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PROPER NAMES:

RIGID DESIGNATION AND THE CAUSAL THEORY

By

Robert M. Steinman

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ABSTRACT

PROPER NAMES:
RIGID DESIGNATION AND THE CAUSAL THEORY

By

Robert M. Steinman

In this essay an attempt is made to clarify and resolve some of the issues concerning proper names that have arisen as a result of Saul Kripke's now famous work, Naming and Necessity. More specifically, the main focus of attention will be the issues that arise in connection with Kripke's thesis that proper names are rigid designators and his thesis that proper names refer to their bearers in virtue of some appropriate causal connection.

In chapter one I give a formally precise and rigorous account of Kripke's notion of a rigid designator by adopting the following definition. Where α is any name or description, to say that α is rigid is to say that the following condition holds:

$$(A) \quad \Box\{E!\alpha \supset (\exists x)[x=\alpha \ \& \ \Box(E!\alpha \supset x=\alpha)]\}$$

(A) is then used to formally express Kripke's claim that proper names, unlike definite descriptions, are rigid designators, that is that proper names designate the same thing in every possible world in which they designate at all. Finally, in light of my account of a rigid designator

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I attempt to explicate and defend what I take to be Kripke's modal argument against the description theory of proper names. In particular I show that the argument has been misunderstood by various philosophers, and that the attempt to dodge it by viewing names as definite descriptions that have widest possible scope in modal contexts fails.

Chapter two is devoted to critically examining a recent attempt by Michael Dummett to show that at least some proper names are on a par with definite descriptions in modal contexts, and hence are not rigid designators.

In chapter three I attempt to show that the thesis that proper names are rigid designators is not coextensive with the thesis that proper names refer to their bearers in virtue of some appropriate causal connection. To accomplish this I construct a fairly clear and intuitive case of reference involving a proper name where there is no causal connection between the referent and the speaker's utterance of the name. Hence, if successful, I show that a causal theory of proper names cannot provide a necessary condition for name reference.

For my parents: Morris and Theresa Steinman

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INTRODUCTION

Saul Kripke in his now famous work, Naming and Necessity, introduced a very new and radically different theory of proper names, namely, the "causal theory" of proper names. All it takes is a rough statement of the theory for it to be easily seen that it breaks radically with any of the more traditional views of proper names. Consider, for example, the following account of the theory given by Michael Devitt.

> The central idea of the causal theory of proper names is that our present uses of a name, say 'Aristotle' designate the famous Greek philosopher Aristotle, not in virtue of the various things we (rightly) believe true of him, but in virtue of a causal network stretching back from our uses to the first uses of the name to designate Aristotle. Our present uses of a name borrow their reference from earlier uses. It is this social mechanism that enables us all to designate the same thing by a name.[1]

According to a view of proper names that is Fregean in spirit the primary linguistic function of a name is to be a bearer of sense, whereas according to the causal view the primary linguistic function of a name is to refer to its bearer. The fact that names might have reference is only a

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[1]Michael Devitt, "Singular Terms," The Journal of Philosophy, LXXI (April 18, 1974), p. 184.

secondary consideration for the Fregean, just as the fact that names might have sense is only a secondary consideration for the causal theorist.[1] When we ask the question "How do proper names refer?", Frege and Russell tell us that proper names refer if and only if there is an object which satisfies their sense. According to the causal theory, however, a proper name refers if and only if there is an appropriate causal connection between uses of it and some object.

What we have here is two radically different ways of explaining how proper names refer to objects. The first says: via some definite description associated with the name that is its sense, and the other says: via causal connections with the object. It seems clear that the two views are not extensionally equivalent. Given some form of the sense or description theory of names it is possible that a proper name such as 'Santa Claus' could refer to some object via some associated definite description, even though the name bears no causal relation to the object referred to. Imagine that some jolly creature was discovered at the North Pole and that he fit perfectly all of the descriptions commonly associated with Santa Claus. According to a causal theorist like Donnellan the name 'Santa Claus'

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[1]It should be noted that some philosophers, Leonard Linsky for example, interpret Kripke as holding the view that names lack sense altogether. See, Names and Descriptions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 42-65.

would fail to refer to this individual since we know that Santa Claus is only a fictitious entity, and thus the appropriate historical or causal connection would not be available. According to the sense theorist, however, it is entirely possible that we might come to doubt that Santa Claus was fictitious, in which case the name would refer to the individual residing at the North Pole even though an appropriate causal connection was found to be missing. It is also possible, according to the causal theory, to have a case of successful name reference where a name is causally connected with some object in an appropriate manner, yet none of the descriptions associated with the name fit the object in question. Kripke's Gödel-Schmidt example is just such a case. Imagine that someone other than Gödel, say Schmidt, discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, and further suppose that the only definite description that we associate with the name 'Gödel' is 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. According to Kripke we refer to Gödel and not Schmidt when we use the name 'Gödel'. If the sense theory of proper names was correct, however, we would be referring to Schmidt and not Gödel when we used the name.

It also seems clear that any plausible view of proper names that is Fregean or Russellian in spirit would present a challenge for the causal theory of names. Devitt shows his awareness of this problem when he states that:

> The main problem in giving the semantics of proper names is that of explaining the nature of the link between name and object in virtue of which the former designates the latter. From Frege and Russell through to Strawson and Searle, the solution has been sought in the descriptions of the object that users of the name associate with the name. Saul Kripke has shown that all such "sense-theories" of names are mistaken. They are mistaken not merely in details but in fundamentals.[1]

One reason that Devitt and other supporters of the causal theory are so convinced that all such "sense-theories" of proper names are incorrect is that they implicitly accept Kripke's thesis that proper names, unlike definite descriptions, are rigid designators. If this thesis is correct, then Kripke has shown that proper names cannot be disguised or truncated definite descriptions. Roughly, what it means to say that a proper name, say 'George Washington', is rigid is that it denotes the same thing in every possible world where it designates anything. A definite description such as 'the first president of the United States', on the other hand, is not rigid since in some possible world the object denoted by it is other than George Washington. One argument attributed to Kripke to show that while names are rigid, definite descriptions are not, goes as follows.

> Consider any nonrigid singular term, say 'the author of the Iliad'. We may distinguish between the de dicto

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[1]Devitt, "Singular Terms," p. 183.

> and de re readings of any modal sentence in which such an expression occurs in subject position. In particular we may distinguish two readings of the sentence 'The author of the Iliad might have existed and not been the author of the Iliad'. On the de dicto reading the sentence is false; on the de re reading it is true. But if we replace the description 'the author of the Iliad' in both of its occurrences by the proper name 'Homer' to obtain the sentence 'Homer might have existed and not have been Homer', we do not find this sort of ambiguity. To say that the proposition that Homer exists but is not Homer is possibly true (de dicto) is tantamount to saying that Homer is such that it would be possible for him to exist while not being Homer (de re). The reason for this is precisely that the name 'Homer' is rigid, i.e., it denotes the same thing with respect to every possible world in which that thing exists. Thus it makes no difference whether the first occurrence of the name is taken as lying within (de dicto) or without (de re) the scope of the modal adverb 'might'. Its denotation remains the same.[1]

In chapter one I will attempt to give a precise and rigorous account of Kripke's notion of a 'rigid designator', then in light of that account explicate and defend what I take to be his modal argument against the description view of proper names. Chapter two will be devoted to critically examining a recent attempt by Michael Dummett to show that at least some proper names are on a par with definite descriptions in modal contexts, and hence are not rigid designators.

Traditionally, the description theory of names has had a slight advantage over any theory of names that has been Millian in character. According to Mill, the sole

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[1]Nathan Ucuzoglu Salmon, review of Names and Descriptions, by Leonard Linsky, in The Journal of Philosophy, LXXVI (August 1979), p. 437.

linguistic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. If, however, we were to ask a proponent of a strictly Millian view of names "How do names refer?" or "In virtue of what do names denote their bearers?", no answer would be forthcoming. The description theorist, on the other hand, has an intuitively plausible answer to these questions. Proper names have associated with them some definite description which is their sense, and it is in virtue of this sense or meaning that they refer to their bearers. Looked at from a slightly more epistemological rather than an ontological perspective, Kripke makes this point in the following manner.

> The basic problem for any view such as Mill's is how we can determine what the referent of a name, as used by a given speaker, is. According to the description view, the answer is clear. If 'Joe Doakes' is just short for 'the man who corrupted Hadleyburg', then whoever corrupted Hadleyburg uniquely is the referent of the name 'Joe Doakes'. However, if there is not such a descriptive content to the name, then how do people ever use names to refer to things at all? Well, they may be in a position to point to some things and thus determine the references of certain names ostensively. This was Russell's doctrine of acquaintance, which he thought the socalled genuine or proper names satisfied. But of course ordinary proper names refer to all sorts of people, like Walter Scott, to whom we can't possibly point. And our reference here seems to be determined by our knowledge of them. Whatever we know about them determines the referent of the name as the unique thing satisfying those properties. For example, if I use the name 'Napoleon', and someone asks, "To whom are you referring?", I will answer something like, "Napoleon was emperor of the French in the early part of the nineteenth century; he was eventually defeated at Waterloo.", thus giving a uniquely identifying description to determine the referent of

> the name. Frege and Russell, then, appear to give the natural account of how reference is determined here; Mill appears to give none.[1]

Now the causal theory of names, which is essentially Millian in nature, may be viewed in part as an attempt to answer this question left unanswered by Mill's theory. It is important here to notice that if Kripke is correct in holding that names, unlike definite descriptions, are rigid designators and consequently they cannot be disguised descriptions, then the Frege-Russell answer to the question "How do names refer?" is no longer viable. The thesis that proper names are rigid designators simply eliminates any possibility of a Frege-Russell solution to the problem of explaining proper name reference. Thus the causal theory of names might be viewed as an essential adjunct to the thesis that proper names are rigid designators if one is looking for a systematic and comprehensive theory of naming and reference. In chapter three, however, I will attempt to show that the thesis that proper names are rigid designators is not coextensive with the thesis that names refer to their bearers in virtue of some appropriate causal connection. To accomplish this I construct a fairly clear and intuitive case of reference involving a proper name (which may be intuitively seen to be a rigid designator in Kripke's sense

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[1]Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 27-28.

of the term) where there is no causal connection between the referent and the speaker's utterance of the name. Hence, I attempt to show that a causal theory of proper names cannot provide a necessary condition for reference, and that the question "How do names refer?" has yet to be answered by Kripke and his supporters.

CHAPTER ONE

KRIPKE'S MODAL ARGUMENT

Section One

In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke makes use of a battery of different arguments to show that a description view of proper names is false. One sort of argument that is used repeatedly by him is basically designed to show that proper names cannot be disguised definite descriptions since proper names are rigid designators and definite descriptions are not. The contrast between proper names and definite descriptions is drawn by Kripke in either of two ways. At times the distinction is made by noting the truth conditions of simple sentences with respect to counterfactual situations. Thus, for example, great emphasis is laid on the fact that the truth conditions with respect to counterfactual situations of a simple sentence with a proper name in the subject position are not the same as those for that same sentence with some co-designative definite description substituted for the name. This point is made explicit by Kripke in his preface to Naming and Necessity (cf. especially pp. 6-7).

At other times Kriple seems to argue for the difference between proper names and definite descriptions by noting that they display different behavior in modal contexts. Here the emphasis is on an explanation in terms of scope. It is pointed out that proper names in modal sentences display a feature with regard to their scope that is not displayed by definite descriptions. This latter manner of drawing the contrast between proper names and definite descriptions, however, has not been made explicit by Kripke, and thus has been the subject of a great deal of misunderstanding by both his critics and supporters alike. My primary concern will be with the second of these two methods, and what I would like to do in this essay is look at two different sorts of responses that have been made to Kripke's modal argument based on scope distinctions against the description view of proper names.

In section 7 of this chapter I will attempt to justify what may seem to some to be a glaring disparity, namely, my exclusive concern for Kripke's argument regarding scope rather than his argument regarding truth conditions with respect to counterfactual situations of simple sentences. In his preface to Naming and Necessity Kripke places great emphasis on the fact that his thesis that proper names are rigid designators can be intuitively argued for by simply considering counterfactual situations, and need not rely in any way on scope distinctions. His reason

for saying that is, I believe, clear enough. His remarks concerning scope have led many to misinterpret his thesis that names are rigid designators, and he would like, if possible, to circumvent the whole issue in order to prevent any further misunderstandings of his view. Thus Kripke goes to some length to show that not all of our intuitions concerning rigidity and names can be handled in terms of scope. He states that "no hypothesis about scope" can express his view when only simple, nonmodal sentences are considered. I will try to show, however, that in his effort to avoid any further misinterpretations of his view, Kripke overstates his case. In particular, I will try to show that the counterfactual truth condition's argument is equivalent to one about scope. Insofar that this can be accomplished, and provided that appropriate care is taken not to misinterpret his claims about rigidity for names in terms of scope, I see no reason why his view expressed as a doctrine concerning truth conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, requires extensive discussion.

One common misconception shared by all of the critics of Kripke's modal argument that I will consider in this essay concerns his doctrine of rigidity for proper names and the relation it has to scope. According to these philosophers Kripke's thesis that proper names are rigid designators reduces to the requirement that proper names are always to be read as having widest possible scope in the

modal sentences in which they occur. They also maintain that according to Kripke definite descriptions in modal contexts are always to be viewed as having narrowest possible scope. While all of the philosophers that I consider share this misconception of Kripke's thesis, not all of them respond in the same way to what they take to be his modal argument based on this misconception.

Some philosophers, Michael McKinsey and Brian Loar, for example, have attempted to dodge Kripke's modal argument with regard to scope by requiring that the definite descriptions that are substituted for proper names be given widest possible scope in modal contexts. I will show that although these philosophers are successful in their attempt to circumvent the modal arguments that they respectively consider, they succeed only in virtue of the fact that the modal argument each of them considers is not the argument that Kripke in fact gives. I will also argue that the modal argument with regard to scope that is used by Kripke in Naming and Necessity can simply not be dodged by the move to wide scope definite descriptions.

Other philosophers, for example Michael Dummett, also misinterpret Kripke's thesis concerning rigid designators but nevertheless can be viewed as responding to his modal argument in what I take to be a more direct manner. Dummett, for example, seems at times to argue that some proper names, as they occur in modal contexts, are such that

they induce a scope ambiguity that is semantically significant. Hence, the sentences in which they occur are semantically ambiguous with regard to their scope. Viewed in this light Dummett can be seen as trying to show that at least some proper names display the same behavior in modal contexts as do definite descriptions. In chapter two I will try to show that Dummett fails to do what he sets out to accomplish and that consequently his reply to Kripke is inadequate.

Section Two

One of the main theses held by Saul Kripke in his book, Naming and Necessity, is that ordinary proper names are rigid designators, that is, that proper names are such that they denote the same thing in every possible world in which they denote at all. What this means in the semantics of modal logic is that the value of a proper name remains fixed as we evaluate the sentence in which it is contained at each possible world. Consider, for example, the following sentence:

(1) Carnap might not have been Carnap.

It is often pointed out that sentences such as (1) are (at least) syntactically ambiguous between a 'de re' or 'large scope' reading and a 'de dicto' or 'small scope' reading.

Classically the de re/de dicto distinction has been drawn between different modalities, viz., modality de dicto and modality de re. In a de dicto modality the argument of the modal operator is taken to be a proposition and in a de re modality the argument of the modal operator is taken to be a predicate.[1] (1) under a large scope reading would attribute the possibility of not being Carnap to a certain individual, viz., Carnap, and we could accurately express this reading of (1) by the following sentence:

(2) Carnap is such that he possibly is not Carnap.

(1) under a small scope reading would attribute possibility to a proposition, and we could accurately express this reading of (1) by the following sentence:

(3) It is possible that: Carnap is not Carnap.

(1) read either de re as in (2) or de dicto as in (3) is false, since the name 'Carnap' picks out the very same individual at each possible world, where the sentence 'Carnap is not Carnap' is evaluated. That is, of course, if the name picks out anything at all. Since the name

[1]See G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic (London: Methuen and CO LTD, 1968), pp. 183-184, for this way of characterizing the de dicto/de re distinction.

'Carnap' rigidly refers to Carnap it is clear that at each possible world no one other than Carnap is denoted by the name in either of its occurrences. There simply is no possible world where the sentence 'Carnap is not Carnap' is true, and hence there is no reading under which (1) is true.

This would not be the case if 'Carnap' were not a rigid designator (i.e., if 'Carnap' picked out different things in different worlds). In this case while (3) would remain false, (2) would be true. This can be more readily seen by substituting some definite description, say 'the author of Meaning and Necessity', for each occurrence of 'Carnap' in (1). The sentence that results,

(4) The author of Meaning and Necessity might not have been the author of Meaning and Necessity.

has a de re reading, viz.

(5) The author of Meaning and Necessity is such that he possibly is not the author of Meaning and Necessity.

and a de dicto reading, viz.

(6) It is possible that: the author of Meaning and Necessity is not the author of Meaning and Necessity.

When we evaluate a modal sentence containing a definite description in the subject position that has narrow scope with respect to the modal term we reevaluate the description at each possible world. We do this because the value of the description may change from world to world. If, on the other hand, the definite description has wide scope with respect to the modal term, its value remains fixed through all possible worlds in which it has a value. Now, what (5) says is that that very person who is the author of Meaning and Necessity in the actual world is such that in some possible world he is not the author of Meaning and Necessity. (5) is true because while the value of the definite description that precedes the modal operator remains fixed from one world to the next, the value of the definite description that follows the modal operator may change from world to world. Thus in some possible world the author of Meaning and Necessity might be Hegel and it is certainly true that Carnap is not Hegel. What (6) says, on the other hand, is that there is some possible world where the author of Meaning and Necessity is not the author of Meaning and Necessity. Clearly, there is no such world. The value of the definite description may change from world to world, but it must have the value it in fact has in each world. Since 'the author of Meaning and Necessity' is not a rigid designator (4) will be false read de dicto as in (6), and it will be true read de re as in (5).

Kripke, in his article, "Identity and Necessity", gives a similar, though more homey, account of rigidity.[1] In Naming and Necessity, he characterizes his intuitive test for rigidity in the following manner.

> What's the difference between asking whether it's necessary that 9 is greater then 7 or whether it's necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7? Why does one show anything more about essence than the other? The answer to this might be intuitively 'Well, look, the number of planets might have been different from what it in fact is. It doesn't make any sense, though, to say that nine might have been different from what it in fact is.'[2]

Thus according to Kripke's test, 'nine' is a rigid designator and 'the number of planets' is not. In general, then, it appears as though we can say of any singular term α that it is rigid if and only if $\Diamond \alpha$ might have different than α is false. (I have slightly altered Kripke's account because it is not entirely clear that "it doesn't make any sense" or is "meaningless" to say that nine might not have been nine; it seems more likely that it is just false or perhaps necessarily false.) Given Kripke's intuitive test for rigidity we can return to the examples given earlier and see that 'Carnap' is rigid by noting that the de re reading of (1)

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[1] Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," in Identity and Individuation, ed. by Milton Munitz (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 148-149.

[2] Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 48.

(i.e., (2)) is false. We can also see that the 'author of Meaning and Necessity' is not rigid by simply noting that the de re reading of (4) (i.e., (5)) is true.

Now, what I would like to do is formalize Kripke's intuitive account of rigidity in order to make his claim that proper names are rigid designators more perspicuous. To do this it will be useful to find some syntactic device that will allow us to make scope distinctions in a systematic way that exhibits the distinction that has been drawn between (2) and (3), and (5) and (6) respectively. Traditionally the de re/de dicto distinction has been drawn in a quantified modal logic. Consider, for example, the following sentence:

(7) Everything is necessarily extended.

(7), it would be pointed out, is ambiguous since we can distinguish a modality de re from a modality de dicto. If we let "E" abbreviate 'is extended' we can formally illustrate the distinction in the following manner:

(8) $(x)\Box Ex$

(9) $\Box(x)Ex$

(8) expresses a de re modality, and it says that every thing is such that it is necessarily extended. (9) expresses a de dicto modality and it says that necessarily

everything is extended. Notice, that if one is a materialist who also believes that spirits are possible (although not actual) and who holds that being extended is an essential property of everything that actually exists, then (8) will be taken to be true, while (9), on the other hand, will be believed false. Our imagined materialist in this case may be viewed as objecting to the validity of the Barcan formula, $(x)\Box\phi x \supset \Box(x)\phi x$, since he assumes that there are some objects (spirits) that exist in some possible world and are such that they not only have a different property (the property of being nonextended) than those objects that exist in the actual world, but are objects that do not exist in the actual world at all. It should also be noted that given Kripke's or any other plausible semantics for a quantified modal system like S5, the converse of the Barcan formula is also invalid. To see this let the predicate 'E' used in (8) and (9) stand for existence. In S5 (9) would be provable, while (8) would not be valid, since as Kripke states, "although it is necessary that every thing exists, it does not follow that everything has the property of necessary existence."[1]

The de re/de dicto distinction can also be made for modal sentences with singular terms occurring in the subject position. The sentence 'Carnap is necessarily a man'

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[1]Saul Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," in Reference and Modality, ed. by Leonard Linsky (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 70.

exhibits the same ambiguity as does (7), and we can again express the distinction in a modal logic by simply adding identity. Let "c" abbreviate 'Carnap' and "M" abbreviate 'is a man', then the following sentences result:

(10) $(\exists x)\ (x=c\ \&\ \Box Mx)$

(11) $\Box(\exists x)\ (x=c\ \&\ Mx)$

(10) expresses a de re modality, and the occurrence of the name 'Carnap' is given wide scope relative to the modal operator. (11) expresses a de dicto modality, and the occurrence of the name 'Carnap" is given narrow scope relative to the modal operator.

Now, in order to formalize sentences like (2) and (3), and (5) and (6), and clearly indicate the scope of the occurrences of the singular terms contained in them relative to a modal operator, a less cumbersome way of making the distinction illustrated above would be helpful. What I propose is that both names and definite descriptions be treated as singular quantifiers.[1] Let me introduce the following definition of a singular quantifier for names. Where α is any name and Fx is any sentence (open or closed)

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[1] I owe this suggestion to Herbert E. Hendry, as well as the definition of a singular quantifier for names that follows in the text. Also, for an equivalent but alternative way of making the de dicto/de re distinction see David K. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 36-37.

$$[\alpha{:}x]Fx =_{Df} (\exists x)\ (x{=}\alpha\ \&\ Fx)$$

In a sentence of the form $[\alpha{:}x]Fx$, $[\alpha{:}x]$ is to be read as: α is an x such that —. Let us again return to sentence (2). Using our singular quantifier for names we can represent (2) as the de re or large scope reading of (1) by giving the first occurrence of the name 'Carnap' wide scope with respect to the modal operator. The formula that results is as follows:

$$(12)\quad [c{:}x]\Diamond\, x{\neq}c.^{1}$$

(12) it will be recalled is false, as is the sentence that results if both occurrences of 'Carnap' in (1) are given wide scope relative to the modal operator: namely, $[c{:}x]$ $[c{:}y]\Diamond\, x{\neq}y$. If we give both occurrences of 'Carnap' in (1) narrow scope with respect to the modal operator the formula that results,

$$(13)\quad \Diamond c{\neq}c,$$

is a translation of (3), and it is false as well.

Given Kripke's intuitive test for rigidity mentioned earlier one might be tempted to claim that (12)

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[1] Where names appear as arguments of predicates they are to be interpreted as having smallest possible scope.

(but not (13)) expresses his claim that 'Carnap' is a rigid designator. Notice, however, that (12) entails that Carnap exists in the actual world and such a requirement might eventually prove to be problematic. I will return to this matter shortly.

Let me first introduce the following definition of a singular quantifier for descriptions analogous to the one introduced for names. Where α is any definite description of the form (ιy) Gy and Fx is any sentence

$$[\alpha:x]Fx =_{Df} (\exists x)\ ((y)(Gy \equiv y=x)\ \&\ Fx)^{1}$$

Using the singular quantifier for descriptions defined above we can now translate (5) as follows:

$$(14)\quad [(\iota x)Fx:x] \Diamond x \neq (\iota x)Fx^{2}$$

(14) it has been noted is true. The formula that results, however, when both occurrences of the definite description in (4) are given narrow scope relative to the modal operator is false, viz.

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[1]The idea of treating definite descriptions as singular quantifiers is credited by W.V.Quine to Richard Sharvey, See Quine's reply to Grice in Words and Objections, ed. by D.Davidson and J.Hintikka (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1969), p. 327.

[2]As with names, definite descriptions where they appear as arguments of predicates are to be interpreted as having smallest possible scope.

(15) $\Diamond(\iota x)Fx \neq (\iota x)Fx$

(15) is a translation of (6) and it is false as is the sentence that results if both occurrences of 'the author of Meaning and Necessity' in (4) are given wide scope with respect to the modal operator, viz., $[(\iota x)Fx:y][(\iota x)Fx:z]\Diamond y \neq z$.

Again, given Kripke's intuitive test for rigidity one might be tempted to hold that (14) expresses the fact that 'the author of Meaning and Necessity' is not a rigid designator. One might even take (12) and (14) to yield the following rough definition of rigidity. Where α is any name or description, to say that α is rigid is to say that the following condition holds:

(A) $[\alpha:x]\Box x=\alpha$.

To do so, however, would be, I believe, a mistake. Given my definitions of the singular quantifiers for names and descriptions it should be clear that (A) entails that α denotes something that exists in the actual world. What this in effect rules out are cases where α is rigid yet the object denoted by α only exists in some possible world other than the actual world. Now there may or may not be such cases and I would like to remain neutral on this issue, but it seems that we need to allow for such a possibility

if we are to retain the spirit, if not the letter, of Kripke's rough statement of rigidity. Recall, that according to Kripke a singular term α is rigid if it designates the same thing in every possible world where it designates at all. Hence, this would seem to allow for cases where a term fails to denote in the actual world, yet denotes the same object in every possible world where it designates at all.

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke repeatedly asks the reader to ignore complications that might arise from the possible nonexistence of the object. For the most part, he merely assumes that we are dealing with cases where the term in question denotes an object that exists in the actual world. Rather than extend his caveat to a more formalized account of rigidity, I suggest that we seek a definition that allows for names that fail to denote in the actual world.

In "Identity and Necessity", Kripke is also aware of the problem posed by names or definite descriptions that fail to refer. He notes in that article that someone might object that the claim that every object is necessarily self-identical (i.e., $(x)\Box\, x=x$) is false, since some singular terms might fail to denote in the actual world or denote in the actual world but not in all possible worlds. In an attempt to handle the problem he states:

> Let us interpret necessity here weakly. We can count statements as necessary if whenever the objects mentioned therein exist, the statement would be true. If we wished to be very careful about this, we would have to go into the question of existence as a predicate and ask if the statement can be reformulated in the form: For every x it is necessary that, if x exists, then x is self-identical.[1]

Following Kripke's suggestion in the above quotation we might propose to replace (A) with the following condition:

(B) $\Box(E!\alpha \supset [\alpha:x]\Box\, x=\alpha)$.

Condition (B), as opposed to (A), clearly eliminates the need to make the assumption that the term in question denotes an object which exists in the actual world. Unfortunately, (B) is not a condition that Kripke could live with. (B) has the unacceptable consequence that if $(\iota x)Fx$ is rigid then $E!(\iota x)Fx$ entails $\Box E!(\iota x)Fx$. To see this suppose that $(\iota x)Fx$ is rigid and that $E!(\iota x)Fx$ holds in some world w. Then $[(\iota x)Fx:x]\Box\ x=(\iota x)Fx$ holds in w. Since $[(\iota x)Fx:x]\Box\ x=(\iota x)Fx$ holds in w, there is some object designated by $(\iota x)Fx$ in w and that object is designated by $(\iota x)Fx$ in each world. Thus, $(\iota x)Fx=(\iota x)Fx$ holds in each world. But $(\iota x)Fx=(\iota x)Fx$ entails that $E!(\iota x)Fx$. So $E!(\iota x)Fx$ holds in every world. Therefore, $\Box E!(\iota x)Fx$ holds in world w. Whether or not a parallel argument for names can be given is a question

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[1]Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," p. 136.

that need not detain us, since it is clear that when α is a rigid definite description (B) entitles us to hold that $E!\alpha \rightarrow \Box E!\alpha$.

Given Kripke's views concerning rigidity it seems clear that he simply could not accept condition (B). In "Identity and Necessity", for example, he states that:

> ... in talking about the notion of a rigid designator, I do not mean to imply that the object referred to has to exist in all possible worlds, that is, that it has to necessarily exist. Some things, perhaps mathematical entities such as positive integers, if they exist at all, necessarily exist.[1]

Now, the result that we have obtained from (B) might not seem so bad, at least as far as some rigid definite descriptions are concerned. Consider, for example, 'the smallest prime'. As Kripke points out in the passage quoted above, perhaps a mathematical entity like the smallest prime necessarily exists. Kripke, however, clearly would not want to hold that the object referred to by 'Quine' necessarily exists. Yet this is precisely what (B) would commit him to, and the name 'Quine' need not be the culprit. The definite description '$(\iota x)x$=Quine' would appear to satisfy (B), and assuming that the object denoted by it, viz. Quine, exists in the actual world, (B) has a result that Quine necessarily exists. Hence, condition (B) simply will not do.

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[1] Ibid., p. 145.

At first blush one might suppose that replacing (B) with $\ulcorner\Box(E!\alpha \supset \Box(E!\alpha \supset [\alpha{:}x]\Box x{=}\alpha))\urcorner$ avoids our present difficulty. It does not. For it is, as may be readily verified, equivalent to condition (B). What is needed is a definition of rigidity that does not rule out names that fail to denote in the actual world, yet at the same time does not entail that if the object referred to exists, it necessarily exists. In order to accomplish this I suggest that we adopt the following definition. Where α is any name or description, to say that α is rigid is to say that the following condition holds:

(C) $\Box(E!\alpha \supset [\alpha{:}x]\Box(E!\alpha \supset x{=}\alpha))$.

Not only does (C) allow for terms that fail to refer in the actual world, it also does not commit us to holding that the object referred to by '$(\imath x)x{=}$Quine' necessarily exists. One possible drawback, however, is that it seems as though some singular terms will vacuously satisfy (C) by not denoting in any possible world. Thus, for example, terms like 'the largest prime' or 'the round square' or possibly even names of "fictional entities" like 'Pegasus' will all be rigid designators according to (C). Notice, however, that if one were bent on disallowing such terms as 'the largest prime' and 'the round square' as rigid designators, all that need be done is to conjoin the following clause to

(C): $\ulcorner \Diamond E!\alpha \urcorner$. Since there is no possible world where the largest prime exists, 'the largest prime' would not be a rigid designator. Notice also that the addition of this clause to (C) allows one to remain neutral on the issue as to whether or not the names of fictional entities are rigid designators. If one holds a position similar to the one held by Kripke in his article "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic", it would appear as though names of fictional entities could count as rigid designators. In that article Kripke states that "Holmes does not exist, but in other states of affairs, he would have existed." Kripke thus seems to be allowing for the possibility that 'Holmes' denotes in some possible world, but not in the actual world. If, on the other hand, one takes the position that Kripke seems to hold in the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (cf. pp. 156-158), then names of fictional entities could not count as rigid designators. In the latter work Kripke takes back his earlier claim mentioned above and seems to hold that by definition a fictional entity does not exist in any world. Thus what at first glance appeared to be a possible drawback of (C) ultimately turns out to be a virtue. By adding $\ulcorner \Diamond E!\alpha \urcorner$ to (C) we can rule out cases like 'the largest prime', and at the same time remain neutral with respect to names of fictional entities.

The above definition of rigidity would also seem to accord well with Kripke's intuitive test. 'Carnap'

turns out to be a rigid designator as evidenced by (12), while 'the author of Meaning and Necessity' does not as evidenced by (14). There is, however, yet another way in which the thesis that proper names are rigid designators can be made more perspicuous, and that is to note that it is equivalent to the thesis that a scope operator has no semantic role to play for a proper name as it occurs in a modal sentence.[1] That is, the thesis that proper names are rigid designators is equivalent to the thesis that proper names as they occur in modal contexts do not induce semantic scope ambiguity. Strictly speaking, of course, given my definition of the singular quantifier for names the above claim is false. (2) and (3), translated as (12) and (13) respectively, are not equivalent, since (12) entails

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[1]To the best of my knowledge Leonard Linsky in his book, Names and Descriptions, was the first to explicitly take note of this equivalence (cf. chapter three, pp. 42-65). Since then the equivalence of de dicto/de re constructions involving a rigid designator has been noted by Christopher Peacocke in "Proper Names, Reference, and Rigid Designation," in Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, ed. by Simon Blackburn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 109-115. Kripke also notes the equivalence in a footnote in the preface to Naming and Necessity (p. 12, n. 15). In that footnote Kripke asks the reader to ignore complications that might arise from the possible nonexistence of the object. There will, however, be no need to extend his caveat to my formulation of the equivalence.

It should also be noted that given Kripke's statement of the equivalence, his thesis that proper names are rigid designators is "not the same as the doctrine that natural language has a convention that only the large scope reading is allowed." This is the misconception of Kripke's thesis that Loar, McKinsey, and Dummett labor under, which I noted earlier. But as Kripke goes on to point out "the equivalence makes sense only for a language where both readings are admissible."

that Carnap exists, while (13) does not. Hence, strictly speaking we cannot express Kripke's claim that 'Carnap' is a rigid designator in the following manner: '$[c:x]\Box Fx \equiv \Box Fc$'. However, while $\ulcorner[\alpha:x]\Box Fx \equiv \Box F\alpha\urcorner$ does not suffice to define rigidity, strikingly close conditions do. Let $\Box^{\alpha}\phi$ be short for $\Box(E!\alpha \supset \phi)$ and let $\Diamond^{\alpha}\phi$ be short for $\Diamond(E!\alpha \,\&\, \phi)$. $\Box^{\alpha}$ and $\Diamond^{\alpha}$ are thus restricted modal quantifiers ranging only over those worlds in which α exists. Then, rigidity can be defined by either of the equivalent conditions where α is any name or description and $F\alpha$ is atomic:

$$(D^{\Box}) \quad \Box^{\alpha}([\alpha:x]\Box^{\alpha}Fx \equiv \Box^{\alpha}[\alpha:x]Fx)$$

$$(D^{\Diamond}) \quad \Box^{\alpha}([\alpha:x]\Diamond^{\alpha}Fx \equiv \Diamond^{\alpha}[\alpha:x]Fx)$$

Notice, that given our new notation (i.e., $\Box^{\alpha}\phi$) we can go back and rewrite condition (C) as follows: $\ulcorner\Box^{\alpha}[\alpha:x]\Box^{\alpha} x=\alpha\urcorner$. In fact, it can be shown that (C) is equivalent to $(D^{\Box})$ and $(D^{\Diamond})$.[1] Also, as was the case with (C), one can conjoin $\ulcorner\Diamond E!\alpha\urcorner$ to $(D^{\Box})$ and $(D^{\Diamond})$ respectively if one wishes to disallow such terms as 'the largest prime' and 'the round square' as rigid designators. We can now slightly

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[1]Since all modal operators are restricted to worlds in which α denotes, the problem of showing that (C) is equivalent to $(D^{\Box})$ and $(D^{\Diamond})$ reduces to the problem of showing that $[\alpha:x]\Box x=\alpha$ is equivalent to $\Box([\alpha:x]\Box Fx \equiv \Box[\alpha:x]Fx)$ and $\Box([\alpha:x]\Diamond Fx \equiv \Diamond[\alpha:x]Fx)$ under the assumption that α denotes in all worlds. And the reader may easily verify that the latter equivalences hold.

alter Kripke's claim that the thesis that proper names are rigid designators is equivalent to the thesis that "if a modal operator governs a simple sentence containing a name, the two readings with large and small scope are equivalent" so that it will be true. The thesis that proper names are rigid designators is equivalent to the thesis that proper names satisfy conditions ($D^{\Box}$) and ($D^{\Diamond}$).

Now, while proper names satisfy condition (D), definite descriptions, in general, do not. That is, in general definite descriptions are not rigid designators and in general they do induce semantic scope ambiguity in modal contexts. I make the qualification "in general" because, as we have already noted, there are some definite descriptions that do take the same value at each possible world where the sentences that contain them are evaluated. Linsky, in Names and Descriptions, cites (ιx) ($3<x<5$) as just such a description. A better example might be 'the least prime' since names are not involved in the description itself. Other examples might be 'the darkest color' or 'the smallest set'. It is interesting to note that what all of these descriptions seem to have in common is that they designate abstract objects which necessarily stand in certain relationships to other members of their respective kinds; and it is in virtue of necessarily standing in these relationships that the objects necessarily have the properties that they have. A modal sentence involving one of these definite

descriptions seems to have the same truth value regardless of the scope given to the description that occurs in the sentence. Hence, some definite descriptions like 'the smallest prime' will satisfy (D).

Typically definite descriptions, however, do not satisfy condition (D), and hence are not rigid designators. Recall that (5) and (6), translated as (14) and (15) respectively differ in truth value, hence we should find that 'the author of Meaning and Necessity' does not satisfy (D). To see this let "F" abbreviate 'is an author of Meaning and Necessity' and let "α" abbreviate 'the author of Meaning and Necessity'. Now, according to ($D\Box$), since Carnap exists (timelessly),

(16) $[\alpha:x]\Box^{\alpha}Fx$

should be equivalent to

(17) $\Box^{\alpha}[\alpha:x]Fx$.

(16) is false, since being an author of Meaning and Necessity is only a contingent property of Carnap's, that is $\ulcorner[\alpha:x]\ \Diamond^{\alpha}\sim Fx\urcorner$ is true. (17), on the other hand, is true. At any world where the object designated by α exists (that object may or may not be Carnap) it is true that that object is an author of Meaning and Necessity; that is, $\ulcorner\sim\Diamond^{\alpha}[\alpha:x]\ \sim Fx\urcorner$ is true. Hence, (16) is not equivalent to (17), and

hence 'the author of Meaning and Necessity' does not satisfy (D). Definite descriptions are not characteristically rigid designators. Proper names, on the other hand, are always rigid if Kripke is correct. Thus proper names will always satisfy conditions (C) and (D), while definite descriptions in general will not.

Throughout this section I have attempted to give a formal account of the notion of rigidity that does not dodge the crucial issues concerning nonexistence that are affected by it. In the preface to Naming and Necessity, Kripke shows an acute awareness of these issues when he states:

> Concerning rigidity: In many places, both in this preface and in the text of this monograph, I deliberately ignore delicate questions arising from the possible nonexistence of an object. I also ignore the distinction between 'de jure' rigidity, where the reference of a designator is stipulated to be a single object, whether we are speaking of the actual world or of a counterfactual situation, and mere 'de facto' rigidity, where a description 'the x such that Fx' happens to use a predicate 'F' that in each possible world is true of one and the same unique object (e.g., 'the smallest prime' rigidly designates the number two). Clearly my thesis about names is that they are rigid de jure, but in the monograph I am content with the weaker assertion of rigidity. Since names are rigid de jure ... I say that a proper name rigidly designates its referent even when we speak of counterfactual situations where that referent would not have existed. Thus the issues about nonexistence are affected. Various people have persuaded me that all these questions deserve a more careful discussion than I give them in the monograph, but I must leave them here.[1]

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 21.

I believe that the account of rigidity that I have given, in terms of condition (C) and conditions ($D^{\Box}$) and ($D^{\Diamond}$), not only allows for Kripke's distinction between de jure and de facto rigidity, but does so in such a way that the "delicate questions arising from the possible nonexistence of the object" are not ignored. Having accomplished this, however, I will now ask the reader to extend to me the same license to ignore the various complications concerning nonexistence that has been extended to Kripke. I do this merely to facilitate the discussion of various arguments involving rigidity that occur later in the paper. The reader should keep in mind, however, the fact that any of my latter discussion of arguments involving rigidity can always be reformulated in terms of condition (C) or condition (D), so that no questions concerning nonexistence are begged.

Section Three

Michael McKinsey in "The Reference of Proper Names" also notes that in general definite descriptions do not behave in modal contexts as do proper names. That is, he notes that proper names are rigid designators and definite descriptions, in general, are not. McKinsey further notes that "if ordinary names are rigid designators, then, as Kripke points out, they cannot in general, be synonymous

with definite descriptions."[1] After stating this, however, he then curiously goes on to give the following characterization of Kripke's modal argument.

Consider the following two sentences:

(1) It is possible that the 1973 winner of the Triple Crown is not the 1973 winner of the Triple Crown.

(2) It is possible that Secretariat is not the 1973 winner of the Triple Crown.

McKinsey rightly points out that (1) is false since both occurrences of the definite description 'the 1973 winner of the Triple Crown' fall within the scope of the modal operator so that "(1) entails that in some possible set of circumstances, something is not identical with itself."[2] He also correctly points out that (2) is true since 'Secretariat' rigidly designates the same thing in every possible world, and in some world the horse that was the 1973 winner of the Triple Crown may not have been Secrtearіat. Thus, according to McKinsey "since (1) and (2) have different truth-values, it follows that 'Secretariat' and 'the 1973 winner of the Triple Crown' are not synonymous in English."[3] All that remains to be done to complete Kripke's

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[1]Michael McKinsey, "The Reference of Proper Names" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1976), p. 32.

[2]Ibid. [3]Ibid., p.33.

argument, according to McKinsey, is to generalize the result as follows:

> ... for any name and any contingent description... if a name α rigidly designates and a description ⌜the F⌝ is contingent, ⌜it possible that $\alpha \neq$ the F⌝ will be true and ⌜it is possible that the F $\neq$ the F⌝ will be false.[1]

McKinsey's response to the argument as stated is simply to require that the definite description that is substituted for a proper name be given widest possible scope in modal contexts. He states that

> Given this supplement, an ordinary name like 'Secretariat' is typically used as a rigid designator, since it typically has largest possible scope in the sentences in which it occurs. But this is consistent with supposing that whenever a speaker uses 'Secretariat' on a particular occasion, he is using it as short for a definite description having large scope. For instance a speaker of (2) might be using 'Secretariat' as a rigid designator while the thought in his mind is explicitly expressible by
>
> (3) The individual x which won the Triple Crown in 1973 is such that it is possible that x is not the 1973 winner of the Triple Crown.
>
> Since (2) and (3) have the same truth value, it is consistent to suppose that in uttering (2) a speaker is expressing a thought which is also expressible by (3).[2]

It should be clear from the above quotation that McKinsey feels that he has been able to dodge Kripke's argument by

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 34.

showing that (2) can have the same truth value as a sentence which has a coreferential definite description substituted for the name, as long as that description has largest possible scope.

I am willing to grant that McKinsey's response to to the argument he considers is adequate. What I am not willing to grant, however, is that the argument he responds to is in fact the modal argument that Kripke gives. I will also attempt to show, later in this essay, that, in general, any attempt to dodge Kripke's modal argument by a move to wide scope definite descriptions is doomed to failure. Before I do so, however, I would like to consider yet another argument that runs along the same lines as McKinsey's.

Section Four

Brian Loar has also interpreted Kripke's modal argument against the view that ordinary proper names are disguised definite descriptions in such a way that the argument can be met by requiring that the definite description that is substituted for a proper name be given widest possible scope in modal contexts. According to Loar one popular form of the argument, which derives from Kripke's Naming and Necessity goes as follows:

(1) If n were used to mean the F, then 'n might not have been the F' would be false.

(2) But 'n might not have been the F' is true.

(3) Therefore, n is not used to mean the F.[1]

Loar's claim is that the argument is defective. What he argues is that premise (2) is true because the n-position in the sentence mentioned in the premise is given widest possible scope.[2] But, Loar goes on to argue, if we treat the n-position in the sentence mentioned in the consequent of premise (1) as also having widest possible scope, then premise (1) is false and the argument is unsound. We can easily see that premise (1) is false according to Loar by simply substituting 'the F' for 'n'.

In order to evaluate Loar's argument and in order to make his claim concerning the scope of the n-position more perspicuous let me switch his statement of Kripke's argument from the formal mode to the material mode.[3] Put

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[1]Brian Loar, "The Semantics of Singular Terms," Philosophical Studies, 30 (1976), p. 373.

[2]Of course, if Kripke is correct that proper names are rigid designators, then scope ambiguity would not affect the second premise. That is, the sentence mentioned in premise (2) would be true on both a wide scope and a narrow scope reading of the n-position. To simply assume at this point, however, that proper names are rigid designators would be to beg the question against Loar, since it is not an assumption that he seems to hold.

[3]The change from the formal mode to the material mode is justified insofar as it does not appear to alter the essential nature of the argument. Also, it should be noted that such a change could always be justified by arguing that the following equivalence holds. Where 'S' is any sentence: S is necessary if and only if '$\Box$S' is true.

into the material mode the modal argument attributed to Kripke is as follows: Let "Mxy" abbreviate 'x means y'.

(1') $Mn(?x)Fx \rightarrow [n:x]\Box Fx$[1]

(2') $\sim[n:x]\Box Fx$

(3') $\therefore \sim Mn(?x)Fx$

To see how Loar's argument works let us consider a particular case. For example, let us take the name 'George Washington' and the definite description 'the first president of the United States'. According to Loar "names are normally read as having wider scope than modal operators".[2] Thus premise (2') with the name given widest possible scope is clearly true. What (2') says is that it is not the case that George Washington is such that necessarily he is a first president of the United States, and surely we can

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[1]It should be noted that strictly speaking my translation of the argument is incorrect since I have replaced the definite description in the sentence mentioned in premise (1) and in premise (2) with an indefinite description. The reader can easily verify, however, that this does not in any way affect the basic point that Loar is trying to make, nor does it significantly alter his formulation of Kripke's argument. The change to an indefinite description is simply to facilitate dicussion later in the essay of an attempt by Hudson and Tye to revise the premises of the argument in such a way that an appeal to scope distinctions becomes irrelevant.

Also, it should be noted that I am assuming, as does Loar, that 'n' denotes in the actual world.

[2]Loar, "The Semantics of Singular Terms," p. 373.

agree that being a first president of the United States is only a contingent property of George Washington. He might have died in the Revolutionary War and never become a president at all.

Loar contends, however, that the scope consideration which makes premise (2') true is the same feature that makes premise (1') false. His key claim is that (1') with the name in the consequent given widest possible scope is false. What (1') says is that if 'George Washington' means the first president of the United States, then George Washington is such that necessarily he is a first president of the United States. To see that (1') is false Loar claims that all we have to do is substitute 'the F' for 'n'. Thus we have the following:

(1") $M(\iota x)Fx(\iota x)Fx \rightarrow [(\iota x)Fx{:}x]\Box Fx$

What (1") says is that if 'the first president of the United States' means the first president of the United States, then the first president of the United States is such that necessarily he is a first president of the United States. But surely that very person who was in fact the first president of the United States need never have become a president at all. Hence, the consequent of (1") is false which makes (1") false, and Kripke's argument is unsound.

In essence what Loar has done is save the description view of proper names from Kripke's modal argument by requiring that proper names be identified only with those definite descriptions that take widest scope in modal contexts. Again, however, the crucial question that needs to be raised is not whether Loar's move to wide scope definite descriptions is an adequate response to the stated form of Kripke's argument. Rather, the crucial question is whether or not Loar's formulation of Kripke's modal argument is the argument that Kripke in fact gives in Naming and Necessity, and if it isn't will his response remain adequate? Before I answer this question I would like to examine a recent attempt to salvage Kripke's argument, as stated by Loar, by modifying it in such a way that an appeal to scope distinctions becomes irrevelant.

Section Five

In a recent article in Analysis James Hudson and Michael Tye attempt to revise the premises of Kripke's argument in such a way as to thwart the move to wide scope descriptions. They feel that Loar's response is an adequate rejoinder to Kripke's argument as stated, but that their modification of it decisively shows that "the view that proper names are synonymous with definite descriptions cannot be saved by giving the descriptions widest possible

scope".[1] Their restatement of the argument is as follows:

(4) If n were to mean the F, then 'n is an F' would be necessary on the assumption that there is a unique F.

(5) 'n is an F' is not necessary on the assumption that there is a unique F.

(6) Therefore, n does not mean the F.[2]

Hudson and Tye maintain that the primary advantage of their revised argument is that (4) is immune to a possible scope ambiguity in a way in which (1) of section four is not. This is so, they claim, because "while in (1) we have a remark about a sentence which contains a modal operator, in (4) we have rather a modal remark about a non-modal sentence".[3] What I would like to show, however, is that Hudson and Tye are simply wrong. That is, I will attempt to show that (4) properly understood is not only syntactically ambiguous with regard to scope but that it is semantically ambiguous in this regard as well. To accomplish this end it will again be useful to switch the argument from the formal mode to the material mode. Here it might be objected that keeping the argument in the formal mode is an essential feature of the argument. I would

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[1] J.Hudson and M.Tye, "Proper Names and Definite Descriptions With Widest Possible Scope," Analysis, 40 (January 1980), p. 64.

[2] Ibid., p.63. [3] Ibid., p.64.

again, however, suggest that one could always argue that the change is justified based on the equivalence referred to in footnote 3 on page 38.

Also it could be pointed out that Hudson and Tye rely rather heavily on the fact that they are dealing with a nonmodal sentence. Because of this and because of the fact that they are working in the formal mode they seem convinced that a nonmodal sentence like 'n is an F' will not be ambiguous with regard to scope when a definite description is substituted for 'n'. It is not entirely clear, however, why it is that they are so confident about this. Certainly there is no general principle to the effect that no nonmodal sentence with a definite description in the subject position will be ambiguous with regard to scope that they can appeal to. Clearly there are at least some nonmodal sentences that are ambiguous with regard to scope regardless of whether they are treated in the formal mode or the material mode. Consider the sentence,

(A) The present king of France is not bald.

According to Russell it is ambiguous with regard to scope since the definite description 'the present king of France' may have either a primary occurrence in (A) or a secondary occurrence in (A). If the description has wide scope or primary occurrence then the proposition expressed by (A)

entails that the present king of France exists. In this case (A) would read as follows according to Russell.

(B) $(\exists x)(Kx \ \& \ (y)(Ky \supset x=y) \ \& \sim Bx)$

Since 'the present king of France' is an improper description (i.e., lacks a denotation) the sentence is false. If on the other hand, the description has narrow scope or secondary occurrence, then the proposition expressed by (A) does not entail that the present king of France exists. In this case the sentence would be true and according to Russell (A) would read as:

(C) $\sim(\exists x)(Kx \ \& \ (y)(Ky \supset x=y) \ \& \ Bx)$

It should also be clear from the above discussion that the claim that the sentence 'the present king of France is not bald' is false is ambiguous as well. It could mean that the sentence 'there is a present king of France who is not bald' is false, in which case the claim is correct, or it could mean that the sentence 'There is no present king who is bald' is false, which would be incorrect.

It might, of course, be objected that even though Hudson and Tye do not explicitly emphasize the fact that it is atomic, nonmodal sentences that they are talking about, it clearly was their intent. Hence, trotting out Russell's

well worn example is merely a red herring, since it is not an atomic sentence. It might also be pointed out that while (A) is ambiguous with regard to the scope of the definite description relative to the tilde, it need not be ambiguous with regard to the scope of the definite description relative to a modal operator.

I think that both of these points are sound; nevertheless I find Russell's example instructive in this context since its limitations indicate what would be required to show that (4) is false. What we need is an atomic nonmodal sentence with a definite description in the subject position that is ambiguous with regard to the scope of the description, and that is also ambiguous with regard to the scope of the description relative to a modal operator. Consider the following sentence:

(D) The murderer of Smith is a murderer.

Now according to Hudson and Tye if we say of (D) that what it expresses is necessary, our claim will not be ambiguous with regard to scope. I would like to suggest, however, a plausible argument to the contrary. The following argument was first suggested to me by Richard Hall. First let us consider (D) itself. If one holds that Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction for definite descriptions is a semantically relevent distinction, then it could be argued

that (D) is ambiguous depending on whether or not 'the murderer of Smith' is used referentially or attributively. If the definite description in (D) is used referentially, then what (D) expresses is that some particular individual is a murderer, regardless of whether or not he happens to be the murderer of Smith. Now suppose (D) is uttered in a context where 'the murderer of Smith' picks out Jones and Jones is not a murderer. In this case (D) will be false. If we treat referential descriptions as simply descriptions that have wide scope we can express this reading of (D) as follows:

(E) $[(\iota y)Fy:x]Fx$

If, on the other hand, the definite description in (D) is used attributively, then what (D) expresses is that the murderer of Smith whomever he might be is a murderer. In the same case as described above, (D) could be true on this second interpretation, and if we similarily treat attributive definite descriptions simply as descriptions that have narrow scope we can express this reading of (D) as follows:

(F) $F(\iota y)Fy$

So far then we have shown that an atomic, nonmodal sentence can be ambiguous with regard to the scope afforded

to the definite description, as evidenced by (E) and (F), which have been shown to be false and true respectively. Now notice that if we say of (E) that what it expresses is necessary, then what we say is false. (E) will only be true at those worlds where Jones is in fact a murderer, but we know that there is at least one possible world, namely the actual world, where Jones is not a murderer. Hence, our claim that what (E) expresses is necessary is false. To express this in the material mode we need only give the definite description in (E) wide scope relative to the necessity operator.

If, on the other hand, we say of (F) that what it expresses is necessary (barring the nonexistence of Smith's murderer in some world w), then what we say is true. There will be no possible world in which the murderer of Smith in that world is not a murderer. Thus the proposition expressed by (F) is necessary while the proposition expressed by (E) is not. Again, to express in the material mode our claim that what (E) expresses is necessary we need only give the definite description in (E) narrow scope relative to the necessity operator.

We have been able to show that there is a scope ambiguity in an atomic, nonmodal sentence (i.e., (D) read as (E) and (F)) and that it affects the necessity of that sentence (i.e., the claim that what (E) expresses is necessary, is false, while the claim that what (F) expresses is

necessary, is true). Thus we have shown that premise (4) is false.

Those, who like myself, find questionable the claim that Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction for definite descriptions is a semantically relevant distinction will not find the above argument to be very convincing. Those philosophers who agree with Kripke, for example, that Donnellan's distinction is only a pragmatic one would never let the argument get off the ground.[1] Aside from this difficulty with the argument there are a number of other problems associated with it that I will merely suggest here, but not elaborate on. For one thing the above argument treats Russell's notion of scope as a simple dichotomy to be associated with attributive and referential definite descriptions. Also, it might be plausibly argued that Russell's notion of scope doesn't even apply to our (D), since in an atomic sentence like 'The murderer of Smith is a murderer' there does not appear to be any room for scope ambiguity, at least at the level of "surface structure". Further, this last point might be used by some to buttress their claim that (E) and (F) are actually equivalent, and hence do not express different propositions.

One last difficulty that might be raised goes as

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[1]See Saul Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II: Studies in the Philosophy of Language (February 1977), pp. 255-276, for Kripke's account of the distinction.

follows. It is natural to assume that if our (E) and (F) are not equivalent, it is because the definite description in (E) is rigid and the definite description in (F) is non-rigid. Now one thing it might mean to call a definite description, say $(\iota x)\phi x$, rigid is that "it denotes, with respect to all possible worlds the unique object that (actually) ϕ's."[1] If this is the case, then we cannot associate the rigid definite description in (E) with Donnellan's referential definite description. This is so because if a rigid definite description is defined as above, it "determines its referent via its unique satisfaction of the associated property"[2] Donnell's referential definite description, on the other hand, might pick out some individual who does not satisfy the associated property of the description, as was the case in our example with Jones.

For these reasons then, as well as for some that I am sure that I failed to consider, I find it necessary to continue in my attempt to show that Hudson and Tye are wrong by switching their argument to the material mode.

Hudson and Tye start out by considering the sentence 'The F is an F'. Concerning that sentence they note it

> ... is not itself a necessary truth, but it is entailed by the sentence 'There is exactly one F' (given a fixed

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[1] Ibid., p. 259. [2] Ibid., p. 260.

> value of 'F').... it is necessary on the assumption that there is a unique F, meaning by this simply that it is a necessary consequence of 'There is exactly one F'.... if n were to mean the F, then n would be substitutable salva veritate for the F in '"The F is an F" is necessary on the assumption that there is a unique F'.[1]

Now this leaves us with five possible translations for the consequent of (4). They are as follows:

(7) $E!(\iota x)Fx \supset \Box Fn$

(8) $E!(\iota x)Fx \supset [n:x]\Box Fx$

(9) $\Box(E!(\iota x)Fx \supset Fn)$

(10) $\Box([n:x](E!(\iota x)Fx \supset Fx))$

(11) $[n:x]\Box(E!(\iota x)Fx \supset Fx)$

Notice that (7) and (8) are, nearly enough for present purposes of the form $P \supset \Box Q$, while (9) and (10) and (11) are again nearly enough for present purposes of the form $\Box(P \supset Q)$. Now, clearly a translation of the form $\Box(P \supset Q)$ would be a more charitable translation of the consequent of (4), although a translation of the form $P \supset \Box Q$ would seem to be a better rendition of the English, as given. To see this consider the argument with (7) as the translation of the consequent of (4).

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[1]Hudson and Tye, "Proper Names and Definite Descriptions With Widest Possible Scope," p. 64.

(4') $Mn(\iota x)Fx \rightarrow (E!(\iota x)Fx \supset \Box Fn)$

(5') $E!(\iota x)Fx \supset \sim\Box Fn$

(6') $\therefore \sim Mn(\iota x)Fx$

The argument as it stands is not even valid. What premises (4') and (5') entitle us to conclude is not (6') but '$E!(\iota x)Fx \supset \sim Mn(\iota x)Fx$'. Of course, the argument can be made valid by either adding '$E!(\iota x)Fx$' as a premise or by translating (5) as '$\sim(E!(\iota x)Fx \supset \Box Fn)$'. Essentially the same point can be made if we consider the argument with (8) as the translation of the consequent of (4). This, however, is not the chief difficulty with treating a translation of the form $P \supset \Box Q$ as the correct translation of the consequent of (4). When we substitute 'the F' for 'n' in (7) and (8) we can get the following two readings of (4):

(12) $Mn(\iota x)Fx \rightarrow (E!(\iota x)Fx \supset \Box F(\iota x)Fx)$

(13) $Mn(\iota x)Fx \rightarrow (E!(\iota x)Fx \supset [(\iota x)Fx{:}x]\Box Fx)$

The first thing to note about (12) and (13) is that they are syntactically distinct. Thus (4) at least displays a syntactic ambiguity with regard to scope. If, however, we let "n" abbreviate 'Benjamin Franklin', "$(\iota x)Fx$" abbreviate 'the inventor of bifocals', and "F" abbreviate 'is an inventor of bifocals', we will see that (12) and (13) have the same truth value. This might lead one to hold that

Hudson and Tye have been successful in their attempt to make Kripke's argument immune to possible scope ambiguity, at least as far as semantic scope ambiguity is concerned. This, however, would be a mistake, for while it is true that the consequents of (12) and (13) both have the same truth value under the interpretation given above, the truth value they have is not the one that allows the argument to succeed. Both (12) and (13) are false. What the consequent of (12) says is that if there is a unique inventor of bifocals, then there is a unique inventor of bifocals in every possible world. But surely, assuming that there is a unique inventor of bifocals in the actual world, say Benjamin Franklin, it is still possible that in some world other than the actual that bifocals were never invented or that two people invented bifocals.[1] What the consequent of (13) says is that if there is a unique inventor of bifocals, then that very person is such that in every possible world he is an inventor of bifocals. But, clearly being an inventor of bifocals is only a contingent property of Franklin. In some possible world he might have died at birth and never invented anything at all. Only the vacuous case would make the consequent of (12) and (13) true.

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[1]It has been pointed out to me by Richard Hall that the situation isn't saved by stipulating some standard entity α, say the null set, to be the denotation, in a world, of definite descriptions which "intuitively" fail to denote anything in that world. For such an entity won't be an inventor of bifocals, and hence F α will be false there (at those worlds); hence $\Box F(?x)Fx$ is false

Excluding that possibility the consequent of both (12) and (13) are false, hence (12) and (13) are false (assuming, of course, as we have all along that their antecedents are true). Therefore, the more charitable reading of the consequent of (4) is clearly a translation of the form $\Box(P \supset Q)$, and not one of the form $P \supset \Box Q$.

Now, this still leaves us with (9), (10) and (11) as possible translations of the consequent of (4). What (9), (10) and (11) show us, however, is that not only is (4) syntactically ambiguous with regard to scope, but that it is semantically ambiguous in this regard as well. When we substitute 'the F' for 'n' in (9), (10) and (11) we get the following three readings of the consequent of (4):

(9') $\Box(E!(\iota x)Fx \supset F(\iota x)Fx)$

(10') $\Box([(\iota x)Fx{:}x](E!(\iota x)Fx \supset Fx))$

(11') $[(\iota x)Fx{:}x]\Box(E!(\iota x)Fx \supset Fx)$

Both (9') and (10') give the definite description substituted for 'n' narrow scope relative to the modal operator, and both are true under the interpretation previously given, as the reader can easily verify. Hence, neither (9') nor (10') will make (4) false. Now, according to Loar premise (5) is true because the name in it is normally read as having wider scope than the modal operator. However, he goes on to argue that if we also give the definite

description substituted for the name in the consequent of (4) widest possible scope, as we have done with our (11'), we will see that (4) is false. To see that it is false let "(ιx)Gx" abbreviate 'the man who discovered electricity', and suppose that '(ιx)Fx=(ιx)Gx' holds. If we substitute (ιx)Gx for the first occurrence of (ιx)Fx in (11'), the resulting sentence

(14) $[(\iota x)Gx:x]\Box((E!(\iota x)Fx) \supset Fx)$

is clearly false. Since (11') results in a reading of the consequent of (4) that makes (4) false Loar's response to Kripke's argument as stated remains intact, contrary to the claim made by Hudson and Tye,

Now, it might be objected that my (11') is an "illegal" or "incorrect" translation of the consequent of (4). This is so because a modal remark about a nonmodal sentence can only be translated in such a way that the nonmodal sentence has to occur, in tact, within the scope of the modal operator. Another way of making this point would be to argue that if we say of a given sentence, call it ϕ, that what ϕ expresses is necessary, then our remark can only be taken in the <u>de dicto</u> sense and can only be translated as $\Box\phi$. Giving the definite description substituted for 'n' widest possible scope, as I do in my (11'), violates this condition.

Let me make three points concerning the above objection in particular, and one final point concerning my transition of the argument from the formal mode to the material mode in general. I'll begin by making the more general point first.

To the best of my knowledge, Kripke's "modal arguments" in Naming and Necessity are stated by him in the material mode. Hence, it looks like the argument attributed to him by Loar and revised by Hudson and Tye is taken from the material mode and put into the formal mode. In his article, "A Puzzle About Belief", however, Kripke states that "given the arguments of Church and others, I do not believe that the formal mode of speech is synonymous with other formulations."[1] Thus one might well argue that any objection that would be telling against my transition from the formal mode to the material mode would be equally telling against their transition from the material mode to the formal mode.

My second point is that in the present context what the above objection amounts to is that a sentence like 'n is an F' is necessary simpliciter, and can only occur within the scope of the necessity operator. I would like to suggest, however, that sentences are only necessary or possible relative to a given reading. When we say of the

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[1]Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle About Belief," in Meaning and Use, ed. by A. Margalit (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 272.

sentence 'The number of planets is greater than 5.' that it is necessary we are claiming that it is true at every possible world. But to determine its truth value at each possible world we need to know whether or not the values of the singular terms in the sentence remain fixed or change from world to world. In particular we need to know whether or not the value of 'the number of planets' remains fixed at nine or if in some world it changes,i.e., we need to know whether it is '[the number of planets:x]$\Box$x>5' or '$\Box$(the number of planets>5)' that is being asserted when one asserts that 'the number of planets is greater than 5' is necessary. Basically what I am arguing here is that before a sentence can be determined to be necessary or possible a prior question needs to be asked. Namely, 'What are the values of the singular terms in the sentence under consideration?' This prior question can only be answered by giving the sentence a reading with regard to scope. In so far that the above account is correct I suggest that my (11') is a legal translation of the consequent of (4).

The third point that I would like to make concerning the above objection is that it is not an objection that could be raised by Hudson and Tye. This is because to argue that the consequent of (4) can only be given a <u>de dicto</u> or small scope reading is merely to concede the point that Kripke's argument cannot be made independent of scope considerations. But, this is precisely what Hudson and Tye

claim is not the case. That is, they argue that their revision of Loar's first premise "makes an appeal to scope distinctions irrelevant". Hence, scope considerations should no longer be an issue. But, it seems to me, to raise the above objection is tantamount to holding that scope is a relevant issue.

My final point is that matters are not improved much if one argues that Hudson and Tye could easily resist the temptation to raise the above objection, but argue instead that the consequent of (4) simply cannot be translated into the material mode at all. That is, they could argue that not only is (11) an illegal translation of the consequent of (4), but so are (10) and (9) as well. It should be pointed out, however, that to argue in this way would be to part company with Kripke. Kripke goes on in the footnote referred to above to say that the formal mode "can be used as a rough way to convey the idea of scope".[1] Hence, it would appear that Kripke would allow (9) or (10) as a legitimate translation of the consequent of (4). Again, notice that this would be tantamount to granting that scope is a relevant concern, and this is something that Hudson and Tye take pains to deny. It might still be the case, however, that Hudson and Tye do not mind parting company with Kripke at this juncture. If this is so, then it seems to me that the burden of proof is now on them to show that the

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[1] Ibid.

following does not hold: 'n is an F' is necessary if and only if '□n is an F' is true. It is one thing to agree with Church that the formal mode of speech is not synonymous with the material mode, it is quite another, however, to argue as they would have to, that there appears to be no or very little connection between the modes at all. Thus it appears as though Kripke's "modal argument" can be dodged by simply requiring that the definite descriptions that are substituted for proper names in modal contexts be given widest possible scope. We still, however, need to address what I feel is the crucial issue concerning this type of response to Kripke's modal argument. Namely, is the argument that Loar and McKinsey criticize and the argument that Hudson and Tye attempt to salvage by revision, the argument that Kripke in fact gives in Naming and Necessity. I think that it is not, and it is to this issue that I will next turn.

Section Six

McKinsey and Loar, and by implication Hudson and Tye as well, all seem to feel that the modal argument that Kripke gives in Naming and Necessity can be met by the move to wide scope definite descriptions. The time has now come to make good on my claim made earlier that the argument they consider is simply not Kripke's argument. Before doing so, however, let me first try to indicate why I think it is that Loar and McKinsey are led astray.

As I pointed out in my introduction both seem to mistakenly believe that the crucial feature to note concerning proper names is that they are normally read as having wider scope than the modal operator. They believe this because they misunderstand Kripke's thesis that proper names are rigid designators. What Loar and McKinsey fail to realize is that if proper names are rigid designators, then scope distinctions are simply irrelevant for the modal sentences in which they are contained. That is, both fail to realize that proper names do not induce semantic scope ambiguity in modal contexts.

It might be objected that if we take Loar and McKinsey to be claiming that natural language has a convention such that proper names are always to be read as having widest possible scope in modal contexts, then it is also true that proper names do not induce scope ambiguity.[1] Thus, it would be argued, that they, as well as Kripke, can account for the fact that proper names are not ambiguous in modal contexts with regard to scope, and consequently they have not radically misunderstood his thesis that proper names are rigid designators. The problem with this sort of objection, however, as I pointed out in an earlier footnote

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[1]Notice that on this account the claim is not that particular wide scope tokens of proper names are rigid designators, hence they do not induce scope ambiguity; rather the claim is that proper names are not rigid designators, but as they occur in English we are to read them as always having widest possible scope, hence we never get two readings.

(n.1, p. 29) is that it obscures a crucial feature of Kripke's account of the rigidity of proper names. On Kripke's account the claim that proper names do not induce scope ambiguity in modal contexts only makes sense for a language where both a wide scope reading of the name and a narrow scope reading of the name are admissible. Once this is made clear we can then see that proper names display a certain feature in modal contexts (i.e., they are not ambiguous with regard to scope) that is not displayed by definite descriptions.

It should also be noted that Kripke would reject the thesis that proper names are nonrigid designators that are to be read as having wide scope in modal contexts, since he does not feel that all of "our" intuitions regarding proper names can be accounted for along these lines. What Kripke has in mind here is what he refers to as his "intuitive test for rigidity" in terms of counterfactual situations. As I pointed out in my introduction, Kripke sometimes establishes his thesis that proper names are rigid designators by considering the truth conditions, with respect to certain counterfactual situations, of simple, nonmodal sentences with proper names in the subject position. In these cases, according to Kripke, the sentences considered will be such that "there is no room for any scope distinctions".[1]

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 11.

Hence, our intuitions concerning the rigidity of the names involved cannot be accounted for along the lines of the hypothesis considered above in terms of viewing proper names as wide scope nonrigid designators. More will be said about this way of looking at rigid designators later in the section.

Given then this misunderstanding of Kripke's thesis regarding proper names as rigid designators, Loar and McKinsey go on to interpret his argument in the following manner. Consider the sentence

(1) It is possible that Aristotle was not a philosopher.

Both Loar and McKinsey note that a sentence like (1) is true because the name 'Aristotle' is normally read as having wider scope than the modal operator. Now suppose 'Aristotle' really was a disguised definite description, say 'the greatest philosopher of antiquity'. In that case it should be possible to substitute this definite description for the name in (1) and have (1) retain its same truth value. But when the substitution is made the sentence becomes false. What we get is

(2) It is possible that the greatest philosopher of antiquity was not a philosopher.

Since (1) and (2) are not materially equivalent Kripke has shown, according to Loar and McKinsey, that 'Aristotle' cannot be the disguised definite description 'the greatest philosopher of antiquity'.

Now to dodge the argument both note that the reason why (2) is false is that the definite description in it is read as having smaller scope than the modal operator. But, they point out, if we give the definite description substituted for the name wider scope than the modal operator, as was implicitly done with the proper name in (1), then the sentence that results will have the same truth value as (1). The sentence that now results

> (3) The greatest philosopher of antiquity is such that it is possible that he is not a philosopher.

is materially equivalent with (1), and hence according to Loar and McKinsey, Kripke has not been able to show that proper names are not disguised descriptions.

In an effort to clear up some of the misunderstandings concerning his views Kripke in the preface to Naming and Necessity, has the following to say about the above example:

> 'It might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher' expresses a truth, though 'It might have been the case that the greatest philosopher of

> antiguity was not a philosopher' does not, contrary to Russell's theory. Now the last quoted sentence would express a truth if the description used were read, contrary to my intent, with wide scope. So perhaps it might be supposed that the problem simply arises from an (unaccountable!) tendency to give 'Aristotle' a wide scope reading while the descriptions are given a small scope reading; sentences with both names and descriptions, however, would be subject in principle to both readings. My point, however, was that the contrast would hold if all the sentences involved are explicitly construed with small scopes.[1]

It should be obvious from the above quotation that the move by Loar and McKinsey to a wide scope definite description is simply "wide" of the mark. As Kripke points out the contrast between (1) and (2) remains even if, contrary to Loar and McKinsey, we give the name in (1) narrow scope relative to the modal operator.

It is important, however, to notice that there is nothing in Kripke's argument stated in the passage above to prevent Loar and McKinsey from maintaining that the contrast will not hold as long as it is only a wide scope definite description that is substituted for the name in (1). All that is lost in this case is the symmetry in scope. Further, they could point out that a particular token of a definite description which has been given wide scope is such that it picks out the same thing in every possible world where it picks out anything at all, just as is the case for proper names. In this case we could view McKinsey

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[1] Ibid., p. 13.

and Loar as agreeing with Kripke that proper names are rigid designators, but also arguing that the particular token of a wide scope definite description that has been substituted for the name is a rigid designator as well. Hence, it looks like proper names can be disguised descriptions after all, since the claim that names have a property not shared by definite descriptions cannot be upheld.

I am, of course, merely assuming for the sake of argument that it does in fact make sense to view a particular wide scope token of a definite description as a rigid designator. It is not at all clear, however, that a token is the sort of thing that can be substituted, nor is it clear that a token is the sort of thing that can be rigid. In regard to the latter point, if my account of Kripke's notion of rigidity in section two is correct, then it would appear that rigidity is a concept that applies to singular terms (i.e., names and definite descriptions) and not tokens of singular terms. Gerald Vision in a recent article in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy has attempted to make the same point in connection with proper names. In that article he states:

> N is not a name-token, nor is it simply a name-type: it is a instance of a (type) name (henceforth, a name-instance): viz., a type-name as applied to one individual in our world. Thus, the type-name 'Francis Bacon' has in our history at least the following two

> name-instances: one the name of a philosopher, the other the name of an artist.[1]

Unfortunately, Vision does not go on to give us a proper account of what a name-instance is, but it is possible to get at least a rough idea of the distinction that he is groping for. A name-type properly understood is simply a sign-type. Hence, it is an abstract entity defined, for the most part, in purely syntactic terms. (The qualification, for the most part, is meant simply to allow for the possibility of counting words like 'honor' and 'honour' as two tokens of the same word-type, or for the possibility of counting words like 'taxi' and 'taxicab' as two tokens of the same word-type.) Name-types are recognized by their form alone; hence it is possible that two tokens of a given name-type denote different objects. Consider, for example, the sentence, "London, England is bigger than London, Ontario." Here we have two tokens of the same name-type referring to different cities. Clearly, then the name-type 'London' is not the sort of thing that can be rigid.

Now, this might lead one to hold that it is a particular token of the name-type 'London' that is rigid, but this would be a mistake as well. A particular token of a given name-type need not be a token of a singular term.

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[1]Gerald Vision, "Linsky on Rigid Designation and Sense," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 58 (September 1980) p. 291.

Thus, for example, the token of the name-type 'London' that occurs in the following sentence, "There is many a London in the world" is a token of a general term, since it purports to pick out more than one thing. Clearly the token of the name-type 'London' that occurs in the sentence mentioned above is not the sort of thing that can be rigid either. Hence, it is not the name-type 'London' that can be said to be rigid, nor is it the name-token of the type, rather it is simply the name (i.e., the singular term) 'London' that can be said to be rigid.

But if a name is not to be identified with a type, and it is not to be identified with a token either, then with what is it to be identified? More is needed than Vision's notion of a name-instance. Perhaps a name might be identified with the ordered pair $\langle N,O \rangle$ where N is some name-type and O is some object associated with it in some way; and each such ordered pair identifies a singular term. Clearly, more has to be said and some obvious problems (i.e., problems posed by names that lack bearers) have to be ironed out before such a suggestion could be accepted, but I believe that it is enough to give some substance to Vision's claim.

We need not, however, rule out the possibility of tokens being rigid in order to uphold Kripke's claim that proper names have a property (i.e., rigidity) not shared by definite descriptions, and hence that names cannot be

disguised descriptions. That is, even if we assume that it makes sense to call a token of a definite description rigid, the contrast between proper names and definite descriptions can still be drawn in terms of scope. Vision in a footnote to the passage quoted above makes this point in connection with his notion of an expression-instance. He states in the footnote that :

> Perhaps it is because being a rigid designator is a property of expression-instances, and not their uses or tokens, that Kripke seems uneasy about definite descriptions as rigid designators. For although uses of such descriptions may take wide scope, no description-instance is such that all its (possible) uses take wide scope.[1]

The basic point that Vision makes in the passage quoted above need not, however, be made in terms of his notion of an expression-instance. It simply has to be pointed out that while it may be true that a particular token of a definite description that has wide scope is rigid, the definite description of which it is a token is not. Thus as we have already noted some tokens of 'the greatest philosopher of antiquity' will occur in sentences like (2) and some will occur in sentences like (3). Thus the definite description will be such that it is ambiguous in modal contexts, and hence not be a rigid designator. Proper names, on the other hand, simply do not display this ambiguity with regard to

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[1] Ibid.

scope in modal contexts. There simply is no sense in which Aristotle might not have been Aristotle. There is, however, a sense in which the greatest philosopher of antiquity might not have been the greatest philosopher of antiquity.

In a footnote in Naming and Necessity Kripke states the following:

> The facts that 'the teacher of Alexander' is capable of scope distinctions in modal contexts and that it is not a rigid designator are both illustrated when one observes that the teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander (and, in such circumstances, would not have been the teacher of Alexander). On the other hand, it is not true that Aristotle might not have been Aristotle ...[1]

One clear implication of this quotation is that proper names are rigid designators and definite descriptions are not, and that while definite descriptions are capable of scope distinctions in modal contexts, proper names are not. Notice also that while a particular wide scope occurrence of 'the teacher of Alexander' may be rigid, this does not alter the fact that the description which it is an occurrence of is nonrigid, and hence capable of scope distinctions in modal contexts.

The astute reader will, of course, observe that Kripke in the above quotation speaks of two facts. One fact being that 'the teacher of Alexander' is capable of scope

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 62.

distinctions and the other being that it is not a rigid designator. I believe that the reason for this is that Kripke in the above quotation wants to emphasize his intuitive test for rigidity that I referred to in section two. 'The teacher of Alexander' is nonrigid since "it does make sense" to say that the teacher of Alexander might have been someone other than the teacher of Alexander. We can explain this by noting that 'the teacher of Alexander' is capable of scope distinctions in modal contexts in the sense that it is semantically ambiguous with regard to scope, while Kripke is apparently speaking of syntactical scope, so that no such syntactical scope difference comes in here between 'the teacher of Alexander might not have been the teacher of Alexander', and 'Aristotle might not have been Aristotle'.

The proper name 'Aristotle', on the other hand, is a rigid designator. It doesn't make any sense to say that Aristotle might have been someone other than Aristotle. This, however, can not be explained by an appeal to scope. 'Aristotle' is not capable of scope distinctions in modal contexts in the sense that it is semantically ambiguous with regard to scope. Perhaps the following passage from Naming and Necessity where the above quoted footnote occurs will help to clarify the issue.

> Most of the things commonly attributed to Aristotle are things that Aristotle might not have done at all.

> In a situation in which he didn't do them, we would describe that as a situation in which Aristotle didn't do them. This is not a distinction of scope, as happens sometimes in the case of descriptions, where someone might say that the man who taught Alexander might not have taught Alexander; though it could not have been true that: the man who taught Alexander didn't teach Alexander. This is Russell's distinction of scope. It seems to me clear that this is not the case here. Not only is it true of the man Aristotle that he might not have gone into pedagogy; it is also true that we use the term 'Aristotle' in such a way that, in thinking of a counterfactual sitation in which Aristotle didn't go into any of the fields and do any of the achievements we commonly attribute to him, still we would say that was a situation in which Aristotle did not do these things.[1]

Again, Kripke's point here seems to be that we cannot account for the fact that it is possible that Aristotle might not have been a philosopher by an appeal to scope distinctions. 'Aristotle' is simply not capable of scope distinctions that are semantically relevant. We don't have a wide scope reading that makes the claim true and a narrow scope reading of the claim that makes it false; as would be the case if we were dealing with a definite description instead of a proper name. We use the term 'Aristotle' in such a way that '[a:x]$\Box$x=a' is true, and what this means is that when we think of Aristotle in some counterfactual situation it is Aristotle that we are considering.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 61-62.

Section Seven

Now one issue that I have carefully avoided throughout the entire chapter is whether or not there are some intuitions regarding rigidity and names that can be explained by Kripke's intuitive account of rigidity that cannot be explained by the claim that his thesis regarding names is equivalent to the claim that "if a modal operator governs a simple sentence containing a name, the two readings with large and small scope are equivalent."[1] In the preface to Naming and Necessity, it is clear that Kripke wants to argue that at least some of "our" linguistic intuitions regarding rigidity cannot be handled by some hypothesis about scope conventions to the effect that proper names are simply non-rigid designators that are read as having widest possible scope. He starts by giving the following account of his idea of rigid designation.

> Consider:
>
> (1) Aristotle was fond of dogs.
>
> A proper understanding of this statement involves an understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it is in fact true, and of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course in some respects but not in others, would be correctly (partially) de-described by (1). Presumably everyone agrees that there is a certain man—the philosopher we call 'Aristotle'—such that, as a matter of fact, (1) is true if and only if he was fond of dogs. The thesis

[1] Ibid., p. 12.

> of rigid designation is simply—subtle points aside—that the same paradigm applies to the truth conditions of (1) as it describes counterfactual situations. That is, (1) truly describes a counterfactual situation if and only if the same aforementioned man would have been fond of dogs, had that situation obtained. By contrast, Russell thinks that (1) should be analyzed as something like:
>
> (2) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs,
>
> and that this in turn should be analyzed as
>
> (3) Exactly one person was last among the great philosophers of antiquity, and any such person was fond of dogs.
>
> The actual truth conditions of (3) agree extensionally with those mentioned above for (1), assuming that Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity. But counterfactually, Russell's conditions can vary wildly from those supposed by the rigidity thesis. With respect to a counterfactual situation where someone other than Aristotle would have been the last great philosopher of antiquity, Russell's criterion would make that other person's fondness for dogs the relevant issue for the correctness of (1)![1]

Given the intuition about proper names that underlies the above account, Kripke wants to make it clear that his doctrine of rigidity cannot be explained in terms of scope. That is, he wants to make it clear that those philosophers, like Loar and McKinsey, who misinterpret his thesis of rigid designation by viewing it merely as the doctrine that natural language has a convention to the effect that names are to be read as having widest possible scope in modal contexts cannot account for our intuition concerning the rigidity of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

names in the above quoted example. In his effort, however, to show that some of the linguistic intuitions that he adduces on behalf of rigidity cannot be explained by any hypothesis involving scope conventions it appears as though Kripke simply overstates his case. He states:

> (1) and (2) are 'simple' sentences. Neither contains modal or other operators, so there is no room for any scope distinctions. No scope convention about more complex sentences affects the interpretation of these sentences. Yet the issue of rigidity makes sense as applied to both. My view is that 'Aristotle' in (1) is rigid, but 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' in (2) is not. No hypothesis about scope conventions for modal contexts expresses this view; it is a doctrine about the truth conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of (the propositions expressed by) all sentences, including simple sentences.[1]

Contrary to Kripke's claim made above it does seem as though the view that natural language has a convention that names are read only as having wide scope in modal contexts could explain why 'Aristotle' in (1) is rigid (i.e., why it is Aristotle that is relevant to the truth conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, regarding (1)). All that is necessary is that the view be expressed as a conditional claim. That is, we could explain why 'Aristotle' in (1) is rigid by noting that if a modal operator preceded (1) then the name 'Aristotle' would be given widest possible scope, and that is why Aristotle is the

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[1] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

value of the name in this world, as well as all possible worlds. It could then be pointed out that no such scope convention exists for definite descriptions and that is why 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' in (2) is non-rigid. It is important to notice, however, that this sort of explanation as to why 'Aristotle' in (1) is rigid and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' in (2) is not, will be of no value to those who want to hold that proper names are really disguised definite descriptions. The reason for this is simply that it seems extremely implausible to suppose that names could be abbreviated or disguised descriptions if in natural language there exists a scope convention regarding the one but not the other. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the same scope convention that exists for names, exists for definite descriptions as well, then it seems as though we could no longer claim, as Kripke does, that, 'the last great philosopher of antiguity' in (2) is nonrigid. This is so because if the description in (2) is given only wide scope when (2) is preceded by a modal operator, then the value of 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' would be Aristotle in all possible worlds; assuming, of course, that Aristotle is the value of the description in this world. Thus it seems that Kripke's view can be expressed as an hypothesis about scope conventions, but expressing it in this way will be of no help to the description theorist.

I would like to again stress the fact, however, that any view which places a restriction on the scope of names in natural language will not be the same as Kripke's view that a name is a rigid designator if and only if the wide and narrow scope readings of the sentence that contains the name are equivalent. Kripke's view just would not make any sense for a language where both readings were not allowed. It is also interesting to note that in a footnote concerning the above quoted passage, Kripke also expresses his thesis that names are rigid designators in terms of a conditional. That is, he states that his view is equivalent to the thesis that "_if_ a modal operator governs a simple sentence containing a name, the two readings with large and small scope are equivalent."[1] Thus insofar as his view, expressed in this way, counts as an "hypothesis about scope" we also can use it to explain why 'Aristotle' in (1) is rigid and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' in (2) is not. 'Aristotle' is rigid because _if_ (1) were preceded by a modal operator, the wide and narrow scope readings of the sentence would be equivalent. 'The last great philosopher of antiquity', however, is not rigid since, _if_ (2) were preceded by a modal operator, the two readings of the sentence regarding scope would not

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 12. Emphasis added.

be equivalent.[1]

It should also be noted that it is possible to argue, in a much more direct manner, that Kripke cannot make good on his claim that all of our intuitions regarding rigidity can be explained without getting involved with the question of scope. That is, up to now I have only argued, contrary to what Kripke has claimed, that an "hypothesis about scope" can explain all of the intuitions that he has adduced on behalf of rigidity. One might also argue, however, that the account of rigidity that Kripke gives in terms of the truth conditions of (1) and (2) as they describe counterfactual situations actually commits him to an explanation in terms of scope. Thus, one might argue as follows. Let C be a "counterfactual condition", and let '$\Box\!\!\rightarrow$' represent the counterfactual conditional. Now, whether or not (1) is true in C is simply the question of whether or not

(1') C $\Box\!\!\rightarrow$ (1)

is true in this world, and whether or not (2) is true in C is simply the question of whether or not

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[1] A wide and narrow scope reading of (2) preceded by a modal operator will, of course, be materially equivalent. The two readings, however, will not be logically equivalent since the value of the description within the scope of the modal operator may change from world to world.

(2') C $\Box\!\!\rightarrow$ (2)

is true in this world. But (1') and (2') are potentially ambiguous with regard to scope. To see this let us consider (2'). It has a wide scope reading, viz., 'the greatest philosopher of antiquity is such that if it were true that C, then he would have been fond of dogs', and a narrow scope reading, viz., 'if it were true that C, then the greatest philosopher of antiquity would have been fond of dogs'. The same point can be made regarding (1'), only in this case the syntactical scope ambiguity displayed will not be semantically relevant as is the case for (2').

Thus it appears that not only can all of the intuitions that Kripke adduces on behalf of rigidity be expressed by some form of hypothesis in terms of scope, namely, his own; but that also his own view may actually commit him to an explanation in terms of scope. It is for this reason that I have neglected to consider at length his "intuitive test" for rigidity as a separate and possibly more fundamental account of his doctrine.

Section Eight

It should be clear from what has been covered so far that the move to avoid Kripke's argument by employing wide scope definite descriptions has no chance of success. One can stipulate that the definite description that is

substituted for a proper name be given widest possible scope in modal contexts, but as long as that definite description is ordinarily thought to be capable of scope distinctions, the fact remains that it will not have a property that proper names do. Namely, it will not be a rigid designator. That is, it will not be such that scope distinctions are irrelevant, apart, of course, from ad hoc stipulation.

Kripke's modal argument would, of course, be met if the definite descriptions that one substituted for proper names were such that they did not induce scope ambiguity in modal contexts. We have already noted what such a definite description would be like. Definite descriptions like 'the smallest prime number' and 'the darkest color' are rigid designators, and as such would fit the bill if, of course, they were the sort of descriptions that could be substituted for proper names. One feature that these descriptions all seemed to have in common, however, was that they took as their values abstract objects. We also noted that they seemed to be rigid designators in virtue of the fact that certain sorts of relationships held between their values and other members of the respective kinds to which they belonged. Thus, while there does seem to be some definite descriptions in natural language that are rigid designators, they do not seem to be the sort of descriptions that will be of much value for those who wish to save a description view of proper names and avoid Kripke's argument.

This is not to say, however, that such a definite description could not be invented. Linsky notes in Names and Descriptions (p.54) that Quine's proposal for eliminating names in favor of predicates provides us with just such a description. According to Quine any proper name can be eliminated in favor of a predicate in a regimented language. Thus, for example, the proper name 'Socrates' could be replaced by the predicate 'socratizes'. The definite description that would result is (℩x)(x Socratizes), and it is such that it is not ambiguous in modal contexts. Consider the following sentences:

(1) $\Diamond(\iota x)(x \text{ Socratizes}) \neq (\iota x)(x \text{ Socratizes})$

(2) $[(\iota y)(y \text{ Socratizes}):x]\Diamond\, x \neq (\iota z)(z \text{ Socratizes})$

Both (1) and (2) are false. This is so because as Linsky correctly points out "if 'Socrates', as a name, is a rigid designator so is the predicate 'socratizes' which has within its extension in each possible world (in which it has anything within its extension) just that individual who is Socrates."[1] Thus Kripke's modal argument can be met by requiring that the definite descriptions that are substituted for proper names be of this special Quinean sort.

It is interesting to note that in a footnote in Naming and Necessity (p. 29, n.5) Kripke, himself, suggests

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[1]Linsky, Names and Descriptions, p. 54.

the basis for this strategem. In that same footnote, however, he claims that all of the problems he poses for the Frege-Russell description view of proper names (which I take to include his modal argument as well) will apply mutatis mutandis to a view that makes use of the special sort of Quinean definite description we have just considered. Kripke's claim here is simply too strong. Most of the problems he raises for the Frege-Russell view will apply to a reformed language view as well, but not his modal argument.

There is another sort of argument employed by Kripke to show that a description view of names is false that also would seem to be blunted by the adoption of the special sort of Quinean definite description that we have been considering. In Naming and Necessity Kripke gives some cases that are designed to show that a description view of names cannot provide us with necessary conditions for determining the referent of a name. One such case is his Gödel-Schmidt example. Assuming that the only description we associate with 'Gödel' is 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic' we are to imagine the following scenario:

> Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem. A man named 'Schmidt', whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Gödel.[1]

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 83-84.

Given the situation above, Kripke goes on to conclude,

> On the view in question (the description view) then, when our ordinary man uses the name 'Gödel', he really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description, 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. ...So, since the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about Gödel', are in fact always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. We simply are not.[1]

Kripke in the above example is, of course, assuming that 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic' is a nonrigid definite description. The important point to notice, however, is that the situation described above is not improved one iota by claiming that it is a rigid definite description that is used to determine the referent of the name 'Gödel'. Even if this were so the referent of the description in question would still be Schmidt, since a rigid definite description still determines its referent via its unique satisfaction of the associated property. This would not be the case, however, if the rigid description used to determine the referent of the name were of the special Quinean sort that we have been considering. '(?x)(x Gödelizes)' would correctly pick out Gödel in this world as well as all possible worlds, and the intuition that Kripke appeals to in his case is preserved.

Overall, however, I do not think that an appeal to

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[1] Ibid., p. 84.

the sort of Quinean descriptions we have considered will prove to be satisfactory for the description theorist. For one thing, it seems to trivialize their position and for another as Kripke notes "the question, 'How is the reference of 'Socrates' determined?' yields to the question, 'How is the extension of 'x Socratizes' determined'"[1]

Before I leave this section I would like to make two last points concerning rigidity and the possibility of defeating Kripke's modal argument by use of rigid definite descriptions. First, if descriptions like 'the greatest philosopher of antiquity' are ambiguous in natural language between a rigid and nonrigid sense, and it is the rigid sense of the definite description that we are dealing with, then Kripke will simply claim that his principle thesis is not affected. This is so because, as he states, his principal thesis "contrasts names with nonrigid descriptions, as advocated by Russell"[2]

Second, it should also be pointed out that even if definite descriptions are ambiguous in natural language between a rigid and nonrigid sense, this ambiguity could not be used to replace Russell's idea of scope. The reason for this is simply that definite descriptions are such that they may occur in modal sentences where they have neither widest possible scope nor narrowest possible scope. That is,

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[1] Ibid., p. 29.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

definite descriptions may have intermediate scopes in some modal sentences in which they occur. Kripke has made this point in a number of places (see, for example, "Identity and Necessity", n.10, p. 149, and "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," p. 259) by use of the following example. Consider the sentence,

(C) The number of planets might have been necessarily even.

The only sense in which (C) could be true is when the definite description in it is given intermediate scope. If 'the number of planets' is given widest possible scope, (C) is false, and if it is given narrowest possible scope, (C) is false as well. Consider the following translations of (C):

(D) $\Diamond[(\iota x)Nx:x]\Box Ex$

(E) $\Diamond\Box E(\iota x)Nx$

(F) $[(\iota x)Nx:x]\Diamond\Box Ex$

(D) is the reading that gives the definite description intermediate scope and it is the reading that may very well make (C) true. This is because the value of the description might be eight at some possible world and it is necessary that eight is even. (E) gives the definite description narrowest possible scope and it is false since the value of the description might be three at some possible

world in which case it is not possible that it be necessary that the number of planets be even. (F) gives the definite description widest possible scope and it is false as well. In this case the value of the description is nine in all possible worlds and it is such that it could not possibly be necessarily even.

The important point to notice here is that if we try to replace Russell's notion of scope with a simple rigid (i.e., wide scope reading as in (F)), nonrigid (i.e., narrow scope reading as in (E)) dichotomy, then we cannot use the distinction to get the reading which makes (C) true (i.e., (D)). In his article in the Midwest Studies in Philosophy Kripke states that "no twofold distinction can do the job" of replacing Russell's idea of scope distinctions. He clearly intends that this claim hold for Donnellan's referential-attributive as well, but the example he uses to make his case is far less convincing than the one given above. I won't argue for this here, but merely leave it to the reader to form his own opinion. The point I would like to make, however, is that insofar that it is possible to view Donnellan's distinction as capable of replacing Russell's notion of scope, we have good reason for not indentifying referential descriptions with rigid descriptions and attributive description with nonrigid descriptions. This is because it is clear that the rigid-nonrigid dichotomy cannot replace Russell's idea of scope.

CHAPTER TWO

CRITICISMS OF THE MODAL ARGUMENT

Section One

In his book, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Michael Dummett makes the following claim concerning the question of possible scope ambiguity for proper names and definite descriptions in modal contexts.

> ... the question may be resolved for all contexts by adopting some uniform convention determining the scope; thus Frege may be represented as having adopted the convention that the scope of a proper name or a definite description is always to be taken as the widest possible, i.e., the whole sentence.[1]

I believe that it has been this remark or others similar to it that have led some philosophers, like Hudson and Tye, for example, to hold that Dummett's approach to Kripke's argument is essentially the same as that taken by Loar and McKinsey. That is, that the way to avoid the argument is to move to wide scope definite descriptions. The quotation from Dummett referred to above not withstanding, I think

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[1]Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 115.

that to view his argument against Kripke along these lines would be a mistake. It would be a mistake not because that interpretation is insufficiently supported by the text. Unfortunately, Dummett's lack of clarity in discussing the issue seems to allow for such an interpretation. Rather, as I hope will become clear in the pages to follow, it would be a mistake because Dummett can also be seen as attacking Kripke head on. That is, Dummett is best viewed as denying the thesis that proper names are rigid designators, since he attempts to show that at least some proper names are ambiguous with regard to scope in modal contexts. Taken in this way Dummett can be seen as denying Kripke's claim that proper names and definite descriptions are not on a par in this respect.

One of the issues that Dummett focuses his attention on in his appendix to chapter 5 of Frege: Philosophy of Language is Kripke's distinction between using a definite description to "fix the reference" of a proper name verses using one to "give its meaning" (section 2, pp. 111-135). According to Kripke whenever a definite description $\ulcorner(\eta x)\phi x\urcorner$ is used to introduce a name α and $\ulcorner(\eta x)\phi x\urcorner$ is used to fix the reference of α and not give its meaning, α so introduced will be a rigid designator. Now, supposedly one consequence of introducing α in this way will be that we can know a priori that $\ulcorner\alpha=(\eta x)\phi x\urcorner$ (this is so because the reference of α is fixed by $\ulcorner(\eta x)\phi x\urcorner$ even though $\ulcorner\Diamond\, \alpha\neq(\eta x)\phi x\urcorner$ is true

(this is so because $\ulcorner(\iota x)\phi x\urcorner$ does not "fix the meaning" of α; while the value of α remains fixed from world to world, the value of $\ulcorner(\iota x)\phi x\urcorner$ may change at each world). Since α is a rigid designator and $\ulcorner(\iota x)\phi x\urcorner$ is not $\ulcorner\alpha=(\iota x)\phi x\urcorner$ would not be a necessary truth.

Possibly one of Kripke's clearest examples of having a name introduced by a reference fixing definite description is given in a footnote in Naming and Necessity. There he states:

> An even better case of determining the reference of a name by description, as opposed to ostension, is the discovery of the planet Neptune. Neptune was hypothesized as the planet which caused such and such discrepancies in the orbits of certain other planets. If Leverrier indeed gave the name "Neptune" to the planet before it was ever seen, then he fixed the reference of "Neptune" by means of the description mentioned. At the time he was unable to see the planet even through a telescope. At this state, an a priori material equivalence held between the statements "Neptune exists" and "Some one planet perturbing the orbit of such and such other planets exists in such and such a position," and also such statements as "if such and such perturbations are caused by a planet, they are caused by Neptune" had the status of a priori truths. Nevertheless they were not necessary truths, since "Neptune" was introduced as a name rigidly designating a certain planet. Leverrier could well have believed that if Neptune had been knocked off of its course one million years earlier, it would cause no such perturbations and even that some other object might have caused the perturbations in its place.[1]

Some philosophers appear to take issue with Kripke, concerning the passage just quoted, over whether or not

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, n. 33, p. 79.

'Neptune' was in fact introduced by Leverrier as a rigid designator as opposed to a mere abbreviation for some definite description. In this case it would be argued that the definite description 'the planet that caused the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus', as used by Leverrier to introduce the name 'Neptune', fixed its meaning. Keith Donnellan in his article 'The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators' attributes such a position to Dummett, referring to the section in Dummett's book previously noted. In that article Donnellan rather halfheartedly attempts to justify the concern over the factual question as to how 'Neptune' was introduced, which he attributes to Dummett, by noting that Kripke, in the last two sentences in the above quotation, "may seem to be giving an argument" to the effect that Neptune was in fact introduced as a rigid designator and not a mere abbreviation. According to Donnellan the argument goes as follows:

> Take the modal sentence,
>
> (A) Neptune might have existed and not been the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.
>
> Following Kripke, it seems that having just introduced the name via the description contained in (A), Leverrier might nevertheless believe without any inconsistency what (A) expresses. But that seems to show that the following sentence expresses a contingent truth:
>
> (B) If Neptune exists, Neptune is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.

> But if "Neptune" were a mere abbreviation for the description in question then (B) would be equivalent by substitution of the description for the name, to a mere tautology. Thus, or so it might seem, we can show that Neptune was not introduced as an abbreviation.[1]

Now, Donnellan takes the unstated conclusion of this argument to be that since 'Neptune' was not introduced as a mere abbreviation, it was introduced as a rigid designator. But, why should we take this to be the conclusion of Kripke's argument? Especially since as it stands it is fallacious. The argument foisted on Kripke assumes that only two alternatives are possible. Either a proper name, so introduced, is introduced as a rigid designator or it is introduced as a mere abbreviation, but not both. But why, without further argument to the contrary, can't we suppose that the name was introduced as neither or that some as of yet unstated third possibility exists?

If, however, the argument isn't intended by Kripke as an argument to show that 'Neptune' was introduced as a rigid designator, then what is it an argument for? Notice that one could take Donnellan's reading of Kripke to be an argument to show that 'Neptune' doesn't mean 'the planet that caused the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus'. In this case we would simply have a particular instance of the

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[1]Keith Donnellan, "The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II: Studies in the Philosophy of Language (February 1977), p. 14.

general form of argument that Loar attributed to Kripke. The argument would be as follows:

$$Mn(\iota x)Fx \rightarrow \Box(E!n \supset Fn)$$
$$\sim\Box(E!n \supset Fn)$$
$$\therefore \sim Mn(\iota x)Fx$$

We have already seen, however, that there is good reason for not taking this to be Kripke's argument. What I suggest is that we take Kripke's remarks in the section noted by Donnellan, at their face value. That is, that we simply take them as an argument to show that sentences like 'If Neptune exists, then Neptune is the planet that caused the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus' are not necessary truths. The reason for this is that 'Neptune' is a rigid designator and the definite description is not. Leverrier might well have believed that Neptune might not have been the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, since that belief could have been true. The belief could have been true because 'Neptune' rigidly designates the very same planet, while the nonrigid definite description might have an object other than Neptune as its value.

The confusion that arises over Kripke's Neptune example results from the fact that Dummett, and to some extent Donnellan, take Kripke to be giving us a case where a name is <u>made</u> rigid by introducing it via a reference fixing

definite description. Rather, what Kripke is actually doing is showing us, that a proper name which is a rigid designator because all proper names are rigid designators, can be introduced into the language one of two ways. Either by ostension or by fixing the referent with the definite description. Kripke is not arguing that 'Neptune' was introduced by Leverrier as a rigid designator. Rather he is arguing that a rigid designator, 'Neptune', can have its referent determined by a reference fixing description.

It is instructive to consider Donnellan's reply to the argument, as originally set out by him, since it is a response that he attributes to Dummett. According to Donnellan the argument can be met simply by pointing to scope differences in (A). That (A) is ambiguous with regard to scope can be readily seen, it is argued, when we consider the sentences that result when we substitute for 'Neptune' the definite description that is claimed to be definitionally equivalent to it. The narrow scope reading that results,

> (D) It might have been the case that [the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus did not cause the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus].[1]

is plainly false, and hence not a belief that we could

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[1] Ibid.

charitably attribute to Leverrier. The wide scope reading that results,

> (E) The cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus might have been such that it did not cause the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.[1]

however, is true and might well have been believed by Leverrier. Given (D) and (E) Donnellan then goes on to point out,

> That Leverrier might well have consistently believed what is expressed by (A) does not then show that "Neptune" was not introduced by him as an abbreviation for the description nor that (B) is contingently true. For on the hypothesis that it was introduced as an abbreviation (E) expresses one of the propositions (A) could express and (E) is something Leverrier might well have believed.[2]

It should be obvious by now that the above is simply another instance of the basic move by McKinsey and Loar. The sense in which (A) is true is the sense in which the definite description substituted for the name in (A) is given widest possible scope. I hope that it is equally clear, at this point, that this sort of rejoinder to Kripke does not refute his claim that proper names are not disguised descriptions; even when the description is used to

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 15.

introduce the name. Kripke makes this abundantly clear in a footnote concerning Donnellan's article. He states:

> ... Donnellan asks whether I think proper names (in natural language) are always rigid: obviously, he thinks, proper names could be introduced to abbreviate nonrigid definite descriptions. My view is, that proper names are always rigid. In particular this applies to "Neptune". It would be logically possible to have single words that abbreviated nonrigid definite descriptions, but these would not be names. The point is not merely terminological: I mean that such abbreviated nonrigid definite descriptions would differ in an important semantical feature from (what we call) typical proper names in our ordinary speech.[1]

I believe that Kripke's claim that nonrigid definite descriptions "differ in an important semantical feature" from proper names is not only consistent with the position that I have attributed to him, but supports my claim that it is in fact his position as well. I take his point here simply to be that proper names do not induce scope ambiguity in modal contexts and nonrigid definite descriptions do. And that it is this aforementioned "semantical feature" that would prevent 'Neptune' from being a proper name if it were introduced to abbreviate some nonrigid definite description. Kripke also makes this same point in his preface to Naming and Necessity. He states:

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[1]Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," n. 9, p. 272.

> It also became clear that a symbol of any actual or hypothetical language that is not a rigid designator is so unlike the names of ordinary language that it ought not to be called a 'name'. In particular, this would apply to a hypothetical abbreviation of a non-rigid definite description.[1]

The basic premise that Donnellan wants to establish is that there are no theoretical reasons that would block the introduction of a proper name as a rigid designator via a definite description as long as it was explicitly stipulated that the name was being introduced as such. That is, he is primarily concerned to show that the concept of introducing a name as a rigid designator via a reference fixing definite description is a coherent one. The only lesson to be drawn from what he takes to be Dummett's position is that "in the absence of stipulation that the name shall be one or the other, it would be indeterminate whether a name introduced by means of a description is a rigid designator or an abbreviation, so long as the name continues to be pegged to the description."[2] What Dummett supposedly shows us, concerning Kripke's 'Neptune' example, is that an "argument" from modal beliefs to show that 'Neptune' was introduced by Leverrier as a rigid designator can always be evaded, and it is equally plausible to suppose that 'Neptune' was introduced as a mere abbreviation. Thus on the latter

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, n. 5, p. 5.

[2]Donnellan, "The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators," p. 16.

assumption, according to Donnellan, (A) will have two non-equivalent readings as evidenced by (D) and (E), but on the assumption that 'Neptune' was introduced as a rigid designator no such ambiguity of scope results. If 'Neptune' was in fact introduced as a rigid designator, then

(1) $\Diamond n \neq (\iota x)Px$

is equivalent to

(2) $[n:x] \Diamond x \neq (\iota x)Px$.

Now, Donnellan wrongly takes the heart of Dummett's attack on Kripke to be no more than what has been set out above. What he fails to realize, however, is that in the very same section of Dummett's book that he refers to, Dummett offers a much more direct attack of Kripke's position. In particular, Dummett may also be viewed as arguing that even if we assume, a la Kripke, that the description 'the planet that caused the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus' only fixes the referent of 'Neptune' and not its meaning, it is still the case that while (2) is true, (1) is false.

Donnellan goes wrong because he assumes that Dummett is merely arguing that names like 'Neptune' won't be rigid designators if the definite descriptions that introduce them are abbreviations of the names and fix their

meanings. I grant that viewing Dummett's argument in this manner gives us the same result (i.e., 'Neptune' will not be a rigid designator), but it also requires some argument to the effect that Kripke cannot produce a case where the introducing description is only a reference fixer and not a meaning fixer as well. Nowhere in his book, however, do we find Dummett offering such an argument. Rather, what we find is Dummett meeting Kripke head on. He would accept Kripke's claim regarding the introduction of 'Neptune' (i.e., that the introducing description only fixes its reference and not its meaning), but still argue that the name is semantically ambiguous with regard to scope in modal contexts, and hence is not a rigid designator.

Section Two

Dummett begins his attack on Kripke by laying out what he takes to be Kripke's argument to show that a proper name cannot be a disguised definite description when the description in question fixes the referent of the name. He feels that among personal proper names 'St. Anne' would be a good candidate to bear out Kripke's claim. This is because assuming that all we really know about her is that she was the mother of Mary it is natural to take the reference of 'St. Anne' as fixed by the description 'the mother of Mary'. Thus according to Dummett, Kripke's argument is as follows:

> It is evidently true, for example, to say, 'The mother of Mary was necessarily a parent', at least where this is understood as meaning, 'It is necessarily true that, if there was such a person as Mary, and there was one and only one woman who was her mother, then that woman was a parent'. But it is not so evident that it would be true to say, 'St. Anne was necessarily a parent', meaning thereby, 'It is necessarily true that, if there was such a woman as St. Anne, then she was a parent'. For surely we can truly say, 'St. Anne might have died in infancy' or 'St. Anne might have remained a virgin all her life'. It appears to follow that 'St. Anne' and 'the mother of Mary' cannot be synonymous.[1]

Now, if Donnellan's characterization of Dummett's position was essentially correct, we would expect to find Dummett pointing out that the sentence, 'The mother of Mary was necessarily a parent' is false when the description in it is read as having widest possible scope. This, however, is not what we find. (Nor do we find Dummett explicitly arguing that 'the mother of Mary' fixes the meaning of 'St. Anne'.) Rather what Dummett goes on to argue is that <u>there is a sense</u> in which the sentence, 'St. Anne was necessarily a parent' is true. Dummett acknowledges the fact that 'the mother of Mary' is ambiguous with regard to scope in modal contexts, but holds that the same is true of 'St. Anne'. What he wants to show with his St. Anne example is that

> ... no difference between proper names and definite descriptions appears at all. In both cases, there

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[1]Dummett, <u>Frege: Philosophy of Language</u>, p. 112.

> seems to be an ambiguity in modal sentences containing them: the very same ambiguity in both cases, which accordingly cannot be used to differentiate the two types of expression.[1]

In order to make his case Dummett admits that there is a sense in which it is correct to say 'St. Anne might never have become a parent'. In this case 'St. Anne' would be given wide scope relative to the modal operator as follows:

$$[a{:}x]\Diamond \sim Px.$$

But he also holds that there is "an equally clear sense in which we may rightly say, 'St. Anne cannot but have been a parent' provided always that this is understood as meaning that if there was such a woman as St. Anne, then she can only have been a parent."[2] Hence, Dummett's chief concern is to show that the following sentence is true:

> (3) If there was such a woman as St. Anne, then she can only have been a parent.

Unfortunately, (3) is ambiguous. Dummett could be claiming either that

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[1] Ibid., p. 113.

[2] Ibid.

(4) $E!a \supset \Box Pa$

is true or that

(5) $\Box(E!a \supset Pa)$

is true. Clearly, however, the principle of charity dictates that we take (5) and not (4) as the intended reading of (3). The idiom, 'If ... then it must be (or can only have been) the case that ——' is ambiguous in English, and very often what is intended by a speaker to be an uncontested truth can be interpreted in such a way that what he says is false. Consider the following sentence:

(6) If the Tigers win every game, then they must have a perfect season.

(6) could be interpreted as either

(7) $P \supset \Box Q$

or

(8) $\Box(P \supset Q)$.

(7) says that if the Tigers win every game in the actual world, then there is no possible world where they do not

have a perfect season. Clearly, (7) is false since we could assume that the antecedent is true and still imagine a possible world where the Tigers lose one or even all of their games. Similarly, (4) is clearly false. It says that if St. Anne exists in the actual world, then there is no possible world where she is not a parent. But certainly we could assume that the antecedent of (4) is true and still hold that in some possible world St. Anne remained childless all her life. (8), on the other hand, is the reading of (6) that makes it true. (8) says that there is no world where the Tigers win every game and do not have a perfect season. Clearly (8) is the more charitable reading of (6), and similarly (5) would seem to be the more charitable reading of (3). But while it is clear that (6) read as (8) is true, it is not at all clear that (3) read as (5) is true. It simply is not at all obvious that there is no world where St. Anne exists and she is not a parent. (3) read as (5) is doubtful at best, unless we have some account to help guide our intuitions regarding its truth. Dummett realizes this and suggests that Kripke, himself, acknowledges a sense in which (3) interpreted as (5) is true; only not in connection with proper names. Concerning Kripke's metre rod example Dummett states:

> He [Kripke] comments on Wittgenstein's example of the standard metre rod in Paris, and insists, as against Wittgenstein, that it is perfectly proper to ascribe

> to that rod the property of being 1 metre long, on the ground that we can truly say of it that it might not have been 1 metre long. But, in arguing this, he also grants that, in another way, it is a priori true that the standard metre is 1 metre long. Of course, this case is not one to do with what is ordinarily called a proper name: but Kripke wishes to apply, his distinction between 'fixing the reference' and 'giving the meaning' to this case also, holding that taking the metre rod as the standard is a way of fixing the reference, but not of giving the meaning, of the word 'metre. Hence the concession must be taken to apply to proper names in the more usual sense, at least whenever there is something specific which may be taken as fixing the reference.[1]

What Dummett wants to establish here is that Kripke merely replaces necessity de dicto with a priori truth. Quine in his review of "Identity and Necessity" also reads Kripke as making the same move. He states, "Kripke sums up matters in other words: genuine names he calls rigid designators, necessity de re he calls metaphysical necessity, and necessity de dicto he calls a priori truths."[2] Now, what Dummett apparently wants to argue is that insofar as it is a priori true that St. Anne is a parent, and given that a priori truth is just de dicto necessity, (3) read as (5) is true. Thus 'St. Anne' is ambiguous with regard to scope in modal contexts, and hence there is no reason in principle why 'St. Anne' cannot be the disguised definite description 'the

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Willard Van Orman Quine, review of Identity and Individuation, ed. by M.Munitz (New York: New York University Press, 1971) in The Journal of Philosophy, LXIX (1972), p.493.

mother of Mary'. Dummett sums up his position as follows:

> ... we have one and the same phenomenon occurring for both proper names and definite descriptions. There cannot, therefore, be any argument from this fact alone to the conclusion that a proper name can never be equivalent to a definite description. In the case of definite descriptions, Kripke explains the phenomenon in terms of the notion of scope. For proper names, on the other hand, he considers the notion of scope inapplicable, and therefore invokes a distinction between two kinds of possibility. The argument for saying, in this case, that there are two kinds of possibility seems no stronger than it would be in the case of definite descriptions. When we say that the mother of Mary can only have been a parent, in the sense in which it is true to say this are we not expressing a priori knowledge, based solely on our understanding of the words, precisely similar to that expressed by saying that the standard metre rod can only be 1 metre long? When, on the other hand, we say that the mother of Mary might not have been a parent, are we not concerned with the very same kind of metaphysical necessity involved in saying that St. Anne might not have been a parent? To explain the ambiguity, in the definite description case, in terms of uncertainity of scope, however, requires that the modal operator be taken as unambiguous: if its sense shifted, should we not need also to suppose that its scope altered, as we pass from one interpretation of the sentence to the other. Quite plainly, these considerations, as far from providing grounds against the assimilation of proper names to definite descriptions, supply substantial evidence in its favor.[1]

Dummett, however, fails to substantially support the two crucial claims that he needs to make his case. Namely, that it is a priori true that St. Anne is a parent, and that Kripke merely trades ambiguity of scope regarding definite descriptions for ambiguity of modality (i.e., epistemic vs. metaphysical necessity) regarding proper names.

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[1]Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 116.

It seems to me that both claims are false. Notice, though, that if it can be shown that it is not an a priori truth that St. Anne is a parent, that alone will be sufficient to show that (5) is false.

At first glance one might suppose that Dummett is arguing that we know a priori that St. Anne is a parent simply because 'St. Anne' means 'the mother of Mary'. In the passage quoted above he does seem to indicate that this is his position when he says that our a priori knowledge is "based solely on our understanding of the words". For Dummett, however, the phrase "our understanding of the words" refers to their use as reference fixers and not the meanings thay have. This is made clear when he states concerning his St. Anne case and Kripke's metre rod example that:

> ... our knowledge is genuinely a priori knowledge, given in advance of any particular observations or experience relating to the subject-matter of the sentence. It is knowledge derived solely from a grasp of the way in which the words are used, i.e., from the fact that 'the length of the standard metre rod' is used to fix the reference of '1 metre' and 'the mother of Mary' to fix the reference of 'St. Anne'.[1]

Section Three

Before I go on to give my criticism of Dummett's claim that (3) read as (5) is true I would like to briefly

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[1] Ibid. Emphasis added.

consider a slightly different account of and response to his St. Anne case. Leonard Linsky in his book, Names and Descriptions, also views Dummett as meeting Kripke's modal thesis head on (i.e., as arguing that names like 'St. Anne' are not rigid designators). But Linsky, like Donnellan, takes Dummett to be giving a much different argument than the one I have attributed to him. According to Linsky, Dummett has produced a case where the definite description in question fixes the meaning of the name, since it is a case where the description exhausts all we know about the bearer of the name. Thus for Linsky, 'the mother of Mary' is "as good a candidate as we can find for a meaning fixer of the name".[1]

Linsky, uses the name 'Homer' to construct a case parallel to Dummett's St. Anne case. If such a person as Homer existed at all, then we are to suppose that all we know of him is that he was the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey. In this case the definite description 'the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey' is to be taken as fixing the meaning of 'Homer'. But if this is done, then

(9) $\Box$Ah

is true, while

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[1]Linsky, Names and Descriptions, p. 57.

(10) $[h:x]\Box Ax$

is false. (10) is certainly incompatible with

$[h:x]\Diamond \sim Ax$

which is clearly true. Kripke, of course, would probably deny the assumption that a name could have its meaning fixed by some definite description. He would, however, grant that the word 'Homer', in the case described above, could have its meaning fixed by some definite description. But he would then argue, as we have already seen, (cf. p. 93) that the word 'Homer' is simply an abbreviated nonrigid definite description and not a proper name. Linsky seems to totally disregard this as a possibility and merely assumes that 'Homer' and 'St. Anne' would count as proper names for Kripke even if their meaning was fixed by 'the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey' and 'the mother of Mary' respectively.

Now, Linsky correctly maintains that if we count sentences such as (5) and (9) as true, then Kripke's claim that all proper names are rigid designators is false. (For purposes of explication I suggest that we do not contest Linsky's implicit assumption that the singular terms occurring in (5) and (9) are what we would normally call "names", even when they are taken as abbreviated nonrigid definite

descriptions.) He does not, however, want to give up Kripke's thesis that proper names are rigid designators. Yet, he also seems to hold that his Homer case and Dummett's St. Anne case pose a genuine threat. That is, he also seems to hold that without any argument to the contrary, our intuitions are such that we would count (5) and (9) as true. In order to find a solution to this quandry Linsky turns to Kripke's metre rod example.

According to Linsky, given Kripke's discussion of the metre rod example, one might plausibly suppose that it is de dicto necessary that the length of the standard metre rod in Paris is 1 metre long. But in this case Linsky maintains that the purported de dicto necessity can be challenged by Kripke's claim that it is only a priori true that the standard metre rod in Paris is 1 metre long and it is not in any sense necessary (cf. Names and Descriptions, pp. 62 and 66). Hence, Kripke can handle what might seem to be a de dicto/de re ambiguity regarding the standard metre rod case by being able to show that the ambiguity in question is really between a priori truth and metaphysical necessity. The sentence, 'The standard metre rod in Paris is 1 metre long' is both contingent and a priori true. This is because the phrase '1 metre' was introduced into the language by stipulating that its reference be fixed by the description 'the length of the standard metre rod in Paris'. Kripke supposedly can explain how contingent a priori truth

is possible in this case simply by pointing out that a "stipulative definition" was used to fix the reference of the term introduced into the language. The phrase '1 metre' so introduced rigidly designates a certain length in all possible worlds, while the value of the description 'the length of the standard metre bar in Paris' may vary from world to world. Hence, we are dealing with a contingent truth since 1 metre might not be the length of the standard metre bar in Paris in some possible world. Yet, we know a priori what length the standard metre bar has, viz., 1 metre, since it was stipulated that '1 metre' would have its reference fixed by the description used to introduce the term.

The trick now, according to Linsky, is for Kripke to be able to explain, in the same manner, how it is possible for it to be a priori true that St. Anne is a parent and Homer is an author. For, if a similar account can be given of these cases, then Kripke can explain why (5) and (9) appear to be true, and thus protect his thesis that proper names are rigid designators against the purported counter-examples. Linsky, however, places great stress on the antecedent of the preceding conditional. He states:

> I doubt that it can be met. The difficulty lies in the fact that we really do not have any clear account of a priori city. In what way are the St. Anne and Homer cases like that of the standard metre bar? I do not see how the cases can be made similar at all. Can it

> be claimed that St. Anne is a mother "by definition"? Perhaps it can be said that, in some sense, it is true that St. Anne is a mother by virtue of the definition (or meaning, or sense) of 'St. Anne', certainly not of 'mother'. But then what happens to the claim that names do not have senses? Indeed, it can appear that the appeal to a difference in extensions of the concepts of the a priori and the necessary, the a posteriori and the contingent, is only an ad hoc device for avoiding counterexamples.[1]

As a result of the St. Anne and Homer cases Linsky feels that "Kripke must abandon either the distinction between the a priori and the necessary, or the thesis that names are rigid designators (do not induce de dicto/de re ambiguities), or the thesis that they lack sense."[2] Linsky's answer is to take the latter course of action. That is, he wants to hold that it will be a priori true that St. Anne is a parent and Homer is an author only if we allow the proper names of these individuals to have senses. Thus, "we can safely explain the apparent de dicto/de re ambiguities induced by these names which threaten their rigid designator status as really differences of modality, epistemic and metaphysical."[3]

I am sure that by now it has become painfully obvious to the reader that either something has been left out of my account of Linsky's argument or that there is

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[1] Ibid., p. 63.

[2] Ibid., p. 66.

[3] Ibid., p. 83.

something amiss with it. Why, we might wonder, does Linsky go through all of these contortions to show us that a name such as 'St. Anne' requires a sense, when by hypothesis we start out with a case where the definite description used to introduce the name is taken to fix its meaning? If, as Linsky states, 'the mother of Mary' fixes the meaning of 'St. Anne', then 'St. Anne' already has a sense. What further argument is required? Also, since it would be analytically true that St. Anne is the mother of Mary, certainly no further argument is needed to show that we know a priori that St. Anne is a parent.

Actually, something has been left out of my account of Linsky's argument. Linsky does need to argue that proper names require a sense because he also wants to hold that the sense of a name like 'St. Anne' will not be the same as the sense of the definite description that is used to introduce the name and fix its meaning. He is also clearly aware of the fact that it simply won't do for it to be analytically true that St. Anne is the mother of Mary. In this latter regard he states:

> I am not claiming that in cases in which we acquire the sense of a name with a single definite description that the sense acquired is the same as that of the definite description. In fact that cannot be the case, for it is de dicto necessary that the mother of Mary is a mother, and the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey an author. Thus if the sense of the name 'St. Anne' is identical with the sense of 'the mother of Mary' it would follow that it is also necessary de dicto that

> St. Anne is a mother, and this I have been at some pains to deny.[1]

Linsky's answer to the problem raised in the passage quoted above is to suggest that:

> ... the name gains only part of its sense from the description which introduces it to us. Another constituent of its sense accrues to it solely by virtue of the fact that it is a proper name. It is by virtue of this constituent of its sense that any proper name is a rigid designator.[2]

Hence, it would appear as though Linsky wants to argue that we know a priori that St. Anne is a parent not because it is analytically true that St. Anne is the mother of Mary (in which case (5) would be held by many to be true), but because being a mother (i.e., a parent) is only part of the sense of St. Anne. It is hard to see, however, how this sort of explanation could help Linsky avoid his problem. Being a male is only part of the meaning of 'bachelor' yet clearly it is analytically true that a bachelor is a male and as a consequence it is de dicto necessary as well. Similarly, if 'the mother of Mary' is part of the sense of 'St. Anne', then it is analytically true that St. Anne is the mother of Mary and it follows that (5) is true. But this is precisely what Linsky has taken great pains to deny

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[1] Ibid., pp. 83-84. Emphasis added.

[2] Ibid.

since he wants to maintain Kripke's thesis that proper names are rigid designators.

Perhaps Linsky would argue that since being a rigid designator is part of the sense of a proper name it is not analytically true that St. Anne is the mother of Mary. Gerald Vision has pointed out, however, that any attempt that Linsky might make in that direction to reconcile us to the claim that while 'the mother of Mary' is part of the sense of 'St. Anne' it is not analytically true that St. Anne is a mother would seem to undermine his claim that proper names have senses. According to Vision,

> ... since, on ordinary conceptions, 'X is Y' is analytic (and hence de dicto necessary) if 'Y' forms only part of the meaning of 'X', we must suppose that the remainder of the sense cancels this usual expectation. However, all Linsky discloses about the remainder of the sense is that it consists in the item's being a proper name and thus a rigid designator. How could this cancel the analyticity of 'St. Anne is a mother' without being tantamount to the explanation that, despite an intimate relation of the terms, proper names don't take sense?[1]

Thus it would appear that Linsky faces the following problem. If he tries to explain how it is possible that we know a priori that St. Anne is a parent in terms of the sense of the name 'St. Anne', then he can no longer hold that all proper names are rigid designators. This is because if 'the mother of Mary' fixes the meaning of 'St. Anne' (and gives

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[1]Vision, "Linsky on Rigid Designation and Sense," pp. 294-295.

us part or all of its sense), then it is analytically true that St. Anne is the mother of Mary and it follows that (5) is true. If, on the other hand, he tries to argue that it is not analytically true that St. Anne is the mother of Mary and hence, it does not follow that (5) is true because part of the sense of any proper name is that it is a rigid designator, then, as Vision points out, it would appear that names do not take sense. But, according to Linsky, it is only in virtue of the sense of 'St. Anne' that we can know a priori that St. Anne is a parent.

Linsky could, of course, avoid the problem altogether if he could show that a definite description's being part of the sense of a name is sufficient for a prioricity but not analyticity. Unfortunately, he nowhere gives us any indication as to how this could be possible. Notice that in those cases where the introducing definite description merely fixes the referent of the name and not its meaning we can a la Kripke produce the desired explanation. Thus, for example, according to Kripke we know a priori that Neptune is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, and it is not de dicto necessary (and hence, not analytic) since the definite description used to introduce the name 'Neptune' merely fixes the reference of the name. For Linsky, however, the introducing definite description fixes the meaning of the name and gives us, at the very least, part of its sense, in which case it would seem to be

much more difficult to be able to drive a wedge between a prioricity and analyticity.

Section Four

It is possible that I have not done justice to Linsky's argument. It is also possible that he is simply confused or that he never intended to claim that 'the mother of Mary' fixes the meaning of 'St. Anne'. Whatever the case may be it does not affect the crucial feature I wish to note concerning his treatment of the St. Anne case. Linsky feels that in order to view (5) as false we have to be able to show that it is a priori true that St. Anne is a mother, and this he feels can only be accomplished by requiring that the name 'St. Anne' have a sense attached to it. Dummett, on the other hand, wants to argue that (5) is true only because we do know a priori that St. Anne is a parent. His position is that all a priori truths are also de dicto necessary, but not all de dicto necessary truths are a priori true. (Dummett, pp. 117 and 121)

While I find Linsky's account of both Dummett and Kripke to be seriously flawed, I do find it particularly instructive in one respect. Recall that for Dummett, 'the mother of Mary' is only taken to fix the reference of 'St. Anne' and not its meaning; and this fact alone is supposed to show us why it is a priori true that St. Anne is a parent, in a manner precisely analogous to Kripke's metre

rod example. But Linsky has, I believe, argued convincingly that the two cases cannot be made similar at all. In the St. Anne case, as opposed to the metre rod example, we have no plausible way of accounting for the purported *a prioricity*, since no stipulative definition is involved. (We could, of course, do as Linsky suggests and attach a sense to 'St. Anne', but there is no reason for Kripke to be burdened with this unnecessary tactic. Kripke's claim that names are rigid designators can be protected in a manner that is much more direct and that is consistent with his overall view concerning proper names.) Dummett's claim, however, that (3) read as (5) is true is based on the assumption that it is *a priori* true that St. Anne is a parent. Without this assumption he cannot show that 'St. Anne' is not a rigid designator.

Linsky, unlike Dummett, seems to hold that one might take (5) to be true without appealing to any further support. Thus in order to protect Kripke's thesis that names are rigid designators he feels that we have to account for any intuitions we might have regarding the truth of (5) in terms of *a prioricity* (i.e., he feels that Kripke has to show that what appears to result in a *de dicto*/*de re* ambiguity is really an ambiguity between two kinds of necessity, metaphysical and epistemic). It is only because he starts out by assuming that Dummett has produced a plausible counterexample (i.e., (5) might be taken as true) that he is

able to then go on and argue that proper names require senses. Linsky simply misunderstands the structure of Dummett's argument and as a result he takes (5) too seriously. That is, he fails to realize that (5) is false, and that given Dummett's view all one has to do to show this is make it clear that it is not a priori true that St. Anne is a parent.

Dummett, on the other hand, argues in precisely the opposite direction from Linsky. He feels that our intuitions regarding the truth of (5) hinge on its being a priori true that St. Anne is a parent. According to Dummett all a priori truths are de dicto necessary. Hence, if it is a priori true that St. Anne is a parent, then (5) is true. Notice also that given the structure of Dummett's argument he cannot argue, as does Linsky, that 'St. Anne' has a sense attached to it and this accounts for our knowing a priori that St. Anne is a parent. This would be simply to beg the question on Kripke, since he need only maintain that there is no a priori truth to be accounted for in this case.

One might object at this point that Dummett's only mistake is his choice of example. His St. Anne case fails simply because it is not a case where the name was introduced into the language via a stipulative definition. But surely this can be easily corrected. All we need do is consider a name like 'Neptune'. If we assume, as does

Kripke, that Leverrier introduced 'Neptune' into the language by stipulating that its referent be fixed by the definite description 'the planet that caused perturbations in the orbit of Uranus', then we have the required example. The account of how it is possible to know a priori that Neptune caused the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus is thus readily at hand. Dummett can now argue that insofar as we have a case of a priori truth, we also have a case of de dicto necessity.

For the sake of argument I will merely assume that Dummett's somewhat eclectic argument, in this regard, has some force behind it. Hence, rather than try to evaluate it, I would merely like to point out what I find to be an extremely counter-intuitive consequence of accepting it. If Dummett is correct, then 'Neptune' is not a rigid designator, and this follows without having to assume that it is definitionally equivalent to the introducing definite description. But if 'Neptune' is not a rigid designator, then there is some sense in which Neptune might not have been Neptune, viz., the reading on which the first occurrence of 'Neptune' has wider scope than the modal operator, and the second occurence narrower scope. Hence, if Dummett is right the following will be true:

(11) $[n:x] \Diamond x \neq n$

It is, however, extremely difficult to imagine how this could be so given that the description associated with 'Neptune' by hypothesis only fixes its reference and not its meaning. In order for it to be possible that Neptune be other than it is it has to be possible for the value of 'Neptune' in the actual world to be different from its value in some possible world. But for this to be the case it would seem that 'Neptune' would have to abbreviate some definite description which was its meaning or sense. Thus in order for (11) to be true the second occurrence of 'Neptune' in (11) would have to have as its value something other than Neptune. Now, if 'Neptune' abbreviated some description which was its meaning, it would be plausible to suppose that its value changed from world to world. But by hypothesis the description used to introduce 'Neptune' only fixes its reference, and is not abbreviated by the name. Thus if Dummett is right and (11) is true, he will have to explain how it is possible for the value of a name to change from world to world when the name in question is not a disguised definite description. Nowhere does he offer such an explanation. We, therefore, cannot accept Dummett's counterexample without paying a price, and for many this price will surely be too high.

Thus it appears that Kripke's claim that proper names, unlike definite descriptions, are rigid designators can be upheld, and that his argument that names cannot be

disguised definite descriptions remains intact. As I noted in my introduction, however, this would seem to rule out any possibility of a Frege-Russell answer to the question "How do proper names refer?" It is at this point that the causal theory of names becomes an essential adjunct to the thesis that proper names are rigid designators, and it is the causal theory that I will turn to next.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CAUSAL THEORY

Section One

When Saul Kripke first introduced the causal theory of proper names he made it perfectly clear that he was not attempting to give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. He realized that his view concerning proper names required further refinement and elaboration before this could be accomplished, and he took himself to be giving a theory of reference only in the sense that it afforded a "better picture" of the way reference involving proper names actually works. "I want to present a better picture without giving a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. Such conditions would be very complicated, but what is true is that it's in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man."[1]

Others, such as Michael Devitt[2] have been less cautious, and have attempted to give a causal theory of

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 94.

[2]Devitt, "Singular terms," pp. 183-205.

proper names in the stricter sense of the term 'theory'. Devitt may be viewed as making some of the refinements that are required if a causal theory of proper names is to give us a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. It seems to me that such work is crucial if the causal theory of proper names is to be worthy of wide acceptance. One might be inclined to agree with Kripke that the causal view gives us a "better picture" of the way reference involving proper names actually works as long as the possibility exists that it "might be refined so as to give us more exact conditions for reference to take place."[1] Such a refinement (i.e., an analysis yielding a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for such reference) would be most welcome by the philosophical community in general, and the defenders of the causal theory in particular. On the other hand, if it can be shown that a causal theory of proper names cannot provide us with such conditions, then, although we may still be inclined to agree with Kripke that it gives us a "better picture" (than do other traditional accounts), we must nevertheless continue our search for an even more adequate analysis.

In this chapter I attempt to give a fairly clear and intuitive case of reference involving a proper name where there is no causal connection between the referent and the speaker's utterance of the name. Hence, I attempt

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 94.

to show that a causal theory of proper names cannot yield a necessary condition for reference. Also, since the name in question will intuitively satisfy condition (C) of chapter one I will in affect be showing that the thesis that proper names are rigid designators is not coextensive with the thesis that names refer to their bearers in virtue of some appropriate causal connection. I construct my case by first considering what I take to be a parallel case for the causal theory of knowledge. Finally I argue that a familiar move made to salvage the causal theory of knowledge in light of this case won't work for the causal theory of proper names.

Section Two

One approach to the analysis of knowledge inspired by the Gettier[1] counterexamples was an attempt to spell out the characteristic causal relations that hold between one's belief and what is believed. This approach was taken by Alvin Goldman.[2] Goldman attempted to replace the epistemological concept of justification with causal concepts that are naturalistic and given in purely descriptive terms. He viewed his analysis as yielding necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge; we, however, need only be

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[1]E.Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?," Analysis, XXIII (June, 1963), pp. 121-123.

[2]Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," The Journal of Philosophy, LXXIV (June, 1967), pp. 357-372.

concerned with the weaker claim that a causal connection is a necessary condition for knowledge:

> Thesis 1. S knows that p only if an appropriate causal connection exists between S's belief that p and the fact that p.

"Appropriate," knowledge-producing causal processes include the following for Goldman:

> (1) perception
>
> (2) memory
>
> (3) a causal chain, exemplifying either Pattern 1 or 2,[1] which is correctly reconstructed by inferences, each of which is warranted, (Background propositions help warrant an inference only if they are true)
>
> (4) any combination of (1), (2) and (3).[2]

Brian Skyrms[3] designed the following case to show that Thesis 1 is false. Suppose that while Harry is walking home from work one evening he stumbles across some poor soul lying on the sidewalk with his head severed from his body. Harry, being a sharp-witted fellow and a keen student of anatomy realizes that the man must be dead.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 369-370.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Brian Skyrms, "The Explication of 'x knows that p'," The Journal of Philosophy, LXIV (June 22, 1967), pp. 373-389.

Sure enough, Harry is right. The man is dead. Harry could certainly be said to know that the man is dead in this case, and the causal reconstruction would be as follows. Let:

'B' stand for belief.

'h' stand for Harry.

Solid arrows represent causal connections.

Dotted arrows represent inferences.

p = the fact that the man is dead.

q = the fact that his head is severed from his body.

r = a "background" proposition, describing the effect that losing one's head has on one's life.

This is what Goldman calls a "Pattern 2" case, and it reveals that (q) is a cause both of p and of h's belief of (p).



Let us suppose, however, that before Harry stumbled across the body the following events transpired. The man lying on the sidewalk had actually died of a heart attack.

After he had lain there for some time a young medical student happens along and neatly amputates the man's head with his shiny new scalpel. Harry would still be said to know that the man is dead in this case, but notice that (q) is not causally responsible for the man's death.



It seems quite apparent from the above case that Goldman's causal analysis cannot be taken as specifying necessary conditions for knowledge. The point that I would like to stress about Skyrms' case, however, is that we count it as a legitimate counterexample because there are sufficient evidential considerations to warrant knowledge independent of any appropriate causal connection. That is, we are forced to grant that Harry knows the man is dead solely on the basis of epistemological considerations. In the next section of this paper I will present a similar sort of case for reference involving a proper name. Hopefully, it will be a case where there are sufficient evidential considerations to grant successful reference, yet it will be a case where there is no causal connection between

the referent and the speaker's utterance of the name.

Section Three

The causal theory of knowledge attempts to spell out the characteristic relation that has to hold between a person's belief in a certain proposition p and the fact p for knowledge of p to be obtained. Similarly, the causal theory of proper names attempts to spell out the relation that has to hold between a speaker's utterance of a name and the thing named for reference to take place. In both cases the relation is a causal one. The thesis, then, that I attempt to show is false is as follows.

> Thesis 2. In uttering the name n, S refers to x only if an appropriate causal connection exists between S's utterance of the name and x.

Unfortunately, the proponents of the causal theory of proper names are not quite as clear as Goldman is when it comes to spelling out the "appropriate" causal processes. Kripke, for example gives us the following rough account of his theory.

> An initial baptism takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from link to link', the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the

> name 'Napoleon' and decide it would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition.[1]

Devitt characterizes the causal theory of proper names in the following manner.

> The central idea of the causal theory of proper names is that our present uses of a name, say 'Aristotle', designate the famous Greek philosopher Aristotle, not in virtue of the various things we (rightly) believe true of him, but in virtue of a causal network stretching back from our uses to the first uses of the name to designate Aristotle. Our present uses of names borrow their reference from earlier uses. It is this social mechanism that enables us all to designate the same thing by a name.[2]

And, Donnellan gives us yet another account of the theory.

> In general, our use of proper names for persons in history (and also those we are not personally acquainted with) is parasitic on uses of the names by other people—— in conversation, written records, ect. Insofar as we possess a set of identifying descriptions in this case they come from things said about the presumed referent by other people. My answer to the question, 'Who was Thales?' would probably derive from what I learned from my teachers or from histories of philosophy. Frequently, as in this example, one's identifying descriptions trace back through many levels of parasitic derivation. Descriptions of Thales we might give go back to what was said, using that name,

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[1]Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 95.

[2]Devitt, "Singular Terms," p. 184.

> by Aristotle and Herodotus. And, if Thales existed, the trail would not end there.[1]

The general picture that emerges from the preceding accounts is that of a name being hooked up with some object via an appropriate causal process such as an initial baptism and then being passed along to others in virtue of their participation in the causal network that is generated from the original naming ceremony. Jaegwon Kim has pointed out in his article "Perception and Reference Without Causality" that viewing things in this way enables one to think of the causal chain that connects a name with an object in two parts:

> (1) the part extending from a given use of a name to the baptismal event (this causal chain transmits the reference initially established), and (2) the part corresponding to the connection between the baptismal act and the object baptized (this part establishes the initial referential connection between the name and the object named).[2]

Hence, if we want we can focus our attention on the link of the causal chain that exists between a speaker's utterance of a name and its first uses or we can focus our attention

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[1]Keith Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. by D. Davidson and G.Harman (Dordrecht-Holland: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1972), p. 373.

[2]Jaegwon Kim, "Perception and Reference Without Causality," The Journal of Philosophy, LXXIV (Oct., 1977), pp. 606-621.

on the causal link between the first uses and the object. The question that can now be asked is how does this way of looking at things affect Thesis 2. According to Thesis 2 the causal connection that is necessary for reference is one that obtains between an utterance of a name and an object. No mention is made of "first uses", "naming ceremonies", or "initial baptisms". Thus Thesis 2 might be reformulated as follows.

> Thesis 2a. In uttering the name n, S refers to x only if (1) an appropriate causal connection exists between S's utterance of the name and some initial naming ceremony, and (2) an appropriate causal connection exists between that naming ceremony and x.

Any legitimate case of reference involving a proper name where the use of the name is not causally hooked up with the object would falsify both Thesis 2 and Thesis 2a. Notice, however, that in the case of Thesis 2a this might be done in such a way that the causal link between the use of the name and the naming ceremony is left intact.[1] This

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[1]See John Canfield, "Names and Causes," Philosophical Studies, 35 (1979), pp. 71-80, for an example of someone who attempts to show that the causal account does not provide us with necessary conditions for a name's naming its referent, and blurs the distinction between the link of the causal chain that exists between a speaker's utterance of a name and its first uses and the link that exists between the first uses and the object. As a result, Canfield's cases might be viewed as falsifying clause (2) of Thesis 2a, but not clause (1).

Regarding Canfield's cases it should also be noted

might lead one to hold that falsifying Theses 2 and 2a poses no real threat to a causal theory of proper names. In fact, Kripke and Donnellan at times seem to suggest that the crucial connection is the one that links present uses of a name to first uses. Thus it seems as though we need to consider yet another formulation of Thesis 2.

> Thesis 2b. In uttering the name n, S refers to x only if an appropriate causal connection exists between S's utterance of the name and an initial naming ceremony.

I strongly suspect that Thesis 2a is the favored formulation of the proponents of the causal theory of proper names; nevertheless, insofar that Thesis 2 and 2b remain options, I will show that all three are false. To do so, I first construct a case that falsifies Thesis 2a and 2b, but leaves Thesis 2 unscathed. Then by making a slight alteration in the case I show that all three are false.

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that their success would appear to depend on the speaker's descriptions fitting a certain individual when using the name in question (cf. especially pp. 75 and 77). Unfortunately, these are precisely the sorts of cases that someone like Donnellan appeals to in order to show that a causal/historical connection is necessary for a name to name its referent (see Keith Donnellan, "Speaking of Nothing," The Philosophical Review, LXXXIII (January, 1974), p. 18.) The cases that I will go on to present, however, will attempt to circumvent this entire issue by relying for their success on certain evidential considerations which are quite independent of the correctness of the speaker's descriptions.

Section Four

Suppose that while at a party one evening I am informed by my friend Dave's wife that Dave has the peculiar habit of naming all of his pets 'Sal'. I am told that as a lad Dave named his very first pet 'Sal', and that all of his pets ever since have been given the same appellation. Thinking that things might be a bit confusing around the house, if they ever have more than one pet, I asked how they are able to determine which pet is being referred to when the name 'Sal' is used. As it turns out, however, this was never a problem. Dave, she informed me has always been a one pet man. When his first pet died he got a snake, when it died a dog, and so on over the years. Always one pet is replaced by another and they all received the same name.

"At least," I said, when she had finished "this saves you the problem of thinking up new names for your pets since Dave's procedure seems to be pretty automatic." This I was quickly informed was not quite correct. Dave it seems never refers to his new pet as Sal until he has considered a long list of names. Other names, besides 'Sal', are suggested and bantered about, but the end result is always the same. He looks at the list, then looks at his pet, then in the end he looks at his wife and says "Let's call it Sal" (i.e., a naming ceremony takes place). Since Dave's wife is known to be an extremely reliable and

truthful person and not the sort to invent a story simply for the sake of being an entertaining party guest I readily accepted what she had related as an interesting fact about Dave.

Unbeknownst to me, shortly after this conversation took place Dave's latest pet died and he replaced it with a goldfish. As usual when he brought the fish home he considered at length a list of possible names. And just as in the previous cases he rejected all of them in favor of 'Sal'.

Suppose now, that shortly after this I am over at Dave's house and while pointing to Sal Dave asks me what I think of his new fish. Suppose further that previous to this I have not come into contact with Dave, his wife or anyone else who knew Sal after the naming ceremony took place. The question is, if I reply to Dave by saying "Gee, Sal sure is a fine specimen," has my utterance of the name 'Sal' referred to the object swimming around in the bowl? It seems clear to me that the name 'Sal' as it occurred in my utterance did refer to the goldfish. Moreover, it seems clear to me that reference was achieved in this case independently of there being any causal connection between my utterance of the name and the initial naming ceremony. Notice that as the case was described I was at no time part of the causal network that gets generated from the initial naming ceremony. Yet, according to Thesis 2a and 2b this is just the condition that must be met for reference to

occur.

Why do I think it is clear that the name 'Sal' as used by me referred to the goldfish? Recall that in the Skyrms' case we grant that Harry knows the man is dead because there are sufficient evidential considerations to warrant knowledge. Similarly, it seems to me that there are sufficient evidential considerations in the case now under consideration to grant that reference was achieved. Certainly, it wasn't just a lucky guess on my part that 'Sal' was the fish's name. I had been informed that Dave had named all of his pets 'Sal' in the past, and my use of the name was based on good inductive evidence.

What about Thesis 2? Was it shown to be false as well? Was there a causal connection between my utterance of the name and the goldfish? According to Thesis 2 my use of the name 'Sal' refers to the goldfish only if there is an "appropriate" causal connection between my utterance of the name and the goldfish. Since I was perceiving the goldfish at the time of my utterance, and since to perceive something is to be causally affected by it, it might seem as though Thesis 2 has not been shown to be false. I seriously doubt, however, that this is the sort of causal connection a proponent of the causal theory of proper names would call "appropriate". While it is true that the name 'Sal' as it occurred in my statement was causally connected with the goldfish (i.e., I was seeing Sal when I uttered

the name and was prompted to utter the name by seeing Sal in Dave's house) it doesn't seem as though my use of the name was causally linked to the fish in a way that the causal theorists of proper names deem appropriate for reference. Some may feel that the case I have presented does in fact falsify Thesis 2, as well as Thesis 2a and 2b. Others may feel that the causal connection that obtained when I uttered the name while looking at the goldfish was "appropriate". I don't see how this issue can be settled until the causal theorist spells out in detail exactly what is to count as an "appropriate" causal connection. In order to eliminate debate on this question and bypass this issue altogether I make a slight alteration in my case in the next section of the paper. Before doing so, however, I would like to note what I take to be a much more compelling reason for altering the original case.

So far I have merely assumed that the expression 'Sal', as it occurred in my statement, functioned as a proper name. One might argue, however, that the reason why 'Sal' refers to the goldfish and consequently the reason why Thesis 2, and for that matter Thesis 2a and 2b, have not been clearly shown to be false is that the expression 'Sal' in this context can be paraphrased away by or is a surrogate for an indexical sign or perhaps a Russellian logically proper name. That is, 'Sal' as used in my utterance had the extension it did because of the context in

which it was used, and not because it is a proper name that refers. The expression 'Sal' on this account picked out the goldfish in just the way the words 'this' or 'that' would if either of them had been used instead, and what 'Sal' denoted was relative to me just as what a demonstrative denotes is relative to a speaker. Thus, it could be argued that it is not evidential considerations that lead us to hold that 'Sal' refers to the goldfish, but rather it is the realization that the expression in the context of my utterance stood as a surrogate for a demonstrative. If this account of why my use of 'Sal' refers to the goldfish is correct, then it could be argued that I have not really shown Theses 2, 2a, or 2b to be false, since I have not given a case where a proper name, qua proper name, refers to an object.

But is this account correct? Suppose that I had uttered the name 'Saul' instead of 'Sal' when I was commenting on Dave's goldfish. (Imagine that Dave's wife pronounces all of her a's as soft a's so that instead of pronouncing Sal \Sal\ she pronounces it \Sȯl\, and that this led me to believe that all of Dave's pets had been given the name 'Saul'.) My own intuitions are that in this case the expression 'Saul' would not refer to the goldfish, and that this would be sufficient to show that the expression 'Sal' in the context of my original utterance was a name and not a substitute for a demonstrative. Others, however,

might feel that I would still refer to the goldfish, especially those who think that something like Donnellan's[1] referential/attributive distinction for definite descriptions holds for proper names. If it does, then the indexical account would seem to gain plausibility since 'Saul' could be viewed as being used referentially, no matter what the "true" name of the fish is. On this account I could have used any name and still referred to the fish since the name is incidental for reference. Intuitions, then concerning this case may conflict. Thus in order to avoid begging any crucial questions it is clear that I need to alter the original case if I want to avoid this problem.

Section Five

As matters now stand I have presented a case which may at best falsify Theses 2a and 2b but leave open the possibility that Thesis 2 is correct, and which at worst is not a counterexample to any of the three theses. In this section of the essay I alter the original case so that both of these problems may be avoided, and I show that all three theses are false.

Let everything in the original case remain the same, except instead of going over to Dave's house suppose that I just happen to bump into him on the street. He informs me

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[1]Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," The Philosophical Review, LXXV (July, 1966), pp. 281-304.

that his pet aardvark has just died and that he has replaced it with a goldfish. Suppose now that upon hearing this I say to Dave, "I have a lot of extra food for Sal if you need it." As in the previous case I would like to suggest that there are sufficient evidential considerations for reference to be granted. We concede that my utterance of the name 'Sal' refers to the goldfish, not because it is causally connected with Sal (which in this case it clearly is not), but rather because certain epistemological conditions obtain. Dave's wife has, to use Devitt's phrase, "given me the ability to designate Sal by 'Sal'."[1] This ability was gained, however, independently of Dave's wife being causally affected by Sal, and independently of her being causally linked to the original naming ceremony. Notice, also, that there is less temptation in this case to view 'Sal' as standing as a surrogate for a demonstrative. In the previous case it might have seemed that we could paraphrase away the expression 'Sal' by substituting the word 'this' for 'Sal'. In this case no such paraphrase is possible, since no element of spatial selectivity is involved. There is no direct spatiotemporal connection between the expression 'Sal' as it occurs in my utterance and the goldfish.

It might be pointed out, however, that not all

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[1]Devitt, "Singular Terms," p. 185.

indexicals indicate their objects directly.[1] For example, in the case of pronouns we sometimes refer indirectly to an object that has been previously named or described in discourse. (Some linguists refer to such coreferential uses of pronouns as anaphoric.) Thus, it may be argued that while we can't paraphrase away the occurrence of 'Sal' with a demonstrative in this case, we may adequately paraphrase it away with a pronoun. Consider the sentence "I have a lot of extra food for it if you need it" uttered by me after Dave informs me that he has acquired a new pet goldfish. Here reference to the goldfish is achieved because the pronown 'it' in some way "refers back to" Dave's words, and in virtue of this back reference the fish. On this account then the reason why the expression 'Sal' refers to the goldfish is not because it is a name, but because it is a surrogate for the pronoun 'it'.

This time, however, I think it can be shown that the alternate account of reference is not a plausible one. Recall that one observation that made the indexical account of the previous case plausible was that the expression 'Sal' might be viewed as being used referentially. That is, the name would be inessential for successfully referring to the goldfish since any name might have been used to do this.

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[1]Richard Gale makes this point in his article "Indexical Signs, Egocentric Particulars, and Token-Reflexive Words," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P.Edwards (New York: MacMillan, 1967), Vol. 4, p. 151.

In this case, however, it is far less plausible to suppose that I would have successfully referred to goldfish had I used another name. If 'Sal' was merely a surrogate for the pronoun 'it', then it seems as though I should have been able to refer to the fish no matter what name I used. It seems clear to me, however, that if I had said "I have a lot of extra food for George if you need it" after Dave informed me that he has a new pet goldfish, my use of 'George' would not have referred to the fish. Thus we realize that the name 'Sal' is essential for reference in this case, and there is no temptation to suppose that it could be adequately paraphrased away.

Just in case there are any lingering doubts as to the legitimacy of my counterexample that need to be eradicated, however, let me alter my case one last time. Suppose that while at the party Dave's wife informed me that Dave's latest pet had died, and that he was going to replace it the next day with a goldfish. That is, suppose I acquired sufficient evidence to know that Dave would shortly have a new pet goldfish. Now again suppose that I bump into Dave on the street a few days after the party, only this time before Dave has a chance to mention his new pet I say "I have a lot of extra food for Sal if you need it." In this case there is no causal link of any sort between my use of the name 'Sal' and the goldfish (Thesis 2 is false) nor is there a causal connection between my use of

the name and some initial naming ceremony (Theses 2a and 2b are false). More important, however, is the fact that in this case there isn't the slightest possibility of viewing 'Sal' as a mere surrogate for a demonstrative or a pronoun.

Section Six

One obvious observation that could be made concerning the Skyrms' case is that while it is true that the man's head being cut off was not causally responsible for his death it was causally sufficient for his death. Unfortunately, this piece of information is of no avail to Goldman, but it is useful to someone like Marshall Swain[1] who utilizes causal conditions in a "defeasibility" approach to knowledge. On this view it is noted that what prevents knowledge in the Gettier type case is some kind of defect in one's justification. Swain states that "one way of characterizing this defect is to say that, even though the justification involved is sufficiently strong to render the proposition evident, the justification is nevertheless defeated by some special counterevidence."[2] His analysis of knowledge is as follows:

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[1]Marshall Swain, "Knowledge, Causality, and Justification," The Journal of Philosophy, LXIX (May 25, 1972), pp. 291-300.

[2]Ibid., p. 293.

S has nonbasic knowledge that p if and only if
(i) p is true;
(ii) S believes that p;
(iii) S's justification renders p evident for S;
(iv) The causal chain leading to S's belief in e either (1) contains the event or state of affairs referred to by p, or (2) contains some other event or state of affairs that is, in the context of the evidence possessed by S, either causally or logically sufficient for the occurrence of the state of affairs referred to by p.
(v) There is no true statement q such that q in conjunction with S's evidence E fails to render p evident for S and such that q is true because of events in the causal chains referred to in (iv).[1]

The condition in this analysis that defeats Skyrms' counter-example is (iv). This condition rules out the problem raised by Skyrms because the second half of the disjunction allows Harry to know the man is dead on causal grounds. Might not a similar move be made to salvage the causal theory of proper names in light of the case I present? I think not, at least not in any way that would ultimately prove acceptable to a proponent of the causal theory of proper names.

Swain's move relies on the observation that having one's head severed from one's body is causally sufficient for death. In light of this observation it could be pointed out that Harry makes use of the following "causal" law

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[1] Ibid., p. 294.

(A) (x)((x is a person & x has his head cut off) → x is dead)

to learn that the man is dead. Similarly one might plausibly argue that in the Sal case I make use of the following "causal" law

(B) (x)(x is a pet of Dave's → x is named 'Sal')

to learn that the goldfish is named 'Sal'. It might then be argued that (B) seems to be an empirical (i.e., causal) law about Dave and his habits just like (A) is an empirical (i.e., causal) law about people. It might even be argued further that both sustain counterfactual and subjunctive conditional statements. (A), for example, clearly supports statements such as "If Bob were a person and had his head been cut off, then he would be dead." Similarly (B) seems to support such statements as "If the lion at the Potter Park Zoo had been a pet of Dave's, then it would be named 'Sal'." Thus it might finally be argued that (B) is causally sufficient for me to learn that the goldfish is named 'Sal'.

It seems to me that all of this might be granted to the proponent of the causal theory of proper names who opts to make a move similar to Swain's in order to avoid my counterexample. I do not think, however, that this would leave him with very much in the way of a theory that makes

use of Thesis 2, 2a, or 2b. For one thing, while it might be plausible to suppose that (B) is causally sufficient for me to learn that the goldfish is named 'Sal', I do not see how it is plausible to suppose that (B) is causally sufficient for the name 'Sal' as it occurs in my utterance to refer to the goldfish. But it is precisely this latter point that is at issue. Swain is able to avoid the problem raised by Skyrms because he is able plausibly to argue that the evidence Harry bases his belief on (i.e., that the man's head is severed from his body) is causally sufficient for death. In the Sal case, however, the evidential considerations that lead us to grant that reference was achieved are simply not amenable to a causal reconstruction of the sort required by the causal theorist of proper names. The important point to notice is that once the causal theorist appeals to (B) to avoid the Sal counterexample it seems as though the causal connection between the present utterance of a name and some initial naming ceremony drops out of the picture altogether as a requirement for reference. It is also equally important to notice that once an appeal to (B) is made it seems as though there no longer need be a causal connection between an utterance of a name and the object named for reference to take place. This is so because none of the instances that confirm (B) involve the goldfish 'Sal'. Thus the proponent of the causal theory of proper names who makes use of (B) in order to circumvent

my counterexample gives up all that originally seemed to be important and interesting concerning Theses 2, 2a, and 2b.

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