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CRIME IN DETROIT PUBLIC HOUSING

by

Herbert Pennell Norman, Jr.

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT
CRIME IN DETROIT PUBLIC HOUSING

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The purpose of this research is to determine whether the development and structure of the federal statute that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public housing, and to determine what relationship existed between implementation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and crime rate change at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site. The federal program provided money to thirty-nine selected public housing authorities from mid-1980 through mid-1982 to address crime in public housing.

The original hypotheses are that development and structure of the statute adequately addressed public housing crime, and a positive relationship exist between the Detroit Anti-Crime Program and crime rate change at the Brewster site. The methodology to test the hypotheses involves both archival sources and an analysis of secondary data on crime. The Mann-Whitney U Test and Chi Square along with interpretations from scattergrams are employed to determine if a significant relationship exist between implementation of the Detroit program and crime reduction at Brewster-Douglass after program implementation.

Inadequate development and structure of the Anti-Crime statute, the federal government's overall failure rate to address local social issues, and local crime activity in and around the Brewster site canceled any chances for the Detroit Anti-Crime Program to reduce crime activity. Analysis of secondary data confirmed this assumption. This study recommends that future actions to address public housing crime, particularly in the Detroit case, be developed and implemented at the local level. The program must address the entire public housing project site and the neighborhood surrounding the project.

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To my Mom and Dad

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program provided federal money to thirty-nine selected public housing authorities from mid-1980 through mid-1982 to address crime in public housing. The purpose of this research is twofold: to determine whether the development and structure of the federal policy (statute) that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public housing; and to determine what relationship exists between implementation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and crime rate change at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) responded to the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 and President Carter's National Urban Policy with this Demonstration program. The concern for public housing residents and crime perpetrated toward them served as the catalyst for Congress and President Carter to

initiate the program. In addition to the \$12 million set aside for development, implementation and evaluation, various federal agencies and local sources spent approximately \$41 million to carry out the intent of the legislation authorizing the program. The Detroit Anti-Crime Program ran from July, 1980 to January, 1982. The Detroit Housing Commission spent approximately \$2.5 million in federal funds to address crime at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site located in the Lower Woodward Area just north of the Central Business District.

The federal Anti-Crime Program consisted of seven basic program components. Flexible component guidelines allowed each demonstration site (such as Detroit) to develop local strategies to complement each unique situation in relation to each component. The seven components consisted of:

1. improved management of public safety;
2. rehabilitated anti-crime facilities and better physical security design;
3. increased involvement of tenants in fighting crime;
4. more employment of youths;
5. improved anti-crime services for elderly residents, drug abusers, project youths, and victims;
6. additional and more sensitive police and law enforcement;
7. area-wide public/private partnerships targeted on public housing sites as well as surrounding neighborhoods.¹

Past studies of the Anti-Crime Program evaluate various components and on-ground experiences of the federal effort. One federal government study documents success in the establishment of partnerships between various federal agencies that participated in the Program. A second federal

government evaluation relates failure of the federal program to past democratic policies in which it was formulated. A private study completed in 1984 addresses implementation of the Anti-Crime Program at two sites in Cleveland and Toledo. The study concludes that implementation problems and their lack of uniformity killed the programs at these two sites. No existing study analyzes development and structure of the federal policy that authorized the Anti-Crime Program. No existing study has determined the effectiveness of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in reducing crime rates at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site.

This study develops through an analysis of the literature the appropriate methods of federal policy development, and the necessary provisions contained in a statute that assures viable program results. Knowledge of methods of appropriate policy development will aid in an understanding of how a statute's overall theoretical structure and content are determined. A conceptual knowledge of appropriate policy structure and content will allow a delineation of the strengths and weaknesses of the statute that authorized the Anti-Crime Program. An analysis of secondary data on crime at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site will give an idea of the relationship of crime rate change and implementation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. Hopefully, some conclusions can be drawn between overall policy adequacy and the effectiveness of the Detroit Program.

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This study follows a body of policy implementation theory called systems approach to political life. This approach allows the analysts to think in terms of inputs from outside the administrative arena. This approach allows questions to be asked such as to what extent are policy outputs of administrative agencies and are outcomes of administration decisions consistent with the original policy? What effect do outcomes have on subsequent legislative decisions?²

The dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter I defines the purpose of the study, the need for the study, the problem statement, the hypothesis, and the methodology. Chapter II explores the theoretical implications of appropriate policy contents and development. An overall framework of policy analysis, of which policy development is one component, is included. Federal government policy making is also discussed. Chapter III reviews the literature of crime in public housing and crime in urban neighborhoods. Chapter IV is concerned with an overall description of the federal Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and the statute that authorized the Program. It summarizes the President's National Urban Policy, and presents a review and analysis of the legislative development of the statute. Chapter V outlines the development of public housing in Detroit, Michigan. The chapter describes the Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes public housing projects, discusses past and present physical and socioeconomic neighborhood conditions of their

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neighborhoods, and discusses crime in the Brewster-Douglass project and the Lower Woodward Area. In addition, the chapter discusses the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and presents the empirical analysis of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. Chapter VI presents major findings from the study. A summary of recommendations are made with suggestions on possible directions of further study.

NEED FOR THE STUDY/PROBLEM

The federal government attempted on two occasions to evaluate the overall performance of the federal Anti-Crime Program. A June, 1980, HUD report discussed program successes within the first 18 months of operation. The report documented success in inter-agency cooperation of program development and funding. The report states, "The Program has established an unprecedented partnership among Federal offices, public housing agencies, tenants, and local governments, [with] ... \$41 million in funds from Federal agencies and local governments [being] leveraged and co-targeted..."³ The report, completed before Program activity started, does not address local implementation activity.

The second report, published by HUD in May, 1985, attempted a final evaluation of the federal program by the evaluation of Program impact on crime in 15 of the 39 demonstration sites. The evaluation consisted of two major components: an evaluation of program implementation, and an evaluation of program impact. The implementation component

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addressed implementation techniques at both the national and local levels. Impact evaluation involved the collection and analysis of recorded crime data. The politically biased report concluded that the program developed under principles which the Reagan Administration has sought to reverse -- "that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems", and that development under these principles flawed the program.⁴

A 1984 study also examined the implementation process of the Anti-Crime Program carried out by the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo, Ohio) and Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, Ohio). The evaluation addressed three general areas: (a) the character of each program, (b) program activity generated, and (c) factors determining the level, shape, and timing of the two programs. The study concluded that invalid participant selection criteria (selection based on political interests rather than site capacity to administer the program), pluralism (too many actors at all levels), economic turndown, new policies that affected federal spending, less-than competent staff, all contributed to the demise of the two case study programs. In addition, the study suggests that policy-making is an on-going process that overlapped with implementation activity. The study found that "once the PHAs submitted proposals and HUD provided funding, policy-making became a continuous ebb and flow that involved HUD staff, local government officials, PHA administrators, and 'street level' bureaucrats."⁵ The implementation

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literature that suggested program activity in terms of distinct phases did not apply in relation to the two housing authority sites analyzed.

As a result, no analysis exists that addresses the development and structure of the statute that authorized the program, nor has an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Detroit program been completed. The problem that the hypothesis, when tested, will answer is: did the federal statute that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately address crime in public housing, and what relationship exist between implementation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and crime rate change at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site?

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS

Two bodies of thought address the relationship between policy formulation and implementation in the context of a program evaluation. In looking at the relationship between formulation and implementation, a fairly simple delineation can be defined between 1) the formulation/adoption of a policy, 2) policy implementation, and 3) policy reformulation. The formulation/adoption "phase" includes activities such as policy formation, legislative support, and authorization (statutes). Policy implementation includes the start-up of a program, the initiation of new guidelines and procedures, and agency go ahead to begin the tasks that must be undertaken to implement the policy. Finally, policy

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reformulation usually is carried out by initial policy makers with the "fine-tuning" based upon successes and failures of program implementation, during the program or after completion.

On the one hand, some scholars do not conceptually define distinctions between the "phases" of program implementation. This view, referred to as the adaptive or interactive approach, emphasizes that "adjustments take place between goals and strategies among various actors throughout the process to the point of rendering the formulation-implementation distinction meaningless."⁴ Similarly, some scholars, while rejecting the altering of initial goals and objectives, do advocate the modification of goals and programs to meet various unforeseen constraints and changing circumstances. This approach is referred to as policy "redesign," which should not be confused with policy design. On the other hand, scholars view a distinction between the three phases as necessary. Mazmanian and Sabatier suggest that the distinction should be maintained. The policy "redesign" argument is based on the assumption "that objectives evolve continuously as a result of the interaction among a myriad of actors or as a response to new circumstances . . . [making] evaluation of goal attainment . . . impossible." More importantly, "viewing policy-making as a seamless web obscures one of the principle normative and empirical concerns . . . the division of authority between elected officials... and appointed... administrators."⁷

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This research accepts the former position that a distinct delineation between the "phases" of program implementation is not realistic. Rather, the policy redesign concept where goal modification and program modification are necessary to meet unforeseen constraints and changing circumstances is necessary, particularly for federal programs that address defined problems that may vary in scope and content from situation to situation.

The hypotheses of this research are stated as follows:

- 1) The development and structure of the federal policy (statute) that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program were formulated in such a way to adequately address the crime problem in public housing.
- 2) A positive relationship exist between implementation of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program and crime rate change at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology to test the hypotheses involves both archival studies and an analysis of secondary data on crime. A review of the literature establishes a conceptual framework of the field of policy analysis. A discussion on policy-making which is one of several components of the framework sets the stage for a discussion of Congressional policy-making and its constraints. A review of the literature on crime in public housing is also presented. Establishment of a theoretical background of policy-making practices (development), appropriate policy contents (theoretical structure), and establishment of a theoretical

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base of crime in public housing, helps to determine adequacy of development and structure of the Anti-Crime statute to address crime in public housing. An analysis of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program gives an indication of the relationship between program implementation and crime rate change at the Brewster-Douglass project site. Hopefully, a relationship between the Detroit program and adequacy of the theoretical structure of the statute can be determined.

Detroit is a viable site to analyze for several reasons. First, Detroit is not among the programs evaluated in the final evaluation completed by HUD in 1985, therefore no attempt has been made to determine success/failure of their program. Second, the City of Detroit itself has a reputation of high incidences of crime and violence. Before program implementation, Detroit's rate of serious crimes known to police ranked the fourth highest among twenty-three midwest cities (9,416 serious crimes per 100,000 population in 1977). Detroit ranked in first place among the twenty-three cities as having the highest percent of serious crimes labeled as "violent".⁶ Third, the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site, the location of Detroit's Anti-Crime program, has had a history of being crime ridden, a characteristic of larger public housing projects. In addition, a pronounced presence of criminal youth gangs existed in the Brewster-Douglass complex before implementation of the Anti-Crime Program.⁷

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The empirical research strategy that keeps in check all possible threats to internal validity is the classic experimental design that employs random assignment of participants to the program or to a control group.¹⁰ A program's effectiveness is assessed by systematically comparing specific changes in the program group and the control groups (participants not benefiting from the program) over time. This research cannot randomly assign participants to a program or control group because to do so, the researcher has to be involved in the site selection process. Site selection took place approximately eight years before the conception of this study. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development officially considered the thirty-nine public housing projects chosen for participation in the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (Detroit was one of the thirty-nine sites) to be the worst in terms of crime occurrence in the nation.

The study design for this analysis is a "non-equivalent control-group design that incorporates a time-series approach as described by Posavac and Carey.¹¹ Generally, the non-equivalent control-group design compares evaluation criteria variables of two groups: the program group that consisted of the public housing site that participated in the Anti-Crime Program (Brewster-Douglass), and the control group that consisted of a similar public housing site that did not participate in the program (Jeffries Homes). Of the twenty housing projects in Detroit, Jeffries Homes is the most comparable with Brewster-Douglass (Figure 1.1).

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Several variables are considered in choosing Jeffries Homes as the control group site: age of the project, location with respect to downtown, neighborhood amenities, on-site amenities, physical characteristics of the site, age distribution of the tenant population, and socioeconomic characteristics of the tenant population (Table 1.1).

Most of all the threats to internal validity are satisfied when program and control groups are comparable.¹² Threats to internal validity refers to the "reasons why causal interpretations [of the data set] may not be permitted."¹³ Maturation and history are two threats that refer to changes in program participants due to an influence(s) not necessarily related to the program. History refers to specific events that may occur and change the behavior of program participants. Maturation describes natural changes that take place in program participants over a period of time.¹⁴

Collecting data over periods of time is a way of satisfying additional threats to internal validity. The likelihood of confusing the Program's effect with the maturation process is significantly reduced when a time series design is used. In addition, effects of history are more easily detected utilizing time series, than using observations over one or two time periods only.¹⁵ Hattry suggests that comparisons with groups not served by the program in a time series manner "should be considered when controlled, randomized experiments are not feasible."¹⁶

Between the study years 1976 and 1985, Brewster

Location of Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Public Housing Projects



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Table 1.1

Characteristics of Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Homes, December 1980

| <u>Variable</u> | <u>Brewster-Douglass</u> | <u>Jeffries</u> |
|--|--------------------------|-----------------|
| YEAR BUILT | 1938-41;1953 | 1955 |
| PROXIMITY TO CBD | adjacent | adjacent |
| PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS | | |
| family 2BR | 247 units | 299 units |
| family 3BR | 280 | 345 |
| family TOTAL | 563 | 715 |
| elderly Total | 1386 | 1456 |
| total units | 1949 | 2171 |
| high-rise | yes | yes |
| low-rises | yes | yes |
| townhouses | yes | yes |
| ON-SITE AMENITIES | | |
| parking | yes | yes |
| playground | yes | yes |
| day-care | yes | no |
| rec/lounge | no | yes |
| dining | no | yes |
| secured lobby | no | yes |
| NEIGHBORHOOD AMENITIES (within 1/2 mile) | | |
| food store | yes | yes |
| drug store | yes | yes |
| clothing store | no | no |
| library | no | yes |
| community center | no | yes |
| parks | no | no |
| schools | no | yes |
| swimming | no | yes |
| medical facilities | yes | no |

Source: Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, 1981 Directory of Assisted Rental Housing in Wayne County and the City of Detroit, Volume II: Inventory and Description of Assisted Rental Development, June 1981.

Douglass experienced a total of 993 crimes reported and Jeffries Homes experienced a total of 1542 crimes reported, or approximately fifty-five percent more crimes reported than Brewster. This research makes the assumption that crime rates at the two project sites are not entirely similar enough to rule out some concerns of regression as a major internal validity problem. The non-equivalent control group design does not totally control regression as an internal validity issue. Campbell and Stanley state:

"In general, if either of the comparison groups has been selected for its extreme scores on O or correlated measures, then a difference in degree of shift from pretest to posttest between the two groups may well be a product of regression rather than the effect of ... [the Program]." (O represents some process of observation or measurement).¹⁷


However, incorporation of the time series experiment will control the regression factor. Campbell and Stanley suggests that:

"Regression effects are usually a negatively accelerated function of elapsed time and are therefore implausible as explanations of an effect at observation points after program introduction."¹⁸

The time series non-equivalent control-group design is hypothetically diagrammed as shown in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2

Time Series Non-Equivalent Control-Group Design



Generally, the following steps are followed to carry out the empirical analysis:

- 1) identify evaluation criteria;
- 2) identify public housing project to be included in the control group;
- 3) collect data for each defined time period for program and control groups identified;
- 4) compare value changes in criteria of the program and control groups; determine significance of changes using the appropriate statistical tool;
- 5) identify any plausible explanations of changes not related to the Anti-Crime program; estimate their effect on the data if explanations have been defined.

To determine on ground results in the Detroit experience, crime data for major crimes reported over a period of time from 1976 to 1985 for each year are evaluated for the Brewster-Douglass public housing project (program group) and the Jeffries Homes project site (control group). The time period is valid for two reasons. First, archival data on a public housing project basis is not available before 1976. Second, analyzing data through 1985 gives four years of crime variables before the program and four years after

[illegible]

program closeout. Crime variables included in the analysis are major crimes reported: murder, rape, robbery, assaults, burglary, larceny and car theft. Figures for arsons reported on a public housing project basis are not available. Crime data used is reported crimes that was collected by the Detroit Police Department. An assumption is made that all crimes committed were not reported. Thus, figures used in the analysis may not be entirely accurate in representing true crime activity in the public housing projects.

Specific methods for "tests of significance" using the time-series non equivalent design are currently in the development stages.¹⁹ This research employs the Mann Whitney U Test and the Chi Square Test to determine whether there is a significant difference in the rates of the evaluation criteria (murder, rape, robbery, assaults, burglary, larceny and car theft) between the program and control group, before and after introduction of the Anti-Crime Program.²⁰ The Mann Whitney test determines whether a difference in the two independent samples (control and program group) is statistically significant meaning the samples come from different populations. Mann Whitney is advantageous for several reasons. First, it is one of the most powerful distribution-free tests. Second, the test is valid when applied to small, medium, and large samples. Third, the nonparametric character of the test means that no assumptions need be made about the characteristics of the distribution of the populations being analyzed. The "sample" criteria for utilizing Mann Whitney is met on two

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accounts. First, the sampling distribution is not dependent on the observations being sampled, but rather the dependency is on a distribution of the ranking of which the Mann Whitney technique is based.²¹ Second, each year represents a sample y in terms of crime rates.²²

Table 1.2 depicts how the data is utilized by each crime variable in the Mann Whitney technique. The table depicts the number of murders per 10,000 public housing units per year for the program and control groups. Program group (Brewster-Douglass) murders per 10,000 public housing units are represented in column x and control group (Jeffries) murders per 10,000 public housing units are represented in column y . To apply the U Test, the data is ranked from lowest to highest, with the rank showing in columns r_x and r_y . The sum of the ranks are then calculated. The statistic U is calculated from the following equations:

$$U_x = n_x n_y + \frac{n_x (n_x + 1)}{2} - \sum r_x$$

$$U_y = n_x n_y + \frac{n_y (n_y + 1)}{2} - \sum r_y$$

where n_x and n_y are the number of years in sample x and y respectively. Appropriate tables of critical values of U are consulted to determine whether the difference is considered significant. Theoretically there should be no statistically significant difference between control group and program group crime rates before Anti-Crime Program activities, and there should be a statistically significant

Table 1.2

Murders Per 10,000 Public Housing Units

| | Program | | Control | | |
|-------------------|---------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|----------------|
| | Year | x | r _x | y | r _y |
| Before
Program | 1976 | | | I | |
| | 1977 | | | I | |
| | 1978 | | | I | |
| | 1979 | | | I | |
| | | $\sum r_x = r_{1976-1979}$ | | $\sum r_y = r_{1976-1979}$ | |

(program ran from July, 1980 to January, 1982)

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------|----------------------------|--|----------------------------|--|
| After
Program
Intro. | 1980 | | | I | |
| | 1981 | | | I | |
| | 1982 | | | I | |
| | 1983 | | | I | |
| | 1984 | | | I | |
| | 1985 | | | I | |
| | | $\sum r_x = r_{1980-1985}$ | | $\sum r_y = r_{1980-1985}$ | |

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difference between program and control groups after the program (samples from different populations) if the program actually had an effect on crime.²³

The Chi Square Test is applied to determine whether there is a significant difference between crimes reported (actual frequencies) between the Brewster-Douglass site and the Jeffries site in terms of before and after program introduction of the Anti-Crime Program. Chi Square is appropriate for two reasons. First, crime data is available in the form of frequencies. Second, the total number of crime incidences in each crime type (except murder) exceeds the minimum requirement of 20 frequencies. As with the Mann Whitney technique, the "sample" requirement is met as each year represents a sample y in terms of crime rates.²⁴

Table 1.3 depicts how the data is employed by crime variable in the Chi Square Test. The contingency table depicts the total number of murders that took place at the Brewster-Douglass site and the Jeffries site before and after introduction of the the Anti-Crime Program. The test statistic for the two sample two category situation is calculated using the following formula:

$$\chi^2 = \frac{n(AD - BC)^2}{(A + B)(C + D)(A + C)(B + D)}$$

where n represents the total frequency of murders at the Brewster and Jeffries sites; A, B, C and D refer to the number (or frequencies) of murders in each of the cells of the

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contingency table 1.3; and $|AD - BC|$ is the absolute value of the difference between A times D and B times C. Approximate tables of critical values of X^2 are consulted to determine whether the difference in crime rates before and after the program are significant. If the calculated value of X^2 is greater than the critical value, then it is extremely unlikely that crime rates before and after the program is due to chance. Rather the difference is more likely to be due to the Anti-Crime Program.²⁹

Table 1.3
Chi Square Contingency Table for
Frequency of Murders
(by project site)

| | | Total Murders | | | |
|----------|---|----------------|---------------|---|-----------|
| | | 1976-1979 | 1980-1985 | | |
| | | Before Program | After Program | | |
| Brewster | I | I | I | I | |
| | I | A | I | B | I (A + B) |
| | I | I | I | I | |
| Jeffries | I | I | I | I | |
| | I | C | I | D | I (C + D) |
| | I | I | I | I | |
| | | (A + C) | (B + D) | | N |

SUMMARY

The purpose of this research is to determine whether the development and structure of the federal policy (statute) that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public housing; and to determine what relationship exist between implementation of the the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and crime rate change at

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the Brewster-Douglass public housing project site. The Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 authorized HUD to administer the program.

The study has implications on the relationships between urban planning and policy analysis, urban planning and public housing and urban planning and crime prevention. Policy analysis and planning are similar in that both fields define perceived problems, develop goals and objectives to address the perceived problems and implement programs to carry out goals and objectives that address the problems.²⁴ Knowledge of policy analysis in the planning context is important because city planners through competence in policy analysis are better versed in methods, process, and issues that relate to economic and social structure. Competence in policy analysis yield strong writing skills in organization, clarity, and precision. The literature in policy analysis teaches planners how to address political factors in analysis, how to advocate uncomfortable positions, and how to read and understand legislative language. Policy analysis also helps planners learn how governments work, laws get passed and how administrative rules are initiated. Finally, the policy analysis arena assists planners to learn how cities grow and decline, and learn which city problems are addressed by governments at what appropriate level.²⁷

Urban planning issues in a social context should address public housing. The social planning mechanism at the local level is required to provide:

"...preventative and rehabilitative services for... multi-problem families whose conduct causes difficulty to other tenants and management; social group work and recreational programs for all age groups; and ...tenant organization and tenant education [programs] to identify and train leadership, and in the development and constructive self-help organizations, and build cooperative community efforts."²⁸

The relationship between planning and crime prevention address the relationship between environmental factors and crime prevention. Manipulation of the physical environment through planning techniques can reduce crime potential in several ways, some of which are the elimination of underused circulation channels through density control mechanisms, centralization of evening establishments to increase the surveillance mechanism; and centralized parking areas and adding improved lighting and removing hidden barriers to deter crime.²⁹

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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

¹See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Final Report of the Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration, May 1985.

²David A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy, (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1983), pp. 4-5.

³U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 1.

⁴See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Final Report of the Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration, May 1985.

⁵See Steven Michael Edwards, "An Implementation Analysis of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing: A Two-City Case Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1984.)

⁶Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy, (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company), p. 7.

⁷Ibid., p. 8.

⁸U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. Changing Conditions in Large Metropolitan Areas, November, 1980, Table 22, not paged.

⁹Telephone conversation with Ms. Sherone Ivey, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 12 November 1987.

¹⁰Emil J. Posavac and Raymond G. Carey, Program Evaluation: Methods and Case Studies, 2nd edition, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985), p. 232. Also see Harry P. Hatry, et. al., Practical Program Evaluation for State and Local Governments, 2nd edition, (Washington: The Urban Institute Press, 1981), p. 40.

¹¹Posavac, Program Evaluation, p. 212. Also see Hatry, Practical Program Evaluation, p. 34.

¹²Ibid., p. 212.

¹³Posavac and Carey, p. 173.

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¹⁴Ibid., p. 183-184. Also see Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research, (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1963), p. 5.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁶Hatry, Practical Program Evaluation, pp. 35-36.

¹⁷Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research, (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1963), p. 49.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁹Posavac and Carey, p. 217; and J.M. Gottman and G.V. Glass, "Analysis of Interrupted Time-Series Experiments, in Single Subject Research: Strategies for Evaluating Change, ed., T.R. Kratochwill (New York: Academic Press, 1978).

²⁰For further description of the tests, see David Ebdon, Statistics in Geography, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1985), pp. 57-60 and 65-71; and R. Hammond and P.S. McCullagh, Quantitative Techniques in Geography, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 170-181 and 199-202.

²¹See David Ebdon, Statistics in Geography, 2nd ed., (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1985), pp. 59 - 60, for an explanation of this idea.

²²Interview with Dr. Bruce Pigozzi, Department of Geography, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 17 February 1988. As an example, from January 1977 to December 1979, there may have been 150 murders in the study area. One "sample" period is represented from January 1977 to December 1977; another sample period can be represented from June 1977 to May 1978.

²³Of the 20 public housing projects in Detroit, Jeffries Homes is the most comparable with the Brewster-Douglass project. Several variables are considered in choosing Jeffries Homes as the control group site: age of the project, location with respect to downtown, neighborhood amenities, on-site amenities, physical characteristics of the site, age distribution of the tenant population, and socioeconomic characteristics of the tenant population.

²⁴Ibid. Also see R. Hammond and P.S. McCullagh, Quantitative Techniques in Geography, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 171.

²³Ebdon, Statistics in Geography, pp. 67-69.

²⁴Herbert J. Gans, People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 79-80.

²⁷Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki, Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986), p. 7.

²⁸Bernard J. Frieden and Robert Morris, eds., Urban Planning and Social Policy, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 105.

²⁹Shlomo Angel, Discouraging Crime Through City Planning, (Berkeley: University of California, 1968), pp. 19-23.

Chapter II

POLICY ANALYSIS

It is necessary to establish a conceptual framework of general policy analysis and policy making before any conclusions can be drawn on whether the development and structure of the federal policy (statute) that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public housing. This chapter develops through an analysis of the literature the appropriate methods of policy development, Congressional policy-making strategies, and the necessary provisions contained in a statute that assure viable program implementation and results. Knowledge of methods of appropriate policy development aids in an understanding of how a statute's overall theoretical structure and content are determined. A conceptual knowledge of appropriate policy content allows a delineation of the adequacy of the statute to address the crime problem in public housing.

POLICY DEFINED

Policy, or the policy concept, is difficult to define. No one real definition exists that all disciplines utilize. Edwards and Skarkansky explain that policy can be viewed as what governments say and do, or not do.¹ Policy can be stated explicitly in laws or statutes, or in speeches by leading political or administrative officials. Policy can be implied in programs and overall actions of bureaucrats. Policy can be implicit in nature and recognizable only to those who carry out and work with a particular program. Policy can be made implicit through actions by officials that wish to undermine the real purpose of the policy.² Ripley and Franklin give a good, solid, and general statement on policy and policy making:

"Policy is what the government says and does about perceived problems.

Policy making is how the government decides what will be done about perceived problems.

Policy making is a process of interaction among governmental and nongovernmental actors; policy is the outcome of that interaction."³

Looking at this rationale, perceived problems appear to be the catalyst in the initiation of policy of sorts, whether it be a law or statute, or a general type policy directive. Problems that governments address through policy are public problems. Public problems differ from private problems. Dewey defines "public" as consisting of "all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary

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to have those consequences cared for."⁴ Based on this thought public problems are "those that have a broad effect, including consequences for persons not directly involved."⁵

The perceived problem of crime in public housing by Representative Claude Pepper of Florida served as the primary catalyst for his success in passage of the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act. This statute represented a federal government policy directive to address the crime issue in the nations public housing. The following sections of this chapter lay the groundwork to analyze how Congress decided what to do about the perceived crime problem through an examination of the mechanics of Congressional policy-making, and what Congress decided to do about the perceived problem of public housing crime through an analysis of statute content.

FORMULATION, IMPLEMENTATION, REFORMULATION: ARE THEY THE SAME?

Some scholars adhere to the belief that a distinction exist between policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy reformulation that takes place after implementation. Generally, this view is based on traditional American democracy with its notions "of the separate functions of legislatures and administrative agencies."⁶ One approach divides the policy process into three distinct stages. Each stage results in a policy product (Figure 2.1).⁷ An existing problem comes to the attention of policy makers in the agenda setting stage and they then determine that it is the governments responsibility to address the problem.

Governmental agenda is a result of agenda-setting and it is defined as the sum of all the issues and problems that the government addresses at any given time, such as the sluggish economy, high unemployment, shortage of low-income housing, crime in existing low-income housing. Once the problem has been acknowledged and determined to warrant governmental attention, the government must then determine just how it plans to address the problem. The formulation/legitimization stage incorporate talents and ideas from government and non-government actors to develop alternative methods of addressing the problem, and to choose a course of action in eradicating the problem. The end result of this stage is usually a statute or law. Enactment of a statute or law sets the way for the stage of implementation by agencies and individuals given the responsibility to carry out policy actions based on the piece of legislation. Policy impacts on society may or may not be compatible with the intended purpose of the piece of legislation. Impacts not even anticipated may occur. An assessment of policy impacts sets the stage for making decisions on the future of the program and legislation which authorizes the program.®

The distinction in a conceptual sense between formulation and implementation can be challenged. The "adaptive" or "interactive" approach to implementation suggests that goals and strategies can be changed or modified by actors involved in the implementation process to point where a

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
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Figure 2.1
Policy Process



SOURCE: Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, 3rd edition, Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1984, p. 2.

distinction between the formulation and implementation stages cannot be defined.⁹

Majone and Wildavsky do not adhere to the notion that implementing officials have the prerogative to alter basic goals and objectives of a policy directive. They do, however, suggest that goals and programs of policy making are continuously modified by policymakers (not implementors) to adjust to various constraints and changing circumstances.¹⁰

This research accepts the position that a distinct delineation between formulation, implementation, and reformulation is not realistic. Rather, the policy redesign concept where goal modification and program modification are necessary to meet unforeseen constraints and changing circumstances is necessary, particularly for federal programs that address defined problems that may vary in scope and content from situation to situation.

Establishment of a conceptual basis of goal/objective modification or a lack of change in program goal/objectives is necessary to understand and define strengths and weaknesses of the statute that authorized the Anti-Crime Program and its efforts to structure the implementation process. The notion of the modification of goals and objectives appropriately address circumstances where statutes and appellate court decisions are often modified throughout the implementation process. In some cases, modification to the point where the distinction between formulation and implementation are blurred. This situation happens when the

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original policy (statute) is so ambiguous that it is meaningless. Vague policies of this nature force implementing officials to actually formulate an implementable policy before implementation begins. Other examples include situations where a reasonably sound policy does not survive (or is drastically altered) by court decisions, legislators, and administrative agencies over a period of years. Finally, an example of statute modification relates to the gradual evolution of a small experimental program into a major policy innovation.¹¹

A LOOK AT THE POLICY ANALYSIS CONCEPT

This section on the basic policy analysis concept is presented to put into perspective policy analysis at the federal level (presented later) and other forms of policy analysis. Comparison of these approaches helps to delineate strengths/weaknesses of federal government policy-making in general and policy-making related to the Anti-Crime statute specifically.

Policy analysis in a broad sense is defined as the study of the nature, causes, and effects of alternative public policies for dealing with specific social problems.¹² Policy analysis is necessary because, through analysis and study, policies can be made more effective in actually solving social problems.¹³ Policy analysis can be a study of policy content or a study of policy process. In general, an analysis that addresses policy content looks at what the policy is intended to affect, the end result of policy

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implementation and how the defined end result will be accomplished.¹⁴ Policy process addresses the actions and interactions of various policy-making actors that leads to the actual policy generated. The policy process arena may include an assessment of the consequences of the policy.¹⁵

Golembiewski develops this distinction with a delineation between prescriptive studies and descriptive studies of policy. Generally, prescriptive studies focus on policy content and refer to analysis which recommends actions because they will bring about a particular result. Descriptive studies tend to focus on the policy process and ultimately lead to a descriptive and/or explanatory account of the policy and process in question.¹⁶ Descriptive and prescriptive studies are further broken down to yield four major types of policy studies: prescriptive/content, descriptive/content, prescriptive/process, and descriptive/process.¹⁷

Prescriptive/content policy studies are broken down into two traditions. The older tradition (the "normative" study of public policy) "attempts to analyze, usually in a critical fashion, a particular public policy... and generally will also suggest either reforms in the existing policy or a new type of policy altogether"¹⁸ The second, and newer tradition examines either the future consequences of existing policies or the kinds of policies that may be suitable in some forecasted future. Both types of

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prescriptive/contents studies are labeled as "problem-oriented" as they address a given problem and the appropriate policy to deal with the defined problem.

Descriptive/contents policy studies look at the attributes of a policy's contents in relation to the policy process.¹⁹ Policy attributes include traditional content categories such as substantive policy area (problem addressed), institutional categories (agency assigned to carry out intent of the policy), target categories (population group benefiting from the policy), time periods (period in which policy is in force; deadlines), and extent of support (policy backers).

Recent policy studies of the prescriptive/process type generally involve a formalized deductive "rational choice" model such as systems analysis, program-planning-budgeting systems with efficiency and equity being the overriding goal.²⁰ Finally, the descriptive/process type of policy analysis usually studies one or more of the stages of the policy cycle such as formulation, decision-making, implementation, effects, and feedback. Most studies of this type address the policy formulation stage or the policy effects stage. Studies analyzing policy formulation look at the nature, extent, perception, and causes of a policy problem. Policy effects studies usually address impact assessments, evaluations of effectiveness, and/or cost-benefit analysis.²¹

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This dissertation is a representation of the descriptive/contents and descriptive/process type of policy analysis. The research looks closely at policy content of the statute that authorized the Anti-Crime Program in terms of accuracy of the problem defined and implementation mandates of the statute. In addition, this research addresses how Congressional leaders developed the statute and rationale they used for statute contents. Specific variables addressed to determine adequacy of policy content and policy development are discussed in subsequent pages.

Patton and Sawicki view policy analysis as a general set of "systematic procedures or policy analysis methods that can be used to attack contemporary problems".²² Policy analysis is a systematic process which includes problem definition, determination of evaluation criteria, identification of alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, comparison of alternatives and assessment of outcomes. This process can be diagrammed as shown in Figure 2.2.

The process outlined above is not meant to be rigidly followed. Various analysts work through the policy analysis process differently because of backgrounds, time available to carry out the analysis, problem addressed and the availability of financial and informational resources. This model can be used by a beginning analyst as a guide to work through each step in the policy analysis process using their own backgrounds and technical expertise to guide the direction of research.²³ In addition, the model is helpful in

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
that it assists others in evaluating the analysis, and it informs the general population of the effectiveness of adopted policy.²⁴

The first step in the policy analysis process is to verify, define, and detail the problem. It is important in problem verification to look at the initial problem statement with some degree of suspicion. The initial problem may be part of a larger problem. The problem may be one that is inappropriate to be addressed by the decision maker beginning the analysis. The problem that initiated the analysis may not exist, or work its way out over a period of time. The most effective problem definition process is labeled by some as "backward problem solving."²⁵ The backward problem solving process involves an analysis of the available data of the problem in hand, the development and selection of criteria to be used to evaluate alternative policies, defining alternatives, and redefining the problem with the data and other resources in hand. Finally, problem definition involves an understanding of "the positions and influence of various individuals and groups."²⁶ This understanding is facilitated by defining those interested in the problem and why, and the power the concerned has to affect a policy decision. Detailing the problem involves the knowledge of exactly what information is available to conduct the analysis, what information is needed, and how much effort is involved in carrying out the policy analysis.

Establishment of evaluation criteria for later evaluation of alternatives is a central process to the whole

Figure 2.2

A Basic Policy Analysis Process



SOURCE: Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki, Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986, p. 26.

[illegible]

policy analysis exercise. Effective evaluation criteria must be central to the problem and relevant to key participants in the decision process. Effective criteria assist to clarify values, goals, and objectives of the decision makers, and at the same time they explicitly define the desirable and undesirable outcomes. Examples of relevant evaluation criteria include cost of the alternative, net benefit, overall effectiveness, efficiency, equity of the proposed program, administrative workability, legality, and political acceptability. Each alternative later evaluated will have different outcomes for each of the evaluation criteria applied. As an example, one alternative may cause an undue hardship on a particular population group [the equity issue], while another alternative may more evenly distribute benefits to all segments of the population.

Generation of alternative policies is easier once the specific problem and evaluation criteria have been adequately defined. Formulation of alternative policies is important because it can assist in revealing aspects of the problem not earlier identified. A new perspective or insight into the initial problem may be uncovered. Experiments and researched analysis, various brainstorming techniques, and creating scenarios, are all effective means to generate alternative policies. It is necessary to keep an open mind in the development of alternative policies, and not forget the "no-action" alternative. It is also important to remember that what was unacceptable in the past may very well be

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acceptable today because values and assumptions of decision makers, participants and benefactors of policy do change over time.

Evaluation of alternative policies is considered by some as the most important step of the policy analysis process. The evaluation using criteria previously defined hopefully reveals alternative(s) that are most suited to addressing the defined problem. This stage is not a clear-cut process. Some alternatives will immediately be eliminated because of failure to meet major evaluation criteria. Others will call for further and more detailed evaluation that may lead to a need for additional data collection. This stage may also reveal that the problem no longer exist as defined. New information collected may reveal new aspects of the problem that will suggest the need for varying and different evaluation criteria. If this is the case, it is imperative that the analyst "backtrack" the process and redefine the evaluation criteria, and maybe even the problem.

To display alternative policies and their rank according to selected criteria aids in the decision maker choosing the most appropriate alternative to address the defined problem. Generally, evaluation results can be presented as a list of alternatives, with criteria ranking, and an analysis of how each alternative met the established criteria. Evaluation results can be expressed in several ways. First, matrices provide a quick and visible means of comparison of pros and cons of the various alternatives

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considered. In the matrix, one axis contains the alternatives, while the other contains the evaluation criteria. Second, value-comparison schemes to emphasize pros and cons of alternatives are possible when criteria can be expressed in quantitative terms. Third, scenarios can be presented to take into consideration quantitative, qualitative, and political variables determining the viability of each alternative.

Finally, the consideration of the monitoring of policy outcomes is important at the preprogram stage. Preprogram analysis should be conducted with some understanding that a program may fail and why. The failure "areas" may be eliminated if the monitoring and evaluation program is designed during the preprogram period. Policies should also be monitored during implementation to assure policy compliance, to measure impact and determine if the impact is intended, and to decide whether the policy is to be continued, modified, or terminated.

POLICY CONTENT

Before specific strengths and weaknesses of the Anti-Crime Program can be defined, it is necessary to develop a conceptual model of appropriate contents of a statute and necessary political variables that assures successful implementation of the statute. The literature clearly documents the need for clear and precise policy content and for policy that is based on viable problems. Policies more effectively solve social problems when accurate information,

analysis and thought are an integral part of the policy making process.²⁷ In addition to being technically feasible, policies must be politically viable. Technical feasibility and political viability may conflict in the policy-making process. As an example, a policy that addresses a highly controversial issue will be affected politically in the formulation and implementation efforts by support constituencies, lobbyists, and non-supporters. Another way of stating the comparison is policy should be crafted after "informed and thoughtful analysis and discussion, and by elections, bargaining, trading of favors, and wheeling and dealing..."²⁸ Lindblom concludes that policy-making and its contents is determined not so much by fresh information and analysis, but by those in power to make policy with their decisions based on ultimately what will get them the most votes. Therefore, citizens must become actively involved in policy-making and express their concerns to the policymakers.

The literature suggests that for effective implementation, a statute and its political variables must meet several conditions:

1. have policy objectives that are clear and consistent;
2. incorporation of a sound causal theory;
3. structure the implementation process;
4. commitment to statutory goals by implementing agency;
5. program support by organized constituency groups and key legislators throughout the implementation process;
6. priority of statutory objectives is not undermined over time by conflicting public policies that weakens the statutes causal theory or political support.²⁹

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Mazmanian and Sabatier suggests that the first two conditions must always be met for effective program implementation. All six conditions must be met where significant behavioral change is desired of a population resistant to the programmed change.³⁰ This study uses the conditions above to help determine the strengths and weaknesses of the statute that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. A comprehensive analysis of the statutes strengths/weaknesses in relation to these conditions is presented in Chapter VI.

Policy content and structure are the basic determinants of whether or not the goals/objectives of the policy are carried out during program implementation. The Anti-Crime statute could assure an acceptable degree of program implementation and be successful in reducing public housing crime by incorporation of the following conditions in the statute. First, objectives should have been precise and clearly ranked. Clear objectives are invaluable for future program evaluation as the evaluators have explicit definitions as to what must be determined to be successful. Clear objectives serve as a guide for those that perceive discrepancies between the output of the implementing agency, and the direction set by statute objectives. In addition, it is necessary for a new statute that is implemented by an existing agency to contain clear objectives that describe relative priority of the program in the agency's programs. New statutes and program tend to be given low priority when this is not explicit in the new directive.

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At a minimum, the Anti-Crime statute must be precise and clear in problem identification, desired behavior change, and the appropriate method to achieve the desired behavioral change. In addition, the statute must establish a degree of priority for the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) which is the primary implementing agency to carry out the intent of the statute, and establish where the program will be placed with HUD bureaucracy.

Second, objectives of the Anti-Crime statute may have been met if they had incorporated an adequate causal theory. Mazmanian and Sabatier suggest that an adequate causal theory requires that:

"The principal causal linkages between governmental intervention and the attainment of program objectives be understood... and... that officials responsible for implementing the program have jurisdiction over a sufficient number of critical linkages to actually attain the objectives."³¹

An adequate causal theory probably does not exist for public housing crime. Causal Linkages are impossible to delineate because the literature is not explicit on the appropriate way to address public housing crime: is it better to design public housing anti-crime programs to reduce crime activity or design programs to protect public housing residents from crime. In addition, for the anti-crime program to succeed, the implementing federal agency must have administrative authority over the other government agencies that are mandated to provide their funds and areas of expertise to the anti-crime effort. Governmental fragmentation of the

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American system at all levels makes adequate implementation by the primary agency of an anti-crime program virtually impossible.

Third, Anti-Crime statute would have been more effectively carried out if the implementation process was adequately structured to maximize the potential that implementing officials and target groups would perform as intended. The statute has the capacity to structure the implementation process through:

"... its selection of the implementing institutions; through providing financial resources to those institutions; through biasing the probable policy orientations of agency officials; and through regulating the opportunities for participation by non-agency actors in the implementation process."³²

Goals of the selected implementing agency should be compatible with those of the Anti-Crime statute. Money to support a program authorized by the statute is obviously critical. Adequate financial resources are necessary to support program administrators as well as costs of physical improvements that a program may address. The amount of financial resources needed to support a program are based on viable problem identification.

A primary obstacle in the implementation of regulatory and social service programs in general relates to coordination among the implementing agency and the numerous semi-autonomous agencies that have some responsibility in program implementation. This problem is most pronounced in federal statutes that rely on various federal, state, and local agencies to carry out the intent of the program. This issue

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is a major concern with the Anti-Crime statute. Legislators set up the program to utilize expertise and previously committed funds from numerous federal agencies that address crime, juvenile delinquency, and housing. It is imperative that the statute structure a coordinating system as to how participating agencies relate to HUD as well as specific responsibilities of each participating agency.

The degree of hierarchial integration among agencies with responsibility for implementation is determined by:

- 1) the number of veto/clearance points that are involved in the attainment of statutory objectives;
- 2) the extent to which supporters of statutory objectives are provided with inducements and sanctions sufficient to assure acceptance from non-supporters.³³

Veto/clearance points refer to occasions where an actor (either the implementing official or target group members) has the capacity or is given the chance to negatively affect achievements of statute goals and objectives. Mutual goal consensus among all actors is necessary to minimize the availability of veto/clearance points. Nagel states:

"Even given agreement among all actors on basic objectives, the multiplicity of clearance [veto] points offers numerous occasions for delay and the breakdown of consensus as participants negotiate specific agreements. In the absence of such goal consensus, there is every likelihood that opponents or lukewarm supporters of program objectives will be able to control sufficient [veto] points to demand important concessions and potentially to scuttle the program as it applies to them. This is particularly likely in intergovernmental programs, where there will normally be substantial variation in the attitudes of implementing officials in various jurisdictions."³⁴

Simply, veto points are weak places in the implementation structure to allow the opposition to act on their objections to a program or certain components of a program. Resistance to "acting on objectives" can be minimized if the statute provides sufficient reason for the actor to alter their behavior and follow policy guidelines so that the ultimate behavioral change can be accomplished.

Fourth, the Anti-Crime statute would have been most likely to be successful when leaders of the implementing agency (HUD) possess substantial managerial and political skills, and were committed to statutory goals. Agency support of a program is imperative for success in meeting program objectives. Support is necessary for the development of viable regulations and standard operating procedures and enforcement. Policymakers can assure some degree of agency commitment by the assignment of implementation responsibility to an agency whose policy orientation is consistent with that of the new program, or creation of a new agency to administer the program. At the federal level, new statutes authorize programs that are implemented in an existing agency. Agencies in many cases may be ambivalent or even hostile to accept new programs, especially when personnel is not added to accommodate new work demands, or when appropriations are inadequate or nonexistent. Generally, this situation often leads to program failure.³⁹

Fifth, programs that are actively supported by organized constituency groups and key legislators throughout the implementation process will be most successful in

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meeting goals and objectives outlined in a statute. The involvement of organized groups at the beginning of problem formulation and statute development will better assure support. In addition, many support groups are excellent sources of information needed to adequately define the problem in question. Contributors of background information will also strengthen group constituency support of proposed statutes and programs.

Congressmembers may not oversee implementation of their programs once a bill they sponsor becomes law and an assigned agency begins program start-up. Legislators generally fail to oversee their programs because they:

- 1) see opportunities for greater rewards in involvement of the legislative process rather than the administrative process;
- 2) view federal agencies as impenetrable mazes that may pose hazards to their careers;
- 3) become reluctant to review agency activity where close rewarding friendships have developed within that agency;
- 4) perceive agency review is not conducive to Presidential loyalty.³⁴

Finally, statute goals are most obtainable when priority of statute objectives are not undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public policies or other changes that weaken causal theory. Federal programs that operate over many years, or start up at the end of a Presidential Administration (such as with the Anti-Crime program) are particularly in danger. Changes in Administration, Congressional make-up, and/or party dominance will

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have an impact on policy implementation, especially when these changes produced pronounced differences in public policy directives.

Most statutes, especially at the federal level, do not incorporate the above variables in their text because of the wide variety of interests represented, diversity of activities, and the multiple veto and weak party system in Congress. Adequate causal theory are normally not addressed in federal legislation. As a result, many programs are slated for failure from the beginning because of inadequate causal theory, or because federal statutes fail to structure the implementation process.³⁷

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY-MAKING

A conceptual framework to define federal government policy-making practices must be understood before any conclusions can be drawn on the adequacy of the the development of the Anti-Crime statute. An understanding of the roles of various government and non-government actors in statute formulation, and their interrelationships, help to determine why the statute may be strong in some areas and weak in other areas.

The national governmental policy process is housed primarily in the legislative and in the executive branch. Policy activity in these two institutions often, if not always, receive input from non-governmental entities in shaping public policy. Of particular importance are the vast array of interest groups that participate in the formulation

of federal laws. The relationship between interest groups can flow in two ways. Interest groups help to shape policy and policy formulation may define interests that help generate groups to assist in "refining" these new policies.

The interaction between the executive and legislative branches are critical in policy formulation.³⁰ The legislative branch, or Congress, usually consists of party leaders, committee/subcommittee leaders, various members of the House and Senate. The executive branch consist of the President and his Executive Office, and federal employees or civil servants. Figure 2.3 depicts the most important interactions among the various actors in the federal policy-making process. This interaction is critical related to success of the Anti-Crime Program. Congress formulated the Program and assigned implementation responsibility to HUD. Adequate commitment by HUD to administer the program most effectively originates from the HUD Secretary who is a political appointee.

Two critical relationships exist within the executive branch: the President with Executive Office personnel and presidential appointees throughout the government, and Executive Office personnel and presidential appointees with government civil servants. The federal government is obviously too vast for the President to have direct contact with civil servants. Therefore, the placement of political appointees throughout the government system serves as a

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
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Figure 2.3

Interactions in the Federal Policy-Making Process



SOURCE: Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, The Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, 3rd edition, Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1984, p. 6.

vehicles in linking programmatic ideas of the President with civil servants who in turn develop and implement those ideas.

Internal congressional relationships involve the interaction between committee/subcommittee leaders, congressional members, and party leaders with committee leaders acting as intermediaries between the party leaders and congressional members. The committee/subcommittee leaders generally have the most power in deciding major issues that Congress will act upon. In turn, party leaders map out tactical strategies on the best approach in getting the work of committees/subcommittees approved by the Congress.

Finally, interaction between the legislative and executive branches play a role in federal policy-making. Interaction between the President and party leaders normally

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involve the planning of strategy and tactical matters in getting presidential ideas enacted into law. Relationships and interaction between Executive Office personnel and presidential appointees and committee/subcommittee leaders, and interaction between civil service and congressional committee/subcommittee leaders often are more substantive in nature (actual contents, goals/objectives of a proposed law or policy.)

U.S. government policy-making is extremely complex with four characteristics of policy-making definable. The characteristics act with and within each other to complicate the complexity of the policy-making structure. First, the wide-spread phenomena of subgovernments complicate the federal policy-making machinery. Subgovernments are groups of individuals that actually make most of the policy. Subgroups can be defined as "members of the House and/or Senate, members of congressional staffs, a few bureaucrats, and representatives of private groups and organizations interested in the policy area [being addressed]."39

Generally, subgovernments do not have control of all federal policy-making. They do, however, play an important role in most policy-making efforts.

A variety of governmental institutions is another characteristic of federal policy-making. Since there is a geographical dispersion of various federal agencies and offices, and since many institutions share the responsibility of developing and implementing various policies, the federal policy-making process may very well involve action of a

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

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number of states and cities. Involvement of states and local governments in implementation of federal policy is usually dependent on philosophies of the political party occupying the White House.

The third characteristic of federal policy-making is that of separated institutions with the Constitution creating the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. These institutions carry out subdivided governmental functions. The Constitution at the same time limits autonomy by forcing the institutions to share powers. Congressional delegation of authority to the executive branch is an example of this sharing. The final characteristic of federal policy-making is that of the variety and volume of issues addressed. Also, the "specificity" of governmental policy varies from very detailed to vague and ambiguous.

Congressional policymakers often do not follow the rational policy-making route presented at the beginning of this Chapter because of two primary constraints - political feasibility, and the governmental fragmentation issue.⁴⁰ Politicians must bargain and negotiate with each other before reaching decisions. Past precedent is a major constraint and by the examination of a colleagues past voting record it can be determined what that particular congressional member's position will be on a particular policy in question. Congressional members cannot attack a problem

comprehensively because of governmental fragmentation. Many times policies are adopted on a piecemeal basis and they frequently duplicate or contradict existing policy.

Congressional policymakers have several tools at hand to make their task easier. First, policymakers do not follow public opinion. The time and resources needed to collect public opinion often delays and may even aid or kill a potential directive. Second, goals and priorities are often not explicitly stated; this approach requires less research and interaction among the various governmental and non-governmental actors involved in policy formulation. Third, policymakers may consider only a few alternatives (one or two) and research, collect a minimal amount of data on each alternative being considered. Again, this practice saves time and energy. Congressional members seldom analyze projected consequences of alternatives. Finally, policymakers will usually not oversee programs once completed.⁴¹ In summary, policymakers, rather than using public opinion and a rational basis of the policy, will "rely on 'decision rules,' rules of the thumb or standard operating procedures that make policy-making manageable and keep decisions within the bounds of political and economic feasibility."⁴²

Conceptual interactions among actors involved in federal policy-making as presented, and when related to the development of the Anti-Crime statute, helps to analyze several critical issues. First, a look at the roles of special interest groups in statute development (such as

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committee testimony) hopefully gives some clue as to accuracy of policy content. Second, committee reaction of various testimony and anti-crime testimony frequently give an indication of committee priority and commitment to public housing anti-crime needs. Third, a review of Presidential papers, Congressional minutes, and HUD publications, gives an indication of mutual support of the anti-crime issue. Overall support from the President, his cabinet members, and Congress are necessary for implementation to be most effective.

SUMMARY

Literature presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that congressional policy-making cannot follow the rational policy-making process because of political factors and governmental fragmentation. Politicians must bargain and negotiate with each other before reaching decisions. Past precedent is a major constraint and by the examination of a colleagues past voting record it can be determined what that particular congressional member's position will be on a particular policy in question. Congressional members cannot adequately attack a problem because many times policies are adopted on a piecemeal basis and they frequently duplicate or contradict existing policy.

In addition, congressmembers generally do not oversee implementation of their programs once a bill they sponsor becomes law and an assigned agency begins program start-up. Opportunities exist for greater rewards in legislative

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process involvement rather than in the administrative arena. Many congressmembers view federal agencies as impenetrable mazes that can become a threat to their careers; or they become reluctant to review agency activity when close friendships have developed with key agency personnel.

Finally, most statutes developed and implemented at the federal level are not adequately structured for effective policy implementation because of the wide variety of interests represented, the diversity of activities, and the multiple veto and weak party system in Congress. Adequate causal theory are normally not addressed in federal legislation because most issues are much too broad in scope and involve too many variables and actors to adequately be addressed by one piece of implementing legislation. As a result, many federal programs are slated for failure from the beginning because of inadequate causal theory, or because federal statutes fail to structure the implementation process.

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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

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⁶Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian, "Policy Implementation," in Encyclopedia of Policy Studies, ed. Stuart S. Nagel (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), p. 145.

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¹³Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 11.

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¹⁷George J. McCall and George H. Weber, "Policy Analysis Across Academic Disciplines," Encyclopedia of Policy Studies, ed. Stuart S. Nagel (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1983), pp. 202-203; also see Patton and Sawicki, Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning, p. 18-20, for a variation in the McCall and Weber idea.

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²⁴Patton and Sawicki, Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning, p. 29.

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²⁸Ibid., p. 12.

²⁹Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1983), p. 41.

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³¹Mazmanian and Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy, p. 26. For a description of various conceptualizations of causal theory, see Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian, "Policy Implementation", in The Encyclopedia of Policy Studies, ed. Stuart Nagel (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1982), pp. 157-158.

³²Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Effective Policy Implementation (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981), p. 10.

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³⁴Nagel, Encyclopedia of Policy Studies, p. 156.

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³⁷Mazmanian, Implementation and Public Policy, p. 29-30.

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CHAPTER III

CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS

In addition to a framework for policy analysis and policy making as discussed in Chapter II, it is necessary to establish a conceptual understanding of crime in public housing in order to determine whether the statute that authorized the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public housing. In addition, a discussion of neighborhood environmental design and social constraints, and their relationship to crime is presented to help in the establishment of some relationship between results of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program and adequacy of the federal policy that backed the program.

CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING

The literature on crime in public housing is not well developed. However, a few selected studies of an unrepresentative sample of larger public housing projects exist. These studies address physical, social, and management factors, and their relationship to crime in general.

Criminal victimization studies suggests that not all segments of the American population are equally victimized. Studies sponsored by the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development indicate that residents of larger low and medium income housing projects in larger cities experience the highest rate of crime compared with other population segments. The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program did not recognize a diversity of the crime problem in the nation's public housing. The authorizing statute mandated that a broad spectrum of project types, locations, and tenant populations be represented in those public housing authorities selected for local Anti-Crime Program funding. Table 3.1 shows comparisons of selected crime rates at the national level, selected cities and selected public housing projects for 1975, the latest date that comparison figures are available. The crime rate for each public housing project in Los Angeles, Baltimore and Washington is significantly higher than each city as a whole, as well as for the nation. These figures suggest that robbery appears to be the most significant crime problem in public housing projects.

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Table 3.1

Selected Crime Rates^a, 1975-
National, City and Public Housing Project

| Crime | National | Los Angeles/
Nickerson Gds | Baltimore/
Murphy Hms | Wash, DC/
Cappers Dw |
|--------------------|----------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| robbery | 6.9 | 16.0/62.2 | 26.0/114.1 | 17.0/48.0 |
| purse
snatching | 3.2 | 7.0/53.4 | 13.0/36.0 | 12.0/10.6 |
| assault | 26.0 | 35.0/44.8 | 28.0/33.0 | 13.0/16.0 |
| sexual
assault | 1.0 | 2.0/6.8 | 1.0/18.0 | 1.0/8.0 |

^aRates per 1,000 population 12 and over

SOURCE: U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Victimization, Fear of Crime and Altered Behavior: A Profile of the Crime Problem in Nickerson Gardens, Los Angeles, California, April 1977, p. 3; _____. Victimization, Fear of Crime and Altered Behavior: A Profile of the Crime Problem in Murphy Homes, Baltimore, Maryland, April, 1977, p. 4; _____. Victimization, Fear of Crime and Altered Behavior: A Profile of the Crime Problem in Copper Dwellings, Washington, D.C., April 1977, p. 4.

A U.S. Department of Justice study completed in 1973 described characteristics common to a typical "bad" public housing project. A "bad" project is a project that experienced security problems. Projects in this category housed over one thousand families and consisted of high-rises over eight or ten stories or low-rises that sprawled in a labyrinthine fashion over a large tract of land. Bad projects most typically were in large cities. Services and amenities such as playgrounds, laundromats, day-care, and transportation need did not meet the needs of project residents. Physical design fostered the feeling of crowding. Elevators in the high-rises would be few and slow, and planned common areas would be small and undefined.

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Physical design of "bad" projects did not support a surveillance mechanism from staff and residents. Long corridors and elevators in the high-rise buildings prohibited adequate policing. The many small courtyards, numerous walkaways, and dark stairwells and basements presented similar problems in the low-rise units. Open access to the project site appeared to be a real problem particularly for projects located in high crime areas.

Residents of "bad" projects generally knew only a few people in the complex, though most of them had lived on the site for several years. A lack of trust existed among project residents. The typical resident was poor and black and had an income below the poverty level. Few adult men lived on the site. Residents consisted primarily of female-headed households with children and teen-agers. The study concluded that physical design and a weak social structure both made a "bad" project susceptible to crime.¹

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development completed a study in early 1979 that further documented and strengthened earlier findings on characteristics of a "bad" project. The HUD study addressed specific problems of low-income public housing. This study found that those projects labeled as "troubled" suffered severe physical and social difficulties. Troubled projects had difficulties related to project design and physical conditions such as project size and density, lack of defensible space, general structural problems, inadequate heating and/or plumbing, and general maintenance deficiencies. Social problems included the

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impact of vandalism and crime in project neighborhoods and the incidence of problems with a very small number of disruptive tenants.²

The study determined that approximately seven percent of all public housing projects in the country are considered troubled. Ninety-two percent of all troubled projects were designed for occupancy by families (rather than elderly). Elderly projects comprised only eight percent of all troubled projects. The study concluded that family projects are much more likely to be troubled than those projects designed for and occupied by elderly residents.

The study related other tenant characteristics to those projects labeled as troubled. A disproportionately greater number of single-parent and female-headed households occurred in troubled projects than in untroubled projects. Although female-headed households comprise twenty-six percent of all households in public housing, they comprise approximately eighteen percent of the households in untroubled projects and forty-five percent of the households in troubled projects. Single-parent households have similar statistics. Twenty-six percent of all households in public housing are single-parent, but approximately twenty-two percent of all untroubled projects were headed by single-parent households and forty-five percent of the troubled projects had single-parent households.

Troubled housing projects are more likely to be located in urban areas than untroubled housing projects. The study found that seventy-five percent of all troubled projects

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were located in urban areas. Just as importantly, other kinds of "neighborhood" criteria distinguished the location of troubled from untroubled projects. The study concluded that:

1. Troubled projects are more likely to be located in neighborhoods with a high concentration of minority residents.
2. Almost half of all troubled projects are in neighborhoods where renters make up better than fifty percent of all residents.
3. Almost half of all troubled projects are in neighborhoods with high crime rates.
4. Most troubled projects are located in neighborhoods with poor or fair police protection.
5. Most troubled projects have poor availability and quality of public and social services such as fire and police protection, recreation/day care, counseling and health services.

The study also determined that a weak positive association occurs between age of the housing project and the probability of the project being labeled as troubled. Of the sample projects analyzed, the average project age fell around fourteen years. On the other hand, the age of troubled, relatively untroubled, and untroubled projects averaged at nineteen, seventeen, and twelve years respectively. These findings combined with other characteristics such as size of the project makes age a more positive association with the probability of the project being designated as troubled.

As expected, project size has a positive correlation with troubled conditions. Troubled projects have about twice as many apartments as relatively untroubled projects and nearly three times as many as untroubled projects. Two

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reasons may account for this positive correlation. First, physical size may simply a less manageable and controllable environment. Second, size is usually associated with other locational factors that have been determined to be associated with troubled projects. Larger projects tend to be located in more urban areas within lower-income neighborhoods that have inadequate services and amenities.³

Studies on the fear of crime in public housing indicate that residents may restrict their movement in and around the public housing site, but nothing indicates that a significant number of residents move out of public housing because of crime or fear of crime. One rationale for implementation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program as stated in the authorizing legislation is based on the erroneous assumption that residents do move out of public housing because of crime.

Fear of crime is equally an important component in the overall problem of crime in public housing. Past research on fear of crime in public housing reveal that the perception of crime in many cases is so high as to cause undue disturbance and psychological discomfort to public housing residents. Table 3.2 shows how residents of housing projects in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C., rate the probability of future victimization. The studies conclude that the biggest fears of residents include burglary in their absence, robbery on the project site, personal car vandalism, and home vandalism.

A 1972 study addressed management techniques to improve

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Table 3.2
Victimization Probability-
50/50 Chance or Greater^a

| Type of
Victimization | Nickerson Gd
Los Angeles | Murphy Hms
Baltimore | Cappers Dw
Washington |
|---|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Having home broken
into while away | 80.4% | 70.3% | 83.3% |
| Having home broken
into while at home | 46.2 | 44.8 | 39.2 |
| Being robbed in
the project | 77.6 | 62.1 | 74.3 |
| Being beaten up in
the project | 65.5 | 55.9 | 60.5 |
| Being sexually
assaulted ^b | 59.3 | 54.6 | 40.4 |
| Having car
deliberately damaged ^c | 71.5 | 55.6 | 70.5 |
| Having house
vandalized | 73.9 | 50.7 | 69.1 |

^ahow respondents rated the probability of future
victimization

^bpercentage of women only

^chouseholds with cars only

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, Victimization,
Fear of Crime and Altered Behavior: A Profile of the Crime
Problem in Nickerson Gardens, Los Angeles, California, April
1977, p. 36; _____. Victimization, Fear of Crime and
Altered Behavior: A Profile of the Crime Problem in Murphy
Homes, Baltimore, Maryland, April 1977, p. 33; _____.
Victimization, Fear of Crime and Altered Behavior: A
Profile of the Crime Problem in Copper Dwellings,
Washington, D.C., April 1977, p. 43.

the quality of life in an anonymous 849 unit public housing project. One component of this study concluded several findings on fear of crime in public housing as experienced by residents:

1. Fear for children. Parents often worried that their children might become victims of robbery, extortion and assault on the project site compared to other sites such as school or on their way to school.
2. Chances of future personal victimization. Most residents felt they had a 50/50 chance or better within the next year of being robbed, burglarized, or assaulted.
3. Car-related fears. Residents generally expressed fear of robbery or assault at night as they walked from their car to their home or when they parked their car at night.
4. Fear of movement in the project. Residents felt the highest anxiety in situations of being alone, in the process of moving through the project, at night.
5. Problems in the project. Residents indicated that the most serious problems on the project site centered around drugs, juvenile gangs, burglary and vandalism.

The study concluded that residents experience a remarkably high crime rate, an astounding level of fear of crime, and that residents restrict their lives and use of the environment because of concerns about crime in the public housing project.⁴

A 1975 study of four larger public housing projects in Boston indicated that more than sixty percent of the residents considered it very dangerous for them to do night time activities such as waiting for a bus, shopping, using the

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elevators and corridors, and being alone. The study also found that most residents had a high level of fear of crime that kept them from venturing out at night.³

The elderly experience a particularly severe problem with fear of crime in their public housing environs. Because the elderly feel more vulnerable, they become more vulnerable. A survey administered in the mid-1970s in the Wilmington, Delaware public housing system revealed that the topic of crime was the only area in which elderly participants expressed concern.⁴

The literature suggests that public housing crime may be caused by physical factors, social factors, and policies and management practices of the local housing authority. An overview of these factors are necessary to serve as a basis to determine the adequacy of provisions in the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program authorizing statute, and to aid in making policy recommendations for future anti-crime public housing programs. Although these factors have been defined as contributing to public housing crime, the literature does not delineate the extent to which each factor actually contributes to crime, nor does the literature define which of the three factors most influence crime in the public housing setting. It is generally accepted that the physical design of a public housing complex and design of buildings on the complex can deter or encourage criminal activity. Design can also facilitate detection of potential offenders. The literature also suggests that social factors and their relationship to crime activity is

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directly related to the design of the physical environment. Design facilitates territoriality, defensible space, access control, and social cohesion, to name a few. This research takes the position that physical design factors control criminal behavior and social variables related to crime activity in public housing is affected by physical design characteristics.⁷

Physical Environment and Crime

Literature on the relationship between the physical environment and crime document that specific physical factors contribute to the problem of crime in general, and to the public housing setting specifically. Physical factors most often mentioned and empirically documented include lack of surveillance in and around public housing; and inadequate locks on doors and window frames, and inadequate alarms. Physical design of a public housing complex can create areas where surveillance by residents, management, and security personnel is severely restricted. Typical scenarios include grounds not overlooked by windows, poorly lighted areas, hidden spaces, stairways, and poorly placed amenities such as laundry rooms near basement entrances that may be hidden from sight.

A pioneering study published in 1961 by Elizabeth Wood suggested that the design of larger public housing projects encouraged a philosophy of "sophisticated family individualism." In simpler language, Wood felt that the design of project housing did not allow residents the mechanism to develop their own social controls or the

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establishment of a self-policing mechanism. She felt that overall physical design of a public housing project prevented accidental and causal contact among residents.⁹ Wood offered several design alternatives that encouraged social structure in the public housing setting. She suggested that benches and grounds equipment be arranged in such a way to encourage group formation and social order. Also, she suggested that various facilities such as recreation, day-care, and laundry be located in a manner where social control (such as surveillance) is encouraged.⁷

In 1970, Luedtke analyzed the physical design of four public housing projects in Detroit. He found that ground floor apartments located at the end of a row of buildings were more susceptible to breaking and entering. Also, row houses were more frequently victimized by breaking and entering than high rise apartment buildings. He stated:

"Although individual dwelling units are contiguous in row housing, there is very limited visibility of adjoining apartments because all windows and doors are located along the same linear axis. The high rise apartment buildings have more elaborate security measures at the entrance points which tend to make them less susceptible to breaking and entering than the individual dwelling units within a row house sequence."¹⁰

Newman's 1973 publication titled Defensible Space looked at urban forms and how those designs created or prevented crime encounters. He hypothesized that the provision of surveillance opportunities in public housing environments was a significant crime deterrent that lessened the anxiety of inhabitants and created an overall image of a safe environment. He suggested that non-private areas and

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access paths such as stairs, elevators, corridors, and lobbies could be lighted and positioned in such a manner to facilitate their surveillance by residents and formal authorities.¹¹

Another common factor cited in the literature as a contributor to crime in public housing is inadequate locks on doors and windows that are too low or too close to other nearby residences, and the lack of electronic surveillance equipment. The literature suggest that public and private housing units experience a higher burglary rate if doors and windows are improperly secured. Newman documented the vulnerability of public housing units that have inadequately secured doors and locks, and the need for improving residential security in the public housing setting.¹² Brill's research in the latter half of the 1970s with various public housing sites documented similar findings. As an example, in the Baltimore study, Brill found that almost seventy-five percent of reported burglaries (successful or not) were carried out by perpetrators that gained entry through inadequately secured front or back doors.¹³ A U. S. Department of Justice study, completed in 1980, suggested that burglary is primarily determined by the accessibility of buildings and apartments with accessibility related to locks and surveillance devices.¹⁴ A weaker deterrent of burglary activity is the use of electronic alarms. The literature suggests that electronic burglary alarm devices may increase the likelihood of apprehension by notifying someone who is capable of responding quickly when private space is being

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violated. However, circumvention of these devices are common among the more sophisticated criminals. Also, the presence of these devices instill a sense of fear of crime by the residents rather than reduce fear.¹³

The literature suggests other physical factors may relate to crime activity in public housing. Empirical evidence of these factors, however, suggest a weaker relationship to crime activity than those previously discussed. Access control refers to real or symbolic barriers that prevent non-residents from walking freely onto the grounds of the public housing project.¹⁴ This deterrent is most important where public housing crime is caused primarily by neighborhood residents and not by public housing residents. Newman addressed this phenomenon in and around residential buildings where too many residents shared the same uncontrolled and/or unguarded entranceway. Newman postulated that physical design could create boundaries through construction of low walls, landscaping or fencing. The construction of symbolic boundaries through landscaping or real boundaries serves as an indication to potential offenders that they are passing from a public to a more private space.¹⁵ Brill's 1976 study of public housing in the Milville public housing project in Cincinnati justified these findings. He concluded that the highest crime area on the project site occurred near the perimeter of the site where no access control existed to prohibit non-residents from entering the grounds.¹⁶

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Strategies designed to improve access control on public housing sites have their limitations. The effectiveness at night of symbolic barriers such as low walls is low. Fences and shrubberies around the periphery of public housing projects deter neighborhood criminals from entering the project site, but these devices in turn reduce surveillance opportunities.¹⁹

No real or symbolic barriers have existed around the low-rise units in the Brewster-Douglass public housing project. Residents of the nearby neighborhood have had ready access to the public housing site. Interviews with low-rise residents have indicated ready access to be a major problem because they felt that residents of the adjacent neighborhood carried out most crime activity on the project site. One Brewster-Douglass resident felt that fencing around the low-rises would help in keeping neighbors out of the site.

Inadequate circulation patterns may contribute to crime in public housing. This factor addresses pathways, walkaways, and pedestrian movement on the public housing complex. Uncontrolled circulation allows would be offenders to walk up to first floor apartment windows and doors. In addition, uncontrolled circulation patterns limit surveillance opportunities by making it easier for potential offenders to not be noticed by residents and security patrols as they approach residential buildings on the site. The creation of walkaways designed to channel pedestrian movement through the complex in a controlled, easily watched

manner increases opportunities for surveillance. Shrubbery is sometimes used to further delineate the pathway. No solid evidence exist to suggest that this factor alone contributes to public housing crime. Local housing authorities do use this technique in combination with others discussed to reduce crime activity in the public housing setting.²⁰

Internal circulation patterns at the Brewster/Douglass public housing complex is a major factor of crime activity at the site. Building placement along the periphery of the low-rise area coupled with the inability of police to have easy car access to the interior from most periphery vantage points allows offenders along the complex border to escape by merely running into the interior of the complex. By the time police maneuver their vehicles inside the complex, the offenders have escaped.²¹

Residents of the Brewster-Douglass site generally expressed in recent interviews that living at Brewster-Douglass felt comfortable but living conditions would be much better if the city would carry through promises to clean up nearby neighborhoods. A 1979 HUD study indicated that residents' satisfaction of their public housing project was affected by the neighborhood that the project is located. The prevalence of crime, vandalism and other socially undesirable behavior in the neighborhood immediately surrounding the public housing site generates fear among the residents of robbery and physical attack. This fear, particularly among the elderly, keeps residents from venturing out to take care of basic needs. When undesirable

neighborhood characteristics exist, design and management features of the public housing complex will have to compensate for such undesirable conditions if a satisfactory environment is to be obtained.

The 1979 HUD study also found that a public housing development can be successful if located in an undesirable neighborhood. Residents rate sixteen of the thirty-seven sample sites as a satisfactory place to live. Seven of these sixteen sites were located in neighborhoods perceived as unsatisfactory by the residents. Residents expressed high levels of satisfaction of the seven sites because design features and management practices of the public housing projects addressed and compensated for crime experienced in the surrounding neighborhood.²²

Social Factors and Crime in Public Housing

The literature clearly expresses the relationship between crime and social characteristics of public housing residents. Social characteristics coupled with the physical design of the project site together influence criminal activity. Brill and Associates 1975 study of four housing projects in Boston best summarizes this relationship. This study concluded that crime potential, particularly for larger projects, is influenced by design and equipment deficiencies as well as by the presence or absence of those social factors that inhibit people from protecting and helping each other. These social factors include weak social structure of the residents, absence of support groups, and a general lack of interpersonal trust among residents.²³

The most common social deficiency that encourages crime in public housing is a lack of social organization, social cohesion, and informal social control among residents. Social organization occurs when group activity exist with public housing resident involvement, and there are recognized leaders among the residents. Social cohesion addresses friendship issues among residents such as the number and intensity of friendships and helping behavior. Informal social controls refer to general roles and norms among public housing residents.

William H. Brill and Associates conducted a series of public housing studies in the 1970s. The consultant concluded that social organization, social cohesion, and informal controls are nonexistent in many public housing settings. Absence of these social controls cause distrust among the residents and toward the management and housing authority. Residents feel isolated from neighbors and the housing authority. Deficiencies in maintenance and other housing services perpetuate the feeling of social isolation and neglect.²⁴

A HUD found in a 1979 public housing resident satisfaction study that when residents perceive themselves to be similar socio-economically to other residents, their level of satisfaction with other residents and with living in that project is higher. Similarity instills friendliness and trustworthiness that leads to a sense of safety from crime and vandalism.²⁵

Lack of employment opportunities for public housing residents is a major contributor to the crime problem in public housing. No uniform empirical data is available to document this hypothesis. However, statistics from selected public housing sites indicate that nine to twenty-five percent of public housing residents have full-time unsubsidized unemployment.²⁶ The overall literature does not develop a strong relationship between low employment and high crime rates. However, a positive correlation between homicide and suicide has been documented using national unemployment data.²⁷ A study completed in 1985 concluded a weak but significant positive correlation between unemployment and the annual rates of homicide, robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft using time-series data from 1946-1982.²⁸

The lack of territoriality among public housing residents is believed to increase the fear of crime among residents. Territoriality is an attitude where residents desire and have a sense of control over their environment. Residents that possess proprietary and territorial interests contribute to the establishment of community norms and standards and exercise control over those involved in anti-social behavior.²⁹

Rosenthal has a similar concept he calls "turf reclamation." His turf reclamation concept, or neighborhood security, is based on the assumption that we live in residential settings which in a sense we do not control. To establish turf reclamation, residents must establish and

define neighborhood values, agree to take action and set standards for the neighborhood and realize they must give as well as take. Having an organized community and a trained organizer of the community are two elements needed for a safe and secure neighborhood.³⁰

Territoriality is encouraged through the promotion of socially oriented strategies such as improvement of social organization, cohesion, and informal social control. These social factors can possibly be encouraged through physical design standards such as clustering of dwelling units to establish a physical sense of community. In addition, territoriality is encouraged through the provision of jobs in the setting and organized youth activity.³¹

Brill's research in the 1970s on public housing reveal a lack of social service programs that address social problems of the residents. The consulting firm found that many of the households, especially those headed by women, suffer deeply rooted social problems and need help to address them. The firm hypothesized that:

"These social problems contribute directly in so far as the residents who have drug or employment related problems may commit crimes in order to have money. They contribute indirectly as they reduce the potential for social cohesion and self-protective behaviors to limit the residents' vulnerability to potential offenders."³²

Wilson documented that chemically addicted persons are likely to commit more crimes than if they had not become addicted. Most addicts, in addition to selling drugs, become involved in burglary and robbery to support their habit. Wilson referred to a Baltimore study:

"...the frequency with which they [addicts] committed crimes was six times higher during those periods when they were... using heroin regularly than it was when they were not heavy users."³³

Brill concluded that addressing these social issues as well as physical design changes will contribute significantly to the reduction of crime and the fear of crime in and around public housing.

A minor social factor that may contribute to crime in public housing is a lack of supervision and organized activity for youth. Very little literature document this correlation. A conference held by the American Institute of Research on crime in public housing indicated that the combination of one parent families and large numbers of children contribute to youth oriented crime problems.³⁴ Gold investigated the relationship between supervision and delinquency and other factors which contribute to anti-social behavior in youth. The study found that a lack of supervision and organized activity for public housing youths contribute to crime problems in the public housing setting.³⁵ Anti-Crime Program guidelines addressed the issue of organized activities for youth. Specifically, the Detroit Anti-Crime Program employed Brewster-Douglass project youths as site monitors, and as escorts for the elderly.

Newman's discussion on public housing crime relates similar findings. Based on interviews with residents, management and police, he suggests that families with only one adult present are less able to control their teen-age children than those households with two guardians.³⁴

Management Practices and Public Housing Crime

The final category of causes of crime in public housing relates to local government policies and management practices. The major problem related to crime in public housing is the lack of adequate and stable funding to address local crime problems. Local public housing authorities usually have the primary responsibility to provide security personnel for their project sites. In some cases, local public housing authorities contract with the local police force to provide this protection. Papers presented at the 1978 National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials/Department of Housing and Urban Development Anti-Crime Conference held in Washington, D.C., document fund instability to support anti-crime programs. Conference findings indicated that unstable short-term funding: contribute to an unstable security force, hampers coordination of security operation between agencies; and prevents long-range planning and training.³⁷ Rabushka demonstrated that following reductions in security in the Wilmington, Delaware project sites, residents' fear of crime drastically increased. The fear of drugs and rape tripled, the fear of car theft doubled and the fear of assault, robbery and vandalism also increased.³⁸

Congress funded the Anti-Crime Program for one year only. Unstable funding caused particular problems for the hardware component of local Anti-Crime Program. Maintenance and operation of physical surveillance mechanisms such as cameras had to be supported by the local participating housing authority budget after the Anti-Crime Program expired, or cease operation of these mechanisms.

CRIME IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS

The development of a conceptual framework on crime in urban neighborhoods is necessary in order to help establish some relationship between implementation results of the Detroit Urban Initiative Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and adequacy of the federal policy that backed the program. Specifically, this section will aid in defining causes of crime in urban neighborhoods so that the effect that neighborhood crime might have on nearby public housing projects can be determined. Second, the framework will assist in making policy recommendations that may be incorporated in the Anti-Crime Program statute to address neighborhood crime issues and their effect on public housing crime.

Research that address crime in urban neighborhoods makes the assumption that physical design and socioeconomic characteristics of the residents are important because they affect the ability of neighborhood residents to maintain control over the physical space which they inhabit. Maintaining control over the neighborhood is referred to as territoriality. Territoriality appears to be the critical

factor that mediates the relationship between the social and physical environment of a neighborhood and crime activity in the neighborhood. This section discusses the physical environment of a neighborhood, the social characteristics of a neighborhood, territorial control, and the relationship to crime in the neighborhood setting. These categories do not operate independently. Rather, the assumption is made that physical design can either foster or retard social interaction among neighbors, informal street surveillance, and a proprietary attitude toward the neighborhood. The inter-relationships of these categories jointly are believed to influence crime.

Urban Neighborhood Delineation

A definition of an urban neighborhood is in order before pursuing a discussion on neighborhood crime. An urban neighborhood is considered the smallest operating unit in a city, not including the family unit. Ahlbrandt and Cunningham gives a good description of a neighborhood unit. They state,

"[The neighborhood]... is the level of the elementary school, the walk-in convenience store, the parish church, and the community organization mobilized to fight crime.... It is the level where limited human relationships... develop out of propinquity. When they stay around awhile, residents come to identify themselves with their neighborhood. Most neighborhoods acquire a distinctive name."³⁹

Neighborhood delineation is based on the distinctiveness of each area. Distinctiveness comes from several sources such as geographical boundaries; ethnic or cultural characteristics of inhabitants; or psychological unity among people

who feel they belong together.⁴⁰ Physical characteristics normally associated with neighborhood crime include building type, street design, and land use.

Physical Environment and Neighborhood Crime

Oscar Newman analyzed three forms of residential housing and their relationship to crime in his book Community of Interest.⁴¹ He found that residents of single-family housing have a low potential of crime activity because they have full control of activities within the private space that surrounds their structures through the construction of real or psychological barriers, and surveillance activities. Multi-family housing has more potential for crime because the realm of private space of each apartment does not extend beyond the entrance to the apartment. Apartments are accessible by an interior corridor or stairs. These semiprivate spaces can generate crime particularly when security measures are not available. Multi-family housing studied were former single-family dwellings.

Finally, the elevator high-rise building, such as those found in a public housing complex has the highest potential of crime activity. High-rise buildings present a sense of anonymity and ease of accessibility for the outsider. Residents have no real control of public space outside their apartment because too many people share building access and adjoining grounds.⁴²

Repetto's study in 1974 found a positive relationship between the level of access or "physical vulnerability" and increases in robbery and burglary rates. He concluded that

areas with dwelling portals hidden (or made unobservable) by vacant lots, alley ways, shrubs or other obstructions had medium to high burglary rates compared to residential areas where portals were easily seen. He also found "vulnerability" to be the most influential factor in differentiating crime rates of inner city neighborhoods. Inner city burglars value ease of access to a structure more than the value of what they expect to find in the structure. As a result, conspicuously vulnerable areas in the inner city tend to have a higher burglary rate than the more affluent areas with buildings that are less accessible.⁴³

A Detroit study completed in 1970 on residential crime suggested that basement windows are used as a point of entry in approximately 10 percent of burglaries in private dwellings. Entry by basement window is especially prevalent in older inner-city neighborhoods where basement windows are generally larger to permit adult access. Enclosed porches also encourage burglary activity since locks usually found on porch doors are inadequate and can be easily pried open. Once inside the porch, the criminal can break in the structure out of public view.⁴⁴ Finally, the study concluded that residential units with large chimneys located on the side offer another form of concealment for burglars, since a side door is often located near the chimney. The chimney hides the door from the front sidewalk or street. The concealment allows ease in breaking and entering.⁴⁵

The Lower Woodward area, and particularly the Brush Park neighborhood adjacent to the Brewster/Douglass project has physical and social characteristics conducive to crime activity. Multi-family housing construction and conversion of single-family housing to walk-up multi-family encourage criminal behavior because most of these units are vacant and they house illicit drug activity. Household composition of the Lower Woodward area is primarily one-person households. Some seventy percent of the households in the area consist of single persons living alone. Approximately fifteen percent of the population is under eighteen years of age, and roughly twenty one percent of the population is over sixty-five years of age.

Street design effectively reduces crime when components of territoriality are utilized to delineate public and private areas. Restructuring flow of outsiders makes it easier for neighborhood residents to distinguish neighbors from strangers, therefore increasing the neighborhood's informal surveillance mechanism. A study of high crime areas in Atlanta also suggest that insulating outsiders from a neighborhood may be effective in the decrease of opportunistic crimes such as robbery, burglary, and auto theft.⁴⁶ The Hartford, Connecticut, Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program found that a significant reduction in burglary and "fear of burglary" occurred after the rerouting of through traffic from interior residential streets to streets intended for heavier use. Modifying the street system by removing

heavily traveled corridors out of neighborhoods increased resident use of and control over the neighborhood, and increased resident cohesion and interaction.⁴⁷

A 1980 study by Gerald Luedtke analyzed criminal activity and street layout in Detroit. Although not fully tested, the study suggested that the layout of the expressway system and the use of a superblock system encouraged crime by reducing the penetrability capacity of police.⁴⁸

Other aspects of street design contribute to crime. Higher street lighting intensity has a tendency to reduce occurrences on violent crimes such as robbery and assault.⁴⁹ A United States Department of Justice study in 1976 focused on Detroit and it found that three out of four burglaries committed against commercial establishments involved buildings which have either no lights or inadequate lights.⁵⁰

The Luedtke study found lighting to be most important in poorly visible and concealed environments such as those found in the rear and side of buildings. Good lighting coupled with fair visibility of the rear entrance increased the probability of the criminal being observed and reported. Lighting is necessary to reinforce any other protective measures, such as steel doors, to deter criminal activity.⁵¹

The type of street can affect the rate and occurrence of crime in an urban neighborhood. Expressways may effectively shield outsiders from a neighborhood. Shielding reduces the potential of opportunistic crimes. Expressways

may also prohibit high crime activity characteristic of one neighborhood to spill over into an adjacent neighborhood with a lower occurrence of crime activity.⁹²

Finally, the Luedtke study found a relationship between on-street parking and criminal activity in Detroit. He concluded that concealment is a frequent factor that encouraged criminal activity. The study revealed that parked vehicles are the most frequently observed form of concealment in robbery and burglary sites. Nearly 60 percent of all robbery sites and 64 percent of all burglaries show concealment from on-street parked vehicles. On-street parking blocks the interior visibility of the store front from the street. Luedtke suggested that the elimination of on-street parking during high crime hours may facilitate police surveillance and reduce the potential for crime activity. In addition, parking regulations could be amended to require that new stores provide off-street parking.⁹³

Other than Jane Jacob's classic study in the early 1960s, the literature concurs that a homogeneous land use environment generally reduces crime activity. Jane Jacobs determined that a mixed land use environment was the key element to crime deterrence. Continuous and multiple uses of neighborhood facilities enhances natural surveillance by creating overlapping patterns of pedestrian movement.⁹⁴ Surveillance is a natural deterrence of crime because it increases the risk of criminal apprehension.

Most studies suggests that mixed land uses encourage crime activity. Gardiner's work in 1978 on crime and the neighborhood environment suggested that open lots, and open block interiors contribute to crime activity. Vacant areas allow easy access to victims or burglary targets. A sense of openness undermines the residents' sense of being able to observe and control their surroundings. Second, Gardiner found that hospitals and schools become "crime generators" when located in residential areas. These uses attract potential offenders and set up victims in the neighborhood setting. Finally, the study suggested the crime potential increases when neighborhood focal points such as a park, playground or landmark is taken over by outsiders or unruly youths. These areas are used by gangs to scope out potential victims.³³

Skogan and Maxfield's study of crime in Chicago found a high crime problem in the Lincoln Park neighborhood on the city's north side. Incidences of crime were found to be related to principal entertainment establishments that generated heavy traffic congestion and unwanted commercial development.³⁴ This affluent, and predominantly white neighborhood has a mixture of land uses. Most residential dwellings are multi-unit rental apartments. Housing rehabilitation and gentrification of older homes is also a major activity taking place in the neighborhood.

A 1983 study addressed crime in Los Angeles County. This study looked at formerly safe neighborhoods that became dangerous and crime ridden over a period of several decades,

and reasons for why crime became a problem in neighborhoods previously unscathed by crime. The study defined stages of a neighborhood in change from a low crime area to a high crime area over time. First, a rapid land use change occurred from single-family to multi-family dwellings and from residential to a mixture of residential, commercial, and light industrial uses. The rapid change induced zoning changes. Second, a shift in population composition occurred from intact two-parent families to a high proportion of non-intact and unattached individuals.³⁷ The study found that high velocity land use changes during the early stages of land use transformation coupled with a high velocity change in socioeconomic status and subculture together introduced the crime element in the neighborhoods.³⁸

A 1970 study of crime in Detroit addressed variables related to urban form and structure that encourage and/or discouraged the probability of crime, including land use mixtures. The study found that most crime activity to be concentrated along commercial strip areas in the city. Residential dwelling units located within a two block penetration area directly behind a commercial strip had a high rate of breaking and entering. Finally, commercial and residential uses surrounding major institutional facilities suffered high rates of breaking and entering. Institutional facility grounds and themselves had low crime rates because of private security forces in place.³⁹

Social Variables and Neighborhood Crime

The literature indicates that the social structure of a neighborhood has an impact on potential criminal activity in that neighborhood. The primary connection between social structure and control of the neighborhood environment is that of territoriality. Several studies suggest that crime rates tend to be higher in low income, predominantly black neighborhoods that are found near the downtown area. This group of people tend to have low rates of homeownership. The lack of homeownership may also be significantly related to crime because the phenomenon discourages the formation of close ties and a sense of responsibility to the neighborhood. Maintaining control of the neighborhood is difficult when residents have no sense of responsibility to the neighborhood. Bordua's 1958 study of delinquency rates in Detroit suggested that low homeownership and a high number of unrelated individuals living together are the best predictors of high crime rates.⁴⁰

Sociologists have long established a strong relationship between income and crime. Reppetto found in his 1974 study of Boston neighborhoods that the average annual burglary rate per 1,000 dwelling units in lower income (below \$5,000) neighborhoods was more than 1.5 times that of the middle income (\$5,000-\$8,000) neighborhoods and more than 3.5 times that of the upper income (above \$8,000) neighborhoods. Concentrations of robbery activity corresponded with the low income areas of the city. Reppetto found that burglary rates increased with income in black

neighborhoods and these rates decreased with income in white neighborhoods, though there is a slight tendency for burglary rates to rise in high income white areas.⁴¹

A study published in 1981 addressed at crime in San Francisco, Chicago, and Philadelphia. The study found that victimization rates for personal theft and serious assault declined steadily with rise in income of an area. The decline of personal theft was most pronounced from the lowest income category (under \$3,000) to about the \$10,000 per year mark. Skogan and Maxfield found personal theft to be primarily a lower- and working-class problem. The very wealthy are not, however, isolated from risk.⁴² Burglary rates tended to be highest for those areas at the top and bottom of the financial ladder, and lowest for those in moderate income categories.⁴³ Finally, a study in 1976 on crime in the Cass Corridor in Detroit suggested that high unemployment and low income was related to the social and physical problems prevalent in the Corridor, and of the high crime rate. The study found crime rates to be significantly higher in the Corridor than in the City of Detroit. Crimes against people, such as homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault occurred two to four times more frequently in the Corridor than in the entire City. Crimes against property (burglary, larceny, and arson) also occurred more frequently than in the City as a whole.⁴⁴

An association between crime in a neighborhood and the racial composition of the neighborhood is well documented in the literature with varying results. Reppetto's study of

Boston delineated different patterns. He found the average annual residential burglary rate of predominantly black areas (more than 63 percent black population) to be approximately three times that of predominantly white areas (less than 20 percent black population) and approximately one and one-half times that of mixed areas (20 to 63 percent black population). Conventional thought suggest that the association of crime rates with racial composition center on the concept of social instability of racially mixed areas. This explanation does not hold up to the Boston experience. The Boston neighborhoods displayed a high degree of racial homogeneity, and appeared to be just as cohesive as the white or mixed neighborhoods. Obviously, other variables such as income, housing type, vulnerability issues, social issues, and police protection played a major role in neighborhood crime.⁴⁵

Finally, figures reported by the U.S. Department of Justice on victims of crime show that blacks are more often victims of crime than whites, particularly for robbery and larceny. The highest rate of victimization for violent crimes are among black males first, then white males, black females, and last white females. Black on black homicide is a major cause of death among blacks in the United States. Black women are highly susceptible to rape.⁴⁶

Studies suggests that crime is lower in stable residential neighborhoods versus those that are not stable. Stable neighborhoods that contain long-term residents allow the formation of strong emotional ties to the neighborhood.

Long-term residents develop the ability to distinguish between neighbors and strangers, and they develop an informal interaction with others living in the area. Suttle's work, The Social Order of the Slums, documented a communication network in a poor ethnic neighborhood. He found that stable Italian, Mexican and Puerto Rican communities formed an extensive communication network that extended beyond face-to-face relations. These ethnic communities experience fewer burglaries and robberies than black public housing project communities that had the characteristics of being more transient.⁴⁷

A 1975 Study of crime in Washington, D.C., determined that residential stability had a direct link to crime in the District. During the study period, teen-age population rose by thirty-two percent and social problems increased dramatically. Serious crimes rose 400 percent, welfare rates rose by 200 percent, unemployment increased 100 percent, and heroin addition increased by 1,000 percent. This correlation and increase is a result of the lack of job opportunities for teen-agers.⁴⁸

Crime increase also occurred at a similar rate in Detroit during the decade of the 1960s. Murders increased from 100 cases in 1960 to more than 500 reported cases in 1970. However, the number of teen-agers did not quintuple as is the case in Washington, D.C. The study on Detroit and other larger cities also confirmed that change in the age structure of the population is not the sole cause of crime increase in the inner city. Widespread media attention to

crime problems "spreads the word" that a violate growth culture is active. Finally, suburban contact with inner city ghetto's through civil rights programs perpetuated drug activity. White volunteers from the suburbs created a mistaken view of ubiquitous drug activity when in fact drug use may have only been deviant and episodic.⁶⁹

Neighborhood evolution has a relationship to crime. LaGory and Pipkin outlined seven stages of evolution. The rural stage is characterized by low population densities and a predominance of single-family housing. Subdivision activities at the First wave of development occur with a high rate of single-family construction. Initial development ends at the Fully developed, high-quality residential stage. Densities are higher than the former stage because of increased multi-family construction. The neighborhood becomes the high density "new slums" at the packing stage. Structures begin to age, rents fall, and lower-income groups move in. To bridge the gap between old (higher) and new (lower) rents, landlords pack more people into the units than they were designed to hold. The neighborhood is classified as the "old slums" at the thinning stage. Buildings are continually deteriorating. The population core is primarily elderly because the children of the low-income families that moved in the neighborhood during the previous stage move out leaving the elderly behind. In the final stage, Recapture, property is reacquired, leveled or rehabilitated, and made fit for upscale development.⁷⁰

Neighborhoods at the "packing" and "thinning" stages have characteristics conducive to crime activity. Reppetto documents that neighborhoods with a large number of youths usually experience high crime rates, such as in the "packing" stage.⁷¹ Reppetto found a relationship between areas with large populations under the age of 18 and correspondingly large criminal populations in his study of Boston. Neighborhoods with over 40 percent of the population under 18 years of age had an average annual burglary rate of 41/1000 dwelling units. Most of these areas are housing projects, or contain major housing projects, and are located in or near the core area of the city with large black low income populations.⁷² Neighborhoods at the "thinning" stage contain a high number of elderly residents. Surveys show that elderly suffer more from the fear of crime than the actual act of being victimized.⁷³ It can be expected that neighborhoods with a high concentration of elderly experience low crime rates, but the elderly perceive a real danger of crime activity.⁷⁴

On the other hand, family-oriented neighborhoods such as those in the "first wave of development" and "fully developed" stages tend to experience low rates of crime. Suttle's discussion on street life in an ethnic area of Chicago suggest that these family oriented neighborhoods may be well defended against crime because of street activity. He states,

"During the summer months, the streets... are [filled] with children, young adults, and old people. Street life is especially active in the afternoon after school or work. The front steps

are crowded with old people chatting.... Young girls stand in clusters... glancing at the passers-by. Young unmarried men seem to occupy every street corner or unused doorway. Small two- and three- year old... toddle along the sidewalks in front of their homes."⁷⁵

In contrast, neighborhoods dominated by childless couples will not have the surveillance mechanism on the sidewalk to the extent that family neighborhoods experience.

Territoriality and Neighborhood Crime

The physical and social characteristics just discussed indirectly involves the promotion or inhibition of territoriality. Territoriality refers to the maintenance of control over a given area by inhabitants of that area. The relationship between crime and territoriality is defined through several characteristics. First, boundaries of a territorially distinct area are easily delimited. Physical and/or social neighborhood boundaries make it easier for residents to recognize strangers and potential criminals. Second, a neighborhood where residents and neighbors are friends and where residents work and participate in organized social and religious activities will experience a higher degree of territoriality. Third, territoriality is high in neighborhoods where residents care about activities in the neighborhood. Caring about what goes on serves as a catalyst to set up the surveillance mechanism and take action when anti-social behavior occurs. Finally, a territorially distinct neighborhood contains residents with

similar norms and values. Presence of this social trait makes it easy for residents to define explicitly what is and is not acceptable behavior in the neighborhood.⁷⁴

Two bodies of thought address the relationship between territoriality and crime. First, fear of crime is expected to be lower in neighborhoods where informal social control is higher. Informal social control is the means by which individual behavior is controlled based on formal law or by traditions and patterns common to the neighborhood population. Neighborhoods where residents watch out for one another have a relatively low fear of crime. Also, the more a resident feels a part of the community, the lower their fear of crime.

At the other end of the spectrum, some researchers find that residents who are an integral part of the social fabric of the neighborhood exhibit a high rate of fear of crime because they are more aware of crime. Crime generates fear and distrust. People restrict their social activity, stop using community facilities, and avoid street contact with strangers. Wilson argues that:

"Predatory crime does not merely victimize individuals, it impedes and, in the extreme case, prevents the formation and maintenance of community. By disrupting the delicate nexus of ties, formal and informal, by which we are linked with our neighbors, crime atomizes society and makes of its members mere individual calculators estimating their own advantage."⁷⁵

Crime in neighborhood undermines the confidence of residents that locally shared norms still exist. Public places fall under the control of criminals when residents withdraw from

public life and when residents distance themselves from community members. Residents draw support from relatives and close friends rather than relatively unknown strangers.⁷⁹

SUMMARY

The framework developed in this chapter allows for the development of a theoretical model on the genesis of crime in public housing. This model, as presented below, will allow for an accurate evaluation of provisions contained in the Anti-Crime statute that address crime in public housing. A model on the genesis of crime in urban neighborhoods and compared in subsequent chapters with the Detroit situation will help to determine if a relationship can be established between results of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program and adequacy of the federal policy that backed the program.

Public housing projects most susceptible to crime are larger projects located in larger cities in low-income neighborhoods. These neighborhoods are primarily minority occupied and they have a high percentage of renters. The project site as well as the neighborhoods suffers from poor police protection as well as from inadequate social services and other amenities. Neighborhood crime activity commonly filters into the adjacent public housing project. In many cases, the project develops as the center of crime activity in the neighborhood. Reasons that allow this phenomena to develop include a dense population of lower socio-economic people, a high percentage of unemployed teenagers with

little or no supervision, low or non-existent police protection, and other design factors that foster criminal activity.

The physical design of public housing buildings and site layout have a direct effect on crime in the housing project. Design also has an indirect effect on social factors. Design facilitates territoriality, defensible space, access control, and social cohesion. Crime activity is most pronounced in a public housing setting where design deters or does not allow for the development of a surveillance mechanism. Typical scenarios include grounds not overlooked by windows; ground level doors and windows not visible from other neighboring units; poorly lighted areas, hidden spaces, stairways; and poorly placed amenities such as laundry rooms near basement entrances that may be hidden from sight. Crime is also pronounced in projects that have inadequate locks on doors and windows, and when alarm systems are nonexistent. This variable is possibly related to management issues when there is no interest or lack of manpower and funds to assure that these safety features are in place. Public housing projects that have no real or symbolic barriers to serve as access control will experience crime activity, particularly if the project is located in a high crime neighborhood. Without adequate access control, nearby residents have free access to the public housing grounds. Project sites with inadequate circulation patterns encourage criminal activity. Uncontrolled circulation patterns allow strangers to freely walk up to first floor

apartment windows and doors. In addition, uncontrolled circulation patterns limit surveillance opportunities by making it easier for potential offenders to not be noticed by residents and security patrols as they approach residential buildings. Closed circulation patterns where there exist only one or two entrances into the site make it easy for criminals to escape into the interior of the project before police can enter and apprehend.

Social structure, design and crime have a definite link. Physical design that includes building size, building placement, and capacity of the site meeting resident needs such as elevator demand and adequacy of open space affects social structure. A weak social structure is defined as the lack of social organization, social cohesion, and informal social control among residents. Physical design deters interaction among residents. Larger buildings are not conducive to resident interaction, thus crime is higher. Related to physical design and social control is the concept of territoriality. Territoriality is an attitude where residents desire and have a sense of control over their environment. Territoriality does not develop when building and site layout does not allow for the establishment of a sense of "neighborhood", and when there is a lack of jobs and activities for youths do not exist.

Finally, crime will occur in public housing when management practices to keep criminal activity in check is interrupted or terminated because of unsteady funding. Local public housing projects usually have the primary

responsibility to provide security personnel for their project sites. Unstable funding results in a weak security force and prevents long-range planning and training.

Neighborhoods that experience high crime activity have characteristics that separate them from other non-crime neighborhoods. Physical design of the neighborhood as well as the socioeconomic make-up of neighborhood residents together determine the likelihood of the frequency of criminal activity in the neighborhood. Physical design and socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood are important because they affect the ability of neighborhood residents to maintain control over the physical space which they inhabit. Maintaining control is referred to as territoriality.

High crime neighborhoods usually have a predominance of multi-family and high-rise buildings. Multi-family housing have more potential for crime because the realm of private space of each apartment does not extend beyond the entrance to the apartment. High-rise buildings present a sense of anonymity and ease of accessibility for the outsider. Residents have no real control of public space outside their apartment because too many people share building access and adjoining grounds.

Street design has an effect on criminal behavior in the neighborhood. Street patterns that allow an easy flow of outsiders into the neighborhood makes it more difficult for neighborhood residents to distinguish residents from strangers, therefore decreasing the informal surveillance

mechanism. Also, neighborhoods sealed by expressway systems have high crime rates because the "penetrability" of police is reduced. Poor street lighting encourages crime activity, particularly in the rear and side of buildings. Lighting is necessary to reinforce other protective measures, such as steel doors, to deter criminal activity. Finally, neighborhoods that allow on-street parking in and around commercial areas will experience a higher crime rate. On-street parking blocks the interior visibility of the store front on the street thus concealing potential burglary and robbery activity.

Neighborhoods with mixed land uses are more susceptible to criminal activity. A neighborhood with open lots, and open block interiors provide access to victims or burglary targets. Some uses such as hospitals, commercial businesses, and schools become "crime generators" when located in residential areas. These uses attract potential offenders and set up victims in the neighborhood.

A high crime neighborhood generally has a weak socioeconomic base of the residents. The income level is below poverty level. Robbery, burglary, and theft activity are high. Most residents are minority, though this variable does not solely account for high crime activity. The neighborhood will not be stable, therefore transient residents will not have developed any emotional ties to the neighborhood or will they have developed strong informal interaction with their neighbors. High crime neighborhoods are at the lower end of their evolutionary development. They

will contain a high number of teen-agers under eighteen years of age and the high crime neighborhood may also have a high number of elderly. Elderly perception of crime is usually higher than the actual occurrence of criminal activity.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

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Chapter IV

DEVELOPMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

This chapter discusses the development and structure of the statute that authorized the federal Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. In addition, program guidelines of the Anti-Crime Program as administered by the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are reviewed. Knowledge of statute development and structure are necessary in order to determine whether the federal policy that authorized the Anti-Crime Program adequately addressed the crime problem in public housing.

NATIONAL URBAN POLICY-1978

President Carter announced the Nation's first National Urban Policy on March 27, 1978.¹ The policy, entitled "A New Partnership to Conserve America's Communities," called for the combined effort and resources of all levels of government, the private sector, and neighborhood/voluntary organizations to conserve and strengthen our urban areas.

The Policy recognized federal responsibility and leadership in the implementation of the "New Partnership" approach.

Policy objectives outlined in Carter's approach included:

1. Encourage and support of efforts to improve local planning and management capacity in existing federal programs;
2. Encourage of states to become partners to assist urban areas;
3. Stimulation of greater involvement by neighborhood and voluntary associations;
4. Provide fiscal relief to the most hard-pressed communities;
5. Provide strong incentives to attract private investment to distressed communities;
6. Provide employment opportunities, primarily in the private sector, to the long-term unemployment and disadvantaged in urban areas;
7. Increase access to opportunity for those disadvantaged by a history of discrimination;
8. Expand and improve social and health services to disadvantaged people in cities, counties, and other communities; and
9. Improve the urban physical environment and the cultural and aesthetic aspects of urban life.²

In a morning ceremony in the Rose Garden at the White House, President Carter, on July 10, 1978, announced his intention to support the development of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program, and he also officially made this effort a part of his National Urban Policy.³ He stated that "the primary responsibility to control crime rests with local and state officials, but the Federal Government can and does provide essential and effective support." Carter felt that the public housing anti-crime program demonstrated the Federal government's sensitivity to

the crime problem in public housing. Carter's initial proposal involved several Federal agencies that pooled \$32 million to address several activities in the anti-crime component. First, Carter proposed the use of Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) funds to hire local residents for such important, preventive jobs as to staff elevators and patrol unguarded areas. In addition, the proposal directed Interior Department funds to build recreation facilities for public housing residents. Finally, Carter directed the use of Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds to provide counseling for juveniles residing in public housing who may have a potential for crime activity.

In the same ceremony, HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris indicated that the entire public housing system had a negative image because of the crime problem in a few, highly visible public housing projects. This effort, as part of the National Urban Policy, directly addressed some of the worst living conditions in the country. It is interesting to note that Secretary Harris, in an earlier committee testimony, did not address crime in public housing, and she emphatically stated that she did not want program or budget expansion in any HUD programs.

Objectives of the Anti-Crime Program complemented objectives outlined in President Carter's National Urban Policy. The Program met local planning and management objectives by the provision of improved local management of public housing crime problems. The Program met Carter's

neighborhood involvement objective by the encouragement of neighborhood association involvement to carry out local anti-crime efforts such as escorting the elderly. Provisions for branch police precinct offices in public housing administrative site offices, as well as funds to address the crime problem in public housing as a whole met Carter's objective of providing fiscal relief to hard-pressed areas. In addition, program funds that created employment opportunities for public housing residents complemented Policy objectives that related to the provision of employment opportunities for the unemployed and disadvantaged. Finally, the effort to reduce crime met the Policy objectives that addressed the urban physical environment and cultural/aesthetic aspects of urban life.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A legislative history is important in order to understand the overall success of the Anti-Crime Program. The degree to which policy makers structure policy can directly determine if a program will be successful in meeting its objectives. Mazmanian and Sabatier state that "a carefully drafted statute can substantially affect the extent to which its objectives are attained."⁴ Legislation is most likely to succeed if:

1. policy objectives are clear and constant;
2. an adequate causal theory is incorporated in the statute;
3. the implementation process is structured;
4. implementing agency has a commitment to statutory goals;
5. program support exists by organized constituency groups and key legislators throughout the implementation process;

6. priority of statute objectives is not undermined over time by conflicting public policies that weakens the statutes causal theory or political support.³

An analysis of program formulation will provide clues to the level of effectiveness of the Urban Initiatives Program.

Genesis

HUD's response to the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 came in the form of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. The Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 (PL 95-557) contained the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 (see Appendix for complete text). The Senate bill that proposed the original Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 (S. 2637), and introduced on March 2, 1978, did not contain provisions to address public housing security.⁴ Generally, S.2637 amended and extended existing Federal laws that related to housing, community and neighborhood development and preservation, and related programs such as housing construction and finance.

Senator Brooke introduced the initial bill that proposed the public housing security demonstration effort (S.2799) on March 23, 1978. Public housing security problems that had gained increased attention in recent months resulted in introduction of the bill. Senator Brooke justified his bill on the belief that:

1. low-income and elderly public housing residents suffer substantially from rising crime and violence, and they are being threatened as a result of inadequate security arrangements for the prevention of physical violence, theft, burglary, and other crimes;

2. public housing residents have restricted their lives and use of the environment because of their concern about crime, and are abandoning public housing projects at a time when there is an increase demand for public housing units;
3. higher vacancy rates and heavy financial losses of management in some cases have led to complete abandonment of public housing projects;
4. an integral part of successfully providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low-income persons is to insure that the housing is secure;
5. local public housing authorities have inadequate security arrangements for the prevention of crime and vandalism, and lack specific operating funds to provide security measures; and
6. action is needed to provide for the security of public housing residents and to preserve the Nation's investment in its public housing stock.⁷

These findings represented the first significant and initial attempt of Congress to formally recognize that a crime problem existed in public housing. At the same time, however, these findings are somewhat arbitrary. The literature documents that crime among the low-income and elderly public housing residents occurs mainly in the larger public housing projects in larger urban areas. Generally, the smaller elderly complexes are the safest. The floor referred the bills to the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

The final bill, a committee bill (S.3084), titled the "Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978" sent to the House by the Senate, contained provisions of the

original Senate bill (S.2637) plus other Senate bills such as S.2708 and S.2709, the Administration's proposal for programs conducted by the Farmers Home Administration, and S.2799, the original bill that proposed the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The committee bill (S.3084) consisted of seven titles. Failure to bring the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act to the forefront during the Senate committee effort may have contributed to the statutes adequacy to address crime in public housing. The Act suffered a relatively low status from the beginning in terms of its place in the Senate committee bill. Title II contained the Act (at a "sectional" status level) plus provisions that authorized funding programs for the handicapped and for financially troubled projects. In addition, the Title proposed new guidelines for managing federally assisted projects.®

Title II, Section 203, of S.3084, titled "Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978", declared the policy of the United States to provide for the development, demonstration, and evaluation, of a comprehensive program to effectively mitigate crime and vandalism in public housing projects. The Senate committee believed as a whole that residential security in the Nation's public housing system had dissipated to the point of restricted use of public housing, and outright abandonment of low-income and elderly residents in public housing. The committee also felt that the threat of residential security, abandonment and resident fear would eventually lead to a reduction in the

availability of public housing stock, which at the time represented a national investment of approximately \$19 billion. The committee used flawed rationale to justify policy that addressed crime in public housing. Documentation presented in committee hearings failed to support the idea that residents of public housing move because of a lack in residential security. Even HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris acknowledged at Carter's National Urban Policy announcement that crime was a problem in only a few, highly visible public housing projects.*

The public housing security demonstration effort as acknowledged in Senate bill 3084 came as a first step toward the development of a comprehensive program to reduce crime and vandalism in federally assisted housing. The bill directed the Anti-Crime Program to test innovative security measures, concepts, and community anti-crime techniques tailored to specific needs of each project. In addition, the bill mandated funding priority for local public housing authorities that a) provided for the restoration of abandoned dwelling units, b) proposed coordination efforts between management and local government entities in providing increased security and social services to public housing tenants, and c) that provided maximum involvement of tenants in the security program. The bill authorized a set-aside of \$10 million out of public housing operating subsidies appropriated for fiscal year 1979 for the program.

The bill realistically recognized that the program served as a first step to address the crime issue in the nation's public housing system. Inadequacies occurred in setting up the program as a test or pilot program. First, the bill gave no indication of the maximum number of projects to be funded under the demonstration program. As a result, the limited funding proposed (and actually budgeted) potentially could be (and was) spread over many projects to the point of making any effort to address crime under this program futile. Second, the bill did not develop a framework for coordination efforts between public housing authority management and local governments to address crime. Rather, it included only a statement of intent that this arrangement should be set up.

The House version of the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 (H.R. 12433) contained nothing with specific reference to public housing security.¹⁰ The bill did contain two significant themes that set the stage for a later amendment to add public housing security provisions: the commitment to the restoration and preservation of the existing housing stock, and a continued recognition of the needs of elderly and handicapped citizens. Representative Claude Pepper (Florida) introduced an amendment to H.R. 12433 on June 28, 1978, which added Section 204 titled "Public Housing Security." Members of the Select Committee on Aging cosponsored the bill. Rep. Pepper introduced his

amendment days after the murder of an elderly man in a public housing project located in his congressional district.

The amendment, similar but more detailed than the Senate version found in S.3084, instructed the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to initiate and carry out, beginning on October 1, 1978, a program for the development, demonstration, and evaluation of viable means to combat crime and vandalism in the Nation's public housing projects and surrounding neighborhoods. In addition, the amendment encouraged the Secretary to develop innovative community anti-crime and security methods, concepts, and techniques. Selected methods to be addressed included better locking devices and design improvements. Public housing projects selected for participation represented a broad spectrum of project types, locations, and tenant populations. The amendment authorized the HUD Secretary to utilize up to \$12 million for establishment of the program.¹¹ The amendment passed on July 21, 1978; and on July 24, 1978, after House review of S.3084, the House struck out the entire text of S.3084 and inserted in lieu thereof the provisions of H.R. 12433. The House passed S.3084 with the anticipation of a conference to be requested with the Senate. The Senate agreed to the conference.¹²

Representative Pepper's effort still contained two major weaknesses that reduced the program's chances of succeeding. Representative Pepper wanted participants in the

anti-crime program to represent all types of projects and tenant populations. Evidence that crime in public housing is most severe in larger projects, and that smaller, elderly projects have lower rates of crime. Also, the amendment did not establish a cap on the maximum number of participants. Both House and Senate versions of the anti-crime statute contained weak provisions to adequately address the public housing crime problem.

Committee Debates

The Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, and the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs did not make public housing security a major topic of concern during the hearings. Senate bill 2637 contained no provisions for the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. Senate hearings on S.2637, the initial bill for the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, however, did mention public housing security in only two instances. First, the opening statement of Senator Brooke denounced HUD's underfunding of the public housing performance funding system (PFS). Operating subsidy requirements for each project are calculated based upon the use of the Performance Funding System formula. The PFS formula is used to calculate an appropriate subsidy level for each public housing authority based on a rate comparable to what it would cost a well-managed public housing authority of comparable size, location, and characteristics to operate its own units. Underfunding of the PFS would, he felt, result in greater spending of the proposed appeals fund to make up

for the lack of funds in the PFS budget. The bill mandated Anti-Crime funding to come from the appeals fund. The appeals fund proposal established a special fund that provided moneys for liability insurance, special tenant services, and other housing authority needs when no other moneys were available to cover these items. The local housing authority would "appeal" to HUD for these moneys. According to Senator Brooke, "...an adequately funded security program alone, a vital need in many of our larger cities, would absorb more than the \$12 million provided in the HUD budget."¹³ Second, the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) endorsed the idea of a public housing security program. Mr. Joseph E. Canale, President of NAHRO gave the following statement with reference to public housing security:

"With respect to security, we again are asking for a small commitment to maintain an enormous investment. Additional funding is necessary to support security, including the use of tenant patrols. Local police are generally not equipped to provide the intensive coverage required in public housing developments. Public Housing Authorities are unable to obtain assured funding from local or other federal sources. We would recommend, therefore, that the subcommittee approve the establishment of an appeals fund, but that such a fund in its initial year emphasize the funding of security needs. We would recommend that this fund be established at a level of at least \$50 million and be in addition to full funding requirements of PFS [Performance Funding System]. This solution will not only provide definition to the appeals fund and a focused response to security needs, but will also support direct job creating activities."¹⁴

Senate subcommittee hearings expressed no specific opposition to public housing security. However, general opposition statements to increased funding of HUD programs

centered around the theme of austerity. In her Statement before the subcommittee, HUD Secretary Harris expressed the Administration's viewpoint of an austere budget for Fiscal year 1979. Secretary Harris stated that "...I do not ask and do not want ...as a Department and part of [the Carter] Administration ...money beyond that we have requested."¹⁵ Harris did not mention public housing security in her statement to the subcommittee.¹⁶ Senator Proxmire commended Secretary Harris' budget proposal for Fiscal year 1979 for being lean. He stated, "I believe we must keep our housing and community development budget as small as reasonably possible, while we work, simultaneously, to increase the investment and especially the know-how input from the private sector ...if I had it my way ...I would cut your budget sharply."¹⁷

Senate committee debates (in part) intended to set the stage for the development of a public housing security policy since S.2637 contained no specific provisions that addressed public housing security. Low priority of the issue, general inconsistencies of need, coupled with the expressed need of an austere budget created differences between debated issues and the final committee bill (S.3084) sent to the floor. The committee recognized the need for a security program for larger cities, but did not recommend that the anti-crime effort be targeted to large city public housing projects. In terms of funding, Senator Brooke openly acknowledged that a proposed \$12 million to come from an appeals fund that had no real definition of purpose would

be inadequate. In addition, NAHRO officials expressed the need of at least \$50 million for the proposed project, yet recommendations to the floor in S.3084 recommended only \$10 million to fund the demonstration program.

Hearings before the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs on H.R. 12433 did not address the Anti-Crime Program proposal. The amendment introduced by Representative Pepper to create the anti-crime program was added after the hearings were complete. The committee report did recognize and expressed concern about crime and vandalism in the Nation's public housing projects. The committee emphasized that funding for security measures could be used from several sources: public housing modernization funds, public housing operating subsidies, and the proposed \$12 million operating subsidy appeals fund.¹⁰ The committee took no action to propose policy to address the issue.

Congressional Debates

Representative Claude Pepper (Florida) outlined the advantages of his amendment that proposed the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. First, the amendment promoted cooperation among HUD and other federal agencies, such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; Department of Labor; Department of Justice; Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and the Community Services Administration. Second, the amendment did not increase expenditures or budget authority. Instead, it specified a small portion of money already allocated for other purposes to be redirected to the anti-crime program. Third, HUD

endorsed the principle of this amendment. Fourth, the intent of the amendment directly addressed the issue of crime and fear of crime of our public housing elderly residents.

Nine House members went on record to support the amendment. Representative Royal (California) justified his support by citing a study published by the Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests of the Select Committee on Aging. The study demonstrated that the elderly are seriously affected by crime and fear of crime, with burglary being the most predominant crime perpetrated against the elderly. These actions have caused the elderly to literally become "prisoners in their own homes or apartments."¹⁹ Representative Hammerschmidt (Arkansas) rose to support the amendment. He cited results of a study completed by the Housing and Consumer Interests Subcommittee which found that most crimes against the elderly were theft committed by teen-agers between the age of 13 to 18. The study also concluded that simple security devices could substantially deter break-ins in by young and inexperienced burglars. Representative Myers (Pennsylvania) recognized the increased cost of providing the anti-crime program, but felt that the saving recognized in reducing abandonment [as a result of crime] and destruction would greatly offset cost of the proposed program. Representative Oakar (Ohio) endorsed the amendment on the grounds that public housing was just not safe for emotional, physical, and spiritual development because of crime and its effects. Representative Pepper also noted that the amendment had gained support of a broad

coalition of organizations, including the National Council of Senior Citizens, the National Council on the Aging, the National Retired Teachers Association, American Association of Retired Persons, the Urban Elderly Coalition, the National Caucus on the Black Aged, and the Ad Hoc Coalition for Low Income Housing.²⁰ The most realistic statement came from Representative Biaggi (New York). He recognized this proposal as a major first step to address crime in public housing. He stressed that many of our public housing projects were built in a time when the reality of crime was not as severe as today; where structures were not designed with crime reducing incentives in mind. Rep. Biaggi felt that an effective anti-crime effort may serve as a catalyst for a larger federal commitment later.

Generally, public housing security house floor debates lacked an in-depth content and appeared superficial. First, the amendment called for coordination among various federal agencies to carry out the anti-crime effort. At the same time, however, the amendment did not set the framework for agency participation, nor did the amendment define the participation responsibility of agencies involved. Second, the program as proposed demanded no increase in budget authority. Instead, the bill proposed that the program be supported by money allocated for other purposes. While the intentions of this financial arrangement seemed admirable, it also set the stage for future animosity between

anti-crime program administrators and those agencies that had to redefine/reduce their budgets to accommodate the new program.

Senate floor debates on committee bill S.3084 centered around provisions with larger financial appropriations such as the Section 8 housing assistance program and the Section 312 rehabilitation program. Reference to the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act occurred only three times in the Senate debate of S.3084. Senator Proxmire (Wisconsin) felt the committee bill, while based on the Carter Administration proposal for program content, provided spending authorizations far in excess of that endorsed by the Administration. He stated that "the substance of the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, the bill reported by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, is needed legislation. But its substance is flawed by recommendations for additional spending." Proxmire used the Public Housing Security Demonstration Program authorized by Title II of S.3084 as an example of excessive spending authorization. Because of inflationary problems in America, Proxmire stated that "I intend to support efforts to reduce the spending level authorized by the committee bill, and at the same time... work for the adoption of the bill."²¹

Senator Brooke (Massachusetts) strongly urged his colleagues to support the bill. He felt that "housing for low income families and the elderly is one national priority which should not be lightly disregarded in our rush to slice the Federal budget. The bill contains a number of

provisions which support our national commitment to our cities and rural areas and to providing decent housing for our low-and moderate income families and the elderly." Brooke referred to one provision that specifically addressed crime and vandalism in public housing projects, and the victimization of elderly residents. The anti-crime program "will provide for the development and evaluation of improved innovative community anti-crime and security methods and techniques which will mitigate the level of crime in public housing projects and surrounding neighborhoods."²²

Finally, Senator Glenn (Ohio) went on record to support S.3084 as a whole and specifically the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. He felt that this program was a good initial response to the enormous increase in crime in public housing that is affecting the low income, elderly, and minority citizens. "This is an excellent provision, it is badly needed and I support it as separate legislation and as part of S.3084."²³ It is a realistic assumption that was expressed by Representative Biaggi and Senator Glenn that this program with its modest funding level would serve the purpose of an initial step in developing a major program that in the future would address public housing crime issues.

Documentation of Senate floor debates on public housing security showed an even weaker coverage than the House debates. The three Senators that spoke on the issue

expressed their opposition to the program, but as with normal practice of most congressional members they did not express why or on what basis they made their decisions.

Conference Committee

The House called a conference committee to work out different provisions of the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 as addressed in Title II of the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 as provided for in S.3084. The committee agreed on the House provision that outlined congressional findings (as a basis of the Act) that low-income and elderly public housing residents are being threatened as a result of inadequate security arrangements, and that an integral part of successfully providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low-income persons is to insure that the housing is secure. In addition, the committee added a provision and found that action is needed to provide for the security of public housing residents and to preserve the nations housing stock. Policy outlined in the House amendment and included in the conference report stated: "...[the] policy of the U.S. is to provide for the demonstration and evaluation of more effective means of mitigating crime and vandalism in public housing projects, [and the] ...purpose of the policy is to provide a safe living environment, particularly for the elderly residents of public housing projects."

The more specific program authority outlined in the House amendment, and included in the conference report, directed the HUD Secretary to initiate the demonstration

program during the Fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978, and to the extent approved in appropriations Acts. The Senate version gave no specific time frame for commencement of the demonstration program.

The conference agreement contained the House provision listing general criteria that HUD must consider in selecting public housing projects for participation in the demonstration program. The House amendment directed the HUD Secretary to consider the extent of crime and vandalism, the nature and quality of community anti-crime efforts, the nature and quality of police and other protective services to the public housing projects, the vacancy rate and demand for public housing in the locality, and the extent of abandonment of public housing units. The HUD Secretary had the responsibility to assure that projects selected for participation represented a broad spectrum of project types, locations, and tenant populations.

The Senate bill authorized \$10 million from the public housing operating subsidy program to carry out the demonstration program. The House amendment directed that not more than \$12 million be used. The conference report included the House amendment. The conferees clearly expressed that the \$12 million be available only to provide one time single year only grants for Fiscal year 1979.²⁴ Compromises agreed upon in the conference committee generally strengthened the bill by including House bill items such as program intent, time frame for implementation, and a higher fiscal authorization.

Senate Bill 3084 became law (PL 95-557) on October 31, 1978. Title II, Section 207 of the "Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978", cited as the "Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978", authorized the development, implementation and evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. Section 207 stated Congressional findings that:

1. low-income and elderly public housing residents of the Nation have suffered substantially from rising crime and violence, and are being threatened as a result of inadequate security arrangements for the prevention of physical violence, theft, burglary, and other crimes;
2. older persons generally regard the fear of crime as the most serious problem in their lives, to the extent that one-fourth of all Americans over 65 voluntarily restrict their mobility because of it;
3. crime and the fear of crime have led some residents to move from public housing projects;
4. an integral part of successfully providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low income persons is to insure that the housing is secure;
5. local public housing authorities may have inadequate security arrangements for the prevention of crime and vandalism; and
6. action is needed to provide for the security of public housing residents and to preserve the Nation's investment in its public housing stock.

Section 207 attempted for the first time to bring attention to the crime problem in public housing and its negative effect on the living environment of low-income and elderly public housing residents.

The new law stated that it was policy of the United States to provide for the formulation, demonstration and evaluation of an effective means to mitigate crime and vandalism in public housing projects, to result in a safer living environment for project residents, and particularly elderly residents. The law directed the HUD Secretary to initiate and promptly carry out, beginning on October 1, 1978, a program incorporating improved, innovative community anti-crime and security methods and techniques.

The law mandated public housing projects that participated in the demonstration program represent a broad spectrum of project types, locations, and tenant populations. The following factors must also be considered in selecting projects for funding: crime and vandalism in the projects; community anti-crime efforts and police services in the project and surrounding areas; local demand for public housing units; vacancy rates and extent of abandonment of public housing units; and characteristics and needs of public housing tenants.

Security methods required by law included the improvement of physical security equipment for dwelling units, social and environmental design improvements, tenant awareness and volunteer programs, and tenant participation and employment in providing security services. The law mandated a coordination of effort to target resources to carry out the provision of the law between public housing management; local law enforcement officials; the Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Department of Labor; the Community Services Administration; and ACTION.

In addition, the law mandated the HUD Secretary to initiate and carry out a survey of crime and vandalism in the Nation's public housing projects. Not later than eighteen months after the date of enactment of the law, the Secretary must report to Congress results of the survey and findings from the demonstration program. Funding to establish the demonstration program was set at a maximum of \$12 million and would come from Section 5(c) of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 approved in appropriations Acts for Fiscal year 1979.

The weakness of Section 207 contributed to the statutes inadequacy in addressing crime in public housing. The low status of the statute in itself contributed to policy inadequacies by not allowing enough emphasis to be placed on appropriate policy development. The Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, an "Amendment" package, consisted of many Acts and revisions that had a much heavier "play" in congressional debates and hearings, to the point of public housing security being overshadowed.

More specifically, congressional findings that justify Section 207 contained flaws. Some public housing residents, especially the elderly, have suffered from crime and violence in their projects, and at a higher rate than the city where they live. The law implied that this phenomenon is uniform and is rising throughout all of the nation's public housing projects. Research, on the other hand,

suggests differently, that crime within public housing does not occur at a uniform rate. Ironically, a report published by HUD in December, 1978 suggested that robberies per thousand persons in public housing projects range from approximately 22 to 114. Data revealed assaults to be more uniform with over 30 per thousand in 4 out of 5 residential complexes.²⁵ Secretary Harris acknowledged publicly that crime is worse in larger projects. The literature review also shows that public housing crime is most severe in larger projects located in larger urban areas. The provision that "a broad spectrum" of projects be included in the demonstration effort does not agree with findings in the literature. Inclusion of a broad spectrum of projects coupled with absence of a ceiling on the number of projects to be funded are the major weaknesses of the statute and they virtually make the program intent ineffective.

In many cases, and especially among the elderly, the fear of crime has serious implications. One finding of the Act stated that crime/fear of crime caused tenant abandonment of public housing. One report described coping behavioral characteristics of public housing residents experiencing crime or fear of crime in Boston's public housing system. Nearly half of the public housing residents in this category kept their doors locked at all times, did not go out alone at night, kept their children inside at night, restricted night visits from city and public housing residents, and did not shop at night.²⁶ Evidence gives no indication that a significant number of public housing

residents move because of crime/fear of crime perpetuated upon them. An Anti-Crime Conference co-sponsored by the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in September, 1978, indicated that vacancy rates in larger big city public housing projects may contribute to crime, but the the conference fell short of correlating tenant abandonment with crime and fear of crime. A 1986 NAHRO study on public housing cited several reasons for public housing vacancy (Table 4.1). Modernization activities appeared to be the most common reason for vacancy. The prevalence of crime is not listed as a significant reason for vacancy problems. The NAHRO report, however, must be looked at with some suspicion. It is suspected that public housing authorities with vacancies caused by crime problems would mask this issue in the "other" category. Of the percentages given in the "other" category, seven percent of the reasons (of 21.5 percent) for all respondents reported were not defined. To back up this argument, a recent article indicates that there are now nearly 800,000 families enrolled on public housing waiting list nationwide, and these families will have to wait an average of 13 months before being placed. Some families will have to wait for up to three years. In addition, the findings indicated that public housing designated for the elderly will most often have no vacancies. The same study revealed that approximately eighty percent of the households on a waiting list are for authorities with over 2,500 units.²⁷

Table 4.1

Reasons for Public Housing Vacancy:
Percent of Vacancies by Agency Size, 1986

| Agency Size ^a | Recent Turnover | Modernization Activity | Conversion Activity ^b | Demolition Activity | Other ^c |
|--------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Small | 51.1 | 3.7 | 1.4 | N/A | 43.9 |
| Medium | 38.0 | 41.6 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 19.4 |
| Large | 28.8 | 29.7 | 6.9 | 11.4 | 22.6 |
| Very Lg. | 28.6 | 31.5 | 5.5 | 13.7 | 20.4 |
| Largest 14 PHAs | 13.0 | 39.1 | 4.3 | 21.8 | 21.8 |
| All | 23.6 | 34.0 | 5.1 | 15.6 | 21.5 |

Source: Mark L. Matulef, "This is Public Housing," Journal of Housing 44 (September/October 1987): 178.

NOTES: ^asmall = 1 to 499 units; medium = 500 to 1,250 units; large = 1,251 to 2,500 units; very large = 2,501 units or more excluding the 14 largest authorities.

^bincludes conversion to new tenant type and to non-residential.

^cincludes several reasons for vacancies such as miss-match between available units and households on the waiting list, low demand for public housing in the community, and/or applicant rejection of unit when it became available. 12.8% of reasons for vacancy in small PHAs, 2.6% in medium PHAs, 11.3% in large PHAs, 6.5% in very large PHAs, 5.9% in the largest PHAs, and 7.0% of all PHAs were not defined.

Finally, the Act gave an "intent" statement only related to a coordinated effort between various agencies, federal and local, in carrying out the provisions of the new law. While the intent is admirable, the law did not contain adequate provisions to require federal agencies and local governments to work together harmoniously in this effort, nor did the law explicitly define each federal agencies responsibility in carrying out the law's intent. Lack of clarity on agency responsibility is critical since the law set the stage for animosity to develop by mandating that participating federal agencies adjust their budget to accommodate the new program. These weaknesses, coupled with previously appropriated funds being redirected to the public housing security program, set the stage for initial agency disenchantment with the anti-crime program specifically, and with HUD in general.

THE URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM²⁰

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) response to the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 and President Carter's National Urban Policy came in the form of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. To formulate a program that adequately addressed crime and fear of crime in the public housing system, HUD held a series of conferences to gain input from public housing management professionals and a wide variety of citizen groups. Ideas collected from these conferences served as a basis for seven basic program

components to be addressed by each demonstration site: improved management of public safety; rehabilitated anti-crime facilities and better physical security design; increased involvement of tenants in fighting crime; more employment of youths; improved anti-crime services for elderly residents, drug abusers, project youths and victims; additional and more sensitive police and law enforcement; and area-wide public/private partnerships targeted on public housing sites as well as surrounding neighborhoods.

In addition to the \$12 million allocated for development, implementation, and evaluation of the Anti-Crime Program, funds to carry out local efforts came from a variety of agencies (Table 4.2). HUD received one hundred and sixty-three applications from local public housing authorities that requested participation in the anti-crime program. The scarcity of funds allowed HUD to fund only thirty-nine of the proposals. Those applications selected for funding represented all geographical areas of the country. The funded programs included a wide variety of building types - from high rises to row houses. Larger public housing authorities with more than 1,250 units represented 27 of the proposals funded, while the remaining 12 were smaller authorities with less than 1,250 units.²⁹

The authorizing statute mandated that HUD officials consider evidence of serious crime problems, local commitments, and administrative capabilities to determine which applications to approve for funding. In most cases, local data on crime and fear of crime was nonexistent. Also HUD

Table 4.2

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Funding
Sources for Local Crime Programs

| Agency | Amount
(in thousands) |
|--|--------------------------|
| DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT | |
| HUD Low Income Public Housing Modernization | \$20,000 |
| HUD Community Development Block Grant | 2,072 |
| HUD Technical Assistance | 178 |
| DEPARTMENT OF LABOR | |
| Youth Community Conservation & Improvement | 7,410 |
| DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | |
| Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Preven.
Technical Assistance | 1,075
16 |
| Office of Criminal Justice Improvement
Victim/Witness Program | 340 |
| Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs
Technical Assistance | 60 |
| ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE, & MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION | |
| Program Funds | 477 |
| Technical Assistance | 23 |
| DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR | |
| Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service
Urban Parks Program | 913 |
| Technical Assistance | 10 |
| LOCAL MATCHING FUNDS | |
| Anti-Crime Efforts | 8,014 |
| TOTAL | \$40,588 |

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy, Development, and Research, Final Report of the Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration: A Summary, May 1985, p. 15.

was not in a position to test commitments and capabilities of local housing authorities. As a result, the primary consideration for application approval became the quality of the proposal itself. The application review concentrated on how well the application understood and wrote clearly about the logic and theory of the program and how faithfully the housing authorities followed submission requirements.

As a result, the better written proposals had the best chances of funding regardless of the nature of the local crime problem, or the extent of local commitment of administrative capabilities of the local public housing authority.³⁰ Local funding ranged from \$204,600 to \$5.5 million for larger public housing authorities with 1,250 or more units, and from \$119,049 to \$1.5 million for public housing authorities with less than 1,250 units (Tables 4.3 and 4.4).

The Program, from announcement to completion, operated for approximately three years. HUD formally announced the program in May, 1979, and the agency granted awards by Fall, 1979. All thirty-nine sites had their program underway by mid-1980. Program close-outs for all sites occurred by mid-1982. Program competition announcements listed three criteria for selecting Program participants: evidence of serious crime problems, local commitment and administrative capabilities for success.

Local authorities that participated in the demonstration effort used various and differing strategies to implement each of the seven required program components. Local

Table 4.3

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program
Funds Obligated to Public Housing Agencies
as of March 31, 1980

| <u>Agency</u> | <u>Total Funds*</u> |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|
| LARGER AUTHORITIES | |
| Allegheny Co., PA | \$359,100 |
| Atlanta, GA | 1,898,980 |
| Baltimore, MD | 1,251,997 |
| Buffalo, NY | 1,241,337 |
| Cambridge, MA | 795,000 |
| Charleston, WV | 567,000 |
| Charlotte, NC | 701,500 |
| Chicago, IL | 5,542,617 |
| Cleveland, OH (Cuyahoga Metro) | 1,121,550 |
| Dade Co., FL | 916,150 |
| Detroit MI | 2,515,740 |
| Hartford, CT | 1,278,156 |
| Jersey City, NJ | 435,900 |
| Los Angeles, CA | 371,990 |
| Louisville, KY | 1,205,536 |
| Newark, NJ | 1,035,725 |
| New Orleans, LA | 1,090,165 |
| New York, NY | 3,586,850 |
| Norfolk, VA | 1,005,740 |
| Phoenix, AZ | 570,550 |
| Providence, RI | 826,000 |
| San Antonio, TX | 820,393 |
| San Francisco, CA | 460,507 |
| Seattle, WA | 926,700 |
| St. Paul, MN | 204,600 |
| Tampa, FL | 1,102,255 |
| Toledo, OH (Lucas Metro) | 741,000 |
| SMALLER AUTHORITIES | |
| Athens, GA | 754,000 |
| Blackfeet Tribe (Browning, MT) | 606,000 |
| Decatur, IL | 1,555,882 |
| Evansville, IN | 520,183 |
| Greenville, SC | 342,100 |
| Jackson, TN | 637,357 |
| Hampton, VA | 653,485 |
| Oxnard, CA | 577,000 |
| Prince Georges Co., MD | 119,049 |
| Richmond, CA | 167,000 |
| Springfield, MA | 488,309 |
| Taunton, MA | 393,940 |
| PROGRAM TOTAL | \$39,387,343 |

*includes required 10 percent local match

Table 4.3 continued

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: First Annual Report to Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 25 - 31.

authorities addressed management of public safety in several ways. First, all sites hired a full-time anti-crime coordinator that administered and coordinated the crime reduction effort. Other strategies utilized as a local option included implementation of improved procedures for screening undesirable tenant applicants, start-up of a crime prevention training program for security guards and other employees. Scattering potential problem families and locating elderly citizens in units isolated from family units eliminated pockets of crime in public housing complexes. Improved tenant eviction procedures eliminated disruptive families. Finally, improved maintenance practices such as reduced prepare/repair times of units deterred opportunities for vandalism.

Participating public housing authorities agreed to rehabilitate facilities to provide offices for the anti-crime program staff and to reduce the general vulnerability of the housing units to crime. To carry out this component, all authorities expanded and/or rehabilitated existing facilities to improve the delivery of anti-crime programs and services. Authorities had the option to install lighting and/or monitoring equipment when needed to improve surveillance opportunities. In addition, the installation of

locks, alarms, and other security equipment when warranted assisted to deter crime. A change in physical design and circulation patterns of projects demarcated areas intended for specific uses by residents which allowed them more control over their environment. Finally, authorities facilitated communication between police and residents by carrying out measures such as training police officers in the sociology of lower socioeconomic persons.

A major thrust of the Anti-Crime Program involved tenants in the crime fighting effort. Allowing tenants to

Table 4.4

Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program
Top Five Local Programs in Funding
by Federal Agency
(in thousands)

| <u>Funding Source</u> | <u>Chic.</u> | <u>NYC</u> | <u>Detr.</u> | <u>Atl.</u> | <u>Decatur</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|
| HUD | | | | | |
| Modern/Rehab | 2704 | 2310 | 1352 | 1263 | 357 |
| CDBG | 250 | 50 | 50 | 40 | 30 |
| LABOR | | | | | |
| Youth Empl | 458 | 800 | 474 | 355 | 48 |
| JUSTICE | | | | | |
| Youth Crime/Del | 84 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Victim/Witness | 20 | 0 | 20 | 20 | 0 |
| HEW | | | | | |
| Drug/Alcohol | 48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| LOCAL MATCH | <u>1979</u> | <u>427</u> | <u>620</u> | <u>221</u> | <u>1120</u> |
| Totals | 5443 | 3587 | 2516 | 1899 | 1556 |

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: First Annual Report to Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 25-31.

become involved in problem identification, priority establishment, and program design paved the way for future tenant support of anti-crime programs. Public housing authorities used one or more of the following methods in carrying out this component. First, existing tenant organizations became involved in the planning and implementation of the demonstration program. Second, tenant patrol programs established "block watching, floor watching, and/or lobby watching." Third, projects implemented an "operation identification" program to stencil valuables with an identification mark that would be traceable. Fourth, local authorities encouraged educational workshops on crime issues. Finally, local public housing authorities provided technical assistance and training to help tenants organize anti-crime efforts.

The youth employment component made employment opportunities available to youths. HUD felt that training and employment experience for public housing residents contributed to decreased opportunities to engage in criminal activity, and to chances for long-term employment. Approaches used to carry out this component included: youth employment to patrol projects, maintenance and rehabilitation work, and social services; adult employment to staff the anti-crime program and serve as "block watchers" or body guards; provision of job banks, career counselors, and other forms of assistance to residents seeking employment.

The component that addressed improved anti-crime services for elderly residents, drug abusers, youths, and victims utilized various approaches. Alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health awareness programs outlined danger signs of potential problems in each area. Youth programs focused on social activities such as recreation programs, and education, employment, and emotional counseling. Newly created youth councils fostered constructive activities among project youths. Elderly programs ranged from escort services, to domestic chore assistance, to crime prevention seminars, to transportation assistance.

Local participants utilized several methods to meet requirements under the component that addressed police and law enforcement. Some local programs carried out police training to make officers more knowledgeable of any unique/project specific circumstances they could expect to encounter. In addition, increased foot patrols in project areas yielded a higher degree of police visibility. Housing authority administrations gave office space in public housing project offices to police officers. Finally, activities implemented to improve relations between tenants and police included organization of block watches, supervision of youth patrol groups, and supervision of the operation ID program.

Finally, participating public housing authorities strengthened relationships with public and private sector agencies. This component required public housing authorities to coordinate their efforts with other federal programs, state and local programs, private social service

agencies, neighborhood organizations, and private employers. Activities included involvement with neighborhood churches, resident organizations, social agencies, city bureaucracies, merchant associations, schools, and private employers.

SUMMARY

From the beginning, committee debates, Congressional debates and Conference committee debates did not appear to rationally formalize proper intent or direction for an anti-crime program in the nation's public housing. Nor did they give the anti-crime bill high priority in discussion. Initial Senate committee debates used flawed rationale for justifying policy that addressed crime in public housing. Documentation presented in the committee hearings failed to support the idea that residents of public housing move because of a lack of residential security.

Senate bill 3084 realistically recognized that the anti-crime proposal served as a first step to address the crime issue in public housing. However, several inadequacies can be defined in this bill. First, S.3084 gave no indication of the maximum number of projects to be funded under the Anti-Crime program. Second, the bill did not develop a framework for coordination efforts between public housing authority management and local governments in addressing crime.

Rep. Claude Pepper's House bill contained two major weaknesses that seriously reduced the Anti-Crime program's chances of succeeding. First, Pepper wanted participants in

the anti-crime program to cover all types of projects and tenant populations. This desire directly conflicted with evidence that crime in public housing is most severe in larger projects in larger urban areas, and that smaller, elderly projects have lower rates of crime. Second, the bill did not put a cap on the maximum number of program participants to be selected. General misunderstandings and obvious inconsistencies of need, coupled with the expressed need of an austere budget resulted in a low priority for the anti-crime statute in Senate committee hearings. House committee hearings failed altogether to address the issue of crime in public housing.

Congressional floor debates on the crime in public housing bills lacked in-depth content and appeared superficial. Advantages of the proposal outlined in House debates resulted in disadvantages not mentioned. Rep. Pepper's amendment called for coordination among various federal agencies to carry out the anti-crime effort. At the same time, the amendment did not set the framework for agency participation, nor did the amendment define participation responsibility of agencies involved. Second, the amendment as proposed demanded no increase in budget authority. Instead, the bill proposed financial support by money allocated for other purposes. This financial arrangement set the stage for future animosity between program administrators and those agencies that had to redefine their budgets to accommodate funds for the new program. Finally, the amendment received HUD endorsement, but the agency fell

short of a commitment to adequately implement statute objectives set forth by Congress. An adequate commitment could have come in the form of creation of a "Office of Public Housing Crime" to house the anti-crime program.

Documentation of Senate floor debates of the crime in public housing issue demonstrated an even weaker coverage than the House debates. The three Senators that spoke on the issue expressed their opposition to the anti-crime bill, but at the same time, they did not express why or on what basis they made their decisions.

Congressional policy-making is historically weak. Congressional policy-makers often do not follow rational policy-making procedures because of the presence of political influence and governmental fragmentation.³¹ Politicians must bargain and negotiate with each other before they reach decisions. Past precedent is a major constraint and by the examination of a colleagues past voting record it can be determined what that particular congressional member's position will be on a particular policy in question. Congressional members cannot attack a problem comprehensively because of governmental fragmentation. Many times policies are adopted on a piecemeal basis and they frequently duplicate or contradict existing policy.

Also, congressional role in the development of federal legislation is sometimes a minor one. The Economic Opportunity Act passed in 1964 is an excellent example of federal legislation written in the executive branch and subsequently endorsed by the Congress. Role change of the executive and

legislative branches is a 20th Century phenomena that has resulted in the classic legislative function where politicians come together to battle out their proposals to be a less exclusive domain of Congress.³²

Weaknesses of the development and structure of the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 contributed to the statutes inadequacy to address crime in public housing. The language and overall vagueness of the statute reflected a lack of accurate research. The low status of the statute itself contributed to inadequacies by not allowing enough emphasis to be placed on appropriate policy development.

The law implied that all public housing residents, especially the elderly, have suffered from crime and violence. A review of the literature suggests that a wide variation in crime patterns in public housing sites exist between large/small cities, types of crimes committed and tenant composition of the public housing project site. The provision that "a broad spectrum" of projects be included in the demonstration program is a misdirected approach to address crime in public housing since the literature suggests that crime occurs primarily in larger projects located in larger urban areas. This provision coupled with the absence of a ceiling on the number of projects to be funded virtually makes the statute's intent ineffective.

One finding of the statute stated that crime or fear of crime caused tenant abandonment of public housing and that this abandonment caused a threat to public housing stock in

general. Research indicates that fearful residents will most often lock their doors, stay in at night, and restrict their visits to the city and to shop, rather than move. Vacancy figures indicate no overall danger in public housing abandonment. Nearly 800,000 families are on waiting lists nationwide with eighty percent of the families on lists with authorities that oversee larger public housing projects.

The statute did not adequately structure the implementation process. It gave an "intent" statement only in setting up a coordinated effort between various agencies, federal and local, in carrying out the provision of the law. The law did not contain adequate provisions to require agencies and local governments to work together harmoniously, nor did the law define agency responsibilities in carrying out the law.

Program support existed in the form of endorsements and commitments from HUD (the implementing agency) and several organized special interest groups such as the National Council of Senior Citizens, National Council on Aging, and the Ad Hoc Coalition for Low Income Housing. But typical of most federal legislation, solid support and follow-up did not occur by legislators and support groups during the implementation process. This support is necessary to assure that policy objectives are properly carried out.

Finally, a change in Presidential Administrations during program implementation drastically undermined priority of statute objectives in new presidential policy. The new Reagan Administration based operational policy that

local issues (such as public housing crime) should be funded and addressed by local government rather than at the federal level. Administrative changeover at HUD further weakened an already low priority program.

Anti-Crime Program components accurately addressed the major physical and social correlates of crime. Anti-crime program guidelines required that physical factors related to surveillance, door locks, clearly defined areas, and access control be addressed. Program guidelines also addressed social factors such as the creation of activities to increase a higher level of social organization and cohesion.

Local participants of the Anti-Crime Program had the opportunity to gain short-term and long-term benefits of crime prevention. Potential short-term benefits existed in the form of implementation of soft-ware activities. These activities included non-physical improvements such as on-site staff to monitor the crime program, improved procedures for screening undesirable tenants, improved maintenance practices, resident programs to combat crime, resident youth employment opportunities designed to watch over elderly residents and outreach coordination activities to the community such as with local churches, neighborhood organizations and private employers. Potential long-term benefits came in the form of hard-ware activities. These activities included physical improvements on the project site. Specifically, local authorities had the option to install lighting and monitoring equipment when needed to improve surveillance opportunities. Authorities also had the option

when needed to install locks, alarms, and other security equipment to deter crime. Finally, funds could be used to change the physical design of buildings and circulation patterns to demarcate areas intended for specific uses by residents to give them more control over their physical environment.

The intent and purpose of the statute that authorized the Anti-Crime Program was an admirable effort to address crime in public housing. A legislative review of the statute revealed, not surprisingly, that Congress did not adequately research the basis and frequency of public housing crime. This inadequacy led to weaknesses in the statute that significantly reduced chances of the program being successful in reducing crime. The most severe weaknesses that weakened overall program intent and undermined chances of program success included program participation by projects not experiencing significant problems, no cap on the number of projects to participate in the program, no implementation structure of the program, and a mandate for participation of specific federal agencies in the program with money that these agencies had previously allocated for other programs within their respective Departments. This mandate set the stage for animosity between participating agencies and HUD.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

¹This is the first time a President had formulated a comprehensive set of policies to guide Federal government actions and programs for America's cities. This new policy approach was mandated by the National Urban Policy and New Community Act of 1970, as amended in 1977.

²U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, The President's National Urban Policy Report, August 1978, p. 122.

³See U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, Book II- June 30 to December 31, 1978), Jimmy Carter, 1979, p. 1241-1246. Also see U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy, Development, and Research, Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, First Annual Report to Congress, June 1980, p. 1.

⁴Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy, (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1983), p. 29.

⁵Ibid., p. 41.

⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs. 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 850-905.

⁷Ibid., pp. 906-907.

⁸U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978. S. Report 95-871 to accompany S.3084, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, p. 2.

⁹See U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, Book II- June 30 to December 31, 1978), Jimmy Carter, 1979, p. 1241-1246.

¹⁰See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978. H. Report 95-1161 to accompany H.R. 12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978.

¹¹U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Pepper offering an Amendment to the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, H.R.12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 28 June 1978, Congressional Record 124:19412.

¹²U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Reuss speaking for the necessity of a conference between the House and Senate on the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, H.R.12433 and S.3084, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 24 July 1978, Congressional Record 124:22290-22291. Also, U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire speaking to agree to the conference requested by the House on the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, S.3084, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 26 July 1978, Congressional Record 124:22850.

¹³U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs. 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, p. 3.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 426.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 16-40.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 4-6.

¹⁸U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978. H. Report 95-1161 to accompany H.R.12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 169-170. The appeals fund was proposed to assist local public housing authorities, primarily in older urban areas, whose high security and insurance costs could not be adequately accounted for by the current performance funding formula.

¹⁹U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Pepper offering an Amendment to the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, H.R.12433, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 28 June 1978, Congressional Record 124:19412-19416.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire speaking on the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, S.3084, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 19 July 1978, Congressional Record 124:21606.

²²Ibid., Senator Brooke speaking on the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, pp. 21607-21608.

²³Ibid., Senator Glenn speaking on the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, pp. 21973-21974.

²⁴U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Compilation of the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development [Committee Print]. 95th Cong., 2d sess., December 1978, pp. 102-104.

²⁵U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Crime in Public Housing Volume I: A Report, by W. Victor Rouse, Washington, USGPO, December 1978, p.1.

²⁶Ibid., p. 3.

²⁷Mark L. Matulef, "This is Public Housing," Journal of Housing 44 (September/October 1987): 176-179.

²⁸See U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Final Report of the Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration: A Summary, May 1985.

²⁹Public housing authorities funded having more than 1,250 or more units were: Allegheny Co., PA; Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Buffalo, NY; Cambridge, MA; Charleston, WV; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Cleveland, OH, (Cuyahoga Metro); Dade Co., FL; Detroit, MI; Hartford, CT; Jersey City, NJ; Los Angeles, CA; Louisville, KY; Newark, NJ; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; Norfolk, VA; Phoenix, AZ; Providence, RI; San Antonio, TX; San Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA; St. Paul, MN; Tampa, FL; and Toledo, OH, (Lucas Metro);. Public housing authorities funded having less than 1,250 units were Athens, GA; Blackfeet Tribe, Browning, MT; Decatur, IL; Evansville, IN; Greenville, SC; Jackson, TN; Hampton, VA; Oxnard, CA; Prince Georges County, MD; Richmond, CA; Springfield, MA; and Taunton, MA.

³⁰U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Final Report of the Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration: A Summary, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 27.

³¹George E. Edwards III and Ira Sharkansky, The Policy Predicament: Making and Implementing Public Policy, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1978), pp. 10-11.

³²John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, 3rd. ed.,
(Washington: University Press of America, Inc., 1980), pp.
37-38.

Chapter V

THE DETROIT EXPERIENCE

To gain an understanding of the relationship between results of the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program and adequacy of the federal statute that backed the program, it is necessary to look at a general history of public housing in Detroit, and discuss specific past and present neighborhood characteristics of the Brewster-Douglass public housing project. Conclusions can then be made on whether or not the Detroit Anti-Crime Program, as based on the theoretical structure presented in the statute, is workable in an environment and setting such as that found at the Brewster-Douglass site and neighborhood.

DEVELOPMENT OF DETROIT PUBLIC HOUSING

Public housing in Detroit began with the establishment of the Detroit Housing Commission in November, 1933. Creation of the Commission occurred after the Federal Emergency Housing Corporation (FEHC) allocated \$3.2 million to the City of Detroit for slum clearance and construction of low-rent housing. Initial responsibility of the Commission included alleviation of the housing shortage by the erection of large scale low cost housing projects; and direct slum clearance and replacement of the slums with low cost projects.¹ The FEHC award to Detroit reflected a national concern for poor housing:

"Events leading up to this occasion had their roots in the gradual growth during the preceding decade of a national consciousness of the effects of bad housing, the responsibility of the Government to care for the prime necessities of life and the financial burden of slum areas. [President] Roosevelt's progressive program and the administrative activities in setting up certain agencies of procedure such as the Emergency Housing Corporation gave concrete expression to such social trends."²

Local interest to address the slum problem in Detroit developed with a 1929 publication of statistics and data gathered from a city-wide social survey conducted by the Michigan Housing Association, a philanthropic non-profit organization created for the purpose to develop an awareness for adequate housing facilities in the City. This study concluded that congestion most accurately characterized the Detroit slum situation.³

Public housing or low-income housing originated as an experimental public works program designed primarily to increase employment; stimulate business activities; clear slums; and provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing for lower income families. Passage of the Housing (Wagner-Steagall) Act of 1937 formalized the program design to emphasize decent, safe, and sanitary housing for lower income families.

Detroit began work immediately on the public housing program upon passage of the Wagner-Steagall Act. The Commission chose seven initial sites for public housing because:

1. "They represented areas that were fertile breeding spots for the development of crime areas.
2. They represented areas in which contagious diseases flourished.
3. They represented property that had seriously deteriorated in recent years.
4. They represented areas in which the cost of government services rendered was out of proportion to the taxes levied.
5. The amount of voluntary demolition in the areas was high.
6. They represented areas in which private industry had done next to nothing for over twenty years.
7. It is unlikely that these areas could be rehabilitated for anything but low rental housing.
8. Proper development of the areas suggested might well have been the beginning of a stabilization and renewing of downtown property values.
9. They represented areas which could be tied together with a traffic improvement plan."⁴

Selection of these sites followed the adopted policy to clear slum areas and replace with low-income housing.

The Housing Commission followed their policy to construct low-cost housing in slum areas in the selection of a site for their initial public housing project. The site chosen for the Brewster project contained housing units in deplorable condition characteristic of the Lower Woodward area. Several characteristics of the site made it desirable for the Brewster project:

"All utilities are installed. The site is of such a size and shape that it can be adapted to community development. One of the chief considerations to be borne in mind is... the large... character [to assure] that it will not be influenced by unfavorable surroundings... but is capable of raising economic values and social standards in adjacent properties so that the beneficial effects will radiate outward into surrounding territories....

Another important consideration in the selection of this particular site was the Brewster Street Center built in 1929 at a cost of a half a million dollars. It is a modern, well-equipped Community Recreation building and can be made the center of organized activities in the completed project."³

During Brewster construction, the Commission realized that clearing slums before the construction of alternative housing greatly increased the strain on housing availability for lower income families. An undated report published by the Detroit Housing Commission that announced the start-up of the city's public housing program expressed the rationale for initially building on vacant land:

"The present housing shortage is so serious that tearing down slum houses before new houses are put up would throw a lot of families onto the street. Every new unit built on a vacant site adds a home that is badly needed to the total supply of housing in Detroit. That is why the Detroit Housing Commission wants to concentrate, for a time, on building on land that is now vacant."*

The initial pool of vacant sites considered for public housing construction included those sites owned by the City and previously used for other municipal purposes.⁷

The two major events for the Detroit Housing Commission in 1937 centered around the Brewster Project and the Parkside Project. The Commission let the contract for the erection of the Brewster project on June 11, 1936. The Brewster contract called for the construction of 701 family units intended for black occupancy. The Housing Division of the federal Public Works Administration (PWA) built the Brewster Project. Construction of this project occurred in the heart of Detroit's black slum area on ten blocks of land lying between Mack on the north, Wilkins on the south, Hastings on the east, and Beaubien on the west. The first tenants moved into Brewster in September, 1938.⁸ Brewster reached 100 percent occupancy by Spring, 1939.

The completion of Brewster Addition in 1940 added 240 family units to the project site. The Housing Commission chose a three block site for Brewster Addition, two blocks of which lie directly north of Brewster Homes between Mack and Eliot and the other block southeast of the present project between Wilkins and Watson. Tenants in Brewster's early history had pride in their home and surroundings:

"The second summer in the life of Brewster Homes finds a profusion of flowers amid well-kept lawns. Many tenants are taking a keen and delighted interest in working in the flower gardens and in caring for the lawns.

The tenants... have taken an intense interest in raising funds to equip the social rooms, and provide needed recreation facilities. The Mothers' Club has at various times cooked and served dinners to groups visiting the project or to other public organizations, in order to buy ping-pong equipment, sand-boxes for children, and machinery for the boy's hobby shop. All of these activities have been evidenced by a fine cooperative spirit and a genuine love and appreciation of Brewster Homes."

Work started on the Parkside project on July 10, 1938. The \$3.4 million contract called for fifty-eight buildings and a central heating plant designed to house 785 low-income families.¹⁰ The original project design consisted of two story row houses and row flats and three story apartments. Construction of the two story structures included brick veneer walls with wood floors; the three story apartments, concrete floors and solid masonry walls.¹¹ The completion of Brewster and Parkside Homes in 1939 made available 1,476 low-income apartments in the City. The Housing Division of the Public Works Administration also planned and built the Parkside project. The Housing Division chose a thirty-one acre vacant site located on the northeast corner of the intersection of Conner and Warren Avenues, bounded on the north by Frankfort Avenue and on the east by Gray Avenue. The Division felt this site to be favorably located in relation to recreational areas and centers in industrial employment.

In 1938, the Housing Commission changed their policy of housing project site selection. No longer did the Commission officially choose sites on vacant land in or near slum areas. The emphasis changed to select sites nearer to industrial areas and away from the city center. The Parkside Project met Commission guidelines to locate new projects near industrial areas. The policy change reflected the urgent unemployment and housing situation of industrial workers, and the change represented a new approach to clear slums:¹²

"The housing shortage was found to be in large part reflected by overcrowding in the slums. It was strongly felt, therefore, that a gradual transference of families from substandard dwellings in the slums and blighted areas to the outlying new projects would pave the way for actual slum clearance with less upheaval in the relocation of families."¹³

By the eve of World War II, the Housing Commission authorized the selection of sites and construction of four additional public housing projects. Detroit faced a critical housing shortage at the beginning of World War II. Housing problems existed in the costs and availability of rental housing for blacks, and in shortages of housing for the defense program. Estimates of the number of people expected to migrate to Detroit to complete war contracts ranged from 75,000 to 165,000. The city had limited housing to meet these needs at the beginning of the War. Blacks in the city faced housing shortages because of an increase in the black population, economic constraints, and prejudice:

"A constantly increasing Negro population is forcing these people to live in badly dilapidated and overcrowded houses in the older sections of the

city.... This growth has been accelerated in war time and times of industrial expansion....Negros who... come to Detroit... find individually and as a group the greatest obstacles to the solution of their housing problem.... Besides their marginal economic status... it is a matter of legal and customary practice to limit the areas in which they may live.... As a consequence they are forced to buy or rent in the older sections of the city where there are either no restrictive covenants or where the covenants have expired. The... result is that Negros... must pay excessive rentals for overcrowded quarters... or they must live in dilapidated areas so unsafe or unsanitary that they are unfit for human habitation."¹⁴

Despite the shortage of housing for low-income blacks, Housing Commission activities centered around defense housing that included permanent as well as temporary war units.

The first project selected did not follow policy guidelines to locate projects in outlying areas. Rather the project became the second expansion of the existing Brewster project. The Commission chose this site because of site availability and time constraints related to the severe need for housing. This extension added 148 units to the Brewster complex. The second activity expanded the Parkside project by 183 units. Parkside expansion took place on a parcel of land north of Frankfort and east of Conner. The Public Works Administration considered this site for the original Parkside project. In addition, the Commission incorporated the principle of scientific orientation in the Parkside expansion. Siting of the units positioned them in the direction of 30 degrees east of north. This positioning allowed the units to get the benefit of morning sun in winter, and avoid the extreme warmth of the western sun in the summer.¹⁵

The site chosen for the Charles Terrace project had several positive attributes. Officials chose the site based on its proximity to a large industrial area of Detroit. In addition, the Commission looked favorably on site proximity to a nearby playfield, nearby parochial and city schools, reasonable costs, and eradication of some slum conditions nearby.¹⁴ The thirty acre site is bounded on the east by Mound Road, on the north by Charles Street, on the west by Buffalo Avenue and on the south by Talbot Street.

The Charles Terrace Homes project construction began in 1940 and added 440 units of flats and row houses to the city public housing stock for white tenants. Full occupancy occurred on July 25, 1941. The project included, in addition to the 61 residential buildings, a community building, an administration building, and two central heating plants. Site development followed the superbblock plan. Site plans located a large open park and recreational space of approximately two acres in the center of the site. This design made it possible to walk to the recreational area from any building on the site without crossing a street. Traffic entered the site through cul-de-sac drives from the boundary streets. Site design also included ample parking facilities.¹⁷

The final site chosen by the Housing Commission also adhered to the policy to locate public housing near industrial districts. Construction on the S. James Herman Gardens project began in the Fall of 1940. Location considerations of this project included proximity to defense

plant work locations, recreation facilities, and transportation routes. The site chosen lay midway between the River Rouge industrial area to the south and the recreational area of Rouge Park to the northwest:

"The site is particularly well located for defense workers in that it happens to be outside the congested areas and in the general direction of several of the more important defense plants such as the Ford Bomber Plant at Willow Run."¹⁰

The low cost of land made it possible to plan for an abundance of open space and recreational areas. Recreational uses included play space, tennis courts, ball field, and pools. Orientation of the dwellings permitted the uninterrupted passage of the prevailing winds for the summer time. This orientation also allowed for sunlight access in both the front and rear of each building. Street design discouraged through traffic. Non-dwelling structures included an administration building, a community building, a maintenance building, and a central heating plant. The administration building also housed a day nursery. Building types at Herman Gardens included 1,340 flats and 810 row houses for a total of 2,150 units at the project site. Units had either one, two, or three bedrooms.¹¹

Tenant selection and rental policies of the Detroit Housing Commission in 1941 followed the terms of the United States Housing Act, loan contracts with the United States Housing Authority, and resolutions of the Detroit Housing Commission. Admission requirements to public housing followed these guidelines:

1. "Natural and cohesive family groups only are accepted.
2. The head of the family must be a citizen.
3. The family must have been resident in the City of Detroit for 12 months prior to formal application.
4. The family must at the time of acceptance be living in a substandard dwelling.
5. The net annual family income must be less than a stipulated maximum [Families whose income is more than five times the rent (six times if there are two or more minor dependents) are to be excluded]."²⁰

The Housing Commission based income limits for the Herman Gardens and Smith Homes developments on average war worker salaries in the City. Apartments in these projects rented for forty-five dollars a month. The Commission gave war workers priority for admission into these two projects.²¹

The year 1942 marked the period of intensive war housing activity involvement by the Detroit Housing Commission. The year is characterized by skyrocketing industrial production. Detroit became the gigantic war arsenal of the country. As a result of growing industrial activity and the conversion of automobile plants to full war production, the influx of in-migrant war workers intensified the demand for housing facilities. The Detroit area gained 336,000 people from the Census of 1940 to June, 1942. In contrast, only 19,502 additional dwelling units became available in the same period of time.²²

Three new public housing projects in 1942 opened and added 2,560 units to the public housing stock. Families that worked in the war industry had first priority to these

units. The War Production Board temporarily suspended further plans for construction of non-war housing. The suspension permitted the construction of only essential war housing, and prohibited general public housing and slum clearance. As a result, the Board deferred planning and construction of the Edward J. Jeffries Homes and Frederick Douglass Homes until after the War. The two projects had been in the planning stages for about one year.

At the request of the United States Housing Authority (USHA), the Detroit Housing Commission became agent for the USHA in the construction of the only permanent housing project designed specifically for defense housing. The Commission located Sojourner Truth Homes between Nevada and Stockton Avenues at Fenelon Street in northeast Detroit for the families of 200 black defense workers. Sojourner Truth consisted of one-story frame construction sheathed buildings and two-story brick-veneered structures. The community building contained a generous foyer, offices and a large community room with kitchen alcove.²³ Sojourner Truth became the first and only permanent defense housing project completed in March, 1942. The first black families moved in after much protest from the neighborhood.²⁴ The first section of Herman Gardens that consisted of 2,150 units opened for occupancy in November, 1942. Half of the 210 units at John W. Smith Homes became occupied in December, 1942.

Plans for the development of John Smith Homes (formerly the Brightmore Project) began in 1941. The Commission awarded a construction contract in the Spring of 1942.

Completion of the project occurred in January, 1943.

Location of this 210 unit row house project followed the Housing Commission's policy to locate public housing in outlying areas near industrial districts. The Commission located Smith Homes in the northwest part of Detroit near the General Motors Diesel Plant. Superhighways made easy access to the Ford Bomber plant and other numerous defense industries. The site plan for the project site called for parking areas to be located near boundary streets. This system of parking allowed site roads to be constructed with reduced widths. The site plan arranged buildings around the perimeter of the site in such a way as to accumulate a large recreational area at the center that adjoined the community building.²⁰

Due to war emergencies and the pressure and restriction of materials, the Housing Commission elected to begin a temporary war housing program to meet the demand of housing needs of war workers. The Commission decided to build prefabricated demountable dwellings in areas located within easy access of war production factories. The Federal Public Housing Authority under the terms of the Lanham Act authorized 5,000 temporary dwelling units for Detroit war workers in 1942. The Commission adopted a policy to erect temporary housing on leased sites when possible.²¹

Tenant selection for war housing adhered to the following guidelines in the following priority:

1. "in-migrant worker who wishes to bring his family to Detroit;

2. war worker who is currently without a home-- this includes those families facing eviction because of the sale of the property in which they live;
3. war worker who is commuting an unreasonable distance to work;
4. war worker living in substandard housing;
5. war worker living in substandard housing but who neither lives in nor works in Detroit."²⁷

By the end of May, 1943, the city had occupied 5,420 war housing dwellings. In addition, the completion of Hermans Gardens and John Smith Homes occurred. Ten temporary war housing projects existed in various stages of completion:

1. McKeever Homes. Completed October, 1943. 670 units.
2. Valentine Homes. Completed September, 1943. 350 units.
3. John Fisher Homes. Completed September, 1943. 572 units.
4. Catallo Homes. Completed August, 1943. 372 units.
5. Emerson Homes. Completed Winter 1944. 782 units.
6. Robert Carle Homes. Completed September, 1943. 200 units.
7. Adams Homes. Completed January, 1944. 260 units.
8. Charles Annex. Completed Winter, 1944. 300 units.
9. Temporary Douglass Homes. Completed April, 1944. Scattered sites in southeast Detroit. 352 units.
10. Robert Brooks Homes. Completed January, 1944. 300 units.²⁸

Primary emphasis of the Housing Commission in 1944 centered around the continued need to provide housing for black war workers. In addition, the growing need to house returning veterans posed a new problem. Veterans of World War II began to apply for housing in increased numbers. Policy mandated that war housing be built on leased lots on scattered sites located primarily in industrial areas of the city. Site selection became increasingly difficult because of a policy of the Detroit Common Council that prohibited the location of war and/or public housing in such a manner as to change the racial characteristics of a neighborhood. The Housing Commission also unsuccessfully solicited outlying communities to allow for the construction of temporary war housing in their communities.

The question of changing the policy to integrate neighborhoods with war housing surfaced in late 1942 with construction of Sojourner Truth Homes:

"The Director-Secretary of the Housing Commission sent a communication to the Mayor setting forth the fact that no further sites were to be found due to the racial restrictions of areas. The problem was brought out in the open and a site in southwest Detroit which is undergoing a transition in racial characteristics was submitted to the Common Council. After hearings were conducted toward the consideration of this crucial issue, the site was finally rejected. The result was that Negro housing still remained the most vital problem of housing and other civic authorities."²⁹

Completion of war housing occurred in 1944. Over 10,000 families lived in Detroit Housing Commission projects, 5,071 in permanent housing developments, and 5,057 in temporary war housing. The latter projects utilized

fourteen different site locations. An occupancy level of ninety-nine percent occurred by the end of the year. Fisher Homes suffered initial occupancy problems because the Commission miss-judged and built a surplus of one-bedroom units. To eliminate this vacancy, modification occurred to thirty-two one-bedroom to make sixteen four-bedroom units. A need existed to accommodate larger families, and this modification helped to meet this need.³⁰

The Housing Commission's primary goal after the War was to house returning veterans. Housing for low-income black families became a low priority. In December, 1945, Willow Run Village became home for 2,300 veterans. Willow Run furnished an important source of housing and within six months the complex had 100 percent occupancy and a waiting list of over 800 families. Sensitivity to needs of low-income black families dropped to an all time low because of the redirected focus on veterans and expressed concerns of black special interest groups:

"Throughout the year the antagonistic attitude of organized 'protective' groups to the establishment of Negro communities has continually harassed the Housing Commission in its selection of sites for Negro occupancy.... The Housing Commission in selecting sites for Negro occupancy has followed a policy of not changing the racial characteristics of neighborhoods. In line with this rule it has been getting increasingly more difficult to select suitable sites for units to be occupied by Negroes."³¹

The 1946 Detroit Housing Commission Annual Report noted the positive accomplishments of the Commission in race relations after the war. The Commission's attitude centered around the harmony between blacks and Japanese-Americans rather

than between blacks and the Housing Commission. Housing Japanese-Americans in a harmonious environment with blacks became a major goal of the Commission:

"Although popular feeling was very antagonistic toward this particular minority group [Japanese-Americans], it was possible to place many families of Japanese origin in the housing projects under the jurisdiction of the Detroit Housing Commission and have them accepted by the tenants living there."³²

Congressional response to the veteran housing problem came in the form of the Veterans Emergency Housing Law of 1946 that authorized the erection of 200,000 dwelling units nationwide. Detroit received 2,000 units of veteran emergency housing. Existing public housing in the city supplied 800 units while the allocation supplied money to build 1,200 temporary units. The Housing Commission located most of the units at six sites on the east side of the city near the heart of the industrial area:

1. 228 unit project (black occupancy) located at the foot of Tennessee between Avondale and the River;
2. 512 unit project (white occupancy) located on the west side of Conner between Warren and Gratiot;
3. 294 unit project (white occupancy) located on the west side of St. Jean between Freund and the River;
4. 98 unit project (black occupancy) located on scattered parcels within the area bounded by Pembroke, alley west of Greggs, Eight Mile Road, and the alley east of Cherrylawn;
5. 26 unit project (white occupancy) located on the site of Fisher and Catallo Homes war housing projects; (A tornado previously destroyed Fisher and Catallo Homes.);

6. 32 unit project (white occupancy) located in the playfield area at McKeever Homes;

Dwelling units of the Veterans Emergency Housing Program consisted primarily of one and two bedroom units. This program built temporary housing equal to or better than housing built under the old war housing program.³³

In addition to construction of these units, the Housing Commission mandated that vacated conventional public housing units be filled by veterans and their families and that only the most extreme cases of hardship among non-veteran families be given consideration for occupancy.³⁴ Table 5.1 lists public housing, war housing, and defense housing projects at the peak of the temporary housing program.

The Detroit Housing Commission began deprogramming of their temporary projects in December, 1952. The federal government built temporary war housing projects in Detroit in 1943 and 1944 on land leased from private owners. The Detroit Housing Commission oversaw operation of these units. These units housed veteran's families after the end of World War II. The Housing Commission built the veterans projects in 1947 to provide additional temporary housing for returning war veterans.³⁵ During the year ending June 30, 1954 nearly 2,600 families moved from temporary public housing in the city. The Commission boarded up and removed these units from operation. The Commission successfully deprogrammed all temporary units by August, 1956.³⁶ The Commission took

TABLE 5.1

Public Housing Program in Detroit
July 1, 1949

| Project | Kind | Status |
|-------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Brewster Homes | PWA ^a | completed September, 1938 |
| Parkside Homes | PWA | completed September, 1938 |
| Brewster Addition | PHA ^b | completed July, 1941 |
| Parkside Addition | PHA | completed September, 1941 |
| Charles Terrace | PHA | completed October, 1941 |
| Herman Gardens | PHA | completed May, 1943 |
| John W. Smith | PHA | completed January, 1943 |
| Jeffries Homes | PHA | construction begun 7/1950 |
| Douglass Homes | PHA | construction begun 5/1950 |
| Sojourner Truth | defense | completed March, 1942 |
| McKeever Homes | temp war | completed October, 1943 |
| Catallo Homes | temp war | completed August, 1943 |
| Fisher Homes | temp war | completed September, 1943 |
| Valentine Homes | temp war | completed September, 1943 |
| Emerson Homes | temp war | completed October, 1943 |
| Emerson Homes | temp war | completed March, 1944 |
| Emerson Homes | temp war | completed April, 1944 |
| Carle Homes | temp war | completed October, 1943 |
| Brooks Homes | temp war | completed January, 1944 |
| Brooks Homes | temp war | completed January, 1945 |
| Brooks Homes | temp war | completed July, 1944 |
| Adams Homes | temp war | completed January, 1944 |
| Charles Annex | temp war | completed July, 1944 |
| Moseley Homes | temp war | completed October, 1944 |
| Moseley Homes | temp war | completed February, 1945 |
| Temp. Douglass | temp war | completed May, 1944 |
| Temp. Douglass | temp war | completed April, 1944 |
| Temp. Douglass | demountable | completed September, 1944 |
| Algonquin Homes | veterans | completed August, 1947 |
| Charles F. Stone | veterans | completed November, 1947 |
| Croxon Homes | veterans | completed August, 1947 |
| Brooks Annex | veterans | completed July, 1947 |
| McKeever Annex | veterans | completed May, 1947 |

^aPublic Works Administration projects

^bprojects funded under the Housing Act of 1937

Source: Detroit Housing Commission, "Public Housing in Detroit, Annual Report, July 1949-June 1950", p. 18.

steps in 1948 to return public housing to its original purpose to provide housing to low income persons. A large percentage of tenants had high incomes. These tenants obtained public housing during the war effort because the Commission did not have in place income limits during the war. The Housing Commission made a double attack on removing higher income tenants. First, the Commission issued notices to vacate to over-income families. Second, the Commission levied a surcharge rent against any over-income families that for any reason remained in low-rent public housing. The surcharge made tenants pay a fair rent in accordance with their income and in accordance with prevailing rents in the private market.³⁷

By 1949, the Housing Commission had refocused its direction to provide housing to low-income families with children. Mayor Van Antwerp placed primary emphasis on proceeding as rapidly as possible with new public housing on vacant land sites in order to achieve the greatest possible expansion of the city's total supply of housing and to provide units into which families displaced by slum clearance operations can be moved:

"The current severe housing shortage as it affects low- and middle-income families with children would appear to be a more urgent problem than the clearing of slums, which cannot be accomplished in any event until housing is found for the persons who would be displaced."³⁸

President Truman signed in to law the Housing Act of 1949 in mid-July. This Act authorized additional units of public housing nationwide. The Detroit Housing Commission

took advantage of this Act and reactivated plans for the construction of Frederick Douglass Apartments and Edward Jeffries Homes. Clearance of the Douglass site eradicated one of the worst slum areas in the city. The site is adjacent to the existing Brewster project. Slum clearance also occurred with the construction of Jeffries. The city owned the land for these two sites for ten years. War time priorities deferred construction of these two projects. The Commission awarded construction bids for Douglass Apartments on September 12, 1949, and for Jeffries in the summer of 1950.³⁹

The 1951 Detroit Master Plan outlined general site requirements that the Housing Commission adopted to guide in the selection of locations for future public housing projects. The Plan stated policy that required sites to be located in residential sections that had the potential to remain good areas for living. The sites must be accessible to schools, recreation areas, shopping centers and other community services, and employment. The Commission established special requirements for buildings and site layout:

1. "Dwellings are grouped in developments of 200 units or more.
2. Structures are usually terraces or apartments.
3. The gridiron street system is usually modified to reduce area in street, to provide space for playgrounds, and to permit better orientation of buildings."⁴⁰

In addition, the Commission adopted policy to address traffic generated by public housing in a neighborhood. Most sites are found adjacent or near major thoroughfares.

Access from project local street to the major thoroughfare permits direct discharge of traffic onto the thoroughfare. This arrangement does not increase traffic movements in the rest of the neighborhood.

The Housing Commission signed a contract with the federal government in June, 1952 to allow for construction of a 3,874 unit public housing project (referred to as Michigan 1-11) on a near east side slum site adjacent to the Gratiot and Lafayette Redevelopment projects. This project, never completed, had developmental problems from the beginning. Congressional cutbacks of new public housing unit allocations made it difficult for local public housing agencies to obtain money for new units. The planned project also faced heavy local opposition. In 1955, the Public Housing Administration ordered the Detroit Housing Commission to terminate plans for this unnamed project until site location issues could be settled.⁴¹ A local citizens redevelopment committee petitioned the Housing Commission to integrate this project with private housing scheduled to be built in the Gratiot/Lafayette area. The Commission never settled the controversy around this project, and in 1963, the Commission transferred the site for this proposed project to the Elmwood Park urban renewal project.⁴²

Authorization and construction of only two housing projects occurred between the end of World War II and 1966. The completion of Edward J. Jeffries Homes and Frederick Douglass Apartments in 1955 brought the total number of low-rent public housing units to 8,155. During the first

six months of 1953, the completion of approximately 700 units occurred between the Jeffries and Douglass projects. Most of the units completed consisted of units to accommodate large families (with four or more children). The completion of these row house units met a long recognized need for more large size public housing units in Detroit. Construction of the remaining multi-story portions of the two projects began in late 1952. The six high-rises at the Douglass site contain 672 units. The eight buildings at the Jeffries site contain 896 units.⁴³ Completion of the two developments during 1955 added 3,176 dwelling units to the city's housing supply. Jeffries Homes contained 2,170 units which made it the city's largest public housing project, and Douglass Homes contained 1,006 units. Jeffries is located along the John C. Lodge Expressway between Canfield Avenue to the north and Temple Avenue to the south. Douglass Homes is located along Hastings Street between Wilkins and Winder Streets, directly south of the older Brewster Homes.⁴⁴

Several reasons account for the slow-down of public housing construction during this time period. First, the Jeffries and Brewster projects had difficulties with leasing and filling vacancies, causing some officials of the Housing Commission to be reluctant to approve more housing.⁴⁵ High vacancy rates, a result of an outflux of population to the suburbs, and to other states and cities, resulted in a "loose" rental market in Detroit that made the supply of public housing adequate.⁴⁶ Second, city politics discouraged the development of new public housing sites.

Freedman states that "Mayor Cobo's dislike of public housing and especially of projects on vacant sites led to the abandonment of several of the sites recommended by the Detroit Housing Commission in the 1950s".⁴⁷ Finally, President Eisenhower ignored Congressional mandate to strengthen the public housing program in the Housing Act of 1949. He reduced the rate of new public housing construction to around 10,000 units per year for the entire nation.⁴⁸

Local and federal policies that governed tenant admission in Detroit public housing dictated major changes in the 1953 fiscal year. First, Federal Judge Arthur Lederle issued a permanent injunction that restrained the Detroit Housing Commission from:

1. "Leasing units on the basis of race or color;
2. Maintaining separate lists of white and Negro applicants;
3. Maintaining racially segregated public housing projects."⁴⁹

Second, the Housing Commission rescinded the existing occupancy resolution which affirmed the policy that preserved neighborhood racial characteristics. The new policy stated:

"In the selection and removal of tenants of housing projects, the Commission will be guided by the best interests of all the people of the City for the purposes of protecting their rights and the promotion of harmony amongst them, all in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Michigan."⁵⁰

The Commission carried out this policy in a token manner by making Jeffries Homes a racially-integrated project. The other low rent projects maintained racially segregated tenants.

The Housing Commission again recognized in 1954 the need for larger public housing units to accommodate the growing demand for housing for larger families. Small families are more mobile, have lower income limits, and have much less difficulty in finding private rental housing. As a result, families that require the larger units must wait longer than those that need only one or two bedrooms. In the Fall of 1954, one-third of the 8,152 families on the Housing Commission's waiting list required three or four bedroom dwellings. To meet this need, the Commission began a conversion program in existing public housing projects to accommodate the demand for larger units. The Commission increased the inventory of larger units by combining existing smaller units. Conversion practices at Herman Gardens combined forty-four zero-bedroom units with forty-four two-bedroom units to make forty-four four-bedroom units. Application of similar practices occurred at Charles Terrace that yielded twelve four-bedroom units. In addition, conversions at Parkside and Brewster Homes added 140 units with three or four bedrooms.⁵¹

Urban Renewal activities authorized by the 1954 Housing Act broadened the Housing Commission's program to eliminate slums and dilapidated housing in Detroit. Slum clearance caused the displacement of many families. The Commission chose direct relocation options toward the private market rather than toward existing public housing. The Commission temporarily relocated approximately seventy-five families in public housing until private units could be obtained.⁵²

In 1956, Congress appropriated funds for the continuation of public housing activity. Significant changes occurred with respect to public housing for the elderly. New legislation allowed for the first time admission of the single-elderly to public housing. In order to salvage the Michigan 1-11 project in the Gratiot and Lafayette Redevelopment Area, the Commission designated this project as an elderly complex. The strategy did not work.

The Commission began a unique experiment at the Jeffries project in 1960. One of the fourteen story, 112 unit buildings opened exclusively as housing for the elderly. Alterations made in the building accommodated this age group and included the installation of handrails in hallways and bathrooms, and the provision of space for recreational and leisure time activities. The elderly "expansion" program carried over to three of the adjacent buildings (at Jeffries) as units became vacant due to normal attrition. A similar experiment occurred in two of the buildings at Douglass Homes. In addition, one of the buildings at Jeffries opened in the early 1960s for the families of married college students that attended college in the City.

Prominent national housing figures scrapped the notion of the regenerative power of public housing in the early 1960s. By November, 1963:

"public housing had evolved from a large-scale community program aimed at supplying safe and sanitary housing environments to upwardly mobile working-class families into a housing strategy emphasizing the delivery of welfare services to socially and psychologically demoralized tenants."³³

This change led to policy adjustments that increased occupancy of the elderly. This trend gained popularity because of the notion that housing the elderly is more accepted than giving housing assistance to poor blacks. Detroit continued the trend by allowing the proportion of dwelling units occupied by the elderly to increase. At the end of 1962, some thirty-five percent of the total units in the city housed elderly tenants (five percent increase from the previous year). The Commission also began the provision of on-site services for the elderly:

"An addition to the Parkside Recreation Center at Parkside Homes was built primarily aimed at serving the leisure time needs of the elderly residents of the project as well as those in the surrounding community. The new facility follows the pattern set at other housing developments in the provision of recreation and lounge areas."⁵⁴

In 1963, emphasis on social services to residents of Detroit's public housing increased significantly. The Commission worked closely with other agencies to meet the social service needs of public housing residents. The Commission established working relationships with the Neighborhood Service Organization, Michigan State University, the United Automobile Workers, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, the Detroit Board of Education, the Department of Parks and Recreation, the Health Department, YMCA, and the YWCA. The types of organizations are indicative of the nature of services provided. The most significant development occurred with the establishment of a tri-party agreement between the

Housing Commission, Neighborhood Service Organization, and the Michigan Department of Welfare to initiate an effort of concerted social services at Brewster-Douglass Homes.⁵³

Social service provisions for the elderly further developed in 1964. Noteworthy activities included the establishment of day care center at Brewster-Douglass, the opening of a credit union at Jeffries, and library service to the elderly residents of Herman Gardens. The day care center occupied a former administration building with staff from the Michigan Department of Social Welfare. The Michigan Credit Union League and the Neighborhood Service Organization advanced a total of \$20,000 to set up the credit union at Jeffries. Finally, the Neighborhood Service Organization and the Detroit Public Library entered into an agreement with the Housing Commission to provide books for the elderly.⁵⁴

The Housing Commission in 1966 reaffirmed and strengthened their direction to emphasize elderly housing because of the success of the elderly experiment at the Jeffries Homes and Brewster-Douglass project sites, and new provisions in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 that emphasized housing for the elderly in public housing. Modification of the Act followed the development of an increased negative image of public housing. Most people perceived all public housing to be the home for poor blacks, and the home/generator of criminal activity and other socially unacceptable behavior.

The new City housing policy mandated that future public housing construction be designed and built for elderly and larger families, and the policy allowed low-rent housing to be designed and integrated into existing neighborhoods. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 allowed the Housing Commission to offer low-rent public housing that utilized an atmosphere outside of a public housing project setting. Generally, qualifying owners of suitable "scattered site" dwellings entered into a contract with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for a period of one to five years. The owner either leased directly to the Housing Commission which in turn sublet the dwelling to the qualifying tenant, or the Commission entered into a working contract with the owner that allowed the owner to lease directly to the tenant.²⁷

Elderly housing built under the new policy in the late 1960s included Harriett Tubman Terrace, Herman Garden Towers (an addition to the existing Herman Gardens), State Fair Apartments, Glenview, Woodland and the Conner-Waverly Apartments. The completion of Lee Plaza in 1969 and Charles Diggs apartments in 1974 marked the first addition of a "family" public housing project to the city's inventory since the Jeffries construction in 1955.²⁸ Elderly construction continued in the early 1970s with the construction of Forest Park, Temple Towers, Warren West, Wolverine Apartments, Sheridan Place I, and an elderly addition to Herman Gardens.

The elderly expansion program continued through the mid-1970s at the Jeffries Homes and Brewster-Douglass sites. High-rise conversion at the two project sites took place for several reasons. A study completed by the Housing Commission indicated an immediate need of 6,000 elderly public housing units in the City. Also, the study recommended conversion of the fourteen story high-rise units at the two sites to one bedroom to meet the needs of the elderly. One bedroom units are generally considered to be appropriate for senior citizen occupancy. In addition, research on long-range effects of housing older people together demonstrated that elderly housing promoted an increased contact between the elderly residents through senior citizen activities directed toward them. Many older people prefer to live among their age groups as friendships are more easily made through sharing their past years.³⁹

Construction of Herman Gardens and Forrest Park utilized the turnkey method of development. The turnkey method refers to the procedure where the local public agency and a private developer enters into an agreement to construct public housing. The developer has complete control over the project, and upon completion, the Housing Commission purchases the project.⁴⁰

The construction of only one public housing project has occurred in Detroit since the completion of Charles Diggs and Sheridan Place I in the 1973-74 period. Sheridan Place II, adjacent to Sheridan Place I, added 200 elderly units to the city public housing inventory upon completion in 1983.⁴¹

Today, twenty public housing projects exist in the City of Detroit (Table 5.2). They range in size from forty-four units at Woodland Courts to 2,154 units at Herman Gardens. Small neighborhood sites in various locations total 504 units. The Detroit Housing Commission currently oversees 10,818 public housing units in the City.

Official policy of the Detroit Housing Commission that addressed public housing occupancy has been inconsistent over the years. The program began by accommodating housing for slum dwellers. Policies later changed to accommodate war workers, veterans, low-income families, and then the elderly. Policy changes reflected outside stimuli such as World War II and local/national sentiment. Even when policy mandated housing for low-income black families, implementation tended to redirect the focus to other needs.

Initial policy that addressed site selection of public housing focused on the housing needs of Detroit's core slum area. The area was characterized by high crime, disease, physical deterioration, and high government expense for services. Rent exploitation occurred as a result of gross overcrowding caused by outside pressure to not allow the black community to expand into adjacent white neighborhoods. The Commission's answer to this housing issue came in the form of the completion of the Brewster public housing project in 1938. The Brewster project, a slum clearance project, was Detroit's first public housing project built exclusively for black families that lived in slum conditions. Increasing pressure in late 1930 to accommodate

Table 5.2

Public Housing Projects in the City of Detroit

| Name | Family/Elderly
Units | Total
Units |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|
| Brewster Douglass Homes | 563*/1386 | 1,949 |
| Diggs | 104/0 | 104 |
| Charles Terrace | 428/0 | 428 |
| Conner/Waverly Apartments | 0/139 | 139 |
| Forest Park | 0/129 | 129 |
| Glen View | 0/129 | 129 |
| Harriett Tubman Terrace | 0/211 | 211 |
| Herman Gardens | 2,025/129 | 2,154 |
| Jeffries Homes | 715/1,456 | 2,171 |
| Lee Plaza | 222/0 | 222 |
| "Neighborhood Sites" | 492/12 | 504 |
| Parkside Homes | 837/255 | 1,092 |
| Sheridan Place I | 0/210 | 210 |
| Sheridan Place II | 0/200 | 200 |
| Smith Homes | 210/0 | 210 |
| Sojourner Truth | 199/0 | 199 |
| State Fair Apartments | 0/211 | 211 |
| Temple Towers | 0/64 | 64 |
| Warren West | 0/213 | 213 |
| Wolverine Apartments | 0/235 | 235 |
| Woodland Courts | 0/44 | 44 |

*The low-rise family units are no longer occupied.

SOURCE: Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, 1981 Directory of Assisted Rental Housing in Wayne County and the City of Detroit Vol II: Inventory and Description of Assisted Rental Development, June 1981; and Telephone conversation with Mr. Leonard Karle, Detroit Housing Department, Detroit, Michigan, 13 April 1988.

housing for industrial workers encouraged the Commission to change policy to locate future public housing near industrial plants rather than in slum areas. The Commission hoped this change would encourage families to move out of the slums into housing near industrial work. The Commission never considered that local industry had a strong aversion to hire the typical black (former) ghetto dweller.

Detroit became the war arsenal of the United States during the World War II era. An already tight housing market for blacks became unbearable with an influx of 165,000 new residents who moved to the City to work in the war plants. The Housing Commission officially stated policy to supply housing for the black war worker. However, tenant selection policies mandated that only "natural and cohesive family groups be admitted." Commission staff felt that only white workers met the "cohesive family group" criteria. This resulted in exclusion of black war workers being admitted to public housing. The Commission gave priority to applicants that moved to the City for work in the war effort. Income limits as a criteria for admission to public housing were temporarily suspended and the rent was based on a percentage of the average salary paid by defense plants. The Commission did not directly address housing for the typical black ghetto dweller. Sojourner Truth homes became the only project designated as black defense housing under the U.S. Housing Authority defense housing program. Much neighborhood protest occurred with this project and site selection because the neighborhood was

primarily white. Location of Sojourner Truth in a predominately white neighborhood broke the Commission's long-term policy of locating public housing in areas where racial mixture of the neighborhood could not be changed.

At the end of World War II, the Commission concentrated their efforts to meet the demand of returning war veterans. The policy to not integrate neighborhood using public housing was reinstated. Needs of low-income families were essentially ignored because of returning veterans and also because of increased pressure that black advocacy groups put on the Commission.

By the 1950s, veteran needs no longer existed and the Commission again changed policy to address housing needs of low- and moderate-income families. Policy suggested that future public housing projects be located in residential areas that had the potential to remain good areas for living. Construction of Jeffries Homes represented this new philosophy. The Commission chose the site for Jeffries because it represented a protrusion of dilapidated housing in an existing stable neighborhood. Jeffries represented the first attempt to build high-rise public housing for white families and clear slums at the same time. A court injunction in 1953 forced the Commission not to rent on the basis of color. As a result, the Commission designated Jeffries as an integrated project.

Construction of the Douglass project began in 1952 and it represented a national trend where housing authorities cleared slum areas and built high-rise units to house the

displaced. Location of Douglass in the black ghetto, and eventual change in racial make-up of Jeffries to predominantly black suggests that an underlying policy of the Commission was to keep the black poor in their traditional parts of the City and not allow these large public housing projects to be built in more racially mixed or white neighborhoods. This same practice of converting horizontal ghettos to vertical ghettos occurred in most major cities in the country.⁴²

An increasing negative image developed toward public housing nationally and in Detroit as a result of these new "ghettos". As a result, Jeffries began an elderly conversion program in 1960. Public opinion perceived it more acceptable to give assistance to elderly than to poor blacks. New policy in the late 1960s that no longer mandated natural and cohesive family groups for admission to public housing further strengthened this negative image. The Commission filled high-rise apartments at Jeffries and Brewster/Douglass with single-parent poor blacks. The projects became pockets of high crime activity of all types. The Commission eventually converted the high-rises at Brewster/Douglass and Jeffries to elderly occupancy.

THE BREWSTER-DOUGLASS AND JEFFRIES NEIGHBORHOODS

Brewster-Douglass

The Brewster-Douglass public housing project is located in the Lower Woodward area as defined by the City of Detroit Planning Department. The Lower Woodward area is bounded to

the north by the Edsel Ford Freeway, to the south by the Fisher Freeway, to the east by the Chrysler Freeway, and to the west by the Lodge Freeway. The Lower Woodward area consist of nine planning units: Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park, Medical Center, Art Center, Southeast Cass Corridor, Southwest Cass Corridor and the Wayne State University area (Figure 5.1). Approximately fifty-six percent of the population was black according to the 1980 Census.

Development of the Lower Woodward area as a residential neighborhood began around 1910. The original form and fabric of the community does not exist today because of urban renewal, street widening activities, conversion of single-family homes to apartment buildings, redevelopment into cultural, medical and educational uses. The process of demolition is still continuing today, not so much because of urban renewal activities, but because of abandonment of structures by property owners and tenants. Abandonment is especially pronounced in the lower Cass community and in Brush Park which is adjacent to the Brewster-Douglass project.

The Lower Woodward area has experienced high crime problems and other social ills since the 1930s. One survey taken in the 1930s revealed crime in this area to be 7.5 times the city average, juvenile delinquency 10.4 times higher, tuberculosis 6.5 times higher, pneumonia eight times higher, and infant mortality 1.5 times the average for the City as a whole. Almost one-third of the families in the area received public welfare.⁴³

A steady decline in the number of persons and number of housing units has occurred between 1970 and 1980. The population decreased by more than one-third and housing units decreased by twenty four percent. The 1980 census reported existing vacancy rates in the Lower Woodward area at eighteen percent which represented the highest of any portion of the city. The overall loss of housing units and an exodus of population occurred because:

1. demolition and clearance activities associated with the Community Development Block Grant program with cleared land designated for non-residential uses;
2. deterioration of housing units over time;
3. rehabilitation of structures from multi-family use to single-family use;
4. demise of permanent resident hotels.⁴⁴

Until recently, most of the areas family households lived in the low and medium rise units at the Brewster-Douglass project. In 1988, fewer than twenty-five of the Brewster-Douglass low and medium rise family units are occupied (out of 563).⁴⁵

The Lower Woodward area has the lowest average population per household and the highest proportion of one-person households of any residential area in the city.⁴⁶ Some seventy percent of the 13,600 households in the area consist of single persons living alone. City-wide this figure is only twenty-nine percent.⁴⁷ Generally, only fifteen percent of the population is under eighteen, well below the city average of thirty percent. Senior citizen representation constituted roughly twenty-one percent of the population of

this area according to the 1980 census. Senior citizens are predominantly found in the Brush Park and Medical Center planning units (both adjacent to Brewster-Douglass), the southeastern quadrant of the Cass Corridor and Brewster-Douglass.

The median annual household income in the Lower Woodward area is less than \$5,000. Two reasons for low income in the area includes the concentration of one-person households and the large number of residents living on some form of assistance such as social security, welfare, unemployment compensation, or subsistence level paying jobs.⁴⁰

The Brewster-Douglass planning unit as designated by the Planning Department includes approximately sixty acres of the south-east corner of the Lower Woodward area. Found in this planning unit is the 1,949 unit Brewster-Douglass public housing project. The development of Brewster-Douglass occurred in two major phases. The Brewster section, built during the 1937-1939 period, consist of low-rise homes. The Douglass section, constructed between 1950-1953, includes low-rise, mid-rise, and fourteen story high-rise apartment buildings. The high-rise units contain predominantly elderly occupants while the other occupied units are designated family.


Low-rise units in the Brewster-Douglass public housing project are vacant with the exception of a few units. Neighborhood residents of the Brewster/Douglass area expressed that the Housing Department has allowed the low-rise units to become vacant. Residents felt that planned vacancy

of these units served as the beginning step in the process to upgrade the area and accommodate expansion of the Cultural and Medical Centers.⁶⁹ Councilman Ravitz of the Detroit City Council feels that the presence of the Brewster-Douglass project is "worrisome" to the redevelopment effort of the Lower Woodward Area. He suggested that the Housing Commission desires to rehabilitate the vacant units at Brewster-Douglass and make them available to higher socioeconomic persons. Councilman Ravitz expressed that Brewster-Douglass will be physically and socially upgraded within a five year period to complement improvements to the nearby Cultural Center which contains the Fox Theater and Orchestra Hall.⁷⁰ An officer at the 13th Police Precinct expressed the view that city hall may have a role in abandonment of the Brewster-Douglass low-rises. He stated that "word is out on the streets that plans call for rehabilitation and conversion of these units into condominiums."⁷¹

Mayor Coleman Young recently proposed to tear down approximately 1,000 vacant or deteriorating units at the site. Rationale for this policy is based on the assumption that units targeted for demolition are likely to lose federal subsidies in 1991. Also, city officials feel that keeping the units open have the potential of draining scarce city resources.⁷² Mayor Young is not without opposition on his demolition policy. Councilwoman Maryann Mahaffey suggests that federal funds may be available for future rehabilitation of these deteriorating units.⁷³ Also, local activists for Detroit's 20,000 homeless have protested

Figure 5.1

Lower Woodward Area



SOURCE: City of Detroit. Planning Department. Woodward Area Planning Planning Report, Preliminary Draft, March 1983.

against Mayor Young's plans. The activists want the city to let the homeless live in the unoccupied units, rather than demolish them.⁷⁴ The City Council recently gave indirect endorsement of demolition activities at Brewster/Douglass by voting to exclude the project from a study of the city's public housing stock. Demolition supporters on the council favor the eradication of unusable units and improve living conditions at the site by lowering the density and building townhouse units.⁷⁵

The neighborhood adjacent and to the south of Brewster/Douglass is Brush Park. Like the rest of the Lower Woodward area, Brush Park has not remained static over time. Brush Park, formerly known as Piety Hill, developed between 1870 and 1890 as a result of the movement of prosperous Detroit citizens from the immediate downtown area. Woodward Avenue boasted the city's finest mansions of successful merchants and the manufacturing elite. Adjacent residential streets contained homes of the less wealthy. The Brush Park neighborhood also contained the L. Beaubien Farm, a working class neighborhood with one-story homes and apartments.

An exodus of wealthy merchants began as early as 1900 with Jewish families moving into Brush Park. In addition, multi-family housing construction and conversion of many of the original homes to apartment and boarding houses occurred between 1900-1920. By 1930, Brush Park became a totally black community. Expansion of the automobile industry after World War I encouraged black migration from the south. New blacks found difficulty in obtaining housing except in

certain areas, such as Brush Park, because of a limited housing supply, and because of prejudices. This resulted in over-crowding conditions.⁷⁶ A high degree of vacancy and abandonment coupled with deteriorating physical conditions existed by the 1960s. Demolition activities began in the 1970s to remedy the deteriorating landscape. The number of Brush Park dwelling units decreased by approximately twenty-nine percent between 1970 and 1977. A program to preserve historic structures in Brush Park also began during the decade of the 1970s. Recently, the entire Brush Park planning unit became a historic area as designated by local ordinance, and a plan for neighborhood conservation of historic structures and development is in the planning stages. The area lacks local retail and service facilities, and outdoor recreation for younger persons. Despite strong efforts of neighborhood organizations, drugs and crime are prevalent in the Brush Park area.⁷⁷ Plans also call for the construction of new residential units in the area.

The Medical Center planning unit north of Brewster-Douglass developed as a residential and institutional community during the last twenty years of the 19th Century. Housing types consisted primarily of multi-family units and some single-family homes. Lower density neighborhoods developed just east of Woodward Avenue. Higher density housing developed nearer and adjacent to Woodward Avenue, the city's major transportation artery.

The area's current institutional character began with initial residential development in the late 1800s. With the wave of residential development came construction of the original Harper Hospital (1884) and Central High School (1896). Jewish migration into this area occurred along with the same migration south in Brush Park. By 1930, black residents filtered into the neighborhood. Black residents occupied the homes and established several businesses and institutions such as the Dunbar Hospital (first black hospital in the city) and the Hansberry Music School. Cultural activities developed in the early 20th Century. The main branch of the Detroit Public Library and the Detroit Institute of the Arts, designed in Italian Renaissance Revival, established this area as the cultural focal point for Detroit. Institutional expansion in the area continued through the 1940s with the construction and expansion of the Maccabees Building (Detroit public school headquarters), the Rackham Building (Engineering Society of Detroit) and Wayne State University expansion. The Center for Creative Studies is a prominent development that began in 1958.⁷⁰

Before urban renewal activities began in the 1950s, the medical center redevelopment area consisted of a variety of land uses which included residential, commercial, light industrial and institutional facilities arrayed together with no real discernible logic or rational pattern. Predominantly blighted conditions characterized the overall character of the neighborhood. Overcrowded and substandard structures existed with non-existent side, front and rear

yard space. Substandard units made up ninety percent of all structures in the area (Table 5.3). No open space, park areas or community facilities existed in the neighborhood. Inadequate parking compounded the overall traffic problem. Through-streets carried high volumes of traffic that originated elsewhere in the city. A major source of community irritation and concern centered around street crimes. This concern reflected negatively on the neighborhood to the point of tarnishing the appeal of existing medical facilities to prospective medical personnel. City officials felt that neighborhood ills could be solved through clearance and redevelopment of the area.⁷⁹

Urban renewal activities initiated in the 1950s drastically changed the residential character of the area now known as the Medical Center. One study suggested that the activity displaced over 3,000 families just north of Brewster-Douglass. In addition, urban renewal resulted in displacement of over 200 businesses and over 400 churches to make room for medical center structures. Demolition activities virtually wiped out low-income housing in the area.⁸⁰ Ironically, neighborhood opposition to the medical center development focused on hospital discrimination toward black patients and doctors, rather than on clearance of the poor black neighborhood.⁸¹ Two urban renewal projects addressed residential housing to accommodate medical personnel associated with the medical complex. Unfortunately most of the housing fell much above the price range of those low-income residents previously displaced as a result of

Table 5.3

Number of Structures in the Medical Center
Before Redevelopment

| Structure Type | Total | Standard(%) | Substandard(%) |
|-----------------|------------|-------------|----------------|
| residential | 902 | 287(8%) | 832(92%) |
| non-residential | <u>217</u> | 40(18) | 177(82) |
| TOTAL | 1,119 | 110(10) | 1,009(90) |

Source: Clarence C. White, "Community Organization, Participation and Interaction in Renewal Areas of Detroit," Master of Public Administration Thesis, Wayne State University, 1964, p. 35.

clearance activities.²

For the past fifteen years, churches in the area have developed housing for low-income families. The Plymouth Congregational Church developed Medical Center Court, Warren Plaza, and Bethel Towers. Friendship Baptist Church developed Friendship Forest Park.³ The current Medical Center #4 meets part of the needs for neighborhood shopping and housing for the Medical Center employees. Medical Center #4 is located north of Warren Avenue between Brush and St. Antoine Streets. A senior citizen high-rise is located on the northerly portion of the site. Townhouses and garden apartments are planned for the remaining vacant area. Neighborhood amenities include the fifteen acre Tolan Playfield, and the Warren Plaza neighborhood shopping center.⁴ Initial plans for the Medical Center #4 project

also proposed the restoration and adaptive re-use of two historic buildings: the old Hansberry School of Music and the old Dunbar Hospital.²³

Today the medical center area contains new residential uses for medical center personnel, four major hospitals--Harper Grace Hospital, Receiving Hospital, Wayne State University Medical School and Hutzel Hospital, plus numerous clinics and related buildings. In addition, the area contains a medical office-commercial high-rise, related parking lots and structures, a housing tower and a significant vacant parcel left for development on the northeast corner of Mack and Woodward Avenues. The city planning department suggests commercial and office re-use of this property.²⁴

Jeffries

The Jeffries Homes public housing project is located in the Southwest Sector planning area as defined by the Detroit Planning Department. The Southwest Sector area had a population of over 157,000 people in 1980. Forty-six percent were Black. Other groups include Southern Whites, Poles, Ukrainians, Maltese and Mexican-Americans. This sector is located to the west and adjacent to the Woodward area previously discussed. The western and southern city limits and the Conrail Railroad (formerly the Detroit Terminal) constitute the other boundaries. The Southwest Sector consist of nine subsectors or planning units: Jeffries, Hubbard Richard/Corktown, Tireman, Condon, Vernor Junction, West Riverfront, Chadsey, Springwells and Boynton. Boundary

delineation for each planning unit is determined by major physical barriers such as industrial corridors, freeways, or railroad tracks.⁹⁷

Initial development in the Detroit area occurred in the Southwest Sector. French settlers arrived in the early 1700s and immediately took advantage of the area's abundance of water, fertile land for farming and lumber, and game and furs. Accessibility to the Detroit and Rouge Rivers allowed the area to become a trading center for these goods, as well as a military fortress for the region.

The richness of the location made the area a prime candidate for developments associated with the Industrial Revolution in the late 19th century. The availability of water transportation and other natural resources served as a catalyst for economic development. By 1900 ... "Southwest Detroit was the site of companies manufacturing glass, salt products, stoves, chemicals and glue, bricks and other building materials."⁹⁸ Strong technological advancements coupled with Henry Ford's mass production technology attracted thousands of immigrants from the South and Europe to work in the factories. The pattern of immigration resulted in the development of strong ethnic and minority neighborhoods.

The Jeffries planning unit is defined by the Detroit Planning Department as bounded on the north by the Edsel Ford Freeway, on the south by the Fisher Freeway, on the east by the Lodge Freeway, and on the west by the Jeffries Freeway (Figure 5.2). As with the Lower Woodward area that


contains Brewster-Douglass, the Jeffries planning unit changed physically and socio-economically over time along with the Southwest Sector change. Suburban sprawl resulted in overall decay of the area. Very few of the original housing structures are standing because of clearance activities during the past thirty-five years associated with freeway development, public housing construction, street widening, urban renewal, schools, and institutional and commercial encroachment.☛

According to 1980 figures, thirty-six percent of the households in the Jeffries planning unit are considered at or below the poverty level. The lowest income persons reside in the Jeffries Homes public housing project located along the eastern edge of the planning unit. These figures are the highest of any subcommunity in Detroit. The high poverty level is based on several factors. Twenty-seven percent of the households receive welfare. Some twenty-four percent of the households receive social security. Fifty-three percent of the residents of the Jeffries area do not have any earned income. Seventy-one percent of the Jeffries planning unit are Black. Historically, this composition has not been the case. Southern Whites once dominated the area. White concentration dwindled as a result of suburban expansion and "white flight". Today, the White population has concentrated in the lower portion of the planning unit along with the Hispanic population.

Jeffries Homes contains 2,644 of the planning unit's 14,000 residents. Ninety-eight percent of the occupants of the public housing project are Black. In 1983, the public housing project had the highest percentage of couples over sixty-five years of age of any Detroit neighborhood. The project matched the city's average of single-persons sixty-five and older. Thirty-six percent of the residents of Jeffries Homes had incomes at or below the poverty level. This poverty concentration was the highest of any portion of the City.¶¶

With few exceptions, housing in the Jeffries neighborhood is among the oldest in the City. Pre-1900 general residence structures make up some thirty percent of existing structures. Residential structures include single-family units, flats, and row houses. Construction of some forty-two percent of existing structures took place within the first ten years of the 20th Century. Between 1910 and 1919 construction of about thirty-six percent of the structures took place. Since 1929, only 29 single-family homes, flats and row houses have been built. Postwar multi-family housing in the Jeffries area include: Jeffries Homes (public housing), Kundig Center, Freedom Place, Fountain Court and Selden Court. In the 1970s, the Jeffries area lost thirty-six percent of its housing units and roughly fifty percent of the population. By 1978, the vacancy rate soared to seventeen percent. The phenomenon is still continuing, especially in the neighborhood just south of Jeffries Homes. The Trumbull and Butternut area is a very poor community

Figure 5.2
Jeffries Neighborhood



SOURCE: City of Detroit. Planning Department. The Southwest Sector: Preliminary Draft, March 1983.

that consists primarily of eighty to ninety year old housing stock. The older stock is slowly being vacated and demolished to make room for parking lots. The area is just north of Tiger Stadium."¹

The Jeffries area has pronounced positive and negative aspects. As found in most of the southwestern portion of Detroit,

"... a goodly proportion of the residents live here out of choice. Proximity to the Central Business District and the Cultural Center, good transportation, and ethnic ties are among the various reasons why many choose to live here. Woodbridge, where restored homes have attracted many persons of different income groups, is the most obvious... example of a neighborhood in the Jeffries [planning unit] whose residents regard it as unique."²

The Jeffries planning unit is not without negative social and physical aspects. A major problem is the vast amount of vacant land, especially near the Jeffries Homes public housing project. Existing housing, with few exceptions, is severely deteriorated and mixed with poorly maintained vacant land. Because of age, lack of adequate maintenance, and location, Jeffries Homes is not considered an ideal place to live. Serious and severe social problems exist in the Jeffries planning unit. Problems of poverty, poor health, drug trafficking and unemployment add to the overall negative image of this portion of Detroit."³

BREWSTER-DOUGLASS AND LOWER WOODWARD AREA CRIME

The original form and fabric of the neighborhood where the Brewster-Douglass project is located has not been static over time. The physical and social instability has resulted

in a crime problem in the area since the 1930s. More recently, the crime problem has exploded because of drug activity and an increased number of abandoned structures to house drug activity. Historically, the Lower Woodward area has experienced major crime for several reasons. First, the rapid pace of urbanization in the 1940s put a strain on the already tight housing market. The in-migration of Southerners to Detroit caused overcrowded conditions. Second, urban renewal devastated the area. Urban renewal activities helped to continue the unstable effect of the area that directly caused crime to continue. Urban renewal demolished neighborhood churches. Churches in the past served as a stabilizing force for the neighborhood. Social structure degenerated as a result of this action.¶

The physical and social instability caused by mass in-migration, urban renewal, and demolition negated any chances of neighborhood residents to maintain control over their physical space. The literature calls this concept territoriality. Territoriality appears to be the critical factor that mediates the relationship between the social and physical environment of a neighborhood and crime activity in the neighborhood.

Crime in the Lower Woodward area has not always been present. In the early 20th century, inhabitants showed virtually no socioeconomic divergence. Major crime activity simply did not exist because:

"Over those years, a mute, common understanding ruled Detroit—an understanding that certain residential barriers were not to be violated. Whatever the egalitarian rhetoric of the culture at

large, Detroiters were born and raised in a atmosphere in which class consciousness was a palpable thing. Consequently, crime-omnipresent, terrifying street crime of the sort that characterizes American life today-remained under control, as it does in most societies where people know their place and where community feeling (for better or for worse) runs deep in every neighborhood."⁹³

Then came social and economic conflict caused by a drastic increase in population of the city. War production activities attracted thousands of Southerners to the City. The postwar consumer age increased demand for automobiles for the country. This demand attracted more immigrants to work in automobile factories. By 1950, some 1.9 million workers lived in the same area that a half million lived in just twenty-five years earlier. Segregation practices forced most of the black workers (some 400,000) to live in the tiny ghetto near downtown. Residents of the "black bottom" had no other neighborhood choices to live. Suburban development provided a viable living alternative for white workers.

The intolerable living situation for blacks pitted working class whites against working class blacks in a neighborhood by neighborhood battle for dominance and possession. The battle resulted in white flight and a phenomenal level of increase in crime. The crime problem occurred not because of the increase in black residents, but because of a shattered neighborhood stability:

"In the years which saw Detroit descend into its "Murder City" period, it was a metropolis almost entirely given over to transience. The sense of community feeling is difficult to preserve in a forest of 'for sale' signs."⁹⁴

High density development and neighborhood stability is a representation of the neighborhood evolution stage called "packing" as defined by LaGory and Pipkin. Some refer to the neighborhood as the "new slums" in the packing stage. In the packing stage, structures begin to age, rents fall, and lower-income groups move in. To bridge the gap between old (higher) and new (lower) rents, landlords pack more people into these units than they were designed to hold.⁹⁷ In the Detroit case, landlords took advantage of tenants and increased rents rather than lowering rents. This worked for the landlord because of the social and political influences that prohibited blacks from living elsewhere and because of the resistance of adjacent neighborhood to allow the neighborhood to expand.

The Detroit Urban League conducted a survey in 1959 to determine residents' attitude on crime activity in the neighborhood adjacent to the Brewster-Douglass area. The report that summarized survey findings outlined the following major reasons for crime in this neighborhood:

1. "Lack of parental supervision.
2. Transient renters in the area.
3. Unemployment.
4. Poorly lighted streets and alleys.
5. Lack of adequate recreational and employment outlets for teen-agers.
6. Permitted loitering on corners and in front of commercial establishments."⁹⁸

Resident explanation of crime activity correspond to findings in the literature on crime in urban neighborhoods. An absence of strong parental supervision and a surveillance mechanism coupled with no employment or recreational opportunities for teen-agers already living in a hostile environment creates a situation conducive to criminal activity. Studies that have addressed the Detroit crime problem consistently document this correlation.⁷⁷ Studies also show that street lighting intensity affects crime. Areas well lighted have less of a problem with robbery and assaults.

Citizens felt that much of the criminal activity in the neighborhood occurred as a result of the placement of persons and families relocated because of urban renewal and public improvement activities. Black and white citizens felt that these displacees brought into the neighborhood a different cultural standard of living. A change to an unacceptable standard of living and not a change in race seemed to be the major issue for permanent residents of this neighborhood. The neighborhood contained numerous businesses, such as bars and pool halls, that provided a nest for many persons that lived in and outside of the neighborhood. These establishments and activities within them encouraged criminal behavior. The presence of mixed uses in the Lower Woodward Area and crime activity validates findings stated in the literature on the positive relationship between these two variables. Commercial establishments particularly serve as crime generators that bring in "outsiders" and the outsiders are principle crime perpetrators. A neighborhood

like Woodward where the social structure is weak or nonexistent does not have the mechanism to identify and patrol outsiders before they engage in criminal activity.

Finally, many landlords of apartment units located in the area lived elsewhere in the city. Limited contact occurred between the landlord and tenants except for rent collection times. An abundance of absentee landlords encouraged crime because the landlord never monitored undesirable behavior that took place in their apartment buildings.¹⁰⁰

The 1967 riots in many ways symbolized the bottom of the abyss. The riots killed 43 Detroiters and left a portion of the city in ruins. The Chandler Park area suffered an exceptionally severe negative image for several years after the riots. Gangs that operated out of abandoned houses victimized black and white families. A former Chandler Park resident stated: "Everyone on our block--absolutely everyone--was robbed one year... even two policemen."¹⁰¹ The riots solidified the perceived negative image of the Lower Woodward Area, the Brewster-Douglass project, and the Jeffries project.¹⁰²

Crime activity has flourished in the neighborhood for several reasons (Table 5.4). Officer Madison of Detroit's thirteenth precinct stated that:

"...the Lower Woodward area has had a history of crime for many reasons. The average income is less than minimum wage. There is a low educational level among the residents. Most are on some form of government [financial] assistance. There are no role models for the teen-agers, except for the dope dealers. The area has historically attracted lower socioeconomic blacks. And crime moved in

because of the lower socioeconomic conditions."¹⁰³

The population make-up of the Lower Woodward area consists of Blacks and Whites; Indians (from India) and Chinese; Wayne State University students and faculty; and "arts people". Officer Madison expressed the opinion that most crime activity occurs within each population group, rather than in-between these groups. Very little crime exist

TABLE 5.4

Major Offenses in the 13th Police Precinct, Detroit:
1975 - 1986

| YEAR | Murder | Rape | Robbery | Assault | Burglary | Theft | Auto
Theft |
|------|--------|------|---------|---------|----------|-------|---------------|
| 1975 | 78 | 156 | 2094 | 1158 | 2335 | 3315 | 2367 |
| 1976 | 85 | 134 | 2160 | 1115 | 2490 | 3793 | 2251 |
| 1977 | 56 | 136 | 1395 | 989 | 1648 | 3137 | 1733 |
| 1978 | 54 | 99 | 1162 | 972 | 1404 | 2537 | 1343 |
| 1979 | 45 | 97 | 1063 | 1032 | 1434 | 2662 | 1555 |
| 1980 | 64 | 140 | 1539 | 1393 | 1794 | 3185 | 1808 |
| 1981 | 66 | 141 | 2115 | 1082 | 2561 | 4651 | 2936 |
| 1982 | 63 | 110 | 1944 | 981 | 2402 | 4259 | 2479 |
| 1983 | 73 | 150 | 1948 | 1053 | 1986 | 4220 | 2695 |
| 1984 | 79 | 144 | 1919 | 854 | 1736 | 4534 | 2850 |
| 1985 | 78 | 121 | 1703 | 865 | 1423 | 3588 | 2343 |
| 1986 | 63 | 101 | 1490 | 910 | 1285 | 3383 | 1789 |

Source: Detroit Police Department.

toward the Chinese and Indians.

Other reasons contribute to the crime problem in the Lower Woodward area. John R., Brush, Cass Streets, and Woodward Avenue are major thoroughfares through the neighborhood. These thoroughfares contribute to crimes of morality because they bring in "outsiders" that seek prostitutes and pornographic theaters. Past studies show that neighborhood crime activity can be reduced when the street

system is modified to remove heavily traveled corridors out of the neighborhood. Rerouting traffic around neighborhoods increase resident use of and control of the neighborhood.¹⁰⁴ Land use design and type cause crime. Until recently the 3rd Street area experienced severe prostitution problems. Two bars, The Sweetheart Bar and Andersons Gardens served essentially as homes of prostitution. The closing of these establishments caused this activity to move to the vicinity of Woodward Avenue and 7 Mile Road.

Building shape plays a role in crime activity in the area. Most are old Victorian and vacant structures that systematically do not have linear exteriors. This design creates shadows and blind spots that hide doors and windows to allow for easy access by the criminal.¹⁰⁵ Studies consistently find a positive relationship between "physical vulnerability" and increases in robbery and burglary rates. Vulnerability, or the ease at which a criminal can enter, is the most influential factor that affect crime activity in an inner city neighborhood.¹⁰⁶ Finally, construction of freeways isolated the Lower Woodward area. The freeways serve as a boundary around this area to contain crime activity.¹⁰⁷ Researchers have long documented the effect expressways have on containing crime activity in a neighborhood.¹⁰⁸

Crime is beginning to move from the Lower Woodward area in general because structures are so dilapidated that they cannot adequately house crime activity. The area is in transition between the thinning stage and recapture stage of

the neighborhood cycle as defined by LaGory and Pipkin.¹⁰⁹ Most structures are abandoned and the next step is to demolish the area to make room for new and more viable land uses. Given the situation, it is expected that crime activity is moving northward. Movement of crime is not necessarily the case in the Brush Park neighborhood. This neighborhood is designated a "historic district" by the City of Detroit and the State of Michigan. Demolition of a structure cannot be accomplished without approval from the City and the state Historical Commission. Bureaucratic red tape to get needed permission has delayed clearance of the Brush Park area. As a result, many of the abandoned structures in Brush Park are now "dope houses". The Chambers family has control of the Brush Park/Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes territories. Young Boys, Inc., had control of this area in the 1970s and before the Chambers family.¹¹⁰

Crime activity is not uniform throughout the Lower Woodward area because of the availability of private auxiliary police and heavy traffic in the cultural center area. Wayne State University, the Cultural Center, and the Medical Center have private police forces to patrol their property. No major crime problems exist in these areas. Crime that does occur is usually directed toward the more affluent and carried out by persons of the lower socioeconomic sector. The most severe problem occurs in the Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park and Jeffries areas. These areas characteristically have a large number of abandoned buildings to house illegal activity. Also, street layout

makes it difficult for police patrols to cruise through the project. It is all but impossible to patrol the public housing sites except on foot, and that method is impractical for obvious safety reasons. Councilman Ravitz suggests that the Brewster-Douglass area will be physically and socially upgraded within a five year period to complement improvements in the cultural area that contains the Fox Theater and Orchestra Hall. The Cultural Area is targeted for private development that will cater to upper echelon suburban residents. The rationale is that these patrons of the arts will more likely use the facilities in the Cultural Center if nearby crime activity is eradicated. It is expected that the Cass area will also go through a similar upgrading.¹¹¹

An interview with a resident of the Lower Woodward Area revealed a different interpretation of the origin of crime activity. This resident expressed that crime activity in the Lower Woodward Area has been a planned activity of the City: "They've allowed drugs and addicts to occupy and control so the area would deteriorate."¹¹² Some residents feel that the presence of this type of activity gives the City an excuse to clear the area to allow for construction and expansion of land uses that will be used by primarily the wealthier upper-class. Specifically, plans are in the making for expansion of the Veterans Administration Hospital, the Cultural Center, and the high tech area adjacent to Cass Park. Detroit Technical Institute is planning an expansion in the high tech area.

Some demolition and conversion activities have already taken place that have encroached on housing for lower-income families and individuals. Research Park Apartments and Freedom Place in the vicinity of the 4th Street neighborhood (near the Lodge Freeway and Forrest area) have been converted to housing for Wayne State University. Gentrification of the neighborhood in the vicinity of Woodward Avenue and Second Street began in the early 1980s. This activity displaced approximately fifty low income families. To date, most of the rehabilitated dwellings are still vacant.¹¹³

Crime in the Brewster-Douglass project became significant in the 1960s. In the project's earlier years, residents characterized the project as a pleasant place to live. A former Brewster-Douglass resident stated that:

"...in the 1950s the project was generally a nice place to live and work. Residents were stable working class blacks who lived there briefly and then would move on. Occupants could make only so much money, and when the [income] limit was reached they had to move. There was a presence of project police."¹¹⁴

Another person interviewed expressed the living experience of her mother at Brewster-Douglass:

"My mother lived in the Brewster-Douglass low-rise units from 1965-1985. Drug traffic problems were rampant in the low rises in 1985. Dealers would use kids in the project as 'runners' and the dealers lived in the nearby neighborhoods and suburbs. My mother felt that Brewster-Douglass was a good place to live when she moved in, but something went sour in the late 1960s. The management changed admission policy and started to allow undesirables into the project. I believe this change was deliberate on behalf of the City, so the area would run down, then they would have an excuse to tear down or repair for the rich medical people

at the Medical Center."¹¹⁵

Crime activity at the Brewster-Douglass project became most pronounced with further deterioration of the adjacent neighborhood, and with relaxed admission policies in the late 1960s. These two changes in conjunction with physical design and layout of the project allowed criminal activity to take over the project, especially the low-rise units. Brewster-Douglass had most characteristics of a typical "bad" project as defined by the United States Department of Justice. A "bad" project is an inner city project that experiences security problems. These projects house over one thousand families and consists of high-rise buildings over eight or ten stories or low-rise buildings that sprawl in a labyrinthine fashion over a large tract of land. Services and amenities such as playgrounds, laundromats, day-care and transportation needs do not meet needs of project residents. Physical design fosters the feeling of crowding by an insufficient number of elevators and by planned common areas that are small and undefined. Physical design is incapable of supporting a strong surveillance mechanism. A weak social structure exists.¹¹⁶ A later study determined that "troubled" public housing projects are likely to be found in neighborhoods that:

1. have a high concentration of minority residents;
2. have a high percentage of renters;
3. have high crime rates;
4. have inadequate police protection.¹¹⁷

Further, deterioration of the nearby neighborhood with drug activity and free access to the Brewster-Douglass site made project children ideal candidates to push drugs. Research suggests that a lack of access controls onto the public housing project site located in crime ridden neighborhoods have some relation to crime activity in public housing.¹¹⁶

The social structure of the residents of Brewster-Douglass during peak crime activity in the early to mid-1980s followed the model of tenant characteristics of crime ridden projects. The literature suggests that tenants of troubled projects are primarily single-parent and female-headed households. No male figure is usually present. Most tenants are on some form of welfare assistance. The tenant population is primarily minority. Interviews with Detroit Housing Department staff indicated that the social structure of the Brewster-Douglass tenants during Anti-Crime Program implementation concurred with these findings described by the literature that are characteristics of bad or troubled projects.¹¹⁷

Today, residents of the City of Detroit view Brewster-Douglass as very unsafe. Residents of the project, however, feel differently. Residents interviewed indicated that today Brewster-Douglass is relatively safe since the low rises are empty. An interview with a Brewster-Douglass resident confirmed the relative feeling of safety for the elderly. The resident stated that:

"Now Brewster-Douglass is relatively safe. Victims of crime are usually those that make connections and buys with dope dealers. The average person has no problem with crime in Brewster-Douglass. We

have no bars on our windows. There is usually no problem with cars being stolen. I would rather walk around the project site at 3:00AM than in the day when the dealers are around."¹²⁰

Residents feel that the media has given the project a negative name. Most of the illegal activity takes place in nearby Brush Park, but the media and city officials think that Brewster-Douglass houses most of the drug activity.

Historically, crime activity in the Brewster-Douglass project can be attributed to two variables. First, the Housing Commission loosened admissions standards of tenants in the late 1960s. This loosening followed a national trend. The Commission allowed low-income persons with unstable characteristics to occupy Brewster-Douglass, such as single female head of households with live in companions and welfare recipients. The Commission no longer checked on the character of applicants before they were approved for admission.¹²¹

Second, city officials perceive drugs to be a primary activity in the Brewster-Douglass project. It is difficult for police to control the drug problem because of project street layout and because of abandoned structures. No through streets exist in the Brewster-Douglass project. Dealers sell street drugs along peripheral sidewalks along Beaubian and other peripheral streets. When police arrive, the dealers and buyers run into the project interior grounds that are not accessible to police except by foot. By the time police are able to leave their cars and enter the project grounds, the criminals have escaped. Most of the

Brewster-Douglass low rise units are officially abandoned. Some of these abandoned units serve as headquarters and residents of drug dealers. Obvious safety factors prohibit police from penetrating these enclosed quarters. Officials believe that some crime activity occurs in the Brewster-Douglass high-rises, but not to a significant degree.¹²²

THE DETROIT URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

The Detroit Housing Department carried out the local Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program activities in the Brewster Douglass public housing project. The Detroit Anti-Crime Program began in July, 1980, and closed in January, 1982. It consisted of two major program components: physical security improvements (hardware) and patrolling activities (software). As shown on Table 5.5, approximately \$1.3 million in funds from the Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program supported the installation of hardware such as cameras, locks, and fencing around the elderly high-rises. Installation of cameras eliminated blindspots and generally unsafe areas of the project by offering constant twenty-four hour per day monitoring. A central security control room permitted quick detection of any crime activity and/or socially unacceptable behavior. The Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program (Public Housing Modernization) provides money to capital improvement in public housing to upgrade living conditions, correct physical deficiencies and achieve operating efficiency and economy.

The second program component consisted of two primary activities: youth employment and technical assistance. An interagency cooperative agreement between the U.S.

Table 5.5

The Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Funding

| <u>Agency/Program</u> | <u>Amount*</u> |
|--|----------------|
| DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT | |
| Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program | \$1,352,000 |
| Community Development Block Grant | 50,000 |
| DEPARTMENT OF LABOR | |
| Office of Youth Employment | 474,000 |
| DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | |
| Office of Criminal Justice Improvements | 20,000 |
| TOTAL | \$1,896,000 |
| LOCAL FUNDS* | <u>619,740</u> |
| | \$2,515,740 |

*10% required local match

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, Washington: GPO, March 31, 1980, p. 26., and Interview with Mr. Clarence White, Detroit Housing Department, November 10, 1987.

Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S.

Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Detroit Housing Department provided funds to support the software component. The general objective of the Detroit youth employment component directed the program to:

"provide selected youths, aged 16 - 19 and living in the [Brewster-Douglass] targeted public housing development, job skills, training and employment in and around the developments. Youths aged 20 - 21 also can participate as supervisors. (The training and employment will fit into the public housing authority's overall Anti-Crime Work Plan and teach transferable skills which can lead to future employment in areas of local labor market demand

after Federal funding ends.)"¹²³

Specifically, the Detroit youth employment component sought:

1. overall emphasis on "bridge" employment, training, and counseling that moves away from illegal activities or legal "secondary markets" jobs and toward legal "primary market" jobs;
2. implementation of successful strategies used in the Job Corps;
3. increased employment of tenants as community service officers, public safety officers, and lobby monitors;
4. improved training and counseling for tenant community service officers, public safety officers, and guards including sensitivity to the needs, values and life styles of tenants;
5. increased training and employment of tenants to lead organized tenant anti-crime efforts and to increase tenant cohesion;
6. increased training and employment of tenants in anti-crime and related services - including activities like recreation, education, and cultural pursuits that help bring tenants together;
7. increased training and employment of tenants to install security hardware, make related capital improvements and architectural changes, and help maintain and rehabilitate public housing authority property.¹²⁴

Youth employment activities included the hiring of youth security patrols, crew leaders, and community security organizers. The program hired thirty-eight youths as security patrols in the age range of sixteen to nineteen that resided in the Brewster-Douglass complex and surrounding areas. The component gave preference to those youths in school or to those youths planning to return. Duties of the security patrol included:

1. patrol and inspection of assigned paths, walks, streets, lobbies, stairways and grounds for criminal and disorderly conduct;

2. report criminal and/or socially unacceptable behavior to Security Headquarters on the site;
3. escort senior citizens to and from their residents when requested;
4. refer persons in need to appropriate agency or service;
5. cooperate and assist in the Victim/Witness efforts and the Block/Lobby/Hour Watch Program.

Security Patrol members received seven weeks of training through the Detroit Police Academy and through the on-site Security Coordinator. Those that successfully completed the training had the opportunity to become Police Cadets through the Police Department's Cadet Program, and when job availability warranted, a Police Trainee through the Police Academy.

Crew Leaders or supervisors that consisted of six youths (age twenty to twenty-one) had the responsibility for overall supervision of security patrol members as they executed their duties listed above. The Crew Leaders also attended the seven week training session with an opportunity for future training at the Police Academy as a Police Trainee. Finally, the program hired seven Community Security Organizers that had the responsibility to assist the on-site Crime Coordinator in the development of the local software component of the Anti-Crime Program.

The second activity of the patrolling component involved technical assistance. The overall program objective of this activity set the direction for the Housing Department to acquire technical assistance through hiring a local

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on-site Anti-Crime Coordinator to develop and improve an anti-crime strategy for Brewster-Douglass. Specifically, the Coordinator and his assistant developed and directed the Lobby Attendant Program, the Neighborhood Block Watch Program, the Welcome New Neighbor Program, the Victim/Witness Program, and oversaw day to day operations of the Anti-Crime Program. Security patrols, the Anti-Crime staff, and other agencies carried out these programs.¹²⁹

The Lobby Attendant program placed security booths in the front lobby of each building. The controlled entrance prohibited anyone entering the lobby until contact with the lobby attendant had been established. In addition, floor monitors listened for disturbances on their floor and immediately contacted the attendant, who in turn contacted the on-site security office when disturbances arose. The Neighborhood Block Watch Program, modeled after the City's effort of neighborhood watches set up in other more middle class neighborhoods of the city, put into place a surveillance mechanism for the project grounds. The Tenant Security Board consisted of representatives of different areas of the project site and represented the different types of structures on the site, defined various "troubled" areas where crimes took place. Security patrols stationed in the vulnerable areas deterred any potential criminal activity. The Welcome the New Neighbor Program, designed for new tenants, showed the new tenants that "somebody cared". It extended the family concept which is important to control negative youth behavioral patterns. The program carried out its

purpose through "get together" meetings with new tenants, block watch program participants, and other on-site security patrol personnel. The Victim/Witness program assisted victims and witnesses of crime in and around Brewster-Douglass in dealing effectively with crime trauma, the hardships crime activity placed on the victims and witnesses, and procedures and requirements of the criminal justice system.¹²⁴ Generally, the program involved short-term crisis intervention counseling, immediate transportation, emergency housing, personal protection of individuals, crime scene clean-up, information and notification of arrest and trials, baby-sitting, and public education and training.

The Detroit Anti-Crime Program met each of the seven basic program components mandated by HUD in the following manner. Improved management of public safety occurred with the hiring of an on-site Anti-Crime Coordinator. This position developed, oversaw, and coordinated local anti-crime efforts. Improved management techniques included a training program for housing personnel to help them identify housing security problems, relocation of families out of the high-rises where the elderly are predominant, a stronger and more enforceable eviction policy for continuously disruptive and anti-social tenants, placement of tenants who fall in the upper income range. The hardware component of the Brewster-Douglass effort improved the physical design of Brewster-Douglass through installation of a twenty-four hour camera surveillance system designed to readily detect criminal behavior and/or socially unacceptable behavior.

This activity eliminated "blind spots" conducive to criminal behavior; the fences restricted movement of persons (with the potential to commit criminal activity) from entering spaces deemed "not public". The youth employment program actively involved tenants in fighting crime as well as employed youths that resided at Brewster-Douglass. The anti-crime services, such as elderly escorts made the project and the immediate area safer for the elderly tenants living at the demonstration site. The sense of security given to the elderly freed them to venture out and take advantage of amenities located in their neighborhood. The Victim/Witness program, which assured anonymity in reporting crimes and the block/lobby watch program, further reduced the fear of crime in and around the public housing site. Participation by the Detroit Police Department and the Detroit Police Academy allowed the opportunity for local law enforcement officers to work with public housing youths, which resulted in respect and corporation among youths, and sensitivity from the police officers.

Finally, area-wide public/private partnerships formed with several agencies in addition to the Detroit Police Department and the Detroit Police Academy offered various social services to Brewster residents. The Urban League of Detroit worked with project and neighborhood youths to define those as "troubled" and re-involve them in the educational process. In addition, the League provided youthful parents (those parents having children at a very young age) with the tools necessary for positive parenting. The

Detroit Health Department provided personal time for the prevention of drug and alcohol abuse in the "youth-at-risk" category. The Wayne County Department of Social Services assigned case workers to the project site to identify problem families. Community Medical Management provided health care, free screening examinations, as well as professional referrals when needed. The City's Comprehensive Youth Services (CYS) program developed recreational programs, assisted in the organization of the Neighborhood Watch Program, and offered youth employment counseling. Finally, the City of Detroit Senior Citizens Department provided information and referral services to the elderly tenants.¹²⁷

PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The study design for the Detroit Anti-Crime Program implemented at Brewster-Douglass is an outcome evaluation that uses the "non-equivalent control-group design", and visual interpretations of scattergrams that plot crime rates.¹²⁸ Interpretations from scattergrams will strengthen overall conclusions presented in the statistical analysis. The non-equivalent control-group design compares evaluation criteria (crime) variables of two groups: the program group that consists of the public housing site that participated in the demonstration program (Brewster-Douglass), and the control group that consists of a similar public housing site that did not participate in the program (Jeffries Homes). Of the twenty public housing projects in Detroit, Jeffries

Homes is the most comparable with the Brewster-Douglass project. Several variables are considered in choosing Jeffries Homes as the control group site: age of the project, location with respect to downtown, neighborhood amenities, on-site amenities, physical characteristics of the site, age distribution of the tenant population and socioeconomic characteristics of the tenant population. Refer to Table 1.1 in Chapter I for specific characteristics of these two sites.

Most all the threats to internal validity are satisfied when program and control groups are comparable.¹²⁹ Threats to internal validity refer to the "reasons why causal interpretations [of the data set] may not be permitted."¹³⁰ Maturation and history are two threats that refer to changes in program participants due to an influence(s) not necessarily related to the program. History refers to specific events that may occur and change the behavior of program participants. Maturation describes natural changes that take place in program participants over a period of time.¹³¹

Collecting data at several observations over periods of time is a way of satisfying additional threats to internal validity. The likelihood of confusing the program's effect with the maturation process is significantly reduced when a time-series design is incorporated. In addition, effects of history are more easily detected by the utilization of time series, than by the use observations over one or two time

periods only.¹³² Comparison with groups not served by the program in a time series manner "should be considered when controlled, randomized experiments are not feasible."¹³³

To determine on ground results in the Detroit experience, crime data for major crimes reported over a period of time from 1976 to 1985 for each year are evaluated for the Brewster-Douglass public housing project (program group) and the Jeffries Homes project site (control group). The program began in July, 1980, and it officially closed out in January, 1982. Crime variables included in the outcome evaluation are major crimes reported: murder, rape, robbery, assaults, burglary, larceny and car theft. Data for arsons reported on a project basis are not available.

This research employs the Mann Whitney U Test and the Chi Square Test to determine whether there is a significant difference in the rates of each evaluation criteria between the program and control group, before and after introduction of the Anti-Crime Program.¹³⁴ The Mann Whitney test determines whether a difference in the two independent samples (control and program group) is statistically significant meaning the samples come from different populations. The data is standardized that yield crime variable rates per 10,000 public housing units. Chapter I discusses specifics of the Mann Whitney test and application of the statistic. Theoretically, there should be no statistically significant difference between control group and program group crime rates before Anti-Crime Program activities, and there should

be a statistically significant difference between program and control groups after the program (samples from different populations) if the program actually had an effect on crime.

In applying the Mann Whitney U Test, the null and alternate hypotheses are stated for each crime variable as follows:

H_0 : No significant difference exist in (crime variable) rates between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes and the differences are a result of chance variation and therefore not significant.

H_1 : A statistically significant difference exist in (crime variable) rates between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes and the rate at Brewster-Douglass is lower (or higher) than that found at Jeffries Homes.

Table 5.6 depicts calculated values of U. When the calculated value of U is less than or equal to the critical value of U, the null hypothesis is rejected. Results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in robbery, assaults and burglary rates between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries and the rates of each of the three crimes at Brewster-Douglass is less than those found at Jeffries Homes. Mann Whitney, thus indicates that a significant relationship exist between introduction of the Anti-Crime Program and the reduction of robbery, assaults, and burglary rates.

To strengthen overall outcome conclusions, the Chi Square Test is applied to determine whether there is a significant difference between crimes reported (actual frequencies) between the Brewster-Douglass site and the Jeffries site in terms of before and after program introduction

of the Anti-Crime Program. Table 5.7 depicts how the data is employed by crime variable in the Chi Square Test. The contingency table shows the total number of murders that

Table 5.6

Mann Whitney U Test
Calculated Values of U by Offense

| Offense | Before Introduction ^a
Calculated U | After Introduction ^b
Calculated U |
|-------------|--|---|
| murder | 2 | 16 |
| rape | *0 ^c | 11.5 |
| robbery | 5 | *7 ^d |
| assaults | 6.5 | *2 ^d |
| burglary | 8 | *5 ^d |
| larceny | *1 ^c | 9 |
| auto thefts | 4 | 13 |

*denotes significant difference

^acritical value of U=1, with $n_x=4$ and $n_y=4$, significance level = .05, one tailed.

^bcritical value of U=7, with $n_x=6$ and $n_y=6$, significance level = .05, one tailed.

^cThese two anomalies are essentially negated since differences calculated in the "posttest" are insignificant.

^dWhen the calculated value of U is less than or equal to the critical value of U, the null hypothesis is rejected. The null hypothesis is stated as $H_0=X=Y$; Alternate hypotheses are stated as either $H_1=X>Y$ or $H_1=X<Y$.

took place at the Brewster/Douglass site and the Jeffries Homes site before and after introduction of the Anti-Crime Program. The test statistic for the two sample two category situation is calculated using the following formula:

$$X^2 = \frac{n(|AD - BC| - n/2)^2}{(A + B)(C + D)(A + C)(B + D)}$$

where n represents the total frequency of murders at the Brewster/Douglass and Jeffries sites; A , B , C and D refer to the number (or frequencies) of murders in each of the cells of the contingency table; and $|AC - BD|$ is the absolute value of the difference between A times B and B times C . Approximate tables of critical values of X^2 are consulted to determine whether the difference in crime rates before and after the program are significant. If the calculated value of X^2 is greater than the critical value, then it is extremely unlikely that the crime variable before and after the program is due to chance. Rather, the difference is more likely to be due to the Anti-Crime Program.¹³⁵

Table 5.7

Chi Square Contingency Table
for Frequency of Murders
(by project site)

| | Total Murders | | |
|----------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------|
| | 1976-1979
Before Program | 1980-1985
After Program | |
| Brewster | A | B | (A+B) |
| Jeffries | C | D | (C+D) |
| | (A+C) | (B+D) | N |

In applying the Chi Square Test, the null and alternate hypotheses are stated for each crime variable as follows:

H₀: There is no difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number of (crime variable) before and after the program.

H₁: There is a significant difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number of (crime variable) before and after the program.

Table 5.8 depicts calculated values of χ^2 by offense. The table indicates that the calculated value of χ^2 for assaults, burglary and auto thefts is greater than the critical value = 3.84. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected for these three crimes. At this point a conclusion cannot be made that a reduction occurred at the Brewster-Douglass site because the Chi Square Test does not indicate where the difference is found. It is necessary to refer to contingency tables to determine where the difference is found. Inspection of the contingency table (Table 5.8) shows that the difference in the number of assaults and burglaries is found at the Brewster-Douglass (program group) between 1980 - 1985. In addition, the difference in the number of auto thefts are found at the Brewster-Douglass site before the program, thus negating auto thefts as being reduced by the Anti-Crime Program. Chi Square thus indicates a significant relationship between introduction of the Anti-Crime Program and reductions in assaults and burglary rates. Combining results of Mann Whitney and Chi Square give an indication that assaults and burglaries are the only two of the seven crime variables that have a significant relationship with Anti-Crime Program introduction.

Table 5.8

Chi Square Contingency Table of Crimes Reported
and Calculated Values of X^2 by Offense

| OFFENSE
by Project | X^2 ^a | 1976-1979
actual freq. | 1980-1985
actual freq. |
|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| MURDER | N/A ^b | | |
| Brewster-Douglass | | 3 | 4 |
| Jeffries Homes | | 0 | 7 |
| RAPE | 0.67 | | |
| Brewster-Douglass | | 4 | 8 |
| Jeffries Homes | | 9 | 7 |
| ROBBERIES | 0.40 | | |
| Brewster-Douglass | | 71 | 91 |
| Jeffries Homes | | 114 | 169 |
| ASSAULTS | *9.80 ^{c,d} | | |
| Brewster-Douglass | | 59 | 33 |
| Jeffries Homes | | 68 | 91 |
| BURGLARIES | *9.30 ^{c,e} | | |
| Brewster-Douglass | | 70 | 73 |
| Jeffries Homes | | 91 | 184 |
| LARCENIES | 2.67 | | |
| Brewster-Douglass | | 28 | 292 |
| Jeffries Homes | | 62 | 426 |
| AUTO THEFTS | 10.05 ^{c,f} | | |
| Brewster-Douglass | | 55 | 202 |
| Jeffries Homes | | 106 | 208 |

Source: City of Detroit Police Department.

*indicates significant difference

^acritical value of $X^2=3.84$ with $df=1$ at a .05 significance level. If $X^2 > \text{critical } X^2$, then H_0 is rejected.

^bcalculated value for the number of murders cannot be determined because the total number of murders were 14. Total frequencies must be greater than or equal to 20 to use the Chi Square Test.

^cAlternate hypotheses that are accepted indicate a difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number of offenses reported before and after the Anti-Crime Program ONLY. The test does not indicate where the difference is found. A visual inspection of the raw data is necessary to make that determination.

^dCritical value calculations indicate that there is a

Table 5.8 (continued)

significant difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number of assaults reported before and after the program. Inspection of the raw data indicate that the difference is found at the Brewster-Douglass site between 1980 and 1985.

•Critical value calculations indicate that there is a significant difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number of burglaries reported before and after the program. Inspection of the raw data indicate that the difference is probably found at Brewster-Douglass between 1980 and 1985.

•Critical value calculations indicate that there is a significant difference between Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries Homes in the number of auto thefts reported before and after the program. However, inspection of the raw data indicate that the difference is found at the Brewster-Douglass site BEFORE program implementation.

Scattergrams that represent the time-series non-equivalent control-group design as applied to the crime variables for the study years 1976-1985 give an indication that the Detroit Anti-Crime Program did not have a strong effect on crime reduction at the Brewster-Douglass site. Using statistical analysis alone to prove success can be misleading. Reported murders at Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries projects were not found to be significantly related to the Detroit Anti-Crime program. However, a scattergram of murder rates show an increase of murders reported at both sites just before the anti-crime program with a reduction occurring during and after the program at the Brewster site. Reported murders at the Brewster site fell to zero within a year after program termination. At the same time a steady fall of reported murders occurred at the Jeffries site

(Figure 5.3). Although not statistically significant, a drop in murders is socially significant, particularly for those families that did not have to endure death.

The reported number of rapes at Brewster-Douglass remained relatively stable before program introduction with the exception of an increase just before the anti-crime program began (Figure 5.4). An increase in reported rapes occurred at both project sites during anti-crime program implementation. The number of reported rapes fell at both sites after termination of the program. Again, although not statistically significant, the drop in reported rapes has a social significance particularly related to the fear generated by all tenants when rapes occur. Reported rapes at the Brewster site dropped from three in 1982 to zero in 1984.

Reported robberies fluctuated widely particularly before program introduction (Figure 5.5). Robberies declined at both sites in the late 1970s and then began to increase two years before the program. The increase continued at the Brewster site during program implementation. Both sites experienced a drop in reported crimes in the year after program termination. Reported robberies then doubled at the Brewster site. Mann-Whitney indicated that a significant relationship exist between reported robberies and introduction of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. Figure 5.5 suggests that the significance is related more to the large fluctuation of reported robberies before the program versus some stabilizing of yearly robberies after the program

rather than actual program implementation. A rise in the robbery rate at Brewster-Douglass further solidifies this idea.

Both the Mann-Whitney and Chi Square test indicate a significant relationship between reported assaults and implementation of the anti-crime program at Brewster-Douglass. However, the scattergram clearly shows that reported assaults began to stabilize at the Brewster site before anti-crime program implementation (Figure 5.6). A general decline of reported assaults at the Jeffries site began in 1978 and continued throughout the study period. Based on this evidence, an assumption cannot be made that suggests any significant relationship exists between a drop in reported assaults at Brewster-Douglass and implementation of the anti-crime program.

A significant relationship exists between reported burglaries and the Anti-Crime Program according to results of the Mann-Whitney and Chi Square tests. Figure 5.7 reveals that a decline in reported burglaries at Brewster-Douglass three years before program introduction. A slight increase in reported burglaries occurred at the Brewster site during program implementation. A small decrease occurred at Brewster during the first year after program termination with a larger increase occurring for the remainder of the study period. The graph clearly shows no real decline in reported burglaries at Brewster after the anti-

crime program. Results of Mann-Whitney and Chi Square can possibly be explained by the wide fluctuation of burglaries at the Jeffries site.

Reported larcenies at both study sites took a dramatic increase before anti-crime program implementation (Figure 5.8). Both sites experienced a small decrease during the period that the program operated at Brewster. Both sites experienced an increase in larcenies the year after program termination. Finally, both sites experienced a major drop in reported larcenies the last year in this study. The scattergram as well as Mann-Whitney and Chi Square suggest no relationship between reported larcenies and introduction of the anti-crime program at Brewster-Douglass.

A major drop in reported auto thefts occurred at both study sites in the late 1970s with a dramatic increase occurring around 1980 (Figure 5.9). Reported auto thefts increased slightly at Brewster during initial phases of anti-crime program implementation while at the same time decreasing at the Jeffries site. This trend reversed itself by the end of the anti-crime program at Brewster. After the program, reported auto thefts rose and then dropped significantly at Brewster-Douglass. A significant and steady drop occurred also at Jeffries. Statistical testing and the scattergram confirm no strong relationship between reported auto thefts and implementation of the anti-crime program at Brewster-Douglass.

Figure 5.3





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Figure 5.5




Figure 5.6




Figure 5.7

Actual Number of Reported Burglaries at the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985




Figure 5.8

Actual Number of Reported Larcenies at the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985





Figure 5.9

Actual Number of Reported Auto Thefts at the Brewster-Douglass
and Jeffries Public Housing Projects: 1976-1985



SUMMARY

Findings presented in this chapter allows for conclusions to be made on Detroit Housing Commission policy inconsistencies, crime at the Brewster-Douglass project in relation to crime in the surrounding neighborhood, and the lack of success of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. Official policy of the Detroit Housing Commission that addressed occupancy has been inconsistent over the years. The public housing program began by the accommodation of housing for slum dwellers. Policies later changed to accommodate black war workers, veterans, low-income families, and elderly. Policy changes reflected outside stimuli such as World War II and local/national sentiment. Even when policy mandated housing for low-income minority families, implementation tended to redirect the focus to other needs.

The Lower Woodward area has experienced crime problems since the 1930s because of physical and social instability. This instability is a direct result of the rapid pace of urbanization in the 1940s that put a strain on housing, urban renewal that devastated the area, and the demolition of neighborhood churches (by urban renewal) that served as a stabilizing force in the neighborhood. More recently, crime activity in the area has exploded because of increased drug activity.

Crime in the Lower Woodward area is fluctual, depending on location and time of day. Areas with private patrol, such as the medical center and Wayne State University, have little crime in the daytime. Crime is most severe in the Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park, and Jeffries areas. These areas characteristically have a large number of abandoned buildings to house illegal activity. Neighborhood attributes that contribute to crime activity in the Brush Park and Cass areas include the presence of major thoroughfares such as Woodward Avenue. These thoroughfares contribute to crimes of morality because they bring in outsiders that seek prostitutes and pornographic theaters. "Adult" shops encourage loitering of criminals. Building shape plays a role in crime activity. Most structures are old Victorian and vacant structures that systematically do not have linear exteriors. This design creates blind spots that hide doors and windows to allow for easy access by criminals. Residents feel that crime activity is encouraged by the City to justify plans for demolition of the area and expansion of the medical and cultural activities nearby.

Street layout in the public housing projects makes it difficult for police patrols to cruise through the projects. Crime in Brewster-Douglass became significant in the 1960s because of a change in tenant selection policies to allow admission of unstable families to permanently live in public housing units and because of increased crime activity in the Brush Park neighborhood. Today, residents of the City view

Brewster-Douglass as unsafe. Residents of the project, however, feel that Brewster-Douglass is relatively safe since the low-rise family units are now empty. Residents suggests that the media has given the project a negative name. Most of the illegal activity takes place in nearby Brush Park, but the media and city officials think that the project houses most of the drug activity.

Social instability is perhaps the core reason for crime proliferation in the Lower Woodward area, particularly the Brush Park and Cass neighborhoods, and the Brewster-Douglass and Jeffries public housing projects. Residents in these neighborhoods and housing projects are characteristically poor, uneducated, unemployed (or underemployed), and are on some form of welfare. Most households are either elderly or single-parent with no stable male figure present. The population has a high number of teenagers that are unemployed, and they have a lot of unstructured free time. The literature documents these social factors with unstable living environments and their relationships to high crime activity. Physical design characteristics facilitate the mechanism for crime activity to occur when social instability is present.

The study design for evaluating the Detroit Anti-Crime Program is an outcome evaluation that uses the "time-series non-equivalent control-group design" and visual interpretations of scattergrams that plot crime rates. Interpretations from scattergrams strengthen overall conclusions presented in the statistical analysis. The "non-equivalent

control-group design" compares evaluation criteria (crime) variable of two groups: the program group that consist of the public housing site that participated in the demonstration program (Brewster-Douglass), and the control group that consist of a similar public housing site that did not participate in the program (Jeffries Homes).

To determine on ground results of the Detroit Anti-Crime program, crime data for major crimes reported over a period of time from 1976 to 1985 for each year are evaluated for the program and control group. The Mann Whitney U Test and the Chi Square Test are employed to determine whether there is a significant difference in the rates of each evaluation criteria between the program and control group, before and after introduction of the Anti-Crime program. Crime variables included in the evaluation are major crimes reported: murder, rape, robbery, assaults, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Mann Whitney suggest a significant relationship between reported robberies, reported assaults, and reported burglaries and implementation of the anti-crime program at the Brewster site. Chi Square suggest a significant relationship exist between reported assaults and burglaries and implementation of the anti-crime program.

Scattergrams that represent the time-series non-equivalent control-group design give an indication that the Detroit Anti-Crime Program did not have a strong effect on crime reduction at the Brewster-Douglass site. Mann-Whitney indicated that a significant relationship exist between reported robberies and the anti-crime program. A scat-

tergram of reported robberies indicate that the significance is related more to the large fluctuation of reported robberies before the program versus some stabilizing of reported robberies after the program. A rise in the robbery rate at Brewster-Douglass after the program further solidifies this idea.

Both the Mann-Whitney and Chi Square test indicate a significant relationship between reported assaults, reported burglaries and implementation of the anti-crime program. However, a scattergram shows that reported assaults began to stabilize at the Brewster site before anti-crime program implementation. Also, a general decline of reported assaults as the Jeffries site began in 1978 and continued throughout the study period. These findings negate any assumptions that relate the decrease in reported assaults and implementation of the anti-crime program. A scattergram of reported burglaries show a slight increase at Brewster during program implementation. A small decrease occurred at Brewster during the first year after program termination. The graph shows no real decline in reported burglaries at Brewster after the anti-crime program. Results of the statistical tests can possibly be explained by the wide fluctuation of reported burglaries at the Jeffries site.

Overall analysis of crime activity at Brewster reveal no significant relationship between crime reduction and implementation of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program. The Detroit Anti-Crime program included appropriate program choices, but implementation of these choices occurred in the wrong sec-

tion of the public housing project. Interviews with Detroit police, project citizens, and Housing Department staff suggests that most of the crime activity before and during program implementation took place in the low-rise section of the public housing project. Crime activity was initiated primarily by neighborhood citizens from the Brush Park neighborhood and flowed into the low-rise section of the Brewster-Douglass project. All hardware and software program components were installed and/or implemented in the high-rise elderly buildings. Detroit Anti-Crime program designers apparently wanted the program to protect the elderly rather than address the root of the crime program.

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Chapter VI

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A comprehensive analysis of the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978, the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program, and the Detroit Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program defines specific strengths and weaknesses of the Act and program guidelines, and strengths and deficiencies in the Detroit example. Delineation of specific strengths and weaknesses allow for recommendations to be made that appropriately address crime in public housing. Specific recommendations will hopefully benefit future efforts to address the public housing crime issue.

The federal Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program and the Detroit Anti-Crime Program from the beginning had no real chance for success. The very nature of Congressional policy-making does not allow for a rational process to adequately define problems and develop programs to solve those problems. Failed past Congressional efforts

to address local social ills document this weakness. Most federal policy initiatives lack adequate structure and content to assure adequate program success. These issues also held true for the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978, the act that authorized the Anti-Crime Program.

U.S. government policy making is extremely complex, and often the complexity hampers the development of viable policy in several ways. First, a plethora of sub-governments involved in policy making complicate the overall process. Subgroups are members of the House and/or Senate, congressional staff members, some bureaucrats, and representatives of special interests groups and organizations that have an interest in the area the policy is to address. Second, the variety of governmental institutions tends to complicate federal policy making. A geographical dispersion of federal agencies that will share in development of a specific policy may very well result in several cities and states adding input to the overall process.

Congressional policy makers do not follow a systematic policy-making process because of political and bureaucratic constraints. To make their job easier, Congressional policy makers usually take "short cuts" when they formulate policy. First, public opinion may not be followed because of the time required to accurately assess this opinion. Second, goals and objectives may not be explicitly stated to save time on research and interaction among the various governmental and non-governmental actors involved. Third, policy makers may consider only one or two alternatives to

address the problem defined and collect minimum data and need analysis to save time. Finally, Congressional members usually will not oversee programs once they are implemented.

Development and structure of the Anti-Crime Program is a product of weak federal government policy-making where political and bureaucratic constraints hamper any success of federal programs. This deficiency has historically been a problem with federal government policy-making, particularly with the war on poverty programs of the 1960s.¹ Congressional policy-making has a role to protect the needs of interest groups and politics. This direction in policy-making does not allow for adequate problem definition and implementation development.

From the beginning, committee debates, congressional debates and conference committee debates did not appear to rationally formalize proper intent or direction for an anti-crime program in the nation's public housing. Nor did they give the anti-crime bill high priority in discussion. Initial Senate committee debates used flawed rationale for justifying policy that addressed crime in public housing. Documentation presented in the committee hearings failed to support the idea that residents of public housing move because of a lack of residential security.

Initial Senate and House bills contained several inadequacies that set the stage for overall program failure at the federal level and also in Detroit. First, neither bill gave an indication of the maximum number of projects to be funded under the Anti-Crime Program. Second, the Senate

bill did not develop a framework for coordination efforts between public housing authority management and local governments to address crime. Third, the House version wanted participants in the anti-crime program to cover all types of projects and tenant populations. This desire directly conflicted with evidence later presented in committee hearings that crime in public housing is most severe in larger projects in larger urban areas, and that smaller, elderly projects have a low rate of crime. General misunderstandings and obvious inconsistencies of need, coupled with the expressed need of an austere budget resulted in a low priority for the anti-crime statute in Senate committee hearings. House committee hearings failed altogether to address the issue of crime in public housing.

Congressional floor debates on the crime in public housing bills lacked in-depth content and appeared superficial. Rep. Pepper's amendment called for coordination among various federal agencies to carry out the anti-crime effort. At the same time, the amendment did not set the framework for agency participation, nor did the amendment define participation responsibility of agencies involved. Second, the amendment as proposed demanded no increase in budget authority. Instead, the bill proposed financial support by money allocated for other purposes. This financial arrangement set the stage for future animosity between program administrators and those agencies that had to redefine their budgets to accommodate funds for the new program. Finally,

the amendment received HUD endorsement, but the agency fell short of a commitment to adequately implement statute objectives set forth by Congress.

Documentation of Senate floor debates of the crime in public housing issue demonstrated an even weaker coverage than the House debates. The three Senators that spoke on the issue expressed their opposition to the anti-crime bill, but at the same time, they did not express why or on what basis they made their decisions.

Weaknesses of development and structure of the anti-crime statute contributed to the inadequacy to address crime in public housing. The language and overall vagueness of the statute reflected a lack of accurate research. The law implied that all public housing residents, especially the elderly, have suffered from crime and violence. A review of the literature suggests that a wide variation in crime patterns in public housing sites exist between large/small cities, types of crimes committed and tenant composition of the public housing project site. The provision that a "broad spectrum" of projects be included in the anti-crime program is a misdirected approach to address crime in public housing since the literature suggests that crime occurs primarily in larger projects located in larger urban areas. This provision coupled with the absence of a ceiling on the number of projects to be funded virtually makes the statute's intent ineffective.

The statute did not adequately structure the implementation process. It gave an "intent" statement only in setting up a coordinated effort between various agencies, federal and local, in carrying out the provision of the law. The law did not contain adequate provisions to require agencies and local governments to work together harmoniously, nor did the law define agency responsibilities in carrying out the law.

Program support existed in the form of endorsements and commitments from HUD (the implementing agency) and several organized special interest groups such as the National Council of Senior Citizens, National Council on Aging, and the Ad Hoc Coalition for Low Income Housing. But typical of most federal legislation, solid support and follow-up did not occur by legislators and support groups during the implementation process. This support is necessary to assure that policy objectives are properly carried out.

Finally, a change in Presidential Administrations during program implementation drastically undermined priority of statute objectives in new presidential policy. The new Reagan Administration based operational policy that local issues (such as public housing crime) should be funded and addressed by local government rather than at the federal level. Administrative changeover at HUD further weakened an already low priority program.

The intent and purpose of the statute that authorized the Anti-Crime Program was an admirable effort to address crime in public housing. A legislative review of the

statute revealed, not surprisingly, that Congress did not adequately research the basis and frequency of public housing crime. This inadequacy led to weaknesses in the statute that significantly reduced chances of the program being successful in reducing crime. The most severe weaknesses that weakened overall program intent and undermined chances of program success included program participation by projects not experiencing significant problems, no cap on the number of projects to participate in the program, no implementation structure of the program, and a mandate for participation of specific federal agencies in the program with money that these agencies had previously allocated for other programs within their respective Departments. This mandate set the stage for animosity between participating agencies and HUD. The statute did adequately address the basic physical and social causes of public housing crime in the literature.

Given the clear weaknesses of inadequate development and structure of the Anti-Crime statute, coupled with the federal governments overall failure rate to address local social issues, it can be expected that the Detroit Anti-Crime Program never had a chance of success to reduce crime activity at Brewster-Douglass. Results of statistical testing and scattergram interpretation of reported crimes over time at Brewster-Douglass document this assumption.

Application of the Mann-Whitney U Test indicate that a significant relationship exist between implementation of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program and the reduction in the number of reported robberies, assaults, and burglaries after the

program. Chi Square analysis suggests a significant relationship between implementation of the program and a reduction in the number of reported assaults and burglaries. Scattergram interpretation negate the significant relationships defined through statistical testing. A scattergram of reported robberies suggest that the significance is related more to the large fluctuation of reported robberies before the program versus some stabilizing of yearly robberies after the program rather than actual program implementation (Figure 5.5). Reported assaults began to stabilize at the Brewster site before anti-crime program implementation (Figure 5.6). A scattergram of reported burglaries shows no real decline in reported burglaries at Brewster-Douglass after the anti-crime program (Figure 5.7). Results of Mann-Whitney and Chi Square can be explained by the wide fluctuation of burglaries at the Jeffries site.

Several reasons account for the failure of the Detroit Anti-Crime program to significantly reduce crime activity at the Brewster-Douglass public housing project. First, Brewster-Douglass is located adjacent to neighborhoods that experience a very high crime rate. Before and during Anti-Crime program implementation, nearby Brush Park and Cass areas housed the core of Detroit's drug activity. Drug activity coupled with other crimes associated with drug activity filtered into the low-rise section of Brewster-Douglass. Project youths became "runners" for the drug dealers, and many low-rise apartments became dope houses. The Detroit Anti-Crime Program concentrated anti-crime ac-

tivity in the high-rise elderly units of Brewster-Douglass where less crime activity took place. All program components such as the installation of cameras and fences, and patrolling activities were installed in and around the high-rise units. Detroit Anti-Crime Program designers appeared to be more interested in protecting the elderly who lived in the high-rise units rather than developing a program to directly address the cause of crime activity on the public housing project site. Since most recorded crime activity occurred in and around the low-rise units, it is not surprising that statistical analysis revealed no significant drop in crime activity during and after anti-crime program implementation.

An attempt is also made to discern some relationship between success of crime reduction at Brewster-Douglass by implementation of the Detroit Anti-Crime Program and adequacy of the federal statute that authorized the anti-crime program. Two general weaknesses of the statutes may have contributed to the lack of success of the Detroit program to reduce crime at the Brewster-Douglass project. First, the absence of a cap on the number of participants greatly reduced the scope of local programs and amount of money that could be made available to each program. In the Detroit case, a larger program proposal with more funding could have included the implementation of crime deterrents in the entire Brewster-Douglass project and not just in the high-rise area. Second, the Anti-Crime Program provided funds for one year only. The statute contained no provision for

maintenance and operation of hardware components after termination of the program. The Detroit program installed cameras and fencing in and around the high-rise units. Operation and maintenance of the system became the responsibility of the Detroit Housing Department after program termination. An already inadequate and depleted maintenance budget essentially assured eventual breakdown of the mechanical surveillance system.

Recommendations

This study documents that local crime issues in public housing are not best addressed at the federal level for many reasons previously discussed. Other alternatives to consider in addressing public housing crime include:

- 1) local crime intervention at Brewster-Douglass only;
- 2) local crime intervention at Brewster Douglass and the surrounding neighborhood;
- 3) no action on the crime issue.

Local intervention to address crime issues at the Brewster site without considering the influence that adjacent neighborhood crime has on the Brewster site seems unrealistic. Evidence clearly indicate that the majority of crime activity experienced at Brewster is activity that has filtered onto the project site from nearby neighborhoods such as Brush Park and Cass. To address crime in one little corner of a large crime area would be an exercise in futility. The literature supports the notion that projects located in high crime neighborhoods almost always have crime problems themselves.

Choosing the alternative to totally ignore the crime issue is a blatant act of social irresponsibility by the City of Detroit. Conditions exist in the Lower Woodward area that now make it feasible to remedy the crime problem without a large displacement of existing residents. Most structures in the Brush Park and Cass neighborhoods are vacant. Those still standing are in such dilapidated state that they cannot sufficiently house crime activity.

The ideal situation to address local public housing crime is to let local governments address the issue. Local crime issues and settings are so diverse that it is impossible for federal legislation to be written and programs designed to adequately address these social ills in an adequate manner. This fact has been proven over and over again. In the case of Detroit, this study recommends that future programs that deal with crime in the Brewster-Douglass area address the project site as well as the entire neighborhood. This would be easy in the Brewster case because the neighborhood is bounded by freeways and by the Medical Center and Wayne State University, which are areas with relatively low crime activity. Wayne State and the Medical Center form relatively crime free boundaries. The freeways make it difficult for crime activity from the other side of the freeway to filter into the neighborhood in question.

Specifically, the following recommendations are made to eradicate crime in the Brewster-Douglass project and surrounding neighborhood. These recommendations are designed

to eradicate some of the core social problems that are strongly related to neighborhood and public housing crime activity. The activities will foster a sense of social cohesion, informal social control, and territoriality. These social components coupled with a modified physical environment to discourage criminal activity will make Brewster-Douglass and the surrounding neighborhood a safer place to live. This proposal suggest that the neighborhood and the Brewster site be treated as one unit in terms of improving the neighborhood.

Territoriality occurs when residents feel they have a sense of control over their housing and neighborhood. The presence of social cohesion and informal social control facilitates the presence of territoriality. A sense of control can be established by the creation of community organizations with public housing and neighborhood residents and encourage them to work together and with the police. Community organizations can serve as a single coordinator to integrate physical improvement strategies, new policing strategies, and other resident crime reduction strategies. The neighborhood community organizations can initiate resident efforts to improve the neighborhood and reduce criminal opportunities by working with local county and city officials to target the area for services to meet specific needs such as unemployment, health care, increased police protection, and public transportation.

Physical redesign of the neighborhood facilitates a crime free neighborhood. First, a recommendation is made to tear down all structures that are unrepairable and dilapidated. Initiate a program (scattered site public housing or other subsidy program) to build on sites made vacant by the demolition. Enforce provisions that public housing be occupied by stable family units. Another option is to give scattered site public housing tenants the option to buy their unit. Use Community Development Block Grant monies or other funds to rehabilitate private structures designated as repairable. Allocate city funds to improve infrastructure in the neighborhood and on the Brewster site. Suggested improvements include street paving, sidewalk repair, improved street lighting, sidewalk planting, and controlled street parking. Rehabilitate the low-rise units at Brewster-Douglass and mandate that these units be filled with stable families or elderly people. Erect a small wooden fence around yard space for each unit in the neighborhood and Brewster to give a sense of control over the immediate space outside of each living quarter. Seek alternatives to redirect thru traffic away from Woodward Avenue and John R Streets to reduce outside traffic. Redirecting traffic discourages potential offenders from entering the neighborhood and committing an illegal act. Construct a police sub-station in the neighborhood with a police team that has strong relationships with neighborhood and public housing residents.

An effort of this magnitude will take tremendous cooperation from many City agencies. The Detroit City Council must be totally committed and provide the necessary revenues that will allow these improvements to be made. Improvement of the Brewster-Douglass, Brush Park and Cass areas will help in changing the image of high-rise public housing in the City, and the improvements will also aid in improving the negative perception that most people have on downtown Detroit. Improved perception of the downtown area is the first step in economic revitalization.

One final comment- our society must change the negative attitude that has developed toward the lower socioeconomic segment of our population. An open and accepting attitude by policy-makers and implementors toward those that do not fall within the typical middle-class white male arena is the first step at all levels of government in formulating viable programs to address society's ills.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

¹Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan, The Politics of Neglect: Urban Aid From Model Cities to Revenue Sharing, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), p. 36.

APPENDIX

PUBLIC HOUSING SECURITY DEMONSTRATION ACT OF 1978

Public Law 95-557

Title II- Housing Assistance Programs

Section 207.

- (a) This section may be cited as the "Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978".
- (b) (1) The Congress finds that-
 - (A) low-income and elderly public housing residents of the Nation have suffered substantially from rising crime and violence, and are being threatened as a result of inadequate security arrangements for the prevention of physical violence, theft, burglary, and other crimes;
 - (B) older persons generally regard the fear of crime as the most serious problem in their lives, to the extent that one-fourth of all Americans over 65 voluntarily restrict their mobility because of it;
 - (C) crime and the fear of crime have led some residents to move from public housing projects;
 - (D) an integral part of successfully providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low-income persons is to insure that the housing is secure;
 - (E) local public housing authorities may have inadequate security arrangements for the prevention of crime and vandalism; and
 - (F) action is needed to provide for the security of public housing residents and to preserve the Nation's investment in its public housing stock.
- (2) It is, therefore, declared to be the policy of the United States to provide for a demonstration and evaluation of effective means of mitigating crime and vandalism in public housing projects, in order to provide a safe living environment for the residents, particularly the elderly residents, of such projects.
- (c) (1) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall promptly initiate and carry out during the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978, to the extent approved in appropriation Acts, a program for the development, demonstration, and evaluation of improved, innovative community anti-crime and security methods, concepts and techniques which will mitigate the level of crime in public housing projects and their surrounding

neighborhoods.

- (2) In selecting public housing projects to receive assistance under this section, the Secretary shall assure that a broad spectrum of project types, locations, and tenant populations are represented and shall consider at least the following: the extent, nature and quality of community anticrime efforts in the projects and surrounding areas; the extent, nature and quality of police and other protective services available to the projects and their tenants; the demand for public housing units in the locality, the vacancy rate, and extent of abandonment of such units; and the characteristics and needs of public housing tenants.
- (3) In selecting the anticrime and security methods, concepts and techniques to be demonstrated under this section, the Secretary shall consider the improvement of physical security equipment or dwelling units in those projects, social and environmental design improvements, tenant awareness and volunteer programs, tenant participation and employment in providing security services, and such other measures as deemed necessary or appropriate by the Secretary. Particular attention shall be given to comprehensive community anticrime and security plans submitted by public housing authorities which (i) provide for coordination between public housing management and local law enforcement officials, or (ii) coordinate resources available to the community through programs funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Labor, the Community Services Administration, and ACTION, or other Federal or State agencies.
- (4) In carrying out the provisions of this section, the Secretary shall coordinate and jointly target resources with other agencies, particularly the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Labor, the Community Services Administration, and ACTION.
- (d) The Secretary shall initiate and carry out a survey of crime and vandalism existing in the Nation's public housing projects. The survey shall include the nature, extent and impact of crime and vandalism and the nature and extent of resources currently available and employed to alleviate crime and vandalism in public housing.
- (e) The Secretary shall report to the Congress not later than eighteen months after the date of enactment of

this Act. Such report shall include the results of the survey on crime and vandalism in public housing; findings from the demonstration and evaluation of various methods of reducing the level of crime; and legislative recommendations, if appropriate for (A) a comprehensive program to increase security in public housing projects and (B) increasing the coordination between anticrime programs of other State and Federal agencies that may be used by public housing authorities. Any recommendations shall include estimated costs of such programs.

- (f) Of the additional authority approved in appropriation Acts with respect to entering into annual contributions contracts under section 5(c) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 for the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978, the Secretary may utilize up to \$12,000,000 of such authority in the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1978, for the establishment of the public housing security demonstration program authorized by this section.

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