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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

THE SULPHUR WAR (I8lt0): A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE KINGDOM OF THE
TWO SICILIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

presented by

Dennis w. Thomson I

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THE SULPHUR WAR (1840): A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE KINGDOM OF THE
Two SICILIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
By

Dennis W. Thomson

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1989

SD758C7€2

ABSTRACT
THE SULPHUR WAR (1840): A CONERDNTATIDN
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE KINGDOM OF THE
Two SICILIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
By

Dennis W. Thomson

The Sulphur War resulted from a quarrel between Great
Britain and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies over a monopoly
on Sicilian sulphur granted in 1838 by Ferdinand II to the
French firm Taix-Aycard. The British government claimed
that the monopoly damaged the interests of its nationals in
Sicily and violated the Treaty of 1816. The Neapolitan
government insisted that the contract was necessary to solve
the problems of the sulphur industry and rejected the charge
of treaty violation. When negotiations failed to persuade
Ferdinand to cancel the monopoly, Lord Palmerston ordered
the fleet to initiate hostile operations.

This event exemplified the transition from control
through commercial treaties to "gunboat diplomacy." It also
underlined the length to which Great Britain would go in an
area where its control of the seas would be the decisive
factor. While the British were in the process of extending
formal control over Hong Kong, Natal, and the Sind, the
sulphur crisis indicated that they were willing to pursue
their interests aggressively against a European country.

The crisis also suggested the plight of an under-

developed country seeking to implement economic reforms

Dennis W. Thomson
which threatened the interests of a maJor power. As the
demand for sulphur rose in industrial markets, Ferdinand
missed the opportunity to exploit fully a domestic natural
resource. The regulation of the Sicilian sulphur industry
could have improved the kingdom’s balance of trade and
contributed to the development of the domestic economy.

This work describes and interprets the background and
significance of the crisis both from the British and
Neapolitan perspectives. More specifically, it addresses
the following questions: What considerations influenced
Ferdinand’s decision to approve the Taix-Aycard contract?
Did the sulphur monopoly violate international law? What
factors motivated the British government to resort to
"gunboat diplomacy"? What is the larger significance of
this episode against the background of post-Restoration
Europe?

Interest in the fields of British Imperialism and
Italian Risorgimento motivated this work. Research was
conducted at the National Registry of Archives and the
Public Record Office in Great Britain and the Archivio di

Stato, Naples, Italy.

To My Parents

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work owes a debt of gratitude to several persons
who guided, encouraged, and assisted me along the way.
While it is impossible to thank everyone, I would like to
mention those who have been especially helpful. First, I
wish to thank my doctoral advisers, Professors Donald Lammers
and David LoRomer; and the other members of my committee at
Michigan State University, Professors David Robinson and
Gordon Stewart. Without their guidance and support, I would
not have been able to undertake and complete this work. For
my archival research, I am grateful for the permission to
examine the Broadlands Papers at the National Registry of
Archives in London and the records of the Admiralty, the
Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office at Kew. Mr. C. K.
Wollgar, the Director of Archives at Southampton University,
kindly assisted me in locating some important information in
the Palmerston papers. Doctor Renato Grispo, Direttore
Generale del Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali,
facilitated my research in Italy. Doctor Maria Antonietta
Arpago, Director of the Sezione Affari Esteri at the Archivio
di Stato, Naples, deserves a special note of thanks, as does
the entire staff at the Archives. My appreciation is also

directed to the people at the libraries of Michigan State

University and Mercy College of Detroit, and especially to
Elizabeth Szalay, who patiently hunted for the books and
articles indispensable to my research. For typing cheerfully
and efficiently the many revisions of my manuscript, I thank
Elaine Mooney. A busy schedule notwithstanding, my old
friend Professor David G. Cylkowski of the English Department
at Mercy College of Detroit read this dissertation and made
several stylistic suggestions. To everyone who helped me, my
sincere gratitude for having contributed so generously to
the finished product. Of course, I assume responsibility for
all that is contained in this work, particularly any errors
of fact or interpretation.

This note of thanks would not be complete without
recognizing the support of my parents, Walter and Juliana

Thomson, who were always there when I needed them.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
ARCHIVAL SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
I. THE INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. THE ARENA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
III. THE LIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
IV. THE COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
V. THE WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
VI. THE CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
APPENDIX A: SICILIAN CURRENCY AND WEIGHTS . . . . . . 154
APPENDIX B: EXPORT AND PRICES OF SICILIAN SULPHUR . . 155
APPENDIX C: TREATY OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1816, ARTICLES

IV AND V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
APPENDIX D: THE POLLOCK-PHILLIMORE OPINIONS . . . . . 160

APPENDIX E: THE NEAPOLITAN POSITION: LUDOLF TO
PALMERSTON, SEPTEMBER 17, 1838 . . . . . 162

APPENDIX F: THE BRITISH POSITION: PALMERSTON TO
LUDOLF, OCTOBER 12,1838 . . . . . . . 167
APPENDIX G: THE CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
APPENDIX H: THE PEOPLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Sulphur Mining Areas in Sicily 1840 . .

viii

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

British documents are located in the following
collections and files:

Admiraitx (ADM)

Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London,
United Kingdom; 1/4365, 1/5499-5500.

Boand_gf_12ade (ET)

Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London,
United Kingdom: 1/357, 1/359, 2/11.

Broadland§_2a2e£s (BF)

University of Southampton, Southampton,
United Kingdom: BD/SI/1-24, GC/BE/5-568,
GC/GR/99-1824, GC/KE/2-36, GC/LA/1-31.

GC/LU/5-22, GC/ST/ 121-123, GC/TE/2-372.

EQLBIQD_foIce (F0>

Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London,
United Kingdom: 70/137, 70/149, 70/155,
70/166.

Neapolitan documents are located at the Archivio di
Stato of Naples (ASN), Italy, in the following sections
and files:

ALEDLXLQ.BQ£DQD§ (AB)
ff. 1013-1020.
MIDI§£§£9_AiimLLJEflJEJ.(MAE)
ff. 4124-4132.

Ministerg_bgrIc9ltura4.1Ddustniat_e_§9mmencio <MAIC)
ff. 173-175.

ix

CHAPTER I

W

'Fra tanti doni di cui fu prodigo
ii Cielo in verso la Sicilia vi
e quello dello zolfo."

Large deposits of sulphur are a natural resource of
Sicily. Mining probably began in the sulphurous plateau
between the Platani and Salso rivers in the central and
southwestern regions of the island long before existing
written documentation.’ Archaeological evidence indicates
that at least four mines operated in the province of

Agrlgento at the end of the second century.’ Most of

these mines were imperial property and employed salaried

 

‘('Sulphur is one of the many God-given gifts to
Sicily.") 'Memoria sulla controversia per 1’ appalto de’
solfi in Sicilia,” ASH/MAE, f. 4130, p. 4.

2The fact that there was no documentation of a sulphur
industry during the pre-Christian era is not proof that
extraction had not begun. The ancient Mediterranean world
was familiar with sulphur, which is mentioned in Deuter-
onomy, the Book of Job, and Homer’s Odyssey.

3The names of the mines (gfifiiglngg) were Porciana,
Cassiana, Gellia, and Fortunato. T. Mommsen, 9922“:
WW. 9. 858 and A Salinas. M1134

agay1_gl_antigh11§, pp. 36- -37: quoted in Maurizio Colonna,
Wm <Catanla: Unlveralta d1
Catania, 1971), pp. 7- 9.

2

personnel, slaves, and convicted criminals.‘ Others were
run by entrepreneurs (ggngugtgggg) who employed the managers
(manglngg) and acted as liaison between the owners and the
staff.6 Imperial Rome imported most of its sulphur from
Sicily, using it for medicines, farming, and industry.‘ It
was useful as a disinfectant and a hemostatic, and farmers
employed it in viticulture and as an effective method of
pest control. In industry, sulphur served to bleach wool
and in the manufacture of the forerunners of today’s matches.

The Arabs contributed to a revival of the industry
which declined after the fall of Rome. Their interest
focused upon the development of the “Greek Fire' which was
first used by the Byzantines in naval warfare. Evidence
also suggests that by the eleventh century the Arabs knew
the properties of Sicilian sulphur along with the methods of
extraction.’ The subsequent diffusion throughout Europe of
black powder revolutionized war and promoted the use of this

product.’

 

‘Mommsen, p. 8583 quoted in Colonna, p. 8.

“B. Pace. AW. vol. 1.
pp. 394-395: quoted in Colonna, p. 9.

‘Rome imported sulphur exclusively from Sicilian mines

according to Michele Rostovtzev, stg£1§_g§gngmlgg_g_ggglglg
WM. 9. 75: quoted In Colonna. p. 9.

’Abfl al Hukm’ibn Galandah described the Sicilian
“yellow sulphur,“ its methods of excavation, and health
hazards faced by the miners such as the loss of hair and
nails. Ibid. pp. 9-10.

'Black powder was a mixture of saltpeter, sulphur, and
coal.

3

Throughout the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern
Period, the industry developed at a slow pace, hampered by
crude methods, low profits, and high transportation costs
from the mines to the coast.’ At the beginning of the
eighteenth century, there were only six mines operating in
Sicily.‘° By the end of the same century, the number of
mines increased substantially, and the export of sulphur
rose to 90,000 cantars.H

MaJor discoveries in chemistry and their subsequent
application stimulated this growth. By the third decade
of the eighteenth century, the Cornelius Debb method
facilitated the manufacture of sulphuric acid in Great
Britain.‘2 Sulphuric acid was also used to extract soda from
common salt. In 1791 Nicholas LeBlanc registered this
method in France and the first plant for the production of
artificial soda opened in Marseilles in 1797. Eventually,
British and French industrialists Joined forces to exploit

the advances of chemistry and their applications to industry.

 

’In 1781, the price of sulphur was only ten Lani per
cantar. Ibid., p. 14. See Appendix A.

‘°Federlco Squarzlna. ELenuzI9ns.1.99mmercie.de119_znl:

fn_Ln_SIQIIIA_nel_sacelo_XIx (Turin: I.L.T.E.. 1963). p. 19.

HThere was an increase in the number of mine sites
during the second half of the eighteenth century. Colonna,
table 1, p. 16: and Squarzina, p. 19.

‘zThis method was originally developed in France by
Lefevre and Lemery during the seventeenth century. The first
plant for the manufacture of sulphuric acid in England
appeared near Richmond in 1740. The manufacture of tex-
tiles, brass, tin, and bleach all required the use of
sulphuric acid.

ovou MAHUHm 2H mgmt OZHZHS mammaam .H ousorm

OZwmmE.

 

5
In 1825 the first plant for the manufacture of surrogate
soda in the British Isles opened in Glasgow.

The increased demand for sulphur further stimulated
the production of Sicilian sulphur, which had already grown
steadily during the war years." Sicily enJoyed a quasi
monopoly on sulphur. Sicilian sulphur was plentiful, acces-
sible, and of good quality. Nowhere else in Europe was
sulphur available in thick beds and under better market
conditions.“ The production of sulphur hit an unprece-
dented high of 900,000 cantars and exports totalled 400,890
cantars during 1832.“5

As the industry expanded, technical and economic

problems persisted.“ Methods of exploration and extraction

 

‘°By 1815, the yearly export had risen from 4,000 tons
at the beginning of the century to 23, 802 tons. A. Coppi,
- , p. 479: quoted in Colonna, p. 17.
These figures contradict Francesco Ferarra’s statement that
the demand for sulphur rose “all of a sudden“ in 1832.

Francesco Ferrara. WW. vol. 9.
p. 34: quoted in Squarzina, p. 22.

“'Un seul pays d’ Europe, la Sicile, fournit au com-
merce la presque totalite des souffres qui se consomment."
(“Only one European country, Sicily, provides the trade
with practically all the sulphur in use.') .

Wines (Paris: Dupont. 1840). ASN/AB.
f. 1017. p. 3.

”Ludovico Blanchlnl. WM
3191115 (Palermo: n.p., 1841), p. 359: and Appendix B,

table 1.

“Among the problems noted by C. Lippi at the end of
the eighteenth century were an ignorance of Sicilian geology,
absence of clear ideas concerning the organization of the
operation, inadequate legislation pertaining to mining, and
lack of investment capital. C. Lippi,

W. p. 115: quoted in
Colonna, pp. 16-17.

'

6
continued to be primitive and uneconomical. Workers, barely
familiar with the rudiments of geognostics, often searched
for new deposits on a hit-or-miss basis. A particular type
of gypsum called bggsgalg, brownish-yellow, spongy, and
located in conJunction with blue clay and sulphurous waters,
tipped off the searchers to the presence of sulphur.
Exploration therefore remained as close to the surface as
possible in order to minimize cost and hazards. If the
results were unsatisfactory, the mine owners would simply
move the operation.

The use of the bore, as in Great Britain and France,
would have made the search less haphazard and reduced labor
costs. However, the mine owners were reluctant to invest in
new techniques. They were not concerned with competition
and preferred to rely upon a plentiful and cheap commodity--
Sicilian labor. The methods of processing sulphur were also
about one hundred years behind those of the British and the
French.‘7

The pickman (pigggnlgng) mined the raw material and
supervised the fusion process in the galgagella, a round
furnace with a bottom slanted toward an exit. Workers
ignited the ore from above so that the sulphur would
separate from the gypsum and other minerals. Now in liquid

form, the sulphur would then descend toward the exit and

 

17J. Deiabretoigne et J. De Rechter, Lndustnig_§gufig;e

Wu. p. 6: quoted in
Colonna, p. 45.

7
fill wooden molds called gayiti. Once cooled and in solid
foam, the sulphur was ready for transportation to the docks
for subsequent sale.

Pickmen were paid on a piece-work basis." Conse-
quently, they were interested in mining as much sulphur as
possible in the shortest time and at the easiest location.
Most of them came from rural communities and worked for a
period of six months, usually three or four days a week.*’
Distances prevented them from commuting so they lived near
the pits for long periods of time. As the pickmen went
deeper, they labored in an environment which was either too
hot or too cold, dimly lit, and badly ventilated.=° Col-

lapsing galleries, gas explosions, and accidental fires

 

”'On January 1, 1838, approximately 814,845 men com-
prised the labor force. Their daily wages were: five
carlins for pickmen, two carlins for their gapugl (assis-
tants), four carlins for the QEQLLQEL (burners), and six
carlins for overseers and others. 'Delle Solfatare in
Sicilia e de’ nuovi provvedimenti per la industria e lo spac-
cio del solfo,‘ ASN/AB, f. 1018, pp. 4-5. Miners’ wages
compared favorably with other industries. Silk workers in
Palermo earned between 3.12 to 4.11 13:1 a day for twelve
hours of work. Cacioppo d’Antalbo, 'Sull’ Opinione di uno
scrittore intorno all’ industria s1ciliana,“ Qignnalg_gi
Statlgtigg (1853), pp. 5-6: quoted in Colonna, p. 98.

"The opening of several mines around Caltanissetta
created higher wages and a labor shortage, prompting an 1833
proposal by the Intendant to recruit vagrants and the unem-
ployed for work in the pits. This would make labor avail-
able, lower the wages, and relieve the township’s financial

burden. ASC. W. L 1082. Colonna.
pp. 100-101.

2°John Goodwin, the British Consul General in Sicily,
expressed the different view that the ”hardy and healthy
looks of the burners'I compared favorably with the “sickly
aspect of the southern population.” Raleigh Treveiyan,

We may York: Horror». 1973). p. 485.

n. 3.

8
were occupational hazards.2‘ Also, the mines were likely
to fill with water thus forcing the miners to ball with
terracotta containers (gugntgng) or manual wooden pumps
(tggmpg).

Young boys between the ages of ten and fifteen (ggnugl)
had the unenviable task of carrying the sulphur to the
surface. In most cases, their indigent families inden-
tured them to the pickmen for this service. These young-
sters shared the danger and work with the pickmen. Poor
pay, however, prevented them from repurchasing their con-
tracts. They grew up in the pits stunted, deformed, illit-
erate, victims of malaria and malnutrition, overworked, and
often abused.22 Their plight did not attract sympathetic
attention until after Unification.’°

The rising demand for sulphur did not generate an
interest in improving the methods of production and working
conditions. In fact, it reinforced mining techniques which

were crude, haphazard, wasteful, and dangerous. By the

 

2‘Officials expressed concern with accidents in the
pits caused by fires, explosions, and flooding. ASC, f.
1082, Colonna, pp. 100 and 143-144.

22Evidence of the physical damage suffered by young
workers emerges from ColaJanni’s study which showed that
military recruits declared unfit in 1872-1873 were more
likely to come from the ranks of sulphur workers than farm
laborers. Nicola ColaJanni, “I Lavoratori deile zolfare in

Sicilia,’I L3_Rijg;ma_$gglalg (1894): quoted in Colonna,
table 40, p. 145.

°°The problems of the garusatg received official
notice at an 1868 physicians’ congress in Agrigento. By
1875, the Italian government adopted some legislation for
the protection of adolescent miners. Colonna, p. 147.

9

third decade of the nineteenth century, there were no plans
for the improvement of exploration, the introduction of
machinery, or the training of specialized personnel.24 The
economic structure of the industry did not encourage initia—
tive and advancement as “cheap labor and a guaranteed export
meant that there was no incentive to improve methods of
production.“’3 The mine owners lacked entrepreneurial
ability, investment capital, technical expertise, and the
spirit of adventure necessary to launch a modern industry.
Frequently, they were content with leasing the pits to a
concessionary (gapellgtg) for a rent which fluctuated
between 20 and 30 percent of the total output. The gangl;
1211 in turn bore the burden of the operational cost and
had to respond to pressure from the owners to extract as
much as possible from the mines before their leases expired.
The concessionaries lacked the resources and expertise
necessary to direct a successful enterprise and the capital
for day-to-day operations. Hardly experts in the mining of
sulphur, they entrusted the process of exploration and
extraction to the miners. Like the gangllgtl, the land-
owners were more likely to speculate than to invest.

The lack of clear and specific legislation imposing

limits on the unrestricted use of the undersoil by the

 

"The first improvement was the introduction of the

galgangnl which replaced the gglganglla in the fusion
process (1851). Ibid. p. 46.

”Denis Mack Smith. W (New York:
William Morrow, 1969), p. 385.

10
landowners aggravated the problem. Since the medieval
period, royal Jurisdiction over all mines was neither clear
nor consistent. Theoretically, mines were among the negalig
or rights of the sovereign.”‘ The charter leg_flgn_ngggt,
issued by Charles of AnJou in 1289. clearly listed all the
resources of the undersoil under the cggalig.” In prac-
tice, the interpretation of feudal land rights generated
a controversy regarding the ultimate Jurisdiction over the
mines of the kingdom. A compromise eventually allowed the
Sicilian landowners to dispose of their sulphur with the
permission of the Crown and a one-time fee of thirty
ducats."

The strength of several landowners and the indif-
ference of some administrators to this arrangement made
enforcement of the law difficult. Independent-minded land-
owners did not ask permission to operate the mines on their
land.” It was also unclear whether the sulphur pits were
mines or simply surface caves expressly exempted from legis-
lation on mines. This distinction remained vague and worked
in favor of the owners. A royal ordinance of 1754 mandated
the disclosure of mines operating without permits. Yet

twenty-five years later, the Prince of Trabia and other

 

"Bianchini, p. 357.

a""Risposta a’ 4 quesiti fatti dall’ Ambasciata di
Francia in ordine ai diritti di regalia,“ ASN/MAE, f. 4129.

2"Prammatiche 15 e 17 del 1383 e 1388,“ Ibid.

all"Colonna, p. 23.

11

landlords sued for an exemption from this ordinance and won.
Arguing that the 1754 law did not apply to surface caves,
the landlords continued to harvest their sulphur and were
eventually excused from the obligation.°°

During the first decades of the nineteenth century,
the question of royal Jurisdiction over the sulphur mines
continued to be debatable. In 1806, the Treasury proposed
a tax of 10 percent on the total output of sulphur, but the
Tribunal of Patrimony reJected this new tax on the grounds
that it would have been a departure from precedents and
would have increased the burdens of an industry already beset
by transportation costs. This decision reaffirmed the prin-
ciple of 233311;, exacting the payment of ten gaze for the
opening of a mine. The king concurred and commented that
“under the circumstances“ the proposed tax would have ham-
pered the growth of 'a branch of commerce most useful to the
nation.'°‘ Although the desire to encourage trade may well
have prompted his decision, it is safe to assume that the
overriding factor here was the position of the king and his
family, who had sought shelter in Sicily to escape the
French occupation. The new tax would not have been popular

with the barons who were in finm control of the land."

 

9°Squarzina, pp. 7—9.

3”Real dispaccio del 20 settembre 1808 sul diritto
deil’ 523313132,“ ASN/MAE, f. 4129.

“a'La nobilta . . . teneva saldamente in mano la terra
che costituiva la principaie fonte di lavoro e di pro-
duzione: possedeva il monopolio dello zolfo.’ (“The
nobility . . . firmly controlled the land which was the main

12

After the Restoration, the mine owners received con-
firmation for their claims to surface and undersoil
resources, and exemption from the restrictions which applied
to the others.°° For all practical purposes, these ordi-
nances placed the control of sulphur in the private sector,
perhaps in the mistaken assumption that it would most appro-
priately oversee the future development of the industry.
However, private control did not translate into efficiency
and.modernization, nor was the state able to address the need
for improvements. The network of roads connecting mine sites
with the coast was grossly inadequate, making transportation
slow and costly." Official interest focused upon the pro-
tection of the environment and public health, a worthy
program, but one not likely to improve the management of the

sulphur mines.°'

 

source of work and production: it had a monopoly on sul-

phur.') Francesco Renda, La_fi1g111a_ng1_1&12 (Caltanis-
setta: Sciascia, 1963), p. 51.

“’Third parties could take over the operation of idle
mines, but not sulphur pits. Code of March 26, 1819, Arti-
cle 477 and Law of October 17, 1826: Squarzina, p. 13.

"The Bourbon administration had been aware of the
need to build roads. "Sicily must build roads at all
costs." Minister Luigi de’Medici to the Crown Prince
Francis, December 6, 1817, Rosario Romeo, Mezzgg1gnng_e
W (Naples: 8.3.1.. n.d.). p. 92.
Transportation counted for 30 percent of the cost of
sulphur. Colonna, p. 108.

3°This interest prompted the ordinances of 1757 and
1778 which forbade the opening of mines near fields and
dwellings, and limited the excavation and fusion seasons
from May to September. Similar guidelines were issued in
1809, 1811, and 1813. Ibid., pp. 29-30. Another ordinance
in 1830 prescribed appropriate methods of fusion. Bian-
chini, p. 358.

13

The demand from foreign buyers generated a false sense
of security which stimulated interest in the opening of new
mines. By 1834, approximately 150 owners operated 196 mines
concentrated primarily around Girgenti (90), Caltanissetta
(88), and Catania <11)." Consequently, the volume of
export increased steadily. Between 1834 and 1837, 3,049,736
cantars were sold to foreign buyers.°’ Great Britain alone
bought 1,653,425 cantars during the same period." French
imports climbed from 14,000 tons in 1832 to 41,000 tons in
1838."

What appeared as a positive development for the
economy had negative effects. Greedy speculators, negligent
overseers, and unskilled workers damaged the environment in
their search for new sulphur deposits. According to a
contemporary source, the demand for mine workers deprived
farming of needed manpower.‘° During 1838, the production

of 814,845 cantars in the three leading provinces required a

 

"V1 ncenzo Glure. WM
(Geneva: Droz, 1973), p. 19.

3’See Appendix 8, table 1.

"See Appendix B, table 2.

3’R. W. Rawson, “On the Sulphur Trade in Sicily and
the Commercial Relations between that Country and Great
Britain,‘I quoted in Giura, p. 16.

‘°F. P. Mortiilaro, - — -

$121111, p. 99: quoted in Colonna, p. 55.

14
total of 6,500 workers.“‘ The resulting farm-labor shortage
reduced agricultural output for local consumption and the
production of cash crops.

To make matters worse, the chase for a quick profit
and the resulting intense production surpassed the demand
for sulphur. This demand could absorb only between 600,000
and 700,000 of the 900,000 cantars produced in a year. As a
result, there were 950,000 cantars of sulphur on hand by
January 1, 1838. If we subtract from this figure the
700,000 cantars absorbed by the market and the 300,000 held
in reserve by consumers and then add the 850,000 cantars
produced that same year, we can estimate the sulphur reserve
at the end of 1838 to be about 1,000,000 cantars.“= Over-
production led to falling prices. The price of sulphur in
1833 reached an unprecedented high of forty-five Lgp1 per
cantar.‘° By 1836, it fell to 16.75 and plunged to 13.50
the following year.“

At this Juncture, one obvious solution was to develop
and implement plans which utilized these reserves. Refin-

eries constructed in Sicily could have solved the problem by

 

“‘Delle Solfatare in Sicilia,“ p. 4: “Ouadro Sinottico
delle solfare in Sicilia,“ ASN/MAIC, f. 174: and Gino Arias,

W (Boloene: Zanlchelli. 1921). p.
158.
‘zGiura, p. 21.

"See Appendix B, table 3.

“Ibid.

15

manufacturing sulphuric acid and artificial soda.‘5 Unfor-
tunately, the sulphur producers were isolated and divided by
competition.“ They also lacked the investment capital and
expertise necessary to launch such a program. Another
solution could have been to decrease production. This action
would have reduced the surplus and restored a certain
equilibrium between supply and demand, thus stabilizing
prices. But the great maJority of mine owners, anxious about
their losses, continued to excavate and prices further
declined. Producers who failed to show a profit abandoned
their mines. By 1838, the number of mines dwindled to 140:
63 in Girgenti, 64 in Caltanissetta, and 13 in the valley of
Catania." The producers also had the option of leasing or
subletting their operation to British or French businessmen
who had the resources to succeed. Indeed, foreign investors
profited handsomely from the sulphur boom of 1832-1834. When
prices began to fall, they bought vast amounts of sulphur,
held it in reserve, and waited for an eventual rise in price.

British businessmen in Sicily were a prosperous and

closely knit group which mingled with the uppercrust of

 

4“As late as 1864 there were only two such refineries
in Sicily, mostly the result of low domestic demand.

“The absence of a cooperative spirit (g21;119_g1
asggg1az1gng) exacerbated competition. Colonna, p. 106.

"'Notizie statistiche sullo stato delle solfare di
Sicilia al gennaio 1838,“ ASN/MAIC, f. 173.

16
local society.“° They acted as bankers for debt-ridden
barons, made marriage alliances with prominent families, and
became partners with Sicilian businessmen. BenJamin Ingham,
William Dickinson, and William Morrison shared a shipping
venture with the princes of Campofranco, Scordia, and Cute.
They purchased a steamship built in Scotland, changed its
name from the potentially controversial 1ng12gnggnz§ to
Eg1gnmg, and placed it in service. Among the co-directors of
this venture were Duke Ettore Plgnatelli di Monteleone and
Baron Gabriele Chiaramonte di Bordonaro. Vincenzo Florio, a
shrewd Calabrese who eventually became a well-known Sicilian
capitalist, was also part of this group."

It is debatable whether or not a “vague sense of
kinship“ between the British and the Sicilians grew from
their common Norman heritage.'° More likely, other circum-
stances shaped British sympathies for the Sicilians, such as
the memories of past slights by Queen Maria Carolina and

some ministers.°‘ Moving in aristocratic quarters where

 

‘°The traveller John Galt observed in 1812 that “The
general foreign trade is in the hands of the British.I
Treveiyan, p. 12. Until 1838, “The sulphur trade in Sicily
was almost entirely in English hands.“ 23293:, p. 4.

“'Trevelyan, p. 80: and p. 85, n. 20.
BOIbld.' p. 13.

"Apparently the queen did her best to make life
difficult for British merchants and even went as far as
'despoiiing' a large British merchant vessel in 1811.
Robert Fagan, the British consul in Palermo, wrote to Lord
Amherst in 1809 that “The conduct in general of most of the
Ministers appears to be studiously directed to give disgust
to the British.‘I Ibid., pp. 20-21.

17
anti-Bourbon sentiments were common, some of these foreign
businessmen adopted a critical attitude toward the court
which degenerated into open hostilities during the sulphur
crisis.9’

Some pro-Bourbon sources have expressed a severe
Judgement on the commercial activities of these business-
men, representing them as ruthless and unscrupulous specu-
lators who intended to prey upon I'public distress,“ hoard
sulphur, and establish a “monopoly of foreign gold upon
Sicily’s poverty.“°° Consequently, “the fruit of Sicilian
land and labor' which could be bought so cheaply “went to
increase the deposits of Marseilles and Liverpooi.'9‘ With
milder language, the economist Ludovico Bianchini pointed
to the fact that these investors gained a great deal from
the crisis. As producers, they controlled the output of the
maJor mines: as buyers, they had access to sulphur at
depressed prices: and as sellers, they set the price of
sulphur on foreign markets.°°

As the crisis continued, the producers looked to the

 

'2Nevertheless, Ferdinand conferred upon BenJamin
Ingham the order of St. Ferdinand in recognition of the fact
that his brig, the E1aa, was the first to complete a voyage
from Sumatra to Sicily in 1839. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

I""‘Giovandosi . . . della miseria pubblica, tennero
modo come riunire in poche mani l’ incetta del solfo, per
imporre legge e fondare il monopolio dell’ oro straniero
sulla poverta siciliana. 'Delle Solfatare in Sicilia,“
p. 6.

9"Memoria sulla controversia,“ p. 6.

asBianchini, p. 360.

18
government for help. Suggestions ranged from the extreme to
the moderate. One proposed that the government should
assume the operation of all the pits, with a yearly compen-
sation designated to the owners." A more moderate proposal
came from the Duke of Villarosa on behalf of several mine
owners. It suggested that all mines should be closed for
eight months rather than the customary six.°’ Another came
from John Wood, the owner of several mines, who proposed that
operations should shut down during 1837.9'

The government did not react favorably to these pro-
posals. Limiting the mining season would not necessarily
reduce production, since it was possible for the mines to
produce more in less time. A shorter mining season would
increase unemployment, create an imbalance between supply
and demand, and violate the rights of the owners to dispose
of their property. Closing the mines for a year could also
force prices to rise, thus increasing the profits of specu-
lators holding large quantities of sulphur in reserve.°’
This reJection did not indicate the government’s indif-
ference for the plight of the industry, but rather a lack of
confidence in the proposed methods.

At the same time, the Neapolitan government was

 

P‘Ibld.
"Exams. 9. 5.

9°John Wood to Antonino Franco, Minister of Sicilian
Affairs, March 30, 1837, ASN/MAE, f. 4132, Giura, p. 24.

“'Exnose. p. 6.

19
concerned with other problems which were related to the
sulphur industry. Farming, the backbone of Sicily’s economy,
suffered from the damage to arable land caused by the inten-
sive, haphazard excavation and the loss of manpower. In
addition, the activities of foreign merchants hurt the state
since neither custom duties on exports nor a tax on operating
mines existed at that time.‘°

There were a number of suggestions to solve these
problems. Luigi de’Medlci, the protectionist minister of
Ferdinand I and Francis 1, was the first to propose in 1825-
1826 a monopoly for the sulphur industry without result. In
1831, Messrs. Chauvenet and Aycard presented a similar pro-
posal which failed to secure the approval of the Neapolitan
government because of the persisting opposition from the
supporters of free trade.“ In 1833 Aime Taix, a financier
from Marseilles, advanced another proJect and later resub—
mitted it with some modifications."

The first Taix proposal presented several maJor
points. The production of sulphur would be strictly con-
trolled by allowing the mines to operate between mid-July
and mid-December and suspending operations altogether
whenever production exceeded set limits. The firm would

have the exclusive right to purchase all the available

 

‘°Ibid.
“Squarzina, p. 23.

‘z'Primo progetto del Sig. Taix.“ ASN/MAIC. f- 174-

20

sulphur on the island at the price of one ducat per fifty
kilograms and to sell it at 36—38 carlins per cantar
(approximately .46 carlins per kilogram). Taix believed
that this plan would offer economic and political advan—
tages. Private funds would finance the building of roads
connecting the excavation sites with the coast, thus
decreasing transportation costs. Improved communications
would deprive revolutionary propaganda of a pretext to
attack the Bourbon administration.63 This proposal went to
a commission of Sicilian merchants, producers, and experts
who reJected it primarily on the grounds that it was a
monopolyu"4

The same commission also evaluated the second proposal
submitted by Aimé Taix and his partner Arsene Aycard on May
1, 1836. The two businessmen knew that there was as yet no
viable solution for the problems of the industry and that
some influential individuals supported their proJect.65
This time the commission approved the proposal by the narrow

margin of seven to five. The minority claimed that the

 

‘3"La mancanza delle comunicazioni interne della
Sicilia ha servito di pretesto alle furibonde declamazioni
dei Rivoluzionari nella loro Ligua [s19] fanatica contro
i Borboni.“ (“The lack of internal communications in Sicily
has provided the pretext for the irate ranting of the revo-
lutionaries in their fanatic attacks against the Bourbons.")
Letter from Aimé Taix to Ferdinand II, August 27, 1833,
delivered verbally on September 6, 1833. Ibid.

‘4“Risoluzione del Consiglio di Stato, 15 Dicembre,
1834," ASN/MAIC, f. 174.

ésAntonio Lucchesi-Palli, the Prince of Campofranco
and Lieutenant General of Sicily since 1834, was a foremost
supporter of this proposal.

21
contract would violate free trade, antagonize foreign govern-
ments, and encourage the search for a sulphur surrogate.“
The maJority believed that the gravity of the situation
required strong measures. In support of their position,
they cited the precedents established by the British, Dutch,
and French governments which adopted similar protectionist
programs."

The plan had advantages and disadvantages, and
appeared to be the lesser of two evils when compared to the
crisis in the industry." It would generate capital,
provide for the construction of roads, facilitate the
collections of revenues, lend support to the kingdom’s
merchant marine, and create Jobs in industry, trade, and
farming. On the other hand, the fears of an intensified
search for a sulphur surrogate were premature and exag-
gerated because sulphur had unique qualities as a natural
resource and even the Continental Blockade had failed to
produce a substitute.

A modified version of this proposal went to the

Council of State, which in turn sent it to the Consulta for

 

“'Parere dei cinque dissidenti,‘ ibid. The Camera
Consultiva di Commercio di Messina also opposed the proposal
on the grounds that it would place both Sicilian industry
and the Neapolitan merchant marine at a disadvantage.

"'Delle Solfatare,” pp. 7-8.

"In April 1837, even John Wood felt that a monopoly
was a preferable alternative to the ruin of the industry.
John A. Davis, “The South, the Risorgimento,and the Origins
of the ’Southern Problem’,“ in John A. Davis (ed.), Gnamgg1

Winn (London: Groom Helm. 1979).
p. 70. .

22

evaluation." To turn down a certain benefit for uncertain
losses was like “Jumping in a river to avoid getting drenched
by the rain."° With one exception, the Consulta was
favorably impressed with the proposal and recommended its
adoption with some modifications." Continuing discussions,
revisions, and delays postponed the signing of the final
agreement between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and
Taix-Aycard until July 1838.73

The contract consisted of twenty-seven articles which
set forth in detail the nature of the monopoly. For a
period of ten years, Taix-Aycard agreed to contribute a
capital of 1,200,000 ducats to a central fund and the
Neapolitan government would add 600,000. The mine owners

and producers would receive a compensation of four carlins

 

"In order to take care of business on both sides of
the Beacon, the Consulta was established on July 26, 1821.
On June 24, 1824, the two branches merged under the title
. With headquarters in Naples, it con-
tained the Departments of Justice, Ecclesiastical Affairs,
Interior, and Finance. The Council of State assumed the name
Consulta on November 9, 1852. Iole Mazzoleni, £9n11

(Naples: Arti Tipografiche, n.d.), pp. 257-258.

’°The date of the document is December 11, 1837,
followed by the Consulta’s approval on December 15, 1837.
I'Privativa degli zoifi chiesta per la Sicilia oltre al Faro
dai Sigg. Taix-Aycard," Archivio di Stato di Palermo, Con-
sulta Siciliana, f. 16, Opinion 1639: Squarzina, pp. 24-28.

"Fearing that the proposed contract would violate
free trade, the Duke of Cumia cast the dissenting vote.
'Avviso della Consulta con unito il parere unico del
consultore, Duca di Cumia,“ ASN/MAIC, f. 174.

72The notarized agreement and the contract registered
on July 9, 1838, are in ASN/AB, f. 1015, and ASN/MAIC, ff.
173 and 174.

23
per cantar for not exceeding a set limit of production which
was equal to two-thirds of the average yearly output of each
mine during the period 1834-1837.’° The company would buy
the sulphur necessary to replace the amount sold, so that
there would always be 150,000 cantars in reserve. Producers
were free to sell to anyone, providing that they paid a
surcharge of twenty cariins per cantar. In exchange, the
Royal Treasury would receive 400,000 ducats from Taix-Aycard
every year. Should the company sell more than 600,000
cantars, this premium would increase proportionately. In
addition, Taix-Aycard would finance the establishment of
chemical-industrial factories and assume the responsibility
for the training of Sicilian personnel."

Not only did the contract offer a solution to the
problems of the sulphur industry, but it also addressed the
larger questions of Sicilian economic and political con-
ditions. There were provisions for agricultural improve-
ments, the introduction of new industries, technological
guidance, and invitations for needed capital. Moreover,
the government was in the position to gain from Sicily’s
stability and prosperity and would benefit from what
amounted to an export duty on sulphur which would facilitate
the abolition of the grist tax.

But all these advantages did not eliminate domestic

 

’°Squarzina, p. 29.

"Taix to Ferdinand, November 23, 1837, submitted to
the Consulta on December 6, 1837, ASN/MAIC, f. 174.

24
criticism of the proJect. Along the way to final approval,
the proposal encountered considerable opposition from in—
fluential quarters.79 One obJected to the idea of tampering
with free trade and another was reluctant to grant a monopoly
to a foreign firm. There was also an apprehension of
foreign reaction, and events proved the validity of this
last consideration. While the proposal was still in the
planning stage, rumors concerning the possibility of a
monopoly being granted to a French firm began to circulate
in diplomatic circles. The British and French envoys
reacted with dismay and indignation, and pressured the
Neapolitan government to reJect the proposal. The question
of Sicilian sulphur was about to erupt into an international

confrontation.

 

78Among the opponents were Antonino Franco: Antonio
Statella, the Prince of Cassaro and Minister of Foreign
Affairs: and Onorato Gaetani, the Duke of Laurenzana, who
replaced Campofranco as Lieutenant General of Sicily in 1837.

CHAPTER II

1W

". . . all those rulers who landed by main force

from every direction, who were at once obeyed,

soon detested and always misunderstood . . . ."

The Straits of Messina represent more than a mere geo-
graphical accident separating an island of 9,830 square
miles from the Italian peninsula. Although for centuries a
succession of foreign rulers competed for control, Sicily
was a separate entity shaped by an unique cultural tradi-
tion. This situation persisted after the Treaty of Vienna
(1738) which gave Sicily to the Spanish Bourbons. Hence-
forth, these rulers had to contend with a strong local
aristocracy bent on preserving traditional institutions and
sharing power with the Crown. The Napoleonic Wars further
isolated Sicily from the rest of Europe, exacerbated the

difficulties between the Crown and baronage, and opened the

 

‘Giuseppe Tommasi di Lampedusa, Ing_ngpaLg (New York:
Pantheon, 1960), p. 208. In ancient times, Greeks,
Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and Romans occupied Sicily at
one time or another. During the Middle Ages, Vandals,
Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, Angevlns, and Aragonese ruled
the island in succession. In modern times, Sicily passed
from Spain (1504-1713) to Austria (1713), Savoy (1713-1720),
and again Austria (1720-1738). The Bourbons governed Sicily
from 1738 to 1861, when it became a part of the Kingdom of
Italy.

25

26
door to British occupation of the island. By that time,
Great Britain had become concerned with the strategic
importance of Sicily and the rapidly expanding economic
interests of its nationals in the Xingdom of Naples.

For all these reasons, Sicily became an arena in which
diverse interests pursued mutually exclusive goals. The
barons resisted reforms which would erode their political
and economic privileges and championed autonomy from Naples.
The monarchy strove to implement a program of reforms and
strengthen the central government. During the war emergen-
cy, Ferdinand IV welcomed British protection, but resented
their interference in domestic affairs. On the other hand,
the British preserved their economic privileges established
by a series of commercial agreements even after the end of
the war.

The political strength of the Sicilian barons rested
upon their control over a parliament which had functions
similar to the French Estates General, the Spanish Cortes,
and the Scandinavian Things. The Sicilian parliament had
the prerogative of approving and managing taxes and grants
to the Crown: most of its members enJoyed immunity from tax-
ation. So long as parliament granted whatever the viceroys

requested, baronial privileges could continue undisturbed.a

 

2For a good description of the Sicilian parliament to
1812, see Emilio del Cerro (Nicola Niceforo), “La Sicilia e
la coetltuzl'one del 1812." WWW.
vols. 39-46 (1914-1916, 1922, 1924-1925). There is also use-
ful information in the work by Ernesto Pontieri, 11_I;§mgngg
gg1_p§;gnagg1g_§1g111§ng (Florence: Sansoni, 1943), pp. 127-

27

The Sicilian parliament was divided into three estates
or p;ggg1.° The feudal or military bgagg1g was the largest
and the most powerful of the three. Its members were hered-
itary lords who represented the townships (un1yeng113).
The high clergy constituted the second estate which was
smaller than the first but Just as prestigious. Under
the leadership of the Archbishop of Palermo, its membership
included archbishops, bishops, and abbots. The interests of
the second estate coincided with those of the feudal bnggg1g,
and the two often Joined forces when voting on fiscal
matters, since both were exempt from taxation. The third
estate (geman1a1g) was the only elected body. It was
also the smallest and least consequential of the three.‘ In
theory, it represented the interests of the king’s subJects
living on state lands (W19). In practice, it was sub-
servient to the first two orders and had to assume the fiscal
burden voted by the first and second estates. The estates
deliberated separately but met in Joint session for the
final vote which was by estate. Consequently, the third
estate did not have a fighting chance against the privileged

orders.

 

140: and in Giacomo Giacomazzi,
(Palermo: Instituto Bibliografico Siciliano, 1960).

°The division into three estates originated in the
reign of Roger de Hautevilie (died 1111). He created
divisions for the Church, the barons, and those who lived on
Crown lands. Ibid., p. 10.

‘In 1812, the bnagg1g_gemgn1a1g had 45 members compared
to 114 in the feudal and 54 in the ecclesiastical estates.

Del Cerro, vol. 41 (1916), pp. 338-344.

28

An institution dominated by special interests would
resist any attempt at reforms which combined the ideas of
progress and common good under the leadership of a strong
state. Apparently, the Bourbons failed to understand the
“values and functions of parliamentary assemblies.“° They
regarded the Sicilian parliament as a feudal relic which
limited royal authority and perpetuated the dominance of
vested interests.

The earliest challenge to the barons’ position came
from Domenico Caracciolo, a disciple of the Enlightenment
and Viceroy from 1781 to 1786. Caracciolo wanted to restore
the authority of the Neapolitan state which was weakened by
centuries of baronial abuse. He envisioned a program of
reform which would modernize the administration of Sicily.
Foremost among these proposed reforms were a redefinition of
the aristocracy’s Juridical position and a redistribution of
the fiscal burden according to more equitable principles.
The barons viewed this plan as an attack on their privi-
leges, because fiscal reform would end their immunity from
taxation and deprive parliament of its right to levy taxes.‘
Furthermore, the proposals were sponsored by a "foreign“

dynasty which was insensitive to Sicilian aspirations. The

 

aErnesto Pontieri, "Aspetti e tendenze dell’ asso-
lutismo napoletano,“

W
W (Naples: E S 1.. 1965). p. 18.

‘The barons defended their tax-immune status on the
ground that their military service satisfied their feudal
contract.

29

barons reacted by using parliament as a shield against
reform and rallied conservative interests around the banner
of Sicilian separatism. The sustained opposition and
hostility of a powerful minority defeated the Caracciolo
experiment.’ In his enthusiasm for reform, he was years
ahead of his time, never understanding that Sicily was not
France.‘ He had the problem of being an outsider who
represented a foreign dynasty, and his style antagonized
rather than conciliated his opponents.’ Finally, the
administration never gave him unqualified support, and his
enemies had powerful allies in Naples. Foremost was the
prime minister, the Sicilian Marquis della Sambuca.‘°

Differences between the Crown and the barons became
more acute during the difficult years of Ferdinand’s
Sicilian “exile.“ When the royal family initially sought
refuge on the island, parliament tied the approval of a
substantial subsidy to the establishment of a permanent
court in Palermo under a royal prince. This would have

replaced the Viceroy and recognized Sicilian hopes for an

 

’He never understood how “seventy families could devour
one million and a half people." Pontieri, 'L’ Esperimento
riformatore del Marchese Domenico Caracciolo Vicere di
Sicilia (1781-1786)," ibid., p. 105.

.Iblde' p0 1100
'His characterization of Sicilians as gan1_3;ngbb1311

(“mad dogs“) did not make him any more popular in that

quarter. Roearlo Romeo. WW (Bari:
Laterza, 1982), p. 61.

‘°Pontieri, 'L’ Esperimento,‘ 11_R119nm1gmg, p. 140.

 

30

autonomous government. However, when Ferdinand left Sicily
in 1802, he conveniently forgot his side of the bargain.H
The king’s second and more prolonged visit generated further
friction. Squabbles between Sicilians and Neapolitans con-
tinued in 1806 and gave the impression that the Neapolitans
were more alien in Sicily than the British.‘2 Old disagree-
ments concerning the amount and use of Sicilian revenues and
the queen’s open hostility to anything Sicilian aggravated
the situation.‘°

The ensuing struggle for power between king and par-
liament was rooted in the weakness of the court which was
struggling with the loss of Naples and the need for revenue.
Under these circumstances, any reform program had little
chance for success. By February 1810, Ferdinand was as
usual hard-pressed for money and requested an extraordinary

subsidy of 360,000 enze a year to be assessed equally among

 

HPontieri, 'Un Retroscena nel conflitto costituzionale
del 1811 in Sicilia tra la corona e l’ aristocrazia,‘I 11
R1£eem1eme, p. 210. The Archbishop of Palermo was appointed
Lieutenant General and was succeeded by the Prince of Cuto
in 1802.

”Giacomo Blanco. We
W. p. 263: quoted in Pontierl. manta.
p. 363. Neapolitan and Sicilian courtiers held different

views regarding the best government for Sicily. The former
favored Vincenzo Cuoco’s solution of an unitarian state
similar to the Napoleonic Empire: the latter supported Paolo
Balsamo’s idea of an autonomous state based on the English
model. Ibid, p. 364.

‘°There is ample evidence of Maria Carolina’s dislike
for Sicily, ''a poor land, inhabited by beggars.“ Antonio
Capograssi, ’ - ~ -
neee1een1ene (Bari: Laterza, 1949), p. 28. See also
Pontieri, 11_I;emen1e, p. 363, n. 3.

31
the estates.H This move, which reopened the question
of the fiscal reforms proposed by Caracciolo, sought
approval of a sizeabie subsidy as a trade-off for a more
equitable redistribution of taxes. It also had the
potential of decreasing the power of parliament by elimin-
ating its traditional role of voting subsidies.‘9 Parlia-
ment reacted to this incursion on its prerogatives and took
the initiative away from the Crown by reducing the subsidy
to 150,000 gaze and abolishing baronial immunity from
taxation.”

At this point, the king decreed taxes which did not
have parliamentary support and provided for the confiscation
of ecclesiastical lands, a lottery to compensate the owners,
and a tax of one percent on all money payments. Up in arms,
forty-six barons signed a petition against illegal taxa-
tion." One of their leaders, Giuseppe Ventimiglia the
Prince of Belmonte, opened secret negotiations with the

British and requested protection from the king.‘° Discovery

 

‘“Pontieri, 'Un Retroscena,“ 11_R1fenm1eme, p. 213.

‘°The architect of this proposal was Luigi de’Medici,
the Minister of Finance. He was a Neapolitan champion of
enlightened absolutism and centralization and was under-
standably unpopular with the Sicilian barons.

“The economist Paolo Balsamo drafted this counter-
proposal which had a strong anti-monarchial tone.

17According to the constitution of James of Aragon,
the king could raise taxes in times of emergency without the
consent of parliament. Pontieri, 11_Ieemenee, pp. 356-357.

‘°Belmonte went so far as to accept the notion of a
new sovereign selected by the British, “even if necessary a
Protestant.'. Mack Smith, p. 341. According to Amherst’s

32
of this conspiracy led to the arrest of Belmonte and four
other barons, including Carlo Cottone the Prince of
Castelnuovo, and Belmonte’s uncle. At this Juncture,
British intervention led to the release of the five barons
from prison, the suspension of Ferdinand from his royal
duties, the exile of Maria Carolina from the court, the
repeal of the one percent tax, and the dismissal of
unpopular ministers. The intervention also paved the way
for the constitutional revolution of 1812-1813.

This baronial rebellion, supported by a foreign power,
weakened the Bourbon state and favored the interests of its
opponents. The barons surrendered the appearance of privi-
lege, but managed to keep the substance." They controlled
the island, limited the power of the monarchy, and remained
'the strongest force in the land."° The slow and cumber-
some process of reform implementation had worked in their

favor. In contrast to Naples, Sicily did not have by 1820

 

letter to Wellesley of July 28, 1810, the king had already
I'been guilty of gross violations of the constitution under
which he holds the crown.‘ The barons were no longer pro-
tected against 'a tyranny wholly repugnant to the original
freedom enJoyed by the inhabitants of Sicily." If England
refused to intervene, the barons would be driven to rebel-
lion and 'perhaps even ultimately into the arms of France.“

Harold Acton, Ihe_fieeepene_efi_flee1ee (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1956), p. 578.

"This was the opinion of Carlo Afan de Rivera, the
Director of Roads, Waters, and Forests, Eene1ee1_eu11e

W (Naples: 11.9.. 1820). p. 19. The
barons probably agreed to share the tax burden because they

knew that reforms would most likely remain meaningless.

RomeO. W. pp. 135-136.
a°Mack smith, p. 351.

33
an implementation deadline. An operation which was completed
in Naples had thus not even begun in Sicily.“

Paradoxically, the Restoration of 1815 weakened the
position of the barons without strengthening the Crown. Any
notion of preserving the Constitution of 1812 over strong
Austrian opposition had no chance of success. Great
Britain, the patron saint of the Sicilian constitution, did
not undertake any diplomatic action in its favor and was
content with protecting its economic and strategic interests
in the Mediterranean. The barons could no longer rely upon
the constitution as a base for their political power: nor
could they entertain hopes for Sicilian autonomy.

Even the restored monarchy did not operate from a
position of strength. King of two kingdoms, Ferdinand I was
in fact the undisputed ruler of neither.22 The Great Powers
backed his restoration according to the principle of legiti-
macy and for the sake of European stability.23 While these
considerations preserved the Bourbons’ dynastic rights,

their prestige was low in Europe. During wartime, they were

 

21Pontieri. 11.12amont9. p. 368.

22Walter Maturi, "La Politica estera napoletana dai 1815

al 1820." 31xista_Stonica_ItaLLana. vol. 4 (1939). p. 227.

23"The Congress of Vienna has recognized as King of the
Two Sicilies the present monarch and has also supported the
union of the two countries in a single kingdom. This union
is tied with its other political view and so many powers
have participated in such a general organization that we
could not alter it without fearing upheavals and without
upsetting the equilibrium of an area of Europe.“ Duke
Armand de Richelieu, French prime minister (1815-1818), to
Count de Narbonne-Pelet, French ambassador to Naples,
January 30, 1816: Maturi, p. 233.

34
under British protection. In peacetime, they passed under
Austrian tutelage.

In Sicily, the king faced the charge of treason
because of the abrogation of the constitution and the sup-
pression of parliament. Raising the old war cry against a
”foreign" dynasty, the barons led the attack and found
support for the claim that Ferdinand I had destroyed ancient
privileges and the gains of 1812. According to the histor—
ian Nicolo Palmeri, the king and his ministers had deprived
Sicilians of all political rights and reduced “a kingdom
with a seven-century-old constitution to the lamentable
condition of a province . . . ruled by a tyrannical and
absolute prince."2“ The demotion of Palermo from capital
city to provincial seat symbolized the diminished status of
the barons. A centralized adninistration deprived them of
the exercise of patronage in the provinces. The owners of
large estates assumed a heavier tax burden, while at the
same time the abrogation of entail threatened the integrity
of their landholdings.25

The restored monarchy could have strengthened its

position against the barons by cultivating support from

 

2“"Ridurre un regno, che per sette secoll avea avuto
una costituzione, alla lagrimevole condizione di provincia
d’ un regno governato dall’ assoluto arbitrario potere del
principe. . . .' Nicole Palmeri, SAQQLQ_SLQEIQQ:EQILLL£Q
WILLA: quoted in Roma. 1.].
313mm. pp. 158-159.

23After the abolition of entail, younger sons were
frequently persuaded to remain single in order to maintain
the integrity of the estate. Mack Smith, p. 363.

35

other quarters. Moderate reformists, professionals, small
landowners eager to acquire more land, and civil servants
concerned with career opportunities within the new bureau-
cracy could have looked to the Crown as their protector
against baronial abuse. This alliance might have outweighed
their dissatisfaction concerning the mode and substance of
several reforms.=‘ However, the political philosophy of the
Bourbons’ program blocked progress in this directlon.”

Even after the Revolution of 1820, anti-feudal legis-
lation did not guarantee economic progress, and the Sicilian
economy and society remained more or less what they were in
the eighteenth century." The reforms failed to redistri-

bute the land and improve the conditions of the peasantry.

 

3‘The new taxes, the conscription law, and the manner
of the reform process were especially unpopular. ‘Nulla
rimase esente da riforma, come se la Sicilia ad una grande
rivoluzione fosse soggiaciuta o regno di conquista del cav.
de’Medici fosse divenuta' (”Nothing was exempt from reform
as though Sicily had suffered a great revolution, or become
a conquest of Cavalier de’Medici'). Francesco Paterno

CosteIIO. W
W: quoted in Romeo, 11
We. pp. 176—177.

”Romeo. W. pp. 176-177.

2'The baron’s disappointment over the abrogation of the

constitution, popular dissatisfaction with the reforms of
the preceding five years, and anti-Neapolitan sentiment are
some of the causes for the Revolution of 1820 in Sicily.
The more democratic Spanish Charter was chosen over the
Constitution of 1812, and urban artisan guilds participated
in the struggle. However, leadership remained in the hands
of aristocrats, a fact which led the Neapolitan revolution-
aries to suspect a separatist agenda. Municipal rivalries,
divisiveness among the leaders, and the uncertain direction
of the movement prevented the revolution from.becom1ng an
”expression of conscious political will.“ Ibid., p. 168.

 

 

 

36

Impoverished barons were more likely to sell their land to
more affluent nobiemen than to subdivide it into smaller
holdings. The law of subJugation, which assigned lands in
payment for debts, did not redistribute those lands across
class lines, since creditors were mostly members of either
the aristocracy or the clergy. The peasants did not benefit
from the abolition of manoriai rights, which survived in
practice. The right of the landlord to buy the crops of
his tenants at a fixed price continued because the peasants
were hard pressed for money and willing to accept the
conditions of sale imposed by the landlord.“' The aboli-
tion of Ipromiscuous rights“ damaged the interests of the
peasants who relied on the use of pastures, woodlands, and
marshes.°° All this played into the hands of the land-
owners, who sabotaged or delayed reform. Land reform,
which was so important for the economy, failed because “it
was anathema to the only people who counted.“u

To make matters worse, the transition to a peacetime
economy at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars had a
negative impact on Sicily. For several years Sicily was
a base for military operations against the French and a
center of Mediterranean trade. The British presence in

Sicily generated a strong demand for foodstuffs, which

 

2"Pontlelrl. IJJLamsmto. p. 370.

°°Promiscuous rights applied to those lands where
ownership coexisted with usage rights. Not until 1825 did
the peasants receive some compensation for their losses.

"Mack Smith, p. 409.

37

raised the price of crops and the value of the land.32
After their departure, falling demand caused a decline in
crop prices and land values.'°

Sicily’s export trade, facing competition from Russian
wheat and Spanish olive oil, was also in trouble. In
addition, the commercial agreement with Great Britain on
September 26, 1816, reduced the tariff on British goods
entering Neapolitan ports by 10 percent." Luigi Blanch
called the treaty a 'Navigation Act in reverse“ because it
promoted British comneroial interests in the Mediterranean
and gave them a clear advantage in Sicilian markets.°°
Neapolitan commerce did not enJoy the same advantages in
British markets, and Neapolitan shipping could not carry
goods to Sicilian ports as cheaply as the British.

The trade policies sponsored by Luigi de’Medici in
1823-1824 were indications of his concern for the plight of

 

°’Until 1815, the British spent about £12,000,000 per
year in Sicily. Ibid., p. 255. Luigi de’Medici calculated
that Sicily’s income from 1806 to 1815 exceeded expenses by

20.000.000 on“. RomeO. WW. 9. 93.

"According to the historian Palmeri, the value of land
decreased by two-thirds from 1810 to 1825. This meant a loss

of 30.000.000 can. RomeO. W. p. 179.

"For a detailed account of the trade agreement and its
negative impact on the Neapolitan economy, see Pontieri,
I'Sul Trattato di commercio Anglo-Napoletano del 1845,“ 11

Eujeem1lme, pp. 281-297. See also Gaetano Cingari, M2219:
g1eene_e_R1eeee1menee (Bari: Laterza, 1970), pp. 158-164.

°°Pontleri, 'Sul Trattato,” 11_R1fienm1eme, p. 288. A
discount on the tariff was an improvement over the old flag
privilege which exempted vessels from customs inspection,
thus increasing the opportunities for contraband which was
very costly to the Neapolitan treasury.

38
the Neapolitan traders and merchant marine. He was philo-
sophically opposed to trade restrictions, but the British
domination prompted his shift to protectionism.°‘ De’Medicl
may have considered these policies as bargaining chips to
encourage British acquiescence in a reciprocity agreement
which would include the abolition of the 10 percent tariff
reduction, but the British government reacted by standing
firm and a customs war followed. The British adopted
punitive measures against Neapolitan imports carried by
Neapolitan vessels and the Neapolitans employed subterfuge
by rerouting their exports to British ports through
Trieste." De’Medici died in 1830 without seeing any
positive prospects for trade parity. At the end of that
same year, Ferdinand II succeeded to the throne and
inherited both the unresolved Sicilian Question and the
thorny problem of Anglo-Neapolitan trade relations.

British economic interests in Sicily commenced with
the treaties of Madrid (1667) and Utrecht (1713). The
former treaty with Spain gave Great Britain flag privileges
in the ports of the Neapolitan Kingdomland the latter
reinforced the British exemption from customs inspection.°°

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, British statesmen

 

"These policies extended the 10 percent tariff
reduction to Neapolitan vessels, reduced customs on exports,
and increased them on imports. Ibid., p. 293.

“’Among the British reprisals was an import tax of £10
per ton on Sicilian olive oil imported on Neapolitan
vessels. Ibid., pp. 294 and 297.

"Ibid., p. 283.

39

began to question the value of a restrictive trade policy.
At that time, William Pitt laid the foundations of an empire
based on foreign trade and not military power.” Part of
his program became clear when his government negotiated the
1786 commercial treaty with France, which substantially
reduced trade barriers between the two countries.“° However,
the French Revolution and Napoleon’s Continental System
forced the cancellation of this policy. Under a treaty
negotiated with Naples in 1793, the British agreed to
protect Neapolitan-merchantmen trading in the Mediterranean.
In return, the Neapolitan government pledged to suspend
trade with France.“1

The war with France had an impact on British trade
in the Mediterranean. On the one hand, Sicily became a

focal point for British commercial activity.“2 British

 

°’Bernard Semmel,
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 13, n. 1.
See also Peter Marshall, “The First and Second British
Empire: A Question of Demarcation,‘I 3131921. vol. 49 (Febru-
ary 1964), pp. 13-23: and G. C. Bolton, “The Founding of the

Second British Empire.“ Esonom12_fliatorx_flexlew. vol. 19
(April 1966), pp. 195-200.

‘°W. 0. Henderson, “The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty

of 1786.‘ Econom12_flistorx_kexieu. vol. 10 (August 1957).
pp. 104-112.

“The King of Naples pledged some military assistance
and could not make a separate peace without British consent.
Great Britain promised to maintain a fleet in the Mediter-
ranean throughout the period of emergency and to give
special consideration to Neapolitan interests at the con-
clusion of the war. Acton, p. 256.

‘3'In the beginning of the present century. . . Sicily
became with Malta the depot of English trade. From those
places the products of British colonies as well as of
British industry were smuggled into the blockaded ports

40

trade with Sicily remained strong to the eve of the Sulphur
War, when British manufactured goods accounted for more than
32 percent of Sicilian imports. At the same time, Great
Britain imported wine, oil, citrus fruits, and sulphur,
absorbing more than 40 percent of Sicily’s exports.‘°

British nationals doing business in Sicily formed the
core of this commercial activity. Several merchant groups
had been active in Sicily since the last quarter of the
eighteenth century and were concentrated mainly in the port
cities of Palermo and Messina. Others operated along the
coastal areas of Licata and Girgenti. The Woodhouse family,
whose first shipment of wine went to Liverpool in 1773, was
perhaps the first to gain a measure of notoriety. The
presence of the British navy in the Mediterranean had a
positive effect upon their business, as British warships
called frequently at Sicilian ports. This development
placed the Woodhouse enterprise in the enviable position of
not being able to keep up with the demand for its wine.“

Woodhouse was only one of many British nationals who

 

along the coast of the Mediterranean.“ Comment by Julius C.
Kretschmar, American consul in Palermo, writing in April,
1854: quoted in Treveiyan, p. 475, n. 33.

4"'Trade statistics for the years 1834 and 1838-1840
are in Roma. 11.311229111131139. pp. 220-221-

“In addition to establishing a wine industry in Sicily
which was quite able to expand to meet this demand, Woodhouse
created what was, in effect, the beginnings of a complete
agrarian revolution. His business provided loans to farmers
so that they could clear their wheat fields and olive groves,
replacing them with vineyards. Treveiyan, pp. 15—16.

41
gradually constructed for themselves a substantial vested
interest in Sicily at the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Morrison, Routh, Valentine, Jeans, Horner, Taunton,
and Rose were some of the biggest names among the new
merchants.4B In innovation and diversity, BenJamin Ingham
perhaps represented the best success story of British
enterprise in Sicily.“ At the conclusion of the Napoleonic
Wars, Ingham and his fellow merchants generated enough
activity to draw the appointment of no less than thirty
British consuls or vice-consuls to the island at various
times."

There is little evidence to suggest, however, that as
of the first decade of the nineteenth century the British
government supported a formal program to promote trade with
Sicily. British merchants pressed hard for commercial
advantages, especially the 10 percent reduction in the
tariff on imported goods from Great Britain: but Richard
Wellesley, the foreign secretary in the Percival cabinet,

did not respond to these requests and apparently gave

 

‘9There was also a Sanderson who greatly extended his
oils business in Messina. Now Italian owned, his firm is
still flourishing under the name W. Sanderson and Sons.
Ibid., p. 48.

“‘Ingham’s maJor claim to fame was making Marsala wine
famous. Other business activities included the export of
citrus fruit, olive oil, sumac, and barilla, with sidelines
in almonds, filberts, manna, liquorice, pumice, and
currants. Ibid., p. 6.

‘7Ibid., p. 12.

42
”little thought” to commercial advantages.‘°

The British government’s indifference to the wishes of
these merchants ended with the conclusion of the war. As
the Bourbons reclaimed Naples, the merchants once again
pressed for the restoration of flag privileges in the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. At the same time, the Neapoli-
tan government perceived the advantage of conciliating Great
Britain in order to ensure that nation’s concurrence in the
abolition of the Constitution of 1812. The commercial treaty
signed on September 26, 1816, establishing a 10 percent re-
duction in the tariff on all British imports into the king-
dom, was the resultant compromise between the governments of
Great Britain and Naples. In return, the British government
abstained from any opposition to the demise of the Sicilian
Constitution.

In their analysis of the British ”informal empire”
during the nineteenth century, John Gallagher and Ronald
Robinson note that imperialism is not a necessary function
of economic expansion. They argue that, ”whether imperi—
alist phenomena show themselves or not is determined not
only by the factors of economic expansion, but equally by
the political and social organization of the regions brought

into the orbit of the expansive society, and also by the

 

“John Roeeel I l . Wm
- (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

WWW

sity Press, 1956), p. 20. Petitions to the Foreign Office
and the Board of Trade from the merchants of Exeter, Leeds,
Nottingham, and Sheffield can be found in F0 70/49.

43
world situation in general.”" In the case of Sicily, the
British government was also concerned with maintaining
political influence and a strategic presence in the area.
During the reign of Ferdinand IV, the practice of monitoring
developments at the Neapolitan court enabled the British to
exercise a measure of control through the actions of John
Acton and.William Bentinck. Both men successfully worked
within their respective capacities to insure that the
policies of the Neapolitan government were compatible with
the interests of Great Britain.

John Acton was born in Besancon, France, and eventu-
ally served the Grand Duke of Tuscany as a soldier of
fortune. Ferdinand IV appointed him minister of marine in
1779 with the intent of reorganizing the Neapolitan navy.
From there Acton rose to the rank of foreign minister and
then finally in 1785 to prime minister. Sir William
Hamilton, the British envoy to Naples, recognized the signi-
ficance of Acton’s position when he implied that Acton
relayed military intelligence to the British on a regular
basis.°° The French also understood the effects of Acton’s
presence in Naples. Baron Alquier, the French ambassador to
Naples, came to the conclusion that as long as Acton con-

tinued as prime minister, Naples would never become attached

 

“'John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ”The Imperialism

of Free Trade.” 2W. vol. 6 (1953).
p. 6.

°°Acton, p. 182.

44
to France."1 Even Hamilton’s successor, Hugh Elliot, admit-
ted that Acton’s presence was the best safeguard for British
interests in the area.52

The British government decided to intervene formally
in the internal affairs of Sicily in 1806 as the peace nego-
tiations with France came to a halt. By the time William
Bentinck, the former governor of Madras, assumed his posi-
tion as Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Sicily
during the Napoleonic Wars, most contemporary observers were
beginning to see an elaborate struggle taking shape between
Bentinck, representing the causes of the British alliance
and a constitution for Sicily, and his antagonist, Queen
Maria Carolina, representing the forces of reaction and
anti-British sentiment.°° The emergency created by the
war with France appeared to Justify more than a military
presence on the island. The tension between the Crown and
baronage, and Maria Carolina’s alleged collusion with the
enemy persuaded Bentinck to act. By aiding and abetting the

barons, he interfered with the domestic affairs of Sicily,

 

3‘Alquier added ”You may depend upon it that in the
Sicilian Cabinet Chevalier Acton is only a member of the
British Cabinet. What can we expect from the Court of
Naples when it is directed by a British subJect? Every-
thing about Chevalier Acton is English: titles, hopes,
speeches, and material fortune. His wife has no other title
but Milady: he has Just put his nephew in the British navy:
when he speaks of the British he says we. . . .” Ibid., p.
465.

Balbide, p0 4890
9"H. M. Lackland, ”The Failure of the Constitutional

Experiment in Sicily. 18113-1814.” Wm.
vol. 41 (April 1926), p. 210.

45
and exceeded his mandate to defend Sicily from a French
invasion.

Perhaps Bentinck’s boldest activities related to the
deposition of Queen Maria Carolina. He complained often of
the queen’s opposition to his plans for governing Sicily and
went on to say in a letter to her that ”if . . . Your
MaJesty has been carrying on a direct correspondence with
our enemy . . . I leave to Your MaJesty to Judge whether it
will not be prudent for Your MaJesty to retire in time from
Palermo before these circumstances can become the subject of
further discussion and irritation.”°‘ Almost one year
later, the British foreign secretary tried to convince the
Neapolitan ambassador in London, the Prince of Castelcicala,
that the British government ”insisted on nothing less than
the queen’s departure for Vienna.”99 She left for Vienna
the following June.

After the departure of the queen, Bentinck continued
to interfere in Sicily’s internal affairs. When he sus-
pected in October 1813 that reactionary ministers might
assume control of the Sicilian cabinet, he ceased caring for
constitutional niceties and ”began to take an active part
in the negotiations for forming a ministry.”°° In another

controversy over the budget and, in the final analysis,

 

"Bentinck to the queen, March 16, 1812, F0 70/51,
Rosselli, p. 185.

'°Castlereagh to Bentinck, Private Letters, February 9,
1813, F0 70/59, Rosselli, p. 195.

"Lackland, p. 229.

46
executive power, ”Bentinck felt that the task of bringing
the recalcitrant members of parliament to reason would be
impossible if parliament were able to meet at once, and he
therefore demanded . . . a further prorogation of a week.”°’
Bentinck was also active in controlling Sicilian elections,
and left little doubt concerning his intentions in the minds
of local politicians." He announced that he was the
”strongest man in the country, that he regarded himself as
the advocate of the nation whose interests they were
betraying by their factious conduct, and that he was
determined to dictate the law to them.”"

From the beginning of Bentlnck’s tenure, inconsisten-
cies in British Sicilian policy became apparent. One source
relates that the British government ”gave William Bentinck
new instructions which emphasized the necessity of Sicilians
sharing in the government of Naples.”‘° According to
another source, the British felt that baronial privileges
were harmful to Sicily and ought to be curbed in the
interests of national defense.‘* It is clear at this point
that strategic interests overrode any concern for a consti-

tution which gave political power to the barons. Lord

 

"Ibid., p. 227.
"Mack Smith, p. 349.
"Lackland, p. 228.

“Charles K. Webster. W
1&1221515 (London: Bell and Sons, 1931), p. 76.

‘iMack Smith, p. 341.

47

Castlereagh, the foreign secretary in the Liverpool cabinet,
stated that Ferdinand was Sicily’s lawful sovereign who
should be ”restored” and not ”elected.”2 As the war drew
to a close, he wrote to Bentinck that ”it is not insurrec-
tion we now want in Italy . . . we want disciplined force
under sovereigns we can trust.”" This may explain why
Castlereagh welcomed Austrian influence in Naples. When
Ferdinand promised not to introduce a constitution without
Austrian consent, the British government acquiesced without
debate.

After the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh’s alignment
with progressive groups became more apparent. His efforts
to restore independence to the territories conquered by Napo-
leon are well documented.“ The Neapolitan Revolution of
1820 served further to define Castlereagh’s position re-
garding liberalism and forced him to confront the dilemmas
now facing British foreign policy." He had to acknowledge
both growing domestic support for liberal causes and Austrian

fears of progressive influence in the Neapolitan state.

 

‘3Webster, p. 84.
‘°Ibid., p. 260.

“Stephen R. Graubard, ”Castlereagh and the Peace of

Europe.” lournal.of.hrltisb.§tud11a. vol. 3 (November
1963), p. 82.

‘9”The old struggles between Austria and France for
power and influence in Italy, and between Britain and France
for supremacy in the Mediterranean were complicated by the
new doctrines of Liberalism and Nationality, and the new
system of the European Alliance.” Charles K. Webster, The

EoreIqb_2oI1c1_of.§aatlereaqh_1§1§:1§22 (London: Bell and
Sons, 1925), p. 259.

 

 

. V
.
.
. " I
. .
i ‘ ‘ .
l
. e ‘ I I
I
. l - . r A ‘ ‘
,_ u \ . ‘V 7 I '
n ' I.
. _ ~ ..
-- ' - 9
. . . k
a ' A r ‘
.
‘ , .. v -
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u 7‘ I i '
| ' - . - .
. . _ F. ’ 7
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- " A o h
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A 7| r
. w
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48
Although Castlereagh never disputed Austria’s right to
intervene, he made it clear that any action taken in this
direction should have the support of other European powers
and especially Great Britain’s.“ In response to Austrian,
Prussian, and Russian plans for a concerted intervention in
the internal affairs of Naples at the Congress of Troppau,
Castlereagh emphasized that the exclusion of states from the
European system and the altering of their institutions by
force would violate international law." The Austrian
ambassador to London attributed Castlereagh’s position to
the ”disguised liberalism” which was making itself felt
among the supporters of the Liverpool ministry.‘° George
Canning, Castlereagh’s successor at the Foreign Office, did
not support the idea of a congress system to maintain the
‘eeegee_gee. Addressing the House of Commons on March 29,
1821, in an apparent reaction to the popular movements in
Naples, Piednont, Portugal, and Spain, Canning stated ”I see

the principles of liberty in operation and shall be one of

 

“The Neapolitan king broke the treaty which bound him
”not to allow any changes in the political system of his
dominions inconsistent with their ancient monarchical
institutions or with the principles adopted by His Austrian
MaJesty for the internal administration of His Italian
Provinces.” W. Alison Phillips, ”Great Britain and the
Continental Alliance 1816-1822,” in Adolphus W. Ward and
George P. Gooch (eds.),

Wish
2eee1gn_2911e11_11§§;1212 (New York: Machllan, 1923), vol.
2, p. 34.

"Webster . W322.
p. 303.

"Ibid., p. 271.

49

the last to restrain them."°¢

This ”disguised liberalism” was beginning to infil-
trate institutions within the British political system. The
Whigs often supported measures sympathetic to liberal
causes. In a speech before the House of Commons on February
21, 1821, James Mackintosh voiced great concern over the
goals supported by the Holy Alliance at the congresses of
Troppau and Laibach. He also moved to demand a full dis-
closure of the intentions of His MaJesty’s Government,
”emphasizing that if the principles of national independence
had been trampled underfoot by one nation of Europe, the
more it behooved the others to look with Jealous anxiety to
the safety and the preservation of their own inviolable
rights.”’° Castlereagh addressed the House of Commons in
response to these developments, saying that he was perfectly
willing to Join in many of the sentiments Mackintosh
expressed." Although this motion fell to defeat by a
margin of 69 votes, 125 members of the House of Commons

supported it.72

 

"This statement reflected only a part of Canning’s
political philosophy. He also regarded the Spanish Consti-
tution as a very improper and dangerous model, but a lesser
danger than the congress system and the Holy Alliance.
Harold Temperley, ”The Foreign Policy of Canning,” in Ward
and Gooch (eds.), p. 112.

7°Thomas Curson Hansard (ed.), Eee11emen§ee1_nepe1ee,
(London: Baldwin, 1821), vol. 4, p. 838.

7‘Ibid., p. 865.

’zlbid., p. 894.

49
the last to restrain them."‘?

This ”disguised liberalism” was beginning to infil-
trate institutions within the British political system. The
Whigs often supported measures sympathetic to liberal
causes. In a speech before the House of Commons on February
21, 1821, James Mackintosh voiced great concern over the
goals supported by the Holy Alliance at the congresses of
Troppau and Laibach. He also moved to demand a full dis-
closure of the intentions of His MaJesty’s Government,
”emphasizing that if the principles of national independence
had been trampled underfoot by one nation of Europe, the
more it behooved the others to look with Jealous anxiety to
the safety and the preservation of their own inviolable
rights.”’° Castlereagh addressed the House of Commons in
response to these developments, saying that he was perfectly
willing to Join in many of the sentiments Mackintosh
expressed.’1 Although this motion fell to defeat by a
margin of 69 votes, 125 members of the House of Commons

supported it.72

 

"This statement reflected only a part of Canning’s
political philosophy. He also regarded the Spanish Consti-
tution as a very improper and dangerous model, but a lesser
danger than the congress system and the Holy Alliance.
Harold Temperley, ”The Foreign Policy of Canning,” in Ward
and Gooch (eds.), p. 112.

’°Thomas Curson Hansard (ed.), Eee11emen1eex_nebe1ee,
(London: Baldwin, 1821), vol. 4, p. 838.

7‘Ibld., p. 865.

72Ibid., p. 894.

50

This formal condemnation of the principles which
guided the Holy Alliance with respect to the Neapolitan
Revolution parallelled Castlereagh’s strategy toward Naples.
He reacted vigorously to the challenges and entreaties
presented by the Holy Alliance. As a result, the British
government officially stood apart from the Holy Alliance’s
concerted efforts to preserve the conservative spirit in
Naples. The overarching significance here was that
Castlereagh regarded the Holy Alliance’s actions as not
only repugnant to the fundamental laws of Great Britain but
also in conflict with the system of international law.’°
Castlereagh seemed to emerge from all this as a defender of
liberal ideals as his condemnation of the Holy Alliance’s
conduct toward Naples evoked the ”applause of Liberals all
over Europe.”’4

More support for liberal movements came from Henry
John Temple, the Third Viscount Palmerston, the successor to
Castlereagh and Canning at the Foreign Office. Palmerston
expressed sympathy for Belgian independence and welcomed
the July Revolution in France, calling it a ”triumph for
the principles of free discussion and the diffusion of

knowledge.”" His reputation in Italy as a friend of

 

"Webster . W.
p. 321.

"Ibid., p. 323.

’°Christopher Bartlett, ”Britain and the European
Balance 1815-1848,” in Alan Sked (ed.), ’

Eeuee_1§1§;1§5§ (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 152.

51
liberalism began in 1832 when Metternich sent Austrian
troops to occupy the Papal States. On that occasion,
Palmerston criticized Metternich for failing to make the
Pope reform the administration of the Papal States."
This policy statement did not endear Palmerston to the
Austrians, as Metternich accused the British of being more
subversive in Italy than the French.”

In addition to the growing economic and political
involvement with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Bri-
tish were also establishing a strong strategic presence in
the area. In 1814, the British had seized the island of
Malta from the French with the concurrence of the Maltese
assembly. This development gave the Admiralty access to an
island which was strategically located in the central Medi-
terranean, only sixty nautical miles from the Sicilian shore
and slightly farther from the Italian peninsula. More im-
portantly, the British became the dominant sea power in the
area. During the years 1835 and 1836, there were 23 ships
of the line on the Mediterranean station, increasing to 25

British ships in 1837, 29 in 1838 and 1839, and finally

 

"”The short argument seems to be that unless reforms
are made, Austrian interference will be perpetually required
to preserve order, but that other powers cannot be expected
to look on quietly. . . and there will arise imminent danger
of war.” Palmerston to Sir Frederick Lamb, British ambas-
sador to Vienna, April 15, 1832, The Papers of Queen

Victoria. Kenneth Bourne. W;
1351 (New York: MacMillan, 1982), p. 366.

”Palmerston to Lamb, March 13, 1832, BP, Bourne,
p. 367.

52

expanding to a peak strength of 37 ships of the line by
1840.’°

The direction of British foreign policy was another
factor which determined British naval strength in the Medi—
terranean. In 1831, Palmerston reacted to what he perceived
to be French and Austrian interference in central Italy with
six sail of the line at his disposal.” The fate of the
Ottoman Empire and political instability of the Iberian
peninsula were also matters of concern to Palmerston. In
August 1836, he sent a British naval force under Admiral
Rowley to the Tunisian coast to remind France that ”she
was not the sole power in the Mediterranean.”°° Thus ”Italy,
Greece, the Ottoman Empire, the North African coastline . .
were the obJects of much British diplomatic activity, often
reinforced by the British navy.”H

The protection of trade routes and the welfare of
British nationals in the area also dictated the disposition

of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. Discussions in

 

"Chr 1 atopher Bartlett . WM:
1815:1853 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), Appendix II, p. 341.

7’Palmerston happily added that ”We shall be strong
enough in the Mediterranean to do what we like with any
fleet the French can have in that sea.” Graham to Malcolm,
March 15, 1831, ADM/1/4365, ibid., p. 85.

'°Palmerston felt that ”Rowley should take care not to
assume a menacing appearance, but when there is the begin-
ning of a row, it is natural that the Police Man should
walk up to the spot, to see what is going on.” Palmerston’s
minute on a letter from Mlnto, August 2, 1836, ELL/217,

Bartlett. WW. 9. 117.
"Bartlett. Wilmer. p. x.

53

the House of Commons focused not only on the importance of
the Indian trade but also on the development and protection
of the routes to India through the eastern Mediterranean.°3
Two routes were under consideration by 1835, one through
Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf via the Gulf of
Antioch, the other through the Isthmus of Suez and the Red
Sea via the port city of Alexandria. Although a parliamen—
tary committee favored the development of the latter at the
expense of the former, both routes together contributed to
the development of Malta as a way-station through which the
bulk of British Mediterranean commerce passed.°°

British strategists planned to protect British
nationals trading in the Mediterranean region. Immediately
after the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh believed that

political concerns took precedence over economic

 

'aA parliamentary committee issued a report which
emphasized the importance of a ”rapid communication with
India.” Mr. Charles Grant, speaking in support of a motion
that £20,000 be granted to ”assist in the experiment of
a more rapid communication with India by steam conveyance,”
declared that ”it was equally the duty and the interest of
England to watch all the modes of access to India, with a
view to the political and economic prosperity and the mutual
advantage of both countries.” Hansard, (ed.), vol. 25
(1834), pp. 930-931.

'°Royal Mail service to India began in 1835 and became
available on the first of every month. Dispatched from
Falmouth to Malta in the steam packets of the Royal Navy,
the mail would then go to Alexandria by branch steamer when-
ever the appr0priate vessels were available. ”That this
plan was looked upon as being more than a temporary trial is
indicated by the fact that the Admiralty Board simultane-
ously placed orders for the building of six new steamers ex-
pressly for the Mediterranean service.” Hanford L. Hoskins,

B;111eh_Ree1ee_1e_1ng1e (London: Frank Cass, 1966), p. 211.

54

considerations, but shortly thereafter ministers began to
narrow the gap between these priorities.°‘ In 1820,
Castlereagh dispatched a ship of the line and two frigates
to the Mediterranean as reinforcements for the ship of the
line already there in response to the trouble in Naples.
The foreign secretary sent these ships to ”protect British
commercial interests.”°°

There is little doubt that the British government had
more than a passing interest in the movements of foreign
ships along the Mediterranean coastline. France was the most
likely candidate to upset the favorable balance of British
commerce in this area. The London I1me§ supported a more
active government role in the defense of British commercial
interests against French interference.°‘ When the sulphur
crisis challenged British economic interests, the British
negotiator, James MacGregor, became ”one of the firmest

advocates of the use of force.”"

 

"Bartlett, ”Britain and the European Balance,“ in
Sked (ed.), p. 147.

”Bartlett. WW. 9. 65.

"A September 11, 1838, editorial declared, ”Let the
merchants of Great Britain look around them. Let them turn
their eyes to Senegal, Oran, Algiers, Constantine, Tunis,
Greece, Naples, La Plata, the Amazons, the Gulf of Mexico,
the Gulf of California, and they will perceive in each of
these regions France established as the avowed enemy of

British commerce.” James Swain, In£_SLEMQQLE_£QL_Lh:

WM (Boston:
Stratford, 1933), p. 108.

'7”I beg leave to assure your Lordship that my best
Judgement shall be exerted to assist in carrying through
these measures which, considering the great natural

55

The Bourbon Kingdom in Sicily during the period
immediately preceding the Sulphur War represented an arena
in which the British either made use of favorable circum-
stances or directly acted to secure a measure of control
over a sovereign state to further British plans. Long
before the outbreak of the Sulphur War, a growing awareness
of British commercial interests in Sicily resulted in the
creation of an economic sphere of influence. The presence
of a John Acton at the Court of Naples, the appointment of
William Bentinck as the Commander-in-Chief in Sicily, and
the disassociation of Castlereagh, Canning, and Palmerston
from the philosophy of the congress system also helped
define a British political sphere of influence in Sicily.
All these circumstances combined with broader developments
elsewhere, such as the concern for the disposition of the
Ottoman territories and the protection of the British trade
routes to India, to form a strategic presence in the area.

The British position complicated the Bourbon program
of reform and control in Sicily. Ferdinand had to struggle
not only with the barons who impeded reform.and a closer
union with Naples, but also with British economic, politi-
cal, and strategic domination. After the Restoration,

the Bourbons had to cope with persistent internal opposition

 

Resources of the Two Sicilies hitherto by restrictions and
other Adninistrative means paralyzed as to their calmercial
development, will . . . be attended by the greatest practi-
cal advantage to British trade and navigation.” MacGregor
to Palmerston, September 20, 1839, PRO/BT/2/11/492-493,
Davis, in Davis (ed.), p. 87.

56
following the repeal of the constitution and the abolition
of parliament. In addition, the implementation of economic
reforms which were so important to the modernization of
Sicily was limited while British trading privileges guaran-
teed by the Treaty of 1816 continued.

The strong British presence in Sicily and the Bourbon
struggle to solve the Sicilian Question against internal and
external opposition defined the arena within which the
Sulphur War unfolded. This confrontation provides insights
regarding Gallagher and Robinson’s description of the
relationship between political control and economic
expansion.

Economic expansion. . . will tend to flow into
the regions of maximum opportunity, but maximum
opportunity depends as much upon political
considerations of security as upon questions of
profit. Consequently, in any particular region,
if economic opportunity seems large but political
opportunity small, then full absorption into the

extending economy tends to be frustrated until
power is exerted upon the state in question.°°

 

°°Gallagher and Robinson, p. 6.

CHAPTER III

M

”Let but a hand of violence be laid upon an
English subJect, and the great British lion,
which lies couchant in Downing Street, begins
to utter menacing growls and shake his
invincible locks.M
For a long time prior to the Sulphur War, Great
Britain possessed an informal empire in Sicily. As the
sulphur crisis loomed on the horizon, the British
government shifted its policy of informal control over
Neapolitan affairs to one of ”gunboat diplomacy.” Palmer-
ston, realizing that a peaceful solution to the problem was
improbable, ordered the British navy to blockade the port of
Naples. This action did fall short of annexation, yet was
one in which the use of British power came to play a central
role.
The following analysis of the transition to a policy
of ”gunboat diplomacy” should reveal several characteristics

of British imperialism during the first half of the nine-

teenth century. Although strategic considerations were

 

‘Hillard, a Bostonian, quoted in Treveiyan, p. 486,
n. 19.

57

58
important factors in the British opposition to the French
presence in the Mediterranean, controversy still surrounds
the relative importance of economics to strategy in the
determination of British foreign policy. For example,
British policy-makers had economic as well as strategic
reasons for supporting Abl-el-Kader in Algeria.2 Were they
motivated by the same considerations in the controversy
over the Sicilian sulphur? Who were the individuals
responsible for this policy, and from where and to what
degree were they influenced by groups and agencies within or
outside the government?

Any attempt to answer these questions must be preceded
by a discussion of the political decision-making process
within the British government, specifically in the area of
international relations. During this period, the adminis-
tration of British foreign policy was in a state of transi-
tion. It was a time when the influence of the monarch was
on the decline and that of a group of cabinet ministers,
especially the foreign secretary, was on the rise.3 It was
also a time when parliament may indeed have been more than

”peripherally involved” in the decision-making process as it

 

2Palmerston seemed particularly I'prone to abandon non-
interventlon” when other European nations threatened to
establish monopolies. It was this, ”as well as the impli-
cations for the strategic command of the Mediterranean that
made him so anxious about French expansion beyond Algeria.”
Bourne, p. 626.

’Charlee Middleton. WM

Eeee1gn_£e11e1_1Z§2;1§5§ (Durham: University Press, 1977),
p. 4.

59
related to the formation of foreign policy.4

The struggle between the forces of reaction and change
over the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 resulted in a
shift of political power. Charles Grey, the prime minister
who supported reform of the electoral system, called for a
new election in the process and together with a group of
leading Tories prevailed over a hesitant king and an
obstructionist House of Lords. The passage of this legis-
lation increased the representation of the urban middle
class in parliament. The prime minister, with the support
of the maJority in the House of Commons, could now ”wield
his authority more strongly than even George III would have
found possible.”5 As a result, the cabinet became more
responsive to pressures from parliament and parties.

At the same time, the responsibility for the develop-
ment of foreign policy fell on a small coterie of senior
cabinet officials who made the ”vast maJority of the
decisions taken by any cabinet.”‘ During the 1830s,
Palmerston worked to consolidate his position of influence

and retained maJor responsibility for the direction of

 

“Middleton admits that ”Parliamentary support became
increasingly important as the ability of the Crown to
influence elections declined, and parliamentary control of
the purse always loomed as a potential check to too ambitious
a foreign policy.” Ibid., p. 7.

6Ibid., p. 66.
‘Ibid., p. 65.

60

foreign policy in the Melbourne cabinet.’ The prime
minister may even have gone so far as to give his foreign
secretary a free hand. When France seemed ready to extend
its territorial control beyond Algeria, Palmerston responded
by sending a British officer to reorganize the Bey of Tunis’
army without even consulting his prime minister.’ This
style was based on the Palmerstonian conviction that there
were ”very few public men in England who follow up foreign
affairs Sufficiently to forsee [e1e] the Consequences of
Events.”’

A forceful and pragmatic politician, a convert to the
ideals of George Canning, Palmerston was foreign secretary

for the duration of the sulphur crisis.*° He was about

 

’A. J. P. Taylor saw Melbourne as having little in-
fluence over the direction of foreign policy during his ten-
ure in office (1835-1841), and remarked that Melbourne ”made
scarcely any attempt to wield power while he was in office.”
Taylor also posed the question, ”What does he tell us about
the political world in which prime ministers are supposed to
rule supreme?” Dorothy Marshall, Leeg_fle1heeene (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975), pp. vii-viii. On the other
hand, Palmerston’s authority was checked on occasion. When
British businessmen failed to receive payment on outstanding
debts in Portugal, Palmerston composed a ”strong letter” to
the Portuguese government and even went so far as to
threaten seizure of Portuguese colonies. This message never
reached Lisbon, and it was Melbourne who ”insisted . . . on
submitting the matter to the cabinet.” Bourne, p. 588.

'Ibid., p. 557.

’Palmerston to Granville, F0, June 5, 1838, PRO 30/29/
423: same to same, FO, June 5, 1838, PRO 30/29/413: and
Palmerston to Russell, March 7, 1836, Private, PRO 30/22/
2A, ff. 274-277: Middleton, p. 47.

‘°John Henry Temple, the Third Viscount Palmerston
(1784-1865), began his career with election to parliament in
1807 and retired after his second term as prime minister
(1859-1865). At the time of the sulphur crisis, he was in

L4

61

to lead his nation into a war over an issue which was
apparently economic: the award of the Sicilian sulphur con-
tract to a French company. Palmerston opposed the contract
from beginning to end. At first he endeavored to persuade
the Neapolitan government to reJect the Taix-Aycard con-
tract. After the signing, he pressed for its cancellation.

This position rested upon the Treaty of 1816.
According to Palmerston, the contract violated Article IV
of the treaty which stipulated that British commerce and
subJects in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies should be
treated ”upon the same footing as the commerce and subJects
of the most favoured nations,” and Article V which allowed
British subJects to dispose of their personal property in
any way whatever and ”without the smallest loss or
hindrance.”u Palmerston felt that British merchants were
the victims of an arbitrary act which challenged the con-
cept of private property and was hostile to manufacturing

countries.”I To the Neapolitan charge that salt and tobacco

 

his second of three terms as foreign secretary (1830-1834,
1835-1841, and 1846-1851) and later presided over the Home
Office (1852-1855).

uPalmerston to Sir William Temple, British envoy
to the Court of Naples, October 27, 1837, Eeeeee_Re1e111e
WM. (London: mm. 1840).
no. 2, p. 2, ASN/AB, f. 1013. Palmerston to Count Ludolf,
the Neapolitan ambassador to London, October 12, 1838,
ibid., no. 26, p. 47: see Appendix F. For the specific
wording of Articles IV and V, see Appendix C.

”’John Kennedy, British charge in Naples, to
Palmerston, July 14, 1838, Eepeee, no. 16, p. 24. Palmer-
ston obJected very strongly that at the ”very moment when
these British subJects have completed their preparation
and outlay, and.when they are about to derive therefrom

62

monopolies had existed for some time to which the British
government offered no obJections, Palmerston replied that
those monopolies predated the Treaty of 1816, and on that
basis ”cannot be made the ground of complaint on the part of
Her MaJesty’s Government." Palmerston’s ”demand” that
British nationals engaged in commerce with Sicily should
receive permission to ”continue to work their mines” and
sell their sulphur without being exposed to ”any interfer-
ence or restriction” irritated the Neapolitan government.“

Further examination of the diplomatic correspondence
during the sulphur crisis raises the question of strategic
motivation. Palmerston was suspicious of French intentions
in the Mediterranean since the invasion of Algeria in 1830

and was already poised to oppose Austrian meddling in the

 

those advantages which their personal exertions and pecun-
iary expenditure entitled them to expect, the Neapolitan
Government steps in, limits the quantity which such persons
are to raise to two-thirds of the average quantity hitherto
raised, during the time that some of the mines . . . had
been completely unproductive, and with respect to this
limited quantity, forces the British Lessees, either to sell
their sulphur to a private Company, and at a price arbitrar-
ily fixed, or to pay on exporting their sulphur themselves,
a duty more than double the amount which a privileged
Company is to pay.” Palmerston to Ludolf, October 12, 1838,
ibid., no. 26, pp. 46-47. The possibility of a monopoly was
mentioned in French diplomatic quarters since March, 1837.
Auguste Tallenay, French charge in Naples, to Louis-Mathieu
Mole, French foreign minister, March 7, 1837: Armando Saitta
(ed.),

ge11e_nee_s1e111e (Rome: Instituto Storico Italiano per

l’ Eta Moderna e Contemporanea, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 67-68.

”'Palmerston to Ludolf, October 12, 1838, p. 47.

“Ibid., p. 48.

 

63
affairs of Naples.‘° He also alluded to a French threat to
British interests in Sicily.“ As the sulphur crisis became
more acute, Palmerston expressed a concern for the ”unprom-
ising . . . commercial disposition of the French” and urged
a quick renegotiation of the 1816 agreement ”before we speak
to France on the subJect . . . for that France would en-
deavor to throw every difficulty our way.“7 Palmerston
expressed a deeper concern for the overall activities of the
French in the Mediterranean." The French government
responded quickly to this deteriorating relationship by

making every effort to mediate the crisis between Great

 

‘sThls was an indication that Palmerston was ready to
use the British navy for the purpose of ”cutting off
communications between Naples and Sicily.” Palmerston to
Temple, September 1, 1837, BP, GC/TE/263.

“Palmerston feared that the proposed monopoly would
be detrimental to the interests of British traders in Sicily
since all foreigners would be excluded from the sulphur
trade with the exception of the ”original founders” who
happened to be French. He further declared that ”It would
be impossible to maintain . . . that British interests would
not specifically suffer by the establishment of the proposed
monopoly.” Palmerston to Temple, January 26, 1838, Reneee,
no. 4, p. 5.

1"Palmerston to Lamb, April 22, 1839, BP, GS/BE/511/2.
Although France and Great Britain Jointly opposed the
Taix-Aycard contract, their commercial rivalry continued in
the Mediterranean.

"”1 said certainly, events ought to be prevented in
the Levant: but that the only way of preventing events of a
very serious nature is to reduce Mehemet All to a state of
occupation compatible with his condition of subJect--with
respect to the intentions attributed to France. I said that
such schemes have been openly proclaimed in many of the
French papers, which are the organs of that party to whose

64
Britain and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Palmerston may
have taken this effort as a signal that the French government
was inclined to cooperate with the British to resolve the
crisis.”’

Although the strategic issue seemed to fade as the
sulphur dispute continued, the overall British concern for
commercial advantage remained constant throughout the
crisis. In order to Justify military action, Palmerston
declared that ”in the interests of British commerce .
and the honour of Her MaJesty’s Crown,” Her MaJesty’s
Government must compel the Neapolitan government to respect
the Treaty of 1816, and ”to make reparation for the great
inJuries which Her MaJesty’s subJects resident in the

Neapolitan dominions have sustained.”2°

 

opinions and influence the French government say they are
obliged to defer. That those papers plainly say that the
Mediterranean ought to be made a French lake: that Mehemet
All should be rendered independent sovereign of Egypt, Syria,
and Arabia: and should be the protected ally of France: and
that thus with Algiers and Egypt and Syria and with Tunis
and Tripoli which would of course be swallowed up, France
would virtually command the whole of the southern shore of
the Mediterranean from Tangiers to Adana.” Palmerston to
Lamb, March 12, 1840, BP, GC/BG/527/3. For a more thorough
discussion of the Eastern Question, see R. L. Baker,
”Palmerston and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessl,” Eng11en

fl1e19e1ee1_3ex1eu, vol. 43 (January 1928), pp. 83-89.

"”I send you by messenger copies of the communica-
tions which have passed between us and the French about
Neapolitan affairs, and copies of despatches which I have
sent you through the French government--you will see that we
have accepted the good offices of the French government for
the attainment of our demands.” Palmerston to Temple, April
20, 1840, BP, GC/TE/285/1.

2°Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty, March 10, 1840, ADM, 1/5499/73268.

65

Palmerston confronted other issues which pertained to
British economic interests within the kingdom during this
critical period. He strongly believed that the Treaty of
1816 was not ideally suited to the economic needs of both
countries, and pressured the Neapolitan government to nego-
tiate a new treaty based on the principle of reciprocity."
He hoped to continue the program for the liberalization of
British trade generally initiated by William Pitt and
fostered by William Huskisson’s Reciprocity of Duties Act of
1823.33 More importantly, a new commercial treaty between
Great Britain and the Neapolitan Kingdom would remove
barriers to free exchange, thus benefiting both countries.
Palmerston suggested a reciprocal decrease in duties paid on
Sicilian olive oil imported to Great Britain and on British
commodities exported to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies such
as fish, cotton, and iron.’° To accomplish this task, James
MacGregor went to Naples as a special envoy during the summer
of 1839 with the explicit instruction to negotiate only the

tariff rate.=‘ After extensive talks with the Neapolitan

 

2”Palmerston threatened to purchase oil from Greece or
France if the Neapolitan government would ”not agree to our
proposals.” Palmerston to Temple, April 21, 1834, BP,
GC/TE/219/2.

22Judith Blow Williams,

MW
Ieege_fixeene1en_11§g;1flfig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972),

3°Palmerston to Temple, October 30, 1835, BP, BD/SI/i.

"This was an important instruction, since Palmerston
strongly felt that a new treaty was impossible without a new
tariff rate. Palmerston to Temple, January 1840, ibid.,
BD/SI/8/2. -

66
foreign minister, MacGregor returned to London with a
revised tariff and new articles which Palmerston found
unacceptable.

Palmerston directed his main obJections to Article III
which failed to provide British subJects with sufficient
protection against forced loans, and Article XII which
implied that monopolies existed only in England. He
reserved his most strenuous disapproval for Article XVIII
which annulled the Treaty of 1816 forever, while limiting
the duration of the proposed treaty to twelve years. It was
”absurd” to expect that ”Great Britain should consent to
forego advantage permanently secured to her, for others
which it would be at the option of the Neapolitan Government
to abrogate after a time.”29

Palmerston was not only disappointed with the sub-
stance of the agreement but also by the conduct of the
negotiators. He made it very clear that MacGregor did not
have the authority to negotiate the terms of the treaty,
and that he was ”distinctly and expressly told by me before
he left England” to confine himself to the tariff and ”not
to enter into any description about the articles of the
treaty.” In a reference to the Neapolitan representative
who was Antonio Statella, the Prince of Cassaro and Neapoli-
tan foreign minister, Palmerston exclaimed that the documents
had ”no force or value whatever,” and presumed that Cassaro

was ”fully aware that Mr. MacGregor had neither the powers

 

2°Palmerston to Temple, January 1840, ibid., BD/SI/9/4.

67
nor instructions to negotiate.26 The negotiations for a new
treaty continued until 1845, long after the sulphur contro-
versy ran its course.

The failure to establish an economic relationship with
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies based on the principles of
free trade was only one of the factors which threatened Brit-
ish economic interests in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Palmerston expressed concern with the revocation of a Neapol-
itan ordinance issued in February, 1838, which allowed the
free export of corn and pulse until December 31. British
merchants had purchased ”large quantities” of these commodi-
ties before the deadline, but suffered losses after the Nea-
politan government announced the immediate repeal of this
ordinance on December 1. Palmerston conceded that the revo-
cation was legitimate because ”a due regard to the wants and
interests of the Neapolitan peOple require such measure,” but
insisted on compensation for the losses of the investors.27
At the time when the Neapolitan government challenged British
commercial interests, powerful forces began to press Palmer-
ston for a solution to the sulphur dispute.

Long before Palmerston became involved with the

sulphur crisis, British commercial interests in the Kingdom

 

"Palmerston to Temple, January 1840, ibid., BD/SI/8/2
and BD/SI/8/3.

27Palmerston to Temple, March 7, 1840, ibid., BD/SI/
13/1-2. Two experts on international law, Sir Frederick
Pollock and Dr. Joseph Philllmore, supported Palmerston’s
contention. November 29, 1839 and January 29, 1840,
BT/1/359.

68
of the Two Sicilies and at home pressed the British govern-
ment to maintain the favorable conditions of trade estab-
lished by the Treaty of 1816. The treaty guaranteed a 10
percent reduction on the tariff for British imports into
Sicily, a competitive advantage which British merchants,
manufacturers, and shipping interests were very reluctant to
surrender.

A favorable trade climate prompted a group of Man-
chester merchants to look at the Neapolitan Kingdom as a
market for their textiles. Their hopes quickly faded with
the announcement of a second Neapolitan tariff increase in
1823.3' The merchants reacted to this assault upon their
interests by protesting to the British government that these
measures would have a disastrous impact on their exports to
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies." The government responded
by successfully negotiating with the Neapolitan government
for the removal of the new duties. However, the same
commercial interests in Manchester were not satisfied with
the mere restoration of the old rates and pressed for
compensation for ”losses sustained through the unfair impo-

sitions.”°° This tactic proved successful when the

 

2'On July 13, 1823, the Neapolitan government raised
import duties from 13 to 18 percent. A second tariff
followed a month later which ”considerably increased” those
duties. Arthur Redford. WW
Ieege_112$;1fl§§ (Manchester: University Press, 1934), p. 87.

2,

December 31, 1823, ibid., p. 88.
'°June 29, 1825 and July 26, 1826, ibid.

69
Neapolitan government eventually indemnified the merchants
for the expenses incurred by the additional duties.“ This
was an early indication that British commercial interests
had the power to influence decisions at the highest level
of the government.

British trade also faced a sharp decline in sulphur
imports to Great Britain as a result of the Taix-Aycard
monopoly. In 1838, sulphur imports totalled 44,595 tons,
but dropped to 20,361 tons in 1839, and to 10,150 tons
between January and April, 1840.32 This decline in the
sulphur trade affected two main groups within the British
commercial community: the sulphur merchants in Sicily and
commercial and manufacturing interests in Great Britain. In
1823, cotton merchants and manufacturers had successfully
pressed the British government to intervene. A similar
pattern emerged during the sulphur crisis. British merchants
and manufacturers sought and received support from the
British government for their claims against the Neapol-
itan government. Approximately nineteen British firms

claimed damages of 373,978 ducats or £65,610.33 From

 

32See Appendix B, table 2.

°°Giura, p. 99. The decline in the amount of sulphur
exported to Great Britain not only marked a general decrease
in trade between the Neapolitan Kingdom and Great Britain,
but also signalled declining revenues for British shipping
companies. Goodwin compared the number of ships which left
Sicilian ports bound for Great Britain during the three
years preceding the establishment of the monopoly with the

70

March 1838 to January 1840, they sent petitions to the
British government protesting the establishment of the
monopoly.°‘ Six hundred and thirty-one mercantile and
manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom also exerted
pressure by submitting petitions which deplored the new
contract.°°

These protests closely paralleled the obJections
offered by the British government. The merchants were
concerned with preserving their investment in the production
and trade of sulphur. They spoke reverently of free trade
and protested the violation of Article V of the treaty which

guaranteed the ”disposing of their property . . . without

 

three-year period following the award of the contract.
From January 1, 1835 to July 31, 1838, 2,756 ships left
Sicily for the British Isles loaded with sulphur, as com-
pared to 1,488 ships from August 1, 1838 to December 31,
1841. ”Remarks on Recent Changes in Sicilian Commerce,”
September 21, 1842, PRO/FO/70-183, Giura, p. 50, n. 3.

3“Agents of the following British firms in Sicily
signed those petitions: William Abbott: Caillers and Company:
M. S. Craig: William Craig: William Dickinson: 0.
E. Franck: Gardner, Thurburne, and Rose: P. P. B. Ingham
and Company: William Leaf and Company: Matthey, Dates, and
Company: Morrison, Brikerton, and Company: Morrison,
Valentine, and Company: J. Nicholls: Prior, Turner, and
Thomas: Henry Newton Reid: W. Sanderson: Joseph Smithson:
Joseph Whitaker: George Wood and Company. British merchants
of Palermo to Goodwin, March 27, 1838, Eepeee, enclosure no.
1 in no. 7, Temple to Palmerston, April 9, 1838, pp. 12-13:
British merchants of Palermo to Kennedy, July 31, 1838,
ibid., enclosure in no. 20, Kennedy to Palmerston, August
14, 1838, pp. 33-35: and same to same, November 1, 1838,
ibid., enclosure in no. 31, Kennedy to Palmerston, November
3, 1838, p. 52.

"These petitions came from London, Edinburgh, Leith,
Glasgow, Kirkaldy, Dundee, Arboath, Carlisle, Belfast, and
Montrose. Palmerston to Temple, January 28, 1840, BP,
BD/SI/10.

71
any hindrance or obstacle.”°‘ The merchants were also upset
with the idea that a French company would now reap the
benefits of an industry which was developed by British
capital. Messrs. Cumming and Wood complained of a ”most
arbitrary act” on the part of the Neapolitan government
which now exposed British commercial interests to ”most
serious” losses."

These commercial interests communicated their position
to the British government through petitions. Usually com-
posed by a group of merchants, these letters went to the
British consular representative in Sicily, who in turn
forwarded them to the British embassy in Naples. In March
1838, British merchants in Palermo expressed the hope that
the British government would take some steps to ”avert a
measure fraught with so much inJury to British commerce.”3°
They voiced similar sentiments in a July memorial, while
Cumming, Wood, and Company wanted an assurance that ”Her
MaJesty’s Ministers will not see us sacrificed in the way

contemplated by the powers here.”°’ Palmerston strongly

 

"Memorial of the British merchants of Palermo to
Kennedy July 31, 1838, Eeeeee, enclosure in no. 20, Kennedy
to Palmerston, August 14, 1838, p. 34.

°’Messrs. Cumming, Wood, and Company to Kennedy, August
10, 1838, ibid., enclosure in no. 21, Kennedy to Palmerston,
August 14, 1838, p. 37.

"Britlsh merchants of Palermo to Goodwin, March 27,
1838, ibid., enclosure no. 1 in no. 7, Temple to Palmerston,
April 9, 1838, p. 13.

3'Memorial of the British merchants of Palermo to
Kennedy, July 31, 1838, ibid., enclosure in no. 20, Kennedy
to Palmerston, August 14, 1838, pp. 33-35: and Messrs.

72

supported the positions of British merchants in Sicily
with his October 12 letter to the Neapolitan government.
The merchants appreciated the firm position taken by the
foreign secretary against the monopoly, and expressed a
”deep sense of gratitude” for the ”timely interference and
security for our interests in Sicily.”‘°

The failure of the MacGregor mission in 1839, the
delaying tactics of the Neapolitan government during the
negotiations for a new tariff, and the Neapolitan king’s
order of December 1838, which nullified Palmerston’s initial
effort in support of the British sulphur interests by
extending the contract for another six months, forced the
merchants to consider the possibility that the monopoly
might continue for an indefinite period. With a sense of
frustration, the British merchants in Palermo then peti-
tioned the Board of Trade with the hope that the Board
would expedite a solution to the problem and that ”steps may
be taken for our being informed as to the intended changes
in the existing state of things.”“ Shortly thereafter,

Palmerston pressed hard for abolition of the monopoly.

 

Cumming, Wood, and Company to Kennedy, August 10, 1838,
ibid., enclosure in no. 21, Kennedy to Palmerston, August
14, 1838, p. 35.

‘°British merchants of Palermo to Kennedy, November 1,
1838, ibid., enclosure in no. 31, Kennedy to Palmerston,
November 3, 1838, p. 52.

“‘Petition from the British merchants of Palermo to
the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Trade and
Plantations, January 11, 1840, ibid., sub-enclosure in no.
50, MacGregor to W. Fox Strangways, Office of Committee of
Privy Council for Trade, February 12, 1840, p. 69. '

73

In general, recent scholarship suggests that commercial
linterests played a very minor role in determining policy at
the Board of Trade.“2 In their correspondence with the
Foreign Office, Board officials do admit to pressure from
trade organizations, yet ”this is mentioned comparatively
rarely as the underlying reason for a course of diplomatic
action.”‘° The conduct of the Board of Trade during the
sulphur crisis, however, seems to deviate from this inter-
pretation. Not only was the Board of Trade aware of and
sympathetic to the urgent demands of the sulphur interests
during the crisis, but it made specific recommendations on
foreign policy to support these interests. Henry La
Bouchere, the president of the Board of Trade, acknowledged
the great amount of British capital invested in the sulphur
properties. He also made note of the ”hostile” and ”power-
ful” influences which made the ”consequences of delay . . .
most serious.”“ He warned Palmerston of the ”very strong”
feelings at Manchester and Liverpool on the subJect and went
even further by urging him to accept the reciprocity treaty
with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as negotiated by James
MacGregor.“I A sense of urgency and authority characterized

La Bouchere’s letter to Palmerston: he expressed the hope

 

“Lucy Brown . W
Mexemen1_1fl§Q;1fl$2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 135.

‘°Ibid.

”‘La Bouchere to Palmerston, December 28, 1839, BP,
GC/LA/7.

‘PIbid.

74

that the foreign secretary would come to the conclusion that
the treaty must be ratified ”however impulsively it may have
been signed by MacGregor.”“ In this instance, the presi-
dent of the Board of Trade was concerned with the problems
of the sulphur interests. More importantly, he made a
strong attempt to influence Palmerston, and as a result
became part of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus.

Meanwhile, Palmerston began to feel pressure from
another quarter. In a limited fashion, the question of
Sicilian sulphur came before parliament when the contract
became official in July 1838. There was a brief discussion
in the House of Commons and the president of the Board of
Trade had to answer some questions on the subJect." As
the monopoly continued for the next eighteen months, British
diplomats pressed for its termination. Although MacGregor
had already persuaded the British merchants in Sicily to
drop their plans to petition parliament directly, by the end
of 1839 a ”numerous” and ”influential body” of merchants was
in the process of reconsidering this course of action.“°
MacGregor admitted that this situation could be very
embarrassing to Her MaJesty’s Ministers, and Palmerston

shared his sentiments." As soon as he saw the possibility

 

”‘Ibid.
"Hansard (ed.), vol. 44 (1838), p. 792.
‘°MacGregor to Palmerston, November 3, 1839, BT/2/11.

"Ibid.: Palmerston to Temple, January 28, 1840, BP,
BD/SI/io.

75
that British sulphur interests might present their
grievances before parliament, Palmerston felt compelled to
solve the problem once and for all. He wrote to Temple on
January 28:

The inJury which the sulphur monopoly is

occasioning to British merchants is so great

that the matter will soon be brought under

discussion in Parliament, and unless Her

MaJesty’s Government are enabled without any

further delay whatever to announce to Parliament

that the monopoly has been put an end to, Her

MaJesty’s Government will be compelled to take

measures which would be very painful to Her

MaJesty’s Government. . . .°°
Within a month, merchants from London, Liverpool, and
Glasgow Joined the British merchants in Sicily in stating
their case before parliament.

The time had come for Lord Lyndhurst, a Tory who had a
reputation for obstructing Whig policies in the House of
Lords, to champion the cause of the sulphur interests by
bringing more pressure to bear on Palmerston.u His speech
in the House of Lords on March 2, 1840, was remarkable for a
number of reasons. It was a vigorous defense of British
commercial interests, a part of the ongoing debate between
Tories and Whigs on how to best serve these interests, and

an attempt to influence foreign policy by making specific

recommendations for a course of action.

 

'°Palmerston to Temple, January 28, 1840, ibid.

"John Singleton Copley (1772-1863), the First Baron
Lyndhurst, served as Chancellor (1827-1831) and (1841-1846).
A staunch Tory, he was a consistent and unrelenting leader
of the opposition to Whig legislation and a sharp critic of
the Melbourne government during the sulphur crisis.

76

Lyndhurst was well aware of the pressure being exerted
by the British sulphur community as he rose to present his
speech in the House of Lords. He lamented the end of the
sulphur trade and underscored the fact that the price of
sulphur on the British market was ”double what it was at the
end of 1837.”32 Lyndhurst went on to mention the failed
diplomacy of the last eighteen months which, he claimed, was
directly responsible for the financial losses of British
subJects.'° He attacked a governmental policy which did
”nothing effectual” to solve these problems.°‘ Lyndhurst
proceeded to exhort the government to ”afford to its
subJects and merchants who had embarked in this branch of
commerce . . . protection to which they had a right,” but he
was also aware that a resolution of the problem was nowhere
in sight and that the monopoly could continue for an indefi-
nite period.'° His impatience with the monopoly and his
resolve to force the government to take a particular course
of action became very apparent when he closed his speech
with the suggestion that ”six line-of—battle ships sent to
Naples would settle the matter in a fortnight.”°‘

Although it is hard to specify the degree to which

 

“’Hansard (ed.), vol. 52 (1840), p. 805.

I"Ibid. Lyndhurst had information that British mer-
chants suffered losses of £1,000 per day. Ibid., p. 808.

34Ibid., p. 805.
'°Ibid., p. 80?.
"Ibid., p. 808.

77

Lyndhurst’s speech was responsible for Palmerston’s order to
go to war, it is clear that parliament Joined the Board of
Trade as a part of the foreign policy decision-making
process. There were several reasons for this development.
Commercial interests were better represented in parliament
as a result of the electoral reforms of 1832. Also, the
position of the government was not strong. Melbourne’s
moderate Whig faction had a slim maJority in the House of
Commons and was vulnerable to attacks, not only from the
Tory opposition, but also from groups within his own party.
The depression and the debate over the Corn Laws, which
Melbourne initially favored, further weakened his position.

So far, the evidence suggests that the British fought
the Sulphur War primarily for economic reasons. Palmerston
perceived that the sulphur monopoly which the Neapolitan
government granted to a French company Jeopardized the Brit-
ish commercial position in Sicily. British commercial acti-
vity and trade with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which
had been growing at a fast pace since the late eighteenth
century, faced the prospect of a decline. Indeed, Palmer-
ston’s letter to Temple on January 28 seems to confirm that
he acted strictly in the interests of the British sulphur
community.

Although evidence of economic causation is very
strong, a more thorough examination of the diplomatic
relationship between governments and Palmerston’s opinion of

Ferdinand II raises the possibility that other factors may

78
also have had a bearing on the decision to go to war.
Palmerston may indeed have succumbed to pressure from the
sulphur interests, but he also responded to political
considerations such as the rights and responsibilities of
nations under the terms of international law. Palmerston’s
disapproval of the methods by which the Neapolitans con-
ducted their foreign policy was exceeded only by his
personal dislike for Ferdinand 11. These personal feelings
were never a part of a basically economic interpretation of
the cause of the Sulphur War. Although these feelings may
have strengthened the foreign secretary’s resolve to order
the fleet into action, economic considerations still played
a dominant role.

The treaties of Madrid (1667) and Utrecht (1713), the
defense pact of 1793, and the Treaty of 1816 legitimized a
wide range of British economic privileges in the Kingdom of
the Two Sicilies. As soon as he became aware of the sulphur
monopoly, Palmerston immediately cited the Treaty of 1816 as
the basis upon which the Neapolitan government was at fault
for the award to Taix-Aycard. In his rush to the defense of
the British sulphur community, did Palmerston have a valid
claim that the award violated the terms of the Treaty of
1816?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to
understand whether the British government possessed a legit-
imate claim under the terms of international law. The

British position throughout the entire crisis rested upon

79
the assertion that the sulphur monopoly violated Articles IV
and V of the 1816 treaty. Palmerston contended that the
monopoly forced British nationals to sell their sulphur to a
privileged group, and was therefore a violation of Article
IV which guaranteed that British subJects and their articles
of commerce be treated on the same footing as those of the
most favored nations. Palmerston also believed that the
monopoly forced British nationals to dispose of their
property at a fixed price, a clear violation of Article V
which guaranteed British nationals the right to dispose of
their personal property ”without the smallest loss or
hindrance.”°’

The British government did not readily find legal
support for this position. Two international law Jurists
claimed that the sulphur monopoly granted by the Neapolitan
government to Taix-Aycard was not a violation of the Treaty
of 1816. Sir Frederick Pollock offered the following
opinion on March 12, 1840:

The decree creating the Brimstone Monopoly is

not in any respect an infraction of the Treaty

between this country and the Neapolitan Govern-

ment, either with reference to British SubJects

interested in Mines in Sicily or to British Sub-

Jects, holders of Brimstone at the date of the

decree. The Treaty puts the subJects of the

Crown of England on the footing of the most

favoured nations, and it seems to me to do

nothing more. A decree which applies equally to

the SubJects of the King of Naples and to all
foreigners without distinction, cannot, I think,

 

"”An Analysis of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between His Britannic MaJesty and the King of the Two
Sicilies,” ASN/MAE, f. 4130. See Appendix C.

80

be regarded as a violation of such a treaty.'-"3
Dr. Joseph Philiimore’s analysis specifically addressed
Articles IV and V of the treaty. He dismissed the idea that
the monopoly violated the ”most favored nation” status of
British nationals under Article IV. Dr. Phillimore observed
that the terms of the monopoly applied to all residents of
Sicily, including the Sicilians themselves. He also
dismissed the argument that the monopoly opposed the spirit
and intent of Article V, which entitled British subJects to
dispose of their ”personal property of every kind and de-
scription . . . without the smallest loss or hindrance.”

Dr. Phillimore made the distinction between ”personal” and
”real” property and placed the sulphur mines in the latter
category. With respect to the sulphur already in the pos-
session of British nationals, he also commented on the fact
that ”British SubJects are in no way” more affected ”than
the SubJects of all other countries as well as those of the
Neapolitan Dominions.”°’

The analyses of Sir Frederick Pollock and Dr. Joseph
Phillimore have withstood the test of time. Almost a century
later, another international law Jurist addressed the issue
of expropriation from another perspective and arrived at the

same conclusion.‘° This interpretation offers two

 

9°”Sulphur Trade of Sicily,” ASN/MAE, f. 1430. See
Appendix D for the Pollock-Phillimore opinions.

a’Ibid.

‘°Alexander P. Fachiri, ”Expropriation and Interna-
tional Lav.” WM. vol. 6

81
propositions associated with a general law of nations:
1. A state is entitled to protect its subJects

in another state from inJury to their property

resulting from measures in the application of

which there is discrimination between them and

the subJects of such other state.

2. A state is entitled to protect its subJects

in another state from gross inJustice at

the hands of such other state, even if the

measure complained of is applied equally to

the subJects of such other state.“
According to the first proposition, Palmerston did not have
the right to issue an order for intervention on the basis of
international law since the terms of the monopoly applied
equally to all residents of Sicily. Palmerston could not
act upon the conditions of the second proposition either,
since the Neapolitan offer to compensate British businessmen
ruled out the notion of ”gross inJustice,” and Palmerston
had been aware of those proposals for some time.‘2 Contro-

versy surrounds the opinion of John Campbell, Queen

Victoria’s Attorney General. According to a Neapolitan

 

(1925), pp. 159-171. Fachlri was a barrister at the Inner
Temple and wrote in response to the expropriation dilemma
resulting from the First World War.

“Ibid., p. 160.

"Ibid., pp. 170-171. Palmerston abrasively replied
to the Neapolitan government’s suggestions for compensation:
”The only full and Just compensation which can be afforded
them for the outlay that they have made . . . would be a
permission to continue to work their mines and sell their
sulphur, without being subJect to any interference or
restriction on the part of Taix and his Company.” He
added, ”Such permission the British government demands.”
Palmerston to Kennedy, October 12, 1838, Eepeee, no. 28,
p. 49. Cassaro to Kennedy, August 27, 1838, ibid., enclo-
sure in no. 24, Kennedy to Palmerston, September 1, 1838,
p. 39, documents the Neapolitan proposals.

82
source, Campbell found that the monopoly did not violate the
Treaty of 1816.‘° On the other hand, a modern biographer of
Palmerston states that the Queen’s Advocate Justified the
British position under the terms of international law.“

If the opinion of expert Jurists cannot support the
thesis that a British foreign secretary was merely respond-
ing appropriately to a violation of international law,
Palmerston may indeed have had other political reasons for
the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy against the
Neapolitan Kingdom. He was consistently in practical and
philosophical disagreement with Ferdinand, and may have
regarded these developments as a threat to longstanding
British political interests within the Neapolitan Kingdom.
The Neapolitan tactic of delay during the sulphur negotia-
tions, Palmerston’s negative perceptions of the Bourbon
government, and his dislike for Ferdinand set the stage
for the deteriorating relationship between Great Britain and
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies during the period immedi-
ately preceding the Sulphur War.

In the flurry of diplomatic activity during the
crisis, Palmerston experienced the same frustrations which
had marked his unsuccessful attempts to renegotiate a new

commercial treaty with the Neapolitans. Since the beginning

 

"Paolo Ruffo, the Prince of Castelcicala and Neapoli-
tan envoy to London, to Fulco Ruffo, the Prince of Scilla
and Neapolitan foreign minister, May 15, 1840, ASN/MAE, f.
4130, Giura, p. 83.

‘4Jasper Ridley, LeegLEe1meee19n (London: Constable,
1970), pp. 230-231.

83
of 1839, Cassaro carefully reassured British diplomats that
Ferdinand had every intention of cancelling the sulphur
contract with Taix-Aycard and insisted that he had spoken to
the king on the subJect ”with more than ordinary energy.”‘°
Vacillations continued as Cassaro was still optimistic about
the cancellation of the contract, yet refused to set a date
for its demise.“ When Cassaro failed to respond to a
number of British direct inquiries concerning its status at
the close of 1839, it became clear that the Neapolitans
did not intend to negotiate in good faith.

The Neapolitan game of vacillation and delay had a
deleterious effect upon the conduct of Palmerston. He
vented his frustration in the January 28 letter which
threatened ”very painful” measures if the matter was not
resolved." Cassaro feared that the abrasive note would
upset Ferdinand and played for more time. He asked the
British envoy to hold the note until the Council of State
meeting on February 21, and on that date told Kennedy that
the council had decided to set aside the contract. Once
again, Cassaro stalled for more time, adding that this

decree would not be issued until the Council of Ministers

 

‘°Kennedy to Palmerston, May 27, 1839, Eeeeee, no. 36,
p. 57: and Kennedy to Palmerston, August 29, 1839, ibid.,
no 37, p. 59.

“Kennedy to Palmerston, November 5, 1839, ibid., no.
42, p. 63. Cassaro stated that it would be better not to
insist on a written answer which could wound Ferdinand’s
personal honor. MacGregor to Palmerston, November 13, 1839,
ibid., no. 44, p. 64.

‘7Palmerston to Temple, January 28, 1840, BP, BD/SI/io.

84
appointed a committee to review the Taix claims the
following week. At this point, Kennedy insisted on a
written verification of cancellation. At the Austrian
embassy that evening, Cassaro asked the king for an
appointment the following morning. After that meeting,
Cassaro met with Kennedy at 4 p.m. and reported that
Ferdinand had approved a written reply which would not be
forthcoming until 7 p.m. This deadline also passed without
concrete results. In fact, Kennedy received no further
information until he met Cassaro on the street the following
day. During this casual meeting, Cassaro gave Kennedy
written verification of cancellation, but without a firm
date."

It was only a matter of time before Ferdinand would
reveal his intentions to the British government. On March
8, he received Temple very graciously, but insisted on the
”right to adopt in his own dominions any measures . . . for
the benefit of his subJects.”" On March 16, he blatantly
announced at the Council of State meeting that the monopoly
would continue.’° Ferdinand defied Palmerston for almost a
year and a half after the foreign secretary sent his first
letter urging immediate cancellation, and for a month after

Palmerston issued his ”very painful measures” threat. With

 

"Kennedy to Palmerston, February 25, 1840, Repeze,
no. 53’ pp. 71-730

"Temple to Palmerston, March 12, 1840, ibid., no. 59,
p. 76.

’°Ibid.

 

85

the failure of extensive diplomatic action and the Neapoli-
tan show of bad faith during those negotiations, Palmerston
proceeded with his plans for military action. Although
there is no direct evidence to support the contention that
Neapolitan duplicity pushed Palmerston to the breaking
point, it nevertheless left an unfavorable impression, and
prompted Metternich’s remark to Ferdinand that, ”You are
right on the issue, but always wrong in the form.”71

More tension came from political developments in
Spain. Palmerston sided with the constitutionalist sup-
porters of Isabella when Ferdinand VII died without leaving
male issue in 1833. He disassociated himself from the
Wellington government’s policy of providing support to the
legitimist claimant Don Carlos and allowed detachments of
the British army to serve with the constitutionalist forces
in Spain. Ferdinand did not openly side with the Carlists,
but the episode left Palmerston with the impression that the
King of Naples was actively supporting the forces of
reaction against those of progress, and was thus acting in
opposition to British policy in Spain.72

To make matters worse, Naples had a reputation as a
hotbed for legitimist intrigue. It was the residence of the
Duchess of Berry, half-sister of Ferdinand II, standard-

bearer of the French legitimists and a supporter of Don

 

#

"Pietro Cala-Ulloa, Giuseppe de’Tiberlis (ed.), 11
W (Naples: E.S.I.. 1977). p. 90-

’zlbid.

86
Carlos in Spain.73 The duchess was also a maJor supporter
of Aime Taix, thereby establishing a link between the
politics of conservatism and what Palmerston believed was an
assault upon British interests in the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies."

Against this background, Palmerston frequently
expressed a general disgust for political conditions in
Sicily. He remarked to Temple that, ”It is not possible
that the Sicilians who have habitually so much intercourse
with the peninsula populations should long continue satis-
fied with their present condition.”’° He went as far as to
”strongly urge” Count Ludolf to:

Recommend to his government to appoint some able

enlightened and impartial men, to act as commis-

sioners to inquire into the present state of

Sicily, to report upon the grievances and abuses
which they might find to exist in that island,

 

7°Maria Carolina Ferdinand Luisa (1798-1870) was the
eldest daughter of Francis I and of his first wife, Maria
Clementine of Austria. Her marriage to a son of the future
Charles X produced an heir to the throne whom the legiti-
mists supported after the Revolution of 1830. She led the
Vendeans in an unsuccessful campaign against Louis-Philippe
and survived imprisonment in the castle of Blaye.

"Aime Taix was clearly a protege of the Duchess of
Berry. In a letter to Ferdinand, Taix referred to the
duchess as ”my august protectress.” Taix to Ferdinand, July
29, 1838, ASN/AB, f. 820, Giura, p. 36, n. 3. Palmerston
knew that Taix was a ”known partisan of the Carlists” who
employed legitimist refugees to fill vacancies in his firm
and received financial assistance from a ”Carlist House in
London.” Kennedy to Palmerston, July 24, 1838, Eeeepe, no.
18, p. 33: and Kennedy to Castelcicala, April 4, 1839,
ASN/AB, f. 1013. Mention of a linkage between Taix and
legitimist groups emerges in non-diplomatic sources. Cala-
Ulloa, pp. 59 and 81.

7sPalmerston to Temple, March, 1837, BP, BD/SI/4/1.

87

and to suggest such measures as might appear to
them best adapted to remedy present evils."

Palmerston was prepared to go much further in defense of
political rights. When he became aware that civil
disturbances in Sicily might invite Ferdinand’s military
intervention, he warned that such an action must receive the
”consent or acquiescence of the great maritime powers of
Europe.””

The sulphur crisis reinforced Palmerston’s convic-
tions. In a long and forceful letter to Temple, he
responded not only to the commercial limitations imposed
upon British citizens engaged in the sulphur business, but
also to the denial of the British nationals’ right to assem-
ble freely for the performance of their religious duties.’°
This infringement upon the rights of British citizens within
the Neapolitan Kingdom infuriated Palmerston. Yet, he was
not particularly surprised that such an inJustice would
occur in a country which did not have a free press or a
representative assembly, and where supreme authority in all
legislative matters resided with the sovereign.”

Finally, Palmerston intensely disliked the King of

Naples. In a letter to a close friend, he described

 

"Palmerston to Temple, May 1, 1837, ibid.,
BD/SB/4.

7’Ibid.
"Palmerston to Temple, January 1840, ibid., BD/SI/8/4.
"Ibid.

88
Ferdinand as an ”ignorant, uneducated, violent, passionate,
and weak” person, a ”crowned and sceptered Lezeeeene.” In
the same letter, he Justified the Sulphur War by saying that
Ferdinand ”has yet to be taught many of those things which
he ought to have learned in his childhood: and our ships
must begin this part of his education.”°°

Palmerston may indeed have seized the opportunity to
humiliate a king who refused to favor British interests in
his kingdom. The strained relationship between the British
foreign secretary and the Neapolitan king, the distance
between their positions on the ideological spectrum, and the
negative aspects of Neapolitan diplomacy during the sulphur
crisis lend support to the theory that Palmerston had poli-
tical as well as economic reasons for his actions.

Several conclusions concerning the behavior of the
British government emerge from the sulphur crisis. In part,
Palmerston clearly reacted to pressure fromlthe sulphur
interests who perceived that the Taix-Aycard monopoly
threatened their trading privileges in the Kingdom of the
Two Sicilies. British businessmen in Sicily sent letters
through foreign office channels: when this method failed to
produce results, they petitioned the Board of Trade.
Merchants at home petitioned their representatives in
parliament. In turn, both the Board of Trade and parliament
strongly supported sulphur interests and forced Palmerston

to acknowledge the seriousness of the situation: thus both

 

°°Palmerston to Lamb, April 11, 1840, ibid., GC/BE/529.

89
became a part of the foreign policy decision-making process
during the sulphur crisis.

Yet, it would be a mistake to view the intervention
entirely as a response to a threat to British economic
interests. It is true that Palmerston acknowledged pressure
from.the sulphur interests and government agencies by
sending the Neapolitan government a strong letter which
called for the cancellation of the sulphur contract. It is
also true that Palmerston initiated the Sulphur War when the
Neapolitan government failed to cancel the monopoly. How-
ever, a strict economic analysis fails to consider other
aspects of the period which created more tension between
Palmerston and Ferdinand.

Palmerston had good reasons to suspect that the British
political position in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was in
sharp decline. Acton was no longer an influential minis-
ter at the Court of Naples and Bentinck did not have an army
in Sicily to protect British interests. Palmerston saw
Ferdinand apparently flaunting the Treaty of 1816, while
Neapolitan diplomats negotiated in bad faith. He looked to
Spain and saw Ferdinand in an apparent alliance with the
forces of reaction against the forces of progress. In the
Neapolitan Kingdom.itself, British diplomats had to defend
vigorously the right of free assembly for British residents.
When confronted with an independent-minded Ferdinand,
Palmerston labeled him a Lezzeeene and sent ships to the Bay

of Naples to teach him lessons which Palmerston claimed

90
should have been learned in his childhood.

The sulphur episode is one example of British imper-
ialism determined by political, economic, and personal
factors. It is also a case study in the transition from
informal control through treaties to ”gunboat diplomacy,” and
gives further definition to the Gallagher and Robinson
observation that when the political situation of any
particular region fails ”to provide satisfactory conditions
for commercial or strategic integration . . . power is used

imperialistlcally to adJust those conditions."n

 

"Gallagher and Robinson, p. 6.

CHAPTER IV

W

Je resterai maItre chez moi. . . .
Ferdinand II.”

The emerging international crisis over the sulphur
monopoly coincided with a troubled period in the history of
Sicily. In spite of all the sanitary precautions adopted to
contain it, a cholera epidemic which had begun in Naples in
the fall of 1836 reached Palermo the following June.2 Panic
and the belief that the government was responsible for the
spread of the disease provoked rioting in Palermo, Messina,

Syracuse, and Catania.” Popular protest focused upon two

 

””I shall remain master in my home. . . .” Tallenay to
Mole, November 3, 1838, Saitta (ed.), p. 159.

2Some foreign diplomats thought that these precautions
were excessive. Temple complained about the fumigation of

diplomatic pouches. Harold Acton, Ine_Lee1_fleeepene_ej
Nee1ee (London: Methuen, 1961), p. 101.

’Ten percent of Sicily’s population died. Gaetano
Cingari, ”Dalia Restaurazione all’ Unita,” Rosario Romeo
(ed.), S1ee1e_ge11e_$1e111e (Naples: E.S.I., 1977), vol. 8,
p. 30. During a five-month period, Palermo lost 24,000
citizens from a population of 166,000. Among the casualties
were Gaetano Maria Trigona, the Archbishop of Palermo: the
historian Nicolo Palmeri: the Princess of Campofranco, wife
of the Lieutenant General of Sicily: and Domenico Scina,
Chancellor of the University of Palermo, and leader of the
separatist movement.

91

92
constant themes of discontent: economic distress and anti-
Neapolitan sentiment.

Contemporary observers described the economic and
administrative problems of Sicily. Pietro Cala-Ulloa, a
Neapolitan magistrate stationed in Trapani, presented a
dismal picture of the conditions in Sicily.“ Large tracts
of arable land were abandoned and overrun with weeds. The
barons, who remained in control of the land, did not permit
the subdivision of their large estates while a displrlted
peasantry lived at a subsistence level. Inefficiency and
corruption prevailed at all levels of government. Industry
and trade suffered for lack of an active urban middle
class. British interests still dominated the economic scene
and did not permit the growth of Sicilian manufacturing ”nor
would they for a long time.”° Sicily’s public works were
inadequate. The island was ”without roads, commerce, and
industry” and remained ”an anachronism in European civili-
zation.”‘ Gala-Ulloa identified other problems such as the
survival of feudal privileges and persistent Sicilian separ-
atism. He concluded that the most appropriate solution was

the establishment of a strong centralized state. These

 

“Pietro Cala-Ulloa, ”Considerazioni sullo stato
polltico e economico della Sicilia,” in Pontieri,
”Ferdinando II di Borbone e la Sicilia: momenti di politica
riformatrice,” 11_R1fieem1eme, pp. 232-242. At that time,
Cala-Ulloa was one of the Neapolitan magistrates assigned to
a Sicilian post in accordance with the law of exchange

(ammonia).
”Ibid., p. 233.
‘Ibid., p. 232..

93

comments may have reflected the bias of a Neapolitan
bureaucrat who was a loyal supporter of the king. Another
contemporary source, however, pointed to the shortcomings
of the Bourbon adninistration. A French diplomat stationed
in Naples mentioned the misuse of public funds, the abuse
of public credit, and a corrupt and inefficient Judicial
system. He concluded that Ferdinand was indifferent to the
plight of Sicily, which he considered a land of conquest
rather than a loyal component of his domain.7

But it would be difficult to argue that Ferdinand was
not interested in the welfare of Sicily. Since his acces-
sion in 1830, he counted the unresolved Sicilian Question
among the ”deep wounds” (Bligh§_2£91939§) mentioned in his
inaugural address.’ This twenty-year-old, vigorous, deter-
mined monarch initiated a new administration which promised
to establish fiscal responsibility and eliminate ineffi-
ciency and corruption from all levels of government.’

Sicilian-born, he envisioned reforms which would consolidate

 

’Tallenay to Mole, November 17, 1837, Saitta (ed.),
p. 126.

'Acton. W. p. 48.

’Ferdinando Carlo was born in Palermo on January 12,
1810. He was the third child and first son of Francis, then
Duke of Calabria, and later Francis 1, by his second wife
Isabella, Infanta of Spain. Styled Duke of Noto at birth
and Duke of Calabria after the accession of his father, he
succeeded to the throne on November 8, 1830. In 1832 he
married Maria Cristina of Sardinia (1812-1836), and in 1838
Maria Theresa of Austria (1816-1867). He died in Caserta on
May 22, 1859.

94
the good will of his subJects on the other side of the
Beacon and strengthen the unitarian monarchy.

These principles guided Ferdinand’s Sicilian policy
until 1837. Immediately after his accession, he appointed
his brother Leopold, the Count of Syracuse, Lieutenant
General of Sicily, replacing the unpopular and corrupt
Marquis Pietro Ugo delle Favare. The Sicilians applauded
the appointment of a Sicilian-born Prince of the Blood who
had intelligence and style and liked the islanders. On
Leopold’s advice, Ferdinand revived the Ministry for Sicilian
Affairs in Naples and appointed as its head a Sicilian,
Antonino Franco. In addition, two Sicilians held seats on
the Council in Palermo.‘°

During his first state visit to Sicily in 1831,
Ferdinand received a very warm reception. On that occasion,
a volcanic island emerged in the waters around Sciacca and
Pantelleria. Immediately christened Ferdinandea, it
appeared to be a good omen for both the new king and
Sicily.“ In a spirit of goodwill, the king granted amnesty

to political exiles, reinstated army officers of liberal

 

1”This council assisted the Lieutenant General, and
included the directors of four departments: Justice,
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Ecclesiastical Affairs. Its
president was a Sicilian, Antonio Mastropaolo, who shared
this office with the Prince of Campofranco after 1832.

“The island was approximately 1.25 miles in circum-
ference. It emerged in two phases between July 18 and
August 3 following seismic activity. It soon disappeared,
but re-emerged for a short time in 1863. The British
claimed the island in the name of William IV and called it
Graham Shoal.

95

persuasion, and abolished the military tribunals estab-
lished in 1826. Ferdinand shared with his brother a sincere
concern for the economy of Sicily, evidenced by the estab-
lishment of six economic societies in provincial capitals
and the Palermo Institute for the Encouragement of Agricul-
ture and Industry.”3 These policies did not represent a
radical shift in the adninistration of Sicily and were con-
sistent with the enlightened reform program of the Bourbons.
Yet autonomy was still out of the question. When the pepu-
larity of the Count of Syracuse fueled rumors of his becoming
king of an independent Sicily, Ferdinand promptly replaced
him with the Prince of Campofranco."

The civil disturbances of 1837 marked the end of this
conciliatory phase of Ferdinand’s Sicilian policy. Disap-
pointed and angry, he stifled rebellion, tightened control,

and reinforced centralization. General Del Carretto

 

12These actions seemed to contradict negative French
Judgements such as the allegation that Ferdinand could not
identify the roots of the Sicilian problem and apply the
appropriate remedies. Tallenay to Mole, April 13, 1837,
Saitta (ed.), p. 75.

‘°These rumors probably contributed to the failure of
the proposed.marriage between the Count of Syracuse and
Marie Christine of Orleans, a daughter of Louis-Philippe.
Leopold left Sicily on April 22, 1835, two months after a
masquerade featuring Roger of Hauteville unwisely reminded
the Sicilians of their independence under the Normans, thus
increasing Ferdinand’s ill feelings toward his brother.
Acton, Ihe_Lee1_Beeebene, p. 79. Some say that the dismissal
of the Count of Syracuse was one of the causes of the riots
of 1837. Niccola Nisco,
e1_1§§Q (Naples: Lanciano e Varaldi, 1908), p. 46. Campo-
franco did not compare favorably with his predecessor and
seems to have been ”short on knowledge and natural talent.”
Ibid. p. 37.

96

ruthlessly re-established order in Sicily within three
months.H To erase any misunderstanding about a measure of
autonomy for Sicily, the king abolished the Ministry for
Sicilian Affairs and the Council in Palermo. He also
limited the authority of the new Lieutenant General, Onorato
Gaetani, the Duke of Laurenzana, abolished the office of
Superintendent of Sicilian Roads, and opposed the plan to
build a memorial to the Catanese composer Vincenzo Bellini.

Particularly unpopular was the exchange of civil
servants between the mainland and Sicily. Sicilians had
enJoyed the privilege of holding administrative posts on the
island, a practice which fostered nepotism and inefficiency.
Ferdinand ordered Sicilians to posts on the continent and
assigned Neapolitans to positions in Sicily. On the surface,
this appeared to be a wise decision which would promote a
better understanding among the king’s subJects. In reality,
there were serious problems. The exchange involved an equal
number of Neapolitans and Sicilians, but since there were
more posts to be filled on the mainland than on the island,
the Neapolitans maintained a stronger overall position in the
administration of the kingdom. In addition, those reassigned
resented being uprooted from their homeland.

The end of Ferdinand’s conciliatory policy did not,

 

“There were 750 arrests and more than 100 death sen-
tences, some of them for common crimes. Nisco mentions 133
executions and compares the repression to Judge Jeffreys’
”Bloody Assizes” in seventeenth century England. Ibid.,

p. 55. Other sources cite 120 capital sentences. Bianchini,
quoted in Cingari, ”Dalia Restaurazione,” Romeo (ed.),

WW. .9. 30.

97

however, diminish his interest in alleviating the ”deep
wounds” noted in his inaugural address. He visited Sicily in
1838 in order to investigate local problems, and the reforms
which followed (1838-1841) addressed a variety of matters
associated with law enforcement, public works, and
charities.”I Death by starvation was not uncommon for the
depressed peasantry, and Ferdinand reacted by lowering the
unpopular grist tax (mee1neee) which fell so heavily on
the poor.*‘ A new levy on the mine owners compensated the
treasury for the resultant loss in revenues.

Other areas of the Sicilian economy needed attention.
The rural masses’ low standard of living, their self-
sufficiency in manufacturing, and the lack of communication
between townships prevented the growth of internal markets.
A backward technology, a dearth of investment capital, and
the domination of foreign interests, especially British,
limited industrial development. Ferdinand’s interest in
finding a solution to some of these problems prompted his
negotiations with Taix-Aycard, and ultimately precipitated a
confrontation with Great Britain.

Ferdinand’s goals and personal style played an impor-

tant role in the conduct of foreign policy. Circumstances

 

‘BPontieri, ”Ferdinando II dl Borbone e la Sicilia,”

ILRLformim. pp . 258-262.

”‘Ferdinand also addressed the problem created by the
slow implementation of the anti-feudal laws. He ordered
the subdivision of vast ecclesiastical estates in royal
patronage and instructed local authorities to protect the
peasants’ rights of access to common land and water. Mack
Smith, p. 407.

98
had forced his predecessors to accept foreign protection and
control. In contrast, Ferdinand aimed to assert the inde-
pendence of his klngdom." He proceeded to avoid a firm
commitment to either Austria or France, a difficult task in
view of the tension between the archconservative Hapsburg
empire and the ”revolutionary” July Monarchy. Metternich
noted with alarm the King of Naples’ conciliatory gestures
toward political dissidents, his intention to remain neutral
in the event of a Franco-Austrian conflict in Italy, and his
choice of France as the guardian of Neapolitan interests in
Morocco." On the other hand, France noted with concern
the legitimist sympathies of the King of Naples and his
anti-constitutional sentiments." On a more personal level,

Louis-Philippe resented the failure of the matrimonial plans

 

”’According to Ludwig Lebzeltern, the Austrian ambas-
sador to Naples, Ferdinand was dominated by the fear of
being influenced. Lebzeltern to Metternich, December 31,
1830. Ruqeero Moscatl. WW
MAW (Naples: E.S.I.. 1947). p. 15.

"At a meeting of the Council of State, Ferdinand
allegedly stated that had he not been the King of Naples he
would have been the world’s greatest republican. Ibid., p.
25. During a visit to France in 1836, Ferdinand doffed his
hat to the statue of Napoleon in Place Vendame. Cala-Ulloa,
de’Tiberiis (ed.), 11_Regne, p. 64. Although this was
merely a polite gesture toward the French people, it is fair
to assume that Metternich, had he heard of this episode,
would not have been amused.

"”I would surrender the Crown, would abandon Naples
rather than approve a constitution: in the backward state of
civilization of this country, it would only encourage
excesses and disturbances in the kingdom.” Moscati, p. 22.

99

between his house and the Bourbons of Naples.’°

Walking a tightrope, Ferdinand frequently gave impul-
sive and contradictory signals, which led the Austrian ambas-
sador to complain about the absence of ”solid principles” in
Neapolitan foreign policy.“* Actually, this spirit of inde-
pendence, often combined with stubbornness and conceit,
remained a consistent trait of Ferdinand’s foreign policy.
He was intent on achieving the goal of a nonaligned foreign
policy which had eluded both his father and grandfather.
Consequently, he did not reveal those ”solid principles” or
dependable subordination which would have pleased Metternich.

Ferdinand differed from his predecessors in other
important ways. One was the low esteem in which he held
diplomacy and diplomats.22 Another was his determination to
conduct his foreign policy directly, thus avoiding the
ministerial influence exercised at other Bourbon courts. He
did not seek the advice and guidance of a Bernardo Tanucci,
John Acton, Donato Tommasi, or Luigi de’Medici. Further-

more, the klng took pleasure in withholding vital

 

2°In addition to the rumored marriage of the Count of
Syracuse, there had been talk of a similar alliance between
Ferdinand and another daughter of Louis-Philippe--Louise
Marie of Orleans.

2‘Lebzeltern to Metternich, November 15, 1833, Moscati,
p. 29.

22”Le roi de Naples a . . . un mepris affecte pour la
diplomatie et les relations diplomatiques auxquelles ll
affecte de n’ attribuer aucune part d’ importance et aucune
utilite effective.” Joseph d’Haussonville, French charge in
Naples, to Nicholas-Jean Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, French
foreign minister, March 4, 1840: Saitta (ed.), p. 217.

100
information from his ministers and cut them off from
deliberation and decision.23 His secretive nature, mistrust
of others, and unwillingness to share authority may have
partially accounted for this behavior.24 Unfortunately,
these circumstances deprived Ferdinand of the assistance of
knowledgeable and honest counsellors, and opened the door to
the influence of self-serving courtiers who agreed with his
moods of the moment.

Especially responsible for this situation was an inner
circle led by Monsignor Celestino Cocle, the king’s
confessor: the Abbe Giuseppe Caprioli, his secretary:
General Giuseppe Filangieri: and Nicola Santangelo, the
Minister of Interior. French diplomats called this group
the ”resistance party” because it supported Ferdinand’s
resolve to resist British pressures for the abolition of the
monopoly. Its members represented conservative interests

which opposed innovations, whether political or economic,

 

2“"Even a sympathetic observer detected this secretive
style of the king, who took offense when someone guessed his
thoughts (”s’ offendeva d’ essere indovinato.”). Cala-
Ulloa, de’Tiberiis (ed.), 11_Regne, p. 63. French diplomats
were even more explicit, commenting that Ferdinand derived
pleasure from leavipg his ministers in the dark (”prend
plalsir a laisser meme ses ministres dans l’ ignorance.”).
Tallenay to Mole, July 26, 1837, Saitta (ed.), p. 90.

'“Ferdinand wanted to take all the initiatives and
disliked the appearance of sharing authority. Tallenay to
Mole, April 13, 1837, ibid., p. 77. The same source
commented that ”The king (of Naples) is little disposed
toward listening to the advice of good men. . . . His
excessive diffidence and contempt for people . . . makes him
see in his advisers only persons who are ready to deny him
power.” Tallenay to Mole, August 25, 1837, ibid., p. 106.

101

and wished to curry favor by championing their master’s
causes.28

But there were other items on their secret agenda.
Members of this group favored the sulphur monopoly because
they supported protectionist policies which insured the
survival of a number of business enterprises. There were
rumors that some of them had reaped illicit gains for
supporting Talx." According to the Sardinian ambassador,
Cocle provided speculators with confidential information
about the sulphur crisis which enabled them to profit from
the Neapolitan stock market.37 This cabal worked diligently
to discredit Cassaro, who favored a more prudent and concil-
iatory policy toward Great Britain and the abolition of the
monopoly as a step in the direction of free trade. It
influenced the king against Cassaro, portraying him as being
unconcerned with the preservation of royal dignity and
national honor. Its members stoked the fires of Ferdinand’s
wrath by informing him of the debates in parliament and the

inflammatory items purposely inserted in the Qeze11e_gu_fl1g1

 

asHaussonville to Adolphe Thiers, French foreign mini-
ster, April 14, 1840, ibid., pp. 250-252. French diplomats
refer to ”intrigues of private interests” which supported
Taix. Mole to Tallenay, April 10, 1837, ibid., p. 74.

"Santangelo had the reputation of being an unscru-
pulous profiteer. Haussonville to Thiers, April 14, 1840,
ibid., p. 253.

a’Luigi Crosa di Vergagni to Clemente Solaro della
Margherlta, Sardinian foreign minister, April 16, 1840:
Nicomede Bianchi,

Wane
eeeeeee_1n_11e11e (Turin: Unione Torinese, 1867), vol. 3,
pp. 288-289.

102
by Taix himself.29 This situation was bound to isolate the
king from most of his ministers and facilitated the influ-
ence of his personal style over the conduct of foreign
policy.

Ironically, Palmerston once commended the ”inde-
pendent spirit of the King of Naples which . . . deserves
encouragement.”3’ Ferdinand himself originally professed an
adniration for ”anything English,” and showed himself a
courteous and congenial host to the British colony in
Naples.°° Other members of his family shared his sympa-
thies, especially his brother, the Prince of Capua, who was
obsessively fond of the English language and customs even
before his elopement with Penelope Smith.‘in

Capua provided the occasion for the first clash

between Palmerston and Ferdinand.“'a Before becoming an

 

z'Haussonvllle to Thiers, April 14, 1840, Saitta (ed.),
p. 251.

”Auouetue Craven (ed.>. Lord.£a1menaton1_5a_£ornes:
3'!°-l ‘ I ll‘ '9 "' - I I T 9 - ‘0-

’ (Paris: Didier et Compagnie, 1878),
vol. 1, p. 123. During the proJect for the League of
Italian States (1831-1834), Great Britain shared Ferdinand’s
reservations about an Italian federation dominated by
Austria. Moscati, pp. 30-32.

°°Acton. Ine_Last_Bou£b9na. pp. 66 and 137.

"Capua ”era di lingua e costumi inglesi infatuato.”
Gala-Ulloa, de’Tiberiis (ed.), p. 60. He was the second
surviving son of Francis I and was born in Palermo on
November 10, 1811. He married Penelope Smith on May 11,
1836 and died in Turin on April 22, 1862.

O 0 0‘” - 0

32The Capua Affair is described by Cala-Ulloa, ibid.,
pp. 60-64 and 80-84: and more recently by Acton, Ihe_Lee1

Beezbene, pp. 90-99. See also Benedetto Croce, Qn_2;1ne1ee
g1_fleee11 (Bari: Laterza, 1944).

103

international eeeee_ee1ebee, the ambitious, self-indulgent
prince fought with his brother on several occasions.33
Capua and Penelope eloped in January, 1836 and eventually
married at Gretna Green, Scotland. Ferdinand did not
approve of this marriage.°‘ Yet the fugitives enJoyed the
protection of Queen Victoria and the support of Palmer-
ston.°° Ferdinand coped with this unpleasant development in
order to defuse the emerging tension over the question of
Sicilian sulphur, but he could not accept the British pre-
sumption to dictate the terms of the reconciliation with his
brother and subJect. Even though he liked British ways, the
King of Naples drew the line at foreign interference in his
family’s business.

Capua’s demands further complicated the negotia-
tions.°‘ His cordial relations with political exiles in

London and rumored candidacy for a European throne further

 

3°Capua accused his brother of suppressing their
father’s last will which bequeathed him an income of 132,000
ducats. Ferdinand vehemently denied this charge, stating
that he had personally paid the debts left by Francis I so
that Capua could inherit his full share. Cala-Ulloa, de’
Tiberiis (ed.), p. 83.

3“Ibid., p. 62.

35Several reports indicate that Palmerston was related
to Miss Smith, who was the daughter of Grice Smith of
Ballynatray, Youghal, County Waterford, Ireland.

"The Capuas wished to live in England, asked for the
title of Princess for Penelope, and the surname of Bourbon
for their children. Ferdinand denied this request, but
offered a generous settlement and a yearly income which was
larger than the one enJoyed by his brother before the
elopement.

 

104
deterred a reconciliation.37 According to the Neapolitan
consul in Athens, the prince, supported by British sympathi-
zers and Sicilian aristocrats, plotted to become Sicily’s
constitutional king.°° Palmerston had favored his intention
to reside in Malta, but changed his mind after the London
I1mee published Capua’s inflammatory proclamation to the
Sicilians. He then advised Capua to postpone the execution
of the Malta proJect and publicly disavow any intention to
”foment and encourage disturbances in Sicily.”°’

The Capua Affair damaged Ferdinand’s image in British
political circles, casting him in the role of a family
tyrant and persecutor of ill-starred lovers. But Ferdi-
nand stood on firm ground. As the head of the Bourbons of
Naples, he had the prerogative to regulate the marriage of
family members.“° In the final analysis, he behaved with
moderation and restraint, offered Capua an honorable
settlement, dispatched a special emissary to conduct nego-
tiations in London, and endeavored to pacify Palmerston.

In other disagreements more closely related to foreign

 

a’I. Arcuno, ”Vita d’ esilio di Carlo di Borbone,
Principe di Capua,” Semn1gm, vol. 5 (1932), pp. 191-192
and vol. 6 (1933), pp. 193-194.

°°Domenico Morelli to Scilla, March 23, 1840, ASN/MAE,
f. 4130.

3’Palmerston to Capua, April 28, 1840, ASN/MAE, f.
4131, copy. Another version claims that Metternich inspired
Capua’s proclamation in order to keep the controversial
prince away from Sicily. Bianchi, pp. 296-297.

‘°It is interesting to note that since the passage of
the Marriage Act of 1772, members of the British royal
family also needed the consent of the sovereign to marry.

105
policy, Ferdinand acted in a sensible and prudent manner.
For example, he moved cautiously and avoided clear commit-
ments during the controversy relating to the Carlists and
the Duchess of Berry.‘u A true Bourbon, Ferdinand favored
legitimist causes, but as the king of a relatively small
state, he understood the necessity of compromise and avoided
confrontations which did not serve his country’s best
interests.

The emergence of the sulphur crisis provided a more
serious issue between Ferdinand and Palmerston. In this
instance the king’s personal style in the conduct of
foreign policy impeded the negotiations with Great Britain
and exacerbated the confrontation with Palmerston. Under
these circumstances, his foreign minister operated at a
disadvantage. Cassaro had a clear understanding of his
responsibilities, which he described as supervising the
observance of international treaties and maintaining good
relations with foreign powers.‘3 He expected to be briefed,
if not consulted, on matters as important as the inter-

national repercussions of the sulphur monopoly. Yet one

 

‘iFerdinand suppressed the publication of the Court
Almanac in order to avoid recognizing either Spanish
claimant. Cala-Ulloa, de’Tiberiis (ed.), p. 59. He also
did not receive with royal honors his nephew, the Count of
Chambord, who was the legitimist claimant to the French
throne. Haussonville to Dalmatia, January 28, 1940, Saitta

(ed.), pp. 193-197: and Acton, Ihe_Lee1_Beeenene, p. 130.

42”Esposizlone del principe di Cassaro a Sua Maesta
il re di Napoli, relativa alla questione delle zolfatare di
Sicilia, 15 Gennaio 1840,” ASN/AB, f. 1016: MAIC, f. 4125:
and Bianchi, p. 457.

106

month before the signing of the contract, Cassaro pro-
fessed scant knowledge of the status of the negotia-
tions." In fact, on more than one occasion, he asked
Santangelo for the information requested by the British and
French envoys.“‘ Cassaro’s tactics of evasion and procras-
tination, which so angered the Foreign Office, are more
clearly understood against this background of poor communi-
cation. To make matters worse, Ferdinand was probably aware
of Cassaro’s strong reservations regarding the monopoly and
was consequently reluctant to consult with his foreign
minister.‘5

Struggling between his best Judgement and loyalty to
the king, Cassaro initially managed a tepid defense of the

contract asserting that it was not a monopoly because it

 

‘3”The negotiations have been carried out without the
concurrence of Prince Cassaro, who has received no official
information upon the subJect.” Temple to Palmerston, June 2,

1838, Eepeee, no. 10, p. 16.

”‘Kennedy to Palmerston, July 4, 1838, ibid., no. 12,
p. 17: and Cassaro’s ”Esposizione,” Bianchi, p. 455.

‘BThe British envoy knew that Cassaro had characterized
the sulphur contract as ”odious.” Temple to Palmerston,
April 16, 1839, Eepeee, no. 34, p. 56. Cassaro himself
acknowledged his strong reservations, and believed that the
contract would have an adverse effect upon the Sicilian
economy and relations with Great Britain and France. ”Espo-
sizione,” Bianchi, p. 455. He also had ”fortissimi dubbi”
about the question of the violation of commercial treaties.
”Rispettoso voto del Principe di Cassaro sull’ affare dei
zolfi di Sicilia trattato nel Consiglio ordinarlo di Stato
del Marzo 16, 1840,” ASN/AB, f. 1016: AB/MAE, f. 4125: and
Bianchi, p. 464.

107
was ”general for all nations.”“‘ By his own admission,
he relied heavily upon Santangelo’s assurance that the
sulphur matter would receive ”mature consideration.”" He
was under the impression that the Council of Ministers would
discuss the contract as part of the overall trade relation-
ship with Great Britain. He was confident that his presence
on the Council would insure a fair disposition of this
business.‘° But Cassaro eventually learned from Temple that
negotiations were in fact progressing, and Santangelo
acknowledged at the beginning of June, 1838, that the king
had conditionally endorsed the Taix-Aycard contract."

At the same time, Santangelo offered strong arguments
in support of a contract that addressed the depressed con-
ditions of an industry victimized by the greed of foreign
speculators. Monopolies were a longstanding practice in
civilized societies, as exemplified by the soda industry in
Marseilles. A correct interpretation of Article IV of the

Treaty would disprove any allegation of treaty violation.°°

 

‘6Cassaro to Temple, November 18, 1837, Eeeeee,
enclosure 2 in no. 3, Temple to Palmerston, November 22,
1837, p. 4. The correspondence between Cassaro and Temple
is in ASN/AB, ff. 1014 and 1018.

‘7”Esposizione,” Bianchi, p. 455.
‘elblde , ppe 455-4560
"Ibid., p. 456.

°°The original Italian version of this letter is dated
June 8, 1838. Its translation is dated July 8, 1838, Eeeeee,
enclosure 1 in no. 13, Kennedy to Palmerston, July 9, 1838,
pp. 18-21. As a result of this letter, Ludolf was the target
of a violent verbal attack by Palmerston at the end of a

108
Ludolf supported this interpretation with strong arguments.5‘
Articles IV and V granted Great Britain the status of
favored nation, but did not confer upon British nationals
more privileges than those enJoyed by Neapolitan subJects.
The Crown had the right to levy taxes on national and
foreign businessmen: the situation amounted to a tax on
sulphur. The restrictions on the sulphur trade were more
liberal than those applied to other products because sellers
were free to deal with individuals and groups other than the
Company.92 Neither Santangelo nor Ludolf mentioned compen-
sation for British merchants.°°

Palmerston’s intemperate response to the Ludolf note

 

dinner honoring Queen Victoria on July 25, 1838. A few days
later, the foreign minister reneged on a promise to assist
Naples against the Albanian pirates. ”Esposizione,” Bianchi,
p. 456. Another letter from Santangelo refuted the charge
that British businessmen in Sicily did not receive due notice
of the contract. Cassaro forwarded this letter to Temple
without comment. Santangelo to Cassaro, August 29, 1838,
ASN/AB. f. 1014.

"Ludolf to Palmerston, July 31, 1838, ibid: and
Repene, no. 17, pp. 30-51. Ludolf restated the Neapolitan
position in a lengthy letter to Palmerston, September 17,
1838, Eeeene, no. 25, pp. 40-45. See Appendix E.

82Differenze tra il Governo Inglese e quello di
Napoli,” ASN/MAE, f. 4130: and Ludolf to Palmerston,
September 17, 1838, Eeeeee, no. 25, pp. 40-43.

9°Cassaro tackled this task, suggesting that the
merchants submit documentation of their expenses and losses.
Only the businessmen who had rented the mines before hearing
of the contract would be eligible for compensation. Cassaro
to Kennedy, August 27, 1838, ibid., enclosure in no. 24,
Kennedy to Palmerston, September 1, 1838, p. 39. Santangelo
wanted to prove that the merchants did receive due notice of
the monopoly (see footnote 50) and insisted on the documen-
tation of damages. Santangelo to Cassaro, August 24, 1838,
ASN/MAE, f. 4126.

109

enraged Ferdinand and prompted a strong reply.°‘ Although
this retort never reached its destination, it offers an
insight on the king’s position.°° It refuted, almost point
for point, the charges levelled at the Bourbon administra-
tion and the monopoly. Ferdinand opened with a strong
defense of his government which he insisted was neither
despotic nor irresponsible: nor one in which ”caprlce, want
of political knowledge, preJudice, private interest, or
undue influence may procure the promulgation of unJust and
impolitic edicts.” Equality under the law had replaced old
class privileges, and Neapolitan subJects enJoyed a freedom
which was commensurate with ”their character, wishes, and
needs.” The government protected the private property of its
citizens and foreign nationals alike, thus insuring a
favorable climate for investment. The British could not
claim a ”monopoly on political and economic science in the
country of Broggio, Vico, Galiani, and Genovesi.”

Passing to the defense of the contract, Ferdinand
argued that it did not establish a monopoly. True, the firm

was exempt from paying the tax of two ducats per cantar

 

P‘Palmerston to Ludolf, October 12, 1838, Eeeeee, no.
26, pp. 46-48. See Appendix F. A copy of the king’s letter,
undated, is in ASN/AB, f. 1013.

°°Ludolf received the order to transmit these comments
verbally. Palmerston’s prolonged absence from London and
the subsequent death of Ludolf prevented delivery. The
detente in Anglo-Neapolitan relations which occurred in 1839
may have persuaded Cassaro to drop this matter, especially
since he felt that these remarks would have exasperated the
British government ”to the limit.” ”Esposizione,” Bianchi,
p. 457.

110

levied upon others, but this was fair in view of Taix-
Aycard’s financial obligations which included payments to
the Neapolitan treasury, compensation to the mine owners for
limiting extraction, costs of transportation, warehousing,
and administration. Ferdinand reJected Palmerston’s charge
that selfishness had motivated the approval of the contract.
The Neapolitan government could have imposed a tax of one
ducat per cantar on sulphur, thus generating an income of
600,000 ducats a year. But this would have necessitated
selling the sulphur at a lower price, hardly a remedy for a
depressed industry. The letter concluded with an appropri-
ate reminder of the historical ties between Great Britain
and Sicily.

The loyalty with which the ancestors of His

Sicilian MaJesty kept the alliance with England

resulted in the loss of their continental do-

mains. Let history decide which of the coun-

tries sacrificed more for the other. The

government of His MaJesty is content with

mentioning that in Sicily English subJects were

hospitably received and protected: there they

have established the base of their speculation

and fortune.°‘
Although it is possible to argue against some opinions
expressed in this message, such as the claim that the
contract was not a monopoly, the myth of Ferdinand’s tyranny
and ignorance finds no support. The reality is an inde-
pendent-minded ruler, anxious to clear his adninistration

of unfair criticism and to Justify his intentions in the

award of the Taix-Aycard contract.

 

S‘Ibid.

111

The resolve which Ferdinand expressed so forcefully in
this note appeared to waver in the months that followed,
giving the impression that he might abolish the monopoly and
Justifying Cassaro’s hopes for a quick solution to the
crisis.87 For one thing, Taix-Aycard had difficulty ful-
filling its obligations.°° Its default would provide an
excellent pretext for cancellation without bowing to foreign
pressure.

A better solution focused upon the renegotiation of
the Anglo-Neapolitan commercial treaty which the British
government proposed at the end of 1838.9’ The notion of
burying the sulphur deal in a new treaty appealed to Cassaro.
A good courtier, he gave Ferdinand credit for an initiative
which would ”like magic lay to rest all bitterness, terminate

the controversy, and satisfy England.”‘° The new treaty

 

9’Kennedy to Palmerston, August 29, 1839, Eeeene,
no. 37, p. 58: November 5, 1839, ibid., no. 42, p. 63: and
MacGregor to Palmerston, November 13, 1839, ibid., no. 44,
p. 63.

°°Kennedy to Palmerston, March 18, 1839, ibid., no. 33,
p. 56. By May, Taix had not paid half of what he owed and
received permission to pay only one-third of the balance.
Wood to Kennedy, May 18, 1839, ibid., enclosure in no. 36,
Kennedy to Palmerston, May 27, 1839, p. 58.

"Pontieri, ”Sui Trattato di commercio,” W.
p. 299.

‘°”. . . come per lncantesimo sopire a un tratto ogni
rancore, troncar le contestazionl e soddisfare l’.Inghil-
terra.” ”Esposizione,” Bianchi, p. 458. According to
Cassaro, the king discussed this idea when he returned from
Sicily at the beginning of 1839 and gave formal approval to
bilateral negotiations between his foreign minister and
James MacGregor on June 15. The draft of the proposal was
completed by November 25, and submitted to the king at the
beginning of December. Ibid.

112
offered Naples several advantages. It would place the
Neapolitan merchant marine and commerce on an equal footing
with the British and abolish without compensation the tariff
of 10 percent on Neapolitan goods ten years after the
signing of the treaty. The monopoly would be quietly
abolished, saving national honor. At this point, even the
British were optimistic for a peaceful solution. In June
1839, Poulett Thomson informed the House of Lords that ”some
arrangement was about to be made that would be advantageous
to both countries, while it would check the monopoly on
sulphur which was not only inJurious to all parties, but was
one of the most absurd arrangements ever undertaken by a
Government.”“

However, Ferdinand hesitated and then reJected this
proposal. Exasperated by the turn of events, MacGregor
commented that ”the only thing left was to do to Naples what
the French had done to Vera Cruz,” where Adniral Baudin had
opened fire on the port in November 1838.‘2

British pressure on Cassaro increased after parliament
opened on January 16. The foreign minister did his best to
persuade Ferdinand that the time had come for a compromise.

He argued that the contract had not improved the

 

“London I1mee, June 22, 1839, ASN/MAIC, f. 174.
Actually, the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council
intended to suspend measures designed to encourage the
import of sulphur from other areas and the development of
surrogates. Palmerston to Kennedy, December 10, 1839,

Baum. no. 34, p. 64.

‘zflaussonville to Dalmatia, January 28, 1840, Saitta
(ed.), p. 201.

113

conditions of Sicily, where limits on production had
increased unemployment and crimes against property. The
sulphur monopoly was a royal concession which the king could
properly revoke, especially since Taix-Aycard did not fulfill
its obligations.‘°

But Ferdinand continued to play for time, sending
confused and contradictory signals. First he indicated his
intention to cancel the contract, then he refused to issue a
written confirmation. A statement dictated by Ferdinand on
February 23 authorized Cassaro to announce the end of the
monopoly, but it was followed by nearly a month of procras-
tination and misunderstanding.‘“ This erratic course was,
in part, the result of Ferdinand’s tendency to keep people
guessing about his real intentions. Kennedy complained to
Palmerston that ”past experience has unfortunately shown
that procrastination and delay are inherent in the system of
this Government.”‘°

Other reasons may have persuaded the king to postpone

 

‘3”Parere del principe d1 Cassaro sullo scioglimento
del contratto di concessione del zolfi trattato nel Con-
siglio d1 Stato del 26 Gennaio 1840,” ASN/AB, f. 1016: and
ASN/MAE, f. 4125.

“Cassaro’s note to Temple began with the emphatic
”Sir, the sulphur business is solved!” and bore the anno-
tation ”written by verbal order of the king.” ASN/AB, f.
1016: and ASN/MAE, f. 4130. At Cassaro’s request, Kennedy
withheld a strong note from Palmerston and delivered it only
when he became convinced that Ferdinand had no intention of
cancelling the contract. ”Rispettoso voto del Principe di
Cassaro,” Bianchi, p. 465.

‘BKennedy to Palmerston, November 5, 1839, Eepeee,
no. 42, p. 63.

114

cancellation. With the support of the French government,
Taix and his associates might press for payment of damages
resulting from the abolition of the contract.“ Although
Ferdinand had expressed the intention to cancel ”at all
cost,” he may have recoiled from paying a substantial sum of
money to Taix and decided to continue the monopoly.‘7 Mid-
night consultations with Cocle, carried out in the privacy
of the royal bedchamber, encouraged this course of action.
Probably, the announcement of February 23 was a ruse to gain
time and Ferdinand had never seriously thought of cancelling
the monopoly. Evidence of his willingness to do so is scant
and primarily limited to the repeated assurances of Cassaro,
who was not very successful in reading his master’s mind.

Regardless of his motives, Ferdinand’s behavior in
this matter appears to be highly questionable. The sulphur
crisis was the most delicate and serious foreign confron-
tation of his reign before the revolutions of 1848. The
situation required tact and good will, together with a
coherent plan developed in consultation with knowledgeable
advisers. Deliberate attempts to mislead his opponent,
especially given the great disparity of power, were counter-
productive and bound to discredit the reputation of the king.
It is quite possible that no Neapolitan diplomatic effort

could ultimately have prevailed against the British

 

“Haussonville to Dalmatia, February 8, 1840, Saitta
(ed.), p. 221.

67MacGregor to Palmerston, November 13, 1839, Eeeeee,
no. 44, pp. 63-64.

115
determination to force the abolition of the monopoly. How-
ever, Ferdinand’s reputation in the international community
could have been enhanced by a more honest and realistic
foreign policy.

These actions contrast with the king’s good intentions
and positive approach to the solution of Sicily’s problems.
He gave ample consideration to the Taix proposal, and
approved it only after soliciting the opinions of the appro-
priate consultative bodies. In his letter to Palmerston, he
defended the Neapolitan position with reasonable arguments,
in a tone which was firm yet conciliatory, proJecting an
image of dignity and fairness. Ferdinand’s contradictions
resulted in part from the pressure of the situation. Faced
with opposition from a superior power, he resorted to
questionable diplomatic maneuvers in order to protect his
country. In addition, he was the product of his formation
and environment, an absolute ruler who frequently acted
without advice or consent in the area of foreign policy.

The question remains whether it is appropriate to Judge
Ferdinand according to the standards of constitutional
governments or movements.

By the middle of March, Temple was warning of
reprisals should a satisfactory reply be further delayed.68

This stiff note prompted the March 16 meeting of the Council

 

‘aLuigl d1 Regina, Neapolitan charge in London, to
Cassaro, March 10 and 13, 1840, ASN/MAE, f. 4130: Temple
to Cassaro, March 15, 1840, ASN/AB, f. 1016: also Eeeeee,
enclosure in no. 60, Temple to Palmerston, March 17, 1840,
p. 77. .

116
of State. Discussion centered on the course of action to
take in response to the British threat. With the exceptions
of Cassaro and Pletracatella, all ministers Joined forces
with the king and supported the continuation of the monopoly
in order to forestall new demands and preserve national
honor. In an overconfident mood, this maJority downplayed
the gravity of the situation. A British blockade would most
likely fail because of the length of the kingdom’s coastline.
If successful, the blockade would ultimately benefit the
Neapolitan economy by protecting it from foreign imports.
The captured Neapolitan vessels would probably manage to
escape or could be ransomed with public funds. Ferdinand
insisted that he was right on the issue because the monopoly
fell within his prerogatives and did not violate any
treaty." He reassured his ministers of the kingdom’s
defensive capabilities and boasted that a firm response would
force the British to withdraw, as in the case of the French
fleet under Adniral Lalande.”o

Cassaro presented the rationale for his dissent from

 

"Ferdinand’s speech is in Austrian archives, and also
in Moscati, pp. 40-41.

’°The arrival of Admiral Lalande in the Bay of Naples
on September 28, 1837, created quite a concern over the
intentions of the French fleet and placed the port garrison
on full alert for two days and two nights. This episode
occurred at the height of the Franco-Neapolitan quarrel over
the French postal steamships, and was at first viewed as an
aggressive action against Naples. The official French
explanation was that Lalande had lost an anchor in the bay a
few years before and only wanted to test the depth of the
waters to avoid a similar occurrence. Saitta (ed.), Sep-
tember 29, 1837, pp. 114-115: October 6, 1837, p. 117: and
December 17, 1837, pp. 138-140.

117

the maJority opinion. The length of the coastline would
favor, rather than hinder, a naval blockade, which would
damage, rather than benefit, the Neapolitan economy. It
would also prevent the export of cash crops, the import of
raw materials essential to Neapolitan industry, and would
deprive the Treasury of custom revenues. Even worse, a naval
engagement could result in the complete destruction of the
Neapolitan fleet and damage Neapolitan interests far more
than coming to terms with Palmerston. In Cassaro’s opinion,
the best way to uphold national honor was to respect treaties
and maintain friendly relations with other nations. In
conclusion, he recommended the abolition of the monopoly,
restoration of free trade, and settlement of the dispute.

The Council meeting of March 16 marked the end of
Cassaro’s political career. On several occasions, he had
expressed his intention to quit if Ferdinand reneged on the
promise to repeal the monopoly. True to his word, the
foreign minister resigned verbally at the end of the meeting
and in writing the same evening.7‘ On April 3, he received
the order to leave the capital within twenty-four hours.
Ferdinand treated his foreign minister harshly, denying him
permission to choose his place of exile and travel without

police escort. He ordered Cassaro to be arrested at night

 

"His resignation was accepted on March 23, and pub-
lished in the QezzeLLe on March 24. Haussonville to Thiers,
March 24, 1840, Saitta (ed.), p. 229. Ferdinand asked for
Lebzeltern’s recall because he suspected him of intriguing
with Cassaro. Metternich denied the request. Moscati,

p. 42.

118
and taken to Foggia, Apulia, about 150 miles from Naples.72
When Cassaro became ill, the king ignored his request for a
transfer to Rome. This harsh treatment was unusual as well
as undeserved. Obviously Ferdinand wanted to make an
example of him.” The question now remains whether the king
punished the minister for having dissented, or whether he
wanted to convey the impression that Cassaro had misrepre-
sented him during the negotiations with the British.

The meeting also marked the triumph of the resistance
party. To succeed Cassaro, Ferdinand appointed the Prince
of Scilla, an amiable cipher who was a member of the anti-
Cassaro cabal. His influence on the conduct of foreign
policy appears to have been negligible: all available
evidence suggests that his maJor concern was to execute the
orders of the king and avoid the fate of his predecessor.
By his own admission, he lacked experience in foreign
affairs and needed additional time to familiarize himself
with the intricacies of the sulphur question." The
appointment of Scilla deprived the king of an experienced
adviser who was both able and willing to provide alterna-

tive views.

 

’2Temple to Palmerston, April 5, 1840, Eepeee, no. 69,
p. 88.

7°Cassaro was not as fortunate as the ministers of the
French kings, who were confined to their country estates.
Cala-Ulloa, de’Tiberiis (ed.), 11_Regne, p. 89.

7“Temple to Palmerston, March 21, 1840, Eeeeee, no. 62,
p. 78: and Haussonville to Thiers, March 24, 1840, Saitta
(ed.), p. 230.

119

Finally, the meeting marked the end of any hope for a
peaceful settlement with Great Britain.’° A note of protest
entrusted to Castelcicala carried the Neapolitan ultimatum to
London." Should Great Britain attack the flag or harm a
single Neapolitan subJect, the Neapolitan government would
protect its rights according to the norms of international
law. At the same time, Scilla alerted diplomatic represent-
atives scattered throughout Europe to the progressive
deterioration of the situation.” British observers in
Naples agreed that the time for a negotiated settlement was
passing. As Temple informed Palmerston:

There is every appearance that the Neapolitan

Government is determined to persevere in its

resistance to the Just demands of the British

Government, and to maintain the Sulphur

Monopoly, regardless of consequences, in

violation of its treaties with England and

France, and of the repeated promises made to

the British Government.’°

Diplomatic negotiations failed to settle the Anglo-
Neapolitan quarrel over Sicilian sulphur by March 1840.

Ferdinand was on a collision course with Palmerston and

faced a double dilemma. On the one hand, he could not

 

75Even the French charge felt that Ferdinand had
reached the point of no return on March 16. Haussonville
to Dalmatia, March 19, 1840, ibid., p. 227.

7“”Nota protestativa consegnata al Principe di
Castelcicala ai 29 Marzo, 1840,” ASN/AB. f. 1013.

7’Scilla’s coded messages to diplomatic personnel in
London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Turin, and Rome are in
ASN/AB, f. 1013.

7‘Temple to Palmerston, March 29, 1840, Eepeee,
no. 66, p. 84.

120

implement domestic reforms without risking military inter-

vention by a maJor power. On the other hand, he could not

pursue his goal of a nonaligned foreign policy without losing

diplomatic support in time of need. Metternich shrewdly

assessed Ferdinand’s situation:

. . . while he had the laudable intention to
reorganize the internal administration of his
country, he attached a value to the word
independence which he could not possess on a
practical policy: independent as a person, he
had no ministers: independent as a sovereign,
he had no allies: and was consequently without
counsellors at home and friends abroad.7’

 

7“’Metternich to Felix von Schwartzenberg, Austrian
ambassador to Naples, March 10, 1844, Moscati, p. 56.

CHAPTER V

IHE WAR

No blood was shed in this
somewhat ludicrous affair. . . .‘

The Sulphur War was out of the ordinary. There was no
formal declaration of war on either side, and diplomatic
personnel in London and Naples remained at their posts.
There were no maJor or minor engagements between the two
fleets: nor were there any attempts to land in enemy terri-
tory. Although the initial British plan for the blockade of
Neapolitan ports never materialized, there were random raids
on Neapolitan shipping. While small commercial vessels
suffered damages, there were no human casualties, with the
exception of four Neapolitan soldiers who allegedly died as
the result of a twenty-six hour fast enroute from the main-
land to Sicily.2

After Ferdinand issued his ”declaration of indepen-

dence” at the Council meeting of March 16, war seemed

 

‘Herbert F. Winnington-Ingram, fleee1e_efi_geg (London:
W. H. Allen, 1889), p. 20.

2W. April 13. 1840, ASN/MAE. f.
4130.

121

122
inevitable.a Accordingly, the Neapolitan government placed
the kingdom on a war alert and activity increased near Fort
St. Elmo in Naples. On the evening of March 17, the
Eeeg1neege sailed for Sicily with a military cargo which
consisted of two cavalry units, defense material suited for
a siege, and ammunition destined for Palermo, Messina, and
Syracuse.‘ By the end of March, Temple was reporting that
Neapolitan military preparations were to ”be carried out
with great activity,” including the deployment of 20,000
troops in Sicily and outfitting of the 74-gun ye§e11e§ and
other warships at anchor in the port of Naples.8 There were
rumors in London of Neapolitan war preparations which were
totally out of proportion to the issue and danger, and of
Ferdinand’s intention to lead his troops in the defense of
Sicily.‘ Preparations continued in April as the king
ordered artillery units to guard approaches to the port

of Naples. Two Swiss battalions were put in charge of the

 

°”Tutto accennava a guerra," Cala-Ulloa, de’Tiberiis
(ed.), p. 89.

“Haussonville to Dalmatia, March 19, 1840, Saitta
(ed.) p. 227.

aTemple to Palmerston, March 29, 1840, Eeeeee, no. 66,
p. 84.

“A pro-Palmerston paper. Ibe_uorn1ngushronicle.

ascribed the military alert to a quarrel between Naples and
the Bey of Tunis. Di Regina to Scilla, March 31, 1840, ASN/
MAE, f. 4130: and Francois Pierre Guizot, neme1eee_peee

aerx1r_a_1__hiat91:e_dedmon_tempa (Paris: Michel Levy Freres.
1962), vol. 5. p. 90.

123

defense of Castel Nuovo and one of Castel deli’ Uovo.7
Obviously, the Neapolitans expected an imminent attack.
The British consul in Trapani, a Sicilian, reported to the
authorities that the governor of Malta had inquired about
the defense capabilities of that port city. This report
prompted additional ammunition to be shipped to Trapani.°

While the Neapolitan government was planning for war,
efforts to postpone the expected reprisals continued beyond
the British deadline of April 1.’ On that day, Scilla com-
plained about the tone of Temple’s March 25 note, which
was ”stringent for its brevity and peremptory nature.” In
the same letter, Scilla announced the departure of Castel-
cicala, who would present the ”definitive solution of
this already too protracted and unpleasant discussion.”‘°
Should this mission fail to cancel British reprisals, the

Neapolitan government would then inform European chanceries

 

7Haussonville to Thiers, April 2, 1840, Saitta (ed.),
p. 240.

‘Cala-Ulloa, de’Tiberiis (ed), p. 89.

'Temple had warned that ”serious consequences” would
result from further delays. Temple to Scilla, March 22,
1840, ASN/MAE, f. 4130: and Eeeeee, enclosure 2 in no. 63,
Temple to Palmerston, March 24, 1840, p. 82. Three days
later, Temple formally requested the abolition of the
monopoly and compensation for damages within one week.
Otherwise, Admiral Robert Stopford, the commander of the
Mediterranean fleet, would receive orders to proceed against
Neapolitan vessels. Temple to Scilla, March 25, 1840,
ibid., enclosure in no. 64, Temple to Palmerston, March 27,
1840, p. 83. ‘

‘°The ”Nota Protestativa” of March 29, 1840, restated
the Neapolitan position of treaty non-violation, but did not
provide a new solution. ASN/AB, f. 1013.

124

of a development that ”must interest the general policy of
Europe and particularly the tranquility of its states.”H
Acting on orders from Palmerston, Temple refused to cancel
his instructions to Malta.‘2

As European powers became more and more apprehensive
lest ”the sulphur of Aetna set all Europe on fire,” Scilla
continued to court European support and assistance.‘° The
minister’s optimism reflected Ferdinand’s belief that the
prospect of a war in the Mediterranean would prompt European
governments to intervene in order to prevent the controversy
from degenerating into an open conflict. Austria appeared
to be the most likely power to mediate. Close family ties
united the courts of Vienna and Naples, especially after the
marriage of Ferdinand to his second wife, the Archduchess
Maria Teresa. More importantly, a maJor goal of Metter-
nich’s foreign policy was to maintain the balance of power
on the Italian peninsula. A war in the Mediterranean would

destabilize the Italian states, reduce Austrian influence,

 

11Scilla to Temple, April 1, 1840, ASN/MAE, f. 4130;
and Papers, enclosure in no 67, Temple to Palmerston, April
2, 1840, pp. 84-85. Temple was aware of Castelcicala’s
departure, ostensibly to transmit a congratulatory message
to Queen Victoria on the occasion of her wedding. Temple
to Palmerston, March 28, 1840, ASN/AB, f. 1018; and Pagans,
no. 66, p. 84.

mPalmerston to Scilla, March 13, 1840, ibid., no 57,
p. 75: and Temple to Scilla, April 3, 1840, ibid., enclosure
in no. 70, Temple to Palmerston, April 5, 1840, p. 89.

”aMetternich to Lebzeltern, April 11, 1840, Moscati,
p. 43. Scilla briefed Neapolitan diplomatic and consular
personnel on the possibility of international complications.
Circulars of March 21 and 24, 1840, ASN/MAE, f. 4130.

125
and open the door to the influx of liberal ideas.

Ferdinand had other reasons for expecting Austrian
assistance. Since 1834, he appeared to become more support-
ive of Austrian interests as he favored the removal of
French troops from Ancona.“ This prompted Lebzeltern to
declare that the King of Naples had finally become a royal-
ist. Ferdinand also honored his predecessors’ commitment to
maintain 60,000 troops in the Po Valiey.‘° Thus it was not
unreasonable for him to expect some help in return.“

Contrary to Neapolitan expectations, however, neither
Metternich nor Ferdinand’s father-in-iaw, the Archduke
Charles, offered their good offices. Metternich expressed
his concern for the serious consequences of the quarrel.”7
In his confidential letter to Lebzeltern, the Austrian
chancellor explicitly stated that Austria had no intention
of interfering with the domestic administration of the King-
dom of the Two Sicilies, but was worried about the interna-
tional consequences of an Anglo-Neapolitan war. He correctly
sensed that Prussia and Russia would not support Naples, and
that France would probably negotiate, but only as a mediator

partial to Great Britain. He closed his remarks with a

 

“Moscati, p. 34.

‘aBianchi, pp. 308-309.

i‘Expected support from Vienna may have strengthened
Ferdinand’s resolve to resist British demands. Ibid., p.
284.

"Domenico Gagiiatl, Neapolitan ambassador to Vienna,
to Scilla, April 13, 1840, ASN/MAE, f. 4130.

126

severe Judgement of the reckless and ill-advised behavior
of the King of Naples, and warned that Ferdinand ”would have
to back down and Palmerston . . . does not intend to make his
retreat easy.”*° Other chanceries acted in a similar manner.
St. Petersburg answered that Russia was a long way from the
central Mediterranean and lacked the naval capability to
protect Naples against the British fleet.‘° Berlin exhorted
London to use restraint, but abstained from further action.

Austria, Prussia, and Russia may have had other
motives for not supporting Naples. They did not enJoy the
commercial privileges which Naples granted to France and
Great Britain, and may have looked forward to the abolition
of the contract as a first step toward a change in the
overall Neapolitan trade policy.2° In addition, Palmerston
was courting the support of these powers in order to check
French influence in the eastern Mediterranean. This
successful maneuver produced the Quadruple Alliance which

isolated France and created the most serious crisis in

 

u”Metternich to Lebzeltern, April 11, 1840, Moscati,
pp. 43-44. The Austrian ambassador warned Palmerston that
British military action in Italy would invite an Austrian
response and endanger the peace of Europe already threatened
by the Eastern Question. Bianchi, pp. 296-297.

”’Giura, pp. 75-76.

2°”. . . les pulssances etrangeres ont des raisons de
désirer tout ce qui peut amener un changement compiet dans
les relations commerciales de ce royaume, a cause du bene-
fice de 10% dont elles ne Jouissent pas comme nous, et
elles n’ ignorent pas que la dissolution du contrat des
souffres, vu l’ arrangement deJa proJete avec l’ Angieterre,
etait un premier pas falt dans ce sens.” Haussonville to
Thiers, March 31, 1840, Saitta (ed.), p. 234.

127

Anglo-French relations since Waterloo.21

This lack of support for the Neapolitan position was
not indicative of an unqualified approval of Palmerston’s
actions. Two years after the Sulphur War, the Earl of
Aberdeen, Paimerston’s successor at the Foreign Office,
expressed his own disapproval of Palmerston’s intemperate
conduct.22 While Guizot acknowledged that the monopoly had
damaged British interests, he reJected the notion that it
was a violation of any commercial agreement, especially
after the Pollock-Phillimore opinion had cleared the
Neapolitan government.2° Guizot concluded that Palmerston
would have used more restraint in dealing with a maJor power
such as France or the United States.24

Neapolitan envoys throughout Europe could not have

agreed more with these sentiments.2° Some denounced British

 

"Norman Gash. An1sL9cnagx_and_Eeonie;_Bnitain_1§1§:
1565 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 295.
Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia signed the Pact
of London on July 15, 1840.

22ASN/MAE, f. 2091, Pontieri, “Sui Trattato di
commercio,” Il_Riformismg. p. 310.

2"'F'rancesco Castelnuovo, a Boiognese Jurist, went a
step further by claiming that the depressed conditions of
the sulphur industry made the monopoly necessary. ASN/AB,
f. 1017.

2“Guizot, pp. 94-95. Guizot waggishly noted that it
was Just like England to-cope with two wars, one in China
for some pills and one in Naples for some matches. Ibid.,
p. 90; and Giura, p. 75, n. 5.

a"Ample documentation of the correspondence between
Neapolitan diplomats and Scilla is in ASN/MAE, ff. 4129,
4130, and 4131.

128

greed and arrogance during the Opium War.26 Others offered
unrealistic suggestions. Gagliati felt that an all-out war
was a preferable alternative to a blockade because it would
embarrass Palmerston and rally international support around
Naples. The most absurd idea came from the Neapolitan
ambassador to St. Petersburg, who favored giving patent
letters (lettg;g_g1_manga) which would permit Spaniards,
Greeks, and even Americans to raid British ships in the
Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean!27

As tensions mounted and both sides warned their
nationals of possible problems, the idea of a negotiated
settlement gained support as the only way out of a situation
which threatened the peace of the region.2° Luigi Crosa di
Vergagni, the Sardinian ambassador, was briefly successful
in his attempt to bridge the differences between Scilla and

Temple.2’ His plan for a preliminary agreement had the

 

2“Giuseppe Ramirez, Neapolitan consul in Malta, to
Scilla, April 30, 1840, ASN/MAE, f. 4130.

27Giura, pp. 75-76.

2‘”A Neapolitan circular of March 29, 1840, directed the
consuls in Livorno, Ancona, Genoa, Trieste, Marseilles, and
Gibraltar to advise Neapolitan captains of the implications
of the quarrel with Great Britain. ASN/MAE, f. 4130. On
April 2, the British consul Thomas Galway advised British
merchants in Naples to use their own Judgement in placing

their cargo on Neapolitan vessels. 11_§g;nig§g_naltg§g,
April 18, 1840, p. 122, ASN/MAE, f. 4130.

2’Correspondence relating to the Crosa mission is in
ASN/MAE, ff. 4129 and 4131. The best contemporary account

from the Neapolitan side is the W
W

i r

C;ggg_g_fl,_1gmglg, Saitta (ed.), pp. 247-250, n. 1.

129
green light from both sides but collapsed within a few
days.°° Slowly, the plan for French mediation gained
ground, although Franco-Neapolitan relations had been less
than cordial. France suspected the Neapolitan court of
favoring the legitimist cause, and resented the Neapolitan
refusal to grant warship status to French state steamships
(pagggpggg) entrusted with the delivery of the mail to
Neapolitan ports.°‘ Also, the French complained of the
frivolous pretexts used to expel French subJects, especially
those of liberal persuasion, from the Kingdom of Naples.
Further resentment focused upon odious harassment, a
systematic ill-will against everything French, and the
Neapolitan tactics of delaying redress of well-founded

grievances.32 On the Neapolitan side, there were suspicions

 

a°The draft had the initial approval of Pietracatella,
Parisio, and the Council of State. The initiative failed
because of misunderstandings, suspicion, and intransigence
on both sides. Kennedy opposed it and persuaded Temple to
modify the initial draft, thus angering the Neapolitans.
Temple showed an unwillingness to cater to the usual dila-
tory tactics of the king. Ferdinand was reluctant to
accept a compromise which would appear as a capituiation to
British demands and suspected collusion between Temple and
Crosa. Ibid., p. 250. The Sardinian government criticized
Crosa for undertaking the task without official approval and
recalled him shortly thereafter.

"The French kept a vigilant eye on the activities of
French legitimists in Naples such as the Viscount de Waisch.
Dalmatia to Auguste Perier, charge in Naples, November 13,
1839, Saitta (ed.), pp. 189-190. The visit of the Count of
Chambord, the legitimist claimant, was the topic of
correspondence between the French foreign minister and the
charge in Naples from November 1839 to January 1840.

32”Des actes et des procedes, que reprouvent a la fois
l’ equite et ie droit international, semblent accuser de la
part de l’ Adninistration des Deux Sicilies contre tout ce

130
of the trends established by the Orleans monarchy. Always
sensitive to slights, Ferdinand resented Louis-Philippe’s
cool treatment of his ambassador to Paris in 1835.33
Franco-Neapolitan relations became so strained that the two
governments ceased exchanging envoys of ambassadorial rank in
the mid-thirties.°‘

France had Joined Great Britain in the protest against
the monopoly, but the news of Ferdinand’s intention to
cancel the contract in February, 1840, generated a subtle
shift in French diplomacy. The French government now became
aware of the need to protect national interests and insure
an equitable compensation for the losses suffered by French
investors. After all, Taix and associates were creditors of
the Neapolitan government and entitled to their own govern-
ment’s protection.°°

Ferdinand’s ill-concealed contempt for diplomats and

diplomacy and his personal control over foreign policy

 

qui porte le nom francais un sistheme de maiveillance et
d’ hostilite qu’ on a peine a s’ expliquer.” flgtg§_§g£_lg§

mammalian. August 1837. ibid.. pp.
100-101.

3°Bianchi, pp. 276-277.

"Adniral LaLande’s arrival in the Bay of Naples
occurred during this period.

as”Cette resiliation change completement a nos yeux la
position de M. Taix et de ses associes, et que nous ne
devons plus voir en eux que des Francais creanciers du
Gouvernement Napolitain, et dont les interSts compromis ont
droit a la protection de la France.” Haussonville to
Dalmatia, March 15, 1840, Saitta (ed.), p. 221.

\L,

131

discouraged offers of diplomatic assistance.3‘ Neverthe-
less, Haussonville initiated steps in this direction,
stressing to Cassaro the advantages of French over Austrian
mediation. With a strong presence in the Mediterranean,
France was a better shield against the British fleet than
Austria offering ”its Hussars from the depths of Hungary.”37
Urged by other diplomats, Haussonville made a similar repre-
sentation to Scilla and then to Ferdinand. Although he care-
fully restated France’s complete agreement with the British
position on the monopoly, he clearly indicated the willing-
ness of his government to officiate as an intermediary.39

After the failure of the Crosa initiative, the
possibility of French mediation increased. In Paris,
Castelcicala took credit for securing Louis-Philippe’s good
offices.°’ The French government also appreciated
Ferdinand’s success in persuading the Duchess of Berry to

moderate her legitimist activities.‘° The Neapolitan

 

3‘Haussonvilie to Dalmatia, March 4, 1840, Saitta
(ed.), p. 217.

37”Un ambassadeur d’ une nation comme la n6tre, ailiee
de l’ Angieterre, puissance maritime, maintenant lmposante
dans le Mediterranee, ne serait-il pas un protecteur plus
efficace contre les vaisseaux de iigne venus de Malte, que
ie ministre d’ Autriche vous offrant ses houzards du fond de
la Hongrie?” Haussonville to Thiers, March 15, 1840, ibid.,
p. 223.

3°Haussonville to Thiers, March 24, 1840, ibid., pp.
229-230: and March 31, 1840, ibid., p. 236.

a"Castelcicala to Ferdinand, April 15 and 20, 1840,

ASN/AB, f. 1013. Castelcicala had the reputation of being a
self-serving meddier. Guizot, p. 101.

“Acton. When. 9. 130.

132
government responded by signalling a willingness to allow an
allied power to negotiate the issue of compensation.“
In London, Guizot found Palmerston troubled by the whole
business and interested in a quick diplomatic solution.
Anxious about European reaction, the foreign secretary
asked the ambassador, ”Pouvez-vous nous alder a finir
cette affaire, et comment?”" After receiving specific
instructions from Thiers, Guizot offered a proposal which
the British cabinet accepted on April 16.‘° Three days
later, Lord Granville, the British ambassador to Paris,
formally accepted the French mediation. That same day,
Thiers telegraphed the proposal to Haussonville, who in turn
presented it personally to the king on April 25.“ Ironi-
cally Caprioli and Cocle, who had championed resistance to
British demands, now hastened to advise the king to accept
the French mediation. Having succeeded in ruining Cassaro’s

career, these courtiers turned their attention to finding a

 

“‘Haussonville to Thiers, April 17, 1840, Saitta (ed.),
p. 254.

‘2”Can you help us to terminate this business, and
how?” Guizot, p. 96.

43Ibid., pp. 89-90.

4‘Granville’s note to Thiers is appended to Thiers’
letter to Haussonville of April 20, 1840. Saitta (ed.),
pp. 255-256, n. 1. Negotiations were to be held in Paris
and not Naples, ostensibly to spare Ferdinand the embar-
rassment of dealing under British guns. Actually, the
French hoped that negotiating in Paris would avoid the
delays, uncertainties, and equivocations which characterized
Neapolitan foreign policy. Thiers to Guizot, April 20,
1840, Guizot, p. 99.

133

solution to the crisis while maintaining the king’s favor.48

While diplomats worked toward a peaceful solution to
the problem, the Sulphur War had begun. Palmerston consid-
ered his country at war since the first week of April, when
he casually remarked to the Neapolitan charge in London, ”Do
you know that we are at war?”“ But the British fleet had
not as yet initiated hostile action against Neapolitan
ships. On April 10, Admiral Stopford on the H.M.S. Princess
ghgnlgttg notified the governor of Malta, Henry Bouverie,
that the Neapolitan government had failed to comply with the
”Just demands of the British Government regarding the Mono-
poly of the Sulphur Mines.” Consequently, he would execute
his orders ”with all possible dispatch.”" According to
his instructions, Stopford would ”cause all the Neapolitan
ships that may be in Neapolitan or Sicilian waters to be
stopped and detained” until he received orders to cease and
desist." The fleet maneuvered in the southern Mediter-

ranean, mostly around the islands of Capri and Ischia, in

 

45Haussonville to Thiers, May 2, 1840, Saitta (ed.),
p. 269.

”‘Luigi di Regina to Scilla, April 7, 1840, ASN/MAE, f.
4130; and Giura, p. 72. Palmerston did not view this
action as an all-out war, unless British citizens became
victims of aggression. Palmerston to Temple, April 14,
1840, Pagans, no. 68, p. 88.

"Wine. April 18. 1840. carried the
text of this letter. ASN/MAE, f. 4130.

‘°Ibid. Temple’s description of the operation is very
similar: ”Not an immediate blockade, but to chase Neapolitan
vessels and hold them as pawns.” Temple to Scilla, April
17, 1840, ibid.

134

Sicilian territorial waters, and off Italy’s heel.“°
H.M.Ss. Ballangpngn, Banpgw, flygna, and Jasun from Malta and
the corvette Iaibgt from Corfu stopped, searched, and dis-
abled Neapolitan commercial vessels, and escorted them to
British naval bases. The first ship confiscated by the
British was the Agnilla, which arrived in Malta on April
21.°° These operations appeared to be more consistent with
piracy on the high seas than a war fought according to
conventional rules.51

The memoirs of a British naval officer who partici-
pated in the hostilities treat the entire episode as a lark,
an exercise which broke the monotony of service at sea.‘52
Rear Adniral Herbert Frederick Winnington-Ingram was a young
midshipman on the H.M.S. IQLDQL. which was under the command
of the then Captain Henry Codrington. Strategy relied upon
the element of deceit. H.M.S. Ialpgt hoisted the Austrian

flag until it came within two or three miles of the

 

”’Unconfirmed reports mentioned British hostile action
as far north as the island of Pianosa in the Tuscan archi-
pelago and as late as June 23, 1840. Report of the General
Consulate of the Two Sicilies in Livorno, June 24, 1840, ASN/
MAE, f. 4131.

a°For a detailed description of the vessels taken to
Malta from April 21 to April 27, see ”Notamento di tutti i
legni di Real Bandiera che sgraziatamente sono qui approdati
in arresto,” Ramirez to Scilla, April 27, 1840, ASN/MAE, f.
4130. The vessels carried salt, citrus fruits, wheat, and
barley. The British released the cargo of one ship because
it consisted of French goods. Ramirez to Scilla, May 2,
1840, ibid.

l3”Davis, in Davis (ed.), p. 86.

52Winnington-Ingram, p. 20.

135
unsuspecting quarry. Then it would fire a shot across the
bow, putting the crew in a state of confusion ”like a
wounded bird with feathers dishevelled by the sportsman’s
fire.”$3 Winnington-Ingram’s account contains some glaring
mistakes, such as a reference to the King of Naples as
Francis rather than Ferdinand.°“ However, this eyewitness
account indicates perceptions which must have been fairly
common within the British navy.38

The reports from consular personnel reflect a more

sober side of the war. Several consuls residing in port
cities such as Giuseppe Tschudy in Livorno, Filippo Boscaini
in Civitavecchia, Ferdinando Scaglia in Trieste, and Giuseppe
Monticelli in Venice requested information and expressed
concern for Neapolitan trade." The consul in Corfu,
Giorgio Balsamo, described the status and treatment of the
captured crews.B7 From Malta, Ramirez reported that the

disruption of trade between Naples and Sicily generated

 

E5"Ibid.
54Ibid.

°°The admiral considered the capture of a big sea tur-
tle as the highlight of the entire operation. Ibid., p. 22.

86ASH/MAE, ff. 4130 and 4131.

a7Balsamo identified the name, origin, and destination

of the five captains detained in Corfu at the end of April
and reported that the crews enJoyed freedom of movement at
the base. Balsamo to Scilla, April 30, 1840, ASN/MAE, f.
4131. Two more vessels were captured in May, but orders
came from Malta to release two empty ships, one carrying
British goods and two confiscated after April 26. By the
end of May, only two Neapolitan ships remained in Corfu.
Balsamo to Scilla, May 29, 1840, ibid.

136

shortages and a rise in the price of commodities such as
wine.°°

Consular reports also provide information regarding
the hardships and losses incurred by the captains of the
captured ships. Small Neapolitan entrepreneurs who con-
tracted for the delivery of their cargo suffered inconven—
iences, humiliation, and, in several cases, substantial
damages. There was the case of Captain Gennaro Lauro of the
Agagnga who was under contract with a trading firm in
Castellammare di Stabia to load salt in Trapani destined for
Odessa. On April 26, the H.M.S. Banpgu opened fire on the
Aaagnta about thirty miles out of Girgenti and escorted it to
Malta where it remained until June 15. When Lauro and his
vessel finally arrived in Odessa on August 12, the cargo was
for the most part spoiled. In addition, an oversupply on
the local market interfered with the sale of the remaining
good salt on board. Lauro lost most of his cargo and could
not recover the expenses incurred for salaries and the main-
tenance of his crews. While in Malta, he missed several
business opportunities and would miss others while in

Odessa. Although he was not responsible for the delays, the

 

soA small boat carrying orange and cotton seed was the
last to arrive in Malta on April 25. Ramirez to Scilla,
April 27, 1840, ibid. Ramirez was an outspoken critic of
the British fleet’s arrogant behavior and British policy,
which ”was always known for disloyal and abusive behavior,
especially in the matter of commercial interests.” Ramirez
to Scilla, April 30, 1840, ASN/MAE, f. 4130.

13?
trading company found him in default and fined him.59 This
woeful tale provides some insight on the ordeals of Nea-
politan traders, but its accuracy is questionable since its
purpose was to obtain compensation.

British raids continued after the announcement of the
French mediation, notwithstanding Palmerston’s April 20
promise to Guizot to suspend hostilities for three weeks as
a conciliatory gesture.‘° In retaliation, Scilla ordered an
embargo on British vessels in Neapolitan ports.“ Inconse-
quentiai and short-lived, this action affected eight ships,
mostly empty, and lasted only twenty-four hours.‘2

In the meantime, other issues stood in the way of the
negotiations. The French were particularly upset with the
postponed departure to Paris of the Duke of Serracapriola,

appointed ambassador the previous fall, and now mentioned as

 

B’Gennaro Lauro to Felice de Ribas, the Neapolitan
consul in Odessa, August 23, 1840, ASN/MAE. f. 4131.

‘°Craven (ed.), p. 210.

‘*”Progetto di nota che ii ministro di S. M. Siciliana
dovra dirigere al gabinetto il 25 aprile 1840,” ASN/MAE, f.
4130. Neapolitan representatives in European capitals were
notified of the embargo on April 24. Ibid.

‘2The Neapolitan government defined the circumstances
which Justified retaliation, quoting the authority of
Emerich de Vattel and other political theorists. A govern-
ment which cannot obtain redress for the unfair treatment of
its subJects has the right to treat in the same manner the
subJects of the offending power. The title of this memo is
”Secondo il diritto delle genti” (”According to Interna-
tional Law”), under the heading of the Ministry of the
Interior and its author was probably Santangelo. ASN/AB,

f. 1013.

138
the chief negotiator for the Neapolitan side.”3 This post-
ponement delayed the arrival of the new French ambassador to
Naples, and the Thiers government was beginning to wonder if
the Neapolitan government meant to exchange envoys of ambas-
sadorial rank.“

Closely linked to Serracaprioia’s arrival was the
extent of his authority to negotiate on behalf of his
government. Without full powers, he would be forced to seek
approval from Naples at every step, and this would contra-
dict the stipulation that negotiations be held in Paris.
According to the Neapolitan government, Serracapriola had
full powers since the beginning of May and could, if he
wanted, “sell Sicily.”‘° Actually, he could not negotiate
without consulting his government until the end of May.“
Yet, he still had reasons to be apprehensive about the con-
sequences of decisions made without Ferdinand’s approval.
Even the French minister sympathized with Serracapriola’s

precarious position."

 

‘aNicola Donnorso Maresca, the Duke of Serracapriola,
delayed his departure because of the death of his mother in
Russia. Haussonville to Thiers, March 17, 1840, Saitta
(ed.), p. 222.

“France wanted to be represented by a diplomat with
the same rank as the Austrian ambassador.

‘5Montebelio to Thiers, May 7 and 10, 1840, ibid.,
pp. 280-281; and Montebello to Thiers, May 9, 1840, ibid.,
p. 282.

‘fThiers to Montebello, May 28, 1840, ibid., p. 287.
‘7”Il est a plaindre dans tous les cas.” (”He is to be

pitied in all cases.”) Montebello to Thiers, May 10, 1840,
ibid., p. 285.

139

More important than the question regarding Serra-
capriola’s mission was the substantive issue of a quick
abolition to the sulphur monopoly. Palmerston was anxious
to close the books on the contract and impatient with the
lack of progress in this direction.‘° Notwithstanding
repeated promises to cooperate, Ferdinand hesitated to
cancel the sulphur contract. Speculation surrounds the true
reasons for the king’s reluctance. Perhaps he would have
preferred to see the monopoly cancelled by default on the
grounds that Taix-Aycard had failed to fulfill some of its
obligations." Perhaps the “resistance party” was again in
position to exercise some influence.70 According to French
sources, Ferdinand was concerned with the loss of revenue
resulting from the termination of the monopoly and planned
other means to exploit the production of Sicilian sulphur."1
Consequently, he postponed cancellation until receiving
assurances that his sovereign right to regulate the industry

would not be challenged in the future."’2

 

‘°Palmerston suspected that the delay was a part of the
usual dilatory tactics of the Neapolitan government and con-
templated a resumption of the reprisals. Palmerston to
Granville, June 2, 1840, ASN/AB, f. 1015.

“’Serracapriola suggested this solution to Thiers, who
vehemently reJected it. Thiers to Montebello, May 28, 1840,
Saitta (ed.), pp. 288-289.

7°Haussonville to Thiers, May 2, 1840, ibid., p. 269.

7*Montebello to Thiers, May 7, 1840, ibid., p. 279.

72Thiers supported Ferdinand’s right to regulate the

export of sulphur and Palmerston agreed. Thiers to Monte-
bello, May 28, 1840, ibid., 99. 289-290.

140

Another issue which complicated the negotiation
process was the inability of the two governments to agree on
a rationale for cancellation. The British insisted that the
monopoly should be abolished because it violated a commer-
cial treaty, a notion which the Neapolitans rejected from
beginning to end.’° As far as the French mediators were
concerned, the issue of violation was secondary to the issues
of abolition and compensation. Thiers bypassed the issue of
violation, and expressed doubts regarding its validity.74
Thus the French removed a maJor obstacle from the conclusion
of the negotiations, and the Neapolitan government was now
free to adopt a polite formula to Justify the cancellation.75

This solution left the way open for the French proposal

 

73When he accepted the mediation offer, Granville stip-
ulated that the sulphur monopoly must be abolished immedi-
ately because it violated Article V of the 1817 treaty.
Granville to Thiers, April 19, 1840, ibid., p. 255, n. 1.
The Neapolitan position was equally clear, and stipulated
that the only condition for accepting mediation was the
preservation of the principle that the monopoly did not
violate any treaty. Scilla to Haussonville, April 23, 1840,
ibid., p. 264.

’“France mentioned only two conditions: abolition and
compensation. Thiers to Haussonville, April 20, 1840,
ibid., p. 257. More explicitly, Thiers expressed the view
that ”Ii sera a propos de s’ abstenir de toute mention du
traite de 1817, dont la violation est pour le moins prob-
lematique” (”It will be a good idea to abstain from any
mention of the Treaty of 1817, whose violation is to say the
least problematic.”) Thiers to Montebello, May 28, 1840,
ibid., p. 287.

76The desire to comply with the wishes of the French
government provided a convenient cover and face-saving device
for accepting the proposal.

141
which attempted to satisfy both parties." Ferdinand was
pleased to see that the proposal dropped the issue of
violation and preserved his sovereign right to regulate the
sulphur industry. The British were gratified with the
notion of a quick end to the monopoly. They also liked the
inclusion of two British representatives, together with two
Neapolitans and a French referee, in a commission charged
with determining the compensation for losses suffered by
British investors.7’ Palmerston accepted these conditions
on July 7.7“

Two days later, Serracapriola urged his government to
accept this proposal and Scilla informed Ferdinand of this
new development. On July 21, Ferdinand notified his prime
minister that he had accepted the conditions and issued
Decree 6310 which abolished the monopoly.” Diplomatic
amenities followed. Temple expressed gratification for the
settlement of the controversy, and Scilla reciprocated by
conveying the king’s hope that the friendly ties between the

two nations would remain strong in the years ahead.°° The

 

"”Ultimato di M. Thiers per lo affare dei zolfi,"
ASN/MAE, f. 4126: and Guizot, pp. 426-429.

77Ferdinand would have preferred to let the French
determine the amount and distribution of the indemnity.

"ASN/MAE, f. 4124: and Guizot, p. 429.

7’Serracaprioia to Scilla, July 9, 1840, ASN/MAE, f.
4124: Scilla to Ferdinand, July 16, 1840, ibid.: and
Ferdinand to Pietracatella, July 21, 1840, ibid.

°°Temple to Scilla, July 27, 1840, ASH/AB, f. 1013: and
Scilla to Temple, August 10, 1840, ASH/MAE, f. 4214.

142
Sulphur War had lasted three months and twelve days.“

The short duration of the monopoly makes it difficult
to assess its impact on the sulphur industry. Available
data indicate that sulphur production and trade declined.
In 1838 the export of sulphur was 84,272 tons, but this
figure does not reflect the amount of sulphur hoarded by the
merchants before the contract went into effect. The only
full year of the monopoly was 1839, when exports fell to
27,476 tons and sulphur prices stabilized around 29.21
ducats per ton.32

The first item on the Neapolitan agenda was the
financial settlement with Taix-Aycard, concluded in August
1840.°° When the contract was abolished, the company held
approximately 900,000 cantars (71,407 tons) of sulphur in
reserve.94 Dumped on the market, this surplus would have

drastically depressed prices, so the Neapolitan government

 

°‘This figure assumes that the war began on April 10,
1840, when Stopford informed the governor of Malta that
hostile action would commence against Naples and ended when
Temple received the authorization to recall the fleet from
Neapolitan waters. Temple to Scilla, July 22, 1840, ASN/AB,
f. 1013: and Giura, p. 88.

92See Appendix B, tables 1 and 4.

9°”Situazione del debito del Reale Governo verso la
disciolta compagnia Taix-Aycard e Compagni per gli zolfi di
Sicilia per effetto della convenzione dell’ 11 agosto 1840,“
ASN/AB, f. 1015. Taix did not receive full compensation
until May, 1843. Giovanni d’Andrea, Minister of Finance, to
Scilla, May 29, 1843, ASN/MAE, f. 4125.

°‘R. Busacca, ”Sulla Questione degli zolfi e sulle
consequenze della Compagnia Taix-Aycard," Qig;nala_di
Statistiga (1840), Colonna, p. 74.

143
bought the surplus at a price of 36 carlins per cantar "free
on board,” and imposed an export duty of 20 carlins per
cantar in order to finance the purchase.

This action dissatisfied many: the mine owners who had
to extract sulphur without the guarantee of a fixed price
and sell it at a lower profit margin: the buyers who faced
higher prices in the British market because of the export
duty: and the British government which protested this inter-
ference with the free purchase of suiphur.°° Through
Temple, the Foreign Office requested a reduction of this
tax, but the Neapolitan government at first stood firm,
arguing that the king had the right to regulate the industry
and impose a levy." Eventually Naples relented, partly to
avoid further problems and facilitate the export of the
oversupply.°’

The last task was to settle the claims submitted by
British nationals in Sicily. There were questions concerning
the real extent of these damages.°° All the evidence
suggests that British trade and navigation did suffer losses.

The Neapolitan government acknowledged this fact and asked

 

°°Palmerston to Castelcicala, September 2, 1840,
ASN/MAE: and Giura, pp. 91-92.

I""‘Temple to Scilla, March 1, 1841, ASN/MAE, f. 4130:
Giura, p. 92-93: and Scilla to Temple, April 7, 1841,
ASN/MAE, ff. 4126 and 4132.

°7Thls duty was reduced to eight carlins in 1841 and
two carlins the following year. It was abolished in 1846.

°°Sullivan to Palmerston, June 22, 1841, Davis,
in Davis (ed.), p. 86.

144
for documentation. An international commission composed of
Sir Woodbine Parrish and Stephan Henry Sullivan of Great
Britain, Michelangelo La Rosa and Giuseppe Bonguardino of
Naples, and a sunarpitga,(super-referee), the Count de Lourde
of France, met to address this issue. Between March and
December 1841, this commission considered nineteen claims,
and awarded a grand total of 121,454 ducats instead of the
373,978 requested.°’

Unexpectedly, France abandoned the mediator role and
supported the claims of a group of investors from Mar-
seilles, meeting with strong Neapolitan obJections. When
Scilla argued that the Thiers proposal did not mention any
grounds for these demands, the French backed down. They
acknowledged that their request was unwarranted and appealed
to the ”agg13§_pigflxaillanta” (”benevolent fairness”) of
Ferdinand.’° These claims continued until 1851, when
France accepted a settlement of 44,000 ducats instead of the
233,442 requested."

Thus ended an undeclared war which did not inflict any

 

°’For the agenda and criteria of this commission, see
Giura, pp. 98-101.

’°Montebello to Scilla, February 15, 1841: Scilla to
Montebello, April 14, 1841: and Montebello to Scilla, April
25, 1841: ibid., pp. 96-97.

"ASN/MAE, f. 4128: and Giura, p. 98, n. 2. The French
position during the crisis was somewhat ambiguous. Although
France formally Joined Great Britain in protest, it did not
pursue the matter as energetically. There is a question of
whether or not banking interests such as Lafitte’s, which
supported Taix-Aycard, influenced the French government to
use restraint. Giura, p. 10.

145
casualties, but had its winners and losers. Great Britain
clearly won the day because it forced the abolition of the
sulphur monopoly. Palmerston could now close the books on
an annoying controversy which had engaged the Foreign Office
in frustrating and protracted negotiations."'2 British
merchants in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies received com-
pensation and maintained their privileged status. France
was also a winner because of its prestigious role as a
mediator between the two parties. Naples was grateful for
the face-saving resolution and was well disposed toward
friendlier relations with Paris.

Ferdinand emerged bruised from the fray. Forced under
foreign pressure to abandon the attempt to regulate a maJor
industry, he cancelled the monopoly and compensated Taix-
Aycard, the British, and the French. After bragging repeat-
edly about his resolve and combat readiness, he lacked both
the diplomatic support and military resources to prevail.

It was a hard lesson to learn that ruling over a kingdom
protected by ”sea and holy water” was not enough to insure
the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. On the
positive side, Ferdinand could take some comfort in having
been cleared of the charge of treaty violation. Naples did

not suffer severe damages and continued to be free from

 

’zPalmerston felt that the outcome of the controversy
meant the end of a ”great embarrassment” and the release of
the entire British fleet which was needed for service in the
eastern Mediterranean. Palmerston to Temple, July 13, 1840,
Craven (ed.), pp. 214-215.

146
foreign occupation. This was an improvement over the

experiences of his two immediate predecessors.

CHAPTER VI

C ON

The Sulphur War exemplified the evolution of British
imperialism through commercial treaties to a form of limited
military intervention. It also represented an intermediate
stage between economic and political influence and outright
annexation. By the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Great Britain had established a virtual hegemony over the
Mediterranean. Commercial treaties, a strategic presence,
and John Acton’s influence over the Neapolitan court sup-
ported British interests in the area. During the Napoleonic
War, William Bentinck not only protected the Bourbons and
their Sicilian domains, but also supported a baronial rebel-
lion, acting more like an overlord than an ally. At the
end of the war, the British military presence ended, but
commercial domination continued under the guarantees of the
Treaty of 1816. This form of control was nothing new, and
even warranted the dispatch of warships to Naples during the
Revolution of 1820. The rapidly growing demand for sulphur
and the expanding business activities of British merchants
in Sicily emphasized the need for continued control in the
area.

147

148

But other factors motivated the use of force by the
British government. Palmerston never felt comfortable with
the presence of a reactionary government in Naples, and was
aware of the links between legitimist forces and Aime Taix.
On the home front, he could not ignore the demands of
commercial interests represented in parliament. Not only
did the British cabinet formulate policies which were bene—
ficial to economic interests, but did so in response to a
considerable amount of political pressure. Obviously, the
Sicilian sulphur trade was important to several British
industries in a phase of expansion, and parliamentary opposi-
tion and special interest groups urged Palmerston to resolve
the crisis. Yet, it was the presence of the fleet in Malta
which permitted the prompt and effective use of force
against Naples.

Finally, the British government was accustomed to
having its way with Naples for many years. Faced with
resistance from unexpected quarters, Palmerston reacted with
anger and disbelief.‘ It was unthinkable that an autocratic
ruler of a lesser state, whose role was to cooperate or
acquiesce, would presume to challenge the government of a
great power. The low esteem which Palmerston had for
Ferdinand personally further exacerbated the situation.
These feelings influenced Palmerston’s conduct during the

crisis, which appeared to Justify indictments of arrogance

 

1Cala-Ulloa, de’Tiberiis (ed.), p. 81.

149

and abuse.2 It is clear that the personal antipathy between
the foreign secretary and the king, which resulted from
differences of philosophy, style, and goals, made their
positions irreconcilable. Subsequent developments proved
that the confrontation was a personal duel between two
willful men. The Anglo-Neapolitan gatanta, which eventually
led to the commercial treaty of 1845, must be credited to
the tact of Lord Aberdeen, who understood the need to con-
ciliate Ferdinand. Palmerston’s return to power the
following year ended this peaceful interlude.‘a

But the Sulphur War was far more than a personal con-
frontation, as it underscored the tension arising between
industrial nations in a phase of expansion and developing
countries seeking to diversify their economies, assess their
resources, and bring their structures of production in line
with their needs while preserving their political auton-
omy.“ For the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the sulphur
crisis was an acute manifestation of the problems of an
industry which was not structured to take full advantage of
the demand for a plentiful domestic resource. Sicily’s
favorable geographical position and vast deposits of sulphur

were not sufficient to insure economic development.

 

2Giura, pp. 102-103.

aPontieri, ”Sui trattato di commercio," 11_Eifg:mismg,
pp. 342-343.

4Francesco Sirugo, "La ’Rivoluzione Commerciale’. Per
una Ricerca su Inghilterra e mercato europeo nell’ eta
del Risorgimento italiano,“ Stagi_fitg;1g1, vol. 2 (1961),
p. 267.

150

The monopoly not only addressed the depression of an
important industry by controlling sulphur production and
prices, but offered other advantages as well. Sulphur
revenues were expected to facilitate the abolition of the
grist tax, improve farming, build roads, and train technical
personnel. Furthermore, Sicily depended heavily upon the
import of manufactured goods and competed with other nations
for the export of cash crops.5 Regulation of sulphur ex-
ports had the potentlal to make Sicily more competitive on
foreign markets. Obviously, a reform of the sulphur indus-
try could not have solved all of Sicily’s problems. The
improved profile of a single industry does not necessarily
translate into general prosperity, nor do export taxes
guarantee optimum use of revenues.

There is no challenge to the fact that Ferdinand had
the right to make provisions for the welfare of his kingdom.
It is equally clear that his actions did not violate any
international agreements. What defeated this attempt was a
combination of two factors: the growing importance of sul-
phur in international industry and the weakness of the
Bourbon kingdom in Sicily, which was partly a function of
its association with more generally ”retrograde” political
tendencies and opposition from Just as ”retrograde” elements
in Sicily. Since the eighteenth century, Neapolitan trade

policy had been uncertain, cautious, and subordinate to the

 

aAurelio Lepre, "Sui Rapporti tra Mezzogiorno e Europa

nel Risorgimento,” Studi_$tgnlgl, vol. 10 (1969), pp.
556-557.

151

needs of the great powers. During the early part of the
nineteenth century, the Bourbons had to cope with French
invasions, British guardianship, a baronial rebellion in
Sicily, and Austrian troops of occupation. No wonder their
economic policy remained closely linked with foreign policy.

For all these reasons, any reform affecting the
Neapolitan economy had little chance of success without
foreign support, or at least, acquiescence. Any attempt to
protect a domestic raw material, which was so important to
the industrial nations, was likely to meet opposition by the
”imperialism of free trade.” Great Britain tended to react
against any unilateral protectionism as was the case when
Belgium considered membership in the Unign_gu_nigi.‘ The
Sulphur War proved that a state which was economically and
politically dependent could not possibly implement reforms
which threatened the interests of a great power. Thus the
abolition of the monopoly signalled the end of the Neapol-
itan bid for commercial independence.’

When a diplomatic squabble regarding a question of
domestic policy degenerated into open hostility, the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies lacked the economic resources, military

capability, and diplomatic support to win the day. Carried

 

“The Unign_gg_n1g1 was a planned customs union linking
the markets of Belgium, France, Piedmont, Spain, and Switz-
erland. In October 1842, Lord Aberdeen dissuaded Leopold I
of Belgium from Joining, alleging that such an action would
threaten the interests of Belgium and the balance of Europe.

P. Thureau-Dahgin. WM. vol.
5, p. 128: quoted in Sirugo, p. 292.

7Davis, in Davis (ed.), p. 87.

152
away by his obsession with independence, Ferdinand miscalcu-
lated the inevitable outcome of a confrontation with Great
Britain. This was a serious error for a head of state who
chose to ignore the advice of his foreign minister.

The Sulphur War also determined the subsequent course
of Neapolitan foreign relations. The events of 1840 rein-
forced Ferdinand’s mistrust of diplomacy and diplomats. His
animosity found special targets in Temple, whose recall he
requested on several occasions, and in Lebzeltern, who
represented a power which refused to support the Neapolitan
cause. France reaped the benefits of Ferdinand’s good will
for having brokered the settlement and, as a result, Naples
recognized Isabella as the Queen of Spain. Alarmed by this
development, Metternich replaced the outspoken Lebzeltern
with the tactful Prince Felix von Schwartzenberg, whosuc-
ceeded in improving relations between Naples and Vienna.

But Ferdinand continued to avoid a firm commitment to either
France or Austria, and led his country into further diplo-
matic isolation. Another Italian state did not eventually
make the same mistake. Defeated by Austria in the campaigns
of 1848-49, Piedmont understood the need to secure an alli-
ance with France before engaging the same superior power on
the battlefield. This realistic foreign policy, combined
with timely reforms and astute ministerial leadership, made
the difference between the future of the Savoys and that of
the Bourbons of Naples on the Italian peninsula.

As the year of revolutions approached, Ferdinand’s

153
policy of nonalignment prevented the formation of useful
and solid alliances and isolated Naples from the rest of
Europe. In addition, the king failed to implement reforms
in a basic industry which had the potential of making Sicily
more competitive in international trade. These failures
have implications regarding the survival of the Bourbon
monarchy in southern Italy and the persistence of economic

problems in the area.

APPENDIX A

SlClLlAfl_§QRREH§X

ana = three ducats*
Ducat a ten tan;

Tani = twentymni
Carlin = Neapolitan Lani

*ana = 12.75 11;; (1862)

W

Cantar - 79.342 kilograms

Ton a 12.70 cantars

154

APPENDIX B

1. Total export 1832-1850 (decimal values omitted).

Year Canter: 1208
1832 400,890 31,566
1833 495,769 39,036
1834 676,413 53,260
1835 699,215 55,056
1836 846,001 66,614
1837 828,107 65,205
1838 1,062,144 84,272
1839 346,301 27,476
1840 609,600 48,000
1841 698,500 55,000
1842 762,000 60,000
1843 825,500 65,000
1844 889,000 70,000
1845 952,500 75,000
1846 1,016,000 80,000
1847 1,079,500 85,000
1848 1,143,000 90,000
1849 1,143,000 90,000
1850 1,016,000 80,000

 

*Colonna, table 3, p. 49: table 5, p. 52; table 8, p.
73: table 11, p. 76: and table 13, p. 79.

155

156

Export to Great Britain 1834-1840 (decimal values

 

9301.412:

322,453
390,144
423,583
517,245
566,356
258,584
128,905

83.

Ton:

25,390
30,720
33,353
40,728
44,595
20,361
10,150

Prices of average quality sulphur (free on board) per

 

2.

omitted).*
X33:
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840-April

*Giura, table 17, p.

3.

cantar in Lani 1808-1837.*
min 2:15.:
1808 15.00-18.00
1809 17.00-18.00
1810 18.00-20.00
1811 18.50-22.00
1812 22.00-24.80
1813 26.00-26.00
1814 21.00-25.00
1815 21.00-26.00
1816 26.00-38.00
1817 27.00-30.00
1818 27.00-30.00
1819 24.00-26.00
1820 19.00-22.00
1821 18.00-20.50
1822 18.00-19.00

*Glura, table 5, p. 20.

Dan

1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837

Erin

16.00-18.00
15.00-16.00
12.00-14.00
11.50-13.00
11.50-13.00
11.50-13.00
10.50-12.00
10.25-13.00
13.50-18.00
18.00-38.00
38.00-45.00
21.00-45.00
17.00-23.00
16.75-23.00
13.50-15.25

157

4. Sulphur prices (Raddusa mines) per cantar in Lani
1839-1848.*

 

mi: Bug:
1839 23.00
1840 23.00
1841 10.00
1842 12.00
1843 12.00
1844 13.50
1845 11.10
1846 12.10
1847 12.15
1848 13.00
1848 20.00
*Colonna, table 9, p. 75 and table 10, p. 76.

APPENDIX C

Azgigla IV

His MaJesty the king of the Two Sicilies promises
that British Commerce in general, and the British subJects
who carry it on, shall be treated throughout his dominions
upon the same footing as the most favoured nations, not
only with respect to the persons and property of the said
British subJects, but also with regard to every species of
article in which they may traffic, and the taxes, or other
charges payable on the said articles, or of the shipping on
which the importation shall be made.

Article V

With respect to the personal privileges to be enJoyed
by the subJects of His Britannic MaJesty in the kingdom of
the Two Sicilies, His Sicilian MaJesty promises that they
shall have a free and undoubted right to travel and to
reside in the dominions of his said MaJesty, subJect to
the same precautions of police which are practiced towards
the most favoured nations. They shall be entitled to
occupy dwellings, and warehouses, and to dispose of their
personal property of every kind and description, by a
sale, gift, exchange, or will, and in any other way whatever,
without the smallest loss or hindrance being given them on
that head. They shall not be obliged to pay, under any pre-
tence whatever, other taxes and rates than those which are
paid, or that hereafter may be paid, by the most favoured
nations in the dominions of his said Sicilian MaJesty.

 

“”Analysis of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between His Britannic MaJesty and the King of the Two
Sicilies, Signed in London, September 26, 1816," ASN/MAE,
f. 4130.

158

159

They shall be exempt from all military service, whether by
land or by sea; their dwellings, warehouses, and everything
appertaining thereto, for obJects of commerce, or residence,
shall be respected.

They shall not be subjected to any vexatious search
or visits. No arbitrary or vexatious inspections of their
books, papers, or accounts, shall be made under the pretence
of the supreme authority of the state, but these shall alone
be executed by the legal sentence of competent tribunals.
His Sicilian MaJesty engages on all these occasions to
guarantee to the subJects of His Britannic MaJesty, who
shall reside in his states and dominions, the preservation
of their property, and personal security, in the same
manner as those are guaranteed to his subJects, and to all
foreigners belonging to the most favoured and most highly
privileged nations.

APPENDIX D

Ibg Bollock-Ehllllmore ngnlgg§*

Whether the creation of the Brimstone Monopoly in
question is an infraction of the treaty with the Neapolitan
Government, either as applied to the British SubJects
interested in Mines in Sicily, or to British SubJects,
holders of Brimstone at the date of the establishment of the
Monopoly?

OPINION OF SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.

I am of opinion that the decree creating the Brimstone
Monopoly is not in any respect an infraction of the Treaty
between this country and the Neapolitan Government, either
with reference to British SubJects interested in Mines in
Sicily or to British SubJects, holders of Brimstone at the
date of the decree. The Treaty puts the subJects of the
Crown of England on the footing of the most favored nations,
and it seems to me to do nothing more. A decree which
applies equally to the SubJects of the King of Naples and to
all Foreigners without distinction, cannot, I think, be
regarded as a violation of such a treaty.

12th March, 1840.

 

OPINION OF DR. PHILLIMORE.

According to the best received opinions of all the
Writers on Public Law, a monopoly of the description set
forth in the Case may be created by any Independent State
within its own dominions without the infraction of any
principle of the Law of Nations.

 

*"Sulphur Trade in Sicily," pp. 2-3, ASN/MAE, f. 4130.

160

161

Undoubtedly, however, it is competent to two States to
prohibit by express stipulation the execution of any such
monopoly within the limits of their respective dominions.
The only point therefore for consideration here seems to be,
whether the monopoly in question is in any way affected by
the Treaty of the 26th December, 1816, which at the present
moment regulates the commercial intercourse between Great
Britain and Sicily.

The only articles which by any latitude of construc-
tion can be held applicable to this point are the 4th and
5th. The former, relating to the commerce to be exercised:
the latter, to the personal privileges to be enjoyed by
British Subjects within the Sicilian Dominions.

The utmost the 4th article stipulates for, is, that
the Commerce of British Subjects should be placed on the
footing of the most favored nations, and, as the subjects of
the most favored nations, indeed the natives themselves, are
equally affected with British Subjects by the creation of
the monopoly under the Decree of July, 1838. I am clearly
of opinion that the monopoly of Brimstone is not prohibited
by the terms of this article: this article being the one in
which, in my opinion, if any such prohibition were intended
it would naturally be expected to be found.

The 5th article, in my Judgment, is "dehors," the
point in question: it stipulates for the usual privilege and
immunities to British Subjects, and for the protection of
their personal property, and places them with respect both
to the one and to the other, on the footing of the most
favored nations. But the Mines of Brimstone are not Personal
but Real Property: and with respect to the Brim- stone, which
may be in store, the British Subjects are in no way affected
by the Decree of 1838, otherwise than the Subjects of all
other countries as well as those of the Neapolitan Dominions.

In any view therefore that I can take of this question,
my opinion is, that the monopoly not being prohibited by the
Law of Nations, there is no stipulation in the existing
Treaty which can have the effect of precluding the Neapolitan
Government from making any Regulation they may think fit,
respecting the production of Brimstone and its export from
Sicily, provided that British Subjects are placed in no worse
condition with respect to the growth and export of this
commodity than the Subjects of that most favored State.

Doctors’ Commons,

26th March, 1840.

APPENDIX E

't on:

MW*

September 17, 1838.

The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of His Sicilian Majesty, has hastened to
transmit to his Government the note which his Excellency
Viscount Palmerston, Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs of Her Britannic Majesty, did him the honour
to address to him on the 27th of July last, complaining
loudly of the monopoly in Sicilian sulphur lately granted to
a company by the Government of the King. His Majesty has
learnt, not without great pain, that this grant is con-
sidered by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, as an
infraction of the convention of 1816.

The Undersigned takes the liberty of remarking to
Viscount Palmerston with reference to the note on the same
subject which the Undersigned had the honour to present to
his Excellency on the 31st of July last, that according to
the dictates of common sense the privileges which a Sovereign
may grant to a foreign nation should never be of such nature
as to exceed similar privileges and immunities granted to his
own subjects. A contrary principle must be looked upon not
only as little in accordance with the paternal regard due to
those subjects, but would be fraught with great detriment to
the interests of the Sovereign, and would be diametrically
opposed and injurious to the prosperity of his states: a
prosperity which ought to be the principal object and the
first duty of every act emanating from sovereign power.

The Government of His Sicilian Majesty finds itself in
the present case supported by the very Convention referred
to, which was concluded with England in 1816. In fact, if
the terms and the sense of the 4th and 5th Articles of that
Convention be well considered, it is clearly manifest that
by the concessions made to the subjects of Her Britannic
Majesty, His Sicilian Majesty has strictly entered into no
other engagement towards them, than to look upon them as the

 

*Eapana, no. 25, pp. 43—45.

162

163

most favoured nation, and indeed as his own subjects. The
fourth Article says, "His Majesty the King of the Two
Sicilies promises likewise that British commerce in general
and the British subjects who carry it on, shall be treated
throughout his dominions upon the same footing as the most
favoured nation, not only with respect to the persons and
property of the said British subjects, but also with regard
to every article in which they may traffic, and with regard
to the taxes or other duties payable on the said articles,
or on the vessels employed in importing the same.”

A perusal of this Article distinctly proves that in
this very extended concession the King has strictly adhered
to the measure of privilege usually granted to foreign
nations: that is to say, that he has not granted anything
except what is not likely to be injurious to the interests
of his own subjects, and that he has not exposed himself to
inconveniences, ruinous to his own interests and to the
prosperity of his kingdom. It must moreover not be lost
sight of, that by this very Article the King has reserved
to himself the power of imposing contributions on the
property of British subjects equal to those to which the
most favoured nation may be subject, provided the general
interest should require it: and this Article may thus indeed
be considered as the foundation of the immunities and priv-
ileges enumerated in Article 5, quoted as follows. ”With
respect to the personal privileges to be enjoyed by the
subjects of Her Britannic Majesty in the kingdom of the
Two Sicilies, His Sicilian Majesty promises that they shall
have a free and undoubted right to travel and to reside in
the territories and dominions of His said Majesty, subject
to the same precautions of police which are practised
towards the most favoured nations. They shall be entitled
to occupy dwellings and warehouses, and to dispose of their
personal property of every kind and description by sale,
gift, exchange, or will, and in any other way whatever,
without the smallest loss or hindrance being given them on
that head.”

It is clear from the contents of this Article (which
may be considered as explanatory of the preceding one,)
that the disposal of the property of British subjects in the
kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in whatever way such disposal
may be accomplished, shall not be impeded by the operations
of the laws prohibiting the sale of property to foreigners:
but it can never be inferred from that Article that
foreigners should not be subject to the laws of the country
which they inhabit, or in which they possess property: laws
to which even the subjects of the Sovereign are themselves
amenable. If this were not so, this Article would be in
contradiction to the 4th: and the meaning of the words just
cited is confirmed by the following short quotation, which
will in every possible way elucidate the existing discus-
sion. ”They (English subjects,) shall not be obliged to pay,
under any pretense whatever, other taxes or rates than those
which are paid, or that hereafter may be paid, by the most

164

favoured nation in the dominions of His Sicilian Majesty.”
The Undersigned, in corroboration of what he has above
stated, has moreover the honour to point out to his Excel-
lency Viscount Palmerston what is actually the case, and
what has been the constant practice in the kingdom of the
Two Sicilies, without its having given rise to the slightest
objection, thus affording a convincing and unanswerable
proof, that His Sicilian Majesty has in no wise deprived
himself by the Treaty in question, of the power of giving
exclusive concessions for certain articles of trade within
his states. It is this that, notwithstanding the Treaty of
1816, which has been appealed to, a monopoly or royalty of
salt and tobacco, the produce of this kingdom as well as of
other states, already exists: and there never has been a
question of the right of British subjects, to sell this
produce by virtue of the said Convention. As it is therefore
impossible to doubt the right possessed by the King to
establish monopolies, and to farm them out either to private
individuals or to companies, how can the right of the King to
establish a company be contested, which according to the
contract, already known to his Excellency Viscount
Palmerston, is bound to regulate the trade in the sulphur of
Sicily: an article produced exclusively in that island, and
of which there is no reproduction. No publicist will be
able to deny, that the two above mentioned qualities of this
mineral, ought especially to draw upon it, the provident
attention of the Government of His Majesty, with a view to
the regulation, by equitable laws, of its exportation: to
the production of a larger, a more permanent, and a more
certain gain than has hitherto been acquired by those
subjects who own that mineral, without wasting imprudently a
treasure which other nations are considered not to possess.
This sacred right of the Sovereign cannot be disputed: and
no opportunity could have been found, for exercising such
right with greater Justice and general utility, and without
injury to the rights of other states, or to the obligations
and engagements contracted with other nations, as has been
easily proved above. The fact that the conditions attached
to this contract for the sale of sulphur are much more
moderate and liberal than those to which the monopolies of
salt and tobacco are subjected, cannot fail, moreover, to be
of weight, and will not escape the attention of those who
oppose the measure. In the latter monopoly, it is posi-
tively forbidden to sell the articles subject to it: while,
with respect to sulphur, the owners have been left at
liberty either to sell it to the company or not, according
to their own convenience or pleasure, subject to the payment
of a tax. If, therefore, the monopoly above-mentioned on
articles common to other countries has not given rise to
objection, still less should the formation of a company
dealing in sulphur, the exclusive production of Sicily, be
liable to opposition, founded as it has been by the King for
the wisest and most paternal purposes: namely, to augment to
a certain, but not to an eventual or precarious extent, the

165

price of the mineral: to protect those possessors of mines,
who have not the means of working them, against usury: and,
finally, to establish, on firm foundations, a vast adminis-
tration calculated to enrich Sicily, and to cause that
country to prosper.

The Undersigned begs his Excellency Viscount Palmer-
ston to consider that this measure is equally binding on the
subjects of the Two Sicilies as on foreigners: and that,
considered even in its worst light, it would amount to
nothing more than a tax on the sulphur mines: and who can
deny this right to the King? Who can pretend that His
Sicilian Majesty has, by the Convention of 1816, abandoned
such right with respect to the subjects of Great Britain?

Or rather, who will not say that the King has, in this
matter, exercised a right inherent in Sovereignty, and
which, notwithstanding all interpretation to the contrary,
he had reserved to himself by the very terms of the Conven-
tion itself? Supposing any intention to exist to carry the
objections which might be brought forward by the English
still further, they could not even pretend that the prohi-
bition issued to the proprietors to raise from their mines a
larger quantity of sulphur than that judged fitting for
exportation, would be an impediment to the sale: for,
according to the conditions of the Contract, the profit
which would result from that increase of sulphur of which
the production is prohibited, is compensated in money by the
Company: and at the same time the mineral, which is not like
an article which can be re-produced, is kept in reserve for
future exportation, always to the benefit of the proprietors
themselves. How is it possible to call so useful a measure,
an impediment, which, while it pays the profit resulting
from the surplus of prohibited production, keeps in reserve,
on the same ground, a treasure which cannot be reproduced?
The Government of His Sicilian Majesty does not impede, but
simply regulates the sale of a produce of its own territory,
and thus organizes the means of deriving greater profit for
the proprietors. But this constitutes the right and the
duty of every Sovereign, and of every well organized Govern-
ment. The King had this in view in fixing a price not to be
exceeded, for the sale of sulphur, thus securing the
interests of all foreign merchants, and removing all idea of
monopoly. It would be possible here, very pertinently, to
bring forward the arguments already adduced, and which it
will be useless to repeat, which have served to give a clear
and true explanation of the terms of the 4th and 5th Articles
of the Convention. The King has only had in view to remedy
the decay of an exclusively national interest, of a precious
gift of nature, which the shrewdness of certain foreign
speculators on the one hand, and the avidity for temporary
gain on the part of the proprietors of mines on the other
tended entirely to ruin. The King felt that it was his duty
to remedy this evil, as it would have been vain to expect
any useful arrangement from the combined deter-

mination of so many proprietors, divided as they are in

166

interests and opinions, and who are probably in a great
measure ignorant of their own true interest. The most noble
attribute of Sovereignty, and of all political society, has
accordingly, under these circumstances, been called into
action: namely, that of directing the interests of indi-
viduals to the common good, and of affording to those
interests the most palpable advantages. The King has never
deprived himself of this attribute, either by the meaning or
by the spirit of the Convention, as the Undersigned has
sufficiently proved.

Leaving the distinct and positive value of these
arguments to exercise their just weight upon the Government
of Her Britannic Majesty, the Undersigned has at the same
time, in using them, given most convincing proofs that His
Majesty his August Master has not violated, or ever has had
the intention of violating, the Treaties which exist between
him and Her Britannic Majesty, the scrupulous execution of
which is, on the contrary, his constant desire: and that the
earnest wish of His Sicilian Majesty is constantly to main-
tain and to cultivate good understanding with Her Britannic
Majesty, being ready to do every thing in order to render
himself agreeable to that August Sovereign without at the
same time losing sight of the perogatives of his crown,
or of the interests of his own subjects.

The Undersigned, &c.
(Signed) LUDOLF.

APPENDIX F

W
W*

The Undersigned, &c., has the honour to acknowledge
the receipt of the official note, addressed to him on the
17th ultimo, by Count Ludolf, &c., containing the grounds on
which the Government of His Sicilian Majesty consider the
course which they have adopted, with respect to the Sicilian
Sulphur Trade, justifiable and compatible with the letter
and spirit of the Treaty of 1816.

In reply, the Undersigned must, in the first place,
state, that Her Majesty’s Government do not admit the funda-
mental position, on which Count Ludolf’s argument rests:
namely, that no Sovereign can be expected to grant to
foreigners greater privileges or immunities than are enjoyed
by his own subjects. For the Undersigned must observe, that
it is precisely for the purpose of securing in certain
cases, such greater immunities and exemptions, that Treaties
of Commerce are frequently made. Because, in countries
where the Government is arbitrary and despotic, and subject
to no responsibility or control, it may often happen that
caprice, want of political knowledge, prejudice, private
interest, or undue influence, may procure the promulgation
of unjust and impolitic edicts, inflicting much injury upon
the people of such state, interfering with the legitimate
industry of individuals, deranging the natural transactions
of commerce, and causing great detriment to private
interests, and to national prosperity: and Foreign Govern-
ments whose subjects are engaged in commercial intercourse
with the people of such State, are, therefore, often anxious
to secure their subjects, by fixed stipulations, and by
Treaty engagements, from being liable to the injuries and
uncertainties, which, from the above mentioned causes, the
people of the State itself are from time to time exposed to.

Now the Treaty of 1816, between Great Britain and
Naples, contains a stipulation of this nature: and, according
to that Treaty, although the Neapolitan Government may
exercise its Sovereign Power over its own subjects, and
interfere as it pleases with their private and commercial

 

*Eapans, no. 26. pp. 45-48: ASN/MAE, f. 4130.
' 167

168

transactions, yet it cannot so interfere with, or restrain
the private and commercial transactions of British subjects.

But the monopoly granted by the Neapolitan Government
to Messrs. Taix and Co., does interfere with, and restrain
the private and commercial transactions of British subjects
in Sicily, by preventing those subjects from selling, as
they please, the sulphur raised from mines which they have
rented, and to increase the productiveness of which, they
have expended a considerable capital. Therefore, the
monopoly of Messrs. Taix and Co., is inconsistent with the
Treaty engagements of the Sicilian Crown, towards the Crown
of Great Britain: and the British Government cannot consent,
that such monopoly shall have any application to the com-
mercial transactions of British merchants in Sicily.

But, even supposing that the above mentioned argument
advanced by Count Ludolf were valid, which Her Majesty’s
Government cannot admit it to be, still the provisions of
the monopoly granted to Messrs. Taix involve so great a
violation of the Treaty of 1816, that Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment would be Justified in demanding and obtaining redress
for Her Majesty’s subjects on that account. For, assuming
that the Treaty of 1816 secures to British subjects in the
Neapolitan dominions, no other privilege than that of
being, at all times, and in all respects, placed upon a
footing of perfect equality with Neapolitan subjects, or
with the subjects of the most favoured nation: still,
that Treaty, even upon such a narrow and limited interpre-
tation of it, (an interpretation, which Her Majesty’s
Government by no means admit,) would protect British sub-
jects from being treated in any possible contingency, within
the Neapolitan Dominions, less well than other individuals:
and the Treaty could not authorize His Sicilian Majesty to
impose higher duties upon the property of British subjects,
than upon the property of other individuals: and yet these
things would be the consequence of the monopoly of Messrs.
Taix and Co. For a permission is granted to that firm, in
consideration of the annual payment to the Neapolitan
Government of 400,000 ducats, to export every year 600,000
cantars of sulphur free of duty: and, whereas the whole
quantity of sulphur to be exported from Sicily, is, by the
contract with Messrs. Taix and Co., to be limited to 600,000
cantars, while the present average yearly produce is calcu-
lated at 900,000 cantars, and is considered susceptible
of great and progressive increase: therefore, Messrs, Taix
and Co., are further to pay to the proprietors of sulphur
mines, an annual sum of 120,000 ducats, as compensation to
those proprietors for the injury they will sustain, by reason
of this limitation of the quantity they are to be permitted
to raise and sell. It is, therefore, clear that Messrs.
Taix and Co. pay for the privilege which has been granted to
them, and in lieu of duty, the annual sum of 520,000 ducats;
being at the rate less than one ducat a cantar. On the
other hand, British subjects who may not choose to sell
their sulphur to Messrs. Taix’s Company, are to be obliged

169

to pay a duty of 2 ducats a cantar on exportation.

Thus, British subjects would pay on the exportation of
their sulphur, a duty more than double the amount of the
whole consideration to be paid by Messrs. Taix and Co., for
the privilege granted to them, and in lieu of duty. The
difference would be still greater, and still more to the
disadvantage of the British Lessees of Mines if the in-
creased exportation provided for by the 25th Article of
the Contract should take place.

But Count Ludolf endeavours to give to the 5th Article
of the Treaty, an interpretation altogether new and unten-
able, for the purpose of reconciling the stipulations of
that Article with the measure now under discussion.

The 5th Article states, that British subjects shall be
entitled to dispose of their personal property in any way
whatever, and without the smallest loss or hindrance: and
Count Ludolf contends, that this passage refers solely to
such hindrance as would arise from laws, preventing for-
eigners from possessing property in Sicily, and that the
passage affords no protection to British subjects against
vexatious interference, and arbitrary exaction, in regard to
the disposal of their property. But such an interpretation
of the Treaty, is totally at variance with the clear and
distinct terms of the Article in question, and is directly
opposed to the intention of the contracting parties, as
recorded in the preamble, which is stated to be, ”to provide
for the security and advantage of the subjects and commerce
of Great Britain:” and in such an interpretation, there-
fore, Her Majesty’s Government certainly can never acquiesce.

Count Ludolf, moreover, endeavours to defend the
monopoly granted to Monsieur Taix, by quoting the precedent
of other monopolies, which have long existed in the Neapol-
itan Dominions, and against which no objection has been
urged on the part of Great Britain: and he particularly
specifies the monopolies of salt and tobacco.

But the Undersigned begs to state, that there is no
parity between the two cases: and that a monopoly granted
exclusively to a company of individuals like the firm of
Messrs. Taix and Co., is essentially, and in principle
different from a monopoly assumed to itself as a Royalty by
the Executive Government of the country, and granted out in
permissions to any person who may take out a permit for that
purpose: and it is evident that the latter species of
monopolies can form no precedent for the former.

No doubt Royal monopolies, such as those of salt and
tobacco, in the Neapolitan States, are very objectionable
ways of raising a revenue. They interfere injuriously with
private enterprise, prevent the full development of the
natural commercial resources of the Nation, and check the
consequent increase of the Public Revenue: but in all
countries where the science of Political Economy has been
imperfectly understood, such monopolies have constituted one
of the sources of income for the Crown. When the Treaty of
1816 was signed, the above-mentioned monopolies existed in

170

the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies,
and however injurious those monopolies may be to the
interests of the Neapolitan Government, their operation
cannot be made the ground of complaint on the part of Her
Majesty’s Government, under the stipulations of the Treaty
of 1816.

But with respect to sulphur, the case is different.
British subjects conceiving themselves protected by the
terms of the Treaty, and relying upon the existing law of
the land, have become largely interested in the operations
of raising and exporting sulphur from mines belonging to
private individuals: and by their intelligence, industry,
and capital, such British subjects have succeeded in again
rendering profitable, mines which by former neglect had been
allowed to fall into decay. But at the very moment when
these British subjects have completed their preparations and
outlay, and when they are about to derive therefrom those
advantages wich their personal exertions and pecuniary
expenditure entitle them to expect, the Neapolitan Govern-
ment steps in, limits the quantity which such persons are to
raise to two-thirds of the average quantity hitherto raised,
during the time that some of the mines, for the causes above
stated, had been comparatively unproductive, and with respect
to this limited quantity, forces the British Lessees, either
to sell their sulphur to a private Company, and at a price
arbitrarily fixed, or to pay on exporting their sulphur
themselves, a duty more than double the amount which the
privileged Company is to pay. It is needless to say, that
such a proceeding is highly injurious to British subjects,
extremely unjust, and at variance with the stipulations of
the Treaty. It is true, as Count Ludolf observes in another
part of his note, that, as an alleged compensation for this
limitation, a certain sum is to be paid to the Proprietors
and Lessees of Mines, and that this sum is to be calculated
according to the amount by which the average production of
the last four years, exceeds the quantity now permitted to
be exported.

But it must be observed, that the Neapolitan Govern-
ment, in making that calculation, consulted no party, except
the one whose interests are directly opposed to those of the
British merchants: and had no regard to the increased pro-
duction, which, for the future, would necessarily follow
from the effects of the British capital and machinery which
have been applied to the Sicilian Mines. The limitation now
established, must therefore prove ruinous to many individ-
uals who have no other way to repay themselves for the large
sums laid out in these mines, but by an increased annual
production. But, instead of being freely allowed to increase
their annual production, they are, on the contrary, to be
compelled to diminish it. Her Majesty’s Government cannot,
therefore, admit, that any compensation founded on such a
calculation as that above mentioned, can be an equivalent for
the injury which the monopoly would inflict upon the British
Lessees of Sicilian Mines.

171

Nothing but the future operations of the parties
themselves can show what additional quantity of sulphur the
outlay and preparations made by those Lessees will actually
enable them to raise: and the only full and just compen-
sation, which they can receive for the outlay, which,
trusting in the good faith of the Neapolitan Government,
they have made, will be a permission to continue to work
their mines, and to sell their sulphur, without being
exposed to any interference or restriction on the part of
Messrs. Taix and Company.

Such permission, the British Government demand: and
the British Government must hold that of Naples responsible
for all losses and injuries, which any subjects of Her
Majesty may incur, in consequence of the monopoly of Monsieur
Taix.

There is one further argument advanced by Count
Ludolf, which requires some comment.

Count Ludolf repeatedly asserts that the contract with
Messrs. Taix and Co. has been entered into by the Neapolitan
Government, solely from a paternal regard for the public
good: and in order the better to regulate the production of
sulphur, and to prevent the mines from being prematurely and
wastefully exhausted. But by the 25th article of the con-
tract, the probability of an exportation greater than
600,000 cantars is admitted, and provision is made for the
contingent profit which the Neapolitan Government is to
derive from such increase: and as the conditions under which
this increased exportation is to take place are not speci-
fied, it may be inferred that if Messrs. Taix and Co. should
find the speculation profitable, they will increase the ex-
portation to any extent, consistent with their own interests.

But in that case, the argument used by Count Ludolf,
that the measure is one of paternal precaution against a too
rapid expenditure of the sulphur of Sicily, will fall to the
ground: and the question will resolve itself simply into one
of greater or less profit to the holders of the contract.

The Undersigned in conclusion, begs to observe, that
the Neapolitan Government, seems to labour under a miscon-
ception as to a fundamental point on which Count Ludolf’s
argument rests: for that Government appears to imagine that
sulphur is an article found only in Sicily, and that Provi-
dence has rendered all mankind dependent upon that single
island for a commodity which is extensively required for
various uses. But if the monopoly in question is persisted
in, the Neapolitan Government, and Monsieur Taix and his
Company, will soon find that the geographical information
upon which the Company has been founded, is as defective, as
the principle on which it rests, is impolitic and unjust. A
very short period will satisfy the Government of Naples that
sulphur is an article much more extensively diffused over
the surface of the earth than has been represented by the
persons who have projected this monopoly: and the scheme of
Monsieur Taix will inevitably bring other mines in other
countries into fuller work, will introduce into the market

172

of the world a larger quantity of sulphur, and will thus
diminish permanently the value of the Sicilian mines. When
this result has been accomplished, the Government of Naples
may perhaps regret that it allowed itself to listen to a
scheme suggested by individual cupidity, which can only be
carried into effect by sacrificing the interests of the many
to the avarice of the few, which violates the national
faith, and which must involve the Crown of Naples in a
difference with a Power, whose fleets and armies have
protected and preserved for that Crown, the very island
where the subjects of that power are now about to be exposed
to treatment oppressive and unjust.

The Undersigned, 8c,
(Signed by) PALMERSTON

APPENDIX G

H H O OGY

WW

1667 The Treaty of Madrid granted Great Britain flag
privileges in Neapolitan ports.

1713 The Treaty of Utrecht confirmed these privileges.

1793 The British agreed to protect Neapolitan merchantmen
and the Neapolitan government pledged to suspend
trade with France.

1813 Murat abolished the flag privileges in Naples.

1815 Great Britain asked for the restoration of flag
privileges, but de’Medici opposed the request.

1816 With the Treaty of September 26, Naples granted Great
Britain a 10 percent reduction on import duties and
the status of most favored nation.

1823 In order to protect Neapolitan commerce and the
merchant marine, de’Medici increased duties on
imports and decreased duties on exports.

1828 Great Britain raised the duties on Neapolitan imports
shipped on Neapolitan vessels.

1829 De’Medici tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a treaty
based on reciprocity.

1833 The British expressed an interest in renegotiating
the Treaty of 1816, but only that section concerning
parity in navigation.

1834 Negotiations broke down because Great Britain was

unwilling to surrender the 10 percent discount
guaranteed by the Treaty of 1816.

173

174

1838 - The British proposed a renegotiation of the Treaty of

1816 based on complete parity.

W13

1833 First Taix proposal.

1836 Second Taix proposal.

1837 March, French envoys in Naples become aware of the
Taix proposal.

1837 November, the British government officially protested
the projected Taix-Aycard contract.

1838 July 10, Ferdinand approved the Taix-Aycard contract.

1838 July 25, violent verbal confrontation in London
between Palmerston and Ludolf.

1838 September 17, Ludolf’s note to Palmerston described
in detail the Neapolitan position.

1838 October 12, Palmerston rejected Ludolf’s arguments

1839

1840

1840

1840

1840
1840

1840

1840

and reaffirmed British opposition to the monopoly.

December 24, MacGregor and Cassaro completed the
draft of a new commercial agreement which provided
for the cancellation of the monopoly.

January, British merchants petitioned for the repeal
of the sulphur monopoly.

January 28, Palmerston’s note requested the immediate
cancellation of the sulphur contract, but Cassaro
persuaded Kennedy to withhold this note from the king
until after the Council meeting of February 21.

February 23, Cassaro announced the abolition of the
monopoly.

March 2, Lyndhurst addressed the House of Lords.

March 8, Ferdinand reaffirmed his intention to
continue the monopoly.

March 15, Temple forwarded Palmerston’s January 28
note.

March 16, Ferdinand supported the continuation of the
monopoly at the Council of State.

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

1840

175

March 23, Ferdinand officially accepted Cassaro’s
resignation and appointed Scilla to succeed him.

March 26, The Pollock-Phillimore opinions stated that
the sulphur monopoly did not violate the Treaty of
1816.

April 10, Stopford informed the governor of Malta
that the fleet was commencing hostile operations.

April 12, the Crosa initiative failed.

April 12, Guizot informed Palmerston that the French
government was willing to mediate.

April 16, the British cabinet accepted the offer of
French mediation.

April 19, Thiers urged Ferdinand to accept the
mediation.

April 21, the first ship confiscated by the British
arrived in Malta.

April 24, Naples placed an embargo on British vessels
in Neapolitan ports.

April 25, the Neapolitan government formally accepted
the mediation and lifted the embargo.

July 7, Palmerston accepted the conditions of the
mediation.

July 21, Ferdinand accepted the Thiers proposal and
abolished the monopoly.

July 22, Temple received the authorization to recall
the fleet from Neapolitan waters.

APPENDIX H

W

ABERDEEN, George Hamilton-Gordon: Earl of: Foreign Secretary
in the Peel Cabinet, 1841-1846.

ACTON, John Francis Edward: Prime Minister of Ferdinand IV,
1785—1804.

ANTONINI, Emidio: Baron: Neapolitan Ambassador to Berlin,
1833-1847.

BEAUVALE, Frederick Lamb: Baron: British Ambassador to
Vienna.

BENTINCK, William Henry Cavendish: Commander-in-Chief,
British forces in Sicily, 1811-1815.

BERRY, Maria Carolina of Bourbon: Duchess of: half-sister of
Ferdinand II and mother of the legitimist claimant to the
French throne.

BOUVERIE, Henry: Governor General of Malta.

BUONGUARDINO, Giuseppe: Neapolitan representative to the
commission of compensations.

BUTERA, Giorgio Wilding: Prince of: Neapolitan Ambassador to
St. Petersburg.

CAMPOFRANCO, Antonio Lucchesi Palli: Prince of: Lieutenant
General of Sicily, 1835-1837.

CANNING, George: Foreign Secretary in the Liverpool Cabinet,
1822-1827.

CAPRIOLI, Giuseppe: Abbe: secretary of Ferdinand II.

 

*Unless stated otherwise, office holders served during the
sulphur crisis.

176

177

CAPUA, Carlo of Bourbon: Prince of: controversial brother of
Ferdinand II.

CARACCIOLO, Domenico: Marquis: Neapolitan Ambassador to
London and Paris, 1754-1764: Viceroy of Sicily, 1781-1786.

CASSARO, Antonio Statella: Prince of: Neapolitan Foreign
Minister, 1830-1840.

CASTLEREAGH, Robert Stewart: Viscount: Foreign Secretary in
the Liverpool Cabinet, 1812-1822.

COCLE, Celestino: Monsignor: confessor of Ferdinand II.

CHAMBORD, Henry Charles of Bourbon: Count of: legitimist
claimant to the French throne.

CROSA di VERGAGNI, Luigi: Marquis: Sardinian diplomat.

DALMATIA, Nicolas Soult: Duke of: French Foreign Minister,
1839-1840.

D’ANDREA, Giovanni: Marquis: Neapolitan Minister of Finance.

DEL CARRETTO, Francesco Saverio: Commander, Neapolitan
police.

ELLIOTT, Hugh: British envoy and successor to William
Hamilton in Naples.

FERDINAND I of Bourbon: King of the Two Sicilies, 1816-1825:
formerly Ferdinand IV of Naples, 1759-1816.

FERDINAND II of Bourbon: King of the Two Sicilies,
1830-1859.

FERDINAND VII of Bourbon: King of Spain, 1808, 1814-1833.
FRANCO, Antonino: Secretary of State for Sicilian Affairs.

GAGLIATI, Domenico Severino Longo: Marquis: Neapolitan envoy

extraordinaire to Vienna.
GOODWIN, John: British Consul General in Palermo.

GRANVILLE, George Leveson-Gower: Earl of: British Ambassador
to Paris.

GREY, Charles: Earl of: Whig politician: Prime Minister,
1830-1834.

GUIZOT, Francois Pierre: French Ambassador to London,
February-October, 1840.

178
HAMILTON, William: British envoy to Naples, 1764-1800.

HAUSSONVILLE, Joseph Othenin de Cléron: French charge in
Naples, January-May 1840.

KENNEDY, John: British charge in Naples.

LABOUCHERE, Henry: Vice-President of the Board of Trade,
1835-1839: President, 1839-1841.

LAROSA, Michelangelo: Neapolitan representative to the
commission of compensations.

LAURENZANA, Onorato Gaetani, Duke of: succeeded Campofranco
as Lieutenant General of Sicily in 1837.

LOURDE Jean: Count de: French representative to the
commission of compensations.

LEBZELTERN, Ludwig: Count: Austrian Ambassador to Naples,
1830-1844.

LUDOLF, Guglielmo Constantino: Neapolitan Ambassador to
London.

LYNDHURST, John Singleton Copley: Baron: Tory member of the
House of Lords.

MACGREGOR, James: British envoy aggraggginaira to Naples.

MEDICI, Luigi de’: Neapolitan Finance Minister, 1822-1823:
Foreign Minister, 1823-1830.

MELBOURNE, William Lamb: Viscount: Whig politician: Prime
Minister, 1835-1841.

MOLE, Louis Mathleu: Count: French Foreign Minister and
Prime Minister, 1836-1839.

MONTEBELLO, Napoleon Auguste Lannes: Duke of: French
Ambassador to Naples in May 1840.

MURAT, Joachim: General, Napoleonic Army: King of Naples,
1809-1815.

PALMERSTON, John Henry Temple: Viscount: British Foreign
Secretary, 1830-1834, 1835-1841, and 1846-1851.

PARISH, Woodbine: British representative to the commission
of compensations.

PARISIO, Nicola: Neapolitan Minister of Justice.

179

PERCEVAL, Spencer: Tory politician: Prime Minister,
1809-1812.

PERIER, Auguste Casimir: French charge in Naples, 1839-1846.

PIETRACATELLA, Giuseppe Ceva-Grimaldi: Marquis: President of
the Council of Ministers.

PITT, William: Prime Minister, 1783-1801 and 1804-1806.
RAMIREZ, Giuseppe: Neapolitan consul in Malta.

REGINA, Luigi di: Neapolitan charge in London after the
death of Ludolf.

SANTANGELO, Nicola: Neapolitan Minister of the Interior.

SATRIANO, Carlo Filangeri: Prince of: General, Neapolitan
Army.

SCILLA, Fulco Ruffo: Prince of: Duke of Santa Cristina:
Neapolitan Foreign Minister, 1840-1848.

SERRACAPRIOLA, Nicola Donnorso Maresca: Duke of: Neapolitan
Ambassador to Paris.

SOLARO DELLA MARGHERITA, Clemente: Count: Sardinian Foreign
Minister, 1835-1847.

STOPFORD, Robert: Admiral, British Navy: Commander,
Mediterranean Fleet.

STRANGWAYS, W. Fox: member of the Board of Trade.

SULLIVAN, Stephan Henry: British representative to the
commission of compensations.

SYRACUSE, Leopold of Bourbon: Count of: brother of Ferdinand
II: Lieutenant General of Sicily, 1830-1835.

TALLENAY, Auguste: French charge in Naples, 1836-1838.
TEMPLE, William: British envoy to Naples.

THIERS, Marie Joseph: President of the Council of Ministers,
1836 and 1840.

THOMSON, C. E. Poulett: President of the Board of Trade,
1834-1839.

WELLESLEY, Richard Colley: Marquess: Foreign Secretary in
the Perceval Cabinet, 1809-1812.

180

WELLINGTON, Arthur Wellesley: Duke of: Tory politician,
Prime Minister, 1828-1830.

WINNINGTON-INGRAM, Herbert Frederick: British naval officer
and participant in the Sulphur War.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The scant mention of the Sulphur War in British
publications is an indication of the slight interest
assigned to this event by English-speaking scholars. Yet,
there is abundant information on British foreign policy and
domestic politics which led to 1840. Biographies of

Palmerston provide valuable information on his foreign

policy. Jasper Ridley’s ngg Palmerstgn (London: 1970) and
Kenneth Bourne’s Palmerstog: Ina Early Xgars 1784-1841 (New

York: 1982) mention the Sulphur War. The less recent Lita
91_£aimar§tgg by Herbert C. F. Bell (New York: 1936) does

not. The private correspondence of Palmerston edited by

Augustus Craven Lgrg Ealmergtgg: Sa Correspondgngg igtimg
a ’ i t t ue ’ uro e 0

a_1§§Q (Paris: 1878) provides some insight on his behavior
during the crisis. Another biography, Dorothy Marshall’s
Lg;d_flalpgarfla (London: 1975), defines the relationship

between Palmerston and his prime minister during the

crisis. Charles K. Webster’s Iha_Egraign_£gllgx_gf_2almar;
W (London: 1951): W2:
W5 (London: 1931): and W
Qastlgrgagh 1815-1822) (London: 1925): Adolphus W. Ward and
George P. Gooch (eds.), Ina_gambrigga_fliatgry_gj_firitj§h

181

182
Egpglgn Egllgy 1283-1212 (New York: 1923) are standards of

reference for the period. A more recent and specific study
by Charles Middleton. W11
291192 1282-1846 (Durham: 1977), addresses the relation-
ship between the Crown and the Foreign Office in the
decision-making process, but has earned criticism for some
errors and generalizations. A group of scholars addresses
the strategic aspects of the British presence in the central
Mediterranean. Among these authors are Christopher
Bartlett. W (Oxford:
1963): Hanford Hoskins, Briti§h_gguga§_;g_13gia (London:
1966): and James Swain. Ihg_fiLEuQQL§_1Q£_Lb§_§QnLEQl_Qi_Lh§
Maglgannanaan_prigr_;g_1§fl§ (Boston: 1933). The following

works present British foreign policy in the context of
specific periods or areas. Christopher Bartlett, ”Britain
and the European Balance 1815-1848,” in Alan Sked (ed.),
W348 (New York: 1979).
discusses the interplay between political and economic
considerations in shaping British foreign policy during the
post-Restoration years. For the British occupation of
Sicily, see Antonio Capograssi, Gl;_lnglaai_1n_11alia
ggranta_la_gampagna_napglagnigna (Bari: 1949) and John
Rosselll. Warm
of Sicily 1811-1814 (Cambridge: 1956). H. M. Lackland’s

”The Failure of the Constitutional Experiment in Sicily
1813-1814,” Eugli§n_fllagg£1gal_gayiaw (April 1926), mentions

Bentinck’s ambitious plans for control in Sicily. For a

183
special treatment of British foreign policy immediately
following the Congress of Vienna, see Stephen R. Graubard’s

“Castlereagh and the Peace of Europe," Jggrgai of British
Studies (1963) and the excellent treatment by Norman Gash in

chapter 10 of his Anistggnagy_ang_2agpla (Cambridge: 1979).
The same chapter examines the development of that policy to
the end of the Palmerston years, while other chapters cover
several aspects of domestic policy. More narrowly focused
is the article by R. L. Baker, “Palmerston and the Treaty of
Unkiar Skelessl,” Engii§n_fli§tgrigal_3ayiaw (January 1928).
For the controversy surrounding the sulphur monopoly and
international law, see ”An Analysis of the Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation between His Britannic Majesty and
the King of the Two Sicilies,” and Iba_£gilggk;2niilimgna
Qpinigna (London: 1840). For a more recent interpretation
of the expropriation question, see Alexander P. Fachiri,
”Expropriation and International Law,” Briti§n_1aarbggk_gf
IDS££0§&19081_L§K (1925). For the diplomatic correspondence
between London and Naples presented to Parliament by order
of the Queen. see Ea2ers_ReIat1xe_t9_the_Srlrhur_Monorolx_10
Sigiiy (London: 1840). Thomas Curson Hansard (ed.), Eaciia-
mantary_Daba1a§, has the discussions for the years 1838-
1840. The only existing eyewitness account by a participant
in the naval operations against Naples is Herbert F.
Winnington-Ingram’s flaa£t§_gf_Qak (London: 1889). For the

economic perspective, John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s

”The Imperialism of Free Trade.” Erongmir_flistgrx_xeries

184
(1953), has been essential to this study. Desmond C. M.
Platt’s Einanre, Irage, and EQIIELQS in British Egreign
Egiigy 1815-1215 (Oxford: 1963), offers the interpretation
that it was not a function of the British government to
promote foreign trade. A subsequent response to Gallagher
and Robinson, Platt’s "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some
Reservations,” Ergggmir_fli§;9ry_gagiag_(August 1968), and
”Further Objections to an ’Imperialism of Free Trade’,
1830-1860," o i or v w (February 1973), define
the Sulphur War as an exception to the rule rather than part
of a plan to further economic interests through government
policy. Other works in the same area are: W. 0. Henderson,
”The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786,” Eronomir
flisrgry_gayiaw (August 1957): Peter Marshall, ”The First and
Second British Empire: A Question of Demarcation,” fliargry
(February 1964): G. C. Bolton, “The Founding of the Second
British Empire,” Ergflgmi§_fli§rgry_flariaw (April 1966): and
Bernard Semmel, Ina_Riaa_g1_£raa_1raga_1mpariaii§m (London:
1970). Judith Blow Williams, Br1t1sn_§ommerr1a1_fioiirx_ard

Iraga Expansiog i750-1850 (Oxford: 1972), contributes a
useful, select bibliography of literature from 1953 to 1969.

For information on the Board of Trade, see Roger Prouty, In;
13W (London:
1957) and Lucy Brown. Writ:
Movament 1839-1852 (Oxford: 1958): although the latter fails
to see any relationship between the Board of Trade and the

foreign policy decision-making process within the British

185

government. Arthur Redford’s Manghgstgr Merchants and
Egrgign Iraq; iZ94-i858 (Manchester: 1934) still provides

useful information on primary sources. The activities of
the British merchants in Sicily are described in Raleigh
Treveiyan’s Erinra§_gngar_rna_yglrang (New York: 1969).
Harold Acton’s Ina_ngrbgfl§_gj_flapia§ (New York: 1956)
and Ina_La§t_flggrbgg§_gr_uapias (London: 1960) describe the

Neapolitan court during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries in an anecdotal style. The latter book is a
colorful and informative account of the reign of Ferdinand
II. Both works give a sympathetic account of the Bourbons:
unfortunately, they also fail to cite complete footnotes. A

more recent and scholarly general work is Denis Mack Smith’s

Mggarn Sigiiy aftar 1213 (New York: 1968), the second volume
of his A Histgry Qf Sigiiy. Mack Smith has made a valuable
contribution to an understanding of the political and
economic problems of modern Sicily. Storia gaiia Sigiiia
(Naples: 1977), a multl-volume collection of essays edited
by Rosario Romeo, provides a wide range of topics on
Sicilian history. In contrast with the abundant biographies
of Palmerston, no modern historian as yet has written a
complete and authoritative account of the life of Ferdinand
II, nor are there works dealing with his ministers. Judge-
ments by his contemporaries reveal a partisan bias. A
refreshing exception is the portrait left by Pietro Cala-
Ulloa, the Duke of Lauria, a perceptive and loyal civil

servant of both Ferdinand and his successor, Francis II.

186

Giuseppe de’Tiberlls has published under the title of ii
Eagng_gi_£arginangg_ll (Naples: 1977) part of Cala-Ulloa’s
manuscript Dalia Riggigziggi ngi Egggg g1 Naggii, which was

left unfinished in 1875. This account balances Ferdinand’s
flaws and shortcomings against his energy and good inten-
tions and concludes with the acute observation that his
reign was one of labor and not achievement ("pig g1
travagiig gng Qi part9.”) Among more recent historians,
Ruggero Moscati has included a section on Ferdinand II in
his 1 Borbgni in Italia (Naples: 1970). Ernesto Pontieri
describes in detail the scope and significance of Ferdi-
nand’s reforms in “Ferdinando II di Borbone a la Sicilia:
Momentl di politica riformatrice,“ 11_Rijgrmismg_pgrbgrigg
WWW (Naples: 19655)-
Nicomede Blanchi’s We
aurggaa_in_lralia (Turin: 1867) is a good place to begin an
examination of Neapolitan foreign relations preceding and
following the Sulphur War. It carries the text of Cassaro’s
memoranda of January and March 1840, and a detailed descrip-
tion of Crosa di Vergagni’s efforts to conciliate the
contenders. Bianchi is open about his dislike of Ferdi-
nand: his account of the crisis is not consistently objec-
tive. The best modern analysis of Ferdinand’s foreign
policy and repercussions of the war is Ruggero Moscati’s

0. l-..- 0., So pog- .‘ 0.0 -il‘l q o ou._ .. - -
(Naples: 1947), which carries the text of Ferdinand’s anti-

British speech of March 16, 1840. Armando Saitta (ed.),

187

" - 91 e. e e -. 1' -- -_ - -. ' ° R‘ele e.‘
Dug Siriiia (Rome: 1973), published the correspondence of
French diplomats stationed in Naples. The severe judge-
ment expressed by these diplomats reflects the strained
relations between Naples and Paris. In the area of foreign
relations, two publications concerning specific periods
deserve mention. Walter Maturi, "La Politica estera
napoletana dal 1815 al 1820,” Eivista Stgrira igaiiaga
(1939), is a scholarly and well-balanced account of the

international problems confronting the Kingdom of the Two

Sicilies. In his recollections entitled namgir§_pggr_§aryir
a i’ bistgira g: mgr SszE (Paris: 1862), Frangois Pierre

Guizot describes his role as intermediary between Palmerston
and the French government and appends the text of the Thiers
proposal. Several works have addressed other areas and
periods of Sicilian history. For an understanding of the
origins, composition, and functions of parliament see
Giacomo Giacomazzi, 11_Eariamanrg_§i§iiiang (Palermo: 1960).
For the reforms of Domenico Caracciolo and the relations
between the Bourbons and Sicilian barons, see Mack Smith:
Pontieri’s essay "L’ Esperimento riformatore del marchese
Domenico Caracciolo Viceré di Sicilia (1781-1786)," Li
12.1mm: and his book WW
aigiiiang (Florence: 1943), which is the most complete
account of the landed aristocracy’s struggle to preserve
ancient privileges. Especially important for an under-

standing of the Sicilian Question is Rosario Romeo’s Li

188
Riagrgimafl;g_in_§igiiia (Bari: 1982). For the Constitution
of 1812, see the article by Emilio del Cerro “La Sicilia e
la costituzione del 1812,” c vi
(Palermo: 1914-1925), which also describes in detail the
actions of parliament: Francesco Renda, La Sigiiia ngi 1812
(Caltanissetta: 1963), an Italian scholar’s perception of
the British occupation: and Pontieri’s essay “Un Retroscena
del conflitto costituzionale del 1811 in Sicilia tra la
Corona e l’ aristocrazia parlamentare,” 11_Rifgrmi§mg. For
the problems of the Restoration, see Gaetano Cingari,
Maz;ggigrng_a_gi§grgimanrg (Bari: 1970) and his essay "Dalia
Restaurazione all’ Unita," Romeo (ed.), firQrLa_gaila
Sigilia. For the economy of the sulphur industry, see
Ludovico Bianchini, - v i
(Messina: 1841), reprinted in 1960. Bianchini wrote with
knowledge and authority, although Gino Arias, La_Qua§tigfla
marigignala (Bologna: 1921), has challenged the data on the
number and ownership of the sulphur mines. Several anony-
mous papers which were published in 1840 shared Bianchini’s
pro-Bourbon attitude and justified the monopoly as the
solution to the industry’s problems. While interesting to
read, their objectivity is suspect. A good example is the
Expgaa_aar_La_gaa§rign_ga§_§ggifira§ (Paris: 1840), which was
probably sponsored by Taix and financed by the House of
Laffitte. In the same category are the ”Memoria sulla
controversia per 1’ appalto de’ solfi in Sicilia“ (Italia:

1840) and ”Delle Solfatare in Sicilia e de’ nuovi

189
provvedimenti per l’ industria e lo spaccio del solfo"
(n.p.:n.d.). For a current perspective, see Mack Smith,
Romeo, and Salvatore Francesco Romano’s Momenti dai
Riggrgimanrg_in_§irilia,(Messina: 1952), which mentions the
influence of foreign capital on the Sicilian economy. The
most informative works on the origins, development, struc-
ture, and problems of the sulphur industry are Federico
Squarzina’s WU;
nai_garglg_filx (Turin: 1963) and Maurizio Colonna’s L;
1ngastria_zglfifara_§igiiiana (Catania: 1971). Other modern
scholars discuss the problems of underdeveloped countries in
post-Napoleonic Europe: Francesco Sirugo’s "La ’Rivoluzione
Commerciale’: Per una Ricerca su Inghilterra e mercato
europeo nell’ eta del Risorgimento italiano,” Studi_$rgriri
(1961): and Aurelio Lepre’s ”Sui Rapporti tra Mezzogiorno e
Europa nel Risorgimento,” srggi_§rgrigi (1969). John A.
Davis, ”The South, the Risorgimento and the Origins of the
’Southern Problem’,” in John A. Davis (ed.), Gramsgi_and
itaiy’s Bassiyg Eeyoiutign (London: 1979), perceives the
Sulphur War as both a symptom and a factor of the problems
in the Italian South. This essay has the additional dis-
tinction of being the only article in English which mentions
the Sulphur War. On the question of the monopoly’s
legality, two papers of the time supported Naples and
criticized Great Britain: ”The Sulphur Question Plainiy
Stated in a Letter to Lord Palmerston” (London: 1840), and

”Risposta alle petizione de’ negozianti inglesi” (Pisa:

190
1840). Similar arguments are expressed in "D1 una Quistione
surta tra il governo delle Due Sicilie e la Inghilterra
in Marzo 1840,” ”Se nel Contratto de’ solfi abbiavi contrav-
venzione al trattato per gli affari di commercio fraoii
governo di Napoli e quello della Gran Bretagna,” and ”I
nostri Trattati del 1816 non sono lesi se 11 Re concede ad
un estero un privilegio e una privativa sopra un ramo d1

commercio,” (all n.p.: n.d.). Michele Solimene’s Suiia

o I

000‘ -_ e.‘ -. - e e. ‘ 0 e -.| -_ -_ l'l ‘ -.
. - a t l ”'ene of - Iu- ' ' t e - l . ._—. t:
da’ zgifi (Naples: 1840) deals extensively with the issue of

treaty violation. For the diplomatic and military develop-
ments of the Sulphur War, see the memoirs of Guizot and
Winnington-Ingram. Vincenzo Giura’s La Questigge degli
zgifi siriiiagi (Geneva: 1973) remains the most current and

complete work on all the aspects of the sulphur controversy.

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Trade’ 1830-1860." Eronomir_flisrorx_8erir_. Vol. 26
(February 1973): pp. 77-90.

Sirugo, Francesco. ”La ’Rivoluzione Commerciale’: Per una
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PAPERS PUBLISHED DURING THE SULPHUR CRISIS

"An Analysis of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
Between His Britannic Majesty and the King of the Two
Sicilies.” n.p.:n.d.

”Delle Solfatare di Sicilia e de’ nuovi provvedimenti per la
industria e lo spaccio del solfo." n.p.:n.d.

"Di una Quistione surta tra il governo delle Due Sicilie e
la Inghilterra in Marzo 1840.” n.p.:n.d.

"Expose sur la question des souffres." Paris: Dupont, 1840.

"I nostri Trattati del 1816 non sono lesi se 11 re concede
ad un estero un privilegio e una privativa sopra un
ramo di commercio.” n.p.:n.d.

"Memoria sulla controversia per l’ appalto degli zolfi della
Sicilia.” Italia: n.p., 1840.

"Riposta alle petizioni de’ negozianti inglesi pei solfi di
Sicilia.” Pisa: n.p., 1840.

"Se nel Contratto de’ solfi abbiavasi contravvenzione al
trattato per gli affari di commercio fra ii governo di
Napoli e quello della Gran Bretagna." n.p.:n.d.

”Sulphur Trade in Sicily: The Pollock-Phillimore Opinions.”
London: n.p., 1840.

"The Sulphur Question Plainiy Stated in a Letter to Lord
Palmerston.” London: Burrup and Blight, 1840.