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**USES AND EFFECTS OF FOREIGN TELEVISION PROGRAMMING:
A STUDY OF AN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES TELEVISION IN KOREA**

By

Jeonghwa Choi

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT**USES AND EFFECTS OF FOREIGN TELEVISION PROGRAMMING:
A STUDY OF AN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES TELEVISION IN KOREA****By****Jeonghwa Choi**

Deriving from a combined research agenda from both critical and empirical orientations in international mass communication research, the present investigation dealt with a unique foreign medium that has existed in Korea for more than 30 years, namely, the American Forces Korea Network Television (AFKN-TV). The study was primarily focused on the question, "who views what on AFKN-TV for what reasons with what impact?"

While such conventional critical frameworks as media or cultural imperialism logic provided a macro-level umbrella perspective for the study, a few other audience-centered micro-level perspectives and hypotheses provided a conceptual framework through which operational constructs were made more easily identifiable. Included among such specific theoretical frameworks utilized in the study were: the cultivation hypothesis with some conceptual modifications; the uses and effects model; and a few other cognitive approaches in media effects research.

Several sets of hypotheses in the study were tested in a survey among 222 better-educated Korean adults, with a special attention paid to the uses and effects of AFKN-TV programming. Major findings from the analyses of data

utilizing blockwise multiple regressions and various contingency methods revealed that the perceptual impact proposed vis-a-vis AFKN-TV was not as alarming as frequently warned by many critical researchers. Despite the less-than-expected degree of impact, however, it was noted that, depending on the indigenous consumers' various situational and psychological orientations, foreign television program viewing can have a moderate impact on certain areas of perceptions.

Closely related to the findings, the extended cultivation logic, which incorporated the program specificity and audience selectivity, was found to be very much consistent with the contingent effect model supported in the present investigation. In other words, AFKN-TV's impact on the selected Korean shadow viewers' perceptions of U.S. society/people and their comparative self-images were by and large contingent upon numerous audience-centered variables such as selective attention, viewing motivations and perceived realism of program content.

Aside from the effects findings, the study also revealed that language learning motives were a significant predictor for generally more positive gratifications sought from AFKN-TV viewing, which then were a more immediate facilitator for more active consumption of the medium. Overall, the shadow viewers' motivational structure was a significant predictor both for actual viewing and for a few areas of effects examined in the study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The fact that the U.S. entertainment television programming is featured on the television systems in many developing nations is widely known to casual observers as well as to international mass communication researchers. Indeed, saying that American television programming is ubiquitous around the globe is now almost a cliché. A vast literature accumulated during the last two decades on the issue of global television program flow has frequently pointed out the predominance of made-in-USA television programming worldwide, and the one-way flow of communication from developed to developing nations. At the same time, the area has also witnessed various ideological contentions and normative judgements regarding a variety of critical issues stemming from the debate.

Although a fair amount of empirical data have been provided in regard to largely structural aspects of the so-called "New World Information Order" debate, relatively little empirical support has been established for the claims suggesting various undesirable effects of foreign television programming on the indigenous viewers' psychological orientations. This imbalanced research emphasis, frequently noted between the so-called critical

and the empirical camps of international mass communication research, has eventually given rise to the "ferment in the field" during the early 1980s (e.g., see "Ferment in the Field," a special issue of Journal of Communication 33-3, Summer 1983). Still unclear, however, is whether the call for a merge of these two approaches has been met by serious attempts to find various points of convergence, both at the level of their epistemological compatibility and in terms of empirical operationalizability of certain areas of the critical thinking.

At the most general level, the present research can be viewed as an attempt to bridge the gap between the two approaches. That is, a major conceptual foothold in the attempt originates from various critical writings in the area of global television program flow. At its operational level, however, the study is unavoidably empirical. At the same time, the major epistemological orientation in the study may be viewed as rather empirical than normative. Vis-a-vis various implications from the two macro-level umbrella perspectives on global communication flow (i.e., diffusionism vs. imperialism), the scope of the study is somewhat modest. Nevertheless, the study must be viewed as a meaningful step toward accumulating empirical data as to various contentions on rather micro-level psychological impact of foreign television programming.

In short, the present study is primarily concerned

with one question: whether viewing American television programming could be significantly associated with several chosen areas of perceptions about American society and culture among selected indigenous shadow viewers of an American Armed Forces Television in Korea. The presence of the American Forces Korea Network Television (AFKN-TV) indeed provides a unique opportunity to test a few hypotheses relating television viewing to its perceptual impact on the viewers. The focus of the study is particularly unique in that the study does not deal with ordinary television program imports (as frequently discussed in the realm of global television program flow), but with an American military broadcasting channel that has existed in Korea for more than 30 years.

The "Korean Paradox" today, significantly reduced imports plus extended U.S. television programming through now satellite-aided AFKN-TV, urgently calls for a research specifically investigating potential convergence of Korean shadow viewers' reality conceptions with the "wide world" of American television. In light of the fact that various ideological concerns had once surmounted to the point of a nationwide panic in Korea, the focus of the study is all the more appropriate and meaningful.

The focus may seem trivial on its surface level, particularly in relation to the rather macroscopic and normative research interests espoused by many critical

writers in the area of global communication flow. When proven as predicted in the study, however, the evidence could be used as a laying stone for further investigations of whether the perceptual convergence verified could be linked to subsequent attitudes or behavioral tendencies potentially associated with American television program viewing. This rationale is consistent with the concept of the "second-order cultivation" discussed recently by several mass communication researchers.

While the study starts out with the primary focus as such, it also provides an interesting testing ground for the cultivation hypothesis in a cross-cultural setting. At the same time, by incorporating the motivational nature of television viewing (i.e., "uses and effects"), the study tests whether including the audience selectivity in cultivation research would better fit the predictions set forth in the area, or would provide justifiable reasons for other conditional hypotheses. For instance, if the media impact were found partially mediated by various motivational processes (e.g., viewing patterns, different processing strategies according to specific "goal schema"), the audience selectivity must be more openly discussed in the realm of cultivation research. In this regard, the approach taken in the study is relatively new, both on its conceptual level and in its operationalizations.

Yet another unique aspect of the present study can be

noted in that it specifically tests whether viewing particular program content will be a better predictor than total viewing amount for the perceptual impact proposed in the study. While several previous studies have also paid attention to the aspects similar to this one, the conceptual distinction was rather loose or even absent for the most part. To specifically test the rationale, the present study incorporates a few cognitive theories of mass communication research as appropriate conceptual tools for explaining the particular aspect of cultivation logic. Of course, it is also noted that this rationale is foreshadowed by the contention that the viewing specificity must be viewed as a variable rather than an assumption.

While those are the major areas of interest, the study also pays a close attention to an array of descriptive aspects of the shadow viewers of AFKN-TV. Accordingly, a few predictions are forwarded in relation to several areas of interrelated exposure patterns and viewing motivations. In addition, an exploratory look at the antecedent variables is taken to ascertain the extent to which these variables are related to AFKN-TV exposure patterns among the Korean shadow viewers.

Finally, a few points should be made on the studies previously conducted on AFKN-TV in Korea. As noted later in more detail, the studies reviewed generally lacked either clear conceptual rationales or a methodological rigor. For

instance, Armilla's (1984) research on the media usage patterns among the relatively better-educated urban Koreans was not particularly interested in the shadow viewers of AFKN-TV. While relatively extensive in its samples, K. Kim's (1981) study was narrowly focused on the largely descriptive patterns of AFKN exposure among Korean youths. Findings from two other studies (H. Kim, 1985; Kang and Morgan, 1988) among Korean college students seemed to suffer from their limited generalizability due to the nature of the samples employed (i.e., 223 students in one university setting and 226 college students attending one private language institute, both from Seoul, Korea). Finally, a most recent study among 390 college students from 7 major universities in Seoul, Korea (Choi, Straubhaar & Tamborini, 1988) appeared to have limitations partially due to the lack of a conceptual clarity when dealing with several interrelated hypotheses. Taken together, the current state of research in this area strongly suggests a need for a research based not only on appropriate methodological procedures but on more coherent conceptual rationales as well.

CHAPTER REVIEWS

The immediately following Chapter (Chapter II) is devoted to a full description of specific situational details of AFKN-TV within the context of the current Korean

domestic broadcasting environment. It begins with the question "what is AFKN-TV and how has it evolved in Korea?" In the process, an evolutionary dividing point is drawn on October 4th, 1983, when a new around-the-clock satellite programming was initiated by the launch of the SATNET. Then, a few noticeable changes in the AFKN-TV programming after the SATNET are explained, particularly in light of a journalistic clash between the AFKN's free-flow philosophy and Korean authority's developmental or control philosophy. The situation is also well illustrated by the phrase describing the sudden upsurge in U.S. journalistic programs on AFKN-TV--"waking up with Brian Gumble's Today show and going to the bed with Ted Koppel's Nightline."

The remaining sections of Chapter II describe what viewers see on AFKN-TV and a few distinctive characteristics of the programming. In addition to the abundance of journalistic programs, a relatively less amount of cultural programs and a predominance of entertainment programming are contrasted with several exemplary AFKN-TV programs available right before and during the survey taken for the present study. Implications of the AFKN-TV programming for policy and research are summarized in light of findings from several previous studies conducted on Korean shadow viewers of AFKN-TV.

Chapter III introduces major theoretical perspectives utilized in the study and presents specific research

questions deriving from the perspectives. The Chapter is structured in three portions: 1) macro-level ideological/critical theory and research; 2) micro-level psychological theory and research; and 3) predictions in the study derived from the theoretical perspectives outlined.

The first part of the Chapter summarizes two differing umbrella perspectives to view major characteristics frequently noted in the process of global television program flow. A review of research on the impact of foreign television programming then follows mid-range perspectives introduced. This is done in order to provide a macro-level ideological context for the empirical undertaking proposed and reported in the study. This portion ends with highlighting the case of AFKN-TV as a unique opportunity to test several hypotheses specifically pertaining to the indigenous viewers' perceptual convergence with the foreign media content. The situation is capsulated by the term "Korean paradox"--a hardly achieved self-reliance in domestic television programming plus a full-time American television channel fed by a direct broadcast satellite (SATNET). The paradox is critically reviewed with potential policy implications in mind, particularly within the ideological context provided by the macro-level theories reviewed.

The second part of Chapter III introduces three major theoretical perspectives taken to investigate the question,

"who views what on AFKN-TV for what reasons with what impact." These theories are more concerned with an individual's psychological orientations and behaviors than with normative or structural analyses of global communication flow. Accordingly, they are defined as relatively micro-level psychological perspectives vis-a-vis the previously introduced macro-level critical perspectives. It should be noted, however, that the distinction is primarily for the sake of an explanatory convenience.

As a starting point of the inquiry, uses & gratifications approach is explained in detail, which is followed by a "uses & effects" model fully advocated in the study. To deal with the ending point of the inquiry (i.e., "with what impact"), the "cultivation hypothesis" is introduced as a potentially useful analytic tool, albeit not without limitations. Aided with some conceptual and methodological refinements advanced later, an attempt is made to extend the operational boundaries of the hypothesis. In a similar manner, major implications of the extension for cross-cultural cultivation research are also pointed out.

To further justify the reformulation of the cultivation hypothesis (e.g., inclusion of "audience selectivity" and "media content specificity"), a "multiple-trace memory model" of communication is introduced. The

model is explained particularly in connection with one component of the model, namely, the "contextual information" of communication sources. Then, implications from the model for the theoretical structure of cultivation logic are illustrated.

In addition, several other cognitive approaches in mass communication research are introduced to justify the theoretical perspectives advocated earlier in the study. For example, it is argued that certain components of a human information processing model (e.g., "goal schema") are compatible with the cognitive or motivational flavor found both in the uses & effects model and in the extended reformulation of the cultivation hypothesis.

Deriving from the micro-level psychological perspectives, the last part of Chapter III identifies the scope of the empirical investigation along with major predictions set forth in the study. According to their distinctive characteristics, the hypotheses were collapsed into two major areas: predictions regarding the actual "uses" of AFKN-TV and those regarding the "effects" of the medium.

They were tested in a survey among relatively better-educated Korean adults during the period of July-October, 1986. Methodologies used in the study are described in Chapter IV, including the rationale behind the sample selected, procedures of the survey, measurements of the key

variables, and an overall description of statistical methods employed in the data analyses.

Chapter V starts with preliminary findings with regard to the sample characteristics, language and other media orientations, and various features as to the highly motivational nature of AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow audience. Following the generally descriptive overview are the major findings in relation to the specific hypotheses proposed in the study.

The last Chapter (Chapter VI) provides a summary review of the major findings in the study, along with a discussion dealing with various conceptual and methodological issues involving the key results. In that regard, a few alternative interpretations of the data are forwarded whenever deemed necessary. Then, overall conclusions are drawn in relation to the major research agenda proposed in the study, that are followed by a discussion of limitations in the study. Finally, contributions of the study are briefly identified particularly in light of the study's underlying purpose of bridging the gap between critical and empirical camps of international mass communication research. Implications for further research in the area similar to the one investigated here are also incorporated in the final section of the Chapter.

CHAPTER II

AFKN-TV AND ITS SHADOW AUDIENCE

AFKN's 'Nothing-Can-Stop-Us-Now' theme is more of a reality now than ever...Simply said, you will see family and adult prime time offerings, information, and talk shows, children's programs, and 'the soaps,' to name just a few, located within the same 'blocks'daily... If in doubt, give us a call... We're AFKN and 'Nothing Can Stop Us Now.'" (AFKN-TV Guide, October 1983, p. 2)

AN OVERVIEW

At the time when AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) officials and the American audience of AFKN in the Korean Peninsula were in an exuberant mood with the advent of a new around-the-clock satellite programming (SATNET) on October 4th, 1983, a heated, if not a new, debate was going on in the Korean Parliament as well as among intellectuals, practicing journalists and opinion leaders from various walks of life. As might be speculated, the debate had much to do with various critical issues regarding cultural sovereignty, journalistic philosophy, and value conflicts.

To fully understand the issues surrounding the presence of AFKN-TV in Korea, one may have to start with the questions such as: 1) What is AFKN and how has it evolved in Korea?; 2) Who are the "shadow audience" of AFKN?; 3) What do they watch on AFKN-TV?; and 4) Why do the shadow audience watch what they watch on AFKN-TV? The answers to these questions then logically will lead to the

questions such as: 1) Are there any impact of AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow audience?; and 2) If such impact appeared to exist, what is the nature of the impact?

AFKN is one of the world's largest military radio and television networks. General policy guidelines are furnished by the American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Programming headquarters of AFRTS, which has a longer history than does the Voice of America (VOA) by three months (Browne, 1982), is located at AFRTS-Los Angeles, California; and AFKN has been under the staff supervision of the Public Affairs Office for the Headquarters of the United States Forces in Korea.

The mission of AFKN is supposedly to provide radio and television information and entertainment for all U.S. military personnel serving in the Republic of Korea (AFKN Brochure, 1983). The mission has been constantly reminded of and reinforced by one of the most frequently heard AFKN station break: "AFKN, serving you as you serve in the Republic." While the nature of the AFKN's mission in Korea seems clear, it is at the same time no less clear that AFRTS is increasingly recognized as a major American voice in indirect international broadcasting (or perhaps "narrowcasting").

According to some broadcasting history literature, the first U.S. Armed Forces radio station came on the air in

December 1941, from Fort Greely, Alaska (Browne, 1971). By May 1942, the Armed Forces Radio Service was in full swing; and by the end of the World War II, it was coordinating the activities of some 300 stations overseas, and broadcasting a shortwave service for U.S. military personnel around the world. Browne (1982) explained the after-the-War fluctuations of AFRTS as follows:

Peacetime brought a considerable decrease in number of stations, to a low of 60 in 1949, but Cold War tensions and the Korean War, followed by the war in Vietnam, saw the number rise again. By the late 1960s there were over 300 stations in 30 foreign countries and 9 U.S. territories. That number has again declined in the 1970s, and there are roughly 100 stations in 15 foreign countries as of 1981. (p. 130)

Little doubt that AFRTS and the U.S. overseas military broadcasting are clearly intended for U.S. citizens--military personnel, their dependents and civilian support staff. Yet also apparent is that these broadcast services do reach indigenous listeners/viewers. Various polls and surveys done by domestic stations in countries where there were also U.S. military stations indicated listenership for the latter on the order of 2 to 4 percent of the adult population once a week or more (Browne, 1982).

As to the Korean shadow audience of AFKN, a survey among Korean youth (middle and high school and college students, K. Lee, 1981) suggested that more than 82% of the respondents watched AFKN-TV on a regular basis; and results of a mid-1983 U.S. Information Agency survey among 1,477

better-educated Koreans (with secondary education or higher) in four major metropolitan areas in Korea (Seoul, Pusan, Taegu and Kwangju) indicated that about 12% of the respondents listened to AFKN-Radio at least once a week (Armilla, 1984). A study among 223 college students (H.Kim, 1985) reported that about 65% of the respondents regularly watched AFKN-TV during weekdays, and the percentage increased up to 82% during weekends. In terms of viewing time, the 30-minutes-to-1-hour-per-day category topped with 27% of the respondents; while almost 13% reported watching more than one-and-a-half hour a day.

In a similar manner, a recent study among Korean college students (Choi, Straubhaar & Tamborini, 1988) reported that about 15% of the respondents watched AFKN-TV for more than an hour daily; and Kang and Morgan (1988) also found that about 52% of the Korean college students surveyed watched a similar amount of AFKN-TV. It appears that these shadow audiences have been consistently increasing, particularly among the young and the better-educated; and the size of the shadow audience is likely to grow more with the extended time-schedule and programming of AFKN-TV and Radio thanks to the SATNET launch.

EVOLUTION OF AFKN

AFKN Radio

Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) first came to Korea late in 1945, following the end of the World War II and shortly after the Korean Independence from the colonial Japanese occupation. At that time, the radio audience consisted of personnel in the U.S. Army XXIV Corps, 6th and 7th Divisions and the U.S. government civilians. This early network was comprised of three radio stations located in Pusan, Chonju (later moved to Kwangju), and Seoul, the capital of Korea. In late 1948 and early 1949, however, AFRS was withdrawn from Korea along with the remaining U.S. Forces.

The first American troops to return to the Korean War in June, 1950, received American radio broadcasts from transmitters located in Japan, through the AFRTS Far Eastern Network (FEN)-Japan. With the famous Inchon Landing by General MacArthur in September 1950, AFKN also came ashore. Then, AFKN's first radio station was activated in Seoul on October 4th, 1950. Because of the rapidly changing frontiers in the early part of the Korean War, AFKN became a virtual "network on wheels" (AFKN Brochure, 1980). After a brief occupation of Seoul by the Communist Chinese, the AFKN Seoul studios were reopened in April 1954, and the "network on wheels" began its transition to permanent facilities. As of 1983, there were 15 AM radio transmitters

solely for AFKN radio broadcasting.

In 1964, AFKN launched FM broadcasting from the network headquarters in Seoul. FM stereo was added in 1971, and, as of 1983, there were 11 AFKN-FM radio transmitters operating throughout the Korean Peninsula. Initially, some of the FM broadcast day consisted of repeated AM programming. Today, however, only the hourly newscasts are simulcast on the AFKN-FM and AFKN-AM Networks.

As to the program content, weekly air time of AFKN-AM can be divided into two main categories: locally produced AFKN disc-jockey shows and packaged programs from AFRTS-Los Angeles and AFRTS-Washington. While Los Angeles provides weekly shipments of prepackaged 30-minute and 55-minute entertainment shows, Washington garners live sports events, special events, and news features such as "Meet the Press" and "Issues and Answers." The 24-hour AFKN-AM broadcasting can be also divided between network and local time. During network time, the six affiliate stations carry the programming originated from the key station in Seoul; and during local time, each of the six affiliates uses its own announcers for local events.

Since the majority of AFKN-AM audience is under 25 years of age (mostly military personnel), top-forty music seems to dominate the broadcast day. The around-the-clock AFKN-FM broadcasting also originates from Seoul, and is fully automated. It offers the audience a middle-of-the-

road easy listening alternative to the lively upbeat sound of AFKN-AM.

The advent of SATNET brought about a few changes in the AFKN radio. Most notable in AFKN-AM appears to be the increase in live morning programs directly fed from the U.S. In AFKN-FM, as indicated by an insider (AFKN TV-Guide, September 1983, p.20), the "sound-lift" was basically for more humanized and personable formats with more "alive and jumping" disc jockeys. More variety music styles may also be pointed out as a major change in AFKN-FM, which include jazz, classical music, rock'n roll oldies, in addition to the middle-of-the-road adult contemporaries. A recent one-week programming schedule of AFKN-AM and AFKN-FM is found in APPENDIX-B.

AFKN-TV

On September 15th, 1957, a little later the first Korean commercial television station (HLKZ-TV) was established with RCA's cooperation on May 12th, 1956, AFKN television began its operations. Early AFKN-TV programming consisted largely of American films directly shipped from the United States since there were no facilities yet for live television broadcasting. Shortly before the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS-TV: government owned and operated public channel) was officially launched on June 22nd, 1961, the first live telecast originated on January 4th, 1959,

from the AFKN's new studio and headquarters at Yongsan, Seoul. Since then, AFKN-TV broadcasting in remote areas has gradually been increased with microwave relay equipments and television transmitters located throughout the Korean Peninsula. As of 1983, at least 19 television transmitters were serving the major U.S. military population areas in the Republic of Korea.

The overall AFKN organization is structured with four divisions: Production, Engineering, Logistics, and Budget & Operation (AFKN Brochure, 1983). The Production Division is responsible for entire programming broadcast by AFKN; and includes Network Radio, Television Production, Television Programming/Continuity and News Center. The Engineering Division is responsible for the installation and maintenance of broadcasting equipments, while the Logistics and Budget Division procures new equipments and replacement parts. The Administrative Division, including Unit Supply, operates as an army unit taking care of correspondence for Army and Air Force personnel.

Paying separate attention to a few individual divisions in the Production Division seems necessary for better understanding of the overall AFKN operations in Korea. First, the Television Production Division (TP) produces approximately 12 hours of local programming per week, mostly for daily live newscasts at 6 pm and 10 pm. Other local programming includes regular bulletin boards

for local activities, short 5-to-10-minute local features about the Korean language and culture, special promotional materials for new programs and special features, and some public service announcements (PSA's) for the local U.S. military personnel. (e.g., "Don't get VD's from local prostitutes," "Don't die from carbon monoxide poisoning from local traditional heating systems.")

Second, Television Programming/Continuity (TPC) maintains a video library which consists of more than 3,000 television programs, and processes all tape and film shipments from AFRTS-Los Angeles. TPC is also responsible for supervising the on-air crew, developing the daily television log, and preparing a weekly television schedule for distribution throughout the Republic of Korea.

Finally, News Center (NC) provides news, weather and sports to its nationwide AM and FM radio and television audience. There are hourly radio newscasts which are either locally originated or carried from major American networks via AFRTS-Washington. NC receives UPI and AP teletype services around-the-clock, as well as the Korean news teletype service. AFKN also has a teletype link and satellite voice circuit from AFRTS. Prior to the SATNET launch, AFKN had been receiving daily ABC News and UPI-Video News services via airmail, and been enjoying a limited access to the Korean membership of the International Communication Satellite (INTELSAT) in order

to provide timely visual reports of worldwide news. The advent of SATNET, however, brought about a revolutionary change in the world of AFKN-TV news.

Major Changes in AFKN-TV after SATNET

First of all, the overall broadcasting time has been increased from the previous 15 hours to 19 hours: 4 more hours a day. Given that all four Korean domestic television channels still carry a broadcasting schedule of less than 17 hours per day, it is not too all surprising to hear the puzzling question--"Who's the boss anyway?"

Second, a revolutionary change in the programming of AFKN-TV appears to be in the enormous quantitative increase and qualitative enhancement of journalistic programs. For instance,

According to Randall [AFKN Chief of Production], AFKN will go on the air daily at 6 am, signing off at its usual time around 1 am. The "Today" show gets things started on weekdays, followed by a major network news show at 8 am, more news from either Ted Turner's Cable News Network (CNN), NBC or ABC at noon, "Tonight" at 10:30 pm following locally produced news, then ABC's "Nightline" with Ted Koppel.

(Pacific Stars And Stripes,
September 29, 1983)

As thoroughly discussed in the next Chapter, one may now begin to understand the claims forwarded by many proponents of media imperialism perspective and the reasons why many Korean critics and policymakers claim that the Republic of Korea is practically under the direct politico-

economic and cultural influence of American broadcasting culture and journalistic philosophy.

Third, there appears to be relatively little change in general entertainment programming, except for the quantitative increase of specials and variety shows such as "Billy Joel in Concert," "Rockworld," and so forth.

Fourth, there are now a lot more uninterrupted live sports programs. Before the SATNET, AFKN had depended heavily on the INTELSAT for live broadcasts on an occasional-use basis, frequently standing in line behind 40 or more other satellite contractors to gain broadcast time. The launch of SATNET, however, offered AFKN a privilege of full-time satellite use, uninterrupted and fully dedicated to the American Armed Forces broadcasting in the Far East and its viewers. Today, one can see the Major League ~~baseball's~~ playoff games, every game of the World Series and at least three football games, two professional and one college, every weekend on AFKN-TV, and all timely and mostly live.

In short, the increase in the broadcasting time and a greater emphasis on more authentic and high quality news programs directly fed through SATNET seem to be the major changes in AFKN-TV since October 4th, 1983. Implications of these changes on the Korean indigenous culture and broadcasting policy are discussed later in this Chapter.

WHAT VIEWERS SEE ON AFKN-TV**An Overview**

The entire make-up of AFKN-TV programming may be classified into three major functional categories: journalistic, cultural, and entertainment programs. First, journalistic programs on AFKN-TV encompass almost every single format available in broadcast journalism: straight news (e.g., CNN Headline News, NBC News, AFKN News); in-depth news analysis programs (e.g., ABC Nightline, Washington Week in Review, This Week with David Brinkley); news magazines (e.g., Sixty Minutes, CNN Investigative Report, 20/20); soft or semi-news magazines (e.g., Today, Barbara Walters Special); and news interview programs (e.g., Take Two, Freeman Report, Meet the Press).

Second, cultural programs on AFKN-TV consists of more extensive general adult education programs and less intensive educational programs for children. The former includes documentary programs (e.g., NOVA, Vietnam--A TV History, Battleline), talk shows and discussion programs (e.g., Donahue), and other public service programs. Among the latter are Sesame Street, 3-2-1 Contact, Mr. Roger's Neighborhood, Vegetable Soup, and so forth.

Finally, entertainment programs, the most prevalent forms of AFKN-TV programming, literally cover all the possible formats and varieties available in the U.S. Included in this category are: sitcoms (e.g., Three's

Company. After M*A*S*H, Jennifer Sleeps Here, Benson, Gimme A Break, Sidney); crime-adventures (e.g., Magnum P.I., Hill Street Blues, Matt Houston, Devil Connection, Starsky and Hutch); soaps and prime-time drama (e.g., Ryan's Hope, General Hospital, Dallas, Knots Landing, Dynasty); game shows (e.g., Family Feud, Name That Tune, \$20,000 Pyramid, Jeopardy); music varieties (e.g., Rock World, Evening at Pops, Solid Gold, Dance Fever, Soul Train); adult comedies (e.g., Benny Hill); a variety of late night specials on music and movies, and so forth.

In short, it is not an exaggerated observation that the world of AFKN-TV practically represents a mirror image of contemporary cable viewing in the U.S. That is, AFKN-TV programming reflects not only the major Networks' near-past and present makeups but many independent stations' spinoffs and reruns as well. In addition, some of AFKN-TV programming frequently carries variety specials which sometimes can be seen only on pay-cable channels in the U.S. (e.g., Michael Jackson's Thriller, Kenny Rogers and Dolly Parton in Concert). In the realm of sportscast, an average American television viewer may find AFKN-TV an ideal mixture of major Networks plus some other sports cable channels in the U.S. such as ESPN and PASS.

Yet, another unique aspect of AFKN-TV should also be noted. There are no commercials at all throughout its 19-hour-a-day programming. Although a few military-oriented

PSA's are interspersed in feature programs, the frequency of regular program interruptions by the PSA's is much less than the degree of commercial interruptions typically found in American commercial television channels.

AFKN-TV and Its Mass Appeal Format

America was filling up with non-English speaking immigrants at the turn of the century, and for entertainment they flooded into the nicklodeons that appeared suddenly like spring flowers in the poliglot cities of the country. Within a year of the first opening in Pittsburgh, nearly 5,000 nickle theaters were operating to fulfill the entertainment desires of foreign-born workers who had arrived in America unable to read newspapers or understand vaudevill jokes. (Read, 1976, p.40)

Having pointed out the strikingly similar structural proximity between the AFKN-TV programming and typical television programming found in the U.S., it seems worthwhile to point out some notable features of American television world in general. The evolution of the "penny press" and "nickelodeon theaters" during the early years of the American mass media history may well justify the notoriously multi-cultural, thus, mass-appeal orientations, which could still be noticeable in no less degree in most of American television programming and movies. In an attempt to justify a media diffusionism perspective, Read (1976) pointed out that the universal-appeal themes and formats were the major driving force of American mass media products, particularly motion pictures and television programs, for their dominant share in international

markets.

Of course, one can see many high-quality or high-brow cultural programming on American television these days, notably on such channels as PBS and A&E (Arts & Entertainment). However, when it comes to the most easily identifiable characteristics of the world of American television entertainment, the phrase "violence and sex" may well sum up the picture.

Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly one or two studies which contain comprehensive content analysis data supporting the contention, the trend has been quite thoroughly documented over the years by many American mass communication scholars (e.g., Franzblau, Sprafkin & Rubinstein, 1977; Fernandez-Collado, Greenberg, Korzenny & Atkin, 1978; Greenberg, Graef, Fernandez-Collado, Korzenny & Atkin, 1980; Roberts, 1982; a series of "Violence Profile" by Gerbner and his associates, 1976a, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980; Hawkins & Pingree, 1982). Also, two reports on "Television and Behavior" by the Surgeon General (1972) and by the National Institute of Mental Health (1982) may be considered timely and perhaps the most comprehensive attempts to address the concerns regarding the prevalence of violence and sex in American television.

Given the AFKN-TV's major programming philosophy of "the best selections of the most popular programs in the States" (AFKN-TV Guide, October 1983), it seems quite

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obvious that the dual emphases on violence and sex should be similarly apparent in the world of AFKN-TV as usually found in U.S. TV channels. The utmost emphasis of AFKN-TV on the mass-appeal popular culture orientation may seem justifiable in the sense that AFKN-TV is mainly for the American military personnel who are largely under 25 years old and residing in Korea only on a rotating basis. Given the evidence as to the presence of unintended or "shadow" viewers among the indigenous population in Korea, however, the massive intrusion of perhaps the best American television entertainment filled with violence and sex may have serious implications on Korean government's broadcasting policy as well as on various psychological orientations among the indigenous shadow audience.

Implications on Policy and Research

Our mass media policymakers tend to see television as more of an information-conveying medium than of a cultural diffusion medium. They are more inclined to wander about within the journalistic dimension of television medium than to formulate a long-term cultural policy regarding the medium's ultimate potential. (H. Kang, 1983, p.40)

As noted earlier, the massive intrusion of uncensored American news programs through AFKN-TV was the major cause for the rekindled concern over cultural sovereignty among many Korean critics. Relatively less salient in the debate, however, appeared to be the cultural and psychological implications of AFKN-TV. The trend seems quite analogous to the earlier emphasis on the international news flow

controversy in the New World Information Order debate. As suggested by various non-Marxist media imperialism approach and mid-range perspectives (reviewed in the next Chapter), potential side effects of television's cultural content on the viewers' psychological orientations should be considered no less important than the cultural sovereignty issue.

While suggestions for some corrective policy measures were abound in the debate (Kang, 1983; Won, 1984; a series of newspaper articles and essays by Choe, 1980; Chung, 1983a, 1983b, 1984; Hong, 1980; D. Kim, 1983; H. Kim, 1983; J. Kim, 1981; Y. Lee, 1984, 1985; S. Park, 1983; Shin, 1983; Suh, 1979; Yoon, 1983), particularly right after the advent of SATNET on October 4th, 1983, relatively little research has provided concrete data supporting the contentions on psychological impact of AFKN-TV. In this respect, the "Korean paradox," a hardly achieved self-reliance in domestic television with a full-time American television channel, must be scrutinized not only in terms of policy implications but in an attempt to provide a clear evidence as to the contentions implying various undesirable side-effects of the foreign media. It is exactly from this background and context that the present study is proposed and conducted.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

MACRO-LEVEL CRITICAL THEORY AND RESEARCH

In a broad sense, the study of international flow of information is another approach to the study of international relations. (Mowlana, 1985b, p. 9)

An Overview

The last two decades have witnessed an enormous growth in research and writing on the international flow of communication. While the early studies were heavily concentrated on print media and news agencies (for an annotated bibliography during the 1970s and the early 1980s, see Mowlana, 1985a), it was not long before that television was given much attention by national planners as well as communication scholars as a primary area of importance.

As indicated by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (1980), the rapid technological advances in this medium and their increasing global implications have contributed to its growth and the degree of interest generated. Although the "international news flow controversy" had been a major concern in the initial stage of the "New World Information Order (NWIO)" movement, a variety of issues as to the international flow of "cultural content" have also become salient agendas in

the NWIO debate, ranging from "cultural homogenization" through imported TV programs and music to "national sovereignty issues" stemming from Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and Transboder Data Flow (TBDF).

As the less developed countries (LDC's) increased their political bargaining power within international organizations such as UNESCO and ITU (International Telecommunications Union), complaints about the "imbalanced and one-way flow" of communication became more salient not only within those international fora but among many developed nations in Western Europe and North America. Many critical scholars (e.g., Schiller, 1969, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1984; Nordenstreng, 1974, 1979; Tunstall, 1977; Beltran, 1978; Lee, 1980; Hamelink, 1983) appeared to agree upon the contention that foreign media play a significant, if not the single most important, role in changing the receiving nation's indigenous culture, and that media imports, whether they be international wire news, film, pop music or TV programs, are subjecting the world to "homogenized Western commercial culture."

In a now classic piece, Nordenstreng and Varis (1974) reported the first empirical documentation of global flows of television programming. Based on data compiled from questionnaires received from over 50 nations, two major trends were identified: one-way flow from a few big exporter nations to the rest of the world and the

predominance of entertainment programming. Among the top exporters were the United States, England, West Germany and France. A follow-up study by Varis (1984) among 69 nations again found few notable changes since 1973, although with some indications of increased regional exchanges among LDC's (e.g., Latin America and Middle East).

As to more specific illustrations of many developing nations' domestic broadcasting situations and their functioning in global arena, Katz and Wedell (1977) provided a synthetic overview. First, they evaluated the performance of broadcasting in light of its promises as originally planned by the LDC's. Then, they pointed out the "haphazard and frivolous" nature of the television development in the LDC's, indicating that television was introduced largely for reasons extraneous to development of receiving nations.

They further suggested that the LDC's disenchantment with performance of the medium was partly due to the misguided conception of the "dominant paradigm" (Lerner, 1955, 1976; Rogers, 1976 & 1978) which sees development and modernization as the equivalent of Westernization. After detailing various specific ways by which broadcasting systems have become established in many LDC's, they cautiously concluded that there existed an enduring dilemma concerning the coexistence of the "epochalist" demand for modernization with the "essentialist" demand for

authenticity.

While these two seminal works (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974; Katz & Wedell, 1977) were somewhat confined to providing an overview and general patterns of international flow of television programming, no doubt that they served as a springboard for a flurry of discussion and highlighted the urgency for further research in this area. For example, Antola and Rogers (1984) investigated television program flow among six Latin American Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Among their findings were: 1) imports from the U.S. were still dominant in Latin American television, although somewhat less than in the early 1970s; and 2) as to regional exchange among Latin American nations, Mexico played a crucial role both as a regional producer of television programs and as a gatekeeper for American programming (as a dubbing headquarters). Based on these findings, they concluded that the "Latinization" of Latin American television was still rather faint and that the structure of the television industry in the region was generally rather "North American."

Related to the study, Straubhaar (1983), after outlining several competing perspectives on the patterns and structures of television program flow, pointed out five possible causal factors in the growth of television exports from Latin American nations. They were: 1) size of domestic

market; 2) media industry structure; 3) behaviors of entrepreneurs and programmers; 4) government policies and regulations; and 5) nature and relative appeal of cultural contents of television programming. While deriving these factors, he suggested a usefulness of the "cultural industry" approach (McAnany, 1984) which permits considerations of a variety of causal factors for the growth of television industry in LDC's. He concluded, for example, that the market size and the effects of government policies seemed to have had the greatest influence on the growth of television industries in several Latin American nations.

For instance, Brazil and Mexico enjoyed a relatively large domestic audience market, 75 million and 45 million respectively. Also, predominantly private initiatives in the Brazilian media industry and the private quasi-monopoly structure of the Mexican media industry appeared to contribute to their diversified channels and program orientations which ultimately made the two nations dominant powers in the regional television program flow.

In a review of global television program flow, Mowlana (1985b) identified additional factors which may impede or facilitate the flow. An insufficient infrastructure in Latin American countries was referred to as inhibiting reception and adaptation of programs such as Sesame Street. A conflict between communication and development goals in

many LDC's was also suggested as having serious implications. More specifically, Mowlana pointed out:

... when communication and development goals are not clearly defined, many national leaders have joined the bandwagon praising Western technology in order to justify communications project without carefully considering the purposes for which the technology is applied... If national communication policies are to be devised, the conflict of interest between conventional notions of media professionalism [slick production quality] and the desire to gain control over the production end of television flows [developmental journalism] must be resolved.
(p.37, brackets added)

For example, the consequences of misjudgement by policy makers were well illustrated by the Iranian Revolution, where the modern communication system implemented by the Shah conflicted with the traditional communication networks of Iranian culture and value systems (Mowlana, 1979). Other relevant factors affecting the flow, regional as well as global, included the rate of diffusion of innovations, language barriers, ethnocentrism, geographical proximity and the degree of cultural similarity or homophily between the producing and receiving nations.

While important are these structural and processual investigations of various types and directions of international television program flow, at the heart of the debate on the flow seems to lie the issue of the impact on viewers around the world. Here, a brief conceptual overview of competing explanatory paradigms may help further discussion of the debate. At the risk of missing some gray

areas, the following two overarching umbrella perspectives are summarized in the next section, namely, the camps of "media diffusionism" and "media imperialism."

Media Diffusionism Perspectives

There is an enormous amount of adoption of cultural elements from abroad, the items adopted are modified to adapt to the adopting culture, and in this process there is a cycle of initial dependence on interaction with the source culture, but it is followed by a patriation of the new activity and a relative growth of domestic interactions.

(Pool, 1977, p.140: underline added)

Ideological roots or key assumptions of "media diffusion" approach may be found in the law of laissez-faire marketplace which is based upon the Western liberalism and individual self-perfection logic. Probably the concept of free-flow of information has emerged from the socio-political context of free trade and capitalism. As pointed out by several scholars (e.g., Salinas & Paldan, 1979; McPhail, 1981; Hamelink, 1983), here lies a close evolutionary tie between the "New International Economic Order (NIEO)" and the "New World Information Order (NWIO)." This logical affinity between free trade and free flow of information, according to the critical scholars, ultimately perpetuates the old colonial-dependency relationship and patterns, either in a downright or in a subtle manner.

Basically, media diffusionists agree with cultural anthropologists who claim that diffusion almost always has a catalytic function in sociocultural development. The

concern of anthropologists for cultural diffusion appears to coincide with some implications from the "product life-cycle theory" (Vernon, 1971) for media diffusion. The theory maintains that interaction with foreign media would facilitate local learning and adoption of advanced technology so that the recipient nations would be better equipped to utilize media for indigenous cultural development. The business model, initially developed within industrial organization theory and used to explain the evolutionary process of transnational corporations, has been applied to media flows in Read (1976) and Pool (1977).

Read explained the imbalanced communication flow between the U.S. and the LDC's as a natural and unintended outcome of cultural evolutionary process, cornering the opposing "media imperialism" perspective as largely misled and too radical. He viewed foreign expansion of American transnational enterprises as driven by a purely economic motivation to maximize profits on a global scale, nothing more nothing less. It is a value-free institutional necessity, not any consciously orchestrated conspiracy that has made the U.S. a dominant exporter of television programs. He claimed that American corporations began television program exports on a random and casual basis, and often at the request of the LDC's; and that the U.S. derives nearly two-thirds of its foreign earnings in such exportation from other developed nations, not from LDC's.

For example, the U.S. telefilm merchants made a profit of \$85 million in 1971, of which Canada accounted for 19%, Australia 18%, Japan 17% and England 12%. The remaining countries accounted for only 34%, of which Brazil, France and West Germany were prominent.

Yet another argument against the "near-conspiracy" media imperialism contention was forwarded in terms of audience size. The U.S. plus the "big four" (Canada, Britain, Japan and Australia) and the "minor three" (Brazil, France and West Germany) accounted for 62.5% of total world television audience, and Soviet Union for 12.8%, with the remaining countries sharing only 24.7%. Thus, according to Read, what really counts is the communication flow from the U.S. to the other industrialized nations, whereas the flow from the U.S. to the LDC's could at best be of peripheral importance.

As cited at the beginning of this section, Pool (1977) also supported the product life-cycle evolutionary process. He contended that the Center-to-Periphery television program flow would lead to: 1) establishment of local production facilities; 2) coproduction efforts between the Center and the Periphery; 3) local accumulation of imported television culture; and eventually 4) erosion of television markets in Center nations and a reversed flow from the Periphery to the Center.

As to some corrective measures for the present

communication disparity, media diffusionist remedies range from speedier technological transfers and the democratization of communication to regional cooperations. In short, they advocate the free and open interaction of LDC's with the cosmopolitan cultures, not the entire dissociation from global transactions.

Media Imperialism Perspectives

Electronic colonialism is the dependency relationship established by the importation of communication hardware, foreign-produced software, along with engineers, technicians and related information protocols, that vicariously establish a set of foreign norms, values and expectations which, in varying degree, may alter the domestic cultures and socialization processes. (McPhail, 1981, p.20.)

Media imperialism approach tends to view the imbalanced global communication flow as an outgrowth of the deep-rooted Western colonialism tradition, thus, of internal contradictions of advanced capitalism. It rejects the laissez-faire supply-demand free-market philosophy, criticizing it as an ideological and economic tool to perpetuate the dependent underdevelopment of the LDC's.

Lee (1980) interpreted the imbalanced one-way flow of television programs partly as a result of transnational corporations' "want-creation manipulations." Schiller (1976) pointed to the U.S. military-industrial complex as the major "engine" of its global media supremacy, identifying media imperialism as an downright manifestation of capitalistic colonialism. A logical consequence of these

claims appears to be the contention that the present dependency by the Periphery nations on the Metropolitan Center will lead to further, and even permanent, dependency manifested by: 1) a long-term exploitation by the capitalist powers; and 2) a continued underdevelopment of the LDC's (Schiller, 1976; Salinas & Paldan, 1979; Hamelink, 1983).

Here, Lee's (1980) distinction between the Neo-Marxist and Non-Marxist views to interpret the global communication disparity may warrant a brief attention. One distinction he drew between the two is that Non-Marxists tend to deal with "media imperialism" rather than the seemingly all-encompassing "cultural imperialism" or "imperialism" per se; whereas Neo-Marxists tend to view "media imperialism" as too constricting because they consider it as part of a rather global concept such as "imperialism" itself. Lee further suggested that the Non-Marxist approach of media imperialism may be a better analytic tool because it provides the researcher with a manageable range of research agenda.

In addition, the Non-Marxist view is considered more flexible than the Neo-Marxist view in that the former tends to emphasize both the complex internal dynamics of the recipient nations (e.g., economies of scale, autonomous internal forces such as local constraints on television imports) and the external exploitative mechanisms

functioning on a global scale. In other words, the Neo-Marxist view may be criticized in that it usually does not take into full consideration of various internal dynamics within the importing nations while placing too much emphasis on the global scale generalizations. Related to the distinction, the definition of "media imperialism" put forward by Boyd-Barret (1977) may have been a major line of thought in many critical researchers:

The process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country are singly or together subject to substantial pressure from the media interest of any other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected.

As to the "product life-cycle" contention from the media diffusionists, media imperialism contenders consider it as too optimistic and insufficient to explain the inherent mechanisms functioning in the process of global media flow. For instance, Lee (1980) argued that:

It is questionable, however, whether these subcenters ever change their fundamental dependency relationship with the metropolitan centers, or whether the bulk of their [exporting nations'] media products are necessarily conducive to the national development needs... The unreserved optimism of media diffusionists may turn out to be a romantic fallacy. If they think the Third World countries have to learn the technology to produce products that are suitable to indigenous cultures, then the model seems to actually refer to the technological diffusion rather than cultural diffusion. (p.52; emphases original)

One of the most radical remedies for correcting the global disparity in media flow, according to the Neo-Marxist cultural imperialism perspective, is total

withdrawal from the global capitalist system and its dominant cultures (Schiller, 1976; Hamelink, 1983). While accepting the unrestrained free-flow philosophy may not be the best solution for many LDC's, also problematic appears to be the downright closed-door policy of cultural protectionism. As Lee suggested, however, the "go socialist" alternative may not be a good option either as manifested by "socialist media imperialism." A few exemplary cases of the socialist media imperialism were well illustrated by nations such as Cuba.

In short, the Neo-Marxist radical approach appears to be good at diagnosing problems inherent in the media diffusion camp's rather optimistic and liberal interpretations, but at the same time poor at providing suitable therapy to cure the imbalanced global media flow. What is urgently called for now is a mid-range perspective, hitting somewhere between the diffusionism and the Non-Marxist media imperialism. With a limited range of meaningful research agenda both for those relatively subjective/normative critical scholars and for those positivistic empiricists, it would contribute to bridging the gap between what have been epistemologically termed as the critical and empirical camps of mass communication research (Rogers, 1982; Hur, 1982).

**Mid-Range Perspectives and Review of Research
on the Impact of Television Imports**

...there is a need to link findings made by systems studies and processes and effects analysis of international mass communication. It is true that findings available in systems analysis and processes and effects analysis are fundamentally related, despite the differences of research focus and research technique in past international mass communication research. (Hur, 1982, p.549)

Another possible reason for the lack of attention to effects is that critical research is still at an early stage of development... For example, given the major differences in the notion of ideology among structuralist, political economy and culturalist approaches, critical research is as yet unable to advance upon the terrain of effects.
(Fejes, 1984, p.221)

As can be seen from the two umbrella perspectives summarized, a researcher may take a variety of assumptions or generalities depending on which approach he or she subscribes to. Aside from the systematic and structural level of analysis (e.g., product life-cycle theory, anthropological evolutionism, perpetuation of the Center-Periphery status quo, dependent underdevelopment, etc.), however, one may be more interested in delineating specific impact of international television program flow on the psychological level.

Such research will specifically deal with operationalizable theoretical constructs such as the cultivation of beliefs, values, ideologies, attitudes and behaviors. At the same time, these approaches would

function as filling the gap between the structural analysis and the processes/effects analysis of international mass communication research (Hur, 1982).

For instance, deriving from the media imperialism perspective, one may anticipate a strong hypodermic-needle impact of television program imports among populations in receiving nations. On the contrary, however, adherents of the media diffusionism may be more inclined to come up with some limited-effect models of media when applied to the psychological level analysis of the global television program flow.

It is true that various normative and critical interpretations of global communication flow have been advanced on system-level analysis; however, relatively little research has provided concrete evidence to justify the value-laden claims. Indeed, the plethora of research that has flourished in this area since the early 1970s seems to defy a precise reflection of the state of the art in theory and research involving pertinent areas of the field. As aptly indicated by Hur (1982) and Rogers (1982), the only exception is a notable trend in the field toward an imbalanced research emphasis. That is, a heavy concentration on the structural or processual analyses of various global communication systems has been sharply contrasted with a much weaker emphasis on various social and psychological "effects" variables in international mass

communication research.

In this regard, Lee's (1980) discussion of the four levels of generality derived from the non-Marxist media imperialism perspective may suggest a useful mid-range analytic tool for investigating the impact of television program imports. His refinement of media imperialism was concerned with: 1) television program exportation to foreign countries; 2) foreign ownership and control of media outlets; 3) transfer of metropolitan broadcasting norms and discrepancy between media commercialism and public interests; and 4) cultural intrusion of alien value systems and capitalistic world views.

Of particular interest in the research investigating specific psychological impact of international television program flow is the last dimension of the four generalities, namely, the cultural intrusion of alien values. Lee claimed that the mass-produced and mass-packaged television programs, whether imported or emulated, would eventually weaken the popularity of domestic high or folk culture, just like the Gresham's Law dictates.

As the subtitle of his book suggested, the "homogenizing television culture" may foster a "false consciousness," a spurious sense of well-being and catharsis among the vast segment of the politically and economically disadvantaged population in the LDC's. Constant reinforcement of media commercialism would

strengthen a "conspicuous consumption" pattern among the relatively more advantaged local elites, enlarging the gap between the haves and the have-nots, thus, eventually leading to "rising frustration," instead of "rising aspiration," among the mass audience. While Lee's discussion still seemed to dwell on the normative level of analysis as to the global television program flow, it deserves a credit in that it suggested a meaningful step toward empirical operationalizability of a certain amount of effect variables in that context.

Perhaps the first empirical evidence regarding imported television programs' impact on foreign viewers may date back as early as in 1968, when Browne (1968) reported in a small-scale international survey that the U.S. television programs, more often than not, gave foreign viewers a favorable impression of life in the U.S. This was chiefly through their portrayal of "harmonious family life, a high standard of living, and a general sense of freedom and equality for and among Americans" (pp. 315-316). Also reported in the study was that violence and "unreality of presentation" were the predominant negative impressions, with bad taste as to "immorality, brashness and excessive emphasis on sex" coming in a very distant third.

In terms of image transfer, or, what might be termed as "psychological imperialism" fostered by imported television programs, Beltran (1978) attempted to synthesize

several Latin American research findings. After illustrating a repertoire of images portrayed by Latin American television world, including both local and imported, he classified what he termed as the "basic images" into two distinctive dimensions: positive and negative stimulations. Among those which might have been promoted by made-in-USA television programs were: conformism, adventurism, racism, elitism, materialism, aggressiveness, self-defeatism, romanticism, conservatism, and so forth. Beltran, then, went on to argue that a research which moves beyond the mere identifications of implicit "alien" images was needed.

While these two empirical pieces provided general ideas about the impact of the U.S. television programs abroad, other researchers investigated more specific impact on attitudes and beliefs among the receiving populations. In a field experiment among Formosan children, Tsai (1970) hypothesized that the viewers of U.S. television programs on Taiwan television would have a more favorable attitude toward certain elements of U.S. culture and a less favorable attitude toward their own culture than their non-viewing counterparts. While some findings suggested the impact of U.S. television programs on specific attitudes toward U.S. culture, little influence was evidenced on the Formosan children's outlook on their culture. In line with these findings of limited media effects in a crosscultural

setting, Sparks (1977) noted that there was little attitudinal impact associated with U.S. television news watching among the Canadian population.

In a test of cultural imperialism hypothesis among Icelandic children, Payne and Peake (1977) again reported minimal impact of U.S. television viewing on generating favorable attitudes about the U.S., and no effect in increasing political information about the U.S. In a later synthesis of three studies among Icelandic populations, however, Payne (1978) carefully concluded that, despite minor differences among the studies, "there appears to be a very slight direct relationship between TV viewing and knowledge of political figures occasionally covered on U.S. TV" (p. 180). While interpreting the results, he also noted:

Much of the literature on information, value, and attitude transfer is more historical than empirical. Some studies are mainly descriptive and many of the remaining studies are limited by short-term manipulation of the independent variable, serious contamination from other crosscultural contact, or confounding of the effects of different media. As a result, findings of these studies have often been tentative and have contradicted each other. (p. 173)

There were several other studies with some evidence of moderate effects of imported television program viewing. A study among Canadian college students (Barnett & McPhail, 1980), utilizing a metric multidimensional scaling method, found a substantial impact of U.S. television program viewing on perceptions of national identity. For example,

the more U.S. television viewed by Canadians, the less they perceived of themselves like Canadians and the more they perceived of themselves like Americans. Furthermore, in the proportion of the sample that watched an extreme amount of U.S. television, the subjects were found to identify significantly closer to the U.S. than Canada.

In a study among the Algonkian Indians of Central Canada, Granzberg (1982) reported a similar finding that, after the introduction of television mostly filled with American programs, "outgroup identity" and stress had increased among the Algonkian children. For example, in a role-playing simulation situation, television viewing appeared to promote the tendency for the Algonkians to choose the members of outgroup identity (i.e., Euro-Canadians) instead of their in-group members as role models, particularly for the role of the "good" person.

More recently, Tan, Tan & Tan (1987) investigated an "enculturation" potential of U.S. television programs among Filipino high school students, and reported that frequent viewing of American television was associated with some erosion of traditional Filipino values. For example, heavy viewers of American television were more likely than infrequent viewers to consider "pleasure" an important value; while at the same time they tended to consider "salvation," "wisdom" and "forgiving" less important values than infrequent viewers.

In a similar study among Korean college students, however, Kang & Morgan (1988) reported mixed findings: while some values showed no association with American television program viewing at all, heavy viewers of American television programs hold less traditional values on some topics but more traditional values on others. They concluded that while the sharply divergent patterns provided some support for the enculturation of values by U.S. television program viewing, a hypodermic-needle model of media imperialism was not adequate to explain the results.

In a step going beyond the realm of national identity or value orientations influenced by foreign media, Boyd (1984) explored some of the reasons for the uses and the subsequent results of using imported television programs in LDC's. An interesting point he raised was related to what he called the "Janus effect" of the imported television program viewing: 1) the perceptions by the viewer of the originating country; and 2) any new perceptions of the viewer's own country in light of the imported programming. He pointed out:

This puts the viewer in the position of looking two ways at once, and hence the Janus effect referred to in the title...it is of interest to ask if the viewer in what is commonly called a developing country, but which have had a culture anteceding that of the United States, sees his or her culture as being superior, inferior, or perhaps too traditional and not progressive enough. (p.380)

The notion of Janus effect appears to have a logical affinity with the "social comparison theory" in social psychology literature (e.g., Festinger, 1954) as well as with Beltran's (1978) notion of "self-defeatism" claimed to be fostered by imported television programs.

While the studies reviewed so far were generally concerned with the cognitive and attitudinal impact of made-in-USA television programs viewed across different cultures, yet another interesting line of inquiry also came from the area of "cultivation" research. Originally developed by Gerbner and his colleagues (Gerbner & Gross, 1976a), the cultivation hypothesis proposed a strong impact of television on viewers' construction of social reality (a detailed explication of the hypothesis follows shortly in this Chapter). While investigating the U.S. television programs' impact on the conceptions of social reality among Australian children, Pingree and Hawkins (1981) suggested:

One of the most promising approaches to studying the influence of television on culture starts with the hypothesis that information learned from the mass media is incorporated into individuals' conceptions of social reality and presumably guides further learning and behavior. If a careful analysis finds a relationship between television viewing and these conceptions, then we can begin to make a case for television's contribution to our shared values and assumptions. (p.97)

In the study applying the postulates and methodologies of the cultivation hypothesis, they found that U.S. television viewing was associated with both perceptions of violence and interpersonal mistrust in Australian society.

The relationships sustained their significance even after simultaneous controls for demographic and other media variables. Pingree and Hawkins concluded that, as speculated previously by many critical researchers, the effects of television viewing on conceptions of social reality indeed extended beyond the culture that created the programming.

Additional support for the possibility of cross-cultural cultivation by imported television programs also came from two sample surveys among Israeli adolescents (Weimann, 1984). The study reported that heavy viewers of made-in-USA television programming tended to paint a rosier picture of American life (e.g., wealth and standard of living), even when other demographic factors were held constant.

In summary, research specifically investigating the impact of imported television programming on the viewer's psychological orientations has provided mixed findings. Some studies suggested a null to minimal impact of imported television viewing (e.g., Tsai, 1970; Sparks, 1977; Payne & Peake, 1977), while other studies revealed at best a moderate impact of such viewing (e.g., Barnett & McPhail, 1980; Granzberg, 1982; Pingree & Hawkins, 1982; Weimann, 1984; Tan et al., 1987; Kang & Morgan, 1988). Whether derived from a macro-level analytic paradigm (e.g., media diffusionism or media imperialism) or from rather micro-

level psychological hypotheses (e.g., image-transfer, Janus effect, enculturation or cultivation), apparent from the studies is that a "bullet theory" or "hypodermic-needle model" of cross-cultural media impact was not firmly established. With a minimal-to-moderate degree of foreign media impact found in some of the studies, however, more research is deemed necessary to justify the claims concerning various psychological and ideological dimensions of the media imperialism logic.

Macro-Level Perspectives and AFKN-TV

The presence of 19-hours-a-day American Forces Korea Network Television (AFKN-TV) in Korea provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of American television programming in a country where a relatively high degree of self-reliance in the realm of domestic media has been maintained for a quite a while. Despite the Korean government's sincere efforts to promote indigenous culture, with much success, and despite the now well-developed Korean broadcasting structure with enhanced technical and programming sophistication, a massive intrusion of the best American entertainment programs through AFKN-TV, according to the media imperialism bullet theory, will have a detrimental impact on the Korean people's values, ideologies, and beliefs.

The Republic of Korea is very much independent in

terms of television programming of its own. According to "The History of Korean Broadcasting" (KBS, 1976), the proportion of imported films to the indigenous programming in 1962 was up to one fourth of the entire Korean Broadcasting System's (KBS) 4-hour-a-day scheduling. As shown in Table 1, however, as of July 1983, the proportion of imported television programming was reduced to less than 12% all across the four television channels in Korea.

 Table 1 about here

At the same time, the relative independence of Korean television programming can be explained also in terms of the broadcast time and content of imported television programs. Since the early 1970s, major imported film features have been removed from the prime-time scheduling and placed during late-night or weekend afternoon time slots. In 1962, major 5 program imports on KBS television (e.g., "I Love Lucy") were all located within the prime-time hours; in 1965, major 5 imported features on TBC-TV (now KBS-2) such as "Combat" and "The Fugitive" were all placed within the peak-time hours (7:30 to 8:30 pm); and no exception was found for MBC-TV's initial scheduling in 1969, where major one-hour feature imports (e.g., "Ironside," "Barron") were scheduled within the 8:20-to-9:15 pm slot.

Improved technical sophistication of the Korean indigenous television industry, the advent of increasingly popular Korean telenovelas and traditional costume dramas, awakened government policies to promote indigenous initiatives and values in the early 1970s have all contributed to the removal of the imported television features from the prime-time scheduling in most domestic channels. The process appears to be quite consistent with the findings from Straubhaar's (1983) investigation of several Latin American countries and also with McNany's (1984) "cultural industry" perspective. In addition, the consideration of various internal dynamics regarding the indigenous initiatives and socio-economic factors is quite in line with the Non-Marxist thinking of media imperialism perspective (Lee, 1980).

The content of the imported television programs has also been changed since the 1970s: more entertainment and less educational programs before; and less entertainment and more educational/cultural programs after. As shown in Table 2, as of July 1983, children's programs, documentaries, and other educational/cultural programs accounted for more than 60% of all the imports.

Table 2 about here

While the gradual shift from the heavy reliance on

imported television entertainment to the relative self-reliance in Korea may appear to be consistent with the media diffusion logic, it should not be viewed as disconfirming several important implications from the media imperialism argument. Inherent technological dependency in terms of broadcasting hardware, heavy reliance on transnational advertising revenue, and lack of creativity as to the development of television program formats/ideas may be just a few illustrations of the Korean broadcasting structure's dependency upon the global economic and cultural markets.

For example, most of the sophisticated state-of-the-art broadcasting equipments still comes from such countries as the U.S. and Japan (e.g., General Electric, RCA, Westinghouse, Sony, Panasonic); a fair share of television advertising revenue comes from the products manufactured by the major transnational corporations, either independent or affiliated with Korean subsidiaries (e.g., Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Nestle); and, except for some successful Korean telenovelas and traditional costume dramas, many domestic television programs have been either downright copies or slightly modified spinoffs of many American television programs. A few examples of such copied or emulated program formats include: "News Panorama" (ABC's "20/20"), "Quiz Express" ("\$20,000 Pyramid"), "One Hundred People Survey" ("Family Feud"), "Radar 11" (CBS's "60 Minutes), "TV

Kindergarten One Two Three" (PBS's "3-2-1 Contact"), "Top Songs of the Week" ("Solid Gold").

Although not widely publicized or acknowledged by the Korean broadcasting professionals, a long-term participatory observation and various interviews conducted by the present author within inside circles of the Korean broadcasting world strongly suggested that AFKN-TV was a very influential educational outlet for the Korean broadcasters. By and large, the Korean broadcasting professionals appeared to be very much attentive to most of AFKN-TV programs, and tended to view the presence of AFKN-TV as an immediately available "school of journalism" or "department of broadcasting" in the U.S.

In addition, conflicts between Korean policymakers' attempts to gain control of domestic broadcasting outlets ("developmental journalism") and the AFKN-TV's "free-flow journalism" have been gradually intensified over the years, particularly since the introduction of the around-the-clock satellite link (SATNET) on October 4th, 1983. For example, Korean government's usually subtle, but sometimes rather direct, endeavor to censor many politically sensitive domestic news has been constantly undermined by AFKN-TV's uncensored international news coverages delivered through such programs as "ABC News with Peter Jennings," "CBS Evening News with Dan Rather," "NBC News with Tom Brokaw," "CNN Primetime News," "ABC News Nightline," in addition to

the locally produced "AFKN Nightly News."

Aside from the issues surrounding the adoption of American television program formats and a cleavage between the two directly opposing journalistic philosophies, a few other side-effects of AFKN-TV viewing among Shadow viewers, according to the mid-range perspective of media imperialism, seem no less apparent. Such largely unintended impact of the foreign medium would include: young people's commercial/sexual/racial/occupational socializations through various aspects of American life portrayed in the world of AFKN-TV; possible national self-image degradation through incidental but significant social comparison processes (what Boyd called the "Janus Effect", 1984); and confusion of morals and ethics, particularly among the young. In that regard, several micro-level psychological perspectives are introduced in the following section, that were considered particularly relevant to investigate some of these unintended side-effects potentially contributable to AFKN-TV.

MICRO-LEVEL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND RESEARCH

A logical starting point to answer the question "who views what on AFKN-TV for what reasons with what impact" appears to be an approach utilizing the research investigating the uses audience members make of the mass media, the gratifications from media consumption, and their

antecedents and consequences. While the conventional uses & gratifications research may be useful for answering some part of the question (i.e., "who views what for what reasons"), the remaining part of the question (i.e., "with what impact") calls for a few other specific theoretical perspectives available in media effects research. Such perspectives potentially useful in the present inquiry include a uses & effects approach, the cultivation hypothesis, and a multiple-trace memory model of communication.

Uses & Gratifications and Uses & Effects

If any concept in the theoretical structure can be said to be central it is the gratifications sought from media experiences, thus underscoring the motivational nature of uses and gratifications theory. Yet the model makes clear that gratifications sought cannot be viewed in isolation, connected as they are in both antecedent and consequent fashion to a host of media, perceptual, social and psychological variables.

(Palmgreen, 1984, p. 46)

As widely understood, at the core of the uses & gratifications approach is the concept of an active audience. The major underlying assumption highlighting the term "active audience" is the voluntaristic and selective nature of the audience behaviors regarding mass media consumption.

Accordingly, uses & gratifications researchers have disapproved of the old "magic bullet" theory or the

"hypodermic needle" model of mass media effects, which proposed and envisioned an aggregate of passive audience imbibing uncritically the all-powerful media messages. More specifically, Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1974) postulate that the uses & gratifications approach is concerned with "(1) the social and psychological origins of (2) need, which generate (3) expectations of (4) the mass media or other sources, which lead to (5) differential patterns of media exposure (or engagement in other activities), resulting in (6) need gratifications and (7) other consequences, perhaps mostly unintended ones." (p. 20)

Evolved out of dissatisfaction with earlier "effects" research based on a rather simplistic "stimulus-response" model, the uses & gratifications research has endeavored to elucidate gratifications concepts as intervening variables between interactions between audience and mass media. Although the active audience concept and the subsequent typological inquiries of media gratifications have not been without criticism (e.g., Elliott, 1974; Goodhart, Ehrenberg & Collins, 1975; McQuail, 1983), a comprehensive literature review in this area appears to support that mass media consumption is at least partially motivated by gratifications sought or perceived to be obtained (Greenberg, 1974; Kippax & Murray, 1980; Hur & Robinson, 1981; McLeod & Becker, 1981; Palmgreen, Wenner, & Rayburn, 1981; Becker & Fruit, 1982; McLeod, Bybee & Durall, 1982;

Rubin & Rubin, 1982; Wenner, 1982; Palmgreen, 1984).

For example, Wenner (1982), employing a hierarchical regression analysis, found that various gratification measures explained a significant portion of variance in exposure to network evening news and "60 Minutes" when demographic and other media variables were controlled. In an attempt to identify more specific patterns of associations between audience gratifications and media exposure, Rubin & Rubin (1982) found that the seeking of informational gratifications were significantly associated with exposure to television news, documentaries, and talk shows. On the other hand, those who sought for passive gratifications (e.g., companionship, relaxation, arousal, passing time, and habit) were found to be heavier viewers, than the information seekers, of overall television programming as well as daytime soaps and game shows. In short, the study strongly suggested that specific gratifications sought are related to consumption of specific types of television programming.

As frequently pointed out, however, the abundance of research identifying the link between audience gratifications and media exposure has been sharply contrasted with a lack of empirical studies specifically investigating various antecedent factors for generating the motivations and any consequences of media consumption. Indeed, these two starting and ending points of the uses &

gratifications approach were explicitly identified and fully explained in the Katz et al.'s classic (1974). While several authors suggested various speculative typologies as to the social/psychological origins of media gratifications (Johnstone, 1974; McGuire, 1974; Blumler, 1979), empirical evidence supporting the claim seemed at best suggestive. Furthermore, adding more typological terms to various dimensions of the social/psychological origins appeared only to complicate the matter, which is somewhat analogous to an initial stage of typology development in the uses & gratifications tradition.

Despite the limitations, however, a few studies merit a separate attention in light of the present study. In an attempt to identify the relationship between the need for social integration and media use among adolescents, Johnston (1974) proposed a dichotomy of social utilities of media use. What he called the "transcendental uses" were identified as stemming from one's motive to escape from social realities. Conventionally formulated typologies of media use such as escape, relaxation, and reducing stress may fall within this dimension.

An individual's "experiential uses" of media, on the other hand, were derived from a motive to actively seek for social integration and adaptation. Such gratifications as information-seeking, surveillance, and social belonging may be a few examples within this dimension. As indicated by

Palmgreen (1984), the "transcendental uses" appear to have a conceptual affinity with Blumler's (1979) notion of "compensatory uses"; and the "experiential uses" appear to stress the importance of "functional," as opposed to compensatory, orientations of media uses among the audience.

In a study utilizing a similar conceptual framework of the compensatory versus functional orientations of media uses, Rosengren & Windahl (1972) reported some evidence suggesting a significant association between low potential for social interaction and parasocial interaction with media content. Along with Johnston's (1974) conceptualization of major audience orientations of media uses, this study strongly suggested a usefulness of the dichotomy in analyzing the social origins for generating various motivations for the media uses.

As noted earlier, an epistemological distance from "effects" research in the uses & gratifications approach has largely kept the researchers from going beyond looking at the mere "consequences" of media uses such as the "gratifications obtained or perceived to be obtained." Indeed, Katz et al. (1974) and Blumler (1979) criticized the paucity of theoretical as well as empirical studies bridging the gap between the two traditions. According to a recent comprehensive literature review (Palmgreen, 1984), however, the situation seems to have much progressed toward

the desired direction.

Perhaps a major contribution to the conceptual discussion of a "uses & effects" model may be credited to Windahl (1981). In a critical review of research and conceptual foundations of the uses & gratifications approach, Windahl proposed a synthesis of uses & effects models of mass communication. His model led to a new term, "consequences," a synthesis of "medium content effects" and "gratification process consequences." He pointed out:

The uses and effects model which I propose could be seen either as a uses and gratifications model with effect elements or an effect model, containing some uses and gratifications elements... The model presented...will regard the uses and gratifications process, partly as a bundle of intervening variables--as argued by Klapper in 1963--partly as a system of independent variables. (pp. 175-178)

In short, the model Windahl proposed can be seen as a serious attempt to extend the ending point of Katz et al.'s (1974) description of the uses & gratifications approach, incorporating various effect variables deemed useful in fully understanding the aspect of "consequences." For example, he suggested that the "effects of media content through media use" and "consequences of media use" may work toward similar outcomes such as media dependency, a widening knowledge gap, and "spirals of silence" (Noelle-Newman, 1974)--what he called the "consequences." However, some limitations of the model must be acknowledged in that the tricotomy of effects, consequences, and consequences may not include all types of possible outcomes, and in that the

relations among the three types of outcomes may not be easily explainable.

After reviewing the empirical literature regarding the "uses & effects" model, Palmgreen (1984) concluded that a variety of audience gratifications were related to a wide spectrum of media effects, including knowledge, dependency, attitudes, perceptions of social reality, agenda setting, discussion, and various political effects variables. For the purpose of the present AFKN study, a few areas of effects associated with the uses & gratifications seem pertinent for further discussion. Among such areas to be investigated in the study are attitude formation and perceptions of social reality.

In this regard, Blumler's (1979) conceptual refinement seems to suggest a meaningful step toward the merge of uses and effects traditions. Based on three most widely recognized gratification typologies, three hypotheses were proposed. First, he suggested that cognitive or surveillance motivations should promote knowledge gain and learning. Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis, both from self-report surveys and from experimental studies, has been quite consistent.

For instance, audience motivations for information-seeking and surveillance of sociocultural milieu were found to be strong predictors for gaining knowledge about political candidates and their issue positions (e.g.,

Atkin, Bowen, Nayman, and Sheinkopf, 1973; Atkin & Heald, 1976; McLeod & Becker, 1974). In addition, different motivations (e.g, to learn about issue stands of a candidate versus to form an impression of the candidate's personality) facilitated different types of learning according to the initial motivation "sets" manipulated in an experimental setting (Garrazone, 1983).

Second, Blumler hypothesized that diversion and escape motivations would promote audience perceptions of social reality in line with portrayals frequently found in entertainment materials. He suggested such motivations would lower the audience member's "perceptual guard," which in turn make them more vulnerable to various media impact. According to Johnston's (1974) terminology, this hypothesis may be paraphrased as that the "transcendental" users of media would accept media reality more easily than would do the "experiential" users of media.

While empirical support for the hypothesis is not fully established yet, this hypothesis seems to provide an interesting ground for testing the cultivation hypothesis (discussed shortly), particularly in connection with a form of audience activity (i.e., exposure motivations). Although several studies have investigated the relationship between such motivations and perceived reality of television programming (e.g., Greenberg, 1974; Rubin, 1979, 1981, 1983), findings from the studies shed little light on

the question whether such diversional or "transcendental" motivations would significantly mediate the media impact on the viewers' social reality construction.

Finally, Blumler suggested that involvement in media content for personal identity reasons is likely to promote reinforcement effects. That is, many people tend to select media content which reinforces their attitudes and predispositions. In these cases, the uses & gratifications process constitutes a bundle of intervening variables in effects research. Having a close conceptual closeness with the "selective exposure/perception/retention" logic proposed by Klapper (1963), this hypothesis has been supported by several studies in political communication literature (e.g., McLeod, Durall, Ziemke, & Bybee, 1979; McLeod & Becker, 1981).

In a related vein, Levy and Windahl (1984) identified two dimensions of "audience activity." The first activity dimension focused on the qualitative orientation of audiences toward the communication process: "selective," "involved," and "using" relationships to media. These three dimensions were matched with other three dimensions of audience activity, namely, specific temporal phases of the interaction with media: "preactivity" (e.g., planning to watch television news), "duractivity" (e.g., engaging in other distracting activities while viewing), and "postactivity" (e.g., thinking about the program viewed or

discussing it with others).

The three matched cells of the audience orientation and the temporal sequence (e.g., selective preactivity, uninvolved duractivity, and using media in postactivity) were then put to an empirical test to see whether they would relate to the audience member's uses and gratifications. Included in major findings from the study was an overall significant association between gratification measures and all three measures of audience activity. That is, a higher degree of media use motivation and perceived gratifications led to more active media consumption.

While the study did not utilize the concept of audience activity beyond the realm of uses & gratifications, the three dimensions appear to be important in identifying previously unidentified, or at best loosely discussed, variables potentially intervening in the process of various media impact. In light of the potential merge of uses and effects traditions and the notion of "consequences," the hypotheses proposed by Blumler (1979) also seem to indicate a strong intervening potential of the motivation variables in identifying specific media impact. As such, the hypotheses as well as the specific dimensions of audience activity all appear to suggest an additional conceptual basis for the arguments put forward to explain the complexities concerning the strong perceptual impact of

television viewing such as cultivation.

Cultivation Hypothesis

Why do you Americans export programs which make us all think that your street is running with blood and you have to dodge from doorway to doorway to avoid being hit by bullets?

(a baffled Yugoslav patron,
recited from Lee, 1980, p. 67)

I don't think I'm eligible for answering that question. Since I was among the panel on the floor, I don't know what it was like on television. You guys tell me what your impressions of the debate was really like.

(a reply by Peter Jennings, ABC-News anchorperson, paraphrased)

As suggested by the reply by the ABC-News anchorperson right after the first Presidential Debate in November, 1988, a television reality sometimes takes on more true-to-life quality than what actually happened in real life. In the age of television, it seems true that socially dominant perspectives provided and nurtured by a pervasive medium such as television have powerful implications as to people's construction of social reality. Also intuitively making sense is the various speculations and normative judgements regarding detrimental side effects of imported foreign media content among the receiving populations. As briefly introduced in Chapter II, one of the useful conceptual tools to identify such impact on the viewers' psychological orientations is the "cultivation hypothesis."

While theories pertaining to human's construction of

meaning and knowledge can be found manifold in other relevant fields of inquiry (e.g., symbolic interactionism, sociology of knowledge, schemata theories in social cognition literature, linguistic theories of meaning, etc.), perhaps a pioneering work in the context of "mediated" communication may date back to the Walter Lippmann's classic, *Public Opinion* (1922). From numerous examples compiled through the turbulent period witnessing the World War I, he has suggested that depictions of the press were often "spurious" in that they were very misleading, creating distorted or even completely false pictures "in people's heads" for the world outside. While Lippmann's treatise was mainly concerned with the print media, perhaps the most influential mass media in the pre-television era, it is still considered as having heralded similar postulates used in the present age of visual media represented notably by television.

Among the research agendas or theoretical bases for studying how media content plays a part in the social construction of meaning is what George Gerbner and his associates called the cultivation hypothesis. Evolved out of the national concern with various effects of television violence during the 1960s and 1970s, the Cultural Indicators Group led by Gerbner has initially sought to delineate an overall picture of television violence. Based on its annual content analyses or what they called the

message system analyses, they reported the amount of violence shown on television in a series of Violence Profiles (Gerbner et al., 1976a, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981).

They also attempted to develop a theoretical framework and an empirical strategy for studying the impact of televised violence on people's beliefs. While the message system analysis was a descriptive assessment of samples of prime-time and weekend daytime network television dramatic programming, the cultivation analysis was the investigation of viewer conceptions of social reality associated with the most recurrent features of the television world.

In short, the cultivation hypothesis posited that the television world of aggregate stories and images plays a major role in setting the public agenda and shaping socially pervasive norms, thus "cultivating" dominant perspectives of society. The hypothesis further suggested that an "organically composed total world of interrelated stories" cultivates among viewers a set of cognitive structure that is employed to perceive and interpret the world around them.

Based on the content analyses showing the systematic interrelatedness and pervasive violence and crime in the world of U.S. network television, Gerbner et al. suggested that heavy television viewers develop a TV-biased set of beliefs that correspond more closely with the distorted

television world than with the actuality of the real world.

They noted:

Television is the central and most pervasive mass medium in American culture and it plays a distinctive and historically unprecedented role... the individual is introduced virtually at birth into its powerful flow of messages and images. The television set has become a key member of the family, the one who tells most of the stories most of the time... These stories form a coherent if mythical "world" in every home. Television dominates the symbolic environment of modern life. (Gerbner et al., 1980a, p. 23)

While later studies included other forms of behavior shown on television, Gerbner and his associates have been concerned in particular with how violence shown on television exaggerates the viewer's perceptions of crime in society and fears of crime in their neighborhoods. To provide empirical evidence, they devised an analytic method called the "cultivation differential," which was essentially a forced-choice procedure between a television answer and a reality answer. The replies of heavy versus light viewers were then compared to generate the cultivation differential between the two subgroups of television viewers. The statistics used described such aspects of the society as the risk of falling victims to a crime or assault and the proportion of population engaged in law enforcement occupations.

Although findings from early research seemed to support the predictions set forth in the hypothesis (e.g., Gerbner et al., 1976b, 1977, 1978), reanalyses of the same

data by others (Hughes, 1980; Hirsch, 1980a, 1980b, 1981a, 1981b) yielded little support for the cultivation. By introducing simultaneous controls for a number of potential third variables, Hughes (1980) found that the relationship between television viewing and fear of walking alone at night was reduced to nonsignificance.

He also examined a few other variables that Gerbner et al. (1978) reported in their analysis of the 1975 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) data, and pointed out the cultivation predictions were met by mixed results. For example, the relationship between viewing and a question about America staying out of world affairs was weakened but remained significant. However, for two Anomie questions that Gerbner et al. found in the 1977 NORC data (i.e., "Most public officials are not really interested in the problems of the average man," and "In spite of what some people say, the lot of average man is getting worse."), the relationships remained significant but appeared curvilinear: medium viewers showed the most agreement with the items.

Isolating nonviewers and extreme viewers, Hirsch (1980b) also replicated the cultivation research using the same NORC data set used by Gerbner et al. On a majority of 18 relevant questionnaire items, the nonviewers were more frequently fearful, alienated, and favorable to suicide than the light viewers; and the extreme viewers appeared to

perceive a less scary world than heavy viewers. In addition, using multiple controls simultaneously on age, gender, and educations greatly reduced support for the cultivation predictions. Hirsch concluded that the cultivation hypothesis remained an "interesting but unsupported speculation," and called for more rigorous replications and a conceptual refinement.

Based on the results of these studies, the hypothesis has been challenged not only for its methodological weakness but for conceptual vagueness as well. As a result, several authors have begun to look at other explanations for the relationships set forth in the hypothesis. For example, recent literature (e.g., Tyler, 1980; Tyler & Cook, 1984) looked at the conceptual distinction between personal and societal-level judgements about salient social issues, particularly crime, and the impact of media on these judgements. According to this distinction, societal-level judgements refer to beliefs about phenomena related to general society and the environment in which one lives.

As to crime perceptions, this type of judgements might be operationalized as estimates of the amount of crime in society and concern about crime in one's neighborhood. Personal-level judgements differ from societal-level judgements in that they refer to beliefs about events that more or less directly affect the individual. When dealing with crime, this might include estimates about the

likelihood of personal crime victimization and the degree of victimization fear.

Tyler and Cook (1984) suggested that information related to judgements about the general population did not appear to influence personal perceptions concerning fear of victimization. They further noted that media content indirectly pertaining to an individual could affect societal-level perceptions while having little impact on personal-level fear. Accordingly, personal judgements about vulnerability are best predicted by direct experience with crimes and by frequent conversations about crime with others.

In addition, they suggested that the strong association between media exposure and societal-level, not personal-level, judgements is mainly due to the "informativeness" of the media event rather than to the "affectivity" of its imagery. The distinction, of course, implies that the specification of both the media content (e.g., crime news versus crime entertainment) and the different levels of fear being observed (e.g., personal fear of crime versus societal estimates of crime) are important factors in determining the overall cultivation effect.

Similar to the manner, other researchers found that looking at different dimensions of fear within the personal versus global-level distinction could be useful in

resolving some of the inconsistencies found in cultivation research. For example, Tamborini, Zillmann, and Bryant (1984) distinguished situation-specific perceptions of crime victimization fear at the societal-level (e.g., urban versus rural environmental fear; fear for the safety of significant others versus fear for the safety of strangers) and demonstrated that the relationship between television viewing and fear differed along these dimensions. The study appeared to signify the importance of these distinctions in determining the overall perceptual media impact.

The conceptual inconsistencies and largely mixed empirical findings have also been noted in a few cross-cultural investigations. The now almost classic and perhaps most widely cited piece of disconfirmation of the cultivation came from Canada (Doob & MacDonald, 1979). Results from data collected from door-to-door surveys in four Toronto areas (two in downtown and two in suburbs, both including a high and low crime area) revealed that, when actual crime rate of the region was controlled for, there was no overall relationship between television viewing and fear of crime. A stepwise multiple regression analysis and a canonical correlation were utilized to corroborate the finding. While this finding later led to a conceptual refinement of the cultivation such as "resonance" (Gerbner et al., 1980a), persistent impact of TV viewing for 14 of the 25 secondary questions suggested a

need for distinguishing between different dimensions of crime fear.

Yet another failure for replicating the cultivation was documented from Great Britain when Wober (1978) reported the results from a national survey on "Attitudes to Broadcasting," which contained two cultivation-related items: one dealt with prevalence of violence manifested in terms of one's chances of being a victim of robbery, and the other with interpersonal mistrust. The two items were summed to form a "Security Scale," which was not related to TV viewing in all categories of gender, age, and social class.

Deriving from the previous findings that social anxiety and anomie varied among different social strata, and that controls for demographic factors often significantly weakened the associations between TV viewing and various social perceptions, Wober and Gunter (1982) suggested an alternative explanation. That is, both extent of TV viewing and anxiety/mistrust may be a function of some third variables, such as underlying personality characteristics. While not directly proven in their research, the alternative hypothesis was tested in the study by utilizing Rotter's "fate" factors (e.g., perceived lack of control or powerlessness).

In a similar line of research, Gunter and Wober (1983) tested a selective exposure rationale--a reversed

cultivation logic. Results from the study among London residents showed that viewing of action/adventure programs and U.S. programs was related to the belief in "just world." That is, those spent more time watching these types of programs exhibited a stronger belief that the world is a just place. The result was then interpreted as suggesting that people with the just world belief turn to dramatic storylines for further reinforcement and clarification of their beliefs. An assumption underlying the interpretation is that fictional television programs featuring violence and crime are typically resolved with the triumph of good over evil.

As briefly noted earlier in this Chapter, a few other cross-cultural inquiries specifically investigating the impact of U.S. television program imports also brought mixed support for the cultivation: some found a moderate support (e.g., Pingree & Hawkins, 1978, among Australian children; Weimann, 1984, among Israeli adolescents; Tan, Tan, & Tan, 1987, among Filipino high school students), and others found a mixed support (e.g., Kang & Morgan, 1988, among Korean college students). As indicated recently by several authors (e.g., Kang & Morgan, 1988; Tamborini & Choi, 1988b), the discrepancies in these studies may reflect the fact that different dependent variables were employed by different researchers (e.g., images, values, beliefs); and that diverse characteristics of the cross-

cultural viewers may interact with the predictions set forth in the cultivation hypothesis.

In a synthetic review of cultivation in various cross-cultural contexts, Tamborini and Choi (1988b) attempted to explain some inconsistencies in light of both conceptual and methodological flaws in cultivation research. First, they outlined three major categories of research in the area: (1) foreign residents living in the U.S. and exposed to U.S. television programs (e.g., Choi & Tamborini, 1988; Tamborini & Choi 1988a); (2) residents of foreign nations exposed to U.S. television program imports (e.g., Pingree & Hawkins, 1978; Wiemann, 1984; Tan et al., 1987); and (3) residents of foreign nations exposed to their native television (e.g., Doob & MacDonald, 1979; Wober, 1978; Wober & Gunter, 1982).

Deriving from the inquiry, they suggested that the notion of "cultural diversity" should be seriously considered in cross-cultural cultivation research in that: (1) the "viewer selectivity" varies according to different cross-cultural settings; and (2) the concept of "image coherence" of the world of television, assumed constant by the cultivation hypothesis, should be reformulated as a variable across different cultures. As to the viewer selectivity, they wrote:

In order to provide more concrete evidence for the cultivation potential of U.S. television program imports, segmenting the audience according to major motivations for U.S. television program viewing may

help further our understanding of the process. (p. 21)

This contention is quite relevant for the approach taken in the present study of AFKN-TV in Korea. That is, the "uses & effects" model explained in the previous section seems a logical solution to overcome the limitations of the cultivation hypothesis, particularly when applied to a cross-cultural setting. The contention is also consistent with the discussion on some conditions and processes of cultivation by other researchers.

For example, Hawkins and Pingree (1982) identified five such processes that may affect the cultivation. When dealing with foreign populations, each of the processes appears to have far more meaningful implications. First, individual differences in information processing abilities or cognitive structure may be responsible for differences in cultivation. Age, educational background, language proficiency, and sociocultural experiences are examples of the factors involved. Given that the entire AFKN-TV programming is broadcast in English language, degree of English language proficiency of a Korean shadow viewer should be considered especially important.

Second, degree of attention paid to television programs and perceived reality of program content may inhibit or facilitate television's cultivation potential. Research by Pingree, Starrett, and Hawkins (1979) reported that active involvement with a program inhibited

cultivation; while several other studies (e.g., Slater & Elliott, 1982; Elliott, Rudd, & Good, 1983; O'Keefe, 1984) showed that the higher the perceived credibility of the content is, the more likely the influence of that content on social reality construction. A few other concepts noted earlier in uses & effects approach, such as "preactivity" and "duractivity" (Levy & Windahl, 1984), also appear to tap the factors like attention paid and involvement with television content.

Third, real-life experiences may confirm or disconfirm television messages, thus amplifying or diminishing television's cultivation potential. Gerbner et al.'s (1980a) "resonance" reasoning is an example of the real-life confirmation of television messages. In addition, the trichotomy of crime victimization experiences as "direct," "interpersonal," and "mediated" has been found to be a significant predictor of individual differences in cultivation effects (Tyler, 1980, 1984; Tyler & Cook, 1984; Tyler & Rasinski, 1984; Weaver & Wakshlag, 1984).

When dealing with a foreign population exposed to American television programming, variables pertaining to the experience factor may become all the more significant. Given the largely limited real-life experiences in American social milieu among the Korean shadow viewers of AFKN-TV, it may be an interesting question to ask whether other relevant experiences such as having travelled to the U.S.

(direct) or having relatives in the U.S. (interpersonal) would generate different cultivation outcomes than would having no real-life experiences at all (mediated only).

Fourth, the degree of social interaction and integration may interfere with the cultivation. One study (Rothschild, 1979) indicated that an increase in social interaction tended to counteract television messages by providing a rich set of alternative information. In addition, studies using such cross-cultural populations in the U.S. as foreign immigrants or foreign students (Choi & Tamborini, 1988a; Tamborini & Choi, 1988a) suggested that the degree of institutional completeness of ethnic communities may be an important intervening variable between host television viewing and conceptions of social reality. Related to the AFKN study, other media uses may provide the shadow viewers with alternative information sources to learn about American society and life, which in turn may inhibit or facilitate the cultivation by AFKN-TV viewing.

Finally, Hawkins and Pingree (1982) argued that the specific content of television viewing is a better predictor of cultivation than the total amount of viewing, and demonstrated differential degrees of associations between television content types and perceptions of violence in society. Several other studies have also revealed a strong predictive potential of media content

specificity such as: crime-related versus noncrime-related drama (e.g., Hawkins & Pingree, 1980; Weaver & Wakshlag, 1984); justice-depicting versus injustice-depicting drama (Wakshlag, Vial, & Tamborini, 1983; Tamborini, Zillmann, & Bryant, 1984); crime entertainment versus crime news or documentary (Tamborini, Zillmann & Bryant, 1984; O'Keefe, 1984); and television crime news versus newspaper crime news (O'Keefe & Reid-Nash, 1984).

Although the television content specificity may be discussed within this rather extended boundaries of the cultivation hypothesis, the original contention by Gerbner and his associates (e.g., Gerbner & Gross, 1976a; Gerbner et al., 1986) seemed directly opposed to the concepts such as specific and selective viewing. They pointed out:

Television differs from other media in its centralized mass production and ritualistic use of a coherent set of images and messages produced for total populations. Therefore, exposure to the total pattern rather than only to specific genres or programs is what accounts for the historically new and distinct consequences of living with television, namely, the cultivation of shared conceptions of reality among otherwise diverse public. (1986, p. 19)

Naturally, for those who adhere to the viewer non-selectivity and habitual attendance to television, it becomes difficult to accomodate the conceptual modifications such as inclusion of viewer selectivity and television content specificity.

As noted earlier, the present inquiry on the question "who views what on AFKN-TV for what reasons with what

impact" requires a premise that would allow the consideration of audience member's selective viewing and its resulting consequences. Furthermore, the "uses and effects" model identified explicitly calls for that premise. Then, the cultivation hypothesis in its original formulation with the assumption of non-selectivity appears to have limited utility for the purpose of the current study.

On the other hand, if one accept the extended boundaries of the hypothesis, cultivation can be a useful end point for the study. In this regard, Tamborini and Choi (1988b) argued that, instead of assuming non-selectivity, it should be more useful to take variations in selectivity into account and see how they affect the processes of cultivation.

While tentative, some evidence for the usefulness of such an approach was demonstrated in a research by Choi, Straubhaar, and Tamborini (1988). Among the Korean college students surveyed, the respondents' perceived importance of English language learning and the perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV were highly correlated with most of the AFKN-TV viewing indicators (e.g., total viewing, information or entertainment viewing). In addition, there appeared to be a differential degree of predicted perceptual impact of the medium according to the viewers' varying motivations for AFKN-TV exposure,

attesting to the mediating potential of certain audience characteristics.

In short, with some refined conceptual modifications, the cultivation hypothesis can be an interesting and even promising effort to pursue a time-honored question of how humans acquire knowledge and meaning, particularly in the context of mediated communications. As pointed out by several authors (e.g., Hirsch, 1980b; DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989) the hypothesis in its original conception was an attractive and intuitively plausible logic.

However, despite the enormous amount of attention and research focused on the potential cultivation of certain beliefs and perceptions by television viewing, empirical evidence to date for the hypothesis appears at best mixed, while the controversy and conceptual refinements are still under way. Nevertheless, the hypothesis, when equipped with some extended conceptual boundaries proposed by Tamborini and Choi (1988b), must be viewed as a useful analytic tool in cross-cultural inquiries involving the indigenous viewers' consumption of foreign TV program content.

Cognitive Approaches and a Multiple-Trace Memory Model

When one seriously considers the audience as active participants in the mass communication process (e.g., in uses/gratifications or uses/effects approach), the orientation is unavoidably "cognitive." Instead of assuming

the audience as an aggregate of passive individuals, a cognitive approach rather places various forms and functionings of human cognition in a central role.

At the same time, it also implies a need for more than the conventional "black box" descriptions of human mental processes frequently considered intervening the stimulus-response model of communication. As noted by several authors (Singer, 1982; Reeves, Chaffee, & Tims, 1982; DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989), however, many of the same beliefs about human behavior that underlie cognitive psychology have been at best loosely identified and discussed in mass communication research.

For example, J. Singer (1982) noted that a major advance in television inquiries since 1970s has been reflected in an increasing recognition that the medium must be understood more broadly in relation to people's cognitive and affective functioning with television. He pointed out:

...individuals bring to each environment preestablished schema or what might be called "preparatory plans," based, of course, on previous experience as well as fantasized anticipations about what may be expected in a situation. These schema have been built up over dozens of previous interactions with the environment, on the basis of other kinds of learning experience. (p. 2)

As such, a variety of other cognitive theories generally assume that the person is mentally active, organizing and processing stimuli from the environment rather than simply responding directly to them.

Along this line, Reeves, Chaffee and Tims (1982) summarized a few major cognitive themes in mass communication research. In the area of political communication, they noted, there has been a noticeable shift from the early focus on voting and stable attitudes to the role of media in informing the electorate and setting the public agenda by making some issues more salient than others (e.g., Chaffee, 1978; McComb & Shaw, 1972; Weaver, Graber, McComb, & Eyal, 1981). Salience, or psychological availability, is a key factor in the psychology of cognitive heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); and issue salience has been the major dependent variable in agenda-setting research. While Piagetian conceptions of cognitive developmental stages have received much attention in the study of children and television (e.g., Wackman & Wartella, 1977; Collins, 1982; D. Singer, 1982); other research programs have also focused on such cognitive variables as message discrimination, decision-making strategies, and counter-arguments in the face of persuasive media messages.

It is interesting to note that uses & gratifications approach and the cultivation hypothesis can also be explained in the cognitive context of mass communication research. A good example of a social information processing model relevant in this respect is the one proposed by Wyer and Srull (1980). Briefly, the model identified four

"storage units" and five "processing units" in the human information processing system. While complicated it may seem, one notable construct among many ideas suggested in the model was the notion of the "goal specification box" and a "goal schema." Identified as one of the major functions of the "processing units," the goal schema controls the directions and flow of information according to a set of preestablished or newly-forming goal specifications.

In other words, depending on individual needs at any given time, the person will place an appropriate goal schema in the goal specification box residing in permanent storage. The goal schema will then influence the processing of incoming information by focusing the perceiver on those aspects of the new information that are most consistent with the schema.

Although the model in itself may suffer from its inherent theoretical infalsifiability, it nevertheless provides media researchers with some meaningful implications. For example, the goal schema notion is quite compatible with the uses & effects model (Windahl, 1981) and with the refined cultivation logic (e.g., processing abilities, focusing strategies, viewing selectivity, content specificity, etc.). According to the model, different television viewing motivations will lead to different resulting impact, depending on the viewer's

"processing goals."

While several studies introduced in previous sections revealed the findings quite consistent with this contention (e.g., McLeod & Becker, 1974; Atkin & Heald, 1976; Garramone, 1983), Cohen (1981) similarly suggested that observational goals are instrumental in selecting the person or behavioral schema to be applied. Taken together, the information processing model proposed by Wyre and Srull (1980) seems to suggest yet another way of justifying the merge of uses & gratifications approach and effects approaches such as cultivation.

As noted at the end of the previous section, however, one puzzling area of cultivation research is its adherence to the overall TV viewing measure. That is, the cultivation hypothesis in its original formulation does not allow the inclusion of viewing specificity (as opposed to the total amount of television viewing) as the major independent variable. While many researchers have tried to see whether viewing different types of television programming resulted in varying degrees of cultivation (e.g., Hawkins & Pingree, 1980; Wakshlag et al., 1983; Tamborini et al., 1984; Weaver & Wakshlag, 1984; O'Keefe & Reid-Nash, 1984), largely missing in the literature was a clear conceptual explication as to why specific viewing patterns should be included within the framework of cultivation rationale.

Of course, underlying the total viewing advocacy in

Gerbner et al.'s contention (1976a, 1986) was that, in addition to the relative non-selectivity of the viewers (discussed earlier), television is characterized by a relatively coherent set of images and messages intended for total populations. If one accepts the position that the important factor in television content is the overall television image, then a cultivation research in cross-cultural settings should be preceded by a comprehensive content analysis on the "coherent set of images and messages" produced by television for a given culture, including foreign as well as domestic programming. As indicated by Tamborini and Choi (1988b), however, this approach greatly reduces the applicability of cultivation to the individuals exposed to international television programming, whether imported or other unique cases such as AFKN-TV programs.

On the other hand, if one assumes that an important factor is the exposure to specific content from selected television programming, then the researcher can test cultivation by concentrating on the association between the viewing of specific programs and perceptual tendencies in line with the images portrayed in those particular program types. Tamborini and Choi (1988b) pointed out:

It is interesting to note that the second approach is not based on the assumption (and necessary condition) that all television programming in a culture portrays one 'coherent set of images and messages'. Thus, if we accept the proposition that different television genres and television programming

from different geographical and ideological sources often portray a variety of coherent images within a given nation or culture, it is still possible to test the proposition upon which this approach is based.

They concluded that, to deal with the problems associated with cross-cultural cultivation research, selectivity in television use and coherence of television images should be treated as variables instead of assuming that they fall within certain boundaries.

Along this line, yet another hypothesis originating from cognition literature seems to shed some light on viewing specificity and its perceptual convergence. In a recent article, Shapiro (1988) proposed a "multiple-trace memory model" of communication on world view. According to the model, a complex network of external and internal factors influences what is remembered from a communication source including mass media. Each remembered event then is stored as a separate memory trace. Associated with that event memory is information about the context of the communication (i.e., "contextual information"), which will be used to determine which memories are relevant when a person constructs a world view in real-time (also see Hintzman & Block, 1971; Hintzman, 1976, 1986).

In the proposed model, a person's world view was defined as the "individual's answer to a question about the nature of his or her external environment at a given moment, if the individual does not know and cannot infer an

objective answer to the question." Shapiro noted that the definition may sound like an operational definition rather than a conceptual one. He noted:

...it reflects a fundamental assumption that when a subject does not have an objective answer available in memory, world-view judgements are generated in real-time in response to a particular situation. Any 'predisposition' toward viewing the world in a particular way is the result of cumulative decisions about the meaning attached to communication stimuli, the aspects of those communication stimuli stored in memory, and retrieval strategies that determine which stored traces are judged relevant to a particular situation. (p. 3)

Applied to mass media situations, this definition suggests that meaning from television and other discourses is relative and is created by each individual using a complex network of situational goals, preferred mental strategies and previous experience. In addition, on the contrary to the cultivation in its original formulation, the definition implies all viewers do not extract very similar meanings from television fiction materials.

Among the ideas in the model particularly relevant for the issue of media content specificity in cultivation appears to be the communication source of memory or contextual information. The model assumed that people can generally identify and use the contextual information to decide how relevant that memory is to the world-view decision being made--that is, monitoring whether the source of information is real (e.g., direct experience, television

news) or fictional (e.g., fictional television entertainment, novels). In this regard, the multiple-trace memory hypothesis suggests a possible explanation for the small correlations frequently noted in cultivation research. Shapiro further noted:

Over time, heavy television entertainment watchers tend to accumulate more television entertainment memories than do light viewers. If the reality monitoring process were perfect--that is people could always remember the source of a memory--then the model predicts little or no difference between heavy and light television watchers, all other things being equal. Television entertainment memories would not in general be used in making world-view decisions about the real world because they come from an unreal source. (p.19)

It seems clear from the discussion that apparently more realistic television programming such as news and documentaries would have more direct impact, than less realistic entertainment, on their perceptual convergence among the viewers. On the other hand, another way of elaborating on this argument is that the perceived realism of a communication source will influence the ways by which television contributes to the conceptions of social reality among the viewers. At any rate, the multiple-trace memory hypothesis strongly suggests an importance of viewing specificity and perceived realism of TV programs watched when investigating the perceptual (or world-view) impact of television.

PREDICTIONS IN THE STUDY

Deriving from the theoretical perspectives outlined above, a few sets of predictions were made. In light of their underlying conceptual characteristics, two distinctive categories were discernible: predictions regarding the "uses of AFKN-TV" and predictions regarding the "effects of AFKN-TV."

Predictions Regarding the Uses of AFKN-TV

First, based on the research specifically relating media usage motivations to the degree of involvement with the media, the following hypotheses were developed. Levy and Windahl (1984) reported that more positive gratifications such as information-seeking and surveillance led to more active media consumptions, partially manifested by such behavioral tendencies as planning what to watch (i.e., a higher level of "preactivity") and paying a higher degree of attention while watching (i.e., a lower level of "duractivity"). It seemed highly likely among the Korean shadow viewers that more positive motivations such as information-seeking and cultural or language learning would promote a stronger tendency of selective and attentive consumptions of AFKN-TV programming. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that the higher is the degree of positive motivations, the higher will be the level of pre-planning and attentiveness.

HYPOTHESIS-1: The selected Korean shadow audience with positive motivations will be more likely to know what to watch on AFKN-TV than those with passive motivations.

HYPOTHESIS-2: The selected Korean shadow audience with positive motivations will demonstrate a higher degree of attention paid while watching AFKN-TV than those with passive motivations.

Second, based on the unique characteristics associated with English language learning motivations among the selected Korean shadow viewers of AFKN-TV, a few intuitive hypotheses were derived. For instance, it seemed highly apparent that those with a higher level of English language proficiency would watch the television programming broadcast in English with a higher level of positive motivations such as learning more about U.S. society/culture and about colloquial language itself.

At the same time, it seemed equally likely that those who perceived a stronger language learning potential of television programming broadcast in the interested foreign language would seek for more positive gratifications from the exposure. In addition, one can presume that these two factors (i.e., perceived language proficiency and perceived language learning utility of media) could be preceded by a relatively higher-level perception: perceived importance of English language as a success tool in Korean society. Those with a higher level of assigned importance of English language might have been trying harder to acquire a certain level of language proficiency, and accordingly saw a

stronger potential of AFKN-TV as a language teacher.

Taken together, the following three hypotheses were developed from the rationales. It should be noted that the hypotheses were proposed specifically in relation to the viewers' positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing, not to the actual uses of the medium. That is, a primary interest in these hypotheses was to test whether the language-related factors would well predict the viewers' certain motivational features associated with the particular medium.

HYPOTHESIS-3: An individual's perceived English language proficiency will be a significant predictor for positive motivations for AFKN-TV exposure among the selected Korean shadow viewers.

HYPOTHESIS-4: An individual's perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV viewing will be a significant predictor for positive motivations for AFKN-TV exposure among the selected Korean shadow viewers.

HYPOTHESIS-5: An individual's perceived importance of English language as a success tool in Korean society will be a significant predictor for positive motivations for AFKN-TV exposure among the selected Korean shadow viewers.

Third, the following hypotheses were generated based on the research relating different types of gratifications to different patterns of television exposure (Wenner, 1982; Rubin & Rubin, 1982). Identifying various gratifications sought from television viewing, these studies found in particular that information-seeking motivations were significantly associated with the viewing of television

news, documentaries, and talk shows. Also noted in the studies was that passive gratifications such as relaxation, habit or passing time were related to a heavier consumption of overall television programming than were information-seeking motivations.

Given the AFKN-TV's nature of foreign language broadcasting, however, the latter finding appeared to have less relevance than the former, particularly among those with a lower level of language proficiency. That is, it seemed highly unlikely that AFKN-TV would provide relaxation or companionship for those who could hardly comprehend English language. AFKN-TV for Koreans may be analogous to a Spanish language channel for Americans in that regard. It seemed obvious that those Americans who cannot comprehend Spanish language do not watch much of television programs broadcast only in Spanish, unless particularly motivated by a cultural or language learning purpose.

Thus, on the contrary to the second finding noted above, it would be more interesting to see if positive motivations such as cultural and language learning would better predict AFKN-TV viewing than would passive motivations. Accordingly, the following two hypotheses were derived from the rationales.

HYPOTHESIS-6: Information-seeking motivation among the selected Korean shadow audience will be a significant predictor for exposure to AFKN-TV information programming.

HYPOTHESIS-7: Positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing among the selected Korean shadow audience, such as cultural and language learning, will be stronger predictors for AFKN-TV exposure than passive motivations such as simple curiosity or social facilitations (e.g., imitations).

Finally, several hypotheses were generated particularly with regard to the language-related factors in order to ascertain the extent to which these variables were related to the actual AFKN-TV exposure patterns among the selected Korean shadow viewers. Given the relatively higher motivational nature of AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow audience than that of Korean television viewing, the degree of English language proficiency, perceived importance of English language learning, and perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV viewing were considered among the most important predictors for AFKN-TV viewing.

These predictions may appear to be somewhat redundant vis-a-vis the three hypotheses relating the same predictors to the viewers' generally more positive motivational characteristics (HYPOTHESES 3,4 & 5). However, given the lack of conceptual clarity dictating only a mediating potential of viewing motivations (i.e., between language orientations and the actual uses of AFKN-TV), it was decided to test the hypotheses separately.

HYPOTHESIS-8: An individual's perceived English language proficiency will be a good predictor for exposure to AFKN-TV among the selected Korean shadow viewers.

HYPOTHESIS-9: An individual's perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV viewing will be a good predictor for exposure to AFKN-TV among the selected Korean shadow viewers.

HYPOTHESIS-10: An individual's perceived importance of English language as a success tool in Korean society will be a good predictor for exposure to AFKN-TV among the selected Korean shadow viewers.

Predictions Regarding the Effects of AFKN-TV

As noted earlier, the scope of predictions regarding the effects of AFKN-TV on Korean shadow audience was confined to several perceptual areas of media impact. These areas can be divided into two categories: 1) perceptions pertaining to the original cultivation research, including both crime-related and noncrime-related perceptions of U.S. society; 2) perceptions of comparatively self-degraded images of one's own culture. In addition, a few other hypotheses were drawn from the rationales extending the original cultivation logic as well as from the research specifically pointing out intervening potential of several motivational variables identified in the previous Chapter.

First, the following hypotheses were derived from the initial cultivation inquiries on the perceptions of "mean world" and violent crimes in U.S. society (Gerbner et al., 1976b, 1977, 1978). Profiling a heavy emphasis on violence in American television programs, these earlier studies reported that heavier viewers demonstrated meaner perceptions of people around them, more disorderly

perceptions of society, and more exaggerated perceptions of violent crimes in society.

Based upon these findings and upon the assumption that the programs covered on AFKN-TV are in their nature roughly equivalent to those covered in major television channels in the U.S., the data will be explored to see if heavier AFKN-TV viewers among the selected Korean shadow audience would demonstrate generally meaner perceptions of American people and society, partially manifested by the perceptions of unfriendly Americans and disorderly U.S. society. In addition, it will be also tested whether heavier AFKN-TV viewers will show stronger perceptions of crime prevalence in U.S. society.

HYPOTHESIS-11: Heavier AFKN-TV viewers among the selected Korean shadow audience will demonstrate "meaner" perceptions of U.S. people and society.

HYPOTHESIS-12: Heavier AFKN-TV viewers among the selected Korean shadow audience will demonstrate stronger perceptions of crime prevalence in U.S. society.

Second, based on the research distinguishing levels and dimensions of crime-related judgements and perceptions, the following hypothesis was derived. Several previous studies (Tyler, Cook, and Gordon, 1981; Tyler, 1984; Tyler and Cook, 1984) revealed that media impact on societal-level perceptions did not usually translate into personal-level anxiety. For example, one may have exaggerated perceptions of violent crimes in society, potentially due to some media influence. These perceptions, however, do not

necessarily equivocate the similar level of personal anxiety or fear of crime victimization. Based on the rationale, an attempt will be made to ascertain whether the AFKN-TV's influence on the Korean shadow viewers' personal-level fear of crime victimizations, imagined in U.S. society, would be less prominent than would be the impact on societal-level judgements of crime prevalence in U.S. society. Of course, this test must be preceded by some evidence suggesting the existence of such media impact (i.e., confirmation of HYPOTHESIS-12).

HYPOTHESIS-13: AFKN-TV's influence on the selected Korean shadow viewers' imagined fear of crime victimization in the U.S., if any, will be less prominent than the one on the viewers' perceptions of crime prevalence in U.S. society.

Third, based on the conceptual boundary extensions of cultivation logic discussed and on a few other cultivation inquiries regarding noncrime-related perceptions, several more cultivation-related hypotheses were developed. If crime shows on AFKN-TV could engender relatively exaggerated perceptions of violence in U.S. society among the Korean shadow audience, one can also imagine that other AFKN-TV programs may promote some other salient social beliefs regarding various characteristics of U.S. society and culture.

If a researcher were successful in identifying a strong perceptual impact of a specific program type on certain noncrime-related perceptions, then we must

acknowledge the usefulness of such approach as advocated in the present study. While a separate hypothesis is forwarded shortly in this regard (i.e., content specificity), the tests of several noncrime-related perceptions were deemed consistent with the conceptual extension discussed in the previous Chapter.

As notable exemplary areas, perceptions of sexual permissiveness and drug abuse in U.S. society were chosen to be investigated in the study. Given the much more conservative moral stands toward sexual attitudes and behaviors in Korean culture than in U.S. culture, and given the much less attention paid to drug problems in Korean society than in the U.S., the two areas were thought to provide an interesting testing ground for the hypothesis proposing a relatively strong perceptual impact of media.

In addition, these two areas can be viewed compatible with previous television content analyses summarizing the U.S. television world in the phrase "sex and violence" (Franzblau et al., 1977; Fernandez-Collado et al., 1978; Greenberg et al., 1981, 1982, 1985; Gerbner et al., 1976b, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980a, 1981). These areas were considered meaningful also in light of a few other studies specifically investigating the cultivation potential of U.S. soap-opera viewing (Alexander, 1985; Carveth & Alexander, 1985).

For instance, these studies generally showed that U.S.

prime-time dramas and daytime soap-operas contained substantial amount of direct and indirect cues through which one could learn about sexual attitudes and behaviors among various segments of a given population. It seemed obvious that foreign viewers of U.S. TV programs would form or reinforce similar perceptions of sexual behaviors and attitudes in U.S. society, at least partially grounded on the images portrayed in the programs. Perceptions of such aspects as divorce, extramarital affairs, single parenthood, unmarried cohabitation, abortion, venereal diseases, teenage mothers all may contribute to forming an overall impression of sexual permissiveness in U.S. society.

Although prime-time dramas and daytime soap-operas may be two of the key sources of learning about American sexual life styles among foreign viewers, it seemed no less obvious that other television programs also provide information about various aspects of American life including sexual behaviors. For example, considering that violence and sex have been very much closely interwoven in many of today's U.S. TV programs, crime-adventure shows may be as much a potent candidate for educating viewers about sex as are soaps. Other programs such as news and documentaries may also contribute to the conceptions of sexual permissiveness in U.S. society. Deriving from these rationales as well as from the previous studies on soap-

opera viewing and cultivation, it will be tested whether a heavier diet of AFKN-TV programs will lead to a higher level of sexual permissiveness perceptions of U.S. society among the selected Korean shadow audience.

HYPOTHESIS-14: Heavier AFKN-TV viewers among the selected Korean shadow audience will demonstrate a higher degree of sexual permissiveness perceptions of U.S. society.

Based on the rationales similar to those for the sexual permissiveness perceptions, it will also be tested whether heavier consumption of AFKN-TV programs among Korean shadow audience would lead to more exaggerated perceptions of drug abuse in U.S. society, partially manifested by overestimation of the percentage of drug addicts among the entire U.S. population, experimenters of some sort of hallucinatory drugs in U.S. high schools and college campuses. While certain images examined in the study were partially drawn from previous content analyses particularly in relation to drug-related portrayals in U.S. television (e.g., Smart & Krakowski, 1973; McEwen & Hanneman, 1974; Hanneman & McEwen, 1976; Winick & Winick, 1976; Fernandez-Collado, Greenberg, Korzenny & Atkin, 1978; Greenberg, Fernandez-Colladao, Graef, Korzenny & Atkin, 1980), a deliberate attempt was made to let the respondents to judge about more extreme images such as the percentage of drug addicts among the entire U.S. population. This was done to see whether AFKN-TV programming influenced an overall impression about drug problems in the U.S., rather

than to test a precise match between specific television portrayals and the viewers' reality perceptions regarding drugs.

HYPOTHESIS-15: Heavier AFKN-TV viewers among the selected Korean shadow audience will demonstrate a higher degree of drug abuse perceptions of U.S.society.

In addition to the two exemplary noncrime-related areas of social perception, yet another area was chosen to be investigated in the study. Based on Weiman's (1984) findings among the Israeli youth suggesting a relationship between U.S. television viewing and perceptions of American affluence, the following hypothesis was drawn.

HYPOTHESIS-16: Heavier AFKN-TV viewers among the selected Korean shadow audience will demonstrate a higher degree of affluence perceptions of U.S. society.

Fourth, based on the rationales suggested by several critical researchers (Beltran, 1978; Boyd, 1984), it will be examined whether a heavy diet of AFKN-TV programs will contribute to the formation of self-degraded images of indigenous culture among the shadow viewers. Although the hypotheses such as "self-defeatism" and the "Janus effect" seemed intuitively plausible, little evidence was available for the claims. Despite the paucity of empirical data, the present study attempts to test the hypotheses by asking the respondents to judge about the comparative quality of their indigenous culture, partially manifested through the degree of agreement with such statements as: "We have relatively

less to be boastful of in regard to mass culture comparing with the Western culture" or "Our television programs are generally inferior to the ones available in developed nations such as the U.S. and England."

HYPOTHESIS-17: Heavier AFKN-TV viewers among the selected Korean shadow audience will exhibit a higher degree of self-degraded perceptions of their own culture.

Fifth, a relatively higher-order hypothesis was conceived with regard to one particular aspect of the extended cultivation logic--namely, the content specificity. Indeed, it cuts across all of the cultivation-related hypotheses identified so far. Thus, it was defined as an encompassing higher-order hypothesis.

While speculating on the processes of potential cultivation by television viewing, Hawkins and Pingree (1982) suggested that specifying television program content may be an important issue for identifying a more precise picture of the phenomenon. For example, should there be a significant relationship between TV viewing and forming certain social perceptions, a researcher must be interested in isolating the program type most responsible for the association. In this regard, a "multiple-trace memory" model of communication sources (Shapiro, 1988) and a conceptual discussion on potential usefulness of the boundary extension of cultivation (Tamborini & Choi, 1988b) were introduced earlier.

Taken together, the discussion strongly suggested a

need for including the concept of "content specificity" in the realm of cultivation research. Based on the reasoning, an attempt was made to see if the exposure to certain types of AFKN-TV programming would better predict, than an aggregate measure of total viewing, the selected areas of U.S. society perceptions and comparative self-perceptions among the selected Korean shadow audience.

For instance, it seemed highly likely that viewing AFKN-TV programs containing crime events and information would be a better predictor for the crime-related perceptions than total amount of AFKN-TV viewing. While one can intuitively choose certain program types to be more closely related than others to the areas of social perception investigated (e.g., soaps and dramas with sexual permissiveness; news/information and crime shows with drug abuse), a rather exploratory approach was taken to ascertain the potentially diverse patterns.

HYPOTHESIS-18: Exposure to specific program content will be a better predictor, than total amount of AFKN-TV exposure, for the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV investigated in the study among the selected Korean shadow audience.

Finally, in a manner similar to the one right above, a group of higher-order hypotheses was derived from the research identifying a few more motivational variables potentially intervening the relationships proposed in the present study. For example, the following hypothesis was derived from the research distinguishing types and effects

of social/psychological utilities of media uses.

Several previous studies (Johnston, 1974; Blumler, 1979; Rubin, 1979, 1981; Windahl, 1981) suggested that diversion and escape motivations for television exposure (or "transcendental uses") may promote conceptions of television reality more easily than would other cognitive or surveillance motivations (or "experiential uses"). More specifically, Blumler (1979) suggested that such motivations would lower the audience member's "perceptual guards," which in turn make them more vulnerable to television's perceptual influence. Despite a lack of empirical data and less established cross-cultural testability of the claim, an attempt was made to test the rationale in a form of hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS-19: All of the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV predicted in the study will be more prominent, if any, among the selected Korean shadow audience with passive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing than among those with positive motivations.

Closely related to the proposition, and at the same time to HYPOTHESIS-1, it seemed equally likely that those shadow viewers with a lesser degree of "preactivity" or program awareness would fall within a category conceptually similar to the passive motivation dimension. That is, those who usually know what to watch on AFKN-TV could be considered active gratification seekers, thus could be viewed residing at the positive end of the motivation continuum. Accordingly, it was proposed that less pre-

planned shadow viewers would exhibit stronger perceptual impact of AFKN-TV viewing proposed in the study.

HYPOTHESIS-20: All of the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV predicted in the study will be more prominent, if any, among the selected Korean shadow audience with less pre-planning for AFKN-TV viewing than among those with a higher degree of pre-planning.

Related to the two hypotheses above and also to HYPOTHESIS-2, which proposed a relationship between positive motives for AFKN-TV viewing and the degree of attention paid while watching AFKN-TV ("duractivity"), yet another interesting hypothesis can be drawn in connection with the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV proposed in the study. As noted earlier, Hawkins and Pingree (1982) suggested that the degree of audience involvement with television may inhibit or facilitate the medium's cultivation potential; and one study (Pingree et al., 1979) found that the active involvement did inhibit the cultivation.

In light of the present inquiry of AFKN-TV, however, the direction is more likely to be in the facilitative side. For example, a higher level of attention paid while watching AFKN-TV programming could allow the viewers to more keenly observe even minute details of American society and lifestyles portrayed in the programming. The attentive Korean shadow viewers of AFKN-TV may detect various visual cues about American affluence (e.g., houses, furniture, cars, swimming pools, food); about American misery (e.g.,

ghettos, street people, drug addicts, crimes); and about various human interaction patterns. Thus, it seemed very likely that a higher degree of attention paid while watching AFKN-TV would lead to a stronger perceptual impact of AFKN-TV, whether related to the perceptions of affluence or misery. Albeit tentative, the following hypothesis was advanced to investigate the potential contingency.

HYPOTHESIS-21: All of the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV predicted in the study will be more prominent, if any, among the selected Korean shadow audience who pay closer attention while watching AFKN-TV.

In addition, based on the research identifying the intervening potential of the viewers' perceived credibility of television programming (Slater & Elliott, 1982; Elliott, Rudd & Good, 1983; O'Keefe, 1984), the following hypothesis was derived as yet another higher-order prediction. That is, should the shadow audience perceive the programs on AFKN-TV as accurate reflections of real life in the U.S., AFKN-TV's perceptual impact examined in the study will be amplified according to the degree of perceived realism. As noted earlier, this reasoning is also consistent with Shapiro's (1988) suggestion that communication information from more realistic sources would have a stronger impact on people's world-view judgements.

HYPOTHESIS-22: All of the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV predicted in the study will be more prominent, if any, among the selected Korean shadow audience who perceive a higher degree of realism in the AFKN-TV programming they watch.

CHAPTER IV

METHODS

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURES

Before describing the procedures of the survey taken for the study, a brief introduction of background of the survey seems necessary to justify the appropriateness of the sample and to ascertain the boundary of the study's external validity. The sample in the study was chosen from a population of relatively young Korean college graduates who had jobs in a few major industrial giant firms in Korea. The people in the group were believed to represent one of the few most meaningful segments of AFKN-TV shadow audience among entire Korean population.

As suggested by previous writers (Hong, 1980; J. Kim, 1981; H. Kang, 1983), college students and relatively young white collar workers (with college or higher degrees) have been frequently noted as the most active shadow viewers of AFKN-TV in Korea. In addition, colloquial English language learning motivation has been cited as the single most important motive for the exposure to AFKN-TV among these populations; and certain situational characteristics found in these groups have frequently attested to the observation.

In short, the sample in the study represents the young and ambitious in Korean corporate elitedom. They were

chosen by the giant corporations through one of arguably the most rigorous screening processes existing in the world. At the same time, they are the survivors of a series of extremely competitive odd-man-out games played in Korea: high school entrance exams, nationwide screening for college eligibility, and separate college entrance exams administered by individual colleges and universities, to name just a few. It may be more than interesting for outside observers to realize that English language plays a major role throughout the process.

A formal English language education in Korea starts during the first year in middle school. To get accepted in a few most prestigious universities in Korea, the students must pass three most crucial areas of study. English language is one of them, while Korean language/literature and mathematics are the remaining two. In order for a Korean college graduate to get a job in one of the conglomerate companies chosen in the study, he or she must take, among others, a set of written examinations for at least three subjects. Again, English language is almost always one of them, while a written essay and the so-called "common sense" knowledge comprise the other two. Apparently, the last two seem to play a less decisive role than the first in the final decision-making process by the employers; and the cumulative experience over the years frequently remind the socially upscale Koreans the

importance of English language in their chosen careers.

Given the utmost priority placed on international trade throughout various stages of Korean economic development plans for more than three decades, the language priority seems understandable. "The story of English" in Korea, however, does not culminate with one's success of getting a job in the prestigious firms. The new employees in the firms must face a yet another competitive survival game: climbing the corporate ladders. Not surprisingly, among the most useful cards in the game is English language proficiency, either practical or perceived by significant others in a variety of professional settings. A higher language proficiency is more likely to bring additional fringe benefits such as overseas travels and on-the-job training abroad. These additional career-building opportunities, coupled with increasing language competency, then gradually lead to a faster chance of promotion.

Today, it is a widespread practice for those companies to encourage (or push) their employees to improve English language proficiency; and, for overall productivity, instituting in-house language training programs or facilities has become a fad in those firms. In short, it is a widely accepted dictum in Korean corporate elitedom that English really is a success tool.

In light of this somewhat less academic story of English in Korea, the sample chosen in the study can be

considered as representing one important segment of shadow audience of AFKN-TV. To provide more meaningful implications of AFKN-TV's existence in Korea, choosing a sample from presumably one of the most active consumers of the medium was believed to have a better operational utility than selecting a cross-sectional sample representing the entire Korean population. Albeit with a limited generalizability outside the population chosen, the study could promote further inquiries among other less prominent groups of AFKN-TV shadow viewers in Korea.

The hypotheses in the study were tested through a survey among the better-educated Korean adults during the period of September-October, 1986. Out of three hundred questionnaires distributed in 7 major business conglomerates in Seoul, Korea, a total of 236 questionnaires were collected primarily from office/work settings in the chosen companies. All of the questionnaires were distributed and collected in person rather than by mail for convenience and to assure high return rates. A few inside helpers (e.g., managers, directors and other knowledgeable network liasons) and the immediate availability of respondents in the company settings offered the convenience. After excluding entirely or partially unfinished ones, the total number of questionnaires analyzed in the study was 222.

MEASUREMENTS

The key variables were measured through a questionnaire written in Korean. All the items, indices, and scales in the questionnaire were translated into Korean using "experiential equivalence" under the assumption of "cultural translation" instead of "linguistic translation" (Brislin, 1970; Sechrest et al., 1982). Also, a technique of "back translation" was employed on a few items to check whether the respondents understood what the researcher asked. Although a part of the questionnaire was replicated from previous intercultural studies involving Korean samples in the U.S. (Choi & Tamborini, 1988; Tamborini & Choi, 1988a), the ambiguity of wording and comprehensiveness of questionnaire items were further checked in a pretest among a small group of Korean students attending a major mid-western university in the U.S. For all the variables concerned, subject scores for variables consisting of more than a single item were computed by averaging the summed scores from subject responses on all items in each variable grouping.

Antecedent Measures

The antecedent variables for key independent measures consisted of a number of situational factors including:

(1) **Perceived English language proficiency (2 items):**
 Asking "How much do you think you usually understand the

language when you watch AFKN-TV programs?" (11 levels: not at all=0; about half=5; almost all=10) and "In comparison with your colleagues (e.g., peers or coworkers) how would you evaluate your English proficiency?" (11 levels: much worse=0, about same=5, much better=10) [reliability coefficient alpha= .71]

(2) Perceived importance of English language learning: One item asking the degree of agreement to "English language is an important tool for a success in Korean society." (5 levels: strongly disagree=1 to strongly agree=5)

(3) Perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV viewing: One item asking the degree of agreement to "AFKN-TV is a useful tool for learning colloquial English language." (5 levels: strongly disagree=1 to strongly agree=5)

(4) Motivations for AFKN-TV viewing (11 items): A small pilot study among 34 Korean college students just prior to the data collection revealed 11 items were the most frequently cited reasons for watching AFKN-TV. These items were found to be consistent with previous writing on AFKN-TV issues (Hong, 1980; J. Kim, 1981; K. Lee, 1981; H. Kim, 1985; Y. Lee, 1985). The items included "information-seeking," "to learn about U.S. society and culture," "to learn colloquial English," "to enjoy better entertainment variety," "others' recommendations," "longer on-air time than Korean TV," "attractive program guides in Korean newspapers," "tired of boring Korean TV," "peers' talk

about AFKN-TV programs," "curiosity," and "to see famous faces (e.g., Madonna, Cindy Lauper, Michael Jackson)." (5 levels: strongly disagree=1; strongly agree=5)

Independent Measures

The key independent measures associated with various AFKN-TV orientations among the shadow viewers included:

(1) Hourly exposure to AFKN-TV (2 items): "How many hours do you usually watch AFKN-TV including morning, afternoon, and evening?": one "on the average weekday," and the other "on the average weekends." (both 5 levels: rarely, less than 1, 1 to less than 3, 3 to less than 5, 5 hours or more) [reliability coefficient $\alpha=.73$]

(2) Specific AFKN-TV program exposure (9 items): "How frequently do you watch the following types of TV programs on AFKN-TV?" News/information, comedy, crime-adventure, music/variety, soaps/dramas, game/quiz, sports, movies, talk shows--all with 3 actual examples of program titles that were available on AFKN-TV one year prior to and during the period of the survey. (all 4 levels: very frequently=4, frequently=3, occasionally=2, rarely=1)

(3) Total amount of AFKN-TV viewing: In addition to the overall measures of AFKN-TV viewing in hourly terms (i.e., "how many hours do you usually watch...?"), a combined measure of "total amount" of AFKN-TV viewing was developed by summing up the 9 specific viewing indicators above.

[reliability coefficient $\alpha = .72$]

(4) Total amount of AFKN-TV information program viewing: In a similar manner, a combined measure of total amount of AFKN-TV information programming viewing was developed by summing up the scores from 2 specific viewing measures (news/information plus talk shows) [reliability coefficient $\alpha = .54$]

(5) Total amount of AFKN-TV entertainment program viewing: A combined measure of total amount of AFKN-TV entertainment programming viewing was developed by summing up the scores from the remaining 7 specific viewing measures (comedy, crime/adventure, music/variety, soaps/dramas, game/quiz, sports, and movies). [reliability coefficient $\alpha = .67$]

(6) Perceived realism of AFKN-TV programming: Two items asking, "How accurate do you think AFKN-TV programs are in terms of reflecting the real U.S. society and culture?": one on "information" and the other on "entertainment" programming--with 3 exemplary titles of actual AFKN-TV programs in each category. (11 levels: not at all accurate=1; very much accurate=10) [reliability coefficient $\alpha = .73$]

(7) Degree of preactivity (know what to watch): One item asking, "How frequently do you know what to watch on AFKN-TV or plan to watch?" (5 levels: almost always=5; frequently=4; occasionally=3; rarely=2; never=1)

(8) Degree of duractivity (attention paid while watching):

One item asking, "How much attention do you think you usually pay to the program content while you watch AFKN-TV?" (11 levels: not at all=0, very much=10)

Dependent Measures

The key dependent variables in this study included items from Gerbner et al.'s (1977, 78, 79) Mean World Index, crime judgement scale, and two cultivation differential (CD) items; a simplified/combined version of Tamborini et al.'s (1984) situation-specific fear of crime victimization; several items for three chosen areas of U.S. society perceptions (i.e., sexual permissiveness, drug abuse, affluence); and a few items measuring comparative self-image perceptions. These resulted in the following 8 dependent measures.

- (1) Mean U.S. perceptions (2 items): The degree of agreement with "The U.S. society is generally peaceful and orderly" and "Americans are generally kind and friendly." (5 levels: strongly agree=5 to strongly disagree=1; reverse coded) [reliability coefficient $\alpha=.58$]
- (2) Societal-level crime perceptions: One item asking the degree of agreement with "Violent crimes such as murder, rape, aggravated assault and armed robbery are constantly increasing in the U.S." (5 levels: strongly agree=5; strongly disagree=1)
- (3) Cultivation differential items (2 items): Two separate

items asking subjects to judge "the percentage of violent crimes in the U.S." (15% or 25%), and "the percentage of law enforcement officials among the U.S. male population" (1% or 5%).

(4) Imagined chance of crime victimization in U.S. (2 items): One item asking to rate "imagined chance of crime victimization in U.S. urban environments such as in New York City, Chicago, or Los Angeles," and another item asking "imagined chance of crime victimization in small rural towns in the U.S.A." (both 10 levels: not at all likely=0; very much likely=10) [reliability coefficient $\alpha = .81$]

(5) Perceived sexual permissiveness in U.S. society (3 items): Three items asking to estimate the percentage of U.S. population engaging in "premarital sex," "sex before college or prior to the age of 20," and the percentage of "teenage mothers among the entire teen population in the U.S." (all on a 0% to 99% continuum) [reliability coefficient $\alpha = .68$]

(6) Perceived drug abuse problems in U.S. society (2 items): Two items asking subjects to estimate "the percentage of U.S. population who are drug addicts" and "the percentage of U.S. high school kids who have had some sort of drug experiences at least more than once," (on a 0% to 99% continuum) [reliability coefficient $\alpha = .64$]

(7) Perceived affluence of U.S. society (4 items): Four

items asking subjects to estimate the percentage of households with "more than 5 rooms," "more than 2 passenger vehicles," "heating and air-conditioning," and "a swimming pool." (all 4 items on a 0% to 99% continuum) [reliability coefficient $\alpha=.81$]

(8) Perceived self-degraded images of one's own culture (3 items): Asking the degree of agreement to "We Koreans do not seem to have much of a distinctive culture vis-a-vis the Western culture," "Korean television programs are in a less developed stage comparing with U.S. television programs," and "As far as popular culture is concerned (e.g., pop music, movies), ours is generally inferior to U.S. popular culture." (5 levels: strongly disagree=1; strongly agree=5) [reliability coefficient $\alpha=.67$]

Control Measures

The control variables identified in the study included a number of demographic and experiential characteristics: gender, age, travel experience to the U.S., knowledge of friends/relatives living in the U.S., knowledge of violent crime victimizations of family members or relatives living in the U.S., and that of friends or acquaintants. Other media uses among the shadow viewers included: Korean newspapers, U.S. news magazines such as TIME and NEWSWEEK, Korean TV, and various types of US-imported movies.

In addition, AFKN-Radio, a sister medium of AFKN-TV

popular among young and progressive Koreans, was also included. With its two-wing operation (AM & FM), AFKN-Radio has been increasingly recognized as a major carrier of the up-to-the-minute American pop music in Korea. While it may have a relatively limited potential for the specific areas of perceptual impact investigated in the study (e.g., crime, sex, drugs), it seemed less deniable that the slick quality of programs as well as music itself could engender a diffused perception of American enviability and comparative self-degradations among the Korean shadow listeners.

ANALYTIC METHODS

The major statistical procedures used for the data analyses consisted of: 1) a factor analysis to identify major underlying dimensions of different motivations for AFKN-TV viewing; 2) zero-order correlations to provide indications of generally descriptive relationships among key factors; 3) blockwise multiple regression analyses to identify the explanatory strength of each predictor variable with appropriate controls inserted; and 4) cross-tabulation analyses to elaborate on the findings from the regression analyses, particularly in relation to the contingency hypotheses proposed in the study.

For instance, multiple regression analyses were performed to isolate the most significant predictors for the

perceptual variables. Cross-tabulation analyses with 9 different types of AFKN-TV programming as independent variables were carried out to locate the content most responsible for the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV found or yet undiscovered. In addition, two-way cross-tabulation analyses with appropriate controls were performed to detect whether the proposed perceptual impact of AFKN-TV were contingent upon the controlled factors included in the analyses. As a result, these procedures generated 3 major tables for each impact area investigated in the study.

Original scores from all the variables included in the cross-tabulation analyses were transformed to fit the dichotomous categories designed in a post-hoc manner. As a rule of thumb, the data transformation was carried out by checking and dividing the mid-points of the original scores. For example, total amount of AFKN-TV viewing was dichotomized at the point of 1.44 ($X=1.425$), generating light and heavy viewer categories ($N=113$ and 108 respectively). For another example, the original scores for sexual permissiveness perception was divided at the point of 43.33 on a zero-to-99 scale ($X=45.01$), producing low and high perceiver categories ($N=104$ and 118 respectively).

Consequently, at the risk of losing the power of the original data, the transformed data were treated as if they had been categorical variables. The step was taken, however, to meet a maximal degree of operational parsimony

and convenience. Given the relatively small sample size in the study ($N=222$), and given the potential danger of having vacant cells in the analyses, particularly in the two-way design, the trade-off was considered worth venturing. For statistical significance tests for the associations examined in the cross-tabulation analyses, Kendall's normalized "tau-b" was chosen throughout.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

Before presenting major findings for the HYPOTHESES advanced in the study, an array of preliminary findings were summarized to provide an overall sketch review of major characteristics of the sample investigated in the study. They included demographic characteristics, language orientations, other media uses, and various AFKN-TV orientations.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Sample Characteristics

The sample (N=222) consisted of 180 males and 42 females, with age ranging from 23 to 43 years old (mean=30.2 years; mode=30 years old). More than two thirds of the respondents (n=161) had knowledge of relatives or friends living in the U.S., while only about 11 percent (n=25) had actually been to the U.S. Also, about 72 percent of the respondents (n=160) replied that they enjoyed a living standard of middle class or above; and it was interesting to see that almost 92 percent of the respondents (n=202) were willing to visit the U.S. either to study or for a visit in the near future.

Language Orientations & Other Media Uses

Given the AFKN-TV's nature of a foreign language broadcast channel, a careful examination of various language orientations among the selected indigenous sample must be an essential step for further investigations of AFKN-TV exposure patterns and their possible links to other effect variables. To isolate the proposed perceptual impact of AFKN-TV viewing among the Korean shadow audience, it was also necessary to explore other media usage patterns among the target population.

The perceived English language proficiency in the present sample appeared to be in the range of moderate to high. To the item asking the percentage of AFKN-TV programs literally understood (i.e., "how much do you think you understand the AFKN-TV programs?"), about 40% of the respondents (N=94) reported half or more (50% or more on zero-to-99% continuum). To the item asking the degree of comparative English language proficiency, about 65% (N=151) said they had the same or a higher level of language ability comparing with their friends or peers.

Considering that the sample in the study mainly consisted of the individuals who had been chosen by their employers partly on the basis of their English language ability, the considerably high level of perceived language proficiency reported among the sample seemed not surprising. The mean score of the combined language

proficiency measure in the study was around the mid-point of the scale, and it had an acceptable reliability coefficient ($\alpha=.71$).

As to the the question asking whether English language is an important tool for a successful career building in Korean society, only 5% ($N=10$) disagreed. A similar finding was noticed again in the shadow viewers' perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV viewing. While 29% ($N=65$) chose a neutral stand, 67% ($N=149$) agreed with the statement, leaving only 4% of the respondents ($N=8$) in the disagreeing group.

In regard to other media uses potentially contributable to the perceptual convergence hypothesized in the study, 5 such media were chosen to be examined. For Korean television viewing, the sample reported a mean score of 2.4 on two 5-level measures (weekdays and weekends together). In arithmetic terms, it was translated as equivalent of about 2 hours of daily domestic TV viewing. The amount was much more than the average viewing score of AFKN-TV ($X=1.7$ on the same 5-level measure).

As to specific Korean TV program preferences, news/information was reported to be the most frequently viewed content ($X=3.284$), followed in distance by sports ($X=2.685$) and music/variety programs ($X=2.212$). It was also noted that foreign imports on Korean TV (mostly from the U.S.) enjoyed a more-than-average popularity among the

sample ($X=2.676$).

Findings from a composite measure of U.S. movie enjoyment revealed a relatively lower level of theater-going among the sample ($X=1.806$ on 4 levels). Given a limited access to U.S. movie imports in Korean movie theaters, the observed amount may not be viewed extraordinary. Among the 7 different genres of U.S. movie imports examined, R-rated adult romance was the most frequently attended ($X=2.113$). Among closely following the lead were war movies (e.g., "Apocalypse Now," "Killing Fields," $X=2.081$), sci-fi movies (e.g., "Close Encounters with the Third Kind," $X=1.919$) and comedies ($X=1.721$).

As to print media, the amount of exposure to U.S. news magazines (i.e., TIME and NEWSWEEK) and Korean newspapers were examined. While about 17% ($N=40$) of the sample reported to subscribe to both TIME and NEWSWEEK, about 64% of the sample ($N=141$) reported they regularly read either TIME or NEWSWEEK and only 19% ($N=41$) reported to read neither. The trend appeared to signify the highly intelligent upper-class nature of the sample selected. The amount of Korean newspaper reading among the sample was also found to be on a very high level. Almost all the respondents reported not to miss a day; about 75% ($N=165$) read more than 30 minutes a day; and 33% ($N=73$) regularly spent more than an hour enjoying the smell of ink in Korean newspapers.

Taken together, the print media consumption among the selected AFKN-TV shadow viewers seemed more than avid. In light of the predictions in regard to the perceptual impact of AFKN-TV in the study, these print media should be considered a potentially powerful contender.

Finally, only about 8% of the sample (N=17) was found to be regular listeners of AFKN-Radio, while almost 60% (N=131) reported to rarely listen to AFKN-Radio. This is somewhat inconsistent with previous suggestions as to the existence of a significant shadow audienceship of AFKN-Radio in Korea. Perhaps, the suggestions were suitable only for a limited segment of Korean population such as adolescents or college students, and may not be applicable to the relatively mature adult population represented in the present sample. As pointed out earlier, however, the seemingly negligible listenership of AFKN-Radio in the present sample must not be viewed as discounting its potential accountability of certain areas of perceptual impact of AFKN-TV proposed in the study.

AFKN-TV Orientations

Table 3 reveals an overall pattern of AFKN-TV exposure among the selected Korean shadow viewers. During weekdays, about half the respondents (45%, N=99) reported they watched AFKN-TV at least regularly, and 9% (N=20) reported more than an hour of daily AFKN-TV viewing. The amount of

exposure increased during weekends, with more than a quarter (27%, N=60) reported to watch more than an hour a day.

Table 3 about here

Overall, the AFKN-TV viewing orientations among the sample were found to be pretty much restricted to the lower end of the continuum, suggesting a high degree of positive skewedness (.565). The relatively low variance detected in the major independent variable also implied a strong possibility of attenuated correlations with the dependent variables examined in the study. To reduce the possibility, another measure of AFKN-TV viewing was used whenever an aggregate measure of AFKN-TV viewing were to be correlated with major dependent variables in the study, namely, the "total viewing" that is a mean score from the combined measure of 9 specific AFKN-TV program viewing.

Although problems associated with the restriction of range were not to be solved clearly, the "total viewing" measure showed a slightly higher degree of variability than that of the "hourly viewing" measure (variances = .285 and .130 respectively). In addition, the step taken was further justified in that the combined measure of specific program types could be conceptually more precise than the simple hourly measure of viewing amount.

As to the program types preferred among the shadow viewers, sports, news/information, music/variety and movies were among the top-ranked. The least watched were soaps/dramas, game/quiz and talk shows, while comedy and crime/adventure enjoyed a moderate degree of popularity (see Table 4). In aggregate viewing measures, little difference was detected between AFKN-TV information viewing ($X=1.426$) and AFKN-TV entertainment viewing ($X=1.425$).

Table 4 about here

Table 5 shows the rank orders among major reasons for AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers. As anticipated, the English language learning motivation was the most highly ranked, followed by information-seeking and "to enjoy entertainment variety" motivations. While cultural learning motivation was among the top five, a relatively passive motivation such as "longer on-air time than Korean TV" was also noted to be one of the toppers.

Table 5 about here

To ascertain if the 11 individual motivation measures would collapse into a fewer aggregate terms, a principal component factor analysis with varimax rotations was performed. Table 6 presents the results with 9 out of the

11 individual measures loaded onto two major underlying dimensions (factors). Those highly loaded on factor-1 appeared to tap a relatively more positive dimension of media gratifications seeking, while those on factor-2 seemed to represent a relatively more passive dimension. Accordingly, factor-1 was defined as the "positive motivations," and factor-2 as the "passive motivations" for AFKN-TV viewing. The two items left out of the two factors were discarded in later analyses using the aggregate indicators.

Table 6 about here

Related to the previous discussion on the rank orders among the individual motivation measures, the passive motivations were ranked generally lower than the positive ones. While the difference was easily noticeable in the results shown in Table 5, the trend was detected once again by the mean score difference between the two aggregate measures (i.e., $X=3.055$ for positive motivations and $X=2.434$ for passive motivations).

As to the degree of realism in AFKN-TV programming, perceived to be accurately reflective of American society and culture, the respondents rendered a moderate level of credibility to the overall programs they watch on AFKN-TV ($X=5.59$ on a zero to ten continuum). Meanwhile, a slight

difference was noticed between AFKN-TV information and entertainment programs ($X=5.937$ and 5.243 respectively). Given the generally more realistic nature of television news/information programs than that of entertainment features, the difference, although in small magnitude, seemed obvious and self-explanatory.

In terms of audience "preactivity" and "duractivity," the respondents exhibited a moderate degree of program awareness and attentiveness: about half (47%) reported they knew what to watch on AFKN-TV at least occasionally, while 5% almost always knew what to watch. The shadow viewers also reported a mean attentiveness score of 4.176 on a zero to ten scale. While comparative data vis-a-vis the domestic TV program awareness and attentiveness were not available, the degrees found among the sample were interpreted as at least moderate.

FINDINGS ON THE USES OF AFKN-TV

Preliminary Analyses of Motivation Measures and Findings on HYPOTHESES 1 to 5

While closely related to the hypotheses regarding the actual "uses" of AFKN-TV, it should be interesting to identify a few distinctive antecedent factors for major motivations for AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers. It is particularly meaningful in light of the arguments pointing to the importance of such investigations (e.g., social and psychological origins of media gratifications;

see, Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974).

An overview of initial zero-order correlations between the two aggregate motivation measures and various demographic/situational factors are summarized in Table 7. Overall, positive motivations were generally more strongly associated with more predictor variables than were passive motivations. For instance, positive motivations were significantly correlated with all but gender, while passive motivations were significantly related to only 6 variables.

Table 7 about here

As proposed in HYPOTHESES 1 and 2, the audience level of program awareness ("preactivity") and attentiveness ("duracitivity") was significantly correlated with positive motivations ($r=.24$ and $.33$ respectively, both at $p<.01$). The shadow viewers who endeavored to learn more about U.S. society/culture and English language exhibited a higher level of AFKN-TV program awareness of what to watch. At the same time, they tended to pay closer attention while viewing the AFKN-TV programs. While a small correlation was found for passive motivations with audience program awareness ($r=.13$ at $p<.05$), no significant association was obtained as to attentiveness.

Due to the generally limited interpretative potential of correlational data, multiple regression analyses with

block-wise controls were conducted for the two aggregate motivation measures. This was done specifically in relation to the hypotheses relating language-related factors to positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers (HYPOTHESES 3, 4 and 5).

These major predictors were included in the last block to isolate the degree to which they explained the variance of the motivation measures, while demographic and other media variables were inserted as prior controls. Factors related to audience preactivity and duractivity were excluded in the regression equations because they were considered not so much as predictors for the motivations as behavioral resultants of the motivational characteristics among the shadow viewers.

In addition, because of its high correlations with motivation measures ($r=.41$ with positive motivations, and $r=.18$ with passive motivations, both at $p<.01$), an individual's perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programming was also included in the last block, in a post-hoc manner, to see how much predictive strength would remain significant after the blockwise controls. These steps were further justified in that factors associated with individual perceptions regarding English language and certain features of the medium itself were considered more important than the other situational factors such as demographics and other media uses. While the procedures

were primarily based on the conceptual rationale, they were also consistent with the generally stronger correlations of such predictors found in relations with the motivation measures (see Table 7).

As shown in Table 8, 3 out of the 4 key predictors survived the controls and remained significant in moderate magnitudes for positive motivations. In contrast, none of the 15 factors remained significant for passive motivations, not to mention the key predictors. Perhaps, an attempt to look for substantial predictors for passive motivations might be a futile one, partly because of the highly motivational nature of AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers to begin with, and partly due to the relatively loosely defined conceptual characteristics of "passive" motivations.

Table 8 about here

The shadow viewers with a higher level of English language ability sought to gain more cultural or language learning and to enjoy more entertainment variety from AFKN-TV viewing. The trend seemed absent, however, among those who perceived a stronger importance of English language as a success tool in Korean society.

Aside from the language-related predictors, perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programming remained significant

after the controls. Those who perceived a higher degree of realism in AFKN-TV programming reported more positive reasons for AFKN-TV exposure. That is, those who believed more strongly that AFKN-TV programming is accurately reflective of what it purported to portray sought for more learning about language, society and culture as well as for better enjoyment of entertainment programming.

In addition to the 3 key predictors, gender and the viewers' knowledge of relatives or friends living in the U.S. were also found to be significant. Females tended to seek for more positive gratifications from AFKN-TV viewing, and, to a lesser extent, the shadow viewers' interpersonal affiliations with someone living in the U.S. appeared to promote more active reasons for AFKN-TV exposure.

In an attempt to detect a relative importance of each group of predictors, R square changes over the 3 steps were examined. That is, a large change in R square would indicate that the group of variables provided relatively unique information about the dependent variable that was not available from the other independent variables in the equation.

For positive motivations, R square changes over the 3 blocks were: .1338 ($p=.000$) for demographics; .0484 ($p=.0589$) for other media uses; and .1610 ($p=.000$) for the 4 key predictors. It was noted that the other media uses had very little to do with the motivation measures, and

that the 4 key predictors together were able to explain roughly about 16% additional variability of positive motivations, even after the controls. In the mean time, R square changes for passive motivations were .0439, .0293 and .0355 for the 3 blocks, and none were significant.

Analyses of AFKN-TV Uses and Findings on HYPOTHESES 6 to 10

Initial zero-order correlations revealed 19 key independent factors for 3 AFKN-TV viewing indicators (i.e., total viewing, information program viewing, and entertainment program viewing). As proposed, an individual's perceived English language proficiency, perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV and positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing were all significantly correlated with the amount of AFKN-TV exposure (see Table 9).

Table 9 about here

While the shadow viewers with a higher level of language proficiency watched more of all types of AFKN-TV programming, the trend appeared more salient in information program viewing ($r=.45$ with information, and $r=.28$ with entertainment programming, both at $p<.01$). Considering that the viewers' relatively well-matured comprehension ability of narratives is indispensable to fully understand

television programs mainly featuring talking-heads (e.g., news/documentaries and talk shows), the stronger association of language ability and AFKN-TV information programming among the shadow viewers seemed self-explanatory.

The shadow viewers' perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV was related mainly to information program viewing, while perceived importance of English language was associated with none of the AFKN-TV viewing measures. At the same time, passive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing were not related to any of the AFKN-TV viewing measures.

As to the relationships between other media uses and AFKN-TV viewing, AFKN-Radio was found to be most strongly correlated with all types of AFKN-TV programming. Those shadow viewers who watched more Korean TV programs, including U.S. TV program imports available on Korean TV, also watched more AFKN-TV, particularly, entertainment. Print media, however, whether U.S. news magazines or Korean newspapers, were not related to AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers.

To provide indications of explanatory strength for each of the key predictors identified in the HYPOTHESES 7, 8, 9 and 10, three multiple regression analyses were conducted in a manner similar to the ones previously introduced earlier. Among the 19 variables identified in

Table 9, the degree of AFKN-TV program awareness was excluded because of its conceptual ambiguity in causality terms. That is, while the audience preactivity variable was clearly related to positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing (more as a resultant than as a causal factor), it seemed less clear whether the variable should be viewed as an antecedent factor for AFKN-TV viewing.

In addition, U.S. program imports on Korean TV was also excluded in the regression equations on the ground that the variable appeared to be tautological vis-a-vis total amount of Korean TV viewing. The step was further justified in that the magnitudes and directions of correlations between the two domestic TV viewing indicators and AFKN-TV viewing measures were very much identical. For instance, zero-order correlations of the 2 domestic TV viewing indicators with AFKN-TV entertainment were exactly same ($r=.22$ at $p<.01$); and were very close with total amount of AFKN-TV viewing ($r=.18$ and $.17$ respectively at $p<.01$). However, neither was significant with AFKN-TV information. Table 10 presents major findings from the regression analyses under 3 different AFKN-TV viewing indicators.

 Table 10 about here

Once again, the viewers' perceived language

proficiency and positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing persisted the controls and remained significant in moderate degrees, across all 3 types of AFKN-TV viewing measures. Three other "perceived" factors, however, remained or became insignificant after the blockwise controls. Perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV lost its significance in relation to information program viewing as well as to total viewing. Perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programming also became an insignificant predictor.

Passive motivation for AFKN-TV viewing, however, was transformed to be as significant as positive motivations (from $r = -.10$ at $p > .05$ to $\text{Beta} = -.21$ at $p < .01$), but only for information program viewing and in an opposite direction. Those who were less concerned with positive learning tended to view less amount of AFKN-TV. The result was interpreted as a clear evidence for the proposition that positive motivations will be a good predictor for AFKN-TV viewing (HYPOTHESIS-7).

Aside from the key predictors, a few demographic and other media variables were found to be good predictors too. Gender and age were positively related to AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers, suggesting that females and the older tended to watch more AFKN-TV entertainment. Shadow listenership of AFKN-Radio was also found to be a decent predictor for AFKN-TV viewing. Among the other media included in the equation, AFKN-Radio was the only indicator

that survived the controls, implying that there existed a significant overlap between AFKN-TV viewership and AFKN-Radio listenership among the Korean shadow residents in the world of AFKN.

Statistics regarding R square changes and partial F-tests revealed that all 4 blocks had significantly unique information for explaining total and entertainment viewing. For instance, R square changes for AFKN-TV entertainment were: .10 ($P=.001$) in block-1, .11 ($p=.000$) in block-2, .06 ($p=.002$) in block-3, and .03 ($p=.029$) in block-4. For AFKN-TV information program viewing, however, the R square change in block-2 (other media uses) was insignificant (.04 at $p=.099$), while those in other blocks showed a trend similar to the ones found in AFKN-TV entertainment viewing (.13 at $p=.000$ in block-1; .12 at $p=.000$ in block-3; and .04 at $p=.002$ in block-4).

For the hypothesis specifically relating information-seeking motivation to AFKN-TV information program viewing (HYPOTHESIS-6), a more detailed picture of zero-order correlations between individual motivations and specific AFKN-TV program content is provided in Table 11. Overall, information-seeking was most strongly correlated with all 3 aggregate AFKN-TV viewing indicators among the 11 individual motivations for AFKN-TV viewing (i.e., $r=.35$ with total viewing, $r=.28$ with information, and $r=.28$ with entertainment, all at $p<.01$).

Table 11 about here

It was noted that information seeking motivation was most highly correlated with AFKN-TV news/information program viewing ($r=.40$ at $p=.000$), and that the magnitude of association was stronger with information than with entertainment viewing. To further ascertain the relationships, AFKN-TV news/information viewing was separately examined vis-a-vis different motivations. In addition to information-seeking motivation, "to learn about English language" and "curiosity" were significantly correlated with the particular program content, but to a less extent and with curiosity in an opposite direction. Talk show viewing, included in the aggregate viewing measure of AFKN-TV information, was also significantly associated with information-seeking motivation.

The last 2 columns of Table 11 confirmed once again the hypothesis proposing a stronger predicitive potential of positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing, than that of passive motivations (HYPOTHESIS-7). While none of the specific AFKN-TV programming content was correlated with passive motivations, all but 2 were significantly related to positive motivations.

Additional findings in Table 11 included: 1)

information-seekers generally sought to watch more of a whole array of AFKN-TV program types; 2) "to enjoy entertainment variety" motivation was mainly correlated with AFKN-TV entertainment features such as crime/adventure, music/variety and movies; 3) like information-seeking, language learning motivation was correlated with most of the AFKN-TV program types available, only except for crime/adventure and sports; 4) comedy shows and movies were consistently associated with all 4 types of positive motivations; and 5) Korean newspaper guides for AFKN-TV programming was moderately responsible for entertainment viewing such as sports and music/variety.

FINDINGS ON THE EFFECTS OF AFKN-TV

Due to the closely interrelated nature of the effect hypotheses proposed in the study, the contingency hypotheses (HYPOTHESES 18, 19, 20, and 21) were tested and reported in conjunction with individual effect hypotheses relating various perceptual areas to AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers. For instance, a stronger potential of specific program content than that of total viewing indicator (HYPOTHESIS-18) was tested against each perceptual area, whether it be "mean world," crime, sexual permissiveness, drug abuse, affluence, or other comparative self-images.

In the same manner, other contingency hypotheses proposing an amplifying potential of passive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing (HYPOTHESIS-19), that of attentiveness while watching AFKN-TV (HYPOTHESIS-20), and of perceived realism of AFKN-TV programming (HYPOTHESIS-21) were all tested vis-a-vis specific perceptual areas investigated. As a result, each perceptual area was examined with 3 major tables summarizing the results from: 1) multiple regression analyses involving key predictor variables with appropriate controls inserted blockwise; 2) cross-tabulation analyses with individual AFKN-TV program types as independent measures; and 3) two-way cross-tabulation analyses with appropriate controls inserted.

Finally, it was noted that, in the process of the blockwise regression analyses, AFKN-TV total viewing indicator was automatically thrown out from the analyses due to its failure to meet the minimum tolerance criterion of .01. High zero-order correlations of total viewing measure with two aggregate viewing indicators appeared responsible for the exclusion. Given the operational redundancy evidenced by the intercorrelations among three AFKN-TV viewing measures (e.g., $r=.72$ between total and information; and $r=.96$ between total and entertainment; both at $p=.000$), it seemed obvious that the proportion of variability potentially explainable by total viewing indicator was almost negligible.

Consequently, the effect hypotheses involving total AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers were tested against the two aggregate viewing measures. Because the hypothesis emphasizing the program content specificity was separately tested vis-a-vis each individual AFKN-TV program type, the method of using two aggregate viewing measures instead of one total indicator was further justified.

Findings on Mean U.S. Perceptions
(HYPOTHESES-11 & HYPOTHESES 18 to 22)

Due to the relatively low reliability noted in the combined measure of the "mean world" perceptions ($\alpha=.58$), the two items were analyzed separately. The procedure was taken and further justified in that the items appeared to tap somewhat mutually distanced dimensions: a macro-dimension of U.S. society versus an interpersonal dimension of U.S. people.

Initial zero-order correlations revealed 14 potential key predictors for the two dependent mean-world items. These variables were entered into two multiple regression equations, and major findings are summarized in Table 12. Overall, AFKN-TV viewing was not a good predictor for both perceptions of disorderly U.S. society and of unfriendly Americans.

 Table 12 about here

While neither AFKN-TV information nor entertainment viewing was significant in the equations, similar results were also detected in a few other regression analyses employing forward selection processes with a criterion of $p < .05$. None of the three AFKN-TV viewing indicators were chosen to be included in the analyses, implying a relative insignificance of these factors in explaining the variability in the Korean shadow viewers' perceptions of disorderly U.S. society and of unfriendly Americans.

Aside from AFKN-TV viewing, the viewers' willingness or plan to go to the U.S. either for a visit or to study was a good predictor for an orderly picture of U.S. society and friendlier perceptions of Americans. Also noted in Table 12 was that females tended to hold friendlier perceptions of Americans than males and no other media were found to be significant in predicting the "mean" U.S. perceptions.

In an attempt to detect yet undiscovered impact of AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers, cross-tabulation analyses were performed with individual AFKN-TV program types as independent variables. Table 13 reveals two significant associations: heavier AFKN-TV comedy viewers held more orderly perceptions of U.S. society, and heavier AFKN-TV movie viewers thought of Americans friendlier.

Table 13 about here

Taken together, the shadow viewers who watched more comedy shows and movies on AFKN-TV tended to hold more attractive perceptions of U.S. society and people. The trend was partially corroborated by zero-order correlations found among the variables concerned (e.g., $r = -.11$ at $p < .05$ between "disorderly" and comedy).

With some degree of usefulness of an approach taking into account TV program "content specificity" proven by the results shown in TABLE-13 (HYPOTHESIS-18), it was thought appropriate to present a summary table here which presents all zero-order correlations between specific AFKN-TV programming and all the perceptual areas investigated in the study. While the particular table will be constantly referred to whenever "content specificity" is discussed later on, the summary table is introduced here for a presentational convenience (Table 14).

In Table 14, a few additional relationships were found significant in regard to the two items of "mean" U.S. perceptions. AFKN-TV comedy viewing was correlated not only with orderly U.S. perceptions but with friendly perceptions of Americans as well ($r = -.16$ at $p < .01$). While soap/drama was correlated with friendly Americans ($r = -.16$ at $p < .01$), game/quiz was found to be related to disorderly U.S.

society.

 Table 14 about here

To further identify potentially contingent relationships due to a few situational factors, two-way cross-tabulation analyses were conducted on the two "mean" U.S. items. Overall, very few significant differences were found. For the interpersonal dimension, none of the differential measures of association were found meaningful. However, a handful of significant associations were found in the societal dimension (see Table 15).

 Table 15 about here

Viewing motivations, attentiveness and perceived realism of the medium did not reveal any differentiating potential with regard to the disorderly perceptions of U.S. society. However, a moderate difference was found significant as to the degree of AFKN-TV program awareness (i.e., "preactivity"). Among those who rarely knew what to watch on AFKN-TV, about 53% of the heavy AFKN-TV viewers exhibited more disorderly perceptions of U.S. society, while about 37% of light viewers fell in the same category. The difference was statistically significant (cultivation differential [CD] was +16 at $p < .05$), and the similar trend

was not present among those with a higher level of pre-planning for AFKN-TV viewing.

In addition, a similar trend was noted among the heavy AFKN-TV viewers who also watched more domestic television and among those who read less U.S. news magazines. The differences were more prominent ($CD=+25$ at $p<.01$ for both) than in audience pre-planning, implying that U.S. news magazine reading may intervene the AFKN-TV's potential perceptual influence while domestic TV viewing may amplify the process.

Findings on Crime-Related Perceptions
(HYPOTHESES 12 & 13 and HYPOTHESES 18 to 22)

Among 14 key independent variables entered into the regression equations for two crime-related perceptions, none of the two AFKN-TV viewing indicators were found significant. While they were significantly correlated with personal-level fear of imagined crime victimizations in the U.S., neither survived the blockwise controls (Table 16).

Table 16 about here

Other media uses among the shadow viewers were also found to be negligible in their ability to explain the variability of the dependent measures. While 2 demographic indicators were significant in predicting either societal-level crime perceptions or imagined personal-level anxiety,

a look at R square changes over 3 steps taken in the equations suggested all the predictors combined accounted very little variability of the two crime-related indicators among the Korean shadow viewers (e.g., multiple R's for the 2 equations were .28 and .29, both at $p > .05$).

The zero-order correlations of the two crime-related items with two AFKN-TV viewing indicators appeared to suggest a failure for the hypothesis proposing a less prominent impact of AFKN-TV on the personal-level anxiety, than on the societal-level judgements. While none of the AFKN-TV viewing indicators were correlated with societal-level perceptions, both were significantly correlated with personal-level fear ($r = .15$ with information, and $r = .14$ with entertainment, both at $p < .05$). As noted earlier, however, the associations lost significance in regression analyses.

To identify specific loci of differences as to individual AFKN-TV program types, cross-tabulation analyses of these crime-related items were performed. As shown in Table 17, only except for game/quiz show viewing, no single AFKN-TV viewing indicators generated significantly differential degree of associations for societal-level crime perceptions. However, AFKN-TV information in general and news/information programs in particular showed significant measures of associations. Heavier consumers of AFKN-TV news exhibited a higher level of imagined crime victimization fear.

Table 17 about here

While these observations were consistent with zero-order correlations noted in TABLE-14 (e.g., $r=.15$ at $p<.05$ between personal fear and AFKN-TV news/information), the results were interpreted as in conflict with the hypothesis predicting less prominent impact of AFKN-TV viewing on personal-level anxiety than on societal-level perceptions among the shadow viewers (HYPOTHESIS-13). The null finding was underscored once again by the contrast shown between the two items in relation to their zero-order correlations with 3 aggregate AFKN-TV viewing measures: none were significant for the societal-level perceptions while all 3 were significant for personal fear (see Table 14).

Table 18 presents the results from the two-way cross-tabulation analyses of the crime-related items with controls. Again, societal-level crime perceptions had very little variability according to the individual control factors inserted. Heavy AFKN-TV viewers with a lesser degree of program planning, however, demonstrated a moderately lower level of crime prevalence in U.S. society ($CD=-15$ at $p<.05$). This particular result was interpreted as in conflict with the hypothesis proposing a mediating potential of audience "preactivity" (HYPOTHESIS-20).

Table 18 about here

As implied by the significant zero-order correlations and CD scores between personal fear and a few AFKN-TV viewing indicators, a relatively large number of significant CD scores were detected in the two-way cross-tabulation analyses. In demographic terms, older heavy viewers of AFKN-TV showed a higher level of imagined crime fear, and the trend was more prominent among males than females. Also, the heavy AFKN-TV viewers who had been to the U.S. or had relatives or friends living in the U.S. exhibited a higher level of imagined anxiety. In a similar manner, knowledge of actual crime victimizations of relatives or friends living in the U.S. appeared to amplify the media impact on the viewers' imagined crime victimization fear.

As to the hypotheses proposing contingent media impact, the results showed a mixed support. For instance, AFKN-TV's impact on the imagined personal fear was more prominent among the heavy viewers who were largely motivated by passive gratifications ($CD=+19$ at $P<.05$), and among those who rarely knew what to watch on AFKN-TV ($CD=+19$ at $p<.05$). The results were interpreted as consistent with HYPOTHESES 19 and 20.

Vis-a-vis the hypotheses predicting an amplifying

potential of viewing attentiveness (HYPOTHESIS-21) and perceived realism of AFKN-TV programming (HYPOTHESIS-22), the results provided a fair amount of support. Heavy AFKN-TV viewers with a lower level of alertness demonstrated as much media influence as found among those with a higher level of attentiveness ($CD=+16$ and $+19$ respectively, both at $p<.05$). Thus, the potency of viewing attentiveness in predicting a more pronounced media impact received a mixed support. However, the proposition that the viewers' perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programming will promote a stronger media influence was clearly supported in relation to the personal-level fear. The predicted media impact was more prominent among those with a higher level of perceived realism of AFKN-TV programming ($CD=+20$ at $p<.05$).

To further explicate the relationships observed in the two crime-related measures, two additional cultivation differential items were investigated (i.e., estimates of law enforcement officials and the portion of violent crimes in the U.S.). This was done particularly in connection with the hypothesis proposing an importance of media content specifications and with other contingency hypotheses.

Results from the two multiple regression equations for the items revealed generally insignificant accountability of the predictors entered (Table 19). For instance, the multiple R in the equation for the law officials was .22 at $p>.05$, and no single predictor was found significant.

Similarly, the multiple R in the equation for the item measuring the estimates of violent crimes in the U.S. was small in magnitude and again insignificant (multiple $R=.31$ at $p>.05$). One meaningful predictor was found for the latter, however, implying the viewers' interpersonal knowledge of crime victimizations in the U.S. may promote an exaggerated view on violent crimes in the U.S. ($r=.17$ and $Beta=.17$, both at $p<.01$).

 Table 19 about here

The hypothesis as to media content specificity was tested by the results shown in Table 20. Again, no single individual AFKN-TV program was a decent indicator for the law official item. Total and entertainment viewing, however, were related to the item for violent crimes. Nevertheless, they were viewed with some caution particularly when examined in relation to the findings in the regression analysis as well as to the ones in zero-order correlations (see Table 14). That is, no significant relationships were detected with the aggregate measures in the results.

 Table 20 about here

As to individual AFKN-TV programming, crime/adventure

and movies were significant discriminators regarding the exaggerated estimates of violent crimes in the U.S., whereas soap/drama viewing was inversely related. While the connection between AFKN-TV crime/adventure and the dependent crime measure was noted as particularly relevant for the content specificity argument, the results as a whole was interpreted as supportive of HYPOTHESIS-18.

A few significantly contingent relationships of the proposed media impact were summarized in Table 21. For the estimates of law enforcement officials in the U.S., 3 out of 4 contingency hypotheses were substantially supported. For instance, the heavy AFKN-TV viewers with generally passive motivations and those with a lower level of pre-planning chose the television answer (5% instead of 1%) more frequently than did the light viewers (HYPOTHESES 19 & 20).

 Table 21 about here

While the heavy AFKN-TV viewers with a higher level of pre-planning also showed a significant discrimination, the direction of the association was interpreted as still supportive of HYPOTHESIS-20. That is, it was the light AFKN-TV viewers in the category who more frequently chose the exaggerated answer ($CD=-16$ at $p<.05$). In addition, it was also noted that the heavy AFKN-TV viewers who

considered the medium more realistic tended to choose the television answer more often (HYPOTHESIS-22). On the contrary to HYPOTHESIS-21, however, the heavy viewers with a lower level of viewing attentiveness showed a more pronounced media impact.

The contingent trends were far less prominent in the item measuring the estimates of violent crimes in the U.S. While the cultivation differential for total AFKN-TV viewing was noted as significant, only one significant difference was noted in the contingent relationships proposed, but in an opposite direction: the heavy AFKN-TV viewers with a higher level of viewing attentiveness chose the television answer more frequently.

The results in the second item led to a speculation that the differential associations sought in the item might lie somewhere other than the areas related to the contingency hypotheses proposed. Indeed, a few other such differences were noted in relation to certain demographic characteristics. For instance, the heavy viewers of AFKN-TV who had personally been to the U.S. or who had relatives or friends living in the U.S. reported generally more exaggerated perceptions of violent crimes in the U.S. (CD=+58 at $p < .01$ and CD=+15 at $p < .05$ respectively).

In addition, the heavy AFKN-TV viewers with a relatively lower level of other media uses (e.g., U.S. movie imports or domestic newspapers) exhibited a heightened

media impact. Together with the findings associated with other situational factors examined above, these results seemed to suggest that direct or interpersonal experience may have an amplifying potential for the media impact proposed, and that other media may intervene the process as a potential inhibiting factor.

Findings on Noncrime-Related Perceptions
(HYPOTHESES 14, 15, 16 & 18 to 22)

Major findings from three multiple regression equations for the noncrime-related perceptions are summarized in Table 22. Overall, there were very few significant predictors for the sexual permissiveness perceptions of U.S. society among the Korean shadow viewers of AFKN-TV. The observation was further corroborated by the weak accountability of all the predictors combined (multiple $R=.22$ at $p>.05$).

 Table 22 about here

While AFKN-TV viewing measures were not significant predictors for drug abuse perceptions of U.S. society either, AFKN-TV entertainment viewing had a moderate level of explanatory strength for affluence perceptions of the U.S., even with the blockwise controls ($r=.12$ at $p<.05$; Beta=.20 at $p<.01$). The results were interpreted as a partial support for the hypothesis proposing a differential

predictive strength of different media content (HYPOTHESIS-18).

By and large, other media uses among the shadow viewers explained very little for the three perceptual areas examined. It was noted, however, that the younger shadow viewers were more likely to have exaggerated perceptions on sexual openness and the prevalence of drug problems in U.S. society. In addition, the shadow viewers' interpersonal affiliations with someone living in the U.S. appeared to discourage them to draw a rosier picture of U.S. society.

Table 23 reveals a few significant findings as to the hypothesis emphasizing the TV program content specificity (HYPOTHESIS-18). Again, no meaningful indications were found in the area of sexual permissiveness perceptions. While AFKN-TV crime/adventure viewing was a potent predictor for the exaggerated drug abuse perceptions of U.S. society, it appeared to be the area of affluence that revealed most differentiating potential of content specificity.

Table 23 about here

In contrast with the significant predictorship of AFKN-TV entertainment viewing found in the regression equation, AFKN-TV information was a significant

discriminator in this analysis, at least in their aggregate forms. It should be noted, however, that the direction of difference was not in serious conflict with the positive relationship between AFKN-TV entertainment viewing and exaggerated perceptions of U.S. affluence.

That is, the heavy AFKN-TV information viewers exhibited a lesser degree of affluent images of the U.S., while AFKN-TV entertainment viewers reported a higher level of affluence perceptions. The trend was further verified by a few other significant discriminatory indications found in relation to individual AFKN-TV program content. More specifically, news/information programs, like in the aggregate AFKN-TV information measure, were responsible for the less affluent perceptions of the U.S.; whereas individual entertainment programs such as comedy, soap/drama, game/quiz and movies, contributed to more affluent images of the U.S.

Also noted in the inquiry was that the degrees of discrimination were more significant for entertainment than for information, implying a tendency of stronger association between AFKN-TV entertainment viewing and rosier perceptions of the U.S. among the Korean shadow viewers. The observation was also consistent with the zero-order correlations found significant between the two variables (e.g., $r=.12$ at $p<.05$ with AFKN-TV entertainment as a whole; $r=.21$ at $p<.01$ both with comedy and with

game/quiz: see Table 14).

Table 24 presents the results from the two-way cross-tabulation analyses for the three perceptual areas. As noted earlier in Table 23, no significant differences were detected in relation to total amount of AFKN-TV exposure. Furthermore, very few controlled discriminations were found significant as a whole. A total absence of significant differences was also noticed vis-a-vis the hypotheses proposing various contingent relationships of the media impact predicted (HYPOTHESES 19 to 22).

Table 24 about here

However, among those who had personally been to the U.S., 61% of the heavier AFKN-TV viewers reported stronger perceptions of drug abuse in the U.S., while only 14% of the light viewers chose the same category ($CD=+47$ at $p<.01$). The result was interpreted as implying an mediating potential of direct experience in testing the media impact proposed.

A similar trend was also found among the shadow viewers who read less amount of U.S. news magazines, again only in the perceptual area of drug abuse. It seemed likely that a lack of competing media information regarding drug problems in the U.S. had augmented the AFKN-TV's perceptual impact among the Korean shadow viewers with less exposure

to U.S. print media.

Findings on Comparative Self-Images
(HYPOTHESES 17 & 18 to 22)

To see if the proposed media impact would differ along different exemplary areas of the self-degraded perceptions investigated in the study, the three comparative image items were analyzed separately. The step was taken also because the items appeared to deal with mutually distinguishable areas of self-image: popular culture (e.g., pop music and movies), overall culture (e.g., cultural tradition), and broadcasting programming (e.g., radio and TV).

As shown in Table 25, AFKN-TV viewing indicators were generally poor predictors for all three areas of comparative self-image perceptions among the shadow viewers. As to the item designed to measure possible national or cultural inferiority perceptions in terms of popular culture, none but the viewers' willingness to visit the U.S. in the future were found significant. The insignificant accountability of all the predictors combined was also noticed for the item (multiple $R=.29$ at $p>.05$).

Table 25 about here

While significant overall predictability was found for each of the other two items, a major source of the

statistical significance appeared to lie somewhere other than the key predictors identified in the study. For the item designed to measure the shadow viewers' inferior perceptions of overall indigenous culture, print media were generally good predictors. Those who read more U.S. news magazines exhibited more inferior perceptions of their own culture. Those who read more domestic newspapers, however, reported less self-degraded images of their indigenous culture.

A similar trend was also noticed among those who watched more domestic TV programs, in relations to comparative quality of indigenous broadcasting culture. Heavier consumers of domestic TV programs exhibited a lesser degree of inferior perceptions of their own broadcasting quality.

Also related to the other media uses among the shadow viewers of AFKN-TV, the shadow listenership of AFKN-Radio and frequent exposure to U.S. movie imports were significantly correlated with the item related to the comparative self-images of indigenous culture. However, they lost the significance after the block-wise controls. In the mean time, throughout the three regression equations, one controlled factor appeared to be the most consistently significant predictor for the all three comparative image items: the shadow viewers' willingness to go to the U.S. either for a visit or to study in the near

future.

As to the hypothesis proposing differential impact according to specific media content (HYPOTHESIS-18), the data involving the shadow viewers' self-image perceptions revealed an overall confirmation of the usefulness of such approaches. As shown in Table 26, a few such indicators were found across all three items. For instance, heavier AFKN-TV entertainment viewers in general, and heavier viewers of AFKN-TV comedy programs in particular, exhibited a higher level of self-degraded images as to the comparative quality of their own popular culture.

 Table 26 about here

While no significant differences were found for aggregate AFKN-TV viewing indicators in the other two areas, at least 4 significant discriminations were detected in the areas according to the program content specificity. Heavier viewers of AFKN-TV news/information reported a lesser degree of inferior cultural perceptions, whereas the heavier consumers of AFKN-TV movie features demonstrated a higher level of such perceptions. In addition, heavier viewers of AFKN-TV game/quiz shows reported a lesser degree of inferior perceptions of their own broadcasting culture, while heavier viewers of AFKN-TV talk show programs exhibited a higher level of such perceptions.

The trends were further verified by the zero-order correlations found between the variables identified above (see Table 14). For instance, AFKN-TV comedy was correlated with inferior pop culture ($r=.12$, $p<.05$), movies with inferior overall culture ($r=.16$, $p<.01$), and talk shows with inferior broadcasting culture ($r=.13$, $p<.05$).

Summary results from the two-way cross-tabulation analyses for the three items are presented in Table 27. First, the popular culture item revealed a supportive indication for HYPOTHESIS-20: heavier AFKN-TV viewers with a lesser degree of pre-planning exhibited a higher level of inferior pop culture perceptions. A similar trend was found among those with a higher degree of passive motivations (HYPOTHESIS-19), but the difference failed to reach at a statistical significance. On the contrary to HYPOTHESES 21 and 22, however, the heavier AFKN-TV viewers with a lower level of perceived credibility of media or of viewing attentiveness showed a pronounced media impact.

Table 27 about here

The item involving the overall cultural perceptions revealed little unique information for the contingency hypotheses. Another significant difference was noted, however, in the item associated with one's own broadcasting culture. The heavier AFKN-TV viewers with a higher level of

positive motivations showed a lesser degree of inferior perceptions of their own broadcasting quality. The result was interpreted as an indirect evidence for the hypothesis linking the viewers' passive motivations to heightened media impact (HYPOTHESIS-19).

Aside from the findings related to the contingency hypotheses, a few other significant measures of association were detected in the inquiry. For instance, female respondents demonstrated a far lower level of inferior self-image perceptions than males, and the trend appeared to be more salient among the young. In addition, relatively lower living standard perceived by the heavy AFKN-TV viewers seemed to promote a higher level of self-degraded images, particularly in regard to the quality of indigenous popular culture. A similar trend was also noticed among the heavy AFKN-TV viewers who had never been to the U.S.

As to other media uses among the shadow viewers, U.S. movie viewing did not appear to promote the inferior perceptions, while domestic TV viewing seemed to be a strong inhibitor of the AFKN-TV's perceptual influence predicted. That is, the potential self-image degrading impact of AFKN-TV viewing was less pronounced among those who watched a good deal of Korean TV programs (i.e., $CD=-23$ at $p<.01$), whereas the impact appeared to be more prominent among those who watched a less amount of Korean TV programs (i.e., $CD=+29$ at $p<.01$).

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Deriving from several macro-level critical perspectives on international television program flow, the study started out with an underlying proposition that foreign media would play a role in the indigenous consumers' conceptions of social reality. Based on several micro-level psychological theories and related research, specific predictions were made in relation to the uses and the effects of one unique foreign medium among a selected shadow audience. One underlying purpose of the study was to investigate how an American Armed Forces Television channel in Korea, presumably of a closed-circuit nature, was used among the largely uninvited audiences with what purpose and with what impact.

In light of the various critical claims regarding the global imbalance of communication flow, the Korean paradox --a mixture of a relatively self-reliant domestic broadcasting programming and a wide world of American television--was viewed as a unique opportunity to test several socio-psychological hypotheses among the shadow viewers of AFKN-TV. Among other things, a potential cultivation process through AFKN-TV viewing was predicted as one of the significant roles played by the particular medium.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

As expected, several language-related factors proved to be important predictors for the actual uses of AFKN-TV as well as for the viewers' generally more positive motivations for the uses. At the same time, hypotheses relating positive motivations to several situational characteristics salient among the shadow viewers were also supported by the data.

For instance, the hypotheses proposing significant relationships of positive motivations with the degrees of audience preactivity (pre-planning) and duractivity (attentiveness) found moderate evidence in the data (HYPOTHESIS 1 and 2). The propositions that the viewers' perceived language proficiency and language learning utility of AFKN-TV will be significant predictors for the positive motivations also received substantial support by the data. (HYPOTHESIS 3 and 4). However, the proposition relating the viewers' perceived importance of English language to the positive motivations (HYPOTHESIS-5) failed to find significant evidence. Instead, the viewers' perceived realism of AFKN-TV programming was found to be the strongest predictor for the positive motivations.

Given the intuitively anteceding nature of the perceived importance of English language to the other two language-related predictors, the downplayed significance of the higher-order language variable appeared less

convincing. That is, without a certain degree of importance assigned to the learning of a foreign language in the first place, the level of language proficiency achieved or that of the perceived learning utility of a medium cannot be explained easily. The particular result (i.e., non-support for HYPOTHESIS-5) might be partially due to several significant intercorrelations found among the predictors, in which case a unique strength of an independent variable tends to be spread out among or absorbed by the other correlated predictors simultaneously included in the regression equation.

For instance, it was noted that, while the viewers' perceived importance of language learning was significantly correlated with positive motivations ($r=.17$ at $p<.01$), it was also significantly correlated with the perceived language proficiency ($r=.18$ at $p<.01$) and to the perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV ($r=.42$ at $p<.01$). Along with its conceptually overriding nature, these zero-order correlations seemed to suggest a moderate importance of the variable.

The possibility of a statistical artifact due to the rigorous control employed in the analyses was also noted in relation to gender. The statistical transfiguration of gender (i.e., from $r=.04$ at $p>.05$ to $\text{Beta}=.16$ at $p<.05$) appeared to have something to do with its significant correlations with other predictors in the equation (e.g.,

with age, $r=.57$ at $p<.01$; with perceived living standard, $r=.12$ at $p<.05$; with AFKN-Radio, $r=.13$ at $p<.05$; with Korean newspaper, $r=-.13$ at $p<.05$). Taken together, females were younger and more upscale, listening more AFKN-Radio but reading less Korean newspapers, than the male counterparts surveyed in the study. The intercorrelations, however, may substantially obfuscate the degree of unique contributions of gender (and the perceived importance of English language for that matter) to explaining the variances in the motivation measures examined. Thus, a caution should be needed in interpreting the results.

As to the strongest predictorship for positive motivations manifested by the viewers' perceived realism in AFKN-TV programming ($r=.41$ & Beta=.24, both at $p<.01$), it seemed self-explanatory that those who more strongly believed in the programming content would seek for more learning and enjoyment from the medium. While the interpretation seemed logical, the data did not appear to falsify an alternative hypothesis. That is, it seemed equally likely that those seeking for more learning and better entertainment would render a higher level of believability to the programs viewed and perceived to be utilized.

The hypotheses relating the shadow viewers' perceived language proficiency and positive motivations for AFKN-TV

viewing to actual uses of AFKN-TV were strongly supported by the data (HYPOTHESES 7 and 8). Together with the findings from the analyses of AFKN-TV viewing motivations, it appeared that the shadow viewers with a higher level of English language proficiency tended to watch more AFKN-TV programs, particularly for positive reasons such as further language learning and active enjoyment of entertainment varieties. While a higher level of perceived language proficiency appeared to promote a heavier consumption of AFKN-TV information than entertainment, positive gratification seekers tended to enjoy both types of programming pretty equally.

In addition, the hypothesis linking the viewers' information-seeking motivations to actual viewing of AFKN-TV information programming was clearly supported by the data (HYPOTHESIS-6). However, the hypothesis predicting a significant association between the viewers' perceived importance of English language and actual AFKN-TV viewing failed to find a substantial support (HYPOTHESIS-10). Together with the null finding from the analyses of viewing motivations per se (not actual uses), this result led the researcher to look for some additional clues other than the ones discussed earlier.

Perhaps, one may have to question the reliability of the measurement instrumentation for the particular variable. Noted in connection with the doubt was a

preliminary characteristic regarding the language factor's variability among the selected sample. Only 5% of the respondents disagreed with the statement saying English language is an important success tool in Korea. As noted earlier, the lack of discrimination within the sample seemed inevitable, given the better-educated and intelligent nature of the sample surveyed. However, a multiple-item measure tapping several more subtle aspects of the language importance could have produced more meaningful results in relation to the hypothesis proposing the variable's predictive potential for actual uses of the English language medium.

In a similar manner, the hypothesis predicting a significant connection between the viewers' perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV and actual consumption of the medium was by and large unsupported by the data. (HYPOTHESIS-9). At best, a partial evidence was detected in zero-order correlations of the language-related factor particularly with AFKN-TV information viewing ($r=.11$ at $p<.05$).

To detect a clear linkage among the variables only loosely identified so far (i.e., perceived language proficiency, perceived language importance, perceived learning utility of AFKN-TV, positive motivations, and actual viewing), a path-analytic method was utilized. That is, a deviation correlation matrix was created among the

variables according to the statistics related to the observed correlations and the expected ones. The procedure produced a result showing one particular interrelationship seemed the most plausible: the viewers' perceived language importance caused the perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV ($r=.42$ at $p<.01$) which caused the positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing ($r=.36$ at $p<.01$) which appeared to be the most immediate causal factor for the actual viewing of AFKN-TV ($r=.33$ at $p<.01$).

While all the deviations examined were trivial, the one observed between the perceived language importance and the actual viewing appeared most conspicuous ($-.06$). The deviation, however, proved to be within the range of sampling error alone (plus or minus .13). In addition, the viewers' perceived language proficiency was also a good predictor for the perceived language importance. When inserted as an antecedent factor in the model identified, the language proficiency variable seemed to generate a result that appeared to be outside an appropriate parsimony criterion for model building. That is, while the relationship between the language proficiency and the assigned importance was significant, a cause-effect linkage between them appeared rather mutual than a one-way relationship.

As to other media uses and AFKN-TV viewing, it was interesting to note a significant overlap between AFKN-TV

viewership and AFKN-Radio listenership among the shadow audience surveyed. While the sample in the study reported a relatively less amount of AFKN-Radio listening than suggested by previous inquiries among other Korean samples (e.g., high school or college youngsters), the result appeared to indicate a need to identify an underlying factor that may promote active uses of both AFKN-TV and Radio.

To provide a summary review of the results pertaining to various media impact proposed in the study, a separate table was created. As shown in Table 28, a clear support was demonstrated for the hypothesis predicting a differentiating potential of specific media content (HYPOTHESIS-18), while the hypotheses relating the overall AFKN-TV viewing to several perceptual areas were largely not supported by the data. For instance, viewing AFKN-TV comedy programs was negatively related to the two negative items on the perceptions of U.S. society and people. It seemed highly plausible that the light-hearted American comedy shows frequently featuring friendly interpersonal interactions in generally happy and cheerful contexts would promote more optimistic views on U.S. society and people among the foreign audience.

Table 28 about here

For the hypotheses predicting a contingent nature of media impact proposed, the data revealed a generally weak support for the two "mean" U.S. items. Only the hypothesis predicting such contingency on the degree of audience pre-planning (HYPOTHESIS-20) received a partial support, only for the item on the disorderly perceptions of U.S. society.

Aside from the key predictors, the viewers' willingness or plan to go to the U.S. for a visit or to study was a significant predictor for an orderly picture of U.S. society and friendlier perceptions of Americans. While it seemed highly plausible that those Korean adults with a higher degree of U.S. aspiration held more attractive images of U.S. people and society, the data at hand did not falsify an alternative interpretation. That is, the upper-middle class Korean adults who viewed U.S. society and people more enviable were more willing to visit the U.S.

A substantial amount of support was obtained for the content specificity hypothesis again in relation to the crime-related perceptions, whereas HYPOTHESES 12 and 13 were not supported with the aggregate AFKN-TV viewing measure. The evidence was particularly prominent for the cultivation differential item on violent crimes in the U.S. (25% instead of 5%) and for the imagined personal-level fear. The result for the personal fear, however, seemed a puzzling one, particularly for the hypothesis specifically predicting a less media impact on the personal-level

anxiety than on the global-level judgements.

While the data at hand provided only ancillary indications for the comparison (e.g., zero-order correlations or standardized partial regression coefficients), the cultivation differential (CD) analyses with individual AFKN-TV programs as independent variables suggested at least an equal degree of media impact on both levels of crime-related perceptions. Because the media impact observed appeared to differ along different genres of programming, it seemed more useful to discuss it in the context of program content specificity.

For instance, the societal-level judgements about crime appeared to vary along the entertainment dimension, while the personal-level fear appeared to vary along the informational dimension of AFKN-TV programming. The Korean shadow viewers' choice of the exaggerated estimate on violent crimes in the U.S. (i.e., 25% instead of 15%) was more frequent among the heavier viewers of AFKN-TV entertainment, particularly crime/adventure and movies. The higher level of imagined personal anxiety manifested by the shadow viewers, however, was more pronounced among the heavier viewers of informational content, particularly news varieties.

With the usefulness of content specificity proven, the remaining question goes to explaining the rationales for the findings. Perhaps, the results can be illuminated by

the distinction between the "affectivity" and the "informativeness" of media content discussed by Tyler & Cook (1984). As noted earlier, they suggested that a relationship between media exposure and human judgements, particularly the ones on global-level, is largely due to the informativeness of the media event rather than to the affectivity of its imagery.

When applied to the finding in which informational media content promoted a higher level of personal-level anxiety while entertainment content contributed to the individual's societal-level judgements, an alternative hypothesis seemed plausible. That is, more believable media content such as news may directly affect the personal-level anxiety, while make-believe entertainment content can at best affect a rather diffused global-level perceptions. Of course, the Tyler & Cook's distinction did not entirely eliminate the justifiability of the alternative rationale. However, the present finding appeared to have a pertinence more in relation with the viewers' perceived realism of media content, than with the affectivity-informativeness distinction.

In this regard, the rationales derived from a multiple-trace memory model of communication sources (Shapiro, 1988) appeared to be more in line with the findings. That is, the contextual information about more believable media sources (e.g., news/information) would

generate stronger imprints in people's construction of a world view. Albeit of secondary nature, the rationale was partially corroborated by the finding related to a contingency hypothesis in that the heavier AFKN-TV viewers with a higher level of perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programming exhibited a more pronounced personal-level fear (see Table 18).

Related to this, the other contingency hypotheses regarding the crime-related perceptions received a mixed verdict. None were supported for 2 societal-level items including the cultivation differential item on violent crimes in the U.S., while 3 such hypotheses were supported in the law-official item. Taken together, these results were interpreted as a minimal-to-weak evidence for the societal-level items. For the personal-level fear, however, all 4 contingency hypotheses were supported, implying a more complex nature of the media impact on the personal-level anxiety.

Aside from the key predictors, it was interesting to note that the heavy AFKN-TV viewers who had been to the U.S. or had relatives or friends living in the U.S. exhibited a more pronounced media impact. Along with a similar result associated with the viewers' knowledge of actual crime victimizations of relatives or friends living in the U.S., these findings strongly confirmed the argument that direct experience or interpersonal knowledge must be

considered seriously whenever a researcher attempts to isolate the media impact on the audience member's conceptions of social reality.

As to the other noncrime-related areas, the hypotheses proposing a significant impact of overall AFKN-TV viewing on the shadow viewers' perceptions of sexual permissiveness, drug abuse and affluence in the U.S. (HYPOTHESES 14, 15 and 16) were not supported by the data. The hypothesis involving program content specificity (HYPOTHESIS-18), however, found a substantial support, particularly in relation to the perceptions regarding drug abuse and affluence. Vis-a-vis the other contingency hypotheses, the data revealed very little unique information, across all three areas of social reality among the Korean shadow viewers of AFKN-TV.

More specifically, the cultivation differential analyses suggested that AFKN-TV's impact on the viewers' heightened drug abuse perceptions in the U.S. was highlighted by its entertainment programming in general and crime/adventure in particular. Considering that a fair amount of drug-related crimes and incidents are frequently featured in these types of TV programs in the U.S., the observed relationship among the foreign viewers appeared not too surprising. While undiscovered in the analysis, several more potential promoters of such perceptions were also detected in the preliminary correlational data.

For instance, AFKN-TV information programs, particularly news, were significantly correlated with the exaggerated drug abuse perceptions ($r=.18$ and $.17$, both at $p<.01$; see Table 14). Again, it seemed highly likely that the shadow viewers who frequently attended the U.S. news stories reporting various aspects of drug problems in the U.S. held opinions partially based on such portrayals in a relatively straightforward fashion. Taken together with a few additional findings in the analyses, these results once again strongly suggested the importance of media content specificity in investigating the perceptual media impact proposed.

In fact, the differences stemming from the content specificity were most pronounced in the perceptions of American affluence among the foreign viewers of U.S. television. AFKN-TV entertainment viewing, even in its aggregate term, survived the controls in the regression analysis, and individual variations for the affluence were mostly consistent with the speculations loosely alluded in previous Chapters.

By and large, exposure to AFKN-TV information programming appeared to discount a rosier painting of U.S. society, whereas AFKN-TV entertainment tended to promote enviable perceptions of the American affluence. It seemed highly plausible that the foreign viewers learned a lot about American affluence from numerous environmental cues

available in a variety of television entertainment fare (e.g., *Dynasty*, *Dallas*). At the same time, it seemed equally likely that the viewers would learn about American misery (e.g., street people, inner-city ghettos) frequently reported and discussed in a variety of news/information TV programs. While the results found in the present study may not represent all the possible relationships between media uses and social reality construction, they should be viewed as a strong evidence for the importance of media content specificity hitherto only latent in previous cultivation research.

Finally, the hypothesis proposing an overall impact of AFKN-TV viewing on the viewers' comparatively self-degraded perceptions of their own culture (HYPOTHESIS-17) was clearly unsupported by the data. Apparently AFKN-TV itself did not have a strong influence in engendering negative self-images partially due to numerous incidental learning about U.S. values or norms of behavior among the foreign viewers. The results were tentatively interpreted as an antithesis for the various ideological claims forwarded by many critical researchers.

However, the hypothesis proposing an importance of specific media content (HYPOTHESIS-18) was largely supported across all three areas examined in relation to the AFKN-TV's potential self-image erosion impact. For instance, AFKN-TV comedy shows and movie features were

found to be potentially strong promoters of inferior self-images among the shadow viewers, either in reaction to overall indigenous culture or to popular culture. Together with the similar findings in the perceptions of orderly and affluent U.S. society and friendlier Americans, U.S. comedies on AFKN-TV appeared to be the most potent contributor to the generally more cheerful and optimistic views on the U.S. among the foreign viewers.

Aside from AFKN-TV programming, it was more than interesting to note that, across all 3 comparative self-image items, the viewers' willingness to go to the U.S. either for a visit or to study was a strong predictor. While the results were worth noting, it seemed appropriate to interpret the data as suggesting that those with relatively more self-degraded images of their own culture tended to hold a higher level of aspirations for U.S. society and culture.

At the same time, the interpretation was also in line with the finding that a heavy consumption of U.S. print media (e.g., TIME, NEWSWEEK) tended to promote the inferior perceptions of overall indigenous culture. Again, an alternative interpretation seemed equally plausible: those who keenly perceived the inferior quality of their own culture would digest more foreign media in order to compensate what they perceived to be missing in their culture.

Related to these interpretations, it was far more interesting to note that there appeared to be a strong indication of an inverse relationship between the inferior perceptions and the uses of domestic media. For instance, those who read more Korean newspapers reported far less degraded self-perceptions as to the quality of indigenous culture; and those who watched more Korean TV programs tended to perceive better quality of domestic TV programming. While these results seemed to be in line with the alternative rationales provided above, they may also have something to do with the nature of the content in the domestic media.

As has been frequently pointed out by many critical mass communication scholars, there is a strong tendency in domestic media in many developing nations that underlies mainstream policy guidelines or agenda: promoting traditional values against a constantly increasing influx of foreign (particularly, Western) norms. Whether direct or subtle, the messages along the line are frequently built into the domestic TV programs or opinion pages of print media. With frequent exposure to the messages, the indigenous audience would create or reinforce their pride and values consistent with the inherent mainstream ideas about their own culture. When applied to the present study, this would inhibit the AFKN-TV's potential for the proposed self-erosion impact of foreign media.

Taken together, the results seemed to suggest that those who were satisfied with their own culture tended to reinforce their optimistic views by consuming more domestic media than foreign ones. Quite inversely, the results may also suggest that the foreign media such as AFKN-TV would have a strong perceptual impact, only or particularly among the individuals who are relatively more discontented with their own culture.

As to the 4 contingency hypotheses in relation to the comparative perceptions, the data provided a mixed support. The hypothesis relating the viewers' passive motivations to a heightened media impact (HYPOTHESIS-19) was partially supported only in the area of broadcasting culture. The hypothesis proposing an inhibiting potential of the viewers' active pre-planning (HYPOTHESIS-20) was also partially supported only in the area of popular culture. However, the hypotheses predicting an amplifying potential of viewing attentiveness and perceived realism of media (HYPOTHESES 20 & 22) were less supported by the data.

A columnwise examination of the Table 28 reveals a relative importance of each predictor across all the perceptual areas investigated. By and large, the hypotheses relating an overall amount of AFKN-TV viewing to several areas of U.S. society perceptions and comparative self-perceptions among the selected shadow viewers were rejected by the data. In the mean time, the hypothesis proposing a

better predictive ability of an individual AFKN-TV program content, than that of total viewing, received a good deal of support across most of the perceptual areas examined. The other hypotheses predicting several contingent media impact also received a fair amount of support by the data, but to a lesser extent.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

With major findings summarized and interpreted as such, a few limitations of the study must be acknowledged. First of all, the study has its validity only within a limited range of the Korean shadow audiences of AFKN-TV. Although the findings may have a relatively decent fit to other equally well-educated upscale segments of Korean adult population, their external validity beyond the socio-economic strata seems questionable.

In this regard, more research is needed that will compare different populations controlling numerous situational factors associated with AFKN-TV viewing and its potential perceptual impact. For instance, it seems not entirely impossible that the degree of incidental learning from AFKN-TV viewing may be more pronounced (or equally present) among the audience members who can hardly understand English language at all. With a virtual absence of linguistic comprehension of the TV program narratives, a strong reliance on the program visuals may promote more

enduring impact on the viewers' images of, say, American affluence or misery. Even with a relatively far lower amount of exposure than that of the better-off, the perceptual impact potentially obtainable among these members may suggest a need for appropriate cultural policy guidelines as to the existence of AFKN-TV in Korea.

Second, the range of dependent variables employed in the study was by and large limited to several most salient social aspects of the U.S., whether positive or negative images. In addition, the areas chosen were confined to the perceptual domain of the viewers' psychological orientations, without considering other attitudinal or behavioral tendencies potentially promoted by the medium. While the "second-order" cultivation of such additional areas was alluded as might be following the perceptual impact proposed, a separate inquiry into those areas could have provided more illuminating results vis-a-vis the existence of AFKN-TV in Korea. A research specifically investigating those areas is urgently called for in this regard, particularly among the young populations in Korea.

Third, as noted earlier, the predictors and the other control variables in the study had some limitations in regard to their reliability as well as to their scope of variability. For instance, almost all the respondents in the survey reported a willingness to go to the U.S. for a visit or to study. Given the importance of the variable

proven in several analyses involving either the uses or the effects of AFKN-TV among the shadow viewers, a multiple indicator specifically designed to measure the degree of aspirations for U.S. society and culture seems necessary.

More importantly, the restriction of range in the major independent variable in the study (i.e., AFKN-TV viewing amount) suggested a strong potential for significantly attenuated impact sizes examined. Closely related to the external validity limitation pointed out earlier, a comparative study utilizing an extended range of variability of the viewing measure could have generated relatively stronger impact of AFKN-TV viewing among the shadow viewers.

Fourth, considering a few potentially spurious relationships among other media uses, AFKN-TV viewing indicators and the dependent measures in the study, uncovering additional third or intervening variables seems equally necessary to isolate the media impact examined. For instance, an individual's overall tendency to seek for audio-visual sensations may cause heavier consumptions of such media as AFKN-TV and domestic TV programs, U.S. movie imports and AFKN-Radio. In a similar manner, an individual's higher aspiration for Western values and norms of behavior may lead to heavier enjoyment of both broadcast and print media of Western origin. Taken together, factors such as these may wield a combined effect both on the media

behaviors and on the viewers' psychological orientations.

Of course, incorporating all the imaginable variables in regression equations should not be the best operational strategy to be chosen in the inquiries such as the present one. Provided with appropriate conceptual rationales, however, the factors such as those identified above seem to have a powerful potential in explaining the impact of foreign media, whether reduced or amplified by the additional factors. In fact, several intercultural investigations of media cultivation included such variables (e.g., personality characteristics such as "perceived lack of control" or "fate" in Wober & Gunter, 1982), and found some evidence for the usefulness of such inclusions.

Finally, closely related to the limitations on the range of dependent variables employed in the study, the findings in connection with the overall amount of AFKN-TV viewing might have been more clearly proven if a content analysis of the programs in the medium were accompanied. Although the content specificity hypothesis was clearly supported in the study (thus diminishing the need for such content analyses), an attempt to identify a few more salient characteristics inherent in AFKN-TV programming might have provided more concrete evidence both for the content specificity hypothesis and for the original cultivation hypothesis.

Similarly, a content analysis of Korean TV programs

may provide meaningful ideas for isolating the AFKN-TV impact investigated in the study. For instance, it was found that the heavier AFKN-TV viewers who also watched a lot more Korean TV programs tended to hold less self-degraded images of their own culture. If a researcher could identify the Korean TV program content most responsible for the inhibiting potency, then he or she may draw a clearer picture regarding the contingent foreign media impact.

In that regard, yet another line of research may be interesting to pursue. While the present study was primarily interested in the impact of AFKN-TV among the selected shadow viewers, it should be equally interesting to investigate the impact of Korean TV among the indigenous audience. That is, a replication of the original cultivation research in Korea would provide a cross-cultural evidence illuminating on the conceptual assumptions and methodologies of cultivation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Based on the findings, interpretations and related discussions provided above, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn in the study. First of all, while investigating the perceptual impact of foreign television programming predicted in the study, the viewers' motivational structure and media content specificity proved to be indispensable in

isolating the proportion of the impact specifically attributable to the media.

One of the principal purpose of the study was to test an extended cultivation framework in a cross-cultural setting, incorporating various contingent factors often neglected in previous research. While some methodological limitations were acknowledged, the findings in the study appeared to strongly attest to the appropriateness of such an approach.

Second, the perceptual impact of foreign television program viewing among the selected shadow viewers was not as strong as warned by many critical scholars in international mass communication research (e.g., cultural and media imperialism, electronic colonialism, homogenization of American commercial culture or psychological imperialism). As acknowledged in the previous Chapter, however, the size of the impact examined in the present inquiry might have been significantly attenuated due to the restricted range of variability detected in the independent viewing measures. Nevertheless, a hypodermic-needle or a magic-bullet effect of foreign media was not clearly established in the study.

Third, despite its less-than-expected degree of impact, particularly in its aggregate term, foreign television program viewing can have a moderate impact on certain areas of perceptions, depending on the indigenous

viewers' various situational and psychological orientations. In other words, AFKN-TV's impact on the Korean shadow viewers' perceptions of U.S. society/people and their comparative perceptions of self-image were by and large contingent upon numerous situational factors other than AFKN-TV viewing itself.

Closely related to the limited-effect conclusions drawn from the findings, the study also sought to ascertain its unique contribution in its attempt to bridge the gap between macro-level critical analyses and micro-level psychological approaches in international mass communication research. Albeit not without multiple epistemological connotations inherent in the terms, the distinction between the two orientations in communication research may have been not so much clearly delineated as apparent at best.

Still, as noted by Smythe and Dinh (1983), an analysis of empirical and critical research can be used as a backdrop for suggesting the potential contributions of critical theory to a study of communications phenomena. At the same time, such an analysis would also provide an opportunity for empirical scholars to corroborate on various contentions espoused by critical researchers. In short, a careful review of theory and research in both approaches would contribute to eliminating "methodological exclusivism" and "theoretical monomania" often suggested to

exist between the two camps (Hamelink, 1983b).

Traditionally, the issue of media effects has been most often formulated in terms of behaviorist interpretations of human behavior and society--at least within the community of U.S. communication scholars. In contrast to the behaviorist orientations of mainstream communication research, however, critical researchers seek to examine a variety of dialectic interrelationships among media, communications and social power. Accordingly, they tend to be more interested in such areas as structuralistic, cultural/historical and political economy approaches to media analysis than in conventional social-psychological variable-analytic investigations of media effects.

For instance, drawing upon ideas found in linguistics, anthropology and semiotics, the main goal of the structuralist approach has been the study of the system and processes of "signification" and "representation" in the media (e.g., Curran, Gurevitch & Woolacott, 1982). Contextual analyses of the narratives in films, television programs or commercials often constitute a few potential empirical structuralist research foci. In addition, the processes of production, dissemination and overall control of media systems have been major concerns among political economy-oriented critical media researchers (e.g., Murdock & Golding, 1977). While historical and cultural studies of

media have also found their niches in the realm of critical research, the approaches taken together represent an orientation highly emphasizing an individual's dialectic interactions with society, culture and overall environment.

As pointed out by several gap-bridging writers (e.g., McQuail & Windahl, 1981; Fejes, 1984), however, these emphases in critical research are not regarded as totally incompatible with traditional behavioral effects research. Although not all types of mainstream research interests are equally useful to critical research, at least a few sociological-based mainstream models of media impact have been noted as germane to the concerns of critical research (e.g., the agenda-setting, the spiral of silence, the knowledge gap and the media dependency models, etc.). Fejes noted:

They [these models] differ from other behavioral models [psychological-based ones] as they center on such issues as the informal learning of social roles; the tendency of media to convey implicit ideology; the formation of the climate of opinion; the differential of knowledge in society; and long term changes in culture, institutions and social structure. (p.223)

No doubt that one can find many more meaningful converging research interests from both critical and empirical camps of communication inquiry. According to the contention cited above, the logic of cultivation also appears to be a good candidate for such convergence. In that regard, Bennett's (1982) notion of "dual reality" seems quite akin to the logic of cultivation, which has

been noted as an example of the reality defining role of the media often conceived by critical researchers.

As McQuail and Windahl (1981) have noted, these models or hypotheses view media effects as long-term and indirect. At the same time, they are in one way or another associated with sociological dimensions of media effects such as ideology and perceptions as opposed to psychological ones. When applied to the areas of international mass communication research, the relevance of the converging interests seems all the more significant.

As noted earlier, there appears to be an assumption in critical research that media effects are powerful. No doubt that one of the principal presuppositions underlying the logic of cultural or media imperialism is the notion of powerful media. While the orientation is quite analogous to the propaganda research before and during World War II period, it tends to neglect an audience-centered approach in favor of an analysis of message content or production. Here seems to lie a serious problem when a researcher attempts to apply critical models of media effects to a cross-cultural setting. Related to the point, Fejes (1984) noted:

Yet there is a danger that for critical communication research...the audience will be regarded as passive. As more and more research is focused towards message content and production, the audience will become more and more invisible in the theory and research of critical scholars.

For critical communication research, there is a distinct danger of a disappearing audience.
(p. 222, emphasis added)

As thoroughly documented in Chapter III, research specifically investigating the impact of imported television programming on the indigenous viewers' psychological orientations has so far provided largely mixed findings (cf. pp. 45-52). Drawing upon the idea of a disappearing audience in critical research, however, it seems apparent that the research primarily concerned with message content tended to portray a powerful effects model (e.g., Beltran, 1978, Boyd, 1984).

The present study did not appear to be far outside the realm of the minimal-to-moderate effects framework previously established in the area (e.g., Barnett & McPhaile, 1980; Granzberg, 1982; Pingree & Hawkins, 1982; Weimann, 1984; Tan et al., 1987; Kang & Morgan, 1988). However, one thing that has become more clear by the present investigation was that, with a closer attention paid to various audience factors, the foreign media effects could be significantly less alarming than often speculated by many critical writers.

While starting out with a few major macro-level critical perspectives in international mass communication research, the present study did not neglect other audience-centered micro-level approaches available in mainstream effects research. By combining the two areas, the study

sought to bridge the gap between the two camps. At the same time, by drawing upon ideas found in cognitive literature in media effects research, the study attempted to provide a meaningful ground for the direction much needed but less heeded so far.

Finally, in addition to the suggestions for further studies identified earlier in relation to the limitations of the present study, a few more suggestions can be made particularly with regard to the above discussion of critical and empirical approaches in international mass communication research. As pointed out by Hur (1982), there has been an urgent call for a research linking the findings forwarded by systems studies and processes/effects studies of international mass communication. A few areas of such combined research interests for the presence of AFKN in Korea can be identified in that regard.

For instance, policy research on the justifiability of AFKN's history-worn legal status as an extraterritorial entity in Korea may be partially guided by some empirical findings from inquiries such as the present one. Research investigating the delicate balance between AFKN's free-flow philosophy and Korean authority's developmental philosophy may be substantiated by opinion research among the audiences of either AFKN-TV journalistic programs or of domestic TV news.

In addition, a researcher may be interested in

investigating the degree of program similarities between Korean and U.S. TV programs, particularly in connection with program ideas and formats. Related to this, other research attempting to identify a potential influence of AFKN's long-time existence in Korea upon Korean broadcasting professionals' attitudes toward both domestic and U.S. TV programs may reveal interesting data vis-a-vis the program content study. Taken together, these combined research ideas proposed as well as the present inquiry would lead the way to opening up more productive scientific exchanges between critical and empirical schools of communication inquiry.

TABLES

TABLE-1
WEEKLY BROADCASTING TIME & PROPORTION OF IMPORTED TV PROGRAMS
IN FOUR MAJOR TV NETWORKS IN KOREA (1983)

	total broadcasting minutes	imported programs minutes	% of imported programs	number of imported programs
KBS-1	5,830	529	9.1%	11 & 1/4*
KBS-2	5,130	495	9.6%	10
KBS-3	3,300	440	13.3%	5
MBC	5,160	545	10.6%	11
total	19,420	2,009	10.3%	37 & 1/4*

(Note) 1. KBS-1 & KBS-2 (Korean Broadcasting System) are government owned and operated public broadcasting channels; 2. KBS-3 is a government owned and operated educational broadcasting channel; and 3. MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) is a semi-commercial channel of which about half the entire stock is owned by KBS.

* A once-a-month feature documentary program was counted as 1/4.

TABLE-2
NUMBER OF IMPORTS PER CHANNEL BY MINUTES AND PERCENTAGES
(1983)

	general dramas	feature movies	kids programs	educational/ cultural	total
KBS-1	3&1/4 (219)	1 (90)	5 (150)	2 (70)	11&1/4 (529)
KBS-2	2 (100)	1 (90)	5 (195)	2 (110)	10 (495)
KBS-3	0	0	0	5 (440)	5 (440)
MBC	3 (160)	1 (110)	5 (215)	2 (60)	11 (545)
total	8&1/4 (479)	3 (290)	15 (560)	11 (680)	37&1/4 (2,009)
	[23.8%]	[14.5%]	[27.9%]	[33.8%]	[100%]

(Note) Numbers in (parentheses) denote minutes, and numbers in [brackets] represent percentages across all channels.

TABLE-3
AFKN-TV EXPOSURE PATTERNS AMONG
THE SELECTED KOREAN SHADOW VIEWERS BY WEEKDAYS & WEEKENDS

	weekdays		weekends	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
rarely	55%	(123)	39%	(86)
less than an hour	36%	(79)	34%	(76)
more than an hour, but less than 3 hours	8%	(18)	24%	(54)
more than 3 hours	1%	(2)	3%	(6)

(Note) Weekday AFKN-TV Viewing was measured by asking "On the average weekdays, how many hours do you usually watch AFKN-TV, including morning, afternoon and evening?"; and Weekends AFKN-TV Viewing was measured by asking the same question except for changing the weekdays to weekends.

TABLE-4
RANK-ORDERED POPULARITY OF SPECIFIC AFKN-TV PROGRAMS
AMONG THE SELECTED KOREAN SHADOW VIEWERS

	mean score	rank
total viewing	1.425	
information	1.426	
entertainment	1.425	
news/info	1.685	[2]
comedy	1.338	[5]
crime/adventure	1.311	[6]
music/variety	1.617	[3]
soap/drama	1.086	[9]
game/quiz	1.167	[7]
sports	1.698	[1]
movies	1.473	[4]
talk show	1.167	[7]

(Note) Mean scores were obtained from the questionnaire items asking the FREQUENCIES of specific AFKN-TV programs viewing. (e.g., "How often do you watch news/ information programs on AFKN-TV such as CNN-Headline News, AFKN-Nightly News, ABC-News Nightline, and so forth?" all 4 levels: very frequently=4, frequently=3, occasionally=2, and rarely=1)

TABLE-5
RANK-ORDERED MOTIVATIONS FOR AFKN-TV EXPOSURE
AMONG THE SELECTED KOREAN SHADOW VIEWERS

	mean score	rank
information-seeking	3.093	[2]
to enjoy entertainment variety	3.005	[3]
to learn about U.S. society & culture	2.832	[5]
to learn colloquial English language	3.307	[1]
like other friends or peers	2.218	[10]
longer on-air schedule than Korean TV	2.956	[4]
attractive newspaper program guides	2.562	[6]
boring Korean TV	2.235	[9]
friends or peers talk about AFKN-TV programs	2.154	[11]
from curiosity	2.542	[7]
to see famous faces	2.405	[8]

(Note) Mean scores were obtained from the questionnaire items asking the degree of agreement to 11 specific motivations generally known for AFKN-TV viewing among the Korean shadow viewers. (all 5 levels: strongly agree=5 to strongly disagree=1)

TABLE-6
FACTOR LOADINGS OF 11 MAJOR MOTIVATIONS
FOR AFKN-TV VIEWING

	factor 1 (positive motives)	factor 2 (passive motives)
information-seeking	<u>.82</u>	.04
to enjoy entertainment variety	<u>.63</u>	.34
to learn about U.S. society and culture	<u>.76</u>	.33
to learn colloquial English language	<u>.80</u>	.20
like other friends or peers	.18	<u>.72</u>
longer on-air schedule than Korean TV	.35	.53
attractive newspaper program guides	.33	<u>.66</u>
boring Korean TV	.34	.59
friends or peers talk about AFKN-TV programs	.14	<u>.74</u>
from curiosity	.06	<u>.74</u>
to see famous faces	.23	<u>.71</u>

TABLE-7
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TWO AGGREGATE
MOTIVATION MEASURES AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS
(N=222)

	positive motivations	passive motivations
age	.13*	-.05
gender	.04	.08
U.S. travel experience	.19**	-.01
relatives in U.S.	.25**	.14*
willingness to go to U.S. for a visit or to study	.15*	.12*
living standard	.15*	-.05
perceived English language proficiency	.34**	.06
perceived importance of English language	.17**	.17**
perceived language learning utility of AFKN-TV	.36**	.17**
perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programming	.41**	.18**
know what to watch on AFKN-TV	.24**	.13*
attentiveness while watching AFKN-TV	.33**	.11
AFKN-Radio	.12*	.02
U.S. movies	.12*	-.03
U.S. news magazines	.15*	.10
Korean TV viewing	.15*	.07
Korean newspaper reading	.12*	.10

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$

TABLE-8
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF TWO AGGREGATE MOTIVATIONS
WITH BLOCKWISE CONTROLS

	positive motivations		passive motivations	
	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta
<u>block 1 (demographics):</u>				
gender (male=0)	.04	.16*	.08	.08
age	.13*	.11	-.05	-.07
living standard	.15*	-.01	-.05	-.07
U.S. travel experience	.19**	.07	-.01	-.01
U.S. relatives	.25**	.13*	.14*	.12
plan U.S. visit for study or travel	.15*	.05	.12*	.05
<u>block 2 (other media):</u>				
U.S. movies	.12*	.09	-.03	-.06
U.S. news magazines	.15*	.12	.10	.09
AFKN-Radio	.12*	.02	.02	.00
Korean TV	.15*	.06	.07	.08
Korean newspapers	.12*	.10	.10	.09
<u>block 3 (key predictors):</u>				
perceived English language proficiency	.34**	.21**	.06	.02
perceived language utility of AFKN-TV	.36**	.17**	.17**	.05
perceived importance of English language	.17**	-.05	.17**	.10
perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programs	.41**	.24**	.18**	.11
multiple R		.59**		.33
*: p < .05; **: p < .01				

TABLE-9
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AFKN-TV VIEWING MEASURES
AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

	total viewing	information viewing	entertainment viewing
age	.08	.04	.08
gender	.06	-.02	.10
U.S. travel experience	.15*	.18**	.12*
relatives in U.S.	.17**	.12*	.16**
willingness to go to U.S. for a visit or to study	.13*	.10	.13*
living standard	.25**	.30**	.19**
perceived English language proficiency	.37**	.45**	.28**
perceived importance of English language	-.01	-.02	-.01
perceived language utility of AFKN-TV	.11*	.11*	.09
perceived credibility of AFKN-TV programming	.17**	.10	.17**
know what to watch	.30**	.28**	.27**
AFKN-Radio	.32**	.25**	.30**
U.S. movies	.17**	.06	.19**
U.S. newsmagazine	-.06	-.10	-.03
U.S. programs on Korean TV	.18**	.03	.22**
Korean TV viewing	.17**	-.02	.22**
Korean newspapers	.06	.03	.06
positive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing	.33**	.25**	.31**
passive motivations for AFKN-TV viewing	-.01	-.10	.03

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$

TABLE-10
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF 3 AGGREGATE AFKN-TV VIEWING
MEASURES WITH BLOCKWISE CONTROLS

	total		information		entertainment	
	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta
<u>block 1 (demographics):</u>						
gender (male=0)	.06	.14	-.02	-.00	.10	.18*
age	.08	.14	.04	.00	.08	.18*
living standard	.25**	.06	.30**	.11	.19**	.03
U.S. travel	.15*	-.08	.18**	-.02	.12	-.09
U.S. relatives	.17**	.07	.12*	.05	.16**	.06
plan U.S. visit	.13*	.09	.10	.10	.13*	.07
<u>block 2 (other media):</u>						
U.S. movies	.17**	.08	.06	.06	.19**	.07
U.S. magazines	-.06	-.08	-.10	-.08	-.03	-.07
AFKN-Radio	.32**	.24**	.25**	.15*	.30**	.24**
Korean TV	.17**	.02	-.02	-.09	.22**	.07
Korean newspapers	.06	.09	.03	.02	.06	.10
<u>block 3 (perceived factors):</u>						
perceived language proficiency	.37**	.26**	.45**	.35**	.28**	.18*
perceived language utility of AFKN-TV	.11*	-.05	.11*	.01	.09	-.07
perceived language importance	-.01	-.12	-.02	-.09	-.01	-.11
perceived realism of AFKN-TV	.17**	.02	.10	-.07	.17**	.05
<u>block 4 (motivations):</u>						
positive motivations	.33**	.26**	.25**	.24**	.31**	.22**
passive motivations	-.01	-.14*	-.10	-.21**	.03	-.09
multiple R		.59**		.58**		.55**

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$

TABLE-11
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AFKN-TV VIEWING
MOTIVATIONS AND SPECIFIC PROGRAM CONTENT
(N=222)

	information seeking	entertainment variety	learn about U.S.	learn English
total viewing	.35**	.26**	.20**	.23**
information	.38**	.06	.15*	.20**
entertainment	.28**	.31**	.19**	.20**
news/info	.40**	.02	.09	.15*
comedy	.12*	.10*	.23**	.21**
crime/adventure	.20**	.24**	.11	.09
music/variety	.13*	.27**	.05	.14*
soap/drama	.09	.03	.06	.12*
game/quiz	.05	.08	.09	.12*
sports	.24**	.17**	.05	.01
movies	.24**	.28**	.17**	.14*
talk show	.20**	.09	.20**	.22**

	like others	longer on-air time	newspaper guide	boring Korean TV
total viewing	-.04	.20**	.12*	.07
information	-.09	.05	-.01	.05
entertainment	-.01	.23**	.16**	.07
news/info	-.08	.04	-.02	.02
comedy	-.01	.07	.01	.10
crime/adventure	.07	.10	.10	.09
music/variety	-.10	.16**	.12*	.09
soap/drama	.05	-.09	.06	-.01
game/quiz	.09	.01	.01	-.06
sports	-.02	.23**	.16**	.02
movies	-.04	.26**	.11	.03
talk show	-.05	.04	.02	.09

(continued on next page)

TABLE-11 (Cont.)

	peer talk	curious	famous faces	POSITIVE MOTIVES	PASSIVE MOTIVES
total viewing	-.06	-.08	-.04	.33**	-.01
information	-.06	-.22**	-.01	.25**	-.10
entertainment	-.06	-.01	.05	.31**	.03
news/info	-.04	-.19**	.02	.22**	-.08
comedy	.08	-.03	.07	.21**	.03
crime/adventure	-.02	-.03	-.01	.20**	.03
music/variety	-.08	.01	.06	.18**	.00
soap/drama	.06	-.05	.07	.10	.05
game/quiz	-.04	.01	-.05	.11	.01
sports	-.05	.01	-.03	.15*	.02
movies	-.09	.02	.09	.26**	.02
talk show	-.08	-.18**	-.05	.22**	-.09

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$

(Note) 1. total viewing=mean scores from the combined measure of 9 specific programs viewing; 2. information=mean scores from the combined measure of 2 specific programs viewing (news/information and talk shows) ; 3. entertainment=mean scores from the combined measure of 7 specific programs viewing (comedy, crime/adventure, music/variety, soap/drama, game/quiz, sports, and movies); 4. POSITIVE MOTIVES=mean scores from the combined measure of 4 individual motivation items ("information seeking," "to enjoy entertainment variety," "to learn about American society and culture," and "to learn English language"); 5. PASSIVE MOTIVES=mean scores from the combined measure of 5 individual motivation items ("like other friends or peers," "attractive newspaper program guides," "peers or friends talk about AFKN-TV programs," "from curiosity," and "to see famous faces").

TABLE-12
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF TWO MEAN-WORLD ITEMS
BY AFKN-TV MEASURES WITH CONTROLS

	disorderly U.S. society		unfriendly Americans	
	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta
<u>block 1 (demographics):</u>				
gender (male=0)	.02	-.08	-.14*	-.17*
age	-.13*	-.19*	.04	-.09
living standard	.04	.03	-.08	-.05
U.S. travel	-.01	.00	.05	.03
U.S. relatives	-.03	.00	.14*	.14*
near future visit to U.S.	-.26**	-.28**	-.20**	-.22**
knowledge of crime victims in U.S.	.07	.08	.08	.10
<u>block 2 (other media):</u>				
U.S. movies	-.06	-.06	-.08	-.06
AFKN-Radio	-.10	-.11	-.07	-.02
U.S. magazines	-.05	-.03	.06	.05
Korean newspapers	.09	.07	.12*	.06
Korean TV	-.05	.00	-.10	-.12
<u>block 3 (AFKN-TV measures):</u>				
AFKN-TV information	.06	.09	-.04	-.02
AFKN-TV entertainment	-.01	.00	-.08	-.05
multiple R		.37**		.37**
*: p < .05; **: p < .01				

TABLE-13
CD ANALYSES OF TWO MEAN WORLD ITEMS WITH
AFKN-TV PROGRAM TYPES AS CONTROLS

	U.S. society disorderly			unfriendly Americans		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
total viewing	38%	45%	+7	35%	34%	-1
information	40%	43%	+3	34%	35%	+1
entertainment	40%	43%	+3	35%	34%	-1
<u>controlling for:</u>						
news/info	41%	42%	+1	34%	36%	+2
comedy	45%	31%	-14*	37%	28%	+9
crime/adventure	44%	35%	-9	33%	38%	+5
music/variety	44%	39%	-5	37%	32%	-5
soap/drama	42%	31%	-11	36%	19%	-17
game/quiz	40%	52%	+12	35%	33%	-2
sports	41%	42%	+1	33%	36%	+3
movies	39%	46%	+7	39%	28%	-11*
talk show	40%	50%	+10	34%	38%	+4

***: p < .05 (tau)**

TABLE-14
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AFKN-TV VIEWING
AND PERCEPTION MEASURES

	U.S. society disorderly	unfriendly American	crime prevalence	personal fear
total viewing	.01	-.07	-.05	.16**
information	.06	-.04	-.02	.15*
entertainment	-.01	-.08	-.06	.14*
news/info	.03	-.04	-.01	.15*
comedy	-.11*	-.16**	-.10	.08
crime/adventure	-.04	.02	.02	.10
music/variety	-.05	-.01	-.01	.10
soap/drama	-.04	-.16**	-.06	.00
game/quiz	.11*	-.09	-.10	.05
sports	-.01	-.00	-.02	.12*
movies	.02	-.09	-.12*	.05
talk show	.10	-.04	-.04	.08

	% law official	% violent crimes	sexual permissiveness	drug abuse
total viewing	.09	.07	.08	.14*
information	.03	.08	.07	.18**
entertainment	.10	.05	.07	.10
news/info	.07	.11*	.04	.17**
comedy	.05	-.04	-.03	.08
crime/adventure	.07	.11*	.12*	.13*
music/variety	.02	.02	.01	-.02
soap/drama	.05	-.13*	.02	.06
game/quiz	.08	-.04	.09	.21**
sports	.09	.10	.03	.06
movies	.13*	.19**	.04	.17**
talk show	-.06	-.01	.09	.12*

(continued on next page)

TABLE-14 (Cont.)

	affluence	inferior pop culture	inferior culture	inferior broadcasting
total viewing	.07	.10	-.05	.02
information	-.05	.09	-.04	.08
entertainment	.12*	.09	-.05	-.02
news/info	-.04	.09	-.05	.04
comedy	.21**	.12*	.01	-.04
crime/adventure	.02	.10	-.05	.05
music/variety	.01	.04	-.05	.05
soap/drama	.10	.03	.01	-.05
game/quiz	.21**	.03	.03	-.10
sports	.04	.03	-.05	-.02
movies	.13*	.10	.16**	-.05
talk show	-.04	.07	.01	.13*

*: p < .05; **: p < .01

[Note] 1) U.S. society disorderly: agreement to "U.S. society is generally orderly and peaceful" (reverse coded); 2) unfriendly Americans: "Americans are generally kind and friendly" (reverse coded); 3) crime prevalence: "Violent crimes such as murder, rape, aggravated assault and armed robbery are constantly increasing in the U.S."; 4) personal fear: 2 items, one asking "imagined chance of crime victimization in U.S. urban areas such as New York City or Detroit," and the other "in small rural towns in the U.S."; 5) % law officials: the percentage of law enforcement officials in the U.S. (1% or 5%); 6) % violent crimes: the percentage of violent crimes in the U.S. such as murder, rape, aggravated assault and armed robbery (15% or 25%); 7) sexual permissiveness: 3 items asking the percentages of U.S. population engaging in "premarital sex," "sexual experience before college or before the age of 20," and "teen mothers among U.S. teenage population"; 8) drug abuse: 2 items asking the percentages of "drug abusers among U.S. population" and "high school kids with some drug experiences; 9) affluence: 4 items asking the percentages of U.S. households with "more than 5 rooms," "more than 2 passenger vehicles," "heating and air-conditioning" and "a swimming pool" 10) inferior pop culture: agreement to "Vis-a-vis American pop culture (e.g., pop music or movies), we Koreans seem to have relatively less to be proud of."; 11) inferior culture: "We Koreans seem to have less of a distinctive culture comparing with Western culture."; 12) inferior broadcasting: "Korean TV programs have still much to be desired comparing with American ones."

TABLE-15
TWO-WAY CD ANALYSES OF TWO MEAN WORLD ITEMS

----- U.S. society disorderly unfriendly Americans -----						
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD

overall	38%	45%	+7	35%	34%	-1

controlling for:						
gender						
male	40%	43%	+3	39%	37%	-2
female	32%	55%	+13	23%	20%	-3
age						
below 30	37%	48%	+11	32%	28%	-4
30 or above	40%	40%	0	40%	42%	+2
living standard						
below middle	40%	50%	+10	42%	33%	-9
middle+	37%	44%	+7	32%	34%	+2
U.S. travel						
no	38%	43%	+5	36%	29%	-7
yes	29%	56%	+27	29%	61%	+32
U.S. relatives						
none	34%	50%	+16	24%	10%	-14
some	40%	44%	+4	42%	39%	-3
future U.S. visit						
no	71%	67%	-4	71%	50%	-21
yes	33%	44%	+11	30%	33%	+3
AFKN-TV motivations						
passive	39%	44%	+5	29%	24%	-5
positive	34%	46%	+12	28%	31%	+3
AFKN-TV credibility						
low	44%	56%	+12	39%	44%	+5
high	28%	36%	+8	34%	26%	-4
planned AFKN viewing						
low	37%	53%	+16*	39%	24%	-15
yes	39%	39%	0	28%	41%	+13
AFKN-TV attention						
low	44%	51%	+7	39%	31%	-8
high	31%	42%	+9	31%	35%	+4
U.S. movies						
light	41%	45%	+4	42%	32%	-10
heavy	31%	45%	+14	27%	36%	+9
Korean TV						
light	46%	38%	-8	42%	32%	-10
heavy	25%	50%	+25**	25%	36%	+11
U.S. news magazines						
no	32%	57%	+25*	32%	30%	-2
yes	41%	37%	-4	37%	37%	0
Korean newspapers						
light	29%	46%	+17	23%	27%	+4
heavy	42%	45%	+3	40%	36%	-4

*: p < .05; **: p < .01 (tau)

TABLE-16
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF TWO CRIME-RELATED MEASURES
BY AFKN-TV MEASURES WITH CONTROLS

	perceptions of crime prevalence		personal fear	
	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta
<u>block 1 (demographics):</u>				
gender (male=0)	-.01	-.09	.10	.04
age	-.04	-.15	-.04	.00
living standard	.10	.11	.20**	.15*
U.S. travel	.17**	.20**	.02	-.02
U.S. relatives	.05	.04	-.06	-.08
near future visit to U.S.	-.03	-.02	-.01	-.02
knowledge of crime victims in U.S.	-.01	-.03	.12*	.08
<u>block 2 (other media):</u>				
U.S. movies	.06	.05	.09	.07
AFKN-Radio	-.00	-.03	.11	.04
U.S. magazines	-.00	.04	-.03	.00
Korean newspapers	.07	.05	-.06	-.04
Korean TV	.00	-.04	-.02	-.09
<u>block 3 (AFKN-TV measures):</u>				
AFKN-TV information	-.02	-.04	.15*	.05
AFKN-TV entertainment	-.06	-.08	.14*	.08
multiple R		.28		.29
*: p < .05; **: p < .01				

TABLE-17
CD ANALYSES OF TWO LEVELS OF CRIME PERCEPTIONS
WITH AFKN-TV PROGRAM TYPES AS CONTROLS

	societal perceptions			personal fear		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
total viewing	71%	66%	-5	33%	49%	+16**
information	68%	67%	-1	33%	48%	+15*
entertainment	70%	67%	-3	36%	45%	+9
<u>controlling for:</u>						
news/info	70%	67%	-3	34%	47%	+13*
comedy	70%	64%	-6	40%	41%	-1
crime/adventure	69%	68%	-1	40%	42%	+2
music/variety	69%	68%	-1	42%	39%	-3
soap/drama	69%	63%	-6	41%	38%	-3
game/quiz	71%	55%	-16*	40%	46%	+6
sports	72%	66%	-6	33%	37%	+4
movies	71%	66%	-5	38%	44%	+6
talk show	70%	63%	-7	38%	53%	+15

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$ (tau)

TABLE-18
TWO-WAY CD ANALYSES OF TWO LEVELS OF CRIME PERCEPTIONS

	societal perceptions			personal fear		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
overall	71%	66%	-5	33%	49%	+16**
<u>controlling for:</u>						
<u>gender</u>						
male	71%	65%	-6	29%	49%	+20**
female	68%	70%	+2	50%	45%	-5
<u>age</u>						
below 30	73%	67%	-6	38%	39%	+1
30 or above	68%	64%	-4	26%	62%	+36**
<u>U.S. travel</u>						
no	70%	63%	-7	34%	43%	+9
yes	86%	83%	-3	14%	78%	+64**
<u>U.S. relatives</u>						
none	68%	50%	-18	42%	60%	+18
some	72%	70%	-2	28%	46%	+18**
<u>know of victims</u>						
no	71%	65%	-6	33%	48%	+15
yes	67%	70%	+3	33%	52%	+19*
<u>future U.S. visit</u>						
no	79%	67%	-12	29%	71%	+42*
yes	70%	66%	-4	33%	47%	+14*
<u>AFKN-TV motivations</u>						
passive	72%	58%	-14	32%	51%	+19*
positive	77%	70%	-7	36%	50%	+14
<u>AFKN-TV credibility</u>						
low	66%	58%	-8	30%	44%	+14
high	79%	72%	-7	34%	54%	+20*
<u>planned AFKN viewing</u>						
low	73%	58%	-15*	34%	53%	+19*
high	67%	72%	+5	31%	45%	+14
<u>AFKN-TV attention</u>						
low	66%	57%	-9	38%	54%	+16*
high	77%	70%	-7	27%	46%	+19*
<u>U.S. movies</u>						
light	72%	60%	-12	31%	53%	+22**
heavy	69%	71%	+2	35%	45%	+10
<u>Korean TV</u>						
light	70%	64%	-6	35%	43%	+8
heavy	73%	68%	-5	30%	53%	+23**
<u>U.S. news magazines</u>						
no	70%	60%	-10	38%	55%	+17
yes	71%	71%	0	30%	45%	+15*
<u>Korean newspapers</u>						
light	58%	46%	-12	39%	46%	+7
heavy	76%	72%	-4	31%	49%	+18**

*: p < .05; **: p < 01 (tau)

TABLE-19
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF TWO CD ITEMS
BY AFKN-TV MEASURES WITH CONTROLS

	5% law officials		25% violent crimes	
	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta
<u>block 1 (demographics):</u>				
gender (male=0)	.00	-.02	.06*	-.03
age	.01	.01	-.07	-.07
living standard	.00	-.02	.11	.08
U.S. travel	-.03	-.02	.00	.02
U.S. relatives	-.11	-.12	-.06	-.08
near future visit to U.S.	.03	.03	-.12	-.13
knowledge of crime victims in U.S.	-.09	-.08	.17*	.17*
<u>block 2 (other media):</u>				
U.S. movies	-.01	-.03	.14*	.12
AFKN-Radio	.08	.07	-.09	-.13
U.S. magazines	.08	.09	-.01	.00
Korean newspapers	.01	.01	.01	.01
Korean TV	.04	.02	.06	.04
<u>block 3 (AFKN-TV measures):</u>				
AFKN-TV information	.03	.00	.08	.05
AFKN-TV entertainment	.11	.13	.05	.02
multiple R		.22		.32
*: p < .05; **: p < .01				

TABLE-20
CD ANALYSES OF TWO CRIME-RELATED ESTIMATES WITH
AFKN-TV PROGRAM TYPES AS CONTROLS

	5% law officials			25% violent crimes		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
total viewing	21%	27%	+6	50%	62%	+12*
information	23%	25%	+2	51%	60%	+9
entertainment	22%	25%	+3	50%	61%	+11*
<u>controlling for:</u>						
news/info	22%	26%	+4	52%	60%	+8
comedy	23%	26%	+3	59%	48%	-11
crime/adventure	22%	28%	+6	53%	65%	+12*
music/variety	24%	24%	0	57%	55%	-2
soap/drama	23%	31%	+8	58%	31%	-27*
game/quiz	23%	30%	+7	57%	49%	-8
sports	23%	25%	+2	53%	59%	+6
movies	21%	28%	+7	49%	67%	+18**
talk show	25%	16%	-9	57%	50%	-7

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$ (tau)

TABLE-21
TWO-WAY CD ANALYSES OF TWO CRIME-RELATED ESTIMATES

	5% law officials			25% violent crimes		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
overall	21%	27%	+6	50%	62%	+12*
<u>controlling for:</u>						
<u>gender</u>						
male	20%	28%	+8	46%	63%	+17*
female	27%	20%	-7	68%	55%	-13
<u>age</u>						
below 30	21%	27%	+6	51%	61%	+10
30 or above	22%	27%	+5	50%	62%	+12
<u>living standard</u>						
below middle	24%	37%	+13	47%	63%	+16
middle+	20%	24%	+4	52%	61%	+9
<u>U.S. travel</u>						
no	22%	28%	+6	53%	59%	+6
yes	14%	22%	+8	14%	72%	+58**
<u>U.S. relatives</u>						
none	25%	45%	+20	59%	65%	+6
some	19%	23%	+4	46%	61%	+15*
<u>future U.S. visit</u>						
no	21%	17%	-4	n/a	n/a	n/a
yes	21%	27%	+6	49%	59%	+10
<u>AFKN-TV motivations</u>						
passive	22%	38%	+16*	46%	60%	+14
positive	23%	24%	+1	55%	64%	+9
<u>AFKN-TV credibility</u>						
low	27%	29%	+2	54%	67%	+13
high	12%	25%	+13*	44%	57%	+13
<u>planned AFKN viewing</u>						
low	14%	36%	+22**	50%	64%	+14
high	36%	20%	-16*	51%	59%	+8
<u>AFKN-TV attention</u>						
low	20%	43%	+23**	49%	71%	+22*
high	23%	19%	-4	52%	57%	+5
<u>U.S. movies</u>						
light	20%	27%	+7	45%	64%	+19*
heavy	23%	26%	+3	58%	60%	+2
<u>Korean TV</u>						
light	17%	26%	+9	45%	55%	+10
heavy	27%	27%	0	60%	66%	+6
<u>U.S. news magazines</u>						
no	19%	20%	+1	54%	61%	+7
yes	22%	31%	+9	49%	62%	+13
<u>Korean newspapers</u>						
light	23%	27%	+4	45%	69%	+24*
heavy	21%	27%	+6	52%	59%	+7

*: p < .05; **: p < .01 (tau)

TABLE-22
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF NONCRIME-RELATED PERCEPTIONS
BY AFKN-TV MEASURES WITH CONTROLS

	sexual permissiveness		drug abuse		affluence	
	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta
block 1 (demographics):						
gender (male=0)	.06	-.08	.10	-.08	.17*	.10
age	-.18*	-.23*	-.20**	-.25**	-.13*	-.04
living standard	.02	.00	.16**	.13	-.10	-.13
U.S. travel	-.03	.02	-.02	.00	-.01	.06
U.S. relatives	-.07	-.06	-.11	-.07	-.22**	-.23**
near future visit to U.S.	.00	-.03	-.08	-.10	.01	.02
block 2 (other media):						
U.S. movies	-.02	-.08	-.02	-.07	.09	.09
AFKN-Radio	.04	.01	.10	.04	.08	.04
U.S. magazines	-.05	-.00	-.09	-.03	-.04	-.00
Korean newspapers	.03	.03	-.05	-.04	-.09	-.06
Korean TV	.06	.09	.02	.09	.02	-.04
block 3 (AFKN-TV measures):						
AFKN-TV information	.07	.05	.18*	.13	-.05	-.10
AFKN-TV entertainment	.07	.07	.11	.06	.12*	.20**
multiple R		.22		.35*		.32*

*: p < .05; **: p < .01

TABLE-23
CD ANALYSES OF ITEMS ON SEX, DRUGS & AFFLUENCE WITH
AFKN-TV PROGRAM TYPES AS CONTROLS

	sex			drugs			affluence		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
total viewing	54%	52%	-2	52%	57%	+5	54%	53%	-1
information	51%	55%	+4	51%	58%	+7	60%	48%	-12*
entertainment	52%	54%	+2	53%	56%	+3	51%	56%	+5
<u>controlling for:</u>									
news/info	51%	56%	+4	52%	57%	+5	60%	47%	-13*
comedy	53%	54%	+1	55%	54%	-1	48%	69%	+21**
crime/ adventure	50%	62%	+12	50%	68%	+18**	54%	53%	-1
music/variety	54%	52%	-2	54%	55%	+1	53%	54%	+1
soap/drama	54%	44%	-10	55%	50%	-5	52%	75%	+23**
game/quiz	52%	61%	+9	53%	64%	+11	50%	73%	+23**
sports	56%	51%	-5	52%	57%	+5	48%	59%	+11
movies	54%	52%	-2	51%	60%	+9	46%	64%	+18**
talk show	54%	50%	-4	53%	63%	+10	53%	59%	+6

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$ (tau)

TABLE-24
TWO-WAY CD ANALYSES OF ITEMS ON SEX, DRUGS & AFFLUENCE

	sex			drugs			affluence		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD

overall	54%	53%	-1	52%	57%	+5	54%	53%	-1

<u>controlling for:</u>									
gender									
male	55%	49%	-6	52%	55%	+3	51%	53%	+2
female	50%	65%	+15	55%	65%	+10	68%	55%	-13
age									
below 30	62%	53%	-9	59%	63%	+4	62%	56%	-6
30+	44%	51%	+7	44%	49%	+5	44%	49%	+5
living standard									
<middle	66%	54%	-12	50%	67%	+17	61%	71%	+10
middle+	48%	52%	+4	53%	54%	+1	51%	48%	-3
U.S. travel									
no	55%	50%	-5	55%	56%	+1	54%	54%	0
yes	43%	67%	+24	14%	61%	+47**	57%	50%	-7
U.S. relatives									
none	51%	45%	-6	59%	65%	+6	66%	75%	+9
some	56%	54%	-2	49%	55%	+6	47%	48%	+1
U.S. visit									
no	50%	50%	0	64%	67%	+3	57%	50%	-7
yes	55%	52%	-3	51%	56%	+5	54%	53%	-1
AFKN motivations									
passive	52%	51%	-1	54%	51%	-1	52%	67%	+15
positive	62%	53%	-9	51%	57%	+6	51%	57%	+6
AFKN credibility									
low	50%	52%	+2	54%	56%	+2	57%	45%	-12
high	60%	53%	-7	49%	57%	+8	49%	59%	+10
AFKN planning									
low	55%	44%	-11	53%	56%	+3	54%	49%	-5
high	51%	58%	+7	51%	58%	+7	54%	56%	+2
AFKN attention									
low	57%	51%	-6	48%	60%	+12	57%	43%	-14
high	50%	53%	+3	58%	55%	-3	50%	58%	+8
U.S. movies									
light	52%	51%	-1	52%	51%	-1	48%	47%	-1
heavy	56%	53%	-3	56%	53%	-3	63%	58%	-5
Korean TV									
light	52%	49%	-3	54%	66%	+12	46%	51%	+5
heavy	57%	55%	-2	50%	50%	0	66%	55%	-11
U.S. magazines									
no	54%	50%	-4	43%	73%	+30**	49%	50%	+1
yes	54%	54%	0	57%	46%	-11	57%	55%	-2
Korean newspapers									
light	58%	50%	-8	55%	69%	+14	58%	54%	-4
heavy	52%	53%	+1	51%	53%	+2	52%	53%	+1

*: p < .05; **: p < .01 (tau)

TABLE-25
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF 3 COMPARATIVE PERCEPTIONS
BY AFKN-TV MEASURES WITH CONTROLS

	inferior pop culture		inferior culture		inferior broadcasting	
	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta	simple r	Beta
block 1 (demographics):						
gender (male=0)	.05	-.00	.08	.01	.07	.11
age	-.05	-.12	-.05	-.10	-.01	.01
living standard	.07	.04	.09	.10	.04	.02
U.S. travel	.07	.11	.06	.12	.06	.04
U.S. relatives	.03	.00	-.03	-.03	.14*	.13
near future visit to U.S.	.14*	.17*	.18*	.23**	.23**	.26**
block 2 (other media):						
U.S. movies	.07	.11	.12*	.13	-.02	.04
AFKN-Radio	.07	-.02	.14*	.09	.05	.00
U.S. magazines	.07	.11	.11*	.14*	.04	.07
Korean newspapers	-.05	-.07	-.15*	-.15*	-.03	-.03
Korean TV	-.06	-.06	.05	.10	-.13*	-.16*
block 3 (AFKN-TV measures):						
AFKN-TV information	.09	.02	-.04	-.08	.08	.07
AFKN-TV entertainment	.09	.09	-.05	-.07	-.01	-.09
multiple R		.29		.42**		.35*

*: p < .05; **: p < .01

TABLE-26
CD ANALYSES OF COMPARATIVE PERCEPTIONS WITH
AFKN-TV PROGRAM TYPES AS CONTROLS

	<u>pop culture</u>			<u>culture</u>			<u>broadcasting</u>		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
total viewing	34%	44%	+10	29%	23%	-6	74%	71%	-3
information	36%	42%	+6	30%	22%	-8	75%	70%	-5
entertainment	32%	45%	+13*	28%	24%	-4	75%	70%	-5
<u>controlling for:</u>									
news/info	38%	40%	+2	31%	21%	-10*	75%	70%	-5
comedy	35%	49%	+14*	28%	21%	-7	74%	69%	-5
crime/adventure	36%	45%	+9	27%	23%	-4	72%	75%	+3
music/variety	36%	42%	+6	28%	25%	-3	70%	76%	+6
soap/drama	38%	44%	+6	26%	31%	+5	73%	69%	-4
game/quiz	38%	46%	+8	27%	24%	-3	75%	58%	-17*
sports	39%	39%	0	31%	22%	-9	74%	72%	-2
movies	36%	43%	+7	22%	32%	+10*	74%	70%	-4
talk show	37%	50%	+13	27%	19%	-8	70%	84%	+14*

*: $p < .05$ (tau)

TABLE-27
TWO-WAY CD ANALYSES OF THREE COMPARATIVE PERCEPTIONS

	pop culture			culture			broadcasting		
	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD	light	heavy	CD
overall	34%	44%	+10	29%	23%	-6	74%	71%	-3
controlling for:									
gender									
male	31%	46%	+15*	26%	25%	-1	70%	72%	+2
female	46%	35%	-11	41%	15%	-26*	91%	65%	-26*
age									
below 30	41%	45%	+4	37%	17%	-20**	75%	72%	-3
30+	24%	42%	+18*	20%	31%	+11	74%	69%	-5
living standard									
<middle	32%	54%	+22*	26%	25%	-1	66%	71%	+5
middle+	35%	41%	+6	31%	22%	-9	79%	71%	-8
U.S. travel									
no	32%	44%	+12*	29%	21%	-8	74%	71%	-3
yes	57%	44%	-13	29%	33%	+4	86%	67%	-19
U.S. relatives									
none	34%	50%	+16	29%	30%	+1	68%	60%	-8
some	33%	43%	+10	29%	21%	-8	78%	73%	-5
U.S. visit									
no	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	43%	50%	+7
yes	37%	43%	+6	33%	21%	-12*	79%	72%	-7
motivations									
passive	35%	47%	+12	32%	22%	-10	79%	73%	-6
positive	43%	44%	+1	28%	24%	-4	85%	70%	-15*
AFKN credibility									
low	24%	40%	+16*	29%	19%	-10	70%	73%	+3
high	49%	48%	-1	30%	26%	-4	81%	69%	-12
AFKN planning									
low	35%	51%	+16*	30%	24%	-6	73%	69%	-4
high	31%	39%	+8	28%	22%	-6	77%	72%	-5
AFKN attention									
low	31%	49%	+18*	31%	20%	-11	71%	66%	-5
high	37%	42%	+5	27%	24%	-3	79%	73%	-6
U.S. movies									
light	29%	51%	+22**	23%	21%	-2	72%	68%	-3
heavy	40%	39%	-1	38%	24%	-14	77%	73%	-4
Korean TV									
light	33%	62%	+29**	22%	30%	+8	77%	85%	+8
high	34%	31%	-3	41%	18%	-23**	71%	60%	-11
U.S. magazines									
no	41%	48%	+7	27%	18%	-9	65%	68%	+3
yes	30%	42%	+12	30%	26%	-4	79%	72%	-7
Korean newspapers									
light	48%	62%	+14	45%	35%	-10	68%	65%	-3
heavy	28%	39%	+11	23%	19%	-4	77%	72%	-5

*: p < .05; **: p < .01 (tau)

TABLE-28
A SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

	contingency hypotheses on					
	total viewing	specific viewing	viewing motives	pre-viewing plan	viewing attention	perceived realism
<hr/>						
MEAN U.S.						
disorderly						
society	R	S	R	S	R	R
unfriendly						
Americans	R	S	R	R	R	R
<hr/>						
CRIME-RELATED						
crime						
increasing	R	S	R	R	R	R
5% law						
officials	R	R	S	S	R	S
25% violent						
crimes	P	S	R	R	R	R
personal						
fear	P	S	S	S	P	R
<hr/>						
NONCRIME-RELATED						
sexually						
permissive	R	R	R	R	R	R
drug						
abuse	P	S	R	R	R	R
affluence	P	S	R	R	R	R
<hr/>						
COMPARATIVE						
PERCEPTIONS						
popular						
culture	R	P	R	S	S	R
overall						
culture	R	P	R	R	R	R
broadcasting						
culture	R	P	S	R	R	R
<hr/>						

(Note) S=supported; R=rejected; P=partially supported.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX-A

Questionnaire in English (abridged and translated from the original Korean questionnaire)

The questions in this first section are concerned with the American Forces Korea Network Television (AFKN-TV). While answering the questions, please keep in mind that these are NOT about Korean domestic television. Please respond to the following questions by circling the number that you think best corresponds to your opinions or ideas.

1. On an average weekday, how many hours do you usually watch AFKN-TV, including morning, afternoon and evening?
 1. rarely
 2. less than 1 hour
 3. one hour or more, but less than 3 hours
 4. three hours or more, but less than 5 hours
 5. five hours or more
2. On typical weekends (Saturdays and Sundays), how many hours do you usually watch AFKN-TV, including morning, afternoon and evening?
 1. rarely
 2. less than 1 hour
 3. one hour or more, but less than 3 hours
 4. three hours or more, but less than 5 hours
 5. five hours or more
3. How frequently do you watch the following types of programs on AFKN-TV?

	very frequently	frequently	occasionally	rarely
news/info	4	3	2	1
comedy	4	3	2	1
crime/adventure	4	3	2	1
music/variety	4	3	2	1
soap/drama	4	3	2	1
game/quiz	4	3	2	1
sports	4	3	2	1
feature movies	4	3	2	1
talk shows	4	3	2	1

Any others? Please specify one or two. _____

4. For what reasons do you think you watch AFKN-TV?

	strongly agree	agree	neutral	disagree	strongly disagree
up-to-the-minute info	5	4	3	2	1
entertainment variety	5	4	3	2	1
cultural learning	5	4	3	2	1
English learning	5	4	3	2	1
like many others	5	4	3	2	1
longer on-air than Korean TV	5	4	3	2	1
newspaper guides	5	4	3	2	1
Korean TV boring	5	4	3	2	1
peers talk about AFKN-TV	5	4	3	2	1
just curious	5	4	3	2	1
to see famous faces	5	4	3	2	1

If any other reasons, please specify one or two.

5. Do you know what to watch before you turn on AFKN-TV?

1. never
2. rarely
3. occasionally
4. frequently
5. almost always

6. How frequently do you watch crime/adventure shows on AFKN-TV which contain violent crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery or aggravated assault?

1. never
2. rarely
3. occasionally
4. frequently
5. very frequently

7. How accurate do you think entertainment programs on AFKN-TV reflect U.S. society and culture (excluding purely information-oriented programs such as news and documentaries)?

1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10
not at all very much
accurate accurate

8. How accurate do you think information programs on AFKN-TV (e.g., news, documentaries or talk shows) reflect U.S. society and culture?

1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10
not at all very much
accurate accurate

9. While you are watching AFKN-TV, how much attention do you think you pay to the programs?

1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10
not at all very much
attentive attentive

10. How much do you think you understand English language when you watch AFKN-TV programs overall?

1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10
very little about half almost all

11. How much attention do you think you usually pay to song lyrics when you watch and listen to music/variety programs on AFKN-TV?

1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10
very little very much

12. In comparison with you colleagues, how would you evaluate your English proficiency?

1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10
much worse about same much better

 How much do you agree with the following statements? Please
 circle the number that you think best corresponds to your
 opinion. (SA: strongly agree; A: agree; N: neutral;
 D: disagree; SD: strongly disagree)

	SA	A	N	D	SD
1. English language is an indispensable tool for a success in Korean society.	5	4	3	2	1
2. AFKN-TV renders a good opportunity for learning about colloquial English.	5	4	3	2	1
3. As far as English language education is concerned, the sooner the better.	5	4	3	2	1
4. American popular songs are a good tool for learning about colloquial English.	5	4	3	2	1
5. Generally speaking, our popular songs seem not as good as the U.S. ones.	5	4	3	2	1
6. In comparison with "Western" culture, we have relatively less of "our own" culture.	5	4	3	2	1
7. Our TV programs are relatively less matured vis-a-vis the U.S. ones.	5	4	3	2	1
8. In general, U.S. society is peaceful and orderly.	5	4	3	2	1
9. Violent crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery and aggravated assault are constantly increasing in U.S. society.	5	4	3	2	1
10. In general, Americans are friendly and kind.	5	4	3	2	1

 The following items are related to Korean television, NOT
 AFKN-TV.

1. On an average weekday, how many hours do you usually watch Korean TV, including morning, afternoon and evening?

1. rarely
2. less than 2 hours
3. two hours or more, but less than 5 hours
4. five hours or more, but less than 8 hours
5. eight hours or more

2. On a typical weekend, how many hours do you usually watch Korean TV, including morning, afternoon and evening?

1. rarely
2. less than 2 hours
3. two hours or more, but less than 5 hours
4. five hours or more, but less than 8 hours
5. eight hours or more

3. How frequently do you watch the following types of Korean TV programs?

	very frequently	frequently	occasionally	rarely
news/info	4	3	2	1
music/variety	4	3	2	1
cultural programs	4	3	2	1
sports	4	3	2	1
soaps/serial drama	4	3	2	1
nonserial drama	4	3	2	1
crime/detective	4	3	2	1
game/quiz	4	3	2	1
foreign imports	4	3	2	1

any other types? Please specify one or two.

4. For what reasons do you usually watch Korean TV?
 (SA: strongly agree; A: agree; N: neutral; D: disagree;
 SD: strongly disagree)

	SA	A	N	D	SD
relaxation	5	4	3	2	1
escape from problems	5	4	3	2	1
reduce stress	5	4	3	2	1
emotional stimulation	5	4	3	2	1
killing time	5	4	3	2	1
entertainment	5	4	3	2	1
companionship	5	4	3	2	1
information seeking	5	4	3	2	1
monitor environment	5	4	3	2	1
conversational topic	5	4	3	2	1
because TV is turned on	5	4	3	2	1

Any other reasons? Please specify one or two.

-
5. How often do you consult program guides before you turn on Korean TV?

1. never
2. rarely
3. occasionally
4. frequently
5. almost always

6. How often do you know what to watch before you turn on Korean TV?

1. never
2. rarely
3. occasionally
4. frequently
5. almost always

7. How frequently do you watch U.S. TV program imports on Korean TV which contain violent crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery or aggravated assault?

1. never
2. rarely
3. occasionally
4. frequently
5. very frequently

8. On average, how much time do you usually spend reading Korean newspapers?

1. less than 15 minutes
2. 15 to 30 minutes
3. more than 30 minutes, but less than an hour
4. one hour or more, but less than 2 hours
5. two hours or more

9. How many times do you go to the movies in a month?

1. rarely
2. 1-2 times
3. 3-4 times
4. 5 times or more

10. How frequently do you enjoy the following types of foreign movies at theaters?

	very frequently	frequently	occasionally	rarely
romance	4	3	2	1
adult comedy	4	3	2	1
sci-fi	4	3	2	1
horror/cult	4	3	2	1
crime/adventure	4	3	2	1
hi-teen comedy	4	3	2	1
war	4	3	2	1

Any other types? Please specify one or two.

11. Do you own a home VCR? (If you circled no, go to Q.16)

1. yes
2. no

12. If you own a home VCR, how long have you been using it?

_____ years and _____ months

13. If you own a home VCR, for what reasons do you use it?

	SA	A	N	D	SD
time-shifting	5	4	3	2	1
tape-renting	5	4	3	2	1
home-movie making	5	4	3	2	1

Any other reasons? Please specify. _____

14. If you own a home VCR, how many hours do you use it on an average day? _____ hours

15. If you own a home VCR, how frequently do you rent tapes that contain the following types of U.S. entertainment?

	very frequently	frequently	occation- ally	rarely	never
romance	5	4	3	2	1
horror/cult	5	4	3	2	1
sci-fi	5	4	3	2	1
crime show	5	4	3	2	1
music/variety	5	4	3	2	1
hi-teen	5	4	3	2	1
comedy	5	4	3	2	1

Any other types? Please specify one or two.

16. On an average day (including weekends), how many hours do you usually spend listening to Korean radio (both AM and FM broadcasting)?

1. rarely
2. less than an hour
3. one hour or more, but less than 3 hours
4. three hours or more, but less than 5 hours
5. five hours or more

17. On an average day (including weekends), how many hours do you usually spend listening to AFKN Radio (both AM and FM broadcasting)?

1. rarely
2. less than an hour
3. one hour or more, but less than 3 hours
4. three hours or more, but less than 5 hours
5. five hours or more

18. Please check if you regularly subscribe to the following magazines.

TIME _____
 NEWSWEEK _____
 Readers Digest _____

Any other U.S. magazines? Specify one. _____

 The following items ask about your ideas on a few aspects
 of U.S. society. Please circle the number that best
 corresponds to your opinions.

1. What percentage of U.S. married couples get divorced?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

2. What percentage of U.S. high school kids has had intimate sexual experiences at least once?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

3. What percentage of U.S. college students has had intimate sexual experiences at least once?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

4. What percentage of U.S. high school kids has tried some sort of hallucinatory drugs such as marijuana at least once?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

5. What percentage of the entire U.S. population is inflicted with drug addiction?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

6. What percentage of U.S. female teen population constitutes unmarried motherhood (teenage mothers)?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

7. What percentage of U.S. workers is engaged in white collar jobs?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

8. What percentage of U.S. workers is engaged in blue collar jobs?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

9. What percentage of the entire U.S. households has more than 5 rooms?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

10. What percentage of the entire U.S. households has more than 2 passenger vehicles?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

11. What percentage of the entire U.S. households has air-conditioning?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

12. What percentage of the entire U.S. households has an independent swimming pool?

0 ___ 10 ___ 20 ___ 30 ___ 40 ___ 50 ___ 60 ___ 70 ___ 80 ___ 90 ___ 99%

13. What percentage of U.S. male population is engaged in law enforcement jobs?

1. 1%
2. 5%

14. What percentage of all the crimes in the U.S. is violent crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery or aggravated assault?

1. 15%
2. 25%

15. Violent crimes in the U.S. are committed by:

1. strangers
2. acquaintants

16. Suppose you are living in a big metropolitan city in the U.S. such as New York City, Los Angeles or Chicago, how likely do you think your chances of falling victim to some form of violent crimes?

0 ___ 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ 6 ___ 7 ___ 8 ___ 9 ___ 10
very unlikely very likely

17. Suppose you are living in a small rural town in the U.S., how likely do you think your chances of falling victim to some form of violent crimes?

0 ___ 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ 6 ___ 7 ___ 8 ___ 9 ___ 10
very unlikely very likely

18. How serious do you consider the following types of social issues in U.S. society?

	extremely serious	very serious	somewhat serious	not at all serious
drug abuse	4	3	2	1
homosexuality	4	3	2	1
VD (e.g., AIDS)	4	3	2	1
teenage mothers	4	3	2	1
crimes	4	3	2	1
alienation of elderly	4	3	2	1
pollution	4	3	2	1
racism	4	3	2	1
divorce	4	3	2	1
handgun	4	3	2	1
drunk driving	4	3	2	1
illiteracy	4	3	2	1
sexual promiscuity	4	3	2	1
inner city ghetto	4	3	2	1

19. Do you know of any of your family members or relatives living in the U.S. who have been victimized by some form of crimes?

1. yes
2. no

20. If yes, how long ago has it happened? _____ months ago.

21. Do you know of any of your friends or acquaintants living in the U.S. who have been victimized by some form of crimes?

1. yes
2. no

22. If yes, how long ago has it happened? _____ months ago.

 Please answer the last few demographic items. As fully explained on the cover page of the questionnaire, your anonymity is fully guaranteed in this research. Thank you.

1. Your gender? (Check one) male _____; female _____
2. Your age? _____ years old
3. Have you been to the U.S.? 1. yes; 2. no

4. Do you personally know of anybody living in the U.S.
(e.g., family members, relatives, friends)?
1. yes
2. no
5. Given a chance, are you willing to go to the U.S. for
a visit or to study in the near future?
1. yes
2. no
6. Number of cohabitants in your household? _____ people
7. How would you assess your living standard?
- 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____ 9 _____ 10
low middle high

THE END

Appendix-B: Sample AFKN Program Guides

AFKN RADIO**AM/FM Programs-August '84****AM****AFKN NEWS EVERY HOUR** ^{AM}
PROGRAMS ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE ^{FM}**SUNDAY**

0115 Contemporary
0605 Hallmarks
0635 Open Door
0705 Amen Corner
0805 Morning Report
(News/Sports)
0830 Protestant Hour
0905 Musical
1105 Salt Lake
Taborack's Choir
1130 Memorial
Chapel Service (L)
1200 Noon Report
(News/Sports)
1230 Love on the Rock
1305 American Top 40



1705 Live from Gilley's
1800 Evening Report (News/Sports)
1830 Art of Positive Thinking
1835 Golden Days of Radio
1915 "ROK" Sunday (L)
2105 Vibe (Latin)
2305 Weekly Special

WEEKDAYS

0005 Wulmen Jack
0105 Night Watch
0305 Gene Price
0405 Harry Newman
0505 Morning Watch (L)
0630 Morning Report
(News/Sports)
0700 Morning Devotions
0702 Morning Watch (L)
0905 Charlie Tuna
1005 Phil Harvey
1030 Jim Pewster
1100 AFKN Today (L)
1300 Swap Shop
1305 Golden Days
1330 Jazz Beat
1405 Roland Byrum (R)
1505 Don Tracy (R)
1605 Rollin' Home (L)
1755 Swap Shop
1800 Evening Report
(News/Sports)
1815 CBS Mystery Theater
1905 Gene Price
2005 Harry Newman
2105 All That Jazz
2205 Caruso Concert
2305 Pete Smith

**SATURDAY**

0005 King Biscuit Flower Hour
0105 Contemporary
0605 Golden Days of Radio
0630 East of Eden
0705 History of Rock and Roll
0800 Morning Report
(News/Sports)
0830 It's Saturday Morning (L)
1200 Noon Report
(News/Sports)
1230 Jonathan Fields and Friends
1305 Country Countdown
1605 Countdown (Soul)
1800 Evening Report
(News/Sports)
1830 Health Line
1835 Golden Days of Radio
1905 Big Band Bash



2005 Dick Clark's Rock,
Roll & Remember
2305 Off the Record

FM**MUSIC TRANSMITTED IN STEREO**
RECEPTION DEPENDS ON LISTENING AREA

0015 Contemporary
0805 Morning Report
(News/Sports)
0830 Contemporary
1200 Noon Report
(News/Sports)
1230 Contemporary
1305 Country Countdown
1605 Countdown
(Soul)
1800 Evening Report
(News/Sports)
1830 Contemporary
2105 Dick Clark's Rock,
Roll & Remember

0005 Contemporary
0105 Night Watch
0305 Contemporary
0505 Country Morning
0630 Morning Report (News/Sports)
0700 Morning Devotions
0702 Country Morning
0905 Contemporary
1100 AFKN Today
1300 Swap Shop
1305 Contemporary
1800 Evening Report (News/Sports)
1815 Soul Alive
2005 Mary Turner
2105 Night Train (L)

0005 Contemporary
0800 Morning Report (News/Sports)
0830 Contemporary
1200 Noon Report (News/Sports)
1230 Contemporary
1405 American Top 40
1800 Evening Report (News/Sports)
1830 Contemporary

"SUPERSTATION" answers the audience challenge on AFKN Radio! AFKN recently conducted an audience survey and discovered the majority wanted more contemporary music on FM Stereo. So, FM "SUPERSTATION" takes to the air with popular music around the clock.

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