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ABSTRACT

ISLANDS AND ADMIRALS: THE U.S. NAVY, MICRONESIA,

AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

By

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Previous studies of the US's role in Micronesia in the twentieth century have focused almost exclusively on the controversy over alleged Japanese militarization of the islands in the 1920's and 1930's or over the battles fought for the islands between the US and Japan during World War Two. There have been relatively few examples of work which explore US policy after World War Two in a Cold War context and an even smaller number of works which analyze US naval policy specifically. This thesis is an attempt to fill that gap in Cold War historiography. Not only does the paper investigate US naval policy toward Micronesia in a strategic Cold War context, but it also explores policy motivations among the American naval officer corps itself and US Micronesian policy in the context of interservice and interdepartmental rivalry within the US government. Finally, it attempts to elaborate on the work of the small number of scholars who have concentrated on Micronesian affairs.

To Lisa, with love.

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This thesis is dedicated to my loving wife Lisa. Her support has created an atmosphere which has allowed me to begin to acquire the skills of a professional historian. I could not have completed the program without her.

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Introduction

In July 1947, the United States was granted power as the sole administering authority over the islands of Micronesia by the United Nations. More specifically, this international trusteeship was the only one of eleven UN trusteeships in former League of Nations mandate areas which was termed a "strategic" trust[1] and provided the administering power (the US) with the authority to undertake fortification and other military measures to ensure national, as well as international, security goals.

For the first six years after World War Two, the United States Navy was the sole administering agency in Micronesia. In fact, from 1945 to 1947, before the trusteeship agreement was signed, the Navy was able to rule over Micronesia in an arbitrary manner, similar to its prewar administration of Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.[2]

What were the motives of US naval planners in obtaining the postwar administrative control of Micronesia? How had the interwar years of Japanese administration, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Pacific island hopping campaign influenced naval planners' attitudes toward the US role in the Pacific after 1945? The question must also be asked if US naval planners viewed strategic trusteeship as an adequate means by which to attain US national security goals in Micronesia or if they favored

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[1] William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-45* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 116.

[2] See Whitney T. Perkins, *Denial of Empire: The United States And Its Dependencies* (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1962), passim.

more complete control through measures like annexation. More importantly, how had rising global tensions with the USSR since 1944 influenced naval planners in their perceptions of Micronesia? In a related question, how was Micronesia strategically linked in the planners' minds to other geographic regions of the world?

Historiographically, the islands of Micronesia have been viewed strictly in the context of their value during the interwar years as Japanese naval bases, US concern over those bases, the cost to the United States of conquering them from Japan, and their postwar value to the US as a guarantee against a resurgent Japan.[3] Rarely have historians viewed Micronesia in the strategic context of the Cold War *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union.

In addition, historians have seen US strategic security in the Pacific in very strict military terms. The islands were perceived to have little value beyond their use as naval bases and security outposts against a resurgent Japan.[4] It can be suggested, however, that the strategic context in which the planners operated entailed a broader definition of strategic security than strictly military considerations. Evidence exists, in fact, to suggest that elements of the naval officer corps viewed US strategic security in the Pacific in economic and racial, as well as military, terms. But how important were the economic and racial dimensions in relation to the broader strategic context? Were they incorporated in US naval policy before 1947? Finally, were economic and racial measures advocated by a

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[3] For a sample of this literature, see Willard Price, *Japan's Islands Of Mystery* (New York: The John Day Company, 1944); Earl S. Pomeroy, *Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951); and Herold J. Wiens, *Pacific Island Bastions of the United States* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962).

[4] One historian who has detected other than strategic motives in US plans is Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 68-69 and 77-78.

fringe element of the officer corps or the main body of officials involved in naval postwar planning?

In addition to a dearth of literature on these questions, the literature to date has left other aspects of the US role in Micronesia untouched. For instance, did the military services present a unified bloc within the US government when it came to advocating a postwar American presence in Micronesia or were there differences between them over strategy and the composition of US forces in the Pacific Basin? Were there other bureaus of the US government with perceived interests in the debate over Micronesia? Did they agree or disagree with the military, or elements of the military, on these questions? Finally, to what degree did Micronesia represent a microcosm of the larger issues the US government faced as it revolutionized US defense and foreign policy during the origins of the Cold War? Only by answering these questions can gaps left in Cold War and Pacific Island historiography be filled and can Micronesia's role in the origins of the Cold War be determined more concretely.

Chapter One

Micronesia and the Origins of the Cold War

Micronesia and the Strategic Context

On July 29, 1944, Brigadier General Lemuel C. Shepard, Jr., commanding officer of the First Provisional Marine Brigade on Guam, addressed his men, commending them on their efforts at liberating Guam from the Japanese. Shepard emphasized the importance of avenging the loss of Guam to the Japanese in 1941, but also stressed the island's significance as an American fortress in the Pacific.[1] Shepard's statement seems to typify the attitudes of American naval leaders toward the US role in the Pacific. These men wanted to see not only Guam, but all Micronesia, become an American buffer zone in the Pacific.[2] To American naval decision makers, the experiences of Pearl Harbor, the island-hopping campaign across the Pacific, and the casualties sustained during the war were proof enough that future US security could be guaranteed only by the complete control of Micronesia.

Historians fully acknowledge this attitude among American naval decision makers, but do not explore in depth the degree of control these men hoped the US would be able to wield over Micronesia.[3] By analyzing aspects

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[1] Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1964), 303.

[2] For the concept of the "American Lake" see John Dower, "Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945-50," in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations,* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 146-206.

[3] For an example of current historiography on the U.S. in Micronesia see E.S. Pomeroy's *Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951; Michael Schaller's *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.* Oxford:

of American control seldom investigated, such as the Navy's concern with the Soviet occupation of the Kurile-Sakhalin area or the racial and economic dimensions of policy toward Micronesia, the student can understand better the attitude and outlook of American naval decision makers and their concern over a future war in the Pacific with the USSR similar to the one fought with Japan.

A quick glance at a map of the Pacific immediately indicates the strategic importance of Micronesia. The Marianas, in the northwest corner of the chain, are only about 1500 miles from Japan, Guam is within striking distance of both Japan and the Soviet Far East, and Yap and Belau, in the southwest region of the island group, are only 600 miles from the Philippines and Indonesia.[4] Obviously, such a strategically located group of islands would be important to any nation with perceived interests in the Pacific or East Asia. However, the islands took on added importance for the US after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific.

To say that the attack on Pearl Harbor had a traumatic effect on the thinking of US naval officers and their concept of national security is a gross understatement. Not only did the attack cripple the Pacific Fleet for many months, but the Japanese succeeded in conquering US possessions like Guam and Wake Island. Micronesia played a key role in the attack on Pearl Harbor, with some partici-pating Japanese units being based in the islands.[5] Additionally, even the United States West Coast came under attack from

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Oxford University Press, 1985, 52-76; Roger Gale, "Micronesia: A Case Study of American Foreign Policy." Ph.D. diss., The University of California at Berkeley, 1977; Lester J. Foltos, "The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-1947," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Summer 1989): 317-42.

[4] Gale, *Micronesia: A Case Study of American Foreign Policy*, 4-6.

[5] Jonathan M. Weisgall, "Micronesia and the Nuclear Pacific Since Hiroshima," *SAIS Review* 5 (1985): 41.

Japanese submarines.[6] Though the submarine attacks were insignificant, they could only have intensified the naval officer corps' belief that the US had narrowly escaped massive devastation in the war.

More importantly, the casualties sustained by the US in the Pacific in World War Two numbered some 250,000 dead of the 407,000 men and women lost by the United States in all the theaters of operations. A substantial proportion of these casualties occurred in the island-hopping campaign in the Central Pacific. Over 107,000 American casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) were sustained in the Marshall, Marianas, Carolines, Volcano, and Ryukyu Island campaigns, which included some of the most vicious fighting of the Second World War.[7] The numbers had a telling effect on American strategic planners, high casualty rates being an important determinant for choosing an "island hopping" campaign in the central Pacific, a campaign in which less important Japanese bases were bombed into submission and bypassed, rather than conquered at high cost to the US.

Finally, as historian Michael Sherry indicates, Pearl Harbor and the new weapons developed subsequent to it demonstrated the nation's vulnerability to sudden attack,[8] as well as the minimal response times available to react to foreign attack. It is inconceivable that American naval policymakers and officers could have experienced the war in the Pacific

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[6] Clark G. Reynolds, "Submarine Attacks on the Pacific Coast, 1942," *Pacific Historical Review* 33 (1964): 183-193.

[7] For total US killed in action in the Pacific war see Dower, "Occupied Japan and the American Lake," 172. For total US casualties in the island hopping campaigns across the central Pacific (killed, wounded, and missing), see the letter from Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal to Senator H.F. Byrd, 24 July 1945, File 33-1-22, Box 65, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, General Records of the Department of the Navy (Record Group 80), National Archives, Washington, DC. For the Marianas Campaign, see Foltos, "The New Pacific Barrier," 320.

[8] Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing For The Next War: American Plans For Postwar Defense, 1941-45* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 235.

without realizing the importance of island groups like Micronesia to a future defense in depth for the continental United States.

Therefore, it is not suprising that the US wanted to prevent other powers from gaining control of the islands as had happened in 1898 and 1919. The Navy argued for control of the islands on the grounds that anything short of total US control would invite a repetition of history from the interwar years, when it claimed that the non-fortification clauses of the Washington Treaty System allowed the Japanese to rearm and prepare for war in the Pacific while the US dismantled its defenses there.[9] In addition, US naval officials such as Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations in 1946, specifically put the islands in the context of the "blood and treasure" with which the U.S. had paid for them.[10] However, in spite of the impact the interwar and war years had on the Navy's argument for postwar control, the Navy's preoccupation with Micronesia took on greater meaning due to the rising global tensions with the Soviet Union after 1945.

During World War Two, American postwar planners were continually struggling with strategic plans for a very uncertain postwar world. Most planners knew, after 1943, that the postwar world would probably include a devastated Japan and Germany, greatly weakened European colonial powers, and the emergence of the United States and Soviet Union as the most

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[9] See page 2 of "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific," part of a memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the JCS entitled "Draft Trusteeship Agreement-Pacific Islands." SWNCC 59/7, cross-referenced to CCS 360 JCS Central Decimal File, 1946-47, (12-9-42), sec. 28, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, National Archives, Washington, DC.

[10] From the Forrestal Diaries, 22 October 1946. See also page one of a letter from the Secretaries of War and the Navy to the President, 13 April 1945, the Forrestal Diaries; and Report on Postwar Base Rights, entitled "Sites for Bases," 20 March 1943, Serial 236, File "P-1", Box 170, Strategic Plans Records Division, Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC.

powerful nations on Earth. There was hope among a substantial number of planners and officials that postwar relations with Russia would be cordial, even cooperative. Foremost among these officials was, of course, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who advocated his concept of the "Four Policemen", consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China, to "police" the postwar world against international lawlessness. Even after FDR's death in April 1945, President Harry S. Truman was hoping for postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union, though he was apparently less willing to acquiesce in unilateral Soviet actions in Europe and East Asia than FDR may have been.

Although confrontations in these areas brought about the eventual dissolution of the Grand Alliance after 1945, American policymakers did not see war with the Soviet Union as inevitable. As historian Melvyn Leffler asserts, the early Cold War years were ones of nearly universal agreement in the United States government that the Soviets desired to avoid a military engagement.[11]

In 1946, for example, naval intelligence had produced a memo that saw Russia physically and economically exhausted by the war, seeking a Soviet-style "Monroe Doctrine" for her sphere of influence, and assuming a decidedly defensive posture in coming years. It was a viewpoint with which the JCS apparently agreed.[12] And in 1947, the War Department's Military Intelligence Division determined that in spite of an improvement in Soviet

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[11] Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-48," *American Historical Review* 89 (April 1984): 359,362.

[12] Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 138.

war potential, Soviet military strength remained insufficient to carry out an attack on the US without placing the USSR in extreme jeopardy.[13]

Before the war had ended, however, some US policymakers had taken a decidedly aggressive attitude toward the Soviet Union. They seem to have exhibited what historian Michael S. Sherry has called the "ideology of national preparedness", a highly popular mode of thinking in the US military in the 1940's. Subscribers believed that since the US had been caught so unprepared in 1941, and since modern weaponry had eroded America's geographic advantages in defense, future security for the United States meant large standing military forces, outlying bases, and an economy capable of instant and total wartime mobilization.[14]

In addition, Daniel Yergin has broadened this defensive outlook to the entire American society and asserted that the US was transformed into a "national security state" between 1945 and 1948, a state of being in which all of a society's resources, talents, and energies are directed toward fulfilling the requirements of perceived security. To Yergin, this concept was one of mentality and mindset which took on the strength of gospel, a single, all-encompassing ideology which Yergin believes Americans needed in order to explain their world in more simple terms.[15]

Because of America's unpreparedness in 1941, the perceived strength of the Soviet Union in 1945, and the growing list of global problems which the United States had to deal with after 1945, the defeat of Germany and Japan did not put American policymakers at ease. In fact, as historian Larry

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[13] Leffler, "American Conception of National Security," 359,362.

[14] Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War,* ix, 34-35, 54, 84-85, 92-93, 129, 200, 204-05, 235.

[15] Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1977), 195-98.

Gerber suggests, the new ideas about national security were inherently anxiety producing and thus contributed more to an underlying sense of insecurity.[16]

To reinforce the sense of insecurity US policymakers may have felt, the tensions with Russia grew worse as time went on. From the perspective of US decision makers, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, Manchuria, and the Kurile-Sakhalin area in 1945-46 worsened prospects for American national security. Furthermore, the suspicions of the foreign policy decision makers were probably heightened by warnings from people like Averell Harriman, John R. Deane, and George Kennan.

One policymaker, Navy Secretary James Forrestal, had harbored suspicions about Russia dating back to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Some historians feel that Forrestal's suspicions had more to do with his own personal convictions against communism rather than any substantial evidence of Soviet aggression. Michael Schaller, for instance, asserts that Forrestal was a man predisposed to seeing communism as the work of the anti-Christ. Yergin believes that Forrestal lacked personal psychological security and offers this as an explanation for his behavior. Regardless of whether Schaller's and Yergin's forays into psychohistory are accurate, Forrestal certainly believed that the Russians were not to be trusted and that events in Eastern Europe proved him correct. In a remark especially revealing of his attitude toward the Soviet Union, Forrestal asserted that the Russians were essentially "Oriental" in their thinking, untrustworthy, and complained that the US should not try to "buy" their understanding or trust by acquiescing to Soviet demands. Forrestal thought this to be another

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[16] Larry G. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 6 (Winter 1982): 76.

form of appeasement, a policy he said should not have been attempted with Hitler or repeated with Stalin.[17]

In addition to revealing some of Forrestal's racial beliefs, this statement clearly illustrates his linkage of the pre-war years to the events after 1945. In 1944 and much of 1945, Forrestal believed that he was one of a very small number of people who knew the dangers which Stalin presented to the United States. In May 1944 he reportedly exclaimed to George Earle, former governor of Pennsylvania: " . . . 'My God, George, you and I and Bill Bullitt are the only ones around the President who know the Russian leaders for what they are.'" What was worse to Forrestal was his belief that most Americans believed history was " . . . something that occurred on another planet. . . "[18] and that very few had any conception of "national security". To Forrestal, those few who did have ideas on how to protect American interests were in for harsh treatment, destined to be labelled fascists or imperialists while Stalin took over half of Europe with American approval.[19] If Forrestal perceived Stalin as "another Hitler", bent on global domination, then he may have placed greater importance on the US retention of Micronesia in the postwar period, especially if he perceived a Soviet naval threat in the central Pacific similar to the Japanese presence of 1941.

As 1945 turned into 1946, Forrestal was increasingly joined by others in the United States government who were also wary of the Soviet Union. Whether or not the US was seriously threatened in these years by the Soviet Union remains a lively debate among historians. What is more

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[17] Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan*, 69. Also, Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 133.
[18] Elliot Converse, "United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942-1948." (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1984), 77.
[19] Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War*, 170.

important, however, were the perceptions of people at the time. The men who had just finished directing the war against Germany and Japan came to see identical threats from Russia and a possible repetition of the "errors" of appeasement of the 1930's.

Demobilization played a large part in heightening the concern of US officials over Soviet actions. The United States military was reduced in strength from over twelve million men and women in the summer of 1945 to about one and a half million in the summer of 1947.[20] Furthermore, it is apparent that even though greater reliance was placed on atomic weapons as a deterrent to Soviet aggression as US conventional forces were demobilized, US atomic capabilities were also set back by a lack of experienced crews, nuclear-capable aircraft, and atomic weapons themselves. As David Alan Rosenberg has shown, as late as July 1947 there were only thirteen atomic bombs, each of which took nearly forty men two days to assemble. In addition, there were only about thirty B-29 aircraft from the 509th Bomb Group in New Mexico capable of dropping atomic weapons. Though not many decision makers knew just how poor US atomic warmaking capability was at the time,[21] a shortage of bombs had been common knowledge among top decision makers since August 1945 and they may not have had as great a confidence in atomic weapons as a deterrent as some scholars have assumed.

Demobilization occurred at the same time that tensions between the US and USSR rose over Eastern Europe, Iran, and the intensification of the

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[20] Wolfgang Krieger, "Was General Clay A Revisionist? Strategic Concepts of the United States Occupation of Berlin," *Journal of Contemporary History* 18 (April 1983): 175. Also Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 214-15.

[21] David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-50," *International Security* 7 (Spring 1983): 14-15, 11.

Chinese civil war. To Forrestal, the public's overriding desire to "bring the boys home" proved that Americans refused to face what he thought was the reality of the international world. It confirmed for him that the American public had already gone through what he called "mental demobilization", that it was blinded by Allied victory, and that it was no longer prepared to deal with Stalin's aggression.[22]

Nevertheless, other prominent Americans were also aware of declining American military capabilities. This awareness may partially account for their exaggeration of Soviet military capabilities in the late 1940's. Future US ambassador to the UN Senator Warren Austin, for example, estimated that the Russians had an army capable of fielding over ten million men. General John R. Deane, former chief of the US military mission to Moscow during the war, thought it more like five million. In actuality, neither of them probably would have conceded that demobilization had affected Soviet society as well and that by early 1948, the Soviet standing army would be at less than three million.[23] The exaggeration of Soviet military capability not only indicated a greater suspicion about the Soviet Union and its actions around the world, but also a greater sensitivity to the perils of rapid demobilization.

Demobilization had an impact on US policy toward Micronesia as well. Given declining defense resources and capabilities in the early Cold War, the concept of strategic denial may have taken on greater importance in regard to the islands. Strategic denial meant the occupation of territory by a nation that perceived it as vital to its national security. Declining defense

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[22] Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943-1946* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 215.
[23] Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 270. See also Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982-1983): 110-138.

budgets would have prevented the US from fully developing the islands as naval bases. However, US occupation would at least have "denied" the islands to any possible Soviet incursions and still provided the US with inexpensive defense outposts on its Pacific frontier.

The military, of course, did not want to see its forces reduced at all, much less in so drastic a manner. Even more importantly from the perspective of the military, rapid demobilization in 1945 closely resembled that of 1919.[24] Therefore, to US military officers, an increasing Soviet threat in the context of rapid demobilization probably seemed like a repetition of the pattern of aggression which had led to war in the late 1930's. As tensions around the world mounted in 1945 and 1946, it must have been disheartening and frightening for the Navy to have to admit that it had shrunk operationally to the dimensions of about two small naval task groups. In fact, by November of 1946, Admiral Ernest J. King stated that the Navy was no longer capable of fighting a major battle.[25]

As Forrestal's influence in the Navy grew from 1944 on, his ability to sway the Navy's officers toward his views on Russia may have taught them that war with the Soviet Union threatened. In addition, World War Two, with its more technologically sophisticated weapons and shorter reaction times to attack, had taught them that the best defense was a good offense. To these officers, the best way to prevent an attack on the continental United States was to have a defense in depth with far-flung bases, bases which could also support offensive action against aggressor nations in East Asia. Micronesia seemed to fulfill this role. At first, the islands were to

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[24] Earl S. Pomeroy, *Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia*(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), 75-115.
[25] Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy*, 216. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War*, 217.

be used to facilitate the control of postwar Japan. However, as Cold War tensions mounted, Micronesia became increasingly important to American defenses in the Pacific against Russia, not Japan.

Though Russia did not possess a great navy at this time, American naval officers knew it possessed a large submarine force and thought it might have the industrial capability to create a large navy in the Pacific. Furthermore, military decision makers were not thinking solely in terms of the immediate future, but of long-term security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) in October 1946 of a possibly unfriendly Asia or " . . . Asiatic-European coalition . . ." in the future. They admitted to thinking in terms of one hundred years into the future, but envisioned a Eurasian continent industrialized and communized, turning its munitions capability against the United States under Soviet direction.[26]

According to Marc Gallicchio, the JCS believed that if Russia controlled Asia, the US could still ensure its security in the Far East if it controlled certain regions in the Pacific, including Micronesia. Still, the JCS was quick to point out to SWNCC that if the US did not take direct control of the islands it would probably have to repeat the costly process of 1943-45 at some future date.[27]

The cost of conquering Micronesia from the Japanese, the entrenchment of the Pearl Harbor syndrome in strategic thinking, and the rising Cold War tensions with Russia all seemed to have convinced American

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[26] See pages 3-4 of "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific," part of a memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the JCS entitled "Draft Trusteeship Agreement-Pacific Islands," SWNCC 59/7, cross-referenced in CCS 360, JCS Central Decimal File, 1946-47 (12-9-42), sec. 28, RG 218, NA.

[27] See Marc S. Gallicchio's *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 36. Also, Ibid.

strategic planners that the fundamental security requirement for the United States was control of the Pacific Ocean Area. It was almost certainly for this reason that the US Military Staff Committee to the United Nations elaborated on the value of the islands to the United States during the negotiations over the international trusteeships. The committee asserted that possession of the mandates by any other power would provide that power with bases from which to attack or intimidate the US, or to cut it off from Pacific nations with which the US had important commerical interests. Additionally, the committee claimed that even if the islands were neutralized, the threat of seizure by an aggressor nation was enough to force the US to forfeit control of its strategic approaches. Ominously, the committee concluded that the US " . . . cannot permit those islands to fall into the hands of any power which might ever be hostile to the United States."[28] The report conveniently limited the possible options for the US to total control and military fortification, denying the feasibility of even neutralizing the islands. Though the report may have been oriented toward controlling postwar Japan, the continual references to "any other power" clearly indicated Russia.

Finally, an episode at the time of the United Nations negotiations over Micronesia definitively illustrates the importance the islands held in American strategic planning. Negotiations became so heated at one point that John Foster Dulles, then a US negotiator at the UN, warned the UN General Assembly that if it did not accept US proposals for Micronesia, then

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[28] Page 5 of Norris, Assistant Secretary of the Military Staff Committee to Truman, 22 February 1947, CCS 360, Central Decimal File, 1946-47, (12-9-42), sec. 29, RG 218, NA.

the United States was intent on bypassing the United Nations and continuing *de facto* occupation unilaterally.[29]

Of course, we do not know to what degree Dulles was speaking for the United States government, since Truman favored strategic trusteeship through the United Nations. But if there was any credibility to Dulles' statement, then it is quite revealing about US policy toward Micronesia and the influence the Pacific War had on that policy. One of the most important foreign policy goals of the United States after the war was to establish a credible and effective United Nations. The action suggested by Dulles could have inflicted irreparable damage on the UN. If Dulles was accurate and the US was willing to bypass the UN to achieve naval security in the Pacific, then US determination to control Micronesia was very strong indeed.

Micronesia and the Kurile-Sakhalin Area

One aspect of the US acquisition of Micronesia rarely explored by historians is the relationship between the control of Micronesia and Soviet control in the Kurile-Sakhalin area and Eastern Europe. Marc Gallicchio has begun to explore US-Soviet relations in Northeast Asia, but even he does not explore the possibilities that some sort of *quid pro quo* may have existed between the United States and the Soviet Union over the two areas.[30]

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt had assured Stalin that upon Soviet entry into the war against Japan the USSR would regain southern Sakhalin Island, lost to Japan in the 1904-05 Russo-

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[29] James H. Webb, Jr., *Micronesia and US Pacific Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980's* (New York: Praeger Publications, 1974), 79.

[30] See Gallicchio, *The Cold War Begins in Asia*, 3,5, 9, 10, 71, 78, 80-82, 86-88; and Marc S. Gallicchio, "The U.S. and the Kuriles Controversy: Strategy and Diplomacy on the Soviet-Japan Border, 1941-1956," (Paper delivered at the Fourteenth National Meeting of The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, The American University, 1988), 1-50.

Japanese War. In addition, Roosevelt assured Stalin that the Kurile Island chain north of Japan would be "turned over" to Russia as a way to guarantee it access to the Sea of Japan.[31]

Though there was some dissent among US officials over this, postwar planners were not faced with actual Soviet control of the Kurile region until the sudden collapse of the Japanese Empire in August 1945. This created a power vacuum in Northeast Asia and allowed the Russians to exercise territorial control to within about 20 miles of Hokkaido in northern Japan. One scholar even argued that this Soviet advance gave it control of the approaches to the Sea of Okhotsk and their Far Eastern and Siberian coasts, an area no longer neutralized by Japanese air and naval bases in the Kuriles.[32] Still, it was not widely thought in 1945 that Russia would ever build the navy necessary to exploit the control of the Kurile-Sakhalin area.

Another scholar at the time suggested that the elimination of Japanese naval and airpower from East Asia and the unfavorable conditions for establishing a navy in the Soviet Far East would cause the Russians to be concerned solely with land-based defenses in the future.[33] Even American military planners, at first, cited the lack of Soviet strategic forces and a weak industrial base in the area as evidence that the Soviet Union did not pose a threat to the US in the Pacific and would not for some time. In fact,

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[31] Gallicchio, "US and the Kuriles Controversy," 7-9; Dower, "Occupied Japan," 154; Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation, 30 November 1946, *FRUS* 1946, I: 691; Commander Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, *United States Naval Administration Of The Trust Territory Of The Pacific Islands* (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, 1957), Vol. III, 28; Forrestal Diaries, 16 December 1946.

[32] See Gallicchio, "U.S. and the Kuriles Controversy," 20; Herold J. Wiens, *Pacific Island Bastions of the United States* (Princeton: P. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), 54-55. In actuality, the Soviet Union was able to control very little of the area after 1945 because of the poor state of the Soviet Navy and because the Japanese naval presence in the area was replaced by that of the United States Navy.

[33] David Nelson Rowe, "Collective Security in the Pacific: An American View," in *Pacific Affairs* 18 (March 1945): 12-13.

some naval officers viewed Soviet control of this area very benignly. In 1945, Admiral Charles Cooke, Chief of Navy War Plans, grudgingly admitted that the Russians at least deserved the northern Kuriles so that sea lanes in the area would be opened to them.[34]

However, as Cold War tensions increased in late 1945, American admirals began to place more importance on the control of Micronesia because of their growing perceptions of the USSR as a strategic naval threat. One reason suspicions may have increased is that the Russians possessed one of the largest submarine forces in the world at the time, though it was clearly a defensive force in nature and was neither the most technologically sophisticated or combat experienced. Yet, in strategic planning numbers usually matter. By late 1945 and 1946, Navy planners, fully engaged in preparing for war with Russia, thought that Russian submarines could deploy into the Pacific from the Kuriles and prey on allied shipping. Additionally, the sea lanes around Japan were supposedly within easy striking range of Soviet airfields in the Kuriles, even though the planners were apparently never able to explain how a Soviet strategic air force or navy would suddenly materialize in the Far East in the event of war.[35] Clearly, the Navy was probably thinking in long-range terms, much as the JCS was. More importantly, though, the American Navy, used to equating numbers of ships with the overall quality of a navy, would naturally have been concerned over the prospect of the Soviet submarine fleet patrolling the waters of Japan, the Pacific Ocean Area, or even the West Coast of the United States. After all, German submarines had been

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[34] Gallicchio, "U.S. and the Kuriles Controversy," 10, 17.
[35] Ibid., 20.

sinking American warships and merchant vessels within sight of the United States East Coast only three or four years before.

Significantly, in late 1947 Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan compared Germany's ability to immobilize the Allied fleets in World War Two with small numbers of U-boats to the fact that the Russians had a much larger submarine fleet. Sullivan's comparison implied that the larger Soviet submarine fleet had the capability to inflict even more damage in future wars than the Germans had in World War Two. In addition, the Soviets supposedly had the capability of building additional submarines vastly superior to anything the Germans had been able to put to sea.[36] Of course, Sullivan was never able to explain how a relatively inexperienced navy such as the Soviet Navy could have suddenly become so deadly, nor how their submarine technology, based on captured German U-boats, could have advanced so far in a little over two years. Nevertheless, his statement gives an indication of the intimate connection between wartime experiences and postwar planning among American naval planners.

To meet the perceived Soviet threat, the Navy began to work out a strategy for the northern Pacific in March, 1946. On Forrestal's orders, the Navy conducted multi-ship exercises in the Arctic and Antarctic Oceans to learn how efficiently carriers and their aircraft could operate in snowy weather, icy seas, and low visibility. Operation Frostbite, as the series of exercises was called, clearly indicted Russia as the new enemy of the United States Navy since the northern route was the shortest one between the U.S. and Russia. Though there are indications that the exercises were held both to practice operations against a resurgent Japan and to impress

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[36] See Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 338.

the American public about the Navy *vis-a-vis* the Army Air Force, the strategic orientation of the exercises toward the Soviet Union was unmistakable.[37]

American naval preparations for war with Russia may have seemed necessary to the United States Navy, but they must have appeared extremely provocative to the Soviet leadership. If Soviet leaders had suspicions and fears about American naval deployments in the Pacific and Northeast Asia, they had good reason. For example, US bombers and warships based in Micronesia, Okinawa, and Japan could not only have repelled potential Soviet assaults, but could also have struck deep inside Russian territory in the maritime provinces.[38] In fact, Navy plans counted on the ability of their carrier fleets to do this, Operation Frostbite being just one example.

Furthermore, the United States itself had had fleeting plans for base rights in the Kuriles in 1945 and before. As early as 1943 there had been suggestions by the State Department to internationalize the Kuriles. One member of the Department's Territorial Subcommittee suggested that "... 'if the northern islands were internationalized there would not be much the Russians could do about it.'" And Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle went further, indicating that if the US controlled the Kuriles it could establish an air route from the US to the Far East without ever touching Soviet soil.[39] Additionally, in 1945, after rejecting any possibility of Soviet occupation zones in Japan, Truman had demanded that the Soviets

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[37] Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy*, 222-23.
[38] Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan*, 56.
[39] For both quotes, see William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-45* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 80-81.

permit American air force and weather units access to their occupation zones in the Kuriles.[40]

Finally, in drawing up General Order No. 1, the supposed guideline for Allied forces taking the Japanese surrender in East Asia and the Pacific, Colonel Charles Bonesteel and Lieutenant Colonel Dean Rusk of the Army's Strategy and Policy Group had placed the Kuriles in a category labelled "other Pacific Islands", meaning the islands were to have been surrendered by Japan to the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz, not to a Soviet commander. Bonesteel himself had been almost the sole American official to oppose that part of the Yalta Accords which conceded control of the Kurile-Sakhalin area to the Soviet Union. He had argued that since the US was going to great lengths to obtain control of the Mandated Islands after the war, it should likewise be wary of allowing a Soviet presence in the Kuriles, since the Aleutians-Kuriles route to East Asia was shorter than the route through Micronesia and since the Soviet Union was obviously the only nation in Asia which posed a potential military threat to the US in the near future.[41]

Some planners, however, saw opportunities, not threats, in the strategic interdependence of Micronesia with Soviet spheres of influence. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), led by Army Lieutenant General Stanley Embick, took note during the war of a possible *quid pro quo* between the United States and the Soviet Union over Micronesia and Eastern Europe, respectively. The JSSC urged American officials to agree to cross-channel operations into France and Soviet postwar control of Eastern Europe

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[40] Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan*, 57.
[41] Gallicchio, *Cold War Begins in Asia*, 76, 78.

in return for Soviet entry into the war against Japan and postwar US hegemony in the Pacific Ocean Area.[42]

In addition, John Dower believes the Russians expended considerable energy attempting to draw a parallel between Soviet control in Eastern Europe and American control in Japan and the Pacific. Dower offers as evidence Soviet efforts to establish an Allied control commission in Japan which would have safeguarded predominant US control over the entire country in return for US acquiescence to Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Further, Dower asserts that US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov came to an understanding in December 1945 over Micronesia and the Kuriles which complemented the agreement by Roosevelt and Stalin the previous February. Dower claims that both the US and USSR indulged in what he called "security imperialism", a type of imperialism which allowed the two superpowers to satisfy their own geostrategic requirements while continuing to criticize the European colonial powers for failing to grant independence to their subject areas.[43]

Dower may be correct about his analysis of "security imperialism", but there is evidence that contradicts his claim of Soviet efforts to come to terms with the United States over Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia or that there was some sort of understanding between Byrnes and Molotov as early as December 1945. Quite to the contrary, primary sources illustrate that the Soviet Union attempted to frustrate American designs in the Pacific on several occasions.

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[42] Mark A. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War," *Diplomatic History* 6 (Summer 1982): 313.

[43] Dower, "Occupied Japan," 152, 154, 158.

Not only did the Soviet Union successfully deflect all efforts by the United States to obtain occupation rights in the Kuriles-Sakhalin area, but it also prevented the Kuriles from being established as an international trusteeship. In addition, Russia tried to establish itself as a "state directly concerned" with the United Nations negotiations over the international trusteeships, including the strategic trust territory of Micronesia. Furthermore, it attempted to have the right to veto military fortifications in the Pacific Islands given to the Security Council, something totally contrary to American wishes. To the US, this seemed uniquely unfair. The US complained that too many restrictions were being placed on its administration in the Pacific, that the Soviets had a freer hand in the Kuriles than it did in Micronesia, and that the US wanted similar rights for itself.[44]

A conversation between Byrnes and Molotov in December 1946 indicates the stimulus-response mentality which poisoned US-Soviet relations over the two areas and dispels any impression that efforts at accommodation took place. Molotov had told Byrnes that Russia had to be consulted in any plans to fortify the Pacific Islands. Byrnes responded that he wanted to know what the Russians proposed to do with the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Molotov said these islands were not open to discussion because they were part of a former agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta. Byrnes retorted that he regarded nothing as being subjected to previous agreements. Comically, each time Molotov brought up the subject of fortifications in Micronesia, Byrnes inquired into Soviet intentions in the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Byrnes later recounted this conversation to Forrestal

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[44] Memorandum by Dulles, 30 November 1946, *FRUS* 1946, 1:690-91.

and said that he was in no great hurry to see a trusteeship agreement consummated. His tone seemed to imply that he was content to let the Russians and the United Nations deal with a unilateral American consolidation in Micronesia. Subsequent to Byrnes' assertion, Forrestal expressed the view that " . . . any negotiations with Russia had to be predicated upon a thorough awareness of the unbending determination of the Russians to accomplish world communization."[45]

Soviet unilateral control of the Kurile-Sakhalin area, in fact, created an even greater determination on the part of some in the United States for the annexation of Micronesia. Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, for instance, said " . . . it would be 'absurd' to talk about placing Pacific bases under trusteeship when the Soviet Union was gaining complete control of the Kuriles."[46]

Even the JSSC, which had implied during the war that an opportunity for a *quid pro quo* existed between the US and USSR over Micronesia and Eastern Europe respectively, had by 1946 claimed that sentiment in the country was moving away from altruistic ideas about international trusteeship in the islands toward unilateral annexation. Additionally, the JSSC appeared to leave no doubts as to why this change of opinion had occurred when it stated that an example of unilateral annexation already existed in the acquisition of the Kurile Islands by Russia.[47]

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[45] For a view of the Byrnes-Molotov dialogue, see Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* Vol. III, 28-29. Byrnes' determination not to be "rushed" into trusteeship agreements can be found in the Forrestal Diaries, "Cabinet Luncheon," 16 December 1946, Frame 1390, Reel 2. Finally, Forrestal's linkage of the dispute over the Kurile-Sakhalin area to Soviet global intentions can also be found in the Forrestal Diaries, 21 January 1947.

[46] Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* Vol. III, 16; and Gale, "Micronesia: A Case Study in American Foreign Policy," 59.

[47] See, "Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on Trusteeships for Japanese Mandated Islands," JCS Files, RG 218, NA.

The Joint Chiefs, long opposed to a trusteeship in Micronesia, used Soviet control of the Kuriles to argue for a reversal of Truman's decision to offer Micronesia as an international trusteeship. They asserted that US moral leadership in the UN would suffer if the US cynically offered the islands for a trusteeship in which virtual US control was assured anyway. The Joint Chiefs claimed that if the US simply took control on the grounds that the islands were of vital strategic importance to the US, much as Russia had done in the Kuriles, then US prestige in the UN would not be damaged.[48] In other words, the JCS did indeed see the possibility of a *quid pro quo* between Micronesia and the Kuriles.

In reality, the Joint Chiefs were hardly concerned with the US's position *vis-a-vis* the UN, as is apparent from their attacks on the concept of trusteeships and the UN's alleged inability to protect US interests in the Pacific. Nevertheless, their argument indicates the frustration they must have felt at having to witness the US being subjected to international controls in Micronesia while the Soviet Union received a free hand in the Kurile-Sakhalin area.

Thus, as Cold War tensions mounted between 1945 and 1947, US planners and policymakers increasingly saw a strategic inter- dependence between the two areas and Europe. Accordingly, US and Soviet actions appeared increasingly hostile to each other and fueled suspicions. These suspicions, in turn, heightened the determination of both nations to secure control over the perceived spheres of influence which they had deemed necessary for basic security. This determination on the part of the United

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[48] Annex to Appendix 'A' from a Memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the navy entitled "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific." Minutes of the 59th meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 24 May 1946, SWNCC Minutes, SWNCC Papers (microfilm), Film 15172, Reel 8.

States to ensure its security in the Pacific Ocean Area by the control of Micronesia was best exemplified by the degree of control the Navy attempted to wield in the islands.

The Economic Dimension

Economic control was one way by which the Navy attempted to eradicate all influence from the Japanese era and exercise its dominion over the islands. Surprisingly, the Navy's economic role in Micronesia is almost totally absent from current literature. The islands were thought to be more of an economic burden than any sort of windfall and most historians have quickly summarized any US interest as strictly strategic.[49]

In a revolutionary departure from traditional writing on this subject, however, William Roger Louis asked whether the estimate of US 'security' in the Pacific might also have included making the Pacific and Far East safe for American trade and investment.[50] Officially, the Navy consistently stressed the lack of economic or commerical value of the islands to the US. Forrestal repeatedly stated to Congress and other officials that the administration and upkeep of military establishments in the islands would constitute a substantial drain on the United States treasury. In fact, the Navy tried to quell charges of imperialism from foreign governments by claiming that since the islands had no economic value, imperialism was an unfounded and inaccurate accusation against the United States. As Forrestal stated, " . . . [m]ostly they are sandspits in the Pacific, islands of small area, that represent no great economic asset, and, to that extent, they are

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[49] See, for example Pomeroy, *Pacific Outpost*, passim.
[50] See Louis' *Imperialism at Bay*, 68-69.

quite different . . . from the acquisition of territory in the old imperial sense."[51]

Further evidence, however, indicates two patterns. One is that strategic and economic control and national security were inexorably interdependent in the minds of policymakers and planners. This is indicated in a letter from Rear Admiral Richard S. Byrd to President Roosevelt in April 1944 summarizing a survey mission Byrd had carried out in the Pacific islands in 1943 upon Roosevelt's authorization. Byrd was quick to point out that FDR should know " . . . 'exactly what air routes, islands, landing fields, strategic areas, etc., are essential for the combined purposes of commerce and political and military strategy . . .'."[52]

The second pattern indicated, however, is that the evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the US had plans for the economic exploitation of Micronesia. Several measures taken which impacted on island economics clearly reflected security concerns. For instance, in June 1946, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan (MacArthur) had forbidden fishing vessels " . . . to approach closer than 12 miles to any island in the authorized area south of 30 [degrees] north latitude . . ."[53] an area which included the Micronesian Islands. This was an order specifically meant for Japanese fishing boats in 1946, the Navy being quite obviously concerned about any Japanese presence in the islands. Additionally, at the

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51 Pages 2 and 3 of a Letter by the Secretaries of War and the Navy to the President, 13 April 1945, the Forrestal Diaries. Also, see page 9 of a report by retired Navy Admiral H.E. Yarnell entitled, "Memorandum on Post-War Far Eastern Situation," 16 June 1944, File "Intelligence," Folder A8, Box 195, Strategic Plans Division Records, Navy Operational Archives. Finally, for Forrestal's criteria for imperialism, see U.S. Congress, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1946: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 25.

52 Letter cited in Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 271.

53 Richard, *United States Naval Administration*, Vol. III, 195.

tenth meeting of the United States delegation to the United Nations in New York in October 1946, John Foster Dulles stated that the Navy wanted to establish trade monopolies for Americans in Micronesia, primarily to forestall foreigners from gathering intelligence on the islands.[54]

However, at the same time that the US was carrying out these security measures, they were also securing certain economic advantages in Micronesia. In December 1945, for instance, Admiral Raymond Spruance, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area (CinCPOA), ordered the islands closed to private enterprise and outside investment and had the Navy and the United States Commercial Company take over the export-import trade in Micronesia.[55] In addition, the trusteeship agreement concluded by the UN in July 1947 granted the US special trade privileges such as most-favored-nation status and the right to integrate the islands into a customs zone with the US, the US being the only administering authority to receive such powers. The Navy had even established an Island Trading Company which controlled most of the new Trust Territory's importing and exporting.[56]

More explicitly, a report by the House Committee on Naval Affairs' Subcommittee on Pacific Bases, entitled "Study of Pacific Bases," and published in August 1945, offers fascinating insights into the possibility of American economic ambitions toward Micronesia. The report backs Louis'

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[54] Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations, 25 October 1946, *FRUS* 1946, 1:661. Also, see page 66 of Enclosure on the Draft Trusteeship Agreement by the Ad Hoc Committee appointed at the 42nd SWNCC Meeting, SWNCC 59/4, cross-referenced under "Draft Trusteeship Agreement," Box 89 of the JCS Central Decimal File, 1946-47, CCS 360 (12-9-42), sec. 27, RG 218, NA.

[55] Richard, *United States Naval Administration*, Vol. III, 408.

[56] Gale, "Micronesia: Case Study in American Foreign Policy," 63, 64.

assertion that American policy aimed toward making the Pacific and East Asia safe for American investment.

First, the report emphasized the economic importance of the islands and the fact that the Japanese had proven the islands were self-sufficient in food production. The subcommittee was even more impressed by the fact that the Japanese had actually turned a 2-to-1 profit during their administration of Micronesia. More specifically, the subcommittee called for the development of resources in the islands such as vegetables, fish, and native handicraft,[57] envisioned the islands as future shipping and commerical centers, and felt that there was room for productive ventures financed by American capital.[58]

Certain articles published in the United States Naval Institute's *Proceedings*, the Navy's semi-official forum for political debate, also provide an interesting insight into thoughts by American naval officers on the economic exploitation of Micronesia. It is uncertain whether these economic arguments were sincere or were simply tactics used by the officers to obtain Congressional and public support for an American naval presence in Micronesia. Nevertheless, the arguments tend to offer even more support to Louis' assertion. One example is a February 1945 article in which Marine Corps Major Guy Richards argued that the Micronesians would be easily attracted to US suzerainty because of a supposedly superior US technological and economic prowess which had been demonstrated during

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[57] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, Subcommittee on Pacific Bases, *Study of Pacific Bases,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 1012, 1020, 1022. For a view of Japanese economic adminstration of Micronesia in the 1920's and 1930's, see Mark R. Peattie's *Nanyo: the Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 118-152.

[58] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, Subcommittee on Pacific Bases, *Study of Pacific Bases,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 1022-23.

the war. The tone of Richards' article implies an economic element to the American strategic role in Micronesia, suggesting that a preponderance of consumer goods would not only socialize the Micronesians to US control but also provide a market for US goods.[59]

Rear Admiral G.J. Rowcliff was more immediately concerned with the economic problems the US would experience after the war. Rowcliff summarized these economic problems as diminished natural resources, unemployment, high tariffs, a search for markets, and large public debts. Rowcliff then proceeded to explain how US trade with the lucrative Western Pacific (probably including East Asia as well) would help alleviate these problems as US manufactured goods were exchanged for Micronesian raw materials like copra, vegetables, rubber, oil, and silk. He believed that markets could be built in the Western Pacific " . . . which will have been well primed with American equipment, public works, and development, [and] even subsidized with American dollars and fertilized by American flesh and blood . . ."[60], a statement clearly meant to stir the American people into action over "their" area of the world.

Navy Supply Corps Captain K.C. McIntosh went one step further than Admiral Rowcliff. Stating that the islands were needed for national security, he advised the United States to advance loans to the islands as well as to construct public works and develop markets of saleable goods in order to establish self-supporting economies. McIntosh thought such goods were represented by things like copra, sugar, coffee, peppers, and other products which he claimed could be cultivated in Micronesia. He further believed it would cost the US less to provide funds for the development of

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[59] Major Guy Richards, USMCR, "Pacific Briefing," *USNIP* 71 (February 1945): 170.
[60] Rear Admiral G.J. Rowcliff, USN, "Guam," *USNIP* 71 (July 1945): 793.

market economies in the islands than to continue to subsidize them with government funds.[61]

Put into perspective, reports by aggressive subcommittees and articles written by naval officers do not prove that a policy of economic exploitation was being formulated. While various officials saw economic opportunities in Micronesia, the evidence is susceptible to a contrary interpretation.

For example, orders excluding foreign and private investment from the islands can be seen as attempts by the Navy to monopolize island trade for profit, as can its establishment of an island trading company and US rights to most favored nation status in the islands. On the other hand, these same measures can be interpreted as elements of a military policy designed to secure the area from any foreign encroachment. MacArthur's exclusion of Japanese fishing boats from the area is an obvious example of the latter explanation.

The Racial Dimension

The Pacific War between the United States and the Japanese Empire has been well documented by historians as a war of racial and cultural hatred.[62] What has not been well documented by historians, however, are

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[61] Captain K.C. McIntosh, (SC), USN (RET), "The Road Ahead," *USNIP* 71 (November 1945): 1285.

[62] See especially Akira Iriye's *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-45.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981 and John Dower's *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. See especially *Louis' Imperialism at Bay,* 367-68. Captain H.L. Pence, Officer-in-Charge of the Navy's Occupied Areas Section during World War Two, had rather specific ideas of what to do with the Japanese people after the war. Pence thought it would be best for US security in the Pacific to totally annihilate the Japanese people. Short of this measure, he believed the US at least had to ring Japan with powerful bases, including in Micronesia, to prevent Japan from rebuilding and seeking revenge. He particularly saw the Pacific war in terms of a war of race survival for "white civilization" and thought that " . . . 'Every step should be taken to assure the absolute dominance of . . . white rule in the Pacific.'"

the racial attitudes of the American naval officer corps toward Micronesia itself. Information found in documents at the Navy Operational Archives in Washington, DC, as well as in secondary sources, suggests that a racial dimension existed in American naval planning toward Micronesia. It appears that this was not only the racism generally indicative of American society in the late 1940's, but may have been an ambition on the part of the naval officer corps for total racial control as an element of military security. Fear was exhibited that if racial control was not achieved, the "foreign races" would be able to claim a political standing on the islands at a later date and wrest concessions or control from the United States with the assistance of their "home" government.

At first, the dominant theme in American racial attitudes toward Micronesia appears to have been to impose American values upon Micronesians.[63] American influence in Micronesia went far back to the early nineteenth century when American whaling ships and missionaries visited the islands. The missionaries established stations on the islands and proceeded to convert the natives with some success. Churches became established in the islands and Christian culture was apparently fairly widespread among Micronesians. In fact, in 1946, when the United States Navy sent a team under Commodore Benjamin Wyatt to inform the people of Bikini Atoll that their island would have to be evacuated because of the impending atomic bomb tests, the team unwittingly interrupted an American-style, Sunday morning Congregationalist church service! After

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[63] Robert C. Kiste, for example, believes that since the earliest days of naval control elements of social engineering were begun which had more to do with the imposition of American values than with the well-being of the Micronesians, programs such as Western style education which taught democratic values. See "Termination of the U.S. Trusteeship in Micronesia," *Journal of Pacific History* 21 (October 1986): 128.

the service, Commodore Wyatt even used a biblical analogy to convince the islanders to leave, comparing them to the Children of Israel whom the United States was going to lead to the land of salvation much as God had done for the Jews![64]

Christianity was an important element of assimilating the Micronesians to American control. As early as January 1945, Admiral Raymond Spruance had remarked that Christinizing the natives would assist the US in swaying them away from Japanese influence. He also advocated teaching them English, but wanted it understood that he was not " . . . trying to put undershirts on any native belles who are not accustomed to wearing them."[65] While Spruance's paternalistic remark definitely hints at an "Americanization" of Micronesia through social engineering, his concern over preventing any Japanese influence over the Micronesians more clearly implies a general concern for military security in the islands.

Other measures taken by the naval military government support this last conclusion. For example, the Navy quickly removed all Japanese from the islands after the war ended, stressing the importance of their removal " . . . to their homeland, or to such other places as may be later determined . . ."[66] In addition, from August 12, 1944 to May 30, 1946, the naval military government denied such basic civil rights as the right of assembly, public meetings (except for religious purposes), and even the right to assemble the Guam Congress.[67] Finally, the Navy's policy in regard to land

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[64] Gale, "Micronesia: A Case Study of American Foreign Policy," 22, 25; and Richard, *United States Naval Administration*, Vol. III, 509-10.

[65] Lieutenant Commander Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, *United States Naval Administration Of The Trust Territory Of The Pacific Islands* (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, 1957), Vol. II, 78.

[66] "Proposed Plan for Civil Government," Box 193, Strategic Plans Division Records, Navy Operational Archives.

[67] Roy E. Jones, "The Guam Congress," *Pacific Affairs* 19 (December 1946): 411.

use on Guam suggests that the overriding concern of the Navy was, again, absolute military control rather than an "Americanization" of the natives. The Navy had final say, for instance, in all cases of land appropriation and prewar claims to damages. It could literally dictate " . . . who goes back where, how they go back, how fast they go, and on what lots they go back . . ."[68] If the Navy's plans had been to socialize the natives into some sort of American-style society on the islands, those plans would have more sensibly entailed the prompt settling of prewar claims for land and damages on a favorable basis for the islanders. Instead, it seems the Navy simply indulged in a land grab to satisfy its basing requirements.

Regardless of whether US naval policy toward Micronesia was motivated by thoughts of military security or the imposition of American values (they may have been one and the same to naval decision makers), racism was evident. "From the very beginning [of the American liberation of Micronesia] distinctions were made between ethnic groups in this area."[69] One example of these distinctions can be found in a document in the Strategic Plans Division of the Navy Operational Archives. This document detailed a problem which rapid demobilization had caused for naval planners in Micronesia, namely a shortage of military personnel who could be utilized as a labor force for the construction of bases in the islands. The document suggested that potential sources of labor from East Asia could be imported to Micronesia and used to replace demobilized American military laborers, but was mainly concerned that the " . . . future population of the Marianas

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[68] Timothy P. Maga, "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946-50," *Pacific Historical Review* 53 (February 1984): 69.

[69] Douglas L. Oliver, *The Pacific Islands, 3rd ed.* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 264.

contains the least number of persons of races undesirable from a military point of view."[70]

To the planners " . . . the ideal arrangement would be to import U.S. laborers belonging to the White race, thereby establishing firmly a Caucasian colony of the United States."[71] They believed that Chinese or Filipinos would be "undesirable", supposedly because of their ability to establish themselves in the islands and later bring political pressure against the United States. The planners wanted to avoid a situation they thought similar to Hawaii or California, where they claimed Asian immigrants had been allowed to settle and bring excessive political pressure on the US in national and international issues.[72]

If white laborers could not be found for the islands, Japanese were preferred as temporary laborers because of the ease of controlling them as prisoners of war without arousing the American public and because they were seen as ideal for the heavy physical labor of base construction.[73] Filipinos, on the other hand, were seen as totally undesirable for base construction because they were " . . . by comparison [with the Japanese], as far as physical labor is concerned, . . . lazy." It is small wonder that these men were concerned that the Russians might be able to accuse the United States of using Japanese prisoners of war as slave labor for base fortifications![74]

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[70] Page 1 of Enclosure(B) to OP-30-P Memorandum, 27 June 1946, File B-7, Box 156, Strategic Plans Division Records, Navy Operations Archives.
[71] Ibid., 1.
[72] Ibid., 3.
[73] Ibid., 2.
[74] Ibid.

When it came to permanent settlers, as opposed to temporary laborers, the order of race preference changed with whites again being the most "preferred" group, then natives or even Filipinos, and finally East Asians. " . . . [M]embers of the Brown race would be preferable next to members of the White race . . . Filipinos . . . would be preferable to members of the Yellow race as permanent settlers."[75] Filipinos seemed to have better fit the "requirements", probably because Japanese were considered a security risk and because of the American colonial experience in the Philippines.

The possibility of permanently settling white Americans in Micronesia suggests an additional aspect to the naval officer corps' racial attitudes. It too denotes security consciousness laced with paternalistic racism. To what degree did naval officers want to populate the islands with white Americans in order to absorb the Micronesians into the white population? One historian, Mark Peattie, suggests that Japanese immigration policy toward Micronesia in the 1920's and 1930's was just such an effort.[76] Interestingly enough, at least one American naval officer writing in *Proceedings* suggested a similar policy, though he was not as straightforward about it as to suggest total absorbtion.

This officer, Lieutenant Commander T.O. Clark, believed it desirable to have white American families move to Micronesia after base construction and family facilities had been completed. Remind-ing the reader of America's more "rustic" days, he thought that " . . . only . . . those who are kindred spirits to the settlers of our one-time ever advancing western frontiers . . . " could be lured away from the high standard of living in the

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[75] Ibid., 4.

[76] Peattie, *Nanyo*, 153-197.

United States.[77] Still, he envisioned a "Naval Colonizing Section" moving into the islands to establish colonizing units for naval personnel and their families.[78] He saw this as an opportunity to develop the resources and commerce of the islands, while simultaneously coupling their sovereignty and economy to that of the US. He hoped that these naval families would elect to remain permanently, supporting themselves by farming, trade, or Navy pensions,[79] and he believed the natives would gladly "elevate" themselves to become "useful" citizens of the US; the US would return their loyalty by policing the Pacific and accepting at long last the manifest destiny it had selfishly avoided for nearly half a century.[80] What is most significant about Clark's ideas is that they seem to embody all that naval policymakers hoped to obtain from Micronesia in the mid-1940's: overwhelming US influence in the Pacific Basin; guarantee against a future Pearl Harbor, whether from a resurgent Japan, the Soviet Union, or some combination of "Eurasian" powers; and a global showcase of American benevolence and progress.

Conclusion

American experiences during World War Two, growing global tensions with the Soviet Union after 1945, and perceptions of US vulnerability by American naval officers galvanized their determination to obtain maximum

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[77] Lt. Cdr. T.O. Clark, USNR, "The Administration of the Former Japanese Mandated Islands," *USNIP* 72 (April 1946): 511.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid, 512-513.

[80] Ibid., 513. One other naval officer, Vice Admiral Wright, "complimented" the Micronesians even more than Clark had done on their ability to build a future for themselves under American tutelage. "Those who know the intelligent and competent brown skinned folk of Micronesia admire the way that they have adapted themselves to their surroundings." See Vice Admiral Carleton H. Wright, USN (RET), "Trust Territory Of The Pacific Islands," *USNIP* 74 (November 1948): 1341.

control over the islands of Micronesia. Strategic considerations seemed to have predominated in their planning. Though there is significant evidence to suggest that the Navy had plans for the islands both as part of a postwar global American economic order and as a showcase of American benevolence, the balance of the evidence leaves little doubt that the Navy's preoccupation with economic and racial control probably had more to do with strategic security in the context of the Cold War.

Chapter Two

Micronesia and the Battle within the Bureaucracy

Micronesia became a focal point for several key issues in the American government during the formative years of the Cold War. The islands were at the center of controversy between the War and Navy Departments over a debate on postwar defense strategy, a dispute on the roles and missions of each service, and a struggle for shares of the defense budget. In addition, the postwar administrative control of Micronesia was disputed between the War, Navy, State, and Interior Departments in light of the criticism of prewar naval administraton in Guam and American Samoa. Given the context of the Cold War and the debate over defense and foreign policy at the time, the interdepartmental struggle over policy toward Micronesia can be seen as a microcosm of the issues facing the American government during the early years of the Cold War.

The Interservice Debate on Strategy

In 1945, Micronesia quickly became involved in the Army-Navy debate on postwar strategy in the Pacific, most specifically over the use of either naval or air forces as the main US force in the Pacific and East Asia. Each service, faced with declining defense budgets and demobilization, tried to use its wartime experiences and capabilities, combined with the perceived necessity of maintaining US forces in the Pacific, to argue for a special role in the Pacific which would have guaranteed it the premier role in American defense policymaking.

Soon after the Japanese surrender in September 1945, the JCS had outlined a policy which it hoped would be adopted as the postwar US military strategy. The JCS argued for the postwar maintenance of a highly trained and equipped military deployed on a global basis as a guarantor of US interests. Supporting such a force would be overseas bases, a sophisticated intelligence and warning system, and the stockpiling of strategic material. One of the key components of this force would be mobile striking units capable of instant and sustained action against potentially hostile nations.

The Navy agreed with the concept of mobile striking power, especially since it assumed that postwar responsibilities in Micronesia and the Pacific Basin would inevitably come under its jurisdiction and that these responsbilities would require the maintenance of fast carrier task groups in the Pacific to carry out tasks like the postwar control of Japan.[1] Forrestal put it succinctly when he asserted that the Navy would form a defensive wedge in the Pacific, based on sea and airpower, that would guarantee both the freedom of the Pacific and US security against any future attacks from East Asia.[2]

The Navy contended that it was ideally suited to fulfill this mission. It specifically argued that carrier airpower in the Pacific was the only means of providing the US with a mobile tactical air force close to the Eurasian continent.[3] The Navy's record in the Pacific War encouraged it to

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[1] David Nelson Rowe, "Collective Security in the Pacific: An American View," *Pacific Affairs* 18 (March 1945): 8, 11-12, and 16.

[2] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1946: Hearings before a Subcommittee on Navy Department Appropriations,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 25.

[3] U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947: Hearings before a Subcommittee on Navy Department Appropriations,* 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, 8. See also SWNCC 282, "Basis for the Formulation of a U.S. Military Policy," September 19, 1945, found in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University

assert that naval airpower could meet and defeat land based airpower which the AAF argued made naval power obsolete. Indeed, the Navy had impressive statistics concerning Japanese air bases overwhelmed by roving carrier fleets.

Conversely, the AAF believed that the Pacific was the region most suited to supporting atomic airpower projected toward East Asia. It saw Micronesia as "permanent aircraft carriers" in the Pacific and saw an opportunity to use them in undermining the Navy's arguments. The AAF cited its operational experience in Micronesia against Japan in 1944-45 as evidence of its capabilities in the Pacific. In addition, it noted the relative invulnerability of Micronesia from the Soviet Union compared to nations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Furthermore, many of these nations had expressed a reluctance to host US military bases. Finally, the fact that the US exercised unilateral control over the central Pacific encouraged the AAF to claim that Micronesia's value lay in its potential as a system of advanced bomber bases which could be used to contain communism in East Asia. Accordingly, the AAF emphasized Pacific operations in its training deployments in 1946 and 1947 and tried to use these deployments to illustrate that naval support was unnecessary for the AAF to deploy and project US power to the Eurasian periphery.[4]

The Navy, however, countered that it could carry out missions vital to strategic security in the Pacific which the AAF could not because of the

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Press, 1978), 39-44. In addition, see Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-46* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 148-50; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1946: Hearings before a Subcommittee on Navy Department Appropriations,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 4-5; Harry R. Borowski, *The Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment Before Korea* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), 74, 76, and 77.

[4] Borowski, *The Hollow Threat,* 74, 76, and 77.

inherent limitations of aircraft. For instance, it believed it alone had the capability of heavy lift and presence on the surface of the world's oceans which guaranteed maritime supremacy to the US, a maritime supremacy still necessary, in the Navy's view, for US national security and economic prosperity.[5] Likewise, it could claim that the Navy was the only service able to operate systems of supply, communication, and surface and air transportation in the Pacific during the war.[6]

The Navy had influential Congressional allies who were also convinced that control of the Pacific was primarily a naval problem and therefore the realm of the Navy Deparment.[7] One such Congressional ally was Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs. Vinson was quoted as saying that the Pacific War had been predominantly naval in nature. Even more surprising were his very provocative statements largely discounting the efforts of the other Allied nations in the Pacific and subordinating the efforts of the Army and AAF to those of the Navy in defeating Japan.[8]

Vinson's statements are not entirely suprising given the myriad of factors which contributed to Congressmen's assertions. But such a blatant dismissal of the War Department's efforts against the Japanese could only have encouraged naval officers' conviction that the Navy had a special and

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[5] U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, *Hearings before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 394.

[6] Vice Admiral Carleton H. Wright, USN (RET), "Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands," *USNIP* 74 (November 1948): 1334, and Commander Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, *United States Naval Administration Of The Trust Territory Of The Pacific Islands* (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, 1957), Vol. III, 120.

[7] See Page 1 of "Postwar Naval Bases in the Pacific," from File "Agenda Pacific Conference, November 1944," Box 182, Strategic Plans Records Division, Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC.

[8] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, *Study of Pacific Bases: A Report by the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases to the Committee on Naval Affairs,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 1159.

paramount role to play in Pacific security. Vinson's statement is indicative of the intensity which the interservice debate on strategy reached in these years and of the central role Micronesia played in that debate. Micronesia, however, played an even greater role in the interservice debate on roles and missions, a debate which partially fueled the debate on postwar strategy and which involved interdepartmental rivalry between the War, Navy, State, and Interior Departments over the postwar administrative control of Micronesia.

Roles and Missions

Interservice debates on roles and missions had been a staple of American defense policymaking since the 1920's when the potential of the airplane as a military weapon cast doubt on the Navy's ability to continue as the nation's first line of defense.[9] The attack on Pearl Harbor, the revolutionary advances in weaponry during World War Two, (including the advent of atomic airpower by the Army Air Force (AAF)), and the shortened response times of one nation to another's aggression, all intensified doubt among the Navy's critics as to its viability in the postwar era.[10] Because of

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[9] For a detailed account of this controversy, see especially Vincent Davis' *The Admiral Lobby* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 48-86.

[10] For an overview of literature on defense unification and the postwar debate on roles and missions, see Herman S. Wolk, "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-50: The Air Force," *Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives* 7 (Spring 1975): 18 and 19; Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 92, 96-97; Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-50* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 211-13; Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans For Postwar Defense, 1941-45* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 17, 39-42 and 110; and Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy*, 145-46, 155, and 241-46. Also, see David Alan Rosenberg's "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist* 38 (May 1982): 25-30; "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," *Journal of American History* 66 (June 1979): 62-87; and "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security* 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71. In addition, Major Harry R. Borowski, USAF, "Air Force Atomic Capability from V-J Day to the Berlin Blockade-Potential or Real?" *Military Affairs* 44

the significance of Micronesia to America's postwar conception of national security, the islands were vitally important to this debate.

An early example of Micronesia's involvement in the debate over roles and missions occurred immediately after the war with the atomic bomb tests against American and Japanese naval vessels at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands in 1946. First proposed in late 1945 and early 1946 by the AAF, the tests were enthusiastically supported by the Navy thereafter as a way to demonstrate that atomic bombs had not made warships and navies obsolete. The Navy's survival as the first line of defense depended on this. Similarly, the AAF tried to use the operation to illustrate the efficacy of precision strategic bombing and to demonstrate its ability to provide the first line of defense.[11]

Conducted in the summer of 1946, the tests proved in-conclusive. While they illustrated that warships were very vulnerable to atomic airpower, the results were not decisive enough to silence the Navy's opinion that it could survive an atomic war at sea. Nor did the results prevent the AAF from continuing its claim that in a real war the fleet would have been destroyed.[12]

What is most interesting about the operation, however, was not the result, but the way in which it epitomized the interservice rivalry between the Army and Navy. Not only had the services debated the objectives and desired results of the operation, but they had even debated basic aspects

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(October 1980): 105-110; and Borowski, *The Hollow Threat*, passim. Finally, see Elliot Converse, "United States Plans For A Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1984), 147.

[11] Lloyd J. Graybar, "Bikini Revisited," *Military Affairs* 44 (October 1980): 118; and Graybar, "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting?" *Journal of American History* 72 (March 1986): 893-95.

[12] Graybar, "Bikini Revisited," 120-22.

like the placement of ships.[13] Even more significant was the extent to which each service attempted to control the test conditions. The Navy, for example, exercised control over the vessels involved, the territory where the bombs were dropped, and the majority of the key officers, other personnel, and logistics support.[14] In addition, the commander of Operation Crossroads, Vice Admiral William Blandy, took rather extreme steps to control the press and foreign observers. These steps included indoctrination films, a limit on the number of foreign correspondents and observers who could attend the tests, and their separation from US military personnel and scientists involved in the operation.[15] The most explicit example of this attempted control, however, was contained in a top secret memorandum which urged the Navy's leadership to use experiments as a pretense to sink any naval vessels which survived. The planners wanted to prevent the AAF from being able to sink the ships themselves and wanted to keep the press from obtaining coverage that could be used against the Navy in the unification and appropriation debates.[16]

It is testimony to the intensity of the interservice debate on roles and missions that even the results of Operation Crossroads could not convince the Navy of relinquishing its dream of obtaining a large postwar

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[13] Top Secret dispatch from Commander, Joint Task Force One, dated 17 August 1946, Folder 0-1 (Operations-Future), Box 163 of the CNO Records (Double Zero), Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC. Also, William A. Shurcliff, *Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation Crossroads* (New York: W.H. Wise, 1947), 9; and Graybar, "Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting?", 895.

[14] Graybar, "Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting?", 893-95.

[15] Memorandum for Vice Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, 18 March 1946, File 39-1-37, Box 72, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, General Records of the Department of the Navy (Record Group 80), National Archives, Washington, DC; and letter from Blandy to Forrestal, date unknown, same file. Also, Appendix "A" to Memorandum by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, SWNCC 248/3, 4 February 1946, SWNCC Papers (microfilm), Film 15172, Reel 22.

[16] See Top Secret Memorandum from M.B. Gardner and Forrest Sherman, dated 25 March 1946, found in Folder D-3, "Dispostion of Japanese Ships," Box 161 of CNO Records, (Double Zero), Navy Operational Archives.

fleet and continuing as the nation's first line of defense. Furthermore, Operation Crossroads was not the only time that Micronesia illustrated the debate on roles and missions. In fact, the islands would mirror this debate in many other ways.

For example, Micronesia became the focal point for a controversy over the Army-Navy command relationship in the Pacific. This was a dispute largely fought between MacArthur and Nimitz which had begun early in the war. By January 1945, the problem was primarily one concerning the Army's control of naval forces. An entry in Forrestal's diary explains that Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet under MacArthur's operational control, had been ordered by MacArthur not to carry out any fleet movements without his express permission.[17] The dispute grew more serious in July 1946, when MacArthur asserted that the Seventh Fleet should be kept forward deployed in the Western Pacific, with one Marine division based at Guam, and that the entire force should remain under his operational control in the event hostilities broke out in East Asia.[18] To the Navy, the idea of fleet movements being controlled by an Army officer was anathema and these events were clear violations of its bureaucratic authority and autonomy.

One month later, Forrestal wrote that General Eisenhower believed that a proper command relationship in the Western Pacific would entail an army officer exercising control over Japan, the Philippines, and the Ryukyus, while a separate Pacific Ocean Command of the Pacific Basin should be placed under a naval officer.[19] Apparently, MacArthur would have none of

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[17] Forrestal Diaries, 19 July 1945.
[18] Ibid., 10 July 1946.
[19] Ibid., 21 August 1946.

this, since in September 1946, Forrestal wrote that Nimitz's conversations with Eisenhower over MacArthur's demands were not promising. MacArthur continued to argue for control of the Marines and the Seventh Fleet on the grounds that they were needed as support in case of hostilities in East Asia. But even Eisenhower admitted the reasons were "political" and again proposed a single Pacific theater under one naval officer.[20]

Conflict over the control of the Marines in Micronesia was also illustrative of the dispute arising from War Department proposals for a defense unification scheme which would have left the AAF in predominant control of postwar American defense policy and would have threatened the survival of the Corps itself. In spite of their substantial expansion during the war and a favorable reputation with the general public, the Marines had been under constant threat of being absorbed by the Army. The period after 1945 was no different and it appears only Congressional allies and favorable public opinion prevented this.[21]

The Marines were extremely important to any scheme of control in Micronesia and the Pacific, since they had been the pioneers of amphibious warfare and had been the spearhead in conquering Micronesia from Japan. Like the Navy, the Marine Corps believed its use of amphibious doctrine and the fighting in the Central Pacific had guaranteed it a prominent role in postwar defense policy. In fact, it justified its existence because of its "special" talents in relation to the Army. Specifically, the Marines claimed the Army was too "ponderous", lacked mobility, and argued that " . . . 'a great

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[20] Ibid., 24 September 1946.

[21] The most complete account of this is Marine Corps Colonel Gordon W. Keiser's, *The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944-47: The Politics Of Survival.* Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982.

national army cannot be a specialist Marine Corps - and still be an Army.'"[22] The Navy joined the Marines in extolling their special differences with the Army. Anything less would have fueled Army charges that the Marines were a wasteful duplication of the Army, just as naval aviation was supposedly a wasteful duplication of the AAF.

Such fears do not seem to be totally unfounded in light of remarks made by Army generals. Eisenhower, in particular, asserted that the expansion of the Marine Corps during World War Two was strictly an emergency development and that it should not be seen as assigning a mission of land warfare to the Navy or Marines. He acknowledged the need for the Marines to bridge the gap between the soldier and sailor, to guard ships and naval bases, and to provide small units of fast reaction forces in forward areas to protect American interests. But he also believed that once the Marines were expanded to the point where they took on a combined arms stature, i.e., tanks, aircraft, and troops, they were duplicating Army functions. Accordingly, Eisenhower argued that the Marines be restricted to their traditional functions, that they be composed of combat units no larger than regimental size, and that they be limited to 50,000 or 60,000 men.[23]

Even more bellicose toward the Navy and Marine Corps was AAF Brigadier General Frank Armstrong. In 1947, Armstrong vehemently denied the efficacy of carriers in future wars and repeatedly asserted that the AAF was destined to "run the show." In addition, he had plans for the Marines. He claimed that the Marines were a " . . . fouled up Army talking Navy lingo . . . ", that the Army was going to put the Marines into the Regular Army and make

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[22] Ibid., 55.
[23] Forrestal Diaries, 3 December 1946.

"real" soldiers out of them, and that the Navy would be relegated to supporting the needs of the air and ground forces.[24]

Another point involving Micronesia and the Marines illustrates the Navy's fear that the Marine Corps would be perceived as a "second Army" and taken from Navy Department control as result of defense unification. Specifically, the division of responsibility between the Navy and the Marine Corps over civil and military government in Micronesia concerned naval officials. The question was whether the Marines would be charged with civil administration responsibilities as well as military government responsibilities in Navy areas of operation. The Navy felt the Marines should have responsibility for military government during the assault and consolidation phases of an amphibious invasion, but that the Navy should be responsible during any long term occupation of an area and should be solely responsible for civil government in all phases of an invasion. In addition, it felt that tactical units of the Fleet Marine Force should not be used as security or police forces during an invasion, arguing that this could be interpreted as a wasteful use of their specialized training in amphibious operations.[25] In short, the Navy was trying to ensure that the Marine Corps' duties in no way duplicated the duties of Army civil affairs units in Germany or Japan or Navy civil affairs units in Micronesia, since this would have added weight to the War Department's argument that the Marines were substandard copies of the Army.

Although disputes of this nature continued in general between the two services, there is some evidence that they began to work together to try to

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[24] Robert G. Albion, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 612-13.

[25] Richard, *United States Naval Administration*, Vol. III, 56-57, 55.

resolve differences over the control of Micronesia. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air John L. Sullivan said, the Army and Navy needed to stand " . . . 'shoulder to shoulder. . .'" in the matter.[26]

One reason for this cooperation was Congress' Pearl Harbor investigation, which was occurring at the same time as the debates on strategy, the defense budget, and the future of Micronesia. It was revealed that one significant cause of the surprise attack had been a lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy. In February 1946, Nimitz stated that if command relationships in the Pacific Ocean Area were not worked out soon, the services were due for serious public criticism. "With the Pearl Harbor investigation fresh in its mind, the public would probably give vent to great and righteous indignation."[27]

The main reason, however, for the cooperation between the Army and Navy in 1946 was probably opposition from the State and Interior Departments over the administrative control of Micronesia. This debate was concerned with the administrative form that the postwar control of Micronesia would take, either through unilateral annexation as advocated by the military services, or through a United Nations "strategic trusteeship" as advocated by State and Interior. As early as 1945, the State and Interior Departments had suggested and lobbied for Micronesia to be placed under strategic "trust" as a UN international trusteeship, with the US being the

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[26] For Sullivan's statement, see Richard, *United States Naval Administration*, Vol. III, 15. Also, "Memorandum for the JCS," CCS 014 Pacific Ocean Area (8-21-45), JCS Geographic Files, 1942-45, Box 679, RG 218, NA; and "Memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy," dated 3 November 1945, same file as above. In addition, there is "Pacific Islands Administration," 11 December 1945, File 77-1-66, Box 128, RG 80, NA. Finally, see Converse, "United States Plans For A Postwar Overseas Base System," 226-27.

[27] Forrestal Diaries, 16 February 1946.

sole administering authority and exercising, in effect, virtual and unimpeded control.[28]

The military was vehemently opposed to anything less than virtual US annexation of the islands. One officer, Vice Admiral Russell Willson, Navy member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), even referred to the State Department as " . . . the 'international welfare boys' . . ." as an example of his disdain for the department and its proposals.[29] In fact, military opposition to trusteeship concepts was so serious it could be said that US military policy with regard to Micronesia in 1945-47 was in conflict with the foreign policy goals determined by President Truman and his advisers.

Truman and his advisers hoped to deflect charges of territorial aggrandizement from the Soviet Union and the European colonial powers by clothing American control of Micronesia in the UN strategic trusteeship concept. This would have provided for virtual US control and security in the Pacific, while still allowing the Truman Administration to criticize Soviet annexations in Eastern Europe and East Asia, as well as European colonialism in Africa and Asia. The military, however, struggled against the State and Interior Departments' advocacy of strategic trusteeship from the start.[30]

The Navy was particularly concerned with the efforts of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to bring Micronesia under Interior Department control. Ickes wanted to correct what he believed were the abuses of

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[28] William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-45* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 479-82.
[29] Ibid., 478.
[30] Ibid., 68-87, 366-367, and 463-573; also, Lester J. Foltos, "The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-1947," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Summer 1989): 317-42.

prewar naval civil administration, such as incompetent and dictatorial naval governors and the Navy's absolute control over civil rights.[31] Ickes' accusations about the military administration of dependent territories had gotten serious enough for Sullivan to write Forrestal that " . . . the Navy should attempt to reach an understanding with the Army on the whole problem before the matter is discussed further with civilian agencies."[32]

On the surface, it appears that a large part of the controversy between the Navy and Interior Departments was personal animosity between Forrestal and Ickes.[33] For example, when Forrestal was asked in January 1945 to comment on a bill proposed by Ickes to have Micronesia directly administered by a civilian agency under an assistant secretary of the Navy, Forrestal remarked " . . . that the Navy's suggestion was that " . . . 'Mr. Ickes be made King of Polynesia, Micronesia, and the Pacific Ocean Area.'"[34] Even after Ickes resigned as Secretary of the Interior, Forrestal wrote harshly about him in his secret files, sarcastically accusing him of hypocritical self-righteousness and of carrying on a moral crusade against the Navy.[35]

However, the alignment of the Navy Department against the Interior Department was actually much more than a conflict between two men. It was, in the words of historian William Roger Louis, one of the greatest controversies in the history of the American government.[36]

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[31] Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* Vol. III, 18-19 and Vol. II, 60 and 62. See also Whitney T. Perkins, *Denial of Empire: The United States And Its Dependencies* (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1962), 285.

[32] Memorandum from Sullivan to Forrestal, date unknown, found in File 77-1-6, Box 128, RG 80, NA.

[33] Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* Vol. II, 60 and 62, and Vol. III, 29-30; also, Louis, *Imperialism at Bay,* 19.

[34] Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* Vol, II, 60 and 62.

[35] Ibid., Vol. III, 29-30.

[36] Louis, *Imperialism at Bay,* 19, 475-96, and 512-35.

Throughout 1945 and 1946, the State and Interior Departments continued to assert that the islands needed to be placed under an international trusteeship to avoid accusations about territorial aggrandizement from other nations and to avoid the abuses of naval civil administration.[37] The military, however, used several arguments to try to avert trusteeship under a civilian agency.

It argued that a civilan agency controlling the islands would, of necessity, have to acquire its own fleet of patrol vessels because of the geography of Micronesia, thereby adding additional expenses to the administration of the islands at a time of fiscal austerity.[38] Even more importantly, the services questioned whether administration by a civilian agency would endanger national security,[39] since control of the islands was desired for their usefulness as security outposts, not experimental showcases for the State or Interior Departments. In addition, Secretary of War Robert Patterson pointed out that the civilan control of Micronesia would suggest to the global community that the US intended to annex the islands as it had done to Alaska and Hawaii, thus creating the type of situation the State and Interior Departments were supposedly trying to prevent.[40]

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[37] Message from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, 9 April 1945, *FRUS* 1945, 1:211-13. Also, see Perkins, *Denial of Empire*, 309-10.

[38] Roger Gale, "Micronesia: A Case Study of American Foreign Policy." (Ph.D. diss., The University of California at Berkeley, 1977), 64.

[39] See Appendix "B" of "Position With Respect To The Government of Guam, American Samoa, and The Trust Territory Of The Pacific Islands," SWNCC 364/3, 26 June 1947, found in CCS 014 Pacific Ocean Area (8-21-45), Box 679 of the JCS Geographic Files, 1942-45, RG 218, NA.

[40] The Forrestal Diaries, 30 October 1945. See also Memorandum for the President entitled, "Administration of Pacific Island Bases," SWNCC 249/1, January-February 1946, SWNCC Minutes, SWNCC Papers (microfilm), Frame 1125, Reel 22, Film 15172. "... any such change in administration would have the appearance of this Government settling down for a long period of occupation..."

Finally, the Navy contended in a particularly racist manner that the development of the island populations along family and clan lines supposedly made it impossible for them to create any type of "republican" form of government in the future, thereby requiring a strong US presence in the islands to maintain order and stability. "The islanders seldom comprehend or respond rationally to federations or to other features of the American-European political patterns." Therefore, it was thought that the interests of the inhabitants (and, incidentally, of the United States Navy) would best be served " . . . by establishing in most of the islands a strong but benevolent government--a government paternalistic in character . . ."[41]

In the end, the interdepartmental controversy seems to have been somewhat of a draw. Against the opposition of the military, the State and Interior Departments were able to convince first President Roosevelt and later President Truman to have the islands offered to the UN as a strategic international trusteeship with the US as the sole administering authority and the Navy as the direct adminis-trative agency. Virtual control was still in the hands of the US, but it was a less than perfect situation from the military's point of view.[42]

The motives of the various departmental officials are unclear here. Personal animosity between civilian and military officials could have accounted for the dispute. Furthermore, personal beliefs in annexation or trusteeship probably ran deep and may have been just as significant. In addition, since Micronesia counted so heavily in the bureaucratic interests

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[41] Richard, *United States Naval Administration*, Vol. I, 19.

[42] Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 475-96 provides an excellent account of FDR's views in favor of international trusteeship, as well as the debates over the wording of the strategic trusteeship agreement. See also, Foltos, "The New Pacific Barrier," for an account of the Truman Administration's support of the State Department's proposals.

of the War and Navy Departments, the State and Interior Departments bureaucratic interests in this matter cannot be overlooked.

The State Department may have fought for trusteeship as a way to gain the bureaucratic upper hand against the military services in foreign policymaking. Clearly, a State Department victory over Micronesia may have paved the way for the Department's ascendancy in the Truman Administration's foreign policy bureaucracy.

Similarly, Ickes' statements imply that Interior Department control over Micronesia was his most important objective, regardless of its being couched in trusteeship terminology. Interior Department control of Micronesia would have extended its area of jurisdiction from Alaska and Hawaii into the central Pacific, increased its political influence in Congress, and indicated a postwar US commitment to dependent peoples whom Ickes thought the Navy had so badly abused since 1898. Most importantly, control of Micronesia may have been a way in which to promote his visibility within a new administration.

It is unclear to what degree the Navy's success in gaining bureaucratic control of Micronesia assisted it in the face of War, State, and Interior Department criticism in the all-important debate over roles and missions. Still, the controversy does illustrate the bitterness the disputes reached at times and indicates how important the tiny islands of Micronesia were to various agencies of the United States government in the mid-1940's.

The Battle of the Budget

Interservice rivalry over strategy, roles, and missions after 1945 was motivated in large part by increased competition over declining defense

budgets. Strategy, roles, and missions determined a service's budget. If a particular service was perceived as the nation's first line of defense, then major budgetary appropriations would fall to that service. However, if a service was relegated to minor roles, then that service would be denied the lion's share of the postwar defense budget.

In budgetary terms, things had gone quite well for the Navy during the war. The scope and intensity of global operations brought it unprecedented budgets and brought its personnel the rewards inherent in wartime service. However, the postwar years did not bode well for the Navy. Given the AAF's success at winning Congressional and public support for atomic airpower as the inexpensive solution to postwar American defense policy and given the wartime criticism of the Navy's leadership for being anachronistic in its strategic and tactical thinking, the Navy felt particularly threatened in regard to its bureaucratic and budgetary future.[43] The postwar years must have seemed particularly uncertain to the naval officer corps, so dependent for personal and career advancements on annual appropriations from Congress. As one naval officer stated as early as 1943, "'The Navy will be required to cut its expenditures to the bone.' Miserly appropriations, he concluded, were 'the most difficult obstacle the Navy will have to surmount.'"[44]

Micronesia played a significant role in the Navy's postwar maritime strategy and therefore in its postwar budgetary strategy, since the two were inexorably linked. The Navy's postwar strategy differed from its prewar plans in that it called for a deployment of forces on a global rather than hemispheric scale. The interwar aggression of the Axis Powers, the

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[43] Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy*, passim, and Caraley, *Politics of Military Unification*, passim.
[44] Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War*, 26.

shock of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and American experiences during World War Two all convinced American naval planners of the need for a high level of readiness and the forward deployment of forces to every corner of the globe.[45] Perceptions of a growing Soviet threat reinforced these beliefs.[46]

In the context of the Cold War, this strategy seems sensible. Yet in the context of declining defense budgets and increased competition from the AAF, a global strategy can be seen as a justification for high levels of defense appropriations. Forrestal himself, when questioned by Congress, would not give a definitive answer to the necessary budget levels, remarking that the Navy's budget should be determined by the " . . . 'the blood pressure of the international community . . . '"[47], a statement indicating the Navy's desire to avoid limitations on the postwar defense budget similar to the ones imposed on it in 1919.

The Navy's control of Micronesia in large part justified a substantial postwar budget for itself. There was little debate between the services over the necessity of some sort of American military force to patrol the area around Micronesia. The Navy, however, argued that since it had been the service responsible for conquering the area from the Japanese, it was logically the force which should assume security responsibility for the area. Truman and his advisers concurred in 1945 and the Navy retained control of

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[45] Ibid., 33, 93, 129, 200, 204-05, and 218.

[46] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1948: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,* 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 13-17. See also, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations,* 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, 40-41.

[47] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, *Study of Pacific Bases: A Report by the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 1166.

Micronesia, guaranteeing for itself an active role in the Pacific on behalf of US interests.[48]

An active role in Pacific affairs meant an active fleet patrolling Micronesian waters. The implications for the Navy's budget were obvious if it was to be funded a well-balanced fleet based on the most technologically sophisticated aircraft carriers, surface ships, and submarines.[49] Yet just as important from the Navy's perspective were the immense support forces which would be necessary to a fleet in the Pacific. Not only did a fleet entail the actual ships, planes, and men, but also the support infrastructure of docks and yards, supply depots, and training facilities necessary to service fleets which were deployed overseas for months at a time.[50] This type of fleet support would have had to be maintained at existing bases in the United States and Hawaii and built literally from scratch in many areas of Micronesia, including areas of the islands left untouched by the war which the Navy wanted to develop into new bases.[51] In short, it would have meant a tremendous boon to the Navy's substantially reduced postwar budget.

Furthermore, the Navy argued that island bases in Micronesia and a patrolling fleet in the Pacific were necessary for security, contending that

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[48] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1946: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 26.

[49] John C. Ries, "Congressman Vinson and the 'Deputy' to the JCS Chairman," *Military Affairs* 30 (Spring 1966): 19. See also Dean C. Allard, "La Bataille Du Potomac" (Paper delivered at the Colloque International, "Les Marines De Guerre Du Dreadnought Au Nucleaire", Paris, 25 November 1988), 10. "The Navy was well aware that atomic bombs were the glamor weapons of the day and that a capability to deliver these devices could further its claims for large appropriations."

[50] Herold J. Wiens, *Pacific Island Bastions of the United States* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), 119, 60.

[51] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, *Study of Pacific Bases: A Report by The Subcommittee on Pacific Bases,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1015-17, 1020, and 1168.

the war in the Pacific had proven that each was vulnerable to attack without the other.[52] By making such claims, the Navy attempted to forestall charges by the AAF that US security in the Pacific could have been provided for more cheaply by stationing bombers at Micronesian bases and dispensing with a large fleet. It may have been for this reason that one naval officer, Commander Harold Stassen, a member of the US delegation to the UN Conference at San Francisco in 1945, was known to remark that Micronesian " . . . island bases 'are as essential a part of our armament as guns and ships.'"[53]

Given actual Soviet naval activity in the Pacific in 1946 and after, and the potential for the building of a Soviet Pacific fleet, which was minimal, it appears that strategic concerns were not the sole reason behind the Navy's lobbying for control of Micronesia. It is true that the mere potential of Soviet naval activity in the distant future was enough to cause naval planners concern because of their experiences in the Pacific during World War Two and because of their perceptions of a global threat from Russia. However, set in the context of drastically falling defense budgets and the bitter debate over roles and missions with the AAF, it was in the Navy's bureaucratic interest to obtain administrative control of Micronesia and patrol it with a large, well-balanced, and expensive fleet.

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[52] Captain J.M. Kennaday, USN, "A Proper Conception of Advanced Bases," *USNIP* 72 (June 1946): 791. The Navy was fairly explicit in several documents of the "lessons" of the Pacific War, especially in regard to the interdependency of carrier fleets and island bases. " . . . the Navy must at all times bear in mind that at best bases constitute contributory and not independent strength; that they cannot in themselves compensate for inferiority in mobile combatant forces . . . ", page 14 of "Basic Determination of Active U.S. Naval Forces Required in Postwar World," Box 212, Strategic Plans Records Division, Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC. See also, "Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy," dated 26 January 1945, Box 193, Ibid.; and "Comments by CinCPac and CinCPOA on Mobile Forces Versus Bases," found in file "Joint Operations, February 1946-October 1946," Box 198, Ibid.

[53] Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 515-16.

Conclusion

Micronesia became heavily entangled in the interservice rivalry between the War and Navy Departments over global postwar strategy, roles and missions, and the control of the Marine Corps. In addition, the islands were the focal point of a struggle between the War, Navy, State, and Interior Departments over the administrative control of foreign policymaking and the future of US policy toward its dependent territories and peoples. Finally, the islands represented, in part, the postwar competition between the military services over dwindling budget resources. From this perspective, it can be seen that Micronesia represented a microcosm of the issues which fueled the politics and debate on American defense and foreign policymaking during the early years of the Cold War.

Conclusion

US interests in Micronesia began as early as the days of the whaling industry in the nineteenth century and increased markedly in 1898 when Guam and the Philippines were taken as advanced naval stations in the Pacific. But in spite of American naval officers' efforts to have the US take control of the entire island chain in 1898 and 1919, it was not until 1945, when the perceived failure of the Washington System and the scarring experience of the Pacific War made a significant enough impact on American thinking, that the Navy was able to lobby effectively for the control of Micronesia.

In discussing the history of the US in Micronesia, historians have concentrated almost solely on the possession of the islands as a future deterrent to Japan. Just as important, however, were the naval planners' perceptions of the USSR as a future threat in the Pacific Basin. Even more importantly, these perceptions were not held by fringe elements of the planning bodies, but by highly influential people like Forrestal who were central to the policy-making process.

The planners' depiction of the Soviet Union as the primary future naval threat in the Pacific was an indication of the impact the war and rising Cold War tensions had on their thinking, since in the late 1940's the USSR had no Pacific fleet to speak of nor did it have much potential or incentive for building one. Even the Soviet submarine force, one of the largest in the world, was technologically unsophisticated, largely untrained, and inexperienced. Yet the memory of U-boats off the United States East Coast during World War Two, the victories of the Japanese Navy in 1942, and the mere potential of the Soviet Navy to be built into a major strategic

force in the future prompted the plannners to argue for the absolute control of Micronesia and the Kurile-Sakhalin area as well.

Evidence discovered in the Navy Operational Archives suggests that there were also other than strictly military arguments voiced by the planners for the American control of Micronesia. These arguments included economic and racial dimensions to overall strategic control, and denoted plans for a US colony in the Pacific and the economic exploitation of Micronesia on a scale similar to the Japanese League of Nations mandate in the 1920's and 1930's. Undoubtedly, plans for colonization and economic exploitation did exist in the minds of some planners, naval officers, and even Congressmen. But these people were more peripheral to actual policymaking than figures like Forrestal and an investigation of the documentation produces the conclusion that US policy was motivated predominantly by strict military considerations when it came to the control of Micronesia.

A further aspect of US policy toward Micronesia which has been relatively ignored is that Micronesia represented a microcosm of larger bureaucratic issues being debated in the American government in 1945. The sudden assertion of US power at the end of World War Two, coupled with drastic cuts in the federal budget, brought on keen competition between the War, Navy, State, and Interior Departments for a share in defense and foreign policymaking. Micronesia seems to have represented a focal point for that competition as well as a source of postwar bureaucratic justification to these departments.

For example, Micronesia illustrated many of the issues of interservice rivalry between the War and Navy Departments, such as the debates over postwar strategy, roles and missions, and the distribution of

the defense budget. In addition, debate over Micronesia reflected the conflict of interests between the military services on the one hand, and the State and Interior Departments on the other. Specifically, the negotiations in the United Nations brought to the surface personal animosities between officials of the four departments, conflicting philosophies for the postwar administration of dependent territories and peoples, and charges of incompetence in policymaking.

This emphasis on bureaucracy is not meant to imply that US policy was determined by various bureaucratic interests alone. Quite to the contrary, strategic arguments for the retention of the islands prevailed. Still, the evidence suggests that bureaucratic motives were important. Thus, it was necessary to scrutinize events through a bureaucratic context in order to gain the broadest perspective possible on the post-World War Two control of Micronesia by the United States Navy and to supplement existing historiography.

APPENDIX

SECRET

DISCUSSION

ENCLOSURE (B) TO OP-30-P MEMO OF 27 JUNE 1946[1]

1. In correspondence and dispatches from ComMarianas, NavGovGuam and from CinCAFPac, it has become apparent that demobilization has reduced the effective labor force available in the Marianas to a point where Army and Navy Commanders in the area no longer can carry out effectively the missions which have been assigned to them. At present, critical labor shortages are being partly filled by the use of Japanese prisoners-of-war and Japanese demilitarized personnel still remaining in the Marianas Islands awaiting repatriation to Japan. When repatriated, their absence will leave a hole in the abailable labor market for the filling up of which no satisfactory solution has been found yet. Proposals have been received from CinCPac and NavGovGuam to supply the labor needs by (a) contract Chinese labor, (b) contract Filipino labor. CNO has disapproved (a). No decision has been made on (b). CinCAFPac has proposed to CinCPac importing 14,000 Ryukyuan laborers for Army construction projects in the Marianas. CinCPac has requested CNO's views on this proposal.

2. The 14,000 laborers which CinCAFPac estimates will have to be imported into the Marianas during the next six to twelve months for Army construction projects include both skilled and unskilled labor. It is understood that, on Guam alone, the Army Construction Program is about $18,000,000, while the Navy Construction Program there is upwards of $50,000,000, from which can be inferred that the Navy will require a considerably greater number of laborers that the 14,000 needed by the Army. With a conservative estimate of a total of 35,000 laborers needed for Army and Navy work, and with the present estimated native population of 23,000, such a tremendous increase in the population of the Islands will, I am confident, have a marked and lasting effect on the composition of the population in years to come. It is to our interests to insure, as far as careful planning will permit, that the future population of the Marianas contains the least number of persons of races undesirable from a military point of view.

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[1] Document found in File "B-7", Box 156, Strategic Plans Records Division, Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC.

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3. Disposal of excess and surplus property is a current pressing problem for which unskilled labor is needed at once. Procuring skilled and unskilled labor for the maintenance of existing bases and for construction programs is a problem which must be overcome very soon. The importation of personnel to form a permanent source of labor for the support and maintenance of our bases in the Marianas is a form of colonization, because this laboring class must remain in the Islands as long as we have bases there. They will comprise all types of labor from clerical help, artisans, mechanics, on down to gardeners and personal servants of families residing in the Islands. From a small island outpost, Guam and the other Marianas bases are being transformed into large colonies. How we colonize them now will determine the composition of the population for the next hundred years. To avoid a polygot community such as now exists in the Hawaiian Islands, the ideal arrangement would be to import U.S. laborers belonging to the White race, thereby establishing firmly a Caucasian colony of the United States. It is believed that this is impractical of accomplishment. However, proper far-sighted planning will, it is believed, insure a population in the Marianas containing a minimum of less desirable races.

4. While it would be desirable to procure labor from U.S. sources, it is not practical because of high wage costs and because not enough U.S. personnel will voluntarily leave the States to work in the Marianas. It is understood that to date after a four months intensive campaign to get artisans in the U.S. for civil service jobs in Guam, only thirty (30) have been obtained.

5. It is my opinion that the labor situation will have to be met in part by the use of foreign contract labor from one or more of the following places, and that the order of preference of these places from which such labor comes should be:

(1) Japan
(2) Ryukyus
(3) China
(4) Philippines

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6. I believe the best solution for the labor problem in the Marianas area is to import Japanese or Ryukyuan contract laborers because close military control of them can be effected most easily from a politico-military viewpoint. The proposals made by forces afloat for using contract labor include always the segregation of the laborers with a view to preventing their presence from affecting the economic and social life of the indigenous population. Use of Japanese or Ryukyuan labor will avoid any political repercussions incident to keeping them in compounds in the same areas where other Japanese are in similar compounds; it will avoid any effective political pressure being brought to bear, looking toward their remaining permanently in the islands, since U.S. public opinion would not react favorable to any such pressure. It should be easy to obtain this labor. Japanese, Ryukyuans, Chinese or Filippinos should accept such contracts willingly since it will permit the personnel concerned to exist under better economic conditions than those current in their own countries. Such use of Japanese or Ryukyuans will help relieve SCAP in some measure from the necessity of providing food and shelter for a number of repatriated Japanese or Ryukyuans. Japanese, Ryukyuans, or Chinese should provide a better type of labor than the Filipinos since the former physically are more rugged and can and will do much more strenuous labor than the Filipinos, who, by comparison as far as physical labor is concerned, are lazy. Possible objections to using Japanese or Ryukyuan labor are

(a) Possible conflict with our policy to repatriate all Japanese and Ryukyuans to their homeland. I do not believe there is an actual conflict here. The conditions on which the above policy is based differ from that for which labor is wanted.

(b) Possible Russian claims that U.S. were using Japanese for "slave" labor.

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7. Principle objection to the use of either Chinese or Filipino contract laborers in the Marianas is that it will result inevitably in their remaining in the Marianas to form a definite population group in the future because judging by U.S. experience in California and Hawaii, such nationals are bound eventually to bring to bear political pressure from their own governments to permit them to remain in the area in which they would be working. This pressure results because the laborers find living and social conditions in U.S. territory on a much higher scale and much more pleasant than in their native countries. This was experienced in our own country when Chinese were imported into California and Japanese and Chinese into Hawaii. They were imported under contract which envisaged their return to their own countries at the expiration thereof. That this failed is well-known. For reasons stated in paragraph 3 above, I do not believe that this would happen if Japanese or Ryukyuan contract laborers should be used.

8. Another objection to use of Filipino contract laborers is that if they were kept segregated in compounds, I envisage that U.S. newspaper reporters could make a tremondous yellow sheet story, accompanied by photographs showing the Filipino contract labor compounds and the Japanese POW's and DMP compounds on the same islands, inferring that the U.S. Army and Navy was placing nationals of the Philippine Republic in a category similar to that of enemy Japanese.

9. A decision is needed as to what race of laborers shall be gotten for the Marianas and from what countries. The whole problem of importing labor into the Marianas is so involved with permanently increasing the population of these islands and will so affect the future composition of their population that I consider an overall policy for such importation is needed for the guidance of the Army and the Navy. Guidance is needed in order to insure that members of various races, which might be undesirable from both the military and political point of view of the future composition of the population in the islands and which, if introduced, might remain, are not brought into them.

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I believe that a policy covering importing labor into the Islands, which will include importing both temporary and permanent contract and directly labor needed therein, should be prepared and presented to the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee for approval.

10. If and when necessary to bring personnel into the Islands for labor purposes who are of races not desired to become part of the permanent population, such laborers should be under such controls and from such countries as to insure that they will be removed from the Islands when the need for their services ends, without any danger of having political pressure brought to bear to avoid their return to their native land.

11. For furnishing a permament source of labor in the Marianas, it is believed that members of the Brown race would be preferable next to members of the White race, since the native Chamorrons are of the Brown race. Filipinos, being predominantly of the Brown race, would be preferable to members of the Yellow race as permanent settlers.

Navy Department

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

25 March 1946

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-03:[2]

Subject: Destruction of NAGATO and SAKAWA.

1. Assuming subject vessels survive "CROSSROADS" they would be "on their last legs". The Army Air Force may pounce upon such a fortuitous opportunity to demonstrate their prowess by sinking such a mighty vessel as the NAGATO. It would make a good press release.

2. To forestall such a possibility, we should have plans of our own. Accordingly, I recommend for your signature the attached memo.

M. B. GARDNER.

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[2] Memorandums found in Folder D-3 "Disposition of Japanese Ships", Box 161, CNO Records (Double Zero), Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC.

Navy Department

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

25 March 1946

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-34:

Subject: Destruction of NAGATO and SAKAWA.

1. CNO is indicating to SCAP a requirement for subject vessels based on the needs of Commander Joint Task Force One.

2. It is expected they will be destroyed incident to "CROSSROADS". On the chance that they survive we should anticipate this possibility and direct CinCPac, in this eventuality, to sink them promptly by such means as you believe will be beneficial from the point of view of any experiment which may be pending and for which they would be a suitable target.

3. Your comment and recommendation is requested.

FORREST SHERMAN.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Primary Sources

The primary sources for this work were obtained at the Navy Operational Archives and the National Archives in Washington, DC as well as at the libraries of Michigan State University and the University of Michigan. The research at the Navy Operational Archives was educational, but not as fruitful as had been hoped. The records in the Strategic Plans Records Division proved useful, as did the Joint Task Force One Report on the Bikini Atoll Tests and the CNO (Double Zero) files. Unfortunately, the records of Navy Civil Affairs Officers in Micronesia are not yet fully declassified and are largely still in storage at the Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. In general, Navy Department records which are declassified appear in a very haphazard and disorganized fashion. It was only due to the assistance of the Archives staff that I was able to obtain the information which I did.

Research at the National Archives was much more successful. I was able to examine the Records of the Office File of the Secretary of the Navy (RG 80) and the Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218). Information was found most easily in RG 80 by searching the RG 80 Index under headings like "Trusteeships", "Islands and Territories", and "Mandated Areas." With RG 218, the Geographic File 1942-1945 and the Central Decimal File 1946-1947 provided the most valuable information on policy-makers' rationale for seeking control of the mandated islands.

James Forrestal's Diaries were also used extensively, especially the period covering 1944-47. The *FRUS* series from 1943-45 proved invaluable in researching great power diplomacy over the Kurile-Sakhalin area. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee papers were used in part, especially Series 59, 248, 249, 282, and 364. Congressional documents, mainly transcripts of hearings, were used to research the appropriation debates. Particularly insightful were documents from the 79th and 80th Congress' (1945-48), as well as a report on Pacific bases by a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee, which was completed in 1945.

Finally, Commander Dorothy Richard's three-volume series on US naval administration in the Trust Territory was utilized. Richard's work was useful in selective areas, but it seems to have been done largely to justify and advocate the US role, as well as to describe the minor details of everyday naval administration. Obviously, the latter was of little use to this study, but the areas of policy analysis were gleaned for whatever information could be analyzed or criticized.

Secondary Sources

Although the thesis concentrated on US naval policy toward Micronesia in the 1940's *per se,* there were many books and articles on pre-1941 naval and diplomatic history which laid the groundwork for further research into the Second World War and Cold War eras. Among these works were William R. Braisted's *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (1958) and *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922* (1971), as well as his "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* vol. 41 (June 1954). In addition, the following articles were used to set the context of pre-1941 interservice rivalry in

the United States military, as well as US naval and diplomatic policy toward Japan, Micronesia, and the Pacific Ocean Area: Ashbrook Lincoln's "The United States Navy and The Rise of The Doctrine of Airpower," *Military Affairs,* vol. 15 (Fall 1951), Harry H. Ransom's "The Battleship Meets The Airplane," *Military Affairs,* vol. 23 (Spring 1959), Raymond G. O'Connor's "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Disarmament in the 1920's," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* vol. 45 (December 1958), Barry Rigby's "The Origins of American Expansion in Hawaii and Samoa, 1865-1900," *International History Review,* vol. 10 (May 1988), Ernest R. May's "American Policy and Japan's Entrance into World War I," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* vol. 40 (September 1953), Timothy P. Maga's "Prelude to War? The United States, Japan, and the Yap Crisis, 1918-22," *Diplomatic History,* vol. 9 (Summer 1985) and "Democracy and Defense: The Case of Guam, U.S.A., 1918-1941," *Journal of Pacific History,* vol. 20 (July 1985), Richard Dean Burns' "Inspection of the Mandates, 1919-1941," *Pacific Historical Review,* vol. 37 (November 1968), Dirk A. Ballendorf's "Secrets Without Substance: U.S. Intelligence in the Japanese Mandates, 1915-1935," *Journal of Pacific History,* vol. 19 (April 1984), G.W. Warnecke's "Suetsugu's Fence-Key To Pacific Strategy," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 15 (December 1942), John M. Haight, Jr.'s "Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan," *Pacific Historical Review,* vol. 40 (May 1971), Lester H. Brune's "Considerations of Force in Cordell Hull's Diplomacy, July 26 to November 26, 1941," *Diplomatic History,* vol. 2 (Fall 1978), and Daniel F. Harrington's "A Careless Hope: American Air Power and Japan, 1941," *Pacific Historical Review,* vol. 48 (May 1979).

One of the most important groups of works for this thesis was a series of books and articles on American diplomatic and military policy in

the 1940's, especially interservice rivalry and its impact on policy. Foremost among these was Vincent Davis' *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946* (1966) and *The Admirals Lobby* (1967). In addition, I obtained valuable information from Demetrios Caraley's *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict And The Policy Process*(1966), Gordon W. Keiser's *The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944-47: The Politics Of Survival* (1982), and *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (1962) by Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder. Articles explored included Richard F. Haynes' "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-1950: The Army," Herman S. Wolk's "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-50: The Air Force," and Paola E. Coletta's "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-1950: The Navy," all in *Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives,* vol. 7 (Spring 1975), John C. Ries' "Congressman Vinson and the 'Deputy' to the JCS Chairman," *Military Affairs,* vol. 30 (Spring 1966), and Commander Russell H. Smith's "Notes On Our Naval Future," *USNIP,* vol. 72 (April 1946). In addition, Dr. Dean C. Allard, then Senior Historian at the Naval Historical Center, was kind enough to provide me with a copy of his "La Bataille Du Potomac," a paper delivered at the 1988 Paris naval history conference "Les Marines De Guerre Du Dreadnought Au Nucleaire".

Furthermore, extensive reading was done in general works on US defense and foreign policy during the early Cold War in order to set US policy toward Micronesia in a Cold War context. Some of these more general works included David Mayers' "Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan's Views, 1947-48," *International Security,* vol. 11 (Summer 1986), Matthew A. Evangelista's "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security,* vol. 7 (Winter 1982/83), Mark A. Stoler's "From

Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War," *Diplomatic History,* vol. 6 (Summer 1982), Joseph Preston Baratta's "Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal for World Government?" *The International History Review,* vol. 7 (November 1985), Wolfgang Krieger's "Was General Clay A Revisionist? Strategic Aspects of the United States Occupation of Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History,* vol. 18 (April 1983), and Olav Riste's "Free Ports in North Norway: A Contribution to the Study of FDR's Wartime Policy Towards the USSR," *Journal of Contemporary History,* vol. 5 (1970).

Even more helpful for US military policy in a Cold War context were Gregg Herken's *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb In The Cold War, 1945-1950* (1980), Michael S. Sherry's *Preparing For The Next War: American Plans For Postwar Defense, 1941-45* (1977), Robert Albion's *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947* (1980), and Harry R. Borowski's *The Hollow Threat: Strategic Airpower and Containment Before Korea* (1982) as well as his 1980 article in *Military Affairs* entitled, "Air Force Atomic Capability from V-J Day to the Berlin Blockade-Potential or Real?" Also, indispensable for background on US overseas base policy was Elliott V. Converse's "United States Plans For A Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942-1948," (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1984), and Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis' *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950* (1978).

Additional works which were worthwhile in determining the context of World War Two and the Cold War were Daniel Yergin's *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (1977), as well as Melvyn P. Leffler's "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences

of the Early Cold War," *International Security,* vol. 11 (Summer 1986) and his excellent article "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," *American Historical Review,* vol. 89 (1984). Eduard Mark's "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Statesmen and the Perceptions of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947," *American Historical Review,* vol. 94 (October 1989), Forrest Pogue's "The Military in a Democracy: A Review of *American Caesar;*" *International Security,* vol. 3 (Spring 1979), and Franklyn A. Johnson's "The Military And The Cold War," *Military Affairs,* vol. 20 (January 1956). These works provided me with a limited "education" on American policy during World War Two and the early Cold War, thus setting the context in which it was possible to write about American naval policy toward Micronesia.

Very helpful on World War Two and the Cold War specifically in East Asia and the Pacific were Akira Iriye's *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-45* (1981), John Dower's *War Without Mercy: Race and Power In The Pacific War* (1986), Michael Schaller's *The American Occupation Of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (1985), and his 1982 article in the *Journal of American History* entitled "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia". Marc S. Gallicchio's *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (1988) and William Roger Louis' *Imperialism At Bay: The United States And The Decolonization Of The British Empire, 1941-1945* (1977) were excellent works. Gallicchio's book provided insight into the diplomacy over the Kurile-Sakhalin area, providing context and answering questions not addressed by the *FRUS* series. Louis' work was a superb introduction to the United States government's attitude toward trusteeship negotiations and the importance of the Japanese Man-

dated Islands to postwar US security in the Pacific and East Asia. Less helpful were Harold M. Vinacke's "United States Far Eastern Policy," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 19 (December 1946), W.L. Holland's "War Aims And Peace Aims In The Pacific," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 15 (December 1942), and Rupert Emerson's "American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 20 (September 1947); these works were generally less critical of US policy and written more with an informative purpose in mind.

However, John W. Dower's "Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945-1950," found in Edward Friedman's and Mark Selden's *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations* (1971) provided fascinating ideas on US- Soviet negotiations over the Kurile-Sakhalin area and Micronesia as well as US concepts of a defense in depth in the Pacific after 1945. I was also fortunate to be able to cite Marc S. Gallicchio's unpublished paper, "The U.S. and the Kuriles Controversy: Strategy and Diplomacy on the Soviet-Japan Border, 1941-1956", a forthcoming article in the *Pacific Historical Review.* This paper assisted me in piecing together the possible connections between Micronesia and the Kurile-Sakhalin area. A related work is Michael A. Palmer's *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Strategy in the first Postwar Decade* (1988).

Unfortunately, there were few works which concentrated on great power imperialism in Micronesia without delving into some sort of justification of the actions taken by the concerned power. Probably the best exception to this rule, however, was Mark R. Peattie's *Nan'yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945* (1988), an excellent account of the Japanese administration of the islands with special attention given to economic administration, migration and population policy, and the question of the Japanese militarization of the islands before 1941. For this last

question see sections of Jeffrey M. Dorwart's *Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945* (1983). Less useful beyond historical detail were Earl S. Pomeroy's *Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia* (1951), Willard Price's *Japan's Islands Of Mystery* (1944), John W. Coulter's *The Pacific Dependencies Of The United States* (1957), Herold J. Wiens' *Pacific Island Bastions of the United States* (1962), Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez' *A Complete History of Guam* (1964), James H. Webb, Jr.'s *Micronesia and US Pacific Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980's* (1974), Douglas L. Oliver's *The Pacific Islands* (1989), Whitney T. Perkins' *Denial of Empire: The United States And Its Dependencies* (1962), Stanley A. DeSmith's *Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories* (1970), David Nevin's *The American Touch in Micronesia* (1977), and *Oceania and Beyond: Essays on the Pacific Since 1945* (1976), Carl Heine's *Micronesia at the Crossroads: A Reappraisal of the Micronesian Political Dilemma* (1974), Clark G. Reynolds' "Submarine Attacks on the Pacific Coast, 1942," *Pacific Historical Review,* vol. 33 (1964), R.S. Nathan's "Geopolitics and Pacific Strategy," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 15 (June 1942), and Earl S. Pomeroy's "The Navy and Colonial Government," *USNIP,* vol. 71 (March 1945). With the exception of Peattie, all of these works either concentrated on cultural or political matters in Micronesia itself, on alleged Japanese guilt for the militarization of the islands before 1941, or on a justification of postwar US policy. Little, if any, work was done on viewing the US control of Micronesia in a Cold War context as opposed to that of the Second World War. Nor did many of these works see the US desire for control being motivated by domestic politics within the US government, such as inter-service rivalry between branches of the US military.

Some works on trusteeship issues and Micronesia, however, did prove more insightful and useful. Foremost among these was Lester J. Foltos' "The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-47," *Diplomatic History,* vol. 13 (Summer 1989). This article not only provided an excellent general chronology of events directly related to the thesis, but interesting ideas on the rifts between the Pentagon and the State Department over the postwar control of Micronesia. In addition, it was a superb guide to sources at the National Archives and Navy Operational Archives. Other works which provided information and detail were Roger Gale's "Micronesia: A Case Study of American Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of California at Berkeley, 1977), John J. Sbrega's "Determination versus Drift: The Anglo-American Debate over the Trusteeship Issue, 1941-1945," *Pacific Historical Review,* vol. 55 (May 1986), Roy E. James' "The Guam Congress," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 19 (December 1946), David Nelson Rowe's "Collective Security In The Pacific: An American View," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 18 (March 1945), Robert C. Kiste's "Termination of the U.S. Trusteeship in Micronesia," *The Journal of Pacific History,* vol. 21 (October 1986), Timothy P. Maga's "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946-1950," *Pacific Historical Review,* vol. 53 (February 1984), and Mark A. Stoler's "The 'Pacific-First' Alternative in American World War II Strategy," *International History Review,* vol. 2 (July 1980).

There were specific articles which provided information and ideas on the implications of atomic energy for US policy during the origins of the Cold War. These ideas laid the context for my work on the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946. Specifically, there were articles by David Alan Rosenberg on US atomic strategy in the late 1940's: "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," *Journal of American History,* vol.

66, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security,* vol. 7 (1983), and "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist,* vol. 38 (1982). Additional articles included Larry G. Gerber's "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History,* vol. 6 (Winter 1982), Martin J. Sherwin's "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941-45," *American Historical Review,* vol. 78 (October 1973), James L. Gormly's "The Washington Declaration and the 'Poor Relation': Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy, 1945-46," *Diplomatic History,* vol. 8 (Spring1984), and Barton J. Bernstein's "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," *Journal of American History,* vol. 60 (March 1974).

Other books and articles concentrated more specifically on the tests themselves, rather than atomic power. The US government's official report of the tests, William A. Shurcliff's *Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation Crossroads* (1947), while not very objective in its analysis of the domestic political and bureaucratic reasons for the tests, was used for historical detail and as a reference for analysis. Vice Admiral W.H.P. Blandy's "Operation Crossroads: The Story of the Air and Underwater Tests of the Atomic Bomb at Bikini," *Army Ordnance,* vol. 31 (January-February 1947) was similarly biased in outlook, but did offer amusing anecdotes. Other articles on the implications of atomic energy for naval power were included in the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* specifically Captain W.D. Puleston's "The Probable Effect On American National Defense of the United Nations and The Atomic Bomb," *USNIP,* vol. 72 (August 1946), John P. Cranwell's "Sea Power And The Atomic Bomb," *USNIP,* vol. 72 (October 1946), Rear Admiral W.S. Parson's "Atomic Energy: Whither Bound,"

USNIP, vol. 73 (August 1947), and Walmer E. Strope's "The Navy And The Atomic Bomb," *USNIP,* vol. 73 (October 1947). More scholarly and unbiased sources on this subject were Jonathan M. Weisgall's "Micronesia And The Nuclear Pacific Since Hiroshima," *School of Advanced International Studies Review,* vol. 5 (Summer-Fall 1985), two articles by Lloyd J. Graybar, "Bikini Revisited," *Military Affairs,* vol. 44 (October 1980) and "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting?", *Journal of American History,* vol. 72 (March 1986), and Glenn H. Alcalay's "Maelstrom In The Marshall Islands: The Social Impact of Nuclear Weapons Testing," found in Catherine Lutz' *Micronesia As Strategic Colony: The Impact of U.S. Policy On Micronesian Health and Culture* (1984).

Finally, articles from the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* were indispensable to investigating the American naval officer corps' thoughts on the US control of Micronesia and the possibilities for strategic and economic exploitation of the islands in the name of US national security. Foremost among these articles were Major Guy Richards' "Pacific Briefing," *USNIP,* vol. 71 (February 1945), Rear Admiral G.J. Rowcliff's "Guam," *USNIP,* vol. 71 (February 1945), Captain K.C. McIntosh's "The Road Ahead," *USNIP,* vol. 71 (November 1945), Lieutenant Commander T.O. Clark's "The Administration of the Former Japanese Mandated Islands," *USNIP,* vol. 72 (April 1946), Vice Admiral Carleton H. Wright's "Trust Territory Of The Pacific Islands," *USNIP,* vol. 74 (November 1948), Captain J.M. Kennaday's "A Proper Conception of Advanced Bases," *USNIP,* vol. 72 (June 1946), Earl S. Pomeroy's "The Problem of American Overseas Bases: Some Reflections on Naval History," *USNIP,* vol. 73 (June 1947), "Naval Bases Past and Future," coauthored by H. Gard Knox, Rear Admiral Frederic R. Harris, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, *USNIP,* vol. 71 (October 1945), Commander W.C.

Chambliss', "Base Nonsense," *USNIP,* vol. 71 (Februrary 1945), Lieutenant William H. Hessler's "Geography, Technology, and Military Policy," *USNIP,* vol. 73 (April 1947), Lieutenant Edward E. Wilcox's "Back Door in the Pacific," *USNIP,* vol. 76 (February 1950), and Robert McClintock's "The United Nations and Naval Power," *USNIP,* vol. 73 (June 1947).