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The Dialectic of Reform in Social Studies
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THE DIALECTIC OF REFORM IN SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION:
EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG
THREE RATIONALES OF SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION, 1870-1920

by

Mohamed Abdul Motey Elmazzawi

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ABSTRACT

THE DIALECTIC OF REFORM IN SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION: EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THREE RATIONALES OF SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION, 1870-1920

By

Mohamed Abdul Motey Elmazzawi

The processes of data collection, analysis, and interpretation were guided by three basic questions.

- What were the conceptual bases of the rigor, relevance, and radical rationales in social education between 1870 and 1920?
- What were the historical conditions--socio-economic, cultural, and political that accompanied the rise and demise of these rationales?
- How did these historical conditions influence these rationales or traditions?

The primary accessible curriculum documents that addressed these issues were the sources of data. Secondary sources in curriculum provided additional data.

The research method compared curriculum information with socio-historical and professional contexts. Qualitative content analysis was completed between the three research questions and three sets of issues which were defined after the completion of the literature review. This process permitted different concepts and/or categories to emerge over a recurring pattern or course of deductive-inductive cycles.

Significant propositions confirmed are the following.

- If the constants and variables of economic(s), culture(s), and politic(s) set the outer limits of reform, inter-subject conflict and compromise and extra-subject competition and dialogue regulated the unfolding dialectic of reform. Each rationale emerged as a place where ideas could influence the subject community.
- The rationales embodied dynamic philosophies and pedagogies to bring social and pedagogical commitments to the forefront of practice. The rationales were more like dynamic social and intellectual movements.
- Socially, the different rationale advocates belonged to the old gentry the rising middle class. The ideological commitments and professional persuasions and training of these advocates played significant roles in structuring and mediating their visions.

-- The relevance rationale was much more attuned to reform in the progressive era. Its advantageous location into the center of discourse broadened its channels of communication with inter- and extra-subject communities.

The three rationales were much more than rhetorical conventions. Rather, they were responsive and dynamic social, intellectual, and professional movements that sought to address the regularities and anomalies in discourse and practice. They carved traditions, inscribed techniques, articulated doctrines, expressed sympathies, championed morals and legacies that continue to inspire.

DEDICATION

To teachers, all teachers--
those whose company I had the honor of and
those whom I missed--
I dedicate this humble study.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea of writing a history of social studies education grabbed my attention and stimulated my curiosity since my early graduate work in Egypt. However, it was in a meeting with my doctoral dissertation committee in spring 1991, after several unsuccessful attempts to choose a topic for my dissertation, that the research questions of this study began to crystallize.

All my committee members served as intellectual mentors and insightful guides at different phases of my doctoral program. Professor Banks Bradley, the chairperson of my committee and co-director of my dissertation, was always supportive, flexible, and kind to me at all times. Professor William Joyce was always a source of confidence and inspiration. Professor Keith Anderson was the teacher and friend to rely on when I was puzzled intellectually or troubled socially. Professor Charles Blackman was always there, especially at the moments of despair, to inspire and heal the wounds. The words "thank you" fall short of expressing my deep sense of appreciation and gratitude to them.

Many faculty members at the College of Education offered me all kinds of help and support along the way. Professor Michael Sedlak,

despite his busy schedule, never withheld his priceless advice and valuable insights from me. His concerns about my academic progress always inspired me to aim high and to rise to the challenge.

Professor Suzanne Wilson was always generous and quick in providing me with enlightened ideas and suggestions and important articles at different phases my writing. And the list could go on and on.

I would like to extend my sense of recognition and appreciation to all the staff members at the College of Education's Teaching Resources Library, MSU's main library, and the Michigan Historical library for all their help and promptness in uncovering and making available different sources and references crucial for the completion of this dissertation. Their patience and tolerance can never be forgotten.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
List of Figures	vii
 CHAPTER ONE: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	 1
Introduction	1
Need for This Study	2
Importance of This Study	3
Statement of the Problem	4
Research Method	7
Delimitations	8
Definitions of Terms	9
Rationale or Tradition	9
Reform	10
The Dialectic of Reform	11
 CHAPTER TWO: RATIONALES AND INTERPRETATIONS IN SOCIAL EDUCATION HISTORY	 12
Overview	12
Rationales of Social Education as School Subject	12
Interpretations of Social Studies Education History	19
The Conventional Interpretation	22
The Revisionist Interpretation	26
Theoretical Framework	38
 CHAPTER THREE: THE ACADEMIC RIGOR RATIONALE	 49
Overview	49
The Rigor Rationale: Phases of Development	49
The Rigor Rationale: Substance	53
The Rigor Rationale: Visible Premises	57
The Rigor Rationale: Invisible Premises	67
The Rigor Rationale: An Explanation	71
Summary and Conclusions	78

CHAPTER FOUR: THE RELEVANCE RATIONALE	81
Introduction	81
Relevance: Origins and Transformations	82
Relevance: Substance	85
Relevance: Visible Assumptions	92
Relevance: Invisible Assumptions	103
Relevance: An Explanation	110
Conclusions	119
CHAPTER FIVE: THE RADICAL RATIONALE	122
Introduction	122
Origins and Development	122
Substance	126
Visible Assumptions	136
Invisible Assumptions	154
The Radical Rationale: Appealing Rhetoric and Weak Effects: An Explanation	161
Conclusions	166
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	169
Alternative Rationales: Commonalities and Differences .	169
Propositions	183
A Model of Curriculum Change	185
Methodological Notes	190
BIBLIOGRAPHY	196

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
1 Imaginary, symmetrical, moral, and democratic model of curriculum change	188
2 Realistic configuration of curriculum change in social education between 1870 and 1920	189

CHAPTER ONE

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Introduction

One of the perennial issues in social education is the question of what to teach and how to teach. Whether the social studies curriculum is organized around knowledge or experiences, curriculum critics and analysts look at the match or mismatch between such knowledge or experiences and their stated goals or purposes to determine their congruency or incongruency. Because of their different theoretical persuasions or orientations and/or their different career and social interests, curriculum critics and analysts' articulations lead into different directions, despite their extremely valuable insights and practical implications. Perhaps a common point among critics of the critics depicts the vagueness of social studies goals and purposes.

However, concurrent critiques and analyses of different curriculum issues, be they general curriculum issues or subject-based issues, are not peculiar to the state of the art in the curriculum field historically conceived. At different historical moments, intense curriculum debates and controversies erupted to address different perennial and/or newly emerging issues

and problems. The question of what to teach and how was always embodied in the social and historical discourse about the general curriculum rationale as well as the rationale of the subject itself.

The practical nature of such curriculum issues as what to teach and how, which are sometimes disguised in highly technical terms, entails different ideological and educational orientations and leads to different social consequences. While concurrent curriculum discourse partially speaks to such dimensions, technical rationality appears to dominate. Curriculum critics and scholars attribute this situation to a pervasive state of "historical amnesia" in the field (Goodson, 1983). The current study seeks to remedy this imbalance by uncovering the socio-historical traditions and contexts that enveloped such issues as what to teach and how in social studies education between 1870 and 1920.

Need for This Study

The need for this study is based on both theoretical and practical justifications. Theoretically, an overemphasis on the technical dimensions of such issues as what to teach and how, especially in a field such as social studies, would submerge the meanings, values, and interests that underlie such issues. Thinking and rethinking the curriculum choices and commitments that are made with regard to these issues and their underlying meanings, values, and interests are deemed essential to the raison d'être of a field like social studies. An historical study that seeks to speak to the latter dimensions appears to have a corrective potential of such an

imbalance in curriculum discourse. Teachers' practical decisions and choices about what to teach and how, which are generally constrained by a technical rationality entrenched in the concurrent discourse and practice, would be greatly informed and enlightened by clarifying the meanings, values, and interests that underlie different curriculum choices, decisions, and commitments. Not only can teachers' expertise, voice, and power be enhanced through different organizational reforms, but through an understanding of their critical and decisive role in building a more equitable and just society for the present and upcoming generations. A historical study that seeks to speak to such issues as what to teach and how in their socio-historical contexts and with an eye on the rationales or traditions that informed them would hopefully contribute towards building such an understanding.

Importance of This Study

However, a historical study that seeks to speak to the aforementioned issues and dimensions would be condemned for its extreme presentism if it made its ultimate justifications based on concurrent theoretical and practical needs. Such presentism, if allowed to fulfill its course, may lead to a distortion of significant historical events in an urge to demonstrate their relevance or irrelevance to concurrent issues, problems, and/or controversies. In short, a historian should not sacrifice the present for the sake of the past and neither the past for the sake of the present.

The importance of this study, then, stems not from a blind identification with the present or a certain segment of it but from the historical perspective and historical experience it offers to counteract the extreme presentism of other segments that already dominate the curriculum discourse. In other words, the importance of a historical study stems not from its relevance conceived as dogma but from its relevance conceived as a guide.

The particular concern of this study, i.e., to speak to the socio-historical dimensions and traditions that underlay the issues of what to teach and how over social studies history, would help illuminate how such issues were shaped by different "social dynamics and processes" as well as "professional dynamics and processes" (Popkewitz, 1987) in their socio-historical context(s). While such illuminations may add insights and explanatory power to different interpretations of curriculum reform and/or change, they provide guidance to the concurrent curriculum discourse and practice. Of utmost importance in this respect is the distinction between the concepts of "structure" and "choice" (Apple, 1979) and their interaction with regard to social studies history. In this regard, the current study may help illuminate how such an interaction explains the patterns of stability and change in the context of social studies history.

Statement of the Problem

On reviewing the concurrent and relevant discourse in social studies education in the United States and England--a process that

will be extensively spelled out in the next chapter, it appears that three different rationales or traditions for social studies education were articulated.

1. Social studies education should aim at enhancing the intellectual capacities of students in order for them to assume their leadership roles in the society upon the completion of their education.
2. Social studies education should aim at the differential socialization of students in order for them to fit nicely into their leadership and followership roles in the society upon the completion of their education.
3. Social studies education should aim at providing students with concrete educational experiences that are capable of promoting their critical thinking skills and guiding their actions toward building a more equitable and just society.

Doubtless, each of these rationales or traditions entails distinct conceptions of education and the educative process, school knowledge and experiences, students as individual and social beings, teachers as social and cultural agents. Initially, it could be argued that the first rationale, i.e., the intellectual rigor especially in its early heydays between 1870 and 1910, adheres to the formal training theory of the mind, the academic and/or logical organization of school knowledge, the teacher-centered pedagogy, as well as others. Different but equivalent arguments could be made with regard to the other two rationales.

These three rationales or traditions, along with their pedagogical, psychological, and social implications, do not occur or grow in a vacuum though. Rather, they are dialectically related to the socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions of the society. For example, it could be argued that the intellectual

rigor rationale may represent an aristocratic perspective towards the relationship between schools, curricula, and social education on one hand and agrarian and pre-capitalist social structure and relations on the other. That is, such a rationale, the argument may continue, would fit a feudal society where the social relations of production are relatively stable and the educational privileges are geared exclusively towards the enlightenment of the sons and daughters of feudal lords. Similarly, it could be argued that the differential socialization or relevance rationale may represent a meritocratic and social engineering perspective towards the relationship between schools, curricula, and social education on one hand and a progressively rising corporate and capitalist social structure and relations on the other. Moreover, such a rationale appears to be responsive to the economic and social problems of contemporary capitalist societies.

Regardless of the mechanistic nature of this initial analysis and its focus on socio-political rather than cultural spheres, the point is to illustrate how different rationales or traditions of social education are always enveloped in the socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions of the time and place in which they emerge. Moreover, this analysis should not be perceived as if these three rationales or traditions were to represent three different historical epochs, despite the fact that this may be true. Rather, these three rationales may co-exist in a particular historic moment as different representations of social and economic interests as well as cultural and ideological outlooks. Finally, these

different rationales or traditions may gain or lose momentum depending on their vitality and responsiveness to the dynamics of the economy, culture, and politics.

Accordingly, the major purpose of this study is to flesh out the historical dialectic of the relationship between the different rationales or traditions of social education along with their pedagogical, psychological, and social implications and the socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions that accompanied their rise or demise in the subject-formative years between 1870 and 1920. More specifically, this study attempts to provide answers to the following questions.

1. What were the major rationales or traditions of social education articulated between 1870 and 1920? What were the pedagogical, psychological, and social underpinnings of these rationales?
2. What were the historical conditions-- socio-economic, cultural, and political--that accompanied the rise and demise of these rationales or traditions?
3. How did these historical conditions influence these rationales or traditions? How did these rationales or traditions influence these historical conditions?

Research Method

The research approach employed in order to provide answers to these questions was historical and sociological. The reachable and available curriculum deliberation documents in social education as well as relevant social and educational literature were subject to a qualitative content analysis informed by an open ended set of questions. These questions emerged from the review of literature.

For further elaboration on these questions as well as the research procedures see Chapters Two and Six. Suffice it to say that the basic curriculum deliberation documents that formed the core of the qualitative content analysis were:

1. the 1893 National Education Association's Report of the Committee on Secondary Social Studies, the commonly-called Madison Conference;
2. the 1899 American Historical Association's Report on the Study of History in the Schools, the commonly-called Report of the Committee of Seven;
3. the 1911 American Historical Association's Report on the Study of History in Secondary Schools, the commonly-called Report of the Committee of Five;
4. the 1908 American Political Science Association's Report on Instruction in American Government in Secondary Schools;
5. the 1916 American Political Science Association's Report on the Teaching of Government;
6. the 1916 National Education Association's Report on Teaching the Social Studies in Secondary Education; and
7. the Second Annual Report of the Committee of Teaching Sociology in the Grades and High Schools in America.

Delimitations

The assertions or generalizations confirmed or disconfirmed by this study will be confined by the following delimitations.

1. The focus of this study is on the ideological and formal social education curriculum at the high school between 1870 and 1920. The written, enacted, and received curricula are not part of this study. Despite their utmost importance for a complete understanding of the nature of reform in social education, addressing these curricula would have made the completion of this study extremely

difficult. Nevertheless, due attention is given to the general outline of the written and enacted curricula in spelling out the visible and invisible assumptions of the competing rationales or traditions.

2. The rigor, relevance, and radical rationales or traditions of social education at the high school between 1870 and 1920 were not the only rationales of social education in existence during these historic years. Rather, other rationales such as different religious and anarchistic rationales emerged and contributed to the literature and history of the field. However, these different religious and anarchistic rationales are not part of this study.

Definitions of Terms

The following terms are used in this study according to the following definitions.

Rationale or Tradition

Linguistically, the term rationale is referred to either as "a reasoned exposition of principles; an explanation or statement of reasons" or as "the fundamental reason, the logical or rational basis (of anything)." This means that a rationale would touch upon the fundamental parameters that underlie any particular intellectual and/or social phenomenon. "He sees the rationale of the whole system, its origin and operation" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, p. 219). Accordingly, a rationale of a social education movement would touch upon, if it would not be embedded in, the moral, cultural, and social bases of the society.

Operationally, then, a rationale of social education would include and/or imply both reasons and social groups, with definite

values and interests, that have direct bearings on the direction of social education.

Since a rationale is not a static entity but subject to modifications, development, and change, i.e., has a history, this study equates a rationale with a tradition in a scientific and moral sense.

Reform

Linguistically, the term reform refers to what is done "to make a change for the better in (an arrangement, state of things, practice or proceeding, institution . . . etc.); to amend or improve by removal of faults or abuses." This means that a particular reform, especially in education, speaks to definite goals, specific processes and a content. The goals should be judged as good, the processes could include additions or subtractions, and the content could include organizational as well as practical dimensions. Moreover, a reform speaks to different social groups with different values and interests. "May no such storm fall on our times, where ruin must reform." "A body of members anxious to preserve, and a body eager to reform" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, pp. 429-481).

Accordingly, a reform, especially in education, includes goals, content, and processes which reflect and seek to satisfy or meet the values and interests of different social groups.

The Dialectic of Reform

Linguistically, the term dialectic pertains to whatever discourse that has "the nature of logical disputation"; or can be described as "argumentative, logical." Philosophically and sociologically, the term has two different uses: (a) the continuous convergence and divergence of ideas and principles until reaching the ultimate unification of opposites, and (b) the continuous convergence and divergence of ideas and social groups in their genuine attempt to solve fundamental intellectual and social contradictions (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, pp. 599-600).

While the first use is Hegelian, the second use is Marxist. Since a logical disputation implies the existence of opposites in a social context, there are no conceptual contradictions between the linguistic, philosophic, or sociological uses of the term.

Operationally, then, the dialectic of reform lends itself to the description and explanation--ideas and praxis--of conflict and consensus of different social and professional groups with regard to the rationale, content, and consequences of a reform.

CHAPTER TWO

RATIONALES AND INTERPRETATIONS IN SOCIAL EDUCATION HISTORY

Overview

This chapter provides a descriptive and critical review of literature in social education as a school subject. It includes both theoretical and historical studies. It is organized or divided into three sections: (a) a descriptive and critical analysis of the most important rationales of social education as a school subject, (b) a descriptive and critical analysis of the major interpretations of social education history between 1870 and 1920, and (c) a theoretical framework and research questions that informed the analysis in subsequent chapters.

Rationales of Social Education as School Subject

Nowadays those interested in social education, whether teachers or administrators, students or parents, intellectuals or laypersons, would encounter a plethora of rationales for teaching the social sciences in the high school. Stanley analyzed a wide variety of rationales advocated or entertained by the subject community. Prominent among these rationales are the intellectual rigor

rationale, the common values rationale, the social problems rationale, the reflective inquiry rationale, the critical thinking rationale, the environmental competence rationale, the critical pedagogy rationale, the social reconstruction rationale (Hunt & Metcalf, 1968; Keller, 1972; Newmann, 1975; Oliver & Shaver, 1966; Stanley, 1979; Wesley & Wronski, 1964). While this plethora of rationales represents a symptom of a healthy field, it may appear quite astonishing, and even confusing, especially to the disinterested observer.

Barr et al. (1977) provided a classification of the different rationales of teaching social studies at public schools in the United States. According to them, most of these rationales can be subsumed under three basic traditions or rationales: (a) the social studies as social science tradition which upholds teaching the social sciences (or simplified versions of them) as the basic goal of social studies education, (b) the citizenship education tradition which makes the promotion and commitment to socially accepted values the basic goal of social studies education, and (c) the reflective inquiry tradition which makes studying and solving critical and significant social problems the ultimate goal of social studies education (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977). Definitely, such a classification reduces the sense of confusion, if any, in the field and provides a sense of coherence to the subject community. As such, Robinson (1977) identified three basic traditions in the history of social studies education: the conventional tradition (social studies as the social sciences), the citizenship education

tradition, and the reflective inquiry tradition. Moreover, he concluded that the history of social studies education since its inception represents an interplay among the aforesaid three traditions (Robinson, 1977). Thus, instead of a plethora of rationales, three basic traditions or rationales of social studies education appear to be accepted by the subject community as dynamic or prime movers of development and change in the subject history.

However, since the basic goal of these classifications perhaps was to provide coherence to a seemingly confused field, their basic emphasis was more on the conceptual rather than the socio-historical foundations that underlay the three rationales or traditions. Despite some worthwhile sociological and historical observations, these classifications concentrated on delineating the conceptions of goals, content, pedagogy, teacher, and student that are embodied in each rationale or tradition. As such, since these classifications have defined citizenship education as a separate and distinct rationale, they may leave the impression that the other rationales or traditions are oblivious to citizenship education, a situation or dilemma that would be categorically denied by all members of the subject community. As a matter of fact, each rationale may claim that its approach carries with it the most realistic and authentic meanings of citizenship and entails the appropriate means of accomplishing or fulfilling them.

At any rate, different researchers attempted to spell out the socio-historical foundations of the basic rationales or traditions of teaching different school subjects including the social studies.

Goodson (1983) identified three basic historical rationales or traditions in his study of the rise of environmental studies as a school subject in England. According to him, a subject history is apparently formed through a dialectic of conflict and compromise among three different rationales or traditions: the academic tradition, the utilitarian tradition, and the pedagogic tradition. To him, the academic tradition is "content focused and typically stresses abstract and theoretical knowledge for examination." Subject groups that advocate this rationale or tradition advance the examinational criterion as a basis of accepting or rejecting emerging new subjects or fields that strive for recognition and legitimation. In general, according to Goodson (1983), the academic rationale or tradition (classical liberal in origin or in essence) appears to have been historically oriented or responsive to the needs, values, and interests of the upper middle class and the preparation for professional life and career. The utilitarian tradition, on the other hand, deals with practical knowledge which is sometimes not amenable to examination. Despite the advocacy of governmental, industrial, and commercial circles of this tradition, it continues to occupy (or to be confined to) a low status in the school curriculum. To Goodson, this tradition appears to have been historically geared to the demands of the non-professional vocations in which the majority of people work for most of their adult life. Finally, the pedagogic tradition deals with the personal, social, and common sense knowledge of children. According to Goodson, this tradition is child-centered. It does not aim at preparation for the

professional ladder nor training or apprenticeship for vocation. Rather, it aims at aiding the child's inquiries or discoveries through the activity method. Historically, the bulk of work done under the auspices of this tradition, according to Goodson, was directed to school leavers. And the more pedagogic-based curricula have come to focus on those sections of pupil clientele, the more they suffered from comparatively low status in the subject community. Thus, a rationale or a tradition of teaching a school subject not only entails distinct conceptions of goals, content, pedagogy, teacher, and student but it is also tied to certain needs, values, and interests of a particular constituency and oriented or geared towards a particular student clientele.

Such an understanding is underscored and reinforced in Whitty's (1985) historical study of the rise and demise of three different social studies reform movements in England between the 1940s and 1970s. To him, the subject was shaped by a dialectic of conflict and compromise among the progressive movement of the 1940s and 1950s, the new social studies movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the political education movement of the late 1970s and between them and the old humanist tradition. Despite the overlapping rhetoric of these different reform movements, Whitty distinguished among three basic traditions embodied in these movements: the academic tradition; the relevance and meaningfulness tradition; and the critical or radical tradition. The historical contexts of the rise and demise of these movements (and traditions) and the dialectic of conflict and compromise between these

traditions and the old humanist tradition will be addressed in the next sections. What is important here though is to highlight the fact that each tradition of social studies, as Whitty's study indicates, has a history and is tied to particular social, political, and educational constituencies. That is to say, the rationales or traditions of social studies education are conceptually distinct, grounded in values and interests of particular social and/or cultural groups, and have a history of their own.

Hence, it seems quite sensible and consistent with Stanley (1979, 1981), Whitty (1985), and Goodson's (1983) researches to distinguish among three basic rationales or traditions of social studies education.

1. The Rigor Rationale or Tradition

Conceptually, this rationale or tradition emphasizes that the basic goal of social studies education is the intellectual development of citizens. Advocates of this rationale or tradition claim that an emphasis on intellectual development would lead to the formation of informed citizens and the provision of a meaningful learning experience to students. It stresses the importance of teaching the structures of the disciplines--federated or fused--in order to achieve the basic goals of social studies education. The pedagogy advocated by this rationale or tradition highlights the importance of the inquiry method, beside any method the teacher may deem appropriate, in achieving the transmission or discovery of knowledge. The teacher is conceived of as a scholar, intellectual, or subject matter specialist. And the student is conceived of as a young scholar or inquirer. Sociologically, this rationale or tradition is associated with aristocratic groups and intellectual circles at the university. As such, it seems to be oriented or responsive to middle and upper middle class constituencies or

communities. Historically, this rationale or tradition seems to be the most established tradition of social studies education. It seems to be the oldest tradition as well.

2. The Relevance Rationale or Tradition

Conceptually, this rationale or tradition defines the basic goal of social studies education as the formation of functionally literate and socially efficient citizens. It stresses the importance of focusing on the common values of the society and its enduring social problems if social studies education is to achieve its goals. The pedagogy advocated by this tradition gives way to the process of reflective inquiry as an indispensable part of its scheme of social studies education. Teacher's work would be described as somewhat like that of a social worker. And the conception of the student and student's learning are much more like that of a young moral and social inquirer. Sociologically, this rationale or tradition seems to be backed by different governmental, industrial, and commercial circles. As such, it seems to be mainly or principally geared towards working and/or lower middle class students. Historically, a dialectic of conflict and compromise underlay the relationship between the relevance and rigor rationales or traditions and contributed to shaping or forming of the subject since the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, with the advent of the twentieth century the relevance rationale or tradition emerged as a new and strong contender in the subject community.

3. The Radical Rationale or Tradition

Conceptually, this rationale or tradition emphasizes that the basic goal of social education or social studies education is the raising of students social consciousness and guiding their actions with regard to crucial economic, social, cultural, and political problems, dilemmas, and/or crises in their society. The content of social studies education should speak to the recurring and newly emerging problems and crises at both the national and local levels with a clear vision of what constitutes a good society. The teacher is perceived as a "transformative intellectual" (Giroux, 1988) and the student as an active learner and a bridge builder towards a more equitable, just, and humane future. The pedagogy advocated by this tradition, while acknowledging

the necessity of students' initiatives in learning, alludes to the indispensable role of the teachers in knowledge selection and/or problem definition and in communicating a clear vision of what constitutes a good society. Sociologically, this rationale or tradition is advocated by different critical and socialist circles and seeks to reach a wider audience among different social groups. While this tradition does not deny its sympathy with the people who are discriminated against because of their gender, color, or social class, it declares the goals of its unfinished agenda to be the building and rebuilding of a more equitable and just society for all social groups. Historically, this rationale or tradition, despite gaining some momentum at different historical moments, seems to be the least incorporated in the formal discourse and practice of social studies education. It seems to be the most marginalized rationale or tradition in the history of the subject community as well.

This general outline of the basic rationales or traditions of social studies education seems a bit static though. Such rationales or traditions are always products and social constructs of their time and place. Both the conceptual and societal bases of these rationales or traditions are subject to change and development over time. Thus, what remains is to examine and elucidate these rationales or traditions in the American context between 1870 and 1920.

Interpretations of Social Studies Education History

The rise and growth of social studies as a school subject were interpreted differently by different researchers and scholars. Among the most dominant interpretations, one can discern four different interpretations.

1. The rise and growth of social studies as a school subject was directly linked to the academic development and growth at the university level. The scholarly community at this level, through its skilled activity and intelligible standards, always provided inputs and directions to the newly emerging subject and guided its subsequent growth and development (Goodson, 1983). This interpretation is commonly called the philosophical interpretation.
2. The rise and growth of social studies was a function of genuine efforts and articulations of prominent professional committees. These committees sought to incorporate the best available knowledge and experiences into the curriculum in order to fulfill the progressive needs of the society (Robinson, 1980). This interpretation is commonly called the conventional interpretation.
3. The rise and growth of social studies was substantially influenced by the efforts and inclinations of the intelligentsia at different points in time to use the subject as a vehicle to "validate a cultural unanimity which had lost its coherence" (Robinson, 1980, p. 11). This interpretation is commonly called the cultural politics interpretation.
4. The rise and growth of social studies was inextricably interwoven with the efforts and inclinations of powerful social, economic, and cultural groups who sought to use the subject to legitimate a particular vision of the society congruent with their values and interests (Robinson, 1980). This interpretation is commonly called the revisionist or radical interpretation.

Each of these interpretations provides a partial explanation of the rise and growth of social studies as a school subject. However, some explanations seem more reasonable and plausible than others. For example, the philosophical interpretation seems to be the least relevant to the case of interpreting social studies history. At one level, this interpretation would illustrate the rise and growth of the subject as a fait accompli (Goodson, 1983), i.e., as an

irreversible, steady, and uninterrupted process. That is to say, the case of a new school subject is immediately made once a university base of that subject is established. Furthermore, any changes or reformulations of such a subject, a situation that happened frequently in the history of social studies, should be squarely explained by the corresponding changes or reformulations of the parent discipline or speciality at the university level. While the influence of the academic growth and organizational changes at the university level can not be denied, social studies history can not be completely explained by such developments or changes. The rise and growth of a subject encompass ideas as well as people. And a subject community is not synonymous with the scholarly community at the university. At another level, this interpretation " appears to be based on an absolutist conception of a set of distinct forms of knowledge which correspond closely to the traditional areas of the academic curriculum" (Goodson, 1983). Social studies which could be conceived of as an alliance among several social disciplines or subjects, all of them considered modern subjects by academic standards, can not lend itself to such an absolutist conception of knowledge. As such, the cultural politics interpretation seems to be the most complex and least understood--at least for me--in explaining the history of the subject. Further research and scholarly work are essential to determine whether or not the essence of different cultural canons, ethos, and lives of different cultural groups led to different rationales of teaching the subject and how the spirit of consensus or understanding was

preserved or endangered in this respect. Definitely, concepts like cultural hegemony, cultural resistance, cultural pluralism, and cultural democracy can serve as explanatory constructs of different social studies programs at different points in time. Moreover, a historical account that would entertain such an explanation of social studies history would certainly look beyond the formal or informal social studies programs at the public schools.

At any rate, both the conventional and revisionist interpretations seem to be the most relevant interpretations of the rise and growth of the subject especially in its formative years between 1870 and 1920. Therefore, the basic tenets, characteristics, methods, strengths, and weaknesses of each interpretation will be addressed in the following pages.

The Conventional Interpretation

Generally speaking, this interpretation emphasizes that schools are the basic engines of democracy. They are the great social equalizers. The benevolent and meritocratic nature of these institutions is always progressed or expanded under the pressures of relentless democratic and progressive forces. At different points in time, emerging social conditions and needs necessitated the cooperation among different social, cultural, and professional groups to work out new, modern, and socially responsive curriculum to meet these rising conditions and needs. The outcome of such mutual cooperation, in most circumstance, was the production of socially progressive and culturally unbiased curriculum capable of

representing the culture, with its basic needs, problems, and aspirations. After all, it is difficult to accept the notion that math, history, literature, and science are bourgeois inventions (Lawton, 1975).

Advocates of this interpretation of social studies history claim that such history is closely related to the rise and growth of different learned societies and professional associations, especially in the disciplines that have direct bearing on social studies education. Prominent among these learned societies and professional associations are the American Historical Association (AHA, 1884), the National Education Association (NEA, 1857), and different social sciences associations such as the American Political Science Association (APSA, 1903), the American Anthropological Association (AAA, 1904), and the American Sociological Association (ASA, 1907). At least the ideological and formal (or recommended) high school social studies curricula were a direct outcome of genuine efforts and articulations made by these associations in the form of national or joint committees. Any macro level socio-economic, cultural, and political changes did not assume any direct influence upon social studies history. The professional committees served as intermediaries between the subject and the concerns of different social, cultural, and political groups. It was through these committees that these concerns were mediated and articulated. Such a position conferred or bestowed upon the committees substantial power and authority over the direction of the subject (Robinson, 1980).

Three main accounts of social studies history were offered or articulated by the conventional viewpoint. The first of these accounts was developed by Tryon (1935). To him, the history of social studies was shaped by the benevolent and cooperative efforts of learned societies, professional associations, civic and fraternal groups, and educational associations. The rise of social studies in 1916 came about as a result of benevolent and cooperative efforts of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and historians. These professionals put aside their interests and the interests of their particular disciplines and helped create a social studies curriculum characterized by intellectual honesty and academic rigor as well as its responsiveness to the needs of students of a modern school system in a modern society (Lybarger, 1991). The growth of social studies since then (up to the mid 1930s) continued to reflect such benevolent and disinterested efforts on the part of the associations. Similarly, Johnson and Wesley developed slightly different arguments to account for social studies history (Johnson, 1932; Tryon, 1935; & Wesley, 1957).

The historical approach employed in these accounts combined qualitative and quantitative methods to explain the internal development and growth of each of the disciplines comprising the social studies. The chief source of data in these accounts were the reports of national organizations, professional committees, and scholarly surveys. Among the issues and concerns that captured the attention of these accounts were the tension between the intellectual tradition and the citizenship education tradition, and

the increasing systematization and rationalization of the curriculum (Robinson, 1980).

The conventional interpretation of social studies history was severely criticized. At one level, it overemphasized the role of the learned societies, professional associations, and national committees in accounting for the rise and growth of social studies. If these societies, associations, and committees set up or defined the parameters of social studies at the ideological level, it was universities and school administrators who worked out the formal curriculum that entered schools and classrooms. In other words, the institutional and organizational relationship between high school and the college played as a significant role as the learned societies, professional associations, and national committees in deciding about the structure and form of social studies (Keels, 1980). At another level, the definition or conception of the historical context in the conventional interpretation seems to be rather limited. Apart from considerations of such contextual issues as the rise of students enrollment, the articulation between high schools and colleges, and the internal changes in school organization, this interpretation overlooked the influence of different socio-economic, cultural, and political changes upon the substance, form, and direction of the subject. The tripartite social and political reforms at the turn of the century (i.e., immigration, urbanization, and industrialization) seem to command little influence, or no influence at all, on the direction of subject according to this interpretation. Finally, the conventional

interpretation down played the role of conflict in accounting for the rise and growth of social studies. However, one can discern a sense of tension and contestation between different learned societies and professional associations with regard to the direction of social studies even within the conventional interpretation (Robinson, 1980).

The conventional interpretation has its own merits, however. As the first interpretation ever that made its focus the carving of a history of social studies, it created a collective sense of the past among social studies educators, provided inspiration and professional uplift for workers within the field, and helped stabilize a field frequently perceived as disintegrated, chaotic, and insecure (Robinson, 1980).

The Revisionist Interpretation

In general, this interpretation emphasizes that schools and curricula are middle class institutions and inventions. They generally function for the benefit of the middle class. The organizational structure, the cultural capital, and cultural ethos of these institutions, while serving the needs and aspirations of the middle class, legitimate social inequalities among different social and cultural groups. According to Bourdieu, this legitimization process operates through what he calls the internalization and naturalization of failure" (Bourdieu, 1982). Different social and cultural groups express--with different degrees of vigor--specific values and interests with regard to the making of

the school curriculum. Yet, the school curriculum almost always reflects the values and interests of the most powerful social and cultural groups. At different points in curriculum history or a subject history, powerful social and cultural groups compete over the command or direction of the curriculum or subject. And at each point, the outcome of such conflict or competition represents a temporary compromise among these powerful social and cultural groups. Any internal or external changes that influence the distribution of power among these groups precipitate a new phase of conflict, competition, and negotiation to work out a new curriculum compromise. The least powerful social and cultural groups influence a curriculum compromise to a degree commensurate with their power. These groups or their spokesmen are generally absented or marginalized in the process of negotiating a curriculum compromise.

Advocates of this interpretation of social studies history emphasize that constructing a social history of the rise and growth of a school subject should focus on uncovering the social dynamics that shaped the rise and growth of that subject. It should avoid the naive perspective that perceives the rise and growth of a subject as a symptom of normal evolution or an example of the growth of civilization. As such, it should eschew the narrow perspective of approaching this history through analyzing the role of professional committees in modifying curricula to fit the flow of students into the high school and university curricula. Equally important--beside uncovering the "social dynamics" that gave way to particular formulation or reformulation of a school subject--are the

voices of dissent and the counter-hegemony practices aroused by the dominance of a particular tradition in a subject history (Popkewitz, 1987). With some stretch of imagination, the revisionist or radical interpretation of the rise and growth of social studies would go something like this: the rise of social studies in the second decade of this century was influenced, to a large extent, by America's social and economic transformation from an agrarian to urban and industrial society as well as the rise of corporate capitalism. This transformation was accompanied by strong drives towards rationalization and scientism, professionalization and bureaucratization, efficiency and social control. At another level, this transformation created a lost sense of community, especially among members of the middle class who were squeezed between the flow of immigrants and dislocated citizens from below and corporate capitalists from above (Apple & Franklin, 1979). All these changes and their ramifications left their imprint upon the early formulation of social studies , a formulation that sought, in some accounts, to restore the lost sense of community among members of the middle class and to achieve a degree of control over the immigrants and the socially dislocated citizens. At different points of subject history , social and structural forces worked together, wittingly or unwittingly, to maintain the control of dominant social and cultural forces over the structure of meaning beside their control over the structure of production. However, this hegemonic structure did not prevent voices of dissent and counter-hegemony from carving a critical and social

reconstructionist tradition in social studies history. This tradition has left significant marks on the subject history through its attempt to provide an alternative vision and practice, whether inside or outside the formal boundaries of the subject, that ran counter to the dominant traditions in subject history (Popkewitz, 1987).

Intellectuals, professionals, and school people, then, can neither be perceived as completely benevolent or disinterested individuals nor unconscious puppets or apostles of the dominant social and cultural elites. Rather, they were men and women with particular values and interests who understood the givens and parameters of each historical moment in subject history and expressed their visions with regard to the direction of the subject. Whether they were hampered by the complexity of the time or transcended this complexity and committed themselves to these visions, they were active shapers and interested participants in a complex process of subject making. In other words, the objective realities of each historical moment in subject history did not negate the subjectivities of these intellectuals, professionals, and school people. As a matter of fact, it would not go off the mark to say that these realities were actively reinterpreted through these subjectivities.

The basic tenets of the revisionist or radical interpretation of social studies history can be discerned in many historical researchers and other scholars' efforts. Four historical accounts are important for further understanding and illumination of this

interpretation. Franklin (1986), in his account of the rise of social studies in the second decade of this century, highlighted the connections between the rationale, structure, and content of social studies and the fears and concerns of the middle class about the lost sense of community and like mindedness of the nineteenth century small town. It was through the articulation and genuine efforts of intellectuals and professionals, who belonged to this class, that the new subject and its direction came to being (Franklin, 1986). As such, Lybarger (1987) in his account of the ideological outlook of the NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education indicated that the members' conceptions of students' needs--as a basis of knowledge or experience selection and organization--was substantially influenced by the ideology of charity organization and the social settlement movements of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The social efficiency and the socialization into the Anglo-Saxon ideals embodied in these movements underlay the conception of needs articulated in the 1916 social studies report. This connection between the ideology of the charity organization and the social settlement movements and the rationale of social studies as expressed in the 1916 report was due, at least in part, to the fact that a substantial number of the committee members worked and participated effectively in these movements (Lybarger, 1991).

Besides these accounts of the rise of the social studies in the second decade of the twentieth century, comprehensive surveys of the field's history were developed as well. Hertzberg (1981) offered a

comprehensive survey of the field's history between the last quarter of the 19th century and the late 1970s. A thorough analysis of six social studies reform movements were elucidated: the intellectual development movement, the social efficiency movement, the social reconstructionist movement, the life adjustment movement, the new social studies movement, and the social and personal self realization movement. To him, each movement represented a distinct and continuous phase in the field's history. In each phase, historians, professional and social educators, and social scientists articulated different rationales, contents, and methods for teaching the subject. The official social studies curriculum in each phase came about as a result of a dialectic of conflict and compromise among these subject groups. Moreover, such a curriculum was responsive to the social and political conditions that precipitated the rise of each reform movement. Overall, the rationale of social studies was subject to conflict and compromise among different groups and associations. Different alliances were formed. Some were backed by social, economic, and political forces. Others ran counter to these forces. Some of these alliances persisted. Others faded away. However, the basic traditions that competed over the direction of social studies were the academic rigor tradition, the relevance and meaningfulness tradition, and to a lesser extent the social reconstructionist tradition (Hertzberg, 1981).

Barr et al. (1977) offered a similar account of social studies history. For them, social studies history seems to be a function of the dialectical relationship among three professional bodies: the

historians, the social educators, and the social scientists. At each round of this dialectical relationship different social and political changes and/or developments took place and different ideas emerged that influenced the parameters of this relationship.

Both Barr et al. (1977) and Hertzberg's (1981) surveys, taken together, provides a lot of insights about social studies history in its societal and professional contexts. A brief account of their explanations seems necessary. According to them, the last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed the early heydays of the academic rigor rationale or tradition. Concerned about different social changes and influenced by the dominant theories of learning like mental discipline and classicism, the scientific historians and the moderate revisionists (educators) forged an alliance that made the rigorous study of history and its allied subjects the basic rationale of teaching social studies. Yet, with an accelerated tone of social change, the rise of pragmatism and behaviorism, and the formation of different social sciences associations, the old alliance between the scientific historians and the moderate revisionists "exploded." Historians, social scientists, and educators competed bitterly over the direction of social studies at the first quarter of this century.

It was towards the end of the second decade of this century that an alliance among social efficiency minded educators, new or social historians, and social scientists was formed and made its focus the articulation of a social studies rationale that would give precedence to relevance over rigor. Nevertheless, by the end of the

first quarter of this century, it was clear that social educators took the lead in the affairs of social studies, once the exclusive realm of the historians.

The second quarter of this century witnessed the rise of the social reconstructionist rationale or tradition. With the onset of the depression and the institutionalization of the New Deal, the rise of different totalitarian regimes abroad, and the formation of different educational associations--national as well as regional--leaders of the social studies movement, especially the historians and social educators--argued that social studies should aim at creating rich and many sided personalities capable of living and participating in a collective democracy. The move towards this rationale, however, reflected the historians' concerns about their declining role in the affairs of social studies and their interests in reconciling the disparate views of educators, social scientists, and theirs with regard to the direction of social studies education.

Nonetheless, it was neither the Deweyian (or soft) version of social efficiency nor the Sneddenian (or stern) version of social efficiency that dominated the social studies practice. The social reconstructionist or the democratic efficiency rationale that were called upon by the historians and social educators did not make significant inroads in classrooms either. Rather what dominated practice in social studies was a distorted version of the Deweyian version of social efficiency.

The social studies courses that dominated the classrooms throughout the 1940s and early 1950s were described as social stew

or social slush. It was different set of social, political, and intellectual changes and developments that called these practices into question and precipitated the rise of the new social studies movement, with its renewed emphasis on academic rigor. The declining patriotic and democratic attitudes of youth, the fears and concerns about American technological superiority after Sputnik, the rise of the new middle class with its concerns about academic excellence, and the rise of the structure of the discipline movement helped forge an alliance between social educators and social scientists--with a weak degree of involvement on the part of the historians and political scientists--that called for making the rigorous study of the structure(s) of the social sciences the ultimate goal or rationale of social studies. However, it was the historical nature of this movement, its indifference with regard to the present, and its insensitivity to the complexity of change in schools that undermined quickly its influence on social studies classrooms.

The social and political upheavals of the 1960s--especially the civil rights movement and the counter-culture movement--brought the call for relevance and meaningfulness to the forefront once again, but with different implications than those that underscored the NEA's 1916 social studies report. Here, there was a call for a culturally relevant and meaningful curriculum especially for the ethnic and racial minorities. An alliance or an uneasy or restless detente between this new movement and the new social studies was formed. Yet, such an alliance was weak enough that it almost

completely disintegrated under the severe and relentless pressures of the back to basics movement, with its patriotic, elitist, and right wing ideology.

At any rate, the revisionist or radical interpretation went beyond uncovering the social and professional dynamics that influenced the rise and growth of social studies. Some of these interpretations attempted to address the significance, meaning, and fate of different social studies movements that ran counter to the dominant social studies discourse and practice. Significant among these movements were the Socialist Sunday School movement and, according to some analysts, Harold Rugg's series of social studies textbooks (Kliebard & Wagner, 1987; Teitelbaum, 1987). While these movements represent significant events in American educational history in general and social studies in particular, understanding the conditions of their rise and demise would add more insights to our knowledge of the linkages between social studies history, the parameters of the socio-economic and political structures of the society, and the active interpretations and actions of significant individuals and groups in response to these conditions.

The historical method employed in most of these accounts assumes a connection between the objective realities or the parameters of a particular time, epoch, or era and the subjective interpretations and actions of individuals or social/cultural groups in response to them. Yet, these accounts do not assume a predeterministic relationship in this regard. The objective realities are always interpreted and acted upon by individuals and

groups with different values and interests. These individuals or groups' responses were far from being uniform responses. The subjectivities of individuals and groups played as much a role as the objective parameters of social realities in accounting for the rise and demise of certain trends and traditions in social studies history. The chief source of data in these accounts went beyond the formal records of professional committees and national surveys to consider the personal histories (biographies) of those who participated in and influenced different social studies reform movements. The social locations and positions of those involved were depicted through critical readings and analyses of different formal and personal documents such as census reports, tax forms, wills, autobiographies, diaries, and correspondences. Their visions, outlooks, and ideologies were discerned through scrutinizing their writings, speeches, and actions in different occasions and contexts. And all these historical data were brought to bear on significant questions, issues, and concerns that underlie the social history of social studies. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in these accounts to provide reasonable explanation of what went on and why. Some of the issues and concerns of these accounts focused on the connections between rising and demising trends and traditions in social studies history and different social, economic, and political changes, different cultural, intellectual, and professional ideas or theories, and the social locations and identities of different individuals and groups who were active in the subject history.

However, the revisionist or radical interpretation was subject to severe criticism from different directions. Among the most popular criticisms that have been directed towards the revisionist or radical interpretation are the highly politicized categories it imposes on the historical data, a situation that is much more likely to lead, in the absence of extreme caution, to distorted explanations. Another criticism castigated the obsession of this interpretation with conflict as the prime mover of events and its neglect of the forces and urges of consensus. A third criticism highlighted the relatively weak interest of this interpretation in personal histories or biographies in comparison with its interest in the ideological and organizational directions of schools and curricula as a whole.

Revisionist and radical historians responded to each of these criticism articulately, insightfully, and practically. For example, they acknowledged that their categories may imply a particular vision of history and society. But they emphasized that such categories are not equivalent to dogma. Rather, they are always tested and scrutinized within every single historical account. As such, the historical canons of scholarship are always present as safeguards against any potential distortion in any of these accounts.

At any rate, the revisionist or radical interpretation significantly expanded our understanding of social studies history. Moreover, it offered a critical vantage point that shook the conventional wisdom of social studies history. And finally, it

looked critically at the consequences of different social studies reform movements in terms of the constraints they placed and the possibilities they opened for the social education of different social and cultural groups.

The study in hand aspires to transcend the boundaries between the conventional and revisionist interpretations in explaining the history of the subject in its formative years between 1870 and 1920. It seeks to analyze and situate the deliberations of different secondary school social studies committees in their social, cultural, professional, and political contexts. And in so doing, it builds on and makes full use of the most important insights advanced by both interpretations.

Theoretical Framework

Obviously, grasping the essence of social studied history between 1870 and 1920--let alone grasping that history in its entirety--is a highly complex and formidable endeavor. Such complexity and difficulty stem from the multi-dimensional and subtle interactions this history involves. Any social studies reform movement involves a wide variety of institutions, programs, ideas, ideologies, personalities, career interests, and social groups' interests and aspirations. A reasonable and meaningful historical account of such a movement, or the history of the whole subject in its entirety, requires genuine efforts, skills, and insights--let alone energy and patience--on the part of those interested whether they happen to be professional historians or amateurs.

However, approaching social studies history without a theoretical framework would make such an endeavor extremely difficult, if not nearly impossible. If writing history--any history--without a theoretical framework amounts to mere eclecticism, writing a history of social studies--given its highly complex nature--would amount to navigating without a chart or compass in an uncharted sea. A theoretical framework, then, is an indispensable part of writing a history of social studies. It may be even fair to say that a theoretical account of social studies would be not only meaningless but also unsocial.

Both the conventional and revisionist or radical interpretations attempted to provide such a theoretically grounded history of social studies. Each placed much more emphasis on particular elements of the subject history and worked out plausible explanations given its theoretical orientation. The conventional interpretation, with its modernization and consensus tenets, emphasized the influence of "professional dynamics and processes" on the subject history. On the other hand, the revisionist or radical interpretation, with its conflict and critical tenets, emphasized the influence of different "social dynamics and processes" on social studies history. Both are extremely useful as they sensitize our professional and social consciousness vis-a-vis social studies discourse and practice.

Nevertheless, it seems quite difficult to understand social studies history through a perspective that focuses squarely on either the "professional dynamics and processes" or the "social

dynamics and processes." A full, accurate, and penetrating understanding of the subject history should transcend the fictitious schism between the professional and the social. Both the "professional dynamics and processes" and the "social dynamics and processes" are interrelated and seem to be the opposite sides of a single coin.

At any rate, different educational and curriculum historians called upon future research and scholarship that transcend the boundaries between the conventional and revisionist or radical interpretations. Kaestle (1976) called on educational historians to transcend the entrenched division between the consensus and conflict traditions of writing history and provide "elegant" explanations that would account for more of the conflicting evidence in America's educational history. He succinctly stated his argument as follows:

. . . "because there is abundant evidence of both pervasive consensus and pervasive conflict in America's educational development, I believe historians' dispositions in future research should be to (a) define more precisely what relationship we are looking at when we assert consensus or conflict, (b) eschew an interpretation framework which sees either as the essence of development, and (c) find a more elegant way to relate the two. In my view, the notion of elegance denotes for historians the effort to construct-without lapsing into mere eclecticism interpretations that will help explain a greater bulk of the conflicting evidence than do existing interpretations. We need to emulate and improve upon sociologists . . . who attempted to produce social change theories that would incorporate--indeed emphasize--conflict without making economic class the sole focus. (pp. 390-396)

Similarly, curriculum historians called for future research and scholarship in curriculum that would transcend the boundaries between the conventional and revisionist or radical interpretations.

Both Kliebard and Franklin (1983) called upon curriculum historians to eschew the perspectives that illustrate the curriculum as the ultimate panacea of social ills and the vehicle of social progress or as the subtle medium of hegemony and social control. According to them, both the sanguine and the critical interpretations miss the point. Historically, the curriculum was neither a completely progressive nor a completely repressive or oppressive force. Rather, it represented an "uneven compromise among several competing forces." Echoing Kaestle (1976), they constructed their argument as follows:

" . . . despite the utility these interpretations may once have, their focus on limited aspects of our historical experience tends to flatten our understanding of that experience and leads us ultimately to miss its complexity and ambiguity. Rather than a monolithic trust engineered by one political wing or another, the American curriculum is more likely a product of unexpressed and uneven compromise among several conflicting forces. Some no doubt progressive and other clearly conservative, with much that is in between or simply different. What curriculum history needs are not heightened political antagonisms but what Carl Kaestle has called "elegant" explanations that will explore the various dimensions and ramifications of that compromise. (Kliebard & Franklin, 1983, p. 148)

The answers to these persistent and stimulating calls were never late. Different curriculum historians and theorists attempted to provide historical models and accounts that transcended the boundaries between the conventional and the revisionist or radical interpretations of subjects' histories. Significant among these historical models and accounts are Cooper's (1984) model of subject change, Goodson's (1983) historical study of the rise of environmental studies as a school subject, and Whitty's (1985)

historical study of different social studies reform movements. Interestingly enough, these studies emerged as an outgrowth of a systematic research program in the British context. The focus of these studies on the historical and sociological bases of subjects change and development perhaps represented a trans-Atlantic and concomitant response to the aforesaid interests and concerns of American educational and curriculum historians. A brief review of these studies seems in order.

Cooper's (1984) model of subject change, despite the fact that it was developed in the context of a historical study of mathematics and science in England, includes a set of explanatory propositions that could transcend the boundaries of school subjects. Among these propositions that seem relevant to the purpose of this study are the following propositions.

1. Subjects are constituted of segments, with distinct missions and material interests. In other words, subjects are not monolithic entities. Rather, they are loose amalgamations among these segments.
2. Conflict and consensus among these segments--and their hostilities to or alliances with groups inside and outside a subject or group of subjects--should be seen as explanatory factors in accounts of a subject change.
3. The relative power of different subject's segments is directly related to the differential distribution of resources among these segments, with the resources broadly defined to include access to financial resources, access to media, access to cognitive skills, and access to recruitment processes. This differential distribution of resources can be explained by different locations of these segments within a set of structural relationships as well as the

positions these segments take with regard to forging alliances with powerful and resource controlling groups.

4. A subject mission or missions should be seen as partially negotiable social construct. Therefore, different reforms that call upon a subject redefinition should consider the consequences of these reforms upon the career interests and aspirations of different interested actors, segments, allied groups, potential adversaries or allies.
5. Since any redefinition of a school subject is characteristically a compromise among the demands of various powerful groups, we should expect its legitimacy to be continuously contested as changes occur in the distribution of resources and climate of opinion in various arenas (Cooper, 1984). The significance of this model stems from its attempt to link structural and interactional approaches in the historical analysis of a subject redefinition. As such, this significance stems from its simplicity and applicability to different subjects.

Goodson's historical study of the rise of environmental studies established a similar set of enlightening propositions. According to him (1983), the academic tradition of subjects like Geography and Biology perceived the new contender as a potential threat to their established status, resources, and boundaries. Conversely, rural studies perceived the rise of environmental studies as an opportunity to enhance its weak status and resources. This is why rural studies transformed its name to environmental studies and its rationale from a utilitarian and pedagogic rationale to an academic one. While the more utilitarian traditions within geography and biology expressed interest and sympathy with environmental studies, they kept their loyalty to their parent disciplines. The entrenched influence of the academic traditions in geography and biology made

the negotiations between the new contender's constituency and the institutional and organizational authorities difficult and bitter negotiations. Eventually, environmental studies was granted a provisional status as a school subject. The significance of this study stems from its confirmation of the segmented nature of school subjects and the intra- and extra-subject conflict around status, resources, and boundaries.

Similarly, Whitty (1985) provided an interpretive historical account of three social studies reform movement in England: the social studies movements of the 1940s and 1950s, the new social studies movement of late 1960s and early 1970s, and the political education movement of late 1970s. Despite the overlapping rhetoric of these movements, Whitty distinguished among three different rationales or traditions embodied in these movements : the relevance and meaningfulness tradition, the academic rigor tradition, and the radical or critical tradition. While each movement emphasized its impartiality to all traditions of teaching the subject at the rhetorical level, it advocated or placed much more emphasis on a particular tradition rather than the other at the practical level. That is to say, the realities, practices, and strategies of each movement were complementary to its rhetoric in revealing its ideological direction. The 1940s and 1950s movement placed much more emphasis on relevance and meaningfulness. The late 1960s and early 1970s placed much more emphasis on academic rigor. And the late 1970s movement placed much more emphasis on relevance and criticism. The rise and demise of these movements were situated in

their socio-political, professional, and organizational contexts. For the late 1940s and 1950s movement (relevance and meaningfulness), it was the socio-political climate of post World War II that gave way to the rise of this movement. However, it was the political priorities of the time as well as the dominance of the old humanist tradition that belittled its influence and eventually led to its decay. For the late 1960s and early 1970s movement (academic rigor), it was the failure of the relevance movement that inspired this movement to use the academic rigor argument in its quest for status and resources. Yet, it was the changing political priorities and professional conflict over status and resources that caused the failure of this movement. For the political education movement--with its relevance rationale and critical mantle--the political and social support it received did not overcome the institutional resistance of the old humanist tradition, a situation which led eventually to its demise (Whitty, 1985). The significance of this study stems from its attempt to link the professional, institutional, and organizational to the economic, social, and political in exploring the rise and demise of each movement. In other words, it attempted to spell out the connections between "the professional dynamics and processes" and "the social dynamics and processes." Moreover, such significance stems from Whitty's depiction of the major rationales or traditions in social studies history, i.e., the relevance and meaningfulness tradition, the academic rigor tradition, and the critical tradition. The verification of these traditions through matching rhetoric and

realities of each movement was undoubtedly a genuine accomplishment as well.

Obviously, the conceptual and societal bases or foundations of different rationales or traditions that shaped the history of different school subjects underlay many of the aforementioned studies. In general, this study employs similar logic. Specifically, it aspires to achieve the following goals and respond to the following questions.

1. To analyze the conceptual bases of different social studies rationales or traditions that arose and shaped the subject in its formative years between 1870 and 1920. In so doing, this study attempts to provide answers to the following questions:
 - a. Whether or not these rationales or traditions reflected a commitment to a federated or fused conception of school knowledge?
 - b. Whether or not these rationales or traditions reflected a commitment to indoctrination or liberal learning?
 - c. Whether or not these rationales or traditions reflected a commitment to social control or social change?
 - d. Whether or not these rationales or traditions reflected a commitment to domestication (quietism) or social criticism?
2. To analyze the social, intellectual, and professional forces or alliances that backed (advocated) or opposed (resisted) these rationales or traditions as they arise and/or get reformulated. In so doing, this study attempts to provide answers to the following questions.
 - a. Whether or not these rationales or traditions represented different competing and/or cooperating segments of a subject community?

- b. Whether or not the relative power of different rationales or traditions related to the distribution of resources among subject segments?
 - c. Whether or not the relative power of different rationales or traditions related to the structural locations and positions of subject segments with regard to inter- and extra-subject organizations and/or communities that have say over resource distribution or allocation?
 - d. Whether or not these rationales or traditions carried with them opportunities or threats that enhanced or jeopardized the prospects and interests of intra-subject segments and extra-subject organizations or communities? To what extent can such opportunities or threats explain the success or failure of these rationales or traditions?
- 3. To provide a socio-historical explanation of the rise or demise of each rationale or tradition of social education in its formative years. Since the conventional interpretation advocated the professional dynamics and processes or professional consensus as the major explanatory factor or category of the subject intellectual history, and since the revisionist interpretation advocated the social dynamics and processes or social conflict as the major explanatory factor or category of the subject social history, this study aspires to provide answers to the following questions.
 - a. Whether or not the professional dynamics and processes and the social dynamics and processes were interdependent or mutually exclusive in explaining the formative years of the subject history?
 - b. Whether or not the internal differentiation within and/or convergence across the subjects or disciplines that constituted the social studies were completely independent of or dependent on the social structure?

- c. Whether or not social, intellectual, and educational ideas and theories influenced the rise or demise of different rationales or traditions of social education in its formative years?
- d. Whether or not the rise of a particular rationale or tradition of social education represented an ultimate and irreversible triumph of a particular subject segment and its inter- and extra-subject alliances or a temporary compromise that was soon to be contested by other inter- and extra-subject segments?

The different definitions, goals, and questions that emerged from this critical review of the literature helped make the analyses and explanations embodied in the subsequent chapters much more focused and straightforward. Moreover, the extremely valuable insights of the conventional and revisionist interpretations served as criteria or points of reference to evaluate the emerging analyses and explanations.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ACADEMIC RIGOR RATIONALE

Overview

This chapter will focus on the early heydays of the rigor rationale as it accompanied the rise of social education (history and its allied subjects) as a school subject in the modern high school and an explanation for that rise. To facilitate this process, the chapter will be divided into the following sections: the rigor rationale's phases of development, its substance, its visible premises and invisible premises, an interpretation of the rigor rationale, and a summary with conclusions.

The Rigor Rationale: Phases of Development

The roots of the rigor rationale in social education date back to the early institutions of secondary education in colonial America. The classical curriculum of the Latin grammar school, with its focus on Latin, Greek, and mathematics, was generally conceived as a rigorous curriculum capable of enlightening and enculturating the minds of the young. The basic function of schooling at that time focused on making "gentlemen" ready to assume leadership roles in society. In its modern sense, social education did not

constitute a formal curriculum in Latin grammar schools. Moral philosophy and/or religion were, in an indirect fashion, the only relevant courses to social education at this stage.

The early beginnings of the modern definition of a rigorous rationale in social education accompanied the rise of the academy and the modern high school as institutions of secondary education between the 1781 American Revolution and the 1860 Civil War. Although both the academy and the modern high school were secondary institutions, they were different in terms of their institutional and curricular forms. While the academy was, to a large extent, a private institution, the high school was basically public. Therefore, the academy's curriculum was generally focused on teaching the classics, mathematics, and moral philosophy and/or religion, while the high school's curriculum gave more time to modern subjects. Both institutions coexisted in the first half of the 19th century. By the advent of the Gilded Age (1870s to 1890s), high schools were on the rise with academies rapidly waning (Sizer, 1964; Church & Sedlak, 1976).

Despite the differences between the forms of these institutions, both had courses in social sciences in their curricula, the most popular of which were history courses, especially United States, general, and/or ancient history. The basic rationale underscoring these emerging curriculum entities emphasized the crucial role of history as a school subject in enlightening and enculturating the young and the making of a literate electorate and/or "republican machines." Here the rigor

rationale of social education slowly started to disassociate itself with the classics and learning for learning's sake and to increasingly associate itself with the rigorous study of modern subjects intellectually relevant to the prospective destinations of students and the unfolding realities of society. In other words, there was a rise in the intellectual relevance of the basic rationale of social education.

The last three decades of the 19th century witnessed a confirmation of this pattern. Distinguished committees of national stature promoted or advanced the case of intellectual relevance as a rationale of social education at the secondary school level. Prominent among these committees were the National Education Association (NEA) committee of 1892 and the American Historical Association (AHA) committee of 1896. They established intellectual relevance as the basic rationale of teaching history, political economy, and government as interdisciplinary subjects at the secondary school level. Thus, a rigorous social education curriculum came to be equated with intellectually relevant and interdisciplinary organized courses in these areas.

With the early years of the 20th century, the rigor rationale of social education started to incorporate a novel trend and take on a new mantle. The early experiences and/or experiments of a differentiated high school curriculum brought the question of relevance anew to the forefront. No longer did intellectual relevance constitute an adequate rationale for social education. Practical and vocational relevance emerged as complementary

components or elements to intellectual relevance. The AHA committee of 1907 epitomized the early response of the rigorists to these rising elements and their institutional conditions. For them, an adequate and rigorous rationale of social education at the high school not only had to be intellectually relevant, but practically and vocationally relevant as well.

Throughout these phases of development, the rigorists maintained an enlightened commitment to a liberal, humanistic, and individualistic tradition of education and schooling. Whether their basic emphasis was pure intellectualism, intellectual relevance, or intellectual and practical relevance, they never abandoned their faith in the individual as the ultimate end of the educative process. Individuals' enlightenment and enculturation through a valid, adequate, and relevant body of social knowledge stayed relatively secure at the core of their social consciousness and curriculum deliberations. Consequently, the growth and modification of the rigor rationale, especially its transformation from focusing merely on intellectual relevance to incorporating practical relevance seems to have been a deliberate, conscious, and genuine response on the part of rigorists to newly emerging social and institutional conditions at the turn of the century.

In the following section, the substance of the rigor rationale and its shift from intellectual relevance to intellectual and practical relevance will be addressed.

The Rigor Rationale: Substance

There seems to be a consensus among American educational and curricular historians that the modern rigor rationale in social education began between the 1870s and 1910. Barr (1969) considered these years to be the early heydays of the "traditional model" in social education. Hertzberg (1981) indicated that these years witnessed the real beginning of a viable, conscious, and organized professional thinking in social education (Hertzberg, 1981).

Although the other competing rationales (vocational relevance and radical rationale) were being created or on the rise during these years, rigorists appeared much more authoritative and influential in shaping social education discourse at that time. The scientific historians of the AHA and the moderate revisionists of the NEA seem to have been unequivocally committed to the institutionalization of a secondary school social education curriculum that promotes the intellectual reasoning power and cultural sensibilities of the high school population.

The Madison conference (December 28-30, 1892) eloquently stated its convictions with regard to the basic rationale of teaching history, political economy, and government.

It is the mature convictions of the members of the conference . . . as teachers . . . that the subjects in question, especially when taught by the newer methods herein advocated, serve to broaden and cultivate the mind; that they counteract a narrow and provincial spirit; that they prepare the pupil in an eminent degree for enlightened and intellectual enjoyment in after years; and that they assist him to exercise a salutary influence upon the affairs of his country. (NEA Report of the Committee on Secondary Social Studies, 1893, pp. 166-167)

Similar convictions were echoed by both the Committee of Seven (1896) and the Committee of Five (1907) with regard to teaching history and its allied subjects. For the Seven, teaching history embodied both intellectual and dispositional dimensions. Their intellectual dimensions dealt primarily with the cultivation of historical reasoning ("historical mindedness").

All our institutions, our habits of thoughts, our modes of actions are inheritance from preceding ages: no conscious advance, no worthy reform can be secured without both a knowledge of the present and an appreciation of how forces have worked in the social and political organization of former times. If this be so, need we seriously argue that boys and girls in the schoolroom should be introduced to the past which has created the present--that historical mindedness should be in some slight measure bred within them, and that they should be given the habit, or the beginnings of a habit, of considering what has been when they discuss what is or what should be? (AHA, 1899, p. 19)

Meanwhile, the dispositional dimensions of teaching history, according to the Committee of Seven, deal with the formation of noble and gentlemanly characters that internalized the distinct and honorable traits, impulses, and prejudices of the culture.

Many a teacher has found that in dealing with the great and noble acts and struggles of bygone men, he has succeeded in reaching the inner nature of the real boys and girls of his classes and has given them impulses and honorable prejudices that are the surest sources of permanent and worthy refinement. We venture to suggest that character is of even greater value than culture. (AHA, 1889, p. 20)

In addition, they should that teaching history was quite conducive to enhancing students' research skills and a sure method of kindling and nurturing their imagination.

For the Committee of Five, the rationale of teaching history and its allied subjects amounted to a restatement of the basic rationale advanced by the Committee of Seven. However, the Five's report gave due attention to the importance of factual knowledge as an essential and indispensable component in the effective cultivation of historical mindedness among high school students.

In fact, there appear to be two essential results that should be the product of historical study: first, a firm, hard grasp of a reasonable quantity of facts and historical relations, some aptitude in gleaning knowledge from historical books, some appreciation of what history is, some historical imagination, some skill, though it not be great, in putting together the facts that one has learned. (AHA, 1911, p. 40)

Thus the rigorists in social education seem to have adhered to social education programs that promote the intellectual reasoning power of students, their cultural enlightenment, and character building. For them, history and its allied subjects, when taught as fused or integrated subjects, constituted a rigorous and intellectually relevant disciplines capable of enhancing students' intellectual growth and training them to assume their leadership roles in the society.

The rigorists demonstrated a progressive awareness of the influence of social and cultural conditions--local circumstances, the differences in aptitudes and abilities of students, and the different career and vocational choices open to them--upon their social education programs. Both the Committees of Ten and Seven encouraged school administrators, teachers, and local communities to adapt the experts' recommendations to their specific social and cultural conditions. Yet such flexibility seems to have been more

related to the form, and perhaps the content, of their programs than to the rationale itself. That is to say, while different schools in different local communities were permitted and encouraged to adapt their teaching methods and the number, and perhaps the content, of their courses to suit their specific conditions, the basic goals of social education were to continue to aim at enhancing the intellectual reasoning power of students, their cultural enlightenment, and character building regardless of these adaptations. Thus, while the social and cultural heterogeneity of the society was acknowledged, the drive toward building a common culture was to continue.

With the rise of trade schools as distinct institutions of secondary education and the institutionalization of vocational tracks in high schools, the rigorists were obliged to rethink and reconstruct their rationale to fit the newly emerging institutional and organizational conditions. At this point in time, they realized that an adequate rationale of social education should be intellectually as well as vocationally relevant. Such realization led them to recommend different social education curricula for trade schools and the vocational tracks of the high schools. Yet the rigorists insisted that such vocationally-oriented curricula should be enveloped and conveyed as a liberal, adequate, and intellectually sound social education experience for these groups of students. The Committee of Five was the most articulate in this respect.

The pupil from the trade school or semi-professional schools should not be turned out ignorant of the main current of modern history, ignorant of the

history of their country and the ideals it tried to make its own, and ignorant of the government under which they must have their share of influence. (AHA, 1911, p. 69)

Accordingly, the five recommended a minimum of a two-year course for trade school students including modern and American history with due emphasis on correlated studies of economics, industrial history, and commercial geography. While the form, scope, and sequence, of this course were different than those of a high school course, the Committee of Five attempted to preserve a liberalizing and rigorous social education experience for trade school students through this course.

Thus it appears that the rigorists in social education, while open to the unfolding social and educational realities, upheld a tradition in social education that gave priority to enculturation and enlightenment in a common culture over vocationalization, segmentation, and stratification of culture(s).

The Rigor Rationale: Visible Premises

The rigorists' rationale in social education seems to have been built upon a set of premises that reflected their fundamental assumptions and understandings of the nature of the educative process, social knowledge, pedagogy, and the teaching-learning process. Identifying such premises, as clearly stated in the rigorists' reports, would help uncover the educational and curricular logic that underlay the rationale itself. Next, each premise will be dealt with in turn.

The rigorists appear to have adhered to a conception of education that emphasized cultural enlightenment and intellectual training as the basic goals of social education at the secondary school level. The Committee of Ten, for example, emphasized that social education is much more akin to developing the intellectual capabilities of students than any other subject. According to them, "History and its allied branches are better adapted than other studies to promote the invaluable mental power which we call judgment" (NEA, 1893, p. 165).

As such, the rigorists seem to have adhered to cultural transmission and appropriation as the fundamental function of schooling. The Committee of Five was much more explicit about this aspect than either the Committee of Ten or of Seven. For the Five, education, especially social education, should aim at providing students with opportunities to develop their intellectual reasoning power and acquire the dispositions and skills that would enable them to understand and enjoy the cultural capital of their society. They cogently explicated this point as follows.

The thing we deplore is that young men and women should leave the schools and encounter the work and pleasure of mature years without a knowledge of history, for history will peculiarly help to fit them for entering upon their duties in the society and give them the basic satisfaction in the intellectual life. (AHA, 1899, p. 67)

The social function of education received its due attention from the rigorists. For most of them, cultural enlightenment, intellectual training, and character building--while worthy of consideration on their own terms--were indispensable means for

preparing students to carry out their future adult roles as leaders in their society. The Seven, for example, explicated the social function of a rigorous social education curriculum.

The chief object of every experienced teacher is to get pupils to think properly after the method adopted in his particular line of work, not an accumulation of information, but the habit of correct thinking is the supreme result of good teaching in every branch of instruction. All this simply means that the student who is taught to consider political subjects in school, who is led to look at matters historically, has some mental equipment for comprehension of the political and social problems that will confront him in everyday life and has received practical preparation for social adaptation and for forceful participation in civic activities. (AHA, 1899, p. 18)

Thus it appears that the conception of education advocated by the rigorists was more in line with a liberal aristocratic philosophy of schooling. On one level this conception was deeply concerned about the individual and his/her cultural enlightenment and intellectual growth. On another level it was geared toward the preparation of prospective social leaders from that relatively small number of students who can gain access to high school education.

Not only did the rigorists have a distinct conception of education, they seem to have had an elaborate conception of school knowledge as well. Despite the existence of significant differences among their recommended social education curricula, they all seem to have adhered to a common conception of school knowledge. Regardless of the differences and specificity of such curricula, the rigorists emphasized that school knowledge in history and its allied subjects should be verifiable, non-controversial, and systematic. By this qualification, they declared their adherence to the scientific

school of historical thinking and ushered in the beginnings of systematic curriculum thinking. For them school knowledge, whether historical, political, or economic, was important in so far as it helps to develop the historical, political, and economic reasoning power of students. As such, the potential of its inclusion and/or exclusion were completely dependent on its verifiability, plausibility, and acceptability by the scholarly community. The Committee of Ten alluded to their convictions in this respect.

When the facts are chosen with as little discrimination as in many school textbooks, when they are mere lists of lifeless dates, details of military movements, or unexplained genealogies, they are repellant. To know them is hardly better worth while than to remember, as a curious character in Ohio was able to do some years ago, what one has had for dinner everyday for the last thirty years. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that facts in history are like digits in arithmetic; they are learned only as means to an end. (NEA, 1893, p. 168)

Moreover, the rigorists emphasized that school knowledge, whether historical, political, or economic, needs to be conceptual as well as procedural. By this qualification, they meant that social knowledge at the secondary school should address both the substance and methods or, in more contemporary terms, the substantive and syntactic structures of the disciplines composing the field. For them the single emphasis on either the substance or methods would neither do justice to the subject(s) nor to the students. The Committee of Seven clearly explicated this point.

We ask, then, for a course in history of such length that the pupil may get a broad and somewhat comprehensive view of the general field, without having, on the one hand, to cram his memory with unrelated meaningless facts or, on the other hand, to struggle with generalizations and philosophical ideas

beyond his ken. We think, however, that quite as important as perspective and proportion are method and training and a comprehension of the essential character of the study. (AHA, 1899, pp. 48-49)

Similarly, the Committee of Five stressed the importance of both conceptual and procedural knowledge as inseparable components of social knowledge in general and in history in particular.

If history teaching results only in the memorizing of a modicum of bare facts in the order in which they are given in a text, there is not much to be said in favor of the retention of the subject as an important part of the curriculum. This does not mean that pupils should not be accurate, painstaking, and thorough, it means in addition to learning and learning well a reasonable amount of history from the text, the pupil should gain much more, he should learn how to use books and how to read them, he should be led to think about the historical facts and to see through the pages of the books the life with which history deals; he may even be brought to see the relation between evidence and historical statement in simple cases where material is close at hand; he should in some measure get the historical state of mind. (AHA, 1899, pp. 39-40)

The rigorists' premises about knowledge production and selection influenced their understandings of how such knowledge should be organized for school use. For them school knowledge, whether historical, political, or economic, had to be chronologically, logically, and sequentially organized. A depiction of their specific programs would give credence to such an understanding. For example, they emphasized that the study of American history should be preceded by a study of ancient, medieval, and modern English and/or French history. This condition clearly reflected their commitment to the chronological and logical organization of the subject matter. Within each course, however,

the rigorists encouraged both chronological and topical approaches to the organization of the subject matter.

Besides, the rigorists were impartial proponents of an interdisciplinary (fused) and common social education curriculum for all students who can make it to the high school. Their ultimate aspirations hinged upon getting students enrolled in and studying three or four courses in history and its allied subjects. While they called for employing different pedagogical methods to make the common curriculum more accessible to different groups of students, they never initiated the issue of differentiating the curriculum according to students' abilities and their prospective social and occupational destinations. Indeed, the rigorists' accommodation to the rising trend of curriculum differentiation demonstrated, as already indicated, their enlightened commitment to a liberal and rigorous, though not common, social education experience for all students.

Yet, no matter how high such aspirations were, most students who enrolled in and graduated from the high school at the turn of the century studied only a unit, or two at the most, of history and its allied subjects. This situation was largely due to the difficulty of reconciling such high aspirations with the givens of the high school graduation requirements and the colleges or universities' admission requirements. It appears that school and university administrators played a significant role in defining the formal social education curriculum. Most students, despite the rigorists' recommendations, studied only a unit or two of history

each week for a total of five periods a year. This unfortunate outcome was perhaps the result of the inability of the rigorists, historians, and educators alike to convince their colleagues at universities and schools to give more credence to history and its allied subjects as part of their admission and graduation requirements (Keels, 1980).

Thus, it appears that the rigorists' conception of school knowledge, its selection, organization, and distribution were more in line with their paradigmatic orientations to the parent sciences of social education. As classical liberals in ideology, neoclassicist in economics, scientific humanists in history, and moderate revisionists in education, they were more inclined to draw a line between advocacy and objectivity in the process of knowledge validation. This inclination may have led them to emphasize the intrinsic rather than the exchange value of school knowledge. For them a rigorous social education curriculum was essential to students' intellectual growth and, wittingly or unwittingly, could lead to the maximization of their professional, career, and leadership chances upon their graduation. In short, the intrinsic and exchange values of school knowledge might not have been well differentiated at this stage. Even when this differentiation came about, the rigorists attempted to contain its deleterious effects upon the intrinsic value of knowledge.

At any rate, if the rigorists adhered to a liberal-aristocratic conception of education and a scientific humanist conception of school knowledge, they were, by and large, pedagogical proponents of

teaching for understanding. For them, teaching methods that promote rote learning, memorization, and the regurgitation of bits and pieces of information were not only useless but also detrimental. They were zealous reformers of the pedagogy of social education. For them, the ultimate justifications of methods hinged upon their potential in enhancing students' intellectual reasoning power. Therefore, they called for more effective use of oral and written recitations, more reliance on interdisciplinary approaches that transcended the rigid boundaries of the different disciplines constituting social education, more employment of the source and intensive study methods, particularly in teaching history. Besides, the rigorists gave due attention to the importance of good textbooks, classroom and school libraries, field trips, and audiovisual aids as vehicles that facilitate teaching for understanding.

In their deliberation, the Committee of Ten envisioned the image of a typical classroom life regulated by such methods.

The conference is of the opinion that textbooks must continue to be used but should be carefully selected, and the pupil should have the constant use of at least two different books, that the recitation upon them should not consist of an historical catechism, but should be made up of suggestive questions raising a comparison and a combination of different parts of the pupil's material, and the proper relations and proportions of that material may be promoted by some system of rapid recitation, with criticism by teacher and class. (NEA, 1893, p. 192)

This image of a classroom full of purposeful reading, lively discussions, and constructive criticism seems to have preoccupied

the rigorists' pedagogical imagination and represented the core of their pedagogical thinking.

The teaching-learning process as envisioned by the rigorists seems to have been much more like an interplay of ideas between the students and their teachers via a medium of valid and verifiable school knowledge. The students, whether college or non-college bound, were generally perceived as young scholars quite capable of attaining substantial intellectual growth through their social education programs. As such, they were perceived as prospective leaders and effective participants in the civic affairs of their society. For such students, then, a rigorous, interdisciplinary, and common social education curriculum seemed necessary for their preparation. Even with the rise of trade schools, the rigorists never abandoned their faith in students' capabilities and needs for such a liberal and rigorous social education curriculum. Despite their recommendation of a truncated and practically relevant version geared toward a trade school students, they insisted on an intellectually sound and liberally oriented social education curriculum for these groups of students.

The third element of the teaching-learning process, i.e., the teacher, received considerable weight in the rigorists' deliberations. First of all, they deplored the fact that teaching history and its allied subjects was increasingly becoming the vocation of the vocationless. The Committee of Ten ironically expressed their sense of bitterness with regard to this predominant pattern.

It would be as sensible for schools to employ a deaf and dumb person to teach reading or to ask a Cherokee to teach Latin or to depend for the teaching of history on persons who have not had special training in history. (AHA, 1899, p. 181)

Second, the rigorists emphasized that a teacher who assumes the responsibility of nurturing students' intellectual growth and historical mindedness must him- or herself be historically minded. The Committee of Seven made this point quite clearly.

To cultivate historical mindedness, to teach pupils to think historically and to approach facts with the historical spirit--this is the chief object of instruction in any field of history. But unless the teacher has acquired perspective, unless he has become historically minded and knows himself what the historical method is, he cannot instruct his pupils. These characteristics cannot be absorbed from a textbook in an hour or two before recitation, they are the products of time and toil. (AHA, 1899, p. 117)

Next, academic knowledge in social education, i.e., history and its allied subjects, is necessary but not sufficient condition for furnishing a competent social education teacher. Beside academic knowledge, the social education teacher needs to be psychologically and pedagogically disposed to teach history. That is to say, a social education teacher must internalize a sense of identification with his/her field and acquire the necessary skills for teaching it. The Committee of Ten highlighted this concern, "In all schools it is desirable that history should be taught by teachers who have not only fondness of historical study, but also have special attention to effective methods of imparting instruction" (NEA, 1893, p. 187). The Committee of Seven echoed the same concern with even more zeal. "A successful teacher must have more than mere accurate information

and professional knowledge. He needs to have a living sympathy with the tale with which he tells" (AHA, 1899, p. 116).

In sum, the rigorists were completely aware that the quality of the intellectual interplay of ideas in the classroom depended largely upon the teachers' being well grounded academically, historically minded, and psychologically and pedagogically disposed and equipped to teach their field. The Committee of Five eloquently summed up this point, "The great demand of the day is for teachers that have themselves inhaled the breath of enthusiasm, and that have knowledge, skill, and force" (AHA, 1899, pp. 14-15).

The Rigor Rationale: Invisible Premises

A careful reading of the rigorists' curriculum deliberation reports reveals that there might have been a set of invisible premises--the philosophy of education, the psychology of learning, and the social structure--underlying such deliberation endeavors. The invisibility of such premises, however, does not imply by any means that the participants were unaware of their operation and influence. The point simply is that these premises were unspoken about and largely left out from the reports.

In general, it seems that an idealistic philosophy of education and curriculum making underscored the rigorists' deliberation endeavors. Barr (1969) indicated that such idealistic premises operated.

If universal truths, ultimate laws, and absolute ideals exist, if truthful and reliable knowledge about these absolutes can be discovered, then it was perfectly logical to those holding the traditional position to conclude that the all-inclusive aim of education should be the transmission of this definite body of knowledge. Thus, history is regarded as a substantive body of verified information which all students should learn. (Barr, 1969, pp. 16-17)

Such idealistic premises persisted up until the precursors of pragmatic thinking began to emerge as an underlying assumption in the report of the Committee of Five. As already indicated, the Five insisted upon a rigorous and liberalizing social education experience for all students, whether college or non-college bound, yet they acknowledged the necessity of adapting the curriculum to suit the prospective adult roles of different groups of students. Whether such an accommodation on the part of the Five represented the beginning of an enduring and lasting transformation of their thinking about education and curriculum making or a strategic compromise to preserve their increasingly threatened or endangered authority and their voice in shaping the social education discourse will be discussed shortly. Suffice it to say now that the idealistic premises that underlay the rigor rationale since its inception in the 19th century were not static. Rather, they were subject to revision and reconstruction through a continuous dialogue between the rigorists and their unfolding social and educational realities.

As such, the rigor rationale seems to have embodied a theory of learning that gave priority to intellectual growth and cognitive training. Such a theory is commonly called the mental discipline

theory of learning (Barr, 1969). Basically, this theory promoted the case of the classics and mathematics as disciplines of substantial disciplinary value to students' intellectual training and growth. For mental disciplinarians, the inner growth of students' reasoning power and imagination was commensurate with the difficulty level of the subjects studied and the efforts devoted to their mastery.

The rigorists were enlightened advocates of mental discipline. They did wholeheartedly embrace the mental discipline theory and attempted to demonstrate its congruency with teaching history and allied subjects. Such efforts appeared most clearly in the deliberation of the Committee of Ten.

As studies in language and in the natural sciences are best adapted to cultivate the habits of observation; as mathematics are the traditional training of the reasoning faculties; so history and its allied branches are better adapted than any other studies to promote the invaluable mental power we call judgment. (NEA, 1893, p. 189)

However, over time it appears that the psychological basis of the rigor rationale, as embodied in the mental disciplinary theory, started to experience a shift from having a purely cognitive and moral focus toward incorporating functional and pragmatic elements. For example, the Committees of Seven and Five, besides highlighting the intellectual disciplinary power of history and allied subjects, talked about the formation of habits and training in skills appropriate for students' adult roles. Nevertheless, such a shift was not complete and perhaps represented an accommodation on the part of the rigorists to the rising vocational relevance rationale

and its psychological twin, experimental and behavioral psychology.

Finally, the rigorists' rationale appears to have been grounded in an aristocratic theory of the social structure. Despite their acknowledgment, at least in rhetoric, of the role of education in social mobility, for them society was composed of leaders and followers. And secondary education in general and history and allied subjects in particular should train those who can afford and gain access to such an education to assume their leadership roles upon graduation. It appears that the basic concern of the rigorists was focused on how to make social knowledge more accessible to secondary school enrollees. Perhaps they were less concerned about how to increase access to secondary education to begin with.

However, with the rise of trade schools and comprehensive high schools, the rigorists' theory of social structure began to embrace elements of the meritocratic philosophy of schooling. While they welcomed the rising number of enrollments at the secondary school and recommended different curricula for different schools or tracks within schools, they attempted to preserve the integrity of their tradition by insisting upon a liberal and rigorous, though uncommon, social education experience for all students.

At any rate, the basic objective and subjective conditions that contributed to the formation and transformation of the rigor rationale between the 1870s and 1910 will be studied and analyzed in the next section to provide an account of the social, professional, and ideological forces and characters that shaped these processes.

The Rigor Rationale: An Explanation

As already indicated, the rigor rationale went through three phases through the 19th and early 20th centuries. These phases brought about different strands, similar to geological layers of historically related but distinct rationales. First the rigor rationale was conceived as the liberal, humanistic, and vigorous study of the classics, mathematics, moral philosophy and/or religion. This rationale influenced the Latin grammar school curriculum in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Second, the rigor rationale was conceived as the liberal, humanistic, and vigorous study of classical, modern, and practical subjects influencing the curriculum at both academies and modern high schools throughout the 19th centuries. While many of these institutions focused on the rigorous study of classical and modern subjects, some of them incorporated practical courses or subjects into their curricula. History, especially United States, general, and ancient history, as well as other modern subjects, were introduced into these curricula as intellectually relevant courses for the enculturation and training of the prospective leaders of the society.

Third, the rigor rationale was conceived as the liberal, humanistic, and vigorous study of a thorough, well-rounded, and interdisciplinary course in history and allied subjects that is both intellectually and practically relevant to the prospective social responsibilities and professional careers of students. Here the rigorists confirmed the earlier strand of the rationale (enculturation and training) and took one step further by

recommending a liberal and rigorous social education experience for trade school students that would be intellectually satisfying and practically relevant to their prospective adult roles.

These shifts in the focus of the rigor rationale were by no means whimsical; they were genuine responses on the part of the rigorists to the specific social, intellectual, and institutional conditions of their time. While these responses aggressively tried to rescue society from its mounting social and institutional problems, they stayed close to the basic tenets of the rigor tradition. To use Higham and Haines' (1963) terms, rigorists, historians, and educators were "neither 'romantics' devoted to the mystical evocation of the ideal nor 'realists' absorbed in the pragmatic and concrete to the exclusion of ideology." Their social and educational reforms reflected a deep commitment to "the framework of the traditional liberal moral order" and their faith in the "scientific analysis and human compassion" (p. 902) in dealing with social, political, and educational problems.

Throughout the last decades of the 19th and early 20th centuries, American society witnessed a basic structural transformation from a basically agrarian and commercial society to a massively urban and industrial society. In economic terms, American society transformed from competitive capitalism to corporate capitalism as a mode of production. In the midst of this transformation, American society witnessed unprecedented scientific achievements and technological inventions. As such, it witnessed numerous social conflicts and normative tensions, representing, in

literary terms, the "best of times and the worst of times" (Degler, 1959; Hofstadter, 1955; Wiebe, 1967).

At the social level, the contradictions of interests and aspirations between capitalists and workers, big and small capitalists, farmers and both big capitalists and workers created a sense of social upheaval in the last decades of the 19th and early 20th centuries. These conflicts and aspirations contributed to the form and content of political discourse during this historical epoch.

At the cultural and intellectual levels, the lives, minds, and hearts of all Americans were preoccupied with making sense of their immediate present and worried about the future directions of their society. All Americans--whether elite or common; upper, middle, or lower class; native-born or of foreign origin--experienced different kinds of cultural and intellectual agonies during these years. Despite the specificity of such agonies, the normative crisis seems to have touched the lives of every person.

The rigorists lived and experienced the same cultural and intellectual agonies as other Americans, yet their sense of alienation and crisis appeared more acute than that of other social and cultural groups. The rigorists were eye witnesses to a disintegrating sense of community and like-mindedness to which they were morally attached. Nonetheless, they were fervent believers in the role of education in restoring the lost moral core and order of the society that blossomed in the mid-19th century small and mid-sized towns. Their social, political, and educational reforms

reflected a past that was cherished, a present that was troublesome, and a future that was unpredictable.

The rigorists' social education curricula were part and parcel of a larger educational reform movement at the university level that aimed at providing intellectual enlightenment and research training experiences to the prospective leaders of the society (Church & Sedlak, 1976; Haines, 1977). For them, the liberal, humanistic, and classical curriculum of the old colleges and academies was no longer sufficient by itself to meet the rising social problems and cultural needs. It was necessary for them, therefore, to reshape both the university and high school courses of study to meet these cultural needs and social problems. And in so doing, they wholeheartedly embraced a solid cultural canon and a rigorous scientific method and disseminated a liberal and humanistic aura in the whole experience of public education (Furner, 1975; Ross, 1991; Silva & Slaughter, 1984).

The rigorists, with their rationale and reform programs, were not mere functionaries or intermediaries between the whole social system and the rising modern university and/or high school though. Rather, they were interested actors who had their vision of what to reform, how to reform, and why to reform. For them, what needed to be reformed was the institutional relationship between the high school and the modern university so as to reduce the confusion and chaotic situation that already characterized this relationship. As such, the curriculum of the high school, like that of the modern university, needed to be reformed so as to permit the expansionary

logic of knowledge to unfold and its incorporation into the process of cultural transmission and appropriation to proceed. The "how" of the reform focused on enhancing the congruency between the high school graduation requirements and the university or college admission requirements. The "why" of the reform provoked the desirability of restoring the lost moral order of the society through enculturating and training its prospective leaders in a liberal, humanistic, and rigorous curriculum. In such reform programs, the rigorists were neither the functionaries of corporate capital nor the apostles of the state. Rather, their rationale and reform program were more attuned to, if not representative of, the interests and aspirations of that segment of the society that was rapidly losing its power (i.e., the old gentry and small competitive capital). However, this rationale and these reform programs did not represent a dangerous threat to the rising corporate order. On the contrary, the rigorists' concerns about homogenizing social relations and restoring the lost order were shared by most corporate capitalists.

Of course, this is not meant to indicate that the rigorists' social origins and/or class positions were adequate explanatory constructs that would account for their social and educational choices and reforms. To a large extent, the rigorists belonged to the old gentry or at least represented its legitimate heirs. However, according to Haines (1977), while the rigorists "were part of the educated elite, they were hardly political elitists" (p. 904). Their social concerns spread over a wide spectrum of social

issues beside education. Significant among these issues were the spoils system, municipal government, taxation, crime, disease, alms houses and charity organizations, administration of prisons and mental asylums, etc. Their ideology as classical liberals and conservative evolutionists was much more influential than their social origins and/or class positions in forging their choices and reforms. Besides, different choices and reform programs were advocated by different intellectual and political leaders who came from social origins and/or class positions similar to that of the rigorists. Thus, it appears that the conjectures of social origin and/or class position cannot fully explain the rise and authority of the rigor rationale in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Quite as important as the rigorists' social origins and/or class positions were the channels through which they shaped the social education discourse throughout these historic days. Different professional associations offered hearings, meetings, conferences, platforms, and formed distinct and concerted committees for the rigorists to discuss, recommend, and publicize their rationale and reform programs. The rigorists themselves were instrumental in forming many of these associations and were influential members and leaders in conducting their affairs. Significant among these associations, in so far as social education is concerned, were the NEA (since its inception in 1857), the AHA (since its inception in 1884), and a host of different district, state, and regional associations. The rigorists' rationale and reform programs were contested within and without these associations

by different conservative and radical voices. Yet these contestations failed to offset the overwhelming consensus between historians and educators that was at its zenith or peak throughout these years. Moreover, the rigorists, through their access to wider circulating periodicals and policy-making centers, reached a broader social education audience and succeeded in shaping the general opinion of professionals and laypersons as well. Finally, the professional tradition of forming committees, whether by a single association or as a concerted effort between different associations, gave more authority to the curriculum deliberation outcomes and helped to contain voices of dissent. Thus, it appears that the professional ideology and subculture as well as the resource distribution among professionals are tenable as explanatory constructs of the rise and authority of the rigor rationale in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

As already indicated, the rigorists were not the only social education actors at the turn of the century. Their rationale and reform programs were contested by conservatives and radicals on both sides of the educational aisle. While the conservatives bemoaned or decried the rigorists' departure from the classics and their advocacy of modern subjects, the radicals criticized them for imposing a rationale and a cultural code on an increasingly heterogeneous school population. Yet the rigorists were aware and confident that their "choice" was the most "realistic" and "reasonable" response to the conditions of their time. Both Krug (1969) andSizer (1964) described the rigorists as "moderate

revisionists" and/or "moderate innovators" and their reform programs as realistic and reasonable compromises, given the conditions of their time and their classical, liberal ideology.

The rigorists' incorporation of practical elements into their rigor rationale and liberal reform programs represented, again, a genuine response on their part to the rising voice and authority of the conservative progressives in the early years of the 20th century. They accepted the different measures of deferring school-leaving age and enhancing access to secondary education, whether through trade schools or comprehensive high schools, because such measures did not contradict their basic ideological tenets as moderate revisionists. Meanwhile, they insisted on transforming the defacto legal access and school attainment into cultural achievement. After all, the rigorists were advocates of an aristocracy of culture, not aristocracy of wealth or of social origin, and they continued to be sincere to their own tradition.

Summary and Conclusions

The origins of the rigor rationale go back to the Latin grammar school in colonial and revolutionary America. Its modern strand, created in the last decades of the 19th century, made the enculturation and intellectual training, through classical and modern subjects, the basic function of schooling.

Social education was part and parcel of a school curriculum aimed at enlightening and training the prospective leaders of the society. A segmented, incomplete, and scattered social knowledge

was no longer sufficient for achieving such a goal. Accordingly, the rigor rationale of social education, in its modern sense, came about to meet rising cultural needs and social problems.

Underlying the rigorists' rationale was a set of visible and invisible premises about education, knowledge, pedagogy, the teaching-learning process, philosophy of schooling, the psychology of learning, and the social structure. The process of identifying and uncovering these premises helped illuminate the rigorists' commitment to creating an aristocracy of culture through an interdisciplinary social education curriculum that gives priority to intellectual training and liberal learning.

The rigorists' accommodation to the rising vocational relevance rationale at the turn of the century represented a genuine response, as did their rationale and social education curriculum at the last decades of the 19th century, to newly emerging social and institutional conditions. However, the rigorists, in both cases, never abandoned their faith in the priority of culture and liberal learning.

In so doing, the rigorists were neither "mystical romantics" nor "pragmatic materialists." Rather they were moderate reformers who stayed sincere to their classical, liberal tradition. Their social origins, class position(s), and their professional status and resources can be entertained as explanatory constructs that would account for much of their authority and influence in the field at this early stage of its history.

The next chapter will attempt to spell out the conditions that led to the demise of the role of rigorists and the rise of the role of vocationalists in shaping the discourse of social education during these historical years.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RELEVANCE RATIONALE

Introduction

Despite the fact that the heydays of the relevance rationale in social studies education occurred in the first two decades of the 20th century, educational and curriculum historians agree that the origins of this rationale go back to the 18th century in pre-revolutionary America. Over roughly a century and a half, the relevance rationale, as a philosophy and pedagogy as well as a policy and social institution, was subject to numerous changes and transformations. By the close of the second decade of the 20th century, this rationale, which began as a curious option on the curriculum margin, became the dominant and legitimate rationale of social studies education, or the curriculum core, for that matter. The chapter at hand will attempt to spell out the meaning of the relevance rationale in social studies education, providing an explanation of its rise in the first two decades of the 20th century.

Relevance: Origins and Transformations

The origins of the relevance rationale can be traced back to pre-revolutionary America. Benjamin Franklin's curriculum has been interpreted as providing equal emphasis to the useful and the ornamental (Church & Sedlak, 1976). Relevance at this early stage, it appears, aspired to combine the practical and the cultural in a uniquely constructed curriculum and distinct institutional form.

However, such a soul-searching synthesis was to wait until the first half of the 19th century where the academies emerged as genuine educational enterprises. The basic curricular and institutional forms that preceded the rise of the academies, whether the Latin grammar school or private venture institutions, were singular or unidimensional in purpose. They either prepared culturally enlightened gentlemen (Latin grammar schools) or average citizens for living and practical affairs (private venture institutions). Academies came about to bridge this curricular and institutional chasm.

The curriculum content and pedagogy in academies were much more related to intellectual relevance than vocational relevance. Both the modern and practical subjects introduced into the academies were overwhelmed by institutionally dominant paradigms of schooling and teaching which seem to have been inclined toward preparing the posterity for cultural and professional lives. Thus it appears that the genuine and long-awaited synthesis of "useful" and "ornamental" curricula was partially achieved at this stage. "The academies were not training for practical skills; their avowed aim was to provide

'training for life,' and this meant book learning" (Sizer, 1964, pp. 31-32).

The demise of academies and the rise of modern high schools in the second half of the 19th century, while reflecting the changing socio-economic and cultural conditions of 19th century America, amounted to a new beginning for the relevance rationale advocates toward achieving their goal.

In its early stages, the modern high school, in spite of being an institution or a curricular form, preserved its roots in the cultural and intellectual spheres. Its formal curriculum represented a genuine compromise between classical and modern subjects, not practical subjects. Despite urgent calls and criticisms from the right and the left, modern rigorists and revisionists hammered out a rationale that came close to intellectual and cultural rigor rather than vocational and economic relevance. As indicated in Chapter Three, while such a compromise was balanced and genuine, it was uneasy and ephemeral.

Soon, the advent of the progressive reform movements brought the aforementioned compromise under severe scrutiny. The rise of corporate capitalism and the rationalization of the economy, the intensifying sense of social and cultural crises and the professionalization and bureaucratization of social life and services, and the high rates of dropouts and enrollments in modern high schools, especially among children of average people, made the case of the rigor rationale and the common curriculum basically obsolete. Social efficiency-minded reformers and educators called

for restructuring and rationalizing the secondary school curriculum in order to make it consistent with the broader socio-economic processes of structural adjustment. Even advocates of the rigor rationale began to lean toward the rationalization of the curriculum to fit the new social order.

Despite the voices of dissent on both sides of the educational aisle, the modern high school as an institution and curricular form was restructured in correspondence with economic and occupational structures. This process brought the relevance rationale as a philosophy and pedagogy as well as a policy and social institution to the center of the educational stage, whether in deliberation, policy, or practice.

These complex processes of restructuring transformed modern secondary schools into agencies of selection, training, and socialization. In policy terms, students were guaranteed equal access to secondary schools but were to be exposed to differential processes of training and knowledge acquisition. In curricular terms, vocational subjects were guaranteed equal access to secondary schools but were to be exposed to differential processes of training and knowledge acquisition. In curricular terms, vocational subjects were guaranteed equal weight and equivalent status to those of academic subjects. Hence, relevance in the vocational sense came to dominance the discourse and practice of secondary education.

Since the relevance rationale advocates largely conceived the vocational subjects as relevant by definition, the dilemma and burden of proof fell on academic subject communities. A complex and

intricate dialogue between intra- and inter-subject communities and between them and extra-subject communities and enterprises emerged. Through this dialogue, the relevance rationale in academic subjects was constructed. The progression, outcome, actors, and meaning of this dialogue in the context of social studies as a secondary school subject will be dealt with in subsequent sections.

Relevance: Substance

The relevance rationale in social studies education was shaped through a conflict and consensus kind of dialogue between different subject communities. Significant among these communities were the American Political Science Association (APSA), the National Education Association (NEA), and the American Historical Association (AHA). Extra-subject communities contributed to this dialogue directly and indirectly. This section, however, will focus on the contributions of different professional associations. The contributions of extra-subject communities will be dealt with in subsequent sections.

The early years of the 20th century, as already indicated in Chapter Three, witnessed an adjustment of the rigor rationale to fit the emerging new organization of secondary education. The report of the AHA Committee of Five epitomized such an adjustment. In a sense, the report amounted to a declaration that the old consensus between the AHA and NEA with regard to social studies education needed to be revised. At this point in time, the center of gravity in social education began to shift from rigor to relevance.

The first subject community historically attuned to this moment was the newly-formed APSA. In two of its annual reports, the organization advocated a rationale of social education that equated teaching social studies, particularly government, with the preparation of intelligent and cooperative citizens socialized and trained to fit their future adult roles, leaders as well as followers. In its 1908 report, the ASPA's Committee of Five articulated its rationale.

Why is there no time in a high school supported by taxation to teach directly and in the most efficient manner the government of the city, the state, and the nation, the organization of political parties, their functions, parliamentary procedures, the duties of citizenship? The youth, who are our legislators, judges, executives, party workers and citizens in the making, are in these schools for the very purpose of being taught these things. (p. 234)

The APSA's Committee of Seven reiterated a similar emphasis in its 1916 report. The ultimate goal of teaching government, according to the Seven, should be the inculcation of civic virtues and deference to experts' judgment.

The chief function of civic instruction, it must always be remembered, is not simply to give a kind of preliminary training for casting the ballot for this is but a small part of the duty which citizenship entails. To appreciate the social and governmental institutions of his community, to fulfill his part in making those institutions agencies of progress and helpfulness in the great struggle for good government and liberty, such is the high function of civic instruction. (p. 34)

Meanwhile, the early adjustment initiated by the moderate rigorists of the AHA in their 1911 report was gaining more prominence through the scholarship and writing of new historians. Their evolving rationale of history teaching, with its focus on the

problems of the present and moral and social utility, brought them close to their counterparts in the APSA. For example, Robinson (1920) advocated the case of social and institutional history, with its focus on pressing social problems, instead of political history, with its focus on the personalities, political events, and problems of the past. Moreover, while acknowledging the role and importance of intellectual history, Robinson advocated a rationale of teaching history that sought to reconcile the needs for social efficiency with aspirations for social justice, especially for non-college bound students. For him, a history curriculum that gives due weight to the history of mechanical and technological inventions, the history of the division of labor, and the social significance of working men and women in the history of social and human progress would bring reconciliation into fruition. In short, history teaching, according to Robinson, needed to be brought into "the closest possible relations with the actual life and future duties of the great majority of those who fill our public schools" (pp. 133-134).

The NEA (1893) was moving in a similar direction. The moderate revisionists of the latter decades of the 19th century began to give way to the social efficiency-minded educators in the first two decades of the century. Eliot's endorsement of the vocational movement in 1908 announced the advent of the age of social efficiency. The rising role and influence of the efficiency-minded educators began to be felt and seen through their adaptation to the

scientific management movement (Taylorism) and contributions to the vocational education movement.

Through their concerns about rationalizing the educational system, eliminating waste, task analysis, and means-ends relationships, among others, the efficiency-minded educators contributed to shaping the relevance rationale in social education. Their most outspoken proponent was Snedden (1914). For him, the rigor rationale of teaching history became no longer adequate. Moreover, he made the case for teaching not only history but other social sciences, especially sociology, with explicit goals and definite means clear in mind.

What I mean is this: that the real purpose in the study of history--no, there is no purpose in the study of history as such, but one of the real purposes of education is to get the mind into an understanding, an intelligible and idealized grasp of social environment, which is suggested by continental and American history to a certain extent. To get him to see in perspective the social environment. . . . Our duties are to teach history and also to teach something that has not been made, but which I call sociology, not sociology as defined by the sociologists: it is the carrying of the youth back into all sorts of beginnings, into places and times when things began, and where social forms were elementary. But the young person goes back there on the basis of his and the teacher's contact with the social situation. I cannot help think it is a mistake to teach Greek and Roman history as we do, thinking it is education. (p. 15)

Thus, it seems that different segments of the professional subject communities were actively and simultaneously engaged in shaping the relevance rationale in social studies education throughout the first two decades of the century. Significant among these segments were the proponents of the new civics in the APSA, the new historians of the AHA and the social efficiency-minded

educators of the NEA. Regardless of their territorial differences, they were in common agreement about the need for a new rationale for social studies education. At minimum, they called for a rationale that gives due weight to pressing social problems and students' future adult roles.

However, this emerging definition of relevance was not satisfactory to other segments of the professional subject communities. Significant among these segments were the critical pragmatists of the NEA, the socialists, and the old rigorists or humanists. While the contributions of most of these segments will be described and analyzed extensively in Chapter Five, a word about such contributions seems illuminating at this point.

For most of the critical pragmatists, a relevant rationale of social studies education was far from being a mere concern about vocational prospects or cultural enjoyment. Rather, it was a philosophy, policy, and pedagogy of restructuring the community through the schools and their curricula. Social studies education, according to them, should teach a science of society and employ a liberal-progressive pedagogy in order to bring about a social condition more authentic and congruent with liberal democratic ideals. Dewey (1902), for example, called for restructuring the school and the curriculum to reflect and shape the quintessential values of the larger community. Through his theoretical and practical contributions, he established a pedagogical precedent of the school as a community receptive and responsive to the major concerns, problems, and direction of the larger community. For him,

" . . . only by being true to the full growth of all the individuals who make it up, can society by any chance be true to itself" (p. 7).

No matter what the subject matter is, the educative experience needs to be intrinsically related to students' growing consciousness in their immediate and prospective communities.

If the subject matter of the lessons be such as to have an appropriate place within the expanding consciousness of the child, it grows out of his own past doings, thinkings, and sufferings, and grows into application in further achievements and receptivities, then no device or trick of method has to be resorted to in order to enlist "interest." (Dewey, 1902, p. 27)

Dewey's rationale was different from the vocational relevance rationale. Despite the fact that he was not against vocationalization as such, on numerous occasions Dewey decried the detrimental effects it had when it turned out to be the driving force of schooling, curriculum, and pedagogy.

The socialists, in turn, articulated a rationale and practice in social education that sought to counteract the rising vocational relevance rationale. For them, given the dominant conditions of exploitation and dehumanization, social education needed to counteract the explicit and implicit messages that create the possessive individual and hierarchical and patriarchal social relations. As such, social education needed to cultivate the social consciousness and community spirit among the school population. Steinmetz (Teitelbaum, 1987) suggested that a socialist rationale of social education would entail an act of resistance and an act of reconstruction. That is, if "our children are taught that their main mission in life is to make a living," then we need to teach

them that "only thing worth working for or worth living for is to make this a better world to live in" (pp. 245).

Finally, with the rise of the melting pot and cultural pluralism theories as well as the rationalization of the curriculum, the voice of the moderate rigorists was becoming increasingly weak, lonely, and dim. Perhaps they were forced to modify their position or to focus on elaborating their rationale for college-bound students, whether in public or private schools.

Thus, it seems that the rigor rationale already institutionalized through the work of moderate revisionists, scientific historians, and administrative progressives reached a dramatic state of disarray. Instead of a focus on intellectual training and cultural enlightenment, different subject segments were, at this historical moment, competing over the direction, shape, and substance of the field. While this competition or conflict generated a worthwhile discourse in social studies education, it generated a need for a consensus as well, one necessary to connect rhetoric to reality and discourse to practice.

It was the NEA Committee on Social Studies Education that attempted to forge this consensus. Its report emerged as a mild version of social efficiency carefully located among the competing rationales of social studies education.

The high school course has heretofore been determined too largely by present needs and past experience. The important fact is not that the pupil is getting ready to live, but that he is living, and in immediate need of such mental and social nourishment and training as will enable him to adjust himself to his present social environment and conditions. By the very processes of present growth he will make the best

possible provision for the future. This does not mean that educational processes should have no reference to the future. It does not mean, to use a concrete illustration, that a boy should be taught nothing but voting until he is 21 and about to cast his first ballot. It means merely that such instruction should be given at the psychological and social moment when the boy's interests are such as to make the instruction function effectively in his processes of growth. As a boy's mental and horizon broadens with the processes of education, he will become inquisitive about facts and relations perhaps long before he has direct use for them in the affairs of life. The best question that can be asked in class is the question that the pupil himself asks that he wants to know and not the question the teacher asks because he thinks the pupil some time in the future ought to know. (Dunn, 1916, p. 11)

This extended excerpt from the committee report indicates that its members aspired to achieve a genuine and authentic compromise between the needs of personal growth and the demands of social efficiency. And in so doing, they located themselves, at least at the rhetorical level, between the advocates of social efficiency and the critical pragmatists in different professional communities of their subject.

Relevance: Visible Assumptions

The discourse of social studies education throughout the first two decades of the 20th century dramatically departed from the traditional conception of education as a process of intellectual enculturation and enlightenment. The emerging new conception exceedingly embraced a definition of education as a process of differential socialization and training responsive to the needs of different groups of students and their occupational prospects. This

transformation ushered in the ascendancy of a meritocratic utilitarian conception of education.

The early precursors of meritocratic-utilitarian conception, as previously indicated, appeared in the report of the AHA Committee of Five. On the heel of this report--or, perhaps, concomitant with it--emerged a series of reports that advocated such a conception. The different reports of the APSA and the NEA are replete with evidence that confirm this assertion. "The chief purpose of education is to fit one to respond intelligently to that high calling which is the common call to every man to take his place, to do his work in the community of his fellows," (APSA, 1916, p. 32).

The report of the NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education (Dunn, 1916), despite its liberal tendency, embraced this rising conception. "The social studies differ from other studies by reason of their social content rather than in social aim; for the keynote of modern education is 'social efficiency,' and instruction in all subjects should contribute to this end" (p. 9).

Similarly, the processes of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution portrayed the general inclination of the relevance rationale advocates toward education for social efficiency. In general, two principles influenced these processes: the pressing social problems or the demands of social efficiency for that matter and the personal needs and occupational prospects of different groups of students. Prior to the NEA's 1916 Committee's report, the APSA, NEA, and the new historians of the AHA varied in terms of the kind and degree of emphasis given to each of these principles.

While the APSA and NEA may have given more weight to the pressing social problems and/or the demands of social efficiency, the new historians of the AHA and the critical pragmatists seem to have attempted to strike a balance between the demands of social efficiency and the intellectual needs of students.

A comparison between the 1908 report of the APSA and some of the new historians' statements with regard to the rising Americanization and vocational education movement may be revealing or illuminating at this point. The 1908 APSA report, for example, placed much more emphasis on the command of the fundamental processes that could be taught through a course in government. According to it, "A reasonable facility in the use of our country's language, including an acquaintance with its best literature; a reasonable comprehension of the practical workings of our country's government; and a fair understanding of its past history" (APSA, 1908, p. 252).

On the other hand, Robinson (1920), an outspoken advocate of social and institutional history, emphasized the importance of a meaningful and intellectually sound history course for non-college bound students. "In their endeavors (the industrial education advocates) to offset the existing evils, I am convinced that they will be forced to summon history to their aid--not the history now to be found in our textbooks, but those phases of past human experience and achievement which serve to explain our industrial life and make its import clear" (p. 141).

As previously stated, for Robinson this history course would give due weight to the history of mechanical and technological inventions, the history of the division of labor, and the social significance of the working men and women in the history of social and human progress. In short, usefulness or practicality did not negate meaningfulness and fairness for Robinson.

At any rate, the NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education attempted to reconcile these differences. For the Committee, the two principles that should guide the processes of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution were pressing social problems or demands of social efficiency and the personal needs of students.

. . . unless the subject matter and methods of instruction are adapted to the pupil's immediate needs of social growth, such attempts (gaining more ground in the curriculum) avail a little. What is true of civics is also true of the other social studies, such as history and economics. (Dunn, 1916, p. 10)

This reconciliation apparently reveals the ingenuity of the Committee members as moderate, liberal, progressives. For them usefulness and practicality did not negate meaningfulness, with what is meaningful defined on meritocratic rather than aristocratic or egalitarian terms. The tension between equal access to schools and differential access to knowledge can be resolved by attending to the personal needs of students.

Not only did the pattern of conflict-consensus underlay the processes of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution, but it touched upon the nature of school knowledge itself. While

one may notice a submerged tension between the role of practical and conceptual knowledge in the formation of social studies courses prior to 1916, the Committee's report attempted to reconcile this tension through an approach more attuned to the social construction of knowledge. A comparison between the view of the new historians and the political scientists is merely illustrative at this stage.

In their early deliberation, the political scientists emphasized the priority of practical knowledge in teaching government. By practicality, they meant that students should study the forms and functions of their government in action, not through a documentary approach. The following excerpt from the APSA's 1908 report may shed light on the early practical approach to school knowledge.

It (American government as a school subject) is nothing more nor less than a study of the state as a living and acting community, adapting itself to the needs of present economic and social conditions. It is the investigation of our governmental and political machinery, its component parts and their functions. It is not merely the study of books or constitutional documents, but the contemplation of existing realities, the government, the electorate, the political party, each in its activities and manifestations . . . (p. 245)

In subsequent reports, the political scientists modified their position though. They called for a balanced curriculum that gave equal weight to both practical and conceptual knowledge. This modification was apparent in the 1916 APSA report. By conceptual knowledge, they meant that political knowledge should address the formal organization and operation of government as well as its underlying principles. By practical knowledge, they meant that such

knowledge should address the functioning of the community and the duties and obligations of citizens.

The new historians, despite the highly acclaimed notion that they were anti-intellectuals, gave due attention to a conceptual understanding of historical knowledge that is relevant to social issues and pressing problems, especially in the preparation of non-college bound students. For example, Robinson (1920) suggested two principles of knowledge selection: whether an historical event represents a profound truth or an anomaly of an historical era, and whether that event will aid the reader in grasping the meaning of progress in that era. As previously indicated, he suggested in addition a topical approach to knowledge organization.

In short, the difference between political scientists and new historians on that issue, barring oversimplification, can be summed up as this. For the political scientists, what is relevant meant what would lead to an informed action on the short run. For the new historians, what is relevant meant what would lead to a meaningful life. In other words, it was a difference between dehistorizing and historizing, decontextualizing and contextualizing school knowledge, or so it appears at the moment.

At any rate, the NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education attempted to resolve this submerged tension. Committee members were concerned about relevance and meaningfulness, but they offered personal needs as a context for meeting these concerns. In other words, a meaningful social studies curriculum cannot be determined a priori. Neither could it be turned to a set of

specific skills or bits of information. For them, all learning experiences should be intrinsically related to the evolving needs and growing consciousness of the learner.

The selection of a topic in history and the amount of attention given to it should depend not merely upon its relative proximity in time nor yet upon its relative present importance from the adult or from a sociological point of view, but also and chiefly upon the degree to which such a topic can be related to the present life interests of the pupil or can be used by him in the present processes of growth. (Dunn, 1916, p. 44)

Committee members indicated that such a principle should be considered in constructing the curriculum whether at its formal or enacted levels, a distinction that was really blurred for them. Thus it appears that it was the psychologizing rather than the sociologizing or historicizing of school knowledge that counted.

At any rate, the territorial dimension of social studies was the most apparent area of conflict and compromise between different segments of the subject community. Throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, newly-emerging professional associations like the APSA, the American Sociological Association (ASA), and the American Anthropological Association (AAA) and, to a lesser extent, relatively old associations like the American Economic Association (AEA) were challenging the dominance of the old consensus of the historians and moderate revisionists over the form and substance of secondary school curriculum. Each subject segment attempted to construct a good case for the inclusion of its domain of knowledge and expertise, as a distinct entity, into school curriculum. The imperatives of scheduling and time allocation were

perhaps sufficient by themselves to create a need for mutual accommodation among different subject segments without crowding out each other.

While the demands of each segment varied in terms of the angle of vision and the time needed in the school curriculum, the inclusion and/or accommodation of these demands required concessions on the part of historians and moderate revisionists. New historians' openness and readiness for cooperation with the emerging social sciences facilitated this accommodation. However, it was the NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education that brought the accommodation to a formal consensus. By virtue of this consensus, government and economics gained a foothold in the problems of democracy course, and the extensive number of history courses already recommended by the Committees of Ten, Seven, and Five dwindled to just two courses, world and American history.

The pedagogy of teaching social studies, having the aforementioned evolving premises in mind, put a significant emphasis upon direct experiences besides different vicarious experiences already common in teaching social studies. Regardless of their immediate and/or remote professional affiliations, the relevant rationale advocates made the case for the introduction of the problem method, the laboratory method, and the field investigation method as complementary pedagogical approaches to different vicarious methods such as teaching by telling, discussions, debates, recitations, and collateral reading. What distinguished among them, though, was whether to psychologize, historicize, or sociologize the

educative experience. In short, while the relevance rationale advocates were in agreement with regard to the form of the educative experience, they differed with regard to the structure of that experience.

The NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education endorsed the present and evolving consciousness of the learner as the core of the educative experience, suggesting that an ideal method should cultivate interest, right motive, sound and relevant information, sound and dispassionate judgment, and willingness to initiate action. However, the process of teaching and learning was accommodated to the new curriculum organization suggested by the relevance rationale advocates. That is, an educative experience that responds to the personal needs of students cannot be separated from its organizational context. In short, the process of teaching-learning or the enacted curriculum was to be the outcome of four commonplaces, to use Schwab's (1978) terms--student, content, teacher, and context. A word about each of these is in order.

As previously indicated, secondary school students were largely conceived as actual and prospective citizens who are entitled to thorough knowledge and educative experiences that fit their needs and interests, their community social problems, and their occupational prospects. The concept of student, therefore, was far from being monolithic. Different concepts of students emerged or were constructed, given their distinctive cultural backgrounds, social contexts, and occupational prospects.

As such, the content of social studies was moving away from a dominance of historical knowledge to the inclusion of political, sociological, and economic knowledge and from a focus on conceptual understanding to practical knowledge and experience. While the NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education called for situating the knowledge in personal experience, the overall curriculum and experiences were supposed to lead to attaining seven cardinal principles. These principles were health, command of fundamental processes, worthy home membership, citizenship, moral character, vocation, and leisure time. This conception of content was consistent with the differential socialization rationale.

The teacher of social studies, according to the relevance rationale advocates, needed to be well trained pedagogically and well grounded academically. At the pedagogical level, the social studies teacher should be well immersed in a science of pedagogy with its theoretical, practical, and technical dimensions. Academic preparation was no longer sufficient for the preparation of social studies teachers. Accordingly, special attention needed to be devoted to enlightening and training prospective teachers and in-service social studies teachers in the processes of knowledge selection, organization, distribution, and presentation. "In teacher-training schools special attention should be given to methods by which instruction in the social studies may be made to meet the 'needs of present growth' in pupils of elementary and high school age" (Dunn, 1916, p. 59).

At the academic level, the teacher's knowledge about the social sciences should be interdisciplinary, conceptual, and procedural, meaning that colleges and universities that supply high school teachers should provide courses in methods of teaching their subjects.

Many high school teachers come directly from the college and university with excellent equipment, so far as subject matter is concerned, but with no training whatever in methods of teaching. It is, therefore, recommended that colleges and universities that supply high schools with teachers provide courses in methods of teaching, in the sense indicated above in connection with teacher-training schools. (Dunn, 1916, p. 59)

In short, the relevance rationale advocates' vision of the teacher, especially the moderate liberals, was neither that of a technical expert nor that of an aristocratic intellectual. Rather, it was more akin to a practical pedagogue, well informed in the knowledge of his/her subject or field.

The context of learning was largely conceived in terms of the personal needs of students. Yet this context, as previously stated, could hardly be separated from cultural, social, and organizational contexts, the last of which were not implied or referred to in this report but influenced the mediation of the teaching-learning process. This dilemma (i.e., the intersection between deliberation, policy, and teaching and the organizational strategies that emerged in the progressive era) may not have eased the burden on the teacher, but it appears that it may have initiated the conditions of teacher bashing.

In sum, the process of teaching and learning became context-specific. That is, the growing consciousness of students and their needs became the point at which different mediating cultural, social, and organizational factors intermingled. This situation definitely represented a heavy burden on students and teachers alike. Moreover, teaching and learning as the liberal interplay of ideas between teachers and students through the medium of a common curriculum gave way to a paradigm of the teaching and learning consonant with a meritocratic-utilitarian philosophy of social, occupational, and cognitive engineering.

Relevance: Invisible Assumptions

The relevance rationale in social studies embodied a set of implicit assumptions about the psychology of learning, philosophy of education, and social philosophy. While this set of assumptions can be discerned through a careful reading and analysis of different reports on social studies through the first two decades of the 20th century; a review of pertinent research and scholarship that addressed these assumptions would enhance the validity of the points made in this section.

At the psychological level, social studies deliberation committees throughout the first two decades of the century seem to have departed completely from the mental discipline and faculty psychology that underlay earlier curriculum deliberations. Neither learning for learning's sake nor the training of memory and reasoning powers of mind were the focus of the relevance rationale

advocates. Rather, their focus shifted almost completely to the discovery, understanding, and application of the principles of consciousness, character, and behavior socialization and formation relative to definite and desired ends.

Such a shift in the psychological underpinnings of the social studies rationale paralleled a shift within psychology as a discipline. The years between 1880-1920 witnessed the demise of psychology as a philosophical and theological field and the rise of psychology as an empirical science. This paradigm change within psychology was far from being monolithic. Different empirical strands competed over the discourse and practice of the emerging discipline. Significant among these strands were structuralism, functionalism, and behaviorism. These strands differed or represented different variations along the question of scope and methods in psychology. For the structuralists, the content of students' minds outlined the scope of structural psychology. Introspection and field investigation were the basic methods of the discovery and understanding of the principles, laws, and/or generalizations that regulate the workings of the mind. For the functionalists, it was the connections between means and ends that represented the scope of their psychology. Structured or unstructured introspections and field investigations were their methods of the discovery and understanding of genuine relationships between means and ends. For the behaviorists, it was the animated actions, both human and non-human, that represented the scope of their psychology. Experimental and laboratory methods were their

methods of the discovery and understanding of the "laws" of human functioning (Thompson, 1968).

The relevance rationale advocates, it appears, were more influenced by structural and functional psychology rather than behavioral psychology though. References to the works of Dewey and Hall appeared in both the APSA (1916) and NEA (1916) reports. However, apart from the reports, behavioral psychology may have made its way into schools and classrooms through the institutionalization of testing and vocational guidance movements. The established wisdom in social studies history, at least at its theoretical level, indicates that the psychological foundation of relevance in the field became more Deweyian than Watsonian.

At the philosophical level, social studies curriculum deliberation committees seem to have dramatically departed from the pre-pragmatic/idealist philosophy of education and schooling. No longer were their basic concerns focused on enculturation, enlightenment, and intellectual training. Their focus shifted almost completely from initiating the young into a common culture to the differential socialization and integration of different groups of students into the economic and occupational structures.

Such a shift in the philosophy of education paralleled a shift in the philosophy of the social sciences in general. Throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, scientism and the discovery of the natural laws of social phenomena became increasingly the norms and goals of the social sciences. These consolidating norms and goals enhanced the objective stance and expertise of social

scientists with regard to policy formation and intervention strategies. On the fringes, though, there were voices of dissent calling for either non-interventionist or completely objective social science or a critical and historical approach to the field. Despite the significant contributions of these fringe groups, especially the critical approach, their influence on practical discourse and policy formation seems to have been marginal.

In short, while pragmatic and objective social science advanced as an overarching philosophy, different strands competed over the discourse and practice in these disciplines. Significant among these strands were materialist and utilitarian pragmatism, moderate reformist pragmatism, and critical-moral pragmatism. For the materialists, social phenomena operated according to divine and discoverable laws, and the role of the social scientist was to discover these laws through a disinterested and objective approach to his/her field. No intervention--or minimal intervention--in the unfolding course of social phenomena was necessary. For the moderate reformists, the norms of natural law and the discovery of its operation in social spheres were accepted. Yet a moderate level of advocacy was necessary to counteract the apparent and excessive irrationalities in these different social spheres. For the critical moralists, change was the fundamental law in historical and social phenomena. And peaceful, intelligent, and progressive social change required the discovery and understanding of the parameters of different social phenomena (Ross, 1991).

Despite such a sketchy description of these strands, one may notice a similarity between them and the different philosophical strands of schooling and education that emerged throughout the first two decades of the 20th century. While social and personal efficiency was advocated as the basic function of schooling and education, different strands emerged, representing variations along this emerging educational philosophy. For some, efficiency meant a mechanical relation among schooling, education, and the economic and occupational structure, commonly called the stern strand of social efficiency. In this version, the needs of the economy precede the cultural and personal needs of students in the process of curriculum conception, construction, and execution. For others, efficiency meant striking a balance or a compromise between economic and occupational needs and students' personal and cultural needs, commonly called the mild version of social efficiency. In this strand, the processes of curriculum conception, construction, and execution require a substantial degree of artistry and practical deliberation to strike a defensible compromise. Finally, there were some educators who believed that a true and authentically efficient system of education should pave the way to creating conditions of greater personal and social fulfillment.

In many accounts the relevance rationale advocates represented a mild version of social efficiency. Their curriculum deliberation reports epitomized their concerns about striking the aforesaid balance, a compromise between the economic needs and the personal

and cultural needs of students. In short, their reports came to be Deweyian rather than Sneddenian (Hertzberg, 1981).

At the socio-historical level, relevance rationale advocates in social studies education seem to have embodied or represented the social and professional interests of the rising professional middle class around the turn of the century. Their curriculum deliberations, complete with ethos and objective and progressive dimensions, paralleled those of the professional and progressive wings of the rising middle class in the broader society. As such, the processes of specialization, professionalization, and rationalization of practice seemed to have underlay these curriculum deliberations and reforms as was the case in other professional practices. No longer did regional prejudices nor gentry connections account for their reform programs or social visions. At such an historic moment, reform programs and social visions were increasingly shaped by a dialectic of conflict and compromise within different subject communities. However, it would be naive to assume that the relevant professional communities that shaped the relevance rationale of social studies education were immune or irresponsible to the concurrent political and social movements throughout these historic days. Different forms of dialogue between social studies professional communities and various social and political communities occurred. And this dialogue, advertently or inadvertently, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to shaping the relevance rationale in social studies education.

Both the intra-professional community and the extra-professional community dialogues contributed to shaping the relevance rationale. At the intra-professional level, the NEA and the APSA (and the AHA, to a lesser extent) were engaged in a recurring dialogue throughout the first two decades of the century. At the extra-professional level, different professional associations developed forums of communications, some in concert with each other, with various social and political communities and laypersons. Significant among these communities were the National Association of Manufacturer (NAM), the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the National Civic Federation (NCF). Such multi-dimensional and multi-level dialogues contributed to shaping the vision, mission, discourse, and resources of social studies education in these historical days. A word about this dialogue will be mentioned in the next section.

In general, all social and professional groups accepted progressivism and social reforms as necessary and desirable. Yet they differed about the mission and means of achieving such a reform. As far as social studies was concerned, three different strands of social and political philosophies were on the rise throughout these historic days: conservative progressivism, liberal progressivism, and radical-critical progressivism. For the conservatives the process of socialization and building a community through education was equivalent to cultural dominance and social control. For the liberals, the process of socialization and building a community through education was a process of mutual

respect and understanding among cooperating communities and individuals. For the radicals or criticals, they were rigorous and liberating, necessarily relevant, and would eventually result in the building of a "lovely, worthy, and harmonious community" (Church & Sedlak, 1976, p. 251).

The compromise that was reached by the relevance rationale advocates, through their intra- and extra-professional dialogue, with its careful balance between the economic needs and the personal and cultural needs of students, would entitle the relevance rationale advocates to the seats of moderate liberal progressives. This point will be addressed fully in the next section. Thus, the invisible assumptions of the relevance rationale reveal the meaning of the rationale and the complexity of the conditions and choices that were to be made to bring it about.

Relevance: An Explanation

Three different explanations have been advanced by social studies historians to account for the rise of the relevance rationale in social education. A word about each explanation will be mentioned in the process of providing a view of what happened in the social studies field throughout the first two decades of the century.

The first explanation, advanced by Apple and Franklin (1979), emphasized that differential socialization and training of students through high school curriculum in general and social studies in particular cannot be fully understood without reference to the

social origins and interests of its advocates. For them, these advocates, whether social scientists or professional educators, were members of the rising middle class and were concerned about the disintegrating sense of community in early 20th century America. They wanted to restore the like-mindedness and homogeneity of a mid-19th century American town. Their educational programs, therefore, sought to cultivate such like-mindedness and homogeneity through curricula that upheld training at the formal level and socialization at the informal level. In such programs the social studies was conceived as intrinsically and instrumentally related to the cultivation of the like-mindedness and homogeneity whether at the formal or informal curricular levels.

The second explanation was advanced by Spring (1972) and, to a certain extent, Lybarger (1981). For them the relevance rationale in social education embodied the spirit and realities of the progressive reforms in general which amounted to the rationalization of the social, economic, and educational structures in order for them to be congruent with the interests and aspirations of the rising economic and political capitalism. At one level, curriculum stratification corresponded to social stratification (Spring, 1972). At another level the form and content of social studies, while mitigating the suffering of the dispossessed and disenfranchised, perpetuated their dependency (Lybarger, 1981).

The third explanation was advanced by Hertzberg (1981). For him the rise of the relevance rationale was forged through a continuous dialogue and accommodation among different subject

communities in the first two decades of the century. Significant among these communities were the APSA, NEA, AHA, and a host of different regional association. Eventually, this dialogue resulted in a compromise among these associations in the NEA's 1916 Committee on Social Studies Education. By virtue of the report, the basic rationale of the social studies came to be equated with education for social efficiency.

While the aforementioned summaries may not represent a full and fair representation of their proponents' visions and perspectives, they seem sufficient to proceed with the process of developing a relatively thorough and well-balanced view of what happened in the social studies in the first two decades of the century. At first glance, it seems that the building block in each of the above explanations was a specific social force or constituency. For the first explanation, social scientists and professional educators, as representatives of middle class interests, frustrations, and aspirations, were the social force that advanced the case of the relevance rationale. For the second explanation, both political and corporate capitalism underwrote the relevance rationale in social education, with social scientists and professional educators serving as mere executors of this overwhelming power. For the third explanation, professional associations worked on the development of the relevance rationale in a relatively autonomous fashion.

For each explanation, then, a particular social force was celebrated. But saying this does not mean that these explanations are incomplete or highly contradictory. Rather, it means that they

differed in their definition of which particular social force had the upper hand in shaping the relevance rationale. Each of them provides a perspective that would illuminate the different socio-political, economic, intellectual, and professional forces and processes that gave rise to the relevance rationale.

As members of the middle class, a substantial number of the relevance rationale advocates, social scientists, and professional educators alike came from middle class origins. But whether their views with regard to the rationale of social studies education were solely influenced by their middle class social origin is, perhaps, questionable. For one thing, different social scientists and professional educators who came from similar class origins advocated different rationales like the rigor or radical rationales. Moreover, being middle class would not completely justify their nostalgia about a mid-19th century American community, a community in which they did not live, did not have great stake in, and which perhaps contradicts their urge toward social mobility and status avenues that opened up for them in 20th century America.

If the restoration of a sense of community (i.e., like-mindedness and homogeneity) was consonant with the interests and aspirations of any social group at this historic moment, it would have been the old gentry and/or their heirs who would advocate a rigorous rationale for social studies education that promotes intellectual training and cultural enlightenment through a rigorous and common curriculum for all students. Fortunately or

unfortunately, as previously stated, the rigorists themselves were leaning toward the relevance rationale.

By the same token, it is difficult to accept the notion that social scientists and professional educators were mere executors of the will of political and corporate capitalism. Both the social sciences and the educational sciences were undergoing substantial change throughout these historic years. The rise of corporate capitalism, the massive industrialization, urbanization, and immigration brought about a new set of social and cultural problems and crises, and both groups wrestled with them.

By virtue of their professional training and theoretical persuasion, social scientists and professional educators were preoccupied with two basic endeavors in their research and policy deliberations: (a) the possibility of elaborating a science of society that seeks to define the parameters of social functioning and progress, stability and change; and (b) the possibility of mediating a program of reform that seeks to address the irrationalities that arise with or accompany social progress and change.

By virtue of their perspectives, social scientists and professional educators differed with regard to these two basic endeavors though. Relatively few of them advocated a program of research and reform that could be termed conservative and critical, with the majority supporting a program of research and reform that could be termed moderate and pragmatic.

Right wing social scientists and educators may have represented the old gentry and their heirs, the conservative wing of the rising middle class. Their basic concern focused on bringing 19th century moral order into 20th century corporate order.

On the other hand, left wing social scientists and professional educators, the rising corporate order and competitive and possessive individualism, represented the core of the social problem and/or crisis. According to them, rebuilding or restructuring the American community required a program of research and social reform that aspired to fulfill democratic ideals instead of having their sole focus on elaborating a science of liberal change. This group of social scientists and educators came basically from among social democrats and indigenous American socialists who advocated the case of radical labor and popular movements.

For centralist social scientists and professional educators, the focus of their research and reform programs revolved around the most efficient ways of rebuilding the American community. While their conservative and liberal strands accepted the rising order and strove to develop a science of liberal change, they differed with regard to the policies, mechanisms, and meaning of an efficient community in corporate America.

While the conservative progressives believed that an efficient community cannot be brought about without technology and a system of administration that are capable of bringing and even imposing order, the liberal progressives believed that such a definition of efficiency would have substantial and dramatic human costs. They

thought that giving each community a voice in conducting its affairs and promoting a degree of mutual respect and understanding among different social groups would bring communal life into fruition. This group of social scientists and educators may have represented the reform-minded or progressive wings of the middle class. Their programs of research and reforms may have had an appeal to or grasped the attention of powerful corporate and political centers that shaped the major economic, social, and political reforms of these historic years.

The question now is, "Why is it that the relevance rationale, not the rigor or radical rationales, emerged triumphant in these historic years?" Professional training, theoretical and ideological persuasion--not the social origin thesis or the corporate power thesis--played a basic role in shaping the discourse in social studies in the first two decades of the century. At this point, two different views were explicated by historical research and scholarship in curriculum and social studies history.

1. A dialectic of conflict and compromise between different subject communities can account for the processes of assimilation and accommodation that took place within and without these communities and eventually effected a consensus that carried the vision and reform program of the centralist social scientists and educators more than any other group.
2. While the centralist social scientists and educators' vision and reform programs had an appeal to or grasped the attention of the corporate centers of powers as they came close to the spirit of the general economic, social, and political reforms that dominated the progressive era, these general reforms, with their focus on rationalization, bureaucratization, and professionalization of the economic and social

spheres and/or services, offered the social scientists and educators different career opportunities and were relevant to their status needs.

In short, the question is whether the rise and/or triumph of the relevance rationale was a matter of persuasion among disinterested professionals or a matter of pragmatic exchange between the centralist social scientists and the corporate and political centers of powers. In the context of social studies, different evidences exist that could support both views.

On the one hand, different strands of centralist perspective in social science and education emerged simultaneously in different subject communities like the APSA, NEA, and AHA. The advocates of teaching the new civics or government in the APSA, the advocates of teaching social efficiency in the NEA, and the advocates of teaching the new history in the AHA seem to have started from similar assumptions and diagnosis of the problem of the present and the direction of the future. If individual social scientists, educators, or historians' contributions are to be studied on a case-by-case basis, substantial differences among them may emerge. However, in general, there seems to have been a sound basis for a dialogue between different segments of the subject communities at this time. Moreover, different social scientists, educators, and historians maintained membership in different subject communities and thus, perhaps, facilitated the dialogue across subject boundaries. While the intra-subject community dialogue shaped the community's position with regard to the rationale of social studies education as was the case in different independent reports of

professional associations, the inter-subject communities' dialogue, through the efforts and energy of these groups and individuals, facilitated the rise of a consensus among subject communities with regard to the rationale of social studies education as was the case in the NEA's 1916 Report on Social Studies Education (Hertzberg, 1981).

On the other hand, social scientists and professional educators were not isolated members indulging intellectually in their ivory towers at universities and professional associations. Rather, many of them were engaged in positive and negative relationships with extra-subject communities and circles. While numerous social scientists and educators provided advice, expertise, and work to the rising bureaucracy, civic associations, welfare organizations, corporate and political organizations, and philanthropic foundations, others jeopardized their career chances and job securities through the critical stands and advocacy of the case of radical and popular movements. To a large extent, the relevance rationale advocates in social studies education belonged to the former rather than the latter group. And one could suspect that their experiences and relationships with these different extra-subject communities and circles contributed to shaping their rationale of social studies education.

At any rate, one is tempted to say that no matter what the "professional dynamics and processes" or the "social dynamics and processes" that shaped the relevance rationale, social scientists, professional educators, and historians who directly contributed to

this process attempted deliberately to maintain the integrity of their field and the ethical calling of their profession. On one hand, it is commonly accepted among social studies' historians that the NEA's 1916 Report of Social Studies Education, epitomizing the professional consensus during confusing conditions, came closer to the Deweyian version of social efficiency than the Sneddenian one. It attempted to supplement the urge toward vocational relevance with an equally important dimension of personal relevance. On the other hand, contrary to the generally conservative progressive reforms advocated by different powerful socio-political and professional groups, the relevance rationale advocates in social education articulated a rationale and program that came closer to that of the liberal progressives than that of the conservative progressives.

Whether such a rationale and program served different social and cultural groups differently a debatable point. Yet this shortcoming should not lead one to underestimate the degree of genuineness, courage, and integrity that underlay the deliberation of these cross-subject communities and their members who aspired to fulfill the ideal of being honest brokers of vision and policy in such increasingly complex and delicate social and professional structures.

Conclusions

The relevance rationale in social studies education crystallized in the first two decades of the 20th century. This crystallization was part and parcel of a larger societal process of

structural adjustment that took place in the progressive era. While the origins of this rationale went back to the 18th century, its imprint and influence, as a philosophy and pedagogy as well as a policy and social institution, on the discourse and practice of social studies education were squarely felt in the first two decades of the 20th century.

Substantively, the relevance rationale in social studies education represented a philosophy and pedagogy that sought to strike a compromise between fulfilling the demands of social efficiency and meeting the needs of personal growth of different groups of students. As such, it embodied a set of visible and invisible assumptions that portrayed its liberal progressive and meritocratic utilitarian inclinations.

Institutionally, the rise of the relevance rationale in social studies education amounted to a declaration of the demise of the role of the rigorist and moderate revisionists in shaping the discourse and practice in social studies education and the ascendancy of the role of the centralist social scientists, the social efficiency minded educators, and the new historians in shaping that discourse and practice.

In short, as a philosophy and pedagogy, the relevance rationale in social studies education epitomized a mild version of social efficiency. What is relevant needed to be useful and meaningful in social and personal terms. As a policy and social institution, the relevance rationale in social studies education housed the moderate liberal social and educational reformers who advocated the

differential and meaningful socialization of different groups of students to live their present and fulfill their future prospects.

The role of professional training, theoretical persuasions, and ideological positions of the relevance rationale advocates seem to provide further illumination and/or explanation of the triumph of the relevance rationale in social education in the first two decades of the century. While the social origin thesis and the corporate power thesis illuminate the outer limits or prospects of social studies reform in the progressive era, the professional and ideological thesis illuminates the actual "professional dynamics and processes" and the "social dynamics and processes" that gave rise to the relevance rationale. In short, the relevance rationale in social education emerged as a moderate liberal position with regard to schooling and social studies education. This position came about as a deliberate choice on the part of its advocates. However, this choice was not predetermined. Rather, it was constructed through a dialectic of conflict and compromise between intra- and inter-subject communities and between them and extra-subject communities and circles.

The next chapter will attempt to spell out the meaning of the radical and critical rationale of social studies education and provide an explanation of its marginality in the discourse and practice of social studies education between 1870 and 1920.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RADICAL RATIONALE

Introduction

Despite the relatively weak professional representation of the radical rationale advocates in the official curriculum deliberation committees, they generated a theoretical and practical discourse in social education that would entitle them to occupy a distinctive position in the history of the discipline or field. Their ideas and practical experiments, though tapping different sources and loosely connected, amounted to theoretically informed programs for transforming schools, curriculum, and social education. The chapter in hand will attempt to spell out the basic tenets and assumptions of the radical rationale as far as social education is concerned. As such, it will attempt to provide an explanation of its marginal location and relatively weak influence in the history of the discipline or field between 1870 and 1920.

Origins and Development

The radical rationale in social education was part and parcel of different strands of radical and critical philosophies and/or ideologies that sought a reconstruction of education and society to

enhance the cause of social justice and equality. Despite a wide variety of early harbingers or precursors, these strands took full shape and force throughout the second half of the 19th and the early 20th centuries. Significant among these strands were the ideas and experiments advocated by different socio-political and professional groups such as the critical pragmatists, socialists, and cultural democrats. In addition, other radical and critical groups such as anarchists and religious groups co-existed with these strands, contributing to the cause of social education. However, since the subject of this paper concentrates on analyzing the most salient or predominant rationales of social education in public secondary schools, the focus of this chapter will be on the former rather than the latter strands.

It is important at the outset to emphasize the following observations.

1. Critical pragmatism, socialism, and cultural democracy, as intellectual and social philosophies, do not imply a homogeneity of ideas among all individuals who belonged to these philosophies.
2. These strands are not mutually exclusive.
3. These strands represented different and almost simultaneous historical and social responses to the massive industrialization and urbanization and immigration that took place in the American society between 1870 and 1920.

A word about each strand may be needed at this stage.

Contrary to idealism and pragmatic materialism, critical pragmatism emerged at the turn of the century as a philosophy and program of social reform that sought to cultivate a sense of

community among different social groups and to expand and fulfill the liberal democratic ideals (Bottomore, 1968). Generally, such a philosophy and program meant that schools, curricula, and social education can be used as a leverage for social regeneration and reconstruction. Through the cultivation of socialized intelligence, meaningful associations, and mutual respect among different social groups, schools can serve as leverages for community and social regeneration. The ideas and experiments of Adams, Montessori, Dewey, and others epitomized this strand.

Indigenous American socialism has emerged as a call for social transformation and reconstruction since the first half of the 19th century. Communist and utopian ideas and experiments developed and advanced throughout the century (Tien, 1972). However, as the gilded age crisis took hold on the mind and heart of the society, both the American Socialist Labor Party and the American Socialist Party emerged respectively as a dynamic response to this crisis and as organized and democratic attempts to achieve a structural change and transformation to further the cause of freedom and equality (Weinstein, 1969). The socialists believed that a progressive and democratic education is much more likely to flourish, blossom, and fulfill its potentials in a progressive and democratic economy. However, the socialists did not suspend their educational deliberation and experimentation until the glorious triumph of socialism. Besides their political campaigns to gain representations in different national, municipal, and local administrative bodies, they developed an elaborate rationale, reform

strategies, and curricular practices that embodied their vision of the new society. For them, social education--and all educational experiences, for that matter--should aim at and guarantee the full development of socially cooperative and altruistic individuals. The ideas and practices embodied in the Socialist Sunday School movement and writings of socialist educators such as Simons, Dell, and Herran epitomized this rationale.

The cultural democrats, a loose term appropriate to describe the genuine attempts of different social and cultural groups or their representatives to democratize cultural policies, canons, and practices, called for social education programs and different cultural policies at wider social and cultural spheres that revise and transcend the historically outmoded and repressive stereotypes ingrained in the social, cultural, and symbolic capital. The ultimate goals of these policies and programs were directed toward enhancing social justice and equality. For cultural democrats, cultural capital(s), policies, and resources needed to be democratized rather than vulgarized. That is, the symbolic violence and hegemony that oppress and marginalize women, people of color, and different ethnic groups needed to come to a halt. Instead, cultural logic and practices of contestation and confirmation were indispensable for the moral and progressive revitalization and transformation of the general culture. Different intellectuals, social and cultural movements, and institutions emerged in the first two decades of the century that embodied these ideas, epitomized by

Maley, DuBois, and Friedleander (Buhle, 1981; Cremin, 1961; Dell, 1913; DuBois, 1973; Freire, 1980).

At any rate the critical pragmatists, socialists, and cultural democrats, despite their distinctive ideas and programs, seem to have departed substantially from the concomitant ideas and programs of social and school reforms. As far as schooling and social education are concerned, they advocated and advanced rationales, policies, and practices that touched upon the fundamental and root foundations of schooling, curriculum, and social education. Moreover, despite the fact that they draw upon different theoretical traditions, they were closer to each other, however loosely, than to the dominant modes of social and school reforms. The upcoming section will attempt to spell out the basic tenets of the radical rationale as it relates to schooling and social education.

Substance

The radical rationale advocates seem to have agreed that social education programs in public schools should aspire to expand and fulfill the liberal-democratic ideals through providing all students, regardless of gender, race, or social class, with equal access to a rigorous, meaningful, and empowering social knowledge, training, and disposition. Schools, curricula, and social education needed to be liberated from the crippling influences of politics and markets. A school system that creates a monopoly of intellect is as detrimental and inefficient as a system that processes and produces capitalist machines. Schools, curricula, and social education,

therefore, should aspire to achieve both egalitarian and humane ideals embodied in liberal democratic traditions.

Obviously, the above statement may represent an oversimplification of the radical rationale of social education as it attempts to extrapolate the common features that cut across all its strands. Accordingly, it seems quite important to look at some of the ideas articulated by eminent representatives or spokespeople of the critical pragmatists, socialists, and cultural democrats. Such an attempt is by no means exhaustive, but hopefully it will be illuminating.

The ultimate goal of social education for critical pragmatists at this historic stage seems to have been directed toward "the cultivation of a socialized intelligence" (Dewey, 1916), i.e., a new social mentality and disposition that permitted the sharing of interests, freedom and fullness of interaction and association, and progressive social readjustment. Dewey was clearly a zealous and passionate advocate of such a position.

. . . but unless the idea that the unifying and social direction in education is a farcical pretense, subjects that bulk as large in the curriculum as history and geography must represent a general function in the development of a truly socialized and intellectualized experience. The discovery of this function must be employed as a criterion for trying and sifting the facts taught and the methods used. (p. 247)

Similarly, in their second annual report, ASA sociologists (1920) emphasized that a full understanding and awareness of a science of society, i.e., that science that encompasses ethics, history, economics, political science, and sociology, is necessary

for the future roles of students as authentic shapers of the destiny of their society and the fulfillment of liberal-democratic ideals. For them, a study that focuses on the immediate personal and social needs and problems to achieve proximal and psychological adjustments is not adequate, to say the least. According to them, "A study of our times alone tends (in the case of 10th grade history) to endorse the obsessions of the time spirit from which the time most needs to escape" (ASA, 1920, p. 228).

For the socialists, the educative experiences, especially in social education, should aim at overcoming the sense of helplessness among the children of the masses: kindling their imaginative powers, intellectual curiosity, truth-searching or discovery and nurturing their dispositions toward constructive, enduring, faithful, and altruistic social and occupational relations. And in so doing, social education and educators should aspire to be active agents of a truly democratic culture (Dell, 1919). That is, a culture that aspires to cultivate among all children or students creative faculties, disinterested curiosity, meaningful and constructive personal relations, and personal and social usefulness. While a social education that seeks to cultivate a moral, progressive, and democratic culture leads necessarily to promote a humane and democratic social efficiency, focusing and promoting technical efficiency through schools, i.e., differential socialization for different occupational and social roles, lead neither to a democratic culture nor to a democratic efficiency. Dell (1919) was a fervent and emphatic advocate of such a position.

In the school-workshops of capitalism, the child is taught how to work for somebody else, how to conduct mechanical operations in an industrial process over which he has no control; in the democratic workshops of the schools he learns to use those processes to serve his own creative wishes. In the one he is taught to be a wage-slave--and bear in mind that this refers to the children of the poor--for the rich have their own private schools for their own children. In the other the child learns to be a free man. (p. 85)

On a practical level, social education as taught in Socialist Sunday Schools aimed at counteracting the possessive, selfish, and competitive spirit engendered by the dominant curricular paradigm. As such, it aimed at immersing students in the spirit of public service, cooperation, brotherhood, solidarity, and good citizenship (Teitelbaum & Reese, 1983). In short, social education aimed at nurturing a cooperative and altruistic social ethic or morality.

The line of demarcation between the critical pragmatists and socialists is a fine one, especially if we acknowledge that socialism was largely conceived as a set of working hypotheses rather than a set of dogmatic beliefs. Both groups enveloped their advocacy of progressive pedagogy with a penetrating social criticism. However, the socialists were more keenly aware that enhancing economic democracy and economic rights of all social groups would make the personal and societal fruits of progressive pedagogy more likely or handy. Tien (1972) accurately and eloquently stated this point.

This fusion of progressive educational theory with radical social criticism was typical of socialist educational thought in the first two decades of the century. The complementary existence of these two elements in the socialist educational thought differentiates it from that of all but the most left of liberals, for the socialists saw the classroom not only

in the perspective of the wider society but also in relationship to the revolutionized which they sought to bring about. Paradoxically, they felt that the economic democracy which they envisaged was essential to the full implementation of progressive programs in the schools. Yet, at the same time, they believed that the adoption of these programs would be an important factor in the creation of men and women with a socialist outlook. An education whose methodology emphasized experimentation, self reliance and the application of intelligence to social problems seemed to almost all socialists . . . to be more in tune with socialist goals as well as intrinsically superior. Traditional subject matter and methods, most socialists thought were two closely associated with an aristocratic past and were of dubious values in an industrialized, scientific, and democratic age. (pp. 92-93)

The cultural democrats advocated different cultural and educational programs that carried significant imports vis-a-vis social education. Regardless of their different emphases or focuses, they aspired to revitalizing, democratizing, and transforming the general culture without succumbing to vulgarization. For them, the critical issues of gender, race and ethnicity, and identity did not need to be submerged. Rather, they were to be addressed head on in a progressive and democratic atmosphere. Moreover, social and educational policies needed to be advanced in order to enhance the cause of social justice and equality in these contexts. For most of them, a democratic culture, in and out of schools, would engender a disposition toward a democratic, peaceful, and constructive dialogue among equals, in a moral as well as a social sense, who are committed and concerned about building shared cultural resources and living experiences that are real, vital, and progressive. Such a democratic culture would

avoid the pitfalls of cultural conflicts and build meaningful bridges between the general culture and its constituent parts.

In his vivid analysis of the feminist movement at the turn of the century, Dell (1913) illuminated some of the basic issues and concerns that preoccupied the minds and hearts of women at the turn of the century. Significant among these issues and concerns were women's political rights (the women's suffrage movement), women's economic rights (equal pay, access to leadership positions, and initiatives in their spheres of expertise), women's civic rights (the right to be treated as full citizens, not as commodities or servants), and women's moral and legal roles in the institutions of marriage and artistic contributions (also see Jones, 1984). Of course, the emphasis on these issues and concerns differed from person to person and association to association. Yet it appears that the liberation of women or, to use Dell's term, setting them free from the shackles of markets, politics, and negative historical experiences underlie most of these concerns.

Despite the fact that education, including social education, was not addressed head on, the importance of Dell's analysis is quite clear. One could not imagine a social education program that aspires to fulfill the mission of women's liberation that still clings to restricting the role of women to the old stereotypes of sexual commodities, obedient servants, conforming workers, and/or voiceless wives. A social education program that seeks to depart from these stereotypes and achieve the moral mission of women's liberation, whether in its substance and methods or in its formal or

informal messages, should seek to cultivate the knowledge, dispositions, and practical experiences that would empower the rising generation, male and female alike, to cherish, trust, and fulfill their potentials as full persons and citizens in a relentless urge toward moral justice and equality.

DuBois (1973) called for a democratization of schooling and culture in order to overcome all forms of segregation and discrimination along racial lines. For him, a liberal and culturally responsive or sensitive rather than technical (industrial) education seemed absolutely necessary for the advancement of blacks and their empowerment. The term "self assertion" may have epitomized DuBois' rationale of secondary education. According to him, self assertion was far from being synonymous with crude power. Rather, self assertion meant cultivating and harnessing the intellectual, psychological, and physical energies through a long and careful process of coordination and development, balancing and repression, inspiration and encouragement in order to bring rising generations into the fullest and roundest development as human beings. Such a goal, i.e., self assertion or empowerment, was a necessary first step toward achieving even a higher goal for the black race, that is, "the abolition of the color line, the treatment of all men according to their individual desert and not according to their race" (DuBois, 1973, p. 15).

As a result, DuBois was critical of an exclusive focus on industrial education as the only viable option to the rising

generations of black students as was the case in the Hampton Institute.

. . . in an institution where the president of the United States can with applause tell young men not to hitch their wagons to a star but to a mule; where the sincere old man who spoke on this platform three days ago can say amid laughter that the great duty of a minister is to teach his folks to raise a good dinner; and where around all and in all, there is an insistence on the practical in a manner and tone that would make Socrates an idiot and Jesus Christ a crank--in such a place it seems to me no infringement of the rights of hospitality to say that I believe that this doctrine is so fundamentally false as to call for a word of warning. (DuBois, 1973, p. 12)

The imports of such a vision with regard to social education are quite apparent. For a positive self assertion to prosper and blossom, the socialization policies, canons, and practices need to satisfy or meet the best standards of social equality, knowledge, and cultural sensitivity.

As far as different cultural traditions and resources cherished by different cultural and/or ethnic groups, the cultural democrats advocated a positive stance that may be termed democratic pluralism, that is, a cultural logic and practice that institutionalizes a progressive, democratic, and peaceful dialogue between the mainstream culture and its constituent subcultures. For them, the mainstream culture and the old cultural traditions need not and should not deny the positive, significant, and vital contributions of subcultures. By the same token, the subcultures need not and should not succumb to mere isolationism and negative resistance. In short, the cultural democrats advocated the rise of new cultural outlook, institutions, and traditions that would enact a moral,

progressive, and democratic transformation of culture. According to Cremin (1961), "The position (democratic pluralism) was a noble and courageous one in the face of mounting pressure for undivided loyalty during the war years, but it was neither widely heard nor widely heeded by the nation at large" (p. 69).

Thus, it seems that the radical rationale of social education was part and parcel of an intellectual, social, and cultural movements that sought fundamental change and reconstruction of the American society in the first two decades of the 20th century. Whether as intellectuals, associations, revolutionaries, teachers, or ordinary citizens, the radical rationale advocates, it appears, were zealous proponents of redefining the liberal democratic tradition in order to bring to the fore and fulfill its egalitarian and humane potentials.

Whether they were critical pragmatists, socialists, or cultural democrats, the radical rationale advocates transformed their vision(s) and commitments to certain policy initiatives and measures with regard to curriculum organization, knowledge accessibility, and the relationship between schooling and work. These initiatives and measures portrayed or reflected their unbending commitments to social justice and equality.

At the curriculum organization level, it appears that all the radical strands were critical of a curriculum differentiation that corresponded to and reinforced the gender, racial, and class composition of the social structure. With a different emphasis, of course, they made the case for a common curriculum that combined

work and play, science and art, mental and manual preparation for all groups of students, regardless of their gender, color, or social class.

At the level of knowledge accessibility or distribution, all the radical strands, it appears, were critical of the stratification, regimentation, and commodification of school knowledge, a situation that perpetuated the myth and hegemony of the dominant culture. They advocated a social constructivist conception of school knowledge that gives the learners an active role in shaping the meanings and implications of their educative experiences. For the radicals, social occupations, the processes of social living, and the conscious and unconscious premises of the lived culture would furnish an endless and rich source for a collective and democratic deliberation, organization, and implementation of the school curricula. Students in such a conception would be active shapers of their own learning through a constructive, democratic, and caring dialogue or conversation between each other, between them and their teachers and whoever and whatever happens to be of value and relevance to their ever growing and expanding minds and sympathies.

At the level of the relation between schooling and work (the occupational structure), all the radical strands, with different degrees of emphasis, believed that a curriculum that is common, democratic, and empowering would lead to transforming and reconstructing the social relations of work and occupations to be more equitable, fair, and harmonious. That is, if students would

learn to construct and reconstruct their learning experiences, they would be more likely to transfer such dispositions and sympathies to their adult worlds and social relations. However, the socialists, in particular, were convinced that a democratic economy would reduce the objective and subjective biases embodied in the corporate structure which make such progressive growing and learning devoid of meaning and nullifies the social and personal returns of education.

In short, the radical rationale of schooling and social education, despite its segmented and loosely constructed nature, sought to achieve the fullest and roundest development possible for the rising generations regardless of their gender, color, class, or cultural resources. As such, it sought to cultivate a social spirit, intelligence, and ethnicity that gave priority to public service, cooperation, and altruism. The means of enacting such a radical and progressive rationale were policy initiatives and measures that call for the institutionalization of a common, democratic, and socially constructed curriculum. The outcome of such a curriculum, i.e., progressive, democratic, and socially constructed ideas, policies, and practices, it was hoped, would be more equitable, fairer, and more harmonious schooling and social relations.

Visible Assumptions

Radical rationale advocates developed distinct conceptions of education, knowledge, pedagogy, teachers, students, and the teaching-learning process. The section at hand will attempt to

spell out the basic assumptions of these conceptions as well as the differences that may have existed among the different strands of the radical rationale.

For all radical strands, i.e., critical pragmatists, socialists, and cultural democrats, education and the educative process meant a social consciousness and social reconstruction. All of them acknowledged the necessity, indispensability, and simultaneousness of consciousness raising and social reconstruction for the democratic social transformation to occur. However, it appears that critical pragmatists and cultural democrats gave more primacy and priority to consciousness raising and transformation than socialists did. Of course, such an assertion does not mean that socialists suspended their educational efforts until the achievement of economic and social transformation. Rather, it means that critical pragmatists and cultural democrats were more optimistic about the roles of school and education.

For critical pragmatists, education meant a realistic, vital, and timely process of individual empowerment and social reconstruction. For example, Dewey (1916) emphasized that such a conception is particularly important for the survival and regeneration of a democratic society.

A society which makes provisions for the participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control and the habits of mind which secure social change without introducing disorder. (p. 115)

This kind of education, according to Dewey (1916), should be geared toward building democratic and humane rather than hegemonic and instrumental social relations. That is, instead of an education that gives priority to selection and socialization along gender, race, and class lines, the new education should attempt to make "a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive capacities be offered all" (p. 142). Moreover, instead of an education that focuses squarely on prospective vocational skills, attitudes, and dispositions that would make students fit nicely in predetermined and fixed occupation roles, norms, and relations, the new education should aim at the "cultivation of power to join freely and fully in shared and common activities" (p. 144).

An education that makes its goal the processes of associated living and their democratic and constructive regeneration and transformation would neither be satisfied with education as a cultural refinement nor education as a vocational and technical preparation. For Dewey, new education would assume the following.

What one is as a person is what one is as associated with others, in a free give-and-take of intercourse. This transcends both the efficiency which consists in supplying products to others and the culture which is an exclusive refinement or polish.
(p. 145)

Besides Dewey, other sociologists, in their second annual report, stressed the importance of an education that seeks to provide students with conceptual tools and psychological dispositions and/or attitudes that are necessary for them to participate fully and

critically in the redefinition and fulfillment of the liberal-democratic ideals (ASA, 1920).

For the socialists, the basic goal of education in general and social education in particular was twofold:

1. to provide all children and students with liberal and enlightening educative experiences that would permit their maximum, full, and well-rounded growth and development. Such educative experiences should aspire to cultivate the dispositions of being ever truth-searchers, beauty-makers, and ethics bounded. And in so doing, these experiences should not only keep the creative and imaginative powers of children and/or students in tact, but nurture and kindle them along constructive directions or channels; and
2. to provide all children and/or students with learning opportunities and social contexts that lead to the cultivation of a social morality and public spirit that promote cooperation, service, and altruism as the most positive propensities of human nature and social welfare. (Dell, 1919; Tien, 1972)

Such a conception of education departed substantially from the academic as well as the vocationally-oriented conceptions already prevalent in educational and social discourse. Moreover, such a conception, while anticipating and acknowledging difficulties and resistance to its institutionalization efforts, sought to use the schools to bring about more democratic and socialistic social relations. For the socialists, the full realization of the educative potentials and imports of such a conception will be achieved with the social transformation to democratic socialism.

For socialists cultural democratic education and social education might have meant a moral, constructive, and democratic sharing, dialogue, and/or conversation among the children and/or

students and between them and their teachers through real, vital, authentic, and educative experiences. Such experiences would draw upon and seek to make accessible and intelligible different cultural traditions and practices of all cultural groups.

This conception was clearly neither an argument for dominant cultural canons (i.e., the aristocratic culture), nor for profane culture (i.e., the culture of the back alley). Rather, it was an argument for a moral, democratic, and progressive construction and reconstruction, give and take, contestation and confirmation of the lived experiences and their cultural bearings, meanings, imports, and implications. Certainly, such a conception sought the demystification of culture, the progressive reconstruction, democratization, and ennoblement of the culture, not its impoverishment.

Radical rationale advocates' conceptions of school knowledge came as clear evidence of their social and educational commitments. For critical pragmatists, socialists, and cultural democrats, school knowledge needed to be made more accessible to greater number or to all students, more impartial with regard to different cultural canons and practices of different cultural groups as well as burning social issues and concerns and more open to the creative and sensitive scrutiny of learners. These conceptions of school knowledge laid down the early precursors of a radical curriculum paradigm, one in which the principles of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution would give due and critical attention

to social and cultural foundations and implications of knowledge construction and acquisition.

For critical pragmatists, the principles of knowledge selection, organization and distribution, as explicated by Dewey (1916), should satisfy intellectual, psychological, and social criteria. The intellectual and psychological criteria necessitate that school knowledge should be meaningful and intrinsically related to the unfolding and growing experiences of learners (and, consequently, learning by doing may precede learning through verbal communication). The social criteria necessitate that school knowledge becomes accessible to greater numbers of all students, seek to preserve the essence of social living, and enhance the role of learners in shaping their learning and social prospects. By fully attending to these criteria in constructing and enacting the school curriculum, school knowledge and the educative experience would become a truly authentic medium of forging a progressive and democratic cultural consensus and social regeneration.

A curriculum which acknowledges the social responsibilities of education must present situations where problems are relevant to the problems of living together, and whose observation and information are calculated to develop social insight and interest.
(Dewey, 1916, p. 226)

School knowledge thus conceived would be both humane and democratic. That is, in its selection, organization, and distribution, it would be approached as an optimal provision that suits the growing and expanding experience of the learners rather than a sacred, complete, and finished product to be mastered.

It (school knowledge) does not represent perfection and infallible wisdom; but it is the best at command to further new experiences which may, in some respects at least, surpass the achievements embodied in existing knowledge and works of art. (Dewey, 1916. p. 214)

In their second annual report, ASA sociologists (1920) stressed the importance of the structure of social sciences as well as social philosophy and cognitive and developmental psychology in the processes of curriculum construction and enactment. A redefinition of liberal democratic ideals, sociologists thought, required a progressive, realistic, and rigorous engagement of students in the substance and methods of the social sciences as well as the ideals and virtues of social living. For socialists, school knowledge should not be offered as commodified, regimented, and finished products that need to be mastered. Rather, it should be socially constructed through real, conscious, and guided contact with the social realities.

An over-reliance on textbooks and their mastery as the ultimate means and ends of social education was deplored by socialists as responsible for the miserable situation and sense of helplessness predominant among teachers and students alike. The mastery of a textbook, or a set of textbooks, for that matter, cannot ensure that a conscious learning and control over the area of interest and social concern would take place. It may even be nothing more than adding another category to the accumulated myth.

The book, as the center of our educational process, must be demoted. It is a good servant but a bad master. And only as a servant can it be tolerated, as an adjunct to the gardens and workshops and

laboratories and kitchens and studios and playgrounds of the school world. (Dell, 1919, p. 46)

School knowledge in the social sciences can be acquired through a social constructivist approach that focuses students' creative powers, intellectual curiosity, and moral sensitivity on real, vital, and critical issues and problems of social living, past and present. And through an inquiry method that aspires to reach the standards of fair-minded historians and social scientists, school knowledge would be constructed and internalized and its meaning and social imports realized.

By eliminating the textbook, or by using it simply as a convenient syllabus and chronological guide to an inquiry into the significance and relationships of the events of the past, with the aid of every good historical work available for reference, the study of history would become a matter of concern to the pupil, and past looked at from several angles, and down a felt perspective of time, would become real. (Dell, 1916, p. 43)

The basic themes that constituted the content of social education at Socialist Sunday Schools represented a testimony and concrete example of socialists' conceptions of school knowledge. Practically, school knowledge in social education as conceived and enacted by socialist educators and teachers in these schools reflected certain belief commitments, pedagogical understandings, and value choices. The socialists were committed to bring about a more just, democratic, and humane society. For them a capitalist society should be transformed through peaceful, educational, and non-educational struggle into a democratic-socialist society for such human aspirations to prevail. School knowledge, they thought, is socially constructed. And they were convinced that such

knowledge was geared at this historical stage toward the capitalist ideology and congenial with the interests of the dominant social classes. Consequently, they (the socialists) thought that a successful strategy to counteract such an ideologically and class-based curriculum is to bring to the fore the issues, themes, and problems that were silenced and/or omitted from school curriculum.

According to Teitelbaum (1987), such belief commitments and pedagogical understandings led socialists to choose 13 curricular themes that seemed timely and urgent for achieving their goal. These included interdependence of individuals, the dignity and contributions of different kind of labor, cooperation and collectivist social and personal relations, internationalism, anti-militarism, revisionist social science, social equality, serious social problems as inherent in capitalist relations, and a critical perspective toward everyday life (see also Popkewitz, 1987).

For the cultural democrats, it appears the principles of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution should not make the erroneous assumption that teachability is gender-, race-, or class-dependent or contingent. Moreover, they emphasized that cultural capital and resources of society, whether commodified or lived, should neither be left to a chaotic process of dissemination and representations nor imposed on different cultural groups. Rather, the capital and resources needed to be democratized through a process of fair and honest representation as well as a logic of scrutiny and confirmation. In short, the principles of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution need to take into

consideration the important conviction that an enduring, constructive, and democratic cultural consensus cannot be achieved through imposing an omnipotent cultural code nor through evading critical cultural questions all together.

All radical strands advocated and welcomed the rise of progressive pedagogy. Child-centered pedagogy and the principles of self-direction, experimentation, and initiation were adopted and brought to bear upon all radical deliberations and practices. However, it appears that both critical pragmatists and cultural democrats were more inclined toward liberal teaching and learning than were socialists. A word about the pedagogical thinking embodied in these strands seems in order.

For the critical pragmatists, a pedagogy or method of teaching needed to be attuned to the growing experience of learners and intrinsically related to the logic of subject matter. According to Dewey (1916), "Method is not antithetical to subject matter. It is the effective direction of subject matter to desired results. It is antithetical to random and ill considered action--ill considered signifying ill adapted" (p. 194).

A pedagogy or method of teaching, despite the importance of studying it scientifically, is far from being a technical or standardized, uniform course of action. Rather, it signifies an intellectual orientation and certain attitude toward learning and/or the educative process. For Dewey, technical knowledge in teaching may furnish a necessary but not sufficient condition for an

enlightened management of the growing and expanding experiences of learners.

When they (technical knowledge and skills) get in the way of his (the teacher's) own common sense, when they come between him and the situation in which he has to act, they are worse than useless. But if he has acquired them as intellectual aids in seizing upon the needs, the resources and difficulties of the unique experiences in which he engages, they are of constructive value. (Dewey, 1916, p. 202)

Dewey specified four features of a good pedagogy or method of teaching.

1. Directness which signifies "rising to the needs of the situation." That is, confidence, devotion, and straightforwardness on the part of the teacher.
2. Open-mindedness which signifies accessibility of mind to any and every consideration that will throw light upon the situation that needs to be cleared up and that will help determine the consequences of acting this or that way. That is, a non-routinized or mechanical and contextually sensitive interest in teaching and learning.
3. Single-mindedness which signifies a complete or near to complete devotion and engagement in teaching and learning. That is, the teacher's concern about educating should override any other concern (like discipline and control).
4. Responsibility which signifies "seeing the situation through" and deliberating its consequences. (pp. 204-210)

Such intellectual orientations, psychological dispositions, and imaginative powers were of particular importance in teaching the social sciences. Making intelligible and sensitive connections between the growing experiences of the young, the corpus of formal knowledge, and the processes of social living requires a substantial degree of artistry and training, Dewey proposed and experimented

with the social occupations, social problems, and nature study as means or vehicles for making such connections. Given these means or vehicles, all the social sciences, and the physical sciences, for that matter, can be brought to bear upon the growing experiences of the young without any resort to external devices to enlist interest and/or motivation.

For socialists, the rising progressive pedagogy carried different socialistic intents and imports. Therefore, they welcomed and adopted such progressive methods as child-centered pedagogy, social occupations, cooperative learning (work, play, and art), peer reward and punishment, principles of experimentation, initiation, and self direction, among others. Yet, according to Tien (1972), they differed with critical pragmatists and progressive educators on two grounds.

1. If rationale social interaction as an educational goal represented a point of agreement between socialists and progressive educators the socialists believed that nurturing and inculcating such social values as the spirit of public service and cooperation is necessary and desirable. Such a position was not highly appreciated by progressive educators because of their commitment to experimentalism and pragmatism. Despite the fact that some socialists saw no contradiction between critical pragmatist logic and Marxist or socialist logic, most socialists believed in the inculcation of pro-social values as an indispensable dimension for progressive education to be truly progressive.
2. If child-centered pedagogy represented a point of agreement between socialists and progressive educators, socialists believed that such a pedagogy should be largely conceived and enacted in such a way as to be socially constructive, pro-social, and fundamentally altruistic. Moreover, despite a kind of skepticism on the part of their

fellows, others entertained the idea that a rigorous literature could be inspiring, enlightening, and liberating. (See also Simons, 1900-1901; Walling, 1913).

On a practical basis, however, the socialist pedagogy as practiced in Socialist Sunday Schools combined teacher-centered and conceptually-based instruction with child-centered and socially-oriented pedagogy in a unique fashion. Most socialist teachers worked out a compromise between liberal learning and indoctrination that preserved their commitments to personal growth and social transformation (Teitelbaum, 1987; Teitelbaum & Reese, 1983).

For cultural democrats, it appears that progressive pedagogy and liberal learning that permit quality education for all cultural groups, preserve their dearest commitments, and bring about a progressive and democratic cultural consensus were much more humane and democratic than a pedagogy of teaching and learning based on ethnocentric and cultural deprivation premises. At any rate, all radical strands highlighted or underscored the indispensable role of the teacher in their curricular deliberation and practices. For all of them, the teacher as a frontier social thinker and progressive pedagogue occupied a controlling and critical position in the orchestration and conduction of the teaching-learning process. A word about the assumptions of each strand with regard to the role of the teacher may be illuminating at this point.

For critical pragmatists, the teacher should be well acquainted with the science and art of pedagogical deliberation and practice, with its intellectual, social, and psychological foundations. For example, Dewey (1902) indicated that the social science teacher

needs to be well acquainted with the logic of subject matter or the structure of social sciences, the problematics and ideals of social living, and the logic of growth and development. This acquaintance is essential for the teacher to orchestrate educative experiences conducive to consciousness raising and social regeneration.

Similarly, sociologists indicated that a solid understanding of social sciences in their entirety and uniqueness as well as an adequate training in the modern science of education are necessary conditions for teachers to fulfill or satisfy the obligations of their roles. Moreover, a continuous collaboration between social science scholars and high school teachers represent an important condition for a fulfillment of role obligations to occur (ASA, 1920). In short, the social science teacher envisioned here was like a progressive intellectual and pedagogical leader.

For socialists the disempowering conditions of teachers' work were deplored. The teachers, especially women teachers, shared a sense of helplessness with their charges, children, or students. According to Dell (1913), being general teachers, low salaried, restricted by peculiar codes of conduct, and bureaucratically controlled by segmented learning programs led to a prevalent sense of alienation and routinization among teachers. Therefore, socialists advocated a vision of the teacher as social thinker and critical and caring pedagogue, that is, a person who portrays deep commitments to social justice and equality in his/her pedagogical thinking and action and displays a voluntary spirit toward his/her charges and the wider community. Such dispositions, given adequate

social knowledge and an ethic of caring, would lead the teacher to devise teaching-learning experiences genuine and authentic enough to stimulate the mind and enrich the spirit of his/her students so as to become active, collaborative, and future agents of social reconstruction.

Practically, teacher in the Socialist Sunday Schools was largely conceived as a socialist pedagogue knowledgeable about socialism and critical social issues, committed to the case of working class students, and blessed with a warm, caring, and loving personality. While many teachers who joined these schools were well trained as teachers, the leaders of the movement did not stipulate a college degree as an absolutely necessary condition to teach in these schools (Teitelbaum & Reese, 1983).

For cultural democrats, it appears that teachers were much more like honest brokers of progressive and democratic culture dialogue and consensus. Fueled with their commitments to truth and justice and tempered by cultural sensitivity and open-mindedness, they would address the critical cultural issues head on and resist the temptation of debunking these issues for a superficial sense of harmony and efficiency.

Thus, it appears that all radical strands sought different strategies to empower the teaching force and restore its centrality to the teaching-learning process and the larger processes of social reconstruction. However, this search and emphasis did not relegate the role of students to mere recipients of the progressive wisdom or prescriptions of actions in their classrooms. Quite the contrary,

different strategies of teachers' empowerment brought with them a new outlook that upgraded the role of students in the teaching-learning process and the larger processes of social reconstruction as well. This outlook definitely converged with progressive pedagogy in such a way to give students more say in shaping their lives and the lives of their communities. A word about each strand's conception of students seems necessary at this stage.

For critical pragmatists, students were shapers of their personal and communal lives. No matter what their future adult roles would be like, they should be encouraged to understand, conceptually and practically, essential meanings and problematics of personal and social living. Moreover, they should, through their voluntary engagement and informed convictions, participate constructively in bringing about a truly liberal-democratic social relations.

For socialists, students should not be blamed for their inability to function in social or adult life, especially in the case of students who start at a disadvantage. Education, particularly social education, should give them a sense of power through strengthening their intellectual and physical mastery over their environment. More importantly, they should grow with a feeling of being important, useful, and constructive organisms of their community and the world. At another level, socialists conceived students as prospective agents of social reconstruction, regardless of their social backgrounds. Consequently, they underscored their need to be sensitized and equipped with the

knowledge, skills, and dispositions that would enable them to become informed actors in the process of social reconstruction.

A substantial portion of learning in Socialist Sunday Schools was delegated to students in order to enhance their sense of power and control over their destinies. Socialist educators were encouraged and motivated to give children and students progressive and meaningful measures of control over their own learning (Teitelbaum & Reese, 1983).

For the culture democrats, it appears that students were largely conceived as innocent and sacred cultural beings. Therefore, they should be protected from the tides and currents of cultural conflicts and manipulation. A moral, progressive, and democratic pedagogy, however, should encourage them to engage in a culturally and socially situated discourse of experience.

Finally, all the radical strands conceived the teaching-learning process as a four dimensional process. That is, it represents the practical interaction among teachers, students, school knowledge, and the social and cultural contexts. Since the former three dimensions were already addressed, the latter dimension, i.e., the social and cultural contexts, will be elucidated in the following paragraphs.

For critical pragmatists, the learning context went beyond the walls of classrooms to different spheres of social occupations and the problematics of social living. These provided a realistic and vital medium of interaction between students and school knowledge or

content, between students and students, and between students and their teachers.

For socialists, social realities and the everyday experiences and aspirations of the working class and marginalized social groups offered different realistic, vital, and authentic resources and points of references for a meaningful and constructive social and intellectual mediation to take place. In these processes of social and intellectual mediation, students, teachers, and other adults, i.e., parents, visitors, and volunteers, can play substantially and equally important roles.

For cultural democrats, the teaching-learning process was, in a sense, an honest and democratic endeavor to structure and practice a common discourse and build common social and cultural bridges or contexts instead of striving in a sea of isolated cultural islands. Given their sincerity and impartiality, the cultural democrats certainly believed that common discourse, cultural bridges and common grounds should progressively emerge without being defined in advance.

Thus, it seems quite clear that radical rationale advocates' commitment to consciousness raising and social reconstruction led them to advance distinct conceptions of education, knowledge, pedagogy, teacher, student, and the teaching-learning process. In their discourse about the practice of these conceptions, all the radical strands transcended the polemic of rigor versus relevance. Yet their sincere concern and interest in social and cultural

reconstruction perhaps made their deliberation and practices more rigorous and relevant.

Invisible Assumptions

Underlying the radical rationale of social education and its visible assumptions were sets of invisible assumptions or premises that made it more distinct from the rigor and relevance rationales. These assumptions or premises represent the psychological, philosophical, and social foundations of the rationale itself. Accordingly, each set of these assumptions will be analyzed in turn to further bring the rationale to light.

At the psychological level, it appears that radical rationale advocates laid the early bases of social, cultural, and psychic foundations of learning. The social constructivist approach to learning was clearly evident in the writings of critical pragmatists, especially Dewey (1916): "Only by engaging in a joint activity, where one person's use of material and tools referred to the use other persons are making of their capacities and appliances, is a direction of disposition attained" (p. 47).

For critical pragmatists, the process of cognitive and psychic growth was a vital and active part of a network of horizontal and vertical social relationships that are purposive and constructive. According to Walling (1913), such an understanding was fully grasped by Dewey.

The child's experience from the first must be with life itself, that is, with productive and social activities, and from the first these activities must be in some degree similar to those of adults, and more and

more so as the child develops, since this is the type of all real experience. The experience is from the first social interaction since no kind of manual training in actual industrial processes can take place without a certain amount of cooperation, division of labor, and real social life. The child falls into definite and complex and natural relations with other children, as well as with the teacher from the beginning of his school life. And without this division of labor there develops emulation and rivalry just because all are doing the same work--and competition is considered undesirable and unnecessary by Dewey and other social thinkers. (Walling, 1913, p. 278)

Hence, the relationship between the teacher and the taught in this perspective seems to be based on moral rather than instrumental grounds. Consequently, teaching methods needed to be more practical, social, and ethical rather than technical, individualistic, and utilitarian. That is, an individual child needed to be conceived as a growing innocent and sacred personality in a social context rather than a mere aggregation of predetermined sets of behaviors, habits, and tricks.

What is needed is not any such reward or punishment, but companionship and the stimulation of the child to independent efforts for their own sake. "In case of either rewards, of however subtle a kind, or punishment, however humane, are used" says Dewey, "the children are getting set in external habits or moralities, and are learning to find their center of intellectual gravity outside their own selves." And it is only a system of education that satisfies, to the full, all the need of activity and possibility of self expression there in the child that will succeed in making such external devices unnecessary. (Walling, 1913, p. 277)

Similarly, the socialists demonstrated an acquaintance with the social constructivist approach to learning. The Vygotskian concept of the zone of proximal development was touched upon, if not fully grasped, by Dell (1919). In his elucidation of the inter-

relationships among the teacher, the taught, the content, and the context, he indicated that the process of learning commences irresistibly whenever there is a desire for learning on the part of the learner and a tempting and interesting situation or problem that begs his/her curiosity. At this point all that is needed, according to Dell, is to put a passionate, patient, and really knowledgeable person about that situation or problem at the "curiosity range" of the learner (pp. 33-34). At this point, the learning process commences at once and proceeds irresistibly.

At another level, the socialists displayed knowledge of the implications of the psycho-analytic theory for teaching and learning. For some of them, a broad, multi-faceted, and interest-centered knowledge and experiences should bring students' consciences to dominate their selfish and destructive urges. And whatever remained of their subconscious tendencies should be counterbalanced. Such personal growth can be further enhanced and situated in historic and social contexts through a study of the psychic lives and the dialectic of the constructive and destructive forces and motives in orchestrating the drama of history and social evolution (Boyd, 1902-03; Walling, 1913).

For cultural democrats, it appears that a moral and liberating cultural psychology was foreshadowed. That is, a psychology of teaching and learning committed, in its scope, methods, and implications, to preserving the dearest commitments and value choices of different social and cultural groups as well as enhancing

their understanding and receptivity to the commitments and value choices of each other.

At the philosophical level, it appears that the radical rationale advocates worked out and/or developed sets of critical and practical propositions that would guide the processes of social and cultural transformation and/or reconstruction. In these theoretical formulations, as previously stated, critical pragmatists and cultural democrats were more optimistic than the socialists about the role of schools in bringing about more just and equitable social relations. A word about each set of these propositions may throw more lights on this point.

For critical pragmatists, power arrangements at the political, economic, social, and intellectual levels shape the choices and shifts in education in general and social education in particular. The problems, issues, and dilemmas encountered in the discourse-practice of social education reflect the parameters and problematics of such arrangements. Dewey (1916), for example, emphasized that the concurrent organization of the school curriculum reflected a detrimental partitioning of experience. Such partitioning was epitomized in the several dualisms that characterized the school curriculum at these historic days. Significant among these dualisms were the labor versus leisure, vocation versus culture, the practical versus the intellectual, association versus individuality. Such partitioning and its accompanied dualisms or opposed pairs had their roots in the division of society into more or less rigidly

marked off classes and groups and amounted to a defacto balance of power among properly bounded and segregated domains and interests.

Yet, critical pragmatists strongly believed that deliberate and critical human choices and actions can deconstruct and reconstruct the social world to fulfill highly cherished human ideals and aspirations. Having emphasized that power arrangements shape human choices did not necessarily mean that all human undertakings, with all the ideas, people, and institutions they embody, are epiphenomena predetermined in advance by these arrangements. Human will, intelligence, and aspirations can exert an influence on or have a leverage over the direction of social living. Dewey emphasized that philosophy as a general theory of education, and education as a deliberately constructed practice of philosophy, can exert a substantial leverage over the direction of social living. Both philosophy and education deal with the right mental and emotional dispositions that would effect social adjustment and/or transformation, given the concomitant social problems, conflicts, and uncertainties.

Hence, if human leverage over the social condition is to result in the right social adjustment and/or transformation, a democratic dialogue among social groups should be institutionalized in order to guarantee a continuous criticisms and consensus building with regard to the burning issues of social living. Dewey (1902) emphasized that there was an urgent need for educational reformation and reconstruction because of the thoroughgoing change in social living. Such reformation and reconstruction, which were, for him,

educational and social by definition, required a redefinition of the ideas and ideals of society through a progressive and democratic dialogue among all social groups. Such a dialogue would focus on scrutinizing and building a consensus with regard to the new ideas and ideals implicit in social change and the old ideas and ideals inherited from the past. The function of philosophy is to define, through such thorough, progressive, and democratic dialogue, what needs to be incorporated and discarded from the new and old ideas and ideals. The function of education is to effectuate these agreed-upon ideas and ideals deliberately in practice as open and optimal provision (also see Cherryholmes, 1988).

Similarly, the socialists thought that the social relations of production tend to structure the policies, functions, content, and methods of schooling. For them, schools, curricula, and social education, as part of the superstructure(s) of the society, generally tend to serve two functions: the reproduction of the dominant social relations and the legitimation of the structure and arrangements of power.

Yet, given the progressive and democratic elements of the schooling system, in comparison with the economic, and the expansionary logic of the political rights, the socialists--and all progressive forces--can capitalize on the educational system to quicken the process of social transformation and to cultivate a socialistic morality and intelligence.

With the rise of the democratic socialist state, however, the full potential of socialistic education will come to fruition. Both

teachers and students will be freed from the crippling demands and pressures of market forces and will be engaged in a collective and humanistic enterprise that breeds social morality and personal development. Tensions between finance versus education, the taxpayer versus the child, special interests versus society will cease to exist or at least the priority will be given to the latter part of the binary distinctions. Finally, parents--all parents--will have a significant role to play in the education of their children (Tien, 1972; Walling, 1913).

For cultural democrats, it appears that the concept of culture was largely conceived as a composite of vital organisms that grow, develop, and change. Hence, neither cultural absolutism nor cultural relativism can lead to a moral, progressive, and democratic social transformation and/or reconstruction. For such transformation and reconstruction to occur, a pedagogy that breeds, cherishes, and respects rationale commitments, cultural receptivity, and a logic of scrutiny and confirmation could preserve the dearest and the sacred in culture and expand or revitalize the most progressive and democratic elements of it (Buhle, 1981; Cremin, 1961; Dell, 1913; DuBois, 1973).

At the socio-political level, all radical strands joined the forces of peaceful and democratic social change and reconstruction. Critical pragmatists called for social change and reconstruction that would institutionalize humane and democratic efficiency in all social spheres. They were ardent opponents to the technical and economic schemes of efficiency advocated by conservative and

dominant social classes. Socialists called upon all progressive forces in society to join the revolutionary class (the working class) in bringing about a democratic socialist state. In doing so, American socialists were not mere shadows of foreign thoughts or political strategies. Rather, they emerged as indigenous revolutionaries responsive to the particularities of the American historical experience. The cultural democrats called for a democratization, not vulgarization, of culture. Through breeding rationale commitments, cultural receptivity, and open-mindedness, they advanced the case of a moral, progressive, and democratic revitalization and/or transformation of culture. Thus, in their socio-political philosophies and programs, all radical strands declared their unequivocal commitments to the values of social justice, social equality, humane and democratic efficiency, and moral and progressive cultural harmony.

The Radical Rationale:
Appealing Rhetoric and Weak Effects:
An Explanation

The radical rationale in social education emerged as a powerful alternative to the rigor and relevance rationales between 1870 and 1920. Yet radicals and the radical rationale failed to influence practice in any substantial degree. With the progression of time, its rhetorical influence on social education discourse became marginal, and its impact on practice became increasingly slim.

Such tragic failure of the radical rationale in shaping the discourse-practice in social education had nothing to do with the

social origin or social location of its advocates. Critical pragmatists, socialists, and cultural democrats all belonged in general to the progressive strata of the middle class. In this respect, they were not very different from the reform-minded social and educational groups. Yet two factors led to more radical philosophies and strategies of social and educational reforms.

1. A critical Christian consciousness was evident in the upbringing of most radical rationale advocates, especially Christian socialists and social gospellers.
2. Their ideological commitments, professional training, and personal experiences and sympathies led them to adopted visions and strategies that departed substantially from the moderate, reform-minded strata of the middle class. (Ross, 1991)

At any rate, the point of social origin or social location can only indicate that radical rationale advocates transcended the narrow preoccupations and interests of their social strata and adopted reform strategies that sought to effect a fundamental change in social consciousness and relations so as to extend the benefits of liberal democratic ideals to the disenfranchised strata that were kept for a long time on the margin because of the markets' gender, race, and class biases.

The ideological commitments and reform strategies adopted by radical rationale advocates brought them to direct confrontation and antagonistic encounters with the institutions of corporate capitalism. At the university level, radicals were subject to continuous reappraisals, scrutiny, disciplinary actions, and even dismissals. Outside the university, they were victimized by the

activities of different vigilante groups and clubs. Such confrontations reached their peak during World War I and later the Russian Revolution. At this time the government's repressive and disciplinary capacities were added to those of trustees, patriotic groups, and commercial clubs in a relentless campaign to "purge" the system of radical elements (Furner, 1975; Ross, 1991; Weinstein, 1967).

In such a climate, any resource exchange between radicals and the corporate center was not feasible or thinkable. At the same time, the radicals' social and political constituencies such as different workers' organizations, women's organizations, and racial and ethnic organizations lacked the adequate resources, both tangible and intangible, that would make the rationale a viable and effective alternative philosophy, policy, and social institution (Silva & Slaughter, 1984). In fact, one of the ironies in the history of the radical rationale was the reluctance of some of its leaders to what they may have considered a premature installment and experimentation with their educational ideas in practice. It is historically established that the Socialist Sunday School movement emerged as a result of relentless efforts on the part of skilled and unskilled labor rather than the socialist leaders. According to Teitelbaum and Reese (1983), the support of socialist leaders eventually came to be a case of too little too late at the end of the second decade of the century.

However, the lack of resources and the hostile or uneasy relations between radicals and the corporate center and the

administrative bodies did not prevent the socialist leaders from reaching out to different intellectual forums, greenhouses, and progressive and reform oriented organizations and/or associations to deliberate and propagate the case of social and educational change. At the theoretical level, different institutions, like the National Organization of Women (NOW), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS) and periodicals such as Freewoman, Crisis, and the International Socialist Review emerged throughout the first two decades of the century as midwives for the birth of the radical rationale. Despite the wealth of discourse offered by these institutions and periodicals, some were short lived while others emerged late as the momentum of social reform subsided. More important, the dynamics of markets and politics obstructed any concerted efforts among these institutions to bring into effect their strategies of social regeneration, reconstruction, and/or transformation. At the practical level, both the Socialist Sunday School movement and Dewey's experimental school emerged as different ways of bringing about the radical rationale into effect. While the fate of the Socialist Sunday Schools paralleled the tragic fate of the Socialist Party by the end of the second decade of the 20th century, Dewey's school continued to carry out his progressive ideas up to the 1940s. However, despite the historic and educational legacies and inspirations of these practical experiments, their impact continued to be weakly felt in mainstreamed educational circles.

As already indicated, such heroic undertakings, whether at the theoretical or practical levels, were further weakened by a logic of professionalization that excluded the radical rationale advocates from participating in different curriculum deliberation committees in social education, especially those that took on national structures. As such the moral impulses embodied in the radical rationale became increasingly subject to a process of "splitting off," i.e., a process of stripping out the "safe" ideas and reform measures and incorporating them into the dominant educational rationale and excluding the "dangerous" ideas, measures, and advocates from the dominant rationale and institutions. Dewey recognized this process in his criticism of the random application of so-called progressive education, an application that ended up legitimizing and institutionalizing personal adjustment and mechanical efficiency, not personal empowerment and social reconstruction as was originally conceived.

At any rate, no matter what the prime cause of the tragic judgment failure of the radicals to bring about social reconstruction through education and social education, the legacy of their courageous and creative deliberations and practices, according to many American historians, persists as a constant reminder that the dominant rationale of education in general and social education in particular is just one way of representing reality. And such a representation, if distorted and biased, can be resisted and opposed, if not changed.

Conclusions

The radical rationale in social education emerged at the turn of the century as a powerful alternative to the rigor and relevance rationales. Despite some early precursors in the 19th century, the rationale began to take full shape and force, at least at the rhetorical level, in the first two decades of the 20th century. Critical pragmatists, socialists, and cultural democrats engineered the rationale as a philosophy, pedagogy, policy, and social institution.

Substantively, all radical strands, despite their different premises and emphases, aimed at achieving a thorough, peaceful, and democratic social and cultural transformation and reconstruction. The radicals were zealous and passionate advocates of the cause of social justice, equality, humane and democratic efficiency, and the moral democratization of culture. For all of them, schooling, curricula, and social education, therefore, were vital and indispensable spheres of social, cultural, and educational transformation and reconstruction. The radicals believed that breeding and nurturing full personal growth, social intelligence and association, and social morality represent the fundamental mission of schooling in general and social education in particular. Moreover, they were convinced that a progressive, democratic, and liberating pedagogy that a progressive, democratic, and liberating pedagogy that cherishes self expression, experimentation, personal and group initiatives, cooperative learning, a social constructivist approach to teaching and learning, and peer and group evaluation

would enhance the progressive and democratic mission of schools, curricula, and social education. And in so doing, the radicals transcended the time-honored polemic of rigor versus relevance; and, in turn, they perhaps became more rigorous and relevant than their counterparts.

Institutionally, the radicals proposed different policy measures in order to translate their social commitments and choices as well as their pedagogical commitments and understandings into concrete educational realities. Most of their policy measures and recommendations aimed at the democratization of access to schools, access to progressive and advanced school knowledge, access to resources and service, and more socially responsible and democratic relationship between schools and the economic and occupational structure. While the radicals were aware and critical of the difficulties that awaited the institutionalization of such policy measures, they were convinced that pedagogy is as powerful as policy in bringing about social and cultural transformation and reconstruction.

Because of these difficulties, the radical rationale, at least as a policy and social institution, perhaps was not destined to succeed or triumph at such an historic juncture. It appears that the "social dynamics and processes" and the "professional dynamics and processes" that enabled the relevance rationale to emerge triumphant at this stage worked to the disadvantage of the radical rationale. Besides its segmented nature, the scarcity of both tangible and intangible resources among its constituencies as well

as the hostile and uneasy relations with the corporate centers and the administrative bodies, especially during World War I and after the Russian Revolution, reduced the likelihood of its successful institutionalization, if they did not make its survival uncertain. As such the professional dynamics and processes of inclusion and exclusion, incorporation and splitting off minimized the influence of the radicals in shaping formal discourse and practice in social education.

However, the radical rationale and its advocates persisted at the level of theory and forged minor but significant experiments at the level of practice. Such heroic and creative endeavors established the historical precedents of progressive and radical deliberation and practice in social education. And such precedents, in turn, became immortal legacies and sources of inspirations for radicals and non-radicals alike in contemporary educational theory and practice.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter encompasses a summary of the line of analysis developed in the last five chapters as well as the main conclusions reached. In addition, a model of curriculum change in social education between 1870 and 1920 is proposed, and some methodological notes are provided.

Alternative Rationales: Commonalities and Differences

The study at hand attempted to flesh out the dialectic of reform in social studies education between 1870 and 1920, the commonly called formative years of social studies education. It aimed at elucidating different rationales of social studies education that competed over the direction, substance, and methods of teaching the subject(s). As it became abundantly and progressively clear over the course of writing this dissertation, three different rationales dominated the discourse, and perhaps the practice, of social education between 1870 and 1920. The rigor, relevance, and radical rationales emerged and were reformulated as full-fledged alternatives of social studies education during these historic years. In addition, different strands of anarchic and

religious rationales of social education emerged and persisted during these years. The contributions of the latter strands are outside the scope of this dissertation, though.

The rigor, relevance, and radical rationales were analyzed as philosophies, pedagogies, policies, and social institutions in order to illuminate their paradigmatic content as well as the dialectical relationship between them and the socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions of the gilded and progressive eras. And in so doing, the analysis focused on the ideological, intended, and formal curricula rather than the written, lived, and received curricula. The major and available curriculum deliberation documents in social studies education articulated by the scientific rigorists and moderate revisionists of the American Historical Association (AHA); the National Education Association (NEA); the social efficiency-minded educators of the NEA; the social scientists of the American Political Science Association (APSA); the new historians of the AHA; the critical pragmatists, the socialists, and the cultural democrats of the American Sociological Society (ASA), the Socialist Intercollegiate Society (SIS), the Progressive Education Association (PEA), and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) represented the primary sources of the analysis developed in this dissertation. Besides, different secondary sources of historical, educational, and curriculum research and scholarship were of significant value to such an analysis as sources of data, ideas, insights, and inspirations.

As the social contradictions, cultural agonies, and political tensions of the Gilded Era took hold over the American collective mind, the needs of social and educational reform became quite apparent. The rigorists and moderate revisionists of the AHA and the NEA were the first to articulate and shape the rigor rationale of social studies education at the secondary school in its modern institutional form. They were moderate reformers who focused on intellectual training, cultural enlightenment, and character building in order to create and maintain the cultural aristocracy. Their basic concerns were more about scholarly canons and cultural traditions than access to schools. In their 1892, 1899, and 1911 curriculum deliberation and policy documents, they made clear and defensible cases of interdisciplinary and liberal teaching and learning of verified and non-controversial knowledge in history, economics, and government. And in so doing, they sought to enhance access for college- or non-college-bound students to the standard canons and honored prejudices of the dominant culture.

The scientific rigorists and moderate revisionists were zealous advocates of an aristocracy of culture, not an aristocracy of wealth or social origin. They did not, therefore, object to enhancing access to schools. What they decried was the systematic watering down of the education of the children of plain people. To them, the relentless urge toward practicality and vocationalization amounted to stripping out such an education of any significant intellectual and/or cultural bearings.

The heyday of the rigor rationale in social studies education occurred at the turn of the century. The social origin, the social position, and the professional status of the scientific rigorists and moderate revisionists brought their rationale and reform program to the center of the discourse, and perhaps the practice, of social education. As representatives of the old gentry and/or their heirs, they were outspoken and influential social, intellectual, and professional leaders. They provided links between the rationale as a philosophy, pedagogy, policy, and social institution and the resource holders in different educational and social institutions. Their concerns about the disintegrating moral core of the society and restoring and expanding its honored cultural ethos brought them closer to the rising corporate economic and political capitalism or at least they did not represent a major threat to its unfolding logic.

With the progression of time, however, the influence of the rigor rationale became increasingly weak. The progressive rationalization of the economy; the specification, specialization, and bureaucratization of most spheres of social life; the professional needs of the rising middle class; and the rationalization of the educational system to meet the complex demands of the new social order as well as the needs of the children of the plain people made the case of cultural aristocracy kind of obsolete. A new rationale of social studies education at the high school emerged at the first two decades of the 20th century as a reformulation and/or contextualization of practicality in social

education. Throughout these two decades, a dialectic of conflict and compromise between intra- and inter-subject communities such as the NEA, the APSA, and the AHA and between them or segments of them and extra-subject communities such as the National Civic Federation (NCF), the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) brought about the new reformulation of the relevance rationale in social education.

The NEA's 1916 curriculum deliberation and policy report epitomized the relevance rationale in social education as a philosophy, pedagogy, policy, and social institution. Through a context-specific (social and organizational) teaching and learning of American and world history and the problems of democracy, the relevance rationale advocates made a clear and defensible or plausible case for the differential socialization of different groups of students in such a way to meet their personal needs and prospective adult roles. And in so doing, they advocated a liberal teaching and learning approach that made the growing and expanding experiences of students the major, if not the sole, criterion of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution. In general, the relevance rationale advocates in social education were moderate liberals and their deliberation and curriculum settlement came from Deweyian rather than Sennednian or Watsonian roots.

Certainly, there were points of agreement and disagreement between the rigorists and the relevance rationale advocates. Both subject segments did not object to enhancing access to secondary schools. Yet, they differed with regard to the purpose and degree

of access to knowledge. The rigorists, while accommodating themselves to the rising trend of curriculum differentiation, persisted on a sufficient and relevant degree of intellectual training and cultural enlightenment, especially geared toward the children of plain people. Such persistence penetrated the relevance rationale through the influence of Robinson and Dewey, with a shift in emphasis from intellectual history to social history. The relevance rationale advocates, on the other hand, forged a rationale that called for commonality at the ideological and formal levels and differentiation at the lived and perhaps the written levels. Thus, while the rigorists wanted to temper the rising trend of practicality and vocationalization with a degree of intellectual training and cultural enlightenment, the relevance rationale advocates wanted to temper that very urge with a degree of humanistic and social vitality.

Both the rigorists and the relevance rationale advocates in social education promoted the case of liberal teaching and learning. To the rigorists, liberal teaching and learning meant the interplay and/or interface of ideas and insights between teachers and students in an intellectually stimulating context. To the relevance rationale advocates, it meant an intellectual attitude that guides choices of substance and methods in the context of the growing personal experience of students. While the progressive methods advanced by the relevance rationale advocates were more related to liberal teaching and learning, the traditional methods promoted by

the rigorists distinguished, perhaps, between indoctrination and intellectual training.

To both subject segments, then, the rationale of social education amounted to the socialization of mind and character to fulfill social, cultural, and personal needs and obligations, with needs and obligations humanistically and meritocratically rather than culturally and aristocratically conceived with the rise of the relevance rationale. While historians of social studies education like Lybarger (1983) and Franklin (1986) emphasized that the rise of the relevance rationale in social education represented a subtle way of social control, especially with regard to the children of plain people, the moderate reform stance of this subject segment cannot be denied.

The rigorists and the relevance rationale advocates called for an interdisciplinary approach to social education at the formal level (a federated curriculum to use Hertzberg's [1981] terms or relatively strong classification to use Bernstein's [1977] terms). Yet, while the rigorists' articulation gave more weight to history in comparison with economics and government, the relevance rationale advocates' approach distinguished between history on the one hand and economics, sociology, and political science or government on the other. On written and actual levels, both the rigorists and the relevance rationales advocates encouraged an interdisciplinary approach to knowledge selection, organization, and distribution. Yet, while in the rigorists' case historical knowledge outweighed economic or political knowledge, in the relevance case the

interdisciplinary approach was more obvious in the case of the problem Of democracy course. Moreover, the two subject segments, as already indicated, differed with regard to the criteria of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution as well as their understanding or definitions of the teaching-learning context(s). In general, while the rigorists focused more on the academic contexts and cultural traditions as criteria of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution the relevance rationale advocates advanced the case of personal and social needs as criteria of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution. And in so doing, while the rigorists made the case for cultural aristocracy, the relevance rationale advocates made the case for a mild version of social efficiency.

At any rate, the rise of the relevance rationale in social education in the second decade of the 20th century laid to rest, at least temporarily, the case of a common rigorous curriculum in social education that seeks to enhance the intellectual training, cultural enlightenment, and character building advocated by the scientific rigorists and the moderate revisionists. Instead of a common curriculum and interdisciplinary knowledge, a humanistically tempered and functionally submerged curriculum differentiation in social education was proposed to meet the different personal needs of different groups of students and the different demands of the social order. As members of the progressive and rising wing of the middle class, the relevance rationale advocates, by the virtue of their professional training, ideological persuasions, and personal

as well as occupational experiences were more attuned to the impulses and opportunities of reform in the progressive era. The intra- and inter-subject dialogue as well as the links with extra-subject communities, associations, institutions, and organizations brought the relevance rationale--ideas as well as people--close to the center of discourse, and perhaps the practice, in social education. As honest brokers between the subject communities and the newly rising social and professional order they forged a plausible and workable curriculum compromise. Moreover, their moderate liberal and progressive stance granted them, despite the differences, the respect of both the rigorists and the radicals alike.

The radical segment of the subject community shaped and/or reshaped its rationale of social studies education during these very years. Despite scattered but significant early precursors, especially on the part of the socialists, to reform and reconstruct their communities, schools, and social education, the radical rationale for such processes of reform and reconstruction took full shape and force, at least at the rhetorical level, during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Whether critical pragmatists, socialists, or cultural democrats, the radical rationale advocates advanced and promoted the case of social justice, social equality, humane and democratic efficiency, and moral progressive cultural harmony through their rationale of social studies education. Despite their different emphases and premises, they advocated a rationale that called for enhancing access to schools, access to

knowledge, access to social services, and the labor or occupational markets. To them, all of them, the hierarchical rationalization of the schools, curricula, and the occupational structures along gender, color, and class lines violated the dearest principles embodied in the liberal democratic ideals and represented gross cases of injustices and inequalities that needed to be dealt with and weeded out. As such, a progressive, democratic, and socially constructed social studies curriculum that attend to the ideals and problematics of social living on the one hand and promoted social equality and individual growth on the other would be conducive to more progressive and democratic schooling and social relations. And finally, a pedagogy committed to the principles of the social constructivist approach to teaching and learning and the principles of experimentation, initiation, and self-direction would be more in tune and congenial with the underlying principles of social equality and individual liberty.

Clearly, there were points of agreement and disagreement between the radicals and the rigorists on one hand and the radicals and the relevance rationale advocates on the other. While the radicals and the rigorists appeared to advocate the case of a common and accessible social studies curriculum for all students, they certainly differed with regard to the intents and content of such a curriculum. To the rigorists, a common and accessible curriculum meant a formal medium of training the intellectual reasoning power of students who make it to the high school through verified, expert, and non-controversial knowledge. To the radicals such a common and

accessible curriculum meant a moral, progressive, and democratically constructed curriculum, including knowledge as well as experiences, that attend to and depict the ideals and problematics of social living and lead to raising the consciousness and inducing informed actions toward social regeneration and reconstruction. Moreover, while the rigorists--with the progression of time--seem to have accommodated themselves and their rationale to the rising trends of practicality and vocationalization, the radicals continued to be ardent critics of the curriculum differentiation movement and its corresponding unhealthy dualisms and binary distinctions between intellectual and manual training, academic and vocational education, leisure and labor, individuality and association. The radicals perhaps deplored such leaning of the rigorists toward these rising trends.

The radicals and the relevance rationale advocates, on the other hand, perhaps demonstrated a common and sincere concern about the parameters of social functioning and the growing and expanding experiences of the rising generations, especially those of the children of the plain people. To both of them, social, cultural, and personal criteria were to regulate the processes of knowledge selection, organization, and distribution. Yet, while the relevance rationale advocates strived, given the rising rationalization of schooling and curriculum, to work out a reasonable compromise between the socio-cultural and the personal in curriculum construction, the radicals continued to deplore these rising trends and promoted the case of a common, progressive, and democratic

curriculum that enhances social equality and individual liberty.

The radicals approach to knowledge selection, organization, and distribution demonstrated their commitments to and understanding of the interdisciplinary approach of curriculum construction. As explicated in Chapter Five, the themes, issues, and concerns emphasized by the radical segment were more derived from the problematics of social living and spread over different disciplines. And such orientation distinguished the radicals from both the rigorists and the relevance segments. In other words, if both the rigorists and the relevance segments' orientations amounted to a relatively strong classification, the radical segment emerged as an advocate of a relatively weak classification.

Finally, pedagogy represented a critical and subtle indicator of the commonalities and differences among the rigorists, the relevance advocates, and the radicals. To the rigorists, authentic traditional pedagogy that focuses on the intellectual interplay of ideas between teachers and students through discussions, lecturing, recitations, intensive study topics and periods, and individual and group readings seemed adequate for fulfilling the goal of training the intellectual reasoning power of students and the formation of their historical mindedness. To the relevance rationale advocates child centered pedagogy, field methods, and experimental methods were to be complementary to the traditional methods in order to fulfill the goal of the differential socialization and training of different groups of students. In a way, it was progressive pedagogy recommended for the creative and artistic use of teachers in their

social, cultural, and organizational contexts. To the radicals, both progressive and traditional pedagogy needed to be wedded to authentic and realistic social problems and experiences on one hand and a critical progressive outlook toward the ideals and problematics of social living in order to bring about consciousness raising and social reconstruction. Definitely, each subject segment was clear about its philosophical, psychological, and social priorities, premises, and value choices. Yet, neither advocated full-fledged indoctrination as a desirable pedagogy to bring about its ideals and intents. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that both the rigorists and the radicals advocated a relatively stronger framing, to use Bernstein's terms, than did the relevance rationale advocates.

At any rate, the radical rationale, as a philosophy, pedagogy, policy, and social institution was the least incorporated in the dialogue among subject communities. By the virtue of their personal upbringing, professional training, and ideological persuasions on one hand and the presence of a critical Christian consciousness in their education, training, and deliberation on the other, the radicals emerged as the most progressive and radical wing of the rising middle class at the turn of the century. The particularities of their social location and position led them to advocate the cases of the rising popular, labor, and women movements and to bring their aspirations to bear upon schooling, curriculum, and social education. At the same time, such social location and position precipitated bitter encounters between the radicals and the

corporate centers of powers as well as uneasy, even hostile, relations between them and different administrative bodies. In such a situation, the prospects of equal or commensurate access to tangible and non-tangible resources, communication, and recruitment became increasingly slim and difficult for them.

However, the radicals reached out to different progressive and democratic societies, organizations, and periodicals and forged minor but significant educational experiments or projects to carry out their vision. Such courageous and creative efforts on the part of the radicals made their rationale a viable option of social studies education. Yet, such viability was contained and marginalized by a splitting off a kind of logic that worked to incorporate its most "congenial" and "safest" ideas and measures and exclude its "uncongenial" and "dangerous" ideas and people from the effective and steering subject communities. Such logic, besides the leaning of the rigorists towards practical relevance, gave way to the relevance rationale of social education to emerge triumphant in the second decade of the twentieth century.

Thus, if the rise of corporate economic and political capitalism in the first two decades of the 20th century resolved, at least temporarily, the fundamental socio-economic contradictions and political tensions on one hand and set the outer limits of resolving the cultural tensions, the social dynamics and processes and the professional dynamics and processes that underlay the dialogue among the subject communities and between them and extra-subject associations, organizations, and institutions worked-given these

conditions for the advantage of the relevance rationale advocates more than the rigorists and the radicals. While the resilience and ingenuity of the relevance rationale advocates broadened their channels of communication with different inter- and extra-subject communities. The reservations and resistance of both the rigorists and the radicals respectively established their rationales as alternative traditions and immortal legacies in the history of the subject to be revitalized as the needs and dialectic of reform necessitate.

Propositions

The analysis offered in this dissertation confirms the following propositions as building blocks in a model of curriculum change in social studies education between 1870 and 1920.

1. The different rationales of social studies education that emerged between 1870 and 1920, i.e., the rigor, relevance, and radical rationales were much more like social, intellectual, and professional movements rather than fixed pedagogical stances or positions. Each rationale elaborated a distinct and dynamic vision and a mission of the subject and its community. And each rationale, as a philosophy, pedagogy, policy, and social institution, strived to influence the direction, substance, and methods of teaching the subject. The rigor, relevance, and radical rationales debated, and perhaps conversed about, the mission and substance as well as premises and emphases they advocated. The outcome of such competing vision, dialogue, and conversation worked for the advantage of the relevance rationale.
2. An explanatory factor of the triumph of the relevance rationale as a subject segment related to its advantageous position and share in the asymmetrical distribution of resources. With the progression of time, the relevance rationale was

moving to the center of discourse and practice in social education. And in this process, the relevance rationale advocates came to replace or inherit the scientific rigorists and the moderate revisionists' access to resources, communication, recruitment, and policy formation circles. While the radical rationale established itself as a subject segment during these historic years, its exclusion from the formulae of resources distribution definitely weakened its direct influence over the direction of the subject.

3. A second explanatory factor of the triumph of the relevance rationale and the marginalization of both the rigor and the radical rationales related to a dynamic change of their structural location and position with regard to intra- and extra-subject communities, institutions, associations and organizations. This dynamic change, while influencing the resources distribution, broadened the professional influence of the relevance rationale in comparison with the rigor and radical rationales.
4. A third explanatory factor of the triumph of the relevance rationale and the marginalization of both the rigor and the radical rationales related to the different opportunities and threats embodied in each rationale, especially as they relate to the broad base of the subject community, i.e., teachers and students as well as administrators, parents, and laypersons. In general, it appears that the maximum opportunities, professional and non-professional, were promised by the relevance segment and the maximum threats accompanied the radical segment. However, both the rigor and radical segments persisted as alternative rationales and continued to express their reservations and resistance.
5. A fifth explanatory factor of the triumph of the relevance rationale and the marginalization of both the rigor and radical rationales related to the general paradigmatic change at the university and the general cultural climate at the turn of the century. By the second decade of the century, a centralist and moderate reform paradigm came about to dominate the discourse and practice of the social sciences (Ross, 1991). While such a centralist and moderate reform paradigm emerged as an outgrowth or reformulation of old positivistic premises that adhere to the assumptions of natural

law and laissez-faire economics in order to meet the policy and legitimation needs of the rising order, the old conservative roots of this paradigm as well as the radical traditions or strands of the social sciences persisted and underwent various degrees of modification that reflected the changing historical conditions and their different premises and advocacies as well. The influence of the centralist and moderate reform paradigm, and to a lesser degree the neo-conservative tradition, outweighed the radical tradition, especially in policy advice and formation (Sliva & Slaughter, 1984). At the same time, the general cultural climate was becoming increasingly less receptive to the notion of radical change, especially with the status needs and opportunities of the middle class threatened by such notion. The reform minded strata of the middle class were progressively experiencing a sense of disillusionment and fatigue with regard to the notion of radical reform. Over time, the highly cherished concept of horizontal mobility was replaced by the less radical or progressive concept of vertical mobility (Bledstein, 1976). Moreover, the war years (1914-1918) made the general cultural climate less favorable, if not hostile, to any notion of radical change whatsoever. Certainly, both the paradigm change and the cultural climate enhanced the prospects of the relevance rationale in comparison with the radical and the rigor rationales.

6. Finally, the relevance rationale counteracted the urges toward the stern version of social efficiency and demonstrated or displayed a substantial degree of resilience, ingenuity, and courage in their urge toward humanizing and tempering the functional rationalization of schools, curricula, and social education. And in so doing, they emerged as moderate liberals, receptive and responsive to reservations and criticism from the other two competing segments.

A Model of Curriculum Change

Given these explanatory propositions and/or factors of curriculum change in social education in its formative years (1870-1920), it is difficult to accept the conventional interpretation of

the subject history. Even the professional dynamics and processes, i.e., the dialectic of conflict and compromise among intra- and inter-subject communities--a dialectic that entails the formation, deformation, transformation, and reformation of these communities--cannot suffice by itself to explain the history of the subject. The rationales that competed over the direction of the subject between 1870 and 1920 were part and parcel of larger social and intellectual movements and far from being immune professional and pedagogical entities. By the same token, it is hard to accept a revisionist interpretation of the history of the subject that overemphasizes the role of the social dynamics and processes, i.e., resources distribution, markets, and politics to the exclusion of the subjectivities and choices, opportunities and threats, initiatives and uncertainties, persistence and courage embodied in each subject segment as a social movement. After all, the professional dynamics and processes and the social dynamics and processes were not mutually exclusive. Rather, they were interdependent in shaping the overall discourse of the subject and its internal differentiation. The subject segments that competed over the direction of social education between 1870 and 1920 embodied ideas and people, philosophies and pedagogies, policies and social institutions. Each segment emerged as a dynamic social and professional response to the historical conditions of the gilded and progressive eras and reflected the historical origins of these traditions and the subjectivities of their bearers.

The line of analysis, explanation, and propositions advanced or confirmed in this dissertation can be further illuminated by comparing Figures 1 and 2 on the following pages. These two figures respectively illustrate an idealistic and a realistic vision of the parameters and multilevel or multi-layered relations embodied in curriculum change.

Despite concomitant problems and possibilities of oversimplification and reductionism, the multi-level, multi-directional, and geometrical relations portrayed by these two figures, taken together, would clarify the following propositions.

1. The outer limits of curriculum change in social education are defined and mediated by the socio-economic, political, cultural, and international constants and variables, statics and dynamics, conflict and consensus.
2. The intermediate level or layer that mediate and shape curriculum change in social education, while not immune of the influences of the socio-economic, political, cultural, and international constants and variables, influences both the ideological, formal, written, and lived curricula. However, such influence is far from being uni-directional or even bi-directional. Rather, it unfolds through a complex dialectic of conflict and compromise among inter- and extra-subject communities, associations, organizations, and institutions.
3. The subjectivities, values, choices, interests, and aspirations of different subject segments and/or traditions influence and shape the rationales as philosophies, pedagogies, policies, and social institutions. Such influence occurs within a context of dialogue among intra- and inter-subject communities mindful of and responsive to the needs of the moment, whether social or cultural, as well as the traditions of their communities. In such complex context, persistence and change count at both the group and individual levels.




Figure 1. Imaginary, symmetrical, moral, and democratic model of curriculum change.

Close and Remote Cultural Contexts




Figure 2. Realistic configuration of curriculum Change in Social Education Between 1870 and 1920.

4. While Figure 1 represents an imaginary, symmetrical, moral, idealistic, and democratic model of curriculum change in which an overall encompassing, balanced, dialogic, and peaceful change can be achieved, Figure 2 illustrates how the outer limits of change, the intermediate and multi-layered processes and dynamics within and without the subject communities, and the rationales themselves shaped the processes and dynamics, social as well as professional, of inclusion and exclusion, articulation and resistance, incorporation and splitting off, streamlining and marginalization in the actual process of curriculum change between 1870 and 1920.

However, the subjectivities, choices, values, interests, and aspirations of the different or all subject communities can not be fully and adequately accounted for in these two figures. Multilevel and multi-layered historical and biographical studies of a representative sample of each subject segment and their personal recollections, choices, experiences, contributions, interests and aspirations in crucial curriculum matters or decisions, whether at the ideological, formal, written, or lived levels, would further illuminate and verify the analysis, explanation, and propositions advanced or confirmed by this dissertation.

Methodological Notes

Since the dialectic of reform in social studies education in its formative years between 1870 and 1920 was the basic focus of this study, the different rationales were of particular interest and importance for fulfilling or meeting its goals. The analysis and explanation developed in this dissertation, therefore, attempted to provide a balanced understanding and coverage of the three major

rationales as ideas and people in a social and professional context. Each rationale was largely conceived as a social and professional movement that represented a distinct and dynamic response to the emerging or changing social conditions and the identities, interests, traditions and aspirations of its advocates.

A complete or near to complete understanding of the dialectic of reform in social studies education presumably requires a careful analysis of the major rationales and their dialectical relationships at the theoretical and practical levels. That is to say, in order to understand fully how these rationales were shaped, formulated, and/or reformulated, it is necessary to go above and beyond a conception of social studies curriculum as mere ideological statements, syllabi, and/or textbooks to incorporate the lived experiences of students and teachers in their classrooms. However, it was difficult to address both dimensions, i.e., the discourse and practice in social education, because of the restrictions of such factors as time, logistics, and energy.

Such shortcoming does not jeopardize the significance of this study though. It is a common curricular wisdom to emphasize that what gets taught in classrooms is largely determined at the ideological and formal levels. That is to say, the recommended curricula, as philosophies, pedagogies, substance(s), policies, and social institutions, always have greater chances to influence practice than any undefined category of knowledge or social experience. Certainly, the recommended curricula may get modified or even undermined in practice. Yet, still their chances to enter

the classrooms are definitely greater. In short, if elucidating the rationales at the theoretical level is necessary but not a sufficient condition for understanding the dialectic of reform in social studies education, elucidating the rationales in practice is necessary but not sufficient for such understanding as well. The two levels of analysis are complimentary indeed.

At any rate, three methodological options were inviting and promising at the outset:

1. to focus on an analysis of the rationales as dynamic and distinct responses and philosophies of social studies education in a historical context.
2. to focus on studying the history of the professional associations that addressed the question of social studies education and the influence of their internal transformation and/or differentiation as well as their external relations with other social organizations and institutions on shaping the rationale of social studies education.
3. to focus on studying the contributions and biographies of representative and significant numbers of historians, social scientists, educators, teachers, intellectuals, and laypersons who contributed significantly to the question of social education in its formative years.

The methodological strategy adopted in this dissertation attempted to satisfy both option one and two and to a lesser degree option three.

To satisfy option one, the major and available curriculum deliberation documents articulated by the AHA, NEA, APSA, and ASA between 1890 and 1920 were classified and analyzed in order to define the rationale explicated and adopted in each document. As such, each rationale, as philosophy, pedagogy, policy, and social

institution, was situated in the larger movements and processes of social reform that were rampant in the gilded and progressive eras. Such situating was achieved through linking each rationale to a social force or constituency that gave it energy and weight.

To satisfy option two, the major professional associations that contributed to the question of social education in its formative years such as the AHA, NEA, APSA, ASS, ISS, and NAACP were studied, relying basically on secondary sources at this level, in order to understand the relations between their visions, formulations, and reformulations and the question of social education.

The dissertation in hand touched upon option three as well. A rudimentary attempt to link the rationales to the specifics of social location, upbringing, education, professional training, ideological persuasions of prominent members of subject segments was ventured. Most members of the subject community came from the strata of the old gentry, the patrician scientists--or their heirs--or the rising middle class. And the specifics of their upbringing, education, professional training, ideological persuasion, therefore, counted. As such, it became clear over the course of writing this dissertation that different members of the subject community went through different degrees of change in terms of their perspective or rationale of teaching the subject. As already mentioned, socially and culturally situated biographical studies of different members of the subject segments can enrich and illuminate our understanding of the complexity of curriculum change.

The analysis developed in this dissertation, given this strategy, was qualitative. A deductive-inductive logic that goes back and forth between the framework outlined in Chapter One and the curriculum deliberation documents as well as the relevant research and scholarship, whether historical, educational or curricular, guided the line of analysis advanced in this dissertation. The questions and/or propositions developed in Chapter One were largely open ended and thus served to guide the analysis without prejudicing it. That is to say, they served as illuminating perspective and analytic tools sensitive to the meanings and distinctiveness of the data. The general understanding of the rationales of social education as philosophies, pedagogies, policies, and social institutions emerged over the course of writing the dissertation.

Such methodological strategy, it appears, can be fruitful in illuminating the dialectic of reform in social studies education in different historical and socio-cultural contexts. For example, elucidating the dialectic of reform in social studies education in the USA between 1920 and 1950 or between 1950 and 1980 can further verify, modify, or change the propositions confirmed in this dissertation. As such, elucidating the dialectic of reform in social studies education in different socio-historical contexts can provide critical tests of the possibility of developing a valid and/or universal curriculum reform proposition or theory of curriculum change.

The specifics, details, and human experiences embodied and unfolded by the dialectic of reform in social education between 1870

and 1920, or any other historical period for that matter, can be illuminated by focusing the analysis on the organizational and interactional levels in schools and classrooms. The possibility of sampling the broader base of the subject segments, i.e., the ideas and practices of teachers and students, administrators and parents, intellectuals and laypersons who spoke to the question of social education and advocated one view or the other as rationale for teaching the subject, looks like a promising vehicle for revealing the minutes and/or specifics of curriculum reform as well as giving fair representations of different subject segments. However, the paucity and/or difficulty embodied in unearthing archives to discover relevant documents, records, or manuscripts may hamper or discourage the most ambitious researcher especially in the early years of subject formation. Yet, as the focus of research progresses toward relatively recent years, both the availability of documents and first eye witnesses would make such undertaking highly promising and rewarding.

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