




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**PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING AND THE
POLITICAL USE OF MILITARY FORCE**

By

James David Meernik

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1991

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ABSTRACT

**PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING AND THE
POLITICAL USE OF MILITARY FORCE**

By

James David Meernik

In order to predict when presidents use military force in support of their foreign policy and how much force they employ, I develop a cybernetic/cognitive model of decision making. I hypothesize that presidents' survival goals lead them to attach importance to the preservation of domestic and international credibility, the prevention of war with the Soviet Union and the feasibility of conducting military operations. I compile a data set of 412 international crises during which we can assume the president considered using military force and was influenced by the aforementioned goals. Utilizing a regression equation to predict when presidents use force and a non-linear regression equation to predict how much force they use, I find that almost all the variables measuring presidents' survival goals are significant. Furthermore, I am able to correctly predict presidents' choices nearly 80 percent of the time. I conclude that as long as the United States remains a superpower presidents will continue to use military force for largely the same reasons I find in this dissertation.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables.....	vi
List of Figures.....	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review.....	1
Introduction.....	1
The Controversy in the Literature.....	3
The Realist Models.....	3
The Domestic Politics Models.....	9
The Historical Models.....	12
Deterrence Theory Models.....	17
Scope and Purpose of the Dissertation.....	22
Chapter 2: A Cybernetic/Cognitive Decision-Making Model..	27
Introduction.....	27
The Preeminence of the President.....	27
The Legal Basis of Presidential Primacy in Foreign Policy.....	28
Political Incentives for Presidential Primacy in Foreign Policy.....	31
Selecting a Decision-Making Model.....	33
An Overview of the Cybernetic/Cognitive Perspective....	37
The Cybernetic Model.....	39
Boundedly Rational Decision Making.....	39
Survival and Decision Making.....	40
Essential Information and Decision Making.....	43
The Cognitive Model.....	49
Consistency and Decision Making.....	50
Summary.....	55
Chapter 3: Foreign Policy Goals and the Political Use of Military Force.....	58
Introduction.....	58
Credibility and Survival.....	59
The Importance of Credibility in American Foreign Policy.....	60
The Historical Evolution of Credibility in American Foreign Policy.....	62
The Importance of Credibility in American Domestic Politics.....	75
Credibility and the Political Use of Military Force..	81
The Prevention of War and Survival.....	85
The Availability of Means and Survival.....	90
Decision Making Across Presidencies.....	91
Summary.....	94
Chapter 4: Essential Information and the Use of Military Force.....	96
Introduction.....	96
Presidents' Decisions.....	96

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Fo

Credibility and Opportunities to Use Force.....	97
The Use of Force Decision.....	103
The Force Level Decision.....	104
Essential Information and the Decision to Use Military Force.....	107
Superpower Involvement, U.S. Credibility and the Prevention of War.....	109
U.S. Involvement.....	111
U.S. Military Presence.....	112
U.S. Military Presence and Soviet Use of Force.....	114
U.S. Military Aid.....	114
U.S. Prior Use of Force.....	115
Soviet Involvement.....	117
Soviet Military Aid.....	118
Current Soviet Use of Force and/or Permanent Military Presence.....	119
American Public Pressure and the Use of Force.....	119
Media Coverage.....	120
Anti-American Threats or Violence.....	122
Presidential Popularity.....	123
The Feasibility of Operations and the Propensity to Use Force.....	124
Access.....	125
Internal Events.....	125
Limited War.....	126
Number of States Involved.....	127
Summary.....	128
Chapter 5: Model Specification.....	131
The President's Decisions.....	131
The Achen Correction for Selection Bias.....	136
Summary.....	146
Chapter 6: Model Results.....	148
Introduction.....	148
Goodness of Fit Indicators.....	148
Individual Variables.....	155
U.S. Military Presence and Soviet Use of Force.....	155
U.S. Military Presence.....	156
U.S. Military Aid.....	157
U.S. Prior Use of Force.....	157
Soviet Military Aid.....	157
Current Soviet Use of Force and/or Permanent Military Presence.....	158
Media Coverage.....	159
Anti-American Threats or Violence.....	160
Presidential Popularity.....	160
War.....	161
Internal Events.....	161
Access.....	162
Number of Nations Involved.....	162
Selection Bias Term.....	163
Groups of Coefficients.....	164
Regional and Presidential Dimensions in the Use of Force.....	165
Presidential Administrations and the Use of Force....	170
Regional Variations in the Use of Force.....	176
Incorrectly Predicted Cases.....	180

Summa
Chapter
Research
Creation
and
The
For
The
For
The
Ame
Res
Appen
Bibli

Summary.....	199
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research.....	200
Credibility: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research.....	200
The Prevention of War: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research....	205
The Force Level Decision: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research....	207
The Cybernetic/Cognitive Model: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research.....	208
Appendix: Operationalization of Variables.....	211
Bibliography.....	214

Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

Table

Table
Table 1

Table 1
Table 1
Table 1

Table 1

Table 1

Table 1

Table 1

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The Use of Force Model.....	150
Table 2: The Force Level Model.....	150
Table 3: Use of Force Model Predictions by President...	151
Table 4: Force Level Model Predictions by President....	152
Table 5: Use of Force Model Predictions by Region.....	153
Table 6: Force Level Model Predictions by Region.....	154
Table 7: The Use of Force Model With Presidential Variables.....	168
Table 8: The Force Level Model With Presidential Variables.....	169
Table 9: Opportunity/Use of Force Ratios By President..	171
Table 10: Use of Force/Force Level Ratios by President.....	172
Table 11: Opportunity/Use of Force Ratios By Region....	173
Table 12: Use of Force/Force Level Ratios by Region....	174
Table 13: False Positive Errors For The Use of Force Equation.....	181
Table 14: False Negative Errors For The Use of Force Equation.....	182
Table 15: False Positive Errors For The Force Level Equation.....	183
Table 16: False Negative Errors For The Force Level Equation.....	184
Table 17: LIST OF ALL CASES.....	185

Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Literature Review Summarization.....	23
Figure 2: A Cybernetic/Cognitive Model of Decision Making...	56
Figure 3: Presidents' Decision Making and the Use of Military Force.....	129

Introduction

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review

Introduction

After World War II, the United States assumed the mantle of leadership of the free world and its responsibilities. It developed a globalist foreign policy predicated upon an active containment of communist influence, particularly Soviet backed or inspired aggression (Bertram, 1982; Gaddis, 1982; Holbraad, 1979; Johnson, 1985; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987; Lefeber, 1983; Nathan, and Oliver, 1976; Tillema, 1973). One of the principal tools utilized by all presidential administrations has been the military. While the military had been employed for a variety of purposes short of war in Asia and Latin America prior to the Second World War, since the onset of the Cold War, U.S. armed forces have been deployed 217 times (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978; Zelikow, 1986; this figure constitutes the sum of all non-friendly naval visits compiled by the aforementioned authors). Their missions have ranged from the emplacement of ground troops and the provision of logistical support to allies, to the protection of American lives abroad. Given a global military presence and communist threat, the pursuit of political goals through the use of military force has been a constant feature of American foreign policy during the Cold War.

As defined by Blechman and Kaplan (1978, p.12) a political use of military force occurs when:

physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence .

Whether one considers the major military interventions of this era (e.g. Lebanon, 1958; the Dominican Republic, 1965) or less publicized endeavors (e.g. Zanzibar, 1961; Haiti, 1971), the commitment of the U.S.

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armed services represents one of the most visible and far reaching foreign-policy tools available to presidents. There have been uses in which American lives have been lost (Mayaguez, 1975; Iran, 1980), uses which have fundamentally affected U.S.-Soviet relations (West Berlin, 1948), and uses which created U.S. obligations to foreign nations (Greece, 1946; Vietnam, 1964).

Presidents have found that uses of the military short of war not only can help achieve their immediate foreign-policy objectives, a show of force can demonstrate American will and reputation to preserve U.S. security in the long term. A show of force as an expression of American credibility sets an example of American commitment to its interests in which allies might take comfort and enemies might take heed. Influence is gained over friendly nations who become indebted to American protection and over adversaries who are deterred from expanding militarily for fear of provoking the United States. Therefore, long-term security interests and the prestige of the nation are served by an active military presence demonstrating American capability and resolve through displays of military force.

Furthermore, the political use of military force is an attractive option because it is a forceful alternative for exercising influence short of the imposition of American interests through full-scale war. Because of the omnipresent danger of nuclear war, full scale military conflict may be a costly and hazardous instrument of foreign policy. Even though its principal protagonist is the U.S.S.R., presidents have both loath to confront directly or attack the Soviets. The bipolar struggle has been waged indirectly in third countries using military force in a limited manner, and almost exclusively, short of war. During the Cold War presidents have elected to go to war only twice, yet they have deployed the military for political purposes without initiating

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Not only is the nation affected by the political use of military force, presidents have also enjoyed the benefits and the prestige resulting from successful military endeavors and suffered as a result of unsuccessful incidents. It has been shown (Lee, 1987) that there is a significant upsurge in presidential popularity after almost all visible uses of the military. This in turn increases the president's influence over the legislative and executive branches making passage of his domestic program more likely. A president's legacy in foreign affairs may also turn on his performance in utilizing military force. For example, the Cuban missile crisis appears to have earned John F. Kennedy a place in history as a skilled practitioner of Cold War diplomacy, while the failure of Desert One seems to epitomize the perceived ineptitude of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy.

The Controversy in the Literature

That political uses of military force are prominent and consequential events is not disputed. Rather what is at issue in the study of international relations and American foreign policy are the reasons presidents choose the military to attain foreign policy goals. The four principal models used to explain these decisions, which are relevant to this dissertation, are referred to here as the realist-international politics model, the domestic politics model, the historical model and deterrence theory model. They are described and analyzed below.

The Realist Models. Traditional international relations scholars hold that international factors or some conception of the national interest are the most significant in predicting when nations utilize their military arsenal (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Keohane, 1986; Waltz,

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1979). Such research maintains that foreign policy can be separated from domestic policy, and that the state acts as a unitary, rational actor driven primarily by security concerns. While some researchers claim that every war constitutes a unique event (Aron, 1966; Rapoport, 1974), political scientists have created a plethora of models attempting to predict the outbreak, longevity, intensity and effects of wars. Scholars have hypothesized that internal conflict/domestic economic problems (Rummel, 1963; Stoll, 1981; Tanter, 1966;), arms races (Choucri and North, 1975; Richardson, 1960; Singer and Small, 1972; Weede, 1970), contact and contiguity (Garnham, 1976a; Starr and Most, 1976; Weede, 1976; Wesley, 1969), status inconsistency (Midlarsky, 1976; Wallace, 1973b), capability concentration (Singer, Brewer and Stuckey, 1972; Wallace, 1972) and expected utility calculations (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981) all contribute in some way toward creating war or conditions under which war is likely to occur. While these models are typically used to explain great power conflict and not necessarily limited uses of force, their insights into conflict initiation ought to be examined to determine their generalizability. Three models in particular, the Balance of Power, Power Transition and Polarization, which have received a great deal of attention in the field are examined here to demonstrate many of the typical problems facing conflict studies. By analyzing their shortcomings, a more accurate and robust model predicting political use of force decisions can be developed.

The Balance of Power model has been one of the most often utilized methods for explaining systemic war. Systemic wars typically involve coalitions of major powers and fundamental redistributions of power in the global system (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987, p. 59). According to proponents of the Balance of Power model, an equal balance of power ensures peace while inequality creates disequilibrium and conflict.

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States act to prevent other states from expanding in power at their expense and to increase their own power. Wars, alliances and diplomacy are the central vehicles employed to maintain the distribution of power and influence among nations (Morgenthau, 1985; Singer, 1979). Political uses of military force would represent American attempts both to contain the Soviets to prevent an imbalance of power in their favor and to expand its own power at the Soviets' expense.

Perhaps the most fundamental problem facing Balance of Power models has been a general lack of agreement on whether they are designed to predict the decisions of nation states since a balance is often described as a goal, or predict the systemic consequences of an anarchic self-help system (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, p. 369). As Bueno de Mesquita points out in The War Trap, war initiators win the preponderance of conflicts. This finding casts considerable doubt upon the notion of war as a consequence of systemic imbalance operating independently of goal-oriented decision-making. Since war is a purposeful act, the locus of responsibility for initiating these actions must reside in a national authority. As Bueno de Mesquita points out, "Ultimately, only individual human beings, acting alone, in response to others, or in conjunction with others, are capable of making decisions" (1980, p. 397). Furthermore, the Balance of Power model, by focusing on the systemic level also tends to obscure the role of motivation, bias, and uncertainty which are bound up in the decision to go to war. Therefore, one of the primary deficits in many Balance of Power theories is the difficulty they face in assigning responsibility for war initiation. One of the most fundamental tasks for any research agenda is to specify which decision maker or apparatus is charged with the power to employ military force.

The Power Transition Model advanced by Organski and Kugler explains

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major war (defined as occurring when there is 1) major power participation in each coalition; 2) battle deaths higher than in any previous war; and 3) loss of population or territory) with reference to international development. It holds that major wars are most likely to occur when a challenger state is just short of exceeding the power potential of the dominant state. While the model has achieved some degree of success in predicting conflict prior to World War II, there is little discussion of the probability of war during the Cold War period. Organski and Kugler do dispute the notion that this period is a wholly new one in which traditional measures of national power are irrelevant given the presence of nuclear weapons. They demonstrate that the behavior of nations during crises is not contingent upon the presence of nuclear weapons (1980, p. 176). Yet they fail to indicate why the Soviet Union, when it was in the process of overtaking American military power, did not initiate a superpower war. Organski and Kugler utilize several measures of national power and go so far as to say military power is equivalent to socio-economic power--thus there is evidence that sometime during the Cold War, there was a power transition period (1980, p. 147-148). Some discussion of this phenomenon is needed. The peculiarities of the Cold War era, while they should not prevent cross-sectional analyses, would seem to call for models which are capable of incorporating the role of nuclear deterrence in shaping political and military strategy.

As Gochman and Maoz (1984) note, some analysts claim that nuclear weapons make war less likely because of their possibly catastrophic consequences, while another school argues that the incidence of limited war ought to increase as the major powers take their conflict to other, less dangerous playing fields. There is no reason, however, not to find both predictions borne out in reality. General warfare is greatly feared

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among the major powers and has been assiduously avoided as events since World War II show. Superpower consultations during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet-PRC Ussuri river confrontations and the 1973 Mideast War all indicate a shared interest in preventing superpower competition from spiralling out of control. Yet, as a consequence of the uneasy coexistence between fear of nuclear war and superpower animosity, instead of general war, there is limited war (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan); instead of superpower confrontation, there are proxy wars (Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia), and instead of nuclear suicide, there is the delicate minuet the superpowers perform to demonstrate strength while at the same time avoiding military contact. The need to avoid war which had formerly served to establish dominance in international affairs made the demonstration of power and influence through less violent means an ascendant interest in foreign policy. Nuclear weapons have not diminished potential or real conflict, only the style of competition has changed. Therefore, theories which do not take into account the desire to avoid general war and the desire to compete will find it difficult to predict accurately the occurrence or intensity of conflict in the nuclear age.

Another major category of theories of international conflict examine the correlation between polarization and war (Aldrich and Ostrom, 1978; Bueno de Mesquita, 1975; Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Waltz, 1964). There is a fair amount of dispute, however, over which type of polarization or system is the most likely to lead to war. Deutsch and Singer hold that multipolarization leads to uncertainty, engendering restraint in international affairs. Waltz argues that greater uncertainty leads to greater potential for faulty decision-making and unintended conflict. Aldrich and Ostrom find that there is a curvilinear relationship between the number of poles in a system and its

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In part this lack of agreement is due to an ecological fallacy of sorts. These theorists hypothesize that uncertainty is created at the systemic level as the number of nations and number of poles increase, yet uncertainty is assumed to affect individual or organizational-level decision making. Utilizing system-produced factors to explain lower level behavior requires a congruence and connection between the two levels of analysis which is not employed in most of these studies. The absence of any mechanism explaining how and when uncertainty filters down into state behavior explains in part why the research may contain contradictory findings. There is no notion of an opportunity to use force which might indicate when uncertainty exercises its effects. A more accurate analysis should specify the conditions or events where uncertainty or other determining factors exert an impact on the decision to use military force. Waltz (1979) argues that the most useful way of accounting for this problem is to conceptualize the nation-state as a firm operating in different economies depending on the nature of the polar system. There is no need then to account for changes occurring within the state. One of the goals of research in international politics, however, ought to be the development of decision-making models to understand why choices are made. Waltz instead prefers to examine outcomes rather than choices. Yet as was mentioned previously, to understand fully decisions to use the military, the decision-maker and the decision-making process must be outlined.

Research utilizing the realist framework points to three primary flaws which must be addressed when modelling decisions to employ military force. First, there is a need to assign responsibility for military action. This dissertation assumes the president is the dominant decision-maker in American foreign policy. Second, researchers must

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address how the need to prevent a nuclear holocaust has influenced the style of major power conflict. I hypothesize that the United States acts to prevent superpower confrontation at the same time it acts to exert influence and establish credibility through the political use of military force. Last, there is a need to incorporate the concept of opportunity into conflict studies to predict when and how important variables exercise their impact. Researchers must be more specific about which international situations provoke conflict. This dissertation arrives at a definition of opportunity which is used as the unit of analysis.

The Domestic Politics Models. Some political scientists studying the political use of military force have found that presidents are driven to a large extent by domestic factors (Neal and James, 1990; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Job and Ostrom, 1986; Stoll, 1981). In the drive to maintain their popular support and image as strong leaders, presidents monitor domestic political conditions to ensure their political survival. While this research does not deny the significance of international factors or the U.S.-Soviet relationship, it stresses that foreign policy is best viewed as driven by a mix of national and political interests.

Richard Stoll (1981) attempts to demonstrate that a link exists between the reelection efforts of presidents and their likelihood to use force. He finds that there are fewer visible uses of force associated with presidential reelections in peacetime and a slight increase in uses during wartime. Stoll's model, however, is rather limited in its conception of a president's domestic interests. A broader view of political considerations in American foreign policy might demonstrate that presidents are influenced by more than just quadrennial concerns.

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Presidents continually attempt to maintain solid political support in both the Congress and the public to increase their own and their party's electoral prospects. By utilizing an incomplete model, Stoll neglects the impact of these factors and possibly biases his results.

Ostrom and Job (1986) construct a model that predicts the points in time during which presidents might use force. The basic units of measurement are not *a priori* defined situations, but intervals in time. They demonstrate that a president's decision to use major force-levels is a function of domestic, political, and international factors. While this work laid the foundation for later quantitative research, one particular shortcoming in the research design makes some of the findings tenuous. Because the endogenous variable is a unit of time and not an opportunity, Ostrom and Job used primarily contextual variables which do not describe the immediate foreign policy crises facing presidents. That the president would not take notice of factors peculiar to the immediate situation, such as its location, accessibility or the degree of communist involvement seems highly unlikely. By not incorporating the role of situational characteristics in their study, it is possible that Ostrom and Job's results may not be generalizable.

In a follow-up paper, (Job and Ostrom, 1986), the authors address the problem of selection bias resulting from not taking into consideration the situational context within which the president makes the decision to employ the military. They predict uses of force from defined opportunities, and utilizing a cybernetic/cognitive decision-making model, show that contextual and situational variables are quite accurate in predicting presidential responses (Job and Ostrom, 1986). Therefore, this second work is an improvement upon their first work, since the variation in the endogenous variable is reflective of the true decision-making environment facing the president. Secondly, by utilizing an

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opportunity-based data set, Job and Ostrom are not reliant upon the aggregated variables used in their previous study and thus utilize a wider variety of factors likely to influence the president. However, the inclusion of many of their exogenous variables in this model is not justified in any systematic manner. The lack of an overarching theoretical framework which places the political use of military force within a wider context of foreign policy interests makes the external validity of the model somewhat questionable. It is this omission in the research which will be addressed in this dissertation.

Oneal and James (forthcoming, 1991) seek to determine whether the realist school of international relations is in need of serious revision given the dramatic evidence of the influence of domestic politics on U.S. foreign policy in Job and Ostrom's work. Scholars in the realist tradition have typically distinguished between the low politics of domestic events and the high politics of international security affairs. In light of the impact presidential popularity, presidential success and the state of the economy demonstrate in Ostrom and Job's models, Oneal and James hypothesize that more robust measures of international factors ought to be employed to gauge accurately their significance. Their measure of the severity of international crises is designed to address this problem, but does not fair nearly as well as domestic conditions in predicting uses of force, and must be judged lacking. The problems with their analysis, however, also extend to their theoretical framework and unit of analysis. The authors limit their attention to time intervals rather than opportunities to use force as the endogenous variable. Furthermore, their crisis severity variable is not integrated into a model of presidential decision making, but is justified largely because it accords well with the whole realist literature on conflict. These problems combine to make Oneal and James findings rather incomplete.

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Research in this body of literature has two primary flaws which are addressed in this dissertation. First, many of the models use inappropriate endogenous variables which hinder the utilization of the proper exogenous variables. This dissertation utilizes a definition of opportunities to use force modelled after Job and Ostrom (1986). Second, much of the literature suffers from the lack of a theoretical framework from which influential factors in presidential decision making can be derived. While Ostrom and Job (1986) and Job and Ostrom (1986) make a great deal of progress in this area, a stronger connection between foreign policy interests and the use of force must be forged. I attempt to address this problem through the development of a cybernetic/cognitive model of decision making centered around the notion of survival.

The Historical Models. The term, historical models, is somewhat misleading. Most of the authors of these studies do not attempt to deduce a testable theory of the political use of military force. Rather, they generally use case study methodology to analyze the perspicacity of the decision to use military force and the effectiveness of the deployment. While they may resort to statistics to buttress their theoretical arguments, the focus of the research is primarily descriptive or prescriptive. The most notable common thread among these works is their analysis of the necessity of military force in achieving foreign-policy goals. The utility of these studies lies primarily in the substantive information and insights they convey.

In their ground-breaking study of the political use of military force, Blechman and Kaplan devote most of their attention to describing the location, time, preconditions, type of deployment and the success of 215 (later expanded to 226) uses of military force. In addition,

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however, the authors developed a somewhat simplistic model predicting the frequency of uses of the military which proved to be quite accurate. Utilizing only the presence and lingering affect of the Korean and Vietnamese wars, national confidence and the number of opportunities to use force to predict the frequency of uses of force from 1946 through 1976, the authors are able to show a reasonably good fit for their model. In the case-study portion of their study, the most notable feature is the prominence given to the role communist influence plays in alerting presidents to threats to American interests. The political use of military force played an essential role in the U.S. policy of containment of this influence.

Phillip Zelikow (1987) extends the data set gathered by Blechman and Kaplan to include the years 1977-1984. Despite his emphasis upon information gathering, Zelikow does present some findings to be contrasted with Blechman and Kaplan's. First, even in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, U.S. policy makers did not retreat to fortress America. Secondly, the geographic focus and targets of military action have shifted more toward the Middle East, and Central America where the specter of civil war induced many military demonstrations of force. Perhaps his most important finding, however, concerns the justification for U.S. military involvement. Zelikow writes:

The concern with credibility has not diminished. The most common rationale for U.S. military action has been and remains the desire to underscore the credibility of U.S. commitments around the world to both enemies and friends (1987, p. 45).

Thus, even in the light of, (or perhaps because of) U.S. failure in Vietnam, presidents still believe the best defense of U.S. security lies in preserving American credibility. It is the concern for credibility which this dissertation hypothesizes is the most important influence on the political use of military force.

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studies of three notable crises (Laos, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam) to define optimal decision-making strategies. They find that factors such as the strength of U.S. motivation, adequate domestic political support and the presence of usable military options were most often associated with successful outcomes. For example, when presidents are able to demonstrate American credibility, their adversaries are more likely to back down. The authors also document the importance of domestic and situational factors as well as international conditions thereby demonstrating the validity of developing broader models of foreign policy. The authors are reluctant, however, to test their hypotheses in other crises and in those situations where military force was not used. Hence, despite containing many interesting findings, such studies demonstrate the need to develop more extensive data bases to test hypotheses and develop generalizable conclusions.

In a similar analysis, Brands (1987) examines three noteworthy American military interventions (Dominican Republic, Lebanon and Grenada) to generate a model of presidential decision making. He concludes that the most critical factors inducing an application of force include a history of instability in a region, a rapid progression of events which encourages bureaucratic consensus, endangered American lives, and the shadow of past failures or problems elsewhere. While Brands is able to shed additional light on the concerns weighing on presidents, his selection of cases, like many others who study this phenomena, inhibits the external validity of his work. While it is very important for any model to be able to predict these major military operations, their prominence should not obscure the insights to be gained from examining less well known cases. That is why it is crucial to establish a data set which covers the entire spectrum of non-cooperative uses of military force.

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Herbert Tillema's Appeal to Force develops a framework to explain the occurrence of major U.S. military interventions of the Cold War era. He attempts to outline factors which may either lead presidents to deploy the military or cause them to refrain from employing the armed forces. Thus, he addresses a major fault of the literature discussed previously, the restriction of the dependent variable to uses of force. Tillema demonstrates that there are a good many restraints operating on the president, such as the possibility of conflict with the Soviet Union, no request from local leaders for military intervention, and no outside support. The most important explanatory factor in the decision to intervene is the perception that there is imminent danger to the U.S. or the threat of a communist government coming to power in a nation where one was not previously in place. Tillema shows that when these events transpire, the use of force is a function of the degree of U.S. interest in the state in which the opportunity occurs. U.S. interest in a state is one element of Tillema's conceptual framework which is further developed in this dissertation.

Richard Betts' analysis of nuclear diplomacy (1987) also provides an important advancement of the field. While Betts is chiefly interested in investigating the episodes in which the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons, his inquiry has several implications for this study. He finds that more than anything else presidents focused on "the political imperative of blocking the adversary's advance than on the danger of war if the enemy refused to desist and the dispute intensified" (Betts, 1987, p. 213). Similarly, this dissertation stresses the weight placed by presidents upon blocking the advance of communist aggression in the effort to maintain credibility at home and abroad. Betts' discovery of the secondary importance of avoiding military conflict with the Soviet Union when the United States feels

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particularly aggravated by Soviet advances is also somewhat startling given the voluminous literature documenting U.S. recalcitrance to use military force under such circumstances. A description of the type of situations under which presidents will not hesitate to confront the Soviet Union and other military aggressors is a crucial part of this model.

Mandel (1985), in examining the effectiveness of uses of naval force, reveals some interesting trends of relevance to this study. He employs a data base created by Cable (1981) which measures the results of exercises in gunboat for a variety of nations in the post World War II era. Mandel finds that the most powerful and significant factor in explaining whether the results of a use of naval force were unsuccessful, mixed or successful was the previous use of violence in the area of the incident by the assailant, which he terms the credibility of the assailant's intentions. Given its powerful role in determining the outcomes of uses of force, it appears likely that presidents are aware of the impact of credibility when deciding to use force as well.

Three principal lessons are drawn from these historical models. First, there is a need to examine the whole range of uses of military force as Blechman and Kaplan do to develop fully a complete model of coercive diplomacy. This dissertation examines all non-cooperative uses of military force and opportunities to use force from 1948 through 1984. Secondly, communist involvement in an international crisis is a critical factor in explaining uses of military force. The communist threat plays a large role in the president's drive to preserve credibility both at home and abroad in this dissertation. Lastly, during the Cold War presidents have demonstrated that they are extremely interested in maintaining the credibility of American commitments and will to use force. This point forms the basis for the foreign policy beliefs which I

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hypothesize motivate presidents to utilize the military for political purposes. It is this last point which is the subject of the next body of literature to be addressed.

Deterrence Theory Models. Many scholars have maintained that American foreign-policy makers believe the U.S. has global military responsibilities and commitments which always must be attended to regardless of international or domestic conditions. Because the Soviet threat was perceived to be acute and widespread, American interests have come to be threatened all over the globe. Stanley Hoffman's interpretation of the "Kissinger Doctrine" is instructive:

Peace or containment is therefore indivisible. Every crisis anywhere tests our ability to stand up to the Soviets. And the credibility of the U.S. depends on our capacity to meet every test....In this design every incident must be treated seriously, since even if it has no intrinsic significance, losing the test would encourage our adversary to test us again
(The New York Review of Books, December 6, 1979).

In this view, given further credence by the theoretical works of Kaufman (1954), Schelling (1960) and Jervis, Lebow and Stein (1981), the interdependence of U.S. commitments implies that a threat to one is a threat to all. The implicit consequence of this universalistic view of American interests is that generally regardless of political conditions at home or abroad, political uses of military force should occur throughout the globe to forestall the dominoes from collapsing all the way back to the United States. Practical and political constraints, however, have made such a strategy unrealistic. Presidents are more likely to discriminate among crises and respond militarily only when sufficiently provoked, rather than as a general principle. Thus, I attempt to develop a more realistic model of American strategy in this dissertation to show which threats have warranted a military response.

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Axelrod (1984) among others, focus on the strategies that might be used to deter an adversary and maintain credibility. Because it is so difficult to make a costly commitment believable, states must find ways to demonstrate their resolve. Many of these researchers argue that states may restrict their freedom of action or take dangerous risks to solidify in an adversary's mind the certainty of a commitment. Discrete uses of military force are particularly effective in communicating one's willingness to run risks and protect interests, hence deterring future aggression. Much of this literature is concerned with modelling only abstract designs of deterrence and credibility; yet it is equally important to operationalize threats to credibility to test the validity of their hypotheses. Advances in the field of deterrence theory have been distinctly apolitical (Morgan, 1985). To determine if policy makers actually behave as they are theorized to in this literature, it is necessary to develop empirical models that predict the occurrence and nature of military operations designed to bolster credibility. There are several works on U.S. foreign policy germane to this study which, while they are not, strictly speaking, works on deterrence theory, discuss at length the role credibility plays in the formation of U.S. commitments and the use of force.

Johnson (1984), for example, asserts that foreign-policy makers have moved away from the classical model of national interest when formulating commitments to a Cold War model. In the classical realist model, nations establish some objective criteria of foreign-policy interests which determine commitments abroad. After determining the extent of their interest, nations project resources to conquer or defend which in turn determine the credibility of their willingness to protect these interests. In the Cold War model, however, commitments are made not because some state or region is intrinsically of value, but because

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a failure to act might lead other nations to believe the U.S. would not respond with military force when similar situations arose in the future. Interests are determined by the quantity of resources a nation pours into another state to maintain its credibility. Presidents believe they will be punished by both the American electorate and foreign powers if they do not maintain American commitments abroad, even if these commitments were not of their own making. For example, John Kennedy believed that Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles had encumbered the United States with too many alliances in the 1950's, but he was unwilling to renege on any U.S. commitments to states of peripheral interest for fear of generating insecurity about America's commitment to Europe.

In a similar vein, Gaddis finds that beginning in the Truman administration, foreign-policy makers began to believe that changes in the balance of power could come not only from objective events in the world, but from psychological changes in the beliefs of world leaders. Therefore:

...judgments (about U.S. security) based on such traditional criteria as geography, economic capacity, or military potential now had to be balanced against considerations of image, prestige and credibility (Gaddis, 1982. p. 92).

Decision makers have repeatedly justified military moves as necessary to counter possible losses of prestige and credibility, particularly during administrations which prided themselves on maintaining a wide range of military responses (e.g., Kennedy and Johnson). Gaddis finds that while the inclination to use force and the choice of foreign-policy tools utilized to protect these considerations have varied over time, these perceptual concerns have remained. According to Gaddis the salient debate in U.S. foreign policy concerning the preservation of credibility has been over whether the military should be used to deter almost all forms of communist aggression (the strategy of symmetric response), or just where the U.S. has local superiority (the strategy of asymmetric

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Schell (1976) arrives at many of the same conclusions as Johnson and Gaddis in his study of American foreign policy during the Vietnam War. He finds that it was a fear of appearing weak to the Soviets, U.S. allies, the Vietnamese and others which prompted U.S. intervention in Vietnam and protracted U.S. withdrawal. According to Schell the prospect of a domestic backlash from losing Vietnam also made Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon continue to invest in the war. Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations were equally concerned with maintaining the prestige and the power of the office of the presidency. A period of military retrenchment might lead the public to believe the president was weak and indecisive and would irreparably damage America's standing in the world. The American presidency became the ultimate domino in an international and domestic struggle to preserve the image of U.S. power and will.

Schell traces the beginning of the tremendous impact of credibility on U.S. foreign-policy makers to the dissatisfaction of many in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations with Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation. Policy-makers like Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Maxwell Taylor and John Kennedy all felt that the over-reliance on the nuclear threat to deter all forms of communist aggression lacked credibility and would not prevent the communists from nibbling away at Third World states of peripheral interest. America needed an activist foreign policy which would be both capable and willing to utilize military force in all manner of circumstances to underscore the U.S. commitment to preserving the free world. According to Schell their aim was:

to establish in the minds of peoples and their leaders throughout the world an image of the United States as a nation that possessed great power and had the will and determination to use it in foreign affairs (1976, p. 342).

If there is one problem with Schell's analysis, however, it is that

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he fails to take account of the role credibility played in foreign policy before the Vietnam War. One only has to examine the numerous references to the "Munich Syndrome" during the 1940's and 1950's to appreciate how much American presidents and their advisers were determined to project an image of strength and resolve to deter any future Hitlers. Such concerns also made themselves quite prominent in NSC-68, one of the most oft-quoted and pivotal documents in American foreign policy. The authors of that 1950 document argued that power was no longer simply a matter of sizing up military forces, but was quite dependent upon perceptions, images and the will to use it. Therefore, it is important to realize that the concern for credibility which Schell so amply demonstrates has been an ongoing drive in U.S. foreign policy since World War II.

Thus, there seems to be a consensus that U.S. interests have been driven in large part by the need to maintain credibility in the eyes of the world and the American public. Credibility has, to a large extent, triumphed over the traditional and more objective assessments of national interest described by the realist scholars. Yet there has been insufficient attention devoted to defining credibility and threats to it in order to test directly its impact on American foreign policy in general and the political use of military force in particular. Therefore, one of the aims of this dissertation is to establish that this concern and the desire to prevent war have affected the political use of force in a systematic fashion during the Cold War. The role of credibility must be further integrated into any general theory of the use of the military for political purposes to appreciate truly the decision making environment in which the president operates and expand upon the work of Job and Ostrom and Blechman and Kaplan. The credibility of the United States and the president are the most important factors in explaining

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The relevant controversies and problems in all the different bodies of literature as well as the proposed changes this dissertation attempts are summarized in Figure 1. While the proposed advances do not cover the entire theoretical framework for the dissertation, they do point to those areas of most interest in the relevant literature which the dissertation addresses.

Scope and Purpose of the Dissertation

This dissertation seeks to predict when presidents use the military for political purposes and how much force they use. In order to accomplish these goals, I attempt to show that in the drive to maintain U.S. influence and contain the Soviet Union, presidents have attached the greatest concern to foreign decision makers' perceptions of the U.S. will to use force (credibility) and the avoidance of conflict with the Soviet Union (prevention of war). It is hypothesized that presidents have felt a failure to respond to Soviet/communist aggression, or to maintain U.S. influence and prestige might lead other nations, particularly the U.S.S.R., to draw inappropriate conclusions about U.S. willingness to use force in similar situations in the future. This dissertation further attempts to show, however, that presidents do not believe the U.S. must respond wherever its resolve to use force might be questioned. Rather, presidents become more likely to use force and higher levels of force as the threat to U.S. credibility, manifested in the level of superpower involvement in some situation rises. Presidents are hypothesized to be concerned with maintaining credibility for domestic reasons as well. They wish to maintain an image of strength and resolve at home in order to enhance their popularity, legislative success and chances for re-election and place in history books. This

Body of Literature

Realist
Models

Domestic
Politics
Models

Historical
Models

Deterrence
Theory
Models

Body of Literature	Point of Interest	Proposed Changes
Realist Models	1. Lack of Clearly Identified Decision Makers.	President is Dominant Decision Maker.
	2. Fails to Address Impact of Bipolar World on Conflict.	Bipolar World Leads to Concern for Credibility and Avoidance of War.
	3. Fails to Specify Situational Conditions Conducive to Use of Force.	Definition of an Opportunity to Use Force.
Domestic Politics Models	1. Use of Time Interval as Endogenous Variable.	Use of Opportunity as Endogenous Variable.
	2. Lack of Theoretical Framework of Foreign Policy.	Theoretical Framework Centered Around Survival Drive.
Historical Models	1. Need for Extensive Data Base To Present Generalizable Results.	Analysis of All Uses and Opportunities From 1948-1984.
	2. Importance of Communist Threat in American Foreign Policy.	Communist Threat Causes Presidents to be Concerned with Credibility.
	3. Importance of Credibility in the Use of Military Force	Concern for Credibility Leads Presidents to Use Force.
Deterrence Theory Models	1. Models are Too Absolute and Abstract to Accurately Predict Uses of Force.	Definition of Threats In Order to Predict Uses of Force.

Figure 1: Literature Review Summarization

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dissertation seeks to show that in order to predict when presidents use force and how much force is used, all these factors must be incorporated into a model of presidential decision making.

I also attempt to demonstrate that presidents take measures to prevent war with the Soviets when they believe a deployment of the military might lead to direct confrontation with that country. In order to avoid escalating superpower crises to the point of nuclear war, presidents generally avoid using force where the Soviets have established a military presence. In certain areas of critical interest to the United States, however, it is hypothesized that regardless of the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, presidents believe forceful action must be taken to prevent irreparable damage to U.S. security. Finally, this dissertation hypothesizes that after threats to credibility and of war have influenced presidents, considerations of the feasibility of military operations further encourage or constrain the propensity to use force. While these factors may not be as important in the president's decision as credibility and the prevention of war, they provide information which cannot be gleaned from superpower politics about the ease with which military operations might be undertaken.

To examine how threats to credibility and of war along with logistical concerns influence presidents' choices, a cybernetic/cognitive model of decision making is developed. The cybernetic/cognitive model is particularly appropriate for describing these decisions since it is concerned with how fundamental beliefs about personal and national survival, such as concern over credibility, influence the manner in which decision makers formulate and make their choices. Furthermore, it presents a realistic view of how individuals reach decisions in complex and uncertain environments such as are likely to exist when presidents are confronted with dangerous international

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crises. Given the historical evidence of presidential decision making in the literature previously discussed, the cybernetic/cognitive perspective appears to be the most appropriate choice for modelling decisions to use military force.

In order to operationalize and test the hypotheses concerning credibility, war and feasibility of operations, data containing information on all opportunities to use force from 1948 to 1984 has been gathered. Data on uses of force were obtained from Blechman and Kaplan and Zelikow's follow up to their study. A definition of an opportunity to use force (outlined in Chapter Three) was used to identify those international events which are likely to have been viewed by presidents as occasions on which the option of military force may have been desirable. This unit of analysis was used to guide information collection on both the proximate events surrounding opportunities to force and general domestic and international conditions. These data are used to test the hypotheses that specify which factors ought either to encourage or restrain the president's propensity to use force and use high force levels. In order to determine the impact of the variables on the president's decision making process, a linear probability model and a non-linear probability model predicting when presidents use force and how much force they use are employed.

A particularly interesting feature of the model is that there is substantial reason to believe that the error terms of the two equations are correlated, producing inconsistent estimates of the coefficients in the second equation predicting the amount of force the president uses. Because these incidents are a subset of the first, and because it is likely that many of the factors which explain the decision to use force are similar to the ones which explain the level of force used, sample selection bias is probable. While procedures for correcting for this

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problem have been developed in the case where the first equation utilizes probit and the second, OLS, there has been extremely little work done in estimating models where both equations contain limited dependent variables. Therefore, by demonstrating the manner in which selection bias may be corrected for under these circumstances, the dissertation's methodology should also make a contribution to political science.

Drawing from Deutsch, the purposes of the dissertation are four-fold: to organize, measure, serve as a heuristic device and predict (Deutsch, 1963, p. 8). First, various models have been proposed which assert the primacy of domestic factors, historical peculiarities, international agents and deterrence requirements. This dissertation seeks to bring all of these sets of factors together and demonstrate that insights from each field may be utilized to provide a more complete picture of the political use of military force. Second, it seeks to measure empirically the constructs held to be significant predictors of the use of force so that their utility in this undertaking may be demonstrated, and that they may be utilized by researchers with different foci of inquiry. The proposed decision-making model also serves as a heuristic device by providing a general enough framework so that other aspects of U.S. diplomacy, particularly U.S.-Soviet relations, can be understood. Finally the model is designed not only to postdict past decisions, but to predict future uses of the military as well. If it shall accomplish these purposes, this dissertation should represent a significant advance in the field of American foreign policy and international relations.

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Chapter 2: A Cybernetic/Cognitive Decision-Making Model

Introduction

In order to understand how decisions regarding the use of force are made, the decision maker and the decision-making process must be analyzed. This dissertation uses a cybernetic/cognitive model of decision making to explain the manner in which presidents choose to use military force. Given the uncertainty and constraints under which presidents make decisions regarding the use of force, the cybernetic/cognitive model, with its emphasis on the role of simplicity in goal formation and information processing, provides a desirable framework for mapping out these choices. The goals of this chapter are to demonstrate first that the president is the preeminent actor in the decision to use force, develop criteria for a suitable model of decision making, explore the role of uncertainty in decision making, briefly examine the cybernetic/cognitive perspective on decision making and uncertainty, and finally develop a cybernetic/cognitive model of presidential decision making.

The Preeminence of the President

The literature on U.S. foreign-policy making unambiguously demonstrates that it is the president who exercises supreme control over the nation's military actions (Crabb and Holt, 1980; Hermann, 1969; Rourke, 1983; Tillema, 1973). The president has so dominated foreign policy questions that Crabb and Holt are led to write, "After two centuries of American diplomatic experience, the president has emerged as the ultimate decider or decision maker of last resort", (1980, p. 5). Presidential pre-eminence in the political use of military force springs

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from a number of considerations. These factors may be broken down into two groups. First, there is the legal basis upon which the president's authority as chief foreign-policy maker rests. Second, there is the political environment which gives presidents the incentives to make decisions regarding military action.

The Legal Basis of Presidential Primacy in Foreign Policy.

Presidential power in the political use of military force is in large part derived from the Constitution which designates the president as the civilian commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Alexander Hamilton wrote that the commander-in-chief has "...the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy" (Federalist Paper No. 69). Crabb and Holt argue that the president's position as commander-in-chief, "...is clearly one of the most influential powers in the foreign policy field" (Crabb and Holt, 1980, p. 8). Furthermore, because the Constitution instructs the president to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, he also draws substantial implied foreign-policy power from this document. And American presidents have generally interpreted this power rather broadly and have rarely asked for congressional approval of their actions. In fact, Crabb and Holt count approximately 125 "undeclared wars" and other instances of violent conflict abroad conducted under presidential authority (1980, p. 9). American actions during the war with Mexico in 1846, the Marine landings in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua earlier in this century, Roosevelt's tilt toward the British prior to American involvement in World War II, the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the 1983 invasion of Grenada are but several examples of the exercise of presidential dominance in the use of the military (Caraley, 1984). The long-term effect of these undertakings has

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been to establish a precedent of presidential leadership in foreign policy. Moreover, the onset of the Cold War has further widened executive latitude in foreign policy in general and the use of military force in particular (Sundquist, 1981; Rourke, 1983).

Presidents have also found support for their command of foreign policy from the Supreme Court. The Court has regularly sided in favor of the dominance of the executive branch in foreign affairs. It has held that the existence of a state of war was dependent upon prevailing international conditions and that the president was not obliged to wait for a declaration of war from Congress before responding to external threats (Crabb and Holt, 1980, p. 44). In *U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation*, the Court found the Executive branch possessed external sovereignty and the powers associated with it and that the president was the representative of that sovereignty. Therefore, he was the supreme arbiter of questions involving the nation's security (Crabb and Holt, 1980, p. 45). Some scholars (Sundquist 1981; Rubner, 1985) also believe that the Supreme Court's ruling in *Immigration and Naturalization Service vs. Chadha* nullified the section of the War Powers Resolution requiring the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from hostilities if Congress so directs with a concurrent resolution. These developments can only further buttress the president's constitutional claims to predominance in this area.

Only Congress has contested presidential power in foreign policy. In fact, four provisions of the Constitution give the Congress particular war powers to: 1) declare war, 2) raise and support armies, 3) provide and maintain a navy and 4) make rules for the regulation of the armed forces (Article I, Section 8). Furthermore, it was based upon this authority and because of displeasure over executive conduct of the war in Vietnam that Congress undertook its boldest challenge to

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presidential preeminence in the use of military force, the War Powers Resolution. The purpose of the resolution was to ensure that, "...the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities" (P.L. 93-148, H.J. Res. 542, November 7, 1973). Congress tried to ensure that its war-making powers would be respected and that its leaders would be consulted prior to the initiation of future hostilities in order to avoid Vietnam-style conflicts.

Despite its intentions in the War Powers Act, however, Congress has not been able to wrest a significant degree of power away from the president (Pious, 1979; Rourke, 1983). The resolution contains ambiguous language which allows the president to interpret its provisions according to his needs. The provision for "timely" notification allows the president to determine when he informs Congress of missions he may in fact have already undertaken (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987, p. 446). The lack of enforcement mechanisms short of suspension of appropriations gives Congress few alternatives to thwart a president determined to have his way. In fact, some have argued that the resolution has strengthened the executive branch by according the president greater latitude in deploying the armed forces than is contained in the Constitution (Crabb and Holt, 1980).

Developments in international relations in modern times, such as the explosion of executive agreements, alliance treaties, and the exigencies of security in the 20th century have also made the exercise of congressional power increasingly difficult. For example, nations today rarely make a formal declaration of war before commencing hostilities and thus legislative debate becomes more of a formality than a necessary condition for action. Furthermore, the creation of a worldwide network of military alliances has challenged the power of

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Congress to declare war since many of the alliance treaties come close to calling for automatic retaliation in the event of hostilities (e.g., Article 5 of the NATO agreement). Presidents have been the primary beneficiaries of these developments and have further strengthened their foreign policy powers at the expense of the Congress.

Political Incentives for Presidential Primacy in Foreign Policy.

In spite of the powers it possesses or could obtain Congress has rarely been able to muster the political will to challenge presidents (Rubner, 1985). According to Crabb and Holt, "What becomes clear from the post World War II practice is that Congress pays much less attention to constitutional niceties or consistency than it does to pragmatic considerations (1980, p. 113). In fact, Congress has overseen and encouraged the granting of foreign policy making power to the Executive branch (e.g., The National Security Act of 1947; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) since it lacks the centralization of power, information, and political incentives to oversee foreign policy. Prominence in foreign policy generally does not enhance a legislator's chances for re-election with a public more interested in the nation's and their own economic welfare (Rubner, 1985; Russett, 1990). Indeed, even when Congress has given itself the power to become more involved in foreign policy formulation, (e.g., the War Powers Resolution, the formation of committees monitoring intelligence activities) it is reluctant to utilize the power except when it is politically attractive (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987 p. 458-459). "Congress does not want to be accused of taking a chance with the security of the nation or of depriving the president of the armed strength required to defend the nation's territory and interests" (Crabb and Holt, 1980, p. 46). For example, after viewing the public's support for the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya, Congressional

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criticism of Reagan's foreign policy was muted (Tucker, 1989). However, when the American people turned against the deployment of Marines in Lebanon and criticized the Iran-Contra affair, Congress was ready to demand the right of consultation in foreign affairs (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987, p. 447). Rather than making policy and being held accountable for it, it is much more electorally attractive for legislators to let the president lead and measure the prevailing political winds before announcing their opposition or support.

Contrarily, the president has substantial incentives to become involved in foreign-policy matters. The public views the president as the focal point of governmental action and has generally rewarded presidents for prominent and brief displays of military force (Anderson, 1985; Stoll, 1990; Greenstein, 1966; Nanes, 1971; Neustadt, 1960; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Ostrom and Simon, 1985). As Schell points out, it is often the president's own political credibility which is at stake when there is an international crisis involving the United States. He views the president as the ultimate domino whose political survival is the final cost of any unsuccessful foreign-policy undertaking (1976, p. 384).

Ultimately, any attempt at providing a categorization and prediction of dominance in foreign policy must take into consideration a host of factors ranging from public mood, external threat, congressional unity/disunity, and presidential inclination. Yet one fact does stand out. Given the manifold dangers to American lives and interests abroad, the capacity of the military to respond with breathtaking speed to these threats and a public accustomed to presidential action and results, the ingredients are there for continued executive dominance in the deployment of military force, despite congressional assertiveness in other areas of foreign policy (Rose, 1988, p. 234). The president is given

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the power to make certain that the United States continues to enjoy its dominating military position in the world even if Congress feels it must fine tune the level of American commitment. As the New York Times reported:

Americans not only prefer presidential leadership, but the scope of foreign and domestic problems and the recurrent emergencies facing a world power simply demand Presidential power" (The New York Times, November 18, 1977).

In the Cold War era presidents, Congress and the public alike have recognized the need for strong and decisive leadership to preserve American security and interests. Therefore, for the reasons enumerated above, the president is the best positioned actor to make decisions involving the utilization of military force. He is the "ultimate decider" in the political use of military force.

Selecting a Decision-Making Model

Before describing the manner in which the president decides to use military force, the criteria used for specifying a decision-making model need to be outlined. Because it is presidential decision making with which this dissertation is concerned, it must be emphasized that ultimately the most desirable model will be one that accounts for both the process and the president's choices rather than just the decision outcome. It is the president's beliefs, thought processes, and cognitive constraints which, if accurately identified, can help predict the choices he makes. Therefore, decision-making models which detail the workings of the "black box" are preferred to models which are primarily concerned with predicting outcomes (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Mandel, 1986). The cybernetic/cognitive model not only establishes criteria for determining inputs and predicting choices, it is a psychological model of human thinking and behavior which links the two together. By specifying the manner in which inputs are gathered,

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interpreted and utilized, a more realistic representation of decision making can be formed. Models which neglect this approach not only risk misunderstanding what factors drive nations to use force and how they operate, they also risk incorrectly predicting a nation's actions. Therefore, the cybernetic/cognitive model (Simon, 1955; Steinbruner, 1974) is more desirable than many of the models associated with the rational actor approach which is one of the most frequently used models in international conflict.

The manner in which an approach accounts for decision making under uncertainty is the other major criteria for selecting a desirable model. The cybernetic/cognitive model is expressly concerned with modeling behavior under conditions of uncertainty, which is the most serious and pervasive problem confronting presidential foreign policy making. The research on decision making in crises and opportunities to use force has indicated that presidents labor under a variety of constraints, particularly uncertainty over an opponent's goals and resources, the precise characteristics of events, and the effects of their actions on others (Allison, 1971; Berkowitz, 1977; Hermann, 1969, 1972; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1962; Yarmolinsky, 1971). In fact, much of the above-cited literature has been devoted to determining just how presidents develop effective decision-making strategies when there is insufficient information. The cognitive strategies which they argue decision makers utilize represent a significant advance over the black box models. In particular, presidential decision making in the political use of military force is subject to a variety of uncertainties across administrations and various precipitating events (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978). Therefore, the most desirable decision-making model will be that one which is most capable of accounting for the manner in which presidents deal with this problem. It is the cybernetic/cognitive model which I find to be the

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most desirable in this respect. Precisely why uncertainty influences decision-making to such an extent is examined next to justify the need for this type of decision-making model.

Uncertainty is one characteristic most researchers include in their definitions of crises or major foreign policy decisions. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) write that "The occasion for decision arises from uncertainty" (p. 92). Schelling speaks of "...the great uncertainty" which characterizes crises (1966, p. 96). Wiener and Kahn write that, "In most crises, relative to normal uncertainties about the immediate future, there is a large range of outcomes possible" (1962, p. 8). Whether the uncertainty refers to a lack of information about an opponent's intentions or resources, incomplete information plays a crucial role in many major foreign policy decisions. For example, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon never completely understood the stakes for which the North Vietnamese were waging their war against the South. Their inability to understand their opponents' goals and motivations led them to employ a variety of military tactics which were largely inappropriate for the type of conflict in which they were involved (Schell, 1976). President Truman's inability to appreciate the degree of insecurity felt by the Chinese prior to their intervention in the Korean War and the magnitude of the effort they were prepared to mount provides another example of the effect uncertainty creates in foreign policy. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin conclude, "It would appear to be a permanent liability of the decision-making process that pertinent information is almost never complete (1962, p. 102).

Furthermore, during foreign policy crises, presidents often work under strict temporal constraints which limit their search of the environment for pertinent information (George, 1980; Hermann, 1969; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1962, p. 103). Hermann writes that:

Short decision time requires that in a restricted period of time the situation will be altered in some major way. After the situation is modified, a decision is either no longer possible or must be made under less favorable circumstances" (Hermann, 1969, p. 30).

Such time constraints are an integral part of situations in which presidents consider the use of military force. Presidents are often forced to respond to rapidly changing events before American action becomes irrelevant (Tillema, 1971). For example, during the instability in Lebanon in May of 1958, Dwight Eisenhower was confronted with a series of crises culminating in the coup which overthrew King Faisal of Iraq. The situation required immediate action before the president risked losing what little control he felt he had over the progression of events (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978). A leisurely analysis of the type and extent of the threat to American interests would have precluded the decisive action which the president felt was necessary. Henry Kissinger believed that because of mounting Soviet diplomatic and military pressure in the Middle East, little time could be devoted toward examining American options during the Yom Kippur War (Betts, 1987, p. 123-128). A military response was necessary--only the form it would take could be debated. Time pressures thus force presidents to simplify their decision-making process thereby creating more uncertainty (Hermann, 1969).

In order to understand and predict the outcomes of presidential choices in the political use of military force, the role of uncertainty must be taken into account in the decision-making model. Presidential decision making may not always be characterized by a thorough, careful analysis of all relevant material. Because of the difficulties involved in obtaining all possible information, time and expertise, decision makers utilize only those resources which are deemed to be sufficient for reaching a decision (Simon, 1970, p. 69). Therefore, a model of

presidential decision-making in the use of military force should not propose unreasonable demands on the president's time and energy. It should, instead reflect the uncertainty and simplification of reality which scholars agree presidents face when making major foreign-policy decisions (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1962; Tillema, 1971). Snyder, Bruck and Sapin argue that because of uncertainty decision makers find it necessary, "...to adopt and employ interpretative schemes and compensatory devices", (1962, p. 102). These schemes and devices, they argue, represent a simplification of reality. An accurate decision-making model, therefore, must be concerned with describing what these decision-making "devices" are and how they operate. The cybernetic/cognitive model is concerned with analyzing just how these devices are employed.

To summarize, a suitable model for understanding and predicting when presidents use the military for political purposes should possess the characteristics described above. First, it should be a model of decision making which seeks to explain how individuals reach decisions. By explaining the decision-making process, its outcomes can be predicted. Second, a suitable model should account for the role of uncertainty in decision making. Since problems of uncertainty affect each stage of the decision-making process, the manner in which individuals cope with this problem must be taken into account.

An Overview of The Cybernetic/Cognitive Perspective

The cybernetic/cognitive model developed by Simon (1955, 1957, 1969), Ashby (1952) and Steinbruner (1974) is expressly concerned with explaining decision making under uncertainty. Steinbruner proposes the cybernetic/cognitive model as a realistic representation of the manner in which individuals survive when forced to make decisions in

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environments characterized by uncertainty (1974). According to Job and Ostrom (1986), the cybernetic model provides an understanding of how people, "reach decisions in highly complex and volatile environments by formulating simple and manageable decision algorithms" (p. 5). The cybernetic/cognitive model is designed to account for the type of decision-making problems which researchers (Allison, 1970; Blechman and Kaplan, 1978; Tillema, 1971) have observed when presidents are confronted with opportunities to use military force.

Steinbruner finds, however, that the cybernetic model needs to be supplemented with the cognitive model to provide a complete picture of decision-making. The cybernetic model standing alone is severely taxed when it must account for the manner in which individuals contend with uncertainty in their environment and the range of behaviors they exhibit (Steinbruner, 1974, p. 69). Simon describes how individuals can overcome uncertainty by decomposing the hierarchical structure of environments that cannot be comprehended in toto. Steinbruner (1974) advances Simon's work by augmenting the cybernetic with the cognitive model to account for the manner in which this decomposition takes place. The cognitive model stresses the role belief systems, perception and the desire to maintain consistency between the two influence decision makers striving to surmount uncertainty. Such a framework is particularly appropriate for modeling use of force decisions. The literature on U.S. foreign policy making is replete with examples of presidents interpreting and responding to international events about which they possess insufficient information on the basis of strongly held beliefs (Gaddis, 1982; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987; Ostrom and Job, 1986). The cybernetic and cognitive perspectives are described in further detail as the model used in this dissertation is developed.

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The Cybernetic Model

Cybernetic theories of decision making describe the manner in which decisions are reached in an environment characterized by uncertainty. The manner in which uncertainty is modeled is so important that Beer is led to claim that, "The role of uncertainty in the behavior of real-life systems is paramount" (1959, p. 182). Simon, Steinbruner and others develop the cybernetic/cognitive model to represent decision-making devices employed when individuals are faced with uncertainty in their environments. Simon (1957, 1969), Steinbruner (1974) and Marra (1985) outline four key principles of overarching importance in every aspect of the cybernetic/cognitive decision making model which constitute such devices (the fourth principle is part of the cognitive component of the decision-making model and is described later). It will be shown how these principles or strategies are employed to overcome the problem of uncertainty and why they are applicable to presidential decisions regarding the use of military force. These principles are:

1. Cybernetic decision makers are boundedly rational
2. Survival is the dominant goal in decision making.
3. Presidents monitor essential information which pertains to the survival goal and employ it in simple and stable decision rules.

Boundedly Rational Decision Making. Simon (1955, 1957) and Steinbruner (1974) offer the cybernetic model as a modification of the analytic model. They do so in light of the difficulty the analytic model has in accounting for the manner in which individuals operate in decision-making environments characterized by uncertainty. Simon finds the analytic model's theory of decision making imposes too many burdens on decision making given human limitations (Simon, 1955, 1957, p. 40).

Simon and Steinbruner argue that decision makers do not strictly adhere to the strategies of the rational actor model, such as estimating the probability of occurrences of critical events and continual updating and searching for new information. Rather, Simon claims:

...the human being never has more than a fragmentary knowledge of the conditions surrounding his actions, nor more than a slight insight into the regularities and laws that would permit him to induce future consequences from a knowledge of present circumstances (1957, p. 81).

Because the problems created by uncertainty are so great, decision makers are viewed as boundedly, rather than fully rational. Thus, Simon argues that the task for researchers is to develop, "...a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man" (1955, p. 7). The cybernetic model describes such a decision-making environment characterized not by sophisticated outcome calculation, but by limited conceptualization, search of the environment and choice formulation. Because individuals experience cognitive limitations, Steinbruner and Simon speak of decision makers who operate in a complex environment they simplify in order to survive. The role of survival is examined next.

Survival and Decision Making. According to Simon (1969) and Marra (1985), the drive for survival is the most elemental of an individual's or organization's goals. Both must possess it in order to sustain their activities and both are guided by some notion of survival at the most basic stratum of motivation. It must be stressed, however, that survival implies more than the will to live; it may encompass one's political, emotional or economic survival. Ashby defines survival as occurring when, "...a line of behavior takes no essential variable outside its given limits" (1952, p. 42). Thus, survival implies and is

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Arguing similarly, Simon writes:

The distinction between the world as sensed and the world as acted upon defines the basic condition for the survival of adaptive organisms...[G]iven a desired state of affairs and an existing state of affairs, the task of an adaptive organism is to find the correlating process that will erase the difference (1970, pgs. 111-112).

Simon claims that individuals search for the correlating process which allows them to adapt and survive in their environment (p. 111). He also writes that, "These procedures consist in assuming that he can isolate from the rest of the world a closed system containing only a limited number of variables and a limited range of consequences" (Simon, 1957, p. 82). This closed system is a defining feature of a decision maker's bounded rationality. It is a strategy that accepts the cognitive limits and uncertainty individuals experience that makes them boundedly rational beings (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1962, p. 102). Thus, decision making is dominated by the organism's drive to preserve a highly valued survival state by employing strategies which have proven successful under conditions of uncertainty (Ashby, 1952, p. 4).

As Marra notes, however, this does not imply that the survival goal is exclusive, only that human behavior in its most reductive form is motivated by the survival instinct (1985, p. 360). Thus, researchers seeking to identify the origin of some fundamental behavior should look first to an individual's most basic needs. As Simon notes, behavior is typically organized hierarchically with general decisions most affecting the ultimate ends made first. "Through the hierarchical structure of ends, behavior attains integration and consistency," (Simon, 1957, p. 63). Simon finds that by organizing their means and ends in such a fashion, individuals may surmount the uncertainty they would normally face in confronting a complex environment (1970, p. 111). Simon's views

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find added support in the research of Abraham Maslow who writes, "The basic needs arrange themselves in a fairly definite hierarchy on the basis of the relative principle of potency" (1970, p. 97). Maslow goes on to identify survival needs as the most basic drives motivating humans. The desire for safety and a well-ordered environment dominate an individual's most basic behaviors. While there is a huge gulf in the type of safety needs facing individuals and nations, states and their foreign policy makers are necessarily concerned with national security.

Thus, the role of survival in decision making is best viewed as the top rung in a hierarchy of goals motivating individuals. It involves the maintenance of a necessary and highly desired state. Any change in the conditions of variables viewed as essential in maintaining this state is viewed as a threat to survival. It is the most fundamental goal which leads individuals to develop strategies to attain a desired state. The task for theoreticians is to identify individuals' particular survival goals which motivate and color their choices. These survival goals may incorporate those of the individual as well as any larger entity with which the individual identifies. For example, the president is concerned not only with the survival of his own political career, but he is also charged with defending the security of the United States. Survival goals should embody enduring and fundamental needs of the individual if they are to influence pervasively the individual's decision making process (Maslow, 1970, p. 100). In Chapter Four, I specify why American presidents have come to view the maintenance of credibility and the avoidance of war with the survival of the United States. Because foreign policy makers have identified the attainment of these ends with the ultimate end of American security in the Cold War, they have come to dominate the political use of military force.

Finally, because of the problems of uncertainty, decisions related

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to survival are generally made in a hierarchical fashion according to the importance of the relationship between a particular decision and the desired environment. George, writing of hierarchical decision making as a strategy for coping with uncertainty, describes individuals "...attempting to deal with different uncertainties at optimal points in the sequence of interrelated decisions" (1980, p. 41). Simon argues that individuals decompose their environments into manageable components (1970, p. 111). In working toward the desired state within each component or as Simon refers to them, subsystems, individuals make decisions based upon their significance and urgency. They move from general to specific steps in a hierarchy designed to bring about a greater integration of behavior (Simon, 1957, p. 96). Simon writes that, "...the several components in any complex system will perform particular subfunctions that contribute to the overall function" (1970, p. 73). Since a decision at one point in time may be dependent upon the outcome of previous decisions, people consider the most general and ultimately influential choices first before proceeding to make more specific selections. When faced with uncertainty, hierarchical decision-making allows individuals to dissect their environment to understand better it.

Essential Information and Decision Making. The third principle of cybernetic theory is the notion of a limited, essential information set. Since individuals are hypothesized to be committed to maintaining their survival only information that directly bears on this drive will be monitored and utilized. This filtration process further ensures that uncertainty can be managed in the most optimal manner by attending to only that information which is considered essential. According to Steinbruner, "...decision mechanisms screen out information which the established set of responses are not programmed to accept" (1974, p.

67). Ashby writes that an individual, "...has a number of variables which are closely related to survival" (1952, p. 41). He calls these "essential variables" (p. 41). Survival considerations drive the individual to gather essential data on environmental changes that must be countered or adapted to. Ashby argues that we can identify these essential variables by examining how an individual responds when there are significant alterations in these variables. If there is a change in the status of a variable between time (t) and time (t+1) such that an individual is stimulated to action to ensure survival, the condition of such a variable is considered essential for the individual (Ashby, 1962, p. 42).

Decision makers also find it difficult to cope with complex or probabilistic assessments of events and tend to employ simplified appraisals of essential information to reduce the burden of analysis (Ashby, 1952, p. 42; Heuer, 1981, p. 306). Thus the information which is monitored is not examined in all its complexity. Rather, uncertainty, time constraints and cognitive limitations simplify the richness of essential information to make it more easily digestible for the individual. Black and white interpretations of events are more comprehensible than various shades of gray. This simplification aids decision makers in responding to events in their environment much more quickly in order to insure survival (Simon, 1957, p. 89).

Essential information is employed in an individual's decision-making process which then directs action to overcome environmental changes. Simon writes that the individual:

...designs and establishes mechanisms that will direct his attention, channel information and knowledge, etc., in such a way as to cause specific day-to-day decisions to conform with the substantive plan (1957, p. 96).

This substantive plan is the strategy which the individual follows to attain some desired state--in this case survival. The substantive plan

is made up of what Simon (1959) and Ostrom and Job (1986) call "decision premises". These premises are "...computational procedures for assessing the state of the environment and its implications for action" (Simon, 1959, p. 274). The decision premises direct a response in the presence of some stimulus. Each essential variable represents the stimulus or input of a decision premise. After determining the saliency of an essential variable, the individual is either encouraged or restrained from taking some action (Ostrom and Job, 1986, p. 545, 551). The effect of all the decision premises in the substantive plan is to ultimately decide whether action is required to maintain the individual's survival.

As a consequence of the restricted range of information individuals monitor, the field of possible alternatives will be confined as well.

For example, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin argue:

The range of alternative projects which the decision makers consider is limited. Limitations...are due in large part to: the individual decision maker's past experience and values; the amount of available and utilized information; situational elements; the characteristics of the organizational system and the known, available resources (1962, p.92).

Furthermore, Yarmolinsky notes, "The president cannot spend much time considering all imaginable courses of action; he has to focus on those few which his subordinates are best equipped to carry out" (1971, p. 127). In addition, because cybernetic decision makers attempt to adapt to changing environments, they generally either take action to maintain a desired state or remain inactive if external events are not threatening (Ashby, 1952, p. 41). An action is either satisfactory if it leads to a desired state or unsatisfactory if it does not. Thus, Simon and March are led to write, "Most human decision-making, whether individual or organizational, is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives..." (1958, p. 141). Therefore decision makers limit their choices because of satisficing and demands on their time,

energy and cognitive abilities.

We may now represent the manner in which individuals employ essential information to maintain survival in the following equation:

$$p(ST) > h \quad [1]$$

The decision maker acts when the probability (p) of a survival threat (ST) is greater than a threshold (h) beyond which the individual cannot afford to remain inactive if he is to maintain survival. Such a simplistic conceptualization requires greater detail, however, if it is to be of any use in predicting individual behavior. The addition of two other terms to the equation is desirable for making the decision-making model more relevant to predicting presidential choices.

First, individuals are always necessarily aware of their capacity for taking various courses of actions. Before meeting any challenge to survival decision makers must determine if they possess the appropriate means to achieve their desired end. Without capability, the will to defend oneself or protect a national interest is largely irrelevant. The cybernetic literature generally assumes the decision-maker possesses the requisite means (e.g., Ashby, 1962). When the decision being modelled concerns the deployment of large numbers of men and machine over long periods of time and vast distances as it does in this dissertation, however, the feasibility of action can no longer be assumed. This consideration must be incorporated into the equation by adding a term to reflect the probability the president possesses the means for meeting a survival threat. Therefore, as the probability of the means being available increases, the likelihood of acting ought to increase as well.

Second, there are always risks and costs to be incurred from acting

which must be weighed against its benefits. The effort and expense of taking action will necessarily concern decision makers confronted with shallow or inconclusive evidence regarding the extent of a threat to survival. Individuals will also be aware of the possibility that taking action to preserve survival in one sphere might jeopardize maintenance of another highly desired state. Steinbruner refers to situations wherein individuals must decide which of two or more incompatible goals ought to be pursued as value tradeoff problems. According to rational actor models, decision makers engage in value integration when such problems arise. Individuals create a common metric along which both values can be placed and find an ideal point on the scale which attempts to satisfy both. The cybernetic model argues that people engage in value separation wherein the incompatible relationship between two values is denied and each are pursued, often without regard for the other. Because of the pressures of uncertainty, "...cognitive inference mechanisms tend to eliminate tradeoffs from a belief system" (1974, p. 104). Hence, individuals seek to satisfy each value at different times and deny that a tradeoff is taking place to avoid the emotional and mental difficulty of making a highly complex decision. Although information regarding costs and benefits is considered essential and always examined, an individual's decision leads him either to pursue benefits by acting or avoid costs through inaction. Decision makers must ultimately choose which factors are the most important and act accordingly. Therefore, I add a term to the equation reflecting the costs and risks decision makers must address before making a final decision.

The incorporation of the concepts of feasibility of action and costs/risks necessitates a revision in Equation [1]:

$$p(ST) + p(M) - p(C + R) > h \quad [2]$$

Under these circumstances an individual will act if the probability of a threat to survival, (ST), plus the probability that the individual possesses the appropriate means to take action, (M), minus the probability of costs and risks, (C + R), are greater than a threshold, (h), beyond which the individual cannot afford to remain inactive if he is to maintain survival. There are several features of this equation which require further elaboration.

First, the equation reflects the uncertainty felt by decision makers. Individuals are confronted with probabilities rather than certainties and must adjust their choices accordingly. Presidents cannot always be positive they are accurately judging their information and acting appropriately upon it. Thus, when I develop a statistical model stochastic terms are utilized to reflect the probabilistic nature of the decision-making process. Second, the equation incorporates inhibitory as well as exhibitory factors which influence the final decision. While the individual may desire to take action because of a threat to survival, he may simultaneously be inhibited from acting by potential problems arising from his decision. Third, the process by which the individual arrives at a decision is additive. Probabilities of costs and benefits are summed to arrive at a final estimation of the desirability of taking action. Only in this way can the president incorporate all essential information into his final, composite estimation of the desirability of using force and high levels of force.

To summarize the preceding discussion, because of cognitive limitations, an individual's decision-making process is best characterized as boundedly rational. The desire for survival is the key to understanding the behavior of boundedly rational decision makers. Survival affects decision making by motivating individuals to maintain a highly desired

state through the examination of information thought crucial to understanding environmental changes. Information and options are evaluated by their degree of association with survival. To adapt to their environment, individuals hierarchically choose from limited response sets.

The Cognitive Model

As Steinbruner notes, the cybernetic conception of decision making is somewhat narrow and undifferentiated. There exists a considerable degree of incongruity between the simplistic processes that cybernetic decision makers employ and the complexity and variety which inheres in the world. The challenge for the cybernetic theorist lies in preserving the attractive simplicity of the model while simultaneously accounting for the variety of behavior which is observed. This is done in Steinbruner by supplementing the cybernetic with the cognitive perspective. The cognitive perspective attempts to demonstrate that by processing information both prior to and independently of conscious direction, decision makers are able to organize information and formulate general behaviors without a great deal of intellectual effort. Therefore, a simplified decision-making environment can be maintained as the volume of information and situations to which an individual must respond are processed and organized in his mind to facilitate comprehension and choice. The cognitive perspective is concerned with explaining how the mind carries out these operations. This dissertation seeks to show that these processes play a major role in presidents' decisions to use military force.

One of the primary concerns of the cognitive perspective is the relationship between collections of beliefs, perceptions and behavior. Because collections of beliefs, or belief systems, affect the manner in

which people experience their surroundings, they necessarily influence how individuals interact with their environment. Festinger argues that belief systems, by reducing complexity and dissonance, further cause individuals to respond in rather predictable ways (1957, p. 47). Belief systems help decision makers comprehend and respond to a variety of familiar and unfamiliar events by simplifying the decision maker's perceptions (George, 1980, p. 57). By insuring that decisions can be made, inaction or indecisiveness which might reduce the potential for survival, is prevented. As Jervis writes, "...Intelligent decision making in any sphere is impossible unless significant amounts of information are assimilated to pre-existing beliefs" (1976, p. 145). Therefore, there is a specific need for belief systems in maintaining survival, and for the cognitive perspective in supplementing the cybernetic perspective. This leads to the fourth assumption of decision making:

4. A decision maker's belief system structures his interpretation and routinizes his utilization of information.

The manner in which this cognitive simplification takes place has been the subject of a good deal of research. While the terms employed vary among researchers, they all speak of the powers and structure of the human mind in decision making.

Consistency and Decision Making

George (1980), in discussing how decision makers resolve the challenges of uncertainty, writes of the guidance fundamental beliefs offer decision makers. Systems of beliefs enable individuals to process information and determine the attractiveness of various courses of action. Systems of beliefs may be organized around the nature of interstate conflict, axioms regarding correct strategy and desirability of

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action (George, 1980, p. 45). According to George, most decision makers have developed fairly stable beliefs on these matters. He utilizes the term "operational codes" to represent the manner in which beliefs affect decision making. Rather than serving as a rigid recipe for action, operational codes:

...serve as a prism or filter that influences the actor's perception and diagnosis of political situations and that provides norms and standards to guide and channel his choices of action in specific situations (George, 1980, p. 45).

In the face of uncertainty, belief systems provide a readily accessible and understandable guide which directs and structures an individual's choices at successive stages of the decision-making process.

In Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis documents the disastrous consequences incorrect images of the enemy can have on foreign policy making. He finds that many incorrect inferences foreign policy makers adopt can be traced to their internal desire to maintain a congruent relationship between external events and their internal thought structure. It is this drive to maintain consistency which is the most important component of the cognitive perspective in this decision making model.

Consistency is defined as the process by which individuals make external events comprehensible and compatible within the framework of their internal belief system (Cottam, 1986; Festinger, 1957; Holsti, 1979; Jervis, 1976; Shapiro and Bonham, 1973). Jervis writes that, "Consistency can largely be understood in terms of the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images" (1976, p. 117). He goes on to write:

...expectations create predispositions that lead actors to notice certain things and to neglect others, to immediately and often unconsciously draw certain inferences from what is noticed, and to find it difficult to consider alternatives (Jervis, 1976, p. 145).

Early pioneering work in the field by Festinger suggests that when people are confronted by a lack of symmetry between their beliefs and real life events, they experience cognitive dissonance, or non-fitting relations among the cognitive elements in their belief systems (1957, p. 12-13). He finds that in order to maintain consonance, individuals will regularly seek out and utilize only that information which fits with their belief systems (p. 30). Furthermore, Festinger maintains that whenever possible individuals prefer to follow the path which requires the least intellectual effort when reducing dissonance between beliefs and real world events (p. 44).

The importance of consistency in general policy making has been extensively documented in the literature (Axelrod, 1976; George, 1980; Shapiro and Bonham 1973, 1976; Steinbruner, 1974; Sylvan and Chan, 1984). Of even more importance, however, is the considerable evidence of the importance of consistency in U.S. foreign policy making in general and use of force decisions in particular. In the formulation of foreign policy, Shapiro and Bonham find that decision makers engage in consistency to understand changing international conditions. They write:

...the decision maker attempts to put the new international situation into the context of his experiences. This is a process of bringing together various components of the situation with his existing beliefs about the nations and actions involved so that the decision maker can define the situation (1973), p. 163).

In addition, Cottam asserts that, "Cognitive images play a role in all stages of an intervention from influencing the choice of strategy to processing information as the strategy is implemented" (1987, p. 12). These cognitive images constitute the frame of reference decision makers employ to interpret new and unfamiliar situations. In a 1969 analysis of Lyndon Johnson's decision to send the Marines into the Dominican Republic in 1965, Lowenthal found that key decision makers exhibited a

tendency to allow their predispositions to color their interpretation of instability in that country. Their desire to "fit" the problems in the Dominican Republic into the Cuban pattern of events has also been amply documented by Brands (1987) and Blechman and Kaplan (1978). Jervis cites a plethora of cases in which decision makers engaged in wishful thinking, analogizing, inferences of impossibility and a host of other cognitive strategies designed to create consistency between events and beliefs (1976).

As Steinbruner (1974) points out the process of consistency facilitates decision making by making the complexity of external events comprehensible within a framework of beliefs. He writes that:

The ability to build stable, reliable perceptual images out of varying stimulus patterns reveals that the mind is routinely capable of powerful logical operations on inherently ambiguous data (1974, p. 93).

The desire to maintain consistency between internal beliefs and the environment enables individuals to readily formulate strategies when they possess incomplete information about the threats they are facing. Thus, the drive for consistency helps the individual overcome uncertainty through its role in memory organization and information processing (Festinger, 1957, p. 44; Steinbruner, 1974, p. 100).

Environmental changes about which the decision maker lacks information are fitted into the belief system and interpreted according to its axioms. According to Steinbruner, the placement of an event into the belief system allows individuals to employ the cybernetic decision-making process (1974, p. 90). Belief systems manage the decomposition of a complex environment into the readily understandable perceptual images that allow decision makers to utilize simple and stable decision rules. Therefore, the cognitive model and particularly the cognitive process of consistency are crucial to the development of a comprehensive model of decision-making by explaining how people reach decisions under

conditions of uncertainty.

As George, (1980), Jervis, (1976) and Shapiro and Bonham, (1973) demonstrate, presidents' belief systems and the process of consistency help them overcome uncertainty when making major foreign policy decisions. Since the drive for survival is the most basic drive people possess (Maslow, 1970), it tends to dominate their belief systems. Thus, when making decisions regarding the use of force, presidents' belief systems put primary emphasis upon the achievement of those goals thought to be most critical in maintaining survival. They direct individuals to be sensitive to essential information directly bearing on critical environmental changes (Festinger, 1957, p. 12). Environmental changes are evaluated according to the extent to which they jeopardize the conception of survival embodied in the decision maker's belief system. After having determined whether or not survival is threatened, presidents determine what action is necessary.

Because they are central elements of the cybernetic/cognitive decision-making model, the specification of presidents' survival goals and the belief systems that develop around them must be the next step in modeling the decision to use force. Therefore, the manner in which presidents have conceptualized survival must first be outlined. Next, the beliefs presidents hold about these survival goals must be specified in order to understand how and why they act upon threats to survival. Although individuals have a variety of belief systems, for the purposes of this dissertation I am interested in the character of presidents' survival-oriented belief system. This dissertation seeks to show that presidents believe the survival of the United States and their political careers are dependent upon dependent upon maintaining the credibility of their own and the U.S. resolve to use force, avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union and determining the feasibility of undertaking military

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operations. Why foreign policy makers have felt these goals are essential for their conception of survival and the manner in which these beliefs have structured their behavior are examined in Chapter Three.

Summary

To summarize, the cognitive element of the cybernetic/cognitive model of decision making shows how people consciously and unconsciously structure their perceptions and interpretations to facilitate decision making under uncertainty. After their belief systems have helped presidents to interpret opportunities to use force and determine the extent of the threats to survival they are hypothesized to form strong predispositions about the desirability of using force and high levels of force. Utilizing the essential information which their belief systems direct them to, presidents form a composite evaluation of an opportunity to use military force through a series of decision premises. Presidents generally either take some military action to maintain survival or determine that a response is not necessary. This decision-making process is represented in the Figure 2.

This diagram seeks to show the series of events which take place as an individual, confronted with some stimulus threat to survival chooses a course of action. After having discovered a threat to survival, the individual first attempts to understand it and define its relevance by placing the event within the organization of his belief system. He seeks to maintain consistency between what he sees and what he believes. In so doing the threat to survival takes on a particular meaning for the individual. Based upon the meaning of the threat, the individual scans his environment for information on the status of essential variables which will help him to further appreciate the gravity of the threat. After having assimilated all this data and utilized it in his decision




Figure 2: A Cybernetic/Cognitive Model of Decision Making

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premises, the individual structures his choices so that he selects from only a few competing options. He may elect to take action in an attempt to restore the environment to a desired state, or he may decide that action is not desirable or too difficult. It should be found that presidents employ a similar process when making decisions concerning the use of military force.

Thus, the cybernetic/cognitive model is the best suited model for understanding and predicting presidential decision making in the political use of military force according to those criteria outlined previously. First, it is a model of the decision-making process which describes the affects of belief systems and survival goals on presidential choices. Second, by describing people as boundedly rational individuals who employ only essential information in reaching their decisions, it accounts for behavior under conditions of uncertainty. Furthermore, it provides an abstract framework of decision making which can be used to model the behavior of a plethora of decision problems. The researcher must identify the substantive content of survival goals, belief systems and essential information to apply the model toward predicting an individual's choices. In chapters Three and Four, I apply the principles of cybernetic/cognitive decision making to presidents' decisions regarding the use of military force and attempt to show how they lead to specific patterns of behavior.

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Chapter 3: Foreign Policy Goals and the Political Use of Military Force

Introduction

In order to understand when and how presidents employ the military for political purposes, research must begin by examining how the drive for survival shapes U.S. foreign-policy interests. It is hypothesized that the survival need leads presidents to attach importance to the credibility of the United States, their own credibility while in office, the avoidance of confrontation with the Soviets and the availability of means to meet threats. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that by specifying how these concerns affect presidents' decision-making processes, a foreign-policy model can be developed that can predict the occurrence and magnitude of political uses of force.

In Chapter Two, four principles about cybernetic/cognitive decision making were outlined. They are generally assumed to be applicable to all manner of individuals and choices. In this chapter I try to demonstrate how these principles may be applied to the decision-making process presidents employ regarding political uses of military force. These principles are fleshed out and given specific meaning within the context of use of force decisions. The role of the survival goal in U.S. foreign policy is the first of the cybernetic/cognitive decision-making principles discussed below. First, I examine how survival depends upon presidents' maintaining the United States' reputation as a nation willing to use its military capability. I next describe the evolution of the importance of credibility in American foreign policy. Second, I detail how presidents also believe their survival in office is influenced by the public's image of their willingness to use military force. Third, I show why presidents believe survival is also dependent

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on preventing superpower war. Fourth, I briefly examine how the availability of means affects presidents' decisions. Finally, I seek to demonstrate how the concern for credibility, the prevention of war and availability of means homogenizes decision making across administrations

Credibility and Survival

In cybernetic/cognitive decision making, the survival goal leads individuals to monitor changes in their environment that threaten the maintenance of a desired state. In the Cold War era, the survival of the United States has meant security from the Soviet/communist threat. In particular, the literature on American foreign policy (Gaddis, 1982; Johnson, 1986; Morgan, 1981; NSC-68; Schell, 1976) has demonstrated that for a variety of reasons presidents have felt that the survival of the United States was dependent upon maintaining the credibility of its reputation for using military force to meet this threat. Schell writes that the aim of credibility in American foreign policy has been:

...to establish in the minds of peoples and their leaders throughout the world an image of the U.S. as a nation that possessed great power and had the will and determination to use it in foreign affairs (1976, p. 342).

Even though the United States had an awesome military arsenal, its' utility would be severely diminished unless other nations believed presidents possessed the willingness to use it. Thus, as a superpower intent upon protecting its interests against the challenges of the communist bloc, presidents have proven immensely concerned with upholding this image (Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 1985, p. 130). If presidents were not concerned with reputation, their desired state--the security of the United States--would be threatened. Threats to credibility are the survival threats alluded to in Chapter Two.

Therefore, to explain how presidents' conception of survival leads

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them to employ military force in a fairly consistent manner, I develop an analytic framework for understanding the importance of credibility in these decisions. The reasons for this concern may be grouped into two categories: 1) the role of credibility in nuclear deterrence and, 2) the need for credibility in maintaining an American position of power equal to or greater than that of the Soviet Union. Each of these is explored below before detailing the historical evolution of credibility in American foreign policy.

The Importance of Credibility in American Foreign Policy. Pres-
idents have long been concerned with communicating to the Soviets the sincerity of the American pledge to retaliate should the Soviets launch a nuclear attack. Although nuclear retaliation may appear irrational or incredulous, presidents believe that unless the Soviets are deterred by the American threat, they will try to exploit any political/military advantage they find. Ultimately, presidents are afraid that an incredible threat might encourage or provoke the Soviets into launching a nuclear first strike. The conundrum presidents face is trying to convince the Soviets an incredible threat to retaliate is in fact credible. Much of their effort has revolved around formulating an effective nuclear strategy. Presidents have overseen the hardening and dispersing of missile silos, the development of nuclear launch doctrines and diplomatic pronouncements of American intentions in order to demonstrate the credibility of their nuclear retaliatory pledge (Freedman, 1986). Yet, they have also been concerned with maintaining a credible willingness to utilize their military arsenal.

Most importantly for this dissertation, presidents have been extremely concerned with the need to avoid giving the Soviets doubts about their willingness to use military force during international

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crises. They fear the Soviets might generalize about American reluctance to use force in one case to situations involving their willingness to use nuclear weapons. If threats to its interests were allowed to pass by without a response, the Soviet Union might begin to doubt the sincerity of its nuclear retaliatory pledge (Schell, 1976, p. 352-353). Should presidents not maintain a credible willingness to use force in matters of less gravity than the superpower nuclear relationship, they feel the survival of the United States would be threatened by an emboldened Soviet Union ready to risk nuclear war. Thus, the credibility of American will to use force becomes important in preventing a nuclear attack (Morgan, 1982, p. 145). Presidents believe the survival of the U.S. has come to depend on its willingness to use force (Gaddis, 1982; Johnson, 1986; Schell, 1976).

In fact, in cultivating a reputation for using force, presidents are behaving like most status quo powers fending off challenges to their hegemony. As Alt, Calvert and Humes argue, a nation may invest in reputation by, "...bearing some initial cost to establish a reputation for toughness" (1988, p. 448) in order compel or deter the action of another state. Dominant powers realize that their position may be secure only so long as other nations believe them to be dominant. As a great, status quo power, the concern for developing a credible reputation for using force is natural and is likely to dominate American foreign policy as long as the U.S. is a superpower. Presidents have believed that absent an American willingness to use force, the position of the United States would slowly erode and the Soviet Union would become the dominant world power (Gaddis, 1982; Johnson, 1986). Soviet advancements might ultimately lead to the Western hemisphere and threaten the survival of the United States. According to Johnson (1986) presidents believe that by maintaining a reputation for being willing to

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utilize American power, the dominoes can be kept from falling. They have come to associate the credibility of American willingness to use force with the survival of the United States.

Therefore, to explain decisions to use force requires understanding how the goal of maintaining a credible willingness to use military force influences presidential decision making. Presidents believe the survival of the United States is dependent upon a credible nuclear threat and protecting American hegemony. This conception of survival necessitates maintaining a credible willingness to use military force. And only by using military force can American credibility be successfully communicated. Soviet perception of American credibility ought then to deter them from launching not only a nuclear attack, but expanding their influence around the world at the expense of American interests. I seek to show in the discussion below that the preservation of credibility has been a fundamental and enduring goal of American foreign policy during the Cold War.

The Historical Evolution of Credibility in American Foreign Policy.

The quest for credibility has been the dominant force in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. As Morgan writes, there has been "...a recurring, compulsive concern about its (the United States) reputation for being ready and willing to follow through on its commitments" (Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 1985, p. 136). The concern with credibility has been apparent in a wide spectrum of decisions ranging from the development of weapons systems, decisions on U.S. force posture, and arms control as well as the political use of military force. Although nations have always been concerned with preserving images of credibility, in the Cold War era, American presidents have conferred unprecedented significance to this goal by identifying the preservation

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of credibility with the preservation of the United States and their own political careers. To understand why, it is necessary to examine the evolution of American foreign policy during the Cold War.

It is an old adage that generals are always waging new wars based upon lessons learned in the last war. This aphorism, however, also applies to politicians and in particular to U.S. foreign policy makers during the Cold War. While in the 1930's many American and European politicians were afraid of stumbling into another bloody war because of inflexible security commitments, after World War II appeasement was the bete noire of the allies. The so-called "lesson of Munich" or the "Munich Syndrome" (derived from the 1938 peace conference where the British and the French capitulated to Hitler's demands in Czechoslovakia) is that satisfying an aggressor's appetite only leads to further demands and belligerence. Therefore, war can be avoided by stopping militant powers as soon as they begin behaving aggressively (May, 1973).

Soviet machinations and intransigence in the aftermath of World War II soon caused American foreign policy makers to begin to wonder if the lessons of Munich might not be applied in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Quarrels with the Soviets over German re-unification, the composition of governments in Hungary and Poland, the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the continuing Soviet occupation of northern Iran all served to raise serious doubts about Soviet and communist ambitions. These events coupled with the Soviets' stated aspiration of a communist world, appeared to threaten greatly American interests. Presidents and policy makers were counseled that the Soviets would look and probe for signs of weakness among the allies and press their advantage through subversion and aggression, gradually eating away at the Western World (Gaddis, 1982; Johnson, 1985; Northredge, 1974). Thus, presidents

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quickly realized the increased importance of their willingness to stand up to the Soviets and others who would interfere with American interests. An investment in American reputation would be needed to secure not only Western Europe, but ultimately the United States itself.

Faced with an increasingly vulnerable Western Europe and a growing communist threat, particularly in Greece, in 1947 the Truman administration became the first to raise the specter of Munich and use it to help justify an expanded American role in international affairs. Truman announced in his Truman Doctrine address before a joint session of Congress that he wanted the world to know the United States would not retreat into the isolationism which dominated its foreign policy after World War I. America was prepared for a long struggle with the Soviet Union in order to prevent the communists from expanding their influence. U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey, and later the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, exemplified American resolve to meet this challenge. Ernest May writes:

Once Truman and the men around him perceived developments of the 1940's as parallel to those of the 1930's, they applied this moral and hence resolved to behave toward the Soviet Union as they believed their predecessors should have behaved toward the expansionist states of their time (1973, p. 32).

American foreign-policy makers came to believe that by nipping communist expansion in the bud, a catastrophic, superpower war over domination of the world could be prevented.

While Truman's advisers recommended different strategies for containing communism, they all agreed that the United States' will to defend its allies would be the most crucial factor in deterring the Soviet Union and preventing another Munich. Harry Truman's secretaries of state and defense counseled that the Soviet Union,

...cannot be brought about by skillful argument or the appeal to reason. The only thing which will deter the Russians will be the conviction that the United States is prepared, if necessary, to meet aggression with force of arms" (and that) ...the best hope of

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preserving peace is that the conviction should be carried to the U.S.S.R., Turkey and other powers that...the United States would not hesitate in joining other nations in meeting armed aggression by the force of American arms (quoted in May, 1973, p. 40).

One of the corollary lessons of Munich was that Hitler's perception of Allied weakness evidenced in their appeasement policies greatly increased his confidence in the belief that he could triumph over his adversaries. Thus, Truman and his advisers as well as subsequent presidents concluded that the Soviets must believe the United States' threats to use force, its resolve to defend allies, and its will to exploit its power were all credible. They believed in the words of Jervis, Lebow and Stein, "...that the image of the United States was fragile and subject to damage by all sorts of unfortunate events" (1985, p. 137). Therefore, if the communists perceived a credible willingness to use military force they might be kept from behaving like latter day Hitlers.

The Truman Doctrine was also notable in its call for the United States to, "...support free peoples resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Crabb, 1982, p. 108). Truman felt that the communists were mounting a purposeful, global offensive and believed only the United States could prevent this campaign from succeeding. While this universalistic rhetoric was never meant to commit the United States to the preservation of all pro-Western governments, its clear rejection of isolationism and espousal of international interventionism most definitely extended the battlefield of the Cold War beyond Europe. Thereafter, the lessons of Munich would have to be and were applied to communist aggression in countries hitherto of little concern to America (e.g., Korea, Vietnam). For example, Gaddis writes, "There was almost immediate agreement in Washington that Korea...had by nature of the attack on it become vital if American credibility elsewhere was not to be questioned" (1982, p. 109). Lyndon

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Johnson argued during the Vietnam War that "There are a hundred other little nations...watching what happens...If South Vietnam can be gobbled up, the same thing can happen to them" (quoted in Gaddis, 1982, p. 241) If the United States were facing a global threat, it would need to discourage the Soviets and their allies by making them certain in their minds as to the inevitability of an American response to any moves they might be envisioning. Evidence of American pre-occupation with credibility is apparent in the behavior of the United States when confronted with aggression. A brief review of subsequent developments in U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War era should make this point clear.

In NSC-68, one of the seminal statements of U.S. foreign policy, the Truman administration set forth a strategy of containment which has guided presidents to this day. NSC-68 asserts that in the Cold War world, considerations of image, prestige and credibility had become paramount. According to the authors of this document, the Soviet Union was out, "to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin [and] that those who lack it are decadent and doomed" (NSC-68, April 14, 1950, FR: 1950 I., pgs. 263-264). Failure to respond to Soviet challenges would mean a gradual withdrawal from global order until the time when the U.S. would discover it had surrendered its vital interests. Furthermore, NSC-68 contended that all interests had become equally vital and that the United States must be prepared to defend its interests in all places where the communist menace was looming. U.S. credibility and with it U.S. power and prestige in the world would be severely crippled if the United States chose to ignore its global responsibilities.

The Eisenhower administration elaborated upon the importance of credibility in the domino theory. Eisenhower argued that if the United States did not step in immediately after uncovering evidence of com-

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munist aggression in some nation, U.S. security guarantees to other states in the region would be jeopardized. Other regional treaties might subsequently be undermined until the security of the United States itself might ultimately be endangered. For example, in 1958 after events in Lebanon and Iraq alerted U.S. foreign policy makers to opportunities for the advancement of Soviet interests, Eisenhower agreed that if the United States were to do nothing, "...the dependability of the United States' commitments for assistance in the event of need would be brought into question throughout the world" (quoted in Blechman and Kaplan, 1978, p. 231). In a letter to Churchill, Eisenhower claimed that if the United States were to appear weak and passive, it would create the impression that, "...we are slinking into the shadows, hoping that the beast will finally be satiated and cease his predatory tactics before he finally devours us" (quoted in Gaddis, p. 144). Grime imagery aside, Eisenhower clearly believed that the responsibility of protecting the survival of the United States depended on stopping the spread of communism before it extended too far. Deterring the Soviets in the long run would demand a credible willingness to use force which would itself be established by meeting communist challenges.

It was the policy of brinkmanship, however, where Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, most explicitly linked the preservation of credibility with the survival of the United States. The quest for credibility and the deterrence of nuclear attack were to serve as mutually reinforcing goals. Eisenhower and Dulles were aware that short of actually using nuclear weapons, there were few means by which the administration could communicate the sincerity of its pledge to use these weapons in retaliation for communist aggression. By manipulating the shared risk of war (Schelling, 1960, p. 99) or going eyeball to eyeball with the other side, however, the administration could convince

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the Soviets that the United States was willing to commit a seemingly irrational act (using nuclear weapons). It was hoped that the Soviets would infer from risky American behavior in superpower crises that the Eisenhower did have the determination to carry out his policy of massive retaliation. According to Schell, American policy makers felt that by:

...advertising America's strength to the world at levels below the brink, it would hold the world a few steps back from nuclear extinction and at the same time would deter the Communists from aggressive moves (1976, p. 352).

Discrete uses of military force during crises could then be used to demonstrate the credibility of the nuclear threat as well as the credibility of American resolve to uphold its commitments. This coupling of the credibility of U.S. nuclear strategy with the more general credibility of the U.S. will to defend its interests, while it was a major innovation of the Eisenhower administration, was a festering problem in the view of the succeeding Kennedy administration.

John F. Kennedy came into office criticizing his predecessor's excessive reliance on nuclear weapons to deter communist aggression. He and his advisers, like Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and his brother, Robert, believed that the nuclear deterrent was losing credibility. They argued that the Soviets and especially Third World communist movements did not or would not believe the United States was willing to escalate to global nuclear war in order to prevent small, backward, and largely agrarian nations from being taken over by local insurgencies. And not only were the communists gnawing away at the perimeters of American interests (e.g., Laos, the Congo, Cuba), JFK contended that U.S. security in general was eroding because of the implausibility of massive retaliation. Kennedy returned to the ideas articulated in NSC-68 wherein a wide range of military options were to be developed and utilized in a manner tailored to the nature of the communist threat. Aggression would be deterred and credibility maintained by communicating

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to the Soviets and others through words and deeds that America was prepared to meet all threats with countervailing force (the policy of symmetric containment). He pushed for a counter-insurgency capability to meet the guerrilla threat in Vietnam and Laos. He met Soviet challenges in Cuba and Berlin with roughly equivalent counter-measures. The certainty of a response was the lynch pin of the Kennedy policy of preserving U.S. credibility in contrast to the Eisenhower reliance on certainty as to the nature of a possible response.

Vietnam was the opportunity both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations seized on to prove not only the effectiveness of symmetric containment, but the credibility of U.S. commitments. Yet as the two presidents became progressively wedded to the conflict in Vietnam, they and their strategists became pre-occupied with demonstrating America's will or resolve to the exclusion of almost all other considerations. What counted most, Jonathan Schell claims in The Time of Illusion was, "...not the substance of America's strength or the actual state of its willingness, but the image of strength and willingness" (1976, p. 353). The under-secretary of Defense wrote a memo in which he declared, "Why we have not withdrawn is, by all odds, one reason. To preserve our reputation as a guarantor, and thus preserve our effectiveness in the rest of the world" (quoted in Schell, 1976, p. 362). While Vietnam was by no means the only conflict in which the military was employed to help protect credibility, it became the critical test of the Kennedy/Johnson policy of ensuring survival through symmetric containment.

It was Richard Nixon's fate to be saddled with terminating the war in Vietnam and rescuing American credibility from the faltering effort he inherited from Lyndon Johnson. Indeed, the Nixon administration at times seemed obsessed with proving American strength; with demonstrating that the United States was not a, "pitiful helpless giant", as Nixon

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himself put it. He was afraid of the sentiment toward appeasement and passive acquiescence to communism he felt creeping into the American psyche. The tools which Nixon employed to combat the descent into isolationism he saw required expanding his own powers to wage the war at home and abroad to preserve American credibility. He attempted to silence critics of the war to counteract the impression of weakness the anti-war movement created. He prosecuted the waning months of the war with a vengeance heretofore unobserved. Strategic withdrawal and tactical escalation was the name given to Nixon's policy of retiring from commitments which could not be realistically met, while simultaneously intensifying and expanding the violence of the struggle against communism as the price to be paid for the U.S. retreat. That such policies would drive Nixon from office is not surprising given his attempt to, "compensate the lack of will he found among the people with a fierce will of his own" (Schell, 1976, p. 373).

Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations also demonstrated that the drive to sustain American credibility was a domestic as well as a foreign policy problem. No longer would U.S. credibility be primarily dependent upon American actions abroad, public support for U.S. policies would exercise their own unique and powerful effect on presidents and their use of force. For example, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, administration worries of perceptions of American weakness in light of the withdrawal from Vietnam and the continuing Watergate revelations played a major role in the decision to put the U.S. armed services on a global DEFCON 3 alert (Betts, 1988, p. 126). And as Henry Kissinger argued when Congress compelled the Ford administration to terminate its support for one of the factions in the Angolan civil war, such appeasement would, "...lead to further Soviet and Cuban pressures on the mistaken assumption that America has lost the will to counter adventurism

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or even to help others to do so" (quoted in Lebow, 1985, p. 218). The Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations have all been forced to come to terms with two seemingly irreconcilable goals of U.S. foreign policy: 1) the need to maintain the credibility of American commitments and will to use force, and 2) the need to avoid involving the U.S. too deeply into foreign conflicts.

Jimmy Carter tried to prevent another Vietnam through a conspicuous aloofness to power politics. If he avoided visibly tying U.S. prestige to foreign events, Carter hoped his administration could evade situations which might call for a demonstration of U.S. resolve that might not be forthcoming. Initially, Carter adopted a Wilsonian demeanor by crusading for a more humane world of reduced tension and human rights, but like the former president he was unable to transform his lofty rhetoric into concrete and understandable policies. As events in Nicaragua, Iran, Ethiopia and Afghanistan were to demonstrate to Carter's detractors, the U.S. could not afford to be afraid of involving itself in foreign conflicts. In the end Carter created a credibility gap. Too often tough talk was paired with only moderate level responses. Carter's statements about crises in the Horn of Africa, Iran and Afghanistan were often phrased quite starkly (i.e., the Carter Doctrine's call for the defense of the Persian Gulf region against outside interference), while his actual responses were criticized for being too little and too late (i.e., the hostage rescue mission). In the eyes of his harshest critics, Jimmy Carter's failure to protect actively U.S. credibility was endangering American security and survival.

Ronald Reagan was able to exploit this newfound frustration with American impotence to rally the country around the Soviet threat and hostile Third World forces. Yet to his dismay he found this frustration co-existing with the ongoing reluctance of most Americans to come to the

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aid of countries battling communist aggression. For example, even though Reagan made Nicaragua the centerpiece of his battle against communism, public opinion polls showed that the majority of Americans were opposed to Reagan's policies in the region, let alone the sending of American soldiers into Nicaragua (Wittkopf, 1987). Congressional reluctance to sanction the use of American military power and increased involvement in the policy formulation made matters even more difficult for a president who entertained visions of rolling back communist gains (Destler, Gelb and Lake, 1984). Thus, while there was public demand for retaliation against the Khomeini's and Khadafy's of the world, there was a corresponding public wish to avoid excessive entanglement in the affairs of other nations (Tucker, 1989). Credibility could and had to be maintained, but only very carefully and selectively.

The Reagan administration's successes and failures in the political use of military force in pursuit of the preservation of credibility pointed up the problems of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era. Where the administration's policy was direct and decisive, as in the Grenada invasion and the bombing of Libya, Reagan was able to demonstrate U.S. power while avoiding tying the military down in a protracted struggle. As Robert Tucker commented, "...these military actions effectively served the nations diplomatic interests, if only by restoring a measure of prestige and credibility in the use of power" (1989, p. 16). However, when the policy was muddled and where the use of force was only tangentially related to diplomatic goals, as in the deployment of the Marines in Beirut, the results were quite detrimental to U.S. credibility, especially in the Middle East. Yet, Ronald Reagan was able to use the military quite regularly, demonstrating that while American credibility might not be as robust as it was during the heyday of Cold War consensus, neither was the nation's

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resolve as uncertain as it was during the 1970's.

Both Ronald Reagan and George Bush have attached great importance to the preservation and demonstration of U.S. credibility, even in light of the reduced Soviet threat. In the Middle East and Central America, neither have exhibited much reluctance publicly to couple American credibility to the war against communists and other anti-American forces. For example, several uses of force in the Middle East were undertaken in large part to bolster sagging U.S. credibility in light of the withdrawal of the Marines from Beirut in 1984. In regard to events in Central America, Ronald Reagan claimed that if the United States could not, "defend ourselves there...our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble and the safety of our homeland would be out in jeopardy" (quoted in Destler, Gelb and Lake, 1984, p. 81). Reagan and Bush have attempted to show the world that the United States is still a dominant, reputable power, concerned with world order regardless of which nation acts against its interests. At the same time, however, they have structured their actions so that the U.S. might not find itself in a position where once again there might arise a lack of political will to see through a commitment. Thus, while their actions may be more circumscribed than their predecessors, the Reagan and Bush presidencies have once again actively deployed the military in pursuit of political goals.

Despite different approaches to foreign policy and shifts in control of the White House, the desire to maintain credibility and the role of the political use of force in this effort have remained remarkably enduring goals. All presidents have identified the need to demonstrate the credibility of U.S. will to employ force as a fundamental goal in many if not most incidents in which the military were deployed for political purposes. While there are some differences between

administrations, they are more reflective of the differing international and domestic circumstances under which these presidents had to labor. For example, although Jimmy Carter utilized the military less often than any of his predecessors, the inactivity of his administration can largely be explained by the drop in the number of severe international crises in his first years in office, and the reluctance of the American public to countenance military involvement overseas. And despite the distinction between the generally asymmetric containment policies of Republican administrations and the symmetric containment policies of Kennedy and Johnson, the differences were mainly rhetorical. When the opportunities presented themselves (e.g., Lebanon, 1958, Yom Kippur War, 1973; the Mayaguez incident, 1975), the Republicans were generally just as ready to respond as the Democrats.

Credibility has been important because presidents feel that security and stability result from credible threats to use force and that insecurity and instability result from a perceived unwillingness to use force (George and Smoke, 1974). It is feared that a loss of credibility would undermine the entire policy of containment and mutual deterrence as well. If the Soviets were to perceive an incredible willingness to use force, they might begin by upsetting the global balance of power and conclude by launching a nuclear attack against the U.S. Therefore, presidents have realized that the survival of the United States is dependent in large part on making sure the Soviets do perceive that they are willing to back up threats and policies with military force. There has been a fundamental concern both with credibility and the need to use military force to preserve it such that one might conclude presidents have viewed this goal as essential to maintaining survival. This leads to the first of four principles regarding presidents' conception of survival:

Principle 1A -- Survival: For presidents, survival requires that foreign audiences perceive a credible American willingness to use its military capability.

Yet as events which have taken place since the Vietnam War so vividly illustrate, presidents, must also be aware of the expectations of the American public. The voters are also interested in the president's willingness to use force to protect American interests. The pressure the American public exerts on presidents is described next.

The Importance of Credibility in American Domestic Politics.

Just as presidents believe the survival of the United States is dependent upon maintaining credibility internationally, they also believe their domestic political survival is dependent in part on their willingness to use force. I attempt to demonstrate that presidents feel that in order to attain office and succeed while in office (e.g., their domestic political survival), they must maintain an image as a strong leader who will take military action to protect American interests. I seek to show that because the public has consistently rewarded presidents concerned with reputation with electoral success and approval while in office, presidents are strongly influenced by domestic opinion. Therefore, they must be just as concerned with the American public's perception of their reputation for using force as they are with the perceptions of foreign audiences. In order to assess the impact the American public has on presidential decisions involving the use of military force, it is necessary to begin by briefly examining public attitudes toward foreign-policy issues.

While the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy has been assiduously studied over the years, there exists a fair amount

of controversy on the extent, time, and area of its impact (Cohen, 1983; Crabb and Holt, 1980; Wittkopf, 1987). Despite the lack of conclusivity in many studies, however, there does exist a good deal of agreement on many broad generalizations about the content of the public's beliefs. Opinion surveys have documented the ebb and flow of the public's political beliefs and perceptions and have provided us with a useful picture of the public's proclivities. To assess properly the impact of public opinion on the use of military force, it is necessary to begin by sketching the broad parameters of the public's beliefs.

Internationalism has been the dominant force in American public opinion during the Cold War, even though isolationist tendencies have arisen in the aftermath of the Vietnam War (Cohen, 1983; Wittkopf, 1987). Internationalism is characterized as embracing the acceptance of using military force in pursuit of diplomatic goals, an impulse to intervene in other nations' affairs, and a belief in the supremacy and superiority of American institutions and ideals. In the aftermath of World War II, the public's general reaction to the Truman Doctrine and communist takeovers in Eastern Europe and the Far East was to accept the necessity of this type of activist, global foreign policy. The expenditure of American manpower and military hardware in pursuit of foreign policy goals was considered justifiable by the public in a variety of situations in view of the Soviet threat.

It was this perceived threat which has been the most important stimulus in mobilizing the public to support foreign aid, membership in military alliances, uses of the military short of war and wars themselves. In fact, once aroused, the voting public has displayed remarkably resilient and fervent anti-communist attitudes. The loss of China, the "missile gap", and the election of Ronald Reagan underscored to presidents and politicians the pressure and desirability to portray

the Soviet threat in the starkest terms possible. Because of this desire to appear tough and unyielding toward the communists, presidents have felt the need to present a credible willingness to use military force in defense of American interests (Gaddis, 1982). Presidents who have proven or appeared incapable of taking strong action have usually not succeeded in office. I examine below how the public's anti-communism has made presidents believe that their political survival depended in part on the need to take forceful military action.

While anti-communism has long been a hallmark of American political life (witness the Red scares after World War I), it was not until after Soviet domination of Eastern Europe became apparent that the electoral and political implications of these attitudes fully manifested themselves. When President Truman went on the offensive with his plan for aiding Turkey and Greece in 1947, he was urged by his advisers to make the threat, "clearer than the truth" and to "scare the hell out of the American public" (Crabb, 1982, p. 126). Once mobilized, however, American anti-communist attitudes have played a large role in the electoral fortunes of both the Republicans and the Democrats. In fact, of the three issues which Eisenhower made the focus of his campaign, two (Korea and communism) were directed at Truman's inability or unwillingness to take forceful action. Eisenhower promised to take stronger measures to end the war and to stop the spread of communism.

And just as Truman was assailed by the Republicans for being too weak, each party has taken to criticizing the other for being "soft on communism" in order to attract more votes. Dwight Eisenhower was castigated by John Kennedy for not taking a more active, military role in burgeoning Third World conflicts. Jimmy Carter was similarly assaulted by Ronald Reagan for allowing the spread of communism to go unchecked during his tenure in office (Hess and Nelson, 1985). George

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McGovern was criticized by Richard Nixon for his pacifistic attitudes. The common theme among all these charges was that the president or presidential candidate was not going to take strong enough action to protect American interests against the communists and should not be entrusted with high office. Hence, presidents have both felt pressured to maintain an image as a strong leader in order to stay in office and to take a harder line than their opponent to attain office. This electoral pressure ultimately has its origins in public opinion. Though the charges of weakness have generally come from political opponents, the American public electorally determines the validity of the accusations. And while the American public may occasionally come down on the side of the less belligerent candidate (e.g., the 1964 presidential election), its tendency has been to reward the president who projects a more credible willingness to use force.

Consider, for example, the following scenario. When confronted with what he believes to be a communist threat to American interests, a president may choose to employ the military to counter the danger or utilize some other less forceful option. Depending on his response, a president faces the possibility of making one of two errors in judging the threat. An incorrect underestimation of the actual threat or the public's perception of the threat might lead a president to decide against the need for a forceful response. Such an error would give a president's political opponents evidence for accusations of timidity and weakness in foreign affairs which may prove damaging to his legislative agenda, his party's election prospects and his own political future. For example, Jimmy Carter was widely criticized for under-estimating the communist and Soviet/Cuban role in the Nicaraguan revolution and failing to take appropriate measures to block the Sandinista's ascent to power (Destler, Gelb and Lake, 1984). Regardless of the significance of the

communist threat or the ability of the United States to change the course of events in Nicaragua, inaction in the face of perceived danger was damaging enough for Jimmy Carter. And while one mistake may not cause a president his office, each failure to take action provides further grist for opponents' charges of weakness.

Contrarily, a president may incorrectly over-estimate the communist threat leading him to opt for a forceful response where in fact it may not have been necessary. The consequences of this action, however, are likely to be far less damaging. An effort to at least do something is much more easily understood by the public than inaction in the face of danger. Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada may not have been necessary to preserve the global balance of power, but the public nonetheless understood his rationale for invading an island of heretofore negligible significance. Hence, presidents have generally proven to be more interested in guarding against the first type of error. Goaded into action in part by a fear of looking hesitant or timorous, presidents have shown a marked preference for action to appease a public more willing to listen to the arguments of hardliners than accommodationists.

In the language of Alt, Calvert and Humes, it is necessary for presidents to make an investment in reputation for domestic purposes. By demonstrating a willingness to use force they protect themselves against charges of weakness and heighten their stature as a strong foreign-policy leader. Thus, as a simple matter of survival in office or ascension to office, presidents and candidates have become well aware of the public's preference for leaders who are willing to use American power in defense of its interests. The inducements from the public to take action, however, do not stop when the president or candidate is done campaigning for office. The need to maintain a reputation for using force for domestic purposes continues to influence presidents

throughout their tenure in office.

For example, while presidents are in office, the American public has been quick to reward them for displays of military force. Almost invariably, political uses of military force have resulted in the rally round the flag effect wherein the public and Congress flock to the president's side to form a common front against the external enemy. Hughes writes:

It appears that, almost regardless of prior attitudes of the public, regardless of the popularity of the president and regardless of how well the president handles the crisis, a large proportion of the population will support him (1978, p. 38)

Even uses of force which can be termed failures, such as the Bay of Pigs operation and the Iranian hostage rescue mission, resulted in a surge of presidential popularity (Lee, 1977). Popularity increases such as these can be a useful presidential tool in dealing with Congress, the president's political party, and the public itself (Neustadt, 1960; Ostrom and Simon, 1985). Increases in popularity have been associated with success on presidential support votes in Congress (Edwards, 1980) and increased representation of the president's party in Congress (Tufte, 1975). Awareness of these benefits can only increase the enticement of the military option.

Just as the maintenance of a credible willingness to use force can bolster a president's popularity and provide him with numerous political benefits, so too can the appearance of weakness lead to diminished popularity and numerous political costs. As Kegley and Wittkopf note, "Public evaluations of his [Jimmy Carter] foreign policy performance were especially critical and generally paralleled his overall decline in popularity" (1987, p. 312). Presidential success in dealing with Congress and improving the electoral chances of his party decreases as presidents experience this sort of decline in popularity (Neustadt, 1960; Edwards,

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1980). I do not mean to argue that presidents must use military force at every opportunity in order to prevent a decline in their popularity. Rather, presidents must be aware of their reputation for using force they help create at each opportunity. And because this image and the overall perception of the president's performance to which it contributes are such vital resources in domestic politics, presidents must closely monitor public opinion when they consider using military force.

Thus, the impact of public pressure encourages the president to tailor his military response according to his own political conditions and needs. American public pressure significantly predisposes presidents to be concerned with their own political survival. Because the public's strong anti-communist attitudes and demand for forceful action in defense of American interests play such an important role in determining the outcomes of presidential elections, presidents must promote or maintain an image as a powerful leader of the American military. And because presidential success while in office also depends on this image as well, presidents are further predisposed to demonstrate a willingness to take military action when necessary. Thus, to maintain domestic political survival, presidents generally must act forcefully. This leads to the second statement regarding presidents' conception of survival:

Principle 1B -- Survival: For presidents, survival requires that domestic audiences perceive a credible American willingness to use its military capability.

Credibility and the Political Use of Military Force. By placing the historical evidence within the analytic framework outlining the justification for presidential concern with credibility, I conclude that presidents must be concerned about maintaining the survival of the

United States and their political careers, and furthermore, that this consideration largely shapes their foreign policy decisions along with the desire to prevent war. It remains to be seen, therefore, precisely the manner in which the goal of preserving credibility affects decision making related to the political use of military force. This process is outlined below.

That American presidents have assiduously cultivated credibility to contain communism and succeed in office has already been demonstrated. The identification of the point at which presidents feel credibility has been sufficiently threatened to require action has not yet been achieved. Deterrence theory scholars (George and Smoke, 1974; Hoffman, 1978; Kaufman, 1955; Schelling, 1966) argue that there is an interdependence of U.S. commitments such that a threat to one is a threat to all. Thus, each challenge to the nation's reputation ought to be sufficient to necessitate a use of force if only to prevent its credibility from unraveling. These scholars have generally not taken into consideration the political context in which decisions regarding the upholding of commitments and the use of force are made (Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 1985, p. 130). Rather than studying deterrence and American foreign policy as dependent upon the credibility of every commitment everywhere, I seek to demonstrate that there is a political context within which decisions regarding the use of force are made.

Because the U.S. does not have the domestic and international support, time, money, or the military hardware to respond to every international crisis which might remotely threaten its reputation, presidents do not feel bound to respond with force whenever an opportunity arises. Presidents are not beholden to the requirements of classical deterrence theory wherein each threat is theoretically equal to all others. Rather their decisions are influenced by the particular exigencies of domestic

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and international conditions and the availability of the appropriate means for taking action. Since presidents' dominant interest is the preservation of domestic and international credibility, this dissertation hypothesizes that presidents become more likely to use force the greater the probability that credibility is at stake. Given an opportunity to use force, presidents deploy the military only when they perceive that their or the nation's reputation for using force may be damaged through inaction. Thus, they act when conditions arise which take them out of their desired state (i.e., Ashby's definition of survival).

Presidents must be selective about the circumstances under which they decide to deploy the military. Therefore, they ought to be most interested in using force in those areas where foreign and domestic actors are most likely to be watching and drawing inferences about future U.S. inclination to use force and presidential toughness. For example, an unwillingness to use force to defend West Berlin (a very visible symbol of Western resistance to communism) would likely indicate that the U.S. was unwilling not only to use force in areas of similar importance, but also in areas of lesser importance. There would likely be tremendous international and domestic fallout from a failure to respond to communist provocations in such regions. Conversely, there would be little incentive to use force in regions which had attracted minimal prior attention, (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa during much of the Cold War) since there would be little likelihood that other nations would make any inferences regarding the probability of U.S. action in areas of greater geo-strategic significance.

Thus, if presidents must make an investment in reputation and if, as was argued previously, presidents cannot make investments in all places and at all times, they will make investments and deter aggression

when and where it will make the greatest impact. Therefore, presidents will be most likely to establish credibility and use force in areas and states where foreign observers and the American public will be most likely to be watching the American response. This not only ensures that American interests will be defended in such areas, but that the display of force will find its widest possible audience. Furthermore, the more likely that U.S. behavior is monitored, the more likely presidents feel compelled to respond to protect American credibility. Those factors which are most likely to lead foreign and domestic audiences to monitor presidential behavior are examined in Chapter Four.

Given the preceding discussion, presidents view the survival of the United States and the survival of their own political careers with the preservation of credibility. Furthermore, presidents believe that they must act forcefully to preserve the credibility of American willingness to use force. Gaddis's analysis of the perceptions of the National Security Council during the Truman administration is instructive. He writes that the members believed that "World order, and with it, American security, had come to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what the balance actually was" (1982, p. 92). Presidents have felt that if they did not demonstrate a credible willingness to use force, first the perception of American power and then the power itself would begin to diminish rapidly. Thus, one of the most significant contributions this dissertation should make to the study of American foreign policy is to demonstrate that concern over credibility has become more important than other more concrete, "realist" definitions of U.S. interests. And, the tool of choice in the quest to preserve credibility has been the political use of military force. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: When the president believes that the credibility of American willingness to use force is threatened, the probability of a use of force and a high level use of force increase.

The Prevention of War and Survival

The second enduring and fundamental goal presidents have pursued to ensure survival is the prevention of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. When opportunities to use force arise, presidents are aware that the possibility of war and especially war with the Soviet Union may exist. Therefore, although at times the preservation of credibility has assumed greater importance (for reasons which will be explained later), the avoidance of superpower war has been an enduring feature of Cold War conduct. To understand fully the manner in which presidents use or avoid using military force, this objective must be explored.

The avoidance of superpower war has been one of the few fundamental and consistently adhered to goals of all American presidents during the Cold War (Walt, 1986; Johnson, 1986; George, Farley and Dallin, 1988). Presidents fear that once a military confrontation between the superpowers begins, events might rapidly spiral out of their control (Allison, 1971; Freedman, 1986). They have furthermore believed that if war begins, ultimately U.S. conventional inferiority or the dynamics of escalation would lead to the introduction of nuclear weapons. Such a war would not only destroy the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but most of their allies as well. Therefore the actual physical survival of the U.S. depends on avoiding war with the U.S.S.R. It is the prospect of war presidents confront when making decisions regarding the use of force that is the potential cost and risk alluded to in Chapter Two. This leads to the third principle of survival:

Principle 1C -- Survival: For presidents, survival requires that war with the Soviet Union be avoided.

The more complex issue has been the manner in which the superpowers have tried to avoid a war which they greatly fear while simultaneously pursuing incompatible foreign-policy goals. The dynamics of this process must be explored next to show how it effects presidents' decisions regarding the use of force.

From Harry Truman through George Bush, American presidents have wrestled with the twin desires to act cautiously to prevent superpower war and to appear strong and resolute. Both superpowers have attempted through the use of military force to demonstrate their power and protect interests, while at the same time they have tried to reduce the possibility of a superpower military conflict. In reality it is the mutual recognition of a multitude of incompatible policies and outlooks on the international system which have forced the superpowers to manage their competition. Alexander George points out that:

Great powers have always attempted to find ways of regulating their rivalry in order to control its costs and risks. In the modern era it is particularly the specter of thermonuclear holocaust that has forced the superpowers to recognize that outcomes of vital importance to each are influenced not merely by one's own policies and actions nor merely by the other's behavior, but also by the nature of the interaction between them (1988, p. 644).

There are numerous examples of agreements both formal and tacit which the superpowers have adhered to that belie their commitment to the prevention of military confrontation. A brief review of these agreements should support this argument.

In George, Farley and Dallin's U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, Barry Blechman describes a variety of superpower arrangements aimed at reducing the risk of war. Among these are agreements intended to reduce the risk of conflicts resulting from military forces in Europe, (e.g.,

the Helsinki Accords and follow-up negotiations in Stockholm in 1986), agreements designed to improve communication links between the superpowers (e.g., the Hotline, and establishment of nuclear risk centers), agreements intended to reduce the possibility of confrontation on the high seas, (e.g., the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas), and agreements intended to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, (the 1971, "Accidents Agreement"). These arrangements all showcase areas of mutual interest where the superpowers attempt to practice feasible and politically desirable restraint. Whether it is termed "peaceful coexistence" or some other diplomatic phrase, in the words of Alexander George, both superpowers have attached, "major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations" (1988, p. 668).

While formal agreements have often only codified arrangements already observed in practice, informal tacit measures have often played a significant role in regulating superpower competition. Osgood and Tucker (1970) and George (1988) have shown that tacit superpower rules of cooperation exist which discourage meddling in areas of vital interest and reduce the risk of war. Alexander George terms these, "basic rules of prudence in U.S.-Soviet relations" (1988). The first of these is that neither superpower shall initiate military action against the forces of the other superpower. Several corollaries follow from this:

- 1) neither superpower shall exploit its advantage in a crisis to impose on the other a policy dilemma between backing down in defeat or desperately initiating the use of force (e.g. the Cuban Missile Crisis);
- 2) each superpower shall operate with great restraint in its policies and actions toward areas of vital interest to the other superpower";
- 3) "neither superpower shall permit a regional ally to drag it into a

confrontation or shooting war with the other superpower, and finally; 4) each superpower shall accept military intervention by the other superpower in a regional conflict if such intervention becomes necessary to prevent the overwhelming defeat of a regional ally" (George, 1988). Taken together, these rules of prudence set the parameters for acceptable superpower action thereby serving not only to prevent confrontation, but also formalize spheres of influence and prevent most challenges to them.

For example, the United States has generally acted with a great deal of restraint when the Soviet Union was deploying military forces in its satellite states. Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were greeted with diplomatic rather than artillery salvos, as were threatened interventions in East Germany and Poland. Similarly the Soviet Union has avoided directly challenging U.S. military hegemony in Latin America (the invasions of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama), American escalation in the Vietnam War (the bombing of Cambodia and the bombing and mining of Hanoi and Haiphong). As Gaddis (1987) points out, in the Cold War, the superpowers have navigated through many crises which in earlier times would have quickly escalated into major power war. Hence in order to encourage Soviet restraint in U.S. spheres of influence, and to reduce the probability of military encounters, presidents customarily avoid using armed forces where the Soviets are using their military or in areas of Soviet hegemony where the U.S.S.R. is maintaining a permanent military presence. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: When the Soviet Union deploys its military such that the president believes a Soviet-American military confrontation is possible, the probability of a use of force and a high level use of force decrease.

Yet, there exists a fundamental incompatibility between the desire to act to preserve credibility and the need to not act to prevent war. This is the type of conundrum referred to by Steinbruner as a value tradeoff. It was argued in Chapter Two that one strategy individuals might adopt to resolve this dilemma involved the pursuance of both strategies separately and the realization of each value at different times. Therefore, although presidents may examine the potential for both threats materializing, the cybernetic/cognitive would suggest that their response is designed to address only one of these threats. To determine which threat is the more urgent requires understanding presidents' calculations when they are confronted with an opportunity to use force. A president must be able to determine if action is required regardless of the risk of war. Because presidents do have a preference for action when using force (Ostrom and Job, 1986), the issue is not if but when a use of military force is necessary. The president must determine at what point a Soviet threat is so egregious, that a decision not to use force would almost surely set the U.S. on a course whose terminus would be the end of American security. Under these circumstances, a decision to use force might threaten American survival immediately, but a decision not to use force would almost surely threaten long-term American survival.

In fact, presidents have demonstrated that there are some situations where the threat to credibility is so critical that the lack of a strong military response would irreparably damage the power and prestige of both the president and the United States. While it may be important to avoid war, ultimately long-term security depends on constant vigilance against aggression. Thus, although presidents have generally acted with a fair amount of caution and restraint when dealing with the Soviets, they have also made it clear that they are willing to escalate

crises over matters they believe to be of vital interest. U.S. behavior during the 1948 Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1973 Mideast War all show that presidents believe that it is better to fight rather than flee.

Since a decision to respond to a Soviet use of force in kind implies an extreme threat to survival, only those situations where American interests are most vitally effected will require such action. Therefore, when the Soviet use of force is directed at areas where American interests are most pronounced, the probability of a use of force ought to increase. This idea will be elaborated on in greater detail and developed into a hypothesis in Chapter Four.

The Availability of Means and Survival

As was mentioned in Chapter Two, individuals must take into consideration the availability of the appropriate means for meeting a survival threat before action can be taken. In the context of presidential decisions regarding the use of force this I refer to this concern as the feasibility of military operations. The feasibility of military operations is defined as the president's perception of the physical difficulties involved in deploying the military. Presidents must be aware of the military's ability to respond to crises with the appropriate forces and in a timely fashion. The development of a reputation for using force necessitates that presidents possess a military capability. The president's ability to maintain survival would be severely compromised were he not able to determine the feasibility of carrying out various operations. Furthermore, the feasibility of operations determines the probability the military will be able to successfully carry out their assigned duties. An operation might still fail because foreign actors are not sufficiently influenced by the display of force, but without the

initial probability of success, many operations may not be attempted at all. Therefore, knowledge of the feasibility of military operations is essential to presidents' decision-making process. This leads to the following survival principle and hypothesis:

Principle 1D -- Preservation of credibility and prevention of war necessitates presidential knowledge of the availability of means to meet threats.

Hypothesis 3: As the availability of means to meet threats becomes greater, the probability of a use of force and a high level use of force increase.

Decision Making Across Presidencies

The concern for credibility and the prevention of war have had important consequences on the manner in which presidents make their decisions. In fact, cognitive theories (Steinbruner, 1974; Jervis, 1976) have demonstrated that beliefs affect the decision-making process in many ways. Thus, the principle of cybernetic/cognitive decision making regarding the role of belief systems may now be elaborated upon. This leads to the following statement:

Principle 2 -- Belief Systems: The president's belief in the importance of credibility, the prevention of war and the availability of means structures his interpretation and routinizes his utilization of information.

As described in Chapter Two, presidents are assumed to maintain a belief system which aids them in organizing information, coping with complexity and facilitating choice. This belief system may now be understood as centering around the importance of preserving credibility and preventing war. The impact of a belief system structured by these concerns influences decisions regarding the political use of military force in a

variety of ways.

First, presidents may seek out information which alerts them to the possibility of a challenge to U.S. credibility, making it more likely they will perceive such threats. Because this information is so vitally important, presidents are especially sensitive to any indication that survival is in any way threatened. At the first sign of a threat to credibility, presidents are likely to act. For example, since few politicians have been punished for overestimating the communist threat, presidents are alert to even low-level Soviet moves to gain friends in the Third World (e.g., Guatemala, 1954; Grenada, 1983). Such sensitivity to threats to credibility makes it more likely that presidents' attention is directed toward events which might resemble such threats. As George argues, "the individual's beliefs...are active agents in determining what he attends to and how he evaluates it" (1980, p. 57). Heightened awareness may likely lead to an increasing number of opportunities to use force.

Presidents are also apt to interpret information according to the perceptions which dominate their belief systems (i.e., the process of consistency). The concern for credibility tends to dominate perceptions because it is so important. Hence, international developments which presidents find unpleasant or dangerous are likely to be perceived as threats to credibility even though other interpretations may be equally plausible. Nationalism, non-alignment, and the quest for economic sovereignty have all been interpreted as evidence of either anti-Americanism or communist subversion and therefore, possible threats to credibility. As Tillema writes "...it is true that in international politics every situation is different, but in the resort to force, American policy-makers have treated each new situation in the same manner as earlier ones" (1973, p. 179). In construing events to fit with

their established conceptions, presidents may create threats to credibility, and therefore opportunities to use force. Interpreting the event as a threat to credibility might further justify, to the president, a forceful U.S. response. Given that the concern for credibility is widely shared among policy makers and has generally proven to be a reliable guide for foreign policy, the creation or enlargement of threats to it among various administrations is likely.

Lastly, their belief systems significantly predispose presidents to respond in particular ways in order to maintain survival. When presidents find evidence that an opportunity presents a threat to credibility or of war, they require little further information to induce them to act (in the case of credibility) or not act (in the case of possible Soviet-American confrontation). For example, Tillema, (1973) and Brands (1987) have shown that presidents have been quite willing to use military force to bolster U.S. credibility and friendly regimes on the basis of scant evidence from the field that little threat existed (Lebanon, 1958; Dominican Republic, 1965; Grenada, 1983). Ole Holsti's study of John Foster Dulles demonstrated that the late Secretary of State maintained a remarkably rigid perception of Soviet intentions and behavior which led him to respond to Soviet initiatives in a rather predictable manner. Similarly, when confronted with threats to survival goals, presidents need to take action given the emphasis placed upon the achievement of these goals. A failure to act might undermine the utility and desirability of the whole belief system, as well as endanger survival. Thus, maintenance of the belief system itself encourages certain behaviors.

Therefore, because of the similarity of presidents' belief systems and because these beliefs homogenize the interpretation and utilization of information in much the same way across administrations, presidents

are likely to behave in largely similar ways toward survival threats. All presidents have been confronted with these same types of threats from the Soviets and other communists. The locations of crises and the superpower proxies may change, but the preservation or credibility and the prevention of war have remained constant if only because they are such fundamental survival goals. Furthermore, while personality and other idiosyncratic factors may create subtle shifts in diplomatic language and pronouncements, it is the responsibilities of the office of the presidency which shape the behavior of the men who occupy it, not vice versa. We should find that holding all other factors constant, regardless of the occupant of the White House, presidents use military force with approximately the same degree of probability. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: There are no significant differences in the propensity of presidents to use force and high levels of force.

Summary

I argue that presidents examine the threat to credibility to determine if the country's and his own reputation might be endangered through inaction. The president determines the extent of the threat to credibility by determining the likelihood that foreign actors and the American public will adjust their perception of the president's will to use force based upon his response in the immediate situation.

Presidents also seek to discover if there is a possibility of Soviet-American military confrontation during an international crisis. If there is, presidents will generally shy away from using force. When the Soviets challenge vital American interests, however, presidents generally have opted to meet the threat to credibility rather than avoid

the threat of war. I also argue that presidents must be aware of the feasibility of undertaking military operations before making a final decision.

Because the concern for credibility and the prevention of war are so important to presidents, they will likely affect their decisions regarding the use of force in similar ways. Therefore, we ought to find that presidents behave in much the same way when confronted with an opportunity to use force. And because the concern for credibility and the prevention of war have been such enduring and fundamental goals of American foreign policy, we may conclude that presidents associate their attainment with maintaining a highly desired survival state.

In Chapter Two a general model of cybernetic/cognitive decision making was advanced and represented in Equation 2. The work in this chapter may be encapsulated in Equation 3 representing presidents' decision-making process regarding the use of force:

$$p(ITC) + p(DTC) + p(F) - p(TW) > h \quad [3]$$

I hypothesize that presidents' decisions are based upon the probability of an international threat to credibility, (ITC), plus the probability of a threat to credibility domestically, (DTC), and the probability that a military operation is feasible, (F), minus the probability of a threat of war, (TW). If after weighing these factors the president finds that the need to take action is greater than a survival threshold, *h*, beyond which he and the nation cannot endure, he ought to use force. The manner in which I operationalize these terms is described in chapters Four and Five.

Chapter 4: Essential Information and the Decision to Use Military Force

Introduction

American presidents have become fixated upon deterring and meeting challenges to credibility and preventing war with the Soviet Union. Therefore, in order to predict when presidents employ military force, the circumstances under which presidents come to believe these concerns are threatened must be specified. It is hypothesized that the level of superpower military involvement and American public pressure are prominent factors utilized by presidents in determining the extent to which American credibility is being threatened and the possibility of war. Furthermore, presidents must also be aware of the feasibility of carrying out military operations before they can meet survival threats. Knowledge of this information is then equally essential. The specific aims of this chapter are to describe presidents' two decisions regarding the use of force, analyze the role of essential information as it relates to superpower military involvement, American public pressure and the feasibility of military operations, predict the propensity of the president to use force and high force levels, and to advance several propositions associated with these relationships.

Presidents' Decisions

This dissertation argues that presidents consider their choices in a hierarchical fashion. First, presidents must decide whether or not to use the military for political purposes. Only after this decision has been reached can the president consider what type of military option is the most attractive. While some might argue that the president may

evaluate all his choices simultaneously and simply determine the level of force appropriate for the occasion, there are two important reasons for believing presidents will behave otherwise. As was stated previously, because of the tremendous stakes and risks involved in using the military, presidents tend to view this option as separate and unique. Therefore, presidents perceive opportunities first and foremost according to the desirability of a use of military force. Secondly, the consideration of a multitude of options simultaneously would impose great demands on the president's cognitive ability to determine the congruence between a particular type of response and the threat he perceives. Therefore, presidents make a decision regarding the use of force first and then decide upon the appropriate level of force.

Credibility and Opportunities to Use Force. As was argued in Chapter One, one of the principal problems with many models in this field was their lack of a notion of opportunity from which to predict international conflict. Quarterly time intervals and windows of opportunity stretching over several years are too vaguely defined to realistically reflect presidents' decision-making environment. International situations precipitate the use of force, not arbitrarily defined periods of time. Specification of the circumstances under which presidents actually make decisions is necessary to understand and predict when they prefer action over inaction. Therefore, this dissertation's identification and utilization of a set of opportunities to use force represents a significant advance in the field of quantitative international relations. I attempt to capture the circumstances surrounding international crises so that all the appropriate international as well as domestic forces may impinge on the president's decision-making process. Such an effort should provide us with a more practical and

justifiable conceptualization of the decision-making environment.

I hypothesize that the concern for credibility leads presidents to determine the severity of a survival threat according to the perceived likelihood that foreign decision makers or the American public will re-evaluate their perception of U.S. will to use force based upon the president's response during some international crisis. Such events are considered opportunities to use force and the manner in which they are to be identified must be addressed next.

Opportunities to use force are defined as those situations in which it can reasonably be assumed that the president considered the use of military force as a policy option where he believed there to be evidence of a threat to his or the nation's credibility. The opportunities to use force under consideration all share the common property of events which seemed likely to attract the president's attention. This does not imply that there was in every case ample evidence of a threat to credibility, only that the events were of such magnitude that there is reason to believe the president perceived a threat. The criteria which were used to define and identify international events likely to be perceived as containing such threats are borrowed from Job and Ostrom (1986):

- 1) the situation involved a perceived current threat to the territorial security of the U.S., its current allies, major clients or proxy states;
- 2) the situation posed a perceived danger to U.S. government, military or diplomatic personnel; to significant numbers of U.S. citizens or to U.S. assets;
- 3) events were perceived as having led, or likely to lead to advances by ideologically committed opponents of the U.S. (i.e., communists or "extreme leftists" broadly defined) be they states, regimes or regime contenders;
- 4) events were perceived as likely to lead to losses of U.S. influence in regions perceived as within the U.S. sphere of

influence, especially viewed as Central and South America;

5) events involved inter-state military conflict of potential consequence; in human and strategic terms; or events, because of civil disorder, threatened destruction of substantial number of persons (1986, p. 10).

Job and Ostrom justify this set of events as worthy of inclusion in the data set because they are generalized to be a "syndrome of characteristics commonly found in use of force situations" (p. 9). That is, attributes of situations where presidents used force in the past as defined by Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Zelikow (1986) were used as the search criteria for opportunities to use force from 1948 through 1984. Thus by generalizing from these characteristics backward and forward across time and nations they were able to construct a data set of events which contains both opportunities to use force and uses of forces. This method of "criterion matching" was one of several which might have been employed to justify the search for and inclusion of events in the data, but it is the most empirically defensible.

One possible alternative to criterion matching is to examine the historical record to determine what nations and events U.S. presidents and foreign policy leaders ante facto identified as being of vital interest to the United States. These situations would then define opportunities to use force. Historical induction, however, is fraught with numerous complications. First, as Job and Ostrom note, such a methodology poses a seductive trap: "U.S. interests are what U.S. decision makers perceive them to be from moment to moment" (1986, p. 9). Interests and opportunities end up defining one another. Thus, a lack of permanently defined interests precludes establishing search criteria which are not dependent upon the nature of each, individual opportunity. Secondly, the historical record is littered with examples of presidents

declaring one policy while following another. Dean Acheson's declaration of a Far East defense perimeter excluding South Korea, U.S. denial of military involvement in Guatemala in 1954, the Reagan policy of no deal-making with terrorists are all part of a common trend of incongruity between declared and actual policy. Thus, while the historical record can provide clues to determine which events threaten American interests, it does not provide the explicit guidance an empirically justifiable methodology requires.

A second alternative is to utilize the work of other researchers and data sets to build a new classification of opportunities to use force. Unfortunately, much of the work in international conflict has examined only those events which were likely to lead to war, rather than a limited use of force. While some of these events undoubtedly merit inclusion in this data set, the data collected by Singer and Small, Butterworth and others generally and properly so ignores many minor events which lead to political uses of military force (e.g., military coups in Third World nations, isolated attacks on U.S. military personnel, etc.). Therefore, while the information in these events can be used to check for and demonstrate the generalizability of the opportunity data set, it cannot provide a complete picture of all international events likely to be of interest to U.S. foreign policy makers.

Criterion matching which is utilized in this dissertation is the most empirically justifiable method for creating an opportunity data set. By specifying a set of conditions under which uses of force may occur, the search criteria are not complicated by the alterations and inconsistencies of American foreign policy and the incomplete definitions of other data sets. While this methodology appears to reduce the probability of making errors of commission, the possibility of errors of omission cannot be overlooked. The criterion derived from the actual

uses of force may not provide an all-inclusive list of events which may contain evidence of threats to credibility. There are no satisfactory solutions to this dilemma, however, since no matter what methodology is chosen there is always the possibility that a use of force was considered under highly peculiar and/or secret conditions. Therefore, the choice was made to risk the possibility that events worthy of being considered opportunities were excluded rather than including a plethora of generally unimportant events in order to reduce the probability of making errors of exclusion.

The challenge for the researcher lies in determining exactly where and when these threats are present. Using the method of criterion matching as formulated by Ostrom and Job, five types of international events were specified and the historical record examined for their occurrence. The Ostrom and Job opportunity data set begins in 1948. The Blechman and Kaplan data set runs through 1976 while the Zelikow data set extends the information on uses of force through 1984. Thus, the data set I employ including both information on opportunities and uses of force begins in 1948 and runs through 1984. 412 situations were found which satisfied the Job and Ostrom criteria--these opportunities constitute the unit of analysis for the dissertation. Information was collected on the specific events, actors and military action surrounding opportunities. Additional information on domestic political conditions was also collected by the author or borrowed from other data sets.

In order to better acquaint the reader with this research it would be instructive to describe the opportunities to use force in greater detail. Opportunities to use force may be divided up into five different categories of events. First there are actions taken by governmental or non-governmental actors regarding U.S. military forces, government personnel, civilians, property or economic assets. For

example, Fidel Castro's nationalization of American business in Cuba in the early 1960's, North Korea's capture of the U.S. Pueblo or the Iranian takeover of the U.S. embassy in 1980 all fall under this type of opportunity to use force. Second there are intrastate events such as civil strife, guerrilla warfare or military coups. The riots in Columbia in 1948, the various insurgency movements in Vietnam, Laos, Nicaragua and other nations and the military coups in Brazil (1964), South Korea (1960) and Chile (1973) are all examples of intra-state conflicts which presidents might view as threatening to U.S. interests. Third there are minor and major violent inter-state disputes such as wars or border skirmishes. The clashes between Soviet and PRC forces along the Usuri River, the strife between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Iran-Iraq war fall into this category. Fourth, there are non-violent disputes between states such as the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba and disagreements concerning the status of Berlin. Finally there are situations in which the United States disagrees with cooperative policies adopted by its adversaries, such as the Czechoslovakian transfer of arms to Guatemala in 1954.

Each region of the world has been the site of numerous opportunities. The Middle East has been the site of the most opportunities, (106 and 25.7 percent of the 412 cases) and South Asia the least, (14 and 3.4 percent of the sample). The breakdown of opportunities among the other regions is as follows: Central America (84, 20.4%), South America (39, 9.5%), Western Europe (26, 6.3%), Eastern Europe (21, 5.1), Sub-Saharan Africa (40, 9.7%), Southeast Asia (53, 12.9%) and East Asia (29, 7.0%). When examining the distribution of opportunities across administrations it can be seen that some presidents have been confronted with more opportunities than others. The breakdown is as follows: Truman (40, 9.7%), Eisenhower (82, 19.9%), Kennedy (52

(12.6), Johnson (65, 15.8%), Nixon (51, 12.4%), Ford (23, 5.6%), Carter (26, 6.3%) and Reagan (73, 17.7%). The late 1950's and early 1960's in particular witnessed a great deal of upheaval as many new states came into existence and presented presidents with a multitude of intra and inter-state conflicts with which to contend. Conversely, the world appears to have been a quieter place for Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter than their predecessors.

It is important to remember, however, that presidents are hypothesized to behave in similar ways when confronted with opportunities to use force. So while one president may be forced to make more decisions, we should find that other presidents in his place would treat the crisis in a comparable fashion. Thus, the use of opportunities as the units of analysis will allow me to test this hypothesis.

The Use of Force Decision. When examining an opportunity to use force, presidents must first determine if the threat to credibility is sufficient, the necessary resources available and the threat of war negligible enough to warrant a use of force. A political use of military force then is defined as occurring "when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence or to be prepared to influence"... (in a non-cooperative manner) specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence" (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978, p. 12). This definition, although largely taken from Blechman and Kaplan, excludes cooperative uses of force, such as friendly visits to foreign ports. The uses of force include displays of strength, military exercises, the transportation of equipment or foreign armies, naval blockades, the use

of firepower, ground invasions, interposition of military forces between foreign armies, and demonstrations of the right of transit. For a more detailed description of the military operations and their variation across time and region the reader is referred to the original studies by Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Zelikow (1986).

The Force Level Decision. The level of force presidents use should have a great bearing on the visibility and impact of the message they are sending to allies and adversaries about U.S. credibility. The more substantial, dedicated or noticeable the response, the more likely other states may infer substantial U.S. interest in such situations. Conversely, a weak or low-level response may be taken as evidence of American timidity or lack of commitment. How presidents choose to respond to situations in which they decide to use the military may greatly affect the success of these missions, and relations with the states involved, key allies, and the U.S. public. They are aware that the idea of success is ambiguous and subjective among political actors and the public. When the image of strength and commitment become overriding foreign policy objectives, any military show of force which does not exude these qualities may be judged lacking. The appearance of strength will help create an image of strength which in turn will increase the likelihood of success. As Graham Allison demonstrates in Essence of Decision, the selection of a military option was probably the most important decision facing JFK during the Cuban missile crisis (1971, pgs. 208, 214). Therefore, not only have presidents been interested in this decision, they have also realized the importance of their force level choice on the preservation of credibility and the prevention of war.

Presidents have control over two elements of the military

deployment which can increase the visibility of the show of force: the force size and force style (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978). Force size refers to the quantity of military components, while force style refers to the type of military activity--direct or indirect intervention.

Force size includes: 1) a **major** force component defined as one of the following: "a) a ground combat force larger than one battalion, b) a naval force at least as large as two aircraft carriers or battleship task groups, c) a land based, combat air force at least as large as one wing.", 2) a **standard** force component, defined as one of the following:, " a) a ground force larger than one company, but not larger than one battalion, b) one aircraft carrier or battleship task group, c) a combat air force at least the size of one squadron, but less than one wing." and 3) a **minor** force component, defined as "a non-nuclear capable force of any type which does not meet the definition of a major or standard force component" (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978 p. 50).

The notion of force style is somewhat more subjective, although both Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Zelikow (1986) have created useful definitions of the missions the U.S. armed forces are charged with carrying out. They divide these into manifest and latent military missions. When U.S. forces are engaged in manifestly military operations they assume an active role in crisis resolution by becoming a participant rather than just an observer in a situation. Manifest missions include: movement of military equipment or forces to a target, movement of the target itself, evacuation, use of firepower, emplacement of ground forces, imposition, exercise, or blockade as defined by Blechman and Kaplan. When the U.S. military are employed in a latent manner their role is one of a monitor providing a presence or surveillance. The military deployment can influence crisis resolution chiefly by the effect of its presence on the perceptions of the other actors involved.

Latent missions consist of: providing U.S. presence, patrol, reconnaissance, and demonstration as defined by Blechman and Kaplan.

These two characteristics are highly interdependent since the style of an operation may often require a particular quantity of force (e.g., an active attempt to assert control over another nation's affairs would likely require a sizable number of troops). Similarly, a large size use of force is more likely to imply an attempt to become directly involved in some intra or inter-state dispute. Because these two aspects of the visibility of a use of force are so intertwined and reinforcing, I assume that deliberation concerning one decision necessarily involves the other. Therefore, the president's decision on this subject is assumed to be consolidated into one force-level choice. The force level thus concerns both the amount of force used and the manner in which it is deployed.

Just as I argue presidents monitor essential information in terms of gross distinctions, I also assume they examine force levels in a similar fashion. I maintain that presidents make one simple distinction between high and low levels of force. A high level use of force is assumed to consist of any major or manifest use of force while a low level use of force is assumed to consist of a standard, minor or latent use of force which is not a major or manifest use of force.

There are several reason for believing that presidents consider manifest or major uses of force as separate and distinct from latent and minor uses of force. Major or manifest uses of force are the most likely to attract a great deal of attention and effect crisis outcomes. Major uses of force represent the greatest possible display of American military power while manifest uses announce forthright American participation. The substantial time and effort required to deploy a major use of force make it a substantially different type of undertaking than a

minor display of force. Similarly, a manifest use demands a much greater degree of commitment and concerted effort than a mere display of military hardware. Furthermore, a large-scale deployment or active intervention is likely to commit American and presidential credibility while small-scale uses of force deployed away from the crisis hotspot are not nearly as unalterable.

In the force-level decision as well as the decision to use force, there is every reason to believe the preservation of credibility and the prevention of war have had the greatest influence on the president's choice. First, since the decision to use force and the force-level decision are interdependent, the dominant factors in one decision should be influential in the other. Second, because the nature of the response is also important in communicating U.S. intentions, the same factors ought to be influential in both decisions. Finally, because presidents as cybernetic/cognitive decision makers are assumed to engage in a limited search of their environment, there is little reason to engage in two searches since the interdependence of the two decisions implies that factors in one decision ought to be influential in the other. Therefore, while the use of force and force-level decisions are considered separately, I hypothesize that presidents examine the same information in each.

Essential Information and the Decision to Use Military Force

In Chapter Three, it was hypothesized that presidents are motivated by four survival principles. These principles involve: 1) the need to maintain credibility internationally, 2) the need to maintain credibility domestically, 3) the need to prevent superpower war, and 4) the need to be cognizant of the availability of means. In accordance with the cybernetic/cognitive theory of decision making, only that

information which directly impinges on these principles is employed to reach a decision. This leads to the following principle:

Principle 3 - Essential Information/Bounded Rationality:
Presidents generally monitor and utilize only information which bears upon their four principles of survival.

As was mentioned in Chapter Two, the cybernetic/cognitive decision maker employs a series of decision premises which guide his actions. The input for these premises are the pieces of essential information which the decision maker regularly monitors. Essential information provides a reliable guide for the decision maker when he must determine what type of action is necessary to promote survival. Furthermore, because of demands upon the decision maker and the availability of information, his search of the environment for essential data will be limited--the president operates as a boundedly rational decision maker. Therefore, there must be some compelling logic in his selection of essential information--it must bear directly on the survival goal. For this dissertation, the presidents' selection of essential information is organized around their survival goals. The essential information must alert the president to a threat to the credibility of the United States internationally, a threat to his reputation domestically, the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, or relate to the availability of means. Each piece of essential information is utilized in a decision premise related to these four survival goals. The president evaluates the status of each piece of essential information to determine whether or not the desirability of a use of force ought to increase. Next, I describe how presidents determine what types of information are essential for their survival and the decision premises (organized as operational hypotheses) they utilize when determining the desirability of

using force.

Superpower Involvement, U.S. Credibility and the Prevention of War

It was argued in Chapter Three that presidents believe the greater the attention given to an international crisis, the more likely the president's response would be scrutinized in order to predict U.S. actions in the future. They realize that it is neither possible nor desirable to make the probability of a military response in all opportunities great enough to deter all potential aggressors and convince the public of their toughness. Thus, presidents are more likely to use force the greater the likelihood that other nations and the American public will be watching and drawing inferences about U.S. credibility.

I hypothesize first that presidents use the level of superpower military involvement in an opportunity to use force to ascertain the likelihood that other nations are watching their behavior. That is, the more the United States and/or the Soviet Union pour their military resources into a nation, the more likely it is that the communists and other states will be evaluating the U.S. response when a crisis in that state occurs. Involvement enlarges the stakes and causes the possibility of damage to American credibility in the event of presidential inaction to increase; thus it enhances the probability that presidents use the military to demonstrate the credibility of U.S. commitments.

Since it is the credibility of the U.S. will to use force and the probability of war with which domestic and foreign decision makers are concerned, the level of military involvement should accurately indicate the degree of the U.S. commitment to defend and the Soviet/communist threat to this commitment. While there are many possible indicators of superpower involvement, it is critical to select those which are most

salient in the Cold War. For instance, while the level of trade between two nations would reflect the presence of ties between the states, it may not indicate the nature or depth of those ties. Trade with Korea and Vietnam was negligible before the U.S. became involved in military conflicts there. Conversely, military involvement connotes much more evidence of strong and deep ties since it visibly demonstrates a desire on the part of the United States to defend or extend its involvement. It is a concrete and fairly reliable signal of American or Soviet commitment and intention which foreign actors can use as a guide to superpower interest. For the preceding reasons, then, military involvement in general is utilized as the most practical and effective indicator of the extent to which presidents believe credibility and the possibility of war may be at stake in an opportunity to use force.

I also hypothesize that presidents make a distinction between cases in which Soviet involvement represents a threat to American credibility and those in which Soviet involvement is so formidable as to dramatically inflate the likelihood of military confrontation should the president elect to use force. Specifically, when the U.S.S.R. is either already using force in a state or region or has permanently deployed its military (e.g., Eastern Europe), presidents will not want to risk superpower confrontation and will shy away from crises in these areas. Thus, I hypothesize that presidents employ the level of military involvement to both gauge the threat to credibility internationally and the possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The different types of superpower involvement are outlined and their importance in presidents' decision-making process explicated below.

Superpower military involvement is defined as the extent to which either superpower has been or is utilizing military resources to further its influence in a particular state or region. It is measured by

current or past U.S. involvement including: 1) an established military presence, 2) the furnishing of military aid to some state or organization, or 3) a prior use of force; and/or Soviet involvement including 4a) a current use of force, 4b) permanent military presence or 5) the furnishing of military aid to some state or organization. Since the importance of a prior U.S. use of force concerns the precedent it sets for presidents, a Soviet prior use of force cannot have the same type of effect, and hence is not included as an indicator of involvement.

U.S. Involvement

The level of current or past U.S. involvement in an area signals to the president the degree of investment or sunk costs the American government has in some state or organization. Presidents are assumed to believe this involvement alerts foreign actors to monitor events taking place in such areas. Johnson (1984) and Gelb and Betts (1979) both persuasively argue that as the U.S. projects more of its resources into some state, the value of that state grows in the eyes of decision makers. Johnson (1984) argues as well that even when presidents verbally declare some event to be a threat to U.S. credibility they have committed the U.S. to that situation. Presidents operate under the assumption that a failure to maintain U.S. influence in areas where it has invested a great deal of wealth and energy will signal an unwillingness to defend other states which have received similar and lesser amounts of resources. "According to the doctrine of credibility, the president himself was the universal link; he bound all parts together, for wherever he involved himself he placed the credibility of the United States at stake" (Schell, 1976, p. 384). Therefore, progressive levels of involvement should increase the probability of a use of force since presidents believe allies and enemies will be making generalizations

about future U.S. behavior based on the current will to defend U.S. influence. This information becomes essential in the preservation of the survival goals. The different types of U.S. military involvement are described below.

U.S. Military Presence. The first and most important indicators of U.S. involvement are the existence of U.S. military bases or a high level use of force in the recent past. Each are considered to constitute an established U.S. military presence. Military bases are very powerful and visible marks of one nation's status in another (Harkavey, 1989). Instability in countries hosting a large-scale military presence almost necessarily involves the United States since often times a formal alliance exists between the U.S. and these states (e.g., West Germany, South Korea, Japan). At other times the U.S. military is the target itself of local agitation (e.g., Cuba, Panama, the Phillipines). Presidents have also often found their allies to be rather insecure and in need of constant reassurance about the credibility of U.S. commitments (Hoffman, 1978; Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 1981), further encouraging them to take forceful action. Finally, not only does a military presence signify an especially close relationship between the host country and the United States, a visible military presence also demonstrates that the United States is necessarily involved should any aggression against the host country take place. This trip wire function insures that U.S. credibility is always and obviously at stake in any matters which threaten the stability of the host country or the U.S. presence.

A high level use of military force in the recent past suggests that presidents attach a similar degree of importance to the area or state in which the force was directed. Having established a significant interest in some situation, threats of renewed instability or aggression are

likely to be viewed as serious threats to credibility for a variety of reasons. First, highly visible, previous actions are likely to be recalled when foreign decision makers study current situations in order to deduce U.S. motivation in the future. Previous large-scale action may create a critical precedent presidents wish to uphold in order to maintain their reputation. Second, an ongoing military presence may confer upon the U.S. the status of an occupying power with many of the responsibilities for maintaining the security of the client state associated with such standing (e.g., Lebanon in the early 1980's). Inaction in the face of threats to this position may call into question U.S. commitments in other areas. For these reasons, a recent, high level military presence is a critical measure of the extent to which American credibility is on the line in the host country.

Opportunities to use force arising in nations where there is an established U.S. military presence are considered critical threats to U.S. credibility. More so than any other type of situation, opportunities in such states represent for presidents supreme tests of U.S. resolve to meet its defense obligations. Thus, in areas where the United States has either permanently deployed its military forces or used a high level of force within the past year, any threat to its status necessitates decisive measures to counter the threat to the credibility of the U.S. determination to maintain its position. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 1a: Situations occurring where there is an established U.S. military presence increase the probability of a use of force.

Operational Hypothesis 1b: Situations occurring where there is an established U.S. military presence increase the probability of a high level use of force.

U.S. Military Presence and Soviet Use of Force. Situations

where there is both an established U.S. military presence and a Soviet use of force, represent both critical threats to U.S. credibility and critical threats of war. Soviet military challenges to these areas of vital concern are rare, yet inherently perilous situations. They represent dangerous transgressions of the Cold War order, major probes of Western intentions and profound tests of American credibility. Such crises are usually the culmination and crescendo of long-simmering conflicts and happen in familiar Cold War trouble-spots such as Berlin, Cuba and Korea. Because these are the areas where U.S. involvement is most pronounced, it is expected that the critical threat to credibility is more important to the president than the threat of war. The probability that foreign observers are monitoring these situations is so great that failure to take action would be tantamount to surrendering a fateful battle in the Cold War. Confrontation becomes necessary if the American position throughout the world is not to be severely crippled. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 2a: Situations involving a Soviet use of force and an established U.S. military presence increase the probability of a use of force.

Operational Hypothesis 2b: Situations involving a Soviet use of force and an established U.S. military presence increase the probability of a high level use of force.

U.S. Military Aid. The importance of American military aid in a president's assessment of the extent to which credibility might be threatened by events in the recipient state also involves the role of precedence in the pursuit of credibility. While many indicators of the strength of American ties to a state might be employed, that which provides the best evidence of a relationship warranting attention in the

preservation of credibility ought to be chosen. For instance, while economic aid is given to a wide variety of nations, many of these have had only negligible roles in the Cold War (e.g., Mali, Bolivia, etc.). Transfers of arms indicate at least some interest in either maintaining or expanding U.S. security interests in the target nation. More importantly, however, opportunities to use force arising in such states may involve challenges to U.S. influence. The allocation of military aid to a nation confers it some degree of status in the Cold War (Northedge, 1974, p. 163). Such status may lead foreign actors to study the American response to determine if future challenges to that or other similar states are likely to be opposed. Furthermore, in the event of either internal or external threats to the recipient nation, the United States might very well feel obligated to respond to protect its relationship and reassure the recipient of its commitment. Allies in other states or regions might view the absence of assistance as justification for reviewing their security relationship with the U.S.. Therefore, when presidents believe they have accorded a nation some significance or role in superpower competition through the introduction of military aid, opportunities arising in such states become threats to U.S. credibility. Those states which are the site of an established American presence are not included here. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Operational Hypothesis 3a: Situations occurring in states where the U.S. has been a supplier of military aid in the past year increase the probability of a use of force.

Operational Hypothesis 3b: Situations occurring in states where the U.S. has been a supplier of military aid in the past year increase the probability of a high level use of force.

U.S. Prior Use of Force. A prior use of U.S. force in the area or state within which a current opportunity to use force is occurring is important in the president's decision calculus for a number of reasons.

At face value earlier deployments of military force are evidence of U.S. interest in the region or nation (those states which are the site of an established American presence are not included here). Given the slow rate at which foreign policy interests change over time, there is ample reason to believe that past involvement connotes some degree of contemporary concern for a state or region. A more persuasive argument for the importance of prior action involves the role of precedent in the preservation of credibility. Independent of any real interest in or intrinsic value of a state, presidents and their advisers believe past actions create anticipations and expectations about future U.S. uses of force. After years of fighting in Vietnam, the driving force in U.S. policy was not to protect the South Vietnamese against the North, but to demonstrate that the United States had staying power and was not going to run away from a problem (Gaddis, 1982; Schell, 1976). Whether or not foreign policy makers in other nations actually believe an American reluctance to use force in areas where it has done so in the past is a reliable gauge of future American action is inconsequential. Presidents believe their previous actions are important and that to break precedent with the past would be tantamount destroying the credibility of U.S. commitments and capability. Those states which are the site of an established American presence are not included here. Thus:

Operational Hypothesis 4a: Situations occurring in states where the U.S. has used military force in the past increase the probability of a use of force.

Operational Hypothesis 4b: Situations occurring in states where the U.S. has used military force in the past increase the probability of a high level use of force.

Soviet Involvement

Presidents have also invariably used Soviet/communist actions to justify their foreign-policy endeavors to the American people and the international community. Whether presidents believed they had to present proof of communist meddling in order to obtain the acquiescence of these groups for their actions, or were simply using the red threat as an excuse to intervene in the affairs of other nations, presidents have found this type of evidence to be the most alarming, and therefore, the most useful whatever their purposes. The specter of communism has been used in all of the major post World War II foreign-policy doctrines (e.g. the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine) (Crabb, 1982). In addition, as Tillema, (1973) and Krasner, (1978) have shown, the threat of a communist takeover is a crucial factor in explaining major U.S. military interventions. Therefore, since the U.S. has centered its military commitments around the Soviet threat, presidents believe increasing levels of Soviet military involvement alert foreign observers to the importance of a conflict in the same way the level of American involvement does. Presidents feel a failure to respond to such provocations will have a comparably deleterious effect on U.S. credibility.

There comes a point, however, where Soviet involvement crosses the threshold from representing a threat to U.S. credibility to constituting a significant military commitment. As research on U.S-Soviet relations has indicated, both superpowers try to avoid military confrontation except where vital interests are at stake (George, Farley and Dallin, 1988; Osgood and Tucker, 1970; Walt, 1989). Thus, when the U.S.S.R. is first to deploy its armed forces in some situation or has been maintaining a military presence, responsibility rests with the United States to avoid confrontation by not introducing its own military. Only when

the Soviets are using their military in or against a state where the U.S. has an established military presence will there be any kind of need or obligation to respond.

Soviet Military Aid. For American presidents U.S.S.R. involvement is evidenced by Soviet military presence and Soviet military aid, yet the two exert different effects on the president's propensity to use military force. Opportunities to use force occurring in nations where the U.S.S.R. is the arms donor exemplify threats to the credibility of American resolve to deter the Soviets. Presidents have continually called attention to Soviet and communist bloc arms shipments as evidence of Soviet aggression and menace. Communist arms shipments have provided the impetus for uses of the military in Guatemala, (1954), Cuba (1962), Congo (early 1960's), Laos (1960's), Nicaragua (1980's), and in a variety of other cases. Whether presidents believed Soviet military aid merely symbolized an expansion of communist influence, or whether they believed communist weapons might be used to spread aggression and insurgency, they have insisted that failure to halt such expansion would only encourage further aggression and cast the United States in the role of the appeaser. Presidents have argued that such involvement constitutes a test of American will in the eyes of the rest of the world. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Operational Hypothesis 5a: Situations occurring in states where the U.S.S.R. has been a supplier of military aid in the past year increase the probability of a use of force.

Operational Hypothesis 5b: Situations occurring in states where the U.S.S.R. has been a supplier of military aid in the past year increase the probability of a high level use of force.

Current Soviet Use of Force and/or Permanent Military Presence.

While Soviet disbursement of military aid might be contested through the use of military force, the same conditions and inducements generally do not apply when the Soviet Union is the status quo power defending its allies or is the first to use military force during an international crisis. When an opportunity to use force has involved confronting the Soviet military, presidents have been extremely cautious about using their forces for fear of starting a conflict or damaging tacit agreements about superpower spheres of influence. First, as Morgan (1985) demonstrates, the Soviets are quite reluctant to back down when challenged to defend their vital interests, particularly in Eastern Europe. Both superpowers have generally been reluctant to confront directly the other where it has a permanent military presence (Gaddis, 1982; Hoffman, 1978; Walt, 1989). Therefore, despite occasional rhetoric about rolling back communism, presidents have proven risk averse when given the opportunity. Second, even outside of the Soviet bloc, presidents have been unwilling to confront Soviet uses of force for fear of escalating a crisis (Kaplan, 1981). When the U.S.S.R. lays claim to being the status quo power by virtue of using its military first, the "responsibility" for confrontation rests with the United States should the president decide to act. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 6a: Situations involving a Soviet use of force or permanent Soviet military presence decrease the probability of a use of force.

Operational Hypothesis 6b: Situations involving a Soviet use of force or permanent Soviet military presence decrease the probability of a high level use of force.

American Public Pressure and the Use of Force

Since presidents are interested in the maintenance of their own political credibility, they are quite mindful of the domestic context

within which decisions regarding the use of force are made. Presidents usually perceive the public temper on the use of force as composing the broad parameters which circumscribe their options. There are occasions, however, when public interest is piqued because of the magnitude of some crisis or some particular feature of it. It is on these occasions where the president experiences pressure to reach a decision in keeping with the demands of public for action to preserve his own and American credibility that decisions regarding the use of military force can be said to be swayed by domestic considerations. These are the essential indicators of threats to the president's domestic survival which he must monitor on a regular basis.

In surveying the relationship between the public, the president and the political use of military force in the Cold War, there are three factors concerning public pressure which can reasonably be expected to influence presidents' decisions. The three conditions alert presidents to threats to his domestic reputation for taking action to protect American interests. Thus, in order to respond in such a way as to protect his image, the president must be cognizant of these conditions and utilize them in his decision premises. Each of the operational hypotheses outlined below ought to be considered as analogous to the decision premises presidents utilize.

Media Coverage. The degree of pressure presidents feel from the public during any one opportunity to use force can influence decision making in a variety of ways. Ostrom and Job have demonstrated that when the American public identifies high-risk foreign policy issues as the most important facing the nation, U.S. strategic superiority increases the probability of uses of force while increasing levels of superpower tension decrease the desirability of a use of force (1986). The public

has shown impatience with diplomatic stalemates increasing the attractiveness of decisive action (Iran, 1980; terrorism during much of the 1980's), but has also demonstrated a reluctance to become involved in remote parts of the globe (Wittkopf, 1987). Such findings, however, say little about the general inclinations of the American public to use force in any specific incident.

Presidents typically believe that when the public is cognizant of their actions, they should preserve their own political credibility and image of strength by taking forceful action. Since neither the president nor the researcher can gauge the level of public support for military action in all cases, a surrogate measure is necessary. Here it is hypothesized that presidents monitor the amount of media coverage as a method by which they determine the likelihood of public interest and arousal over foreign events. Thus, an indirect inference is made: as the coverage of an opportunity prior to a use force increases, so should public attention to the crisis. And because it was assumed earlier that generally domestic pressure leads presidents to act, increasing levels of public attention to a crisis inferred from the level of media coverage should cause presidents to believe their credibility is more likely on the line. In essence, presidents are hypothesized to use media coverage as gauge to determine public interest.

The cybernetic/cognitive model suggests that individuals tend to employ simplified appraisals of essential information to reduce the burden of analysis (Ashby, 1952, p. 42; Heuer, 1981, p. 306). Similarly we would expect presidents to develop rough approximations of the level of media coverage an opportunity is receiving rather than carrying out meticulous calculations of the quantity of reporting. Therefore, I assume that presidents distinguish between low, medium and high coverage issues in order to reduce the complexity of information and more easily

reach a decision. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 7a: Presidents are more likely to use force the greater the media coverage of an opportunity to use force.

Operational Hypothesis 7b: Presidents are more likely to use a high level of force the greater the media coverage of an opportunity to use force.

Anti-American Threats or Violence. Threats to American citizens have been viewed both as challenges to American prestige and as convenient justifications for U.S. military interventions (Brands, 1987; Tillema, 1973). The invasions of the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama were all explained in part as operations designed to rescue Americans at risk. That presidents have often relied upon such threats to give added substance to their arguments in favor of intervention does not, however, imply that they believe such threats are unimportant. In fact, for a variety of reasons, presidents may feel such intimidation represents a threat to credibility as well. From the point of view of foreign actors the lack of a strong U.S. response in the face of direct violence upon its own citizens might well signal an unwillingness to respond to threats of violence to its allies. More importantly, however, the American public is quite likely to be outraged by such incidents and demand that the president retaliate. For example, Jimmy Carter was under strong pressure to do something about the American hostages in Iran. Ronald Reagan felt similar demands may have arisen had he not rescued the American medical students on Grenada. When two U.S. servicemen were killed while pruning a tree in the Korean DMZ, Richard Nixon responded by sending the aircraft carrier Midway from Japan and alerting squadrons of B-52's while the offending tree was later cut down. Given a threat to American citizens, presidents feel generally pressured to take some sort of action if only to ward off

possible accusations of timidity. Such accusations, real or imagined, could seriously damage a president's domestic political standing. Therefore, these incidents ought usually to be met with a high level of U.S. military force. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 8a: When there are threats or violence to American citizens in an opportunity to use force, presidents are more likely to use force.

Operational Hypothesis 8b: When there are threats or violence to American citizens in an opportunity to use force, presidents are more likely to use a high level of force.

Presidential Popularity. Approval ratings have been shown to affect a great many presidential actions ranging from responses to Congressional vetoes (Simon and Rohde, 1986) to the decision to use force (Ostrom and Job, 1986; Oneal and James, 1991). Russett (1990) argues that presidents feel driven to shore up their popularity by attracting public attention to decisive foreign policy actions. The employment of military force in particular tends to create a "rally round the flag effect" wherein presidents may boost their approval ratings for a few months. Presidents who have a low level of popularity feel compelled to utilize the military to gain political resources for domestic political use. As Russett argues, "The polls and the electronic media have created a kind of permanent referendum on the president compelling him to produce constant evidence of his popularity" (1990, p. 40). That presidents allow their foreign policy to be swayed by domestic political considerations is one reason why observers emphasize the word "political" when studying the political use of military force. Presidents feel a need to act tough in international relations to demonstrate to the public they are vigorously protecting American interests. When their approval ratings are below a politically comfortable margin, presidents may thus feel more pressured to rescue their faltering reputation with a

demonstration of military might. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Operational Hypothesis 9a: When their popularity rating falls below 60 percent, presidents are more likely to use force.

Operational Hypothesis 9b: When their popularity rating falls below 60 percent, presidents are more likely to use a high level of force.

The Feasibility of Operations and the Propensity to Use Force

The feasibility of military operations conveys to the president a sense of the practical obstacles which will be in his way should he decide to deploy the military. Presidents must be aware of the military's capability for carrying out various types of operations, their ability to reach crisis locales and the practicality of influencing events before making any final choices. Such information, while it cannot conclusively determine what actions the president takes, may on many occasions act as a brake, diminishing the desirability of using force. If presidents are determined to use the military regardless of which service branch they wish to utilize or irrespective of the possibility of specific types of military missions, such hindrances will remain just that--obstacles to be overcome. However, when presidents are not entirely convinced a use of military force is necessary, their willingness to attempt to overcome such difficulties may lead them to resort to other less obtrusive options. Therefore, presidents are also hypothesized to use this information in their decision premises. Each of the operational hypotheses outlined below ought to be considered as analogous to those decision premises.

Access. I use the term accessibility of a region to mean in particular its accessibility to the U.S. Navy. The navy is the preferred service of choice by presidents (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978) since it can easily and quickly be brought in and withdrawn, it can carry out airborne and ground operations and does not necessarily entail direct on-the-ground American involvement in crises. Therefore, landlocked nations which are out of sight, out of range of naval guns and do not possess beachheads for marine landings are not attractive or practical targets. Presidents may find their options limited to operations which necessitate much more manifest and visible involvement. Unable to effectively signal U.S. concern with a naval sail-by and not willing to conduct airlift operations, presidents may elect to refrain from using force in many landlocked nations. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 10a: When opportunities occur in landlocked nations, presidents are less likely to use force.

Operational Hypothesis 10b: When opportunities occur in landlocked nations, presidents are less likely to use a high level of force.

Internal Events. The desirability of military operations in opportunities concerning intra-state instability or conflict is unattractive for a variety of reasons. Incidents such as these typically involve warring factions or different cliques contesting for control of the government. Rather than wishing to take sides in a domestic struggle, presidents may find observing from the sidelines the more prudent course of action. Signalling via military force to different factions within a foreign nation may present problems in insuring the accurate transmission to the appropriate actors of U.S. intentions during murky and quickly changing events. Finally, the use of military force short of active intervention may have little effect on such

situations if the U.S. goal is to change the course of events. When the United States is interested in the outcome of an internal power struggle, for example, presidents may feel that simply providing a U.S. military presence will not alter the course of events except perhaps to give added weight to the voices charging the U.S. with meddling and imperialism. And presidents are also likely to be reluctant to intervene actively for fear of committing U.S. forces to a civil war. Therefore, presidents generally use little or no force at all on such occasions. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 11a: When the opportunity involves intrastate instability or conflict, presidents are less likely to use force.

Operational Hypothesis 11b: When the opportunity involves intrastate instability or conflict, presidents are less likely to use a high level of force.

Limited War. The consequences of U.S. involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars are voluminous and diverse. During these wars themselves, however, U.S. foreign policy was also altered, principally by the diversion of vast amounts of resources half-way around the world. The materiel and manpower required for these undertakings was so substantial it made military operations in other parts of the globe difficult to mount. Furthermore, the presidents who presided over these wars were generally reluctant to involve the United States in other conflicts for fear of squandering more U.S. resources and losing public support for the primary war. Ostrom and Job (1986) demonstrate that when the United States is involved in a limited war, presidents are less likely to use major force levels. Therefore, during the time periods between June, 1950 and July, 1953, and August, 1964 (The Gulf of Tonkin incident) and January, 1973, presidents ought to be reluctant to sanction additional deployments of military force. This leads to the following

propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 12a: When the United States is involved in a limited war, presidents are less likely to use force.

Operational Hypothesis 12b: When the United States is involved in a limited war, presidents are less likely to use a high level of force.

Number of States Involved. While the United States may be the strongest military power in the world, in most opportunities other friendly and hostile nations pursuing their own objectives will be competing with the U.S. for the attention of the target state. Increasing nation-state involvement magnifies an incident's potential repercussions and the likelihood that the U.S. will have to come to the aid of an ally or counter the activities of its enemies. Widespread state involvement may create such a large audience and substantial international expectations that the president feels compelled to respond in order to forcefully assert American interests and credibility. Furthermore, as more states are drawn into an international crisis the more likely it is one of them can provide the naval ports, bases or flyover rights the military requires to deploy its forces. Rather than assuming presidents attempt to count precisely the number of nations involved in an opportunity, I assume he makes gross distinctions between low, moderate and high levels of state involvement. This leads to the following propositions:

Operational Hypothesis 13a: As the number of states involved in an opportunity increases, presidents are more likely to use force.

Operational Hypothesis 13b: As the number of states involved in an opportunity increases, presidents are more likely to use a high level of force.

Summary

The president's decision making process in the use of force is outlined in Figure 3. Given an opportunity to use force, presidents are hypothesized to monitor and utilize three different types of information related to survival in their decision premises. Presidents are hypothesized to use the level of superpower military involvement in an opportunity to determine the extent of the threats to credibility and of war. The greater the level of superpower involvement, the greater the threat to credibility and the more likely that the president uses force. When the Soviet Union is involved to the point that it is using military force prior to American intervention, presidents are hypothesized to be more interested in avoiding war by foregoing a military operation. Nonetheless, when the Soviets challenge substantial American commitments, presidents are hypothesized to feel compelled to respond. American public pressure also functions in much the same way. As it increases, the domestic political stakes for the president usually increase as well making a use of force more attractive. The feasibility of military operations is examined to determine the practicality of military action. Operations which are viewed as difficult or impractical diminish the desirability of many uses of force. Based upon these factors, presidents determine if survival is threatened enough and the situation amenable enough to warrant a use of force. If presidents determine that force is needed, they next determine what level of force to use.

In order to determine further the validity of the cybernetic/cognitive decision-making models they will be tested against three alternative models predicting the occurrence and magnitude of uses of force. The first will employ regional dummy variables, the second presidential dummy variables and the third will utilize presidential and




Figure 3: Presidents' Decision Making and the Use of Military Force

regional variables. A regional model will be important in determining if groups of contiguous states or geo-strategic alliances may explain presidential actions in many situations. The results ought to indicate that the concern for credibility transcends state borders and geography. The second model will test the impact of particular administrations to determine if there are either temporal or personal differences among presidents when they use force. This will also provide a test of Hypothesis 4 outlined in Chapter Three. Finally a combined model will be used to determine if these two sets of factors together are able to explain much of the variation in the use of force. It should be found that the cybernetic/cognitive models are able to predict a greater percentage of cases than any of these alternative models. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: A region-based model successfully predicts fewer cases than the cybernetic/cognitive model.

Hypothesis 6: A presidency-based model successfully predicts fewer cases than the cybernetic/cognitive model.

Hypothesis 7: A region and presidency-based model successfully predicts fewer cases than the cybernetic/cognitive model.

The operational hypotheses/decision premises outlined above and the general hypotheses in Chapters Three and Four are tested in Chapter Six after a discussion of the methodology involved in making such tests.

The President's Decisions

In order to cope with the uncertainty he confronts in his decision-making environment, the president monitors and evaluates the circumstances surrounding opportunities to use force in a boundedly rational manner. That is, he operates with only limited information and limited options. First, only those indicators of threats to survival or that relate to the feasibility of undertaking military action are hypothesized to be employed on a regular basis by presidents. Such discrimination reduces the search of the environment but more importantly, ensures that action can be taken to maintain survival. The president's belief system then structures and influences his perception of this information so that it is readily understood and evaluated in accordance with his survival goals. It facilitates the president's appraisal of his environment by providing a context within which he places threats to survival. The president assesses this information in a series of decision rules. He determines the desirability of taking action to ensure survival according to his perception of the threats to credibility and of war along with considerations of the feasibility of military operations. Furthermore, the options from which the president chooses will be small in number to reduce uncertainty and calculation. Therefore, in order to predict what action the president takes, his choices must first be specified.

In accordance with the cybernetic/cognitive model's emphasis on limited choice, the president is viewed as making only two decisions related to the use of force. Furthermore, he is viewed as examining only two alternatives for each decision. The two presidential decisions

in this dissertation are the decision to use or not use force and the decision to use or not use a high level of force. Let Y_{i1} represent the president's first choice set with $Y_{i1} = 0$ when force is not used and $Y_{i1} = 1$ when force is deployed. Furthermore, if and only if the president elects to use force, let $Y_{i2} = 0$ when the president employs a low level use of military force, and $Y_{i2} = 1$ if the president utilizes a high level of force. Only if the president decides to use military force does he go on to make a decision about the amount of force he wishes to employ.

In order to reach decisions regarding the desirability of using force, presidents must first determine whether the configuration of the status of essential information represents a threat sufficient to require a use of force and then possibly a high level of force. The president evaluates the status of the essential variables in accordance with the thirteen basic decision premises outlined in Chapter Four. The premises are of a form whereby if condition "X" is present in the environment, the president's evaluation of the desirability of a use of force or high force level is adjusted accordingly. For example, one decision premise relates to the possibility of threats to American citizens. The decision premise would be: if threats are present, increase the probability of a use of force; if threats are not present, decrease the probability of using force.

After the president has evaluated each of the decision premises, he arrives at a composite evaluation of the desirability of using force and high levels of force. Each composite evaluation of an opportunity reflects the president's assessment of the importance of all the relevant factors. In order to arrive at a final estimation of the necessity to take action to maintain survival, the president must combine all the insight gained from his evaluation of the essential information. The

outcome of each single decision premise increases or decreases the probability of using force and using a high level of force. In order to integrate this information all of the individual increases and/or decreases are combined to create the final evaluation of the desirability of taking action. While these calculations and scales cannot directly be observed, they may be conceptualized as probabilities. The researcher cannot witness these procedures, only model them and the president's propensity to use force as a latent, unobserved variable.

Each opportunity is evaluated on two scales: the desirability/probability of using force (Y^*_{1i}) and the desirability/probability of using a high force level (Y^*_{2i}). As the values on the scale Y^*_{1i} increase, the desirability of a use of force increases. If the president chooses to use military force, he next evaluates the scale, Y^*_{2i} . As values on that scale increase, the desirability of a high level use of force increases. This process may be represented by:

$$Y^*_{1i} = \Sigma b_j IC_{ji} + \Sigma c_k DC_{ki} + \Sigma l_m W_{mi} + \Sigma g_n F_{ni} + e_{1i} \quad [4]$$

Given $Y_{1i} = 1$;

$$Y^*_{2i} = \Sigma q_j IC_{ji} + \Sigma r_k DC_{ki} + \Sigma s_m W_{mi} + \Sigma t_n F_{ni} + \theta_i + e_{2i} \quad [5]$$

where IC_{ji} , DC_{ki} , W_{mi} , and F_{ni} are variables concerned with international credibility, domestic credibility, war prevention and feasibility of operations respectively; b_j , c_k , l_m , g_n , q_j , r_k , s_m and t_n are the weights for these variables in each equation; θ is a selection bias term (this is described in greater detail later) and e_{1i} and e_{2i} are the random error terms.

This dissertation contends that in the president's decision-making process an opportunity moves from being unfavorable to favorable for a

use of force or a high level of force at a particular point, h , on the composite evaluations. This is analogous to the critical threshold which Ashby describes (1952, p. 41) and Ostrom and Job utilize (1986, p. 551). Thus, at any point equal to or greater than h_1 , presidents are hypothesized to use force and, given a decision to use force, at any point equal to or greater than h_2 presidents are hypothesized to use a high level of force. This process is represented as:

$$Y_{1i} = 1; \text{ if } (Y^*_{1i} > h_1) \quad [6]$$

$$(\text{Given } Y_{1i} = 1): Y_{2i} = 1; \text{ if } (Y^*_{2i} > h_2) \quad [7]$$

When the president's composite evaluation of his environment indicates that the critical threshold has been reached or exceeded, a threat to survival exists. The president identifies a range of values the composite indices take on when a threat to survival does not exist and a range of values for when such a threat is present. By dividing the scales into two sets of environmental states, the president reduces the number of options to select from and ensures that action can be taken.

Since the evaluations constitute a latent, non-observable variable and because all possible idiosyncratic factors in each opportunity cannot be incorporated into the decision-making model, the models must determine the president's evaluations in a probabilistic fashion. These caveats necessitate revisions in the above equations. Thus, it is assumed that presidents make their two decisions in the following manner:

$$\Pr (Y_{1i} = 1) = \Pr (Y_{1i}^* > h_1) =$$

$$\Pr \left[\left(\sum_{j=1}^5 b_j IC_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^3 c_k DC_{ki} + \sum_{m=1}^1 l_m W_{mi} + \sum_{n=1}^4 g_n F_{ni} + e_{1i} \right) > h_1 \right]. \quad [8]$$

$$\text{Given } (Y_{1i} = 1): \Pr (Y_{2i} = 1) = \Pr (Y_{2i}^* > h_2) =$$

$$\Pr \left[\left(\sum_{j=1}^5 q_j IC_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^3 r_k DC_{ki} + \sum_{m=1}^1 s_m W_{mi} + \sum_{n=1}^4 t_n F_{ni} + \phi_i + e_{2i} \right) > h_2 \right] \quad [9]$$

This specification of the president's decision-making process reflects the principles of the nature of cybernetic/cognitive decision-making outlined in Chapter Two in the following manner. First, the limited number of essential variables and options is consistent with the boundedly rational view of decision-making. Such limitations are strategies employed to help the decision-maker overcome uncertainty about the environment. Second, the president is predicted to take action to ensure survival only when his composite evaluation of the environment reaches or exceeds a critical threshold. This view of decision-making is comparable to Ashby's view of the manner in which individuals respond to critical states in their environment (Ashby, 1952, p. 42). Third, the president is hypothesized to utilize only essential information related to maintaining credibility internationally and domestically, preventing war and the feasibility of military operations. Fourth, while the impact of belief systems cannot be directly modeled, presidents' similar belief systems structure their perception of information, thereby causing them to respond in a relatively predictable manner. Therefore, only the two decision-making models are necessary for all presidents. For these reasons it should be found that Equations [8] and [9] are fairly accurate representations of the

cybernetic/cognitive decision-making model described in Chapter Two. Furthermore, they should also provide a reliable test of the hypotheses outlined in Chapters Three and Four.

The Achen Correction for Selection Bias

To test the validity of the cybernetic/cognitive models depicted in equations [8] and [9], it is necessary to obtain estimates of b_j , c_k , l_m , g_n , q_j , r_k , s_m , t_n , θ_i , h_1 and h_2 . Before estimating the model, however, the problem of selection bias must be addressed. Such bias occurs when the inclusion of cases into a choice set is determined by a previously occurring selection process. In this dissertation the problem arises in the equation predicting the force level. Only those opportunities which result in a use of force are considered by the president at this stage. Therefore, the first equation, modeling the decision to use/not use force constitutes a selection equation. The second equation predicting force level is commonly called the substantive equation.

If potential observations are excluded from the substantive equation according to some predetermined or non-random selection process, selection bias is likely to result. As Berk notes, whenever the substantive and selective procedures involve the same actors, and/or the same physical location, and/or at about the same time, there are theoretical grounds for believing that selection bias exists (Berk, 1983, p. 389). In the two decisions modeled in this dissertation, all three problems are in evidence. The same actor, the president, is assumed to decide when to use force and how much force to use. In making both his decisions, the president is responding to one set of events. Finally, the decisions are interrelated, making the chronological sequence of choice of short duration. Under these conditions,

random disturbances may significantly affect jointly the selection and substantive outcomes (Berk, p. 393).

The presence of sample selection bias jeopardizes both internal and external validity. Internal validity is threatened because it may not be possible to untangle the effects of the exogenous variables and the error term. By not controlling for selection bias, the correlation between the exogenous variables and the disturbance term may lead the researcher to attribute causal effects to the exogenous variables which actually result from the error disturbances (Berk, p. 388). This correlation may make the variables that do not belong in the selection equation appear to be significant in the substantive equation.

Secondly, external validity will be endangered since, according to Heckman, the relationship between X and Y may either be systematically underestimated or overestimated (Heckman, 1976, p. 478). This bias arises because the conditional mean of the error term in the substantive equation is not included as an exogenous variable. Berk writes that, "only in special cases can the direction of the distortion be known" (1983, p. 388). He goes on to argue that, "...the problems caused by non-random exclusion of certain observations are manifested in the expected values of the endogenous variable" (1983, p. 390). The expected values of the error term are no longer zero and tend to be correlated with the exogenous variables.

To correct for such problems a ratio called the hazard rate is constructed which represents for each observation, "the instantaneous probability of being excluded from the sample conditional upon being in the pool at risk" (Berk, 1983, p. 391). The hazard rate is constructed from the predicted values of the endogenous variable in the selection equation. The predicted values are first multiplied by -1. According to Berk the numerator of the hazard ratio is the predicted value's

density and the denominator is 1 minus the predicted value's cumulative distribution (1983, p. 391). The denominator indicates the probability that there is data for an observation for the endogenous variable in the substantive equation. Thus, the lower the probability that a case will appear in this equation, the greater the value of the hazard rate (Heckman, 1976, p. 479). A hazard rate is calculated for each observation in the first equation to be used in the second or substantive equation to control for the expected non-zero value of the disturbances and avert over or under-estimation of the parameters. It captures the expected values of the disturbances in the substantive equation. When there is no sample selection bias and thus all observations are accounted for, the hazard rate becomes insignificant and ordinary least squares can be used. When selection bias is present, utilizing the hazard rate yields consistent estimates of the regression coefficients (Heckman, 1976, p. 481).

In this dissertation, however, the problem of estimating the degree of selection bias is compounded by the presence of a second binary choice set in the substantive equation. The sample selection models described by Heckman, (1976) Berk, (1983) Nelson, (1984) and others refer to substantive equations with interval level endogenous variables where regression is the preferred method of estimation. Yet, as Achen notes:

Regardless of whether the outcome equation is specified as a probit or linear probability model to cope with its dichotomous dependent variable, mechanical application of...Heckman's model ...yields inconsistent coefficient estimates under any plausible assumptions (1987, p. 106)

The modeling of selection and substantive equations with limited dependent variables has received only scant attention and usage in the literature (Greene, 1990; Van De Ven and Van Praag, 1981). Greene primarily discusses simultaneous probit equations with selection bias which assume

simultaneity in the relationship between the two equations. Yet, as was mentioned earlier, it is assumed that the president makes his two decisions sequentially rather than simultaneously. Therefore, this type of model would be inappropriate.

One alternative might be to combine the president's two decisions into one where the choice is among using no force, a low level of force and a high level of force. While this may be empirically testable (and it will be tested in future research) there are numerous theoretical reasons for asserting that presidents separate their choices. First, as Simon (1969) has indicated individuals decompose their environments into manageable components. In working toward the desired state within each component or as Simon refers to them, subsystems, individuals make decisions based upon their significance and urgency (1970, p. 112). Since a decision at one point in time may be dependent upon the outcome of previous decisions, people consider the most general and ultimately influential choices first before proceeding to make more specific selections. Therefore, presidents are assumed to employ a hierarchical form of decision making.

Second, because of the tremendous stakes and risks involved in using the military, presidents tend to view the use of force and force-level decisions as separate and unique. Therefore, presidents perceive opportunities first and foremost according to the desirability of a use of military force (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and the Yom Kippur war). Lastly, the consideration of a multitude of options simultaneously would impose great demands on the president's cognitive ability to determine the congruence between a particular type of response and the threat he perceives. Therefore, a hierarchical conceptualization of decision making is utilized in this dissertation

Fortunately Achen demonstrates that there is a plausible

alternative which can accommodate the dichotomous nature of both of the endogenous variables. He outlines a two-equation linear and non-linear regression procedure which yields consistent and unbiased coefficient estimates and takes into consideration the presence of selection bias. Achen argues that his correction for selection bias yields significantly more meaningful results than OLS might offer. He writes, "The principle difference between selection bias forecasts and their OLS counterparts is that the former take account of the information in the disturbance term from the first equation" (1987, p. 125). Better coefficient estimates and improved forecasts result from controlling for the unobserved selection processes in the substantive equation.

The first stage of the Achen procedure involves estimating the selection Equation [8] with the dichotomous endogenous variable by means of a linear probability model. As many have noted (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Greene, 1990, McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975), however, this type of model is not always the preferred method of estimation. In regression, there are no restrictions on the values of the exogenous variables and the coefficients. Therefore, the endogenous variable must be free to take on any values between negative and positive infinity. If, as in this dissertation, the endogenous variable takes on only two values (0,1), this assumption is not maintained. The parameter estimates are, however, unbiased and consistent. The expected value of Y reduces to a probability and regression applied to a dichotomous endogenous variable is thus termed, the linear probability model. Although there are some practical difficulties involved in utilizing this methodology, they can as Achen notes, be overcome (1987, p. 104-105).

The regression coefficients in the linear probability model measure the effect on the probability of using force of a unit change in an exogenous variable. For example, a coefficient value of $-.17$ in the war

variable would indicate that during times of limited war, the probability of using force decreases by 17 percent holding all other factors constant. Yet as Aldrich and Nelson (1984) note, often the coefficients in the linear probability model are biased downward since the estimates will be highly sensitive to the range of data in the sample. Since all of the variables in the two equations (except media coverage and number of states involved which are both trichotomous) are dichotomous, this problem should not exercise significantly adverse effects.

While the use of a linear probability model yields unbiased and consistent parameter estimates, the assumption that the error term has a constant variance is violated. According to Aldrich and Nelson, "...the variance of (the error term) varies systematically with the values of the dependent variable" (1984, p. 13). Observations where Y_i is close to zero or one will have low variances while the observations approaching .5 will have high variances (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, p. 276). The inefficient estimates which are associated with this sort of problem generally lead to difficulty in making strong statements of statistical inference. Yet, if the ratios between the coefficients and their standard errors are quite substantial and yield significance levels less than .01, for example, greater confidence can be maintained in the efficiency of the parameters.

Another problem commonly associated with utilizing a linear probability model (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984) are estimates of Y^*_{1i} and Y^*_{2i} which exceed the values of Y_{1i} and Y_{2i} . Since the expected value of the endogenous variable is expressed as a probability, it is bounded by zero and one. Thus, the smallest value that X_i takes on must yield a predicted probability equal to or greater than zero while the largest value X_i assumes must translate into a predicted value of no more than

one (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984, p. 24). This problem is dealt with in Achen's model by constraining over-estimations to .99 and under-estimations to .01. These corrected estimates then become the predicted values and are used to calculate the prediction errors of Equation [5] when the problem arises.

Aldrich and Nelson also note that when the endogenous variable is dichotomous, the greater the range of the exogenous variables, the more biased are their marginal effects. Since the linear probability model places upper and lower bounds on the expected probability values, it must also impose limits on the values the coefficients can assume. That is, the coefficients cannot be of a magnitude whereby they yield predictions of Y_i beyond the (0,1) range. Since the coefficient values must be constrained, the impact of a one unit increase in X_i on the predicted values of Y_i becomes smaller the more values the exogenous variable takes on. Because of the limited range of values of most of the exogenous variables (described above) in this dissertation, this problem should not be particularly egregious.

Another objection to the linear probability model which Aldrich and Nelson describe is that the marginal effect of exogenous variables is constant. When values of the exogenous variables take on a wide range of values, it is possible that at their upper and lower bounds an additional increment of change will have little effect. Towards the mean value of the endogenous variable, however, a one unit change may have a substantial effect and cause a significant change in the predicted values (1984, p. 26). While this problem may be quite apparent when one is predicting home ownership from income as Aldrich and Nelson do, it is not nearly as disturbing when the values of the exogenous variables are with few exceptions, dichotomous. Therefore, for the reasons specified above, the linear probability ought to accurately model the use of force

decision. The results of the linear probability model applied to Equation [8] are examined in Chapter Six.

Achen notes that the linear probability model can be extended to model the substantive, or in this case, the force-level equation as well. If both the selection and substantive equations are modeled as linear probability equations, their error terms will be uniformly distributed (Achen, 1987, p. 106). Achen further argues that this joint distribution implies, "...the outcome equation can be estimated consistently in censored samples by adding a single additional term to the equation in the style of other selection bias estimators" (1987, p. 106). The equation becomes nonlinear in form, but it can be estimated using nonlinear least squares.

The first step in the procedure is to estimate the selection, or use of force equation using the linear probability model. Predicted values in this model which exceed 1 or are less than zero are constrained to their respective limits and then used in calculating the residuals. To estimate the coefficient for the selection bias term in the nonlinear model requires multiplying these corrected residuals, (\hat{u}_{1i}) , from Equation [8] by the predicted values of an initial run of the substantive equation and 1.0 minus those values $[(\hat{u}_{1i}) * (\hat{Y}_{2i}) * (1 - \hat{Y}_{2i})]$. Achen suggests .5 as the most plausible starting value for the predicted values of the substantive equation and hence, 1 minus this hypothesized predicted value is also .5. Utilizing these starting values ensures that the predicted values of the substantive equation will be consistent and unbiased. Furthermore, according to Berk, there are no significant differences in the hazard rates obtained from probit, logit and linear probability models (1983, p. 395). Therefore, the calculation of the hazard rate values from linear probability model should not adversely affect the results.

The corrected residuals are used with the other variables in a trial run of Equation [9] in order to obtain starting values for the nonlinear model. The nonlinear model is then run using these values as initial coefficient estimates to calculate the final coefficients, standard errors and confidence intervals. The criterion used for determining the values of the coefficients in the nonlinear model is identical to that used in a linear regression, the minimization of the sum of squared errors. An iterative linearization method is used wherein the force-level equation is linearized around the initial set of coefficient values (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, p. 263). Ordinary Least Squares is applied to this equation and generates a new set of coefficient values. The nonlinear equation is then re-linearized around these values and the process continues until the relative reduction between successive residual sums of squares is less than 1.00E-08. The computer program (SPSSX, in this case) calculates standard errors and confidence intervals in the last linearization.

Therefore, when incorporating the Achen correction procedures (1987, p. 106-107) into the second equation, Equation [9] is slightly revised. The decision to use a high level of force is now represented by:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr (Y_{2i}=1) \text{ if } (Y_{1i} = 1) = \Pr (Y_{2i}^* > h_2) = \\
 & \Pr \left[\left(\sum_{j=1}^5 q_j IC_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^3 r_k DC_{ki} + \sum_{m=1}^1 s_m W_{mi} + \sum_{n=1}^4 t_n F_{ni} + \beta_{13} u_1 \right) * \right. \\
 & \left. \left(\sum_{j=1}^5 q_j IC_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^3 r_k DC_{ki} + \sum_{m=1}^1 s_m W_{mi} + \sum_{n=1}^4 t_n F_{ni} \right) * \right. \\
 & \left. \left(1 - \left(\sum_{j=1}^5 q_j IC_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^3 r_k DC_{ki} + \sum_{m=1}^1 s_m W_{mi} + \sum_{n=1}^4 t_n F_{ni} \right) \right) + e_{2i} \right] > h_2 \quad [10]
 \end{aligned}$$

As Achen notes, however, the error terms of this model will likely not be the most efficient. As he writes, "...the form of the variance matrix for the coefficients shows that such estimates are not fully efficient" (1987, p. 137). That is, the possibility exists that the variance of other unbiased estimators will be smaller. The errors of the coefficients in the selection equation will depend on the heteroskedastic variances of the error term. Thus, inefficient estimates of the standard error may lead to difficulty in making strong statements of statistical inference. Yet as Achen notes, fully efficient procedures require the inversion of an n -dimensional square matrix which is not practical for data sets of this size (1987, p. 137). Achen goes on to suggest that the coefficient values obtained in the nonlinear model may be used as starting values in a search for maximum likelihood estimates.

Still, inefficient estimates of error variance do not mean that the standard errors cannot be interpreted as such, only that other estimators may have smaller variances (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, p. 28; Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, p. 55). That such estimators exist is in fact, rather difficult to verify (Greene, 1990, p. 319). Increasing the efficiency of the standard errors will generally only serve to tighten the confidence intervals and make the coefficients more significant (Greene, pgs. 99-118). Other properties, such as unbiasedness which the coefficients in the nonlinear model do possess are equally if not more important than efficiency alone (Kennedy, 1985, p. 14). In addition, in asymptotic, or extremely large samples, the problems associated with inefficiency generally decline (Kennedy, 1985, p. 16; Greene, 1990, p. 103). Thus, if the ratio between the coefficients and the standard errors are rather sizable (e.g., by a factor of 2) the estimators will still provide a fairly reliable test of the significance of the coefficients. The estimators will not be biased toward finding significant

relationships where there are none. Hence, a fair degree of confidence may still be maintained in the efficiency of the parameters, and further procedures for increasing standard error efficiency are not necessary. Therefore, the standard errors are interpreted as they are.

In fact, the results are quite significant (and described in Chapter Six). Therefore, the standard errors which the nonlinear estimation procedures generate can be used to determine the significance of the individual variables. The coefficient estimates generated by the nonlinear estimation procedure may be used with a fair degree of confidence in their significance. The nonlinear coefficient values indicates the effect a one unit change in the exogenous variable exercises on the probability of using a high force level holding all other factors constant. Unfortunately, many of the goodness of fit measures associated with regression are inappropriate under these circumstances and cannot be utilized. The impact of the exogenous variables, their associated t statistics and a variety of other statistical tests are analyzed in the next chapter.

Summary

This dissertation seeks to model presidents' decisions regarding the use of force and the employment of high force levels. It is hypothesized that presidents utilize a series of decision premises designed to maintain presidents' four survival goals. Presidents decide when to use force and high levels of force after evaluating all decision premises and placing each opportunity on a composite index. When the outcomes of these decision premises yield large values on the two indices, presidents are likely to use force and high force levels. Low values on these scales exercise the opposite effect. Since this process cannot be observed and because it may be affected by random factors not

included in the decision-making model, presidents' choices must be modeled and predicted in a probabilistic fashion.

In order to do this and to take into consideration the selection bias likely to be present in the force-level equation, a procedure suggested by Achen (1987) is used. First a linear probability model is employed to estimate the use of force decision equation. The force-level decision is modeled by incorporating a selection bias term generated by the residuals of the first equation and initial-run predicted values of the second equation. This term controls for among other problems, the possibility of correlation between the exogenous variables and the error term. A nonlinear probability model is then employed to predict the force-level decision. Although there is a possibility the estimates of this model may not be the most efficient, large ratios between the coefficients and the standard errors ought to attenuate this problem.

Chapter 6: Model Results

Introduction

The results of the Achen procedure bode quite well for the two models. When modeling the decision to use force almost all the variables are significant and in the expected direction. The overall fit of the second model is quite good as well and most variables are significant and in the expected direction. I first describe the models' predictive capacity and their goodness of fit indicators. Second, I examine the impact of the individual variables on presidents' two decisions. Next, I explore the regional and presidential dimension in the use force and test Hypotheses 4, 5, 6 and 7 to determine if models employing variables measuring these factors are able to correctly predict a greater percentage of cases than Equations [9] and [10] and if the addition of presidential variables to Equations [9] and [10] improve the fit of the models. Finally, I comment on the incorrectly predicted cases to gain an appreciation of where the models might be improved.

Goodness of Fit Indicators

The most often utilized measure of goodness of fit for models predicting choice is the percentage of correctly predicted cases. By following the procedures described above, the linear probability and nonlinear least squares models generate predicted values Y^*_{1i} and Y^*_{2i} respectively. As in probit analysis, the models assign a predicted value of "0" or "1" to each case based upon its placement along the unobserved continuum of probability and more specifically if it falls below or exceeds the critical thresholds, h_1 and h_2 . These thresholds are set at .5 so that any case which falls below .5 is predicted as no

use of force or low level use of force. A use of force or high level use is predicted when the evaluation lies on or above the critical threshold. As can be seen in Table 1, the use of force decision model correctly predicts slightly more than 76.9 percent of all cases, a 24.2 percent improvement over the null hypothesis which is to predict the modal category (use:52.7 percent) to occur in every instance. It predicts 81.1 percent of the uses correctly and 72.3 percent of the non-uses correctly. Thus, it is slightly biased toward predicting the modal category. The force-level decision model represented in Table 2 predicts 79.2 percent of the cases correctly, a 24.4 percent improvement over the null hypothesis which is to predict the modal category (low-level use:54.8 percent) to occur in every instance. It predicts 81.5 percent of the high level uses correctly and 77.6 percent of the low level uses correctly. In addition, an examination of Tables 3 through 6 reveals that there are no large fluctuations in the models' predictions of uses of force and high level uses of force across both presidential administration and geographic region.

In order to test the joint hypothesis that all coefficients except the constant are zero, the X^2 statistic has been computed for the use of force equation. This statistic cannot be calculated for the second equation, however, since an unbiased estimate of the true variance of the error term e_2 cannot be calculated (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, p. 266). The X^2 statistic for the use of force equation is 184.9 and it is significant at the .00001 level. There is only the slimmest of chances that all the coefficients except the constant are equal to zero. The adjusted R^2 of the first equation is .34 which also speaks well to the overall fit of the model. The R^2 is interpreted as it normally would be in any standard OLS equation as the percentage of explained variance. The dichotomous nature of the endogenous variable,

Table 1: The Use of Force Model

VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	T STATISTIC	P VALUE
CONFRONT	.197	1.71	.0446
PRESENCE	.232	4.29	.0000
U.S. AID	.128	2.83	.0023
PRIOR	.131	2.52	.0059
SOVIET AID	-.019	-.44	.3409
SOVIET FORCE	-.287	-3.59	.0000
MEDIA COVERAGE	.104	3.71	.0000
ANTI-U.S.	.138	2.73	.0032
POPULARITY	-.094	-2.27	.0116
WAR	-.069	-1.43	.0764
INTERNAL	-.217	-3.92	.0000
ACCESS	-.120	-1.57	.0582
NUMBERS	.083	2.15	.0158
CONSTANT	.168	2.07	.0192

$R^2 = .34$

Percent Correctly Predicted = 76.9

X^2 Statistic = 184.9, p. < .00001

Wald Stat. for International Credibility Variables = 5.8, p. < .00001

Wald Stat. for Domestic Credibility Variables = 8.7, p. < .0001

Wald Stat. for both sets of Credibility Variables = 8.5, p. < .00001

Wald Stat. for Prevention of War Variable = 12.9, p. < .0004

Wald Stat. for Feasibility Variables = 8.7, p. < .00001

Table 2: The Force Level Model

VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	T-STATISTIC	P-VALUE
CONFRONT	.333	2.25	.0122
PRESENCE	.228	2.11	.0174
U.S. AID	-.087	-1.36	.0869
PRIOR	-.111	-1.19	.1170
SOVIET AID	.050	.83	.2033
MEDIA COVERAGE	.027	.45	.3264
ANTI-U.S.	.131	1.77	.0384
POPULARITY	-.141	-2.04	.0207
WAR	-.374	-3.59	.0000
INTERNAL	.176	1.95	.0256
ACCESS	-.511	-3.17	.0000
NUMBERS	.186	3.00	.0013
SELECTION TERM	-7.717	-1.72	.0427
CONSTANT	.247	.95	.1711

Percent Correctly Predicted = 79.6

Table 3: Use of Force Model Predictions By President

	False Positives	True Negatives	True Positives	False Negatives	Percent Correct
President					
Truman	0	29	7	4	90%
Eisenhower	10	21	43	8	78%
Kennedy	8	10	28	6	73%
Johnson	9	17	33	6	77%
Nixon	4	31	9	7	78%
Ford	7	8	7	1	65%
Carter	7	6	9	4	57%
Reagan	9	19	40	5	80%
All Presidents	54	141	176	41	77%

Table 4: Force Level Model Predictions By President

	False Positives	True Negatives	True Positives	False Negatives	Percent Correct
President					
Truman	0	4	5	2	82%
Eisenhower	6	16	20	9	71%
Kennedy	1	13	16	4	85%
Johnson	3	23	10	3	85%
Nixon	0	11	4	1	94%
Ford	1	3	3	1	75%
Carter	1	7	3	2	77%
Reagan	5	20	14	6	75%
All Presidents	17	97	75	28	79%

Table 5: Use of Force Model Predictions By Region

	False Positives	True Negatives	True Negatives	False Negatives	Percent Correct
Region					
Central America	8	18	48	10	76%
South America	1	26	7	5	85%
Western Europe	3	6	16	1	85%
Eastern Europe	0	16	1	4	81%
Middle East	19	33	45	9	74%
Sub-Saharan Africa	8	17	12	3	73%
Southwest Asia	3	6	4	1	71%
Southeast Asia	8	10	29	6	74%
East Asia	4	9	14	2	79%
All Regions	54	141	176	41	77%

Table 6: Force Level Model Predictions By Region

	False	True	True	False	Percent
	Positives	Negatives	Positives	Negatives	Correct
Region					
Central America	7	29	18	4	81%
South America	0	11	1	0	100%
Western Europe	2	3	12	0	88%
Eastern Europe	0	2	0	3	40%
Middle East	4	19	19	12	70%
Sub-Saharan Africa	3	11	1	0	80%
Southwest Asia	0	4	0	1	80%
Southeast Asia	1	12	15	7	77%
East Asia	0	6	9	1	94%
All Regions	17	97	75	28	76%

however, necessitates prefacing this result with a caveat. Aldrich and Nelson write that, "The maximum value of R^2 is generally less than 1 and...will vary from sample to sample depending on the values of X in the sample..." (1984, p. 29). Again, the R^2 is not appropriate for the nonlinear force level equation.

Individual Variables

In Tables 1 and 2 it can be seen that almost all of the variables have significant coefficients. The T ratios indicate that the null hypothesis of no relationship can be resoundingly rejected for nearly all the variables. These variables appear to accurately represent the essential information presidents utilize. The regression coefficients are generally interpreted as the increment of change or probability in the dependent variable brought about by a one unit change in the independent variable. The impact of each of the variables is examined below.

U.S. Military Presence and Soviet Use of Force. (Variable Name=CONFRONT) Those situations in which there is an established U.S. military presence and a Soviet use of force have a positive and statistically significant impact on the propensity of presidents to use force. As expected, presidents are quite likely to use force when the Soviets openly challenge American credibility in areas of vital interest. To allow such a provocation to go unanswered might well result in a precipitous drop in American influence and a questioning of American commitment to the security of the free world. In fact, of the 15 occasions when such confrontations did occur, presidents elected to use force 12 times and high levels of force 10 times. The probability of a use of force increases by 19 percent according to the estimates in the

first equation. Their impact on the probability of a high level use of force is also positive and strongly significant. Holding all other factors constant in the second equation, these situations increased the probability of a high level use of force by 33 percent. When presidents do choose to respond to Soviet military provocations, they act decisively to meet the challenge.

U.S. Military Presence. (Variable Name=**PRESENCE**) Situations arising in nations where the U.S. has established a permanent military presence or has employed a high level of force within the past year are considered critical threats to U.S. credibility, and have a statistically significant impact on both decisions. When all other variables are held constant, situations occurring in these locales increase the probability of a use of force by 23 percent and increase the probability of a high level use of force by 22 percent. That force was not utilized more often may be explained in part by the location of many of these opportunities. An examination of the cases where the United States did not use force in these situations reveals that they were dominated by events in Cuba and Panama. Part of this may be due to the unusual presence of a U.S. military base in a hostile Cuba that makes many military operations politically impossible. The opportunities in which force was not used in Panama are somewhat more troubling due to the visibility and importance of the Panama Canal. Given that many of Panama's opportunities were characterized by internal crises presidents may have wished to keep the American military out of domestic situations for fear of being charged with Yankee imperialism. Ultimately, because an established military presence connotes a significant investment and visibly demonstrates American commitment in some state, it is a very important predictor of the political use of force.

U.S. Military Aid. (Variable Name=U.S. AID) When the United States has provided military aid to a nation in the previous year there is a statistically significant impact on the decision to use force, but not on the force-level choice. The probability of a use of force increases by 12 percent while the probability the president elects to employ a major or manifest use of force decreases by 8 percent. Instability in such states would seem to call for only a minor use of force. One might infer presidents do not believe American credibility would suffer should they forego a major military operation in areas where U.S. military involvement is not so great. However, the complete absence of an American response might tempt the Soviets or others to expand their influence in these areas.

U.S. Prior Use of Force. (Variable Name=PRIOR) Prior demonstrations of military force have a similar impact on presidents' decisions. When the United States has used military force in the state previously presidents are significantly more likely to use force. They are not, however, more likely to use a high level of force on such occasions. The probability of a use of force increases by 13 percent and a high level use of force decreases by 11 percent, although this variable is insignificant in the force level model. All other things being equal, crises in such states present significant threats to American credibility, but not to such an extent as to influence the nature of the military response.

Soviet Military Aid. (Variable Name=Soviet Aid) Interestingly, presidents do not appear to feel that the delivery of Soviet military aid to a state is not sufficient enough provocation to require any type

of military response. When all other things are equal, this variable is insignificant in both equations. Presidents may only feel the need to respond to spreading communist influence when it reaches states or regions where the United States has demonstrated its commitment via a prior use of force or military aid. Presidents may feel hesitant to respond to crises in Soviet proxy states such as Syria and Egypt (before 1973) in the absence of a threat to an American client.

Current Soviet Use of Force and/or Permanent Military Presence.

(Variable Name=SOVIET FORCE) Situations in which the Soviets are currently using their military represent high level threats of war and do not generally impress presidents as situations wherein a political use of the military might be conducive to achieving diplomatic ends. When controlling for all other variables, these situations decrease the probability of a use of force by 28 percent. Out of 33 opportunities, presidents used force only 9 percent of the time when the Soviets were the first to deploy their military. Clearly, presidents are rather careful about the types of situations in which they involve the military. When the Soviet Union has already begun to use its armed forces for political purposes, the risk of starting a superpower war must appear quite daunting to presidents. In fact, the caution demonstrated here helps explain why there has not yet been a hot war between the United States and the U.S.S.R..

Because there were only three occasions when the U.S. responded to a Soviet use of force outside of an area where the U.S. had an established military presence this variable was almost perfectly collinear with the constant term and had to be dropped from the second equation. Interestingly, however, in two out of the three occasions on which the U.S. military was employed in response during these events, presidents

employed a high force level. It should be remembered, though, that these uses of force both took place in areas removed from the location in which the Soviets were operating. The first took place in West Germany during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the second in the Persian Gulf during the invasion of Afghanistan. In neither of the incidents were the United States and the Soviet Union remotely close to confronting one another. Presidents may feel the need to be seen as doing something (Russett, 1990) about such crises, yet they must demonstrate concern to all observers without provoking the Soviets. Therefore, a high level use of military force outside the crisis region is a convenient measure which attempts to satisfy both objectives.

Media Coverage. (Variable Name=**MEDIA COVERAGE**) One of the most important factors related to presidents' domestic credibility in their decisions is perhaps the most interesting. When news coverage of an opportunity rises, the likelihood of a use of force significantly increases, although the variable is insignificant in the second equation. Holding all other variables constant, as media coverage moves from low to medium to high, the probability of a use of force by increases by 10 percent and the probability of a high level use of force increases by 2 percent. The media appear to act as a fairly reliable barometer of the importance of a crisis, but they also increase public awareness. Presidents are motivated by public concerns and as the public becomes more aware of crisis situations presidents feel more pressure to respond. The observed relationship might also indicate that presidents look upon highly publicized events as potential opportunities to expand their power and popularity. Whether presidents use the military because they feel forced to by an attentive public or because such opportunities are personally attractive, the role of the media in these

foreign policy decisions lends further credence to the idea of a "political" use of military force. The insignificance of the relationship between media coverage and level of force presidents employ is puzzling given its substantial impact on the first decision. Presidents may in fact not be swayed by less tangible factors when they must determine the details of military activity.

Anti-American Threats or Violence. (Variable Name=ANTI-U.S.)

When United States citizens' lives are threatened or have already been imperiled, presidents are quite likely to use force. In both equations the variable is significant and in the expected direction. Controlling for all other factors, such situations increase the probability of a use of force by 13 percent and a high level use of force by 13 percent as well. Given the recent concern over U.S. hostages in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran, as well as numerous incidents of violence directed against American military personnel in the past, presidents are apt to feel as though they must at least find some sort of military outlet for the public's frustration (what Cable calls an "expressive" use of force, 1979). And as was mentioned previously, these opportunities are attractive to presidents even when American lives might not seriously be in danger. Incidents such as the invasion of Grenada demonstrate the appeal of threats to Americans as an added justification for large scale military operations.

Presidential Popularity. (Variable Name=Popularity) Interestingly, contrary to the findings of Russett (1991), Ostrom and Job (1986) and others, I find that when presidents' popularity is below 60 percent, they are significantly less likely to use force and high levels of force. The probability of a use of force decreases by 9 percent and

a high level use of force decreases by 14 percent. These results also run counter to my own hypotheses and would indicate that presidents are much more risk averse about using military force for political gains than previous evidence would suggest. When their popularity rises above 60 percent, rather than feeling secure and hesitant about taking military action presidents may believe they have broader support both in the public and Congress. Their popularity may encourage presidents to take military action they otherwise might have felt to be too venturesome when their approval ratings were lower. Future research ought to be conducted to determine if high approval ratings decreases the probability of presidential action in other areas when controlling for the factors used in this study.

War. (Variable Name=WAR) When the United States is involved in a limited war, the probability of a use of force declines by 6 percent and a high level use of force declines by 37 percent. This variable is significant and in the expected direction, however, only in the second equation. Massive military operations elsewhere seem to make the capacity for additional high level political uses of force difficult. Presidents may also feel reluctant to overextend the U.S. military by imposing additional costs on American lives and pocketbooks.

Internal Events. (Variable Name=INTERNAL) As was expected, situations in which the primary event of interest to the United States involved only one other nation exercise a negative impact on presidents' decisions. When holding all other variables constant, the probability of a use of force declined by 22 percent, yet the probability of a high level use of force increased by 17 percent. Still, only 33 percent of the time are high levels of force used under these circumstances.

Therefore, the lack of negative relationship in the second equation is perhaps best explained by the presence of other controlling factors. The results of the first equation, however, would seem to indicate that presidents may find it difficult to impose American interests into domestic disputes or perhaps feel that American credibility is not threatened. They are reluctant to become involved in disputes which have few ramifications beyond the borders of the state in question.

Access. (Variable Name=ACCESS) The inaccessibility of the location in which an opportunity occurs has a negative and statistically significant impact on both decisions. When holding all other variables constant, opportunities in landlocked nations decrease the probability of action by 12 percent and decreases the probability of a high level use of force by 51 percent. Thus, it appears that presidents' decisions have been influenced by the expediency of military operations. Clearly the presidents' inability to use the navy severely constrains his options. Landlocked nations are not conducive to many low or high level military operations and thus presidents appear highly unlikely to undertake the type of missions such locations would demand.

Number of Nations Involved. (Variable Name=NUMBERS) The number of nations involved in an incident has a positive and statistically significant impact on both the use of force and force-level decisions. As nation state involvement moves from low to medium to high, the probability of a use of force rises by 8 percent and the probability of a high level use of force increases by 18 percent. As more states become involved, the more likely it is that one of the participating states will provide the U.S. with the necessary logistical aid to deploy the military. Concurrently, opportunities which attract the

participation of many nations may cause presidents to feel compelled to respond to demonstrate American commitment and strength.

Selection Bias Term. (Variable name=Selection Bias Term) This variable measures the conditional probability of each case being excluded from the sample at risk. Thus, as the probability of an opportunity being excluded rises, the less likely we are to find that there is a high level of force used in such a case. The mean of the selection term for high force level opportunities is .05 and its mean for low force level situations is .09. It can be seen from these figures that when the probability of being excluded is high, presidents are more likely to utilize low levels of military force. Conversely, those situations in which a high level of force was used tend to have lower average values for the selection bias term.

The significance of the coefficient of this term demonstrates that there are other factors influencing presidents' second choice which have not been modeled. According to Berk, the selection term coefficient may be capturing either of two processes. First, it might capture the unobserved effects of omitted variables. These hidden factors might cause the observations which are more likely to be uses of force to be high level uses of force as well. The other possibility is that there is a naturally occurring selection process which is unobserved. In other words, the president may be determining the appropriate conditions to use force in such a way that it effects his second choice. For example, a president may "miss" some opportunities to use force that appear to be of little significance in his belief system. The set of opportunities he selects from might then be biased toward the inclusion of events to which he is likely to respond. As Berk points out, however, the problem of infinite regress in sample selection is likely

to plague many models and there is little that can be done about it (1983, p. 396).

Groups of Coefficients

It is also possible to analyze the impact of groups of coefficients on the use of force. The Wald Statistic is analogous to the T statistic. It tests the proposition that a group of coefficients is equal to zero. It has a χ^2 distribution with the degrees of freedom determined by the number of restrictions placed on the model (Greene, 1990, p. 190). For example, to determine if three variables are all equal to zero requires three degrees of freedom in the Wald Test. The larger the χ^2 , the more unlikely it is that the group of coefficients are all equal to zero.

The Wald statistic for the group of coefficients measuring threats to credibility internationally is 5.8 and proved to be significant at the .00001 level in the use of force equation. None of the Wald statistics can be calculated for the second model, however. The Wald statistic associated with the variables measuring the threat to credibility domestically is 8.7 and is significant at the .0001 level. When testing the significance of both the military involvement and domestic variables measuring threats to credibility, the Wald statistic is 8.5 and significant at the .00001 level. The Wald statistic for the variable measuring the threat of war is 12.9 and is significant at the .0004 level. Finally, those variables measuring the feasibility of military operations are also significant in the use of force equation at the .00001 level with a Wald statistic of 8.7. Since almost all of the individual variables measuring these concerns are significant in each equation, the hypotheses concerning the importance of international and domestic credibility, war prevention and the feasibility of military

operations in the president's decision-making process appear to be supported.

Regional and Presidential Dimensions in the Use of Force

Typically the modal value of the dependent variable is used as a base-line against which to judge a model's predictive capacity. In order to provide a more rigorous test of the model's performance, test hypotheses 4,5 and 6 and determine if geographic regions or presidential administrations play a significant role in the use of force, the cybernetic/cognitive model is tested against three alternatives. The first employs binary region variables for Central America, South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia (excluding Southeast Asia, the reference category). The second employs binary variables for all presidential administrations (except Kennedy's which acts as the reference category). The third model employs both regional and presidential variables.

The regional model predicts uses of force correctly 83.9 percent of the time, but fares poorly when predicting non-uses. Under these circumstances the model is correct only 39.5 percent of the time. Overall the regional model's 62.8 percent success rate still falls substantially short of the cybernetic/cognitive model's accuracy rate of 76.9. When employed to predict presidents' force level decision, the regional model is correct 65.4 percent of the time. It predicts 71.4 percent of the low level uses correctly and 61.1 percent of the high level uses. Thus, while regional variables fare somewhat better predicting the second decision, they do not contain nearly enough information to perform as well as the cybernetic/cognitive model.

Interestingly the presidential model does not perform any better.

It predicts 83.9 percent of the uses of force correctly and 40.5 percent of the non uses correctly for a combined success rate of 63.3.

Similarly, the presidential model is just as deficient in predicting the force level decision. It has an overall success rate of 62.2 percent. It predicts 64.5 percent of the low level uses correctly and 59.8 percent of the high level uses. Thus, although the presidential model predicts more cases than simply using the modal category, it isn't nearly as accurate as the cybernetic/cognitive model.

Furthermore, as can be seen in Tables 7 and 8 when adding the presidential variables to the cybernetic/cognitive models, the impact of the binary variables for almost all the presidents are quite insignificant. The only exception in the use of force equation is the Ford variable which is significant and negative. The reluctance of the public, Congress and the military to become militarily involved overseas after the debacle in Vietnam may explain Ford's reluctance to use force. Interestingly, Jimmy Carter who is commonly perceived as a more pacifistic president is not significantly less likely to use force. The Johnson variable is significant and negative in the force level equation, while the variable for Harry Truman is significant and positive. LBJ's disinclination to utilize high force levels may in part be explained by the tremendous diversion of military resources to Vietnam during most of his term in office although further analysis into this question is needed. Momentous crises in Berlin, Iran and China might account for Truman's use of high levels of military force. Clearly the United States possessed a great deal of military power during his administration and was not afraid to use it.

Taken as a group presidential variables also exercise an insignificant impact on both decisions. To determine whether or not the model with the presidential variables provided significantly more

explanatory power than the model without them a Wald test was performed on this set of variables. The Wald statistic for the first equation is 1.5 which is insignificant at the greater than the .15 level. Such tests cannot be performed on the second equation. Adding the presidential variables, however, increases the percentage of correctly predicted cases in the use of force model by 1.9 percent while it lowers the percentage in the force level model by 3.2 percent. Thus, the evidence is somewhat mixed concerning the variability of presidents' force decisions. Hypothesis 4 of Chapter Three regarding the impact of belief systems on presidential behavior is therefore, not supported. It was hypothesized that similar belief systems would cause presidents to view threats to credibility and of war alike. Their similar perceptions would then lead them to respond in a relatively predictable manner. Future research ought to determine if the discrepancies noted above are best explained by factors external to the Ford, Johnson and Truman administrations or if the foreign policy advice offered to these presidents was somehow different than that given to their counterparts.

Finally, an analysis of the model employing both regional and presidential variables reveals that the cybernetic/cognitive model still outperforms its alternatives. While this last model provides greater accuracy than the other baseline models, its' overall success rate of 66.5 percent is still 10.4 percentage points lower than the cybernetic/cognitive model. When used to predict the force level decision this model does somewhat better. It predicts 69.9 percent of the low level uses correctly and 66.3 percent of the high level uses for an overall success rate of 68.2 percent. Since the cybernetic/cognitive model outperforms all three of these baseline models, Hypotheses 5,6 and 7 can be rejected.

Table 7: The Use of Force Model With Presidential Variables

VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	T STATISTIC	P VALUE
CONFRONT	.155	1.331	.1840
PRESENCE	.200	3.644	.0003
U.S. AID	.122	2.692	.0074
PRIOR	.134	2.536	.0116
SOVIET AID	-.030	-.688	.4916
SOVIET FORCE	-.308	-3.827	.0002
MEDIA COVERAGE	.101	3.531	.0005
ANTI-U.S.	.145	2.848	.0046
POPULARITY	-.009	-.179	.8577
WAR	-.083	-1.190	.2349
INTERNAL	-.219	-3.933	.0001
ACCESS	-.123	-1.614	.1074
NUMBERS	.086	2.209	.0277
TRUMAN	-.121	-1.196	.2324
EISENHOWER	.003	.053	.9574
JOHNSON	.012	.137	.8911
NIXON	-.131	-1.321	.1871
FORD	-.286	-2.518	.0122
CARTER	-.138	-1.326	.1857
REAGAN	-.078	-.914	.3615
CONSTANT	.202	2.085	.0377

$R^2 = .34$

Percent Correctly Predicted = 78.7%

Wald Statistic for Presidential Variables = 1.5, p. > .14

Table 8: The Force-Level Model With Presidential Variables

VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	T STATISTIC	P VALUE
TRUMAN	.293622503	1.70	.0446
EISENHOWER	.048949536	.47	.3192
JOHNSON	-.262831114	2.03	.0212
NIXON	-.092422638	.51	.3050
FORD	.094325491	.48	.3156
CARTER	-.001578877	.00	.5000
REAGAN	.004366463	.03	.4880
CONFRONT	.261891205	1.62	.0526
PRESENCE	.250427300	2.47	.0068
U.S. AID	-.118740450	1.34	.0901
PRIOR	-.074774212	.73	.2327
SOVIET AID	.031722264	.46	.3228
MEDIA COVERAGE	.074867874	1.48	.0694
ANTI-U.S.	.144775964	1.77	.0384
POPULARITY	-.174254266	1.89	.0294
WAR	-.028643523	.22	.4129
INTERNAL	.156325603	1.18	.1190
ACCESS	-.199263104	1.20	.1151
NUMBERS	.196786002	3.32	.0000
SELECTION TERM	-2.022549607	.73	.2327
CONSTANT	.070791008	.29	.4247

Percent Correctly Predicted: 76.0

Further information about the use of force across presidential administrations and regions can be gleaned from Tables 9 through 12. An examination of the changing temporal and regional differences in the use of force may yield further insights into possible changes or variations in American foreign policy. While this information does not directly test the validity of the models, it may highlight strong and weak areas of model performance. The changing nature of the use of military force across presidential administrations is examined first.

Presidential Administrations and the Use of Force. First it can be seen that there are wide discrepancies between the likelihood of uses of force and high force levels across administrations when not controlling for other factors. Several findings are notable. First, there is a substantial decrease in the probability of uses of force during the Truman, Nixon and Ford administrations. The impact of the Korean and Vietnam wars probably best explains the reluctance of these presidents to employ military force elsewhere. Interestingly, although Harry Truman was the least likely president to use force, he was most likely to use a high level of force. The Cold War tensions over Central Europe may account for this finding. Truman appears to have responded only to serious aggression which necessitated an equally severe military rejoinder.

The presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Reagan saw the most active application of military force. Both Blechman and Kaplan (1978, p. 52) and Ostrom and Job (1986, p. 559) concur that the first three administrations employed the military rather frequently and used high levels of force more often than most other administrations. Several explanations of this phenomenon are possible. First, the explosion of new nation-states in the Third World, especially in the early

Table 9: Opportunity/Use of Force Ratios By President

President	Uses	Opportunities	Use/Opportunity Ratio
Truman	11	40	28%
Eisenhower	51	82	62%
Kennedy	34	52	65%
Johnson	39	65	60%
Nixon	16	51	31%
Ford	8	23	35%
Carter	13	26	50%
Reagan	45	73	62%
All Presidents	217	412	52.6%

Table 10: Use of Force/Force Level Ratios By President

President	High Level Uses	Total Uses	Use of Force/Force Level Ratio
Truman	7	11	63%
Eisenhower	29	51	57%
Kennedy	20	34	59%
Johnson	13	39	33%
Nixon	5	16	31%
Ford	4	8	50%
Carter	5	13	38%
Reagan	20	45	44%
All Presidents	103	217	47%

Table 11: Opportunity/Use of Force Ratios By Region

Region	Uses	Opportunities	Use/Opportunity Ratio
Central America	58	84	69%
South America	12	39	31%
Western Europe	17	26	65%
Eastern Europe	5	21	24%
Middle East	54	106	51%
Sub-Saharan Africa	15	40	38%
Southwest Asia	5	14	36%
Southeast Asia	35	53	66%
East Asia	16	29	55%
All Regions	217	412	52.6%

Table 12: Use of Force/Force Level Ratios By Region

Region	High Level Uses	Total Uses	Use of Force/Force Level Ratios
Central America	22	58	38%
South America	1	12	8%
Western Europe	12	17	70%
Eastern Europe	3	5	60%
Middle East	31	54	57%
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	15	6%
Southwest Asia	1	5	20%
Southeast Asia	22	35	63%
East Asia	10	16	63%
All Regions	103	217	47%

1960's, created many unstable governments and movements for secession. Thus, the number of opportunities to use force necessarily rose during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson years. Second, the call from Peking and Moscow for wars of national liberation not only inspired many of these newly independent nations to rid themselves of Western influence, it also seriously concerned the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Thus, the presence of both tremendous incentives and opportunity to use force during this period, rather than any forces peculiar to these administrations explains why presidents engaged in heightened military activity.

As others have speculated (Ostrom and Job, 1986), the Reagan presidency was indeed a time of heightened military force deployments. In fact, the predicted probabilities of force during the Reagan years are the highest in the model, reaching an average of 79 percent in 1983. Again, however, Reagan's increased activity can be explained with reference to the domestic and international conditions included in the decision-making models rather than any idiosyncrasies of the man and his administration. First, the American public's frustration with the country's inability to deal with Third World despots and the rising Soviet military capability allowed Reagan greater latitude in foreign affairs than his immediate predecessors. Second, increased threats to American citizens from terrorists and renegade governments provided many opportunities for "surgical" uses of force. Thus, although popular opinion has portrayed Reagan as a rather militant cold warrior, his behavior in office has not deviated significantly from other administrations when qualifying factors are taken into effect.

Interestingly, however, only three presidents utilized high force levels less than Ronald Reagan. Thus, despite his harsh rhetoric and intransigence toward the Soviets, Reagan was rather judicious in the

manner in which he used force. His administration appeared to appreciate both the need to demonstrate American credibility via the military and the need to avoid excessive amounts of force which might inextricably involve the United States in complex Third World conflicts. Another explanation that was not tested here concerns American public attitudes toward the danger of not only drawn-out conventional wars, but nuclear war with the Soviet Union. During Reagan's first term there was a strong anti-nuclear movement in the United States and Western Europe. And while Reagan disagreed with many of its goals, it is possible he felt that public opinion would not countenance high level military action if it felt there was a possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Such a hypothesis, while not attempted here, might yield further interesting conclusions regarding the role of public opinion in foreign policy.

The findings described above indicate that while there are apparent inconsistencies and differences among presidential administrations, they may be accounted for by factors included in the decision-making models. Nonetheless, future tests ought to be performed to conclusively determine the impact of individual presidents on foreign policy. For example, the models used here might be applied to each administration to judge their fit. Further attention might also be given to the role of opportunity in predicting when force is used. A model capable of explaining the occurrence of opportunity would prove especially useful. In this way the consistency and evolution of American foreign policy during the Cold War might better be detailed.

Regional Variations in the Use of Force. There is also a great deal of diversity in the use of force across the nine different regions when all other things are not equal. First, uses of force occurred

rather frequently in Central America, Western Europe and Southeast Asia. Longstanding American interest in Central American instability may account for much of the activity in this region. Presidents have used military force in pursuit of political, economic and military goals in this region since the turn of the century. In a region dominated by ever-changing military dictatorships and other unstable forms of government, presidents have had both the opportunity and the incentive to intervene in America's "backyard". In addition, its proximity, the Panama Canal and the presence of a military base in Cuba have provided further reason for American attention. Even into the 1980's events in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras have demonstrated the continuing American interest in this region.

Yet, while Central America was the most popular region for uses of force, only 35 percent of these uses were high force level uses. Only South America and Sub-Saharan Africa saw a smaller percentage of high level uses of force. It is possible that presidents did not feel that large displays of force were necessary in response to the largely internal events which characterized opportunities in this region. Some element of complacency over American domination of this region since the Monroe Doctrine may also explain the lack of major displays of military power in this area.

The importance of Western Europe and the NATO alliance is intrinsic to American security and thus any occasion for concern in this area almost always necessitates a high level use of force. The U.S. fought two world wars on the continent and the Cold War began and ended in Europe. And finally the presence of the largest contingent of the American military outside the U.S. conclusively demonstrates just how vital all presidents have felt European stability was to American security. Therefore, the numerous high level uses of force is largely

accounted for by the American commitment to this region. Should the U.S. falter in its support to the nations of Western Europe, presidents have felt that the Soviet Union might extend its Iron Curtain even further.

The presence of numerous insurgencies in Southeast Asia during the 1960's explains in large part why this area was so frequently the site of American uses of force. In fact, 50 percent of all the uses in this region occurred in the period between 1960 through 1965. Communist movements in Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia were all perceived to be harbingers of future low-intensity conflicts elsewhere. Kennedy and Johnson made South Vietnam the lynchpin of the strategy of symmetric containment. They consistently used high levels of force in all these nations to communicate to the Soviets and Chinese their willingness to pay any price and bear any burden in support of pro-Western governments.

Force was rarely employed in South America, Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. First, the relative lack of U.S. forces in the South Atlantic and the difficulty in getting to the southerly and landlocked nations on the South American continent may explain why this area of the Western Hemisphere did not receive much military attention. The possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union accounts in large measure for the absence of all but five uses of force in Eastern Europe (this also includes Finland and the Baltic Sea area. Finally, the perceived insignificance of Africa may explain why these areas were so neglected. Despite controversies over Angola, South Africa and Zaire, presidents have generally decided that military aid and covert operations were much more suitable for battling communist influence in this area. Thus, there would seem to be a strong geo-strategic component to presidential decisions. Only those areas where there is a significant degree of military investment and commitment warrant the utilization of

force. Thus, credibility must generally be at stake before presidents decide to deploy the military.

There is a mixed record of the use of force in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and East Asia. The use of force in the Middle East in particular presents an interesting picture of the evolution of American foreign policy and the use of military force. During the 1950s the Eisenhower administration was quite active in political developments in this region. From the tension between Iran and the Soviet Union, to the conflict over the Suez Canal and the invasion of Lebanon, Eisenhower was able to successfully project American military might with relative ease. A reliance upon Israel and the Shah produced a feeling of complacency in later administrations, however, and with the exception of brief American involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars, there were few uses of force in the Middle East during the 1960's and 1970's. Presidents only became involved when events seemed to demand a use of force.

In the 1980's, however, the problems resulting from complacency and lack of involvement came home to roost and the U.S. began its most active period of military involvement in Middle East politics. In fact, 33 percent of all uses of forces in this region occurred between 1979 and 1984. Thus, again when the need arose and the opportunity presented itself, presidents used military force. This ebb and flow of U.S. involvement may explain in part why the models found it difficult to predict uses of force in this region. It would suggest that there may be particular features of Middle East politics or reliance on other powers which the model does not incorporate into its predictions. This possibility will be explored in future research.

Ultimately, there is a strong geo-strategic component to the use of force predicated primarily upon extensive American military involvement in many states. These findings generally support the idea that

different parts of the globe were more important than others because of the degree of American credibility at risk. Future research on regional variations might apply these models to various areas of the world to investigate the possibility of intra-regional differences. Such research might also examine the relationship between the use of force and a country's economic capacity, its size and proximity to other conflicts.

Incorrectly Predicted Cases

In order to illuminate problems the models had in correctly predicting the force decisions, a general description of the incorrectly predicted cases is presented in tables 13 through 16 (all opportunities are listed in Table 17). Table 13 lists both those cases where the first model predicted a use of force where there was none and Table 14 lists the cases in which there was a use of force where the model predicted there would not be one. Tables 15 and 16 present these same types of errors for the force-level model. There are not any striking patterns to be found in these two types of cases which might lead one to believe that there had been any serious errors of omission or commission in the models. There are, however, some interesting trends which are worthy of comment.

First, many of the cases where the model incorrectly predicts a military response or a high level use of force occurred in areas which had been the site of many previous uses. Cuba, South Korea, and Lebanon have been the targets of uses of force quite often because of the unique and somewhat unstable positions they occupy in Cold War geopolitics. In fact, the 54 incorrectly predicted cases occurred in only 33 nations. The average number of uses of force occurring in these nations is five (the average number of uses among all nations which were sites of uses

Table 13: False Positive Errors For The Use of Force Equation

PREDICT - USE ACTUAL - NO USE			PREDICT - USE ACTUAL - NO USE		
MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION	MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
4	53	REBEL PROBLEMS IN LAOS	2	80	COLUMBIA REBELS SEIZE EMBASSY
9	54	CHINA/TAIWAN FIGHTING	5	80	CUBAN MIGS SINK BAHAMAN BOAT
1	55	TACHEN ISLANDS EVACUATED	7	81	ISRAEL BOMBS PLO IN LEBANON
4	57	HONDURAS/NICARAGUA FIGHT	12	80	JORDAN/SYRIA FIGHTING
10	57	SYRIA/TURKEY CRISIS	8	82	MILITARY COUP IN KENYA
11	58	US PRESENCE IN BERLIN	4	83	US EMBASSY BOMBED IN BEIRUT
12	59	ANTI-US RIOTS IN PANAMA	10	83	MARINES KILLED IN BEIRUT BOMB
1	60	CUBA SEIZES US PROPERTY	12	83	US EMBASSY BOMBED IN KUWAIT
4	60	SOUTH KOREA/RHEE TOPPLED	6	84	SAUDIS DOWN IRANIAN PLANES
12	60	LAOS/CIVIL WAR			
3	61	ANGOLA/ANTI US RIOTS			
4	61	LAOS CIVIL WAR			
12	61	CONGO FIGHTING IN KATANGA			
1	62	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC COUPS			
1	62	INDONESIA/DUTCH CRISIS			
2	62	US PRESENCE IN BERLIN			
10	62	YEMEN CIVIL WAR			
10	63	ALGERIA/MOROCCO BORDER DISPUTE			
2	64	CUBA CUTS OFF GUANTANAMO WATER			
8	64	REGIME INSTABILITY IN S. VIETNAM			
3	65	INDONESIA SEIZES US OIL FIRMS			
5	65	INDIA INCURSION INTO KASMIR			
11	65	RHODESIA PROBLEMS			
12	65	UNREST IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC			
11	67	CYPRUS WAR THREAT			
3	68	JORDAN/ISRAEL FIGHTING			
4	68	TWO US SOLDIERS DIE IN N.KOREA			
10	69	LEBANON FIGHTS PLO			
10	69	N.KOREA KILLS US SOLDIERS			
3	71	EAST PAKISTAN CIVIL WAR			
9	72	ISRAEL INVADES LEBANON			
7	75	CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA			
8	75	CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON			
10	75	MOROCCO/SPAIN DISPUTE			
12	75	ANGOLA CIVIL WAR			
12	75	INDONESIA INVADES TIMOR			
1	76	MOROCCO/ALGERIA WAR			
6	76	SYRIA INVADES LEBANON			
4	77	ZAIRE INVADED BY REBELS			
7	77	US HELICOPTER DOWN BY N. KOREA			
7	77	EGYPT/LIBYA BORDER FIGHTING			
8	77	ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA FIGHTING			
11	78	MILITARY RULE IN IRAN			
6	79	INSURGENCY IN NICARAGUA			
12	79	US EMBASSY IN LIBYA BURNED			

Table 14: False Negative Errors For The Use of Force Equation

PREDICT - NO USE ACTUAL - USE

MONTH YEAR EVENT DESCRIPTION

1	48	ARAB/ISRAELI WAR
12	49	CHINA/NATIONALISTS TO TAIWAN
6	50	ANTI-US RIOTS IN VIETNAM
8	50	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON
3	56	JORDAN/GLUBB OUSTED
3	57	INDONESIA REVOLT CRUSHED
6	57	HAITI MILITARY COUP
6	57	LEBANON RIOTS AND ELECTIONS
1	58	VENEZUELA UNREST
1	59	THAILAND/CAMBODIA CONFLICT
4	59	PANAMA/INVASION FROM CUBA
2	60	ARGENTINA/MYSTERY SUB
6	61	UNIDENTIFIED SUB BY ECUADOR
6	61	ZANZIBAR CIVIL STRIFE
5	62	USSR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN BALTIC
8	62	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN HAITI
4	63	JORDAN GOVERNMENT FALLS
9	63	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC COUP
3	64	BRAZIL MILITARY COUP
5	64	STRIFE IN BRITISH GUIANA
8	65	CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN
4	67	MILITARY COUP IN GREECE
8	68	USSR INVADES CZECHOSLOVAKIA
12	68	N.KOREA ATTACKS SOUTH FISHING
5	69	RIOTS IN CURACAO
12	69	DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA
4	70	INSURGENTS IN HAITI
4	70	CIVIL DISORDER IN TRINIDAD
10	70	USSR SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA
4	71	DUVALIER DIES IN HAITI
10	73	OIL CRISIS
7	76	TENSION BETWEEN UGANDA & KENYA
6	78	RIGHTS OF PASSAGE IN OKHOTSK
9	78	USSR PRESSURES FINLAND
10	79	S.KOREAN PRESIDENT ASSISINATED
1	80	USSR INVADES AFGHANISTAN
5	80	SOUTH KOREA KWANJU UPRISING
12	80	POLITICAL CRISIS IN POLAND
2	81	ECUADOR/PERU FIGHTING
12	82	MILITARY EXERCISES OFF OMAN
7	83	LIBYAN INTERVENTION IN CHAD

Table 15: False Positive Errors For The Force-Level Equation

PREDICT - HIGH LEVEL FORCE ACTUAL - LOW LEVEL FORCE

MONTH YEAR EVENT DESCRIPTION

2	57	RED SEA/AQABA DISPUTE
6	58	CUBAN REBELS TAKE US CITIZENS
7	60	CONGO UPRISING
8	60	MILITARY COUP IN LAOS
12	60	SECURITY OF GUANTANAMO
1	61	CONGO CIVIL WAR
1	62	US NOTICES BUILD-UP IN CUBA
4	64	SECURITY OF GUANTANAMO
6	64	CYPRUS VIOLENCE
8	64	CONGO CIVIL WAR
1	75	CYPRUS UNREST
11	78	MIGS IN CUBA
3	83	SECURITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA
6	83	INSURGENCY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
6	83	SYRIA IN LEBANON
9	83	FIGHTING IN LEBANON
2	84	US SHIPS SHELL SYRIANS

Table 16: False Negative Errors For The Force-Level Equation

PREDICT - LOW LEVEL FORCE ACTUAL - HIGH LEVEL FORCE

MONTH YEAR EVENT DESCRIPTION

8	50	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON
3	51	SECURITY OF YUGOSLAVIA
3	54	DIEN BIEN PHU
7	54	CHINESE DOWN UK AIRLINER
3	56	JORDAN/GLUBB OUSTED
7	56	EGYPT NATIONALIZES SUEZ CANAL
3	57	INDONESIA REVOLT CRUSHED
12	57	INDONESIA/NETHERLANDS CRISIS
2	58	INDONESIAN UNREST
8	59	LAOS CIVIL WAR
11	60	CUBAN THREAT TO GUATEMALA
5	61	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/TRUJILLO KILLED
5	62	USSR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN BALTIC
4	63	JORDAN GOVERNMENT FALLS
9	63	INDONESIA/MALAYSIA CRISIS
9	64	INDONESIA/MALAYSIA DISPUTE
9	65	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CIVIL WAR
8	68	USSR INVADES CZECHOSLOVAKIA
6	70	JORDAN/PROBLEMS WITH PLO
11	74	ARAB OIL POLICY
11	79	IRAN HOSTAGE TAKING
1	80	USSR INVADES AFGHANISTAN
5	81	ISRAELI JETS IN LEBANON
8	81	US/LIBYA CLASH IN SIDRA GULF
11	81	SECURITY OF PERSIAN GULF
3	82	PROBLEMS WITH SINAI TRANSITION
12	82	MILITARY EXER. OFF OMAN
1	84	NICARAGUA DOWNS US HELICOPTER

TABLE 17: LIST OF ALL CASES

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1	48	GREEK CIVIL WAR
1	48	ARAB/ISRAELI WAR
1	48	SECURITY OF TRIESTE
1	48	SECURITY OF BERLIN
2	48	COUP IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
3	48	RIGHTIST REBELS IN COSTA RICA
4	48	FIGHTING IN PALESTINE
4	48	BERLIN AIRLIFT
4	48	COLUMBIA RIOTS
6	48	BERLIN AIRLIFT PART 2
10	48	SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM NORTH KOREA
10	48	MILITARY COUP IN PERU
11	48	VENEZUELAN COUP
12	48	COSTA RICAN INVASION
12	48	DUTCH BREAK TRUCE
2	49	COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN SIAM
2	49	CHINESE CIVIL WAR
3	49	USSR RELATIONS WITH IRAN
3	49	MILITARY COUP IN SYRIA
7	49	UNREST IN GUATEMALA
8	49	YUGOSLAVIA/USSR DISPUTE
11	49	COLUMBIA DISORDER
11	49	PANAMANIAN REVOLUTION
12	49	CHINA/NATIONALISTS GO TO TAIWAN
6	50	ANTI-US RIOTS IN VIETNAM
6	50	US NAVY DEFENDS TAIWAN STRAITS
6	50	FRENCH/VIET-MINH WAR
8	50	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON
3	51	SECURITY OF YUGOSLAVIA
5	51	UNREST IN PANAMA
10	51	COUP IN VENEZUELA
10	51	IRAN/UK OIL CRISIS
10	51	EGYPT UK OIL CRISIS
1	52	EGYPTIAN RIOTING
3	52	CUBAN UNREST
4	52	LEFTIST REVOLUTION IN BOLIVIA
6	52	US/JAPAN RELATIONSHIP
7	52	IRANIAN RIOTS/MOSSADEGH RETURNS
7	52	KING ABDICATES IN EGYPT
10	52	USSR RELATIONS WITH SWEDEN
2	53	TAIWAN DENEUTRALIZED BY US
3	53	MIG DOWNS NATO PLANES IN WEST GERMANY
4	53	REBEL PROBLEMS IN LAOS
6	53	EAST GERMAN RIOTS
8	53	SECURITY OF JAPAN

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
8	53	MOSSADEGH TOPPLED IN IRAN
3	54	DIEN BIEN PHU
5	54	GUATEMALA GETS USSR ARMS
6	54	ARBENZ TOPPLED IN GUATEMALA
7	54	VIETNAM ARMISTICE
7	54	CHINESE DOWN UK AIRLINER
8	54	TACHEN ISLANDS FIGHTING
9	54	CHINA/TAIWAN FIGHTING
11	54	ATTEMPTED COUP IN EGYPT
1	55	TACHEN ISLANDS EVACUATED
1	55	COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA FIGHTING
9	55	PERON TOPPLED IN ARGENTINA
1	56	TAIWAN/CHINA CONFLICT
2	56	EGYPT/ISRAELI RED SEA CONFLICT
3	56	GLUBB OUSTED IN JORDAN
5	56	SECURITY OF US BASES IN MOROCCO
6	56	POLISH REBELLION
7	56	EGYPT NATIONALIZES SUEZ CANAL
10	56	REBELLION IN POLAND
10	56	ISRAEL INVADES SINAI
10	56	REBELLION IN HUNGARY
11	56	CRISIS IN HUNGARY
12	56	ATTEMPTED COUP IN HAITI
12	56	SYRIA GETS USSR ARMS
2	57	DISPUTE OVER RED SEA/AQABA
3	57	REVOLT CRUSHED IN INDONESIA
4	57	DISORDER IN JORDAN
4	57	HONDURAS/NICARAGUA FIGHTING
5	57	ANTI-US RIOTS IN TAIWAN
6	57	MILITARY COUP IN HAITI
6	57	LEBANON RIOTS AND ELECTIONS
7	57	REBELLION IN OMAN
7	57	CHINA/TAIWAN CONFLICT
8	57	SYRIA COUP AND CRISIS WITH US
9	57	USSR RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
10	57	SYRIA/TURKEY CRISIS
12	57	INDONESIA/NETHERLANDS CRISIS
1	58	VENEZUELA UNREST
2	58	INDONESIAN UNREST
5	58	LEBANON/ANTI-US VIOLENCE
5	58	NIXON HARASSED IN VENEZUELA
6	58	CYPRUS DISPUTE
6	58	CUBAN REBELS TAKE US CITIZENS
7	58	IRAQI LEFTIST COUP
7	58	LEBANESE UNREST
7	58	JORDAN UNREST
8	58	QUEMOY AND MATSU CRISIS

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
10	58	CUBAN INSURGENTS KIDNAP US CITIZENS
11	58	US PRESENCE IN BERLIN
1	59	CASTRO SEIZES POWER
1	59	THAILAND/CAMBODIA CONFLICT
2	59	BERLIN TENSION
3	59	IRAQI COUP FAILS
3	59	TIBET REVOLT AGAINST CHINA
4	59	PANAMA/INVASION FROM CUBA
5	59	BERLIN/USSR ULTIMATUM PASSES
7	59	TAIWAN/CHINA FIGHTING
8	59	CIVIL WAR IN LAOS
8	59	REBELS FROM CUBA IN HAITI
11	59	DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
12	59	ANTI-US RIOTS IN PANAMA
12	59	PARAGUAY/REBEL INVASION
1	60	CUBA SEIZES US PROPERTY
2	60	ARGENTINA/MYSTERY SUBMARINE
2	60	ANTI-CASTRO OVERFLY IN CUBA
4	60	RHEE TOPPLED IN SOUTH KOREA
5	60	U2 INCIDENT
7	60	CONGO UPRISING
8	60	MILITARY COUP IN LAOS
9	60	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
9	60	CONGO CIVIL WAR
11	60	CUBAN THREAT TO GUATEMALA
12	60	CIVIL WAR IN LAOS
12	60	SECURITY OF GUANTANAMO
12	60	CIVIL WAR IN LAOS
1	61	EL SALVADOR COUP
1	61	CONGO CIVIL WAR
2	61	CIVIL WAR IN LAOS
2	61	REBELS TAKE PORTUGUESE SHIP
3	61	ANGOLA/ANTI-US RIOTS
3	61	CARIBBEAN/WESTERN UNION SHIP
4	61	CUBA BAY OF PIGS
4	61	LAOS CIVIL WAR
5	61	COUP IN SOUTH KOREA
5	61	TRUJILLO KILLED IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
6	61	UNIDENTIFIED SUB BY ECUADOR
6	61	ZANZIBAR CIVIL STRIFE
6	61	BERLIN CRISIS
7	61	CIVIL WAR IN LAOS
7	61	KUWAIT DISPUTE
8	61	EAST GERMANY/BERLIN CRISIS
11	61	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC COUP
11	61	ECUADOR DISORDER
12	61	SOUTH VIETNAM CIVIL WAR

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
12	61	CONGO FIGHTING IN KATANGA
1	62	ATTEMPTED COUP IN PORTUGAL
1	62	US NOTICES BUILD-UP IN CUBA
1	62	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC COUPS
1	62	INDONESIA/DUTCH CRISIS
2	62	US PRESENCE IN BERLIN
2	62	SOUTH VIETNAM CIVIL WAR
3	62	UNREST IN GUATEMALA
5	62	REVOLT IN VENEZUELA
5	62	INDONESIA DUTCH FIGHTING
5	62	USSR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN BALTIC
5	62	LAOS CIVIL WAR
6	62	TAIWAN STRAITS TENSION
7	62	ALGERIA CIVIL WAR
8	62	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN HAITI
10	62	YEMEN CIVIL WAR
10	62	CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
10	62	INDIA/CHINA WAR
12	62	COUP ATTEMPT IN GUATEMALA
2	63	VENEZUELAN SHIP SEIZED
2	63	YEMEN CIVIL WAR
4	63	HAITI/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DISPUTE
4	63	JORDAN GOVERNMENT FALLS
4	63	LAOS CIVIL WAR
5	63	LAOS CIVIL WAR
6	63	SOUTH VIETNAM BUDDHIST CRISIS
8	63	HAITI/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DISPUTE
9	63	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC COUP
9	63	INDONESIA/MALAYSIA CRISIS
10	63	HONDURAS COUP
10	63	SECURITY OF BERLIN
10	63	ALGERIA/MOROCCO BORDER DISPUTE
11	63	COUP IN SOUTH VIETNAM/DIEM KILLED
11	63	IRAQI COUP FROM LEFT
11	63	CUBAN INSURGENTS IN VENEZUELA
1	64	CUBA SUPPORTS MEXICAN INSURGENTS
1	64	PANAMA RIOTS
1	64	COMMUNIST REVOLT IN ZANZIBAR
1	64	SOUTH VIETNAM COUP
1	64	FIGHTING ON CYPRUS
2	64	CUBA CUTS OFF GUANTANAMO WATER
3	64	CAMBODIA/ANTI-US RIOTS
3	64	BRAZIL MILITARY COUP
4	64	SECURITY OF GUANTANAMO
4	64	LAOS RIGHTIST COUP
5	64	STRIFE IN BRITISH GUIANA
6	64	CYPRUS VIOLENCE

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
7	64	CUBA SUPPORTS DOMINICAN REPUBLIC INSURGENTS
8	64	INSURGENTS IN HAITI
8	64	TONKIN GULF RETALIATION
8	64	CONGO CIVIL WAR
8	64	TURKISH PLANES BOMB IN CYPRUS
8	64	REGIME INSTABILITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
9	64	VENEZUELA CUBAN INSURGENTS
9	64	INDONESIA/MALAYSIA DISPUTE
11	64	MILITARY COUP IN BOLIVIA
11	64	INSTABILITY IN SUDAN
11	64	CONGO VIOLENCE
1	65	WORSENING RELATIONS WITH TANZANIA
3	65	INDONESIA SEIZES US OIL FIRMS
4	65	CIVIL WAR IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
4	65	CUBAN INSURGENTS IN BRITISH GUIANA
5	65	CUBAN INSURGENTS IN VENEZUELA
5	65	INDIA INCURSION INTO KASMIR
6	65	ALGERIA/BEN BELLA OUSTED
7	65	CYPRUS/POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
8	65	PAKISTAN/INDIA WAR
8	65	CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN
9	65	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CIVIL WAR
10	65	INDONESIA COUP
11	65	RHODESIA PROBLEMS
12	65	UNREST IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
1	66	COUP IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
2	66	CIVIL UNREST IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
2	66	NKRUMAH OVERTHROWN IN GHANA
2	66	LEFTIST COUP IN SYRIA
6	66	MILITARY COUP IN ARGENTINA
6	66	MILITARY COUP IN ARGENTINA
11	66	ISRAEL/JORDAN HOSTILITIES
12	66	THAILAND INSURGENTS
1	67	NORTH KOREA SINKS ROK PATROL
4	67	MILITARY COUP IN GREECE
5	67	SIX DAY WAR
7	67	NIGERIA/BIAFRAN CIVIL WAR
7	67	CONGO REBELLION IN KATANGA
8	67	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS
9	67	CHINESE SPONSERED UNREST IN HONG KONG
10	67	ISRAELI DESTROYER SUNK BY EGYPT
11	67	CYPRUS WAR THREAT
12	67	YEMEN CIVIL WAR
1	68	NORTH KOREA SEIZES PUEBLO
3	68	JORDAN/ISRAEL FIGHTING
4	68	TWO US SOLDIERS DIE IN NORTH KOREA

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
7	68	USSR RELATIONS WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA
8	68	USSR INVADES CZECHOSLOVAKIA
10	68	MILITARY COUP IN PANAMA
10	68	PERU MILITARY COUP
11	68	MILITARY COUP IN MALI
12	68	ISRAEL INVADES LEBANON
12	68	NORTH KOREA ATTACKS SOUTH KOREAN FISHING
3	69	USSR/PRC BORDER FIGHT
3	69	MILITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN
4	69	PERU SEIZES US FISHING BOATS
4	69	NORTH KOREA DOWNS US PLANE
5	69	RIOTS IN CURACAO
5	69	LEFTIST COUP IN SUDAN
7	69	SALVADORIANS INVADE HONDURAS
9	69	LIBYA MILITARY COUP
9	69	BOLIVIA MILITARY COUP
10	69	LEBANON FIGHTS PLO
10	69	NORTH KOREA KILLS US SOLDIERS
12	69	USSR RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA
12	69	DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA
2	70	UNREST IN PHILLIPINES
4	70	INSURGENTS IN HAITI
4	70	CIVIL DISORDER IN TRINIDAD
6	70	PROBLEMS WITH PLO IN JORDAN
9	70	CIVIL WAR WITH PLO IN JORDAN
10	70	LEFTIST MILITARY COUP IN BOLIVIA
10	70	USSR SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA
10	70	ALLENDE INAUGARATED IN CHILE
11	70	COUP IN SYRIA
11	70	GUINEA INSTABILITY
12	70	CIVIL DISORDER IN POLAND
1	71	MILITARY COUP IN UGANDA
3	71	EAST PAKISTAN CIVIL WAR
4	71	ARMED REBELLION IN CEYLON
4	71	DUVALIER DIES IN HAITI
5	71	EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS
5	71	SEA OF JAPAN STAND DOWN
7	71	CHILE NATIONALIZES US COPPER
7	71	COUPS IN SUDAN
8	71	COUP IN BOLIVIA
12	71	PAKISTAN/INDIA WAR
2	72	CUBA SEIZES MERCHANTMAN
5	72	CIVIL WAR IN BURUNDI
9	72	ISRAEL INVADES LEBANON
3	73	UNREST IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
4	73	IRAQI/KUWAITI DISPUTE
5	73	STATE OF EMERGENCY IN ARGENTINA
5	73	PLO VS. LEBANESE ARMY

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
6	73	GENOCIDE IN BURUNDI
7	73	UNREST IN URUGUAY
8	73	MILITARY COUP IN CHILE
8	73	LIBYA NATIONALIZES OIL COMPANY
10	73	YOM KIPPUR WAR
10	73	OIL CRISIS
1	74	CHINA TAKES OVER PARACELS
2	74	IRAN/IRAQ WAR
4	74	MILITARY COUP IN PORTUGAL
7	74	CYPRUS MILITARY COUP
9	74	MILITARY COUP IN ETHIOPIA
9	74	UNREST IN ARGENTINA
11	74	ARAB OIL POLICY
1	75	CYPRUS UNREST
2	75	ETHIOPIA/HEAVY FIGHTING IN ERITREA
3	75	KING ASSISINATED SAUDI ARABIA
4	75	CAMBODIA REGIME FALLS
5	75	REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM FALLS
5	75	MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT
7	75	POLITICAL CRISIS IN PORTUGAL
7	75	CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA
8	75	CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON
8	75	MILITARY COUP IN BANGLADESH
10	75	MOROCCO/SPAIN DISPUTE
12	75	ANGOLA CIVIL WAR
12	75	INDONESIA INVADES TIMOR
1	76	MOROCCO/ALGERIA WAR
3	76	CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON
3	76	MILITARY COUP IN ARGENTINA
6	76	SYRIA INVADES LEBANON
7	76	TENSION BETWEEN UGANDA AND KENYA
7	76	UNREST IN JAMAICA
8	76	NORTH KOREA KILLS US OFFICERS
2	77	AMIN THREATENS US CITIZENS
3	77	MENGISTU EMPOWERED IN ETHIOPIA
4	77	ZAIRE INVADED BY REBELS
7	77	US HELICOPTER DOWN BY NORTH KOREA
7	77	EGYPT/LIBYA BORDER FIGHTING
8	77	ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA FIGHTING
2	78	ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA FIGHTING
5	78	ANGOLA REBELS INVADE ZAIRES
6	78	RIGHTS OF PASSAGE IN OKHOTSK
9	78	INSURGENCY IN NICARAGUA
9	78	USSR PRESSURES FINLAND
11	78	UGANDA INVADES TANZANIA
11	78	MILITARY RULE IN IRAN
11	78	MIGS IN CUBA

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
12	78	MASSIVE UNREST IN IRAN
1	79	CHINA AND VIETNAM BORDER DISPUTE
2	79	BAHKTAR TOPPLED IN IRAN
2	79	CHINA INVADES VIETNAM
3	79	BORDER FIGHTING IN YEMEN
3	79	TANZANIA INVADES UGANDA
6	79	INSURGENCY IN NICARAGUA
10	79	SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA
10	79	SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT ASSASSINATED
11	79	IRAN HOSTAGE TAKING
12	79	US EMBASSY IN LIBYA BURNED
1	80	USSR INVADES AFGHANISTAN
2	80	COLUMBIA REBELS SEIZE EMBASSY
4	80	IRAN/IRAQ BORDER DISPUTE
4	80	US HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION
5	80	CUBAN MIGS SINK BAHAMAN BOAT
5	80	KWANJU UPRISING IN SOUTH KOREA
7	80	THAILAND/VIETNAM FIGHTING
7	80	MILITARY COUP IN BOLIVIA
8	80	MASSIVE UNREST IN POLAND
8	80	MILITARY COUP IN SURINAM
9	80	MILITARY COUP IN TURKEY
9	80	IRAN/IRAQ WAR BEGINS
10	80	USSR BORDER PROBLEMS WITH CHINA
12	80	JORDAN/SYRIA FIGHTING
12	80	POLITICAL CRISIS IN POLAND
1	81	INSURGENCY IN EL SALVADOR
2	81	ECUADOR/PERU FIGHTING
5	81	ISRAELI JETS IN LEBANON
5	81	HONDURAS/NICARAGUA FIGHTING
6	81	ISRAEL BOMBS IRAQI NUCLEAR PLANT
7	81	ISRAEL BOMBS PLO IN LEBANON
8	81	MILITARY COUP IN GAMBIA
8	81	US/LIBYA CLASH IN SIDRA GULF
9	81	SOUTH AFRICA INVADES ANGOLA
9	81	US/USSR MILITARY EXERCISES IN BALTIC
10	81	MILITARY EXERCISES IN CENTRAL AMERICA
10	81	BOTSWANA SWINGS LEFT WITH USSR AID
10	81	SADAT ASSASSINATED
11	81	SECURITY OF PERSIAN GULF
12	81	MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND
12	81	US RIGHTS OF PASSAGE OFF ALBANIA
1	82	INSURGENCY IN EL SALVADOR
3	82	PROBLEMS WITH SINAI TRANSITION
5	82	FALKLANDS WAR
6	82	ISRAEL INVADES LEBANON
7	82	ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA FIGHTING

Table 17 (cont'd)

MONTH	YEAR	EVENT DESCRIPTION
8	82	MILITARY COUP IN KENYA
8	82	SECURITY OF HONDURAS
8	82	US MARINES IN LEBANON
9	82	REFUGEE CAMP MASSACRE IN LEBANON
12	82	MILITARY EXERCISES OFF OMAN
2	83	SECURITY OF HONDURAS
2	83	LIBYA\SUDAN TENSION
3	83	SECURITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA
3	83	NICARAGUA SUPPORTS EL SALVADOR INSURGENTS
4	83	US EMBASSY BOMBED IN BEIRUT
4	83	THAILAND/CAMBODIA FIGHTING
6	83	INSURGENCY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
6	83	SYRIA IN LEBANON
7	83	SECURITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA
7	83	LIBYAN INTERVENTION IN CHAD
8	83	COUP IN GUATEMALA
9	83	FIGHTING IN LEBANON
9	83	KAL 007 SHOT DOWN BY SOVIETS
9	83	US NAVY SHELLS LEBANON
10	83	SOUTH KOREAN OFFICIALS ASSASSINATED
10	83	US INVASION OF GRENADA
10	83	MARINES KILLED IN BEIRUT BOMB
12	83	US PLANES BOMB SYRIAN POSITIONS IN LEBANON
12	83	US EMBASSY BOMBED IN KUWAIT
1	84	NICARAGUA DOWNS US HELICOPTER
2	84	US SHIPS SHELL SYRIANS
3	84	SUDAN/LIBYA FIGHTING
4	84	SOVIET SHIPS FIRE AT US SHIPS
4	84	CIA MINES NICARAGUAN HARBORS
5	84	VIOLENCE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
5	84	IRAN ATTACKS SHIPPING IN GULF
6	84	SAUDIS DOWN IRANIAN PLANES
6	84	US/HONDURAS MILITARY EXERCISES
8	84	US/UK CLEAR RED SEA MINES
9	84	US EMBASSY IN BEIRUT BOMBED
11	84	GANDHI ASSASSINATED/UNREST IN INDIA
11	84	US CLAIMS NICARAGUA RECEIVES MIGS
12	84	IRANIANS STORM HIJACKED PLANE

of force is 3.5). Therefore we might expect that there would be many opportunities to use force in or about these nations, some of which for idiosyncratic reasons, presidents choose not to respond to with military force. The models become biased toward predicting uses of force and high level uses of force in almost all these high superpower involvement states. Therefore, one problem the models seem to have is discriminating between the threatening and non-threatening events surrounding particular opportunities to use force.

To illustrate the problems the models faced in predicting either no use of force or low level uses of force, it is instructive to examine some of the cases in more detail. For example, the death of two U.S. soldiers in 1969 in the Demilitarized Zone of Korea at the hands of North Korean soldiers was predicted to be a use of force. An examination of this case reveals that it contained many of the threats to survival which lead presidents to believe action is desirable. Its' location involved a nation where the United States had a permanent military presence, the U.S. had easy access to the region and the violence was a direct attack on American military forces. These factors decisively tipped the scales and the model predicted that there would be a 54 percent probability of a use of force when in fact there was none. Thus, it was primarily the high level American military involvement in the area which caused the model to make this incorrect prediction. As it turned out, president Nixon decided that no response was necessary and contented himself with verbal warnings.

The model also predicts a use of force to occur in the civil war in Angola during the mid 1970's. Because there was extensive media coverage, easy accessibility, and no ongoing war, the predicted probability of military action was, 51 percent. Yet although the Ford administration attempted to make a major case for funding of various

factions of the Angolan rebels, Congress rebelled at U.S. meddling in a distant nation on the heels of the withdrawal from Vietnam. As it turned out, the president decided that American involvement be kept concealed and opted instead to utilize CIA-backed local forces. That the presidents utilized covert operations in several other opportunities (e.g., Iran, 1953; Guatemala, 1954) suggests that options unobservable to the researcher may also play a significant role in presidents' decisions.

When Fidel Castro was threatening the security of the Guantanamo Bay military base in December of 1960, the force level model incorrectly predicts a major military response when the president opted a low level response. Because of the presence of the military base in Cuba, the accessibility of the region, and the major media coverage, these events combined to create an 60 percent probability of a use of force. While the Eisenhower chose not to meet this event with a high level military response, Cuba later became the site of many of the uses of force in the Caribbean region. Eisenhower's reluctance to use major force given his earlier extensive involvement in Central American politics is somewhat puzzling. The death of John Foster Dulles, his evolving image of Latin American politics (Blasier, 1985) and a wait-and-see attitude may help explain the rather subdued naval "presence" Eisenhower opted for to meet this challenge. Thus, even though the force-level model performed admirably in predicting presidential actions, there are undoubtedly many unobservable factors affecting this more particularistic decision.

When the models incorrectly predict no use of force, the opportunities are generally characterized by internal events. Governmental instability, military coups and other intra-state events made up 82 percent of wrongly predicted uses of force. Presidents decided that coups and deteriorating political conditions in places as

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diverse as Haiti, Curaco, Tanzania, Greece and Libya required some show of military might. Yet, because presidents generally did not, however, respond to the vast majority of internal events, the model had difficulty in predicting a use of force when such conditions did occur. In the future, an improved model might attempt a finer discrimination between those internal events of interest to presidents and those of negligible significance.

The peculiarity of several opportunities explains why the models have a problem correctly predicting some uses of force. The ouster of General Glubb in Jordan in 1954, strife in British Guiana in 1964 and a Soviet submarine off the coast of Argentina in 1960 are all examples of idiosyncratic events which typically are not part of any larger pattern of threats. Thus, they do not fit neatly into the pattern of foreign policy beliefs I assume presidents hold. Luckily, since these cases are rare, this type of error is rather infrequent.

An interesting subset of cases are those in which the first model predicted no use of force where there was in fact some deployment of the military. The second model's performance in predicting these 41 cases might be considered somewhat suspect. Since all but 8 of these cases turned out to be low level uses of force, it would seem to indicate that the first model's underestimation of the desirability of using force was not entirely misplaced. However, when we examine the force-level model's performance in predicting these cases, we find that it incorrectly predicted seven of the eight high level uses of force observations. Therefore, some bias from the first equation does carry over into the model's estimation of the force level decision.

Again it is also instructive to examine in depth some of the incorrectly predicted uses and high-level uses of force. For example, Lyndon Johnson surprisingly chose to stage a rather large military

exercise in Western Europe in response to the U.S.S.R.'s 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Only rarely have presidents elected to use military force in response to events in the Warsaw Pact. While this fact explains why the model did not predict a use of force, understanding the American response is not quite as straightforward. Because the exercises took place in West Germany there was little chance of a Soviet-American military confrontation. Thus, Johnson need not have been especially concerned with provoking a shooting war. According to Blechman and Kaplan (1978) there were two main reasons for his actions. First, Johnson felt that the invasion might subsequently threaten Rumania and then Yugoslavia. He believed that these two communist states' slight tilt toward the West might be put in jeopardy and the possibility of exploiting fissures in the communist movement severely reduced. Second, Johnson believed that America's NATO allies needed reassurance about the U.S. commitment to their security in view of this threat and the extensive American involvement in the war in Vietnam (pgs. 473-474). Thus, it becomes important to understand and model not just when important nations are directly endangered, but when they are indirectly threatened as well.

In the case of the takeover of the American embassy in Teheran during the 1979 Iranian revolution, the force-level model incorrectly predicted a low level response. While this event represented an obvious threat to American lives, the lack of significant American or Soviet military involvement and the lingering affects of the Vietnam War cause the model to predict only a 28 percent probability of a high level use of force. Obviously, the threat to American lives was much more pronounced than some past hostage-taking incidents which did not result in a use of force (e.g., Cuba during the 1950's). Furthermore, it was at this time that American public opinion began to demand increased action

to meet the plethora of international crises facing the country. Like many of the models' other incorrect predictions, too much emphasis was placed upon the role of military involvement.

The results of examining these individual cases highlight two problems the models face. First, there are still many idiosyncratic factors influencing presidents' decisions which are not part of the model, such as the ready availability of other attractive options rather than military force. Yet, while added information may improve the models' predictive capacity, it taxes the cybernetic/cognitive model's emphasis on simplicity in decision-making. Second, both models allow the superpower involvement variables to often determine the presidents' choices. Because these are such influential factors they tend to dominate many of the presidents' decisions. In this case the introduction of additional information into the models' might allow for finer discrimination in predicting presidential action. Thus, while the addition of other factors into the models may help alleviate both problems, there are important tradeoffs which must be taken into consideration.

It is also instructive to examine the performance of the two models in predicting some of the major uses of force during the Cold War era. Both models correctly predict the invasions of Lebanon (1958), and the Dominican Republic (1965), the naval quarantine of Cuba during the missile crisis (1962), the uses of force surrounding the various crises over the status of Berlin (1958-1961), U.S. military action during the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the invasion of Grenada (1983). Since an appropriate test of any model is its ability to explain as much as and more than other models (e.g., Tillema, 1971 and Brands, 1987 which focus just on the aforementioned events) the model's overall accuracy does represent a significant advance in the fields of American foreign policy and international relations.

Summary

Six of the seven major hypotheses outlined in Chapters Three and Four and 18 of the 26 operational hypotheses in Chapter Four were supported by the statistical evidence. Thus, a strong case can be made in favor of the plausibility of the cybernetic/cognitive model and the theoretical conceptualization of presidential foreign-policy making. First, presidents do appear to behave as boundedly rational decision makers who utilize only essential information in order to maintain survival. Almost all the indicators of essential information were found to be significant in predicting the presidents' decisions regarding both the use of force and the use of high force levels. Together, these variables were able to predict 76 and 79 percent of the presidents decisions. Thus, the inclusion of additional information would have had only a marginal effect on models' predictions.

Second, because the groups of variables measuring the threats to credibility internationally and domestically, the threat of war and the feasibility of military operations were all significant and in the expected direction, it would appear that they are of vital importance to presidents when making these major foreign policy decisions. If, as was concluded in Chapter Two, that presidents utilize only essential information related to maintaining survival and since this information proved significant in predicting their decisions, we might tentatively conclude that presidents felt this information was crucial in maintaining survival.

Therefore, it would appear that the cybernetic/cognitive model of decision making yields a fairly accurate representation of the manner in which presidents make major foreign policy choices. The relevance of these findings concerning presidential foreign policy goals both for politicians and political scientists is discussed in Chapter Seven.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

Credibility: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research

The results of this dissertation have many implications both for the study of international relations and the conduct of American foreign policy. Perhaps the dissertation's most important finding is the evidence of the impact of threats to credibility on the president's decision-making process. The significance of almost all the individual variables and the general fit of the models strongly suggest that presidents' decisions to employ military force are political decisions, based primarily upon the need to appear credible to a variety of audiences. Such findings should prompt classical realist scholars to give serious thought to questioning the assumptions of their models of international conflict. Traditional concerns such as the balance of power or polarization, although useful concepts at the system or state level of analysis are rather deficient in predicting the foreign policy behavior of key individuals. The concern for domestic and international impressions of American will to use force that characterizes presidential behavior and largely determines where and when they use military force is obscured in the realist framework. The tangible indicators of power and influence which these models are concerned with have, by the admissions of foreign policy makers, been relegated to a secondary role as perceptions of influence and reputation have been ascendant in the bipolar world.

The concern for credibility in American foreign policy is still in evidence today. In the Persian Gulf crisis, the principal justification for the rapid American military build-up in Saudi Arabia centered around

the need to demonstrate that aggression would not be allowed to go unchecked for fear of future contagion effects. By comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolph Hitler and raising the Munich analogy, George Bush has shown that reputation and credibility are still at the forefront of American foreign policy. Therefore, despite the apparent loss of the Soviet Union as the convenient center of gravity for all international wrong-doing, the United States has not relinquished its global responsibilities and capabilities. Coupled with an essentially status quo outlook, American superpower standing has made the U.S. a hegemonic power, and as with all hegemons it is continually conscious of the need to preserve its reputation (Alt, Calvert and Humes, 1988). Thus, although this dissertation is concerned with predicting foreign policy decisions during the Cold War, it would seem that barring any drastic changes in the international balance of power, presidents will continue to be concerned about the preservation of credibility. The problem for presidents may lie in establishing some new rationale rather than anti-communism to rally domestic and international support for military operations to preserve credibility.

Whether or not the use of military force to support American credibility has always led presidents down desirable or appropriate paths and is deserving of the degree of attention accorded to it is another matter. Such an inquiry must first determine if presidential and American credibility have been damaged in the past either by lack of a forceful response to an international crisis or by an excessive reliance on military force. The presidential concern for credibility and reputation in domestic politics was extensively outlined in Chapter Three and may be summarized briefly here. As Blechman and Kaplan (1978), Ostrom and Job (1986) and Schell (1976) have indicated, presidents fear being labelled as soft on communism and therefore have a

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preference for action to protect American credibility from threats abroad. Gaddis writes of the importance the loss of China had on many foreign policy leaders who feared a similar public and political backlash should the United States suffer any more egregious defeats (Gaddis, 1982, p. 242). Furthermore, given the public's history of electorally condemning presidents or presidential candidates perceived as weak or ineffectual (Carter, McGovern), the consideration given to projecting an image of strength for domestic purposes appears deserved (although the rejection of Goldwater demonstrates that an image of strength can be pushed too far). Thus, the concern for maintaining an image as a strong leader for the American public does not appear to be misplaced.

Ascertaining the effect American concern for credibility has had on international politics, the balance of power and the opinions of foreign leaders is a much more formidable task. Many conservative politicians (Nixon, Reagan) have argued that in the aftermath of Vietnam, lack of U.S. credibility encouraged the Soviets to begin extending their influence into Africa. Furthermore, it has been claimed that American failure to respond forcefully to any number of crises during this period (Angola, 1975; Ethiopia/Somalia, 1977-79; Nicaragua, 1978-1979) only served to foster increased aggression. Reagan's removal of the Marines from Beirut in 1984 supposedly damaged American credibility in the Middle East and helped make the Kuwaiti reflagging in part a mission to repair America's damaged image in that part of the world. One might also point to other threats and provocations which, if allowed to go unchecked, might have seriously impaired U.S. status and relations with allies (e.g., Berlin, 1948; Cuba, 1962). Thus, a prima face case can be made rather easily for recognizing the importance of taking action to maintain credibility.

There is, however, one inescapable conclusion some observers reach

about presidential reliance on credibility preservation as a justification for military action. As Johnson (1986) points out, often times presidents themselves put American and their own credibility at stake in some crisis simply by asserting that it is. Public pronouncements of threats to American credibility might rally the American people and serve notice to other nations that the U.S. feels threatened, but often it has the effect of committing the power and prestige of the U.S. to questionable causes. For example, Lyndon Johnson soon lost sight of the relative intrinsic insignificance of Vietnam, and inextricably wove his own and the nation's destiny into the fate of a country for which he had little regard (Gaddis, 1982, p. 243). Too often presidents feel the need to bolster sagging support for their foreign policies by establishing a U.S. interest and obligation in nations where no such commitments previously existed. This perhaps is the most regrettable and enduring legacy of the importance of credibility in U.S. foreign policy. While American resolve and strength are necessary resources in international politics, too often presidents have expended these scarce resources in contests over ambiguous and dubious goals.

Perhaps the most critical assessment of the impact of credibility on American foreign policy may be gleaned by examining the consequences of the widespread use of military force. Researchers might draw one of two conclusions about the extensive use of military force in the years of this study. The first is that American credibility has been constantly threatened during the Cold War thereby requiring the consistent use of military force. The second is that the sheer number of uses indicates military force has not influenced foreign actors' impressions of American credibility, or that their effects wear off rather swiftly. Some mix of the two conclusions seems most probable. Because the U.S. is the dominant status quo power, constant challenges from lesser powers

are to be expected as part of the normal anarchic quality of international relations. At the same time, foreign actors may not put as much stock in shows of force as they do in other indicators of American credibility, such as diplomatic maneuvers and public pronouncements. The inadequacy of military force in sustaining credibility may also be the result of confusion over which American signals foreign actors choose to believe. Presidents' lack of understanding of their adversaries, the transmission of mixed signals, uncertainty as to ends and their appropriate means and domestic demands have all at some point altered foreign actors' perceptions of American will in spite of displays of force. Therefore, because presidents cannot prevent all challenges to American hegemony nor prevent other nations from misinterpreting shows of force, there may always be threats which presidents feel compel a military response.

Any test of the efficacy of American military force must also address the extent to which presidents achieve their stated goals. Blechman and Kaplan found that presidents were most successful in achieving their goals within a six month period after the use of force, but that the use of force did not have nearly as great an effect in influencing nations in the long run (1978, p. 89). Furthermore, the authors found that when the military was used to assure friendly nations and deter adversaries, presidents were more successful than when the military mission was to induce friends or compel adversaries (p. 89). They also find that generally higher force levels more often resulted in unsuccessful outcomes than lower level uses of force (p. 99). Thus, the missions which seek to force a long-term change in behavior and require extensive force are the least likely to meet with success. Yet, it is precisely these types of missions which are the most important to the president given the nature of the goals and the amount of force

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No study to my knowledge, however, has looked at the effects of the overall reliance on the use of military force on U.S. foreign policy. Undoubtedly many Third World nations which have and have not been subject to American military intervention have formed hostile impressions of this country and its power. Both of these questions ought to be examined in more detail in future quantitative as well as case study research.

While the concern for credibility is probably not dominant in the foreign policies of nations ill-equipped to expend the resources necessitated by the perception of so many threats, the importance of credibility in the foreign policies of other major powers should be examined. A companion model describing Soviet political uses of military force would prove extremely beneficial in understanding Soviet foreign policy and the systemic action-reaction processes in U.S.-Soviet military moves (e.g., Kaw, 1987). For example, some researchers have pointed out that in view of Soviet willingness to back down over Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. places far less weight on the importance of credibility. Rather it accepted when necessary, tactical defeats in the furtherance of grand strategic objectives. The importance of reputation for status quo powers, such as Great Britain in other eras would also yield valuable insights regarding the motives driving coercive diplomacy.

The Prevention of War: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research

Although this dissertation shows that presidents have taken pains to avoid a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, it also shows that they have done so on their own terms. While presidents generally

stayed out of opportunities in Eastern Europe or Soviet client states, communist threats to vital interests were almost always met with a military response. This finding suggests several intriguing inferences. First, during the Cold War it would seem that presidents quite readily accepted the possibility of war on numerous occasions and nonetheless proceeded with their military endeavors (Berlin, 1948, Cuba, 1962). Another possibility, however, is that the Soviets were at fault in creating and pushing superpower crises to the brink of war and that presidents were forced to respond to these situations. Given that the vast majority of incidents involving Soviet provocations took place in Western Europe, it would seem that the U.S.S.R. never would or could accept U.S. hegemony in this area, and continually attempted to drive wedges between the partners in the NATO alliance. While this hypothesis appears ostensible, the American role in creating conditions likely to lead to war cannot be overlooked.

Resort to the use of armed force on many occasions, particularly those involving Western Europe, may indicate that previous policy often failed to deter the Soviets from probing Western interests and resolve. The political use of military force may signal that diplomatic efforts failed or did not achieve their desired affect, making additional action necessary. Given the number of Soviet-American confrontations, two explanations are possible. First, American credibility may have failed to impress the Soviets and they were not deterred from testing U.S. policy. Second, the Soviets may have felt they had vital interests at stake as well during many of these crises and could not back down for domestic or intra-alliance reasons. Ultimately, however, the evidence of confrontation should not obscure the evidence of restraint which presidents exhibited on numerous occasions. Seldom did presidents confront the Soviets directly for anything less than what were perceived to

be vital interests. And as the work of George, Farley and Dallin (1988) points out, even when confrontation was possible, extreme caution was employed to prevent accidental encounters and defuse the crises. Such restraint, especially in Eastern Europe, may have proven crucial in preventing many possible superpower wars.

The Force Level Decision: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research

This dissertation also seeks to show that not only is it possible to predict when presidents use force, but how they use force as well--a type of analysis rarely attempted. Because the military are capable of performing a variety of foreign-policy functions, it is important to understand how they are deployed. This dissertation demonstrates that most of the same concerns which influenced presidents' decisions regarding when to use force played a significant role in determining how much force was used. It seems apparent that presidents are highly concerned with the forcefulness of the message and intent of the political use of military force and its relationship to credibility. The results of Chapter Six demonstrate that as the perceived challenge to credibility rises, both the need to use force and the need to respond with convincing amounts of force rise.

The amount of force applied to a crisis may also have a profound impact on its resolution. Blechman and Kaplan demonstrate that with the exception of military operations employing the highest levels of force, major and manifest uses of force generally fared the poorest in effecting positive crisis outcomes (1978, p. 99). Furthermore, it seems likely that on many occasions the greater the level of force used, the more likely it is that the United States will become involved in armed conflict. For these reasons the force-level decision takes on added

importance. If it is being largely driven by credibility concerns, many of the same potential problems created by such considerations described above are equally if not more so relevant here.

There are many important questions regarding the force level decision, however, which remain to be answered. First, the link between the level of force and the outcomes of incidents should be analyzed in greater detail to determine the degree of relationship between force and foreign policy success, the probability of war, the establishment of further commitments and other issues relating to U.S. relations with target states. Second, this dissertation employed a rather limited conceptualization of the types of force levels chosen by presidents. Future research in this area might involve more intensive analysis into the relationship between military missions and foreign policy goals to gauge the fit between strategy and tactics as suggested by Summers (1982).

The Cybernetic/Cognitive Model: Implications for American Foreign Policy and Suggestions for Further Research

Finally, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate that political scientists may predict the outcome of presidential decision making when employing the cybernetic/cognitive framework. Because of its plausibility and tractability in modelling decision-making under uncertainty, it becomes a valuable aid in explaining foreign-policy making. Through the incorporation of the cognitive process of consistency in the analysis and the cybernetic goal of survival, a more realistic model of foreign-policy decision making has been developed. Previous work on decision making has at times made individual and organizational decisions appear as though they arrived at in a vacuum (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). Without a general conception of the driving

forces of U.S. foreign policy (anti-communism, for example) and their relationship to boundedly rational decision making, the substantive determinants of choice seemed somewhat ad hoc. This dissertation seeks to overcome these problems by directing the reader's attention to the direct linkage between individuals' fundamental desire for survival and its reflection in the drive for the preservation of credibility and prevention of war. The tighter connection between decision-making theory and foreign policy should help researchers to understand and predict presidential choices more accurately.

Exploration of the importance of image concerns ought to be given more attention in rational actor and organizational process models of decision making. At present there is little room for the role of perceptions and other intangible factors in these models. Given the increasing evidence that foreign policy is significantly shaped by concerns other than force projection, national interest, and industrial potential, (Marra, 1985; Ostrom and Job, 1986), scholars of international relations should not stay wedded to models which are not fully specified. Insights from all levels of analysis ought to be utilized to develop a more complete picture of the foreign policy decision making processes of all nations. A variety of domestic and international factors influence presidents' decisions--and all of them need to be included in any model predicting the use of force. Thus, the findings of this dissertation accord well with previous research done by Ostrom and Job.

Ultimately, however, it is the need to understand and predict such visible and far-reaching events which makes their elucidation a critical task for political scientists. Political uses of military force have often resulted in substantial loss of life and property. They have embroiled the United States in the political and military struggles of

many parts of the globe, all of which have served to shape old interests, create new ones and sabotage both. Therefore, by understanding the calculations presidents make when confronted with an opportunity to use force we can help predict not only their decisions, but outline the possible consequences of their choices based upon our knowledge of previous endeavors. Such vital information may be employed to point toward the more judicious uses of coercive diplomacy and warn of the more costly and ill-conceived applications of military force.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Operationalization of Variables

ACCESS	<p>Operationalization: Any landlocked nation.</p> <p>Data Source: <u>U.S. Documents: Handbook of Economic Statistics</u>; <u>U.S. Documents: List of Military Installations</u>; <u>American Defense Annual</u>: The Ohio State University.</p>
ANTIUS	<p>Operationalization: Any situation in which American lives have been lost or are threatened.</p> <p>Data Source: <u>Facts on File</u>.</p>
FORCE	<p>Operationalization: Physical actions taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence or to be prepared to influence in a non-cooperative manner specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence and outside of the context of such situations.</p> <p>Data Source: <u>Force Without War</u>, 1976: The Brookings Institution; <u>Journal of Strategic Studies</u>, 1986:29-54.</p>
FORCE LEVEL	<p>Operationalization: A high level use consists of all major or manifest uses of force. Data Source: <u>Force Without War</u>: The Brookings Institution; <u>Journal of Strategic Studies</u>, 1986:29-54.</p>
FORCE STYLE	<p>Operationalization: Manifest: Movement of military equipment or forces to a target, movement of a target's military equipment or target, evacuation, use of firepower, emplacement of ground forces, imposition, escort of a target's forces, blockade as defined by Blechman and Kaplan. Latent: providing U.S. presence, visit, patrol reconnaissance, exercise, demonstration as defined by Blechman and Kaplan.</p> <p>Data Source: <u>Force Without War</u>: The Brookings Institution; <u>Journal of Strategic Studies</u>, 1986:29-54.</p>

FORCE TYPE	<p>Operationalization: 1) a minor force component, defined as "non-nuclear capable forces of any type which do not meet the definition of a major or standard force component". 2) A standard force component, defined as one of the following:, " a) a ground force larger than one company, but not larger than one battalion, b) one aircraft carrier or battleship task group, c) a combat air force at least the size of one squadron, but less than one wing." 3) A major force component defined as one of the following: "a) a ground combat force larger than one battalion, b) a naval force at least as large as two aircraft carriers or battleship task groups, c) a land based, combat air force at least as large as one wing." Minor and standard uses are combined into low level uses of force. Major uses are considered high level uses of force. Data Source: <u>Force Without War: The Brookings Institution; Journal of Strategic Studies</u>, 1986:29-54.</p>
INTERNAL	<p>Operationalization: Internal Events are those which are considered by Ostrom and Job to involve civil strife or change in governmental leadership with no other primary or secondary events involving other nations. Data Source: Job and Ostrom: "Opportunity and Choice: The U.S. and the Political Use of Force: 1948-1976."</p>
MEDIA COVERAGE	<p>Operationalization: The number of inches of coverage devoted to the issue by <u>Facts on File</u> categorized from 0-16, 17-34, 35-50 inches. Data Source: <u>Facts on File</u>.</p>
NUMBERS	<p>Operationalization: The number of nations involved in an opportunity. Data Source: <u>Force Without War: The Brookings Institution; Journal of Strategic Studies</u>, 1986:29-54.</p>
OPPORTUNITY	<p>Operationalization: 1) the situation involved a perceived current threat to the territorial security of the U.S., its current allies, major clients or proxy states; 2) the situation posed a perceived danger to U.S. government, military or diplomatic personnel; to significant numbers of U.S. citizens or to U.S. assets; 3) events were perceived as having led, or likely to lead to advances by ideologically committed opponents of the U.S. (i.e., communists or "extreme leftists" broadly defined) be they states, regimes or regime contenders; 4) events were perceived as likely to lead to losses of U.S. influence in regions perceived as within the U.S. sphere of influence, especially viewed as Central and South America; 5) events involved inter-state military conflict of potential consequence; in human and strategic terms; or events, because of civil disorder, threatened destruction of substantial number of persons.</p>

Data Source: Job and Ostrom: "Opportunity and Choice: The U.S. and the Political Use of Force: 1948-1976."

- PRES. POP.** **Operationalization:** Percentage of public approving the president's job performance.
Data Source: Gallup polls: 1948-1984.
- SOV. MILITARY AID** **Operationalization:** Any nation or group within a nation which is receiving military aid at the time of the opportunity from the U.S.S.R.
Data Source: Facts on File, U.S. Documents: Handbook of Economic Statistics; World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbooks; The Military Balance, The Institute for Strategic Studies; SIPRI, 1971. The Arms Trade With the Third World.
- SOV. USE OF FORCE** **Operationalization:** Any area in which the Soviet Union has is currently using force.
Diplomacy of Power: The Brookings Institution;
American Defense Annual: The Ohio State University.
- U.S. DEPLOYMENT** **Operationalization:** Any nation in which the United States has maintained military bases prior to and during the opportunity to use force or has used a high level of military force within the past year.
Data Source: Facts on File, U.S. Documents: List of Military Installations; Force Without War: The Brookings Institution; Journal of Strategic Studies, 1986:29-54.
- U.S. MILITARY AID** **Operationalization:** Any nation or group within a nation which is receiving at least one million dollars in military aid at the time of the opportunity from the U.S either in the form of outright grants or guaranteed loans, through the Military Assistance Program, Foreign Military Sales Program, or other similar programs organized by the U.S. government, or at least one million dollars in direct military assistance or at least one million dollars in guaranteed loans for the purchase of military equipment from the Soviet Union.
Data Source: Facts on File, Annual Yearbooks; U.S. Documents: Handbook of Economic Statistics, Annual Yearbooks; World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbooks; The Military Balance, The Institute for Strategic Studies; SIPRI, 1971. The Arms Trade With the Third World.
- U.S. PRIOR USE** **Operationalization:** Any area in which the United States has previously used force.
Data Source: Force Without War: The Brookings Institution; Journal of Strategic Studies, 1986:29-54.
- WAR** **Operationalization:** Situations occurring when the United States is involved in a limited war.
Data Source: Job and Ostrom: "Opportunity and Choice: The U.S. and the Political Use of Force: 1948-1976."

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