at» d Aw - ifiiym- VP“ 3"" u “CV. ,_ .,' », :.~ -; u ; ..',.v.,-;, n-M-vvn 4.- n..- RM“. 7‘ . .. Hut» .‘4 m 1 ‘ __'.; I . In: - . ~.~.- .: ' 1 '13. — \ - .23. .g .2. I‘mI-W-m~\u .u \ m- tizt‘P' 4.4.» r, , ”new"... "‘rl , up!» m. -. y-.. a- l nu .. hu:;‘»o .. . :‘nflhlv‘. u-I. A ~¥ ‘fftlr ~ : s 3; N3. ”t?‘“ -35 “at": £2?- 33:33:; ”i 4». Aug“. . w 4.. ~ .- .... u s 4..» K»; ‘»}.'.1.»:.. . .4»: I. .n » -u > my.” 375;. Tl! »-:.ca. '.~—3 ‘ ;.vw 33:37.,“ ', I» -k.’ A: ‘4.» .93: . “:32 p‘ . “w : 41:1 5"?»1534M3-Mv a I . -, p“..- .r. .f. 2-’ a; 1“ I . an . n, u:r}:a..'::l"' fortuqlvf l'r . r. 9..., LIBRARY )flcMgan State University \ _J' -——— —' This is to certify that the dissertation entitled THE ROLE OF THE PRESS AS DEFINED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PART LEADERS, JOURNALISTS AND JOURNALISM EDUCATORS, 1983-1989 presented by TUEN-YU LAU has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D . Mass Media degree in M (:2) Major profess Date Il/l‘f/dl/ MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 28/7957 41 ‘I ",M. ”a 4‘ ,,v. r v-Infir |I¢r" ~ ..o~ ‘4 ’M" . M; ‘fi-‘M PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. [I DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE fl . L , Mn 21s 1995 l l J . h'? - V17 4 ._W_ o 9 “ME“! ll fl MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Inaitmion omens-9.1 l_ AS LEADERS, j in THE ROLE OF THE PRESS AS DEFINED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, JOURNALISTS AND JOURNALISM EDUCATORS, 1983-1989 BY Tuen-yu Lau A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Journalism 1991 AS LEADERS, . This 5‘ Chinese C03; educators he research qte by these th: these three agreement a‘: The prgl leaderwriml examined the: prOCeSS by a about or by The fir Press role t the years, n role than tie HO”Wen nor the people~o EB3’3363 ABSTRACT THE ROLE OF THE PRESS AS DEFINED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, JOURNALISTS AND JOURNALISM EDUCATORS, 1983-1989 BY Tuen-yu Lau This study examines the press role suggested by the Chinese Communist Party leaders, journalists and journalism educators between 1983 and 1989. It seeks to answer three research questions: (1) What were the press roles suggested by these three groups; (2) Did the press roles suggested by these three groups change; and (3) What was the extent of agreement about the press roles among the three groups? The press role in China is operationalized as either leader-oriented or people-oriented by 22 themes. This study examined the input of the three groups in the policy making process by analyzing the content of 503 articles written about or by members of these three groups. The findings suggest that all three groups changed during this period from emphasizing the leader-oriented press role to the people-oriented press role. Throughout the years, more leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the journalists and journalism educators. However, more journalists and journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the leaders. The fi‘ with signifr. and 1989. i likely to a. educators i journalists role than t‘.I These : the press r First, the ; Changed the significant held differ The findings also suggest that the three groups started with significant differences in 1983 and converged in 1988 and 1989. Throughout the years, the journalists were more likely to agree with the leaders than were the journalism educators in the press role suggested. This shows that the journalists were closer to the leaders' idea of the press role than the journalism educators were to the leaders. These findings suggest two trends in the discussion of the press role in China during the journalistic reforms. First, the leaders, journalists and journalism educators changed their suggestions of the press role. Second, a significant number of journalists and journalism educators held different opinions from the leaders. Copyright b 1991 Copyright by TUEN-YU LAU 1991 Dedicated to Connie and Vivian Lau Many p support frc dissertatic Dr. Le encouraged shared his formerly of he t0 Pursu Pregram at ; Dr. so commune, E directiOn . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people have given me ideas, inspirations and support from the beginning to the completion of this dissertation. A note of thanks to them is in order. Dr. Leonard Chu of the Chinese University of Hong Kong encouraged me to pursue this dissertation and frequently shared his observations with me. Professor Timothy Yu, formerly of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, encouraged me to pursue graduate studies by starting at the Master's program at Stanford University in 1979. Dr. Stephen Lacy, who chaired this dissertation committee, helped to steer this study into the right direction. The questions he raised help to sharpen the focus of the study. He has been a demanding "gatekeeper" and an understanding teacher. The guidance committee and dissertation committee also helped me in my doctoral studies and dissertation writing. They are: Dr. Warren Cohen, Dr. Mary Gardner, Dr. Tom Muth and Dr. Bella Mody. Dr. Tom Muth served as the chair of the guidance committee. vi I alsc Dr. James E death in 19 wrote to as Throughout assistance The di development‘ Dr. Tsan-ku many stinul Some 0 Program at aSSistance. test and Co i“? helped ProfesSiona the diSSert I Last b wife, Conni dome mYse I also would like to express special thanks to the late Dr. James Bradshaw of Central Michigan University. His death in 1989 saddened me. One month before he died he wrote to ask about the progress on my dissertation. Throughout my doctoral studies, he gave me valuable assistance for which I shall always remain grateful. The discussion of journalistic, political and economic developments in China with my friends, Dr. Ming K. Chan, Dr. Tsan-kuo Chang and Dr. James Tong, has provided me with many stimulating thoughts for the study. Some of my colleagues in the mass media doctoral program at Michigan State University provided important assistance. Hairong Li and Xinmin Qin, helped in the pre- test and coding of the data for the dissertation. Penghwa Ang helped with graphs and proofreading. Norma Green's professional copy editing saved me from many more errors in the dissertation. Last but definitely not the least, I must thank my wife, Connie, who took up the tasks of supporting the family and taking care of our daughter, Vivian, so that I could devote myself to this dissertation. vii e - E'tw'w TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page 1. INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY.........1 Endnotes...................................... ..... 4 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY................... ........ 5 A Conceptual Framework to Study Inputs of the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators in Defining the Press Role......................7 Studies of Policy Inputs in Communist Countries and China.OOOOOOOCOCOOOCCCCOO0.000.000.0000....12 Policy Conflicts in Post-Mao China................13 Journalists and Journalism Educators as Interest Groups in Shaping the Press Role in China......16 Role Overlaps Among the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators in Defining the Press ROIe in ChinaOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0......O....0021 Institutional Differences-~A Possible Source of Differences Among the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators.................. ..... 35 EnanteSeeeeeoooeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeooeeeeeeeeeeeooe00039 3. LITERATURE REVIEW/THE PRESS ROLE IN CHINA.........42 The Role of the Press as Defined in Chinese LiteratureCOOOOOOCOOOOO0.0...00.0.000000000000049 Five Affinities of the Chinese Press Role.........50 Other Issues Raised in the Journalistic Reforms that were Related to the People-oriented and Leader-oriented Press Role.....................57 Coui A Si End: RES} Cont Stuc Sour Unit REE Re: Could the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Role be the Same?........................65 A Summary of the Research Questions of the Study..67 EnanteSe O I O O C O O O O ..... O ...... O OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO I O 68 RESEARCH METHOD 0 O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O ......... O ..... O O 6 9 Content Analysis Procedures.......................69 Study Peri-0d. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O ..... O O O O ......... O O 70 Sources of Data.. ......... ............ ............ 70 unit Of AnaIYSiSI O O O ..... O O O I O O O O O O O O O O I O O 00000000 78 Criteria for Selecting Relevant Articles for the Study ..... ........ ........ ... .......... 78 Operational Definitions of the Variables in the StUdy.......OOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOO ........... 82 Coding Procedures.................... ...... .......99 Inter-coder Reliability Tests.....................99 Data Analysis and Statistical Procedures. ...... ..102 EndnoteSooo ........ 0.0.0.000...0.0.00000000000000108 FINDINGS.......OOOOOOOOOOOO......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO.109 Research Question #1: Did the Discussion Emphasis of the Press Role Vary Between 1983 and 1989?...00000000000000000.0.0.0....0.109 Research Question #2: What was the Press Role Suggested by Each of the Three Groups Between 1983 and 1989?...00000000000......0.00000....0117 Research Question #3: Did the Discussion of the Press Role By Each of the Three Groups Vary Between 1983 and 1989?...................119 ix R956 R856 L.) M Rese Rese 1+ ~_P-1 CONC Research Question #4: What was the Extent of Agreement Between the Leaders and Journalists in Defining the Press Role Between 1983 and 1989?.....................................140 Research Question #5: What was the Extent of Agreement Between the Leaders and Journalism Educators in Defining the Press Role Between 1983 and 1989?................................144 Research Question #6: What was the Extent of Agreement Between the Journalists and Journalism Educators in Defining the Press Role Between 1983 and 1989?.............146 Research Question #7: Did the Extent of Disagreement in Discussing the Press Role Among the Groups Support the Hypothesis that the Outside Initiative Model was Practiced?...148 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONOOOOOO....OOOOOOOO....0161 Content of the Major Press Role Themes on Which the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators Agreed and Disagreed................163 Reasons the Press Role Changed From Leader- Oriented to People-Oriented Between 1983 and1989.00.00.00.00000000000000000IOOOOOO0.0.188 Implications of the Study's Findings on the Policy Process in China.......................193 Implications of the Study's Findings on Comparing World Press Systems.................201 Limitations of the Study............. ........... .206 Recommendations for Further Studies..............209 EndnoteSOIOOOOO......OOOOCO......OOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.214 APPENDICES I. A E II. Coc III. Lis IV- Cod V. Cod LIST OF RE APPENDICES I. A Summary of Hu Yaobang's Speech "0n the Party's Journalistic Work" Made on February 8, 1985...217 II. Coding Procedures to Identify Role Overlaps Among Famous Journalistic Figures in the China Journalism Yearbook.....................218 III. List of Journalism Publications in China.........220 IV. Coding Instrument................................222 V. Ceding Form.’O0.0.000.........OOOOA‘OOOOOOOO....0.0232 LIST OF REFERENCES xi 10. 11. 12. 13. A CD}: A Yea Frequ Five Five The L LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Statistics of Journalism Workers in China, 1983....19 2. Role Overlaps of Famous Journalistic Figures in the China Journalism Yearbook.......31 3. CCP Affiliation of Famous Journalistic Figures in the Qhinaslgurnali§m_xearbggk-......34 4. Journalism Education Job and Educational Level of Famous Journalistic Figures in the China gouznalism Yearb00k0000......OOOOOOOOO......0.038 5. sources Of Data.........OCOOOOOOOCOOOO...........0079 6. A Classification of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles....................88 7. Articles Used in the Content Analysis.............100 8. A Comparison of Using Articles and Themes in Data AnaIYSis.......COOOOOOOOO......OOOOOOOO0.106 9. A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-Oriented Press Roles, 1983-1989....110 10. Frequencies of the 10 Most Discussed Press R018 Themes. 1983-1989.......OOOOOOOOOO0.0000.113 11. Five Most Discussed Leader-oriented Press Role Themes, 1983-1989........................115 12. Five Most Discussed People-oriented Press Role Themes, 1983-1989........................116 13. The Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Suggested by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989...........118 xii 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24o 25. A Y Fret A C< AYe Freq ACc AC0 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. A Year-by-year Analysis of the Leader-oriented People-oriented Press Roles Discussed by the leaders, 1983-19890.00000000000.0.0.0....0121 Frequencies of the Leaders' 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes, 1983-1989..................124 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Leaders Because of National and Provincial Affiliation, 1983-1989.........OOOOOOOOOOOOO0.126 A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Discussed by the Journalists, 1983-1989.............. ...... 128 Frequencies of the Journalists' 10 Most Discussed Press R016 Themes, 1983-1989. e e o o e e e o e o e e e o e o .130 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Journalists Because of National and Provincial Affiliation, 1983-1989.............131 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Journalists Because of Party and Non-party Press Affiliation, 1983-1989. 0 O O O O O O I O O O O ..... 133 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Journalists Because of Management Positions Held, 1983-1989.00.00.00.......OOOOOOOIOOOOO0.134 A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Discussed by the Journalism Educators, 1983-1989...........136 Frequencies of the Journalism Educators' 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes, 1983-1989........138 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among the Journalism Educators Because of National and Provincial Affiliation, 1983-1989.............139 Comparisons of the Frequencies of the 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes by the Leaders, Journalists & Journalism Educators, 1983-1989.....................................142 xiii 26. 27. 28. The APe ACc 26. The Press Role Suggested by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators During the Three PeriOdS’ 1983-1989. I O O I O O O O O O O I O O O O O 149 27. A Period-by-period Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Discussed by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, l983-1989..........................151 28. A Comparison of the 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes During the Three Periods, 1983-1989....157 xiv Figure 10, Pc Or St. LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Different Models of Policy Making in China and Their FOCiOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.00.00.000 ....... 14 2. Possible Role Overlaps Among Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators.... ....... 23 3. Organization Chart of the Chinese Communist Party Central and News and Propaganda Related units.O......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.0.0027 4. State Bureaucracies of the State Council and News and Propaganda Related Units..............28 5. A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles, 1983-1989....111 6. A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented Press role by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, l983-l989...............122 7. A Year-by-year Comparison of the People-oriented Press role by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989...............123 8. A Period-by-period Comparison of the Leader- oriented Press Role by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989...........153 9. A Period-by-period Comparison of the People- oriented Press Role by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989...........155 10. Relationship Between News and Propaganda.........171 Chapter One: INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY Journalistic reforms (xinwen gaige)1 were hot topics in the journalistic circles in the People's Republic of China until the tumultuous Tiananmen incident in June 1989.2 The call for journalistic reforms started in December 1978 when the third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party charted a new economic and political course. Its discussion came to a halt after the Tiananmen incident. The withdrawal of the discussion of the first press law at the post-Tiananmen National People's Congress in August 1989 signaled an intermission in journalistic reforms.3 The period from 1978 to 1989 is important in Chinese journalistic history because it signals the search for a new press role in China. A within-system change in China will affect the between-system comparison in the study of world press systems. Studies of the period will contribute to a comparative perspective of the world press systems. However, issues (it At 1 period re suggested press rol disagreem question . role defix life coulc thl'ee grou journalist should hav The d may be the °Pinions a] and disagr. among the : educators ‘ ntranSmiSS; Altho; 1973, this dOCUment Xinwen Con. document) . party I S d l 2 However, systematic studies of the journalistic reform issues during this period are lacking.‘ At least three questions about this journalistic reform period remain unanswered. First, what were the press roles suggested? Second, who raised what issues in defining the press role? Third, what were the agreements and disagreements among the discussion participants? The first question is fundamental to the understanding of the press role defined in China. Although peOple from all walks of life could discuss the press role, this study will focus on three groups of people: the Chinese Communist Party leaders, journalists, and journalism educators. These three groups should have direct interests in defining the press role. The definition of the press role by these three groups may be the same or different. This study will examine their opinions about the press role, and the extent of agreement and disagreement among them. An extensive disagreement among the leaders and the journalists and journalism educators would suggest that the latter two were not mere "transmission belts" of the leaders' opinions. Although discussions of journalistic reforms began in 1978, this study will begin in 1983. On February 8, 1985, then secretary-general Hu Yaobang announced a definitive document, "On The Party's Journalistic Work" (Guanyu Dang de Xinwen Gongzuo). (See Appendix I for a summary of the document). February 8, 1985 marked the beginning of the party's directives on the press role and set the tone for journali: organizec before HL The leadi Journalis consecuti Section 0 which sug- momentum . January 15 The s by the lee Profession jOUrnals' It also Wi determine 1983 and 1 3 journalistic work after 1985.5 lMany meetings were organized to study the document. To compare the situations before Hu's document, 1983 and 1984 were added to the study. The leading professional journalism journal in China, Jgurgalism Egon; (Xinwen Zhanxian), published in four consecutive issues (from January to April) a "Special Section on Improving the News," (Gaijin Xinwen Zhuanji), which suggests that journalistic reforms were gaining momentum in China in 1983. Therefore, the study will cover January 1983 to June 1989. The study will content analyze the opinions expressed by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators in professional and academic journalism journals, ideological journals, official documents and speeches given at meetings. It also will compare the opinions of the three groups to determine if variations existed among the groups between 1983 and 1989. Endnotes: 2. There first one liberation Endnotes: 1. The Chinese pinyin of some key terms used in the study are put in parentheses to help some readers understand the Chinese characters used. 2. There were two journalistic reforms in China. The first one was marked by the re-organization of the Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao) in 1942. The second one was marked by the re-organization of the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) in 1956. 3. People's Daily, August 10, 1989, reported that the discussion of the press law was withdrawn. 4. The studies that were directly related to China's journalistic reforms are Cheek, 1989; Lee, 1990; Polumbaum, 1989 & 1990; Starck and Yu, 1989; and Yu, 1988. 5. The discussion of journalistic reforms in China was a result of the policy change after the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. Since then, China has emphasized more economic developments than political struggles. Thus, discussion on the changing press role was also underway. Hu's journalism document was a watershed in the discussion on journalistic reforms. Chapter Two: DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 1 in Chinese This study examines the role of the press society as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, journalists and journalism educators between January 1983 and June 1989. During this period, the leaders, journalists and journalism educators raised many issues about the press role in achieving the political, economic and social goals within the Chinese society. The study will focus on who raised yhat issues in defining the press role and to what extent did they agree or disagree? Here is an elaboration of the foci of the study: (a) WHO-~the CCP leaders, journalists and journalism educators.z (b) SAID WHAT-~what were the issues raised by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators in defining the press role in Chinese society? (C) EXTENT OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT--Was there a shift in positions held by these groups? What were the issues the I agreed on G reception ‘ These definition? changed du: the study , difference; The 1. Perceive t; that there Press role their hat-lo Sever. the jOUrna whether th and Whethe repOrterS A fac within the affiliatic propose d 6 issues the leaders, journalists and journalism educators agreed on or disagreed about? What was each group's reception to the issues raised by other groups? These three questions seek to examine if the definitions of the press role held by the three groups changed during the period under study. If there was change, the study will examine whether it was possibly related to differences among the three groups. The leaders, journalists and journalism educators may perceive the press role differently. It is also possible that there were variations within each group in defining the press role. A factor that could affect all three groups is their national and provincial affiliation.3 Several factors may contribute to differences within the journalist group. The differences could be related to whether they were affiliated with the party press or not, and whether they are senior editors or rank and file reporters within the party press.‘ A factor that could have contributed to differences within the journalism educator group is the institutional affiliation. The different journalism schools in China may propose different press roles. These possible sources of inter-group and intra-group differences will be examined in the study.5 A CONCEPT: JOURNALIS ELLE The : journalisr of agreeme journalist the press 1. the journa Educators 2 . the J'OurnaI edLICatOrS 3 . disagree & journaliSn 7 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO STUDY INPUTS OF THE LEADERSI JO AL STS AN URNA ISM EDUCATO S N E NG PRESS ROLE The issues raised by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators may be similar or different. In terms of agreements and disagreements among the leaders, journalists and journalism educators in their discussion of the press role, the following situations are possible: 1. The leaders agree with both the journalists and the journalism educators. The journalists and journalism educators also agree with each other. 2. The leaders disagree with both the journalists and the journalism educators. The journalists and journalism educators also disagree with each other. 3. The leaders agree with the journalists and disagree with the journalism educators. The journalists and journalism educators may agree or disagree with each other. 4. The leaders disagree with the journalists and agree with the journalism educators. The journalists and journalism educators may agree or disagree with each other. This study will examine which one of these four situations happened in the discussion of the press role in China between 1983 and 1989. The last three situations, which show either the journalists or journalism educators disagreeing with the leaders, would indicate that the leaders did not have full control of the opinions of two groups of people. The disagreement between the journalists and journ groups ha" In t were cons the discu — fii may not a' happened, With the : The 5 governmeni called an (1976). I thmuqh w! study will conCept tC First underStanc. earlier S 8 and journalism educators would indicate that these two groups have different opinions about journalistic reforms. In this study, the journalists and journalism educators were considered to be two groups who tried to contribute to the discussion process. It is possible that the journalists may not agree with the journalism educators. If this happened, then the question is whether the leaders agreed with the journalists or journalism educators. The study of the extent of agreement between a government and its people in developing public policy is called an agenda building process by Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976). Agenda building is the examination of the process through which key issues become adopted public policy. The study will modify Cobb and his associates' agenda building concept to examine the foci outlined above. First, a definition of agenda is essential to understand Cobb et al's agenda building concept. In an earlier study, Cobb and Elder (1972) defined agenda as "a general set of political controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity" (p. 14).6 Cobb et a1. suggested two types of agenda: public and formal. A publig_ag§nda is composed of issues that have achieved a high level of public interest and visibility that demand action of the government by a sizable proportion of the public. A formal agenda is a list of items which decision Agenda bu the moven Cobb outside i initiativ an assunp (insider/‘ outside 1; agenda ar; exPanded 1 model refc governmen. Status a1. refers to whose Slip Public. The whether t called if Considers The QdUCatOrc because t 9 decision makers have accepted for serious consideration. Agenda building, according to Cobb et al., is the study of the movement from the public agenda to the formal agenda. Cobb et a1. suggested three agenda building models: outside initiative model, mobilization model, and inside initiative model. These models are basically derived from an assumption of a dichotomy between the policy makers (insider/the government) and the people (outsider). An outside initiative model refers to a process through which agenda arise in non-governmental groups and are then expanded to finally become formal agenda. A mobilization model refers to agenda that are initiated inside the government and consequently achieve formal agenda status almost automatically. An inside initiative model refers to agenda that arise within the governmental sphere whose supporters do not try to expand them to the mass public. The differences among the three models depend on whether the government or non-governmental bodies, sometimes called interest groups, initiate the agenda for policy consideration. The issues raised by the journalists and journalism educators in this study are all considered public agenda because they were published. Because the leaders are decision makers, the issues they raised are considered formal agenda in the study. Although some Chinese journalists are party members, they are considered outsiders in the jo the journ journalis When model ref the journ espoused If til by the jol agreement Practiced If U different Policy di: journalisj If the 3'0 each 0the gr011133 . The study bee docqunts the leade; order in ‘ The publh be rerrde 10 in the journalistic reform process. Like the journalists, the journalism educators are considered outsiders in the journalistic reforms. When applied to this study, the outside initiative model refers to the situation in which the issues raised by the journalists or journalism educators were subsequently espoused by the leaders in their policy statements. If the agenda of the leaders were embraced subsequently by the journalists or journalism educators with high agreement, this may imply that the mobilization model was practiced. If the journalists and journalism educators expressed different opinions even after the leaders expressed their policy directives, then it suggests that the journalists and journalism educators were not hand-maidens of the leaders. If the journalists and journalism educators disagreed with each other, then it suggests that they were not homogeneous groups. The inside initiative model cannot be explored in the study because it requires availability of confidential party documents and private communication records to show that the leaders originated the agenda. In determining the correlation of the issues raised by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators, the time order in which the opinions were made public is important. The publication date of articles and official documents will be recorded as an indicator of the time order. Moreover, intensity measureme the frequ each grou It i across ti among the was not c In e among the important then CCP Journalis then Seer the Thirt Zhaovs dc report Cc should Us same as ShOuld be remain 2} on imPOrt 'n'Enti rar HU'S Used to c among the before ar 11 the frequencies of each issues raised also would show the intensity each group had toward each issue. The two measurements combined will determine the agenda raised by each group. It is possible that there was no consistent pattern across time. The lack of a consistent pattern within and among the groups shows that the discussion of the press role was not consistent and these groups were not homogeneous. In examining the extent of agreement and disagreement among the leaders, journalists and journalism educators, two important policy documents could be used. The first one is then CCP secretary-general Hu Yaobang's "0n the Party's Journalistic Work" in February 1985.7 The second one is then secretary-general Zhao Ziyang's "Government Report to the Thirteen Party Congress" in October 1987.8 Though Zhao's document was not directly related to journalism, his report covered three journalistic principles: (1) the press should use public opinion to supervise the government and serve as checks and balances (yulun jiandu): (2) the public should be informed of important events (zhongda shijian rang renmin zhidao): (3) the public should be allowed to debate on important matters before decisions were made (zhongda wenti rang renmin taolun).9 Hu's journalism document and Zhao's party document were used to compare the extent of agreement and disagreement among the leaders, journalists and journalism educators before and after the documents were announced. As a result, three per to Februa from Marc I announced Tiananmerx mg Many literatur Policy api Powerful eXtension Communist "OutpUts' (Skiliing Griffiths approach_ °n1Y the rath9r tr To I Skilling "interest authOrs c Studied c military. JUriStsN 12 three periods were used in the study: (1) from January 1983 to February 1985 (when Hu's document was announced): (2) from March 1985 to October 1987 (when Zhao's document was announced): and (3) from November 1987 to June 1989 (when Tiananmen incident occurred). S DIES O O C NP CO S COUNTRIES AND CH N Many studies of communist Chinese politics in Western literature assumed the Chinese leaders took a totalitarian policy approach (Meyers and Kuo, 1987). That is, the all- powerful communist leaders have the widest possible extension of power over society. Thus, most studies of communist politics were concerned exclusively with "outputs," and were entirely lacking in the "inputs" (Skilling and Griffiths, 1971, p. 1). Skilling and Griffiths (p. 15) labeled this the "transmission belt" approach--the different groups in a communist society were only the means of transmitting policy to the other groups rather than sources originating it. To provide a new approach to study communist politics, Skilling and Griffiths pioneered the study of the role of "interest groups" in Soviet politics. They and their co- authors of the book, Interest Groups in §oviet Politics, studied different groups--the party, security police, military, industrial managers, economists, writers and jurists--in the policy making process. Most of the findings suggested process. I Man} on Skilli: 1986; Che LieberthaI (1986) su process. Iwrmative tendency;I organizat Hard— Concern w politiCal W Skil policy Dr 1978) 13 suggested that the interest groups had inputs in the policy process. Many studies of Communist Chinese politics have built on Skilling and Griffiths' findings (e.g., Burns and Rosen, 1986: Chang, 1975: Falkenheim, 1987: Lampton, 1974: Lieberthal and 0ksenberg, 1988: and Shaw, 1985). Harding (1986) summarized eight models in China's policy making process. Figure 1 shows that the eight models (structural; normative; Mao-in-command: factional: bureaucratic: tendency: generational: and interest groups) focus on the organization, participants and process of policy making. Harding (p. 18) suggested that these models' primary concern was to identify the participants in the Chinese political process under two dimensions: (a) state versus society: and (b) motives ascribed to CCP leaders. POLICY C NF ICTS IN POS -MA C IN Skilling and Griffith's observations on the Soviet policy process and other findings on China's post-Mao (after 1978) policy arenas, such as health, economic, agriculture, literature, suggested that opinions among the leaders, state bureaucracies, organizations, and groups could differ. Burns and Rosen (1986) have compiled a set of documents that showed policy conflicts existed in different policy arenas, including industry, commerce, agriculture, literature and art, education and population between 1976 and 1986. Munro Hodels ’ Structural Normative r Hao-in-con' Factional r Bureaucrat? Tendency mg Generationa InterESt gr *Harry Hard Process: Tor Figure 1 Different M Models Structural model Normative model Mao-in-command Factional model Bureaucratic model Tendency model Generational model Interest group model 14 LQQi Organization--description and allocation of power and authority Process--rules & norms of Chinese Communist doctrine & government policy Participants--changing personality of leaders Participants--leaders patronage network Organization--competition among different state/party agencies Organization & Outcomes--tension and alternative policy preferences Participants--among different generation of leaders Participants--interaction of various socio- economic groups in society *Harry Harding, "Competing Models of the Chinese Communist Policy Process: Toward a Sorting and Evaluation," in Issues and Studies 20: 2 February 1984): 13-36. Figure 1 Different Models of Policy Making in China and Their Foci* u9fln su; showed vi had confl | Burn political professic technicia 1978. Bu deba' 15 (1989) suggested that the Tiananmen incident in June 1989 showed vividly that different groups in the Chinese society had conflicting opinions from those of the leaders. Burns and Rosen (1986, p. 1) said that the Chinese political authorities liberalized their control over the professional activities of intellectuals, scientists and technicians to achieve rapid economic development after 1978. Burns and Rosen observed that: Within the Party and within society public debate has centered on (1) the methods that are appropriate for achieving these goals: (2) the likely consequences of rapid economic development for the Party, and the new relationship of the Party with the state and society: (3) the nature _of state in the changed circumstances brought on by rapid economic development: and (4) the lessons to be drawn from the twenty-five years of post- Liberation China (p. 1). Burns and Rosen also suggested that "Elite groups and individuals in post-Mao China have publicly advocated competing policy options and have sought support for their programs among specialized constituencies" (pp. 1-2). The groups in the policy formation and implementation process included central party offices, prominent party leaders, organized occupational and social groups, journalists and writers of "letters to the editor." Thus, the policy process in post-Mao China has become "more of a process of negotiation, coalition building, and compromise as leaders have backed competing policy options and sought largely short-term victories" (Burns and Rosen, p. 1-2). The} and intel was the c scientist their opi visible a categoric interests (Burns an Munr showed th rising "i minded h i W N This educatOrSI discuSsiOI general c' study Wil data avaij advocated imprisohe: study becg will Only 16 They also suggested that "One of the most fascinating and intellectually exciting developments in post-Mao China was the commentaries on state policy by Chinese social scientists" (p. 4). Thus, more intellectuals expressed their opinions in specialized journals. Further, the more visible activities of opinion groups--including both categoric and professional groups--in defending their interests signaled a more open period between 1976 and 1986 (Burns and Rosen, p. 15). Munro (1989) suggested that the Tiananmen incident showed that some Chinese leaders tried to suppress the rising "interest groups pluralism" and to maintain a "one- minded hierarchy." 0"_I L. OAS ! 1‘" : NS GOUS N SflAPING THE PRESS ROLE IN CHINA This study proposes that journalists and journalism educators are two interest groups who participated in the discussion of the press role in China.10 Although the general citizenry should be involved in the process, the study will not include their inputs because of insufficient data available on their opinions. The conflicting opinions advocated by some intellectuals and dissidents, such as the imprisoned Wei Jingsheng, also will not be analyzed in the study because they merit a separate study.11 The study will only examine the extent to which the opinions of the leaders and how Mu: be class (e.g., c coastal groups w Mun groups 1 cannot u: Country; horiZOntg some Chir ‘x’aobang Pluralis mindedne Mun Organi z a members: abOUt the have Pith grOUps' C are two! led Inight The - ill “Umber aetivitie< 17 leaders, journalists and journalism educators were different and how they were different. Munro (1989) proposed that interest groups in China can be classified according to age (e.g., retirees), occupation (e.g., doctors, teachers), and geographical location (e.g coastal versus hinterland). In 1984, about 2,627 interest groups were registered in Shanghai (Munro, 1989). Munro suggested three reasons for the rise of interest groups in China in the 19805: (1) the central government cannot use political force to control everything in the country: (2) the economic reforms have brought more horizontal and vertical trading and information flow; (3) some Chinese leaders, such as late secretary-general Hu Yaobang and ousted secretary-general Zhao Ziyang, promoted pluralism and did not launch mass campaigns promoting "one- mindedness" for many years.12 Munro said the legalization of the many voluntary organizations may serve to lobby officials for their members' interests. "Yet there is much that remains unclear about the form of the relation that such organizations would have with the state" (Munro, p. 30). The rise of interest groups, of which the journalists and journalism educators are two, suggests that the interests of the leaders and the led might be different. The journalists and journalism educators have increased in number since 1978. Concurrently, their professional activities also increased nationwide. First, the number of journali professi students 1978 (Gr 70,700 r Chinese journali four-fol. 230,000 1 schools ; 1986 I re; (thna_g£ 18 journalists, research units within the news organization, professional journals, journalism schools, teachers, students and academic journals have increased greatly since 1978 (Greenberg and Lau, 1990). By January 1987, about 70,700 reporters and editorial staff members worked in the Chinese media. About 5,000 students were enrolled in 42 journalism schools and programs (zhuanye), representing a four-fold increase between 1980 and 1987. In addition, 230,000 people enrolled in the journalism correspondence schools in 1987. There were 767 journalism teachers by 1986, representing almost a four-fold increase since 1980 (China Journalism Yearbook, 1982 to 1987, and 23g Xearhook L81, p. 500). A 1983 national survey of Chinese journalists showed that the 1,088 newspapers in China employed 22,948 news workers, including reporters, editors and translators (China Journalism gearbook 1984, p. 55). Table 1 shows that 32.8 percent of the news workers had college education. About 5.6 percent had college level journalism education. About 40 percent had high school education. In addition, the journalists were more active in organizing themselves and participating in professional and academic activities. First, all journalist associations (Xinwen Gongzuozhe Xiehui) in China's 29 provinces and autonomous regions had been reactivated in 1978 after an interruption during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Their number increased from 50 in 1983 to 166 in 1990 (Wu, Table 1 Statisti A. TY B. AGE U? 56 EDUCI Co? Col /Jc Hig 19 Table 1 Statistics of Journalism Workers in China, 1983* A. TYPES of Media No. of Media No. of Workers newspapers 1,088 22,948 news agencies 2 2,486 radio stations 114 23,087 (radio & TV combined) TV stations 42 Total 1,246 48,531 B. AGE of Journalists Newspapers News Agencies under 35 32.2% 18.1% 36-55 60.0% 69.1% 56 and above 7.8% 12.8% C. EDUCATION of Journalists College 32.8% 58.9% College 5.6% 11.0% /Journalism Program High School 39.0% 30.1% Middle School 22.6% 0.0% * Journalists included reporters, editors, translators and broadcasters. The total number of newspapers, radio and tv stations was as of November 1983. The education of the workers was as of February 1983. This is only a sample of some media. The study was conducted by the News Division of the Propaganda Department. Source: China Journalism Yearbook 1984, p. 55. 1991, p- formed a All China Jizhe Xie thenselw Journalis relations The and nurdog activitiil Openly CJ increase:| 1988 (Gil Pel‘Cent C-I 1985 Were journali! example, Shanghai Daxue) ir Add: fOrmed jc Pro‘vinCESI of China Lianhehul. Q %' D. 20 1991, p. 3). Second, the provincial associations also formed a central body headquartered in Beijing, called the All China Journalists Association (Zhonghua Chuanguo Xinwen Jizhe xiehui). Some provincial associations called themselves the provincial unit (fenhui) of the All China Journalists Association, showing their subordinate relationship with the central body.13 The rapid expansions in journalism student enrollment and number of teachers were followed by increased research activities (Greenberg and Lau, 1990). For example, the openly circulated journalism teaching materials had increased from four kinds in 1978 to almost 100 kinds by 1988 (China Journalism Yearbook 1989, p. 13). Moreover, 40 percent of the journalism books published between 1903 and 1985 were published after 1978 (Lau, 1989). Several journalism schools began to publish academic journals. For example, the College of Journalism at Fudan University in Shanghai began publishing the Jonznalism gniversity (Xinwen Daxue) in 1980. Additionally, journalists and journalism educators have formed journalism societies (xinwen xuehui) in many provinces to study journalistic issues. A Joint Association of China Journalism Societies (Zhongguo Xinwen Xuehui Lianhehui) was formed in 1988 (Qninn gournnlism Xenzbogk igng, p. 401-402). A China Journalism Research Foundation (Zhongguo Xinwenxue Yanjiu Jijinhui) was founded in December 1988 to encourage research (China Jougnalism gearbook 1989, p.396-3 The activiti« these gr: ROLE OVE] EDUCATORS Ider journali press re] the three inter-10c}. Communist to separa The: in Figur! 1. eduCatOrS jOUrnalis leaders, 2 . ournalis VQrSa. Journalis 21 p. 396-397). These increasing professional, academic and research activities of the journalists and journalism educators show these groups play a more active role in their profession. RO E OVE'LAP L 0 G miiDERS O ’ A,ISTS AND 0 ' ALISM EQUCAIOEE IN QEEINING IHE BBESS ROLE IN CHINA Identifying the inputs of the journalists and journalism educators as two interest groups in defining the press role in China may be complicated by the overlaps among the three groups under study. A common assumption of an interlocking relationship among these three groups in a communist society raises an issue of whether it is possible to separate their opinions. Theoretically, the following role overlaps, also shown in Figure 2, among these three groups are possible: 1. c ' o This means the leaders, journalists and journalism educators are three separate groups. That is, no journalists are leaders, no journalism educators are leaders, and no journalists are journalism educators. 2. c ' ' d '. n- , 5 cl 'o-,.. 5Sn -g- a . s ._- a s-o. - - -_ou- This means some leaders are journalists and vice versa. Journalism educators have no connection with journalists and leaders. 3. journali: and vice and jourr 22 3. Scena 3: ove a s b w en leaders and 'o,r .l'sm e--c. os_ , '. 11s'st. ._- , se-a a - e it This means some leaders are journalism educators and vice versa. Journalists have no connection with leaders and journalism educators. 4. c ° ve s w ' u 1' s 'e._ a —I ‘d-,o 9,8 3 A-..- s a.‘ 1 S‘-- ot* or.-- This means some journalists are journalism educators and vice versa. Leaders have no connection with journalists and journalism educators. 5. Scenanio 5: Ingerlocking overlaps among leadegs, ' u n 'sts ' a ’ e c s This means the same person wears three "hats"-— leaders, journalists, and journalism educators-- simultaneously. It should be noted that these scenarios describe the status at a specific point in time. The status of an individual's occupational role and group affiliation may change over time. There should be a distinction between the current role and preyions role. The current role refers to the role the person was holding when the article or document was published. The previous role refers to the role the person held prior to publication of the article or document. The current and previous roles could be different. Each person in the study could also be distinguished between a nrimagy role and secondagy role. A primary role refer to the current full—time responsibilities that the A \ “ELL FjQUTe ~ 'N I ”Own-c dodfnar _ 23 E E E E g . @Q C O G C L 4. [TI [_. + C— m [— + m I... + L + m J+E Figure 2 L=Leaders; J=Journallsts; E=Educators Possible Role Overlaps Among Leaders. Journallsts and Journallsm Educators hi person ‘ role re publica Be leaders there a. treated if thert journal: Classifj The 10urnali used to journali, holding 1 eduCa‘tOrs time role concurren requires t“ ful 1- would be 8:: W legflijg| The l affiliaticl examined . 24 person was holding at the time of publication. A secondary role refers to the part-time responsibilities at the time of publication. Because the leader's role was so powerful, the current leadership role should take precedence over other roles if there are any role overlaps. Therefore, the leaders will be treated as a separate group in this study. That means even if there were current role overlaps of the leaders as journalists and journalism educators, they will be classified as leaders only. Then, the role overlaps between the journalists and journalism educators should be distinguished. The criteria used to determine the gnggent nzimnzy :ole of the journalists and journalism educators were whether they were holding full-time roles as journalists and journalism educators. A role overlap means a person was holding full- time roles both as journalists and journalism educators concurrently. This would seldom happen because each role requires much time to perform, and it is difficult to hold two full-time roles concurrently. The more likely overlaps would be some journalists and journalism educators hold secondary roles respectively. The study will focus on the curgent ngimazy role of these three groups. The more likely overlaps would be in the ngevious roles each person has held. A person may change jobs and affiliations over a period of time. Then the question to be examined is whether the previous role would affect the discussil previous no evidel consistel For exam] journali: a particx current a because 1 Pressure the impac Study. 2 the Prev; To t it is necl the Ccp al the Orgarl The Central A committee secl'etary I I Committeel I 25 discussion of the press role? While it is possible that previous roles may influence the current position, there is no evidence to suggest that the influence will be consistently in one direction among various group members. For example, the experience of a leader who has been a journalist may not necessarily guarantee that he will accept a particular press role advocated by journalists. In fact, current affiliation is more important than past affiliation because past organizations do not exert the immediate pressure that current organizations do. For these reasons, the impact of the previous role will not be examined in this study. Also, it is impossible to obtain data to identify the previous role of each author in the study. To better understand the implications of role overlaps, it is necessary to examine the organizational structure of the CCP and the state bureaucracies. Figures 3 and 4 show the organization chart of the CCP and state bureaucracies. The CCP National Party Congress is comprised of a Central Advisory Committee with 200 members: a Central Committee with 175 members and 110 alternate members: secretary-general: and a Central Party Disciplinary Committee with 69 members. Directly under the Central Committee and Party secretary-general are the Politburo with 23 members and a Central Secretariat. In addition, the , three-member Central Military Commission also plays a role in decision making. Directly under the Politburo and Central Committee are three media units: Red Flag (Hongqi, the pal new jet People' that is inpleme Th vice-prl National making k of the c committe NPC: the Procurat. The bUreaucre Councilor Premier 2 the State including Planning including Office, h drafting inc1Ude X SciehCeS' also 12 5 ”3318810 26 the party's ideological journal), which was replaced by a new journal called fienhing_1;n§h (Qiushi) in June 1988: Egnnle;§_2nily (Renmin Ribao): and the Propaganda Department that is involved in propaganda policy making and implementation. The state bureaucracies are headed by a president and vice-president of the People's Republic of China. The National People's Congress (NPC) is the highest decision making body (some consider the NPC the rubber stamped body of the CCP). When the NPC is not in session, a standing committee is in charge. Three bodies are directly under the NPC: the Supreme People's Court: the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the State Council. The State Council is the operating arm of the state bureaucracies. A premier and nine vice-premiers and councilors administer the State Council. After former premier Zhao Ziyang eliminated some ministries and organs, the State Council in 1989 was comprised of 32 ministries, including a Ministry of Radio, Film and Television: eight planning commissions: six working organs: 20 offices, including the State Press and Publications Administration Office, which is in charge of publication registration and drafting of the press law: and five institutions which include Xinhua News Agency and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which housed the Journalism Institute. There are also 12 state bureaus directly under the ministries and commissions. The journalism schools are under the Central Ad' w/ 200 meml Cen 27 National Party Congress Central Advisory Comm. Central Committee w/ 200 members w/ 175 members & 100 alternate w/ secretary general Politburo w/ 23 members Central Secretariat Central Party Disciplinary Comm. w/ 69 members Central Military Comm w/ 3 members Two Publications Propaganda Dept People's Daily Red Flag/Seeking Truth Figure 3 Organization Chart of the Chinese Communist Party Central and News and Propaganda Related Units Central M: unmissior Supreme Pe Court [\ 32 mini incl. a Radio F xinhUa “glue 4 State ehre. News ; Pro} 28 President of the PRC Vice—president of the PRC Standing Committee Central Military National People's Congress Commission Supreme People's State Council Supreme People's Court I Procuratorate Premier Vice-Premier Councillors (9) Secretary 32 ministries a planning 5 working 20 offices incl. Ministry of commissions organs organs directly Radio Film and TV under SC 12 State Bureaus directly under the ministries and commissions 5 Institutions directly under State Council including Xinhua News Agency Chinese Acalemy State Press 8 of Social Sciences Publications Administration Office Figure 4 Stats Bureaucracies of the State Council and News & Propaganda Related Units jurisdic Commissj To leaders, of the 1 leaders, "Who's W 1986 and explanat analysis Fou listed 1 were ana were lea Percent) fellowin 1. journali 2. 3. educator secondar‘ 4. the Part: 5. EdUCatOr' secondar‘ 29 jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Education Commission. To assess the extent of role overlaps among the leaders, journalists and journalism educators, an analysis of the famous journalistic figures was conducted. Names of leaders, journalists, and journalism educators listed in the "Who's Who" section of the China Journalism Yearbgok between 1986 and 1989 were analyzed. (See Appendix II for an explanation of the coding criteria and procedure for this analysis). Four hundred and seventy-four journalistic figures listed in the China Journalism gearboog from 1986 to 1989 were analyzed. Table 2 shows that 99 of them (20.9 percent) were leaders, 332 (70 percent) were journalists and 43 (9.1 percent) were journalism educators. Table 2 shows the following current role overlaps: 1. No one person was a leader, journalist and journalism educator concurrently. 2. No leaders were journalists concurrently. 3. Four percent of the leaders were journalism educators concurrently. (The journalism educator role was a secondary role). 4. About 2.4 percent of journalists were involved in the party structure or state bureaucracies concurrently. 5. About 2.4 percent of journalists were journalism educators concurrently. (The journalism educator role was a secondary role). 6. involved concurre 7. journali secondar The not occu three gr Tab overlaps l. journali 2. PreviOuS 3. educator 4 . PreViOuS 5. j”man. 6. leaders I 7, " j°Urnalis The 3O 6. About 2.3 percent of journalism educators were involved in the party structure or state bureaucracies concurrently. 7. About 9.3 percent of journalism educators were journalists concurrently. (The journalist role was a secondary role). These findings suggest that current role overlaps did not occur extensively. Thus, the error from assuming the three groups as separate groups was small. Table 2 also shows the following previous rgle overlaps: 1. No one person was a leader, journalist and journalism educator at the same time previously. 2. About 92.9 percent of the leaders were journalists previously. 3. About 7.1 percent of the leaders were journalism educators previously. 4. About 22 percent of the journalists were leaders previously. 5. About 6.6 percent of the journalists were journalism educators previously. 6. About 18.6 percent of journalism educators were leaders previously. 7. About 81.4 percent of journalism educators were journalists previously. The findings suggest that many leaders in charge of journalism matters were former journalists. This result Table 2 Role Ove Yearboox Overlaps Role Over Leaders Journalig Journalisr ducators Overlaps R018 OVGr] J0”malist Journallsr EdUCatorS 31 Table 2 Role Overlaps of Famous Journalistic Figures in the China Journalism Yearbook Overlaps of Current Role: CURRENT ROLE Journalism Role Overlaps Leaders Journalists Educators N=99 N=332 N=43 Leaders 95 8 1 96.0% 2.4% 2.3% Journalists O 316 4 0.0% 95.2% 9.3% Journalism 4 8 38 Educators 4.0% 2.4% 88.4% Overlaps of Previous Role: PREVIOUS ROLE Journalism Role Overlaps Leaders Journalists Educators N=99 N=332 N=43 Leaders 0 73 8 0.0% 22.0% 18.6% Journalists 92 237 35 92.9% 71.4% 81.4% Journalism 7 22 O Educators 7.1% 6.6% 0.0% could he figures Journali likely tl The journali journali Table 3 were CCP Percent SUQQest leaders 0n jOUrnali Percent had been and jour. leVel. . percent < eduCatOrS The journali: a Close i wish to t leaders' leadErs C affiliati 32 could have been because the leaders were famous journalistic figures listed in the "Who's Who" section of the China goggggli§m_2egrbggg. Their journalistic connection was likely to be the selection criteria. The high percentage of journalism educators being journalists previously was logical. The percentage of journalism educators being leaders previously was quite low. Table 3 shows that 58.1 percent of the journalism educators were CCP members, while 86.9 percent of the leaders and 82.5 percent of the journalists were CCP members. All these suggest that the journalists had closer ties with the leaders than the journalism educators. 0n the other hand, not many leaders and journalists had journalism teaching experience. Table 4 shows that 7.1 percent of the leaders and 6.6 percent of the journalists had been journalism educators. Further, not many leaders and journalists had journalism education at the college level. Table 4 shows that 2.0 percent of leaders, 9.6 percent of journalists, and 23.2 percent of journalism educators had college level journalism education. The high percentage of leaders who were former journalists suggests that journalists and leaders might have a close tie. The implication is that some journalists, who wish to take leadership roles later, may stay closer to the leaders' stance. The closeness of the journalists to the leaders depends on two factors: (1) CCP party press affiliation, and (2) management rank within the party press; that is press, some ca as head bureauc would b author' accompa name of Th1 Press a: and jou: Table 3 journali wOrked f the high The roles we in the Q less fan have aff 33 that is the higher the rank of the journalists in the party press, the closer the journalists toward the leaders. In some cases, the chief editor of the party press was assigned as head of the journalism affairs units in the state bureaucracies. A special group of party press journalists would be identified for further analysis by examining the author's credit accompanying each article. Some accompanying credits provided information on the rank and name of newspaper the journalist was affiliated with. The analysis of the famous journalistic figures party press affiliation indicates that many leaders, journalists and journalism educators had worked for the CCP press. Table 3 shows that 74.7 percent of leaders, 81.3 percent of journalists, and 60.5 percent of journalism educators had worked for the CCP press. The journalism educators showed the highest non-CCP press affiliation, 32.6 percent. The findings indicate that overlaps of current primary roles were not common among the famous journalistic figures in the China Journalism Yearbook. One could assume that the less famous journalistic figures would be less likely to have affiliation with the state structure and bureaucracies. These findings indicate that role overlaps should not pose a threat in the study. However, the study will still seek to identify role overlaps in the coding process. Furthermore, in examining the inputs of the journalists in defining the press role, the study will seek to analyze the differences due to the following factors: (1) party Table 3 CCPAffiliati Xg§[hggg CCP HENBERSH I CCP Members NotCCP Membe Not Mentionei N = CCP PRESS AFFILIATION CCP Press Non‘CCP Pregfi Hot Mentione: Unknown N: 34 Table 3 CCP Affiliation of Famous Journalistic Figures in the China Journalism Yearbook GROUPS CCP MEMBERSHIP Leaders Journalists Journalism Educators CCP Members 86.9% 82.5% 58.1% Not CCP Members 6.1% 5.4% 30.2% Not Mentioned 7.1% 12.0% 11.6% N - 99 332 43 CCP PRESS AFFILIATION CCP Press 74.7% 81.3% 60.5% Non-CCP Press 24.2% 18.1% 32.6% Not Mentioned 1.0% 0.3% 7.0% Unknown 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% N = 99 332 43 versus non position-- journalist INSTITUTIC E§5§E_Eifi§_ Besid analyze po influences schools or “59d in th. different ; PUblished Fudan Ullivl (XiUWenXue People's U] mime“ Xu4 0f SOcial : JournaliSm journals , published They repre' Joul'Ilc‘als s JournEllism ' assmalted 35 versus non-party press affiliation: and (2) management position--editors versus rank and file--held by the journalists. INS TUTIONAL D F ERENCES--A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF DI FERENCES AMONG THE LEADERS, JOURNALISTS AND JOURNALISM EDUCATORS Besides role differences, the study also seeks to analyze possible sources of differences due to institutional influences--that is differences among different journalism schools or different editorial policies for the publications used in the study. The journals used in the study represent different institutions--Jounna1ism Egon; (Xinwen Zhanxian), published by the Eegpie;§_paiiy in Beijing; r a 's University (Xinwen Daxue) by the College of Journalism of Fudan University in Shanghai; Journalism Collected Essays (Xinwenxue Lunji) by the College of Journalism of the People's University in Beijing; and Journalism Journal (Xinwen Xuekan) of the Journalism Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Joint Association of China Journalism Societies in Beijing. The CCP ideological journals, Beg Elag (Hongqi) and Seeking Truth (Qiushi), are published under the auspices of the Propaganda Department. They represent the views of the party. Because most of the journals selected in the study are published by different journalism schools, any content differences could be associated with differences among these journalism schools. The analys school aff schools: F the Journa Beijing Br -all of th Institute . has select. Howev4 schools sh: not many 1‘ eduCation,| COllege Edl Percent of Educéltors 1 leaders ha If th, differed, 1 could Inean It also is or, the th If th. E Xmanatio Drags role he vs 130110. 36 The analysis of the famous journalistic figures' journalism school affiliation identified the following journalism schools: Fudan University in Shanghai: People's University: the Journalism Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences: Beijing Broadcasting Institute; Xinhua School of Journalism- -all of them in Beijing. Except the Beijing Broadcasting Institute and the Xinhua School of Journalism, this study has selected the journals published by these institutions. However, the potential influence of the journalism schools should not be over-emphasized. Table 4 shows that not many leaders and journalists had journalism college education, but many journalism educators had journalism college education. Table 4 also shows that about 9.6 percent of journalists and 23.3 percent of journalism educators had journalism college education. Two percent of leaders had journalism college education.“ If the opinions expressed by each group in each journal differed, several explanations are possible. First, it could mean that the journal encouraged conflicting opinions. It also is possible that its editorial policies differed. Or, the three groups did have different opinions and the journal just reflected their differences. If the opinions expressed by each group in each journal show consistent agreement among the three groups, several explanations are possible. First, their opinions on the press role were homogenous. It also could suggest that the news policy arena was tightly controlled by the CCP leaders. They did no by Burns an other polic 37 They did not enjoy a similar level of autonomy as suggested by Burns and Rosen in an analysis of policy conflicts in other policy arenas in post-Mao China. Table 4 Journalism Ed Figures in th JOURNALISM ED JOB EVER HELD. Home Current Past EDUCATIONAL L C0“999 (excl Journal ism [0 Journalism no primary to P0 Secondary Sch NO SChOOl lng Unknown Table 4 Journalism Education Job and Educational Level of Famous Journalistic 38 Figures in the China Journalism Iearbggk JOURNALISM EDUCATION JOB EVER HELD None Current Past EDUCATIONAL LEVEL College (excluding Journalism College) Journalism College Primary to Post- Secondary School No Schooling Unknown Leaders N=99 88.9% 4.0% 7.1% Leaders N=99 41.4% 2.0% 32.4% 0.0% 24.2% Journalists N-332 91.0% 2.4% 6.6% Journalists N-332 24.4% 9.6% 35.9% 0.3% 29.8% Journalism Educators N=43 27.9% 23.3% 23.2% 0.0% 25.6% l. TIN most iml system . study 9 radio a leaders separat 2. Ti examine availak their c availar 3. Po journal orienter reporter 4. The in the a bureaucr; press. I this occx journalis Hu J ivei, Very outs role even bureaucral 5. It 51 factors me i' In th 7° See A 3; Zhao ““1959 Ch iongress of 9' Ibid. :23 The as new t readied. ha 39 Endnotes: 1. The study focuses on the press only because it is the most important form of media in the Chinese political system. The press sometimes is used as reading materials in study groups. Other mass media, including film, movie, radio and television broadcasting, though used by the leaders to mobilize the people, should be examined in separate studies. 2. The public's role in discussing the press role is not examined in the study because of insufficient data available. The most appropriate data would be surveys of their opinions. This data collection option is not available. 3. Polumbaum (1989, p. 157) found in her survey of Chinese journalists that national reporters were more reformist- oriented and less propagandist-oriented than the provincial reporters. 4. The journalist's management position could be explored in the analysis because some state and government bureaucracies officials were former chief editors of party press. However, there is no consistent pattern to show that this occupational linkage would systematically affect the journalists' opinions toward the press role. For example, Hu Jiwei, a former chief editor of the Reggie's Qaily, was very outspoken in advocating a more people-oriented press role even when he served as a member of the state bureaucracy. 5. It should be noted that an analysis of each of the factors mentioned here depends on the availability of data. 6. In this study, the term "issues" and "agenda" are used interchangeably. Agenda is a list of issues raised. 7. See Appendix I for a summary of this document. 8. Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics," report to the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 25, 1987, in 13th National gongress of the Communist Party of China, (Beijing: Beijing Review Press, 1987). 9. Ibid. 10. The assumption is there were different interests in a society that need to be compromised before a consensus is reached. See Graham K. Wilson, Ingeresg Groups, Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990. The same concept was applied to Li Pan, "T Pluralism: Mich.: unp Stewart, " Repeal of 1969): 29- 40 applied to studying Soviet and Communist China politics, see Li Fan, "The Question of Interests in the Chinese Policy Making Process," China Quarterly 109 (March 1987): 64-71; Donald J. Munro, "One-Minded Hierarchy Versus Interest Group Pluralism: Two Chinese Approaches to Conflict," Ann Arbor, Mich.: unpublished manuscript, June, 1989; Phillip D. Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education," florid Egiitigs, 22 (October 1969): 29-50. I 11. See for example, Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals," Asian Survey 11:7 (July 1981): 747-774, and Liu Shengqi, A Research or the Underground Publications in China, 1978-1982 (Zhongguo Dailu Dixia Kanwu Yanjiu), Taipei: Shangwu Publishing Co., 1985. 12. This was based on an interview with Donald J. Munro in August 1989. See Yuet-keung Lo and Tuen-yu Lau, "From One- mindedness to Interest Group Pluralism--An Interview with Donald J. Munro, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan," Honq Kong Economic Journal, September 18 and 21, 1989. 13. The journalist associations and some local newspapers also have organized journalism societies (xinwen xuehui) and formal research units (xinwen yanjiusuo) to promote journalism research. The China Journalism Yearbgok from 1982 to 1989 listed at least one journalism society for each of the 29 provinces and autonomous regions. China Journaiism Yearbook i288 (p. 12) reported that more than 70 media related research units were formed in the country. By 1987, the number of provincial journalism societies had increased from 70 in 1986 to 150 in 1987 (China Journalism gearbook i988, p. 12). The major activities of these societies were to organize seminars and meetings for exchanges and to promote journalism research. Most of the research units established after 1978 were affiliated with the major newspapers in some of the provinces. The thna Jgurnalism Yearbook recorded 13 of the 28 provinces and autonomous regions had research units by 1988. Beijing alone accounted for nine of the research units, such as the Xinhua News Agency, People's Radio Station, and the minorities press. These provincial journalism societies have merged into a central body called, Joint Association of Chinese Journalism Societies (Zhongguo Xinwen Xuehui Lianhehui) in 1982. It published an influential journal, Journalism Journal (Xinwen Xuekan), jointly with the Journalism Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences. A bimonthly published since July, 1985, the Journalism Journal carried research findings and discussions in journalism and broadcasting theories and practices , 14. Many college lei of journall college le* 41 practices, history and law. 14. Many leaders, journalists and journalism educators had college level education. About 43.4 of leaders, 34 percent of journalists and 51.2 percent of journalism educators had college level education. LITE The r StUdY. sho Concepts 0 Many develop a Systems, Schramm.s schohrs ha and tone dc ”P with fiv Picard (198 identified Sieben 9t asserted th sourCe. Br approaches the one‘ste Chapter Three: LITERATURE REVIEW/THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN CHINA The role of the press in China, as the focus of the study, should be defined. The Western and Chinese Communist concepts of the press role will be discussed here. Many attempts in Western literature have been made to develop a comparative framework for different world press systems. The pioneering work was Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's (1956) Four Theories of the Press. Since then, scholars have tried to revise the four theories of the press and tone down their value-laden labels. Hachten (1987) came up with five normative labels for the world press system. Picard (1983), based on the Nordic countries' experience, identified a fifth model besides the four models proposed by Siebert et al. Altschull's (1984) seven laws of journalism asserted that news media were agents of their financial source. Brod (1987) proposed the one-step and two-step approaches to classify the world's media. Brod (p. 10) said the one-step approach refers to the Western tradition 42 of simply includes 1 a message to synthes vorld pres market, mc These that there systems. theoretica sI’Stems. t0 the mad limitation Country We the "pigeo kind of st; 1974, p. 2‘ Some ( and system: Suggested E prOPOSed 6 Within a 43 of simply reporting the news. The two-step approach includes (1) determining the desired effect, and (2) sending a message to achieve it. Schillinger (1989), in an attempt to synthesize the discussion up to 1989, suggested that the world press systems could be analyzed by three variables: market, motive and survival. These comparative world press systems approaches assume that there were similarities and differences among the systems. Some scholars have attempted to develop a theoretical and conceptual framework to compare these systems. While these comparative studies have contributed to the understanding of the world press system, their limitation is that they assumed the press systems in each country would remain unchanged. Merrill criticized this as the "pigeon-hole approach." It uses typologies to place the press systems "rather snugly in one or another category in a kind of static 'immediate slice of time' way" (Merrill, 1974, p. 24). Some world press systems, and the political philosophy and systems that govern them, are changing. Merrill (p. 24) suggested a "progression approach." Lowenstein (1971) proposed a Progression Model that also emphasized changes within a system. The changing nature of some press systems in the world shows the importance of studying the "within system" similarities and differences over time. For example, the People's Republic of China has undergone dramatic changes since 1978. The Chinese are debating the future d examinat and 1989 participe The develop t Western c press rol scholars review be The 1 the world biP01ar CC The "SOVie included, SYStem- T1 libertaria, value‘lade P. 108), label-‘,,co Chinese pr Dress role jUdngHt . 44 future directions of this communist state in the 19905. An examination of the discussion of the press role between 1983 and 1989 in this study will show what changes the discussion participants wanted to achieve. The first step to examine the press role in China is to develop the criteria to define the press role. Whether the Western concept of the press role is applicable to study the press role in China depends on how differently the Western scholars and Chinese scholars define the press role. The review below will be a starting point. The traditional Four Theories of the Press classified the world press system on an authoritarian and libertarian bipolar continuum (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956). The "Soviet Theory of the Press," in which China was included, was considered an example of the authoritarian system. The American press system was an example of the libertarian system. This "hostile" and "us-versus-them" value-laden framework has been criticized (Altschull, 1984, p. 108). Although Hachten (1987) later used a normative label--"Communist" system--to describe the Soviet and Chinese press system, it still failed to characterize the press role in communist countries without any value judgment. Altschull (1984) also had tried to come up with seven more neutral laws of journalism to compare different world press systems. Altschull said (1984, p. 298) that in all press systems, the news media are agents of those who exercise the news finance t instead 0 ideology. the piper Shoe: operation; sources: a informal 5 media Vehj its Center bodies." imierest g Shoem Venicls de impel-ta nt I 45 exercise political and economic power, and the contents of the news media always reflect the interests of those who finance the press. Altschull focused on who owns the media instead of using a classification based on political ideology. In a way, Altschull suggested that "He who pays the piper calls the tune." Shoemaker (1987, pp. 24-29) suggested an operationalization of Altschull's four different funding sources: official, commercial, special interest groups and informal sources. Shoemaker suggested that "the more a media vehicle is financed by 'official' sources, the more its content will reflect the ideologies of governmental bodies." That same principle applies to commercial, special interest groups and informal sources. Shoemaker further hypothesized that "the more a media vehicle depends on 'official' funding sources, the less important competition is to content and the less responsive the medium is to audience feedback." The opposite is true for the commercially-funded medium. Thus, the relationship of the officially- and commercially-funded press shows two types of news provider and receiver relationship. The news provider of the officially-funded press, which is the government, is not greatly concerned about whether the receivers buy the publication because it does not rely on subscription as a source of revenue. However, the news provider should be concerned whether the receivers read the publication to ensure th receivers press is I because t1 revenues. the "send« press can These studying 1 Press role it should the Studie sender (16 attempted receiVer ( 1981? and that China oriented p P01Um "leader- v inter"’iews that the j reforms I h the leader Chinese jg But the (m Orl'Entecl p' l 46 ensure the message is transmitted effectively to the receivers. The news provider of the commercially-funded press is more concerned in meeting the receivers' needs because their subscription means financial and advertising revenues. Thus, the officially-funded press can be called the "sender—oriented press," whereas the commercially-funded press can be called the "receiver-oriented press." These two types of press roles are applicable to studying the press role in China. The discussion of the press role in China since 1949 has concentrated on whether it should be sender oriented or receiver oriented. Most of the studies before the 19805 assumed China's press role is sender (leader) oriented. But the studies in the 19805 have attempted to show how the leaders shifted to be more receiver (people) oriented (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Robinson, 1981: and Terrel, 1984). More recent studies have suggested that China has debated a press role between a "leader- oriented press role" and a "people-oriented press role." Polumbaum (1989, 1990) used this classification of a "leader- versus people-oriented press role" in her interviews with Chinese journalists in 1988. She suggested that the journalists, during the latest journalistic reforms, had tried to strike a balance between two masters-- the leaders and the people. Her survey found that the Chinese journalists were caught between these two groups. But the question remains: What is the meaning of "a leader- oriented press role and a people-oriented press role"? In ‘ people—o: such, the governmer the part) literatur For exam; the theor the media When Studies 0; literatun Structure. Challengir Andersom Controlle leader_0r rOle. HOWeV leader.”i incompatib united as them. Whe answer to Jour’lcllist differentl 47 In the Western press concept, the leader-oriented and people-oriented press roles are at bipolar extremes. As such, the "free" press is considered a "watchdog" of the government, and the "communist press" is the "mouthpiece" of the party only.1 This concept prevails in the Western literature on Chinese communication system before the 19805. For example, Yu (1966) and Houn (1967) tried to understand the theories and practices of "propaganda" in China, with the media being the "propaganda tools" of the leaders. When China adopted economic reforms in the 19805, many studies on the Chinese communication system in Western literature sought to show the impact of a changing market structure--the introduction of privately-owned businesses challenging the state-owned businesses--on the press (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Robinson, 1981: and Terrel, 1986). These studies suggested that the liberation of the state- controlled market structure signaled a shift from the leader-oriented press role to a more people-oriented press role. However, the Chinese leaders did not believe the leader-oriented and people-oriented press roles were incompatible. They argued that they and the people were united as one nation and there was no difference between them. Whether this is the case will be reflected in the answer to the questions: Did the Chinese leaders, journalists and journalism educators define the press role differently? Did the journalists and journalism educators discuss t} by the le' The a journaliS‘ those of ‘ interests the Chine: interest-r The Tiana: COHflicti; (Munro, 1r Students: Party Corr leaders We jOUrnaliS, c“trol. BY re SChOlar-S ' Press rol Studies. 48 discuss the changing press role within the restrictions set by the leaders? The answer will depend on whether interests of the journalists and journalism educators were different from those of the leaders. According to Li Fan (1987), different interests did exist in China. Munro (1989) suggested that the Chinese leaders had always tried to suppress an interest-group pluralism and impose a one-minded hierarchy. The Tiananmen incident in June 1989 vividly exposed the conflicting interests between the Chinese leaders and people (Munro, 1989). Some Chinese journalists were on the students' side, demanding a press role independent from party control. The Tiananmen incident suggests that the leaders wanted to maintain control, and the people and journalists wanted to break away from the tight party control. By reviewing a summary of issues synthesized by Chinese scholars, this study will seek to define the leader- and people-oriented press role in China. Additionally, the review will help establish a framework to study China's press role, which has not yet been achieved in previous studies. For example, Cheek (1989) attempted to document China's efforts to redefine propaganda but his study lacked a framework. Starck and Yu (1989) only studied selected issues of the journalistic reforms up to 1988. The study also lacked a systematic framework. Lowenstein (1966) had developed a "Press Independence and Critii measure w 11 factori governmeni China woul 21-factor dimension? (2) goverr foreign i; distributi advertisir‘ r91ationsy rP-Viewing reforming Operationa T W The c EdUCatOrs 49 and Critical Ability (PICA) Index," with 21 factors to measure world press freedom. Lowenstein said only the first 11 factors will be used to measure countries in which the government or political party completely owns all media. China would thus be measured by the first 11 factors. The 21-factor PICA index could be collapsed into these dimensions: (1) legal--written laws or threats of penalty; (2) government licensing; (3) press ownership: (4) access to foreign information: (5) government control of printing and distribution of the press; and (6) media dependency on advertising revenues. These dimensions describe the relationship between the government and the media. After reviewing the press role themes discussed by the Chinese in reforming the press below, this study will use 22 themes to operationally define the "leader-oriented and people- oriented press role" in China. THE ROLE OF TEE ERESS AS DEFINED 1N CEINESE LITERATURE The Chinese leaders, journalists and journalism educators have defined the role of the press in terms of five affinities: which are: (1) Party affinity (dang xing), (2) people affinity (renmin xing), (3) ideological affinity (sixiang xing), (4) combative affinity (zhandou xing), and (5) commercial affinity (shangpin xing).2 .An explanation of these five affinities would help understand how they illustrate the press role in China and the relationship This solely be articles ; official 5 Lerrir affinity a assess par directives requlatior abided by Proletari a 'The (; exPlaining 0f the Q Said: [—1 50 between the leaders, journalists and people. Five A 'ni 'es t e nes 55 o e 1. Eartx_effinitx (dang xing) (Lidan Chen. 1988. pp- 52-53)3 This refers to the issue of whether the press should solely be the party's mouthpiece, which means that all articles published in the press represent the party's official stand. Lenin first advocated the relationship between party affinity and the press. He suggested three criteria to assess party affinity: (a) whether the press followed party directives: (b) whether the press recognized party regulations and decisions: (c) whether the press voluntarily abided by all the experience of the confederation of the proletarians in the world. The CCP first adopted party affinity in the 19305. In explaining the meaning of party affinity, the 1942 editorial of the Libererion Daiiy's (Jiefang Ribao), "To the Readers," said: Every article, every news dispatch, every piece of news should follow the party's perspectives. More importantly, the press must have close relationship with the party's policy and plans. The press should be the pioneer and advocate in realizing all party policies." (A_Qellsstien_ef_thnese_gemmunist_£artx Journeiism Work Dee umegrs, 3rd. vol., 1988, p. 50. ) In 1956, the Peepie's Qeily (Renmin Ribao) editorial board revised this concepte‘ IRecognizing that it was practically impossible to have all content, including the letters to the editor, reflect fully and correctly party perspecti‘ suggested articles '- represente necessari- been suggr be publisl more rigs: 0f Marxis: masses Thus‘ f0110w the organiZat] rePrESentj partY‘OWne prOCeSs . 2. pp- 52-53) Peepi affinity media ShOu The leader opinion p0 51 perspectives as defined by the leaders, the newspaper suggested that, from then on, only editorials and those articles written by officials of the Party Central represented the party's stand, and other content did not necessarily reflect the party's opinions. Moreover, it has been suggested that opinions opposing the party also could be published in the newspaper. Such measures would promote more rigorous activities and allow a better interpretation of Marxism. However, the suggestion was not implemented (A Collection of ghinese Cemmunist Party Journalism Work Documents, 2nd vol., 1988, p. 483). Thus, party affinity emphasizes that the press should follow the party's ideology, political policy and organization objectives. Therefore, opinions not representing the party's views would not be published in the party-owned press. This represents a top-down communication process. 2. Peopie affigity (renmin xing) (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 52-53) People affinity (renmin xing), sometimes called masses affinity (qunzhong xing), refers to the issue of whether the media should represent the people's interests and opinions. The leaders used site visits instead of regular public opinion polling to understand the people. An underlying assumption of communism is that the party, which fully represents the people and vice versa, should share the same interests and opinions. Thus, it emphasizes a close relatio: Acc Readers, party p: daily ne deeds, 1 their op enlighte its frie C011\ecti_r 3rd. vol In 3 0f Jinsuj People at “5. all t Chly a ha MW VOL, 198 The l IIIQanS not invovad' shOuld re bee). AS Press est 55‘56) . The 52 relationship between the press and the people. According to Libererier_geiiy's editorial, "To the Readers," in 1942, the meaning of people affinity was: the party press had to be close to the populace's emotions and daily needs. It also should record the people's heroic deeds, reflect their difficulties and sorrows, and voice their opinions. The press role was not only "to inform, enlighten, educate, and organize the people, but also to be its friend and mouthpiece to overcome difficulties." (5 Collection ef Chinese gommunisr Barty Jeurgalism Documents, 3rd. vol., 1988, p. 51). In 1948, Mao Zedong, in his "Talks to Editorial Staff of Jinsui Daily" offered an often quoted explanation of people affinity. "Our newspaper needs to be put together by us, all the people, the whole party. It cannot be run by only a handful of people behind closed doors." (A Collection of Chinese Communist Party Journaiism Work Documents, 3rd. vol., 1988, p. 234). The whole party's participation (zhuandang banbao) means not only that the top administrators of the party were involved, but also that all party members at all levels should read and write for the party press (zhuan min ban bao). As a collective propagandist and organizer, the party press established a national network of correspondents (tungxunyuan) made up of the public (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 55-56). The relationship between party affinity and people affinity 1988, pp- people a should f promote leaders. interest, interest. 53 affinity has been discussed by Chinese scholars (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 60-61). The difference between party affinity and people affinity is: party affinity means the party press should follow unconditionally the party's leadership and promote the party's policies: whereas people affinity means the party press should reflect the demands and wishes of the people and monitor the work of the governmental bodies and leaders. As such, party affinity focuses on the party's interest, and people affinity focuses on the people's interest. The relationship between party affinity and people affinity was first discussed briefly between 1957 and 1958. Some said party affinity was the same as people affinity--party affinity was the collective conduct of the proletarians and the people, and only the party can represent the people's basic needs. It was suggested that separating party affinity from people affinity was the idea of the rightists. Subsequently, the discussion of these two affinities was not allowed for almost two decades. Its discussion was brought up again in March 1979. Although no consensus was reached, several major positions surfaced: (a) people affinity was the foundation of party affinity: (b) people affinity was a subset of party affinity, so party affinity also represented people affinity: (c) party affinity and people affinity could be the same and could not be the same: (d) party affinity and people affinity were identical. In should n because of the p them. I affinity reform a: journali: People a: journali: affinity 3. 1988, pp. This dP-Voted t upholdimE Proletarj ”317(1qu The: affinity the CCP 1 adherenCe differEnc principle refers to 4. 19 88' pp. 54 In 1981, some scholars said that "people affinity" should not be included in the party's journalistic work because all wrongdoings were a result of the impure matters of the party and there was no need for the people to correct them. In 1987, other people suggested that party and people affinity represented different content and rules. Some reform advocates suggested that a breakthrough in the journalistic reforms was to establish the authority of people affinity. Lidan Chen (1988) reported that most journalism textbooks published before 1987 still said party affinity and people affinity were the same. 3. ideolegicei effigity (sixiang xing) (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 52-53) This refers to the issue of whether the press should be devoted to upholding the "Four Insistences," that is, upholding the socialist road, dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. There is a close relationship between the party affinity and ideological affinity. They are related because the CCP leaders have pledged unchangeable allegiance and adherence to the "Four Insistences." However, their difference is: party affinity refers to the guiding principle and role of the press whereas ideological affinity refers to the correct content to be carried in the press. 4. mba v (Zhandou xing) (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 55-56) Thi: ready to press shr the oppo: importani has to pl and educa Ther First, tr poli corr the stru the wea its % vol. 3900 Staff Of 55 This refers to the issue of whether the press is always ready to combat opinions that are against socialism. The press should take the initiative to raise these issues with the opposing sides. It also should quickly portray the important ideological issues in life. That means the press has to play the role of collective prOpagandists, organizers and educators. There are two interpretations on combative affinity. First, the Libererien_neiiy's 1942 editorial said: The party press should be the fighter for party policies, and pointedly expose all dark sides and corruptions. Particularly on the ideological front, the party press should carry out firm ideological struggles and promote communism and democracy. Also, the party press is the most powerful self-criticism weapon, and so it should honestly and fairly criticize its own faults and weaknesses." (A.QQII§Q£12D_Q£ Chinese Communist Earry gogrgelism Werk Qecgments, 3rd. vol., 1988, p. 51). Second, Mao Zedong explained in his "Talks to Editorial Staff of liD§Ei_DQil¥ (Jinsui Ribao)" in 1948: (The party press) should uphold all truth (zhenli) and truth should take a clear-cut stand. All the propaganda conducted by our party should be lively, clear-cut, sharp, and should not mutter and mumble. Our revolutionary proletarians should have a combative style. You will not see blood by using a blunt knife to cut meat even if you have tried to carve for half a day-".AcQ2llsstisn_2f__hiness_§2mmunist_£ertx _eurn_lism__erk_nesumen_s 3rd vol-. 1988. p. 237) 5- Qemmsrsial_sffinitx (shangpin xing) (Lidan Chen. 1988, pp. 11-13) This refers to the issue of whether the press should be a commercial product. It also refers to the issue of whether to carry advertisements that promote products and services.' of finan The discusse commerci and a co placed t commerci socialis People a nature de if news advertisi in journa Elem-mall The as a com news was Show the 56 services. Although this is basically an economic question of financial sources, this is also a political issue. The pros and cons of commercial affinity have been discussed since 1981. The arguments against newspapers as commercial products were: (a) The format and value of news and a commercial product were different; (b) socialism placed the social efficiency of news in high priority, but commercialism in news cannot show the superiority of socialism; (c) news in a socialist society only served the people and the construction of socialism, and its class nature determined that it was not a commercial product: (d) if news were a commercial product, news could promote advertising; (e) the study of news as a commercial product in journalism studies was not a serious topic and it will eventually change the proletariat nature of the press. The supporting arguments, however, focused on: (a) news as a commercial product met the principles of Marxism; (b) news was not a commercial product and it was not a means to show the superiority of socialism, which was at its preliminary stage: (c) examples from daily life showed that news can be a commercial product which also carry the class nature; (d) inappropriate ideas in society should be punished by law and were not necessarily the result of recognizing news as a commercial product: (e) news as a commercial product was part of an inevitable trend in the reform, therefore, it was an important research topic area. O (f :3' (D l H (D H D, l 1988 Prin in t: Serb 57 th r issues a ed u isti reforms that were ,- a -. I. ,- .-.. -- 1,. -t.- -. he +2 . - .g- Besides these five affinities of the Chinese press role, many other issues were raised during the journalistic reforms. These issues, summarized in the gournalism Dictionary edited by Lidan Chen of the Journalism Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, show the breadth and depth of the discussion of the press role. They were related to the different aspects of the five affinities of the press role. 6. Qeorerieg journaiism (yulu xinwenxue) (Lidan Chen, 1988, p. 21) This refers to the wide use of quotations, usually printed in bold typeface, from Marxism, Leninism and Maoism in the news reports during the Cultural Revolution. A series of articles criticizing this practice appeared in 1979. The criticisms were: (a) the quotations only served a political purpose; (b) the quotations were taken out of context and some distortion and deletion were done to meet a special purpose: (c) the quotations were explained incorrectly-~some explanatory notes did not agree with the quotations but many readers were misinformed because they did not have time to double check the accuracy of the quotations. Therefore, the criticism of "quotation journalism" was to guard against such wrongdoing happening again. idec leac in s defi dict on t natu inte stru and Woul Poli pers natu; faCt< deril 58 This practice of "quotation journalism" relates to the ideological and party affinities, with which a particular leader played an important role. 7. C 55 u 55 (Lidan Chen, 1988, p.8) This means news reflects the nature of a certain class in society. During the Cultural Revolution, the press was defined as "a tool for the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat." Since 1981, the arguments on the class nature had stressed the issues of: (a) class nature of the press was intense when class struggle was intense, and class nature of the press was mild when class struggle was mild; (b) not all news carried a class nature, and only political news carried a class nature: (c) all news would represent a certain perspective but news did not carry political perspectives and news carrying political perspectives did not necessarily mean it would carry a class nature; (d) class nature should be combined with other factors, such as party affinity and commercial affinity, to derive a more accurate and scientific understanding. This issue relates to ideological affinity. 8- Wm (Lidan Chen. 1988. P- 9) This means news organizations reflect and comment on daily life to guide public opinion and influence the people in their thought, work and daily life. The guiding force can be direct or indirect. Since 1979, the Chinese journalism circle could not agree on whether the guiding fore the lead peop de 2 in 1! this orgar atter main oPini 59 force should be direct or indirect. But many agreed that the guiding role did not mean direct instruction from the leaders. This issue reflects a debate between party affinity and people affinity. 9. The orgepizetiep reie er phe parry press (dangbao de zuji zuoyong) (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 53-54) This Soviet-originated concept first appeared in China in 1930. In 1957, there was a short-lived discussion on this topic. But later, suggestions raising doubts on the organizing role of the press were banned. In May 1986, attenders at a national journalism meeting agreed that the main organizing role of the press was to guide public opinion and thought. This issue relates to party affinity and people affinity. 10. priie Qpiniop ang Augiepee suryeys (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 88-90) Public opinion polling was more widely used in China after 1980 and the first scientific audience survey was conducted in Beijing in 1982. The use of surveys to understand the receivers suggested that (a) the leaders were concerned about the effectiveness of their messages making an impact on the people: (b) the top-down approach, which ignored the people's needs, was changed (Lau and Qin, 1989: WOmack, 1986). This issue relates to party affinity and people 6O affinity. Several issues related to the role of public opinion were raised during the journalistic reform debate. 11. WW (yulun yilu) (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 91-92) This means the opinions of the counter-revolutionaries are not allowed to appear in the press. This concept first appeared in the "Hu Feng Counter-revolutionary Materials" published in the Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) on May 24, 1955. In 1980, the uniformity of public opinion was explained as a fundamental policy of the nation and it meant no enemies were allowed to express opinions that were against the "Four Insistences." However, during the Cultural Revolution and the influence of Leftist thinking, many opinions were suppressed as counter-revolutionary ideas under the name of preserving uniformity of public opinion. This issue relates to party affinity and people affinity. 12. To create pubiie ppipipp (zhizao yulun) (Lidan Chen, 1988, p. 93) It means (a) to raise the society's awareness and to form a public opinion and reflect the truth; (b) to reflect the opinion of a certain class and to influence and organize Opinions of a certain class: or (c) to spread rumors and false messages to manipulate public opinion. This issue relates to party affinity. 13. WW (zuzhi yulun) (Lidan 61 Chen, pp. 93-94) This means that to achieve a specific goal, a certain viewpoint is promoted or criticized extensively. But this usually carries an unfavorable connotation because of its association with major political campaigns launched in the past. This issue relates to party affinity. 14. The spperyisory roie pf pupiic epipiop (yulun jiandu) (pp. 94-95) This means the people can use the press to monitor the conducts and performance of the party and leaders. It has three characteristics: (a) it takes an adversary role toward the party and leaders: (b) it is an open act: and (c) it has an invisible compelling control over those being criticized. Since 1980, several articles were published about this concept. The 13th National People's Congress reaffirmed that: All modern news and propaganda tools were used to increase the coverage of party affairs and activities so that public opinion can play a supervisory role, and support the people's criticism of the wrongdoings in our work, and to fight against bureaucracy and all inappropriate styles. This issue relates to people affinity. 15. Opepness and trensparepcy (toumingdu) (pp. 39-40) There has been a call to allow the press to carry criticism about party policies and the press should carry reports about important matters and decisions to inform the people. 62 This issue relates to people affinity. 16. sritisism_and_§slf:sritisism (piping yu ziwo piping) (pp- 56-58) In a 1950 document, "The Decision to Begin Criticism and Self Criticism in the Press," the CCP Party Central circulated the following instructions: (a) the newspaper no longer needed to seek approval from those party and government officials before publishing an article criticizing them; (b) no one can use his power to suppress the criticism carried in the newspaper, nor to take revenge --such violations will be punished by law: (c) if the criticism were true, the one who was being criticized should publish a statement in the same newspaper and accept the open criticism, and if there were something inaccurate, the newspaper should publish a correction, but the one being criticized should still accept the correct criticism (5 Collection of C inese Comm 5 t u a 5m Wo k Docpments, 2nd. vol., 1988, pp. 6-7). In 1953, a CCP Propaganda Department instruction stipulated that a newspaper could not criticize party officials or units at the same level, but it could reflect its opinions to the upper level party committees. These issues about the role of public opinion suggest a debate between party and people affinities. They imply that the leaders and people do have differences and they do not always share the same interests. This issue relates to people affinity. 63 17. ;- .t'o 59's ,- w--, - r .12 ' --.-. o. yu xuanehpan) (Lidan Chen, 1988, pp. 87-88) The discussion of a "people- versus leader-oriented press role" is, in a way, a discussion of what constitutes news and propaganda in China. The similarities and differences between news and propaganda have been discussed since 1980. Views proposing that news and propaganda are different held that: (a) news meets the people's information needs and propaganda meets the propagandist's needs; (b) news reports facts and propaganda instills a certain viewpoint: (c) news lets other people know a fact and propaganda promotes a message--if it is successful, the receiver will accept, otherwise, the receiver will reject it. Views proposing that news and propaganda were the same held that: (a) these two are different but they can be combined, that is, news can contain propaganda and propaganda can contain news: (b) news is part of propaganda; (c) news is the same as propaganda; (d) news and propaganda should be separate but their combination is a subjective function initiated by the communicator and social-political factor. This issue relates to party affinity and people affinity. Two other important journalistic issues were raised during the 19805. Some leaders, journalists and journalism educators raised the issue of press freedom. They also 64 tried to draft a press law to define the press role legally. 18. Ereegem_pf_rhe_press (xinwen ziyou) (Lidan Chen, 1988, p. 30) The central question is: What is the socialist style press freedom? Some suggest that press freedom should be developed hand in hand with democracy and the legal system, cultural and economic development, and China's modernization progress. This issue relates to party and people affinity. 19. Press law (xinwenfa) Some journalists proposed the creation of a press law to protect their news-gathering rights. Some said the press law only serves to give the leaders a legitimate reason to restrict their activities. The Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences had established a special office to study and draft a press law in 1984. But so far, no press law has been adopted. This issue relates to party and people affinity. The issues of freedom of the press and the press law are in a way the summation of the issues related to the people-oriented versus leader-oriented press roles. Some journalists and journalism educators want a set of laws to protect their news-gathering rights and freedom of the press. Some consider the press law to be a legal protection from the purges of the party leaders. However, some leaders consider the concept of freedom of the press to be a bourgeois idea imported from capitalist countries that is 65 not practicable in China.5 Besides these issues, the question of how information was presented also was raised during the journalistic reform debate between 1983 and 1989. The news content issue was, for example, whether more economic and political news should be carried. The news presentation issues were about length of stories, timeliness, writing style, grammatical accuracy, visual aids, etc. These issues about news content and presentation techniques will not be examined in the study. Could rhe ieager- and people-oriepped press roie he the same? The two press roles suggested above imply that the party and the people represent different interests. Several previous studies (e.g. Burns and Rosen, 1986; Li Fan, 1987; Lieberthal and 0ksenberg, 1988: and Chang, 1975) supported the view that different interests existed. The CCP rhetoric has always been that the party represents the people. Without any valid public opinion surveys, it is difficult to determine whether the party represents the people or not. But the Tiananmen incident in June 1989 has raised many doubts thatsuch rhetoric could be true. Therefore, the division of the leader- versus people- oriented press role is an attempt to distinguish the differences from the political, economic, legal and social dimensions in defining the press role. The leader-oriented 66 press role would support party affinity: ideological affinity: combative affinity: the use of leaders' quotations as guiding principle: and the idea that the press should create, guide and organize the public opinions so that they are the same as the leaders'. The leader-oriented press role would not emphasize and could even reject commercial affinity. According to the leader-oriented press role, news is part of propaganda--that is, the leaders use news to propagate their ideas and influence the people to follow the leaders' instructions. The people-oriented press role would support people affinity: encourage the use of surveys to understand the readers; use public opinion to supervise the government; encourage openness and transparency of the policy process by using the press as a channel and forum for national affairs: adopt a set of press laws to guarantee people's press freedom, people's right to know, and the journalists' news-gathering rights. According to the people-oriented press role, news is not part of propaganda-- that is, news should just be dissemination of information and not a tool for the leaders to propagate their ideas to influence the people. The underlying assumption of a leader-oriented versus people-oriented press role is that these two press roles are incompatible. Then the question is: What kind of press role did the Chinese leaders, journalists and journalism educators advocate? 67 [1.1.1 0 1__--_S_.A§’. _ CNS 0 STUD : Based on the discussion above, the study will address the following research questions related to the leaders, journalists and journalism educators between 1983 and 1989: 1. Did the discussion emphasis on the press role vary between 1983 and 1989? 2. What was the press role suggested by each of the three groups between 1983 and 1989? 3. Did the discussion emphasis on the press role by each of the three groups vary between 1983 and 1989? 4. What was the extent of agreement between the leaders and journalists in defining the press role between 1983 and 1989? 5. What was the extent of agreement between the leaders and journalism educators in defining the press role between 1983 and 1989? 6. What was the extent of agreement between the journalists and journalism educators in defining the press role between 1983 and 1989? 7. Did the extent of disagreement in discussing the press role among the groups support the hypothesis that the outside initiative agenda building model was practiced? 68 Endnotes: 1. Shoemaker (1987) proVided hypotheses in her description of the relationship between the funding source and news content. Shoemaker proposed that the more a media vehicle is funded by official sources, (a) the less likely the journalist is to see his job as that of an adversary to government; (b) the less important the criterion "newsworthiness" is to story selection; (c) the less important journalistic objectivity is except to convey official views; (d) the more the journalist will see his role as that of a public educator; (e) the less important is the journalist's personal attitudes; (f) the journalist would not seek out information to be transmitted, but rather reacts to information that is presented to him. On the other hand, commercial funding source supported medium would be more concerned with what the readers want. 2. The five affinities of the party press were first advocated by the Soviet press theory. They are: party affinity, ideological affinity, combative affinity, people affinity and accuracy affinity. There are variations to the five affinities. Some add the masses affinity (qunzhong xing) or drop the combative affinity. In 1942, giefahg Ribao mentioned four affinities: party affinity, the masses affinity, combative affinity and organization affinity (zuji xing). In 1947, kinhua Rihao (New China Daily) raised the issue of party affinity and people affinity. See Chen Lidan, gourhalism Dictionary, Beijing: China News Services Press, 1988, pp. 51-52. The pinyin romanization of these five terms were in parentheses in the text. 3. To cut down on the number of endnotes, the source of information is given at the heading of each section. 4. In 1956, there was a short-lived journalistic reform, see Jinglu Yu, "The Abortive 1956 Reform of Chinese Journalism," Journaiism Quarterly 65:2 (Summer 1988): 328- 334. 5. The most comprehensive and liberal discussion of the concept of freedom of the press in China is the Qplieereg Essays eh Ereegop or the Eress (Xinwen Ziyou Lunji), compiled by the China Journalism Society, Shanghai: Wenhui Bao Publisher, 1988. In its publication note, it said: "The book was edited at the end of 1986, but for some reason its publication was delayed until Fall, 1988." The preface, written by the chairman of the China Journalism Society, Hu Jiwei, was dated October 30, 1986. The title of the preface was entitled, "The Freedom to Discuss 'Freedom of the Press'." Chapter Four: RESEARCH METHOD This chapter addresses these issues: (1) content analysis procedures; (2) operational definitions of the variables in the study: (3) coding procedures, including inter-coder reliability tests: and (4) data analysis and statistical procedures. CONTENT ANAL I P O E ES: Content analysis was the research method used to examine the press role suggested by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators in China. The following issues in the content analysis procedures were addressed: (1) study period; (2) sources of data; (3) unit of analysis: and (3) criteria for selecting articles. 69 70 The study covered January 1983 to June 1989. In 1983, the Journalism Frent carried a "Special Section on Improving News Reporting" (Gaijin Xinwen Zhuanzhi) in four consecutive issues from January to April. This indicated that discussion of journalistic reforms began to pick up momentum in 1983. The inclusion of 1983 and 1984 established a baseline to assess the change before CCP secretary-general Hu Yaobang announced the party journalism statement in February 1985. The study ended at the outbreak of the Tiananmen incident in June 1989. Those journals published after January 1983 were used from their first issue to the latest issue available. SOURCES OE DATA The issues raised by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators in defining the press role were examined through their views expressed in official documents, reports of meetings about the press policy, professional and academic journalism journals, and ideological journals. These four types of printed materials provided the data used in the study. The strengths and limitations of the printed materials should be noted here. The number of newspapers and professional and academic journalism journals increased 71 significantly between 1978 and 1989. Many publications were based in the provinces. The study used only national publications available outside China to do the content analysis. Because they are national publications, the issues were assumed to have national attention. If the provincial issues were important enough, they would get national exposure. Appendix III shows a list of national and provincial journals published in China. The journals used in this study's content analysis covered almost all the regular and frequently published journals. One journal that could have been used in the study but was excluded is the Chinese lenrnelisrs (Xinwen Jizhe) published by Xinhua News Agency in January 1987. Although the inclusion of the thnese Journalists might have provided the possibility of including the views of Xinhua News Agency in the study period, its publication starting date in 1987 could have affected the analysis after 1987. Moreover, a complete collection of the thnese Jonrnaiists was not available in the United States. The following is a detailed description of the data sources used in the study. The LEAQERS' Views: The leaders' views could be found in three types of printed records: (1) published official documents and rules and regulations: (2) published newspaper reports of meetings held by leaders on news and propaganda:1 and (3) articles written by leaders or interviews with leaders published in 72 professional and academic journalism journals and ideological journals. The following sources were used to collect the leaders's views: I. Enblished pfficiai documents and rules and regnlations: A. Indexes or thnese newspapers: All relevant official documents listed in the Eegpleis_peily_ingex (Renmin Ribao Suoyin) from 1983 to 1989 were selected for the study. B. Published official goeunents: These documents were found in collected volumes of documents, newspapers, professional journals and academic journalism journals, and ideological journals. 1. Chine gpurneiism gearbook (Zhongguo Xinwen Nianjian), from 1983 to 1989 (the latest issue), is the authoritative journalism yearbook published by the Journalism Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences. The yearbook had published official documents of the leaders. The study selected documents dated between January 1983 and June 1989. 2. Beg_£1eg (Hongqi), a journal published between 1958 and 1988, carried authoritative essays on CCP ideology. As the party's official journal on ideological and theoretical issues, the articles written by the leaders ‘were considered official documents of the party. Official documents and articles written by party leaders and state bureaucracies about the press between January 1983 and June 73 1988 (the last issue) were selected. 3. seeking_1rnrh (Qiushi), which replaced Bed Eleg as the CCP party ideological journal in July 1988, also carried official documents and articles written by party leaders. These articles, also considered official documents of the party, were selected. 4. Selected Collection of Importanp Historical Qeeuments Since she lzrh Party Qenhrel Commiiptee2 (Shierda Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian) , was published in two volumes in 1986. They covered September 1982 to April 1986. All official documents about the press published between January 1983 and April 1986 were selected. 5- 9W quncil of the Eeople's Repuhlie er thne (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao) has been published in 1978. All relevant documents related to the press between January 1983 and June 1989 were selected. 6. Official Announcements of the National 0 e's Con 55 's (Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongbao) has been published in 1978. All relevant documents related to the press between January 1983 and June 1989 were selected. II. b 's e es ' s: A. o a 'o s of eo '5 b c (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fagui Huibian) has been published since 1956 and interrupted 74 between 1962 and 1978. It resumed publication in 1979. All relevant documents related to AR the press between January 1983 and December 1988 (the latest available issue was published in January 1990) were selected. The 1989 documents were not available. III. newspaper reports pf neetings held by leaders on news and propagenda: The newspaper reports of meetings held by leaders on news and propaganda between 1983 and 1989 were selected from the Eeople's Daily Index and China--Daily Beppr; of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), published by the Central Intelligence Agency of the 0.8. government. IV. Arrieles yritten hy leegers er inperyiews yirh leaders publisheg in prefessipnel jeurnelism jonrnals and so 0 ' o 15: The professional journalism journal used was Jgurnalism Fronp (Xinwen Zhanxian). (See below for a more detailed description of this journal). The ideological journals were keg_£lgg and Seeking Trnth. All articles written by leaders and interviews with leaders in these journals during the study period were selected. T e JOU A ' e s: The journalists' views could be found in two types of printed records: (1) articles written by journalists in professional and academic journalism journals and ideological journals; and (2) published newspaper reports of meetings held by or with journalists on news and propaganda. 75 The following sources were used to collect the journalists' views: I. bl' w ' ss 'ou n 's journals: A. Jgurnelism Eran; (Xinwen Zhanxian). This journal is published monthly by the People's Daily, the Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, for national and international circulation. First published in December 1957, the journal's name was changed to genrnalisn gractices (Xinwen Yewu) in 1960. It ceased publication in June 1966 at the start of the Cultural Revolution. It resumed publication in December 1978, and continues to the present. It is the oldest professional journalism journal in China. II. Published views in academic jonrnalism jpurnals: The following academic journalism journals were used to collect the journalists' views: A. lournelism.leurnal (xinwen Xuekan). B. Qournalisn Qniyersiry (Xinwen Daxue). C. Journalism Colleeted Essays (Xinwen Lunji). (See the section on journalism educators for a description of these journals). All articles in these journals written by journalists about the press role during the study period were selected for the study. III. 2ublishsd.xiegs_in_ideelogissl_ieurnels= The journalists' views also were found in the ideological journals. Bed.£lag and Seeking_1rutn. I52 IH 76 IV. -w--.ot ‘o-e.‘ ._ u" .10; 1- e 3 0 _1a '5 s on news end prepaganda: Newspaper reports of meetings held by journalists on news and propaganda were selected from the gegple;s_heily inner and FBIS between 1983 and 1989. The QOURNALISM EDUQATQRS' Views: The journalism educators' views could be found in two types of printed records: (1) articles written by journalism educators in professional and academic journalism journals and ideological journals; and (2) published newspaper reports of meetings held by or with journalism educators on news and propaganda. The following sources were used to collect the journalism educators' views: I. Published views in academic journalism journals: A. Journelisn gonrnal (Xinwen Xuekan). This bimonthly journal has been published jointly by the Joint Association of China Journalism Society (Zhongguo Xinwen Xuehui Lianhehui), an academic society comprised of all journalism societies in China, and the Journalism Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences. Because of its joint auspices, the journal usually carries articles written by journalists, journalism educators and researchers. The study selected related articles in the journal from its first issue (July 1985) to the latest issue available (April 1989). B. Jogrnalism University (Xinwen Daxue). This journal has been published quarterly by the College of 77 Journalism of Fudan University in Shanghai since September 1980. Because Fudan University's journalism department is a major journalism institute in China, the journal also has significant influence. It is one of the two journalism departments in the country that has a doctoral program. The study selected related articles in the journal from its first issue after January 1983 to the issue before the Tiananmen incident in June 1989. C. gonrnalism Collecped Esseys (Xinwen Lunji). This is a collection of journalism essays published by the journalism department of the People's University of China since September 1980. It is one of the two journalism departments in the country that has a doctoral program. The study selected related articles in the journal from January 1983 to the current issue available (November 1988). II. Pub 5 e 'ews ' e s' a ' u al'sm jgurnels: Because journalism educators were regular contributors to professional journalism journals, their articles written in Jonrnalism Fronp were selected. III. Enblished views in igeglogieel journals: The journalism educators' views also were expressed in ideological journals, Beg_£lgg and seeking_2rnrh. IV. 5 s u is edncatgrs en pens and propagenga: Newspaper reports of meetings of journalism educators on news and propaganda were selected from the geople's Qeily 78 Indek and FBIS between 1983 and 1989. (See Table 5 for a complete list of all sources used in the study). UNIT Y Both articles and themes were used as units of analysis. Each article or official document was coded for its themes according to a systematic coding scheme. Twenty- two themes were used to operationally define the press role. Each article was coded for one or more of the press role themes mentioned. (See Appendix IV for the coding instrument and Appendix V for the coding form). Criteria fer Selecting Relevanp Arpieles for the Study Separate criteria and procedures were used to select relevant articles in the sources listed in Table 5 to gather the views of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators. The criteria and procedures differed in terms of the types of documents used in the study. The study used three types of materials: (1) materials with a specific journalism focus: (2) materials without a specific journalism focus; and (3) indexes of Chinese newspapers and FBIS. Journalism specific publications mean the publications were devoted to issues in journalism exclusively. This was 79 Table 5 Sources of Data Data Sources Year Published Years Covered JOURNALS: Journalism Front 1978-today 1978-today Journalism Journal (bimonthly) 1985-89 1985-89 Journalism University (quarterly) 1980-89 1980-89 Journalism Collected Essays 1980-88 1980-88 (irregular) Red Flag 1958-88 1958-88 Seeking Truth 1988-today 1988-today YEARBOOKS AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS: China Journalism Yearbook, 1982-89 1982-89 1981-88 Selected Collection of Important v.1 1986 1982-1986 Historical Documents Since the v.2 1986 1982-1986 12th Party Congress (2 volumes) Official Announcements of the monthly 1978-89 State Council of PRC Official Announcements of the yearly 1978-89 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the PRC Collections of Law & Regulations 1986-88 1979-88 of the PRC Selected Collection of Laws & v.1 1984 1982 Regulations of the PRC v.2 1984 1984 Collections of Laws of the PRC 1985 1979-84 People’s Daily Index l979-today l979-today FBIS 1979-today 1979-today 80 determined either by the title of the book or the sponsor and content. ' The criteria and procedures were explained below. I. r ter a a d ce e o selectin dat rom ' u n lism s c m e i 5: Journalism specific materials used in the study included: ghine gournalism gearbook, gournalism Front, ______r_elJournalism Jou n . Win. and Melissa Collecred Essays. All relevant articles and documents dated or published between January 1983 and June 1989 were included in the study. Because the study was to examine the press role, articles about radio and television broadcasting were not included.3 .Additionally, all photo-only stories, cartoons, announcements of meetings, sample questions and answers of national journalistic examinations and advertisements were excluded. All articles in the media history and foreign media departments of the journalism journals were excluded as well. The criteria in selecting articles about the discussion of the press role were based on the following procedures. First, if the title of the article or document mentioned specifically the role of the press or included the term "journalistic reforms" (xinwen gaige), the article or document was selected for examination. If the title was not helpful in determining whether the article or document was related to the press role, then the content of the article 81 was used to determine whether the article would be included in the study. The selection criteria were whether the article mentioned one of the terms listed in Chapter Three, or whether the term "journalistic reforms" was used. II. Criperie ang prgeedure for selecting data fron non-jgurnalisn speeific meperials: Non-journalism specific materials used in the study included: 13521.net}. Sewn. W m rtant Histo 'ca Docume t e h 1 h Part Congress, Official Announeements of phe State gouncil gf the People's Eepublic of thna, Official Announcements of the National People's Congress of the People's gepphlic of ghine, and Collectign of Lews eng Begplatigns pr rhe Eeople's Bepuhlic of Chine. All materials dated or published between January 1983 and June 1989 were examined for the study. All entries under journalism (xinwen), propaganda (xunchuan) and publication (chuban) sections in these sources were selected. Some rules and regulations that were published in the journalism journals were counted only once. III. Criteria end precegure for seleeping dare rrom indexes of Chinese newspapers ang Ehls: All relevant materials dated or published in the People's peily Index and FBIS between January 1983 and June 1989 were examined for the study. All entries under journalism (xinwen), propaganda (xunchuan) and publication (chuban) sections in these sources were selected. Only Hu 82 Yaobang's document on journalistic work in 1985 and the 1986 speech given at the meeting of chief editors in all provinces by Tan Tan, the deputy director of the Propaganda Department, appeared in different journals. They were counted once in the study. PE TIONA DEF I IO F V B S THE STUD The operational definitions of the leaders, journalists, journalism educators, the press roles and the time element are explained below. Definition of leaders The leaders were defined as individuals or institutions within the party or state bureaucracies. Leaders were further classified by whether they served for the central or provincial party and state bureaucracies. The following is an operational definition of leaders: CC a S ruc u e: --members of the National Party Congress: --members of the Central Advisory Committee; --members and alternate members of the Central Committee: --members of the Central Party Disciplinary Committee: --members of the Politburo: --members of the Central Military Commission; 83 --head and deputy head of the Propaganda Department. W: --president and vice-president of the PRC: --members of the standing committee and the full committee of the National People's Congress--if a member was a NPC member, journalist and/or journalism educator concurrently, the primary role of the member was classified according to current profession: --premier and vice-premiers of the State Council: --ministers and deputy ministers of the 32 ministries of the State Council: --head, deputy heads and officials of the State Press and Publications Administration Office: The description of the party structure and government bureaucracies above were basically for the central leaders. The same party structure and government bureaucracies existed at the provincial level except for the following units: the Central Advisory Committee, Central Party Disciplinary Committee, Politburo, Central Military Commission, and the State Council. The study will use the same provincial party structure and bureaucracies, except those which do not exist at the provincial level. Central affiliation included Beijing and Shanghai: and provincial affiliation represented the rest of the 29 provinces and autonomous regions. Some articles may not be written by the leaders themselves but could be interviews with or reports of the 84 leaders' speeches given at meetings. Thus, the articles would still be coded as the views of the leaders even if the article carried a journalist's byline. Definition of jpnrnelisrs Journalists were defined as individuals or institutions (including professional journalists organizations). Journalists also were classified by whether they worked at the central or provincial level, whether they worked for the party or non-party press, and whether they were senior editors or rank and file reporters. The central level included Beijing and Shanghai and the provincial level included the rest of the 29 provinces and autonomous regions. The party press affiliation is described below. All journalists holding titles as chief editor, deputy chief editor, or department or section heads were considered senior editors, and others were considered rank and file reporters in the coding. The following is an operational definition of the journalists: CC Mouth e 5: --All those who were affiliated with the People's My; --All those who were affiliated with Xinhua News Agency:‘ --All those who were affiliated with the national official CCP newspapers listed in the Encyelopegie of 85 Newspapers in thne, a survey of all newspapers conducted in 1987; --All those who were affiliated with the provincial official CCP newspapers listed in the Encyclopedia of newspapers in thne, a survey of all newspapers conducted in 1987: Ngn-QCE Mouthpieges: --All those who were affiliated with all national non- party newspapers listed in the Encyelopedia of Newspapers in ghina: --All those who were affiliated with all provincial non-party newspapers listed in the Encyglgpedia of Newspapers in Chine; Professiongl gournalists Organizapions: --All those who were affiliated with the national journalists associations. --All those who were affiliated with the provincial journalists associations. --All those who were affiliated with the research units of the national party newspapers: --All those who were affiliated with the research units of the national non-party newspapers: --All those who were affiliated with the research units of the provincial non-party newspapers; --All those who were affiliated with the research units of the provincial non-party newspapers; An article was coded as being written by professional 86 organizations only if the article carried the byline of the professional organization and not an individual's name. If an individual's name was used as the byline of an article, the article was coded as written by journalists who were affiliated with the party or non-party mouthpieces. Definition of journalism educators Journalism educators were defined as individuals or institutions who taught in journalism educational and research institutions. They included: --members of the Journalism Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: --members of the Journalism School of the Xinhua News Agency in Beijing; --members of the Journalism Department of Fudan University in Shanghai: --members of the Journalism Department of the People's University in Beijing; --members of all journalism schools in Beijing and Shanghai, other than those mentioned above: --members of all journalism schools outside Beijing and Shanghai, other than those mentioned above: Journalism educators also were classified by their national and provincial affiliations. National included Beijing and Shanghai, and provincial represented the rest of the 29 provinces and autonomous regions. 87 Variable 5 (labeled as BYLINE in the coding instrument) and Variable 6 (labeled as WHO in the coding instrument) were designed to define the leaders, journalists and journalism educators. In addition, Variable 8 (labeled as CHANNEL in the coding instrument) was designed to check for differences due to variations of the editorial policies of the different journals used in the study. Definirion of the Press Boles The press role was defined as either leader-oriented or people-oriented in Chapter Three. Table 6 shows a summary of the operational definitions of the leader-oriented and people-oriented press roles. Based on the operational definitions in the table, 22 themes were used to define the two press roles. Each theme contained two statements--with the first one representing the people-oriented press role and the second one the leader-oriented press role. The presence of each statement or a similar one supporting the people-oriented press role was assigned a score of 1. The presence of each statement or a similar one supporting the leader-oriented press role was assigned a score of 2. The absence of the discussion of either of these statements was assigned a score of 0. (See Appendix IV Coding Instrument, Variables 9 through 30). 88 Table 6 A Classification of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles LEADER-ORIENTED ROLE vs. P OPLE-ORIENTED RD E PARTY AFFINITY PEOPLE AFFINITY --press solely owned & operated --press could be owned and by the party operated by the people --press is the party’s mouthpiece --press could reflect and represents the party’s stand other viewpoints, and represent people’s interests & viewpoints --press is a tool for class struggle --press is not a tool for & dictatorship of proletariat class struggle and is for all people --press should guide public opinion --supervision by public opinion --ensure uniformity of public --allow difference in opinion according to party line public opinion different from party line --publicize party decisions after --allow people to take decisions are made part in discussing party decisions before decisions are made --surveys are useful to achieve --surveys are important propaganda effectiveness to understand people’s interests so the press can better serve the people --journalists are party cadres/ --journalists are not members, thus they should follow party cadres/members, and party line should be independent --journalists are under the --journalists are party committee’s supervision independent and the chief editor has final decision on policy & content 89 Table 6 (cont’d) --all people should be mobilized to write for the press under the party’s guidance --the press can expose party’s wrongdoings with the party’s approval IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY --the press should always uphold the "Four Insistences" COMBATIVE AFFINITY --combat all opposing opinions against socialism or party policies JOURNALISM EDUCATION --journalism education should train "red and professional" cadres to serve the party ECONOMIC REFORMS --economic reform could go hand in hand with journalistic reforms --all people should be mobilized to write for the press without interference from the party --the press can serve as checks and balances of the party’s wrongdoings without party’s approval --the press could deviate from the ”Four Insistences" if this is the wish of the people --allow other opinions to exist even if they disagree with socialism or party policies --Journalism education should downplay the political orientation --economic reform should push the journalistic reforms a step further to meet the people’s needs and demands 90 Table 6 (Cont’d) COMMERCIAL AFFINITY --press can use advertising as a funding source, but the press should still be under the party’s control --newspapers should be subscribed to by government subsidy and distributed free --newspaper should be delivered by the post office PRESS LAN & FREEDOM --press law is acceptable as long as it upholds the "Four Insistences" and abides by party policies --press freedom is a bourgeois concept, thus, should be banned NEWS AND PROPAGANDA --news is propaganda and its purpose is to instill the party’s views to the people --advertising should be the major funding source so the press can be independent of the party’s control --newspapers should not be subscribed to by government subsidy --newspapers should set up their own delivery system --press law is to protect journalists news gatherings and people’s right to know --press freedom is the right guaranteed by the constitution for the people and should allow journalists to carry out their work without party’s interference --news is not propaganda and its purpose is to disseminate information to serve the people’s needs 91 2grpy_erriniry: It included press ownership (Variable 9), mouthpiece (Variable 10), class struggle tool (Variable 11), watchdog (Variable 12), party line (Variable 13), decision (Variable 14), surveys (Variable 15), journalists as cadres (Variable 16), chief editor autonomy (Variable 17), checks and balances (Variable 18), news stringer (Variable 19), quotation journalism (Variable 20).5 Each of these variables is explained below. Press Ownership: The statement representing the people-oriented role is: "The press could be owned and operated by the people (minban baozhi) and the press needs to pay more attention to being the people's mouthpiece." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press should be solely owned and operated by the party and it should insist on being guided by the party." Mouthpiece: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "The press could reflect vieWpoints other than the official viewpoints, and thus, it represents more the people's voices and viewpoints." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press is the party's mouthpiece, therefore, every article and news story must follow the party's vieWpoints. It is an honor to be the party's mouthpiece, eyes and ears." Class struggle tool: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "The press is not a class struggle tool and is for all people. The term class struggle is just rhetoric used by some leaders to misuse the 92 role of the press." The statement representing the leader- oriented press role is: "The press is a tool for class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat under the leaders' guidance." Watchdog: The statement representing the people- oriented press role is: "The press should use public opinion to supervise the government (yulun jiandu). It should encourage people to criticize the wrongdoings of the government." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press should guide and create public opinion that is under the guidance of the party." Party line: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Allow the press to carry opinions that are different from the party. Those who expressed different opinions should not be labeled counter- revolutionaries." The statement representing the leader- oriented press role is: "The press should ensure that public opinions are uniform under the party line (yulun yilu). No conflicting opinions and no counter-revolutionaries' opinions could be expressed in the press." Decision: The statement representing the people- oriented press role is: "Allow the people to participate in discussing important matters in the press (zhongda shijian rang renmin zhidao) before decisions are made to encourage openness and transparency in the policy process (toumingdu ‘and zhongda wenti rang renmin taolun)." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press 93 is used to publicize party decisions to organize the people (xinwen zhidaoxing)." Surveys: The statement representing the people- oriented press role is: "Surveys are important to understand the people's interests and needs so the press can better serve the people." The statement representing the leader- oriented press role is: "Surveys are useful to help propagate the party's views to achieve better results." Journalists as cadres: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Journalists could be independent from the party even if they are party members." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "Journalists are party members and they should follow the party line." Chief editor autonomy: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Chief editors should have the final say on editorial policy and content. The censorship and review system (shencha jidu) should be abolished." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "Journalists are under the party committee's supervision and the party secretary should have final say on editorial policy and content." News stringers: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "All people should be mobilized to write for the press without interference from the party (zhuanmin banbao)." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "All members of the party 94 should be mobilized to write for the press and they should help promote information disseminated from the party (zhuandang banbao)." Checks and balances: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "The press should criticize and monitor party affairs and publication of these stories do not need approval from the party." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press can expose the party's wrongdoing only after approval is given by the party." Quotation journalism: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "The press should not practice 'quotation journalism' (yulu xinwenxue)." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press should quote the leaders' sayings for the people as guiding principles." ideological affinity: Four Insistences (Variable 21) represents ideological affinity. The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "The press can deviate from the 'Four Insistences' (sige jianchi) if this is the wish of the people." The statement representing the leader- oriented press role is: "The press should always unquestionably uphold the 'Four Insistences'." Qpnheriye_effinify (Variable 22): The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "The press should allow different opinions to exist even if they disagreed with socialism or party policies." The statement 95 representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press should combat all opinions opposing socialism or party policies." Journalism Education (Variable 23): The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Journalism education should downplay political orientation, but emphasize journalistic professionalism." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "Journalism education should train 'red and professional' cadres to serve the press." Commercial affinity: It comprises advertising (Variable 24), subscription (Variable 25), and newspaper delivery (Variable 26). Each of these variables is explained below. Advertising: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Advertising should be allowed in the newspapers so that they can gain financial independence from the party's control. The press can be a commercial product." The statement representing the leader- oriented press role is: "The press can use advertising as a funding source but the press should still be under the party's control. The press cannot be a commercial product." Subscription: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Newspaper should not be supported by government subsidy through government-paid subscription. Subscription paid by the people would show how popular the newspaper is." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "Newspapers should be 96 subscribed to by government subsidy and distributed free to serve as study materials of the party policies." Newspaper delivery: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Newspapers should establish their circulation and delivery systems so that they are more efficient and are less subject to the government's control through registration and postal inspection." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "Newspapers should be delivered through the post office so that the government can keep track of the newspapers." con ' re a 'ons ' w ono 'c fo 5 a d journalistic reforns (Variable 27): The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Economic reforms should push the journalistic reforms a step further to meet the people's needs and demands." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "Economic reforms and journalistic reforms should proceed under the close supervision of the party." Press law and freedom: Press law (Variable 28) and press freedom (Variable 29) were two variables for this dimension. Press law: The statement representing the people- oriented press role is: "The press law is to protect the journalists' news gatherings and people's right to know." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "The press law should uphold firmly the 'Four 97 Insistences' and should not promote bourgeoisie ideas." Press freedom: The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "Press freedom is the right of the people guaranteed by the constitution, and the government should not interfere." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "Press freedom is a bourgeois concept and should be banned." Relationship between news and propaganda (Variable 30): news and propaganda is the variable for this dimension. The statement representing the people-oriented press role is: "News is not a subset of propaganda and news is to transmit information to meet the people's needs." The statement representing the leader-oriented press role is: "News is a subset of propaganda and news is to propagate party policies and mobilize the people under the party's direction. Propaganda is to instill the party's views to the people." De 'n' io o t t me element Variable 3 (labeled as YEAR in the coding instrument) and Variable 4 (labeled as MONTH in the coding instrument) were used to analyze changes over time. The time element refers to the publication date of the journal that carried the article or document. If both the journal's publication date and the article's or document's publication date were given, then the document's publication date was recorded in the study. 98 For example, Hu Yaobang's journalism document was a speech made on February 8, 1985, at the Central Secretariat. The geople's Daily published the document on April 14, 1985. Thus, the time element recorded in the coding was February 1985. If the date of the document was missing, then the publication date of the journal was recorded. Likewise, a meeting date, if given, determined the time element recorded in the study. If the news reports did not indicate the time element, then the publication date of the newspaper or journal that carried the meeting report was recorded as the time element. All professional and academic journalism journals would carry a publication date, which was recorded in the coding. The time element of all articles or documents was used to analyze changes over time between January 1983 and June 1989. For research questions one through six, the calendar year covering January to December in each year was used to analyze changes over time. For research question seven, a different method was used to determine the time period. As explained earlier in Chapter Two, three periods were used: (a) Pre-Hu Yaobang Period--from January 1983 to February 1985, (b) Post-Hu Yaobang Period--from March 1985 to October 1987, and (c) Post-Zhao Ziyang Period--from November 1987 to June 1989. All articles and documents were analyzed according to this division of the time periods. 99 ING PROC D The first step was to determine the total number of articles included in the content analysis. A master list of articles was compiled to form the pool of articles to be analyzed in the study. The official documents and meetings were included in the Eeople's peily and FBIS list. Table 7 shows a total count of articles used in the study. lNTER-CODER RELIABILIT! TESTS Preliminary pre-tests were conducted to develop the coding instrument and instructions. Ten articles from the Journalism front, Journalism gonrnal and lgnrnelisn University were used in the three preliminary inter-coder reliability tests. Three coders, who can read and write Chinese, read and coded the articles according to the coding instrument. The coding instrument was pre-tested four times during the weeks of March 10 to April 1, 1991. The first pre-test included four articles taken from Journalism Eron . The overall inter-coder agreement for the four articles was 65.8 percent, 82 percent, 85 percent and 87 percent, respectively.6 The second pre-test included three articles from qurnelisn Ergnf. The overall inter-coder agreement was 71 percent, 85 percent and 86 percent, respectively. The third pre-test included three articles from Journalism 100 Table 7 Articles Used in the Content Analysis YEAR SOURCES ' Row 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 Total Official Document 2 O l O l O 1 5 Meetings 4 4 8 7 5 12 13 53 Journalism Front 28 34 29 29 41 80 29 270 Journalism Journal 0 O 21 31 21 29 8 110 Journalism University 2 7 4 11 1 21 8 54 Journalism Collected 3 0 2 l 2 1 O 9 Essays Red Flag/Seeking Truth 0 1 O 0 0 1 O 2 Column Total - 39 46 65 79 71 144 59 503 101 Journal. The overall inter-coder agreement was 74.4 percent, 90 percent, and 90 percent, respectively. A closer look at the results of the first and second pre-tests showed that the overall coding agreement was affected by the design of the coding sheet and instructions. The coding sheet and instructions were revised. Then, an item-by-item analysis of the inter-coder agreement showed that most of the disagreement was about the "judgment items"--Variable 9 to Variable 30--designed to determine the themes of people-oriented and leader-oriented press roles. The coding instrument and instructions were revised. Several questions were dropped from the coding instrument. The newly designed coding sheet and re-written coding instructions helped eliminate the mechanical errors. Not counting the judgment items, the third pre-test showed a 100 percent inter-coder agreement on those mechanical recording items from Variable 1 to Variable 8. To achieve better inter-coder agreement on the coding for Variables 9 to 30, a Chinese version of the operation definitions was written so that the coders can look for the terms listed in Chinese. The fourth pre-test included four articles from the Journalism Qourna . Only those judgment items were coded. The fourth pre-test showed an improvement of the coding agreement, which ranged from 90 to 100 percent for Variables 9 to 30. 102 QAIA ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL EROCEDURES Both articles and themes were used as units of analysis in analyzing the data. The study recorded 503 articles by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators. About 87.9 percent of the articles were by single authors, 10.1 percent by news institutions, and 2.0 percent by coauthors. The 22 themes in each article were combined to indicate the press role suggested in each article. Before this procedure was taken, the question that had to be addressed is: Whether each co-authored article was written by authors of different groups? First, 98 percent of the articles could be clearly identified as by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators exclusively. Second, a check of the 2 percent of co-authored articles (which accounted for 10 articles) also showed that the co-authors of each article were from the same institution. There was no mixed- authorship from different groups in each article. Because each article represented one group only, each article could be used to indicate the press role suggested by each group. Each article represented the author's stance on the 22 themes defining the press role. Each of the 22 themes, when mentioned in the article, could represent one of two directions--either leader-oriented or people-oriented. That means in each article, one of the following situations could happen: the article suggested (1) all leader-oriented press role themes; (2) all people-oriented press role themes; or 103 (3) a mix of leader- and people-oriented press role themes. Those articles that did not mention one of the 22 press roles themes were not included in the study. In the first two situations, the author's stance of the press role was one-sided. To determine each author's stance on the press role when the article carried mixed suggestions on the press role, the following procedure was taken. First, the leader- and people-oriented press role themes were made into two numeric values that represent two directions. Each mention of the leader-oriented press role theme was given a score of -1, and each mention of the people-oriented press role was given a score of +1. If a theme was not mentioned in the article, the score is 0. If the article mentioned either all leader-oriented or all people-oriented press role only, the score could range from -1 to -22 and +1 to +22, respectively. But in the case of mixed suggestions, the positive and negative scores would cancel each other out. A score of zero means that the author of that article has mentioned some leader-oriented and some people-oriented press role themes and they cancelled each other out. So, the article was neither leader-oriented nor people-oriented. Then these articles would be grouped under the "neutral" category in the classification of the press role. If the article made more leader-oriented press roles themes than people-oriented press role themes and vice versa, then the press role could still be classified as either leader- or people-oriented. 104 When this data analysis procedure was followed, the 503 articles showed the following break-down: 17 articles showed a score of zero: 25 articles had scores ranging from -6 to -1; and 361 articles had scores ranging from +1 to +9. Because those minus scores were collapsed as one group representing the leader—oriented press role, and the plus scores were collapsed into one group representing the people-oriented press role, they were treated as nominal data. The interval between each category of leader- and people-oriented press roles was not considered because a frequency count shows that 24.1 percent (121 articles) had a score of -1 and 68.6 percent (345 article) had a score of 1. Only 0.8 percent (three articles) showed a more leader- oriented press role. About 3.2 percent (16 articles) showed a more people-oriented press role. Therefore, although the different interval might show the intensity toward the press role, the assumption of interval data seemed inappropriate. Then contingency tables were set up. Frequency counts and percentages were used to compare differences between groups. Cramer's V was computed for each contingency table to show the strength of associations. It ranges from 0 to +1, with 0 indicating no relationship and +1 indicating a perfect relationship (Weaver, 1989, P. 70). Another question that has to be addressed is: Whether there are differences using each article and the themes in the analysis? A year-by-year comparison of the analysis between the people-oriented press role themes and article- 105 based results were computed. Table 8 shows that the difference is not more than 6.1 percent, the use of each article versus each theme was acceptable. Further, to make the analysis of the press role themes more manageable, those themes mentioned less than 40 times between 1983 and 1989 were dropped in the tables presented in the findings chapter. When this procedure was taken, those themes mentioned more than 40 times were: the press as a mouthpiece, 236 times; the press as a watchdog, 145 times; relationship between news and propaganda, 96 times: the decision process being more transparent, 80 times: the autonomy of chief editors, 80 times: the upholding of the Four Insistences, 56 times; the press law, 47 times: the press as checks and balances, 45 times: press freedom, 44 times: and the use of surveys, 41 times. These 10 themes accounted for 88 percent of all the 22 themes raised between 1983 and 1989. This procedure was used only for further analysis of the themes discussed over time. All other analyses use articles as the unit of analysis. Another question that had to be addressed was the use of calendar year and time periods in analyzing the changes over time. Both measures would indicate changes over time. The use of three periods had one advantage over the use of calendar year. The three periods used in the study indicated a stimulus was introduced in the beginning of each period. The first period covered from January 1983 to February 1985. In 1985, the then CCP secretary-general Hu 106 Table 8 A Comparison of Using Articles and Themes in the Data Analysis* Year Themes x? Article %* Differences 83 52.9 59.0 6.1 84 31.0 34.8 3.8 85 50.8 47.7 3.1 86 76.7 72.7 4.0 87 59.8 57.7 2.1 88 96.1 95.8 0.3 89 94.4 93.2 1.2 * denotes the percentages of the people-oriented press role mentions. 107 Yaobang announced a party document on journalistic work. This party document marked the beginning of the second period, post-Hu Yaobang period, which covered March 1985 to October 1987. The third period, post-Zhao Ziyang period (from November 1987 to June 1989), was marked by a party document released by then CCP secretary-general Zhao Ziyang. Zhao announced that the party decision should be made transparent and the press should be the watchdog of the government. The division of these three periods was based on the two party directives by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Any changes in these three periods might suggest that the party directives played a role. However, the use of calendar year also might show the impact of the anti- liberalization movement launched right after the student movement in December 1986. Both the calendar year and time period were used in the analysis. 108 3.011193%: 1. The official documents may be published in the mass media, announced at meetings, or circulated internally. This study will first identify the documents published. Then it will identify what meetings were held. The meeting is an occasion at which the leaders announced their policy directives. Sometimes internally circulated documents may be referred to in the meeting. These meetings may or may not be reported in the official press or journals. If they were reported, the leaders' opinions (jianghua) expressed during the meeting were usually adopted as policy directives and guidelines. Therefore, it is important to know what meetings were held and what opinions were expressed during the meeting. For example, in their attempt to "provide a vehicle for capturing a part of China's elite decision making, for tracking the appearance of various issues on the agenda of the leaders, for documenting major decisions taken...," Lieberthal and Dickson (1989, p. xi) compiled A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China, 1939-1986. 2. The 12th Party Congress was held in September 1982. 3. Radio and television broadcasting were not included because they, as audio-visual media, raised different issues compared with the press. For example, radio and television use different presentations and serve different purposes-- some consider radio and television as entertainment media. Although the policy of radio and television broadcasting and the press could be the same, the exclusion of radio and television broadcasting would provide a clearer focus in the study. Moreover, radio and television broadcasting were not rapidly developed in the early 19805 and their influence is still taking shape. However, the leaders, journalists and journalism educators had been studying the press before the founding of the people's republic. For these reasons, the press was chosen as the focus of the study. 4. Journalists from the geople's Daily and the Xinhua News Agency were considered more important in the policy process because of the importance of these two media. Please see Figures 3 and 4 for their role in the CCP organization. 5. The name in parentheses is the variable name used in the SPSS analysis. These SPSS names can be found in Appendix IV the coding instrument. 6. The inter-coder reliability was computed by the number of agreements divided by the total number of coding decisions. Chapter Five: FINDINGS ;“S :3 , '0 S _ON ; : !_P _ _ D -QLSSHO _MP ‘8 S 0 HE ERESS ROLE VARY BETWEEN 1983 AND l9§9? The answer to this question has two parts: (1) What was the overall press role suggested between 1983 and 1989? and (2) Were there changes in each year? Table 9 shows that there were more suggestions overall of the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role, 71.8 percent versus 24.9 percent, respectively. About 3.4 percent of the articles did not show a preference for the press role. In 1984, the suggestions of the leader- oriented press role exceeded the people-oriented press role. It was a tie in 1985. From 1986 onward, the suggestions of the people-oriented press role exceeded the leader-oriented press role. The results are presented graphically in Figure 5. 109 Table 9 110 A Year—by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE Count 83 Col % Leader- 16 oriented 41.0% People- 23 oriented 59.0% 0 Neutral 0.0% Column N = 39 Cramer’s V = 0.35 YEAR Row 84 85 86 87 88 89 N 28 31 19 27 2 2 125 60.9% 47.7% 24.1% 38.0% 1.4% 3.4% 24.9% 16 31 57 41 138 55 361 34.8% 47.7% 72.7% 57.7% 95.8% 93.2% 71.8% 2 3 3 3 4 2 17 4.3% 4.6% 3.8% 4.2% 2.8% 3.4% 3.4% 46 65 79 71 144 59 Grand N - 503 100 90 80 7O 60 50 percentages 40 30 20 10 Figure 5 111 95.8 93 .2 72.7 59 60.9 57 .1 47. 41 .E 38 4.8 4.1 3 4 .4 3 T l l T l 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 your C] leader-oriented + people-oriented A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles, 1983-1989 112 Table 9 and Figure 5 show that the suggestion of the leader-oriented and people-oriented press role did change each year between 1983 and 1989. The Cramer's V value of 0.35 shows the press role and year were moderately correlated. The pattern shows that the suggestions of the leader-oriented press role went up one year and went down the following year between 1983 and 1987. Then the suggestions of the leader-oriented press role decreased significantly in 1988 and 1989. The opposite direction is true for the pattern of the people-oriented press role. Table 9 and Figure 5 also show that the difference between the leader- and people-oriented press role became larger in 1988 and 1989. About 1.3 percent and 3.4 percent suggested the leader-oriented press role in 1988 and 1989, respectively, whereas 95.8 percent and 93.2 percent suggested the people-oriented press role in 1988 and 1989. Tables 10 presents the 10 most discussed press role themes between 1983 and 1989. Overall, the five most discussed leader-oriented press role themes in descending order were: the press should be the party's mouthpiece; the press should uphold the Four Insistences: the press should serve as checks and balances of the government under the party's guidance: the press should use public opinion under the supervision of the party; and chief editors should be under the supervision of the party. 113 Table 10 Frequencies of the 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes, 83-89* YEAR 83 - 84 85 86 THEMES T___2 T___2 T__—2 T__—2 Mouthpiece 14 10 8 11 10 21 30 13 Watchdog 6 l O 1 9 3 12 2 Decision 1 l O 6 1 9 7 1 Surveys 6 3 2 l 2 O 10 3 Chief Editor 0 O 3 3 4 3 15 0 Checks & Balances 5 2 1 3 l 2 3 4 Four Insistences O 8 O 10 O 6 O 7 Press Law 0 O 1 O 4 O 6 0 Press Freedom 0 O l O 7 O 7 O News/Propaganda O O 4 12 2 15 2 87 88 89 Total Mouthpiece 28 10 64 3 l4 0 168 68 Watchdog 10 1 65 O 35 O 137 8 Decision 5 l 34 0 14 O 62 18 Surveys 5 1 8 O 0 O 33 8 Chief Editor 2 2 16 1 ll 0 51 9 Checks & Balances 2 5 11 l 4 1 27 18 Four Insistences O 16 O 6 O 3 O 56 Press Law 3 o 16 o 16 o ' 46 1 Press Freedom 4 0 13 O 12 O 44 O News/Propaganda 7 2 27 O 6 0 86 10 Note: lsPeople-oriented, 2-Leader—oriented themes. * These 10 most discussed themes accounted for 88% of all themes. 114 Overall, the five most discussed people-oriented press role themes in descending order were: the press should be the people's mouthpiece: the press should be the watchdog of the government without any interference; the party decision process should be made more transparent and allow participation from the people; the chief editors should have editorial autonomy; and a press law should be introduced to protect the journalist's news gathering rights and the people's right to know. Table 11 gives a year-by-year comparison of the five most discussed leader-oriented press role themes between 1983 and 1989. The table shows that the suggestion of the press as the party's mouthpiece dominated between 1983 and 1986. From 1987 to 1989, the number one theme suggesting the leader—oriented press role was the emphasis on upholding the Four Insistences--that is, upholding the socialist road, dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. It should be noted that combative affinity was the fifth most mentioned leader-oriented press role theme in 1983. It was mentioned only five times between 1983 and 1989: and was never mentioned after 1987. Table 12 shows a year-by-year comparison of the five most discussed people-oriented press role between 1983 and 1989. The press as the people's mouthpiece was the most discussed theme between 1983 and 1987. Then in 1988 and Table 11 115 Five Most Discussed Leader-oriented Press Role Themes, 1983-1989 Leader-oriented Press Role 1983 mouthpiece (10) four insistences (8) surveys (3) journalism education (3) combative affinity (2) 1985 mouthpiece (21) decision process (6) journalism education (6) watchdog (1), party line (1), editor in chief autonomy (1) 1987 four insistences (16) mouthpiece (lO) checks & balances (5) journalism education (4) party line (3) 1989 four insistences (3) journalism education (2) checks & balances (1) people’s press (1) * * Only four themes raised this year 1984 mouthpiece (10) four insistences (10) decision process (6) party line (4) journalism education (4) 1986 mouthpiece (7) four insistences (7) news/propaganda (5) checks & balances (5) surveys (3) 1988 four insistences (6) mouthpiece (3) chief editor autonomy (1) checks & balances (1) * Note: The number in parentheses is the number of times this theme was mentioned. 116 Table 12 Five Most Discussed People-oriented Press Role Themes, 1983-1989 People-oriented Press Role 1983 1984 mouthpiece (14) mouthpiece (8) watchdog (6) news/propaganda (4) checks & balances (5) chief editor autonomy (3) journalism education (3) checks & balances (1), people press (1), party line (1), delivery (1), press law (1) decision process (1), news freedom (1) subscription (1) 1985 1986 news/propaganda (12) mouthpiece (30) mouthpiece (10) news/propaganda (18) watchdog (9) chief editor autonomy (15) press freedom (7) watchdog (12) class struggle (6) surveys (10) 1987 1988 mouthpiece (28) watchdog (65) watchdog (10) mouthpiece (64) decision process (5) decision process (34) surveys (5) chief editor autonomy (16) press freedom (4) press law (16) 1989 watchdog (35) press law (16) mouthpiece (12) decision process (12) press freedom (12) Note: The number in parentheses is the number of times this theme was mentioned. 117 1989, the number one theme raised in support of the people— oriented press role was to make the press a watchdog of the government. It also should be noted that the suggestion of press freedom was the fifth most discussed theme in 1984, 1985, 1987 and 1989. In 1988, the suggestion of a press law as a legal framework to protect the journalists' and people's right to know was the fifth most mentioned theme. These findings show that the emphasis on the discussion of the press did vary between 1983 and 1989. RESEARCH UESTION 2: WHAT WAS T E PRESS ROLE SUGGESTED BY EACH OF THE THREE GROUPS BETWEEN 1983 AND 1982? Table 13 shows an overall analysis of the press role suggested by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators separately between 1983 and 1989. The Cramer's V value of 0.16 shows that the association between the three groups and the press role emphasized was small but notable. The leaders were almost equally divided in their suggestions of the leader- and people-oriented press role, 43.0 percent versus 54.4 percent, respectively. Most journalists and journalism educators favored the people-oriented press role. About 71.3 percent of the journalists and 86.5 percent of the journalism educators advocated the people-oriented press role. Table 13 also shows that more journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the 118 Table 13 The Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Suggested by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989* PRESS ROLE GROUPS Count Journalism Col % Leaders Journalists Educators Leader 34 80 11 Oriented 43.0% 25.0% 10.6% People 43 228 90 Oriented 54.4% 71.3% 86.5% 2 12 3 Neutral 2.5% 3.8% 2.9% Column N = 79 320 104 Grand N - 503 Cramer’s V = 0.16 119 journalists and leaders: 86.5 percent, 71.3 percent and 54.4 percent, respectively. That also means that the more journalists suggested the people-oriented press role than the leaders, 71.3 percent versus 54.4 percent, respectively. The opposite is true for their suggestions of the leader- oriented press role. 'E if H DUEST_ON ; : DVD 31 P S!_S 10 OF H 'fES ’O_. §Y EACH OF THE THREE GROUPS VAR! EETWEEN 1283 AND 1289? The press role suggested by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators is described separately here. A. The press role suggested by the leaders: Table 14 shows a year-by-year comparison of the leader- oriented press role suggested by the leaders. The Cramer's V value of 0.59 shows a moderately strong association between the press role and years. Overall, more articles by the leaders suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role, 54.4 percent versus 43.0 percent, respectively. More articles by the leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the people- oriented press role in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1987. In all other years, more articles by the leaders suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role. Table 14 and Figure 6 show that in 1983, all leaders suggested only the leader-oriented press role. Then the 120 number of leaders suggesting the leader-oriented press role shows a downward trend between 1983 and 1989, except in 1987, when there was a sharp increase. The sharpest change of the leaders' stance on the leader-oriented press role happened in 1986, 1987 and 1988. In 1986, only one out of ten leaders (10 percent) suggested the leader-oriented press role. In 1987, almost nine out of 10 leaders (88.9 percent) suggested the leader-oriented press role. In 1988, no leader suggested the leader-oriented press role. One leader suggested the leader-oriented press role in 1989. Table 14 and Figure 7 show a year-by-year comparison of the people-oriented press role suggested by the leaders. The pattern is the opposite of their stance on the leader- oriented press role. There were big changes in 1987 and’ 1988. In 1987, only one leader (11.1 percent) suggested the people-oriented press role. It shows a drop from 80.0 percent in 1986 to 11.1 percent in 1987. In 1988, all leaders suggested the people-oriented press role. Table 15 shows the 10 most discussed press role themes by the leaders. In terms of the leader-oriented press role themes, the two most suggested were: the press should be the party's mouthpiece, and the Four Insistences should be upheld. In terms of the people-oriented press role themes, the two most suggested were: the press should be the watchdog Of the government, and chief editors should have editorial autonomy. 121 Table 14 A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Discussed by the Leaders, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE YEAR Count 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 Row Col % N Leader- 5 11 8 1 8 O l 34 oriented 100.0% 78.6% 80.0% 10.0% 88.9% 0.0% 8.3% 43.0% People- 0 3 2 8 1 19 10 43 oriented 0.0% 21.4% 20.0% 80.0% 11.1% 100.0% 83.3% 54.4% 0 O O l O O l 2 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 2.5% Column N = 5 14 10 10 9 19 12 Grand N = 79 Cramer’s V = 0.59 100 90 80 70 50 percentages 40 30 20 Figure 6 60‘ 122 100 .. 88.9 _ 66 3° i 625 66 . 52.5 “ 6.2 33.3 2 l _ 25 21. — 113 89 2 3’ 4-5 1 1 T l 83 84 as 86 87 6% 89 year leaders + iournalisie 0 educators A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented Press Role by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983—1989 123 100 90-4 M)— w): 7 60 a percentages (n O l 10 a 813 p 00:; ’1 1 1 ”r 1 83 84 85 86 87 88 your C] leaders + iournafists O educators Figure 7 A Year-by-year Comparison of the People-oriented Press Role by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989 89 124 Table 15 Frequencies of the Leaders’ 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes, 1983-1989* YEAR 83 84 85 86 THEMES 1___2 T__-2 1__—2 1___2 Mouthpiece 0 4 l 4 O 5 0 3 Watchdog 1 O 0 l O 2 2 0 Decision 0 l O 2 0 2 1 0 Class Struggle O O O 0 2 O 2 0 Chief Editor 0 O 2 2 0 2 7 0 Jlm education 0 1 O 2 0 1 0 0 Four Insistences 0 8 0 10 O 6 0 7 Press Law 0 0 O 0 O 0 1 0 Press Freedom 0 O O O O O l 0 Party line 0 l O 2 O l 1 0 87 88 89 Total Mouthpiece 1 2 3 0 l O 6 18 Watchdog 1 l 12 O 9 O 25 4 Decision 1 0 5 O 1 O 8 5 Class Struggle O 0 1 0 O 0 5 0 Chief Editor 1 O 0 0 2 O 12 4 Jlm education 0 1 O 0 O O O 5 Four Insistences O 16 0 6 0 3 O 13 Press Law 1 0 3 O O O 5 Press Freedom 1 0 3 O 1 O 6 0 Party lin O 2 1 O O O 2 6 Note: 1=People-oriented, 2-Leader-oriented themes. * These 10 most discussed themes accounted for 87.9% of all themes. 125 In terms of changes over time, the most conspicuous change in the leader-oriented press role theme was the emphasis on the Four Insistences. It increased significantly in 1987 and decreased in 1988 and 1989. In terms of the people-oriented press role themes, the most conspicuous change was the emphasis of the press as the watchdog of the government. It increased significantly in 1988 and continued in 1989. Table 16 shows that the percentages of the national leaders suggesting the people-oriented press role are higher than the leaders as a whole, 61.4 percent versus 54.4 percent, respectively. However, the percentages of the provincial leaders suggesting the people-oriented press role were lower than the leaders as a whole, 45.7 percent versus 54.4 percent, respectively. Table 16 also shows that the provincial leaders's opinions of the two press roles were quite close: 48.6 percent versus 45.7 percent. More national leaders suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role; 61.4 percent versus 38.6 percent. These findings show that the leaders' suggestion of the press role gig change between 1983 and 1989. The leaders changed from a leader-oriented press role to the people— oriented press role after 1985, except in 1987 when the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign was launched. An overwhelming majority of the leaders supported the people- oriented press role after 1988. 126 Table 16 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Leaders Because of National and Provincial Affiliation, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE YEAR Row Count 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 N Col % National Leaders Leader- 4 3 5 1 4 O O 17 oriented 100.0% 100.0% 71.4% 14.3% 80.0% 0.0% 8.3% 38.6% People- 0 O 2 6 1 15 3 27 oriented 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 85.7% 20.0% 100.0% 100.0% 61.4% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Column N = 4 3 7 7 5 15 3 44 Provincial Leaders Leader- 1 8 3 O 4 O 1 17 oriented 100.0% 72.7% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 11.1% 48.6% People- 0 3 O 2 O 4 7 16 oriented 0.0% 27.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 100.0% 77.8% 45.7% 0 O O 1 O O 1 2 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 5.7% Column N = l 11 3 3 4 4 9 35 Grand N = 79 127 B. The press role suggested by the journalists: Table 17 shows a year-by-year comparison of the leader- oriented and people-oriented press role suggested by the journalists. The Cramer's V value of 0.37 shows that the press role and years were moderately correlated. Overall, more articles by journalists suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role, 71.3 percent versus 25.0 percent, respectively. More articles by journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role than the people-oriented press role in 1984 and 1985. In all other years, more articles by journalists suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role. Table 17 and Figure 6 show the leader-oriented press role suggested by the journalists. They show the beginning of a downward trend in 1985 and continued until 1989. No journalist suggested the leader-oriented press role in 1989. Table 17 and Figure 7 present the people-oriented press role suggested by the journalists. Table 17 shows that more leaders suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role in 1983 and between 1986 and 1989. More than 90 percent of the journalists suggested the people-oriented press role in 1988 and 1989. In 1989, almost all journalists suggested the people-oriented press role. Table 17 128 A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Discussed by the Journalists, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE Count 83 84 Col % Leader- 9 15 oriented 29.0% 62.5% People- 22 7 oriented 71.0% 29.2% 0 2 Neutral 0.0% 8.3% Column N . 31 24 Cramer’s V - 0.37 YEAR ROW 85 86 87 88 89 N 21 17 16 2 0 80 52.5% 36.2% 33.3% 2.2% 0.0% 25.0% 16 30 29 88 36 228 40.0% 63.8% 60.4% 94.6% 97.3% 71.3% 3 0 ‘ 3 3 l 12 7.5% 0.0% 6.3% 3.2% 8.3% 3.8% 40 47 48 93 37 Grand N - 320 129 Table 18 shows the 10 most discussed press role themes by the journalists. In terms of the leader-oriented press role themes, the two most discussed were: the press should be the party's mouthpiece, and the Four Insistences should be upheld. In terms of the people-oriented press role themes, the two most discussed were: the press should be the people's mouthpiece, and the press should be the watchdog of the government affairs. Additionally, many journalists also suggested that news should not be the same as propaganda. In terms of changes over time, the most conspicuous change of the leader-oriented press role themes was the emphasis on the Four Insistences. The journalists all suggested that the Four Insistences should be followed. This press role theme increased in 1987 and decreased in 1988 and 1989 subsequently. In terms of the people-oriented press role themes, the most conspicuous change was the increase of the suggestion of the press should be the watchdog of the government in 1988. In addition, the suggestion that news is not a subset of propaganda also increased significantly in 1988. Table 19 shows that the national and provincial affiliation of the journalists was similar to the pattern of the press role of the journalists as a whole. The only year that shows a difference is 1984, when the percentages of the national and provincial journalists were significantly different from the percentages of the journalists as a 130 Table 18 Frequencies of the Journalists’ 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes, 1983-1989* YEAR 83 84 85 86 THEMES T—2 T——2 T—Z' 1—2 Mouthpiece 13 5 6 7 7 14 15 10 Watchdog 5 1 O O 4 1 2 1 Decision 1 O O 4 1 7 1 1 Surveys 6 3 1 1 l O 6 2 Chief Editor 0 0 1 1 2 1 5 0 Checks & Balances 5 1 O 2 1 2 l 3 Four Insistences O 5 O 5 O 6 O 4 Press Law 0 O O O 2 O 2 0 Press Freedom 0 O O O 3 O 3 0 News/Propaganda O O O 2 5 2 11 2 87 88 89 Total Mouthpiece 23 7 48 3 11 O 123 46 Watchdog 8 O 37 O 21 O 73 3 Decision 2 l 18 O 8 O 31 13 Surveys 3 l 5 O O O 22 7 Chief Editor 0 2 11 O 6 O 25 4 Checks & Balances 2 2 6 l 2 0 17 11 Four Insistences O 12 O 4 O 2 O 38 Press Law 0 O 9 O 13 O 26 0 Press Freedom 1 O 6 O 7 O 20 O News/Propaganda 9 1 23 O 3 O 51 7 Note: lsPeople-oriented, 2=Leader-oriented themes. * These 10 most discussed themes accounted for 87% of all themes. Table 19 131 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Journalists Because of National and Provincial Affiliation, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE Count 83 84 Col % National Journalists Leader- 4 9 oriented 22.2% 75.0% People- 14 3 oriented 77.8% 25.0% 0 0 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% Column N = 18 12 Provincial Journalists Leader- 5 6 oriented 38.5% 50.0% People- 8 4 oriented 61.5% 33.3% 0 2 Neutral 0.0% 16.7% Column N = 13 12 85 8 53.3% 33.3% 13.3% 15 13 52.0% 11 44.0% 4.0% 25 YEAR 86 10 33.3% 20 66.7% 0 0.0% 30 87 88 89 5 0 0 35.7% 0.0% 0.0% 9 34 8 64.3% 100.0% 100.0% 0 0 O 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14 34 8 ll 2 0 32.4% 3.4% 0.0% 20 54 28 58.8% 91.5% 96.6% 3 3 1 8.8% 5.1% 3.4% 34 59 29 ROW 33 28.0% 83 70.3% 1.7% 118 47 23.3% 145 71.8% 10 5.0% 202 Grand N . 320 132 whole. In 1984, 75 percent of the national journalists and 50 percent of the provincial journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role, whereas 62.5 percent of all journalists suggested the same press role. However, the non-party press affiliation and non- management positions held by the journalists did make a difference. Table 20 shows that percentages of non-party press journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role were lower than the percentages of the journalists as a whole, 18.8 percent versus 25.0 percent, respectively. They also show that the percentages of the non-party journalists suggesting the people-oriented press role are higher than the journalists as a whole, 78.1 percent versus 71.3 percent, respectively. Similarly, Table 21 shows that the percentages of the reporters suggesting the leader-oriented press role were lower than the percentages of the journalists as a whole. Their differences narrowed in 1988 and 1989. Table 21 also shows that the percentages of the reporters suggesting the people-oriented press role were higher than the percentages of the journalists as a whole, 83.0 percent versus 71.3 percent, respectively. These findings show that the journalists' suggestion of the press role gig change between 1983 and 1989. The journalists changed from the leader-oriented press role to the people-oriented press role after 1986. An overwhelming 133 Table 20 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Journalists Because of Party and Non-party Press Affiliation, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE YEAR ROW Count 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 N Col % Party Journalists Leader- 8 14 18 17 15 2 O 74 oriented 30.8% 70.0% 50.0% 37.0% 34.9% 2.5% 0.0% 25.7% People- 18 4 15 29 26 75 36 203 oriented 69.2% 20.0% 41.7% 63.0% 60.5% 93.8% 97.3% 70.5% 0 2 3 O 2 3 1 ll Neutral 0.0% 10.0% 8.3% 0.0% 4.7% 3.8% 8.3% 3.8% Column N = 26 20 36 46 43 80 37 288 Non-party Journalists Leader- 1 1 3 O 1 O O 6 oriented 20.0% 25.0% 75.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.8% People- 4 3 1 1 3 13 0 25 oriented 80.0% 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 60.0% 100.0% 0.0% 78.1% 0 O O O 1 O O 1 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 100.0% 0.0% 3.1% Column N = 5 4 4 1 5 13 0 32 Grand N - 320 Table 21 134 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among Journalists Because of Management Positions Held, 1983-1989 PRESS-ROLE Count 83 Col % Editors Leader- 8 oriented 34.8% People- 15 oriented 71.0% 0 Neutral 0.0% Column N = 23 Reporters Leader- 1 oriented 12.5% People- 7 oriented 87.5% 0 Neutral 0.0% Column N = 8 84 13 65.0% 25.0% 10.0% 20 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 4 85 16 57.1% 11 39.3% 1 3.6% 28 41.7% 41.7% 16.7% 12 YEAR 86 87 88 89 14 15 2 0 43.8% 39.5% 2.8% 0.0% 18 21 67 18 56.3% 55.3% 93.1% 94.7% 0 2 3 1 0.0% 5.3% 4.2% 5.3% 32 38 72 19 3 1 0 O 20.0% 10.0% 2.2% 0.0% 12 8 21 18 80.0% 8004% 100.0% 100.0% 0 l 0 0 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15 10 21 18 ROW 68 29.3% 155 66.8% 9 3.9% 232 12 13.6% 73 83.0% 3.4% 88 Grand N = 320 135 majority of the journalists supported the people-oriented press role after 1988. C. The press role suggested by the jggrggligm educators: Table 22 shows a year-by-year comparison of the press role suggested by the journalism educators. The Cramer's V value of 0.33 shows that the press role and years were moderately correlated. Overall, more articles by journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role, 86.5 percent versus 10.6 percent. The number of journalism educators making suggestions increased in 1985 because the Journalism Journal included in the study began publication in this year. The only year that the leader-oriented press role suggestions outnumbered the people-oriented press role was 1983. Overall, more than three out of four journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role between 1984 and 1989. Only a few journalism educators suggested the leader- oriented press role in every year. Table 22 and Figure 6 show a year-by-year comparison of the leader-oriented press role suggested by the journalism educators. They show a downward trend over the years, except in 1987 when there was a slight increase. In 1988, no journalism educator suggested the leader-oriented press role. 136 Table 22 A Year-by-year Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Roles Discussed by the Journalism Educators, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE YEAR ROW Count 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 N Col % Leader- 2 2 2 l 3 O 1 11 oriented 66.7% 25.0% 13.3% 4.5% 21.4% 0.0% 10.0% 10.6% People- 1 6 13 19 11 31 9 9O oriented 33.3% 75.0% 86.7% 86.4% 78.6% 96.9% 90.0% 86.5% 0 O O 2 O 1 0 3 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 2.9% Column N = 3 8 15 22 14 32 10 Grand N = 104 Cramer’s V = 0.33 137 Table 22 and Figure 7 show a year-by-year comparison of the people-oriented press role suggested by the journalism educators. They show that more articles by journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role since 1984. In 1988, almost all journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role. Table 23 shows the 10 most discussed press role themes suggested by the journalism educators. In terms of the leader-oriented press role themes, the two most discussed were: the press should be the party's mouthpiece and news should be part of propaganda. In terms of the people- oriented press role themes, the two most discussed were: the press should be the people's mouthpiece, and the press should be the watchdog of the government. It also should be noted that many journalism educators suggested that news should not be a subset of propaganda. Additionally, the Four Insistences were not in the ten most discussed themes of the journalism educators. Table 24 shows that the national and provincial affiliation of the journalism educators did not make a difference in the press role suggested. Only one article written by a provincial journalism educator was recorded. These findings show that the journalism educators' suggestion of the press role gig change between 1983 and 1989. The journalism educators' press role changed from the 138 Table 23 Frequencies of the Journalism Educators' 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes, 1983-1989* YEAR 83 84 85 86 THEMES 1—_—2 1___2 1—__2 1—-_2 Mouthpiece 1 1 1 O 3 2 15 O Watchdog O O O O 5 O 8 1 Decision 0 O 0 O 0 O 5 O Surveys 0 O 1 0 1 0 4 0 Chief Editor 0 O 0 O 2 O 3 0 Checks & Balances O 0 0 O 0 O 2 0 Class Struggle O O 1 O 1 O 2 0 Press Law 0 O l O 2 0 3 0 Press Freedom 0 O 1 O 4 O 3 0 News/Propaganda O O 4 O 7 O 6 1 87 88 89 Total Mouthpiece 4 1 l3 0 2 O 39 4 Watchdog l O 16 O 5 O 35 1 Decision 2 O 11 0 5 O 23 O Surveys 1 O 1 O O O 8 0 Chief Editor 1 0 5 1 3 O 14 1 Checks & Balances O O 3 O 2 O 7 0 Class Struggle 2 O 5 O 1 O 12 0 Press Law 2 O 4 O 3 O 15 0 Press Freedom 2 O 4 O 4 O 18 O News/Propaganda 5 2 10 O 1 O 33 3 Note: laPeople-oriented, 2-Leader-oriented themes. * These 10 most discussed themes accounted for 86.5% of all themes. 139 Table 24 A Comparison of Possible Differences Among the Journalism Educators Because of National and Provincial Affiliation, 83-89 PRESS ROLE YEAR ROW Count 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 N Col % National Educators Leader- 2 2 2 1 2 O 1 10 oriented 66.7% 25.0% 15.4% 5.9% 18.2% 0.0% 10.0% 10.6% People- 1 6 11 14 9 31 9 81 oriented 33.3% 75.0% '84.6% 82.4% 81.8% 96.9% 90.0% 86.5% 0 O O 2 O 1 0 3 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 2.9% Column N = 3 8 13 17 11 32 10 Provincial Educators Leader- 0 O O O 1 O O 1 oriented 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% People- 0 O 2 5 2 O O 9 oriented 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 90.0% 0 0 O O O O O 0 Neutral 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Column N = O O 2 5 3 O 0 Grand N = 104 140 leader-oriented press role to the people-oriented press role after 1983. An overwhelming majority of journalism educators supported the people-oriented press role after 1984. RESEARC UESTION 4: WHA WAS THE EXTENT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEADERS AND JOURNALISTS IN DEFINING THE PRESS ROLE BETWEEN 1983 AND 1989? Tables 14 and 17 show the extent of agreement between the leaders and journalists in defining the press role between 1983 and 1989. Overall, more leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the journalists, 43 percent versus 25 percent, respectively. More journalists suggested the people-oriented press role than the leaders, 71.2 percent versus 54.4 percent, respectively. Tables 14 and 17 and Figure 6 show a year-by-year comparison of the extent of agreement in terms of the leader-oriented press role. In 1983, all leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role, whereas about one out of three (29 percent) journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role. Figure 6 shows that the difference between the leaders and journalists narrowed when more journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role and fewer leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role. The difference widened again in 1987, when almost one out of nine leaders (88.9 percent) and only one out three journalists (33.3 percent) suggested the leader-oriented press role. Almost 141 the same percentage of leaders and journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role in 1988 and 1989. Tables 14 and 17 and Figure 7 show a year-by-year comparison of the people-oriented press role suggested by the leaders and journalists. The leaders and journalists started with a big difference in 1983, 0 percent versus 71.2 percent, respectively. Over the years, the journalists always outnumbered the leaders in suggesting the people- oriented press role, except in 1986 when more leaders suggested the people-oriented press role than the journalists, 80.0 percent versus 63.8 percent, respectively. In 1988 and 1989, the gap between the leaders and journalists narrowed. The biggest difference between the leaders and journalists happened in 1987, when almost six out of ten (60.4 percent) journalists suggested the people- oriented press role, compared with one out of 10 leaders (11.1 percent) who suggested the same press role. Table 25 shows the press roles themes that the leaders and journalists agreed and disagreed with most. The theme on which the leaders and journalists disagreed with most was whether the press should be the party's or people's mouthpiece. The journalists suggested that the press should be the people's mouthpiece, and the leaders suggested otherwise. The themes on which the leaders and journalists agreed completely were that the press should uphold the Four 142 Table 25 Comparisons of the Frequencies of the 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989* YEAR 83 84 85 86 THEMES Mouthpiece Leaders Journalists Educators Watchdog Leaders Journalists Leaders Decision Leaders Journalists Educators Surveys Leaders Journalists Educators Chief Editor Leaders Journalists Educators H H H H H Haich N O-‘Ho CON N ...-e u—awo Host-I ON-h N HH CONN 01016 Ohio 000 0010 01—0 oun— ooo owo oov—a OHN HHo coo ooo OHN co-oo can oat- NNO o-u-ao OHO who wuo cum ooo ours: OHN N-hUI N wmw #010 011—01—- ooo om.— OHC on N a: O oo 40 Total 6 17 Mouthpiece Leaders Journalists 2 Educators Watchdog Leaders Journalists Educators Decision Leaders Journalists Educators Surveys Leaders Journalists Educators Chief Editor Leaders Journalists Educators huh- HNN a. co HmO—I (III-HO Nt-H-I N w Hw-h NNi-l Hut—- ONO OHO OHO OOH p—e N (D HOO GOO GOO GOO ONO GOO GOO GOO GOO GOO (A, H H 0030'! was» COO MQH Ho.— H N Hen-a- owl- 143 Table 25 (cont’d) O O! 83 84 85 H N H N p—a H N Checks & Balances Leaders Journalists Educators Four Insistences Leaders Journalists Educators Press Law Leaders Journalists Educators Press Freedom Leaders Journalists Educators News/Propaganda Leaders Journalists Educators woo COO OOH OOO NHO I-‘OO ONO OOO OOO OOO ONO N 0°C 0°C 0°C COO 0010 COD OOO OOO OU‘O OHH ONO 0°C 0°C OU'IO ONH NU‘IO awo NNO OOO OI—IO (”NH I—INO 00° 00° N-DN 0001—1 #00 87 88 89 Total Checks & Balances Leaders Journalists Educators Four Insistences Leaders Journalists Educators Press Law Leaders Journalists Educators Press Freedom Leaders Journalists Educators News/Propaganda Leaders Journalists Educators 01-01—- HNO‘ ON“ OOO ONO wwo OOO NNO NOH «50100 «5400, OOO (JOIN 1 23 10 OOO 00° 00° N‘O‘ OO-IO o—c OOO OOO OOO ONO) OOH N at NHO OOO 00° N O “NO OOO OOO 01400 NHH Hwo hwy—- Note: l-People-oriented, 2-Leader-oriented themes. * These 10 most discussed themes accounted for 85.67% of all themes. 144 Insistences, and the press law and press freedom should protect the journalists' news gathering rights and the people's right to know. These findings show that the extent of agreement between the leaders and journalists became greater in 1988 and 1989. Their extent of agreement between 1983 and 1987 was small. RESEA CH UESTION 5: WHA WA TH EXTENT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEADERS AND JOURNALISM EDUCATOR§ IN DEFINING THE PRESS ROLE BETWEEN 1983 ADD ;9§2? Tables 14 and 22 show the extent of agreement between :the leaders and journalism educators between 1983 and 1989. They indicate that the leaders and journalism educators differed greatly in their suggestions of the leader-oriented and people-oriented press role. Overall, more leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the journalism educators, 43 percent versus 10.6 percent, respectively. More journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the leaders, 86.5 percent versus 54.4 percent, respectively. Tables 14 and 22 and Figure 6 show a year-by-year comparison of the extent of agreement in terms of the leader-oriented press role. It started with a very big difference between the leaders and journalism educators in 1983, 100 percent versus 29 percent, respectively. The leaders and journalism educators maintained more than 50 145 percent difference between 1984 and 1985. Their difference narrowed in 1988 and 1989 when fewer leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role. Tables 14 and 22 and Figure 7 show a year-by-year comparison of the extent of agreement in terms of the people-oriented press role. It started with a more than 70 percent difference in 1983. The leaders and journalism educators maintained a more than 50 percent difference between 1984 and 1985. In 1986, the difference between the leaders and journalism educators became smaller. The difference increased to more than 60 percent in 1987. The difference narrowed in 1988 and 1989 when more leaders suggested the people-oriented press role, while the percentage of the journalism educators suggesting the people-oriented press role remained almost the same compared with the previous years. Table 25 shows the press role themes the leaders and journalism educators agreed and disagreed with most. The theme on which the leaders and journalism educators disagreed most was whether the press should be the party's or people's mouthpiece. The leaders suggested the press should be the party's mouthpiece and the journalism educators suggested otherwise. The themes on which the leaders and journalism educators agreed completely were the themes of upholding the Four Insistences, and the press law and press freedom to protect the journalists' news gathering rights and the people's right to know. 146 These findings show that the extent of agreement between the leaders and journalism educators became greater in 1988 and 1989. Their extent of agreement was small between 1983 and 1987. RESE CH UEST O 6' WAS THE E N GREEMENT BETWEEN THE JOURNALISTS 0 RNA IS EDUCA OR N DEFINING IflE RRESS ROLE BETWEEN 1983 AND 1989? Tables 17 and 22 show the extent of agreement between the journalists and journalism educators between 1983 and 1989. Overall, more journalists suggested the leader- oriented press role than the journalism educators, 25 percent versus 10.6 percent, respectively. More journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the journalists, 86.5 percent versus 71.2 percent, respectively. Tables 17 and 22 and Figure 6 show a year-by-year comparison of the extent of agreement in terms of the leader-oriented press role. Except in 1983, more journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role than the journalism educators. Their difference stayed at the 30 percent level between 1984 and 1986. Their difference began to narrow to 11.9 percent in 1987, and continued in 1988 and 1989, with less than 10 percent difference. Tables 17 and 22 and Figure 7 show a year-by-year comparison of the extent of agreement in terms of the people-oriented press role. Except in 1983, more journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the 147 journalists. In 1984 and 1985, their difference was more than 50 percent. Their differences narrowed to 18.2 percent in 1986 and continued until 1989, with less than 10 percent difference. Table 25 shows the press role themes the journalists and journalism educators disagreed and agreed with most. The theme on which the journalists and journalism educators disagreed most was whether the party's decision process should be more transparent. All journalism educators suggested that the decision should be more transparent, while some journalists disagreed. The theme on which the journalists and journalism educators agreed completely were the upholding of the Four Insistences, the press law and the press freedom to protect the journalists' news gathering rights and the people's right to know. These findings show that the extent of agreement between the journalists and journalism educators became greater in 1988 and 1989. Their extent of agreement was small between 1983 and 1987. It also should be noted that Figures 6 and 7 show that the difference between the leaders and the journalism educators was bigger than the difference between the leaders and journalists. This suggests that the journalists were closer to the leaders than the journalism educators. 148 RESEARC UESTI N ' D THE N O SAGREEMENT DISCUSSING TEE PRESE RDLE AMOEG IHE GROUPS SUPPORT IHE H PO HESIS ‘ H __ 0 SI! _ ‘T_ A MOD 7 WA 'RACTI E? First, the three periods were used for this analysis. The division of the Pre-Hu Yaobang period--from January 1983 to February 1985-~and the Post-Hu Yaobang period--from March 1985 to October 1987--was based on Hu-Yaobang's journalistic document made in February 1985. The Post-Zhao Ziyang period--from November 1987 to June 1989--was set after Zhao Ziyang announced his party document on journalism work in October 1987. Second, the answer to this question would depend on: (a) Whether the press role varied in the three periods: (b) whether the three groups' stances on the press role vary in these three periods: and (c) whether the leaders changed their positions in direction of the journalists and journalism educators and not vice versa? A. Did the press role vary in these three periods? Table 26 shows the different press roles suggested during the three periods. During the Pre-Hu Yaobang period, the leader-oriented press role was suggested more than the people-oriented press role. In the subsequent two periods, the suggestions of the people-oriented press role exceeded the leader-oriented press role. The difference between the leader-oriented press role and people-oriented press role became very big during the Post-Zhao Ziyang period: 3.2 percent versus 93.5 percent, respectively. 149 Table 26 The Press Role Suggested by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators During the Three Periods, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE PERIODS Count Pre Post Post Col % Hu Yaobang Hu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang Leader- 48 7O 7 oriented 52.7% 35.7% 3.2% People- 41 118 202 oriented 45.1% 60.2% 93.5% Neutral 2 8 7 2.2% 4.1% 3.2% Column N = 91 196 216 Grand N - 503 Cramer’s V = 0.32 150 B. Did the three groups' stances on the press role vary in these three periods? Table 27 and Figures 8 and 9 show the three groups' different stances on the press role. (1) WW: Table 27 and Figures 8 and 9 show that more leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the people-oriented press role during the Pre-Hu Yaobang period, 85 percent versus 15 percent. During the Post-Hu Yaobang period, more leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the people- oriented press role, although the difference was small, 55.6 percent versus 40.7 percent, respectively. The leaders changed to the people-oriented press role during the Post Zhao Ziyang period. Almost nine out of ten leaders (90.6 percent) suggested the people-oriented press role. (2) The jougnalisgs' ggangg on fine press rolg: Table 27 and Figures 8 and 9 show that more journalists suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader- oriented press role during all three periods. The differences during the first two periods were small, but the difference during the Post-Zhao Ziyang period was very big. During the last period, almost nine out of 10 journalists (93.6 percent) suggested the people-oriented press role. Table 27 151 A Period-by-period Comparison of the Leader-oriented and People-oriented Press Role Discussed by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989 PRESS ROLE Pre Hu Yaobang Leaders Leader 17 Oriented 85.0% People 3 oriented 15.0% Neutral 0 0.0% Column N = 20 Journalists Leader 27 Oriented 45.0% People 31 oriented 51.7% Neutral 2 3.3% Column N = 60 Journalism Educators Leader 4 Oriented 36.4% People 7 oriented 63.6% Neutral 0 0.0% Column N = 11 PERIOD Post Wu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang 15 55.6% 11 40.7% 1 3.7% 27 49 40.8% 66 55.0% 4.2% 120 12.2% 41 83.7% 4.1% 49 Post 2 6.3% 29 90.6% 1 3.1% 32 Grand N - 79 2.9% 131 93.6% 5 3.6% 140 Grand N - 320 2.3% 42 95.5% 2.3% 44 Grand N - 104 152 (3) The jegrneliem ngeaEers' stenee on the prees gele: Table 27 and Figures 8 and 9 show that more journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press roles during all three periods. The differences were big during these three periods: ranging from a difference of 27.2 percent, 71.6 percent, and 93.2 percent, respectively. C. Did the leaders change their position in direction of the journalists' and journalism educators' directions and not vice versa? (1) The suggesgiene ef tge leager-ezieeeeg prees rele among the leaders, joeggalisgs and jeurnalism educators: Figure 8 shows that more leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the journalists during the three periods. The differences between the leaders and journalists ranged from 40 percent, 14.8 percent, and 3.4 percent, respectively during the three periods. Figure 9 also shows that more leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than the journalism educators during the first two periods. The difference between the leaders and journalism educators were more than 40 percent during the first two periods. Their difference narrowed to 0.8 percent in the third period. Figure 9 shows that the stances of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators converged during the third period. The leaders showed the sharpest change from the second period to the third period. Figure 8 also shows 153 9O 80 70 60 50 40-1 percentages 30— 20- lO-* O 1 z 3 Pre Hu Post Hu Post Zhao periods 0 leaders + iournalists 0 educators Figure 8 A Period-by-period Comparison of the Leader-oriented Press Role by the , Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989 154 that the change by leaders and journalists was moderate from the first period to the second period and was more extreme from the second period to the third period. The journalism educators made a more extreme change from the first period to the second period and a more moderate change from the second period to the third period. (2) su st'o s o the eo -o 'ented ress role among the leeders, journalists and journalism educators: Figure 9 shows that more journalists suggested the people-oriented press role than the leaders during the three time periods. Their differences ranged from 36.7 percent, 14.3 percent, and 3.0 percent, respectively during the three periods. Figure 9 also shows that the leaders and journalism educators started with a 48.6 percent difference in the first period. The difference narrowed to 43.0 percent and 4.9 percent, respectively during the second and third periods. Figure 9 shows that the leaders, journalists and journalism educators converged during the third period. The leaders showed the sharpest change from the second period to the third period. Figure 9 also shows that the change by the journalists was moderate from the first period to the second period and was more extreme from the second period to the third period. The journalism educators made moderate changes from the first period to second period and from the second to the third period. 155 100 90- 80- l 70 O) I Al-l C 60 a); percentages 30- 204 15 10 1 Pre Hu Post Hu Post Zhao penods C1 leaders + iournalists O educators Figure 9 A Period-by-Period Comparison of the People-oriented Press Role by the Leaders, Journalists and Journalism Educators, 1983-1989 156 D. Did these findings support the hypothesis that an outside initiative model was practiced? The findings presented so far show two trends: (1) the journalism educators were always ahead of the leaders and journalists in emphasizing the people-oriented role: and (2) the sharpest change for the journalism educators came first between the first and second periods, while the sharp change for the journalists and leaders was later. To further examine what press role themes the leaders changed positions on toward journalists and journalism educators, the 10 most discussed press role themes were examined. There were several themes that the journalists and journalism educators raised more times than the leaders. They were: the use of readership surveys: the drafting of a press law; press freedom: and the relationship between news and propaganda. The frequencies with which these three themes were raised suggest that the journalists and journalism educators were more active in setting these agenda. Table 28 shows that the journalists and journalism educators made more suggestions in these themes than the leaders in the first two periods. They disagreed more during these two periods. The leaders agreed more with the journalists and journalism educators in the third period. 157 Table 28 A Comparison of the 10 Most Discussed Press Role Themes by All Groups During the Three Periods, 1983-1989 Pre Post Post THEMES Hu Yaobang Hu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang Total 1 1 2 l 2 1 2 Mouthpiece Leaders 1 8 l 8 4 1 6 17 Journalists 20 12 39 32 64 3 123 47 Educators 2 1 22 3 15 O 39 4 Watchdog Leaders 1 1 3 2 21 1 25 4 Journalists 5 1 11 2 61 O 73 3 Educators O O 14 1 21 0 35 1 Decision Leaders 0 3 2 2 6 O 8 5 Journalists 1 6 2 7 28 O 31 13 Educators O O 7 O 16 O 23 O Surveys Leaders 0 O 1 1 2 O 3 1 Journalists 7 4 10 3 5 0 22 7 Educators 1 O 6 O 1 O 8 0 Chief Editor Leaders 2 3 8 1 2 O 12 4 Journalists l 1 7 3 17 O 25 4 Educators 0 0 6 O 8 1 14 1 Checks & Balances Leaders 1 2 O 4 2 1 3 7 Journalists 5 4 2 6 10 1 17 11 Educators O O 2 O 5 O 7 0 Four Insistences Leaders 0 8 O 3 O 2 O 13 Journalists O 10 O 19 O 9 O 38 Educators O O O 3 O 2 O 5 Press Law Leaders 0 O 2 O 3 O 5 O Journalists 1 O 3 O 22 O 26 O Educators 1 O 6 O 8 O 15 0 Press Freedom Leaders 1 O 2 O 4 O 6 O Journalists 1 O 5 O 14 O 20 O Educators 1 O 8 O 9 O 18 O News/Propaganda Leaders 0 O 1 O l O 2 O Journalists 0 2 25 5 26 O 51 7 Educators 4 O 17 3 12 0 33 3 Note: l=People-oriented, 2=Leader-oriented themes. * These 10 most discussed themes accounted for 85.67% of all themes. 158 There were several issues that show the leaders changed their stance after some counter-arguments by the journalists and journalism educators. For example, the journalists and journalism educators disagreed with the leaders during the first two periods on whether the press should be the party's or people's mouthpiece. Then CCP secretary-general Hu Yaobang said in his 1985 journalistic document that the press should be proud to be the party's mouthpiece. However, Table 28 shows that more journalists and journalism educators suggested that the press should be the people's mouthpiece during the first two periods. The leaders changed their stance during the third period and agreed with the journalists and journalism educators. However, when the leaders suggested a press role theme that showed agreement with the existing stance of the journalists and journalism educators, the three groups show more agreement. The case in point is Zhao Ziyang's suggestion of making the party decision process more transparent, and that the press should serve as the watchdog of the government. During the Post-Zhao Ziyang period, the suggestions raised by the journalists and journalism educators increased significantly and they all showed the same stance. The stance of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators were the same throughout the three periods on another press role theme--the upholding of the Four Insistences. Table 25 shows that the leaders emphasized the 159 upholding of the Four Insistences. The journalists followed closely with this suggestion. The frequencies of the journalism educators raising this theme were few. This might indicate that the journalism educators did not follow the leaders' agenda as closely as the journalists or they thought other issues were more important. These findings support the hypothesis that the journalists and journalism educators did have some inputs in the agenda building process, and they did influence the leaders' stance in some cases. It also should be noted that the difference between the leaders and the journalism educators was bigger than the difference between the leaders and the journalists. Figure 9 shows that more journalists suggested the leader-oriented press role than the journalism educators during all three periods. The differences between the journalists and journalism educators were more than 28.6 percent during the Post-Hu Yaobang period. Moreover, more journalism educators suggested the people-oriented press role than the journalists. Their differences in the first two periods were about 11.9 percent and 28.7 percent, respectively. Their differences decreased to 1.9 percent during the third period. This suggests that the journalists were closer to the leaders than the journalism educators. Overall, the three groups' stances on the press role converged in 1988 and 1989, with the leaders and journalists making sharper changes to converge with the stance of the 160 journalism educators. The journalism educators made only moderate changes in their stance of the press role throughout the three periods. Chapter Six: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION This study examined the press role suggested by the CCP leaders, journalists and journalism educators during the journalistic reforms between 1983 and 1989. The findings indicate that all three groups changed from emphasizing the leader-oriented press role to the people-oriented press role. More leaders suggested the leader-oriented press role than did the journalists and journalism educators. More journalism educators and journalists suggested the people- oriented press role than the leaders. The three groups started with significant differences in 1983 and converged in 1988 and 1989. Throughout the years, journalists were more likely to agree with the leaders than were the journalism educators in suggesting a press role. This indicates that the journalists' idea of the press role was closer to those of the leaders than to those of the journalism educators. 161 162 The findings also show that national and provincial affiliation of the journalists and journalism educators did not make much difference in their suggestions about the press role. However, the national affiliation of the leaders, the party press affiliation and management positions held by the journalists did make a difference in the press role they suggested. More national leaders, non- party press journalists and reporters suggested the people- oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role. These results suggest two trends in the discussion of the press role in China during the journalistic reforms. First, the leaders, journalists and journalism educators changed their suggestions for the press role. Second, the opinions of a number of journalists and journalism educators differed significantly from the leaders' opinions during the agenda building process. This indicates that the journalists and journalism educators were two interest groups in China's policy making process, similar to some interest groups in Skilling and Griffith's (1971) study of Soviet politics. The journalists and journalism educators were not mere "transmission belts" of the party policy. The disagreements on some issues among the leaders, journalists and journalism educators show the groups had different agenda in the policy process. The findings suggest that both the mobilization model (in which the leaders initiated the agenda and were followed by the journalists and journalism educators) and the outside 163 initiative model (in which the journalists and journalism educators initiated the agenda adopted by the leaders) might have been practiced simultaneously. This probably reflects the complexity of the real-life interactions among different participants in an agenda building and policy making process. Based on these findings, the following discussion will address these six topics: (1) a review of the major press role themes on which the leaders, journalists and journalism educators agreed and disagreed: (2) an examination of some possible reasons why the press role changed from leader- oriented to people-oriented between 1983 and 1989: (3) implications of the findings in the policy making process in China: (4) implications of the findings in comparing world press systems: (5) limitations of the study: and (6) recommendations for future studies. QONTENT OF THE EAQOR DRESS RQLE THEMES ON WHICH THE LEADERSI JOURNALI TS i D JIU’ ',_ y HI 1 I1. “GI- I '-I I ‘ ’ I The study used 22 press role themes to analyze the three groups' stances on the press role, which were either leader-oriented or people-oriented. The themes represent the five affinities of the press role: (1) party affinity: (2) people affinity: (3) ideological affinity: (4) combative affinity; and (5) commercial affinity. The drafting of the press law in China introduced a new legal dimension in 164 discussing the press role. The three groups' discussion of the relationship between news and propaganda shows that they did not think news should be propaganda. The few mentions of the combative affinity and commercial affinity suggest that they were not important themes during the journalistic reforms between 1983 and 1989. The following discussion will cite some representative articles analyzed in the study to illustrate the three groups' opinions on three issues: (1) party affinity versus people affinity, (2) relationship between news and propaganda, and (3) the drafting of the first press law in the People's Republic of China. These three issues were among the top 10 most frequently discussed press role themes. In addition, the suggestions to change the newspaper ownership and give the chief editors more editorial autonomy will be discussed in greater detail. While editorial autonomy was among the top 10 themes, press ownership was not. However, the ownership issue showed how some journalists and journalism educators tried to achieve more independence from the party by proposing privately owned newspapers. The press ownership and editorial autonomy press role themes are part of the debate between party affinity and people affinity. 165 Party Affinity (dang xing) vegsgs People AffiniEy (renmin xing) The most discussed press role theme is whether the press should be the party's mouthpiece or the people's mouthpiece. This is a debate between party affinity (dang xing) and people affinity (renmin xing). Party affinity represents the leader-oriented press role, while people affinity represents the people-oriented press role. Some leaders and journalists suggested in a 1983 meeting of the Mid-South Newspapers Working Group that "the party press should represent the party and they should be proud to be the party's mouthpiece and its eyes and ears."1 The participants at the meeting said that the press should hold firmly to its party affinity and be synchronized with the ideological thinking of the party. The publisher of the Hubei Daily (Hubei Ribao), Fan Kun, said: The basic consensus of our editorial staff is: Hubei Daily is the party's mouthpiece. Upholding the party affinity is the basic principle of the newspaper. There is no need to talk about the so-called 'people affinity' (Fan, 1983, pp. 19-20). Hu Yaobang reaffirmed the importance of party affinity in his document on journalistic work in February 1985.2 However, some journalists said that the press should serve the people's needs. Readership surveys were used to better understand the people's needs. The first readership survey in Beijing in 1982 conducted by the Journalism Society in Beijing started a wave of such studies in China. 166 Many newspapers and television stations conducted research to try to understand their audiences. The thne_genznelien Yearbooh published survey results every year between 1983 and 1989. The increasing use of surveys represented a shift in attention from the senders to the receivers. The communicators were aware that they were not all-powerful senders (Lau and Qin, 1989). The editors of the Linening_neily (Liaoning Ribao) emphasized the importance of serving the people in their design of the newspaper (Editorial Office of Liegning_Deily, 1986, pp. 21—22). Some journalists and leaders believe that the newspaper content should be made more interesting to increase readership. The chief editor of Shenyang Deily (Shenyang Ribao), Liu Haijia (1985, p. 3), said, "People's affinity is to serve the people." The chief editor of giejeng_Deily (Jiefang Ribao), Chen Nienyun (1985, p. 20), asked whether the press should be the "people's teacher or public servant?" Chen and other journalists suggested that the newspapers should be made "more readable, credible and closer to the readers (kedu kexin keqin)." Some leaders agreed with this suggestion. Chen also said that the concept of "the press as the party's mouthpiece" was fading. Chen was referring to the newspaper as authoritative party document. Study sessions to analyze the content of the newspapers were fewer. He said the press should be the people's "servant with a smile," instead of being their "stern teacher." The 167 journalists suggested that the press should abandon the top- down attitude and switch to the bottom-up approach. Hu Yaobang also said in his document on journalistic work that the press should be the link between the people and the party. ...For the party's journalism to fully play its role as the party's mouthpiece, then this naturally includes the role of conveying information from the upper levels (party) downward and from the lower levels (people) upward, the role of strengthening ties between the party and the masses and reflecting the masses cries, and the role of satisfying in every respect the mass' requirement for information (Hu, 1985, K1). A 1986 meeting of the chief editors from all provinces, with officials from the Propaganda Department attending, summarized the debate between the party affinity and people affinity into five areas of changes.3 First, it should change from a one-way top-down communication to a two-way communication between the top and bottom. That is, the press should play a dual role: for the party to disseminate directives to the people and for the people to serve as the watchdog of the government. Second, the press should change from serving one function to serving many functions. Six functions of the press were suggested: to disseminate news, propagate ideological thinking, reflect public opinion, spread knowledge, provide entertainment and promote product information (advertising). Third, it should change from a closed system to an open system. The press should widen the reader's horizon to new ideas and the world. Fourth, it should change from directing to serving the people. Fifth, 168 it should change from one-way instilling the people to two- way exchanges of ideas with the people. The journalism educators also contributed to the debate between party affinity and people affinity. A journalism educator at the Journalism Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yuan Hai, suggested that the newspapers should not be the "collective organizer" (zuzhi zuoyong): The press is a tool for public opinion. Its content has no power as a legal directive (falingxing) and enforcement (changjixing) to the people. The people can choose to follow the directives or not to follow them. If this title of "collective organizer" is forced upon the press, this will only increase the "official tone" (yamen qiang) of the news coverage. People will develop a rebellious feeling, and, thus, affect its effectiveness (Yuan, 1987, pp. 46-47). One chief editor of an evening newspaper in Yunan province succinctly summarized the importance of serving the people: "The only criterion to judge the success of a newspaper is whether the readers like it or not" (Ying, 1988, pp. 17-18).‘ Table 25 shows that the debate among the leaders, journalists and journalism educators on the press role in 1988 and 1989 came to a consensus--that the press should be the people's mouthpiece. The leaders changed from a strong belief in the press as the party's mouthpiece between 1983 and 1987 to accepting the press as the people's mouthpiece in 1988 and 1989. 169 Relatignshin hehween News eng Bhopagange The discussion of whether the press should be a party's or people's mouthpiece is related to the discussion of the relationship between news and propaganda. Many leaders, journalists and journalism educators had assumed that news is a subset of propaganda. Many studies in the Western 1 literature (e.g., Houn, 1961 and Yu, 1964) were based on the same assumption. Several articles analyzed in this study show some journalism educators and journalists tried to clarify and redefine the relationship of news and propaganda. The journalism educators had a more active discussion about the relationship between news and propaganda than the leaders and journalists. In 1985, the gournalism Journal carried in several consecutive issues a special section about the relationship of news and propaganda. A journalism educator at Fudan University, Ge Zhiren, traced the origin of how news was considered propaganda (Ge, 1984, pp. 6-11). According to the "Resolution on Propaganda Work in the Second Plenary of the Sixth Party Congress" passed in June 1929, the functions of news and propaganda were defined as: Newspapers should use the people's own attitude and the news to propagate the party's ideas. This will make the newspapers more suited to the people's needs and interests, and can influence and be well accepted by the people. ( Col ect'o 0 hi es ommun's P rt Journalistie Wenh Documenhs, vol. 1, 1980). 170 Ge said news has played a subordinate role to propaganda since then. During the Cultural Revolution, news was non-existent in the newspapers and the news content was propaganda material used as a class struggle tool (Ge, 1984, p. 6). Many journalism educators felt that the relationship between news and propaganda should be redefined. The purpose was to set the press role on the right course for the new political and economic needs after the fall of the "Gang of Four."5 Figure 10 shows four possible relationships between news and propaganda summarized by a provincial journalism researcher (Yang, 1986, pp. 55-58): 1. News is a subset of propaganda. 2. News and propaganda have some intersection as two entities. 3. News and propaganda are two separate entities. That means they have no relationship. 4. News and propaganda are exactly the same. After some debates, the leaders, journalists and journalism educators agreed that news and propaganda are two entities with some common grounds. But it was not clear how much overlap news and propaganda should have. Then, some journalism educators introduced the concept of public opinion in the relationship between news and propaganda. The consensus after some discussion was: news, propaganda and public opinions are three entities, but they have mutually related areas. 171 Propaganda Propaganda . Propaganda News=Propaganda Figure 10 Pelatlonshlp Between News and Propaganda 172 Ge Zhiren summarized the definition of propaganda, news and public opinion. Propaganda is defined as using a message to influence the receiver to accept the sender's viewpoints. News is defined as the reportage of recently occurring facts that the people want to know. Many leaders, journalists and journalism educators also emphasized that news should be accurate. News should be based on facts and should not be based on propaganda needs. This is different from the "false, exaggerated, and empty reports" (jia, da, kong) published during the Cultural Revolution. Some journalists said that news should provide information without any intention of influencing the readers (Wu, 1985, pp. 16-18). For example, weather reports are news but they are not disseminated for the purpose of influencing the people according to the sender's purpose. Additionally, news was recognized as a commercial product. That means commercial affinity (shangping xing) was recognized. This has allowed the re-emergence of advertising in the media. Public opinion was defined as collective viewpoints of a group of people. It reflects the feeling of a group of people at one point in time (Luo, 1987, pp. 23-24). At a meeting to discuss the journalistic theory of the relationship between news, propaganda and public opinion, the participants agreed that these three are equal and one is not subordinate to the others.6 173 Table 25 shows that more journalism educators raised this press role theme than the journalists. The leaders only raised this issue twice; once each in 1986 and 1988. The journalism educators and journalists mostly suggested that news should not be propaganda. The aftin China' F s ess Law The drafting of the press law in China is significant in the journalistic reforms because it represents the desire of the drafters to make journalism subject to the rule of law (fazhi) rather than the temperament of individual leaders (renzhi). Many journalists and journalism educators hope that the press law would protect their news-gathering rights, the people's right to know and press freedom. The drafting of the press law was officially suggested at the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress, the highest decision-making body in China (Fu, 1984, pp. 2-5). In 1984, the Propaganda Department called a meeting to discuss the press law. Then the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress appointed the Educational and Cultural Affairs Sub-committee to be responsible for the drafting of the press law (Fu, ibid.). A veteran journalist and former publisher of Peeplele_heily, Hu Jiwei, was appointed to head the sub-committee. By 1988, three different versions of the press law draft were 174 circulated for comments. The press law, scheduled to be discussed at the National People's Congress, was withdrawn from the agenda after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. This lengthy process of drafting the press law shows that there was no consensus on what the press law should cover and whose rights it should protect. To show how the drafting of the press law progressed, the issues discussed by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators are presented here chronologically. In 1984, Fu Yuzhang raised three issues about the press law (Fu, ibid). First, should the journalists follow the party's directives or the press law? If the party's directives are the guiding principles, there is no need to have a press law. If there is a press law, do the journalists follow the press law and not the party directives? Second, does the press law protect or restrict the journalist's news gathering rights? What are the parameters for the journalists? Can the journalists have full freedom within the parameters? Third, what is the appropriate format to administer journalistic activities? Should an office be established in the government to oversee the implementation other than the Propaganda Department of the Party Central? In 1985, the Educational and Cultural Affairs Sub- committee of the National People's Congress organized a symposium in Shanghai to discuss the press law. Three issues were raised (Journalism Rhone, 1985, p. 8). First, 175 the press law should specify clearly the people's freedom of speech and their right to publish. Second, journalists should enjoy freedom of speech and publication in accordance to the rights written in the constitution. Third, an office should be set up to administer press registration and approval.7 In 1986, four journalism educators from the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, Xu Yaokui and his associates, quoted a Propaganda Department report on the press law (Xu Yaokui et al., 1986, pp. 3-10). The report said that the press law should allow the right to criticize the government. The press should be penalized if it publishes false and inaccurate reports or leaks national secrets.8 Xu et al. (1986, p. 3-10) suggested four rights be included in the press law. First, all news based on facts should have the right to be published as long as it does not violate the constitution and the law or harm the people. Party press should still abide by the party constitution. Second, press freedom includes the right to criticize the government. Third, it is necessary to strengthen self-discipline of the journalists. Journalist associations could set up press councils to criticize wrongdoings and unethical behavior in the press circle. Fourth, the appropriate departments should give awards to those news units and journalists who have contributed to the promotion of national policies. In 1988, a journalism educator from Fudan University, 176 Xu Peiding (1988, pp. 11-13), raised four questions about the press law. First, what kind of press law should it be? Xu said three ideas have been suggested about this issue. They were: (a) the press law should encourage journalists to speak freely; (b) the press law cannot protect press freedom because this is already guaranteed by the constitution--the press law could only restrict press freedom: (c) the press law is an administrative law under the constitution, and its purpose is to protect press freedom and stop abuses of press freedom. Second, should journalists be cadres of the party? Xu said there is more harm than benefit in specifying that journalists be cadres. Third, should the press law adopt the term "press freedom"? Xu said this term should be used in the press law. Fourth, should the people be allowed to own and publish their newspapers (minban baozhi)? Xu said if people can own and publish their newspapers, this newspaper ownership structure will allow diversity. In 1988, in an editorial note accompanying an article on the press law, the editor of gennnelien_£;enh summarized the controversies surrounding the drafting of the press law (Sima, 1988, pp. 4-5). First, should the press law be based on current experiences or be more far-sighted? Second, should the press law define press freedom and how to define it? Third, should the people be allowed to own and publish their newspapers? Fourth, should those news stories criticizing the government officials be seen by the officials concerned? Fifth, should non-party press be 177 obliged to propagate the party's policies? The press freedom issues were discussed in greater detail by two articles carried in the Jen;nelien_lennnel in 1989. Liao Xiaoying (1989, pp. 1-7) of the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences suggested press freedom should have four meanings: (a) people should have the right to own and publish their newspapers: (b) people should have the right to free speech: (c) people should have the right to know: and (d) news editors should have the freedom to decide what to publish. The press freedom discussion was best summarized by the Collected Essays on Press Ereedom (Xinwen Ziyou Lunji) edited by the China Journalism Society (Zhongguo Xinwen Xuehui) in 1988. A note explaining the publication of this book said, "This book was edited at the end of 1986 and for some reason its publication was delayed until fall 1988." The introduction, "The Freedom to Discuss 'Press Freedom'" (Tanlun 'Xinwen Ziyou' de ziyou), written by Hu Jiwei summarized the progress of the discussion of press freedom in China. Table 25 shows that the leaders, journalists and journalism educators had total agreement on the introduction of the press law throughout the years. They believe that the press law should protect the journalist's news-gathering rights, the people's right to know, and press freedom should be encouraged. The discussion of the press law involved deciding what principles to be covered. 178 It also should be noted that the journalists and journalism educators were leading the way in discussing the press law and press freedom. The leaders did not express their opinions about these two themes until 1986. The number of times the journalists and journalism educators raised these two themes outnumbered the leaders. They showed that the journalists and journalism educators were helping to set the agenda and the leaders followed their suggestions. Table 25 shows that while the journalists and journalism educators had increased their suggestions on the press law and press freedom in 1989, the leaders only mentioned press freedom once and did not comment on the press law at all. This might suggest that the leaders felt differently about these issues in 1989. Two other issues--newspaper ownership structure and editorial autonomy--raised by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators are explored further here. They highlighted the journalists' and journalism educators' attempts to seek financial and professional independence from the party, thus, helping to promote the people-oriented press role. The call for editorial autonomy was one of the top 10 most frequently discussed press role themes. hewspaper Ownership Sprucpnpe Some journalists and journalism educators suggested that the ownership structure of the newspapers should be 179 expanded. First, non-party newspapers should be allowed to exist and play a role different from the party press. Second, some journalists even said that the people should own and publish their newspapers. In 1985, Hu Yaobang had rejected the idea of privately owned newspapers. The rationale for privately owned newspapers was that if economic reforms had made possible privately owned businesses, why not include newspapers? In reply, Hu Yaobang said in his 1985 document: In fact, even the reform of the economic structure is only a reform of the operational management system and not a fundamental change in the nature of the ownership system. The sole aim of invigorating the socialist enterprises is to establish a socialist economic structure full of vitality; it is impermissible to change the nature of the socialist public ownership system. As far as operations are concerned, the party's journalism organs are a kind of enterprise, but they are first of all organs of public opinion. No matter what kind of reforms we are carrying out, we absolutely cannot change in the slightest the nature of the party's journalism or change the relations of this work to the party. It therefore will not do to copy in journalism certain expressions used in reform of the economic structure without analyzing it (Hu, 1985, K3). Despite Hu's statement, some journalism educators and journalists still raised this issue later. In 1986, Xu Yaokui (1986, pp. 3-10) and his associates at the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, proposed a multi-layer newspaper ownership structure. With the party press as the core of the structure, they proposed the following types of ownership: (a) newspapers owned by the government agencies, trade unions, social groups: (b) newspapers owned by the economic enterprises or colleges: 180 (c) other newspapers that are collectively owned by a group of people. They suggested that there should be a clear distinctiOn between the party press and non-party press; and political press versus the non-political press. Ln Huaimin (1986, pp. 3-7), a journalism educator, suggested that some non-party newspapers could be operated by individual units under the principle of financial self- sufficiency. These non-party newspapers, Lu suggested, should enjoy legal status (faren). They could publish all types of news, including public opinion and party's policies. The emergence of financially self-sufficient newspapers was further analyzed by two staffers of the State Press and Publication Administration Office, Liang Heng and Kuang Jin (1988, pp. 6-9), in their 1988 article in the goupnalism genznel. They said about 90 to 150 newspapers were affiliated with some units in name only so that they can obtain the registration permits. These newspapers formed their editorial board first before finding a unit to be their sponsor. Sometimes the only connection between the editorial board and the sponsoring unit was that the unit helped keep the newspaper's personnel files. Further, the editorial office ran its own affairs, including being solely responsible for its profit or loss and the newspaper's assets. The sponsoring unit did not give the editorial office any financial support. Sometimes, the editorial board paid some administration fees to the units for 181 sponsorship. The editorial board was solely responsible for its editorial content. The newspapers that have used this ownership include lnfoznetion Express (Xinxi Kuaibao) in Shangdone province: WWW (Zhongguo Nungchun Jingyingbao) in Beijing: W c nom al (Shijie Jingji Daobao) in Shanghai: and the fiainan Development News (Hainan Kaifabao) and fiainan Ecenomic Deily (Hainan Jingjibao) on Hainan Island. Among these, the most famous is the World Economic Hegeld, whose late editor, Qin Benli, was credited with publishing news different from the party policy before and after the Tiananmen incident in 1989.9 The domestic and international editions of the World Economic Herald enjoyed popularity among journalists and the people (Chang, 1989, pp. 130-150). The two staffers of the State Press and Publication Administration Office proposed setting up a dual newspaper administration system. First, the party press should be the party's mouthpiece and publish the party's documents and important government news. These party publications should be fully supported by the party in providing workers, money and assets. Second, the non-party press should enjoy its legal status (faren diwai). They should not belong to any party units and should not be obliged to publish party news. They should reflect the public's opinions. The party should have no responsibility to provide workers, money and assets to support these newspapers. Their survival should depend on whether they can compete for readership and financial 182 resources. These newspapers should be subject to the rules of the law and regulations (Liang and Kuang, 1988, pp. 6-9). They also suggested that the propaganda departments at each level should still supply party documents and directives to these non-party press or "privately owned newspapers" (minban baozhi). Moreover, the press and publication administration offices at each level should review the qualifications of the publisher and chief editor. If their qualifications were approved, they could apply for registration. Upon approval, they could enjoy their legal status as a newspaper. These newspapers also would pay taxes and be subject to the jurisdiction by the government departments such as material resources supply, tax, trade and commerce. Before the two staffers suggested this dual system, several journalism educators and journalists had made similar suggestions at an academic symposium organized by the Capital Journalism Society (Shoudu Xinwen Xuehui) in November 17 to 27, 1987.10 Gan Xifen, of the Journalism Department of the People's University of China, suggested that Beijing and Shanghai should first have non-party owned daily newspapers and, if some provinces had the resources, they should be allowed to publish non-party owned n newspapers. At the same meeting, Zhang Huanzhang, of the China Youth News (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao), suggested that the government, social organizations and individuals should be 183 allowed to own and publish newspapers.12 The Qhina_Jeurnalism_xearbegk_12§§ also published a list of privately and publicly owned newspapers during the early 19505 to show that different newspaper ownership had existed in China. This may be the yearbook editors' attempt to contribute to the discussion of this issue. The yearbook was edited by the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences. Editorial Autonomy Tied in with the argument for a non-government press is the suggestion to give the chief editors more or less full editorial autonomy in deciding news content. This would allow the press to serve as a system of checks and balances of the government and to use public opinion to supervise the government (yulun jiandu). Further, this would allow the press to reflect public opinion during the policy making process. Table 25 shows that these were two of the most frequently discussed press role themes during the journalistic reforms. It is not surprising that the journalists raised this theme more than the leaders and journalism educators. The journalists tried to seek their professional recognition. The journalists' call for editorial autonomy was supported by the journalism educators. 184 Chen Zhongshan (1988, pp. 20-23), a journalism educator at the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, traced the origin of the "review and censorship system" (shencha jidu) that has undermined the editor's autonomy. The 1951 "Resolution of the Party Central on Newspapers Using Criticism and Self-Criticism" stipulated that "The Party Central decides all newspapers and publication should carry out criticism and self- criticism for all wrongdoings in our work" (Chen, ibid.) Chen said the first case that set the rule--"the party press cannot criticize the same level party secretary and committee"--is the xishan Beasant hewe (Yishan Nongmin Bao) in March 1953. The Comment (pijian) of the Propaganda Department said: Party press is the mouthpiece of the party. The editorial board of the party has no right to oppose the party secretary and committee. If the editorial board has different opinions, it can raise that with the party secretary or committee. If necessary, it can report to the upper level party secretary or committee or even the Party Central. Not asking for instructions (qingshi) before criticizing the party secretary, or using the newspaper as a forum to debate with the party secretary is inappropriate. This way of doing things is a separation from the party's guidance, and also is a serious violation of organization discipline (Chen, ibid.). Chen Zhongshan quoted the 1951 resolution to show that the policy of not permitting the newspaper to criticize the party secretary at the same level contradicts the directives of the 1951 resolution. 185 All newspaper editors and reporters should be responsible independently for the criticism they release openly in the newspapers. In the past, many provincial newspapers had such practice--they sent those articles which criticized the party secretary and staffs concerned for a preview. They will publish the article only after seeking their agreement. This practice had helped avoid many inaccurate and inconsiderate criticisms during the war period when investigation was inconvenient. To continue such practice under the current conditions would do more harm than benefit. It is not appropriate. From now on, the workers of the newspapers should still seek opinions from the departments concerned if they are uncertain of the accuracy of the criticisms. If they think they are accurate, they should still publish the criticism even when they have not consulted the person or unit being criticized (Chen, ibid.). Chen said the Party Central's 1951 resolution clearly expressed that the "review and censorship system" introduced during the war period should be abolished. Chen criticized the Propaganda Department's Comment as contradicting the 1951 resolution. After 1957, Chen said, all editors lost their right to criticize the party. He said this was the cause of all wrongdoings of the government because it was left unchecked. He also criticized the 1981 "Resolution of the Party Central on the Current News and Broadcasting Propaganda Policy" for stipulating that newspaper criticism "should seek the opinion of the department or person involved before publication." He suggested that all those documents that restrain the rights of the journalism to checks and balances should be abolished. Some leaders supported the journalists' call for editorial autonomy. For example, the deputy director of the Propaganda Department, Tan Tan, said at the meeting of all 186 provincial chief editors in 1986 that the chief editors should have editorial autonomy to decide what to publish as long as the content does not violate the Four Insistences and the party policy.13 Some leaders had encouraged journalists to practice editorial autonomy. For example, a city party secretary in Hunan Province said he did not want to say too much about the editorial policy. He said if he gave too many instructions to the editor, he would have done the work of the chief editor. He encouraged the chief editor and his staff to take control of the newspaper's content and said he would take a "hands-off policy" (Sun Yongjiu, 1986, pp. 17- 18). It seems that whether editorial autonomy was practiced depends on whether the leaders openly encouraged the editors to take charge. A case in point is the Shehen gonnunieation Rene (Shekou Tungxun Bao) in February 28, 1982. The newspaper wanted to publish a reader's letter, "Please Pay More Attention to Management--A Suggestion to Comrade Yuan Geng" (Gai zhiyi guanli le--xiang Yuan Geng tongzhi jin yi yan).“ The editor asked Yuan Geng, chief of the Shekou District, whether the letter should be published, and if so, whether his name should be deleted. After Yuan Geng gave the green light, the article was published with the name of Yuan Geng as the target.15 This case suggests that editorial autonomy depends on the approval of the leader. A provincial journalist, Sun Yousheng of Dalian Daily 187 (Dalian Ribao), said journalism reforms were difficult to achieve because the editors had no autonomy. Sun (1988, p. 4) said the editor is like a butler in a house. Although he has keys to all the doors in a house, he is not the master. He said many articles criticizing the government were either banned in the process of seeking approval, changed completely, or "watered down" after many revisions by party officials at different levels and units. He said if this is not changed, the press cannot serve a checks and balances role to the government and the journalistic reforms would not make much progress. During a meeting of all chief editors in 1986, they suggested that the editors should be given the fullest degree of autonomy, including allowing the newspapers to make mistakes. When newspapers do make mistakes, the party should help instead of simply blaming them. The editors at the meeting also suggested that the journalists should strengthen their professionalism and ideological knowledge to perform their task.16 The title of an award-winning essay published in the Joupnelism Egenp in May 1989, "Chief Editor, You Can March Ahead Courageously," best summarized the desire of the journalists to gain editorial autonomy (Wang, 1989, pp. 18- 19). 188 R SON TE _’R _iI-' 1.1- -I SRIM .l‘II-ILE __I I EO -ORIENT B This discussion will explore some possible reasons why the suggested press role changed from leader-oriented to people-oriented. These reasons include: (1) the leaders, journalists and journalism educators learned from the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution: (2) increased competition among the newspapers: and (3) changing political and economic conditions within China during this period. Wen Jize (1983, pp. 14-15), a veteran journalist and journalism educator at the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, said 90 percent of the party policies were disseminated by the party press before the establishment of the people's republic. Therefore, the press content was treated as party documents. Li Liangrong (1986, pp. 7-12), a journalism educator at Fudan University, proposed that the press does not need to play the same role now. Li said that when communication facilities were inadequate during the Sino-Japanese war and pre-liberation days before 1949, newspapers were the only means for the party to send its directives to the people. The press then was almost like an official document that people studied carefully. Thus, it established its role as the party's mouthpiece. This was no longer necessary in the 1980s because many more channels of communication were available. 189 Moreover, the problem of such practice is that when the party makes mistakes, the credibility of the press would be affected. For example, when the "Gang of Four" controlled the press during the Cultural Revolution, they used the press to serve their political ambitions. Some journalists and journalism educators suggested that if the press content does not always represent the party's views exclusively, the errors in the press would not affect its credibility. More importantly, if the press represents people affinity rather than party affinity only, it will be a medium for reflecting different opinions and there will not be right or wrong opinions. The increased competition among newspapers also caused the leaders and journalists to pay more attention to the people's needs. As part of the political and economic system, the media may have contributed to the economic reforms. The economic reforms adopted by the leaders changed the media environment. Statistics show that about 1,008 new newspapers were founded between 1980 and 1985. This represented 56.8 percent of all newspapers founded between 1950 and 1978 (Ensxs1eeedia_ef_ghinese_nerseaeer§. 1988, p. 516). More newspapers were competing for readers during the period under study than ever before. Moreover, the types of newspapers available also increased during this period. Statistics show that party press accounted for 20.7 percent of all newspapers registered in 1985 (Ens2sl2eedia_ef_2hinese_uer§eaeers. 190 1988, p. 517). Specialty publications, such as science and technology newspapers and television weeklies, were more popular than the party press. Statistics compiled from the Chine Journalism Yeerpeok for 1983 to 1989 show that the circulation of the Eeople's Daily dropped steadily from 520 million copies in 1982 to 450 million copies in 1988. However, the number of evening newspapers, which were popular among the people and did not contain many party documents, increased from 13 in 1982 to 38 in 1988. Their combined circulation increased from 38.9 million in 1982 to 82.5 million in 1988. This has convinced many leaders and journalists that the people-oriented thinking in publishing the newspapers would expand their reach. They realized that attracting readers depends on whether the papers meet readers' needs. As the chief editor of uenfang Daily (Nanfang Ribao) said: "The editorial policy of Nenfeng_Deily is to disseminate information, explore issues, serve the people and guide their daily life" (xie, 1987, pp. 11-12). The chief editor of Jiefeng Daily in Shanghai, Chen Nienyun (1985. p. 20), said that competition has forced the party press to be more sensitive to the people's needs. Chen said it was no longer possible to use party directives to ask different units to subscribe the newspapers. He said that the party newspapers were skimmed in the office with many people preferring to read the evening newspapers at home carefully. He said study sessions using the party press were seldom seen. He believed that the interests of 191 the readers have changed. The readers wanted to get information on how to "get rich, attain knowledge and seek entertainment." Additionally, the central government also pressured the media to be self-sufficient financially. Survival was an urgent incentive for meeting the readers' needs. The rising production cost also was a financial burden for the newspapers.17 Because of less financial subsidy from the government, the newspapers relied more on subscription and advertising as revenues. About one-third to one-half of some newspapers' revenues was said to come from advertising in 1988. The dependence on advertising revenues also makes it important to have many readers. All these developments indicate that the relationship between the press and the people has changed toward a more commercial system--the people, as the consumers, influence the survival of the press, and not only the party's subsidy (Li Liangrong, 1988, pp. 5-8). The changing political and economic conditions in China also contributed to the change from the leader-oriented press role to the people-oriented press role. The third plenary session of the 11th Party Congress charted a new political and economic course. It denounced the "class struggle line" during the Cultural Revolution and determined to achieve "Four Modernizations" in agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology.18 The economic development accelerated the need for information 192 within and across regions. The newspapers and other media changed their content to meet this new need. Moreover, the re-opening of the doors of China to the outside world also has brought new ideas to China. People were not so ready to accept everything the leaders said or the policy directives carried in the press. The Chinese people were getting more pluralistic as Munro (1989) and Burns and Rosen (1986) had suggested. Li Liangrong and Sun Wei (1988, pp. 8-10), two journalism educators at Fudan University, said that pluralistic ideas prevail in the world and so news should reflect these phenomena by carrying more diversified coverage. The introduction of the concept of public opinion shows that the Chinese leaders, journalists and journalism educators recognized that different opinions existed in society. A Public Opinion Institute was established in the People's University of China in 1986. Then secretary- general Zhao Ziyang also encouraged the use of the press as a medium of discussion (xieshang) and dialogue between the leaders and the people. This has contributed further to the change of the press role. As a Eeople's Daily journalist, Ding Jichong, said: Discussion and dialogue is part of the socialist democratic system. It also means exchanges between the top and bottom, and a means to solve problems. Our reports of discussion and dialogue should show equal and democratic spirit. This will ensure the readers will read the report about dialogue and will listen to the arguments suggested (Ding, 1987, p. 18). 193 IM'__C‘ ON 0, , n.9Y' I o. 4., '0 , rte lN ChINA The differences among the opinions of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators suggest that the leaders did not dominate the agenda building process. Whether the inputs of the journalists and journalism educators were adopted in the policy decision is, however, beyond the scope of the data in this study. The total agreement among the three groups of upholding the Four Insistences indicates that this was a parameter for the discussion and the change of the press role. The university student demonstrations and their burning of copies of the Deijing Daily, the party press, in late 1986 signaled their distrust of the party mouthpiece.‘19 It also showed discontent among a group of citizens toward the party. The leaders announced the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign in early 1987 and put the blame on some journalists and intellectuals for causing the unrest. Many journalists again pledged allegiance with the Four Insistences. Some journalists were removed from their posts. Notably, the geople's Deily reporter, Liu Binyan, was expelled from the Party as one of three intellectuals held responsible for the student demonstrations. Several articles in the lengneliem_§;enp in February 1987 openly named Liu Binyan as the "black hand" behind the student movement. The Deeple's Daily Discipline Committee said: 194 He (Liu) criticized the Four Insistences as an antiquated concept that has led China to several catastrophes. (He said) it is rigid and dogmatic. (He also said) it sounds good but its content is conservative and even reactionary...To uphold the party discipline and its constitution, we decided to expel Liu Binyan from the party.“’ Other journalists and intellectuals also were under the party's pressure to do self-criticism. Some journalists, willingly and unwillingly, wrote articles and made speeches to support the party's directives. The increase of pro-Four Insistences press role themes in 1987 was consistent with the political campaign pattern in China. The anti-bourgeois campaign in early 1987 did have an impact on the press roles suggested by some leaders, journalists and journalism educators. Articles by the leaders and journalism educators increased their suggestions of the leader-oriented press role sharply from 1986 to 1987, despite a continuously declining trend between 1983 and 1986. However, the articles by the journalists suggesting the leader-oriented press role continued to decline slightly between 1986 and 1987, following their steadily declining trend between 1983 and 1988. These changes suggested that the journalists and journalism educators would retreat in their discussion to conform to the leaders' views when threatened with repercussions. Table 22 shows that the number of articles by journalism educators decreased from 22 in 1986 to 14 in 1987. Of these 22 articles, the number of articles suggesting the leader-oriented press role increased from one to three, while the articles suggesting the people- 195 oriented press role decreased from 19 to 11. Table 17 shows that the journalists in fact increased their number of articles from 47 in 1986 to 48 in 1987, while their suggestions of the leader-oriented press role continued to decrease. Further, Tables 17 and 22 show that 29 articles of the journalists (60.4 percent of all articles) advocated the people-oriented press role, compared to 11 articles of the journalism educators (78.6 percent of all articles) suggesting the same press role. These changes suggested that the journalists, though lagging behind the journalism educators in advocating the people-oriented press role between 1983 and 1987, were more aggressive than the journalism educators in seeking a new press role despite pressures from the anti-bourgeois campaign. However, the fact that the journalism educators did not increase their mentions of the upholding of the Four Insistences in 1987 shows that they did not follow the leader's party line closely. Because they were not practicing journalism on the front line, there was more distance from the leaders than there was from the journalists., This could explain why they could avoid making public allegiance to the Four Insistences. Or the few mentions of the Four Insistences by the journalism educators may mean it was not an important issue to them. The findings in this study have shown that the farther away the journalists and journalism educators were from the leaders, the more likely they were to suggest the people- 196 oriented press role. The non-party press journalists and reporters suggested a more people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role. The journalism educators, who focus more on the theory than practice of journalism, suggested a more people-oriented press role than the leader- oriented press role. Kelly (1987) said the student demonstration and its subsequent repercussion on the Chinese intellectuals followed Goldman and Wagner's (1987) suggestion of a cyclical pattern. Goldman and Wagner said: Since the Party came to power in 1949, it has sought the co-operation of intellectuals in developing the economy, but it has also insisted that they conform to every shift in the Party's political and ideological line. Since these goals are contradictory, policy towards intellectuals has oscillated between periods of repression and periods of relative relaxation. These cycles are influenced by political and economic events, but they have a dynamic of their own: the Party insists more and more strongly on conformity until the intellectuals become reluctant to co-operate with it: then it relaxes its control until the intellectuals' independence and criticism threaten the Party's authority. The Party then presses hard on the intellectual again. (P.20) Goldman and Wagner's observations suggest that the Chinese leaders determine the extent of dialogue and consultation between the leaders and the led. Thus, the agenda building process in China has to be re-examined. The study's findings indicate that the journalists and journalism educators held opinions on certain press role themes that differed from the leaders' positions. The journalists and journalism educators initiated the discussion of the press law, press freedom and the relationship between news and 197 propaganda. This supports the position that the outside initiative agenda was practiced in China. However, if the agenda of the journalists and journalism educators were developed during the relaxation authorized by the leaders, this means the leaders were still setting the parameters and direction of the agenda. For example, when then secretary- general Zhao Ziyang said supervision by public and the government decision process should be made transparent, many journalists and journalism educators picked up this theme. Does that mean the mobilization model was practiced? These phenomena indicate that the policy process in China is complex. Agenda building in all societies generally functions within the parameters set by law and norms of society. The differences among societies is the source and distribution of power, and the process that sets the parameters. To examine the agenda building process in China, the power between the leader and the discussion participants should be examined. Cobb and his associates' agenda building model is based on the operation in a democratic society where the leaders have no more power than the people allow. When it is applied to study the Communist policy process, the source of authority and balance of power between the participants should be further examined. Second, individual commitment in the agenda building process also should be considered. Although some Chinese journalists were expelled from the party and some were blacklisted by the party in the student demonstrations in 198 1987 and 1989, respectively, they have continued to advocate their beliefs openly. For example, Liu Binyan continued to write his investigative exposes in the Eeeple's Deily after 1987 and before he left China because of the Tiananmen incident in 1989. The open criticism by the party would actually help upgrade the intellectuals' reputation.21 This shows that some intellectuals are willing to be the dissident voices in the policy process. For example, some 500 reporters signed a petition to support the World Economic Herald editorial policy before and during the Tiananmen incident. Some even considered taking legal action against the party for suspending their chief editor, Qin Benli . 22 Third, the power of an individual leader or a small group of leaders would determine the policy decision. The so-called "Gang of Elders" (laoren bang) is still in charge of important policy decisions. The process of negotiation and consultation may not influence the minds of those octogenarians. Therefore, the policy process has its rules of the game set by a core group of leaders. This also may be a clue to explore why the leaders, journalists and journalism educators were found to converge in their opinions of the press role in 1988 and 1989. The Tiananmen incident showed the journalists and journalism educators were in conflict with some of the leaders who differed from the “Gang of Elders". Fourth, the agenda building analysis also should 199 consider the institutions involved. This study uses four journalism journals to collect the opinions of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators. They are: Joupnalism Front, published by the People's Daily in Beijing: Journalism Journal, published jointly by the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Joint Society of China Journalism Society in Beijing: Joupnalism Univepsity, of Fudan University in Shanghai; and Journalism Colleeted Essays, of People's University of China in Beijing. The Journalism Front is under the direct supervision of the Central Secretariat, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is an institution directly under the State Council. The Qenzneliem_£zenp could be considered an extension of the party's mouthpiece, and the Denpnelien Journal could be considered the "think tank" of the State Council. During both the 1987 and 1989 student demonstrations, directors and researchers at the Academy of Social Sciences were removed from their posts for "instigating" the studentsd23 Most of the institutes in the Academy of Social Sciences underwent "house-cleaning" after the Tiananmen incident.“’ There were no reports about the journalism educators being censured in China. The Journalism Journal, however, has not published any issues since the April 1989 issue.”’ This may suggest that the researchers at the Academy of Social Sciences, being closer to the central policy process, might be working on more dangerous ground than other journalism educators. The role 200 of the journalism educators at the Academy of Social Sciences should be examined further in future studies. The role of all journalism educators in the agenda building and policy process also deserves more study. Because they are closer to the theories than practices of journalism, they may enjoy a more "detached" role in the journalistic reforms. Their theoretical articles may help to put the journalistic phenomena into perspectives. There was evidence that they served a more "detached" role in the journalistic reforms by the surveys of the leaders and journalists they conducted. For example, the Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences conducted a survey with members of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the National People's Congress (NPC) in April and May of 1988, respectively (Chen and Er, 1989, pp. 29- 102).“’ About 82.2 percent of the NPC members and 83.3 percent of CPPCC members said the press law should protect press freedom (Chen and Br, 1989, p. 84). However, 60.1 percent of the NPC members and 55.9 percent of CPPCC members did not agree that privately owned newspapers should be allowed (Chen and Er, 1989, p. 85). Further, about 26.5 percent of the NPC members and 21.8 percent of CPPCC members did not agree chief editors should have more editorial autonomy. They said that the journalists' professionalism was not high enough and cannot be trusted (Chen and Er, 1989, p. 46-47). 201 The Public Opinion Institute of the People's University of China did a survey of the journalists in China (Chen and Er, 1989, pp. 176-196) in 1988.27 About 87.7 percent of the journalists were not satisfied with the leadership of their journalistic work (Chen and Er, 1989, p. 177). About 60.2 percent of journalists were not very optimistic about the future of journalistic reforms. Whether these results had affected the journalistic reforms is not known. These results were the journalism educators' attempts to gauge the progress and the issues to be decided in the journalistic reforms. They suggest that the journalism educators play a different role in the policy process than the leaders and journalists. _MP ICAT INS O _ SH.I ' , I_N A I Ier". WI'LD PRESS SYSTEMS Many studies have sought to examine the differences among world press systems in the international communication field (e.g., Altschull, 1984: Bord, 1987: Hatchen, 1987: Picard, 1983; Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956). Many _ international communication researchers are still searching for a model for a comparative analysis despite the many attempts made (e.g., Lowenstein, 1966: Schillinger, 1989). Before a comparative model is developed, it is important to note that the press system of a country may change. The changes within a system will affect the comparative 202 analysis. The case in point is the press system in China between 1983 and 1989. The findings in this study indicate that the leaders, journalists and journalism educators wanted to change the press role in China. They wanted to change from the leader-oriented press role to the people-oriented press role. They even suggested that the press should not be "a collective propagandist, organizer and agitator"--a label commonly used in many studies to describe the Chinese press system. Although some studies have examined this journalistic reform period, they lack a procedure to examine the press role in China. The content analysis in this study helps fill this void. If the findings show changes have been suggested in this period, there may be changes in other periods as well. The Chinese have identified two other journalistic reform periods: one in 1942 and one in 1956. The Cultural Revolution also gave rise to another press role in China-- "the press was used as a class struggle tool." The three periods show that the Chinese are still in search of an appropriate press role, and the labeling of the press system according to some value judgments would promote misunderstanding. Even so called "value-free" labels such as the Communist press system would be meaningless without a way to describe the characteristics of the press system. The use of 22 press role themes and the classification of leader and 203 people orientations in this study is an attempt to define the press role in Chinese society. Although the use of the five affinities by the Chinese scholars to define press role shares some similarities with the Western systems (e.g., the PICA measure developed by Lowenstein in 1966), the findings in this study show that the five affinities used by the Chinese scholars also are different from the Western press role. In the Western literature on the Chinese press role, the models used are based on the Western press role. This raises the question of what kind of perspective is appropriate to study a country's system. Would a model developed according to a foreign system be more appropriate to study a country's system? Or could the system of that country be used to study its own system? Then, would the results from such study contribute to a comparative study of world press systems? Or would the concept of a people- oriented and leader-oriented press role be applicable to compare different world press systems? Altschull's (1984) suggestion of the examination of the relationship between the source of financial support and the press role is useful. This study had used it as the theoretical basis for the classification of the people-oriented and leader- oriented press roles. The operational definitions of the press role according to the Chinese scholars in this study might serve as a starting point in further discussion. The concept of a people-oriented press, which some scholars call a free press, may be a universal concept. The 204 free press serves the interests of the people and not as the mouthpiece of the party. Altschull (1984) suggested that the source of funding is an important factor in determining whether the press role is people-oriented. However, the findings in this study suggested that the relationship between the funding source and the press role is more complex than what Altschull suggested. Although the Chinese Communist media systems remain largely owned and subsidized financially by the state, the findings indicate that more leaders, journalists and journalism educators advocated the people-oriented press role than the leader-oriented press role between 1983 and 1989. These findings also may suggest that the opinions of these leaders, journalists and journalism educators differed from the core leadership. Their differences maybe one of the causes of the Tiananmen incident in 1989. This suggests that the press role could be measured (1) by the actual performance of the press and (2) by the agenda of those who participate in the system. The first measurement will tell what the system is doing and the second measurement will show how it may change. The findings in this study show that in a almost purely state- owned press system in China, prominent actors directly involved in the press performance-~the Chinese leaders, journalists and journalism educators--suggested agenda to change the press role to more people-oriented. 205 Further, some press role themes discussed between 1983 and 1989 indicate that the ownership structure of the Communist press system is not pure. The Chinese press system is not purely state-owned. The suggestion of privately-owned newspapers and acceptance of advertising in China shows that the press system was not dominated by one form of financing. Some "semi-privately owned" newspapers, such as the World Econonic Derald, had been experimented. Because most press systems are not pure in their form of financing, the analysis of the comparative press systems, particularly within the Communist press systems, should consider the degree of variation within the systems and the changes over time. Even when one financing form dominates, as in China during the period under study here, it does not mean the members of the press system accept the status quo, nor that changes cannot take place. Moreover, while press systems may largely promote the status quo and those in political and economic power as Altschull suggested, it is a matter of degree. During the period under study here, the Chinese leaders, journalists and journalism educators increased their suggestions of the people-oriented press role and they almost reached a consensus on the press role in 1989. This indicates that the degree of people-orientation versus leader-orientation is an important measure of the press role, both in performance and in agenda building. As such, Altschull's notion of "He who pays the piper calls the tune" 206 does not measure the complexity of the press performance and policy process. The policy process is an important aspect to be examined, even in the commonly believed leader- dominated policy process in Communist countries. The lack of agreement between the press performance and the reform ideas suggested makes the study of the policy process more interesting and important. The Chinese journalists' and journalism educators' bold people-oriented press role themes documented in this study indicate clearly that it is important to examine the inputs, not just outputs, in the policy process. It should be noted that this study only shows that the Chinese leaders, journalists and journalism educators wanted to change the press role. Whether the press role in China was changed or will be changed is subject to further analysis. An interesting study would be to examine if discussion among participants leads to actual changes later on. LIMITATIONS OF THE SIDDY The limitations of the study include the data and research method used. The study is a content analysis of national journalistic publications available in the United States. The articles in the journals were content analyzed to examine what press roles were suggested by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators, and to what extent 207 they agreed or disagreed on the press role. The data used in the study raised the question of whether the findings could be generalized to represent all leaders, journalists and journalism educators in China. First, it is related to the selection of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators in the study. The study has not attempted to control the selection of these three groups. The selection criteria were based on whether the article was related to the discussion of the press role, and not authorship. Therefore, all leaders, journalists and journalism educators had equal chance of being selected in the study. However, the journals used in the study might have selection criteria that are beyond the control of the researcher of this study. Theoretically, all those leaders, journalists and journalism educators could submit their articles to these journals. More important leaders could have a better chance of having their opinions included in the journal. Moreover, the leaders might not need to submit their articles for review of publication. The journals might automatically publish the leaders' articles. However, the articles of the journalists and journalism educators might have undergone a review process. Whether there was a review process is not known. It also is possible that the leaders' public positions on the press role were the agreed- upon stance by the leaders behind closed doors. This policy process also is not known. 208 Second, can the findings be generalized to represent all leaders, journalists and journalism educators? An analysis of the 320 journalists' articles shows that they represented 262 journalists. The 104 journalism educators articles were by 75 journalism educators. The 79 leaders articles were by 71 leaders. The total number of leaders is not known, but there were 70,700 journalists in 1987 and 767 journalism educators in 1986. Therefore, without a control of the selection of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators in the study, it is impossible to make any inference or generalizations about the study. However, it is possible that the editors of these journalistic journals selected the opinions of these groups because they represented the overall opinions of these three groups. Further, it should be noted that the generalizability of the findings should not be problematic. This study examined what ideas were expressed in the marketplace of ideas by members of each of the three groups. The representation issue is more important in changing behavior than in disseminating ideas. The content analysis method used in the study also is a limitation. It is an analysis of the manifest content of the articles. Some foreign correspondents in China said that people in China may express opinions less freely and candidly in a published article because of the fear of later repercussions (Butterfield, 1982: and Bernstein, 1982). People may speak more openly in a private conversation. 209 Although this is true, the findings suggest that some journalists and journalism educators showed their disagreement with the press roles in the articles published in the journalistic journals. Perhaps this limitation of the data is that the degree of disagreement might be higher than the study's findings have shown. Although this study is an analysis of changes over time, the unknown time lapse between the article submission and publication make it difficult to precisely tell the relationship in the sequence of events and whether there is a relationship between the press role themes raised each year. However, this study looked at the point when the articles entered the marketplace of ideas in society. These limitations are embedded within the data and the research method. Despite these restraints, the data did provide an analysis across time of the press roles suggested by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators between 1983 and 1989. RECOMMENDATION FO E D The study has only examined the press role during the journalistic reform period between 1983 and 1989. Impact of the Tiananmen incident on the press role could be studied. Jiang Zemin, the new CCP secretary-general appointed after the Tiananmen incident, told all provincial chief editors in November 1989 that the media should be the party's 210 mouthpiece, journalistic works should uphold the party affinity, press freedom is not absolute freedom, and the party should strengthen its guidance on journalistic worksJ28 Whether the journalists and journalism educators followed these guidelines could be further explored. The changes of the press roles also could be examined using individuals as the unit of analysis. The study has analyzed the changes of each group as aggregate data, but further analysis of changes of individuals within each group could aid in understanding whether those individuals changed their views of the press role. This micro-analysis of each group, particularly on several important leaders who had crucial influence on the definition of the press role, would supplement the analysis of the aggregate data. Moreover, the two journalistic reform periods in 1942 and 1956 and the press role during the Cultural Revolution could be compared with the journalistic reforms between 1983 and 1989. The coding scheme used in this study could be used to compare the press role in other periods in China. The lack of discussion of some of the affinities could indicate the emphasis among the five affinities. For example, combative affinity was not discussed at all after 1983. This indicates that this affinity was not as important as the other issues. Whether the press role suggested by the leaders, journalists and journalism educators has been implemented in the news content could be explored in further studies. This 211 will show the link between the discussion of the press role and the news content. In this kind of study, the relationship between the journalists' suggestion of the press role and the news content could show how far the journalists have adopted their ideas and how far they have changed the instructions of the leaders in the implementation process. To carry out this study, an operational definition of the press role in terms of news content would have to be developed first. Other groups' opinions of the press role also could be examined. For example, the dissidents' views of the press role could be explored. Being labeled as dissident, this group is assumed to differ from the leaders. An interesting issue is the extent to which they differed from the journalists and journalism educators. Although the Chinese people are directly affected by the definition of the press role, their opinions were not examined in the study. This would require a survey of their opinions. In fact, if possible, the surveys of the leaders, journalists and journalism educators would contribute to the direct understanding of their opinions of the press role. This study would be more useful if it is part of an on-going project conducted at least once a year. Such study opportunities do not seem to be easily available to researchers outside China. Even Chinese researchers would need approval and cooperation by the authorities. This kind of survey data also are subject to the threats of 212 reliability and validity pertaining to survey research in general and the survey research environment in China (Rosen and Chu, 1987). From the policy perspectives, future studies are needed to examine the news policy process in China. The findings have indicated that the journalists and journalism educators are two interest groups in the policy process. But this concept of interest groups needs further analysis. The focus is on whether the journalists and journalism educators are two organized groups in China. The first step would be to examine the role of the All China Journalist Association and its role in China. In what way does the All China Journalist Association help the journalists to get their welfare? Where do the officers come from? Are they closer to the journalists or the leaders? How did they "lobby" for their welfare and influence the news policy process? Similar studies could be done on the journalism educators. Because the journalism educators help shape the professionalism, personal career and vision of the journalists, a profile of who they are, and their educational and journalistic goals could be conducted. The research question might be: What role did they play in influencing the news policy process? Further, the differences among the various journalism schools, particularly the role of the Journalism Research Institute, could be further examined. 213 These different studies would contribute to a better understanding of the parts the leaders, journalists, and journalism educators played in their search for the press role in China. 214 W: 1. The meeting was reported in Doupnalism Front 12 (December 1983): 19-20. The meeting was held in Hubei from October 31 to November 12, 1983. The participants included journalists in the five provinces in the Mid-South, journalists from 10 news units and officials from the Propaganda Department. 2. See Appendix I. 3. The conference of all provincial chief editors was called by the Propaganda Department in August 9 to 15, 1986. The deputy director of the Propaganda Department, Tan Tan, and the head of the News Section gave speeches at the meeting. The theme was on journalistic reforms. See Douznalism Joupnal 5 (December 1986): 48-50 for a summary of the meeting. 4. Ying Zhongqi, "The Only Criterion to Examine the Evening Newspaper is Good" (Jianyan wanbao haohuai de weiyi biaozhun) Doupnalism Epont 10 (October 1988): 17-18. Ying quoted the sentence in the editorial message of the Journalism Front to the readers in its January 1981 issue, which said: "People are the master of history and they are what the newspapers should serve. Whether the people like to read, and how many people read this or that newspaper is the only criterion to determine whether the newspaper is good or bad (p. 3)." 5. Gang of Four refers to the four-member team led by Jiang Qing, the widow of Mao Zedong, in the Cultural Revolution. 6. The meeting was organized by the Journalism Department and Journalism Research Institute of Wuhan University in November 7 to 9, 1987. About 30 journalism educators attended. 7. The State Council set up a State Press and Publications Administration Office in January 1987. See "State Council Sets Up Media, Publications Office," £Dl§, January 28, 1987, K19. 8. The third session of the Seventh National People's Congress Standing Committee passed a Secrecy Law in September 1988. See People's Daily Overseas Edition, September 6, 1988. Before the law was passed, Hu Jiwei, was quoted as saying that the secrecy law should penalize those who kept secret information which should have been made open to the publiC- See MW September 4,1988. 215 9. For a description of HOILQ Ecenonie heralg, see the Chapter 5 in Won H. Chang's Mess Megie in thne (Ames, Iowa: Iowa University Press), 1989. 10. "The Capital Journalism Society Academic Symposium: Study the 13th Congress Document and Explore Journalism Reforms" (Shoudu Xinwen Xuehui zhaokai xueshu taolunhui: xuexi shisanda wenjian tansuo xinwen gaige), Donpnalisn goupnal 1 (1988): 47-51. Some 80 representatives from news units, journalism schools and research units in Beijing attended the conference. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. See footnote 3. 14. For a report of the case, see Shi Tungyu, "We Are at the New Starting Point--A Review of News Criticism During the New Time" (Women chuzai xin de qidian shang--dui xin shiqi xinwen piping de huigu yu fansi), Dennnalism Jounnal 3 (March 1983): 4-5, 10. 15. Ibid. 16. See footnote 3. 17. Ia Kung Pao, January 15, 1989. 18. Hu Yaobang, "On Journalistic Work During the New Era" (Guanyu xinshiqi de xinwen gongzuo), a speech made at the seminar of the All China Journalists Association, March 10, 1979, in Journalism Research Institute of Academy of Social Sciences ed” WW (Kaichuang xinwen gongzuo de xinjumian), Beijing: China News Publisher, 1985, pp. 6-10. 19. "Beijing students Burn Renmin Ribao, Beijing Ribao," FBIS, January 5, 1987, K2-4. 20. The February 1987 issue of Jenznelien_19n;nel reprinted from the January 25, 1987 People's Daily announcement. 21. For example, Wang Ruowang, a former editor of a Shanghai newspaper was imprisoned and later put under house arrest for his outspoken ideas during the Tiananmen incident. He wrote in Eai §hing (April 1991), after his recent release from the prison, that he had more visitors seeing him to show support of his ideas. 216 22. "Newspapers To Take Legal Action on Editor's Removal," Ta Kun Pao, May 4, 1989, translated in FBIS, May 4 1989, pp. 30-31. 23. For example, after the 1986 student demonstration, Liu Zaifu, director of CCAS Institute of Literature: Su Shaozhi, director of CCAS Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought: Yan Jiaqi, director of CCAS Institute of Politics were investigated for their role in the students movement.‘ Su and Yan were forced to leave China after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. 24. Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Modernists on Marxism Face the Axe," §outh China Morning Post, July 20, 1991. 25. Based on information provided by a journalism educator of a journalism school in Beijing who arrived in the United States in August 1991 as a visiting scholar. The latest China Journalism Yearbooh lggg (p. 497) also reported that the Journalism Dgnpnal ceased publication as of April 1989. 26. The research method of each survey should be noted here. The CPPCC members survey was conducted in April 1988. About 2,501 questionnaires were distributed at a CPPCC meeting. About 472 of the returned questionnaires were usable. The low return rate of 23.0 percent affects the validity of the survey. The NPC member survey was conducted between May 26 and September 1988. Although it had a higher return rate (1,542 out of 2,447 returned, or 63.0 percent), the long survey period affected the validity of the opinions gathered. 27. The study claimed to be a survey of journalists nationwide, but its sampling method was not explained. The survey was conducted in February and March 1988. Some 3,094 questionnaires were sent out and 1,884 were returned. It represented a 60.9 percent return rate. 28. "Jiang Zemin Explains the Fundamental Guidelines of Journalistic Works" (Jiang Zemin chanming xinwen gongzuo jiben fangzhen), a speech made at the seminar of all provincial chief editors on November 28, 1989, Jeupnalism Front 12 (December 1989): 3-5. APPENDICES Appendix I A Summary of Hu Yaobang's Speech "On The Party's Journalistic Work" made on February 8, 1985 Hu Yaobang, "On Party Journalism Work" (Guanyu Dang de Xinwen Gongzuo), was a speech made at the Central Secretariat Conference on February 8, 1985. Many study meetings were held subsequently to study the "spirit of the document." The document covered the following areas: A. The Nature of Journalistic Work: a. The press is the party's mouthpiece. "It is an honor to represent the party." b. There is no absolute freedom: it should be under the supervision of the party. c. Journalistic reforms are not the same as economic reforms. The collective ownership structure could not change. Therefore, private ownership of the newspapers should not be allowed. d. The socialist press could learn from the news writing and editing skills, advanced communication technologies and management concepts of the capitalist press. It cannot learn the fundamental policies of the capitalist press because the two systems are different. B. The Journalistic Duties a. "The press should use many lively facts and opinions to promote the party's and government's ideas, the people's opinions and activities in a timely and accurate fashion to the whole country and the whole world." C. Fundamental Issues to Provide a Good Press a. Accuracy--80% of news stories on the positive side, and 20% on the negative side of events in China. b. Timeliness--but whether to report important events immediately should depend on the political guideline. c. Interesting. D. On Journalistic Training a. Strengthen their party affinity. b. Strengthen their journalistic skills. c. Strengthen their unified spirit. * The People's Daily published the full text on April 14, 1985 on pages 1 to 3. For a translation of the full text, please see FBIS, April 15, 1985, K1 to K15. 217 Appendix II Coding Procedures to Identify Role Overlaps Among Famous Journalistic Figures in the China Journalism Yearbook A. grocedures: This study was to answer the following questions: (The name of the variable is put in parentheses). 1. What was their educational attainment? (Education) 2. How many of the leaders, journalists, and journalism educators were communist members? (CCP membership) 3. How many of them had worked for CCP mouthpieces? (CCP mouthpiece) 4. How many of them had journalistic practical experience? (J-Experience) 5. How many of them had worked in the state bureaucracies? (Govt affiliation) 6. Were they affiliated with any group organization, including journalist association and journalism educator association, etc? (Group affiliation) 7. How many of them had identity overlaps, that is a. Whether a leader had been a journalist or journalism educator concurrently or at one point in time? b. Whether a journalist had been a leader or journalism educator concurrently or at one point in time? c. Whether a journalism educator had been a leader or journalism educator concurrently or at one point in time? B. Sample: The names listed in the thne Jenpnelisn Xeapbooh between 1983 and 1989 were included for analysis. A total of 873 names were listed. After deleting those people who were deceased before 1949 and those who have lived in Taiwan since the communist regime was established on the mainland, 474 names were included in the analysis. C. Coding Chipenig: The persons listed in the yearbook was first identified according to its current occupation in the yearbook. They were classified as (1) journalists: (2) journalism educators; (3) journalists and journalism educators 218 219 concurrently: (4) researcher of a government or newspaper and broadcasting institution: (5) government official in the state bureaucracies: (6) government officials and journalism educators: (7) other occupation: and (8) unknown. This is based on the primary role of each person in the list. Primary role is the full-time role each person held. Then each person was coded according to the following criteria: 1. Education: college and above: journalism college: post-secondary: high school completed: attended but did not complete high school: primary school: no schooling and unknown. 2. CCP Membership: membership was mentioned: was not a member: membership was not mentioned. 3. CCP Mouthpieces: worked with CCP mouthpieces: did not work with CCP mouthpieces. 4. J-Experience: Whether the person has current, past or no journalistic experience. 5. Govt. affiliation: Whether the person has current, past or no affiliation with the government agencies/bureaucracies. 6. Group affiliation: Whether the person has been a member of (a) journalist association: (b) writers association: (c) journalist and writers association concurrently: (d) journalism education association: (e) journalism education and journalist education concurrently: (f) journalism education, journalist and writer association at the same time: (g) other associations. 7. Identity overlaps: Whether the person has held current, past or no position as a journalist, journalism educator and leader. a. Whether the person has held a journalist job currently, in the past or never. b. Whether the person has held a journalism education job currently, in the past or never. 8. The actual years of the person's experience as a journalist and journalism educators were recorded in the coding. Special coding is recorded to note the years of experience after 1949. 9. The journalism education institution also was coded into Fudan University in Shanghai: People's University in Beijing: Journalism Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute in Beijing: Xinhua Journalism Institute in Beijing: Jinan University in Guangzhou: Shanxi University in Shanxi: and other universities. 10. The coding procedure also noted whether the person was a current or past member of the National People's Congress or the Chinese People Political Consultative Conference. Appendix III List of Journalism Publications in China I. National Journals A. Monthlies 1. lenpnelien_fizenp (Xinwen Zhanxian), published by the People's Daily. B. Bimonthlies 1. Journalism Journal (Xinwen Xuekan), published jointly by China Journalism Society and Journalism Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 2- Chinese_leurnalists (Zhongguo Jizhe). published by Xinhua News Agency. 3. Joupnalisn eng gnogession (Xinwen yu Chengcai), published by Lihepepien_Deily (Jiefang Ribao). 4. news Writing (Xinwen yu Xiezuo), published by Beijing Journalism Society and Beijing Journalist Association. 5. Dennneliepe (Xinwen Jizhe), published by Shanghai Journalism Society. C. Quarterlies 1. Internatienal_uers_§sene (GUOji Xinwen Jie). published by the Journalism Department of the People's University in Beijing. 2. gouznalism Dnivepsipy (Xinwen Daxue), published by the Journalism Department of Fudan University in Shanghai. 3. Chine Adverpising (Zhongguo Guanggao), published by China Advertising Editorial Board in Shanghai. D. Yearbooks 1. Qhina_leurnalism_xearbeek (Zhongguo Xinwen Nianjian), published by Journalism Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 220 221 E. Irregular Publications 1. geurnelism Reseapeh natenial (Xinwen Yanjiu Ziliao), published by Journalism Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 2. Doupnalisn gellected Essays (Xinwenxue Lunji), published by the Journalism Department of the People's University in Beijing. 3. Jeurnalism_nssar§ (Xinwen Lunchong). published by the Xinhua News Agency. II. Provincial A. Monthlies 1. News Fighpepe (Xinwen Zhanshi), published by Shanxi Provincial Journalist Association. 2. News Knowlegge (Xinwen Zhishi), published by Shanxi Daily. 3. Jouznelisn news (Xinwen Tongxun), published by Jiangsu New China Daily (Xinhua Ribao). B. Bimonthlies 1. News Writing (Xinwen Xiezuo), published by Harbin Daily and New Evening Post (xinwenbao). 2. genrnalisn Qincles (Xinwen Jie), jointly published by Sichuan Daily and Sichuan Provincial Journalist Association. 3. Yeung_lcurnalists (Qinqnian Jizhe). published by Shangdong Popular Daily (Dazhong Ribao). C. Quarterlies 1. News 0 n' on (Xinwen Chuanbo), jointly published by Heilongjiang Provincial Journalist Association, Heilongjiang Provincial Journalism Society, and Heilongjiang Provincial Journalism Institute. Source: Jeurnalism_leurnal. no. 1. 1985. p. 80 Note: These publications continued to publish as of March 1991. Appendix IV Coding Instrument CODING FORM FOR THE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF JOURNALISTIC ISSUES REGARDING ROLE OF THE PRESS IN CHINA, 1983-1989 Purpose: To identify issues discussed by CCP leaders, journalists, and journalism educators in defining journalistic role in China. The coding form will be used to code party documents and articles in journalistic professional and academic journals and ideological journals. VAROI CODER # i VAROZ ARTICLE # Please write down the title of the article on the coding sheet. VAROS YEAR VAR04 MONTH the article was published: (YEAR/MONTH): (2 digits for YEAR and 2 digits for MONTH). (If year/month is unknown, use 00). If it was an official document, enter the effective date of the documents. VAROS BYLINE--WHO was the author of the article? (The purpose of this question is to identify whether the opinions were expressed by the party leaders, journalists, journalism educators, and the people). Was author of the article given? (Author refers to the byline given to the article and the source of the official documents given in the document--the government office which authorized the document). (0) no author was given (1) yes, single author, one person's name was used as the author of the article of document: (2) yes, coauthors, names of two or more persons were used as the authors of the article: (3) yes, news organization, including newspapers, radio and television broadcasting stations, and news agencies, and no personal name was mentioned: 222 223 (4) yes, government agencies, including state agencies and excluding the news organizations defined in 3, and no personal names were mentioned: (5) yes, educational institutions, including the journalism schools in colleges: VAR06 WHO--Identify the affiliation of the author of the article if affiliation was given or known. If this was a coauthored paper, use only the first author's affiliation for the coding. (00) no name is given (01) unknown, a name is given, but the affiliation of the writer is not known. This include those with pen names. JOURNALISTS (02) special commentator of the journal (ben bao pinlun yuan). They are considered national party press editors. (03) national party media editor/institution/research unit of newspaper, who was not a special commentator of the journal, e. g. People s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and all party media headquartered in Beijing and Shanghai, see Enc cl edia of News a ers : (04) national NON-pappy media editor/institution/research unit of newspaper, who was not a special commentator of the journal, e. g. People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and all party media headquartered in Beijing and Shanghai see WW China: (05) nationel peppy media pepeppex, who was not a special commentator of the journal, e.g. People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and all media headquartered in Beijing and Shanghai, see Encyclopedia of Newspapers in China: (06) national NDD-papty media peportep, who was not a special commentator of the journal, e.g. People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and all media headquartered in Beijing and Shanghai, see En la ed' f ws e ' : (07) provinciel papty media editep/cr institution/research unit of newspaper, who was not a special commentator of the journal, see Encyelopedia of Newspepers in Chine: (08) ppovinciel DDE;pezpy media egippp/institution/research unit of newspaper, who was not a special commentator of the journal, see Encyclopedie of Newspapers in Chine: (09) pzovincial peppy media repoppez, who was not a special commentator of the journal, see Encyelopedia of News rs ' ' : 224 (10) provincial thepeppy media repezpep, who was not a special commentator of the journal, see c c 0 ed a News ers 'n n : JOURNALISM EDUCATORS (11) university professors/institution, but their affiliation was not known: (12) university professors/institution--People's University: (13) university professors/institution--Fudan University: (14) university professors/institution--Journalism Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences: (15) university professor/institution--Xinhua School of Journalism: (16) national university professor/institution--other universities not included in 12 to 15: (17) provincial university professor/institution: PARTY LEADERS (18) national party leader/party committee member, including Party Central Committee, National Party Congress, Central Advisory Commission, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Central Military Commission, Politburo, General-secretary, secretariat, president and vice-president of PRC, chairman and vice-chairman of the CCP party: state councillors of the State Council: premiers, vice-premiers, and ministers of the State Council: (19) Provincial party leaders, including provincial, county and primary level party congresses, provincial secretariat and secretary-general: STATE BUREAUCRACIES (20) National officials from Propaganda Department, Publication and Control Office: (21) National officials from other state bureaucracies, e.g. United Front Work, International liaison, Organizational Department etc.: (22) provincial officials from Propaganda Department, Publication and Control Office: (23) provincial officials from other state bureaucracies, e.g. United Front Work, International liaison, Organizational Department etc.: JUDICIAL (24) Representatives and judges from the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's procuratorate, people's court, people's procuratorate: 225 PROVINCIAL JUDICIAL (25) Representatives and judges from the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's procuratorate, people's court, people's procuratorate: VARO? OVERLAP--whether there are current role overlaps among the leaders, journalists and journalism educators. Check the personnel directory, China Journalism Yearbook Who's Who section, and ask PRC students and scholars. (0) Unknown, cannot identify the overlaps after exhausting all of the means above. (1) Leader only That means the author is a leader only. (2) Journalist only That means the author is a journalist only. (3) Journalism educator only. That means the author is a journalism educator only. (4) Leader + journalist That means the author is a leader and a journalist. (5) Leader + journalism educator That means the author is a leader and a journalism educator. (6) Journalist + journalism educator That means the author is a leader and journalism educator. (7) leader + journalist + educator That means the author is a leader, journalist and journalism educator. VAROB CHANNEL--THROUGH WHICH CHANNEL (TYPES OF ARTICLES) : Identify the ORIGIN of the articles and documents: (1) OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS: If the official document was published in professional and academic journalistic journals, the document would be classified as official document and not under either professional or academic journals section. This included laws and regulations. 226 REPORTS OF MEETINGS: (2) meetings , JOURNALISM PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS: (3) Journalism Front (Xinwen Zhanxian) JOURNALISM ACADEMIC JOURNALS: (4) Journalism Journal (Xinwen Xuekan) (5) Journalism University (Xinwen Daxue) (6) Journalism Collected Essays (Xinwenxue Lunji) IDEOLOGICAL JOURNALS: (7) Red Flag (8) Seeking Truth F. THEMES EXPRESSED IN THE ARTICLES: The following categories are designed on a three-point scale, 0 means this point was not addressed, 1 refers to a people-oriented idea: 2 refers to a leader-oriented idea. PARTY AFFINITY: Press Ownership (VAR09 PEOPRES) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press could be owned and operated by the people (minban baozhi) and the press needs to pay more attention to being the people's mouthpiece." (2) "The press should be solely owned and operated by the party and it should insist on being guided by the party." Mouthpiece (VARIO MOUTHPIE) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press could reflect viewpoints other than the official viewpoints, and thus, it represents more the people's voices and viewpoints." (2) "The press is the party's mouthpiece, therefore, every article and news story must follow the party's viewpoints. It is an honor to be the party's mouthpiece, eyes and ears." 227 Class Struggle Tool (VAR11 CLASS) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press is not a class struggle tool and is for all people. The term class struggle is just rhetoric used by some leaders to misuse the role of the press." (2) "The press is a tool for class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat under the leaders' guidance." Watchdog (VARIZ WATCRDOG) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press should use public opinion to supervise the government (yulun jiandu). It should encourage people to criticize the wrongdoings of the government." (2) "The press should guide and create public opinion that is under the guidance of the party." Party Line (VAR13 PARTYLIN) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Allow the press to carry opinions which are different from the party. Those who expressed different opinions should not be labeled counter-revolutionaries." (2) "The press should ensure that public opinions are. uniformed under the party line (yulun yilu). No conflicting opinions and no counter-revolutionaries' opinions could be expressed in the press." Decision (VARIC DECISION) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Allow the people to participate in discussing important matters in the press (zhongda shijian rang renmin zhidao) before decisions are made to encourage openness and transparency in the policy process (toumingdu and zhongda wenti rang renmin taolun)." (2) "The press is used to publicize party decisions to organize the people (xinwen zhidaoxing)." Surveys (VARis SURVEYS) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Surveys are important to understand the people's interests and needs so the press can better serve the people." (2) "Surveys are useful to help propagate the party's views to achieve better results." 228 Journalists as Cadres (VAR16 CADRES) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Journalists could be independent from the party even if they are party members." (2) "Journalists are party members and they should follow the party line." Chief Editor Autonomy (V3317 EDCEIEF) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Chief editors should have the final say an editorial policy and content. The censorship and review system (shencha jidu) should be abolished." (2) "Journalists are under the party committee's supervision and the party secretary should have final say on editorial policy and content." News Stringers (V1318 STRINGER) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "All people should be mobilized to write for the press without interference from the party (zhuanmin banbao)." (2) "All members of the party should be mobilized to write for the press and they should help promote information disseminated from the party (zhuandang banbao)." Checks and Balances (VAR19 CHECKS) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press should criticize and monitor party affairs and publication of these stories do not need approval from the party.” (2) "The press can expose the party's wrongdoing only after approval is given by the party." Quotation Journalism (VARZO QUOTEJLM) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press should not practice 'quotation journalism' (yulu xinwenxue)." (2) "The press should quote the leaders' sayings for the people as guiding principles." 229 IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY: Four Insistences (V3321 30038) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press can deviate from the 'Four Insistences' (sige jianchi) if this is the wish of the people." (2) "The press should always unquestionably uphold the 'Four Insistences'." COMBATIVE AFFINITY: Combative Affinity (V3322 COMBAT) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press should allow different opinions to exist even if they disagreed with socialism or party policies." (2) "The press should combat all opinions opposing socialism or party policies." JOURNALISM EDUCATION: Journalism Education (V3323 JLHED) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Journalism education should downplay political orientation, but emphasize journalistic professionalism." (2) "Journalism education should train 'red and professional' cadres to serve the press." COMMERCIAL AFFINITY:. Advertising (V3324 ADS) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Advertising should be allowed in the newspapers so that it can gain financial independence from the party's control. The press can be a commercial product." (2) "The press can use advertising as a funding source but the press should still be under the party's control. The press cannot be a commercial product." 230 COMMERCIAL AFFINITY: Subscription (V3325 SUBSCRIB) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Newspaper should not be supported by government subsidy through government-paid subscription. Subscription paid by the people would show how popular the newspaper is." (2) "Newspapers should be subscribed to by government subsidy and distributed free to serve as study materials of the party policies." Newspaper Delivery (V3326 DELIVERY) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Newspapers should establish their circulation and delivery systems so that they are more efficient and are less subject to the government's control through registration and postal inspection." (2) "Newspapers should be delivered through the post office so that the government can keep track of the newspapers." Relationship Between Economic and Journalistic Reforms (VARZ? ECONOMIC) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Economic reforms should push the journalistic reforms a step further to meet the people's needs and demands." (2) "Economic reforms and journalistic reforms should proceed under the close supervision of the party." PRESS LAW AND FREEDOM: Press Law (V3328 LAW) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "The press law is to protect the journalists' news gatherings and people's right to know." (2) "The press law should uphold firmly the 'Four Principles' and should not promote bourgeoisie ideas." Press Freedom (V3329 FREEDOM) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "Press freedom is the right of the people guaranteed by the constitution, and the government should not interfere." (2) "Press freedom is a bourgeois concept and should be banned." 231 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPAGANDA AND NEWS: News and Propaganda (V3330 PROPAGA) ----- (0) This point was not mentioned. (1) "News is not a subset of propaganda and news is to transmit information to meet the people's needs." (2) "News is a subset of propaganda and news is to propagate party policies and mobilize the people under the party's direction. Propaganda is to instill the party's views to the people." V3331 N3NE--Name of the author in pinyin. Appendix V Coding Form Column VAR Names Qoding Resulp l VAROl coder # _ 2-4 VAR02 article # _ _ _ 5-6 VAR03 year _ 7-8 VAR04 month _ 9 VAROS byline _ 10- VAR06 who _ 11 12 VARO7 overlaps _ 13 VAR08 channel _ 14 VAROQ peopress _ 15 VAR10 mouthpie _ l6 VARll class _ 17 VARlZ watchdog _ 18 VARl3 partylin _ 19 VAR14 decision _ 20 VARIS surveys _ 21 VAR16 cadres _ 22 VARl7 edchief _ 23 VARlS stringer _ 24 VAR19 checks _ 25 VARZO quotejlm _ 26 VARZl fours 232 Column 27 VAR22 28 VAR23 29 VAR24 30 VAR25 31 VAR26 32 VAR27 33 VAR28 34 VAR29 35 VAR30 36- VAR31 55 233 MW combat jlmed ads subscrib delivery economic law freedom propaga Name LIST OF REFERENCES Altschull, J. Albert. e owe ° The 30 the News edia i uma a . New York: Longman, Inc., 1984. Anderson, Michael H. "China's 'Great Leap' Toward Madison Avenue." In lenpnal of Communicepion 31:1 (Winter 1981): 10-22. Atwood, Erwin L. and Nien Sheng Lin. "Cankao Xiaoxi: Reference for China's Cadres." In Donrnelism Quarterly 59 (Summer 1982): 240. 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