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MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
FOOD. RELIEF CENTERS AND FORCED MIGRATION IN N.E. AFRICA:
AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES

presented by

Teshome Tadesse

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master of Arts de eeirl Multidisciplinary Program
Socia Science

7L 2% at;

A Major professor

 

 

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oWMt

 

m, [5113" mums AND mm MIGIATIG‘I IN N.E. AFRICA:

AN ANALYSIS OF'INSTTTUWTONS AND POLICIES

By

Teshome Tadesse

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER.OF ARTS

Multidisciplinary Program

College of Social Sciences

1990

it":

ABS'IFACT

m BRIEF M AND FORCE) MIGIATION IN N.E. AFRICA:

AN ANALYSIS OF INSTI'IUTIONS AND POLICIES

Food insecurity and poverty encourage rural populations to evacuate
their localities. The two are the underlying causes of forced migration.
Droughts and political instability exacerbate food insecurity and
poverty conditions and speed up the process of evacuation of economic or,
more specifically, ’food-seeking’ migrants to towns, cities and
agricultural 1y viable regions within their countries as well as outside.
This thesis looks at the problem North East African countries--Ethiopia,
Sudan and Somalia--face in this regard.

The waste involved as a consequence of forced migration bleeds
scarce development resources. A revision of current development policies
and an immediate end to the raging civil conflicts and wars can enhance
food production.

Improvement in the terms of trade involving primary agricultural
products and increased foreign aid can supplement the local effort and
promote the development of the agricultural sector. 'lhese actions pave

the way for addressing the root causes of the problem.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my unforgetable father, Tadesse‘Tsigie,
who gave myself and my two younger brothers all a father should give to
his children. His personal interest in my education and his encouragement
against all odds brought me up to this level of education. His parents,
Member Tsigie Gebru and Weizero Tsedale Brelie, share with him the credit
for our education. My father and his parents loved kids. They helped so

many of their relatives’ and acquaintances’ children to go to school.
Note: Family names are not used in Ethiopia unlike in many other

countries. All Ethiopians are therefore identified by their first names,

followed by those of their fathers, as in this thesis.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank all the Michigan State University professors from whom I
took courses and other professors as well as fellow students who
enlivened my interest in the topic I chose for the discussion of this
thesis.

My special thanks are due to Professor Jay Artis of the Department
of Sociology who has been chair of my Thesis Cbmmdttee and who, in this
capacity, helped me to make the main hypothesis more pertinent to the
thesis. His suggestions and corrections of the text have been as highly
useful, as have his untiring effort and consistent supervision been
invaluable. Professor Wiley, Department of Sociology, and Professor Carl
Liedholm, Department of Economics, have been resource professors for my
thesis.

I am, particularly grateful to Professor Paul Strassmann, one of my
committee members, whose encouragement and guidance has been most
invaluable. Professor Elias. Dinopoulos, a former Economics Department
faculty member and a member of my committee, read my preliminary and
exploratory paper on forced migration and encouraged me to submit the
same with slight changes as my Master’s Thesis. He was also a source of
encouragement for my academic pursuit.

I thank also Professor Chris Vanderpool (Sociology), and Professor

George Axinn (Resource Development) whose invaluable advice at the

iii

initial stage of the research was both stimulating and helpful.

I should like to extend my sincere gratitude to individuals and
institutions without whose continued assistance the writing of the thesis
would have been impossible. My sincere thanks go to the Ethiopian Relief
and Rehabilitation Commission (BBC) for selecting‘ me from. among staff
member candidates as its FAQ fellow. The Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) of the U.N., which made it possible for me to study at
MSU; the International Students and.Scholars Office of MSU, which took
over the sponsorship from. the FAQ and with the MUltidisciplinary
Program, College of Social Sciences, enabled me to finish my studies,
deserve my warmest of thanks. All of them. share the credit for my
successful completion of my graduate program.

I am especially grateful to Professor Carl Goldschmidt, head of the
Multidisciplinary Program, for his personal assistance and encouragement
in my academic studies. The Center for Advanced Studies of International
Development also made my graduate assistantship work schedule flexible so
that I could finish writing the first and final drafts of the thesis with
ease.

Mrs.Lauri Hadson, Administrative Assistant and the Director of
Academic Computing at MSU’s Computer Center, Dr. Paul Hunt, and Mrs.
Kriss Ostrom, the Circulation Librarian of MSU, permitted me to use the
Main Library’s micro-computers for extended periods of time. Glenn
DeYoung, a staff member of Academic Computing, corrected the setting of
my thesis as well as my lengthy independent study paper on floppy
diskettes. My thanks are also due to them. Mrs. Elonor Boyles, a

librarian in government documentation at the MSU’s Library accessed me

iv

to a number of documents pertinent to my study. I wholeheartedly thank
her for her untiring effort and help.

Evaldo DeArmas, a graduate student in Chemistry and my good
neighbour, taught me and my wife how to use the word perfect program as
much.as he edited and helped us in getting the printout of the document.
A free and complete access to his private computer facilities was of
considerable help. we are most grateful to himself and his kind family
members.

Last but not least, I am grateful to my wife, Worknesh.Teferra,
without whose support and hard work in the typing of the first drafts and
later on in the word processing, this thesis would have not been what it
is now. She easily deciphered the words and sentences in my awful
handwriting as she also corrected my English. My mother’s presence here
was an added advantage as she took care of her grand children while my
wife did the work of word processing.

My younger brothers, Belayhun Tadesse and Solomon Tadesse, supported
me morally as well as financially since the beginning of my studies.
Embet Fikru, my cousin, was also of help in many ways.

All the professors and individuals as well as my family members
share with me the small contribution this thesis may make to the study
of the relationship between food insecurity, poverty and forced migration
in N.E. Africa. The mistakes and errors, however, are mine and mine

alone.

Teshome Tadesse

Chapters

1. Introduction

2. Definition of terms and the relationship between food
insecurity, poverty and forced migration

2.1. Food security and food insecurity

2.2. The relationship between food insecurity and poverty

2.3. Persistence of food insecurity and poverty: factors
reinforcing each other

2.4. Income or employment and adequate feeding as necessary
conditions for alleviating food insecurity and poverty

2.5. Resource "mobilization" and food insecurity and poverty

2.6. Alternative measure small farmers take before migration

2.7. Forced migration and the factors fuelling it

3. Measurement of poverty, distribution of population and the
crisis in agriculture in N.E. Africa

3.1. Crude measures of poverty for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan
3.1.1. Land and income distribution in Ethiopia
3.1.2. Income distribution in Somalia
3.1.3. Income distribution in Sudan

3.2. Distribution of population and agricultural development
3.2.1. The situation in Sudan
3.2.2. The population distribution condition in Ethiopia
3.2.3. Somalia’s situation

3.3. Water resources and irrigation in N.E. Africa

3.4. The role mechanized agriculture plays in the agriculture

TABLEVOF CONTENTS

of the region

vi

Pages

1-16

17-41
17

23

25

26
29
31

36

42-83

42
42
45
46

5O
51
51
55

55

57

305.

3.6.

3.7.

5.2.

5.3.

5.4.

505.

Agriculture and the crisis in food production 63
3.5.1. Growth rate in food production and population 65
3.5.2. Caloric and protein intake levels 69

Physical quality of life index: The situation in
NOrtheast Africa compared to other country groupings 71

The migration of rural people as well as professionals
and skilled ones and its impacts on the economies of

the N.E. African nations 75
Discussion of the problem: proximate causes of persisting
food insecurity, poverty and forced migration 84-106
The domestic environment 85
4.1.1. Access to land 85
4.1.2. Unbridled government intervention in production 87
4.1.3. Misallocation of resources 89
4.1.4. Conflicts over the distribution of political and
economic power and lack of access to resources for the
majority of the people 90
4.1.5. Neglect of small-holder agriculture by the
state 93
4.1.6. Droughts 96
Some domestically originated and externally induced
proximate factors of food insecurity 97
4.2.1. Increasing food import bills 97
4.2.2. Military spending 101
4.2.3. Debt servicing 103
4.2.4. The prOhibitive cost of energy 104
Peasants/small farmers who move seeking food and relief
food that attracts 107—128
Availability of relief food at cross border points 107
Food needs, refugees and the advantages that accrue to
hosts 110
The predicaments of the UNHCR and its role in the
aggravation of the refugee problem 112
The role neighboring countries play in the accentuation
of the problem.and the benefits they get 114
The repatriation situation 121

Forced migration or refugeeism.and how it fits into the
general theory of migration 122

vii

5.7. Dealing with one of the root causes of migration:
locally displaced populations

6. Foreign aid: a good supplement to domestic efforts to
combat food insecurity, poverty and forced migration

6.1. The pros and cons of foreign aid
6.2. The cash-for-work program and in-migration
Conclusion

Appendices

References

viii

124

129-143

130

135

144-158

159-172

173-184

LIST OF TABLES

Tables

1.

[\D

I.
Int—A
D

{II

C)

10.

11.

13.

Proportion of farmers using improved seed,
fertilizer and average household fertilizer
consumption in Ethiopia

. The relationship between income and family

size (Ethiopia)

. Farm household and cultivated land by size of

farms, cumulative percentage, 1968—1970

Income distribution in Ethiopia as exhibited
by the results of the 1981-1982 Rural Household
Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey

. Household expenditure as an indirect measure

of income distribution (Ethiopia)

. The 1975 household expenditure survey

Somalia

Income levels (urban and rural) in the Sudan

. Selected patterns of income in the Sudan

(annual income in Sudanese Pounds)

. Average income of households (Sudan) by province

(Northern provinces only)

Classification of the Sudanese population by
income groups

Estimated area of the crop sub-sector in the
Sudan

. Resources and their use in agriculture in

Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan

Average annual growth rate for GNP per capita,
GNP, GDP, agriculture and average annual rate
of inflation

ix

19

34

41

43

44

46

47

48

49

49

56

63

65

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

(\D
[\3

[\9
L3

24.

Population and its growth rate, density and
total area of countries

Average index of per capita food productiont The
situation in Northeast Africa and other LDCs

Calories and protein per capita intake per day
for N.E..African and other groups of nations

Per capita GNP and physical quality of life
index: Inter-country comparison (war and civil
war as well as drought affected Northeast
Africa and selected countries with highly
reduced political instability problems

Migrant labour (skilled and professional) in
Northeast Africa

Trade in food and animals (’000, U.S.$)

. Total food transfer for N.E. African countries

between 1973/74 and 1984/85 (in ’000 mt)

. Military expenditure (in millions of U.S. $)

. Debt servicing by Northeast African countries

between 1980 and 1984

. Energy imports, (including petroleum) as a

percentage of merchandise exports

Refugee pOpulation distribution in N.E. Africa
as of 1988 ‘

Appendices (A-D)‘

Appendix A (1).’Dhe rational behind a nation’s need

Appendix A (2). Per capita share of cereals produced

to produce some of its own food locally

in Ethiopia between 1980 and 1985,

Appendix A (Tables 25-26). Decrease in levels

of spending for food imports and arms and the
impact of this on investment for education,
health and agriculture

66

68

7O

74

80

98

99

102

104

105

117

159-171

159

160

161-163

25.

Total budget-revenue, total expenditure and the
proportion of reducible costs of food and animal
imports and military spending for N.E. African
countries in 1983 (in millions of U.S.$)

26(a): Government expenditures and possible rises

in investment for agriculture, etc., that could
have been achieved by Ethiopia for a late 1970
or early 1980 year if food import costs and
military spending were cut

26(b): Government expenditures and possible rises

in investment for agriculture, etc., that could
have been achieved by Somalia in 1978 if food
import costs and military spending were cut

Appendix B (Tables 27-32). Refugee movements and

27.

28.

30.

31.

32.

UNHCR expenditures for assistance to refugees,

161

162

163

returnees and displaced populations’ maintenance 164-167

Refugee or forced migrant movements in Northeast
Africa (1966-1989) (in ’000)

UNHCR expenditures and proposed budgets for
refugees in NOrtheast Africa 1981-82 to 1986-87
and 1988( in ’000 of U.S.$)

Multilateral assistance for rural settlements,
multi-sectoral maintenance for refugees in
established camps and voluntary repatriation
expenditures in Northeast Africa (in ’000 of U.S.$)

Returnee populations in Northeast Africa
between 1972 and 1987 (in ’000)

Estimate of the displaced populations in
Ethiopia and Sudan for selected years

UNHCR’s costs for counselling, transportation,
and program support for refugees in.Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan (in ’000 UQS.$)

Appendix C (Tables 33-38). Bilateral, multilateral

33.

and technical assistance and grants to N.E.

164

165

166

167

167

168

African and other LDCs: comparisons 169-171

Bilateral ODA from.DAC and OPEC members
countries and multinational agencies supported
by them

xi

169

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

Multilateral assistance mainly financed by DAC
member countries

Technical assistance

Grants of OPEC member countries to individual
countries 1970 and 1975-84

Grants of OPEC member countries through
multilateral agencies

Tying status of concessional commitments to

LDCs from DAC countries and multilateral
agencies 1981-82 and 1984 (%)

xii

169

170

170

170

171

ADB
ADBP
CSA
DAC

EOC.

FAO

GDP

IBRD
ICARA
IFPRI
IFAD
ILO
IMF

LDCs

NIEO
ODA
OECD

OPEC

PQLI

ABBREVIATIONS

Asian Development Bank

Agricultural Development Bank of Pakhistan

Central Statistical Authority (Ethiopia)

Development Assistance Committee

Ethiopian Calendar

European Economic Community

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Gross Domestic Product

Gross National Product

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
International Food Policy Research Institute
International Fund for Agricultural Development
International Labour Office

International MOnetary Fund

Least Developed Countries

Ministry of Agriculture (Ethiopia)

New International Economic Order

Official Development Assistance

Organization for Beonomic Cooperation and Development
Organization of the Petroleum.Ekporting Countries
Physical Quality of Life Index

xiii

RRC

UNCTAD

UNDP

UNESCO

UNHCR

UNICEF

WFP

The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission of Ethiopia

United Nations Conference on trade and Development

United Nations Development Programme

The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinatior

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund

World Food Programme

xiv

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this masters thesis is to assess the food insecurity,
poverty and the consequent "forced migration" problems which have come to
be chronic features in North East Africa, a region which consists of
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and tiny' Djibouti. The region. has been
suffering from human-induced and long-tailed drought conditions
persisting for about one-and-a-half decades. These conditions have given
rise to an endless train of forced migrants who inundate rural and urban
areas at home and those of neighboring countries. The receiving
countries in particular, are impoverished to a degree as the refugees
become a burden on them. The sending country also continually loses
labour power in those young people who make up an estimated 90 per cent
of the forced migrants.

Domestic and international attention has been focussed on these
problems. But despite humanitarian outpourings to combat emergencies and
a degree of transfer of development assistance, the problems endure. In
fact, at times the man-made problems of both internal and external nature
have been conspiring to make the already bad situations in food
production and distribution worse.

Unless in the case of governments which.wish to cover up failure and
specialized academic literature which. involves itself in deeper studies
of the phenomena relating to natural disasters, food shortages are not

ascribed to or explained by natural disasters alone. Most of the

2
existing literature sees both man-made and natural disasters as causing
food shortages.

Many authors see a combination of man-made and natural disasters as
having a direct impact on food insecurity. Among these are Fieldhouse
(1986), Jansson et a1 (1987), Kent (1987); and the Independent Commission
on International Human Issues (1986). Others emphasize the manrmade issue
as the underlying cause of the problem.(Singer et a1, 1987; Commins et
a1, 1986, World Bank, 1985).

The relative weight given to man-made disasters in the lining up of
causal factors for the phenomenon of forced migration or refugeeism has
been higher by far, however.‘The deterioration in the performance of the
agricultural sector (resulting from economic policies and institutions)
of the economy which "has had reverberations that extend to other
important economic spheres such as industry and commerce" explain.the
food crisis (Cbmmins et a1 1986: 4-5 and 90-96). Such factors as
"endemic phenomena as corruption and repression" are direct outgrowths of
economic decline (Commins et al: 5). They add that prolonged rainfall
shortages (drought) often exacerbated by vermin, particularly locusts,
weaver birds (Quelea Quelea) and army worms are also common features of
the problem (Commins: 90). Food shortages while "most critical during
abnormal times," are also caused by bad weather and other chronic
conditions such. as land degradation decertification, and domestic
policies of nations (Burki, in Chidzero and Gauhar, 1986:117).

WOrld Refugee Survey (1985:44) also ascribes the problem.to a
combination of man-made and natural factors which manifest themselves in
the form. of bad government policy, famine, war, drought and the politics

of assistance. These factors are said to combine with the cruel effects

3
of droughts to produce forced migrants or refugees (Ibid: 44-47).

For some authors natural disasters do not at all explain the crisis
in food production.‘The prohibition of, among other things, the "free
movement of produce, forced delivery quotas for farmers and the closing
of retail outlets" which have resulted in the lag in food production and
failure of distribution, as in Mezambique (a war-torn country), are
responsible for the problem (Singer et al, 1987:86). "Systemic"
failures, among others are given as obstacles to increasing food
production by Harf and.Trout (1986 :31). The observation of Dovering
(1988:56) with regard to farm and non-farm income disparities has an
import to this discussion. He says that "the relative constancy" of the
disparity in income over a period of time "...indicates that the
underlying causes are systematic and pervasive rather than incidental or
easily shifting". This observation supports the contention that more than
any thing else, defects in the structures and processes of development
explain the decline of and lag in agricultural production in poor nations
such as those in Northeast Africa. Cox (in Ecology of Food and NUtrition
1978: 207-220) gives the problem of lack of food a regional dimension.
Famine which is a situation of extreme lack of food is, according to him,
"...the regional failure of food production or distribution systems..."
leading to human suffering.

The literature does identify man and nature as causing the grim food
problems we see in the developing world and particularly the least
developed countries. Kent (1987:174) has observed that a "natural
disaster may lead to man-made disaster or vice versa". The focus of this
thesis is, however, the human aspect of the problem, As Longhurst (in

Food and NUtrition Bulletin, 1987:31-32) has also contended "human

4
related phenomena...contribute to famine..." and may even be identified
as the "primary" cause of it. But the dimensions and the relationship
between these factors are rarely dealt with country-by-country or
regionally.

The problem. in this regard has also not been in the lining up of
factors contributing to disasters leading to starvation and human
suffering. It is in the establishment of the underlying causes and.the
relationship between them.and the relative weights they carry in.the
determination of such phenomenon as forced, migration. As Shanin
(1978:280), in.his discussion of migration, has put it so well "any
analysis of labour migration ...must consider the process of
disintegration and change in rural economies and societies". The problems
of migration cannot be ascribed to a few or one major cause which more
often than not fail to explain the' changes that take place in the
countryside in the main. As Shanin rightly contended "there must be a
more substantial analysis of actual happenings" in the rural areas that
lead to low levels of food production. As Bigsten (1983:37) has also
cogently put it "...more time must now be devoted to concrete studies
aimed at accumulating scientific knowledge before any meaningful
generalizations about a phenomenon can be made" and before any action at
remedying the problem under discussion in this thesis is taken.

An attempt will be made to depict the relationship between food
insecurity, poverty and forced migration in a model form for the purpose
of this thesis. Forced migration and repatriation as they relate to this
thesis are perceived as forward (exit of people as forced migrants) and
backward (reentry) processes which involve in-country and out of country

movements.

5

These processes can be viewed by two simple models (Models I and II
below) which explain the interplay between internal and external causes
of forced migration. The home region is affected by two sets of factors-
-the internal and the external which under different situations (A and B)
combine with each other to induce migration and/or repatriation.

The home region is the major ‘source of the migration problem, But
then. in situation A, conditions that are better than the home region
(foreign 1) including the availability of food and the existence of peace
attract rural people to make the forced exodus that has become a common
experience in many parts of the world and indeed in NOrtheast Africa. The
push factors are the exact opposite of the foreign pull factors--lack of
food and poverty as well as drought and instability-- (refer to the
enumerated factors under Domestic 1, see Model I below).

Segments of forced migrants stay in urban areas within their nations
or better still in asylum countries as long as food is available in
emergency relief camps and/or until conditions back home become better
(e.g., when the rains come or conditions which drove the migrants
improve). They thus begin to repatriate when especially host country
camp life reverses the push into a pull factor (see Situation B in MOdel
II). Feed insecurity, poverty and forced migration will be taken up in
chapter two where each of them. is defined and their relationship is
established. In the subsequent chapters, these factors will be used to

explain the concrete situation in Nbrth East Africa.

Model I: The Relationship Between Food Insecurity,

Poverty and Forced Migration

 

:I: : A. Basic causes : :L: : B. Resource consuming : :fi:
:U: I l I I I Etc—HALE l l 1
WI I l :I I I 1 IF:
:D: :1. Nonavailability: :M : : 1. Growing food import : : O :
:E: : of food : :M : : bills : : R :
:R: :2. Poverty : :E : : 2. Rising cost of : : C :
:L: : : :D : : debt service : : E :
:Y: : : :I : : 3. Continuing conflicts : : D :
:1}: HA1 :4. Increasinseners‘y H I
'N T cons tion M '
:6?! SIB P! “’“P 9: 1 :
I I I I I I I I I
: : : : : : : B. Attraction of food : : G :
1C: 1 l 1C: 1 I {R}
:A: :B. Aggravating : :A : : 1. Urban and surplus : : A :
:U: : causes : :U : : producing areas : : T :
:S: : : :S : : 2. Global relief food : : I :
:E: :1. Droughts : :E : : distribution centers : : O :

:2. Instability : :S : : : : N :

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

Model II: Situations A and B, push and pull factors

summer:
A

ASgwM
It

M an 0F DOMESTI
P“ Maonmrs

Fence” (reed)
\
)

 

 

    
    

 

 

H0 PI E I
grown
ne‘mmmmn
1 _.- .
~. 1
Shannon 1 “ j"

5

Food insecurity, poverty and forced migration:
situations A and B

: A. Forced migration :
I I

: Percentage of

I I I
I I I
: Domestic : Eth.migrants : Foreign :
: (Negative) : (in Sudan) : (Positive) :
I ______________________ + _______________ + __________________ I
I I
: 1. Lack of food : * : Food :
I I I I
I I I I
: 2. Small land : * : Employment and :
: (poverty) : : settlement :
I I I I
I I I I
: 3. Loss of property : 7 : No :
I I I I
I I I I
: 4. Fear : 27 : No :
I I I I
I I I I
: 5 Conscription : 10 : No :
I I I I
I I I I
: 6. Heavy taxation : 8 : No :
I I I I
I I I I
: 7. War (Instability): 38 : No :
I I I I
I I I I
: 8. Political : I i
: Persecution : 10 : No :
I I I I
I I I I
: Total : 100 : :
*Source: These percentages which. were taken from. Mekuria’s (in

Nobel, 1987) paper are made use of because they would to, an
extent, help to appreciate the magnitude of some of the variables
explaining forced migration in terms of weights. variables 1 and 2
are two of the most important factors in the decision to migrate as
Mekuria’s study indirectly indicates. To my knowledge, no field
study that has statistics relating to them exists. Variable 1, for
instance, can explain variables 4 and 7 as the absence of food
constitutes a threat to survival of households. Fear and war greatly
decrease the ability of households to produce food and force their
members to evacuate as migrants in search of food and/or better
opportunities.

 

: Foreign 2 : Domestic 2 :
I I I
I I .
1 New : Positive :
' I
I """""""""""""""""""" + """""""""""""""""""" I

1. Dwindling food distribution 1. Restoration of peace

2. Difficulty in owning land 2. Improvement in

economic activity

3. Rehabilitation
assistance

3. High cost of Settlement and
little success in it

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

l I

: 4. Regimentation of camp life : 4. Attraction of home

I I

I I

: 5. Discrimination in : 5. Reunion with family

: employment : members, extended ones
I I

I I

I I ° '

, . 6. A non-confining open
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I

country-side as opposed
to relief camp life

6. Host population’s aversion
to migrants

7. Nostalgia for home

7. Geographic difference
environment better at
(dry, humid etc lowland
characteristics in Sudan
and Somalia for e.g.)

8. Conscription

9. Availability of selective
settlement opportunity

10. Services restriction

A complex problem.like food insecurity, poverty and forced migration
invariably needs further, deeper research than has been done so far in
order to come up with policy options that address the plight of the poor
in particular. The tendency to see the problems from. symptomatic
standpoints is at best tenuous. United Nations agencies have since a few
years ago been trying to "prevent the conditions that cause mass exodus
of refugees rather than to treat the symptoms or effects..." (Loescher in
Loescher and Monahan, 1989:18 and Rogge, 1985:21-22). The introduction of
"resource building" activities which have developed into palliative

actions... has recently led to increasing attention being paid to this

9
previously little-explored area (Singer et al, 1987:86). A look at the
problem from a humanitarian perspective which usually aims at providing
food and other relief assistance, in the main, is beneficial and saves
countless lives. But unfortunately it does not help much.to reduce the
impact of food insecurity or that of its permanent feature--poverty.

A case by case study of food insecurity and poverty situations would
definitely put in place the relative contribution of these factors to the
phenomenon of forced migration. This thesis constitutes a general
overview of the complexities of the issues. A. field study based on it
may help to have a good grasp of the dimensions of the problem.

The position taken in this thesis is that man-made factors explain
the food insecurity and its allied scourges in the main. An attempt will
be made to establish with some concrete evidence the underlying causes of
the problem. Natural disasters are seen in terms of their aggravational
roles rather than as primary causal factors.

In general, this thesis will attempt to examine the relationship
between food insecurity and poverty and their impact on forced migration.
Some of the factors that limit food production--factors like the lack of
land, investible resources and improved agricultural tools--in the main
will be isolated and treated in as much as they contribute to the
entanglement of the small-holder farmer’s drive to increase production.

The major thesis of this paper is that a serious shortage of food
and the existence of poverty lead to a ’forced’ migration condition which
impels people to go away from their localities to better-off areas within
their nations and outside in search of food. In relation to this major
thesis, the argument that the fortification of the existing local coping

mechanisms of food insecurity through a scheme of financial assistance to

10
those people who are below the subsistence level is advanced. It is
argued that this measure would check forced migration or refugeeism
-involving economic or ’food-seeking’ migrants and that it would pave the
way for in-migration.

The following minor hypotheses will also be considered.

1. Food insecurity and poverty interact and reinforce
conditions which lead to creeping famine and forced migration.

2. Land-abundant but financially and human resource
impoverished nations of Northeast Africa can improve their
capacity to make food available to the poor small farmer through
policies of economic liberalization and a broad range of
democratization of institutions.

3. The removal of the unstable conditions that pervade the region
is one of the urgent preconditions for increasing food
production.

4. The improvement of the physical quality of life--nutrition,
health and education--would induce people to work.harder to
benefit their households and by the way stimulate the local.
economy.

5. 'The channeling of external assistance that focuses more on the
long-term.needs of the disaster-hit would generate local
resources in the form of counterpart funds and labour-time for
increasing'production.

This research. has its limitations. A field study of the various

phenomena under consideration would have helped to measure the relative
weights of the factors explaining food insecurity, poverty and forced

migration much more precisely. But as some primary source data has been

11
used, the result of the study would give only a glimpse of some of the
realities of the situation. The above introductory discussion constitutes
chapter 1 of the thesis.

Chapter 2 deals with definitions of terms and the establishment of
the relationship between food insecurity and poverty as they relate to
the conditions in the Northeast African countries of Ethiopia, Somalia
and Sudan. The reasons why food insecurity and poverty persist in the
developing country context will also be dealt with as will be the import
of different income or employment and feeding levels both as obstacles
and as necessary conditions of changing’ the serious situation of
production that persists. The shortage of resources and the difficulty
of mobilizing the same for improving conditions would also be given
attention in the chapter.

Because of the semi-permanent condition of food insecurity and
poverty conditions for a significant majority of the people in rural
areas, much of the aggregate production is somehow consumed. A
substantial amount of the small produce is thus apportioned for
distribution to extended family members, goes as gifts for the destitute,
is loaned, or used for household consumption. The net effect of this is
that little is saved for any further reinvestment.

'Dhis circularity between production and consumption is one of the
key factors for what is generally identified as "arrested development" in
the rural sector which. constitutes more than two-thirds of the
populations in least developed countries as those of N.E. Africa. The
evidence is borne out by instances from.Ethiopia where around 36 per cent
of the rural population’s household income has to be supplemented by

gifts and loans in order for people in the category to subsist.

12
Contributions to traditional mutual aid systems as well as associations,
especially religious ones, may be looked at as factors which are in the
way of accumulating investment funds.

In fact, they dissipate, as it were, a good deal of the produce
which may go into investment. Such an analysis is given little attention
in the interplay of production and consumption in the rural areas.‘These
have empirical dimensions which require field researches the results of
which would, in all likelihood, point to the fact that a set of
institutional as well as financial interventions, which should catalyze,
increased production, curtail money lines of expenditures and induce
overall savings, are urgently needed. The introduction of rural banks
which lend money at low interest rates and the setting up of educational
systems which preach the value of extricating dependency syndromes can
help a lot in this regard.

Some measures of poverty as they apply to the NOrtheast African
nations’ conditions will be looked into in chapter 3. The measurement
will be assessed from the angle of distribution of population, land
utilization and agricultural development and the relationship of these to
the crisis in production.

The physical quality of life index (PQLI) will be examined as a
complementary component in the measurement of socio-economic conditions
in the region. All the countries-~Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan--have
achieved the distinction of remaining behind in areas of development--
food production not excluded. Infant mortality per 1000 live births is
as high as the health services are poor.

In the face of unchanging income levels for many in urban areas and

outright destitution in rural areas, little else is left for many people

13
to stay in their localities. Migration provides a way out of the
problems. Chapter 3 thus discusses the point that international
migration, among others, had been resorted to by many people in northern
Ethiopia alone during the first half of this century for economic
reasons.

In Chapter 4, food insecurity, poverty and forced migration would be
analyzed in light of some of the internal and external causes of the
problem. Basically the problem is that excess resources were used to
purchase goods and services from.the international market and they were
used to employ a goodly number of people (mainly in the military and in
some other organizations) who service redundant institutions as well as
those institutions which mushroomed without taking into account other
national priorities.

Government spending which usually fails to appreciate the necessity
of prioritization in development and the instability conditions which
particularly pervade N.E. Africa will be examined in relation to both the
food produced and imported and to the decreasing level of exports.

_ Nbrtheast African nations, like those of many least developed
countries, have to devote a good deal of their earnings to purchasing or
obtaining necessary and ’unnecessary’ commodities and services--food
grain in the main, energy, foreign loans and arms--which in a way they
require to function as national entities. In the earlier section of the
chapter, the domestic causes of the problem, which include entrenched
institutional and socio-economic values, power struggles among’political
groups and central governments, and the failure to prioritize and to
properly allocate resources are discussed.

Chapter five discusses some of the main reasons why segments of

14

forced migrants walk to international food distribution centres and the
huge costs that would have been made unnecessary if rural development
were undertaken in earnest by forced migrant source nations. The point
made here is that assistance extended to potential forced migrants at
their places of origin, that is, before the migrants make the exodus,
would make the place of origin more attractive to continue the thread of
life. Such assistance would thus eventually minimize the pressure these
unfortunate people pose in first instance countries of asylum as well as
others. This would be analyzed with the help of UNHCR’s data on
expenditures for refugees in host nations.

The forced migrant’s role in stressing the job market on top of
using excessive amounts of host country national resources and the
opposition this has raised and the restrictions the situation has imposed
in these countries would also be considered. The fact that the forced
migrant country loses labour power and revenue from, the productive
activity of these people would also be reviewed in relation to the forced
migration conditions that obtain.

The fact that small-holder agriculture, if assisted with modern
inputs and if the people in it are given the necessary incentive, is the
way out of the food shortage problem. will again be underlined. That
foreign grants and donations, if channelled and utilized properly, can be
effective supplementary tools of expanding food production will also be
dwelt upon.

In Chapter 6, the need for external assistance as a development tool
is highlighted. International assistance has been devoted more to
emergency programmes for internal as well as external refugees. The

current argument that this should be linked to development and

15
particularly grass-root level development is given a shot in the arm.
The tendency to tie in donor wishes and interests in the provision of
assistance will also be briefly examined.

The cash-for-work program which has been implemented in Ethiopia and
its positive outcome of not only helping "prospective" forced migrants to
stay in their localities, but also of attracting previous migrants who
had left because of destitution, would be discussed. 'Dhis will be
highlighted as a means of advising governments and donors of the great
value of addressing food production problems at the grass-roots levels.

The final part of the thesis emphasizes the value of the
liberalization of the socio-economic systems and the ending the existing
conflicts within each nation of NOrtheast Africa. Stability and
democratization of the socio-economic and political institutions are
viewed as primary conditions for changing the grim food production
situation in the region.

It also entertains the idea that economic cooperation between
developing countries and industrialized countries, beyond its value of
reducing’ food insecurity and poverty and of curbing forced migration,
would stimulate demand for goods and services, production and
international trade. It notes that this cooperation is absolutely
necessary and that it would be enhanced as the current conditions slowly
but surely evolve toward some kind of balance.

It stresses that the development of the small-holder agriculture is
a top priority and that temporary needs satisfaction and interest
promotion, as has been exhibited by the continuing conflicts in the
region, would only aggravate the food shortage situation and pave the way

for the repetition of the abysmal food deficit conditions over and over

16
again. State funds expended on the military by governments and
internationally-mobilized funds spent on emergency camps rather than.on
agricultural development, inter alia, are seen as valuable resources
miserably wasted when at' some future date stock-taking is undertaken by
the decision-makers and other actors.

The uplifting of the poor helps expand the revenue base for
governments and increases the demand for "food goods" and services not
excluding international ones at some distant date. It is thus prudent for
home governments, in particular, and the international community in
general, to pave the way for increased food production in the region as a
whole. Lack of food is one of the most immediate problems that has to be
dealt with so that peace would descend on the region and economic

activity invigorated.

17

Chapter 2

IDefinition of terms and.the relationship between food insecurity, poverty

and.forced.migration

2.1. Food security and insecurity

Food security is the ability of a society to feed its population
throughout the year with enough and nutritious food that is necessary for
health and for pursuing an adequate level of activity. Food security is
absolutely necessary for activities in all fields of social and economic
endeavour, and its express purpose is to meet the household’s basic food
requirements and promote national economic development. Eicher and
Staatz (1984zl) define food security as:

the ability of a country or region to assure, on a long-
term.basis that its food system provides the total population
access to a timely, reliable and nutritionally adequate
supply of food.

Lipton and Heald (1984:9-11) as well define food security as "the
stabilization of access, or of proportionate shortfalls in access to
calories by a population."

Weber and Jayne (1988:1) also define food security as:

"a situation in which all individuals in a population possess
the resources to assure access to enough food for an active
and healthy life."
Bingman (1984: 6-7) has come up with a definition of food security

in reverse. For him one of the commonly accepted definitions of food

18
insecurity is the probability that in any given year actual food
consumption will fall below a minimal level necessary for survival and
adequate health.

The main ideas reflected in the definition of food security are the
existence of food items in adequate quantities and the ability of
households to afford to purchase them (Sen 1981; 1984: and Sen in Urqiudi
1987, Siamwalla and valdes, 1980; Eicher and Staatz 1985 and Singer et al
1987).

The other alternative is to subsidize or distribute food for the
poor if such food is available in abundance. If this is not the case then
any country would be in trouble. As FAO notes "redistributing an
aggregate output which remains small only perpetuates poverty." (FAO 20th
Session, Rome 10-29 Nov. 1979:223). Or to put the same thing in a
different way a falling production or a high rate of population growth
compels the redistribution of limited resources for ever more people. As
Judit Kiss (1977:6-7) has said:

"High population growth leads to the preservation of poverty

and increase in the domestic requirements of food and the

sharpening of tension on the labour market..."

It is not only availability of the food domestically per -se that
is important for food security though. The ability of a nation to
purchase its food, a substantial or minimum. portion of the total
requirements, from outside its borders is also a means of side-stepping
the food insecurity problems (see Appendix A,1).

Low level technology in the developing countries is also one of the
stumbling blocks in the way of production and hence the lag in

agricultural development. An instance where technology makes a

19
difference is exhibited by a ranking of regions by levels of fertilizer
and improved seeds used in agriculture in.Ethiopia. In the Arsi region,
particularly the Chelalo province, where Swedish technical assistance has
made it possible for technology to be injected, overall fertilizer use,
among other things, has in many instances, led to production increases on

a unit and overall level.

Table 1. Proportion of farmers using_improved seed,fertilizer and
average household fertilizer consumption

:Farmers using :Average fertilizer :Farmers using

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I I
I I
: Region :Fertilizer :Consgmption :_mproved seeds :
: :(per cent) :(kiloggams) :(per cent) :
: ---------- + -------------- + ------------------- + --------------- :
: Average : 14 : 8.76 : 2 :
: Arsi : 47 : 31.75 : 21 :
: Bale : 1 : 0.76 : :
: Gamu Gofa: 1 : 0.27 : — :
:ann : 16 : 9&6 : - :
: Gonder : 3 : 1.43 : 1 :
: Hararghe : 4 : 1.41 : 2 :
: Illulabor: 2 : 1.12 : 2 :
: Keffa : 13 : 5.34 : - :
: Shewa : 24 : 18.95 : l :
: Sidamo : 9 : 2.86 : 5 :
: Wellega : 15 : 7 22 : - :
I Wello : - l - l - I

Source: Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), General Agricultural
Survey, Preliminary Report 1983/84 (1976 ENC.), VOl 1,
Planning and Progranming Department, Addis Ababa, October
1984.

20

As the figures for Arsi indicate (see Table 1), the Arsi region
stands first in the use of a great deal of modern inputs. The other
regions, where such information on new technology, exposure to the use of
improved seeds and fertilizer as well as ability to mobilize resources as
a consequence of increased production has not been the case, poor use of
modern inputs is in evidence. This evidence may enable us to conclude
that where infusion of both capital and information is slow there is an
apparent absence in production increase and spread of technology.

Nations, like individuals in society who do not have the resources
to set aside for the procurement of the balance of their food needs, seek
the money or the resources to buy the extra amount necessary for their
consumption in the first place. Under these circumstances, such nations
or a segment of their people do not have the resources to purchase their
food which is an immediate requirement. The purchase of modern inputs the
costs of which are quite high are unthinkable in such cases.

Self-sufficiency in food also does not guarantee the distribution of
adequate food to all members of society, particularly to segments of
people, e.g. the poor, children and the aged (Sen 1984), and communal
needs determined by culture, e.g. nomads. FAO’s argument that the
production of "larger output does not automatically increase the income
and employment of economically weaker claimants..." (FAO, 1979:223)
befits this argument.

Surplus-producing nations such as India and Brazil have millions of
people suffering from malnutrition and starvation (Chakrabarti, in Ford
and Chakrabarti 1987:183 and Hollist and Tullis 1987:1). This happens in
these two countries and Mexico in spite of the fact that "substantial

growth in per capita GNP and Industrial Production have taken place..."

21

(Manetsch in Ecology of Food and NUtrition, 1982:225). Yet these nations
export food and other agricultural products to raise foreign exchange for
the purchase of capital goods and other inputs, to service their foreign
debts, etc. Even in the food production giant of the world, the United
States, some 20 million people are said to be facing hunger because
"enumerable holes in the food safety net have been pierced" (Ford and
Holmquist in Chazan and Show, 1988: 214). There are thus "poverty-induced
pockets of hunger" among industrialized nations of the world,
"demonstrating again the relationship between income and hunger" (Harf
and Trout, 1986:45).

Food self-sufficiency or even surplus production thus does not mean
that all the poor or the unemployed would readily have access to food.
As Ford and Holmquist (Ibid: 214) correctly argue, "...abundance is no
guarantee that all members of society will be able to satisfy even a
minimal level" of their nutritious food needs. One thing is, however,
certain. Increased availability of food, as shown by rises in per capita
production or "mean production," counters the effects of growing
instability of the food problem markedly (Bingman, 1984:7).

In countries where democratic institutions can be coaxed or
mobilized, the surplus produced can be distributed readily to counter
existing abnormalities temporarily or even permanently. These nations
with bountiful production are much.more capable than those with deficient
production to do this. This view is supported by Sen (1984: 325) who
notes that food insecurity and.hence poverty can be eliminated easily in
richer countries than poorer ones.

Hunger can thus be eliminated or mitigated by institutional measures

such as in the U.S. in the 19703 (Ford and Holmquist, in Chazan and

22

Show:214). It may be mitigated in the long-run with the adoption of
policies that aim.at laying the groundwork for narrowing the gap between
incomes through the provision of services, such as health.and education
in Sri Lanka (Gillis et al, 1983) and the two services plus public
distribution of food in Kerala (Sundaram, 1986 and the U.N., 1975:20)
indicate that this has been a characteristic feature of the two peoples
in Asia.

Among those countries which attempted to institute land reform,
Ethiopia and Tanzania, for example, were unable to match this "gain" with
important measures of providing incentives and rural credit services,
inter alia, which.are necessary to enhance agricultural development and
reduce poverty. The distribution of land in and of itself would not lead
to an increase in production. ‘The key to this is the realization of
profit by the farmer. As Shao (in Issue, 1985: 15-16) argued so well in
his discussion of Tanzania, food "price increases in themselves are
meaningless unless the ...producer is able to increase his margin of
profit, to improve his standard of living and to expand.production." The
two countries have been venturing into more complex systems of state-led
and controlled agricultural activities for 'many years now. ‘Ehese
eventuated in rising national expenditures on. faulty priority programmes
as well as those which arose because of the states’ increasing and
dominant involvement in the economy (Lofechie in Chasan et al, 1988:149-
53 and Griffin in Hollist et al, 1987:126-27). In both.countries’ cases
state revenue increasingly dried up and investment resources went down as
a consequence. Both.nations, therefore, have simply been unable to avoid
exposure to food insecurity. Somalia and Sudan, after experiencing

production failures of state ownership of land, and other resources,

23
reestablished the market mechanism.with individuals working on their own
to satisfy their household needs as well as to generate surpluses which
they can dispose of to earn money for their other daily requirements
(Ragsdale and Ali in Oberai, 1988:213 and Berry and Geistfield, 1983: 45-
49).

Eshetu Chole’s and Teshome Mulat’s study about settlements in
Ethiopia indicates that individually farming’families were better-off
than their compatriots in government assisted and controlled farming
cooperatives (Eshetu Chole and Teshome Mulat, 1984:57-58 and see also
their article in Oberai, 1988:182). These observations are helpful in
redesigning policies of development that particularly affect the small

farmer.

2.2. The relationship between food insecurity and poverty

Food insecurity may be of a temporary or permanent nature.
Temporary food insecurity situations arise when a locality or a set of
regions produce less than is necessary to satisfy their needs. This
situation compels the transfer of food from, other localities thus
creating pressure on the overall availability of food at the national
level. Temporary food insecurity may thus be "associated with either
fluctuations in food production or price changes" (Siamwalla and valdes,
1980: 272). This takes place as a consequence of shortage of rains,
floods, pest attacks or civil conflicts, and the like.

Food insecurity, for the poor in this sense is a downward shift
and/or loss of income that affects their well-being. The poorest of the
poor in particular may usually have to forgo a meal or two a day for the

reason that their income is not sufficient to satisfy their daily

24
minimum requirement for the duration of the food shortage or until such
time that supply is restored and prices decrease.

A Mellor, in the International Food Policy Research.Institute Report
of 1987 notes that "rising food prices redistribute income shares from
the poor to the rich" (1987:8). Mellor provides empirical evidence for
this from.India which states that:

a ten per cent increase in food grains prices reduces the food
gains in consumption of the two poorest income deciles by 6 per
cent while decreasing the food grain consumption of the tenth
decile by only 0.2 per cent.

The decrease in the share of the food grains of the poor and the
consequent transfer of a good chunk of the income of this group to
increase the revenue deriving from the farm sector subsidizes (through
the provision of health, education and other national services), in a
way, the rich who have to pay less for the adjustment of the market
condition resulting from. price rises. This may be because of two
reasons. First, the number of the poorer farmers in society is greater,
and their share in the payment for the adjustment required, due to the
rise in grain prices, would thus be higher by that much. Secondly, it may
be because the transfer may be subsumed in the existing distortions of
income distribution which largely favors those with.higher incomes. This
means the rich have the money to spend which money they are able to
directly and indirectly get as a result of the ill-distribution of
resources.

The impact of food prices is thus crushing on the poor. Harf and

Trout (1986:36), citing a calculation, point out that a quarter can get a

person some cereal which can supply his daily nutritional needs. But

25
they hasten to argue that in most parts of the world hungry people

cannot have the very quarter that is much needed for the purpose (Ibid.).

2.3. Persistence of food insecurity and poverty:factors

reinforcing each other

This leads us to the question of why poverty is an endless and a not
so easily combatted problem in society and particularly in less developed
nations. The question is both intriguing and difficult, if not
impossible, to answer. anetheless, attempts can be made to discuss some
of the variables and the internal relationship between poverty and food
insecurity.

Food insecurity emanates from. poverty and vice versa. The two are
mutually inclusive. The existence of one per se predetermines the
existence of the other in many nations. Poverty, the inability to gain
access to food, among other basic necessities of life, is closely
associated with hunger which is the absence of food for a definite or
more or less extended period of time.

As Harf and. Trout (1986: 62-63) note directly: "food power is
purchasing power." They see a circularity between food availability and
income. Amartya Sen argues that food shortage is experienced by those
who do not have the means to get food or to purchase it (1984:486).

Thus the failure in farm production translates "directly into an
entitlement failure" (Ibid.). He cites wello’s experiences in this
regard as an evidence. Peasants in this Ethiopian region were unable to
purchase food in spite of its existence in some places. Padmini,
UNICEF’s representative in Ethiopia (UNICEF 1945-1985:32), also shares

the views of Sen when she observes that people in wello were moving out

26
of the region when some food was flowing into the local market. Those
with no income moved out of the region while food moved into their
localities.

Paradoxically enough, there was also "some movement of food out of
Wello through the famine period" (Sen 1984:469) consistent with perhaps
the less than adequate demand for it in the region. This moving out of
food from.Wello and its entry into other areas must have filled in some
of the food shortage gaps elsewhere. An economic and historical study is
in order here to see the real problem at that time, but this is not the

immediate concern of this paper.

2.4. Income or employment and adequate feedingias necessary conditions
for alleviating food insecurity and poverty

Reduced income leads to a reduced conditions of food security. But
as Ford and Holmquist argue, casting the food crisis as a problem of
production gets at only part of the difficulty and not even the most
important one (in Chazan and Show 1986:213). According to Harf and
Trout, the "key to alleviating poverty is income". And by extension they
note that the alleviation of poverty is employment (Ibid. 1988:62-63).

Employment, and hence income, in themselves are, in this context,
thus considered as factors‘ fully explaining the phenomenon of poverty.
The FAO (1985: 26) which, however, recognizes the big role income plays
in determining survival discounts the argument that it is the only
measure of poverty; many other social and environmental factors
contributing to malnutrition are closely linked to poverty of individuals

and countries. As the FAO argues, even though the level of

27
income is not the only cause of variability in food intake it
is being recognized as the main cause, particularly among the
poorest segments of the population (FAO, 1985: 26).

A food intake level that would assure a degree of activity that can
at least assure the maintenance of individuals and households is a
precondition for the release of energy for the most minimal level of
activity.

Food insecurity can also be explained as one of the main causes of
poverty for the reason that it strips the individual’s ability to work
and to be productive. As Chazan and Show (1988:13) argue:

Food constraints deplete human energy, reduce motivation,
limit production and circumscribe prospects for its
amelioration.

As Hollist and Tullis also contend, "malnutrition both takes and
denigrates human life" (Hollist and Tullis, 1987:2). Similarly, Harf and
Trout (1986:35) also argue out the case in the same vein. They advance
the view that the "prevalence of world hunger and various levels of
malnutrition are seen to be closely associated with poverty" (Ibid.). In
the words of Spitz (1978:867) people with no access to food are ones who
have "lost the most elementary of rights--the right to right itself."
Green (quoted in Kent 1987:177) also make reference to this right as it
relates to disaster victims as the "most basic of human rights--the right
to life".

The U.N. Preparatory Conference on Food and Agriculture (1943) which
was part of the preoccupation of the founding fathers of the present
international machinery, recognized the primacy of food for human life.

They came to note that "...poverty, the first cause of malnutrition",

(quoted in Singer et al: 1987:79) was the factor inhibiting increase in

28
the well being of people in many countries whose total number was two
thirds of the world population. For them freedom from want meant "...a
secure, adequate and suitable supply of food for every one..." (Ibid.).

People must eat to be in shape and work. The availability of food
is, therefore, a sine qua non of life and by extension the spring-board
of capability to work to feed oneself and one’s household members as well
as beyond. Health gained through nutritious food is vital. First, it is
a means of increasing food production. As the WOrld Bank argues food for
households is important for the reason that "...improved nutrition is an
investment in the productivity of a nation’s population (WOrld
Development Report 1986z8). Secondly, it cuts expenses for curative
diseases that may otherwise have to be paid for dearly if and when
extreme food shortages are experienced at some future date.

These are two of the reasons why governments attempt, only through
lip service, in many cases, to give priority to agriculture. It looks
like the international community also has, if not directly, indirectly
come to realize that agricultural development is a key to combating
famine and hunger in poor countries. Lipton argues that this is so. But
despite this, he says that the contribution of official bilateral aid
inflows for rural development, specifically agriculture, in less
developed countries has been proportionally less than the overall
increase in development assistance from these sources between 1975 and
the early eighties (Lipton, 1984: 1-16).

Elsewhere he notes that huge public support in many rich donor
countries is very much. focussed upon health, nutrition and other human
concerns. He cites the Western big response to the African famines in

1983/84 to support his argument. But despite the effort and the small

29
understanding achieved the poor in food deficit countries continue to
suffer and to produce less.

Inability to work as a consequence of lack of an adequate level of
caloric intake by the poor is thus one of the main reasons for persisting
poverty. On the other hand, poverty is a condition in which, put
cogently, "entitlement" or income to purchase one’s survival food and
other basic necessities to sustain oneself as well as one’s family

members is not there.

2.5. Resource ’mobilization’ and food insecurity_and poverty
‘Dhe poor peasant is so much.tied to his traditional and subsistence
agriculture, unpaying agriculture for the small-holder in many instances,
that he is unable to extricate himself out of poverty. Chirstensen (in
Hollist et al, 1987: 40) comes up with a palatable contention regarding
the unbearable web of poverty that entangles the poor farmer. In the
author’s words:
"...poverty is associated with incapacity of the peasants to move
their assets to the booming sectors, or to the sectors that
eventually take advantage of rapidly increasing effective demand."
Poor peasants thus cannot move out of traditional agriculture simply
because they have only little means to purchase modern inputs and to
introduce irrigated agriculture to their system of production wherever
this is possible. In as much as command over resource--the ability to
generate income or to attain. a minimum level of purchasing power--is
absent, the capability to provide oneself with basic necessities of life,
food in particular, is also remote. One thing which is allied to this
and which is equally important is the availability of resources which

pave the way for increased production.

30

Alemneh (1987:122) has found out that only 7% of the Arsi region
sample farmers he studied had T% savings. The Arsi Agricultural
Development Unit also came to the same conclusion in a sample study it
conducted (Ibid.). But the Ethiopian Statistical Authority, in its sample
survey of 12,000 farmers, has come up with a result pointing'that 18%Iof
the rural population produces in excess of its needs. Although this may
not indicate that all this can be categorized as savings, its potential
for being used as an investment resource may be high. But this potential
is not realized because of the complex socio-economic and political
relations in the country.

The economic and social environment which per se greatly reduces
peoples’ opportunities to produce should itself not be poor so as to
enable people to be productive and hence use their labour optimally. In
areas where the fertility of the soil is poor or where land size is too
small, productivity is low. Human power is enormously wasted over the
preparation of land for farming in many parts of central as well as
northwestern and northern Ethiopia in the main. This calls for the
judicious use of land resources in Ethiopia (Eshetu and Teshome, 1984:56)
and indeed in the other Nbrtheast.African countries’ cases. This means

land that is unutilized should be exploited wherever it is available.

2.6. Alternative measures small farmers take before migration

In a rural setting, the individual household, faced with food
shortage and hence price hikes and entangled by poverty, may make the
deficiency good through measures it takes in the immediate and long-run
senses. In such a situation there are at least some six different ways

of responding to such a misfortune. The various responses made are

31
dependent on the intensity and extensity of the problem and the social
psychological conditions of each household and the existing avenues of
support systems.

The first option is available for the insightful and.the extra-hard-
working peasant. This is one who has acquaintances to whom he may
previously have worked off-farm.either as a tenant or on his own by
renting land. This category of peasants most of the time arrange for
themselves some kind of employability. They invariably step from.one
farm.employment to another both within their localities or their fringes
to fix some kind of gainful employment by themselves.

The second option that is there for the peasant is to engage oneself
in some kind of side-line activity involving cottage industry. In this,
the peasant can be an owner-operator or he can work for those who have
businesses of sorts. Such kinds of accessory activities include flour-
mill running, garment production, or service giving such as milking or
cattle rearing.

With a view to finding a means to make ends meet, the third category
of poor peasants borrow money. But farmers here may hardly be able to
pay back the debt becaUse the traditional rural banking systems are
controlled by landlords and money-lenders whose income generation is also
largely dependent on the traditional rural money market.. They take away
a substantial amount of the produce of the peasant farmer by charging'him
unbearably high interest rates--200 per cent (in Ethiopia’s case) at
times which has been payable in cash and kind. A.1969 development program
study of Ada Wereda in Ethiopia by Borton, Mamo, Almaz and John indicates
that the interest rate in the traditional rural credit market ranged from

40 to 350 and over per cent for the Ada and other areas of the country.

32
The Agro-Industrial Bank in Ethiopia required high value collateral
which automatically excluded the peasant from borrowing money.

The traditional money-lending institution known as shail or credit
against future crop in the Sudan is also an important means of siphoning
off resources from the small farmer (Ahmed, 1977: 115-116 as quoted in
Barnett and Abdulkarim,1988: 144). The interest rate charged varied from
50% to 300%.

In the rural areas, the peasant does have little option other than
to go to these money lenders who make him prey to their extortionary
practices (Barnett and Abdulkarim 1988: 121-128 and World FOOd Report,
1987: 20). Rural banking institutions are not available to enforce some
sense in their operation which involves the charging of exorbitantly high
interest rates.

Basu (1984) argues that the poorer peasant farmer may stay in the
"debt-trap" for a long-time or permanently under such circumstances. He
may even have to sell some of his assets, particularly land or
alternatively turn himself into a labourer of the lender. Some state
systems also tax smallholder agriculturalists out of existence. 'Dhe tax
system Which in some instances also requires the farmers to pay their
taxes indirectly in kind, such as the forced grain delivery schemes in
socialist modes of transfer of produce, is too crushing for many.

For the state this transfer is a source of capital accumulation and
government upkeep. The peasant may thus be unable to break out of poverty
as he perforce leads himself and/or is dragged into a bonded labour type
of relationship with the lender who may also be among the better-off
farmer's group in a rural setting (World Food Report, 1987:20). The

continued payment of this debt, in spite of the fact that it is heavy,

33
is the insurance or, if you will, the future collateral of the farmer’s
ability to borrow at a later date (see Basu, 1984).

In one sense,. then, poverty is the permanent cause of income
reduction and by extension one of the main reasons for food insecurity.
Under these circumstances, the peasant, is hardly able to maintain
himself and members of his household let alone engage himself in
comparatively sophisticated agriculture. 'Fhe fourth. alternative is to
find solace in. the traditional safety mechanism of kin and close
relation support, which. can be identified with. the extended family
system. This is a peasant or a farmer who is, comparatively speaking, a
lucky one.

He may also make the deficiency good from. gifts collected through
outright beggary as well whidh is a degrading condition (but as the
Ethiopian society endorses, one activity which is still better than
robbery and other unlawful means of gaining a means of livelihood) yet a
means of survival for the ’kinless’ or for one who does not have richer
friends. This is the fifth.avenue which.the peasant has to resort to in
order to continue to survive.

The fourth and the fifth mechanisms impoverish households to a
considerable extent. Households with a relatively higher number of
members consume a good deal of their production thus closing any avenues
for raising investment funds. FAQ’S argument (END, 1979:223) that a
redistribution of "aggregate output" which is already small increases the
poverty of household and indeed nations--especially food deficit nations
(refer to section 2.1 above) holds water here. This argument does clearly
have an import on the Ethiopian situation. The Ethiopian Central

Statistical Authority’s Rural Household Income Consumption and

34

Expenditure Survey, shows that households with more than Birr 2669 (2.07
Ethiopian Birr = U.S.s 1, official exchange rate) annual income and
higher number of members had a lower standard of living than their
compatriots with incomes of Birr 499 and below (CSA, 1988:xvii-xix and
see Tables 10-24 or pp 14-26). The CSA national survey indicates that
more income in rural Ethiopia leads to a bigger size of a household as
Table 2 indicates.

Table 2. The relationship between income and family size (Ethiopia)

Income category Size of household members

I I I
l I I
I I I
I I I
: (Birr) l i
i i i
I I I
I I I
: 500-1299 : 3.9-4.8 :
I I I
I I I
: 2000-2999 : . :
I I I
I I I
: 2300-5899 : 5 0-5.8 :
I I I
I I I
: 5900-7500 and above : 7 9-8.9 :

Source: Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority,
Rural Household Income Consumption, and
EXpenditure Survey, Addis Ababa, 1988.

But there are those who are not so fortunate to be able to find a
better-off kin or are smart enough to go around and find a job for
themselves or create one. These can be categorized under households
which usually face food shortages or "survival necessities," if you will,
desperately. These in many cases take the sixth and sad option which
involves evacuation of the locality or the region.

The peasants in this category are indeed ones on whom. fortune has

completely turned its face against and they have in the main no one to

35

turn to and exhaust the local safety-nets. They are ones whom.Griffin in
Hollist et al, 1987:132) identified as ones who face "abnormal breakdown
in access to food" which leads to a decision to take a "desperate measure
to avoid dying..." As during the 1972-74 drought in Ethiopia, many
peasants in 1983 "abandoned their villages to search. for food" after
having consumed their "planting seeds" (Shepared,in Issue, 1985:6). The
most likely option this category of the poor in the rural setting have is
thus to make a forced exodus in search of food or some kind of work for
survival. According to the FAQ also they constitute the most under-
privileged of the rural people and this situation compels them to abandon
their localities (The Fifth World Food Survey (FAD), 1987:20). They are
ones who have, according to Amartya Sen (1984:470) like the wello
peasants of 1972/74 drought period, experienced a "direct entitlement
failure" which means they were hit by a loss of the means to livelihood
to the marrow.

This loss of entitlement translates into a complete loss of
"citizenship rights" which means that the social security of members of
society is grossly affected. This social security, which Burki
(1986:124) notes is a "person’s entitlement bundle", has been
increasingly destabilized as a consequence of man-made and natural
disasters (drought in particular). These two disasters, especially
famine, have, according to Burki, "threatened the functioning of this
fundamental fall-back entitlement" (Ibid.).

Hundreds of thousands of people have been turned into drought,
economic and political refugees in Africa and particularly N.E Africa
during the last two decades. A substantial number of these refugees

leave their areas in search of food. The main focus of this thesis, as

36
explained in the introduction, is that refugees or forced migrants who
cross borders are in the main food-seeking migrants and that the
availability of food in their localities would change their decision to
migrate. A definition of forced migrants or refugees and the forces
behind their movement is in order before going into the discussion of the

problem.in the region.

2.7. Forced migration: its definition and the factorsgfuelling it

Forced migration refers to a special group of rural people in
Northeast Africa in particular who face permanent and semi-permanent food
shortages and ones who move to areas where they can find food at the
slightest opportunity. Forced migrants are those people who, in strained
circumstances, where the already poor condition in food availability is
made poorer by continuing food shortages, choose to abandon their areas.
The circumstances that fuel forced migration in Northeast Africa are
thus persistent food shortages and the conflict conditions which are
themselves rooted in the lop-sided nature of the distribution of wealth
in society. The chronic food shortages and the continuing conflicts have
enormously hampered food production in the region.

The food shortages resulting from drought and instability situations
are themselves rooted in the general poor production condition in the
Northeast African region. It is the considered view of this thesis that
an improvement in the food production conditions would greatly stem the
large scale movement of migrants. The preference of people in some
conflict-ridden parts of the world to stay in their localities even
during wars and/or their immediate return when cease fire is declared

solidifies this argument. In Ethiopia, the woes of some settlers,

37
settlers who must have, in the main, been better-off in their areas of
origin and who were moved to new ones by obnoxious and authoritative
decision-makers who did not care a bit for human rights, is a further
testimony of the acceptability of the contention.

Nonetheless, forced migration has been usually related to the
forceful movement of people to places other than their own (far and near)
as slaves or indentured labourers (Harf and Trout 1986:102; Bouvier et al
1979:8). In such a situation people are forced by a powerful group or a
government which compels them. to go away from. their localities within
their nations or outside and work as farm labourers, etc., without their
will. This process in past years related to such a forced movement of
people from Africa and Asia. It is also sometimes referred to as an
"involuntary migration," to use Bouvier’s terminology.

Refugeeism. is also a process of movement of people from their
localities under the pressure of lack of food or to use Sen’s (1984) apt
description of this phenomenon, "loss of entitlement in terms of command
over resources in order to survive."

Migration and refugeeism are sometimes interchangeably used. Rogge
(1987:86, 1985:41) refers to refugees as "migrant populations." Also
Shulthesis (1983), CIMADE (1986:13-15, 20-21 and 105) use the word
migrant as a synonym of a refugee. Widgren (in Loescher and MOnahan,
1989:54) classifies refugees among involuntary migrants.

Involuntariness and force are thus central to the process of
movement of people whose ability to feed and maintain themselves is
hampered by forces external to their will and decisions in substantial
number of cases. Such migrations whether they take place as a consequence

of a direct force emerging from a powerful group’s, a state’s or state-

38
blessed actions (because of slavery, indentured labour, etc.), eventuate
in a direct and/or indirect denial of the means and opportunity for
people to work and earn their daily bread (due to landlessness, lack of
basic agricultural tools and/or the availability of little cash, the
prevalence of instability, etc.), are the same in content if not in form.
There is an element of force behind the movement of people
particularly from the rural areas. FOr Cirtautas (1963:28) the refugee is
one who leaves home involuntarily; he is one driven out from.his home
country. Cirtautas saw force behind the refugee’s ’expulsion.’ The
refugee is, according to Cirtautas, "put into the street, turned out into
the cold without food or shelter." Rees (1959:9-17) also contends that
force is central to the exodus of people from.their homes as refugees.
Rogge (1985:4) also sees force behind the movement of refugees. In
his own words:
The most commonly accepted image of refugees is of persons
impelled to evacuate their normal places of residence, who have
done so at short notice often without chattel and consequently in
need of material assistance.

He further contends that:

...in most cases such migrations are politically motivated, but
that there also exist environmental push factors such as
earthquakes or droughts (Ibid.).

The above authors--Cirtautas, Rees and Rogge--have made it clear
that force is behind the movement of people as refugees. Their analyses
here, however, do not see factors beyond the immediate fiery conditions
for such a movement. They have not shown us the relationship between man-
made and natural disasters as well as the unstable conditions which
impinge on the food production capabilities of peasant farmers and which

may eventually lead to the evacuation of their places of origin.

39

Forced migration is, therefore, an appropriate term.to describe the
exodus of people either for economic (subsistence and/or hunger) drought
(persistent food shortages) political or religious (instability) etc.
reasons. Besides, forced migration is an appropriate identification mark
for all these types of refugees in view of the fact that refugeeism, at
least, in international organization (UNHCR) instruments, refers to those
people who are afraid of being persecuted by a group (clans and tribes)
or the state and those who continue to fear for their lives in their own
countries.

Forced migration then takes place, inter alia, because of economic
hardships that are faced by individuals and members of communities in
societies of least developed and food deficit countries among whom.are
the Northeast African nations. Permanent economic hardship for many
small-holders is worsened by droughts and unstable political situations.

The push factors fuelling migration emerge out of the inability of
people to maintain themselves in terms of food. Discussing the issue from
the angle of improving ones economic standing Hammer and Linn (in Mills
1987:1259) observe that "migrants tend to move from. places of lower
economic opportunity to areas of higher economic opportunity", and.that
migration levels originating from any area tend to reflect ’push.factors’
related to the lack of local opportunities". Thus a movement of an
impoverished group of people may specifically be induced by lack of food
which is a basic economic necessity. In the absence of some sustainable
increase in food production, the poor in the rural areas continue to lead
a life that shifts between subsistence and a never-ending economic trap
which more often than not locks them.into the vicious circle of poverty.

The lop-sided nature of the distribution of resources such as land

40

present impediments to resource mobilization for a number of them.
Landlessness was rampant in Ethiopia before the 1974 revolution. It has
been a problem even after the nationalization of land because of the
continuing shrinkage of plots because of redistribution to growing
numbers of peasant association members. This is one of the key factors
impeding the growth in food production in many areas of the country (See
Almneh Dejene, 1987:20-22).

Several studies indicate that peasant land holdings have been
getting smaller between 1974 and 1984. For instance, in Arsi, one of the
surplus producing regions along with Shewa and Gojjam, peasant holdings
shrunk from 2.9 ha in 1974 to 2.2 ha in the late 19703 and from 2.1-2.0
ha in the early 19808 (see Alemneh’s 1984 survey in Arsi; Fasil Gebre
Kiros, 1985; Desalegn Rahmato, 1984 and Mengistu WOube, 1985.

Land fragmentation is antithetic to development and as such it
grossly limits increases in food production. Much of the literature
contends that aside from making farmers risks-averse, it paves the way
for soil erosion, discourages the use of modern inputs, sterilizes
investment and dwindles agricultural income to a considerable extent
(McPherson, 1983). For many drought victims in northern Ethiopia
shortage of land is one problem.which.hinders increase in production. As
Shepherd observed accurately, it is difficult to increase output without
increasing the size of the plot households farm (Shepherd, 1975:94).

The shortage of land combined with the absence of critical inputs
like fertilizers, hand-tools as well as improved ploughs militate against
food production. In the Sudan, for instance, the problem of low
agricultural yield has as its source the use of little or no modern input

by a good segment of the small-holder farmer population (Berry and

41
Giestfeld 1983:80, 98 and Elhassan in Barnett and Abdelkarim.1988:166,
177). The absence of an environment which provides incentives to work
harder and produce more has also been an additional factor which has
been in the way of production in Ethiopia in.particular.

The marginalized peasant at a point of decline toward destitution
begins to sell his assets and moves out of his area in his strenuous
effort to survive. At the root of the problem of the movement of people
from their localities is thus poverty that throws them.over to the regime
of food nonavailability (Walker 1985: 4). As Spitz (1978: 868) contends,
when in the rural areas

...supplies are scarce there is a mass exodus of country
dwellers towards the towns to which. they are lured by the
hope of finding cheap food or some way of earning money, no
matter how little.

What this writer in effect says is that the lack of food, among
other things, is the motivating force pushing people, as it were, to
migrate (Spitz, ibid.:887). Longhurst (in Food and NUtrition, 1987)
contends that

when food shortages extend beyond seasonal severity

vulnerable groups can, among other things, change the
composition of their diet, sell off their asset or migrate.

These contentions are supported by writers such as (Todaro 1969,

1971; Caldwell, 1969) who say that even under normal conditions people

migrate to towns or cross international borders to better their incomes.

This point will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.6 below.

42

Chapter 3

Measurement of poverty, distribution of population.and.the crisis in

agriculture in N.E..Africa

3.1. Crude measures of poverty for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan
As discussed in Chapter II, poverty is the most basic source of
food insecurity though it is not the only one. In the three major
Northeast African countries (Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) poverty, not
excluding absolute poverty, is rampant. unequal land and livestock
distribution and the low level of income received by good segments of

populations in the countries indicate the prevalence of abject poverty.

3.1.1. Land and income distribution in Ethiopia

In pre-1974 Ethiopia much of the arable land was held by a smaller
percentage of the population and this condition prevailed up to the mud
seventies. Some 7.7 per cent of the total population owned 30.1 per cent

of the land at that time.

423

Table 3. Farm HHs* and cultivated land by size of farms,
cumulative percentageL 1968-1970

 

 

I I I I
:CUm.%:30.1I37.2I47.8:69.4I87.1I97.6:99.5:99.9 I100

: Category of farm size, hectares {Total}
: ---------------------------------------------- + ----- :
:HHs :4 :3 :2 :1 I 0.5: 0.2: 0.1: 0.05: :
: ----- +----+----+---—+—---+----+----+----+ ----- : :
:Cum.%: 7.7:11.1:17.8:38.2:64.1:88.3:95.6:98.5 :100 :
Iland I I I I I I I I I I
I
I
I

HHs=Households;
CUm=Cumulative

Source: Central Statistical Office 1975 as quoted in Mesfin W.
Mariam 1984:78.

As Table 3 shows, those peasants with less than a hectare of land
constituted 61.2 per cent of the population and had less than 30.6 per
cent of the land under their control (report of the situation between
1957 and 1970). A household with one hectare of land, and one capable of
producing 5-10 quintals of grain/ha (for this estimate see Ludstrom,
1976:42), and this may not be the case with millions of households, was
only able to feed his family members at a very low ration level each day.
Given that 10 quintals of grain make 100 kilograms or 1,000,000 grams,
this output is only adequate to feed 5.4 people at the barest half a kilo
or a 500 gram-ration level per person.per day (amount of food distributed
to disaster victims). But the 1980-85 average production was so low (only
5,458,000 MT) that each adult person’s per capita share was only 378
grams per day. This has been much less than the dry ration provided to
drought victims, for example (see note in Appendix A).

Susan George argues that at the rate of 2,300 calories per day for

adults one ton or 10 quintals can feed 4.17 adults throughout the 365-day

42b
year (George, 1984). The U.N.’s minimum daily energy intake required
stands at 2,330 calories (Compendium of Social Statistics, 1980:235).

’Dhis computation does not include the clothing and other minimum
basic requirements (such as utilities) of an individual peasant and his
family members. A wider discussion of this issue is not the aim here.
Rather it is to show the seriousness of the problem. The value of food
produced by the hypothetical household excludes some very important basic
needs like clothing, edible oil, kerosine, etc. The above data,
nonetheless, is one good measure of the level of poverty which.has its
iron grip on a large majority of the population oijthiopia.

A much better measurement of income distribution in Ethiopia is
provided by the Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey
conducted over the period May 1981 to April 1982. Data on income,
consumption and expenditure was collected from. 12,000 rural households
(primary sampling units).

The income and receipt patterns of the households were determined
by a detailed categorization of households in terms of income and
domestic expenditure as well as receipts and payments. Both.the income
and receipt avenues utilized in the survey "provide interesting features"
relating to the income distribution in the country.

About 48 per cent of the rural households, as the sample survey
results indicated, received an annual income of less than Birr 1,300 or
U.S. $268 or U.S.$ 64 per person for a household member at the rate of
4.2 persons per household (see Table 4). The MOA General Agricultural
Survey (1983/84) put the highest rural income for households (that of

Arsi) at Birr 963.

43

Table 4. Income distribution in Ethiopia as exhibited
by the results of the 1981-1982 Rural Household
Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey

I
I """""""""""""" I” """""""""""" I
I Below 1300 I 48 I
: -------------------------- + ---------------------- :
I 1300-3499 I 45 I
: -------------------------- + ---------------------- :
I Above 3500 I 7 I

Source: Central Statistical Authority, 1988: 22-25.

Note:

Income: Rural household-originated income from sales of, for e.g.,
crops and goods and services purchased and resold after
processing.

Receipt: Income plus additional money flowing from traditional
mutual aid institutions, returns of money loaned and

miscellaneous income.

The expenditures of the categories of households in a way indicate
the true income distribution situation in the country as a whole. The
Central Statistical Authority of Ethiopia, itself contends that
"expendi tures are usually taken as a good approximation of incomes (CSA,
Statistical Bulletin No. 61, April 1986: xiii). The survey reveals the
percentages of households for three categories of households which spent
all of what they earned and those which spent more as well as less (See

Table 5 for comparisons).

44
Table 5: Household expenditure as an indirect measure of income

distribution

ICategory ofIExpenditureIPercentage ofITbtal Share in totalI

Ihousehold Ilevel Ipopulation I income % I
I ----------- + ----------- + ------------- + -------------------- I
I 1 I >Income I 36.4 I 41.8 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 2 I =Income I 45.5 I 32.4 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 3 I (Income I 17.7 I 25.9 I
: : : : :
I I I 100.0 I 100.0 I

Source: CSA, 1988: 22-25

As the figures in Table 5 indicate 36 per cent of the rural
population spends more than the income it earns. It seems that the
balance comes from gifts, loans, remittances and so on as discussed in
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Those households whose expenditure equals their
income constitute 45 per cent of the population. This category is thus
one which can be considered as one which subsists on its income by the
skin of its teeth.

The population which spends less than it earns is only 18 per cent.
Given that the society practices the extended family and humanitarian
system of mutual support and also involves itself in the traditional
rural credit system, a good deal of the savings of the last group are in
all likelihood used for such services.

Rural savings under these circumstances are considerably eroded. By
the same token calculated and planned investment in the rural setting are
highly constrained. The society is in part locked into each other and
generally speaking, the savings achieved by the 18% household category

mainly dissipates itself as consumption resource.

(D

45
One of the factors which holds back development in rural Ethiopia in
all likelihood is this condition. The introduction of modern rural money
market systems may slowly contribute to.a greater degree of thriftiness
in this consumption oriented settingu This new institution would help
eliminate the need to pay usurious interests by borrowers and supplement
the cash needs of peasants thus leading them on the road to self-

sufficiency in the long-run.

3.1.2 Income distribution in Somalia

The poverty condition in Somalia is as bad as that in Ethiopia.
According to a household expenditure survey conducted by the
International Labor Office (1977:331) 79% of the nomadic population, 80%
of the sedentary agriculturalist population and 61% of the urban
population expended less than So Sh (Somali Shillings) 5,260 or U.S.
$825 or about $165 (per capita) per year (Berry and Johnston,1983:75).
But it is observed that "rural values are about half of this" (Ibid.).
The above percentages of the populations of each (nomadic and sedentary
agriculturist) have been "categorized as poor" (Ibid.).

Table 6 also shows the differentiation of "wealth and poverty" among
socio-economic groups across the Somali society as per the 1975 Household
Expenditure Survey conducted by the International Labor Office. Some
53.2 per cent of the Somali society of rural and urban backgrounds is
capable of expending between So. shillings of 0-520 (refer to Table 6)

only.

46

Table 6: The 1975 household expenditure survey (Somalia)

IRange of I I I I
I income INomadic SectorIRural Sector**I Urban Sector I
I per annum I -------------- + -------------- + -------------- I
I in So Shs*INo of HHS: %. INo of HHS: % :No of HHS: % I
I ----------- + --------- +----+ --------- +----+ --------- +----:
I 0- 520: 44 I17.7I 36 I34.6I 1 I 1.9:
I 520-1,040I 20 I 8.1: 11 I10.6I 2 I 3.8:
I1,560-2,080I 25 I10.1: 5 I 4.8: 7 I13.8:
I2,080-2,600I 19 I 7.7: 7 I 6.7: 4 I 7.7:
I2,600-3,120I 16 I 6.5: 2 I 1.9: 3 I 5.8:
I3,120-3,640I 17 I 6.8: 3 I 2.9: 3 I 5.8:
I3,640-4,160: 8 I 3.2: 1 I 0.9: 3 I 5.8:
I4,160-4,680I 9 I 3.6: 6 I 5.8: 5 I 9.6:
I4,680-5,200: 6 I 2.4: 3 I 2.9: 1 I 1.9:
I Over 5,260: 52 I21.0: 21 :10.3I 21 :40.4I

Source: International Labor Office, 1977:331.

*The rate of exchange (distorted) at the early 19803 rate was U.S. 1

:*::u::hglgs (HHS) in rural villages in Middle Shebelle (the

regions are mainly agricultural).

Berry and Johnston (1983:75-77) have, based on the data of Table 6,
concluded that the living standard of the nomads is better than that of
the agriculturalists. They note that not only are settled farmers poorer
than their urban and nomad counterparts, but the disparity in income
between settled farmers is high compared to the other two groups. They
also underline that the poverty-stricken group of settled farmers is much
higher than the other two. This evidence may help support the contention

that poverty is rampant among settled crop dependent farmers who tend to

migrate when their household food needs are not satisfied.

3.1.3 Income distribution in the Sudan
In the Sudan also more or less the same level of poverty is in

evidence. Some 82% of the rural households have incomes below LS

47
(Sudanese Pounds) 200 (Berry, and Giestfeld, May 1983:75). Thds per
capita income is very much distorted just as that of Somalia. As Berry
and Giestfeld have registered their reservation regarding the average
share of income of the rural population.

They say that this average of LS 200 is high because the Gezira and
mechanized farm incomes which constitute higher rural incomes are also
taken into account in the calculation. These incomes hold only for a
small percentage of the population. They note that outside these
"watershed" areas of modern agriculture, household income averages below
LS 100 particularly in the Darfur area (Berry and Giestfeld, Ibid.).
Worse still in Southern Sudan, share of the income is "less than half" of
that of Darfur, North Western Sudan, which is another poor area (see
Table 7).

Table 7: Income levels (urban and rural) in the Sudan

I Income I Percentage of population I
I levels I urban I rural I
I I I I
I 400 I 25 I 2 I
I 200 I 28 I 82 I
I 100* I .. I .. I
I 50* I .. I .. I

Source:ILO, 1976 and Berry and Giestfeld; 93-95.
(1.3 Sudanese pounds(LS) = U.S. $1)

*Much of the rural population in the Northwest of the country

(Darfur) had an income of less than LS 100 while those in the South
get less than LS 100 or even 50, according to Berry and Giestfeld.

The best available information on income distribution in the Sudan
is one that provides the pattern on a range basis. The agricultural-
traditional and the urban informal sectors are the two lowest income

categories in the society. The ranges of incomes are 20-120 LS for

48
traditional agriculturists and 85-310 LS for the urban informal group
both of which are in the category of the poor. The overall income

distribution is shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Selected patterns of income in the
Sudan (annual income in LS)

I Labor force sector I Basic range: Average of ranges'I
I1;»;EQIZQLQIIZLQEZIQQAII'"£63756"? """""" 95 """
I Agricultural-modern I I I
I (owners or tenants) I 500-4,000 I 2,250 I
I Workers I 100- 150 I 125 I
I Urban-informal I 85- 310 I 197 I
I Urban-modern I 300- 700 I 500 I

Source: Lees and Brooks, 1977 and Berry and Geistfeld, 1983: 100.

The low household income as shown in Table 8 is an indication of the
level of poverty in the Sudan. With the exception of Khartoum.province,
five of the provinces’ households make less than 200 LS (Sudanese pounds)

annually (Brooks, 1970 quoted in Lees and Brooks, 1977).

49

Table 9. Average income of householdsgby province (Northern
provinces only)

 

IEggxlggg I Average annual income I
I I (Sudanese pounds) I
INorthern I 124 I
I I I
I I I
IKhartoum I 235 I
I I I
I I I
IKassala and Red Sea: 186 I
I I I
I I I
IBlue Nile I 180 I
I I I
I I I
:Kordofan I 153 :
I I I
I I I
IDarfur I 98 I

Source: International Labor Organization, 1976.
According to Kasper W. Moll, the majority of the Sudanese population
belongs to the low-income group of the society. The population is

categorized into the following groups with regard to income.

Table 10: Classification of the Sudanese population by income group

IPercentage of I Percentage of IIncome level in Ls:
:Total population: Rural I Urban I(U.S.$1=1.3 LS) I
I I pulationIpopulation: I
I ---------------- + ---------- + ---------- + ------------------ I
I 31 I 34* I - I >100 LS I
I 43 I 48 I - I 100-200 LS I
I 14 I 11 I - I 200-300 LS I
I 5 I 1.4 I 40 I (500 LS I
I I I I I
I I I I I

Source: Klaus Klennert, ed., 1986: 186.

*93%.of the rural households earn less than 100 LS per year. Of the
12 mn people over age 15, an estimated 6 million earn some kind of
income and many are underemployed. Some 6% are officially unemployed
(Klennert, 1986: 186).

Some 3,435,000 (1976-77) economically active persons or 3,432,000

50
(1979/80) household heads, that is, 68.5 per cent and 65.8 per cent, in
that order, were in the agricultural sector (Berry and Giestfeld
1980:101). Outside the seasonal 545,000 cotton pickers and those hired
by Kordofan projects (70,000) and the projects in Kassala which hire
100,000 people, most of the 3.4 million households are in the category of
peasant agricultural and/or nomadic sector (Ibid.).

The seasonal workers are paid "low wages", according to Berry and
Giestfeld (Ibid.). As Table 8 above also indicates annual household
income for peasant agriculturists is very low in the north and Darfur. In
southern Sudan, where per capita income is also much lower as shown
above, unemployment which was 19% for the urban areas and 21% for the
rural sector, compared to that of northern Sudan where it was 6.3%»and
4.95, respectively, (Government of Sudan, 1977, quoted in Berry et al,
1980) poverty is not only common but it takes a heavy toll of the
population in that part of the country.

The average annual incomes of the provinces where the key cities of
Khartoum, Kassala, etc., are located, are higher than the outlying
Northern Kordofan and Darfur provinces (see Table 9 above). Some 40% of
the urban population also earns more than 500 Sudanese pounds while a
significant majority of the rural population earns less than 300 Sudanese

pounds (refer to Table 9).

3.2. Distribution of population and agricultural developmemt
Distribution of population in all the three countries is uneven.

Although this may be because of the hostile environments in much of the

open lands or because of traditional settlement patterns, the fact

remains that much of the land that can be put to agricultural production

51
lays waste while millions of people suffer from.grinding and permanent

hunger.

3.2.1. The situation in the Sudan

In the Sudan, for instance, some 65% of the population lives in
central sudan’s provinces of Khartoum, Blue Nile, Kordofan and.Darfur
(W.Moll, in Klennert, 1986:186). Of the 75%. of the Sudanese rural
population 66% are sedentary agriculturists and 9% are nomads (Ibid.).
Some 65%.of the Sudanese population also lives in Central Sudan (Ibid.).

Judit Kiss (1977:7) has found out that as a consequence of
"geographical and economic factors" the population distribution in the
Sudan is uneven. Some 50 per cent of the population is "crammed into 14
per cent of the country" (Ibid.). This is a rather small percentage of
land-man ratio. This must be one of the reasons why only 1.2 per cent of
the 5% of the total arable land area of the country is under the plough
(UN FAO,1985:173). MOst of the population of the northern part of the
country has been compelled to live along the banks of the Nile and
"relies upon its waters to irrigate small amounts of land," (Berry and
Geistfeld, 1983:93). "High seasonal temperatures, sparse rainfall and
lack of arable soils impede most agricultural development..." and a good
number of people have as a consequence been forced to adapt to a nomadic

way of life to counter the severe environmental conditions (Ibid.).

3.2.2 The population distribution condition in Ethiopia
The situation in Ethiopia is not that different from.that of the
Sudan. The large majority of the Ethiopian population is also

concentrated on the highlands. According to Mesfin Wolde Mariam, some

52
90% of the country’s population lived on the highlands--northwestern and
northeastern parts--of the country (Mesfin, 1972).

A recent study which Mesfin conducted indicates that some 69 per
cent of the p0pulation inhabits 29 of the land which is above 1,600 meter
elevation (Mesfin, 1986:5-6). Tadesse( 1983: 6) notes that most of the
Ethiopian farming population restricts its activities to the high
plateaux of the country. Crummy (1983:2)also notes that Ethiopian
peasants cultivate land that is above 1,000 meters (3,500-4,000 ft.) in
altitude up to the limits of cultivation above 3,000 meters (11,500 ft.).
An estimated land of only less than one-third of the total land area is
thus inhabited by most of the population. The highland areas to which
Mesfin referred to above have more than. 66 per cent of the total
cultivated land area, 45 per cent of the land under forests and 46 per
cent under shrubs (Mesfin 1986, 5-6).

This estimate is also carried by a study made by Kloos and Adugna,
(quoted in Hodes and Kloos, 1988:918) which provides the information that
33.8 million people live on high plateaus which are above 1800 meters and
receive an annual mean rainfall of 1000-2000 mm, This concentration of
the population on the highlands has been keeping most of the country’s
agricultural land beyond the reach of the ploughs This has not been
without a good reason.

Most of the lowland areas were shunned because of malaria
infestation and other health hazards. Between 1960 and 1974, some 20,000
family heads were settled in lowland areas in the main (RRC, 1985:157).
Some 12,990 settlers, 23% of whom ‘were peasants and 43% urban-based
unemployed people, were settled up to 1976. Also between 1976 and 1981

some 30,298 additional families were settled (RRC, 1985).

53

The largest number, around 600,000 of the settlers, however, moved
or were moved to new and open areas in the lowland areas between 1984 and
1986 under a mostly government sponsored but controversial program (RRC,
1985 and Hodes and Kloos 1988:918). But despite these hazards, some of
the destitute moved on their own and the majority through the government
programmes. Overzealous government officials, including some at higher
echelons gave the green light for the use of outright force and/or a
threat of force to settle part of the populations from Tigrai, Wello and
Northern Shewa to the open lowland areas to get land to work on. This
happened because of two reasons, according to Jansson (1987:173). First,
the voluntary nature of the selection of settlers, designed by the
relevant government organization (RRC) and endorsed by the government,
was disregarded by some officials who insisted that those peasants whose
Meher, Ethiopia’s big rains, crop failed or those who were unable to
repay their debt or those cultivating slopes above 30 degrees should go
(Ibid.). Secondly, overzealous administrators were after fulfilling
quotas relating to the number of people to be settled (Ibid.). The grave
mistake that followed was the setting of quotas in this largely essential
information deficient programme of settlement. MOst of the settlers
moved under the state’s programme were allowed to farm. under the
producers’ cooperatives arrangement which disallowed individual ownership
of holdings other than small private gardens. This was another grave
error in that it led to a change into a system of farming' that the
peasants were little accustomed to in their places of origin. A well-
designed programme of settlement can, aside from.mitigating the chronic
food shortage condition in the long-run, help to redistribute population

in a way that the land resources of the country could be optimally used.

54
Since the large majority of the Ethiopian population lives in the rural
areas, its economic activity would be limited to agriculture for many
years to come. At the current population growth rate which outpaces food
production by a wider margin, a lag in the important measure of
settlement and resettlement would make the food shortage condition much
more serious.

Of the total Ethiopian population of 42 million, 86 per cent lived
in the rural areas by 1985 (RRC, 1985:34). An estimated 85 per cent of
the population earn their livelihood from agriculture and animal
husbandry (Kloos and Adugna, quoted in Hodes et al, 1988:918; Getachew et
al, 1974:25. The total population had shot up to 46 million by 1987. The
rural population grew at a rate of 2.9 per cent per annum, a percentage
which itself grew from 2.5 per cent over the last few years. According
to the RRC (1985:34):

Of the total population, 49.4 per cent or 17.1 million, are in the
15-59 working age group. Within that group, 75.4% or 12.9 million
are economically active.It is thus obvious that the country has a
large labor force, a significant proportion of which is
unemployed or underemployed.

This population can be profitably used to bring more land under
cultivation. The open lowlands which are not used by the indigenous and
other earlier settlers, nonetheless, need to be increasingly freed of
health hazards and the new settlers, those who moved of their own free
will, should be provided with information, inputs and their share of
individual plots of land and other support they require in their

strenuous effort to become self-sufficient. Those who were unwillingly

moved should be helped to return if they wish to do so.

55

3.2.3 Somalia’s situation

Somalia, though less fortunate in the gift of fertile land than its
two other neighbours, has not used its full potential of land as well.
Only the southern third of Somalia which also includes the watered areas
from Wabe Shebelle and Juba rivers, which have their sources in
Ethiopia, makes a viable crop production enterprise possible, according
to Berry and Johnston (1983). Out of the 8.2 million hectares (13 per
cent of the total land area of the country) some 14 per cent of the
population (600,000 people) depend for their livelihood on 540,000 ha of
land which they use for rainfed agriculture (Berry and Johnston, 1983:13

and 28.

3.3 Water resources and irrigation in Northeast Africa

The water resources of the three countries are not also used much
despite the fact that their considerable usefulness as vehicles of
increasing food production is realized. Although the costs of developing
irrigation agriculture with the use of modern inputs is high, much.effort
is not exerted wherever it is possible to utilize the resources with the
possible minimum expenses.

According to Berry and Geistfeld (1983:22) the Nile River in the
Sudan provides water to 4 millon acres of land along its banks which are
farmed through "pump schemes and major gravity irrigation projects." But
still 61 per cent of the Sudanese rural population farms only 6.9 million
hectares of land. Some 2.6 and 1.8 million hectares are under mechanized

and irrigated farming, respectively (see Table 11 for comparisons).

56

Table 11. Estimated area of the crop sub-sector in the Sudan

Agricultural I
population (%)I
l

I

I I

I l

I I

I I
I ------------- + --------- + ---------- + ----------------- I
:Irrigated I 4.2 I 1.8 I 16 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
IMechanized I 6 1 I 2.6 I 23 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
ITraditional I 16.4 I 6.9 ‘ I 61 I
Irain-fed I I : :
I I I I I
I Total I 26.7 I 11.3 I 100 I

Source: Agriculture Bank of Sudan, quoted in AJB.Zahlan, 1986.

*Mns= millions **Ha=hectare

In Ethiopia too a tiny percentage of the water resources of the
country is used. Around 100,000 ha of utilized are used for irrigation
purposes (RRC, 1985).

Also in Somalia, some 300,000 hectares of land which is potentially
irrigable is. used for cereal production (Berry and Johnston, 1983: 33).
Of this total only 50,000 hectares of controlled irrigation and 110,000
hectares of flood irrigation have been used up to the early 19803
(Ibid.).

Some estimates, according to Berry and Johnston, have it that
expansion is possible in some areas such as the Bay Region. But lack of
data and national capacity to generate the same limit activity in this

regard.

57
3.4 The role mechanizationgplays in the agriculture of the region

Agricultural land that is mechanized is also one of the most
important sub-sectors in the three countries when looked at from.the
point of view of the allocation of government budgets for crop
production; but the huge costs that have been attached to it do not
justify its existence most of the time. A small discussion of the
problem in this paper will give a better understanding of why peasant or
small-holder agriculture which is the source of livelihood for about
three fourths of the populations of each nation in NOrtheast Africa is
backward.

Traditional agriculture, the main tool of which is the age-old
plough in most areas of the three Northeast African countries, has been
given little attention. Even the improved technology of oxen-driven
plough agriculture has been lagging behind owing to the poverty of
peasants, among other things. In Ethiopia, for instance, close to 38 per
cent of the farming population cultivates without using plough-oxen. In
other words, it uses hand tools to farm.its holdings. Some 32 per cent of
the farming population owns one oxen for its farming activities (MOA,
1984). Many pair their oxen with ones that come from.relatives or from
acquaintances in return for labour or in kind payments. These group of
peasants constitute 24.7 per cent of the farming population (MOA, 1984).
Alemneh (1987:139) says that "approximately half of the peasant farmers
have either one or no oxen" in Ethiopia.

In the Sudan as well "hand tools still remain the only means of
production for most people" (Abdulkarim in Barnett and Abdulkarim
1988:143) These authors note that even in the so-called mechanized

farming areas:

58
Hand tools remain very significant, and they are increasingly

purchased in the market. This is so even in those communities
where production is predominantly for subsistence and not for

exchange (Ibid.).

This contention of these two writers is also supported by they
findings of Elhasan (in Barnett and Abdulkarim, 1988:176) who in his
study of rural villages in the Sudan found out that in Kurtula, 90 per
cent of the households depend on family member labour which uses hand
tools for farming purposes. In other villages such as Delami and Ellfaid,
among others, the use of farm. "hand tools are still the norm"
(Ibid.:177).

Alemneh’s study of .Arsi (Ethiopia) where the Arsi regional
Development Unit (ARDU) indicates that some 64 per cent of the sample
farmers (92 of the 144 interviewed farmers) did not know about the
improved farm implements developed by this project which was supported by
the Swedish Government (1987:134). The reason for this, according to
Alemneh are two. The first is that the extension services of the project
are weak and, the second, the small number of tools developed are
expensive to the average farmer. Alemneh notes that 18 per cent of this
sample farmers responded that the equipments produced were expensive
(Ibid.). Alemneh’s piece of advise is that the project should be
committed to a research and extension effort on developing "appropriate
and easy-to-handle equipment which is at the same time affordable to the
majority of the small farmers in the Arsi Region" (Ibid.). This applies
to all other regions of Ethiopia also. Both.the Government of Ethiopia
and donor countries such as Sweden, the U.S., EEC, etc., should also help
in this regard if the food shortage problem.is to be partially solved at

least.

59

Elhasan (in Barnett and Abdulkarim, 1987:177) also says that peasant
production in the Sudan has been lagging behind as a consequence of an
"unequal access to resources internal to peasant production". Alemneh
also points out that access to credit and a good management of the same
in Arsi and more particularly in all the other regions as well as the
improvement of the traditional technology and its popularization are
fundamental measures to increase food production in Ethiopia. But
unfortunately much effort is not made to address these problems in both
countries.

Mechanized agriculture, on the other hand, as represented by state
farms and cash crop farms, consuming as it does, a large chunk of
Ethiopia’s budgetary allocations, has been given shots in the arm
consistently. Some three-fourths of the nation’s "resources in terms of
credit, fertilizer and improved seeds go toward the development of this
sector (Alemneh, 1987:20). But its results have neither boosted the
initially expected foreign exchange earnings and/or the consumption
needs of the larger population of the country for the reason.that its
expansion is in part limited and the earnings deriving from it show
declines too often.‘The same thing is true of the Sudan as well. The
export-oriented production units such as the over one-million-hectare
Gezeira Scheme, despite the flow of public and private investment funds
were "neglected" during the 1970-75 plan period (HUssein in Barnett and
Abdelkarim, 1988:60). As a result of the decline in the pumping of funds,
"these projects not only failed to increase their contribution to the
country’s export earnings, but also failed to maintain their past
contribution" (Ibid.).

By far, one good example of this is the performance of the state

60
farms in Ethiopia. Huge investments, particularly in the state farms,
were credited for helping to raise agricultural production by 2.5% in
1982/83 (RRC, 1985:50-54) from a level of 1.2%. representing the 1965-80
period (World Development Report, 1987: 202-204).

But the government later accepted the fact that the drought has also
affected the performance of the state farms (RRC, 1985 and Jansson et al,
1987:119). According to Dawit (1989: 273-75; Jansson et al, 1987:119) the
amount of financial resources pumped into Ethiopia’s state farms which
constitute about four per cent of the cultivable land (94% is farmed by
small-holders organized into peasant associations) is not justified by
their performances. Not only this, according to Alemneh, 70 per cent of
the 26,000 metric tons of seeds produced and distributed in the country
annually go to state farms (Alemneh, 1987:103). Dawit and Jansson,
quoting the Ministry of Agriculture and other government sources,
respectively, note that the costs of production of the state farms are so
high that even the preferential market prices offered to them. by the
government’s Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) could not enable
them to pay their costs of production let alone reach the break-even
point of profits.

The impact of expanded holdings by commercial farms in the Sudan
has in part also been the displacement of households from the land they
cultivated. This has led to the leasing of land by individuals who
themselves rent it from.the government (Barnett and Abdelkarim 1988: 156-
58). Expansion of commercial agriculture, particularly cash-cropping
activities, according to Barnett and Abdelkarim, had been "accompanied by
an increase in consumption" and had "affected even the most remote and

self-contained communities" thus destroying their local production

61
(Ibid.: 142-43). To make matters worse, the Sudanese government, in a bid
to help ’merchant capital’, banned local (community level) production of
such crops as cotton which in a way also constituted basic necessities
for the rural population (Ibid.).

Increase in the consumption ’need’ of the household also eventuated
in the drive to engage in more cash-cropping by many small-holder
agriculturalists in the Sudan” This deteriorated. the food production
situation and turned many into migrants who were after making ends meet
for their impoverished households.

The large-scale mechanized and collective farm development drives
in Somalia in the early -1970$ also turned increased number of small-
holder farmers into agricultural labourers (UNHCR, Workshop, 1981:31).
The limitation on the grain small farmers could maintain for themselves
because of the forced delivery requirements to the government also
discouraged them from producing surplus (Ibid.).

Unrestricted and ill-planned state farms and commercial
agriculture, as discussed above, bring about distortions in the
allocation of the limited financial resources of nations as those of
Northeast Africa. Human resources are also wasted because people are
"forced" to divert their attention from primary and initial stage of
producing food for survival.

A balanced development effort which.takes the food needs of poor
rural households and one which slowly transforms household units into
surplus producers is very much called for. A detailed treatment of this
sector is not within the scope of this paper. The forgoing discussion
has, however, attempted to give a bird’s eye view of the dimensions of

the problem as it relates to the major sector of small-holder agriculture

in the three nations.

State and commercial farms thus consume a great deal of the
financial resources of the countries, resources that are awfully thin at
that. These resources could have profitably been invested in small-holder
agriculture the per hectare production average of which (for selected
crops in Ethiopia) had in 1983 been almost double that of state farms
(Dawit 1989:274). That is why a discussion relating to them is important
from.the point of view of this thesis.

All said and done, both the mechanized and traditional agricultural
sectors are not adequately equipped with the institutional and
technological inputs that are required to make a substantial contribution
to food production. Even though the number of tractors used in Ethiopia
rose from 3,600 to 3,900; in Somalia from. 1,300 to 1630, and in Sudan
from 8,767 to 18,000 between 1974-76 and 1985, (FAQ Yearbook 1986) their
contribution to national food production has not at all been substantial.

That is why a greater degree of commitment for the development of
the sector, particularly that of the small-holder, is called for.
Investment in the sector should of necessity rise in order to avert the
mass starvation conditions which. have become glaring characteristics of
the Nertheast African region. A coup de grace to begin the difficult road
of containing food shortages is long overdue and the national governments
should be able to bring about this change and immediately at that or else
face tormenting experiences. Foreign aid can also play supplemental roles
in this effort once it is taken up earnestly.

MOSt of the populations of the countries, particularly those of the
Sudan and Ethiopia, are concentrated on smaller percentages of the arable

land area. Part of the reason for this, as discussed earlier on, are

63
malaria infestations, the unbearable heat in.parts of the lowland areas,
water shortages, and lack of infrastructures such. as roads. Benign
neglect of agriculture, particularly peasant agriculture, on.the part of
the state are equally important causal factors explaining the low level
of agricultural development as was noted earlier.

Table 12. Resources and their use in agriculture in Ethiopia, Somalia
and Sudan

I IArable IIrrig. IForest IAg. %.per: Ag. lab.
I Area Iland asIland asIland as Iha of Ias % of

CountryIKm2 inI%age of: of ar.:a % of Iar. land ' ag. pop.
I(’000)It. land: land It. land

. I

I I
I --------- + ------ + ------- + ------- + -------- + --------- + ----------
I Eth. {1221.9: 13 : 1 : 24 I 1.9 : 40 I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
: Som. : 637.0: 2 I 12 : 14 I 3.9 I 37 I
I I l I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I Sud. I2505.8I 5 I 14 I 20 I 1.2 I 31 :
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I

Source: FAQ, State of Food and Agriculture,
1985: 173.

Abbreviations: Irrig=irrigated; Ag=agriculture; Lab=labor
Ar=arable; t=total, and pop=popu1ation
The potential land that can be used for agriculture is plenty. As
shown in Table 12 above, less than four per cent of the arable land on
the average is under the plough in the three Northeast African nations.
Low levels of human resources development as well as the misuse and
misallocation of the meagre investible resources available are in part
responsible for the less than. optimal utilization of existing land

resources 0

3.5. Agriculture and the crisis in food production

Agriculture is the mainstay of the large majority of people in least

64
developed countries (LDCs) in which group the three N.E. African nations
fall. After a 2.3 per cent average annual growth rate in the 19603,
agricultural output in Africa declined to around 1.3%.per annum in the
19703 (World Development Report, 1985; WOrld Bank, 1984:77; D.K.
Fieldhouse, 1986:93; Assefa Mehretu, 1988:4). In the 19803 the growth
rate has gone down even further (World Development Report, 1987).

In continental Africa, production in per capita terms which grew at
0.2% a year during the 19603 fell by 1.4% a year in the 19703 (WOrld
Development Report, 1985). While this grew at an average of 1 per cent
per annum between 1968 and 1983 in developing countries as a whole it
fell by 1.1%Iper annum in Africa for the same period (Jazairy, 1987:50).

various factors are responsible for the deceleration of
agriculture, particularly food, which, according to the World Bank (World
Development Report, 1985) showed a "modest increase" in the 19603, to a
decline of a negative 1.1% in the 19703 (Burki, in Gauhar, 1986:118).
The World Bank observes that if agriculture "lags, it is because of
inadequate investment, lack of incentives for farmers and inappropriate
policies as well as problems of technology, climate and soil (World
Development Report, 1985:40). According to Taylor (in Chidzero and
Gauhar, 1986:57) "Rigid controls over producer prices have had a negative
effect on the development of the rural sector in general" (Taylor, ibid.
:57).

Deceleration in agriculture and especially food production in the
Horn of Africa has had a debilitating effect on the livelihood of
hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. A least developed
country with a large majority of its populations in the category of

subsistence agriculture is in all likelihood not capable of producing a

65
surplus which is one source of economic growth. The presence of
unemployed people in the category of subsistence producers is a liability
to less developed countries which in part have to redistribute their
"subsistence food" to the unemployed as per the traditional mechanism of
helping extended family members as well as those that are destitute and

with no relations to resort to.

3.5.1 Growth rate in food production and population

The already fragile production of food is thus worsened by the
redistribution of the little that is raised by way of food among the poor
in society. FAQ’S argument that "a smaller aggregate output which
remains small only perpetuates poverty" holds water here in this regard.
Under these circumstances, the society cannot generate the food
surpluses which it very badly needs to boost the sector which is the most
significant source of investible resources. This is the hard reality that
is being observed in NOrth East Africa.

Table 13: Average annualggrowth.rate for GNP, per capita
GNP, GDP, agriculture & average annual rate of inflation

I IGNP per Capita I GDP IAgricultureIAverage I
I CountryIDollarsIAverageI Average I average Iannual I
I I Iannual I annual I annual Igrowth rate I
I I Igrowth I growth I growth Iof inflationI
I I Irate % I rate % I rate %. I - I
' -------- + ------- + ------- + ----------- + ----------- + ------------ V

1985 I1965-85I65-80I80—85I65-80I80—85I60-85I80-85

I

I I

I I

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I

ILDCs I 200 I 0.4 I 3.2 I 2.8 I 2.0I 1.9 I 11.4I 18.9 I
I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I
IEthiopiaI 110 I 0 2 I 2.8 I 0.3 I 1.2I-3.4 I 3.3: 2.6 I
I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I
ISomalia I 280 I -0.7 I 2.8 I 4.9 I .I 7.9 I 10.5: 45.4 I
I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I
:SUdarl : 300 I no : 308 :‘007 I 209:-505 : 1105: 3107 I

Source: WOrld Development Report, 1987:202-204.

66

The average annual growth rate for agriculture in Ethiopia and Sudan
was extremely low compared to those of low income countries where it only
showed a decline from.2.0%>to 1.9% in 1965-80 and 1980-85, respectively.
In Ethiopia and Sudan, however, negative growth rates are registered for
the latter period. The growth rate for agriculture in Somalia indicates
an "appreciable" 7.5 per cent increase while that of the per capita GNP
shows a negative (-0.7) which appears to show a growth rate in reverse

(refer to Table 13).

Table 14. Population and its annual growth rate between 1970 and 1980

I I Population I Av.annual growth I
I I I rate of populationI
ICountry I (in ’000) I per cent 1970-1980I
I _________ + ______________ + _____________________ I
I I
IEthiopia I 42.6 I 2.5 I
I I I I
I I I I
ISomalia I 3.6 I 2.7 I
I I I I
I I I I
ISudan I 18.4 I 2.7 I

Source: Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics 1983, UQN. New York, 1983.

While the average annual growth rate of population has been going
up, the annual growth rate of production for Ethiopia and the Sudan.had
gone from bad to worse as the preceding two tables indicate particularly
in the first half of the 19803. Population in Ethiopia grew at 2.5%?
2.9%, while agricultural production decelerated at a negative 3.4%.as
Table 13 shows. The situation in the Sudan has been even worse. In this
country population growth has been climbing at 2.7% per annum.while
agriculture slid at a rate of a negative 5.5%. Somalia is an exception.

While its population grew at 2.T%, its agriculture showed a growth rate

67
of 7.9 per cent between 1980 and 1985. This figure, however, contradicts
with the negative annual growth rate registered (see Table 13 above) and
needs a further. scrutiny. However, this is beyond the scope of this
thesis.

Population growth has, therefore, been outstripping food production
to a point where Ethiopia and Sudan, in particular, have to import
increasing amounts of food to make good the balance (see Table 19a, in
Chapter 4). Much of the differential of the balance nonetheless came
from international community aid (Refer to Table 20, Chapter 4) and
concessional sales by surplus producing western donor countries.
Political instability and recurrent droughts are in part responsible for
the tragic decline in food production in N.E. Africa. These factors will
be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4 below.

Persisting poverty in NOrtheast Africa is also shown by the low
performance in food production in terms of per capita annual production.
For twenty years, the averages for all the three countries showed very

little improvement with negative shifts interspersed.

68

Table 15. Average index of per capita food production:The
situation in N.E.Africa and other LDCs

I Nation I74-76I75-77I76-78I77-79I78-80I79-81I80—82I81-83I83-85I
I ---------- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- I
I Ethiopia I 83I 85I 84I 84I 83I 85I 82 I 106 I 97 I
I Sudan I 117: 106I 108I 105: 102: 102: 87 I 94 I103 I
I Somalia I 91: 96I 87I 85: 84: 65I 60 I 108 I102 I
I Chad I 76I 83: 89: 91: 91: 96I 95 I 101 I106 I
I Tanzania I 113I 93I 93I 94I 92I 91I 88 I 108 I108 I
I Kenya I 88: 89: 91: 92: 86I 85: 88 I 86 I 99 I
I Senegal I 96I 100I 96I 88I 89I 76I 93 I 71 I105 I
I Ivory I I I I I I I I I I
I Coast I 124I 116I 104I 102I 107I 110I 107 I 108 I115 I
I Cameroon I 108: 101: 112: 110: 109: 101: 102 I 84 I107 I
I LDCs I 96I 98I 97I 105I 101I 111I 110 I 111 I120 I

Source: World Development Reports 1982 through 1988.

The average annual food produced per capita for Ethiopia, Sudan and
Somalia was much below the average indices for the 1965-67; 1969—71;
1974-76 and 1979-81 periods. In Sudan’s case, the figure showed a
consistent decline from 113 in 1974-76 to 87 and 94 in 1980-82 and 1981-
83, respectively, only to overstep the 1979-81 index to 103 in 1983-85
(refer to Table 15 above).

Somalia’s averages showed a slump in 1979-81 and 1980-82 to 65 and
60, in that order, from a high of 96 in 1975-77. The decline appears to
have coincided with the aftermath of the 1977-78 war with Ethiopia. It
has been over 100 for the 1980-85 period.

Ethiopia’s indices indicate marginal increases and falls. With the
exception of the 1981-83 period which. registered a figure of 106 above
the 1974-76 average index, the tri-annual figures were much below 100.

The World Development Report carries a figure which is much below the

69
1983-85 figure which was 97. This reduction in.per capita production
coincides with the 1983-84 and subsequent years of drought and the
intensification of the civil war in the north of the country and
elsewhere. The drought and the civil wars are, however, factors which
further strengthened the hold of poverty and food insecurity.

Compared to the averages of the low-income countries which almost
showed consistent increases, from 96 in 1974-76 to 120 in 1983-85, the
performance of the three countries in terms of per capita production is
low indeed. Countries with apparently lesser or fewer political
problems, Tanzania and Kenya in East Africa and Senegal, Ivory Coast and
Cameroon in west Africa, did much better in terms of per capita
production compared to the Northeast African countries and Chad, another
country that has been war-torn for over a decade until a year or so ago

(see Table 14).

3.5.2. Caloric and protein intake levels

 

The little improvement and/or decline in food production has no
doubt translated into low caloric and protein intake for almost two
decades. The Northeast African countries were unable to achieve the 2300
calorie intake level--the average level of developing market-economy
countries. While Ethiopia which had a 2115 level in 1964-66 (a level
which was much better than those of the developing market economies
then), encountered a failure of an almost 200 units of dietary
deficiency between 1969 and 1976 to rise to only 2189 in 1980-82. Sudan
showed consistent increase from 1858 calories in 1964-66 to 2280 in 1980-

82.

70

Table 16: Calories and protein per capita intake per day
for N.E. African and otherggroups of nations

I I Year I
: : --------------------------------------------------------- :
I I Calories (number) I Protein (grams) I
I Countries I I I
: : ---------------------------- +---------------------4 ------ :
I I 64-66 I69-71 I74-76 I80-82 I64-66 I69-71 I 4-76 I80-82 I
I ----------- + ------- + ------ + ------ + ------ + ------ + ------ + ------ + ------- I
I DevelOPingI I I I I I I I I
I mket I I I I I I I I I
I economies I 2,084 I2,160 I2,170 I2,319 I 52.4 I 54.0 I 54.1 I 57.1 I
I Ethiopia I 2,115 I2,042 I1,862 I2,189 I 72.2 I 70.4 I 61.2 I 72.6 I
I Sudan I 1,858 I2,118 I2,112 I2,280 I 60.3 I 64.7 I 63.4 I 69.3 I
I Somalia I . I ... I ... I ... I . I . I . I . I
I DevelOPGd I I I I I I I I I
I market I I I I I I I I I
I economies I 3,137 I3,250 I3,292 I3,375 I 90.9 I 94,0 I 95.7 I 98.4 I
I Socialist I I I I I I I I I
I countries I 2,362 I2,447 I2,532 I2,717 I 62,6 I 63.7 I 66.0 I 69.7 I

Source: UNCTAD, Statistical Year Book, 1983/84 U.N
34th Issue, New York, 1986: 583-85

The figures for Developed Market Economies for the 1980-82 period
was 3,375, a difference of over 1200-1300 units above those of Ethiopia
and Sudan. A minimum of 2300 caloric intake level is advocated as a
break-even point for a healthy living and the release of a modest energy
for work.

The 2300 caloric intake mark has not been achieved in Ethiopia and
Sudan in particular. Without this level of intake of energy producing
food, food production increases. would be far from being stimulated.
Hence the large majority of the rural populations would remain in the

poverty trap on this count also.

71
3.6. Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI):‘Dhe situation in
North East Africa compared with other country groupings
The measures of poverty in North East Africa discussed so far can be
supplemented by the physical quality of life index (PQLI). The variables
of infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy, which are commonly
accepted as the components of the PGIJ, are sometimes considered as a set

of more precise measures of socio-economic betterment*.

 

*PQLI is a measure of welfare which tries to assess levels of living
that GNP per capita does not measure properly. It was adopted after 1976
to supplement the GNP per capita to "assess economic welfare between
nations" and to measure "economic progress," Larson and Wildford, 1979:
581-584 and Berry and Johnston, Ibid: 71-74.

Although Larson and Wildford question the necessity of using‘PGlJ as
a measurement of welfare on the grounds that per capita GNP is adequate
for the purpose, it is of high value in the sense that per capita income
in and of itself measures income that is not true for every individual in
society. But with PQLI, it gives a bird’s eye view of the level of social
and economic progress achieved in three different aspects of life.
Infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy are combined into a single
index through correlation analysis to see the level of achievement of
societies.

72
These variables are important indicators of economic development
(Caldwell, 1988) and are themselves stimulants of development. Their
assessment thus helps to have a clearer view of conditions of development
in North East Africa, one of the concerns of this thesis.

The grinding poverty which. the Nbrtheast African countries
experience impacts their social and economic development as resource
constraints translate into these sectors as well. Compared to other
countries of Africa, the N.E. African countries and Chad, which suffer
from.political instability and repeated impoundment of natural disasters,
have achieved little in the areas of life expectancy and infant
mortality, etc.

A comparison of the war and drought ravaged countries of N.E. Africa
and Chad (serialized 1-4 in Table 17); the relatively stable countries
but somehow affected by natural disasters (4-9) and the groups of
countries from poor to middle and rich countries (10-14) shows the
relative position of the countries in terms of GNP per capita, life
expectancy, infant mortality and adult literacy. Nbrtheast African
countries are at the lower end of the scale in almost all of these
indicators.

The average per capita income for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan in
1982 was U.S.$260.0. Cbmpared to that of the relatively speaking conflict
free countries (group 2) which registered an average annual per capita
income of $510.0, the average for the conflict and drought-ridden N.E.
African countries is very low indeed. This average income is only 20 per
cent of that of group 2.

All the four countries (N.E. Africa and Chad or group 1) have one of

the lowest levels of life expectancy for 1983--an average of 45 years

73

(see Table 17 below). Those countries which.have, for instance, drought,
related problem, among others, with Virtually no costs of instability--
Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Cameroon (group 2) appear to
have done better in this regard with an average of 52 years.

In terms of infant mortality (for those aged under one year) the
1983 average for the second group listed above was 111 per 1000 live
births while that of the second group was 130 for the same period. This
is again an indication of the relatively satisfactory performance of the

second group which has stable political conditions.

 

educed political

w

 

cggparison

t affected NOrth East

m.—

ar and civil war as well as dr

1

4

Inter-country

74

—_—

instability problems

 

 

 

Africa and selected nations with

Per capita GNP and_EQLI

fl

 

Table 17:

.
..X. o o o o
) .) 4AAt tAAAA
. S o o o o 0
m _( ZVNV NNNNN
.... V. .0 6
l C t .8
m mm H — .............................................
.A e c . S 449303 n09.1.7.9u
t r -( o a o o o
.1 .0 011.1. 7939.1
l .7 1nu5:u 1.59.1.4
( . 9
.1
'- ....... +- ...............................................
tr .3 .729. C 71016 1 95 O 0 9
Fer-m.8 1.4.4. 3 384.21.. 1 17 1 3
d I. .9 111. 1.. 111.1 1.. 1..
mmwr .1...
m u
t IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
m v.” .
te0.5 6164.. 81.215 62 4 l 8
fiv.0.6 6668 39.765 52 2 3 1
n1 0.9 1111... 1.11131 11
I all .1
IIIIIIII +IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
. \l.
t S .
C V.” .
e C .3
fmwe.8 3853 InaCO.I 89 6 0 1
ix v...9 441.1. 551.55 45 7 7 6
L e .(.1..
""""" +--'-'-'-"'|-I"'|-5"---I'5'"I"'-'-"'I""""""'-'l
h .3
.8
...... .9
we "I 538 03507 27 5 . 4
t - o o o o o o o o o
WW8 .5 010 02313 02 2 3
r. .6 . .
.9
....1
.2
Po . no nvnvnv no nonononono no nvnv no no
/) - 9 205 O ...—U 414.:‘1‘Lnu ‘L 26 6 1
W3 .1... 14.2. 0. 9_o341n403 5 22 0 o 3
( - 1 1
. 1..
IIIIIIII ....IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIn1|IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
. n
. . . O
- ‘v o n C
. a a o n I . r 0 e
y . .1 a .I. e .si I4 Q ...u 7.. C LA m n
r . D. .1 g m C 5 ...o a a t I. e m
t . O l. Wa .agn...ra SC .8. me]. .
m . .1 Md r 2......” Lu“. _.:_S.mknt kdon
. .n e 1 n r . n 8.. no.1Mo r o m.r.d c o
.w . t u o v m e e “5.1.. ”do. w n m c m.1 n c
. ESS A TKSICGA SAII e _ Mie
.

The rest of

rocked by political

1-4 are ones
for population categories of 10 years

listed from
instability and wars, those from 5-9 are stable.

(1970-1983)

Countries

the groups of countries are listed for comparative purposes.

0
O

Source: WOrld Bank, 1985, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1987.

*Varying years
plus or 15 years plus.

NOte

75

A fair comparison in the area of adult literacy is rendered
difficult due to the lack of comparative data for 1983 for almost all
countries except Ethiopia. This country, which had only a 10 per cent
literacy rate in 1965 increased the percentage to 62.4 in.1985. This was
achieved through the mobilization of students and urban dwellers and
peasant associations throughout the country over a period of less than
eight years. Along with the land nationalization measure, the rise in the
literacy rate, are two significant achievements scored as a result of
social order change in the country. But these achievements were not
bolstered by other equally important measures. Although they are factors
which.can help increase the tempo of development, their contribution
remains to be seen. At the moment, however, their impact is shrouded in
complex webs of variables of development.

The low per capita GNP grthh rates and the constituent variables
which are exhibited by PQLI, which together measure socio-economic
performance of countries, indicate that N.E. Africa is, in general,
relatively and absolutely poor. Under these circumstances, the countries
cannot have the necessary and adequate investment resources which can be

applied toward agricultural development.

3.7. The migration of rural people and professionalsand skilled

ones and its impacts on the economies of N.E. Africa

Wherever scarcity of land is experienced and wherever populations
have been increasing over and above the comparable level of agricultural
production, the tendency has been to struggle to win one’s household’s
bread in all conceivable ways. These include ploughing additional land on

a share-cropping basis; renting land that may lie around; living on loans

76
the rate of interest of which is crushing and which places many a peasant
on bonded labor, living on extended family resources and/or beggary, and
ultimately evacuating the locality and/or region for relief and/or some
kind of expected employment. A resort to these often difficult choices
were discussed in detail earlier in chapter 2, section 2.6.

Migration of the rural poor and professionals as well as skilled
labor and its implications on the economy of the countries will be
treated below. Forced migration is true today as it was in the past in
North East Africa and especially in Ethiopia.

This has been taking' place owing to the shift of power balances,
among other things, in the power distribution conditions emanating from
episodic power struggles observed in societies. In general, in northern
Ethiopia, for instance, the deterioration in political conditions before
the dawning of the TWentieth Century forced populations to migrate to the
central and southern parts of the country where a relative peace and land
resources were abundant (Mccann 1983:19) in the expanding state of
Shewa. The growing needs of local officials, who were relatively
independent of central authorities; and the demands of the state-placed
heavy burdens of in kind taxes and labor which was provided by peasant
farmers in the form of corvee, were the sources of "wealth” tapped by the
state. McCann produces historical evidences to establish this fact. This
system of taxing people out of existence constituted some of the "push"
factors which fuelled the migration process (see McCann, ibid.:4-25).

Other factors which McCann notes were responsible for the migration
of people from NOrthern Ethiopia were also "...the advanced state of
erosion (soil) deforestation and capital shortages in the aging northern

production system," (Ibid.:19). Many peasants also engaged themselves in

77
trading (salt bar, hides and skins or manufactured goods) activities to
bolster their income which they used for the purchase of "seed, oxen or
even access to land" (Ibid.).

The narrowness of these activities also forced a substantial number
of Ethiopians from. northern Ethiopia to work as migrant labourers in
colonized Eritrea and in Gedaref, Sudan, where development schemes were
there (Ibid.:20). Again "over a quarter of a million of northern
Ethiopians" including those from.Eritrea served in Libya where Italians
were pacifying rebellions in Gyrenaica and Fezzan between 1911 and 1931
(Ibid.). According to McCann the major purpose of this mdgration and
service in foreign army expeditions were motivated by the "desire to
collect the means to survive and reproduce in the rural economy which
increasingly required outside income and start-up capital", (Ibid.:21-
22). Many came back home not only with cash but also with varying
skills.

A rough estimate of 70,000 Ethiopians were working in the Sudan by
the late 19603 (estimate was by knowledgeable Ethiopians living in the
Sudan in the late 19603 and whom. the writer of this thesis had the
opportunity of talking to). Political conditions .and deteriorating
economic circumstances resulting from. repetitive droughts compelled a
variously estimated 1,000,000 Ethiopians to cross the border into the
Sudan as a place of sanctuary, as a source of employment, as a spot of
temporary relief and as a stepping stone to migrate to wherever work and
education was available. It is difficult to make estimates, rough ones
even, of the various categories of the economic migrants and political
refugees that have been in the Sudan for the last three decades. Small

surveys by Mekuria in Nobel 1987, see Chapter 1, page 6) and Rogge

78
(1985:146) give a bird’s eye view of the situation.

Akol’s (in Rogge 1987:146-153, see also Akol’s dissertation of 1986)
studies of the various categories of refugees from. Southern Sudan shows
that 11.4 per cent of the 219,400 refugees belonged to the Anyanya rebel
forces. The rest of them. were people displaced by the war and the
instability conditions. It can, therefore, be argued that most of the
refugees moved out of their localities as a consequence of economic and
social life disruption. Mekuria’s survey of refugee types in the Sudan
also showed that only 10 per cent of the refugees belonged to the group
which left home as a consequence of political persecution (see the
Introduction of this thesis).

Drought refugees from Tigrai who went to the Sudan for temporary
succor of their starvation in international relief camps returned to
Ethiopia when the rains came back after the 1984/85 severe drought. The
number of these forced migrants or refugees was around 80,000 (WOrld
Refugee Survey 1985, 1986: 44-47). Thus does not include the small
number of refugees who trekked back on their own and through government
posts in Eritrea and through airports.

Timberlake (1985) estimated that some 300,000 "returnee-refugees"
entered the Southeastern region of Hararghe. .A mixture of some 320,000
Ethiopian forced migrants and Somali refugees entered Ethiopia from
Somalia (U.S. Refugee Committee, 1985). According to the World Food
Programme (1986 in Review:1986 24-25) 400,000 Somalian refugees like the
30,000 or so who repatriated from. Djibouti arrived in Ethiopia. These
last category of refugees returned home after they realized some
rehabilitation assistance has been promised or the project for securing

one was foreseen, development projects were being started and conditions

79
were improving in the Hararghe and Sidamo regions, Eastern and South
Eastern Ethiopia, respectively. These refugees constitute a segment which
more than anything else wished to struggle to make a living in its home
country come what may. It also represents those groups who detested
refugee camp life outside home.

Professional and skilled labor which is an important factor for the
economies of these countries is either misplaced or misused or migrates
in search. of better opportunities. But this labor is not easily
quantifiable. However, such labor has found a fissure through which it
can remedy the misplacement and misuse as well as the unchanging low
income it earned. According to a study by Galal el Din, (1978; quoted in
Berry and Giestfeld 1983:35) some 231,350 Sudanese migrants worked in 14
Arab and other countries. Of this number some 140,550 were in Saudi
Arabia, 45,000 or 19.5% in Egypt, 20,000 or 8.6% in Libya, 12,000 or
5.2% were in the United Arab Emirates.

Somalia has also been sending migrants to those attracting oil boqm
economies of the Middle East. Some 150,000 Somalis were working in the
oil producing gulf states in the early 19703, and early 19803 (Berry and
Johnston 1983:65). A conservative estimate has it that some 20 per cent
of the externally earned wages are repatriated and that the value of this

comes to "three-quarters of the total wages in Somalia" (Ibid.).

Ethiopia likewise faces a major problem.in this. Tens of thousands
of professionals and skilled labor (some 50,000 live in the U.S.A.,
Refugees, No. 44, August 1987 and Akalu 1988) is said to have migrated
outside the country to the industrialized west in the main and to the

Middle East and Africa to some extent (see Table 18). International

80
organizations as well have employed several hundreds of Ethiopian
professionals. A large number of semi-skilled Ethiopian refugees in the
Sudan is said to have inundated the exploitative informal private
business sector of the economy of the Sudan where it is a source of cheap

labor (Rogge, 1985:135-138 and Gaim, 1983).

Table 18: Miggant labor (skilled and professional)

in North East Africa

 

I Source I Destination I I
I Country I Gulf States I Western IOthers I
I I Icountries I I
I -------------- + -------------- + ---------- + -------- I
I 1I Ethiopia I N.A. I 50,000 I N.A. I
I I I I(USA onlyH I
I 2: Sudan I 217,000 I N.A. I 2,000 I
l I I I I I
I I I I I I
I 3I Somalia I 150,000 I N.A. I N.A. I

Source: Berry and Johnston, 1983:65-67 and Berry and Geistfeld,

33-36, Akalu 1987, and Refugees, No.44, August 1987.

The manpower needs of these countries are certainly considerable.
But the countries somehow afford to lose these "dear" professionals and
skilled personnel to the better-off nations. While appreciating the
contribution of the Sudan in terms of this "scarce (human) resource" to
the OPEC countries in the Middle East, the Sudanese themselves lament
the sad reality for the reason that this drain has come at a time of a
"new surge of Sudanese development activity" (Berry and Geistfeld,
1983:26).

’Ihe remittances from such workers have been considerable in Sudan’s

and Somalia’s cases. According to the Bank of Sudan and IBRD, these

81
amounted to 15-20 per cent of the value of imports in the Sudan (Berry
and Geistfeld, 1983:33) and "about three quarters of the total wages in
Somalia’ (Berry and Johnston, 1983: 65). This figure for Somalia appears
to be a conservative estimate and represents only 20% of the repatriated
wages. Jamal (1983) estimated that the amount is "as much as four times
the income generated in Somalia’s working sector" (Jamal V., 1983).

Ethiopia also benefits from. such. remittances. According‘ to the
Ethiopian Statistical Abstract (1986:246) some Ethiopian Birr 344,000
million (U.S.l = 2.07) was received in 1985 through transfer payments
which included "all donations and imports of capital by religious and
private organizations as well as individuals..." The figure for
remittances by Ethiopian residents abroad are not given separately. But
quite a lot of money from.Ethiopians living around.the world is said to
be finding its way into the country.

The feelings of the governments, especially those of Sudan and
Somalia about this type of migrant remittances is mixed. While the
foreign exchange transferred provides support for the fragile balance of
payments situation and warrants increase in hard currency levels, its
inflow and use is uncontrolled by a set of ’cautious’ government
policies. Such policies as are instituted do not maximize’ the "positive
impact" of these earnings on the balance of payments (Berry and Giestfeld
1983: 33).

In fact, the Sudanese government, while showing its concern over the
threatening "brain drain" element and its overall negative impact on.the
economy, seems to support the idea of further migration when it is quoted
as saying: "...it appears that current labor shortages are not as great

a constraint on development as the shortage of foreign exchange" (Berry

82
and Geistfeld:34) for the country. This value is held in.spite of the
fact that in. Africa "trained, educated and experienced manpower was
extremely scarce," as Berg, (in Ravenhill, 1986:46) observed.

Moll (in Klennert:186) suggests that the low (urban) unemployment
rate of 6%.in the Sudan may be because of emigration of a substantial
number of the population--47,000 annually--to look for work in such
neighbouring countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya. According to
this author some 500,000 to 600,000 Sudanese were employed abroad. The
author remarks that although the emigration of this population, which
consists of professionals and skilled people (doctors, teachers,
technicians, economists and specialized workers), has a negative impact
on the development of the country, its ability to channelize resources in
the form of remittances contributes a great deal to the country’s balance
of payments. This is estimated at between U.S.$500 and 600 million a
year.

The migration of skilled workers considerably inhibits the smooth
management of the economies of the countries (Berry and Giestfeld, 1983:
65). Many developing countries complain of a low level of human
resources development which is an essential ingredient of economic
development. The economic destabilization wrought as a consequence of
such "brain drain" may not be easily quantifiable, however.

The encouragement of these processes of "flight of human capital",
built with years of commitment of resources and their allocation for
correcting distortions in the balance of payments, may help solve the
immediate problems of governments. Its long-run. damage is, however,
incalculable as they would postpone development that should normally

take place now and avoid extreme difficulties which have been in the

83

offing as the conditions of emergency food distributions and their
attendant costs indicate. Berry and Giestfeld observe the export of
Sudanese labor "may be a considerably more efficient means of earning
foreign exchange than the same labor employed in the production of
export goods" (1983: 34). But be that as it may, the uncertainty that
surrounds this source of income and its temporary nature and moreover the
possibility of its saturation makes it a poor source of national income.

Demand for skilled and semi-skilled labor in particular may go down
as oil prices decrease as situations in the Middle East have indicated.
A further careful study of this phenomenon would.help policy makers to
make hard choices in the interest of their national economies in the long

run.

84

Chapter 4

Discussion of the problem: some proximate causes of

persisting food insecurity, poverty and forced.migration

Forced migration is caused by food insecurity and poverty which
factors have their roots in a multiple and complex set of factors as we
saw above. These are indeed the underlying*causes of forced migration in
the distant senses. But their being determinant factors explaining the
phenomenon of forced migration can not exclude proximate causes which do
aggravate the permanent causes of the problem in the immediate sense.

Domestic and international conditions and policy outcomes constitute
yet other sets of obstacles inhibiting increase in. production,
particularly that of agriculture. Each. of these two factors plays
distinctive roles in its impact on the food security condition of a
particular nation. Each also reinforces the exacerbating role of the
other. The role human mistakes, both in terms of designing’policies and
analyzing pertinent information on social and economic conditions, having
their origins as they do in local and/or international conditions, play
in the food security equation. has more often than not been little
appreciated. This complexity' of the food security equation has been
subsumed by "a visual association between. hunger and drought" (Assefa:
1988:6) and one may for sure add by wars and civil wars. The unfortunate

result of this has been a gross neglect of the several factors which,

85
with.the underlying and proximate causes, eventuate in.the ’edifice’ of

food insecurity, poverty and forced migration.

4.1. The Domestic environment

The behavior of the domestic environment is the most important which
either holds back or Istimulates food production. Access to land,
unbridled government intervention in food production, misallocation of
resources, the rise of small groups of enterprising rich.farmers and
limitation of rights of many small farmers, among small farmers, neglect
of small-holder agriculture and the chocking of entrepreneurial
initiative, as well as droughts are among the chronic obstacles in the

way of increasing food production.

4.1.1 Access to land

Access to land or alternatively employment opportunities for many
rural citizens is hard to come by in all the three N.E. African
countries. There just is not enough land for many peasants or small
farmers to work on.in.théir localities. This is so because the decision
to hold to or to distribute resources in many cases is in.the main made
by a totally different set of people--the government or the groups which
hold a significant portion of national assets--and the poor are left to
their "nature- and/or' system. concocted" destinies. These are the
realities in the distribution and use of resources.

The poor are usually referred to as people who have been outrun in
the economic race to develop themselves despite the fact that "a system
that is open to all" exists, so it is argued. This View has had a wide

currency in the affluent industrialized societies wherein it is believed

86
that the poor are:

individual dropouts in the economic race because of certain

personal inadequacies such as idleness, lack of skills, lack of

moral fibre, etc. (Chakrabarti, in Ford et al, 1987:182).

The real situation is the contrary, however. The poor cannot
easily enter the race. As Ford and Holmquest contend "...access to
power..." which affords citizens the construction of "state policy is a
key factor structuring the environment of production and distribution"
(in Chazan and Show, 1988:214). Much as production with. all its
attendant factors is an important element of meeting food scarcities,
local decision in the way of channelizing and allocating resources for
production is a crucial driving force of increasing food production that
is needed for the satisfaction of basic needs at least.

An FAQ study indicates that outside Latin.America, small holdings
account for around two-thirds of all farms (Agriculture: Toward 2000,
1979z6). This is a consequence of population increase as well as ill-
distribution of land resources. Another FNO study involving 18 countries
with regard to the scarcity of land also indicates that only Brazil and
Mexico had more than a hectare of arable land per head of agricultural
population (FAQ, World Food Report, 1987:20). This may be the case with
many other countries of the developing world as well. But whatever the
situation, failure to provide land to the landless or an alternative
means of employment in the end tends to worsen the food production
condition of any country. Again as the FAQ’succinctly put it, only small
progress should be expected from

the less radical approach.of improving access of small farmers to

services and current inputs. Landlessness of agricultural

populations become more severe in a number of countries and small

farms become, on average, smaller still (FAD, 1979:13).

But lack of land does not pose much problems in N.E. Africa as we

87
saw in Chapter 3. The problem.in this respect, however, is the transfer
of populations to wherever land is open and productive with. the least
cost and with minimum social conflicts that may arise as a consequence of
the redistribution. Care must be taken, however, when there is an
indication that the size of the holdings would be small to the point of
eventuating in worsened amount of food produced (FAO,1979:6).

As Chazan and Show, (in Chazan et al, 1988: 14) argue "access to
power" is the missing link in effectively harnessing resources, both
physical and human, for maintaining a reasonable level of production.
These researchers entertain the strong view that "...state power is a
key factor structuring the environments of production and access to
food..." (Ibid.). What these authors call "departicipation" in the
socio-economic and political processes is, therefore, a key to the
decline of production of food and other necessities of life. This is a
result of what Chakarbarti (Ibid:183) called "structural malignancy"
which pervades Third WOrld Countries in particular. The poor peasant with
a small land or no land at all should be able to have a say in the
redistribution of resources as well as in the decision to migrate to
other areas where land is available. Governments can iplay the role of

advisors and facilitators of such a decision, and nothing more.

4.1.2 Unbridled government intervention in production

A matter that is closely linked to the marginalization of the poor
in the decision-making process is the unbridled intervention of
government in the production of food in the rural areas. Governments and
rich farmer groups in the least developed and food deficit countries,

among others, lay emphasis on state and/or commercial farms with a view

88
to producing food that would be sold to urban dwellers and other groups
which are in the main outside the agricultural sector, at cheaper prices
and also with a view to accumulating capital and earning foreign
exchange.

In socialist-oriented systems, in particular, the peasant farmer is
compelled to sell, at less than the market price, a good portion of his
produce to the state. This food is made available to urban dwellers and
it is a source of savings for investment funds for financing development
in other sectors..

Urbanites are more vocal and potent than their rural counterparts
are (Franke and Chasin, 1980 and Fieldhouse, 1986:96) and they are a
power in their own right to reckon with. The state has, therefore, to
favour the urban areas because agitation here is intense and urbanites
can challenge its power. It has to feed the emerging intellegentia, the
ever-increasing number of migrants and the fast-growing urban population
due to natural increases or face the consequences of unrest. "The
political cost of offending the urban population was much higher than
that of "incurring the wrath" of the small farmers (Chazan and Show,
1988:5).

This is one of the reasons why a lot of food makes its way into
urban areas. Such food is either subsidized or the price for it is often
kept at below production cost thus injuring the farmer in terms of income
or reducing’ his terms of trade with those of the comparatively favoured
town dwellers. Chazan and Show express their indignation about this in
the following words. Country after country, both in Africa and the Third

World,

89
while paying lip service to the need to rural revitalization opted
for the risky course of establishing of complex systems of price
supports. The move behind the resort to such a policy is self-
evident. -
But this promise and wish to transform rural areas by governments

has been easier given than acted upon. That is why the food crisis has

continued unabated.

4.1.3 Misallocation of resources

 

Misallocation of the resources also siphoned-off from.the rural
areas in the form of tax revenue and additionally in socialist-oriented
systems "compulsory sales of portions of the produce" of peasants is
another ill-advised, unprioritized and distortionary measure governments
zealously take. 'Dhis holds back development. The state-collected
revenues in either way may usually end up where they cannot stimulate
further production. They are usually not ploughed back into the
agricultural sector for further regeneration of capital for investment.

Instead, all attention in LDCs, N.E. .Africa not excluded.has been
focussed on "...the best means of achieving urban industrial growth,"
(Commins, Lofchie and Payne, 1986:12). Emphasis on industrial development
which many national governments in developing countries promote distorts
prices and its aim is the extraction of capital from. the agricultural
sector (Harf and Trout, 1986:160).

Fourthly, in a system. where government has unlimited power, income
and consumption may well increase, but the gains made may not reach the
poor segments of society. The rich under these circumstances get richer
and the poor get poorer (Gillis et al, 1983). These groups in society

among whom are urban dwellers in some ways benefit a lot from resources

90
mobilized nation-wide. In sub-Saharan Africa where urbanization.has been
growing at 6.1% "some 90 per cent of food imports including food
assistance (concessionally purchased in the main) go to its cities
(Jazaiy, 1987:52) Small-holder agriculture under these circumstances is
simply neglected because of the fact that the little resources that a
nation is capable of mobilizing is used to subsidize the urban
population. MOst of the rural population and, in particular, the poor
cannot benefit from the subsidy. They rarely receives the food purchased
from outside. Structural deficiencies that manifest themselves in the
process in part turn out to be the root causes for the flight of
resources used for the purchase of food. These resources may well go to
the financing of food production at home if policies that take balanced

development into account are designed.

4.1.4 Conflicts over the distribution of political and economic power

and lack of access to resources for the_majority of the people
Conflicts over the distribution of state power and.the limitation of
democratic rights, which are reflected by limitations of individual
rights, constitute yet another set of problems which bring about decline
in food production. Witness, for instance, the continuing and devastating
'problems faced by nations in N.E. Africa. On the one hand, central
governments, as the customary custodians of the national scepter, flex
their muscles against those who oppose "the sanctity" of this value
irrespective of existing socio-economic inequities and lop-sided
political power distribution conditions. Opposition groups on.the other
hand, who feel the burden the inequities entail struggle for separation

and/or autonomy and democratization of institutions in order of severity

91

of demands tabled by many ’liberation fronts’. Advocates of separatism.in
particular are, however, eager to use or want to capitalize upon the
apparent sentiment they evolve as an instrument of expendiency to redress
the real root cause of the conflict-~the imbalance in.power distribution.
In fact the key to the conflict is this very issue. Haggai Erlich.(1986:
191—208) and Looram.(1959:2) document this very well in.Ethiopia’s case.
Both of them.argue that the narrowness of the access to opportunities are
in many cases the basis for the civil conflicts that arise.

Both.the centre and the opposition in the N.E. African countries
seem.to have failed to inject the language of concession, trust, mutual
advantage and respect for each.other in.the annals of their seemingly
endless political contests. In the mean time the socio—economic bulwark
of their societies are exceedingly eroded to a point of starvation of
their people. The two groups appear to be not interested in involving'the
larger society,:members of each. nation’s societies who also have the
requisite leadership qualities at all levels and interestingly enough.who
may help to bring about peace to the disturbed environment, in the
determination of the issues that lead to the bitter contests in the first
place. Freedom of chOice and democratic ways of ironing out differences
are miserably lacking. An Ethiopian novelist, Baalu Girma, attributes the
disagreement between the two groups ("central" Ethiopia and the
opposition in Eritrea) as something’having to do with "principles". The
bitter conflict, he says, continues because of the lack of good councel
which can bring the two sides together (see Appendix.D).

The conflict situatuion.has been disrupting life in Ethiopia, Sudan
and Somalia for several years or even decades now (The Middle East, June

1983; Gillis et al, 1983, Jansson et al, 1987). Many people have been

92
denied the opportunity of generating food production as a consequence of
these systemic defects.

The limitation of rights in access to and the disposition of
resources or the means to their acquirement applies to the larger
majority of the population which is divested of these rights. Small
numbers of people whether it be those in the government of the day and/or
some politically powerful group(s) conveniently situated and their abeys
have wide ranging access to resources and privileges because of faulty
state policies which are not in tune with the needs of the larger
society. As Fieldhouse (1986:94) has observed, many governments in
Africa, and indeed in the world, have not, been concerned with "economic
growth but rather with the maintenance of political power and the
distribution of wealth.to themselves and their supporters.

As the FAQ also correctly argues "little progress was made in
reducing inequities in access to production resources, including
institutional services," in many developing'countries of the world (END,
Agriculture Toward 2,000, 1979:13). Indeed, the existing lop-sided land
distribution conditions and the ’command’ this has given large farmers
over "supplies and services" has been one cause of the prevalence of
poverty and malnutrition as well as a "critical constraint on the
contribution of small-holders to increased production" (Ibid.:13).

This inclination toward the support of cOhorts--political, social as
well as economic groups-~in most cases brings about opposition and this
becomes intense if it affects food--a basic need. As Chazan and Show
correctly saw the clash between beneficiaries and those marginalized
becomes "intense...when food resources in any event scarce, are unevenly

distributed..." leading to, as it were, intensified "class antagonisms,"

93
(Chazan and Show 1988; 12). Harf and.Trout (1986:160) see the problem.in
terms of "mismanagement...in the administration of the economy" as a
whole that inevitably makes in-roads into the agricultural sector. The
energy and resources consumed by the conflicts take away the performance
in production. In the meanwhile the rights of many people, among‘whom
are the rural poor, to enjoy the fruits of being citizens of a nation is
jeopardized. This leads to the more expensive option of migration of

people in search of food.

4.1.5 Neglect of small-holder agriculture by the state

Added to the narrow access to land resources by the poor, excessive
government intervention in economic activity, etc., a3‘discussed above,
is the little attention accorded to small-holder agriculture by the
state. This is what is termed "benign neglect" of the important sector of
peasant agriculture in less developed countries by their own states.
Assefa Bequele and Eshetu Chole (1969:49), after enumerating a host of
obstacles--economic and non-economic--which impeded agricultural
development in Ethiopia including the limdted availability of
agricultural credit, singled out the very little concern shown by the
then government, "amounting to almost total indifference", as perhaps the
most significant factor inhibiting'the sector’s surge ahead. The current
government’s preoccupations in internal military conflicts and its
pursuit of producers’ cooperatives development above all else has brought
about deceleration in the sector.

Infrastructural developments and the provision of social services
which include health and education in many developing societies are

accorded low priority in the scale of national development. Instead other

94

priorities of political nature, e.g., conflicts resolution through the
use of force or grandiose economic programmes, such as the building of
large-scale dams, which.can easily be perceived and.signify the state’s
"commitment in a concrete way", emerge. Considerable efforts and
resources are consumed by these activities and projects. Agricultural
price policies that part company with increased food production;
distortionary use of national savings, and the neglect of small-holder
agriculture are all human-induced drawbacks to agricultural development.

In fact the most immediate and sticking problems that have to be
removed of the way for quickening the tempo of development in the
immediate sense are these factors. Liberalization of the socio-economic
system including the distribution of land and freedom.to use the same in
a way that enables people to make profits is thus a primary step to
invigorate the agricultural sector of the economy. The extreme limitation
of the role of "high" and "medium" level farmers in the world-wide back-
tracking socialist development context also pierce holes in existing
production processes when resources and institutions are fully controlled
and mobilized by the state. Aside from.the transaction cost involved, the
effective replacement of this surplus producing category of farmers in a
number of cases would well neigh be impossible and overall national
production would suffer as a consequence.

The role "elite farmers" can play in _increasing national food
production is, as it were, "swallowed" in the discussion of equitable
distribution of land and other resources and the implementation of
programmes to address them. These farmers, as catalysts of change, can
indeed help raise production and create a climate of competition for the

rest of the population. Their encouragement is both.necessary and wise.

95

The argument that land should be fairly redistributed to enable the poor
to be self-sufficient and that enterprising farmers should at the same
time be allowed to engage themselves in profitable agricultural activity
is not a contradiction in terms. In actual fact both activities can.go
hand in hand each without harming the interests of the other. Any country
needs the contribution of each to help increase the overall national
production. Just as man, being a social being, requires a community to
fulfil his needs and for his protection, so also does the agricultural
population need the indirect "services", inter alia, of entreprizing
individuals wherever they may be. But the avarice and greed of such
entrepreneurs should be tamed, controlled and softened by socio—economic
policies which are just to all. What is needed to soften the antagonistic
interests of the entrepreneurs and the larger group of farmers is to put
in place a wise and practical resource allocation system by governments
with the active participation of the people at the local level. A
reasonable tax policy, among other things, can do this job. The problem
is not with the marrying of the apprently contradictory ’systems’ of
agriculture which are indeed sensitive; but it is rather with the failure
of decision-makers to learn how best to use them.

Without entrepreneurs who may also be identified as good risk-
bearers and "managers", the larger farming society would be deprived and
vulnerable. The evidence now for this is the resort of socialist
countries also to the "individual" in contradistinction to the only
"collective" for removing the roadblocks in the way of economic
development. The Setit Humera agricultural activities which in the 19603
and 19703 drew the attention of thousands of entrepreneurs from.many

parts of Ethiopia --entrepreneurs who farmed around 150,000 hectares of

96
land-- are a good example of the ability of this set of people in helping
to speed up agricultural development. Setit Humera was one of the five
large scale commercial farms in the western Lowlands of the country which
produced sesame, a crop identified as the "golden grain" because of the
fact that it earned a good deal of foreign exchange to the country (Kifle
Mariam. 1969:56 and 30-32). The expansion of commercial farms in the
Sudan, though unbridled and one damaging the interests of small farmers
in several areas of the country, is yet also another instance of this
(see also section 3.4 in Chapter 3 above). The state took over the
management as well as the assets of farmers during the land
nationalization spree that characterized the socio-economic and political
conditions in the aftermath of the 1974 Ethiopian revolution. It was
later unable to manage it or to settle disaster hit people on it. There
and then, cash crop which earned a good chunk of foreign exchange was
produced. Setit Humera has for many years now been an almost abandoned

zone because of the conflicts that grip the area.

4.1.6 Droughts

Although human-induced problems are in the main responsible for
keeping down agricultural production in many LDCs, this does not mean
that problems relating to natural disasters such as droughts,
decertification and pest attack do not impair households’, communities’
or even a good part of a nation’s food production. Far from that. Even
though these factors do not, in many instances, constitute the underlying
causes for the deceleration in food production, they nonetheless
definitely worsen the existing food insecurity and poverty conditions.

Droughts do decrease food production just as decertification slowly

97
sterilizes soils (Franke et al, 1980:4).

Droughts, like politically unstable conditions, have led to the
migration of the entire people in villages in least developed food-
deficit countries. Thousands of people move to towns and even cross
international boundaries in search of food. Emamples are Ethiopians,
Sudanese and Somalian economic, drought and political refugees, a good
number of whom return to their respective localities after having
satisfied their immediate needs from. national and international food
distribution centres and after weather conditions, both natural and
political, improve (WOrld Refugee Report, 1985, and Akol in Rogge,
1987:130-143). The number of those involved in the exodus is dependent
upon the intensity and extensity of the problem. As Harf and Trout
(1986:104) argue "refugee situations fluctuate greatly depending on the
extent of economic disruption wrought by .disasters, among' other things,
physical conflict and political unrest at a given moment. Their cooling
down is likewise dependent upon the low intensity of these disruptive

factors.

4.2. Some domestically originated and externally induced proximate

factors of food insecurity

 

4.2.1 Increasing food import bills

The external causes for the decline in food production are
associated with the decrease in export earnings of LDCs, rise in import
bills both for food and particularly energy, increasing indebtedness and,
in some cases, rising expenditure on arms. The prevailing economic
conditions in the N.E. African countries which. have been extremely

affected by these factors illustrate what shortages of resources and

98
particularly foreign exchange can do to a country or a region in this
shrinking and interdependent world.

As Table 19a and 19b indicate, between 1980 and 1985, Ethiopia,
Somalia and Sudan have been spending increased amounts for the import of
food. Exports of food and animals in dollar terms, on the other hand,
fell from U.S.$ 305,334,000 to $237,118,118 in 1985 for Ethiopia; from
$114,516,000 to $81,510,000 for Somalia from.$l72,851,000 to $95,272,000
for the Sudan for the same period (FAD, Trade Yearbook, 1987).

The value of imports rose from around 12 per cent in 1980 to 36 per
cent in 1985 for Ethiopia whereas that of exports fell from 18 per cent
to 14 per cent (see Table 18a). While the value of exports for Somalia

and Sudan went down, that of their imports showed minimal shifts.

Table 19a: Ede in food and animals L’OOO U.S.$)

I YearIEthiopiaI % SomaliaI %

I I I

I I I
I ------- + -------- + ------- + -------- + ------- + I
I 1980 I 82,890: 12.6 I 99,638: 14.9 I 371,631: 24.0 I
I 81 I 71,742: 10.9 I 146,042: 21.9 I 161,904: 17.0 I
I 82 I 68,430: 10.1 I 130,881: 19.6 I 213,154: 13.8 I
I 83 I 104,336: 15.9 I 78,251: 11.7 I 210,297: 13.6 I
I 84 I 88,333: 13.5 I 117,260: 17.6 I 191,411: 12.4 I
I 85 I 239,970: 36.6 I 94,890: 14.2 I 295,660: 19.1 I
I I I I I I I I
I I l I I I I I
I Total I 655,701I100.0 I 666,962I100.0 I1,545,057:100.0 I

99

Table 19b: Trade in food and animals (’000 U.S.8)

Year: EthiopiaI % SomaliaI %

, ------ + --------- + --------------- + --------------- + ------- I
1980 305,334: 18.1 114,518: 15.7 172,851: 19.1
81
82 285,814: 17.0 238,429: 33.0 224,106: 24.8

91,341: 12.6

48,841I 6.8

81,570: 11.3
I

149,164I 16.5

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
297,493: 17.6 116,953: 13.0 I
I

I

I

I

I

I

237,118I 14.1
I

I I
I I
+ +
: :
261,443I 15.5 I 147,292I 20.4 I 146,853I 16.2
: :
I I
I I
: :
I I 95,272I 10.5
: : '
I I
I I

I I
I I
I I
I I
' :
I

I 83 I 288,473: 17.1
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I

I I I
1,685,675I100.0 721,989I100.0 905,199I100.0

Source: FAO Trade Yearbook, Vbl.40, FAO Rome,1987:315.
International food transfers consisting of concessional purchases
and grants increased nearly five-fold for Djibouti, nine-fold for
Ethiopia, fifteen-fold for Somalia and ten-fold for the Sudan between
1973 and 1984 (FAQ, Food Aid in Figures, 1986:40-42).
Table 20: Total food transfer for N.E. African countries

between 1973/74 and 1984/85 (in ’000 MT)

I I countries I
I I I
I 1 """"""""""""""""""""""" I
I Year I Djibouti I .Ethiopia I Somalia I Sudan I
I ---------- + ------------ + ------------ + ---------- + -------- I
I 74/75 I - I 54.1 I 111.2 I 46.0 I
I 75/76 I - I 86.6 I 55.1 I 24.8 I
I 76/77 I - I 74.7 I 79.1 I 54.1 I
I 77/78 I 2.9 I 76.0 I 72.5 I 111.7 I
I 78/79 I 5.2 I 162.5 I 87.4 I 90.0 I
I 79/80 I 4.9 I 111.5 I 136.8 I 212.3 I
I 80/81 I 13.7 I 288.0 I 330.1 I 194.5 I
I 81/82 I 11.3 I 189.7 I 185.9 I 194.1 I
I 82/83 I 8.4 I 344.0 I 188.5 I 330.0 I
I 83/84 I 10.7 I 171.9 I 176.6 I 450.4 I
I 84/85 I 15.0 I 868.9 I 247.9 I 812.1 I

Source: FAO, Food Aid in Figures, 1986, No.4:40-42

100

Much as increase in food aid has been high, partly because of the
grim.food production conditions (refer to Table 20), capital flow has
been low for the countries under study for this paper. Ramphal laments
over the fact that "capital flows have become harder to attract" and
unfortunately they have "hardened in their terms" (in Chidzero and Gauhar
1986:15-16).

The WOrld Bank also paints a dim picture of the situation. On.the
basis of the existing and obtaining situation, gross flows of aid and
private capital, even if they are kept at the 1980-82 levels, would fall
precipitously with an even bigger fall in real terms in the mid- and late
19803.

According to the 1986 UNCTAD Report (p.91), the net capital
requirements for the LDCs would rise above the estimated U.S. $6.4
billion in 1990. This is assumed on.the basis of some considered points
relating to aid.

The first assumption is that a 0.15 per cent of donor GNP assistance
would flow to these nations reaching at the end of the decade (19803) to
0.30% of GNP. The second set of assumptions hold that: (1) economic
growth for these nations would maintain a 2.6% economic growth rate
(consistent with. the average population growth rate); (2)GDP by 1995
would grow at an annual 7.2% and (3) this GDP growth. rate would be
attained by 1990.

According to the UNCTAD 1986 report (pp.90-91) this target would not
be achieved with the 0.15%. GNP IOfficial Development Assistance (ODA)
which it doubts would not enable the countries to maintain their early
19803 income levels. It notes that "to accelerate growth LDCs would need

much larger capital flows and aid." we will have some more discussion of

101
this topic as it relates to the assistance that flows to forced migrants
in relief, settlement, etc., programmes later in Chapter 6 of this

thesis.

4.2.2 Militarypspending

Military spending in. N.E. .Africa is a constituent part of the
increase globe-wise. Harf and Trout discuss the problem. and its
implications on resources that can be used for development. According to
them, military spending world-wide rose from U.S. $200 billion in 1960;
to $291 billion in 1972 and $818 billion in 1982 (Harf and Trout,
ibid.:5). Some 28 million people were employed by the military forces in
1982 world-wide. This figure was only 21 million seven years earlier
(Ibid.). For Harf and Trout this is only part of the story. They argue
that when one adds the number of people employed directly and indirectly
to service the military industry, the population can exceed the 100
million mark (Ibid.).

The increase in the expenditure for military operations. has been
taking a good share of N.E. African countries’ national wealth.as well
(World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987). Not only this,
the destruction of physical infrastructure and standing crops and other
assets due to the wars are not small either. Ethiopia, for example,
estimated that around U.S. $3 billion.worth of property was destroyed by

the war unleashed on it by Somalia in 1977/78 (RRC, 1985).

102

I Year I Ethiopia I Somalia I Sudan I
I -------------- + ------------- + ------------- + ---------- I
I A 1975 I 79 I 51 I 95 I
I 76 I 111 I 53 I 106 I
I 77 I 142 I 63 I 161 I
I 78 I 127 I 154 I 182 I
: 79 : fl : 14_3 : as. I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I A: Average I 145 I 93 I 149 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I B 80 I 339 I 109 I 215 I
I 81 I 352 I 118 I 225 I
I 82 I 376 I 127 I 315 I
I 83 I 390 I 120 I 163 I
I 84 I £12_0 I §2 I 1%) I
I B:Average I 375 I 112 I 217 I
I Av. of A&B I 260 I 102 I 183 I

Source: werld.Military Expenditures and.Arms Transfers, 1987.

As Table 21 above indicates military expenditure has been rising
in Ethiopia in real terms from 1975 to 1984. It rose from a mere $79
million in 1975 to $411 million in 1984. 'Dhis is an over five—fold
increase. The average annual expenditure was U.S. $260 million.

A slightly more than three—fold increase was registered for
Somalia’s military expenditure between 1975 and 1977, the time in which
it invaded Ethiopia, the 1977-78 war. Although this expenditure showed a
general decline, it rose to $127 mdllion (the ten year average was $102
million in 1982) after registering lower figures in 1980 and 1981, a time
at which.the Somali National MOvement (SNM) and other forces opposing the
centre were set up and have since been active. In 1988 SNM attempted to
take over the government by controlling almost all of the northern.part
of the country. The expenditure on the military at this time must have
evidently risen sharply.

Ewen in the Sudan, where after the 1970 Addis Ababa accord which

103

brought the embittered south and the centre to a comparative amity,
military expenditure increased manifold up to 1982. Sudan’s military
expenditure shot up from. a low of $95 million in 1975 to $315 in 1982
which is a three-fold increase. It showed a relative decrease after
that. The average annual military expenditure for the period 1975 to
1984 has been $183 million. The institution of the Koranic (Sharia) laws
intensified opposition from. the south after which. the military
expenditure budget must have risen up. Figures for the same expenditures
for the years after 1985 are not available for comparisons.

All of the three countries--Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan-- are
involved in their own civil wars. Each supports one or more political
groups opposing central administrations or seeking secession (e.g.
Eritrea from. Ethiopia). Unless sense and reason descend from.both.the
centres and the outlying. areas, there will be no end to the wars and
military expenditures would increase and would definitely affect
development. The food insecurity and poverty conditions would continue as
the countries lose a lot of resources to the war effort.

The disruptions wrought by the conflicting parties impinge upon food
production. A diversion of the resources from. these consumptive to
productive lines can greatly enhance production. The released foreign
exchanges, from. these can, for instance, be used for the purchase of
agricultural inputs and the construction of small dams for irrigation
agriculture which has proved to be a short-cut for achieving food self-

sufficiency as in India and elsewhere in Asia.

4.2.3 Debt servicing

Debt servicing is another line of national expenditure which takes a

104
toll of foreign exchange resources. Figures in.Table 21 give a clearer
picture of the problem as they relate to N.E. African countries.
Table 22: Debt servicing by NOrtheast African countries between

1980 and 1984

I I Debt service I %age I Debt Service as I %age I
I I(Mns of U.S.$)I rise IPercentage of ExportsI rise I
I Country I ---------------------- + ---------------------------- I
I I 1980 I 1984 I 1980 I 1984 I
I ----------- + ------ + --------------- + --------- + ------------------ I
I Djibouti I 6 I 18 I 300 I 32 I 69 I 216 I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I Ethiopia I 35 I 124 I 354 I 8 I 30 I 375 I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I Somalia I 20 I 46 I 230 I 15 I 102 I 680 I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I Sudan I 100 I 155 I 155 I 18 I 21 I 117 I

Source UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries, 1987: 125-125

As shown in.Table 22 the cost of debt servicing for all the four
nations has been increasing between 1980 and 1984 at an astronomic rate.
Debt servicing rose by an average of 260 per cent for all the countries
between 1980 and 1984. Ethiopia’s was the highest with 300%.and Sudan’s
the lowest with 155%.

In terms of the value of exports the debt service was 680%.higher
for Somalia in 1984 when compared with.that of 1980. It was 375%.for
Ethiopia for the same period. This has evidently had a negative impact
on their food production capabilities as well by sharing the hard-earned
foreign exchange which under normal circumstances can be allocated for

food production--purchase of inputs and research. for instance.

4.2.4 The prohibitive cost of energy
Energy is an important factor of development. Without fuel modern

transportation becomes meaningless. According to Harf and Trout

105
(1986:27) "energy has proved to be an, important component of human
development and human existence.

The situation for Nerth East .African countries which have been
affected by man-made and natural disasters has been extremely difficult
in this regard. They paid significant amounts of foreign exchange to
import petroleum.

In 1965, Ethiopia, Sudan.and Somalia spent an average of only 7 per
cent of their merchandise export earnings for energy. By 1985 they had to
devote an average of 45.6 per cent of this income to satisfy their energy
needs with.Sudan consuming more than Ethiopia and Somalia. In fact the
cost of energy for the three countries increased by an average of 524:T%
between 1965 and 1985.

Table 23: Energy imports, (petroleumI as a

percentage of:merchandise exports

I Country I 1965 I 1985 I
I ----------- + ---------- + -------- I
I Ethiopia I 8 I 43 I
I I I I
I I I I
I Somalia I 9 I 43 I
I I I I
I I I I
I Sudan I 5 I 5 I
I I I I
I I I I
I Average I 7.3 I 45.6 I

Source: world Development Report, 1987:218.

Much of the N.E. African countries’ resources have thus been
consumed, as it were, by food imports, debt servicing and military and
energy expenditures. The share of these in the total expenditures of
'the countries is considerably high.as can be observed in Table 23 also.
The three nations have thus placed themselves in a position where

they can only invest very little of their resources into agriculture and

106

related sectors of development. Reductions of three-fourths of the 1983
costs in food and animal product imports and military spending and the
allocation of these savings for education and.health as well as for
agriculture would have had positive implications on these sectors’
developments. The level of spending for Ethiopia for a particular year
around 1980 and for Somalia for 1978 would have changed from.23.3 to 31.7
per cent and from 17.3 to 28.8 per cent, respectively (refer to Tables
25-26 in Appendix A) if such reductions materialized.

Production in agriculture, under such. circumstances, would have
risen a bit. Educational and.health services would have also expanded.
But increasing costs in food imports and military spending make such
achievements difficult.

This then is one of the major reasons for the deceleration of
agriculture and the poverty of a good segment of the rural population. It
is at this point that the very poor and the destitute think in terms of
evacuating their homes. Their destinations are surplus-producing and/or
urban areas within their own nations and relief camps in the main in

neighbouring countries.

107

Chapter 5

Peasants/small farmers who move seeking food

and relief food.that attracts

5.1. Availability of relief food at cross border points

The availability of food and other relief in comparatively greater
amounts in neighbouring regions serves as a magnetic pole to a goodly
segment of forced migrants. Its contribution to the rate of increase of
the number of forced migrants is more often than not much less realized.
Both refugee-receiving countries and.the UNHCR provide assistance to the
people made destitute by the war and drought conditions. The refugee
population, aside from.political, religious and economic reasons which
forces it to move and cause constant shortages of food at home, grows as
a consequence of this easily obtainable food.‘Dhe increase in the level
of assistance at cross border points leads to a trek of more and more
people. This point will be discussed in detail later in.this section.

There is yet another factor which students of social science should
not lose sight of. The needs of refugee-receiving countries, poor
countries, in particular, in terms of food and financial assistance, are
as big as those struck by man-made and natural disasters. Somalia has
been one such nation which has been attempting to use the refugee problem
to secure increased access to bigger amounts of international assistance.

This contention was fortified by the fact that refugees whose number

108
was over 1.5 million (a number deliberately inflated by Somalia,
according to authentic sources, and to which point we will turn to later)
were turning out to be increasingly burdensome to its socio-economic
capacity. The immediate benefit for Somalia in this regard was, of
course, the flow of increased relief resources and the perceived long-
term gains have been the incorporation of the Ogaden to its territory.

Indeed, Somalia has benefited from. the refugee situation
considerably. In the early 19803, it received.more than $40 million U.S.
annually for refugee maintenance purposes, more than any other country in
the region. (see Table 28 in Appendix B). Although refuge settlements in
Somalia have not been successful at all, they were getting more funds
even more than the Sudan where many from.Ethiopia had settled. Somalia,
for instance, received $4.9 and $4.5 million ‘U.S. in 1984 and 1985,
respectively, for the settlement of refugees in its territory (see Table
29 in appendix B). In the Sudan, settlement programmes for 100,000
refugees was in the process of being undertaken in the early 19803 (UNHCR
Doc.A/AC.96/601, October 22, 1981:4).

The 1985 allocation was more than one-third of the budget set for
refugee settlers in the Sudan. But evidences indicate that the
settlements have not been particularly successful. In fact, world
Refugee Survey (1985:47) carries the criticisms levelled at Somalia with
regard to the handling of refugee settlements. Aside from.inflating .
refugee numbers, Somalia keeps refugees in desolate areas (under the
pretext that "better sites are not available") where there is little hope
for agricultural self-sufficiency in order to assure continued aid for
its economic development (See also Stein’s article in Rogge 1987).

Stein’s (in Rogge 1987:54-58) observations that resources including land

109
available for new settlements in refugee host nations are exaggerated and
that asylum countries are afraid that existing resources currently
exploitable land resources, for example, are not adequate for their own
nationals clearly applies to Somalia in this respect.

These facts show that countries attempt to gain covertly from
conflict situations in neighbouring’ nations by exploiting' the forced
migrant issue and that the money and other resources collected are used
for financing domestic programmes of governments. Dawit (1989), who was a
close observer of these happenings, has said that "Somalia’s economy was
given an enormous boost by the large scale relief operation" (1989:316)
that was going on in that country.

Another advantage derived from. refugee influxes is the creation of
organizations for relief and sometimes for rehabilitation or settlement
programmes. Such projects catering to refugees obviously require the
creation of organizations and employment of people to run the business of
relief operations. There is a documentation to the effect that about
16,000 people found employment for relief and other operations catering
to Afghan refugees in Pakistan (UNHCR, Refugees: No.41, 1987:22). Also
the bureaucracy created around the programme of refugee relief enriches
itself from. the ’bounty’. Sometimes again the corruption of officials in
such organizations may manifest itself in the form. of diversion of
resources to groups of people other than the intended beneficiaries. This
was also a situation that had surfaced in Somalia, among others (Kent,
1987:73-76 and Jansson, 1987).

In some cases humanitarian gestures as they relate to refugees have
been seen as a national status symbol in addition to the economic one.

For instance, the Sudanese are acclaimed as a people who have been very

110
sympathetic toward the cause of refugees. Dawit explains that this
gesture gained the Sudanese political credit and made them."look like
’saints’ compared to the evil government to the east (Ethiopia) that
preyed on its own people" (Dawit,1989:316).

These features are not particular to these countries. One thing is,
however, certain. The degree varies from.society to society. Any country
in desperate need of such resources would not miss the opportunity to
exploit the situation if resources can be comparatively easily mobilized
from. such sources. The refugee syndrome does bring about such a

situation.

5.2. Food needs,prefugees and the advantages that accrue to hosts

The assertion that humanitarian motives predominate in.hosting
refugees is too often advanced. This is not true in a number of cases.
‘Dhe resource that flows on behalf of the refugees and by the way to the
local population (see ICARA II documents and Rogge, 1986:150), and the
skill and low wage labour that refugees provide to the host country
economy (Rogge, ibid.: 142-155), would in all probability outweigh the
claimed humanitarian dispositions (Kent, 1987:118-131).

The immediate need of some countries revolves around getting a good
portion of the free food on the pretext that refugees are there. It is
not to say that refugees do not at all benefit. Far from. that; they are
in fact fed and housed. And one of the reasons why differences between
host populations at the local level and refugees arises is because of
this. The local people are sometimes left in the lurch.when refugees get
an assorted bundle of food a portion of which they sometimes sell at the

local market and raise money that puts them.in better stead. Rogge

111
(1985) and Gaim. Kibre-Ab (1983) document this very well. In fact
demonstrations were staged against refugees by local populations in.the
Sudan because of their role in worsening the scarcity situation (Rogge,
1985:149).

That is why some governments try to isolate refugees from local
populations. In addition to their use of the limited services, they are
seen as security risks (see Rogge, 1985: 133-153). But in spite of this,
refugees stay at or find their way to other urban centers. In the urban
centres, the informal business sector’s needs absorb them. The business
world does need such cheap labour for the reason that such labour demands
low wages. Such labourers also work longer hours and they do not get
organized into labour unions (Gaim, 1983:89) and thus they do not pose
any threat to employers.

Host governments also need these labourers as substitutes to
nationals sometimes. Work permits have, for instance, been given by the
Sudanese at will to skilled refugees both from Northern Ethiopia and the
rest of the country when their own people went for the ’foreign exchange
rushes’ that emerged in.the oil rich.states of the Middle East during'the
last two decades or 30. Berry and Giestfeld (1983:90-91) and Rogee (1985:
135-138)dwe1l upon this issue in a detailed fashion.

When the local economy deteriorates and employment opportunities
narrow down, they are despised and all conceivable restrictions are
applied to their movements. Plans are worked out for their settlement in
rural areas and/or near agricultural enterprises where they can become a

source of labour pool, but always as a supplemental pool.

112
5.3. The predicaments of the UNHCR and its role

in the_aggravation of the refugee problem

Just as much as refugees create substantial problems to their hosts,
so also do they bring about situations where the distribution of
international assistance becomes jeopardized. The UNHCR.has been.facing
the intractable problem.of distributing assistance to bona fide refugees
as per the U.N. stipulations catering for refugees. The problems that
relate to this situation are two.

The first is the separation of the ’real’ politically persecuted
refugees from. the other migrants.‘nhis has been posing problems for the
organization.which does not have any practical means of verification and
act accordingly. This is not the immediate concern of this paper. But it
is one which needs a detailed study and analysis.

The second problem relates to the preferential treatment of
refugees to local populations. Attempts to isolate refugees from.local
populations for assistance purposes have been found to be both
impractical and frustrating to the UNHCR. The separation of, for
instance, Ethiopian refugees from.the local Somali population in Somalia
has been difficult as the U.S. Refugee Comittee Report of 1985 alluded
(see p.47 of the report). Both Ethiopian Somalis and those in Somalia are
so similar that an identification process becomes blurred.

That is why international assistance as it relates to refugees goes
astray albeit with no design on this count. In such a situation
assistance allocated for refugees is ’wasted’ or its purpose is little
fulfilled. Both Tanzania and Sudan, among other nations, have frequently
frowned upon UNHCR assistance that has been favouring refugees to the

exclusion of host populations.

113

The ICARA II conference had the objective of raising funds for
countries which have been burdened by the presence of refugees. The
UNHCR, which.was faced with the problem.of separating returnees from
displaced populations in Ethiopia’s Hararghe region had to work contrary
to its own stipulations (RRC 1985 and UNHCR News, various issues; See
also the 1957 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol for refugees).

But in spite of such.problems, the UNHCR has sometimes been under
fire for its role of exacerbating' the refugee flow. It was, for
instance, accused by Uganda for its threats of withdrawal of funds from
relief programmes unless the Ugandan government settled refugees from
Sudan and Zaire in Uganda (Holborn, 1975:1216). A more recent version of
this is UNHCR’s attitude toward the voluntary repatriation of drought hit
Tigrans of Ethiopia who crossed the border into Sudan and returned to
their country in 1985 (CUnny and Stein, in Loescher and Mondhan,
1989:296). These authors say that the organization was "...more of a
hinderance than help to the repatriation." Rogge (1985:22) also
subscribes to this view but he says that the organization.has since the
last one-and-a-half decades been involved in development in host nations
like the Sudan and that it can contribute considerably along this line
given adequate resources. Dawit also accused.the organization for being a
’political instrument’ of those who attempted to ’discredit the
government of Ethiopia’ (Dawit 1989:315-316). Many of the refugees,
according to Dawit, who were hoodwinked by the ’propaganda of rebels’ and
other interested groups, and the consequent provision of food and
facilities across borders, were much nearer to distribution and relief
centers in their own home country than otherwise. These cross border

locations were thus by far distant to ’prospective’ refugees.

114

The same author reproves the UNHCR for its failure to help find
durable solutions to the refugee problem. The argument is palatable in
the sense that millions of dollars spent on such.ventures most usually
sink in the sands when, for instance, the relief operations are closed
due to political changes in the refugee-sending country and the forced
migrants repatriate.

Some of the infrastructure and the facilities left behind
definitely help the local populations. Where virgin land is brought
under cultivation the host country for sure benefits (Holborn 1974:915).
But as refugee settlements are in most cases far flung from local

population centers their usefulness is thus at times negligible.

5.4. The role neighbouring:countries play in the accentuation

of the problem.and the benefits they reap

The countries in Northeast Africa seem.to be involved in a tit for
tat actions with.respect to the support which. they provide to groups
opposing the central governments of each country. This has in turn
invariably laid to the strengthening of the centres’ military power which
centres attempt to hash. down the challenges posed from.the opposition.
The opposition groups also recruit their forces from. the ranks of
refugees and the competition between the centre and its rival continues
endlessly.

In the process public order and the orderly conduct of agricultural
activity is interfered with. People are compelled to take flight to save
their lives. This process repeats itself bulging'the number of refugees
ever more. Both.local and international resources are depleted for the

maintenance of forced migrants or refugees as discussed earlier on.

115

Governments thus walk into deep waters without initially realizing'that
the problem.would in the end be so much engaging and resource-consuming.
As they cannot assist refugees by themselves they request for the flow of
international assistance. The assistance that comes creates problems
ranging from. increased large scale refugee influxes, socio-economic
disruptions arising from.disparities in the living standards of refugees
vis-a-vis local populations to the imposition of restrictions on the
movements of the strangers (refugees). FUnds allocated for refugees are
sometimes diverted toward financing'host government development or other
programmes.

But in spite of all these problems, of late the refugee movement in
N.E. Africa has increased both in intensity and extensity as Somalia and
Sudan continued to support opposition groups to Ethiopia’s central
government. Ethiopia also intensified its assistance to dissidents of
both countries in return.

The three countries have been exchanging forced migrants during the
last three decades (see Table 27 in Appendix B). Many of the refugees in
the late 19703 and early 19803 were from. Ethiopia which.previous
estimates put the figure to around 1.8 million (Clark.and Stein 1982,
CTMADE et a1 1981). The Somali Government, however, even after ICARA II
following which. the claimed 1,500,000 refugee population was lowered to
700,000, was insisting that 300,000-1,000,000 refugees .have been
integrated with their kith and kin inside the country (Berry and
Johnston, 1983: 48). But this claim was partially if not fully eroded by
the flow of a substantial number of people from Somalia.

Many UNHCR- member states raised the problem of refugee population

statistics and requested UNHCR to assist governments resolve the problem

 

116

in this regard (UNHCR, Doc.A/AC.96/601, 22 October 1981:24). In.the 32nd
Session devoted to the High Commissioner’s (UNHCR) programme at the
General Assembly of the U.N., Ethiopia’s Relief and Rehabilitation
Commissioner Shimelis Adugna observed that Assistance to refugees and
returnees "must be fair, and also flexible so as to take account of their
needs in the countries of a3ylum, resettlement and origin (U.N.
Doc.A/AC.96/SR.337, October 22, 1981:4). This meant also little was done
in.the countries of origin to help solve the refugee problem.in general.
Whatever the case, this and other voices of the UNHCR member states must
have been one of the reasons why refugee figures, particularly those of
Somalia, was questioned. The number of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia was
later lowered by more than half, that is, to 700,000 which was taken only
as a planning figure by the UNHCR.

Deteriorating economic conditions as a consequence of grinding and
expanding poverty and drought fuelled by the instability factor in
Somalia and Sudan at the beginning of the early 19803 have also resulted
in huge populations movements into Ethiopia. The exodus of people from
Somalia’s northern region relates to the cleavage created between the
south and.the north on questions of distribution of power and resources
(The Middle East, JUne 1988). An estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 refugees
from Somalia and Sudan were said to have found shelter in Ethiopia (mg
Ethiopian Herald, February 27 and 9, 1989 and Addis Zemen, Yekatit
(February) 2, 1981 E.C.). As can be observed in Table 24, close to
591,000 refugees from. Somalia and some 384,000 from.Sudan.have found
temporary shelters in Ethiopia during 1988 and the first half of 1989.
The distribution of the refugees in NOrtheast- Africa as of 1988/89

follows:

117

Table 24. Refugeeppopulation distribution in N.E. Africa as of 1988

 

 

I S.N. I Refugee I Receiving I Population I
I I Source Country I Countgy I I
' ------ + ------------------ + ------------ + --------------------- '
I I
I l I Ethiopia I Sudan I 670,000—1,000,000 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 2 I Ethiopia I somalia I 440,000 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 3 I Ethiopia I Djibouti I 15,000 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 4 I Sudan I .Ethiopia I 384,700 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 5 I Somalia I Ethiopia I 453,000-591,359 I

Source: UNHCR News, various issues, The Ethiopian Herald,

February 7 and 9, 1989 March.22, 1988 and Addis Zemen,
Megabit (March) 13, 1980 E.C., WOrld Refugee Survey, 1987

As can be seen in Table 27, Appendix B, also the population of
forced migrants in the region has been increasing at an increasing rate
since the early 19703. The continuing conflicts between political groups
that have failed to compromise and governments that are obstinate are
responsible for the mess that is being observed in the region (Hakovirta
1986:97).

According to Hakovirta when Ethiopia was warring with Somalia, the
Eritrean Liberation Front thought ’victory’ was around the corner for
them.and they refused to negotiate a settlement. And after Ethiopia’s
victorious emergence from.the war and drive to settle scores in the
north, Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam. decided in favor of a
military solution. As the war continued, so did the refugee trek rise
(see Harkovirta, ibid., 97-98).

Part of the reason for the exodus of people from their localities

was, however, not only the politically insecure conditions and the

economically bankrupt environment that characterized the home country, as

118
contended earlier, but also the pull factor which the availability of
food presented beyond the borders of these nations. The provision of
relief food attracts those who are destitute to cross the border and
satisfy their survival needs if and when food is available on the other
side of the border.

That availability of food attracts ’healthy people’ (able-bodied)
also can be observed from.the situation in Somalia. This concern.was
voiced time and again. The WOrld Refugee Survey of 1985 (p.47) presents
the case from.Somalia in the following manner:

...refugee camps in Somalia are becoming part of the culture of
the region’s nomadic Somali people...(who) obtain. food in the
camps where conditions are often better than the surrounding
desert and the families from.Ethiopia and Somalia sent their women
and children to the camps, while the men continue to tend their
herds.

Somalia has, however, been receiving considerable assistance for
settlement purposes when in actual fact this was not justifiable on
these counts as well (refer to Table 29 in Appendix B). It is, therefore,
at this juncture that the politics of emergency international assistance
has considerable implications for the outflow of people from these
countries. International assistance is attracted by refugee receiving
nations which themselves are compelled to a degree to provide relief and
sometimes shelter for the forced migrants initially.

The call for international assistance is made by host nations which
soon realize that the maintenance of the refugee populations within their
borders is beyond their national capacity. This is especially the case
with food deficit and poor countries than other wise. The UNHCR, with the

agreement of host government (Loescher in Loescher et al, 1989:18-20),

starts relief operations with allocations from. the High commissioner’s

119

special emergency fund. This is followed by international assistance from
all sources-—bilateral, multilateral and voluntary agency sources.
Initially the assistance comes in trickles, but it increases depending on
the rate of inflow of dislocated people. Many starved people make their
way to the food distribution centres, both local and cross border ones.
This is done in an attempt to survive and the direction of the movement
is to where the refugees’ welfare in this case, their food needs, are
best served. Such a movement of people and the flow of food are thus
caught in a seemingly endless circularity with little change of
disengagement in the ebb and flow of socio-economic and political turmoil
inside the sending country. Humanitarian assistance is channeled in
keeping with the tempo of the flow of refugees.

"The more refugees a country has, the more assistance it is likely
to receive" (Simmance, in Rogge 1987:20). This assistance may well be
tinged by ideology or some perceived interest. It thus misses the
intended goal of helping people and may instead help to increase the rate
of forced migration. Reductions in food rations, on the other hand, some
times compel refugees to return home. An example of this is the Burmese
refugees who quickened the process of their repatriation from.Eangladesh
when they found out that food rations were being cut (Coles, Gervase,
Quoted by Cony and Stien in Loescher and.Monahan, 1989: 308). The case of
the 55,000 Ethiopian drought refugees who were forced to make a 50-day-
long trip (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1985) to the Sudan to satisfy
their dire need of food and who returned to Ethiopia on foot in.May-June
1985 when the Megs; (big) rains came, is one strong .point which supports
the contention that food availability, like the prospect of getting

higher income in urban and overseas labour markets, attracts destitute

 

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people and in this case from. Ethiopia to the Sudan. According to the
werld Refugee Report this returnee population’s number was 80,000 rather
than 55,000. The report says that in 1986 some 80,000 rural folks who
crossed the border into Sudan voluntarily returned home (World Refugee
Report, 1986:10).

The same was true of many refugees who crossed.the border from
Ethiopia into Somalia. At the height of the flow of considerable
assistance into Somalia from.international community sources, the refugee
population in that country grew in number (see Table 28 and 29 in
Appendix B).

Between 1979 and 1981 the refugee population rose from.450,000 to
1,540,000 (see UNHCR, Refugee Magazines 1979-1985 and Table 27 in
Appendix B). This coincided with the flow of a multi-purpose assistance
worth U.S.$49,078,200 in 1981 to $53,398,500 in 1986 (refer to Table 28
in Appendix B; see also Report of the UNHCR, G/AmOfficial Records: 4lst
Session, Supplement No. 12, 1986:31). The amount of all types of refugee
assistance that had been pumped into Somalia in 1982, 1983 and 1984 was
of the order of $49,078,200; 38,565,000 and $46,558,000, respectively
(UNHCR August 1983: 97, refer to Table 28 also). The observation of the
Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner in his 1981 appeal for
international assistance of the UNHCR.has thus some bearing on the issue
of the distribution of aid to refugees (see Section 5.7 below).

This large amount of assistance flow was sustained up until 1986 in
spite of the fact that more than half of the refugee population had
returned to Ethiopia in.1983 (see Table 30 in Appendix B and UNHCR Report
July 1986:56). In 1987, the amount went down to a U.S. $30,874,000 to

rise to an estimated $33,283,000 in 1988 (UNHCR Report...1986-87, 1987,

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51-55 and Report of 1986:56).

The relief food given to such. refugees has been also found to be
better in terms of both quality and quantity in some countries. The
basic daily ration or food basket delivered to refugee populations, for
instance, in Somalia consisted of:

250 grams of maize or sorghum

75 grams of wheat flour
20 grams of meat
40 grams of sugar
3 grams of tea
Source: UNHCR.Refugee Magazine, No.3, Sep.-Oct 1980.
This assorted bundle indeed contained nutritious food. And this

must have also been among the major factors that lured huge numbers of

refugees to Somalia in the late 19703 and early 19803.

5.5. The repatriation situation

Repatriation, compared to the refugee population in the region, has
had little relevance to the major 'population movements in NOrtheast
Africa. These population movements’ figures are negligible unless they
specifically refer to the Sudanese refugees most of whom.repatriated from
1971-1973 after the Addis Ababa agreement involving the Sudanese
government and the Anyanya forces (Akol, 1984, see also Table 30).

Another repatriation which.was fair in scale relates to Ethiopian
refugees who returned home after the UNHCR-Ethiopian Government-Djibouti
Government tripartite agreement for repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in
Djibouti (RRC, 1985:149-155). The number of returnees of Ethiopian and
Sudanese refugees from. each. of the two countries which are important
hosts and senders of refugees of the four nations of the region, has been

negligible in the 19803.

122

By 1985, some 320,000 returnees of the estimated 700,000 refugees
from.Somalia were registered in Kelafo and MUstahil, Ogaden region,
Ethiopia, for rehabilitation to their previous livelihood (UNHCR, Fact
Sheet, July 1985; UNHCR.Report 14 August 1987: 25-32, and WOrld Refugee
Survey 1985: 46). The UNHCR and the Lutheran world Federation were
attracted by small groups of spontaneous ahd voluntary repatriants for
whom rehabilitation programmes, supported by both.organizations, were set
up since the early 19803 (UNHCR, Fact Sheet, July 1985, UNHCR.Report
A/AC.96/657, 5 August 1985:98-100). This activity in turn magnetized more
refugees to return.

According to UNHCR expenditure reports, U.S.$408.5 was allocated to
returnees earlier and the same allocation rose to $12,177,000 in 1983
(Report of UNHCR, August 1983:53). In 1984 it went down to $7,900,000 to
rise again.in 1985 to U.S. $13,618,000 (UNHCR Report, 5 August 1985: 102-
103). The allocation for emergency relief assistance and rehabilitation
shot up to U.S. $26,700,000 under the special program.sub-heading. The
same allocation went down to U.S. $9,552,000 in 1986-1987.

International assistance was thus flowing to Ethiopia at a much
smaller rate compared to Somalia in particular despite the fact that more
than half of the refugees had returned to Ethiopia beginning 1983. This
is an indication of the politicization of assistance as it relates to

refugees in the region.

5.6. Forced migration or refugeeism.and.how it fits into
the general theory of migration
The data on refugee movements and the discussion above point to the

fact that the availability of resources, food in this case, does have

123

implications for the flow of country-folks toward the direction where
food and other necessities are available. Todaro’s (1969, 1970) basic
idea that migration is a function of the gap in income between rural and
urban areas and the probability of improving ones welfare by getting a
better paying job in.the latter, fits well with.the movement of people
across borders where they can obtain food, freely-distributed food. This
theory of Todoro has acquired empirical evidence in a study conducted by
Straubhaar (in Salvatore, ed., 1988: 139-159) and this has strengthened
the theory that the ’attractivity’ of better-paying jobs was the
motivating factor for people migrating from. southern Enrope to the
Federal Republic of Germany and France in particular in the 19803.

Caldwell’s (1969) research in Ghana also supported the assumption
that movement of people from rural to urban areas was linked to the
possibility of improving ones incomes (Refer also to Section 2.7 above).
Questions posed in France by Conde and Diagne (1986:103-104) brought out
similar results which supported the assertion that migrants were induced
by the wish to improve their economic position with the eventual view of
improving their incomes and that of their families. The absence of ’local
opportunities’ and the need to find areas of ’higher economic
opportunity’ constitute the push and pull factors of migration (Hammer
and Linn in Mills, 1987: 1259).

The movement of rural-folks from drought affected and economically
marginalized areas as well as from.conflict or war-affected regions is in
like manner motivated by the need to get food for a good number of
people. The Todoro model also finds an empirical evidence in this
migration of people as well. Lack of food in the drought affected areas

of Ethiopia in the mid 19803 forced destitute rural people to move out of

124

their localities to improve their welfare, or better still, to save their
lives. These groups of people and. individuals had reason enough to
convince themselves of the fact that their welfare would be enhanced if
they migrated to places where distribution of food took place as in
Somalia and Sudan. And paradoxically enough. their return.to their home
countries when their food needs are satisfied clearly shows the
objectives of their migration.

Food is thus the key to such a movement. Whether by "natural"
positioning or accident or political manipulation, food attracts the
destitute. A. segment of any refugee group follows the trails of food as
the Ethiopian refugee movements from/Tigrai and Eritrea to the Sudan as
well as from the Ogaden to Somalia and back indicate. This movement is an
explanatory factor for the contention that the source of the problem.is
the fragile existence of the people in terms of food in the local area
primarily. Such a movement of refugee groups according to Franks and
Chasin (1980: 10) is in a sense good because people go to where the food
is in order to survive. Secondly, it is also the "assistance child" or
the outcome of the free distribution of food elsewhere rather than.at the

refugees’ villages or districts in.their own.home countries.

5.7. Dealing with one of the root causes of migration:
Locally displaced populations
One major source of the forced migration of people in the region to
which less attention has been given is the displaced population
particularly in Ethiopia and the Sudan (see Table 31, Appendix B). The
effort made to assist the displaced population as much as the refugee one

has not been substantial. In one his appeals to the UNHCR for more

125

assistance to refugees in 1981, the Relief and Rehabilitation
Commissioner of Ethiopia in 1981 observed that the "rendering assistance
to one area and not to adjacent areas..." (i.e. an apparent reference to
the provision of assistance to refugees in Somalia and denial to
displacees in .Ethiopia) "...could contribute to the influx of refugees"
(U.N. Doc.A/AC.96/SR.337, Oct.16, 1981:4). The cause for the exodus of
refugees across borders is also the very factor which has been given to
the benign neglect of both the national governments and the international
donor community. Disaster prevention according to Kent (1987:119) are not
a priority of both until after the fact of the cataclysmic occurrences.
While monies have been flowing for refugees who cross borders, little was
flowing toward the areas disrupted inside the sending nations. The
UNHCR’s mandate,at least officially, covered only bona fide refugees.

There has been no active international agency like the UNHCR which
could follow up the mitigation of the plight of internal displacees. The
Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), which
is the U.N.’s arm.for this purpose, could only do little with the little
budgetary and extra budgetary resources made available to it. The 1982/83
and 1984/85 budgets allocated for UNDRO were U.S. $8.2 and $10.3 million,
respectively, while that of the UNHCR was $741.9 and $832.7 million for
the same period (U.N. Doc., 36th. Session, Supplement No. 6, 1981 and
1983:205-206 and 240-241, and 3-2 and 42-43, respectively).

UNDRO thus remains an organization which. can only appeal to or
notify bilateral donors to help countries with.displaced populations to
deal with the situation in the affected countries. It does not have the
machinery to mobilize international sympathy like the UNHCR. And.what is

more ’internal refugees’ or displaces are thought to be going on.well

126
with the status quo and unless they cross-borders little sympathy comes
forth in favor of them.

The problems relating to the exodus of people from.Ethiopia,
Somalia and Sudan appear to be fundamental which require both the
reduction of poverty and the resolution of civil conflicts. The
improvement of the well-being of the poor farmer or peasant in the rural
areas, through measures of stopping the on-going conflicts and by lending
hands to the destitute who can touch the leverage points of production,
can curtail the so far interminable outflow of forced migrants.

The transfer of a significant portion of the money spent on
counselling,‘ transportation and program. support for refugees in
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan would undoubtedly help increase
production or expand social services substantially in any one of the
refugee producing country’s local areas. In the words of UNHCRfls Director
of Assistance "...a disproportionate amount of resources was being
devoted to relief as compared to durable solutions, which.were essential
objectives of the UNHCR assistance" (U.N. Doc.A/AC.96/601, October 1,
1981:24). In another document, the UNHCR itself has admitted that in
refugee assistance its "emphasis has remained on the provision of food
and other immediate relief supplies" (U.N., Doc.A/AC.96/594, October 1,
1981:XV). The U.S.$141.3 million (see Table 32, Appendix B), expanded on
counselling transportation and administrative support compared with
voluntary repatriation (only $5,337.? million) for the 1981 to 1988
period (calculated from. Table 29, Appendix B) is an evidence of this
reality. A calculation of the voluntary repatriation, settlement and camp
(relief assistance for refugee camps) in Northeast Africa--Djibouti,

Ethiopia and Somalia-- for the same period also supports the UNHCR

127
director’s most appropriate observation relating to the stress on relief
programmes as opposed to durable solutions. Only 0.96 per cent or
U.S.$5,337.7 million. of the U.S. $553,464.9 million (calculated from
Table 29 in Appendix B) for these lines of expenditure went toward
voluntary repatriation. This total does not include expenses for

returnees in Ethiopia.

The expenditure for refugee maintenance in camps only in.Djibouti,
somalia and Sudan for the same period was U.S. $315,567.7 million or 56
per cent of the total (calculated from Table 29 as above). This excludes
the transportation, counselling and administration activities’
expenditures. The amount of money alloted for settlement activities in
the refugee accepting countries of Nertheast Africa was 42 per cent of
the total expenditure as shown above. The relief and related assistance
appear to have only minimal ripple effects in promoting the refugees‘
long-term welfare. If only a way of transferring these resources to the
localities of refugee-producing countries with stigmas of starvation and
poverty were found, the continuing influx would be stemmed considerably.
The saving of these funds for development purposes can indeed help many
would-be refugees become self-reliant.

Signs of hitting at the problem’s roots have been evolving slowly
but surely. These include the clustering of ideas around an approach.that
looks at a regional solution to the problem. of the movement of people
across international borders. Such an approach was suggested by the
UNHCR for the Horn of.Africa in particular. In the word of UNHCR’S report

to the General Assembly of the U.N.:

128

The causes and the socio-economic structUres of the
large scale population displacements in the area, their
needs and their various potential solutions are so
interrelated that efforts with a view to achieving a
regional approach to the refugee problems in the Horn of

Africa will continue to be pursued (U.N.Doc.A/AC.
96/594, October 1981).

This is indeed a process and an action in the right direction. Its

immediate launching on a more expanded basis is, nonetheless, long over

due .

129

Chapter 6

Foreign aid: a good supplement to domestic efforts

to combat food.insecurity, poverty and forced.migration

The food production problem, aside from its debilitating effect on
the working’population in many parts of the N.E. African countries, has
intercepted the flow of resources into the agricultural sector which is
the main stay of the economies. NOt only are domestically mobilized
resources, however little, are expended on emergency efforts but
externally-raised ones are consumed and/or checked by the very nature of
existing low level of activities in the countries.

Ramphal, in Chidzaro and Gauhr, (1986:16) notes the well-
known fact that:

The food crisis has been.superimposed on an economic crisis
deriving from chronic external financing difficulties and debt.
Africa has suffered from. serious reversals on the external
front... Its terms of trade have deteriorated, such.that over the
last ten years low income African countries have lost 20%Iin.the

purchasing power of their exports overall... capital flows have
become harder to attract and have hardened in their terms.

As pointed out earlier, one of the reasons for fishing for external
food and development assistance is motivated by the wish to redress such
imbalances that surface as a consequence of deteriorating food production
and terms of trade conditions. The contribution of foreign aid in the

mitigation of starvation and the enhancement of economic development in

130
TWCs especially in N.E. Africa has been considerable. Its efficient
application to activities that lead to increase in food production.has

been noted in several countries.

6.1. The pros and cons of foreign aid

A brief appreciation of the pros and cons of foreign aid in
particular would help one to have a clearer insight into the role aid.has
been playing in mitigating emergencies and reducing poverty in N.E.
Africa. Its advantages are at times sterilized by politics, local as
well as international. A detailed discussion of this issue is not the aim
of this thesis.

Food aid is attacked on two counts. The first is that it leads to
the ’neglect of agriculture’ and places more resources in the hands of
the privileged few at the expense of the rural poor (Lappe et al 1980 and
Bauer 1984). A more extreme version of this views is contained in the
writings of Lappe, who believes that all development assistance "actually
increases hunger and repression by reinforcing the power of national and
international elites who usurp the resources rightfully belonging to the
hungry" (Lappe, et al, 1980: 55).

T.W. Schultz also argues that "aid in kind...has the effect of
increasing the capacity of the government that receives such aid to
continue discriminating against its own agriculture" (Schultz,1964).
This view is strongly supported by“ Singer et al, (1987, see Ch.5) who
enumerate a number of areas including balance of payments and budget
deficit support, economic development and institutional (schools,
hospitals, mother and child care) changes that occur as a result of the

flow of aid and help governments to stay in power.

131

Blaxter (1986:101-102), after a considered discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of aid in general, comes to the conclusion
that emergency and related development assistance is only in order and
much useful. He argues that the settlement programmes undertaken in Sri
Lanka and Ethiopia which.have international assistance inputs have helped
to decrease human sufferance. Due to these assistance flows, as he put
it cogently: "there has been an amelioration of the human condition,
which while slow, would not otherwise have occurred," (Ibid.: 104). This
has also been the view of the WOrld Bank. Jackson (1982:93), a leading
proponent of the counter-productive nature of food assistance in the
rehabilitation of disaster affected populations, supports the provision
of food aid wherever it is genuinely needed, for instance, for refugees
and in emergencies.

Food aid in fact helps food-short countries in two important ways.
First, it can help them in overcoming the temporary food demand and
supply imbalances that accompany the development process. In these
countries, the surge in demand for food that occurs in the middle stages
of development frequently outstrips the production capabilities of
domestic agriculture (Mellor in Holist et al, 1987: 55).

Second, food aid can be an important instrument of income transfer
from.the. rich developed countries to poor people in developing countries
(Singer et al, 1987). Because the poor spend the bulk of their
additional income on food, the provision of food would raise their
incomes. The availability of more food for consumption, accumulation and
its conversion into cash after arrangements are made with donors can
indeed be one source for bolstering the income of the poor in famine-

ridden areas. Food aid is thus a backup for national programmes for

132
benefiting the poor.’Dhis goal may be achieved through food-for-work and
food subsidy programmes.

Foreign aid thus helps a lot in getting food deficit countries out
of famine and.huger conditions to an extent both in the short-run by
providing relief and in the long-run by developing agriculture and the
infrastructure it needs, e.g. roads, storage facilities, environmental
rehabilitation, etc. Evidences of this are the food-for-work programmes
which.have benefited regions in Ethiopia among others. Some 22,000 kms of
terraces were built in.the Hararghe region of Ethiopia in a period of two
years up to 1982 (RRC, 1985).

WFP assistance is too well noted in this regard. In .Ethiopia, as in
many food deficit countries, the organization’s relief cum development
project (food-for-work) has began to help the destitute in natural
disaster areas to be more productive. In Ethiopia, the organization has
been providing food for the hungry

not in the form. of free handouts but in exchange for hard work
aimed at laying the foundations of self-sufficiency. Up to 1985,
some 700,000 hectares of land. had been forested or terraced.
Almost 20,000 hectares of forests are planted each. year and no
less than 200 kilometers of soil or stone terraces constructed.
Even if the programmes expanded at 20 per cent a year, it would

take 50 years to cover the areas susceptible to erosion
(Harrison, 1987:124-133).

WFP has been active in "terracing and reforestation and other
activities aimed at rehabilitating degraded land and securing it for
future cultivation" (WFP, 1986 in Review:12). In the words of the
organization:

The project is the largest of its kind in Africa. Close to U.S.
$180 million has been allocated to cover activities up to 1989.

WFP provides food to workers as payment for long-term conservation
particularly appropriate assistance in an area that has

133
traditionally suffered from lack of food, even in normal drought-
free times. Results to-date are impressive. About 200,000
kilometers of hillsides have been terraced-—enough to build a one
meter high stone-wall four times around the world (Ibid.).

WFP Executive Director James Ingram, who was once on an on-the-spot
evaluation mission to one of the Ethiopian food-for-work project areas in
1982 commented: "This is a good job. I have never seen anything like this
before," (RRC, 1985:210). Clay and Singer (1985: 72), quoting the
literature on food aid, cite the food-for-work programme as a successful
one which typically leads to the "institutionalization of public works on
an enhanced scale."

Generally speaking, the international economic environment, trade,
technology, commercial capital and development assistance, have
contributed a lot to major changes in world agriculture (world
Development Report 1985:40). The Marshal Plan, through the agency of
which the U.S. transferred significant amounts (to the tune of U.S. $16
billion) of resources to reconstruct world War II-shattered Enrope as
well as the infusion of food and capital into Indian and Southeast Asian
agriculture are testimonies of the validity of this assertion. This type
of a new and massive "transfer of resources from.the North.to the South"'
is what is appropriate to the world (Widgren, in Loecher and Monahan,
1989:58) and particularly to the nations suffering from continued food
shortages.

But in spite of such results, the advantages of foreign aid is
pervaded by economic interests and.political and religious ideologies of
local as well as international nature. That aid.has a religious bias can
be perceived from.the fatness of the resources transferred by members of

the Organization of Petroleum. Exporting Countries (OPEC) of the Middle

134

East to sister moslem nations. Ethiopia, a christian country in the
environs of the Middle East and with a population of 42 million in the
early 19803, received only 0.49% of the OPEC grants, while tiny Djibouti,
with about half a million souls, made 6.13% of the grant money
transferred for Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti from 1970 to 1984 (see
Table 36 in Appendix C). Sudan made 62 per cent while Somalia received 32
per cent of this assistance.

The superpower clash. which is consistent with. the creation of
spheres of influence for strategic and economic purposes (Johnston and
Taylor 1986:235) is one problem which is in the way of a relaxed transfer
of development aid. The basis for the tension and rivalry, in addition
to its humanitarian dimension, is tinged by also economic interests (Clay
and Singer l985:9, see also Tables 33-38 in Appendix C). It is motivated
by the creation of spheres of influence which in the last analysis would
make easy access to resources and trade possible.

This is also manifested by the tying of aid. varying "tying and
procurement rules may impose an administrative burden" on recipients of
aid (UNCTAD, Report of 1986:97 and refer to Table 38 in Appendix C).
According to the same UNCTAD Report, slightly over one-fifth of

Development Assistance committee (DAC) aid to least developed countries

as a group is tied while
"approximately two-thirds of bilateral commitments, of which
technical cooperation and food aid accounted, for an important
part, were estimated to have been tied." (see also Table 38).
On the other hand, multilateral assistance which allows purchases on

competitive bidding and OPEC assistance, both of them. as they relate to

concessional assistance, are generally free of procurement restrictions

135

(UNCTAD, ibid., 97). But the rising shift in the system. of transferring
resources through bilateral rather than multilateral channels has
constrained the sidestepping of these restrictions. Kent (1987372) is
among those who saw this "increasing tendency to provide assistance
bilaterally" rather than other wise. Kent saw some problems in the
relatively free use of such resources as a consequence. But according to
the UNCTAD Report referred to above DAC countries have been reporting
that they were increasingly covering local costs and giving priority to
untied forms of assistance, among other things (Ibid.).

This new initiative of relaxing’the transfer of resources for poor
countries would help expedite their development. Economic development
was oftentimes viewed by many donors as the concern of individual
countries; As a consequence of this general view "...financial grants
for purely developmental actions were becoming harder to obtain..."
(Singer et al, 1987:86).For a great number of donors emergency
humanitarian assistance, therefore, was considered the most appropriate

and legitimate cause for aiding nations in disaster situations.

6.2. The cash for—work project and in-miggation

The cashsfor-work program.to which reference has been.made earlier
on in this thesis has turned out to be a factor that checks the outflow
of forced migrants as the programme proved in four districts in
Ethiopia’s four regions. Under the system. the destitute and/or those
people on the verge of disaster are provided with monthly cash
advancement in order to enable them to purchase food from. the market or
adjoining localities with surpluses (UNICEF, 1985:32).

The programme in a nutshell addresses two sets of problems. The

136
first is the provision of basic necessities for survival. The second one
constitutes the construction of a bridge, as it were, that would excite
the requisite resources, human as well as production processes that would
eventually bring about self-sufficiency. As the UNICEF document
(1985:33) succinctly put it, cashsfor-work "provides a practical means
of protecting peoples’ food entitlement while contributing to longer-term
preventive and development measures."

Cashrfor-food is a system.whereby "victims of natural disasters" are
provided with sums of money in lieu of relief food where food grains are
obtainable from. near-by market places or adjoining localities at
manageable prices" (RRC/UNICEF, Report, October 1985). The problem.was
not the nonavailability of food, but the means to purchase it with on the
part of the destitute.

Even at the height of the 1972-74 great wello Drought in Ethiopia,
food was both flowing into markets of the region and out of the region
as well, (Sen 1984:469, Padmini, UNICEF 1985:32). Market prices were
found to be inelastic for a range of grains in the region. 'Dhis must
have been caused by the sluggish demand that was there, inter alia, and
hence the reason for the transfer of food to other areas. Those with no
cash or with little cash. had their "entitlement" eroded by force of
circumstances. Such segments of people thus become so destitute that
they began to line up for the long and arduous journey aiming at securing
food and/or employability.

Although migration in search. of food at international food
distribution centers at cross border locations is a recent phenomenon,
the destitute took refuge in urban ad other areas of Ethiopia, for

instance, in.the 19803 as in the 19703 to survive. They definitely put a

137
lot of pressure to services and the staggering economdes of their own
urban areas and those of refugee hosting countries.

Net only this, the cost of transportation, logistics,
administrative operations, among others, to distribute food to the
famine-stricken in forced migrant hosting nations by donors and
governments has turned out to be colossal (see Table 32 in.Appendix B).
Between 1981 and 1988 some U.S.$141 million were spent on counselling,
transportation and programme support and administration by UNHCR in
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Close to U.S.$110 million of this
expenditure went to defraying food. hauling activity costs involving
relief centers in the main. The inconveniences that result from.the
distribution of food and other relief that is incompatible with.needs and
tastes of the recipients has, it appears, been combining with.the three
factors enumerated above--migration to areas where food and employment is
available putting much pressure to the migrant’s destination area and the
increasing cost of relief food distribution and administration--to inject
some thinking into the policies relating to the provision of aid to
disaster victims.

The cash-for-work programme was started by the UNICEF and the Relief
and Rehabilitation Commission of Ethiopia in 1983. Its positive impact
included the curbing of the tendency to migrate (RRC/UNICEF,IOctober
1985). Its creation of a stable community life and.the intensification of
agricultural activities in Mama Mider, Northern Shewa, one of the
traditional migrant sending regions of northern Ethiopia, is noted. An
almost full planting of the land in Mama Midir was made possible with.the
provision of "seed money", money for the purchase of seeds for planting,

according to the REC/UNICEF project evaluation document.

138

One of the most important outcomes of the cash-for-work project has
been its attraction of in-migrants. Some 18 members of households in
Mama Mider and eight in Dodota, Arsi Region, returned home to reinstate
themselves (BBC/UNICEF, October 1985 and November 1985).

The preceding discussion, therefore, indicates that intervention
programmes such as the cash-for-work scheme not only checks migration,
but it also attracts people to return to their homes. It thus saves
forced migrant sending nations the trouble of forgoing potential revenues
that would be collected if peasants and farmers ploughed their land by
staying in their localities and the receiving countries from expending
whatever little of their surplus resources hosting alien people.

The international commmity which supports both bona fide refugees
and other forced migrants can also economize and switch its hard-
collected funds for priority progranmes. Since the absorptive capacity of
refugee accepting countries in sustaining progranmes of development for
refugees in some remote areas is very much limited, the need to find
alternative ways of solving the refugee problem is only reasonable.

The fear of particularly many industrialized Western countries, in
regards to giving jobs that may be around for their own nationals for
refugees as well and providing the refugees with maintenance allowances
and services may be a threat to their well-being. Their refusal to take
more and more non-political or economic migrants, who inundate their job
markets, nowadays, is thus justified on this count alone. The restrictive
measures these host nations have begun to apply in an effort to lock
entry points would, however, be minimized if forced migrants who move out
of their home countries are helped at their own places of origin.

The transfer of a good deal of the resources expended on the

139

maintenance of relief centers in neighbouring host countries to the
localities of the forced migrants is a measure which.may not have any
parallel. It must be noted that success in this regard is dependent upon
a firm commitment both by national governments and the international
donor community. Unfulfilled promises of guaranteed employment or the
laying-off those employed returnees as among'the "Anyanya" forces in the:
Sudan (Akol in Rogge 1987: 154) after the February 1972 Addis Ababa
agreement would take the situation back to square one. This agreement
stopped the previous civil war in the Sudan. The anticipated industrial
growth foreseen by the Sudanese government did not materialize and the
government was compelled to lay-off the repatriants (Ibid.). This may
well be one the factors which may have reignited the civil war in the
Sudan which has been raging since 1983. A sustained resource injection to
such groups of people would help avoid a stress and strain situation
which would lead to conflict in society. The cashpfor-work programme in
Ethiopia seems to have demonstrated that food production conditions among
poor communities can change through the inflow of resources from.outside
the local environment. This intervention programme can thus bear fruit if
it is vigorously pursued with an updated information back-up and re-
evaluation.

The provision of cash for the destitute in foodrshort areas is a
kind of assistance that goes to the root of the problem. As Kent
(1987:175) has keenly observed the international system. of disaster
response is a recognition of the "appropriate and timely intervention as
well as enhanced coordination"; but that these elements which can change
the situation for the better are made inoperative because of "contending

goals, interest" and organization procedures that at "best of times

140
resemble a kind of constrained anarchy". A.radical change of this state
of affairs is an absolute necessity for the concerted effort exerted to
ameliorate the conditions of the destitute.

But whatever the case, as Clay and Singer (1985:67) also argue the
provision of any assistance at the "right place and at the right time"
with a foresight of directing it to a "socially useful end product" is
most essential. The avoidance of the leakage of such a resource before it
reaches the intended beneficiaries and an assurance that it would in.the
end create "assets of an adequate standard...at a reasonable cost" (Clay
and Singer, ibid.) helps to extricate the ’food.poor’ from a dependency
syndrOme that is observed in many parts of the world and promotes
development in the local area of forced.migrant sending countries.

That the provision of cash also on a loan basis aids the destitute
can be observed from. its impacts on the rural poor in Bangiadesh.and
Pakistan. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Agriculture Development
Bank of Pakistan (ADBP) have enabled poor households to improve their
farm.and cottage industry incomes a great deal (Arab News, NOV 24, 1989.

These particular credit facilities help rural women, small-holder
farmers and the landless to establish cottage industries, to purchase
farm.inputs and set up livestock to improve their livelihood. The credit
schemes are supported by the Asian Development Bank and International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in Pakistan’s case, and.the
Grameen (rural) Bank.which was started in.1976 through a small private
initiative in Bangladesh’s case. The Grameen Bank catered for the
landless and the loans were secured without any normal bank collateral
requirement and 75 per cent of the borrowers were women (werld

Development Report 1988:117). The borrowers themselves owned 75 per cent

141
of the assets of the bank while the country’s government’s share was only

25 per cent (The Economist, October 1986:26). Those "under half acre of

 

land or less than the value of one unirrigated acre of assets, can get
loans" (Ibid.). Some 250,000 borrowers (three-fourth of whom were
females) or over a million people benefitted from the bank’s services in
the early 19803. The bank has become a Mecca for development economists
and is being copied around the worlduChicago and Arkansas included.

The FAO initiated projects in eight African countries are other
instances where the rural poor benefit from such a credit and aid
provision arrangements. In these countries, the FAO encouraged farmers to
organize into groups of 15 people and "stood as a guarantor" to enable
them to borrow money from local banks for the purchase of fertilizers and
other farm inputs. Wenty-five such groups in Kenya achieved "notable
increases in maize and potato yields" (FAQ, World Food Report, 1987:44).

The repayment rates, which stood at 73 per cent, by the women and
farmers groups in Pakistanhas been found to be hig'ily satisfactory.
Full repayment of the loan, at 12 per cent interest rate, in the
Pakistani borrower’s cases has been required; a one-year grace period has
also been attached to the loan. In Bangladesh, the repayment rate was a
high of 98 per cent. Also in Aakagema District of Kenya, the 25 farmer
groups assisted by the FAO repaid 98 per cent of the total debt.
According to the FPO, this was a recovery rate rarely achieved in many
other credit programmes; the farmers managed to save U.S.$6,000 (FAO,
1987:42). Such loans have thus set farmers and other groups on the road
to self-sufficiency. They should be allowed to mushroom in rural
Northeast Africa as well.

The cash-for-work intervention progranme, initiated on behalf of the

142
food insecure peasant farmers, as was discussed above, has also helped to
change the rate of the outflow of refugees or forced migrants. It can
also work well as a widely acceptable policy shift in dealing with the
chronic situation.that the forced migrant problem has brought about in
N.E. Africa as well as in other parts of the continent and indeed in the
world.

The credit and cash-for—work programmes targeted at the poor may not
have an immediate impact on.the economies of NOrtheast African countries
and more specifically Ethiopia. But they have to be pursued. hard within
the limits of the resources that can be mobilized from.all sources. With
time their imprint on the economy would be significant. Small farmers who
are the backbone of the food deficit countries like those of Nertheast
Africa can make considerable contributions to their countries’ growth and
development if programmes designed to help them help themselves are
worked out.

The results of relief operations in Ethiopia in 1984 and 1985,
following one of the severest droughts in the country, have shown that
international aid and cooperation can help millions of starved people
survive through hard times of gnawing droughts and man-made disasters. In
the words of Jansson, the U.N. Relief Operation Head in Ethiopia from
December 1984 to January 1986, the then relief operation "kept alive
more than seven million Ethiopians and enabled some 800,000 people
displaced by the famine to return home and begin to grow food" (Jansson
et al, 1987:74). This colossal effort is yet another indication of the
international community’s desire to help people visited by droughts time
and again. Like it was argued earlier the momentum of such operation

should be kept alive over a number of years. albeit in a lower scale,

143
fanning small-holder agriculture in the drought affected areas slowly and
continually. The recurrence of the disaster conditions witnessed in
Ethiopia and in the NOrtheast African region as a whole can be minimized
and controlled through the supply of food and farm.inputs as well as cash
depending of the particular needs of the rural poor.

The experience of small and hard-working farmers in Nepal who
plough eroded and steep foothills and who "produce more than their
neighbours on large holdings in the irrigated and basically more fertile
valleys" (FAQ, World Food Report, 1987:21) appear to show that small is
also beautiful and rewarding, N.E. Africa’s farmers can also be a source
of hope if they are also accorded participatory role in managing their
own economic activities and if they are assisted to satisfy their basic
needs in terms of food as well as in terms of basic farm inputs or the
means to obtain these for an expanded production also on less fertile and
steep slopes which characterize the region’s traditional highland areas.

Such grass-roots development schemes are few in number. Their
popularization would in all probability eventuate in "resource building
activities" (Singer et al, 1987:86) which would slowly bring about
measures of self-sufficiency in food for people afflicted by recurrent

disasters.

144

CONCLUSION

As has been discussed in some detail earlier on in this thesis, the
movement of a substantial number of hungry and or famished people in
Nertheast Africa is motivated by an expected availability of food outside
the stressed local area where food shortages are experienced repeatedly
and at times devastatingly. Urban and surplus producing regions as well
as, in emergency situations, relief centers within disaster-hit nations
and neighboring countries, constitute the destinations of the movement of
people.

I People, as it were, are forced to go out of their local areas in
search of food, among other things. The drought and instability (war)
conditions worsen the peasant’s or small-holder agriculturist’s ability
to satisfy his basic daily food requirements or his capability to produce
more.

Food insecurity and poverty and the consequent forced migration,
.malignant problems in N.E. Africa, can only be addressed if the
relationship between them. is exhaustively studied unlike the small
attempt made by this thesis. Both.domestic and international efforts,
more so local ones, should be exerted in a cooperative venture to
adequately address the problem.

The following four major steps, inter alia, have to be taken in

order to change the food shortage and consequent famine and/or hunger as

145
well as forced migration problems in the NOrtheast African nations--
Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.
1. An immediate end to the long-tailed civil wars and enmity
between the NOrtheast African countries.
2. Democratization of the socio-economic and political systems.
3. Improvements in the terms of trade and stabilization of primary
product prices.
4. Transfer of more international community resources to food

deficit countries for addressing the problem at its roots.

1. Immediate end to the civil wars in the region

An immediate end to the long-tailed civil wars in.Ethiopia,
Somalia and Sudan should be the initial step toward reinstating and
releasing the forces of agricultural production. The central governments
and the numerous opposition groups have been fighting each other with
the express purpose of controlling and/or sharing power.

These endless fights, which. have been cause for the decimation of
hundreds of thousands of people and for the starvation of millions of
them, should be replaced by talks; first, to resolve the existing
political differences, secondly, to bring about a just and a rationale
political order in which.all parties among the larger society, i.e., not
only active political group members within. the body politic and among
the opposition, partake and, thirdly, to generate production. A.genuine
participation of the people of each. country in deciding matters
affecting their own affairs is an essential component of the process of
democratization of the socio-economic and political systems.

The direct and indirect confrontation among the three countries

146
which is clearly manifested by their active support for the opposition
groups in each country, although it has helped to challenge the dominant
rule from. the centres, has also strengthened the centres considerably.
And by so doing it has sharpened the conflict adding fuel to the already
not so easily extinguishable fire of the crisis in food production that
has ingrained itself for so long. A genuine and gorgeous suppoort which
could have induced substantial changes in the countries could have long
ago obviated the need for the huge sacrifices made so far. In other
words, the supports extended are self-interest based involving long-term
economic advantages and short-term. military gains aimed at quashing
opposition to central rule. A regional solution to the food crisis can
only come when democratization is allowed to take root in each nation and
moreover when a sense of mutual advantage of the parties involved takes
precedence over “all other considerations. A.regional approach.to the
solution of the problem.is thus one way of giving peace and.oonsequently

food production the attention they need.

2. Democratization of the socio-economic and political system

Access to the means of production of food, along with. the right of
the people to decide questions relating to their own local affairs, also
goes a long way in inducing' individual and group entrepreneurship. This
is among the essential first steps that have to be taken to begin to
address the food crisis in the region. Food production policies that
excite the majority of the population to work are primary inputs for
moving production ahead. The promotion of incentives to produce and
freedom to dispose of the same through a little controlled market

mechanism is thus urgently needed.

147

Amartya Sen (in World.Development, 1989: 778) has contended.that
freedom as it relates to "economic incentives in the expansion of
national output in general and food production in. particular... is a
primary condition which. helps poverty-stricken populations". What Sen
(Ibid.) calls the "instrumental perspective of freedom. Which.includes
the freedom. to earn profits" as well as the freedom.to oppose the
political system and achieve autonomy are basic components of the
"delivery and use of food".

Indeed, the decentralization of the decision-making process and the
participation of the people in development activities should be aimed at
"reducing the heavy functional loads upon the state (Rothchild and
Gymah-Boadi in Ravenhill 1986:281). As Fieldhouse rightly observed this
condition would "free local initiatives as well as make a leaner and
stronger central state more able to tackle the reponsiblities remaining
in its hands" and consequently help to increase its overall
effectiveness (Ibid.).

The "freedoms" referred to above pave the way for a nascent
accumulation of capital and efficient use of resources which in the
longerun can counter poverty. Systematic measures of combatting
problems of development, or "poverty elimination" particularly in low-
income food deficit nations, can generate employment (Harf and Trout,
1986:164). Also low income food deficit countries can boost their
national income "satifactorily only with.a good production performance
within agriculture and ...distribution improvements are easier to make
when production is rising rather than stagnating" (FAO, 1979:223). The
full participation and indeed an active participation of all those who

are capable of working is a matter that governments should encourage and

148
allow to unfold.

Governments should thus take the liberal road to development by
drastically decreasing their high-handed involvement in the economy and
instead concentrating their efforts, inter alia, on the building of
physical and social infrastructures which.stimulate the climate for new
initiatives by the people. ’Dhis, among other things, constitute full-
time jobs for all governments. They should thus essentially limit their
efforts in taking up these and other similar activities which individual
entrepreneurs cannot handle in the short-term.

In other words, the state can play a major or supplemental role
depending on the sector that is taken up at a particular time. In this
sense the state would play a major role but individuals would have
"greater scope for making full use of their...skills, enterprise and
assets", (Fieldhouse, 1986:95). Development policies should take these
realities into account for better results.

Growth rates that may be achieved from the participation of all
segments of society can expand the revenue base of the state which.can
allocate a portion of this to deal with.poverty. This expanded source of
revenue as Manetsch (in Ecology of FoOd and Nutrition, 1982:225) argued
in relation to cases of health/nutrition intervention programmes in.poor
countries would help promote overall development serving at the same
time the needs of the poor in the general scheme of national economic
development. CUrry’s (1989) view that sustained economic development
reuqires the participation of the poor is relevant here. In his own
words: "sustainable development requires a broad-based economic growth
in which the widespread productive participation of and benifit to the

poor are essential features" (CUrry, 1989: 1089-90).

149
3. Improvements in the terms of trade and stabilization of prim py
product prices

Improvement in the terms of trade for the least developed countries.
stabilization of primary product prices and the decrease in real
interest rates on internationally borrowed money will nelp those
nations to save huge amounts of resources for their economic activities
as discussed.in.Chapter IV. The savings aChievcd can be used to generate
production in the agricultural sector. This would considerably bolster
their eConomies t.rough forward and backward linkages within and outside
agriculturc.
towever, little now and largely misplaced and
misallocctcd have to also be managed well for any meaningful resource
flow into agricu ture. A correct and wise allocation of these resources
in Zinc with the dictates of efficiency and optimality reduces poverty

and insecurity considerably and also limits large scale population

L.
I

dislocations which have become common in NOrtheast Africa. Foreign aid
lots in particular, at this point in time, have thus major roles to
play in giving a jerk to the development process that is increasingly
foiled by resource immobility and the governments’ benign neglect of the
most important agricultural sector-- small-holder farmer agriculture.
Scuh a continued flow of aid which. should contain supplemental
resource for development requires a serious discussion between the
industrialized North and primary product producer South in the spirit of
the New International Economic Order (NIEC). .A diplomatic and political
offensive which would bring about cooperation and which would enhance
increased understanding between the two worlds is vital. It is long

overdue.

150

As a 1988 conference on cooperation for International Development,
as it relates to the U.S., clearly saw, the industrialized world would
need the developing one for the future of both lies in their cooperation
rather than otherwise. The food deficit least developed countries in
Africa can only be self-sufficient if such cooperation materializes and
indeed if an adequate level of assistance-are transferred to supplement
domestic efforts (FAQ, 9lst Session, 1987).

Failure to provide increased assistance for this important sector
would further disrupt the socio-economic life and the stability of the
region which inturn hampers the small effort made to produce its food
which would in turn lead to ever more forced migrations. This end
result of instability in life and food production would not only harm
the forced migrant source countries’ welfare, but of those near and far
participants who, with some change of policies, can alter the situation
for the better. The restrictions 'host countries impose on refugee
movements (McDowall, 19:18) and the appeals of first instance asylum
nations to get more assistance to deal with the burden the problem
entails are all the more reason enough for addressing the problem.at the
local level.

Like first asylum neighboring countries as those of N.E. Africa, for
instance, European and North. American industrialized countries have
narrowed down the avenue for issuing passports for refugee
resettlements. Of the estimated total world-wide 10 million refugees,
these nations can only take 150,000 a year for resettlement (Ford
Foundation, August 1983: 14 and WOrld Refugee Report, 1986: 67-73). Even
as far back as 50 years ago, the League of Nations High Commisioner for

Refugees, in a letter, which announced his resignation and addressed to

151

the League’s Secretary General, predicted that the then international
community "in the present economic condition of the world have only
"...limited power of absorption of refugees" (McDonald quoted by Coles
in Loescher and Monahan, 1989:409-410). It is to avoid the increasing
burden of sharing their resources and services which.may be strained by
continuing flow of migrants that these countries with high levels of
standard of living opted for such restrictions. African host
governments whose call for burden sharing’ has not been elevated enough
despite repeated calls for assistance have, more than once, themselves
indicated their support for voluntary repatriation (Stein in Rogge,
1987: 56, Berry et al, 1983).

Third World rural refugees, the majority of whom are rural forced
migrants (Christensen 1982:3, CIMADE 1986:89 and Griffin in Hollist et
al 1987:133) would have to be satisfied by existing meagre resources of
the first instance host nations or the limited assistance advanced by
the international community for their upkeep. The extra financial fund-
raising drive initiated by the UNHCR in 1984 through the agency of ICARA
II, 9-11 July 1984, in the spirit of burden-sharing, was almost a
virtual failure.

At ICARA II, the refugee-inundated nations pushed for the flow of
extra funds towards economic development_ programmes that would also
include support for their deteriorating economic conditions worsened by
refugee influxes. The countries for whom. the request was made insisted
that such programmes should be covered out of the regular development
assistance transfers to these countries (Stein in Rogge, 1987:56). As
Stein convincingly argues:

to the donors, larger refugee assistance budgets and fewer

152
durable solutions raise the specter of an endless drain of
resources, of expanded burden sharing that goes on and on.with
no solutions in sight (Ibid.:56).

The observation above demonstrates that, all said and done, the
forced migrant problem.has to be attempted to be solved at its roots.
The refugee-sending nations’ governments of NOrtheast Africa, as role
palyers in the creation of the problem, should attempt to extinguish the
fire that worsened the situation in the first place. A genuine attempt
can mitigate the poverty and food insecurity conditions that have
ingrained themselves in the region. As Mr. MCDonald, the former League
of Nations High Commissioner, 50 years ago, also rightly put it, the
problem of refugees "...must be tackled at its source if disaster is to
be avoided" (McDonald as quoted by Goles in Loescher and MOnahan
1989:409).

Food shortages and poverty, as was argued earlier on, are not only a
result of inequity in the distribution of resources among segments of
societies. These inequities themselves also emanate from."inadequacy of
resources, shortage of motivated and trained manpower, absence of local
expertise and appropriate technology, traditional resistance to socio-
economic changes or innovations", etc., (Ahmed in Beg et al, 1980:160).
According to Ahmed these can be identified as "zero" factors of
development and they are factors which can "...completely neutralize,
unhinge or misdirect the development process" (Ibid.). Attempts at
addressing’these problems would help quicken the pace of development. As
Dovering (1988:170-171) also remarked, a better-trained human resource
factor, among others, limits or accelerates development. It is thus

sound to argue that with the allocation of resources aimed at improving

153

the lot of the rural poor, these factors must be taken into account.
Unfortunately, however, many governments and international organizations
fail to see the interplay of a multiple set of factors--man-made and
natural disasters as well as the scarcity of resources--in limiting
development. Based on some assumptions that are less well-scrutized and
limitations faced because of shortages of resources, they begin
development programmes that are both resource-consuming and ones that at
times bring about distortions in existing development activities.

The destabilization wrought by a blindfold sticking to a prescribed
policy of development by governments and the withdrawal or threat of
withdrawal of funds by the such institutions as International Menetary
Fund (IMF) and other bilateral sources of finance and the imposition of
development models would not be in the interest of the small farmer
(Raikes 1988:259). A relaxed environment of development and transfer of
resources, based on thorough studies of the needs of the poor are
essential components of expanding economic activity. An open economic
policy and a flexible system of transfer of resources may help a lot in
regenerating the economy and in encouraging the poor and those facing

acute shortages of food in particular to produce more.

4. Transfer of international community resources to food deficit
countries for addressingpthe problem at its roots
Surely, resources available for increasing numbers of forced
migrants are limited and the international instability that is fired as
a consequence lingers. Even the UNHCR’s hint that funds for Ethiopian
returnees from Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan were limited for its 1986/87

programmes is a clear indication of the fact that a reasonable solution

154

to the refugee prOblem. is yet a long way ahead. Attitudinal and policy
changes to address the problems right at their sources--the rural areas
of refugee-generating nations--are important major steps toward solving
the scourge of famine. The question as to where the resources for
mounting such programmes would come is pertinent here. A reduction in
military spending at the individual country and/or international level
may well be a quick answer to the question. The chunk of resources that
military spending chops in N.E. .Africa was discussed in 4.2.2, in
Chapter 4, of this thesis. The amount of resources that go into this
wasteful venture world-wide is colossal.

As the U.N. Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, has said "official
development assistance from.’all sources’ in an.entire year constituted
only 18 days of military expenditure" (quoted in Blaxter 1986: 105).
Also according to Widgren (in Loescher and Menahan. 1989:57) official
development assistance to poor countries was only one-twenty-fifth of
the total annual military expenditure or it represented "...well over 5
per cent of world output".'Dhis expenditure may be a source of funds
for programmes that aim. at addressing food.shortages in food deficit
nations. This is now justified by the current tendency to reduce the
arms race world-wide. The continuing conflicts in Nbrtheast Africa do
need to be quashed in order to enable the hungry millions in the region
as elsewhere to feed themselves and in order for the world to see less
of the awful sights of grotesque human beings injured by famines.

For those who have fled their countries as refugees for any reason,
except political, no better alternative than voluntary repatriation (the
other major responses being first country settlement and third country

resettlement) is the most practical as Stein (in Rogge: 50) and UNHCR

155

(quoted in CIMADE:126) contend. In the words of UNHCR’s director of
assistance also, "...the only genuine durable solution was voluntary
repatriation to the country of origin as compared with. temporary
solutions such as the provision of emergency assistance ..." which would
be of help until the root causes of their flight were no more (U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/SR.336, October 22, 1981:7). Such repatriation.should, however,
be accompanied by assistance flows which would reroot the displaced and
those likely candidates firmly in their places of origin (Perez de
Cuellar, quoted in CIMADE et al, ibid., :126). The costs of such
ventures, are much less than assisting such groups outside their
localities (see‘Tables 29 and 32 in Appendix B). Seen from the distant
future’s point of view, the prohibitive costs, of logistics and
transport, administrative services, counselling services (the cost of
which was $141,311,500 (refer to Table 32, and also see Section 5.7
above in Chapter 5) for N.E. Africa for the period 1981-1988)and so on
can be profitably used. to obviate any "meaningless" dislocation of
particularly the rural poor from.their places of origion.

Donors should thus be able to see beyond short-term.ideological and
economic interests in their decisions to provide food or better still
the means of raising food right at the place of the root of the problem.
Just as much as aid recipient countries should refrain from.requesting
more resources to broaden "the scope of the aid programme" in the name
of refugees, so also donors should not "subordinate the principles
governing assistance to considerations of a purely political and
economic nature (U.N. Doc.A/AC.96/SR.336, October 22, 1981:6).That
donors earmark most of the money for specific refugee relief and

development programmes and to specific host nations has been

156
disappointing to many both in the UNHCR and outside (Stien, in Rogge
1987:48 and Gil Loescher et al, 1989:18-20). The impact of such
restrictions may well turn out to be negative.

An indirect fight against a system. which entertains an ideology
contrary to that of donors can be fought better when there are less
hungry people to say "no" to such a system. of rule. Such.solid
individuals can mushroom better at home rather than outside their
countries where their psycho-political stature tends to be firm, Many
Third World refugees who move to a less well developed nation get only
temporary relief in the country of refuge. This is also because they
compete for limited resources of the host states which frown upon the
strangers (Rogge, 1985:135-136). As Griffin (in Hollist et al, 1987:133)
put it: "if someone must suffer and starve, it is better to do so at
home than as an alien abroad," That destitute people must be helped at
home to ward off the bitter avenues of forced migration is justified on
this count as well. The economic and social cost of migration is big and
its interception at its infancy is advantageous for the international
community, the refugee source country and above all to the victim.who
has been the focus of humanitarian assistance. As Eicher (July 1988:30)
has convincingly argued, food flow to drought-hit and famine areas is a
less costly venture than feeding them. in shelters outside their
localities. This is an indirect contention that this measure may help a
lot in curbing'the migration of people in search of food, This point was
dwelt upon in section 5.7 in Chapter 5 fairly sufficiently.

In any case, in all the three countries democratization of the
political systems and a complete overhaul of the socio-economic

structures is a necessity of the first order. The states and the other

157

combatants in the conflicts of the region have to make overtures of
"compassion and political wisdom" as the Secretary General of the U.N.
(Quoted in CIMADE:126) has intimated to help solve the forced migrant
problem. The states in the three nations have to recognize this hard
reality and they should be able to take the lead to bring the complex
problem to broad day light for an eventual resolution of the food
equation.

Emergency camps in host nations in particular take a toll of
globally raised humanitarian funds and resources for the maintenance of
forced migrants or refugees . Moreover, the resources sink in the sands
of host nations in N.E. Africa without much. hope of a substantial
regeneration as they are used for consumption rather than investment for
the rural poor in their places of origin.

This situation is thus a major factor which limits food production.
It should, therefore, be scrutinized for sounder policy options for
development inside the N.E. African nations producing forced migrants.
Refugee source countries carry the brunt of the problem.and they should
try to make matters less painful in the interest of their people and, of
course, themselves as the Ethiopian local idiomatic warning runs: "ye
salt! ye better be tasty, or they will toss ye away labeling ye a good
for nothing hard piece of stone." Embittered people are time bombs of
political change as the uprisings of Eastern Europe have amply
demonstrated. Governments in N.E. Africa should be able to realize this
by now.

The international community does have some power and a good deal of
stake in cooling down the problem. and helping the starved. It should

thus do all it can to advise and to censure the N.E. African region’s

 

158
governments and opposition groups alike so they would stop their neck
and neck competition to hold to or hold power and instead create a
socio-economic and political climate that would regenerate the
productive capacity of a considerable portion of the labour force which
has been fettered by lack of investible resource and peace.

If need be the conventional wisdom that sovereign nations should be
left alone and that they cannot be pressured to be reasonable in this
regard must, as the League of Nations Secretary-General has cogently put
it, 50 years ago, "yield to those of common humanity" (quoted by Coles
in Loescher et al, 1989:410). This indeed calls for the estabilishement
of an acceptable and genuine supra-national body (Schultheis, 1983:25)
which should use the voices of the destitute in food-poor countries in
particular and international public opinion to bring about an
environment that would turn out to be less painful to humans. Political
forces within the nations of NOrtheast Africa, should they fail to solve
their problems on their own, must bend to such an "international public
opinion and moral authority" and help their people and themselves. Ebod
Security and/or a better standard of living or a prospect for it, at
least, is a healthy source of well-being for all people in any nation.
Every thing else should always be a second priority in these hard times

in N.E. Africa in particular.

159

APPENDICES ArD

Appendix A(l): The rationale behind a nation’s need to produce some of
its own food locally

Countries like Japan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong buy the
balance of their food needs from.the international market. But they make
it a point to produce their own food even if they do not have the
comparative advantage. The Japanese, for instance, saw protection of '
domestic agricultural production (e.g. rice) as a means of "...national
security, including the preservation of agriculture as a source of strong
soldiers and consideration of balance of payments and the balanced growth
of agriculture and industry", (Hayami, 1988:35).

This led to the protection of domestic rice. According to Hayami:
"among grains more than complete self-sufficiency in rice has been
maintained by a very strong protection" (Ibid.:lO). The Japanese Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry insists that protection.should be adhered to
with respect to agriculture (Harf and Trout, 1986:16). And this, the
authors say, is done in spite of the comparative disadvantage the
country faces in terms of food production.

The national rates of agricultural protection for rice for Japan and
for European Economic Community countries for 1980 and 1984 were 192 and
235 compared to 10 and 44, respectively. The nominal rate of protection
for wheat for the same years was 261 and 318, as well as negative ten

(-10) and 18, for Japan and EEC, in that order.

160

This is an indication of the fact that countries which do afford to
import their food on the basis of comparative advantage grow a
substantial amount of their food to protect the farming population’s
well-being both to maintain a balance in domestic and industrial
production and by so doing to sidestep the consequences of instability_on
the international market (e.g. the 1973 world wide shortage of wheat).
This policy is pushed to the fore partly because it is also bolstered by
scientific and engineering capacity as opposed to natural resource
endowment which means that technology helps such.countries in spite of
the fact that comparative advantage is not on their side as it relates to

other industrialized countries.

Appendix A(2): Per capita Share of cereal produced.in
Ethiopia between 1980 and 1985

l l : Annual cereal : Per capita :
1 : Population : production : daily share :
: Year : (in millions): (in ’000 MT) : (in grams) :
: ------- + -------------- + --------------- + ------------- :
l 1980 : 38 : 5,612 : 405 i
I I I I I
I I I I I
: 81 : 39 : 5,382 : 378 :
I I I I I
I I I I I
: 82 : 40 : 6,718 : 460 :
I I I I I
I I I I I
: 83 : 41 : 5,527 3 369 :
I I I I I
I I I I I
: 84 : 42 : 4,188 : 273 i
I I I I I
I I I I I
: 85 : 43 : 5,320 : 339 :
I I I
I I I
: Average 5,458 : 370 :

Sources: Data for the calculation of the per capita cereal share was
taken from.World.Development Report of 1987:214 and FAQ Processed
Statistics, 1984-85: 10. The per capita share is calculated by
multiplying each year’s production figures by 1,000,000 grams
(1 MT) and dividing this by each year’s population multiplied by
365 days.

161

Appendix A (Tables 25-26): Decrease in levels of spending for food

Table

inports and arms and the inpact of this on investnent for

education, health.and agriculture

25: Total budget-revenue, total expenditure and the proportion of
reducible costs of food and animal imports andfmilitary
spending for N.E. African countries in 1983 (ingmillions of

 

U.S.$)
: : Amount of : :
: Total : reducible : Tbtal :
Country : revenue : expenditure : expenditure :
----------- +-----------+--------------+-------------:
Ethiopia : 922 i 108 i 1275 l
I I I I
I I I I
Somalia : 278 : 103 : 359 :
I I I I
I I I I
Sudan : 1200 : 183 : 1800 :

Source: Albert,1987. The reducible amounts were calculated from.the

total expenditures of each country for food and animal
imports and military spending (refer to Tables 19(a), 19(b)
and 21). They constitute sums of three-fourths of these
lines of costs for 1983. The argument that money released
from.these expenditures would raise the level of spending
for food production, etc., is made here.

162

Appendix A, Table 26(a): Government expenditures and the possible rises
in investment for agriculture etc. that could have been
achieved by Ethiopia for a late 1970 or early 1980 year if
food import costs and military spendinggwere cut

I In Millions of U.S.$
I Total

: : : :
I I I Voage I
I I % IShare in I Savings,I money I change I
I Type of I Itot. exp-I from I for educ.,I in the I
I expend. I Ienditure I Table 25I health. I levels I
I I I I I agrico I of 6X!) I
I ----------- + ------- + --------- + --------- + ----------- + -------- I
I Education I 9.80 I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I Health I 3.70 I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I Agrico I 7-70 I I I I I
I I I I I I I
5 . E E :' :' E :'
I Sub total I 23.20 I 295.8 I 108.4 I 404 I 31.7 I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I Gel. pub. I I I I I I
I services& I I I I I I
I defence I 44.40 I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I Economic I I I I I I
I services I 21.80 I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I Others I 10.00 I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I Sub-tot. I 76.80 I 979.2 I I I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
I Total I100.00 I1275.0 I I I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I

Source: Calculated from.the information in Table 25.

163

Table 26(b): Government expenditures and possible rises in investment
for agriculture,etc,,that could have been achieved by
Somalia in 1978 if food import costs and military spending

were cut

I I I In millions of U.S. I I
I I I Share in ISavings fromITotal avai- I%age I
IType of I % Itotal exp-ITable 25 I-lable money Ichange I
:expenditure I I-enditure I Ifor educationIin I
I I I Ihealth.and Ilevels I
I I I Iagriculture Iof exp. I
I ------------ + ------ + ---------------------- + ---------------------
:Education I 8.30:
I I I
I I I
:Health I 3.20:

I I

I I

 

IAgriculture I 5.80:
I

I
I Sub total I 17.30: 62.1

I
IGeneral Pub-I
Ilic services:

103.4 165.5 28.8

-I

I

I

I

I

I
--—--------------‘----—--------+—-_
tun—----IIv—o-I-r—c-o—————-—-—----——---—_—-—-- +

I
I
I
Iand defense I 50.00:
I I I
I I I
IEconomic I I
:services I 11.70:
I I I
I I I
IOthers I 21.00:
I I I
a l """ I
I Sub total I 82.70: 297.0
I I I
I I I
I Total :100.00 359.0
I I
I I

Source: Calculated from.the information in Table 25

164

Appendix B (Tables 27-32): UNHCR’s expenditures for refugee, 'returnee and

displaced populations’ maintermnce

 

 

Table 27: Refugee or forced migzant movements in Northeast

Africa (1966-1989) 111’) ’000)

 

.
d.
u. S O
S. U 0
ouasBs . .R . .R .C C R h . 0 m
t. 2 5 2 7 8 7 0 9 0 . .X.
. 2 2 5 9 3 2 6 3 5 . 0
h. 2 4 6 4 4 6 7
t. 6
E“
Ill+ """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
. R
m. C +
%" m R 0.C wow p w
. . 0 0 0 0h4 0 5 . 0 0 0
0. . _ . . . . . 7 0 0 0 5 0 6 0 0 4
t. 4 5 3 7 1H 7 4 3 4
- 9.
. 1 .
m" m
. 7
l'+ """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
h.
t.
E“
0.3030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .h e
...». 7 7 0 1
m" .m. w
0.
S.
"d """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
h. 0 . 1.. 1
...».
E. W5 R9 R51 1 h4h5 e
- 0G - - 0C 0 2h h o o 4
O.N1..B5 5 . 6 O . O . . 9 2 2 8 . 8
t. 1.. 1 2 1 1 6 3 5 7 3 7 . 3
. 2 1 1 h.
d. 0
U. 2
S“ 3
-'+ """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
um.
.
.1. lam
..J.
D“ R C .m. R 7 7
O. 0 2 1.. 5 6 3 . .
t" . . . . . . . 2 . 4 3 3 . 1.. 1 .
..n.
a"
"+- """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
r. 6 7 0 1 2 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
a. 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
e. 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
V... 1.. 1 1 1.. 1.. 1 1.. 1.. 1 1 1 1.. .1. 1 1 1 1 I.
.

 

24-27 and 154

e Ethiopian Herald, February 9, 1988

 

CIMADE, et al., 1986

C
e

Table 28.

UNHCR Expenditures

165

NOrtheast Africa 1981-82 to
Country

4,453.9
3,868.5
3,317.1
3,115.3
2,759.2
3,2 8.1

7,524.4

5,373.5
11,796.3
14,439.8
21,829.2
22,859.4
24,773.5
15,857.8

49,078.2
38,565.0
46,558.3
44,079.8
42, 06.6
53,398.5
30,874.0
33,283.0

and Proposed Budget
1986-87 and 1988 (’000 of US$)

20,139,4
26,845.7
31,702.3
49,162.9

103,501.9

59,881.3
45,095.6
46,935.8

for Refugees

in

Source: UNHCR Activities Financed by Vbluntary FUnds: Reports for
1981-82 and Proposed Vbluntary Funds Programmes and Budget
for 1983 through 1986-87 and 1986

Note: Each year’s expenditure was taken from.the documents
As much as possible the

produced after the year of activity.

obligated and

of
bu

 

O

23::232201

US

hl
h2

max

UNHCR, Refugee Magazines, various issues and.UNHCR Activities
Financed by VOluntary FUnds: Report for 1986-87 and Proposed
Programme and Budget for 1988.

= W.T.S.
Fall 19

Berry and Giestfeld.

Table 28.
dg‘eto

For

1988

the figure represents

the revised allocations were used in the making
the proposed

Gould, Refugees in Tropical Africa, in IMR, Vbl. VIII No.3,

74:415.

World Refugee Survey, 1985.

Rogge I

1985:10-21.

Holborn 1974:1374.

Nevile, October 1967.

News from UNHCR, No.1 Jan-Feb 1981, quoted in Research Report No.67
by Gaim.Kibreab.
Preliminary Report of the UNHCR to the U.N. Economic and
Social Council, 2nd Regular Session, E/1982/2a 1982.

united States Department of State, WOrld Refugee Report,
September 1986.
UNHCR, 14 August 1987.

UNHCR, Managing Rural Settlements for Refugees in Africa,

Dar-es-

Seam, 1981.

UNHCR and various other sources.

Brooks and El—Ayouty, 1970: Appendix VIII: 293.

166
Table 29: MUltilateral assistance for rural settlements, multi-sectoral

maintenance for refugees in established camps and voluntary
repatriation expenditures in Northeast Africa (in ’000 U.S.$)

 

 

 

 

 

 

I I Countgy I
I I I
I 1 """""""""""""""""""""""""""" I
I Year I D ibout1 I Ethiopia I Somalia I Sudan I
' ------------ + ------------ + ------------ + ------------ + ------------- '
I I
I 1981 I I I I I
I v.8. I . I 10.0 I .. I 82.1 I
I Settlement I .. I 373.2 I .. I 9,478.6 I
I Camp I 3,931.3 I . I 34,626.9 I 3,585.0 I
I I I I I I
I 1983 . 1 I I I
I V.R. I . I .. I . I 75.0 I
I Settlement I . I 355.0 I . . I 20,023.0 I
I Camp I . I .. I 34,882.8 I .. I
I I I I I I
I 1983 I I I I
I I I I I I
I V.R. I 353.1 I 10.0 I .. I 110.0 I
: SGttlement : - : 00 : o. : 25,29801 :
I Camp I 3,350.0 I I 29,018.8 I .. I
I I I I I I
I 1984 I I I I I
I V.R. I 566.0 I 5.0 I .. I 350.0 I
I Settlement I - I 3,806.1 I 4,895.2 I 32,471.3 I
I I I I I I
I 1985 I I I I I
I VQR. I 10.0 I 138.7 I 5.2 I 150.0 I
I I I I I I
I I I I I I
I 1986 I I I I I
I __ I I I I I
I v.8. I 139.8 I 10.0 I 187.8 I 310.0 I
: ca’np : 1,595.6 : o : 13,0990]. : "' :
I I I I I I
I £517 I I I I I
I V.R. I 140.0 I 23.8 I 894.0 I 446.0 I
I Settlement I .. I 12,656.0 I 1,368.0 I 27,367.0 I
I Camp I 1,400.4 I .. I 25,166.0 I 11,125.0 I
= s = s s .=
' 1988 '

I I I I I I
I V.R. I 60.0 I 27.0 I 789.0 I 446.0 I
I Settlement I .. I l4,140.0 I 1,368.0 I 28,827.4 I
I Camp I 918.3 I .. I 26,701.0 I 10,536.0 I

Camp: Assistance to persons of concern. to UNHCR Multisectoral Care for
refugees in established camps and ‘V.C.: Veluntary repatriation
T=expenditure: V.R.=5,337.7, Settlement: 232,5 59.3 and camp=315,567.9

167

Table 30: Returnee populations in NOrtheast Africa between 1972 and 1987
(in ’000) for selectedgyears

: : : : : : : : : ICountry or :
I S.N.ICountry I1972:1983:1984/85I1986:1987:1988:1989IRepatriationI
I ----- + --------- +----+----+ ------- +----+----+----+----+ ------------ I
I I I GI I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I
: 1. :Ethiopia : 17 : O O : O O : O O : O O : O O : 0 :Sum :
I I I I wI I hI hI I I I
: 20 :Djimuti : O O : 32 : O O :302 :208 : .0 : 0. :Ethiopia :
I I I I wl I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I
: 3 O :SOMI ia : 0 O :320 : O O : O O : O : O O : O 0 :Ethiopia :
I I I I I W I hI I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I
I 4 ISudan I . I .. I 55 I 65 I .. I . I .. IEthiopia I

Sources: Refer to key in Appendix A.Table 27.

Table 31: Estimate of the displaced population in.Ethiopia

and Sudan
I I Year I
: : ---------------------------------- :
I Countr I 1981 I 1988 I
I ---------- + ----------- + ---------------------- I
I I c I C U I
I Ethiopia I2,400,000 I 700,000 -1,500,000 I
I I I I
I I c I u I
I Sudan I 60,000 I1,500,000 I
I I I I
I I I I
I Somalia I .. I .. I

Source: c=CIMADE 1986: 24-27 (The 1,300,000, figure given by
Somalia at ICARA II asking for assistance, according to
CIMADE)

u=US Committee for Refugees,1987.

168 '

Appendix B Table 32: UNHCR's costs for councellingI transportation and

program support for refugees in DjiboutiL,Ethiopia,,$omalia and Sudan
(in '000 U.S. dollars)

 

 

 

Year Councelling Transportation Program support & administration
2119 _5t_h m _s_u_d 21 591 502 as 211.4 Eth Lora .....Sud
1981 206.7 23.7 .. 175.7 15299.0 455.9 26.0 1333.0 825.9
1982 294.0 43.5 50.0 547.5 . 10600.0 535.9 338.5 1437.2 1339.7
1983 308.0 55.7 90.1 449.9 . 12390.0 538.6 722.2 1263.8 1189.4
1984 278.0 64.9 189.3 679.3 . 9546.0 357.3 1451.1 1248.1
1985 427.0 173.3 115.4 447.5 . 9566.0 432.0 1199.7 1199.7
1986 427.0 153.3 163.5 440.0 . 7744.2 .. .. 493.9 1313.0 288.0
1987 489.0 176.0 263.5 737.0 ..6101.6 12910.0 3154.0 .. 536.0 1501.0 282.0
1988 504.4 227.1 219.0 752.0 ..6358.0 12630.0 3651.3 .. 575.0 1347.0 282.0
S.T. 2934.1 917.5 1019.1 4228.9 ..12459.6 90685.2 6805.3 1530.4 3480.9 10945.7 6304.8

Total by type
of expenditure 9099.6 109950.l 2226.8

G. Total l4l311.5

Source: UNHCR Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Reports for 1981-82
and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programs and Budget for 1983 through
1986-87 and 1988.

169

Appendix C (Tables 33-38): Bilateral. multilateral and technical assistanmeand
grants to N.E. African and other LDCs: comparisons

Table 33: Bilateral ODA from DAC and OPEC member countries and
multilateral agengies supported by them

Bilateral DAC member countries net disbursement in $ million
Countr 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

Ethiopia 32.7 72.9 72.8 59.0 56.0 70.5 91.4 76.2 76.9 93.1 187.0
Somalia 17.9 23.3 20.1 25.2 46.8 49.8 139.3 139.8 141.6 152.2 193.1
Sudan -.1 60.2 54.4 55.8 113.0 149.3 271.6 294.7 357.3 438.2 308.6
Dijibouti 10.9 34.1 28.1 32.7 29.3 19.0 32.0 36.3 44.4 41.2 48.3
Tanzania 37.9 234.7 212.0 257.3 332.3 457.4 523.1’ 484.7 483.7 427.7 407.2
Bangladesh .. 703.9 319.8 384.0 666.5 774.4 850.2 672.0 822.0 582.4 674.7

Source: UNCTAD Report,1986:48

Table 34: Multilateral assistance mainly financed by DAC member countries

Ethiopia 4.5 27.5 30.7 18.3 33.0 42.4 81.1 111.0 87.9 117.5 127.8
Sudan 6.7 35.0 22.3 28.3 34.5 56.5 104.5 105.4 102.2 96.1 108.0
Somalia 6.8 39.7 39.2 32.6 30.5 43.8 125.6 146.6 112.4 105.0 109.9
Dijibouti 0.9 0.3 -- 1.8 2.7 3.7 8.0 13.0 9.4 9.6 9.4
Tanzania 4.0 36.6 26.3 23.5 36.3 48.4 50.3 66.4 60.9 52.3 65.8
Bangladesh .. 107.4 82.3 87.4 107.8 105.2 95.7 130.6 153.3 123.0 169.6

Source: UNCTAD Report,1986:50

170

Table 35 Technical assistance
Ethiopia 19.6 36.1 31.5 30.3 26.5 29.2 44.2 63.9 53.1 63.8 80.8
Sudan 6.5 28.1 30.9 37.7 60.3 69.1 102.4 131.5 117.9 127.4 121.7
Somalia 10.6 19.6 16.0 19.4 21.5 32.1 92.9 103.2 92.0 113.6 107.4
Dijibouti 6.2 11.1 14.0 15.2 14.3 19.0 27.8 29.8 30.8 29.2 29.7
Source: UNCTAD Report,l986:53

Table 36 Grants OPEC member countries to individual countries 1970 6 1975-84

Ethiopia* -- 1.2 -- 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.1 10.1 -- -- --

Sudan* 1.5 164.1 239.0 114.3 97.5 288.2 218.7 175.0 141.5 352.8 105.1
Somalia* -- 71.8 37.3 208.2 106.0 95.7 127.6 38.1 160.7 26.2 49.8
Dijibouti* -- -- -- 19.7 64.0 -- 30.6 12.4 1.6 11.5 38.5
Tanzania -- 0.2 0.6 6.9 1.0 3.5 15.5 15.3 14.3 18.2 10.9
Bangladesh -- 61.1 10.9 25.8 44.6 13.2 51.1 47.2 126.8 110.0 20.3

Source: UNCTAD Report,1986:64

Table 37: Grants frop:0PEC through multilateral agencies

Ethiopia 0 14.2 -- 2.4 2.4 -- 0.0 0.2 0.2 -- -0.2
Sudan 0 14.1 28.5 15.5 18.4 15.7 22.9 26.8 30.4 1.7 4.3
Somalia 0 7.5 4.2 5.0 7.9 10.5 16.1 15.3 21.6 21.8 9.7
Dijibouti 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.8 2.0 3.3 9.5
Tanzania 0 7.1 0.0 5.9 1.0 1.2 4.2 8.7 14.8 14.3 6.7
Bangladesh 0 -- -- 13.9 1.1 10.4 4.1 30.4 22.6 13.8 12.1

Source: UNCTAD Report.1986:67

Note: Nonconcessional flows from multilateral agencies mainly financed by OPEC
countries between 1977 and 1984 are negligible. Exceptions are Sudan and
Somalia which received from 34mm to 40 million between 1977 and 1981 (Sudan)
between 1979 and 1981 (Somalia) and Bangladesh between 1979 and 1983.

*OPEC grants (1) for Ethipia, Sudan. Somalia and Djibouti for 1970-1984 are
0.491, 51.701, 31.692. and 6.131 respectively.

171

Table 38: Tyingystatus of concessional commitments to LDCs from.DAC
countries and multilateral agencies 1981—82 and 1984 (%Q

 

 

I Particulars I 1950 I 1982 I 1984 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 1. DAC bilateral and concessional I I I I
I commitments I 100 I 100 I 100 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 1.1 united I 29 I 24 I 22 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 1.2 Partially tied I 9 I 10 I 13 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 1.3 Tied including technical I I I I
I cooperation and food aid I 59 I 64 I 64 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I -of which technical cooperation I 29 I 29 I 27 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I -of which food aid I 9 I 10 I 13 I
I l I I I
1 . 1 1 I 1
I 2. Concessional commitment from.DAC I I I I
I member countries ad multilateral I I I I
I agencies I 100 I 100 I 100 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 2.1 Multilateral and united I I I I
I bilateral I 57 I 56 I 56 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 2.2 Partially tied bilateral I 8 I 6 I 8 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I 2.3 Tied bilateral, including I I I I
I technical aid and food aid I 35 I 38 I 36 I

Source: UNCTAD Secretariat estimates based on data provided by the
OECD, in LDCs 1986 Report: 98

172

Appendix D

Baalu Girma, a noted Ethiopian NOvelist, has given a good account of
the civil conflict in Eritrea. In. his words (Baalu Girma 1984:25) this
hostility filled in environment is depicted thus:

Sons of the same mother (Ethiopia) behold

Breeding, harbouring differences too vain and bold
Erring in their interpretation of the world

Avenues to wise councelling foiled

They stick to fighting tooth and nail

In an era where hysteria-ridden ill-advisors prevail.

This piece of poem can be furthered by the following stanza to
reflect the theme of this thesis. As a consequence,

The helathy economic environment distrubed

As the sole view of a few

But indeed of the many entrenched

The cycle of distressed life goes on beyond and beyond
Let the sensible and conpassionate chip in inch by inch
And rapidly so peace and justice to all descend.

173

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