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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
THE I MPERIAL POLI CY OF
JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN

presented by
MARK ALLEN WARBER

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

M. A. . HISTORY
degree 1n

 

 

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MSU Ie An Mundlve ActIoNEquel Opportunity InetItqun

 

 

The Imperial Policy of Joseph Chamberlain

By

Mark Allen Warber

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1990

ABSTRACT
JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN'S IMPERIAL POLICY

BY

Mark Allen Warber

This thesis examines the imperial policy of Joseph
Chamberlain in order to highlight the usefulness of the
theory of social imperialism. Social imperialism focuses on
the close connection between the economic and strategic
goals of late Victorian imperialism, and social conditions
in Britain. Social imperialists sought colonies as a way of
improving the standard of living in the imperial homeland.
Social imperialism shows that the economic and strategic
aims of imperialism cannot be studied in isolation because
each was mutually supporting. Chamberlain, as Colonial
Secretary from 1895-1903, saw imperialism as a means of
promoting social reform at home. Economic advantage was
sought in imperial expansion to finance social reform.
Military security, through acquisition of strategic
territory, insured the protection of the Empire’s resources.
Chamberlain’s policy was based on the idea that the
well being of all Englishmen depended on the economic and

military power of the Empire.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1
I. SOCIAL IMPERIALISM 6
II. CHAMBERLAIN'S EARLY CAREER 19
III. SOUTH AFRICA ' 43
IV. TARIFF REFORM 64
V. CONCLUSION 116
APPENDIX 1 120
APPENDIX 2 130
BIBLIOGRAPHY 136
END NOTES 142

iii

I NTRODUCTI ON

When Joseph Chamberlain took the podium in Birmingham
on May 15, 1903, Britain was the center of the greatest
Empire in the world. It was appropriate that Chamberlain
address the issue of imperial unity in Birmingham, the
center of his political support. Chamberlain had begun his
struggle to link Britain’s industrial power to the resources
of the colonies while M.P. for Birmingham, and the town's
interests remained in his mind. A new century was beginning,
and Chamberlain was speaking as Colonial Secretary to
outline a new style of imperialism. Chamberlain, a social
imperialist, believed a strong Empire was essential to a
healthy domestic scene. In response to changed world
conditions closer, formal ties were now needed between the
mother country and her colonies.1 Chamberlain easily
projected his enthusiasm and optimism to his audience. He
announced, "The Empire is in its infancy. Now is the time
when we can mould that Empire, and we and those who live
with us can decide its future destinies."2 It was clear the
Empire was on the threshold of a new stage in its
development following the recent shock of the South African

War. Chamberlain would spend the rest of his life trying to

insure that the new imperial system would be based on close
military and commercial ties. Only such ties, he believed,
would allow the advance of social reform in Great Britain,
while promoting her strength and influence abroad.

Central to any study of the world of the late 19th and
early 20th century is the subject of imperialism. European
imperialism may be roughly defined as continuous political
and territorial control by technologically superior nations
over other peoples.3. This simple definition, however,
obscures many facets of imperialism and does nothing to
explain the motivation behind imperial expansion. Debate
over Victorian imperialism is especially fierce. The
discussion centers on a "scramble for Africa" during which
19th century imperialism reached its apogee.

There are three main schools of thought on the subject
of Britain's part in the scramble. The earliest school,
developed out of the work of the historian J.A. Hobson,
relies on economic motives. The general outline of Hobson’s
theory continues to draw support from many economic
historians--and through V. I. Lenin’s adoption of Hobson's
data--also Marxist historians as well. Hobson suggests that
Britain was pushed to move into Africa by financiers hoping
to secure outlets for surplus capital.

A new perspective offered by R. Robinson and J.
Gallagher refutes the importance of economic motives by

highlighting the strategic importance of Africa. They refute

3
Hobson by pointing out the minor value of Africa
economically. Britain expanded into in Africa, they believe,
in an attempt to protect the main routes to the star of her
Eastern Empire, India. Robinson and Gallagher argue that
there was no new impetus for British expansion, other than
the need to move further into Africa’s interior to protect
traditional goals.

These two interpretations have engaged the attention of
most historians. Yet there remains a third alternative that
explains certain aspects of British imperialism more
effectively by focusing on the connection between imperialism
and domestic politics. Social imperialism serves as the best
name to differentiate the third school of thought from the
economic and strategic or political perspectives. The
fundamental principle in this view is the idea that a
prosperous and stable Britain required an extensive Empire.
Social imperialism brings out the appeal of Empire from both
the economic and strategic standpoints. Social imperialists
saw the Empire as the source of both economic strength and
political power. An Empire provided security from outside
foes, while insuring Britain’s economic success. Imperial
trade would create prosperity which would allow social
improvement throughout the Empire. Conversely, the failure
to maintain an Empire would weaken Britain’s military and
cripple her economy. Social imperialism better illustrates
the stakes Victorian statesmen believed were involved in

imperial expansion. Imperialism, including expansion into

4
Africa, was necessary to protect Britain’s economic and
strategic well being. Strategic security and economic value
could not be separated, even though one element or the other
could be more important in causing expansion in individual
cases. Within the social imperialist framework, Africa was
neither acquired as a vital outlet for capital alone, nor
solely as a strategically important shipping route. Instead,
Africa was a potential resource to be developed for the
betterment of Britain and the Empire as a whole.

Nowhere is social imperialism more evident than in
Joseph Chamberlain’s term as Colonial Secretary from
1895-1903. Chamberlain began his political career as a
champion for social reform and the extension of prosperity
to Britain’s lower classes. He saw imperialism as a way to
achieve these goals while maintaining Britain's traditional
political structure. Empire, not revolution, would provide
new wealth to be used for the betterment of Britain's poor.
African colonies would provide markets and raw materials for
Britain's industrial complex. It was the need for closer
ties between the colonies and the mother country which made
Chamberlain risk war in South Africa. After the Boer War
Chamberlain presented the center piece of his imperial plan:
tariff reform. He suggested the creation of an imperial
customs union to tie the Empire together through commerce,
while creating funds to improve social services. Tariff
reform highlighted Chamberlain’s attempt to rationalize the

Empire’s economy by protecting imperial trade in order to

5
promote social reform at home. It is the close connection
between expansionist imperialism and domestic social reform

that places Chamberlain’s actions within the realm of social

imperialism.

I. SOCIAL IMPERIALISM

Joseph Chamberlain's political life was spent pursuing
two broad goals. His first aim was the defense of Britain’s
national power and position in the world. This goal required
a strong military and a healthy economy. In addition to this
desire for British supremacy, Chamberlain hOped to create a
new system of state sponsored welfare. Workers would be
protected in the event of accident, the elderly would be
provided with pensions, and the educational system would be
improved. Chamberlain hoped to use the Empire to provide the
resources to make England strong both externally and
internally.

Imperialism would give Britain access to markets and
resources that would allow her to maintain her commercial
success. The colonies would help pay for an Imperial army
and navy to insure the safety of the Empire. Chamberlain
envisioned the creation of an imperial customs union to
integrate the Empire’s economy. Tariffs would protect
imperial industries from outside competition and provide
funds for social reform. African colonies were not expected
to be the most important territories in Britain’s Empire,
but the were still valued. Chamberlain was planning for the
future, he hoped less promising African colonies might one
day yield resources valuable to Britain. Chamberlain would
follow a forward policy in South Africa in order to preserve

Britain’s dominance in one of Africa’s more prosperous

7
areas. After the Boer War Chamberlain would fight for tariff
reform in an attempt to utilize the fruits of Empire more
effectively.

Social imperialism explains certain aspects of the
partition of Africa and Chamberlain's subsequent imperial
policy better than either the economic or political schools.
Social imperialism offers a solution to the questions left
unanswered by the other theories. Social imperialism
highlights the close connection between imperial acquisition
and domestic politics and social conditions. British
statesmen of the 1890’s found it impossible to separate the
interests of the Empire and the mother country. In this,
social imperialism has ties to Hobson's theory in that
imperialism depends on conditions in Britain.1 Imperialist
politicians, like Chamberlain, sought to protect the Empire
as a means of advancing the welfare of all Englishmen.

The theory of social imperialism suggests that
imperialism provides a way to solve domestic problems in the
mother country. The concept of social imperialism dates from
the early twentieth century. In 1919, J. A. Schumpeter
defined social imperialism as an attempt to gain the support
of the working class for Empire by offering social reform.2
Most recently the idea was reexamined by Hans-Ulrich Wehler
in relation to German imperialism and social unrest.3 Wehler
believed German imperialism served as a way to distract the
German population so they would not brood on social
problems. Wehler’s scheme does not apply directly to the

British case. British social imperialism includes the close

8
connection between the domestic scene and imperialism, but
lacks the sense of immanent social revolt.

A better definition of social imperialism focuses on
the connection between imperial success and domestic well
being. England’s social imperialists did not so much attempt
to deceive the workers as try to help them. Social
imperialists believed an empire was necessary for national
greatness and health. Men like.Chamberlain attempted to
unite all classes in defense of the Empire. British social
imperialists sought to maintain the Empire as a way to solve
or avoid problems concerned with the economic success and
military security of England.

Chamberlain's goals as Colonial Secretary were not
based on a need to diffuse social tension, but on a wish to
use the Empire to enhance and defend Britain's high standard
of living. Chamberlain believed imperialism was essential to
the continued well being of the English people. British
social imperialism was a more optimistic movement than
Wehler’s German variety. Britain's problems, where they
existed, could be solved at the same time as the lives of
all subjects of the Crown were improved. Imperialism would
provide the means to social reform at home, improve
stability, bring greater economic opportunities to all, and
allow other peoples to gain the benefits of British
civilization. It was hoped that such arguments would win the
general public over to the idea of expansive imperialism.4

The appeal of social imperialism is evident given the

diversity of the political backgrounds of its adherents.

9

Social imperialism drew support from groups outside the
Unionist party, including their opponents the Liberals, as
well as the politically independent Fabian Society.5 Few
argued against military defense and economic growth. The
only real Opponents were those fearing the English would
exploit the peoples under their control. Conflict between
social imperialists would develop, however, over the best
means of promoting imperial success.

The origins of social imperialism can be traced to the
changes in the European balance of power brought about by

6 As newly

the unification of Germany in the 1870’s.
industrialized nations began to demand their share in the
markets and raw materials that were the fruits of Empire,
Britain was forced to annex African colonies or be excluded.
By 1895 Lord Salisbury focused the debate in West Africa
on Britain’s need to acquire new territory to allow British
trade to avoid newly erected tariff barriers.8 There was,
therefore, a "New Imperialism". There was a new impetus to
acquire colonies in Africa and elsewhere.

Raising nationalism and racism provided extra impetus
to the quest to maintain England’s power base. The emergence'
of new powers had two effects of Britain’s style of imperial
control. Firstly, newly consolidated states became
challengers to British control. Loose imperial ties would no
longer stand up against outside pressure. The English
believed they would be helping indigenous peoples by

protecting them from other industrial powers. They believed

British control to be the most benevolent and enlightened.

10
The English were convinced that only their supervision would
allow other peoples to advance culturally.

Secondly, Germany and the United States provided
examples of the value of close economic and political uniOn
under strong central governments.9 The U.S. and Germany
protected their economies by erecting tariff barriers to
limit foreign competition. Greater protection allowed
development of domestic industry. By the 1890’s the U.S.A.
and Germany would surpass Britain in steel production,
highlighting Britain’s coming industrial eclipse.10.
Chamberlain found such trends alarming. The success of the
.U.S.A. and Germany also inspired him.

Chamberlain believed the best means of beating these
challengers was to adopt their methods. British tariffs
would be introduced to enhance her economy and protect her
industry. Closer imperial ties and increased government
involvement would enable Britain to better develop her vast
Empire. The large size and great wealth of the British
Empire would insure success. The "New Imperialism" in
Britain was typified by an attempt to expand the Empire,
strengthen the ties to the settler colonies, and to develop
the tropical colonies.11

Social imperialists further believed that an overseas
empire is necessary to alleviate social problems in the
mother country. Such problems may include unemployment,
poverty, inflation, crime, and a host of lesser evils. The

collective action of an empire’s population would enable any

obstacle to progress to be over come. A well defended,

ll
wealthy, multinational empire, having an integrated economy,
would have something to offer for all imperial citizens.

Joseph Chamberlain's plan would reduce foreign threats
to Britain's dominant position in industry and commerce,
while meeting the demand for social reform at home. The fact
that many of Chamberlain's plans remained unfulfilled makes
it difficult to determine whether industrial advance or
social progress was foremost in his scheme. His wish to help
Britain's poor would link his early Radical years with those
as an imperialist. Chamberlain would simply expand on his
early belief in municipal reform to create a plan for the
entire British Empire. His goal remained the same.
Imperialism would replace Radicalism as the answer to
Britain’s problems.

Joseph Chamberlain's entire career highlights the
limits of Hobson's and Lenin's view. Chamberlain was a
capitalist, as Lenin might note, but his motives for
imperial advance were different than those which Marxists

would suggest.12

A defense of financiers alone contradicts
the Radical underpinnings of Chamberlain’s political life.
It is clear that Chamberlain’s imperial goals were not based
on the demands of financial interests, but on a wish to
create a unified, self—sufficient Empire. The economic
historians imply imperialism serves private interests at the
expense of the public good. The Colonial Secretary's plan,
however, was designed to enhance the power of the nation,

not to aid the rich or advance capitalism.

The economic theories of imperialism usually

12
oversimplify the process of expansion. Hobson and others
describe a process which begins when business or financial
interests see the chance for profit in an undeveloped
region. Once a region is seen as useful to capitalists,
either as an outlet for capital or a market, pressure is put
on the government to acquire the area. Annexation, formally
or informally, soon follows. In the scheme of economic
historians, the government and armed forces act as the tools
of the capitalists. Humanitarian and religious groups then
provide the justification for expansion.

The economic schools fails, however, if non-financial
interests advanced imperialism for their own ends.13 Joseph
Chamberlain represents such an interest. Economics remains
an important element of imperialism, but economics is not
the primary cause. Social imperialists are not interested in
personal financial success or even the financial success of
the government. Financial success is only important when it
advances national power or improves the life of the imperial
citizenry. Successful businessmen are a potential resource
not a goal in themselves.

Since imperialism requires government action it is more
logical to view capitalists as tools of the state, rather
than the opposite. Businessmen can be used by the government
to increase the nation’s economic strength. British
administrators, like Chamberlain, sought to guarantee the
colonies produced a profit, yet attempts at imperial cost
efficiency does not necessarily show why a territory was

acquired.14 Humanitarian and imperialist groups constantly

l3
sought colonial expansion, but were ignored by those in
power unless their aims coincided with the government's
goals.15 Without doubt businessmen were used in the same
way. The government used charter companies as a means of

16 Chamberlain made sure

extending imperial control cheaply.
Sir George Goldie's Royal Niger Company lost its charter
when it became clear that Goldie was bent on exploiting the
lands under his control, rather than developing them.17
Economic value also served as a convenient justification for
expansion when the government needed support. The Colonial
Office was quick to note the economic opportunities present
in areas acquired for non-economic reasons.18 Chamberlain
argued for the value of colonies as a way of gaining allies
in his attempt to strengthen imperial ties.19

Usually the government treated businessmen in the same
way as any other interest. Politicians listened to their
advice, but kept them at a distance. Politicians were often
unconcerned with business affairs.20 British statesmen
continued to be recruited from the wealthy upper class who
were able to put the nation's interests before their own.
Such politicians were quick to defend the rights of British
finance and business, but not to advance private

interests.21

In 1889 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, G. J.
Goschen, stated, "...it is unsound commercial policy to seek
to assist the British enterprise in its struggle with
foreign rivals, out of the pocket of the general

..22

taxpayer.

England's economic system, with its free trade basis,

14
strove to minimize government involvement in the economy.
Chamberlain would find it extremely difficult to bring about
state involvement in the economy. There were many cases when
the government resisted economic interests. Salisbury did
not gave in to pressure to intervene in South America when
British financial interests were threatened in the early
18905.23 The government turned a deaf ear when Manchester's
Chamber of Commerce asked the government to seek new markets
in Africa.24 Formal expansion did not occur when financial.
interests demanded it, but when national interests became
involved.

In 1881, well before Chamberlain had developed a
concrete imperial plan, he condemned the purely economic
view of the Empire. He stated, "a great nation...could not
wrap itself up in a policy of selfish isolation and say that
nothing concerned it unless its material interests were

25 Chamberlain believed that the Empire

directly attacked."
should have economic value, but this was not his only
concern. The Empire was meant to serve all its inhabitants,
not exploit them. The English saw themselves as having an
obligation to help their subject peoples and improve the
lives of all imperial citizens. The English themselves were
the focus of Chamberlain’s design, but their interests would
not be advanced at the expense of others. The imperial
system, he proposed, was structured to elevate the standard
of living of the English working class without bringing

about hardship for the other classes in Britain. Living

conditions in the colonies would be improved at the same

15
time.

The unity of direction and the power of capitalist
entrepreneurs, as the economic historians represent it, is
both misleading and an oversimplification. It is true that
19th century businessmen profited from imperialism, but this
does not prove that imperialism was begun to advance the
private interests of capitalists. Birmingham’s Chamber of
Commerce, along with others, asked for expansion into
Africa.26 This commercial pressure usually resulted from
panic during periods of economic slump.27 After such periods
commercial interest in Africa declined. There is no clear
evidence to show that capitalists determined imperial
advances or even that they were the primary force advocating
advance. Businessmen could ask for intervention, but
government action on their behalf was never assured. It is
more realistic to view capitalist entrepreneurs as one
possible interest group which may, or may not advocate
imperialism. There is no proof that capitalists formed a
unified group, or that there was a financial monopoly in
Britain.28

Hobson links manufacturers, like Joseph Chamberlain, to
the finance capitalists. He believed industrialists and
financiers were allied to bring about expansion. Hobson
stated, manufacturers profited from the instability caused
by the use of imperial power.29 Those who manufactured the
goods needed to fight the large and small wars caused by
30

imperialism, Hobson believed, actively promoted expansion.

The business interests of Manchester, Sheffield, and

16
Birmingham used imperial power to secure new markets.31
Industrialists sought to profit from imperialism by gaining
new outlets for export, in much the same way financiers
sought outlets for capital.

One of the aims of Hobson’s study of imperialism was
refutation of Chamberlain’s arguments for protection.32
Hobson saw Chamberlain as the defender of one of the allies
of finance capitalists. Yet these interests are not the
same. Chamberlain’s view was the anti-thesis of that of
bankers. The Colonial Secretary wished to protect England’s
power by protecting her industry.33 His imperial system was
based on this premise. Industry provides jobs for Englishmen
and creates the goods necessary to develop the Empire.
Domestic industry was more important than foreign
investment. Investing outside the Empire could even hurt the
country by aiding enemies or simply denying Englishmen
access to funds. Chamberlain made clear his belief that a
great nation could not survive with an economy based on
finance alone.34 Not surprisingly Chamberlain found it
difficult to gain London’s financiers support for his plans.

Self-sufficiency for Britain and the Empire was
Chamberlain's goal. His aim was an Empire which would, "even
if alone, be self-sustaining and self-sufficient, able to
maintain itself against the competition of all its

"35 Industry was vital. Development of the colonial

rivals.
economies would not eliminate the need for British
manufacturing.36 British industry would, in fact be enhanced

by developing the Empire. Colonies would provide both raw

l7
materials and demand for industrial goods. The mother
country would provide military protection, finance capital,
and industrial goods. Such a relationship would use capital
to enhance the power of the entire Empire.

Economic historians are not alone in miscalculating the
influence of economics on imperialism. The proponents of the
strategic explanation of imperialism also fail to see the
link between economics and Empire. Robinson and Gallagher
are correct in their defense of the importance of political

37 Still, they confuse the

motives and local events.
connection between economics and political power in
Britain's imperial expansion. Political power requires
economic strength. The promotion of free trade by Britain
was only one way of maintaining economic power. Robinson and
Gallagher note that state power and trade enhance each

38 Yet they neglect to consider the way that formal

other.
imperial expansion into areas of economic importance
increases political power.

Chamberlain hoped to improve Britain 5 security, not
only by protecting India, but also by increasing her
economic base through imperialism. Even areas of slight
economic value could add to the strength of the Empire.
Chamberlain was even willing to claim areas of no known
value in the hopes that some use could be found for such
territories in the future. Strategically important areas
were seen by social imperialists as being doubly valuable.

These lands provided resources and enabled Britain to

protect strategic goals. In Chamberlain’s mind the economic

18
value of a colony was as important a its political worth.

Robinson and Gallagher's belief in continuity breaks
down when examining Chamberlain's radical policy.39 Unlike
many, Chamberlain was ready to sacrifice Britain's free
trade tradition for the good of the Empire. Chamberlain’s
new system would create an imperial customs union to draw
the colonies closer to Britain and provide funds for social
reform. The "imperialism of free trade" had no place in this
plan.40 The State needed influence in the imperial economy
to provide for welfare. Social reform seemed impossible
under a system of unregulated free trade.

Chamberlain's plans were considered too radical for
many Englishmen to accept. It is a mistake to suggest there
was no change in Britain’s style of imperialism. Chamberlain
wished to preserve the Empire by building a new imperial
structure which would insure Britain’s future strength.
Imperial tariffs were an indispensable part of this new
structure. Chamberlain's Empire would be based on formal
economic and military ties, not influence and free trade.
Influence was sought whenever possible, but actual control

was best.

II-CHAMBERLAIN'S EARLY CAREER

Joseph Chamberlain was was born in Camberwell, one of
the newer suburbs of London, on July 8, 1836.1 His father
was a businessman and his mother was the daughter of a
brewer and cheesemonger.2 The only thing that differentiated
the Chamberlains from others of their class was their
religious non—conformity. The Chamberlain family had a
strong Unitarian background. Their religion focused on
humanitarian reform and tolerance of other beliefs.3 It may
have been Chamberlain's Unitarian background which directed
him down a path of practical reform.4 The Chamberlain family
had long favored immediate reform, such as education, slum
clearance, and pension plans, to elevate Britain's working
classes.5 His church had involved Joseph and his family in
social work in London's slums, instilling what his
biographer J.L. Garvin called, a "principle of personal
service."6 The direction of Joseph’s service to his country
would be determined in 1854. In that year, at the age of
eighteen, Joseph set out for Birmingham to work in his
Uncle’s screw manufacturing business. John Nettlefold's
firm, would provide Joseph with the financial means to enter
politics.

Due in part to his religious non—conformity Chamberlain
entered the political arena as a Radical, the most
progressive group in the Liberal Party. He first entered the

national political scene in 1865 by joining a national

l9

20

Liberal association.7 Radicalism had been born in Cobden’s
fight against the Corn Laws.8 Besides fighting for free
trade, the Radicals had championed the rights of the middle
class in general. By the 1860’s Radicals, represented by men
like J.S. Mill and John Bright, had shifted to an attack on
privilege in order to gain an extension of the franchise.9
When Chamberlain joined the Radicals the focus had shifted
yet again. The reform act of 1867 had increased the
franchise and the Radicals had entered an alliance with the
Whigs. The Radicals and Whigs, forming the new Liberal
Party, now sought educational reform. The Liberals believed
_education provided the solution to all of society's ills,
from poverty to drunkenness.10 Chamberlain had found his
first major cause and a party through which to work towards
his political vision.

In 1867 Chamberlain fought for educational reform. In
that year he joined the Education League to work for free,

11

compulsory education. Free education provided a means not

only of helping the individual, but also as a means of

12 A transition

keeping English workers from crime and vice.
to free education, however, proved to be too drastic a
change for the electorate. In 1874 Chamberlain noted that
there would be no popular support for his plans until, "...
the great tide of commercial prosperity which has rolled
over England will begin to abate."13 Chamberlain would find
it very difficult to generate popular support for reform in

an atmOSphere of economic growth. England's economic success

would retard all movement towards reforms aimed at altering

21
the status quo.

In 1869 Chamberlain began to take a more active part in
local politics. He first served on the Birmingham Town
Council and then became Mayor in 1873. Chamberlain’s
activity in Birmingham coincided with, and was deeply
affected by the rise of what became known as the "civic
gospel". The civic gospel entailed government supported
social reform linked to democratic participation and a
strong distrust of privilege.14 The foundation of
Chamberlain’s political life would be laid in his Birmingham
years. For the rest of his life he would seek the extension
of democracy and the elevation of the working class.15
Birmingham was to become the model that would show the way
to achieve both these ends.

Birmingham's workers were greatly in need of help when
Chamberlain entered local politics. Most workers found
themselves packed into unhealthy and decaying slums. Such a
situation, in Chamberlain's mind, was inconceivable in a
modern industrial city. The elimination of the health hazard
and degradation caused by Birmingham's slums was at the top
of Chamberlain’s agenda. The problem was finding money to
finance reform.

Chamberlain realized increasing taxes would not supply
the funds. his solution was the take over, by local
government, of major utilities. Gas and water were
municipalized, insuring a steady source of income, as well

16

as the funds for slum clearance. Chamberlain believed

utilities and other public enterprises should be profitable,

22

to enable the lowering of taxes.17 Municipalization had the
added benefit of removing vital monopolies from the hands of
speculators and giving them to the people.18 More reform
followed. The city's sewage system was upgraded, street
lighting was introduced, and the construction of a new
downtown business district, Corporation Street, was begun.19

Chamberlain’s fight to aid the working class through
improved housing was a success. He succeeded in helping the
poor without hurting the middle and upper classes. The
working class got better housing, and the rich avoided
higher taxes. Improvements had been made possible through
the COOperative effort of the general taxpayers, prominent
businessmen, and the city’s leaders. At this time
Chamberlain learned of the value of c00peration between
business, government, and the citizenry. His future policies
would attempt to reconcile the interests of businessmen and
workers, using the government as an impartial arbitrator.

Chamberlain never gave up the belief that change for
the better was made possible through cooperative effort, not
class conflict. He would reject socialism and the labor
movement as viable political solutions, on the basis of
their promotion of class struggle. Chamberlain would oppose
the "new" Radicals because he believed they abused the
democratic system by using class tension to further their
own ends.20 In a play Chamberlain wrote in 1895, he
expressed his view of reform to aid the working class, while
criticizing socialists and Trade Unionists. The character

representing Chamberlain, Arthur Hartley states, "Our

23
business is to seek the real cause of their (workers)
distress, and if possible to remedy that, not to use their
condition for political ends, or to lead them into agitation

"21 All classes

which must be barren of practical results.
working together was the path to reform, not the elevation
of one class at the expense of another.

Fresh from his successes in Birmingham, Chamberlain
embarked on a career in national politics in 1876 when he
became a member of Parliament. Through Parliament,
Chamberlain hoped to extend Radical reform throughout the
nation. A position on the Board of Trade in Gladstone’s
government followed. Chamberlain became more aware of the
economic problems facing Britain after becoming President of
the Board of Trade.22 The Board educated Chamberlain in
Britain’s trade relations as well as alarming trends in the
employment picture.23 Yet, already he was beginning to chafe
under the restraints placed on him by Gladstone and the
Whigs.

In 1884 Chamberlain announced his "unauthorized"
Radical program. This statement was Chamberlain's answer to
a perceived lack of Liberal social reform. Educational
reform reform remained an important element in the Radical
program. Chamberlain was able to use his experience in
Birmingham to suggest ways to extend local government to
better address social problems.24 County and national
councils would be created to govern locally, and in Ireland

25

and Scotland. Land and tax reform to aid the lower classes

at the expense of the rich was outlined.26 Ways were

24

suggested to increase the number of small land owners.
Ironically, given Chamberlain’s future stance on taxation,
direct taxation would be increased, while indirect taxation
would be lowered.27 Because many Radicals came from a
Non—conformist religious background disestablishment of the
Anglican Church was a major goal. Universal manhood suffrage
and the payment of M.P.s rounded out the program, as long
range goals.28

While Chamberlain’s domestic policy challenged the
conservative wing of the Liberal party and Gladstone
himself, his position on the Empire kept within the bounds
of mainstream Liberal thought. He did not oppose the idea of
Empire itself, but only Disraeli's expansionism. This
criticism of Conservative policy never equaled

29 Chamberlain believed the Empire

anti-colonialism.
benefited both Britain and the peOples under British
control. Most Liberal criticism focused on the way the
Empire was run, not imperialism itself. His early views
included a wish to keep Britain's overseas commitments to a
minimum.30
The M.P. for Birmingham already had pronounced views on
the region which would become the focus of his future
career, Africa. Before 1884 Chamberlain believed that
Britain's African colonies were burdens and that only
Cape Town was needed as a coaling station.31 October,
1884 marked the beginning of an about face in Chamberlain’s

perception of the Empire. In 1884 he realized that

Britain's position in South Africa was threatened by

25
outside forces. The instability caused by granting Boer
demands after the British defeat at Majuba was soon brought
home to London. Not only had the morale of the English at
the Cape been damaged, but the Boers had been convinced of

. . . 32
Britain 5 weakness.

The Afrikaners began to move west into
British territory. Chamberlain asked for the prevention of
Boer incursions into Bechuanaland to stop any possible link

33

up with the Germans in South West Africa. In September he

asked that an expedition be sent to force the Boers back

34 The.Radical member of Parliament was

into the Transvaal.
beginning to question Liberal imperial policy, and to think
about the way the Empire affected domestic reform.

» The Imperial Federation League was created in 1884
which had as its goal the consolidation of the Empire. The
League was inspired by the political philosophy of

Chamberlain's Radical associate, Charles Dilke.35

Although
the League itself was short lived, the influence of Dilke's
ideas on Chamberlain would be felt throughout the rest of
his career. Dilke championed the creation of two imperial
bodies, a customs union and an imperial council. The League
argued that closer ties to the self-governing colonies would
be achieved through and an imperial customs union.36 An
imperial council would oversee the union as well as promote

37 In time

greater colonial contribution to imperial defense.
Chamberlain would accept both these broad goals.
In some cases Chamberlain’s early stance on imperial

issue had been determined by the political struggle in

Britain, rather than by thoughtful consideration of the

26
Empire. In 1880-81 Chamberlain and his Radical ally and
friend Charles Dilke threatened to resign over the Boer
rebellion in the Transvaal. Ironically the Radicals were
ready to leave the government if Gladstone approved the use
of force to keep the Boers within the Empire. The real

38 The Whig Ministers under the

issue, however, was Ireland.
Earl of Kimberley favored a hard line in both Ireland and
the Transvaal. The Radicals, with their pro-tenant policy
for Ireland, hoped to use the Boer rebellion to weaken

39 With Gladstone's backing the Radicals were

Kimberley.
successful and the Transvaal was given up. Again in 1885
Chamberlain was ready to use opposition to the conquest of

40

the Sudan to pressure Gladstone to resign. Yet in 1882

Chamberlain had responded to the popular mood and had given

41 He hoped order

his support for intervention in Egypt.
could soon be restored and the British troops withdrawn.
Chamberlain would resist a large relief expedition to save
General Gordon because he feared a major campaign against
the Mahdists would jeopardize an early withdrawal from
Egypt.42 Chamberlain’s early resistance to imperial
expansion is often most readily reconciled with his future
actions by seeing them in light of his political struggles
at home.

Ireland formed an important back drop in the early
development of Chamberlain’s views on imperialism. The most
important political issue in the 1880's involved Ireland's

quest for home rule. Chamberlain's resistance to Home Rule

was not based solely on fear of the dissolution of the

27
Empire.43 Ireland had always been a special case, and it was
not assumed that any action taken there would be reflected
throughout the Empire. In 1882 Chamberlain had agreed that
the Irisn should be given local autonomy while efforts were
made towards land reform.44 He wrote of his "conviction that
the Irish people were entitled to the largest measure of
self-government consistent with the continued integrity of
the Empire."45 Chamberlain wished to give Ireland a degree
of self-government to undercut those calling for
independence.46 It was hoped that local autonomy would
diffuse the agitation for complete separation. Gladstone had
his own plans for Ireland which centered on a separate Irish
Parliament. Gladstone's proposal would lead Chamberlain to
split with the Liberals.

During the struggle over the Irish question Chamberlain
would call for "Home Rule all round", where an Imperial
Parliament had sole authority over the entire Empire.47 One
means of maintaining a degree of central control would be a
federal system, like that of the U.S.A., representing all

48 An Imperial Parliament would

Britain’s possessions.
replace the current imperial system so that all areas would
have input into imperial policy making. The Empire would
abide by the decisions made by this body.

Federation, however, would have meant the destruction

49 The House of Lords and the

of the old Constitution.
Monarchy itself would have been swept away with the
Constitution. The plan for federation never had a chance, it

is questionable whether Chamberlain himself expected its

28
implementation. He would have little trouble abandoning
federation once he had allied himself with the

Conservatives.50

The plan, though unrealistic, highlighted
the defects of Gladstone’s plan and offered common ground on
which to gather opposition to Home Rule. Gathering
opposition may have been Chamberlain's main goal.51 As it
turned out, the plan was never a viable alternative.

After failing to defeat Gladstone for control of the
Liberal party on the issue of Home Rule, Chamberlain and his
Radical allies left to form a new party, the Liberal-
Unionists. Liberal-Unionism provided Chamberlain with the
chance to greatly broaden his political support. An
electoral compact with the Conservatives to prevent a
Liberal victory in 1886, grew into an actual merging of the
two parties.52 The new alliance took the name Unionist.
Unionism united all who supported the Empire and opposed
Home Rule. It also a provided a means to appeal to those
workingmen tired of the Liberal focus on Ireland rather than
social reform.53 Chamberlain saw in the Unionist party a
chance to remedy the harm done to the poor as a result of
defective Liberal imperial policy.54

The Unionists had united in Opposition to Home Rule,
but this negative stance was not enough to create a viable
party. What was needed was a long term policy. When
Chamberlain defined what it meant to be a Unionist he
outlined the Party's future policy and what he would spend

the rest of his life trying to achieve. He said of the

Unionist Party, "... it includes all men who are determined

29
to maintain an undivided Empire, and who are ready to
promote the welfare and the union, not of one class, but of
all classes...."55

During the 1890's Chamberlain continued to press for
social reform. In 1890-91 Chamberlain again fought for free
education, as well as a public health program, improved
housing, industrial arbitration, shorter working hours,
accident insurance, and old age pensions.56 Chamberlain had
little success in convincing his more conservative
colleagues or the public of the value of these programs. He
therefore limited the cope of the reforms he proposed and
continued with more modest goals.

In the period from 1886 to 1892 the Conservatives, in
alliance with the Liberal-Unionists, enacted legislation
extending local government and granted aid for land
purchase.57 After the final defeat of Home Rule and
Gladstone’s government in 1895 Chamberlain saw a chance to
capitalize on growing labor agitation by adopting certain
aspects of their proposal.58 His new program included an 8
hour day for miners, payment of M.P.s and an amendment to

59

the Employer Liability Act of 1880. Old Age Pensions would.

be created through voluntary contributions matched by

60 It was believed such acts would pacify

government funds.
labor with out upsetting the political structure of the
nation.61 Chamberlain's new program closely matched his 1885
Radical Program. Some of the early goals, such as

disestablishment and greater direct taxation, had to be

abandoned given Chamberlain's new conservative allies.

30

Chamberlain, expanding on his reforms as major of
Birmingham, hOped to involve the state in the direction of
commerce.62

In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain accepted the post of
Colonial Secretary in Lord Salisbury's government.
Chamberlain, whose Liberal Unionist support was needed by
the Conservatives, had been offered his choice of Cabinet
positions. Many were surprised that he chose the less
prestigious Colonial Office. The new Colonial Secretary,
however, had a vision of empire he wished to make reality.
Chamberlain's three main objectives were the economic
development of the Empire, its political unification, and
the persuasion of the English public of the value of the
Empire.63 The new Empire would unify the variety of British
colonies and possessions into a politically and economically
integrated whole. He looked forward to a time, "when we may
reach a union in which free states, all of them enjoying
their independent institutions, will yet be inseparably
united in defense of common interests, and in the observance

"64 New colonies in Africa and

of mutual obligations.
elsewhere, would help revitalize the British empire.

The Colonial Office was a safe position from which
Chamberlain could work for reform without clashing with his
more conservative allies.65 What the new Colonial Secretary
did not realize was that his acceptance of the Colonial
Office would leave him at the mercy of those in more central

66

Cabinet positions. The Colonial Office's reliance on the

Treasury would greatly affect all imperial policy. The

31

Treasury resisted all expansive Colonial policy because it
was the Treasury which had to justify all expenditure.67

Chamberlain had come to the conclusion that private
investment alone would never deve10p the colonies
adequately.68 Greater government involvement was needed. In
1895 Chamberlain suggested that the yearly revenue from the
government’s Suez Canal stocks should be diverted to a
special fund. The revenue, "...should be lent or invested in
the Crown colonies and dependencies of the Empire for public
works, such as railways, bridges, harbors, and
irrigation."69 George Hamilton, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, blocked the move to keep his department from
losing the seven hundred thousand pounds per year the stocks

70 The Treasury also tended to resist the Colonial

provided.
Secretary's plans out of a conservative reluctance to get
the government more deeply involved in the economy.
Chamberlain was able to get financial support for West
Indian sugar only because the Treasury feared he might get
the Cabinet to agree to tariffs for the area.72 The need to
struggle for funding greatly limited the scope of colonial
reform.

After his split with the Liberals, Chamberlain had
become more personally involved in the Empire in a number of
ways. He had business dealings in Canada and the West
Indies, visited Egypt and the Middle East, and negotiated
with the U.S. over Canadian fishing rights.73 These

activities gave Chamberlain a new perspective on the

Empire’s problems. Before this period Chamberlain had

32
generally resisted expansion, afterward, the growth of the
Empire was his primary goal.74
Chamberlain's view of the Empire had been shifting long
before he became Colonial Secretary. Dilke suggested that
Chamberlain's views were only Radical in respect to domestic
affairs, while he remained "patriotic" on imperial matters.
75 He had supported the Zulu War of 1879 as a means of
establishing logical boarders in South East Africa.7
Chamberlain had already begun laying the groundwork
for his populist Empire in a speech in Toronto in 1887. He
stated, "True democracy does not consist in the
dismemberment and disintegration of the Empire, but rather
in the knitting together of kindred races for similar
objects."77 Cooperation between all members of the Empire
would lead to the utilitarian goal of the greatest good for
the greatest number. The object of the Empire would become
the betterment of all imperial citizens. It was assumed that
the English, because of their cultural superiority, would
lead the way. Chamberlain would state,
"The defense of all British interests and the
reorganization of the newly acquired territories
are inseparably linked with the greater scheme by
which we hope to make our Empire something more
than a mere geographical expression. We hope to
make it a living entity in which each part shall
contribgge to the success and security of the
whole."
His position on the Empire in South Africa in 1888
reflected Chamberlain’s new position well. The expansion of

Boer farmers into Bechuanaland prompted Chamberlain to speak

out in defense of the Empire and the African peoples under

33
the Crown. He said, "... the abandonment of these duties
would be as fatal to our nations prosperity as it would be

79 His

discreditable to our character and national honor."
statement reflected Chamberlain's view of the duties
involved in imperialism as well as the connection between
the Empire and England's prosperity. The Africans may not be
considered equal partners in the imperial structure, but
their interests could not be ignored. The Africans would be
afforded the same protection as the English. This at least
was the goal.

In 1888 Chamberlain stated, "I will never willingly
admit of any policy that will tend to weaken the ties
between the different branches of the British Empire."80 He
had supported intervention in Egypt to protect EurOpean
lives and to restore order.81 By 1889 Chamberlain was
standing firmly behind the Conservative policy. In a letter
to his son Austin on Egypt, he wrote, "If we come away
before our work is firmly established, the country will go
back again in a few years to the old conditions of corrupt

"82

and arbitrary administration. Chamberlain realized the

need to protect the Suez Canal, but he saw Britain's primary
goal to be the protection of the Egyptian people.83 Yet, in
contradiction to Hobson, Chamberlain was not interested in
using London’s power to protect Egypt's creditors.84
Chamberlain always supported pragmatic solutions to
imperial problems, while he Opposed any imperial policy that

lacked clear objectives.85 Mindless expansionism and

excessive jingoism threatened the Empire as much as

34
anti-colonialism. Chamberlain's Radicalism contained an
element requiring the pursuit of justice. Chamberlain
defended indigenous peOples when they were threatened by
English injustice. He was as quick to chastise the Boers for
mistreating Africans.86 In general Chamberlain saw the
British presence as a positive influence on all involved.
Chamberlain believed, "We have an opportunity if we seize
it, which comes seldom to any civilized nation, of
reducing ... the sum of human suffering in the world."87 On
Egypt he wrote, "The duty cast upon us ... is to secure to
the Egyptian people the greatest possible development of

representative institutions."88

The English came not as
conquerors, but the bringers of peace and democracy.

By 1893 Chamberlain publicly announced his dedication
to the expansion of the Empire.89 His Old belief in limiting
Britain’s overseas commitments had been abandoned. Expansion
of the Empire was necessary to ease growing unemployment and
to insure trade. The social reforms Chamberlain hoped to
enact would be impossible if the nation was in economic

90 Chamberlain believed, "Experience teaches us that

"91

decline.
trade follows the flag. Areas which could not be
currently used should be "pegged out" for unforeseen needs

92 This expansive policy met with resistance

of the future.
within the Unionist Party itself. Lord Salisbury, the
Unionist party’s leader, favored preserving only important
colonies like Egypt and South Africa. Less vital colonies,
like those in West Africa, could be used in bargaining with

European opponents to gain other political objectives.93

35
Chamberlain could not accept such views.

In West Africa Chamberlain saw the need to push British
control into the interior to avoid being surrounded and
isolated by French territory.94 The economic survival of
small African colonies, such as the Gold Coast, Lagos, and
the Niger, was dependent on their expansion. These
territories relied on the products of the hinterland
reaching trading posts on the coasts and on major rivers.
French control threatened to divert resources to their own
colonies. Chamberlain fought to protect the economy of the
West African colonies. He created the West African Frontier
Force with African levies to keep the French out of the

95 In 1898 as Colonial

vaguely defined British territories.
Secretary, Chamberlain won major concessions for Britain in
an Anglo-French Convention which ended a number of boundary
disputes in West Africa.96 Chamberlain had insured that
Britain had a large military force in the area before
entering negotiations.

The late 18905 saw Chamberlain willing to risk war with
France to protect the Empire in Africa. The colonies in West
Africa had been consolidated by negotiating with France. Yet
the French had seen the chance to extend their control to
the Nile and to disrupt Britain’s control of Egypt. In 1897
France dispatched an expedition under Captain Marchand to
travel from West Africa, through the Sudan, to establish an
outpost on the Nile. The Sudan, formerly a part of Egypt,
had been abandoned to the forces of the Mahdi years before.

Britain had not seen the need to retake the area after their

36

intervention in Egypt. The establishment of a French outpost
in the Sudan, however, threatened the security of Egypt. The
French, unlike the Mahdists, had the technology to interfere
with the flow of the Nile, on which Egypt depended.

The Colonial Secretary held the patriotic View that
Marchand must withdraw immediately. It was unacceptable to
compensate the French for this withdrawal with territory

97 London would

anywhere in the world, the Cabinet agreed.
not submit to political blackmail. To strengthen the
government's resolve Chamberlain spoke to the nation
denouncing France’s constant pressure on British territory,

98 Chamberlain had

what he called a "policy of pinpricks".
shown his willingness to go to war over Fashoda. Only the

renunciation Of all Marchand’s outposts in the Sudan would
satisfy him.99 Chamberlain's public stance helped convince

100 This determination

Paris of the determination of Britain.
and internal political conflict made the French decide to
abandon their plan.

While foreign policy was not the official realm of the
Colonial Secretary, the large impact of the colonies on
foreign relations insured that Chamberlain had a major role
in negotiations with foreign nations. Chamberlain was
unwilling to support any action which would jeopardize the
security of the Empire. He saw, however, that the safety of
the colonies was Often better served by offering concessions
to other nations. In the 1890's Britain had three ways in

which to develop her power. She could seek European allies,

work for closer ties to the U.S., or create a stronger bond

37
with the Empire.101 Chamberlain sought to strengthen Britain
by both drawing closer to the colonies and by seeking allies
throughout the world. the Colonial Secretary was successful
in cultivating closer ties to the U.S.A., but attempts at
long term cooperation with the Germans proved fruitless. The
failure to gain a strong European ally highlighted the
necessity of closer ties to the colonies. The Empire had
become vital to the security of Britain.

The Empire had much to offer other than political
security. The Colonial Secretary felt that the Empire did
not exploit the peoples who lived within it, but rather
provided them with their needs. Mother country and colony
would benefit each other. Britain would provide a
governmental, industrial, and cultural center. The colonies
would provide raw materials, new markets and room for
expansion. Since the Empire served the imperial citizen,
instead of the citizens serving the Empire, it became
possible to improve the way of life of all by improving and
strengthening the Empire. Chamberlain wished to institute

102

"scientific administration" for the colonies. Planning

and efficiency was vital in linking economic success to
social justice through out the Empire. The imperial
administration would be rationalized to run as smoothly as

possible. The colonies would be expected to pay for their

103

own administration. An overall plan for development was

104

needed. Chamberlain would spend the rest of his life

trying to develop and implement an all encompassing plan.105

Without doubt Chamberlain drew on his early experiences

38
in Birmingham when forming his vision of empire. Chamberlain
progressed from his early faith in increased activity by
local government to one Of increased government involvement

106 London would act as the imperial

on an imperial scale.
center, directing the allocation of financial and
technological outlays to her possessions. England would
benefit greatly by being the center of a revitalized Empire.
A transportation and communication infrastructure would be
expanded to better link the colonies to the mother country.
The colonies were an investment which needed to be develOped

107 Efficient

and modernized so as to produce a profit.
administration, however, did not mean a heartless
determination of profit and loss. Chamberlain's Empire would
appeal to the spirit, not simply the pocket book.108
Humanitarian improvements and the advancement of political
rights were primary goals of the Empire.
The Treasury would help finance initial colonial

develOpment so that the Empire would soon be able to stand

109 London would distribute the prOfitS 0f empire

on its own.
to the mother country and the colonies alike in the form of
improved social services, welfare, transportation,
communication, and defense. The laying of additional
undersea telegraph cable, and the increase of steamship
lines and railways tied the colonies more closely
together.110

The shape of a colony's economy would depend upon its

unique physical or social geography. Each part would

contribute that which it was most suited to produce. The

39

diversity of Britain’s posSessions proved a definite
advantage. Those areas most suited to providing agricultural
goods could specialize in farming. Other areas would provide
the industrial goods the agrarian areas needed. Britain was
best fitted to become the industrial center of the Empire. A
symbiotic relationship would develop between the Britain and
the colonies, as well as between all areas of the empire.
While many colonies resisted specialization, Chamberlain
continued to press for greater imperial efficiency at the
price of economic independence for the colonies.

Chamberlain's imperial plans stressed a strong
commitment to democracy as the best means to promote the
good of all. While London would serve as the center of the
Empire, the capitol would not monopolize all power.
Chamberlain had abandoned the idea of imperial federation in
1886, yet the notion of the new parliament remained.111
Chamberlain envisioned the creation of an Imperial
Parliament. His thoughts on such a body highlighted his
belief in democracy and imperial cooperation. The Empire
would become a union of free nations, pledged to submit to

112 Chamberlain never worked out the

the collective will.
idea of the Imperial Parliament in a realistic form. The
Colonial Secretary believed the colonies themselves should
suggest the creation of the new body and that premature
moves on London’s part could ruin the chances of an Imperial
. . . 113

Parliament being successful.

The new Imperial Parliament would be one where, "all

should be equally responsible, that all should have a share

40
in the welfare, and sympathize with the welfare of every

part."114

The Colonial Secretary hoped was that the
interests of the individual would be subordinated to the
common good. Imperial unity was to be essential to the
strength of the Empire. All parts would have a say in policy
making. Like England 5 Parliament, input did not necessarily
mean equal influence. Chamberlain, after all, still believed
Britain was best suited to lead the world. The Empire,
however, would be a single unit. Success for one part would
be reflected throughout the Empire. Chamberlain’s empire
would be linked by strong bonds of kinship, history,
commerce, and mutual interest. The centrifugal drift of the
icolonies could finally be reversed.

In time the idea of an Imperial Parliament would be
abandoned. The problem in the plan was in part due to the
distance separating England from her colonies. The
individual colonies were Often too isolated geographically
and politically. Most colonies were too far away to suggest
specific legislation which would affect Britain or other
colonies.115 It also seemed unlikely that the self-governing
colonies would be willing to submit to greater outside

116 Sectional interests

control and higher Imperial taxes.
would become more divisive, and common ground harder to
find.

In addition to expansion, Chamberlain also saw the need
to develop the colonies. Originally Chamberlain saw the

government’s role as one of negative influence, to prevent

abuse. Private business would develop the colonies at the

41

same time as they sought their own interests.117 Progress
would be furthered through competitive capitalism, tempered
by state guided reform. This system was much cheaper, but it
would have made it impossible to give the Empire a unity of
direction. In time Chamberlain would see the need for
greater government involvement to actively promote the
Empire. Only state intervention could insure the social
advance of the Empire's citizenry.

In 1895 Chamberlain equated the Empire to an estate.
The owner of such an estate would be considered negligent if
he made no move in the direction of "... improving the
property, in making communication, in making outlets for the

products of his lands."118

The British government had the
same responsibility as such an owner. Chamberlain
immediately pressed for the use of government capital in the
colonies. Funds were needed for railroad and harbor building
in Africa, railroads and irrigation in Cyprus, and loans to
revitalize the West Indian sugar industry.119

Chamberlain's determination to fight to preserve the
Empire did not mean domestic policy no longer concerned him.
He continued to work for the reconciliation of the new

120 The Empire became

industrialists with the working class.
a means of creating a common goal for all Britons around
which they could create a better society. While looking for
a means to advance reform he had begun to look at the Empire
in a different way. With a businessman’s eyes Chamberlain

came to see the colonies as overlooked assets. Chamberlain

began to see the Empire as a resource which could be

42
utilized for the good of all. African territories needed to
be seized immediately to keep other nations from gaining

their resources.121

Not surprisingly, given Chamberlain's
position, he turned to a famous Conservative Prime Minister,
Benjamin Disraeli, for inspiration. Chamberlain adopted
Disraeli’s position that reform and imperialism were
mutually supporting as the basis of his imperial policy.122
As Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain could expand his
earlier plans for municipal reform to cover the Empire as a
whole.123 Developing the colonies would pay for welfare and
social services. To Chamberlain the condition of England was
interdependent with conditions throughout the Empire.
Britain's prosperity, Chamberlain believed, rested of the
trade provided from colonies gained in the past.124 London
would be responsible for directing and rechannelling the

profits of imperialism back to the Empire’s citizens.125

III-SOUTH AFRICA

Chamberlain’s plan for the Empire in Africa ran into
difficulty almost immediately. The Colonial Secretary hoped
to acquire as much of Africa as possible, even though most
of Africa had poor economic prospects and few English
settlers. South Africa, however, had a strong economy and
large British pOpulation making it a valuable prize. The
Cape Colony was one of Britain7s most valuable imperial
assets. South Africa was, therefore, important to the
success of Chamberlain’s entire imperial strategy. One of
the most pressing problem Chamberlain faced as the new
Colonial Secretary was the growing tension between the Crown
colonies of South Africa and the independent Boer republics.
The Afrikaners and English had been competing for control of
South Africa since the original British takeover of the Cape
after the Napoleonic war. Peace between white men and black
had recently enabled friction to grow between Afrikaner and
Englishmen.

In the 1830’s thousands of Boers had trekked north to
escape British control, creating two independent republics,
the Orange Free State and the South African Republic or the
Transvaal. The English feared the Boers would stir up
trouble with the African tribes on the boarders of the Crown
colonies in their quest for more land. Even more threatening
than Boer-African struggles spilling over into English

territory, was the chance that the Afrikaners would allow

43

44
other European powers acceSs into South Africa. The absence
of European rivals had allowed England to dominate the
region at little cost. It seemed this advantage was about to
be lost. To prevent this potential threat, the British cut
the Boers Off from the coast by annexing the surrounding
territory.

In spite of the success of isolation of the Boers,
London’s best solution to the Dutch problem would be the
incorporation Of the Boer republics into the Crown colonies.
Chamberlain saw such unification under the Crown as a way of
adding new resources to the Cape Colony at the same time as
a major external threat was eliminated. Only incorporation
would eliminate the Afrikaner challenge. By the 1890's two
British attempts to extend control over the Afrikaner
republics had failed. The most recent, in 1881, had seen the
defeat of British troops at Majuba Hill at the hands of Boer
Commandos. Britain hoped that commerce and the threat of
hostile Africans would draw the Boers to union.

This hope was destroyed in 1886 when gold was
discovered in the Transvaal's Witwatersrand district. Gold
gave the Afrikaners the means to threaten British hegemony.
The growth of the Transvaal’s economic power had worried
Chamberlain for some time.3 The vast wealth the mining
industry produced shifted the center of power north to the
Boers. The economic strength produced by the Cape's wool and
diamonds was being Offset by the gold of the Witwatersrand.4
Chamberlain feared that South Africa would unite under the

Boer states, rather than the Crown. A Union hostile to

45
Britain would make his dream of imperial integration
impossible in South Africa.

The Colonial Secretary’s standing with the Dutch
population of South Africa was badly damaged when he was
implicated in the Jameson Raid soon after taking office.
Chamberlain’s continued support of Cecil Rhodes after the
Raid and the subsequent government investigation made it
appear London was conspiring with the Randlords.5 London had
no need to defend the Randlords, in the way Hobson suggests,
since only the Randlords would benefit. To a large extent
the British already dominated the Transvaal's economy.6 The
Boer’s geographic location insured that most of their trade
passed through British territory. In addition, London's
banks were still needed to finance the mining industry, no
matter who ran the government. Yet Chamberlain and the
Cabinet had nothing to gain financially by supporting the
mine owners.7 The government was made of skilled politicians
who were not easily deceived. The Colonial Secretary and the
rest of the government took note of many interest groups,
yet remained detached.8 An unpopular war could easily
destroy political careers. Rhodes may have been willing to
risk his political fortunes to aid his financial position,
but Chamberlain’s approval of the action had much different
aims.9

It was Chamberlain’s wish to create a Union of South
Africa, under the Crown, which drove Chamberlain to turn a
blind eye to Rhode’s plot, not a wish to aid the Randlords.

In 1887 Chamberlain had opposed Rhodes' attempt to expand

46
north.10 Chamberlain favored imperial control in South
Africa, not expansion by uncontrollable entrepreneurs. The
Colonial Secretary would rather have done without Rhodes’
aid, but Chamberlain was impatient to advance his imperial
scheme.11 Even though he distrusted the Rand magnates all
support for expansion was valued. Chamberlain could not have
afforded to alienate Rhodes had his conspiracy succeeded.12
The government was willing to use the mine owners as allies,
but did not allow them to dictate policy. Chamberlain
realized the difficulty in getting Treasury funds for the
area. Rhodes' company was needed, "...in the interest of the

13

development of these new estates." The Colonial Secretary

defended the British South Africa Company before Parliament
as having greatly improved the regions under its control.14
After the Raid, Chamberlain published the Uitlander
grievances to justify the unrest in the Transvaal and

15 Chamberlain would not

praised Rhodes as an Empire builder.
cast away a man or an institution which could be used to
construct his imperial blueprint. London tried to gain the
Randlords’ support, but the government never trusted them or
believed their goals were the same.

Political control, as the main step towards closer
imperial ties, was Chamberlain’s main goal. In his speeches,
the Colonial Secretary had outlined his personal goals and
those of the government. The first was the protection of
British subjects. The second was that, "...in the interests

of the British Empire, Great Britain must remain the

paramount power in South Africa."17 An independent Republic,

47
with ties to London, would most suit the majority of the
Randlords. Yet an Uitlander Republic was incompatible with
the aims of the Colonial Secretary. Chamberlain strongly
opposed the creation of such a republic, even one allied to
England. The interests of the Empire required a unified
South Africa firmly within the imperial fold.18 He stated,
"The substitution of an entirely independent Republic,
governed by or for the capitalists of the Rand would be very
much worse for British interests in the Transvaal itself and

for British influence in South Africa."19

An independent
Boer republic was preferable. Chamberlain believed, that in
the long term, peace in South Africa could only be made
possible through British control.20 Most of his direct
involvement in the Jameson Raid were attempts to insure
imperial control could be quickly established in
Johannesburg.

The greatest check to Chamberlain’s plans arose when
the Boer’s refused to accept integration.21 In the past the
Afrikaners had asserted their independence, yet could not
deny Britain’s overall dominance. Now the republics had the
economic power to challenge English control. By the 1890's
the Boers had begun to dispute British suzerainty.
Chamberlain believed the Boers had to be pressed into
cooperating before their power became any greater. The
Colonial Secretary’s part in the Jameson Raid highlighted
his impatience. He was unwilling to see the cornerstone of

Britain’s African Empirelost. The Boer War was the result

of the incompatibility of Chamberlain’s goal of imperial

48

unity and the Afrikaner quest for independence.

In spite of Chamberlain’s support for Rhodes’ attempt
to overthrow Kruger, the Colonial Secretary did not favor a
military invasion of the Boer Republics. He had hoped the
Jameson Raid would give Britain an excuse to intervene to
restore order. Support for Rhodes was withdrawn when it was
clear there would be no uprising in the Transvaal.
Chamberlain did not want to be responsible for a full scale
war. To a great extent Chamberlain and the British Cabinet
were forced into war in 1899. The British government
continued to back the Cobdenite ideal of peaceful resolution

22

of conflicts through compromise. Such a policy made sense

given Britain’s role as the world’s industrial leader and
main beneficiary of world trade. War’s instability and the

disruption of trade harmed Britain more than any other

23

nation. War in South Africa was the last resort, not the

first hope. As Chamberlain stated on March 19, 1898, "The

principle object of Her Majesty’s Government in South Africa

. "24
at present is peace.

Chamberlain believed any war would be drawn out and

expensive.25 On these grounds war would have been, "... a

. . . . 26
course of action as immoral as it would have been unWise."

Chamberlain noted that such a war would not gain the

27

nation’s support. A costly war would also retard social

reform by diverting government funds.
The use of force was also unappealing because of the

28

need to maintain the loyalty of the Cape Dutch. The Boers

living in the Crown colonies had proven loyal, but they

49
remained sympathetic to their kinsmen in the north.
Chamberlain wrote, "A war with the Transvaal would certainly
rouse antagonism in the Cape Colony, and leave behind it the
most serious difficulties in the way of South African

"29 The Jameson Raid had already undermined the

union.
support of the Cape Dutch. 30 Chamberlain believed war with
the Republics might serve to unite all Afrikaners against
the British.31

The Colonial Secretary's hopes for peace rested on the
1884 London Convention which had given Britain suzerainty

over the Transvaal.32

The Convention gave the Transvaal
internal independence, but placed checks to insure British
interests would not be discriminated against. The extent of
this suzerainty was loosely defined, yet the treaty provided
the legal basis for future British claims. Primarily, the
Convention gave Britain the right to control the Transvaal’s
foreign affairs. Article four gave Britain the right to
approve treaties between the South African Republic and any
nation other than the Orange Free State.33 London assumed it
would determine what constituted foreign policy.

Chamberlain would define suzerainty as,"Superiority
over a State possessing independent rights ... with
reference to certain specified matters."34 Article four
meant, therefore, that the Transvaal was not a sovereign
state and could not expect to be treated as one.35 Any
claims to sovereignty independent of the London Convention

36

were ignored by London. The Convention was to be used to

draw the Boers closer to the Crown diplomatically. The

50
Afrikaners, however, refused to be lead in any way which
would reduce their independence.

Boer hostility was more dangerous given Kruger’s
attempts to form ties with other European powers. Kruger’s
active courtship of Germany in the wake of the Jameson Raid
made it imperative to reassert British influence in the
area. The Colonial Secretary now had the added problem of
keeping a hostile European power from gaining control of the
Transvaal. To Chamberlain it appeared that time was running
out. It would be impossible to create an economically viable
empire if most revenue was spent simply defending the
colonies from foreign powers.

London's first step was to isolate the Afrikaners
politically. Chamberlain had been seeking closer ties to
Germany for some time.37 In 1898 an Anglo-German convention
had been passed concerning the possible division of
Portuguese possessions in South Africa.38 England and
Germany divided Portuguese territory into zones of economic
influence. Each nation would gain possession of their zone
if Portugal went bankrupt.39 A rail line to Delagoa Bay
completed in 1894, Kruger’s path to the sea, lay within
Britain's zone.40 Included in the treaty was an agreement by
Germany to acknowledge British suzerainty over the Boer
states. Even so, it was realized that the British could not
insure the isolation of the Boers until the Bay was in
actually in British hands.41 The threat of outside
intervention had been reduced, but Britain needed to

overcome Boer resistance .

51

The problem became one of gaining the nation’s support
for a forward policy in South Africa to pressure the Boers
into cooperation. The Jameson Raid had brought the plight of
Englishmen in the Transvaal to the attention of the British
public. After the discovery of gold, English miners,
engineers, and businessmen had moved into Afrikaner
territory in large numbers. Boer distrust of the British
prompted them to deny the newcomers, or Uitlanders, the
rights of citizenship, even though they were expected to pay
taxes. The Uitlanders sent two petitions to London asking
for intervention when the Boers refused to grant foreigners
voting rights. The plight of the Uitlanders proved a means
of gaining support in Britain for a stronger stance towards
the Transvaal.

Chamberlain was willing to use the Uitlander problem to
press more energetically for his imperial plan. The
Uitlander’s quest for political rights served as a great
propaganda vehicle to unite the nation behind Chamberlain’s
plan.42 In time, London decided justice could only be served
by extending the franchise to the Uitlanders. The fight for
voting rights would justify and legitimize Britain's use of
force against the Afrikaners. Conversely, if the Boers
agreed to expand the franchise, the large number of
Englishmen would allow Britain to gain control through the
ballot box. The census statistics used by the government
listed 62,509 Englishmen in the two Boer republics, while
there were only 18,126 Burghers with the franchise in the

Transvaal.43 In either case the Boers would be drawn into

52

closer ties to London. Chamberlain summed up the British
position in a one sentence. He stated, "It is our duty, not
only to the Uitlanders, but to the native races, and to our
prestige in that part of the world and the world at large,
to insist that the Transvaal falls in line with the other
states in South Africa."44 The enfranchisement of the
Uitlanders seemed the best way to encourage the union of
South Africa

Chamberlain took a risk when he acknowledged the
Uitlanders’ quest for political rights. The loyalty of the
Empire’s citizens would be threatened if London was shown to

45 Chamberlain feared

be unable to protect her subjects.
Britain would lose control of her African subjects if the
English proved incapable of protecting themselves.46 Britain
could not abandon her citizens in the Transvaal, but action
in their behalf could bring about war.47 The only option
open was to pressure Kruger for reform, without directly
provoking the Boers.48 Rights for the Uitlanders became the
primary British demand in her negotiations with the
Afrikaners.

Chamberlain believed negotiation from a position of
strength to be the best means of avoiding armed conflict. He
came to believe that the British had lost the Afrikaner's
respect after Majuba, this loss of respect caused most of
the current problems.49 Only a forceful position seemed
likely to restore Britain’s dignity. On April 19, 1897 he

wrote Salisbury of the need to convince Kruger, "...we are

in earnest and mean to defend the Convention with all our

53

strength. My hope is that he will give way as he has done

"50 A firm stance would also keep foreign powers

51

before...
from meddling in the area. The plan seemed to work.
British reinforcements were sent to South Africa and Kruger
appeared to back down. Kruger repealed the Alien Immigration
Bill aimed at curbing the influx of non-Boers, and he

52 Attacks on the

revised the Alien Expulsion Bill.
Uitlander press were also slowed.

Chamberlain remained optimistic, British influence in
the area was growing and it seemed likely that negotiation
would serve to resolve the issues dividing Briton and
Boer.53 The Colonial Secretary, however, failed to take one
important fact into account while negotiating with the
Boers. London, quite simply, had no means of meeting Kruger
halfway, short of giving up influence in the Boer

Republics.54

Chamberlain was told bluntly by a member of his
staff that there was, "...no concession on our part that
could safely be made."55 The government and the Colonial
Secretary refused to consider any loosening of Britain's
suzerainty, believing compromise on this issue would destroy
British influence throughout South Africa. From such a
bargaining position a peaceful settlement, satisfactory to
Britain, was only possible if the Boers would give up more
than they received in return. The Boers, in turn, refused to
make any compromise which threatened their independence.

The breakdown of negotiations at Bloemfontein in June

1899, began a rapid spiral to war. Over time, Chamberlain

came to believe that the Boers were not negotiating in good

54

faith, and that only a united South Africa under Afrikaner

56

control would satisfy them. Chamberlain would note, "what

has been the Boer aspiration from first to last? It has been
to get rid of every shred and vestige of British

supremacy."57 The Colonial Secretary was willing to threaten

58

the Boers to protect Britain’s rights. Gradual progress

through negotiations was the preferred method of Chamberlain

and the government, but the Cabinet did not rule out the use

59

of force to protect British sovereignty. Lord Selborne

summed up the government's position perfectly when he wrote

Alfred Milner, "Peace is undoubtedly the first interest to

60

South Africa, but not peace at any price." London's goal

was the protection of British subjects and the maintenance

61 .
War remained a more

62

of her supremacy in South Africa.
acceptable alternative than losing control. It was this
willingness, that led to the outbreak of war.

South Africa was the key to the success of
Chamberlain's imperial plan for Africa. Her resources would
fund reform throughout the Empire. In 1898 over twenty-five

63

percent of the world’s gold was produced on the Rand. This

gold would be a powerful weapon in the hands of an enemy or
a valuable asset for the British. Imperial takeover looked
increasingly advantageous given the precarious position of

64

Britain's gold reserve. The main aim of the Colonial

Office was to unify South Africa under the Crown and to make

65 This goal could be achieved by

it economically viable.
integrating the economic power of the Boer republics with

the political power of the Crown colonies. Keeping the

55
Transvaal's gold supply within the imperial fold would also
help the Empire's economy as a whole, while providing
England with a great strategic resource.

The policy which resulted in the Boer War is explained
best by social imperialism. The Colonial Office hoped to
develop the African colonies in order to promote the welfare
of Englishmen and Africans.66 Colonies became important for
their economic potential, not just for their proximity to
lines of communication. Trade was vital to this goal, but so
was government control. Britain advanced in South Africa to
gain an asset for her Empire which would enhance the
standard of living of all imperial subjects. At the same
time South Africa would increase the strength of the Empire
by adding to its economic and military power.

The defense Of Britain’s colonies in South Africa had
become a strategic goal in itself. The area's resources were
not the only elements keeping England interested in South
Africa. The Cape had a large English population which had
every appearance of growing. Chamberlain would anger the
Boers by suggesting the "colonization" of Afrikaner areas

67 London had the responsibility of

with English settlers.
protecting these citizens, as well as the original
inhabitants of South Africa. Britain sought the best way to
insure the well being of her subjects, at the least cost.
The political union of South Africa seemed the best means of
achieving this goal. The Boer Republics became enemies

because they stood in the way of union.

In the end, Britain was not willing to surrender her

56

hegemony in South Africa. Chamberlain believed the success
of the Empire was essential to Britain's survival as a great
nation. He refused to see British control of Africa's most
promising region undermined. The government had tried to
reach an agreement which would have allowed closer ties
between the Boers and London. Political pressure to get
Kruger to move towards the imperial fold had been applied
for over a year, with no effect.68 War resulted because the
Boers resisted imperial expansion. Their resistance,
however, did not bring about imperial advance as Robinson
and Gallagher suggest. Afrikaner Opposition only altered the
shape of imperial expansion. Chamberlain's imperial program
would have been the same had the Boers willingly
participated. Expansion would still have occurred.

Chamberlain's bleak forecast about the cost of a war
with the Afrikaners proved correct. In spite of the ferocity
of the war Britain's peace plan was quite moderate.
Chamberlain did not want to despoil the Boer Republics, but
integrate them into the imperial structure. He hoped
benevolence in victory would promote loyalty to the Crown so
that all South Africans would work for the good Of the
Empire. The Colonial Secretary wanted justice for those who
stood with the Crown, without taking revenge on the Boer

69

rebels. Chamberlain favored the 1900 war settlement which

stated that the Transvaal would become a self-governing
colony. The army, railroad, and customs union would be under

70

imperial control. The Colonial Secretary realized it would

be necessary for Britain to help the Boer farmer to

57

recover.71 Much of the destruction of Boer property was
repaired. A further Thirty-five million pounds were loaned
to the Boers to develop the area. Three million pounds were
given as gifts.72 These funds may not have been distributed
as efficiently as possible, but fairness was the goal.73
Chamberlain hoped to revive the Transvaal’s economy as
rapidly as possible. All the British asked in return was
Boer acknowledgement of Edward as their sovereign. The final
peace of Vereinegan had been structured to achieve
Chamberlain’s early goal of unity between Britain and Boer
and a Transvaal which was, "protected as to its outside
relations and independent as to its internal affairs."74

Chamberlain did not feel that the Boer territories, nor
even a Union of South Africa were ready to accept
self-government. Even so, the Colonial Secretary argued for
a rapid end to he military government of the Transvaal.75 It
was hoped stability and normality could be established as
quickly as possible. The Crown should continue to govern for
the next two or three years, Chamberlain argued. The
imperial government would only interfere to protect Imperial
interests.76 The British hOped to protect their sovereignty,
but they also wished to create a loyal Afrikaner population.
This goal was most achievable by allowing the Boers as many
freedoms as possible without giving up all control. London’s
control would insure that the wishes of the majority would
be respected, but minorities would also be protected.77

The Colonial Secretary planned to give the African

population of the Boer Republics the vote so that all may

58

have a part in determining the colony's political future.
Originally property would be the only qualification limiting
the franchise.78 In the end, however, the clause of the
Vereinegan Treaty extending the franchise was dropped to
placate the Boers.79 Even though Chamberlain's attempt to
enfranchise the African population of the Boer territories
had failed, he still wished to encourage the integration of
Africans into the colonial system.

It was felt that the future prosperity of the African
population could only be insured by training them to work in

80 The Colonial Secretary hoped to use

modern industries.
African labor to solve South Africads growing labor
shortage.81 In this way the colonies' indigenous peoples
would strengthen the Empire at the same time as the shared
in the benefits of imperialism. Higher taxation would force
Africans to seek wage labor in the mines and other European

82

sanctioned occupations. The quest for African labor had

the added advantage of turning external African enemies into

83 Chamberlain's

assets as part of the colonial work force.
plan was strongly paternalistic and unself-consciously
racist. He believed wage labor was a means of civilizing

84 It was not clear whether Africans could hope to

Africans.
become the equals of the Empire’s English population. While
he gave lip service to the ideal of providing work for
Africans, Chamberlain continued to favor the increase of
British labor as the best means of developing the'

85

colonies.

Chamberlain himself traveled to South Africa in 1903 to

59
help reconcile Boer and Briton while trying to get all the
colonies to take a more active part in the Empire.86 The
Colonial Secretary would return to London convinced of the
need base the Empire on cooperation with the colonies rather
than strict control from London.87 Reconciliation in South
Africa became essential to the entire Imperial structure.
Chamberlain also visited Johannesburg to gauge the

loyalty of the Rand capitalists. Despite initial distrust on
Chamberlain's part, the Randlords were able to convince the

Colonial Secretary of their loyalty.88

The mining magnates
were expected to contribute to reconstruction after the war.
Chamberlain had established a ten percent profit tax on the
mines.89 The Rand also came up with thirty million pounds to

90 The Colonial

be used for loans for reconstruction.
Secretary wanted to make it clear the mining magnates would
be expected to fulfill their responsibility to help develOp
the colony. Chamberlain found taxation to be a good way for
the government to direct private industry to work for the
‘good of the entire Empire.

The ground work for federation was laid at this time as
well. An Inter-Colonial Council was formed to administer the
Orange Free State and the Transvaal as a single political
unit to prepare for their entrance into the union.91 More
importantly a conference of South African colonies was held.
The conference highlighted some of the ways the Colonial
Secretary wished to promote imperial unity. Representatives

from the colonies and Britain discussed the possibility of a

South African customs union, establishing tariffs, new

60
railroad construction, and a common African policy. A
twenty-five percent preference on British goods was also-

92 The conference established the precedent for

considered.
more formal discussions for the South African colonies which
would pave the way towards union. 1
The Unionists' 1900 election victory was primarily
based upon popular support for Chamberlain’s policy and the
war. 93 The Colonial Secretary pointed to colonial
involvement in the war as being one result of the Unionist
policy of enhancing imperial ties.94 The election had given
Chamberlain popular apprOval, yet there remained an
undercurrent of discontent. The Liberals claimed that

95

‘Chamberlain had given up on social reform. This charge was

not entirely true, Chamberlain had continued to fight for

96 The Unionist Party had extended loans to

pensions.
purchase houses, established new factory legislation and
arbitration, and created labor exchanges.97 Chamberlain

himself had been instrumental in the formation of a bill
proving workman’s compensation for workers hurt in

98 Yet imperial problems had begun to

industrial accidents.
monopolize the Colonial Secretary's time. To regain his
former impetus Chamberlain needed to find a way to advance
imperial and social reform at the same time.

The high cost of the war, coupled with Britain's
inability to defeat a small, undeveloped state forced a
reexamination of the the basis of empire. To many Englishmen

the Empire no longer appeared a bringer of progress, but as

means of exploiting less powerful peoples. The ruthless

61
suppression of guerrilla forces reinforced this image. An
unfavorable view of the Empire was etched into the public
mind by the harsh conditions of the internment camps before
Chamberlain removed them from the Army's jurisdiction.

It was obvious the war benefited the Randlords by
removing the restraints imposed by Kruger's government. Yet
the common miners received no improvement of conditions and
were even superseded by cheaper Asian labor.99 Chamberlain
had claimed the war had been fought to insure the equality
of the white races and justice for the blacks.100 Yet
Chamberlain’s promise to give the franchise to the African
population of the Republics was postponed until
self-government was restored.101 This qualification
eliminated the chance for an African franchise in the near
future and would lay the ground work for apartheid. There
had never been a serious attempt on the part of the imperial
authorities to make blacks and whites equal in South

102 Hobson was not alone in his conclusion that

Africa.
imperial power had become the tool of capitalists hoping to
despoil the colonies.

Chamberlain saw popular discontent with imperialism as
an opportunity to press more energetically for his new
imperial system. A policy of drift had proven dangerous to
Britainfs supremacy in Africa. Imperial strength had proven
necessary to preserve the colonies. The war had highlighted
grave defects in Britain's imperial system, yet it was still

103

possible to solve these problems. Chamberlain would point

to the rapidity with which prosperity was restored to the

62

104 The aid of the self-governing

defeated Boer territories.
colonies had proven the possibility of closer cooperation
and mutual protection. The Empire still had much to Offer. A
generous peace plan had shown London's willingness to
compromise once their position was secure. Britain was even
willing to allow a degree of autonomy to problem
territories.

The war itself had proven the need to formalize and
strengthen ties to the colonies. Closer ties to the colonies
would also serve to lessen the danger caused by Britain’s
lack of European allies. The war had highlighted this
isolation in increased continental criticism of British
policy.105 Suzerainty was no longer enough. The case of the
internment camps and the cost in human lives had proven the
necessity of greater government involvement in the colonies.
Chamberlain believed the nation had to learn the lesson the
war taught.

The Boer War had brought out a number of problems
facing Britain. Military setbacks highlighted the weakness
of her army. Defects became evident in her imperial system
as well as problems in foreign relations. The war had proven
that not all were able to see the advantages of British
control. Boer resistance, the Unionists believed, had been
made possible by loosening the imperial bond. The European
response to the war highlighted Britain's diplomatic
isolation. A widespread movement towards reform followed the

106

war, its goal being "national efficiency". National

efficiency in Britain would be attained by improving the

63
social setting, the Empire, the military, and the economy.
In short, all aspects of British society were to be examined
and improved. Domestic strength and imperial power were
mutually supporting. The need to defend the Empire made
domestic reform imperative in order to better provide the
means for imperial defense.107 Chamberlain’s imperial and
economic policy was perfectly suited to this new spirit of
reform. The Colonial Secretary could now hope for wider
acceptance of his plans for domestic reform and imperial
restructuring. The problem became one of showing how his
plans were superior to all others.

The appeal of national efficiency was obvious, as was
the need for change. The political parties and individuals
differed as to what was the best means of develOping
national strength. The Liberals worked for slum clearance,
poor relief, and improved education to create an environment
suitable to the creation of an "imperial race".108
Chamberlain did not disagree with these goals, they had long
been his own. The Liberal imperialists, lead by Lord
Rosebery' and Charles Dilke, also felt that the Empire was
essential to Britain, but they continued to put their trust
in free trade.109 They felt imperial ties would remain
strong because of the sentimental attachment of English
colonists to the mother country and because of the need for
mutual defense.110 The export of British capital was viewed
by the free traders as a weapon in the international

111

struggle. The Liberal believed this weapon required the

continuance of free trade.

IV-TARIFF REFORM

Chamberlain could not accept the Liberal reliance on
free trade. He planned to revolutionize the Empire’s fiscal
system by creating an imperial commercial union. Chamberlain
was pessimistic about the continued tie between the mother
country and the colonies. He felt, "We must either draw
closer, or we shall drift apart."1 He believed a revived
empire protected by tariffs as the best means of creating
revenue for social reform and focusing imperial power. Free
trade, which Robinson and Gallagher saw as the basis of
British imperialism, had become a threat to the Empire.
Chamberlain's tenure as Colonial Secretary marked the height
of an attempt to shift away from free trade to state
directed capitalism.3 Fiscal reform would allow commercial
ties to draw the colonies and the mother country into an
imperial union. Chamberlain believed tariffs would help
unite the diverse regions of the Empire to form an
integrated economic unit.

Commercial union in some form served as the best means
to national efficiency, Chamberlain believed. Union promoted,
the Empire's internal strength by directing all parts
towards a common economic goal. Chamberlain felt, "The
Empire is commerce."4 At the same time formal commercial
ties provided a structure with which to utilize the power of
the Empire when dealing with other nations.5 He had first

considered the idea of an imperial commercial union in

64

65

1881.6 Chamberlain rejected protectionism at this time,
holding the same objections that would be directed against
his own program.7 Tariffs, he thought, would raise prices
and damage the export trade Britain had gained through free
trade.8 Over time, however, the Colonial Secretary would
begin to see defects in Britain’s system of free trade.
Chamberlain freely admitted that over the course of thirty
years his views had changed in response to changing world
conditions.9

Economic success, a prime generator of political power,
was seen as inseparable from strategic considerations. In
'1903, Chamberlain noted, "we all desire the maintenance and
increase of the national strength and the prosperity of the
United Kingdom."10 The concepts of strength and prosperity
were linked. Britain’s strength was often needed to defend
the economic position which made her strength possible. The
main debate of the late Victorian period was over the best
means to preserve England's power.

The solutions Chamberlain would propose were not
original. Tariff advocates had been active since the

11

1870's. By 1895 C.E. Howard Vincent, M. P. from Sheffield,

had begun asking Parliament to, "adopt such measures as may
ensure the defense of Britain's industrial interests."12
Vincent provided statistics highlighting the damaging
inroads foreign competitors had made into Britain’s markets.
Increased customs duties would reverse this trend, while

advancing the development of Britain's industrial base.

Chamberlain backed Vincent in Parliament and would

66
eventually adOpt his solutions to the problems facing

England.l3

By 1896 Chamberlain had been fully converted to
the idea of protection, but felt the nation was not ready
for the plan.14 It would take the Boer War and the public
outcry for change to set the stage for an imperial customs
union.15

Chamberlain believed Britain was forced to retaliate
when other nations began erecting tariff barriers.16 Germany
had imposed tariffs first in 1879 and expanded them in 1885.
France raised tariffs in 1882, the U.S. in 1891, Italy,
Austria-Hungary, and Russia followed.17 Foreign tariffs
restricted British trade, while Britain remained Open to tax
free goods from outside. As British exports declined,
foreign imports to England increased, beginning a dangerous
shift in the balance Of trade.18 At first Chamberlain
thought Britain could force other nations to abandon their
tariffs. In time, Chamberlain would see that this goal was
unrealistic. Tariffs had become too important to the nations
creating them.

Tariff barriers proved very useful to the nations
protected by them. Duties provided an important source of
government revenue. At the same time home industries
benefitted by limiting foreign competition. Britain’s rate
industrial expansion soon began to fall as compared to that
of protected countries, like Germany and the U.S..19
Overseas Britain began to find herself losing foreign

markets to lower priced domestic products. Britain lost the

advantage of lower production costs, made possible through

67
mass production, when tariffs artificially increased the
price of her exports.

In addition to losing her former markets, Britain found
her domestic economy vulnerable to foreign goods. Britain's
policy of free trade allowed foreign nations to "dump" their
surplus goods in England.20 Manufactured goods that could
not be sold elsewhere were shipped to Britain. In fact,
Chamberlain noted, "the United Kingdom is the only country
where this process can be carried on successfully, because
we are the only country which keeps open ports."21 In
'England, they were sold at the lowest possible price in
order to gain a slight return. The lack of tariffs insured
that prices for such goods remained low. English producers
often could not compete in their own markets.

Chamberlain considered tariffs a means to eliminate
this unfair foreign competition. Chamberlain pointed out
that he had supported free trade, but that he was "not a
free trader at any price."22 When free trade began to harm
the nation it was time for change. Chamberlain stated that
under free trade, "...we are not in a position to offer any
preference or favour whatever, even to our own children. We
cannot make any difference to those who treat us well, and

"23

those who treat us badly. Chamberlain was able to refute

Cobden by showing that those nations having tariffs were
experiencing growth in foreign trade to rival Britain's.24
Further, he argued, Cobden had proved wrong in his

prediction that world wide free trade would follow Britain’s

example.25 In spite of problems inherent to free trade,

68
Chamberlain never supported absolute protection, favoring

selective import control.26

In this way Britain could enjoy
the advantages of both protection and free trade.

Besides protecting British and imperial trade, tariffs
had another important result, the creation of revenue.
Chamberlain hoped to use the tariff revenues to fund a
variety of welfare projects as well as pay for colonial
development. The Colonial Secretary had long hoped to

27

institute a system of old age pensions. The coming of the

28

Boer War, however, delayed any action. After the war, Sir

Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made

29 The war had

it clear that pensions would have to wait.
already strained the Treasury and driven taxes up.
Ironically the war Chamberlain had supported to preserve the
Empire had forced the postponement of his plan for social
reform and colonial develOpment.30 Now tariff revenue
provided the chance to finance the scheme or any other
social reforms requiring large sums of money.31

Chamberlain saw tariffs as a chance to reduce direct
taxation in Britain. State revenue would substitute indirect

32

taxes from import duties for direct taxation. This method

had much in common with Chamberlain's early days in
Birmingham. As mayor, Chamberlain had insured Birmingham’s
utilities produced a profit, allowing the city fathers to
reduce the tax rate.33 Tariffs, therefore, provided a means
to bypass Unionist aversion to raising taxes to pay for

34

welfare. Chamberlain's plan had added relevancy in the

1890's when direct taxation had risen to nearly 50 percent

69

of all taxes, climbing from 25 percent in the 1870's.35
Tariffs provided a means of reducing the burden of taxation
on the individual at the same time as it redirected capital
back into the Empire.

Chamberlain, believed the time for protection had come.
Confidence in free trade had been shaken due to rapid
oscillations in the volume of trade since the 1860's.36 By
1896 the Colonial Secretary realized not even Britain's own

37 The colonies'

colonies were willing to follow free trade.
were, in fact, erecting barriers against Britain herself.
Canada resisted free trade within the Empire in the hOpes of
offsetting Britain’s greater industrial power.38
Chamberlain s belief that Britain’s power and prosperity
depended on trade from the colonies made colonial tariffs a
great threat.39 The commercial independence of the colonies
hastened the destruction of the ties of common interest
holding the Empire together.

The gravest danger that Chamberlain perceived was the
disintegration of imperial ties. Laissez-faire economics had
allowed the colonies to drift away from the mother country.
For years the colonies had been pursuing their own
commercial aims, irrespective of the overall impact on the
Empire. The most prosperous colonies, those which had the
most to offer the Empire, had begun to compete with England.
Colonies began to seek there own interests to the detriment
of the whole. Chamberlain came to the conclusion that a
customs union would best unify the economic aims of the

40

colonies and the mother country. If London made no attempt

70
to coordinate the economic aims of the colonies and the
mother country, Britain would, Chamberlain claimed,
"...give up all hope whatever to anything in the
nature of closer fiscal relations with them;...
in the absence of that closer fiscal relationship
you must abandon all hope4gf securing closer
political relationships."
The final dissolution of the Empire must soon follow. Free
trade created antagonism between different parts of
the Empire which were competing economically. In 1905
Chamberlain would note, "If you want and Empire; if you want
influence in the world, I think you will find that free

imports are inconsistent with it."42

The colonies, in
attempting to protect their own economies, saw Britain as a
commercial threat. Free trade allowed the colonies to
develop a taste for independence without being given proof
of the advantages of the imperial connection. The Colonial
Secretary believed Britain's economic isolation from the
Empire, caused by economic infighting, was as hazardous as
her political isolation from Europe.43 Chamberlain wished to
insure all Englishmen understood, "The lesson to all is our
strength in unity."44 The lack of European allies forced
Britain to spread her military strength very thinly. The
lack of imperial economic unity, in turn, limited Britain's
economic strength. Chamberlain asked, "Let us do all in our
power by improving our communications, by developing our
commercial relations, by co-operating in mutual defense, and
"45

none of us then will ever feel isolated.

The Colonial Secretary had been interested in the

71

promotion of imperial trade since his work on the Board Of
Trade. It was not until 1898, however, that Chamberlain got
solid evidence of serious trade setbacks by soliciting trade
information from the colonies themselves. He sent a circular
to the colonial governors to gain their insight on how to
increase imperial trade.46 The Colonial Secretary asked,
"...the extent to which...foreign imports of any kind have
displaced or are displacing similar British goods and the

47 While the final report on the

cause of such displacement."
findings would take months to compile, broad trends were
soon apparent. It was clear that foreign nations were
underselling British companies in the colonies.48 This was a
dangerous trend which could eventually limit British trade
to her Empire. Foreign companies proved more willing than
British firms to mold their sales techniques to the colonial
environment.49 Chamberlain forecast disaster unless Britain
made stronger effort to keep ahead of her competitors in the
colonies.

Closer commercial ties to the colonies and actual
commercial union would enhance Britain's trade and increase
government revenue. A fiscal blue book in 1903 showed that
in the period between 1890 and 1902, Britain’s exports to
the colonies increased 21.2 %, while that to foreign nations

was down 12 %.50 In 1902 the colonies would take 42 % of

51 . . . . . .
CommerCial union would increase British

England's exports.
trade to the colonies by restricting foreign trade. In a
message to the colonial governors Chamberlain expressed his

main aim. He wrote, "I am impressed with the extreme

72

importance of securing as large a share as possible of the
mutual trade of the U.K. and colonies for British producers
and manufacturers."52

A larger share of colonial trade for Britain would
provide funds for industrial advances at home. Improving
Britain's productive capability was vital in enhancing her
economic and political strength. Greater profits could be
used to expand and modernize British industry. Revived
industries would create greater profits which could be
reinvested in England, with enough left over to share with
British workers. The dangerous tendency of British business
advancing investment and services at the expense of
production would be reversed.53 Revenue for Chamberlain’s
long standing plans for social reform could be raised by
taxing foreign buyers rather than British business. Tariffs
would protect and enlarge British industry and still allow

54 All classes would

wage increases and higher employment.
benefit. The upper and middle classes would get investment
opportunities in British firms. The working class would gain
jobs and welfare.

Chamberlain looked to Germany as an example of
successful commercial union. Germany exemplified the way
industrial and social advances were made possible using
tariffs and strong central control.55 The German states had
been united, her trade had expanded, and the German military
strengthened. Even though Germany lacked the resources

Britain’s colonies provided, it was clear her industrial

capacity would soon outstrip Britain’s. By 1908 German steel

73
production would be double that of England's.56 Yet the
German government still advanced social reform. Bismarck had
used tariffs to protect Germany's industry and agriculture,
while providing higher wages, increased employment, as well

. . . 57
as penSions and insurance for workers.

In discussing the
German system Chamberlain noted, "Gradually ... national
objects and political interests were introduced, and so,
from starting as it did on a purely commercial point and for
commercial interests, it developed until it became a bond of
unity and the basis of the German Empire."58

The German system, the Zollverein, set a single custom
rate on goods from outside the German states. Trade between
the states was carried on without any duties. The Zollverein
appealed to Chamberlain because of its spirit of
COOperation, without an inflexible structure.59 The German
system, structured to accommodate the German states, would
have to be expanded and altered to fit the British Empire.
Only the general outline of the Zollverein would be
maintained in Chamberlain's plan. He suggested creating "an
Imperial Zollverein in which there should be Free Trade
between the whole Empire and duties against other

"60 The colonies were expected to sacrifice their

countries.
tariffs in return for the imposition of British tariffs
against foreign products.61 The Empire would become an
economic unit in competition with the rest of the world.
Tariffs would force Open markets by threatening higher

British tariffs in retaliation for excessive foreign

barriers. Chamberlain asked his opponents in Parliament, if

74
they dared, to announce their unwillingness to aid a colony
in a conflict over trade with foreign powers.62 For example,
retaliatory tariffs aimed at any colony could be met with
British retaliation in support of her colony. Chamberlain
used the example of German barriers aimed at Canada because

63 A customs union

she had allowed Britain lower duties.
would enable the entire Empire to respond to such

Chamberlain turned the tables on critics by
highlighting the number of colonial tariffs his plan would.
eliminate. He said his plan would "... be the greatest
advance that free trade has made since it was first
advocated by Mr. Cobden."64 Unlike the mercantilist system
Chamberlain’s plan was often compared to, the new union
would not be based on the exploitation of the colonies.
Chamberlain noted in 1903 while discussing the relationship
between Britain and the colonies "If you benefit any one of
us you cannot help benefiting the whole. The whole depends
upon the parts. You cannot have one of the parts diseased
without the whole suffering."65 Mother country and colony
would support each other, each providing what the other
needed. threats. Britain and the colonies could protect each‘
other.

At the same time, union insured a steady imperial
market.66 Duties would be imposed on foreign food and raw
materials in order to improve the position of colonial raw

67 Tariffs and imperial free trade

materials sent to England.
would encourage colonial food production. Cheaper colonial

raw materials would lower the cost of finished manufactures

75
for the colonies.

The relation between the industrial base of Britain and
the raw materials of the colonies seemed obvious to
Chamberlain. The colonies would provide raw materials to_
Britain, the industrial center, which would provide finished
industrial products. Most imperial trade already followed
this pattern. The Union would simply make the system simpler
and more beneficial to the Empire. Chamberlain believed this
system would enable the Empire to be, "...self-sustaining
and self—sufficient, able to maintain itself against the
competition of all its rivals."68 Imperial self-sufficiency
became one of Chamberlain's primary goals.

The Colonial Secretary made the mistake of implying
that the colonies should be content to remain Britain’s
source of food and raw materials. This lapse is confusing,
because Chamberlain saw the danger of thinking the colonies
would remain industrially backward. Chamberlain noted that
important colonies, like Canada and Australia, had already
begun building their own industries behind tariffs barriers.69
It would be unreasonable, as well as impossible, to reverse
this trend. Greater emphasis on aiding colonial develOpment
would have helped diffuse colonial distrust of Chamberlain’s
plans.70 The colonies did not intend to remain industrially
undeveloped.71 Greater colonial development would also serve
to strengthen the Empire’s weakest links, the undeveloped
colonies.

The Colonial Secretary did not necessarily oppose the

development of colonial industry, but his tariff scheme made

76
sure colonial industry benefited British firms. He asked the
colonies, "... there are many things which you do not now
make, many things for which we have a great capacity for

"72 A

production - leave them to us as you have heretofore.
customs union would allow England to aid the colonies in
their industrial develOpment, both to profit from colonial
buildup and to keep a place in the colonial markets.73 The
industrialization of the whole Empire would have created
more trade for Britain, since she had the technology needed
to expand industry.74 Colonial develOpment within a customs
union would insure that imperial industries complemented
each other. Tariffs on foreign manufactured goods also made
it cheaper for the colonies to purchase their industrial
requirements in Britain. The colonies would gain cheap
industrial goods, Britain would receive steady markets and
funds for social reform.

The union’s main purpose was to unify the Empire.75
Generating funds for government use and promoting trade and
industry was important, but they were not the only goals.
Economic success created political power. Power became the
primary aim of Empire. Chamberlain realized social reform
could only succeed if Britain remained able to defend itself
against her enemies. The Colonial Secretary may have decided
it was more important to strive first for England's security
before working to improve the lives of the working class.
Chamberlain used the terminology of conflict when arguing

for fiscal reform. He used phrases like, "weapon of a

moderate tariff" and "defend our home market", to highlight

77

. . . 76
the importance of the link between trade and power. He
tried to make clear his feeling that Britain was involved in
a trade war with much of the rest of the world. Defeat in
this war would be as serious as a military defeat.
Chamberlain stated,

"It seems to me that the men who do not care

for the Empire, the men who will sooner suffer

injustice than go to war, the men that would

surrender rather than take up arms in their own

defense-they are the men in favor Of doing in

trade exactly what they are willing to do in

political relations."77
Tariffs allowed Britain to defend herself in a trade war,
free trade meant surrender to foreign economic powers. In
the final analysis power, not individual wealth, became the
goal of the union.78 The pursuit of power and security
sidetracked Chamberlain from his early quest for social
reform. Now reform had become another factor contributing to
national power, rather than a goal in itself.

Chamberlain, after being converted to the new system,
had to fight to convince his colleagues of the need to
protect the Empire. Chamberlain advocated following the lead
of European nations, which were building trade walls around
their empires. Colonies provided the troops and supplies
which insured a state's power.79 The Colonial Secretary saw
that the political, strategic, and economic interests of the

80 i . . ,
Economic unity was necessary if

Empire to be interlocked.
Britain was to be protected. Closer imperial ties made such
unity possible. The Empire needed to expand into Africa, not

to aid financiers, but to protect and increase Britain's

78
power.81 The African colonies, in fact, played only a minor
part in the proposed tariff program. Expansion was
encouraged, not to open new markets for capitalists, but to
gain greater economic resources for Britain.

The Colonial Secretary gradually outlined his fiscal
policy. He suggested a Corn duty of two shillings a quarter
be placed on foreign grain. Maize would be excepted, because
of its use as a cheap animal feed.82 A five percent tax on
meat and dairy products would also be passed. Bacon would be
exempt as it was a staple of Britain's poor.83 A ten percent
tax on manufactured goods would serve to protect British
industry.84 The colonies would be exempt from all duties.

Chamberlain announced his plan for an imperial union at
the 1897 Colonial Conference. The response was
disheartening. The Conference proved that the settler
colonies opposed the idea of an imperial council to oversee

85

imperial policy and closer control from Britain. Colonial

distrust forced Chamberlain to state publicly, "we are not,

in any circumstances, going to interfere with the domestic

"86

affairs of the colonies. The colonies wanted greater

imperial cooperation, not surrender to London’s control or

that of an Imperial Parliament.87 They wanted unity of

direction, not a new imperial structure.88 The Colonial

Secretary chose to take the agreement to meet regularly as

an indication of greater future co-Operation.89

1897 marked the beginning of movement in the direction

of union when Britain withdrew her favored nation treaties

90

with foreign countries. Such agreements gave trading

79

advantages to certain foreign nations. The treaties were
revoked to allow such advantages to be extended to the
colonies alone. Australia and Canada would claim imperial
trade had been improved by the abrogation of favored nation
treaties with Belgium and Germany.91 Government directed
expansion of imperial trade insured that the benefits of
empire would be enlarged and shared. The Colonial Secretary
hoped for more trade agreements, but believed the initiative
should come from the colonies.92 The colonies appreciated
the move, but continued to resist more formal commercial
union.9

The colonies were not prepared to abandon their own
tariffs, one of the prerequisites of an imperial union. At
the 1900 Colonial Conference the Colonial Secretary proposed
what was meant to be the first step towards union.
Chamberlain asked for the elimination of all tariffs within
the Empire.94 Yet tariff revenue had become too important to
colonial budgets.95 Chamberlain noted, "It is no use to
expect that our colonies will abandon their customs duties

' 96 After

as their chief and principle source of revenue.’
all, one of the appeals of a commercial union would be the
creation of revenue for reform. It was hard to ask the
colonies to eliminate their chief source of revenue for
possible benefits in the future. Other colonies opposed such
a move because the removal of colonial tariffs was seen as
antithetical to their industrial development. The

unrestricted flow of cheap British manufactures would

destroy colonial industries. The colonies made it clear that

80
they were unwilling to give up their own industrial growth
to benefit England.97 Canadian leaders argued against
imperial free trade to protect her industries from British
competition. The colonies could see very clearly the same,
danger inherent to free trade that Chamberlain did. The
villain, however, was Britain not foreign powers.

Chamberlain also had trouble convincing the colonial
leaders that the benefits of close imperial ties outweighed
greater contributions to the common defense or to the loss
of some independence. Support for tariff reform in Britain
was so limited that Chamberlain felt unable to proceed
without colonial support. The custom union seemed
unworkable. One Of the main goals of union was the renewal
of imperial ties, but these bonds could not be reforged by
forcing the colonies to cooperate.

The 1902 Colonial Conference set Chamberlain's future
course.98 The colonies had made clear their opposition to
Chamberlain's union. Chamberlain had opened the Conference
with a speech enumerating the three ways to unite the
Empire.99 Unity would be achieved, He believed, through
common defense, commercial union, or new political
relationships. Closer political ties proved most
problematic. The colonies would not consider any proposal
for an imperial parliament before Britain offered economic

100 The Colonial Secretary sympathized with the

concessions.
colonies and was willing to work on their behalf, yet no
progress could be made before London could offer the

colonies something in return. The colonies had made it clear

81
they found political federation disagreeable.101 No colony,
or England itself, would consider giving up their national

sovereignty to an imperial parliament.102

That left only
defense or commercial union as the bases for closer ties.

Chamberlain believed the colonies might accept a
defensive union rather than a commercial one. Most colonies
did not even favor free trade within the Empire.103 One of
the resolutions passed at the 1902 conference stated, "it is
not practicable to adOpt a general system of Free Trade."104
The colonies refused to remove their tariffs. Yet, the
question of defense met with only limited colonial support.
To Chamberlain's mind, the British Army and Navy were most
often used to protect colonial interests, which only

105 The colonies should,

affected England indirectly.
therefore, make a greater contribution to imperial defense.
Each colony wanted the protection of the mother
country, but they did not want to be obligated to support
the common defense. The war in South Africa had proven the
colonies’ willingness to assist Britain militarily. This
help, however, was offered without any formal obligation.
Opposition to an Imperial Parliament stemmed in part from
colonial unwillingness to be obligated to share in the
expenses of overall imperial defense.106 In 1902 the
suggestiOn that an imperial militia be raised was opposed by

Canada and Australia.107

Most colonies were finding that a
British military presence was becoming less important.
Australia remained isolated from any grave threat. Canada

relied on the friendship of the U.S.A., and could expect

82
little help if this friendship was lost.

Chamberlain still believed in the need for protection
of the colonies by the Royal Navy and British regiments. Yet
he also saw the need to promote the imperial connection in
more constructive ways. Further, in 1896 Chamberlain noted,
"It is very difficult to see how you can pretend to deal

with (the)... great question of Imperial defense without

having first dealt with the question of Imperial trade."108
In fact, "Imperial defense is only another name for the
.109

protection of Imperial commerce.‘ Because of the
connection between economic and military power, it became
vital to develop the Empire's economic strength. Tariffs
seemed the best means to keep Britain's economic power from
flowing outside of the Empire. If military need no longer
drew a colony to the mother country, commercial and economic
benefits might.

The colonies agreed to closer commercial ties to
Britain, but only to the extent that these ties did not
interfere with their own interests. The problem was
formulating a program which would both approach
Chamberlain’s original goals, and which the colonies would
approve. In 1890 a Canadian, Colonel George Denison had sent
Chamberlain a plan outlining trade preference as a means of

10 When he first got Denison's proposal,

uniting the Empire.1
Chamberlain still felt that imperial defense was the best
means of reversing colonial drift. Even so Chamberlain had

seen the logic of Denison's plan. Each colony and Britain

herself would be free to erect tariffs barriers to raise

83

revenue and protect industry. These tariffs would then be
lowered for other members of the Empire to give them
preference over foreign goods. Preference insured that the
colonies could maintain their tariffs, at the same time as
they agreed to the creation of English tariffs. On the
surface it appeared that the colonies had more to lose by
approving the creation of British tariff barriers.111
Preference on a duty still costs more than no tariff at all.
Yet, the self-governing colonies hoped to capture the share
of English trade lost by foreign nations when Britain
established tariffs.

At the 1900 Colonial Conference the Canadian Prime
Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, put forth a strong defense

for colonial preference.112 Laurier specifically asked for

the remission of Britain's proposed Corn tax for Canada.113
In 1900 the Treasury approved the Colonial Stock Act. The
Act allowed the investment of British trust fund revenue in
Canadian stock in return for preference for British goods.114
By the 1902 conference it was obvious that defense
alone would not create the Empire Chamberlain envisioned.
Preference, however, proved a means of moving towards
greater imperial cooperation, while overcoming colonial

15 Chamberlain believed

reticence to commercial union.
preferential treatment would prove the advantage of closer
ties to Britain. The colonies would then be willing to
accept more of his plan. Preference, not imperial'free

trade, would become the first step towards economic unity.

Chamberlain had decided to lead the tariff reformers because

84
it was they who,

"...attach even greater importance to the
possibility of securing by preferential and
reciprocal arrangements with our colonies a
great development of trade within the Empire
and a nearer approach to a commercial union
which,...must precede or accompany closer

political relations, and without WhifT6°°° no
permanent co-operation is possible."

The impetus for the new style of imperialism came from
the center of the imperial system, not the periphery.117
London had more to gain from change than did the colonies.
While Chamberlain's plans would be greatly altered to gain
colonial support, the primary consideration would be the
effect of reform on Britain. Tariffs proved so appealing to
the Colonial Secretary because they would provide funds for
reform in Britain. Chamberlain also favored the way a
commercial union would protect English industry and jobs. In
the end fiscal reform would fail because of Chamberlain's
inability to show the benefit of change to Britain.

The Colonial Secretary's first practical efforts at
creating a system of imperial preference closely followed
the Boer War. A duty on grain had been imposed to raise
revenue to pay for the war. The fact that the Treasury had
even considered imposing a tariff on a staple such as grain
highlights the Unionist difficulty in finding revenue.118
Chamberlain hoped to get a reduction in this duty on behalf
of Canada. Preference for Canada would prove important to
Chamberlain’s long term plans by legitimizing both tariffs

and colonial preference. Reducing the Corn Duty for Canada

would create a major precedent, allowing other colonies to

85

submit their own preference proposals.119

Chamberlain hoped
that the experience would also disperse popular fear of
raising prices.120 More reform could then follow.

The Colonial Secretary found it surprisingly easy to
persuade the Cabinet to reduce the duty for Canada.121 C.T.
Ritchie, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer and free trade
advocate, strenuously Opposed preference in any form as part
of a move to an extensive protection system.122 Ritchie's
opposition was seemingly overridden in Cabinet. Considering
himself successful, Chamberlain left for talks in South
Africa. On March 31, 1903, with the Colonial Secretary out
.Of the picture, Ritchie refused to include the duty in his
new budget.123 By excluding the Corn duty altogether,
Ritchie was able to forestall any moves towards fiscal
reform.

Chamberlain was furious when he learned of Ritchie’s
action, but it was already too late. There had been no major
pressure, from either the government or the public, to
oppose Ritchie. Chamberlain realized he needed widespread
political support if his plan for fiscal reform was to
succeed. Chamberlain would lead his first campaign to create
support for tariff reform after his return from South
Africa, from May 1903 until the beginning of 1904.124 His
goal was to inform the public of the benefits of tariffs and
preference. The goal of tariff reform, and the focus of
Chamberlain's campaign was, "to secure more equal terms of
competition for British trade and closer commercial union

with the colonies."125

86

The Colonial Secretary also needed to overcome the
resistance of his own party to his program. Another goal in
the first tariff campaign was, therefore, for Chamberlain to
win the full support of Arthur Balfour, the new Prime
Minister, through argument or political pressure. Balfour s
allegiance did not seem too difficult to get. Chamberlain
believed himself secure in the role of unacknowledged party
leader and someone the Prime Minister needed to court. In
April an informal poll of the Unionists in the House of
Commons counted 172 preferentialists. There were an
additional 73 members who would vote for preference if it
was accepted party policy, as well as 98 who favored
retaliatory tariffs and some preference. There were only 27
Unionist Free Traders.126 Balfour, the Colonial Secretary
believed, would have no choice but to give in to the demands
of the tariff reformers. Balfour was expected to expel the
hard line Free Traders and provide a rallying point for the
rest of the Unionists.127 An early election would then be
called to allow the Unionists the opportunity to exploit
their renewed unity.128

It appeared to Chamberlain that he had found the ideal
party leader with whom to work. Balfour seemed committed to
reform and, more importantly, was not a free trader. This
appearance proved deceiving. The Colonial Secretary assumed
the P.M. would follow the majority of the party and back

tariff reform.129

Balfour did not reject Chamberlain's
program out Of hand, but neither did he accept it

wholeheartedly. In negotiations with the colonies

87
Chamberlain asked for a discussion of the issue of
preference at a special colonial conference. Balfour stepped
in and disrupted the plan for the conference by asking for a
vote on whether to hold the conference and another vote to

130 This move pushed tariff reform far

approve its findings.
into the future, whereas Chamberlain wanted immediate
action. Chamberlain felt it was necessary to enter
negotiations with the colonies with a firm plan.131

Balfour had been convinced by portions of Chamberlain's
argument, but was unwilling to give whole-hearted support

132

for fear of splitting the government. The Prime Minister

admitted his willingness to discuss preference, but he
resisted any action which might raise the cost of living.133
Tariffs, even if they were lowered in favor of the colonies,
would raise prices in Britain. Yet the clamor for reform was
too loud to resist all change. Balfour, responding to the
widespread demand for national efficiency, set about
removing the die hard free traders in hopes of making the

134 The Prime Minister

Unionists the party of reform.
realized the need to sacrifice economic orthodoxy to some
degree in order to advance Britain’s economic position.
Without realizing it, Chamberlain had lost the battle
for the government's backing as early as September 1903.135
It was at this time that Chamberlain failed to gain
Balfour's active support. The Prime Minister, however, by
attempting to reconcile the protectionists and the moderate

free traders convinced Chamberlain that there was still hope

Of winning the government over. For this reason the Colonial

88
Secretary was ready to listen to a plan Balfour prOposed.
The plan would lead to the fall of the Unionist government
and doom the tariff campaign.
As a compromise between the two Opposing wings of the
party, the Prime Minister agreed to suggest retaliatory

136 Balfour proposed

tariffs to force down foreign tariffs.
that Chamberlain leave the government to gather pOpular
support, while the Prime Minister worked to regain party

137

unity. On September 14, 1903, as part of Balfour’s plan,

Chamberlain announced he would resign if the idea of
colonial preference was not accepted as official policy.138
The Prime Minister accepted his resignation. It was hoped
the Colonial Secretary’s absence would make reconciliation
easier. The Colonial Secretary hoped Balfour would soon see
the need to support imperial preference. Austin Chamberlain
noted, "...without preferential duties it would be
impossible either to raise the money required for social
reform or to lower the rate of unemployment."139
Chamberlain believed, correctly, that resignation would

140 Austin Chamberlain

give him greater freedom of action.
would take his fathers place in the Cabinet. Giving up his
responsibilities would give Chamberlain more time to develop
his reform policy. He would also then be able to take his
campaign to the people through a series of speeches. His
style is made clear in his description of the typical voter.
He wrote, "He seizes upon a principle or larger issue, and
is quite willing to delegate to his representative all

"141

questions of detail and method. Chamberlain would make

89
sure the public understood the "larger issues" involved in
tariff reform.

While a member of the government Chamberlain had been
restricted by a Cabinet compact prohibiting public
statements on issues that could divide the government.142
Yet the ability to make public addresses must be balanced by
the political cost of leaving the center of power. When in
office Chamberlain could use his ability to resign and,
possibly breakup the government to fight for his program.
Chamberlain was sure the government would move towards

143 The P.M. had to

tariffs after he had broken the ground.
give reform his entire backing, or Chamberlain foresaw "...
we should lose a great deal of the enthusiasm which can

"144

alone carry great political changes. If, however,

Balfour failed to fall in line, Chamberlain believed, the

145 If the government fell,

government would not last long.
Chamberlain was sure he could gain the popular support to
bring victory out of defeat. He said, "If my judgement is
correct, it will not be very long before the whole programme
is accepted by the country, and I regard this as certain if
we are approaching a time of commercial depression."146
Balfour then moved to gain the support of the Duke of
Devonshire, a moderate free trader and well respected
conservative politician. If Devonshire backed the Prime
Minister, Balfour would not only gain the support of the
moderate free traders, but also legitimize his program to

147

the public. Unfortunately Balfour had misjudged the

situation. In September 1903, the primary free traders,

90

Ritchie, Hamilton, and Balfour of Burleigh, left the
government when retaliatory tariffs were announced.148 It
was hoped their leaving would allow room for more moderate
Unionists. Chamberlain’s absence would serve to diffuse fear
that the government had abandoned free trade entirely. The
plan broke down when Balfour failed to get Devonshire's
support, the Duke then resigned in October.149

The government had lost the main representatives from
both major factions without creating a compromise. Balfour
failed to give the government a direction and worsened the
party's internal struggle. Once the divisions became clear

150 Balfour was

[Chamberlain held back from a complete split.
able to placate Chamberlain with vague assurances of reform,
never making a clean break with the free traders within the
party. Chamberlain had given the Unionists a policy position
to rally around.151 Yet Balfour avoided any clear policy in
order to keep the different groups comprising the Unionist

152 Fighting the election without a

Party from splintering.
real platform, however, would insure Balfour's defeat.
Despite his failure to get Balfour’s support,
Chamberlain was determined to rally the general public
behind the cause of protection and preference. The 1903-1904
tariff reform campaign was quite unusual. Chamberlain,
although he was seen as the epitome of the Unionist
position, lacked Official sanction. His was a political
campaign to defend the current government, yet the campaign

lacked the direct backing of the government.

The Colonial Secretary adopted the methods of one of

91

the most successful anti-tariff organizations, the Anti-Corn
Law League, to gain pOpular support for his tariff scheme.153
The Anti-Corn Law League had brought about the end of
tariffs on wheat fifty years earlier, through a massive
propaganda campaign. Chamberlain following their lead,
combined public appearances with the distribution of

154

information in leaflets, tracts, and popular music. Sir

A. Pearson, owner of the Daily Express, bought the

 

BEBEQEEB in 1904 and turned it into a pro-tariff organ.155

Soon 15 out of London’s 21 newspapers worked to support
Chamberlain's-program.

The attempt to mold popular opinion was linked with a
search for allies within the Unionist party. The Colonial
Secretary would find it easy to gain support from the
ordinary Unionist party member. Astute political maneuvering
gave Chamberlain control of most Unionist local committees

156

and all national organizations- In May 1904, Chamberlain

replaced his political rival, the Duke of Devonshire, as

157

president of the Liberal-Unionist Association. The only

major party body Chamberlain would never control was the

Unionist central office.158

1903 saw the formation of the Tariff Reform League. The
League had been formed, "for the defense and development of

"159

the indUstrial interests of the British Empire. Besides

advocating the Colonial Secretary’s tariff plans the League
promoted imperialism as an alternative to socialism.160.

Tariffs would provide the revenues that would improve the

lives of the workers, not worker control. Chamberlain

92
realized the Unionists needed to Offset the Liberal call for
higher taxation of the rich, if they were to stay in
office.161 The Colonial Secretary did not oppose taxation
, because of overt sympathy for the rich, but he hoped to
raise money without exploiting class conflict. One message
presented by reformers was that the well being of workers
depended on the well being of industry as a whole.162 Owners
and workers needed to stand together against outside
competition.

Chamberlain presented a number of arguments tailored to
his various audiences, to convince them of the need for
reform. In return for colonial support, Chamberlain would
fight for preference for colonial wine, fruit, tea, coffee,
cocoa, and sugar.163 The colonies were won over by the
promise Of preference, new trade opportunity, and closer
imperial cooperation. Australian backing for Chamberlain's

164 South Africa and New Zealand gave

165

plan grew gradually.

Canada was divided

between a free trade West and a pro—reform East.166 The lack

their support to fiscal reform.

of support from all Canadians surprised and disappointed

167 The Colonial Secretary was, after all,

Chamberlain.
following Canada’s lead. In the end Canada Offered Britain
preference of thirty-three and a third percent, While South
Africa offered twenty-five percent, and New Zealand ten
percent.168 Other colonies were also willing to negotiate.
1903 gave Chamberlain the chance to put his plan into

action. In that year Chamberlain helped stop the United

States from seriously damaging Malaya's tin industry.

93
Chamberlain successfully championed a tariff which would
raise the price of tin ore, insuring that the ore would be

169 The tariff worked,

dressed in Malaya rather than the U.S.
and kept the important tin processing industry in the
colony. Unfortunately the success of the plan could not be
proven in time for the reform campaign

Chamberlain drew most support in Britain from Fair
Traders. The Fair Traders advocated retaliatory tariffs to
breakdown foreign barriers.170 Fair Traders sought a middle
ground between free trade and a formal union. They were
willing to advocate a customs union which would eliminate

171

colonial tariffs against British goods. The Fair Traders,

however, saw tariffs as a necessary evil to reestablish free
trade, not as a means of strengthening the Empire.172
Chamberlain’s position forced him to accept even marginal
allies.

Birmingham remained a staunch fair trade center, giving
Chamberlain a secure home base.173 Colonial and foreign
tariffs were aimed primarily at British industry. The
Midlands had been hit hard by the U.S.A.'s 1891 tariff.174
The main prOponents of tariff reform were the Midland metal
entrepreneurs.175 Chamberlain had owned such a business
himself and continued to share the outlook of these
industrialists. British manufacturers in general would

176 Tariffs would promote English

benefit from protection.
manufactures throughout the Empire by impeding foreign
competitors. Conversely, the reduction of colonial, and

where possible, foreign tariffs would aid British export of

94
industrial products. Closer commercial ties to the Empire
would provide new Opportunities to British companies

177

restricted from foreign nations. As early as 1885 the

Birmingham Chamber of Commerce had been urging greater

exploitation of the colonial market.178
Besides industrialists, Chamberlain also found

adherents among English farmers threatened by imported

179

food. British farm workers would also be aided by

tariffs. Lower prices for domestic food stuffs would return
land to cultivation and provide greater employment.180
Inflating prices of foreign food would Obviously prove a
boon for British farmers. Colonial grain producers, such as
Canada, would alSo benefit. The Empire’s food producers
would have to step in to take over from foreign suppliers
whose prices would have been inflated by tariffs.

Politically the cause of tariff reform would become
linked to the Unionist party. Yet conservative elements
within the party remained staunch free traders. A minority
of Unionists favored maintaining the current fiscal system
and focusing on other reforms first.181 Others, for
political or personal reasons refused to consider any limits'
on free trade. In 1904 anti-tariff Unionists formed the Free
Food League, to highlight the threat of higher food prices.182
Although the League collapsed rapidly, the League encouraged
bargains between Free Trade Unionists and Liberals.183 Again
Chamberlain had created severe divisions within his own

party.

The Colonial Secretary's methods alienated many of his

95

colleagues as well. Many Unionists believed opposition to
Chamberlain was the only way to preserve Conservatism.184
Many Opposed Chamberlain to fight against what they saw as
mob rule of the party. This was a prime consideration of

those Unionists favoring the interests of the established
church, the landed aristocracy, and the House of Lords.185
These conservative Unionists had never trusted "Radical Joe"
Chamberlain. England's traditional landed class fought the

Liberals to avoid the land taxes the Liberal had promised to

institute.186

Yet such opposition did not always result in
support for Chamberlain.

Other groups and interests continued to defend free
itrade and the economic status quo. British shipping had
flourished under free trade. Cheap German steel for ship
construction and the absence of barriers to trade to Britain
insured low cost and high demand for Britain’s merchant

187

fleet. Trade barriers could severely limit England's

carrier trade. Ship owners were unconvinced by Chamberlain's
claim that, while cargoes would change from foreign
manufactures to colonial raw materials, the volume of

188

shipping would be maintained. All those employed as

middlemen for foreign goods, naturally opposed tariffs.189
The cotton industry would lead the defense of free

trade. Cotton required the new markets free trade was

opening in the East as well as inexpensive raw materials for

190 So virulent was the cotton industries

production.
Opposition to tariffs, that before the 1905 Parliamentary

election the Manchester Guardian noted, "A candidate had

 

96
. "191
only to be a Free Trader to get in.
The cotton industry highlighted the desire for cheap
food for workers. Increased food prices remained the
drawback to Chamberlain’s plan. Much of Britain's food
supply came from Europe and America. Tariffs would inflate
the prices of food from these sources. Many employers

resisted tariffs for this reason alone.192 Britain's

industrial strength owed much to cheap food.193 Expensive
food, meant higher wages for workers. British cotton owed
its success to keeping Operating cost low. Chamberlain
favored higher wages to Offset increases in food prices.
Employers hOped to avoid raising wages.
Many other businesses and industries Opposed tariffs
for their own reasons. Tariffs could raise the price of raw
materials.194 Colonial trade could not always make up the
difference. Companies which relied on materials from foreign
markets, or which sold imported products would bear the
brunt of the prOposed tariffs. Any company involved in
foreign trade had reason to fear rising prices, foreign
retaliation, or both. Chamberlain believed their Opposition
misguided. He said, "I hear it stated by them ...that our
trade with them (the colonies) is much less than our trade
with foreign countries and therefore ...we should do
everything in our power to cultivate trade with foreign, and
that we can safely disregard the trade with our children."195
London's bankers continued to back free trade in order
to maintain the strength of the money market on which they

196

relied. London's bankers had prospered under free trade,

97

and saw no need to alter the fiscal status quo. Many feared
protection would insure the loss Of profits generated
through international banking, interest on foreign loans,
and returns from the world wide insurance system.197

Chamberlain was not the enemy of the financial
interests of London. He saw capital as an important resource
which needed to be preserved within the Empire. He called
capital the "sinew of Empire" and believed British capital
could be used to both generate profit and to develop the

. 198
colonies.

The Colonial Secretary only opposed those
financial structures which threatened the Empire’s economic
self-sufficiency. Tariffs against foreign food would protect
colonial trade to Britain, while keeping English capital
within the Empire.199 Only financial transactions which
helped develop the industry and agriculture of the Empire
had a legitimate place in Chamberlain’s system. Chamberlain
opposed speculation which did not produce a useful
commodity. He also fought against the practice of promoting
services over production. Britain needed to expand its
industrial capacity, not simply become the middleman or
banker of foreign nations.200
Tariff barriers were expected to be a great boon to
British laborers. Tariffs were meant to be beneficial for

201

groups favoring full employment. Protected industries

would expand, creating new jobs and offering higher wages.

Further, Chamberlain promised to institute old age pensions

202 Chamberlain realized the working

203

using tariff revenue.

class would pay three fourths of any tax on food.

98

Chamberlain, however, was willing to use all the revenue
tariffs produced to improve the lives of the working class.
The rich would, therefore, contribute to social reform, but
would not be expected to have to pay the entire cost.204

British trade, and in turn the position of workers, had
become threatened due to its own success. Britain's
expanding trade had led to the imposition of tariff barriers
aimed primarily at Britain. In addition, improved working
conditions and higher wages had increased the cost of

205 Britain’s workers had

production for British firms.
benefited from her economic prosperity. Yet these advances
increased the price Of British goods. Chamberlain warned
that the need to keep British products cOmpetitive required
the imposition of tariffs or the reversal of previous
reforms. He made clear that the improved condition of the
working class needed to be protected. He pointed out to
English workers,

"You cannot keep your work at this higher

standard of living and pay if at the same time

you allow foreigners at a lower standard and

lower rate of pay to send tgfiér goods freely

in competition With yours."

Tariffs would serve to keep British manufactured goods
competitive within the Empire by increasing the cost of
foreign goods. If Britain failed in the market place workers
would be the first to suffer. Protection provided the means
to increase the benefits gained by workers, while protecting

British trade. All Englishmen could expect to share in the

greater prosperity industrial expansion and increased

99
colonial trade would create. The treasury would use the
funds from tariffs to improve conditions at home and in the
colonies. Chamberlain stated, "Imperial progress and social

progress at home should converge towards unified, or at

"207

least harmonized ideals. Imperial possession had become

openly equated with domestic prosperity 208

The greatest factor limiting support for tariff reform
remained fear of high food prices. Many remembered the
hardships of the 1840's caused by tariffs forcing up food
prices. Colonial sources, even when granted preferential
rates, could not totally replace foreign supplies of food.

Cheap food was of more immediate concern to workers than an

209

united Empire. A tax on food was essential to

Chamberlain's entire scheme. He acknowledged this fact, "I
do not propose a tax on raw materials, which are a necessity
of our manufacturing trade. What remains? Food. Therefore if

you wish to have a preference, ... if you wish to prevent

u210

separation, you must put a tax on food. Later,

Chamberlain would realize he had underestimated opposition

to higher food prices.211

Chamberlain tried hard to gain worker support for his

cause. The focus of his first tariff reform campaign was the

212

working class. Chamberlain even used fear of high food

prices in his defense of protection. He stated,

"it is not a comforting reflection to think that
we, part of the British Empire, that might be
self-sufficient and self-contained, are
nevertheless dependent ... for four-fifths of our
supplies on foreign countries, any one of which by
shutting their doors on us might redugp3us to a
state of almost absolute starvation."

100

In Birmingham Chamberlain illustrated his position by
holding up two loaves of bread before his audience.214 One
loaf contained slightly less flour to represent higher costs
due to tariffs. Yet the two loaves were virtually
indistinguishable. Chamberlain hoped the simple
demonstration would prove to the working class the
hollowness of their fear of higher food prices. The Colonial
Secretary hoped to convert the laboring class to tariff
reform through logical argument. Chamberlain backed up the
illustration of the two loaves with other arguments to sell
his cause to the working class.

It was clear to Chamberlain that tariffs allowed
greater production and improved conditions for workers. To
gather support advocates of tariff reform provided funds for
workers, the "tariff-trippers", to visit German factories to

15 Such workers provided first

report on conditions there.2
hand knowledge of the success of the German system, while
they formed a cadre of labor support for Chamberlain's
tariff policy. These pro-tariff workers, however, proved
unable to generate widespread support.

The issue of full employment and higher wages remained
at the center of Chamberlain’s argument. He asked, while
addressing the issue of social problems, "What is the whole
problem as it affects the working classes of this country?

"216

It is all contained in one word, Employment. Food prices

remained an issue only so long as one had work. Chamberlain

101
argued that most misunderstood the historical background of
tariffs. The poor position of the working class before the
repeal of the Corn Laws was not due to tariffs, but
unemployment and low wages.217 He claimed, "It is a mistake
to suppose that the best method of giving relief to the .
labouring classes is simply to operate on the articles
consumed by them. If you want to do them the maximum good
you should rather operate on articles which give them the

maximum of employment,"218

Reducing taxes was not the
solution, but rather increasing employment. Problems in
British industry had been caused when production had

219 These problems

surpassed the capacity of foreign markets.
had disappeared as foreign economies had expanded. The
U.S.A. served as an example of a nation where the cost of
living was high, but where better wages allowed an superior
standard of living.220
On the issue of food prices, Chamberlain turned to
W.A.S. Hewins, former director of the London School of
Economics, for effective arguments in favor of reform.
Hewins became the main economic advisor for the tariff
reformers and Secretary of the Tariff Commission.221 The
Tariff Commission had been formed by the Tariff Reform
League to gather and disseminate information and statistics
on tariffs. Chamberlain hoped to undermine Liberal criticism
by bringing into question the premise that tariffs insured
higher food prices. Hewins argued that the repeal of the

original Corn Laws and spread of free trade had not lowered

the price of grain. Prices had fallen because of the

102
development of America's wheat lands, combined with advances
in technology allowing grain to be transported cheaply.222
Chamberlain was confident that he could win the working
class to his side by eliminating their fear of rising prices
or by focusing on full employment.

Chamberlain refused to accept the argument that those
workers who lost their jobs when a trade was destroyed by
foreign competition could gain employment elsewhere.223
Skilled workers especially could not hope to maintain their
standard of living if forced to learn a new trade. Tariffs,
by protecting British industry, would make factory closings
less likely.

Chamberlain, was never able to get the support of
organized labor. Trade unions remained convinced of the
value of free trade, favoring internationalism over

imperialism.224 Chamberlain failed in his attempt to argue

that free trade and trade unionism were incompatible.225
Unions saw their best interests as being served by working
within the old economic structure, using organization and
the power of the strike to gain more for workers. If the
common worker lacked their leaders’ ideological ties to the
workers of the world, they knew that tariffs meant higher
food prices. Promises of pensions, full employment, and
higher wages never overcame this basic fear. The improved
economic situation severely damaged worker support for
tariff reform. It was hard to justify drastic change when

the economic climate seemed good and the position of the

worker was improving.

103

Resistance to Chamberlain’s proposals provided a
perfect opportunity to the Liberals. A defense of free trade
became a rallying cry to unite Liberals, at the same time as
it increased their popular support. Tariff reform gave the
Liberals the backing of free trade Unionists, workingmen and
their political organizations, textile manufacturers,
shipping magnates, and bankers.226 The Liberals central
appeal remained criticism of rising food prices and loss of
trade.227 Liberal critics pointed to the success of
Britain's economy. They thought it foolish to tamper with a
policy which had proved successful.228 As an alternative to
tariffs, the Liberals promised to redistribute wealth
through land taxes.229

In spite of the Colonial Secretary’s efforts to enlist
support, his plan proved doomed to failure. Free trade,
having the advantage of any current orthodox economic
system, continued to gain adherents. Free trade had brought
riches and power to Britain. Any attempt to interfere with
freedom of trade was looked at with suspicion. The timing of
Chamberlain's campaign for tariff reform limited its pOpular
support even more. Trade slumps were commonplace, but the
economic crisis that Chamberlain forecast was not readily
apparent.230 He stated, "It is not what we have got now, but
the question is how long shall we keep it, and how much we

"231

shall keep of it. It was true that by 1903 more problems

were beginning to appear. The boom in shipping and railways
had ended, and the cotton industry was in decline.232

Throughout the country unemployment was increasing. While

104
some industries may have been experiencing difficulties, but
the overall economic climate was, in fact, quite good. If
some industries were experiencing trouble, others were doing

233 Tariff reform would have had far greater

very well.
support if there had been more economic distress.

It was not clear that the colonies could make up for
the loss of foreign trade. In 1900 British trade to foreign
nations totaled 711 million pounds, while trade to the

234 Chamberlain saw this trend

colonies valued 237 million.
as strengthening foreign nations at the expense of the
Empire. Possible enemies were growing rich through trade to
Britain, not the colonies. Chamberlain's Opponents saw the
numbers differently. They saw the need to promote greater
foreign trade, not colonial trade, as the way to bring
greater prosperity to Britain.

Colonial trade was increasing in volume, but trade
between the colonies and Britain was declining.235 The
statistics of declining trade suggests the colonies were
looking less attractive as markets. It was often easier for
colonies to trade with neighboring states rather than
Britain. Chamberlain’s opponents believed this trend to be
natural and irreversible. Chamberlain saw the results
differently. He asked, "Do you think it better to cultivate
trade with your own people, or to let that go in order that
you may get the trade of those who rightly enough are your
competitors and rivals?"236

Chamberlain made a severe tactical error in his 1903

reform campaign. He failed to highlight the fact that higher

105
wages and old age pensions would compensate for slightly

higher food prices.237

Instead of showing that his plan had
taken higher prices into consideration, he backed down. He
now offered lower duties on some items to make up for new
tariffs on others. The duties on tea and sugar would be
decreased to make up for higher duties on grain.238 NO doubt
Chamberlain took this course to court Balfour who opposed
tariffs because they threatened to raise the cost of
living.239 Juggling the tariff rates was simply an
indecisive retreat which only served to confuse the real
issue.

In July of 1904 Chamberlain launched his second tariff
reform campaign. The first campaign had focused on the cites
of the industrial heartland, the second was aimed to reach

Britain's agricultural regions.240

British agriculture, as
well as industry, was also threatened by unrestricted
foreign imports. The growing and processing of agricultural
products needed to be preserved. Chamberlain claimed, "Sugar
has gone; silk has gone; ... ; wool is threatened; cotton

"241

will go. Chamberlain stressed that in the past no nation

had produced enough agricultural surplus to compete with
British farmers. This had changed. Not only were British
agricultural goods kept out of foreign markets, but foreign

242

food was also being dumped in Britain. The English

farmer was suffering due to free trade.
Tariffs against grain would allow British growers to

243

benefit from higher prices. If, as Chamberlain predicted,

Britain’s grain production was expanded to meet the new

106

244

demand, prices could fall again. France had imposed

higher duties than those which Chamberlain proposed, yet the

245 Chamberlain,

prices of meat and wheat had fallen.
however, neglected to examine differences in the amount Of
cultivatable land between France and Britain, or differences
in farm wages. Few were convinced that prices would fall.
The coming election highlighted the limits of rural support
for tariff reform. The Liberals were able to dominate the
rural areas by promising cheap food and "land for the
people".246
Chamberlain was beginning to doubt the government's
ability to stay in office. The time for the next General
Election was drawing near. The second campaign’s other aim,

therefore, was to lessen any Liberal lead.247

Ironically, in
1905 the Tariff Reform League, was the only national
Unionist organization capable of waging an effective
campaign.248 Yet Balfour's government was still not prepared
to accept Chamberlain’s policy.

By 1904 Chamberlain was hoping to rebuild the Unionist

party from scratch.249

In May 1905 a compromise with his
opponents in the party seemed likely. Chamberlain would
reenter the Cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. He
would agree to stop working for reform on his own.250 The
P.M., however, feeling pressure from the Free Traders
changed his mind. It still appeared that Balfour’s position
in the party was untenable. In November Chamberlain openly

challenged Balfour, and got the backing of the local party

organization, the National Union of Conservative

107

Associations.251

As before, Chamberlain's timing was off. Chamberlain

could not afford a complete split from Balfour.252

Chamberlain was never completely secure in his leadership of

the reformist wing of th Unionist party, and he lacked a

clear crisis to justify breaking up the party. 253 Many

Unionists supported Chamberlain’s aims, but they were not

ready to rebel against their party leader.254 Chamberlain

even had trouble keeping his followers in line. Many in the
Tariff Reform League saw the need for tariffs, but balked at
the idea of imperial preference.255 Preference insured a
rise in food prices, while selective tariffs did not. He was
forced to abandon the position that tariff revenue alone
could finance social reform. Balfour managed to keep his
faltering government in Office until 1905, blocking
Chamberlain and allowing the Liberals time to rally.256

In the election of 1905 Chamberlain tried to run on the

257

strength of his policy alone. He hoped tariff reform

would give the Unionists a firm domestic policy with which

to Oppose the Liberals.258 The failure to unify the

Unionists, however, insured that tariff reform was not

presented as effectively as it might have been.259 The

election was a Liberal landslide. There had been no defeat
as great in living memory. The Liberals took 400 seats in

the House of Commons, up from 186. The Unionists held only

260

157 Unionist infighting and the lack of a coherent

POliCY had given the Liberals the government.261

Chamberlain’s plan for reform, which was meant to give

108

the Unionists a firm policy, served to split the Party into

262

rival factions. If Balfour had accepted Chamberlain’s

position in 1903 the Unionists would have had a good chance

263 Instead Balfour had vacillated, hoping to

of victory.
please everyone, he succeeded in satisfying no one. Further,
his failure to enumerate a clear party policy allowed the
Opposing factions to consolidate their own positions.264
Without the backing of Balfour, as the Party's
representative, Chamberlain’s plan could not succeed.
The nation had become disillusioned by the lack of

Unionist social reform during the debate over fiscal reform.
Chamberlain himself was widely condemned as having promised
reform, but instead brought about war in South Africa.265
Many voters had been alienated by Balfour’s 1902 Education
Act which subsidized church schools through real estate
taxes.266 The Liberals had won over the Trade Unions by
promising to eliminate the burdens of the Taff Vale

267 The Irish went over to the Liberals, after

268

decision.
being promised a gradual move to Home Rule. Unionist
support for the use of indentured Chinese labor in South
Africa lost them more votes.269 The Unionists also suffered
the basic disadvantage of a party in Office for many years.
The Liberals were able to criticize ten years of Unionist
government, as well as offer their own programs.

Opposition to tariff reform further hastened the defeat
of the Unionist government. The Liberals were able to unite

to defend free trade, while the Unionists could not rally

behind reform.270 During the election many constituencies

109

saw a struggle between Liberals, Chamberlain’s tariff
reformers, and Conservative free traders.271 The Unionists
continued to support empire, but they failed to adopt
Chamberlain’s plan to rationalize an imperial system. The
Liberal promises to reduce unemployment, establish old age
pensions, recultivate the land, and improve Britain’s
technical schools allowed them to double the number of votes
they had received in 1900.272

Chamberlain's cause gave the Liberals the chance to
retake the government. The cost of the Empire could be
reduced in one of two ways. Chamberlain wished to make the
Empire more efficient and self-sufficient by drawing the
colonies closer to the mother country using tariffs. The
Liberals were able to reduce costs by giving the colonies
more independence. Revenue for social programs was also
available without tampering with free trade. Once in office,
the Liberals set about increasing the taxes on the rich.273
The working class was spared the cost of high food prices
and the economy continued to experience an upswing.274

There were many reasons for the failure of the tariff
reform campaign. The radical nature of the changes
Chamberlain demanded limited support within his own party.
His plan required a rejection of Britain's liberal

tradition.275 Many felt protection would lead to the loss of

more trade than the colonies could compensate for.276 The
majority of the Unionists continued to rely on free trade as

the means to economic success. Opposition to Chamberlain

within the Unionist ranks was deep seated. Tories, the

110

champions of the Anglican Church and the hereditary

nobility, continued to distrust the former Radical.277 The

Tories were willing to Oppose any attack on the status quo.

The Treasury balked at the expense of Chamberlain's reform

policy.2/8 A new fiscal structure would have to be put in

place, not only to collect the tariffs, but also to insure
the law was not circumvented. Chamberlain's wish that
colonial contributions to imperial defense would win the
Treasury to his side proved unrealistic.279

Chamberlain's argument was not without flaws. The major
industries suffering setbacks, such as iron, steel, and
coal, had problems that were not caused by foreign

280 Problems in these industries were caused by

limits in management rather than by outside factors.281 In

competition.

such cases, the Liberals argued, tariffs would simply

protect inefficient industries while limiting productive

reform.282 Chamberlain failed to prove that improved

technology and greater efficiency in industry would not

solve Britain's problems more effectively than tariffs.283
There were other defects in Chamberlain’s policy. Most

imports to Britain were raw materials which would not be

284 Such imports would not generate funds for reform.

taxed.
Chamberlain’s plan also included a major contradiction The
revenue for reform required imports which could be taxed.
Yet tariffs were also designed to protect domestic industry

285 If foreign imports were

by blocking foreign imports.
restricted, there would be no revenue. By 1905 Chamberlain

himself realized this contradiction made it impossible for

111
tariffs to both protect industry and raise revenues for

286 The twin aims of tariff barriers were

social reform.
incompatible. Preference insured that revenue created by
inter-imperial trade would remain limited.

Chamberlain never made clear what role of the African
and tropical colonies would be. Would the Protectorates be
given preference, or would they be exempted from British
duties? Would African colonies be forced to impose tariffs
on foreign goods? Confusion over such details limited the
appeal of fiscal reform. The neglect of the African and
tropical colonies is understandable, given their lessor
value as trading partners. Yet their exclusion becomes more
‘noticeable when Chamberlain's promise to develop these
colonies is remembered.

Chamberlain made another mistake by failing to fully
consider the implications of his plan for India, the
linch-pin of the British Empire. The fact that India had
never fallen under the Colonial Secretary’s jurisdiction
proved a great handicap when he proposed Empire wide reform.
As a result Chamberlain could give no conclusive answer as
to how India would fit into the tariff system. He said India
might become a full member of the tariff structure, or she

287

could "stand out" of the system. Yet both of these

options would create grave hardship in the colony. Tariffs
threatened India’s extensive export trade.288 India’s
favorable balance of trade insured she favored free trade.
Even if India remained outside the system, where she would

not enjoy the benefits of imperial preference, she might

112
face foreign retaliatory tariffs. Even small increases in

food prices could drive large portions of the Indian

289

population towards starvation. It would not be fair to

the other colonies to extent preference to India without

giving her the same responsibilities as the other colonies.

Chamberlain’s failure to consider India gave his Opposition

. . . 290

new opportunities to attack his plan.
Chamberlain took a questionable approach to the issue

of fiscal reform. Protection and retaliatory tariffs had

291 Britain already

292

considerable popular support in Britain.
had tariffs designed solely to produce revenue.
Chamberlain simply needed to convince the nation that these
duties needed to be expanded. Colonial preference had only
limited appeal to Englishmen and created considerable
Opposition. Many feared tying Britain's economy to the
colonies. Chamberlain would have found it much easier to
convince the country of the value of tariffs before
addressing the theme of preference. On the other hand, the
colonies expected immediate rewards for the advantages they
provided Britain. Chamberlain chose to fight for tie entire
program, tariffs and preference, at once hOping to highlight
those elements favored both in England and the colonies.293
Surprisingly the belief that the world at large would
retaliate against Britain if she established protective

94 . . .
Most foreign nations, haVing

tariffs, was mistaken.2
erected their own trade barriers, understood the wish to
protect domestic industry and profit from foreign trade.

Chamberlain could have brought this fact to the public’s

113

attention more dramatically. By presenting the foreign
position, Chamberlain could have reinforced the idea that
Britain's current imports were too small. Tariffs could be
shown to advance domestic industry as well as produce
revenue. This argument would also counter critics who
believed Britain’s present duties were sufficient.295

While there were problems in Chamberlain's defense of
reform, other Unionists had no policy alternative with which
to rally popular support. After the 1905 defeat of the
Unionists, tariff reform became a party platform simply
because the party had no other defined policy with which to

296

oppose the Liberals. In the wake of the electoral defeat

Balfour, to keep control of the Unionist Party, accepted the

297

general outline of Chamberlain's policy. Of the 157

Unionist M.P.s returned to office, 102 stood with
Chamberlain, 36 with Balfour, and 16 for free trade.298

In spite of his precarious position, Balfour continued
to resist any further democratization of the party.299 In
1906 Chamberlain asked for a party meeting to determine
support for Tariffs, ways to eliminate free traders from the
party, and ways to expand the democratic basis of the
party.300 Chamberlain realized that it was the Conservative
party hierarchy which opposed fiscal reform, not the typical
Unionist. Balfour avoided the precedent of convening a party
meeting determine policy by giving Chamberlain his personal
support in an open letter, rather than putting the issues to

301

a vote. Balfour's agreement gave Chamberlain new hOpe. He

now believed it would be possible to undermine the Liberals

114

by calling for greater social reform than the new government
while defending continuity in imperial policy.302 Such a
policy had proven successful in Chamberlain’s Radical days.
Unfortunately he never had the time to consolidate his new
position.

Chamberlain reached his 70th birthday in July 1906.
Although weary from a number of public celebrations, he
remained ready to begin a new political struggle for tariff

303
reform.

The Birmingham politician was finally forced to
pay the price of years of stress and overwork. On the
evening of July 11, Chamberlain suffered a stroke which
paralyzed his right side. In spite of partial recovery, the
stroke ended his active participation in politics. He would
remain interested in the quest for tariff reform until his
death in 1914, but his physical condition would not allow
his real involvement. His removal from the scene eliminated
the driving force behind tariff reform.

The pre-war years brought about a steady failing of the
reform movement. Austin Chamberlain had been passed up for

304

leadership of the Unionist Party. By 1911 the

Liberal-Unionist Party had been absorbed by the

305 The Conservative leader, Bonar Law, had

Conservatives.
been forced to abandon the quest for tariff reform, in order
to keep Free Traders within the party.306 In Canada, where
the main colonial impetus for reform can be said to have
originated, overtures were made to the U.S.A. for reciprocal

307

trade. Although the treaty failed, it marked Canada's

shift away from ties to Britain to local commercial ties.

115

If the political bodies Chamberlain had created had
failed, the ideas he had championed continued to exert
influence. Tariffs provided a way to finance social reform
without raising direct taxes and continued to gain
adherents.308 Chamberlain was able to make the argument that
the Liberals had to finance reform from the pockets of
Englishmen, while his scheme would use tariffs to make

309

foreigners pay for progress in Britain. Chamberlain’s was

a conservative means to avoid class conflict while elevating
the living standards of the working class and modernizing

310 It would take the Great Depression to

Britain's industry.
prove that Britain's economy was not impervious to distress.
In 1929, at the Ottawa Commonwealth Conference, Neville
Chamberlain set up the first system of imperial

311
preference.

V-CONCLUSION

Joseph Chamberlain saw imperialism as the solution to a
variety of problems facing Britain. Poverty, unemployment,
declining trade, class inequalities, and loss of influence
could all be reversed through imperialism. Chamberlain, as a
social imperialist, believed the Empire would make social
reform in Britain possible by strengthening the national
economy and providing revenue. Colonies would provide
markets and raw materials that Britain could use to improve
the standard of living of all Englishmen. Chamberlain was
willing to fight the Boers in South Africa to protect
-imperial markets and resources.

He supported imperial expansion throughout Africa in
order to acquire more resources for Britain. New colonies in
Africa were valued because of the economic assets they could
provide the Empire. This explains the primary importance of
the settler colonies in the Colonial Secretary’s scheme.
Canada, Australia, and South Africa had large British
populations and expanding economies, both of which were
needed to keep the Empire strong. Most of Africa had only
minor value. Chamberlain realized this, but even a small
return was better than none. The economic resources of the
settler colonies and the undeveloped colonies of Africa and
elsewhere could only be secure if they became part of the
Empire.

In spite of widespread support, Chamberlain’s imperial

116

ll7

blue-print would remain uncompleted. The South African War
had proven to Chamberlain that he was correct in viewing the
weakening of the imperial tie as a danger to the Empire.
Granting the Boer Republics independence had created threat
to British possessions in South Africa. The war also
provided Chamberlain with the opportunity to push for a
commercial union based on tariffs and imperial preference. A
post-war outcry for national efficiency convinced
Chamberlain the nation was ready to listen to his plans for
reform. Chamberlain, however, could not persuade the British
public that free trade was a threat to England's future
prosperity. Not even Britain's working class, those
Chamberlain had tried hardest to help, were willing to
accept tariffs which threatened to increase food prices.

Chamberlain had believed imperialism would solve social
problems in Great Britain. The Empire provided the resource
base and strength to create a prosperity unparalleled in her
history. The colonies would also benefit from imperial
control, but problems in England were more immediate to
Chamberlain. Chamberlain's brand of imperialism, however,
was not designed to cope with the contradiction between
English control and humanitarianism. He would never accept
social progress at home, if the price was distress in the
colonies. On a more pragmatic level, widespread resistance
to imperial control made imperialism too expensive to allow
greater prosperity in England. Without realizing it
Chamberlain had glimpsed the death of the Empire in the

KOpjies of the Transvaal. Chamberlain's social imperialism

118
was structured to use the Empire to advance social reform.
This aim would be impossible if all England's energy was
required simply to keep the the alliance of the colonies.
Chamberlain thought that the good of all was best
achieved through mutual cooperation between the colonies and
Britain. Simple profit for businessmen or even wealth for
Britain, as Hobson suggests, was never the goal. Military
security was not the prime focus of the Empire either. Power
was vital, both economic and military, but not for its own
sake. Power allowed the improvement of social conditions
throughout the Empire. Chamberlain outlined the twin
objectives of his thirty year career,
"The first of these objects is the consideration
of what is called the condition of the people;
... in order to improve the condition of the
people, to elevate their lives, to give them, and
especially the poorest of them, a better chance in
the competition which is always going on. And in
the second place, what has most interested me has
been a consideration of ... the future of the
Empire of which the country forms a part. "1
Chamberlain believed imperialism insured a better life for
all Britain’s subjects. Yet the quest for political
independence had started undermining the colonies loyalty to
Britain. Chamberlain's Empire would have proved unattainable
even with support in England because the colonial peoples
had come to believe their happiness was only possible
through independence. In 1903 Chamberlain had stated, "You
may yet see a teeming population of the various races, of
divergent interests, that go to make up the British Empire,

united by a common bond — one life, one flag, one fleet, one

throne."2 He did not realize how fast this dream was

119

slipping away.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX l-The Economic School

J. A. Hobson argued that the machinations of finance
capitalists forced Britain into Africa.1 In seeking motives
for the new wave of colonial expansion from the late 1870's
until around 1900, Hobson first examined Britain's domestic
scene. It was here he believed the answer lay. To find the
reason for imperial expansion, Hobson initially eliminated
other possible explanations. There appeared to be no
military threat from Africa. Foreign competition did not
force the British to expand. Trade patterns favored Britain,
so there was no need to gain new markets. Trade to the
Icolonies was, in fact, decreasing at the time of the
acquisition Of Africa.2 Manufacturers and traders had little
to gain in the African markets.3 Further, the domestic
economy had the ability to absorb a virtually limitless
supply of goods, labor, and capital.4

The stable foundation Of the domestic economy and the
success of foreign trade led Hobson to believe the cause of
imperialism lay elsewhere. What had changed in the late
Victorian period was the amount of English capital invested
abroad. Foreign investment had in fact doubled between 1884
and 1900.5 A further connection between finance and
imperialism appeared to be the influence of bankers in
London and the importance of their foreign holdings. For

example, South African and English financiers seemed

instrumental in bringing about the Boer War through their

120

121

calls for British intervention.

Hobson took such information and worked it into a
simple cause and effect formula. There had been a dramatic
increase in foreign investment. Financiers were interested
in Africa. Yet trade to the newly acquired colonies was Of
only minor importance. The bankers must, therefore, be
interested in outlets for capital. Using their vast economic
power, financiers put pressure on the British government to
gain these new outlets. Hobson states, "Imperialism implies
the use of the machinery of government by private
interests,..., to secure for them, economic gains outside
their mother country."6 Hobson believed the expensive and
dangerous path of colonial expansion had been chosen to
benefit only a small financial clique.

Hobson next offered an explanation of the sudden
financial need for new colonies. By the late Victorian
period wealth had become concentrated in the hands of a
super-rich elite. This concentration of wealth forced
interest rates down by reducing the buying power of
Britain's lower and middle classes.7 Most consumers lacked
buying power, while those few with extra funds could not
purchase enough to keep the economy growing. The effect of
such underconsumption was felt most strongly by the rich
elite.8 A stagnant economy created a decline in interest
rates, which hurt the rich by lowering profits from the
investments on which they relied. The roots of imperialism

lay, therefore in the domestic economy.9 Only when the home

122
economy became limited, did outward expansion begin.

Wage increases could have countered declining interest
by putting more money into circulation, regenerating the
economy, and increasing the demand for capital. Yet the top
of the financial hierarchy sought higher rates of interest
that would not jeopardize their monopoly of wealth.10 Such
interest rates could be found in the less develOped
colonies, where rates remained higher because of a scarcity
of capital. Africa, Hobson believed, was the answer.
Imperialism in Africa provided better investment
Opportunities.11

Investment in African colonies had other advantages as
well. Undeveloped territories would need sources of capital
to modernize, boosting interest rates. The government itself
would also seek loans to develop these colonies. Parliament
would be responsible for providing administration,
transportation, and trOOps for the colonies, creating the
stabile atmosphere investors sought.12 This position
confirms Rosa Luxemburg’s claim that, "political power is
nothing but a vehicle for the economic process."13 Rich
bankers grew wealthier by pressing the government for new
colonies in Africa, while passing the cost of Empire on to
the common Briton and African.

Government intervention in Africa was, Hobson believed,
easily achieved by the powerful financiers working behind
the scenes. It was simple for bankers to utilize the

propaganda potential Of the press. The promise of the wealth

of Africa could be exaggerated. Outcries over threats to

123
British citizens and honor could be manipulated to bring
about military intervention.14 Financiers could also use
their wealth to back military, religious, commercial, and
administrative groups which promoted African expansion.
Hobson believed the government was driven by these bankers
to gain territories they would not otherwise have sought and
which were worthless to the majority of Britain's
population.

Lenin adopted Hobson’s data to prove a theory which had
much in common with Hobson's. Lenin also believed
imperialism was caused by financiers seeking outlets for
surplus capital. Yet Lenin saw monopoly as the basis of
imperialism. In the late 1870's banks used their
concentrated wealth to gain control of whole industries.16
Competition limited profits, so cartels were formed and
rivals eliminated.17 Centralization spread as the banks took
over the means of production and raw materials in addition
to money capital.18 As Hobson suggested, once the rich
could no longer invest their surplus capital in the domestic
economy at the former rate of profit, they began to look
elsewhere. Surplus capital was not distributed among the
workers since this would lead to a decline in profits.19
Imperialism resulted when financiers began to direct
government power outward in a quest for new territories to
be brought under their control.

The new imperialism was differentiated from all other

stages of imperialism because of monopoly and the export of

capital over goods.20 Africa appealed to financiers because

124

it lacked indigenous finanCial structures that could compete
with European monOpolies for labor and raw materials.21 In
such areas financiers could gain the greatest possible
return on their investment capital. Lenin assumed EurOpean
governments automatically accepted the direction of
financiers.22 The protected colonial markets insured prices
in EurOpe would not fall, nor would wages increase.23

The financiers and, in turn, the entire imperialist
nation begins to exploit the colony. Imperialism also serves
as a means of avoiding class conflict by shifting the most
brutal class exploitation abroad. The profits of the Empire
are used to bribe the working class so that they too support
expansion.24 Slight wage increases pacified the European
worker, while African workers were forced to work at
starvation levels. Only this ability allowed capitalism to
survive. The acquisition of colonies also serves, many
Marxists believe, to distract the workers from poor
conditions at home with visions of imperial grandeur.25
Lenin expanded on Hobson’s ideas. Lenin made imperialism a
necessary stage in the development of capitalism.26
Imperialism is not an end in itself, but is simply a means
of prolonging the capitalist system. The socialist
revolution was to occur when the exploitation of the
colonies no longer provided the means to deceive the workers
in the industrial nations of Europe.

Lenin's theory was used by later historians to explain

all imperialism. Yet Lenin was examining a very specific

period of time. Lenin stated, the monopoly stage of

125
capitalism which causes imperialism, occurred after the turn
of the 20th century. It occurred, therefore, after the
scramble for Africa.27 The fact that Lenin focused only on
the period preceding World War I limits the usefulness Of_

28 Other limits of the

Marxist theory based on his work.
Marxist school become apparent through criticism of Hobson’s
economic theory of imperialism. Marxist historians, like
others of the economic school fail to prove that the
economic motive drove imperial expansion.

Hobson had created a theory that established a motive
for colonial expansion in Africa, next he suggested who
benefited, and finally sketched out how expansion was
promoted. Yet Hobson’s theory has grave defects which are
integral to its seemingly simple and clear process of cause

and effect.29

The first major flaw in Hobson's argument was
due to the imprecision of his data. Foreign investment had
increased, but Hobson did not look at where the capital was
going. Most investment flowing out of England did not go to
the new African colonies, but to America and the long
established "white" colonies. Most of Africa was totally
unsuited to large scale capital export. This oversight
shakes the foundation of the remainder of Hobson's economic
explanation of African imperialism. Lenin and his Marxist
followers base important portions of their theories on
Hobson’s spurious data. Later economic and Marxist
historians attempt to strengthen the case for the financial

basis of the scramble by arguing that Africa remained

economically attractive to private interests, and that these

126
interests were able to insure expansion. In this, both they
and Hobson fail.

Statistics make clear that Africa was not important as
an outlet for capital. Between the years 1870 and 1900 the
U.S.A. was the largest borrower of British capital.
Investment which did take place within the Empire usually
avoided Africa. Ninety percent of British investment
remained within Britain, the settler colonies or went
abroad.3O Only one sixth of the remaining ten percent went
to Africa. Such a small amount could not have had the impact
on British financiers that Hobson claims. Most capital went
to the settler colonies or India. The most economically
important part of the African continent, South Africa, had
been a part of the Empire for generations. It was these well
established colonies, often having a large British
population, which were important to Britain. Investment,
naturally, sought these colOnies rather than the new,
underdeveloped African colonies. An 1886 Royal Commission
stated it would be more beneficial to develop current
markets rather than open new areas.31 The settler colonies
provided a stabile atmosphere for investment as well as
expanding industry, transportation, communication, and
agriculture. The colonies with responsible governments,
however, kept investment returns at competitive levels to
protect colonists needing capital.32

The Empire as a whole did not provide the main outlet
for investors looking for opportunities outside Britain, nor

33

were high interest rates created. In some African colonies

127

trade and investment had been greater before annexation.34
Imperial control insured greater protection for investors,
but greater risk meant higher returns. Capital sent to
Europe and America produced higher profits, with little real
risk given the stability of these areas.35 Further, it must
be noted that nations, like Russia and Italy, expanded their
empires with limited capital resources.36 There was no
financial need for new colonies in Africa.

Economics alone cannot explain the "New" imperialism
which resulted in the partition of Africa. Hobson’s theory
of underconsumption and surplus capital is further flawed.
The idea that capital needed to be exported to compensate
for falling profits had first been defended by Jeremy
Bentham at the start of the 19th century.37 At this time,
however, the leading economic experts, such as Bentham and
J.S. Mill, argued for the abandonment of Empire.38 As far as
most of Africa was concerned, given the area's lack of
economic value, the earlier view is more valid.

No financial crisis severe enough to alter Britain’s

39 The African markets were

investment patterns is apparent.
limited or non-existent. Imperial control was costly and
often destabilizing. African wars were numerous, and there
was a constant threat that these wars could escalate into a
European conflict. The price of Empire in Africa required
its maintenance prove vital to the mother country. Only the
advance of state power, not economic gain for a few

40

individuals, made the cost of imperialism acceptable.

Hobson also fails to explain why certain classes

128

supported imperialism. It would seem to be more beneficial
for financiers to Oppose conflicts that would disrupt the
status quo. The financial network relies on stability to get
a return. London bankers were generally opposed to
imperialism as disruptive of trade and investment, both of
which flourished in relative peace.41 During the Boer War
French and German banks make great profits while British
banks were left behind.42

Agreement between manufacturers themselves could not
even be relied on. Not all were fooled by exaggerated

stories about African markets.43

Others dealt in products
which would not find African buyers. Yet all would be
expected to contribute to the cost of Empire. Higher taxes
and possible disruption of more important European markets
led many to discourage expansion.

Financial and industrial interests were, in fact,
opposed. Hobson neglects to examine the actual conflict of
interest between bankers and manufacturers. The geographic
division between London based financiers and northern
industrialists had a parallel in basic ideological
differences. Bankers believed it was possible to improve
Britain's economic position through the use of finance
capital alone.44

The rise of British banking had proceeded parallel to
a decline in production.45 Investment did not necessarily
benefit from decline in manufacturing, but neither was it

hurt by industrial decline. A declining industrial base was,

therefore, not seen as a threat by financiers. Bankers

129

accelerated such decline by sending capital abroad.46 Energy
should be devoted to expanding the financial infrastructure,
they believed, not the industrial one. Financiers saw
Britain's role to be the financial capital of the world, not
the industrial one. Given Hobson's premise, only those areas
of the Empire which could absorb surplus capital were valued
by bankers.

Hobson’s claim that imperialism hurt the English
working class is not proven. Workers, in fact, often
benefited from ties to the Empire. Trade to Canada,
Australia, South Africa, and India elevated the standard of
living in Britain as well as the profit margin.47 Emigration
to the colonies enabled many to begin a better life. Cheap
land was available in many African colonies to encourage
immigration and draw badly needed skilled labor to the
colonies. The imperial civil service provided many middle
class men with careers, while the Army provided work for
working class men who could not find jobs in Britain. The
development of the colonies provided opportunities for all

levels of British society.

APPENDIX 2-Strategic School

Unlike Hobson and Lenin, Robinson and Gallagher believe
the appeal of Africa was based on strategic considerations,
not financial need. They see no pressing economic need for
African expansion. Some areas, like Griqualand West, could
have been economically exploited without being made a part
of the Empire.1 Other areas were only developed to help pay
for their administration.2 Britain had even tried to give
control of Egypt to a council of the Great Powers.3 The
market potential of most areas was examined only after
expansion had taken place.4

Control of Africa was necessary, however, to protect
the sea routes to Britain's Eastern Empire. The Cape Colony
had been acquired at the end of the Napoleonic War to
provide bases on the southern route to India. India was a
central consideration in most of Britain's imperial policy.
India, besides being an important market, was the
administrative center of England's Eastern Empire.5 The
Indian Army doubled the size of the Empire’s armed forces,
at no cost to the British tax payer. Lord Rosebery would say
that Britain’s foreign policy was, "mainly guided by
considerations of what was best for our Indian Empire."6 The
completion of the Suez canal opened a new route and
redirected British interest to northern Africa. Disraeli’s
purchase of Suez stock and Gladstone’s military intervention

in Egypt were aimed at protecting this strategic route to

130

131
the East. Robinson and Gallagher see the long standing
desire of London to protect these two routes as the main
force driving expansion into Africa.

The fact that Africa had been important strategically
for a long period disputes Hobson’s and Lenin's arguments
for a "new" imperialism. Robinson and Gallagher defend the
idea that the motives for expansion in Africa did not
change, only the style.7 They suggest that for decades
Britain had been pursuing an "imperialism of free trade".8
From the start of the 19th century the British sought only
to Open new areas to her trade, not to gain new colonies. At
this time, "the main engine of expansion was enterprise."9
The use of force or possible annexation followed only where
free trade was excluded.10 With the promotion of trade as
the primary goal, imperial expansion was often unnecessary
and expensive. Even by the 1880's, Robinson and Gallagher
believe, there was no desire to acquire colonies in Africa.

In the mid-19th century, London could protect her
trading interests within a loose "informal" Empire.11
Political pressure sufficed to maintain influence. Subject
peoples were allowed to keep their own institutions if they
did not interfere with trade. Britain faced little outside
competition and indigenous peOples were too weak to resist.
Africa, except for a few strategic outposts, remained a part
of this informal Empire. There was no major threat to either
the Cape route or the Canal. The English had no desire or

need to promote formal Empire in Africa.

What changed in the 1880's was the ability to protect

132
trade and strategic routes without formal annexation. At
this time, Robinson and Gallagher argue, the old status quo
was breaking down. A series of unconnected crises in the
African political scene destroyed the peace under which
trade had flourished and the eastern routes had been
protected.12 The most important of these crises were caused
by the growth of Egyptian and Boer nationalism. These two
movements threatened the most strategically important areas
of Africa.

It was not coincidence that unrest began in those areas
where Britain was most involved. Cooperation had been
possible between Englishmen and Africans in the early stages
of their contact. Such collaboration had allowed the
creation of an informal Empire in the first place.13 Over
time, however, contact with the British began to put
unbearable strain on indigenous economic and political
institutions, causing their collapse.l4 Formal imperialism
can be defined as expansion lacking widespread collaboration

, . . 15
by indigenous peoples.

The breakdown of African states and
rise of opposition to the British presence, forced Britain
to extend her formal control deeper into the interior to
restore order.

The danger to the Empire caused by African and Boer
unrest was made worse by the threat from other European
powers moving into Africa at the same time. The new
imperialist powers of Europe increased the pressure on

African states, restricted British trade, and menaced the

routes east. In 1884, London had participated in the Berlin

133
Conference to avoid being pushed out of West Africa.16 In
1898 Britain was willing to risk war to keep the French from
gaining control of Egypt.17 Trade remained important to the
British, but the safety of the Cape and the canal remained
the main goal.

Those areas that merchants most coveted, were of least
interest to the government.18 After 1880 Britain 5 main
expansion was defensive, seeking territory of less economic
value, but having strategic significance.19 Robinson and
Gallagher show that the West African colonies were used to
bargain for the protection of Egypt, even though these

20 After 1880 Britain

colonies had good trading prospects.
was forced to gain African territory to combat African and
European threats to the route to India.

Robinson and Gallagher's focus on political and
strategic reasons for imperial expansion rests on a much
firmer foundation than does the economic school. It is
impossible to take any imperialist action without politics
being involved, while expansion was possible without
economic reward.21 Proponents of the economic school suggest
that imperialism serves private economic interests instead
of the entire nation. Yet governmental action must be
justified as being for the good of all. Political
considerations, therefore, are paramount even in cases where
the territory taken is of great economic value.

The strategic element of Britain imperialism is quite

evident. Afghanistan was invaded because of its proximity to

India. The Sudan was important due to its connection with

134
Egypt. Numerous islands, like Gibraltar, were claimed to
become bases and coaling stations. Robinson and Gallagher's
case for the original takeover of South Africa and Egypt, as
strategic routes East, are logical and well supported. The
Empire in Africa was often advanced to keep other European
powers out, rather than because of a wish to possess these
areas for their own sake.22 Yet to state that strategic
considerations were important in some cases does not mean
these motives determined all expansion.

Robinson and Gallagher's critique of the economic
school is appropriate. Imperialism was not caused by
economic interest alone, or by businessmen. The impact of
local conditions, as well as the influence of the official
mind, must be considered to gain a complete picture of
imperial expansion. While Robinson and Gallagher's strategic
explanation is sound, their theory neglects important
elements of British imperialism. Their theory is convincing,
but its application must be considered limited given the
fact that Chamberlain's entire imperial policy lies outside
its scope.

Robinson and Gallagher's theory contains a major
structural weakness. They fail to make clear the distinction
between strategic expansion and expansion to further free
trade. The "imperialism Of free trade" insures that Robinson
and Gallagher’s theory has a strong economic component. Yet
they argue that strategic considerations were foremost in

causing expansion. Could pressure from economic interests

bring about expansion in areas where strategic goals were

135

23

not involved? Did expansion to protect trade end once

imperial defense became more important? If this is true, it

would mean there was a "new imperialism. The "new"
imperialism could then be defined as a new focus on security
and power, rather than trade.24 If such expansion continued,
Robinson and Gallagher need to make clear that there were

two independent causes of imperial advance, one commercial

and one strategic.

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END NOTES

NOTES

Introduction
1

Note: D.K. Fieldhouse typified the New Imperialism as
an attempt to protect national power through imperialism.
D.K. Fieldhouse, "Imperialism: An Historiographical
Revision," The Economic History Review, XIV, 1961, p. 204.

 

2

J.L. Garvin, and Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph
Chamberlain, Vol. V, (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1932-1951), p. 185.

 

 

3
Winfried Baumgart, Imperialism, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982), p. 8.

 

I-Social Imperialism
l
D.K. Fieldhouse, "Imperialism: An Historiographical
Revision," The Economic History Review, XIV, 1961, p. 189.

 

2
Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform,
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 13.

 

3

Baumgart, p. 140.
4

Semmel, p. 13.
5

Baumgart, p. 166.
6

1919:
7

Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy,
(London: Fontana Press, 1981), p. 28.

 

8
Baumgart, p. 121.

9
James Morris, Pax Britanica, (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1968), p. 24.

 

142

143

10
Baumgart, p. 167.

11
Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset: Britain's Libergl
Empire, 1897-1921, Vol. 1 (New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1970),
p. 39.

 

 

12
See Appendix 1.

13
Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 191.

14
A. Atmore and S. Marks, "The Imperial Factor in
South Africa in the Nineteenth Century: Towards a
Re-assessment," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
Higppgy, III, 1974, p. 111.

 

15
Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny,
Africa and the Victorians (Garden City, New York: Anchor
Books, 1968), p. 463.

 

16
Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945,
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 61.

 

17
Richard Jay, Joseph Chamberlain: A_Political Study,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), o. 201.

L

 

 

18
Bernard Porter, "Imperialism and the Scramble,"
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 9, 1980, p.
77.

 

 

19

Baumgart, p. 132.
20

Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 11.
21

Baumgart, 130.
22

IPEQ
23

léié
24

Ibig., p. 164.

144

25
Enoch Powell, Joseph Chamberlain, (London: Thames
and Hudson, 1977), p. 50.

 

26
William Hynes, The Economics of Empire, (London:
Longman Group Ltd., 1979), p. 109.

 

28
Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 197.

29
J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1902), p. 152.

 

30
Ibid., p. 46.

Ibid., p. 49.

32
Norman Etherington, "Theories of Imperialism in
Southern Africa Re-visited," African Affairs, 81, 1982, p.
397.

 

33
Semmel, p. 150.

35
Louis Creswicke, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol
IV, (London: The Caxton Publishing Co., 1905), pp. 4, 39.

 

36
Peter Cain, "J.A. Hobson, Financial Capitalism, and
Imperialism in Late Victorian and Edwardian England,"
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XIII, No. 3,
1985, p. 20.

 

37
See Appendix 2.

38
Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny,
Africa and the Victorians, p. 4.

 

39
See Appendix 2.

145

40
See Appendix 2.

II-Chamberlain’s Early Career

1
Garvin, Vol. I, p. 21.

Harry Browne, Joseph Chamberlain, Radical and
Imperialist, (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group Ltd., 1974), p.
25.

 

 

4
Denis Judd, Radical Joe, (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1977) p. 3.

 

5
Browne, p. 26.
6
Garvin, Vol. I, p. 45.
7
Jay, p. 4.
8

Peter Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, (London: Cassel and
Co., 1966), p. 1.

 

9
Walter Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1988), p. 115.

 

10
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 3.

 

ll
Browne, p. 26.

12
Jay, p. 11.

13
1214-. p- 31-

14
IEiQ-. p- 7-

15
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. xii.

 

 

16
Garvin,

17
Semmel,

18
Browne,

19
Jay, p.

20

Vol.

L O

25.

I:

146

189.

Fraser, goseph Chamberlain, p.

22

 

155.

R. V. Kubicek The Administration of Imperialism:
Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office,

 

 

Duke University Press,

23
Garvin,

24

Kubicek, The Administration

25
Fraser,

26
Kubicek

27
Fraser,

28

lhié-

29
Jay,

30

1214.,
31

ieis..
32

Garvin,

Vol.

II,

1969),

O.

L

p.

448.

6.

of

 

Joseph Chamberlain,

 

, The Administration

of

(Durham,

Impgrialism, p.

 

45.

Imperialism, p.

 

Joseph Chamberlain,

 

p. 86.

p.

Vol.

85.

I,

p.

489.

45.

N.C.:

8.

8.

33

Jay, p. 85.
34

Ibid.,

p. 87.

35

Baumgart, p.

Ibid., 76.

p.

Ibid., p. 77.

38

C.C. Eldridge, Victorian Imperialism,

Highlands, New Jersey:

39

Jay, p. 55.
40

1§i§-, p- 101.
41

l9i§° I p- 67
42

Garvin, Vol. I,
43

Jay, p. 123.
44

lQié . p. 59.
45

Joseph Chamberlain, A Political Memoir:
Batchworth Press,

(London:

46

1924-, p- 139-
47

Garvin, Vol.
48

Judd, p. xiii.
49

Powell, 74.

p.

50

Jay, 188.

p.

147

76.

(Atlantic

 

II,

Humanities Press,

p. 526.

1978), p. 155.

1880-92,

 

1953), 151.

p.

p. 75

148
51
Epig., p. 125.

52
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 105.

 

53
Jay, p. 128.

54
Charles Boyd, ed., Mr. Chamberlain s Speeches, Vol.
I (London: Constable and Co., 1914), p. xxi.

 

55

Jay, p. 180.
56

1§i§-, p 174
57

Garvin, Vol. II, p. 423.
58

Jay, p. 176.
59

1919-
60

Ibid., p. 178.

61
1214.. P- 179-

62
Browne, p. 54.

63
Andrew Porter, "British Imperial Policy and South
Africa: 1895-9", In The South African War, Edited by Peter
Warwick, (London: Trewin COpplestone Books, 1980), p. 39.

 

64
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 366.

65
Jay, p. 195.

66
Richard Shannon, The Crisis of Impgrialism, 1865-1915,
(London: Granada Publishing, 1979), p. 291.

 

 

67
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 70.

 

149
68

Garvin, Vol. III, p. 176.

70
Kubicek, Administration of

Imperialism, p.

 

73
Ibid., p. 11.

74 _
Shannon, p. 166.

75
Jay, p. 92.

76
Powell, p. 40.

77
Jay, p. 187.

78
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 70.

79
Jay, p. 188.

80
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 322.

81
Chamberlain, p. xiii.

82
Garvin, Vol. II, p. 452.

83
Garvin, Vol. I, p. 451.

84
£919-, 9- 452-

85
Jay, p. 93.

74.

150

87
Creswicke, Vol. III, p. 49.

88
Garvin, Vol. I, p. 451.

89
Jay, p. 194.

90
Kubicek,Administration of Imperialism, p. 12.

 

91
Jay, p. 189.

92
Jay, p. 194.

93
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,
p. 408. Bernard Porter believes imperial expansion occured
at the slightest demand, as long as no objections on other
grounds could be found. B. Porter, p. 80.

 

94
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 211.

95
1218.. p. 214.

Ibid., p. 221.

Ibid., p. 228.

98
1218-. p- 233-

99
£219-
100
lg;g., p. 237.

101
Beloff, p. 9.

102
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,
p. 398.

 

.151

103
Ibid., p. 408.

104
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 69.

 

105

Chamberlain’s plan for the West Indies serves to
illustrate his overall plan. With government assistance
small proprietors would replace large plantations. These
small land holders would be taught improved methods of
cultivation to insure that they prospered.(Garvin, Vol. IV,
244). The spirit behind this policy was the same as that
underlying earlier Radical plans, the desire to break up
monopolies of wealth and redistribute this wealth among the
masses. It was a way of rebuilding society from the ground-
up. In addition to redistributing the land, a new
transportation and communication infrastructure would be put
in p1ace.(Garvin, Vol. IV, 244) In this way, the local
economy would be internally linked, and integrated into the
imperial economy. Political integration of the West Indies
into the Empire would be accomplished through closer control
from London.(Garvin, Vol. IV, 244) The West Indian model of
internal reform and imperial integration created a common
imperial interest, while improving the lot of the
individual.

106
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 174.

 

107
Browne, p. 53.

108
G.B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa: 1902-10,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 8.

 

 

109
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,
p. 397.
110
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 175.
111
Powell, p. 77.
112
Pyrah, p. 6.
113

Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates
(Commons), Fourth Series, 3 April, (1900), p. 1144.

 

152

114
Browne, p. 55.

115
Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1900), p. 1149.

 

116
1219-! p. 1151.

117
Jay, p. 201.

118
Jay, p. 195.

119
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 69.

 

120
Jay, p. 180.

121
B. Porter, p. 80.

122
Jay, p. 185.

123
Judd, p. xiii.

124
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 343.

125
Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, "The Export of
British Finance - 1865-1914." Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, XIII, 1985, p. 30.

 

 

III-South Africa

Ibid;, p. 194.

Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the
South African State" History Workshop, 8, 1979, p. 57.

 

153

4

Peter Richardson and Jean Jacques Van-Helten, "The
Gold Mining Industry in the Transvaal 1886-99," In The South
African War, Edited by Peter Warwick, (London: Trewin
Copplestone Books, 1980), p. 21.

 

 

5

J.A. Hobson's Imperialism was based in part on this
belief. R.V. Kubicek, however, shows that there was no unity
among Randlords and that it is difficult even to determine
why individual Randlords supported the Raid. R. V. Kubicek,
"The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment," Journal of British
Studies, XI, 1972.

 

 

Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p.

 

458.

7

Andrew Porter, "Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and
South Africa: 1895-9," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
Hispppy, I, 1972, p. 3.

 

8
Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, p. 59.

 

9
G. Blainey, "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid,"
Economic History Review, Vol. 18, series 2, 1965, p. 366.

 

10

 

Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,
p. 239. '

11
Anthony Nutting, Scramble For Africa, (New York: E.P.
Dutton, 1971), p. 308.

 

12
A. Porter, "British Imperial Policy", p. 42.

13
Garvin Vol. III, p. 107. Atmore and Marks see
Britian’s South African policy as an attempt to create a
modern industrial state in England's immage.(Atmore and
Marks, p. 115).

14
Parliamentary Debates, 29 January, (1897), p. 806.

 

15
Phyllis Lewsen, ed., The Correspondence of John X.
Merriman:_1890:1§9§, (Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society,
1963), p. 229.

 

 

154

16
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 136.

 

17
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 21.

18
Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, (New York: Random
House, 1979), p. 21.

 

19

 

p. 428.

20
Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, (1899), p. 267.

 

21 .
Judd, p. 214.

22
Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 16.

 

23
Ibid., p. 17.

24
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 368.

25
Pakenham, p. 18.

26
Ibig;

27
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 366.

28
Pakenham, p. 25.

29
Cecil Headlam, ed., The Milner Papers. Vol. I,
(London: Cassel and Co., 1933), p. 227.

 

30
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 366.

31 p
A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and South
Africa", p. 10.

32
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 21.

155

33
British Sessional Papers, (1884), LVII, C. 3914, p. 9.

 

34
Headlam, Vol. I, p. 389.

 

36

British Sessional Papers, (1899), LXIV, C. 9507, p. 180.
37

A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Africa", p. 15.
38

IEEQ;I p 4°
39

Garvin, Vol. III, p. 318.
40

1219;
41

A. Porter, "British Imperial Policy", p. 37.

42
lgig;r 9: 48°

43
British Sessional Papers, (1895), LXXI, C. 7633.

 

44
K.O. Hall, "Why Could the Aims of Milner and
Chamberlain in South Africa not be Achieved Without War?"
Seminar Paper, Michigan State University, 1968, p. 4.

45
Judd, p. 213.

46
Parliamentary Debates, 28 July, (1899), p. 703.

 

47
Jay, p. 229.

48
1218;, p- 230-
49
Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, (1899), p. 270.

 

50
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 141.

156

53
Pakenham, p. 25.

54
Hall, p. 17.

55
Hall, p. 18.

56
Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, (1899), p. 274.,

 

57
Parliamentary Debates, 5 February, (1900), p. 614.

 

58
Hall, p. 5.

59
Donald Denoon, A_Grand Illusion, (London: Longman
Group, 1973), p. 29.

 

60
Headlam, Vol. I, p. 229.

61
Hall, p. 1.

62
A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Africa", p. 17.

63
Atmore and Marks, p. 131.

64
lgig;r p- 111-
65
A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Africa", p.
5. Atmore and Marks agree that South Africa was to be
integrated into England's economy and that the route to
India was only a secondary goal. (Atmore and Marks, p. 108).

66
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,
p. 387.

 

67

157
Denoon, p. 75.

68
Browne, p. 63.

69
G. H. Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 67.

 

70
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,
p. 457.

 

71
Headlam, Vol. II, p. 215.

72
Judd, p. 227.

73
Denoon, p. 96.

74
Parliamentary Debates, 28 July, (1899), p. 715.

 

75
Pyrah, p. 141.

79
Pakenham, p. 599.

80
Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 73.

81
l§i§;r p: 333-
82
Parliamentary Debates, 24 March, (1903), p. 110.

 

83
Atmore and Marks, p. 124.

84
Parliamentary Debates, 24 March, (1903), p. 106.

 

158

85
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 103.

86
Judd, p. 229.

87
Pyrah, p. 11.

88

Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 335. The debate continues over
what led individual Randlords to support British
intervention in the Transvaal. Geoffrey Blainey, supported
by Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, thinks the long range
development of deep level mines required British control.
The deep mine owners required capital, centralized control,
and labor which the United Kingdom was more capable of
providing.Blainey,(Marks and Trapido) R.V. Kubicek
disagrees, citing differences in corporate and financial
strategies as the determinants of alliegance. Parent banks,
degree of reinvestment, and methods of funding were most
important.( R. V. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory
and Practice, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979).

 

 

 

89

Jay, p. 267.
90

Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 323.
91

l§1§_, p- 328-
92

121d
93

Garvin, Vol. III, p. 605.
94

Parliamentary Debates, 5 February, (1900), p. 623.
95

Garvin, Vol. III, p. 625.
96

'1819_
97

98
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 155.

159

98
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 155.

99
Eldridge, p. 216. Atmore and Marks saw African
labor as another resource Britin tried to gain in their
conflict with the Boers. (Atmore and Marks, p. 125).

100
Parliamentary‘Debates, 5 February, (1900), p. 615.

 

101
Eldridge, p. 210.

102
Denoon, p. 96.

103
ParliamentaryADebates, 5 February, (1900), p. 624.

 

106
Baumgart, p. 168.

Ibid., pp. 160,172.

109
Semmel, p. 27.

110
Semmel, p. 146.

111
Baumgart, p. 173.

IV-Tarif Reform

1
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 96.

2

The Colonial Secretary believed that world conditions
had changed, and that a new imperialism was necessary. It
was no longer enough simply to intensify the old style of
imperialism as Robinson and Gallagher suggest. Chamberlain

160

hoped to create a new imperial system better suited to
altered world conditions.

3
Etherington, p. 398.

4
Jay, p. 210.

5
Semmel, p. 150.

6
Powell, p. 48.

7

Lenin believed industrialism required protection,
worsening over-production.(Baumgart, p. 116) In Lenin’s
system protection was a cause of, not a result of
imperialism. Schumpeter, however, saw protection as a
pre- capitalist holdover which was incompatable with
irnperialism.(Semme1, p. 17).

8
Powell, p. 48.

9

Boyd, Vol. II, p. 166. Chamberlain often lacked the
expertise and ideological certainty of reformers in the mold
of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Chamberlain was a man of action
rather than a philosopher. He would often first seize upon
an issue or make a decision, and only afterward look for
arguments to support his position. Viscount Morley said of
him, "... though not of the politicians who are forced into
action by an idea, he was quick to associate ideas with his
actions."(Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 3)
Chamberlain s tendency to support sudden, widespread change,
sometimes without regard for consequences had first led him
to become a Radical.

 

 

10
Boyd, Vol. II, o. 143.

L

11
Semmel, p. 84.

12
Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1895), p. 1210.

 

13
Boyd, Vol. II, p. xvii.

14
Semmel, p. 87.

161

15
Ibid.

16
Powell, p. 48.

17
Semmel, p. 89.

18
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 168. D.C.M. Platt suggests Britain
was also outgrowing her former markets at the same time as
foreign tariffs were restricting British trade.(Platt, p.
11)

19
Semmel, p. 89.

20
Judd, p. 243.

21
Creswicke, Vol. IV, pp. 4, 118.

22
Jay, p. 287.

23
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 37.

27
Browne, p. 65.

28
Judd, p. 241.

29
Jay, p. 253.

31
Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 186.

 

162

 

 

 

32

Semmel, p. 160.
33

Semmel, p. 91.
34

Judd, p. 242.
35

Semmel, p. 161.
36

Judd, p. 243.
37

Boyd, Vol. I, p. 369.
38

Shannon, p. 310.
39

Boyd, Vol. I, p. 343.
40

Garvin, Vol. III, p. 189.
41

Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p.
42

Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 652.
43

Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 406.
44

Boyd, Vol. II, 71.
45

Boyd, Vol. I, p. 362.
46

Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p.
47

Browne, p. 54.
48

Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p.
49

Ibid

——-——-

180.

155.

157.

163

Semmel, p. 149.

Browne, p. 54.

53
Semmel, p. 156.

54
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 892.

55
Semmel, p. 118.

56
Ibid;, p. 90.

58
Creswicke, Vol. III, p. 36.

59
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 28.

60
Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1900), p. 1151.

 

61
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 371.

62
Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 179.

 

63
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 138.

64
Jay, p. 209.

65
Boyd, Vol. II, o. 196.

L

66
Semmel, p. 152.

67
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 370.

68
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 39.

164

Garvin, Vol. V, p. 348.

72
Jay, 0. 286.

L

73
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 44.

74
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 347.

75
Semmel, p. 150.

76 ‘
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 122.

77
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 102.

78
Semmel, p. 150.

79
Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 204.

80
Etherington, o. 399.

A.

81
D.K. Fieldhouse, Theory of Capitalist Imperialism,

 

(London: Longman Group Ltd., 1967), o. 127.

L

82
Creswicke, Vol IV, p. 199.

——_——

84
Semmel, p. 92.

85
Browne, p. 58.

86
Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1900), p. 1149.

 

165

87
Garvin, Vol 4, p. 415.

89
Paul Hayes, "British Foreign Policy and the Influence
of Empire, 1870-1920," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
Hippppy, XII, 1984, p. 108.

 

 

 

 

90
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 194.
91
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 496.
92
Parliamentary Debates, (1901), p. 1096.
93
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 194.
94
Jay, p. 262.
95
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 229.
96
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 323.
97
Shannon, p. 310.
98
Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 414.
99
1214_, p. 420.
100
Jay, p. 260.
101
Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 420.
102
l9l§1r p. 430.
103

166

104
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 39.

105
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 188.

106
Shannon, p. 312.

107
Hayes, p. 109.

108
Garvin, Vol. III, 0. 178.

L

109
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 369.

110
Garvin, Vol. II, p. 468.

111
Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 191.

 

112
Jay, p. 262.

113
Jay, p. 264.

114
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 89.

 

115
Garvin, Vol. IV, p 446.

116
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 122.
117
This central impetus contradicts to some extent
Robinson and Gallagher’s position that the periphery
determined the pace of imperial expansion.

 

118
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 227.
119
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 150.
120
1919;
121

Shannon, p. 313.

167

122

Jay, p. 264. Twenty years before, in a strange
reversal of roles, Chamberlain had defeated Ritchie in a
debate before Parliament. In 1881 Ritchie had argued for
retaliatory tariffs against France, Chamberlain attacked the
idea of a tax on food, and won.(Garvin, Vol. I, p. 433) The
Colonial Secretary's earlier statements would soon come back
to haunt him.

123
Shannon, p. 313.

124
Garvin, Vol VI, p. 543.

125
Peter Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform," Historical
Journal, V, No.2, 1962, p. 161.

 

 

126

Jay, p. 298.
127

1910 . p- 302
128

1219-
129

Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 258.

 

130
Jay, p. 296.

131
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 255.

 

132
Semmel, p. 105.

133
Jay, p. 278.

134
Shannon, p. 355.

135
Jay, p. 282.

136
Shannon, p. 356

137
Ibid.

138
Judd, o.

L

139

A. K. Russel,

(Hamden,

140
Jay, p.

141
Fraser,

142
Garvin,

143
Judd, o.

L.

144
Fraser,

145
Jay, p.

147
Shannon,

149

Ibid., p.

150
Jay, p.

151

igig;' 9'

152

Ibid., p.

155
Shannon,

168

248.

Liberal Landslide:

 

 

 

Connecticut:

284.

Joseph Chamberlain, p.

 

Vol. V, p. 355.

248.

Joseph Chamberlain, p.

 

284.

p. 357.

306.

311.

307.

110.

p. 358.

Archon Books,

261.

261.

The General Election

169

156
Russel, o. 29.

L

157
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 150.

158
Fraser. Jpseph Chamberlain, p. 271.

 

159
Semmel, p. 101.

161
Russel, p. 28.

162 .
Semmel, p. 26.

163 .
Jay, p. 286.

164
Garvin, Vol. VI, 0. 527.

L

165
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 331.

166
lgig;r p: 340:

168
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 100.

169
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 329.

170
Jay, p. 192.

170

174
Semmel, p. 87.

177
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 73.

178
Semmel, p. 86.

179
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

180
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 194.

181
Russel, p. 172.

182
12141. p. 30.

183
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 269.

 

184
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 149.

185
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 271.

 

186
Semmel, p. 101.

187
Semmel, p. 146.

188
Creswicke, Vol. IV, D. 124.

L

189
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

190
Semmel, p. 146.

191
Russel, p. 173.

171
192
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

193
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 229.

 

194
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 159

195
Creswicke, IV, p. 34.

196
Baumgart, p. 166.

197
Semmel, p. 150.

198
Davis and Huttenback, p. 30.

199
Shannon, p. 350.
200
Lenin and Hobson assumed protectionism to be the

final outcome of imperialism. Tariffs were essential to
industrialization. Custom duties allowed industrial
monopolies to protect their markets by forcing out foreign
competitors. Tariffs, they believed, increased the effects
of underconsumption by artificially inflating prices.
(Baumgart, p. 116) What they failed to realize, was that
British capitalists resisted the shift to protectionism.
Schumpeter saw more clearly that laissez—faire capitalism
worked against the New Imperialism.(Semme1, p. 17) Many
industries had more to gain through free trade. There was no
unity among capitalists, as Chamberlain’s campaign for
fiscal reform would soon show. Chamberlain's attempt to
erect tariff barriers to protect industry failed, the
majority of Englishmen remained free traders. The question
of tariffs created cleavages throughout British industry and
society not based on financial position.

201
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

202
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 29.

203
Parliamentary_Debates, May 28, (1903), p. 186.

 

204
Ibid.

172

 

205

Semmel, p. 95.
206

Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 104.
207

Garvin, Vol. III, p. 19.
208

Judd, p. 189.
209

Semmel, p. 148.
210

Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 97.
211

Russel, p. 205.
212

lglg;' 9‘ 29°
213

Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 115.
214

Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 499.
215

Semmel, p. 119.
216

Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 120.
217

19181, p. 197.
218

léig;l p- 127-
219

Boyd, Vol. II, p. 234.
220

Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 197.
221

Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 246.
222

Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 73.

173

 

223

l§l9;r p 143
224

Semmel, p 98
225

Boyd, Vol II, p 204
226

Russel, p. 205.
227

Ipldp, p. 67.
228

Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 195.
229

Russel, p. 72.
230

Judd, p. 254.
231

Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 122.
232

Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 455.
233

Shannon, p. 360.
234

Browne, p. 53.
235

Judd, p. 244.
236

Boyd, Vol. II, p. 139.
237

Garvin, Vol. V, p. 270.
238

19121;
239

1214_. p. 362
240

Garvin, Vol. VI, 0. 601.

h

241
Jay, 9-

242

Creswicke,

243

246
Russel,

247
Garvin,

248

EQEQLI P-

249
Shannon,

250
Fraser,

251
Russel,

252
Fraser,

253
Fraser,

254
Jay, p.

255
Semmel,

256
Shannon,

257
Jay, p.

174
287.
Vol.

IV, 193.

p.

p. 175.

V01° VII 9. 608.
774.
p. 363.

Joseph Chamberlain, p. 264.

 

p. 32.

"Unionism and Tariff Reform",
"Unionism and Tariff Reform",
30.

p. 124.

p. 363.

301.

p. 164.

p. 165.

175

262
Garvin, Vol. V1, p. 794.

264
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 151.

265
Russel, p. 198.

266
Arnstein, p. 208.

267
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 774.

268
Russel, p. 75.

269
19141. p. 177.

270
Semmel, p. 134.

271
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 152.

272
Russel, p. 71; Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 273.

 

273
Baumgart, p. 175.

274

The Liberal victory underlines the the limits of
Robinson and Gallagher’s theory. Chamberlain's program was
not part of a long term quest to protect free trade as
Robinson and Gallagher suggest. His was a "new" imperialism,
bent on expansion, yet linked to radical politics. Imperial
power would be used in a positive way, not simply to keep
competitors from prohibiting British trade. Free trade could
benefit certain individuals, but Chamberlain was more
interested in the common good. It is not surprising that

176

Chamberlain eventually abandoned his support of free trade.
Cobden’s defense of free trade had been based on the belief

that the quest for personal wealth brought the greatest

good. (Garvin, Vol V, p. 202) Chamberlain wished to develop
national strength and advance social reform. He distrusted
individualism as detrimental to Britain. He saw the future to
be an age of formal, united empires. His main goal was to

insure Britain could take her place among these powers.

275
Shannon, p. 359.

276
Judd, p. 239.

277
Jay, p. 274.

278
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 159.

 

279
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 150.

280
Judd, p. 254.

281
Shannon, p. 360.

282
lélg;r p- 362-

283
Garvin, Vol. VI, 0. 478.

L

284
Jay, p. 289.

285
Ibigp, p. 329.

286
Semmel, p. 96.

287
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 271.

288
Creswicke, p. 206.

289
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 271.

 

 

 

177

 

 

290
lglg;r p: 274-
291
igié;r p: 356-
292
Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 191.
293
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 357.
294
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 356.
295
Parliamentary_Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 191.
296
Judd, p. 269.
297
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 851.
298
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 155.
299
lélg;r p: 156-
300
1918;: p. 163.
301
1214-
302

Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 856.

303
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 278.

 

304
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 984.

305
l§l§;r P- 976-

future.(Etherington, p.

178

308
Jay, p. 317.

309

Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 892.

310
Jay, p. 317.

Appendix 1-The Economic school

1

Norman Etherington notes that Victorian businessme

2

Hobson, Imperialism, p. 39.

 

3

Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p.

 

4

Hobson, Imperialism, o. 29.

A.

 

5
Baumgart, p. 109.

6

Hobson, Imperialism, p. 94

 

7
lEEQ;I p- 83-

8

Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p.

 

believed outlets for capital would be needed in the

386.) He suggests, however, that
many theorists were too quick to assume governments did what
business and financial interests wished.

69.

72

179

9

D.C.M. Platt, "The National Economy and British
Imperial Expansion before 1914," Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 2, 1973, p. 5.

 

 

10
Hobson, Imperialism, p. 56.

 

13
Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 90.

 

14
Hobson, Imperialism, p. 359.

 

15

léig;r p- 51:
16 .
V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of
Capitalism, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 13

 

 

l7
lglg;r p: 86-
18
Ipldp, p. 51. Ironically, Joseph Chamberlain saw

American and German trusts as a threat to Britain which
lacked such monopolies.(Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 51)

19
Ibigp, p. 73.

20
Ibid., p. 72.

Ebig;r p° 97°

22
Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 193.

23
1212;, p- 192-

24
Lenin, p. 128.

25
Baumgart, p. 136.

180

26
Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History,
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), p. 300.

27
Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, p. 8.

 

28
Etherington defends Lenin’s theory by pointing out
that Lenin was not attenpting to explain the Scramble for
Africa, therefore the Scramble cannot by used to dispute
Lenin.(Etherington, p. 385)

29
D.K. Fieldhouse's "Imperialism: A Historiographical
Revision" examines Hobson’s critics and the success with
which they undermine Hobson’s theory.

 

 

30
Davis and Huttenback, p. 49.

31
Baumgart, p. 164.

32
Davis and Huttenback, p. 49.

34
Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 127.

35
Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 198.

 

36
Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 149.

37
A.G.L. Shaw, ed., Great Britain and the Colonies
1815-1865, (London: Methuen & Co., 1970), p. 10.

 

B. Porter, p. 78.

40
D.K. Fieldhouse sees the inability of the economic
school to prove imperialism was an economic necessity as the
prime flaw in their theories.(Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p.
195)

181

41
Baumgart, p. 126

42
12.19;

43
Hynes, p. 7.

44
Semmel, p. 62.

45
Semmel, p. 156.

46
Cain, p. 19.

47
Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 198.

Appendix 2-Strategic School

1
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p.

 

61.

2
12191. p. 409.

3
lglg;r p- 149-

4

Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "The Partition of
Africa," (1962) In Imperialism, Edited by M.R. Louis, (New
York: New VieWpoints, 1976), p. 74.

 

5
Morris, p. 263.

6
lgig;r p- 276-

7

Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "The Imperialism
of Free Trade," (1953) In Imperialism, Edited by M.R. Louis
(New York: New Viewpoints,1976), p. 54.

 

8
lpid., p. 60.

182

 

9
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p.
3. '
10
Robinson and Gallagher, "Imperialism of Free Trade",
p 60.
11
l§l§;1 9 61°
12
Robinson and Gallagher, "Partition of Africa", p.
75.

13
M.R. Louis, Imperialsim, (New York: New Viewpoints,

1976), p. 26

 

15

Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of
European Imperialism," (1972) In Imperialism, Edited by M.R.
Louis (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), p. 130. Donald
Denoon studied South Africa to show that the Boer War was a
lost cause because it was impossible to make the Dutch into
satisfactory collaborators.(Denoon, A Grand Illusion)
Atmore and Marks viewed the war in similar way. (Atmore and
Marks, 0. 109)

L

 

16
Robinson and Gallagher, "Partition of Africa", p.

89.

17
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,

 

p. 95.

18
Ibid., p. 462.

20
Ibid;, p. 393.

21
Baumgart, p. 91.

22
B. Porter, p. 80.

183

2 3
1219;.

24
Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 204.

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