HOW PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS RESPOND TO
STATES’ ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS
By
Hyemi Lee

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
K-12 Educational Administration - Doctor of Philosophy
2013

ABSTRACT
HOW PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS RESPOND
TO STATES’ ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS
By
Hyemi Lee
Since the 1990s, many states have started implementing standards-based reforms and
developed their own accountability systems. Under the NCLB, each state established academic
content and performance standards, implemented test for all the students in third grade through
eighth grade annually, and set up annual measurable objectives (AMOs) in reading and
mathematics for districts, schools, and designated student subgroups within schools. The
combination of states’ decisions on accountability policies, such as performance standards, high
school graduation exit exams, and the difference of between starting points and intermediate
goals, may lead to the varying strength of the accountability systems in different states.
Although several studies focused on whether these differences are related to student
achievement and teachers’ instruction, little is known about how principals respond to
accountability systems, although principals make a big difference in teachers’ instruction and
students’ academic outcomes. Therefore, it may be necessary to find the relationship between the
strength of the states’ accountability policies and principals’ responses (having influence on
instruction and facilitating teachers’ learning), and the relationship between the strength of states’
accountability systems and teachers’ responses (teacher autonomy and their participation in
professional development programs).

The relationship between the strength of accountability systems (the stats’ proficiency
performance standards, the difference of starting point and intermediate goals (AMO strength) in
states, and the high school graduation exit exams) and principals’ responses were studied using
2-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analysis based on 2007-2008 SASS, and the
relationship between the strength of accountability systems and teachers’ responses were
examined using 3-level hierarchical linear modeling analysis based on the same data set.
The analysis of two level HLM found the negative effects of states’ accountability
systems on principals responses. AMO strength was negatively related to principals’ influence on
instruction, and the high school graduation exit exams negatively affected principals’ support of
professional days before and during the school year. However, other states’ accountability
policies, the proficiency performance standards may not have any relationship with principals’
influence on instruction and their facilitating teacher learning. Principals’ professional
development programs and school climate were related to principals’ responses to states’
accountability systems.
The findings of three level HLM showed that the proficiency performance standards
increase teacher curriculum autonomy and their spending time for content professional
development programs although AMOs strength and high school graduation school exit exams
decreased them. Principals were an essential factor for teacher autonomy and their participation
in professional development. School physical features were effective on teacher curriculum
autonomy and their content professional development programs, while school climate were
critical on teacher instructional autonomy and teachers’ spending time in classroom management.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I really want to express my full gratitude to my advisor and my dissertation committee
chair, Dr. Susan Printy, for her assistance through my doctoral studies at Michigan State
University. During four and half years, she always has trusted in me and provided academic and
personal advices. She also devoted numerous hours to reading my dissertation and to providing
insightful comments in order to improve my dissertation. Without her guidance, I cannot stay and
develop my life at MSU.
I really appreciate my dissertation committee, Dr. BethAnn Smith, Dr. Peter Youngs, and
Dr. Kristy Cooper. They provided invaluable advice and comments. Their kind words are great
encouragement for me. It has been a great honor to have them serve on my dissertation
committee.
I would like to extend thanks my friends. America life as a stranger was sometimes lonely
and difficult, but my friends were a wonderful boost for my long years of American life. They
always provide power that I can overcome the difficult time, and they make me smile. Moreover,
Rose Cooper is another sister in America. Thanks to her, I can have unforgettable memory in my
life.
Finally, my family has been an unfailing source of my understanding and encouragement.
My parents and younger brother have offered steady faith that I would reach my goals. They
have maintained continuing interest in my progress and cheered each success, and they have
given unconditional support to achieve my goals. My successful life may be due to my family
unwavering support. I love you.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... x

CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................1
I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................1
CHAPTER TWO .....................................................................................................9
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................9
1. Accountability in America ...............................................................................9
1) Definition .....................................................................................................9
2) Assumptions...............................................................................................10
3) History .................................................................................................... 11
4) Federal accountability framework .............................................................14
5) Changes of states’ accountability systems .................................................17
2. Indexes of Accountability Systems ................................................................21
1) Indexes of accountability systems in previous studies ..............................21
2) Major factors of states’ accountability strength .........................................29
Proficiency performance standards .....................................................29
Annual measurable objectives strength ...............................................31
High school graduation exit exams .....................................................34
3. Studies of Accountability Effects ..................................................................36
1) The effects of accountability on students ..................................................36
2) The effects of accountability on teachers ..................................................39
4. Principals’ Response to Accountability .........................................................43
1) Having influence on instruction ................................................................43
2) Facilitating teacher learning ......................................................................44
5. Teachers’ Responses in Accountability..........................................................47
1) Teacher autonomy ......................................................................................47
2) Teachers' professional development ..........................................................49
CHAPTER THREE ...............................................................................................52
III. METHODLOGY..............................................................................................52
1. Conceptual Model ..........................................................................................52
2. Research Questions and Hypotheses .............................................................54
3. Data
........................................................................................................56
v

4. Variables ........................................................................................................59
1) The strength of states’ accountability systems ..........................................59
2) Principals’ responses ..................................................................................61
3) Teachers’ responses....................................................................................62
4) Control variables ........................................................................................64
5. Analysis of Principal’s Responses to Accountability Policies ......................67
6. Analysis of Teachers’ Responses to Accountability Policies ........................72
7. Limitations .....................................................................................................81
CHAPTER FOUR ..................................................................................................82
IV. RESULTS .........................................................................................................82
1. Principals’ Responses to States’ Accountability Systems ..............................82
1) The level and characteristics of principals’ responses ...............................82
2) The relationship between the strength of states’ accountability systems
and principals’ responses ...........................................................................85
Principals’ influence on instruction .....................................................85
Support of professional work ..............................................................88
Provision of professional days before or during the school year ........90
Synthesis of principals’ responses .......................................................92
2. Results of Teachers’ Response to States’ Accountability Systems ................94
1) The level and characteristics of teachers’ responses .................................94
2) The relationship between states’ accountability strength and
teacher autonomy .......................................................................................98
Teacher curriculum autonomy .............................................................98
Teacher instructional autonomy.........................................................102
Synthesis of teacher autonomy ..........................................................104
3) The relationship between states’ accountability strength and
teachers’ participation time in professional development .............................106
Content professional development participation time ...........................106
Instruction professional development participation time ...................... 110
Classroom management professional development participation time . 112
Synthesis of teachers’ participation time in professional
development ........................................................................................... 115
CHAPTER FIVE.................................................................................................. 117
V. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION ..........................117
1. Discussion .................................................................................................... 117
1) The weak negative relationship between states’ accountability
policies and principals’ responses .......................................................... 117
2) The directly opposed effects of states’ accountability policies on
vi

teachers’ responses .................................................................................120
3) The limited effects of states’ accountability policies on specific
schools ..................................................................................................122
4) The limited effects of states’ accountability policies on specific
domain of practice ...................................................................................123
5) Principals’ effects on teachers’ responses ................................................125
2. Implications..................................................................................................127
3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................130
APPENDICES .....................................................................................................131
Appendix A Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade
in Reading ...................................................................................133
Appendix B Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade
in Mathematics ............................................................................134
Appendix C Starting Points of 50 States in 2002 ...........................................135
Appendix D Intermediate Goals of 50 States in 2007 ....................................136
Appendix E Number of High School Teachers Among 50 States ..................137
Appendix F Principals Responses by States ...................................................139
Appendix G Teachers’ Responses by States ...................................................140
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................141

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table II-1 Ten Principles for Accountability................................................................................. 15
Table II-2 Types of High School Graduation Exit Exams ............................................................ 19
Table II-3 Existing Indexes of Accountability .............................................................................. 27
Table III-1 The Characteristics of Principal Data Set ................................................................... 57
Table III-2 The Characteristics of Teacher Data Set ..................................................................... 58
Table III-3 The Characteristics of Teacher Data Set ..................................................................... 58
Table III-4 The Strength of States’ Accountability Systems ......................................................... 60
Table III-5 Variables of Principals’ and Teachers’ responses ........................................................ 63
Table III-6 Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 66
Table III-7 Descriptive Statistics for the 2-level Analysis Variables ............................................ 67
Table III-8 Descriptive Statistics for the 3-level Analysis Variables ............................................ 74
Table IV-1 The Level of Characteristics of Principals’ Responses ............................................... 84
Table IV-2 The Influential Factors for Principals’ Influence on Instruction ................................. 86
Table IV-3 The Influential Factors for Principals’ Facilitating Teacher Learning ........................ 91
Table IV-4 The Level of the Characteristics of Teachers’ Responses ........................................... 97
Table IV-5 Influential Factors for Teacher Curriculum Autonomy............................................. 100
Table IV-6 Influential Factors for Teacher Instructional Autonomy ........................................... 103
Table IV-7 Influential Factors for Teacher’s Participation Time in Content Professional
Development Programs ........................................................................................... 108
Table IV-8 Influential Factors for Teacher’s Participation Time in Instruction Professional
Development Programs ............................................................................................. 111
Table IV-9 Influential Factors for Teacher’s Participation Time in Professional Development
Related to Classroom Management .........................................................................114
viii

Table VI-1 Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade in Reading .......... 133
Table VI-2 Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade in Mathematics ... 134
Table VI-3 Starting Points of 50 States in 2002.......................................................................... 135
Table VI-4 Intermediate Goals of 50 States in 2007 ................................................................... 136
Table VI-5 Number of High School Teachers Among 50 States ................................................ 137
Table VI-6 Principals Responses by States ................................................................................. 139
Table VI-7 Teachers’ Responses by States .................................................................................. 140

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure II-1 Florida Annual Measurable Objective for Reading .................................................... 33
Figure II-2 Michigan Annual Measurable Objectives for Reading .............................................. 33
Figure III-1 A Conceptual Model .................................................................................................. 53

x

CHAPTER ONE
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) and Goals 2000 were established in
1994, many states have started implementing standards-based reforms. Goals 2000, the first
policy based on the standards-based approach, offered states federal funding for using
proficiency performance standards (McDonnell, 2005). Under the law, schools that received Title
I funds developed academic standards and prepared assessment systems for measuring students’
academic performance (Finn & Kanstoroom, 2001). Also, under the IASA, many states
established their standards-based reforms. The law stated that schools that received Title I
funding should use the state’s content standards, and students in the schools should acquire the
standards that states established (McDonnell, 2005). Due to the effects of IASA and Goals 2000,
the number of states having accountability systems has increased (Meyer, Orlofsky, Skinner, &
Spicer, 2002; Goertz & Duffy, 2001). Based on these previous educational accountability
policies, President George W. Bush signed The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act into law in
January 2002.
Accountability that has dominated American education since the 1980s, assumes that a
school is responsible for students’ achievement, that teachers do their job to gain rewards and to
avoid sanctions, and that teachers’ efforts can improve students’ academic outcomes. Based on
these assumptions of accountability, NCLB requires each state to establish academic content and
performance standards, to test all the students in grades 3 through 8 annually, to set up annual
measurable objectives (AMOs) in reading and mathematics for districts, schools, and designated
student subgroups within schools, and to offer rewards or sanctions based on whether or not
districts and schools achieve adequate yearly progress (AYP) (Erpenbach, 2011; Taylor, Stecher,
1

O'Day, Naftel, & Le Floch, 2010; Le Floch et al., 2007; Forte & Erpenbach, 2006; Fast &
Erpenbach, 2004; Erpenbach, Forte-Fast, & Potts, 2003).
Under NCLB conditions, the fifty states have produced various accountability systems
based on their educational conditions, such as a proportion of minority students and a state size.
For example, states with a higher proportion of minority students, with the greatest degrees of
poverty, and with large size cities tend to have state-level tests and high school graduation exit
exams (Shuster, 2012; Wei, 2012; Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2006; Amrein & Berliner, 2002;
Carnoy & Loeb, 2002). Also, states with a high family income tend to have difficult math
proficiency standards and states with a large minority population and high family income are
more likely to build up ambitious annual measurable objectives for math (Wei, 2012), so students
in these states should acquire high test-scores to pass the standards. However, other states do not
have these things. The combination of states’ decisions on accountability policies, such as
performance standards, high school graduation exit exams, and the difference of between starting
points and intermediate goals, leads to the varying strength of the accountability systems in
different states.
Because few states implemented high-stakes tests and rigorous sanctions in the early age
of NCLB, states that have these policies were considered by the researchers to be “high stakes”
states (Nichols et al., 2006; M. Clarke et al., 2003; Pedulla et al., 2003; Amrein & Berliner, 2002;
Carnoy & Loeb, 2002). For examples, Texas, North Carolina, and New York were high stakes
states, while Iowa, New Hampshire, and North Dakota were not. However, as time goes, almost
states have executed high stakes tests, and thus high school graduation exit exams and big
differences between their AYP starting points and their intermediate goals can be considered as a
critical indicator of strong accountability systems (Wei, 2012).

2

After accountability systems became widespread throughout America, many researchers
began studying the effects of accountability on students, e.g., whether or not accountability
policies enhance students’ academic accomplishments and reduce achievement gaps. Some
obtained negative findings: the policies decreased reading achievement and did not reduce the
achievement gap (J. Lee & Reeves, 2012; Usher, 2012; Schneider, 2011; J. Lee, 2006) although
others found positive effects of accountability policies (Dee & Jacob, 2011; Reback, Rockoff, &
Schwartz, 2011; Ladd & Lauen, 2010).
In addition, researchers focusing on the effects of accountability on teachers produced not
only positive results but also negative results. Advocates insist that accountability systems
encourage teachers to align standards and instruction with tests (Hamilton, Stecher, Russell,
Marsh, & Miles, 2008; Finnigan & Gross, 2007) and to collaborate with each other (Diamond,
2007). However, opponents found that accountability narrows the curriculum, emphasizes
teaching for tests (Diamond, 2012; Cocke, Buckley, & Scott, 2011; Srikantaiah, 2009), and
increases teachers’ stress and turnover (Hannaway & Hamilton, 2008).
Moreover, because each state has a different accountability system, several studies
focused on whether these differences of states’ accountability systems are related to student
achievement and teachers’ instruction. Some found that accountability strength is significantly
related to high mathematics attainment for fourth grade Hispanic students and eighth grade
African American students (Wei, 2012; Nichols et al., 2006; Carnoy & Loeb, 2002). However,
others did not find any positive effects of strong stakes accountability policies (Amrein &
Berliner, 2002). Several educators discovered that teachers in high-stakes states implement
instruction focusing on tests more so than do those in low-stakes states (M. Clarke et al., 2003;
Pedulla et al., 2003; Swanson & Stevenson, 2002).

3

However, little is known about how principals respond to accountability systems (Rice,
2010; McGhee & Nelson, 2005), although principals can make a big difference in teachers’
instruction and students’ academic outcomes (Louis, Leithwood, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2010;
DeMoss, 2002). The existing studies about principals in the era of accountability have focused
on principals’ desirable responses to accountability (Elmore, 2005) and their perception of
accountability policies (McKay, 2011; Kelley, Kimball, & Conley, 2000). The variable
conditions described above may provide an opportunity to examine how principals respond in
order to meet the goals of accountability policies and to increase students’ academic
achievements.
Little is known about differences in principals’ responses in states with strong policies
versus states with weak policies. As differences of strength in states’ accountability policies
make a difference in students’ performance (Wei, 2012; Carnoy & Loeb, 2002) and in teachers’
instruction (M. Clarke et al., 2003; Pedulla et al., 2003; Swanson & Stevenson, 2002), it is
reasonable to think that the differences of states’ accountability systems may also influence
principals’ responses. When states are more influential in developing standards for curriculum,
student performance, and assessment, schools may be more accountable for student outcomes
(Fuhrman & Elmore, 2004) and may experience huge stress, which can influence how they lead
others (Knobl, 2010; Priolo, 2010). Due to force from states’ accountability policies, principals
in strong states’ accountability systems may focus on methods for increasing students’ academic
performance than those in weak accountability systems.
Existing studies have focused on principals in states with a long history and/or strength of
accountability policies. Principals in these states, including Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Virginia, tend to focus on students’ performance (Hamilton et al., 2007), to emphasize instruction

4

through evaluating teachers (Gonzalez, 2012; Rutledge, Harris, & Ingle, 2010), and to establish a
school environment for supportive of professional capacity (Sanzo, Sherman, & Clayton, 2011;
Arbogast, 2004). A solid research base in states with variable accountability conditions is,
however, non-existent. We do not know whether principals in states moderate or weak
accountability systems respond identically to accountability policies as those counterparts in the
strong accountability states. Therefore, I would like to study the relationship between the states’
accountability systems and principals’ responses.
I will specifically focus on principals’ two responses: having influence on instruction and
facilitating teachers’ learning. In accountability contexts, students’ academic outcomes are
considered as a main indicator of school education success or failure (Foy, 2008). When students’
test scores are not high enough to pass states’ performance standards, schools and principals may
receive sanctions (Mintrop & Sunderman, 2009). To avoid sanctions, principals should make
efforts to increase students’ academic achievements. The representative methods that principals
can take to improve students’ academic outcomes are an emphasis on standards and curricula, an
evaluation of teachers, and an encouragement of teachers’ professional development participation
(Bottoms, 2003).
To acquire high-test scores, principals try to align schools’ standards and curriculum with
the state’s standards or assessments (Hamilton et al., 2007), and they also observe in classrooms
and evaluate teachers’ instruction to check whether or not teachers implement schools’ standards
and curriculum (Gonzalez, 2012; Louis et al., 2010). Because teachers’ instruction that is highly
related to students’ outcomes has been considered as a major issue since the emergence of
accountability policies (Sebastian & Allensworth, 2012), principals may have more influence for
developing teachers’ capacities from professional development (Rutledge et al., 2010; Hill, 2007).

5

Therefore, I would like to address the first research question: what the relationship
between strength of states’ accountability systems and principals’ responses (their influence on
instruction and facilitation of teachers’ learning) is. Because principals can be influenced by each
state accountability system, their responses to accountability policies may not be uniform. I
assume that state’s high proficiency performance standards, AMO strength, and high school
graduation exit exams will be significantly positive correlated with principals’ influence on
instruction and their facilitation of teachers’ learning. Principals in states with high achievement
goals and high school graduation exit exams may have more influence on standards, curriculum,
and instruction, and that they facilitate teachers’ learning than principals in states with weak
accountability systems.
In addition, I address the second research question: what the relationship between
strength of states’ accountability systems and teachers’ responses (teacher autonomy and their
participation in professional development programs) is. I assume that states’ high proficiency
performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be negatively
and significantly correlated with teacher autonomy and that states’ high proficiency performance
standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively and
significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional development programs.
Teachers in states with high proficiency performance standards, big differences between starting
points and annual objectives, and high school graduation exit exams may produce lower level of
teacher autonomy and participate in more professional development programs than teachers in
states with weak accountability systems.
Especially, I assume that different principals’ responses may influence the relationship
between states’ accountability strength and teachers’ responses, such as teacher autonomy and

6

professional development participation time. Principals are likely to implement accountability
policies in their schools, so they may influence teachers in their schools. When principals have
more tight and direct power about curriculum and instruction, teachers may have low control
(Eden, 2001). In addition, as a builder, designer, and supporter of professional development,
principals promote teachers’ participation in professional development programs (Sanzo et al.,
2011; Wahlstrom & York-Barr, 2011).
To respond to these research questions, in the Chapter 2, I first will explain conception,
assumption, and history of accountability. I will also describe the maturation of and changes in
federal and state accountability policies since the implementation of NCLB and examine the
research studying the strength of accountability systems and the studies related to accountability
effects on students and teachers. Finally, I will investigate the strength of accountability systems
using (1) the stats’ proficiency performance standards, (2) AMO strength (the difference of
starting point and intermediate goals in states), and (3) high school graduation exit exams based
on states’ Consolidated Application Accountability Workbook.
In the Chapter 3, I will describe a conceptual map, research questions, data sets, variables,
analysis, and limitations. In the Chapter 4, I will try to respond research questions. First, I will
study the relationship between the strength of accountability systems and principals’ responses:
principals’ influence on instruction and their support of professional development using 2-level
hierarchical linear modeling analysis based on 2007-2008 SASS. Next, I will examine the
relationship between the strength of accountability systems and teachers’ responses: teacher
autonomy and their participation time in professional development using 3-level hierarchical
linear modeling analysis based on the same data set.
My study is intended to expand my understanding of the potential influence of

7

accountability policies. From this study, I can confirm dissimilar states’ accountability systems.
The federal accountability policies do not offer specific regulations. Under the ambiguity, each
state should create and implement its accountability systems, including academic content
standards, proficiency performance standards, measurement methods, assessment systems, and
rewards or sanctions for schools. The combination of these factors can produce different level of
states accountability systems.
In addition, I can comprehend the relationship between states’ accountability systems and
principals’ and teachers’ responses. Existing studies have focused on states with high states’
accountability systems and have studied how principals and teachers respond to these states’
accountability systems. However, as we know the different level of states’ accountability systems,
principals and teachers may differently behave based on their states’ accountability systems.

8

CHAPTER TWO
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will explain literature reviews related to accountability. To understand
accountabilty, the definition, assumptions, and hisotry of accountability are desecribed. Base on
the basic knowledge about accountabilty, this chapter will elucidate how federal government and
states’ implement accountabilty systems. In additon, indexes of accountability systems in
previous studies and the effects of accountability on students and teachers are expounded. Finally,
this chapter can show how principals and teachers repond states’ accountabilty systems in
previous studies.

1. Accountability in America
This part will expound definitions, assumption, and history of accountability.
Additionally, federal accountability framework and states’ accountability systems are going to be
explained.

1) Definition
Even prior to the federal government established the NCLB Act, the concept of
accountability became prevalent. Literally, accountability comes from the verb “account” which
means “to reckon, count, count up or calculate” (Wagner, 1989, p. 7). In the concept of
accountability, there are at least two actors: “those being called into account; and those doing the
calling” (Walberg, 2002, p. 157), and there are two factors: responsibility and entitlement
(Wagner, 1989). One actor has the responsibility for giving an account, and this responsibility

9

comes from the law or people sharing this responsibility (Leithwood & Earl, 2000). The other
actor has entitlement to demand an account. Applying this concept to education, a school has the
responsibility for establishing educational goals, pursuing them, and choosing instructional
methods. Parents may be entitled to ask about their children’s education and school life under the
law, and citizens and taxpayers are entitled to inquire about expenditures of school funds
(Wagner, 1989).
Based on this concept, Rothman (1995) defined educational accountability as "the
process[es] by which school districts and states attempt to ensure that schools and school systems
meet their goals”(p. 189). Educational accountability policies are methods for states or school
districts to check whether or not a school meets the state’s educational goals.

2) Assumptions
Accountability is based on several assumptions (Kozar, 2011; Ladd, 1996). The first is
that the school is a basic unit delivering education and thus teachers and principals should be
held accountable. The second assumption is that schools are responsible for students’
performance. The third assumption is that students’ academic outcomes are measured by tests
and standards created by external organizations created. The final assumption is that the students’
academic results become a standard to reward successful schools or to punish unsuccessful
schools. In addition, accountability assumes that to gain rewards and to avoid sanctions, school
staffs will do a better job of improving students’ academic achievements (Finnigan & Gross,
2007; Spillane, Diamond, Burch, & Hallett, 2002). In fact, we assume both that accountability
policies are effective means to influence schools and that schools have the capacities to locate,
select, and implement effective improvement programs and policies for achieving accountability

10

(Gross & Goertz, 2005).

3) History
Accountability reforms are not new in the education field: the concept of accountability
has continued since 1950s. Linn (2000) mentioned five waves of reforms from 1950s to 1990s in
the America. They are:
1950s: Tracking and selection
1960s: Program accountability
1970s: Minimum competency testing
1980s: School and district accountability based on standardized tests
1990s: Standards based accountability systems.
The emphasis on accountability started from the late 1950s. When the Soviet Union
succeeded the Sputnik Launch, it was believed that America education “was too sluggish to
respond promptly to the new demands or to make good use of science and technology for the
engineering of change” (Chase, 1971, p. 182). Public education became accountable for nation
priority. As accountability models in education, tests were considered as important tools for
selecting students for higher education (Linn, 2000).
Through the Coleman (1966)’ report, the Equality of Educational Opportunity, more
commonly known as the “Coleman Report,” educators found that students have different
educational opportunities and resources based on their race and social economic status. To
reduce these differences, the federal government initiated the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) in 1969 (Linn, 2000). Under the Title I of the ESEA, the federal
government spent federal funding on educational programs that are expected to improve students’
academic outcomes and the government wanted to evaluate effectiveness of these programs
11

using measured outcomes (Shepard, 2008). The focus of educational evaluation shifted from
inputs or resources to outputs or results by title I (Ravitch, 2002).
In the 1970s, minimum competency testing reforms were widespread. In 1969, the
Education Commission of the States created the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) to "examine achievement in ten learning areas, to spot changes in the level of
achievement over the years and to apply the implication of those changes to national educational
policy" (Wise, 1979, p. 9). With the NAEP, the number of states implementing minimum
competency testing increased from 2 to 34 during ten years (Linn, 2000). Especially, states used
this testing as requirement of high school graduation because this testing can check students’
basic skills and evaluate public schools (Resnick, 1980).
Although accountability remained a significant topic in the 1970s, the introduction of the
A Nation at Risk report in 1983 by the National Commission on Excellence in Education
encouraged national awareness about accountability. The report considered public education as a
main reason of the ineffective nation (Education, 1983). Since the release of A Nation at Risk
report, states and the government implemented standardized test (Linn, 2000) and had more
influence on school reform and more enhanced educational standards (D. L. Stevenson &
Schiller, 1999; Fuhrman, Clune, & Elmore, 1988). In the 1980s, 275 state-level educational
reforms were established (Wirt & Kirst, 1989, pp. 3-4). This trend continued throughout the
1990s.
In the 1990s, the federal government has encouraged states to establish and develop
content and performance standards under the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 (IASA)
and Goals 2000. Under the IASA and Goals 2000, states establish challenging standards,
implement assessment systems for measuring students’ academic performance, and hold schools

12

accountable for all students’ achievement (McDonnell, 2005; Finn & Kanstoroom, 2001; Goertz,
2001). Due to the effects of IASA and Goals 2000, the number of states having accountability
systems increased (Meyer et al., 2002; Goertz & Duffy, 2001), but the states did not yet have
completed state level accountability systems.
In 2002 the U.S. Congress passed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), reauthorization
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Under the NCLB, each state should establish
and develop mandatory national accountability systems that held schools and districts
responsible for student achievement (Taylor et al., 2010; Le Floch et al., 2007). NCLB requires
schools received federal Title I funding to meet their state’s performance standards or to receive
sanctions (Erpenbach et al., 2003). However, from 2011, the federal government has offered
states the opportunity to waive several requirements of NCLB. As of March 2013, 48 states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Bureau of Indian Education have received waive
application permit.
One current accountability policy is Race to the Top (RTT) announced by President
Barack Obama in 2009. RTT was designed to produce effective school reforms by relying on
incentives, not sanctions, so states that have demonstrated students’ academic development and
have rigorous reforms receive federal educational funds (McGuinn, 2012; G. A. Scott, 2011).
RTT requires several criteria that states should establish to apply for RTT funds and these
requirements led to school reform in state-level (M. McNeil, 2011). Under the RTT, forty-eight
states have signed on to the Common Core State Standards Initiatives (Finn, 2012; Ravitch,
2010).
To sum up, for seven decades federal government has established various educational
accountability policies, and these policies have moved from input accountability focusing on

13

regulations to outputs accountability focusing on students’ test scores and graduation rates
(Goertz, 2001; Fuhrman, 1999; Elmore, Ableman, & Fuhrman, 1996). With a tendency of federal
accountability policies, states’ educational accountability systems have also emphasized
educational outcomes (Crowe, 2011) and have narrowed educational attention that federal
government advocated (McGuinn, 2012).

4) Federal accountability framework
The most recent federal accountability in education is NCLB. In this part, I will explain
major features of NCLB. The NCLB Act requires each state to design and implement its
accountability systems based on ten criteria that are known as “the ten principles for
accountability”. States describe academic standards, assessment systems, AYP (Adequate Yearly
Progress), and rewards and sanctions in a Consolidated Application Accountability Workbook1.
Ten principles for accountability are explained in Table II-1.
First, NCLB requests that states set up challenging academic content and performance
standards (NCLB, 2001 sec. 1111 (b) (1)). Content standards explain what students in elementary
and secondary school must know and be able to do, contain coherent and rigorous content, and
encourage the teaching of advanced skills. These standards are applied to all schools and children
in the state. States should establish content standards at least in mathematics, reading or language
arts, and science (beginning in the 2005–2006 school year).

1

All the state's accountability workbooks are listed on the Department of Education
website (http://www.ed.govIadmins/leadlaccount/stateplans03/index.html).
14

Table II-1 Ten Principles for Accountability
i.
ii.
iii.

iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

viii.
ix.
x.

A single statewide Accountability System is applied to all public schools and LEAs
(local educational agencies—commonly referred to as “school districts”);
All students are included in the State Accountability System;
State definition of AYP (adequate yearly progress) is based on expectations for
growth in student achievement that is continuous and substantial, such that all
students are proficient in reading or language arts and mathematics no later than
2013–2014;
State makes annual decisions about the achievement of all public schools and LEAs;
All public schools and LEAs are held accountable for the achievement of individual
student groups;
State definition of AYP is based primarily on the state’s academic assessments;
State definition of AYP includes graduation rates for public high schools and an
additional indicator selected by the state for public middle and public elementary
schools (such as attendance rates);
AYP is based on reading or language arts and mathematics achievement objectives;
State Accountability System is statistically valid and reliable; and
In order for a public school or LEA to make AYP, the state ensures that it assessed at
least 95 percent of the students enrolled in each student group.

NCLB also describes performance standards, which determine how well children are
mastering the material in the states’ academic content standards. Based on the degree to which
students understand and master content standards, performance standards are classified into three
levels: basic, advanced, and proficient. When students master the academic materials, the
students are placed in the proficient level. However, basic level is the third level of achievement
in providing complete information about the progress of the lower-achieving children toward
mastering the proficient and advanced levels of achievement.
In addition, NCLB asks that the implementing state’s academic assessments review the
annual progress of each school (NCLB, 2001 sec. 1111 (b) (3)). During the 2002-2003 school
year, NCLB required reading and mathematics tests for students in three grade spans (3-5, 6-9,
10). The 2005-2006 school year increased reading and mathematics tests for all students in
grades 3-8 and one grade in grade 10-12. From the 2007-2008 school years, students were
required to take science tests. The assessment has to be aligned with the state’s challenging
15

academic content and performance standards and has to provide coherent, valid, and reliable
information about student attainment of such standards. The students’ achievement is
disaggregated by ethnicity, gender, English proficiency, disability status, migrant status, and
economic status.
Moreover, NCLB includes other academic performance indicators (NCLB, 2001 sec.
1111 (b) (2)). For example, student attendance, retention rate, state or district level assessments,
and percentage of students completing special programs (advanced placement courses, gifted
programs, or college preparatory courses) can be indicators (Mills, 2008). In secondary schools,
the graduation rate is an indispensable indicator.
Based on these test scores and indicators, states “identify for school’s improvement”
whether the school makes AYP as defined in the State’s plan (NCLB, 2001 sec. 111 (b) (2) (C)).
To evaluate AYP, each state establishes a starting point based on the 2001- 2002 school year and
a timeline for all students in each group to meet and exceed the proficient level of academic
achievement by the 2013- 2014 school year. Also, states build annual measurable objectives
(AMOs) and intermediate goals of assessment and other indicators in order to meet 100%
proficiency by the 2013 - 2014 school year. In analyzing AMOs, no less than 95% of the students
enrolled in a school must participate in the assessment programs, because when the number of
students who participate in the assessment is too small, the reliability and validity of the AMOs
may be damaged.
Also, NCLB explains the rewards and sanctions when schools and districts pass or fail
AYP standards (NCLB, 2001 sec. 1116 (b)). When schools approach the standards of AYP or are
highly ranked in its accountability systems, they gain a title of “distinguished schools” or “Honor
School of Excellence”. However, if schools that received Title1 funding fail to reach AYP

16

standards for two consecutive years, the schools are placed in “program improvement” status. In
the first year of having program improvement status, failed schools can receive supplemental
educational services and technical assistance. Simultaneously, they provide notice of their AYP
failure to parents, and they offer opportunities for students to transfer to another public school.
When schools in the improvement status category do not show any development, the schools’
staff is replaced and the schools may be reorganized or closed.
In summary, the federal government does not provide specific regulations and encourages
states to create and implement their accountability systems involving these components:
academic content and performance standards, measurement and assessment systems, and rewards
or sanctions for schools.

5) Changes of states’ accountability systems
Although 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico received approval for their
first accountability plans in June 2003, they have modified and developed their plans annually.
Individual states have negotiated their educational accountability systems with the federal
government in order to gain flexibility in implementing the systems (Mills, 2008) and to
temporarily reduce the number of schools labeled as failing (Sunderman, 2006). In every year
from 2003 to 2011, most states wanted to modify their accountability systems. 47 states in 20032004 school years, 20 states in 2004-2005 school year, 48 states in 2005-2006 school year, 49
states in 2008-2009, 36 states in 2009-2010, and 31 States in 2010-2011 requested modification
of their accountability systems (Erpenbach, 2011; Taylor et al., 2010; Le Floch et al., 2007; Forte
& Erpenbach, 2006; Fast & Erpenbach, 2004; Erpenbach et al., 2003).
One of the changes was shown in content standards. In the early stage of NCLB, there

17

were some variations in the content standards of what students in elementary and secondary must
know (Finn & Kanstoroom, 2001). However, after the Kindergarten-12 Common Core State
Standards in English and mathematics was created by the National Governors Association Center
for Best Practices and the Council of Chief State School Officers in 2010, as of July 2012, fortyfive states and three territories have accepted these standards. Fifty states have similar levels of
content standards.
Second, performance standards also have changed. According to the studies the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES), states’ performance standards for fourth and eighth
grade reading were arranged from below the NAEP basic level to below the NAEP proficient
level from 2003 to 2009 and standards for fourth and eighth grade mathematics have placed in
little higher position than those for reading since 2003 (see Appendix A and Appendix B)
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2011; Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, & McLaughlin,
2009; National Center for Education Statistics, 2007).
Since 2003 Massachusetts has continued high standards in fourth and eighth grade
reading and Mathematics since 2003 although Tennessee and Georgia have continuously had low
standards. Also, some states have increased their performance standards, but other states have
decreased. For example, Indiana, North Carolina, and Oklahoma increased fourth and eighth
grade reading and mathematics performance standards; however, Maine, South Carolina, and
Wyoming’s reading and mathematics performance standards decreased (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2011; Bandeira de Mello et al., 2009; National Center for Education
Statistics, 2007; Peterson & Hess, 2005).
Third, there were changes in assessment fields. States have created new assessments or
modified existing assessments for reading and mathematics since 2005 and for science since

18

2007. The number of states also increased, so in 2006-2007, thirty five states used attendance
rate as other academic indicators in elementary and middle schools (Taylor et al., 2010). In
addition, the number of states that implemented high school graduation exit exams has increased
as shown Table II-2 below. Although nineteen states implemented graduation tests in 2002, 26
states used high school graduation exit exams in 2012 (McIntosh, 2012; Chudowsky, Kober,
Gayler, & Hamilton, 2002). Especially, the number of states that implement end-of-course exams
as graduation tests has increased (Zabala, Minnici, McMurrer, & Briggs, 2008).

Table II-2 Types of High School Graduation Exit Exams
Year

2002

2008

2012

High school graduation exit exams
No mandatory exit exam
End-ofComprehensive exams
course exams
2
AL, FL, GA, IN, LA, MD,
AK, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC,
NY, TX
MN, MS, NV, NC, NJ, NM,
HI, ID, IL, IA, KS, KY, MA, ME, MI,
OH, SC, TN, TX, VA
MO, MT, NE, NH, ND, OK, OR, PA,
RI, SD, UT, VT, WA, WV, WI, WY
AK, AL, AZ, CA, FL, GA,
MS, NY, TN, AR, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, IA, KS,
ID, IN, LA, MA, MN, NC,
VA
KY, MD, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, NH,
NJ, NM, NV, OH, SC, TX,
ND, OK, OR, PA, RI, SD, UT, VT,
WA
WV, WI, WY
AL, AR, AZ, CA, FL, GA,
AK, IN, LA, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, IA, KS, KY,
ID, MA, MN, NJ, NV, NM, MD, MS,
ME, MI, MO, MT, NC, NE, NH, ND,
OH, OR, RI, SC, TX, WA
NY, OK, VA PA, SD, TN, UT, VT, WV, WI, WY

Even though development of states’ accountability systems, NCLB faces difficulties
reaching its goals. For example, it may be an unachievable goal for all students in each group to
meet and exceed the proficient level of academic achievement by the 2013- 2014 school year
(Shelly, 2012). In 2011, to help alleviate this unattainable, the federal Department of Education
received waive applications for changing their own accountability systems. States can receive
2

Texas implemented the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) test and endof-course exams (Chudowsky et al., 2002).
19

flexibility several aspects, such as reconfiguration of performance proficiency standards,
assessment of students’ academic outcomes, and identification of low-performing schools (K. S.
Berry & Herrington, 2011). In addition, states should implement four requirements to obtain
flexibility: “adopting college- and career-ready standards; creating state-defined accountability
systems that reward success and promote improvement; strengthening teacher and principal
practice through evaluation systems, and reducing duplication and administrative burden placed
on districts and schools (Ayers, 2011, p. 6)”.
As of March 2013, 48 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Bureau of
Indian Education have submitted requests for flexibility3. Of those waiver requests, 35 have been
approved and fourteen4 waivers are still under review. However the California’s request was
rejected, and just two states, Montana and Nebraska, have not submitted applications.

3

All information are taken from the website (http://www.ed.gov/esea/flexibility/requ

ests).
4

Alabama, Alaska, the Bureau of Indian Education, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, N
ew Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, an
d Wyoming.
20

2. Indexes of Accountability Systems
This part will introduce indexes of accountability systems that previous studies
implemented and three major factors for accountability strength: the proficiency performance
standards, the annual measurable objectives (AMOs) strength, and high school graduation exit
exams.

1) Indexes of accountability systems in previous studies
According to my analysis of federal and individual states’ educational accountability
policies, each state has different accountability systems (McDermott, 2003). The NCLB law does
not mention specific accountability systems; so each state, in different ways, interprets, designs,
implements, and develops its own accountability policies (Heinecke, Curry-Corcoran, & Moon,
2003). Academic content standards, performance standards, assessment systems, AYP, and
AMOs vary substantially among states. Also, the states use different “rewards, sanctions,
selection criteria for low-performing schools, exit criteria for probation, school governance
requirements, planning mandates, monitoring systems, and supports for building capacity at
schools” (Mintrop, 2003, p. 3).
These differences in accountability policies among the 50 states create different
accountability strength. The Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) insists that strong
state accountability systems have six essential elements (Reed, Scull, Slicker, & Winkler, 2012).
•

Adoption of demanding, clear, and specific standards in all core content areas, and
rigorous assessment of those standards;

21

•

Reporting of accessible and actionable data to all stakeholders, including
summative outcome data and other formative data to drive continuous
improvement;

•

Annual determinations and designations for each school and district that
meaningfully differentiate their performance;

•

A system of rewards and consequences to drive improvement at the school and
district levels;

•

A system of rewards and consequences to drive improvement at the individual
student level; and

•

A system of rewards and consequences to drive improvement at the individual
teacher and administrator level.

Only a few educators have made efforts to examine the differences of the accountability
systems and the effectiveness of the differences. Amrein and Berliner (2002) examined nine
educational policies (high school graduation exams, high-stakes attached to tests, schools closed,
principals replaced, grade-to-grade promotion, school choice, awards for schools, teachers, and
students) of 27 states and calculated the number of policies that states implement. For example,
Delaware, North Carolina, and Texas implemented six accountability policies, but Georgia,
Minnesota, and Missouri executed only one policy. States that have high scores tend to have high
school graduation exams and high-stakes tests. Researchers did not find consistent results that
high-stakes tests and high school graduation exams increase students’ performance.
Carnoy and Loeb (2002) created an index of accountability from 0 to 5, named the
“strength” of the accountability system, using a database developed by the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education (CPRE) which offers information on state testing and accountability

22

policies as of 1999-2000. “States receiving a zero do not test students statewide or do not set any
statewide standards for schools or districts. … States receiving a 5 test students in primary and
middle grades, strongly sanction and reward schools or districts based on improvement in student
test scores, and require a high school minimum competency exit test for graduation” (p. 311).
For example, because Iowa and Nebraska did not have any state level accountability policies,
their accountability strength was 0. However, Florida, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Texas
implemented strong accountability policies, including high school exit exams, so they got 5.
They found that accountability strength is significantly related to the mathematics
accomplishment among eighth graders, especially for African American and Hispanic students,
but are unrelated to students’ grade-to-grade progression rates. However, Carnoy and Loeb did
not explain how they distinguished a 5 score from a 4 score.
Swanson and Stevenson (2002) examined the twenty-two states’ activities5related to
standards-based assessment and accountability from studies conducted by the Council of Chief
State School Officers and quantified the states’ activities, named an index of “policy activism”,
using a Rasch measurement model. If states had performance standards in all academic subjects
and statewide students’ performance assessments as of 1996, they gained high scores and are
considered as high reform states. Maryland and Kentucky were the most active states in 50 states
although Nebraska, Iowa, and Wyoming had low of standards activities. In the study of Swanson

5

The twenty-two state policy activities were classified into four types: (1) content
standards, (2) performance standards, (3) aligned assessments, and (4) professional standards.
The activities are: (1) Math Document; (2) Science Document; (3) Math Standards; (4)
Science Standards; (5) Language Arts Standards; (6) History Standards; (7) Math
Innovativeness; (8) Science Innovativeness; (9) Recertification; (10) Licensure by Standards;
(11) Certification Tests; (12) Major in Field; (13) Math Document; (14) Math Performance
Levels; (15) Science Document; (16) Science Performance Levels; (17) Math Innovativeness;
(18) Science Innovativeness; (19) Math Assessment; (20) Science Assessment; (21)
Innovative Items; and (22) Innovative Tests.
23

and Stevenson, a state’s policy activism does not influence standards-based instructional
practices, such as emphasizing topic and skills, implementing pedagogical techniques, and
employing classroom assessments. However, this study did not consider school-level variables as
influential factors that reflected schools’ organizational features.
Clarke, Pedulla, and colleagues created the Boston rating by using a three by three matrix
of accountability: one dimension is the severity of accountability policies related to students, and
the other dimension is the severity of accountability policies related to teachers, schools, and
districts (M. Clarke et al., 2003; Pedulla et al., 2003). When states have regulated or legislated
sanctions or decisions based on the states’ test scores, the states are considered high stakes states.
If states have promotion/retention or graduation policies, they are considered as high stakes
states for students, and if states have accreditation, funds, or receivership, they are also
considered as high stakes states for teachers, schools, and districts. Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
and sixteen states implemented strong accountability policies not only for students, such as
promotion/retention or graduation policies but also for teachers, such as accreditation or funds.
However, Iowa had low policies for both and Idaho had low accountability policies for teachers
and high accountability policies for students (Pedulla et al., 2003). Teachers in high-stakes states,
compared to those in lower-stakes states, tend to feel more pressure, to use curriculum for
aligning with the policies, to spend more time on instruction in testing areas, and to focus or test
preparation.
Lee and Wong (2004) calculated the number of policies that states use based on three data
set6 and created a composite factor of state activism in accountability policy during the 1990s.

6

Three data sets are (1) 1995-1996 data from the North Central Regional Education
Laboratory (NCREL) and the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO); (2) 1999
data from the Quality Counts (QC) report; and (3) 1999-2000 data from the Consortium for
24

Based on state activism, states were classified 50 states into three categories: states with strong
accountability systems (12 states in the top quartile), those with moderate systems (25 states in
the middle half), and those with weak systems (13 states in the bottom quartile). North Carolina,
and Texas were states with strong accountability policies but Arkansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming
were states with weak accountability systems. States with strong accountability systems tend to
have assessment, report cards, performance rating of schools, rewards for successful schools, and
reconstitution or major alteration of failing schools. However, many weak accountability states
do not have direct incentives to schools in the form of performance ratings, rewards, assistance,
and sanctions although they implement report cards for schools. Differences of accountability
policies among states were not significantly related to the increase of mathematics and the
reduction of racial and socioeconomic achievement gaps.
Nichols and his colleagues (2006) created ‘the accountability pressure rating (APR)’
based on an introduction essay, a reward/sanction sheet, and newspaper stories. When states feel
high-stakes testing pressure, they gain high scores in APR. Texas had high-stakes testing pressure
comparing to Wyoming. APR influences math NAEP performance only for certain subgroups,
such as fourth-grade Hispanic and eighth-grade African American students, but it also increases
the drop rate.
Finally, Wei (2008) generated the AMOs strength measured by the difference between
starting points in 2003 and the intermediate goals in 2005. A larger difference means that it is
more difficult for states to attain the goal, and that the states have stronger accountability systems.
North Carolina and Missouri had high AMOs strength but Minnesota and New Mexico had low
AMOs strength. States with strong AMOs strength tend to have a higher mathematics
Policy Research in Education (CPRE) report (J. Lee & Wong, 2004, p. 803).

25

achievement for fourth grade Hispanic students and eighth grade White students, but lower
reading achievement for all eighth students and fourth grade white students.
Seven existing indexes of accountability are summarized by state in Table II-3. Most
studies considered Maryland, Florida, and Texas as states with strong accountability systems but
Iowa and Wyoming as start with weak accountability systems. However, there are differences
between existing indexes. For example, Delaware and Michigan were considered as states with
strong accountability systems in studies of Amrein and Clarke, but other studies did not.
Although six indexes exist, it is necessary to create and use a new accountability index
for identifying states’ accountability systems and understanding the effects of accountability on
principals and teachers. In the early age of NCLB, few states implemented statewide tests and
sanctions, so scholars consider the high-stakes tests and sanctions as indicators of strong
accountability systems (Nichols et al., 2006; M. Clarke et al., 2003; Pedulla et al., 2003; Amrein
& Berliner, 2002; Carnoy & Loeb, 2002). However, in 2012 most states have tests and sanctions.
Therefore, statewide and sanctions cannot be longer suffice an indicator of high stakes states.

26

Table II-3 Existing Indexes of Accountability
Amrein&
State Berliner
(2002)

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN

4
5
5
6
5
1
4
4
5
5
3
5
1

Carnoy&
Loeb
(2002)
Strength of
accountability
systems
4
1
2
1
4
1
1
1
5
2
1
1
2.5
3
0
1
4
3
1
4
2
1
2

Swanson &
Stevenson
(2002)
Index of policy
activism
2.195
-0.949
-0.395
-0.268
0.090
0.662
1.291
0.206
-0.268
0.662
0.320
-0.268
0.320
0.899
-1.606
0.320
1.969
-0.026
1.291
2.459
0.320
0.434
-0.395

Lee &
Nichols
Wong
et al
Wei (2008)
(2004)
(2006)
The
Boston Rating State activism in
AMOs strength
accountability accountability
Student Teacher
policy
pressure rating G4M G4R G8M
H
H
Strong
3.06
6.00 5.00 6.00
M
H
Weak
2.00
7.52 6.00 7.52
H
M
Moderate
3.36
13.3 11.30 5.50
H
M
Weak
11.96 11.36 14.12
H
H
Moderate
2.56
10.5 10.80 10.50
L
H
Weak
5.13 5.64 9.83
M
H
Moderate
1.60
9.00 11.00 9.00
H
H
Weak
8.00 5.00 8.00
Moderate
10.27 11.62 13.37
H
H
Strong
15.00 17.00 15.00
H
H
Moderate
3.44
8.30 6.70 8.30
L
M
Moderate
1.76
18.00 14.00 18.00
H
H
Weak
9.00 6.00 9.00
M
H
Strong
7.82 6.64 7.82
H
H
Strong
7.20 6.90 7.20
L
L
Weak
4.30 5.00 2.00
L
H
Moderate
13.30 12.20 13.30
L
H
Strong
0.54
7.73 5.25 8.35
H
H
Strong
3.72
11.7 10.50 11.70
L
M
Weak
1.78
9.00 7.00 9.00
H
H
Strong
2.82
12.20 14.00 16.80
H
H
Weak
3.18
7.90 4.90 7.90
M
H
Moderate
9.00 10.00 12.00
H
M
Moderate
3.50 3.00 3.50
Clarke et al
(2003)

27

G8R
8.00
6.00
11.50
13.66
10.80
6.35
11.00
5.00
14.38
17.00
6.70
14.00
6.00
6.64
6.90
5.70
12.20
5.44
10.50
7.00
13.70
4.90
12.00
3.00

Table II-3 (cont'd)
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

2
1
4
3
5
4
6
5
2
3
5
4
6
2
3
-

3
1.5
1
0
1.5
1
5
4
5
5
1
3
1
2.5
1
1
3
1
1.5
5
1
1
2
1
3.5
2
1

0.547
1.023
-1.261
-1.606
0.320
1.153
-0.395
0.779
0.091
1.597
-0.026
1.153
0.434
0.662
-0.661
0.091
0.899
-0.802
0.320
-0.661
1.153
-0.268
0.547
0.206
0.899
-0.395
-0.949

H
L
L
L
H
L
H
H
H
H
L
H
L
M
M
L
H
L
H
H
L
L
H
H
M
H
L

H
H
M
M
H
M
H
H
H
H
M
M
H
M
H
H
H
M
H
H
M
H
H
M
H
M
M

28

Moderate
Moderate
Weak
Weak
Moderate
Weak
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Weak
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Strong
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Weak

3.82
2.14
3.28
4.08
4.14
1.90
3.20
3.50
4.78
2.80
3.08
3.08
1.00

13.00
21.80
9.00
10.40
9.00
9.00
4.21
10.00
6.40
13.60
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
6.40
21.15
9.00
7.00
8.60
7.00
9.40
11.00
11.70
5.50
10.50
12.70

9.00 19.00
19.40 21.80
10.00 11.00
11.30 11.30
10.00 9.00
7.00 10.00
3.77 4.21
10.00 10.00
7.80 6.40
8.70 16.70
10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00
9.00 10.00
4.00 9.00
20.60 21.15
6.00 9.00
6.00 7.00
6.20 8.60
6.00 7.00
11.00 11.00
9.00 11.00
8.00 13.80
4.67 6.00
6.50 10.50
11.60 12.45

18.00
19.40
10.00
10.50
10.00
8.00
3.77
10.00
7.80
9.70
10.00
10.00
10.00
9.00
5.30
20.60
6.00
6.00
6.20
6.00
8.00
9.00
11.70
4.17
6.50
10.92

Moreover, since 2002, states have continually modified their accountability policies for
ten years. In 2002, there was no common core academic standard among 50 states but in 2012,
forty-five states adopt them (Kober & Rentner, 2012). In addition, some states, including Indiana,
North Carolina, and Oklahoma, have increased fourth and eighth grade reading and mathematics
performance standards since 2002; however, Maine, South Carolina, and Wyoming’s reading and
mathematics performance standards have decreased (National Center for Education Statistics,
2011; Bandeira de Mello et al., 2009; McLaughlin et al., 2008; National Center for Education
Statistics, 2007). The numbers of states that implement high school exit exams also have
increased. In 2012, twenty-six states implement mandatory exit exams although in 2002 only
nineteen states had (Zabala et al., 2008). Because the states’ accountability policies in 2002 may
be different from those in 2012, it may not good to examine the relationship between strength of
states’ accountability systems and principals’ and teachers’ responses suing existing indexes.

2) Major factors of states’ accountability strength
Based on these literatures about the difference of accountability system strength, I assume
that accountability strength is determined by three major factors: the proficient performance
standards, the annual measurable objectives (AMOs) strength, and the high school graduation
exit exams.

Proficiency performance standards
NCLB requires each state to implement academic assessments and to review the annual
progress of each school. Because assessment methods and standards were not specified in the
law, each state decides on the high-stakes test that all students should take, and they set up its
29

content and performance standards accordingly.
Although content standards among 50 states have been similar since the introduction of
the Kindergarten-12 Common Core State Standards in English and mathematics, there are huge
variations in the proficiency performance standards that determine how well children are
mastering the material in the state academic content standards. Some states, such as South
Carolina and Massachusetts set up high proficiency performance standards, but other states, such
as Tennessee and Oklahoma did not in 2003 (Peterson & Hess, 2005). Therefore, one student
who passes the proficiency performance standards of Tennessee may not pass the standards of
South Carolina.
The variations in the proficiency performance standards among states are remarkably
shown by studies of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). NCES has studied the
states’ proficiency standards, considering the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) as a comparison metric7 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011; Bandeira de
Mello et al., 2009; McLaughlin et al., 2008; National Center for Education Statistics, 2007).
NCES found great variation in proficient performance standards in reading and mathematics
across the states (see Appendix A and Appendix B). Massachusetts, Missouri, and South Caronia

7

For a given subject and grade, the percentage of students reported in the state
assessment to be meeting the standard in each NAEP school is matched to the point in the
NAEP achievement scale corresponding to that percentage. “The method of obtaining
equipercentile equivalents involves the following steps: (1) obtain for each school in the
NAEP sample the proportion of students in that school who meet the state performance
standard on the state’s test; (2) estimate the state proportion of students who meet the
standard on the state test, by weighting the proportions (from step 1) for the NAEP schools,
using NAEP school weights; (3) estimate the weighted distribution of scores on the NAEP
assessment for the state as a whole, based on the NAEP sample of schools and students
within schools; and (4) Find the point on the NAEP scale at which the estimated proportion
of students in the state who score above that point (using the distribution obtained in step 3)
equals the proportion of students in the state who meet the state’s own performance standard
(obtained in step 2)”(Bandeira de Mello et al., 2009, p. 6).
30

had high performance but Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Tennessee had low performance standards
in fourth and eighth reading and mathematics in the 2007-2008 school year (Bandeira de Mello
et al., 2009).
Under the NCLB, all students should exceed proficiency performance standards by the
2013-2014 school year. Therefore, if states set up high proficient performance standards, the
students in those states may have difficulties reaching these goals. For example, although two
students acquire the same score of 185 in eighth grade mathematics, the student in Tennessee
will pass the state’s proficient performance but the other student in Massachusetts will not in
2009. Therefore, Massachusetts’s principals and teachers will arguably focus more on students’
test scores than Tennessee’s principals and teachers do.

Annual measurable objectives strength
Under the NCLB, states explain how all students will meet proficient standards by the
2012 school year and will show the yearly annual measurable objectives (AMOs), which are the
annual minimum required percentages of students who pass the states’ proficient performance
standards. As the first step, states set up a starting point8, which is an initial annual measurable
objective for each subject area in 2002. It presents how many percentages of students meet or
exceed the state’s proficient standards that states established. However, New York, Oklahoma,
and Vermont use their starting point and intermediate goals as scale score, not the percent
proficient improvement. Based on states’ workbooks, the starting point of eighth grade

8

A starting point is based on “the higher of the percentage of students at the
proficient level who are in (1) the state’s lowest achieving group of students or (2) the school
at the 20th percentile in the State, based on enrollment, among all schools ranked by the
percentage of students at the proficient level” (NCLB, 2001 sec. 111 (b) (2) (E)).
31

Mathematics in Arizona was 7%, while in Indiana it was 57.1%. Each state differently sets up its
own starting points (see detail in Appendix C.).
Next, states set up the intermediate goals and illustrate how they will move from the
starting point percent in 2002 to 100% in 2014. Intermediate goals, as prescribed by NCLB, must
increase at least every third year, and each increase must be equal size. Because there is no
specific regulation, each state chose intermediate goals every one, two, and three years, which
leads to different trajectories: a straight-line pattern, a stair-step pattern (straight with plateaus), a
front-loaded trajectory (larger increases for the early steps between plateaus), and a back-loaded
trajectory (larger increases for the last steps between plateaus) (Porter, Linn, & Trimble, 2005)9.
For example, as two figures show, Florida chose the stair-step approach with equal increases
between steps and Michigan adopted the back-load trajectory approach.
Appendix D shows 50 states’ intermediate goals in 2007 or 2008. New Hampshire and
Tennessee tended to set high intermediate goals, but California had low intermediate goals. Each
state differently sets up its own intermediate goals.

9

According to state’s first workbook, most states selected a straight-line pattern and a
stair-step pattern, but many states changed to back-loaded trajectory. In 2005, four states
chose to use the straight-line pattern, nineteen states elected to use the stair-step pattern, and
twenty-four states chose the back-loaded approach. No State chosen the front-loaded
approach (Porter et al., 2005).
32

Figure II-1 Florida Annual Measurable Objective for Reading
eading

Reading
Figure II-2 Michigan Annual Measurable Objectives for Reading
Citation from: Porter, A. C., Linn, R. L., & Trimble, C. S. (2005). The Effects of State
Decisions About NCLB Adequate Yearly Progress Targets. Educational Measurement,
Issues and Practice, 24(4), 36
(4),
33

Because each state establishes a different level of starting points and intermediate goals,
some states have big differences between the starting point and the intermediate goal, but other
states do not. If the differences are large, it may be difficult for students to reach the goals, and so
principals and teachers focus on increasing students’ test scores, spending more time and efforts
on this. The states with large differences may have stronger accountability systems. However, if
the differences are small, the states’ accountability systems are not strong. For example, Florida
had a big difference between the starting point and the intermediate goal, but Michigan had a
small difference (see Figure II-1 and II-2). Therefore, in Florida students may be difficult to
reach the goal and principals and teachers may more focus on students' test scores than
Michigan’s principals and teachers do.

High school graduation exit exams
Several states have implemented high school graduation exit exams, so students in the
states need to take and pass the tests to receive a high school diploma. Generally, high school
graduation exit exams are classified into two types: comprehensive exams and end-of-course
exams (McIntosh, 2012). Comprehensive exams assess multiple subjects and are generally
targeted at the 9th or 10th grade level, but end-of-course exams assess whether students master
the content of specific high school classes (Zabala et al., 2007). In 2012, eight states used end-ofcourse exams and eighteen states implemented comprehensive exams as statewide and
standardized final exams (McIntosh, 2012).
Because principals and teachers could get sanctions, if their students do not acquire
grades high enough to pass the test, school staffs in states with mandatory tests for graduation
may feel more pressure from accountability policies and spend more time on preparing the tests
34

and on teaching the curriculum related to the tests than do principals and teachers in states with
no mandatory tests (Vogler, 2008; Bishop, Moriarty, & Mane, 2000).

35

3. Studies of Accountability Effects
Since accountability systems implemented, a lot of educators have studied the effects of
accountability systems in schools. This part will reveal the effects of accountability systems for
students and teachers.

1) The effects of accountability on students
There are controversies about whether accountability policies increase or decrease
students’ accomplishment. Some found that accountability increases students’ achievement
(Jacob, 2005). Before NCLB, states with accountability policies tend to have higher students’
academic achievement than states without the policies (Dee & Jacob, 2011). For example, prior
to NCLB, Texas’ various accountability policies, such as high stakes tests, encourage students to
acquire higher NAEP test scores than other state’s students (Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata, &
Williamson, 2000). After NCLB, students in states with high stakes testing acquire higher test
scores than students in states without policies (Nichols et al., 2006; Hanushek & Raymond, 2005;
Carnoy & Loeb, 2002). The researchers assume that strong accountability policies, such as high
stake tests offer more pressure for increasing students’ performance (Reback et al., 2011; Ladd &
Lauen, 2010).
However, others claim that states with high stakes tests or high school graduation exit
exams do not always have a high students’ National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP),
American College Test (ACT), Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), and Advanced Placement (AP)
scores (S. S. Smith & Mickelson, 2000). Although Maryland implements stakes test, eighth h
grade mathematics accomplishment did not increased (Amrein & Berliner, 2002). Although
students in Texas receive the positive effects of strong accountability policies, their NAEP test

36

scores are not significantly higher than nationwide students’ scores (Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey,
& Stecher, 2000). Moreover, there are few studies to find positive effects on reading achievement
in the fourth and eighth grades (J. Lee & Reeves, 2012; Dee & Jacob, 2011; Schneider, 2011)
and the number of schools that do not meet AYP has increased continuously since 2006 (Usher,
2012).
Researchers also have discussed the effects of accountability policies on an achievement
gap. Some studies mention that accountability policies are effective in reducing inequalities in
students’ performance by race, socioeconomic status (SES), and achievement (Dee, Jacob,
Hoxby, & Ladd, 2010; Henne & Jang, 2008; Hanushek & Raymond, 2004). The impact of
accountability policies is larger for Black and Hispanic students than for White students: in
fourth grade mathematics, Black and Hispanic students increased their NEAP test scores about
14.6 points and 9.8 points after implementation of NCLB although White students increased 4.9
points (Dee & Jacob, 2011). After NCLB, there is a reduction of an achievement gap between
poor and non-poor students in fourth grade and eighth grade mathematics as well as between low
performing and high performing students (J. Lee & Reeves, 2012; Ballou & Springer, 2009;
Reback, 2008). Especially, reduction of achievement gap occurs in lower performing schools
because the schools receive more pressure from accountability and pay more attention to
minorities and economically disadvantaged students (Figlio, Rouse, & Schlosser, 2009; Springer,
2008).
However, other studies say that the accountability policies do not reduce students’
academic achievement gaps because the effects of the policies differ by race and SES (Murnane
& Levy, 2001; S. S. Smith & Mickelson, 2000). Because Black students receive more
conventional teaching, such as lecture, recitation, and seat work than White students (Cox &

37

Witko, 2011; Diamond, 2007), they gain less effect from the policies than White students, and
the achievement gap between students of different race is continued or expanded (J. Lee, 2006;
Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Hanushek & Raymond, 2004). Moreover, high school graduation
test or requirements reduce low-achieving students’ test scores (Dee, 2002; Jacob, 2001) and
their higher order thinking skills (Rothstein, 2004). After NCLB, the achievement gap between
low SES and high SES students has been changed significantly in both reading and math at
fourth and eighth grades (J. Lee, 2006).
Additionally, studies produce different opinions about the unintended effects on students.
Although critics argue that accountability policies decrease students’ science or social studies
achievements because teachers spend less time for non-test subjects (Cox & Witko, 2011;
Diamond, 2007), supporters do not find any adverse impact on student non-test subject
performance (Dee & Jacob, 2011; Winters, Trivitt, & Greene, 2010). Advocates observe that the
strength of accountability does not produce significantly negative effects on graduation rates in
high school (Carnoy, 2005), but opponents found that the policies lead more minority students to
fail than White students (Haney, 2000). Strong accountability policies, including graduation
exams and higher course requirements, enhance dropout rates (Jacob, 2001; Lillard & DeCicca,
2001) and reduce matriculation rates of low performance students (Bishop & Mane, 2001;
Fuhrman et al., 1988).
According to studies focusing on students during the last ten years, recent studies by
economists show that accountability is effective in increasing test scores, especially fourth grade
mathematics test scores (Schneider, 2011), although earlier studies found negative effects of
accountability. However, there is no agreement on achievement gap diminution (D. N. Harris &
Herrington, 2006), nor on an English test score improvement (J. Lee & Reeves, 2012; Dee &

38

Jacob, 2011; Schneider, 2011). In addition, it is not clear whether the score increase comes from
students’ academic development or from the policy changes. Many states have modified their
systems for more students to be counted as proficient (Rentner et al., 2006). They have lowered
performance proficiency standards (J. Lee, 2010), enhanced minimum group size for analysis,
used confidence intervals, permitted students to save test scores or retake tests, and modified
many definitions, to all the state’s advantage (Erpenbach, 2011; Forte & Erpenbach, 2006).
These studies excessively emphasize the effects of accountability policies on students’
academic achievement and overlook the effects on students’ non-academic outcomes, such as
learning interest or attitude. Although NCLB highlights improvement in students’ academic
accomplishment, academic interest and learning attitude are more important and effective in
improving students’ academic outcomes in the long term (Hemmings & Kay, 2010). Excessive
emphasis on achievement may be negative for students’ cognitive development (Nichols &
Berliner, 2007), and for students’ widespread knowledge and skills acquisition (Koretz, 2005;
Stecher, Chun, Barron, & Ross, 2000). Moreover, excessive emphasis on achievement leads
students to avoid educational challenges and efforts (Dee, 2002), and weakens students’
academic interest and inter-personal skills (Rothstein, Jacobsen, & Wilder, 2008).

2) The effects of accountability on teachers
Researchers have studied the effects of accountability policies for teachers and some have
found that accountability is effective to develop teaching quality. Under the rigorous
accountability systems, teachers spend more time and effort on curriculum, teaching, and
assessment (Kelley, 1999; Koretz & Training, 1996) because of local norms or agreements about
accountability and professional practices (Swanson & Stevenson, 2002). Teachers reorganize
their curriculum to fit accountability assessments (Srikantaiah, 2009; Hamilton et al., 2007;
39

Swanson & Stevenson, 2002; Kelley & Protsik, 1997), especially in states with strong
accountability policies (Firestone, Mayrowetz, & Fairman, 1998). For example, teachers
emphasize logical writing skills that are necessary for standards-based essays as well as highorder thinking skills, such as critical thinking and problem solving (Yeh, 2005; Wollman-Bonilla,
2004). In addition, teachers have modified their instructional methods and pedagogical
techniques in order to align with the policies (Hamilton et al., 2008; Finnigan & Gross, 2007)
and states’ standards (Hamilton et al., 2007). Teachers employ various types of assessments
(Swanson & Stevenson, 2002), emphasize classroom management (Koretz & Training, 1996),
and apply data for decision-making and teaching practices (Srikantaiah, 2009; Hamilton et al.,
2007; Kelley et al., 2000).
The accountability policies facilitate teacher collaboration and professional development.
In the regular meetings required by the policies, teachers share knowledge of content and school
reforms with colleagues, and thus establish a collaborative culture (Diamond, 2007; Kelley et al.,
2000; Stecher et al., 2000). Also, these policies encourage teachers to participate in professional
development and to create professional communities for improving their content knowledge and
teaching skills (Srikantaiah, 2009; Libresco, 2005; Yeh, 2005; Firestone et al., 1998). Especially,
when states implement state’s achievement tests and the tests are aligned with state standards,
teachers’ participation in content-focused professional development is high (Phillips, Desimone,
& Smith, 2011; Desimone, Smith, & Phillips, 2007).
However, other researchers found different results. Accountability policies emphasize
only tested subjects and narrow instructional content (Anagnostopoulos, 2006; Booher-Jennings,
2005). Teachers increase their teaching time for test subjects (Cocke et al., 2011; Cox & Witko,
2011; Dee & Jacob, 2011; Reback et al., 2011; West, 2007), and decrease the time for non-tested

40

subjects (Kober, Chudowsky, & Chudowsky, 2008; Hamilton et al., 2007; Rouse, Hannaway,
Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2007). Moreover, they limit the scope of class instruction to the specific
content for testing, instead of general content in the subjects or higher-order skills (Srikantaiah,
2009; Hamilton et al., 2008; Diamond, 2007) and to “bubble kids” who are close to the proficient
standard, instead of the other students (Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010; Reback, 2008; Hamilton et
al., 2007; Booher-Jennings, 2005). These negative effects on teaching are shown more by
teachers in states with strong accountability than by teachers in states with weak accountability
(M. Clarke et al., 2003).
This content contraction leads to fragmented and teacher-centered instruction (Au, 2007).
Due to the pressure of tests (L. M. McNeil, 2000; Sirotnik & Kimball, 1999), teaching styles are
changed into “teaching to the test” (Diamond, 2007; Hoffman, Assaf, & Paris, 2001; Clotfelter &
Ladd, 1996), which emphasizes memorization, recitation, and lecture (Diamond, 2012).
Moreover, teachers are reluctant to implement innovative teaching practices (Hood, 2012;
Martell, 2010; Crocco & Costigan, 2007) because teachers change their goals from improving
students’ academic outcomes to reaching state level academic standards or receiving rewards
(Finnigan & Gross, 2007; Booher-Jennings, 2005).
Moreover, accountability policies produce unintended negative effects. Teachers perceive
low autonomy for important decisions in classrooms because of test grades and standards from
states and districts (Diamond, 2012; Hood, 2012; Wills & Sandholtz, 2009; Garvin, 2007; Rouse
et al., 2007). The policies tend to magnify teachers’ stress, frustration, and fatigue because of
insufficient time to prepare for assessment (Finnigan & Gross, 2007; Abrams, Pedulla, &
Madaus, 2003; Kelley et al., 2000), and because of conflicts between teachers’ own approaches
and the enforced approaches to NCLB (Hamilton et al., 2007). The policies decrease the job

41

security of teachers (Opdycke, 2004), especially in low-performing schools (Reback et al., 2011),
and they increase teacher turnover rates (Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2010; Koretz & Training, 1996).
High turnover rates can destroy collegiality and collaboration among teachers and produce
isolated teachers (Rice & Malen, 2003).
Previous studies about teachers under accountability systems showed mixed effects
(Hannaway & Hamilton, 2008; Hamilton et al., 2007). These studies have usually employed
qualitative research methods that can reveal various teachers’ activities. One study described
both positive and negative effects of accountability policies. For example, although teachers
align standards and instruction with performance-based tests, they also narrow curriculum and
perform to test teaching.
Overall, accountability studies about teachers have overlooked teachers’ sense-making
processes (Schmidt & Datnow, 2005). These studies assume that teachers are passive, and thus
they are affected by only accountability policies. However, teachers actively understand and
arbitrate their policy environment and implementation based on their beliefs, knowledge, and
prior experiences (Diamond, 2012; D. M. Harris, 2012; Rex & Nelson, 2004). Moreover,
colleagues, principals, and school climate can help to produce a collective sense-making process
(Louis, Febey, & Schroeder, 2005). Under the same accountability conditions, a principal’s
leadership can make a difference in teacher’s motivation and teaching practice (Finnigan, 2012).
Also, teachers’ perceptions of and activities in response to of accountability policies are likely to
be mediated by school organizations (Spillane et al., 2002).

42

4. Principals’ Response to Accountability
As “street level workers” of state’s educational policies (Lipsky, 2010), principals can
transform remote and intangible policies into closed and tangible outcomes (Rorrer & Skrla,
2005). Effective principals tend to have more influence on instruction and to support teachers’
learning to increase students’ academic achievement that is a major goal of accountability
policies (Robinson, Lloyd, & Rowe, 2008; Bottoms, 2003).

1) Having influence on instruction
Each principal may have capacities and power to influence standards, curriculum, and
instruction. Because principals understand the importance of standards to improve students’
performance (Printy, 2010), they can align their school’s standards with the state’s standards
(Hamilton et al., 2007) and can establish performance standards using their students’ test scores
(Lewis, 2010; Englert, Fries, Martin-Glenn, & Douglas, 2007; Ladd & Zelli, 2002; Spillane et al.,
2002). To achieve the state’s performance standards, principals may match curriculum and
instruction with state level standards or assessments (Hamilton et al., 2007; Marsh & LeFever,
2004). Moreover, principals can want to judge whether teachers are implementing teaching that
can encourage students to meet the state’s standards. They may formally observe classrooms and
evaluate teachers’ curriculum implementation (Gonzalez, 2012; Louis et al., 2010; Mojkowski,
2000).
Principals’ influence on instruction may be affected by their state. Some scholars claim
that when states have more influence on developing standards, curriculum, and assessment,
schools may be more accountable for student outcomes (Fuhrman & Elmore, 2004). However,
others assert that as a state’s influence increases, principals’ and teachers’ influence may decrease

43

(Nance & Marks, 2008). Moreover, there can be differences among state’s in their control of
instruction, although most states have enacted legislation related to standards and curriculum
(Louis et al., 2010). Principals in Massachusetts and Texas think that their states have more
influence on instruction, but the principals in Nebraska and Montana do not think that about their
state (Marks & Nance, 2007). Maryland provides principals with workshops and templates for
standards, curriculum, and professional development (Jenkins & Pfeifer, 2012), so Maryland
principals can have more power over instruction.
Under the situation that the accountability systems of states are not the same, I assume
that there may be differences across the states in principals’ influence on instruction. Although
principals affect school standards, curriculum, and instruction, principals in states with strong
accountability systems may feel more pressure from the accountability systems. This pressure
may encourage principals to have more power for setting performance standards, defining
curriculum, and evaluating teachers than principals in states with weak accountability systems.

2) Facilitating teacher learning
Teacher learning is considered as an teachers’ ongoing process of engagement in various
activities that can produce their belief, knowledge, and instruction (Putnam & Borko, 1997).
Usually, teacher learning can yield the change in knowledge and beliefs, the intentions for
practice, the changes in actual teaching practices in a more permanent way, and the changes in
emotions (Bakkenes, Vermunt, & Wubbels, 2010). The effects of teacher learning can lead
successful students’ academic outcomes (Lam, 2005).
To facilitate teachers’ learning, principals can do two types of works. First, principals
support teachers’ professional work (Croft, Coggshall, Dolan, & Powers, 2010). Principals in

44

effective schools can reorganize faculty meetings to focus on professional development among
teachers (Sanzo et al., 2011), including constructing common planning time for team meetings,
securing additional time, and allocating school educational resources to support professional
development (Graczewski, Knudson, & Holtzman, 2009; Kose, 2009; Arbogast, 2004; Youngs &
King, 2002). Principals can also permit early dismissal of teachers to participate in professional
development programs (Buchholz & List, 2009). Schools can provide substitute teachers so that
staff can attend professional development programs offered by the district or state during the
school day (Daniels, 2009; Roellke & Rice, 2008).
Second, principals can provide professional days before and during the school year. Lack
of time has been cited as the most serious obstacle to the programs (Drage, 2010; Lind, 2007).
Due to schools’ schedules and teachers’ classes, teachers can choose only a few professional
development programs offered at different times and on different days, and it may be difficult for
them to focus on professional development programs (Daniels, 2009). However, when principal
provide professional days, teachers can obtain opportunities for professional development (Bubb
& Earley, 2013).
In accountability contexts, principals’ roles related to teachers’ learning can be influenced
by their state’s systems (Spicer, 2008). States establish many regulations for teachers to
participate in professional development, and they can provide financial funding for professional
development (Boser, 2001; Dean, 2001). Just as each state has a different accountability system,
the states’ regulations of and supports for professional development may be not similar (M.
Clarke et al., 2003). Kentucky has many requirements, 15 semester credit hours in the first five
years (Loeb, Miller, & Strunk, 2009). Massachusetts, Kentucky, and North Carolina, which have
high-stakes tests, offer more financial resources than Kansas, which has low-stakes tests (B.

45

Berry et al., 2003; M. Clarke et al., 2003).
Given that states’ accountability systems are not the same, I assume that there may be
differences in principals’ facilitating teachers’ learning. Principals in states with strong
accountability systems may feel more pressure from the accountability systems and provide more
supportive strategies than principals in states with low accountability systems in order to
facilitate teachers’ learning and to encourage teachers to participate in professional development
programs.

46

5. Teachers’ Responses in Accountability
In the prior part, I explained principals’ responses to accountability, including
emphasizing standards, curriculum, and instruction, and facilitating teachers’ learning. In this
section, I will describe teachers’ responses, teacher autonomy and their professional development
participation time, which can be influenced by principals and states (Murnane & Papay, 2010).

1) Teacher autonomy
In American education, teacher autonomy is considered as an important influential factor
for school education, although it can produce a un-collaborative school climate that encourages
teachers to work alone (O'Hara, 2006). First, teacher autonomy, as one source of intrinsic
motivation, can improve teachers’ professionalism. When teachers have opportunities to
participate in policies, such as textbook and curriculum adoption, they can consider themselves
as a major person (Kelley & Protsik, 1997) and they can consider teaching as interesting and
meaningful professional work (Roth, Assor, Kanat-Maymon, & Kaplan, 2007; Pearson &
Moomaw, 2005). Second, teacher autonomy can decrease stress and increase job satisfaction
(Pearson & Moomaw, 2005). Teachers who are more autonomous in their classrooms may have
high satisfaction and remain in their teaching jobs (Pearson & Moomaw, 2006; Rudolph, 2006;
Brunetti, 2001).
When we study teacher autonomy, principals can be considered as essential, because
principals may influence teachers’ instruction (Printy, 2010). Teachers’ autonomy can be greater
or less based on how principals handle external requirements and expectation (Rudolph, 2006).
When principals implement ‘tight and direct control,’ teacher autonomy may be diminished
(Eden, 2001). For example, when principals choose the curriculum and mandate instruction,

47

teachers can be limited in using their own favorite curriculum and new instructional methods.
However, principals can also encourage teacher autonomy (Pearson, 1995). When principals give
more opportunities for participation in major decisions, understand teachers’ conditions and
needs, establish a school climate which supports teacher autonomy, and assign autonomy to
teachers, teachers can gain improved autonomy (Assor & Oplatka, 2003). Such teachers can feel
that their principal protects them from the pressure of their state’s administration and produces a
school environment in which teachers can implement their autonomy (Byrne, 2009; Crocco &
Costigan, 2007).
It is assumed that educational reforms threaten teacher autonomy (Quiocho & Stall, 2008;
Spillane et al., 2002; Brunetti, 2001). Under the accountability policies, standards, contends, and
curriculum for classroom learning are given and teachers had little flexibility in the content they
taught (Desimone, 2013). For example, many educational works, such as curriculum, texts, class
size, scheduling, and space allocations, may be controlled by legislatures rather than by teachers
(Pearson & Hall, 1993). To reach a state’s performance standards, teachers may abandon their
curriculum and the teaching practices that are best for their students, and they may diminish their
creativity, choice, and spontaneity (Hood, 2012; Martell, 2010; Wills & Sandholtz, 2009; Garvin,
2007).
Other opinions also exist. In schools that are loosely coupled systems, accountability can
produce recoupling between policies and classrooms (Hallett, 2010). Because of the process of
creating tight couplings, teachers may follow accountability regulations in some areas: however,
in other areas where loose couplings still exist, teachers can maintain their autonomy. For
example, teachers can change their curriculum based on the state’s content standards, but they
may continue their instruction with autonomy (Diamond, 2012; Spillane, Parise, & Sherer, 2011).

48

Teachers may need and seek to find a balance point between accountability and professionalism.
Under the situation that the states’ accountability systems are not the same, I assume that
there might be differences in principals’ influence on standards, curriculum, and instruction, and
this difference in influence can affect teacher autonomy. These differences in principals’
activities can be related to teacher autonomy.

2) Teachers' professional development
In the era of accountability, the importance of professional development has increased
because professional development can be an effective method to improve teachers’ content
knowledge, their teaching capacities, and high order thinking skills that are related to students’
performance. First, from professional development teachers can acquire content knowledge
(Youngs & King, 2002; Ball & Cohen, 1999) and problem-solving abilities (Jasper & Taube,
2004). Second, professional development can improve teachers’ instruction (Hill, 2007; Lambert,
2003; Garet, Porter, Desimone, Birman, & Yoon, 2001) and develops alternative student
assessments in their classrooms (Sato, Wei, & Darling-Hammond, 2008; Desimone, Porter, Garet,
Yoon, & Birman, 2002). Third, schools where teachers gain opportunities to participate in
professional development about students’ performance and educational policies can have higher
student educational outcomes than schools where teachers do not have these opportunities (Louis
et al., 2010; Yoon et al., 2008; Joyce & Showers, 2002).
Principals have been considered as essential beings for teachers’ professional
development (Youngs & King, 2002; Hallinger & Murphy, 1986). First, as a builder and designer
of professional development, principals can design professional development programs based on
school visions, and they evaluate the programs (Kose, 2009; Lindstrom & Speck, 2004).

49

Moreover, principals in effective schools can reorganize faculty meetings to focus on
professional development among teachers (Sanzo et al., 2011). When principals establish more
consistent visions, teachers can coherently participate in professional development programs
(Graczewski et al., 2009).
Second, principals can create school contexts that encourage teachers to actively
participate in professional development programs (Wahlstrom & York-Barr, 2011; Rice & Malen,
2003). Principals can secure additional time, find additional funds for workshops and
conferences, and allocate school educational resources to support professional development
(Graczewski et al., 2009; Kose, 2009; Arbogast, 2004; Youngs & King, 2002). They can offer
opportunities for teachers to connect with various organizations from outside, such as local
universities and nonprofit organizations for external assistance (Sebring & Bryk, 2000), and to
participate in decision-making processes related to professional development (Newmann, King,
& Youngs, 2000).
Teachers’ participation in professional development can be influenced by their state’s
educational policies. A state’s strong tasks accountability atmosphere can lead teachers to
participate in professional development programs (Desimone et al., 2007), so when states use
criterion-referenced assessments that are aligned to state standards in mathematics at the high
school level, teachers’ participation time in content-focused professional development can
increase (Phillips et al., 2011; Desimone et al., 2007). Also, 24 states provide some money for
professional development, and 38 states make regulations that teacher should participate in
professional development to maintain their licenses (Boser, 2001).
Under the situation that the states’ accountability systems are not the same, I assume that
there might be differences in principals’ facilitating teachers’ learning. Differences in principals’

50

activities can influence differences of teachers’ participation time in professional development.

51

CHAPTER THREE
III. METHODLOGY
In this methodology chapter, I will explain a conceptual model, research questions,
hypotheses, data sets, variables, and analysis methods.

1. Conceptual Model
Based on literature review, I established a simple conceptual model like Figure III-1
comprised of three parts: states, principals, and teachers. I found that each state has different
accountability policies: the proficiency performance standards, the annual measurable objectives
(AMO) strength, and high school graduation exit exams . Based on these findings, I assumed that
these dissimilar policies could make the different level of accountability strength. This states’
accountability strength can affect principals’ responses: principals’ influence on instruction and
their facilitation of teachers’ learning. This states’ accountability strength can also influence
teacher autonomy and their participation time in professional development programs. Principals’
perception and activities may affect teachers’ educational activities, such as instruction, selection
of curriculum, and participation in professional development.

52

States

Strength of accountability systems
- The performance proficiency standards
- The AMO strength
- High school graduation tests

Principals
Teachers

Teachers’ responses to
accountability
- Having teacher autonomy
- Participating time in professional
development

Principals’ response to
accountability
- Having influence on instruction
- Facilitating teachers learning

Figure III-1 A Conceptual Model
For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures, the reader is referred to the electronic version
of this dissertation

53

2. Research Questions and Hypotheses
Based on the conceptual model, I created the two research questions and nine hypotheses.
The first research question: What is the relationship between strength of states’
accountability systems and principals’ responses: their influence on instruction and their
facilitation of teacher learning?
a) Are there differences in principals’ responses to accountability strength of 51 states?
b) Which states’ accountability strength factors affect principals' responses?
c) Which principals’ individual factors and school environmental factors affect
principals’ responses?
Hypothesis 1: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly correlated with principals’
influence on instruction.
Hypothesis 2: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with principals’
support of professional work.
Hypothesis 3: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with principals’
provision of professional days before the school year.
Hypothesis 4: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with principals’
provision of professional days during the school year.

54

The second research question: What is the relationship between strength of states’
accountability systems and teachers’ responses: teacher autonomy and their participation in
professional development programs?
a) Are there differences in teachers’ responses to accountability strength of 51 states?
b) Which states’ accountability strength factors affect teachers’ responses?
c) Which teachers’ individual factors, principals’ individual factors, and school
environmental factors affect teachers’ responses?
Hypothesis 5: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly correlated with teacher
curriculum autonomy.
Hypothesis 6: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly correlated with teacher
instructional autonomy.
Hypothesis 7: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with teachers’
participation time in professional development programs related to content.
Hypothesis 8: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with teachers’
participation time in professional development programs related to instruction.
Hypothesis 9: States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with teachers’
participation time in professional development programs related to classroom management.

55

3. Data
To respond to these research questions, information about states, district, schools, and
principals was needed. First, state level information related to accountability systems came from
states’ Consolidated Application Accountability Workbook. The workbook is organized using ten
principles of accountability and explains a plan how each state implements a statewide
accountability system that included all public schools and all students in the schools. Their
workbooks illustrate proficiency performance standards, starting points, intermediate goals, and
assessment systems.
Second, School principals and school information came from the National Center for
Educational Statistic’s (NCES) School And Staff Survey (SASS) 2007-2008. SASS, as a set of
questionnaires of teachers, principals, schools, and districts, provides descriptive data in the
context of elementary and secondary education. SASS includes teacher education, certification,
school climate, school size, and student population in 50 states.
SASS has four components from the school questionnaire, the teacher questionnaire, the
principal questionnaire, and the school district questionnaire by sent to respondents in public,
private, and Bureau of Indian Education/tribal schools. I handled only public school, principals,
and teachers because public schools may be more influenced by state accountability systems than
those private schools (McDonald, 2002) because public schools should follow mandates, rules,
and regulations which education agencies set in order to maintain educational funding (Rudolph,
2006).
Since 1987, SASS has been investigated: 1987-1988 school year, 1990-1991 school year,
1993-1994 school year, 1999-2000 school year, 2003-2004 school year, 2007-2008 school year,
and 2011-2012 school year. The data set in the 2003-2004 may not represent states’

56

accountability conditions under NCLB begun in 2002. Also, because since 2011 states have
gained flexibility of accountability, data set in the 2011-2012 may not present states’
accountability systems. Based on this reason, among the seven data set, I used a data set in the
2007-2008 SASS that include 9,800 public schools, 9,800 public school principals, and 47,600
public school teachers.
In this study, I gave attention to the responses of principals and teachers in the secondary
schools. Under the accountability policies, secondary schools may receive more concern than
elementary schools. Secondary schools tend to be a large complex organization because of
specialized content focus, so teachers in these schools may be likely to have more professional
autonomy (Gross & Goertz, 2005). Moreover, high school graduation exit exams can influence
principals, teachers, and students in secondary schools. The public secondary school data include
2, 847 principals and 19,973 teachers.
In the public secondary school data, there are 2,112 male principals and 735 female
principals. The SASS public secondary school data has more white principals (2,526) than nonwhite principals (321). The number of suburban schools principals (1,316) is more than the
number of rural and urban schools principals. The characteristics of principal data set are shown
in Table III-1.

Table III-1 The Characteristics of Principal Data Set
Gender

Race

School region
Total

Male

Female

Non-white

White

Urban

Suburban

Rural

2,112

735

321

2,526

580

1,316

951

2,847

In the public secondary school teacher data, there are 8,350 male and 11,623 female
57

teachers. There are more white principals than non-white teachers. The number of suburban
schools teachers is more than the number of rural and urban schools teachers. The characteristics
of principal data set are shown in Table III-2.

Table III-2 The Characteristics of Teacher Data Set
Gender

Race

School region
Total

Male

Female

Non-white

White

Urban

Suburban

Rural

8,350

11,623

1,701

18,272

580

1,316

951

19,973

According to the secondary schools data, among 19,973 teachers, the number of teachers
who responded that they teach eighth grade is 3,272. About four hundred fifty teachers said that
they teach English field, such as English, reading, and speech. Another about hundred fifty
teachers teach mathematics such as algebra, calculus, and geometry. About two thousand three
hundred fifty teachers mentioned that they teach eighth grade, not English or mathematics. The
Table III-3 shows the distribution of teachers by subjects and grades.

Table III-3 The Characteristics of Teacher Data Set
Grade
Seventh grade
Eighth grade
Ninth grade
Tenth grade
Eleventh grade
Twelfth grade

Test subjects
English
Mathematics
447
371
452
471
1,742
1,987
1,915
2,219
2,011
2,214
1,941
2,085

58

Non-test
Subjects

Total

2,050
2,349
9,222
10,605
10,887
10,588

2,868
3,272
12,951
14,739
15,112
14,614

4. Variables
1) The strength of states’ accountability systems
Accountability strength was comprised of three factors: proficiency performance
standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit tests. The first factor was the level of
proficiency performance standards, which is the corresponding NAEP score based on states’
proficiency performance standards. There are two types of proficiency performance standards:
reading and mathematics. Original data of proficiency performance standards for math and
reading were non-normal distribution, which cannot produce reliable results. I changed these two
original data into standardization data and gained two types of z-scores; proficiency performance
standards z-score for reading and proficiency performance standards z-score for mathematics.
After acquirement of these two z-scores, I acquired mean of two z-scores of proficiency
performance standards for reading and mathematics. The higher the scores, the more difficult
states reach the goals and the stronger states have accountability systems. I obtained this
information from Bandeira de Mello’s (2009) reports. However, assessment data of Nebraska
and Utah State were not available.
The second factor was AMO strength, which is the mean difference of starting points for
reading and mathematics in 2002 and intermediate goals in 2007 for reading or mathematics
assessment in eighth grade. However, New York, Oklahoma and Vermont used their starting
point and intermediate goals as scale score, not the percent proficient improvement. I divided the
difference between starting point and intermediate goals on the scale score by the maximum
scale score on the test to calculate the accountability strength. Because like proficiency
performance standards, original data of AMO strengths were abnormal distribution, I gained the
mean of two standardization data of AMO strength z-score for reading and AMO strength z-score

59

for mathematics. The larger differences of between starting points and intermediate goals may be
more difficult for students to approach at goals and the stronger states have accountability.
Starting points and intermediate goals were shown in section 3 of state’s accountability
workbooks.

Table III-4 The Strength of States’ Accountability Systems

AL
AR
AZ
AK
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO

Proficiency
performance
standards
-1.00
-0.63
-0.11
0.34
-0.94
-0.65
-0.15
0.43
-2.02
0.77
-0.63
-1.00
0.04
0.01
-0.18
0.48
-0.11
1.07
0.41
1.29
-0.63
1.21
-0.10
1.56

AMO
strength
-0.66
-0.62
0.89
-0.14
0.32
-0.18
0.15
-0.46
0.77
-0.69
1.41
-0.31
0.45
-0.43
-0.48
0.75
-0.13
0.41
0.24
1.52
0.06
0.50
-1.32
1.85
1.70

High school
graduation
exit exams
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0

MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

60

Proficiency
performance
standards
0.51
-0.07
0.83
0.28
0.57
0.59
-1.03
0.48
-0.39
-1.21
-0.10
-0.01
0.55
2.66
0.14
-2.46
-0.92
1.07
-0.62
0.79
-1.18
-0.81
0.34

AMO
strength
-0.57
0.23
0.02
-1.38
0.22
0.27
-1.89
-0.91
0.79
-0.30
-1.88
0.19
0.07
-0.44
2.45
0.36
-0.89
-0.36
-0.55
-1.89
-0.18
2.06
-1.37
-0.16
0.52

High school
graduation
exit exams
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

The last factor was high school graduation exit eams. Although many states did not have
high school graduation exit exams, some states implemented high school graduation exit exams,
such as comprehensive exams and end-of-course exams. Therefore, I coded states with high
school graduation exit exams as 1 and states without exams as 0. I obtained this information
from Zabala (2007)’s report “State High School Exit Exams: Working to Raise Test Scores”.
Accountability strength of each stat was shown in Table III-4.

2) Principals’ responses
Principals’ responses include four factors: principals’ influence on instruction, their
support of professional work, their provision of professional days before the school day, and their
provision of professional days during the school day. These variables come from principal
questionnaire in SASS 2007 data set.
Although instruction is a teachers’ work, principals can also influence teachers’
instruction in three fields: setting performance standards for students of this school, establishing
curriculum at this school, and evaluating teacher's instruction at this school. These questions
were measured by a 5-point of Likert-type scale.
Principals encourage teachers to participate in professional development through
facilitating teacher learning and provision of professional days. Facilitating teacher learning are
reducing teachers’ work, employing substitute teachers to cover teachers’ classes, using common
planning time, and operating early dismissal or late start for students.
Provision of professional days happens in the beginning of the students’ school years and
during the students’ school years. These aspects were measured by whether or not schools use
(yes = 1 / no = 0).

61

3) Teachers’ responses
Teachers’ responses were comprises of teacher autonomy and teachers’ participation time
in professional development programs. Teachers usually can have two types of autonomy:
teacher curriculum autonomy and teacher instructional autonomy. Teacher curriculum autonomy
is selecting textbooks and other instructional materials and selecting content, topics, and skills to
be taught. Teacher instructional autonomy is selecting teaching techniques, evaluating and
grading students, disciplining students, and determining the amount of homework to be assigned.
These questions were measured by a 5-point of Likert-type scale.
Teachers can participate in various professional developments including the content of
the subjects they teach; reading instruction; student discipline and management in the classroom.
Although I could make a model that has one dependent variable as an average of three fields of
professional development participation time, I can assume that the taking of one kind of
professional development may be unrelated to the taking of other kinds of professional
development programs (Desimone et al., 2007). Therefore, I analyzed three kinds of professional
development participation time as dependent variables. Teachers answered their participation
time in six professional development programs in the past 12 months. These questions were
measured by a 4-point scale a) 8hours or less, b) 9-16 hours, c) 17-32 hours, and d) 33 hours or
more). Major variables are shown in Table III-5. These variables come from teacher
questionnaire in SASS 2007 data set.

62

Table III-5 Variables of Principals’ and Teachers’ responses
Variables
Principals’ influence on
instruction

Principals’
facilitation
of teacher
learning

Questions
How much actual influence do you think each group or
person has on decisions concerning the following
activities?
i. Setting performance standards for students of this
school
ii. Establishing curriculum at this school
iii. Evaluating teachers of this school
Are the following used to provide teachers in this school
with time for professional development during regular
contract hours?
i. Substitute teachers to cover teachers’ classes
ii. Early dismissal or late start for student
iii. Common planning time for teachers for professional
development
iv. Reduced teacher work loads

Provision of
professional
days

Teacher
autonomy

Support of
professional
work

Are the following used to provide teachers in this school
with time for professional development during regular
contract hours?
i. Professional days built in before the beginning of the
students’ school year
ii. Professional days built in during the school year
How much actual control do you have in our classroom at
this school over the following areas of your planning and
teaching?
i. Selecting textbooks and other instructional materials
ii. Selecting content, topics, and skills to be taught
How much actual control do you have in our classroom at
this school over the following areas of your planning and
teaching
i. Selecting teaching techniques
ii. Evaluating and grading students
iii. Disciplining students
iv. Determining the amount of homework to be assigned

Curriculum

Instruction

Teachers participation time
in professional
development

In the past 3years, how many hours did you spend on these
activities?
i. Content of the subjects you teach
ii. Reading instruction
iii. Students discipline and management in the classroom

63

4) Control variables
To respond four research questions, I used control variables in the level of principals,
schools, and teachers. Principals’ control variables were gender, race, educational background,
the years as principals, ASPIRING participation, and previous participation in professional
development. High scores of educational background mean that the principals may have high
degree. The years as principals are the years principals serve as the principal of a current school
and any other schools. Principals’ control variables come from principal questionnaire in SASS
2007 data set.
Schools’ control variables were region, size, and social economic status (SES). School
region was classified into large or mid-size central city, urban fringe, and small town or rural
area. I let the “Large or mid-size central city” category be the reference category, and create two
dummy variables: urban fringe and small town or rural area. School size was measured by the
number of student who is enrolled in the schools. School SES was inversely measured by the
number of students who participate in the federal free or reduced-price lunch programs. High
scores of school SES means that the schools have few students who participate in free or
reduced-price lunch programs. These variables come from school questionnaire in SASS 2007
data set.
There were three types of school climate: teachers’ shared responsibility, student learning
attitude, and schools’ resource adequacy. Three climates were measured four, two, and four
teachers’ questions that were measured by a 5-point of Likert-type scale. When the scores of
teachers’ shared responsibility are high, teachers perceived that they have high-shared
responsibility about accountability systems. High scores of student learning attitude mean good
student learning attitude. Low schools’ resource adequacy scores means that school have less

64

hygiene factors which affect dissatisfaction although these factors do not motivate teachers.
Teachers’ control variables were gender, race, educational background, teaching years,
high-qualified teachers, and eighth grade test subject teacher. Eighth grade test subject teachers
were eighth teachers who teach Mathematics and English. These variables come from teacher
questionnaire in SASS 2007 data set. Specific questions were shown in Table III-6.

65

Table III-6 Control Variables
Variables
Principals / Schools
Gender
Race
Educational background
The years as principal
ASPIRING program
Professional development
participation
Suburban
Rural
Size
School SES
Teachers’ shared
responsibility

Student learning attitude

Schools’ resource adequacy

Teachers
Gender
Race
Educational background
Teaching years
High qualified teachers
Eighth grade & test subject

Questions
Male: 0 / Female: 1
Non-white: 0 / White: 1
Below Master: 1 / Specialist: 2 / Doctoral: 3
The years as principals serve as the principal of a current school
and any other schools
No: 0 / Yes: 1
No: 0 / Yes: 1
Large or mid size central city: 0 / Urban fringe: 1
Large or mid size central city: 0 / Small town or rural area: 1
The number of students who enrolled in the school
The number of students who participate in the federal free or
reduced-price lunch program (Inversely coding)
i.
Rules for student behavior are consistently enforced by
teachers in this school, even for students who are not in
their classes.
ii.
Most of my colleagues share my beliefs and values about
what the central mission of the school should be.
iii. There is a great deal of cooperative effort among the staff
members.
iv.
In this school, staff members are recognized for a job well
done.
i.
The level of student misbehavior in this school (such as
noise, horseplay or fighting in the halls, cafeteria, or student
lounge) interferes with my teaching.
ii.
The amount of student tardiness and class cutting in this
school interferes with my teaching.
i.
I am satisfied with my teaching salary.
ii.
Necessary materials such as textbooks, supplies, and copy
machines are available as needed by the staff.
iii. Routine duties and paperwork interfere with my job of
teaching.
iv.
I am given the support I need to teach students with special
needs.
Male: 0 / Female: 1
Non-white: 0 / White: 1
Bachelor: 0 / Master: 1
The years as teachers serve as the teachers
No: 0 / Yes: 1
The other grade: 0 / Eighth grade & English or Math: 1

66

5. Analysis of Principal’s Responses to Accountability Policies
In order to examine whether or not there is relations between the strength of states’
accountability systems and principals behaviors related to professional development and
instructions, I used 2-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). Principals are nested within their
states. HLM can reveal these hierarchical features and enable researchers to examine
relationships involving predictors at two or more levels (Davison, Kwak, Seo, & Choi, 2002;
Whitener, 2001).

Table III-7 Descriptive Statistics for the 2-level Analysis Variables
Level-1

Level-2

Variable name
Influence on instruction
Support of professional work
Provision of professional days before
school year
Provision of professional days during
school year
Principal gender
Principals race
Principals educational background
The years as principal
ASPIRING program
Professional development participation
Suburban
Rural
School size
School SES
Teachers’ shared responsibility
Student learning attitude
Schools’ resource adequacy
The proficiency performance standards
AMO strength
High school graduation exit exam

67

N
2,640
2,557

Mean
3.65
2.37

SD
0.42
0.99

Min
1.00
0.00

Max
4.00
4.00

2,557

0.96

0.18

0.00

1.00

2,557

0.92

0.26

0.00

1.00

2,640
2,640
2,640
2,640
2,640
2,640
2,640
2,640
2,513
2,505
2,524
2,524
2,524
47
47
47

0.26
0.88
1.49
8.44
0.52
0.98
0.46
0.34
3.63
2.50
2.94
2.71
2.65
-0.01
0.00
0.47

0.44
0.32
0.67
6.76
0.50
0.15
0.50
0.47
1.47
1.52
0.37
0.52
0.32
0.93
0.99
0.50

0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.25
1.00
1.25
-2.46
-1.89
0.00

1.00
1.00
3.00
45.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
5.00
5.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
2.66
2.45
1.00

Among the 50 states, California, Nebraska, and Utah State did not have proficiency
performance standards, so three states were excluded from level 2 HLM analysis. About 2,600
principals in 47 states were analyzed in 2-level analysis. Descriptive statistics for the 2-level
analysis variables appear in Table III-7.
First of all, I analyzed a fully unconditional model - one-way ANOVA with random
effects – with principals’ influence of instruction and their support professional development to
estimate the proportion of within- and between-group variability in the dependent variable
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 1992). A fully unconditional model represented below.
Principal level: Influence on instructionij = B0 + R
Support of professional workij = B0 + R
Provision of professional days before the school yearij = B0 + R
Provision of professional days during the school yearij = B0 + R
State level: B0 = G00 + U0

Influence on instructionij = The level of influence on instruction of principal i in state j
Support of professional workij = The level of support of professional work of principal i
in state j
Provision of professional days before the school yearij = The level of provision of
professional days before the school year of principal i in state j
Provision of professional days during the school yearij = The level of provision of
professional days during the school year of principal i in state j
68

B0 = Each state’s mean of principals influence on instruction, facilitating teacher learning,
or provision of professional days
G00 = Grand mean of principals influence on instruction, facilitating teacher learning, or
provision of professional days
R = The principal level variance
U = The state level variance

This fully unconditional model analysis can yield an intra-class correlation coefficient
(ICC), which is “the proportion of the variance in the outcome variable that is between the
second-level units” (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998, p. 9). In this study, ICC represented the proportion of

ො
ො
variance in principals’ responses between states. The formula for ICC is ICC = τ଴଴ /ሺτ଴଴ ൅
σଶ ሻ”, where ߬଴଴ is the variability of ߓ௜௝ at the first level, and ߪ ଶ is the variance of ߭଴௝ at the
ෝ
second level. The ICC can be important in multilevel analyses because it can allow determining
the extent to which principals’ responses vary among states and to which teachers’ responses
vary among schools (Raudenbush & Bryk, 1992).
Next, to check the first and second hypotheses, I set research models, the intercepts as
outcome model in which level 1 intercept could be explained by the level 2 predictors (Hofmann,
Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). From this research model, I can confirm influential factors on
principal’s influence on instruction and their facilitation of teachers’ learning. To check whether
there is relationship between states’ accountability strength and principals’ professional
development support or their influence on instruction, I added four types of variables model:
accountability strength, teachers’ individual variables, school variables, and school climate
variables.
69

The states’ accountability strength variables were the proficiency performance standards
and AMO strength, and high school graduation exit tests. The proficiency performance standards
were the sum of the proficiency performance standards z-scores for reading and math and AMO
strength were the sum of AMO strength z-scores for reading and math.
In the hierarchical linear modeling, there are three “centering” options to help interpret
results (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Raudenbush & Bryk, 1992): “raw score (no centering), grand
mean centering (in which individual scores are deviated from the grand mean), and group mean
centering (in which individual scores are deviated from their respective group means)” (Gavin &
Hofmann, 2002, p. 28). Although the appropriate selection of centering depends on the research
model, grand-mean centering generally provides better estimates and interpretability (Whitener,
2001). Based on these findings, I used grand mean centering for variables except for dummy
variables in my research model. The intercept as outcome model is represented below.
Principal level: Influence on instructionij,
Support of professional workij,
Provision of professional days before the school yearij, or
Provision of professional days during the school yearij
= B0 + B1*(Gender) + B2*(Race) + B3*(Educational background) +
B4*(Years as principals) + B5*(ASPIRING programs) +
B6*(Professional development participation) + B7*(Suburban) + B8*(Rural) +
B9*(Size) + B10*(SES) + B11*(Teachers’ shared responsibility) +
B12*(Student learning attitude) + B13*(Schools’ resource adequacy) + R

70

State level: B0 = G00 + G01*(The proficiency performance standards) +
G02*(AMO strength) + G03*(High school graduation exit exams) + U0
B1 = G10
B2 = G20
B3 = G30
B4 = G40
B5 = G50
B6 = G60
B7 = G70
B8 = G80
B9 = G90
B10 = G100
B11 = G110
B12 = G120
B13 = G130

71

6. Analysis of Teachers’ Responses to Accountability Policies
In order to investigate the third and forth research hypotheses, I used three-level
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). When using HLM analysis, we have to consider sample size
(Bell, Morgan, Kromrey, & Ferron, 2010) because small sample and cluster size can produce
biased and inaccurate estimates (Bell et al., 2010). Especially, using a large-scale data set such as
SASS, researchers have experienced the difficulties of data sparseness: few individuals are
dispersed among a large number of level-2 units (Bell, Ferron, & Kromrey, 2008).
Adequate sample size at each level for analysis designs can be adjusted based on different
interests in “parameter estimates, different expectation of statistical power, and different ranges
of tolerable bias and accuracy” (Shih, 2008, p. 93). A 30/30 rule (30 groups with 30 individuals)
for relatively unbiased and accurate random component estimates is normal in educational
researches (Maas & Hox, 2004). Concretely, to produce more valid estimates of level 1 intercept
2

variance (σ ), level 2 intercept variance (τ00), and the level 2 slope variance (τ11), at least a
group size of 5 (at least 100 groups), 10 (at least 100 groups), and 20 (at least 200 groups) is
needed (P. Clarke & Wheaton, 2007). When you examine interactions across levels, a minimum
of 20 observations (level-1) for 50 groups (level-2) is recommended (Hox, 1998).
For unbiased and efficient estimates of the fixed-effects and variance components, we
need “10 observations per group (even at low ICC values) as long as there are at least 200 groups”
(P. Clarke & Wheaton, 2007, p. 345). “If one is willing to accept a standard error that is 5%
higher than this minimum, then cluster number can be as low as 9” (Snijders & Bosker, 2012, p.
186). However, because the number of groups is more important than group size to produce
unbiased estimates (P. Clarke & Wheaton, 2007), when there are many numbers of groups, fixed
effects were affected by small group size (Theall et al., 2011; Maas & Hox, 2002).
72

Based on these literature reviews, I modified a sample size. There may not be any
problems to examine the first and second questions, because each state has sufficient number of
schools: in SASS dataset, Hawaii has 23 schools and California has 95 schools. However,
insufficient teacher respondents in each school can make difficulties analyzing the third and
fourth research questions: the effects of accountability systems on teachers via principals’
different responses. For examples, no state had a school that includes seventeen teacher
respondents. Sixteen Florida schools had only one teacher responded and ten California schools
had two teacher respondents (see detail Appendix E).
After considering these conditions, I decided to use information from schools in which
seven teachers responded for 3-level HLM analysis. When I set a cluster size as 10, 9 or 8, I can
use principals and teachers from only twenty-six, forty, or forty-six states can be examined. The
analysis using a small number of states may be not meaningful to examine the research questions:
the relationship between strength of accountability systems and teachers’ responses. Rhode
Island was excluded from analysis because three states do not have seven schools that have
seven teacher respondents. Also, California, Nebraska, and Utah did not have proficiency
performance standards; so three states also excluded. Therefore, to respond the third and fourth
research questions, I analyzed teachers who come from school with minimum seven teacher
respondents in 46 states: 10,840 teachers come from 1,198 schools in 46 states. Descriptive
statistics for the 3-level analysis variables appear in Table III-8.

73

Table III-8 Descriptive Statistics for the 3-level Analysis Variables
Variable name

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

10,840

2.03

1.43

0.00

4.00

10,840

0.77

1.05

0.00

4.00

Professional development time for
content
Professional development time for
instruction
Professional development time for
classroom management
Teacher curriculum autonomy

0.87

0.00

4.00

10,840

2.99

0.89

1.00

4.00

Teacher instructional autonomy

10,840

3.68

0.40

1.00

4.00

10,840

0.59

0.49

0.00

1.00

Race

10,840

0.92

0.27

0.00

1.00

Educational background

10,652

0.54

0.50

0.00

1.00

Teaching years

10,840

14.40

11.55

-1.00

54.00

High qualified teachers

10,840

0.87

0.33

0.00

1.00

Eighth grade & test subject

10,840

0.03

0.17

0.00

1.00

Influence on instruction

1,198

3.65

0.41

1.33

4.00

Support of professional work
Provision of professional days before
school year
Provision of professional days during
school year
Suburban

1,198

2.36

0.97

0.00

4.00

1,198

0.96

0.19

0.00

1.00

1,198

0.94

0.25

0.00

1.00

1,198

0.52

0.50

0.00

1.00

Rural

1,198

0.25

0.43

0.00

1.00

School size

1,198

4.39

0.98

1.00

5.00

School SES

1,198

2.18

1.35

0.00

5.00

Teachers’ shared responsibility

1,198

2.93

0.30

1.94

3.71

Student learning attitude

1,198

2.73

0.46

1.21

3.93

Schools’ resource adequacy

Level-2

0.61

Gender

Level-1

10,840

1,198

2.65

0.26

1.86

3.56

46

-0.02

0.94

-2.46

2.66

46

0.01

1.00

-1.89

2.45

46

0.48

0.51

0.00

1.00

The proficiency performance standards
Level-3 AMO strength
High school graduation exit exams

74

First, I set a fully unconditional model. This model allowed me to determine the extent to
which teachers’ responses varied among states. The fully unconditional model is represented
below.
Teachers level:
Teacher curriculum autonomyijk = P0 + E
Teacher instructional autonomyijk = P0 + E
Teachers’ professional development time for contentijk = P0 + E
Teachers’ professional development time for instructionijk = P0 + E
Teachers’ professional development time for classroom managementijk = P0 + E
Principals level: P0 = B00 + R0
State level:

B00 = G000 + U00

Teacher curriculum autonomyijk = The level of teacher curriculum autonomy of teacher i
in school j in state k
Teacher instructional autonomyijk = The level of teacher instructional autonomy of
teacher i in school j in state k
Teachers’ professional development time for contentijk = The level of teacher’s
professional development time related to content of teacher i in school j in state k
Teachers’ professional development time for instructionijk = The level of teacher’s
professional development time related to instruction of teacher i in school j in state k

75

Teachers’ professional development time for classroom managementijk = The level of
teacher’s professional development time related to classroom management of teacher
i in school j in state k
P0= Each principals’ mean of teacher autonomy for curriculum and instruction and
teachers’ professional development time for content, instruction, and classroom
management
B00 = Each state’s mean of teacher autonomy for curriculum and instruction and teachers’
professional development time for content, instruction, and classroom management
G000 = Grand mean of teacher autonomy for curriculum and instruction and teachers’
professional development time for content, instruction, and classroom management
E = The teacher level variance
R0 = The principal level variance
U00 = The state level variance

To study whether or not there are relations among states’ accountability strength, changed
principal’ behaviors, and teachers’ autonomy, I implemented three level HLM analyses. Research
model for the third research question was as follows:
Teacher level: Teacher curriculum autonomyijk or Teacher instructional autonomyijk
= P0 + P1*(Gender) + P2*(Race) + P3*(Educational background) +
P4*(Years as teachers) + P5*(High qualified teachers) +
P6*(Eighth grade & Test subjects) + E

Principal level: P0 = B00 + B01*(Influence on instruction) + B02*(Suburban) +
76

B03*(Rural) + B04*(Size) + B05*(SES) +
B06*(Teachers’ shared responsibility) +
B07*(Student learning attitude) +
B08*(Schools’ resource adequacy) + R0
P1 = B10
P2 = B20
P3 = B30
P4 = B40
P5 = B50
P6 = B60

State level: B00 = G000 + G001* (The proficiency performance standards) +
G002* (AMO strength) +
G003* (High school graduation exit exams) + U00
B01 = G010
B02 = G020
B03 = G030
B04 = G040
B05 = G050
B06 = G060
B07 = G070
B08 = G080
B10 = G100

77

B20 = G200
B30 = G300
B40 = G400
B50 = G500
B60 = G600

To examine the relationship among states’ accountability strength, changed principal’
behaviors, and teachers’ professional development participation time, I implemented three level
HLM analyses. Research model for the fourth research question is as follows:
Teacher level:
Teachers’ professional development time for contentijk or
Teachers’ professional development time for instructionijk or
Teachers’ professional development time for classroom managementijk
= P0 + P1*(Gender) + P2*(Race) + P3*(Educational background) +
P4*(Years as teachers) + P5*(High qualified teachers) +
P6*(Eighth grade & Test subjects) + E

Principal level: P0 = B00 + B01*(Support of professional work) +
B02*(Provision of professional days before the school year) +
B03*(Provision of professional days during the school year) +
B04*(Suburban) + B05*(Rural) + B06*(Size) + B07*(SES) +
B08*(Teachers’ shared responsibility) +

78

B09*(Student learning attitude) +
B010*(Schools’ resource adequacy) + R0
P1 = B10
P2 = B20
P3 = B30
P4 = B40
P5 = B50
P6 = B60

State level: B00 = G000 + G001* (The proficiency performance standards) +
G002* (AMO strength) +
G003* (High school graduation exit exams) + U00
B01 = G010
B02 = G020
B03 = G030
B04 = G040
B05 = G050
B06 = G060
B07 = G070
B08 = G080
B09 = G090
B010 = G0100
B10 = G100

79

B20 = G200
B30 = G300
B40 = G400
B50 = G500
B60 = G600

80

7. Limitations
Although this paper had several limitations, the biggest limitation was disregarding the
effects of districts. Districts tend to have a power for allocating financial and human resources to
schools and educational activities (Gamoran & Dreeben, 1986). Moreover, in the age of
accountability, districts set up a coherent vision, increasing students’ achievement, implement
district-wide curriculum, and provide district-wide professional development programs for
teachers to develop their teaching quality (Bae, 2008; Luschei & Christensen, 2008; Hamilton et
al., 2007; Togneri & Anderson, 2003). Although the districts’ own standards and their
accountability forces can influence principals and teachers’ responses to state accountability
policies (Louis et al., 2010), I should exclude district questionnaire because there were few
districts for HLM analysis.
Next limitation is the effects of assistant principals. In many schools, there are assistant
principals and they may practically implement many school activities. Generally, assistant
principals implement various tasks, such as executing external communication and connection,
implementing school staffs’ development, and managing curriculum, learning, and teaching.
Especially, as accountability demands increase, the instructional leadership role can become a
major task because the accountability systems emphasize the students’ academic outcomes
(Oleszewski, Shoho, & Barnett, 2012). Although these assistant principals’ behaviors can affect
principals and teachers’ responses to state accountability policies, I did not used assistant
principals variable because the SASS data does not include enough information about assistant
principals.

81

CHAPTER FOUR
IV. RESULTS
This chapter will describe the project results, which come from two-level and three-level
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analysis. The results will be illustrated sequentially:
principals’ responses to states’ accountability systems and the teachers’ responses to states’
accountability systems.

1. Principals’ Responses to States’ Accountability Systems
Principals’ influence on instruction, their facilitation of teacher learning, and their
provision of professional days were considered as the principals’ responses to states’
accountability systems. This part will describe the level, characteristics, and influential factors of
principals’ responses.

1) The level and characteristics of principals’ responses
Based on the HLM analysis, I obtained the level and characteristics of the principals’
responses to the states’ accountability strength. Principals’ influence on instruction was 3.648,
and their support of professional work was about 2.367. In consideration of the fact that the
maximum points of two responses were the same as 4, principals perceived that they had more
influence on instruction than in supporting teachers’ professional work. Principals’ provision of
professional development before the school year was .964 and during the school year was .926.
This means that principals provide more professional days before the school years than during
the school years.

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The variance of principals’ influence on instruction was 0.173, and the states’ variance
was 0.002. There were few differences in how principals’ perceive their influence on instruction
among the states. Each principal and state differently supports professional work, so principals’
variance on support of professional work was 0.947, and the states’ variance was 0.041.
Principals’ provision of professional days before the school year also differed by principals: the
principals’ variance was 0.032. However, there were little differences among states in the
professional days before the school year: the states’ variance was 0.002. Provision of
professional days during the school year also had similar patterns. Although principals’ variance
was 0.068, states’ variance was 0.002. To sum up, each principal differently responded to states’
accountability policies, and especially principals’ support of professional work had more
variations in principals’ levels. However, there were few differences in principals’ responses to
accountability policies among the states, except for principals’ support of professional work.
Principals in any state had a similar influence on instruction and provided professional days
before or during the school year, although principals’ support professional work may be different
from states’ accountability policies.
The ICC showed similar results. The ICC of principals’ influence on instruction was
approximately 1.137%, which means that the states’ power over principals’ influence on
instruction is about 1.137 %. Principals’ influence on instruction can be affected by principals’
individual characteristics rather than by states’ educational conditions. However, because of the
states’ different characteristics, principals who have the same individual characteristics may have
different levels of influence on instruction.
The ICC of principals’ facilitating teacher learning (support of professional work and
provision of professional days) was larger than the ICC of principals’ influence on instruction.

83

Three values of ICC of principals’ support of professional work, provision of professional days
before the school year, and provision of professional days during the school year were 4.1%,
5.2%, and 3.2%. The influences of principals’ individual factors and schools’ factors were 95.9%,
94.8%, and 96.8%, and states’ accountability policies’ influence were 4.1%, 5.2%, and 3.2%.
Although principals’ support of professional work and provision of professional days were
affected by principals and school factors more than by states’ accountability policies, principals
who have the same individual and school characteristics can implement facilitating teacher
learning according to their state’s dissimilar educational policies. These results appear in Table
IV-1.

Table IV-1 The Level of Characteristics of Principals’ Responses
Principals’ responses

Coefficient

Variance

Standard
Error

Level-1

Level-2

ICC

Influence on instruction

3.648

0.010

0.173

0.002

0.011

Support of professional work

2.367

0.035

0.947

0.041

0.041

0.964

0.007

0.032

0.002

0.052

0.926

0.009

0.068

0.002

0.032

Provision of professional days
before the school year
Provision of professional days
during the school year

After finding the level and characteristics of principals’ responses to states’
accountability policies, I examined the principals’ influence on instruction and their facilitating
teacher learning (support of professional development and provision of professional days) in 51
states. Principals in Illinois, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and New York tended to have higher
influence on instruction, while Alaska, Maryland, and Michigan principals had low influence on
instruction.
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Principals in California, Maine, Illinois, and Texas were likely to implement supportive
behaviors for teachers’ professional learning, while Arkansas, Kentucky, and Michigan provided
less support for teachers’ professional learning. In fourteen states, including Pennsylvania and
Washington, almost all principals provided professional days before the school year; however
Indiana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Ohio provided fewer professional days before the school
year. Five states, such as Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Delaware principals were likely to provide
professional days during the school year, while Arizona, California, and Rhode Island principals
may not. These results appear in Appendix F.

2) The relationship between the strength of states’ accountability systems and
principals’ responses
The two level HLM analysis is used to answer the first research question, about what the
relationship between principals’ responses and the states’ accountability systems: the proficiency
performance standards, the strength of annual measurable objectives (AMO), and high school
graduation exit exams. This analysis can lead to check four hypotheses.

Principals’ influence on instruction
Principals’ influence on instruction was not related to states’ accountability systems.
AMO strength was related to principals’ perception of their influence on instruction. Principals in
the states with large differences between starting points and intermediate goals were likely to
have lower influence on instruction than principals in the states with low AMO strength.
However, the proficiency performance standards and high school graduation exit exams
requirement did not affect principals’ influence on instruction. There may be little significant
85

difference in principals’ influence on instruction between the states with high proficiency
performance standards and difficult high school graduation exit exams and the states with low
standard and no high school graduation exit exams requirement.
Therefore, the first hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance standards, AMO
strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly correlated
with principals’ influence on instruction) was partially supported. The results are shown Table
IV-2.

Table IV-2 The Influential Factors for Principals’ Influence on Instruction
Fixed Effect

Coefficient

Principals’ influence on instruction

3.508

S. E.
0.087

State level
The proficiency performance standards

0.014

0.012

AMO strength

-0.017*

0.009

High School graduation exit exams

-0.004

0.009

Gender

-0.027

0.019

White

-0.035

0.027

Educational background

-0.010

0.012

The years as principal

-0.001

0.001

Principal (school) level

0.038*

0.016

0.147

*

0.067

Suburban

0.057

*

0.026

Rural

0.034

0.026

School Size

-0.007

0.009

School SES

0.008

0.007

-0.006

0.026

0.004

0.017

0.105**

0.025

ASPIRING program
Professional development participation

Teachers’ shared responsibility
Student learning attitude
Schools’ resource adequacy
***
P<0.000, **P<0.010, *P<0.050
86

This model also found principal influential and school factors related to principals’
reports on the extent to which they influence instruction. Principals’ influence on instruction is
related to principals’ participation in development programs for ASPIRING school principals,
which are formal programs implemented by many school districts to increase principals’ abilities
and to have a pool of capable principals. Through ASPIRING programs, principals can improve
their capacities that can then be effective to teachers’ professional works (Corcoran, Schwartz, &
Weinstein, 2012). Professional development programs encourage principals to acquire better
understanding of students’ academic outcomes and to establish a school climate that may be
directly related to students' development (O'Donnell & White, 2005). Knowledge and
information for instruction acquired by these formal professional developments can lead
principals to have more influence on instruction.
Principals in suburban schools are more likely to have influence on instruction than
principals in urban schools. Because suburban school students have been considered as having
high academic achievements, school districts may have less concern about the principals’
capacities to establish curriculum, to set performance standards, and to evaluate teachers (Bloom
& Owens, 2013), and principals in these suburban schools may feel less pressure from
accountability policies. Urban schools may also have trouble with shortages of capable principals
(Owings, Kaplan, & Chappell, 2011). Competent principals may choose suburban schools; so
suburban school principals can have more influence on instruction than urban school principals.
However, there was no significant difference in principals’ influence on instruction in rural
schools relative to urban schools.
Schools’ resource adequacy was related to principals’ influence on instruction. Principals

87

in schools with enough salary, sufficient educational materials, and low paperwork may have
more influence on instruction than other principals. In schools with ample educational resources
that can provide effective instruction, principals consider themselves as valuable instructional
leaders (Spiri, 2001), and thus they can more have influence on instruction.
However, other factors such as principals’ gender, their race, educational background,
years as principals, school size, school SES, teachers’ shared responsibility, and students learning
attitude, did not affect principals’ influence on instruction.

Support of professional work
The two level HLM examined the second hypothesis. Principals’ support of professional
work was not related to three states’ accountability systems; the proficiency performance
standard, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams. There may be little differences
in principals’ support of professional work in states based on the varying elements of
accountability systems. Therefore, the second hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance
standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively and
significantly correlated with principals’ facilitation of teachers learning) was not supported.
This two level HLM analysis can identify the influential factors for principals’ support of
professional work. Principals’ educational background, years as principals, ASPIRING programs,
teachers’ shared responsibilities, and schools’ resource adequacy were significant factors rather
than the strength of states’ accountability systems. Principals’ educational background and
teaching years can increase principals’ support for professional work. Principals with a high
educational degree, such as specialist or doctoral degree, may provide more support for teachers’
professional work than other principals. The years as principals appears to increase principals’
88

support of professional work. Novice principals may have insufficient knowledge about the
technical aspects of school leadership and limited understanding of human relationships (Nelson,
De la Colina, & Boone, 2008). Lack of knowledge and experience can lead to less support of
professional work.
In addition, ASPIRING programs can enhance principals’ support for professional work.
Principals who participate in development programs for ASPIRING school principals can
support teachers’ professional work better than principals who did not participate in these
programs. The ASPIRING programs can develop personal and professional qualities and
behaviors that are related to teachers’ professional work and school effectiveness (Corcoran et al.,
2012). The differences of knowledge can substantially shape how principals led the work and
responded to accountability policies (Louis & Robinson, 2012).
School climate can affect principals’ support for professional work. Teachers’ shared
responsibilities in each school can be positively related to principals’ support for professional
work. Principals in schools where teachers own high responsibility for students’ academic
outcomes may provide support for teachers’ professional work, including reducing teacher work
loads and offering substitute teachers. Because principals may know about their teachers’ work
and what is required for high performance, they extend more effort to support their staffs’
professional work.
However, principals’ gender, race, and professional development participation, and
schools’ region, size, and SES did not affect principals’ support of professional work. Schools’
resource adequacy was also not a significant factor for principals’ support of professional work.

89

Provision of professional days before or during the school year
From the two level HLM analyses, we can examine the third and fourth hypothesis.
Among three states’ accountability systems, high school graduation exit exams were important
influential factors for provision of professional days before the school year and during the school
year. The principals in states with high school graduation exit exams may provide fewer
professional days before and during the school year. The literature indicates that high stakes tests
tend to narrow the curriculum for disadvantaged students, to focus on test-taking skills, and to
decrease instruction time for untested subjects (Gayler, 2005). Principals in states with high
school graduation exit exams receive pressure encouraging higher student pass rates on the tests.
This stress may make principals focus more on students’ learning, such as by implementing
mandatory test previews and reviews classes (Holme, 2008). Moreover, because high stakes tests
may emphasize basic skills, principals may not feel the necessity to provide professional days for
improving teachers’ capabilities. Therefore, high school graduation exit exams may be negatively
associated with principals’ provision of professional days before and during the school year.
However, the proficiency performance standard and AMO strength did not affect principals’
provision of professional days before and during the school year. Therefore, the third and fourth
hypotheses were not supported. The results are shown Table IV-3.
Principals’ provision of professional days before the school year was influenced by no
principal and school characteristics. Regardless of principals’ and schools’ factors, principals
provided professional days before the school year. Only high school graduation exit exams can
influence principals’ provision of professional days before the school year.

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Table IV-3 The Influential Factors for Principals’ Facilitating Teacher Learning
Facilitating teacher learning

Coeff.
1.907

S. E.
0.205

Provision of
professional day
before the school
year
Coeff.
S. E.
0.949
0.039

0.018

0.041

-0.012

0.007

0.006

0.009

0.038

0.031

0.013

0.007

-0.007

0.008

0.003

0.065

-0.033

0.015

-0.034

Gender

-0.063

0.050

-0.005

0.009

0.017

0.012

White

-0.081

0.085

-0.009

0.010

-0.012

0.019

Fixed Effect

Principals responses
State level
The proficiency performance
standard
AMO strength
High School graduation exit
exams
Principal (school) level

Support of
professional work

*

Provision of
professional day
during the school
year
Coeff.
S. E.
0.799
0.079

*

0.017

Educational background

0.097 **

0.034

-0.004

0.005

-0.003

0.008

The years as principal

0.007 *

0.003

0.000

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.035

0.009

0.008

-0.011

0.010

ASPIRING program
Professional development
participation
Suburban

0.260

0.153

0.022

0.028

0.094

0.068

-0.090

0.066

-0.013

0.010

0.016

0.016

Rural

-0.113

0.070

-0.004

0.010

0.012

School Size

0.145

***

0.011

0.016

0.004

0.003

0.018

0.005

**

0.004
0.004

School SES

0.017

0.014

0.003

0.003

0.010

**

Teachers’ shared responsibility

0.104 *

0.051

-0.006

0.013

0.049

*

0.019

-0.102 *

0.044

-0.009

0.010

-0.024

*

0.011

0.079

0.011

0.015

0.000

Student learning attitude

Schools’ resource adequacy
0.036
***
**
*
P<0.000, P<0.010, P<0.050

0.021

Principals’ provision of professional days during the school year was influenced by few
principal and school characteristics. In schools with large size and with high SES students,
principals can provide more professional days during the school. Teachers’ shared
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responsibilities encouraged principals to provide professional days during the school year.
Principals who recognize their teachers’ high shared responsibilities may believe that additional
professional programs can be useful to increase students’ academic achievement, and that their
teachers may actively participate in these professional days. Positive student learning attitude
may decrease principals’ support for professional work. Principals in the schools with positive
students’ learning attitude may not feel the necessity for professional days during the school year.
However, other factors affect principals’ provision of professional days during the school year.
The results are shown Table IV-3.

Synthesis of principals’ responses
Among states’ accountability systems, AMO strength and high school graduation exit
exams were negatively related to principals’ responses: AMO strength may decrease principals’
supporting for teacher learning and high school graduation exit exams can reduce principals’
provision of professional days before and during the school year. However, proficiency
performance standards did not affect four types of principals’ responses. Based on these results,
the first hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high
school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly correlated with principals’
influence on instruction) was partially supported. However, the second hypothesis (states’ high
proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be
positively and significantly correlated with principals’ support of professional work), the third
hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high school
graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with principals’ provision of
professional days before the school year), and the fourth hypothesis (states’ high proficient
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performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively
and significantly correlated with principals’ provision of professional days during the school year)
were not supported.
Principals’ influence on instruction and their support for teacher learning were affected
by principals’ individual factors although principals’ provision of professional days before and
during the school year were not. School climate had an effect on principals’ support for teacher
learning and their provision of professional days during the school year.

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2. Results of Teachers’ Response to States’ Accountability Systems
Teachers’ responses to states’ accountability systems include teacher autonomy for
curriculum and instruction and principals’ participation time in programs related to content,
instruction, and classroom management. This part will describe the level, characteristics, and
influential factors of teachers’ responses.

1) The level and characteristics of teachers’ responses
The 3-level HLM analyses enabled me to obtain the level and characteristics of the
responses of principals and teachers. Teachers had two types of teacher autonomy: curriculum
autonomy and instructional autonomy. The value of teacher curriculum autonomy was 2.989, and
the value of teacher instructional autonomy was 3.672. These results show that teachers had
more autonomy for evaluating and grading students, disciplining students, and determining the
amount of homework to be assigned, than autonomy for selecting textbooks and other
instructional materials, selecting content, topics, and skills to be taught, and selecting teaching
techniques.
In teacher curriculum autonomy, teacher variance, school variance, and state variance
was 0.681, 0.058, and 0.052. Although there were huge variances of teacher curriculum
autonomy among teachers, there were few differences in school and states variances. Teacher
variance of teacher instructional autonomy was 0.151 and school variance and state variances
were 0.008 and 0.002. This means that each school and state may have similar teacher
instructional autonomy, while teachers require different perceptions.
These results show the value of the ICC. 3-level HLM analysis has two ICC: 2-level ICC,
which the proportion of school-level variance of the total variance, and 3-level ICC, which

94

means the proportion of state-level variance of the total variance. The 2-level ICC of teacher
curriculum autonomy was approximately 7.3%, and the 3-level ICC was 6.6%. This means that
when teachers implement autonomy, the influence of principal and school characteristics was
7.3%, and the power of states’ accountability policies was 6.6% although the effects of teachers’
individual factors was 86.1%. Although teachers may be more influenced by features of their
individual factors than by schools’, principals’, and states’ features, they can have different levels
of teacher autonomy based on their principals’, schools’, and states’ characteristics.
The 2-level ICC of teacher instructional autonomy was approximately 5.0%, and the 3level ICC was 1.2%. When teachers implemented instructional autonomy, the power of schools
factors and states accountability policies were 5.0% and 1.2%. Although the influence of schools
and states on teacher instructional autonomy may not be bigger than the influence of teachers’
characteristics, principals’, schools’, and states’ characteristics can make a difference in teacher
instructional autonomy.
Based on these results, teachers have more instructional autonomy than curriculum
autonomy. The variance of teacher autonomy is different based on field: the variance of teacher
curriculum autonomy was bigger than the variance the teacher instructional autonomy. In teacher
curriculum autonomy, school level variance and state level variance were almost the same, so
there may be little difference in teacher instructional autonomy among schools and states.
Teachers’ participation time in professional development varied in professional
development programs. Teachers spent more time participating in content programs (2.046) than
in instruction programs (0.775) or in classroom management programs (0.600). This means that
teachers may have spent almost 9-16 hours in the past 3 years participating in content programs,
and they may have spent less 8 hours in the past 3 years on professional development related to

95

instruction and classroom management.
There is a lot of teacher variance among teachers’ participation time in professional
development programs. Teachers’ variance in content programs was big, as 1.947. Some teachers
may spend more time for content programs participation, but other teachers may not. However,
the teacher variance in instruction program participation and classroom management program
participation was 0.889 and 0.698.
There were also big differences in teachers’ participation time in professional
development programs among schools. Especially, principals in some schools may spend more
time in instruction programs than principals in other schools: the school level variance of
instruction programs was 0.146. When teachers spend time on participation in professional
development, they may be influenced by school features. However, there may be a few
differences of content and classroom management program participation time among schools
(0.053 and 0.038).
In the state level variance, three types of teacher professional development participation
time had similar value: variances of content, instruction, and classroom management were 0.047,
0.059, and 0.014. This means that teachers in 50 states may spend similar participation time in
professional development programs.
The 2-level ICC of teachers’ participation in professional development programs related
to content, instruction, and classroom management were 2.6%, 13.3%, and 5.1%. Although the
power of schools and principals characteristics on content and classroom management programs
was low, teachers were influenced by the schools and principals features for their participation in
instruction programs.
The 3-level ICC of professional development time for content, instruction, and classroom

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management was 2.3%, 5.4%, and 1.9%. Teachers’ spending time in professional development
may be more influenced by features of their states’ accountability policies, although the
influences were smaller than the influence of teachers’ individual characteristics. Although
teachers have the same characteristics, states’ accountability policies can have different time for
professional development. These results appear in Table IV-4.

Table IV-4 The Level of the Characteristics of Teachers’ Responses
Teachers’ reponses
Teacher autonomy
- Curriculum
- Instruction
Participation time in PD
- Content
- Instruction
- Classroom management

Coeff.

Variance
Standard
Error
Level-1 Level-2 Level-3

ICC
2-level

ICC
3-level

2.989
3.672

0.036
0.008

0.681
0.151

0.058
0.008

0.052
0.002

0.073
0.050

0.066
0.012

2.046
0.775
0.600

0.036
0.039
0.021

1.947
0.889
0.698

0.053
0.146
0.038

0.047
0.059
0.014

0.026
0.133
0.051

0.023
0.054
0.019

After understanding the level and characteristics of teacher autonomy and their
participation time in professional development programs, I analyzed two types of teachers’
behaviors by in states. North Dakota, Iowa, and Minnesota teachers may have high teacher
curriculum autonomy and teacher instructional autonomy. Texas, Maryland, and Virginia
teachers may have lower teacher curriculum autonomy and instructional autonomy than other
states’ teachers. However, Each state may have similar levels of teacher autonomy based on the
types.
Teachers in Arkansas, Utah, Texas, and Vermont may spend more time on professional
development programs related to the content than teachers in Indiana, New Jersey, and
Mississippi do. Florida, Oregon, and Iowa teachers can spend more time on professional
development programs related to instruction than New Jersey, Georgia, and Oklahoma teachers.
97

Arkansas, Texas, and Tennessee teachers were likely to join classroom management professional
development programs but Maine, Connecticut, and New Mexico teachers may participate little
in professional development about classroom management. Based on these results, Texas and
Arkansas teachers may spend more time on professional development programs, while
Connecticut and New Mexico teachers are less likely to participate in professional development
related to content and classroom management. Teachers in 47 states may have different
participation time by the three types of professional development programs. These results appear
in Appendix G.

2) The relationship between states’ accountability strength and teacher autonomy
The three-level HLM analysis can answer the second research question, about what the
relationship between the strength of states’ accountability systems and teachers’ responses is, and
can check the fifth hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and
high school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly correlated with teacher
curriculum autonomy) and the sixth hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance standards,
AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly
correlated with teacher instructional autonomy)

Teacher curriculum autonomy
The fifth hypothesis can be checked by the three-level HLM analysis. The results showed
that states’ high proficiency performance standards significantly and positively influenced
teacher autonomy related to curriculum. The proficiency performance standards can be relatively
long term goals that schools should acquire by 2012. In the 2007-2008 school years when the
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survey was implemented, teachers might have considered these standards as clear targets for
making curricular choices and motivation, not as pressure. Therefore teachers in states with high
proficiency performance standards enhanced teachers’ sense of autonomy in the curriculum.
However, AMO strength were negatively related to teacher autonomy in the curriculum at
the .100 significant level and high school graduation exit exams may be negatively related to
teacher autonomy in the curriculum at the .050 significant level. AMO strength and high school
graduation exit exams, as relatively short-term goals, perhaps produce more pressure than the
proficiency performance standards, and thus two factors of states’ accountability systems can
decrease teachers’ autonomy for selecting content and instructional materials. The results are
shown Table IV-5.
Contrary to expectations that states’ high proficient performance standards, AMO
strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly correlated
with teacher autonomy for curriculum, the results of this study show that the accountability
systems in the America send mixed signals to teachers to guide their work: the proficiency
performance standards were positively related to teacher curriculum autonomy but AMO
strength and high school graduation exit exams reduced teacher curriculum autonomy.
Principals’ perceived influence on instruction is related to teacher autonomy for
curriculum. Teachers reported more autonomous decisions about contents, textbooks, topics, and
skills when their principals reported more power over instruction. Principals can be considered as
protectors from the states’ accountability systems, so principals’ large influence on instruction
can enhance teacher curriculum autonomy (Byrne, 2009; Crocco & Costigan, 2007).

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Table IV-5 Influential Factors for Teacher Curriculum Autonomy

2.189

Standard
Error
0.150

0.074 *

0.029

AMO strength

-0.057 +

0.031

High School graduation exit exams

-0.113 *

0.056

Fixed Effect

Coefficient

Teacher curriculum autonomy
State level
The performance standard

Principal (school) level
Principal’s influence

0.080 ***

0.019

Suburban

0.096 **

0.034

Rural

0.191 ***

0.037

***

0.014

*

0.009

School Size

-0.093

School SES

0.023

Teachers’ shared responsibility

-0.021

Student learning attitude

0.040

0.027

Schools’ resource adequacy

0.240

0.026
***

0.056

Teacher level
Gender

-0.018

Race

0.015

-0.046

0.044

0.055

***

0.014

Teaching years

0.014

***

0.001

HQT

0.026

Educational background

Eighth grade & test subjects
***
P<0.000, **P<0.010, *P<0.050, + P<0.100

-0.390 ***

0.025
0.044

For teacher autonomy about curriculum, the school factors, such as their regions, size,
and SES were significant factors. Teachers in suburban and rural schools have higher teacher
autonomy for curriculum than teachers in urban schools. Perhaps because rural principals may
perceive school staff as being involved in many decision making processes (Brown, Carr, Perry,
& McIntire, 1996), rural school teachers report higher teacher autonomy. Moreover, because
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urban schools are likely to have more low-performing students than suburban schools, teachers
in urban schools might feel more pressure to meet their state’s AYP standards (Sunderman,
Orfield, & Kim, 2006). This pressure can lead urban school teachers to have lower curriculum
autonomy than rural and suburban school teachers.
Schools’ size was also a negative influential factor for teacher curriculum autonomy.
Teachers in large schools tend to have lower teacher autonomy for curriculum than teachers in
small schools. In small schools, teachers have more intimate and personal interactions with
students (V. E. Lee & Loeb, 2000), and thus they can teach based on their students’ needs, not by
following the federal curriculum and its standards.
Teachers in school with high SES tend to have more teacher curriculum autonomy than
teacher in school with low SES. School with low SES can have low performing students, who
are not able to acquire states’ proficiency performance standards. With this reason, teachers in
low SES schools can try to follow states’ standards and curriculum and can diminish their
curriculum autonomy.
Among school climate factors, schools’ resource adequacy influenced teacher autonomy
for curriculum. Teachers in schools with resource adequacy were likely to have more teacher
autonomy related to curriculum. High satisfaction and low paperwork, factors of resource
adequacy, were considered as a significant factor of teacher autonomy. Teachers who manage
their tasks and have lighter paper work may recognize themselves as being more autonomous
(Pearson, 1995). Therefore, in schools with resource adequacy, teachers can have more control of
curriculum. However, teachers’ shared responsibilities and students’ learning attitude were not
significantly related to teacher curriculum autonomy.
Individual teacher characteristics, such as teachers’ educational background, teaching

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years, and their teaching grade and subjects, also influenced teacher curriculum autonomy.
Because educational programs and teaching experiences can provide more knowledge related to
curriculum, teachers who have more education background and who have long teaching years
may have more teacher autonomy in curriculum decisions. These effects are significantly lower
for eighth grade test-subject teachers. They may have little impact on decisions about the
selection of textbooks and content because they have to teach a narrowed curriculum in order to
produce high student test scores. The results are shown Table IV-5.

Teacher instructional autonomy
The three-level HLM analysis enabled to check the sixth hypothesis: whether states’ high
proficiency performance standards, AMO strength, and difficult high school graduation exit
exams will be negatively and significantly correlated with teacher instructional autonomy. No
states’ accountability policies were a significant factor for teacher instructional autonomy. States’
proficiency performance, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams did not
influence teacher instructional autonomy. Because states’ accountability policies focus on
standards and curriculum rather than on instruction, in order to increase students’ academic
achievement (Diamond, 2012; Spillane et al., 2011), teachers may maintain their autonomy in
instructional fields, including selecting teaching techniques, evaluating students, making
decisions about homework, and disciplining students. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis was not
supported. The results are shown Table IV-6.

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Table IV-6 Influential Factors for Teacher Instructional Autonomy
Coefficient

Standard
Error

3.557

0.075

State level
The performance standard
AMO strength
High School graduation exit exams

-0.003
0.001
-0.005

0.008
0.009
0.009

Principal (school) level
Principal’s influence
Suburban
Rural
School Size
School SES
Teachers’ shared responsibility
Student learning attitude
Schools’ resource adequacy

0.021 *
0.009
0.022
-0.004
0.006 +
0.079 **
0.046 ***
0.090 ***

0.012
0.013
0.015
0.006
0.005
0.022
0.013
0.022

0.048 **
0.016
-0.007
0.001 **
0.011 +
-0.053

0.008
0.017
0.009
0.000
0.014
0.010

Fixed Effect
Teacher instructional autonomy

Teacher level
Gender
Race
Educational background
Teaching years
HQT
Eighth grade & test subjects
***
P<0.000, **P<0.010, *P<0.050, + P<0.100

Principals’ influence on instruction can be positively related to teacher instructional
autonomy. When their principals report that they hold more power over instruction, teachers
perceive their principals as a protector from the states’ accountability systems. Therefore,
principals’ influence on instruction can increase teacher instructional autonomy (Byrne, 2009;
Crocco & Costigan, 2007).
Among school characteristics, only school SES influenced teacher instructional autonomy.
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Teachers in schools with high SES students reported that they have more autonomous decisions
about teaching techniques, disciplining students, and determining homework than teacher in
schools with low SES students. However, other variables such as region and size did not affect
teacher instructional autonomy.
Schools’ resource adequacy, teachers’ shared responsibility, and positive student learning
attitude were crucial factors for teacher instructional autonomy. When there is a healthy school
climate, which promotes teachers’ collaboration, communication, and job satisfaction (Garvin,
2007; Pearson, 1995), teachers are likely to enhance teacher instructional autonomy (Sparks,
2012; Erpelding, 1999). Teachers in schools with high teachers’ shared responsibility, positive
students’ learning attitudes, and sufficient school resources report higher teacher instructional
autonomy than other teachers. However, no school physical factors were related to teacher
instructional autonomy.
Among school individual characteristics, gender, teaching years, and highly qualified
teachers were essential factors for teacher instructional autonomy. Female teachers reported more
teacher instructional autonomy because female teachers prefer to enjoy school professional
communities more than male teachers (Louis, Marks, & Sharon, 1996). Experienced teachers can
implement autonomous decisions related to instruction, because novice teachers receive much
more supervision than veteran teachers, and the supervision tends to be directive (Range, Scherz,
Holt, & Young, 2011). Highly qualified teachers had more instructional autonomy than nonqualified teachers. The results are shown Table IV-6.

Synthesis of teacher autonomy
States’ accountability systems significantly affected teacher curriculum autonomy but not
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teacher instructional autonomy. For teacher curriculum autonomy, proficiency performance
standards showed positive effects and AMO strength and high school graduation exit exams
made negative effectives. The influence of states’ accountability systems on teacher curriculum
autonomy was mixed. However, states’ accountability systems did not affect teacher instructional
autonomy.
Based on these results, the fifth hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance standards,
AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be negatively and significantly
correlated with teacher curriculum autonomy) was partially supported, and the sixth hypothesis
(States’ high proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit
exams will be negatively and significantly correlated with teacher instructional autonomy) was
not supported.
Principals’ influence on instruction was positively related to teacher two types of
autonomy. When principals reported more influence on instruction and provide sufficient
resources, teachers had more power to make decisions about curriculum and instruction. School
characteristics were significant for teacher curriculum autonomy, and school climate
significantly affect teacher instructional autonomy. Experienced teachers also can more teacher
autonomy in curriculum and instruction fields.

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3) The relationship between states’ accountability strength and teachers’
participation time in professional development
Through three-level HLM analysis, I can check the seventh hypothesis (states’ high
proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be
positively and significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional
development programs related to content), the eighth hypothesis (states’ high proficient
performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively
and significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional development
programs related to instruction), and the ninth hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance
standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively and
significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional development programs
related to classroom management).

Content professional development participation time
The analysis examined the seventh hypothesis: states’ high proficiency performance
standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively and
significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in content professional development
programs. States’ high proficiency performance standards were associated to teachers’
participation time in professional development programs about the content. The proficiency
performance standards are goals that students should acquire by 2012. To attain these goals,
teachers need to devote their time to develop their knowledge and capacities through content
professional development programs in the 2007-2008 school year. Thus, teachers in states with
high proficiency performance standards may encourage teachers to participate in professional
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development programs for content.
However, AMO strength was negatively related to teachers’ participation time in content
professional development programs. Unlike the proficiency performance standards, the annual
measurable objectives are short-term goals that students should achieve in the 2007-2008 school
year. In order to avoid sanctions, teachers may focus on students’ academic improvement, not on
their knowledge development. Therefore, teachers in states with high AMO strength appear to
spend less time in content professional development programs. However, high school graduation
exit exams were not significantly associated to teachers’ spending time in content programs.
Based on these results, the seventh hypothesis can be partially supported. The results are shown
Table IV-7.
Among principals’ behaviors, professional days built in before the school year were an
effective method for teachers to participate in content professional development programs at
the .100 significant level. During the school year, teachers may not have sufficient time to
prepare their curriculum and to improve their knowledge. Therefore, teachers preferred
professional days before the school year for purposes of improving their readiness to implement
the required curriculum.
School characteristics, such as school region and size, were important factors for teachers’
participation time for content. Rural schools are recognized as having limited educational
resources in order to meet states’ standards (Arnold, Newman, Gaddy, & Dean, 2005).
Insufficient resources can produce few professional development programs, and limited
opportunities for teachers to participate in professional development programs may cause rural
school teachers’ low participation rates. Although suburban school teachers also spent less time
in participation time in professional development content programs than urban teachers, there

107

might be a different reason. Because students in suburban schools are considered as having high
academic achievement, suburban school teachers may not feel the necessity to participate in
professional development programs compared to urban school teachers.

Table IV-7 Influential Factors for Teacher’s Participation Time in Content
Professional Development Programs
Fixed Effect

1.400

Standard
Error
0.222

0.081 *
-0.074 *
-0.071

0.031
0.032
0.065

0.020
0.161 +
0.058
-0.094 *
-0.201 ***
0.048 *
0.009
0.124 +
-0.059 +
-0.045

0.016
0.087
0.061
0.038
0.050
0.022
0.013
0.064
0.034
0.061

0.117 ***
-0.123 *
0.077 **
0.006 ***
0.117 **
0.194 *

0.032
0.047
0.028
0.001
0.037
0.096

Coefficient

Teachers’ participation time in content professional development
State level
The proficiency performance standards
AMO strength
High School graduation exit exams
Principal (school) level
Principal’s support of professional work
Principals’ provision of professional days before the school year
Principals’ provision of professional days during the school year
Suburban
Rural
School Size
School SES
Teachers’ shared responsibility
Student learning attitude
Schools’ resource adequacy
Teacher level
Gender
Race
Educational background
Teaching years
HQT
Eighth grade & test subjects
***
P<0.000, **P<0.010, *P<0.050, + P<0.100

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Teachers in large schools spent more time in content program participation than teachers
in small schools. The number of students in large schools may encourage these schools to create
various and comprehensive programs to address students’ needs (K. R. Stevenson, 2006; V. E.
Lee & Loeb, 2000). Many students with different needs might lead teachers to participate in
professional development content programs.
School climate significantly influenced teachers’ participation time in content programs.
Teachers in school with high-shared responsibility among teachers can participate in content
professional development programs. Shared responsibility may encourage teacher to spend more
time on content programs. However, students’ positive learning attitude reduced teachers’
spending time for content professional development programs. Teachers in schools with positive
learning attitude may not need to participate in content professional development programs.
Teachers reported differential benefits based on their individual attributes. Teachers’
participation time in professional development programs about content may differ according to
their gender. Female teachers are more likely to engage in interactive professional development
about content than male teachers. Female teachers are likely to be involved in school
professional community (Louis et al., 1996) based on their effective communication skills
(Tannen, 1991). Teachers’ race was also a significant aspect. White teachers spent less in content
professional development programs than non-white teachers. White teachers can be assigned to
high quality schools due to non-alternative teacher certification (Kee, 2012; Shen, 1997), and
they may not feel the necessity to participate in professional development programs.
Teachers with high educational background, many teaching years, high qualifications,
and grade and subject tend to be involved in content professional development programs.
Because these types of teachers feel the necessity for improving their teaching quality in order to

109

support students’ academic outcomes (Jackson, 2006; Steffy, 2000), they may spend more time
on content professional development programs. Highly qualified teachers and eighth grade
English or mathematics teachers were also likely to participate in professional development
about content.

Instruction professional development participation time
The eighth hypothesis, states’ high proficiency performance standards, AMO strength,
and high school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly correlated with
teachers’ participation time in instruction professional development programs, was also
examined. All aspects of states’ accountability systems, proficiency performance standards,
AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams were unrelated to teachers’ participation
time in instruction professional development programs. As I saw with the autonomy analyses,
accountability pressures did not appear to penetrate into the classroom in the same way they
influence curricular decisions. Based on these results, the eighth hypothesis cannot be supported.
The results are shown Table IV-8.
Principals’ support of professional work and their provision of professional days before
and during the school year can be associated with teachers’ spending time in instruction
professional development although the association was not significant. When principals offer
substitute teachers, common planning time, reduced teacher workloads, and professional days,
teachers may more easily attend the type of instructional professional development programs.
The supportive environment for teacher learning can encourage teachers to spend more time for
instructional professional development programs. These results support the kind of embedded
professional development and collaborative work required for instructional improvement.
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Table IV-8 Influential Factors for Teacher’s Participation Time in Instruction
Professional Development Programs
Coefficient

Standard
Error

0.723

0.304

The proficiency performance standards

0.055

0.035

AMO strength

0.051

0.038

-0.113

0.072

Principal’s support of professional work

0.020

0.014

Principals’ provision of professional days before the school year

0.029

0.077

Principals’ provision of professional days during the school year

0.052

Fixed Effect
Teachers’ participation time in instructional professional
development
State level

High School graduation exit exams
Principal (school) level

0.058
+

Suburban

-0.078

Rural

-0.060

0.046

School Size

0.020

0.023

School SES

-0.013

0.013

0.104

0.068

Student learning attitude

-0.065

0.040

Schools’ resource adequacy

-0.067

0.053

Teachers’ shared responsibility

0.040

Teacher level
0.149 ***

Gender

0.019

-0.126 *

0.056

Educational background

0.035 +

0.020

Teaching years

0.000

0.001

HQT

0.030

0.038

Eighth grade & test subjects
***
P<0.000, **P<0.010, *P<0.050, + P<0.100

0.184 ***

0.048

Race

Schools’ characteristics were related to teachers’ participation time in instruction
programs. Teachers in suburban locations were less likely to join in activities to improve
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instruction. Because students in suburban schools may have high academic outcomes, teachers in
these schools cannot need instruction professional development programs. However, other
school characteristics and school climate did not offer significant effects on teachers’
participation time in professional development programs related to instruction.
Teachers’ individual factors, such as gender, race, teaching years, and teaching grade and
subjects, were significant factors to increase teachers’ participation time in instruction programs.
Female teachers were much more inclined to pursue this type of professional learning than are
male teachers. Teachers’ race also affected teachers’ participation time in programs focusing on
instruction. Minority teachers may come from alternative teacher certification programs (Kee,
2012; Shen, 1997), and they may be assigned to low quality schools with non-excellent school
climate and low SES. Therefore, non-white teachers may feel the necessity of this type of
professional development programs compared to non-white teachers. Experienced teachers were
more likely to spend more time on instructional programs.
The eighth grade English and mathematics teachers spent more time on content and
instruction professional development programs. Eighth grade is a tested grade and English and
mathematics are test sub-subjects. Eighth grade English and mathematics teachers may feel
accountability pressures most strongly, so they may try to increase their teaching quality through
professional development. The results are shown Table IV-8.

Classroom management professional development participation time
The three analysis of the ninth hypothesis (states’ high proficiency performance standards,
AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively and significantly
correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional development programs related to
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classroom management) was studied. States’ accountability policies, proficiency performance
standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams, did not affect teachers’
participation time in professional development programs related to classroom management.
Teachers' inclination to develop their management skills was unrelated to any dimension of
accountability because these states’ accountability systems may focus on standards, not
classroom management. Based on these results, the ninth hypothesis cannot be supported. The
results are shown Table IV-9.
Principals’ facilitating teacher learning may not be an effective method for teachers to
participate in classroom management professional development programs. Principals’ support of
professional work and their provision of professional days before and during the school year did
not affect teachers’ participation time in professional development programs related to classroom
management.
School SES among school physical characteristics significantly affected teachers’
participation in classroom management programs. When the schools have many students who
qualify for the federal free or reduced-price lunch programs, the teachers in these schools may
spend more time in classroom management programs. Schools with significant numbers of
economically disadvantaged children may find it difficult to acquire AYP due to low academic
achievement (Foy, 2008). To overcome the weakness, the teachers focus on classroom
management professional development programs.

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Table IV-9 Influential Factors for Teacher’s Participation Time in Professional
Development Related to Classroom Management
Fixed Effect

Coefficient

Teachers’ participation time in classroom management
professional development
State level

Standard
Error

0.848

0.155

-0.014

0.021

AMO strength

0.002

0.015

High School graduation exit exams

0.017

0.037

Principal’s support of professional work

0.010

0.009

Principals’ provision of professional days before the school year

0.051

0.043

Principals’ provision of professional days during the school year

-0.040

0.035

Suburban

0.030

0.027

Rural

0.015

0.038

School Size

-0.013

0.015

School SES

-0.020 *

0.009

0.040

0.039

The proficiency performance standards

Principal (school) level

Teachers’ shared responsibility
Student learning attitude

-0.153

Schools’ resource adequacy

0.120

***

0.028

*

0.057

Teacher level
Gender

-0.010

0.012

Race

-0.148 ***

0.037

Educational background

-0.038 *

0.019

Teaching years

-0.002 **

0.001

HQT

-0.043

0.027

Eighth grade & test subjects
***
P<0.000, **P<0.010, *P<0.050, + P<0.100

-0.007

0.053

Schools’ resource adequacy can increase teachers’ classroom management professional
development, although students’ learning attitudes is negatively related to teachers’ spending
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time on classroom management professional development. When students have positive learning
attitudes, teachers have less need for this focus so principals provide these programs; conversely,
in schools where students' attitudes are negative, principals support teachers to invest more in
professional development to improve their classroom management skills. Resources are
necessary for these programs, thus schools with more resources are likely to have more of these
types of programs available. However, teachers’ shared responsibility did not affect teachers’
participation in any professional development programs.
Classroom management training was not attractive to minority teachers or those with
extensive experience or MA degrees. White teachers spend more time in classroom management
programs than non-white teachers. Because the master’s course can provide knowledge about
classroom management, teachers with high educational background may not feel the necessity to
participate in classroom management programs while teachers without a master’s degree need
more professional development programs related to classroom management. Experienced
teachers participated less in classroom management programs because they can learn classroom
management skills during their long teaching years.

Synthesis of teachers’ participation time in professional development
States’ accountability systems affected only teachers’ participation time in content
programs, not instruction and classroom management programs. The influence on three factors
of accountability was mixed. The proficiency performance standards significantly increased
teachers’ participation time in content programs while AMO strength decreased the time. The
high school graduation exit exams did not significantly influence teachers’ spending time in
classroom management programs.
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Based on these results, the seventh hypothesis (states’ high proficient performance
standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively and
significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional development programs
related to content) was partially supported. However, the eighth hypothesis (states’ high
proficient performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be
positively and significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional
development programs related to instruction) and the ninth hypothesis (states’ high proficient
performance standards, AMO strength, and high school graduation exit exams will be positively
and significantly correlated with teachers’ participation time in professional development
programs related to classroom management) were not supported.
Principals are essential factors for teachers’ participation in professional development
programs. Professional days before the school year that principals provide can promote teachers’
spending time in professional development programs related to content. Principals’ facilitating
teachers learning can increase teachers’ spending time in professional development programs.
School characteristics made effects on teachers’ participation time in content professional
development programs, and school climate affected teachers’ spending time on classroom
management programs. However, teachers’ professional development time related to instruction
was not affected by school characteristics and school climate.
Teachers’ race was essential factors for teachers’ participation time in three types of
professional development programs. White teachers spent less time in three types of professional
development programs. Eighth grade teachers who teach English and mathematics devoted more
time for professional development programs related to content and instruction.

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CHAPTER FIVE
V. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION
School staffs, principals, and teachers differently respond to each state’s accountability
system. Their responses may be the fundamental key to successful school education and students’
outcomes (Louis et al., 2010; DeMoss, 2002). This dissertation represents an empirical test of
whether states’ accountability policies are related to principals’ and teachers’ responses to them.
The results of this study revealed the extent of principals’ and teachers’ responses to
accountability, and showed the range of influential factors of states, principals, schools, and
teachers. In this concluding chapter, I first discuss the major findings of the study as principals’
and teachers’ responses to accountability systems. At the end of the chapter, I suggest several
implications of the study for teachers, school leaders, policymakers, and educational researchers.

1. Discussion
1) The weak negative relationship between states’ accountability policies and
principals’ responses
Recognizing the differences in accountability policies among 50 states, I assumed that
these differences could cause dissimilar responses from principals. This study about the
relationship between states’ accountability policies and principals’ responses showed that there is
a negative relationship between the strength of states’ accountability systems and principals’
response. Principals in state with large differences of starting points and intermediate goals had
low influence on instruction and principals in states with high school graduation exit exams
requirement especially provide fewer professional days before the school year. Principals in

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states with strong accountability systems are likely to narrow the curriculum, to emphasize testtaking skills, and to decrease instruction time for untested subjects (Gayler, 2005). Moreover,
they provide additional preview and review classes to help many students pass the tests (Holme,
2008). These principals’ behaviors focus on students, not teachers. Therefore, the principals in
states with strong accountability systems have low influence on instruction and provide less
professional days to teachers before the school year.
Other studies also show similar results, in which states’ accountability may produce
negative effects on principals’ perceptions and behaviors. Under the accountability contexts,
principals feel personal and professional pressure from their central office, community, and
themselves (Knobl, 2010; Priolo, 2010). This pressure leads principals to focus on test subjects.
Principals offer more courses or extra-curricular programs only to test subjects (Priolo, 2010;
Spillane et al., 2002), and they redirect funds to these subjects (Lewis, 2010; Ladd & Zelli, 2002).
Principals also force teachers to narrow the curriculum and to spend more time on teaching testtaking skills (Hollingworth, Dude, & Shepherd, 2010; Jones & Egley, 2010; Gardiner, CanfieldDavis, & Anderson, 2009).
However, the relationship between states’ accountability policies and principals’
responses may not strong. The first assumption of the weak relationship between states’
accountability policies and principals’ influence on instruction and their facilitating teacher
learning is that states’ accountability policies are external mandates which are “complex
arrangement[s] of policies, created by actors and interests outside of schools, who are in position
to reward and punish schools, aimed at impacting practices inside schools, and requiring
reporting to diverse external audience” (Knapp & Feldman, 2012, p. 667). This complicated
combination may not be educationally coherent and can create conflicts with school staffs

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(Firestone & Shipps, 2005; O'Day, 2002). Therefore, states’ accountability policies, as external
accountability systems, may have limitations to answer any problem related to teaching and
learning (J. B. Smith, Smith, & Bryk, 1998).
Another assumption is the influence of the district. Within a state, each district may have
different levels of accountability policies (Firestone et al., 1998), which makes a dissimilar
relationship between principals. Because district practices can determine the principals’ efficacy
and behaviors (Leithwood, Louis, & Anderson, 2012; Louis et al., 2010), when districts have
strong policies and a supportive relationship with their principals, principals may adapt the states’
accountability policies or integrate the policies with their pre-existing educational missions
(Louis & Robinson, 2012).
The effect of the media on all principals can be one reason why there is little relationship
between states’ accountability policies and principals’ responses. Since the implementation of
NCLB, principals have watched and listened to the horror of test scores by print and visual
media (Foy, 2008). Through these media, even principals who belong to states with weak
accountability systems can understand and feel strong accountability policies.
The last assumption is time. Initially, principals may have negative perceptions about
accountability systems because their responsibilities shift from school management to the school
effectiveness based on students’ test scores (Foy, 2008). However, time can allow a principal to
accept accountability policies (Louis & Robinson, 2012). Since the implementation of NCLB,
principals gradually have made sense of the accountability systems and consider the systems as
their polices (Louis et al., 2005). Therefore, in the 2007-2008 school year when after five years
of NCLB implementation, principals did not differently respond to states’ accountability systems
based on the strength of states’ accountability systems.

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2) The directly opposed effects of states’ accountability policies on teachers’
responses
Assuming the diverse level of states’ accountability policies, I tried to answer the second
research question: what is the relationship between the strength of states’ accountability systems
and teachers’ responses, that are teacher autonomy and their participation in professional
development programs. The analysis for the second research question found interesting results,
which the factors of states’ accountability policies produced the directly opposed effects on
teachers’ responses. The proficiency performance standards increased teacher curriculum
autonomy and teachers’ participation time in content-based professional development programs,
although high school graduation exit exams decreased their curriculum autonomy and AMO
strength diminished teachers’ spending time in content focused professional development
programs.
According to the results of these research models, AMO strength and high school
graduation exit exams caused negative effects. Teachers in states with a big difference between
starting points and annual measurable objectives, and in states with rigorous high school
graduation exit exams may have lower teacher autonomy for curriculum and spend less time in
content-focused professional development programs than teachers in states without these two
state accountability policies. Achievement targets make a difference. Accomplishment of AYP
goals is a relatively immediate matter for both teachers and students. To avoid sanctions, students
should acquire AYP goals and pass the exams, and teachers should help student to obtain high
test scores. However, longer term goals revolve around implementation of curricular standards.
For students’ successful outcomes, teachers may give up their autonomy and follow the state’s

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standards and curriculum, and, thus, they can focus on students’ learning rather than developing
their own capacities. Therefore, AMO strength and high school graduation exit exams can
provide negative effects on teachers’ responses.
However, the proficiency performance standards were positively associated with teacher
curriculum autonomy and their participation time in professional development programs related
to content. The proficiency performance standards can be relatively long term goals that teachers
should acquire by 2012. In the 2007-2008 school year, when the survey was implemented,
teachers might not have felt any pressure to acquire the proficiency performance standards, thus,
they could maintain and develop their teacher autonomy. In addition, the proficiency
performance standards provided direction for teachers to promote their capabilities and their
instruction. The motivation perhaps led to teachers’ participation in professional development
programs, especially on content.
Based on the these results, proficiency performance standards may be positively related
to teacher curriculum autonomy and teachers’ participation time in content professional
development programs. These findings suggest that the recent waiver policy that federal
government implemented over the past few years could produce positive effects. (Davidson,
Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2013). Because it would be impossible for all schools to reach
proficiency performance standards goals by 2014, the federal Department of Education started
permitting states’ flexibility requests to alleviate the impending 100% proficiency deadline in
2011. As of March 2013, all states but Nebraska and Montana had submitted flexibility requests,
and thirty-five of these requests have been approved. With the flexibility policies, the principals
and teachers may gain additional time to improve their students’ academic accomplishment.
Having time on teachers’ side can be a motivation and a goal, not pressure, for teachers.

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Therefore, through the flexibility policies of NCLB, teachers can enhance their autonomous
decisions about curriculum and their participation time in professional development programs
related to content fields.

3) The limited effects of states’ accountability policies on specific schools
The states’ accountability systems can be significantly and negatively related to schools
with specific features, including urban, large and poor schools. This study found that urban
schools, large size schools, and schools with low SES students tended to have low teacher
curriculum autonomy and to spend more time on professional development time related to
content, which might be negatively related to states’ accountability systems. Teachers in schools
with limited educational resources also report low teacher curriculum autonomy.
Schools in urban areas and schools with low SES students and a large size are likely to
have many low-performing students. Low students’ academic achievement may make teachers
feel pressure from the states’ accountability systems because under the states’ accountability
systems teachers can receive some sanctions when students do not accomplish states’ academic
goals. With this reason, teachers in these urban, large, and poor schools really may follow states’
standards and content for the tests, and, thus, they feel that they have no autonomy. Closely
related, teachers in these types of schools report spending more time on professional
development programs related to content perhaps to confirm and understand test contents and to
increase their students’ academic achievement. Then teachers appear to sense pressures of
accountability perspective more so than teachers in suburban, small size, and affluent schools
that have high-performing students.
The results suggest that low teacher curriculum autonomy might aggravate the

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educational circumstance of urban, large, and poor schools even though it increases the teachers’
participation in professional development that might be positive for high teacher quality. Teacher
autonomy can be considered as essential source of teacher’s intrinsic motivation, professionalism,
and job satisfaction (Roth et al., 2007; Pearson & Moomaw, 2005). Teachers with sufficient
autonomy can implement effective classroom instruction and have satisfaction, which can lead to
retain in their teaching jobs. Under the accountability systems, teachers in urban, large, and poor
schools appear to have low teacher curriculum autonomy, which can make teachers feel less
impelled to participate in collaborative work, take a less professional perspective of their work,
and be less willing to work on improving their teaching practice. Moreover, job dissatisfaction
based on low teacher curriculum autonomy from states’ accountability might lead to increased
turnover of any capable teachers in schools with a poor educational environment. Although states’
accountability systems intended to increase the academic achievement of low-income, low
achieving, and minority students, these accountability systems might actually interrupt students’
improvement in urban schools, in poor schools, and in large schools as a result of low teacher
curriculum autonomy.

4) The limited effects of states’ accountability policies on specific domain of
practice
One more meaningful point is that the influence of states’ accountability policies on
teachers is limited to specific domains of practice. This study found that states’ accountability
policies did not affect teacher instructional autonomy and teachers’ participation time in
professional development programs related to instruction and classroom management.
Teachers’ specific task domains of practice can be perceived by teachers in very different

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ways within accountability contexts. Relatively, teacher instructional autonomy and teachers’
participation in classroom management may be remote domains of practice for the states’
accountability systems, because the goal of accountability policy may be to constrain the
individual decisions teachers make in deciding what curriculum to follow in their practice. Under
the accountability contexts, teachers have limited control about content and curriculum (Eden,
2001), and they devote their time to check and understand the content of tests. However, teachers
appear to retain autonomy in how to teach (Desimone, 2013; Diamond, 2012; Spillane et al.,
2011), and thus they may not feel the necessity for spending time on professional development
programs related to instruction. Moreover, because teachers’ classroom management may be
more related to school contexts, such as school SES and student learning attitudes than states’
accountability policies, teachers’ participation time in professional development related to
classroom management may not be affected by states’ accountability policies.
The limited effects of states’ accountability policies on teachers’ specific fields can be
also explained as recoupling, which “the process of creating tight couplings where loose
couplings were once in place” (Hallett, 2010, p. 54). School organizations have been considered
as loosely coupled systems, in which the external environment and policies may have rarely
penetrated the instruction in classroom (Fullan, 2001). However, school organization may be
comprised of two parts: the institutional sectors, in which loose coupling predominates and the
technical sectors, where tighter coupling occurs (W. R. Scott & Meyer, 1983). Therefore, under
the accountability systems, teachers may enjoy more autonomy for instructional decisions rather
than curriculum decisions.
School climate results from the interaction of various people over time. How teachers
work together and the extent to which they share responsibility for conditions outside the

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classroom can influence school climate. Whether students come to school ready to learn or not,
students contribute to general condition in the schools. Finally, the extent to which parents and
communities support the school with adequate resources is related to the climate within the
school.
With these reasons, school climate is an essential factor for teacher instructional
autonomy and for teachers’ participation in classroom management programs in this study.
School climate can be effective to construct a collective sense-making process in schools (Louis
et al., 2005), and so teachers in the schools with healthy school climate are more likely to
collaborate and communicate each other (Garvin, 2007; Pearson, 1995). Through this interaction
process, teachers can share not only school visions but also various educational knowledge and
information. Therefore, positive school climate can encourage teachers to make autonomous
decisions about instruction and classroom management (Finnigan, 2012; Sparks, 2012; Erpelding,
1999), which can be essential for school education improvement. It is also possible that teachers
who work with other closely reach collective decisions for which they feel individual
responsibility and control.

5) Principals’ effects on teachers’ responses
Through this study, I found that principals' responses are essential factors for teachers’
responses. Principals’ facilitating teacher learning encourages teachers to spend more time in
professional development programs, and the preferred modality and the timing of professional
development varies based on the focus of the activities. Teachers’ participation in professional
development focusing on content is enhanced when principals offered the professional days
before the school year. Content may require attention and planning before the school year begin.

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In contrast, instruction is the center of teacher’s daily work and thus teachers’ learning for
instruction can be enhanced by the principals’ support of professional work during the school
year. Principals’ support, such as providing for substitutes, arranging for early dismissal,
providing common planning time, and reducing teacher work loads, create a school environment
which encourages teachers’ professional growth development (Drago-Severson, 2012; Croft et
al., 2010).
In addition, principals’ reports of the extent to which they influence instruction show a
positive association with teacher autonomy for curriculum and instruction. Based on the “winwin-game concept,” principals’ influence on instruction can have a positive relationship with
teachers’ power in decision-making (Shen & Xia, 2012). Under the accountability policies,
school staffs, both principals and teachers, may be affected by pressure of states and districts.
This pressure may produce a close identity between teachers and their principals. Teachers
consider principals as protectors against the pressure of the state administration, and as producers
of the school environment, which teachers need to implement their autonomy (Byrne, 2009;
Crocco & Costigan, 2007). Therefore, principals’ influence on instruction can encourage teacher
autonomy.

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2. Implications
Based on the results and discussion of this study, it is clear that external accountability
systems measured by this study do not enhance principals’ instructional work or teachers’ sense
of control over their work on classroom condition generally. I would like to suggest several
implications. First, recognizing the limitations of external systems, policy makers might
encourage principals to develop internal accountability systems, which refer to the ability of the
school to respond to external pressure in a way that improves its performance. As I identify the
results, external accountability systems may have less effect on principals’ behaviors. For
principals to positively and actively respond to accountability, internal accountability systems
may be necessary because they can make a positive impact on teachers’ teaching practices
because the systems “reflect an alignment within the school of personal responsibility and
collective expectations - regardless of the external policy” (Abelmann, Elmore, Even, Kenyon, &
Marshall, 1999, p. 38).
However, internal accountability systems do not necessarily develop as the result of the
external accountability system (Gonzalez & Firestone, 2013; McGuinn, 2012). In order to create
internal accountability, policy makers and school districts should provide sufficient workshops,
professional development, and templates for the standards and curriculum of states’
accountability policies. Rather than the signal of states’ accountability policies, educational
resources and school staff capacities are more useful for principals to understand and implement
states’ accountability policies (B. Berry et al., 2003).
In addition, principals might focus on internalizing the external expectations for the
school and share responsibility with their staffs to emphasize students’ outcomes (Knapp &
Feldman, 2012). Developing new teachers, sustaining instructional success, implementing

127

curricular innovations, and changing the school-community relationship can be effective
methods to enhance professional responsibility of relationship (Jacobson, Johnson, Ylimaki, &
Giles, 2009; Polk, 2006).
Second, policy makers can encourage professional development programs for principals.
Principals’ experiences participating in professional development programs may be an effective
method for principals to respond actively and positively to accountability policies. Professional
development programs provide not only a better understanding of content and instruction
(O'Donnell & White, 2005), but they also offer advocacy and outreach to professional
organizations for school principals (Keith, 2011). Principals can improve their abilities for
making and evaluating decisions adhering to states’ accountability standards through
professional development related to data management and analysis (Adamowki, Therriault, &
Cavanna, 2007).
Third, it is necessary for principals to emphasize long-term goals. As the results of this
study, proficiency performance standards can provide positive effects, although AMO strength
and high school graduation exit exams provided negative effects. Long-term goals can be
motivations, compared to short-term goals, which are considered as pressure. Therefore,
principals with long-term points of view implement educational activities that have high yield.
Fourth, in order to enhance teacher autonomy, principals must invest time and effort to
instruction. Principals’ reported influence on instruction was positively related to teacher
curriculum autonomy and instructional autonomy. Therefore, principals need to develop
necessary knowledge and skills to act goals for meet curriculum standards and to evaluate
teachers.
Fifth, principals might want to match scheduling of professional days to the focus on the

128

developmental programs. As confirmed in the results, when principals provide professional days
before the school year, teachers can participate in professional development programs related to
content. Because the provision of professional days before the school year can be an effective
method for teachers to focus on professional development time, principals should implement
professional days before the school year, not during the school year.
Lastly, principals need to implement suitable policies for their school contexts. As we
observed, there were different influential factors for teachers’ work types. If principals would
like to improve teacher instructional autonomy and to increase teachers’ participation time in
classroom management programs, principals should establish healthy school climate, while
which may not an effective method for high teacher curriculum autonomy and high participation
in professional development content and instruction.

129

3. Conclusion
Accountability policies have been placed at the most important point since the 1990s.
Based on the accountability policies, each state implements its own accountability policies. They
established academic content and performance standards, implemented test for all the students in
grades 3 through 8 annually, and set up annual measurable objectives in reading and mathematics
for districts, schools, and designated student subgroups within schools. The combination of states’
decisions on accountability policies, such as performance standards, high school graduation exit
exams, and the difference of between starting points and intermediate goals, may lead to the
varying strength of the accountability systems in different states. Existing studies have found that
the strength of states’ accountability systems can affect students’ academic outcomes and
teachers’ instruction.
Based on this study, there are negative effects of states’ accountability systems on
principals’ responses although the effects were not strong. Principals in states with strong
accountability systems may have low influence on instruction, and they provide less professional
days before and during the school year. Because strong states’ accountability systems are like to
emphasize high students’ test scores, principals in these states tend to focus less on teacher
learning.
This study also found that states’ accountability systems make effects on a specific
domain such as content and curriculum, not instruction. The effects of states’ accountability
systems are also directly opposed effects of states’ accountability policies on teachers’ response:
long-term goals show positive effects although short-term goals show negative effects. In
addition, in schools with specific features, the effects of states’ accountability systems are
remarkably appeared.

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The main goal of accountability policies is to increase students’ academic outcomes.
Under the accountability systems, principals and teachers implement various activities and
behaviors in order to accomplish this goal. However, this study shows that the responses of
principals and teachers to strong states’ accountability systems might be negative for school
staffs and school organization, which can produce low students’ academic outcomes. Therefore,
it is necessary to modify and develop states’ accountability systems in order to create school
context that not only students can produce high academic outcomes, but also principals and
teachers positively perceive and respond to them.

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APPENDICES

132

Appendix A. Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade in Reading
Table VI-1 Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade in Reading

AL
AK
AZ
AK
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO

Forth grade Reading
Eighth grade Reading
Performance Standards
Performance Standards
2003 2005 2007 2009 2003 2005 2007 2009
205 207
234 234
223 222 216 218 241 230 233 231
213 212 256 244 245 241
223 236 229 216 267 254 249 241
231 231 226 220 271 262 261 259
201 201 202 229 229 230 228
217 221 220 214 239 242 245 243
225 220 249 242 240 236
231 230 230 225 263 265 262 262
212 215 213 218 230 224 215 209
247 238 239 264 262 245 241
217 207 217 213 247 235 233 218
208 207 256 245 236 234
225 228 229 257 249 251 255
220 219 220 221 253 250 252 248
226 218 219 217 253 242 241 236
229 223
251 253
221 223 223 221 253 251 246 243
236 234 274
261 253
215 206 208 252 245 250 237
251 255 254 255
252 249
226 222 204 200
238 236
237 233
265 259
205 206 204 223 250 247 251 254
244 242 245 246
272 267
133

MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Forth grade Reading
Eighth grade Reading
Performance Standards
Performance Standards
2003 2005 2007 2009 2003 2005 2007 2009
229
234 235 253
250 246
228

248

246

207

200
219

224
239
220
233
219
231
226
225
213
220
223
236
245
224
198
217

236
215
225
251

239
219
240
217
222
216

213
203
234
232

236
223
250

230
221
233
207
203
224
233
218

225
237
231
236
207
220
225
219
228
214
218
231
215
224
195
214
225
236
213
243
225
219
226

238
258
256

250
251
268
217
255
241
244
254
258

285

276

221

222
225

247
258
252
248
260
217
251
240
232
251
245
253
281
249
211
222

228
229
278

263
239
253
229
231
247

249
272
226
255

232
277

246
256
244
246
247
246
253
251
249
250
245
252
245
254
211
201
235
259
229
253
249
232
259

Appendix B. Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade in Mathematics
Table VI-2 Proficiency Performance Standards in Fourth and Eighth Grade in Mathematics

AL
AK
AZ
AK
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO

Forth grade Math
Eighth grade Math
Performance Standards
Performance Standards
2003 2005 2007 2009 2003 2005 2007 2009
205 207
253 246
223
222 216 218 268 268 265 268
213 212 300
268 266
223
236 229 216 296 288 277 267
231
231 226 220
201 201 202 268 258 259 256
217
221 220 214 258 257 252 251
225 220 250 252
258
231
230 230 225 269 269 266 266
212
215 213 218 255 255 243 247
247 238 239 299 296 294 286
217
207 217 213 280 266 265 261
208 207 276 276 251 251
225 228 229 269 266 266 273
220
219 220 221 266 262 264 263
226
218 219 217
270 265
229 223 291 285 279 273
221
223 223 221 265 264 267 263
236 234 311
286 284
215 206 208 286 276 278 271
251
255 254 255 299 301 302 300
226
222 204 200 278 269 260 253
237 233
286 287
205
206 204 223 261 262 262 264
244
242 245 246 314 311 289 287

134

MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Forth grade Math
Eighth grade Math
Performance Standards
Performance Standards
2003 2005 2007 2009 2003 2005 2007 2009
229
234 235 271
281 285
228

248

246

207

200
219

224
239
220
233
219
231
226
225
213
220
223
236
245
224
198
217

236
215
225
251

239
219
240
217
222
216

213
203
234
232

236
223
250

230
221
233
207
203
224
233
218

225
237
231
236
207
220
225
219
228
214
218
231
215
224
195
214
225
236
213
243
225
219
226

256
275
279

273
287
275
247
277
274
258
269
272

306

305

260

230
273

267
282
272
285
273
270
279
265
249
262
271
279
312
271
234
268

253
263
293

284
259
286
253
262
279

278
279
247
293

261
297

269
281
272
277
249
253
278
265
269
266
272
275
270
271
229
254
275
282
251
288
270
262
278

Appendix C. Starting Points of 50 States in 2002
Table VI-3 Starting Points of 50 States in 2002

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO

Forth
Reading
68.00
64.03
45.00
42.40
13.60
76.92
57.00
57.00
31.00
60.00
30.00
66.00
40.00
58.80
64.00
51.20
47.27
36.90
34.00
43.80
70.70
38.00
69.50
66.00
18.40

Forth
Math
61.00
54.86
50.00
40.00
16.00
75.86
65.00
33.00
38.00
50.00
10.00
51.00
40.00
57.10
62.00
46.80
22.45
30.10
12.00
41.40
53.00
47.00
69.60
49.00
8.30

Eighth
Reading
43.00
64.03
31.00
35.20
13.60
73.61
57.00
57.00
31.00
60.00
30.00
66.00
40.00
58.80
60.00
51.20
45.60
36.90
35.00
43.00
70.70
31.00
64.00
30.00
18.40

Eighth
Math
48.00
54.86
7.00
29.10
16.00
59.51
65.00
33.00
38.00
50.00
10.00
51.00
40.00
57.10
58.00
46.80
16.49
30.10
13.00
19.00
53.00
31.00
58.30
27.00
8.30

MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

135

Forth
Reading
74.00
62.00
30.00
82.00
68.00
40.85
122.00
68.90
65.10
62.00
622.00
40.00
45.00
76.10
17.60
65.00
77.00
46.80
65.00
403.00
60.70
52.20
72.00
61.00
30.40

Forth
Math
51.00
65.00
36.00
76.00
53.00
24.13
86.00
65.80
45.70
35.90
648.00
39.00
35.00
61.70
15.50
45.00
72.00
33.40
57.00
390.00
58.40
29.70
67.00
37.00
23.80

Eighth
Reading
74.00
61.00
37.00
82.00
58.00
36.79
122.00
68.90
61.40
68.60
622.00
40.00
45.00
68.00
17.60
65.00
77.00
46.80
65.00
403.00
60.70
30.10
75.00
61.00
34.50

Eighth
Math
51.00
58.00
32.00
76.00
39.00
15.28
86.00
65.80
33.30
37.00
648.00
39.00
35.00
46.10
15.50
45.00
72.00
33.40
57.00
390.00
58.40
17.30
64.00
37.00
25.30

Appendix D Intermediate Goals of 50 States in 2007
Table VI-4 Intermediate Goals of 50 States in 2007

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO

Forth
Reading
77.00
77.18
56.00
56.80
35.20
88.46
79.00
68.00
58.00
73.30
58.00
78.00
62.50
72.60
76.00
75.60
60.45
57.90
50.00
71.80
85.40
59.00
73.80
83.00
51.00

Forth
Math
72.00
66.09
63.20
55.00
37.00
89.09
82.00
50.00
62.00
59.50
46.00
70.00
62.50
71.50
74.70
73.40
41.84
53.50
40.00
69.10
76.50
65.00
73.90
75.00
45.00

Eighth
Reading
59.00
77.18
54.00
51.40
35.20
86.81
79.00
68.00
58.00
73.30
58.00
78.00
62.50
72.60
73.30
75.60
59.20
57.90
50.00
71.10
85.40
54.00
69.20
65.00
51.00

Eighth
Math
55.00
66.09
38.00
46.83
37.00
79.75
82.00
50.00
62.00
59.50
46.00
70.00
62.50
71.50
72.00
73.40
37.37
53.50
40.00
57.20
76.50
54.00
64.30
64.00
45.00

MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

136

Forth
Reading
83.00
81.00
51.70
86.00
82.00
59.00
133.00
76.70
82.60
74.60
914.00
60.00
56.00
84.10
58.80
82.00
89.00
60.00
77.00
435.00
77.00
76.10
76.67
74.00
53.60

Forth
Math
68.00
83.00
54.60
82.00
73.00
44.00
102.00
77.20
72.90
73.70
932.00
59.00
63.00
74.50
57.80
72.00
79.00
50.00
71.00
427.00
75.00
64.90
72.50
58.00
49.20

Eighth
Reading
83.00
81.00
51.70
86.00
76.00
56.00
133.00
76.70
80.70
79.00
914.00
60.00
56.00
78.60
58.80
82.00
89.00
60.00
77.00
435.00
77.00
65.10
79.17
74.00
56.30

Eighth
Math
68.00
79.00
54.60
82.00
62.00
38.00
102.00
77.20
66.70
58.00
932.00
59.00
63.00
64.10
57.80
72.00
79.00
50.00
71.00
427.00
75.00
58.70
70.00
58.00
50.20

Appendix E. Number of High School Teachers Among 50 States
Table VI-5 Number of High School Teachers Among 50 States

AL
AK
AZ
AK
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS

1
2
1
3
2
8
2
0
3
16
3
2
1
3
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
4
1
2
0

2
4
2
2
7
10
1
0
2
7
0
2
7
3
1
0
3
4
3
4
4
3
6
4
0
2

3
1
4
3
7
8
2
1
1
6
2
2
6
5
2
5
3
4
2
2
7
4
2
3
7
2

4
2
4
8
8
5
8
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
8
3
5
3
7
5
2
3
5
2
4
6

5
6
6
5
6
7
9
6
3
2
5
2
10
11
8
6
4
3
9
6
6
6
8
10
4
12

The number of high school teachers
6
7
8
9
10
11
10
6
8
7
7
2
3
3
0
13
8
10
8
6
9
12
6
6
3
13
12
10
6
6
4
4
5
4
3
9
7
4
12
3
8
1
2
2
1
3
2
5
2
5
8
11
9
11
3
4
5
2
2
0
6
9
13
7
1
11
6
4
3
4
7
11
5
11
5
8
4
8
6
3
8
12
6
6
4
10
12
9
3
5
9
3
5
6
1
12
8
8
7
2
10
4
5
5
1
9
7
9
6
4
12
6
4
3
3
3
13
14
6
3
7
8
7
7
3
8
5
7
6
7
137

Total
11
4
2
3
1
4
4
1
1
4
1
0
3
4
4
2
3
1
2
3
0
3
1
1
5
8

12
2
0
1
2
3
1
3
0
3
1
0
3
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
0
0
2
4
4
1

13
1
1
1
0
3
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
1
3
1
2
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
2

14
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2

15
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0

16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

64
35
73
69
95
47
48
26
65
56
23
70
61
67
49
60
58
50
58
45
55
56
66
60
68

Table VI-5 (cont'd)

MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

1
1
0
5
2
5
2
1
3
0
2
1
4
0
2
1
1
0
6
0
1
1
3
6
1
0
1
106

2
0
1
2
0
6
6
2
4
0
1
7
0
2
4
1
0
1
2
2
4
1
3
2
3
2
2
137

3
4
0
5
2
1
6
1
5
2
5
4
4
1
1
1
2
1
7
7
5
5
4
5
1
3
2
173

4
3
3
5
2
2
10
5
5
6
2
5
6
1
2
4
3
6
12
7
0
4
6
5
6
3
4
213

5
8
9
10
6
5
15
6
9
6
4
6
6
4
7
14
2
7
12
7
5
7
8
6
7
4
8
340

The number of high school teachers
6
7
8
9
10
11
3
7
10
1
3
1
3
9
3
5
1
1
2
1
5
2
5
3
8
2
5
6
3
3
7
6
10
8
1
1
5
4
2
1
5
3
7
3
4
5
8
2
7
7
10
1
1
0
2
3
1
2
2
4
8
10
10
3
2
3
11
12
19
15
7
5
8
3
4
4
3
3
11
12
9
5
7
2
4
0
1
0
0
0
6
7
13
8
4
3
4
5
5
2
0
1
6
10
5
6
5
3
9
4
6
9
3
4
6
11
10
2
1
1
6
4
2
2
0
0
11
8
8
4
1
0
4
8
10
5
3
2
8
5
6
10
3
2
10
13
7
4
4
3
6
7
3
3
2
1
3
7
4
2
2
1
371 343 334
259
157
116
138

12
4
5
2
0
1
1
0
0
1
2
5
1
1
0
2
1
2
3
1
1
0
2
6
2
1
0
84

13
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
3
1
2
1
0
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
4
1
0
0
49

14
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23

15
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10

16
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Total
50
42
47
39
53
63
46
52
33
56
98
50
58
21
65
29
53
79
55
30
50
58
68
62
35
36
2716

Appendix F. Principals Responses by States
Table VI-6 Principals Responses by States

AL
AK
AZ
AK
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO

Influence
on
instruction
3.578
3.477
3.615
3.600
3.657
3.528
3.692
3.667
3.652
3.672
3.692
3.662
3.801
3.662
3.653
3.607
3.640
3.607
3.640
3.518
3.784
3.519
3.637
3.656
3.633

Facilitating
teacher
learning
2.317
2.171
2.573
1.924
2.950
2.620
2.596
2.269
2.552
2.414
2.731
2.364
2.657
2.354
2.449
2.407
1.880
2.418
2.918
2.511
2.196
1.931
2.412
2.362
2.551

Provision of professional days
Before the
During the
school year
school year
0.984
0.889
1.000
0.943
0.960
0.733
1.000
0.864
0.921
0.723
0.960
0.980
1.000
0.962
1.000
1.000
0.970
0.910
0.983
0.966
0.962
1.000
0.939
0.985
0.970
0.896
0.800
0.892
1.000
1.000
0.983
0.983
1.000
0.920
0.982
0.909
0.984
0.918
0.978
0.933
0.893
0.857
0.948
0.948
0.985
0.971
1.000
0.862
0.957
0.942

State

139

MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Influence
on
instruction
3.667
3.729
3.619
3.699
3.576
3.691
3.767
3.574
3.745
3.548
3.714
3.569
3.693
3.587
3.736
3.770
3.727
3.679
3.626
3.731
3.724
3.576
3.662
3.621
3.596

Facilitating
teacher
learning
2.587
2.558
2.239
2.500
2.356
2.603
2.519
2.250
2.394
2.077
1.947
2.367
2.197
2.087
2.224
2.036
1.981
2.667
2.286
2.355
2.569
2.678
2.087
2.469
2.368

Provision of professional days
Before the
During the
school year
school year
1.000
1.000
0.977
0.953
0.978
0.804
0.947
0.947
0.864
0.915
0.985
0.956
0.885
0.923
0.942
0.865
1.000
0.939
0.846
0.904
0.989
0.915
0.980
0.959
1.000
1.000
0.783
0.739
0.985
0.970
1.000
0.929
0.962
0.885
0.988
0.951
0.982
0.946
0.968
0.968
0.980
0.961
1.000
0.949
1.000
0.971
0.969
0.844
1.000
0.974

Appendix G. Teachers’ Responses by States
Table VI-7 Teachers’ Responses by States
Autonomy

Professional development time
Classroom
Curriculum Instruction Content Instruction
management
AL
2.594
3.644
1.910
0.678
0.723
AK
3.151
3.731
2.294
0.538
0.521
AZ
2.917
3.703
2.140
0.941
0.549
AK
2.939
3.689
2.651
1.103
0.963
CA
2.781
3.670
2.137
0.813
0.631
CO
2.967
3.675
2.412
1.146
0.407
CT
3.054
3.652
1.715
0.599
0.310
DE
2.758
3.552
1.871
0.710
0.790
FL
2.708
3.695
2.275
1.668
0.646
GA
2.535
3.606
1.906
0.437
0.549
HI
2.883
3.597
1.662
0.870
0.519
ID
3.037
3.748
2.180
0.587
0.654
IL
3.170
3.719
1.826
0.830
0.681
IN
3.118
3.676
1.545
0.696
0.491
IA
3.358
3.736
1.933
1.253
0.494
KS
3.066
3.688
2.050
0.991
0.737
KY
2.928
3.587
2.147
0.938
0.598
LA
2.626
3.618
1.936
0.717
0.775
ME
3.314
3.704
2.114
0.978
0.298
MD
2.299
3.563
2.091
0.753
0.578
MA
3.104
3.667
2.352
0.578
0.522
MI
2.882
3.659
2.041
0.774
0.421
MN
3.290
3.755
2.068
1.047
0.660
MS
2.828
3.628
1.626
0.554
0.742
MO
3.022
3.645
2.136
0.726
0.770

Professional development time
Classroom
Curriculum Instruction Content Instruction
management
MT
3.213
3.759
2.311
0.626
0.695
NE
3.253
3.729
2.085
0.745
0.610
NV
2.785
3.596
2.204
0.707
0.780
NH
3.091
3.659
2.470
0.580
0.475
NJ
2.874
3.604
1.694
0.351
0.570
NM
3.087
3.674
1.737
0.920
0.357
NY
3.067
3.627
1.989
0.504
0.466
NC
2.721
3.625
1.755
0.723
0.665
ND
3.372
3.796
2.094
0.661
0.531
OH
3.199
3.706
1.813
0.557
0.545
OK
3.104
3.707
1.958
0.465
0.682
OR
3.134
3.741
2.134
1.290
0.601
PA
3.153
3.695
1.877
0.877
0.574
SC
2.751
3.628
1.910
0.836
0.630
SD
3.247
3.713
2.116
0.902
0.768
TN
2.801
3.720
1.954
0.518
0.803
TX
2.663
3.550
2.484
0.641
0.884
UT
3.109
3.823
2.496
0.750
0.719
VT
3.304
3.709
2.554
0.793
0.543
VA
2.642
3.589
2.187
0.651
0.572
WA
2.969
3.670
2.217
0.972
0.510
WV
2.770
3.697
1.811
0.468
0.510
WI
3.241
3.697
2.006
0.877
0.464
WY
3.194
3.647
1.926
1.123
0.660

140

Autonomy

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