and agricultural mechanization. Declining mortal ity and troubled agricultural economy in the rural areas push the people out, leaving higher percentages of less productive and less energetic populations behind. 19 This study examines changes in the spatial patterns of development in lran. The main purpose is to describe spatial inequalities and their changes at three different scales of analysis from 1966 to 1976. Relevant research questions are: i) What are the magnitudes of the spatial inequalities at three scales of Ostan (province), Shahrestan (county), and Shahr (city), and, 2) How have the spatial inequalities changed between 1966 and 1976? 3) How do the magnitudes of areal associations change as the size of the areal units are changed? CHAPTER II DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN This chapter provides some background on development in lran. First, lran's situation in the recent world affairs will be discussed. This section focuses on how the country was drawn into the world economy and became a raw material producer and a market for the industrial countries. This section will be followed by a discussion of the development plans carried out by the state, the white revolution, and rural dependency. lLnn_JILJthJEnflJisbiialcs lran , like many other less developed countries, was drawn into the world market during the period of capitalist expansion, which was characterized by the search for raw materials and markets in the nineteenth century. The recent history of lran shows records of direct invasion and intervention by the colonial powers of Russia, Great Britain and the United States. Almost all European countries enjoyed capitulation, the system of extraterritorial legal rights, in iran. The coup d'etats which occurred in lran in 1921 and 1953 had been sponsored by one or more foreign powers. Until 1951, a British owned oil company had the exclusive concession for exploitation of lranlan oil fields. Fatemi (1980) gives an example of lran's unequal share of oil revenues. According to him, in 1948, from the $320 million profit of the company, "iran's royalty including taxes was about $32 million. At the same time the British government received more than $120 million" (p. 178). Halliday believes that iran "received a low inflow of revenue, and lts~ 20 21 income was determined not by its own policies and needs but by the quite separate needs of the company" (p. 141). lran's nineteenth century also saw an expansion in the amount of land cultivated for cash crops such as cotton, opium, silk and tobacco which were needed by the metropolitan countries of the West. Members of the court, the army, and city merchants bought lands and forced the peasants to cultivate the above crops which were purchased cheaply by the English merchants. A decline in the British supply of raw cotton, due to the American Civil War, encouraged cotton cultivation in most of the Middle Eastern countries including iran. This meant a decline in the production of major staple foods for domestic consumption. in the 18405, cotton trade between lran and the British East lndian Company did not exist, but lssawi (1971) reports that it reached 19,200 rupees in 1860, 1.6 million in 1864, and 6.8 million rupees in 1865. About 2.5 million pounds of cotton were exported to Russia in 1874; by 1881 this amount had reached approximately 4.3 million pounds. According to the same author, opium production increased from 130,000 pounds in 1867 to 530,000 pounds in 1869. About ten years later the export of opium from the Persian Gulf exceeded 1.5 million pounds. These dates coincide with the defeat of China in the Opium War in 1841, which meant that the British opium merchants had access to a vast market. The opium crop is suitable to the water cycle in lran. it is sown in the winter and harvested in the spring, allowing the farmer to cultivate summer crops on their lands. it is estimated that until the late 19205, lran was responsible for approximately one-third of the world's opium production (Bharier, 1971, p. 136). 22 Until the 19205 Iran not only imported capital, manufactured goods, technology and ideology, but technicians and experts were also hired to modernize the country. Based on information given by Marlowe (1963), Belgian experts were employed to help reform the administration of custom houses, Swedish officers to train the army, Italian officers to train the navy, French experts for health reform, Americans to improve the financial administration, and Germans as technical advisors. It was apparent later that the process of modernization was unsuccessful mostly due to conflicts of interest and competition anong the foreign powers. During the last years of the Qajer Kings (1795-1921), Great Britain, France, and Russia were the three rival super powers. By the end of World War I, "the British found themselves to be the dominant de facto influence in lran“ (Smith, 1971, p. 59). It was after the 1953 coup, sponsored by the CIA, that the United States obtained not only 40$ of the oil concession but became the new superpower influencing the political and economic affairs of iran (Harkness and Harkness 1954, Agee 1975, Roosevelt 1979, and Kumar 1981). lran declared its official neutrality in World War ll, but the Allied forces invaded the country on August 25, 1941. The devastating impact of this occupation on lran's economy is important to note. The government of lran was then forced to devalue the currency and expand the money supply by four times as much. The country had to provide the occupying forces with foodstuffs and all the raw materials they needed, in addition to roads, railways and telecommunication. The Allies promised to pay for all of these materials and services when the war was over. When all the costs were summed, the Allied countries owed lran more than 100 million dollars. However, they repaid only 5 million 23 dollars. Katouzian (1982) calls these actions by the occupying forces "a case of armed robbery against a desperately weak and poor nation" (p. 143). iran remained one of the countries which did not receive help from the Marshall Plan. The country was pushed to become a single item-exporter of oil during the 19705. The money from this industry has been the major source of income for the government. Graves (1975) asserts that "oil revenues in 1974 totaled $20 billion--$2 million for every hour of every day" (p. 42). The contribution of oil revenues to the national budget sometimes rose higher than 801 LLLQEJUJBDBQ, 1975, p. 265). However, up to one-third of the national income was spent in purchasing ultra sophisticated weaponry. As explained by Cottam (1980, p. 17), the purposes behind such a policy were: A means for the United States to exercise indirect control over the world's most vital oil producing regime and a means for returning petro-doiiars to America. The employment of thousands of North American and European technicians, the contracts given the great multi-national corporations and the heavy importing of Western luxury goods were seen as faithfully serving Western capitalist interest. In the post-revolutionary lran, the patterns of dependency on oil revenues for foreign exchange and government budget have hardly changed. When the petro-dollar is combined with a dictatorship, under any type of political structure, it "is most likely to create and perpetuate the system of dependent capitalism which possesses all the evils and very few of the alleged benefits of a competitive market economy" (Pesaran, 1981, p. 519). According to the same author, the revolution in iran ended the monarchy, but the system of dictatorship and dependency remain — 24 unchanged and are the most important barriers for self-sustaining development. Under such mechanisms and forces of distribution based on historical and cultural traits, a myriad of inequalities was created. Among them, spatial inequality is the major concern of this study. The concentration of development in one area versus another area, i.e. structures in terms of the patterns of distribution and the processes leading to this type of unequal regional development provide new avenues to be explored by researchers. The role of the state in distribution of oil revenues by selective means towards preferred particular social classes and specific areas is very evident. DestenmaDLflans The history of planning in lran goes back to the end of the Second World War. Among the less developed nations, lran is one of the first countries to consider planning as a useful means to allocate resources. The five different development plans implemented by the Shah's government were heavily dependent on the oil revenues which were also the guarantee for the international and foreign loans. Therefore, any change in the amount of the oil revenues had a direct effect on the planning procedures. For example, the first plan (1948-1955) was crippled by a major loss of oil income during the nationalization process of the oil industry. The tenfold increase in the oil income during the fifth plan (1973-1977), in comparison with the fourth plan, was much greater than the absorptive capacity of the country's infrastructure and administration. 25 in regard to regional development, the second and the fifth plans had some geographical characteristics. in the second plan the major regional plan was cal led the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA) which was copied almost exactly from the Tennesse Valley Authority (TVA). in the fifth plan more attention was focused on the growth pole and growth center strategy. The main idea was to decentral lze the industrial activities that had been concentrated in and around the city' of Tehran. Some provincial capitals were selected to become future industrial centers. it was also proposed that the plan might help in mobilization of human and natural resources in their own location and design a secondary urban system in lran. The anbitious first plan (1948-1955) for agriculture and industry was drafted by American financial advisers. The Plan Organization was initially established to carry out this plan. Most of the budget for this plan was targeted for the development of an infra-structure that would help achieve a consistent growth of the national economy. The first draft of this plan was undertaken by an American Company, Morrison Knudsen. When lran asked for participation and a loan from the World Bank, drafting of this plan was transfered to the Overseas Consultants Company. Nearly 801 of the budget for this development plan was provided by oil revenues. Between 1951-53, because of nationalization of the oil industry in lran and the western boycott of purchasing oil, the first development plan almost stopped functioning. it was after the 1953 coup and when a new oil agreement with American oil companies was signed that the first plan was reactivated. The second plan (1966-1962) was similar to the first plan in terms of approach. it allocated funds to transportation, agriculture, industry, and social services. Three 26 big dams were constructed which introduced a modern irrigation system and hydroelectric power to the country. it was during the second development plan (1955-62) that two American regional planners, Gordon Ciapp and David Lilianthal who were past chairmen of the board of directors of the TVA, were invited to iran to evaluate the plan for copying the TVA model in the southeastern oil producing province of Khuzestan. The plan later was cal led Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA). The plan was not only evaluated but executed by the Development and Resources Corporation owned by the two men mentioned above. The KWPA cal led for the construction of 14 dams "to achieve the best use of the seven rivers for irrigation, flood control, navigation, power and other primary purposes" (Clapp, 1957, p. 3). These aims were similar to TVA's, which were praised world wide. Bagley (1976) gives a bright future for Khuzestan even after the oil is gone. in actuality, the KWPA was essentially a failure, especially with regard to the participation of the international agro-buslness companies. More than 55,000 peasants became the victims of the KWPA around a single dam site. They had to sell their land at prices that were imposed upon them. They lost their homes and became part time wage labor for the company. Most of the foreign capital was withdrawn and later the plan was left alone and discarded. This suggests that the ai ien model for development in the new settings, with totally different cultural, economic, political and administrative structures, may not yield fruitful results. The third plan (1962-1968) was implemented during a recession period in lran. During this plan, the high government expenditures resulted in inflation and foreign balance deficits. About one-quarter 27 of this plan's budget was assigned to the development of transportation and communication. Agriculture and irrigation received about one-quarter of the budget. Most of the planned targets of the third development plan were not reached. This plan was superseded by the fourth plan. The idea that oil resources were limited and would be depleted, pushed the government to create an alternative plan. industry was considered to be the only means to raise and sustain the national wealth. Since the country exhibited a lack of skilled labor and the fourfold increase in oil prices, the government encouraged more capital intensive enterprises by offering tax incentive and providing subsidies. The fourth plan (1968-1973) was prepared and designed for rapid industrialization. in this period, both consumer goods and heavy industry were desirable sectors for investment and approximately one-third of the total investment came from the private sector. During this period, investment in the agricultural sector, especially irrigation, was sharply reduced. The overall projected rate of economic growth was 95. in 1970 the economic growth of the country was 121 which was one of the highest rates in the world and allowed lran to be included on lists of "take-off countries". The government's access to great new oil wealth after 1973 doubled the financial commitment to the fifth development plan (1973 - 1977). At the same time, the foreign investors were invited to participate in heavy industry such as steel, petrochemicals and nuclear reactors. With the increasing rate of inflation, government financing was not easy to obtain and the country's infrastructure was not capable of handling this kind of pressure. The government paid about $2 billion to companies 28 because their ships were not unloaded as scheduled. Many projects were postponed, others were delayed or fell behind their time tables. The lranlan history of planning development may not be a general feature in the LDCs. Yet, it exemplifies how the oil money was important for development, and how the state as the agent of change may fall to achieve regional convergence. Development planning, especially regional planning, is urgently needed in the less developed nations. in LDCs, regional planning is more necessary than in the MDCs, because the LDCs are in the process of transformation from agrarian to industrial economy and their potential resources are not fully discovered, evaluated or utilized (Friedmann 1966). Nevertheless, the most common role of the planner in the LDCs probably had been to "over plan" and "pseudo planning" (Gilbert 1976). They either produce too many plans without political and public backing, or have no more than a ceremonial and decorative role in the state bureaucracy. in Iran, as one author puts it "regardless of who headed the Plan Organization, the Shah consistently took great interest in its activities and, from the late 19505 onwards, his earlier supervision of the development planning changed to direct guidance and personal intervention" (Mehner, 1978, p. 178). W In addition to the above-mentioned development plans, the Shah himself designed reform plans for the country. The Shah's "White Revolution" is probably even more famous than the plans previously mentioned. Among the first six points of the White Revolution was a 29 land reform program to be implemented in 1962. Unlike other countries, lran was not faced with any major peasant unrest threatlng the state and there was also no mention of a land reform in the third development plan. However, the regime was confronted with economic recession and urban opposition in the early 19605. Such authors as Mahdavy (1965), Bill (1972), and Graham (1980), believe that the Shah's goal was to modernize the country's economy along western lines and to capital 125 the rural areas. Still others, such as Lambton (i969) and Nirumand (1969), argue that the land reform was designed to prove to the world, particularly the United States, that lran should legitimately receive foreign aid. After the land reform, the agricultural sector would play its special role in providing surplus capital and labor to the industrial sector. "This required breaking up the old pro-capitalist agrarian relations, introducing money into previously self-sufficient primitive economies, producing for the market, and expanding internal market for the products of home industries" (Tabari, 1983, p. 27). Whatever the reasons behind the land reform program, it had a profound effect on the soclo-econcmlc factors influencing the country. The land was distributed to those farmers who already had access to the land. The landless and poor peasants were totally ignored by the reform (Hooglund 1973). After the implementation of land reform, the large landholders exercised their poi itical power to maintain much of the land they owned. The richest farmers bought second homes in the urban areas and became absentee landowners. The poorest members of the peasant class had no alternative but to move into the urban areas in search of economic opportunity. This inflated the number of poor living in the 30 slums and added additional problems to those that already existed in the cities. The first principle of the Shah's "White Revolution" called for the abolition of the peasant-landlord tenure system and required landlords to sell land to the government, which, in turn, would redistribute the land to certain groups of farmers. The landlords could keep only one village and its surrounding cultivable lands. At first this was opposed by the landlords. They then devised a way to simply divide the best villages among their family members. The remaining land was distributed to the farmers; these were all the poorest lands. Another obstacle was evident from the Islamic clergy who were economically dependent on landlords, merchants and the W331 or lands belonging to mosques and religious institutions. The Shah himself was the largest landlord and the first to sell his own lands after the 1953 coup. He inherited the land from his father, Reza Shah. As an army officer, Reza Shah was not considered to be a big landlord until the land registration of early 19205, for taxation purposes. He not only wrested control of the unclaimed lands, but he also had the power to usurp and obtain ownership rights to any fertile land that he wished. According to Forbis (1980), Reza Shah who "seized a quarter of lran's arable land...was probably the biggest landlord in Asia" (p. 45). The Shah pretended to show the world that he was distributing the crown land among the peasantry. In reality he sold his land to the farmers. His aim probably was to change immovable property into more mobile capital, and invest in in another sector of the economy, such as banking. 31 Before the land reform, about 55$ of the land that was farmed was owned by absentee landlords. Around 10$ of the land was m. The rest was control led by minor landlords and a very small portion was owned by rich farmers. Before the land reform program was instituted, most of the agricultural activity was carried out under Bgngh system, a systan of cooperation between landlord and sharecropper. The purpose was to utilize land, water, and human labor most efficiently. Each productive team in the collectives were supervised by a Man. In addition, the lranlan vii lages had a village headman, or K811311918- He was chosen by the landlord to serve the interest of the landlord. After the land reform in 1963, the finished: became a state appointee serving as an intermediary between the vil lage and the government. Prior to the land reform program, the most common method of operating the farmlands was sharecropping under landlords and mum: close watch. Another method was that somebody else might rent the land from a large landlord and deal with the sharecropping peasant. A third method was taming by the peasant who owned small plots of land with the help of family members and hired labor. The sharecroppers always worried about being replaced by another farmer at the whim of the landlord, giving them no sense of identification with the land. in the sharecropping system, the product was divided between the peasant and the landlord according to the five elements of production which are: land, labor, water, animals and seeds. The owner of each received one-fifth of the harvest. in most cases, the peasant had only his own labor, thus, in the beginning of the cold weather season he was left with only 20$ of the crop, perhaps a large family to support and 32 certainly a lot of debts to pay. The peasant also had to do many other services for the landlord including a type of slavery called Elgar-J, or unpaid labor, which was used in the construction of the landlord's buildings, cultivation of gardens and irrigation works. He also had to contribute a portion of all his farm products including chickens, fruits, fodder, etc. The first stage of the land reform was carried out in order to attract the support of the peasantry and to decrease the power of the big landlords. The speed at which this phase was carried out made even the Shah uneasy, seeing the elimination of the landlord class. According to government statistics, about 30$ (75,000 out of 2.4 million) of the total sharecroppers received land during the first stage of the land reform. In order to save the landlord class, the second stage of the land reform sought to legitimize the ownership of the absentee landlord. This phase of land reform directed regularization of sharecropping rather than eliminating it. The speed of the first stage was considerably slowed down (Halliday, 1979, p. 111). At this phase, the government sided with the landlords and gave them more options as to whether they could rent or sell their land. Actually, they could keep most of their productive plots, called mechanized lands, including orchards and the irrigated lands. The landlords had the capital to dig wells and showing them to the land reform officials would prove that their lands were under irrigation. They might even rent a tractor to indicate that their land was under mechanization. The second stage of the land reform was then fol lowed by sporadic peasant unrest, pushing the government to carry out the third stage of 33 the program. Unlike the first stage, this time the government did not buy the land from the landlord to be purchased by the peasants. Rather, the peasants had to negotiate directly with the owner of the land. To avoid further fragmentation of the farmlands which had already been partitioned into small plots during the long history of the country, the government also introduced the establishment of agricultural corporations and encouraged the development of rural cooperatives. The land reform program had very complex social, economic and political results. The aims of the land reform programs were to pacify the socialists and other political organizations with the propaganda "land to the tiller", reduce the power of the landlords, obtain the support of the rural masses, and Integrate rural areas into the capitalist world economy. It was obvious from the beginning, especially after the implementation of the first phase, that the Shah's purpose was not to eliminate landlord class, but to reduce their political power. The intervention of the government did not reduce the landlord's high social status within the traditional village structure nor did it reduce their high income. The reason was that they could retain the best cultivable lands and even receive more government subsidies after implementation of the land reform program. The program ignored the landless farm workers who had left the rural area and accepted life in the urban slums and to rurallze the urban areas. The land reform also destroyed the traditional Bough, collective production teams. The figngh was not replaced by another adequate system and the bureaucratic intervention always sided with the rich, educated, and influential landlords rather than with the peasants (Hooglund 1981). 34 in the mid-19705, the peasants had control over only one-third of the total area under cultivation, while they made up the majority of the farm population. At this time, there were about two million farm fanllies numbering around eleven million people. The rest of the land was control led by former landlords, cooperative farms and agri-buslness companies. The land owned by former landlords was much larger, more productive, accessible, and suitable for mechanization. The size varied from more than 25 acres up to 10,000 acres. The farm could then respond to the typical market forces and return a higher level of benefits. By 1975, there were about 90 farm corporations in operation. The farmers could vote to have their own corporation. The members of each corporation could transfer the rights of their lands to the corporation in order to receive shares from the income proportional to the unount of their lands. The government would help with capital, machinery and farm equipment and fertilizer and seeds bought at lower prices. The result of this process was that lranlan farmers eventually became dependent on the world market for capital and technology. Emphasis on capital intensive projects, irrigation and technology, set the stage for the White Revolution which "was welcoming the Green Revolution, which in turn meant greater dependence on international agrl-business firms..." (Ahmad, 1981, p. 113). Foreign companies consisted of: C. Brewster and Company, Foremost-McKesson of San Franclso, Shel lcott, and companies from France, Japan and lsrael with their lranlan partners including the Shah's brothers and sisters. These Joint ventures appeared, at least on the surface, to bolster lranlan agriculture. Mechanlzation and capitalization of the farm released 35 further poor rural population and filled the urban slums. At the same time, the industrial sector was unable to absorb these rural migrants who easily could be organized intollarge armies of demonstrators on the streets of most of the larger cities. Among the White Revolution's first six principles, which were later increased to more than twelve, were national ization of pastures and waters. These put further laws and regulations on farmers who were already restricted. The pastures were supposed to be protected by law but they were actually used as royal hunting grounds. Many millions of sheep and goats died due to lack of grasslands and the tradition of animal husbandry was alnost destroyed. Increasing demand by urbanites for more meat forced the government to import frozen meat from Australia and New Zealand. This created further problems by ignoring lslamic laws with respect to the preparation of meats. National ization of water resources meant that the farmers had to pay for the use of the water from the rivers and wells. This reduced the amount of water available from the qanat system. This chain of so-called agrarian reform from above, in addition to the already miserable existence experienced by the peasants, forced them to leave the rural areas for the urban areas. Plowless farmers in the city could only find places in the shanty towns and man-made underground caves. At the present time, an estimated one-third of the urban population lives in the slum areas. 36 MW Similar to rural areas in many other LDCs, rural lran has been dependent on urban sectors for many centuries. The poor and mostly illiterate peasants had to deal with educated, politically and socially powerful landlords and merchants from urban areas. The traditional sharecrOpping was superimposed on the peasants by the absentee landlord and protected by the state. The antagonism between urban and rural sectors is even reflected in the cultural aspects of the society. The landlord in lran is cal led Mauls or Admin. The first term means the owner, while the later means the lord, the god, or the master. The equivalent word for peasant is m. This word actually comes from the word "Den" or village, which is the smallest political unit in iran. The word 11911311. is commonly used in the urban areas in reference to unclvllized, rustic, savage, illiterate and primitive people. Landless people, who amounted to about 40$ of the rural population, did not receive land during recent land reforms. Those who were eligible often had no money to pay the exorbitant prices imposed by the landlords and the government personnel who sided with the landlords. Before the start of the land reform program, the big landlords distributed their fertile lands among the members of their own families including underaged children. in addition, Kankhgda, the village headman and Sam, the leader of traditional collective production teams, received better land that was available. The leftover land which was mostly unproductive was redistributed among the farmers. Always short of cash, the farmers needed to borrow money from different sources. The landlords were the major source of cash and usually 37 charged them very high interest rates. it was the landlords, not the farmers, who could receive the agricultural credits at lower interest rates from the government-sponsored banks. They would lend money to the poor farmers at much higher rates than they had been charged. Merchants and money lenders in the cities also provided the farmers with cash. .SaLafthacl or trade in advance is a traditional system that allows the farmers to sell their crops before the harvest time, especially in the winter, at much cheaper prices. in most of the cases, the farmers did not receive cash at the transaction stage. instead, they had to buy materials and supplies that were needed on the farm and for their families at outrageous prices. These unfair terms of exchange are still practiced in many parts of the country. Thus, the lranlan farmers have been exploited not only by the landlords, but by money lenders, merchants, and in general by the urban people. The two factors of uneven distribution of land ownership and the unfair terms of exchange impose poverty on the rural areas and siphons the rural wealth into the urban areas. Paul if. English's (1967) "Ecological Trilogy" in the Middle East is probably more applicable to lran than any other country where the wealthier city dwellers are called the dominant group in the society. Keddie (1968) also points out that "the traditional patterns of draining the entire agricultural surplus to the cities and leaving only the barest minimum for agricultural investment" (p. 81). Ehlers (1977), who carried out his field research in Khorasan ostan concludes "that practically all of the economic increase resulting from urban initiatives, as they apply to the countryside, flows back into the town with little or no multiplier 38 effect through circulation in the countryside. This then is also one of the reasons why the economic and social gap between city and hinterland, in spite of all positive developments, rather widened in recent years instead of diminishing" (p. 292). Merchants were engaged in the collection of raw materials such as wool for carpet, grain and other agricultural products to feed the urban population. Hides, dried fruits, nuts, spices and carpets are assembled for export to the higher levels in the hierarchial system of urbanization, then to other countries. Through the same channels rural lran is supplied with consumer and manufactured goods. The profits on both sides of the trade, purchasing raw materials at lower prices and liquidation of urban commodities at higher prices accumulate in the cities where they will be transferred later to city of Tehran. Still parts of these profits will leave the country. Graham (1979) reports that "[between 1975-79] about $100 million worth of private capital [left] the country each month" (p. 197). Forbis (1980) also states that "rich lranlans exported billions of dollars" (p. 128). Yet, parts of the oil money that were lost or stolen could have been transfered out of the country. An advisor to the prime minister reports, he was "unable to determine what had happened to $2.0 billion a year between 1974-77” (Fesharaki, 1980, p. 11). The discriminatory nature of investment in agriculture has resulted in the stagnation of this sector of the economy. Any financial loans or grants to agriculture were highly biased toward the farm corporations which made up about one percent of the farm households. They received about 95$ of the total grants and the farm cooperatives with 99$ of the households received only 5$. An oil producing country such as lran 39 "feels able to invest the capital, to import machinery, to hire a lot of foreign experts, to expand urban consumption of domestic and foreign products, to remedy the domestic food deficits via imports, and let agriculture die a natural death without worrying about a baiance-of-payments deficit" (Katouzian, 1981, p. 247). Thus, rural dependency can be considered as an important factor in widening spatial gap between urban and rural sectors. CHAPTER l l l IETHODOLOGY This chapter explains the methodological approaches and procedures used to carry out this study on regional inequality in lran. First, in the section devoted to the study area, some discussion on lranlan geographical regions, political subdivisions, population, and regional variation, and time dimension will be given. Then, the variables, data, and the methodology of this study will be introduced. Wm WM. iran is located in the arid region of Southwest Asia also referred to as the Middle East. llithin the country one may find almost all representative types of physical and cultural aspects of the broader Middle East. From a physical point of view, the country has high mountain ranges similar to those of Turkey. lran also has vast uninhabited areas which are not very different from the Sahara Desert. The major populated and cultivated areas of western lran are a part of what is cal led the Fertile Crescent. Physically, the country could be divided into three different landforms: (1) the Mountains, (2) the Caspian Sea Plain, and (3) the interior. The mountainous areas include the Zagros and Alburz. The Zagros Ranges extend from northwest to southeast and occupy almost the entire western part of the country. important features of the western highlands are a series of tablelands and volcanic soils, especial iy in the northwest. With an annual precipitation of more than 400 mm. the area is the most productive and populated after the Caspian Plain. in 40 41 most places pasture-lands are available for animal husbandry. The wool and hair of sheep and goats are used to support an important carpet weaving industry. The meat and dairy products are sold to the urbanites. in comparison with the Zagros Ranges, the Alburz is more narrow but higher in altitude. The northern slopes of the Alburz are well forested, but the southern slapes, mainly because of a rain shadow effect, are almost barren. The Caspian Plain is a narrow fertile plain located between the Alburz ranges and the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea itself is a shrinking body of water which is about 24 meters below sea level. This is primarily because input from precipitation and rivers is less than evaporation. Fishing, especial iy in connection with the production of caviar, is very significant for the local people. Administratively, the Caspian Plain contains two ostans: Gilan in the Nest and Mazandaran in the east. The highest annual precipitation in iran is recorded in Gilan at Anzail (Pahlavi) in the southwestern corner of this plain which is approximately 2,000 mm. The Caspian Plain is the most important area in terms of rice production in iran. it also produces tea, cotton, citrus fruits, sugar cane, tobacco and other agricultural products. The great lranlan desert, located in the interior parts of the country, coversabout one-half of the total area of lran. The mountains almost completely encircle the interior region. Rainfall in the Central deserts is extranely low, amounting to about 15-26 mm. As a result of the cloudless and dry nature of the region, tenperatures are very high during the day but they fall considerably during the night. Population within this region is almost nonexistent. The few settlements are found mostly on the flanks of the surrounding mountains where water is- 42 available. From the central lranlan deserts, also called Kavlrs, towards the south and east, the physical conditions do not change very much. in other words, the southern and eastern parts of the country are similar to those of the interior. The central parts of lran include most areas of Semnan, southern Khorasan, Kerman, Yazd, and eastern parts of the Central and Esfahan ostans. The arid regions of lran, in addition, cover all of the southern coasts and Sistan-Baluchestan. WM. lran, in the course of its long recorded history, has been divided into sometimes as few as four to as many as forty provinces and its internal boundaries have been unstable even through the last three decades. For instance, the country was divided into 13 ostans at the time of the first national census in 1956, and 21 ostans during the second national census in 1966. in the mid-19705, two more ostans; Yazd and Zanjan, were created by dividing Glian and Esfahan Ostans; thus, at the present time, the country of lran has 23 provinces (Figure 3.3). The smallest political subdivision in lran is called pen or a village. it may consist of several families living in an agglomerated form of settlement. A combination of several villages is cal led new. A Bnkhih refers to a consolidation for some Mast-ans. The largest vll lageln terms of population size becomes the political center of the m, but the population of this center most not exceed 5,000 otherwise it becomes an urban center or man, any locality with less population is cal led rural. The only exception to this rule is that some 51mm centers, even with population of less than 5,000, can be included in the urban areas. in many respects the gum is similar to the county in the United States. .Qflan is the largest political 43 Figure 3.1 iranian Administrative Subdivisions (Ostansi 200 000 r l 1 I {CBLE III III M. Kamiar 44 Figure 3.2 Shahrestans and Shahrs (Ostan Centers) , TABRTZ ............... ........... . u o w . a w _- o 'I. a.“ gflisuAnansrAN * OSTAN CENTER fi] 1 j ‘CUMJEIM NB J M . KAMIAR 45 Table 3.1 Name, Location and Capital City of the 23 Ostans Ostgn 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 3 Markazi (Central) Gilan Mazandaran E. Azerbayjan W. Azerbayjan Bakhtaran Khuzestan Fars Kerman Khorasan Esfahan Sistan & Baluchestan Kordestan Hamadan Chaharmahal & Bakhtlyari Lorestan Kohgliuyeh & Boyer Ahmad Bushehr Hormozgan Semnan Yazd ann Loam; W N. Central Tehran Caspian Plain Rasht Caspian Plain Sari N.W. Zagros Tabriz N.W. Zagros Urmla Central Zagros Bakhtaran S. West Ahvaz S. Zagros Shiraz S. East Kerman N. East Mashhad Central Esfahan S. East Zahedan Zagros Sanandaj Zagros Hamadan Zagros Shahrkord Zagros Khorramabad Zagros llam Zagros Yasuj South Bushehr South Bender-Abbas N. Central Semnan Central Yazd Zggggs Zgnign 46 subdivision within the country and includes all the previously mentioned lower divisions. The 9511:: is comparable to the state in the United States or province in Canada. in this study, all 23 ostans, those shahrestans that include ostan's capital city within their boundaries, and all of the 23 capital cities of the ostans will be treated as areal units of investigation. Thus, this study will carry out the analysis of spatial inequality and areal association at three different geographical scales, Ostan (Figure 3.1), Shahrestan and Shahr (Figure 3.2). The names of shahrestans and shahrs are exactly the same. The name and location of the ostans and their capital cities are also given in Table 3.1. The ostan level of analysis provides an overall picture of development in iran. This scale, however, is too broad and many local variations are masked by averaging the measures of development. To cope with this, data for ostans are divided into two different segments, urban and rural. Furthermore, the ostan level of analysis will be accompanied by both shahrestan and shahr levels to provide better insight on the regional inequalities that may have been overlooked at the ostan level. The data at shahrestan level of analysis are also presented for both urban and rural areas. Accordingly, for each variable and each time periods, five levels of analysis are considered. W. iran's population of more than 40 mil lion is very unevenly distributed among the 23 ostans. in 1976 the largest number of people lived in the Central, East Azerbayjan, and Khorasan. These three ostans contained about 40$ of the total population of lran (20$ in the Central province, 10$ in East Azerbayjan, and 10$ in Khorasan). At the 47 same time, the ostans of llam, Kohyliuyeh and Chaharmahal each had less than one percent of the total population. in terms of population density, iran is considered to be one of the less densely populated countries in the Middle East. in 1976 the crude population density was about 20 person per square kilometer. However, about half the total area of the country is nonecumene; thus, crude density should be doubled. According to most of the data sources available on lran, the land under permanent cultivation is about 7-12$ of the total areas of the country. Therefore, population per cultivated area should be around 200 persons per m2. The main concentration of population is in the north and west with a decrease towards the south and east, the interior being almost enpty. A tiny ostan cal led Gilan, a rice producing ostan, had the highest population density of 107 persons per sz in 1976. Sistan-Baluchestan in the southeast has a population density of about three persons per m2. in 1881 about three-quarters of lranlan people lived in the rural areas (Mcmeni, 1970, p. 49). in 1981, only about half of the population was considered rural. During all three census periods, the Central province has been the leading ostan in terms of urban population. in 1976 approximately 80$ of the people lived in the cities in this ostan, which was fol lowed by Esfahan ostan, 63$, and Khuzestan ostan, 58$. These can be compared with less than 13$ urbanization in Kohgliuyeh ostan. W. The highly urbanized areas consisting of the Central, Esfahan, and Khuzestan ostans are the richer ostans in iran. The nation's capital city of Tehran is located in the Central ostan which gives prestige to it. The wealth of the nation has been 48 accumulated in the capital city in the hands of few people for about 200 years. By the exertion of political and economic powers, this concentration is increasing. Tehran became the capital city of lran only in 1786. The population of Tehran grew from several thousand in 1786 to about 7 million in 1982. Tehran's population was not very different from the country's second largest city in the late 19305, whereas it is nearly seven times bigger now. According to Grahan (1979), one out of every ten persons possesses a car in Tehran, while this is one in ninety outside the capital. Tehran absorbs about 60$ of internal migration. More than 30$ of government employees are settled in this city. More than 50$ of all manufactured goods are produced here. Approximately one-half of all doctors practice in the city of Tehran. Also more than 60$ of iran's student population obtained their education in this city. Within the city of Tehran, topographical and social contrasts exist between the northern and southern halves. The north is higher in terms of elevation. The land rises gradually as one moves in the direction of the mountains in the north. Temperatures are lower in summer here. With the expansion of the city "the former summer resorts to the north have been adopted as permanent residences by the upper classes" (Fisher, 1968, p. 455). ,The slope of the grounds and the structure of the soils permit infiltration of polluted waters towards the south exacerbating sporadic floods in the south during the rainy seasons. The poor districts of southern Tehran are being invaded by new immi grants coming from other parts of the country. Most of these people are employed in informal sectors of the economy and are living in absolute poverty. They are known to be among the poorest people in the 49 world. Houses are made of whatever residual materials are found. For visitors tciTehran's poor districts, it was not "possible to tell which was the animal shelter, and which was the human shelter" (Mohawk, 1980, p. 111). While the rate of literacy in the city of Tehran was 75$, it varied from about 90$ in the north to 65$ in the south in 1976. At the same time, the percent of population with higher education was close to 8$ in some districts in northern Tehran which can be compared with 0.4$ in some areas in southern Tehran. Health personnel and facilities are even more concentrated in one ostan, indeed in one city. There were 13,428 doctors, general and special ist doctors combined, practicing in lran in 1976 and 6,567 were in the Central province. Thus, about 50$ of the doctors were serving about 20$ of the country's total population who were living in Tehran ostan and leaving the other 50$ serving the rest of the country with about 80$ of the population. Still, about 93$ of the central ostan's doctors were in the city of Tehran, while about 55$ of the ostan's population were living in the city of Tehran. in the Central province there was one doctor per 1,000 people, compared with only one doctor per 10,000 people in Kohgliuyeh ostan. Dentists per population were also ten times higher in the Central province than in most of the less developed areas in lran. in 1976, there was one hospital bed available for every 250 people in the Central province, whereas this ratio in Kohgliuyeh was one bed for every 5,000 people. in other words, hospital beds were 20 times more available in Tehran ostan. in terms of the material well being of the people in different ostans, examples of piped water and availability of means of communication like television and telephone, representing income levels,‘ 50 will provide more information about spatial inequality. Over 80$ of the housing units in Tehran ostan had piped water, while it hardly reached to about 20$ in some other ostans. in ostans such as Sistan-Baluchestan, Kohgliuyeh, and llam only about 6$ of the houses had television and in Chaharmahal, Kohgliuyeh, and Ham less than 1$ of the houses had a telephone. These can be compared with 50$ for television and 17$ for telephones in the Central province. Khuzestan is the most important oil producing ostan. More than 90$ of the oil is produced here. in addition, this ostan is very important for agriculture. it is well watered by the Karun River, soils are fertile, and temperatureq are high. Most of the cash crops are well suited to the environmental conditions in this ostan. Esfahan and its neighboring ostan of Yazd have many textile centers. Fertile lands around the city of Esfahan are irrigated by Zayandeh Rud which has its foundation in the western highlands. This is the only and most important river highly used in the central part of the country. Areas of economic stress in iran are located in the periphery, far from the centers of political power. Some ostans in the south and southeast, such as the Sistan-Baluchestan, Hormozgan and Bushehr and facing aridity and harsh environment. Some others, like Kordestan, llam, Chaharmahal, and Kohgliuyeh are located in the rugged mountains of the western lran. The majority of the people are involved in the agricultural activities and animal husbandry. Very few industrial centers are established in these areas. Previously, most of these mountainous areas of the west were occupied by the nomads who had a sound economy based mainly on herding. Under forced sedentarizatlon by the government, this tradition in lran has almost died out. The 51 economic blight of the ‘south and southeast has also been affected by environmental factors, especially by lack of water and remoteness. Mansion. in regard to the time periods of 1966 and 1976 used in this study, two points must be explained: whether a ten-year time interval is enough to observe any development planning results such as spatial convergence or divergence, and where and how this ten-year time fits in the overall picture of the development of the country. it- has been argued that a time frane of three decades or more is required to see the results of a spatially oriented development policy. However, some believe that without radical restructuring of the sociopolitical systems nothing will change even for longer time periods (Stohr and Taylor 1981). Although the time span used in this study may be too short to see significant changes in the levels of spatial inequality, this period covers the most important and crucial portion of history of development in the country. Even during this ten-year period significant changes in the spatial inequality can be identified since this time span covers the fourth and fifth development plans that were considered to be at least partially successful by international observers, marking the highest rates of economic development. The rate of resource exploitation, for example, in reference to the production of oil, reachedits highest level of over 6.0 million barrels a day. The price of oil also reached its highest level ever. Thus, the 1966 - 1976 period may have been a significant episode in the contemporary history of the country in relation to changes in the levels of living and development. 52 .lLaLLabJas Different measures of development were used in order to carry out this study on spatial inequality and its changes over time in lran. First, twelve socio-econcmic characteristics were selected to construct a development map of the country's ostans in 1976. This was done to examine the general patterns of the level of development. These variables, shown in Appendix A.1, include percent of skilled workers, different measures of educational attainment, characteristics of the residential units, measures of health conditions, and percent of urbanization. Data on these variables were only available for ostan in 1976. Therefore, the map of development was produced for this scale of analysis. The selection of these variables was based on theoretical background and data availability. in the study of spatial inequal lty five measures of development were selected for three scales of analysis and two time periods. All of these variables represent different levels of economic development and living condition. Among them were measures of employment, education and characteristics of the housing units. in the study of the areal association and its changes over space and through time, two more variables, migration and distance, were added (See Appendix 8.1). The variables used in this study allow an examination of the convergence-divergence question. The changes in the levels of spatial inequality and their associations are direct consequence of the forces imposing the changes. The selection of the variables, i.e., type of employment, educational achievement and living condition, are based on theories of polarization, center-periphery, and dependency. in a market economy, once development is planned for a favored location, an 53 expansion of regional differences can be anticipated through a cumulative causation mechanism. Urban-industrial development leads to an expansion of employment opportunity, promotion of health and educational conditions, improvement of housing facilities, and advancement of the means of transportation. These, in turn, enhance the chances of further development, specialization, and concentration. inflows of the resources from rural periphery to urban centers are additional factors for increased rates of polarization which result in exploitation of the periphery and its dependency on the centers. The reason for including the two additional variables of migration and distance was to examine the patterns and changes in the relationships between these two, on one hand, and our previous variables, on the other. These two were added to enable us to see the direction and magnitude of their association and their changes over space and through time. The intensity of migration from less developed and traditional rural periphery to more developed and modern urban core in relation to distance decay could be studied by the type of relationship recorded. The changes in the spatial inequality within urban and rural areas are indicators of the processes of development. Unequal levels of concentration and their changes between the two sectors from 1966 to 1976 represent different rates in diffusion of the indicators of modernization. The higher rates of reduction in spatial inequality in the urban areas at the expense of the rural areas reveals the dependency of the latter on the former and its conscl idation through time. The logic behind including these varibles is presented below. The general status of the economy in any country can be measured by the levels and types of employment, which in turn are related to income 54 and regional development. (Baer and Herve 1966, Blandy 1972, Bairoch 1973, and Edwards 1974.) in LDCs the areas where the majority of people are involved in agricultural activities are less developed than those where more people are anployed in manufacturing. The role of government in distribution of public funds is undeniable. For lran as a whole in 1976, government shared 20$ of the total employment, while this share was more than 34$ in urban and only 4$ in the rural areas. Thus, in more developed areas, a higher percentage of people were enployed by the government. Education is partially a result of higher incomes and access to educational facilities. This gives rise to better employment opportunities, which in turn provide higher income levels, especially in the more developed areas (Chiswick 1968, Bowies 1972, Bhagwati 1973, Szyilowicz 1973, Boudon 1974, Buchanaan 1975, and Simmons 1979). Education also has been seen as an important component in demographic development in making "demographical ly rational decisions" with respect to family size (Tabarah 1976, Harblson 1977, and Biaug 1979). it seems that education is a significant factor in creating spatial inequality and it is believed that higher levels of education are found in the more developed areal units of investigation. All of the people who can read and write are considered literate, thus; this variable covers a wide range of educational attainment. To cope with this problem, a better index, population with university degree, also will be used. Variables such as characteristics of the housing units are used to show the overall level of material well-being and the level of economic development by Berry 1961, the United Nations 1951, i970, and Smith 1982. in this study, the percentage of the housing units with 55 electricity ls used to illustrate most of the arguments on regional inequal ity. The reason is that the sources of power are not ubiquitous and almost non-existant in the rural areas. Consequently, it is very expensive to equip the housing units with electricity, which in turn reflects the income levels. it is also a more reliable measure of development, because the census reporters have to see whether a housing unit is supplied with electricity or not. Migration in lran is roughly estimated by the percentage of those people who were born outside of the internal subdivisions under study. Migration itself is both age and sex selective and varies according to different stages of econanic development and information on alternatives available to the migrants. However, the major drive behind the migration process is perceived economic and employment opportunity (Ravenstein 1889, Lee 1966, Bogue 1969, and Thomllnson 1976). Educated and skilled, as well as unskilled, young and mostly male individuals migrate to the urban areas. This provides the core with professional and skilled personnel on one hand, and an unskilled, cheap labor force on the other hand (Freid'nann 1966). At the same time, this process may have negative effects on rural areas. Those that are left behind are mostly children and elderly people. Migration can also be seen as a process of population redistribution which "is primarily determined by national economic development patterns and the spatial distribution of economic opportunity . . ." (Gosling, 1979, p. 405). Accordingly, it can be argued that areas with high percentages of people born in other places are more developed in iran. The significance of distance in spatial studies is closely related to the definition of geography as the science of space. Geography has- 56 also been called a discipline in distance (Watson 1955). As a measurable phenomenon and important spatial quality, distance is basic to the study of geography (Nystuen 1963 and Olsson 1965). The forces molding spatial patterns and processes may be explained by distance and ease of accessibility of the places, which enter into many basic geographical concepts such as locationl analysis, connnectivity, interaction, migration and diffusion. Distance-decay provides a structural theme expressing that the occurrence of events and activities decreases with increasing distance from their sources. improvements in transportation technology that increase accessibility, connectivity and interaction, account for a great reduction of the cost of moving goods between places and to a more profitable area. This allows an area to become the center of specialized industries and many other activities. The regional specialization in turn lends to variations in economic development and spatial imbalances. Thus, regional imbalances in the transportation network may be one basic reason for disparity in overall development and there may be a mutual relationship between levels of development and accessibility of the spatial units. For this study the absolute road distance between Tehran and the provincial capitals was available. Distance was then transformed into travel time to Tehran according to the average overland speeds of the most common means of transportation, road condition, and official speed limits. it is hypothesized that areal units further away, in terms of travel time, from the national capital are less developed. All of the above variables were used to analyze the areal association of the geographical units under investigation. However, 57 only the first five variables will be employed to examine the spatial inequality and its changes in lran for all of the above scales of analysis for the 1966 and 1976 census periods. D11: inadequate data, especially limitations on availability and reliability of data is a problem well known to researchers of less developed countries. Some data were extracted from W: W, 1966 and 1976, published in 1968 and 1980-81 respectively. Additional data were collected from different issues of W. Some essential data in the study of development, for exanple, income, were not available. in order to study patterns of regional development via a composite value of development, data on twelve socio-econcmlc variables (Appendix A.1), that were available only at ostan level in 1976, were gathered. For the study of spatial inequality and areal association, a total of seven variables (Appendix B.1 - 8.11) were selected. Data were gathered for the three geographical scales of ostan, shahrestan, and shahr, during the two census periods of 1966 and 1976 (Figure 3.3). At the ostan and shahrestan levels, however, the data were gathered on urban and rural sectors separately. in lran, with the exception of the Shahrestan capitals, any locality with a population of 5,000 or more is considered to be urban. Between 1966 and 1976, the population of some rural centers reached this minimum requirement due to natural growth and imigration. This means that some of the rural centers, especial iy those crossing the 5,000 threshold, were classified as urban in 1976. A problem may appear 58 moowcma wave can mpmxpec< m.m masmoa co mm—eum Amuaov mgm Akucoouv zoumv wasamo 59 because of the increase in population size of some rural centers during the intercensai period. This type of classification may not be without influence on the findings of this study. However, without proper data on the individual localities, the removal of the effects of this automatic transformation seems almost impossible. minimum After data col iectlon, the first task of this study was to control the variables for their respective population by transforming them into rates, ratios, and percentages. The summation of the z-scores of the twelve socio-econcmic variables for 1976 is used to produce a composite value of development. This index enables us to study the uneven levels of development in the ostan. The Lorenz curve and its associated Gini index were employed to show whether any of the selected variables are concentrated in few places at different scales and time periods. Measuring the concentration and distribution of phenanena has been a major area of interest for social scientists in general and geographers in particular. Lorenz (1904-1905) Wright (1937) Bachmura (1959), and Duncan and Duncan (1955) are notable. The Lorenz curve provides a quick visual means of describing space. it can be used to measure diversification in which a given distribution differs from a hypothetical even distribution shown by the diagonal. From this curve, concentration of phenomena can be calculated. The value of the Gini index measures the level of concentration which is directly related to the nunber of areal units and inversely to the size of the units. Gini value is the percentage of area covered by the curve to the total area under the diagonal, which ranges from 0-100. Zero indicates no 60 variation while 100 shows the variable is concentrated in only one place. Thus, the greater the value, the more concentrated is the variable. The reason for using Gini index of concentration and the index of dissimilarity and their associated Lorenz curve was based on summarizing data, visual effects, and comparability over space and through time. The Gini index provides an overall degree of inequality and the index of dissimilarity is an indicator of the maximum level of inequality. These lndices are the summary representation of the data based on the number of (Hilts under study. The Lorenz curve provides a simple visual effect of the distribution of data. The area covered by the curve reveals the departure from equality of distribution. These indices are also comparable, when the same number of areal units are used. The prosperous and depressed regions can be identified using the coefficient of advantage, the ratio between the percentages of two distributions (Smith 1982). Furthermore, the ratios of Gini coefficients and lndices of dissimilarity, calculated for different spatial units and time periods, can be used as a measure of covergence or divergence. A ratio of unity shows no change in spatial inequality, while a ratio of more than one shows convergence and less than one indicates divergence. in addition to the above indices of spatial disparity, another index of regional inequality, the coefficient of variation, was used to verify the findings in the previous section. This coefficient is computed by dividing standard deviation of each variable by its mean and multiplying it by one hundred. The coefficients of variation are dimensionless, thus, they can be compared with changing scale of analysis and through time. 61 ‘The areal association of the seven variables was calculated at the three different geographical scales of ostan, shahrestan, and shahr for the two census periods of 1966 and 1976. This showed how the correlation coefficients vary with changes in the scale of analysis and through time. Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient was used to calculate the areal association of the above variables. The reason was to normalizerthe data sets and compute the significant levels. The use of correlation coefficient requires data in the forms of measurements on some set of objects. in geographical studies the objects are defined areal units such as ostans, shahrestans, and shahrs. The value of correlations coefficient (r) ranges between + 1.0 and - 1.0. Positive (r) value indicates direct relation, while negative (r) refers to indirect or reverse relation. An (r) value of near zero suggests a very weak relation between the variables. The statistical concept of correlation is almost universal iy used in many disciplines. in geography, earlier studies used this technique to study the relationship between environmental factors and some agricultural products (Rose 1936, Kendall 1939, and Hidore 1963). Later this method was used to cover a wide variety of social, econanlc, and technical probians (Hartman and Hook 1956, Alexander and Lindberg 1961, Kobinson 1962, .and Smith 1968). The scale problem in areal association acknowledges the question of the correlation coefficient between two or more variables may vary systematically, when data are aggregated into areal units of different size. The present study differs from those previous studies that examined the changes in the correlation coefficient when the scale of analysis is changed. Available research works usually attempt to identify the 62 changes Hithe areal association of their variables by changing the number of the areal units through different grouping and regrouping procedures. Thus, changing the total number of areal units, yet, covering the same total area or population under study (Robinson 1950, Yule and Kendall 1957, and Blalock 1964). in the present study only ostan level of analysis covers the whole country. At the lower level scales, city and county, only the 23 ostan centers and those shahrestans 'that had an ostan center within their boundaries were selected. Therefore, at these two levels, smaller proportions of the country were investigated or at each level of analysis different population sizes were studied. The question that must be addressed is whether relationships based on spatial units of one order, e.g., states or provinces, are consistent with relationships obtained from spatial units of another order, e.g., counties. Some geographers who use data for different scales of analysis argue that "conclusions derived from studies made at one scale should not be expected to apply to problems whose data are expressed at other scales. Every change in scale will bring about the statement of a new problem and there is no basis for presuming that associations existing at one scale will also exist at another" (McCarty, Hook, and Knos, 1956, p. 16). Other geographers believe that the scale problem in the measure of spatial patterns may be used to gain further insight about the processes involved (Harvey, 1968). 63 mm in accordance with the research questions and based mainly on the review of the literature, the following hypotheses are formulated: 1) it is hypothesized that spatial inequalities of development exist at all three scales of analysis under study. 2) it is hypothesized that spatial inequalities have increased between 1966 and 1976. 3) it is hypothesized that, by changing the scale of analysis from ostan to shahrestan and to shahr, the areal association among some selected development variables will decrease for both 1966 and 1976 periods. CHAPTER iV CHANGES iN SPATIAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPENT This chapter examines changes in spatial patterns of development in Iran. The most recent picture of development at ostan level in 1976 will be presented via a composite index of twelve measures of development. This will be followed by an example of regional gap, i.e., spatial disparity of the areal units will be illustrated using value added in manufacturing. in the second part of this chapter, the lndices of regional disparities of five variables in 1966 and 1976 for three scales of analysis namely: Ostan (Province), Shahrestan (County), and Shahr (City), will be tabulated and discussed. One of the variables, housing units with electricity, will be mapped and its Lorenz curve will be included to illustrate and clarify the argument related to regional disparity. in this part, the hypothesis that spatial inequality increased from 1966 to 1976, will be tested. Finally, changes in the areal association of the seven selected variables for the above time periods and scales of analysis will be discussed. This is provided to test the hypothesis that correlation coefficients of measures of development decrease as the size of areal units are reduced for above time periods. W To produce a development map of lran, data on twelve variables related to the level of development were selected. These measures include percent skilled workers: measures of education: housing units with electricity, piped water, television, and telephone: doctors, 64 65 dentists, and hospital beds per population: and the percent of urban population in each ostan in 1976 (Appendix A.1). These variables were transformed into percentages to control for their respective population (Appendix A.2). Then, the z-scores of the above data were calculated. Therefore, the original data set of 23 x 12 variables were replaced by a new matrix of 23 x 12 z-scores (Appendix A.3). The rows of this new matrix showing positive and negative values, above or below the mean, were then summed, which provides a composite index of development in lran in 1976. This composite development index, shown in Table 4.1, is used to draw a map of development displayed by Figure 4.1. The more developed provinces possess higher positive development values and are shown as high "elevations" in Figure 4.1. As can be seen from Figure 4.1, except for the oil producing ostan of Kuzestan in the southwest, the development index decreases from its peak in Tehran in all directions toward iran's international borders. The Central province had a development value of more than 39 in 1976, compared with -11 for two small ostans of Kohgliuyeh and Ilam, both located in the inaccessible areas of the Zagros, and Hormozgan, on iran's southern coast. Khuzestan ostan ranked as the second highest developed province in lran with a value of about 13.5. This means that the index of development here was one third of the central ostan. The range between the highest and the lowest development value was more than 50. When the Central ostan is excluded, the range narrows down to about 25. Therefore, half of the spatial differentials is contributed by a single ostan. The difference between index of development in the Central and Khuzestan ostans is 25 units of standard deviation, whereas the difference between Khuzestan and Esfahan ostans is only 2 units Composite Development 66 Table 4.1 index of the Twelve Varibles, Ostan 1976 i Ostan index N K 1 Central 39.39 2 Khuzestan 13.49 3 Esfahan 11.12 4 Yazd 8.19 5 Fars 5.69 6 Semnan 3.35 7 Khorasan 0.97 8 Glian 0.63 9 Bakhtaran 0.49 10 Mazandaran -0.05 11 Bushehr -0.60 12 Kerman -2.31 13 W. Azerbayjan -2.69 14 E. Azerbayjan -3,42 15 Lorestan -5.76 16 Hamadan -6.02 17 Chaharmahal -7.08 18 Kordestan -7,74 19 Sistan -9.24 20 Zanjan -9.98 21 Hormozgan -11.21 22 ilam -11.28 23 Koh‘gi I uyeh -11.44 67 vo.uul 90.0 n..o« no.un 90.0» 94 S °2 whma :muwo .cmuH cw ucosmoH0>oo mo xwocH ouamomfiou H.¢ whoawm z /, a V /, 68 standard deviation. This is an indication of the divergence of Tehran ostan from the rest of the country. At the same time, small differences in the level of development of the last seven ostans, Chaharmahal and Kordestan, Zanjan and Hormozgan, and the last three ostans, particularly depict their similaritiy to each other. A group of ostans with positive index of development such as Esfahan, Yazd, Fars and Semnan are located in iran's central plateau. The last nine ostans listed in Table 4.1 had no positive z-scores on any of the twelve variables. Most of the less developed ostans, with negative values, are located either in the peripheral parts of the country or in the less accessible mountainous and desert areas. Ostans like Bushehr, East and West Azerbayjan, Kordestan, Sistan-Baluchestn, liam, and Hormozgan are located in the peripheral parts of the country and most of them are on iran's international borders. Kerman ostan covers most of the southeastern dry lands. Other less developed ostans like Zanjan, Hamadan, Lorestan, Chaharmahad, and Kohgliuyeh are located in the mountainous areas of the country. Although Tehran ostan was highly developed, in comparison to the other ostans, this does not mean that development within this ostan is the same everywhere. The city of Tehran distorts patterns of development both in the Central province and in the country as a whole. The primacy rate, which is population of Tehran divided by the second largest city in lran, was 1.9 in 1939. This rate increased to 5.2, 6.3 and 6.8 during 1956, 1966, and 1976 respectively. in 1976, more than 80$ of urban population in the Central province were living in the city of Tehran. At the same time, the city of Tehran was 18 times bigger than 69 the second largest city and 9 times bigger than the combined three larger cities in the Central ostan. The provincial primate cities, mostly ostan capitals, within each ostan also dominate their hinterlands. in 1976,in Hormozgan ostan more than 70$ of the urban population lived in Bandar Abbas, the capital city of this ostan. The percentage of urban population living in the provincial capital city for Zanjan was 69$, iiam 67$, Bakhtaran 66$, and Yazd 62$ (See Table 4.2). in six ostans of Zahedan, Khorasan, Esfahan, Hamadan, Kordestan, and E. Azebayjan, more than half of the urban population lived in their respective capital cities. The correlation between the composite development index and primacy rate, which is the population of the biggest city in each ostan divided by the total population of three larger cities, was .6089 which was significant at .002 level. The primacy rate alone can account for 37$ of total variation in the composite development index. This is an indication of the concentration of the variables of development in the provincial primate cities at the expense of the fewer smaller cities and all of their rural areas. The Gini coefficient can be used to determine whether an areal unit has its "fair" share of the development or not. in this case, the population of the areal unit will be compared with percent of the availability of the measures of development. To illustrate spatial inequal ity, the amount of value added in the manufacturing sector in 1972 was used. This variable had the largest Gini coefficient compared with other measures of development. Table 4.3 shows each ostan's proportionate share of the value added in manufacturing and population size. These two can be compared 70 Table 4.2 Primacy Rates of the Largest Cities, Ostan 1976 $ of Urban Pop. Living in the gsign Lagggst Citv Prim§§x_3aig§___ 1 Central 81.4 9.0 2 Gilan 40.9 1.6 3 Mazandaran 9.1 0.3 4 E. Azerbayjan 50.3 2.4 5 W. Azerbayjan 36.8 1.2 6 Bakhtaran 65.8 3.9 7 Khuzestan 26.2 0.5 8 Fars 48.8 2.8 9 Kerman 40.1 1.3 10 Khorasan 53.6 3.8 11 Esfahan 53.3 3.5 12 Sistan 57.6 1.9 13 Kordestan 50.3 1.5 14 Hamadan 51.0 1.7 15 Chaharmahal 28.8 0.9 16 Lorestan 35.6 1.7 17 llam 66.8 2.0 18 Kohgliuyeh 75.0 3.2 19 Bushehr 49.5 1.1 20 Hormozgan 71.1 3.4 21 Sennan 19.9 0.6 22 Yazd 62.2 2.7 23 Zanjan ._§9-4 2.5 71 directly. For example, the Central ostan's share of the value added was three times larger than its population and in some ostans such as Chaharmahal, Zanjan, Sistan-Baluchestan, Kohgliuyeh, and llam, their share of the value added was either very small or zero. The coefficient of advantage, the ratio between the two variables for each ostan, is used to rank the provinces and construct the Lorenz curve. A coefficient of advantage of more than one indicates that the ostan has more of the value added in manufacturing than it "deserves" and a coefficient of less than one shows that the ostan may have been discriminated against. The first four ostans had coefficient of advantage of more than one and the rest of the ostans, with more that 66$ of the total population of the country, were disadvantaged. The degree of inequality can also be shown by the deviation of the Lorenz curve from the diagonal or the line of equal distribution (Figure 4.2). The Gini coefficient, the ratio between the area covered by the curve and total areal below the diagonal, for the above variables was 57.36. Gini value ranges between 0.0, total equality, and 100.0, total inequality. Thus, a value of more than 57 shows a considerable degree of inequality. The dashed lines on the curve show that the Central ostan with 20$ of the population controls about 64$ of the value added in manufacturing in lran. This ostan was followed by Khuzestan ostan which had 6$ of the country's population and produced more than 11$ of the value added. These two provinces together, having about one-quarter of the population, control led more than three-quarters of the value added in manufacturing. The four advantaged ostans' share of value added was more than 82$, yet they were occupied by only one-third of iran's.population. 72 Table 4.3 Value Added in Manufacturing in lran, Ostan 1972 R $ Value $ Cost. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Added Pop. Advan- lative lative N Ostan Mfg. tage Value Pop. K (1) (2) (1)/(2) Added 1 Central 63.72 20.38 3.126 63.72 20.38 2 Khuzestan 11.32 6.40 1.769 75.04 26.78 3 Yazd 1.17 1.05 1.114 76.21 27.83 4 Esfahan 6.27 5.77 1.087 82.48 33.60 5 Kerman 1.54 3.19 0.483 84.02' 36.79 6 Mazandran 3.16 6.99 0.452 87.18 43.78 7 Lorestan 1.13 2.73 0.414 88.31 46.51 8 Khorason 3.82 9.56 0.399 92.13 56.07 9 Fars 1.83 5.96 0.307 93.96 62.03 10 Gilan 1.40 4.63 0.302 95.36 66.66 11 Bushehr 0.26 1.02 0.255 95.62 67.68 12 E. Azerbayjan 2.18 9.36 0.233 97.80 77.04 13 Hamadan 0.47 3.19 0.147 98.27 80.23 14 Hormozgan 0.19 1.35 0.141 98.46 81.58 15 Kordestan 0.31 2.29 0.140 98.78 83.87 16 W. Azerbayjan 0.46 4.12 0.112 99.23 87.99 17 Bakhtaran 0.32 3.03 0.106 99.55 91.02 18 Semnan 0.26 2.76 0.094 99.81 93.78 19 Chaharmahal 0.05 1.15 0.043 99.86 94.93 20 Zanjan 0.06 1.70 0.035 99.92 96.63 21 Sistan 0.06 1.94 0.031 99.98 98.57 22 Kohgliuyeh 0.02 0.71 0.028 100.00 99.28 23 llam 9,00 9,72 9,999 199,99 199 99 73 wcfiuouoomoomz a“ cooo< ooam> N can on 90 no on a 99099900090090.9009...0.009000000090909000OOOOOOOO‘ «anacou — ll|"|'|" '||l| ecu-enacz an.» cocoa-u ceases cauoocouax p—‘UQIHS coaouogu ouch casso .223. cogs-ahead .u canola: cameo-ho: con-cone: 521.32 .3 aeueuzzan cezldm asagu . Shula"... mmm S. u 535 28 gossuqogox loan was” guano .=.L~ ca occasouoescaz a, eaau< asp», co asasu ~=aaos ~.¢ «Leave 'O‘O‘O O'O'CldttPlO'OlO O’O'O’QlGPC'1P‘0‘O‘O O'O'OiiltrlO'O‘O‘O‘. e um nu no .1 a...“ 1... nu nr nu D; 37. on can 74 W in this section, the hypothesis that spatial inequality has increased from 1966 to 1976 will be examined. First, the values of Gini index and coefficient of variation will be given. This will be fol lowed by the maps and Lorenz curves of the housing units with electricity for different scales and time periods. Later in this section, an argument that the gap between urban and rural sectors has widened will be introduced. in the next section, the possible changes in areal association of the measures of development with different scale and time will be discussed. W. Table 4.4 contains the Gini lndices of the five variables for three levels of analysis in 1966. The first two scales of ostan and shahrestan are further broken down into urban and rural sectors. in lran, any locality with a population of less than 5,000 is considered as rurai.The purpose was to examine possible differences between the two sectors. The immediate observation on Table 4.3 reveals that spatial inequality was more acute in rural areas than urban areas. The only exception was population with university degree at ostan level when the Gini index for urban was higher than rural sector, which indicates that this variable is highly concentrated in fewer urban area compared with rural areas. One must be careful in comparing low Gini coefficients for urban and rural areas. A small Gini value is an indication of an even distribution of the variables and the similarity of the areal units to one another. Low Gini indices in urban and rural areas are, however, the product of two totally different phenanena. On one hand, for the 75 Table 4.4 Gini Coefficients for Different Scales of Analysis in 1966 Variables Ostgg Shahcgsigg Total Urban R t n hr Employed in Manufacturing 25.311 15.526 32.641 27.420 17.021 45.564 21.934 Employed by Government 26.035 13.325 15.718 30.218 12.106 28.010 11.537 Literate Population 20.971 16.718 19.028 23.698 9.827 16.601 7.910 Pop. with Univ. Degree 50.211 32.138 24.005 48.791 28.937 37.579 24.890 Housing Units/ Electricity 34.349 11.697 36.660 35.072 8.678 43.201 6.079 Table 4.5 Gini Coefficients for Different Scales of Analysis in 1976 Variables .______.QsIan_.____ ____Sl1abr.esian____ T9191 Urb n u Employed in Manufacturing 27.311 21.899 34.641 26.262 17.771 44.757 17.397 Employed by Government 21.329 9.214 16.718 20.993 11.614 33.210 9.395 Literate _ Population 18.847 9.518 13.939 20.172 6.345 14.665 4.709 Pop. with Univ. Degree 44.887 24.938 21.324 41.499 25.116 33.622 19.117 Housing Units/ Electricity 23.349 4.154 34.793 21.186 3.954 43.471 3.399 76 urban areas, it is a symptom of similarity in availability and "haves". On the other hand, it represents similarity of rural areas in lack of facilities or conditions and "have nots". This can be explained by looking at the distribution and values of the original data used in this study. The higher values are the characteristics of “haves" in the urban areas, while the lower values and smaller ranges are the indication of "have nots" in rural areas. in 1966, on the average, the proportion of the housing units in urban areas having electricity was about 70$ and in 1976 it reached over 90$, compared with 4$ and 14$ in the rural areas for the same time periods. The ranges of this variable were 40-80$ in urban ostan and 0-1‘2$ in rural ostan in 1966. These percentages were 60-99$ and 2-40$ in 1976. Another observation is that the Gini values for total ostan and total shahrestan do not reflect real spatial inequality as do the Gini values for either urban or rural sectors. in some cases they may even be misleading. For example, the Gini of population employed in manufacturing in 1966 for total ostan was 25.3, while it was only 15.5 for urban and 32.6 for rural areas. For the same variable the total shahrestan's Gini was 27.4, but it was 17.0 and 45.6 at urban and rural levels. in both instances the rural inequality is much higher than urban inequality which means that it is more reasonable to use the coefficient for different sectors rather than the total ones. Table 4.5 shows the Gini coefficient for 1976. it gives all of the items that were presented in Table 4.4. As the first step in testing the research hypothesis, these two tables will be compared and contrasted and the changes in the values of the Gini lndices will be discussed. The first hypothesis, that spatial inequality exists at all 77 scales of analysis and the time periods, can be proven. The second hypothesis, that spatial concentration has increased can be rejected with some exceptions. Twenty eight out of thirty five of the Gini values decreased in 1976 compared with those of 1966. However, two of the increased Gini values, employed in manufacturing and by government at rural shahrestan, are very smai i. The equalizing factor has been much stronger in the urban areas rather than rural areas. Thus, the spatial inequality of the measures of education and well-being were less severe for all scales under study in 1976. The reduction in the spatial inequality was not a universal feature of development in iran between 1966 and 1976. Actually, the Gini coefficient of some variables increased. This means that sane of the measures of development were still concentrated in few locations. The Gini crf population employed by government in rural ostan increased from 15.718 to 16.718, while for rural shahrestan this increased from 28.010 to 33.210. The rural areas of Tehran and Khuzestan ostans were the dominant places for government employment in 1966, turf in 1976 a province called Semnan, located in the east of Tehran, was the dominant place. The rural areas of Semnan may have been used by some people working in Tehran as a place of residence; perhaps they were included in Semnan's census. in rural shahrestan, the influential locations for the ‘variable employed by government were not Tehran and Ahvaz in 1976. The new controlling shahrestans were Zahedan and Kerman, both located in the southeastern parts of the country and believed to be less developed areas. in the case of Zahedan, it may have been because of the shrinking proportion of agriculture in the economy, especially when Afganistan built dams on the only river used for irrigation; in addition the 78 government may have employed or sent employed personnel to this region. More often, in the case of Kerman, well known for its carpet industry, the Carpet Company of lran belonging to the state may have hired a larger number of people. Another variable with enlarged Gini value, thus, with greater concentration in few places in both urban and rural ostan and urban shahrestan in 1976, was the population employed in the manufacturing sector of the economy. The highest increase for this variable occurred in urban ostan, where its Gini value changed to 21.899 from 15.526. in both periods under investigation, the ostans and shahrestans with highly specialized textile industries, weaving apparel, and carpet weaving industries were the dominant places of manufacturing compared with those areas with modern assembly lines and petro-chemical activities. The earlier group or the more traditional ones were located in provinces such as Yazed, Esfahan, East Azerbayjan, Kerman and Khorasan, whereas the latter group or the more modern ones were the characteristics of manufacturing in the Central and Khuzestan ostans. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the percentages of the coefficient of variation of the five variables in 1966 and 1976. As another measurement of geographical inequality, these coefficients demonstrate how the indicators of development were unevenly distributed over space among the lranlan subdivisions under study. This technique is used to verify the previous findings on changes in spatial disparity. When the contents of Table 4.6 are compared with Table 4.5, it reveals that in 1976 all of the selected variables were more equal iy distributed in contrast to 1%6. This confirms the previous findings about reductions in the spatial disparity. All of the coefficient of variation 79 Table 4.6 Percent Coefficient of Variation in 1966 Variables _.__Q§Ian.____ W mm: Urban M $ Employed in Manufacturing 22.87 53.62 30.28 70.11 28.36 $ Employed in Government 39.95 59.44 42.06 92.30 36.69 $ Literate 0 Population 14.89 37.94 16.05 45.27 14.39 $ Population with University Degree 56.77 92.59 64.55 148.74 57.01 $ Housing Units with Electricity 20.50 87.99 39.23 89.61 19.10 Table 4.7 Percent Coefficient of Variation in 1976 Variables ___S2§:l:a.n___ We. Urban Ru r n $ Employed in Manufacturing 21.90 34.23 25.75 47.39 24.80 $ Employed by Government 27.50 54.49 28.97 54.23 25.88 $ Literate Population 9.28 27.70 9.65 32.07 8.88 $ Population with University Degree 39.25 59.54 44.35 71.59 37.13 1 Housing Units with Electricity 9.10 75.37 11.31 87.10 10.93 80 decreased, thus providing us with more evidence that spatial inequal lty was smaller in the later period and the variables related to development were more evenly distributed. To illustrate sane of the earlier arguments concerning the spatial gap of development in lran and, more precisely, to look at the regional inequal ities of the housing units with electricity, the fol lowing maps and graphs were constructed. Figure 4.3 through 4.12 show the spatial gap of this variable and its changes at different scales and time periods providing visual effects of the change, especially revealing the urban-rural dichotomy of development process. The Lorenz curves are based on data given in Tables 4.8-4.17. The map and the Lorenz curves are ordered in a way to portray the changes and differences of the spatial gap through time and geographical scales. For instance, both the map and the curve in Figure 4.3 can be compared to Figure 4.4 as well as to Figure 4.5. The map of percent housing units with electricity and its corresponding Lorenz curve at urban ostan level in 1966 are displayed by Figure 4.3. The map in this figure shows that the range of this variable was from about 30$ to more than 80$. Urban areas of two provinces with higher percentages were the Central and Khuzestan. The lowest percentages are found near the country's international borders and in the more inaccessible provinces located in the Zagros areas. The Lorenz curve in Figure 4.3 shows that electricity was more evenly distributed at this scale compared with rural ostan. The curve below the diagonal does not deviate much from the line of even distribution. The small Gini value of 11.697 in 1966 which changed to 4.154 in 1976 means uniformity in distribution and narrowing gap during the period under study. The map of housing units 81 Table 4.8 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Ostan 1966 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Unlts/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage of of K Q§tan (1) (2) (1)/21 (1) (21 1 Khuzestan 9.55 7.75 1.232 9.55 7.75 2 Central 41.70 34.53 1.208 51.25 42.28 3 Bushehr 0.58 0.55 1.054 51.83 42.83 4 Gilan 2.56 2.54 1.008 54.39 45.37 5 Esfahan 7.15 7.66 0.983 61.54 53.03 6 Khorasan 7.26 7.39 0.982 68.80 60.42 7 Lorestan 1.21 1.25 0.968 70.01 61.67 8 Hamadan 1.95 2.02 0.965 71.96 63.69 9 Fars 5.44 5.66 0.961 77.40 69.35 10 Bakhtaran 2.06 2.20 0.936 79.46 b71.55 11 Semnan 0.92 1.02 0.902 80.38 72.57 12 Kordestan 0.88 0.98 0.898 81.26 73.55 13 Kohgliuyeh 0.14 0.16 0.875 81.40 73.71 14 E. Azerbayjan 7.01 8.62 0.813 88.41 82.33 15 Yazd 1.42 1.75 0.811 89.83 84.08 16 llam 0.17 0.21 0.809 90.00 84.29 17 W. Azerbayjan 2.15 2.95 0.729 92.15 87.24 18 Kerman 1.74 2.39 0.728 93.89 89.63 19 Sistan 0.56 0.78 0.718 94.45 90.41 20 Mazandaran 4.06 6.40 0.634 98.51 96.81 21 Chaharmahal 0.40 0.76 0.526 98.91 97.57 22 Hormozgan 0.36 0.70 0.514 99.27 98.27 23 Zanian 0.73 1.73, 9.522 199.99 ,199.99_ 82 Figure 4.3 Housing Units with Eiectricity, Urban Ostan 1966 ELECTRICITY (wa) Il'ns — 83 E83 —73 E153 -83 E43 -53 E33 -43 200 O I“ o O o O O o .11 o N e o 3 f R O I o "' OI o n O o e 6 c :_ o a e I 00 o a e - : ... R O O o 20 o o O O O . . O 0 Gm; Index - 11.697 1° 60 lo zoo 1 With I acute!" 83 Table 4.9 Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Ostan 1966 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Unlts/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage of of £L__Jgflzg; (1) (2) (1)/(2) (1) (21 1 Yazd 3.66 1.27 2.882 3.66 1.27 2 Khuzestan 11.25 4.15 2.711 14.91 5.42 3 Central 19.52 9.25 2.110 34.43 14.67 4 Esfahan 8.19 4.07 2.012 42.64 18.74 5 Mazandaran 12.93 8.74 1.479 55.55 27.48 6 Semnan 1.04 0.87 1.195 56.59 28.35 7 Fars 4.90 5.29 0.929 61.49 33.64 8 Kerman 3.74 4.41 0.848 65.23 38.05 9 Khorasan 9.90 13.04 0.759 75.13 51.09 10 Gilan 4.46 5.89 0.752 79.59 56.98 11 E. Azerbayjan 8.35 11.93 0.700 87.94 68.91 12 Bushehr 0.86 1.29 0.667 88.80 70.20 13 Lorestan 2.02 3.09 0.654 90.82 73.29 14 Chaharmahal 0.70 1.15 0.609 91.52 74.44 15 W. Azerbayjan 2.52 4.89 0.513 94.04 79.33 16 Bakhtaran 1.37 3.15 0.435 95.41 82.48 17 Hamadan 1.35 3.70 0.365 96.76 86.18 18 Hormozgan 0.89 2.50 0.356 97.65 88.68 19 Sistan 0.86 3.04 0.283 98.51 91.72 20 Kohgliuyeh 0.25 1.03 0.243 98.76 92.75 21 Kordestan 0.78 3.56 0.219 99.54 96.31 22 Zanjan 0.36 2.85 0.126 99.90 99.16 jEL_JJ5nL 0.10 0.84, .0.119 100.00 100.00 84 Figure 4.4 Housing Units with Eiectricity, Rurai Ostan 1966 ELECTRICITY .9-12 Es-s 1313— 1241 - Elo— (XHU) " (9 OD 00.. I. .0... .0 J OOOIOOCOI‘. O 2:23 a 1.0 0 o e o O o 80 e n o e z: .- n o I o F ‘0 o s O O O c o : e a e n .0 0 = O O ;'. o R Q I o 20 0 o O o a O 0 e Gin: Index - 36.660 40 so 00 109 1 Utah llactriclty 85 Table 4.10 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Ostan 1976 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Units/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage of of _l_<____9_§tan (1) L2) (1)/(2L (1) (2) 1 Central 37.34 34.78 1.074 37.34 34.78 2 Khuzestan 7.72 7.24 1.066 45.06 42.02 3 Semnan 1.34 1.28 1.047 46.40 43.30 4 Esfahan 8.24 8.15 1.102 54.64 51.45 5 Fars 5.55 5.52 1.005 60.19 56.97 6 Hamadan 1.94 1.97 0.985 62.13 58.94 7 Mazandaran 4.75- 4.83 0.983 66.88 63.77 8 Gilan 2.67 2.73 0.978 69.55 66.50 9 Yazd 1.74 1.79 0.972 71.29 68.29 10 Bushehr 0.75 0.78 0.961 72.04 69.07 11 Khorasan 7.78 8.10 0.960 79.82 77.17 12 Kohgliuyeh 0.17 0.18 0.944 79.99 77.35 13 Bakhtaran 2.18 2.38 0.916 82.17 79.73 14 Zanjan 0.91 1.00 0.910 83.08 80.73 15 Kordestan 0.99 1.09 0.908 84.07 81.82 16 E. Azerbayjan 7.23 8.02 0.901 91.30 89.84 17 Lorestan 1.41 1.57 0.898 92.71 91.41 18 llam 0.25 0.28 0.893 92.96 91.69 19 H. Azerbayjan 2.57 2.89 0.889 95.53 94.58 20 Chaharmahal 0.72 0.82 0.878 96.25 95.40 21 Kerman 2.23 2.56 0.871 94.48 97.96 22 Hormozgan 0.76 0.95 0.800 99.26 98.91 23__§l§1gn 0.76 1.09 0.697 100.00 100.00 86 Figure 4.5 Housing Units with Eiectricity, Urban Ostan 1976 ELECTRIC I TY (SHU) .95 -99 E05 —95 E375 -35 $35 —75 [390 —as o I“ e o e o e 0 IO 9 '1 e e 3‘ o n o I O I- “ . I 0 e o C o : e a e a .0 o = 0 B O F O n O I e 20 o o O o O . . . o . 61m Index - 4.154 «o ' so no 100 1 with [lactrtctzy 87 Table 4.11 Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Ostan 1976 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Unlts/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage of of fiL___9§tan (1) (2) (ll/(2) (1) (2) 1 Yazd 2.65 1.02 2.598 2.65 1.02 2 Esfahan 9.19 4.04 2.275 11.84 5.06 3 Semnan 4.06 1.83 2.218 15.90 6.89 4 Mazandaran 17.11 8.90 1.922 33.01 15.79 5 Central 14.19 8.09 1.754 47.20 23.88 6 Khuzestan 6.40 4.20 1.524 53.60 28.08 7 Fars 7.27 6.00 1.212 60.87 34.08 8 Hamadan 3.77 3.85 0.979 64.64 37.93 9 Bushehr 1.15 1.26 0.913 65.79 39.19 10 Kerman 4.14 4.64 0.892 69.93 43.83 11 Gilan 4.68 6.05 0.773 74.61 49.88 12 Khorasan 8.76 12.71 0.689 83.37 62.59 13 11am 0.56 0.84 0.667 83.93 63.43 14 E. Azerbayjan 7.31 11.14 0.656 91.24 74.57 15 Hormozgan 1.58 2.43 0.650 92.82 77.00 16 Chaharmahal 0.82 1.30 0.631 93.64 78.30 17 Bakhtaran 1.58 3.05 0.518 95.22 .81.35 18 W. Azerbayjan 1.68 4.97 0.338 96.90 86.32 19 Lorestan 0.92 2.83 0.325 97.82 89.15 20 Kordestan 0.77 3.55 0.217 98.59 92.70 21 Kohgliuyeh 0.24 1.23 0.195 98.83 93.93 22 Sistan 0.64 3.31 0.193 99.47 97.24 23 Zanlan 0.53 2.76 9.192 ]99.99 199.99 88 Figure 4.6 Housing Units with Eiectricity, Rurai Ostan 1976 C 'QOOOIQO O l as eooo Ooececoleeoa 0 .0000 00 o c 0 IO. .00 8 O 00 0000000000. .60 00.00.0000 0‘... ‘0. .0... O O ELECTRICITY “HUI .30 —¢o $20 -30 Bio -20 E5 -10 El° -5 II o O o O O O u o 0‘ e a 3 D n 0 I o " ll 0 I 9 o o C e ' e .. O I a 60 o = 0 ° 2 .. R 0 I 0 1| 0 0 0 0 O 0 : Gxni Index - 34.793 4° 60 8° 100 1 81:1: Electricity 89 Table 4.12 Housing Unite with Electricity, Urban Shahrestan 1966 “XZJ’ZJ N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Yasui 23 $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- Units/ Hous. Advan- lative lative Elect. Units tage of of Shahrestan (1) (2) (1)/(2) (1) (2) Ahvaz 3.65 2.85 1.281 3.65 2.85 Tehran 50.77 45.06 1.128 54.42 47.91 Shiraz 4.92 4.54 1.084 59.34 52.45 Sari 0.78 0.75 1.040 60.12 53.20 Rasht 1.83 1.76 1.039 61.95 54.96 Bushehr 0.62 0.60 1.033 62.57 55.56 Mashhad 6.34 6.48 0.978 68.91 62.04 Khorramabad 0.72 0.78 0.923 69.63 62.82 llam 0.24 0.26 0.923 69.87 63.08 Esfahan 8.69 9.50 0.915 78.56 72.58 Sanandaj 0.80 0.88 0.909 79.36 73.46 Bakhtaran 2.40 2.73 0.879 81.76 76.19 Hamadan 2.04 2.34 0.872 83.80 78.53 Tabriz 7.80 9.20 0.848 91.60 87.73 Urmla 1.60 1.95 0.820 93.20 89.68 Yazd 2.19 2.96 0.740 95.39 92.64 Semnan 0.65 0.89 0.730 96.04 93.53 Kerman 1.63 2.34 0.696 97.67 95.87 Zahedan 0.47 0.69 0.681 98.14 96.56 Zanjan 1.12 1.66 0.675 99.26 98.22 Shahrkord 0.42 0.99 0.424 99.68 99.21 Bandar Abbas 0.32 0.76 0.421 100.0 99.97 0'oQ____Q4Q2—____QJQQQ___—lQQ&QQ__lQQAQQ 90 Figure 4.7 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Shahrestan 1966 ELECTRICITY “HUI .35 -95 E35 -as 5335 -es E15 ~35 [:]s 1-15 uajun lug-no. Iowa; 1 1|. 0000.60.00.0000000000000000000. Gin; Index - 8.678 ooooeoeeoooooeeooeeoo09009099ooooeeoeeooooeeeeeeeoe 0 30 40 60 IO 1 I Mich [lectrtctty 91 Table 4.13 Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Shahrestan 1966 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Units/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage of of Wm (11 (2) (Li/(2) (1) (21 1 Ahvaz 8.60 2.53 3.399 8.60 2.53 2 Tehran 6.00 2.01 2.985 14.60 4.54 3 Semnan 1.40 0.54 2.592 16.00 5.08 4 Yazd 11.78 4.74 2.485 27.78 9.82 5 Esfahan 15.20 6.58 2.310 42.98 16.40 6 Mashhad 10.69 7.83 1.365 53.67 24.23 7 Zahedan 1.50 1.14 1.316 55.17 25.37 8 Tabriz 10.46 8.22 1.272 65.63 33.59 9 Shahrkord 2.12 1.99 1.065 67.75 35.58 10 Shiraz 5.25 5.38 0.976 73.00 40.96 11 Kerman 3.41 3.85 0.886 76.41 44.81 12 Rasht 4.02 4.61 0.872 80.43 49.42 13 Bushehr 2.42 3.57 0.678 82.85 52.99 14 Sari 2.14 3.89 0.550 84.99 56.88 15 Khorramabad 4.20 7.73 0.543 89.19 64.61 16 Bandar Abbas 2.12 4.11 0.516 91.31 68.72 17 Urmla 1.68 4.00 0.420 92.99 72.72 18 Hamadan 3.37 8.83 0.382 96.36 81.55 19 Sanandaj 1.07 3.84 0.279 97.43 85.39 00 Bakhtaran 1.16 5.03 0.231 98.59 90.42 21 Zanjan 1.16 6.78 0.171 99.75 97.20 22 Yaqu 0.13 1.35 0.096 99.88 98.85 23 llam 0.12 1.45 0.083 100.00 100.00 ELECTRICITY mm) . . 92 Figure 4.8 Housing Units with Eiectricity, Rurai Shahrestan 1966 e .0... . CO... .. eee e . . ee 0 . . eeeeee eeeeee . . eeee e 0000 ‘ eeee ea eeee _ . eeee E 00 I C C... 0.. O... O .0... I... ee .00 fl . eeo oee 0 00 Q. eeee ee . 000 00 .0. eeee eee eeeeeee ' eee ee e eeee eeeee ee ea... I 12 - 16 , . ' . . " 0 e e eeeee - 1 2 e a e. 1.... .,. .:.:.:.o.o.o.o. . .0... [Es E3 E10 200 O f—7 1 I lfi 300 e e e e e e 00 o N 0 ~ : o n 0 I e "'6. e ‘ Q o e 6 e : e a Q a Q. 0 c e - I p n e 0 e 80 o e 0 e e I 3 Gini Index - 43.201 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 2. 0| ‘0 I. 10 1 Mitt Electricity 93 Table 4.14 Housing Units with Electricity, Urban Shahrestan 1976 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Unlts/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage of of fi;__§flgh59§tan (11, (2) (111(2) (1) (2) 1 Ahvaz 3.16 3.06 1.927 3.16 3.06 2 Esfahan 9.43 8.82 1.069 12.59 11.88 3 Tehran 48.74 46.21 1.055 61.33 58.09 4 Shiraz 4.51 4.30 1.042 65.84 62.42 5 Rasht 1.79 1.80 1.006 67.63 64.20 6 Semnan 0.62 0.62 1.000 68.25 64.82 7 Yazd 2.03 2.12 0.957 70.28 66.94 8 Hamadan 2.14 2.25 0.951 72.42 69.19 9 Urmla 1.66 1.76 0.943 74.08 70.95 10 Mashhad 7.20 7.65 0.941 81.28 78.60 11 Kerman 1.84 2.02 0.911 83.12 80.62 12 Bushehr 0.85 0.94 0.904 83.97 81.56 13 Sanandaj 0.84 0.93 0.903 84.81 82.49 14 Tabriz 7.28 8.10 0.899 92.09 90.59 15 llam 0.26 0.29 0.896 92.35 90.88 16 Bakhtaran 2.63 2.94 0.894 94.98 93.82 17 Zanjan 0.99 1.12 0.884 95.97 94.94 18 Sari 0.78 0.91 0.857 96.76 95.85 19 Khorramabad 0.84 1.03 0.815 97.59 96.88 20 Bandar Abbas 0 .88 1 .09 0 .807 98 . 47 97 .97 £21 Shahrkord 0.80 1.00 0.800 99.27 98.97 122 Zahedan 0.70 0.98 0.714 99.97 99.95 £§§3 Yasui 0.03 0.05 9.999 199.99 ””199.99. 94 Figure 4.9 Housing Units with Eiectricity, Urban Shahrestan 1976 0.0 00.. 0.00000. 0.0 e e e e e O C e I 0 l C e Gini Index - 3.954 00.00....0...0.000... I" m 0.: I A. 0”. w. I .. uuu nu. nee a e 2 I 8". II""" INC. \1 ¥ 0"."00 OHOHOO MU nu I... 000000! H eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee OI" OONIHOHOI x '0'... t . .0. 0 o 0 0 I oceee e .- own. we Y i I .e e 2 I I e one" e T- 9 5 5 5 s a done» 3932.. :9:- «w. Mu .8 .u a. 7..8 0 vi . . - . . on U 5 5 5 100 00.00.... 40 l Mich liectricity 00000.... 0.0.0.000... 95 Table 4.15 Housing Units with Electricity, Rural Shahrestan 1976 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu-A $ Cumu- A Units/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage of of E;__§h§hgg§1§n (11 (2) (1)/(2) (11, (2) 1 Semnan 1.87 0.52 3.596 1.87 0.52 2 Tehran 7.57 2.25 3.364 9.44 2.77 3 Esfahan 13.15 4.49 2.929 22.59 7.26 4 Yazd 3.55 1.73 2.052 26.14 8.99 5 Kerman 5.16 2.59 1.992 31.30 11.58 6 Ahvaz 6.00 3.15 1.905 37.30 14.73 7 Shiraz 8.04 4.33 1.857 45.34 19.06 8 Sari 7.17 4.80 1.494 52.51 23.86 9 Tabriz 11.15 8.55 1.304 63.66 32.41 10 Hamadan 10.69 10.51 1.017 74.35 42.92 11 Shahrkord 2.40 2.62 0.916 76.75 45.54 12 Mashhad 7.42 9.29 0.799 84.17 54.83 13 Bushehr 2.70 3.82 0.707 86.87 58.65 14 Rasht 3.47 5.18 0.670 90.34 63.83 15 Bandar Abbas 1.71 3.43 0.498 92.05 67.26 16 llam 0.88 1.99 0.442 92.93 69.25 17 Zahedan 0.31 0.74 0.419 93.24 59.99 18 Urmla 1.89 4.55 0.415 95.13 74.54 19 Bakhtaran 1.60 5.13 0.312 96.73 79.67 20 Khorramabad 2.10 7.92 0.265 98.83 87.59 21 Yaqu 0.38 1.98 0.192 99.21 89.57 22 Sanandaj 0.58 4.09 0.142 99.79 93.66 23 Zanian 0.21 6.34 0.033 100.00 100.00 96 Figure 4.10 Housing Units with Electricity, Rurai Shahrestan 1976 ELECTRICITY IXHU) ‘ " .45 .80 E35 -45 5320 -35 $10 -2o Bo ~10 l l l I ‘_—1 III e e e . e e II 0 '0 e e : . n e C e I. u . ‘ 0 o e C e ‘ e h a 0 a II e c e e a p 0 fl 0 0 e 20 o e . e e I : Gini Index - 43.471 eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee II II 60 II 10 1 Mich Electticity 97 with electricity in urban ostan in 1976, Figure 4.5, depicts almost the same patterns as the previous map. The lowest value has increased from 30$ to about 60$ and the highest value from 80$ to about 100$, all in all, representing higher levels of improvement in urban ostan up to 1976. in 1966, the highest percentage of the housing units with electricity in the rural ostan areas was recorded for Yazd, which is located next to the great lranlan desert. This ostan does not depend on agriculture. As mentioned before, it is one of the ostans highly specialized in textile and carpet weaving industries. The presence of these types of industry and electricity might have been related to each other. The availability of one of these may encourage development of the other. This ostan was followed by Khuzestan where the biggest dam I n the country was built. Therefore, electricity was also provided to the rural areas. Except for the four ostans of Yazd, Khuzestan, Esfahan, and Tehran, the other nineteen ostans supplied electricity to a very small proportion of their housing units of the rural sector. in some ostans, this pr0portion hardly reached 1$. The examples of this are four ostans, all located in the west, llam with 0.46$, Zanjan 0.47$, Kordestan 0.81$ and Kohgliuyeh 0.91$. Comparing the two maps in Figure 4.4 and 4.6, ln.the later period still ostans such as Yazd, Esfahan and Semnan were the front runners. The western parts of the rural areas in Semnan may have been occupied by people who ccmute to work in the city of Tehran. in 1976, six ostans were included in the lowest class, with Only 5$ of their housing units in the rural areas having electricity. All of these ostans, except one, were located in the west. Sistan-Baluchestan ostan, located in the far southeast, was a new member 98 of this group. The maximum percentages having electricity in rural sector increased from only 12$ to about 40$ in 1976. The Gini index was somewhat smaller in 1976, but the regional gap still was one of the highest values. At urban shahrestan scale in 1966, in Ahvaz shahrestan which is located in Khuzestan, about 94$ of the housing units were supplied with electricity. This may be compared with only about 6$ in Yaqu shahrestan, located in the southern Zagros areas. The range on the map of Figure 4.7 is the largest observed in terms of availability of electricity, yet the Gini coefficient is very small. This is because electricity was provided to a smaller number of the housing units in the areas where the total number of the houses were smaller and, vice versa. in the areas with a larger proportion of housing units, electricity was more available. in 1976, some shahrestans such as Tehran, Shiruz, and Ahvaz reached to a level where more than 95$ of their housing units had electricity. At the same time, no shahrestan under study had less than 60$ of its houses with electricity. The Gini coefficient at this scale was the second lowest calculated for this measure of development. in 1966, at rural shahrestan, again Ahvaz had the highest Percentage of about 12$ of its housing units with electricity. The Other shahrestans, including Tehran, with higher rates ofeiectriclty are located in the central parts of the country. Almost all of the shahrestans, eighteen of them, with lower percentages are located in the peripheral parts of the country. The Gini value at this level is the highest computed and yet it increased from 43.201 in 1966 to 43.471 in 1976. This is the only increase ever recorded for the housing units 99 with electricity. Although the increase is minimal, it exposes the widening gap at rural shahrestan from 1966 to 1976. Finally, Figures 4.11 and 4.12 exhibit housing units with electricity in the 23 cities that are the capital cities of the shahrestans and ostans. lilth an exception of Bandar Abbas, located on the Strait of Hormoz, where 30$ of the housing units had electricity in 1966, all of the other cities under study provided electricity to more than 50$ of their houses. in 1966, the highest percentage was found for the city of Ahvaz with 94$, which was followed by the city of Tehran with 83$. The smai ier Gini ratio of 6.079 shows the resemblance of these cities to each other. Furthermore, a very low Gini value of 3.399 clearly reveals that in 1976, there was not much difference anong those cities. This value was the smallest computed for all the variables at all scales and 1'ime periods. in 1976 only two cities llam and Zahedan provided 60$ and 66$ of their houses with electricity, which were the lowest percentages recorded. in the same period in the city of Bandar Abbas about 76$ of the houses had access to electricity. Eight cities furnished electricity to more than 80$ and twelve cities to more than 90$ of the l ivlng places, which can be considered as a measure of "haves". The C ity of Tehran_reached an all time high rate of 99$ which surpassed all The cities under investigation. Uniformity in distribution of electricity at shahr level is clearly \Iislble. Especially in 1976, the Lorenz curve is drawn almost parallel 1‘0 the line of equal lty. This was, indeed, the characteristic of the Lu~ban areas at both ostan and shahrestan scales. They always had lower Gini values and coefficients of variation. As mentioned earlier, we are- 100 Table 4.16 Housing Units with Electricity, Shahr 1966 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Units/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage K (1) (2) (1)/(2) (1) (2) 1 Ahvaz 3.82 3.14 1.217 3.82 3.14 2 Shiaz 4.52 4.05 1.116 8.34 7.19 3 Tehran 52.38 49.37 1.071 61.23 56.56 4 Esfahan 7.71 7.65 1.008 68.94 64.21 5 Mashhad 6.89 6.98 0.987 75.83 71.19 6 Rasht 1.91 1.94 0.984 77.74 73.13 7 Bushehr 0.42 0.43 0.977 78.16 73.56 8 Sari 0.80 0.84 0.952 78.96 74.40 9 Khorranabad 0.70 0.74 0.946 79.66 75.14 1() Hamadan 1.77 1.88 0.941 81.43 77.02 1 1 llam 0.25 0.28 0.893 81.68 77.30 1 2 Sanandaj 0.85 0.97 0.876 82.53 78.27 1 3 Tabriz 7.42 8.62 0.861 89.95 86.89 1«4 Bakhataran 2.18 2.56 0.851 92.13 89.45 1 5 Sennan 0.62 0.75 0.827 92.75 90.20 1 6 Kerman 1.54 1.91 0.806 94.29 92.11 1‘7 Yazd 1.90 2.39 0.795 96.19 94.50 1 8 Zanjan 1.02 1.29 0.791 97.21 95.79 1 9 Urmla 1.68 2.16 0.778 98.89 97.95 20 Shahrekard 0.28 0.42 0.667 99.17 93.37 21 Zahedan 0.49 0.76 0.645 99.66 99.13 22 Bandar Abbas 0.34 0.84 0.405 100.00 99.97 5;; Iggyj 0.00 0.03 0.000 100.00 100-00 101 Figure 4.11 Housing Units with Electricity, Shahr 1966 0 O Housing Units With Electricity 0 200 P l I I III e e e 0 e e .0 e " e e 3" e n e ' e '- 0' e g e 2 0 ' 3 an. o e I II 9 O 5 e e- . H e ' 0 II e e e e e e I e 1 Uitb Electricity 102 Table 4.17 Housing Units with Electricity, Shahr 1976 R $ Hous. $ Tot. Coef. $ Cumu- $ Cumu- A Units/ Hous. Advan- lative lative N Elect. Units tage K (1) (21 (1)/(2) (i) (2) 1 Tehran 52.08 49.69 1.041 52.08 49.69 2 Shiraz 4.64 4.48 1.036 56.72 54.17 3 Ahvaz 3.36 3.28 1.024 60.08 57.45 4 Esfahan 7.81 7.73 1.010 67.89 65.18 5 Rasht 1.86 1.86 1.000 69.75‘ 67.04 6 Sari 0.84 0.84 1.000 70.59 67.88 7 Semnan 0.53 0.53 1.000 71.12 68.41 8 Bushehr 0.66 0.67 0.985 71.78 69.08 9 Hanadan 1.69 1.73 0.977 73.47 70.81 1() Mashhad 7.20 7.40 0.973 80.67 78.21 1 1 Kerman 1.75 1.80 0.972 82.42 80.01 1 2 Yazd 1.87 1.93 0.969 84.29 81.94 123 Shahrkord 0.42 0.44 0.954 84.71 82.38 14 Urmla 1.80 1.92 0.937 86.51 84.30 1 5 Sanandaj 0.87 0.95 0.916 87.38 85.25 1 6 Tabriz 6.59 7.29 0.904 93.97 92.54 1'7 Bkhtaran 2.45 2.74 0.894 96.42 95.28 1 8 Zanjan 1.07 1.22 0.877 97.49 96.50 1 9 Korranabad 0.76 0.87 0.873 98.25 97.37 20 Bandar Abbas 0.95 1 .18 0.805 99.20 98.55 21 Zahedan 0.75 1.07 0.701 99.95 99.62 22 Yaqu 0.04 0.06 0.667 99.99 99.68 23 llam 0.01 0.32, 0.031 .100.00 100.00 103 Figure 4.12 Housing Units with Eiectricity, Shahr 1976 fédo Housing Units with Electricity 0 200 IOORH ¥ [__3 I I l ‘——1 III e . e e e 0 II o N 0 ~ 3 e n e I e ”'60 o I 0 e e g e p e 3 0 a CI 0 = e - 3 .- fl 0 0 e 20 e e . e e e I e 61:11 Index I 3.399 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee I II 90 60 II ! Hith liectticity 104 actually comparing entities that have been alike in nature within the urbanized sector of the society. Lack of significant spatial inequality in rural lran is probably due to the fact that these areas share the same problem. With few exceptions, this common problem has perhaps been the general poverty and its omnipresence in the rural areas all over the country. To gain an insight into the differences that existed at all scales between urban and rural sectors, the Gini values of the rural areas were divided by those of urban areas. This ratio may be used as a yardstick of the gap between the twc sectors. Table 4.18 draws attention to the existence of the gap and its changes from 1966 to 1976. When the ratio is very close to the unity, the two sectors must be very similar in regard to geographical inequal lty and the higher the ratio, the wider the gap. Two distinctive viewpoints can be generalized from Table 4.18. First, the differences in the spatial disparity of the urban and rural areas are higher at Shahrestan than ostan scale. Second, accepting the above ratio as a measure ct geographical inequality, for both scales of analysis, the degree and magnitude of the gap has widened from 1966 to 1976. The only exception was population employed in the manufacturing sector. At shahrestan level, the ratio was slightly smaller in 1976 than the previous period. At ostan scale, in 1976 this ratio was reduced to 1.6 from 2.1. This may show that the gap between urban-rural sectors at ostan levels in terms of employment in manufacturing was narrowing. 105 Table 4.18 Ratios Between the Gini Values of Rural and Urban Areas at Ostan and Shahrestan Levels 1966 1976 Variable Ostan Shahrestan Ostan Shahrestan Rural/ Rural/Urban Rural/ Rural/Urban .Urban Urban. Employed in Manufacturing 2.1 2.7 1.6 2.5 Employed by Government 1.2 2.3 1.8 2.8 Literate Population 1.1 1.7 1.5 2.3 With University Degree 0.75 1.3 0.85 1.3 Housing Units/ Electricity 3.1 5.0 8.4 11.0 Regarding the first viewpoint, it is reasonable to have higher Gini values at local levels such as shahrestan compared to ostan. On one hand, Gini ratios have an inverse relationship with the size of the areal units and, on the other hand, at shahrestan scale we unmask differences and variations that have been averaged at ostan scale. With respect to the second viewpoint, the ratios are important indicators of the widening gap when rural areas are compared to urban areas. in the rural areas in 1966, for example, the Gini coefficient of access to electricity was more than three times larger than urban areas, and at rural shahrestan it was five times larger. These were increased to eight and eleven times in 1976, respectively. 106 Table 4.19 Ratios Between the Gini Values of 1966 and 1976 for Urban and Rural Areas of Ostan and Shahrestan Variables Urban Ostan Rural Ostan Shahrestan Shahrestan Jilm Rm 66l16 66116 66/76 66/76, Employed in 0.71 0.94 0.96 1.02 Manufacturing Employed be 1.45 0.94 1.04 0.84 Government Literate Population 1.76 1.36 1.55 1.13 Pcp. with Univ Degree 1.29 1.12 1.15 1.12 Housing Units/ 2.81 1.04 2.19 0.99 419.ng LI 'Tne above table contains the ratios that are derived from dividing the Gini coefficients recorded for 1966 by those of 1976 for urban and rural areas of ostan and shahrestan. A ratio of unity indicates no change in the spatial inequality of the subunits from 1966 to 1976. A ratio of more than one can be treated as a measure of convergence and ratio of less than one as indication of divergence. As can be seen from Table 4.19, convergence has been more frequent than divergence from 1966 to 1976 and it is recorded more for the urban areas of both ostan and shahrestan. The same procedures were applied to the coefficients of variation and lndices of dissimilarity. in both cases, the higher ratios, convergence, were found for urban sector. The gap between urban and rural areas has increased since 1966. Figure 4.13 provides a visual presentation of the percentages of the housing units with electricity for urban and rural sectors of ostan and shahrestan in 1966 and 1976. The mean values of this variable have increased for both scales of analysis and time periods whicfli indicates 107 c... 3. Cr..— :5..— :....2 * .5531 0 _...:1 d C—Xt: . :1; .2 0 2.. z+_o_L+oo_m ;+_. m+_== mc_m=oz +=oucoa n... otsm.u Percent Housing Units With Electricity 108 improvement in the supply of electricity to the housing units in the country. The variance for urban areas has decreased sharply, suggesting that urban areas became more similar to each other and moved upward. The rural areas moved upward too, but they became more dissimilar. For example, at shahrestan level, availability of electricity hardly reached to 15$ in 1966, in the later period at the same scale the range was about 1-60$. The Gini coefficients, Figures 4.14-4.18, illustrate that in most of the cases there has been convergence for both urban a5*well as rural areas. Yet, the gap, represented by the area and distance between the lines Joining the values, has widened. This argument is best shown by the percentage of population employed by government, percentageiof literate population, and percentage of housing units with electricity. However, exceptions were the percentage of population employed in manufacturing and percentage of population with university degree. For these two variables, the urban and rural sectors became closer to one another. Table 4.20 index of Dissimilarity Between Urban and Rural Areas Variables 1966 .1976 1966 .1916 Employment in 28.03 36.14 44.83 48.37 Manufacturing Employment by 38.81 33.35 48.17 49.85 Government Literate POpulation 35.58 39.04 48.02 50.45 Population with 54.89 43.05 66.16 66.25 University Degree Housing Units/ 25.32 27.17 46.22 47.65 Jennie”; 109 Table 4.20 presents the indices of dissimilarity of the five variables between urban and rural areas at ostan and shahrestan levels of analysis for 1966 and 1976. A comparison of these indices for the two time periods shows that all but two have increased between 1966 and 1976. The two exceptions were employment in the public sector and population with university degree at ostan level. For the first variable, it is possible that either the government slowed down employment in the urban areas and hired people in the rural areas or Just sent government personnel to the countryside. The second variable, population with university degree, had the largest lndices of dissimilarity for both scales of analysis and time periods. The index of dissimilarity of this variable was smaller in 1976, indicating that the two sectors became similar to each other in contrast to 1966. Yet, this value was the highest compared to the lndices of other variables in 1976. Eight of the lndices increased between 1966 and 1976. This confirms that the two sectors were less similar in the later period. Thus, it can be inferred that the spatial gap between urban and rural areas has widened. it is concluded that when the variation of the measures of development studied within the more uniform spatial subdivisions (i.e., urban, rural or shahr alone), the spatial gaps were mostly smaller in the later period. Yet, when we compare different entities (i.e., rural to urban), the differences between the two have increased dranatical ly. For some cases it has almost tripled. This finding may indicate the fact that the variation of the measures within areas having the same characteristics are narrowing, which are indicators of convergence. When unique areas are matched to other totally separate and unique 110 dmuzm 'e'e'e' 050w 2(hwwmI(Im 08p 050p 2(hmo 08—. 3 OF .I IIIIIIIIIIII I. III \ I1 III \ ll. r0“ I! \I II .1. \ .1 I V O" :Ill‘olltollo‘ Ilia-I. II. ‘‘‘‘‘ III III so. TI lllllllllllllllll llllllll cl. g. on who. can one. co+moczmzm can cm+mo c. m:_L:+ooE=:o: c. eo>o_q2m to mou_oc_ .c.@ a... oL=m_e A. O? .0“ .00 Gini Index Of Employed In Manufacturing 111 Hausa ''''''' 2(hm0 000p ONO, 2(hwWII(Im 08w 050p Ar OF .I lllllllllllll In. . ON II .Il.\. .‘I I". \. c. On .1111: fioe : o... one. use coo— cm+moccmzm can co+mo c. +c¢Ecco>oc >9 m_.e oL=m_u ua>o_a2m .0 mou_ac_ _:_o Gini Index Of Employed By Government 112 Hmhgm 'e'e'e' can»: III .II. Chap 2(hmeI(Iw O8. Ohfip 2(hwo 0.: 01:11:11.: I '- 5 III, .I I. .v 0' I I I, r eeeee r. l o, I I I I, I ''''''''''''''''''' I‘ a, I It! I. " allo" . ON son 3. 00 e a o>o_ cam oom— cm+moccmcm new eo+mo :— co_+m_=aom o+cuo+_4 *o moo—cc. _c_m a_.a ocam.a .Op .0“ .00 Gini Index Of Literate Population 113 amusm ''''''' can»: .I .I ll OAO— 2(hwm¢I+_mtm>_:: ;+_3 co_+o_:aom *0 moo—vs. _c_¢ p_.e ot=m_m :ON Gini Index Of Population With Univercity Degree 114 Hausa 'c'.-.‘ 050— ihmmmzsiw 08. as... 2(hm0 003p .06 i 0' who. can coo— 1‘ ‘ .l/ =m+motgogm new =m+mo c. >+_u_t+uo_u ;+_: m+_== mc_m=oz .o moo_u=_ _c_o m_.v otam.i a i: N '- Glnl Index Of Housing Units With Electricity A r O V foo 115 areas, for example urban versus rural areas, it discloses a widening gap or divergence of development between the tw0 different sectors. This finding supports general research on regional development (Myrdai 1957, Stohr 1974, Slater 1975, and Smith 1982). It also verifies conclusions obtained by studies on Iran (Mehran 1975, Pesaran and Gahvary i978, Parvln and Zamani 1979, Kazeml 1980, Keddie 1981, Abrahanlan 1982, and Halliday 1983). W In this section an attempt will be made to identify changes in the correlation coefflcent of the measures of development when the scales of analysis and time periods are changed. This ls carried out to test the hypothesis that by changing the scale of analysis from ostan to shahrestan and shahr, the correlation coefficients among the selected variables decrease in 1966 and 1976. The Spearman correlation coefficients of the variables are shown in Tables 4.21-4.%. in these tables the confidence levels are shown in the parentheses. First, the correlation coefficients of different scales of analysis will be compared to each other, then they will be contrasted during the two time periods. In order to distinguish the more important and probably the more meaningful associations among the variables at each scale of analysis, a correlation coefficient of 1.5 with a confidence level of .01 will be used. Therefore, the patterns of the areal association will be dealt with if the correlation coefficients were equal or greater than this arbitrary limit. The areal associations were general iy weaker at the ostan scale of analysis in comparison with those of shahrestan in i966. in Table 4.21 .p;m_t toga: any cw _m:omewu on» o>oam cmpmw_ use moose _mL:L com use 116 HN.¢ opnmh m_nmu mg“ co c_e: uco_ Lozofi ocp cw _mcommwo one sopon coumwp min moose cant: go» mueowowemooo mgh nopoz« Amoe.v Amme.v ANHo.V AmoH.V Amme.v Aseo.v - sees. mmos.- ass“. Rmsm.- wees. Nmmc.- cmtgmc op ma_e _m>mth ARV Amse.v Aemm.v Aneo.v Asmo.v Amoo.v Aemm.v HNNH.- - moss. mess. Moon. mice. mmm~.- emt< sussm mecmpao atom s Ase Amse.v Amms.v Ammo.v Anoo.v Amnm.v Afimm.v Nmm~.- owwm. - “mom. ommm. owmm. memo. sowa_tcum_o not; mswcs mcwmso: “my Aime.v AHNN.V AeNH.v Aeoo.v Asmo.v Amee.v mmtmwo mHmH.- emmm. swam. - “mom. mane. Nwofi.- sswmtm>wcs gov; cocsm_=aoa Ase Ames.v flame.v Asoo.v Ammo.v Aeoo.v Ammm.v eesm.- Nome. mes“. “mac. - mmmm. owes. accompsgoa montages s Amv Asos.v AHNO.V Aomo.v AeoH.V Awmm.v Awoo.v wafi. Nsmm. “com. «com. momm. - mamm.- ccmECLm>ow s3 emso_aso s Amy Aomm.v Ameo.v Anmo.v Akom.v Amoc.v Asmm.v emso.- NmNe.- meme. Hemo.- mmem. oomfi.- - acttsoumtscmz cw umso_a2o s.AHV ARV Ame Amv Ase Ame Ame Ase it mmam Ammmogpcogma one cw czo;m min mpo>oo mocmowewcmwmv mama .15me we mmmL< Exam tcm coax: Low mpcmw0ww$mou cowum—mciou 117 .ugmwc some: on“ cw pmcome_n on» m>oam woumwp mew mecca Feta; toe use o_nmu asp co c_e; pew. Logo. on» :_ _m:ommwo on» zo_on noomw_ use mecca cent: com mpcmwoweeooo one umpozs AomH.v Amms.v Aosm.v “NNH.V imme.v Anmn.v - Noam. NN@N.- ommo.- HNmN.- mmes. meno. catcme 0o we_c _m>MLH ARV AmHN.V Aoom.v Asmo.v Amfio.v Amoo.v Aomo.v meow. - seem. mace. “Hem. some. msom.- mmtq sussm animuso stem e Rev Ammm.v ANMN.V Amoo.v Asoo.v Aoko.v Amfio.v emms.- ammo. - comm. moms. wam. oeom.- speawtsum_o sci: mote: sewage: Amy Amso.v Aeoo.o Ammm.v Asoo.v AoNo.v Asso.v magmas same. wmmm. Nomma - swam. omwm. emom.- sswmtm>_:= est; cowom_=aoa Aev Amem.v Ammm.v Aeoo.v Amws.v Aeoo.v Asso.v memo.- mmHH.- comm. mmms. - Omwm. comm.- coism_=qoe montages s Ame Aomo.v Amoo.v Ammi.v Amoo.v AHmH.V Asoo.v mmom. emfio. comm. ammo. memm. - Nomn.- ccmECLw>oo an case—ago s Ame Amem.v AmeH.V Asoo.v Ameu.v Amoo.v Amme.v seso. mesm.- mmee. mega. manm. memo.- - m=_t=sumt=cmz cc umso_a2o s AHV ARV Ace Amy Ase Amy Ame Ase moam Ammmmzucocma on“ cw czocm wee m_m>o4 mocmowmwcmwmv momfi «:mumwtgmsm co memc< _etzz ocm cans: so» mucmwowmeoou cowum_mctou NN.¢ o_neh 118 Ammm.s Amss.v isms.v isms.s Asss.v isms.v ss.s smmm. smsm.- Rams. Hsmm.- msss. ssss.- smasa» as asap _a>aam Ass isms.v isms.s Amss.v Asss.s Amss.s ss.s sass. sass. smss. ssss. sssm.- mats massm assasss sass m Ass isms.v Amss.v Asmm.v AHsH.V ss.H smsm. smmm. mass. NmHm.- assasasaa_s ss_z mass: msmmsss Ass Amss.s isms.v AsmH.v aaamas ss.s ssmm. siss. sasm.- mammaa>mss sass ssssa_sssm Ass isms.s AsmH.v ss.s smsm. HHNm.- ssisa_ssss aaaaasss m Ass Asss.v ss.s msss.- asassaasss ms samspssm m Ass oo.~ m:_csposmscsz cm omxo_s5m & AHV Ame Ass Ass Ass Ass Ass Ass mmss Ammmmgucotss asp cm :zosm mes mpo>ms mocsowewcmwmv owmfi cw Lzmzm Low mucmwurrvmou :prmprLOU mm.¢ oFgmh 119 .ugmmt Loss: ecu cm Pecomswo one m>oas oopm__ mic memes Fags; com ocs m_ssu ago we cps: awoF Logo” one cm ~scomswo on» zo_oa omumw— mes memes sang: to» mucmmuwmwooo och umpoza Amssos Amss.v Assm.v Asss.s isms.s Asmm.s - msms. mssm.- ssma. msss.- mass. asks. smasas as asim sasaam Ass Amss.v Amss.s Amms.v Asss.v Asss.s Amms.v smss.- - msms. smsm. msmm. “mks. sass.- aaas msssm assasss sass s Ass Amss.v Amss.s ANHH.V Asss.v Amsm.v Assm.s sssm.- mass. - msmm. msss. mmss.- asss.- msaasasaa_s sass amiss mscmssz Ass isms.s Amss.s Asss.s Asss.s Asss.v Asma.s aaamas smsH.- sass. mass. - mmsm. ssmm. mssm.- ma_maa>mss sci; sassa_ssss Ass isms.s Amss.v Asss.s Asss.v Asss.s Ast.s msms.- mHmN. msmm. sass. - ssmm. msmH.- ssasa_ssss asaaaa_s m Ass isms.s Amss.s Asss.v Amss.s isms.v Amss.s smms. mNNs. Nsmm. mNHs. ssss. - mess.- ssaEsaasss ms sams_sss m Ass Ammm.s Amsm.s Asss.v Ammm.s Ammo.s Asmm.s msms.- m~m~.- smmm. sssH. smmm. Nsmm.- - ms_assaacssaz sm sassssss m Ass ARV Ass Ass Ass Ass Ass Ass .msssssm<> Amommzucmcss «no cw axons mes mFo>ws mocsowmmcmmmv osmfl assume co msmc< pscsm ocs cans: to» mucmwo_mmmou compspmtgou em.¢ opamh 120 .u;m_c Loss: on» cw Pacomswo ecu o>oas oopmwp mes memes Fees; to» was w_ssu ago we m_s; Hemp Lm3o_ on» cm _scomsmu ecu zopma cosmWF was memes smai: Low mpcmmomewmoo age ”ouoza Amss.s Amms.s ANsN.s Ammm.v isms.s imam.s - sass. smss.- mass. msms.- mess. Nsms.- smasam as asap Pa>aam Ans Amsm.s isms.s Amss.s Asss.s Asss.s Amos.s smss. - mass. smss. ssmm. smsm. mmss.- aaam msssm assasss sass m Ass AmNH.V isms.v Asss.s Asss.s Asss.v Asmm.s mssm.- Hmms. - ssms. smmm. sass.- smss. masaaasaa_s ss_z mamas mssasss Ass Asmm.v Asss.v Asss.v Asss.v Asss.v “ass.v aaamas mssm. sass. mass. - sssm. swam. Hmsm.- ma_aaa>sss saw; sassapssss Ass Amms.v isms.s Amss.s isms.s Amss.s Asms.s swam.- mmsm. swam. smms. - Hess. moms.- sssaasssss aaaaasss m Ass Asss.s Asss.v Amss.s Amss.v Amss.v Asss.s smss. mass. moms. mass. ssmm. - smmm.- asassaa>ss ms sams_sss m Ass Ammm.s isms.v Asss.v Aims.s Amms.s Amss.v msss.- Nsms. mass. Hmss. mssm. smms. - mamasssamssa: sm samsPsEM m AH” Ans Ass Ass Ass Ame Ass Ass massssm<> Amomosocmtss mg» cm cZOIm mes m_m>ms mocsomwmcmmmv mm.e opens mmmfi tcmpmmt—cmcm $0 mmmL< FmLzm 9:. cont: Low mwcmwuwurwwou :OwwmmeLou 121 Amss.s isms.v Asss.s Assm.v isms.s isms.s ss.s mmmm. mmms.- sass. mssN.- mass. smmm.- saasam as assm _a>aam Ame isms.s Amss.s isms.s Amss.s Asss.s ss.s Hsms. sass. sass. sass. assm.- aaa< mamas as_mass sass m Ass Asss.s Asss.v Ammm.s Asks.s ss.s isms. mass. miss.- ssms.- ma_asasaa_s spa; masss mssass: Ass Asss.v isms.s Amms.s aaamas ss.s mmss. mass. smms.- masmaassss sac: ss_sa_ssss Ass Amss.s Amss.s ss.s mmmm. ssmm.- sssaa_ssss asaaasss m Ass Asss.v ss.H ssss.- ssaEsaasss ms sams_sss m Ass oo.H mcmcsuoswscsz :_ uoxopssm & AHV Ass Ass Ass Ass Ass Ass Ass mossssmms Ammmmzucmtss as» as czogm mes mFm>ms mocsommwcmmmv sums as asasm asm asasasasass ss_sa_aaass mm.¢ o_nmb 122 only six correlation coefficients were strong. 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