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The Imperial Policy of Joseph Chamberlain

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ABSTRACT

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN'S IMPERIAL POLICY

By

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This thesis examines the imperial policy of Joseph Chamberlain in order to highlight the usefulness of the theory of social imperialism. Social imperialism focuses on the close connection between the economic and strategic goals of late Victorian imperialism, and social conditions in Britain. Social imperialists sought colonies as a way of improving the standard of living in the imperial homeland. Social imperialism shows that the economic and strategic aims of imperialism cannot be studied in isolation because each was mutually supporting. Chamberlain, as Colonial Secretary from 1895-1903, saw imperialism as a means of promoting social reform at home. Economic advantage was sought in imperial expansion to finance social reform. Military security, through acquisition of strategic territory, insured the protection of the Empire's resources. Chamberlain's policy was based on the idea that the well being of all Englishmen depended on the economic and military power of the Empire.

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INTRODUCTION

When Joseph Chamberlain took the podium in Birmingham on May 15, 1903, Britain was the center of the greatest Empire in the world. It was appropriate that Chamberlain address the issue of imperial unity in Birmingham, the center of his political support. Chamberlain had begun his struggle to link Britain's industrial power to the resources of the colonies while M.P. for Birmingham, and the town's interests remained in his mind. A new century was beginning, and Chamberlain was speaking as Colonial Secretary to outline a new style of imperialism. Chamberlain, a social imperialist, believed a strong Empire was essential to a healthy domestic scene. In response to changed world conditions closer, formal ties were now needed between the mother country and her colonies.[1] Chamberlain easily projected his enthusiasm and optimism to his audience. He announced, "The Empire is in its infancy. Now is the time when we can mould that Empire, and we and those who live with us can decide its future destinies."[2] It was clear the Empire was on the threshold of a new stage in its development following the recent shock of the South African War. Chamberlain would spend the rest of his life trying to

insure that the new imperial system would be based on close military and commercial ties. Only such ties, he believed, would allow the advance of social reform in Great Britain, while promoting her strength and influence abroad.

Central to any study of the world of the late 19th and early 20th century is the subject of imperialism. European imperialism may be roughly defined as continuous political and territorial control by technologically superior nations over other peoples.[3]. This simple definition, however, obscures many facets of imperialism and does nothing to explain the motivation behind imperial expansion. Debate over Victorian imperialism is especially fierce. The discussion centers on a "scramble for Africa" during which 19th century imperialism reached its apogee.

There are three main schools of thought on the subject of Britain's part in the scramble. The earliest school, developed out of the work of the historian J.A. Hobson, relies on economic motives. The general outline of Hobson's theory continues to draw support from many economic historians--and through V. I. Lenin's adoption of Hobson's data--also Marxist historians as well. Hobson suggests that Britain was pushed to move into Africa by financiers hoping to secure outlets for surplus capital.

A new perspective offered by R. Robinson and J. Gallagher refutes the importance of economic motives by highlighting the strategic importance of Africa. They refute

Hobson by pointing out the minor value of Africa economically. Britain expanded into in Africa, they believe, in an attempt to protect the main routes to the star of her Eastern Empire, India. Robinson and Gallagher argue that there was no new impetus for British expansion, other than the need to move further into Africa's interior to protect traditional goals.

These two interpretations have engaged the attention of most historians. Yet there remains a third alternative that explains certain aspects of British imperialism more effectively by focusing on the connection between imperialism and domestic politics. Social imperialism serves as the best name to differentiate the third school of thought from the economic and strategic or political perspectives. The fundamental principle in this view is the idea that a prosperous and stable Britain required an extensive Empire. Social imperialism brings out the appeal of Empire from both the economic and strategic standpoints. Social imperialists saw the Empire as the source of both economic strength and political power. An Empire provided security from outside foes, while insuring Britain's economic success. Imperial trade would create prosperity which would allow social improvement throughout the Empire. Conversely, the failure to maintain an Empire would weaken Britain's military and cripple her economy. Social imperialism better illustrates the stakes Victorian statesmen believed were involved in imperial expansion. Imperialism, including expansion into

Africa, was necessary to protect Britain's economic and strategic well being. Strategic security and economic value could not be separated, even though one element or the other could be more important in causing expansion in individual cases. Within the social imperialist framework, Africa was neither acquired as a vital outlet for capital alone, nor solely as a strategically important shipping route. Instead, Africa was a potential resource to be developed for the betterment of Britain and the Empire as a whole.

Nowhere is social imperialism more evident than in Joseph Chamberlain's term as Colonial Secretary from 1895-1903. Chamberlain began his political career as a champion for social reform and the extension of prosperity to Britain's lower classes. He saw imperialism as a way to achieve these goals while maintaining Britain's traditional political structure. Empire, not revolution, would provide new wealth to be used for the betterment of Britain's poor. African colonies would provide markets and raw materials for Britain's industrial complex. It was the need for closer ties between the colonies and the mother country which made Chamberlain risk war in South Africa. After the Boer War Chamberlain presented the center piece of his imperial plan: tariff reform. He suggested the creation of an imperial customs union to tie the Empire together through commerce, while creating funds to improve social services. Tariff reform highlighted Chamberlain's attempt to rationalize the Empire's economy by protecting imperial trade in order to

promote social reform at home. It is the close connection between expansionist imperialism and domestic social reform that places Chamberlain's actions within the realm of social imperialism.

I. SOCIAL IMPERIALISM

Joseph Chamberlain's political life was spent pursuing two broad goals. His first aim was the defense of Britain's national power and position in the world. This goal required a strong military and a healthy economy. In addition to this desire for British supremacy, Chamberlain hoped to create a new system of state sponsored welfare. Workers would be protected in the event of accident, the elderly would be provided with pensions, and the educational system would be improved. Chamberlain hoped to use the Empire to provide the resources to make England strong both externally and internally.

Imperialism would give Britain access to markets and resources that would allow her to maintain her commercial success. The colonies would help pay for an Imperial army and navy to insure the safety of the Empire. Chamberlain envisioned the creation of an imperial customs union to integrate the Empire's economy. Tariffs would protect imperial industries from outside competition and provide funds for social reform. African colonies were not expected to be the most important territories in Britain's Empire, but the were still valued. Chamberlain was planning for the future, he hoped less promising African colonies might one day yield resources valuable to Britain. Chamberlain would follow a forward policy in South Africa in order to preserve Britain's dominance in one of Africa's more prosperous

areas. After the Boer War Chamberlain would fight for tariff reform in an attempt to utilize the fruits of Empire more effectively.

Social imperialism explains certain aspects of the partition of Africa and Chamberlain's subsequent imperial policy better than either the economic or political schools. Social imperialism offers a solution to the questions left unanswered by the other theories. Social imperialism highlights the close connection between imperial acquisition and domestic politics and social conditions. British statesmen of the 1890's found it impossible to separate the interests of the Empire and the mother country. In this, social imperialism has ties to Hobson's theory in that imperialism depends on conditions in Britain.[1] Imperialist politicians, like Chamberlain, sought to protect the Empire as a means of advancing the welfare of all Englishmen.

The theory of social imperialism suggests that imperialism provides a way to solve domestic problems in the mother country. The concept of social imperialism dates from the early twentieth century. In 1919, J. A. Schumpeter defined social imperialism as an attempt to gain the support of the working class for Empire by offering social reform.[2] Most recently the idea was reexamined by Hans-Ulrich Wehler in relation to German imperialism and social unrest.[3] Wehler believed German imperialism served as a way to distract the German population so they would not brood on social problems. Wehler's scheme does not apply directly to the British case. British social imperialism includes the close

connection between the domestic scene and imperialism, but lacks the sense of immanent social revolt.

A better definition of social imperialism focuses on the connection between imperial success and domestic well being. England's social imperialists did not so much attempt to deceive the workers as try to help them. Social imperialists believed an empire was necessary for national greatness and health. Men like Chamberlain attempted to unite all classes in defense of the Empire. British social imperialists sought to maintain the Empire as a way to solve or avoid problems concerned with the economic success and military security of England.

Chamberlain's goals as Colonial Secretary were not based on a need to diffuse social tension, but on a wish to use the Empire to enhance and defend Britain's high standard of living. Chamberlain believed imperialism was essential to the continued well being of the English people. British social imperialism was a more optimistic movement than Wehler's German variety. Britain's problems, where they existed, could be solved at the same time as the lives of all subjects of the Crown were improved. Imperialism would provide the means to social reform at home, improve stability, bring greater economic opportunities to all, and allow other peoples to gain the benefits of British civilization. It was hoped that such arguments would win the general public over to the idea of expansive imperialism.[4]

The appeal of social imperialism is evident given the diversity of the political backgrounds of its adherents.

Social imperialism drew support from groups outside the Unionist party, including their opponents the Liberals, as well as the politically independent Fabian Society.[5] Few argued against military defense and economic growth. The only real opponents were those fearing the English would exploit the peoples under their control. Conflict between social imperialists would develop, however, over the best means of promoting imperial success.

The origins of social imperialism can be traced to the changes in the European balance of power brought about by the unification of Germany in the 1870's.[6] As newly industrialized nations began to demand their share in the markets and raw materials that were the fruits of Empire, Britain was forced to annex African colonies or be excluded.[7] By 1895 Lord Salisbury focused the debate in West Africa on Britain's need to acquire new territory to allow British trade to avoid newly erected tariff barriers.[8] There was, therefore, a "New Imperialism". There was a new impetus to acquire colonies in Africa and elsewhere.

Raising nationalism and racism provided extra impetus to the quest to maintain England's power base. The emergence of new powers had two effects of Britain's style of imperial control. Firstly, newly consolidated states became challengers to British control. Loose imperial ties would no longer stand up against outside pressure. The English believed they would be helping indigenous peoples by protecting them from other industrial powers. They believed British control to be the most benevolent and enlightened.

The English were convinced that only their supervision would allow other peoples to advance culturally.

Secondly, Germany and the United States provided examples of the value of close economic and political union under strong central governments.[9] The U.S. and Germany protected their economies by erecting tariff barriers to limit foreign competition. Greater protection allowed development of domestic industry. By the 1890's the U.S.A. and Germany would surpass Britain in steel production, highlighting Britain's coming industrial eclipse.[10]. Chamberlain found such trends alarming. The success of the U.S.A. and Germany also inspired him.

Chamberlain believed the best means of beating these challengers was to adopt their methods. British tariffs would be introduced to enhance her economy and protect her industry. Closer imperial ties and increased government involvement would enable Britain to better develop her vast Empire. The large size and great wealth of the British Empire would insure success. The "New Imperialism" in Britain was typified by an attempt to expand the Empire, strengthen the ties to the settler colonies, and to develop the tropical colonies.[11]

Social imperialists further believed that an overseas empire is necessary to alleviate social problems in the mother country. Such problems may include unemployment, poverty, inflation, crime, and a host of lesser evils. The collective action of an empire's population would enable any obstacle to progress to be over come. A well defended,

wealthy, multinational empire, having an integrated economy, would have something to offer for all imperial citizens.

Joseph Chamberlain's plan would reduce foreign threats to Britain's dominant position in industry and commerce, while meeting the demand for social reform at home. The fact that many of Chamberlain's plans remained unfulfilled makes it difficult to determine whether industrial advance or social progress was foremost in his scheme. His wish to help Britain's poor would link his early Radical years with those as an imperialist. Chamberlain would simply expand on his early belief in municipal reform to create a plan for the entire British Empire. His goal remained the same. Imperialism would replace Radicalism as the answer to Britain's problems.

Joseph Chamberlain's entire career highlights the limits of Hobson's and Lenin's view. Chamberlain was a capitalist, as Lenin might note, but his motives for imperial advance were different than those which Marxists would suggest.[12] A defense of financiers alone contradicts the Radical underpinnings of Chamberlain's political life. It is clear that Chamberlain's imperial goals were not based on the demands of financial interests, but on a wish to create a unified, self-sufficient Empire. The economic historians imply imperialism serves private interests at the expense of the public good. The Colonial Secretary's plan, however, was designed to enhance the power of the nation, not to aid the rich or advance capitalism.

The economic theories of imperialism usually

oversimplify the process of expansion. Hobson and others describe a process which begins when business or financial interests see the chance for profit in an undeveloped region. Once a region is seen as useful to capitalists, either as an outlet for capital or a market, pressure is put on the government to acquire the area. Annexation, formally or informally, soon follows. In the scheme of economic historians, the government and armed forces act as the tools of the capitalists. Humanitarian and religious groups then provide the justification for expansion.

The economic schools fails, however, if non-financial interests advanced imperialism for their own ends.[13] Joseph Chamberlain represents such an interest. Economics remains an important element of imperialism, but economics is not the primary cause. Social imperialists are not interested in personal financial success or even the financial success of the government. Financial success is only important when it advances national power or improves the life of the imperial citizenry. Successful businessmen are a potential resource not a goal in themselves.

Since imperialism requires government action it is more logical to view capitalists as tools of the state, rather than the opposite. Businessmen can be used by the government to increase the nation's economic strength. British administrators, like Chamberlain, sought to guarantee the colonies produced a profit, yet attempts at imperial cost efficiency does not necessarily show why a territory was acquired.[14] Humanitarian and imperialist groups constantly

sought colonial expansion, but were ignored by those in power unless their aims coincided with the government's goals.[15] Without doubt businessmen were used in the same way. The government used charter companies as a means of extending imperial control cheaply.[16] Chamberlain made sure Sir George Goldie's Royal Niger Company lost its charter when it became clear that Goldie was bent on exploiting the lands under his control, rather than developing them.[17] Economic value also served as a convenient justification for expansion when the government needed support. The Colonial Office was quick to note the economic opportunities present in areas acquired for non-economic reasons.[18] Chamberlain argued for the value of colonies as a way of gaining allies in his attempt to strengthen imperial ties.[19]

Usually the government treated businessmen in the same way as any other interest. Politicians listened to their advice, but kept them at a distance. Politicians were often unconcerned with business affairs.[20] British statesmen continued to be recruited from the wealthy upper class who were able to put the nation's interests before their own. Such politicians were quick to defend the rights of British finance and business, but not to advance private interests.[21] In 1889 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, G. J. Goschen, stated, "...it is unsound commercial policy to seek to assist the British enterprise in its struggle with foreign rivals, out of the pocket of the general taxpayer."[22]

England's economic system, with its free trade basis,

strove to minimize government involvement in the economy. Chamberlain would find it extremely difficult to bring about state involvement in the economy. There were many cases when the government resisted economic interests. Salisbury did not gave in to pressure to intervene in South America when British financial interests were threatened in the early 1890s.[23] The government turned a deaf ear when Manchester's Chamber of Commerce asked the government to seek new markets in Africa.[24] Formal expansion did not occur when financial interests demanded it, but when national interests became involved.

In 1881, well before Chamberlain had developed a concrete imperial plan, he condemned the purely economic view of the Empire. He stated, "a great nation...could not wrap itself up in a policy of selfish isolation and say that nothing concerned it unless its material interests were directly attacked."[25] Chamberlain believed that the Empire should have economic value, but this was not his only concern. The Empire was meant to serve all its inhabitants, not exploit them. The English saw themselves as having an obligation to help their subject peoples and improve the lives of all imperial citizens. The English themselves were the focus of Chamberlain's design, but their interests would not be advanced at the expense of others. The imperial system, he proposed, was structured to elevate the standard of living of the English working class without bringing about hardship for the other classes in Britain. Living conditions in the colonies would be improved at the same

time.

The unity of direction and the power of capitalist entrepreneurs, as the economic historians represent it, is both misleading and an oversimplification. It is true that 19th century businessmen profited from imperialism, but this does not prove that imperialism was begun to advance the private interests of capitalists. Birmingham's Chamber of Commerce, along with others, asked for expansion into Africa.[26] This commercial pressure usually resulted from panic during periods of economic slump.[27] After such periods commercial interest in Africa declined. There is no clear evidence to show that capitalists determined imperial advances or even that they were the primary force advocating advance. Businessmen could ask for intervention, but government action on their behalf was never assured. It is more realistic to view capitalist entrepreneurs as one possible interest group which may, or may not advocate imperialism. There is no proof that capitalists formed a unified group, or that there was a financial monopoly in Britain.[28]

Hobson links manufacturers, like Joseph Chamberlain, to the finance capitalists. He believed industrialists and financiers were allied to bring about expansion. Hobson stated, manufacturers profited from the instability caused by the use of imperial power.[29] Those who manufactured the goods needed to fight the large and small wars caused by imperialism, Hobson believed, actively promoted expansion.[30] The business interests of Manchester, Sheffield, and

Birmingham used imperial power to secure new markets.[31] Industrialists sought to profit from imperialism by gaining new outlets for export, in much the same way financiers sought outlets for capital.

One of the aims of Hobson's study of imperialism was refutation of Chamberlain's arguments for protection.[32] Hobson saw Chamberlain as the defender of one of the allies of finance capitalists. Yet these interests are not the same. Chamberlain's view was the anti-thesis of that of bankers. The Colonial Secretary wished to protect England's power by protecting her industry.[33] His imperial system was based on this premise. Industry provides jobs for Englishmen and creates the goods necessary to develop the Empire. Domestic industry was more important than foreign investment. Investing outside the Empire could even hurt the country by aiding enemies or simply denying Englishmen access to funds. Chamberlain made clear his belief that a great nation could not survive with an economy based on finance alone.[34] Not surprisingly Chamberlain found it difficult to gain London's financiers support for his plans.

Self-sufficiency for Britain and the Empire was Chamberlain's goal. His aim was an Empire which would, "even if alone, be self-sustaining and self-sufficient, able to maintain itself against the competition of all its rivals."[35] Industry was vital. Development of the colonial economies would not eliminate the need for British manufacturing.[36] British industry would, in fact be enhanced by developing the Empire. Colonies would provide both raw

materials and demand for industrial goods. The mother country would provide military protection, finance capital, and industrial goods. Such a relationship would use capital to enhance the power of the entire Empire.

Economic historians are not alone in miscalculating the influence of economics on imperialism. The proponents of the strategic explanation of imperialism also fail to see the link between economics and Empire. Robinson and Gallagher are correct in their defense of the importance of political motives and local events.[37] Still, they confuse the connection between economics and political power in Britain's imperial expansion. Political power requires economic strength. The promotion of free trade by Britain was only one way of maintaining economic power. Robinson and Gallagher note that state power and trade enhance each other.[38] Yet they neglect to consider the way that formal imperial expansion into areas of economic importance increases political power.

Chamberlain hoped to improve Britain's security, not only by protecting India, but also by increasing her economic base through imperialism. Even areas of slight economic value could add to the strength of the Empire. Chamberlain was even willing to claim areas of no known value in the hopes that some use could be found for such territories in the future. Strategically important areas were seen by social imperialists as being doubly valuable. These lands provided resources and enabled Britain to protect strategic goals. In Chamberlain's mind the economic

value of a colony was as important a its political worth.

Robinson and Gallagher's belief in continuity breaks down when examining Chamberlain's radical policy.[39] Unlike many, Chamberlain was ready to sacrifice Britain's free trade tradition for the good of the Empire. Chamberlain's new system would create an imperial customs union to draw the colonies closer to Britain and provide funds for social reform. The "imperialism of free trade" had no place in this plan.[40] The State needed influence in the imperial economy to provide for welfare. Social reform seemed impossible under a system of unregulated free trade.

Chamberlain's plans were considered too radical for many Englishmen to accept. It is a mistake to suggest there was no change in Britain's style of imperialism. Chamberlain wished to preserve the Empire by building a new imperial structure which would insure Britain's future strength. Imperial tariffs were an indispensable part of this new structure. Chamberlain's Empire would be based on formal economic and military ties, not influence and free trade. Influence was sought whenever possible, but actual control was best.

II-CHAMBERLAIN'S EARLY CAREER

Joseph Chamberlain was was born in Camberwell, one of the newer suburbs of London, on July 8, 1836.[1] His father was a businessman and his mother was the daughter of a brewer and cheesemonger.[2] The only thing that differentiated the Chamberlains from others of their class was their religious non-conformity. The Chamberlain family had a strong Unitarian background. Their religion focused on humanitarian reform and tolerance of other beliefs.[3] It may have been Chamberlain's Unitarian background which directed him down a path of practical reform.[4] The Chamberlain family had long favored immediate reform, such as education, slum clearance, and pension plans, to elevate Britain's working classes.[5] His church had involved Joseph and his family in social work in London's slums, instilling what his biographer J.L. Garvin called, a "principle of personal service."[6] The direction of Joseph's service to his country would be determined in 1854. In that year, at the age of eighteen, Joseph set out for Birmingham to work in his Uncle's screw manufacturing business. John Nettlefold's firm, would provide Joseph with the financial means to enter politics.

Due in part to his religious non-conformity Chamberlain entered the political arena as a Radical, the most progressive group in the Liberal Party. He first entered the national political scene in 1865 by joining a national

Liberal association.[7] Radicalism had been born in Cobden's fight against the Corn Laws.[8] Besides fighting for free trade, the Radicals had championed the rights of the middle class in general. By the 1860's Radicals, represented by men like J.S. Mill and John Bright, had shifted to an attack on privilege in order to gain an extension of the franchise.[9] When Chamberlain joined the Radicals the focus had shifted yet again. The reform act of 1867 had increased the franchise and the Radicals had entered an alliance with the Whigs. The Radicals and Whigs, forming the new Liberal Party, now sought educational reform. The Liberals believed education provided the solution to all of society's ills, from poverty to drunkenness.[10] Chamberlain had found his first major cause and a party through which to work towards his political vision.

In 1867 Chamberlain fought for educational reform. In that year he joined the Education League to work for free, compulsory education.[11] Free education provided a means not only of helping the individual, but also as a means of keeping English workers from crime and vice.[12] A transition to free education, however, proved to be too drastic a change for the electorate. In 1874 Chamberlain noted that there would be no popular support for his plans until, "... the great tide of commercial prosperity which has rolled over England will begin to abate."[13] Chamberlain would find it very difficult to generate popular support for reform in an atmosphere of economic growth. England's economic success would retard all movement towards reforms aimed at altering

the status quo.

In 1869 Chamberlain began to take a more active part in local politics. He first served on the Birmingham Town Council and then became Mayor in 1873. Chamberlain's activity in Birmingham coincided with, and was deeply affected by the rise of what became known as the "civic gospel". The civic gospel entailed government supported social reform linked to democratic participation and a strong distrust of privilege.[14] The foundation of Chamberlain's political life would be laid in his Birmingham years. For the rest of his life he would seek the extension of democracy and the elevation of the working class.[15] Birmingham was to become the model that would show the way to achieve both these ends.

Birmingham's workers were greatly in need of help when Chamberlain entered local politics. Most workers found themselves packed into unhealthy and decaying slums. Such a situation, in Chamberlain's mind, was inconceivable in a modern industrial city. The elimination of the health hazard and degradation caused by Birmingham's slums was at the top of Chamberlain's agenda. The problem was finding money to finance reform.

Chamberlain realized increasing taxes would not supply the funds. His solution was the take over, by local government, of major utilities. Gas and water were municipalized, insuring a steady source of income, as well as the funds for slum clearance.[16] Chamberlain believed utilities and other public enterprises should be profitable,

to enable the lowering of taxes.[17] Municipalization had the added benefit of removing vital monopolies from the hands of speculators and giving them to the people.[18] More reform followed. The city's sewage system was upgraded, street lighting was introduced, and the construction of a new downtown business district, Corporation Street, was begun.[19]

Chamberlain's fight to aid the working class through improved housing was a success. He succeeded in helping the poor without hurting the middle and upper classes. The working class got better housing, and the rich avoided higher taxes. Improvements had been made possible through the cooperative effort of the general taxpayers, prominent businessmen, and the city's leaders. At this time Chamberlain learned of the value of cooperation between business, government, and the citizenry. His future policies would attempt to reconcile the interests of businessmen and workers, using the government as an impartial arbitrator.

Chamberlain never gave up the belief that change for the better was made possible through cooperative effort, not class conflict. He would reject socialism and the labor movement as viable political solutions, on the basis of their promotion of class struggle. Chamberlain would oppose the "new" Radicals because he believed they abused the democratic system by using class tension to further their own ends.[20] In a play Chamberlain wrote in 1895, he expressed his view of reform to aid the working class, while criticizing socialists and Trade Unionists. The character representing Chamberlain, Arthur Hartley states, "Our

business is to seek the real cause of their (workers) distress, and if possible to remedy that, not to use their condition for political ends, or to lead them into agitation which must be barren of practical results."[21] All classes working together was the path to reform, not the elevation of one class at the expense of another.

Fresh from his successes in Birmingham, Chamberlain embarked on a career in national politics in 1876 when he became a member of Parliament. Through Parliament, Chamberlain hoped to extend Radical reform throughout the nation. A position on the Board of Trade in Gladstone's government followed. Chamberlain became more aware of the economic problems facing Britain after becoming President of the Board of Trade.[22] The Board educated Chamberlain in Britain's trade relations as well as alarming trends in the employment picture.[23] Yet, already he was beginning to chafe under the restraints placed on him by Gladstone and the Whigs.

In 1884 Chamberlain announced his "unauthorized" Radical program. This statement was Chamberlain's answer to a perceived lack of Liberal social reform. Educational reform reform remained an important element in the Radical program. Chamberlain was able to use his experience in Birmingham to suggest ways to extend local government to better address social problems.[24] County and national councils would be created to govern locally, and in Ireland and Scotland.[25] Land and tax reform to aid the lower classes at the expense of the rich was outlined.[26] Ways were

suggested to increase the number of small land owners. Ironically, given Chamberlain's future stance on taxation, direct taxation would be increased, while indirect taxation would be lowered.[27] Because many Radicals came from a Non-conformist religious background disestablishment of the Anglican Church was a major goal. Universal manhood suffrage and the payment of M.P.s rounded out the program, as long range goals.[28]

While Chamberlain's domestic policy challenged the conservative wing of the Liberal party and Gladstone himself, his position on the Empire kept within the bounds of mainstream Liberal thought. He did not oppose the idea of Empire itself, but only Disraeli's expansionism. This criticism of Conservative policy never equaled anti-colonialism.[29] Chamberlain believed the Empire benefited both Britain and the peoples under British control. Most Liberal criticism focused on the way the Empire was run, not imperialism itself. His early views included a wish to keep Britain's overseas commitments to a minimum.[30]

The M.P. for Birmingham already had pronounced views on the region which would become the focus of his future career, Africa. Before 1884 Chamberlain believed that Britain's African colonies were burdens and that only Cape Town was needed as a coaling station.[31] October, 1884 marked the beginning of an about face in Chamberlain's perception of the Empire. In 1884 he realized that Britain's position in South Africa was threatened by

outside forces. The instability caused by granting Boer demands after the British defeat at Majuba was soon brought home to London. Not only had the morale of the English at the Cape been damaged, but the Boers had been convinced of Britain's weakness.[32] The Afrikaners began to move west into British territory. Chamberlain asked for the prevention of Boer incursions into Bechuanaland to stop any possible link up with the Germans in South West Africa.[33] In September he asked that an expedition be sent to force the Boers back into the Transvaal.[34] The Radical member of Parliament was beginning to question Liberal imperial policy, and to think about the way the Empire affected domestic reform.

The Imperial Federation League was created in 1884 which had as its goal the consolidation of the Empire. The League was inspired by the political philosophy of Chamberlain's Radical associate, Charles Dilke.[35] Although the League itself was short lived, the influence of Dilke's ideas on Chamberlain would be felt throughout the rest of his career. Dilke championed the creation of two imperial bodies, a customs union and an imperial council. The League argued that closer ties to the self-governing colonies would be achieved through and an imperial customs union.[36] An imperial council would oversee the union as well as promote greater colonial contribution to imperial defense.[37] In time Chamberlain would accept both these broad goals.

In some cases Chamberlain's early stance on imperial issue had been determined by the political struggle in Britain, rather than by thoughtful consideration of the

Empire. In 1880-81 Chamberlain and his Radical ally and friend Charles Dilke threatened to resign over the Boer rebellion in the Transvaal. Ironically the Radicals were ready to leave the government if Gladstone approved the use of force to keep the Boers within the Empire. The real issue, however, was Ireland.[38] The Whig Ministers under the Earl of Kimberley favored a hard line in both Ireland and the Transvaal. The Radicals, with their pro-tenant policy for Ireland, hoped to use the Boer rebellion to weaken Kimberley.[39] With Gladstone's backing the Radicals were successful and the Transvaal was given up. Again in 1885 Chamberlain was ready to use opposition to the conquest of the Sudan to pressure Gladstone to resign.[40] Yet in 1882 Chamberlain had responded to the popular mood and had given his support for intervention in Egypt.[41] He hoped order could soon be restored and the British troops withdrawn. Chamberlain would resist a large relief expedition to save General Gordon because he feared a major campaign against the Mahdists would jeopardize an early withdrawal from Egypt.[42] Chamberlain's early resistance to imperial expansion is often most readily reconciled with his future actions by seeing them in light of his political struggles at home.

Ireland formed an important back drop in the early development of Chamberlain's views on imperialism. The most important political issue in the 1880's involved Ireland's quest for home rule. Chamberlain's resistance to Home Rule was not based solely on fear of the dissolution of the

Empire.[43] Ireland had always been a special case, and it was not assumed that any action taken there would be reflected throughout the Empire. In 1882 Chamberlain had agreed that the Irisn should be given local autonomy while efforts were made towards land reform.[44] He wrote of his "conviction that the Irish people were entitled to the largest measure of self-government consistent with the continued integrity of the Empire."[45] Chamberlain wished to give Ireland a degree of self-government to undercut those calling for independence.[46] It was hoped that local autonomy would diffuse the agitation for complete separation. Gladstone had his own plans for Ireland which centered on a separate Irish Parliament. Gladstone's proposal would lead Chamberlain to split with the Liberals.

During the struggle over the Irish question Chamberlain would call for "Home Rule all round", where an Imperial Parliament had sole authority over the entire Empire.[47] One means of maintaining a degree of central control would be a federal system, like that of the U.S.A., representing all Britain's possessions.[48] An Imperial Parliament would replace the current imperial system so that all areas would have input into imperial policy making. The Empire would abide by the decisions made by this body.

Federation, however, would have meant the destruction of the old Constitution.[49] The House of Lords and the Monarchy itself would have been swept away with the Constitution. The plan for federation never had a chance, it is questionable whether Chamberlain himself expected its

implementation. He would have little trouble abandoning federation once he had allied himself with the Conservatives.[50] The plan, though unrealistic, highlighted the defects of Gladstone's plan and offered common ground on which to gather opposition to Home Rule. Gathering opposition may have been Chamberlain's main goal.[51] As it turned out, the plan was never a viable alternative.

After failing to defeat Gladstone for control of the Liberal party on the issue of Home Rule, Chamberlain and his Radical allies left to form a new party, the Liberal-Unionists. Liberal-Unionism provided Chamberlain with the chance to greatly broaden his political support. An electoral compact with the Conservatives to prevent a Liberal victory in 1886, grew into an actual merging of the two parties.[52] The new alliance took the name Unionist. Unionism united all who supported the Empire and opposed Home Rule. It also a provided a means to appeal to those workingmen tired of the Liberal focus on Ireland rather than social reform.[53] Chamberlain saw in the Unionist party a chance to remedy the harm done to the poor as a result of defective Liberal imperial policy.[54]

The Unionists had united in opposition to Home Rule, but this negative stance was not enough to create a viable party. What was needed was a long term policy. When Chamberlain defined what it meant to be a Unionist he outlined the Party's future policy and what he would spend the rest of his life trying to achieve. He said of the Unionist Party, "... it includes all men who are determined

to maintain an undivided Empire, and who are ready to promote the welfare and the union, not of one class, but of all classes...."[55]

During the 1890's Chamberlain continued to press for social reform. In 1890-91 Chamberlain again fought for free education, as well as a public health program, improved housing, industrial arbitration, shorter working hours, accident insurance, and old age pensions.[56] Chamberlain had little success in convincing his more conservative colleagues or the public of the value of these programs. He therefore limited the cope of the reforms he proposed and continued with more modest goals.

In the period from 1886 to 1892 the Conservatives, in alliance with the Liberal-Unionists, enacted legislation extending local government and granted aid for land purchase.[57] After the final defeat of Home Rule and Gladstone's government in 1895 Chamberlain saw a chance to capitalize on growing labor agitation by adopting certain aspects of their proposal.[58] His new program included an 8 hour day for miners, payment of M.P.s and an amendment to the Employer Liability Act of 1880.[59] Old Age Pensions would be created through voluntary contributions matched by government funds.[60] It was believed such acts would pacify labor with out upsetting the political structure of the nation.[61] Chamberlain's new program closely matched his 1885 Radical Program. Some of the early goals, such as disestablishment and greater direct taxation, had to be abandoned given Chamberlain's new conservative allies.

Chamberlain, expanding on his reforms as major of Birmingham, hoped to involve the state in the direction of commerce.[62]

In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain accepted the post of Colonial Secretary in Lord Salisbury's government. Chamberlain, whose Liberal Unionist support was needed by the Conservatives, had been offered his choice of Cabinet positions. Many were surprised that he chose the less prestigious Colonial Office. The new Colonial Secretary, however, had a vision of empire he wished to make reality. Chamberlain's three main objectives were the economic development of the Empire, its political unification, and the persuasion of the English public of the value of the Empire.[63] The new Empire would unify the variety of British colonies and possessions into a politically and economically integrated whole. He looked forward to a time, "when we may reach a union in which free states, all of them enjoying their independent institutions, will yet be inseparably united in defense of common interests, and in the observance of mutual obligations."[64] New colonies in Africa and elsewhere, would help revitalize the British empire.

The Colonial Office was a safe position from which Chamberlain could work for reform without clashing with his more conservative allies.[65] What the new Colonial Secretary did not realize was that his acceptance of the Colonial Office would leave him at the mercy of those in more central Cabinet positions.[66] The Colonial Office's reliance on the Treasury would greatly affect all imperial policy. The

Treasury resisted all expansive Colonial policy because it was the Treasury which had to justify all expenditure.[67]

Chamberlain had come to the conclusion that private investment alone would never develop the colonies adequately.[68] Greater government involvement was needed. In 1895 Chamberlain suggested that the yearly revenue from the government's Suez Canal stocks should be diverted to a special fund. The revenue, "...should be lent or invested in the Crown colonies and dependencies of the Empire for public works, such as railways, bridges, harbors, and irrigation."[69] George Hamilton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, blocked the move to keep his department from losing the seven hundred thousand pounds per year the stocks provided.[70] The Treasury also tended to resist the Colonial Secretary's plans out of a conservative reluctance to get the government more deeply involved in the economy.[71] Chamberlain was able to get financial support for West Indian sugar only because the Treasury feared he might get the Cabinet to agree to tariffs for the area.[72] The need to struggle for funding greatly limited the scope of colonial reform.

After his split with the Liberals, Chamberlain had become more personally involved in the Empire in a number of ways. He had business dealings in Canada and the West Indies, visited Egypt and the Middle East, and negotiated with the U.S. over Canadian fishing rights.[73] These activities gave Chamberlain a new perspective on the Empire's problems. Before this period Chamberlain had

generally resisted expansion, afterward, the growth of the Empire was his primary goal.[74]

Chamberlain's view of the Empire had been shifting long before he became Colonial Secretary. Dilke suggested that Chamberlain's views were only Radical in respect to domestic affairs, while he remained "patriotic" on imperial matters.[75] He had supported the Zulu War of 1879 as a means of establishing logical boarders in South East Africa.[76]

Chamberlain had already begun laying the groundwork for his populist Empire in a speech in Toronto in 1887. He stated, "True democracy does not consist in the dismemberment and disintegration of the Empire, but rather in the knitting together of kindred races for similar objects."[77] Cooperation between all members of the Empire would lead to the utilitarian goal of the greatest good for the greatest number. The object of the Empire would become the betterment of all imperial citizens. It was assumed that the English, because of their cultural superiority, would lead the way. Chamberlain would state,

> "The defense of all British interests and the reorganization of the newly acquired territories are inseparably linked with the greater scheme by which we hope to make our Empire something more than a mere geographical expression. We hope to make it a living entity in which each part shall contribute to the success and security of the whole."[78]

His position on the Empire in South Africa in 1888 reflected Chamberlain's new position well. The expansion of Boer farmers into Bechuanaland prompted Chamberlain to speak out in defense of the Empire and the African peoples under

the Crown. He said, "... the abandonment of these duties would be as fatal to our nations prosperity as it would be discreditable to our character and national honor."[79] His statement reflected Chamberlain's view of the duties involved in imperialism as well as the connection between the Empire and England's prosperity. The Africans may not be considered equal partners in the imperial structure, but their interests could not be ignored. The Africans would be afforded the same protection as the English. This at least was the goal.

In 1888 Chamberlain stated, "I will never willingly admit of any policy that will tend to weaken the ties between the different branches of the British Empire."[80] He had supported intervention in Egypt to protect European lives and to restore order.[81] By 1889 Chamberlain was standing firmly behind the Conservative policy. In a letter to his son Austin on Egypt, he wrote, "If we come away before our work is firmly established, the country will go back again in a few years to the old conditions of corrupt and arbitrary administration."[82] Chamberlain realized the need to protect the Suez Canal, but he saw Britain's primary goal to be the protection of the Egyptian people.[83] Yet, in contradiction to Hobson, Chamberlain was not interested in using London's power to protect Egypt's creditors.[84]

Chamberlain always supported pragmatic solutions to imperial problems, while he opposed any imperial policy that lacked clear objectives.[85] Mindless expansionism and excessive jingoism threatened the Empire as much as

anti-colonialism. Chamberlain's Radicalism contained an element requiring the pursuit of justice. Chamberlain defended indigenous peoples when they were threatened by English injustice. He was as quick to chastise the Boers for mistreating Africans.[86] In general Chamberlain saw the British presence as a positive influence on all involved. Chamberlain believed, "We have an opportunity if we seize it, which comes seldom to any civilized nation, of reducing ... the sum of human suffering in the world."[87] On Egypt he wrote, "The duty cast upon us ... is to secure to the Egyptian people the greatest possible development of representative institutions."[88] The English came not as conquerors, but the bringers of peace and democracy.

By 1893 Chamberlain publicly announced his dedication to the expansion of the Empire.[89] His old belief in limiting Britain's overseas commitments had been abandoned. Expansion of the Empire was necessary to ease growing unemployment and to insure trade. The social reforms Chamberlain hoped to enact would be impossible if the nation was in economic decline.[90] Chamberlain believed, "Experience teaches us that trade follows the flag."[91] Areas which could not be currently used should be "pegged out" for unforeseen needs of the future.[92] This expansive policy met with resistance within the Unionist Party itself. Lord Salisbury, the Unionist party's leader, favored preserving only important colonies like Egypt and South Africa. Less vital colonies, like those in West Africa, could be used in bargaining with European opponents to gain other political objectives.[93]

Chamberlain could not accept such views.

In West Africa Chamberlain saw the need to push British control into the interior to avoid being surrounded and isolated by French territory.[94] The economic survival of small African colonies, such as the Gold Coast, Lagos, and the Niger, was dependent on their expansion. These territories relied on the products of the hinterland reaching trading posts on the coasts and on major rivers. French control threatened to divert resources to their own colonies. Chamberlain fought to protect the economy of the West African colonies. He created the West African Frontier Force with African levies to keep the French out of the vaguely defined British territories.[95] In 1898 as Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain won major concessions for Britain in an Anglo-French Convention which ended a number of boundary disputes in West Africa.[96] Chamberlain had insured that Britain had a large military force in the area before entering negotiations.

The late 1890s saw Chamberlain willing to risk war with France to protect the Empire in Africa. The colonies in West Africa had been consolidated by negotiating with France. Yet the French had seen the chance to extend their control to the Nile and to disrupt Britain's control of Egypt. In 1897 France dispatched an expedition under Captain Marchand to travel from West Africa, through the Sudan, to establish an outpost on the Nile. The Sudan, formerly a part of Egypt, had been abandoned to the forces of the Mahdi years before. Britain had not seen the need to retake the area after their

intervention in Egypt. The establishment of a French outpost in the Sudan, however, threatened the security of Egypt. The French, unlike the Mahdists, had the technology to interfere with the flow of the Nile, on which Egypt depended.

The Colonial Secretary held the patriotic view that Marchand must withdraw immediately. It was unacceptable to compensate the French for this withdrawal with territory anywhere in the world, the Cabinet agreed.[97] London would not submit to political blackmail. To strengthen the government's resolve Chamberlain spoke to the nation denouncing France's constant pressure on British territory, what he called a "policy of pinpricks".[98] Chamberlain had shown his willingness to go to war over Fashoda. Only the renunciation of all Marchand's outposts in the Sudan would satisfy him.[99] Chamberlain's public stance helped convince Paris of the determination of Britain.[100] This determination and internal political conflict made the French decide to abandon their plan.

While foreign policy was not the official realm of the Colonial Secretary, the large impact of the colonies on foreign relations insured that Chamberlain had a major role in negotiations with foreign nations. Chamberlain was unwilling to support any action which would jeopardize the security of the Empire. He saw, however, that the safety of the colonies was often better served by offering concessions to other nations. In the 1890's Britain had three ways in which to develop her power. She could seek European allies, work for closer ties to the U.S., or create a stronger bond

with the Empire.[101] Chamberlain sought to strengthen Britain by both drawing closer to the colonies and by seeking allies throughout the world. the Colonial Secretary was successful in cultivating closer ties to the U.S.A., but attempts at long term cooperation with the Germans proved fruitless. The failure to gain a strong European ally highlighted the necessity of closer ties to the colonies. The Empire had become vital to the security of Britain.

The Empire had much to offer other than political security. The Colonial Secretary felt that the Empire did not exploit the peoples who lived within it, but rather provided them with their needs. Mother country and colony would benefit each other. Britain would provide a governmental, industrial, and cultural center. The colonies would provide raw materials, new markets and room for expansion. Since the Empire served the imperial citizen, instead of the citizens serving the Empire, it became possible to improve the way of life of all by improving and strengthening the Empire. Chamberlain wished to institute "scientific administration" for the colonies.[102] Planning and efficiency was vital in linking economic success to social justice through out the Empire. The imperial administration would be rationalized to run as smoothly as possible. The colonies would be expected to pay for their own administration.[103] An overall plan for development was needed.[104] Chamberlain would spend the rest of his life trying to develop and implement an all encompassing plan.[105]

Without doubt Chamberlain drew on his early experiences

in Birmingham when forming his vision of empire. Chamberlain progressed from his early faith in increased activity by local government to one of increased government involvement on an imperial scale.[106] London would act as the imperial center, directing the allocation of financial and technological outlays to her possessions. England would benefit greatly by being the center of a revitalized Empire. A transportation and communication infrastructure would be expanded to better link the colonies to the mother country. The colonies were an investment which needed to be developed and modernized so as to produce a profit.[107] Efficient administration, however, did not mean a heartless determination of profit and loss. Chamberlain's Empire would appeal to the spirit, not simply the pocket book.[108] Humanitarian improvements and the advancement of political rights were primary goals of the Empire.

The Treasury would help finance initial colonial development so that the Empire would soon be able to stand on its own.[109] London would distribute the profits of empire to the mother country and the colonies alike in the form of improved social services, welfare, transportation, communication, and defense. The laying of additional undersea telegraph cable, and the increase of steamship lines and railways tied the colonies more closely together.[110]

The shape of a colony's economy would depend upon its unique physical or social geography. Each part would contribute that which it was most suited to produce. The

diversity of Britain's possessions proved a definite advantage. Those areas most suited to providing agricultural goods could specialize in farming. Other areas would provide the industrial goods the agrarian areas needed. Britain was best fitted to become the industrial center of the Empire. A symbiotic relationship would develop between the Britain and the colonies, as well as between all areas of the empire. While many colonies resisted specialization, Chamberlain continued to press for greater imperial efficiency at the price of economic independence for the colonies.

Chamberlain's imperial plans stressed a strong commitment to democracy as the best means to promote the good of all. While London would serve as the center of the Empire, the capitol would not monopolize all power. Chamberlain had abandoned the idea of imperial federation in 1886, yet the notion of the new parliament remained.[111] Chamberlain envisioned the creation of an Imperial Parliament. His thoughts on such a body highlighted his belief in democracy and imperial cooperation. The Empire would become a union of free nations, pledged to submit to the collective will.[112] Chamberlain never worked out the idea of the Imperial Parliament in a realistic form. The Colonial Secretary believed the colonies themselves should suggest the creation of the new body and that premature moves on London's part could ruin the chances of an Imperial Parliament being successful.[113]

The new Imperial Parliament would be one where, "all should be equally responsible, that all should have a share

in the welfare, and sympathize with the welfare of every part."[114] The Colonial Secretary hoped was that the interests of the individual would be subordinated to the common good. Imperial unity was to be essential to the strength of the Empire. All parts would have a say in policy making. Like England's Parliament, input did not necessarily mean equal influence. Chamberlain, after all, still believed Britain was best suited to lead the world. The Empire, however, would be a single unit. Success for one part would be reflected throughout the Empire. Chamberlain's empire would be linked by strong bonds of kinship, history, commerce, and mutual interest. The centrifugal drift of the colonies could finally be reversed.

In time the idea of an Imperial Parliament would be abandoned. The problem in the plan was in part due to the distance separating England from her colonies. The individual colonies were often too isolated geographically and politically. Most colonies were too far away to suggest specific legislation which would affect Britain or other colonies.[115] It also seemed unlikely that the self-governing colonies would be willing to submit to greater outside control and higher Imperial taxes.[116] Sectional interests would become more divisive, and common ground harder to find.

In addition to expansion, Chamberlain also saw the need to develop the colonies. Originally Chamberlain saw the government's role as one of negative influence, to prevent abuse. Private business would develop the colonies at the

same time as they sought their own interests.[117] Progress would be furthered through competitive capitalism, tempered by state guided reform. This system was much cheaper, but it would have made it impossible to give the Empire a unity of direction. In time Chamberlain would see the need for greater government involvement to actively promote the Empire. Only state intervention could insure the social advance of the Empire's citizenry.

In 1895 Chamberlain equated the Empire to an estate. The owner of such an estate would be considered negligent if he made no move in the direction of "... improving the property, in making communication, in making outlets for the products of his lands."[118] The British government had the same responsibility as such an owner. Chamberlain immediately pressed for the use of government capital in the colonies. Funds were needed for railroad and harbor building in Africa, railroads and irrigation in Cyprus, and loans to revitalize the West Indian sugar industry.[119]

Chamberlain's determination to fight to preserve the Empire did not mean domestic policy no longer concerned him. He continued to work for the reconciliation of the new industrialists with the working class.[120] The Empire became a means of creating a common goal for all Britons around which they could create a better society. While looking for a means to advance reform he had begun to look at the Empire in a different way. With a businessman's eyes Chamberlain came to see the colonies as overlooked assets. Chamberlain began to see the Empire as a resource which could be

utilized for the good of all. African territories needed to be seized immediately to keep other nations from gaining their resources.[121] Not surprisingly, given Chamberlain's position, he turned to a famous Conservative Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, for inspiration. Chamberlain adopted Disraeli's position that reform and imperialism were mutually supporting as the basis of his imperial policy.[122]

As Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain could expand his earlier plans for municipal reform to cover the Empire as a whole.[123] Developing the colonies would pay for welfare and social services. To Chamberlain the condition of England was interdependent with conditions throughout the Empire. Britain's prosperity, Chamberlain believed, rested of the trade provided from colonies gained in the past.[124] London would be responsible for directing and rechannelling the profits of imperialism back to the Empire's citizens.[125]

III-SOUTH AFRICA

Chamberlain's plan for the Empire in Africa ran into difficulty almost immediately. The Colonial Secretary hoped to acquire as much of Africa as possible, even though most of Africa had poor economic prospects and few English settlers. South Africa, however, had a strong economy and large British population making it a valuable prize. The Cape Colony was one of Britain's most valuable imperial assets. South Africa was, therefore, important to the success of Chamberlain's entire imperial strategy. One of the most pressing problem Chamberlain faced as the new Colonial Secretary was the growing tension between the Crown colonies of South Africa and the independent Boer republics. The Afrikaners and English had been competing for control of South Africa since the original British takeover of the Cape after the Napoleonic war. Peace between white men and black had recently enabled friction to grow between Afrikaner and Englishmen.

In the 1830's thousands of Boers had trekked north to escape British control, creating two independent republics, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic or the Transvaal. The English feared the Boers would stir up trouble with the African tribes on the boarders of the Crown colonies in their quest for more land. Even more threatening than Boer-African struggles spilling over into English territory, was the chance that the Afrikaners would allow

other European powers access into South Africa. The absence of European rivals had allowed England to dominate the region at little cost. It seemed this advantage was about to be lost. To prevent this potential threat, the British cut the Boers off from the coast by annexing the surrounding territory.

In spite of the success of isolation of the Boers, London's best solution to the Dutch problem would be the incorporation of the Boer republics into the Crown colonies. Chamberlain saw such unification under the Crown as a way of adding new resources to the Cape Colony at the same time as a major external threat was eliminated. Only incorporation would eliminate the Afrikaner challenge. By the 1890's two British attempts to extend control over the Afrikaner republics had failed. The most recent, in 1881, had seen the defeat of British troops at Majuba Hill at the hands of Boer Commandos. Britain hoped that commerce and the threat of hostile Africans would draw the Boers to union.[1]

This hope was destroyed in 1886 when gold was discovered in the Transvaal's Witwatersrand district. Gold gave the Afrikaners the means to threaten British hegemony.[2] The growth of the Transvaal's economic power had worried Chamberlain for some time.[3] The vast wealth the mining industry produced shifted the center of power north to the Boers. The economic strength produced by the Cape's wool and diamonds was being offset by the gold of the Witwatersrand.[4] Chamberlain feared that South Africa would unite under the Boer states, rather than the Crown. A Union hostile to

Britain would make his dream of imperial integration impossible in South Africa.

The Colonial Secretary's standing with the Dutch population of South Africa was badly damaged when he was implicated in the Jameson Raid soon after taking office. Chamberlain's continued support of Cecil Rhodes after the Raid and the subsequent government investigation made it appear London was conspiring with the Randlords.[5] London had no need to defend the Randlords, in the way Hobson suggests, since only the Randlords would benefit. To a large extent the British already dominated the Transvaal's economy.[6] The Boer's geographic location insured that most of their trade passed through British territory. In addition, London's banks were still needed to finance the mining industry, no matter who ran the government. Yet Chamberlain and the Cabinet had nothing to gain financially by supporting the mine owners.[7] The government was made of skilled politicians who were not easily deceived. The Colonial Secretary and the rest of the government took note of many interest groups, yet remained detached.[8] An unpopular war could easily destroy political careers. Rhodes may have been willing to risk his political fortunes to aid his financial position, but Chamberlain's approval of the action had much different aims.[9]

It was Chamberlain's wish to create a Union of South Africa, under the Crown, which drove Chamberlain to turn a blind eye to Rhode's plot, not a wish to aid the Randlords. In 1887 Chamberlain had opposed Rhodes' attempt to expand

north.[10] Chamberlain favored imperial control in South Africa, not expansion by uncontrollable entrepreneurs. The Colonial Secretary would rather have done without Rhodes' aid, but Chamberlain was impatient to advance his imperial scheme.[11] Even though he distrusted the Rand magnates all support for expansion was valued. Chamberlain could not have afforded to alienate Rhodes had his conspiracy succeeded.[12] The government was willing to use the mine owners as allies, but did not allow them to dictate policy. Chamberlain realized the difficulty in getting Treasury funds for the area. Rhodes' company was needed, "...in the interest of the development of these new estates."[13] The Colonial Secretary defended the British South Africa Company before Parliament as having greatly improved the regions under its control.[14] After the Raid, Chamberlain published the Uitlander grievances to justify the unrest in the Transvaal and praised Rhodes as an Empire builder.[15] Chamberlain would not cast away a man or an institution which could be used to construct his imperial blueprint. London tried to gain the Randlords' support, but the government never trusted them or believed their goals were the same.[16]

Political control, as the main step towards closer imperial ties, was Chamberlain's main goal. In his speeches, the Colonial Secretary had outlined his personal goals and those of the government. The first was the protection of British subjects. The second was that, "...in the interests of the British Empire, Great Britain must remain the paramount power in South Africa."[17] An independent Republic,

with ties to London, would most suit the majority of the Randlords. Yet an Uitlander Republic was incompatible with the aims of the Colonial Secretary. Chamberlain strongly opposed the creation of such a republic, even one allied to England. The interests of the Empire required a unified South Africa firmly within the imperial fold.[18] He stated, "The substitution of an entirely independent Republic, governed by or for the capitalists of the Rand would be very much worse for British interests in the Transvaal itself and for British influence in South Africa."[19] An independent Boer republic was preferable. Chamberlain believed, that in the long term, peace in South Africa could only be made possible through British control.[20] Most of his direct involvement in the Jameson Raid were attempts to insure imperial control could be quickly established in Johannesburg.

The greatest check to Chamberlain's plans arose when the Boer's refused to accept integration.[21] In the past the Afrikaners had asserted their independence, yet could not deny Britain's overall dominance. Now the republics had the economic power to challenge English control. By the 1890's the Boers had begun to dispute British suzerainty. Chamberlain believed the Boers had to be pressed into cooperating before their power became any greater. The Colonial Secretary's part in the Jameson Raid highlighted his impatience. He was unwilling to see the cornerstone of Britain's African Empire lost. The Boer War was the result of the incompatibility of Chamberlain's goal of imperial

unity and the Afrikaner quest for independence.

In spite of Chamberlain's support for Rhodes' attempt to overthrow Kruger, the Colonial Secretary did not favor a military invasion of the Boer Republics. He had hoped the Jameson Raid would give Britain an excuse to intervene to restore order. Support for Rhodes was withdrawn when it was clear there would be no uprising in the Transvaal. Chamberlain did not want to be responsible for a full scale war. To a great extent Chamberlain and the British Cabinet were forced into war in 1899. The British government continued to back the Cobdenite ideal of peaceful resolution of conflicts through compromise.[22] Such a policy made sense given Britain's role as the world's industrial leader and main beneficiary of world trade. War's instability and the disruption of trade harmed Britain more than any other nation. [23] War in South Africa was the last resort, not the first hope. As Chamberlain stated on March 19, 1898, "The principle object of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa at present is peace."[24]

Chamberlain believed any war would be drawn out and expensive.[25] On these grounds war would have been, "... a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise."[26] Chamberlain noted that such a war would not gain the nation's support.[27] A costly war would also retard social reform by diverting government funds.

The use of force was also unappealing because of the need to maintain the loyalty of the Cape Dutch.[28] The Boers living in the Crown colonies had proven loyal, but they

remained sympathetic to their kinsmen in the north. Chamberlain wrote, "A war with the Transvaal would certainly rouse antagonism in the Cape Colony, and leave behind it the most serious difficulties in the way of South African union."[29] The Jameson Raid had already undermined the support of the Cape Dutch.[30] Chamberlain believed war with the Republics might serve to unite all Afrikaners against the British.[31]

The Colonial Secretary's hopes for peace rested on the 1884 London Convention which had given Britain suzerainty over the Transvaal.[32] The Convention gave the Transvaal internal independence, but placed checks to insure British interests would not be discriminated against. The extent of this suzerainty was loosely defined, yet the treaty provided the legal basis for future British claims. Primarily, the Convention gave Britain the right to control the Transvaal's foreign affairs. Article four gave Britain the right to approve treaties between the South African Republic and any nation other than the Orange Free State.[33] London assumed it would determine what constituted foreign policy.

Chamberlain would define suzerainty as,"Superiority over a State possessing independent rights ... with reference to certain specified matters."[34] Article four meant, therefore, that the Transvaal was not a sovereign state and could not expect to be treated as one.[35] Any claims to sovereignty independent of the London Convention were ignored by London.[36] The Convention was to be used to draw the Boers closer to the Crown diplomatically. The

Afrikaners, however, refused to be lead in any way which would reduce their independence.

Boer hostility was more dangerous given Kruger's attempts to form ties with other European powers. Kruger's active courtship of Germany in the wake of the Jameson Raid made it imperative to reassert British influence in the area. The Colonial Secretary now had the added problem of keeping a hostile European power from gaining control of the Transvaal. To Chamberlain it appeared that time was running out. It would be impossible to create an economically viable empire if most revenue was spent simply defending the colonies from foreign powers.

London's first step was to isolate the Afrikaners politically. Chamberlain had been seeking closer ties to Germany for some time.[37] In 1898 an Anglo-German convention had been passed concerning the possible division of Portuguese possessions in South Africa.[38] England and Germany divided Portuguese territory into zones of economic influence. Each nation would gain possession of their zone if Portugal went bankrupt.[39] A rail line to Delagoa Bay completed in 1894, Kruger's path to the sea, lay within Britain's zone.[40] Included in the treaty was an agreement by Germany to acknowledge British suzerainty over the Boer states. Even so, it was realized that the British could not insure the isolation of the Boers until the Bay was in actually in British hands.[41] The threat of outside intervention had been reduced, but Britain needed to overcome Boer resistance.

The problem became one of gaining the nation's support for a forward policy in South Africa to pressure the Boers into cooperation. The Jameson Raid had brought the plight of Englishmen in the Transvaal to the attention of the British public. After the discovery of gold, English miners, engineers, and businessmen had moved into Afrikaner territory in large numbers. Boer distrust of the British prompted them to deny the newcomers, or Uitlanders, the rights of citizenship, even though they were expected to pay taxes. The Uitlanders sent two petitions to London asking for intervention when the Boers refused to grant foreigners voting rights. The plight of the Uitlanders proved a means of gaining support in Britain for a stronger stance towards the Transvaal.

Chamberlain was willing to use the Uitlander problem to press more energetically for his imperial plan. The Uitlander's quest for political rights served as a great propaganda vehicle to unite the nation behind Chamberlain's plan.[42] In time, London decided justice could only be served by extending the franchise to the Uitlanders. The fight for voting rights would justify and legitimize Britain's use of force against the Afrikaners. Conversely, if the Boers agreed to expand the franchise, the large number of Englishmen would allow Britain to gain control through the ballot box. The census statistics used by the government listed 62,509 Englishmen in the two Boer republics, while there were only 18,126 Burghers with the franchise in the Transvaal.[43] In either case the Boers would be drawn into

closer ties to London. Chamberlain summed up the British position in a one sentence. He stated, "It is our duty, not only to the Uitlanders, but to the native races, and to our prestige in that part of the world and the world at large, to insist that the Transvaal falls in line with the other states in South Africa."[44] The enfranchisement of the Uitlanders seemed the best way to encourage the union of South Africa

Chamberlain took a risk when he acknowledged the Uitlanders´ quest for political rights. The loyalty of the Empire´s citizens would be threatened if London was shown to be unable to protect her subjects.[45] Chamberlain feared Britain would lose control of her African subjects if the English proved incapable of protecting themselves.[46] Britain could not abandon her citizens in the Transvaal, but action in their behalf could bring about war.[47] The only option open was to pressure Kruger for reform, without directly provoking the Boers.[48] Rights for the Uitlanders became the primary British demand in her negotiations with the Afrikaners.

Chamberlain believed negotiation from a position of strength to be the best means of avoiding armed conflict. He came to believe that the British had lost the Afrikaner´s respect after Majuba, this loss of respect caused most of the current problems.[49] Only a forceful position seemed likely to restore Britain´s dignity. On April 19, 1897 he wrote Salisbury of the need to convince Kruger, "...we are in earnest and mean to defend the Convention with all our

strength. My hope is that he will give way as he has done before..."[50] A firm stance would also keep foreign powers from meddling in the area.[51] The plan seemed to work. British reinforcements were sent to South Africa and Kruger appeared to back down. Kruger repealed the Alien Immigration Bill aimed at curbing the influx of non-Boers, and he revised the Alien Expulsion Bill.[52] Attacks on the Uitlander press were also slowed.

Chamberlain remained optimistic, British influence in the area was growing and it seemed likely that negotiation would serve to resolve the issues dividing Briton and Boer.[53] The Colonial Secretary, however, failed to take one important fact into account while negotiating with the Boers. London, quite simply, had no means of meeting Kruger halfway, short of giving up influence in the Boer Republics.[54] Chamberlain was told bluntly by a member of his staff that there was, "...no concession on our part that could safely be made."[55] The government and the Colonial Secretary refused to consider any loosening of Britain's suzerainty, believing compromise on this issue would destroy British influence throughout South Africa. From such a bargaining position a peaceful settlement, satisfactory to Britain, was only possible if the Boers would give up more than they received in return. The Boers, in turn, refused to make any compromise which threatened their independence.

The breakdown of negotiations at Bloemfontein in June 1899, began a rapid spiral to war. Over time, Chamberlain came to believe that the Boers were not negotiating in good

faith, and that only a united South Africa under Afrikaner control would satisfy them.[56] Chamberlain would note, "what has been the Boer aspiration from first to last? It has been to get rid of every shred and vestige of British supremacy."[57] The Colonial Secretary was willing to threaten the Boers to protect Britain's rights.[58] Gradual progress through negotiations was the preferred method of Chamberlain and the government, but the Cabinet did not rule out the use of force to protect British sovereignty.[59] Lord Selborne summed up the government's position perfectly when he wrote Alfred Milner, "Peace is undoubtedly the first interest to South Africa, but not peace at any price."[60] London's goal was the protection of British subjects and the maintenance of her supremacy in South Africa.[61] War remained a more acceptable alternative than losing control.[62] It was this willingness, that led to the outbreak of war.

South Africa was the key to the success of Chamberlain's imperial plan for Africa. Her resources would fund reform throughout the Empire. In 1898 over twenty-five percent of the world's gold was produced on the Rand.[63] This gold would be a powerful weapon in the hands of an enemy or a valuable asset for the British. Imperial takeover looked increasingly advantageous given the precarious position of Britain's gold reserve.[64] The main aim of the Colonial Office was to unify South Africa under the Crown and to make it economically viable.[65] This goal could be achieved by integrating the economic power of the Boer republics with the political power of the Crown colonies. Keeping the

Transvaal's gold supply within the imperial fold would also help the Empire's economy as a whole, while providing England with a great strategic resource.

The policy which resulted in the Boer War is explained best by social imperialism. The Colonial Office hoped to develop the African colonies in order to promote the welfare of Englishmen and Africans.[66] Colonies became important for their economic potential, not just for their proximity to lines of communication. Trade was vital to this goal, but so was government control. Britain advanced in South Africa to gain an asset for her Empire which would enhance the standard of living of all imperial subjects. At the same time South Africa would increase the strength of the Empire by adding to its economic and military power.

The defense of Britain's colonies in South Africa had become a strategic goal in itself. The area's resources were not the only elements keeping England interested in South Africa. The Cape had a large English population which had every appearance of growing. Chamberlain would anger the Boers by suggesting the "colonization" of Afrikaner areas with English settlers.[67] London had the responsibility of protecting these citizens, as well as the original inhabitants of South Africa. Britain sought the best way to insure the well being of her subjects, at the least cost. The political union of South Africa seemed the best means of achieving this goal. The Boer Republics became enemies because they stood in the way of union.

In the end, Britain was not willing to surrender her

hegemony in South Africa. Chamberlain believed the success of the Empire was essential to Britain's survival as a great nation. He refused to see British control of Africa's most promising region undermined. The government had tried to reach an agreement which would have allowed closer ties between the Boers and London. Political pressure to get Kruger to move towards the imperial fold had been applied for over a year, with no effect.[68] War resulted because the Boers resisted imperial expansion. Their resistance, however, did not bring about imperial advance as Robinson and Gallagher suggest. Afrikaner opposition only altered the shape of imperial expansion. Chamberlain's imperial program would have been the same had the Boers willingly participated. Expansion would still have occurred.

Chamberlain's bleak forecast about the cost of a war with the Afrikaners proved correct. In spite of the ferocity of the war Britain's peace plan was quite moderate. Chamberlain did not want to despoil the Boer Republics, but integrate them into the imperial structure. He hoped benevolence in victory would promote loyalty to the Crown so that all South Africans would work for the good of the Empire. The Colonial Secretary wanted justice for those who stood with the Crown, without taking revenge on the Boer rebels.[69] Chamberlain favored the 1900 war settlement which stated that the Transvaal would become a self-governing colony. The army, railroad, and customs union would be under imperial control.[70] The Colonial Secretary realized it would be necessary for Britain to help the Boer farmer to

recover.[71] Much of the destruction of Boer property was repaired. A further Thirty-five million pounds were loaned to the Boers to develop the area. Three million pounds were given as gifts.[72] These funds may not have been distributed as efficiently as possible, but fairness was the goal.[73] Chamberlain hoped to revive the Transvaal's economy as rapidly as possible. All the British asked in return was Boer acknowledgement of Edward as their sovereign. The final peace of Vereinegan had been structured to achieve Chamberlain's early goal of unity between Britain and Boer and a Transvaal which was, "protected as to its outside relations and independent as to its internal affairs."[74]

Chamberlain did not feel that the Boer territories, nor even a Union of South Africa were ready to accept self-government. Even so, the Colonial Secretary argued for a rapid end to he military government of the Transvaal.[75] It was hoped stability and normality could be established as quickly as possible. The Crown should continue to govern for the next two or three years, Chamberlain argued. The imperial government would only interfere to protect Imperial interests.[76] The British hoped to protect their sovereignty, but they also wished to create a loyal Afrikaner population. This goal was most achievable by allowing the Boers as many freedoms as possible without giving up all control. London's control would insure that the wishes of the majority would be respected, but minorities would also be protected.[77]

The Colonial Secretary planned to give the African population of the Boer Republics the vote so that all may

have a part in determining the colony's political future. Originally property would be the only qualification limiting the franchise.[78] In the end, however, the clause of the Vereinegan Treaty extending the franchise was dropped to placate the Boers.[79] Even though Chamberlain's attempt to enfranchise the African population of the Boer territories had failed, he still wished to encourage the integration of Africans into the colonial system.

It was felt that the future prosperity of the African population could only be insured by training them to work in modern industries.[80] The Colonial Secretary hoped to use African labor to solve South Africa's growing labor shortage.[81] In this way the colonies' indigenous peoples would strengthen the Empire at the same time as the shared in the benefits of imperialism. Higher taxation would force Africans to seek wage labor in the mines and other European sanctioned occupations.[82] The quest for African labor had the added advantage of turning external African enemies into assets as part of the colonial work force.[83] Chamberlain's plan was strongly paternalistic and unself-consciously racist. He believed wage labor was a means of civilizing Africans.[84] It was not clear whether Africans could hope to become the equals of the Empire's English population. While he gave lip service to the ideal of providing work for Africans, Chamberlain continued to favor the increase of British labor as the best means of developing the colonies.[85]

Chamberlain himself traveled to South Africa in 1903 to

help reconcile Boer and Briton while trying to get all the colonies to take a more active part in the Empire.[86] The Colonial Secretary would return to London convinced of the need base the Empire on cooperation with the colonies rather than strict control from London.[87] Reconciliation in South Africa became essential to the entire Imperial structure.

Chamberlain also visited Johannesburg to gauge the loyalty of the Rand capitalists. Despite initial distrust on Chamberlain's part, the Randlords were able to convince the Colonial Secretary of their loyalty.[88] The mining magnates were expected to contribute to reconstruction after the war. Chamberlain had established a ten percent profit tax on the mines.[89] The Rand also came up with thirty million pounds to be used for loans for reconstruction.[90] The Colonial Secretary wanted to make it clear the mining magnates would be expected to fulfill their responsibility to help develop the colony. Chamberlain found taxation to be a good way for the government to direct private industry to work for the good of the entire Empire.

The ground work for federation was laid at this time as well. An Inter-Colonial Council was formed to administer the Orange Free State and the Transvaal as a single political unit to prepare for their entrance into the union.[91] More importantly a conference of South African colonies was held. The conference highlighted some of the ways the Colonial Secretary wished to promote imperial unity. Representatives from the colonies and Britain discussed the possibility of a South African customs union, establishing tariffs, new

railroad construction, and a common African policy. A twenty-five percent preference on British goods was also considered.[92] The conference established the precedent for more formal discussions for the South African colonies which would pave the way towards union.

The Unionists' 1900 election victory was primarily based upon popular support for Chamberlain's policy and the war. [93] The Colonial Secretary pointed to colonial involvement in the war as being one result of the Unionist policy of enhancing imperial ties.[94] The election had given Chamberlain popular approval, yet there remained an undercurrent of discontent. The Liberals claimed that Chamberlain had given up on social reform.[95] This charge was not entirely true, Chamberlain had continued to fight for pensions.[96] The Unionist Party had extended loans to purchase houses, established new factory legislation and arbitration, and created labor exchanges.[97] Chamberlain himself had been instrumental in the formation of a bill proving workman's compensation for workers hurt in industrial accidents.[98] Yet imperial problems had begun to monopolize the Colonial Secretary's time. To regain his former impetus Chamberlain needed to find a way to advance imperial and social reform at the same time.

The high cost of the war, coupled with Britain's inability to defeat a small, undeveloped state forced a reexamination of the the basis of empire. To many Englishmen the Empire no longer appeared a bringer of progress, but as means of exploiting less powerful peoples. The ruthless

suppression of guerrilla forces reinforced this image. An unfavorable view of the Empire was etched into the public mind by the harsh conditions of the internment camps before Chamberlain removed them from the Army's jurisdiction.

It was obvious the war benefited the Randlords by removing the restraints imposed by Kruger's government. Yet the common miners received no improvement of conditions and were even superseded by cheaper Asian labor.[99] Chamberlain had claimed the war had been fought to insure the equality of the white races and justice for the blacks.[100] Yet Chamberlain's promise to give the franchise to the African population of the Republics was postponed until self-government was restored.[101] This qualification eliminated the chance for an African franchise in the near future and would lay the ground work for apartheid. There had never been a serious attempt on the part of the imperial authorities to make blacks and whites equal in South Africa.[102] Hobson was not alone in his conclusion that imperial power had become the tool of capitalists hoping to despoil the colonies.

Chamberlain saw popular discontent with imperialism as an opportunity to press more energetically for his new imperial system. A policy of drift had proven dangerous to Britain's supremacy in Africa. Imperial strength had proven necessary to preserve the colonies. The war had highlighted grave defects in Britain's imperial system, yet it was still possible to solve these problems.[103] Chamberlain would point to the rapidity with which prosperity was restored to the

defeated Boer territories.[104] The aid of the self-governing colonies had proven the possibility of closer cooperation and mutual protection. The Empire still had much to offer. A generous peace plan had shown London's willingness to compromise once their position was secure. Britain was even willing to allow a degree of autonomy to problem territories.

The war itself had proven the need to formalize and strengthen ties to the colonies. Closer ties to the colonies would also serve to lessen the danger caused by Britain's lack of European allies. The war had highlighted this isolation in increased continental criticism of British policy.[105] Suzerainty was no longer enough. The case of the internment camps and the cost in human lives had proven the necessity of greater government involvement in the colonies. Chamberlain believed the nation had to learn the lesson the war taught.

The Boer War had brought out a number of problems facing Britain. Military setbacks highlighted the weakness of her army. Defects became evident in her imperial system as well as problems in foreign relations. The war had proven that not all were able to see the advantages of British control. Boer resistance, the Unionists believed, had been made possible by loosening the imperial bond. The European response to the war highlighted Britain's diplomatic isolation. A widespread movement towards reform followed the war, its goal being "national efficiency".[106] National efficiency in Britain would be attained by improving the

social setting, the Empire, the military, and the economy. In short, all aspects of British society were to be examined and improved. Domestic strength and imperial power were mutually supporting. The need to defend the Empire made domestic reform imperative in order to better provide the means for imperial defense.[107] Chamberlain's imperial and economic policy was perfectly suited to this new spirit of reform. The Colonial Secretary could now hope for wider acceptance of his plans for domestic reform and imperial restructuring. The problem became one of showing how his plans were superior to all others.

The appeal of national efficiency was obvious, as was the need for change. The political parties and individuals differed as to what was the best means of developing national strength. The Liberals worked for slum clearance, poor relief, and improved education to create an environment suitable to the creation of an "imperial race".[108] Chamberlain did not disagree with these goals, they had long been his own. The Liberal imperialists, lead by Lord Rosebery and Charles Dilke, also felt that the Empire was essential to Britain, but they continued to put their trust in free trade.[109] They felt imperial ties would remain strong because of the sentimental attachment of English colonists to the mother country and because of the need for mutual defense.[110] The export of British capital was viewed by the free traders as a weapon in the international struggle.[111] The Liberal believed this weapon required the continuance of free trade.

IV-TARIFF REFORM

Chamberlain could not accept the Liberal reliance on free trade. He planned to revolutionize the Empire's fiscal system by creating an imperial commercial union. Chamberlain was pessimistic about the continued tie between the mother country and the colonies. He felt, "We must either draw closer, or we shall drift apart."[1] He believed a revived empire protected by tariffs as the best means of creating revenue for social reform and focusing imperial power. Free trade, which Robinson and Gallagher saw as the basis of British imperialism, had become a threat to the Empire.[2] Chamberlain's tenure as Colonial Secretary marked the height of an attempt to shift away from free trade to state directed capitalism.[3] Fiscal reform would allow commercial ties to draw the colonies and the mother country into an imperial union. Chamberlain believed tariffs would help unite the diverse regions of the Empire to form an integrated economic unit.

Commercial union in some form served as the best means to national efficiency, Chamberlain believed. Union promoted the Empire's internal strength by directing all parts towards a common economic goal. Chamberlain felt, "The Empire is commerce."[4] At the same time formal commercial ties provided a structure with which to utilize the power of the Empire when dealing with other nations.[5] He had first considered the idea of an imperial commercial union in

1881.[6] Chamberlain rejected protectionism at this time, holding the same objections that would be directed against his own program.[7] Tariffs, he thought, would raise prices and damage the export trade Britain had gained through free trade.[8] Over time, however, the Colonial Secretary would begin to see defects in Britain's system of free trade. Chamberlain freely admitted that over the course of thirty years his views had changed in response to changing world conditions.[9]

Economic success, a prime generator of political power, was seen as inseparable from strategic considerations. In 1903, Chamberlain noted, "we all desire the maintenance and increase of the national strength and the prosperity of the United Kingdom."[10] The concepts of strength and prosperity were linked. Britain's strength was often needed to defend the economic position which made her strength possible. The main debate of the late Victorian period was over the best means to preserve England's power.

The solutions Chamberlain would propose were not original. Tariff advocates had been active since the 1870's.[11] By 1895 C.E. Howard Vincent, M. P. from Sheffield, had begun asking Parliament to, "adopt such measures as may ensure the defense of Britain's industrial interests."[12] Vincent provided statistics highlighting the damaging inroads foreign competitors had made into Britain's markets. Increased customs duties would reverse this trend, while advancing the development of Britain's industrial base. Chamberlain backed Vincent in Parliament and would

eventually adopt his solutions to the problems facing England.[13] By 1896 Chamberlain had been fully converted to the idea of protection, but felt the nation was not ready for the plan.[14] It would take the Boer War and the public outcry for change to set the stage for an imperial customs union.[15]

Chamberlain believed Britain was forced to retaliate when other nations began erecting tariff barriers.[16] Germany had imposed tariffs first in 1879 and expanded them in 1885. France raised tariffs in 1882, the U.S. in 1891, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia followed.[17] Foreign tariffs restricted British trade, while Britain remained open to tax free goods from outside. As British exports declined, foreign imports to England increased, beginning a dangerous shift in the balance of trade.[18] At first Chamberlain thought Britain could force other nations to abandon their tariffs. In time, Chamberlain would see that this goal was unrealistic. Tariffs had become too important to the nations creating them.

Tariff barriers proved very useful to the nations protected by them. Duties provided an important source of government revenue. At the same time home industries benefitted by limiting foreign competition. Britain's rate industrial expansion soon began to fall as compared to that of protected countries, like Germany and the U.S..[19] Overseas Britain began to find herself losing foreign markets to lower priced domestic products. Britain lost the advantage of lower production costs, made possible through

mass production, when tariffs artificially increased the price of her exports.

In addition to losing her former markets, Britain found her domestic economy vulnerable to foreign goods. Britain's policy of free trade allowed foreign nations to "dump" their surplus goods in England.[20] Manufactured goods that could not be sold elsewhere were shipped to Britain. In fact, Chamberlain noted, "the United Kingdom is the only country where this process can be carried on successfully, because we are the only country which keeps open ports."[21] In England, they were sold at the lowest possible price in order to gain a slight return. The lack of tariffs insured that prices for such goods remained low. English producers often could not compete in their own markets.

Chamberlain considered tariffs a means to eliminate this unfair foreign competition. Chamberlain pointed out that he had supported free trade, but that he was "not a free trader at any price."[22] When free trade began to harm the nation it was time for change. Chamberlain stated that under free trade, "...we are not in a position to offer any preference or favour whatever, even to our own children. We cannot make any difference to those who treat us well, and those who treat us badly."[23] Chamberlain was able to refute Cobden by showing that those nations having tariffs were experiencing growth in foreign trade to rival Britain's.[24] Further, he argued, Cobden had proved wrong in his prediction that world wide free trade would follow Britain's example.[25] In spite of problems inherent to free trade,

Chamberlain never supported absolute protection, favoring selective import control.[26] In this way Britain could enjoy the advantages of both protection and free trade.

Besides protecting British and imperial trade, tariffs had another important result, the creation of revenue. Chamberlain hoped to use the tariff revenues to fund a variety of welfare projects as well as pay for colonial development. The Colonial Secretary had long hoped to institute a system of old age pensions.[27] The coming of the Boer War, however, delayed any action.[28] After the war, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made it clear that pensions would have to wait.[29] The war had already strained the Treasury and driven taxes up. Ironically the war Chamberlain had supported to preserve the Empire had forced the postponement of his plan for social reform and colonial development.[30] Now tariff revenue provided the chance to finance the scheme or any other social reforms requiring large sums of money.[31]

Chamberlain saw tariffs as a chance to reduce direct taxation in Britain. State revenue would substitute indirect taxes from import duties for direct taxation.[32] This method had much in common with Chamberlain's early days in Birmingham. As mayor, Chamberlain had insured Birmingham's utilities produced a profit, allowing the city fathers to reduce the tax rate.[33] Tariffs, therefore, provided a means to bypass Unionist aversion to raising taxes to pay for welfare.[34] Chamberlain's plan had added relevancy in the 1890's when direct taxation had risen to nearly 50 percent

of all taxes, climbing from 25 percent in the 1870's.[35] Tariffs provided a means of reducing the burden of taxation on the individual at the same time as it redirected capital back into the Empire.

Chamberlain, believed the time for protection had come. Confidence in free trade had been shaken due to rapid oscillations in the volume of trade since the 1860's.[36] By 1896 the Colonial Secretary realized not even Britain's own colonies were willing to follow free trade.[37] The colonies were, in fact, erecting barriers against Britain herself. Canada resisted free trade within the Empire in the hopes of offsetting Britain's greater industrial power.[38] Chamberlain's belief that Britain's power and prosperity depended on trade from the colonies made colonial tariffs a great threat.[39] The commercial independence of the colonies hastened the destruction of the ties of common interest holding the Empire together.

The gravest danger that Chamberlain perceived was the disintegration of imperial ties. Laissez-faire economics had allowed the colonies to drift away from the mother country. For years the colonies had been pursuing their own commercial aims, irrespective of the overall impact on the Empire. The most prosperous colonies, those which had the most to offer the Empire, had begun to compete with England. Colonies began to seek there own interests to the detriment of the whole. Chamberlain came to the conclusion that a customs union would best unify the economic aims of the colonies and the mother country.[40] If London made no attempt

to coordinate the economic aims of the colonies and the mother country, Britain would, Chamberlain claimed,

> "...give up all hope whatever to anything in the nature of closer fiscal relations with them;... in the absence of that closer fiscal relationship you must abandon all hope of securing closer political relationships."[41]

The final dissolution of the Empire must soon follow. Free trade created antagonism between different parts of the Empire which were competing economically. In 1905 Chamberlain would note, "If you want and Empire; if you want influence in the world, I think you will find that free imports are inconsistent with it."[42] The colonies, in attempting to protect their own economies, saw Britain as a commercial threat. Free trade allowed the colonies to develop a taste for independence without being given proof of the advantages of the imperial connection. The Colonial Secretary believed Britain's economic isolation from the Empire, caused by economic infighting, was as hazardous as her political isolation from Europe.[43] Chamberlain wished to insure all Englishmen understood, "The lesson to all is our strength in unity."[44] The lack of European allies forced Britain to spread her military strength very thinly. The lack of imperial economic unity, in turn, limited Britain's economic strength. Chamberlain asked, "Let us do all in our power by improving our communications, by developing our commercial relations, by co-operating in mutual defense, and none of us then will ever feel isolated."[45]

The Colonial Secretary had been interested in the

promotion of imperial trade since his work on the Board of Trade. It was not until 1898, however, that Chamberlain got solid evidence of serious trade setbacks by soliciting trade information from the colonies themselves. He sent a circular to the colonial governors to gain their insight on how to increase imperial trade.[46] The Colonial Secretary asked, "...the extent to which...foreign imports of any kind have displaced or are displacing similar British goods and the cause of such displacement."[47] While the final report on the findings would take months to compile, broad trends were soon apparent. It was clear that foreign nations were underselling British companies in the colonies.[48] This was a dangerous trend which could eventually limit British trade to her Empire. Foreign companies proved more willing than British firms to mold their sales techniques to the colonial environment.[49] Chamberlain forecast disaster unless Britain made stronger effort to keep ahead of her competitors in the colonies.

Closer commercial ties to the colonies and actual commercial union would enhance Britain's trade and increase government revenue. A fiscal blue book in 1903 showed that in the period between 1890 and 1902, Britain's exports to the colonies increased 21.2 %, while that to foreign nations was down 12 %.[50] In 1902 the colonies would take 42 % of England's exports.[51] Commercial union would increase British trade to the colonies by restricting foreign trade. In a message to the colonial governors Chamberlain expressed his main aim. He wrote, "I am impressed with the extreme

importance of securing as large a share as possible of the mutual trade of the U.K. and colonies for British producers and manufacturers."[52]

A larger share of colonial trade for Britain would provide funds for industrial advances at home. Improving Britain's productive capability was vital in enhancing her economic and political strength. Greater profits could be used to expand and modernize British industry. Revived industries would create greater profits which could be reinvested in England, with enough left over to share with British workers. The dangerous tendency of British business advancing investment and services at the expense of production would be reversed.[53] Revenue for Chamberlain's long standing plans for social reform could be raised by taxing foreign buyers rather than British business. Tariffs would protect and enlarge British industry and still allow wage increases and higher employment.[54] All classes would benefit. The upper and middle classes would get investment opportunities in British firms. The working class would gain jobs and welfare.

Chamberlain looked to Germany as an example of successful commercial union. Germany exemplified the way industrial and social advances were made possible using tariffs and strong central control.[55] The German states had been united, her trade had expanded, and the German military strengthened. Even though Germany lacked the resources Britain's colonies provided, it was clear her industrial capacity would soon outstrip Britain's. By 1908 German steel

production would be double that of England's.[56] Yet the German government still advanced social reform. Bismarck had used tariffs to protect Germany's industry and agriculture, while providing higher wages, increased employment, as well as pensions and insurance for workers.[57] In discussing the German system Chamberlain noted, "Gradually ... national objects and political interests were introduced, and so, from starting as it did on a purely commercial point and for commercial interests, it developed until it became a bond of unity and the basis of the German Empire."[58]

The German system, the Zollverein, set a single custom rate on goods from outside the German states. Trade between the states was carried on without any duties. The Zollverein appealed to Chamberlain because of its spirit of cooperation, without an inflexible structure.[59] The German system, structured to accommodate the German states, would have to be expanded and altered to fit the British Empire. Only the general outline of the Zollverein would be maintained in Chamberlain's plan. He suggested creating "an Imperial Zollverein in which there should be Free Trade between the whole Empire and duties against other countries."[60] The colonies were expected to sacrifice their tariffs in return for the imposition of British tariffs against foreign products.[61] The Empire would become an economic unit in competition with the rest of the world.

Tariffs would force open markets by threatening higher British tariffs in retaliation for excessive foreign barriers. Chamberlain asked his opponents in Parliament, if

they dared, to announce their unwillingness to aid a colony in a conflict over trade with foreign powers.[62] For example, retaliatory tariffs aimed at any colony could be met with British retaliation in support of her colony. Chamberlain used the example of German barriers aimed at Canada because she had allowed Britain lower duties.[63] A customs union would enable the entire Empire to respond to such

Chamberlain turned the tables on critics by highlighting the number of colonial tariffs his plan would eliminate. He said his plan would "... be the greatest advance that free trade has made since it was first advocated by Mr. Cobden."[64] Unlike the mercantilist system Chamberlain's plan was often compared to, the new union would not be based on the exploitation of the colonies. Chamberlain noted in 1903 while discussing the relationship between Britain and the colonies "If you benefit any one of us you cannot help benefiting the whole. The whole depends upon the parts. You cannot have one of the parts diseased without the whole suffering."[65] Mother country and colony would support each other, each providing what the other needed. threats. Britain and the colonies could protect each other.

At the same time, union insured a steady imperial market.[66] Duties would be imposed on foreign food and raw materials in order to improve the position of colonial raw materials sent to England.[67] Tariffs and imperial free trade would encourage colonial food production. Cheaper colonial raw materials would lower the cost of finished manufactures

for the colonies.

The relation between the industrial base of Britain and the raw materials of the colonies seemed obvious to Chamberlain. The colonies would provide raw materials to Britain, the industrial center, which would provide finished industrial products. Most imperial trade already followed this pattern. The Union would simply make the system simpler and more beneficial to the Empire. Chamberlain believed this system would enable the Empire to be, "...self-sustaining and self-sufficient, able to maintain itself against the competition of all its rivals."[68] Imperial self-sufficiency became one of Chamberlain's primary goals.

The Colonial Secretary made the mistake of implying that the colonies should be content to remain Britain's source of food and raw materials. This lapse is confusing, because Chamberlain saw the danger of thinking the colonies would remain industrially backward. Chamberlain noted that important colonies, like Canada and Australia, had already begun building their own industries behind tariffs barriers.[69] It would be unreasonable, as well as impossible, to reverse this trend. Greater emphasis on aiding colonial development would have helped diffuse colonial distrust of Chamberlain's plans.[70] The colonies did not intend to remain industrially undeveloped.[71] Greater colonial development would also serve to strengthen the Empire's weakest links, the undeveloped colonies.

The Colonial Secretary did not necessarily oppose the development of colonial industry, but his tariff scheme made

sure colonial industry benefited British firms. He asked the colonies, "... there are many things which you do not now make, many things for which we have a great capacity for production - leave them to us as you have heretofore."[72] A customs union would allow England to aid the colonies in their industrial development, both to profit from colonial buildup and to keep a place in the colonial markets.[73] The industrialization of the whole Empire would have created more trade for Britain, since she had the technology needed to expand industry.[74] Colonial development within a customs union would insure that imperial industries complemented each other. Tariffs on foreign manufactured goods also made it cheaper for the colonies to purchase their industrial requirements in Britain. The colonies would gain cheap industrial goods, Britain would receive steady markets and funds for social reform.

The union's main purpose was to unify the Empire.[75] Generating funds for government use and promoting trade and industry was important, but they were not the only goals. Economic success created political power. Power became the primary aim of Empire. Chamberlain realized social reform could only succeed if Britain remained able to defend itself against her enemies. The Colonial Secretary may have decided it was more important to strive first for England's security before working to improve the lives of the working class. Chamberlain used the terminology of conflict when arguing for fiscal reform. He used phrases like, "weapon of a moderate tariff" and "defend our home market", to highlight

the importance of the link between trade and power.[76] He tried to make clear his feeling that Britain was involved in a trade war with much of the rest of the world. Defeat in this war would be as serious as a military defeat. Chamberlain stated,

> "It seems to me that the men who do not care for the Empire, the men who will sooner suffer injustice than go to war, the men that would surrender rather than take up arms in their own defense-they are the men in favor of doing in trade exactly what they are willing to do in political relations."77

Tariffs allowed Britain to defend herself in a trade war, free trade meant surrender to foreign economic powers. In the final analysis power, not individual wealth, became the goal of the union.[78] The pursuit of power and security sidetracked Chamberlain from his early quest for social reform. Now reform had become another factor contributing to national power, rather than a goal in itself.

Chamberlain, after being converted to the new system, had to fight to convince his colleagues of the need to protect the Empire. Chamberlain advocated following the lead of European nations, which were building trade walls around their empires. Colonies provided the troops and supplies which insured a state's power.[79] The Colonial Secretary saw that the political, strategic, and economic interests of the Empire to be interlocked.[80] Economic unity was necessary if Britain was to be protected. Closer imperial ties made such unity possible. The Empire needed to expand into Africa, not to aid financiers, but to protect and increase Britain's

power.[81] The African colonies, in fact, played only a minor part in the proposed tariff program. Expansion was encouraged, not to open new markets for capitalists, but to gain greater economic resources for Britain.

The Colonial Secretary gradually outlined his fiscal policy. He suggested a Corn duty of two shillings a quarter be placed on foreign grain. Maize would be excepted, because of its use as a cheap animal feed.[82] A five percent tax on meat and dairy products would also be passed. Bacon would be exempt as it was a staple of Britain's poor.[83] A ten percent tax on manufactured goods would serve to protect British industry.[84] The colonies would be exempt from all duties.

Chamberlain announced his plan for an imperial union at the 1897 Colonial Conference. The response was disheartening. The Conference proved that the settler colonies opposed the idea of an imperial council to oversee imperial policy and closer control from Britain.[85] Colonial distrust forced Chamberlain to state publicly, "we are not, in any circumstances, going to interfere with the domestic affairs of the colonies."[86] The colonies wanted greater imperial cooperation, not surrender to London's control or that of an Imperial Parliament.[87] They wanted unity of direction, not a new imperial structure.[88] The Colonial Secretary chose to take the agreement to meet regularly as an indication of greater future co-operation.[89]

1897 marked the beginning of movement in the direction of union when Britain withdrew her favored nation treaties with foreign countries.[90] Such agreements gave trading

advantages to certain foreign nations. The treaties were revoked to allow such advantages to be extended to the colonies alone. Australia and Canada would claim imperial trade had been improved by the abrogation of favored nation treaties with Belgium and Germany.[91] Government directed expansion of imperial trade insured that the benefits of empire would be enlarged and shared. The Colonial Secretary hoped for more trade agreements, but believed the initiative should come from the colonies.[92] The colonies appreciated the move, but continued to resist more formal commercial union.[93]

The colonies were not prepared to abandon their own tariffs, one of the prerequisites of an imperial union. At the 1900 Colonial Conference the Colonial Secretary proposed what was meant to be the first step towards union. Chamberlain asked for the elimination of all tariffs within the Empire.[94] Yet tariff revenue had become too important to colonial budgets.[95] Chamberlain noted, "It is no use to expect that our colonies will abandon their customs duties as their chief and principle source of revenue." [96] After all, one of the appeals of a commercial union would be the creation of revenue for reform. It was hard to ask the colonies to eliminate their chief source of revenue for possible benefits in the future. Other colonies opposed such a move because the removal of colonial tariffs was seen as antithetical to their industrial development. The unrestricted flow of cheap British manufactures would destroy colonial industries. The colonies made it clear that

they were unwilling to give up their own industrial growth to benefit England.[97] Canadian leaders argued against imperial free trade to protect her industries from British competition. The colonies could see very clearly the same danger inherent to free trade that Chamberlain did. The villain, however, was Britain not foreign powers.

Chamberlain also had trouble convincing the colonial leaders that the benefits of close imperial ties outweighed greater contributions to the common defense or to the loss of some independence. Support for tariff reform in Britain was so limited that Chamberlain felt unable to proceed without colonial support. The custom union seemed unworkable. One of the main goals of union was the renewal of imperial ties, but these bonds could not be reforged by forcing the colonies to cooperate.

The 1902 Colonial Conference set Chamberlain's future course.[98] The colonies had made clear their opposition to Chamberlain's union. Chamberlain had opened the Conference with a speech enumerating the three ways to unite the Empire.[99] Unity would be achieved, He believed, through common defense, commercial union, or new political relationships. Closer political ties proved most problematic. The colonies would not consider any proposal for an imperial parliament before Britain offered economic concessions.[100] The Colonial Secretary sympathized with the colonies and was willing to work on their behalf, yet no progress could be made before London could offer the colonies something in return. The colonies had made it clear

they found political federation disagreeable.[101] No colony, or England itself, would consider giving up their national sovereignty to an imperial parliament.[102] That left only defense or commercial union as the bases for closer ties.

Chamberlain believed the colonies might accept a defensive union rather than a commercial one. Most colonies did not even favor free trade within the Empire.[103] One of the resolutions passed at the 1902 conference stated, "it is not practicable to adopt a general system of Free Trade."[104] The colonies refused to remove their tariffs. Yet, the question of defense met with only limited colonial support. To Chamberlain's mind, the British Army and Navy were most often used to protect colonial interests, which only affected England indirectly.[105] The colonies should, therefore, make a greater contribution to imperial defense.

Each colony wanted the protection of the mother country, but they did not want to be obligated to support the common defense. The war in South Africa had proven the colonies' willingness to assist Britain militarily. This help, however, was offered without any formal obligation. Opposition to an Imperial Parliament stemmed in part from colonial unwillingness to be obligated to share in the expenses of overall imperial defense.[106] In 1902 the suggestion that an imperial militia be raised was opposed by Canada and Australia.[107] Most colonies were finding that a British military presence was becoming less important. Australia remained isolated from any grave threat. Canada relied on the friendship of the U.S.A., and could expect

little help if this friendship was lost.

Chamberlain still believed in the need for protection of the colonies by the Royal Navy and British regiments. Yet he also saw the need to promote the imperial connection in more constructive ways. Further, in 1896 Chamberlain noted, "It is very difficult to see how you can pretend to deal with (the)... great question of Imperial defense without having first dealt with the question of Imperial trade."[108] In fact, "Imperial defense is only another name for the protection of Imperial commerce."[109] Because of the connection between economic and military power, it became vital to develop the Empire's economic strength. Tariffs seemed the best means to keep Britain's economic power from flowing outside of the Empire. If military need no longer drew a colony to the mother country, commercial and economic benefits might.

The colonies agreed to closer commercial ties to Britain, but only to the extent that these ties did not interfere with their own interests. The problem was formulating a program which would both approach Chamberlain's original goals, and which the colonies would approve. In 1890 a Canadian, Colonel George Denison had sent Chamberlain a plan outlining trade preference as a means of uniting the Empire.[110] When he first got Denison's proposal, Chamberlain still felt that imperial defense was the best means of reversing colonial drift. Even so Chamberlain had seen the logic of Denison's plan. Each colony and Britain herself would be free to erect tariffs barriers to raise

revenue and protect industry. These tariffs would then be lowered for other members of the Empire to give them preference over foreign goods. Preference insured that the colonies could maintain their tariffs, at the same time as they agreed to the creation of English tariffs. On the surface it appeared that the colonies had more to lose by approving the creation of British tariff barriers.[111] Preference on a duty still costs more than no tariff at all. Yet, the self-governing colonies hoped to capture the share of English trade lost by foreign nations when Britain established tariffs.

At the 1900 Colonial Conference the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, put forth a strong defense for colonial preference.[112] Laurier specifically asked for the remission of Britain's proposed Corn tax for Canada.[113] In 1900 the Treasury approved the Colonial Stock Act. The Act allowed the investment of British trust fund revenue in Canadian stock in return for preference for British goods.[114]

By the 1902 conference it was obvious that defense alone would not create the Empire Chamberlain envisioned. Preference, however, proved a means of moving towards greater imperial cooperation, while overcoming colonial reticence to commercial union.[115] Chamberlain believed preferential treatment would prove the advantage of closer ties to Britain. The colonies would then be willing to accept more of his plan. Preference, not imperial free trade, would become the first step towards economic unity. Chamberlain had decided to lead the tariff reformers because

it was they who,

> "...attach even greater importance to the possibility of securing by preferential and reciprocal arrangements with our colonies a great development of trade within the Empire and a nearer approach to a commercial union which,...must precede or accompany closer political relations, and without which... no permanent co-operation is possible."[116]

The impetus for the new style of imperialism came from the center of the imperial system, not the periphery.[117] London had more to gain from change than did the colonies. While Chamberlain's plans would be greatly altered to gain colonial support, the primary consideration would be the effect of reform on Britain. Tariffs proved so appealing to the Colonial Secretary because they would provide funds for reform in Britain. Chamberlain also favored the way a commercial union would protect English industry and jobs. In the end fiscal reform would fail because of Chamberlain's inability to show the benefit of change to Britain.

The Colonial Secretary's first practical efforts at creating a system of imperial preference closely followed the Boer War. A duty on grain had been imposed to raise revenue to pay for the war. The fact that the Treasury had even considered imposing a tariff on a staple such as grain highlights the Unionist difficulty in finding revenue.[118] Chamberlain hoped to get a reduction in this duty on behalf of Canada. Preference for Canada would prove important to Chamberlain's long term plans by legitimizing both tariffs and colonial preference. Reducing the Corn Duty for Canada would create a major precedent, allowing other colonies to

submit their own preference proposals.[119] Chamberlain hoped that the experience would also disperse popular fear of raising prices.[120] More reform could then follow.

The Colonial Secretary found it surprisingly easy to persuade the Cabinet to reduce the duty for Canada.[121] C.T. Ritchie, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer and free trade advocate, strenuously opposed preference in any form as part of a move to an extensive protection system.[122] Ritchie's opposition was seemingly overridden in Cabinet. Considering himself successful, Chamberlain left for talks in South Africa. On March 31, 1903, with the Colonial Secretary out of the picture, Ritchie refused to include the duty in his new budget.[123] By excluding the Corn duty altogether, Ritchie was able to forestall any moves towards fiscal reform.

Chamberlain was furious when he learned of Ritchie's action, but it was already too late. There had been no major pressure, from either the government or the public, to oppose Ritchie. Chamberlain realized he needed widespread political support if his plan for fiscal reform was to succeed. Chamberlain would lead his first campaign to create support for tariff reform after his return from South Africa, from May 1903 until the beginning of 1904.[124] His goal was to inform the public of the benefits of tariffs and preference. The goal of tariff reform, and the focus of Chamberlain's campaign was, "to secure more equal terms of competition for British trade and closer commercial union with the colonies."[125]

The Colonial Secretary also needed to overcome the resistance of his own party to his program. Another goal in the first tariff campaign was, therefore, for Chamberlain to win the full support of Arthur Balfour, the new Prime Minister, through argument or political pressure. Balfour's allegiance did not seem too difficult to get. Chamberlain believed himself secure in the role of unacknowledged party leader and someone the Prime Minister needed to court. In April an informal poll of the Unionists in the House of Commons counted 172 preferentialists. There were an additional 73 members who would vote for preference if it was accepted party policy, as well as 98 who favored retaliatory tariffs and some preference. There were only 27 Unionist Free Traders.[126] Balfour, the Colonial Secretary believed, would have no choice but to give in to the demands of the tariff reformers. Balfour was expected to expel the hard line Free Traders and provide a rallying point for the rest of the Unionists.[127] An early election would then be called to allow the Unionists the opportunity to exploit their renewed unity.[128]

It appeared to Chamberlain that he had found the ideal party leader with whom to work. Balfour seemed committed to reform and, more importantly, was not a free trader. This appearance proved deceiving. The Colonial Secretary assumed the P.M. would follow the majority of the party and back tariff reform.[129] Balfour did not reject Chamberlain's program out of hand, but neither did he accept it wholeheartedly. In negotiations with the colonies

Chamberlain asked for a discussion of the issue of preference at a special colonial conference. Balfour stepped in and disrupted the plan for the conference by asking for a vote on whether to hold the conference and another vote to approve its findings.[130] This move pushed tariff reform far into the future, whereas Chamberlain wanted immediate action. Chamberlain felt it was necessary to enter negotiations with the colonies with a firm plan.[131]

Balfour had been convinced by portions of Chamberlain's argument, but was unwilling to give whole-hearted support for fear of splitting the government.[132] The Prime Minister admitted his willingness to discuss preference, but he resisted any action which might raise the cost of living.[133] Tariffs, even if they were lowered in favor of the colonies, would raise prices in Britain. Yet the clamor for reform was too loud to resist all change. Balfour, responding to the widespread demand for national efficiency, set about removing the die hard free traders in hopes of making the Unionists the party of reform.[134] The Prime Minister realized the need to sacrifice economic orthodoxy to some degree in order to advance Britain's economic position.

Without realizing it, Chamberlain had lost the battle for the government's backing as early as September 1903.[135] It was at this time that Chamberlain failed to gain Balfour's active support. The Prime Minister, however, by attempting to reconcile the protectionists and the moderate free traders convinced Chamberlain that there was still hope of winning the government over. For this reason the Colonial

Secretary was ready to listen to a plan Balfour proposed. The plan would lead to the fall of the Unionist government and doom the tariff campaign.

As a compromise between the two opposing wings of the party, the Prime Minister agreed to suggest retaliatory tariffs to force down foreign tariffs.[136] Balfour proposed that Chamberlain leave the government to gather popular support, while the Prime Minister worked to regain party unity.[137] On September 14, 1903, as part of Balfour's plan, Chamberlain announced he would resign if the idea of colonial preference was not accepted as official policy.[138] The Prime Minister accepted his resignation. It was hoped the Colonial Secretary's absence would make reconciliation easier. The Colonial Secretary hoped Balfour would soon see the need to support imperial preference. Austin Chamberlain noted, "...without preferential duties it would be impossible either to raise the money required for social reform or to lower the rate of unemployment."[139]

Chamberlain believed, correctly, that resignation would give him greater freedom of action.[140] Austin Chamberlain would take his fathers place in the Cabinet. Giving up his responsibilities would give Chamberlain more time to develop his reform policy. He would also then be able to take his campaign to the people through a series of speeches. His style is made clear in his description of the typical voter. He wrote, "He seizes upon a principle or larger issue, and is quite willing to delegate to his representative all questions of detail and method."[141] Chamberlain would make

sure the public understood the "larger issues" involved in tariff reform.

While a member of the government Chamberlain had been restricted by a Cabinet compact prohibiting public statements on issues that could divide the government.[142] Yet the ability to make public addresses must be balanced by the political cost of leaving the center of power. When in office Chamberlain could use his ability to resign and, possibly breakup the government to fight for his program. Chamberlain was sure the government would move towards tariffs after he had broken the ground.[143] The P.M. had to give reform his entire backing, or Chamberlain foresaw "... we should lose a great deal of the enthusiasm which can alone carry great political changes."[144] If, however, Balfour failed to fall in line, Chamberlain believed, the government would not last long.[145] If the government fell, Chamberlain was sure he could gain the popular support to bring victory out of defeat. He said, "If my judgement is correct, it will not be very long before the whole programme is accepted by the country, and I regard this as certain if we are approaching a time of commercial depression."[146]

Balfour then moved to gain the support of the Duke of Devonshire, a moderate free trader and well respected conservative politician. If Devonshire backed the Prime Minister, Balfour would not only gain the support of the moderate free traders, but also legitimize his program to the public.[147] Unfortunately Balfour had misjudged the situation. In September 1903, the primary free traders,

Ritchie, Hamilton, and Balfour of Burleigh, left the government when retaliatory tariffs were announced.[148] It was hoped their leaving would allow room for more moderate Unionists. Chamberlain's absence would serve to diffuse fear that the government had abandoned free trade entirely. The plan broke down when Balfour failed to get Devonshire's support, the Duke then resigned in October.[149]

The government had lost the main representatives from both major factions without creating a compromise. Balfour failed to give the government a direction and worsened the party's internal struggle. Once the divisions became clear Chamberlain held back from a complete split.[150] Balfour was able to placate Chamberlain with vague assurances of reform, never making a clean break with the free traders within the party. Chamberlain had given the Unionists a policy position to rally around.[151] Yet Balfour avoided any clear policy in order to keep the different groups comprising the Unionist Party from splintering.[152] Fighting the election without a real platform, however, would insure Balfour's defeat.

Despite his failure to get Balfour's support, Chamberlain was determined to rally the general public behind the cause of protection and preference. The 1903-1904 tariff reform campaign was quite unusual. Chamberlain, although he was seen as the epitome of the Unionist position, lacked official sanction. His was a political campaign to defend the current government, yet the campaign lacked the direct backing of the government.

The Colonial Secretary adopted the methods of one of

the most successful anti-tariff organizations, the Anti-Corn Law League, to gain popular support for his tariff scheme.[153] The Anti-Corn Law League had brought about the end of tariffs on wheat fifty years earlier, through a massive propaganda campaign. Chamberlain following their lead, combined public appearances with the distribution of information in leaflets, tracts, and popular music.[154] Sir A. Pearson, owner of the Daily Express, bought the Standard in 1904 and turned it into a pro-tariff organ.[155] Soon 15 out of London's 21 newspapers worked to support Chamberlain's program.

The attempt to mold popular opinion was linked with a search for allies within the Unionist party. The Colonial Secretary would find it easy to gain support from the ordinary Unionist party member. Astute political maneuvering gave Chamberlain control of most Unionist local committees and all national organizations.[156] In May 1904, Chamberlain replaced his political rival, the Duke of Devonshire, as president of the Liberal-Unionist Association.[157] The only major party body Chamberlain would never control was the Unionist central office.[158]

1903 saw the formation of the Tariff Reform League. The League had been formed, "for the defense and development of the industrial interests of the British Empire."[159] Besides advocating the Colonial Secretary's tariff plans the League promoted imperialism as an alternative to socialism.[160]. Tariffs would provide the revenues that would improve the lives of the workers, not worker control. Chamberlain

realized the Unionists needed to offset the Liberal call for higher taxation of the rich, if they were to stay in office.[161] The Colonial Secretary did not oppose taxation because of overt sympathy for the rich, but he hoped to raise money without exploiting class conflict. One message presented by reformers was that the well being of workers depended on the well being of industry as a whole.[162] Owners and workers needed to stand together against outside competition.

Chamberlain presented a number of arguments tailored to his various audiences, to convince them of the need for reform. In return for colonial support, Chamberlain would fight for preference for colonial wine, fruit, tea, coffee, cocoa, and sugar.[163] The colonies were won over by the promise of preference, new trade opportunity, and closer imperial cooperation. Australian backing for Chamberlain's plan grew gradually.[164] South Africa and New Zealand gave their support to fiscal reform.[165] Canada was divided between a free trade West and a pro-reform East.[166] The lack of support from all Canadians surprised and disappointed Chamberlain.[167] The Colonial Secretary was, after all, following Canada's lead. In the end Canada offered Britain preference of thirty-three and a third percent, While South Africa offered twenty-five percent, and New Zealand ten percent.[168] Other colonies were also willing to negotiate.

1903 gave Chamberlain the chance to put his plan into action. In that year Chamberlain helped stop the United States from seriously damaging Malaya's tin industry.

Chamberlain successfully championed a tariff which would raise the price of tin ore, insuring that the ore would be dressed in Malaya rather than the U.S.[169] The tariff worked, and kept the important tin processing industry in the colony. Unfortunately the success of the plan could not be proven in time for the reform campaign

Chamberlain drew most support in Britain from Fair Traders. The Fair Traders advocated retaliatory tariffs to breakdown foreign barriers.[170] Fair Traders sought a middle ground between free trade and a formal union. They were willing to advocate a customs union which would eliminate colonial tariffs against British goods.[171] The Fair Traders, however, saw tariffs as a necessary evil to reestablish free trade, not as a means of strengthening the Empire.[172] Chamberlain's position forced him to accept even marginal allies.

Birmingham remained a staunch fair trade center, giving Chamberlain a secure home base.[173] Colonial and foreign tariffs were aimed primarily at British industry. The Midlands had been hit hard by the U.S.A.'s 1891 tariff.[174] The main proponents of tariff reform were the Midland metal entrepreneurs.[175] Chamberlain had owned such a business himself and continued to share the outlook of these industrialists. British manufacturers in general would benefit from protection.[176] Tariffs would promote English manufactures throughout the Empire by impeding foreign competitors. Conversely, the reduction of colonial, and where possible, foreign tariffs would aid British export of

industrial products. Closer commercial ties to the Empire would provide new opportunities to British companies restricted from foreign nations.[177] As early as 1885 the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce had been urging greater exploitation of the colonial market.[178]

Besides industrialists, Chamberlain also found adherents among English farmers threatened by imported food.[179] British farm workers would also be aided by tariffs. Lower prices for domestic food stuffs would return land to cultivation and provide greater employment.[180] Inflating prices of foreign food would obviously prove a boon for British farmers. Colonial grain producers, such as Canada, would also benefit. The Empire's food producers would have to step in to take over from foreign suppliers whose prices would have been inflated by tariffs.

Politically the cause of tariff reform would become linked to the Unionist party. Yet conservative elements within the party remained staunch free traders. A minority of Unionists favored maintaining the current fiscal system and focusing on other reforms first.[181] Others, for political or personal reasons refused to consider any limits on free trade. In 1904 anti-tariff Unionists formed the Free Food League, to highlight the threat of higher food prices.[182] Although the League collapsed rapidly, the League encouraged bargains between Free Trade Unionists and Liberals.[183] Again Chamberlain had created severe divisions within his own party.

The Colonial Secretary's methods alienated many of his

colleagues as well. Many Unionists believed opposition to Chamberlain was the only way to preserve Conservatism.[184] Many opposed Chamberlain to fight against what they saw as mob rule of the party. This was a prime consideration of those Unionists favoring the interests of the established church, the landed aristocracy, and the House of Lords.[185] These conservative Unionists had never trusted "Radical Joe" Chamberlain. England's traditional landed class fought the Liberals to avoid the land taxes the Liberal had promised to institute.[186] Yet such opposition did not always result in support for Chamberlain.

Other groups and interests continued to defend free trade and the economic status quo. British shipping had flourished under free trade. Cheap German steel for ship construction and the absence of barriers to trade to Britain insured low cost and high demand for Britain's merchant fleet.[187] Trade barriers could severely limit England's carrier trade. Ship owners were unconvinced by Chamberlain's claim that, while cargoes would change from foreign manufactures to colonial raw materials, the volume of shipping would be maintained.[188] All those employed as middlemen for foreign goods, naturally opposed tariffs.[189]

The cotton industry would lead the defense of free trade. Cotton required the new markets free trade was opening in the East as well as inexpensive raw materials for production.[190] So virulent was the cotton industries opposition to tariffs, that before the 1905 Parliamentary election the Manchester Guardian noted, "A candidate had

only to be a Free Trader to get in."[191]

The cotton industry highlighted the desire for cheap food for workers. Increased food prices remained the drawback to Chamberlain's plan. Much of Britain's food supply came from Europe and America. Tariffs would inflate the prices of food from these sources. Many employers resisted tariffs for this reason alone.[192] Britain's industrial strength owed much to cheap food.[193] Expensive food, meant higher wages for workers. British cotton owed its success to keeping operating cost low. Chamberlain favored higher wages to offset increases in food prices. Employers hoped to avoid raising wages.

Many other businesses and industries opposed tariffs for their own reasons. Tariffs could raise the price of raw materials.[194] Colonial trade could not always make up the difference. Companies which relied on materials from foreign markets, or which sold imported products would bear the brunt of the proposed tariffs. Any company involved in foreign trade had reason to fear rising prices, foreign retaliation, or both. Chamberlain believed their opposition misguided. He said, "I hear it stated by them ...that our trade with them (the colonies) is much less than our trade with foreign countries and therefore ...we should do everything in our power to cultivate trade with foreign, and that we can safely disregard the trade with our children."[195]

London's bankers continued to back free trade in order to maintain the strength of the money market on which they relied.[196] London's bankers had prospered under free trade,

and saw no need to alter the fiscal status quo. Many feared protection would insure the loss of profits generated through international banking, interest on foreign loans, and returns from the world wide insurance system.[197]

Chamberlain was not the enemy of the financial interests of London. He saw capital as an important resource which needed to be preserved within the Empire. He called capital the "sinew of Empire" and believed British capital could be used to both generate profit and to develop the colonies.[198] The Colonial Secretary only opposed those financial structures which threatened the Empire's economic self-sufficiency. Tariffs against foreign food would protect colonial trade to Britain, while keeping English capital within the Empire.[199] Only financial transactions which helped develop the industry and agriculture of the Empire had a legitimate place in Chamberlain's system. Chamberlain opposed speculation which did not produce a useful commodity. He also fought against the practice of promoting services over production. Britain needed to expand its industrial capacity, not simply become the middleman or banker of foreign nations.[200]

Tariff barriers were expected to be a great boon to British laborers. Tariffs were meant to be beneficial for groups favoring full employment.[201] Protected industries would expand, creating new jobs and offering higher wages. Further, Chamberlain promised to institute old age pensions using tariff revenue.[202] Chamberlain realized the working class would pay three fourths of any tax on food.[203]

Chamberlain, however, was willing to use all the revenue tariffs produced to improve the lives of the working class. The rich would, therefore, contribute to social reform, but would not be expected to have to pay the entire cost.[204]

British trade, and in turn the position of workers, had become threatened due to its own success. Britain's expanding trade had led to the imposition of tariff barriers aimed primarily at Britain. In addition, improved working conditions and higher wages had increased the cost of production for British firms.[205] Britain's workers had benefited from her economic prosperity. Yet these advances increased the price of British goods. Chamberlain warned that the need to keep British products competitive required the imposition of tariffs or the reversal of previous reforms. He made clear that the improved condition of the working class needed to be protected. He pointed out to English workers,

> "You cannot keep your work at this higher standard of living and pay if at the same time you allow foreigners at a lower standard and lower rate of pay to send their goods freely in competition with yours."[206]

Tariffs would serve to keep British manufactured goods competitive within the Empire by increasing the cost of foreign goods. If Britain failed in the market place workers would be the first to suffer. Protection provided the means to increase the benefits gained by workers, while protecting British trade. All Englishmen could expect to share in the greater prosperity industrial expansion and increased

colonial trade would create. The treasury would use the funds from tariffs to improve conditions at home and in the colonies. Chamberlain stated, "Imperial progress and social progress at home should converge towards unified, or at least harmonized ideals."[207] Imperial possession had become openly equated with domestic prosperity.[208]

The greatest factor limiting support for tariff reform remained fear of high food prices. Many remembered the hardships of the 1840's caused by tariffs forcing up food prices. Colonial sources, even when granted preferential rates, could not totally replace foreign supplies of food. Cheap food was of more immediate concern to workers than an united Empire.[209] A tax on food was essential to Chamberlain's entire scheme. He acknowledged this fact, "I do not propose a tax on raw materials, which are a necessity of our manufacturing trade. What remains? Food. Therefore if you wish to have a preference, ... if you wish to prevent separation, you must put a tax on food."[210] Later, Chamberlain would realize he had underestimated opposition to higher food prices.[211]

Chamberlain tried hard to gain worker support for his cause. The focus of his first tariff reform campaign was the working class.[212] Chamberlain even used fear of high food prices in his defense of protection. He stated,

> "it is not a comforting reflection to think that we, part of the British Empire, that might be self-sufficient and self-contained, are nevertheless dependent ... for four-fifths of our supplies on foreign countries, any one of which by shutting their doors on us might reduce us to a state of almost absolute starvation."[213]

In Birmingham Chamberlain illustrated his position by holding up two loaves of bread before his audience.[214] One loaf contained slightly less flour to represent higher costs due to tariffs. Yet the two loaves were virtually indistinguishable. Chamberlain hoped the simple demonstration would prove to the working class the hollowness of their fear of higher food prices. The Colonial Secretary hoped to convert the laboring class to tariff reform through logical argument. Chamberlain backed up the illustration of the two loaves with other arguments to sell his cause to the working class.

It was clear to Chamberlain that tariffs allowed greater production and improved conditions for workers. To gather support advocates of tariff reform provided funds for workers, the "tariff-trippers", to visit German factories to report on conditions there.[215] Such workers provided first hand knowledge of the success of the German system, while they formed a cadre of labor support for Chamberlain's tariff policy. These pro-tariff workers, however, proved unable to generate widespread support.

The issue of full employment and higher wages remained at the center of Chamberlain's argument. He asked, while addressing the issue of social problems, "What is the whole problem as it affects the working classes of this country? It is all contained in one word, Employment."[216] Food prices remained an issue only so long as one had work. Chamberlain

argued that most misunderstood the historical background of tariffs. The poor position of the working class before the repeal of the Corn Laws was not due to tariffs, but unemployment and low wages.[217] He claimed, "It is a mistake to suppose that the best method of giving relief to the labouring classes is simply to operate on the articles consumed by them. If you want to do them the maximum good you should rather operate on articles which give them the maximum of employment."[218] Reducing taxes was not the solution, but rather increasing employment. Problems in British industry had been caused when production had surpassed the capacity of foreign markets.[219] These problems had disappeared as foreign economies had expanded. The U.S.A. served as an example of a nation where the cost of living was high, but where better wages allowed an superior standard of living.[220]

On the issue of food prices, Chamberlain turned to W.A.S. Hewins, former director of the London School of Economics, for effective arguments in favor of reform. Hewins became the main economic advisor for the tariff reformers and Secretary of the Tariff Commission.[221] The Tariff Commission had been formed by the Tariff Reform League to gather and disseminate information and statistics on tariffs. Chamberlain hoped to undermine Liberal criticism by bringing into question the premise that tariffs insured higher food prices. Hewins argued that the repeal of the original Corn Laws and spread of free trade had not lowered the price of grain. Prices had fallen because of the

development of America's wheat lands, combined with advances in technology allowing grain to be transported cheaply.[222] Chamberlain was confident that he could win the working class to his side by eliminating their fear of rising prices or by focusing on full employment.

Chamberlain refused to accept the argument that those workers who lost their jobs when a trade was destroyed by foreign competition could gain employment elsewhere.[223] Skilled workers especially could not hope to maintain their standard of living if forced to learn a new trade. Tariffs, by protecting British industry, would make factory closings less likely.

Chamberlain, was never able to get the support of organized labor. Trade unions remained convinced of the value of free trade, favoring internationalism over imperialism.[224] Chamberlain failed in his attempt to argue that free trade and trade unionism were incompatible.[225] Unions saw their best interests as being served by working within the old economic structure, using organization and the power of the strike to gain more for workers. If the common worker lacked their leaders' ideological ties to the workers of the world, they knew that tariffs meant higher food prices. Promises of pensions, full employment, and higher wages never overcame this basic fear. The improved economic situation severely damaged worker support for tariff reform. It was hard to justify drastic change when the economic climate seemed good and the position of the worker was improving.

Resistance to Chamberlain's proposals provided a perfect opportunity to the Liberals. A defense of free trade became a rallying cry to unite Liberals, at the same time as it increased their popular support. Tariff reform gave the Liberals the backing of free trade Unionists, workingmen and their political organizations, textile manufacturers, shipping magnates, and bankers.[226] The Liberals central appeal remained criticism of rising food prices and loss of trade.[227] Liberal critics pointed to the success of Britain's economy. They thought it foolish to tamper with a policy which had proved successful.[228] As an alternative to tariffs, the Liberals promised to redistribute wealth through land taxes.[229]

In spite of the Colonial Secretary's efforts to enlist support, his plan proved doomed to failure. Free trade, having the advantage of any current orthodox economic system, continued to gain adherents. Free trade had brought riches and power to Britain. Any attempt to interfere with freedom of trade was looked at with suspicion. The timing of Chamberlain's campaign for tariff reform limited its popular support even more. Trade slumps were commonplace, but the economic crisis that Chamberlain forecast was not readily apparent.[230] He stated, "It is not what we have got now, but the question is how long shall we keep it, and how much we shall keep of it."[231] It was true that by 1903 more problems were beginning to appear. The boom in shipping and railways had ended, and the cotton industry was in decline.[232] Throughout the country unemployment was increasing. While

some industries may have been experiencing difficulties, but the overall economic climate was, in fact, quite good. If some industries were experiencing trouble, others were doing very well.[233] Tariff reform would have had far greater support if there had been more economic distress.

It was not clear that the colonies could make up for the loss of foreign trade. In 1900 British trade to foreign nations totaled 711 million pounds, while trade to the colonies valued 237 million.[234] Chamberlain saw this trend as strengthening foreign nations at the expense of the Empire. Possible enemies were growing rich through trade to Britain, not the colonies. Chamberlain's opponents saw the numbers differently. They saw the need to promote greater foreign trade, not colonial trade, as the way to bring greater prosperity to Britain.

Colonial trade was increasing in volume, but trade between the colonies and Britain was declining.[235] The statistics of declining trade suggests the colonies were looking less attractive as markets. It was often easier for colonies to trade with neighboring states rather than Britain. Chamberlain's opponents believed this trend to be natural and irreversible. Chamberlain saw the results differently. He asked, "Do you think it better to cultivate trade with your own people, or to let that go in order that you may get the trade of those who rightly enough are your competitors and rivals?"[236]

Chamberlain made a severe tactical error in his 1903 reform campaign. He failed to highlight the fact that higher

wages and old age pensions would compensate for slightly higher food prices.[237] Instead of showing that his plan had taken higher prices into consideration, he backed down. He now offered lower duties on some items to make up for new tariffs on others. The duties on tea and sugar would be decreased to make up for higher duties on grain.[238] No doubt Chamberlain took this course to court Balfour who opposed tariffs because they threatened to raise the cost of living.[239] Juggling the tariff rates was simply an indecisive retreat which only served to confuse the real issue.

In July of 1904 Chamberlain launched his second tariff reform campaign. The first campaign had focused on the cites of the industrial heartland, the second was aimed to reach Britain's agricultural regions.[240] British agriculture, as well as industry, was also threatened by unrestricted foreign imports. The growing and processing of agricultural products needed to be preserved. Chamberlain claimed, "Sugar has gone; silk has gone; ... ; wool is threatened; cotton will go."[241] Chamberlain stressed that in the past no nation had produced enough agricultural surplus to compete with British farmers. This had changed. Not only were British agricultural goods kept out of foreign markets, but foreign food was also being dumped in Britain.[242] The English farmer was suffering due to free trade.

Tariffs against grain would allow British growers to benefit from higher prices.[243] If, as Chamberlain predicted, Britain's grain production was expanded to meet the new

demand, prices could fall again.[244] France had imposed higher duties than those which Chamberlain proposed, yet the prices of meat and wheat had fallen.[245] Chamberlain, however, neglected to examine differences in the amount of cultivatable land between France and Britain, or differences in farm wages. Few were convinced that prices would fall. The coming election highlighted the limits of rural support for tariff reform. The Liberals were able to dominate the rural areas by promising cheap food and "land for the people".[246]

Chamberlain was beginning to doubt the government's ability to stay in office. The time for the next General Election was drawing near. The second campaign's other aim, therefore, was to lessen any Liberal lead.[247] Ironically, in 1905 the Tariff Reform League, was the only national Unionist organization capable of waging an effective campaign.[248] Yet Balfour's government was still not prepared to accept Chamberlain's policy.

By 1904 Chamberlain was hoping to rebuild the Unionist party from scratch.[249] In May 1905 a compromise with his opponents in the party seemed likely. Chamberlain would reenter the Cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. He would agree to stop working for reform on his own.[250] The P.M., however, feeling pressure from the Free Traders changed his mind. It still appeared that Balfour's position in the party was untenable. In November Chamberlain openly challenged Balfour, and got the backing of the local party organization, the National Union of Conservative

Associations.[251]

As before, Chamberlain's timing was off. Chamberlain could not afford a complete split from Balfour.[252] Chamberlain was never completely secure in his leadership of the reformist wing of th Unionist party, and he lacked a clear crisis to justify breaking up the party. [253] Many Unionists supported Chamberlain's aims, but they were not ready to rebel against their party leader.[254] Chamberlain even had trouble keeping his followers in line. Many in the Tariff Reform League saw the need for tariffs, but balked at the idea of imperial preference.[255] Preference insured a rise in food prices, while selective tariffs did not. He was forced to abandon the position that tariff revenue alone could finance social reform. Balfour managed to keep his faltering government in office until 1905, blocking Chamberlain and allowing the Liberals time to rally.[256]

In the election of 1905 Chamberlain tried to run on the strength of his policy alone.[257] He hoped tariff reform would give the Unionists a firm domestic policy with which to oppose the Liberals.[258] The failure to unify the Unionists, however, insured that tariff reform was not presented as effectively as it might have been.[259] The election was a Liberal landslide. There had been no defeat as great in living memory. The Liberals took 400 seats in the House of Commons, up from 186. The Unionists held only 157.[260] Unionist infighting and the lack of a coherent policy had given the Liberals the government.[261]

Chamberlain's plan for reform, which was meant to give

the Unionists a firm policy, served to split the Party into rival factions.[262] If Balfour had accepted Chamberlain's position in 1903 the Unionists would have had a good chance of victory.[263] Instead Balfour had vacillated, hoping to please everyone, he succeeded in satisfying no one. Further, his failure to enumerate a clear party policy allowed the opposing factions to consolidate their own positions.[264] Without the backing of Balfour, as the Party's representative, Chamberlain's plan could not succeed.

The nation had become disillusioned by the lack of Unionist social reform during the debate over fiscal reform. Chamberlain himself was widely condemned as having promised reform, but instead brought about war in South Africa.[265] Many voters had been alienated by Balfour's 1902 Education Act which subsidized church schools through real estate taxes.[266] The Liberals had won over the Trade Unions by promising to eliminate the burdens of the Taff Vale decision.[267] The Irish went over to the Liberals, after being promised a gradual move to Home Rule.[268] Unionist support for the use of indentured Chinese labor in South Africa lost them more votes.[269] The Unionists also suffered the basic disadvantage of a party in office for many years. The Liberals were able to criticize ten years of Unionist government, as well as offer their own programs.

Opposition to tariff reform further hastened the defeat of the Unionist government. The Liberals were able to unite to defend free trade, while the Unionists could not rally behind reform.[270] During the election many constituencies

saw a struggle between Liberals, Chamberlain's tariff reformers, and Conservative free traders.[271] The Unionists continued to support empire, but they failed to adopt Chamberlain's plan to rationalize an imperial system. The Liberal promises to reduce unemployment, establish old age pensions, recultivate the land, and improve Britain's technical schools allowed them to double the number of votes they had received in 1900.[272]

Chamberlain's cause gave the Liberals the chance to retake the government. The cost of the Empire could be reduced in one of two ways. Chamberlain wished to make the Empire more efficient and self-sufficient by drawing the colonies closer to the mother country using tariffs. The Liberals were able to reduce costs by giving the colonies more independence. Revenue for social programs was also available without tampering with free trade. Once in office, the Liberals set about increasing the taxes on the rich.[273] The working class was spared the cost of high food prices and the economy continued to experience an upswing.[274]

There were many reasons for the failure of the tariff reform campaign. The radical nature of the changes Chamberlain demanded limited support within his own party. His plan required a rejection of Britain's liberal tradition.[275] Many felt protection would lead to the loss of more trade than the colonies could compensate for.[276] The majority of the Unionists continued to rely on free trade as the means to economic success. Opposition to Chamberlain within the Unionist ranks was deep seated. Tories, the

champions of the Anglican Church and the hereditary nobility, continued to distrust the former Radical.[277] The Tories were willing to oppose any attack on the status quo. The Treasury balked at the expense of Chamberlain's reform policy.[278] A new fiscal structure would have to be put in place, not only to collect the tariffs, but also to insure the law was not circumvented. Chamberlain's wish that colonial contributions to imperial defense would win the Treasury to his side proved unrealistic.[279]

Chamberlain's argument was not without flaws. The major industries suffering setbacks, such as iron, steel, and coal, had problems that were not caused by foreign competition.[280] Problems in these industries were caused by limits in management rather than by outside factors.[281] In such cases, the Liberals argued, tariffs would simply protect inefficient industries while limiting productive reform.[282] Chamberlain failed to prove that improved technology and greater efficiency in industry would not solve Britain's problems more effectively than tariffs.[283]

There were other defects in Chamberlain's policy. Most imports to Britain were raw materials which would not be taxed.[284] Such imports would not generate funds for reform. Chamberlain's plan also included a major contradiction The revenue for reform required imports which could be taxed. Yet tariffs were also designed to protect domestic industry by blocking foreign imports.[285] If foreign imports were restricted, there would be no revenue. By 1905 Chamberlain himself realized this contradiction made it impossible for

tariffs to both protect industry and raise revenues for social reform.[286] The twin aims of tariff barriers were incompatible. Preference insured that revenue created by inter-imperial trade would remain limited.

Chamberlain never made clear what role of the African and tropical colonies would be. Would the Protectorates be given preference, or would they be exempted from British duties? Would African colonies be forced to impose tariffs on foreign goods? Confusion over such details limited the appeal of fiscal reform. The neglect of the African and tropical colonies is understandable, given their lessor value as trading partners. Yet their exclusion becomes more noticeable when Chamberlain's promise to develop these colonies is remembered.

Chamberlain made another mistake by failing to fully consider the implications of his plan for India, the linch-pin of the British Empire. The fact that India had never fallen under the Colonial Secretary's jurisdiction proved a great handicap when he proposed Empire wide reform. As a result Chamberlain could give no conclusive answer as to how India would fit into the tariff system. He said India might become a full member of the tariff structure, or she could "stand out" of the system.[287] Yet both of these options would create grave hardship in the colony. Tariffs threatened India's extensive export trade.[288] India's favorable balance of trade insured she favored free trade. Even if India remained outside the system, where she would not enjoy the benefits of imperial preference, she might

face foreign retaliatory tariffs. Even small increases in food prices could drive large portions of the Indian population towards starvation.[289] It would not be fair to the other colonies to extent preference to India without giving her the same responsibilities as the other colonies. Chamberlain's failure to consider India gave his opposition new opportunities to attack his plan.[290]

Chamberlain took a questionable approach to the issue of fiscal reform. Protection and retaliatory tariffs had considerable popular support in Britain.[291] Britain already had tariffs designed solely to produce revenue.[292] Chamberlain simply needed to convince the nation that these duties needed to be expanded. Colonial preference had only limited appeal to Englishmen and created considerable opposition. Many feared tying Britain's economy to the colonies. Chamberlain would have found it much easier to convince the country of the value of tariffs before addressing the theme of preference. On the other hand, the colonies expected immediate rewards for the advantages they provided Britain. Chamberlain chose to fight for the entire program, tariffs and preference, at once hoping to highlight those elements favored both in England and the colonies.[293]

Surprisingly the belief that the world at large would retaliate against Britain if she established protective tariffs, was mistaken.[294] Most foreign nations, having erected their own trade barriers, understood the wish to protect domestic industry and profit from foreign trade. Chamberlain could have brought this fact to the public's

attention more dramatically. By presenting the foreign position, Chamberlain could have reinforced the idea that Britain's current imports were too small. Tariffs could be shown to advance domestic industry as well as produce revenue. This argument would also counter critics who believed Britain's present duties were sufficient.[295]

While there were problems in Chamberlain's defense of reform, other Unionists had no policy alternative with which to rally popular support. After the 1905 defeat of the Unionists, tariff reform became a party platform simply because the party had no other defined policy with which to oppose the Liberals.[296] In the wake of the electoral defeat Balfour, to keep control of the Unionist Party, accepted the general outline of Chamberlain's policy.[297] Of the 157 Unionist M.P.s returned to office, 102 stood with Chamberlain, 36 with Balfour, and 16 for free trade.[298]

In spite of his precarious position, Balfour continued to resist any further democratization of the party.[299] In 1906 Chamberlain asked for a party meeting to determine support for Tariffs, ways to eliminate free traders from the party, and ways to expand the democratic basis of the party.[300] Chamberlain realized that it was the Conservative party hierarchy which opposed fiscal reform, not the typical Unionist. Balfour avoided the precedent of convening a party meeting determine policy by giving Chamberlain his personal support in an open letter, rather than putting the issues to a vote.[301] Balfour's agreement gave Chamberlain new hope. He now believed it would be possible to undermine the Liberals

by calling for greater social reform than the new government while defending continuity in imperial policy.[302] Such a policy had proven successful in Chamberlain's Radical days. Unfortunately he never had the time to consolidate his new position.

Chamberlain reached his 70th birthday in July 1906. Although weary from a number of public celebrations, he remained ready to begin a new political struggle for tariff reform.[303] The Birmingham politician was finally forced to pay the price of years of stress and overwork. On the evening of July 11, Chamberlain suffered a stroke which paralyzed his right side. In spite of partial recovery, the stroke ended his active participation in politics. He would remain interested in the quest for tariff reform until his death in 1914, but his physical condition would not allow his real involvement. His removal from the scene eliminated the driving force behind tariff reform.

The pre-war years brought about a steady failing of the reform movement. Austin Chamberlain had been passed up for leadership of the Unionist Party.[304] By 1911 the Liberal-Unionist Party had been absorbed by the Conservatives.[305] The Conservative leader, Bonar Law, had been forced to abandon the quest for tariff reform, in order to keep Free Traders within the party.[306] In Canada, where the main colonial impetus for reform can be said to have originated, overtures were made to the U.S.A. for reciprocal trade.[307] Although the treaty failed, it marked Canada's shift away from ties to Britain to local commercial ties.

If the political bodies Chamberlain had created had failed, the ideas he had championed continued to exert influence. Tariffs provided a way to finance social reform without raising direct taxes and continued to gain adherents.[308] Chamberlain was able to make the argument that the Liberals had to finance reform from the pockets of Englishmen, while his scheme would use tariffs to make foreigners pay for progress in Britain.[309] Chamberlain's was a conservative means to avoid class conflict while elevating the living standards of the working class and modernizing Britain's industry.[310] It would take the Great Depression to prove that Britain's economy was not impervious to distress. In 1929, at the Ottawa Commonwealth Conference, Neville Chamberlain set up the first system of imperial preference.[311]

V-CONCLUSION

Joseph Chamberlain saw imperialism as the solution to a variety of problems facing Britain. Poverty, unemployment, declining trade, class inequalities, and loss of influence could all be reversed through imperialism. Chamberlain, as a social imperialist, believed the Empire would make social reform in Britain possible by strengthening the national economy and providing revenue. Colonies would provide markets and raw materials that Britain could use to improve the standard of living of all Englishmen. Chamberlain was willing to fight the Boers in South Africa to protect imperial markets and resources.

He supported imperial expansion throughout Africa in order to acquire more resources for Britain. New colonies in Africa were valued because of the economic assets they could provide the Empire. This explains the primary importance of the settler colonies in the Colonial Secretary's scheme. Canada, Australia, and South Africa had large British populations and expanding economies, both of which were needed to keep the Empire strong. Most of Africa had only minor value. Chamberlain realized this, but even a small return was better than none. The economic resources of the settler colonies and the undeveloped colonies of Africa and elsewhere could only be secure if they became part of the Empire.

In spite of widespread support, Chamberlain's imperial

blue-print would remain uncompleted. The South African War had proven to Chamberlain that he was correct in viewing the weakening of the imperial tie as a danger to the Empire. Granting the Boer Republics independence had created threat to British possessions in South Africa. The war also provided Chamberlain with the opportunity to push for a commercial union based on tariffs and imperial preference. A post-war outcry for national efficiency convinced Chamberlain the nation was ready to listen to his plans for reform. Chamberlain, however, could not persuade the British public that free trade was a threat to England's future prosperity. Not even Britain's working class, those Chamberlain had tried hardest to help, were willing to accept tariffs which threatened to increase food prices.

Chamberlain had believed imperialism would solve social problems in Great Britain. The Empire provided the resource base and strength to create a prosperity unparalleled in her history. The colonies would also benefit from imperial control, but problems in England were more immediate to Chamberlain. Chamberlain's brand of imperialism, however, was not designed to cope with the contradiction between English control and humanitarianism. He would never accept social progress at home, if the price was distress in the colonies. On a more pragmatic level, widespread resistance to imperial control made imperialism too expensive to allow greater prosperity in England. Without realizing it Chamberlain had glimpsed the death of the Empire in the Kopjies of the Transvaal. Chamberlain's social imperialism

was structured to use the Empire to advance social reform. This aim would be impossible if all England's energy was required simply to keep the the alliance of the colonies.

Chamberlain thought that the good of all was best achieved through mutual cooperation between the colonies and Britain. Simple profit for businessmen or even wealth for Britain, as Hobson suggests, was never the goal. Military security was not the prime focus of the Empire either. Power was vital, both economic and military, but not for its own sake. Power allowed the improvement of social conditions throughout the Empire. Chamberlain outlined the twin objectives of his thirty year career,

> "The first of these objects is the consideration of what is called the condition of the people; ... in order to improve the condition of the people, to elevate their lives, to give them, and especially the poorest of them, a better chance in the competition which is always going on. And in the second place, what has most interested me has been a consideration of ... the future of the Empire of which the country forms a part. "1

Chamberlain believed imperialism insured a better life for all Britain's subjects. Yet the quest for political independence had started undermining the colonies loyalty to Britain. Chamberlain's Empire would have proved unattainable even with support in England because the colonial peoples had come to believe their happiness was only possible through independence. In 1903 Chamberlain had stated, "You may yet see a teeming population of the various races, of divergent interests, that go to make up the British Empire, united by a common bond - one life, one flag, one fleet, one throne."[2] He did not realize how fast this dream was

slipping away.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1-The Economic School

J. A. Hobson argued that the machinations of finance capitalists forced Britain into Africa.[1] In seeking motives for the new wave of colonial expansion from the late 1870's until around 1900, Hobson first examined Britain's domestic scene. It was here he believed the answer lay. To find the reason for imperial expansion, Hobson initially eliminated other possible explanations. There appeared to be no military threat from Africa. Foreign competition did not force the British to expand. Trade patterns favored Britain, so there was no need to gain new markets. Trade to the colonies was, in fact, decreasing at the time of the acquisition of Africa.[2] Manufacturers and traders had little to gain in the African markets.[3] Further, the domestic economy had the ability to absorb a virtually limitless supply of goods, labor, and capital.[4]

The stable foundation of the domestic economy and the success of foreign trade led Hobson to believe the cause of imperialism lay elsewhere. What had changed in the late Victorian period was the amount of English capital invested abroad. Foreign investment had in fact doubled between 1884 and 1900.[5] A further connection between finance and imperialism appeared to be the influence of bankers in London and the importance of their foreign holdings. For example, South African and English financiers seemed instrumental in bringing about the Boer War through their

calls for British intervention.

Hobson took such information and worked it into a simple cause and effect formula. There had been a dramatic increase in foreign investment. Financiers were interested in Africa. Yet trade to the newly acquired colonies was of only minor importance. The bankers must, therefore, be interested in outlets for capital. Using their vast economic power, financiers put pressure on the British government to gain these new outlets. Hobson states, "Imperialism implies the use of the machinery of government by private interests,..., to secure for them, economic gains outside their mother country."[6] Hobson believed the expensive and dangerous path of colonial expansion had been chosen to benefit only a small financial clique.

Hobson next offered an explanation of the sudden financial need for new colonies. By the late Victorian period wealth had become concentrated in the hands of a super-rich elite. This concentration of wealth forced interest rates down by reducing the buying power of Britain's lower and middle classes.[7] Most consumers lacked buying power, while those few with extra funds could not purchase enough to keep the economy growing. The effect of such underconsumption was felt most strongly by the rich elite.[8] A stagnant economy created a decline in interest rates, which hurt the rich by lowering profits from the investments on which they relied. The roots of imperialism lay, therefore in the domestic economy.[9] Only when the home

economy became limited, did outward expansion begin.

Wage increases could have countered declining interest by putting more money into circulation, regenerating the economy, and increasing the demand for capital. Yet the top of the financial hierarchy sought higher rates of interest that would not jeopardize their monopoly of wealth.[10] Such interest rates could be found in the less developed colonies, where rates remained higher because of a scarcity of capital. Africa, Hobson believed, was the answer. Imperialism in Africa provided better investment opportunities.[11]

Investment in African colonies had other advantages as well. Undeveloped territories would need sources of capital to modernize, boosting interest rates. The government itself would also seek loans to develop these colonies. Parliament would be responsible for providing administration, transportation, and troops for the colonies, creating the stabile atmosphere investors sought.[12] This position confirms Rosa Luxemburg's claim that, "political power is nothing but a vehicle for the economic process."[13] Rich bankers grew wealthier by pressing the government for new colonies in Africa, while passing the cost of Empire on to the common Briton and African.

Government intervention in Africa was, Hobson believed, easily achieved by the powerful financiers working behind the scenes. It was simple for bankers to utilize the propaganda potential of the press. The promise of the wealth of Africa could be exaggerated. Outcries over threats to

British citizens and honor could be manipulated to bring about military intervention.[14] Financiers could also use their wealth to back military, religious, commercial, and administrative groups which promoted African expansion.[15] Hobson believed the government was driven by these bankers to gain territories they would not otherwise have sought and which were worthless to the majority of Britain's population.

Lenin adopted Hobson's data to prove a theory which had much in common with Hobson's. Lenin also believed imperialism was caused by financiers seeking outlets for surplus capital. Yet Lenin saw monopoly as the basis of imperialism. In the late 1870's banks used their concentrated wealth to gain control of whole industries.[16] Competition limited profits, so cartels were formed and rivals eliminated.[17] Centralization spread as the banks took over the means of production and raw materials in addition to money capital.[18] As Hobson suggested, once the rich could no longer invest their surplus capital in the domestic economy at the former rate of profit, they began to look elsewhere. Surplus capital was not distributed among the workers since this would lead to a decline in profits.[19] Imperialism resulted when financiers began to direct government power outward in a quest for new territories to be brought under their control.

The new imperialism was differentiated from all other stages of imperialism because of monopoly and the export of capital over goods.[20] Africa appealed to financiers because

it lacked indigenous financial structures that could compete with European monopolies for labor and raw materials.[21] In such areas financiers could gain the greatest possible return on their investment capital. Lenin assumed European governments automatically accepted the direction of financiers.[22] The protected colonial markets insured prices in Europe would not fall, nor would wages increase.[23]

The financiers and, in turn, the entire imperialist nation begins to exploit the colony. Imperialism also serves as a means of avoiding class conflict by shifting the most brutal class exploitation abroad. The profits of the Empire are used to bribe the working class so that they too support expansion.[24] Slight wage increases pacified the European worker, while African workers were forced to work at starvation levels. Only this ability allowed capitalism to survive. The acquisition of colonies also serves, many Marxists believe, to distract the workers from poor conditions at home with visions of imperial grandeur.[25] Lenin expanded on Hobson's ideas. Lenin made imperialism a necessary stage in the development of capitalism.[26] Imperialism is not an end in itself, but is simply a means of prolonging the capitalist system. The socialist revolution was to occur when the exploitation of the colonies no longer provided the means to deceive the workers in the industrial nations of Europe.

Lenin's theory was used by later historians to explain all imperialism. Yet Lenin was examining a very specific period of time. Lenin stated, the monopoly stage of

capitalism which causes imperialism, occurred after the turn of the 20th century. It occurred, therefore, after the scramble for Africa.[27] The fact that Lenin focused only on the period preceding World War I limits the usefulness of Marxist theory based on his work.[28] Other limits of the Marxist school become apparent through criticism of Hobson's economic theory of imperialism. Marxist historians, like others of the economic school fail to prove that the economic motive drove imperial expansion.

Hobson had created a theory that established a motive for colonial expansion in Africa, next he suggested who benefited, and finally sketched out how expansion was promoted. Yet Hobson's theory has grave defects which are integral to its seemingly simple and clear process of cause and effect.[29] The first major flaw in Hobson's argument was due to the imprecision of his data. Foreign investment had increased, but Hobson did not look at where the capital was going. Most investment flowing out of England did not go to the new African colonies, but to America and the long established "white" colonies. Most of Africa was totally unsuited to large scale capital export. This oversight shakes the foundation of the remainder of Hobson's economic explanation of African imperialism. Lenin and his Marxist followers base important portions of their theories on Hobson's spurious data. Later economic and Marxist historians attempt to strengthen the case for the financial basis of the scramble by arguing that Africa remained economically attractive to private interests, and that these

interests were able to insure expansion. In this, both they and Hobson fail.

Statistics make clear that Africa was not important as an outlet for capital. Between the years 1870 and 1900 the U.S.A. was the largest borrower of British capital. Investment which did take place within the Empire usually avoided Africa. Ninety percent of British investment remained within Britain, the settler colonies or went abroad.[30] Only one sixth of the remaining ten percent went to Africa. Such a small amount could not have had the impact on British financiers that Hobson claims. Most capital went to the settler colonies or India. The most economically important part of the African continent, South Africa, had been a part of the Empire for generations. It was these well established colonies, often having a large British population, which were important to Britain. Investment, naturally, sought these colonies rather than the new, underdeveloped African colonies. An 1886 Royal Commission stated it would be more beneficial to develop current markets rather than open new areas.[31] The settler colonies provided a stabile atmosphere for investment as well as expanding industry, transportation, communication, and agriculture. The colonies with responsible governments, however, kept investment returns at competitive levels to protect colonists needing capital.[32]

The Empire as a whole did not provide the main outlet for investors looking for opportunities outside Britain, nor were high interest rates created.[33] In some African colonies

trade and investment had been greater before annexation.[34] Imperial control insured greater protection for investors, but greater risk meant higher returns. Capital sent to Europe and America produced higher profits, with little real risk given the stability of these areas.[35] Further, it must be noted that nations, like Russia and Italy, expanded their empires with limited capital resources.[36] There was no financial need for new colonies in Africa.

Economics alone cannot explain the "New" imperialism which resulted in the partition of Africa. Hobson's theory of underconsumption and surplus capital is further flawed. The idea that capital needed to be exported to compensate for falling profits had first been defended by Jeremy Bentham at the start of the 19th century.[37] At this time, however, the leading economic experts, such as Bentham and J.S. Mill, argued for the abandonment of Empire.[38] As far as most of Africa was concerned, given the area's lack of economic value, the earlier view is more valid.

No financial crisis severe enough to alter Britain's investment patterns is apparent.[39] The African markets were limited or non-existent. Imperial control was costly and often destabilizing. African wars were numerous, and there was a constant threat that these wars could escalate into a European conflict. The price of Empire in Africa required its maintenance prove vital to the mother country. Only the advance of state power, not economic gain for a few individuals, made the cost of imperialism acceptable.[40]

Hobson also fails to explain why certain classes

supported imperialism. It would seem to be more beneficial for financiers to oppose conflicts that would disrupt the status quo. The financial network relies on stability to get a return. London bankers were generally opposed to imperialism as disruptive of trade and investment, both of which flourished in relative peace.[41] During the Boer War French and German banks make great profits while British banks were left behind.[42]

Agreement between manufacturers themselves could not even be relied on. Not all were fooled by exaggerated stories about African markets.[43] Others dealt in products which would not find African buyers. Yet all would be expected to contribute to the cost of Empire. Higher taxes and possible disruption of more important European markets led many to discourage expansion.

Financial and industrial interests were, in fact, opposed. Hobson neglects to examine the actual conflict of interest between bankers and manufacturers. The geographic division between London based financiers and northern industrialists had a parallel in basic ideological differences. Bankers believed it was possible to improve Britain's economic position through the use of finance capital alone.[44]

The rise of British banking had proceeded parallel to a decline in production.[45] Investment did not necessarily benefit from decline in manufacturing, but neither was it hurt by industrial decline. A declining industrial base was, therefore, not seen as a threat by financiers. Bankers

accelerated such decline by sending capital abroad.[46] Energy should be devoted to expanding the financial infrastructure, they believed, not the industrial one. Financiers saw Britain's role to be the financial capital of the world, not the industrial one. Given Hobson's premise, only those areas of the Empire which could absorb surplus capital were valued by bankers.

Hobson's claim that imperialism hurt the English working class is not proven. Workers, in fact, often benefited from ties to the Empire. Trade to Canada, Australia, South Africa, and India elevated the standard of living in Britain as well as the profit margin.[47] Emigration to the colonies enabled many to begin a better life. Cheap land was available in many African colonies to encourage immigration and draw badly needed skilled labor to the colonies. The imperial civil service provided many middle class men with careers, while the Army provided work for working class men who could not find jobs in Britain. The development of the colonies provided opportunities for all levels of British society.

APPENDIX 2-Strategic School

Unlike Hobson and Lenin, Robinson and Gallagher believe the appeal of Africa was based on strategic considerations, not financial need. They see no pressing economic need for African expansion. Some areas, like Griqualand West, could have been economically exploited without being made a part of the Empire.[1] Other areas were only developed to help pay for their administration.[2] Britain had even tried to give control of Egypt to a council of the Great Powers.[3] The market potential of most areas was examined only after expansion had taken place.[4]

Control of Africa was necessary, however, to protect the sea routes to Britain's Eastern Empire. The Cape Colony had been acquired at the end of the Napoleonic War to provide bases on the southern route to India. India was a central consideration in most of Britain's imperial policy. India, besides being an important market, was the administrative center of England's Eastern Empire.[5] The Indian Army doubled the size of the Empire's armed forces, at no cost to the British tax payer. Lord Rosebery would say that Britain's foreign policy was, "mainly guided by considerations of what was best for our Indian Empire."[6] The completion of the Suez canal opened a new route and redirected British interest to northern Africa. Disraeli's purchase of Suez stock and Gladstone's military intervention in Egypt were aimed at protecting this strategic route to

the East. Robinson and Gallagher see the long standing desire of London to protect these two routes as the main force driving expansion into Africa.

The fact that Africa had been important strategically for a long period disputes Hobson's and Lenin's arguments for a "new" imperialism. Robinson and Gallagher defend the idea that the motives for expansion in Africa did not change, only the style.[7] They suggest that for decades Britain had been pursuing an "imperialism of free trade".[8] From the start of the 19th century the British sought only to open new areas to her trade, not to gain new colonies. At this time, "the main engine of expansion was enterprise."[9] The use of force or possible annexation followed only where free trade was excluded.[10] With the promotion of trade as the primary goal, imperial expansion was often unnecessary and expensive. Even by the 1880's, Robinson and Gallagher believe, there was no desire to acquire colonies in Africa.

In the mid-19th century, London could protect her trading interests within a loose "informal" Empire.[11] Political pressure sufficed to maintain influence. Subject peoples were allowed to keep their own institutions if they did not interfere with trade. Britain faced little outside competition and indigenous peoples were too weak to resist. Africa, except for a few strategic outposts, remained a part of this informal Empire. There was no major threat to either the Cape route or the Canal. The English had no desire or need to promote formal Empire in Africa.

What changed in the 1880's was the ability to protect

trade and strategic routes without formal annexation. At this time, Robinson and Gallagher argue, the old status quo was breaking down. A series of unconnected crises in the African political scene destroyed the peace under which trade had flourished and the eastern routes had been protected.[12] The most important of these crises were caused by the growth of Egyptian and Boer nationalism. These two movements threatened the most strategically important areas of Africa.

It was not coincidence that unrest began in those areas where Britain was most involved. Cooperation had been possible between Englishmen and Africans in the early stages of their contact. Such collaboration had allowed the creation of an informal Empire in the first place.[13] Over time, however, contact with the British began to put unbearable strain on indigenous economic and political institutions, causing their collapse.[14] Formal imperialism can be defined as expansion lacking widespread collaboration by indigenous peoples.[15] The breakdown of African states and rise of opposition to the British presence, forced Britain to extend her formal control deeper into the interior to restore order.

The danger to the Empire caused by African and Boer unrest was made worse by the threat from other European powers moving into Africa at the same time. The new imperialist powers of Europe increased the pressure on African states, restricted British trade, and menaced the routes east. In 1884, London had participated in the Berlin

Conference to avoid being pushed out of West Africa.[16] In 1898 Britain was willing to risk war to keep the French from gaining control of Egypt.[17] Trade remained important to the British, but the safety of the Cape and the canal remained the main goal.

Those areas that merchants most coveted, were of least interest to the government.[18] After 1880 Britain's main expansion was defensive, seeking territory of less economic value, but having strategic significance.[19] Robinson and Gallagher show that the West African colonies were used to bargain for the protection of Egypt, even though these colonies had good trading prospects.[20] After 1880 Britain was forced to gain African territory to combat African and European threats to the route to India.

Robinson and Gallagher's focus on political and strategic reasons for imperial expansion rests on a much firmer foundation than does the economic school. It is impossible to take any imperialist action without politics being involved, while expansion was possible without economic reward.[21] Proponents of the economic school suggest that imperialism serves private economic interests instead of the entire nation. Yet governmental action must be justified as being for the good of all. Political considerations, therefore, are paramount even in cases where the territory taken is of great economic value.

The strategic element of Britain imperialism is quite evident. Afghanistan was invaded because of its proximity to India. The Sudan was important due to its connection with

Egypt. Numerous islands, like Gibraltar, were claimed to become bases and coaling stations. Robinson and Gallagher's case for the original takeover of South Africa and Egypt, as strategic routes East, are logical and well supported. The Empire in Africa was often advanced to keep other European powers out, rather than because of a wish to possess these areas for their own sake.[22] Yet to state that strategic considerations were important in some cases does not mean these motives determined all expansion.

Robinson and Gallagher's critique of the economic school is appropriate. Imperialism was not caused by economic interest alone, or by businessmen. The impact of local conditions, as well as the influence of the official mind, must be considered to gain a complete picture of imperial expansion. While Robinson and Gallagher's strategic explanation is sound, their theory neglects important elements of British imperialism. Their theory is convincing, but its application must be considered limited given the fact that Chamberlain's entire imperial policy lies outside its scope.

Robinson and Gallagher's theory contains a major structural weakness. They fail to make clear the distinction between strategic expansion and expansion to further free trade. The "imperialism of free trade" insures that Robinson and Gallagher's theory has a strong economic component. Yet they argue that strategic considerations were foremost in causing expansion. Could pressure from economic interests bring about expansion in areas where strategic goals were

not involved?[23] Did expansion to protect trade end once imperial defense became more important? If this is true, it would mean there was a "new" imperialism. The "new" imperialism could then be defined as a new focus on security and power, rather than trade.[24] If such expansion continued, Robinson and Gallagher need to make clear that there were two independent causes of imperial advance, one commercial and one strategic.

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END NOTES

NOTES

Introduction

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3 Winfried Baumgart, Imperialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 8.

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4 Semmel, p. 13.

5 Baumgart, p. 166.

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7 Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, (London: Fontana Press, 1981), p. 28.

8 Baumgart, p. 121.

9 James Morris, Pax Britanica, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), p. 24.

10 Baumgart, p. 167.

11 Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset: Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921, Vol. 1 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 39.

12 See Appendix 1.

13 Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 191.

14 A. Atmore and S. Marks, "The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the Nineteenth Century: Towards a Re-assessment," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, III, 1974, p. 111.

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16 Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 61.

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18 Bernard Porter, "Imperialism and the Scramble," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 9, 1980, p. 77.

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28 Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 197.

29 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1902), p. 152.

30 Ibid., p. 46.

31 Ibid., p. 49.

32 Norman Etherington, "Theories of Imperialism in Southern Africa Re-visited," African Affairs, 81, 1982, p. 397.

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34 Ibid., p. 157.

35 Louis Creswicke, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol IV, (London: The Caxton Publishing Co., 1905), pp. 4, 39.

36 Peter Cain, "J.A. Hobson, Financial Capitalism, and Imperialism in Late Victorian and Edwardian England," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XIII, No. 3, 1985, p. 20.

37 See Appendix 2.

38 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians, p. 4.

39 See Appendix 2.

40 See Appendix 2.

II-Chamberlain's Early Career

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3 Harry Browne, Joseph Chamberlain, Radical and Imperialist, (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group Ltd., 1974), p. 25.

4 Denis Judd, Radical Joe, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977) p. 3.

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7 Jay, p. 4.

8 Peter Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, (London: Cassel and Co., 1966), p. 1.

9 Walter Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1988), p. 115.

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13 Ibid., p. 31.

14 Ibid., p. 7.

15 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. xii.

16 Garvin, Vol. I, p. 189.

17 Semmel, p. 91.

18 Browne, p. 29.

19 Jay, p. 25.

20 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 155.

21 Ibid., p. 158.

22 R. V. Kubicek The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 6.

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24 Kubicek, The Administration of Imperialism, p. 8.

25 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 45.

26 Kubicek, The Administration of Imperialism, p. 8.

27 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 45.

28 Ibid.

29 Jay, p. 37.

30 Ibid., p. 86.

31 Ibid., p. 85.

32 Garvin, Vol. I, p. 489.

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34 Ibid., p. 87.

35 Baumgart, p. 76.

36 Ibid., p. 76.

37 Ibid., p. 77.

38 C.C. Eldridge, Victorian Imperialism, (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978), p. 155.

39 Jay, p. 55.

40 Ibid., p. 101.

41 Ibid., p. 67

42 Garvin, Vol. I, p. 526.

43 Jay, p. 123.

44 Ibid., p. 59.

45 Joseph Chamberlain, A Political Memoir: 1880-92, (London: Batchworth Press, 1953), p. 151.

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56 Ibid., p. 174.

57 Garvin, Vol. II, p. 423.

58 Jay, p. 176.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., p. 178.

61 Ibid., p. 179.

62 Browne, p. 54.

63 Andrew Porter, "British Imperial Policy and South Africa: 1895-9", In The South African War, Edited by Peter Warwick, (London: Trewin Copplestone Books, 1980), p. 39.

64 Boyd, Vol. I, p. 366.

65 Jay, p. 195.

66 Richard Shannon, The Crisis of Imperialism, 1865-1915, (London: Granada Publishing, 1979), p. 291.

67 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 70.

68 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 176.

69 Ibid.

70 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 74.

71 Ibid., p. 175.

72 Ibid., p. 77.

73 Ibid., p. 11.

74 Shannon, p. 166.

75 Jay, p. 92.

76 Powell, p. 40.

77 Jay, p. 187.

78 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 70.

79 Jay, p. 188.

80 Boyd, Vol. I, p. 322.

81 Chamberlain, p. xiii.

82 Garvin, Vol. II, p. 452.

83 Garvin, Vol. I, p. 451.

84 Ibid., p. 452.

85 Jay, p. 93.

86 Ibid., p. 85.

87 Creswicke, Vol. III, p. 49.

88 Garvin, Vol. I, p. 451.

89 Jay, p. 194.

90 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 12.

91 Jay, p. 189.

92 Jay, p. 194.

93 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 408. Bernard Porter believes imperial expansion occured at the slightest demand, as long as no objections on other grounds could be found. B. Porter, p. 80.

94 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 211.

95 Ibid., p. 214.

96 Ibid., p. 221.

97 Ibid., p. 228.

98 Ibid., p. 233.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., p. 237.

101 Beloff, p. 9.

102 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 398.

103 Ibid., p. 408.

104 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 69.

105 Chamberlain's plan for the West Indies serves to illustrate his overall plan. With government assistance small proprietors would replace large plantations. These small land holders would be taught improved methods of cultivation to insure that they prospered.(Garvin, Vol. IV, 244). The spirit behind this policy was the same as that underlying earlier Radical plans, the desire to break up monopolies of wealth and redistribute this wealth among the masses. It was a way of rebuilding society from the ground up. In addition to redistributing the land, a new transportation and communication infrastructure would be put in place.(Garvin, Vol. IV, 244) In this way, the local economy would be internally linked, and integrated into the imperial economy. Political integration of the West Indies into the Empire would be accomplished through closer control from London.(Garvin, Vol. IV, 244) The West Indian model of internal reform and imperial integration created a common imperial interest, while improving the lot of the individual.

106 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 174.

107 Browne, p. 53.

108 G.B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa: 1902-10, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 8.

109 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 397.

110 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 175.

111 Powell, p. 77.

112 Pyrah, p. 6.

113 Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Fourth Series, 3 April, (1900), p. 1144.

114 Browne, p. 55.

115 Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1900), p. 1149.

116 Ibid., p. 1151.

117 Jay, p. 201.

118 Jay, p. 195.

119 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 69.

120 Jay, p. 180.

121 B. Porter, p. 80.

122 Jay, p. 185.

123 Judd, p. xiii.

124 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 343.

125 Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, "The Export of British Finance - 1865-1914." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XIII, 1985, p. 30.

III-South Africa

1 Judd, p. 193.

2 Ibid., p. 194.

3 Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State" History Workshop, 8, 1979, p. 57.

4 Peter Richardson and Jean Jacques Van-Helten, "The Gold Mining Industry in the Transvaal 1886-99," In The South African War, Edited by Peter Warwick, (London: Trewin Copplestone Books, 1980), p. 21.

5 J.A. Hobson's Imperialism was based in part on this belief. R.V. Kubicek, however, shows that there was no unity among Randlords and that it is difficult even to determine why individual Randlords supported the Raid. R. V. Kubicek, "The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment," Journal of British Studies, XI, 1972.

6 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 458.

7 Andrew Porter, "Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and South Africa: 1895-9," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, I, 1972, p. 3.

8 Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, p. 59.

9 G. Blainey, "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid," Economic History Review, Vol. 18, series 2, 1965, p. 366.

10 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 239.

11 Anthony Nutting, Scramble For Africa, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1971), p. 308.

12 A. Porter, "British Imperial Policy", p. 42.

13 Garvin Vol. III, p. 107. Atmore and Marks see Britian's South African policy as an attempt to create a modern industrial state in England's immage.(Atmore and Marks, p. 115).

14 Parliamentary Debates, 29 January, (1897), p. 806.

15 Phyllis Lewsen, ed., The Correspondence of John X. Merriman: 1890-1898, (Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 1963), p. 229.

16 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 136.

17 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 21.

18 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 21.

19 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 428.

20 Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, (1899), p. 267.

21 Judd, p. 214.

22 Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 16.

23 Ibid., p. 17.

24 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 368.

25 Pakenham, p. 18.

26 Ibid.

27 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 366.

28 Pakenham, p. 25.

29 Cecil Headlam, ed., The Milner Papers. Vol. I, (London: Cassel and Co., 1933), p. 227.

30 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 366.

31 A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and South Africa", p. 10.

32 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 21.

33 British Sessional Papers, (1884), LVII, C. 3914, p. 9.

34 Headlam, Vol. I, p. 389.

35 Ibid., p. 388.

36 British Sessional Papers, (1899), LXIV, C. 9507, p. 180.

37 A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Africa", p. 15.

38 Ibid., p. 4.

39 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 318.

40 Ibid.

41 A. Porter, "British Imperial Policy", p. 37.

42 Ibid., p. 48.

43 British Sessional Papers, (1895), LXXI, C. 7633.

44 K.O. Hall, "Why Could the Aims of Milner and Chamberlain in South Africa not be Achieved Without War?" Seminar Paper, Michigan State University, 1968, p. 4.

45 Judd, p. 213.

46 Parliamentary Debates, 28 July, (1899), p. 703.

47 Jay, p. 229.

48 Ibid., p. 230.

49 Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, (1899), p. 270.

50 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 141.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., p. 142.

53 Pakenham, p. 25.

54 Hall, p. 17.

55 Hall, p. 18.

56 Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, (1899), p. 274.

57 Parliamentary Debates, 5 February, (1900), p. 614.

58 Hall, p. 5.

59 Donald Denoon, A Grand Illusion, (London: Longman Group, 1973), p. 29.

60 Headlam, Vol. I, p. 229.

61 Hall, p. 1.

62 A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Africa", p. 17.

63 Atmore and Marks, p. 131.

64 Ibid., p. 111.

65 A. Porter, "Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Africa", p. 5. Atmore and Marks agree that South Africa was to be integrated into England's economy and that the route to India was only a secondary goal. (Atmore and Marks, p. 108).

66 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 387.

67

Denoon, p. 75.

68
Browne, p. 63.

69
G. H. Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 67.

70
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 457.

71
Headlam, Vol. II, p. 215.

72
Judd, p. 227.

73
Denoon, p. 96.

74
Parliamentary Debates, 28 July, (1899), p. 715.

75
Pyrah, p. 141.

76
Ibid., p. 151.

77
Ibid., p. 150.

78
Le May, p. 75.

79
Pakenham, p. 599.

80
Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 73.

81
Ibid., p. 333.

82
Parliamentary Debates, 24 March, (1903), p. 110.

83
Atmore and Marks, p. 124.

84
Parliamentary Debates, 24 March, (1903), p. 106.

85 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 103.

86 Judd, p. 229.

87 Pyrah, p. 11.

88 Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 335. The debate continues over what led individual Randlords to support British intervention in the Transvaal. Geoffrey Blainey, supported by Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, thinks the long range development of deep level mines required British control. The deep mine owners required capital, centralized control, and labor which the United Kingdom was more capable of providing.Blainey,(Marks and Trapido) R.V. Kubicek disagrees, citing differences in corporate and financial strategies as the determinants of alliegance. Parent banks, degree of reinvestment, and methods of funding were most important.(R. V. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979).

89 Jay, p. 267.

90 Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 323.

91 Ibid., p. 328.

92 Ibid.

93 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 605.

94 Parliamentary Debates, 5 February, (1900), p. 623.

95 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 625.

96 Ibid.

97 Jay, p. 251.

98 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 155.

98 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 155.

99 Eldridge, p. 216. Atmore and Marks saw African labor as anotner resource Britin tried to gain in their conflict with tne Boers. (Atmore and Marks, p. 125).

100 Parliamentary Debates, 5 February, (1900), p. 615.

101 Eldridge, p. 210.

102 Denoon, p. 96.

103 Parliamentary Debates, 5 February, (1900), p. 624.

104 Pyrah, p. 183.

105 Eldridge, p. 211.

106 Baumgart, p. 168.

107 Ibid., p. 165.

108 Ibid., pp. 160,172.

109 Semmel, p. 27.

110 Semmel, p. 146.

111 Baumgart, p. 173.

IV-Tarif Reform

1 Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 96.

2 The Colonial Secretary believed that world conditions had changed, and that a new imperialism was necessary. It was no longer enough simply to intensify the old style of imperialism as Robinson and Gallagher suggest. Chamberlain

hoped to create a new imperial system better suited to altered world conditions.

[3] Etherington, p. 398.

[4] Jay, p. 210.

[5] Semmel, p. 150.

[6] Powell, p. 48.

[7] Lenin believed industrialism required protection, worsening over-production.(Baumgart, p. 116) In Lenin's system protection was a cause of, not a result of imperialism. Schumpeter, however, saw protection as a pre-capitalist holdover which was incompatable with imperialism.(Semmel, p. 17).

[8] Powell, p. 48.

[9] Boyd, Vol. II, p. 166. Chamberlain often lacked the expertise and ideological certainty of reformers in the mold of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Chamberlain was a man of action rather than a philosopher. He would often first seize upon an issue or make a decision, and only afterward look for arguments to support his position. Viscount Morley said of him, "... though not of the politicians who are forced into action by an idea, he was quick to associate ideas with his actions."(Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 3) Chamberlain's tendency to support sudden, widespread change, sometimes without regard for consequences had first led him to become a Radical.

[10] Boyd, Vol. II, p. 143.

[11] Semmel, p. 84.

[12] Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1895), p. 1210.

[13] Boyd, Vol. II, p. xvii.

[14] Semmel, p. 87.

15 Ibid.

16 Powell, p. 48.

17 Semmel, p. 89.

18 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 168. D.C.M. Platt suggests Britain was also outgrowing her former markets at the same time as foreign tariffs were restricting British trade.(Platt, p. 11)

19 Semmel, p. 89.

20 Judd, p. 243.

21 Creswicke, Vol. IV, pp. 4, 118.

22 Jay, p. 287.

23 Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 37.

24 Ibid., p. 156.

25 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 239.

26 Judd, p. 243.

27 Browne, p. 65.

28 Judd, p. 241.

29 Jay, p. 253.

30 Ibid.

31 Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 186.

32
Semmel, p. 160.

33
Semmel, p. 91.

34
Judd, p. 242.

35
Semmel, p. 161.

36
Judd, p. 243.

37
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 369.

38
Shannon, p. 310.

39
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 343.

40
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 189.

41
Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 180.

42
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 652.

43
Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 406.

44
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 71.

45
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 362.

46
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 155.

47
Browne, p. 54.

48
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 157.

49
Ibid.

50

Semmel, p. 149.

51 Ibid.

52 Browne, p. 54.

53 Semmel, p. 156.

54 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 892.

55 Semmel, p. 118.

56 Ibid., p. 90.

57 Ibid., p. 23.

58 Creswicke, Vol. III, p. 36.

59 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 28.

60 Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1900), p. 1151.

61 Boyd, Vol. I, p. 371.

62 Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 179.

63 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 138.

64 Jay, p. 209.

65 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 196.

66 Semmel, p. 152.

67 Boyd, Vol. I, p. 370.

68 Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 39.

69 Ibid., p. 44.

70 Ibid., p. 94.

71 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 348.

72 Jay, p. 286.

73 Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 44.

74 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 347.

75 Semmel, p. 150.

76 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 122.

77 Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 102.

78 Semmel, p. 150.

79 Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 204.

80 Etherington, p. 399.

81 D.K. Fieldhouse, Theory of Capitalist Imperialism, (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1967), p. 127.

82 Creswicke, Vol IV, p. 199.

83 Ibid., p. 98.

84 Semmel, p. 92.

85 Browne, p. 58.

86 Parliamentary Debates, 3 April, (1900), p. 1149.

87 Garvin, Vol 4, p. 415.

88 Ibid., p. 431.

89 Paul Hayes, "British Foreign Policy and the Influence of Empire, 1870-1920," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XII, 1984, p. 108.

90 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 194.

91 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 496.

92 Parliamentary Debates, (1901), p. 1096.

93 Garvin, Vol. III, p. 194.

94 Jay, p. 262.

95 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 229.

96 Boyd, Vol. I, p. 323.

97 Shannon, p. 310.

98 Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 414.

99 Ibid., p. 420.

100 Jay, p. 260.

101 Garvin, Vol. IV, p. 420.

102 Ibid., p. 430.

103 Jay, p. 188.

104
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 39.

105
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 188.

106
Shannon, p. 312.

107
Hayes, p. 109.

108
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 178.

109
Boyd, Vol. I, p. 369.

110
Garvin, Vol. II, p. 468.

111
Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 191.

112
Jay, p. 262.

113
Jay, p. 264.

114
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 89.

115
Garvin, Vol. IV, p 446.

116
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 122.

117
This central impetus contradicts to some extent Robinson and Gallagher's position that the periphery determined the pace of imperial expansion.

118
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 227.

119
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 150.

120
Ibid.

121
Shannon, p. 313.

122 Jay, p. 264. Twenty years before, in a strange reversal of roles, Chamberlain had defeated Ritchie in a debate before Parliament. In 1881 Ritchie had argued for retaliatory tariffs against France, Chamberlain attacked the idea of a tax on food, and won.(Garvin, Vol. I, p. 433) The Colonial Secretary's earlier statements would soon come back to haunt him.

123 Shannon, p. 313.

124 Garvin, Vol VI, p. 543.

125 Peter Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform," Historical Journal, V, No.2, 1962, p. 161.

126 Jay, p. 298.

127 Ibid., p. 302.

128 Ibid.

129 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 258.

130 Jay, p. 296.

131 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 255.

132 Semmel, p. 105.

133 Jay, p. 278.

134 Shannon, p. 355.

135 Jay, p. 282.

136 Shannon, p. 356

137 Ibid.

138 Judd, p. 248.

139 A. K. Russel, Liberal Landslide: The General Election of 1906, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973), p. 28.

140 Jay, p. 284.

141 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 261.

142 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 355.

143 Judd, p. 248.

144 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 261.

145 Jay, p. 284.

146 Ibid.

147 Shannon, p. 357.

148 Ibid., p. 356.

149 Ibid., p. 357.

150 Jay, p. 306.

151 Ibid., p. 311.

152 Ibid., p. 307.

153 Semmel, p. 110.

154 Ibid.

155 Shannon, p. 358.

156
Russel, p. 29.

157
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 150.

158
Fraser. Joseph Chamberlain, p. 271.

159
Semmel, p. 101.

160
Ibid., p. 99

161
Russel, p. 28.

162
Semmel, p. 26.

163
Jay, p. 286.

164
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 527.

165
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 331.

166
Ibid., p. 340.

167
Ibid., p. 346.

168
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 100.

169
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 329.

170
Jay, p. 192.

171
Ibid.

172
Ibid.

173
Ibid., p. 191.

174
Semmel, p. 87.

175
Ibid., p. 148.

176
Cain, p. 20.

177
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 73.

178
Semmel, p. 86.

179
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

180
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 194.

181
Russel, p. 172.

182
Ibid., p. 30.

183
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 269.

184
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 149.

185
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 271.

186
Semmel, p. 101.

187
Semmel, p. 146.

188
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 124.

189
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

190
Semmel, p. 146.

191
Russel, p. 173.

192
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

193
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 229.

194
Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 159

195
Creswicke, IV, p. 34.

196
Baumgart, p. 166.

197
Semmel, p. 150.

198
Davis and Huttenback, p. 30.

199
Shannon, p. 350.

200
Lenin and Hobson assumed protectionism to be the final outcome of imperialism. Tariffs were essential to industrialization. Custom duties allowed industrial monopolies to protect their markets by forcing out foreign competitors. Tariffs, they believed, increased the effects of underconsumption by artificially inflating prices. (Baumgart, p. 116) What they failed to realize, was that British capitalists resisted the shift to protectionism. Schumpeter saw more clearly that laissez-faire capitalism worked against the New Imperialism.(Semmel, p. 17) Many industries had more to gain through free trade. There was no unity among capitalists, as Chamberlain's campaign for fiscal reform would soon show. Chamberlain's attempt to erect tariff barriers to protect industry failed, the majority of Englishmen remained free traders. The question of tariffs created cleavages throughout British industry and society not based on financial position.

201
Garvin, Vol. V, p. 219.

202
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 29.

203
Parliamentary Debates, May 28, (1903), p. 186.

204
Ibid.

205
Semmel, p. 95.

206
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 104.

207
Garvin, Vol. III, p. 19.

208
Judd, p. 189.

209
Semmel, p. 148.

210
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 97.

211
Russel, p. 205.

212
Ibid., p. 29.

213
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 115.

214
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 499.

215
Semmel, p. 119.

216
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 120.

217
Ibid., p. 197.

218
Ibid., p. 127.

219
Boyd, Vol. II, p. 234.

220
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 197.

221
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 246.

222
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 73.

223 Ibid., p. 143.

224 Semmel, p. 98.

225 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 204.

226 Russel, p. 205.

227 Ibid., p. 67.

228 Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 195.

229 Russel, p. 72.

230 Judd, p. 254.

231 Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 122.

232 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 455.

233 Shannon, p. 360.

234 Browne, p. 53.

235 Judd, p. 244.

236 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 139.

237 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 270.

238 Ibid.

239 Ibid., p. 362.

240 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 601.

241
Jay, p. 287.

242
Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 193.

243
Ibid., p. 199.

244
Ibid.

245
Ibid., p. 200.

246
Russel, p. 175.

247
Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 608.

248
Ibid., p. 774.

249
Shannon, p. 363.

250
Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 264.

251
Russel, p. 32.

252
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 164.

253
Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 165.

254
Jay, p. 30.

255
Semmel, p. 124.

256
Shannon, p. 363.

257
Jay, p. 301.

258
Ibid.

259 Russel, p. 91.

260 Ibid., p. 160.

261 Jay, p. 304.

262 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 794.

263 Ibid., p. 544.

264 Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 151.

265 Russel, p. 198.

266 Arnstein, p. 208.

267 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 774.

268 Russel, p. 75.

269 Ibid., p. 177.

270 Semmel, p. 134.

271 Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 152.

272 Russel, p. 71; Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 273.

273 Baumgart, p. 175.

274 The Liberal victory underlines the the limits of Robinson and Gallagher's theory. Chamberlain's program was not part of a long term quest to protect free trade as Robinson and Gallagher suggest. His was a "new" imperialism, bent on expansion, yet linked to radical politics. Imperial power would be used in a positive way, not simply to keep competitors from prohibiting British trade. Free trade could benefit certain individuals, but Chamberlain was more interested in the common good. It is not surprising that

Chamberlain eventually abandoned his support of free trade. Cobden's defense of free trade had been based on the belief that the quest for personal wealth brought the greatest good. (Garvin, Vol V, p. 202) Chamberlain wished to develop national strength and advance social reform. He distrusted individualism as detrimental to Britain. He saw the future to be an age of formal, united empires. His main goal was to insure Britain could take her place among these powers.

275 Shannon, p. 359.

276 Judd, p. 239.

277 Jay, p. 274.

278 Kubicek, Administration of Imperialism, p. 159.

279 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 150.

280 Judd, p. 254.

281 Shannon, p. 360.

282 Ibid., p. 362.

283 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 478.

284 Jay, p. 289.

285 Ibid., p. 329.

286 Semmel, p. 96.

287 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 271.

288 Creswicke, p. 206.

289 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 271.

290 Ibid., p. 274.

291 Ibid., p. 356.

292 Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 191.

293 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 357.

294 Garvin, Vol. V, p. 356.

295 Parliamentary Debates, 28 May, (1903), p. 191.

296 Judd, p. 269.

297 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 851.

298 Fraser, "Unionism and Tariff Reform", p. 155.

299 Ibid., p. 156.

300 Ibid., p. 163.

301 Ibid.

302 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 856.

303 Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 278.

304 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 984.

305 Ibid., p. 976.

306 Ibid., p. 984.

307 Ibid., p. 966.

308 Jay, p. 317.

309 Garvin, Vol. VI, p. 892.

310 Jay, p. 317.

311 Ibid., p. 318.

V-Conclusion

1 Boyd, Vol. II, p. 294.

2 Ibid., p. 119.

Appendix 1-The Economic school

1 Norman Etherington notes that Victorian businessme believed outlets for capital would be needed in the future.(Etherington, p. 386.) He suggests, however, that many theorists were too quick to assume governments did what business and financial interests wished.

2 Hobson, Imperialism, p. 39.

3 Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 69.

4 Hobson, Imperialism, p. 29.

5 Baumgart, p. 109.

6 Hobson, Imperialism, p. 94

7 Ibid., p. 83.

8 Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 72

9 D.C.M. Platt, "The National Economy and British Imperial Expansion before 1914," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2, 1973, p. 5.

10 Hobson, Imperialism, p. 56.

11 Ibid., p. 211.

12 Ibid., p. 56.

13 Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 90.

14 Hobson, Imperialism, p. 359.

15 Ibid., p. 51.

16 V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 13

17 Ibid., p. 86.

18 Ibid., p. 51. Ironically, Joseph Chamberlain saw American and German trusts as a threat to Britain which lacked such monopolies.(Creswicke, Vol. IV, p. 51)

19 Ibid., p. 73.

20 Ibid., p. 72.

21 Ibid., p. 97.

22 Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 193.

23 Ibid., p. 192.

24 Lenin, p. 128.

25 Baumgart, p. 136.

26 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), p. 300.

27 Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, p. 8.

28 Etherington defends Lenin's theory by pointing out that Lenin was not attenpting to explain the Scramble for Africa, therefore the Scramble cannot by used to dispute Lenin.(Etherington, p. 385)

29 D.K. Fieldhouse's "Imperialism: A Historiographical Revision" examines Hobson's critics and the success with which they undermine Hobson's theory.

30 Davis and Huttenback, p. 49.

31 Baumgart, p. 164.

32 Davis and Huttenback, p. 49.

33 Ibid.

34 Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 127.

35 Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 198.

36 Fieldhouse, Capitalist Imperialism, p. 149.

37 A.G.L. Shaw, ed., Great Britain and the Colonies 1815-1865, (London: Methuen & Co., 1970), p. 10.

38 Ibid., p. 3.

39 B. Porter, p. 78.

40 D.K. Fieldhouse sees the inability of the economic school to prove imperialism was an economic necessity as the prime flaw in their theories.(Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 195)

41 Baumgart, p. 126

42 Ibid.

43 Hynes, p. 7.

44 Semmel, p. 62.

45 Semmel, p. 156.

46 Cain, p. 19.

47 Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 198.

Appendix 2-Strategic School

1 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 61.

2 Ibid., p. 409.

3 Ibid., p. 149.

4 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "The Partition of Africa," (1962) In Imperialism, Edited by M.R. Louis, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), p. 74.

5 Morris, p. 263.

6 Ibid., p. 276.

7 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," (1953) In Imperialism, Edited by M.R. Louis (New York: New Viewpoints,1976), p. 54.

8 Ibid., p. 60.

[9] Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 3.

[10] Robinson and Gallagher, "Imperialism of Free Trade", p. 60.

[11] Ibid., p. 61.

[12] Robinson and Gallagher, "Partition of Africa", p. 75.

[13] M.R. Louis, Imperialsim, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), p. 26

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism," (1972) In Imperialism, Edited by M.R. Louis (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), p. 130. Donald Denoon studied South Africa to show that the Boer War was a lost cause because it was impossible to make the Dutch into satisfactory collaborators.(Denoon, A Grand Illusion) Atmore and Marks viewed the war in similar way. (Atmore and Marks, p. 109)

[16] Robinson and Gallagher, "Partition of Africa", p. 89.

[17] Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 95.

[18] Ibid., p. 462.

[19] Ibid., p. 472.

[20] Ibid., p. 393.

[21] Baumgart, p. 91.

[22] B. Porter, p. 80.

23 Ibid.

24 Fieldhouse, "Imperialism", p. 204.