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THE TRANSFER OF TELEVISION AS A COMMUNICATION  
TECHNOLOGY TO NIGERIA: AN EMPHASIS ON THE  
FACTORS AND POSSIBLE CULTURAL IMPACT  
OF TELEVISION DEPENDENCY IN NIGERIA

presented by

Stella Ezimma Okigbo

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M.A. degree in Telecommunication



Major professor

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TECHNOLOGY TO NIGERIA: AN EMPHASIS ON THE  
FACTORS AND POSSIBLE CULTURAL IMPACT  
OF TELEVISION DEPENDENCY IN NIGERIA

By

Stella Ezimma Okigbo

A THESIS

Submitted to  
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MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

1990



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## ABSTRACT

### THE TRANSFER OF TELEVISION AS A COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY TO NIGERIA: AN EMPHASIS ON THE FACTORS AND POSSIBLE CULTURAL IMPACT OF TELEVISION DEPENDENCY IN NIGERIA

By

Stella Ezimma Okigbo

This study was based on an analytical review of secondary data of published materials on Nigerian Television. Effort was made to achieve as much of a comprehensive review of the literature on Nigerian Television as is available in the United States with the time available and as circumstances permitted.

The factors identified to play a major role in Nigerian television dependency include government control of television, television program content and programming, financing, international television program flow/sales, training, Nigerian television policy, and Nigerian television audience attitudes. The disadvantages of television dependency are viewed and recommendations are made on measures to be taken to minimize dependency and significantly achieve desired objectives to ensure greater self-reliance.

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## DEDICATION

To my parents, Dr. Bede Nwoye Okigbo and Mrs. Philomena Nkiruka Okigbo without whose enduring support this thesis would never have been undertaken.

Prof

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to Professor Joseph Straubhaar and Professor Thomas Muth for their assistance and encouragement in preparing this manuscript.

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Until Africa is in uncontested control of its own communications, the struggle for full independence will still not be won. For he who controls communications controls more than the means to transmit messages. He has in his hands a terrible power, the power to create for his audience an image of the world, and more important still, an image of itself.

Rosalynde Ainslie

## INTRODUCTION

### The Conceptual Framework of Media Dependency

Most studies on the use and role of television in developing countries indicate that television has been detrimental to progress. The fault appears to be the television content (i.e., programming) to which the people in these countries are exposed. Furthermore, these studies have shown that the transfer of television, as a mass medium, has not only brought with it a very strong orientation to the western culture, which is usually alien to the indigenous cultures of these countries, but also along with the use of television, there is associated a proven global dominance by the developed countries of the type of television programs and the areas and timing of their distribution to the developing nations.

Furthermore, the broadcast journalists in these developing countries have expressed concerns similar to those that have emerged from these studies. Amadou Mactar Gueye (1988, p. 1660) notes that:

Africa's quest for freedom is not only in the economic and political fields. The terrain of culture also has to be thoroughly investigated. And the media are the strongest tools of imperialism to



impose new roles and models. For the so-called free flow of information is in fact a one-way traffic from dominant industrialized countries to developing countries. Television soap operas, films or documentaries from Third World media are hardly seen on Western, let alone African, networks. But in the remotest city of Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, American, French, and German productions are present.

This statement, although generally referring to most African countries, can be regarded as more specifically applicable to Nigeria, which is the focus and object of this case study. In fact, most of the major concerns about television content and programming in Nigeria have been similarly emphasized by a majority of the Nigerian broadcast journalists and Nigerian mass media scholars, professors, and specialists. One such observer is Mr. Olufolaji Ajibola Fadeyibi, a lecturer in the faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Lagos, as if in direct response to Gueye's statement, made this observation about Nigerian television:

This conclusion is obvious. There is no need for us to perpetuate a situation as well as condemn it at the same time. If the Western nations won't talk about us, play our music and enlighten their audiences about our culture, then we have no business talking about them, playing their music, and showing "Kojak." By so doing, we'll be putting an end to our cultural genocide and communication neo-colonialism. To expect the Western nations to facilitate the bi-directional flow of information is to expect a river to flow backwards. Surely no flow is better than free flow (Altschull, 1984, p. 158).

The assertion is in line with the results of the studies that indicate that there is a new form of

colonialism promoted by the developed countries over the developing countries, such as Nigeria. Moreover, this colonialism promotes and reinforces the continuing dependency of Nigerian television on developed countries for television programs. It is this dependency relationship of Nigerian television that is the target of this analysis of Nigerian television. The main reason for this assertion is that before Nigeria and Nigerians can determine what the country's television stations should portray to its audience, the causes and reasons for Nigerian television dependency should be clearly identified and clearly understood. Identifying the causes and understanding the reasons will reveal to what extent it is possible to find solutions to nip this dependency in the bud. It is only in this way that Nigerian television can serve its audience effectively and efficiently and fulfill the role expected of it.

It is necessary also to point out that this analysis will focus more on Nigerian television dependency being more of the problem from its local and internal context, rather than from the international context. This is because while this dependency appears to be forced on the country, the dependency is actually being more nurtured by the Nigerian television regulations drawn up by government. The Nigerian television executives, in abiding by government rules, have not only succumbed, but

helped to foster the reliance of Nigerian television on foreign imported programs.

Furthermore, the principal methods by which the cultures of various ethnic groups in Nigeria are transmitted from one generation to another include children learning from the behavior and practices of their parents, elders, and their peers and by oral tradition.

This oral tradition has been one of the primary means of transmitting information among the various Nigerian societies. When it becomes necessary for everyone to hear an important and urgent message, the Town Crier, with his gong (Ogene) or various drums, depending on the Nigerian ethnic or linguistic groups, was solely and is still used to send urgent or relevant messages.

Amadi observed that the method of communication before the colonization of Nigeria was predominantly oral. The significance of the importance of Nigeria's oral tradition is further elaborated by Amadi (1986, p. 22). He stated that the Town Crier or Village Announcer could be compared to a telephone line between the village chief (head of a community) and the villages who received the information either through the gong or drum, depending on the particular village. The sound of the tone from these instruments could easily be discerned by

the specific groups which the messages were directed to (p. 22).

Another major aspect of Nigeria's oral tradition was referred to by Frank Ugboajah (1985, pp. 166-167) as "oramedia" or "folk media." This is described as dialogue and verbal exchange, based on indigenous culture, between several groups of people involved in a particular interaction who are listeners. According to Ugboajah, the major objective of this oramedia is to reinforce the values of the group and maintain and preserve a particular world view and social relationship of the group. This is accomplished through teaching and initiation through the portrayal of traditional aesthetic, historical, technical, social, and religious values through the use of proverbs and stories by the spoken word. Also, the use of oramedia makes it possible for people to become aware of their history, past events, and the deeds of their ancestors and several other aspects of that particular culture (Ugboajah, 1985, pp. 166-167).

Although Amadi (1986, p. 24) states that oral tradition is still used to promote nationhood in Nigeria as well as most of Africa, its usage is not as predominantly popular as it used to be. Today, the major Western influences on the Nigerian society since the colonial times are one of two major electronic mass

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media: radio and television. Television and radio, as Nigeria's main information and communication technologies, have increasingly replaced the oral tradition and the Town Crier. During the same period also, formal education and mass media, including newspapers, are playing increasing roles in replacing oral tradition despite limitations posed by illiteracy among segments of the older generations of Nigerians. Some of these media play questionable roles with respect to the transmission of cultures from one generation to the next. Among the young, the mass media share the same role with oral tradition. Television and radio are the major electronic mass media which transmit information, entertainment, and project images to all parts of Nigeria. However, this study focuses on the Nigerian television which, unlike oral tradition and other traditional methods of transmission of culture, poses a greater threat to the cultural identity of Nigerians and to the effective emergence of a truly Nigerian national culture.

The recent erosion of the Nigerian cultures has been noted by McLellan (1986, p. 4) who aptly reported that

Nigeria recently celebrated its 25th anniversary of broadcasting by examining what television has become and discussing what it might be. The feeling among government officials, broadcasters and the general public is that it has failed to meet the challenge of accelerating the development process, contributing to the integration of society and

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providing the means for preserving traditional cultural values.

The reason for this is Nigerian television's high degree of dependence on imported television programs. Due to this threat, Nigerians are in danger of losing the various elements of her cultural heritage. The real danger is that with increased exposure to imported television programs, the various Nigerian cultures might be so much eroded as to be completely wiped out in the future if no measures are taken to stem the tide.

The preservation of culture should be the major priority of broadcasting according to Katz (1979, pp. 66-67) who stated that the theorist and policy-makers of modernization have listed the process of integration of various regions and ethnic groups in a nation and the motivation and instruction of peasants as the two major roles which broadcasting should play in developing societies such as those of Nigeria. Since contacts with Europe and other cultures, Nigerian culture has become invaded by foreign cultures, especially Western cultures to which Nigerians have been exposed through imported television programs.

The major problem stems from the fact that Nigerians are easily assimilating the various aspects of Western culture, but they are not strengthening or reinforcing the various elements of their own indigenous and national cultures.



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There is nothing wrong in selectively adopting some components of Western culture. In fact, Western culture now pervades all aspects of the daily Nigerian lifestyles, from the use of paper which Nigerians use to write to the clothes we wear. The assimilation of some aspects of Western culture have been materialistically convenient--in fact in many cases, extremely very convenient. Through reading of books, magazines, and newspapers and writing in the English language, it is possible for the peoples who speak different languages to communicate between and among themselves. This is not possible in the native languages in the absence of a lingua franca. With television, it has become possible not just to read, but to hear and watch people's behavior, actions, and the clothes they wear. In this process, various elements of Western culture are unconsciously assimilated. For example, today, more Nigerians use the toothbrush much more than the traditional chewing stick, not only because of its convenience, but the status symbol it represents. With this convenience, Nigerians have to maintain a dual cultural existence in which a highly Western and partly Nigerian culture abound in urban areas. In rural areas largely Nigerian and partly Western culture abounds. The existence of this dual culture is permanent as observed by Ugboajah (1985, p. 323) who claimed that the colonial

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languages will continue to be present. Furthermore, Drake (1980, p. 60) concludes that "on the whole, all of the West African states still have close cultural bonds to the British, French, and Portuguese. The schools and colleges and the communications media reflect this fact." Thus, cultural dualism is largely an aspect of the existence of various ethnic groups in Nigeria side by side with various aspects of Western culture.

However, the cultures of various Nigerian ethnic groups need to be welded together and strengthened into a Nigerian national culture. But what is happening is Nigerians are assimilating foreign cultures faster than developing a strong national one. They are, in fact, succumbing totally to the Western culture through the every day exposure and reliance on imported television programs.

Moreover, television, as an information and communication technology has been known to be very detrimental to the cultures of developing countries, such as Nigeria who utilize it as a panacea for advancement. The major reason behind television as a threat to a developing country's advancement is that various studies which have been described in this paper have shown that television, as a technology, has brought with it a strong orientation to the Western culture, which is usually alien to the indigenous and multilingual cultures of developing countries.

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According to Cees J. Hamelink (1983, p. 17),

When a technology is imported, it is inevitable that at least some of the supporting social structure will also be introduced. The importation of the communication media is a classic example of how the whole institutional complex and administrative organization were brought in along with the supposedly "value free" technology.

This means that when Nigeria, as a developing country, chose to introduce television as an information and communication technology from Britain to Nigeria, it inadvertently introduced British ideologies, values, and norms along with television in addition to the manner of television utilization. Thus, Nigerian television did not operate in a vacuum when it was introduced into the Nigerian society.

To be able to explain television dependency in Nigeria, the media dependency theory needs to be invoked. Media dependency is part of the major definition of media imperialism which generally refers to a dominant control of any aspect of the system of ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in a particular country or countries by media interests of another country or several other countries. What then happens is that particular country then becomes dependent on the media interests of the dominating country or countries involved in this relationship. There is usually no reciprocal flow of influences between the receiving developing country and the developed country involved

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(Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 117). The basis of the dependency is the absence of this reciprocal influence between the giving and receiving country, in addition to the transfer of the giving country's culture which renders the receiving country's media dependent. Further Boyd-Barrett (pp. 119-129) recognizes four modes of "media imperialism." Firstly, there is the shape of the communication vehicles that are the existing technological infrastructures which have been determined by the dominant country (mostly developed countries) and which are usually factors alien to the country receiving the particular media system (mostly developing countries). Boyd-Barrett explains this further by observing that developed countries, such as Britain, France, Germany, and most notably the United States, used their early industrialization sophistication to their advantage by being responsible for the "strategic choice" decisions used in formulating media systems. These decisions have led to the current dominant models which are used as the communication vehicle worldwide (1977, p. 120). Boyd-Barrett (p. 121) explains that these developed countries, after developing these media systems to soothe their own needs, then exported and forced these media systems to developing countries, which are usually countries which are not economically strong nations. These nations were then encouraged to absorb these



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foreign media system as their own media systems. The result was the inheritance of a foreign media system which was not made adaptable to their needs and demands. Boyd-Barrett (p. 121) states that:

Radio and television were mainly developed in the United States as specifically one-way communication media for domestic distribution, yet neither of these features was absolutely necessary in technological or market terms. Until very recently, they have been by far the dominant models for the rest of the world; only now, and then only with great perseverance, are alternative models tested, and suited to specific conditions.

This promoted dependency because developing countries had no other alternative but to rely on these models which are solely controlled by developed countries.

Boyd-Barrett (1977, p. 121) further elaborates that the standardization of the shape of these communication vehicles across the world is

sustained by a technological infrastructure developed largely in America and which benefits enormously from economies of scale and which provides much of the important technological equipment for other countries, creating a situation of technological dependency. This situation is especially crucial for the developing countries.

Some of the developing countries have begun manufacturing their own broadcast receiver sets, but all of them still continue to be dependent on imports due to the expensive production and distribution technology. The major suppliers are RCA, Schulberger, EMI, Philips, Telefunken, Siemens, Thompson CSF, Fernsehen, Shibadan, and Nippon Electric (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 121).

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Secondly, there is the set of industrial arrangements used by the dominating developed country to control dissemination of television programs, and the nature of financial arrangements used in exporting the television equipment and programs. This process influences the shape of a communication vehicle very strongly. It involves two major elements according to Boyd-Barrett (1977, p. 122). The character of the particular industrial structure which is usually disseminated, and the nature of the finance for that structure, which is usually exported.

An example of the character of industrial arrangements, according to Boyd-Barrett (1977, p. 122) is the early structure of the Hollywood film industry which formulated several structural arrangements now used by film industries across the world. Furthermore, this structure contributed to Hollywood's dominance of overseas export markets. The Hollywood film industry did three major things: (1) a vertically integrated structure from studio to production, distribution, and exhibition; and (2) a huge public relations and sales which promoted the movies and a distribution system, whereby the monies were distributed to metropolitan houses down to suburban and nonmetropolitan outlets and (3) specialization of labor which resulted in employment security and made-to-formula monies which reflected

immigrant working conditions in America, and their violent conditions. An example of an example of finance exports will deal specifically with an example dealing with developing countries which is the focus of this paper. According to Boyd-Barrett (1977, p. 123), multinational media organizations are the important channels for media finance export through which these developed countries, notably Britain and France, penetrated many parts of Africa, and the United States did penetrate Latin America during the colonial period and after these developing countries gained their political independence. Boyd-Barrett (p. 123) further added that the foreign media ownership and control was strongest where the development of cultural autonomy was little. For example, the existence of all the television stations in the Caribbean was due to extensive British and American financial support. For instance, Roy Thomson, a London-based organization owned the Capital Broadcasting in Bermuda, while the Rediffusion, another London-based organization, had extensive interests in the Caribbean, and owned radio stations in Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 123).

Thirdly, there are the values and practices of the dominating industrial country which are both intentionally and inadvertently transferred to the receiving country. Such values, for example, usually



consist of the dominant country's definition of rules regarding what is purchased and sent to the developing country and how it should be used or not be used. For instance, the training of journalists and broadcasters from developing countries by western media organizations (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 125). Boyd-Barrett (1977, p. 125) argues that with such training, these journalists and broadcasters from developing countries are normally exposed to the values of the western journalists and broadcasters. Usually these acquired values are not beneficial to these journalists and broadcasters. Finally, there is the media content and market penetration. This involves the actual export of the media content which usually portrays the culture of the dominant industrial country. The media content is the vehicle of actual media imperialism. The market penetration of the dominant country or countries takes place through the television programs, films, records, movies, news, books, periodicals, newspapers, etc., consumed by the receiving developing country or countries.

Another perspective of dependency is the notion that dependency not only exists within the theory of imperialism, but it represents a search for various levels of imperialism which would help explain certain aspects of development of the particular country

concerned (i.e., developing countries). Moreover, this search also forms the basic premise for the dependency approach and as such is stated when specific situations are analyzed according to economic domination and the existence of nation states (Paldan & Salinas, 1979, p. 87).

Paldan and Salinas (1979, p. 85) also state that dependency strengthens culture because it promotes national culture. However, this represents a clean-cut contradiction because cultural imperialism undermines the growth of indigenous national cultures. There usually emerges a dominant culture and what happens is that the national culture forms an umbrella under which other subordinate groups protest against the dominant culture.

Overall, Paldan and Salinas (1979, p. 85) observe that cultural imperialism is merely descriptive and used in reference to certain problems. They also maintain that cultural imperialism will have its own independent definition only when imperialism, as a theory, is further analyzed. In other words, the authors hold that in order to understand and analyze cultural imperialism, "imperialism," itself, as a theory must be clearly specifically defined. Sarti (1981, pp. 323-324) supports Paldan and Salinas' views on cultural imperialism. Sarti certainly notes that cultural imperialism is fraught with several contradictions which are difficult to explain,



mainly because cultural imperialism or "cultural dependence," as Sarti refers to it, is so general that it cannot specifically determine the ideological process. This process is vital to explaining the presence of cultural imperialism in a certain country as applied to the Latin American societies studied. Sarti (pp. 379-320) further observed that as a theory, "cultural dependence" was a hindrance towards the understanding of the cultural process in Latin America. "Cultural dependency" could be better defined if the various groups, sectors, and classes in a particular country are individually and analytically studied. Sarti (1981, p. 324) also states like Paldan and Salinas (1979) that dependency which forms the basic core of "cultural dependency" is too simplified and is full of theoretical ambiguities. Sarti (p. 324) then goes on to explain that "dependency" could be disputed. Sarti argues (pp. 324-326) that:

1. cultural dependency would not exist if it was not used in this particular case, to analyze the capitalist development in Latin America;
2. dependency exists as a major support for the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism and not to explain Latin American reality;
3. dependency as it is defined is the political expansion of the capitalist mode of production during the stage of international expansion by a developed country;
4. the capitalist nature of dependency, which is the essence of its problem is not emphasized.

Rather, most of the emphasis is on the characteristic of dependency as a theory;

5. the major focus of the study should be on "imperialism" or "anti-imperialism," which is the "enemy." In other words, "imperialism or anti-imperialism" explains the imbalance in the relationship between developed and developing countries.

Hamelink (1983) expresses dependency as a threat to a dependent country's cultural autonomy by a developed country. He stressed that along with most of transfer of communication technologies from the West to a developing country, goes also the transfer of the culture of the Western country involved in such a transfer. The transfer in most cases then forms the ideology of the developing country, which will use the communication technology.

According to Murphy and Scotton (1987, p. 12), the "Dependencia" theory was formulated by Latin American advocates, and its explanation as a theory is heavily dependent on the social structure of the Latin American continent. As a result, it cannot really be applied to any other developing countries or Third World countries. However, they claim that it is used predominantly in explaining the Western domination, especially in Africa. Thus, both Murphy and Scotton (1987, p. 12) used it to explain the relationship between dependency and journalism-education in Africa.

Chin-Chuan Lee (1979, p. 68) redefined "media imperialism" and suggests that it be examined according to (1) television program exportation to foreign countries, (2) foreign ownership and control of media outlets, (3) transfer of "metropolitan" broadcasting norms and institutionization of media commercialism at the expense of "public interest," and (4) imposition of capitalistic world views and infringement upon the indigenous way of life in the recipient nations. Lee (1979, p. 67) also supports the view expressed earlier that "media imperialism" cannot be really defined as it is so general, because there are different aspects of "media imperialism" which mean different things and require different solutions. Based on this fact, Lee created his own framework of "media imperialism" which is as stated above.

It should be noted that the above researchers substitute dependency with media "imperialism" in their studies. Most of them regard dependency as a form of imperialism or a definition of imperialism or "media imperialism" as a form of "dependency." This proves that dependency and imperialism refer to the same thing--the dominant relationship of developed countries over developing countries in the transfer of communication technologies and programming.

Although these authors do not agree with each other, one major theme is common in their own explanations and definitions of "dependency" or "media imperialism." To all of them the definition of dependency leans more toward the international context. That is, dependency is being defined in terms of the domination of the West or North over foreign countries or the South. For instance, Boyd-Barrett (1977), Lee (1979), McPhail (1987), and Hamelink (1979) all define dependency as manipulation by the developed countries on people whom they have always dominated. Even the local internal aspects of the developing countries or the dominated countries are not emphasized. When they are emphasized, it is explained as being under the sole control of the developing countries.

Furthermore, dependency theory, though not specifically stated, is implied by McPhail (1987, p. 18) who regards "electronic Colonialism" to be the dependency relationship established by the developed countries through the transfer of communication technologies, such as communication hardware (computers, wires, lasers, satellites, etc.), foreign-produced software along with human resources (i.e., engineers, specialists and technicians), comic books, radio programs, television shows, norms and values which may change the domestic culture and socialization of the developing country or countries, which receive these equipment, technologies, and specialists.

Thus, as described above, it is apparent that the dependency theory has different meanings and definitions. Based on these various interpretations of the dependency theory described above, this paper will portray that most media are actually dependent on the internal and the local context of a particular country, which in most circumstances, are developing countries rather than the influence of an international context which, in most cases, consist of the developing countries. In other words, what this means is that in most cases, the problem of media dependency like the case of Nigerian Television is caused by the dependent country. This is because the dependent country does have a choice in deciding whether the country should be or remain media dependent.

All the above constitutes a suitable background for the discussion on medium dependency as observed in the Nigerian television services.

## CHAPTER II

### NIGERIA AS A POLITICAL ENTITY


The country of this particular case study, Nigeria, covers a total area of 357,000 square miles (about 924,000 km<sup>2</sup>) which is about the size of the States of California and Texas. Nigeria is the 12th largest country in Africa in terms of area. It is located on the coast of West Africa and is bounded on the south by the Bight of Benin in the Atlantic Ocean, in the north by the Republic of Niger, and on the east and west by the Republic of Cameroun and Benin, respectively. Nigeria has a population of more than 100 million, and is thus, the first country in terms of population, and every 4th and 5th African is a Nigerian. There are more than 250 ethnic or cultural groups in the country on the basis of language spoken. However, there are three major ethnic groups which have populations amounting to more than 10 million people each. These consist of the Igbo, who make up 17% of the population; the Hausa, who make up 21% of the population, and the Yoruba who make up 20% of the population. Its GNP is \$53 billion, while per capita

income is \$790. The Naira is Nigeria's official currency, and N1 is equivalent to about 14 cents.

Nigeria was a former colony of the United Kingdom, and it received its independence on October 1, 1960. It became a republic on October 1, 1963. For a map of Nigeria with some of the salient features, see Figure 1. Nigeria is made up of 21 states, including the federal capital territory of Abuja. It has a federal government structure like the United States, but is currently under a military regime.

#### The History of Nigerian Television

Television came to Nigeria when the Western Nigerian Television was established and launched on October 31, 1959 (a year before independence) by the Western Nigerian regional government. According to Egbon (1983, p. 331), its origin was political as indicated by the events reviewed hereunder. In 1951, at the time that there were three rival political parties in Nigeria, there was an incident when Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group party, which was in power in the Western Region of Nigeria, declared the then MacPherson Constitution introduced by the British colonial administration as unworkable and then followed this by a stumping out of the House of Assembly in protest. This action was condemned by the Chief Secretary to the House who called

Zone A

- 1a. Ibadan
- 1b. Abeokuta
- 1c. Lagos (Ikeja)

Zone B

- 2a. Benin City
- 2b. Owerri
- 2c. Akure
- 2d. Port Harcourt

Zone C

- 3a. Enugu
- 3b. Calabar
- 3c. Makurdi

Zone D

- 4a. Kano
- 4b. Jos
- 4c. Kaduna

Zone E

- 5a. Maiduguri
- 5b. Bauchi
- 5c. Yola

Zone F

- 6a. NTA Sokoto
- 6b. NTA Minna
- 6c. NTA Ilorin

FCT = Federal Capital Territory.

Figure 1. Locations and Zonal Organization of Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) Stations.



on the governor, Sir John MacPherson in Council to condemn the walkout at this stage in the birth of the Nigerian nation. In response to this request, the governor made a public radio broadcast in which he denounced the walkout by Chief Awolowo and his followers. In response to the broadcast, Chief Awolowo, as leader of the opposition, accused the governor of misrepresenting his party and requested the Director General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service (NBS) to grant him air time to reply to the governor's speech. The request was refused, since the chief Secretary, Mr. Benson to whom the Director General referred the matter for clearance, refused to grant permission. This was because the NBS was owned by the Ministry of Information.

Chief Awolowo was, of course, disappointed and began to nurse the idea of having a regionally controlled mass medium under his party's control. This culminated in the birth of Nigeria's first television station on October 31, 1959, as a result of a motion by Chief Anthony Enahoro, the then Regional Minister of Information. Following the motion to establish the Western Nigeria Television Service (WNTV), a Bill was passed in the Western House of Assembly in 1959. It is obvious that by establishing the WNTV the Western Nigerian government had a more advanced and effective mass communication medium than the NBS. But also by establishing the WNTV the

Action Group, which was one of the three rival political parties in Nigeria, wanted to show the Nigerian public that it was not only the most forward looking, but was in a better position than the National government and other parties to provide social services to the masses (Okigbo, 1989, personal communication). The WNTV, which started broadcasting as the first TV station in Africa as from October 31, 1959, was a joint venture between the Overseas Rediffusion Limited and the Western Nigeria government under the name Western Nigeria Radiovision Service Ltd. (Egbon, 1983, p. 330). By October 31, 1960, the Western Nigeria government started television transmissions and began radio broadcasting in May, 1960 (Egbon, 1983, p. 331). Thus the WNTV had an accidental birth at a time of political turmoil in Western Nigeria, but at the same time the Western Nigerian government had solved the problem of finding alternative ways of getting to the people without repression by the national government. In addition, it also established WNTV as a prestigious status symbol (Egbon, 1983, p. 331). It should be noted that although the joint partnership between the Overseas Rediffusion Limited and the Western Nigeria government was an equal partnership managed on a fifty-fifty basis, the partnership broke up (Egbon, 1983, p. 331). This was because WNTV claimed that the interests of its foreign partner was becoming

incompatible with WNTV's objective of social responsibility and public service. Thus, on December 31, 1961, the government bought out the shares of its foreign partners--The Overseas Rediffusion Limited (Egbon, 1983, p. 331). The call letters then became WNTV-WNBS (Western Nigeria Television and Broadcasting Services) (Egbon, 1983, p. 331).

On October 1, 1960, the Nigerian Independence Day, ENTV (Eastern Nigeria Television) was established in partnership with Overseas Rediffusion Limited of the United Kingdom, the same corporation which helped found WNTV. ENTV later dissolved their partnership. Like WNTV, ENTV was established because of competitive regional struggles (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 96). The regional governments, such as the Eastern Regional Government, had no choice but to start their own television stations in order to keep up with the political pace in the country (Okonkwo, 1986, pp. 95-97).

Television service was started in the Northern section of Nigeria on March 15, 1962, together with radio service (Hachten, 1971, p. 162; Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 43; MacKay, 1964, p. 62). The ownership and operation of both the television and radio service in the Northern region was managed by the Broadcasting Company of Northern Nigeria (BCNN) which consisted of a partnership between the Northern regional government and two British

corporations known as Granada Television and the Electrical and Musical Industries, Ltd. (EMI) (MacKay, 1964, p. 62; Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 43; Hachten, 1971, p. 162). BCNN was commonly recognized with the call-sign Radio Television Kaduna (RTK) (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 43). MacKay observed that the establishment of television service was very successful in the Northern region of Nigeria at that time because television services were quickly started in Kaduna, Kano, and Zaria (1964, p. 62). The partnership between the Northern regional government and the foreign corporations remained friendly and happy (MacKay, 1964, p. 62). In 1970, the shareholdings of the British Companies were sold and transferred through the Interim Common Services Agency to the six northern states who owned the corporation (Golding & Elliott, 1979, pp. 43-44). However, on April 1, 1962, the Federal Government began its own television service under the name "Nigerian Television Service, Channel 10, Lagos" (Ladele et al., 1979, p. 98).

All the television stations, including NBC-TV were all taken over by the Federal Government on April 1, 1976. On April 1, 1977, the Nigerian television stations came under the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), but the NBC operated only as a radio station (Ladele et al., 1979, pp. 102-103).

### Nigerian Television Today

In 1977, Nigerian television services history turned a new page. A military decree No. 24 of April, 1977, authorized the Federal Government-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) to (1) take over all the then existing state-owned television stations (Oduko, 1987, p. 8; Rosen, 1988, p. 226); (2) plan for, establish, and operate new stations in the state capitals which had no television stations (Oduko, 1987, p. 8); and (3) operate as the only sole television station in Nigeria with the power to broadcast and represent the Federal government nationwide (Rosen, 1988, p. 226; Oduko, 1987, p. 8).

The Decree No. 24 caused Nigeria to be divided into six NTA districts called zones. Each zone operates several television stations (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 115).

The main reason for organizing the television stations into zones was to reach all the different ethnic groups in Nigeria so as to foster national integration, while at the same time satisfying the needs of various ethnic groups by showing their distinctive cultural characteristics (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 122). Thus, in addition to showing everyone's culture and nationalities, each ethnic group in each state will be exposed to the cultural characteristics and values of all the other ethnic groups in the state.

Details of the zonal organization of television stations in Nigeria are as follows:

1. Zone A
  - a. NTA Ibadan (Oyo State)
  - b. NTA-Ikeja-Lagos (Lagos State)
  - c. NTA Abeokuta (Ogun State)
2. Zone B
  - a. NTA Benin (Bendel State)
  - b. NTA Owerri (Aba, Imo State)
  - c. NTA Akure (Ondo State)
  - d. NTA Port Harcourt (Rivers State)
3. Zone C
  - a. NTA Enugu (Anambra State)
  - b. NTA Calabar (Cross River & Akwa Ibom States)
  - c. NTA Markurdi (Benue State)
4. Zone D
  - a. NTA Kano (Kano State)
  - b. NTA Jos (Jos State)
  - c. NTA Kaduna (Kaduna State)
5. Zone E
  - a. NTA Maiduguri (Bornu State)
  - b. NTA Bauchi (Bauchi State)
  - c. NTA Yola (Gongola State)
6. Zone F
  - a. NTA Sokoto (Sokoto State)

- b. NTA Minna (Niger State)
  - c. NTA Ilorin (Kwara State)
- (Okonkwo, 1986, pp. 116-122).

For details of these, see Figure 1.

Although the intention was worthwhile, it did not work out because it further fragmented the audience. Katz and Wedell (1977, p. 18) noted that

The regions have kept pulling away from the center and have thought radio and television development important in the establishment of their several identities. The multistate structure that replaced the tripartite regional division threatened to make the broadcasting situation even worse, as each of the states strove to start its own television station. More and more concern was expressed about the apparent inability of the federal broadcast media to contribute to the process of national integration in Nigeria.

In 1979, what Katz and Wedell expressed happened in that the Constitution permitted states to operate and own their own television stations. Eleven new television stations were established by the states (Oduko, 1987, p. 9). Thus, the division of the television stations into zones fragmented the televisions' services even more, because the stations were used for promoting the political ideologies and interests of various political parties in power in the various states (Oduko, 1987; Mytton, 1983). Altogether, there are 34 television stations in Nigeria. NTA owns and operates 22, while 12 are owned and operated by different states (Ezeokoli, 1984, p. 1). There is no doubt that this adversely

affects efficiency of operation of the television services. It also renders harmonization of operations and practices under prevailing NTA policies difficult. In order to show the problem of Nigerian Television dependency, several factors were taken into consideration as shown in Chapter III.



### CHAPTER III

#### TELEVISION DEPENDENCY IN NIGERIA

This case study of television dependency in Nigeria is assessed on the basis of analysis of dependency implications of the following factors: (a) Government Control of Nigerian Television; (b) Television Content and Programming of Nigerian Television; (c) Financing; (d) International Television Program Flow/Sales; (e) Training for Nigerian Television; (f) Nigerian Television Policy; and (g) Nigerian Audience Attitudes.

The major factors which have a tremendous impact on television dependency in Nigeria are the government's control of the Nigerian Television, the financing for Nigerian Television, and Nigerian Television Policy. All of the other factors, such as the content and programming of Nigerian Television, the International Television Program Flow/Sales, Training for Nigerian Television, and Nigerian Attitudes occurred as an impact of the government control of Nigerian Television, financing for Nigerian Television, and the Nigerian Television Policy/Objectives. How all these factors combine to

create dependence in Nigerian Television will be discussed in more detail under the various topics.

#### Government Control of Nigerian Television

Television in Nigeria is under the control of federal and state governments. Both governments exert a strong influence on the use of television in Nigeria.

The problem with government control is that television reflects the view of which government is in power, whether it is a civilian or military government. The following cases serve to show that Nigerian television services function as another arm of the Nigerian government. In 1979, Nigeria was under the civilian government. During that period, one of the political parties in power, PRP (People's Redemption Party) split up into two major factions. One faction was controlled by two state governments, who were expelled from the party by the party leader, Mallam Aminu Kano. As party leader, Aminu Kano controlled the other faction. What happened was that due to an order from the President's Office (Nigerian President) to Nigerian Television (NTV), the television did not report the activities of the two expelled state governors and their supporters. Rather, NTV focused on the party faction of Kano, which it portrayed as the recognized PRP (People's Redemption Party) leader (Mytton, 1983, pp. 118-119).

Lagos state was the last state to receive clearance to start its own television station. Before it could, it was restricted by NTV, which as a result of an order from the federal government jammed the transmissions of NTV Lagos. On February 1, 1981, NTV Lagos got permission to operate amidst several altercations with the federal government (Mytton, 1983, p. 120). However, the federal government only gave approval for state NTV Lagos to operate on UHF, instead of VHF band, which most of Nigerian television stations used. The federal government gave the reason for the action to be that the VHF was overcrowded (p. 121).

Furthermore, if the government could control what broadcasters report in television news program, as indicated in the first case cited above and regulate the frequency in which television transmissions have to be broadcasting, as seen in the Lagos NTV case, it actually has the power to use television to directly promote the kind of information favorable to the powers that be. Politicians in the other four parties complained that the members of the ruling NPN (National Party of Nigeria) party who had back in 1965 used the media to falsely declare themselves winners might repeat it again in 1983 (Mytton, 1983, p. 121). These allegations were not proven then, but Mytton (pp. 121-122) adduced reasons which indicated that such complaints were very likely to

be true. For example, Mytton reported that nine governors from some of the opposition parties, namely the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), and People's Redemption Party (PRP) had complained that the then federal government's policy of controlling the media occurred in October 1979. Then again in February 1981, the same nine governors in addition to three state governors from another opposition party, the Nigeria People's Party (NPP), issued a statement criticizing the federal government for not giving enough revenue to the states and various parts of Nigeria. Mytton pointed out that although the event was newsworthy, it was not reported by NTV. This is because the mention of the statement of what the issues in Nigeria were by the governors would have given them, as the opposition, more public attention in national affairs than the ruling NPN Party thought they deserved. Such news items in the television will likely make the NPN feel very uncomfortable.

With the government using television as it wishes, most Nigerian broadcast journalists have no choice but to obey whatever federal or state government is in power. Andrew Bredin (October, 1982, p. 4) noted that "Even in Nigeria, Africa's most vigorous democracy, political diversity unmatched elsewhere on the continent has not guaranteed the independence of Nigerian broadcasters."

This indicates that Nigeria's government, even though allowing some freedoms, did not exhibit one of the most important freedoms: freedom of the mass media without federal government interference.

Government intervention was not restricted to the federal level (as indicated in the last example). It has been present at the state government level also. At the state level, government intervention was just as serious at the federal or national level. The major reason is that most of the television stations at the state level were started as a result of political pressures. This stemmed from the fact that most of the political parties who were in control of the state and local governments in Nigeria wanted their own television stations, so that they could use them to appeal to their supporters and influence public opinion in their constituencies. Even though there were national (federal) television stations present in these states, the state governments started the new television stations, because the ruling political party at the time, NPN (National Party of Nigeria), exerted considerable political influence on the federal television stations. Whereas it happened in many states, different political parties were in power at the state level, they did not want to expose themselves to federal government control over the information they wished to be transmitted to their constituencies. Therefore, they

felt that it was imperative to have their own state television stations over which they exercised control over the information that is broadcast to the public. The overall result was that there was a lot of political competition between the federal and state governments in the kind and content of news broadcast to the public in Nigeria (Oduko, 1987, p. 3). A reference to Table 1 shows the distribution of the television stations in 1983 and indicates the political parties in the various states in which they are located. It is interesting to note that in those states where the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the party in power at the federal level, was in control, no separate television stations were established. This is because the federal government was in a position to wield its power in controlling the information that gets to the people at both levels, and there was no need for TV stations controlled by the state whose interests were the same at both federal and state levels (Oduko, 1987, p. 3). It is obvious from this that the main reason for establishing the TV stations was political.

Anambra state of Nigeria is an excellent example of a case of the TV station being started by the state government for political purposes. The ruling party, NPN (National Party of Nigeria), had control over NTV Enugu, which was a federal regional TV station. But the



Table 1

List of State TV Stations in 1983

No. of Stations	Town	State	Political Party in Power
1. LTV	Ikeja	Lagos	UPN
2. ODTV	Akure	Ondo	UPN
3. OGTV	Abeokuta	Ogun	UPN
4. BDTV	Benin	Bendel	UPN
5. OYO TV	Ibadan	Oyo	UPN
6. ATV	Owerri	Anambra	NPP
7. IMTV	Enugu	Imo	NPP
8. Plateau TV	Jos	Plateau	NPP
9. Borno TV	Maiduguri	Borno	GNPP
10. Gongola TV	Yola	Gongola	GNPP
11. City TV	Kano	Kano	PRP

Note: UPN = Unity Party of Nigeria

NPP = Nigeria Peoples' Party

GNPP = Great Nigeria Peoples' Party

PRP = Peoples' Redemption Party

Source: Oduko, 1987, p. 10.



governor of Anambra State, where NTV Enugu is located, was Mr. Jim Nwobodo of the Nigeria People's Party (NPP), one of the opposition parties to the ruling party in power, the NPN (National Party of Nigeria). Consequently, the governor of Anambra State that could not exert much control over NTV Enugu established Anambra State Television (ATV) station, which is now called Anambra Broadcasting Service (ABS) as the state television. He stated that the major reason for setting up the television service was to have one directly under Anambra State control (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 264). This was highly political. The major objective of television was to promote the political ideology and programs of the NPP, which was the political party in power in the state. This was evident when it was time for another election. What happened was that the NTA and the FRCN promoted and sponsored programs favorable to Dr. Alex Ekwueme, the Vice President of Nigeria who belonged to the ruling party NPN (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 267). To counteract this, the ATV was determined to boost the governor, Jim Nwobodo's political career and programs. The main evening news at 7 o'clock each day, started with the showing of a smiling picture of the state governor (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 268).

After the election in which Jim Nwobodo of NPP was defeated, the governor of the state was Chief C. C. Onoh

of the NPN. What happened was another classic example of how television is forced to toe the line of the political party in power. After Chief C. C. Onoh of the NPN was named the next governor of Anambra state, the broadcast journalists from ATV and ABC were sacked (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 268). Most of the staff who showed up to work were stopped outside the TV building, and either chased away, beaten, or arrested by policemen who brandished horsewhips (Okonkwo, 1986, pp. 268-270). The station was then closed by the new government. Okonkwo (1986, pp. 268-269) reported that Mr. Nzekwe A. Ene (NPP) of the deposed governor's party made comments which, even though biased, portrays the extent of political dependency of Nigerian television. Mr. Nzekwe A. Ene said:

--We are now being encouraged to believe that the NPN has the mandate of the people to dismantle all the good works of the ejected NPP government. It is the end of Biafra all over again, except that this time there appears to be no General Gowon to manage the reconciliation.

--No doubt it is because of their (NPN) deep knowledge that they are usurpers and are only able to sit in office because of their Lagos god-fathers that the Anambra NPN is acting so skittishly and so petulantly in connection with ATV and ABC.

--It is an open secret that people in the NPN generally have no ideological conception of their role and responsibilities. Most of them seem to be there only because of the loot they expect from Lagos with the Onoh-Ekwueme conduit to Shagari's oil hoards.

--The ATV under the able Director-Generalship of Mr. Nwokolobia Agu, has invested a great deal of

effort and money in training top-notch technicians and other personnel. All of them, from Mr. Agu down to the camera handlers, are not political people. They do their work as professionals and technicians. They have had very little to do with policy. Even if they had disagreed with any instructions emanating from the NPP councils, they had no choice but to carry them out.

--It is imperative . . . that Governor Onoh (NPN) does his very best to preserve the ATV in its entirety, from the DG (Director General) Nwokolobia Agu down, and further, he should provide the ATV with sufficient funds and leeway to continue its evolution into a cultural vehicle for excellence and beauty in our land, which has tried to be, in contrast with the NTA (Enugu) which has nothing else to show the people nowadays except obituaries and self-congratulatory messages of well-wishing from sycophant and imposters of the NPN (SATELLITE, 1983, p. 3, in Okonkwo, 1986, pp. 268-269).

The underlined section serves to indicate television's political dependency. Although the ban was later lifted, the same tendencies continued. The Commissioner for Information at the time, Mr. C. O. Ekwensi, when he took office gave the broadcast journalists conditions they must fulfill before they could be accepted back in the ATV. Ekwensi ordered them that they should either expunge their former loyalties to the old NPP government, or find alternative jobs elsewhere (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 270).

Thus, most broadcast journalists had no choice but to accept the conditions under which they have to reflect the ideology and views of whatever political party is in power. The Nigerian broadcast journalists have no choice

if they are to remain in government employment. Bredin (1982, p. 5) observed that a "senior Nigerian journalist had commented that broadcasting as a profession, is heavily mined politically, and one has to tread carefully." The Golding and Elliott (1979) study of information collected from broadcasters in various Nigerian television newsrooms, supports the above statement. When Nigerian broadcast journalists were surveyed and asked their opinion as to whether their organization is to be regarded as a "mouthpiece of government," 37.3% of them or more than a third agreed with that assertion; 36.1% disagreed, while the remaining 26.5% were not sure. However, their opinions did show a contradiction in that those who agreed they were a mouthpiece of the government, said that their job was important because it contributed to development (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 194). This contradiction was referred to by Golding and Elliott (p. 132) as accommodation in which pressure, in this case by the Nigerian governments, is handled by the self-censorship. The journalists already know the rules. In fact, one editor referred to their accommodations of the Nigerian government as self-censorship with patriotism (Golding & Elliott, 1979, pp. 132-133).

However, contrary to what these broadcast journalists think, such self-censorship does not foster

development. In fact, with such political interventions and restrictions, governments have stifled television's development in African countries (McLellan, 1987, p. 60). This is because without freedom of expression, it will be very difficult to serve the needs of urban poor and rural populations (McLellan, 1987, p. 60).

Once in a while, there are differences by the broadcast journalists who report news without approval (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 132; Mytton, 1983, p. 122). But the news is not reported without careful consideration of the government's policy. The proof of this is evident in the constant complaints of the broadcast journalists. For example, one journalist stated that "It's difficult to maintain one's professional integrity when you have to get clearance all the time" (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 131). Thus, indicating that even broadcast journalists do not choose to air certain programs according to their own initiative without the Nigerian government involved in majority of the decisions.

Thus it can be concluded that such usage of television by the Nigerian government (both federal and regional) is a very good example of using television as an arm of social control in a totalitarian or authoritarian manner by a small group of people, as Skornia (1965, p. 145) stated.

Skornia (1965) stated that television and radio have now become instruments of social control, rather than instruments of communication as they were invented to be. This is because they are not being used in a democratic manner in which all members of society have access to it. Rather, only a small group of people control television and radio. These are the operators who define and dictate what television and radio will portray. Furthermore, television and radio are portrayed as mass media because these operators find it profitable to define and operate these media as such (p. 165). Although Skornia was referring to television and radio programs in the United States, the same can be said for television programs in Nigeria in this particular case. This is because Nigerian Television is not being used in a democratic manner, as stated above. Whatever government is in power decides how Nigerian Television should be operated. These different governments are a small group. In such a situation, the rest of the Nigerian society or any other society has little or no access to the Nigerian Television. In such a case, the Nigerian Television is being operated in a totalitarian or authoritarian manner, as Skornia (1965) stated.

Wilcox (1975, p. 19) observed that the roles of the African mass media usually reflects the attitudes and goals of the government officials. Moreover, more than

80% of the world's television systems are either government owned or managed according to Taishoff (1987, p. 14) who also concluded that such government control is "perhaps illustrative of the apprehension with which governments approach the broadcasting system" (Taishoff, 1987, p. 14).

However, today, the most democratic television systems are still controlled by a small group of people, even though they are not regarded as totalitarian or authoritarian as Skornia stated.

Moreover, the urge to control the television broadcast medium is due to its strong potential to disseminate information effectively and efficiently. Altschull (1984, p. 135) thus explains the urge to control television by observing that broadcast media have dominated our lives more than any other previous communication medium. Altschull then explains that it is no

Small wonder that those who wield power seek to control or to regulate the broadcasting media in their territory, or that those who seek to wrest power strike first of all at the radio and television outlets. Small wonder also that advertisers pour ever-increasing resources into trumpeting their messages over the air (p. 135).

All that Altschull has observed above is clearly evident in the characteristics of the influence of government control of the Nigerian television.

### Nigerian Television Content and Programming

The second dependency problem in Nigeria is that of foreign program importation. Nigeria still relies on foreign programs and foreign formats. Balogun (1985, p. 132) observed that "Television in this country (Nigeria) functions more as a relay station for foreign produced programs than as an outgrowth of our society." Proof of how this dependence started was traced as far back as 1972. It could have been earlier, but it has not been possible to trace this far back enough in this review. In 1972, Nigerian television programs mainly featured such foreign drama series as "Mission Impossible," "Mod Squad," "Mannix," "Danger Man," "Dan August," "Bonanza," and "The FBI." They amounted to 20 hours of foreign programming, out of which 13 hours was for drama, 4 hours was for children's entertainment, and the remaining 3 hours was devoted to music, comedy, and documentaries (Kolade in Head, 1974, pp. 85-6).

Since then, Nigerian television has continued to depend on some kind of foreign programming.

In 1973, foreign television programs imported by Nigerian Television Authority amounted to 63% of all its programming (Varis, 1984, p. 147; Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974, p. 15). In the year 1984, Varis (p. 151) observed that in African countries, foreign imports amounted to 8%



of the 39% of total programs in the informative category, 27% of the 9% of total programs in the educational category, 29% of the 3% of total programs in the cultural category, more than 1% of total programs in the religious category, and 73% of the 30% of total programs in the entertainment category, 60% of the 6% of total program in the sports category, and 40% of the 12% of total programs in others (ads, children, unclassified category). It is obvious that the low amount of imports occurred in the information category which was mainly made of more local news than in other categories. The whole programming was 100% and all programming amounted to 30,524 minutes (509 hours) (Varis, 1984, p. 151). Thus indicating the presence of imported programming in Nigeria as it did in all African countries as a whole.

However, from 1973-74, Nigerian television became somewhat sensitive to foreign importation of television programs. As shown in Table 2, Nigerian television reduced foreign program importations from 70% to 30% (Katz & Wedell, 1977, p. 167, p. 156 (Table 5.3)).

References to Table 2 also shows that it was only NBC which achieved the most significant reduction importation of less than one-third of its programs were imported foreign programs. The other two television stations (WNTV and BCNN) both have more than 50% of the

Table 2

Percentage of Imported and Locally Produced Television Programs in Nigeria (one of the ten selected countries studied) 1973-74

	NBC	WNTV	BCNN
Imported	30	55	55
Locally Produced	70	45	45

Source: Katz and Wedell (1977), p. 156.

programs made up of imported foreign programs (Katz & Wedell, 1977, p. 156 (Table 513), Lee, 1979, p. 241).

This reduction was not continuous since there was resumption of increased importation of programs later. This is probably because the policy on how much foreign programs is imported as compared to the production of television programs locally depended on the policy or actual practice of each of the individual Nigerian television stations.

This continued dependency is more clearly shown by data on the programming of five regional and state television stations, which is presented in Table 3. If there is uniformity in the operations of television stations, which are all under the NTA, then there should

Table 3

Percent of Foreign Content on Nigerian TV Stations

Nigerian TV Stations	% of Foreign Content
Nigerian Television (Lagos)	17%
Nigerian Television (Bauchi)	19%
Nigerian Television (Jos)	36%
Nigerian Television (Kaduna)	18%
Nigerian Television (Ibadan)	14%
Nigerian Television (Calabar)	Unspecified

Source: Farounbi, 1979/80 p. 54 ; Wilson, 1987, p. 44.

not be much difference among the six stations in the proportion of foreign film content of their programs. Figures in Table 3 indicate that foreign program content ranged from 14% to 36%. This clearly indicates that there is no clear-cut uniformity in the proportion of imported programs they use. Each station appears to use as many foreign or imported programs as it wishes (Farounbi, 1979/80, p. 1).

The television dependency on foreign importations continued as indicated by the evidence presented according to type of program below.

As can be seen from the data in Table 4, a considerable amount of imported television programs is used in Nigerian television programming. In fact, 52.9% of imported television programs are shown on Nigerian television compared to 47.1% of local programs. Although there are more local television programs than imported television programs altogether, the dominance of imported television programs in entertainment is very important. This is because most imported television programs are mostly entertainment in nature (McLellan, 1987, p. 607). At 73% the extent of use of imported entertainment programs is the highest in all African countries (Varis, 1984 p. 151). However, the data present a problem because they do not give information of the percentage of imported television programs in the various regional television stations, which will definitely be different, as shown in the percentage of various regional network television stations reported by Farounbi (1979/80, p. 54).

At present, the NTA has stipulated that foreign programs should not be more than 30%, but then, the general manager of the television station has the prerogative in deciding whether to broadcast 10, 20, 25, or 30% of the foreign programs (Rosen, 1988, p. 29) Most of the NTA stations produce more than 70% local programming because of their location in the states and

Table 4

Breakdown of Local and Foreign Program Types

Program Type	% Local	% Foreign	% of Total Output
News, Current Affairs and Sports	100 (35)	-- (0)	29.1 (35)
Public Enlightenment (including community broadcasts)	94.3 (33)	5.7 (2)	29.1 (35)
Entertainment	47.1 (24)	52.9 (37)	44.8 (51)
TOTAL	76.2 (92)	23.34 (29)	100 (121)

Source: Farounbi, 1979/80, p. 20.

regions with various ethnic groups of Nigeria (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 123).

However, combined with these changes once again are the increase in imported foreign programs. For instance, when one television station introduced 50% new programs in its program schedule, there were 45 foreign programs for weeks, and the only 17 television programs selected for promotion were all imported foreign programs (Igbinedion, 1985, p. 105). This indicates that the

dependence on imported foreign programs is still a prevalent problem in Nigerian television.

The furor over the importation of television programs has to do with firstly, what is transferred to Nigeria with it. Nigeria's particular concern is the transfer of the culture of the foreign country which exports the television programs in Nigeria.

The Nigerian television is criticized for being a conduit for the introduction of foreign cultural values into the Nigerian society (Balogun, 1985, p. 132; Opubor, 1985, p. 125). Furthermore, most of the imported television programs shown on Nigerian television are in no way related to the realities of the Nigerian situation (Igbinedion, 1985, p. 105; Okonkwo, 1986, p. 111; Wilcox, 1975, p. 89). Secondly, this dependence on imported programming adversely affects the traditional cultural values of Nigerians who view the imported programs (McLellan, 1987, p. 60; Nzekwu & Mgbemena, 1985, p. 57).

The reasons for this dependence on imported foreign programs by Nigerian television are related to such factors as finance, training, the Western domination of the international flow of television programs, the lack of a definite national policy for Nigerian television. How these factors determine the extent of dependence on

the importation of foreign programs is considered in greater detail below.

### Nigerian Television Financing

Nigerian television is financed from the following sources: government subventions, commercial advertising, and sponsorship (Anonymous, 1989).

The Nigerian television's financial system makes it extremely dependent. Reasons and more details about these are given below.

#### Government Subventions

Government grants or subventions constitute the most predominant source of funding television stations in most African countries, including Nigeria (Anonymous, 1989, p. 6). Both the federal and state governments have been financing television. Since 1977-1986, the first ten years, since it was established, Federal government has funded NTA to the tune of N496.53 million (U.S. \$402 million). Since then, the annual allocations rose from N27.88 million in 1977-78 to N69 million in 1981. It then declined in 1982 to N68.7 million and continued to decline to a further N29 million in 1987 (without consideration of the inflation rate and the devaluation of the Naira) (see Table 5) (Anonymous, 1989, p. 9). If, for example, the effect of devaluation is taken into account, the funding for 1987 will amount to U.S. \$7.08

million as compared to a ten-year coverage of U.S. \$44.2 million at the rate of (U.S.\$1 = N5) (Anonymous, 1989, p. 28). If then calculated before the devaluation of the Naira, the subvention will be at least N5 million Naira (p. 9). Moreover, the government's grants from 1977-86 represent 77.59% of the total revenue and 72.68% of the total expenditure of NTA. However, these subventions have not been enough. This is because the Nigerian government adjusts or increases the grants that it usually makes to the NTA television stations in order to keep up with the effects of inflation. As a result, the government has drastically cut the subventions because diminishing revenues and financial resources (Anonymous, 1989, p. 10). A close look at NTA's 1983-87 income statement in Table 6 highlights this financial problem. In 1987, the N29 million grant which was 43% of the total television revenues and 32% of the total expenditures, was surpassed for the first time by a commercial revenue of N33 million which was 49.7% of total television revenues and 36.7% of television expenditures (Anonymous, 1989, p. 29).

Evidence indicates that the decrease of government grants or subventions began back in 1978. Mr. Yemi Farounbi, General Manager of Nigerian Television, Ibadan, offered explanations for this as follow:



Table 5

Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) Revenues

Year	Government Subvention (Naira)	Internally Generated Revenue (Naira)	Total Revenue (Naira)
1977/78	27,882,578	3,673,033	31,555,611
1978/79	25,718,072	6,683,827	32,401,899
1979/80	24,780,810	9,886,129	34,666,939
1980	68,700,00	10,955,520	79,655,520
1981	69,030,000	17,697,352	86,727,352
1982	68,700,100	16,856,058	85,589,158
1983	55,028,700	16,856,739	71,885,439
1984	61,774,400	11,981,234	73,755,634
1985	48,000,000	18,974,891	66,974,891
1986	46,913,056	29,699,363	76,612,419
TOTAL	496,257,716	143,264,146	636,924,862

Source: NTA (Anonymous, 1989).

Note: US \$1 = N5.00.

Table 6

Nigerian Television Authority Headquarters--Income Statement 1983-1987

Details	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)
Federal Government Subvention	55,028,700	61,774,400	48,000,000	46,913,056	29,019,545
Commercial Income	12,692,321	7,944,382	14,710,790	24,950,841	33,114,013
Other Income	4,164,418	4,036,852	4,264,101	4,748,522	4,274,467
Total Revenue	71,885,439	73,755,634	66,974,891	76,612,419	66,408,025

Source: N.T.A.

Note: US \$1 = N5.00

Nigerian Television has literally been starved of money. In 1978/79, Nigerian Television with ten old stations, and 3-4 developing ones had about N24m. By 1979/80, Nigerian Television with 19 stations, 6 Zonal centers, 1 News production outfit and one national headquarters had N21 million. Progressively, the amount available to each Station got reduced. For example, NTV Ibadan had N2.1 million in 1977/78, N1.9 million in 1978/79, and N1.8 million in 1979/80 as subvention from Government. Under such conditions, it is very difficult for the station to make good programmes. Their subvention is probably about enough to pay salaries and wages (Farounbi, 1979/80, p. 53).

Moreover, the main reason why the subventions are not enough is that the NTA requires at least N208 million to operate adequately. Its average annual subvention of N48 million is less than a quarter of its minimum needs (Anonymous, 1989, pp. 12-14).

It is interesting to note in Table 6 that while government subvention to NTA has fluctuated between 1983 and 1986, its total revenue has remained above N66 million and was in excess of N71 million in 1983, 1984, and 1986. Thus this is largely due to the fact that its internally generated revenue has increased from N10.9 million to 29.7 million in 1986. Yet government subvention as noted above has decreased to the extent that it is just enough to pay staff salaries. This is very likely due to the fact that in Nigeria revenue earnings by parastatals by government corporations or departments, are usually paid into the Treasury and not plowed back into the funds for their operations (Okigbo, personal communication, March 14, 1989).

There are two major consequences of government funding. Firstly, there is government interference in the operations of the television stations and in the program content. For instance, Bredin (1982, p. 3) has noted:

That control over their own national broadcasting system is based in the first instance, on the fact that African governments pay for them. A leading member of Nigeria's military government is credited with putting the relationship between the government and broadcasters at its crudest when he is alleged to have remarked that he who pays the piper calls the tune.

This particularly indicates the most serious consequence of government subventions--the loss of freedom of expression in Nigerian television. Secondly, there is government interference with the staffings of NTA. The result is that government top brass fill the television stations with civil servants of their own choice, who do not necessarily have to have the proper qualifications (Bredin, 1982, p. 3).

### Advertising

Television stations are also funded by advertising in Nigeria. In fact Nigeria, as a country, has an annual advertising expenditure of N300 million. Out of this, the NTA has consistently generated a lot of money which amounted to N33 million in 1987 from advertising (see Table 6) (Anonymous, 1989, p. 15). Moreover, even though the difference is small, NTA generated more revenue from

advertising at slightly over N33 million than from government subventions which then was N29,019,545 (Anonymous, 1989, p. 15).

Advertising is a good alternative source of funding, but Nigerian television receives revenues both from the federal or state governments, as well as from advertising. But even though advertising is a good alternative to government funding, there are complaints against advertising, because of the fear that this will make television too much commercialized to the extent that television will lose its public service function to the country (Anonymous, 1989, pp. 14-15). This is because if advertising is not closely guarded, the commercial goals of advertising will probably override the objectives of public service (Anonymous, 1989, p. 15). Kangwana (1986, p. 264) explains this further by stating that broadcasting organizations in Africa are not established to generate funds, but to provide information for society. This is because these organizations are supported by direct government subvention (Kangwana, 1986, p. 264).

Furthermore, advertising could pose a threat to culture. Janus (1983, p. 29) reported that advertising is a vehicle for the transfer of transnational culture. Janus (p. 29-30) reported that the results of a study by Thizier Seya carried out on the role of transnational

advertising on cultures in Ivory Coast indicated that transnational firms such as Colgate and Nestle helped replace the traditional products, which were cheaper and more effective with "industrialized toothpastes and infant formulas."

Furthermore, the Seya study (Janus, 1983, pp. 29-30) revealed that Ivorians became more consumers of Coca Cola, Nestle products, Marlboro, Maggi Colgate or Revlon. Adesonaye (1990, p. 68) observes that multinational corporations who tout products for advertising mostly encourage consumerism in the advertisements they sponsor. Adesonaye (1990, p. 68) adds that while such consumerism is appropriate for developed countries, they are not appropriate for developing countries. This is because advertisements stimulate the economy (Adesonaye, 1990, p. 68; Kangwana, 1986, p. 264), and in the case of developing countries, the national economy usually cannot support the consumption patterns which advertising could stimulate (Adesonaye, 1990, p. 68).

Furthermore, vital cultural values could be destroyed by advertising. For instance, the Seya study reported that advertisements in the Ivory Coast showed skin-lightening products which according to Janus (1986, p. 29) convinced the African women "to be ashamed of their own color and try to be white." Seya concluded that Ivorians were destroying their dignity as human

beings--their racial identity by believing those advertisements (Janus, 1986, p. 30). Other cultural values which the advertisements eroded was respect for the elders. Advertising changed the attitude toward aging. Ivorian women feared looking older, and the result was that the traditional respect for elders was destroyed (Janus, 1986, p. 30). Moreover, usually Ivorians drink liquor in collective settings. But, the Coca Cola and Heinekens advertisements promoted drinking as an individual (p. 30). Kangwana (1986, p. 264) warned that for advertising to be effective as sponsorship in developing countries, there should be certain defined codes of conduct (which at present Kangwana has observed most African nations do not have) to guard against the reinforcement of racial and sexual stereotypes and to promote appropriate cultural values. Apparently, such was not the case in Ivory Coast. However, until Nigerian television comes up with a better alternative, advertising still is the best choice against government funding when Nigerian television is no longer under government control. Definitely, in Nigeria's situation, government funds are not enough, thus advertising had to be added as a source of funding.

Furthermore, without advertising some of the cost of television services will go directly to the viewers, all of whom might not be able to pay for the costs because

most people are poor, and it will be too expensive for them.

### Sponsorship

Some locally produced programs, such as "Magna Jari Ce," "Cock Crow At Dawn," and "Things Fall Apart" have been sponsored programs (Anonymous, 1989, p. 20). This particular source of funding for Nigerian television is not enough because local production of television programs is very expensive. As a result, according to Farounbi (p. 53), it is much cheaper to buy a sequence of foreign films than to produce them locally. However, Farounbi has further observed that the foreign film distributors go as far as deliberately reducing the cost of the program they are selling so as to make it more economically attractive to the country to buy the imported television programs. It is, therefore, very difficult for any Nigerian television station to avoid the use of imported foreign programs which are significantly cheaper than locally prepared ones in view of constant budgeting deficiencies. In 1970, Nigeria was charged between \$35 and \$40 for a half-hour episode and between \$80 and \$100 for a feature film (Variety, 1976, in Farounbi (1979/80, pp. 54-55).

The second major consequence of shortage of funds is that due to the fact that their finances are limited,



investigative reporting is almost nonexistent. As a result, any of the stories reported on Nigerian television are shared with other Nigerian mass media, namely newspapers, magazines and the radio, all of which report the same stories. But this often results in different interpretations and manner of rendering of the same news items (Mytton, 1983, p. 126). This is because the news costs more per hour than actual production, even though they are less in hours than the original drama and variety productions. The cost production of news productions per hour as a ratio of all program costs per hour for television is 2.6% compared to 8.2% of the news department budget, as the percentage of total station budget (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 74).

Not only is there a lack of resources, but often such lacks present problems ranging from those of transportation to a news scene, to problems in the news studio and lack of film crew (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 73).

Nigeria's financial nightmare with television stems from a major fact that television takes a large amount of the limited communications budgets which most African countries have (McLellan, 1987, p. 60). Furthermore, television is very expensive to operate and as a result, the most adequate programs, which will help most African countries such as producing programs locally, which

satisfy the needs of a majority of the television viewers, in both rural and urban is virtually impossible (McLellan, 1987, pp. 60-61).

#### International Television Program Flow/Sales

Major developed countries, such as the United States and Britain, have not only dominated the flow of television programs to the whole world, but have had much success in doing this in Nigeria. In fact, the United States and Britain have very strong influence on Nigerian television (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974, p. 31). Overall, African countries import at least 10% of television programs from the United States (p. 32). The United States does have a global monopoly in exporting television programs worldwide, particularly in movies, entertainment and sports (Varis, 1984). The United Kingdom through BBC produced programs is the second largest exporter of foreign television programs (pp. 33-34).

Major developed countries, such as the United States and Britain, have not only dominated the flow of television programs in the whole world, but have had much success in doing this in Nigeria. In fact, television programs from the United States and Britain have had a strong influence in Nigerian television (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974, p. 31). It is this dominance by the United

United States in the exportation of its television programs which makes it possible for the United States to strongly influence the cultures in other countries because it is a powerful and economically successful country. United States television programs are shown in every country (Guback, in Gerbner & Siefert, 1984, p. 155). This dominance became so serious, a concern that in June, 1977, cultural penetration of the United States into other countries was the topic of a hearing of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The hearing did no good because the United States government did not take any action on the matter. The United States government did not care about the adverse effect of the dominance of the United States on foreign cultures and industries. Instead the major concern seemed to be on how to stop restrictions which impinged on expansion and increase in the number of foreign market shares of the American film corporations (Guback, 1984, pp. 155-156).

Furthermore, the United States government has been the major supporter of the dominance of United States multinational film corporations in the world. The government approved the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act in 1918, which makes it possible for companies which are competitive in the American market to form a Cartel for foreign trade. This Act was protected from Anti-Trust laws. Moreover, the Act made it possible for the

information of the Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA) in June 1945. The MPEAA brought together major program exporters who wanted to market their products in foreign countries (Guback, 1984, p. 156).

So far the MPEAA has accounted for more than 80% of the total U.S. foreign sales of television programs (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974, p. 32).

It was also possible under the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act for two major motion picture companies to establish two joint-trading associations to develop the African market for American films. The result was the creation of the America Motion Picture Export Company (Africa) or AMPECA in April, 1961, to cater to five English-speaking countries which included Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (Guback, 1984, p. 157; Guback in Gerbner, 1977, p. 36).

AMPECA was also created because the West African market was considered too small to carry out independent operations by any American company. Thus, AMPECA provided a base for centralized distribution of American films. However, this posed another problem--that of monopoly. This is because in 1970, "it has been AMPECA's policy (in Northern Nigeria) that if any exhibitor showed another company's pictures without AMPECA's consent, suppliers to this exhibitor would be stopped" (Guback, 1984, p. 157).

In addition to this, Western countries control the technology of information flow and by and large dictate content of the media (Opubor & Nwuneli, 1985, p. 37).

The foreign news agencies, which currently dominate the news information worldwide include: The Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), Agence France Press (AFP), TASS and Reuters (Gueye, 1988, p. 1660). These same news agencies have always dominated the news scene (Hachten, 1971, p. 51). It got this way because of colonialism.

It should be carefully observed that the impact of colonization on the transfer of television as a communication technology should not be ignored. Despite the fact that Nigeria has gained political independence, the impact of colonialism will still continue to have an effect on the Nigerian mass media. Altschull (1984, p. 153) calls the impact of colonization a more "subtle domination," and cites television and advertising as the new weapons used as exploration by developed countries to "blot out cultures, traditions, and history." This impact of colonialism should not be ignored because it is the major factor which started media dependency and cultural imperialism in developing countries such as Nigeria, the case study of this paper. For instance, most of the European governments established communication facilities between their home capitals and

those of their colonial territories so as to facilitate communication to and from their colonial territories. The major cities involved most of which are capitals in Africa include: Nairobi, Salisbury, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Lagos (Nigeria) Accra, Freetown, Cairo, and Khartoum, Dakar, Abidjan, Brazzaville, Tananarive and Kinhasa (Hachten, 1971, p. 57).

Currently, Africa as a continent, has severe problems in expanding the mass communication industries which would help all African countries to exert a stronger influence which would balance international news flow. Africa possesses only 0.1% of a geostationary satellite time, and a very few broadcast frequency bands (Gueye, 1988, p. 1661). The problem with this is emphasized by Gueye who noted that "In 1983, Africa as a whole had only 970 radio transmitters out of a world total of more than 30,000; and 370 television transmitters out of a world total of more than 54,000" (p. 1661). It follows that Africa accounts for 3.2% of the world's radio transmitters and 0.1% of the world's television transmitters, even though it accounts for 11.6% of the world population. With this major predicament, the Western nations have every opportunity to dominate the world information order.

To curb this domination, Nigeria founded the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) in 1976 (Duyile, 1979, p. 120).

However, the problem of dependency remains somewhat pervasive. NAN, because it is government owned, is once again dependent on government and is subject to its control. As a result, such government controlled agencies as NAN could disseminate government statements as news (Nzekwu & Mgbemena, 1985, p. 60). But government control of NAN cannot be avoided because it is very expensive to operate a news agency privately. Not only this, in developing countries, most media operations are money-losing ventures (Nzekwu & Mgbemena, 1985, p. 60). Although NAN is government controlled, it would be better for Nigeria to own its own news agency than to depend on the Western news agencies.

#### Training for Nigerian Television

Nigerian broadcast journalists had no choice but to depend on the Western model of training in broadcast journalism. The major reason is that Nigeria was a colony of the United Kingdom, and had to depend on the United Kingdom for training in different disciplines and professions.

With colonization came the transfer of the British system of education, which was and is still the model used predominantly in most Nigerian schools, colleges, polytechnics and universities. The goal of British colonialism and colonial education was, in the words of a

former colonial governor, to turn the African into a "fair-minded Englishman" (Murphy & Scotton, 1987, p. 14). Sadly, this goal has not undergone any significant change in most former British colonies, such as Nigeria (Murphy & Scotton, 1987, pp. 13-14). This is even more so in Francophone, Africa.

It is in this way that dependence of Nigerian television on the manner in which Nigerian broadcast journalists are trained began. At first, it started that linkage of broadcasting programs with the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). Training began automatically with the transfer of the BBC television model. Most of the broadcasters were trained in the Nigerian television stations by British expatriates who initially managed the Nigerian television station (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 180). This training did not change even after Nigeria received her independence from Britain in 1960.

From training in the Nigerian television stations, training shifted to overseas. However, at that time, training was reserved for the highly older, mature broadcasters who wanted to broaden their skills to an advanced level (Kolade, 1974, p. 87). Such reliance on foreign expertise through training as an aspect of foreign and technical assistance was referred to by the owner (Lord Thomson) of one of the organizations who trained Nigerians for broadcast journalism as some kind



of foreign exchange which is specifically called "invisible exports" for Britain (Ainslie, 1967, p. 181). Television training was received at Thomson Foundation College in Glasgow which trained 37 Nigerians and the Center for Educational Development Overseas and the BBC in London. Other countries where training has been received, include Egypt, Japan, the United States, and Western Germany (Kolade 1974, p. 87; Head, 1974, p. 280).

Broadcast journalism training, along with journalism training, took a new turn in 1960. This was when the University of Nigeria at Nsukka, the first university in Tropical Africa with a degree program in journalism was established in 1960. UNN was established with American advice and assistance. It offered three-and four-year programs and a one-year diploma for university graduates closely related to the courses offered at American journalism schools (Scotton, 1974, p. 286).

The American style of UNN was chosen because Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the NCNC, the party in power in Eastern Nigeria and then editor and founder of the West African Pilot felt that the British system of education just did not meet Africa's needs. He preferred the vocational orientation of American land grant universities. Therefore, in 1960, he adopted the land grant model and established a special relationship with Michigan State University. Under this contract, Michigan

Michigan State University with American aid, supplied everything used in establishing everything, including the structure, staff, journalism program and the curriculum (Murphy & Scotton, 1987, p. 14). After being briefly interrupted by the Nigerian Civil War, the University of Nigeria resumed operation in 1970 and has continued to this day.

In 1969 the Lagos University Institute of Mass Communication established a three-year degree program and a one-year diploma program in 1967, for experienced journalists (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 180; Scotton, 1974, p. 287).

In 1971, the University Lagos offered the only university degree program to emphasize substantial amount of broadcast training. In 1972, half of its 90 degree and 25 diploma students were enrolled in broadcast training (Scotton, 1974, p. 287).

Sometimes the training was in the form of gifts, such as this project gift to Nigeria. The project was called MATE (Modern Aids to Education). Under contract it lasted from 1963-68. The Washington County School Board, Hagerstown, Maryland, was chosen to help four educational institutions in the Federal Territory, and the Eastern, Western, and Northern regions with instructional television (Head, 1974, p. 229).

MATE's goal was to establish a film library for the school's broadcasting, and give advice and training in the development of the broadcasting units. Also, MATE employed consultants for special services and donated various communication facilities: 200 radio and 75 television receivers, seven video tape records, vehicles, generators, sound-recording equipment, photographic gear, graphic materials and other back-up items (Head, 1974, pp. 230-231).

The training through the MATE project was not altogether successful, and created various dependency problems for Nigerian television. This is because the foreign experts had to deal with working with four different ministries, different levels of commitment to the project and the political unrest of 1966 (Head, 1974, p. 230).

Another form of aid which was given to Nigeria was the instructional television. Nigeria was the first pioneer of the instructional television in sub-Saharan Africa (Nwankwo, 1974, p. 300). Instructional Television began with the Western Region of Nigeria which first used educational television in 1959, followed by Northern Nigeria in 1961, and the Federal National Broadcasting Corporation in 1965 (p. 300). The instructional television was introduced as an educational investment (p. 300). It was based on its educational objective that

USAID decided in an agreement to sponsor the project in 1962 (p. 300). When the project began between 1962 and 1967, USAID donated \$900,000 to the project (p. 300).

However, it was not a successful project because there were several problems which Nwankwo (pp. 300-301) described as follows:

- (a) frequent power failures
- (b) finding suitable time from the commercial stations to air educational programs
- (c) interrupted transmission or reception or both
- (d) nearly three-quarters of the receiving sets for the schools were broken during delivery
- (e) The ITV programs had little impact when it was shown to the schools. This problem had to do with the fact that they were not utilized as methods of direct teaching.
- (f) Some of the British expatriate teachers openly showed their disgust for instructional television and their resentment of the presence of the American experts.

Crippled by the above problems, the USAID stopped giving funds from the program (Nwankwo, 1974, pp. 300-301). Apparently, how this project will fit into the Nigerian situation was clearly not given due consideration before USAID went into this project.

However, Nigeria should have the greater blame for USAID's failure because the top Nigerian officials in the regional ministries were not committed to the project. The expatriates had to do most of the work themselves

because workers were not assigned to them. An example of such a situation was a graphic artist who after working alone for 18 months was just assigned an assistant by the regional ministry just two weeks before the contract ended (Head, 1974, pp. 364-365). In addition, some foreign experts had to waste their time looking for housing, transportation, office space, supplies, clear commodities through customs, take care of the budget and operational decisions during this project (Head, 1974, pp. 364-365). Thus this aid was hindered internally more by the actions of the Nigerians receiving the aid. This is because if they had been more committed to the project, they would have made sure it turned out successfully. This is an example of "deceptive reciprocation" which is a situation whereby the problems inherent in the self-centeredness and ethnocentrism of the donor country (in this case, the United States) is gravely hindered by the lack of reciprocation in the host country (in this case, Nigeria). What predominantly happens is that when the project starts, experts from the host country find nobody to advise (Head, 1974, p. 364).

Nigerian television could not then benefit from these people who were half-trained or not trained at all because they were not committed to the project at all. In most cases in Nigeria, it is these same people who will be required to operate the television stations in

the country since they are the ones who will be in control of the program. Thus, Nigerians have only themselves to blame.

There are serious consequences for the broadcast journalists who receive training in Nigeria or overseas. Only the geographical location is different, but the curriculum is almost the same as the overseas curriculum in which those on the Nigerian universities are based. Broadcast journalism students trained in Nigeria, adopt the same philosophy as those trained abroad and they even analyze Nigerian situations according to their Westernized broadcasting training (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 195). The major problem is not the training, but that the training is not being made relevant to the various Nigerian situations that the broadcast journalist will be dealing with. One aspect of this situation is that the television stations are under federal and state government control. Thus, the kind of autonomy, individuality and creativity promoted by American and British journalism, their philosophy does not just exist in Nigeria as several restrictions on broadcast journalists are presently in effect in the country.

Another problem is that the broadcast journalists cannot effectively apply their training because most of their techniques are not applicable due to the fact that they are more technically advanced in training than the

resources available for them to use (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 191). Such restrictions lead to a scarcity in the amount of talented broadcast journalists a television station could hire. The major problem is that they cannot be hired as most Nigerian television services are not adequately funded (see Nigerian Television Financing section of this paper). Without adequate funding, how can a broadcast journalist work conveniently? Preparation of television programs are extremely very expensive. Furthermore, in extreme cases, many broadcast journalists do not come back to Nigeria because of the low pay. Instead, they become broadcast journalists in foreign countries where they are better paid and have the freedom to control their work (Farounbi, 1979/80, p. 12).

A third major consequence is that Europe and the United States influenced Nigerian journalism education in two ways (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 180). Most of the journalism schools in Nigeria are set up according to European and American mass media values, skills, and standards, which were usually those of the professional communication (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 180). Although there were journalism schools in Nigeria, many journalists could not find a place in these schools. Their alternative, then, was either to go for training abroad, by going to a foreign college or university or taking a correspondence course (Golding & Elliott, 1979,

p. 180). The correspondence courses did not give adequate journalism training because it did not focus specifically on journalism. Rather, it focused on several general education fields (Golding & Elliott, 1979, pp. 180-181). British and American schools of Journalism exploited the need for Nigerian journalists to go abroad to study. They had large scale operations, according to Golding and Elliott (1979, p. 181). An example was the School of Television and Journalism based on one of the English Home Counties which claimed that it did not accept fewer than 350 pupils from Nigeria. The cost of these programs is usually very expensive. In addition, even the local courses offered in Nigeria were claimed by many journalists to be very expensive. These overseas courses, in addition to the courses offered at the journalism schools in Nigeria were usually extremely very expensive. The journalists had no other alternative but to take these courses (Golding & Elliott, 1979, p. 181).

Lastly, the older journalists in Nigeria, who were not university graduates, did not consider a university program very important. They often consider the university-trained recruits as a threat to their own advancement. As a result, many university graduates were not hired (Scotton, 1974, p. 285). This considerably reduced the number of well-trained, talented broadcast



journalists who could contribute immensely to television services in Nigeria.

#### Nigerian Television Policy

From February 13, 1976 to 1979, General Olusegun Obasanjo was the Nigerian ruler. Under his military regime, all the television stations, including NBC-TV were all taken away by the federal government on April 1, 1976, but each station was permitted to operate under its Board of Governors until the Nigerian Television Authority came into existence on April 1, 1977 (Ladele et al., 1979, pp. 102-103). It was in 1977, as stated above, that Nigerian television services history turned a new page. The military decree No. 24 of April, 1977, established the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) to

1. operate as the only sole television authority in Nigeria with the power to carry out television broadcasting and represent the federal government nationwide (Oduko, 1987, p. 8; Rosen, 1988, p. 226)

2. take over all the ten existing state-owned television stations (Oduko, 1987, p. 8; Rosen, 1988, p. 226)

3. plan for, establish, and operate new stations in the state capitals which had no television stations (Oduko, 1987, p. 8).

The NTA 1977 military No. 24 Decree addresses several issues. However, the focus of this study will be on the sections of the decree which deal with how Nigerian culture should be reflected and portrayed on Nigerian television and the content and type of these programs. First, the functions of this decree regarding the protection of Nigerian culture is as follows:

The Authority shall ensure that the services which it provides, when considered as a whole reflect the unity of Nigeria as a Federation and at the same time give adequate expression to the culture, characteristics, and affairs of each State, Zone, or other part of the federation (Article 6-2, NTA Decree, 1977 in Okonkwo, 1986, p. 401).

This section specifically ensures that the languages and cultures of the various ethnic groups represented by zones, state, or otherwise will be portrayed on television. However, it does not specifically state how the cultures or languages will be represented on Nigerian television in order for such portrayals to be regarded as "adequate." Also, how "adequate" these representations of the Nigerian ethnic groups is, is not further defined by the policy.

Furthermore, the statement "the unity of Nigeria as a federation" is vague. It could be interpreted according to any philosophy, opinion, or definition.

Secondly, the section of the 1977 NTA decree which specifically guards the content and type of programs aired on Nigerian Television states:

- a) that all NTA programs should not include anything in the NTA programs which is likely to offend against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to disorder to be offensive to public feeling, or to contain any offensive representation of, or reference to, a living person
- b) that the programs maintain a proper balance in their subject matter and a generally high standard of quality
- c) that any news given in the programs (in whatever form) is presented with accuracy, impartiality, and objectivity
- d) that due impartiality is preserved in respect of matters of political or industrial controversy or relating to current public policy
- e) that subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the programs should not be solely designed just to serve the major interests of any political party (NTA DECREE 1977, Article 9-1 and 9-2, in Okonkwo, 1986, pp. 115, 403).

This means that when programs of political parties are ever included in television programs, the views and policies of the political parties and the utilization of the facilities of the party representatives should be presented in a fair and equal manner.

This section of the decree which pertains specifically to the type of television programs shown on Nigerian Television could again be interpreted according to any opinion, philosophy, or definition. For instance, someone's interpretation of what "good taste" or "decency" means is totally different from another person's. In addition, the decree does not stipulate that imported television programs should not be aired on

television. This is significant, since most Nigerians find imported television programs offensive because of the violent and sexual content of most of these programs.

Moreover, it is surprising that this particular section which deals with the reflection of television programs does not make any mention regarding the portrayal of Nigerian culture in Nigerian Television programs. This is important since this particular section deals with television programming which has the most potent impact on the portrayal of Nigerian culture. This is because the imported television programs pose the most threat to Nigerian culture, as stated earlier.

Moreover, the significant impact of the military decree No. 24, 1977, as a whole is that it caused Nigeria to be divided into six districts called zones. Each zone operates several television stations (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 115).

While the 1977 decree was excellent for organizing ethnic groups in Nigeria, it did not foster national integrations (Okonkwo, 1986, p. 123). To make matters worse, during the implementation of this policy from 1979-1983, another government came into power. This time it was a civilian government which was led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari. It was under this government that the influence of state-owned stations increased tremendously as stated above (Rosen, 1988, p. 227).

With a different government came different interpretations to the Nigerian policy, as portrayed by the prevalent government intervention, which has been indicated by this study.

Furthermore, the federal and state governments directly remained the major policy makers for Nigerian television at this period. However, it seemed that they carried out their government policies through a representative, a commissioner, whose directions were to be adhered to by the Nigerian Television Authority according to all matters. (Article 13 of the NTA 1977 DECREE (NTA in Okonkwo, 1986, p. 405).

However, in the article, the policy makers of the Nigerian Television Authority, as stipulated by Article 2 of the NTA 1977 decree, consists of:

1. a chairman
2. the chairman of each Zonal Board
3. the Director General of the Nigerian Television Authority
4. one representative of the Federal Ministry of Information
5. one person to represent women's organizations in Nigeria
6. six persons with experience in the mass media, education, management, financial matters, engineering, and arts and cultures (p. 400).

The actual policy makers, as stated above, did not carry out any of the policies without the approval of the government. How much control the government wielded can only be determined from the statements of the Nigerian broadcast journalists, researchers, and as indicated earlier, the establishment of new television at this period. In addition, this increase in television stations was not for the benefit of the Nigerian people, but for the benefit of the Nigerian Federal Government.

In December 31, 1983, the Shagari administration was overthrown in a military coup. The Buhari military regime took control as the new Nigerian government. Moreover, from 1984 to 1985, Buhari, himself, was overthrown, and the present military regime of President Ibrahim Babangida took control. It seems that major concerns were shown by both the Nigerian governments and Nigerian broadcasters regarding the role Nigerian Television should be playing at this period in Nigerian society. This is because at the National Communication Policy Seminar of February 1, 1987, at Badagary, Lagos, the federal government of Nigeria suggested that the content of Nigerian Television should portray the following objectives:

1. The exploitation of Television's ability to arouse emotions for the establishment and fostering of a national conscience and for routine campaigning against negative values and tendencies in the society

2. Direction of news and documentaries away from the merely titillating and entertaining events, to events with evident social reform potentialities
3. The extensive use of documentaries and cartoons for the general education of the society, especially in the areas of functional literacy, acquisition of skills and proper adjustment in the society
4. Television program should serve to instill indigenous values (rather than alien ones), the spirit of hard work, patriotism, and confidence in the youth and other members of the nation
5. Elimination of commercials that employ foreign models, characters and settings, as these have the potential of subverting efforts at establishing and fostering pride and confidence in the nation, its cultures, people, and instructions (Anonymous, 1989, pp. 7-8).

This suggestion is much better than the NTA Decree of 1977 because it specifically states what the Nigerian Television program content should avoid. They are very specific and do not have many interpretations.

Furthermore, these suggestions indicate how potent television is becoming as a media in Nigerian society. Thereby it establishes the impact it already has in the Nigerian society.

In addition, Nigeria's cultural policy, which was enacted in the same year with the above suggestions, stipulates that television should be used for:

- a. Projecting Nigerian arts and culture and value system,
- b. Enhancing national consciousness and self-reliance by:

1. producing at least eighty percent (80%) of its program content locally,
2. making its program content relevant to Nigerian realities, history, and achievements, and
3. giving adequate attention and coverage to children, public service and cultural programs (Anonymous, 1989, pp. 8-9).

Moreover, Nigeria's cultural policy, which was enacted in the same year with the above suggestions, stipulates what television should be used for. The intentions portrayed by the policy are excellent. It stipulates that Nigerian television should specifically make Nigerian cultures continuous in the Nigerian society by predominantly portraying it on Nigerian television. However, it still fails to:

1. note that there are various Nigerian cultures because Nigeria is a multilingual society with three ethnic groups. Thus it is wrong to state that Nigerian Television should be used for "Projecting Nigerian arts and culture and value system," as the Cultural Policy of Nigeria states.

2. Nigerian television should produce 100% of its local programs instead of the stipulated 80% mentioned in Section b(1) of the cultural policy. If 80% of Nigerian television programs are produced locally, the remaining 20% leaves room for some dependence on imported television programs. Such is the case right now,



according to Dr. Victoria Ezeokoli, Director of Programs of the Nigerian Television Authority, who stated that a maximum of 20% of the total output on Nigerian Television is foreign produced (Ezeokoli, 1984, p. 1).

Moreover, amid the proposed suggestions and the enactment of the cultural policy, Nigerian television continues to rely on imported television programs. For instance, when one television station introduced 50% of its new programs in its program schedule, there were 45 foreign programs for weeks, and the only 17 television program selected for promotion were all imported foreign programs (Igbinedion, 1985, p. 105) This indicates that the dependence on imported television programs is still a prevalent problem in Nigerian television. The adoption of a strong cultural policy is very important to maintaining Nigeria's culture. For instance, Kangwana (1986, p. 261) observed that

Broadcasting in any society is a cultural medium. It is a forum through which cultural values, including the performing arts, are given expression. It was noted that many African broadcasting organizations fail to give adequate support to their own cultures. Many of them are dominated by alien cultural products.

This conclusion is supported by the current observations presented in this paper regarding Nigerian television programming.

Nigeria's case is unique because the government as policy makers are also responsible for the resources

which will make it possible to implement the individual policy statements and objectives. Moreover, the control of the Nigerian government over television control, ownership, and accessibility was not only extremely necessary, but very significant when Nigeria was fighting for her independence from the British colonists.

This was because the various Nigerian regional governments then used the media to mobilize the Nigerian people to fight for their freedom. A vivid example is the establishment of the Western Nigeria Television (WNTV) by Chief Awolowo as a way to get his opinion heard by the people since he was denied access to the national radio station by the British colonial government in power. It should be noted that WNTV was a catalyst in the establishment of Nigerian television service. After its beginnings, other regional governments established their own television. At that period, there was lot of dissatisfaction with the British colonial government, thus television was a changing agent toward the fight for Nigeria's freedom. Then, Nigeria's national sovereignty had to be protected and prevented from stepping into further colonial abuse by the British and as a result, it was right for the government to own the television. It should be recognized that the regional governments was a well organized group of Nigerian people who were the only Nigerians well equipped and knowledgeable to fight the

British for independence. It has been more than 25 years since this happened. Nigeria has received her independence and the government has served its purpose. Nigeria no longer needs the government in terms of operating and managing its television systems, even though the government might be needed to enforce the laws. However, there is still some support for government ownership today because some Nigerians feel that if television were privatized, only a few individuals or groups would have the accessibility to start a television station (Okwudishu, 1988, pp. 129-129). In addition, the individuals who probably will receive ownership will be those individuals who have the same interest with the government which will make privatization possible. Thus, in such a situation, some feel that government ownership is justified. A writer who agrees that if Nigerian Television should be under government control although it is for different reasons is Edeani (1985, p. 50). Edeani states that ethnic, economic and political problems justify government ownership. Edeani (p. 50) uses a developed country, such as the United States, as an example by stating that the United States government has owned and still owns certain broadcasting facilities since 1920. He explains that these broadcasting facilities have been set up on college and university campuses as "public" broadcasting stations

public affairs programming which are important to the nation. The commercial interests were ignoring such programming. Thus, Edeani (1985, p. 50) does observe that Nigeria's justification in the ownership of broadcasting facilities should not be a monopoly of the ownership of these facilities. This method will not be successful in Nigeria because of the dominance of the Nigerian government as policy makers in the financing and operations of Nigerian Television.

Today a look at government ownership and control since it helped Nigerians in achieving freedom from colonialism has slipped us back into another form of colonialism, neocolonialism through the dependence of Nigerian television on imported television programs. For the amount of local programming which is aired on television, it seems that it could be argued that there is only a small presence of foreign programming. However, the fact that there is still some presence of foreign programming makes Nigerian Television dependent on imported television programs. Then there are those who might argue that actually an interdependence exists, since Nigerians swap their nairas for United States or British produced television programs. It is true that there is an interdependence, but United States and Britain control the interdependence. Nigeria is just another market to the United States or Britain who are

not concerned about the impact of their exported television programs to Nigeria. Furthermore, while the United States was successful in flooding its television programs on Nigerian Television, television programs from developing countries, such as Nigeria, are never seen on American television. Shayon (1977) stated that "American television products were everywhere shown on national television systems--almost no products of other nations were shown on American television stations" (p. 51). This should be a major reason for developing countries, such as Nigeria, to stop depending on imported programs.

Overall, the presence or absence of national television broadcasting policy does not make a difference on the importation of television programs. This is because Nigeria continues to import television programs despite the fact that it has set policies and objectives to protect the various Nigerian cultures.

The problem is dependent on other factors. However, the dominance of the Nigerian government as policymakers for the operations and resource allocations of Nigerian Television is the most significant cause of the problem. This is why Nigeria still needs to set a national television broadcasting policy. According to Rosen (1988, p. 234), the lack of a national broadcasting policy has continued to stifle Nigeria's development.

Furthermore, Nigerian journalists and professors, the majority of whom were all educated at England or the United States, strongly supported the present policies which linked the radio and television broadcasting systems across states. They claimed that the policies, no matter how primitive they appear, stresses the preservation of Nigeria's cultural traditions (Altschull, 1984, p. 157).

What this means is that even though a national policy might not seem appropriate now, it will be necessary for the future. This is because a national policy can be significant toward protecting the sovereignty of a country. Schiller (1981, p. 148) states that

National or policy formation carries no guarantee of rationality, social utility, or even opposition to the now dominant world system of transnational enterprise. What social group(s) has (have) control of the state heavily determines the characteristics of the policies that are formulated.

(The above case study of Nigeria portrays this fact.)

Schiller then continues by saying that

Still, national policy-making of any kind creates an awareness of issues and relationships that previously may have been buried under a seemingly "natural order." Once issues appear on an overt public agenda, the protective veil of implicitness is torn off. The lack of knowledgability that permits certain power relationships to exist unquestioned is at least partly overcome. Sooner or later, thereafter, challenges may be expected (Schiller, 1981, p. 148).

Thus, this indicates that a national policy would help toward stopping the dependence of Nigerian Television on imported television programs in the future, although this might not be apparent now. That is the challenge Nigerian Television will face in the future.

Moreover, the inconsistencies in programming in the Nigerian Television is heavily related to the various Nigerian governments who were the major policy makers. These Nigerian governments were also responsible for choosing other policy makers for Nigerian Television and resources, notably funding, which was required for the operation and implementation of the various individual policies, objectives, and statements, which they established.

Since Nigeria's independence day, Nigeria has had several changes in government as a result of six military coups. Each of these governments had a different set of priorities and goal sectors, which greatly influenced the Nigerian Television. This is because with each change in government, there was a change in priorities and emphasis, which explains the consistent dependence on imported television programs, regardless of the fact that these priorities and goals were supposed to curb that dependence. If there was a well-articulated national television broadcasting policy, adherence to it could not be consistent with the constant change in government,

which ushers in a constant change in priorities and goals. However, in the future, such a national television policy will be necessary for Nigeria's progress.

What can be learned from Nigeria's case is that regardless of who they are, policy makers dominate the formulation and implementation of policies with their influence. The type of policies which are established for society is dependent on the type of policy makers, their philosophies, and the political situation which surrounds their policy making. This is because no policies are established in a political vacuum, regardless of whether the government is highly involved or not. The challenge then for this explains why a thin line exists between policy makers setting policy for technology to benefit people and setting policy for the policy maker's own interest. The challenge then for policy makers will be to benefit all, so that there will be no winners or losers.

Overall, what the Nigerian Television case has portrayed is that technology does not operate in a vacuum. Most of the time we human beings choose the values which go into it. Technology causes a problem when the policy maker who influences the technology establishes the utilization of that technology with values which do not benefit anyone.



### Nigerian Audience Attitudes

The attitudes of the Nigerian television viewers are very important. Most of the programs should not be prepared and presented without giving due consideration to what the Nigerian television viewers want.

A survey conducted in 1979 by Nwuneli showed that 53% prefer Nigerian produced films to foreign films (Igbinedion, 1985, p. 107). Moreover, Igbinedion supports this study with his own study, which indicated that 70% of Nigerians prefer Nigerian films, while 30% prefer foreign ones, and 66% do not like Nigerian television because of the foreign shows (p. 112).

However, the results were mixed when university students were surveyed. The Aliu (1982) study showed that Lagos University students did prefer foreign films shown on television to Nigerian films. Aliu also observed that these students watched films for entertainment and that these films played an important role in influencing the dress pattern of these students (Igbinedion, 1985, p. 107). On the other hand, when another group of students were surveyed in the Enugu capital city of Anambra State, the results were different. Okonkwo (1986, p. 329) observed that the Anambra State preferred local television programs shown on Anambra State television to foreign programs. The ratio was 67% to 22% in favor of local programs.

In general, there appears to be a stronger preference for locally produced programs on television. It seems that with these figures on certain instances, the broadcasters are clearly not paying attention to the Nigerian Television audience's needs in their programs. However, what the data indicates is that there is still some choice for foreign programming, even though it is small. What happens is that Nigerians seem to compare Nigerian local programs to foreign programs. Both are not produced with the same resources and under the same conditions (Farounbi, 1979/80, p. 68). He gave the example of Sesame Street which people have written to him to compliment. However, Farounbi (p. 67-68) observed that if he chose to take it off the air, he could receive protests against its withdrawal.

Moreover, it should be noted that research on the attitudes of the audience is very significant toward the use of television to promote culture. Kangwana (1986, p. 258) observed that:

The audience is the beginning and end of broadcasting . . . it is important to know the audience, their cultural and socioeconomic pattern, their perceived needs, as well as their opinions and reactions to programmes. Information is needed on what audiences have experienced, what more they want to experience or learn, and what broadcasters can do to assist in the realisation of those expectations and hopes. At a simple level the data would be useful in the process of reaching a target audience.

The audience is extremely important in considering television broadcasting because they are the ones who are being exposed to the television programs. Head (1974, p. 321) supports the importance of audience research by stating that the results received from the research can be used to justify the money spent on broadcasting. Head's observations will be significant when the Nigerian Television Authority tries to get advertisers to sponsor its television programs.

However, such audience research must be suited to the Nigerian audience (Kangwana, 1986, p. 259). At the moment the Nigerian Television Authority is taking strides toward increasing audience research. Two in-house research groups of four to six staff have been created by the Nigerian Television Authority. A principal Research Officer was appointed to take charge of this program (Kangwana, 1986, p. 259). Moreover, the same group which is responsible for the audience research is responsible for the budgets for all the Nigerian television stations and maintaining the operations of those television stations (Kangwana, 1986, p. 259).

Furthermore, NTA Ibadan is doing something different to learn about its audience. It has established viewers' associations in rural areas so as to generate interest on television viewing, create an impact in the rural areas and the results hopefully will enable them to develop

more effective programming policies (Wilson, 1987, p. 44). Results from audience research was the key to the success of Brazils' TV Globo in stopping the major influence of the importation of American television programs (see TV Globo case.)

## CHAPTER IV

### ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

#### Analysis and Conclusion

What the above case study of Nigerian Television indicates is that dependency is largely the result of internal factors in Nigeria, such as federal and state government control, financing, television program content programming, and the training of Nigerian broadcast journalists. All these exert more influence than the external or international factors, such as the information flow. For example, foreign television programming appears on Nigerian television because the television manager or whoever is in charge, decides to purchase it. Also, the television manager decides to purchase it because of government policy, which determines the extent of financing which is not enough to support local production of programs, even though some viewers like them. Thus, as indicated in this study, a one-way relationship between Nigeria (the developing country) and the developed countries such as the United States and Britain, from whom it purchases imported.

programs does not exist. Rather, an interdependence exists since Nigerians do give their nairas in exchange for imported television programs from the United States or Britain. Although it must be pointed out that the developed countries, such as the United States and Britain, dominate that interdependence. In this particular case, the United States and Britain, the two largest exporters of foreign television programs to Nigeria regard Nigeria as a lucrative market for their television programs. Nigerian television stations with limited funds find it cheaper to purchase those programs than to make and use local television programs. The cheap foreign programs contracts between American and British companies on the one hand, and NTA on the other. The Nigerian Television Authority does have the prerogative to terminate the relationship. But this does not occur mainly because NTA does not have enough funds to make its own programs. In the case that Nigeria decides to stop buying imported foreign programs, the only thing it will suffer is that of the low quality of locally produced television programs. The choice is really up to the Nigerian government which controls the Nigerian television.

The structure of the Nigerian television stations cannot be easily changed because of the strong influence the Nigerian government wields over it. Even the laws

cannot be easily changed without the government's approval. Nigeria, as a developing country, has more control of internal events than the external or international factors. The only issue which exists is what the government that takes major decisions about television services in Nigeria can do to reduce the extent of Nigeria's dependence. In Nigeria's case, it is the federal and state governments who, in consultation with the television journalists, in the interest of the masses and the nation, take necessary measures to minimize dependence. This will further strengthen the political independence which the country already has. If it is really true that as Ezeokoli (1984, p. 1) maintained that no foreign programs are broadcast in the external network services, then this is a step in the right direction, even though it contradicts observations of studies reviewed here.

#### Recommendations

These following recommendations are very significant because if implemented, the Nigerian television dependency could be curbed.

1. Curtail air time.

Lessening the air time will greatly stop the dependence on imported television programs (Domatob, 1988, p. 170-171). Since the viewing time will be less,

then the production of local programs which will be aired on television will not be as expensive. Moreover, the need to fill the time will be minimized because every hour used on television will then be a quality hour.

Adesonaye (1990, p. 72) observes that:

There should, furthermore, be no crying needs for the near round-the-clock transmission which, as is being attempted now, cannot but result in the massive importation of foreign programmes which are so willingly dumped on us. Six meaningful hours of intelligent television should be considered more productive and more rewarding than eighteen hours of trivia, especially imported trivia.

If air time is curtailed, it will then be possible to increase local programming on television. This is because the production costs for the local programs will be lessened. Domatob (1988, pp. 170-171) observes that it is the increase in available airtime which in some cases creates the demand for imported television programs. With the available air time, a program, is usually shown on television.

2. Co-production with other African countries. Several African countries have begun to exchange and co-produce radio and television programs with each other (Tracey, 1988, p. 24). In the future, more African countries will embrace co-production. For instance, during an interview with a special correspondent from the magazine, West Africa, Mr. A. M. Ngororo, Tanzania's Director of Information Services was asked the question:



In Nigeria, many of the films and adverts shown on television have no relevance to the needs and values of the people. Is the same true for Tanzania?

Mr. Ngororo's reply was:

Let us all accept that we are both former colonies, and inherent in colonialism is cultural domination. We have a fledging national film industry in Tanzania. And I say fledging because we can shoot films, but 90% of what ends up on screen has to be done outside the country and paid for in foreign exchange. Consequently, we still have a lot of trash on our screens, imported films which are not relevant to us, that have hidden cultural motives.

. . . This is one area where African countries can go into joint production; or if there are certain African countries which have a film processing industry--I understand Zimbabwe has--we can extend it to other member countries. So once this mode of operation has been established, it only becomes a matter of building bridges to link up necessary points.

This indicates that in the future the dependence on developed countries for production of various programs will decrease.

3. The Nigerian government needs to allow the privatization of the television mass medium. This will make it possible to be able to produce and air local television programs at a cheaper cost. Since the Nigerian government is the sole owner of the Nigerian Television services, the cost of operations is high because it is dependent on the finances which the government can provide. Provision of these subventions fluctuate with the rate of inflation and this affects the cost of producing local programs to air on the Nigerian Television. Policies could be used to control the amount

of foreign programs which might be shown on television by the private broadcasting organizations. Wedell (1986, p. 293) states that the control of government over most broadcasting organizations stifles the broadcasting medium, which he views as an important instrument in the promotion of the culture of a particular country, particularly if that a country is a developing one such as Nigeria is at the moment.

A Comparative Analysis of the Television Systems  
of Brazil, Algeria, and Trinidad and Tobago  
in Relation to Nigerian Television

The impact of colonialism on the utilization of television as a communication technology should be noted. In order to indicate how strong the impact of colonialism is, the utilization of television in three developing countries will be portrayed. The three countries which will be analyzed are Algeria, Trinidad, and Tobago and Brazil. The utilization of television in Algeria is similar to the utilization of television in Nigeria. The utilization of the television in Trinidad and Tobago does indicate that exposure to imported televisions programs could erode culture, although Skinner and Houang claim that such a conclusion is not definitive nor conclusive yet. However, there are some correlations between the exposure to imported television programs and the erosion of culture. With the example of Globo of Brazil,

developing countries can end the dependence on imported television programs.

### Algerian Television

Mahamdi (1987) observed in this study on Algerian television that Algerian television was under government control is always as the case in most developing countries. Furthermore, Mahamdi (1987, p. 1) referred to television as a "cultural institution." Moreover, the purpose of the study was to analyze the contradictory role of Algerian television and its efforts to adhere to a policy to transmit socialist, anti-imperialism, and pan-Arabic culture which is solely based on an Arab-Islamic revival, while at the same time showing imported television programs on Algerian television (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 2). The Arab-Islamic revival was known as "Arabization" (p. 5). In other words, now that the French had given Algerian her independence, it was then up to Algeria to promote and turn any remaining vestige of the characteristics of the former French colonial master into something Algerian. Television as a technology inherited from the French was not left out.

Algeria television was handed down to Algeria by its French colonists. Under France, it was called the RTF (Radiodiffusion Television Francaise) (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 2). When Algeria got its control, it became the RTA

(Radiodiffusion Television Algerienne) (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 2). Once Algeria became independent, the government took control of television which had also been under the former French colonial government (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 2).

Then Algeria developed a policy to promote culture in Algeria by promoting the Arabic culture and language. The result was that this policy was not adhered to. Instead, Algeria once more succumbed to the culture of its former colonist and other developing countries. Of the programs on Algerian television, 55% were from the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, and some Arab countries (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 16). The television was filled with French-dubbed versions of American television series, such as "Ironside," "Starsky and Hutch," "Dallas," and French tele-films (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 16). The bottom line regarding Algerian television was that it existed in a cultural vacuum (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 15). In addition, the Algerian television and all mass media in Algeria relied on French know-how, personnel training and programming (Mahamdi, 1987, p. 8). Thus, the Algerians did not show any effort in cultural development, and the television portrayed this problem by not promoting Algerian culture. Thus, Algeria's utilization of television is exactly similar to Nigeria's utilization of television: the airing of imported television programs.

While the Algerian television case study portrays the adoption and utilization of television as a communication technology inherited through colonialism, the case of Trinidad and Tobago's utilization of television does indicate that the culture of a developing country could be eroded when the imported television programs dominate the television. Thus, it indicates that if Nigerian television could be a definite instrument for the nonpreservation of Nigeria's cultures, if its utilization is not changed towards the promotion of Nigerian cultures.

#### Transfer of Television to Trinidad and Tobago

The case study of television in Trinidad and Tobago was conducted by Skinner and Houang (N.D.). Their major purpose was to discover if a foreign-influenced national television schedule could affect deeper psychological traits, sociocultural patterns and national ideologies. The consumer's television viewing habits were analyzed for the study. The authors used Trinidad and Tobago because they felt that it was an example of the presence of media-cultural imperialism or media dependency. Skinner and Houang (N.D.) discovered that in 1975, 75% of television shows on Trinidad and Tobago's television was imported from the United States. In 1982, Skinner and Houang (N.D.) also discovered that 85% of the nation's

scheduled prime time television programs were imported from the United States. Skinner and Houang maintained that this domination of United States programming on Trinidad and Tobago television was solely to erode its national identity and culture. Skinner and Houang demonstrate this fact by stating that when a child several years ago was asked at a public competition in Trinidad to name the President of Trinidad and Tobago. The children's reply was "President Carter."

Although the government has policies to correct this dependence on imported television programs, according to Skinner and Houang, it has not been successful. Like most developing countries, the media in Trinidad and Tobago are still owned by their former colonial of masters. What Skinner and Houang (N.D.) discovered from their study was:

1. Magnum P.I., Little House on the Prairie, Solid Gold, Three's Company, Knot's Landing, the Fall Guy, and Benson were chosen by some of the television viewers as personalities most attractive to them.
2. Magnum P.I., Knot's Landing, Lou Grant, and Little House on the Prairie were chosen as television programs which present lifestyles which the television audience wanted to emulate.

3. Little House on the Prairie was chosen, along with Community Dateline, a local program, as programs which tell you how to deal with problems in daily life.
4. The importance of television in the culture of Trinidad and Tobago, when asked that is what media contributes most to Trinidad and Tobago cultures, 42% mentioned television, in comparison to 25% for radio, 16% for newspapers, 2% for magazines, and 1% for Cinema.

Also, when asked what medium brings Trinidad and Tobago together culturally, 47% mentioned television as the most important medium in comparison to 21% for radio, 11% for newspapers, and 2% for magazines.

What this then shows, according to Skinner and Houang, is that exposure to foreign programs could have an impact on the cultures of developing countries. It is important to note that although some television viewers, according to Skinner and Houang, did not make any choices among the television programs, the majority of the television viewers, who chose television programs, chose those which had been imported from the United States. Although the authors point out that their study is neither definitive or conclusive, it is important toward understanding that there is a growing correlation between

media dependency and national dependence, according to the authors.

This study does indicate what could happen to Nigeria if the importation of television programs does continue. TV Globo does indicate that the impact of colonialism can indeed be used to the advantage of a developing country in order to prevent cultural imperialism.

#### The Case of TV Globo of Brazil

The case of TV Globo of Brazil does portray that developing countries, such as Nigeria in the future, can lessen their dependence on imported television programs which erode their culture if they choose to do so.

TV Globo, of Brazil, did stop the influence of imported American television programs by using this influence to their advantage. Today TV Globo is one of the fourth largest commercial networks in the world. As a result, it is considered a multinational corporation (Straubhaar, 1984, p. 235). In the 1960's, there was indirect American influence on TV Globo's television programs. This indirect flow came from TV Globo's partnership with the Time-Life Corporation which lasted from 1962-1971 (Straubhaar, 1984). The owner of TV Globo, Robert Marino, founded TV Globo in 1962 and entered this partnership with the Time-Life corporation



in order to obtain financing and programming advice from a multinational corporation because he felt that he would have a competitive edge over the other television corporations (Straubhaar, 1984).

TV Globo's relationship with the Time-Life Corporation was more successful to TV Globo's advantage than to the advantage of the Time-Life corporation. The Time-Life Corporation felt that they had been exploited in the relationship (Straubhaar, 1984). These following advantages which TV Globo got from this relationship indicates why: Firstly, TV Globo got interest-free loans from 1962-1968, which was the time when it was showing enormous profit as a corporation. Secondly, the increase in profit enabled TV Globo to have a competitive edge over the other television stations. This is because TV Globo hired the best managerial and creative talent away from the other local television stations. Thirdly, TV Globo got management advice in the form of American know-how in network structure and television programming (Straubhaar, 1984). Lastly, TV Globo had strong support from the Brazilian government. The Brazilian government intervened in its relationship with the Time-Life Corporation. The result was that the relationship was broken off in 1968. TV Globo repaid all its loans and expenses from the Time-Life Corporation by 1971 (Straubhaar, 1984, p. 228). Although TV Globo used the

American structure of programming by relying on Time-Life programming advisers for six months that reliance did not influence TV Globo's programming (Straubhaar, 1984). However, during TV Globo's partnership with the Time-Life Corporation, TV Globo's programs which were imported were targeted to the upper class target audiences. This strategy became a failure, and TV Globo decided to change its methods. What TV Globo did was to use the American framework of programming and adapt it more to the Brazil audience. The result was the creation of telenovas, which has become the most popular type of television program in Brazil (Straubhaar, 1984). Telenovas have become very popular in demand from the Brazilian audience (Straubhaar, 1984). As the audience showed a high demand for telenovas, imported American television programs were used as fillers on Brazilian television. TV Globo's success is strongly tied to a strong financial base in advertising and its network production centers. TV Globo established solid production industries for its telenovas, comedy groups, music shows, and recording industries (Straubhaar, 1984). In 1979, TV Globo produced one-hour episodic dramatic series which when they succeeded in late prime time, TV Globo decided to cover more hours (Straubhaar, 1984).

According to the Straubhaar 1984 study, TV Globo adapted the American influence to Brazil culture by

centralizing production and network simulcasting (Straubhaar, 1984, p. 234). Straubhaar (p. 234) observed that:

TV Globo today utilizes a vertical integration of programming unimaginable in the United States (where programs are purchased largely by networks from production companies and film studies after they have been made).

The difference with TV Globo, according to Straubhaar (p. 234) is that TV Globo does almost all of its own production. Its successful strategy is to start with audience research to test the popularity of themes, formats, stars using a scale and depth larger than the United States. Then TV Globo then produces programs for specific audiences at specific times with control and uniformity which Straubhaar (1984, p. 234) observes is impossible for an American network, even if it works very closely with production companies (Straubhaar, 1984, p. 234). Moreover, TV Globo has become so successful that its market strength has given it control over advertisers. This control is important since, since foreign and local advertisers did control most of the decisions (p. 234).

Since, 1968, TV Globo has become very dominant in Brazil. Furthermore, it decreased American influence much more by becoming a major exporter of television programs to Portuguese-speaking countries and Spanish-speaking America in dubbed language version. TV Globo

exported 6400 hours in 1982. Today, TV Globo's success has been further recognized. It has formed technical agreements with television systems in several African countries, and Italy (Straubhaar, 1984). What TV Globo is selling is expertise in program production and network management (Straubhaar, 1984).

Nigerian television can learn from the example of Brazil's TV Globo. Although weakened by the impact of colonialism and several other factors, Nigeria can rise above these impediments through co-production of the utilization of independent film producers in Nigeria.

#### Future Implications for Nigeria

Nigerian television will continuously be dependent on the influence of Nigerian government as the major policy makers of Nigerian television, and its representatives. Thus, the Nigerian government will continue to influence Nigerian television directly through policy making and indirectly by how the particular policies are implemented.

Moreover, Nigeria needs to do more television audience research in order to be able to discover how to utilize television for the benefit of the whole Nigerian society, so that there will be no winners nor losers, when the policies are being implemented.

The greatest hurdle Nigeria, as a developing country, will continue to face will be how to get rid of the colonial burden which already exists among the various ethnic groups, how to balance the various Nigerian cultures when local programs are shown on television and how to integrate the various Nigerian cultures in a satisfactory manner which allows the identification of the individual cultures of the various ethnic groups.

Furthermore, accessibility to Nigerian television will be highly debated. Not all rural areas of Nigeria are exposed to television.

There is an increase in development communication training in Nigeria. There are now 43 communication schools in Nigeria (Mohammed, 1990, p. 80). Out of the 43 communication schools, nine exist as communication training institutions, ten offer courses in mass communication, together with other departments, while 24 schools offer mass communication at full departmental levels (p. 80).

This is a step forward for the training of Nigerian journalists and broadcast journalists. In these various schools, "development" is defined, the role of the media in development is explored, including the international flow of the media and cultural products and the impact this has on developing countries and various other issues

(Mohammed, 1990, p. 82). However, the challenge attached to this training is that there are various definitions on development (p. 83) and there is still no agreement on the role television will play in national development because the role of television has not been included in the national development policy for the nation.

However, there is hope for Nigerian television because there are many Nigerian students who are being trained in telecommunications who will in the future make a difference in Nigerian Television Service.

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