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CRIME IN DETROIT PUBLIC HOUSING

by

Herbert Pennell Norman, Jr.

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
irm partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Social Science
Urban Planning Program

August, 1990

ABSTRACT
CRIME IN DETROIT PUBLIC HOUSING

by

Herbert Pennell Norman, Jr.

The purpose of.this research is to determine whether

the development and structure of the federal statute that
authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration
Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public
housing , and to determine what relationship existed between
implementation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program and crime rate change at the
Brewster—Douglass public housing project site. The federal
program provided money to thirty-nine selected public hous-
ing authorities from mid-1980 through mid-1982 to address
crime in public housing.

The original hypotheses are that development and struc-
tque of the statute adequately addressed public housing
(:rime, and a positive relationship exist between the Detroit
€M1ti-Crime Program and crime rate change at the Brewster
site. The methodology to test the hypotheses involves both
archival sources and an analysis of secondary data on crime.
The Mann-Whitney U Test and Chi Square along with inter-
pretations from scattergrams are employed to determine if a
significant relationship exist between implementation of the

Detroit program and crime reduction at Brewster-Douglass

after program implementation.

Inadequate development and structure of the Anti-Crime
statute, the federal government's overall failure rate to
address local social issues, and local crime activity in and
around the Brewster site canceled any chances for the
Detroit Anti-Crime Program to reduce crime activity.
Analysis of secondary data confirmed this assumption. This
study recommends that future actions to address public hous-
ing crime, particularly in the Detroit case, be developed
and implemented at the local level. The program must ad-
dress the entire public housing project site

and the neighborhood surrounding the project.

Copyright by
Herbert Pennell Norman, Jr.
August, 1990

To my Mom and Dad

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing a dissertation is impossible without support
from colleagues, family, and friends. I would like to thank
Carl Goldsc hmidt, Assefa Mehretu, and Rick Hill for their

valuable input throughout my doctoral program. Special
thanks and appreciation goes to June [mamas for her guidance

and patience as my committee chairperson.
The love and support from my many Michigan friends over

the Years made this endurance exercise bearable. I have a
Special appreciation for Jon and Melba Lacey, Ann Garrison,
Esther McMann, Nancy Merriman, Diane Nolliever, Tom
Nerenhausen, Gordon McMann, David Namie, and “Sunday nite”.
My newfound friends in South Carolina have been espe-
cially supportive the last two years. My love goes to
Durham Crout and Beth Daniell. Thanks also to Jane Hurt,

Chuck Lippy, Jim Henderson, and my boss Jose Caban for put-
ting up with my craziness that resulted from trying to write
and do a full-time job at the same time.

Finally, the support and encouragement of my parents

throughout the entire degree process made this accomplish-
ment possible.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES.........................................ix
LIST OF FIBURES........................................xi
CHAPTER
I. Introduction.................................. 1
lVeed for the Study/Problem................ 5
Statement of Hypothesis................... 7
lfiethodology............................... 9
Summary................................... 21
II. Policy Analysis............................... 27
Policy Defined............................ 28
Formulation, Implementation, Reformulation:
Are They the Same?...................... 29
A Look at the Policy Analysis Concept..... 33
Policy Content............................ 41
Federal Government Policymaking........... 49
Summary................................... 55
III . Crime in Public Housing and Their
lfleighborhoods................................ 61
Crime in Public Housing................... 62
Physical Environment and Crime....... 71
Social Factors and Crime............. 77
Management Practices and Crime....... 82
Crime in Urban Neighborhoods.............. 83
Urban Neighborhood Delineation....... 84
Physical Environment and Crime....... 85
Social Variables and Crime........... 92
Territoriality and Crime............. 98
Summary................................... 100
Ikl. Development and Description of the Urban
Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. 114
National Urban Policy-197B................ 114
Legislative History....................... 117
Genesis............r................. 118
Committee Debates.................... 124
Congressional Debates................ 127
Conference Committee................. 132
Public Law 95-557.................... 134
Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration
Program................................. 140
Summary................................... 149

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

V. The Detroit, Michigan Experience.............
Development of Detroit Public Housing....
The Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes
Neighborhoods..........................

Brewster-Douglass...................
JeffriESIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Brewster-Douglass and Lower Woodward
Aroa crim.IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

The Detroit Urban Initiatives

Anti-Crime

Demon’tration Program. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Program Analysis.........................
summarYIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIOII

VI. Analysis and Summary.........................

APFWEBHDIIX

BI BL I OGRAPHY

viii

160
161

194

194
205

210
224
231
247

262

L I ST OF TABLES

Characteristics of Brewster-Douglass and
JEf'fr-ies Ham's, 1980IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Murders per 10,000 Public Housing Units...

Frequency of Murders......................

Selected Crime Rates, 1975-National, City
and Public Housing Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Victimization Probability - 50/50 Chance
or GreaterIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Reasons for Public Housing Vacancy:

Percent

Of Vacancies by Agency Size, 19Bb...........

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Funding....................

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program
Funds Obligated to Public Housing
Agencies as of March 31, 1980............

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program Top
Five Local Programs in Funding by
Federal Agency...........................

Public Housing Program in Detroit,
JUIY 1’ 1949IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII.II...

Public Housing Projects in the
City Of DetroitIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIOOI

Number of Structures in the Medical

Center Area Before Redevelopment. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Major Offenses in the 13th Precinct, Detroit,
1975-1986IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime

Demonstration Funding........................

Mann Whitney U Test- Calculated Values

Obey OffenSEIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIOI.

ix

Page

14
19

21

b3

68

139

142

144

146

178

191

204

216

225

235

5.8

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Chi Square Contingency Table for Frequency
of "urerSIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 236

Chi Square Contingency Table of Crimes

Reported and Calculated Values of X2 by

Offense-I.IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII... 238

 

 

an.

II.

.J

:0

 

I
I

Figure

LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 Location of Brewster-Douglass and

Jeffries Public Housing Projects (map). . . . .

1.2 Time series Non-equivalent Control-

2.1

grouD Design...................... .........

Pelicy PrOCESSIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

A Basic Policy Analysis Process. ...........

Interactions in the Federal Policy—
making Process.............................

Lower Woodward Area (map).. ......... . ......
Jeffries Subsector (map)....... ..... .. .....

Actual Number of Reported Murders at the
Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public
Housing Project: 1976-1985........... .....

Actual Number of Reported Rapes at the
Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public
Housing Project: 1976-1985................

Actual Number of Reported Robberies at the
Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public
Housing Project: 1976-1985................

Actual Number of Reported Assaults at the
Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public
Housing Project: 1976-1985................

Actual Number of Reported Burglaries at the
Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public
Housing Project: 1976-1985................

Actual Number of Reported Larcenies at the
Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public
Housing Project: 1976-1985................

Actual Number of Reported Auto Thefts at the

Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public
Housing Project: 1976-1985...............

xi

Page

13

15
31

38

51

199

209

243

243

244

244

245

245

246

 

;\

 
 

e
A.

it

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program
provided federal money to thirty-nine selected public hous-
ing authorities from mid-1980 through mid-1982 to address
crime in public housing. The purpose of this research is
twofold: to determine whether the development and structure
of the federal policy (statute) that authorized the Urban
Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately ad-
dressed the crime problem in public housing; and to deter-
mine what relationship exists between implementation of the
Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program
and crime rate change at the Brewster-Douglass public hous-
ing project site.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) responded to the Public Housing Security Demonstration
Act of 1978 and President Carter's National Urban Policy
with this Demonstration program. The concern for public
housing residents and crime perpetrated toward them served

as the catalyst for Congress and President Carter to

initiate the program. In addition to the $12 million set
aside for development, implementation and evaluation,
various federal agencies and local sources spent ap-
proximately 341 million to carry out the intent of the
legislation authorizing the program. The Detroit Anti-Crime
Program ran from July, 1980 to January, 1982. The Detroit
Housing Commission spent approximately $2.5 million in
federal funds to address crime at the Brewster-Douglass
public housing project site located in the Lower Woodward
Area just north of the Central Business District.

The federal Anti-Crime Program consisted of seven basic
program components. Flexible component guidelines allowed
each demonstration site (such as Detroit) to develop local
strategies to complement each unique situation in relation

to each component. The seven components consisted of:

1- improved management of public safety;

2. rehabilitated anti-crime facilities and better
physical security design;

3. increased involvement of tenants in fighting
crime;

4. more employment of youths;

5. improved anti-crime services for elderly
residents, drug abusers, project youths, and
victims:

6. additional and more sensitive police and law
enforcement;

7. area-wide public/private partnerships targeted on

public housing sites as well as surrounding
neighborhoods.‘

Past studies of the Anti-Crime Program evaluate various
components and on-ground experiences of the federal effort.
One federal government study documents success in the estab-
lishment of partnerships between various federal agencies

that participated in the Program. A second federal

government evaluation relates failure of the federal program
to past democratic policies in which it was formulated. A
private study completed in 1984 addresses implementation of
the Anti-Crime Program at two sites in Cleveland and Toledo.
The study concludes that implementation problems and their
lack of uniformity killed the programs at these two sites.
No existing study analyzes development and structure of the
federal policy that authorized the Anti-Crime Program. No
existing study has determined the effectiveness of the
Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in reducing
crime rates at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project
site.

This study develops through an analysis of the litera-
ture the appropriate methods of federal policy development,
and the necessary provisions contained in a statute that as-
sures viable program results. Knowledge of methods of ap-
propriate policy development will aid in an understanding of
how a statutes overall theoretical structure and content are
determined. A conceptual knowledge of appropriate policy
structure and content will allow a delineation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the statute that authorized the
Anti-Crime Program. An analysis of secondary data on crime
at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site will
give an idea of the relationship of crime rate change and
implementation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program. Hopefully, some conclusions can be
drawn between overall policy adequacy and the effectiveness

of the Detroit Program.

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This study follows a body of policy implementation
theory called systems approach to political life. This ap-
proach allows the analysts to think in terms of inputs from
outside the administrative arena. This approach allows
questions to be asked such as to what extent are policy out-
puts of administrative agencies and are outcomes of ad-
ministration decisions consistent with the original policy?
What effect do outcomes have on subsequent legislative
decisions?2

The dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chap-
ter I defines the purpose of the study, the need for the
study, the problem statement, the hypothesis, and the
methodology. Chapter II explores the theoretical implica-
tions of appropriate policy contents and development. An
overall framework of policy analysis, of which policy
development is one component, is included. Federal govern-
ment policy making is also discussed. Chapter III reviews
the literature of crime in public housing and crime in urban
neighborhoods. Chapter IV is concerned with an overall
description of the federal Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program and the statute that authorized the
Program. It summarizes the President's National Urban
Policy, and presents a review and analysis of the legisla-
tive development of the statute. Chapter V outlines the
development of public housing in Detroit, Michigan. The
chapter describes the Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes
public housing projects, discusses past and present physical

and socioeconomic neighborhood conditions of their

 

 

 

 

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neighborhoods, and discusses crime in the Brewster-Douglass
project and the Lower Woodward Area. In addition, the chap-
ter discusses the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program and presents the empirical analysis of
the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. Chapter VI presents major
findings from the study. A summary of recommendations are

made with suggestions on possible directions of further

study.

NEED FQR THE fiTUDY/PRQBLEM

The federal government attempted on two occasions to
evaluate the overall performance of the federal Anti-Crime
Program. A June, 1980, HUD report discussed program suc-
cesses within the first 18 months of operation. The report
documented success in inter-agency cooperation of program
development and funding. The report states, "The Program
has established an unprecedented partnership among Federal
offices, public housing agencies, tenants, and local govern-
ments, [with] ... $41 million in funds from Federal agencies
and local governments [being] leveraged and co-targeted..."3
The report, completed before Program activity started, does
not address local implementation activity.

The second report, published by HUD in May, 1985, at-
tempted a final evaluation of the federal program by the
evaluation of Program impact on crime in 15 of the 39
demonstration sites. The evaluation consisted of two major
components: an evaluation of program implementation, and an

evaluation of program impact. The implementation component

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addressed implementation techniques at both the national and
local levels. Impact evaluation involved the collection and
analysis of recorded crime data. The politically biased
report concluded that the program developed under principles
which the Reagan Administration has sought to reverse -"that
influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can
provide solutions to local problems", and that development
under these principles flawed the program.‘

A 1984 study also examined the implementation process
of the Anti-Crime Program carried out by the Lucas
Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo, Ohio) and Cuyahoga
Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, Ohio). The
evaluation addressed three general areas: (a) the character
of each program, (b) program activity generated, and (c)
factors determining the level, shape, and timing of the two
programs. The study concluded that invalid participant
selection criteria (selection based on political interests
rather than site capacity to administer the program),
pluralism (too many actors at all levels), economic
turndown, new policies that affected federal spending,
less-than competent staff, all contributed to the demise of
the two case study programs. In addition, the study sug-
gests that policy-making is an on-going process that over~
lapped with implementation activity. The study found that
”once the PHAs submitted proposals and HUD provided funding,
policy-making became a continuous ebb and flow that involved
HUD staff, local government officials, PHA administrators,

and 'street level' bureaucrats."° The implementation

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literature that suggested program activity in terms of dis-
tinct phases did not apply in relation to the two housing
authority sites analyzed.

As a result, no analysis exists that addresses the
development and structure of the statute that authorized the
program, nor has an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
Detroit program been completed. The problem that the
hypothesis, when tested, will answer is: did the federal
statute that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program adequately address crime in public
housing, and what relationship exist between implementation
of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration
Program and crime rate change at the Brewster—Douglass

public housing project site?

STATEMENT OF HYPQTHESIS

 

Two bodies of thought address the relationship between
policy formulation and implementation in the context of a
program evaluation. In looking at the relationship between
formulation and implementation, a fairly simple delineation
can be defined between 1) the formulation/adoption of a
policy, 2) policy implementation, and 3) policy reformula-
tion. The formulation/adoption "phase" includes activities
such as policy formation, legislative support, and
authorization (statutes). Policy implementation includes
the start-up of a program, the initiation of new guidelines
and procedures, and agency go ahead to begin the tasks that

must be undertaken to implement the policy. Finally, policy

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reformulation usually is carried out by initial policy
makers With the ”fine-tuning" based upon successes and
failures of program implementation, during the program or
after completion.

(M1 the one hand, some scholars do not conceptually
define distinctions between the "phases” of program im-
plementation. This view, referred to as the adaptive or in-
teractive approach, emphasizes that "adjustments take place
between goals and strategies among various actors throughout
the process to the point of rendering the formulation-
implementation distinction meaningless."‘ Similarly, some
scholars, while rejecting the altering of initial goals and
objectives, do advocate the modification of goals and
programs to meet various unforeseen constraints and changing
circumstances. This approach is referred to as policy
"redesign,” which should not be confused with policy design.
On the other hand, scholars view a distinction between the
three phases as necessary. Mazmanian and Sabatier suggest
that the distinction should be maintained. The policy
"redesign” argument is based on the assumption “that objec-
tives evolve continuously as a result of the interaction
among a myriad of actors or as a response to new cir-
cumstances . . . [making] evaluation of goal attainment . .
. impossible." More importantly, "viewing policy-making as
a seamless web obscures one of the principle normative and
empirical concerns ... the division of authority between

elected officials... and appointed... administrators.“’

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This research accepts the former position that a dis-
tinct delineation between the "phases" of program implemen-
tation is not realistic. Rather, the policy redesign con-
cept where goal modification and program modification are
necessary to meet unforeseen constraints and changing cir—
cumstances is necessary, particularly for federal programs
that address defined problems that may vary in scope and
content from situation to situation.

The hypotheses of this research are stated as fol-

lows:

1) The development and structure of the federal
policy (statute) that authorized the Urban
Initiatives Anti-Crime Program were formulated
in such a way to adequately address the crime
problem in public housing.

2) A positive relationship exist between implem-
mentation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives

Anti-Crime Program and crime rate change at
the Brewster-Douglass public housing project.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology to test the hypotheses involves both
archival studies and an analysis of secondary data on crime.
A review of the literature establishes a conceptual
framework of the field of policy analysis. A discussion on
policy-making which is one of several components of the
framework sets the stage for a discussion of Congressional
policy-making and its constraints. A review of the litera-
ture on crime in public housing is also presented. Estab-
lishment of a theoretical background of policy-making prac-
tices (development). appropriate policy contents

(theoretical structure), and establishment of a theoretical

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base of crime in public housing, helps to determine adequacy
of development and structure of the Anti-Crime statute to
address crime in public housing. An analysis of the Detroit
Anti-Crime Program gives an indication of the relationship
between program implementation and crime rate change at the
Brewster-Douglass project site. Hopefully, a relationship
between the Detroit program and adequacy of the theoretical
structure of the statute can be determined.

Detroit is a viable site to analyze for several
reasons. First, Detroit is not among the programs evaluated
in the final evaluation completed by HUD in 1985, therefore
no attempt has been made to determine success/failure of
their program. Second, the City of Detroit itself has a
reputation of high incidences of crime and violence. Before
program implementation, Detroit's rate of serious crimes
known to police ranked the fourth highest among twenty-three
midwest cities (9,416 serious crimes per 100,000 population
in 1977). Detroit ranked in first place among the twenty-
three cities as having the highest percent of serious crimes
labeled as ”violent".' Third, the Brewster-Douglass public
housing project site, the location of Detroit's Anti-Crime
program, has had a history of being crime ridden, a charac-
teristic of larger public housing projects. In addition, a
pronounced presence of criminal youth gangs existed in the
Brewster-Douglass complex before implementation of the

Anti-Crime Program.’

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The empirical research strategy that keeps in check all
possible threats to internal validity is the classic ex-
perimental design that employs random assignment of par-
ticipants to the program or to a control group.*° A
program's effectiveness is assessed by systematically com-
paring specific changes in the program group and the control
groups (participants not benefiting from the program) over
time. This research cannot randomly assign participants to
a program or control group because to do so, the researcher
has to be involved in the site selection process. Site
selection took place approximately eight years before the
conception of this study. The U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development officially considered the thirty-nine
public housing projects chosen for participation in the Ur-
ban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (Detroit was one of the
thirty-nine sites) to be the worst in terms of crime occur-
rence in the nation.

The study design for this analysis is a "non-equivalent
control-group design that incorporates a time-series ap-
proach as described by Posavac and Carey.** Generally, the
non-equivalent control-group design compares evaluation
criteria variables of two groups: the program group that
consisted of the public housing site that participated in
the Anti-Crime Program (Brewster-Douglass), and the control
group that consisted of a similar public housing site that
did not participate in the program (Jeffries Homes). Of the
twenty housing projects in Detroit, Jeffries Homes is the

most comparable with Brewster-Douglass (Figure 1.1).

11

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Several variables are considered in choosing Jeffries Homes
as the control group site: age of the project, location with
respect to downtown, neighborhood amenities, on-site
amenities, physical characteristics of the site, age dis-
tribution of the tenant population, and socioeconomic
characteristics of the tenant population (Table 1.1).

Most of all the threats to internal validity are

satisfied when program and control groups are comparable.*9
Threats to internal validity refers to the "reasons why
causal interpretations [of the data set] may not be
permitted.““-3 Maturation and history are two threats that
refer to changes in program participants due to an
influence(s) not necessarily related to the program. His-
tory refers to specific events that may occur and change the
behavior of program participants. Maturation describes
natural changes that take place in program participants over
a period of time.*‘

Collecting data over periods of time is a way of satis-
fying additional threats to internal validity. The
likelihood of confusing the Program's effect with the
maturation process is significantly reduced when a time
series design is used. In addition, effects of history are
more easily detected utilizing time series, than using ob-
servations over one or two time periods only.*’ Hatry sug-
gests that comparisons with groups not served by the program
in a time series manner "should be considered when control-
led, randomized experiments are not feasible."“

Between the study years 1976 and 1985, Brewster

12

Figure 1.1

Location of Brewster-Douglass and
Jeffries Public Housing Projects

 

  
   
 
       

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Table 1.1

Characteristics of Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Homes, December 1980

 

 

gagigglg Brewster-Douglas; Jgffrigg
YEAR BUILT 1938-41;1953 1955
PROXIMITY TO CBD adjacent adjacent
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
family 28R 247 units 299 units
family 3BR 280 345
family TOTAL 563 715
elderly Total 1386 1456
total units 1949 2171
high-rise yes yes
low-rises yes yes
townhouses yes yes
ON-SITE AMENITIES
parking yes yes
playground yes yes
day-care yes no
rec/lounge no yes
dining no yes
secured lobby no yes
NEIGHBORHOOD AMENITIES (within 1/2 mile)
food store yes yes
drug store yes yes
clothing store no no
library no yes
community center no yes
parks no no
schools no yes
swimming no yes
medical facilities yes no

 

Source: Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, 1981

Diregtorx 9f Assisted Rental figusigg in flgyng County and the
City 9f Qgtrgig, Vglumg II; Invggtgry and Descriptign 9f
Assisted Rggtal ngglggmggg, June 1981.

*ltttllill

 

14

Douglass experienced a total of 993 crimes reported and Jef-
fries Homes experienced a total of 1542 crimes reported, or
approximately fifty-five percent more crimes reported than
Brewster. This research makes the assumption that crime
rates at the two project sites are not entirely similar
enough to rule out some concerns of regression as a major
internal validity problem. The non-equivalent control group
design does not totally control regression as an internal
validity issue. Campbell and Stanley state:

"In general, if either of the comparison groups has

been selected for its extreme scores on O or corre-

lated measures, then a difference in degree of

shift from pretest to posttest between the two

groups may well be a product of regression rather

than the effect of ... [the Program]." (0 repre-

sents some process of observation or measure-

ment).*7
However, incorporation of the time series experiment will
control the regression factor. Campbell and Stanley sug-
gests that:

"Regression effects are usually a negatively ac-

celerated function of elapsed time and are there-

fore implausible as explanations of an effect at

observation points after program introduction."*'

The time series non-equivalent control-group design is

hypothetically diagrammed as shown in Figure 1.2.

15

Figure 1.2

Time Series Non-Equivalent Control-Group Design

3am; I AFTEK

I
‘f””’d"-“““‘__| Fiuxikfffi»

I
’\
/
afl' ‘\ ___‘___.
‘—':'”"' "" CoNTKbL

L

 

EVALUATION ca lT’G‘flA

TIMI

Generally, the following steps are followed to carry out the
empirical analysis:

1) identify evaluation criteria;

2) identify public housing project to be included in
the control group;

3) collect data for each defined time period for
program and control groups identified;

4) compare value changes in criteria of the program
and control groups; determine significance of
changes using the appropriate statistical tool;

5) identify any plausible explanations of changes not
related to the Anti-Crime program; estimate
their effect on the data if explanations have been
defined.

To determine on ground results in the Detroit ex-
perience, crime data for major crimes reported over a period
of time from 1976 to 1985 for each year are evaluated for
the Brewster-Douglass public housing project (program group)
and the Jeffries Homes project site (control group). The
time period is valid for two reasons. First, archival data
on a public housing project basis is not available before

1976. Second, analyzing data through 1985 gives four years

of crime variables before the program and four years after

16

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I ',

u...
s
o n
-
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...
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program closeout. Crime variables included in the analysis
are major crimes reported: murder, rape, robbery, assaults,
burglary, larceny and car theft. Figures for arsons
reported on a pubic housing project basis are not available.
Crime data used is reported crimes that was collected by the
Detroit Police Department. An assumption is made that all

crimes committed were not reported. Thus, figures used in
the analysis may not be entirely accurate in representing
true crime activity in the public housing projects.
Specific methods for “tests of significance" using the
time-series non equivalent design are currently in the
development stages.*’ This research employs the Mann Whit-
ney U Test and the Chi Square Test to determine whether
there is a significant difference in the rates of the
evaluation criteria (murder, rape, robbery, assaults,
burglary, larceny and car theft) between the program and
control group, before and after introduction of the Anti-
Crime Program.=° The Mann Whitney test determines whether‘a
difference in the two independent samples (control and
program group) is statistically significant meaning the
samples come from different populations. Mann Whitney is
advantageous for several reasons. First, it is one of the
most powerful distribution-free tests. Second, the test is
valid when applied to small, medium, and large samples.
Third, the nonparametric character of the test means that no
assumptions need be made about the characteristics of the
distribution of the populations being analyzed. The

"sample“ criteria for utilizing Mann Whitney is met on two

17

 

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accounts. First, the sampling distribution is not dependent
on the observations being sampled, but rather the dependency
is on a distribution of the ranking of which the Mann Whit-
ney technique is based.’* Second, each year represents a
sample y in terms of crime rates.22

Table 1.2 depicts how the data is utilized by each
crime variable in the Mann Whitney technique. The table
depicts the number of murders per 10,000 public housing
units per year for the program and control groups. Program
group (Brewster-Douglass) murders per 10,000 public housing
units are represented in column x and control group
(Jeffries) murders per 10,000 public housing units are rep-
resented in column y. To apply the U Test, the data is
ranked from lowest to highest, with the rank showing in
columns r" and r,. The sum of the ranks are then calcu-
lated. The statistic U is calculated from the following

equations:

 

 

U” = nuny +nn In“ + 1L __ Eire
2

u, -- n..ny +anv + 1) _ in,
2

where n. and ny are the number of years in sample x and y
respectively. Appropriate tables of critical values of U
are consulted to determine whether the difference is con—
sidered significant. Theoretically there should be no
statistically significant difference between control group
and program group crime rates before Anti-Crime Program ac-

tivities, and there should be a statistically significant

18

Table 1.2

Murders Per 10,000 Public Housing Units

 

 

Program Control
iggr x rx y ry
1976 I
Before 1977 I
Program 1978 I
1979 I
Z r,. '8 rgq7‘—;’79 I Zry = r1.7.-;.7.

(program ran from Jul

1980

1981

After 1982
Program 1983

Intro. 1984
1985

Y:

1980 to January, 1982)

 

2 re 3 r1..°—&9.3

19

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r ”:7:
u u‘ e

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at
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‘ =
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difference between program and control groups after the
program (Samples from different populations) if the program
actually had an effect on crime.33
The Chi Square Test is applied to determine whether
there is a significant difference between crimes reported
(actual frequencies) between the Brewster-Douglass site and
the Jeffriee.site in terms of before and after program in-
troduction of the Anti-Crime Program. Chi Square is ap-
propriate for two reasons. First, crime data is available
in the form of frequencies. Second, the total number of
crime incidences in each crime type (except murder) exceeds
the minimum requirement of 20 frequencies. As with the Mann
Whitney technique, the "sample“ requirement is met as each
year represents a sample y in terms of crime rates.”‘

Table 1.3 depicts how the data is employed by crime
variable in the Chi Square Test. The contingency table
depicts the total number of murders that took place at the
Brewster-Douglass site and the Jeffries site before and
after introduction of the the Anti-Crime Program. The test
statistic for the two sample two category situation is cal-

culated using the following formula:

X2 =n§§AQ - BE: - Q/Z)a
(A + B)(C + D)(A + C)(B + D)

where n represents the total frequency of murders at the

Brewster and Jeffries sites; A, B, C and D refer to the num-

ber (or frequencies) of murders in each of the cells of the

20

....“-

,. no!
a

u one
, .

 

 

"‘r‘)

I]!

‘ a

‘:
‘ e
U

(I!

 

contingency table 1.3; and :AD - BC: is the absolute value
of the difference between A times D and 8 times C. Ap-
proximate tables of critical values of X2 are consulted to
determine whether the difference in crime rates before and
after the program are significant. If the calculated value
of X3 is greater than the critical value, then it is ex-
tremely unlikely that crime rates before and after the
program is due to chance. Rather the difference is more
likely to be due to the Anti-Crime Program.=9
Table 1.3
Chi Square Contingency Table for

Frequency of Murders
(by project site)

Total Murders
1976-1979 1980-1985

8.919;: Programs After- Prom-fl

 

 

 

Brewster I I I
I A I B I (A + B)
I I I
Jeffries I I I
I C I D I (C + D)
I I I
(A+C) (8+0) N
5.2131881

The purpose of this research is to determine whether
the development and structure of the federal policy
(statute) that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program adequately addressed the crime problem
in public housing; and to determine what relationship exist
between implementation of the the Detroit Urban Initiatives

Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and crime rate change at

21

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'1. I

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e
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the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site. The
Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 authorized
HUD to administer the program.

The study has implications on the relationships between
urban planning and policy analysis, urban planning and
public housing and urban planning and crime prevention.
Policy analysis and planning are similar in that both fields
define perceived problems, develop goals and objectives to
address the perceived problems and implement programs to
carry out goals and objectives that address the problems.“‘
Knowledge of policy analysis in the planning context is im—
portant because city planners through competence in policy
analysis are better versed in methods, process, and issues
that relate to economic and social structure. Competence in
policy analysis yield strong writing skills in organization,
clarity, and precision. The literature in policy analysis
teaches planners how to address political factors in
analysis, how to advocate uncomfortable positions, and how
to read and understand legislative language. Policy
analysis also helps planners learn how governments work,
laws get passed and how administrative rules are initiated.
Finally, the policy analysis arena assists planners to learn
how cities grow and decline, and learn which city problems
are addressed by governments at what appropriate level.37

Urban planning issues in a social context should ad-
dress public housing. The social planning mechanism at the

local level is required to provide:

22

Mi.
‘0,

“a

If!» I
,‘ III

0'!)

,IL

4 n
Jun-l

Hqu
v“.

5le

OA.’

‘1')“

"...preventative and rehabilitative services for...

multi-problem families whose conduct causes dif-

ficulty to other tenants and management; social

group work and recreational programs for all age

groups; and ...tenant organization and tenant

education [programs] to identify and train leader-
ship, and in the development and constructive
self-help organizations, and build cooperative
community efforts.""

The relationship between planning and crime prevention
address the relationship between environmental factors and
crime prevention. Manipulation of the physical environment
through planning techniques can reduce crime potential in
several ways, some of which are the elimination of underused
circulation channels through density control mechanisms,
centralization of evening establishments to increase the
surveillance mechanism; and centralized parking areas and

adding improved lighting and removing hidden barriers to

deter crime.”

23

In... F‘

‘u

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

*See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Fingl Rgggrt gf the Evaluation of thgigrbgn Initigtivgg
Anti-grim: nggnstrgtion, May 1985.

2David A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Imlgmentation

ang ngiig Pgiicy, (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1983), pp. 4-5.

3U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Intgrgggngx nggg Initiatives Anti-Crime Program,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 1.

‘See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Final

Reggrt gf the Evgiggtign gf the Urgan Initiatives Anti-Crime
Qemgngtrgtigg, May 1985.

3See Steven Michael Edwards, “An Implementation
Analysis of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in
Public Housing: A Two-City Case Study" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Michigan State University, 1984.)

‘Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier,
m ' P ' P ' , (Glenview, IL: Scott,
Foresman and Company), p. 7.

7Ibid., p. 8.

'U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research. Changing

Congitiong in Large Metropolitan Argas, November, 1980,
Table 22, not paged.

’Telephone conversation with Ms. Sherone Ivey, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington,
D.C., 12 November 1987.

*°Emil J. Posavac and Raymond G. Carey, Program

Evaiggtign: Mgtngds gng Qasg Studies, 2nd edition,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985), p. 232. Also see

Harry P. Hatry, et. a1., Pr t' Pro am val ati n for
State ang nggi ngernmentg, 2nd edition, (Washington: The

Urban Institute Press, 1981), p. 40.

*3Posavac, Prggrgm Evglgatign, p. 212. Also see
Hatry, Pragtigai Prggrgm Evalugtign, p. 34.

*zlbid., p. 212.

*3Posavac and Carey, p. 173.

24

 

5“-

 

*‘Ibid., p. 183-184. Also see Donald T. Campbell and

Julian C. Stanley, Experimental eng Ogasi-Exgerimentai
Qeeigne fgn Reeegrth, (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1963), p. 5.

"Ibid., p. 208.

*‘Hatry, Prggtigei Prggren Exalgetign, pp. 35-36.

1”Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley,

Experimentei eng Qgeei-Exgerimental Designs for Research,
(Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1963), p. 49.

*‘Ibid., p. 41.

uPosavac and Carey, p. 217; and J.M. Gottman and G.V.
Glass, ”Analysis of Interrupted Time-Series Experiments, in
'n ' R r h' r e i or valua in h n e,
ed., T.R. Kratochwill (New York: Academic Press, 1978).

2°For further description of the tests, see David

Ebdon, fitgtigtigs in Geggrnghy, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, Ltd., 1985), pp. 57-60 and 65-71; and R. Hammond
and P.S. McCullagh, n ' a 've T hni u s ‘n eo ra h

2nd edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 170-181
and 199-202.

P‘See David Ebdon, Statietige in Geggreghx, 2nd ed.,
(New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1985), pp. 59 - 60, for

an explanation of this idea.

3=Interview with Dr. Bruce Pigozzi, Department of
Geography, Michigan State University, East Lansing,
Michigan, 17 February 1988. As an example, from January
1977 to December 1979, there may have been 150 murders in
the study area. One ”sample" period is represented from
January 1977 to December 1977; another sample period can be
represented from June 1977 to May 1978.

330f the 20 public housing projects in Detroit,
Jeffries Homes is the most comparable with the
Brewster-Douglass project. Several variables are considered
in choosing Jeffries Homes as the control group site: age
of the project, location with respect to downtown,
neighborhood amenities, on-site amenities, physical
characteristics of the site, age distribution of the tenant
population, and socioeconomic characteristics of the tenant
population.

a‘Ibid. Also see R. Hammond and P.S. McCullagh,

Quantitative Teghniguee in Geggraghy, 2nd ed., (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 171.

25

=°Ebdon, Statietigs in Geography, pp. 67-69.

2“Herbert J. Gans, People end Plens: Essays gn Urban

Prggieme ang Sgiutions, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp.
79-80.

a’Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki, Beeic Method§_of

Pgligy Aneiyeig end Plenninq, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1986), p. 7.

2'Bernard J. Frieden and Robert Morris, eds., Unban
Pl nn'n ' P ' , (New York: Basic Books, 1968),
p. 105.

a"Shlomo Angel, Qiscograging Crime Through City
Pienning, (Berkeley: University of California, 1968), pp.

19—23 0

26

Chapter II
POLICY ANALYSIS

It is necessary to establish a conceptual framework of
general policy analysis and policy making before any conclu-
sions can be drawn on whether the development and structure
of the federal policy (statute) that authorized the Urban
Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately ad-
dressed the crime problem in public housing. This chapter
develops through an analysis of the literature the ap-
propriate methods of policy development, Congressional
policy-making strategies, and the necessary provisions con-
tained in a statute that assure viable program implementa-
tion and results. Knowledge of methods of appropriate
policy development aids in an understanding of how a
statute's overall theoretical structure and content are
determined. A conceptual knowledge of appropriate policy
content allows a delineation of the adequacy of the statute

to address the crime problem in public housing.

27

POLICY DEFINED

Policy, or the policy concept, is difficult to define.
No one real definition exists that all disciplines utilize.
Edwards and Skarkansky explain that policy can be viewed as
what governments say and do, or not do.‘ Policy can be
stated explicitly in laws or statutes, or in speeches by
leading political or administrative officials. Policy can
be implied in programs and overall actions of bureaucrats.
Policy can be implicit in nature and recognizable only to
those who carry out and work with a particular program.
Policy can be made implicit through actions by officials
that wish to undermine the real purpose of the policy.2
Ripley and Franklin give a good, solid, and general state-
ment on policy and policy making:

"Policy is what the government says and does about
perceived problems.

Policy making is how the government decides what
will be done about perceived problems.

Policy making is a process of interaction among

governmental and nongovernmental actors; policy is

the outcome of that interaction.”3

Looking at this rationale, perceived problems appear to
be the catalyst in the initiation of policy of sorts,
whether it be a law or statute, or a general type policy
directive. Problems that governments address through policy
are public problems. Public problems differ from private
problems. Dewey defines "public" as consisting of “all

those who are affected by the indirect consequences of

transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary

28

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. I" 5

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to have those consequences cared for."‘ Based on this
thought public problems are “those that have a broad effect,
including consequences for persons not directly involved."9
The perceived problem of crime in public housing by
Representative Claude Pepper of Florida served as the
primary catalyst for his success in passage of the Public
Housing Security Demonstration Act. This statute repre-
sented a federal government policy directive to address the
crime issue in the nations public housing. The following
sections of this chapter lay the groundwork to analyze how
Congress decided what to to about the perceived crime
problem through an examination of the mechanics of Congres-
sional policy-making, and what Congress decided to do about
the perceived problem of public housing crime through an

analysis of statute content.

FQRMQLATIQN, IMPLEMENTATION, REFORflULeTLON: ARE THEY THE
SAME?

Some scholars adhere to the belief that a distinction
exist between policy formulation, policy implementation, and
policy reformulation that takes place after implementation.
Generally, this view is based on traditional American
democracy with its notions "of the separate functions of
legislatures and administrative agencies."‘ One approach
divides the policy process into three distinct stages. Each
stage results in a policy product (Figure 2.1).7 An existing
problem comes to the attention of policy makers in the
agenda setting stage and they then determine that it is the

governments responsibility to address the problem.

29

Governmental agenda is a result of agenda-setting and it is
defined as the sum of all the issues and problems that the
government addresses at any given time, such as the slug-
gish economy, high unemployment, shortage of low-income
housing, crime in existing low-income housing. Once the
problem has been acknowledged and determined to warrant
governmental attention, the government must then determine
just how it plans to address the problem. The
formulation/legitimization stage incorporate talents and
ideas from government and non-government actors to develop
alternative methods of addressing the problem, and to choose
a course of action in eradicating the problem. The end
result of this stage is usually a statute or law. Enactment
of a statute or law sets the way for the stage of implemen-
tation by agencies and individuals given the responsibility
to carry out policy actions based on the piece of legisla-
tion. Policy impacts on society may or may not be com-
patable with the intended purpose of the piece of legisla-
tion. Impacts not even anticipated may occur. An assess-
ment of policy impacts sets the stage for making decisions
on the future of the program and legislation which
authorizes the program.‘

The distinction in a conceptual sense between formula-
tion and implementation can be challenged. The "adaptive"
or "interactive" approach to implementation suggests that
goals and strategies can be changed or modified by actors

involved in the implementation process to point where a

30

eoos'

#

have

Q I .
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.

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Figure 2.1

Policy Process

 

 

 

 

Policy State Policy Product
Agenda Setting produces 2 Government Agenda
Lleads to
Policy and Programs produces Policy Statements
Formulation and } (including goals and
Legitimization means to achieve them)
leads to

 

/

 

 

 

Program produces Policy Actions
Implementation “"’)
leads to
Policy Impact
leads t0 /
1. Assessment of Policy Impacts
2. Decision on future of policy or program

SOURCE: Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress,
the Egceengrngy, eng Puglig Pgligy, 3rd edition, Homewood,
11.: The Dorsey Press, 1984, p. 2.

Illltttitt

31

distinction between the formulation and implementation
stages cannot be defined.’

Majone and Wildavsky do not adhere to the notion that
implementing officials have the perogative to alter basic
goals and objectives of a policy directive. They do,
however, suggest that goals and programs of policy making
are continuously modified by policymakers (not implementors)
to adjust to various constraints and changing
circumstances.*°

This research accepts the position that a distinct
delineation between formulation, implementation, and refor-
mulation is not realistic. Rather, the policy redesign con-
cept where goal modification and program modification are
necessary to meet unforeseen constraints and changing cir-
cumstances is necessary, particularly for federal programs
that address defined problems that may vary in scope and
content from situation to situation.

Establishment of a conceptual basis of goal/objective
modification or a lack of change in program goal/objectives
is necessary to understand and define strengths and
weaknesses of the statute that authorized the Anti-Crime
Program and its efforts to structure the implementation
process. The notion of the modification of goals and objec-
tives appropriately address circumstances where statutes and
appellate court decisions are often modified throughout the
implementation process. In some cases, modification to the
point where the distinction between formulation and im-

plementation are blurred. This situation happens when the

32

 

;= :r

 
 

‘I
tn...

 
 

 

e
“

8
‘s

,‘
es

\

original policy (statute) is so ambiguous that it is mean-
ingless. Vague policies of this nature force implementing
officials to actually formulate an implementable policy
before implementation begins. Other examples include situa-
tions where a reasonably sound policy does not survive (or
is drastically altered) by court decisions, legislators, and
administrative agencies over a period of years. Finally, an
example of statute modification relates to the gradual
evolution of a small experimental program into a major

policy innovation.u

A LOOK AT THE POLIQY ANAEYSIS CONCEPT

This section on the basic policy analysis concept is
presented to put into perspective policy analysis at the
federal level (presented later) and other forms of policy
analysis. Comparison of these approaches helps to delineate
strengths/weaknesses of federal government policy-making in
general and policy-making related to the Anti-Crime statute
specifically.

Policy analysis in a broad sense is defined as the
study of the nature, causes, and effects of alternative
public policies for dealing with specific social problems.*2
Policy analysis is necessary because, through analysis and
study, policies can be made more effective in actually solv-
ing social problems.‘3 Policy analysis can be a study of
policy content or a study of policy process. In general, an
analysis that addresses policy content looks at what the

policy is intended to affect, the end result of policy

33

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implementation and how the defined end result will be
accomplished.*‘ Policy process addresses the actions and
interactions of various policy-making actors that leads to
the actual policy generated. The policy process arena may
include an assessment of the consequences of the policy.*°

Golembiewski develops this distinction with a delinea-
tion between prescriptive studies and descriptive studies of
policy. Generally, prescriptive studies focus on policy
content and refer to analysis which recommends actions be-
cause they will bring about a particular result. Descrip-
tive studies tend to focus on the policy process and ul-
timately lead to a descriptive and/or explanatory account of
the policy and process in question.*‘ Descriptive and
prescriptive studies are further broken down to yield four
major types of policy studies: prescriptive/content,
descriptive/content, prescriptive/process, and
descriptive/process.*’

Prescriptive/content policy studies are broken down
into two traditions. The older tradition (the "normative"
study of public policy) "attempts to analyze, usually in a
critical fashion, a particular public policy... and
generally will also suggest either reforms in the existing
policy or a new type of policy altogether ...."*' The
second, and newer tradition examines either the future con-
sequences of existing policies or the kinds of policies that

may be suitable in some forecasted future. Both types of

34

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prescriptive/contents studies are labeled as "problem-
oriented" as they address a given problem and the ap-
propriate policy to deal with the defined problem.

Descriptive/contents policy studies look at the at-
tributes of a policy's contents in relation to the policy
process." Policy attributes include traditional content
categories such as substantive policy area (problem
addressed), institutional categories (agency assigned to
carry out intent of the policy), target categories
(population group benefiting from the policy), time periods
(period in which policy is in force; deadlines), and extent
of support (policy backers).

Recent policy studies of the prescriptive/process type
generally involve a formalized deductive "rational choice”
model such as systems analysis, program-planning-budgeting
systems with efficiency and equity being the overriding
goal.2° Finally, the descriptive/process type of policy
analysis usually studies one or more of the stages of the
policy cycle such as formulation, decision-making, implemen-
tation, effects, and feedback. Most studies of this type
address the policy formulation stage or the policy effects
stage. Studies analyzing policy formulation look at the na-
ture, extent, perception, and causes of a policy problem.
Policy effects studies usually address impact assessments,
evaluations of effectiveness, and/or cost-benefit

analysis.‘*

35

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This dissertation is a representation of the
descriptive/contents and descriptive/process type of policy
analysis. The research looks closely at policy content of
the statute that authorized the Anti-Crime Program in terms
of accuracy of the problem defined and implementation man-
dates of the statute. In addition, this research addresses
how Congressional leaders developed the statute and ration-
ale they used for statute contents. Specific variables ad-
dressed to determine adequacy of policy content and policy
development are discussed in subsequent pages.

Patton and Sawicki view policy analysis as a general
set of “systematic procedures or policy analysis methods
that can be used to attack contemporary problems".== Policy
analysis is a systematic process which includes problem
definition, determination of evaluation criteria, iden-
tification of alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, com-
parison of alternatives and assessment of outcomes. This
process can be diagrammed as shown in Figure 2.2.

The process outlined above is not meant to be rigidly
followed. Various analysts work through the policy analysis
process differently because of backgrounds, time available
to carry out the analysis, problem addressed and the
availability of financial and informational resources. This
model can be used by a beginning analyst as a guide to work
through each step in the policy analysis process using their
own backgrounds and technical expertise to guide the direc-

tion of research.‘-"3 In addition, the model is helpful in

36

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that it assists others in evaluating the analysis, and it
informs the general population of the effectiveness of
adopted policy.24

The first step in the policy analysis process is to
verify, define, and detail the problem. It is important in
problem verification to look at the initial problem state-
ment with some degree of suspicion. The initial problem may
be part of a larger problem. The problem may be one that is
inappropriate to be addressed by the decision maker begin-
ning the analysis. The problem that initiated the analysis
may not exist, or work its way out over a period of time.
The most effective problem definition process is labeled by
some as "backward problem solving."99 The backward problem
solving process involves an analysis of the available data
of the problem in hand, the development and selection
of criteria to be used to evaluate alternative policies,
defining alternatives, and redefining the problem with the
data and other resources in hand. Finally, problem defini-
tion involves an understanding of "the positions and
influence of various individuals and groups."=‘ This un-
derstanding is facilitated by defining those interested in
the problem and why, and the power the concerned has to af-
fect a policy decision. Detailing the problem involves the
knowledge of exactly what information is available to con-
duct the analysis, what information is needed, and how much
effort is involved in carrying out the policy analysis.

Establishment of evaluation criteria for later evalua-

tion of alternatives is a central process to the whole

37

Figure 2.2

A Basic Policy Analysis Process

 

  

1

l-_ — - Verify, Define, and 1

| Detail the Problems

4K

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. l 2 |
Monitor : Establish
Policy ' ('- _ __ Evaluation l
Outcomes | I 11 Criteria ‘
T ' ' __l
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5 I 3
Display and I ‘ Identify l
I
Select Among I ' Alternative _'- -
Alternative | | Policies
Policies | l
T
| 1
4
Evaluate

 

 

 

 

Alternative

Policies

 

 

SOURCE: Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki, Baeig Methogs

of Polity Analyeie end Pianning, Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1986, p. 26.

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38

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policy analysis exercise. Effective evaluation criteria
must be central to the problem and relevant to key par-
ticipants in the decision process. Effective criteria as-
sist to clarify values, goals, and objectives of the deci-
sion makers, and at the same time they explicitly define the
desirable and undesirable outcomes. Examples of relevant
evaluation criteria include cost of the alternative, net
benefit, overall effectiveness, efficiency, equity of the
proposed program, administrative workability, legality, and
political acceptability. Each alternative later evaluated
will have different outcomes for each of the evaluation
criteria applied. As an example, one alternative may cause
an undue hardship on a particular population group [the
equity issue], while another alternative may more evenly
distribute benefits to all segments of the population.
Generation of alternative policies is easier once the
specific problem and evaluation criteria have been ade-
quately defined. Formulation of alternative policies is im-
portant because it can assist in revealing aspects of the
problem not earlier identified. A new perspective or insight
into the initial problem may be uncovered. Experiments and
researched analysis, various brainstorming techniques, and
creating scenarios, are all effective means to generate al-
ternative policies. It is necessary to keep an open mind in
the development of alternative policies, and not forget the
"no-action" alternative. It is also important to remember

that what was unacceptable in the past may very well be

39

 

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acceptable today because values and assumptions of decision
makers, participants and benefactors of policy do change
over time.

Evaluation of alternative policies is considered by
some as the most important step of the policy analysis
process. The evaluation using criteria previously defined
hopefully reveals alternative(s) that are most suited to ad-
dressing the defined problem. This stage is not a clear-cut
process. Some alternatives will immediately be eliminated
because of failure to meet major evaluation criteria.

Others will call for further and more detailed evaluation
that may lead to a need for additional data collection.

This stage may also reveal that the problem no longer exist
as defined. New information collected may reveal new
aspects of the problem that will suggest the need for vary-
ing and different evaluation criteria. If this is the case,
it is imperative that the analyst ”backtrack" the process
and redefine the evaluation criteria, and maybe even the
problem.

To display alternative policies and their rank accord-
ing to selected criteria aids in the decision maker choosing
the most appropriate alternative to address the defined
problem. Generally, evaluation results can be presented as
a list of alternatives, with criteria ranking, and an
analysis of how each alternative met the established
criteria. Evaluation results can be expressed in several
ways. First, matrices provide a quick and visible means of

comparison of pros and cons of the various alternatives

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considered. In the matrix, one axis contains the alterna-
tives, while the other contains the evaluation criteria.
Second, value-comparison schemes to emphasize pros and cons
of alternatives are possible when criteria can be expressed
in quantitative terms. Third, scenarios can be presented to
take into consideration quantitative, qualitative, and
political variables determining the viability of each alter-
native.

Finally, the consideration of the monitoring of policy
outcomes is important at the preprogram stage. Preprogram
analysis should be conducted with some understanding that a
program may fail and why. The failure “areas" may be
eliminated if the monitoring and evaluation program is
designed during the preprogram period. Policies should also
be monitored during implementation to assure policy com-
pliance, to measure impact and determine if the impact is
intended, and to decide whether the policy is to be con-

tinued, modified, or terminated.

PO Y T T

Before specific strengths and weaknesses of the Anti-
Crime Program can be defined, it is necessary to deveIOp a
conceptual model of appropriate contents of a statute and
necessary political variables that assures successful im-
plementation of the statute. The literature clearly docu-
ments the need for clear and precise policy content and for
policy that is based on viable problems. Policies more

effectively solve social problems when accurate information,

41

analysis and thought are an integral part of the policy
making process.27 In addition to being technically
feasible, policies must be politically viable. Technical
feasibility and political viability may conflict in the
policy-making process. As an example, a policy that ad-
dresses a highly controversial issue will be affected
politically in the formulation and implementation efforts by
support constituencies, lobbyists, and non-supporters.
Another way of stating the comparison is policy should be
crafted after ”informed and thoughtful analysis and discus-
sion, and by elections, bargaining, trading of favors, and
wheeling and dealing...”" Lindblom concludes that policy-
making and its contents is determined not so much by fresh
information and analysis, but by those in power to make
policy with their decisions based on ultimately what will
get them the most votes. Therefore, citizens must become
actively involved in policy-making and express their con-
cerns to the policymakers.

The literature suggests that for effective implementa-
tion, a statute and its political variables must meet
several conditions:

1. have policy objectives that are clear and

consistent;

2. incorporation of a sound causal theory;

3. structure the implementation process;

4. commitment to statutory goals by implementing

agency;

5. program support by organized constituency

groups and key legislators throughout the
implementation process;

6. priority of statutory objectives is not under-

mined over time by conflicting public policies

that weakens the statutes causal theory or
political support.“’

42

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Mazmanian and Sabatier suggests that the first two condi-
tions must always be met for effective program implementa-
tion. All six conditions must be met where significant be-
havioral change is desired of a population resistant to the
programmed change.39 This study uses the conditions above
to help determine the strengths and weaknesses of the
statute that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program. A comprehensive analysis of the
statutes strengths/weaknesses in relation to these condi-
tions is presented in Chapter VI.

Policy content and structure are the basic determinants
of whether or not the goals/objectives of the policy are
carried out during program implementation. The Anti-Crime
statute could assure an acceptable degree of program im-
plementation and be successful in reducing public housing
crime by incorporation of the following conditions in the
statute. First, objectives should have been precise and
clearly ranked. Clear objectives are invaluable for future
program evaluation as the evaluators have explicit defini-
tions as to what must be determined to be successful. Clear
objectives serve as a guide for those that perceive dis-
crepancies between the output of the implementing agency,
and the direction set by statute objectives. In addition,
it is necessary for a new statute that is implemented by an
existing agency to contain clear objectives that describe
relative priority of the program in the agency's programs.
New statutes and program tend to be given low priority when

this is not explicit in the new directive.

43

 

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At a minimum, the Anti-Crime statute must be precise
and clear in problem identification, desired behavior
change, and the appropriate method to achieve the desired
behavioral change. In addition, the statute must establish
a degree of priority for the U. S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) which is the primary implementing
agency to carry out the intent of the statute, and establish
where the program will be placed with HUD bureaucracy.

Second, objectives of the Anti-Crime statute may have
been met if they had incorporated an adequate causal theory.
Mazmanian and Sabatier suggest that an adequate causal
theory requires that:

”The principal causal linkages between governmental

intervention and the attainment of program objec-

tives be understood... and... that officials

responsible for implementing the program have

jurisdiction over a sufficient number of critical

linkages to actually attain the objectives."3*
An adequate causal theory probably does not exist for public
housing crime. Causal Linkages are impossible to delineate
because the literature is not explicit on the appropriate
way to address public housing crime: is it better to design
public housing anti-crime programs to reduce crime activity
or design programs to protect public housing residents from
crime. In addition, for the anti-crime program to succeed,
the implementing federal agency must have administrative
authority over the other government agencies that are man-

dated to provide their funds and areas of expertise to the

anti-crime effort. Governmental fragmentation of the

44

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American system at all levels makes adequate implementation
by the primary agency of an anti-crime program virtually im-
possible.

Third, Anti-Crime statute would have been more effec-
tively carried out if the implementation process was ade-
quately structured to maximize the potential that implement-
ing officials and target groups would perform as intended.
The statute has the capacity to structure the implementation
process through:

... its selection of the implementing institu—

tions; through providing financial resources to

those institutions; through biasing the probable

policy orientations of agency officials; and

through regulating the opportunities for participa-

tion by non-agency actors in the implementation

process."32
Goals of the selected implementing agency should be com-
patable with those of the Anti-Crime statute. Money to sup-
port a program authorized by the statute is obviously criti-
cal. Adequate financial resources are necessary to support
program administrators as well as costs of physical improve-
ments that a program may address. The amount of financial
resources needed to support a program are based on viable
problem identification.

A primary obstacle in the implementation of regulatory
and social service programs in general relates to coordina-
tion among the implementing agency and the numerous semi-
autonomous agencies that have some responsibility in program
implementation. This problem is most pronounced in federal

statutes that rely on various federal, state, and local

agencies to carry out the intent of the program. This issue

45

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is a major concern with the Anti-Crime statute. Legislators
set up the program to utilize expertise and previously com-
mitted funds from numerous federal agencies that address
crime, juvenile delinquency, and housing. It is imperative
that the statute structure a coordinating system as to how
participating agencies relate to HUD as well as specific
responsibilities of each participating agency.

The degree of hierarchial integration among agencies
with responsibility for implementation is determined by:

1) the number of veto/clearance points that are
involved in the attainment of statutory
objectives;

2) the extent to which supporters of statutory
objectives are provided with inducements and
sanctions sufficient to assure acceptance from
non-supporters.33

Veto/clearance points refer to occasions where an actor
(either the implementing official or target group members)
has the capacity or is given the chance to negatively affect
achievements of statute goals and objectives. Mutual goal
concensus among all actors is necessary to minimize the
availability of veto/clearance points. Nagel states:

”Even given agreement among all actors on
basic objectives, the multiplicity of clearance
[veto] points offers numerous occasions for delay
and the breakdown of consensus as participants ne-
gotiate specific agreements. In the absence of
such goal consensus, there is every likelihood that
opponents or lukewarm supporters of program objec-
tives will be able to control sufficient [veto]
points to demand important concessions and poten-
tially to scuttle the program as it applies to
them. This is particularly likely in
intergovernmental programs, where there will nor-
mally be substantial variation in the attitudes of
implementing officials in various juris-
dictions.“3‘

46

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Simply, veto points are weak places in the implementation
structure to allow the opposition to act on their objections
to a program or certain components of a program. Resistance
to "acting.on objectives“ can be minimized if the statute
provides sufficient reason for the actor to alter their be-
havior and follow policy guidelines so that the ultimate be-
havioral change can be accomplished.

Fourth, the Anti-Crime statute would have been most
likely to be successful when leaders of the implementing
agency (HUD) possess substantial managerial and political
skills, and were committed to statutory goals. Agency sup-
port of a program is imperative for success in meeting
program objectives. Support is necessary for the develop-
ment of viable regulations and standard operating procedures
and enforcement. Policymakers can assure some degree of
agency commitment by the assignment of implementation
responsibility to an agency whose policy orientation is con—
sistent with that of the new program, or creation of a new
agency to administer the program. At the federal level, new
statutes authorize programs that are implemented in an ex-
isting agency. Agencies in many cases may be ambivalent or
even hostile to accept new programs, especially when person-
nel is not added to accommodate new work demands, or when
appropriations are inadequate or nonexistent. Generally,
this situation often leads to program failure.3°

Fifth, programs that are actively supported by or-
ganized constituency groups and key legislators throughout

the implementation process will be most successful in

47

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meeting goals and objectives outlined in a statute. The in-
volvement of organized groups at the beginning of problem
formulation and statute development will better assure sup-
port. In addition, many support groups are excellent
sources of information needed to adequately define the
problem in question. Contributors of background information
will also strengthen group constituency support of proposed
statutes and programs.

Congressmembers may not oversee implementation of their
programs once a bill they sponsor becomes law and an as-
signed agency begins program start-up. Legislators
generally fail to oversee their programs because they:

1) see opportunities for greater rewards in in-

volvement of the legislative process rather

than the administrative process;

2) view federal agencies as impenetrable mazes
that may pose hazards to their careers;

3) become reluctant to review agency activity
where close rewarding friendships have
developed within that agency;

4) perceive agency review is not conducive to
Presidential loyalty.3‘

Finally, statute goals are most obtainable when
priority of statute objectives are not undermined over time
by the emergence of conflicting public policies or other
changes that weaken causal theory. Federal programs that
operate over many years, or start up at the end of a
Presidential Administration (such as with the Anti-Crime
program) are particularly in danger. Changes in Administra-

tion, Congressional make-up, and/or party dominance will

48

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have an impact on policy implementation, especially when
these changes produced pronounced differences in public
policy directives.

Most statutes, especially at the federal level, do not
incorporate the above variables in their text because of the
wide variety of interests represented, diversity of ac-
tivities, and the multiple veto and weak party system in
Congress. Adequate causal theory are normally not addressed
in federal legislation. As a result, many programs are
slated for failure from the beginning because of inadequate
causal theory, or because federal statutes fail to structure

the implementation process.37

FEDERQL QQVERNMENT POLIQV-MAKING

A conceptual framework to define federal government
policy-making practices must be understood before any con-
clusions can be drawn on the adequacy of the the development
of the Anti-Crime statute. An understanding of the roles of
various government and non-government actors in statute for-
mulation, and their interrelationships, help to determine
why the statute may be strong in some areas and weak in
other areas.

The national governmental policy process is housed
primarily in the legislative and in the executive branch.
Policy activity in these two institutions often, if not al-
ways, receive input from non-governmental entities in shap-
ing public policy. Of particular importance are the vast

array of interest groups that participate in the formulation

49

of federal laws. The relationship between interest groups
can flow in two ways. Interest groups help to shape policy
and policy formulation may define interests that help gener-
ate groups to assist in “refining" these new policies.

The interaction between the executive and legislative
branches are critical in policy formulation.3° The legisla-
tive branch, or Congress, usually consists of party leaders,
committee/subcommittee leaders, various members of the House
and Senate. The executive branch consist of the President
and his Executive Office, and federal employees or civil
servants. Figure 2.3 depicts the most important interac-
tions among the various actors in the federal policy-making
process. This interaction is critical related to success of
the Anti-Crime Program. Congress formulated the Program and
assigned implementation responsibility to HUD. Adequate
commitment by HUD to administer the program most effectively
originates from the HUD Secretary who is a political ap-
pointee.

Two critical relationships exist within the executive
branch: the President with Executive Office personnel and
presidential appointees throughout the government, and Ex-
ecutive Office personnel and presidential appointees with
government civil servants. The federal government is ob-
viously too vast for the President to have direct contact
with civil servants. Therefore, the placement of political

appointees throughout the government system serves as a

50

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Figure 2.3

Interactions in the Federal Policy-Making Process

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

[President 1 Party Leaders

Executive Office ‘ Committee and

Personnel and Sub-Committee

Presidential Leaders

Appointees

Civil Servants Senators and
Representatives

 

 

 

SOURCE: Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress,
Th r a r n Pu lic Polic , 3rd edition, Homewood,
IL: The Dorsey Press, 1984, p. b.

titttitttt
vehicles in linking programmatic ideas of the President with
civil servants who in turn develop and implement those
ideas.

Internal congressional relationships involve the inter-
action between committee/subcommittee leaders, congressional
members, and party leaders with committee leaders acting as
intermediaries between the party leaders and congressional
members. The committee/subcommittee leaders generally have
the most power in deciding major issues that Congress will
act upon. In turn, party leaders map out tactical
strategies on the best approach in getting the work of
committees/subcommittees approved by the Congress.

Finally, interaction between the legislative and execu-
tive branches play a role in federal policy-making. Inter-

action between the President and party leaders normally

51

 

 

"‘35

a...
so ”

 

involve the planning of strategy and tactical matters in
getting presidential ideas enacted into law. Relationships
and interaction between Executive Office personnel and
presidential appointees and committee/subcommittee leaders,
and interaction between civil service and congressional
committee/subcommittee leaders often are more substantive in
nature (actual contents, goals/objectives of a proposed law
or policy.)

U.S. government policy-making is extremely complex with
four characteristics of policy-making definable. The
characteristics act with and within each other to complicate
the complexity of the policy-making structure. First, the
wide-spread phenomena of subgovernments complicate the
federal policy-making machinery. Subgovernments are groups
of individuals that actually make most of the policy. Sub—
groups can be defined as ”members of the House and/or
Senate, members of congressional staffs, a few bureaucrats,
and representatives of private groups and organizations in-
terested in the policy area [being addressed]."3’

Generally, subgovernments do not have control of all federal
policy-making. They do, however, play an important role in
most policy-making efforts.

A variety of governmental institutions is another
characteristic of federal policy-making. Since there is a
geographical dispersion of various federal agencies and of-
fices, and since many institutions share the responsibility
of developing and implementing various policies, the federal

policy-making process may very well involve action of a

52

 

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number of states and cities. Involvement of states and lo-
cal governments in implementation of federal policy is
usually dependent on philosophies of the political party oc-
cupying the White House.

The third characteristic of federal policy-making is
that of separated institutions with the Constitution creat-

ing the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of

government. These institutions carry out subdivided
governmental functions. The Constitution at the same time
limits autonomy by forcing the institutions to share powers.
Congressional delegation of authority to the executive
branch is an example of this sharing. The final charac-
teristic of federal policy-making is that of the variety and
volume of issues addressed. Also, the “specificity" of
governmental policy varies from very detailed to vague and
ambiguous.

Congressional policymakers often do not follow the ra-
tional policy-making route presented at the beginning of
this Chapter because of two primary constraints - political
feasibility, and the governmental fragmentation issue.‘°
Politicians must bargain and negotiate with each other
before reaching decisions. Past precedent is a major con-
straint and by the examination of a colleagues past voting
record it can be determined what that particular congres-
sional member's position will be on a particular policy in

question. Congressional members cannot attack a problem

53

comprehensively because of governmental fragmentation. Many
times policies are adopted on a piecemeal basis and they
frequently duplicate or contradict existing policy.

Congressional policymakers have several tools at hand
to make their task easier. First, policymakers do not fol-
low public opinion. The time and resources needed to col-
lect public Opinion often delays and may even aid or kill a
potential directive. Second, goals and priorities are often
not explicitly stated; this approach requires less research
and interaction among the various governmental and non-
governmental actors involved in policy formulation. Third,
policymakers may consider only a few alternatives (one or
two) and research, collect a minimal amount of data on each
alternative being considered. Again, this practice saves.
time and energy. Congressional members seldom analyze
projected consequences of alternatives. Finally,
policymakers will usually not oversee programs once
completed.‘* In summary, policymakers, rather than using
public Opinion and a rational basis of the policy, will
"rely on 'decision rules,‘ rules of the thumb or standard
operating procedures that make policy-making manageable and
keep decisions within the bounds of political and economic
feasibility.”“2

Conceptual interactions among actors involved in
federal policy-making as presented, and when related to the
development of the Anti-Crime statute, helps to analyze
several critical issues. First, a look at the roles of spe-

cial interest groups in statute development (such as

54

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.
an.

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"I:

 

 

 

committee testimony) hooefully gives some clue as to ac-
curacy of policy content. Second, committee reaction of
various testimony and anti-crime testimony frequently give
an indication of committee priority and commitment to public
housing anti-crime needs. Third, a review of Presidential
papers, Congressional minutes, and HUD publications, gives
an indication of mutual support of the anti-crime issue.
Overall support from the President, his cabinet members, and
Congress are necessary for implementation to be most effec-

tive.

SUMMARY

Literature presented in this chapter leads to the con-
clusion that congressional policy-making cannot follow the
rational policy-making process because of political factors
and governmental fragmentation. Politicians must bargain
and negotiate with each other before reaching decisions.
Past precedent is a major constraint and by the examination
of a colleagues past voting record it can be determined what
that particular congressional member's position will be on a
particular policy in question. Congressional members cannot
adequately attack a problem because many times policies are
adopted on a piecemeal basis and they frequently duplicate
or contradict existing policy.

In addition, congressmembers generally do not oversee
implementation of their programs once a bill they sponsor
becomes law and an assigned agency begins program start-up.

Opportunities exist for greater rewards in legislative

55

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process involvement rather than in the administrative arena.
Many congressmembers view federal agencies as impenetrable
mazes that can become a threat to their careers; or they
become reluctant to review agency activity when close
friendships have developed with key agency personnel.
Finally, most statutes developed and implemented at the
federal level are not adequately structured for effective
policy implementation because of the wide variety of inter-
ests represented, the diversity of activities, and the mul-
tiple veto and weak party system in Congress. Adequate
causal theory are normally not addressed in federal legisla-
tion because most issues are much too broad in scope and in-
volve too many variables and actors to adequately be ad-
dressed by one piece of implementing legislation. As a
result, many federal programs are slated for failure from
the beginning because of inadequate causal theory, or be-
cause federal statutes fail to structure the implementation

process.

56

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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

*George C. Edwards III and Ira Sharkansky, The Pplicy
Eggfliggmgnt: Metinq anp Implementing Publie Policy, (San

Francisco: w.H. Freeman and Company, 1978), p. 2.

 

=1bid.

”Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congrees, The

Bureaugregy, and Public Policy, 3rd ed. (Homewood, IL: The
Dorsey Press, 1984), p. 1.

‘J. Dewey, [he Public end It; Proble s, (New York:
Holt, 1927), pp. 15-15.

aJ.E. Anderson, Public Policy Making, (New York:
Praeger, 1975), p. 57.

‘Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian, “Policy
Implemention," in Enc clo edia of Polic Studies, ed. Stuart
5. Nagel (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), p. 145.

’See Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress,

the flgreegerepy, eng Ppplic Policy, 3rd ed. (Homewood, IL:
The Dorsey Press, 1984), p. 2-5.

'For other descriptions see J. Pressman and A.
Wildavsky, Implementation, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973); C.O. Jones, Ag Intrpguction to the

Stpgy gf Puplic Polity, 2nd ed. (North Scituate, MA:
Duxbury Press, 1977); C.E. VanHorn, Policy Implementation in

the Federal System, (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1979); and Paul
A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian, eds., "The

Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework for Analysis,"

Effegtive Pgligy lmplementetign, eds. Paul A. Sabatier and
Daniel A. Mazmanian (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1981).

’Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier,
m le nt 'on and P bli Polic , (Glenview, IL: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1983), p. 7.

*9Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky,

"Implementation as Evolution." W.

ed. Howard Freeman (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
1978), pp. 109, 111 and 114.

uMazmanian, Implementation end Public Pollgy, p. 8.

1“Stuart S. Nagel, "Policy Studies Across the Social
Sciences,” National Forum 69 (1): 9-11.

57

*3Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Mekino Process, 2nd
ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 11.

“A. Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A Framework
for Choice," Politigal Science and Public Policy, ed. A.
Ranney (Chicago: Markhan, 1968), p. 8.

‘Plbid.

*‘For additional detail see R.T. Golembiewski, ”Public
Administration and Public Policy: An Analysis of
Developmental Phases,” Ipe Policy Vecuum, eds. R.N.
Spardaro, et.al. Lexington: (Lexington Books, 1975); and
Patton and Sawicki, Basig Methode of Policy,Analysis and

Planning, p. 18-19.

*’George J. McCall and George H. Weber, "Policy
Analysis Across Academic Disciplines," Encyplopedia of

Poligy §tggie§, ed. Stuart S. Nagel (New York: Marcel
Dekker, Inc., 1983), pp. 202-203; also see Patton and
Sawicki, ' M hod f P 1' An 1 si and Plennino, p.

 

18-20, for a variation in the McCall and Weber idea.

3-'L. A. Froman, "The Categorization of Policy

Contents,” Pplitigel Scienee ang Ppblic Policy, ed. A.
Ranney (Chicago: Markhan, 1968), p. 42.

*’See R.N. Spadaro, et. al., eds., The Policy Vaggum;
precg e Mgpe Prefeeeional Pplitigal Science, Lexington:

(Lexington Books, 1975), for a comprehensive description of
the descriptive study of policy content.

aPsee R.T. Golembiewski, "Public Administration and
Public Policy." '

3*McCall and Weber, "Policy Analysis Across Academic
Disciplines," p. 203.

33Carl V. Patton and David Sawicki, Basic Methods of

Poliey Anelyeie egg Plenning, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1986), p. 2.

23Patton and Sawicki, Baeig Methode of Policy Anelyeie
W. p- 25-

=4See Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for
P li An 1 i , (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 6;
Duncan MacRae, Jr., and James A. Wilde, Pglipy Analyeis for

Puplic Qegieione, (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press,
1979), pp. 4-5; and Edward S. Ouade, An 's fo P blic

Dec' i n, 2nd ed. (New York: Elsevier Scientific
Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 11-12.

58

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3.“

Ii
1 Q

hie \-F.

 

2”See G. Pelga, How tp Solve It, (New York: Doubleday,
1957), pp. 225-232; and Aaron Wildavsky, Speakinq Truth to
Power: The Art ang Craft of Policy An 1 sis, (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), pp. 2-3.

P‘Patton and Sawicki, Basic Methpds of Policy Anelyeie
W. p. 29-

27Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Mekinq Procees, 2nd
ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1980), p. 11.

2‘Ibid., p. 12.
Z’Daniel A. Mazmaninan and Paul A. Sabatier,

eme tation an Publi Polic (Glenview, IL: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1983), p. 41.

3°Mazmanian, Implementation ang Public Policy, p. 42.

3*Mazmanian and Sabatier, Implementation and Pgblic

Pol' , p. 26. For a description of various
conceptualizations of causal theory, see Paul A. Sabatier
and Daniel A. Mazmanian, "Policy Implementation”, in Ipe
Engyglppegie gf Policy Studies, ed. Stuart Nagel (New York:

Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1982), pp. 157-158.
3’Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Effective

Pgligy lmplementetipn (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1981), p. 10.

33Mazmanian, Effective Policy Implementation, p. 12.
3‘Nagel, Engyclopedia pf Policy Studies, p. 156.
3"Mazmanian, Implementation eng Pgblig Policy, p. 28.
3"Mazmanian, Im lem ntation and Publ'c Polic , p. 6.

37Mazmanian, Im men a ' n and Pu i P li ,
p. 29-30.

3'Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congrese,
the Bereaggrepy, and Puplig Policy, 3rd ed. (Homewood, IL:

The Dorsey Press, 1984), pp. 5-9.
3’Ibid.’ pl 10.

‘°George C. Edwards III and Ira Sharkansky, The Policy

Pr d‘ en : Mak‘n and Im lementin Public Polic , (San
Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1978), pp. 10-11.

59

‘*See Mazmanian and Sabatier, Implementation end Public
Poligy, p. 6.

‘2Ibid., p. 12.

 

I 60

 

CHAPTER III

CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS

In addition to a framework for policy analysis and
Policy making as discussed in Chapter II, it is necessary to
establish a conceptual understanding of crime in public
housing in order to determine whether the statute that
authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration
Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public
housing. In addition, a discussion of neighborhood environ-
mental design and social constraints, and their relationship
to crime is presented to help in the establishment of some
relationship between results of the Detroit Anti-Crime
Program and adequacy of the federal policy that backed the

program.

61

 

 

CRIM IN P 8 HO SIN

The literature on crime in public housing is not well
developed. However, a few selected studies of an un-
representative sample of larger public housing projects ex-

ist. These studies address physical, social, and management
factors, and their relationship to crime in general.
Criminal victimization studies suggests that not all
segments of the American population are equally victimized.
EStudies sponsored by the U. S. Department of Housing and Ur-
bam Development indicate that residents of larger low and
medium income housing projects in larger cities experience
the highest rate of crime compared with other population
segments. The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration
Program did not recognize a diversity of the crime problem
in the nation's public housing. The authorizing statute
mandated that a broad spectrum of project types, locations,
amd tenant populations be represented in those public hous-
ing authorities selected for local Anti-Crime Program fund-
ing. Table 3.1 shows comparisons of selected crime rates at
‘the national level, selected cities and selected public
Indusing projects for 1975, the latest date that comparison
figures are available. The crime rate for each public hous-
ing project in Los Angeles, Baltimore and Washington is sig-
nificantly higher than each city as a whole, as well as for
the nation. These figures suggest that robbery appears to

he the most significant crime problem in public housing

Projects.

62

u-
1

 

 

 

Table 3.1

Selected Crime Rates‘, 1975-
National, City and Public Housing Project

Los Angeles/ Baltimore/ Wash, DC/

 

 

Crime Netiopel Nickegeon Gdei Murphy Hme Ca ers w
robbery 6.9 16.0/62.2 26.0/114.1 17.0/48.0
purse

snatching 3.2 7.0/53.4 13.0/36.0 12.0/10.6
assault 26.0 35.0/44.8 28.0/33.0 13.0/16.0
sexual

assault 1.0 2.0/6.8 1.0/18.0 1.0/8.0

 

‘Rates per 1,000 population 12 and over
TSOURCE: U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
(Office of Policy Development and Research, Vigtimization,
Peer of Crime end Altered Behavior: A Profile of theerime
Problem in Nickerson Gardens, Los Angelesi,Celifornie, April
1977, p. 3; . Victimizetion. Fear of Crime end
Altereg Behavior; A Profile of thevCrime Problem in Murphy
Homes, Baltimore, Maryland, April, 1977, p. 4;
Victimization, Fear pf Crime and Altered Behavior: A
Prgfile of the_Crime Problem in Capper Dwellings,
Weshington, D.C,, April 1977, p. 4.

 

 

 

titttttttt

A U.S. Department of Justice study completed in 1973
described characteristics common to a typical "bad" public
housing project. A "bad" project is a project that ex—
perienced security problems. Projects in this category
housed over one thousand families and consisted of high-
rises over eight or ten stories or low-rises that sprawled
in a labyrinthine fashion over a large tract of land. Bad
projects most typically were in large cities. Services and
amenities such as playgrounds, laundromats, day-care, and
transportation need did not meet the needs of project resi-
dents. Physical design fostered the feeling of crowding.
Elevators in the high-rises would be few and slow, and

planned common areas would be small and undefined.

63

3239‘.

I
o All:_
'eufifil

 

Physical design of "bad” projects did not support a
surveillance mechanism from staff and residents. Long cor-
ridors and elevators in the high-rise buildings prohibited
adequate policing. The many small courtyards, numerous
walkaways, and dark stairwells and basements presented
similar problems in the low-rise units. Open access to the

project site appeared to be a real problem particularly for

projects located in high crime areas.

Residents of "bad" projects generally knew only a few
people in the complex, though most of them had lived on the
site for several years. A lack of trust existed among
project residents. The typical resident was poor and black
and had an income below the poverty level. Few adult men
lived on the site. Residents consisted primarily of
female-headed households with children and teen-agers. The
study concluded that physical design and a weak social
structure both made a "bad" project susceptible to crime.‘

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
completed a study in early 1979 that further documented and
strengthened earlier findings on characteristics of a "bad"
project. The HUD study addressed specific problems of low-
income public housing. This study found that those projects
labeled as "troubled" suffered severe physical and social
difficulties. Troubled projects had difficulties related to
project design and physical conditions such as project size
and density, lack of defensible space, general structural
problems, inadequate heating and/or plumbing, and general

maintenance deficiencies. Social problems included the

64

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impact of vandalism and crime in project neighborhoods and
the incidence of problems with a very small number of dis-
ruptive tenants.2

The study determined that approximately seven percent
of all public housing projects in the country are considered
troubled. Ninety-two percent of all troubled projects were
designed for occupancy by families (rather than elderly).
Elderly projects comprised only eight percent of all
troubled projects. The study concluded that family projects
are much more likely to be troubled than those projects
designed for and occupied by elderly residents.

The study related other tenant characteristics to those
projects labeled as troubled. A disproportionately greater
number of single-parent and female-headed households oc-
curred in troubled projects than in untroubled projects.
Although female-headed households comprise twenty-six per-
cent of all households in public housing, they comprise ap-
proximately eighteen percent of the households in untroubled
projects and forty-five percent of the house—holds in
troubled projects. Single-parent households have similar
statistics. Twenty-six percent of all households in public
housing are single-parent, but approximately twenty-two per-
cent of all untroubled projects were headed by single-parent
households and forty-five percent of the troubled projects
had single-parent households.

Troubled housing projects are more likely to be located
in urban areas than untroubled housing projects. The study

found that seventy-five percent of all troubled projects

65

I'd:

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FP-

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were located in urban areas. Just as importantly, other
kinds of “neighborhood" criteria distinguished the location
of troubled from untroubled projects. The study concluded
that:
1. Troubled projects are more likely to be located
in neighborhoods with a high concentration of
minority residents.
2. Almost half of all troubled projects are in
neighborhoods where renters make up better than

fifty percent of all residents.

3. Almost half of all troubled projects are in
neighborhoods with high crime rates.

4. Most troubled projects are located in neighbor-
hoods with poor or fair police protection.

5. Most troubled projects have poor availability
and quality of public and social services such
as fire and police protection, recreation/day
care, counseling and health services.
'The study also determined that a weak positive association
caccurs between age of the housing project and the probabil-
i;ty of the project being labeled as troubled. Of the sample
parojects analyzed, the average project age fell around four-
t:een years. On the other hand, the age of troubled, rela-
‘tzively untroubled, and untroubled projects averaged at
r1 ineteen, seventeen, and twelve years respectively. These
1F indings combined with other characteristics such as size of
‘:.he project makes age a more positive association with the
Cirobability of the project being designated as troubled.
As expected, project size has a positive correlation
Uwith troubled conditions. Troubled projects have about

twice as many apartments as relatively untroubled projects

and nearly three times as many as untroubled projects. Two

66

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reasons may account for this positive correlation. First,

physical size may simply a less manageable and controllable

environment. Second, size is usually associated with other

locational factors that have been determined to be as-
sociated with troubled projects. Larger projects tend to be
located in more urban areas within lower-income neigh-

borhoods that have inadequate services and amenities.3

Studies on the fear of crime in public housing indicate
‘that residents may restrict their movement in and around the
laublic housing site, but nothing indicates that a sig-

riificant number of residents move out of public housing be-

ceause of crime or fear of crime. One rationale for im-

palementation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstra-
t:ion Program as stated in the authorizing legislation is
txased on the erroneous assumption that residents do move out
€31 public housing because of crime.

Fear of crime is equally an important component in the

C)\uerall problem of crime in public housing. Past research

C>rn fear of crime in public housing reveal that the percep-
tlion of crime in many cases is so high as to cause undue
cliaisturbance and psychological discomfort to public housing
"Iesidents. Table 3.2 shows how residents of housing
F>Irojects in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.,
'"Nate the probability of future victimization. The studies
Qcanclude that the biggest fears of residents include
‘Durglary in their absence, robbery on the project site, per-

Sonal car vandalism, and home vandalism.

A 1972 study addressed management techniques to improve

67

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Table 3.2
Victimization Probability-
50/50 Chance or Greater‘

 

Type of Nickerson Gd Murphy Hms Cappers Dw
Vigtimigation Lo; Angeles Beltimore Washington

 

Having home broken
into while away 80.4% 70.3% 83.3%

Having home broken
into while at home 46.2 44.8 39.2

Being robbed in
the project 77.6 62.1 74.3

Being beaten up in
the project 65.5 55.9 60.5

Being sexually
assaulted. 59.3 54.6 40.4

Having car
deliberately damaged= 71.5 55.6 70.5

Having house
vandalized 73.9 50.7 69.1

 

‘how respondents rated the probability of future
victimization
“percentage of women only
°households with cars only
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Victimizatipn,

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fee: gf Crime eng Altereg fiehevipr; A Ppofile of the Crime
Pr b m 'n N' k r n Gar ns Lo An eles California, April
1977, p. 36; . Viptimigation, Feer of Crime and
Altered Behavior: A Profile of the crime Problem in Murphy
Hgmes, Baltimore, Maryland, April 1977, p. 33; .
Victimizatipn, Feer gf Crime ang Altered Behevior: A

Pr fil f h r'm Pr bl m i r Dw in s

Weehingtgn, 9.9., April 1977, p. 43.

itittittit

68

the quality of life in an anonymous 849 unit public housing
project. One component of this study concluded several
findings on fear of crime in public housing as experienced

by residents:

1. Feer fpr philgren. Parents often worried that
their children might become victims of rob-
bery, extortion and assault on the project
site compared to other sites such as school or
on their way to school.

2. Chaneee of future personel victimization.
Most residents felt they had a 50/50 chance or

better within the next year of being robbed,
burglarized, or assaulted.

 

3. Car-releteg fears. Residents generally ex-

pressed fear of robbery or assault at night as
they walked from their car to their home or
when they parked their car at night.

4. Fear pf ppvement in the project. Residents
felt the highest anxiety in situations of

being alone, in the process of moving through
the project, at night.

5. Prgpleme in the projec . Residents indicated

that the most serious problems on the project
site centered around drugs, juvenile gangs,
burglary and vandalism.
The study concluded that residents experience a remarkably
high crime rate, an astounding level of fear of crime, and
that residents restrict their lives and use of the environ-
ment because of concerns about crime in the public housing
project.‘
A 1975 study of four larger public housing projects in
Boston indicated that more than sixty percent of the resi-

dents considered it very dangerous for them to do night time

activities such as waiting for a bus, shopping, using the

69

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elevators and corridors, and being alone. The study also
found that most residents had a high level of fear of crime
that kept them from venturing out at night.9

The elderly experience a particularly severe problem
with fear of crime in their public housing environs. Be-
cause the elderly feel more vulnerable, they become more
vulnerable. A survey administered in the mid-19705 in the
Wilmington, Delaware public housing system revealed that the
topic of crime was the only area in which elderly par-
ticipants expressed concern.“

The literature suggests that public housing crime may
be caused by physical factors, social factors, and policies
and management practices of the local housing authority. An
overview of these factors are necessary to serve as a basis
to determine the adequacy of provisions in the Urban Initia-
tives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program authorizing statute,
and to aid in making policy recommendations for future
anti-crime public housing programs. Although these factors
have been defined as contributing to public housing crime,
the literature does not delineate the extent to which each
factor actually contributes to crime, nor does the litera-
ture define which of the three factors most influence crime
in the public housing setting. It is generally accepted
that the physical design of a public housing complex and
design of buildings on the complex can deter or encourage
criminal activity. Design can also facilitate detection of
potential offenders. The literature also suggests that so-

cial factors and their relationship to crime activity is

70

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directly related to the design of the physical environment.
Design facilitates territoriality, defensible space, access
control, and social cohesion, to name a few. This research
takes the position that physical design factors control
criminal behavior and social variables related to crime ac-
tivity in public housing is affected by physical design
characteristics.’
Ppyeicel Environmept and grime

Literature on the relationship between the physical en-
vironment and crime document that specific physical factors
contribute to the problem of crime in general, and to the
public housing setting specifically. Physical factors most
often mentioned and empirically documented include lack of
surveillance in and around public housing; and inadequate
locks on doors and window frames, and inadequate alarms.
Physical design of a public housing complex can create areas
where surveillance by residents, management, and security
personnel is severely restricted. Typical scenarios include
grounds not overlooked by windows, poorly lighted areas,
hidden spaces, stairways, and poorly placed amenities such
as laundry rooms near basement entrances that may be hidden
from sight.

A pioneering study published in 1961 by Elizabeth Wood
suggested that the design of larger public housing projects
encouraged a philosophy of "sophisticated family
individualism." In simpler language, Wood felt that the
design of project housing did not allow residents the

mechanism to develop their own social controls or the

71

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establishment of a self-policing mechanism. She felt that
overall physical design of a public housing project
prevented accidental and causal contact among residents.6
Wood offered several design alternatives that encouraged so-
cial structure in the public housing setting. She suggested
that benches and grounds equipment be arranged in such a way
to encourage group formation and social order. Also, she
suggested that various facilities such as recreation, day-
care, and laundry be located in a manner where social con—
trol (such as surveillance) is encouraged.”

In 1970, Luedtke analyzed the physical design of four
public housing projects in Detroit. He found that ground
floor apartments located at the end of a row of buildings
were more succeptible to breaking and entering. Also, row
houses were more frequently victimized by breaking and en-
tering than high rise apartment buildings. He stated:

"Although individual dwelling units are contiguous

in row housing, there is very limited visibility of

adjoining apartments because all windows and doors

are located along the same linear axis. The high

rise apartment buildings have more elaborate

security measures at the entrance points which tend

to make them less susceptible to breaking and en-

tering than the individual dwelling units within a

row house sequence.*°

Newman’s 1973 publication titled Qefensible Spape
looked at urban forms and how those designs created or
prevented crime encounters. He hypothesized that the provi-
sion of surveillance opportunities in public housing en-
vironments was a significant crime deterrent that lessened

the anxiety of inhabitants and created an overall image of a

safe environment. He suggested that non-private areas and

72

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access paths such as stairs, elevators, corridors, and
lobbies could be lighted and positioned in such a manner to
facilitate their surveillance by residents and formal
authorities.*‘

Another common factor cited in the literature as a con-
tributor to crime in public housing is inadequate locks on
doors and windows that are too low or too close to other
nearby residences, and the lack of electronic surveillance
equipment. The literature suggest that public and private
housing units experience a higher burglary rate if doors and
windows are improperly secured. Newman documented the vul-
nerability of public housing units that have inadequately
secured doors and locks, and the need for improving residen-
tial security in the public housing setting.*= Brill's
research in the latter half of the 19705 with various public
housing sites documented similar findings. As an example,
in the Baltimore study, Brill found that almost seventy-five
percent of reported burglaries (successful or not) were
carried out by perpetrators that gained entry through inade-
quately secured front or back doors.*3 A U. S. Department
of Justice study, completed in 1980, suggested that burglary
is primarily determined by the accessibility of buildings
and apartments with accessibility related to locks and sur-
veillance devices.“ A weaker deterrent of burglary ac-
tivity is the use of electronic alarms. The literature sug-
gests that electronic burglary alarm devices may increase
the likelihood of apprehension by notifying someone who is

capable of responding quickly when private space is being

73

~‘l

 

 

 

 

 

violated. However, circumvention of these devices are com-
mon among the more sophisticated criminals. Also, the
presence of these devices instill a sense of fear of crime
by the residents rather than reduce fear.15

The literature suggests other physical factors may re-
late to crime activity in public housing. Empirical
evidence of these factors, however, suggest a weaker
relationship to crime activity than those previously dis-
cussed. Access control refers to real or symbolic barriers
that prevent non-residents from walking freely onto the
grounds of the public housing project.*‘ This deterrent is
most important where public housing crime is caused
primarily by neighborhood residents and not by public hous-
ing residents. Newman addressed this phenomenon in and
around residential buildings where too many residents shared
the same uncontrolled and/or unguarded entranceway. Newman
postulated that physical design could create boundaries
through construction of low walls, landscaping or fencing.
The construction of symbolic boundaries through landscaping
or real boundaries serves as an indication to potential of-
fenders that they are passing from a public to a more
private space.*’ Brill's 1976 study of public housing in
the Milville public housing project in Cincinnati justified
these findings. He concluded that the highest crime area on
the project site occurred near the perimeter of the site
where no access control existed to prohibit non-residents

from entering the grounds.*'

74

3.5:

sit
5':

tie

’s
~~T

fa
‘e‘

Strategies designed to improve access control on public
housing sites have their limitations. The effectiveness at
night of symbolic barriers such as low walls is low. Fences
and shrubberies around the periphery of public housing
projects deter neighborhood criminals from entering the
project site, but these devices in turn reduce surveillance
opportunities.*’

No real or symbolic barriers have existed around the
low-rise units in the Brewster-Douglass public housing
project. Residents of the nearby neighborhood have had
ready access to the public housing site. Interviews with
low-rise residents have indicated ready access to be a major
problem because they felt that residents of the adjacent
neighborhood carried out most crime activity on the project
site. One Brewster-Douglass resident relt that fencing
around the low-rises would help in keeping neighbors out of
the site.

Inadequate circulation patterns may contribute to crime
in public housing. This factor addresses pathways,
walkaways, and pedestrian movement on the public housing
complex. Uncontrolled circulation allows would be offenders
to walk up to first floor apartment windows and doors. In
addition, uncontrolled circulation patterns limit surveil-
lance opportunities by making it easier for potential of-
fenders to not be noticed by residents and security patrols
as they approach residential buildings on the site. The
creation of walkaways designed to channel pedestrian move-

ment through the complex in a controlled, easily watched

75

 

manner increases opportunities for surveillance. Shrubbery
is sometimes used to further delineate the pathway. No
solid evidence exist to suggest that this factor alone con-
tributes to public housing crime. Local housing authorities
do use this technique in combination with others discussed
to reduce crime activity in the public housing setting.=°

Internal circulation patterns at the Brewster/Douglass

public housing complex is a major factor of crime activity
at the site. Building placement along the periphery of the
low-rise area coupled with the inability of police to have
easy car access to the interior from most periphery vantage
points allows offenders along the complex border to escape
by merely running into the interior of the complex. By the
time police maneuver their vehicles inside the complex, the
offenders have escaped.‘*

Residents of the Brewster-Douglass site generally ex-
pressed in recent interviews that living at Brewster*
Douglass felt comfortable but living conditions would be
much better if the city would carry through promises to
clean up nearby neighborhoods. A 1979 HUD study indicated
that residents' satisfaction of their public housing project
was affected by the neighborhood that the project is lo-
cated. The prevalence of crime, vandalism and other so-
cially undesirable behavior in the neighborhood immediately
surrounding the public housing site generates fear among the
residents of robbery and physical attack. This fear, par-
ticularly among the elderly, keeps residents from venturing

out to take care of basic needs. When undesirable

76

neighborhood characteristics exist, design and management
features of the public housing complex will have to compen-
sate for such undesirable conditions if a satisfactory en-
vironment is to be obtained.

The 1979 HUD study also found that a public housing
development can be successful if located in an undesirable

neighborhood. Residents rate sixteen of the thirty-seven

sample sites as a satisfactory place to live. Seven of
these sixteen sites were located in neighborhoods perceived
as unsatisfactory by the residents. Residents expressed
high levels of satisfaction of the seven sites because
design features and management practices of the public hous-
ing projects addressed and compensated for crime experienced
in the surrounding neighborhood.==
Sgcial Fectore andlCrime in Public Houeino

The literature clearly expresses the relationship be-
tween crime and social characteristics of public housing
residents. Social characteristics coupled with the physical
design of the project site together influence criminal ac-
tivity. Brill and Associates 1975 study of four housing
projects in Boston best summarizes this relationship. This
study concluded that crime potential, particularly for
larger projects, is influenced by design and equipment
deficiencies as well as by the presence or absence of those
social factors that inhibit people from protecting and help-
ing each other. These social factors include weak social
structure of the residents, absence of support groups, and a

general lack of interpersonal trust among residents.23

77

The most common social deficiency that encourages crime
in public housing is a lack of social organization, social
cohesion, and informal social control among residents. So-
cial organization occurs when group activity exist with
public housing resident involvement, and there are recog-
nized leaders among the residents. Social cohesion ad-
dresses friendship issues among residents such as the number
and intensity of friendships and helping behavior. Informal
social controls refer to general roles and norms among
public housing residents.

William H. Brill and Associates conducted a series of
public housing studies in the 19705. The consultant con-
cluded that social organization, social cohesion, and in-
formal controls are nonexistent in many public housing set-
tings. Absence of these social controls cause distrust
among the residents and toward the management and housing
authority. Residents feel isolated from neighbors and the
housing authority. Deficiencies in maintenance and other
housing services perpetuate the feeling of social isolation
and neglect."

A HUD found in a 1979 public housing resident satisfac-
tion study that when residents perceive themselves to be
similar socio-economically to other residents, their level
of satisfaction with other residents and with living in that
project is higher. Similarity instills friendliness and
trustworthiness that leads to a sense of safety from crime

and vandalism.39

78

Lack of employment opportunities for public housing
residents is a major contributor to the crime problem in
public housing. No uniform empirical data is available to
document this hypothesis. However, statistics from selected
public housing sites indicate that nine to twenty-five per-
cent of public housing residents have full-time unsubsidized
unemployment.“‘ The overall literature does not develop a
strong relationship between low employment and high crime
rates. However, a positive correlation between homicide and
suicide has been documented using national unemployment
data.37 A study completed in 1985 concluded a weak but sig-
nificant positive correlation between unemployment and the
annual rates of homicide, robbery, burglary, larceny-theft,
and motor vehicle theft using time-series data from 1946-
1982.3.

The lack of territoriality among public housing resi-
dents is believed to increase the fear of crime among resi-
dents. Territoriality is an attitude where residents desire
and have a sense of control over their environment. Resi-
dents that possess proprietary and territorial interests
contribute to the establishment of community norms and stan-
dards and exercise control over those involved in anti-
social behavior.”

Rosenthal has a similar concept he calls "turf
reclamation." His turf reclamation concept, or neighborhood
security, is based on the assumption that we live in
residential settings which in a sense we do not control. To

establish turf reclamation, residents must establish and

79

define neighborhood values, agree to take action and set
standards for the neighborhood and realize they must give as
well as take. Having an organized community and a trained
organizer of the community are two elements needed for a
safe and secure neighborhood.3°

Territoriality is encouraged through the promotion of

socially oriented strategies such as improvement of social

organization, cohesion, and informal social control. These
social factors can possibly be encouraged through physical
design standards such as clustering of dwelling units to es-
tablish a physical sense of community. In addition, ter-
ritoriality is encouraged through the provision of jobs in
the setting and organized youth activity.3*

Brill's research in the 1970s on public housing reveal
a lack of social service programs that address social
problems of the residents. The consulting firm found that
many of the households, especially those headed by women,
suffer deeply rooted social problems and need help to ad-
dress them. The firm hypothesized that:

"These social problems contribute directly in so

far as the residents who have drug or employment

related problems may commit crimes in order to have

money. They contribute indirectly as they reduce

the potential for social cohesion and self-

protective behaviors to limit the residents' vul-

nerability to potential offenders."3=
Wilson documented that chemically addicted persons are
likely to commit more crimes than if they had not become ad-
dicted. Most addicts, in addition to selling drugs, become

involved in burglary and robbery to support their habit.

Wilson referred to a Baltimore study:

80

”...the frequency with which they [addicts] com-
mitted crimes was six times higher during those
periods when they were... using heroin regularly

than it was when they were not heavy users."33
Brill concluded that addressing these social issues as well
as physical design changes will contribute significantly to
the reduction of crime and the fear of crime in and around
public housing.

A minor social factor that may contribute to crime in
public housing is a lack of supervision and organized ac-
tivity for youth. Very little literature document this cor-
relation. A conference held by the American Institute of
Research on crime in public housing indicated that the com-
bination of one parent families and large numbers of
children contribute to youth oriented crime problems.34
Gold investigated the relationship between supervision and
delinquency and other factors which contribute to anti-
social behavior in youth. The study found that a lack of
supervision and organized activity for public housing youths
contribute to crime problems in the public housing
setting.3' Anti-Crime Program guidelines addressed the
issue of organized activities for youth. Specifically, the
Detroit Anti-Crime Program employed Brewster-Douglass
project youths as site monitors, and as escorts for the el-

derly.

81

Newman's discussion on public housing crime relates
similar findings. Based on interviews with residents,
management and police, he suggests that families with only
one adult present are less able to control their teen-age
children than those households with two guardians.3‘

Menegement Pragtiges eng Puplic HOpsing Ccime

The final category of causes of crime in public housing
relates to local government policies and management prac-
tices. The major problem related to crime in public housing
is the lack Of adequate and stable funding to address local
crime problems. Local public housing authorities usually
have the primary responsibility to provide security person-
nel for their project sites. In some cases, local public
housing authorities contract with the local police force to
provide this protection. Papers presented at the 1978 Na-
tional Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials/Department of Housing and Urban Development Anti-
Crime Conference held in Washington, D.C., document fund in-
stability to support anti-crime programs. Conference find-
ings indicated that unstable short-term funding: contribute
to an unstable security force, hampers coordination of
security Operation between agencies; and prevents long-
range planning and training.37 Rabushka demonstrated that
following reductions in security in the Wilmington, Delaware
project sites, residents' fear of crime drastically in-
creased. The fear of drugs and rape tripled, the fear of
car theft doubled and the fear Of assault, robbery and van-

dalism also increased.3'

82

Congress funded the Anti-Crime Program for one year
only. Unstable funding caused particular problems for the
hardware component of local Anti-Crime Program. Maintenance
and Operation of physical surveillance mechanisms such as
cameras had to be supported by the local participating hous-
ing authority budget after the Anti-Crime Program expired,

or cease Operation of these mechanisms.

CRIME IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS

The development of a conceptual framework on crime in
urban neighborhoods is necessary in order to help establish
some relationship between implementation results of the
Detroit Urban Initiative Anti-Crime Demonstration Program
and adequacy Of the federal policy that backed the program.
Specifically, this section will aid in defining causes Of
crime in urban neighborhoods so that the effect that neigh—
borhood crime might have on nearby public housing projects
can be determined. Second, the framework will assist in
making policy recommendations that may be incorporated in
the Anti-Crime Program statute to address neighborhood crime
issues and their effect on public housing crime.

Research that address crime in urban neighborhoods
makes the assumption that physical design and socioeconomic
characteristics of the residents are important because they
affect the ability of neighborhood residents to maintain
control over the physical space which they inhabit. Main-
taining control over the neighborhood is referred to as ter-

ritoriality. Territoriality appears to be the critical

83

factor that mediates the relationship between the social and
physical environment of a neighborhood and crime activity in
the neighborhood. This section discusses the physical en-
vironment of a neighborhood, the social characteristics of a
neighborhood, territorial control, and the relationship to
crime in the neighborhood setting. These categories do not

operate independently. Rather, the assumption is made that

physical design can either foster or retard social interac-
tion among neighbors, informal street surveillance, and a
proprietary attitude toward the neighborhood. The inter-
relationships Of these categories jointly are believed to
influence crime.
Urpan Neighborhopg Delineation

A definition of an urban neighborhood is in order
before pursuing a discussion on neighborhood crime. An ur-
ban neighborhood is considered the smallest operating unit
in a city, not including the family unit. Ahlbrandt and
Cunningham gives a good description of a neighborhood unit.
They state,

“[The neighborhood]... is the level of the elemen-

tary school, the walk-in convenience store, the

parish church, and the community organization mobi-

lized to fight crime.... It is the level where

limited human relationships... develop out of

propinquity. When they stay around awhile, resi-

dents come to identify themselves with their neigh-

borhood. Most neighborhoods acquire a distinctive

name."3’
Neighborhood delineation is based on the distinctiveness of
each area. Distinctiveness comes from several sources such

as geographical boundaries; ethnic or cultural characteris-

tics Of inhabitants; or psychological unity among people

84

who feel they belong together.‘° Physical characteristics
normally associated with neighborhood crime include building
type, street design, and land use.

Phyeigel Envirpnmentiepd Neighborhood Crime

Oscar Newman analyzed three forms of residential hous-
ing and their relationship to crime in his book Community of
Intereet.‘* He found that residents Of single-family hous-
ing have a low potential of crime activity because they have
full control of activities within the private space that
surrounds their structures through the construction Of real
or psychological barriers, and surveillance activities.
Multi-family housing has more potential for crime because
the realm of private space of each apartment does not extend
beyond the entrance to the apartment. Apartments are acces-
sible by an interior corridor or stairs. These semiprivate
spaces can generate crime particularly when security
measures are not available. Multi-family housing studied
were former single-family dwellings.

Finally, the elevator high-rise building, such as those
found in a public housing complex has the highest potential
Of crime activity. High-rise buildings present a sense Of
anonymity and ease of accessibility for the outsider. Resi-
dents have nO real control of public space outside their
apartment because too many people share building access and
adjoining grounds.‘=

Reppetto's study in 1974 found a positive relationship
between the level of access or ”physical vulnerability” and

increases in robbery and burglary rates. He concluded that

QR

areas with dwelling portals hidden (or made unobservable) by
vacant lots, alley ways, shrubs or other obstructions had
medium to high burglary rates compared to residential areas
where portals were easily seen. He also found
"vulnerability" to be the most influential factor in dif-
ferentiating crime rates of inner city neighborhoods. Inner
city burglars value ease of access to a structure more than
the value Of what they expect to find in the structure. As
a result, conspicuously vulnerable areas in the inner city
tend to have a higher burglary rate than the more affluent
areas with buildings that are less accessible.“3

A Detroit study completed in 1970 on residential crime
suggested that basement windows are used as a point of entry
in approximately 10 percent of burglaries in private dwell-
ings. Entry by basement window is especially prevalent in
older inner-city neighborhoods where basement windows are
generally larger to permit adult access. Enclosed porches
also encourage burglary activity since locks usually found
on porch doors are inadequate and can be easily pried Open.
Once inside the porch, the criminal can break in the struc-
ture out Of public view.“ Finally, the study concluded
that residential units with large chimneys located on the
side Offer another form Of concealment for burglars, since a
side door is often located near the chimney. The chimney
hides the door from the front sidewalk or street. The con-

cealment allows ease in breaking and entering.“°

86

The Lower Woodward area, and particularly the Brush
Park neighborhood adjacent to the Brewster/Douglass project
has physical and social characteristics conducive to crime
activity. Multi-family housing construction and conversion
Of single-family housing to walk-up multi-family encourage
criminal behavior because most of these units are vacant and
they house illicit drug activity. Household composition of
the Lower Woodward area is primarily one-person households.
Some seventy percent of the households in the area consist
of single persons living alone. Approximately fifteen per-
cent of the population is under eighteen years of age, and
roughly twenty one percent of the population is over sixty-
five years of age.

Street design effectively reduces crime when components
of territoriality are utilized to delineate public and
private areas. Restructuring flow of outsiders makes it
easier for neighborhood residents to distinguish neighbors
from strangers, therefore increasing the neighborhood's in-
formal surveillance mechanism. A study of high crime areas
in Atlanta also suggest that insulating outsiders from a
neighborhood may be effective in the decrease of opportunis-
tic crimes such as robbery, burglary, and auto theft.“ The
Hartford, Connecticut, Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program
found that a significant reduction in burglary and "fear of
burglary" occurred after the rerouting of through traffic
from interior residential streets to streets intended for

heavier use. Modifying the street system by removing

87 _J

heavily traveled corridors out of neighborhoods increased
resident use Of and control over the neighborhood, and in-
creased resident cohesion and interaction."

A 1980 study by Gerald Luedtke analyzed criminal ac-
tivity and street layout in Detroit. Although not fully
tested, the study suggested that the layout of the ex-
pressway system and the use of a superblock system en-
couraged crime by reducing the penetrability capacity of
police."

Other aspects of street design contribute to crime.
Higher street lighting intensity has a tendency to reduce
occurrences on violent crimes such as robbery and assault.‘°
A United States Department of Justice study in 1976 focused
on Detroit and it found that three out of four burglaries
committed against commercial establishments involved build-
ings which have either no lights or inadequate lights.°°

The Luedtke study found lighting to be most important
in poorly visible and concealed environments such as those
found in the rear and side Of buildings. Good lighting
coupled with fair visibility of the rear entrance increased
the probability of the criminal being observed and reported.
Lighting is necessary to reinforce any other protective
measures, such as steel doors, tO deter criminal activity.”*

The type Of street can affect the rate and occurrence
of crime in an urban neighborhood. Expressways may effec-
tively shield outsiders from a neighborhood. Shielding

reduces the potential of Opportunistic crimes. Expressways

88

may also prohibit high crime activity characteristic of one
neighborhood to spill over into an adjacent neighborhood
with a lower occurrence of crime activity.’=

Finally, the Luedtke study found a relationship between
on-street parking and criminal activity in Detroit. He con-
cluded that concealment is a frequent factor that encouraged
criminal activity. The study revealed that parked vehicles
are the most frequently observed form of concealment in rob-
bery and burglary sites. Nearly 60 percent of all robbery
sites and 64 percent of all burglaries show concealment from
on-street parked vehicles. On-street parking blocks the in-
terior visibility of the store front from the street.
Luedtke suggested that the elimination of on-street parking
during high crime hours may facilitate police surveillance
and reduce the potential for crime activity. In addition,
parking regulations could be amended to require that new
stores provide Off-street parking.°3

Other than Jane Jacob's classic study in the early
1960s, the literature concurs that a homogeneous land use
environment generally reduces crime activity. Jane Jacobs
determined that a mixed land use environment was the key
element tO crime deterrence. Continuous and multiple uses
Of neighborhood facilities enhances natural surveillance by
creating overlapping patterns of pedestrian movement.°‘
Surveillance is a natural deterrence of crime because it in-

creases the risk Of criminal apprehension.

89

Most studies suggests that mixed land uses encourage
crime activity. Gardiner's work in 1978 on crime and the
neighborhood environment suggested that Open lots, and open
block interiors contribute to crime activity. Vacant areas
allow easy access to victims or burglary targets. A sense
Of openness undermines the residents‘ sense of being able to
observe and control their surroundings. Second, Gardiner
found that hospitals and schools become “crime generators"
when located in residential areas. These uses attract
potential offenders and set up victims in the neighborhood
setting. Finally, the study suggested the crime potential
increases when neighborhood focal points such as a park,
playground or landmark is taken over by outsiders or unruly
youths. These areas are used by gangs to scope out poten-
tial victims.°°

Skogan and Maxfield‘s study of crime in Chicago found a
high crime problem in the Lincoln Park neighborhood on the
city's north side. Incidences of crime were found to be re-
lated to principal entertainment establishments that genera-
ted heavy traffic congestion and unwanted commercial
development.°‘ This affluent, and predominantly white
neighborhood has a mixture of land uses. Most residential
dwellings are multi-unit rental apartments. Housing
rehabilitation and gentrification Of Older homes is also a
major activity taking place in the neighborhood.

A 1983 study addressed crime in Los Angeles County.
This study looked at formerly safe neighborhoods that became

dangerous and crime ridden over a period of several decades,

9O

and reasons for why crime became a problem in neighborhoods
previously unscathed by crime. The study defined stages of
a neighborhood in change from a low crime area to a high
crime area over time. First, a rapid land use change oc-
curred from single-family to multi—family dwellings and from
residential to a mixture of residential, commercial, and
light industrial uses. The rapid change induced zoning
changes. Second, a shift in population composition occurred
from intact two-parent families to a high proportion of
non-intact and unattached individuals.97 The study found
that high velocity land use changes during the early stages
of land use transformation coupled with a high velocity
change in socioeconomic status and subculture together in—
troduced the crime element in the neighborhoods.°'

A 1970 study of crime in Detroit addressed variables
related to urban form and structure that encourage and/or
discouraged the probability of crime, including land use
mixtures. The study found that most crime activity to be
concentrated along commercial strip areas in the city.
Residential dwelling units located within a two block
penetration area directly behind a commercial strip had a
high rate of breaking and entering. Finally, commercial and
residential uses surrounding major institutional facilities
suffered high rates of breaking and entering. Institutional
facility grounds and themselves had low crime rates because

of private security forces in place.”

91

Sogial Veriables and Neighborhood Crime
The literature indicates that the social structure of a
neighborhood has an impact on potential criminal activity in
that neighborhood. The primary connection between social
structure and control of the neighborhood environment is
that of territoriality. Several studies suggest that crime

rates tend to be higher in low income, predominantly black

neighborhoods that are found near the downtown area. This
group of people tend to have low rates of homeownership.
The lack Of homeownership may also be significantly related
to crime because the phenomenon discourages the formation of
close ties and a sense of responsibility to the neigh-
borhood. Maintaining control of the neighborhood is dif-
ficult when residents have no sense of responsibility to the
neighborhood. Bordua‘s 1958 study of delinquency rates in
Detroit suggested that low homeownership and a high number
Of unrelated individuals living together are the best pre-
dictors Of high crime rates.‘°

Sociologists have long established a strong relation-
ship between income and crime. Reppetto found in his 1974
study of Boston neighborhoods that the average annual
burglary rate per 1,000 dwelling units in lower income
(below $5,000) neighborhoods was more than 1.5 times that of
the middle income ($5,000-58,000) neighborhoods and more
than 3.5 times that Of the upper income (above $8,000)
neighborhoods. Concentrations of robbery activity cor-
responded with the low income areas Of the city. Reppetto

found that burglary rates increased with income in black

92

neighborhoods and these rates decreased with income in white
neighborhoods, though there is a slight tendency for
burglary rates to rise in high income white areas.“

A study published in 1981 addressed at crime in San
Francisco, Chicago, and Philadelphia. The study found that
victimization rates for personal theft and serious assault
declined steadily with rise in income of an area. The
decline Of personal theft was most pronounced from the
lowest income category (under $3,000) to about the $10,000
per year mark. Skogan and Maxfield found personal theft to
be primarily a lower- and working-class problem. The very
wealthy are not, however, isolated from risk."2 Burglary
rates tended to be highest for those areas at the top and
bottom of the financial ladder, and lowest for those in
moderate income categories."3 Finally, a study in 1976 on
crime in the Cass Corridor in Detroit suggested that high
unemployment and low income was related to the social and
physical problems prevalent in the Corridor, and of the high
crime rate. The study found crime rates to be significantly
higher in the Corridor than in the City Of Detroit. Crimes
against people, such as homicide, rape, robbery, and ag-
gravated assault occurred two to four times more frequently
in the Corridor than in the entire City. Crimes against
property (burglary, larceny, and arson) also occurred more
frequently than in the City as a whole.“

An association between crime in a neighborhood and the
racial composition of the neighborhood is well documented in

the literature with varying results. Reppetto's study of

93

Boston delineated different patterns. He found the average
annual residential burglary rate of predominantly black
areas (more than 63 percent black population) to be ap-
proximately three times that Of predominantly white areas
(less than 20 percent black population) and approximately
one and one-half times that of mixed areas (20 to 63 percent
black population). Conventional thought suggest that the
association of crime rates with racial composition center on
the concept of social instability of racially mixed areas.
This explanation does not hold up to the Boston experience.
The Boston neighborhoods displayed a high degree of racial
homogeneity, and appeared to be just as cohesive as the
white or mixed neighborhoods. Obviously, other variables
such as income, housing type, vulnerability issues, social
issues, and police protection played a major role in neigh—
borhood crime.‘°

Finally, figures reported by the U.S. Department of
Justice on victims of crime show that blacks are more Often
victims of crime than whites, particularly for robbery and
larceny. The highest rate of victimization for violent
crimes are among black males first, then white males, black
females, and last white females. Black on black homicide
is a major cause Of death among blacks in the United States.
Black women are highly succeptible to rape.“

Studies suggests that crime is lower in stable residen-
tial neighborhoods versus those that are not stable. Stable
neighborhoods that contain long-term residents allow the

formation Of strong emotional ties to the neighborhood.

94

Long-term residents develop the ability to distinguish be-
tween neighbors and strangers, and they develop an informal
interaction with others living in the area. Suttle's work,
The §g§ial Order of the Slume, documented a communication
network in a poor ethnic neighborhood. He found that stable
Italian, Mexican and Puerto Rican communities formed an ex-
tensive communication network that extended beyond face-to-
face relations. These ethnic communities experience fewer
burglaries and robberies than black public housing project
communities that had the characteristics of being more
transient."

A 1975 Study of crime in Washington, D.C., determined
that residential stability had a direct link to crime in the
District. During the study period, teen-age population rose
by thirty-two percent and social problems increased dramati-
cally. Serious crimes rose 400 percent, welfare rates rose
by 200 percent, unemployment increased 100 percent, and
heroin addition increased by 1,000 percent. This correla-
tion and increase is a result of the lack of job oppor-
tunities for teen-agers."

Crime increase also occurred at a similar rate in
Detroit during the decade of the 19605. Murders increased
from 100 cases in 1960 to more than 500 reported cased in
1970. However, the number of teen-agers did not quintuple
as is the case in Washington, D.C. The study on Detroit and
other larger cities also confirmed that change in the age
structure of the population is not the sole cause Of crime

increase in the inner city. Widespread media attention to

95

crime problems "spreads the word" that a violate growth cul-
ture is active. Finally, suburban contact with inner city
ghetto's through civil rights programs perpetuated drug ac-
tivity. White volunteers from the suburbs created a mis-
taken view Of ubiquitous drug activity when in fact drug use
may have only been deviant and episodic."

Neighborhood evolution has a relationship to crime.

LaGory and Pipkin outlined seven stages of evolution. The
rural stage is characterized by low population densities and
a predominance of single-family housing. Subdivision ac-
tivities at the First wave of development occur with a high
rate of single-family construction. Initial development
ends at the Fully developeg, high-Quality residential stage.
Densities are higher than the former stage because of in-
creased multi-family construction. The neighborhood becomes
the high density "new slums" at the pagking stage. Struc-
tures begin to age, rents fall, and lower-income groups move
in. To bridge the gap between Old (higher) and new (lower)
rents, landlords pack more people into the units than they
were designed to hold. The neighborhood is classified as
the "Old slums" at the thinning stege. Buildings are con-
tinually deteriorating. The population core is primarily
elderly because the children of the low-income families that
moved in the neighborhood during the previous stage move out
leaving the elderly behind. In the final stage, Reca ture,
property is reacquired, leveled or rehabilitated, and made

fit for upscale development.’°

96

Neighborhoods at the ”packing” and ”thinning" stages
have characteristics conducive to crime activity. Reppetto
documents that neighborhoods with a large number of youths
usually experience high crime rates, such as in the
"packing“ stage." Reppetto found a relationship between
areas with large populations under the age of 18 and cor-
respondingly large criminal populations in his study of Bos-
ton. Neighborhoods with over 40 percent of the population
under 18 years Of age had an average annual burglary rate of
41/1000 dwelling units. Most Of these areas are housing
projects, or contain major housing projects, and are located
in or near the core area of the city with large black low
income populations.72 Neighborhoods at the "thinning" stage
contain a high number of elderly residents. Surveys show
that elderly suffer more from the fear of crime than the ac-
tual act of being victimized.73 It can be expected that
neighborhoods with a high concentration of elderly ex-
perience low crime rates, but the elderly perceive a real
danger of crime activity."

On the other hand, family-oriented neighborhoods such
as those in the "first wave of development" and "fully
developed" stages tend to experience low rates of crime.
Suttle's discussion on street life in an ethnic area of
Chicago suggest that these family oriented neighborhoods may
be well defended against crime because of street activity.
He states,

"During the summer months, the streets... are

[filled] with children, young adults, and Old

people. Street life is especially active in the
afternoon after school or work. The front steps

97

are crowded with Old people chatting.... Young

girls stand in clusters... glancing at the passer-

bys. Young unmarried men seem to occupy every

street corner of or unused doorway. Small two- and

three- year Old... toddle along the sidewalks in

front Of their homes.”75
In contrast, neighborhoods dominated by childless couples
will not have the surveillance mechanism on the sidewalk to
the extent that family neighborhoods experience.

Territoriality and Neighbgrhood Crime

The physical and social characteristics just discussed
indirectly involves the promotion or inhibition of ter-
ritoriality. Territoriality refers to the maintenance Of
control over a given area by inhabitants of that area. The
relationship between crime and territoriality is defined
through several characteristics. First, boundaries of a
territorially distinct area are easily delimited. Physical
and/or social neighborhood boundaries make it easier for
residents to recognize strangers and potential criminals.
Second, a neighborhood where residents and neighbors are
friends and where residents work and participate in or-
ganized social and religious activities will experience a
higher degree of territoriality. Third, territoriality is
high in neighborhoods where residents care about activities
in the neighborhood. Caring about what goes on serves as a
catalyst to set up the surveillance mechanism and take ac-

tion when anti-social behavior occurs. Finally, a ter-

ritorially distinct neighborhood contains residents with

98

similar norms and values. Presence of this social trait
makes it easy for residents to define explicitly what is and
is not acceptable behavior in the neighborhood."’

Two bodies Of thought address the relationship between
territoriality and crime. First, fear Of crime is expected
to be lower in neighborhoods where informal social control
is higher. Informal social control is the means by which
individual behavior is controlled based on formal law or by
traditions and patterns common to the neighborhood popula-
tion. Neighborhoods where residents watch out for one
another have a relatively low fear of crime. Also, the
more a resident feels a part of the community, the lower
their fear of crime.

At the other end of the spectrum, some researchers find
that residents who are an integral part of the social fabric
of the neighborhood exhibit a high rate of fear Of crime be-
cause they are more aware of crime. Crime generates fear
and distrust. People restrict their social activity, stop
using community facilities, and avoid street contact with
strangers. Wilson argues that:

"Predatory crime does not merely victimize in-

dividuals, it impedes and, in the extreme case,

prevents the formation and maintenance of com-

munity. By disrupting the delicate nexus of ties,

formal and informal, by which we ar linked with our

neighbors, crime atomizes society and makes of its
members mere individual calculators estimating

their own advantage."”

Crime in neighborhood undermines the confidence of residents

that locally shared norms still exist. Public places fall

under the control of criminals when residents withdraw from

99

public life and when residents distance themselves from com-
munity members. Residents draw support from relatives and

close friends rather than relatively unknown strangers.7°

SUMMARY

The framework developed in this chapter allows for the
development of a theoretical model on the genesis Of crime
in public housing. This model, as presented below, will al-
low for an accurate evaluation of provisions contained in
the Anti-Crime statute that address crime in public housing.
A model on the genesis of crime in urban neighborhoods and
compared in subsequent chapters with the Detroit situation
will help to determine if a relationship can be established
between results of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program and ade-
quacy of the federal policy that backed the program.

Public housing projects most succeptible to crime are
larger projects located in larger cities in low-income
neighborhoods. There neighborhoods are primarily minority
occupied and they have a high percentage of renters. The
project site as well as the neighborhoods suffers from poor
police protection as well as from inadequate social services
and other amenities. Neighborhood crime activity commonly
filters into the adjacent public housing project. In many
cases, the project develops as the center of crime activity
in the neighborhood. Reasons that allow this phenomena to
develop include a dense population of lower socio-economic

people, a high percentage Of unemployed teenagers with

100

little or no supervision, low or non-existent police protec-
tion, and other design factors that foster criminal ac—
tivity.

The physical design Of public housing buildings and
site layout have a direct effect on crime in the housing
project. Design also has an indirect effect on social fac-
tors. Design facilitates territoriality, defensible space,
access control, and social cohesion. Crime activity is most
pronounced in a public housing setting where design deters
or does not allow for the development of a surveillance
mechanism. Typical scenarios include grounds not overlooked
by windows; ground level doors and windows not visible from
other neighboring units; poorly lighted areas, hidden
spaces, stairways; and poorly placed amenities such as
laundry rooms near basement entrances that may be hidden
from sight. Crime is also pronounced in projects that have
inadequate locks on doors and windows, and when alarm sys-
tems are nonexistent. This variable is possibly related to
management issues when there is no interests or lack of man-
power and funds to assure that these safety features are in
place. Public housing projects that have no real or sym-
bolic barriers to serve as access control will experience
crime activity, particularly if the project is located in a
high crime neighborhood. Without adequate access control,
nearby residents have free access to the public housing
grounds. Project sites with inadequate circulation patterns
encourages criminal activity. Uncontrolled circulation pat-

terns allows strangers to freely walk up to first floor

101

apartment windows and doors. In addition, uncontrolled cir-
culation patterns limit surveillance opportunities by making
it easier for potential offenders to not be noticed by resi-
dents and security patrols as they approach residential
buildings. Closed circulation patterns where there exist
only one or two entrances into the site make it easy for
criminals to escape into the interior of the project before
police can enter and apprehend.

Social structure, design and crime have a definite
link. Physical design that includes building size, building
placement, and capacity of the site meeting resident needs
such as elevator demand and adequacy of open space affects
social structure. A weak social structure is defined as the
lack of social organization, social cohesion, and informal
social control among residents. Physical design deters in-
teraction among residents. Larger buildings are not con-
ducive to resident interaction, thus crime is higher. Re-
lated to physical design and social control is the concept
of territoriality. Territoriality is an attitude where
residents desire and have a sense of control over their en-
vironment. Territoriality does not develop when building
and site layout does not allow for the establishment of a
sense of "neighborhood", and when there is a lack of jobs
and activities for youths do not exist.

Finally, crime will occur in public housing when
management practices to keep criminal activity in check is
interrupted or terminated because of unsteady funding. Lo-

cal public housing projects usually have the primary

102

responsibility to provide security personnel for their
project sites. Unstable funding results in a weak security
force and prevents long-range planning and training.

Neighborhoods that experience high crime activity have
characteristics that separate them from other non-crime
neighborhoods. Physical design of the neighborhood as well
as the socioeconomic make-up Of neighborhood residents
together determine the likelihood of the frequency of
criminal activity in the neighborhood. Physical design and
socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood are impor-
tant because they affect the ability of neighborhood resi-
dents to maintain control over the physical space which they
inhabit. Maintaining control is referred to as ter-
ritoriality.

High crime neighborhoods usually have a predominance of
multi-family and high-rise buildings. Multi-family housing
have more potential for crime because the realm of private
space of each apartment does not extend beyond the entrance
to the apartment. High-rise buildings present a sense of
anonymity and ease of accessibility for the outsider. Resi-
dents have no real control of public space outside their
apartment because too many people share building access and
adjoining grounds.

Street design has an effect on criminal behavior in the
neighborhood. Street patterns that allow an easy flow of
outsiders into the neighborhood makes it more difficult for
neighborhood residents to distinguish residents from

strangers, therefore decreasing the informal surveillance

101

mechanism. Also, neighborhoods sealed-by expressway systems
have high crime rates because the "penetrability” of police
is reduced. Poor street lighting encourages crime activity,
particularly in the rear and side of buildings. Lighting is
necessary to reinforce other protective measures, such as
steel doors, to deter criminal activity. Finally, neigh-

borhoods that allow on-street parking in and around commer-

cial areas will experience a higher crime rate. On-street
parking blocks the interior visibility of the store front on
the street thus concealing potential burglary and robbery
activity.

Neighborhoods with mixed land uses are more succeptible
to criminal activity. A neighborhood with Open lots, and
open block interiors provide access to victims or burglary
targets. Some uses such as hospitals, commercial
businesses, and schools become "crime generators" when lo-
cated in residential areas. These uses attract potential
Offenders and set up victims in the neighborhood.

A high crime neighborhood generally has a weak
socioeconomic base of the residents. The income level is
below poverty level. Robbery, burglary, and theft activity
are high. Most residents are minority, though this variable
does not solely account for high crime activity. The
neighborhood will not be stable, therefore transient resi-
dents will not have developed any emotional ties to the
neighborhood or will they have developed strong informal in-
teraction with their neighbors. High crime neighborhoods

are at the lower end Of their evolutional development. They

104

will contain a high number of teen-agers under eighteen
years of age and the high crime neighborhood may also have a
high number Of elderly. Elderly perception of crime is

usually higher that the actual occurrence of criminal ac-

tivity.

1A:

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

*U.S., Department Of Justice, et. al., Deterrence of
Crime in and Around Residences, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 29-31.

2U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Problems
Affecting Low-Rent Public Houeinq Prgiectei, A Field Study,
January l979, by Ronald Jones, et. al., (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 9.

31bide, pp. 32-47.

‘U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Houeing Management Technipal Memoranda: Safety and
Secprity, September 1975, pp. 5-6.

aSee Brill and Associates, Victimigetion. Feer of
Crime, and Altered Behavior: A Profile of Four Houeind

Projepts in Boston, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1975).

‘Alvin Rabushka and William G. Weissert, Caseworkers or

Pplice? How Tenants See Public Housing, (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1977), p. 48.

7The discussion on the three correlates of crime is
loosely based on the text in, U.S., Department Of Housing
and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and
Research, Crime in Public Housing: A Review of Meier Issues
and electe Crime Reduction Strate ies Volum I: A
Repgrt, (Washington: Government Printing Office, August
1979), pp. 7-45.

'Elizabeth Wood, Houeing Design: A Sociel Theory, (New

York: Citizens Housing and Planning Council, 1961).
Reprinted in Gwen Bell and Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, eds., Human
Ident‘ 'n the rban nvironmen , (Baltimore: Penguin,
1972), pp. 327-351.

’Ibid., p. 329-330.

*°U. 5., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, National Institute Of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Crime and the_Physical
City, by Luedtke and Associates, Detroit Michigan, June,
1970, pp. 40-41.

uOscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention

Through Urban Deeign, (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp.
79-80e

106

‘ZSee U. S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Qeeign Directivee for
A hiev n Defensible S ace, by Oscar Newman, (New York:
Center for Residential Security Design, June 1973). Also
see , A Design guide for Improving Residential
Security, by Oscar Newman (Washington: USGPO, 1973).

*SU. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, 3
Profileeof the Crime Problem in Murphy Homes, Beltimore,
Maryland, by Brill and Associates, (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1975), p. 22-23. Also see the following
for similar discussion at other public housing sites. U.
S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Victimizetion. Feer Of Crime, and Altered Behavior: A
Profileiof Four Houeing Prgjecte in Bpeton, by Brill and
Associates, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975);
. Victimization. Feer of Crime, and Altered
Behaviort, A Profile of the Crime Problem in Capper
Quelling§L_Weehingtoni D.C., by Brill and Associates,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977); Brill and
Associates, Comprehensive Security Plen for Dunber Village,
fleet Eejm Beach, Florida, (Annapolis: Brill and Associates,
1976); Brill and Associates, Millvale Safety end Security
Evaluation, (Cincinnati: Cincinnati Housing Authority,
1976).

 

 

1~‘U.S., Department of Justice, National Insitute of
Justice, Eectpge Influencing Crime and Instability in Urbep
Hou 'n Develo ments- Executive Summar , by Oscar Newman and
Karen A. Franck, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
August 1980), p. 15.

*PU.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Crime in Public Housing, Volume 1, pp. 12 - 13.

*‘U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Crime in Public Housing, Vglume I, p. 13.

*7U. S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Deeign Guidelipee for

Creating Defeneible Space, (Washington: USGPO, April 1976),
pp. 109-110.

‘PBrill and Associates, Millvale Safety and Security
Evaluations, (Cincinnati: Cincinnati Housing Authority,

1976).

uU.S. Department Of Housing and Urban Development,
Crime in Public Housin Volume I, p. 16.

107

2°U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Crime in Puplig Housing, Volume , p. 20. Also see Oscar
Newman, Architectugel Deeign for Crimeefirevention,
(Washington: USGPO, March 1973).

"Interview with Officer Madison, 13th Police Precinct,
Detroit Police Department, Detroit, Michigan, 9 December
1988.

22U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Residents'
Satiefection in HUD-Assisted Houging, pp. (5-1) - (5-3).

23See Brill and Associates, Victimizetion. Peer of

Crime, eng Altered Behavior: A Profile_Qj Four Housing
Projecte in Boeton, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1975. -

S‘U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,

in Pub ' Hou in Volume , p. 26; Also see William
H. Brill, "Security in Public Housing: A Synergistic
Approach,“ Deterrence of Crime in end Around Residences,

 

(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973). Brill
looks at a mix of project security improvements to increase
social cohesion of public housing residents.

2“’U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Resigente‘ Satisfaction in HUD- Ass'sted Housin , p. (4-6)

P‘Crime in Puplic Houeing, Volume , p. 38.

27U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Estimating
th c' l of National con mic Polic : lm 1' ions
for Mental and Physical Heelth end Criminal A ression, by M.
H. Brenner. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976).
Also see Ramsey Clark, Crime in Americe: Observations on
its Nature, Causes, Prevention and Qontrgl, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 56-67, for a discussion on
causes of crime in general.

P'David Cantor and Kenneth Land, "Unemployment and
Crime Rates in the Post-World War II United States: A

Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Ameripan Sociolpgical
Review 50 (June 1985): 329.

2"Oscar Newman, Defensiple Spece, (New York:
Macmillan, 1973), pp. 41-77, for an excellent discussion on

these concepts.

108

30S. J. Rosenthal, "An Approach to Neighborhood
Security," Ekistics 39 (February 1975): 89-90. Also see J.
O. Wilson, Th'nkin About Crime, 2nd edition, (New York:
Basic Books, 1983), pp. 26-40 for a discussion of how crime
can hinder function Of a community if not kept in check.

3-*U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Crime in Public Housin Volume I, p. 30.

32Crime in Public Housin Volume I, p. 33.
33Wilson, Thinking About Crime, p. 205

3‘See U. S., Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Policy Development and Research,
Crime in Public Housin Volume II, (Washington: USGPO,
August 1979), for conference transcript.

3”See M. Gold, Status Forcee in Delinguent Boys, (Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social
Research, 1963), pp. 34 and 39.

S‘Oscar Newman, C mm nit of Interest, (Garden City:
Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1980), p. 91.

37See the summary of conference proceedings of the
NAHRO/HUD Conference in Section A of U.S., Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development
and Research, rim in Pu li Hou ing; A Review of Major
Issuee and Selected Crime Reduction Strategiee, Volume II:
A Review of Two Conferences and e9 Annotated B'blio ra h ,
(Washington: USGPO, December 1978).

3'Rabushka, C s w rkers or Polic ?, p. 58.
3"Roger S. Ahlbrandt, Jr., and James V. Cunningham,

New Public,POlicy for N i hborhood Pre ervation, (New Yor
Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 7.

9.
k:

‘°Suzanne Keller, T r n Nei hb rhood: A
Soeiologigal Pepspeetive, (New York: Random House, 1968),
p. 87.

“Oscar Newman, Community of Interes , (Garden City,
New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1980), pp. 48-70, for a

more detailed discussion.
‘2Ibid.’ p. 68.

‘3Thomas A. Reppetto, Resipentiel Crime, (Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger Publishing CO, 1974), p. 50 - 53.

109

44Gerald Luedtke and Associates, Crime and the Physical
City A Pilot Study Prepared for the National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Jutice, (Detroit: Gerald
Luedtke and Associates, 1970), p. 37.

4albid.’ p. 37.

“U. S., Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, Safe and Secure Neighborhoode: Physicel
Characteristics and Informel Territoriel Control in High egg
Low Crime Neighborhooge, by Stephanie Greenberg, William
Rohe and Jay Williams, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1982), p. 50.

“’U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Reducing Residential Crime
end Fear: The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention
Pro ram Executive Summar , by Floyd J. Fowler, et al.,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, December 1979),

p. 37.

“'Gerald Luedtke and Associates. Crime ang the
Physical Qity, p. 6.

4“’See Robert Wright, et al., The Impegt of Street
Lighting on Street Crime, (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social
Research, May 1974).

9°U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, A Review of the Issues in
Street tighting and Crime, by James M. Tien, et al.,
(Cambridge: Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., July 1976),
p. (4-34).

 

a‘-Gerald Luedtke and Associates, Crime and the Physical
City, pp. 26-27

P’U. S., Department of Justice, National Institute of

Justice, Sefe and Secupe Neighborhogds: Physical
Qharecteristige and Informel,Territgriel Control in ngh and
Low Crime Nei hborhoods, by Stephanie Greenberg, William

Rohe and Jay Williams, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1982), p. 47.

°3Luedtke and Associates. Crime and the Physical City.
p. 22.

P‘see Chapter 8, "The Need for Mixed Primary Uses," in
Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great Am rican Cities,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 152-177.

 

110

°°U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
HUD Challenge, “Crime and the Neighborhood Environment," by
Richard A. Gardiner, January 1978, pp. 13-14.

P‘Wesley G. Skogan and Michael G. Maxfield, Coping With
Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reectione, (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 25.

P’Solomon Kobrin and Leo Schuerman, ”Crime and Changing
Neighborhoods: Executive Summary," a working paper
submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice, by the Social
Science Research Institute, University of Southern
California, December, 1983, p. 8.

3'A neighborhood subculture develops when the
socio-economic status of a neighborhood becomes increasingly
heterogeneous as larger numbers of low-income groups move
in. This change brings about a decline in the capacity of
the population to maintain control over the conducts of its
residents, particularly those in the younger and more crime
prone age groups. A neighborhood subculture begins to take
root in which law violation in the eyes of adolescents and
young adult males become tolerated if not an approved source
of income and a vehicle through which to gain the approval
and respect of peers. See Solomon Kobrin and Leo Schuerman,
”Crime and Changing Neighborhoods: Executive Summary", a
working paper submitted to the U. S. Department of Justice,
by the Social Science Research Institute, University of
Southern California, December, 1983), p. 8.

P’Gerald Luedtke and Associates, Crime and the Physical
Cit , A Pilot Study Prepared for the National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, (Detroit: Gerald
Luedtke and Associates, 1970), p. 30.

‘°David J. Burdua, "Juvenile Delinquency and 'Anomie’:
An Attempt at Replication," Sociel Problems 6 (1958-1959):
236.

‘*Thomas S. Reppetto, Residentiel Crime, (Cambridge:
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974), p. 38.

*ZWesley G. Skogan and Michael G. Maxfield, Coging With

Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions, (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publishing Company, 1981), p. 33.

‘3Skogan and Maxfield, pp. 38-39.
‘4Urban Design Studio, "Cass Corridor: Profile and
Policies,” December 1976, College of Architecture and Urban

Planning, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, pp. 8-9.

111

‘PReppetto, pp. 36-37.

“Sue Titus Reid, Crime and Criminology, 4th ed., (New
York: Holt, Rihehart and Winston, 1985), pp. 54-55.

‘7see Chapter 8, "The Puerto Ricans and the Mexicans,”
in Gerald D. Suttles, Ifle Sociel Order of the Slum:
Ethnicity end Territory in tge Inger City, (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 139 - 152.

“James O. Wilson, Thinking About Crime, (New York:
Basic, 1975), p. 13-16.

"Wilson, pp. 17-18.

7‘3’Mark LaGory and John Pipkin, Urgen Sociel Space,
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1981), pp.
161-162.

"see Thomas A. Reppetto, Reeidentiel Crime,
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974).

72Thomas A. Reppetto, Residentiel Crime, (Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974), p. 40.

73Michael J. Hindeland, ”Public Opinion Regarding
Crime, Criminal Justice, and Related Topics,” Journel of
Research in Crime and Delinguency 11 (July 1974): 103.
Also see Wesley G. Skogan and Michael G. Maxfield, Coging
with grime: Individual and Neighborhood Re ctions, (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 47.

 

"U.S., Department of Justice, National Institute of

Justice, Safe and Secure Neighborhoods: Physical
Cheregteristics and Informel Territorial Control in High egg
Low Crime Neighborhoode, by Stephanie W. Greenberg, William
M. Rohe and Jay R. Williams, (Washington: USGPO, May 1982),

p. 6.

73Gerald D. Suttles, The Sogial Order of the Slum:
Ethnigity and Territory in the Inner Cit , (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 74.

7‘U. S. Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, Safe and Secure Neighborhoods: Physical
Characteristics and Informel Territorial Control in High egg
Low Crime Neighborhoode, by Stephanie Greenberg, William
Rohe and Jay Williams, (Washington: USGPO, 1982), p. 7 - 9.

7’James O. Wilson, Thinkin About Crime, (New York:
Basic Books, 1975), p. 21.

112

"See J. E. Conklin, Ineflmpect of Crime, (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1975); D. A. Lewis, "Design
Problems in Public Policy Development: The Case of the
Community Anti-Crime Program,” Criminology 17 (August):
172-183; and Skogan and Maxfield, Coping With Crime, p. 230.

113

 

 

Chapter IV

DEVELOPMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF THE
URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

This chapter discusses the development and structure of
the statute that authorized the federal Urban Initiatives
Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. In addition, program
guidelines of the Anti-Crime Program as administered by the
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are
reviewed. Knowledge of statute development and structure
are necessary in order to determine whether the federal
policy that authorized the Anti-Crime Program adequately ad-

dressed the crime problem in public housing.

NATIONAL URBAN POLICY-197B

President Carter announced the Nation's first National
Urban Policy on March 27, 197B.‘ The policy, entitled ”A
New Partnership to Conserve America's Communities," called
for the combined effort and resources of all levels of
government, the private sector, and neighborhood/voluntary

organizations to conserve and strengthen our urban areas.

114

The Policy recognized federal responsibility and leadership
in the implementation of the "New Partnership” approach.
Policy objectives outlined in Carter's approach included:
1. Encourage and support of efforts to improve
local planning and management capacity in

existing federal programs:

2. Encourage of states to become partners to
assist urban areas;

3. Stimulation of greater involvement by neighborhood
and voluntary associations;

4. Provide fiscal relief to the most hard-pressed
communities:

5. Provide strong incentives to attract private
investment to distressed communities;

6. Provide employment opportunities, primarily in the
private sector, to the long-term unemployment and

disadvantaged in urban areas;

7. Increase access to opportunity for those
disadvantaged by a history of discrimination;

8. Expand and improve social and health services
to disadvantaged people in cities, counties, and
other communities; and

9. Improve the urban physical environment and the
cultural and aesthetic aspects of urban life.2

In a morning ceremony in the Rose Garden at the White
House, President Carter, on July 10, 1978, announced his in-
tention to support the development of the Urban Initiatives
Anti-Crime Demonstration Program, and he also officially
made this effort a part of his National Urban Policy.3 He
stated that "the primary responsibility to control crime
rests with local and state officials, but the Federal
Government can and does provide essential and effective
support." Carter felt that the public housing anti-crime

program demonstrated the Federal government's sensitivity to

the crime problem in public housing. Carter's initial
proposal involved several Federal agencies that pooled $32
million to address several activities in the anti-crime com-
ponent. First, Carter proposed the use of Comprehensive
Employment Training Act (CETA) funds to hire local residents
for such important, preventive jobs as to staff elevators

and patrol unguarded areas. In addition, the proposal

directed Interior Department funds to build recreation
facilities for public housing residents. Finally, Carter
directed the use of Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (LEAA) funds to provide counseling for juveniles resid-
ing in public housing who may have a potential for crime ac-
tivity.

In the same ceremony, HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts
Harris indicated that the entire public housing system had a
negative image because of the crime problem in a few, highly
visible public housing projects. This effort, as part of
the National Urban Policy, directly addressed some of the
worst living conditions in the country. It is interesting
to note that Secretary Harris, in an earlier committee tes-
timony, did not address crime in public housing, and she em-
phatically stated that she did not want program or budget
expansion in any HUD programs.

Objectives of the Anti-Crime Program complemented ob-
jectives outlined in President Carter's National Urban
Policy. The Program met local planning and management ob-
jectives by the provision of improved local management of

public housing crime problems. The Program met Carter's

116

neighborhood involvement objective by the encouragement of
neighborhood association involvement to carry out local
anti-crime efforts such as escorting the elderly. Provi-
sions for branch police precinct offices in public housing
administrative site offices, as well as funds to address the
crime problem in public housing as a whole met Carter‘s ob-
jective of providing fiscal relief to hard-pressed areas.
In addition, program funds that created employment oppor-
tunities for public housing residents complemented Policy
objectives that related to the provision of employment op-
portunities for the unemployed and disadvantaged. Finally,
the effort to reduce crime met the Policy objectives that
addressed the urban physical environment and

cultural/aesthetic aspects of urban life.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A legislative history is important in order to under-
stand the overall success of the Anti-Crime Program. The
degree to which policy makers structure policy can directly
determine if a program will be successful in meeting its ob-
jectives. Mazmanian and Sabatier state that "a carefully
drafted statute can substantially affect the extent to which
its objectives are attained."‘ Legislation is most likely

to succeed if:

1. policy objectives are clear and constant;

2. an adequate causal theory is incorporated in the
statute;

3. the implementation process is structured:

4. implementing agency has a commitment to statutory
goals;

5. program support exists by organized constituency

groups and key legislators throughout the imple-
mentation process;

6. priority of statute objectives is not undermined
over time by conflicting public policies that
weakens the statutes causal theory or political
support.5

An analysis of program formulation will provide clues to the
level of effectiveness of the Urban Initiatives Program.
Genesis

HUD‘s response to the Public Housing Security
Demonstration Act of 1978 came in the form of the Urban In-
itiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. The Housing and
Community Development Amendments of 1978 (PL 95-557) con-
tained the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978
(see Appendix for complete text). The Senate bill that
proposed the original Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978 (S. 2637), and introduced on March 2,
1978, did not contain provisions to address public housing
security.‘ Generally, 8.2637 amended and extended existing
Federal laws that related to housing, community and neigh-
borhood development and preservation, and related programs
such as housing construction and finance.

Senator Brooke introduced the initial bill that
proposed the public housing security demonstration effort
(8.2799) on March 23, 1978. Public housing security
problems that had gained increased attention in recent
months resulted in introduction of the bill. Senator Brooke
justified his bill on the belief that:

1. low-income and elderly public housing residents
suffer substantially from rising crime and
violence, and they are being threatened as a
result of inadequate security arrangements for

the prevention of physical violence, theft,
burglary, and other crimes;

118

2. public housing residents have restricted their
lives and use of the environment because of
their concern about crime, and are abandoning
public housing projects at a time when there is
an increase demand for public housing units;
3. higher vacancy rates and heavy financial losses
of management in some cases have led to
complete abandonment of public housing
projects;
4. an integral part of successfully providing
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
low-income persons is to insure that the
housing is secure;
5. local public housing authorities have
inadequate security arrangements for the
prevention of crime and vandalism, and lack
specific operating funds to provide security
measures; and
6. action is needed to provide for the security of
public housing residents and to preserve the
Nation's investment in its public housing
stock.7
These findings represented the first significant and initial
attempt of Congress to formally recognize that a crime
problem existed in public housing. At the same time,
however, these findings are somewhat arbitrary. The litera-
ture documents that crime among the low-income and elderly
public housing residents occurs mainly in the larger public
housing projects in larger urban areas. Generally, the
smaller elderly complexes are the safest. The floor
referred the bills to the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs.
The final bill, a committee bill (8.3084), titled the

"Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978" sent

to the House by the Senate, contained provisions of the

original Senate bill (8.2637) plus other Senate bills such
as 8.2708 and 8.2709, the Administration’s proposal for
programs conducted by the Farmers Home Administration, and
8.2799, the original bill that proposed the Public Housing
Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The committee bill
(8.3084) consisted of seven titles. Failure to bring the

Public Housing Security Demonstration Act to the forefront

during the Senate committee effort may have contributed to
the statutes adequacy to address crime in public housing.
The Act suffered a relatively low status from the beginning
in terms of its place in the Senate committee bill. Title
II contained the Act (at a "sectional” status level) plus
provisions that authorized funding programs for the hand-
icapped and for financially troubled projects. In addition,
the Title proposed new guidelines for managing federally as-
sisted projects.‘

Title II, Section 203, of 8.3084, titled ”Public Hous-
ing Security Demonstration Act of 1978", declared the policy
of the United States to provide for the development,
demonstration, and evaluation, of a comprehensive program to
effectively mitigate crime and vandalism in public housing
projects. The Senate committee believed as a whole that
residential security in the Nation‘s public housing system
had dissipated to the point of restricted use of public
housing, and outright abandonment of low-income and elderly
residents in public housing. The committee also felt that
the threat of residential security, abandonment and resident

fear would eventually lead to a reduction in the

120

availability of public housing stock, which at the time rep-
resented a national investment of approximately $19 billion.
The committee used flawed rationale to justify policy that
addressed crime in public housing. Documentation presented
in committee hearings failed to support the idea that resi-
dents of public housing move because of a lack in residen-
tial security. Even HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris
acknowledged at Carter's National Urban Policy announcement
that crime was a problem in only a few, highly visible
public housing projects.9

The public housing security demonstration effort as ac-
knowledged in Senate bill 3084 came as a first step toward
the development of a comprehensive program to reduce crime
and vandalism in federally assisted housing. The bill
directed the Anti-Crime Program to test innovative security
measures, concepts, and community anti-crime techniques
tailored to specific needs of each project. In addition, the
bill mandated funding priority for local public housing
authorities that a) provided for the restoration of aban-
doned dwelling units, b) proposed coordination efforts be-
tween management and local government entities in providing
increased security and social services to public housing
tenants, and c) that provided maximum involvement of tenants
in the security program. The bill authorized a set-aside of
$10 million out of public housing operating subsidies ap-

propriated for fiscal year 1979 for the program.

191

The bill realistically recognized that the program
served as a first step to address the crime issue in the
nation's public housing system. Inadequacies occurred in
setting up the program as a test or pilot program. First,
the bill gave no indication of the maximum number of
projects to be funded under the demonstration program. As a
result, the limited funding proposed (and actually budgeted)
potentially could be (and was) spread over many projects to
the point of making any effort to address crime under this
program futile. Second, the bill did not develop a
framework for coordination efforts between public housing
authority management and local governments to address crime.
Rather, it included only a statement of intent that this ar-
rangement should be set up.

The House version of the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Amendments of 1978 (H.R. 12433) contained nothing with
specific reference to public housing security.‘° The bill
did contain two significant themes that set the stage for a
later amendment to add public housing security provisions:
the commitment to the restoration and preservation of the
existing housing stock, and a continued recognition of the
needs of elderly and handicapped citizens. Representative
Claude Pepper (Florida) introduced an amendment to H.R.
12433 on June 28, 1978, which added Section 204 titled
"Public Housing Security." Members of the Select Committee

on Aging cosponsored the bill. Rep. Pepper introduced his

122

amendment days after the murder of an elderly man in a
public housing project located in his congressional dis-
trict.

The amendment, similar but more detailed than the
Senate version found in 8.3084, instructed the Secretary of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to in-
itiate and carry out, beginning on October 1, 1978, a
program for the development, demonstration, and evaluation
of viable means to combat crime and vandalism in the
Nation's public housing projects and surrounding neigh-
borhoods. In addition, the amendment encouraged the
Secretary to develop innovative community anti-crime and
security methods, concepts, and techniques. Selected
methods to be addressed included better locking devices and
design improvements. Public housing projects selected for
participation represented a broad spectrum of project types,
locations, and tenant populations. The amendment authorized
the HUD Secretary to utilize up to $12 million for estab-
lishment of the program.u The amendment passed on July 21,
1978; and on July 24, 1978, after House review of 8.3084,
the House struck out the entire text of 8.3084 and inserted
in lieu thereof the provisions of H.R. 12433. The House
passed 8.3084 with the anticipation of a conference to be
requested with the Senate. The Senate agreed to the
conference.*3

Representative Pepper‘s effort still contained two
major weaknesses that reduced the program's chances of suc-

ceeding. Representative Pepper wanted participants in the

123

anti-crime program to represent all types of projects and
tenant populations. Evidence that crime in public housing
is most severe in larger projects, and that smaller, elderly
projects have lower rates of crime. Also, the amendment did
not establish a cap on the maximum number of participants.
Both House and Senate versions of the anti-crime statute
contained weak provisions to adequately address the public
housing crime problem.
Committee Debates

The Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs,
and the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Af-
fairs did not make public housing security a major topic of
concern during the hearings. Senate bill 2637 contained no
provisions for the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act
of 1978. Senate hearings on 8.2637, the initial bill for
the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978,
however, did mention public housing security in only two in-
stances. First, the opening statement of Senator Brooke
denounced HUD's underfunding of the public housing perfor-
mance funding system (PFS). Operating subsidy requirements
for each project are calculated based upon the use of the
Performance Funding System formula. The PFS formula is used
to calculate an appropriate subsidy level for each public
housing authority based on a rate comparable to what it
would cost a well-managed public housing authority of com—
parable size, location, and characteristics to operate its
own units. Underfunding of the PFS would, he felt, result

in greater spending of the proposed appeals fund to make up

124

for the lack of funds in the PFS budget. The bill mandated
Anti-Crime funding to come from the appeals fund. The ap-
peals fund proposal established a special fund that provided
moneys for liability insurance, special tenant services, and
other housing authority needs when no other moneys were
available to cover these items. The local housing authority
would ”appeal" to HUD for these moneys. According to
Senator Brooke, "...an adequately funded security program
alone, a vital need in many of our larger cities, would ab-
sorb more than the $12 million provided in the HUD
budget."‘-3 Second, the National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) endorsed the idea of a
public housing security program. Mr. Joseph E. Canale,
President of NAHRO gave the following statement with
reference to public housing security:

"With respect to security, we again are asking for

a small commitment to maintain an enormous invest-

ment. Additional funding is necessary to support

security, including the use of tenant patrols. Lo-

cal police are generally not equipped to provide

the intensive coverage required in public housing

developments. Public Housing Authorities are un-

able to obtain assured funding from local or other

federal sources. We would recommend, therefore,

that the subcommittee approve the establishment of

an appeals fund, but that such a fund in its ini-

tial year emphasize the funding of security needs.

We would recommend that this fund be established at

a level of at least $50 million and be in addition

to full funding requirements of PFS [Performance

Funding System]. This solution will not only

provide definition to the appeals fund and a

focused response to security needs, but will also

support direct job creating activities."“

Senate subcommittee hearings expressed no specific op-

position to public housing security. However, general op-

position statements to increased funding of HUD programs

1'75

centered around the theme of austerity. In her Statement
before the subcommittee, HUD Secretary Harris expressed the
Administration's viewpoint of an austere budget for Fiscal
year 1979. Secretary Harris stated that ”...I do not ask
and do not want ...as a Department and part of [the Carter]
Administration ...money beyond that we have requested.”‘°
Harris did not mention public housing security in her state-
ment to the subcommittee.*‘ Senator Proxmire commended
Secretary Harris' budget proposal for Fiscal year 1979 for
being lean. He stated, "I believe we must keep our housing
and community development budget as small as reasonably pos-
sible, while we work, simultaneously, to increase the in-
vestment and especially the know-how input from the private
sector ...if I had it my way ...I would cut your budget
sharply."*7

Senate committee debates (in part) intended to set the
stage for the development of a public housing security
policy since 8.2637 contained no specific provisions that
addressed public housing security. Low priority of the
issue, general inconsistencies of need, coupled with the ex-
pressed need of an austere budget created differences be-
tween debated issues and the final committee bill (8.3084)
sent to the floor. The committee recognized the need for a
security program for larger cities, but did not recommend
that the anti-crime effort be targeted to large city public
housing projects. In terms of funding, Senator Brooke
openly acknowledged that a proposed $12 million to come from

an appeals fund that had no real definition of purpose would

126

be inadequate. In addition, NAHRO officials expressed the

need of at least $50 million for the proposed project, yet

recommendations to the floor in 8.3084 recommended only $10
million to fund the demonstration program.

Hearings before the House Committee on Banking,
Finance, and Urban Affairs on H.R. 12433 did not address the
Anti-Crime Program proposal. The amendment introduced by
Representative Pepper to create the anti-crime program was
added after the hearings were complete. The committee
report did recognize and expressed concern about crime and
vandalism in the Nation's public housing projects. The com-
mittee emphasized that funding for security measures could
be used from several sources: public housing modernization
funds, public housing operating subsidies, and the proposed
$12 million operating subsidy appeals fund." The committee
took no action to propose policy to address the issue.

Congressional Debates

Representative Claude Pepper (Florida) outlined the ad-
vantages of his amendment that proposed the Public Housing
Security Demonstration Act of 1978. First, the amendment
promoted cooperation among HUD and other federal agencies,
such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration;
Department of Labor; Department of Justice; Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare; and the Community Services
Administration. Second, the amendment did not increase ex-
penditures or budget authority. Instead, it specified a
small portion of money already allocated for other purposes

to be redirected to the anti-crime program. Third, HUD

1’97

endorsed the principle of this amendment. Fourth, the in-
tent of the amendment directly addressed the issue of crime
and fear of crime of our public housing elderly residents.
Nine House members went on record to support the amend-
ment. Representative Royal (California) justified his sup-
port by citing a study published by the Subcommittee on
Housing and Consumer Interests of the Select Committee on
Aging. The study demonstrated that the elderly are
seriously affected by crime and fear of crime, with burglary
being the most predominant crime perpetrated against the el-
derly. These actions have caused the elderly to literally
become "prisoners in their own homes or apartments.”*'' Rep-
resentative Hammerschmidt (Arkansas) rose to support the
amendment. He cited results of a study completed by the
Housing and Consumer Interests Subcommittee which found that
most crimes against the elderly were theft committed by
teen-agers between the age of 13 to 18. The study also con-
cluded that simple security devices could substantially
deter break-ins in by young and inexperienced burglars.
Representative Myers (Pennsylvania) recognized the increased
cost of providing the anti-crime program, but felt that the
saving recognized in reducing abandonment [as a result of
crime] and destruction would greatly offset cost of the
proposed program. Representative Oakar (Ohio) endorsed the
amendment on the grounds that public housing was just not
safe for emotional, physical, and spiritual development be-
cause of crime and its effects. Representative Pepper also

noted that the amendment had gained support of a broad

128

coalition of organizations, including the National Council
of Senior Citizens, the National Council on the Aging, the
National Retired Teachers Association, American Association
of Retired Persons, the Urban Elderly Coalition, the Na-
tional Caucus on the Black Aged, and the Ad Hoc Coalition
for Low Income Housing.29 The most realistic statement came
from Representative Biaggi (New York). He recognized this
proposal as a major first step to address crime in public
housing. He stressed that many of our public housing
projects were built in a time when the reality of crime was
not as severe as today; where structures were not designed
with crime reducing incentives in mind. Rep. Biaggi felt
that an effective anti-crime effort may serve as a catalyst
for a larger federal commitment later.

Generally, public housing security house floor debates
lacked an in-depth content and appeared superficial. First,
the amendment called for coordination among various federal
agencies to carry out the anti-crime effort. At the same
time, however, the amendment did not set the framework for
agency participation, nor did the amendment define the par-
ticipation responsibility of agencies involved. Second, the
program as proposed demanded no increase in budget
authority. Instead, the bill proposed that the program be
supported by money allocated for other purposes. While the
intentions of this financial arrangement seemed admirable,

it also set the stage for future animosity between

179

anti-crime program administrators and those agencies that
had to redefine/reduce their budgets to accommodate the new
program.

Senate floor debates on committee bill 8.3084 centered
around provisions with larger financial appropriations such
as the Section 8 housing assistance program and the Section
312 rehabilitation program. Reference to the Public Housing
Security Demonstration Act occurred only three times in the
Senate debate of 8.3084. Senator Proxmire (Wisconsin) felt
the committee bill, while based on the Carter Administration
proposal for program content, provided spending authoriza-
tions far in excess of that endorsed by the Administration.
He stated that "the substance of the Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978, the bill reported by the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, is needed
legislation. But its substance is flawed by recommendations
for additional spending.” Proxmire used the Public Housing
Security Demonstration Program authorized by Title II of
8.3084 as an example of excessive spending authorization.
Because of inflationary problems in America, Proxmire stated
that “I intend to support efforts to reduce the spending
level authorized by the committee bill, and at the same
time... work for the adoption of the bill.“*

Senator Brooke (Massachusetts) strongly urged his col-
leagues to support the bill. He felt that "housing for low
income families and the elderly is one national priority
which should not be lightly disregarded in our rush to slice

the Federal budget. The bill contains a number of

170

provisions which support our national commitment to our
cities and rural areas and to providing decent housing for
our low-and moderate income families and the elderly.”
Brooke referred to one provision that specifically addressed
crime and vandalism in public housing projects, and the vic-
timization of elderly residents. The anti-crime program
"will provide for the development and evaluation of improved
innovative community anti-crime and security methods and
techniques which will mitigate the level of crime in public
housing projects and surrounding neighborhoods.”==

Finally, Senator Glenn (Ohio) went on record to support
8.3084 as a whole and specifically the Public Housing
Security Demonstration Act of 1978. He felt that this
program was a good initial response to the enormous increase
in crime in public housing that is affecting the low income,
elderly, and minority citizens. ”This is an excellent
provision, it is badly needed and I support it as separate
legislation and as part of 8.3084."23 It is a realistic as~
sumption that was expressed by Representative Biaggi and
Senator Glenn that this program with its modest funding
level would serve the purpose of an initial step in develop-
ing a major program that in the future would address public
housing crime issues.

Documentation of Senate floor debates on public hous-
ing security showed an even weaker coverage than the House

debates. The three Senators that spoke on the issue

111

expressed their opposition to the program, but as with nor—
mal practice of most congressional members they did not ex-
press why or on what basis they made their decisions.
Conference Committee
The House called a conference committee to work out
different provisions of the Public Housing Security

Demonstration Act of 1978 as addressed in Title II of the

Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 as
provided for in 8.3084. The committee agreed on the House
provision that outlined congressional findings (as a basis
of the Act) that low-income and elderly public housing resi-
dents are being threatened as a result of inadequate
security arrangements, and that an integral part of success-
fully providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
low-income persons is to insure that the housing is secure.
In addition, the committee added a provision and found that
action is needed to provide for the security of public hous-
ing residents and to preserve the nations housing stock.
Poligy outlined in the House amendment and included in the
conference report stated: "...[the] policy of the U.S. is to
provide for the demonstration and evaluation of more effec-
tive means of mitigating crime and vandalism in public hous-
ing projects, [and the] ...purpose of the policy is to
provide a safe living environment, particularly for the el-
derly residents of public housing projects."

The more specific grogram authgrigy outlined in the
House amendment, and included in the conference report,

directed the HUD Secretary to initiate the demonstration

program during the Fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978,
and to the extent approved in appropriations Acts. The
Senate version gave no specific time frame for commencement
of the demonstration program.

The conference agreement contained the House provision
listing general criteria that HUD must consider in selecting
gublic housing projecte for participation in the demonstra-
tion program. The House amendment directed the HUD
Secretary to consider the extent of crime and vandalism, the
nature and quality of community anti-crime efforts, the na-
ture and quality of police and other protective services to
the public housing projects, the vacancy rate and demand for
public housing in the locality, and the extent of abandon-
ment of public housing units. The HUD Secretary had the
responsibility to assure that projects selected for par-
ticipation represented a broad spectrum of project types,
locations, and tenant populations.

The Senate bill authorized $10 million from the public
housing operating subsidy program to carry out the
demonstration program. The House amendment directed that
not more than $12 million be used. The conference report
included the House amendment. The conferees clearly ex-
pressed that the $12 million be available only to provide
one time single year only grants for Fiscal year 1979.24
Compromises agreed upon in the conference committee
generally strengthened the bill by including House bill
items such as program intent, time frame for implementation,

and a higher fiscal authorization.

133

PL 95-557
Senate Bill 3084 became law (PL 95-557) on October 31,
1978. Title II, Section 207 of the "Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978", cited as the ”Public Hous-
ing Security Demonstration Act of 1978", authorized the
development, implementation and evaluation of the Urban In-
itiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. Section 207
stated Congressional findings that:
1. low-income and elderly public housing residents
of the Nation have suffered substantially from
rising crime and violence, and are being
threatened as a result of inadequate security
arrangements for the prevention of physical
violence, theft, burglary, and other crimes;
2. older persons generally regard the fear of
crime as the most serious problem in their
lives, to the extent that one-fourth of all
Americans over 65 voluntarily restrict their

mobility because of it;

3. crime and the fear of crime have led some
residents to move from public housing projects;

4. an integral part of successfully providing
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low
income persons is to insure that the housing is
secure;

5. local public housing authorities may have
inadequate security arrangements for the
prevention of crime and vandalism; and

6. action is needed to provide for the security of
public housing residents and to preserve the
Nation's investment in its public housing
stock.

Section 207 attempted for the first time to bring attention
to the crime problem in public housing and its negative ef-

fect on the living environment of low-income and elderly

public housing residents.

134

The new law stated that it was policy of the United
States to provide for the formulation, demonstration and
evaluation of an effective means to mitigate crime and van-
dalism in public housing projects, to result in a safer
living environment for project residents, and particularly
elderly residents. The law directed the HUD Secretary to
initiate and promptly carry out, beginning on October 1,
1978, a program incorporating improved, innovative community
anti-crime and security methods and techniques.

The law mandated public housing projects that par-
ticipated in the demonstration program represent a broad
spectrum of project types, locations, and tenant popula-
tions. The following factors must also be considered in
selecting projects for funding: crime and vandalism in the
projects; community anti-crime efforts and police services
in the project and surrounding areas; local demand for
public housing units; vacancy rates and extent of abandon-
ment of public housing units; and characteristics and needs
of public housing tenants.

Security methods required by law included the improve-
ment of physical security equipment for dwelling units, so-
cial and environmental design improvements, tenant awareness
and volunteer programs, and tenant participation and employ-
ment in providing security services. The law mandated a
coordination of effort to target resources to carry out the
provision of the law between public housing management; lo-

cal law enforcement officials; the Law Enforcement

135

Assistance Administration; the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare; Department of Labor; the Community Serv-
ices Administration; and ACTION.

In addition, the law mandated the HUD Secretary to in-
itiate and carry out a survey of crime and vandalism in the
Nation's public housing projects. Not later than eighteen

months after the date of enactment of the law, the Secretary

must report to Congress results of the survey and findings
from the demonstration program. Funding to establish the
demonstration program was set at a maximum of $12 million
and would come from Section 5(c) of the U.S. Housing Act of
1937 approved in appropriations Acts for Fiscal year 1979.

The weakness of Section 207 contributed to the statutes
inadequacy in addressing crime in public housing. The low
status of the statute in itself contributed to policy inade-
quacies by not allowing enough emphasis to be placed on ap-
propriate policy development. The Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978, an "Amendment" package, con-
sisted of many Acts and revisions that had a much heavier
"play" in congressional debates and hearings, to the point
of public housing security being overshadowed.

More specifically, congressional findings that justify
Section 207 contained flaws. Some public housing residents,
especially the elderly, have suffered from crime and
violence in their projects, and at a higher rate than the
city where they live. The law implied that this phenomenon
is uniform and is rising throughout all of the nation's

public housing projects. Research, on the other hand,

suggests differently, that crime within public housing does
not occur at a uniform rate. Ironically, a report published
by HUD in December, 1978 suggested that robberies per
thousand persons in public housing projects range from ap-
proximately 22 to 114. Data revealed assaults to be more
uniform with over 30 per thousand in 4 out of 5 residential

complexes.as Secretary Harris acknowledged publicly that

crime is worse in larger projects. The literature review
also shows that public housing crime is most severe in
larger projects located in larger urban areas. The provi-
sion that "a broad spectrum” of projects be included in the
demonstration effort does not agree with findings in the
literature. Inclusion of a broad spectrum of projects
coupled with absence of a ceiling on the number of projects
to be funded are the major weaknesses of the statute and
they virtually make the program intent ineffective.

In many cases, and especially among the elderly, the
fear of crime has serious implications. One finding of the
Act stated that crime/fear of crime caused tenant abandon-
ment of public housing. One report described coping be-
havioral characteristics of public housing residents ex-
periencing crime or fear of crime in Boston's public housing
system. Nearly half of the public housing residents in this
category kept their doors locked at all times, did not go
out alone at night, kept their children inside at night,
restricted night visits from city and public housing resi-
dents, and did not shOp at night.“ Evidence gives no in-

dication that a significant number of public housing

residents move because of crime/fear of crime perpetuated
upon them. An Anti-Crime Conference co-sponsored by the Na-
tional Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
(NAHRO) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) in September, 1978, indicated that vacancy
rates in larger big city public housing projects may con-
tribute to crime, but the the conference fell short of cor-
relating tenant abandonment with crime and fear of crime. A
1986 NAHRO study on public housing cited several reasons for
public housing vacancy (Table 4.1). Modernization ac-
tivities appeared to be the most common reason for vacancy.
The prevalence of crime is not listed as a significant
reason for vacancy problems. The NAHRO report, however,
must be looked at with some suspicion. It is suspected that
public housing authorities with vacancies caused by crime
problems would mask this issue in the "other” category. Of
the percentages given in the ”other" category, seven percent
of the reasons (of 21.5 percent) for all respondents
reported were not defined. To back up this argument, a
recent article indicates that there are now nearly 800,000
families enrolled on public housing waiting list nationwide,
and these families will have to wait an average of 13 months
before being placed. Some families will have to wait for up
to three years. In addition, the findings indicated that
public housing designated for the elderly will most often
have no vacancies. The same study revealed that ap-
proximately eighty percent of the households on a waiting

list are for authorities with over 2,500 units.27

170

Table 4.1

Reasons for Public Housing Vacancy:
Percent of Vacancies by Agency Size, 1986

Agency Recent Modernization Conversion Demolition

 

Size‘ Turnover Activity Activityb Activity Othegi
Small 51.1 3.7 1.4 N/A 43.9
Medium 38.0 41.6 0.8 0.2 19.4
Large 28.8 29.7 6.9 11.4 22.6
Very Lg. 28.6 31.5 5.5 13.7 20.4
Lgest 14

PHAs 13.0 39.1 4.3 21.8 21 8
All 23.6 34.0 5.1 15.6 21.5

 

Source: Mark L. Matulef, "This is Public Housing,” Journal
of Housing 44 (September/October 1987): 178.

NOTES: ‘small = 1 to 499 units; medium = 500 to 1,250
units; large = 1,251 to 2,500 units; very large =
2,501 units or more excluding the 14 largest
authorities.

bincludes conversion to new tenant type and to non-
residential.

‘includes several reasons for vacancies such as
miss-match between available units and households
on the waiting list, low demand for public housing
in the community, and/or applicant rejection of
unit when it became available. 12.82 of reasons
for vacancy in small PHAs, 2.6% in medium PHAs,
11.3% in large PHAs, 6.5% in very large PHAs, 5.9%
in the largest PHAs, and 7.0% of all PHAs were
not defined.

lilttttitt

139

Finally, the Act gave an "intent” statement only re-
lated to a coordinated effort between various agencies,
federal and local, in carrying out the provisions of the new
law. While the intent is admirable, the law did not contain
adequate provisions to require federal agencies and local
governments to work together harmoniously in this effort,

nor did the law explicitly define each federal agencies

responsibility in carrying out the law's intent. Lack of
clarity on agency responsibility is critical since the law
set the stage for animosity to develop by mandating that
participating federal agencies adjust their budget to accom-
modate the new program. These weaknesses, coupled with pre-
viously appropriated funds being redirected to the public
housing security program, set the stage for initial agency
disenchantment with the anti-crime program specifically, and

with HUD in general.

THE URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM26

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's
(HUD) response to the Public Housing Security Demonstration
Act of 1978 and President Carter's National Urban Policy
came in the form of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program. To formulate a program that ade-
quately addressed crime and fear of crime in the public
housing system, HUD held a series of conferences to gain in-
put from public housing management professionals and a wide
variety of citizen groups. Ideas collected from these con-

ferences served as a basis for seven basic program

140

components to be addressed by each demonstration site: im-
proved management of public safety; rehabilitated anti-crime
facilities and better physical security design; increased
involvement of tenants in fighting crime; more employment
of youths; improved anti-crime services for elderly resi-
dents, drug abusers, project youths and victims; additional
and more sensitive police and law enforcement; and area-wide
public/private partnerships targeted on public housing sites
as well as surrounding neighborhoods.

In addition to the $12 million allocated for develop-
ment, implementation, and evaluation of the Anti-Crime
Program, funds to carry out local efforts came from a
variety of agencies (Table 4.2). HUD received one hundred
and sixty-three applications from local public housing
authorities that requested participation in the anti-crime
program. The scarcity of funds allowed HUD to fund only
thirty-nine of the proposals. Those applications selected
for funding represented all geographical areas of the
country. The funded programs included a wide variety of
building types - from high rises to row houses. Larger
public housing authorities with more than 1,250 units repre-
sented 27 of the proposals funded, while the remaining 12
were smaller authorities with less than 1,250 units.=’

The authorizing statute mandated that HUD officials
consider evidence of serious crime problems, local commit-
ments, and administrative capabilities to determine which
applications to approve for funding. In most cases, local

data on crime and fear of crime was nonexistent. Also HUD

141

Table 4.2

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Funding
Sources for Local Crime Programs

 

Amount
Agency (in thousands)
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HUD Low Income Public Housing Modernization $20,000
HUD Community Development Block Grant 2,072
HUD Technical Assistance 178
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Youth Community Conservation & Improvement 7,410
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Preven. 1,075
Technical Assistance 16
Office of Criminal Justice Improvement
Victim/Witness Program 340
Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs
Technical Assistance 60
ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE, & MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Program Funds 477
Technical Assistance 23
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service
Urban Parks Program 913
Technical Assistance 10
LOCAL MATCHING FUNDS
Anti-Crime Efforts 8,014
TOTAL $40,588

 

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy, Development, and Research, Final Regort
of the Eveiuatign of the Urben Initiativee Anti-Crime

Demgnegcagion: A §gmmary, May 1985, p. 15.

ltlttllttt

142

was not in a position to test commitments and capabilities
of local housing authorities. As a result, the primary con-
sideration for application approval became the quality of
the proposal itself. The application review concentrated on
how well the application understood and wrote clearly about
the logic and theory of the program and how faithfully the
housing authorities followed submission requirements.

As a result, the better written proposals had the best
chances of funding regardless of the nature of the local
crime problem, or the extent of local commitment of ad-
ministrative capabilities of the local public housing
authority.30 Local funding ranged from $204,600 to $5.5
million for larger public housing authorities with 1,250 or
more units, and from $119,049 to $1.5 million for public
housing authorities with less than 1,250 units (Tables 4.3
and 4.4).

The Program, from announcement to completion, operated
for approximately three years. HUD formally announced the
program in May, 1979, and the agency granted awards by Fall,
1979. All thirty-nine sites had their program underway by
mid-1980. Program close-outs for all sites occurred by
mid-1982. Program competition announcements listed three
criteria for selecting Program participants: evidence of
serious crime problems, local commitment and administrative
capabilities for success.

Local authorities that participated in the demonstra-
tion effort used various and differing strategies to imple-

ment each of the seven required program components. Local

143

Table 4.3

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program
Funds Obligated to Public Housing Agencies

as of March 31, 1980

Agency

LARGER AUTHORITIES
Allegheny Co., PA
Atlanta, GA
Baltimore, MD
Buffalo, NY
Cambridge, MA
Charleston, WV
Charlotte, NC
Chicago, IL
Cleveland, OH (Cuyahoga Metro)
Dade Co., FL
Detroit MI
Hartford, CT

Jersey City, NJ

Los Angeles, CA
Louisville, KY
Newark, NJ

New Orleans, LA

New York, NY
Norfolk, VA
Phoenix, AZ
Providence, RI

San Antonio, TX

San Francisco, CA
Seattle, WA

St. Paul, MN

Tampa, FL

Toledo, OH (Lucas Metro)
SMALLER AUTHORITIES
Athens, GA
Blackfeet Tribe (Browning, MT)
Decatur, IL
Evansville, IN
Greenville, SC
Jackson, TN
Hampton, VA

Oxnard, CA

Prince Georges Co., MD
Richmond, CA
Springfield, MA
Taunton, MA

PROGRAM TOTAL

Totel Funds‘

$359,100
1,898,980
1,251,997
1,241,337
795,000
567,000
701,500
5,542,817
1,121,550
916,150
2,515,740
1,278,158
435,900
371,990
1,205,538
1,035,725
1,090,185
3,588,850
1,005,740
570,550
828,000
820,393
480,507
928,700
204,800
1,102,255
741,000

754,000
808,000
1,555,882
520,183
342,100
837,357
853,485
577,000
119,049
187,000
488,309
393,940

$39,387,343

 

‘includes required 10 percent local match

144

Table 4.3 continued

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Interegency Urben Initietives Anti-Crime Proggem: First An-
geelifieeort to Cogggeee, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1980), pp. 25 - 31.

titttttttt
authorities addressed management of public safety in several
ways. First, all sites hired a full-time anti-crime coor-
dinator that administered and coordinated the crime reduc-
tion effort. Other strategies utilized as a local option
included implementation of improved procedures for screening
undesirable tenant applicants, start-up of a crime preven-
tion training program for security guards and other
employees. Scattering potential problem families and locat-
ing elderly citizens in units isolated from family units
eliminated pockets of crime in public housing complexes.
Improved tenant eviction procedures eliminated disruptive
families. Finally, improved maintenance practices such as
reduced prepare/repair times of units deterred opportunities
for vandalism.

Participating public housing authorities agreed to
rehabilitate facilities to provide offieee for the anti-
crime grogram staff and to reduce the general vulnerability
of the housing units to crime. To carry out this component,
all authorities expanded and/or rehabilitated existing
facilities to improve the delivery of anti-crime programs
and services. Authorities had the option to install light-

ing and/or monitoring equipment when needed to improve sur-

veillance opportunities. In addition, the installation of

locks, alarms, and other security equipment when warranted
assisted to deter crime. A change in physical design and
circulation patterns of projects demarcated areas intended
for specific uses by residents which allowed them more con-
trol over their environment. Finally, authorities
facilitated communication between police and residents by
carrying out measures such as training police officers in
the sociology of lower socioeconomic persons.

A major thrust of the Anti-Crime Program involved
tenantsiin the crime::ighting effort. Allowing tenants to

Table 4.4
Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program
Top Five Local Programs in Funding

by Federal Agency
(in thousands)

 

 

 

Funding Source Chic. NYC Detr. Atl. Decatur

HUD

Modern/Rehab 2704 2310 1352 1263 357

CDBG 250 50 50 40 30

LABOR

Youth Empl 458 800 474 355 48

JUSTICE

Youth Crime/Del 84 0 0 0 0

Victim/Witness 20 0 20 20 0

HEW

Drug/Alcohol 48 0 0 0 0

LOCAL MATCH 1979 427 620 221 1120
Totals 5443 3587 2516 1899 1556

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Interagency Urban Initiative; Anti-Crime,Prog[em:

Firet An-

nual Regort to Congress, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1980), pp. 25-31.

*XtithtXt

1AA

become involved in problem identification, priority estab-
lishment, and program design paved the way for future tenant
support of anti-crime programs. Public housing authorities
used one or more of the following methods in carrying out
this component. First, existing tenant organizations became
involved in the planning and implementation of the
demonstration program. Second, tenant patrol programs es-
tablished "block watching, floon’watching, and/or lobby
watching." Third, projects implemented an ”operation iden-
tification” program to stencil valuables with an identifica-
tion mark that would be traceable. Fourth, local
authorities encouraged educational workshops on crime
issues. Finally, local public housing authorities provided
technical assistance and training to help tenants organize
anti-crime efforts.

The yogth emgloyment component made employment oppor-
tunities available to youths. HUD felt that training and
employment experience for public housing residents con-
tributed to decreased opportunities to engage in criminal
activity, and to chances for long-term employment. Ap-
proaches used to carry out this component included: youth
employment to patrol projects, maintenance and rehabilita-
tion work, and social services; adult employment to staff
the anti-crime program and serve as "block watchers" or body
guards; provision of job banks, career counselors, and other

forms of assistance to residents seeking employment.

147

The component that addressed imgroveg anti-crime serv-

ices for elderly residents, drug abusers, youths, and vic-

 

tims utilized various approaches. Alcohol, drug abuse, and
mental health awareness programs outlined danger signs of
potential problems in each area. Youth programs focused on
social activities such as recreation programs, and educa-
tion, employment, and emotional counseling. Newly created
youth councils fostered constructive activities among
project youths. Elderly programs ranged from escort serv-
ices, to domestic chore assistance, to crime prevention
seminars, to transportation assistance.

Local participants utilized several methods to meet re-
quirements under the component that addressed gglice and law
enforgemeni. Some local programs carried out police train-
ing to make officers more knowledgeable of any
unique/project specific circumstances they could expect to
encounter. In addition, increased foot patrols in project
areas yielded a higher degree of police visibility. Housing
authority administrations gave office space in public hous-
ing project offices to police officers. Finally, activities
implemented to improve relations between tenants and police
included organization of block watches, supervision of youth
patrol groups, and supervision of the operation ID program.

Finally, participating public housing authorities
stren h ne r lat'on hi 5 with ublic and rivate sector
agencies. This component required public housing
authorities to coordinate their efforts with other federal

programs, state and local programs, private social service

agencies, neighborhood organizations, and private employers.
Activities included involvement with neighborhood churches,
resident organizations, social agencies, city bureaucracies,

merchant associations, schools, and private employers.

m1

From the beginning, committee debates, Congressional
debates and Conference committee debates did not appear to
rationally formalize proper intent or direction for an
anti-crime program in the nation's public housing. Nor did
they give the anti-crime bill high priority in discussion.
Initial Senate committee debates used flawed rationale for
justifying policy that addressed crime in public housing.
Documentation presented in the committee hearings failed to
support the idea that residents of public housing move be-
cause of a lack of residential security.

Senate bill 3084 realistically recognized that the
anti-crime proposal served as a first step to address the
crime issue in public housing. However, several inade-
quacies can be defined in this bill. First, 8.3084 gave no
indication of the maximum number of projects to be funded
under the Anti-Crime program. Second, the bill did not
develop a framework for coordination efforts between public
housing authority management and local governments in ad-
dressing crime.

Rep. Claude Pepper’s House bill contained two major
weaknesses that seriously reduced the Anti-Crime program's

chances of succeeding. First, Pepper wanted participants in

14°

the anti-crime program to cover all types of projects and
tenant populations. This desire directly conflicted with
evidence that crime in public housing is most severe in
larger projects in larger urban areas, and that smaller, el-
derly projects have lower rates of crime. Second, the bill
did not put a cap on the maximum number of program par-
ticipants to be selected. General misunderstandings and ob-
vious inconsistencies of need, coupled with the expressed
need of an austere budget resulted in a low priority for the
anti-crime statute in Senate committee hearings. House com-
mittee hearings failed altogether to address the issue of
crime in public housing.

Congressional floor debates on the crime in public
housing bills lacked in-depth content and appeared superfi-
cial. Advantages of the proposal outlined in House debates
resulted in disadvantages not mentioned. Rep. Pepper’s
amendment called for coordination among various federal
agencies to carry out the anti-crime effort. At the same
time, the amendment did not set the framework for agency
participation, nor did the amendment define participation
responsibility of agencies involved. Second, the amendment
as proposed demanded no increase in budget authority. In-
stead, the bill proposed financial support by money allo-
cated for other purposes. This financial arrangement set
the stage for future animosity between program ad-
ministrators and those agencies that had to redefine their
budgets to accommodate funds for the new program. Finally,

the amendment received HUD endorsement, but the agency fell

150

short of a commitment to adequately implement statute objec-
tives set forth by Congress. An adequate commitment could
have come in the form of creation of a "Office of Public
Housing Crime" to house the anti-crime program.

Documentation of Senate floor debates of the crime in
public housing issue demonstrated an even weaker coverage
than the House debates. The three Senators that spoke on
the issue expressed their opposition to the anti-crime bill,
but at the same time, they did not express why or on what
basis they made their decisions.

Congressional policy-making is historically weak. Con-
gressional policy-makers often do not follow rational
policy-making procedures because of the presence of politi-
cal influence and governmental fragmentation.3* Politicians
must bargain and negotiate with each other before they reach
decisions. Past precedent is a major constraint and by the
examination of a colleagues past voting record it can be
determined what that particular congressional member’s posi-
tion will be on a particular policy in question. Congres-
sional members cannot attack a problem comprehensively be-
cause of governmental fragmentation. Many times policies
are adopted on a piecemeal basis and they frequently dupli-
cate or contradict existing policy.

Also, congressional role in the development of federal
legislation is sometimes a minor one. The Economic Oppor-
tunity Act passed in 1964 is an excellent example of federal
legislation written in the executive branch and subsequently

endorsed by the Congress. Role change of the executive and

1‘81

legislative branches is a 20th Century phenomena that has
resulted in the classic legislative function where
politicians come together to battle out their proposals to
be a less exclusive domain of Congress.32

Weaknesses of the development and structure of the
Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 con-
tributed to the statutes inadequacy to address crime in
public housing. The language and overall vagueness of the
statute reflected a lack of accurate research. The low
status of the statute itself contributed to inadequacies by
not allowing enough emphasis to be placed on appropriate
policy development.

The law implied that all public housing residents,
especially the elderly, have suffered from crime and
violence. A review of the literature suggests that a wide
variation in crime patterns in public housing sites exist
between large/small cities, types of crimes committed and
tenant composition of the public housing project site. The
provision that "a broad spectrum" of projects be included in
the demonstration program is a misdirected approach to ad-
dress crime in public housing since the literature suggests
that crime occurs primarily in larger projects located in
larger urban areas. This provision coupled with the absence
of a ceiling on the number of projects to be funded vir-
tually makes the statute's intent ineffective.

One finding of the statute stated that crime or fear of
crime caused tenant abandonment of public housing and that

this abandonment caused a threat to public housing stock in

1:7

general. Research indicates that fearful residents will
most often lock their doors, stay in at night, and restrict
their visits to the city and to shop, rather than move.
Vacancy figures indicate no overall danger in public housing
abandonment. Nearly 800,000 families are on waiting lists
nationwide with eighty percent of the families on lists with
authorities that oversee larger public housing projects.

The statute did not adequately structure the implemen-
tation process. It gave an "intent" statement only in set-
ting up a coordinated effort between various agencies,
federal and local, in carrying out the provision of the law.
The law did not contain adequate provisions to require
agencies and local governments to work together har-
moniously, nor did the law define agency responsibilities in
carrying out the law.

Program support existed in the form of endorsements and
commitments from HUD (the implementing agency) and several
organized special interest groups such as the National Coun-
cil of Senior Citizens, National Council on Aging, and the
Ad Hoc Coalition for Low Income Housing. But typical of
most federal legislation, solid support and follow-up did
not occur by legislators and support groups during the im-
plementation process. This support is necessary to assure
that policy objectives are properly carried out.

Finally, a change in Presidential Administrations
during program implementation drastically undermined
priority of statute objectives in new presidential policy.

The new Reagan Administration based operational policy that

153

local issues (such as public housing crime) should be funded
and addressed by local government rather than at the federal
level. Administrative changeover at HUD further weakened an
already low priority program.

Anti-Crime Program components accurately addressed the
major physical and social correlates of crime. Anti-crime
program guidelines required that physical factors related to
surveillance, door locks, clearly defined areas, and access
control be addressed. Program guidelines also addressed so-
cial factors such as the creation of activities to increase
a higher level of social organization and cohesion.

Local participants of the Anti-Crime Program had the
opportunity to gain short-term and long-term benefits of
crime prevention. Potential short-term benefits existed in
the form of implementation of soft-ware activities. These
activities included non-physical improvements such as on-
site staff to monitor the crime program, improved procedures
for screening undesirable tenants, improved maintenance
practices, resident programs to combat crime, resident youth
employment opportunities designed to watch over elderly
residents and outreach coordination activities to the com-
munity such as with local churches, neighborhood organiza-
tions and private employers. Potential long-term benefits
came in the form of hard-ware activities. These activities
included physical improvements on the project site.
Specifically, local authorities had the option to install
lighting and monitoring equipment when needed to improve

surveillance opportunities. Authorities also had the Option

154

when needed to install locks, alarms, and other security
equipment to deter crime. Finally, funds could be used to
change the physical design of buildings and circulation pat-
terns to demarcate areas intended for specific uses by resi-
dents to give them more control over their physical environ-
ment.

The intent and purpose of the statute that authorized
the Anti-Crime Program was an admirable effort to address
crime in public housing. A legislative review of the
statute revealed, not surprisingly, that Congress did not
adequately research the basis and frequency of public hous-
ing crime. This inadequacy led to weaknesses in the statute
that significantly reduced chances of the program being suc-
cessful in reducing crime. The most severe weaknesses that
weakened overall program intent and undermined chances of
program success included program participation by projects
not experiencing significant problems, no cap on the number
of projects to participate in the program, no implementation
structure of the program, and a mandate for participation of
specific federal agencies in the program with money that
these agencies had previously allocated for other programs
within their respective Departments. This mandate set the

stage for animosity between participating agencies and HUD.

155

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

*This is the first time a President had formulated a
comprehensive set of policies to guide Federal government
actions and programs for America's cities. This new policy
approach was mandated by the National Urban Policy and New
Community Act of 1970, as amended in 1977.

2U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, The Preeigent'e

Naiignei grean Policy Reggrg, August 1978, p. 122.

3See U.S., President, Pugli; Pegers of the Presidents
of the Uniteg Stetes (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Fegeral Register, National Archives and Records Service,
Book II- June 30 to December 31, 1978), Jimmy Carter, 1979,
p. 1241-1246. Also see U.S., Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Office of Policy, Development, and
Research, ntera enc r n In‘ ' ive An '- ime Pro ram

Fire; Annual Regort to Congress, June 1980, p. 1.

“Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier,

Implemengagion and Puglig Poiigy, (Glenview, Illinois:
Scott, Foresman and Company,1983), p. 29.

.Ibid., p. 41.

‘U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, Ho s'n n ommun't Devel ment

Amendmenge of 1978. Hearinge befgre the Sgbggmmigtee on

Hegeing eng Urgen Affaire. 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp.
850-905.

 

71bide ’ pp. 906-9070

'U.8. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, ngeing eng Commggity Develggmeni
Amengmengs of 1978. 8. Report 95-871 to accompany 8.3084,
95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, p. 2.

’See U.S., President, ngiie Pegere gf she Preeidenie
gf ghe unigeg Siege: (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Fegerel Regisger, National Archives and Records Service,
Book II- June 30 to December 31, 1978), Jimmy Carter, 1979,
p. 1241-1246.

*°See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking,

Finance, and Urban Affairs, Housing eng Community

Deveiggmeng Amendments ofi1978. H. Report 95-1161 to
accompany H.R. 12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978.

156

M-U.8., Congress, House, Rep. Pepper offering an
Amendment to the Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978, H.R.12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 28 June

1978, angceeeignal Regorg 124:19412.

*SU.S., Congress, House, Rep. Reuss speaking for the
necessity of a conference between the House and Senate on
the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978,
H.R.12433 and 8.3084, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 24 July 1978,
Congreesional Record 124:22290-22291. Also, U.S., Congress,
Senate, Senator Proxmire speaking to agree to the conference
requested by the House on the Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978, 8.3084, 95th Cong., 2d

sess., 26 July 1978, Congressional Recorg 124:22850.

‘3U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing,

and Urban Affairs, Hggsing and Community Develogment
Amendments of 1978L Hearing: befgre ghe Sugggmmittee on

ngsing ang Urban Affairs. 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978,
p. 3.

 

*‘Ibid., p. 426.
I’°Ibid., p. 44.
3-“'Ibid., pp. 16-40.
1-’Ibid., pp. 4-6.

*'U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance,

and Urban Affairs, Hggeing ang Community Develggment

Amengmegge gf 1978. H. Report 95-1161 to accompany
H.R.12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 169-170. The

appeals fund was proposed to assist local public housing
authorities, primarily in older urban areas, whose high
security and insurance costs could not be adequately
accounted for by the current performance funding formula.

"U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Pepper offering an
Amendment to the Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978, H.R.12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 28 June

1978. W 124:19412-19416-
9°lbid.

3*U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire speaking on
the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978,
8.3084, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 19 July 1978, angreeeignei
Reggrg 124:21606.

22Ibid., Senator Brooke speaking on the Housing and
Community Development Amendments of 1978, pp. 21607-21608.

157

23Ibid., Senator Glenn speaking on the Housing and
Community Development Amendments of 1978, pp. 21973-21974.

2‘U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs, m ila 'on f th Hous'n an Com nit
Develggment Amendments of 1978. Subcommittee on Houeing and

Cgmmunity Development [Committee Pringl. 95th Cong., 2d
sess., December 1978, pp. 102-104.

asU.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Crime in Publi;
Hggsing Volume I: A Report, by W. Victor Rouse, Washington,
USGPO, December 1978, p.1.

3‘1bid., p. 3.

27Mark L. Matulef, "This is Public Housing," Journal of
Hogeing 44 (September/October 1987): 176-179.

3'See U.S., Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Policy Development and Research,
F' R r f he v 1 i n f th r In' ia 'v
'- r'm m ns ration- A mm r , May 1985.

2"Public housing authorities funded having more than
1,250 or more units were: Allegheny Co., PA; Atlanta, GA;
Baltimore, MD; Buffalo, NY; Cambridge, MA; Charleston, WV;
Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Cleveland, OH, (Cuyahoga Metro);
Dade Co., FL; Detroit, MI; Hartford, CT; Jersey City, NJ;
Los Angeles, CA; Louisville, KY; Newark, NJ; New Orleans,
LA; New York, NY; Norfolk, VA; Phoenix, AZ; Providence, RI;
San Antonio, TX; San Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA; St. Paul,
MN; Tampa, FL; and Toledo, OH, (Lucas Metro);. Public
housing authorities funded having less than 1,250 units were
Athens, GA; Blackfeet Tribe, Browning, MT; Decatur, 11;
Evansville, IN; Greenville, SC; Jackson, TN; Hampton, VA;
Oxnard, CA; Prince Georges County, MD; Richmond, CA;
Springfield, MA; and Taunton, MA.

3°U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Fine; Reggr; gf

th v ' f h r n In't' 'v nt'- r'm
Demgnetretign: e Summery, (Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1985), p. 27.
3*George E. Edwards III and Ira Sharkansky, Ihe Pgligy

Pr ' n - M kin and Im l mentin Publ’c Polic , (San
Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1978), pp. 10-11.

158

32John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, 3rd. ed.,
(Washington: University Press of America, Inc., 1980), pp.
37-38.

159

Chapter V
THE DETROIT EXPERIENCE
To gain an understanding of the relationship between
results of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program
and adequacy of the federal statute that backed the program,
it is necessary to look at a general history of public hous-
ing in Detroit, and discuss specific past and present neigh-
borhood characteristics of the Brewster-Douglass public
housing project. Conclusions can then be made on whether or
not the Detroit Anti-Crime Program, as based on the
theoretical structure presented in the statute, is workable
in an environment and setting such as that found at the

Brewster-Douglass site and neighborhood.

160

EV PM NT F D TR IT PUB I HO IN

Public housing in Detroit began with the establishment
of the Detroit Housing Commission in November, 1933. Crea-
tion of the Commission occurred after the Federal Emergency
Housing Corporation (FEHC) allocated $3.2 million to the
City of Detroit for slum clearance and construction of low-
rent housing. Initial responsibility of the Commission in-
cluded alleviation of the housing shortage by the erection
of large scale low cost housing projects; and direct slum
clearance and replacement of of the slums with low cost
projects.‘ The FEHC award to Detroit reflected a national
concern for poor housing:

"Events leading up to this occasion had their roots

in the gradual growth during the preceding decade

of a national consciousness of the effects of bad

housing, the responsibility of the Government to

care for the prime necessities of life and the

financial burden of slum areas. [President]

Roosevelt's progressive program and the administra-

tive activities in setting up certain agencies of

procedure such as the Emergency Housing Corporation

gave concrete expression to such social trends."3

Local interest to address the slum problem in Detroit
developed with a 1929 publication of statistics and data
gathered from a city-wide social survey conducted by the
Michigan Housing Association, a philanthropic non-profit or-
ganization created for the purpose to develop an awareness
for adequate housing facilities in the City. This study

concluded that congestion most accurately characterized the

Detroit slum situation.3

161

Public housing or low-income housing originated as an
experimental public works program designed primarily to in-
crease employment; stimulate business activities; clear
slums; and provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing for
lower income families. Passage of the Housing (Wagner-
Steagall) Act of 1937 formalized the program design to em-

phasize decent, safe, and sanitary housing for lower income

families.
Detroit began work immediately on the public housing
program upon passage of the Wagner-Steagall Act. The Com-

mission chose seven initial sites for public housing be-

cause:
1. "They represented areas that were fertile breeding
spots for the development of crime areas.
2. They represented areas in which contagious

diseases flourished.

3. They represented property that had seriously
deteriorated in recent years.

4. They represented areas in which the cost of
government services rendered was out of proportion
to the taxes levied.

5. The amount of voluntary demolition in the areas
was high.

6. They represented areas in which private industry
had done next to nothing for over twenty years.

7. It is unlikely that these areas could be rehab-
ilitated for anything but low rental housing.

8. Proper development of the areas suggested might
well have been the beginning of a stabilization
and renewing of downtown property values.

9. They represented areas which could be tied
together with a traffic improvement
plan."4

162

Selection of these sites followed the adopted policy to
clear slum areas and replace with low-income housing.

The Housing Commission followed their policy to con-
struct low-cost housing in slum areas in the selection of a
site for their initial public housing project. The site
chosen for the Brewster project contained housing units in
deplorable condition characteristic of the Lower Woodward
area. Several characteristics of the site made it
desirable for the Brewster project:

"All utilities are installed. The site is of such

a size and shape that it can be adapted to com-

munity development. One of the chief considera-

tions to be borne in mind is... the large...
character [to assure] that it will not be in-
fluenced by unfavorable surroundings... but is
capable of raising economic values and social stan-
dards in adjacent properties so that the beneficial
effects will radiate outward into surrounding
territories....

Another important consideration in the selec-
tion of this particular site was the Brewster

Street Center built in 1929 at at cost of a half a

million dollars. It is a modern, well-equipped

Community Recreation building and can be made the

center of organized activities in the completed

project."5

During Brewster construction, the Commission realized
that clearing slums before the construction of alternative
housing greatly increased the strain on housing availability
for lower income families. An undated report published by
the Detroit Housing Commission that announced the start-up

of the city‘s public housing program expressed the rationale

for initially building on vacant land:

163

”The present housing shortage is so serious that

tearing down slum houses before new houses are put

up would throw a lot of families onto the street.

Every new unit built on a vacant site adds a home

that is badly needed to the total supply of housing

in Detroit. That is why the Detroit Housing Com-

mission wants to concentrate, for a time, on

building on land that is now vacant.”‘

The initial pool of vacant sites considered for public hous-
ing construction included those sites owned by the City and
previously used for other municipal purposes.’

The two major events for the Detroit Housing Commission
in 1937 centered around the Brewster Project and the
Parkside Project. The Commission let the contract for the
erection of the Brewster project on June 11, 1936. The
Brewster contract called for the construction of 701 family
units intended for black occupancy. The Housing Division of
the federal Public Works Administration (PWA) built the
Brewster Project. Construction of this project occurred in
the heart of Detroit's black slum area on ten blocks of land
lying between Mack on the north, Wilkins on the south, Hast-
ings on the east, and Beaubien on the west. The first
tenants moved into Brewster in September, 1938.. Brewster
reached 100 percent occupancy by Spring, 1939.

The completion of Brewster Addition in 1940 added 240
family units to the project site. The Housing Commission
chose a three block site for Brewster Addition, two blocks
of which lie directly north of Brewster Homes between Mack
and Eliot and the other block southeast of the present

project between Wilkins and Watson. Tenants in Brewster’s

early history had pride in their home and surroundings:

164

“The second summer in the life of Brewster Homes

finds a profusion of flowers amid well-kept lawns.

Many tenants are taking a keen and delighted inter-

est in working in the flower gardens and in caring

for the lawns.

The tenants... have taken an intense interest

in raising funds to equip the social rooms, and

provide needed recreation facilities. The Mothers'

Club has at various times cooked and served dinners

to groups visiting the project or to other public

organizations, in order to buy ping-pong equipment,

sand-boxes for children, and machinery for the

boy's hobby shop. All of these activities have

been evidenced by a fine cooperative spirit and a

genuine love and appreciation of Brewster

Homes."’

Work started on the Parkside project on July 10, 1938.
The $3.4 million contract called for fifty-eight buildings
and a central heating plant designed to house 785 low-income
families.*° The original project design consisted of two
story row houses and row flats and three story apartments.
Construction of the two story structures included brick
veneer walls with wood floors; the three story apartments,
concrete floors and solid masonry walls.‘* The completion
of Brewster and Parkside Homes in 1939 made available 1,476
low-income apartments in the City. The Housing Division of
the Public Works Administration also planned and built the
Parkside project. The Housing Division chose a thirty-one
acre vacant site located on the northeast corner of the in-
tersection of Conner and Warren Avenues, bounded on the
north by Frankfort Avenue and on the east by Gray Avenue.
The Division felt this site to be favorably located in rela-

tion to recreational areas and centers in industrial employ-

ment.

165

In 1938, the Housing Commission changed their policy of
housing project site selection. No longer did the Commis-
sion officially choose sites on vacant land in or near slum
areas. The emphasis changed to select sites nearer to in-
dustrial areas and away from the city center. The Parkside
Project met Commission guidelines to locate new projects
near industrial areas. The policy change reflected the ur-
gent unemployment and housing situation of industrial
workers, and the change represented a new approach to clear
slums:‘=

"The housing shortage was found to be in large part

reflected by overcrowding in the slums. It was

strongly felt, therefore, that a gradual trans-
ference of families from substandard dwellings in

the slums and blighted areas to the outlying new

projects would pave the way for actual slum

clearance with less upheaval in the relocation of

families."*3

By the eve of World War II, the Housing Commission
authorized the selection of sites and construction of four
additional public housing projects. Detroit faced a criti-
cal housing shortage at the beginning of World War II.
Housing problems existed in the costs and availability of
rental housing for blacks, and in shortages of housing for
the defense program. Estimates of the number of people ex-
pected to migrate to Detroit to complete war contracts
ranged from 75,000 to 165,000. The city had limited housing
to meet these needs at the beginning of the War. Blacks in
the city faced housing shortages because of an increase in
the black population, economic constraints, and prejudice:

"A constantly increasing Negro population is forc-

ing these people to live in badly dilapidated and
overcrowded houses in the older sections of the

1AA

city.... This growth has been accelerated in war

time and times of industrial expansion....Negros

who... come to Detroit... find individually and as

a group the greatest obstacles to the solution of

their housing problem.... Besides their marginal

economic status... it is a matter of legal and cus-

tomary practice to limit the areas in which they

may live.... As a consequence they are forced to

buy or rent in the older sections of the city where

there are either no restrictive covenants or where

the covenants have expired. The... result is that

Negros... must pay excessive rentals for over-

crowded quarters... or they must live in

dilapidated areas so unsafe or unsanitary that they

are unfit for human habitation."*‘

Despite the shortage of housing for low-income blacks, Hous-
ing Commission activities centered around defense housing
that included permanent as well as temporary war units.

The first project selected did not follow policy
guidelines to locate projects in outlying areas. Rather the
project became the second expansion of the existing Brewster
project. The Commission chose this site because of site
availability and time constraints related to the severe need
for housing. This extension added 148 units to the Brewster
complex. The second activity expanded the Parkside project
by 183 units. Parkside expansion took place on a parcel of
land north of Frankfort and east of Conner. The Public
Works Administration considered this site for the original
Parkside project. In addition, the Commission incorporated
the principle of scientific orientation in the Parkside ex-
pansion. Siting of the units positioned them in the direc-
tion of 30 degrees east of north. This positioning allowed

the units to get the benefit of morning sun in winter, and

avoid the extreme warmth of the western sun in the summer.15

167

The site chosen for the Charles Terrace project had
several positive attributes. Officials chose the site based
on its proximity to a large industrial area of Detroit. In
addition, the Commission looked favorably on site proximity
to a nearby playfield, nearby parochial and city schools,
reasonable costs, and eradication of some slum conditions
nearby.*‘ The thirty acre site is bounded on the east by
Mound Road, on the north by Charles Street, on the west by
Buffalo Avenue and on the south by Talbot Street.

The Charles Terrace Homes project construction began in
1940 and added 440 units of flats and row houses to the city
public housing stock for white tenants. Full occupancy oc-
curred on July 25, 1941. The project included, in addition
to the 61 residential buildings, a community building, an
administration building, and two central heating plants.
Site development followed the superblock plan. Site plans
located a large open park and recreational space of ap-
proximately two acres in the center of the site. This
design made it possible to walk to the recreational area
from any building on the site without crossing a street.
Traffic entered the site through cul-de-sac drives from the
boundary streets. Site design also included ample parking
facilities.*’

The final site chosen by the Housing Commission also
adhered to the policy to locate public housing near in-
dustrial districts. Construction on the 8. James Herman
Gardens project began in the Fall of 1940. Location con-

siderations of this project included proximity to defense

168

plant work locations, recreation facilities, and transporta-
tion routes. The site chosen lay midway between the River
Rouge industrial area to the south and the recreational area
of Rouge Park to the northwest:

”The site is particularly well located for defense

workers in that it happens to be outside the con-

gested areas and in the general direction of

several of the more important defense plants such

as the Ford Bomber Plant at Willow Run."*'

The low cost of land made it possible to plan for an abun-
dance of open space and recreational areas. Recreational
uses included play space, tennis courts, ball field, and
pools. Orientation of the dwellings permitted the uninter-
rupted passage of the prevailing winds for the summer time.
This orientation also allowed for sunlight access in both
the front and rear of each building. Street design dis-
couraged through traffic. Non-dwelling structures included
an administration building, a community building, a main-
tenance building, and a central heating plant. The ad-
ministration building also housed a day nursery. Building
types at Herman Gardens included 1,340 flats and 810 row
houses for a total of 2,150 units at the project site.
Units had either one, two, or three bedrooms."

Tenant selection and rental policies of the Detroit
Housing Commission in 1941 followed the terms of the United
States Housing Act, loan contracts with the United States
Housing Authority, and resolutions of the Detroit Housing

Commission. Admission requirements to public housing fol-

lowed these guidelines:

169

1. ”Natural and cohesive family groups only
are accepted.

2. The head of the family must be a citizen.
3. The family must have been resident in the City
of Detroit for 12 months prior to formal

application.

4. The family must at the time of acceptance be
living in a substandard dwelling.

5. The net annual family income must be less than
a stipulated maximum [Families whose income is
more than five times the rent (six times if
there are two or more minor dependents) are to
be excluded]."99
The Housing Commission based income limits for the Herman
Gardens and Smith Homes developments on average war worker
salaries in the City. Apartments in these projects rented
for forty-five dollars a month. The Commission gave war
workers priority for admission into these two projects.’*
The year 1942 marked the period of intensive war hous-
ing activity involvement by the Detroit Housing Commission.
The year is characterized by skyrocketing industrial produc-
tion. Detroit became the gigantic war arsenal of the
country. As a result of growing industrial activity and the
conversion of automobile plants to full war production, the
influx of in-migrant war workers intensified the demand for
housing facilities. The Detroit area gained 336,000 people
from the Census of 1940 to June, 1942. In contrast, only
19,502 additional dwelling units became available in the
same period of time.’3
Three new public housing projects in 1942 opened and

added 2,560 units to the public housing stock. Families

that worked in the war industry had first priority to these

1'70

units. The War Production Board temporarily suspended
further plans for construction of non-war housing. The
suspension permitted the construction of only essential war
housing, and prohibited general public housing and slum
clearance. As a result, the Board deferred planning and
construction of the Edward J. Jeffries Homes and Frederick
Douglass Homes until after the War. The two projects had
been in the planning stages for about one year.

At the request of the United States Housing Authority
(USHA), the Detroit Housing Commission became agent for the
USHA in the construction of the only permanent housing
project designed specifically for defense housing. The Com-
mission located Sojourner Truth Homes between Nevada and
Stockton Avenues at Fenelon Street in northeast Detroit for
the families of 200 black defense workers. Sojourner Truth
consisted of one-story frame construction sheathed buildings
and two-story brick-veneered structures. The community
building contained a generous foyer, offices and a large
community room with kitchen alcove.=3 Sojourner Truth be-
came the first and only permanent defense housing project
completed in March, 1942. The first black families moved in
after much protest from the neighborhood.”‘ The first sec-
tion of Herman Gardens that consisted of 2,150 units opened
for occupancy in November, 1942. Half of the 210 units at
John W. Smith Homes became occupied in December, 1942.

Plans for the development of John Smith Homes (formerly
the Brightmore Project) began in 1941. The Commission

awarded a construction contract in the Spring of 1942.

171

Completion of the project occurred in January, 1943.
Location of this 210 unit row house project followed the
Housing Commission's policy to locate public housing in out-
lying areas near industrial districts. The Commission lo-
cated Smith Homes in the northwest part of Detroit near the
General Motors Diesel Plant. Superhighways made easy access
to the Ford Bomber plant and other numerous defense in-
dustries. The site plan for the project site called for
parking areas to be located near boundary streets. This
system of parking allowed site roads to be constructed with
reduced widths. The site plan arranged buildings around the
perimeter of the site in such a way as to accumulate a large
recreational area at the center that adjoined the community
building."

Due to war emergencies and the pressure and restriction
of materials, the Housing Commission elected to begin a tem-
porary war housing program to meet the demand of housing
needs of war workers. The Commission decided to build
prefabricated demountable dwellings in areas located within
easy access of war production factories. The Federal Public
Housing Authority under the terms of the Lanham Act
authorized 5,000 temporary dwelling units for Detroit war
workers in 1942. The Commission adopted a policy to erect
temporary housing on leased sites when possible."

Tenant selection for war housing adhered to the follow-
ing guidelines in the following priority:

1. "in-migrant worker who wishes to bring his
family to Detroit;

172

war housing dwellings. In addition, the completion of Her-

mans Gardens and John Smith Homes occurred.

war worker who is currently without a home--
this includes those families facing eviction
because of the sale of the property in which
they live;

war worker who is commuting an unreasonable
distance to work;

war worker living in substandard housing;
war worker living in substandard housing but

who neither lives in nor works in
Detroit.”27

By the end of May, 1943, the city had occupied 5,420

Ten temporary

war housing projects existed in various stages of comple-

tion:

10.

McKeever Homes. Completed October, 1943.
670 units.

Valentine Homes. Completed September, 1943.
350 units.

John Fisher Homes. Completed September, 1943.
572 units.

Catallo Homes. Completed August, 1943.
372 units.

Emerson Homes. Completed Winter 1944.
782 units.

Robert Carle Homes. Completed September,
1943. 200 units.

Adams Homes. Completed January, 1944.
260 units.

Charles Annex. Completed Winter, 1944.
300 units.

Temporary Douglass Homes. Completed April,
1944. Scattered sites in southeast Detroit.
352 units.

Robert Brooks Homes. Completed January, 1944.
300 units.“'

173

Primary emphasis of the Housing Commission in 1944 cen-
tered around the continued need to provide housing for black
war workers. In addition, the growing need to house return-
ing veterans posed a new problem. Veterans of World War II
began to apply for housing in increased numbers. Policy
mandated that war housing be built on leased lots on scat-
tered sites located primarily in industrial areas of the
city. Site selection became increasingly difficult because
of a policy of the Detroit Common Council that prohibited
the location of war and/or public housing in such a manner
as to change the racial characteristics of a neighborhood.
The Housing Commission also unsuccessfully solicited outly-
ing communities to allow for the construction of temporary
war housing in their communities.

The question of changing the policy to integrate neigh-
borhoods with war housing surfaced in late 1942 with con-
struction of Sojourner Truth Homes:

”The Director-Secretary of the Housing Commission

sent a communication to the Mayor setting forth the

fact that no further sites were to be found due to

the racial restrictions of areas. The problem was

brought out in the open and a site in southwest

Detroit which is undergoing a transition in racial

characteristics was submitted to the Common Coun-

cil. After hearings were conducted toward the con-

sideration of this crucial issue, the site was

finally rejected. The result was that Negro hous-

ing still remained the most vital problem of hous-

ing and other civic authorities."9’

Completion of war housing occurred in 1944. Over
10,000 families lived in Detroit Housing Commission

projects, 5,071 in permanent housing develOpments, and 5,057

in temporary war housing. The latter projects utilized

174

fourteen different site locations. An occupancy level of
ninety-nine percent occurred by the end of the year. Fisher
Homes suffered initial occupancy problems because the Com-
mission miss-judged and built a surplus of one-bedroom
units. To eliminate this vacancy, modification occurred to
thirty-two one-bedroom to make sixteen four-bedroom units.
A need existed to accommodate larger families, and this
modification helped to meet this need.39

The Housing Commission's primary goal after the War was
to house returning veterans. Housing for low-income black
families became a low priority. In December, 1945, Willow
Run Village became home for 2,300 veterans. Willow Run fur-
nished an important source of housing and within six months
the complex had 100 percent occupancy and a waiting list of
over 800 families. Sensitivity to needs of low-income black
families dropped to an all time low because of the
redirected focus on veterans and expressed concerns of black
special interest groups:

"Throughout the year the antagonistic attitude of

organized 'protective' groups to the establishment

of Negro communities has continually harassed the

Housing Commission in its selection of sites for

Negro occupancy.... The Housing Commission in

selecting sites for Negro occupancy has followed a

policy of not changing the racial characteristics

of neighborhoods. In line with this rule it has

been getting increasingly more difficult to select

suitable sites for units to be occupied by

Negros.”3*
The 1946 Detroit Housing Commission Annual Regorg noted the
positive accomplishments of the Commission in race relations

after the war. The Commission's attitude centered around

the harmony between blacks and Japanese-Americans rather

175

than between blacks and the Housing Commission. Housing
Japanese-Americans in a harmonious environment with blacks
became a major goal of the Commission:
”Although popular feeling was very antagonistic
toward this particular minority group [Japanese-
Americans], it was possible to place many families
of Japanese origin in the housing projects under
the jurisdiction of the Detroit Housing Commission
and have them accepted by the tenants living
there."32
Congressional response to the veteran housing problem
came in the form of the Veterans Emergency Housing Law of
1946 that authorized the erection of 200,000 dwelling units
nationwide. Detroit received 2,000 units of veteran emer-
gency housing. Existing public housing in the city supplied
800 units while the allocation supplied money to build 1,200
temporary units. The Housing Commission located most of the
units at six sites on the east side of the city near the
heart of the industrial area:
1. 228 unit project (black occupancy) located at
the foot of Tennessee between Avondale and the
River;
2. 512 unit project (white occupancy) located on
the west side of Conner between Warren and
Gratiot;
3. 294 unit project (white occupancy) located on
the west side of St. Jean between Freund and
the River;
4. 98 unit project (black occupancy) located
on scattered parcels within the area bounded
by Pembroke, alley west of Greggs, Eight Mile
Road, and the alley east of Cherrylawn;
5. 26 unit project (white occupancy) located on
the site of Fisher and Catallo Homes war

housing projects; (A tornado previously
destroyed Fisher and Catallo Homes.);

176

6. 32 unit project (white occupancy) located in
the playfield area at McKeever Homes;

Dwelling units of the Veterans Emergency Housing Program
consisted primarily of one and two bedroom units. This
program built temporary housing equal to or better than
housing built under the old war housing program.33

In addition to construction of these units, the Housing Com-
mission mandated that vacated conventional public housing
units be filled by veterans and their families and that only
the most extreme cases of hardship among non-veteran
families be given consideration for occupancy." Table 5.1
lists public housing, war housing, and defense housing
projects at the peak of the temporary housing program.

The Detroit Housing Commission began deprogramming of
their temporary projects in December, 1952. The federal
government built temporary war housing projects in Detroit
in 1943 and 1944 on land leased from private owners. The
Detroit Housing Commission oversaw operation of these units.
These units housed veteran‘s families after the end of World
War II. The Housing Commission built the veterans projects
in 1947 to provide additional temporary housing for return-
ing war veterans.35 During the year ending June 30, 1954
nearly 2,600 families moved from temporary public housing in
the city. The Commission boarded up and removed these units
from operation. The Commission successfully deprogrammed

all temporary units by August, 1956.3‘ The Commission took

177

TABLE 5.1

Public Housing Program in Detroit
July 1, 1949

 

 

Eggigct Kind Statue

Brewster Homes PWA‘ completed September, 1938
Parkside Homes PWA completed September, 1938
Brewster Addition PHA' completed July, 1941
Parkside Addition PHA completed September, 1941
Charles Terrace PHA completed October, 1941
Herman Gardens PHA completed May, 1943

John W. Smith PHA completed January, 1943
Jeffries Homes PHA construction begun 7/1950
Douglass Homes PHA construction begun 5/1950
Sojourner Truth defense completed March, 1942
McKeever Homes temp war completed October, 1943
Catallo Homes temp war completed August, 1943
Fisher Homes temp war completed September, 1943
Valentine Homes temp war completed September, 1943
Emerson Homes temp war completed October, 1943
Emerson Homes temp war completed March, 1944
Emerson Homes temp war completed April, 1944
Carle Homes temp war completed October, 1943
Brooks Homes temp war completed January, 1944
Brooks Homes temp war completed January, 1945
Brooks Homes temp war completed July, 1944
Adams Homes temp war completed January, 1944
Charles Annex temp war completed July, 1944
Moseley Homes temp war completed October, 1944
Moseley Homes temp war completed February, 1945
Temp. Douglass temp war completed May, 1944

Temp. Douglass temp war completed April, 1944
Temp. Douglass demountable completed September, 1944
Algonquin Homes veterans completed August, 1947
Charles F. Stone veterans completed November, 1947
Croxon Homes veterans completed August, 1947
Brooks Annex veterans completed July, 1947
McKeever Annex veterans completed May, 1947

 

‘Public Works Administration projects

Pprojects funded under the Housing Act of 1937

Source: Detroit Housing Commission, "Public Housing in
Detroit, Annual Report, July 1949-June 1950", p. 18.

444434111!

178

steps in 1948 to return public housing to its original pur-
pose to provide housing to low income persons. A large per-
centage of tenants had high incomes. These tenants obtained
public housing during the war effort because the Commission
did not have in place income limits during the war. The
Housing Commission made a double attack on removing higher
income tenants. First, the Commission issued notices to va-
cate to over-income families. Second, the Commission levied
a surcharge rent against any over-income families that for
any reason remained in low-rent public housing. The sur-
charge made tenants pay a fair rent in accordance with their
income and in accordance with prevailing rents in the
private market.37

By 1949, the Housing Commission had refocused its
direction to provide housing to low-income families with
children. Mayor Van Antwerp placed primary emphasis on
proceeding as rapidly as possible with new public housing on
vacant land sites in order to achieve the greatest possible
expansion of the city‘s total supply of housing and to
provide units into which families displaced by slum
clearance operations can be moved:

"The current severe housing shortage as it affects

low- and middle-income families with children would

appear to be a more urgent problem than the clear-

ing of slums, which cannot be accomplished in any

event until housing is found for the persons who

would be displaced.“3'

President Truman signed in to law the Housing Act of

1949 in mid-July. This Act authorized additional units of

public housing nationwide. The Detroit Housing Commission

179

took advantage of this Act and reactivated plans for the
construction of Frederick Douglass Apartments and Edward
Jeffries Homes. Clearance of the Douglass site eradicated
one of the worst slum areas in the city. The site is ad-
jacent to the existing Brewster project. Slum clearance
also occurred with the construction of Jeffries. The city
owned the land for these two sites for ten years. War time
priorities deferred construction of these two projects. The
Commission awarded construction bids for Douglass Apartments
on September 12, 1949, and for Jeffries in the summer of
1950.3’

The 1951 Detroit Mester Plen outlined general site re-
quirements that the Housing Commission adopted to guide in
the selection of locations for future public housing

projects. The Plan stated policy that required sites to be

 

located in residential sections that had the potential to
remain good areas for living. The sites must be accessible
to schools, recreation areas, shopping centers and other
community services, and employment. The Commission estab-
lished special requirements for buildings and site layout:

1. "Dwellings are grouped in developments of 200
units or more.

2. Structures are usually terraces or apartments.
3. The gridiron street system is usually modified
to reduce area in street, to provide space for
playgrounds, and to permit better orientation
of buildings."‘°
In addition, the Commission adopted policy to address traf-

fic generated by public housing in a neighborhood. Most

sites are found adjacent or near major thoroughfares.

Access from project local street to the major thoroughfare
permits direct discharge of traffic onto the thoroughfare.
This arrangement does not increase traffic movements in the
rest of the neighborhood.

The Housing Commission signed a contract with the
federal government in June, 1952 to allow for construction
of a 3,874 unit public housing project (referred to as
Michigan 1-11) on a near east side slum site adjacent to the
Gratiot and Lafayette Redevelopment projects. This project,
never completed, had developmental problems from the begin-
ning. Congressional cutbacks of new public housing unit al-
locations made it difficult for local public housing
agencies to obtain money for new units. The planned project
also faced heavy local opposition. In 1955, the Public
Housing Administration ordered the Detroit Housing Commis-
sion to terminate plans for this unnamed project until site
location issues could be settled.“ A local citizens
redevelopment committee petitioned the Housing Commission to
integrate this project with private housing scheduled to be
built in the Gratiot/Lafayette area. The Commission never
settled the controversy around this project, and in 1963,
the Commission transferred the site for this proposed
project to the Elmwood Park urban renewal project.‘=

Authorization and construction of only two housing
projects occurred between the end of World War II and 1966.
The completion of Edward J. Jeffries Homes and Frederick
Douglass Apartments in 1955 brought the total number of

low-rent public housing units to 8,155. During the first

181

six months of 1953, the completion of approximately 700
units occurred between the Jeffries and Douglass projects.
Most of the units completed consisted of units to accom-
modate large families (with four or more children). The
completion of these row house units met a long recognized
need for more large size public housing units in Detroit.
Construction of the remaining multi-story portions of the
two projects began in late 1952. The six high-rises at the
Douglass site contain 672 units. The eight buildings at the
Jeffries site contain 896 units.‘3 Completion of the two
developments during 1955 added 3,176 dwelling units to the
city's housing supply. Jeffries Homes contained 2,170 units
which made it the city's largest public housing project, and
Douglass Homes contained 1,006 units. Jeffries is located
along the John C. Lodge Expressway between Canfield Avenue
to the north and Temple Avenue to the south. Douglass Homes
is located along Hastings Street between Wilkins and Winder
Streets, directly south of the older Brewster Homes.44
Several reasons account for the slow-down of public
housing construction during this time period. First, the
Jeffries and Brewster projects had difficulties with leasing
and filling vacancies, causing some officials of the Housing
Commission to be reluctant to approve more housing.‘5 High
vacancy rates, a result of an outflux of population to the
suburbs, and to other states and cities, resulted in a
“loose" rental market in Detroit that made the supply of
public housing adequate.“ Second, city politics dis-

couraged the development of new public housing sites.

182

Freedman states that "Mayor Cobo’s dislike of public housing
and especially of projects on vacant sites led to the aban-
donment of several of the sites recommended by the Detroit
Housing Commission in the 1950s"." Finally, President
Eisenhower ignored Congressional mandate to strengthen the
public housing program in the Housing Act of 1949. He
reduced the rate of new public housing construction to
around 10,000 units per year for the entire nation."

Local and federal policies that governed tenant admis-
sion in Detroit public housing dictated major changes in the
1953 fiscal year. First, Federal Judge Arthur Lederle
issued a permanent injunction that restrained the Detroit
Housing Commission from:

1. "Leasing units on the basis of race or color;

2. Maintaining separate lists of white and Negro
applicants;

3. Maintaining racially segregated public
housing projects.”"

Second, the Housing Commission rescinded the existing oc-

cupancy resolution which affirmed the policy that preserved

neighborhood racial characteristics. The new policy stated:
"In the selection and removal of tenants of housing
projects, the Commission will be guided by the best
interests of all the people of the City for the
purposes of protecting their rights and the promo-
tion of harmony amongst them, all in accordance
with the Constitution and laws of the United States
and the State of Michigan."°°

The Commission carried out this policy in a token manner by

making Jeffries Homes a racially-integrated project. The

other low rent projects maintained racially segregated

tenants.

183

The Housing Commission again recognized in 1954 the
need for larger public housing units to accommodate the
growing demand for housing for larger families. Small
families are more mobile, have lower income limits, and have
much less difficulty in finding private rental housing. As
a result, families that require the larger units must wait
longer than those that need only one or two bedrooms. In
the Fall of 1954, one-third of the 8,152 families on the
Housing Commission's waiting list required three or four
bedroom dwellings. To meet this need, the Commission began
a conversion program in existing public housing projects to
accommodate the demand for larger units. The Commission in-
creased the inventory of larger units by combining existing
smaller units. Conversion practices at Herman Gardens com-
bined forty-four zero-bedroom units with forty-four two-
bedroom units to make forty-four four-bedroom units. Ap-
plication of similar practices occurred at Charles Terrace
that yielded twelve four-bedroom units. In addition, con-
versions at Parkside and Brewster Homes added 140 units with
three or four bedrooms."

Urban Renewal activities authorized by the 1954 Housing
Act broadened the Housing Commission‘s program to eliminate
slums and dilapidated housing in Detroit. Slum clearance
caused the displacement of many families. The Commission
chose direct relocation options toward the private market
rather than toward existing public housing. The Commission
temporarily relocated approximately seventy-five families in

public housing until private units could be obtained.33

184

In 1956, Congress appropriated funds for the continua-
tion of public housing activity. Significant changes oc-
curred with respect to public housing for the elderly. New
legislation allowed for the first time admission of the
single-elderly to public housing. In order to salvage the
Michigan 1-11 project in the Gratiot and Lafayette
Redevelopment Area, the Commission designated this project
as an elderly complex. The strategy did not work.

The Commission began a unique experiment at the Jef-
fries project in 1960. One of the fourteen story, 112 unit
buildings opened exclusively as housing for the elderly.
Alterations made in the building accommodated this age group
and included the installation of handrails in hallways and
bathrooms, and the provision of space for recreational and
leisure time activities. The elderly "expansion" program
carried over to three of the adjacent buildings (at Jef-
fries) as units became vacant due to normal attrition. A
similar experiment occurred in two of the buildings at
Douglass Homes. In addition, one of the buildings at Jef-
fries opened in the early 19605 for the families of married
college students that attended college in the City.

Prominent national housing figures scrapped the notion
of the regenerative power of public housing in the early
1960s. By November, 1963:

”public housing had evolved from a large-scale com-

munity program aimed at supplying safe and sanitary

housing environments to upwardly mobile working-

class families into a housing strategy emphasizing

the delivery of welfare services to socially and
psychologically demoralized tenants."°3

185

This change led to policy adjustments that increased
occupancy of the elderly. This trend gained popularity be-
cause of the notion that housing the elderly is more ac-
cepted than giving housing assistance to poor blacks.
Detroit continued the trend by allowing the proportion of
dwelling units occupied by the elderly to increase. At the
end of 1962, some thirty-five percent of the total units in
the city housed elderly tenants (five percent increase from
the previous year). The Commission also began the provision
of on-site services for the elderly:

"An addition to the Parkside Recreation Center at

Parkside Homes was built primarily aimed at serving

the leisure time needs of the elderly residents of

the project as well as those in the surrounding

community. The new facility follows the pattern

set at other housing developments in the provision

of recreation and lounge areas.”°‘

In 1963, emphasis on social services to residents of
Detroit's public housing increased significantly. The Com-
mission worked closely with other agencies to meet the so-
cial service needs of public housing residents. The Commis-
sion established working relationships with the Neighborhood
Service Organization, Michigan State University, the United
Automobile Workers, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, the Detroit
Board of Education, the Department of Parks and Recreation,
the Health Department, YMCA, and the YWCA. The types of or-
ganizations are indicative of the nature of services

provided. The most significant development occurred with

the establishment of a tri-party agreement between the

186

Housing Commission, Neighborhood Service Organization, and
the Michigan Department of Welfare to initiate an effort of
concerted social services at Brewster-Douglass Homes.as

Social service provisions for the elderly further
developed in 1964. Noteworthy activities included the es-
tablishment of day care center at Brewster-Douglass, the
opening of a credit union at Jeffries, and library service
to the elderly residents of Herman Gardens. The day care
center occupied a former administration building with staff
from the Michigan Department of Social Welfare. The
Michigan Credit Union League and the Neighborhood Service
Organization advanced a total of $20,000 to set up the
credit union at Jeffries. Finally, the Neighborhood Service
Organization and the Detroit Public Library entered into an
agreement with the Housing Commission to provide books for
the elderly.°‘

The Housing Commission in 1966 reaffirmed and
strengthened their direction to emphasize elderly housing
because of the success of the elderly experiment at the Jef-
fries Homes and Brewster-Douglass project sites, and new
provisions in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965
that emphasized housing for the elderly in public housing.
Modification of the Act followed the development of an in-
creased negative image of public housing. Most people per-
ceived all public housing to be the home for poor blacks,
and the home/generator of criminal activity and other so-

cially unacceptable behavior.

187

The new City housing policy mandated that future public
housing construction be designed and built for elderly and
larger families, and the policy allowed low-rent housing to
be designed and integrated into existing neighborhoods. The
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 allowed the Hous-
ing Commission to offer low-rent public housing that util-
ized an atmosphere outside of a public housing project set-
ting. Generally, qualifying owners of suitable "scattered
site” dwellings entered into a contract with the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development for a period of
one to five years. The owner either leased directly to the
Housing Commission which in turn sublet the dwelling to the
qualifying tenant, or the Commission entered into a working
contract with the owner that allowed the owner to lease
directly to the tenant.”

Elderly housing built under the new policy in the late
19605 included Harriett Tubman Terrace, Herman Garden Towers
(an addition to the existing Herman Gardens), State Fair
Apartments, Glenview, Woodland and the Conner-Waverly Apart-
ments. The completion of Lee Plaza in 1969 and Charles
Diggs apartments in 1974 marked the first addition of a
"family" public housing project to the city's inventory
since the Jeffries construction in 1955.“ Elderly con-
struction continued in the early 19705 with the construction
of Forest Park, Temple Towers, Warren West, Wolverine Apart-
ments, Sheridan Place I, and an elderly addition to Herman

Gardens.

188

The elderly expansion program continued through the
mid-19705 at the Jeffries Homes and Brewster-Douglass sites.
High-rise conversion at the two project sites took place for
several reasons. A study completed by the Housing Commis-
sion indicated an immediate need of 6,000 elderly public
housing units in the City. Also, the study recommended con-
version of the fourteen story high-rise units at the two
sites to one bedroom to meet the needs of the elderly. One
bedroom units are generally considered to be appropriate for
senior citizen occupancy. In addition, research on long-
range effects of housing older people together demonstrated
that elderly housing promoted an increased contact between
the elderly residents through senior citizen activities
directed toward them. Many older people prefer to live
among their age groups as friendships are more easily made
through sharing their past years.°’

Construction of Herman Gardens and Forrest Park util-
ized the turnkey method of development. The turnkey method
refers to the procedure where the local public agency and a
private developer enters into an agreement to construct
public housing. The developer has complete control over the
project, and upon completion, the Housing Commission pur-
chases the project.‘°

The construction of only one public housing project has
occurred in Detroit since the completion of Charles Diggs
and Sheridan Place I in the 1973-74 period. Sheridan Place
II, adjacent to Sheridan Place I, added 200 elderly units to

the city public housing inventory upon completion in 1983.“

189

Today, twenty public housing projects exist in the City
of Detroit (Table 5.2). They range in size from forty-four
units at Woodland Courts to 2,154 units at Herman Gardens.
Small neighborhood sites in various locations total 504
units. The Detroit Housing Commission currently oversees
10,818 public housing units in the City.

Official policy of the Detroit Housing Commission that

addressed public housing occupancy has been inconsistent
over the years. The program began by accommodating housing
for slum dwellers. Policies later changed to accommodate
war workers, veterans, low-income families, and then the el-
derly. Policy changes reflected outside stimuli such as
World War II and local/national sentiment. Even when policy
mandated housing for low-income black families, implementa-
tion tended to redirect the focus to other needs.

Initial policy that addressed site selection of public
housing focused on the housing needs of Detroit's core slum
area. The area was characterized by high crime, disease,
physical deterioration, and high government expense for
services. Rent exploitation occurred as a result of gross
overcrowding caused by outside pressure to not allow the
black community to expand into adjacent white neighborhoods.
The Commission's answer to this housing issue came in the
form of the completion of the Brewster public housing
project in 1938. The Brewster project, a slum clearance
project, was Detroit's first public housing project built
exclusively for black families that lived in slum condi-

tions. Increasing pressure in late 1930 to accommodate

190

Table 5.2

Public Housing Projects in the City of Detroit

 

Family/Elderly Total
Name Unite Unite
Brewster Douglass Homes 5633/1386 1,949
Diggs 104/0 104
Charles Terrace 428/0 428
Conner/Waverly Apartments 0/139 139
Forest Park 0/129 129
Glen View 0/129 129
Harriett Tubman Terrace 0/211 211
Herman Gardens 2,025/129 2,154
Jeffries Homes 715/1,456 2,171
Lee Plaza 222/0 222
"Neighborhood Sites” 492/12 504
Parkside Homes 837/255 1,092
Sheridan Place I 0/210 210
Sheridan Place II 0/200 200
Smith Homes 210/0 210
Sojourner Truth 199/0 199
State Fair Apartments 0/211 211
Temple Towers 0/64 64
Warren West 0/213 213
Wolverine Apartments 0/235 235
Woodland Courts 0/44 44

 

tThe low-rise family units are no longer occupied.

SOURCE: Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, i9§i
Directgry g: Assisted RentaliHoueing in Weyne County end the
City of Detroit Vol II: Inventgry and Deecrigtion gf As-

sisteg Rental Development, June 1981; and Telephone conver-
sation with Mr. Leonard Karle, Detroit Housing Department,

Detroit, Michigan, 13 April 1988.

titiit¥44144

191

housing for industrial workers encouraged the Commission to
change policy to locate future public housing near in-
dustrial plants rather than in slum areas. The Commission
hoped this change would encourage families to move out of
the slums into housing near industrial work. The Commission
never considered that local industry had a strong aversion
to hire the typical black (former) ghetto dweller.

Detroit became the war arsenal of the United States
during the World War II era. An already tight housing
market for blacks became unbearable with an influx of
165,000 new residents who moved to the City to work in the
war plants. The Housing Commission officially stated policy
to supply housing for the black war worker. However,
tenant selection policies mandated that only "natural and
cohesive family groups be admitted." Commission staff felt
that only white workers met the "cohesive family group”
criteria. This resulted in exclusion of black war workers
being admitted to public housing. The Commission gave
priority to applicants that moved to the City for work in
the war effort. Income limits as a criteria for admission
to public housing were temporarily suspended and the rent
was based on a percentage of the average salary paid by
defense plants. The Commission did not directly address
housing for the typical black ghetto dweller. Sojourner
Truth homes became the only project designated as black
defense housing under the U.S. Housing Authority defense
housing program. Much neighborhood protest occurred with

this project and site selection because the neighborhood was

192

primarily white. Location of Sojourner Truth in a
predominately white neighborhood broke the Commission's
long-term policy of locating public housing in areas where
racial mixture of the neighborhood could not be changed.

At the end of World War II, the Commission concentrated
their efforts to meet the demand of returning war veterans.
The policy to not integrate neighborhood using public hous-
ing was reinstated. Needs of low-income families were es-
sentially ignored because of returning veterans and also be-
cause of increased pressure that black advocacy groups put
on the Commission.

By the 19505, veteran needs no longer existed and the
Commission again changed policy to address housing needs of
low- and moderate-income families. Policy suggested that
future public housing projects be located in residential
areas that had the potential to remain good areas for
living. Construction of Jeffries Homes represented this new
philosophy. The Commission chose the site for Jeffries be-
cause it represented a protrusion of dilapidated housing in
an existing stable neighborhood. Jeffries represented the
first attempt to build high-rise public housing for white
families and clear slums at the same time. A court injunc-
tion in 1953 forced the Commission not to rent on the basis
of color. As a result, the Commission designated Jeffries
as an integrated project.

Construction of the Douglass project began in 1952 and
it represented a national trend where housing authorities

cleared slum areas and built high-rise units to house the

193

displaced. Location of Douglass in the black ghetto, and
eventual change in racial make-up of Jeffries to
predominantly black suggests that an underlying policy of
the Commission was to keep the black poor in their tradi-
tional parts of the City and not allow these large public
housing projects to be built in more racially mixed or white
neighborhoods. This same practice of converting horizontal
ghettos to vertical ghettos occurred in most major cities in
the country.‘2

An increasing negative image developed toward public
housing nationally and in Detroit as a result of these new
"ghettos". As a result, Jeffries began an elderly conver-
sion program in 1960. Public opinion perceived it more ac-
ceptable to give assistance to elderly than to poor blacks.
New policy in the late 19605 that no longer mandated natural
and cohesive family groups for admission to public housing
further strengthened this negative image. The Commission
filled high-rise apartments at Jeffries and
Brewster/Douglass with single-parent poor blacks. The
projects became pockets of high crime activity of all types.
The Commission eventually converted the high-rises at

Brewster/Douglass and Jeffries to elderly occupancy.

TH BR WST R-DOUG AS AND JEFFRI N HBORHOOD
Breweier-Dggglaee

The Brewster-Douglass public housing project is located
in the Lower Woodward area as defined by the City of Detroit

Planning Department. The Lower Woodward area is bounded to

194

the north by the Edsel Ford Freeway, to the south by the
Fisher Freeway, to the east by the Chrysler Freeway, and to
the west by the Lodge Freeway. The Lower Woodward area con-
sist of nine planning units: Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park,
Medical Center, Art Center, Southeast Cass Corridor,
Southwest Cass Corridor and the Wayne State University area

(Figure 5.1). Approximately fifty-six percent of the popula-

tion was black according to the 1980 Census.

Development of the Lower Woodward area as a residential
neighborhood began around 1910. The original form and
fabric of the community does not exist today because of ur-
ban renewal, street widening activities, conversion of
single-family homes to apartment buildings, redevelopment
into cultural, medical and educational uses. The process of
demolition is still continuing today, not so much because of
urban renewal activities, but because of abandonment of
structures by property owners and tenants. Abandonment is
especially pronounced in the lower Cass community and in
Brush Park which is adjacent to the Brewster-Douglass
project.

The Lower Woodward area has experienced high crime
problems and other social ills since the 19305. One survey
taken in the 19305 revealed crime in this area to be 7.5
times the city average, juvenile delinquency 10.4 times
higher, tuberculosis 6.5 times higher, pneumonia eight times
higher, and infant mortality 1.5 times the average for the
City as a whole. Almost one-third of the families in the

area received public welfare."3

195

A steady decline in the number of persons and number of
housing units has occurred between 1970 and 1980. The
population decreased by more than one-third and housing
units decreased by twenty four percent. The 1980 census
reported existing vacancy rates in the Lower Woodward area
at eighteen percent which represented the highest of any
portion of the city. The overall loss of housing units and
an exodus of population occurred because:

1. demolition and clearance activities associated

with the Community Development Block Grant
program with cleared land designated for non-
residential uses;

2. deterioration of housing units over time;

3. rehabilitation of structures from multi-family
use to single-family use;

4. demise of permanent resident hotels.“
Until recently, most of the areas family households lived in
the low and medium rise units at the Brewster-Douglass
project. In 1988, fewer than twenty-five of the Brewster-
Douglass low and medium rise family units are occupied (out
of 563).‘°

The Lower Woodward area has the lowest average popula-
tion per household and the highest proportion of one-person
households of any residential area in the city.“ Some
seventy percent of the 13,600 households in the area consist
of single persons living alone. City-wide this figure is
only twenty-nine percent."7 Generally, only fifteen percent
of the population is under eighteen, well below the city
average of thirty percent. Senior citizen representation

constituted roughly twenty-one percent of the population of

196

this area according to the 1980 census. Senior citizens are
predominantly found in the Brush Park and Medical Center
planning units (both adjacent to Brewster-Douglass), the
southeastern quadrant of the Cass Corridor and Brewster-
Douglass.

The median annual household income in the Lower Wood-
ward area is less than $5,000. Two reasons for low income
in the area includes the concentration of one-person
households and the large number of residents living on some
form of assistance such as social security, welfare, un-
employment compensation, or subsistence level paying jobs."6

The Brewster-Douglass planning unit as designated by
the Planning Department includes approximately sixty acres
of the south-east corner of the Lower Woodward area. Found
in this planning unit is the 1,949 unit Brewster-Douglass
public housing project. The development of Brewster-
Douglass occurred in two major phases. The Brewster sec-
tion, built during the 1937-1939 period, consist of low-rise
homes. The Douglass section, constructed between 1950-1953,
includes low-rise, mid-rise, and fourteen story high-rise
apartment buildings. The high-rise units contain
predominantly elderly occupants while the other occupied
units are designated family.

Low-rise units in the Brewster-Douglass public housing
project are vacant with the exception of a few units.
Neighborhood residents of the Brewster/Douglass area ex-
pressed that the Housing Department has allowed the low-rise

units to become vacant. Residents felt that planned vacancy

197

of these units served as the beginning step in the process
to upgrade the area and accommodate expansion of the Cul-
tural and Medical Centers." Councilman Ravitz of the
Detroit City Council feels that the presence of the
Brewster-Douglass project is "worrisome" to the redevelop-
ment effort of the Lower Woodward Area. He suggested that

the Housing Commission desires to rehabilitate the vacant

units at Brewster-Douglass and make them available to higher
socioeconomic persons. Councilman Ravitz expressed that
Brewster-Douglass will be physically and socially upgraded
within a five year period to complement improvements to the
nearby Cultural Center which contains the Fox Theater and
Orchestra Hall.7° An officer at the 13th Police Precinct
expressed the view that city hall may have a role in aban-
donment of the Brewster-Douglass low-rises. He stated that
"word is out on the streets that plans call for rehabilita-
tion and conversion of these units into condominiums.""
Mayor Coleman Young recently proposed to tear down
approximately 1,000 vacant or deteriorating units at the
site. Rationale for this policy is based on the assumption
that units targeted for demolition are likely to lose
federal subsidies in 1991. Also, city officials feel that
keeping the units open have the potential of draining scarce
city resources.’= Mayor Young is not without opposition on
his demolition policy. Councilwoman Maryann Mahaffey sug-
gests that federal funds may be available for future
rehabilitation of these deteriorating units.73 Also, local

activists for Detroit's 20,000 homeless have protested

198

Figure 5.1

Lower Woodward Area

 

. .a I: .-
1? eos'tt Fono va
T 3' '5 l?

1-
O
c.
O
5
e
s
c

 

 

 

 

a, Case
w , Corridor
r——-—1 r—g m
we

 

SOURCE: City of Detroit. Planning Department. Woodward Area Planning
Planning_Pep0rt, Preliminary Draft, March 1983.

199

 

against Mayor Young's plans. The activists want the city to
let the homeless live in the unoccupied units, rather than
demolish them." The City Council recently gave indirect
endorsement of demolition activities at Brewster/Douglass by
voting to exclude the project from a study of the city‘s
public housing stock. Demolition supporters on the council
favor the eradication of unusable units and improve living
conditions at the site by lowering the density and building
townhouse units.73

The neighborhood adjacent and to the south of
Brewster/Douglass is Brush Park. Like the rest of the Lower
Woodward area, Brush Park has not remained static over time.
Brush Park, formerly known as Piety Hill, developed between
1870 and 1890 as a result of the movement of prosperous
Detroit citizens from the immediate downtown area. Woodward
Avenue boasted the city's finest mansions of successful mer-
chants and the manufacturing elite. Adjacent residential
streets contained homes of the less wealthy. The Brush Park
neighborhood also contained the L. Beaubien Farm, a working
class neighborhood with one-story homes and apartments.

An exodus of wealthy merchants began as early as 1900
with Jewish families moving into Brush Park. In addition,
multi-family housing construction and conversion of many of
the original homes to apartment and boarding houses occurred
between 1900-1920. By 1930, Brush Park became a totally
black community. Expansion of the automobile industry after
World War I encouraged black migration from the south. New

blacks found difficulty in obtaining housing except in

200

certain areas, such as Brush Park, because of a limited
housing supply, and because of prejudices. This resulted in
over-crowding conditions." A high degree of vacancy and
abandonment coupled with deteriorating physical conditions
existed by the 19605. Demolition activities began in the
19705 to remedy the deteriorating landscape. The number of
Brush Park dwelling units decreased by approximately
twenty-nine percent between 1970 and 1977. A program to
preserve historic structures in Brush Park also began during
the decade of the 19705. Recently, the entire Brush Park
planning unit became a historic area as designated by local
ordinance, and a plan for neighborhood conservation of his-
toric structures and development is in the planning stages.
The area lacks local retail and service facilities, and out-
door recreation for younger persons. Despite strong efforts
of neighborhood organizations, drugs and crime are prevalent
in the Brush Park area.77 Plans also call for the construc-
tion of new residential units in the area.

The Medical Center planning unit north of Brewster-
Douglass developed as a residential and institutional com-
munity during the last twenty years of the 19th Century.
Housing types consisted primarily of multi-family units and
some single-family homes. Lower density neighborhoods
developed just east of Woodward Avenue. Higher density
housing developed nearer and adjacent to Woodward Avenue,

the city's major transportation artery.

201

The area‘s current institutional character began with
initial residential development in the late 18005. With the
wave of residential development came construction of the
original Harper Hospital (1884) and Central High School
(1896). Jewish migration into this area occurred along with
the same migration south in Brush Park. By 1930, black
residents filtered into the neighborhood. Black residents
occupied the homes and established several businesses and
institutions such as the Dunbar Hospital (first black hospi-
tal in the city) and the Hansberry Music School. Cultural
activities developed in the early 20th Century. The main
branch of the Detroit Public Library and the Detroit In-
stitute of the Arts, designed in Italian Renaissance
Revival, established this area as the cultural focal point
for Detroit. Institutional expansion in the area continued
through the 1940s with the construction and expansion of the
Maccabees Building (Detroit public school headquarters), the
Rackham Building (Engineering Society of Detroit) and Wayne
State University expansion. The Center for Creative Studies
is a prominent development that began in 1958.7.

Before urban renewal activities began in the 19505, the
medical center redevelopment area consisted of a variety of
land uses which included residential, commercial, light in-
dustrial and institutional facilities arrayed together with
no real discernible logic or rational pattern.

Predominantly blighted conditions characterized the overall
character of the neighborhood. Overcrowded and substandard

structures existed with non-existent side, front and rear

202

yard space. Substandard units made up ninety percent of all
structures in the area (Table 5.3). No open space, park
areas or community facilities existed in the neighborhood.
Inadequate parking compounded the overall traffic problem.
Through-streets carried high volumes of traffic that
originated elsewhere in the city. A major source of com-
munity irritation and concern centered around street crimes.
This concern reflected negatively on the neighborhood to the
point of tarnishing the appeal of existing medical
facilities to prospective medical personnel. City officials
felt that neighborhood ills could be solved through
clearance and redevelopment of the area.7°

Urban renewal activities initiated in the 19505 drasti-
cally changed the residential character of the area now
known as the Medical Center. One study suggested that the
activity displaced over 3,000 families just north of
Brewster-Douglass. In addition, urban renewal resulted in
displacement of over 200 businesses and over 400 churches to
make room for medical center structures. Demolition ac-
tivities virtually wiped out low-income housing in the
area.'° Ironically, neighborhood opposition to the medical
center development focused on hospital discrimination toward
black patients and doctors, rather than on clearance of the
poor black neighborhood." Two urban renewal projects
addressed residential housing to accommodate medical person-
nel associated with the medical complex. Unfortunately most
of the housing fell much above the price range of those

low-income residents previously displaced as a result of

203

Table 5.3

Number of Structures in the Medical Center
Before Redevelopment

 

 

Structure

Iyee, Totel Stangard(2) Substandard(Z)

residential 902 287(82) 832(922)

non-residential 217 40(18) 177(82)
TOTAL 1,119 110(10) 1,009(90)

 

Source: Clarence C. White, "Community Organization, Par-
ticipation and Interaction in Renewal Areas of Detroit,"
Master of Public Administration Thesis, Wayne State
University, 1964, p. 35.
titttiitiltt

clearance activities.“2

For the past fifteen years, churches in the area have
developed housing for low-income families. The Plymouth
Congregational Church developed Medical Center Court, Warren
Plaza, and Bethel Towers. Friendship Baptist Church
developed Friendship Forest Park.'3 The current Medical
Center #4 meets part of the needs for neighborhood shopping
and housing for the Medical Center employees. Medical Cen-
ter #4 is located north of Warren Avenue between Brush and
8t. Antoine Streets. A senior citizen high-rise is located
on the northerly portion of the site. Townhouses and garden
apartments are planned for the remaining vacant area.
Neighborhood amenities include the fifteen acre Tolan

Playfield, and the Warren Plaza neighborhood shopping

center." Initial plans for the Medical Center #4 project

204

also proposed the restoration and adaptive re-use of two
historic buildings: the old Hansberry School of Music and
the old Dunbar Hospital."

Today the medical center area contains new residential
uses for medical center personnel, four major hospitals-
Harper Grace Hospital, Receiving Hospital, Wayne State
University Medical School and Hutzel Hospital, plus numerous
clinics and related buildings. In addition, the area con-
tains a medical office-commercial high-rise, related parking
lots and structures, a housing tower and a significant
vacant parcel left for development on the northeast corner
of Mack and Woodward Avenues. The city planning department
suggests commercial and office re-use of this property."

Jeffriee

The Jeffries Homes public housing project is located in
the Southwest Sector planning area as defined by the Detroit
Planning Department. The Southwest Sector area had a
population of over 157,000 people in 1980. Forty-six per-
cent were Black. Other groups include Southern Whites,
Poles, Ukranians, Maltese and Mexican-Americans. This sec-
tor is located to the west and adjacent to the Woodward area
previously discussed. The western and southern city limits
and the Conrail Railroad (formerly the Detroit Terminal)
constitute the other boundaries. The Southwest Sector con-
sist of nine subsectors or planning units: Jeffries, Hub-
bard Richard/Corktown, Tireman, Condon, Vernor Junction,

West Riverfront, Chadsey, Springwells and Boynton. Boundary

205

delineation for each planning unit is determined by major
physical barriers such as industrial corridors, freeways, or
railroad tracks."

Initial development in the Detroit area occurred in the
Southwest Sector. French settlers arrived in the early
17005 and immediately took advantage of the area‘s abundance
of water, fertile land for farming and lumber, and game and
furs. Accessibility to the Detroit and Rouge Rivers allowed
the area to become a trading center for these goods, as well
as a military fortress for the region.

The richness of the location made the area a prime can-
didate for developments associated with the Industrial
Revolution in the late 19th century. The availability of
water transportation and other natural resources served as a
catalyst for economic development. By 1900 ..."Southwest
Detroit was the site of companies manufacturing glass, salt
products, stoves, chemicals and glue, bricks and other
building materials."" Strong technological advancements
coupled with Henry Ford‘s mass production technology at-
tracted thousands of immigrants from the South and Europe to
work in the factories. The pattern of immigration resulted
in the development of strong ethnic and minority neigh-
borhoods.

The Jeffries planning unit is defined by the Detroit
Planning Department as bounded on the north by the Edsel
Ford Freeway, on the south by the Fisher Freeway, on the
east by the Lodge Freeway, and on the west by the Jeffries

Freeway (Figure 5.2). As with the Lower Woodward area that

206

contains Brewster-Douglass, the Jeffries planning unit
changed physically and socio-economically over time along
with the Southwest Sector change. Suburban sprawl resulted
in overall decay of the area. Very few of the original
housing structures are standing because of clearance ac-
tivities during the past thirty-five Years associated with
freeway development, public housing construction, street
widening, urban renewal, schools, and institutional and com-
mercial encroachment."

According to 1980 figures, thirty-six percent of the
households in the Jeffries planning unit are considered at
or below the poverty level. The lowest income persons
reside in the Jeffries Homes public housing project located
along the eastern edge of the planning unit. These figures
are the highest of any subcommunity in Detroit. The high
poverty level is based on several factors. Twenty-seven
percent of the households receive welfare. Some twenty-four
percent of the households receive social security. Fifty-
three percent of the residents of the Jeffries area do not
have any earned income. Seventy-one percent of the Jeffries
planning unit are Black. Historically, this composition has
not been the case. Southern Whites once dominated the area.
White concentration dwindled as a result of suburban expan-
sion and "white flight". Today, the White population has
concentrated in the lower portion of the planning unit along

with the Hispanic population.

'207

Jeffries Homes contains 2,644 of the planning unit's
14,000 residents. Ninety-eight percent of the occupants of
the public housing project are Black. In 1983, the public
housing project had the highest percentage of couples over
sixty-five years of age of any Detroit neighborhood. The
project matched the city's average of single-persons sixty-
five and older. Thirty-six percent of the residents of Jef-
fries Homes had incomes at or below the poverty level. This
poverty concentration was the highest of any portion of the
City.’°

With few exceptions, housing in the Jeffries neigh-
borhood is among the oldest in the City. Pre-1900 general
residence structures make up some thirty percent of existing
structures. Residential structures include single-family
units, flats, and row houses. Construction of some forty-
two percent of existing structures took place within the
first ten years of the 20th Century. Between 1910 and 1919
construction of about thirty-six percent of the structures
took place. Since 1929, only 29 single-family homes, flats
and row houses have been built. Postwar multi-family hous-
ing in the Jeffries area include: Jeffries Homes (public
housing), Kundig Center, Freedom Place, Fountain Court and
Selden Court. In the 19705, the Jeffries area lost thirty-
six percent of its housing units and roughly fifty percent
of the population. By 1978, the vacancy rate soared to
seventeen percent. The phenomenon is still continuing,
especially in the neighborhood just south of Jeffries Homes.

The Trumball and Butternut area is a very poor community

208

 

 

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209

Preliminary Draft, March 1983.

 

City of Detroit. Planning Department. The Southwest Sector

SOURCE

that consists primarily of eighty to ninety year old housing
stock. The older stock is slowly being vacated and
demolished to make room for parking lots. The area is just
north of Tiger Stadium.’*

The Jeffries area has pronounced positive and negative
aspects. As found in most of the southwestern portion of

Detroit,

”... a goodly proportion of the residents live here
out of choice. Proximity to the Central Business
District and the Cultural Center, good transporta-
tion, and ethnic ties are among the various reasons
why many choose to live here. Woodbridge, where
restored homes have attracted many persons of dif-
ferent income groups, is the most obvious... ex-
ample of a neighborhood in the Jeffries [planning
unit] whose residents regard it as unique."’2
The Jeffries planning unit is not without negative so-
cial and physical aspects. A major problem is the vast
amount of vacant land, especially near the Jeffries Homes
public housing project. Existing housing, with few excep-
tions, is severely deteriorated and mixed with poorly main-
tained vacant land. Because of age, lack of adequate main-
tenance, and location, Jeffries Homes is not considered an
ideal place to live. Serious and severe social problems ex-
ist in the Jeffries planning unit. Problems of poverty,

poor health, drug trafficking and unemployment add to the

overall negative image of this portion of Detroit.’3

REW TER- OUG 8 AN L W R W ODWARD AREA RIM
The original form and fabric of the neighborhood where
the Brewster-Douglass project is located has not been static

over time. The physical and social instability has resulted

210

in a crime problem in the area since the 19305. More
recently, the crime problem has exploded because of drug ac-
tivity and an increased number of abandoned structures to
house drug activity. Historically, the Lower Woodward area
has experienced major crime for several reasons. First, the
rapid pace of urbanization in the 19405 put a strain on the
already tight housing market. The in-migration of Souther-
ners to Detroit caused overcrowded conditions. Second, ur-
ban renewal devastated the area. Urban renewal activities
helped to continue the unstable effect of the area that
directly caused crime to continue. Urban renewal demolished
neighborhood churches. Churches in the past served as a
stabilizing force for the neighborhood. Social structure
degenerated a5 a result of this action."

The physical and social instability caused by mass in-
migration, urban renewal, and demolition negated any chances
of neighborhood residents to maintain control over their
physical space. The literature calls this concept ter-
ritoriality. Territoriality appears to be the critical fac-
tor that mediates the relationship between the social and
physical environment of a neighborhood and crime activity in
the neighborhood.

Crime in the Lower Woodward area has not always been
present. In the early 20th century, inhabitants showed vir-
tually no socioeconomic divergence. Major crime activity
simply did not exist because:

"Over those years, a mute, common understanding

ruled Detroit-an understanding that certain

residential barriers were not to be violated.
Whatever the egalitarian rhetoric of the culture at

211

large, Detroiters were born and raised in a atmos-

phere in which class consciousness was a palpable

thing. Consequently, crime-omnipresent, terrifying
street crime of the sort that characterizes

American life today-remained under control, as it

does in most societies where people know their

place and where community feeling (for better or

for worse) runs deep in every neighborhood.“’°
Then came social and economic conflict caused by a drastic
increase in population of the city. War production ac-
tivities attracted thousands of Southerners to the City.
The postwar consumer age increased demand for automobiles
for the country. This demand attracted more immigrants to
work in automobile factories. By 1950, some 1.9 million
workers lived in the same area that a half million lived in
just twenty-five years earlier. Segregation practices
forced most of the black workers (some 400,000) to live in
the tiny ghetto near downtown. Residents of the "black bot-
tom“ had no other neighborhood choices to live. Suburban
development provided a viable living alternative for white
workers.

The intolerable living situation for blacks pitted
working class whites against working class blacks in a
neighborhood by neighborhood battle for dominance and pos-
session. The battle resulted in white flight and a
phenomenal level of increase in crime. The crime problem
occurred not because of the increase in black residents, but
because of a shattered neighborhood stability:

"In the years which saw Detroit descend into its

"Murder City” period, it was a metropolis almost

entirely given over to transience. The sense of

community feeling is difficult to preserve in a
forest of 'for sale' signs.""

212

High density development and neighborhood stability is a
representation of the neighborhood evolution stage called
"packing" as defined by LaGory and Pipkin. Some refer to
the neighborhood as the "new slums" in the packing stage.
In the packing stage, structures begin to age, rents fall,
and lower-income groups move in. To bridge the gap between
old (higher) and new (lower) rents, landlords pack more
people into these units than they were designed to hold.°’
In the Detroit case, landlords took advantage of tenants and
increased rents rather than lowering rents. This worked for
the landlord because of the social and political influences
that prohibited blacks from living elsewhere and because of
the resistance of adjacent neighborhood to allow the neigh-
borhood to expand.

The Detroit Urban League conducted a survey in 1959 to
determine residents' attitude on crime activity in the
neighborhood adjacent to the Brewster-Douglass area. The
report that summarized survey findings outlined the follow-
ing major reasons for crime in this neighborhood:

1. "Lack of parental supervision.

2. Transient renters in the area.

3. Unemployment.

4. Poorly lighted streets and alleys.

5. Lack of adequate recreational and employment
outlets for teen-agers.

6. Permitted loitering on corners and in front
of commercial establishments.""

213

Resident explanation of crime activity correspond to find-
ings in the literature on crime in urban neighborhoods. An
absence of strong parental supervision and a surveillance
mechanism coupled with no employment pr recreational oppor-
tunities for teen-agers already living in a hostile environ-
ment creates a situation conducive to criminal activity.
Studies that have addressed the Detroit crime problem
consistently document this correlation.” Studies also show
that street lighting intensity affects crime. Areas well
lighted have less of a problem with robbery and assaults.
Citizens felt that much of the criminal activity in the
neighborhood occurred as a result of the placement of per-
sons and families relocated because of urban renewal and
public improvement activities. Black and white citizens
felt that these displacees brought into the neighborhood a
different cultural standard of living. A change to an unac-
ceptable standard of living and not a change in race seemed
to be the major issue for permanent residents of this neigh-
borhood. The neighborhood contained numerous businesses,
such as bars and pool halls, that provided a nest for many
persons that lived in and outside of the neighborhood.
These establishments and activities within them encouraged
criminal behavior. The presence of mixed uses in the Lower
Woodward Area and crime activity validates findings stated
in the literature on the positive relationship between these
two variables. Commercial establishments particularly serve
as crime generators that bring in “outsiders" and the out-

siders are principle crime perpetrators. A neighborhood

214

like Woodward where the social structure is weak or nonex-
istent does not have the mechanism to identify and patrol
outsiders before they engage in criminal activity.

Finally, many landlords of apartment units located in
the area lived elsewhere in the city. Limited contact oc-
curred between the landlord and tenants except for rent col-
lection times. An abundance of absentee landlords en-
couraged crime because the landlord never monitored un-
desirable behavior that took place in their apartment
buildings.*°°

The 1967 riots in many ways symbolized the bottom of
the abyss. The riots killed 43 Detroiters and left a por-
tion of the city in ruins. The Chandler Park area suffered
an exceptionally severe negative image for several years
after the riots. Gangs that operated out of abandoned
houses victimized black and white families. A former
Chandler Park resident stated: "Everyone on our block-
absolutely everyone-was robbed one year... even two
policemen."*°* The riots solidified the perceived negative
image of the Lower Woodward Area, the Brewster-Douglass
project, and the Jeffries project.*°=

Crime activity has flourished in the neighborhood for
several reasons (Table 5.4). Officer Madison of Detroit's
thirteenth precinct stated that:

“...the Lower Woodward area has had a history of

crime for many reasons. The average income is less

than minimum wage. There is a low educational
level among the residents. Most are on some form

of government [financial] assistance. There are
no role models for the teen-agers, except for the
dope dealers. The area has historically attracted

lower socioeconomic blacks. And crime moved in

215

because of the lower socioeconomic conditions."*°3
The population make-up of the Lower Woodward area consists
of Blacks and Whites; Indians (from India) and Chinese;
Wayne State University students and faculty; and "arts
people”. Officer Madison expressed the opinion that most
crime activity occurs within each population group, rather
than in-between these groups. Very little crime exist

TABLE 5.4

Major Offenses in the 13th Police Precinct, Detroit:
1975 - 1986

 

 

 

 

Auto

YEAR Mucder Rege Robbery Assault Burglary Theft Theft
1975 78 156 2094 1158 2335 3315 2367
1976 85 134 2160 1115 2490 3793 2251
1977 56 136 1395 989 1648 3137 1733
1978 54 99 1162 972 1404 2537 1343
1979 45 97 1063 1032 1434 2662 1555
1980 64 140 1539 1393 1794 3185 1808
1981 66 141 2115 1082 2561 4651 2936
1982 63 110 1944 981 2402 4259 2479
1983 73 150 1948 1053 1986 4220 2695
1984 79 144 1919 854 1736 4534 2850
1985 78 121 1703 865 1423 3588 2343
1986 63 101 1490 910 1285 3383 1789
Source: Detroit Police Department.

illitttttt
toward the Chinese and Indians.
Other reasons contribute to the crime problem in the
Lower Woodward area. John R., Brush, Cass Streets, and
Woodward Avenue are major thoroughfares through the neigh-
borhood. These thoroughfares contribute to crimes of
morality because they bring in "outsiders" that seek pros-
titutes and pornographic theaters.

Past studies show that

neighborhood crime activity can be reduced when the street

216

system is modified to remove heavily traveled corridors out
of the neighborhood. Rerouting traffic around neighborhoods
increase resident use of and control of the neighborhood.‘-cm
Land use design and type cause crime. Until recently the
3rd Street area experienced severe prostitution problems.
Two bars, The Sweetheart Bar and Andersons Gardens served
essentially as homes of prostitution. The closing of these
establishments caused this activity to move to the vicinity
of Woodward Avenue and 7 Mile Road.
Building shape plays a role in crime activity in the area.
Most are old Victorian and vacant structures that systemati-
cally do not have linear exteriors. This design creates
shadows and blind spots that hide doors and windows to allow
for easy access by the criminal.*°' Studies consistently
find a positive relationship between "physical vul-
nerability" and increases in robbery and burglary rates.
Vulnerability, or the ease at which a criminal can enter, is
the most influential factor that affect crime activity in an
inner city neighborhood.*°‘ Finally, construction of
freeways isolated the Lower Woodward area. The freeways
serve as a boundary around this area to contain crime
activity.*°’ Researchers have long documented the effect
expressways have on containing crime activity in a
neighborhood.*°'

Crime is beginning to move from the Lower Woodward area
in general because structures are so dilapidated that they
cannot adequately house crime activity. The area is in

transition between the thinning stage and recapture stage of

217

the neighborhood cycle as defined by LaGory and Pipkin.*°°
Most structures are abandoned and the next step is to
demolish the area to make room for new and more viable land
uses. Given the situation, it is expected that crime ac-
tivity is moving northward. Movement of crime is not neces-
sarily the case in the Brush Park neighborhood. This
neighborhood is designated a "historic district" by the City
of Detroit and the State of Michigan. Demolition of a
structure cannot be accomplished without approval from the
City and the state Historical Commission. Bureaucratic red
tape to get needed permission has delayed clearance of the
Brush Park area. As a result, many of the abandoned struc-
tures in Brush Park are now ”dope houses“. The Chambers
family has control of the Brush Park/Brewster-Douglass and
Jeffries Homes territories. Young Boys, Inc., had control
of this area in the 19705 and before the Chambers family.**°
Crime activity is not uniform throughout the Lower
Woodward area because of the availability of private
auxiliary police and heavy traffic in the cultural center
area. Wayne State University, the Cultural Center, and the
Medical Center have private police forces to patrol their
property. No major crime problems exist in these areas.
Crime that does occur is usually directed toward the more
affluent and carried out by persons of the lower
socioeconomic sector. The most severe problem occurrs in
the Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park and Jeffries areas. These
areas characteristically have a large number of abandoned

buildings to house illegal activity. Also, street layout

218

makes it difficult for police patrols to cruise through the
psoject. It is all but impossible to patrol the public
housing sites except on foot, and that method is impractical
for obvious safety reasons. Councilman Ravitz suggests that
the Brewster-Douglass area will be physically and socially
upgraded within a five year period to complement

improvements in the cultural area that contains the Fox
Theater and Orchestra Hall. The Cultural Area is targeted
for private development that will cater to upper echelon
suburban residents. The rationale is that these patrons of
the arts will more likely use the facilities in the Cultural
Center if nearby crime activity is eradicated. It is ex-
pected that the Cass area will also go through a similar
upgrading.***

An interview with a resident of the Lower Woodward Area
revealed a different interpretation of the origin of crime
activity. This resident expressed that crime activity in
the Lower Woodward Area has been a planned activity of the
City: "They've allowed drugs and addicts to occupy and con-
trol so the area would deteriorate.”‘*’ Some residents feel
that the presence of this type of activity gives the City an
excuse to clear the area to allow for construction and ex-
pansion of land uses that will be used by primarily the
wealthier upper-class. Specifically, plans are in the
making for expansion of the Veterans Administration Hospi-
tal, the Cultural Center, and the high tech area adjacent to
Cass Park. Detroit Technical Institute is planning an ex-

pansion in the high tech area.

219

Some demolition and conversion activities have already

taken place that have encroached on housing for lower-income

families and individuals. Research Park Apartments and

Freedom Place in the vicinity of the 4th Street neighborhood

(near the Lodge Freeway and Forrest area) have been con-

verted to housing for Wayne State University.

Gentrification of the neighborhood in the vicinity of Wood-

ward Avenue and Second Street began in the early 19805.
This activity displaced approximately fifty low income
families. To date, most of the rehabilitated dwellings
still vacant.“-3

Crime in the Brewster-Douglass project became sig-
nificant in the 19605. In the project's earlier years,
residents characterized the project as a pleasant place
live. A former Brewster-Douglass resident stated that:

”...in the 19505 the project was generally a nice

place to live and work. Residents were stable

working class blacks who lived there briefly and
then would move on. Occupants could make only so

much money, and when the [income] limit was reached

they had to move. There was a presence of project
police."‘*‘

are

to

Another person interviewed expressed the living experience

of her mother at Brewster-Douglass:

"My mother lived in the Brewster-Douglass low-rise
units from 1965-1985. Drug traffic problems were
rampant in the low rises in 1985. Dealers would
use kids in the project as 'runners' and the
dealers lived in the nearby neighborhoods and sub-
urbs. My mother felt that Brewster-Douglass was a

good place to live when she moved in, but something

went sour in the late 19605. The management
changed admission policy and started to allow un-

desirables into the project. I believe this change

was deliberate on behalf of the City, so the area
would run down, then they would have an excuse to
tear down or repair for the rich medical people

220

at the Medical Center."**5

Crime activity at the Brewster-Douglass project became
most pronounced with further deterioration of the adjacent
neighborhood, and with relaxed admission policies in the
late 19605. These two changes in conjunction with physical
design and layout of the project allowed criminal activity
to take over the project, especially the low-rise units.
Brewster-Douglass had most characteristics of a typical
"bad” project as defined by the United States Department of
Justice. A "bad" project is an inner city project that ex-
periences security problems. These projects house over one
thousand families and consists of high-rise buildings over
eight or ten stories or low-rise buildings that sprawl in a
labyrinthine fashion over a large tract of land. Services
and amenities such as playgrounds, laundromats, day-care and
transportation needs do not meet needs of project residents.
Physical design fosters the feeling of crowding by an insuf-
ficient number of elevators and by planned common areas that
are small and undefined. Physical design is incapable of
supporting a strong surveillance mechanism. A weak social
structure exists.**‘ A later study determined that
”troubled" public housing projects are likely to be found in
neighborhoods that:

1. have a high concentration of minority
residents;

2. have a high percentage of renters;
3. have high crime rates;

4. have inadequate police protection.*“'"

221

Further, deterioration of the nearby neighborhood with drug
activity and free access to the Brewster-Douglass site made
project children ideal candidates to push drugs. Research
suggests that a lack of access controls onto the public
housing project site located in crime ridden neighborhoods
have some relation to crime activity in public housing.*1'

The social structure of the residents of Brewster-
Douglass during peak crime activity in the early to mid-
19805 followed the model of tenant characteristics of crime
ridden projects. The literature suggests that tenants of
troubled projects are primarily single-parent and female-
headed households. No male figure is usually present. Most
tenants are on some form of welfare assistance. The tenant
population is primarily minority. Interviews with Detroit
Housing Department staff indicated that the social structure
of the Brewster-Douglass tenants during Anti-Crime Program
implementation concurred with these findings described by
the literature that are characteristics of bad or troubled
projects.‘*’

Today, residents of the City of Detroit view Brewster-
Douglass as very unsafe. Residents of the project, however,
feel differently. Residents interviewed indicated that
today Brewster-Douglass is relatively safe since the low
rises are empty. An interview with a Brewster-Douglass
resident confirmed the relative feeling of safety for the
elderly. The resident stated that:

"Now Brewster-Douglass is relatively safe. Victims

of crime are usually those that make connections

and buys with dope dealers. The average person has
no problem with crime in Brewster-Douglass. We

222

have no bars on our windows. There is usually no

problem with cars being stolen. I would rather

walk around the project site at 3:00AM than in the

day when the dealers are around.”*29
Residents feel that the media has given the project a nega-
tive name. Most of the illegal activity takes place in
nearby Brush Park, but the media and city officials think
that Brewster-Douglass houses most of the drug activity.

Historically, crime activity in the Brewster-Douglass
project can be attributed to two variables. First, the
Housing Commission loosened admissions standards of tenants
in the late 19605. This loosening followed a national
trend. The Commission allowed low-income persons with un-
stable characteristics to occupy Brewster-Douglass, such as
single female head of households with live in companions and
welfare recipients. The Commission no longer checked on the
character of applicants before they were approved for
admission.*=*

Second, city officials perceive drugs to be a primary
activity in the Brewster-Douglass project. It is difficult
for police to control the drug problem because of project
street layout and because of abandoned structures. No
through streets exist in the Brewster-Douglass project.
Dealers sell street drugs along peripheral sidewalks along
Beaubian and other peripheral streets. When police arrive,
the dealers and buyers run into the project interior grounds
that are not accessible to police except by foot. By the

time police are able to leave their cars and enter the

{oroject grounds, the criminals have escaped. Most of the

223

Brewster-Douglass low rise units are officially abandoned.
Some of these abandoned units serve as headquarters and
residents of drug dealers. Obvious safety factors prohibit
police from penetrating these enclosed quarters. Officials
believe that some crime activity occurs in the Brewster-

Douglass high-rises, but not to a significant degree.*23

THE DETROIT URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

The Detroit Housing Department carried out the local
Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program activities in the
Brewster Douglass public housing project. The Detroit
Anti-Crime Program began in July, 1980, and closed in
January, 1982. It consisted of two major program com-
ponents: physical security improvements (hardware) and
patrolling activities (software). As shown on Table 5.5,
approximately $1.3 million in funds from the Comprehensive
Improvement Assistance Program supported the installation of
hardware such as cameras, locks, and fencing around the
elderly high-rises. Installation of cameras eliminated
blindspots and generally unsafe areas of the project by of-
fering constant twenty-four hour per day monitoring. A
central security control room permitted quick detection of
any crime activity and/or socially unacceptable behavior.
The Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program (Public
Housing Modernization) provides money to capital improvement
in public housing to upgrade living conditions, correct
physical deficiencies and achieve operating efficiency and

economy.

224

The second program component consisted of two primary
activities: youth employment and technical assistance. An
interagency copperative agreement between the U.S.

Table 5.5

The Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Funding

Agency/Progzem Amount*

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program $1,352,000
Community Development Block Grant 50,000
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of Youth Employment 474,000
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Office of Criminal Justice Improvements 20,000
TOTAL $1,896,000
LOCAL FUNDS* 619,740

$2,515,740

310% required local match

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Interagency Urbanlinitietivee_Anti-Crime Progrem,
Washington: GPO, March 31, 1980, p. 26., and Interview
with Mr. Clarence White, Detroit Housing Department,
November 10, 1987.

tittitttttt
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S.
Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the
Detroit Housing Department provided funds to support the
software component. The general objective of the Detroit
youth employment component directed the program to:
"provide selected youths, aged 16 - 19 and living
in the [Brewster-Douglass] targeted public housing
development, job skills, training and employment in
and around the developments. Youths aged 20 - 21
also can participate as supervisors. (The training
and employment will fit into the public housing
authority's overall Anti-Crime Work Plan and teach

transferable skills which can lead to future
employment in areas of local labor market demand

225

after Federal funding ends.)"*=3
Specifically, the Detroit youth employment component sought:

1. overall emphasis on "bridge" employment, training,
and counseling that moves away from illegal
activities or legal "secondary markets” jobs and
toward legal "primary market" jobs;

2. implementation of successful strategies used in
the Job Corps;

3. increased employment of tenants as community
service officers, public safety officers, and
lobby monitors;

4. improved training and counseling for tenant
community service officers, public safety
officers, and guards including sensitivity to the
needs, values and life styles of tenants;

5. increased training and employment of tenants to
lead organized tenant anti-crime efforts and to
increase tenant cohesion;

6. increased training and employment of tenants in
anti-crime and related services - including
activities like recreation, education, and
cultural pursuits that help bring tenants
together;

7. increased training and employment of tenants to
install security hardware, make related capital
improvements and architectural changes, and help
maintain and rehabilitate public housing
authority property.‘=‘

Youth employment activities included the hiring of
youth security patrols, crew leaders, and community security
organizers. The program hired thirty-eight youths as
security patrols in the age range of sixteen to nineteen
that resided in the Brewster-Douglass complex and surround-
ing areas. The component gave preference to those youths in
school or to those youths planning to return. Duties of the

security patrol included:

1. patrol and inspection of assigned paths, walks,
streets, lobbies, stairways and grounds for
criminal and disorderly conduct;

226

2. report criminal and/or socially unacceptable
behavior to Security Headquarters on the site;

3. escort senior citizens to and from their residents
when requested;

4. refer persons in need to appropriate agency or
service;

5. cooperate and assist in the Victim/Witness efforts
and the Block/Lobby/Hour Watch Program.

Security Patrol members received seven weeks of training
through the Detroit Police Academy and through the on-site
Security Coordinator. Those that successfully completed the
training had the opportunity to become Police Cadets through
the Police Department's Cadet Program, and when job
availability warranted, a Police Trainee through the Police
Academy.

Crew Leaders or supervisors that consisted of six
youths (age twenty to twenty-one) had the responsibility for
overall supervision of security patrol members as they ex-
ecuted their duties listed above. The Crew Leaders also at-
tended the seven week training session with an opportunity
for future training at the Police Academy as a Police
Trainee. Finally, the program hired seven Community
Security Organizers that had the responsibility to assist
the on-site Crime Coordinator in the development of the lo-
cal software component of the Anti-Crime Program.

The second activity of the patrolling component in-
volved technical assistance. The overall program objective
of this activity set the direction for the Housing Depart-

ment to acquire technical assistance through hiring a local

227

on-Si

anti-

Lobby
Progr
Victi
the a

staff

:roh:
lObe
moni‘
lEdi.
0n -5
lorh
3‘. n
leig
lacr

BGar

on-site Anti-Crime Coordinator to develop and improve an
anti-crime strategy for Brewster-Douglass. Specifically,
the Coordinator and his assistant developed and directed the
Lobby Attendant Program, the Neighborhood Block Watch
Program, the Welcome New Neighbor Program, the
Victim/Witness Program, and oversaw day to day operations of
the Anti-Crime Program. Security patrols, the Anti-Crime
staff, and other agencies carried out these programs.*33

The Lobby Attendant program placed security booths in
the front lobby of each building. The controlled entrance
prohibited anyone entering the lobby until contact with the
lobby attendant had been established. In addition, floor
monitors listened for disturbances on their floor and im-
mediately contacted the attendant, who in turn contacted the
on-site security office when disturbances arose. The Neigh-
borhood Block Watch Program, modeled after the City's effort
of neighborhood watches set up in other more middle class
neighborhoods of the city, put into place a surveillance
mechanism for the project grounds. The Tenant Security
Board consisted of representatives of different areas of the
project site and represented the different types of struc-
tures on the site, defined various "troubled" areas where
crimes took place. Security patrols stationed in the vul-
nerable areas deterred any potential criminal activity. The
Welcome the New Neighbor Program, designed for new tenants,
showed the new tenants that "somebody cared". It extended
the family concept which is important to control negative

youth behavioral patterns. The program carried out its

228

purpose through "get together“ meetings with new tenants,
block watch program participants, and other on-site security
patrol personnel. The Victim/Witness program assisted
victims and witnesses of crime in and around Brewster-
Douglass in dealing effectively with crime trauma, the
hardships crime activity placed on the victims and wit-
nesses, and procedures and requirements of the criminal jus-
tice system.*=‘ Generally, the program involved short-term
crisis intervention counseling, immediate transportation,
emergency housing, personal protection of individuals, crime
scene clean-up, information and notification of arrest and
trials, baby-sitting, and public education and training.

The Detroit Anti-Crime Program met each of the seven
basic program components mandated by HUD in the following
manner. Improved management of public safety occurred with
the hiring of an on-site Anti-Crime Coordinator. This posi-
tion developed, oversaw, and coordinated local anti-crime
efforts. Improved management techniques included a training
program for housing personnel to help them identify housing
security problems, relocation of families out of the high-
rises where the elderly are predominant, a stronger and more
enforceable eviction policy for continuously disruptive and
anti-social tenants, placement of tenants who fall in the
upper income range. The hardware component of the
Brewster-Douglass effort 'm rov d he h sica desi n
Brewster-Douglass through installation of a twenty-four hour
camera surveillance system designed to readily detect

criminal behavior and/or socially unacceptable behavior.

229

This activity eliminated ”blind spots” conducive to criminal
behavior; the fences restricted movement of persons (with
the potential to commit criminal activity) from entering
spaces deemed "not public“. The youth employment program
actively involved tenante in fighting crime as well as
employedlyouthe that resided at Brewster-Douglass. The
anti-crime services, such as elderly escorts made the
project and the immediate area safer for the elderly tenants
living at the demonstration site. The sense of security
given to the elderly freed them to venture out and take ad-
vantage of amenities located in their neighborhood. The
Victim/Witness program, which assured anonymity in reporting
crimes and the block/lobby watch program, further reduced
the fear of crime in and around the public housing site.
Participation by the Detroit Police Department and the
Detroit Police Academy allowed the opportunity for local law
enforcement officers to work with public housing youths,
which resulted in respect and corporation among youths, and
seneigivigy from ghe gglige officers.

Finally, area-aide ggblic/grivate gartnershigs formed

with several agencies in addition to the Detroit Police
Department and the Detroit Police Academy offered various
Osocial services to Brewster residents. The Urban League of
Detroit worked with project and neighborhood youths to
define those as “troubled" and re-involve them in the educa-
tional process. In addition, the League provided youthful
parents (those parents having children at a very young age)

with the tools necessary for positive parenting. The

230

Detroit Health Department provided personal time for the
prevention of drug and alcohol abuse in the "youth-at-risk"
category. The Wayne County Department of Social Services
assigned case workers to the project site to identify
problem families. Community Medical Management provided
health care, free screening examinations, as well as profes-
sional referrals when needed. The City's Comprehensive
Youth Services (CYS) program developed recreational
programs, assisted in the organization of the Neighborhood
Watch Program, and offered youth employment counseling.
Finally, the City of Detroit Senior Citizens Department
provided information and referral services to the elderly

tenants.*37

PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The study design for the Detroit Anti-Crime Program
implemented at Brewster-Douglass is an outcome evaluation
that uses the "non-equivalent control-group design", and
visual interpretations of scattergrams that plot crime
rates.*3' Interpretations from scattergrams will strengthen
overall conclusions presented in the statistical analysis.
The non-equivalent control-group design compares evaluation
criteria (crime) variables of two groups: the program group
that consists of the public housing site that participated
in the demonstration program (Brewster-Douglass), and the
control group that consists of a similar public housing site
that did not participate in the program (Jeffries Homes).

0f the twenty public housing projects in Detroit, Jeffries

231

Homes is the most comparable with the Brewster-Douglass
project. Several variables are considered in choosing Jef-
fries Homes as the control group site: age of the project,
location with respect to downtown, neighborhood amenities,
on-site amenities, physical characteristics of the site, age
distribution of the tenant population and socioeconomic
characteristics of the tenant population. Refer to Table
1.1 in Chapter I for specific characteristics of these two
sites.

Most all the threats to internal validity are satisfied
when program and control groups are comparable.*=’ Threats
to internal validity refer to the "reasons why causal inter-
pretations [of the data set] may not be permitted.”*3°
Maturation and history are two threats that refer to changes
in program participants due to an influence(s) not neces-
sarily related to the program. History refers to specific
events that may occur and change the behavior of program
participants. Maturation describes natural changes that
take place in program participants over a period of
time.*3‘.

Collecting data at several observations over periods of
time is a way of satisfying additional threats to internal
validity. The likelihood of confusing the program's effect
with the maturation process is significantly reduced when a
time-series design is incorporated. In addition, effects of
history are more easily detected by the utilization of time

series, than by the use observations over one or two time

232

periods only.*3= Comparison with groups not served by the
program in a time series manner "should be considered when
controlled, randomized experiments are not feasible."“~3‘3

To determine on ground results in the Detroit ex-
perience, crime data for major crimes reported over a period
of time from 1976 to 1985 for each year are evaluated for
the Brewster-Douglass public housing project (program group)
and the Jeffries Homes project site (control group). The
program began in July, 1980, and it officially closed out in
January, 1982. Crime variables included in the outcome
evaluation are major crimes reported: murder, rape, rob-
bery, assaults, burglary, larceny and car theft. Data for
arsons reported on a project basis are not available.

This research employs the Mann Whitney U Test and the
Chi Square Test to determine whether there is a significant
difference in the rates of each evaluation criteria between
the program and control group, before and after introduction
of the Anti-Crime Program.*3‘ The Mann Whitney test deter-
mines whether a difference in the two independent samples
(control and program group) is statistically significant
meaning the samples come from different populations. The
data is standardized that yield crime variable rates per
10,000 public housing units. Chapter I discusses specifics
of the Mann Whitney test and application of the statistic.
Theoretically, there should be no statistically significant
difference between control group and program group crime

rates before Anti-Crime Program activities, and there should

233

be a statistically significant difference between program
and control groups after the program (samples from different
populations) if the program actually had an effect on crime.

In applying the Mann Whitney U Test, the null and al-
ternate hypotheses are stated for each crime variable as
follows:

H-: No significant difference exist in (crime

variable) rates between Brewster-Douglass and Jef-

fries Homes and the differences are a result of

chance variation and therefore not significant.

H,: A statistically significant difference exist

in (grime variable) rates between Brewster-Douglass

and Jeffries Homes and the rate at Brewster-

Douglass is lower (or higher) than that found at

Jeffries Homes.
Table 5.6 depicts calculated values of U. When the calcu-
lated value of U is less than or equal to the critical value
of U, the null hypothesis is rejected. Results indicate
that there is a statistically significant difference in rob-
bery, assaults and burglary rates between Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries and the rates of each of the three crimes at
Brewster-Douglass is less than those found at Jeffries
Homes. Mann Whitney, thus indicates that a significant
relationship exist between introduction of the Anti-Crime
Program and the reduction of robbery, assaults, and burglary
rates.

To strengthen overall outcome conclusions, the Chi
Square Test is applied to determine whether there is a sig-
nificant difference between crimes reported (actual fre-

quencies) between the Brewster-Douglass site and the Jef-

fries site in terms of before and after program introduction

234

of the Anti-Crime Program. Table 5.7 depicts how the data

is employed by crime variable in the Chi Square Test. The

contingency table shows the total number of murders that
Table 5.6

Mann Whitney U Test
Calculated Values of U by Offense

 

 

Before Introduction‘ After IntroductionP

Offense Celculeied U Celculated U
murder 2 16

rape ‘0‘ 11.5
robbery 5 *7“
assaults 6.5 '2“
burglary 8 '5‘

larceny ‘1‘ 9

auto thefts 4 13

 

‘denotes significant difference

‘critical value of U=1, with n.=4 and ny=4, significance
level 8 .05, one tailed.

9critical value of U=7, with nu-6 and ny=6, significance
level - .05, one tailed.

‘These two anomalies are essentially negated since dif-
ferences calculated in the "posttest" are insignificant.

6When the calculated value of U is less than or equal to
the critical value of U, the null hypothesis is rejected.
The null hypothesis is stated as H-=X=Y; Alternate
hypotheses are stated as either H3=X>Y or H,=X<Y.

titltttttttl
took place at the Brewster/Douglass site and the Jeffries
Homes site before and after introduction of the Anti-Crime
Program. The test statistic for the two sample two category
situation is calculated using the following formula:

X2 = n(iAD - BCL ' n/Z)2
(A + B) (C + D) (A + C) (B + D)

735

where n represents the total frequency of murders at the

Brewster/Douglass and

Jeffries sites; A, B, C and D refer to

the number (or frequencies) of murders in each of the cells

of the contingency table; and 2AC - ED: is the absolute

value of the difference between A times B and 8 times C.

Approximate tables of
determine whether the
after the program are
of X‘2 is greater than
tremely unlikely that
the program is due to

more likely to be due

critical values of X2 are consulted to
difference in crime rates before and
significant. If the calculated value
the critical value, then it is ex-

the crime variable before and after
chance. Rather, the difference is

to the Anti-Crime Program.*3=

Table 5.7

Chi Square Contingency Table

for

Frequency of Murders

(by project site)

Total Murders

1976-1979 1980-1985
Before Program After Program

 

 

 

Brewster : i B 1 (8+8)
Jeffries 2 i D Z (C+D)
(A+C) (B+D) N

#*****ttt¥

236

In applying the Chi Square Test, the null and alternate
hypotheses are stated for each crime variable as follows:

He: There is no difference between Brewster-

Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number of (crime

varieble) before and after the program.

Hi: There is a significant difference between

Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number

of (crime variable) before and after the program.

Table 5.8 depicts calculated values of X2 by offense.
The table indicates that the calculated value of X2 for as-
saults, burglary and auto thefts is greater than the criti-
cal value = 3.84. Therefore, the null hypothesis is
rejected for these three crimes. At this point a conclusion
cannot be made that a reduction occurred at the Brewster-
Douglass site because the Chi Square Test does not indicate
where the difference is found. It is necessary to refer to
contingency tables to determine where the difference is
found. Inspection of the contingency table (Table 5.8)
shows that the difference in the number of assaults and
burglaries is found at the Brewster-Douglass (program group)
between 1980 - 1985. In addition, the difference in the
number of auto thefts are found at the Brewster-Douglass
site before the program, thus negating auto thefts as being
reduced by the Anti-Crime Program. Chi Square thus indi-
cates a significant relationship between introduction of the
Anti-Crime Program and reductions in assaults and burglary
rates. Combining results of Mann Whitney and Chi Square
give an indication that assaults and burglaries are the only
two of the seven crime variables that have a significant

relationship with Anti-Crime Program introduction.

237

Table 5.8

Chi Square Contingency Table of Crimes Reported
and Calculated Values of X2 by Offense

 

1980-1985
actual freg.

 

OFFENSE 1976-1979
by Prgject XS‘ actual freg.
MURDER N/Ab
Brewster-Douglass 3
Jeffries Homes 0
RAPE 0.67
Brewster-Douglass 4
Jeffries Homes 9
ROBBERIES 0.40
Brewster-Douglass 71
Jeffries Homes 114
ASSAULTS t9.80°-‘
Brewster-Douglass 59
Jeffries Homes 68
BURGLARIES t9.30=-'
Brewster-Douglass 70
Jeffries Homes 91
LARCENIES 2.67
Brewster-Douglass 28
Jeffries Homes 62
AUTO THEFTS 10.05=-'
Brewster-Douglass 55
Jeffries Homes 106

91
169

33
91

73
184

292
426

202
208

 

Source: City of Detroit Police Department.

l"indicates significant difference
‘critical value of X2=3.84 with df=1 at a
level. If X2>critical X3,

.05 significance
then He is rejected.

.calculated value for the number of murders cannot be
determined because the total number of murders were 14.
Total frequencies must be greater than or equal to 20 to
use the Chi Square Test.

=Alternate hypotheses that are accepted indicate a
difference between Brewster-Douglass'and Jeffries Homes in
the number of offenses reported before and after the Anti-

The test does not indicate where the

Crime Program ONLY.
difference is found.

is necessary to make that determination.

A visual inspection of the raw data

dCritical value calculations indicate that there is a

238

Table 5.8 (continued)

 

significant difference between Brewster-Douglass and
Jeffries Homes in the number of assaults reported before
and after the program. Inspection of the raw data indicate
that the difference is found at the Brewster-Douglass site
between 1980 and 1985.

“Critical value calculations indicate that there is a signi-
ficant difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries
Homes in the number of burglaries reported before and after
the program. Inspection of the raw data indicate that the

difference is probably found at Brewster-Douglass between
1980 and 1985.

'Critical value calculations indicate that there is a signi-
ficant difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries
Homes in the number of auto thefts reported before and
after the program. However, inspection of the raw data
indicate that the difference is found at the Brewster-
Douglass site BEFORE program implementation.

*ttttt*t¥ttt
Scattergrams that represent the time-series non-
equivalent control-group design as applied to the crime
variables for the study years 1976-1985 give an indication
that the Detroit Anti-Crime Program did not have a strong
effect on crime reduction at the Brewster-Douglass site.
Using statistical analysis alone to prove success can be
missleading. Reported murders at Brewster-Douglass and Jef-
fries projects were not found to be significantly related to
the Detroit Anti-Crime program. However, a scattergram of
murder rates show an increase of murders reported at both
sites just before the anti-crime program with a reduction
occurring during and after the program at the Brewster site.
Reported murders at the Brewster site fell to zero within a

year after program termination. At the same time a steady

fall of reported murders occurred at the Jeffries site

239

(Figure 5.3). Although not statistically significant, a
drop in murders is socially significant, particularly for
those families that did not have to endure death.

The reported number of rapes at Brewster-Douglass
remained relatively stable before program introduction with
the exception of an increase just before the anti-crime
program began (Figure 5.4). An increase in reported rapes
occurred at both project sites during anti-crime program im-
plementation. The number of reported rapes fell at both
sites after termination of the program. Again, although not
statistically significant, the drop in reported rapes has a
social significance particularly related to the fear genera-
ted by all tenants when rapes occur. Reported rapes at the
Brewster site dropped from three in 1982 to zero in 1984.

Reported robberies fluctuated widely particularly
before program introduction (Figure 5.5). Robberies
declined at both sites in the late 19705 and then began to
increase two years before the program. The increase con-
tinued at the Brewster site during program implementation.
Both sites experienced a drop in reported crimes in the year
after program termination. Reported robberies then doubled
at the Brewster site. Mann-Whitney indicated that a sig-
nificant relationship exist between reported robberies and
introduction of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. Figure 5.5
suggests that the significance is related more to the large
fluctuation of reported robberies before the program versus

some stabalizing of yearly robberies after the program

240

rather than actual program implementation. A rise in the
robbery rate at Brewster-Douglass further solidifies this
idea.

Both the Mann-Whitney and Chi Square test indicate a
significant relationship between reported assaults and im-
plementation of the anti-crime program at Brewster-Douglass.
However, the scattergram clearly shows that reported
assaults began to stabalize at the Brewster site before
anti-crime program implementation (Figure 5.6). A general
decline of reported assaults at the Jeffries site began in
1978 and continued throughout the study period. Based on
this evidence, an assumption cannot be made that suggests
any significant relationship exists between a drop in
reported assaults at Brewster-Douglass and implementation of
the anti-crime program.

A significant relationship exists between reported
burglaries and the Anti-Crime Program according to results
of the Mann-Whitney and Chi Square tests. Figure 5.7
reveals that a decline in reported burglaries at Brewster-
Douglass three years before program introduction. A slight
increase in reported burglaries occurred at the Brewster
site during program implementation. A small decrease oc-
curred at Brewster during the first year after program ter-
mination with a larger increase occurring for the remainder
of the study period. The graph clearly shows no real

decline in reported burglaries at Brewster after the anti-

241

crime program. Results of Mann-Whitney and Chi Square can
possibly be explained by the wide fluctuation of burglaries
at the Jeffries site.

Reported larcenies at both study sites took a dramatic
increase before anti-crime program implementation (Figure
5.8). Both sites experienced a small decrease during the
period that the program operated at Brewster. Both sites
experienced an increase in larcenies the year after program
termination. Finally, both sites experienced a major drop
in reported larcenies the last year in this study. The
scattergram as well as Mann-Whitney and Chi Square suggest
no relationship between reported larcenies and introduction
of the anti-crime program at Brewster-Douglass.

A major drop in reported auto thefts occurred at both
study sites in the late 19705 with a dramatic increase oc-
curring around 1980 (Figure 5.9). Reported auto thefts in-
creased slightly at Brewster during initial phases of anti-
crime program implementation while at the same time decreas-
ing at the Jeffries site. This trend reversed itself by the
end of the anti-crime program at Brewster. After the
program, reported auto thefts rose and then dropped sig-
nificantly at Brewster-Douglass. A significant and steady
drop occurred also at Jeffries. Statistical testing and the
scattergram confirm no strong relationship between reported
auto thefts and implementation of the anti-crime program at

Brewster-Douglass.

242

1.1.I-e~,- ‘ac .oo‘s\:~‘-§

number of murders

number of rapes

Figure 5.3

Actual Number of Reported Murders at the Brewster-Douglass

 

 

   

 

 

  

 

and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985
S ' Before I Program I After
‘ I
I I
I l
4 ‘ I I
l
3« I ’}\
I I I ‘\
I, ' ‘\\
ZJ l I \\
I \
\
I \
1. l \\
\
I \
l Brewster \ Jeffries
\
1976 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85
Figure 5.4
Actual Number of Reported Rapes at the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985
1) I l
S-dBefore I Program 1 After
I I
4 ‘ A l
/ \ |
’ l
/ \ I
3 . / \
/ \
/ \
I
24 I \
\
I \
’ I
l 11. I Brewster
l \ .
l l \Jeffries
‘ [ ‘7 r I I j ' 1 F
1976 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85

1,...—

..d.—.—.-

7. .¢.-_:--—

number of robberies

number of assaults

Figure 5.5

Actual Number of Reported Robberies at the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985

50 ‘kBefore Program After

404 \

_._,Z._.__.___.

 

 

 

T T 1

f I
1976 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85

Figure 5.6
Actual Number of Reported Assaults at the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985

 

 

’Before I Program I After
25 d \
/' l l
/ \
f ‘ I ‘
20 j \“ __
I \‘~L
I l \
\
15 - l \
I I x.
I I ‘
10 d l I I \\\geffries
l I \
I l \
5 ‘ I I 1
I I Brewster
l l __
T 1* I I 1 I I V '
1976 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85

number of burglaries

number of larcenies

Figure 5.7

Actual Number of Reported Burglaries at the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985

 

 

 

  

- Before I Program I After
)0 I I
I
I
40‘ I
30‘ I
I
20: I
l
10. l
l
I
I
‘ I I Y I v V '
1976 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 85
Figure 5.8
Actual Number of Reported Larcenies at the Brewster—Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985
I“; ’5‘
a’
\
50 ‘
40‘

30-

20‘

10‘

 

 

1976 '77 '78 .79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85

245

 

 

U1
0

b
0

La.)
0

20

number of auto thefts

...—a
C

Figure 5.9

Actual Number of Reported Auto Thefts at the Brewster-Douglass

and Jeffries Public Housing Projects:

Before

Brewster

1976-1985

 

After

 

 

1976

'77

'78

I

'79

I

'80

246

'81

'83

'84

'85

SUMMARY

Findings presented in this chapter allows for conclu-
sions to be made on Detroit Housing Commission policy incon—
sistencies, crime at the Brewster-Douglass project in rela-
tion to crime in the surrounding neighborhood, and the lack
of success of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. Official
policy of the Detroit Housing Commission that addressed oc-
cupancy has been inconsistent over the years. The public

housing program began by the accommodation of housing for

slum dwellers. Policies later changed to accommodate black
war workers, veterans, low-income families, and elderly.
Policy changes reflected outside stimuli such as World War
II and local/national sentiment. Even when policy mandated
housing for low-income minority families, implementation
tended to redirect the focus to other needs.

The Lower Woodward area has experienced crime problems
since the 1930s because of physical and social instability.
This instability is a direct result of the rapid pace of ur-
banization in the 19405 that put a strain on housing, urban
renewal that devastated the area, and the demolition of
neighborhood churches (by urban renewal) that served as a
stabilizing force in the neighborhood. More recently, crime

activity in the area has exploded because of increased drug

activity.

247

Crime in the Lower Woodward area is fluctual, depending
on location and time of day. Areas with private patrol,
such as the medical center and Wayne State University, have
little crime in the daytime. Crime is most severe in the
Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park, and Jeffries areas. These
areas characteristically have a large number of abandoned
buildings to house illegal activity. Neighborhood at-
tributes that contribute to crime activity in the Brush Park
and Cass areas include the presence of major thoroughfares
such as Woodward Avenue. These thoroughfares contribute to
crimes of morality because they bring in outsiders that seek
prostitutes and pornographic theaters. "Adult” shops en—
courage loitering of criminals. Building shape plays a role
in crime activity. Most structures are old Victorian and
vacant structures that systematically do not have linear ex-
teriors. This design creates blind spots that hide doors
and windows to allow for easy access by criminals. Resi-
dents feel that crime activity is encouraged by the City to
justify plans for demolition of the area and expansion of
the medical and cultural activities nearby.

Street layout in the public housing projects makes it
difficult for police patrols to cruise through the projects.
Crime in Brewster-Douglass became significant in the 1960s
because of a change in tenant selection policies to allow
admission of unstable families to permanently live in public
housing units and because of increased crime activity in the

Brush Park neighborhood. Today, residents of the City view

248

Brewster-Douglass as unsafe. Residents of the project,
however, feel that Brewster-Douglass is relatively safe
since the low-rise family units are now empty. Residents
suggests that the media has given the project a negative
name. Most of the illegal activity takes place in nearby
Brush Park, but the media and city officials think that the
project houses most of the drug activity.

Social instability is perhaps the core reason for crime
proliferation in the Lower Woodward area, particularly the
Brush Park and Cass neighborhoods, and the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries public housing projects. Residents in these
neighborhoods and housing projects are characteristically
poor, uneducated, unemployed (or underemployed), and are on
some form of welfare. Most households are either elderly or
single-parent with no stable male figure present. The
population has a high number of teenagers that are un-
employed, and they have a lot of unstructured free time.

The literature documents these social factors with unstable
living environments and their relationships to high crime
activity. Physical design characteristics facilitate the
mechanism for crime activity to occur when social in-
stability is present.

The study design for evaluating the Detroit Anti-Crime
Program is an outcome evaluation that uses the "time-series
non-equivalent control-group design" and visual interpreta-
tions of scattergrams that plot crime rates. Interpreta-
tions from scattergrams strengthen overall conclusions

presented in the statistical analysis. The "non-equivalent

249

control-group design" compares evaluation criteria (crime)
variable of two groups: the program group that consist of
the public housing site that participated in the demonstra-
tion program (Brewster-Douglass), and the control group that
consist of a similar public housing site that did not par-
ticipate in the program (Jeffries Homes).

To determine on ground results of the Detroit Anti-
Crime program, crime data for major crimes reported over a
period of time from 1976 to 1985 for each year are evaluated
for the program and control group. The Mann Whitney U Test
and the Chi Square Test are employed to determine whether
there is a significant difference in the rates of each
evaluation criteria between the program and control group,
before and after introduction of the Anti-Crime program.
Crime variables included in the evaluation are major crimes
reported: murder, rape, robbery, assaults, burglary, lar-
ceny, and auto theft. Mann Whitney suggest a significant
relationship between reported robberies, reported assaults,
and reported burglaries and implementation of the anti-crime
program at the Brewster site. Chi Square suggest a sig-
nificant relationship exist between reported assaults and
burglaries and implementation of the anti-crime program.

Scattergrams that represent the time-series non-
eguivalent control-group design give an indication that the
Detroit Anti-Crime Program did not have a strong effect on
crime reduction at the Brewster-Douglass site. Mann-Whitney
indicated that a significant relationship exist between

reported robberies and the anti-crime program. A scat-

250

tergram of reported robberies indicate that the significance
is related more to the large fluctuation of reported rob-
beries before the program versus some stabalizing of
reported robberies after the program. A rise in the robbery
rate at Brewster-Douglass after the program further
solidifies this idea.

Both the Mann-Whitney and Chi Square test indicate a
significant relationship between reported assaults, reported
burglaries and implementation of the anti-crime program.
However, a scattergram shows that reported assaults began to
stabalize at the Brewster site before anti-crime program im-
plementation. Also, a general decline of reported assaults
as the Jeffries site began in 1978 and continued throughout
the study period. These findings negate any assumptions
that relate the decrease in reported assaults and implemen-
tation of the anti-crime program. A scattergram of reported
burglaries show a slight increase at Brewster during program
implementation. A small decrease occurred at Brewster
during the first year after program termination. The graph
shows no real decline in reported burglaries at Brewster
after the anti-crime program. Results of the statistical
tests can possibly be explained by the wide fluctuation of
reported burglaries at the Jeffries site.

Overall analysis of crime activity at Brewster reveal
no significant relationship between crime reduction and im-
plementation of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. The Detroit
Anti-Crime program included appropriate program choices, but

implementation of these choices occurred in the wrong sec-

251

tion of the public housing project. Interviews with Detroit
police, project citizens, and Housing Department staff sug-
gests that most of the crime activity before and during
program implementation took place in the low-rise section of
the public housing project. Crime activity was initiated
primarily by neighborhood citizens from the Brush Park
neighborhood and flowed into the low-rise section 0 the
Brewster-Douglass project. All hardware and software
program components were installed and/or implemented in the
high—rise elderly buildings. Detroit Anti-Crime program
designers apparently wanted the program to protect the el-

derly rather than address the root of the crime program.

252

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

‘Detroit Housing Commission Papers, May 1966, City of
Detroit Municipal Reference Library, Detroit, Michigan.

2Detroit Housing Commission, First Annual Report of the
Detroit Housing Commission, 1933. (Typewritten), p. 9.

3Ibid., p. 10.

‘Jean Marie Ernecq, Public Houging in Detroit: Houginq
Policies, Research Report no. 1, (Detroit: Center for Urban
Studies, Wayne State University, 1971), pp. 18-19.

sDetroit Housing Commission, First Annual Report of the
Detroit Housing Commission, 1933. (Typewritten), pp. 19-20.
Also see Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, 1981
Directory of Assisted Rental ngsing in Wayne Countv,and thg
City of Detroit. Volume II: Invgntory and Description of
Assisted Rental Developments, June, 1981, p. 56.

‘ , "A Place to Live: A Program for Expanding
Detroit‘s Low-Rent Housing Facilities," not dated ( circa
19305), p. 5.

7Detroit Housing Commission, First Annual Report of the
Detroit Housing Commission, 1933. (Typewritten), p. 13.

' , Annual Report, 1939. (Typewritten),
p. 27.

’Ibid., p. 57.

*° , Fourth Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1937. (Typewritten), pp. 2-3.

 

 

 

8* , Annual Report, 1939. (Typewritten),
p. 28.

12 , Annual Report, 1938. (Typewritten),
p. 60.

$3 , Annual Report, 1939. (Typewritten),
p. 19.

*4 , "Seventh Annual Report of the Detroit

 

Housing Commission, 1941,” pp. 19-20.

‘9 , Annual Report, 1938. (Typewritten),
p. 65.

“Ibid., p. 66.

253

1.?

Housing Commission, 1941,” p. 36.

*‘lbid., p. 34.

*’lbid., pp. 33-34.

=°Ibid., p. 46.

Zilbid.’ p. 47.

2’ "Eighth Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1942," p. 11.

=3 , "Seventh Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1941,” p. 44.

3‘ "Eighth Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1942," p. 9.

=9 , "Seventh Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1941," p. 38.

3‘ , "Eighth Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1942,” p. 23.

S’Ibid., p. 25.

2' , ”Ninth Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1943," pp. 75-77.

3’ , ”Tenth Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1944,” p. 10.

3* “Eleventh Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1945-1946," p. 11.

3‘ , "Eleventh Annual Report of the Detroit
Housing Commission, 1945-1946, " p. 21.

331bid.’ p. 29.

3‘ "Public Housing in Detroit, 1946-1948,”
p. 11.

3’ "Slum Clearance and Public Housing in
Detroit, 1953,” p. 15.

"Seventh Annual Report of the Detroit

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

254

3"Detroit Housing Commission, "Our City and Its
Progress: A Review of the Activities of the Detroit Housing
Commission for the Period July 1, 1955 through December 31,
1956,“ January 1957, by Bette Jenkins, p. 10.

 

 

 

:7 , "Public Housing in Detroit, 1946-1948,"
p. 13.

3. , ”Public Housing in Detroit, 1948-1949,”
p. 8.

39 , "Public Housing in Detroit, 1949-1950,"
p-9

‘PDetroit Common Council, Detroit Master PlanL 1951,
"Public Housing," not paged.

“Detroit Housing Commission, "Our City and Its
Progress: A Review of the Activities of the Detroit Housing
Commission for the Period July 1, 1955 through December 31,
1956," January 1957, by Bette Jenkins, p. 16.

‘2 , "Review of Progress, 1963," p. 1.

‘3 , "Slum Clearance and Public Housing in
Detroit, 1953,” p. 12.

“ , “Our City and Its Progress: A Review of
the Activities of the Detroit Housing Commission for the
Period July 1, 1955 through December 31, 1956,” January
1957, by Bette Jenkins, p. 17.

‘PJean Marie Ernecq, Public Housing in Dgtroit:
Housing Policie , p. 20.

“‘See Detroit Housing Commission Papers. In 1963, the
Housing Commission had a contract with the Public Housing
Administration for the development of 3,874 units. The
contract was reduced to 500 units because of the lack of
demand.

“’Leonard Freedman, Puglig Hggging-The Policigs of
ngertx, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969),
p. 43.

"Ernecq, Publ'c Ho in 'n Detro't, p. 2.
"Detroit Housing Commission, "Urban Renewal and Public
Housing in Detroit: Reviewing the Activities of the Detroit

Housing Commission for the Period from July, 1953 through
June, 1954," January 15, 1955, p. 7.

255

soDetroit Housing Commission, "Urban Renewal and Public
Housing in Detroit: Reviewing the Activities of the Detroit
Housing Commission for the Period from July, 1953 through
June, 1954," January 15, 1955, p. 12.

5*Ibid., pp. 11-12.

szlbidl’ p. 9.

83John F. Bauman, Public HousingjiRace, and Renewal:
Urbgn Plgnninq in Philadelphiar,1920-1974, (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 186 and 190.

5‘Detroit Housing Commission, "Review of Progress,
1962,“ not paged.

3° , ”Review of Progress, 1963," not paged.
Sb , "Review of Progress, 1964," not paged.

°7Parkins, Rogers, and Associates, Inc., QgtroitgPublic
Housing Managgment Improvement Program, Program XVII-
Hqgginq Conversion/Replacement: Rggource/Neegs Study and
Alternate Design Concepts. Detroit, Michigan, June 1973,
pp. 10-11.

 

a'Detroit Housing Commission Papers.

5"Parkins, Rogers, and Associates, Inc., Detroit
Public Housing Management Improvement Proqrgm. Proqrgm XVII-
Housing Conversion/Replagement: Resource/Needs Study and
Alternate Design Concepts. Detroit, Michigan, June 1973,
p. XVII-49.

 

‘°Detroit Housing Commission, "Annual Report of
Progress, 1967," p. 2.

‘*Telephone conversation with Mr. Leonard Karle,
Detroit Housing Department, Detroit, Michigan, 13 April
1988.

‘3see Arnold R. Hirsch, Mgking the Segond ghetto: Race
a d Hous'n ‘n hi a o 94 - 960, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), pp. 10-11.

‘3Detroit Housing Commission, First Annual Report of
the Detroit Housing Commission, 1933. (Typewritten), p. 18.

“City of Detroit, Planning Department, Woodwgrd Argg

Plannin Re ort, Preliminary Draft, September 1983, pp.
(4.01-1) - (4.01-3).

256

‘°Telephone conversation with Ms. Barbara Rennie,
Detroit Urban League, Detroit, Michigan, 17 May 1988.

“City of Detroit, Planning Department. Woodwgrd Area
P anning,Report, Preliminary Draft, September 1983, pp.
4.01-2 - 4.01-3.

.7Ibide’ D. 4001-40
..Ibide’ p. 4.01-70

"Interview with Cass Corridor resident, Detroit,
Michigan, 7 December 1988.

7°Interview with Councilman Mel Ravitz, Detroit City
Council, Detroit, Michigan, 7 December 1988.

"Interview with Officer Madison, 13th Police Precinct,
Detroit Police Department, Detroit, Michigan, 9 December
1988.

72"Housing: Brewster-Douglas deserves study before
being demolished." Detroit Frgg Press, 5 February 1988,
editorial, p. 10A.

73Ibid.

7‘"Squatters protest plan for housing project.“ Detroit
Eggg_E;g§§, 19 January 1988, sect. A., p. 3.

79"Brewster demolition plan gets City Council
backing,"Qgtroit Frgg Press, 21 June 1990, p. 28.

7"Detroit Housing Commission, First Annual Report of
the Detroit Housing Commission, 1933. (Typewritten), p. 20.

77City of Detroit, Wogdward Area Planning Report,
p. 4.02-12

7.1bide, pp. 3009-5 - 3009-7

"Clarence C. White, "Community Organization,
Participation and Interaction in Renewal Areas of Detroit,"
Master of Public Administration thesis, Wayne State
University, 1964, pp. 33-37.

'°Interview with June Manning Thomas, Urban Planning
Program, Michigan State University, 8 February 1988.

"June Manning Thomas, "Neighborhood Response to
Redevelopment in Detroit," Commgnity Development Journal 20
April 1985, p. 93. (article pp 89-98)

257

'Plnteview with Pastor Louis Johnson, Friendship
(Zhurch, by June Manning Thomas, Michigan State University,
2‘? June 1984 .

‘PIbid., City of Detroit, Woodward Argg Plggninq

Report , p . 4 .02-6.

""Residential Opportunities," circa 1986,
Detroit-Housing Files, City of Detroit Municipal Reference
L.ibrary, Detroit, Michigan.

‘PCity of Detroit, Woodwggd Argg Plgnninq Report,
D. 4002-70

"Ibid.

'7City of Detroit, Planning Department, The Southwest
£3ector: Prglimin§r¥,Draft, March 1983, pp. 1.01-1 - 1.01-3.

"lbid., p. 1.01-4.

"Ibid., p. 4.01-1.

’°lbid., p. 3.01—9.

"Ibid., p. 4.01-5.

”albid., p. 4.01-4.

’3lbid., pp. 4.01-4 - 4.01-6.

"Interview with Dr. Richard Thomas, Urban Affairs
F’I’ogram, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan,
16 May 1988.

’°Frank Viviano, "Community Involvement Can Reduce

Street Crime," in Crime ang Crimingls: Opposing Viewpoints,

3115. David L. Bender and Bruno Leone, 2nd ed. (St. Paul,
I‘D“: Greenhaven Press, 1984), p. 83.

"Ibid., p. 84.

”’Mark LaGory and John Pipkin, Urban Soc'al S ace,
(Eielmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 161-162.

"William L. Price, "Survey to Determine Attitude of
Residents‘ Respecting Crime in the Tenth Police Precinct
Fh’eliminary Report),“ 8 October 1959, Detroit Urban League
Pj‘pers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical
"llbrary, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

258

"Urban Design Studio, "Cass Corridor: Profile and
Policies," December 1976, College of Architecture and Urban
Planning, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, pp. 8-9.

a-‘=’°William L. Price, Bentley Papers.

1-°*Frank Viviano, "Community Involvement Can Reduce
Street Crime,” p.. 85.

*lenterview with a Cass Corridor resident, Detroit,
Michigan, 7 December 1988.

803Interview with Officer Madison, 13th Police
Precinct, Detroit Police Department, Detroit, Michigan,
9 December 1988.

*°‘see U.S., Department of Justice, et al., Reducing
Residentigl Crime and Fear: The Hartforg Neighborhood Crime
Prevention ProgrgmLfExgcutiyg Summggy, by Floyd J. Fowler,
et al., (Washington: Government Printing Office, December,
1979), p. 37.

*°’Interview, Madison.

*P‘Thomas A. Reppetto, Regidentigl Crimp, (Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 50-53.

‘97lnterview with Cass Corridor resident, Detroit,
Michigan, 7 December 1988.

‘°°U.S., Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, Safe and Sgcure Neighporhoods: Physical
Characteristics and Informgl Territorial Control in High gpg
Low Crime Neighborhoods, by Stephanie Greenberg, et al.,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 47.

 

*P’Mark LaGory and John Pipkin, Urban §ocia1 Space,
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1981), pp.

161-162.
a~1“’Interview, Madison.

6“interview with Councilman Mel Ravitz, Detroit City
Council, Detroit, Michigan, 7 December 1988.

*‘31nterview with a Cass Corridor resident, Detroit,
Michigan, 7 December 1988.

‘*3Ibid.

259

**‘lnterview with Dr. Richard Thomas, Urban Affairs
Program, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan,
16 May 1988.

usInterview with the director of a homeless shelter in
the Lower Woodward Area, Detroit, Michigan, 7 December 1988.

1L’~"U.S., Department of Justice, et al., Deterrance of
Crime in and Around Bgsidgncgg, (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1973), pp. 29-31.

‘*’U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Problems
Affecting Low-Rggt Public Housing Projects: A Figld Study
January 1979, by Ronald Jones, et al., (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 32-47.

**'U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Crime in Public
Housing: A Review of ngor Issues ang Sglected Crime
Bgduction Strategies,4yolumg I: A Report, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, August, 1979), p. 13.

 

 

**’U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Problems Affecting Low-Rent Public Housing Projegts: A
Etgld Study January 1979, pp. 32-47; and Telephone
conversation with Mr. Leonard Karle, Detroit Housing
Department, Detroit, Michigan, 13 april 1988. Mr. Karle was
Manager of Brewster-Douglass during Anti-Crime Program
implementation. Specific figures on tenant composition are
not available for Brewster-Douglass for 1975-1985.

*=°Interview with a Brewster-Douglass Homes resident,
Detroit, Michigan, 16 December 1988.

*=*Interview with Dr. June Thomas, Urban Planning
Program, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan,
8 February 1988.

*azlnterview with Officer Madison, 13th Police
Precinct, Detroit Police Department, Detroit, Michigan
9 December 1988.

a~=3Letter and enclosure to the Detroit Housing
Department from Maggie H. Taylor, Cooperative Agreement
Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Administration, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, containing cooperative agreement No. HA-6910
between HUD and the Detroit Housing Department, July 25,
1980.

*z‘lbid.

260

1=*‘9City of Detroit Housing Department, Urban
Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, Final Submittal,
Notice-H79-11(PHA), August 30, 1979.

*P‘Letter and enclosure from Maggie H. Taylor.

1~‘""Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, Final
Submittal.

‘P'Emil J. Posavac and Raymond G. Carey, Program
Evaluation: Mgthods and Case StudiggJ 2nd edition,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985), p. 212.

‘2’Ibid.
*3°Ibid., p. 173.

1--'="*Ibid., pp. 183-184. Also see Donald T. Campbell
and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Ouggi-Experimental
Dgsiqns for Research, (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1963), p. 5.

‘321bid., p. 208.

*33Harry P. Hatry, et. al., Practical Program
Evaluation for State and Locgl Govgrnments, 2nd edition,
(Washington: The Urban Institute Press, 1981), pp. 35-36.

*3‘For further description of these tests, see David
Ebdon, Statistics in Ggoqrgphy, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, Ltd., 1985), pp. 57-60 and 65-71; and R. Hammond
and P.S. McCullagh, Qggntitgtive Techn' ues in Geo ra h ,
2nd edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 170-181
and 199-202.

‘3=David Egdon, Stati t'cs in Geo ra h , 2nd ed., (New
York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1985), pp. 59-60.

261

Chapter VI
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A comprehensive analysis of the Public Housing Security
Demonstration Act of 1978, the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Demonstration Program, and the Detroit Urban Initiatives
Anti-Crime Demonstration Program defines specific strengths
and weaknesses of the Act and program guidelines, and
strengths and deficiencies in the Detroit example. Delinea-
tion of specific strengths and weaknesses allow for recom-
mendations to be made that appropriately address crime in
public housing. Specific recommendations will hopefully
benefit future efforts to address the public housing crime
issue.

The federal Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration
Program and the Detroit Anti-Crime Program from the begin-
ning had no real chance for success. The very nature of
Congressional policy-making does not allow for a rational
process to adequately define problems and develop programs

to solve those problems. Failed past Congressional efforts

262

to address local social ills document this weakness. Most
federal policy initiatives lack adequate structure and con-
tent to assure adequate program success. These issues also
held true for the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act
of 1978, the act that authorized the Anti-Crime Program.

U.S. government policy making is extremely complex, and
often the complexity hampers the development of viable
policy in several ways. First, a plethora of sub-
governments involved in policy making complicate the overall
process. Subgroups are members of the House and/or Senate,
congressional staff members, some bureaucrats, and represen-
tatives of special interests groups and organizations that
have an interest in the area the policy is to address.
Second, the variety of governmental institutions tends to
complicate federal policy making. A geographical dispersion
of federal agencies that will share in development of a
specific policy may very well result in several cities and
states adding input to the overall process.

Congressional policy makers do not follow a systematic
policy-making process because of political and bureaucratic
constraints. To make their job easier, Congressional policy
makers usually take "short cuts" when they formulate policy.
First, public opinion may not be followed because of the
time required to accurately access this opinion. Second,
goals and objectives may not be explicitly stated to save
time on research and interaction among the various
governmental and non-governmental actors involved. Third,

policy makers may consider only one or two alternatives to

263

address the problem defined and collect minimum data and
need analysis to save time. Finally, Congressional members
usually will not oversee programs once they are implemented.

Development and structure of the Anti-Crime Program is
a product of weak federal government policy-making where
political and bureaucratic constraints hamper any success of
federal programs. This deficiency has historically been a
problem with federal government policy-making, particularly
with the war on poverty programs of the 19bOs.‘ Congres-
sional policy—making has a role to protect the needs of in-
terest groups and politics. This direction in policy-making
does not allow for adequate problem definition and implemen—
tation development.

From the beginning, committee debates, congressional
debates and conference committee debates did not appear to
rationally formalize proper intent or direction for an
anti-crime program in the nation’s public housing. Nor did
they give the anti-crime bill high priority in discussion.
Initial Senate committee debates used flawed rationale for
justifying policy that addressed crime in public housing.
Documentation presented in the committee hearings failed to
support the idea that residents of public housing move be-
cause of a lack of residential security.

Initial Senate and House bills contained several inade-
quacies that set the stage for overall program failure at
the federal level and also in Detroit. First, neither bill
gave an indication of the maximum number of projects to be

funded under the Anti-Crime Program. Second, the Senate

264

bill did not develop a framework for coordination efforts
between public housing authority management and local
governments to address crime. Third, the House version
wanted participants in the anti-crime program to cover all
types of projects and tenant populations. This desire
directly conflicted with evidence later presented in com-

mittee hearings that crime in public housing is most severe

in larger projects in larger urban areas, and that smaller,
elderly projects have a low rate of crime. General misun-
derstandings and obvious inconsistencies of need, coupled
with the expressed need of an austere budget resulted in a
low priority for the anti-crime statute in Senate committee
hearings. House committee hearings failed altogether to ad-
dress the issue of crime in public housing.

Congressional floor debates on the crime in public
housing bills lacked in-depth content and appeared superfi-
cial. Rep. Pepper's amendment called for coordination among
various federal agencies to carry out the anti-crime effort.
At the same time, the amendment did not set the framework
for agency participation, nor did the amendment define par-
ticipation responsibility of agencies involved. Second, the
amendment as proposed demanded no increase in budget
authority. Instead, the bill proposed financial support by
money allocated for other purposes. This financial arrange-
ment set the stage for future animosity between program ad-
ministrators and those agencies that had to redefine their

budgets to accommodate funds for the new program. Finally,

265

the amendment received HUD endorsement, but the agency fell
short of a commitment to adequately implement statute objec-
tives set forth by Congress.

Documentation of Senate floor debates of the crime in
public housing issue demonstrated an even weaker coverage
than the House debates. The three Senators that spoke on
the issue expressed their opposition to the anti-crime bill,
but at the same time, they did not express why or on what
basis they made their decisions.

Weaknesses of development and structure of the anti-
crime statute contributed to the inadequacy to address crime
in public housing. The language and overall vagueness of
the statute reflected a lack of accurate research. The law
implied that all public housing residents, especially the
elderly, have suffered from crime and violence. A review of
the literature suggests that a wide variation in crime pat-
terns in public housing sites exist between large/small
cities, types of crimes committed and tenant composition of
the public housing project site. The provision that a
"broad spectrum" of projects be included in the anti-crime
program is a misdirected approach to address crime in public
housing since the literature suggests that crime occurs
primarily in larger projects located in larger urban areas.
This provision coupled with the absence of a ceiling on the
number of projects to be funded virtually makes the

statute's intent ineffective.

266

The statute did not adequately structure the implemen-
tation process. It gave an “intent“ statement only in set-
ting up a coordinated effort between various agencies,
federal and local, in carrying out the provision of the law.
The law did not contain adequate provisions to require
agencies and local governments to work together har-
moniously, nor did the law define agency responsibilities in
carrying out the law.

Program support existed in the form of endorsements and
commitments from HUD (the implementing agency) and several
organized special interest groups such as the National Coun-
cil of Senior Citizens, National Council on Aging, and the
Ad Hoc Coalition for Low Income Housing. But typical of
most federal legislation, solid support and follow-up did
not occur by legislators and support groups during the im-
plementation process. This support is necessary to assure
that policy objectives are properly carried out.

Finally, a change in Presidential Administrations
during program implementation drastically undermined
priority of statute objectives in new presidential policy.
The new Reagan Administration based operational policy that
local issues (such as public housing crime) should be funded
and addressed by local government rather than at the federal
level. Administrative changeover at HUD further weakened an
already low priority program.

The intent and purpose of the statute that authorized
the Anti-Crime Program was an admirable effort to address

crime in public housing. A legislative review of the

267

statute revealed, not surprisingly, that Congress did not
adequately research the basis and frequency of public hous-
ing crime. This inadequacy led to weaknesses in the statute
that significantly reduced chances of the program being suc-
cessful in reducing crime. The most severe weaknesses that
weakened overall program intent and undermined chances of
program success included program participation by projects
not experiencing significant problems, no cap on the number
of projects to participate in the program, no implementation
structure of the program, and a mandate for participation of
specific federal agencies in the program with money that
these agencies had previously allocated for other programs
within their respective Departments. This mandate set the
stage for animosity between participating agencies and HUD.
The statute did adequately address the basic physical and
social causes of public housing crime in the literature.
Given the clear weaknesses of inadequate development
and structure of the Anti-Crime statute, coupled with the
federal governments overall failure rate to address local
social issues, it can be expected that the Detroit Anti-
Crime Program never had a chance of success to reduce crime
activity at Brewster-Douglass. Results of statistical test-
ing and scattergram interpretation of reported crimes over
time at Brewster-Douglass document this assumption.
Application of the Mann-Whitney U Test indicate that a
significant relationship exist between implementation of the
Detroit Anti-Crime Program and the reduction in the number

of reported robberies, assaults, and burglaries after the

268

program. Chi Square analysis suggests a significant
relationship between implementation of the program and a
reduction in the number of reported assaults and burglaries.
Scattergram interpretation negate the significant relation—
ships defined through statistical testing. A scattergram of
reported robberies suggest that the significance is related
more to the large fluctuation of reported robberies before
the program versus some stabilizing of yearly robberies
after the program rather than actual program implementation
(Figure 5.5). Reported assaults began to stabilize at the
Brewster site before anti-crime program implementation
(Figure 5.6). A scattergram of reported burglaries shows no
real decline in reported burglaries at Brewster-Douglass
after the anti-crime program Figure 5.7). Results of Mann-
whitney and Chi Square can be explained by the wide fluctua-
tion of burglaries at the Jeffries site.

Several reasons account for the failure of the Detroit
Anti-Crime program to significantly reduce crime activity at
the Brewster-Douglass public housing project. First,
Brewster-Douglass is located adjacent to neighborhoods that
experience a very high crime rate. Before and during Anti—
Crime program implementation, nearby Brush Park and Cass
areas housed the core of Detroit's drug activity. Drug ac-
tivity coupled with other crimes associated with drug ac-
tivity filtered into the low-rise section of Brewster-
Douglass. Project youths became “runners“ for the drug
dealers, and many low-rise apartments became dope houses.

The Detroit Anti-Crime Program concentrated anti-crime ac-

269

tivity in the high—rise elderly units of Brewster-Douglass
where less crime activity took place. All program com-
ponents such as the installation of cameras and fences, and
patrolling activities were installed in and around the
high-rise units. Detroit Anti-Crime Program designers ap-
peared to be more interested in protecting the elderly who
lived in the high-rise units rather than developing a
program to directly address the cause of crime activity on
the public housing project site. Since most recorded crime
activity occurred in and around the low-rise units, it is
not surprising that statistical analysis revealed no sig-
nificant drop in crime activity during and after anti-crime
program implementation.

An attempt is also made to discern some relationship
between success of crime reduction at Brewster-Douglass by
implementation of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program and ade-
quacy of the federal statute that authorized the anti-crime
program. Two general weaknesses of the statutes may have
contributed to the lack of success of the Detroit program to
reduce crime at the Brewster-Douglass project. First, the
absence of a cap on the number of participants greatly
reduced the scope of local programs and amount of money that
could be made available to each program. In the Detroit
case, a larger program proposal with more funding could have
included the implementation of crime deterrents in the en-
tire Brewster-Douglass project and not just in the high-
rise area. Second, the Anti-Crime Program provided funds

for one year only. The statute contained no provision for

270

maintenance and operation of hardware components after ter-
mination of the program. The Detroit program installed
cameras and fencing in and around the high-rise units.
Operation and maintenance of the system became the respon-
sibility of the Detroit Housing Department after program
termination. An already inadequate and depleted maintenance
budget essentially assured eventual breakdown of the
mechanical surveillance system.

Recommendations

This study documents that local crime issues in public
housing are not best addressed at the federal level for many
reasons previously discussed. Other alternatives to con-
sider in addressing public housing crime include:

1) local crime intervention at Brewster-

Douglass only;
2) local crime intervention at Brewster
Douglass and the surrounding neighborhood;

3) no action on the crime issue.

Local intervention to address crime issues at the
Brewster site without considering the influence that ad-
jacent neighborhood crime has on the Brewster site seems un-
realistic. Evidence clearly indicate that the majority of
crime activity experienced at Brewster is activity that has
filtered onto the project site from nearby neighborhoods
such as Brush Park and Cass. To address crime in one little
corner of a large crime area would be an exercise in
futility. The literature supports the notion that projects

located in high crime neighborhoods almost always have crime

problems themselves.

271

Choosing the alternative to totally ignore the crime
issue is a blatant act of social irresponsibility by the
City of Detroit. Conditions exist in the Lower Woodward
area that now make it feasible to remedy the crime problem
without a large displacement of existing residents. Most
structures in the Brush Park and Cass neighborhoods are
vacant. Those still standing are in such dilapidated state
that they cannot sufficiently house crime activity.

The ideal situation to address local public housing
crime is to let local governments address the issue. Local
crime issues and settings are so diverse that it is impos-
sible for federal legislation to be written and programs
designed to adequately address these social ills in an ade-
quate manner. This fact has been proven over and over
again. In the case of Detroit, this study recommends that
future programs that deal with crime in the Brewster-
Douglass area address the project site as well as the entire
neighborhood. This would be easy in the Brewster case be-
cause the neighborhood is bounded by freeways and by the
Medical Center and Wayne State University, which are areas
with relatively low crime activity. Wayne State and the
Medical Center form relatively crime free boundaries. The
freeways make it difficult for crime activity from the other
side of the freeway to filter into the neighborhood in ques-
tion.

Specifically, the following recommendations are made to
eradicate crime in the Brewster-Douglass project and sur-

rounding neighborhood. These recommendations are designed

272

to eradicate some of the core social problems that are
strongly related to neighborhood and public housing crime
activity. The activities will foster a sense of social
cohesion, informal social control, and territoriality.

These social components coupled with a modified physical en-
vironment to discourage criminal activity will make

Brewster-Douglass and the surrounding neighborhood a safer

place to live. This proposal suggest that the neighborhood
and the Brewster site be treated as one unit in terms of im-
proving the neighborhood.

Territoriality occurs when residents feel they have a
sense of control over their housing and neighborhood. The
presence of social cohesion and informal social control
facilitates the presence of territoriality. A sense of con-
trol can be established by the creation of community or-
ganizations with public housing and neighborhood residents
and encourage them to work together and with the police.
Community organizations can serve as a single coordinator to
integrate physical improvement strategies, new policing
strategies, and other resident crime reduction strategies.
The neighborhood community organizations can initiate resi-
dent efforts to improve the neighborhood and reduce criminal
opportunities by working with local county and city offi-
cials to target the area for services to meet specific needs
such as unemployment, health care, increased police protec-

tion, and public transportation.

273

Physical redesign of the neighborhood facilitates a
crime free neighborhood. First, a recommendation is made to
tear down all structures that are unrepairable and
dilapidated. Initiate a program (scattered site public
housing or other subsidy program) to build on sites made
vacant by the demolition. Enforce provisions that public
housing be occupied by stable family units. Another option
is to give scattered site public housing tenants the option
to buy their unit. Use Community Development Block Grant
monies or other funds to rehabilitate private structures
designated as repairable. Allocate city funds to improve
infrastructure in the neighborhood and on the Brewster site.
Suggested improvements include street paving, sidewalk
repair, improved street lighting, sidewalk planting, and
controlled street parking. Rehabilitate the low-rise units
at Brewster-Douglass and mandate that these units be filled
with stable families or elderly people. Erect a small wooden
fence around yard space for each unit in the neighborhood
and Brewster to give a sense of control over the immediate
space outside of each living quarter. Seek alternatives to
redirect thru traffic away from Woodward Avenue and John R
Streets to reduce outside traffic. Redirecting traffic dis-
courages potential offenders from entering the neighborhood
and committing an illegal act. Construct a police sub-
station in the neighborhood with a police team that has
strong relationships with neighborhood and public housing

residents.

274

An effort of this magnitude will take tremendous
cooperation from many City agencies. The Detroit City Coun-
cil must be totally committed and provide the necessary
revenues that will allow these improvements to be made. Im-
provement of the Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park and Cass
areas will help in changing the image of high-rise public
housing in the City, and the improvements will also aid in
improving the negative perception that most people have on
downtown Detroit. Improved perception of the downtown area
is the first step in economic revitalization.

One final comment- our society must change the nega-
tive attitude that has developed toward the lower
socioeconomic segment of our population. An open and ac-
cepting attitude by policy-makers and implementors toward
those that do not fall within the typical middle-class white
male arena is the first step at all levels of government in

formulating viable programs to address society's ills.

275

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

*Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan, The Politigg

of Neglect: Urban Aid From Model Cities to Revenue Sharin ,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), p. 36.

276

APPENDIX

277

PUBLIC HOUSING SECURITY DEMONSTRATION ACT OF 1978

Public Law 95-557

Title II- Housing Assistance Programs

Section 207.
This section may be cited as the "Public Housing
Security Demonstration Act of 1978”.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(1)

(2)

(1)

The Congress finds that-

(A) low-income and elderly public housing
residents of the Nation have suffered sub-
stantially from rising crime and violence,
and are being threatened as a result of in-
adequate security arrangements for the pre-
vention of physical violence, theft,
burglary, and other crimes:

(8) older persons generally regard the fear of
crime as the most serious problem in their
lives, to the extent that one-fourth of all
Americans over 65 voluntarily restrict their
mobility because of it;

(C) crime and the fear of crime have led some
residents to move from public housing pro-
jects;

(D) an integral part of successfully providing
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
low-income persons is to insure that the
housing is secure;

(E) local public housing authorities may have
inadequate security arrangements for the
prevention of crime and vandalism; and

(F) action is needed to provide for the security
of public housing residents and to preserve
the Nation's investment in its public housing
stock.

It is, therefore, declared to be the policy of the

United States to provide for a demonstration and

evaluation of effective means of mitigating

crime and vandalism in public housing projects,

in order to provide a safe living environment for

the residents, particularly the elderly residents,

of such projects.

The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

shall promptly initiate and carry out during the

fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978, to the
extent approved in appropriation Acts, a program
for the development, demonstration, and eval-
uation of improved, innovative community anti-
crime and security methods, concepts and
techniques which will mitigate the level of crime
in public housing projects and their surrounding

278

(d)

(e)

(2)

(3)

(4)

neighborhoods.

In selecting public housing projects to receive
assistance under this section, the Secretary
shall assure that a broad spectrum of project
types, locations, and tenant populations are
represented and shall consider at least the
following: the extent, nature and quality of
community anticrime efforts in the projects and
surrounding areas; 'the extent, nature and quality
of police and other protective services available
to the projects and their tenants; the demand
for public housing units in the locality, the
vacancy rate, and extent of abandonment of such
units; and the characteristics and needs of
public housing tenants.

In selecting the anticrime and security methods,
concepts and techniques to be demonstrated under
this section, the Secretary shall consider the
improvement of physical security equipment or
dwelling units in those projects, social and
environmental design improvements, tenant aware-
ness and volunteer programs, tenant participation
and employment in providing security services,
and such other measures as deemed necessary or
appropriate by the Secretary. Particular atten-
tion shall be given to comprehensive community
anticrime and security plans submitted by public
housing authorities which (i) provide for
coordination between public housing management
and local law enforcement officials, or (ii)
coordinate resources available to the community
through programs funded by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department
of Labor, the Community Services Administration,
and ACTION, or other Federal or State agencies.
In carrying out the provisions of this section,
the Secretary shall coordinate and jointly target
resources with other agencies, particularly the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
the Department of Labor, the Community Services
Administration, and ACTION.

The Secretary shall initiate and carry out a survey of
crime and vandalism existing in the Nation's public
housing projects. The survey shall include the nature,
extent and impact of crime and vandalism and the nature
and extent of resources currently available and
employed to alleviate crime and vandalism in public
housing.

The Secretary shall report to the Congress not later
than eighteen months after the date of enactment of

279

(f)

this Act. Such report shall include the results of the
survey on crime and vandalism in public housing;
findings from the demonstration and evaluation of
various methods of reducing the level of crime; and
legislative recommendations, if appropriate for (A) a
comprehensive program to increase security in public
housing projects and (B) increasing the coordination
between anticrime programs of other State and Federal
agencies that may be used by public housing author-
ities. Any recommendations shall include estimated
costs of such programs.

Of the additional authority approved in appropriation
Acts with respect to entering into annual contributions
contracts under section 5(c) of the United States
Housing Act of 1937 for the fiscal year beginning

on October 1, 1978, the Secretary may utilize up to
$12,000,000 of such authority in the fiscal year
beginning on October 1, 1978, for the establishment

of the public housing security demonstration program
authorized by this section.

280

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