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
FOOD, RELIEF CENTERS AND FORCED MIGRATION IN N.E. AFRICA:
AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES

presented by

Teshome Tadesse

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master of Arts degree in Multidisciplinary Program
Social Science


Major professor

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FOOD, RELIEF CENTERS AND FORCED MIGRATION IN N.E. AFRICA:
AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES

By

Teshome Tadesse

A THESIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Multidisciplinary Program

College of Social Sciences

1990

ABSTRACT

FOOD RELIEF CENTERS AND FORCED MIGRATION IN N.E. AFRICA:
AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES

Food insecurity and poverty encourage rural populations to evacuate their localities. The two are the underlying causes of forced migration. Droughts and political instability exacerbate food insecurity and poverty conditions and speed up the process of evacuation of economic or, more specifically, 'food-seeking' migrants to towns, cities and agriculturally viable regions within their countries as well as outside. This thesis looks at the problem North East African countries--Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia--face in this regard.

The waste involved as a consequence of forced migration bleeds scarce development resources. A revision of current development policies and an immediate end to the raging civil conflicts and wars can enhance food production.

Improvement in the terms of trade involving primary agricultural products and increased foreign aid can supplement the local effort and promote the development of the agricultural sector. These actions pave the way for addressing the root causes of the problem.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my unforgettable father, Tadesse Tsigie, who gave myself and my two younger brothers all a father should give to his children. His personal interest in my education and his encouragement against all odds brought me up to this level of education. His parents, Memher Tsigie Gebru and Weizero Tsedale Brelie, share with him the credit for our education. My father and his parents loved kids. They helped so many of their relatives' and acquaintances' children to go to school.

Note: Family names are not used in Ethiopia unlike in many other countries. All Ethiopians are therefore identified by their first names, followed by those of their fathers, as in this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank all the Michigan State University professors from whom I took courses and other professors as well as fellow students who enlivened my interest in the topic I chose for the discussion of this thesis.

My special thanks are due to Professor Jay Artis of the Department of Sociology who has been chair of my Thesis Committee and who, in this capacity, helped me to make the main hypothesis more pertinent to the thesis. His suggestions and corrections of the text have been as highly useful, as have his untiring effort and consistent supervision been invaluable. Professor Wiley, Department of Sociology, and Professor Carl Liedholm, Department of Economics, have been resource professors for my thesis.

I am particularly grateful to Professor Paul Strassmann, one of my committee members, whose encouragement and guidance has been most invaluable. Professor Elias Dinopoulos, a former Economics Department faculty member and a member of my committee, read my preliminary and exploratory paper on forced migration and encouraged me to submit the same with slight changes as my Master's Thesis. He was also a source of encouragement for my academic pursuit.

I thank also Professor Chris Vanderpool (Sociology), and Professor George Axinn (Resource Development) whose invaluable advice at the

initial stage of the research was both stimulating and helpful.

I should like to extend my sincere gratitude to individuals and institutions without whose continued assistance the writing of the thesis would have been impossible. My sincere thanks go to the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) for selecting me from among staff member candidates as its FAO fellow. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the U.N., which made it possible for me to study at MSU; the International Students and Scholars Office of MSU, which took over the sponsorship from the FAO and with the Multidisciplinary Program, College of Social Sciences, enabled me to finish my studies, deserve my warmest of thanks. All of them share the credit for my successful completion of my graduate program.

I am especially grateful to Professor Carl Goldschmidt, head of the Multidisciplinary Program, for his personal assistance and encouragement in my academic studies. The Center for Advanced Studies of International Development also made my graduate assistantship work schedule flexible so that I could finish writing the first and final drafts of the thesis with ease.

Mrs. Lauri Hadson, Administrative Assistant and the Director of Academic Computing at MSU's Computer Center, Dr. Paul Hunt, and Mrs. Kriss Ostrom, the Circulation Librarian of MSU, permitted me to use the Main Library's micro-computers for extended periods of time. Glenn DeYoung, a staff member of Academic Computing, corrected the setting of my thesis as well as my lengthy independent study paper on floppy diskettes. My thanks are also due to them. Mrs. Elonor Boyles, a librarian in government documentation at the MSU's Library accessed me

to a number of documents pertinent to my study. I wholeheartedly thank her for her untiring effort and help.

Evaldo DeArmas, a graduate student in Chemistry and my good neighbour, taught me and my wife how to use the word perfect program as much as he edited and helped us in getting the printout of the document. A free and complete access to his private computer facilities was of considerable help. We are most grateful to himself and his kind family members.

Last but not least, I am grateful to my wife, Worknesh Teferra, without whose support and hard work in the typing of the first drafts and later on in the word processing, this thesis would have not been what it is now. She easily deciphered the words and sentences in my awful handwriting as she also corrected my English. My mother's presence here was an added advantage as she took care of her grand children while my wife did the work of word processing.

My younger brothers, Belayhun Tadesse and Solomon Tadesse, supported me morally as well as financially since the beginning of my studies. Embet Fikru, my cousin, was also of help in many ways.

All the professors and individuals as well as my family members share with me the small contribution this thesis may make to the study of the relationship between food insecurity, poverty and forced migration in N.E. Africa. The mistakes and errors, however, are mine and mine alone.

Teshome Tadesse

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADBP	Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan
CSA	Central Statistical Authority (Ethiopia)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
E.C.	Ethiopian Calendar
EEC	European Economic Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICARA	International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture (Ethiopia)
NIEO	New International Economic Order
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PQLI	Physical Quality of Life Index

RRC	The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission of Ethiopia
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRO	The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordination
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this masters thesis is to assess the food insecurity, poverty and the consequent "forced migration" problems which have come to be chronic features in North East Africa, a region which consists of Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and tiny Djibouti. The region has been suffering from human-induced and long-tailed drought conditions persisting for about one-and-a-half decades. These conditions have given rise to an endless train of forced migrants who inundate rural and urban areas at home and those of neighboring countries. The receiving countries in particular, are impoverished to a degree as the refugees become a burden on them. The sending country also continually loses labour power in those young people who make up an estimated 90 per cent of the forced migrants.

Domestic and international attention has been focussed on these problems. But despite humanitarian outpourings to combat emergencies and a degree of transfer of development assistance, the problems endure. In fact, at times the man-made problems of both internal and external nature have been conspiring to make the already bad situations in food production and distribution worse.

Unless in the case of governments which wish to cover up failure and specialized academic literature which involves itself in deeper studies of the phenomena relating to natural disasters, food shortages are not ascribed to or explained by natural disasters alone. Most of the

existing literature sees both man-made and natural disasters as causing food shortages.

Many authors see a combination of man-made and natural disasters as having a direct impact on food insecurity. Among these are Fieldhouse (1986), Jansson et al (1987), Kent (1987); and the Independent Commission on International Human Issues (1986). Others emphasize the man-made issue as the underlying cause of the problem (Singer et al, 1987; Commins et al, 1986, World Bank, 1985).

The relative weight given to man-made disasters in the lining up of causal factors for the phenomenon of forced migration or refugeeism has been higher by far, however. The deterioration in the performance of the agricultural sector (resulting from economic policies and institutions) of the economy which "has had reverberations that extend to other important economic spheres such as industry and commerce" explain the food crisis (Commings et al 1986: 4-5 and 90-96). Such factors as "endemic phenomena as corruption and repression" are direct outgrowths of economic decline (Commings et al: 5). They add that prolonged rainfall shortages (drought) often exacerbated by vermin, particularly locusts, weaver birds (*Quelea Quelea*) and army worms are also common features of the problem (Commings: 90). Food shortages while "most critical during abnormal times," are also caused by bad weather and other chronic conditions such as land degradation desertification, and domestic policies of nations (Burki, in Chidzero and Gauhar, 1986:117).

World Refugee Survey (1985:44) also ascribes the problem to a combination of man-made and natural factors which manifest themselves in the form of bad government policy, famine, war, drought and the politics of assistance. These factors are said to combine with the cruel effects

of droughts to produce forced migrants or refugees (Ibid: 44-47).

For some authors natural disasters do not at all explain the crisis in food production. The prohibition of, among other things, the "free movement of produce, forced delivery quotas for farmers and the closing of retail outlets" which have resulted in the lag in food production and failure of distribution, as in Mozambique (a war-torn country), are responsible for the problem (Singer et al, 1987:86). "Systemic" failures, among others are given as obstacles to increasing food production by Harf and Trout (1986 :31). The observation of Dovering (1988:56) with regard to farm and non-farm income disparities has an import to this discussion. He says that "the relative constancy" of the disparity in income over a period of time "...indicates that the underlying causes are systematic and pervasive rather than incidental or easily shifting". This observation supports the contention that more than any thing else, defects in the structures and processes of development explain the decline of and lag in agricultural production in poor nations such as those in Northeast Africa. Cox (in Ecology of Food and Nutrition 1978: 207-220) gives the problem of lack of food a regional dimension. Famine which is a situation of extreme lack of food is, according to him, "...the regional failure of food production or distribution systems..." leading to human suffering.

The literature does identify man and nature as causing the grim food problems we see in the developing world and particularly the least developed countries. Kent (1987:174) has observed that a "natural disaster may lead to man-made disaster or vice versa". The focus of this thesis is, however, the human aspect of the problem. As Longhurst (in Food and Nutrition Bulletin, 1987:31-32) has also contended "human

related phenomena...contribute to famine..." and may even be identified as the "primary" cause of it. But the dimensions and the relationship between these factors are rarely dealt with country-by-country or regionally.

The problem in this regard has also not been in the lining up of factors contributing to disasters leading to starvation and human suffering. It is in the establishment of the underlying causes and the relationship between them and the relative weights they carry in the determination of such phenomenon as forced migration. As Shanin (1978:280), in his discussion of migration, has put it so well "any analysis of labour migration ...must consider the process of disintegration and change in rural economies and societies". The problems of migration cannot be ascribed to a few or one major cause which more often than not fail to explain the changes that take place in the countryside in the main. As Shanin rightly contended "there must be a more substantial analysis of actual happenings" in the rural areas that lead to low levels of food production. As Bigsten (1983:37) has also cogently put it "...more time must now be devoted to concrete studies aimed at accumulating scientific knowledge before any meaningful generalizations about a phenomenon can be made" and before any action at remedying the problem under discussion in this thesis is taken.

An attempt will be made to depict the relationship between food insecurity, poverty and forced migration in a model form for the purpose of this thesis. Forced migration and repatriation as they relate to this thesis are perceived as forward (exit of people as forced migrants) and backward (reentry) processes which involve in-country and out of country movements.

These processes can be viewed by two simple models (Models I and II below) which explain the interplay between internal and external causes of forced migration. The home region is affected by two sets of factors--the internal and the external which under different situations (A and B) combine with each other to induce migration and/or repatriation.


The home region is the major source of the migration problem. But then in situation A, conditions that are better than the home region (foreign 1) including the availability of food and the existence of peace attract rural people to make the forced exodus that has become a common experience in many parts of the world and indeed in Northeast Africa. The push factors are the exact opposite of the foreign pull factors--lack of food and poverty as well as drought and instability-- (refer to the enumerated factors under Domestic 1, see Model I below).

Segments of forced migrants stay in urban areas within their nations or better still in asylum countries as long as food is available in emergency relief camps and/or until conditions back home become better (e.g., when the rains come or conditions which drove the migrants improve). They thus begin to repatriate when especially host country camp life reverses the push into a pull factor (see Situation B in Model II). Food insecurity, poverty and forced migration will be taken up in chapter two where each of them is defined and their relationship is established. In the subsequent chapters, these factors will be used to explain the concrete situation in North East Africa.

Model I: The Relationship Between Food Insecurity,
Poverty and Forced Migration

I U N D E R L Y I N G C A U S E S	A. <u>Basic causes</u>	II I M M E D I A T E C A U S E S	B. <u>Resource consuming activities</u>	III F O R C E D M I G R A T I O N
	1. Nonavailability of food 2. Poverty		1. Growing food import bills 2. Rising cost of debt service 3. Continuing conflicts 4. Increasing energy consumption	
	B. <u>Aggravating causes</u>		B. <u>Attraction of food</u>	
	1. Droughts 2. Instability		1. Urban and surplus producing areas 2. Global relief food distribution centers	

Model II: Situations A and B, push and pull factors



Food insecurity, poverty and forced migration:
situations A and B

A. <u>Forced migration</u>		
Domestic (Negative)	Percentage of Eth.migrants (in Sudan)	Foreign (Positive)
1. Lack of food	*	Food
2. Small land (poverty)	*	Employment and settlement
3. Loss of property	7	No
4. Fear	27	No
5. Conscription	10	No
6. Heavy taxation	8	No
7. War (Instability)	38	No
8. Political Persecution	10	No
Total	100	

*Source: These percentages which were taken from Mekuria's (in Nobel, 1987) paper are made use of because they would to, an extent, help to appreciate the magnitude of some of the variables explaining forced migration in terms of weights. Variables 1 and 2 are two of the most important factors in the decision to migrate as Mekuria's study indirectly indicates. To my knowledge, no field study that has statistics relating to them exists. Variable 1, for instance, can explain variables 4 and 7 as the absence of food constitutes a threat to survival of households. Fear and war greatly decrease the ability of households to produce food and force their members to evacuate as migrants in search of food and/or better opportunities.

B. <u>Repatriation</u>	
Foreign 2	Domestic 2
<u>Negative</u>	<u>Positive</u>
1. Dwindling food distribution	1. Restoration of peace
2. Difficulty in owning land	2. Improvement in economic activity
3. High cost of Settlement and little success in it	3. Rehabilitation assistance
4. Regimentation of camp life	4. Attraction of home
5. Discrimination in employment	5. Reunion with family members, extended ones
6. Host population's aversion to migrants	6. A non-confining open country-side as opposed to relief camp life
7. Nostalgia for home	7. Geographic difference environment better at (dry, humid etc lowland characteristics in Sudan and Somalia for e.g.)
8. Conscription	
9. Availability of selective settlement opportunity	
10. Services restriction	

A complex problem like food insecurity, poverty and forced migration invariably needs further, deeper research than has been done so far in order to come up with policy options that address the plight of the poor in particular. The tendency to see the problems from symptomatic standpoints is at best tenuous. United Nations agencies have since a few years ago been trying to "prevent the conditions that cause mass exodus of refugees rather than to treat the symptoms or effects..." (Loescher in Loescher and Monahan, 1989:18 and Rogge, 1985:21-22). The introduction of "resource building" activities which have developed into palliative actions... has recently led to increasing attention being paid to this

previously little-explored area (Singer et al, 1987:86). A look at the problem from a humanitarian perspective which usually aims at providing food and other relief assistance, in the main, is beneficial and saves countless lives. But unfortunately it does not help much to reduce the impact of food insecurity or that of its permanent feature--poverty.

A case by case study of food insecurity and poverty situations would definitely put in place the relative contribution of these factors to the phenomenon of forced migration. This thesis constitutes a general overview of the complexities of the issues. A field study based on it may help to have a good grasp of the dimensions of the problem.

The position taken in this thesis is that man-made factors explain the food insecurity and its allied scourges in the main. An attempt will be made to establish with some concrete evidence the underlying causes of the problem. Natural disasters are seen in terms of their aggravational roles rather than as primary causal factors.

In general, this thesis will attempt to examine the relationship between food insecurity and poverty and their impact on forced migration. Some of the factors that limit food production--factors like the lack of land, investible resources and improved agricultural tools--in the main will be isolated and treated in as much as they contribute to the entanglement of the small-holder farmer's drive to increase production.

The major thesis of this paper is that a serious shortage of food and the existence of poverty lead to a 'forced' migration condition which impels people to go away from their localities to better-off areas within their nations and outside in search of food. In relation to this major thesis, the argument that the fortification of the existing local coping mechanisms of food insecurity through a scheme of financial assistance to

those people who are below the subsistence level is advanced. It is argued that this measure would check forced migration or refugeeism involving economic or 'food-seeking' migrants and that it would pave the way for in-migration.

The following minor hypotheses will also be considered.

1. Food insecurity and poverty interact and reinforce conditions which lead to creeping famine and forced migration.
2. Land-abundant but financially and human resource impoverished nations of Northeast Africa can improve their capacity to make food available to the poor small farmer through policies of economic liberalization and a broad range of democratization of institutions.
3. The removal of the unstable conditions that pervade the region is one of the urgent preconditions for increasing food production.
4. The improvement of the physical quality of life--nutrition, health and education--would induce people to work harder to benefit their households and by the way stimulate the local economy.
5. The channeling of external assistance that focuses more on the long-term needs of the disaster-hit would generate local resources in the form of counterpart funds and labour-time for increasing production.

This research has its limitations. A field study of the various phenomena under consideration would have helped to measure the relative weights of the factors explaining food insecurity, poverty and forced migration much more precisely. But as some primary source data has been

used, the result of the study would give only a glimpse of some of the realities of the situation. The above introductory discussion constitutes chapter 1 of the thesis.

Chapter 2 deals with definitions of terms and the establishment of the relationship between food insecurity and poverty as they relate to the conditions in the Northeast African countries of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The reasons why food insecurity and poverty persist in the developing country context will also be dealt with as will be the import of different income or employment and feeding levels both as obstacles and as necessary conditions of changing the serious situation of production that persists. The shortage of resources and the difficulty of mobilizing the same for improving conditions would also be given attention in the chapter.

Because of the semi-permanent condition of food insecurity and poverty conditions for a significant majority of the people in rural areas, much of the aggregate production is somehow consumed. A substantial amount of the small produce is thus apportioned for distribution to extended family members, goes as gifts for the destitute, is loaned, or used for household consumption. The net effect of this is that little is saved for any further reinvestment.

This circularity between production and consumption is one of the key factors for what is generally identified as "arrested development" in the rural sector which constitutes more than two-thirds of the populations in least developed countries as those of N.E. Africa. The evidence is borne out by instances from Ethiopia where around 36 per cent of the rural population's household income has to be supplemented by gifts and loans in order for people in the category to subsist.

Contributions to traditional mutual aid systems as well as associations, especially religious ones, may be looked at as factors which are in the way of accumulating investment funds.

In fact, they dissipate, as it were, a good deal of the produce which may go into investment. Such an analysis is given little attention in the interplay of production and consumption in the rural areas. These have empirical dimensions which require field researches the results of which would, in all likelihood, point to the fact that a set of institutional as well as financial interventions, which should catalyze, increased production, curtail money lines of expenditures and induce overall savings, are urgently needed. The introduction of rural banks which lend money at low interest rates and the setting up of educational systems which preach the value of extricating dependency syndromes can help a lot in this regard.

Some measures of poverty as they apply to the Northeast African nations' conditions will be looked into in chapter 3. The measurement will be assessed from the angle of distribution of population, land utilization and agricultural development and the relationship of these to the crisis in production.

The physical quality of life index (PQLI) will be examined as a complementary component in the measurement of socio-economic conditions in the region. All the countries--Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan--have achieved the distinction of remaining behind in areas of development--food production not excluded. Infant mortality per 1000 live births is as high as the health services are poor.

In the face of unchanging income levels for many in urban areas and outright destitution in rural areas, little else is left for many people

to stay in their localities. Migration provides a way out of the problems. Chapter 3 thus discusses the point that international migration, among others, had been resorted to by many people in northern Ethiopia alone during the first half of this century for economic reasons.

In Chapter 4, food insecurity, poverty and forced migration would be analyzed in light of some of the internal and external causes of the problem. Basically the problem is that excess resources were used to purchase goods and services from the international market and they were used to employ a goodly number of people (mainly in the military and in some other organizations) who service redundant institutions as well as those institutions which mushroomed without taking into account other national priorities.

Government spending which usually fails to appreciate the necessity of prioritization in development and the instability conditions which particularly pervade N.E. Africa will be examined in relation to both the food produced and imported and to the decreasing level of exports.

Northeast African nations, like those of many least developed countries, have to devote a good deal of their earnings to purchasing or obtaining necessary and 'unnecessary' commodities and services--food grain in the main, energy, foreign loans and arms--which in a way they require to function as national entities. In the earlier section of the chapter, the domestic causes of the problem, which include entrenched institutional and socio-economic values, power struggles among political groups and central governments, and the failure to prioritize and to properly allocate resources are discussed.

Chapter five discusses some of the main reasons why segments of

forced migrants walk to international food distribution centres and the huge costs that would have been made unnecessary if rural development were undertaken in earnest by forced migrant source nations. The point made here is that assistance extended to potential forced migrants at their places of origin, that is, before the migrants make the exodus, would make the place of origin more attractive to continue the thread of life. Such assistance would thus eventually minimize the pressure these unfortunate people pose in first instance countries of asylum as well as others. This would be analyzed with the help of UNHCR's data on expenditures for refugees in host nations.

The forced migrant's role in stressing the job market on top of using excessive amounts of host country national resources and the opposition this has raised and the restrictions the situation has imposed in these countries would also be considered. The fact that the forced migrant country loses labour power and revenue from the productive activity of these people would also be reviewed in relation to the forced migration conditions that obtain.

The fact that small-holder agriculture, if assisted with modern inputs and if the people in it are given the necessary incentive, is the way out of the food shortage problem will again be underlined. That foreign grants and donations, if channelled and utilized properly, can be effective supplementary tools of expanding food production will also be dwelt upon.

In Chapter 6, the need for external assistance as a development tool is highlighted. International assistance has been devoted more to emergency programmes for internal as well as external refugees. The current argument that this should be linked to development and

particularly grass-root level development is given a shot in the arm. The tendency to tie in donor wishes and interests in the provision of assistance will also be briefly examined.

The cash-for-work program which has been implemented in Ethiopia and its positive outcome of not only helping "prospective" forced migrants to stay in their localities, but also of attracting previous migrants who had left because of destitution, would be discussed. This will be highlighted as a means of advising governments and donors of the great value of addressing food production problems at the grass-roots levels.

The final part of the thesis emphasizes the value of the liberalization of the socio-economic systems and the ending the existing conflicts within each nation of Northeast Africa. Stability and democratization of the socio-economic and political institutions are viewed as primary conditions for changing the grim food production situation in the region.

It also entertains the idea that economic cooperation between developing countries and industrialized countries, beyond its value of reducing food insecurity and poverty and of curbing forced migration, would stimulate demand for goods and services, production and international trade. It notes that this cooperation is absolutely necessary and that it would be enhanced as the current conditions slowly but surely evolve toward some kind of balance.

It stresses that the development of the small-holder agriculture is a top priority and that temporary needs satisfaction and interest promotion, as has been exhibited by the continuing conflicts in the region, would only aggravate the food shortage situation and pave the way for the repetition of the abysmal food deficit conditions over and over

again. State funds expended on the military by governments and internationally-mobilized funds spent on emergency camps rather than on agricultural development, inter alia, are seen as valuable resources miserably wasted when at some future date stock-taking is undertaken by the decision-makers and other actors.

The uplifting of the poor helps expand the revenue base for governments and increases the demand for "food goods" and services not excluding international ones at some distant date. It is thus prudent for home governments, in particular, and the international community in general, to pave the way for increased food production in the region as a whole. Lack of food is one of the most immediate problems that has to be dealt with so that peace would descend on the region and economic activity invigorated.

Chapter 2

Definition of terms and the relationship between food insecurity, poverty and forced migration

2.1. Food security and insecurity

Food security is the ability of a society to feed its population throughout the year with enough and nutritious food that is necessary for health and for pursuing an adequate level of activity. Food security is absolutely necessary for activities in all fields of social and economic endeavour, and its express purpose is to meet the household's basic food requirements and promote national economic development. Eicher and Staatz (1984:1) define food security as:

the ability of a country or region to assure, on a long-term basis that its food system provides the total population access to a timely, reliable and nutritionally adequate supply of food.

Lipton and Heald (1984:9-11) as well define food security as "the stabilization of access, or of proportionate shortfalls in access to calories by a population."

Weber and Jayne (1988:1) also define food security as:

"a situation in which all individuals in a population possess the resources to assure access to enough food for an active and healthy life."

Bingman (1984: 6-7) has come up with a definition of food security in reverse. For him one of the commonly accepted definitions of food

insecurity is the probability that in any given year actual food consumption will fall below a minimal level necessary for survival and adequate health.

The main ideas reflected in the definition of food security are the existence of food items in adequate quantities and the ability of households to afford to purchase them (Sen 1981; 1984: and Sen in Urquidi 1987, Siamwalla and Valdes, 1980; Eicher and Staatz 1985 and Singer et al 1987).

The other alternative is to subsidize or distribute food for the poor if such food is available in abundance. If this is not the case then any country would be in trouble. As FAO notes "redistributing an aggregate output which remains small only perpetuates poverty." (FAO 20th Session, Rome 10-29 Nov. 1979:223). Or to put the same thing in a different way a falling production or a high rate of population growth compels the redistribution of limited resources for ever more people. As Judit Kiss (1977:6-7) has said:

"High population growth leads to the preservation of poverty and increase in the domestic requirements of food and the sharpening of tension on the labour market..."

It is not only availability of the food domestically per se that is important for food security though. The ability of a nation to purchase its food, a substantial or minimum portion of the total requirements, from outside its borders is also a means of side-stepping the food insecurity problems (see Appendix A,1).

Low level technology in the developing countries is also one of the stumbling blocks in the way of production and hence the lag in agricultural development. An instance where technology makes a

difference is exhibited by a ranking of regions by levels of fertilizer and improved seeds used in agriculture in Ethiopia. In the Arsi region, particularly the Chelalo province, where Swedish technical assistance has made it possible for technology to be injected, overall fertilizer use, among other things, has in many instances, led to production increases on a unit and overall level.

Table 1. Proportion of farmers using improved seed, fertilizer and average household fertilizer consumption

<u>Region</u>	<u>Farmers using Fertilizer (per cent)</u>	<u>Average fertilizer Consumption (kilograms)</u>	<u>Farmers using Improved seeds (per cent)</u>
Average	14	8.76	2
Arsi	47	31.75	21
Bale	1	0.76	2
Gamu Gofa	1	0.27	-
Gojam	16	9.06	-
Gonder	3	1.43	1
Hararghe	4	1.41	2
Illulabor	2	1.12	2
Keffa	13	5.34	-
Shewa	24	18.95	1
Sidamo	9	2.86	5
Wellega	15	7.22	-
Wello	-	-	-

Source: Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), General Agricultural Survey, Preliminary Report 1983/84 (1976 E.C.), Vol I, Planning and Programming Department, Addis Ababa, October 1984.

As the figures for Arsi indicate (see Table 1), the Arsi region stands first in the use of a great deal of modern inputs. The other regions, where such information on new technology, exposure to the use of improved seeds and fertilizer as well as ability to mobilize resources as a consequence of increased production has not been the case, poor use of modern inputs is in evidence. This evidence may enable us to conclude that where infusion of both capital and information is slow there is an apparent absence in production increase and spread of technology.

Nations, like individuals in society who do not have the resources to set aside for the procurement of the balance of their food needs, seek the money or the resources to buy the extra amount necessary for their consumption in the first place. Under these circumstances, such nations or a segment of their people do not have the resources to purchase their food which is an immediate requirement. The purchase of modern inputs the costs of which are quite high are unthinkable in such cases.

Self-sufficiency in food also does not guarantee the distribution of adequate food to all members of society, particularly to segments of people, e.g. the poor, children and the aged (Sen 1984), and communal needs determined by culture, e.g. nomads. FAO's argument that the production of "larger output does not automatically increase the income and employment of economically weaker claimants..." (FAO, 1979:223) befits this argument.

Surplus-producing nations such as India and Brazil have millions of people suffering from malnutrition and starvation (Chakrabarti, in Ford and Chakrabarti 1987:183 and Hollist and Tullis 1987:1). This happens in these two countries and Mexico in spite of the fact that "substantial growth in per capita GNP and Industrial Production have taken place..."

(Manetsch in Ecology of Food and Nutrition, 1982:225). Yet these nations export food and other agricultural products to raise foreign exchange for the purchase of capital goods and other inputs, to service their foreign debts, etc. Even in the food production giant of the world, the United States, some 20 million people are said to be facing hunger because "enumerable holes in the food safety net have been pierced" (Ford and Holmquist in Chazan and Show, 1988: 214). There are thus "poverty-induced pockets of hunger" among industrialized nations of the world, "demonstrating again the relationship between income and hunger" (Harf and Trout, 1986:45).

Food self-sufficiency or even surplus production thus does not mean that all the poor or the unemployed would readily have access to food. As Ford and Holmquist (Ibid: 214) correctly argue, "...abundance is no guarantee that all members of society will be able to satisfy even a minimal level" of their nutritious food needs. One thing is, however, certain. Increased availability of food, as shown by rises in per capita production or "mean production," counters the effects of growing instability of the food problem markedly (Bingman, 1984:7).

In countries where democratic institutions can be coaxed or mobilized, the surplus produced can be distributed readily to counter existing abnormalities temporarily or even permanently. These nations with bountiful production are much more capable than those with deficient production to do this. This view is supported by Sen (1984: 325) who notes that food insecurity and hence poverty can be eliminated easily in richer countries than poorer ones.

Hunger can thus be eliminated or mitigated by institutional measures such as in the U.S. in the 1970s (Ford and Holmquist, in Chazan and

Show:214). It may be mitigated in the long-run with the adoption of policies that aim at laying the groundwork for narrowing the gap between incomes through the provision of services, such as health and education in Sri Lanka (Gillis et al, 1983) and the two services plus public distribution of food in Kerala (Sundaram, 1986 and the U.N., 1975:20) indicate that this has been a characteristic feature of the two peoples in Asia.

Among those countries which attempted to institute land reform, Ethiopia and Tanzania, for example, were unable to match this "gain" with important measures of providing incentives and rural credit services, inter alia, which are necessary to enhance agricultural development and reduce poverty. The distribution of land in and of itself would not lead to an increase in production. The key to this is the realization of profit by the farmer. As Shao (in Issue, 1985: 15-16) argued so well in his discussion of Tanzania, food "price increases in themselves are meaningless unless the ...producer is able to increase his margin of profit, to improve his standard of living and to expand production." The two countries have been venturing into more complex systems of state-led and controlled agricultural activities for many years now. These eventuated in rising national expenditures on faulty priority programmes as well as those which arose because of the states' increasing and dominant involvement in the economy (Lofechie in Chasan et al, 1988:149-53 and Griffin in Hollist et al, 1987:126-27). In both countries' cases state revenue increasingly dried up and investment resources went down as a consequence. Both nations, therefore, have simply been unable to avoid exposure to food insecurity. Somalia and Sudan, after experiencing production failures of state ownership of land, and other resources,

reestablished the market mechanism with individuals working on their own to satisfy their household needs as well as to generate surpluses which they can dispose of to earn money for their other daily requirements (Ragsdale and Ali in Oberai, 1988:213 and Berry and Geistfield, 1983: 45-49).

Eshetu Chole's and Teshome Mulat's study about settlements in Ethiopia indicates that individually farming families were better-off than their compatriots in government assisted and controlled farming cooperatives (Eshetu Chole and Teshome Mulat, 1984:57-58 and see also their article in Oberai, 1988:182). These observations are helpful in redesigning policies of development that particularly affect the small farmer.

2.2. The relationship between food insecurity and poverty

Food insecurity may be of a temporary or permanent nature. Temporary food insecurity situations arise when a locality or a set of regions produce less than is necessary to satisfy their needs. This situation compels the transfer of food from other localities thus creating pressure on the overall availability of food at the national level. Temporary food insecurity may thus be "associated with either fluctuations in food production or price changes" (Siamwalla and Valdes, 1980: 272). This takes place as a consequence of shortage of rains, floods, pest attacks or civil conflicts, and the like.

Food insecurity, for the poor in this sense is a downward shift and/or loss of income that affects their well-being. The poorest of the poor in particular may usually have to forgo a meal or two a day for the reason that their income is not sufficient to satisfy their daily

minimum requirement for the duration of the food shortage or until such time that supply is restored and prices decrease.

Mellor, in the International Food Policy Research Institute Report of 1987 notes that "rising food prices redistribute income shares from the poor to the rich" (1987:8). Mellor provides empirical evidence for this from India which states that:

a ten per cent increase in food grains prices reduces the food gains in consumption of the two poorest income deciles by 6 per cent while decreasing the food grain consumption of the tenth decile by only 0.2 per cent.

The decrease in the share of the food grains of the poor and the consequent transfer of a good chunk of the income of this group to increase the revenue deriving from the farm sector subsidizes (through the provision of health, education and other national services), in a way, the rich who have to pay less for the adjustment of the market condition resulting from price rises. This may be because of two reasons. First, the number of the poorer farmers in society is greater, and their share in the payment for the adjustment required, due to the rise in grain prices, would thus be higher by that much. Secondly, it may be because the transfer may be subsumed in the existing distortions of income distribution which largely favors those with higher incomes. This means the rich have the money to spend which money they are able to directly and indirectly get as a result of the ill-distribution of resources.

The impact of food prices is thus crushing on the poor. Harf and Trout (1986:36), citing a calculation, point out that a quarter can get a person some cereal which can supply his daily nutritional needs. But

they hasten to argue that in most parts of the world hungry people cannot have the very quarter that is much needed for the purpose (Ibid.).

2.3. Persistence of food insecurity and poverty:factors reinforcing each other

This leads us to the question of why poverty is an endless and a not so easily combatted problem in society and particularly in less developed nations. The question is both intriguing and difficult, if not impossible, to answer. Nonetheless, attempts can be made to discuss some of the variables and the internal relationship between poverty and food insecurity.

Food insecurity emanates from poverty and vice versa. The two are mutually inclusive. The existence of one per se predetermines the existence of the other in many nations. Poverty, the inability to gain access to food, among other basic necessities of life, is closely associated with hunger which is the absence of food for a definite or more or less extended period of time.

As Harf and Trout (1986: 62-63) note directly: "food power is purchasing power." They see a circularity between food availability and income. Amartya Sen argues that food shortage is experienced by those who do not have the means to get food or to purchase it (1984:486).

Thus the failure in farm production translates "directly into an entitlement failure" (Ibid.). He cites Wello's experiences in this regard as an evidence. Peasants in this Ethiopian region were unable to purchase food in spite of its existence in some places. Padmini, UNICEF's representative in Ethiopia (UNICEF 1945-1985:32), also shares the views of Sen when she observes that people in Wello were moving out

of the region when some food was flowing into the local market. Those with no income moved out of the region while food moved into their localities.

Paradoxically enough, there was also "some movement of food out of Wello through the famine period" (Sen 1984:469) consistent with perhaps the less than adequate demand for it in the region. This moving out of food from Wello and its entry into other areas must have filled in some of the food shortage gaps elsewhere. An economic and historical study is in order here to see the real problem at that time, but this is not the immediate concern of this paper.

2.4. Income or employment and adequate feeding as necessary conditions for alleviating food insecurity and poverty

Reduced income leads to a reduced conditions of food security. But as Ford and Holmquist argue, casting the food crisis as a problem of production gets at only part of the difficulty and not even the most important one (in Chazan and Show 1986:213). According to Harf and Trout, the "key to alleviating poverty is income". And by extension they note that the alleviation of poverty is employment (Ibid. 1988:62-63).

Employment, and hence income, in themselves are, in this context, thus considered as factors fully explaining the phenomenon of poverty. The FAO (1985: 26) which, however, recognizes the big role income plays in determining survival discounts the argument that it is the only measure of poverty; many other social and environmental factors contributing to malnutrition are closely linked to poverty of individuals and countries. As the FAO argues, even though the level of

income is not the only cause of variability in food intake it is being recognized as the main cause, particularly among the poorest segments of the population (FAO, 1985: 26).

A food intake level that would assure a degree of activity that can at least assure the maintenance of individuals and households is a precondition for the release of energy for the most minimal level of activity.

Food insecurity can also be explained as one of the main causes of poverty for the reason that it strips the individual's ability to work and to be productive. As Chazan and Show (1988:13) argue:

Food constraints deplete human energy, reduce motivation, limit production and circumscribe prospects for its amelioration.

As Hollist and Tullis also contend, "malnutrition both takes and denigrates human life" (Hollist and Tullis, 1987:2). Similarly, Harf and Trout (1986:35) also argue out the case in the same vein. They advance the view that the "prevalence of world hunger and various levels of malnutrition are seen to be closely associated with poverty" (Ibid.). In the words of Spitz (1978:867) people with no access to food are ones who have "lost the most elementary of rights--the right to right itself." Green (quoted in Kent 1987:177) also make reference to this right as it relates to disaster victims as the "most basic of human rights--the right to life".

The U.N. Preparatory Conference on Food and Agriculture (1943) which was part of the preoccupation of the founding fathers of the present international machinery, recognized the primacy of food for human life. They came to note that "...poverty, the first cause of malnutrition", (quoted in Singer et al: 1987:79) was the factor inhibiting increase in

the well being of people in many countries whose total number was two thirds of the world population. For them freedom from want meant "...a secure, adequate and suitable supply of food for every one..." (Ibid.).

People must eat to be in shape and work. The availability of food is, therefore, a sine qua non of life and by extension the spring-board of capability to work to feed oneself and one's household members as well as beyond. Health gained through nutritious food is vital. First, it is a means of increasing food production. As the World Bank argues food for households is important for the reason that "...improved nutrition is an investment in the productivity of a nation's population (World Development Report 1986:8). Secondly, it cuts expenses for curative diseases that may otherwise have to be paid for dearly if and when extreme food shortages are experienced at some future date.

These are two of the reasons why governments attempt, only through lip service, in many cases, to give priority to agriculture. It looks like the international community also has, if not directly, indirectly come to realize that agricultural development is a key to combating famine and hunger in poor countries. Lipton argues that this is so. But despite this, he says that the contribution of official bilateral aid inflows for rural development, specifically agriculture, in less developed countries has been proportionally less than the overall increase in development assistance from these sources between 1975 and the early eighties (Lipton, 1984: 1-16).

Elsewhere he notes that huge public support in many rich donor countries is very much focussed upon health, nutrition and other human concerns. He cites the Western big response to the African famines in 1983/84 to support his argument. But despite the effort and the small

understanding achieved the poor in food deficit countries continue to suffer and to produce less.

Inability to work as a consequence of lack of an adequate level of caloric intake by the poor is thus one of the main reasons for persisting poverty. On the other hand, poverty is a condition in which, put cogently, "entitlement" or income to purchase one's survival food and other basic necessities to sustain oneself as well as one's family members is not there.

2.5. Resource 'mobilization' and food insecurity and poverty

The poor peasant is so much tied to his traditional and subsistence agriculture, unpaying agriculture for the small-holder in many instances, that he is unable to extricate himself out of poverty. Chirstensen (in Hollist et al, 1987: 40) comes up with a palatable contention regarding the unbearable web of poverty that entangles the poor farmer. In the author's words:

"...poverty is associated with incapacity of the peasants to move their assets to the booming sectors, or to the sectors that eventually take advantage of rapidly increasing effective demand."

Poor peasants thus cannot move out of traditional agriculture simply because they have only little means to purchase modern inputs and to introduce irrigated agriculture to their system of production wherever this is possible. In as much as command over resource--the ability to generate income or to attain a minimum level of purchasing power--is absent, the capability to provide oneself with basic necessities of life, food in particular, is also remote. One thing which is allied to this and which is equally important is the availability of resources which pave the way for increased production.

Alemneh (1987:122) has found out that only 7% of the Arsi region sample farmers he studied had 7% savings. The Arsi Agricultural Development Unit also came to the same conclusion in a sample study it conducted (Ibid.). But the Ethiopian Statistical Authority, in its sample survey of 12,000 farmers, has come up with a result pointing that 18% of the rural population produces in excess of its needs. Although this may not indicate that all this can be categorized as savings, its potential for being used as an investment resource may be high. But this potential is not realized because of the complex socio-economic and political relations in the country.

The economic and social environment which per se greatly reduces peoples' opportunities to produce should itself not be poor so as to enable people to be productive and hence use their labour optimally. In areas where the fertility of the soil is poor or where land size is too small, productivity is low. Human power is enormously wasted over the preparation of land for farming in many parts of central as well as northwestern and northern Ethiopia in the main. This calls for the judicious use of land resources in Ethiopia (Eshetu and Teshome, 1984:56) and indeed in the other Northeast African countries' cases. This means land that is unutilized should be exploited wherever it is available.

2.6. Alternative measures small farmers take before migration

In a rural setting, the individual household, faced with food shortage and hence price hikes and entangled by poverty, may make the deficiency good through measures it takes in the immediate and long-run senses. In such a situation there are at least some six different ways of responding to such a misfortune. The various responses made are

dependent on the intensity and extensity of the problem and the social psychological conditions of each household and the existing avenues of support systems.

The first option is available for the insightful and the extra-hard-working peasant. This is one who has acquaintances to whom he may previously have worked off-farm either as a tenant or on his own by renting land. This category of peasants most of the time arrange for themselves some kind of employability. They invariably step from one farm employment to another both within their localities or their fringes to fix some kind of gainful employment by themselves.

The second option that is there for the peasant is to engage oneself in some kind of side-line activity involving cottage industry. In this, the peasant can be an owner-operator or he can work for those who have businesses of sorts. Such kinds of accessory activities include flour-mill running, garment production, or service giving such as milking or cattle rearing.

With a view to finding a means to make ends meet, the third category of poor peasants borrow money. But farmers here may hardly be able to pay back the debt because the traditional rural banking systems are controlled by landlords and money-lenders whose income generation is also largely dependent on the traditional rural money market. They take away a substantial amount of the produce of the peasant farmer by charging him unbearably high interest rates--200 per cent (in Ethiopia's case) at times which has been payable in cash and kind. A 1969 development program study of Ada Wereda in Ethiopia by Borton, Mamo, Almaz and John indicates that the interest rate in the traditional rural credit market ranged from 40 to 350 and over per cent for the Ada and other areas of the country.

The Agro-Industrial Bank in Ethiopia required high value collateral which automatically excluded the peasant from borrowing money.

The traditional money-lending institution known as shail or credit against future crop in the Sudan is also an important means of siphoning off resources from the small farmer (Ahmed, 1977: 115-116 as quoted in Barnett and Abdulkarim, 1988: 144). The interest rate charged varied from 50% to 300%.

In the rural areas, the peasant does have little option other than to go to these money lenders who make him prey to their extortionary practices (Barnett and Abdulkarim 1988: 121-128 and World Food Report, 1987: 20). Rural banking institutions are not available to enforce some sense in their operation which involves the charging of exorbitantly high interest rates.

Basu (1984) argues that the poorer peasant farmer may stay in the "debt-trap" for a long-time or permanently under such circumstances. He may even have to sell some of his assets, particularly land or alternatively turn himself into a labourer of the lender. Some state systems also tax smallholder agriculturalists out of existence. The tax system which in some instances also requires the farmers to pay their taxes indirectly in kind, such as the forced grain delivery schemes in socialist modes of transfer of produce, is too crushing for many.

For the state this transfer is a source of capital accumulation and government upkeep. The peasant may thus be unable to break out of poverty as he perforce leads himself and/or is dragged into a bonded labour type of relationship with the lender who may also be among the better-off farmer's group in a rural setting (World Food Report, 1987:20). The continued payment of this debt, in spite of the fact that it is heavy,

is the insurance or, if you will, the future collateral of the farmer's ability to borrow at a later date (see Basu, 1984).

In one sense, then, poverty is the permanent cause of income reduction and by extension one of the main reasons for food insecurity. Under these circumstances, the peasant, is hardly able to maintain himself and members of his household let alone engage himself in comparatively sophisticated agriculture. The fourth alternative is to find solace in the traditional safety mechanism of kin and close relation support, which can be identified with the extended family system. This is a peasant or a farmer who is, comparatively speaking, a lucky one.

He may also make the deficiency good from gifts collected through outright beggary as well which is a degrading condition (but as the Ethiopian society endorses, one activity which is still better than robbery and other unlawful means of gaining a means of livelihood) yet a means of survival for the 'kinless' or for one who does not have richer friends. This is the fifth avenue which the peasant has to resort to in order to continue to survive.

The fourth and the fifth mechanisms impoverish households to a considerable extent. Households with a relatively higher number of members consume a good deal of their production thus closing any avenues for raising investment funds. FAO's argument (FAO, 1979:223) that a redistribution of "aggregate output" which is already small increases the poverty of household and indeed nations--especially food deficit nations (refer to section 2.1 above) holds water here. This argument does clearly have an import on the Ethiopian situation. The Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority's Rural Household Income Consumption and

Expenditure Survey, shows that households with more than Birr 2669 (2.07 Ethiopian Birr = U.S.\$ 1, official exchange rate) annual income and higher number of members had a lower standard of living than their compatriots with incomes of Birr 499 and below (CSA, 1988:xvii-xix and see Tables 10-24 or pp 14-26). The CSA national survey indicates that more income in rural Ethiopia leads to a bigger size of a household as Table 2 indicates.

Table 2. The relationship between income and family size (Ethiopia)

Income category (Birr)	Size of household members
> 499	2.6-3.7
500-1299	3.9-4.8
2000-2999	..
2300-5899	5.0-5.8
5900-7500 and above	7.9-8.9

Source: Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority,
Rural Household Income Consumption, and
Expenditure Survey, Addis Ababa, 1988.

But there are those who are not so fortunate to be able to find a better-off kin or are smart enough to go around and find a job for themselves or create one. These can be categorized under households which usually face food shortages or "survival necessities," if you will, desperately. These in many cases take the sixth and sad option which involves evacuation of the locality or the region.

The peasants in this category are indeed ones on whom fortune has completely turned its face against and they have in the main no one to

turn to and exhaust the local safety-nets. They are ones whom Griffin in Hollist et al, 1987:132) identified as ones who face "abnormal breakdown in access to food" which leads to a decision to take a "desperate measure to avoid dying..." As during the 1972-74 drought in Ethiopia, many peasants in 1983 "abandoned their villages to search for food" after having consumed their "planting seeds" (Shepared,in Issue, 1985:6). The most likely option this category of the poor in the rural setting have is thus to make a forced exodus in search of food or some kind of work for survival. According to the FAO also they constitute the most underprivileged of the rural people and this situation compels them to abandon their localities (The Fifth World Food Survey (FAO), 1987:20). They are ones who have, according to Amartya Sen (1984:470) like the Wello peasants of 1972/74 drought period, experienced a "direct entitlement failure" which means they were hit by a loss of the means to livelihood to the marrow.

This loss of entitlement translates into a complete loss of "citizenship rights" which means that the social security of members of society is grossly affected. This social security, which Burki (1986:124) notes is a "person's entitlement bundle", has been increasingly destabilized as a consequence of man-made and natural disasters (drought in particular). These two disasters, especially famine, have, according to Burki, "threatened the functioning of this fundamental fall-back entitlement" (Ibid.).

Hundreds of thousands of people have been turned into drought, economic and political refugees in Africa and particularly N.E Africa during the last two decades. A substantial number of these refugees leave their areas in search of food. The main focus of this thesis, as

explained in the introduction, is that refugees or forced migrants who cross borders are in the main food-seeking migrants and that the availability of food in their localities would change their decision to migrate. A definition of forced migrants or refugees and the forces behind their movement is in order before going into the discussion of the problem in the region.

2.7. Forced migration: its definition and the factors fuelling it

Forced migration refers to a special group of rural people in Northeast Africa in particular who face permanent and semi-permanent food shortages and ones who move to areas where they can find food at the slightest opportunity. Forced migrants are those people who, in strained circumstances, where the already poor condition in food availability is made poorer by continuing food shortages, choose to abandon their areas. The circumstances that fuel forced migration in Northeast Africa are thus persistent food shortages and the conflict conditions which are themselves rooted in the lop-sided nature of the distribution of wealth in society. The chronic food shortages and the continuing conflicts have enormously hampered food production in the region.

The food shortages resulting from drought and instability situations are themselves rooted in the general poor production condition in the Northeast African region. It is the considered view of this thesis that an improvement in the food production conditions would greatly stem the large scale movement of migrants. The preference of people in some conflict-ridden parts of the world to stay in their localities even during wars and/or their immediate return when cease fire is declared solidifies this argument. In Ethiopia, the woes of some settlers,

settlers who must have, in the main, been better-off in their areas of origin and who were moved to new ones by obnoxious and authoritative decision-makers who did not care a bit for human rights, is a further testimony of the acceptability of the contention.

Nonetheless, forced migration has been usually related to the forceful movement of people to places other than their own (far and near) as slaves or indentured labourers (Harf and Trout 1986:102; Bouvier et al 1979:8). In such a situation people are forced by a powerful group or a government which compels them to go away from their localities within their nations or outside and work as farm labourers, etc., without their will. This process in past years related to such a forced movement of people from Africa and Asia. It is also sometimes referred to as an "involuntary migration," to use Bouvier's terminology.

Refugeeism is also a process of movement of people from their localities under the pressure of lack of food or to use Sen's (1984) apt description of this phenomenon, "loss of entitlement in terms of command over resources in order to survive."

Migration and refugeeism are sometimes interchangeably used. Rogge (1987:86, 1985:41) refers to refugees as "migrant populations." Also Shulthesis (1983), CIMADE (1986:13-15, 20-21 and 105) use the word migrant as a synonym of a refugee. Widgren (in Loescher and Monahan, 1989:54) classifies refugees among involuntary migrants.

Involuntariness and force are thus central to the process of movement of people whose ability to feed and maintain themselves is hampered by forces external to their will and decisions in substantial number of cases. Such migrations whether they take place as a consequence of a direct force emerging from a powerful group's, a state's or state-

blessed actions (because of slavery, indentured labour, etc.), eventuate in a direct and/or indirect denial of the means and opportunity for people to work and earn their daily bread (due to landlessness, lack of basic agricultural tools and/or the availability of little cash, the prevalence of instability, etc.), are the same in content if not in form.

There is an element of force behind the movement of people particularly from the rural areas. For Cirtautas (1963:28) the refugee is one who leaves home involuntarily; he is one driven out from his home country. Cirtautas saw force behind the refugee's 'expulsion.' The refugee is, according to Cirtautas, "put into the street, turned out into the cold without food or shelter." Rees (1959:9-17) also contends that force is central to the exodus of people from their homes as refugees.

Rogge (1985:4) also sees force behind the movement of refugees. In his own words:

The most commonly accepted image of refugees is of persons impelled to evacuate their normal places of residence, who have done so at short notice often without chattel and consequently in need of material assistance.

He further contends that:

...in most cases such migrations are politically motivated, but that there also exist environmental push factors such as earthquakes or droughts (Ibid.).

The above authors--Cirtautas, Rees and Rogge--have made it clear that force is behind the movement of people as refugees. Their analyses here, however, do not see factors beyond the immediate fiery conditions for such a movement. They have not shown us the relationship between man-made and natural disasters as well as the unstable conditions which impinge on the food production capabilities of peasant farmers and which may eventually lead to the evacuation of their places of origin.

Forced migration is, therefore, an appropriate term to describe the exodus of people either for economic (subsistence and/or hunger) drought (persistent food shortages) political or religious (instability) etc. reasons. Besides, forced migration is an appropriate identification mark for all these types of refugees in view of the fact that refugeeism, at least, in international organization (UNHCR) instruments, refers to those people who are afraid of being persecuted by a group (clans and tribes) or the state and those who continue to fear for their lives in their own countries.

Forced migration then takes place, inter alia, because of economic hardships that are faced by individuals and members of communities in societies of least developed and food deficit countries among whom are the Northeast African nations. Permanent economic hardship for many small-holders is worsened by droughts and unstable political situations.

The push factors fuelling migration emerge out of the inability of people to maintain themselves in terms of food. Discussing the issue from the angle of improving one's economic standing Hammer and Linn (in Mills 1987:1259) observe that "migrants tend to move from places of lower economic opportunity to areas of higher economic opportunity", and that migration levels originating from any area tend to reflect 'push factors' related to the lack of local opportunities". Thus a movement of an impoverished group of people may specifically be induced by lack of food which is a basic economic necessity. In the absence of some sustainable increase in food production, the poor in the rural areas continue to lead a life that shifts between subsistence and a never-ending economic trap which more often than not locks them into the vicious circle of poverty. The lop-sided nature of the distribution of resources such as land

present impediments to resource mobilization for a number of them. Landlessness was rampant in Ethiopia before the 1974 revolution. It has been a problem even after the nationalization of land because of the continuing shrinkage of plots because of redistribution to growing numbers of peasant association members. This is one of the key factors impeding the growth in food production in many areas of the country (See Almneh Dejene, 1987:20-22).

Several studies indicate that peasant land holdings have been getting smaller between 1974 and 1984. For instance, in Arsi, one of the surplus producing regions along with Shewa and Gojjam, peasant holdings shrunk from 2.9 ha in 1974 to 2.2 ha in the late 1970s and from 2.1-2.0 ha in the early 1980s (see Alemneh's 1984 survey in Arsi; Fasil Gebre Kiros, 1985; Desalegn Rahmato, 1984 and Mengistu Woube, 1985).

Land fragmentation is antithetic to development and as such it grossly limits increases in food production. Much of the literature contends that aside from making farmers risks-averse, it paves the way for soil erosion, discourages the use of modern inputs, sterilizes investment and dwindles agricultural income to a considerable extent (McPherson, 1983). For many drought victims in northern Ethiopia shortage of land is one problem which hinders increase in production. As Shepherd observed accurately, it is difficult to increase output without increasing the size of the plot households farm (Shepherd, 1975:94).

The shortage of land combined with the absence of critical inputs like fertilizers, hand-tools as well as improved ploughs militate against food production. In the Sudan, for instance, the problem of low agricultural yield has as its source the use of little or no modern input by a good segment of the small-holder farmer population (Berry and

Giestfeld 1983:80, 98 and Elhassan in Barnett and Abdelkarim 1988:166, 177). The absence of an environment which provides incentives to work harder and produce more has also been an additional factor which has been in the way of production in Ethiopia in particular.

The marginalized peasant at a point of decline toward destitution begins to sell his assets and moves out of his area in his strenuous effort to survive. At the root of the problem of the movement of people from their localities is thus poverty that throws them over to the regime of food nonavailability (Walker 1985: 4). As Spitz (1978: 868) contends, when in the rural areas

...supplies are scarce there is a mass exodus of country dwellers towards the towns to which they are lured by the hope of finding cheap food or some way of earning money, no matter how little.

What this writer in effect says is that the lack of food, among other things, is the motivating force pushing people, as it were, to migrate (Spitz, *ibid.*:887). Longhurst (in Food and Nutrition, 1987) contends that

when food shortages extend beyond seasonal severity vulnerable groups can, among other things, change the composition of their diet, sell off their asset or migrate.

These contentions are supported by writers such as (Todaro 1969, 1971; Caldwell, 1969) who say that even under normal conditions people migrate to towns or cross international borders to better their incomes. This point will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.6 below.

Chapter 3

Measurement of poverty, distribution of population and the crisis in agriculture in N.E. Africa

3.1. Crude measures of poverty for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan

As discussed in Chapter II, poverty is the most basic source of food insecurity though it is not the only one. In the three major Northeast African countries (Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) poverty, not excluding absolute poverty, is rampant. Unequal land and livestock distribution and the low level of income received by good segments of populations in the countries indicate the prevalence of abject poverty.

3.1.1. Land and income distribution in Ethiopia

In pre-1974 Ethiopia much of the arable land was held by a smaller percentage of the population and this condition prevailed up to the mid seventies. Some 7.7 per cent of the total population owned 30.1 per cent of the land at that time.

Table 3. Farm HHs* and cultivated land by size of farms,
cumulative percentage, 1968-1970

Category of farm size, hectares									Total
HHs	4	3	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	
Cum.%	7.7	11.1	17.8	38.2	64.1	88.3	95.6	98.5	100
land									
Cum.%	30.1	37.2	47.8	69.4	87.1	97.6	99.5	99.9	100

HHs=Households;

Cum=Cumulative

Source: Central Statistical Office 1975 as quoted in Mesfin W. Mariam 1984:78.

As Table 3 shows, those peasants with less than a hectare of land constituted 61.2 per cent of the population and had less than 30.6 per cent of the land under their control (report of the situation between 1957 and 1970). A household with one hectare of land, and one capable of producing 5-10 quintals of grain/ha (for this estimate see Ludstrom, 1976:42), and this may not be the case with millions of households, was only able to feed his family members at a very low ration level each day. Given that 10 quintals of grain make 100 kilograms or 1,000,000 grams, this output is only adequate to feed 5.4 people at the barest half a kilo or a 500 gram-ration level per person per day (amount of food distributed to disaster victims). But the 1980-85 average production was so low (only 5,458,000 MT) that each adult person's per capita share was only 378 grams per day. This has been much less than the dry ration provided to drought victims, for example (see note in Appendix A).

Susan George argues that at the rate of 2,300 calories per day for adults one ton or 10 quintals can feed 4.17 adults throughout the 365-day

year (George, 1984). The U.N.'s minimum daily energy intake required stands at 2,330 calories (Compendium of Social Statistics, 1980:235).

This computation does not include the clothing and other minimum basic requirements (such as utilities) of an individual peasant and his family members. A wider discussion of this issue is not the aim here. Rather it is to show the seriousness of the problem. The value of food produced by the hypothetical household excludes some very important basic needs like clothing, edible oil, kerosine, etc. The above data, nonetheless, is one good measure of the level of poverty which has its iron grip on a large majority of the population of Ethiopia.

A much better measurement of income distribution in Ethiopia is provided by the Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey conducted over the period May 1981 to April 1982. Data on income, consumption and expenditure was collected from 12,000 rural households (primary sampling units).

The income and receipt patterns of the households were determined by a detailed categorization of households in terms of income and domestic expenditure as well as receipts and payments. Both the income and receipt avenues utilized in the survey "provide interesting features" relating to the income distribution in the country.

About 48 per cent of the rural households, as the sample survey results indicated, received an annual income of less than Birr 1,300 or U.S. \$268 or U.S.\$ 64 per person for a household member at the rate of 4.2 persons per household (see Table 4). The MOA General Agricultural Survey (1983/84) put the highest rural income for households (that of Arsi) at Birr 963.

Table 4. Income distribution in Ethiopia as exhibited by the results of the 1981-1982 Rural Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey

Income group (Birr)	Population %
Below 1300	48
1300-3499	45
Above 3500	7

Source: Central Statistical Authority, 1988: 22-25.

Note:

Income: Rural household-originated income from sales of, for e.g., crops and goods and services purchased and resold after processing.

Receipt: Income plus additional money flowing from traditional mutual aid institutions, returns of money loaned and miscellaneous income.

The expenditures of the categories of households in a way indicate the true income distribution situation in the country as a whole. The Central Statistical Authority of Ethiopia, itself contends that "expenditures are usually taken as a good approximation of incomes (CSA, Statistical Bulletin No. 61, April 1986: xiii). The survey reveals the percentages of households for three categories of households which spent all of what they earned and those which spent more as well as less (See Table 5 for comparisons).

Table 5: Household expenditure as an indirect measure of income distribution

Category of household	Expenditure level	Percentage of population	Total Share in total income %
1	>Income	36.4	41.8
2	=Income	45.5	32.4
3	<Income	17.7	25.9
		100.0	100.0

Source: CSA, 1988: 22-25

As the figures in Table 5 indicate 36 per cent of the rural population spends more than the income it earns. It seems that the balance comes from gifts, loans, remittances and so on as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Those households whose expenditure equals their income constitute 45 per cent of the population. This category is thus one which can be considered as one which subsists on its income by the skin of its teeth.

The population which spends less than it earns is only 18 per cent. Given that the society practices the extended family and humanitarian system of mutual support and also involves itself in the traditional rural credit system, a good deal of the savings of the last group are in all likelihood used for such services.

Rural savings under these circumstances are considerably eroded. By the same token calculated and planned investment in the rural setting are highly constrained. The society is in part locked into each other and generally speaking, the savings achieved by the 18% household category mainly dissipates itself as consumption resource.

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One of the factors which holds back development in rural Ethiopia in all likelihood is this condition. The introduction of modern rural money market systems may slowly contribute to a greater degree of thriftiness in this consumption oriented setting. This new institution would help eliminate the need to pay usurious interests by borrowers and supplement the cash needs of peasants thus leading them on the road to self-sufficiency in the long-run.

3.1.2 Income distribution in Somalia

The poverty condition in Somalia is as bad as that in Ethiopia. According to a household expenditure survey conducted by the International Labor Office (1977:331) 79% of the nomadic population, 80% of the sedentary agriculturalist population and 61% of the urban population expended less than So Sh (Somali Shillings) 5,260 or U.S. \$825 or about \$165 (per capita) per year (Berry and Johnston, 1983:75). But it is observed that "rural values are about half of this" (Ibid.). The above percentages of the populations of each (nomadic and sedentary agriculturist) have been "categorized as poor" (Ibid.).

Table 6 also shows the differentiation of "wealth and poverty" among socio-economic groups across the Somali society as per the 1975 Household Expenditure Survey conducted by the International Labor Office. Some 53.2 per cent of the Somali society of rural and urban backgrounds is capable of expending between So. shillings of 0-520 (refer to Table 6) only.

Table 6: The 1975 household expenditure survey (Somalia)

Range of income per annum in So Shs*	Nomadic Sector		Rural Sector**		Urban Sector	
	No of HHs	%	No of HHs	%	No of HHs	%
0- 520	44	17.7	36	34.6	1	1.9
520-1,040	20	8.1	11	10.6	2	3.8
1,560-2,080	25	10.1	5	4.8	7	13.8
2,080-2,600	19	7.7	7	6.7	4	7.7
2,600-3,120	16	6.5	2	1.9	3	5.8
3,120-3,640	17	6.8	3	2.9	3	5.8
3,640-4,160	8	3.2	1	0.9	3	5.8
4,160-4,680	9	3.6	6	5.8	5	9.6
4,680-5,200	6	2.4	3	2.9	1	1.9
Over 5,260	52	21.0	21	10.3	21	40.4

Source: International Labor Office, 1977:331.

*The rate of exchange (distorted) at the early 1980s rate was U.S. 1 = So Sh 6.3

**Households (HHs) in rural villages in Middle Shebelle (the regions are mainly agricultural).

Berry and Johnston (1983:75-77) have, based on the data of Table 6, concluded that the living standard of the nomads is better than that of the agriculturalists. They note that not only are settled farmers poorer than their urban and nomad counterparts, but the disparity in income between settled farmers is high compared to the other two groups. They also underline that the poverty-stricken group of settled farmers is much higher than the other two. This evidence may help support the contention that poverty is rampant among settled crop dependent farmers who tend to migrate when their household food needs are not satisfied.

3.1.3 Income distribution in the Sudan

In the Sudan also more or less the same level of poverty is in evidence. Some 82% of the rural households have incomes below LS

(Sudanese Pounds) 200 (Berry, and Giestfeld, May 1983:75). This per capita income is very much distorted just as that of Somalia. As Berry and Giestfeld have registered their reservation regarding the average share of income of the rural population.

They say that this average of LS 200 is high because the Gezira and mechanized farm incomes which constitute higher rural incomes are also taken into account in the calculation. These incomes hold only for a small percentage of the population. They note that outside these "watershed" areas of modern agriculture, household income averages below LS 100 particularly in the Darfur area (Berry and Giestfeld, Ibid.). Worse still in Southern Sudan, share of the income is "less than half" of that of Darfur, North Western Sudan, which is another poor area (see Table 7).

Table 7: Income levels (urban and rural) in the Sudan

Income levels	Percentage of population	
	urban	rural
400	25	2
200	28	82
100*	..	..
50*	..	..

Source: ILO, 1976 and Berry and Giestfeld; 93-95.

(1.3 Sudanese pounds (LS) = U.S. \$1)

*Much of the rural population in the Northwest of the country (Darfur) had an income of less than LS 100 while those in the South get less than LS 100 or even 50, according to Berry and Giestfeld.

The best available information on income distribution in the Sudan is one that provides the pattern on a range basis. The agricultural-traditional and the urban informal sectors are the two lowest income categories in the society. The ranges of incomes are 20-120 LS for

traditional agriculturists and 85-310 LS for the urban informal group both of which are in the category of the poor. The overall income distribution is shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Selected patterns of income in the Sudan (annual income in LS)

Labor force sector	Basic range	Average of ranges
Agricultural-traditional	20- 120	75
Agricultural-modern (owners or tenants)	500-4,000	2,250
Workers	100- 150	125
Urban-informal	85- 310	197
Urban-modern	300- 700	500

Source: Lees and Brooks, 1977 and Berry and Geistfeld, 1983: 100.

The low household income as shown in Table 8 is an indication of the level of poverty in the Sudan. With the exception of Khartoum province, five of the provinces' households make less than 200 LS (Sudanese pounds) annually (Brooks, 1970 quoted in Lees and Brooks, 1977).

Table 9. Average income of households by province (Northern provinces only)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Average annual income</u> (Sudanese pounds)
Northern	124
Khartoum	236
Kassala and Red Sea	186
Blue Nile	180
Kordofan	153
Darfur	98

Source: International Labor Organization, 1976.

According to Kasper W. Moll, the majority of the Sudanese population belongs to the low-income group of the society. The population is categorized into the following groups with regard to income.

Table 10: Classification of the Sudanese population by income group

<u>Percentage of</u> <u>Total population</u>	<u>Percentage of</u> <u>Rural</u> <u>population</u>	<u>Percentage of</u> <u>Urban</u> <u>population</u>	<u>Income level in Ls</u> (U.S.\$1=1.3 LS)
31	34*	-	>100 LS
43	48	-	100-200 LS
14	11	-	200-300 LS
5	1.4	40	<500 LS

Source: Klaus Klennert, ed., 1986: 186.

*93% of the rural households earn less than 100 LS per year. Of the 12 mn people over age 15, an estimated 6 million earn some kind of income and many are underemployed. Some 6% are officially unemployed (Klennert, 1986: 186).

Some 3,435,000 (1976-77) economically active persons or 3,432,000

(1979/80) household heads, that is, 68.5 per cent and 65.8 per cent, in that order, were in the agricultural sector (Berry and Giestfeld 1980:101). Outside the seasonal 545,000 cotton pickers and those hired by Kordofan projects (70,000) and the projects in Kassala which hire 100,000 people, most of the 3.4 million households are in the category of peasant agricultural and/or nomadic sector (Ibid.).

The seasonal workers are paid "low wages", according to Berry and Giestfeld (Ibid.). As Table 8 above also indicates annual household income for peasant agriculturists is very low in the north and Darfur. In southern Sudan, where per capita income is also much lower as shown above, unemployment which was 19% for the urban areas and 21% for the rural sector, compared to that of northern Sudan where it was 6.3% and 4.95, respectively, (Government of Sudan, 1977, quoted in Berry et al, 1980) poverty is not only common but it takes a heavy toll of the population in that part of the country.

The average annual incomes of the provinces where the key cities of Khartoum, Kassala, etc., are located, are higher than the outlying Northern Kordofan and Darfur provinces (see Table 9 above). Some 40% of the urban population also earns more than 500 Sudanese pounds while a significant majority of the rural population earns less than 300 Sudanese pounds (refer to Table 9).

3.2. Distribution of population and agricultural development

Distribution of population in all the three countries is uneven. Although this may be because of the hostile environments in much of the open lands or because of traditional settlement patterns, the fact remains that much of the land that can be put to agricultural production

lays waste while millions of people suffer from grinding and permanent hunger.

3.2.1. The situation in the Sudan

In the Sudan, for instance, some 65% of the population lives in central Sudan's provinces of Khartoum, Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur (W.Moll, in Klennert, 1986:186). Of the 75% of the Sudanese rural population 66% are sedentary agriculturists and 9% are nomads (Ibid.). Some 65% of the Sudanese population also lives in Central Sudan (Ibid.).

Judit Kiss (1977:7) has found out that as a consequence of "geographical and economic factors" the population distribution in the Sudan is uneven. Some 50 per cent of the population is "crammed into 14 per cent of the country" (Ibid.). This is a rather small percentage of land-man ratio. This must be one of the reasons why only 1.2 per cent of the 5% of the total arable land area of the country is under the plough (UN FAO, 1985:173). Most of the population of the northern part of the country has been compelled to live along the banks of the Nile and "relies upon its waters to irrigate small amounts of land," (Berry and Geistfeld, 1983:93). "High seasonal temperatures, sparse rainfall and lack of arable soils impede most agricultural development..." and a good number of people have as a consequence been forced to adapt to a nomadic way of life to counter the severe environmental conditions (Ibid.).

3.2.2 The population distribution condition in Ethiopia

The situation in Ethiopia is not that different from that of the Sudan. The large majority of the Ethiopian population is also concentrated on the highlands. According to Mesfin Wolde Mariam, some

90% of the country's population lived on the highlands--northwestern and northeastern parts--of the country (Mesfin, 1972).

A recent study which Mesfin conducted indicates that some 69 per cent of the population inhabits 29 of the land which is above 1,600 meter elevation (Mesfin, 1986:5-6). Tadesse(1983: 6) notes that most of the Ethiopian farming population restricts its activities to the high plateaux of the country. Crummy (1983:2)also notes that Ethiopian peasants cultivate land that is above 1,000 meters (3,500-4,000 ft.) in altitude up to the limits of cultivation above 3,000 meters (11,500 ft.). An estimated land of only less than one-third of the total land area is thus inhabited by most of the population. The highland areas to which Mesfin referred to above have more than 66 per cent of the total cultivated land area, 45 per cent of the land under forests and 46 per cent under shrubs (Mesfin 1986, 5-6).

This estimate is also carried by a study made by Kloos and Adugna, (quoted in Hodes and Kloos, 1988:918) which provides the information that 33.8 million people live on high plateaus which are above 1800 meters and receive an annual mean rainfall of 1000-2000 mm. This concentration of the population on the highlands has been keeping most of the country's agricultural land beyond the reach of the plough. This has not been without a good reason.

Most of the lowland areas were shunned because of malaria infestation and other health hazards. Between 1960 and 1974, some 20,000 family heads were settled in lowland areas in the main (RRC, 1985:157). Some 12,990 settlers, 23% of whom were peasants and 43% urban-based unemployed people, were settled up to 1976. Also between 1976 and 1981 some 30,298 additional families were settled (RRC, 1985).

The largest number, around 600,000 of the settlers, however, moved or were moved to new and open areas in the lowland areas between 1984 and 1986 under a mostly government sponsored but controversial program (RRC, 1985 and Hodes and Kloos 1988:918). But despite these hazards, some of the destitute moved on their own and the majority through the government programmes. Overzealous government officials, including some at higher echelons gave the green light for the use of outright force and/or a threat of force to settle part of the populations from Tigrai, Wello and Northern Shewa to the open lowland areas to get land to work on. This happened because of two reasons, according to Jansson (1987:173). First, the voluntary nature of the selection of settlers, designed by the relevant government organization (RRC) and endorsed by the government, was disregarded by some officials who insisted that those peasants whose Meher, Ethiopia's big rains, crop failed or those who were unable to repay their debt or those cultivating slopes above 30 degrees should go (Ibid.). Secondly, overzealous administrators were after fulfilling quotas relating to the number of people to be settled (Ibid.). The grave mistake that followed was the setting of quotas in this largely essential information deficient programme of settlement. Most of the settlers moved under the state's programme were allowed to farm under the producers' cooperatives arrangement which disallowed individual ownership of holdings other than small private gardens. This was another grave error in that it led to a change into a system of farming that the peasants were little accustomed to in their places of origin. A well-designed programme of settlement can, aside from mitigating the chronic food shortage condition in the long-run, help to redistribute population in a way that the land resources of the country could be optimally used.

Since the large majority of the Ethiopian population lives in the rural areas, its economic activity would be limited to agriculture for many years to come. At the current population growth rate which outpaces food production by a wider margin, a lag in the important measure of settlement and resettlement would make the food shortage condition much more serious.

Of the total Ethiopian population of 42 million, 86 per cent lived in the rural areas by 1985 (RRC, 1985:34). An estimated 85 per cent of the population earn their livelihood from agriculture and animal husbandry (Kloos and Adugna, quoted in Hodes et al, 1988:918; Getachew et al, 1974:25. The total population had shot up to 46 million by 1987. The rural population grew at a rate of 2.9 per cent per annum, a percentage which itself grew from 2.5 per cent over the last few years. According to the RRC (1985:34):

Of the total population, 49.4 per cent or 17.1 million, are in the 15-59 working age group. Within that group, 75.4% or 12.9 million are economically active. It is thus obvious that the country has a large labor force, a significant proportion of which is unemployed or underemployed.

This population can be profitably used to bring more land under cultivation. The open lowlands which are not used by the indigenous and other earlier settlers, nonetheless, need to be increasingly freed of health hazards and the new settlers, those who moved of their own free will, should be provided with information, inputs and their share of individual plots of land and other support they require in their strenuous effort to become self-sufficient. Those who were unwillingly moved should be helped to return if they wish to do so.

3.2.3 Somalia's situation

Somalia, though less fortunate in the gift of fertile land than its two other neighbours, has not used its full potential of land as well. Only the southern third of Somalia which also includes the watered areas from Wabe Shebelle and Juba rivers, which have their sources in Ethiopia, makes a viable crop production enterprise possible, according to Berry and Johnston (1983). Out of the 8.2 million hectares (13 per cent of the total land area of the country) some 14 per cent of the population (600,000 people) depend for their livelihood on 540,000 ha of land which they use for rainfed agriculture (Berry and Johnston, 1983:13 and 28).

3.3 Water resources and irrigation in Northeast Africa

The water resources of the three countries are not also used much despite the fact that their considerable usefulness as vehicles of increasing food production is realized. Although the costs of developing irrigation agriculture with the use of modern inputs is high, much effort is not exerted wherever it is possible to utilize the resources with the possible minimum expenses.

According to Berry and Geistfeld (1983:22) the Nile River in the Sudan provides water to 4 million acres of land along its banks which are farmed through "pump schemes and major gravity irrigation projects." But still 61 per cent of the Sudanese rural population farms only 6.9 million hectares of land. Some 2.6 and 1.8 million hectares are under mechanized and irrigated farming, respectively (see Table 11 for comparisons).

Table 11. Estimated area of the crop sub-sector in the Sudan

Sub-sector	Area		Agricultural population (%)
	mns* of fedans	mns* of Ha**	
Irrigated	4.2	1.8	16
Mechanized	6.1	2.6	23
Traditional rain-fed	16.4	6.9	61
Total	26.7	11.3	100

Source: Agriculture Bank of Sudan, quoted in A.B.Zahlan, 1986.

*Mns= millions **Ha=hectare

In Ethiopia too a tiny percentage of the water resources of the country is used. Around 100,000 ha of utilized are used for irrigation purposes (RRC, 1985).

Also in Somalia, some 300,000 hectares of land which is potentially irrigable is used for cereal production (Berry and Johnston, 1983: 33). Of this total only 50,000 hectares of controlled irrigation and 110,000 hectares of flood irrigation have been used up to the early 1980s (Ibid.).

Some estimates, according to Berry and Johnston, have it that expansion is possible in some areas such as the Bay Region. But lack of data and national capacity to generate the same limit activity in this regard.

3.4 The role mechanization plays in the agriculture of the region

Agricultural land that is mechanized is also one of the most important sub-sectors in the three countries when looked at from the point of view of the allocation of government budgets for crop production; but the huge costs that have been attached to it do not justify its existence most of the time. A small discussion of the problem in this paper will give a better understanding of why peasant or small-holder agriculture which is the source of livelihood for about three fourths of the populations of each nation in Northeast Africa is backward.

Traditional agriculture, the main tool of which is the age-old plough in most areas of the three Northeast African countries, has been given little attention. Even the improved technology of oxen-driven plough agriculture has been lagging behind owing to the poverty of peasants, among other things. In Ethiopia, for instance, close to 38 per cent of the farming population cultivates without using plough-oxen. In other words, it uses hand tools to farm its holdings. Some 32 per cent of the farming population owns one oxen for its farming activities (MOA, 1984). Many pair their oxen with ones that come from relatives or from acquaintances in return for labour or in kind payments. These group of peasants constitute 24.7 per cent of the farming population (MOA, 1984). Alemneh (1987:139) says that "approximately half of the peasant farmers have either one or no oxen" in Ethiopia.

In the Sudan as well "hand tools still remain the only means of production for most people" (Abdulkarim in Barnett and Abdulkarim 1988:143) These authors note that even in the so-called mechanized farming areas:

Hand tools remain very significant, and they are increasingly purchased in the market. This is so even in those communities where production is predominantly for subsistence and not for exchange (Ibid.).

This contention of these two writers is also supported by their findings of Elhasan (in Barnett and Abdulkarim, 1988:176) who in his study of rural villages in the Sudan found out that in Kurtula, 90 per cent of the households depend on family member labour which uses hand tools for farming purposes. In other villages such as Delami and Ellfaid, among others, the use of farm "hand tools are still the norm" (Ibid.:177).

Alemneh's study of Arsi (Ethiopia) where the Arsi regional Development Unit (ARDU) indicates that some 64 per cent of the sample farmers (92 of the 144 interviewed farmers) did not know about the improved farm implements developed by this project which was supported by the Swedish Government (1987:134). The reason for this, according to Alemneh are two. The first is that the extension services of the project are weak and, the second, the small number of tools developed are expensive to the average farmer. Alemneh notes that 18 per cent of this sample farmers responded that the equipments produced were expensive (Ibid.). Alemneh's piece of advice is that the project should be committed to a research and extension effort on developing "appropriate and easy-to-handle equipment which is at the same time affordable to the majority of the small farmers in the Arsi Region" (Ibid.). This applies to all other regions of Ethiopia also. Both the Government of Ethiopia and donor countries such as Sweden, the U.S., EEC, etc., should also help in this regard if the food shortage problem is to be partially solved at least.

Elhasan (in Barnett and Abdulkarim, 1987:177) also says that peasant production in the Sudan has been lagging behind as a consequence of an "unequal access to resources internal to peasant production". Alemneh also points out that access to credit and a good management of the same in Arsi and more particularly in all the other regions as well as the improvement of the traditional technology and its popularization are fundamental measures to increase food production in Ethiopia. But unfortunately much effort is not made to address these problems in both countries.

Mechanized agriculture, on the other hand, as represented by state farms and cash crop farms, consuming as it does, a large chunk of Ethiopia's budgetary allocations, has been given shots in the arm consistently. Some three-fourths of the nation's "resources in terms of credit, fertilizer and improved seeds go toward the development of this sector (Alemneh, 1987:20). But its results have neither boosted the initially expected foreign exchange earnings and/or the consumption needs of the larger population of the country for the reason that its expansion is in part limited and the earnings deriving from it show declines too often. The same thing is true of the Sudan as well. The export-oriented production units such as the over one-million-hectare Gezeira Scheme, despite the flow of public and private investment funds were "neglected" during the 1970-75 plan period (Hussein in Barnett and Abdelkarim, 1988:60). As a result of the decline in the pumping of funds, "these projects not only failed to increase their contribution to the country's export earnings, but also failed to maintain their past contribution" (Ibid.).

By far, one good example of this is the performance of the state

farms in Ethiopia. Huge investments, particularly in the state farms, were credited for helping to raise agricultural production by 2.5% in 1982/83 (RRC, 1985:50-54) from a level of 1.2% representing the 1965-80 period (World Development Report, 1987: 202-204).

But the government later accepted the fact that the drought has also affected the performance of the state farms (RRC, 1985 and Jansson et al, 1987:119). According to Dawit (1989: 273-75; Jansson et al, 1987:119) the amount of financial resources pumped into Ethiopia's state farms which constitute about four per cent of the cultivable land (94% is farmed by small-holders organized into peasant associations) is not justified by their performances. Not only this, according to Alemneh, 70 per cent of the 26,000 metric tons of seeds produced and distributed in the country annually go to state farms (Alemneh, 1987:103). Dawit and Jansson, quoting the Ministry of Agriculture and other government sources, respectively, note that the costs of production of the state farms are so high that even the preferential market prices offered to them by the government's Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) could not enable them to pay their costs of production let alone reach the break-even point of profits.

The impact of expanded holdings by commercial farms in the Sudan has in part also been the displacement of households from the land they cultivated. This has led to the leasing of land by individuals who themselves rent it from the government (Barnett and Abdelkarim 1988: 156-58). Expansion of commercial agriculture, particularly cash-cropping activities, according to Barnett and Abdelkarim, had been "accompanied by an increase in consumption" and had "affected even the most remote and self-contained communities" thus destroying their local production

(Ibid.: 142-43). To make matters worse, the Sudanese government, in a bid to help 'merchant capital', banned local (community level) production of such crops as cotton which in a way also constituted basic necessities for the rural population (Ibid.).

Increase in the consumption 'need' of the household also eventuated in the drive to engage in more cash-cropping by many small-holder agriculturalists in the Sudan. This deteriorated the food production situation and turned many into migrants who were after making ends meet for their impoverished households.

The large-scale mechanized and collective farm development drives in Somalia in the early 1970s also turned increased number of small-holder farmers into agricultural labourers (UNHCR, Workshop, 1981:31). The limitation on the grain small farmers could maintain for themselves because of the forced delivery requirements to the government also discouraged them from producing surplus (Ibid.).

Unrestricted and ill-planned state farms and commercial agriculture, as discussed above, bring about distortions in the allocation of the limited financial resources of nations as those of Northeast Africa. Human resources are also wasted because people are "forced" to divert their attention from primary and initial stage of producing food for survival.

A balanced development effort which takes the food needs of poor rural households and one which slowly transforms household units into surplus producers is very much called for. A detailed treatment of this sector is not within the scope of this paper. The forgoing discussion has, however, attempted to give a bird's eye view of the dimensions of the problem as it relates to the major sector of small-holder agriculture

in the three nations.

State and commercial farms thus consume a great deal of the financial resources of the countries, resources that are awfully thin at that. These resources could have profitably been invested in small-holder agriculture the per hectare production average of which (for selected crops in Ethiopia) had in 1983 been almost double that of state farms (Dawit 1989:274). That is why a discussion relating to them is important from the point of view of this thesis.

All said and done, both the mechanized and traditional agricultural sectors are not adequately equipped with the institutional and technological inputs that are required to make a substantial contribution to food production. Even though the number of tractors used in Ethiopia rose from 3,600 to 3,900; in Somalia from 1,300 to 1630, and in Sudan from 8,767 to 18,000 between 1974-76 and 1985, (FAO Yearbook 1986) their contribution to national food production has not at all been substantial.

That is why a greater degree of commitment for the development of the sector, particularly that of the small-holder, is called for. Investment in the sector should of necessity rise in order to avert the mass starvation conditions which have become glaring characteristics of the Northeast African region. A coup de grace to begin the difficult road of containing food shortages is long overdue and the national governments should be able to bring about this change and immediately at that or else face tormenting experiences. Foreign aid can also play supplemental roles in this effort once it is taken up earnestly.

Most of the populations of the countries, particularly those of the Sudan and Ethiopia, are concentrated on smaller percentages of the arable land area. Part of the reason for this, as discussed earlier on, are

malaria infestations, the unbearable heat in parts of the lowland areas, water shortages, and lack of infrastructures such as roads. Benign neglect of agriculture, particularly peasant agriculture, on the part of the state are equally important causal factors explaining the low level of agricultural development as was noted earlier.

Table 12. Resources and their use in agriculture in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan

Country	Area Km2 in ('000)	Arable land as %age of t. land	Irrig. land as of ar. land	Forest land as a % of t. land	Ag. % per ha of ar. land	Ag. lab. as % of ag. pop.
Eth.	1221.9	13	1	24	1.9	40
Som.	637.0	2	12	14	3.9	37
Sud.	2505.8	5	14	20	1.2	31

Source: FAO, State of Food and Agriculture, 1985: 173.

Abbreviations: Irrig=irrigated; Ag=agriculture; Lab=labor
Ar=arable; t=total, and pop=population

The potential land that can be used for agriculture is plenty. As shown in Table 12 above, less than four per cent of the arable land on the average is under the plough in the three Northeast African nations. Low levels of human resources development as well as the misuse and misallocation of the meagre investible resources available are in part responsible for the less than optimal utilization of existing land resources.

3.5. Agriculture and the crisis in food production

Agriculture is the mainstay of the large majority of people in least

developed countries (LDCs) in which group the three N.E. African nations fall. After a 2.3 per cent average annual growth rate in the 1960s, agricultural output in Africa declined to around 1.3% per annum in the 1970s (World Development Report, 1985; World Bank, 1984:77; D.K. Fieldhouse, 1986:93; Assefa Mehretu, 1988:4). In the 1980s the growth rate has gone down even further (World Development Report, 1987).

In continental Africa, production in per capita terms which grew at 0.2% a year during the 1960s fell by 1.4% a year in the 1970s (World Development Report, 1985). While this grew at an average of 1 per cent per annum between 1968 and 1983 in developing countries as a whole it fell by 1.1% per annum in Africa for the same period (Jazairy, 1987:50).

Various factors are responsible for the deceleration of agriculture, particularly food, which, according to the World Bank (World Development Report, 1985) showed a "modest increase" in the 1960s, to a decline of a negative 1.1% in the 1970s (Burki, in Gauhar, 1986:118). The World Bank observes that if agriculture "lags, it is because of inadequate investment, lack of incentives for farmers and inappropriate policies as well as problems of technology, climate and soil (World Development Report, 1985:40). According to Taylor (in Chidzero and Gauhar, 1986:57) "Rigid controls over producer prices have had a negative effect on the development of the rural sector in general" (Taylor, *ibid.* :57).

Deceleration in agriculture and especially food production in the Horn of Africa has had a debilitating effect on the livelihood of hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. A least developed country with a large majority of its populations in the category of subsistence agriculture is in all likelihood not capable of producing a

surplus which is one source of economic growth. The presence of unemployed people in the category of subsistence producers is a liability to less developed countries which in part have to redistribute their "subsistence food" to the unemployed as per the traditional mechanism of helping extended family members as well as those that are destitute and with no relations to resort to.

3.5.1 Growth rate in food production and population

The already fragile production of food is thus worsened by the redistribution of the little that is raised by way of food among the poor in society. FAO's argument that "a smaller aggregate output which remains small only perpetuates poverty" holds water here in this regard. Under these circumstances, the society cannot generate the food surpluses which it very badly needs to boost the sector which is the most significant source of investible resources. This is the hard reality that is being observed in North East Africa.

Table 13: Average annual growth rate for GNP, per capita
GNP, GDP, agriculture & average annual rate of inflation

Country	GNP per Capita	Average annual growth rate %	GDP		Agriculture		Average annual growth rate of inflation	
	Dollars		Average annual growth rate %	Average annual growth rate %	average annual growth rate %	average annual growth rate %	average annual growth rate of inflation	average annual growth rate of inflation
	1985	1965-85	65-80	80-85	65-80	80-85	60-85	80-85
LDCs	200	0.4	3.2	2.8	2.0	1.9	11.4	18.9
Ethiopia	110	0.2	2.8	0.3	1.2	-3.4	3.3	2.6
Somalia	280	-0.7	2.8	4.9	..	7.9	10.5	45.4
Sudan	300	..	3.8	-0.7	2.9	-5.5	11.5	31.7

Source: World Development Report, 1987:202-204.

The average annual growth rate for agriculture in Ethiopia and Sudan was extremely low compared to those of low income countries where it only showed a decline from 2.0% to 1.9% in 1965-80 and 1980-85, respectively. In Ethiopia and Sudan, however, negative growth rates are registered for the latter period. The growth rate for agriculture in Somalia indicates an "appreciable" 7.5 per cent increase while that of the per capita GNP shows a negative (-0.7) which appears to show a growth rate in reverse (refer to Table 13).

Table 14. Population and its annual growth rate between 1970 and 1980

Country	Population (in '000)	Av.annual growth rate of population per cent 1970-1980
Ethiopia	42.6	2.5
Somalia	3.6	2.7
Sudan	18.4	2.7

Source: Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics 1983, U.N. New York, 1983.

While the average annual growth rate of population has been going up, the annual growth rate of production for Ethiopia and the Sudan had gone from bad to worse as the preceding two tables indicate particularly in the first half of the 1980s. Population in Ethiopia grew at 2.5%-2.9%, while agricultural production decelerated at a negative 3.4% as Table 13 shows. The situation in the Sudan has been even worse. In this country population growth has been climbing at 2.7% per annum while agriculture slid at a rate of a negative 5.5%. Somalia is an exception. While its population grew at 2.7%, its agriculture showed a growth rate

of 7.9 per cent between 1980 and 1985. This figure, however, contradicts with the negative annual growth rate registered (see Table 13 above) and needs a further scrutiny. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Population growth has, therefore, been outstripping food production to a point where Ethiopia and Sudan, in particular, have to import increasing amounts of food to make good the balance (see Table 19a, in Chapter 4). Much of the differential of the balance nonetheless came from international community aid (Refer to Table 20, Chapter 4) and concessional sales by surplus producing Western donor countries. Political instability and recurrent droughts are in part responsible for the tragic decline in food production in N.E. Africa. These factors will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4 below.

Persisting poverty in Northeast Africa is also shown by the low performance in food production in terms of per capita annual production. For twenty years, the averages for all the three countries showed very little improvement with negative shifts interspersed.

Table 15. Average index of per capita food production: The situation in N.E. Africa and other LDCs

	1965-67=100		1969-71=100		1974-76=100		1979-81=100		
Nation	74-76	75-77	76-78	77-79	78-80	79-81	80-82	81-83	83-85
Ethiopia	83	85	84	84	83	85	82	106	97
Sudan	117	106	108	105	102	102	87	94	103
Somalia	91	96	87	85	84	65	60	108	102
Chad	76	83	89	91	91	96	95	101	106
Tanzania	113	93	93	94	92	91	88	108	108
Kenya	88	89	91	92	86	85	88	86	99
Senegal	96	100	96	88	89	76	93	71	105
Ivory Coast	124	116	104	102	107	110	107	108	115
Cameroon	108	101	112	110	109	101	102	84	107
LDCs	96	98	97	105	101	111	110	111	120

Source: World Development Reports 1982 through 1988.

The average annual food produced per capita for Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia was much below the average indices for the 1965-67; 1969-71; 1974-76 and 1979-81 periods. In Sudan's case, the figure showed a consistent decline from 113 in 1974-76 to 87 and 94 in 1980-82 and 1981-83, respectively, only to overstep the 1979-81 index to 103 in 1983-85 (refer to Table 15 above).

Somalia's averages showed a slump in 1979-81 and 1980-82 to 65 and 60, in that order, from a high of 96 in 1975-77. The decline appears to have coincided with the aftermath of the 1977-78 war with Ethiopia. It has been over 100 for the 1980-85 period.

Ethiopia's indices indicate marginal increases and falls. With the exception of the 1981-83 period which registered a figure of 106 above the 1974-76 average index, the tri-annual figures were much below 100. The World Development Report carries a figure which is much below the

1983-85 figure which was 97. This reduction in per capita production coincides with the 1983-84 and subsequent years of drought and the intensification of the civil war in the north of the country and elsewhere. The drought and the civil wars are, however, factors which further strengthened the hold of poverty and food insecurity.

Compared to the averages of the low-income countries which almost showed consistent increases, from 96 in 1974-76 to 120 in 1983-85, the performance of the three countries in terms of per capita production is low indeed. Countries with apparently lesser or fewer political problems, Tanzania and Kenya in East Africa and Senegal, Ivory Coast and Cameroon in West Africa, did much better in terms of per capita production compared to the Northeast African countries and Chad, another country that has been war-torn for over a decade until a year or so ago (see Table 14).

3.5.2. Caloric and protein intake levels

The little improvement and/or decline in food production has no doubt translated into low caloric and protein intake for almost two decades. The Northeast African countries were unable to achieve the 2300 caloric intake level--the average level of developing market-economy countries. While Ethiopia which had a 2115 level in 1964-66 (a level which was much better than those of the developing market economies then), encountered a failure of an almost 200 units of dietary deficiency between 1969 and 1976 to rise to only 2189 in 1980-82. Sudan showed consistent increase from 1858 calories in 1964-66 to 2280 in 1980-82.

Table 16: Calories and protein per capita intake per day
for N.E. African and other groups of nations

Countries	Year							
	Calories (number)				Protein (grams)			
	64-66	69-71	74-76	80-82	64-66	69-71	4-76	80-82
Developing market economies	2,084	2,160	2,170	2,319	52.4	54.0	54.1	57.1
Ethiopia	2,115	2,042	1,862	2,189	72.2	70.4	61.2	72.6
Sudan	1,858	2,118	2,112	2,280	60.3	64.7	63.4	69.3
Somalia	...	...	...	...	..	..	..	..
Developed market economies	3,137	3,250	3,292	3,375	90.9	94,0	95.7	98.4
Socialist countries	2,362	2,447	2,532	2,717	62,6	63.7	66.0	69.7

Source: UNCTAD, Statistical Year Book, 1983/84 U.N
 34th Issue, New York, 1986: 583-85

The figures for Developed Market Economies for the 1980-82 period was 3,375, a difference of over 1200-1300 units above those of Ethiopia and Sudan. A minimum of 2300 caloric intake level is advocated as a break-even point for a healthy living and the release of a modest energy for work.

The 2300 caloric intake mark has not been achieved in Ethiopia and Sudan in particular. Without this level of intake of energy producing food, food production increases would be far from being stimulated. Hence the large majority of the rural populations would remain in the poverty trap on this count also.

3.6. Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI): The situation in North East Africa compared with other country groupings

The measures of poverty in North East Africa discussed so far can be supplemented by the physical quality of life index (PQLI). The variables of infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy, which are commonly accepted as the components of the PQLI, are sometimes considered as a set of more precise measures of socio-economic betterment*.

*PQLI is a measure of welfare which tries to assess levels of living that GNP per capita does not measure properly. It was adopted after 1976 to supplement the GNP per capita to "assess economic welfare between nations" and to measure "economic progress," Larson and Wildford, 1979: 581-584 and Berry and Johnston, Ibid: 71-74.

Although Larson and Wildford question the necessity of using PQLI as a measurement of welfare on the grounds that per capita GNP is adequate for the purpose, it is of high value in the sense that per capita income in and of itself measures income that is not true for every individual in society. But with PQLI, it gives a bird's eye view of the level of social and economic progress achieved in three different aspects of life. Infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy are combined into a single index through correlation analysis to see the level of achievement of societies.

These variables are important indicators of economic development (Caldwell, 1988) and are themselves stimulants of development. Their assessment thus helps to have a clearer view of conditions of development in North East Africa, one of the concerns of this thesis.

The grinding poverty which the Northeast African countries experience impacts their social and economic development as resource constraints translate into these sectors as well. Compared to other countries of Africa, the N.E. African countries and Chad, which suffer from political instability and repeated impoundment of natural disasters, have achieved little in the areas of life expectancy and infant mortality, etc.

A comparison of the war and drought ravaged countries of N.E. Africa and Chad (serialized 1-4 in Table 17); the relatively stable countries but somehow affected by natural disasters (4-9) and the groups of countries from poor to middle and rich countries (10-14) shows the relative position of the countries in terms of GNP per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality and adult literacy. Northeast African countries are at the lower end of the scale in almost all of these indicators.

The average per capita income for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan in 1982 was U.S.\$260.0. Compared to that of the relatively speaking conflict free countries (group 2) which registered an average annual per capita income of \$510.0, the average for the conflict and drought-ridden N.E. African countries is very low indeed. This average income is only 20 per cent of that of group 2.

All the four countries (N.E. Africa and Chad or group 1) have one of the lowest levels of life expectancy for 1983--an average of 45 years

(see Table 17 below). Those countries which have, for instance, drought, related problem, among others, with virtually no costs of instability--Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Cameroon (group 2) appear to have done better in this regard with an average of 52 years.

In terms of infant mortality (for those aged under one year) the 1983 average for the second group listed above was 111 per 1000 live births while that of the second group was 130 for the same period. This is again an indication of the relatively satisfactory performance of the second group which has stable political conditions.

Table 17: Per capita GNP and PQLI: Inter-country comparison
(war and civil war as well as drought affected North East
Africa and selected nations with highly reduced political
instability problems

Country	GNP/C (\$)	GNP growth rate	Life expect- -ancy (years)	Infant mort- ality under 1 year per 1000 births		Adult literacy (percentage)	
	1982	1965-1983	1983	1965	1983	1970(s)-80(s)*	
Ethiopia	120	0.5	43	166	..	10	62.4
Sudan	400	1.3	48	161	117	31.4	N.A.
Somalia	250	0.8	45	166	142	54.8	N.A.
Chad	..	..	13	184	142	54.8	N.A.
Group I Average	256				130		
Tanzania	240	0.0	51	138	97	47.0	N.A.
Kenya	310	2.3	57	124	81	59.2	N.A.
Senegal	440	-0.5	46	172	140	28.1	N.A.
Iv. Coast	710	1.0	52	161	121	42.7	N.A.
Gambia	920	2.7	51	155	116	41.2	N.A.
Group II Average	510				111		
Sub-Sah. Africa	220	-0.2	48	156	119		
LDCs	260	2.7	59	122	75		
Indu. market econ.	11060	2.5	76	24	10		
East Euro- -pean non- market econ	..	..	70	31	30		
Middle income econ.	1310	3.4	61	18	9		

Source: World Bank, 1985, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1987.

Note: Countries listed from 1-4 are ones rocked by political instability and wars, those from 5-9 are stable. The rest of the groups of countries are listed for comparative purposes.

*Varying years (1970-1983) for population categories of 10 years plus or 15 years plus.

A fair comparison in the area of adult literacy is rendered difficult due to the lack of comparative data for 1983 for almost all countries except Ethiopia. This country, which had only a 10 per cent literacy rate in 1965 increased the percentage to 62.4 in 1985. This was achieved through the mobilization of students and urban dwellers and peasant associations throughout the country over a period of less than eight years. Along with the land nationalization measure, the rise in the literacy rate, are two significant achievements scored as a result of social order change in the country. But these achievements were not bolstered by other equally important measures. Although they are factors which can help increase the tempo of development, their contribution remains to be seen. At the moment, however, their impact is shrouded in complex webs of variables of development.

The low per capita GNP growth rates and the constituent variables which are exhibited by PQLI, which together measure socio-economic performance of countries, indicate that N.E. Africa is, in general, relatively and absolutely poor. Under these circumstances, the countries cannot have the necessary and adequate investment resources which can be applied toward agricultural development.

3.7. The migration of rural people and professionals and skilled ones and its impacts on the economies of N.E. Africa

Wherever scarcity of land is experienced and wherever populations have been increasing over and above the comparable level of agricultural production, the tendency has been to struggle to win one's household's bread in all conceivable ways. These include ploughing additional land on a share-cropping basis; renting land that may lie around; living on loans

the rate of interest of which is crushing and which places many a peasant on bonded labor, living on extended family resources and/or beggary, and ultimately evacuating the locality and/or region for relief and/or some kind of expected employment. A resort to these often difficult choices were discussed in detail earlier in chapter 2, section 2.6.

Migration of the rural poor and professionals as well as skilled labor and its implications on the economy of the countries will be treated below. Forced migration is true today as it was in the past in North East Africa and especially in Ethiopia.

This has been taking place owing to the shift of power balances, among other things, in the power distribution conditions emanating from episodic power struggles observed in societies. In general, in northern Ethiopia, for instance, the deterioration in political conditions before the dawning of the Twentieth Century forced populations to migrate to the central and southern parts of the country where a relative peace and land resources were abundant (McCann 1983:19) in the expanding state of Shewa. The growing needs of local officials, who were relatively independent of central authorities; and the demands of the state-placed heavy burdens of in kind taxes and labor which was provided by peasant farmers in the form of corvee, were the sources of "wealth" tapped by the state. McCann produces historical evidences to establish this fact. This system of taxing people out of existence constituted some of the "push" factors which fuelled the migration process (see McCann, *ibid.*:4-25).

Other factors which McCann notes were responsible for the migration of people from Northern Ethiopia were also "...the advanced state of erosion (soil) deforestation and capital shortages in the aging northern production system," (*Ibid.*:19). Many peasants also engaged themselves in

trading (salt bar, hides and skins or manufactured goods) activities to bolster their income which they used for the purchase of "seed, oxen or even access to land" (Ibid.).

The narrowness of these activities also forced a substantial number of Ethiopians from northern Ethiopia to work as migrant labourers in colonized Eritrea and in Gedaref, Sudan, where development schemes were there (Ibid.:20). Again "over a quarter of a million of northern Ethiopians" including those from Eritrea served in Libya where Italians were pacifying rebellions in Cyrenaica and Fezzan between 1911 and 1931 (Ibid.). According to McCann the major purpose of this migration and service in foreign army expeditions were motivated by the "desire to collect the means to survive and reproduce in the rural economy which increasingly required outside income and start-up capital", (Ibid.:21-22). Many came back home not only with cash but also with varying skills.

A rough estimate of 70,000 Ethiopians were working in the Sudan by the late 1960s (estimate was by knowledgeable Ethiopians living in the Sudan in the late 1960s and whom the writer of this thesis had the opportunity of talking to). Political conditions and deteriorating economic circumstances resulting from repetitive droughts compelled a variously estimated 1,000,000 Ethiopians to cross the border into the Sudan as a place of sanctuary, as a source of employment, as a spot of temporary relief and as a stepping stone to migrate to wherever work and education was available. It is difficult to make estimates, rough ones even, of the various categories of the economic migrants and political refugees that have been in the Sudan for the last three decades. Small surveys by Mekuria in Nobel 1987, see Chapter 1, page 6) and Rogge

(1985:146) give a bird's eye view of the situation.

Akol's (in Rogge 1987:146-153, see also Akol's dissertation of 1986) studies of the various categories of refugees from Southern Sudan shows that 11.4 per cent of the 219,400 refugees belonged to the Anyanya rebel forces. The rest of them were people displaced by the war and the instability conditions. It can, therefore, be argued that most of the refugees moved out of their localities as a consequence of economic and social life disruption. Mekuria's survey of refugee types in the Sudan also showed that only 10 per cent of the refugees belonged to the group which left home as a consequence of political persecution (see the Introduction of this thesis).

Drought refugees from Tigrai who went to the Sudan for temporary succor of their starvation in international relief camps returned to Ethiopia when the rains came back after the 1984/85 severe drought. The number of these forced migrants or refugees was around 80,000 (World Refugee Survey 1985, 1986: 44-47). This does not include the small number of refugees who trekked back on their own and through government posts in Eritrea and through airports.

Timberlake (1985) estimated that some 300,000 "returnee-refugees" entered the Southeastern region of Hararghe. A mixture of some 320,000 Ethiopian forced migrants and Somali refugees entered Ethiopia from Somalia (U.S. Refugee Committee, 1985). According to the World Food Programme (1986 in Review:1986 24-25) 400,000 Somalian refugees like the 30,000 or so who repatriated from Djibouti arrived in Ethiopia. These last category of refugees returned home after they realized some rehabilitation assistance has been promised or the project for securing one was foreseen, development projects were being started and conditions

were improving in the Hararghe and Sidamo regions, Eastern and South Eastern Ethiopia, respectively. These refugees constitute a segment which more than anything else wished to struggle to make a living in its home country come what may. It also represents those groups who detested refugee camp life outside home.

Professional and skilled labor which is an important factor for the economies of these countries is either misplaced or misused or migrates in search of better opportunities. But this labor is not easily quantifiable. However, such labor has found a fissure through which it can remedy the misplacement and misuse as well as the unchanging low income it earned. According to a study by Galal el Din, (1978; quoted in Berry and Giestfeld 1983:35) some 231,350 Sudanese migrants worked in 14 Arab and other countries. Of this number some 140,550 were in Saudi Arabia, 45,000 or 19.5% in Egypt, 20,000 or 8.6% in Libya, 12,000 or 5.2% were in the United Arab Emirates.

Somalia has also been sending migrants to those attracting oil boom economies of the Middle East. Some 150,000 Somalis were working in the oil producing gulf states in the early 1970s, and early 1980s (Berry and Johnston 1983:65). A conservative estimate has it that some 20 per cent of the externally earned wages are repatriated and that the value of this comes to "three-quarters of the total wages in Somalia" (Ibid.).

Ethiopia likewise faces a major problem in this. Tens of thousands of professionals and skilled labor (some 50,000 live in the U.S.A., Refugees, No. 44, August 1987 and Akalu 1988) is said to have migrated outside the country to the industrialized West in the main and to the Middle East and Africa to some extent (see Table 18). International

organizations as well have employed several hundreds of Ethiopian professionals. A large number of semi-skilled Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan is said to have inundated the exploitative informal private business sector of the economy of the Sudan where it is a source of cheap labor (Rogge, 1985:135-138 and Gaim, 1983).

Table 18: Migrant labor (skilled and professional)
in North East Africa

	Source Country	Destination		
		Gulf States	Western countries	Others
1	Ethiopia	N.A.	50,000 (USA only)	N.A.
2	Sudan	217,000	N.A.	2,000
3	Somalia	150,000	N.A.	N.A.

Source: Berry and Johnston, 1983:65-67 and Berry and Geistfeld, 33-36, Akalu 1987, and Refugees, No.44, August 1987.

The manpower needs of these countries are certainly considerable. But the countries somehow afford to lose these "dear" professionals and skilled personnel to the better-off nations. While appreciating the contribution of the Sudan in terms of this "scarce (human) resource" to the OPEC countries in the Middle East, the Sudanese themselves lament the sad reality for the reason that this drain has come at a time of a "new surge of Sudanese development activity" (Berry and Geistfeld, 1983:26).

The remittances from such workers have been considerable in Sudan's and Somalia's cases. According to the Bank of Sudan and IBRD, these

amounted to 15-20 per cent of the value of imports in the Sudan (Berry and Geistfeld, 1983:33) and "about three quarters of the total wages in Somalia' (Berry and Johnston, 1983: 65). This figure for Somalia appears to be a conservative estimate and represents only 20% of the repatriated wages. Jamal (1983) estimated that the amount is "as much as four times the income generated in Somalia's working sector" (Jamal V., 1983).

Ethiopia also benefits from such remittances. According to the Ethiopian Statistical Abstract (1986:246) some Ethiopian Birr 344,000 million (U.S.1 = 2.07) was received in 1985 through transfer payments which included "all donations and imports of capital by religious and private organizations as well as individuals..." The figure for remittances by Ethiopian residents abroad are not given separately. But quite a lot of money from Ethiopians living around the world is said to be finding its way into the country.

The feelings of the governments, especially those of Sudan and Somalia about this type of migrant remittances is mixed. While the foreign exchange transferred provides support for the fragile balance of payments situation and warrants increase in hard currency levels, its inflow and use is uncontrolled by a set of 'cautious' government policies. Such policies as are instituted do not maximize the "positive impact" of these earnings on the balance of payments (Berry and Giestfeld 1983: 33).

In fact, the Sudanese government, while showing its concern over the threatening "brain drain" element and its overall negative impact on the economy, seems to support the idea of further migration when it is quoted as saying: "...it appears that current labor shortages are not as great a constraint on development as the shortage of foreign exchange" (Berry

and Geistfeld:34) for the country. This value is held in spite of the fact that in Africa "trained, educated and experienced manpower was extremely scarce," as Berg, (in Ravenhill, 1986:46) observed.

Moll (in Klennert:186) suggests that the low (urban) unemployment rate of 6% in the Sudan may be because of emigration of a substantial number of the population--47,000 annually--to look for work in such neighbouring countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya. According to this author some 500,000 to 600,000 Sudanese were employed abroad. The author remarks that although the emigration of this population, which consists of professionals and skilled people (doctors, teachers, technicians, economists and specialized workers), has a negative impact on the development of the country, its ability to channelize resources in the form of remittances contributes a great deal to the country's balance of payments. This is estimated at between U.S.\$500 and 600 million a year.

The migration of skilled workers considerably inhibits the smooth management of the economies of the countries (Berry and Geistfeld, 1983: 65). Many developing countries complain of a low level of human resources development which is an essential ingredient of economic development. The economic destabilization wrought as a consequence of such "brain drain" may not be easily quantifiable, however.

The encouragement of these processes of "flight of human capital", built with years of commitment of resources and their allocation for correcting distortions in the balance of payments, may help solve the immediate problems of governments. Its long-run damage is, however, incalculable as they would postpone development that should normally take place now and avoid extreme difficulties which have been in the

offing as the conditions of emergency food distributions and their attendant costs indicate. Berry and Giestfeld observe the export of Sudanese labor "may be a considerably more efficient means of earning foreign exchange than the same labor employed in the production of export goods" (1983: 34). But be that as it may, the uncertainty that surrounds this source of income and its temporary nature and moreover the possibility of its saturation makes it a poor source of national income.

Demand for skilled and semi-skilled labor in particular may go down as oil prices decrease as situations in the Middle East have indicated. A further careful study of this phenomenon would help policy makers to make hard choices in the interest of their national economies in the long run.

Chapter 4

**Discussion of the problem: some proximate causes of
persisting food insecurity, poverty and forced migration**

Forced migration is caused by food insecurity and poverty which factors have their roots in a multiple and complex set of factors as we saw above. These are indeed the underlying causes of forced migration in the distant senses. But their being determinant factors explaining the phenomenon of forced migration can not exclude proximate causes which do aggravate the permanent causes of the problem in the immediate sense.

Domestic and international conditions and policy outcomes constitute yet other sets of obstacles inhibiting increase in production, particularly that of agriculture. Each of these two factors plays distinctive roles in its impact on the food security condition of a particular nation. Each also reinforces the exacerbating role of the other. The role human mistakes, both in terms of designing policies and analyzing pertinent information on social and economic conditions, having their origins as they do in local and/or international conditions, play in the food security equation has more often than not been little appreciated. This complexity of the food security equation has been subsumed by "a visual association between hunger and drought" (Assefa: 1988:6) and one may for sure add by wars and civil wars. The unfortunate result of this has been a gross neglect of the several factors which,

with the underlying and proximate causes, eventuate in the 'edifice' of food insecurity, poverty and forced migration.

4.1. The Domestic environment

The behavior of the domestic environment is the most important which either holds back or stimulates food production. Access to land, unbridled government intervention in food production, misallocation of resources, the rise of small groups of enterprising rich farmers and limitation of rights of many small farmers, among small farmers, neglect of small-holder agriculture and the chocking of entrepreneurial initiative, as well as droughts are among the chronic obstacles in the way of increasing food production.

4.1.1 Access to land

Access to land or alternatively employment opportunities for many rural citizens is hard to come by in all the three N.E. African countries. There just is not enough land for many peasants or small farmers to work on in their localities. This is so because the decision to hold to or to distribute resources in many cases is in the main made by a totally different set of people--the government or the groups which hold a significant portion of national assets--and the poor are left to their "nature- and/or system concocted" destinies. These are the realities in the distribution and use of resources.

The poor are usually referred to as people who have been outrun in the economic race to develop themselves despite the fact that "a system that is open to all" exists, so it is argued. This view has had a wide currency in the affluent industrialized societies wherein it is believed

that the poor are:

individual dropouts in the economic race because of certain personal inadequacies such as idleness, lack of skills, lack of moral fibre, etc. (Chakrabarti, in Ford et al, 1987:182).

The real situation is the contrary, however. The poor cannot easily enter the race. As Ford and Holmquest contend "...access to power..." which affords citizens the construction of "state policy is a key factor structuring the environment of production and distribution" (in Chazan and Show, 1988:214). Much as production with all its attendant factors is an important element of meeting food scarcities, local decision in the way of channelizing and allocating resources for production is a crucial driving force of increasing food production that is needed for the satisfaction of basic needs at least.

An FAO study indicates that outside Latin America, small holdings account for around two-thirds of all farms (Agriculture: Toward 2000, 1979:6). This is a consequence of population increase as well as ill-distribution of land resources. Another FAO study involving 18 countries with regard to the scarcity of land also indicates that only Brazil and Mexico had more than a hectare of arable land per head of agricultural population (FAO, World Food Report, 1987:20). This may be the case with many other countries of the developing world as well. But whatever the situation, failure to provide land to the landless or an alternative means of employment in the end tends to worsen the food production condition of any country. Again as the FAO succinctly put it, only small progress should be expected from

the less radical approach of improving access of small farmers to services and current inputs. Landlessness of agricultural populations become more severe in a number of countries and small farms become, on average, smaller still (FAO, 1979:13).

But lack of land does not pose much problems in N.E. Africa as we

saw in Chapter 3. The problem in this respect, however, is the transfer of populations to wherever land is open and productive with the least cost and with minimum social conflicts that may arise as a consequence of the redistribution. Care must be taken, however, when there is an indication that the size of the holdings would be small to the point of eventuating in worsened amount of food produced (FAO,1979:6).

As Chazan and Show, (in Chazan et al, 1988: 14) argue "access to power" is the missing link in effectively harnessing resources, both physical and human, for maintaining a reasonable level of production. These researchers entertain the strong view that "...state power is a key factor structuring the environments of production and access to food..." (Ibid.). What these authors call "departicipation" in the socio-economic and political processes is, therefore, a key to the decline of production of food and other necessities of life. This is a result of what Chakarbarti (Ibid:183) called "structural malignancy" which pervades Third World Countries in particular. The poor peasant with a small land or no land at all should be able to have a say in the redistribution of resources as well as in the decision to migrate to other areas where land is available. Governments can play the role of advisors and facilitators of such a decision, and nothing more.

4.1.2 Unbridled government intervention in production

A matter that is closely linked to the marginalization of the poor in the decision-making process is the unbridled intervention of government in the production of food in the rural areas. Governments and rich farmer groups in the least developed and food deficit countries, among others, lay emphasis on state and/or commercial farms with a view

to producing food that would be sold to urban dwellers and other groups which are in the main outside the agricultural sector, at cheaper prices and also with a view to accumulating capital and earning foreign exchange.

In socialist-oriented systems, in particular, the peasant farmer is compelled to sell, at less than the market price, a good portion of his produce to the state. This food is made available to urban dwellers and it is a source of savings for investment funds for financing development in other sectors.

Urbanites are more vocal and potent than their rural counterparts are (Franke and Chasin, 1980 and Fieldhouse, 1986:96) and they are a power in their own right to reckon with. The state has, therefore, to favour the urban areas because agitation here is intense and urbanites can challenge its power. It has to feed the emerging intellegentia, the ever-increasing number of migrants and the fast-growing urban population due to natural increases or face the consequences of unrest. "The political cost of offending the urban population was much higher than that of "incurring the wrath" of the small farmers (Chazan and Show, 1988:5).

This is one of the reasons why a lot of food makes its way into urban areas. Such food is either subsidized or the price for it is often kept at below production cost thus injuring the farmer in terms of income or reducing his terms of trade with those of the comparatively favoured town dwellers. Chazan and Show express their indignation about this in the following words. Country after country, both in Africa and the Third World,

while paying lip service to the need to rural revitalization opted for the risky course of establishing of complex systems of price supports. The move behind the resort to such a policy is self-evident.

But this promise and wish to transform rural areas by governments has been easier given than acted upon. That is why the food crisis has continued unabated.

4.1.3 Misallocation of resources

Misallocation of the resources also siphoned-off from the rural areas in the form of tax revenue and additionally in socialist-oriented systems "compulsory sales of portions of the produce" of peasants is another ill-advised, unprioritized and distortionary measure governments zealously take. This holds back development. The state-collected revenues in either way may usually end up where they cannot stimulate further production. They are usually not ploughed back into the agricultural sector for further regeneration of capital for investment.

Instead, all attention in LDCs, N.E. Africa not excluded has been focussed on "...the best means of achieving urban industrial growth," (Commings, Lofchie and Payne, 1986:12). Emphasis on industrial development which many national governments in developing countries promote distorts prices and its aim is the extraction of capital from the agricultural sector (Harf and Trout, 1986:160).

Fourthly, in a system where government has unlimited power, income and consumption may well increase, but the gains made may not reach the poor segments of society. The rich under these circumstances get richer and the poor get poorer (Gillis et al, 1983). These groups in society among whom are urban dwellers in some ways benefit a lot from resources

mobilized nation-wide. In sub-Saharan Africa where urbanization has been growing at 6.1% "some 90 per cent of food imports including food assistance (concessionally purchased in the main) go to its cities (Jazaiy, 1987:52) Small-holder agriculture under these circumstances is simply neglected because of the fact that the little resources that a nation is capable of mobilizing is used to subsidize the urban population. Most of the rural population and, in particular, the poor cannot benefit from the subsidy. They rarely receives the food purchased from outside. Structural deficiencies that manifest themselves in the process in part turn out to be the root causes for the flight of resources used for the purchase of food. These resources may well go to the financing of food production at home if policies that take balanced development into account are designed.

4.1.4 Conflicts over the distribution of political and economic power and lack of access to resources for the majority of the people

Conflicts over the distribution of state power and the limitation of democratic rights, which are reflected by limitations of individual rights, constitute yet another set of problems which bring about decline in food production. Witness, for instance, the continuing and devastating problems faced by nations in N.E. Africa. On the one hand, central governments, as the customary custodians of the national scepter, flex their muscles against those who oppose "the sanctity" of this value irrespective of existing socio-economic inequities and lop-sided political power distribution conditions. Opposition groups on the other hand, who feel the burden the inequities entail struggle for separation and/or autonomy and democratization of institutions in order of severity

of demands tabled by many 'liberation fronts'. Advocates of separatism in particular are, however, eager to use or want to capitalize upon the apparent sentiment they evolve as an instrument of expediency to redress the real root cause of the conflict--the imbalance in power distribution. In fact the key to the conflict is this very issue. Haggai Erlich (1986: 191-208) and Looram (1959:2) document this very well in Ethiopia's case. Both of them argue that the narrowness of the access to opportunities are in many cases the basis for the civil conflicts that arise.

Both the centre and the opposition in the N.E. African countries seem to have failed to inject the language of concession, trust, mutual advantage and respect for each other in the annals of their seemingly endless political contests. In the mean time the socio-economic bulwark of their societies are exceedingly eroded to a point of starvation of their people. The two groups appear to be not interested in involving the larger society, members of each nation's societies who also have the requisite leadership qualities at all levels and interestingly enough who may help to bring about peace to the disturbed environment, in the determination of the issues that lead to the bitter contests in the first place. Freedom of choice and democratic ways of ironing out differences are miserably lacking. An Ethiopian novelist, Baalu Girma, attributes the disagreement between the two groups ("central" Ethiopia and the opposition in Eritrea) as something having to do with "principles". The bitter conflict, he says, continues because of the lack of good counsel which can bring the two sides together (see Appendix D).

The conflict situatuion has been disrupting life in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia for several years or even decades now (The Middle East, June 1983; Gillis et al, 1983, Jansson et al, 1987). Many people have been

denied the opportunity of generating food production as a consequence of these systemic defects.

The limitation of rights in access to and the disposition of resources or the means to their acquirement applies to the larger majority of the population which is divested of these rights. Small numbers of people whether it be those in the government of the day and/or some politically powerful group(s) conveniently situated and their abeys have wide ranging access to resources and privileges because of faulty state policies which are not in tune with the needs of the larger society. As Fieldhouse (1986:94) has observed, many governments in Africa, and indeed in the world, have not, been concerned with "economic growth but rather with the maintenance of political power and the distribution of wealth to themselves and their supporters.

As the FAO also correctly argues "little progress was made in reducing inequities in access to production resources, including institutional services," in many developing countries of the world (FAO, Agriculture Toward 2,000, 1979:13). Indeed, the existing lop-sided land distribution conditions and the 'command' this has given large farmers over "supplies and services" has been one cause of the prevalence of poverty and malnutrition as well as a "critical constraint on the contribution of small-holders to increased production" (Ibid.:13).

This inclination toward the support of cohorts--political, social as well as economic groups--in most cases brings about opposition and this becomes intense if it affects food--a basic need. As Chazan and Show correctly saw the clash between beneficiaries and those marginalized becomes "intense...when food resources in any event scarce, are unevenly distributed..." leading to, as it were, intensified "class antagonisms,"

(Chazan and Show 1988; 12). Harf and Trout (1986:160) see the problem in terms of "mismanagement...in the administration of the economy" as a whole that inevitably makes in-roads into the agricultural sector. The energy and resources consumed by the conflicts take away the performance in production. In the meanwhile the rights of many people, among whom are the rural poor, to enjoy the fruits of being citizens of a nation is jeopardized. This leads to the more expensive option of migration of people in search of food.

4.1.5 Neglect of small-holder agriculture by the state

Added to the narrow access to land resources by the poor, excessive government intervention in economic activity, etc., as discussed above, is the little attention accorded to small-holder agriculture by the state. This is what is termed "benign neglect" of the important sector of peasant agriculture in less developed countries by their own states. Assefa Bequele and Eshetu Chole (1969:49), after enumerating a host of obstacles--economic and non-economic--which impeded agricultural development in Ethiopia including the limited availability of agricultural credit, singled out the very little concern shown by the then government, "amounting to almost total indifference", as perhaps the most significant factor inhibiting the sector's surge ahead. The current government's preoccupations in internal military conflicts and its pursuit of producers' cooperatives development above all else has brought about deceleration in the sector.

Infrastructural developments and the provision of social services which include health and education in many developing societies are accorded low priority in the scale of national development. Instead other

priorities of political nature, e.g., conflicts resolution through the use of force or grandiose economic programmes, such as the building of large-scale dams, which can easily be perceived and signify the state's "commitment in a concrete way", emerge. Considerable efforts and resources are consumed by these activities and projects. Agricultural price policies that part company with increased food production; distortionary use of national savings, and the neglect of small-holder agriculture are all human-induced drawbacks to agricultural development.

In fact the most immediate and sticking problems that have to be removed of the way for quickening the tempo of development in the immediate sense are these factors. Liberalization of the socio-economic system including the distribution of land and freedom to use the same in a way that enables people to make profits is thus a primary step to invigorate the agricultural sector of the economy. The extreme limitation of the role of "high" and "medium" level farmers in the world-wide back-tracking socialist development context also pierce holes in existing production processes when resources and institutions are fully controlled and mobilized by the state. Aside from the transaction cost involved, the effective replacement of this surplus producing category of farmers in a number of cases would well neigh be impossible and overall national production would suffer as a consequence.

The role "elite farmers" can play in increasing national food production is, as it were, "swallowed" in the discussion of equitable distribution of land and other resources and the implementation of programmes to address them. These farmers, as catalysts of change, can indeed help raise production and create a climate of competition for the rest of the population. Their encouragement is both necessary and wise.

The argument that land should be fairly redistributed to enable the poor to be self-sufficient and that enterprising farmers should at the same time be allowed to engage themselves in profitable agricultural activity is not a contradiction in terms. In actual fact both activities can go hand in hand each without harming the interests of the other. Any country needs the contribution of each to help increase the overall national production. Just as man, being a social being, requires a community to fulfil his needs and for his protection, so also does the agricultural population need the indirect "services", inter alia, of enterprising individuals wherever they may be. But the avarice and greed of such entrepreneurs should be tamed, controlled and softened by socio-economic policies which are just to all. What is needed to soften the antagonistic interests of the entrepreneurs and the larger group of farmers is to put in place a wise and practical resource allocation system by governments with the active participation of the people at the local level. A reasonable tax policy, among other things, can do this job. The problem is not with the marrying of the apparently contradictory 'systems' of agriculture which are indeed sensitive; but it is rather with the failure of decision-makers to learn how best to use them.

Without entrepreneurs who may also be identified as good risk-bearers and "managers", the larger farming society would be deprived and vulnerable. The evidence now for this is the resort of socialist countries also to the "individual" in contradistinction to the only "collective" for removing the roadblocks in the way of economic development. The Setit Humera agricultural activities which in the 1960s and 1970s drew the attention of thousands of entrepreneurs from many parts of Ethiopia --entrepreneurs who farmed around 150,000 hectares of

land-- are a good example of the ability of this set of people in helping to speed up agricultural development. Setit Humera was one of the five large scale commercial farms in the Western Lowlands of the country which produced sesame, a crop identified as the "golden grain" because of the fact that it earned a good deal of foreign exchange to the country (Kifle Mariam, 1969:56 and 30-32). The expansion of commercial farms in the Sudan, though unbridled and one damaging the interests of small farmers in several areas of the country, is yet also another instance of this (see also section 3.4 in Chapter 3 above). The state took over the management as well as the assets of farmers during the land nationalization spree that characterized the socio-economic and political conditions in the aftermath of the 1974 Ethiopian revolution. It was later unable to manage it or to settle disaster hit people on it. There and then, cash crop which earned a good chunk of foreign exchange was produced. Setit Humera has for many years now been an almost abandoned zone because of the conflicts that grip the area.

4.1.6 Droughts

Although human-induced problems are in the main responsible for keeping down agricultural production in many LDCs, this does not mean that problems relating to natural disasters such as droughts, decertification and pest attack do not impair households', communities' or even a good part of a nation's food production. Far from that. Even though these factors do not, in many instances, constitute the underlying causes for the deceleration in food production, they nonetheless definitely worsen the existing food insecurity and poverty conditions. Droughts do decrease food production just as decertification slowly

sterilizes soils (Franke et al, 1980:4).

Droughts, like politically unstable conditions, have led to the migration of the entire people in villages in least developed food-deficit countries. Thousands of people move to towns and even cross international boundaries in search of food. Examples are Ethiopians, Sudanese and Somalian economic, drought and political refugees, a good number of whom return to their respective localities after having satisfied their immediate needs from national and international food distribution centres and after weather conditions, both natural and political, improve (World Refugee Report, 1985, and Akol in Rogge, 1987:130-143). The number of those involved in the exodus is dependent upon the intensity and extensity of the problem. As Harf and Trout (1986:104) argue "refugee situations fluctuate greatly depending on the extent of economic disruption wrought by disasters, among other things, physical conflict and political unrest at a given moment. Their cooling down is likewise dependent upon the low intensity of these disruptive factors.

4.2. Some domestically originated and externally induced proximate factors of food insecurity

4.2.1 Increasing food import bills

The external causes for the decline in food production are associated with the decrease in export earnings of LDCs, rise in import bills both for food and particularly energy, increasing indebtedness and, in some cases, rising expenditure on arms. The prevailing economic conditions in the N.E. African countries which have been extremely affected by these factors illustrate what shortages of resources and

particularly foreign exchange can do to a country or a region in this shrinking and interdependent world.

As Table 19a and 19b indicate, between 1980 and 1985, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan have been spending increased amounts for the import of food. Exports of food and animals in dollar terms, on the other hand, fell from U.S.\$ 305,334,000 to \$237,118,118 in 1985 for Ethiopia; from \$114,516,000 to \$81,510,000 for Somalia from \$172,851,000 to \$95,272,000 for the Sudan for the same period (FAO, Trade Yearbook, 1987).

The value of imports rose from around 12 per cent in 1980 to 36 per cent in 1985 for Ethiopia whereas that of exports fell from 18 per cent to 14 per cent (see Table 18a). While the value of exports for Somalia and Sudan went down, that of their imports showed minimal shifts.

Table 19a: Trade in food and animals ('000 U.S.\$)

I M P O R T S						
Year	Ethiopia	%	Somalia	%	Sudan	%
1980	82,890	12.6	99,638	14.9	371,631	24.0
81	71,742	10.9	146,042	21.9	161,904	17.0
82	68,430	10.1	130,881	19.6	213,154	13.8
83	104,336	15.9	78,251	11.7	210,297	13.6
84	88,333	13.5	117,260	17.6	191,411	12.4
85	239,970	36.6	94,890	14.2	295,660	19.1
Total	655,701	100.0	666,962	100.0	1,545,057	100.0

Table 19b: Trade in food and animals ('000 U.S.\$)

Year	E X P O R T S					
	Ethiopia	%	Somalia	%	Sudan	%
1980	305,334	18.1	114,516	15.7	172,851	19.1
81	261,443	15.5	147,292	20.4	146,853	16.2
82	285,814	17.0	238,429	33.0	224,106	24.8
83	288,473	17.1	91,341	12.6	149,164	16.5
85	297,493	17.6	48,841	6.8	116,953	13.0
86	237,118	14.1	81,570	11.3	95,272	10.5
	1,685,675	100.0	721,989	100.0	905,199	100.0

Source: FAO Trade Yearbook, Vol.40, FAO Rome,1987:315.

International food transfers consisting of concessional purchases and grants increased nearly five-fold for Djibouti, nine-fold for Ethiopia, fifteen-fold for Somalia and ten-fold for the Sudan between 1973 and 1984 (FAO, Food Aid in Figures, 1986:40-42).

Table 20: Total food transfer for N.E. African countries
between 1973/74 and 1984/85 (in '000 MT)

Year	<u>countries</u>			
	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Somalia	Sudan
1973/74	-	96.1	16.4	78.6
74/75	-	54.1	111.2	46.0
75/76	-	86.6	55.1	24.8
76/77	-	74.7	79.1	54.1
77/78	2.9	76.0	72.5	111.7
78/79	5.2	162.5	87.4	90.0
79/80	4.9	111.5	136.8	212.3
80/81	13.7	288.0	330.1	194.5
81/82	11.3	189.7	185.9	194.1
82/83	8.4	344.0	188.5	330.0
83/84	10.7	171.9	176.6	450.4
84/85	15.0	868.9	247.9	812.1

Source: FAO, Food Aid in Figures, 1986, No.4:40-42

Much as increase in food aid has been high, partly because of the grim food production conditions (refer to Table 20), capital flow has been low for the countries under study for this paper. Ramphal laments over the fact that "capital flows have become harder to attract" and unfortunately they have "hardened in their terms" (in Chidzero and Gauhar 1986:15-16).

The World Bank also paints a dim picture of the situation. On the basis of the existing and obtaining situation, gross flows of aid and private capital, even if they are kept at the 1980-82 levels, would fall precipitously with an even bigger fall in real terms in the mid- and late 1980s.

According to the 1986 UNCTAD Report (p.91), the net capital requirements for the LDCs would rise above the estimated U.S. \$6.4 billion in 1990. This is assumed on the basis of some considered points relating to aid.

The first assumption is that a 0.15 per cent of donor GNP assistance would flow to these nations reaching at the end of the decade (1980s) to 0.30% of GNP. The second set of assumptions hold that: (1) economic growth for these nations would maintain a 2.6% economic growth rate (consistent with the average population growth rate); (2) GDP by 1995 would grow at an annual 7.2% and (3) this GDP growth rate would be attained by 1990.

According to the UNCTAD 1986 report (pp.90-91) this target would not be achieved with the 0.15% GNP Official Development Assistance (ODA) which it doubts would not enable the countries to maintain their early 1980s income levels. It notes that "to accelerate growth LDCs would need much larger capital flows and aid." We will have some more discussion of

this topic as it relates to the assistance that flows to forced migrants in relief, settlement, etc., programmes later in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

4.2.2 Military spending

Military spending in N.E. Africa is a constituent part of the increase globe-wise. Harf and Trout discuss the problem and its implications on resources that can be used for development. According to them, military spending world-wide rose from U.S. \$200 billion in 1960; to \$291 billion in 1972 and \$818 billion in 1982 (Harf and Trout, *ibid.*:5). Some 28 million people were employed by the military forces in 1982 world-wide. This figure was only 21 million seven years earlier (*Ibid.*). For Harf and Trout this is only part of the story. They argue that when one adds the number of people employed directly and indirectly to service the military industry, the population can exceed the 100 million mark (*Ibid.*).

The increase in the expenditure for military operations has been taking a good share of N.E. African countries' national wealth as well (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987). Not only this, the destruction of physical infrastructure and standing crops and other assets due to the wars are not small either. Ethiopia, for example, estimated that around U.S. \$3 billion worth of property was destroyed by the war unleashed on it by Somalia in 1977/78 (RRC, 1985).

Table 21: Military expenditure (in millions of U.S.\$)

	Year	Ethiopia	Somalia	Sudan
A	1975	79	51	95
	76	111	53	106
	77	142	63	161
	78	127	154	182
	79	<u>268</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>199</u>
A=	Average	145	93	149
B	80	339	109	215
	81	352	118	225
	82	376	127	315
	83	390	120	163
	84	<u>420</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>169</u>
B=	Average	375	112	217
Av. of	A&B	260	102	183

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987.

As Table 21 above indicates military expenditure has been rising in Ethiopia in real terms from 1975 to 1984. It rose from a mere \$79 million in 1975 to \$411 million in 1984. This is an over five-fold increase. The average annual expenditure was U.S. \$260 million.

A slightly more than three-fold increase was registered for Somalia's military expenditure between 1975 and 1977, the time in which it invaded Ethiopia, the 1977-78 war. Although this expenditure showed a general decline, it rose to \$127 million (the ten year average was \$102 million in 1982) after registering lower figures in 1980 and 1981, a time at which the Somali National Movement (SNM) and other forces opposing the centre were set up and have since been active. In 1988 SNM attempted to take over the government by controlling almost all of the northern part of the country. The expenditure on the military at this time must have evidently risen sharply.

Even in the Sudan, where after the 1970 Addis Ababa accord which

brought the embittered south and the centre to a comparative amity, military expenditure increased manifold up to 1982. Sudan's military expenditure shot up from a low of \$95 million in 1975 to \$315 in 1982 which is a three-fold increase. It showed a relative decrease after that. The average annual military expenditure for the period 1975 to 1984 has been \$183 million. The institution of the Koranic (Sharia) laws intensified opposition from the south after which the military expenditure budget must have risen up. Figures for the same expenditures for the years after 1985 are not available for comparisons.

All of the three countries--Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan-- are involved in their own civil wars. Each supports one or more political groups opposing central administrations or seeking secession (e.g. Eritrea from Ethiopia). Unless sense and reason descend from both the centres and the outlying areas, there will be no end to the wars and military expenditures would increase and would definitely affect development. The food insecurity and poverty conditions would continue as the countries lose a lot of resources to the war effort.

The disruptions wrought by the conflicting parties impinge upon food production. A diversion of the resources from these consumptive to productive lines can greatly enhance production. The released foreign exchanges, from these can, for instance, be used for the purchase of agricultural inputs and the construction of small dams for irrigation agriculture which has proved to be a short-cut for achieving food self-sufficiency as in India and elsewhere in Asia.

4.2.3 Debt servicing

Debt servicing is another line of national expenditure which takes a

toll of foreign exchange resources. Figures in Table 21 give a clearer picture of the problem as they relate to N.E. African countries.

Table 22: Debt servicing by Northeast African countries between 1980 and 1984

Country	Debt service (Mns of U.S.\$)		%age rise	Debt Service as Percentage of Exports		%age rise
	1980	1984		1980	1984	
Djibouti	6	18	300	32	69	216
Ethiopia	35	124	354	8	30	375
Somalia	20	46	230	15	102	680
Sudan	100	155	155	18	21	117

Source UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries, 1987: 125-125

As shown in Table 22 the cost of debt servicing for all the four nations has been increasing between 1980 and 1984 at an astronomic rate. Debt servicing rose by an average of 260 per cent for all the countries between 1980 and 1984. Ethiopia's was the highest with 300% and Sudan's the lowest with 155%.

In terms of the value of exports the debt service was 680% higher for Somalia in 1984 when compared with that of 1980. It was 375% for Ethiopia for the same period. This has evidently had a negative impact on their food production capabilities as well by sharing the hard-earned foreign exchange which under normal circumstances can be allocated for food production--purchase of inputs and research, for instance.

4.2.4 The prohibitive cost of energy

Energy is an important factor of development. Without fuel modern transportation becomes meaningless. According to Harf and Trout

(1986:27) "energy has proved to be an important component of human development and human existence.

The situation for North East African countries which have been affected by man-made and natural disasters has been extremely difficult in this regard. They paid significant amounts of foreign exchange to import petroleum.

In 1965, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia spent an average of only 7 per cent of their merchandise export earnings for energy. By 1985 they had to devote an average of 45.6 per cent of this income to satisfy their energy needs with Sudan consuming more than Ethiopia and Somalia. In fact the cost of energy for the three countries increased by an average of 524.7% between 1965 and 1985.

Table 23: Energy imports, (petroleum) as a percentage of merchandise exports

Country	1965	1985
Ethiopia	8	43
Somalia	9	43
Sudan	5	5
Average	7.3	45.6

Source: World Development Report, 1987:218.

Much of the N.E. African countries' resources have thus been consumed, as it were, by food imports, debt servicing and military and energy expenditures. The share of these in the total expenditures of the countries is considerably high as can be observed in Table 23 also.

The three nations have thus placed themselves in a position where they can only invest very little of their resources into agriculture and

related sectors of development. Reductions of three-fourths of the 1983 costs in food and animal product imports and military spending and the allocation of these savings for education and health as well as for agriculture would have had positive implications on these sectors' developments. The level of spending for Ethiopia for a particular year around 1980 and for Somalia for 1978 would have changed from 23.3 to 31.7 per cent and from 17.3 to 28.8 per cent, respectively (refer to Tables 25-26 in Appendix A) if such reductions materialized.

Production in agriculture, under such circumstances, would have risen a bit. Educational and health services would have also expanded. But increasing costs in food imports and military spending make such achievements difficult.

This then is one of the major reasons for the deceleration of agriculture and the poverty of a good segment of the rural population. It is at this point that the very poor and the destitute think in terms of evacuating their homes. Their destinations are surplus-producing and/or urban areas within their own nations and relief camps in the main in neighbouring countries.

Chapter 5

Peasants/small farmers who move seeking food and relief food that attracts

5.1. Availability of relief food at cross border points

The availability of food and other relief in comparatively greater amounts in neighbouring regions serves as a magnetic pole to a goodly segment of forced migrants. Its contribution to the rate of increase of the number of forced migrants is more often than not much less realized. Both refugee-receiving countries and the UNHCR provide assistance to the people made destitute by the war and drought conditions. The refugee population, aside from political, religious and economic reasons which forces it to move and cause constant shortages of food at home, grows as a consequence of this easily obtainable food. The increase in the level of assistance at cross border points leads to a trek of more and more people. This point will be discussed in detail later in this section.

There is yet another factor which students of social science should not lose sight of. The needs of refugee-receiving countries, poor countries, in particular, in terms of food and financial assistance, are as big as those struck by man-made and natural disasters. Somalia has been one such nation which has been attempting to use the refugee problem to secure increased access to bigger amounts of international assistance.

This contention was fortified by the fact that refugees whose number

was over 1.5 million (a number deliberately inflated by Somalia, according to authentic sources, and to which point we will turn to later) were turning out to be increasingly burdensome to its socio-economic capacity. The immediate benefit for Somalia in this regard was, of course, the flow of increased relief resources and the perceived long-term gains have been the incorporation of the Ogaden to its territory.

Indeed, Somalia has benefited from the refugee situation considerably. In the early 1980s, it received more than \$40 million U.S. annually for refugee maintenance purposes, more than any other country in the region (see Table 28 in Appendix B). Although refugee settlements in Somalia have not been successful at all, they were getting more funds even more than the Sudan where many from Ethiopia had settled. Somalia, for instance, received \$4.9 and \$4.5 million U.S. in 1984 and 1985, respectively, for the settlement of refugees in its territory (see Table 29 in appendix B). In the Sudan, settlement programmes for 100,000 refugees was in the process of being undertaken in the early 1980s (UNHCR Doc.A/AC.96/601, October 22, 1981:4).

The 1985 allocation was more than one-third of the budget set for refugee settlers in the Sudan. But evidences indicate that the settlements have not been particularly successful. In fact, World Refugee Survey (1985:47) carries the criticisms levelled at Somalia with regard to the handling of refugee settlements. Aside from inflating refugee numbers, Somalia keeps refugees in desolate areas (under the pretext that "better sites are not available") where there is little hope for agricultural self-sufficiency in order to assure continued aid for its economic development (See also Stein's article in Rogge 1987). Stein's (in Rogge 1987:54-58) observations that resources including land

available for new settlements in refugee host nations are exaggerated and that asylum countries are afraid that existing resources currently exploitable land resources, for example, are not adequate for their own nationals clearly applies to Somalia in this respect.

These facts show that countries attempt to gain covertly from conflict situations in neighbouring nations by exploiting the forced migrant issue and that the money and other resources collected are used for financing domestic programmes of governments. Dawit (1989), who was a close observer of these happenings, has said that "Somalia's economy was given an enormous boost by the large scale relief operation" (1989:316) that was going on in that country.

Another advantage derived from refugee influxes is the creation of organizations for relief and sometimes for rehabilitation or settlement programmes. Such projects catering to refugees obviously require the creation of organizations and employment of people to run the business of relief operations. There is a documentation to the effect that about 16,000 people found employment for relief and other operations catering to Afghan refugees in Pakistan (UNHCR, Refugees: No.41, 1987:22). Also the bureaucracy created around the programme of refugee relief enriches itself from the 'bounty'. Sometimes again the corruption of officials in such organizations may manifest itself in the form of diversion of resources to groups of people other than the intended beneficiaries. This was also a situation that had surfaced in Somalia, among others (Kent, 1987:73-76 and Jansson, 1987).

In some cases humanitarian gestures as they relate to refugees have been seen as a national status symbol in addition to the economic one. For instance, the Sudanese are acclaimed as a people who have been very

sympathetic toward the cause of refugees. Dawit explains that this gesture gained the Sudanese political credit and made them "look like 'saints' compared to the evil government to the east (Ethiopia) that preyed on its own people" (Dawit,1989:316).

These features are not particular to these countries. One thing is, however, certain. The degree varies from society to society. Any country in desperate need of such resources would not miss the opportunity to exploit the situation if resources can be comparatively easily mobilized from such sources. The refugee syndrome does bring about such a situation.

5.2. Food needs, refugees and the advantages that accrue to hosts

The assertion that humanitarian motives predominate in hosting refugees is too often advanced. This is not true in a number of cases. The resource that flows on behalf of the refugees and by the way to the local population (see ICARA II documents and Rogge, 1986:150), and the skill and low wage labour that refugees provide to the host country economy (Rogge, *ibid.*: 142-155), would in all probability outweigh the claimed humanitarian dispositions (Kent, 1987:118-131).

The immediate need of some countries revolves around getting a good portion of the free food on the pretext that refugees are there. It is not to say that refugees do not at all benefit. Far from that; they are in fact fed and housed. And one of the reasons why differences between host populations at the local level and refugees arises is because of this. The local people are sometimes left in the lurch when refugees get an assorted bundle of food a portion of which they sometimes sell at the local market and raise money that puts them in better stead. Rogge

(1985) and Gaim Kibre-Ab (1983) document this very well. In fact demonstrations were staged against refugees by local populations in the Sudan because of their role in worsening the scarcity situation (Rogge, 1985:149).

That is why some governments try to isolate refugees from local populations. In addition to their use of the limited services, they are seen as security risks (see Rogge, 1985: 133-153). But in spite of this, refugees stay at or find their way to other urban centers. In the urban centres, the informal business sector's needs absorb them. The business world does need such cheap labour for the reason that such labour demands low wages. Such labourers also work longer hours and they do not get organized into labour unions (Gaim, 1983:89) and thus they do not pose any threat to employers.

Host governments also need these labourers as substitutes to nationals sometimes. Work permits have, for instance, been given by the Sudanese at will to skilled refugees both from Northern Ethiopia and the rest of the country when their own people went for the 'foreign exchange rushes' that emerged in the oil rich states of the Middle East during the last two decades or so. Berry and Giestfeld (1983:90-91) and Rogee (1985: 135-138) dwell upon this issue in a detailed fashion.

When the local economy deteriorates and employment opportunities narrow down, they are despised and all conceivable restrictions are applied to their movements. Plans are worked out for their settlement in rural areas and/or near agricultural enterprises where they can become a source of labour pool, but always as a supplemental pool.

5.3. The predicaments of the UNHCR and its role
in the aggravation of the refugee problem

Just as much as refugees create substantial problems to their hosts, so also do they bring about situations where the distribution of international assistance becomes jeopardized. The UNHCR has been facing the intractable problem of distributing assistance to bona fide refugees as per the U.N. stipulations catering for refugees. The problems that relate to this situation are two.

The first is the separation of the 'real' politically persecuted refugees from the other migrants. This has been posing problems for the organization which does not have any practical means of verification and act accordingly. This is not the immediate concern of this paper. But it is one which needs a detailed study and analysis.

The second problem relates to the preferential treatment of refugees to local populations. Attempts to isolate refugees from local populations for assistance purposes have been found to be both impractical and frustrating to the UNHCR. The separation of, for instance, Ethiopian refugees from the local Somali population in Somalia has been difficult as the U.S. Refugee Committee Report of 1985 alluded (see p.47 of the report). Both Ethiopian Somalis and those in Somalia are so similar that an identification process becomes blurred.

That is why international assistance as it relates to refugees goes astray albeit with no design on this count. In such a situation assistance allocated for refugees is 'wasted' or its purpose is little fulfilled. Both Tanzania and Sudan, among other nations, have frequently frowned upon UNHCR assistance that has been favouring refugees to the exclusion of host populations.

The ICARA II conference had the objective of raising funds for countries which have been burdened by the presence of refugees. The UNHCR, which was faced with the problem of separating returnees from displaced populations in Ethiopia's Hararghe region had to work contrary to its own stipulations (RRC 1985 and UNHCR News, various issues; see also the 1957 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol for refugees).

But in spite of such problems, the UNHCR has sometimes been under fire for its role of exacerbating the refugee flow. It was, for instance, accused by Uganda for its threats of withdrawal of funds from relief programmes unless the Ugandan government settled refugees from Sudan and Zaire in Uganda (Holborn, 1975:1216). A more recent version of this is UNHCR's attitude toward the voluntary repatriation of drought hit Tigrans of Ethiopia who crossed the border into Sudan and returned to their country in 1985 (Cunny and Stein, in Loescher and Mondhan, 1989:296). These authors say that the organization was "...more of a hinderance than help to the repatriation." Rogge (1985:22) also subscribes to this view but he says that the organization has since the last one-and-a-half decades been involved in development in host nations like the Sudan and that it can contribute considerably along this line given adequate resources. Dawit also accused the organization for being a 'political instrument' of those who attempted to 'discredit the government of Ethiopia' (Dawit 1989:315-316). Many of the refugees, according to Dawit, who were hoodwinked by the 'propaganda of rebels' and other interested groups, and the consequent provision of food and facilities across borders, were much nearer to distribution and relief centers in their own home country than otherwise. These cross border locations were thus by far distant to 'prospective' refugees.

The same author reproves the UNHCR for its failure to help find durable solutions to the refugee problem. The argument is palatable in the sense that millions of dollars spent on such ventures most usually sink in the sands when, for instance, the relief operations are closed due to political changes in the refugee-sending country and the forced migrants repatriate.

Some of the infrastructure and the facilities left behind definitely help the local populations. Where virgin land is brought under cultivation the host country for sure benefits (Holborn 1974:915). But as refugee settlements are in most cases far flung from local population centers their usefulness is thus at times negligible.

5.4. The role neighbouring countries play in the accentuation of the problem and the benefits they reap

The countries in Northeast Africa seem to be involved in a tit for tat actions with respect to the support which they provide to groups opposing the central governments of each country. This has in turn invariably laid to the strengthening of the centres' military power which centres attempt to hash down the challenges posed from the opposition. The opposition groups also recruit their forces from the ranks of refugees and the competition between the centre and its rival continues endlessly.

In the process public order and the orderly conduct of agricultural activity is interfered with. People are compelled to take flight to save their lives. This process repeats itself bulging the number of refugees ever more. Both local and international resources are depleted for the maintenance of forced migrants or refugees as discussed earlier on.

Governments thus walk into deep waters without initially realizing that the problem would in the end be so much engaging and resource-consuming. As they cannot assist refugees by themselves they request for the flow of international assistance. The assistance that comes creates problems ranging from increased large scale refugee influxes, socio-economic disruptions arising from disparities in the living standards of refugees vis-a-vis local populations to the imposition of restrictions on the movements of the strangers (refugees). Funds allocated for refugees are sometimes diverted toward financing host government development or other programmes.

But in spite of all these problems, of late the refugee movement in N.E. Africa has increased both in intensity and extensity as Somalia and Sudan continued to support opposition groups to Ethiopia's central government. Ethiopia also intensified its assistance to dissidents of both countries in return.

The three countries have been exchanging forced migrants during the last three decades (see Table 27 in Appendix B). Many of the refugees in the late 1970s and early 1980s were from Ethiopia which previous estimates put the figure to around 1.8 million (Clark and Stein 1982, CIMADE et al 1981). The Somali Government, however, even after ICARA II following which the claimed 1,500,000 refugee population was lowered to 700,000, was insisting that 300,000-1,000,000 refugees have been integrated with their kith and kin inside the country (Berry and Johnston, 1983: 48). But this claim was partially if not fully eroded by the flow of a substantial number of people from Somalia.

Many UNHCR member states raised the problem of refugee population statistics and requested UNHCR to assist governments resolve the problem

in this regard (UNHCR, Doc.A/AC.96/601, 22 October 1981:24). In the 32nd Session devoted to the High Commissioner's (UNHCR) programme at the General Assembly of the U.N., Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner Shimelis Adugna observed that Assistance to refugees and returnees "must be fair, and also flexible so as to take account of their needs in the countries of asylum, resettlement and origin (U.N. Doc.A/AC.96/SR.337, October 22, 1981:4). This meant also little was done in the countries of origin to help solve the refugee problem in general. Whatever the case, this and other voices of the UNHCR member states must have been one of the reasons why refugee figures, particularly those of Somalia, was questioned. The number of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia was later lowered by more than half, that is, to 700,000 which was taken only as a planning figure by the UNHCR.

Deteriorating economic conditions as a consequence of grinding and expanding poverty and drought fuelled by the instability factor in Somalia and Sudan at the beginning of the early 1980s have also resulted in huge populations movements into Ethiopia. The exodus of people from Somalia's northern region relates to the cleavage created between the south and the north on questions of distribution of power and resources (The Middle East, June 1988). An estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 refugees from Somalia and Sudan were said to have found shelter in Ethiopia (The Ethiopian Herald, February 27 and 9, 1989 and Addis Zemen, Yekatit (February) 2, 1981 E.C.). As can be observed in Table 24, close to 591,000 refugees from Somalia and some 384,000 from Sudan have found temporary shelters in Ethiopia during 1988 and the first half of 1989. The distribution of the refugees in Northeast Africa as of 1988/89 follows:

Table 24. Refugee population distribution in N.E. Africa as of 1988

<u>S.N.</u>	<u>Refugee Source Country</u>	<u>Receiving Country</u>	<u>Population</u>
1	Ethiopia	Sudan	670,000-1,000,000
2	Ethiopia	somalia	440,000
3	Ethiopia	Djibouti	15,000
4	Sudan	Ethiopia	384,700
5	Somalia	Ethiopia	453,000-591,359

Source: UNHCR News, various issues, The Ethiopian Herald, February 7 and 9, 1989 March 22, 1988 and Addis Zemen, Megabit (March) 13, 1980 E.C., World Refugee Survey, 1987

As can be seen in Table 27, Appendix B, also the population of forced migrants in the region has been increasing at an increasing rate since the early 1970s. The continuing conflicts between political groups that have failed to compromise and governments that are obstinate are responsible for the mess that is being observed in the region (Hakovirta 1986:97).

According to Hakovirta when Ethiopia was warring with Somalia, the Eritrean Liberation Front thought 'victory' was around the corner for them and they refused to negotiate a settlement. And after Ethiopia's victorious emergence from the war and drive to settle scores in the north, Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam decided in favor of a military solution. As the war continued, so did the refugee trek rise (see Hakovirta, *ibid.*, 97-98).

Part of the reason for the exodus of people from their localities was, however, not only the politically insecure conditions and the economically bankrupt environment that characterized the home country, as

contended earlier, but also the pull factor which the availability of food presented beyond the borders of these nations. The provision of relief food attracts those who are destitute to cross the border and satisfy their survival needs if and when food is available on the other side of the border.

That availability of food attracts 'healthy people' (able-bodied) also can be observed from the situation in Somalia. This concern was voiced time and again. The World Refugee Survey of 1985 (p.47) presents the case from Somalia in the following manner:

...refugee camps in Somalia are becoming part of the culture of the region's nomadic Somali people...(who) obtain food in the camps where conditions are often better than the surrounding desert and the families from Ethiopia and Somalia sent their women and children to the camps, while the men continue to tend their herds.

Somalia has, however, been receiving considerable assistance for settlement purposes when in actual fact this was not justifiable on these counts as well (refer to Table 29 in Appendix B). It is, therefore, at this juncture that the politics of emergency international assistance has considerable implications for the outflow of people from these countries. International assistance is attracted by refugee receiving nations which themselves are compelled to a degree to provide relief and sometimes shelter for the forced migrants initially.

The call for international assistance is made by host nations which soon realize that the maintenance of the refugee populations within their borders is beyond their national capacity. This is especially the case with food deficit and poor countries than other wise. The UNHCR, with the agreement of host government (Loescher in Loescher et al, 1989:18-20), starts relief operations with allocations from the High commissioner's

special emergency fund. This is followed by international assistance from all sources--bilateral, multilateral and voluntary agency sources. Initially the assistance comes in trickles, but it increases depending on the rate of inflow of dislocated people. Many starved people make their way to the food distribution centres, both local and cross border ones. This is done in an attempt to survive and the direction of the movement is to where the refugees' welfare in this case, their food needs, are best served. Such a movement of people and the flow of food are thus caught in a seemingly endless circularity with little change of disengagement in the ebb and flow of socio-economic and political turmoil inside the sending country. Humanitarian assistance is channeled in keeping with the tempo of the flow of refugees.

"The more refugees a country has, the more assistance it is likely to receive" (Simance, in Rogge 1987:20). This assistance may well be tinged by ideology or some perceived interest. It thus misses the intended goal of helping people and may instead help to increase the rate of forced migration. Reductions in food rations, on the other hand, sometimes compel refugees to return home. An example of this is the Burmese refugees who quickened the process of their repatriation from Bangladesh when they found out that food rations were being cut (Coles, Gervase, Quoted by Cuny and Stien in Loescher and Monahan, 1989: 308). The case of the 55,000 Ethiopian drought refugees who were forced to make a 50-day-long trip (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1985) to the Sudan to satisfy their dire need of food and who returned to Ethiopia on foot in May-June 1985 when the Meher (big) rains came, is one strong point which supports the contention that food availability, like the prospect of getting higher income in urban and overseas labour markets, attracts destitute

people and in this case from Ethiopia to the Sudan. According to the World Refugee Report this returnee population's number was 80,000 rather than 55,000. The report says that in 1986 some 80,000 rural folks who crossed the border into Sudan voluntarily returned home (World Refugee Report, 1986:10).

The same was true of many refugees who crossed the border from Ethiopia into Somalia. At the height of the flow of considerable assistance into Somalia from international community sources, the refugee population in that country grew in number (see Table 28 and 29 in Appendix B).

Between 1979 and 1981 the refugee population rose from 450,000 to 1,540,000 (see UNHCR, Refugee Magazines 1979-1985 and Table 27 in Appendix B). This coincided with the flow of a multi-purpose assistance worth U.S.\$49,078,200 in 1981 to \$53,398,500 in 1986 (refer to Table 28 in Appendix B; see also Report of the UNHCR, G/A Official Records: 41st Session, Supplement No. 12, 1986:31). The amount of all types of refugee assistance that had been pumped into Somalia in 1982, 1983 and 1984 was of the order of \$49,078,200; 38,565,000 and \$46,558,000, respectively (UNHCR August 1983: 97, refer to Table 28 also). The observation of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner in his 1981 appeal for international assistance of the UNHCR has thus some bearing on the issue of the distribution of aid to refugees (see Section 5.7 below).

This large amount of assistance flow was sustained up until 1986 in spite of the fact that more than half of the refugee population had returned to Ethiopia in 1983 (see Table 30 in Appendix B and UNHCR Report July 1986:56). In 1987, the amount went down to a U.S. \$30,874,000 to rise to an estimated \$33,283,000 in 1988 (UNHCR Report...1986-87, 1987,

51-55 and Report of 1986:56).

The relief food given to such refugees has been also found to be better in terms of both quality and quantity in some countries. The basic daily ration or food basket delivered to refugee populations, for instance, in Somalia consisted of:

- 250 grams of maize or sorghum
- 75 grams of wheat flour
- 20 grams of meat
- 40 grams of sugar
- 3 grams of tea

Source: UNHCR Refugee Magazine, No.3, Sep.-Oct 1980.

This assorted bundle indeed contained nutritious food. And this must have also been among the major factors that lured huge numbers of refugees to Somalia in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

5.5. The repatriation situation

Repatriation, compared to the refugee population in the region, has had little relevance to the major population movements in Northeast Africa. These population movements' figures are negligible unless they specifically refer to the Sudanese refugees most of whom repatriated from 1971-1973 after the Addis Ababa agreement involving the Sudanese government and the Anyanya forces (Akol, 1984, see also Table 30).

Another repatriation which was fair in scale relates to Ethiopian refugees who returned home after the UNHCR-Ethiopian Government-Djibouti Government tripartite agreement for repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti (RRC, 1985:149-155). The number of returnees of Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees from each of the two countries which are important hosts and senders of refugees of the four nations of the region, has been negligible in the 1980s.

By 1985, some 320,000 returnees of the estimated 700,000 refugees from Somalia were registered in Kelafo and Mustahil, Ogaden region, Ethiopia, for rehabilitation to their previous livelihood (UNHCR, Fact Sheet, July 1985; UNHCR Report 14 August 1987: 25-32, and World Refugee Survey 1985: 46). The UNHCR and the Lutheran World Federation were attracted by small groups of spontaneous and voluntary repatriants for whom rehabilitation programmes, supported by both organizations, were set up since the early 1980s (UNHCR, Fact Sheet, July 1985, UNHCR Report A/AC.96/657, 5 August 1985:98-100). This activity in turn magnetized more refugees to return.

According to UNHCR expenditure reports, U.S.\$408.5 was allocated to returnees earlier and the same allocation rose to \$12,177,000 in 1983 (Report of UNHCR, August 1983:53). In 1984 it went down to \$7,900,000 to rise again in 1985 to U.S. \$13,618,000 (UNHCR Report, 5 August 1985: 102-103). The allocation for emergency relief assistance and rehabilitation shot up to U.S. \$26,700,000 under the special program sub-heading. The same allocation went down to U.S. \$9,552,000 in 1986-1987.

International assistance was thus flowing to Ethiopia at a much smaller rate compared to Somalia in particular despite the fact that more than half of the refugees had returned to Ethiopia beginning 1983. This is an indication of the politicization of assistance as it relates to refugees in the region.

5.6. Forced migration or refugeeism and how it fits into the general theory of migration

The data on refugee movements and the discussion above point to the fact that the availability of resources, food in this case, does have

implications for the flow of country-folks toward the direction where food and other necessities are available. Todaro's (1969, 1970) basic idea that migration is a function of the gap in income between rural and urban areas and the probability of improving one's welfare by getting a better paying job in the latter, fits well with the movement of people across borders where they can obtain food, freely-distributed food. This theory of Todaro has acquired empirical evidence in a study conducted by Straubhaar (in Salvatore, ed., 1988: 139-159) and this has strengthened the theory that the 'attractivity' of better-paying jobs was the motivating factor for people migrating from southern Europe to the Federal Republic of Germany and France in particular in the 1980s.

Caldwell's (1969) research in Ghana also supported the assumption that movement of people from rural to urban areas was linked to the possibility of improving one's incomes (Refer also to Section 2.7 above). Questions posed in France by Conde and Diagne (1986:103-104) brought out similar results which supported the assertion that migrants were induced by the wish to improve their economic position with the eventual view of improving their incomes and that of their families. The absence of 'local opportunities' and the need to find areas of 'higher economic opportunity' constitute the push and pull factors of migration (Hammer and Linn in Mills, 1987: 1259).

The movement of rural-folks from drought affected and economically marginalized areas as well as from conflict or war-affected regions is in like manner motivated by the need to get food for a good number of people. The Todaro model also finds an empirical evidence in this migration of people as well. Lack of food in the drought affected areas of Ethiopia in the mid 1980s forced destitute rural people to move out of

their localities to improve their welfare, or better still, to save their lives. These groups of people and individuals had reason enough to convince themselves of the fact that their welfare would be enhanced if they migrated to places where distribution of food took place as in Somalia and Sudan. And paradoxically enough their return to their home countries when their food needs are satisfied clearly shows the objectives of their migration.

Food is thus the key to such a movement. Whether by "natural" positioning or accident or political manipulation, food attracts the destitute. A segment of any refugee group follows the trails of food as the Ethiopian refugee movements from Tigray and Eritrea to the Sudan as well as from the Ogaden to Somalia and back indicate. This movement is an explanatory factor for the contention that the source of the problem is the fragile existence of the people in terms of food in the local area primarily. Such a movement of refugee groups according to Franke and Chasin (1980: 10) is in a sense good because people go to where the food is in order to survive. Secondly, it is also the "assistance child" or the outcome of the free distribution of food elsewhere rather than at the refugees' villages or districts in their own home countries.

5.7. Dealing with one of the root causes of migration:

Locally displaced populations

One major source of the forced migration of people in the region to which less attention has been given is the displaced population particularly in Ethiopia and the Sudan (see Table 31, Appendix B). The effort made to assist the displaced population as much as the refugee one has not been substantial. In one his appeals to the UNHCR for more

assistance to refugees in 1981, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner of Ethiopia in 1981 observed that the "rendering assistance to one area and not to adjacent areas..." (i.e. an apparent reference to the provision of assistance to refugees in Somalia and denial to displacees in Ethiopia) "...could contribute to the influx of refugees" (U.N. Doc.A/AC.96/SR.337, Oct.16, 1981:4). The cause for the exodus of refugees across borders is also the very factor which has been given to the benign neglect of both the national governments and the international donor community. Disaster prevention according to Kent (1987:119) are not a priority of both until after the fact of the cataclysmic occurrences. While monies have been flowing for refugees who cross borders, little was flowing toward the areas disrupted inside the sending nations. The UNHCR's mandate, at least officially, covered only bona fide refugees.

There has been no active international agency like the UNHCR which could follow up the mitigation of the plight of internal displacees. The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), which is the U.N.'s arm for this purpose, could only do little with the little budgetary and extra budgetary resources made available to it. The 1982/83 and 1984/85 budgets allocated for UNDRO were U.S. \$8.2 and \$10.3 million, respectively, while that of the UNHCR was \$741.9 and \$832.7 million for the same period (U.N. Doc., 36th Session, Supplement No. 6, 1981 and 1983:205-206 and 240-241, and 3-2 and 42-43, respectively).

UNDRO thus remains an organization which can only appeal to or notify bilateral donors to help countries with displaced populations to deal with the situation in the affected countries. It does not have the machinery to mobilize international sympathy like the UNHCR. And what is more 'internal refugees' or displacees are thought to be going on well

with the status quo and unless they cross-borders little sympathy comes forth in favor of them.

The problems relating to the exodus of people from Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan appear to be fundamental which require both the reduction of poverty and the resolution of civil conflicts. The improvement of the well-being of the poor farmer or peasant in the rural areas, through measures of stopping the on-going conflicts and by lending hands to the destitute who can touch the leverage points of production, can curtail the so far interminable outflow of forced migrants.

The transfer of a significant portion of the money spent on counselling, transportation and program support for refugees in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan would undoubtedly help increase production or expand social services substantially in any one of the refugee producing country's local areas. In the words of UNHCR's Director of Assistance "...a disproportionate amount of resources was being devoted to relief as compared to durable solutions, which were essential objectives of the UNHCR assistance" (U.N. Doc.A/AC.96/601, October 1, 1981:24). In another document, the UNHCR itself has admitted that in refugee assistance its "emphasis has remained on the provision of food and other immediate relief supplies" (U.N., Doc.A/AC.96/594, October 1, 1981:XV). The U.S.\$141.3 million (see Table 32, Appendix B), expended on counselling transportation and administrative support compared with voluntary repatriation (only \$5,337.7 million) for the 1981 to 1988 period (calculated from Table 29, Appendix B) is an evidence of this reality. A calculation of the voluntary repatriation, settlement and camp (relief assistance for refugee camps) in Northeast Africa--Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia-- for the same period also supports the UNHCR

director's most appropriate observation relating to the stress on relief programmes as opposed to durable solutions. Only 0.96 per cent or U.S.\$5,337.7 million of the U.S. \$553,464.9 million (calculated from Table 29 in Appendix B) for these lines of expenditure went toward voluntary repatriation. This total does not include expenses for returnees in Ethiopia.

The expenditure for refugee maintenance in camps only in Djibouti, somalia and Sudan for the same period was U.S. \$315,567.7 million or 56 per cent of the total (calculated from Table 29 as above). This excludes the transportation, counselling and administration activities' expenditures. The amount of money allotted for settlement activities in the refugee accepting countries of Northeast Africa was 42 per cent of the total expenditure as shown above. The relief and related assistance appear to have only minimal ripple effects in promoting the refugees' long-term welfare. If only a way of transferring these resources to the localities of refugee-producing countries with stigmas of starvation and poverty were found, the continuing influx would be stemmed considerably. The saving of these funds for development purposes can indeed help many would-be refugees become self-reliant.

Signs of hitting at the problem's roots have been evolving slowly but surely. These include the clustering of ideas around an approach that looks at a regional solution to the problem of the movement of people across international borders. Such an approach was suggested by the UNHCR for the Horn of Africa in particular. In the word of UNHCR's report to the General Assembly of the U.N.:

The causes and the socio-economic structures of the large scale population displacements in the area, their needs and their various potential solutions are so interrelated that efforts with a view to achieving a regional approach to the refugee problems in the Horn of Africa will continue to be pursued (U.N.Doc.A/AC.96/594, October 1981).

This is indeed a process and an action in the right direction. Its immediate launching on a more expanded basis is, nonetheless, long over due.

Chapter 6

**Foreign aid: a good supplement to domestic efforts
to combat food insecurity, poverty and forced migration**

The food production problem, aside from its debilitating effect on the working population in many parts of the N.E. African countries, has intercepted the flow of resources into the agricultural sector which is the main stay of the economies. Not only are domestically mobilized resources, however little, are expended on emergency efforts but externally-raised ones are consumed and/or checked by the very nature of existing low level of activities in the countries.

Ramphal, in Chidzaro and Gauhr, (1986:16) notes the well-known fact that:

The food crisis has been superimposed on an economic crisis deriving from chronic external financing difficulties and debt. Africa has suffered from serious reversals on the external front... Its terms of trade have deteriorated, such that over the last ten years low income African countries have lost 20% in the purchasing power of their exports overall... capital flows have become harder to attract and have hardened in their terms.

As pointed out earlier, one of the reasons for fishing for external food and development assistance is motivated by the wish to redress such imbalances that surface as a consequence of deteriorating food production and terms of trade conditions. The contribution of foreign aid in the mitigation of starvation and the enhancement of economic development in

TWCs especially in N.E. Africa has been considerable. Its efficient application to activities that lead to increase in food production has been noted in several countries.

6.1. The pros and cons of foreign aid

A brief appreciation of the pros and cons of foreign aid in particular would help one to have a clearer insight into the role aid has been playing in mitigating emergencies and reducing poverty in N.E. Africa. Its advantages are at times sterilized by politics, local as well as international. A detailed discussion of this issue is not the aim of this thesis.

Food aid is attacked on two counts. The first is that it leads to the 'neglect of agriculture' and places more resources in the hands of the privileged few at the expense of the rural poor (Lappe et al 1980 and Bauer 1984). A more extreme version of this views is contained in the writings of Lappe, who believes that all development assistance "actually increases hunger and repression by reinforcing the power of national and international elites who usurp the resources rightfully belonging to the hungry" (Lappe, et al, 1980: 55).

T.W. Schultz also argues that "aid in kind...has the effect of increasing the capacity of the government that receives such aid to continue discriminating against its own agriculture" (Schultz, 1964). This view is strongly supported by Singer et al, (1987, see Ch.5) who enumerate a number of areas including balance of payments and budget deficit support, economic development and institutional (schools, hospitals, mother and child care) changes that occur as a result of the flow of aid and help governments to stay in power.

Blaxter (1986:101-102), after a considered discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of aid in general, comes to the conclusion that emergency and related development assistance is only in order and much useful. He argues that the settlement programmes undertaken in Sri Lanka and Ethiopia which have international assistance inputs have helped to decrease human sufferance. Due to these assistance flows, as he put it cogently: "there has been an amelioration of the human condition, which while slow, would not otherwise have occurred," (Ibid.: 104). This has also been the view of the World Bank. Jackson (1982:93), a leading proponent of the counter-productive nature of food assistance in the rehabilitation of disaster affected populations, supports the provision of food aid wherever it is genuinely needed, for instance, for refugees and in emergencies.

Food aid in fact helps food-short countries in two important ways. First, it can help them in overcoming the temporary food demand and supply imbalances that accompany the development process. In these countries, the surge in demand for food that occurs in the middle stages of development frequently outstrips the production capabilities of domestic agriculture (Mellor in Holist et al, 1987: 55).

Second, food aid can be an important instrument of income transfer from the rich developed countries to poor people in developing countries (Singer et al, 1987). Because the poor spend the bulk of their additional income on food, the provision of food would raise their incomes. The availability of more food for consumption, accumulation and its conversion into cash after arrangements are made with donors can indeed be one source for bolstering the income of the poor in famine-ridden areas. Food aid is thus a backup for national programmes for

benefiting the poor. This goal may be achieved through food-for-work and food subsidy programmes.

Foreign aid thus helps a lot in getting food deficit countries out of famine and hunger conditions to an extent both in the short-run by providing relief and in the long-run by developing agriculture and the infrastructure it needs, e.g. roads, storage facilities, environmental rehabilitation, etc. Evidences of this are the food-for-work programmes which have benefited regions in Ethiopia among others. Some 22,000 kms of terraces were built in the Hararghe region of Ethiopia in a period of two years up to 1982 (RRC, 1985).

WFP assistance is too well noted in this regard. In Ethiopia, as in many food deficit countries, the organization's relief cum development project (food-for-work) has began to help the destitute in natural disaster areas to be more productive. In Ethiopia, the organization has been providing food for the hungry

not in the form of free handouts but in exchange for hard work aimed at laying the foundations of self-sufficiency. Up to 1985, some 700,000 hectares of land had been forested or terraced. Almost 20,000 hectares of forests are planted each year and no less than 200 kilometers of soil or stone terraces constructed. Even if the programmes expanded at 20 per cent a year, it would take 50 years to cover the areas susceptible to erosion (Harrison, 1987:124-133).

WFP has been active in "terracing and reforestation and other activities aimed at rehabilitating degraded land and securing it for future cultivation" (WFP, 1986 in Review:12). In the words of the organization:

The project is the largest of its kind in Africa. Close to U.S. \$180 million has been allocated to cover activities up to 1989. WFP provides food to workers as payment for long-term conservation particularly appropriate assistance in an area that has

traditionally suffered from lack of food, even in normal drought-free times. Results to-date are impressive. About 200,000 kilometers of hillsides have been terraced--enough to build a one meter high stone-wall four times around the world (Ibid.).

WFP Executive Director James Ingram, who was once on an on-the-spot evaluation mission to one of the Ethiopian food-for-work project areas in 1982 commented: "This is a good job. I have never seen anything like this before," (RRC, 1985:210). Clay and Singer (1985: 72), quoting the literature on food aid, cite the food-for-work programme as a successful one which typically leads to the "institutionalization of public works on an enhanced scale."

Generally speaking, the international economic environment, trade, technology, commercial capital and development assistance, have contributed a lot to major changes in world agriculture (World Development Report 1985:40). The Marshal Plan, through the agency of which the U.S. transferred significant amounts (to the tune of U.S. \$16 billion) of resources to reconstruct World War II-shattered Europe as well as the infusion of food and capital into Indian and Southeast Asian agriculture are testimonies of the validity of this assertion. This type of a new and massive "transfer of resources from the North to the South" is what is appropriate to the world (Widgren, in Loecher and Monahan, 1989:58) and particularly to the nations suffering from continued food shortages.

But in spite of such results, the advantages of foreign aid is pervaded by economic interests and political and religious ideologies of local as well as international nature. That aid has a religious bias can be perceived from the fatness of the resources transferred by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of the Middle

East to sister moslem nations. Ethiopia, a christian country in the environs of the Middle East and with a population of 42 million in the early 1980s, received only 0.49% of the OPEC grants, while tiny Djibouti, with about half a million souls, made 6.13% of the grant money transferred for Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti from 1970 to 1984 (see Table 36 in Appendix C). Sudan made 62 per cent while Somalia received 32 per cent of this assistance.

The superpower clash which is consistent with the creation of spheres of influence for strategic and economic purposes (Johnston and Taylor 1986:235) is one problem which is in the way of a relaxed transfer of development aid. The basis for the tension and rivalry, in addition to its humanitarian dimension, is tinged by also economic interests (Clay and Singer 1985:9, see also Tables 33-38 in Appendix C). It is motivated by the creation of spheres of influence which in the last analysis would make easy access to resources and trade possible.

This is also manifested by the tying of aid. Varying "tying and procurement rules may impose an administrative burden" on recipients of aid (UNCTAD, Report of 1986:97 and refer to Table 38 in Appendix C). According to the same UNCTAD Report, slightly over one-fifth of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid to least developed countries as a group is tied while

"approximately two-thirds of bilateral commitments, of which technical cooperation and food aid accounted, for an important part, were estimated to have been tied." (see also Table 38).

On the other hand, multilateral assistance which allows purchases on competitive bidding and OPEC assistance, both of them as they relate to concessional assistance, are generally free of procurement restrictions

(UNCTAD, *ibid.*, 97). But the rising shift in the system of transferring resources through bilateral rather than multilateral channels has constrained the sidestepping of these restrictions. Kent (1987:72) is among those who saw this "increasing tendency to provide assistance bilaterally" rather than other wise. Kent saw some problems in the relatively free use of such resources as a consequence. But according to the UNCTAD Report referred to above DAC countries have been reporting that they were increasingly covering local costs and giving priority to untied forms of assistance, among other things (*Ibid.*).

This new initiative of relaxing the transfer of resources for poor countries would help expedite their development. Economic development was oftentimes viewed by many donors as the concern of individual countries. As a consequence of this general view "...financial grants for purely developmental actions were becoming harder to obtain..." (Singer et al, 1987:86). For a great number of donors emergency humanitarian assistance, therefore, was considered the most appropriate and legitimate cause for aiding nations in disaster situations.

6.2. The cash for-work project and in-migration

The cash-for-work program to which reference has been made earlier on in this thesis has turned out to be a factor that checks the outflow of forced migrants as the programme proved in four districts in Ethiopia's four regions. Under the system, the destitute and/or those people on the verge of disaster are provided with monthly cash advancement in order to enable them to purchase food from the market or adjoining localities with surpluses (UNICEF, 1985:32).

The programme in a nutshell addresses two sets of problems. The

first is the provision of basic necessities for survival. The second one constitutes the construction of a bridge, as it were, that would excite the requisite resources, human as well as production processes that would eventually bring about self-sufficiency. As the UNICEF document (1985:33) succinctly put it, cash-for-work "provides a practical means of protecting peoples' food entitlement while contributing to longer-term preventive and development measures."

Cash-for-food is a system whereby "victims of natural disasters" are provided with sums of money in lieu of relief food where food grains are obtainable from near-by market places or adjoining localities at manageable prices" (RRC/UNICEF, Report, October 1985). The problem was not the nonavailability of food, but the means to purchase it with on the part of the destitute.

Even at the height of the 1972-74 great Wello Drought in Ethiopia, food was both flowing into markets of the region and out of the region as well, (Sen 1984:469, Padmini, UNICEF 1985:32). Market prices were found to be inelastic for a range of grains in the region. This must have been caused by the sluggish demand that was there, inter alia, and hence the reason for the transfer of food to other areas. Those with no cash or with little cash had their "entitlement" eroded by force of circumstances. Such segments of people thus become so destitute that they began to line up for the long and arduous journey aiming at securing food and/or employability.

Although migration in search of food at international food distribution centers at cross border locations is a recent phenomenon, the destitute took refuge in urban and other areas of Ethiopia, for instance, in the 1980s as in the 1970s to survive. They definitely put a

lot of pressure to services and the staggering economies of their own urban areas and those of refugee hosting countries.

Not only this, the cost of transportation, logistics, administrative operations, among others, to distribute food to the famine-stricken in forced migrant hosting nations by donors and governments has turned out to be colossal (see Table 32 in Appendix B). Between 1981 and 1988 some U.S.\$141 million were spent on counselling, transportation and programme support and administration by UNHCR in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Close to U.S.\$110 million of this expenditure went to defraying food hauling activity costs involving relief centers in the main. The inconveniences that result from the distribution of food and other relief that is incompatible with needs and tastes of the recipients has, it appears, been combining with the three factors enumerated above--migration to areas where food and employment is available putting much pressure to the migrant's destination area and the increasing cost of relief food distribution and administration--to inject some thinking into the policies relating to the provision of aid to disaster victims.

The cash-for-work programme was started by the UNICEF and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission of Ethiopia in 1983. Its positive impact included the curbing of the tendency to migrate (RRC/UNICEF, October 1985). Its creation of a stable community life and the intensification of agricultural activities in Mama Mider, Northern Shewa, one of the traditional migrant sending regions of northern Ethiopia, is noted. An almost full planting of the land in Mama Midir was made possible with the provision of "seed money", money for the purchase of seeds for planting, according to the RRC/UNICEF project evaluation document.

One of the most important outcomes of the cash-for-work project has been its attraction of in-migrants. Some 18 members of households in Mama Mider and eight in Dodota, Arsi Region, returned home to reinstate themselves (RRC/UNICEF, October 1985 and November 1985).

The preceding discussion, therefore, indicates that intervention programmes such as the cash-for-work scheme not only checks migration, but it also attracts people to return to their homes. It thus saves forced migrant sending nations the trouble of forgoing potential revenues that would be collected if peasants and farmers ploughed their land by staying in their localities and the receiving countries from expending whatever little of their surplus resources hosting alien people.

The international community which supports both bona fide refugees and other forced migrants can also economize and switch its hard-collected funds for priority programmes. Since the absorptive capacity of refugee accepting countries in sustaining programmes of development for refugees in some remote areas is very much limited, the need to find alternative ways of solving the refugee problem is only reasonable.

The fear of particularly many industrialized Western countries, in regards to giving jobs that may be around for their own nationals for refugees as well and providing the refugees with maintenance allowances and services may be a threat to their well-being. Their refusal to take more and more non-political or economic migrants, who inundate their job markets, nowadays, is thus justified on this count alone. The restrictive measures these host nations have begun to apply in an effort to lock entry points would, however, be minimized if forced migrants who move out of their home countries are helped at their own places of origin.

The transfer of a good deal of the resources expended on the

maintenance of relief centers in neighbouring host countries to the localities of the forced migrants is a measure which may not have any parallel. It must be noted that success in this regard is dependent upon a firm commitment both by national governments and the international donor community. Unfulfilled promises of guaranteed employment or the laying-off those employed returnees as among the "Anyanya" forces in the Sudan (Akol in Rogge 1987: 154) after the February 1972 Addis Ababa agreement would take the situation back to square one. This agreement stopped the previous civil war in the Sudan. The anticipated industrial growth foreseen by the Sudanese government did not materialize and the government was compelled to lay-off the repatriants (Ibid.). This may well be one the factors which may have reignited the civil war in the Sudan which has been raging since 1983. A sustained resource injection to such groups of people would help avoid a stress and strain situation which would lead to conflict in society. The cash-for-work programme in Ethiopia seems to have demonstrated that food production conditions among poor communities can change through the inflow of resources from outside the local environment. This intervention programme can thus bear fruit if it is vigorously pursued with an updated information back-up and re-evaluation.

The provision of cash for the destitute in food-short areas is a kind of assistance that goes to the root of the problem. As Kent (1987:175) has keenly observed the international system of disaster response is a recognition of the "appropriate and timely intervention as well as enhanced coordination"; but that these elements which can change the situation for the better are made inoperative because of "contending goals, interest" and organization procedures that at "best of times

resemble a kind of constrained anarchy". A radical change of this state of affairs is an absolute necessity for the concerted effort exerted to ameliorate the conditions of the destitute.

But whatever the case, as Clay and Singer (1985:67) also argue the provision of any assistance at the "right place and at the right time" with a foresight of directing it to a "socially useful end product" is most essential. The avoidance of the leakage of such a resource before it reaches the intended beneficiaries and an assurance that it would in the end create "assets of an adequate standard...at a reasonable cost" (Clay and Singer, *ibid.*) helps to extricate the 'food poor' from a dependency syndrome that is observed in many parts of the world and promotes development in the local area of forced migrant sending countries.

That the provision of cash also on a loan basis aids the destitute can be observed from its impacts on the rural poor in Bangladesh and Pakistan. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP) have enabled poor households to improve their farm and cottage industry incomes a great deal (Arab News, Nov 24, 1989).

These particular credit facilities help rural women, small-holder farmers and the landless to establish cottage industries, to purchase farm inputs and set up livestock to improve their livelihood. The credit schemes are supported by the Asian Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in Pakistan's case, and the Grameen (rural) Bank which was started in 1976 through a small private initiative in Bangladesh's case. The Grameen Bank catered for the landless and the loans were secured without any normal bank collateral requirement and 75 per cent of the borrowers were women (World Development Report 1988:117). The borrowers themselves owned 75 per cent

of the assets of the bank while the country's government's share was only 25 per cent (The Economist, October 1986:26). Those "under half acre of land or less than the value of one unirrigated acre of assets, can get loans" (Ibid.). Some 250,000 borrowers (three-fourth of whom were females) or over a million people benefitted from the bank's services in the early 1980s. The bank has become a Mecca for development economists and is being copied around the world--Chicago and Arkansas included.

The FAO initiated projects in eight African countries are other instances where the rural poor benefit from such a credit and aid provision arrangements. In these countries, the FAO encouraged farmers to organize into groups of 15 people and "stood as a guarantor" to enable them to borrow money from local banks for the purchase of fertilizers and other farm inputs. Twenty-five such groups in Kenya achieved "notable increases in maize and potato yields" (FAO, World Food Report, 1987:44).

The repayment rates, which stood at 73 per cent, by the women and farmers groups in Pakistan has been found to be highly satisfactory. Full repayment of the loan, at 12 per cent interest rate, in the Pakistani borrower's cases has been required; a one-year grace period has also been attached to the loan. In Bangladesh, the repayment rate was a high of 98 per cent. Also in Aakagema District of Kenya, the 25 farmer groups assisted by the FAO repaid 98 per cent of the total debt. According to the FAO, this was a recovery rate rarely achieved in many other credit programmes; the farmers managed to save U.S.\$6,000 (FAO, 1987:42). Such loans have thus set farmers and other groups on the road to self-sufficiency. They should be allowed to mushroom in rural Northeast Africa as well.

The cash-for-work intervention programme, initiated on behalf of the

food insecure peasant farmers, as was discussed above, has also helped to change the rate of the outflow of refugees or forced migrants. It can also work well as a widely acceptable policy shift in dealing with the chronic situation that the forced migrant problem has brought about in N.E. Africa as well as in other parts of the continent and indeed in the world.

The credit and cash-for-work programmes targeted at the poor may not have an immediate impact on the economies of Northeast African countries and more specifically Ethiopia. But they have to be pursued hard within the limits of the resources that can be mobilized from all sources. With time their imprint on the economy would be significant. Small farmers who are the backbone of the food deficit countries like those of Northeast Africa can make considerable contributions to their countries' growth and development if programmes designed to help them help themselves are worked out.

The results of relief operations in Ethiopia in 1984 and 1985, following one of the severest droughts in the country, have shown that international aid and cooperation can help millions of starved people survive through hard times of gnawing droughts and man-made disasters. In the words of Jansson, the U.N. Relief Operation Head in Ethiopia from December 1984 to January 1986, the then relief operation "kept alive more than seven million Ethiopians and enabled some 800,000 people displaced by the famine to return home and begin to grow food" (Jansson et al, 1987:74). This colossal effort is yet another indication of the international community's desire to help people visited by droughts time and again. Like it was argued earlier the momentum of such operation should be kept alive over a number of years. albeit in a lower scale,

fanning small-holder agriculture in the drought affected areas slowly and continually. The recurrence of the disaster conditions witnessed in Ethiopia and in the Northeast African region as a whole can be minimized and controlled through the supply of food and farm inputs as well as cash depending of the particular needs of the rural poor.

The experience of small and hard-working farmers in Nepal who plough eroded and steep foothills and who "produce more than their neighbours on large holdings in the irrigated and basically more fertile valleys" (FAO, World Food Report, 1987:21) appear to show that small is also beautiful and rewarding, N.E. Africa's farmers can also be a source of hope if they are also accorded participatory role in managing their own economic activities and if they are assisted to satisfy their basic needs in terms of food as well as in terms of basic farm inputs or the means to obtain these for an expanded production also on less fertile and steep slopes which characterize the region's traditional highland areas.

Such grass-roots development schemes are few in number. Their popularization would in all probability eventuate in "resource building activities" (Singer et al, 1987:86) which would slowly bring about measures of self-sufficiency in food for people afflicted by recurrent disasters.

CONCLUSION

As has been discussed in some detail earlier on in this thesis, the movement of a substantial number of hungry and or famished people in Northeast Africa is motivated by an expected availability of food outside the stressed local area where food shortages are experienced repeatedly and at times devastatingly. Urban and surplus producing regions as well as, in emergency situations, relief centers within disaster-hit nations and neighboring countries, constitute the destinations of the movement of people.

People, as it were, are forced to go out of their local areas in search of food, among other things. The drought and instability (war) conditions worsen the peasant's or small-holder agriculturist's ability to satisfy his basic daily food requirements or his capability to produce more.

Food insecurity and poverty and the consequent forced migration, malignant problems in N.E. Africa, can only be addressed if the relationship between them is exhaustively studied unlike the small attempt made by this thesis. Both domestic and international efforts, more so local ones, should be exerted in a cooperative venture to adequately address the problem.

The following four major steps, inter alia, have to be taken in order to change the food shortage and consequent famine and/or hunger as

well as forced migration problems in the Northeast African nations-- Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.

1. An immediate end to the long-tailed civil wars and enmity between the Northeast African countries.
2. Democratization of the socio-economic and political systems.
3. Improvements in the terms of trade and stabilization of primary product prices.
4. Transfer of more international community resources to food deficit countries for addressing the problem at its roots.

1. Immediate end to the civil wars in the region

An immediate end to the long-tailed civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan should be the initial step toward reinstating and releasing the forces of agricultural production. The central governments and the numerous opposition groups have been fighting each other with the express purpose of controlling and/or sharing power.

These endless fights, which have been cause for the decimation of hundreds of thousands of people and for the starvation of millions of them, should be replaced by talks; first, to resolve the existing political differences, secondly, to bring about a just and a rationale political order in which all parties among the larger society, i.e., not only active political group members within the body politic and among the opposition, partake and, thirdly, to generate production. A genuine participation of the people of each country in deciding matters affecting their own affairs is an essential component of the process of democratization of the socio-economic and political systems.

The direct and indirect confrontation among the three countries

which is clearly manifested by their active support for the opposition groups in each country, although it has helped to challenge the dominant rule from the centres, has also strengthened the centres considerably. And by so doing it has sharpened the conflict adding fuel to the already not so easily extinguishable fire of the crisis in food production that has ingrained itself for so long. A genuine and gorgeous support which could have induced substantial changes in the countries could have long ago obviated the need for the huge sacrifices made so far. In other words, the supports extended are self-interest based involving long-term economic advantages and short-term military gains aimed at quashing opposition to central rule. A regional solution to the food crisis can only come when democratization is allowed to take root in each nation and moreover when a sense of mutual advantage of the parties involved takes precedence over all other considerations. A regional approach to the solution of the problem is thus one way of giving peace and consequently food production the attention they need.

2. Democratization of the socio-economic and political system

Access to the means of production of food, along with the right of the people to decide questions relating to their own local affairs, also goes a long way in inducing individual and group entrepreneurship. This is among the essential first steps that have to be taken to begin to address the food crisis in the region. Food production policies that excite the majority of the population to work are primary inputs for moving production ahead. The promotion of incentives to produce and freedom to dispose of the same through a little controlled market mechanism is thus urgently needed.

Amartya Sen (in *World Development*, 1989: 778) has contended that freedom as it relates to "economic incentives in the expansion of national output in general and food production in particular... is a primary condition which helps poverty-stricken populations". What Sen (Ibid.) calls the "instrumental perspective of freedom which includes the freedom to earn profits" as well as the freedom to oppose the political system and achieve autonomy are basic components of the "delivery and use of food".

Indeed, the decentralization of the decision-making process and the participation of the people in development activities should be aimed at "reducing the heavy functional loads upon the state (Rothchild and Gymah-Boadi in Ravenhill 1986:281). As Fieldhouse rightly observed this condition would "free local initiatives as well as make a leaner and stronger central state more able to tackle the responsibilities remaining in its hands" and consequently help to increase its overall effectiveness (Ibid.).

The "freedoms" referred to above pave the way for a nascent accumulation of capital and efficient use of resources which in the long-run can counter poverty. Systematic measures of combatting problems of development, or "poverty elimination" particularly in low-income food deficit nations, can generate employment (Harf and Trout, 1986:164). Also low income food deficit countries can boost their national income "satisfactorily only with a good production performance within agriculture and ...distribution improvements are easier to make when production is rising rather than stagnating" (FAO, 1979:223). The full participation and indeed an active participation of all those who are capable of working is a matter that governments should encourage and

allow to unfold.

Governments should thus take the liberal road to development by drastically decreasing their high-handed involvement in the economy and instead concentrating their efforts, inter alia, on the building of physical and social infrastructures which stimulate the climate for new initiatives by the people. This, among other things, constitute full-time jobs for all governments. They should thus essentially limit their efforts in taking up these and other similar activities which individual entrepreneurs cannot handle in the short-term.

In other words, the state can play a major or supplemental role depending on the sector that is taken up at a particular time. In this sense the state would play a major role but individuals would have "greater scope for making full use of their...skills, enterprise and assets", (Fieldhouse, 1986:95). Development policies should take these realities into account for better results.

Growth rates that may be achieved from the participation of all segments of society can expand the revenue base of the state which can allocate a portion of this to deal with poverty. This expanded source of revenue as Manetsch (in Ecology of Food and Nutrition, 1982:225) argued in relation to cases of health/nutrition intervention programmes in poor countries would help promote overall development serving at the same time the needs of the poor in the general scheme of national economic development. Curry's (1989) view that sustained economic development requires the participation of the poor is relevant here. In his own words: "sustainable development requires a broad-based economic growth in which the widespread productive participation of and benefit to the poor are essential features" (Curry, 1989: 1089-90).

3. Improvements in the terms of trade and stabilization of primary product prices

Improvement in the terms of trade for the least developed countries, stabilization of primary product prices and the decrease in real interest rates on internationally borrowed money will help these nations to save huge amounts of resources for their economic activities as discussed in Chapter IV. The savings achieved can be used to generate production in the agricultural sector. This would considerably bolster their economies through forward and backward linkages within and outside agriculture.

Their savings, however, little now and largely misplaced and misallocated have to also be managed well for any meaningful resource flow into agriculture. A correct and wise allocation of these resources in line with the dictates of efficiency and optimality reduces poverty and food insecurity considerably and also limits large scale population dislocations which have become common in Northeast Africa. Foreign aid flows in particular, at this point in time, have thus major roles to play in giving a jerk to the development process that is increasingly foiled by resource immobility and the governments' benign neglect of the most important agricultural sector-- small-holder farmer agriculture.

Such a continued flow of aid which should contain supplemental resource for development requires a serious discussion between the industrialized North and primary product producer South in the spirit of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). A diplomatic and political offensive which would bring about cooperation and which would enhance increased understanding between the two worlds is vital. It is long overdue.

As a 1988 conference on cooperation for International Development, as it relates to the U.S., clearly saw, the industrialized world would need the developing one for the future of both lies in their cooperation rather than otherwise. The food deficit least developed countries in Africa can only be self-sufficient if such cooperation materializes and indeed if an adequate level of assistance are transferred to supplement domestic efforts (FAO, 91st Session, 1987).

Failure to provide increased assistance for this important sector would further disrupt the socio-economic life and the stability of the region which in turn hampers the small effort made to produce its food which would in turn lead to ever more forced migrations. This end result of instability in life and food production would not only harm the forced migrant source countries' welfare, but of those near and far participants who, with some change of policies, can alter the situation for the better. The restrictions host countries impose on refugee movements (McDowall, 19:18) and the appeals of first instance asylum nations to get more assistance to deal with the burden the problem entails are all the more reason enough for addressing the problem at the local level.

Like first asylum neighboring countries as those of N.E. Africa, for instance, European and North American industrialized countries have narrowed down the avenue for issuing passports for refugee resettlements. Of the estimated total world-wide 10 million refugees, these nations can only take 150,000 a year for resettlement (Ford Foundation, August 1983: 14 and World Refugee Report, 1986: 67-73). Even as far back as 50 years ago, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in a letter, which announced his resignation and addressed to

the League's Secretary General, predicted that the then international community "in the present economic condition of the world have only "...limited power of absorption of refugees" (McDonald quoted by Coles in Loescher and Monahan, 1989:409-410). It is to avoid the increasing burden of sharing their resources and services which may be strained by continuing flow of migrants that these countries with high levels of standard of living opted for such restrictions. African host governments whose call for burden sharing has not been elevated enough despite repeated calls for assistance have, more than once, themselves indicated their support for voluntary repatriation (Stein in Rogge, 1987: 56, Berry et al, 1983).

Third World rural refugees, the majority of whom are rural forced migrants (Christensen 1982:3, CIMADE 1986:89 and Griffin in Hollist et al 1987:133) would have to be satisfied by existing meagre resources of the first instance host nations or the limited assistance advanced by the international community for their upkeep. The extra financial fund-raising drive initiated by the UNHCR in 1984 through the agency of ICARA II, 9-11 July 1984, in the spirit of burden-sharing, was almost a virtual failure.

At ICARA II, the refugee-inundated nations pushed for the flow of extra funds towards economic development programmes that would also include support for their deteriorating economic conditions worsened by refugee influxes. The countries for whom the request was made insisted that such programmes should be covered out of the regular development assistance transfers to these countries (Stein in Rogge, 1987:56). As Stein convincingly argues:

to the donors, larger refugee assistance budgets and fewer

durable solutions raise the specter of an endless drain of resources, of expanded burden sharing that goes on and on with no solutions in sight (Ibid.:56).

The observation above demonstrates that, all said and done, the forced migrant problem has to be attempted to be solved at its roots. The refugee-sending nations' governments of Northeast Africa, as role palyers in the creation of the problem, should attempt to extinguish the fire that worsened the situation in the first place. A genuine attempt can mitigate the poverty and food insecurity conditions that have ingrained themselves in the region. As Mr. McDonald, the former League of Nations High Commissioner, 50 years ago, also rightly put it, the problem of refugees "...must be tackled at its source if disaster is to be avoided" (McDonald as quoted by Coles in Loescher and Monahan 1989:409).

Food shortages and poverty, as was argued earlier on, are not only a result of inequity in the distribution of resources among segments of societies. These inequities themselves also emanate from "inadequacy of resources, shortage of motivated and trained manpower, absence of local expertise and appropriate technology, traditional resistance to socio-economic changes or innovations", etc., (Ahmed in Beg et al, 1980:160). According to Ahmed these can be identified as "zero" factors of development and they are factors which can "...completely neutralize, unhinge or misdirect the development process" (Ibid.). Attempts at addressing these problems would help quicken the pace of development. As Dovering (1988:170-171) also remarked, a better-trained human resource factor, among others, limits or accelerates development. It is thus sound to argue that with the allocation of resources aimed at improving

the lot of the rural poor, these factors must be taken into account. Unfortunately, however, many governments and international organizations fail to see the interplay of a multiple set of factors--man-made and natural disasters as well as the scarcity of resources--in limiting development. Based on some assumptions that are less well-scrutinized and limitations faced because of shortages of resources, they begin development programmes that are both resource-consuming and ones that at times bring about distortions in existing development activities.

The destabilization wrought by a blindfold sticking to a prescribed policy of development by governments and the withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of funds by the such institutions as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other bilateral sources of finance and the imposition of development models would not be in the interest of the small farmer (Raikes 1988:259). A relaxed environment of development and transfer of resources, based on thorough studies of the needs of the poor are essential components of expanding economic activity. An open economic policy and a flexible system of transfer of resources may help a lot in regenerating the economy and in encouraging the poor and those facing acute shortages of food in particular to produce more.

4. Transfer of international community resources to food deficit countries for addressing the problem at its roots

Surely, resources available for increasing numbers of forced migrants are limited and the international instability that is fired as a consequence lingers. Even the UNHCR's hint that funds for Ethiopian returnees from Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan were limited for its 1986/87 programmes is a clear indication of the fact that a reasonable solution

to the refugee problem is yet a long way ahead. Attitudinal and policy changes to address the problems right at their sources--the rural areas of refugee-generating nations--are important major steps toward solving the scourge of famine. The question as to where the resources for mounting such programmes would come is pertinent here. A reduction in military spending at the individual country and/or international level may well be a quick answer to the question. The chunk of resources that military spending chops in N.E. Africa was discussed in 4.2.2, in Chapter 4, of this thesis. The amount of resources that go into this wasteful venture world-wide is colossal.

As the U.N. Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, has said "official development assistance from 'all sources' in an entire year constituted only 18 days of military expenditure" (quoted in Blaxter 1986: 105). Also according to Widgren (in Loescher and Monahan, 1989:57) official development assistance to poor countries was only one-twenty-fifth of the total annual military expenditure or it represented "...well over 5 per cent of world output". This expenditure may be a source of funds for programmes that aim at addressing food shortages in food deficit nations. This is now justified by the current tendency to reduce the arms race world-wide. The continuing conflicts in Northeast Africa do need to be quashed in order to enable the hungry millions in the region as elsewhere to feed themselves and in order for the world to see less of the awful sights of grotesque human beings injured by famines.

For those who have fled their countries as refugees for any reason, except political, no better alternative than voluntary repatriation (the other major responses being first country settlement and third country resettlement) is the most practical as Stein (in Rogge: 50) and UNHCR

(quoted in CIMADE:126) contend. In the words of UNHCR's director of assistance also, "...the only genuine durable solution was voluntary repatriation to the country of origin as compared with temporary solutions such as the provision of emergency assistance ..." which would be of help until the root causes of their flight were no more (U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/SR.336, October 22, 1981:7). Such repatriation should, however, be accompanied by assistance flows which would reroot the displaced and those likely candidates firmly in their places of origin (Perez de Cuellar, quoted in CIMADE et al, ibid., :126). The costs of such ventures, are much less than assisting such groups outside their localities (see Tables 29 and 32 in Appendix B). Seen from the distant future's point of view, the prohibitive costs, of logistics and transport, administrative services, counselling services (the cost of which was \$141,311,500 (refer to Table 32, and also see Section 5.7 above in Chapter 5) for N.E. Africa for the period 1981-1988) and so on can be profitably used to obviate any "meaningless" dislocation of particularly the rural poor from their places of origin.

Donors should thus be able to see beyond short-term ideological and economic interests in their decisions to provide food or better still the means of raising food right at the place of the root of the problem. Just as much as aid recipient countries should refrain from requesting more resources to broaden "the scope of the aid programme" in the name of refugees, so also donors should not "subordinate the principles governing assistance to considerations of a purely political and economic nature (U.N. Doc.A/AC.96/SR.336, October 22, 1981:6). That donors earmark most of the money for specific refugee relief and development programmes and to specific host nations has been

disappointing to many both in the UNHCR and outside (Stien, in Rogge 1987:48 and Gil Loescher et al, 1989:18-20). The impact of such restrictions may well turn out to be negative.

An indirect fight against a system which entertains an ideology contrary to that of donors can be fought better when there are less hungry people to say "no" to such a system of rule. Such solid individuals can mushroom better at home rather than outside their countries where their psycho-political stature tends to be firm. Many Third World refugees who move to a less well developed nation get only temporary relief in the country of refuge. This is also because they compete for limited resources of the host states which frown upon the strangers (Rogge, 1985:135-136). As Griffin (in Hollist et al, 1987:133) put it: "if someone must suffer and starve, it is better to do so at home than as an alien abroad." That destitute people must be helped at home to ward off the bitter avenues of forced migration is justified on this count as well. The economic and social cost of migration is big and its interception at its infancy is advantageous for the international community, the refugee source country and above all to the victim who has been the focus of humanitarian assistance. As Eicher (July 1988:30) has convincingly argued, food flow to drought-hit and famine areas is a less costly venture than feeding them in shelters outside their localities. This is an indirect contention that this measure may help a lot in curbing the migration of people in search of food. This point was dwelt upon in section 5.7 in Chapter 5 fairly sufficiently.

In any case, in all the three countries democratization of the political systems and a complete overhaul of the socio-economic structures is a necessity of the first order. The states and the other

combatants in the conflicts of the region have to make overtures of "compassion and political wisdom" as the Secretary General of the U.N. (Quoted in CIMADE:126) has intimated to help solve the forced migrant problem. The states in the three nations have to recognize this hard reality and they should be able to take the lead to bring the complex problem to broad day light for an eventual resolution of the food equation.

Emergency camps in host nations in particular take a toll of globally raised humanitarian funds and resources for the maintenance of forced migrants or refugees . Moreover, the resources sink in the sands of host nations in N.E. Africa without much hope of a substantial regeneration as they are used for consumption rather than investment for the rural poor in their places of origin.

This situation is thus a major factor which limits food production. It should, therefore, be scrutinized for sounder policy options for development inside the N.E. African nations producing forced migrants. Refugee source countries carry the brunt of the problem and they should try to make matters less painful in the interest of their people and, of course, themselves as the Ethiopian local idiomatic warning runs: "ye salt! ye better be tasty, or they will toss ye away labeling ye a good for nothing hard piece of stone." Embittered people are time bombs of political change as the uprisings of Eastern Europe have amply demonstrated. Governments in N.E. Africa should be able to realize this by now.

The international community does have some power and a good deal of stake in cooling down the problem and helping the starved. It should thus do all it can to advise and to censure the N.E. African region's

governments and opposition groups alike so they would stop their neck and neck competition to hold to or hold power and instead create a socio-economic and political climate that would regenerate the productive capacity of a considerable portion of the labour force which has been fettered by lack of investible resource and peace.

If need be the conventional wisdom that sovereign nations should be left alone and that they cannot be pressured to be reasonable in this regard must, as the League of Nations Secretary-General has cogently put it, 50 years ago, "yield to those of common humanity" (quoted by Coles in Loescher et al, 1989:410). This indeed calls for the establishment of an acceptable and genuine supra-national body (Schultheis, 1983:25) which should use the voices of the destitute in food-poor countries in particular and international public opinion to bring about an environment that would turn out to be less painful to humans. Political forces within the nations of Northeast Africa, should they fail to solve their problems on their own, must bend to such an "international public opinion and moral authority" and help their people and themselves. Food Security and/or a better standard of living or a prospect for it, at least, is a healthy source of well-being for all people in any nation. Every thing else should always be a second priority in these hard times in N.E. Africa in particular.

APPENDICES A-D

Appendix A(1): The rationale behind a nation's need to produce some of its own food locally

Countries like Japan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong buy the balance of their food needs from the international market. But they make it a point to produce their own food even if they do not have the comparative advantage. The Japanese, for instance, saw protection of domestic agricultural production (e.g. rice) as a means of "...national security, including the preservation of agriculture as a source of strong soldiers and consideration of balance of payments and the balanced growth of agriculture and industry", (Hayami, 1988:35).

This led to the protection of domestic rice. According to Hayami: "among grains more than complete self-sufficiency in rice has been maintained by a very strong protection" (Ibid.:10). The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry insists that protection should be adhered to with respect to agriculture (Harf and Trout, 1986:16). And this, the authors say, is done in spite of the comparative disadvantage the country faces in terms of food production.

The national rates of agricultural protection for rice for Japan and for European Economic Community countries for 1980 and 1984 were 192 and 235 compared to 10 and 44, respectively. The nominal rate of protection for wheat for the same years was 261 and 318, as well as negative ten (-10) and 18, for Japan and EEC, in that order.

This is an indication of the fact that countries which do afford to import their food on the basis of comparative advantage grow a substantial amount of their food to protect the farming population's well-being both to maintain a balance in domestic and industrial production and by so doing to sidestep the consequences of instability on the international market (e.g. the 1973 world wide shortage of wheat). This policy is pushed to the fore partly because it is also bolstered by scientific and engineering capacity as opposed to natural resource endowment which means that technology helps such countries in spite of the fact that comparative advantage is not on their side as it relates to other industrialized countries.

Appendix A(2): Per capita share of cereal produced in

Ethiopia between 1980 and 1985

Year	Population (in millions)	Annual cereal production (in '000 MT)	Per capita daily share (in grams)
1980	38	5,612	405
81	39	5,382	378
82	40	6,718	460
83	41	5,527	369
84	42	4,188	273
85	43	<u>5,320</u>	<u>339</u>
Average		5,458	370

Sources: Data for the calculation of the per capita cereal share was taken from World Development Report of 1987:214 and FAO Processed Statistics, 1984-85: 10. The per capita share is calculated by multiplying each year's production figures by 1,000,000 grams (1 MT) and dividing this by each year's population multiplied by 365 days.

**Appendix A (Tables 25-26): Decrease in levels of spending for food
imports and arms and the impact of this on investment for
education, health and agriculture**

**Table 25: Total budget-revenue, total expenditure and the proportion of
reducible costs of food and animal imports and military
spending for N.E. African countries in 1983 (in millions of
U.S.\$)**

Country	Total revenue	Amount of reducible expenditure	Total expenditure
Ethiopia	922	108	1275
Somalia	278	103	359
Sudan	1200	183	1800

Source: Albert, 1987. The reducible amounts were calculated from the total expenditures of each country for food and animal imports and military spending (refer to Tables 19(a), 19(b) and 21). They constitute sums of three-fourths of these lines of costs for 1983. The argument that money released from these expenditures would raise the level of spending for food production, etc., is made here.

Appendix A, Table 26(a): Government expenditures and the possible rises in investment for agriculture etc. that could have been achieved by Ethiopia for a late 1970 or early 1980 year if food import costs and military spending were cut

Type of expend.	%	In Millions of U.S.\$			
		Share in tot. exp- enditure	Savings, from Table 25	Total money for educ., health agric.	%age change in the levels of exp
Education	9.80				
Health	3.70				
Agric.	7.70				
Sub total	23.20	295.8	108.4	404	31.7
Gel. pub. services & defence	44.40				
Economic services	21.80				
Others	10.00				
Sub-tot.	76.80	979.2			
Total	100.00	1275.0			

Source: Calculated from the information in Table 25.

Table 26(b): Government expenditures and possible rises in investment for agriculture, etc., that could have been achieved by Somalia in 1978 if food import costs and military spending were cut

Type of expenditure	%	In millions of U.S.			
		Share in total expenditure	Savings from Table 25	Total available money for education, health and agriculture	%age change in levels of exp.
Education	8.30				
Health	3.20				
Agriculture	5.80				
Sub total	17.30	62.1	103.4	165.5	28.8
General Public services and defense	50.00				
Economic services	11.70				
Others	21.00				
Sub total	82.70	297.0			
Total	100.00	359.0			

Source: Calculated from the information in Table 25

Appendix B (Tables 27-32): UNHCR's expenditures for refugee, returnee and displaced populations' maintenance

Table 27: Refugee or forced migrant movements in Northeast Africa (1966-1989) (in '000)

Year	Eth to Djibo	Sud to Eth	Som to Eth	Eth to Som	Eth to Sud
1966	-	N 11	3 70	-	3 22.5
1967	-	B 15	3 70	-	B 25.5
1970	-	h&Ho 25.5	-	-	-
1971	-	.. G	-	-	- R
1972	-	16	-	-	52
1977	-	-	-	-	-
1978	-	-	-	..	..
1979	R 20	R 10.9	-	h2 470	R 297
1980	-	..	-	R 500	-
1981	C 42	C 60	-	C 1,300.0	C 438
1982	hp 31	..	-	C 700	C 627
1983	R 35	R 23-25	-	h+b+R 700-1,540	R 460
1984	..	h1 59	-	W 700	h 439
1985	..	h1 72	-	65.0	-
1986	16.7	h1 132.4	-	..	US 650.0
1987	h1 13.7	h1 178.5	-	400	..
1988	..	..	h 400	US 300	..
1989	..	h e 320-384	e 591	440	x 670-1000

C = CIMADE, et al., 1986: 24-27 and 154

e = The Ethiopian Herald, February 9, 1988

Table 28. UNHCR Expenditures and Proposed Budget for Refugees in Northeast Africa 1981-82 to 1986-87 and 1988 ('000 of US\$)
Country

<u>Year</u>	<u>Djibouti</u>	<u>Ethiopia</u>	<u>Somalia</u>	<u>Sudan</u>
1981	5,056.9	7,524.4	49,078.2	20,139.4
1982	4,071.0	5,373.5	38,565.0	26,845.7
1983	4,453.9	11,796.3	46,558.3	31,702.3
1984	3,868.5	14,439.8	44,079.8	49,162.9
1985	3,317.1	21,829.2	42,06.6	103,501.9
1986	3,115.3	22,859.4	53,398.5	59,881.3
1987	2,759.2	24,773.5	30,874.0	45,095.6
1988	3,288.1	15,857.8	33,283.0	46,935.8

Source: UNHCR Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Reports for 1981-82 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programmes and Budget for 1983 through 1986-87 and 1986

Note: Each year's expenditure was taken from the documents produced after the year of activity. As much as possible the obligated and the revised allocations were used in the making of Table 28. For 1988 the figure represents the proposed budget.

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- h = UNHCR, Refugee Magazines, various issues and UNHCR Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Report for 1986-87 and Proposed Programme and Budget for 1988.
- G = W.T.S. Gould, Refugees in Tropical Africa, in IMR, Vol. VIII No.3, Fall 1974:415.
- S = Berry and Giestfeld.
- W = World Refugee Survey, 1985.
- R = Rogge, 1985:10-21.
- Ho = Holborn 1974:1374.
- N = Nevile, October 1967.
 News from UNHCR, No.1 Jan-Feb 1981, quoted in Research Report No.67 by Gaim Kibreab.
- hp = Preliminary Report of the UNHCR to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, 2nd Regular Session, E/1982/2a 1982.
- US = United States Department of State, World Refugee Report, September 1986.
- h1 = UNHCR, 14 August 1987.
- h2 = UNHCR, Managing Rural Settlements for Refugees in Africa, Dar-es-Salaam, 1981.
- x = UNHCR and various other sources.
- B = Brooks and El-Ayouty, 1970: Appendix VIII: 293.

Table 29: Multilateral assistance for rural settlements, multi-sectoral maintenance for refugees in established camps and voluntary repatriation expenditures in Northeast Africa (in '000 U.S.\$)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Country</u>			
	<u>Djibouti</u>	<u>Ethiopia</u>	<u>Somalia</u>	<u>Sudan</u>
<u>1981</u>				
V.R.	..	10.0	..	82.1
Settlement	..	373.2	..	9,478.6
Camp	3,931.3	..	34,626.9	3,585.0
<u>1982</u>				
V.R.	..	..	..	75.0
Settlement	..	355.0	..	20,023.0
Camp	..	..	34,882.8	..
<u>1983</u>				
V.R.	353.1	10.0	..	110.0
Settlement	-	..	..	25,298.1
Camp	3,350.0		29,018.8	..
<u>1984</u>				
V.R.	566.0	5.0	..	350.0
Settlement	-	3,806.1	4,895.2	32,471.3
Camp	-	-	22,682.5	48,892.4
<u>1985</u>				
V.R.	10.0	138.7	5.2	150.0
Settlement	-	6,997.4	4,592.0	12,518.0
Camp	1,849.0	-	10,604.4	17,248.7
<u>1986</u>				
V.R.	139.8	10.0	187.8	310.0
Settlement	-	7,493.9	2,815.5	15,516.0
Camp	1,595.6	..	13,099.1	-
<u>1987</u>				
V.R.	140.0	23.8	894.0	446.0
Settlement	..	12,656.0	1,368.0	27,367.0
Camp	1,400.4	..	25,166.0	11,125.0
<u>1988</u>				
V.R.	60.0	27.0	789.0	446.0
Settlement	..	14,140.0	1,368.0	28,827.4
Camp	918.3	..	26,701.0	10,536.0

Camp: Assistance to persons of concern to UNHCR Multisectoral Care for refugees in established camps and V.C.: Voluntary repatriation
T=expenditure: V.R.=5,337.7, Settlement= 232,5 59.3 and camp=315,567.9

Table 30: Returnee populations in Northeast Africa between 1972 and 1987
(in '000) for selected years

S.N.	Country	1972	1983	1984/85	1986	1987	1988	1989	Country of Repatriation
1.	Ethiopia	17 ^G	.. ^w	..	.. ^h	.. ^h	..	..	Sudan
2.	Djibouti	..	32 ^w	..	3.2	2.8	..	..	Ethiopia
3.	Somalia	..	320	..	.. ^h	..	..	..	Ethiopia
4.	Sudan	..	..	55 ^w	65	..	..	..	Ethiopia

Sources: Refer to key in Appendix A Table 27.

Table 31: Estimate of the displaced population in Ethiopia and Sudan

Country	Year	
	1981	1988
Ethiopia	2,400,000 ^c	700,000 ^c -1,500,000 ^u
Sudan	60,000 ^c	1,500,000 ^u
Somalia	..	..

Source: c=CIMADE 1986: 24-27 (The 1,300,000, figure given by Somalia at ICARA II asking for assistance, according to CIMADE)

u=US Committee for Refugees, 1987.

Appendix B Table 32: UNHCR's costs for counselling, transportation and program support for refugees in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan
(in '000 U.S. dollars)

Year	Counselling				Transportation				Program support & administration			
	Djib	Eth	Som	Sud	Dj	Eth	Som	Sud	Djib	Eth	Soma	Sud
1981	206.7	23.7	..	175.7	..	..	15299.0	..	455.9	26.0	1333.0	825.9
1982	294.0	43.5	50.0	547.5	..	..	10600.0	..	535.9	338.5	1437.2	1339.7
1983	308.0	55.7	90.1	449.9	..	..	12390.0	..	538.6	722.2	1263.8	1189.4
1984	278.0	64.9	189.3	679.3	..	..	9546.0	..	..	357.3	1451.1	1248.1
1985	427.0	173.3	115.4	447.5	..	..	9566.0	..	..	432.0	1199.7	1199.7
1986	427.0	153.3	163.5	440.0	..	..	7744.2	..	..	493.9	1313.0	288.0
1987	489.0	176.0	263.5	737.0	..	6101.6	12910.0	3154.0	..	536.0	1501.0	282.0
1988	<u>504.4</u>	<u>227.1</u>	<u>219.0</u>	<u>752.0</u>	<u>..</u>	<u>6358.0</u>	<u>12630.0</u>	<u>3651.3</u>	<u>...</u>	<u>575.0</u>	<u>1347.0</u>	<u>282.0</u>
S.T.	2934.1	917.5	1019.1	4228.9	..	12459.6	90685.2	6805.3	1530.4	3480.9	10945.7	6304.8
Total by type of expenditure			9099.6				109950.1			2226.8		
G. Total			141311.5									

Source: UNHCR Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Reports for 1981-82 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programs and Budget for 1983 through 1986-87 and 1988.

Appendix C (Tables 33-38): Bilateral, multilateral and technical assistance and grants to N.E. African and other LDCs: comparisons

Table 33: Bilateral ODA from DAC and OPEC member countries and multilateral agencies supported by them

Bilateral DAC member countries net disbursement in \$ million											
<u>Country</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Ethiopia	32.7	72.9	72.8	59.0	56.0	70.5	91.4	76.2	76.9	93.1	187.0
Somalia	17.9	23.3	20.1	25.2	46.8	49.8	139.3	139.8	141.6	152.2	193.1
Sudan	-1.1	60.2	54.4	55.8	113.0	149.3	271.6	294.7	357.3	438.2	308.6
Djibouti	10.9	34.1	28.1	32.7	29.3	19.0	32.0	36.3	44.4	41.2	48.3
Tanzania	37.9	234.7	212.0	257.3	332.3	457.4	523.1	484.7	483.7	427.7	407.2
Bangladesh ..		703.9	319.8	384.0	666.5	774.4	850.2	672.0	822.0	582.4	674.7

Source: UNCTAD Report, 1986:48

Table 34: Multilateral assistance mainly financed by DAC member countries

Ethiopia	4.5	27.5	30.7	18.3	33.0	42.4	81.1	111.0	87.9	117.5	127.8
Sudan	6.7	35.0	22.3	28.3	34.5	56.5	104.5	105.4	102.2	96.1	108.0
Somalia	6.8	39.7	39.2	32.6	30.5	43.8	125.6	146.6	112.4	105.0	109.9
Djibouti	0.9	0.3	--	1.8	2.7	3.7	8.0	13.0	9.4	9.6	9.4
Tanzania	4.0	36.6	26.3	23.5	36.3	48.4	50.3	66.4	60.9	52.3	65.8
Bangladesh ..		107.4	82.3	87.4	107.8	105.2	95.7	130.6	153.3	123.0	169.6

Source: UNCTAD Report, 1986:50

Table 35 Technical assistance

Ethiopia	19.6	36.1	31.5	30.3	26.5	29.2	44.2	63.9	53.1	63.8	80.8
Sudan	6.5	28.1	30.9	37.7	60.3	69.1	102.4	131.5	117.9	127.4	121.7
Somalia	10.6	19.6	16.0	19.4	21.5	32.1	92.9	103.2	92.0	113.6	107.4
Djibouti	6.2	11.1	14.0	15.2	14.3	19.0	27.8	29.8	30.8	29.2	29.7

Source: UNCTAD Report, 1986:53

Table 36 Grants OPEC member countries to individual countries 1970 & 1975-84

Ethiopia*	--	1.2	--	0.9	0.2	0.9	0.1	10.1	--	--	--
Sudan*	1.5	164.1	239.0	114.3	97.5	288.2	218.7	175.0	141.5	352.8	105.1
Somalia*	--	71.8	37.3	208.2	106.0	95.7	127.6	38.1	160.7	26.2	49.8
Djibouti*	--	--	--	19.7	64.0	--	30.6	12.4	1.6	11.5	38.5
Tanzania	--	0.2	0.6	6.9	1.0	3.5	15.5	15.3	14.3	18.2	10.9
Bangladesh	--	61.1	10.9	25.8	44.6	13.2	51.1	47.2	126.8	110.0	20.3

Source: UNCTAD Report, 1986:64

Table 37: Grants from OPEC through multilateral agencies

Ethiopia	0	14.2	--	2.4	2.4	--	0.0	0.2	0.2	--	-0.2
Sudan	0	14.1	28.5	15.5	18.4	15.7	22.9	26.8	30.4	1.7	4.3
Somalia	0	7.5	4.2	5.0	7.9	10.5	16.1	15.3	21.6	21.8	9.7
Djibouti	0	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.8	2.0	3.3	9.5
Tanzania	0	7.1	0.0	5.9	1.0	1.2	4.2	8.7	14.8	14.3	6.7
Bangladesh	0	--	--	13.9	1.1	10.4	4.1	30.4	22.6	13.8	12.1

Source: UNCTAD Report, 1986:67

Note: Nonconcessional flows from multilateral agencies mainly financed by OPEC countries between 1977 and 1984 are negligible. Exceptions are Sudan and Somalia which received from \$4mn to 40 million between 1977 and 1981 (Sudan) between 1979 and 1981 (Somalia) and Bangladesh between 1979 and 1983.

*OPEC grants (%) for Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti for 1970-1984 are 0.49%, 51.70%, 31.69%, and 6.13% respectively.

Table 38: Tying status of concessional commitments to LDCs from DAC countries and multilateral agencies 1981-82 and 1984 (%)

<u>Particulars</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>
1. DAC bilateral and concessional commitments	100	100	100
1.1 United	29	24	22
1.2 Partially tied	9	10	13
1.3 Tied including technical cooperation and food aid	59	64	64
-of which technical cooperation	29	29	27
-of which food aid	9	10	13
2. Concessional commitment from DAC member countries and multilateral agencies	100	100	100
2.1 Multilateral and united bilateral	57	56	56
2.2 Partially tied bilateral	8	6	8
2.3 Tied bilateral, including technical aid and food aid	35	38	36

Source: UNCTAD Secretariat estimates based on data provided by the OECD, in LDCs 1986 Report: 98

Appendix D

Baalu Girma, a noted Ethiopian Novelist, has given a good account of the civil conflict in Eritrea. In his words (Baalu Girma 1984:25) this hostility filled in environment is depicted thus:

Sons of the same mother (Ethiopia) behold
 Breeding, harbouring differences too vain and bold
 Erring in their interpretation of the world
 Avenues to wise counselling foiled
 They stick to fighting tooth and nail
 In an era where hysteria-ridden ill-advisors prevail.

This piece of poem can be furthered by the following stanza to reflect the theme of this thesis. As a consequence,

The helathy economic environment distrubed
 As the sole view of a few
 But indeed of the many entrenched
 The cycle of distressed life goes on beyond and beyond
 Let the sensible and compassionate chip in inch by inch
 And rapidly so peace and justice to all descend.

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