'vv-g. -W. ’..A....,v..-r . , ‘: '_ .v *__— '— _—_ __ V ‘. u. y ,. 1%.. n vwgy‘p < ‘ n ‘ ‘ m .. ‘ ‘ Mm; .u “‘ ‘ n‘. ‘ .. ‘ . . q. . ”work‘s-'4 - “R N‘.’ll-;CI~>|- “w“.- .- .. .» .m. ‘ H...‘ . ‘ ... ‘. _ . ‘ . .4 n-" ""‘t-V:‘f€“\i"fil‘vIJy..,,g‘. ' , u ‘ ‘H y. . “ AUDIENCE COMMITMENT museums KNOWLEDGE ' _ _ or AUDIENCE AS DETERMINANTS or coenmva f ; ” DISSGNANCE AND suasmum CHANGE, or _ > ' ATTITUDE AND SELF PERCEPTION. rouowms - coummmnuomm ADVOCACY ’ mesis for the Dégree of PM). mamam STATE UNIVERSITY Roam NOEL WIDGERY. 1971 |r1c“) E LIBRARY ’ ‘g. Michigan State Unircrsixy {A A :::3 W W “III! 00 8 \l (D (D 01 w This is to certify that the thesis entitled AUDIENCE COMMENT AND SOURCE KNOWLEDGE OF AUDIENCE AS DETERMINANTS OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND SUB- SEQUENT CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND SELF PERCEPTION FOLLOWING COUNTERAITITUDINAL ADVOCACY presented by Robin Noel Widgery has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph .D . degree in Speech 1327M d? MI/mv Mo: professor Date February 11, 1971 0-7639 AUDIENCE COMMITMENT AND SOURCE KNOWLEDGE OF AUDIENCE AS DETERMINANTS OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND SUB- SEQUENT CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND SELF PERCEPTION FOLLOWING COUNTERATTITUDINAL ADVOCACY By Robin Noel Widgery The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of audience commitment and source knowledge of audience on attitude change and self perception following the writing of oounterattitudinal essays . Students enrolled in undergraduate communication courses at General Motors Institute were administered a pretest attitude question- naire containing several issues considered to be salient for them. The issue producing the most skewed distribution on attitude intensity called for two years mandatory military service for all college students before being accepted by a college or university; thus it was chosen as the experimental issue. About two weeks after the pretest, experimental subjects wrote oounterattitudinal essays under varying conditions of source knowledge of audience and audience commitment toward the issue. Post—encoding measures were then taken of each subject's attitude toward the issue and subject's self-image. The effectiveness of each manipulation was assessed by asking subjects to respond to questions designed to tap their perception of audience attitude and the probability that they would know members of the supposed audience. Subjects assigned to the Control group responded Robin Noel Widgery to the pretest and posttest, but did not write the essay. The knowledge of audience variable was diChotomized between the Known Audience and the Unknown Audience. Subjects in the Known condition were informed that their supposed audience would consist of students at General Motors Institute.. The audience for the Unknown condition was to be students at MiChigan State University. Audience commitment toward the topic in question was diChotomized into those Who were strongly opposed and those who were undecided. The major dependent variable, attitude Change, was assessed by using pretest to posttest difference scores on four, seven—interval semantic differential—type scales. In addition to attitude Change, salience Changes were also measured. Three hypotheses were tested in this experiment: First, that attitude change would be significantly greater for the Known Audience than fbr the Unknown; second, that attitude Change would be signifi- cantly greater fOr the Uncommitted Audience than fOr the Opposed; third, that the greatest amount of Change would be in the Known, Undecided condition and the least amount of Change in the Unknown, Opposed condition. The results failed to support any of the stated hypotheses. However, there was an inverse knowledge of audience effect, showing significantly greater attitude Change for subjects in the Unknown condition. This unexpected result was explained by the supposition that sUbjects encoding for the Known Audience perceived that message Robin Noel Widgery takeback would be possible if ever confronted by a member of the supposed audience. The possibility of message takeback reduced the arousal of cognitive dissonance thus militating against attitude Change. The results of this experiment were discussed within the framework of cognitive dissonance theory and included suggestions for fUture researCh using the oounterattitudinal advocacy paradigm. AUDIENCE COMMITMENT AND SOURCE KNOWLEDGE OF AUDIENCE .AS DETERMINANTS OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND SUB- SEQUENT CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND SELF PERCEPTION FOLLOWING COUNTERATTITUDINAL ADVOCACY BY Robin Noel Widgery A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of SpeeCh 1971 DEDICATION To Suzanne ii Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Speech, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. \ l J rector of esrs Guidance Committee: MW, Chairman iii ACMOMEIISMENTS A doctoral dissertation is seldom the product of a single individual's efforts. In the case of this research, the writer is indebted to those empiricists upon whose work this one is predicated. In this experiment no one has been more instrumental in introducing me to the content of dissonance theory and the paradigm of counter- attitudinal advocacy than has Dr. Gerald Miller. His enthusiasm and sincere interest in this research have made the experience an enjoyable one. For their perceptive and cogent advice, I want to thank Dr. Donald Cushman, Dr. Maryellen McSweeney and Dr. David Ralph. To my colleagues at General Motors Institute, I owe much indeed. 'Iheir encormagement, and the climate of professionalism they have created, have given me the desire and intellectual stimulation needed to complete every step toward the doctoral degree. These men deserve my warmest and sincerest gratitude: Dr. Michael Burgoon, Dr. Robert Carter, Professor Harold Haskitt, Professor Tony Hain, Professor David Hurt, Dr. Ronald Smith, Professor Cecil Stackpole, Dr. Stewart Tubbs, Professor Roger Wilcox, and Dr. Joseph Zima. Thanks, also go to Mrs. Delores "Scotty" Davidson, whose aid has been appreciated so many times during the past four years. Almost all ackriowledgients say something about a wife and how much help she has been. All I can say is thank you Suzanne for your iv patience and tolerance during all these years. I am grateful that you are still my wife, lover, confidant, and friend: even after all this. TABLE or CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv LIST OF'TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii LIST OF.APPENDICES . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . x Chapter I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . . . l Review of Relevant ResearCh . . . . . . . . 3 Audience Attitude Toward the Topic . 3 Source Knowledge of the Audience . . 6 Rationale and Hypotheses . . . . . . 7 II METHODS AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Pretest . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Independent Variables . . . . . . . . . . 10 Audience Attitude . . . . . . . . . . 10 Source Knowledge of Audience . . . . . . . 11 Inductions and Posttest . . . . . . . . . ll Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . 15 Attitude Change . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Self-image . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Harmful Consequences . . . . . . . . . 16 Encoding Anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Manipulation Checks . . . . . . . . . . 16 III RESUUTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l7 Pretest . . . . . . . . . . . Experimental and Control Differences . . . . . 17 Manipulation Checks . . . . . . . . . . 19 vi Chapter III (contd) Chapter Page Test of the Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . 20 Supplementary Analyses . . . . . . . . . 22 IV DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Failure to ConfirmlHWpothesis l . . . . . . 28 Failure to Confirthypothesis 2 . . . . . . ' 29 The Locus of Dissonance Arousal . . . . . . 31 Aversive Consequences . . . . . . . . . 31 Threatened Self-image . . . . . . . . . 32 Implications fbr Future ResearCh . . . . . . 3” Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 vii Table 10 11 LIST OF TABLES Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of pretest attitude scores for experimental and control groups . . . . . . . . . Attitude scores, amount of change, and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental and control groups . . . . . . . . . . Analysis of differences of attitude Change scores between each experimental group and the control group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage and frequency of subjects correctly and incorrectly perceiving audience attitude . . . Means, standard deviation, and analysis of variance of knowledge of source ratings . . . . . . . . Attitude scores, amount of Change, and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental mups O O I O O O O O O O O O O O I 0 Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of anxiety scores of experimental groups . . . Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of persuasiveness scores of experimental groups . . Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of harmful effects scores of experimental groups . Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of salience Change scores of experimental groups . . Means, standard deviation and analysis of variance of qualification scores of experimental groups viii Page 17 18 18 19 20 21 23 2H 2H 25 26 Table Page 12 Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of trustworthiness scores of experimental groups . . 26 13 Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of essay length of experimental groups . . . . . 27 LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix Page A PREIEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE . . . . . . . . 39 B POSITEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE . . . . . . . . H3 C CONTROL POS'ITEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE . . . . . L+7 Chapter I INTRODUCTION Statement of the Problem Experimental desigrs utilizing oounterattitudinal advocacy are especially suited for testing consistency theories . This paradigm requires that the source encode a belief—discrepant message, thus becoming the receiver of his own communication. By using pre- and posttest attitude measures the researcher is able to measure the amount of persuasion the subjects have experienced. The basic assump- tion of this model is that the individual will persuade himself rather than being persuaded by another. Festinger (1957) was one of the earliest proponents of the persuasive efficacy of oounterattitudinal advocacy. According to him an individual will experience cogiitive dissonance when he prepares a message which is counter to his true beliefs. In short, dissonance is aroused because the individual perceives the opposing cognitions (l) I believe )5, and (2) I am advocating fl §. In their classic "dull task" experiment Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) supported their con— tention of a dissonance effect. They asked subjects to tell a confederate that a dull task had been interesting to do. Subjects receiving $1 as a reward for telling the confederate the task was interesting demonstrated sigrificantly greater liking for the dull task than subjects who were given $20 as incentive. Although this 1 2 study has since been attacked for several methodological weaknesses, it, none-the—less, fired the interest of many consistency theorists in the oounterattitudinal paradigm as a viable technique for testing various aspects of dissonance theory. More recent dissonance theorists such as Aronson (1968) and Collins (1968) have taken issue with Festinger's original assumption—— that the locus of arousal is found in the conflict between the cog— nitions "I believe )3," and "I advocated not 2g." Aronson (1968) has refuted Festinger's earlier assumption: In the experiments on oounterattitudinal advocacy for example, I would suggest that it is incorrect to say that dissonance existed between the coglitions "I believe the task is dull," and "I told someone that the task was interesting". . . . What is dissonant is the cognition "I am a decent, truthful human being" and the cognition "I have misled a person; I have A conned him into believing something which just isn't true: he thinks that I really believe it and I cannot set him straight becarse I probably won't see him again." (p. 2'4) Carlsmith (1968) supports Aronson in his speculation as to the locus of dissonance arousal. He underscores the importance of the advocate's concern for his supposed audience, saying that "anytime a person makes some statement counter to his attitudes, and a listener (whose opinion is important to the speaker) is unaware of both the speaker's attitude and his motivation for speaking against these attitudes, dissonance will be aroused." (p. 806) Summarizing the crux of the debate between the "early" and "late" dissonance interpretations, Collins (1968) questioned whether the discrepancies between what a person believes and what he says will actually be sufficient to produce dissonance arousal. Instead he 3 believes that a dissonant state may result from the individual feeling that his counter advocating was a moral or ethical trans- gression, or he may believe that his belief—discrepant message may cause some harmful consequences to the supposed audience . In short, the central issue of concern here is whether or not dissonance will be produced when an individual's self-image is threatened by the counteratt itudinal act , or when he perceives that the act will cause aversive consequences to others . If the loci of the arousal state are found in the perception of threatened self-image or possible aversive consequences , then it is proper to assume that such hypotheses may be tested empirically. Miller (1970) suggests: To raise questions about the "late" dissonance inter- pretation does not detract from the value of attempting to specify precisely those situational factors which serve to heighten or lessen the dissonance experienced by a oounterattitudinal advocate . (p . 9) In "attempting to specify precisely those situational factors" the experimenter has manipulated two independent variables , audience attitude toward the tgpic and source knowledge _o_f_ the audience , in hopes of identifying more accurately the source of dissonance arousal. Review of Relevant Research Audience Attitude Toward the Topic. Underlying the use of this variable is the assumption that if a supposed audience is perceived by the oounterattitudinal encoder to be uncommitted on the issue in question, the encoder may assume his message will have greater influence than if the receiver is already committed. If such a m differential in audience commitment is perceived by an individual, it is reasonable to assume it may affect the degree of cognitive discomfort experienced after encoding a belief;discrepant message. In an experiment by Bodaken (1970) sUbjects reported a significantly greater amount of attitude Change When preparing belief—discrepant essays for uncommitted receivers than. for those who were committed favorably toward the message. This finding supports the theoretic expectation that the subject's fear of aversive consequences to his audience will create cognitive dissonance. A study by Nel, HelmreiCh and Aronson (1969) supports the same view; They asked subjects to make a video recording advocating the legalization of marijuana to be shown to three supposed audience groups-~those for the proposition, those against and those with no opinion. They reported a substantially greater amount of attitude change among subjects encoding fOr the uncommitted audience in the low incentive condition (fifty cents vs. $5). SuCh a result confirmed the dissonance effect predicted by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959): when reward is low, dissonance will be maximal. The preceding studies imply that When an audience is uncom- mitted or has no opinion on a particular issue, it is believed to be more vulnerable to persuasion. When this condition is perceived by the oounterattitudinal communicator, dissonance should exist because of anxiety over aversive consequences to the receiver. Another study illustrating the relevance of aversive conse- quences to dissonance arousal was done by HelmreiCh and Collins (1968). These experimenters manipulated financial reward and audience 5 commitment. Subjects were asked to give speeChes based on arguments given them on note cards. Their speeChes were then delivered in three conditions: no takebaCk video, takeback video, anonymous audio. The subjects in the no—takebaCk condition were not given an opportunity to clarify their true opinion on the video tape recording, While those in the takeback condition were allowed to explain after the SpeeCh their true beliefs and Why they had recorded the oounterattitudinal SpeeCh. Unlike the first two conditions, the anonymous audio SpeeCh was delivered without subjects declaring their identities. The levels of financial.reward.were either fifty cents or $2.50. A dissonance effect (greater attitude Change in the low reward condition) was reported for'subjects in the no—takeback group. It can be reasoned that subjects in this group perceived that their beliefediscrepant messages would be used to persuade others, perhaps having some aversive effect upon them. SuCh a cognition may'have created greater dissonance in the no—takebaCk condition accounting for the greater reported attitude Change. Not being able to clarify their true positions, no— takeback subjects were probably left with the feeling that the audience would continue to misperceive their true attitude on the issue in question. Compounding this cognition would be the feeling that the audience had not been "set straight" on the issue. Related to the issue of aversive consequences is the question of self-concept. What happens to an individual's self—image When he perceives that his belief-discrepant message may have harmful effects upon.his audience? Bramel (1968) believes that dissonance may result from fear of What others will think. He says: 6 The theoretical relevance of the self in this view of dissonance theory now becomes clearer . . . dissonance is a feeling of personal unworthiness (a type of anxiety) traceable to rejection of oneself by other peOple either in the present or in the past. Any information which implies that one is incompetent or immoral arouses dis- sonance. The reason dissonance is greatest when the person feels personally responsible for his behavior is that rejection by other people is usually greatest when they believe the person voluntarily acted in an inap— propriate way. (p. 365) Bramel suggests that dissonance may be aroused by anxiety over the disapproval of 935335. for committing a belief-discrepant act that may be harmful. The present study assumes that such dissonance may also be aroused by the oounterattitudinal advocate ' 8 fl cogrition that he is "incompetent or immoral." The belief-discrepant act may violate the individual's own self-concept to such a degree as to produce dissonance. Source Knowledge of the Audience. This experimenter believes that if fear 9: aversive consequences to the audience or threatened self-image help to arouse dissonance, then it is logical to assume that the source's familiarity with the supposed audience may affect the amount of (‘lissommce experienced. Tf, for instance, a counter- attitudinal advocate believes that he lmcws or will be knam by members of his audience, he may have greater concern lest they suffer harmful effects because of his influence. Also, having such a rela— tionship with those in the audience may affect the advocate's self— concept . We may assume that the more familiar the source is with another individual, the more sensitive he will be to any act that he commits against that individual which is improper, immoral, or un- ethical. The guilt (dissonance) aroused by committing such an act 7 may be even more acute if the advocate is unable to explain to those in the audience his true opinions or the circumstances in which he advocated his belief-discrepant message. If, however, the advocate perceives that it is quite improbable that he will know or be lcnown by anyone in the supposed audience, he may tend to impersonalize the counterattitudinal act . He may tend to think less of his audience E3 _s_e_, because he believes it higlnly im— probable that he will have to confront anyone in the unknown audience . In such a condition, the advocate should experience minimal dissonance . Rationale and typothes es Because this experimenter believes that the counterattitudinal advocate will generally experience greater dissonance and subsequent attitude change when his communication may threaten his self-image or cause potential harmful consequences to his audience, the following hypotheses are proposed: H1: Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for a known audience will report greater attitude change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an unknown audience . Since previous studies indicate that dissonance will be maximal when the supposed audience is perceived to be uncommitted on the issue, the following prediction is made: H2: Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an uncommitted audience will demonstrate greater attitude 8 change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counter- attitudinal messages for a committed audience . Considering the combined effects of both the commitment and familiarity variables, it is reasonable to assume: H3: Attitude change in the direction of the position advocated in the counterattitudinal message will be greatest when the communication is encoded for the known , uncommitted audience and attitude change will be least for the unknown, committed audience . On the basis of Aronson's (1968) and Collin's (1968) specu— lation about the locus of dissonance, Hypothesis 1 is predicated on the belief that an encoder of a belief-discrepant message should experience greater dissonance with the known audience than with the unknown. His relative familiarity with the members of the audience should regulate the degree to which he perceives his message as having potential harmful consequences. Hypothesis 2 is based upon the same speculation . When the counterattitudinal advocate perceives that his supposed audience is uncommitted on the issue in question, dissonance and subsequent attitude change should be maximal. Hypothesis 3 assumes that the combination of the known, uncommitted audience should produce the greatest amount of dissonance and thus subjects should report more attitude change than in the other three cells . Subjects in the unknown , committed audience condition should experience the least amount of cognitive dissonance, subsequently reporting less attitude change than in any of the other three cells. Chapter II METHODS AND PROCEDURES Overview A pretest of student attitudes was administered to 83 from classes in public speaking at General Motors Institute. Based upon the results of this test an issue was chosen for 88 to Lee in counter- attitudinal encoding. Ss were then randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. The Ss in the experimental groups wrote belief— discrepant essays for fifteen minutes under different conditions of audience commitment and familiarity. A posttest was administered to the experimental groups measuring attitude intensity and salience on the issue in question. The posttest also contained items designed to check for subject perception of audience attitude , and audience familiarity. Items were also included in the posttest to assess 88' sensitivity to any potential harmful consequences which may have resulted from the belief-discrepant essay. Another posttest measure was used to measure the Ss' self—concept. Ss in the control group received the pretest and posttest instruments, but did not encode belief—discrepant messages . Pretest The students were induced to complete a qLestionnaire on the pretext that it was part of a statewide college survey of student 10 attitudes on various issues. (See Appendix A.) The pretest instrument was designed for two measures: (1) attitude direction and intensity for several relevant issues, and (2) attitude salience for the same issues. In the measurement of attitude direction and intensity for the several issues, each issue was followed by four, seven-interval, semantic differential scales bounded by the adjectives good—bad, valuable-worthless, pleasant—unpleasant, and fair-unfair. These scales were drawn from the evaluative dimension of meaning as identi- fied by 05good, Tannenbaum, and Suci (1957). The issues were scored by summing across all four scales using one as low and seven as high. Salience was measured by using two seven-point semantic scales with important-unimportant and crucial-trivial as anchors . The issue which had the most skewed distribution and the highest salience was chosen as the topic for the counterattitudinal essays. Independent Variables The two independent variables manipulated in this experiment were audience attitude toward the topic and probable lcrowledge of the audience by the source . Audience attitude . In manipulating this variable , half of the 83 were told that the audience who was to read their essays was already strongly opposed E the advocated position . The other half were told that their respective audience was undecided on the issue in question. 11 Source Knowledge of Audience . This variable refers to the degree of probability that the S perceives that he is known or may become known by those in the supposed audience. In the m con-— dition, 83 were induced to believe that students in another class at General Motors Institute would read their essays. Those in the 227 kpgwg_condition were told that their essays would be read by students at MiChigan State University. The supposition in using these induce— ments was that the probability of students at General Motors Institute ever knowing other students at that college was relatively high, While the probability of their ever knowing students at MiChigan State was relatively low. Induction and Posttest TWO weeks after the pretest had been administered, and the experimental issue had been determined, 83 were asked to write a counterattitudinal essay. These instructions were given to the Ss in the "opposed" conditions: MiChigan College Information Exchange Project Psychology and communication faculty at MiChigan State University, and seven other MiChigan colleges are currently conducting a.researCh project aimed at finding out what it takes to strengthen or Change people's attitudes. What we do is to get from students some indication of their attitudes on certain issues and then, at some later date , we present them with certain arguments in the form of essays which are designed to get themito Change or strengthen their attitudes. Sometime ago questionnaires were administered to students at eight MiChigan colleges asking them their attitudes toward two years of mandatory military service fer all male college students before being accepted by a college or university. Analysis of the questionnaires indicates 12 that nearly all of these students are either undecided 93 or strongly opposed t_o_ this particular policy. Because this is a communication course, we are interested in getting from students in this class the most r— suasive arguments we can, supporting the policy %t "all male college students should serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university." THOSE WHO WILL READ YOUR ARGUMENTS The individuals who will be reading and thinking about your particular arguments will be forty students at Michigan State University (GMI). These particular students at MSU (GMI) are strongly opposed to the policy in question. Because of their strong opposition to this policy, this group of students will probably not be very easily influenced by your arguments. _— In short, you are being asked to write an essay that presents the most persuasive arguments favoring this propos ition : All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. As you write keep your reading audience in mind. They are: Forty students at Michigan State (GMI) who are strongly Opposed :2 the above proposition. You will now be given 15 minutes to complete your essay. The following instructions were given to those 88 who were in the "undecided" condition: 13 Michigan College Information Exchange Project Psychology and commmication faculty at. Michigan State University, and seven other Michi an colleges are currently conducting a research project aimed at finding out what it takes to strengthen or change peOple's attitudes. What we do is to get from students some indication of their attitudes on certain issues and then, at some later date, we present them with certain arguments in fine form of essays which are designed to get them to change or strengthen their attitudes. Sometime ago questionnaires were administered to students at eight Michigan colleges asking them their attitudes toward two years of mandatory military service for all male college students before being accepted by a college or university. Analysis of the questionnaires indicates that nearly all of these students are either undecided gr or strongly opposed t_o_ this particular policy. Because this is a communication course, we are interested in getting from students in this class the most persuasive arguments we can, supporting the policy thatfirall male coIIege students should serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university." THOSE WHO WILL READ YOUR ARGUMENTS The individuals who will be reading and thinking about omn particular arguments will be forty students at M15igan State University (GMI) . These particular students at MSU (911) are undecided on the policy in question. Because of their md’écrsi'o—n toward this policy, this group of students will probably _bg very easily influenced by your arguments. In short, you are being asked to write an essay that presents the most persuasive arguments favorig this propos ition : All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed . service before being accepted by a college or university. As you write keep your reading audience in mind. They are: ll} Forty students at Michigan State (Q11) who are undecided on the above proposition. You will now be given 15 minutes to complete your essay. 85 were asked to read their respective inducement messages. The rationale for having the 88 read the inducement instead of having it read to them by the E, was to heighten the individual encoder's feeling that he would be responsible as an individual for any aversive consequences to the receivers . Heightened realization by the 83 that their collective messages would carry the weight of persuasion on the audience might have facilitated avoidance of responsibility for any possible aversive consequences . After the 83 read the inducement , they were given paper on which to write their essays. In order to insure that all 85 committed themselves publicly to their counterattitudinal message , each 8 was instructed to put his name and student number on the paper before he began to write . C After the essays had been completed, a post—encoding question— naire was distributed (see Appendix B) . This instrument contained the same four semantic differential scales used in the pretest to measure attitudes toward the issue in question. Other measures in the posttest instrument were designed to assess the subjects' perception of audience familiarity and audience commitment on the issue. The posttest also tapped subject perception of possible harmful consequences to the audience resulting from the counterattitudinal message . In order to note any changes in the subject's self-concept as a result of his counterattitudinal act, five scales loading highly on the safety 15 dimension of credibility and five loading highly on the qualification dimension were included (Berlo, Lemert, Mertz, 1970). Control 83 were given a posttest questionnaire containing several issues among them the experimental issue with the same scales employed in the experimental conditions . (See Appendix C.) Dependent Variables Attitude change . The major dependent variable was the amount of attitude chapge measured by the difference between individual pre- and posttest scores on the issue in question. Message content. A word count was made of essays to assess any significant differences between cells. It was hoped that this would be an index of any differential in effort between the four cells. Self-image was measured by using ten semantic differential scales identified by Berlo, Iemert, and Mertz (1970). The instrument included five scales drawn from each of the two major factors of source credibility as reported in their study: Safety (trustworthiness) and Qualification. Each S evalLated himself on each of the following scales: Safety (trustworthiness)-—safe-unsafe, just-unjust, kind-cruel , friendly-unfriendly, honest-dishonest . Qualification--trained—untrained, experienced- inexperienced, skilled—unskilled, qualified— unqualified, informed—uninformed. The rationale for making this measurement was based on the assumption that dissonance ought to affect the subject's own self- perception. If, for instance, he believed his belief-discrepant message might affect someone adversely, the dissonance thus aroused 16 might be reduced by lowering his own self-image as well as changing his attitude on the issue in question. Thus, lower self-image was expected in the group where dissonance was maximal. Harmful Consequences. In order to assess whether 83 perceived that their belief-discrepant messages had harmful effects upon the supposed audience, the 83 were asked to respond to this statement: "My essay may have a harmful effect upon tlnose who will be reading it." They responded on a five—interval Likert scale with Strongly Agree, Neither Agree Nor Disagree and Strongly Disagree as anchors . Encoding Anxiety. In order to measure differences in anxiety among the groups , 88 were asked to respond on a five-interval Likert scale to this statement: "I felt anxious about preparing this message for my audience." The notion here was to see if high anxiety existed when dissonance was maximal. Audience Commitment . The efficacy of this manipulation was determined by having 83 respond to this qtestion: "Before you wrote your essay, how did you think the students who will be reading it felt toward the issue of mandatory armed service for all male college students?" 88 responded on a scale consisting of four alternatives: Favorable, Undecided, Opposed, and Don't Know. Source Knowledge of Audience. The check of this manipulation was determined by having 88 respond to the following statement: "Some of the students in the classes who are to read my essay will know who I am. " Ss responded on a seven-interval scale with Highly Probably, Neutral, and Hignly Improbable as anchors . Chapter 111 RESUUTS Pretest One hundred.seventy—five students at General Motors Institute were randomly assigned to fOur experimental groups and one control group. To ensure that there were no significant differences between these five conditions, subjects' pretest attitude scores were used for a simple analysis of variance. The results of this test indicate that there were no significant differences (Table 1). Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of pre- test attitude scores for experimental and control groups . Condition Mean Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 7.69 3,uu Known: Undecided 7.73 3.u3 Unknown: Opposed 8.00 3.59 Unknown: Undecided 7.78 3.66 Control 7.57 3 17 Source SS df MS F Between 3.55 R .89 < l n.s. Within 20u0.88 170 12.01 Total 26nu.u3 15% Experimental and Control Differences In order to measure fOr differences between the experimental and control groups, a oneaway analysis of variance on difference scores 17 18 was performed. Table 2 shows a significant F value indicating that there were differences among the five groups . Table 2 . Attitude scores , amount of change , and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental and control groups . Condition Pretest Posttest Change Known: Opposed 7.69 8.15 .us Known: Undecided 7.73 8.H9 .76 unknown: Opposed 8.00 9.HH 1.uu Unknown: Undecided 7.78 11.59 3.81 Control 7.57 8.20 .63 Source SS df MS F Between 273.67 u 68.H2 5.29* Within 2199.u5 170 12.9u Total 2u73.12 17H *p < .05 To identify precisely which cell(s) accounted for this effect, Scheffe's comparisons were performed, comparing each experimental condition with the control group . Table 3 indicates these comparisons and shows that only the Unknown: Undecided condition differed significantly from the Control group . A Table 3 . Analysis of differences of attitude change scores between each experimental group and the control group . Condition Mean Scheffe ' s t Control . 6 3 Known: Opposed . 1+6 . 20 Known: Undecided . 76 . 15 Unknown: Opposed 1 . nu . 96 Unlonown: Undecided 3 . 81 3 . 71* *p < .05 19 Manipulation Checks Audience Attitude. In order to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of audience attitudes , subjects were asked to identify the attitude of their respective audience . Table 1+ shows the numbers and percentages of correct and incorrect responses in the four conditions . In all, 88 percent of the subjects perceived their audience's attitude correctly, while 12 percent misperceived these attitudes. Although the Undecided conditions were 19 and 22 percent incorrect respectively, this induction was considered to be generally successful. Table '4. Percentage and frequency of subjects correctly and incorrectly perceiving audience attitude . Condition Correct Incorrect 96 (No . ) 96 (No . ) Known: Opposed 91+ (33) 6 (2) Knowrn: Undecided 78 (25) 22 (8) Unkrnown: Opposed 100 (36) - (-) Unknown: Undecided 81 (29) 19 (7) Total “8'5 (12 35 “'17 "(T77 Audience Knowledge of Source. Subjects had been told that their supposed audience would be students at either Michigan State or General Motors Institute . It was supposed that the probability was greater that the Q11 subjects would perceive themselves to be known by other Q11 students than by the MSU students . To test for this per- ceived difference, subjects were asked to reSpond on a seven-point semantic scale. These scores were used in a two—way analysis of variance (Table 5). Since this analysis yielded a knowledge of source main effect (F = 3u.uu), it was assumed that this manipulation was 20 relatively successful. It should be noted, however, that While there was a significant difference between the Known and Unknown conditions, the mean fer both groups was below the neutral position. Table 5. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of knowledge of source ratings.* Condition Mean Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 3.83 2.17 Known: Undecided 3.27 1.71 Unknown: Opposed 1.77 1.31 Unknown: Undecided 1.92 l.uu Source SS df MS F Audience .0” l .ou < 1 n.s. Knowledge of source 2.91 1 2.91 3u.uu** Interaction .12 1 .12 l.u5 n.s. Error 10.80 135 .08 Total 13.87 138 *Knowledge of source perception scores ranged from 1 (very improbable) to 7 (very probable) **p < .05 Test of the Hypotheses Hypotheses l and 2, whiCh predicted main effects fOr audience attitude and audience knowledge of source, were tested by a twoeway analysis of variance. Hypothesis 3 was not tested because its con- firmation was predicated upon the confirmation of Hypotheses 1 and 2: neither'of'which was confirmed. Data used in testing these hypotheses were mean pretest to posttest attitude Change scores. The significance level used for all tests in this study was .05. 21 Hypotheses l and 2. The first hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between audience knowledge of source and amount of encoder attitude change. Specifically, this hypothesis predicted that: Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for a known audience will report greater attitude change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an unknown audience. Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship between audience attitude and amount of encoder attitude Change. This hypothesis stated that: Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an uncommitted audience will demonstrate greater attitude change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counter- attitudinal messages for a committed audience. Table 6 indicates that there is only one main effect demonstrated. Table 6. Attitude scores, amount of Change, and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental groups. Condition Pretest Posttest Change Known: Opposed 7.69 8.15 .H6 Known: Undecided 7.73 8.u9 .76 Unknown: Opposed 8.00 9.uu l.uu Unknown: Undecided 7.78 11.59 3.81 Source SS df MS F Audience 1.77 l 1.77 2.26 n.s. Knowledge of source ”.07 l H.07 5.l9* Interaction 1.06 1 1.06 1.35 n.s. Error 106.08 136 .78 Total 112.98 139 *p <.05 22 Audience knowledge of source does have a significant effect, but in a direction opposite the prediction. Subjects in the Unknown conditions experienced greater attitude change than their Known condition counter- parts. Change scores for an audience attitude effect were in the predicted direction, but the obtained F was not significant. Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis predicted the cells having the least and greatest amounts of attitude Change. It stated that: Attitude change in the direction of the position advocated in the counterattitudinal message will be greatest When the communication is encoded for the known, uncommitted audience, and attitude change will be least fbr the unknown, committed audience. Support for this prediction was dependent upon the directional confir- mation of both Hypotheses l and 2. Because these were both not supported, Hypothesis 3 was, therefOre, not confirmed in this experi— ment. Sppplementary Analyses Besides using attitude Change as a criterion measure, other measures were taken in the posttest. Salience was the only other pre— and posttest measure-—a11 others were posttest only scores. These latter measures were: (1) subjects' anxiety, ( 2) subjects' evaluation of essay persuasiveness, (3) subjects' perception of subsequent harmful effects resulting from.the essay, and (u) subjects' self-perception scores. .Anxiety. Subjects were asked in the posttest how muCh anxiety they experienced during encoding. These scores were tested in a two- way analysis of variance. As reported in Table 7, there was a 23 Table 7. Means, standard.deviations and analysis of variance of anxiety scores of experimental groups.* Condition Mean Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 2.00 1.2H Known: Undecided 2.76 1.37 unknown: Opposed 2.1” 1.08 Unknown: Undecided 2.”? 1.19 Source SS df MS F Audience .30 1 .30 6.79** Knowledge of source .01 1 .01 < l n.s. Interaction .05 l .05 1.03 n.s. Error 5.uu 136 .ou Total 5.80 139 *Anxiety'was measured on a 1 (least anxiety) to 5 (greatest anxiety) scale. **p < .05 significant audience attitude effect. Those subjects writing essays fer undecided readers experienced significantly greater anxiety than those writing for the Opposed audience. Persuasiveness. Subjects were asked to evaluate the persu- siveness of their essays. A.two~way analysis of variance shown in Table 8 indicates that there was a significant audience attitude effect. Those subjects Who wrote for undecided readers, believed their messages to be more persuasive than did those writing fer readers who were opposed. 21+ Table 8. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of persuasiveness scores of experimental groups.* Conditions Mean Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 3.19 1.53 'Known: Undecided n.21 1.55 Unknown: Opposed 3.75 1.50 unknown: Undecided 9.22 1.27 Source SS df MS F Audience .59 l .59 9.u3** Knowledge of source .10 1 10 1.51 n 8 Interaction .09 1 .09 1.01 n s Ekttn~ 8.16 136 .06 Total 8.99 139 *Persuasiveness was measured on a 1 (very weak) to 7 (very strong) senantic scale. **p < .05 HBrnfiua Effects. Subjects were asked to evaluate the possible harmful effects their'essays might have upon their'respective audiences. Table 9 shows that there is a signigicant audience attitude effect. Subjects writing for the undecided audience believed that their essays would be more likely to have a harmful effect than did those Who wrote for audiences opposed to the essay. Table 9. Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of harmful effects scores of experimental groups.* Conditions Mean _ Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 2.29 1.06 Known: Undecided 2.73 .99 unknown: Opposed 2.08 1.0% Unknown: undecided 2.69 1.27 *Harmful effects were measured on a 1 (least effect) to 5 (greatest effect) scale. 25 Table 9 (contd) Source SS df MS F Audience .28 1 .28 7.87* Knowledge of source .01 1 .01 < 1 n.s Interaction .01 l .01 < l n.s Error 5.m+ 136 .014 Total 5.7M 139- *p < .05 Salience. Besides assessing attitude direction and intensity, attitude salience, or importance, was also treasured. Table 10 reports the anount of salience change between the pre- and posttests . Table 10. Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of salience change scores of experimental groups. Condition Mean Change Standard Deviation Known: Opposed -l. 31; u . 32 Known: Undecided — . 70 5 . 01 Urflcnown: Opposed .08 u . 314 Unknown: Undecided - . 19 5 . 1&2 (Control) (— .09) (9.80) Source SS df MS P Audience .03 1 .03 < 1 n.s. Knowledge of source .93 1 .93 1.38 n.s. Interaction . 21 1 . 21 < 1 n . s . Error 91 . 12 136 . 67 Total 9 2 . 29 139 Although there is a slight indication of negative change for the known conditions, this change is not statistically significant. 26 Self-perception. During the posttest, subjects were asked to evaluate themselves on ten seven-point semantic differential scales designed to measure two dimensions of credibility-qualification, (ability) and trustworthiness (character). Table 11 shows an analysis of variance based on mean qualification scores. Though there is a sligmt interaction effect, it is not significant. Table 11. Means, standard deviation, and analysis of variance of qualification scores of experimental groups. Condition Mean Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 29.97 5.27 Known: Undecided 25.85 3.80 Unknown: Opposed 27.08 9.95 Unknown: Undecided 25.92 9.20 Source SS df MS 1? Audience .16 1 .16 1 n.s. Knowledge of source .71 1 .71 1.20 n.s. Interaction 1.62 1 1.62 2.76 n.s. Error 80.29 136 .59 Total 82.73 139' In Table 12 an analysis of variance of mean trustworthiness scores indicates no effect whatever. Table 12. Means, standard deviation, and analysis of variance of trustworthiness scores of experimental groups. Condition Mean Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 30 . 11 3 . 39 Known: Undecided 30 . 92 3 .19 Unknown: Opposed 29.89 3.90 Unknown: Undecided 29.56 3.75 27 Table 12 (contd) Source SS df MS F Audience .260 1 .260 < 1 n.s. Knowledge of source .002 1 .002 < 1 n.s. Interaction .032 1 .032 < 1 n.s. Ekmtm~ 51.599 ' 136 .379 Total 51.838 1337 werd count. To test fer differences in the amount of subject effort among the experimental groups , am analysis of variance was per- formed using total word count scores. Table 13 indicates that there was no significant effect. Table 13. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of essay length. Condition Mean Standard Deviation Known: Opposed 171.91 51.01 Known: undecided 163.61 99.66 unknown: Opposed 172.72 90.57 unknown: undecided 181.00 59.38 Source SS df MS P Audience .00 1 .00 < 1 n.s. Knowledge of source 82.77 1 82.77 1.15 n.s. Interaction 68.72 1 68.72 < 1 n.s. Extra: 9529.27 139 72.12 Total 9675 . 76 ITT Chapter IV DISCUSSION Although this experiment failed to demonstrate support for the three hypotheses , plausible reasons for non—confirmation can be found within the framework of dissonance theory. Despite this disappoint- ment, the study has provided additional speculative evidence regarding the loci of dissonance arousal. Failure to Confirm Hypothesis 1 This hypothesis predicted that dissonance and subsequent attitude change would be greater for the known audience condition. It was no small surprise when the inverse of this prediction emerged. After considering all aspects of the experimental procedure and the obtained results, however, possible explanations for this effect can be posited. The most likely reason for the greater attitude change in the Unknown Audience condition is based on the Known Audience subjects' ability to "take back" their essays if they should ever be confronted by an acquaintance. This possibility finds support in the study by Helmmeich and Collins (1968). Subjects in that study who were given an opportunity to take back their belief discrepant messages failed to demonstrate the dissonance effect, while those who were unable to to take back the message did experience dissonance . 28 29 Similar to this rationale is the one expressed by a student dwing debriefing for the present study. He said that if his friends were to read the essay, they would know that it did not express his true opinion. Thus subjects in the Known Audience conditions may have been unconcerned about the effects of their essays . When friends are familiar with your attitudes in general, there is little danger of your belief discrepant essay influencing them. For those in the Known conditions, affixing of signatures to the essay may have been insur— ance that the essays would not be taken seriously by the supposed audience. . Another possible reason for failure to obtain a knowledge of audience effect may be found in the joint measuring of attitude change and salience change at the same time . While subjects were given four scales on which to note attitude intensity change, they were at the same time given two scales on which to note change in salience. It is likely that these two measures worked against each other. Changing salience for some subjects may have been an alternate means of dis- sonance resolution, thus enabling them to maintain their previous attitude intensity and direction. Supporting this speculation is the somewhat greater, although not significant, negative salience changes recorded for the known audience than for the unknown. The opposite occurred for attitude change: greater positive change for the mflcnown audience than for the known . Failure to Confirm Hypothesis 2 Even though the results of this effect were in the predicted 30 direction, the audience attitude hypothesis was not confirmed. Both Nel gt El: (1969) and Bodaken (1970) reported significantly greater attitude change fer those persons encoding fer'neutral audiences. In light of suCh strong theoretical support for an audience attitude effect, it was especially disappointing that it was not supported in this study. One factor Which may help to explain the failure to confirm the audience attitude effect is the possibility that subjects in the Known conditions believed.that they could "take back" their’essays, thus reducing dissonance in both the Known: Opposed and Known: Undecided groups. If subjects perceived the possibility for’message "take back," the fear of aversive consequences to the supposed audience might have been.rended, thus militating against dissonance arousal and subsequent attitude change. Despite the fact that the audience attitude effect did not reach statistical significance, it is especially provocative to note that subjects in the Undecided conditions reported that they had: (1) experienced significantly greater‘anxiety'while encoding the belief— discrepant essays (F1,136 = 6.79), (2) believed their~essays to be significantly more persuasive (Pl,136 = 9.93) and (3) perceived that their essays would have more harmful effects upon their supposed audience (Fl,136 = 7.87). These indices suggest that the psychological stresses were present fer greater~dfissonance arousal in both of the Undecided Audience conditions, but the audience attitude effect fer attitude change still was short of statistical significance. 31 Tie Locus of Dissonance Arousal It was the hope of the experimenter to address in some mean- ingful way the issue regarding the locus of dissonance arousal in counterattitudinal advocacy. For it is by clarifying this issue that more reliable predictions may be made about the types of cognitive reorganizations that are likely to be made by individuals when con— fronted by inconsistent situations . Aversive consequences. The debate can be restated, in essence, as existing between Festinger (1957), who believed dissonance was aroused when the individual realized the inconsistency between what he believed and what he said ("I believe 5, but I advocate pg: 29") those recent dissonance theorists who see the inconsistency as existing between what an individual says and the possible harmful effects which may result from such statements. Aronson (1968) puts it this way: In the experiments on counterattitudinal advocacy for example, I would suggest that it is incorrect to say that dissonance existed between the cognitions "I believe the task is dull [X]" and "I told someone the task was interesting [not X]." . . . What is dissonant is the cognition "I am a decent, truthful human being," and the cognition "I have misled a person; I have conned him into believing something which just isn't true: he thinks that I really believe it and I cannot set him straight because I probably won't see him again." (p. 29) (The brackets are mine.) This view subscribes to the belief that dissonance arousal results from concern for the well-being of receivers of belief—discrepant messages. The present experiment lends support to this vieWpoint . As noted above, subjects who encoded for the undecided audience believed that this audience would experience greater harmful effects as the result of 32 reading the counterattitudinal essays. Subjects also perceived that this audience would be more strongly influenced by the essays than would those who were "strongly Opposed" to the issue in questio -- noted by the higher perceived persuasiveness of the essays for the undecided audience . Although the audience attitude effect for atti- tude change fell short of statistical significance, the above findings support the conclus ion that source concern for aversive consequences to the receiver does assist in the arousal of cognitive dissonance. It could be reasonably argued, however, that the non-significance of the attitude effect places the above proposition on shaky footing. In light of this, one consideration should be offered. Whereas in the Nel gt_a_1_. (1969) and Bodaken (1970) studies, the topics of "legal- ization of marijuana" and "required living on campus by all students" were used respectively, the topic here concerns a national policy of mandatory military service for all men before college. It is possible that the topic used in this experiment might have been perceived as being beyond the scope of direct harm to the supposed audience. Decisions to smoke marijuana or live for four years on a college campus are questions that may be decided by the audience in question. However, subjects may have perceived that the question of mandatory military service was beyond the decis ion—making parameters of those in the audience . Threatened self-image . Another viewpoint regarding the locus of dissonance arousal has been expressed by Bramel (1968). His view is that dissonance is the result of threatened self-image. Expression of belief-discrepant opinions is dissonant with one's own self- 33 perceptions. He says: . . dissonance is a feeling of personal unworthiness (a type of anxiety) traceable to rejection of oneself by other people either in the present or in the past . Any information which implies that one is incompetent orimmoral arouses dissonance. (p. 365) Part of this speculation is supported by this experiment. Consistant with the belief that dissonance is traceable to "a type of anxiety," it was observed that subjects encoding for the undecided audience experienced significantly greater anxiety than did those encoding for the strongly opposed audience. The question, however, still remains as to whether or not such anxiety is equivalent to "personal unworthi— ness" and "traceable to rejection of oneself by other people . . . ." The greater anxiety consistent with an audience attitude effect could be attributable to causes other than feelings of personal unworthiness by the subjects. Such anxious feelings could have resulted from concern for aversive consequences to the receiver and not any sense of personal guilt. The possibility that dissonance is aroused by threatened self— image is not supported by the findings of this experiment. There was no reported effect based upon self-perception scores on either the trustworthiness or qualification dimensions. There are, however, some possible explanations for the lack of significant differences among self-perception scores. One reason may be that self-image is too firmly rooted to be easily changed by committing a single act of counter— attitudinal advocacy . Another explanation could be that the Berlo gt 2.1. (1970) scales are not sensitive enougn to detect any changes in self— perception. To the experimenter's knowledge this study is the first to 39 i use these scales for self-evaluation, all others have been for the evaluation of other individuals or institutions . It is possible that subjects asked to evaluate themselves , experienced a type of defensive avoidance reaction . This may have accounted for generally higher scores in the experimental groups than were observed in the Control group. Another possible explanation for not recording any differences in self-perception may be the time of self-evaluation. Since dis— sonance is a post—decisional phenomenon, it is reasonable to assume that threatened self-image is greater immediately after the decision has been made to encode a belief-discrepant message. Threatened self- image should be reduced after attitude change scores have been taken. In the posttest instrument, self-evaluation was the last item. By the time subjects reached this part of the questionnaire, dissonance may have been adequately resolved by means of attitude or salience change . Implications for Future Research The failure to confirm the hypothesis concerning the knowledge of audience variable probably resulted from no weakness in the theo- retical suppositions, but rather from weaknesses of experimental design. V Because of the takeback possibility inherent among subjects in the known audience conditions , subjects may not have experienced the dissonance necessary for attitude change. In a sense, this experi- ment has amounted to a replication of the takeback study of Helmreich and Collins (1968) . Future studies should continue to investigate the 35 efficacy of the knowledge variable . However, the essential method— ological factor is subjects ' perceptions of probability of identifi- cation with the belief—discrepant message. As long as the encoder believes that the audience will identify him personally with the message, the pressure toward dissonance will be reduced. The present study has sham that some dissonance will be produced even when the audience is Imknown to fine souroe. This leads the experimenter to believe that he would have observed the predicted results had he not asked subjects to place their signatures on the essays. If it is assumed that dissonance is aroused through concern for aversive con- sequences, then it is reasonable to presume that the desired effect mignt emerge when the encoder's name is 3393 on the belief-discrepant message. Omission of the name would lessen the possibility of a subsequent takeback. Although the threatened self-image theory of dissonance arousal was not given any direct support in this experiment, the researcher believes that there are certain refinements in methodology that should be made when testing for threatened self-image. First, other instru- ments for self—evaluation ought to be tested. It is possible that the Berlo scales were not sensitive enough for self-examination. Second, the researcher ought to test for changes in self-image immediately after dissonance arousal and before other alternatives for resolution have been presented. The issue regarding the locus of dissonance arousal is critical to the process of identifying and understanding those variables which stimulate cognitive reorganization in inconsistent situations . 36 Under this assumption the present study may be justified. Summary The major purpose of this study was to explore certain aspects of the issue regarding the locus of dissonance arousal in situations involving counterattitudinal advocacy. The center of concern was on the manipulation of audience attitude. toward the counterattitudinal issue and encoder knowledge of the supposed audience. It was pre- dicted that attitude change would be greater when subjects wrote essays for undecided receivers. It was further hypothesized that atti— tude change would be greater when subjects peroeived a greater prob- ability that the audience was known. The final hypothesis predicted that the greatest amount of attitude change would be for the Known, Undecided Audience, while the least change would be for the Unknown, Opposed Audience . None of the stated hypotheses were confirmed in this experiment, although an inverse relationship was found between lmowledge of audience and amount of attitude change . Greater attitude change was reported by subjects who encoded belief discrepant messages for the unknown audience. This effect was explained on the basis that subjects believed they would be able to take bad< their essays for the known audience , but not for the unknown. Subjects thus perceiving that message take back was possible were given an out which militated against dissonance arousal. REFERENCES Ableson, R. P. Psychological implications. In Ableson, R. R. , McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. R., Aronson, E., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (Eds.), Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Source— book. Chicago: Ra—nd M13113; and (50., I968, 1I2-139. Aronson, E. Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In Ableson, R. P., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. R., Aronson, E., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (Eds.) Theories of Cognitive Consistency: _A_ Sourcebook. Chicago: WI? mm Aronson, E. The psychology of insufficient justification: An analysis ' of some conflicting data. In Feldman, 8. (Ed.) Cognitive Consistency: Motivational Antecedents and BehavioraI Con- seguents. mew York and Tendon: AcademicTress, 1966,_II'5~136. Berlo, D. K., Lemert, J. B., and Mertz, R. J. Dimensions for evaltating the acceptability of message source. The Public Qinion Quarterly, 1970, g, 563-576. Bodaken, E. M. Choice and perceived audience attitude as determinants of cognitive dissonance and subseqtent attitude change following counterattitudinal advocacy . Unpublished dissertation, Department of Communication, Michigan State University, 1970. Bramel, D. Dissonance, expectation and the self. In Ableson, R. P., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. R., Aronson, E., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (Eds. ) , Theories 3i: Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. , 1968, 355-365. Brehm, J. W. and Cohen, A. R. Choice and chance relative deprivation as determinants of cognitive dissonance . Journal 9: Abnormal and Social Psyclnologl, 1959, _5_8_, 383-387. Brehm, J. W. Explorations _°_11_n_ Cognitive Dissonance. New York: Wiley, 1962. Carlsmith, J. M., Collins, B. E., and Helmtreich, R. L. Studies in enforced compliance: I. The effect of pressure for compliance on attitude change produced by face-to-face role playing and anonymous essay writing. Journal of Personality and Social Eychology, 1966, §_2_, 256-117—2 . — 37 38 Carlsmnith, J . M. Varieties of counterattitudinal behavior. In Abelson, R. P., McGuire, W. J., Nechmb, T. R., Aronson, E., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (Eds.), Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook. Chicago: Rand WTW W Collins, B. E. The mediation of change due to counterattitudinal behavior. In Abelson, R. P., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. R., Aronson, E., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (Eds.), Theories of Cognitive Consistengg: A Sourcebook. Chicago: Ra—fid Maially 3 an ., 6. Collins, B. E. The effect of monetary inducements on the amount of attitude change produced by forced compliance. In Elms, A. C. (Ed.), Role Playing, Reward, and Attitude Change. Cincinnati: Van Nostrand, I969, 2991—22-3. Festinger, L. A Theo 9: Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, Calif .: Stanford University Press, 1957. Festinger, L. and Carlsmnith, J. M. Cognitive consequences of foroed compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 19 59 , 33, 203-210. *— Helmreich, R. L. and Collins, B. E. Studies inn forced compliance: Commitment and magnitude of inducement to comply as determi- nants of opinion chance. Journal of Personality and Social PsychologI, 1968, 10, 75-8I. '— Miller, G. R. Counterattitudinal advocacy: A current appraisal. An ' unpublished paper, Department of Communication, Michigan State University, 1970. Nel, E., Helmreich, R. L. and Aronson, E. Opinion change in the advocate as a function of the persuasibility of his audience: a clarification of the meaning of dissonance. Journal _of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, l_2_, 11'7-1'99. Osgood, E. E., Suci, G. J., and Tannenbaum, P. H. The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illih'ois Press,19§"7. Rosenberg, M. J. When dissonance fails: On eliminating evaluation apprehension from attitude measurement . Journal 21: Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, I, 28-92. APPENDIX A PRETEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE Dear GMI Student: You are being asked to participate in a project that students in all accredited colleges in Michigan are helping with. It is an opinion survey concerning college student's attitudes toward a variety of issues. We hope you will be willing to help. You might wonder why we are asking you to put your name and college on this form. Very simply we will be correlating these answers with other data available and will be doing this project again at GMI. If you participate now you will not be asked to again. All data is anonymous and will not be seen by anyone at GMI . I have been asked to coordinate this project at GMI and am very grateful for your help . Sincerely , Michael Burgoon Assistant Professor of Communication Department of Communication and Organizational Behavior 39 90 COLLEGE OPINION PROFILE Name Student Number- College Class Time Instructor The purpose of this survey is to solicit the opinions of students on a variety of current issnes--campus and national. On eacln of the following pages you will find a number of issues each followed by a series of descriptive scales. For example, here is an item like those you will see: The United States should withdraw from the United Nations . Bad : : : : : : Good Your job is to place a check-mark (X) above the line that best indi- cates your judgrent about the proposition. For example, if you feel that U. S. withdrawal should be very bad, you would check as follows: Bad X : : : : : : Good If you feel that such a move (withdrawal would be quite bad, you should check as follows: Bad :X: : : : : Good If you feel neutral or indifferent about the proposition, or if you feel that the scale is irrelevant to the proposition, you would check as follows: Bad: : :X: : : Good Remember: Never put more than one-check-mark on a single scale and be sure that each check is in the middle of the line, not on the boundaries . ’ ALL SCALES SHOULD BE CHECKED —- II) NOT OMIT ANY. WORK RAPIDLY —— RECORD FIRST IMPRESSIONS -- DO NOT CHANGE MARKS. The use and possession of marijuana should be legalized. Trivial Crucial Good Bad Worthless Valuable Pleasant Unpleasant unfair Fair Imptmtant Unimportant Draft deferments should be eliminated fer college students. Good Bad unfair Fair Crucial Trivial worthless Valuable Pleasant Unpleasant Unimportant Important Black students should be advised to majornin less rigorous curricula. Unpleasant Pleasant Bad Good Important Unimportant Fair Unfair Valuable Crucial Vkmthless Trivial 92 All students should be required to live on campus fer at least two years of their college attendance. -_—- Unimportant Important Valuable worthless Good : Bad Unfair : Fair Pleasant unpleasant Trivial : Crucial All college male students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. Good Bad Important : ‘Unimportant worthless _____Valuab1e Crucial Trivial Unpleasant : Pleasant Fair : Unfair APPENDIX B POS'I'IEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE Form 5-36C 93 Name ___________________________________________________ Date ....................................... . College _- Class Time ___________ Instructor ______________________ Now that you have written your essay, we would like to know how you feel toward the issue. PLEASE RESPOND ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SCALES. All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. _______ Very Pleasant ________ Quite Pleasant ....... Slightly Pleasant ________ Neutral ........ Slightly Unpleasant __--_-__ Quite Unpleasant ________ Very Unpleasant All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. ........ Very Crucial ________ Quite Crucial ________ Slightly Crucial ........ Neutral ________ Slightly Trivial -___-___ Quite Trivial ________ Very Trivial All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. ________ Very Good ________ Quite Good ---_-___ Slightly Good ________ Neutral ________ Slightly Bad --_-__-_ Quite Bad ________ Very Bad MSU- 11- 70 Form 5-36C an All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. ........ Very Valuable ........ Quite Valuable Slightly. Valuable ________ Neutral ________ Slightly Worthless ........ Quite Worthless ________ Very Worthless All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. ________ Very Unfair ________ Quite Unfair _______ Slightly Unfair ________ Neutral ___--___ Slightly Fair ________ Quite Fair ________ Very Fair All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. ________ Very Important -_-_ __ Quite Important __- _ Slightly Important ________ Neutral _______ Slightly Unimportant ........ Quite Unimportant ........ Very Unimportant Before you wrote your essay, how did you think your reading audience felt toward the issue in question? ........ They were favorable toward two years mandatorymilitary service for male college students. ________ They were undecided toward two years mandatorymilitary service for male college students. MSU- 11- '70 Form 5-36C 1+5 ........ They were opposed to two years mandatory military service for male college students. ........ I don't know what their attitude was toward two years mandatory military service for male college students. RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BY PLACING AN "X" ON THE LINE WHICH MOST NEARLY REPRESENTS YOUR FEELINGS. Statement One My essay may have a harmful effect upon those who will be reading it. ........ Strongly Agree ________ Mildly Agree --______ Neither Agree nor Disagree ________ Mildly Disagree _______ Strongly Disagree Statement Two Some of the students who are to read my essay will know who I am. ________ Highly Probable ........ Quite Probable ________ Slightly Probable ........ Neutral ........ Slightly Improbable ________ Quite Improbable ________ Highly Improbable Statement Three How do you evaluate the persuasive effectiveness of the essay you have just written? ________ Very Strong ________ Quite Strong ........ Slightly Strong ........ Neutral ________ Slightly Weak ________ Quite Weak ________ Very Weak MSU- 1 1- '70 Form 5-36C 1+6 Statement Four I felt anxious about preparing this message for my reading audience. ________ Strongly Agree ________ Mildly Agree ________ Neither Agree Nor Disagree --__-__- Mildly Disagree ........ Strongly Disagree Statement Five I will be able to explain my true beliefs to those who will be reading my essay. ........ Strongly Agree -------- Mildly Agree ________ Neither Agree Nor Disagree _-____-_ Mildly Disagree ________ Strongly Disagree Statement Six Please evaluatejourself on the following scales. WORK RAPIDLY -- MARK EVERY SCALE -- RECORD FIRST IMPRESSIONS: Safe : : : : : : Unsafe Untrained : : : : : : Trained Just : : : : : : UHJUSt lnexperienced : : : : :' : Experienced Kind : : : : . : : Crud Unskilled : : : : : : Skilled Friendly : : : : : : Unfriendly Unqualified : : : : : : Qualified Honest : : : : : : Dishonest Uninformed : : : : : : Informed Note: Recheck to be sure you have responded to every item in the questionnaire. WHEN FINISHED, TURN QUESTIONNAIRE OVER AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. MSU-ll- '70 APPENDIX C CONTROL POS'ITEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE Form 3- 36D 1+7 MICHIGAN COLLEGE INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROJECT)“ Name Date College Instructor Class Time Recently, the activities of college students across the country have provided a multitude of news stories for the mass media. Yet With all the publicity surrounding student revolt and unrest, little is really known about student attitudes toward a number of issues related to student life on our col» lege campuses. On the following pages are. several issues that are of concern to college students. Each issue is followed by a set of descriptive scales. We would like to have you place a check (./) on the line that you think best indicates your Opinion toward the issue. Each scale should be checked --~ do not omit any. *Sponsored by the Averell Foundation Attitude Study Fund. MSI_I-11-'7O Fonn 5-36D The voting age should be lowered to 18 years. 1+8 Slightly Very Bad Quite Bad Bad Neutral Very Quite. Slightly Important Important Important Neutral Very Quite Slightly Unpleasant Unpleasant Very Fair Quite Fair Very Quite Trivial Trivial Very Quite Worthless Worthless Unpleasant Neutral ' Slightly Good Quite Good Very Good Slightly Quite Very Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Slightly Fair Neutral Slightly Trivial Neutral Slightly Worthless Neutral Slightly Quite Very Pleasant Pleasant Pleasant Slightly I Quite Very Unfair Unfair Unfair Slightly Quite Very Crucial Crucial Crucial Slightly Quite Very Valuable Valuable Valuable All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university. Very Ihnfleasant Qune llnplt asant Very Bad Quite Bad Very Quite Crucial CruCial Very Quite Valuable Valuable Very Qu1te Unfair Unfair Very Quite Important Important. ‘MSU- ll~ '70 Slightly Unpleasant Neutral ' Slightly Bad Neutral Slightly Crucial Neutral Slightly Valuable Neutral Slightly Unfair Neutral Slightly Important Neutral “Si ightly Qune Vtry Pleasant Pleasant Pleasant ~ Slightly Good Quite Good Very Good . Slightly .. Quite Very Trivial Trivial Trivial Slightly Quite Very Worthless Worthless Worthless Slightly Quite Fair Fair Very Fair Slightly Quite Very Unimportant Unimportant U nimportant Form 5-36D Draft deferments should be eliminated for college students. 1+9 Slightly Very Fair Quite Fair Fair Neutral Very Quite Slightly Trivial Trivial Trivial Neutral Very Quite Slightly Worthless Worthless Worthless Neutral Slightly Very Good Quite Good Good Neutral Very Quite Slightly Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Neutral Very Pleasant Quite Pleasant Slightly Pleasant Neutral Slightly Very Quite Unfair Unfair Unfair Slightly Quite Very Crucial Crucial Crucial Slightly Quite Very Valuable Valuable Valuable Slightly Quite Bad Bad Very Bad Slightly Quite Very . Important Important Important Slightly Quite Very Unpleasant Unpleasant Unpleasant All students should be required to live on campus during their college attendance. Very Quite Slightly Important Important Important Neutral Very Quite Slightly Valuable Valuable Valuable Neutral Quite Slightly Very Good Good Good Neutral Very Quite Slightly Trivial Trivial Trivial Neutral Very Quite Slightly Unfair Unfair Unfair Neutral Very Quite Slightly Pleasant Pleasant Pleasant Neutral MSU-11-7O Slightly Quite Very Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Slightly Quite Very Worthless Worthless Worthless Slightly Bad Quite Bad Very Bad Slightly Quite Very Crucial Crucial Crucial Slightly Quite Fair Fair Very Fair Slightly Quite Very Unpleasant Unpleasant Unpleasant Form 5-36D 50 Military activity in South Viet Nam should be significantly increased. Quite Very Trivial Trivial Very Quite Worthless Worthless .Quite Very Fair Fair Very Quite Unpleasant Unpleasant Slightly Trivial Neutral Slightly Worthless Neutral ' Slightly Fair Neutral Slightly Unpleasant Neutral ' Slightly Very Bad Quite Bad Bad Neutral Very ' Quite Slightly Important Important Important Neutral Slightly Quite Very Crucial Crucial Crucial Slightly Quite Very Valuable Valuable Valuable . Slightly - Quite Very Unfair Unfair Unfair Slightly Quite Very Pleasant Pleasant Pleasant Slightly Quite Very Good Good Good Slightly Quite Very Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Draft card burners should automatically be reclassified l-A by their draft boards. Quite Slightly Very Unfair Unfair Very Quite Important Important Very Quite Valuable Valuable Very Quite Trivial Trivial Very .Quite Good Good Very Quite Pleasant Pleasant MSU-11-‘70 Unfair Neutral Slightly Important Neutral Slightly Valuable Neutral ° Slightly Trivial Neutral ' Slightly Good Neutral Slightly Pleasant Neutral Quite Slightly Fair Fair Very Fair Slightly Quite Very Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Slightly Quite Very Worthless Worthless Worthless . Slightly . Quite Very Crucial Crucial Crucial ' Slightly .Quite Bad Bad Very Bad Slightly Quite Very Unpleasant Unpleasant Unpleasant Fo rm 5- 36 D 51 The college grading system should be abolished. ' Slightly ' Slightly Quite MSU-ll- '70 ' Very Bad Quite Bad Bad Neutral Good Good Very Good Very Quite Slightly Slightly ° Quite Very Pleasant Pleasant Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant Unpleasant Unpleasant Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Neutral Important Important Important Slightly Slightly Quite Very Fair Quite Fair Fair Neutral Unfair Unfair Very Unfair Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Worthless Worthless Worthless Neutral Valuable Valuable Valuable Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Crucial Crucial Crucial Neutral Trivial Trivial Trivial The United States should withdraw from the United Nations. Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Unpleasant Unpleasant Unpleasant Neutral Pleasant Pleasant Pleasant. Very Quite Slightly 1 Slightly Quite Very Trivial Trivial Trivial Neutral Crucial Crucial Crucial Slightly Slightly Quite Very Bad Quite Bad Bad Neutral Good Good Very Good Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Valuable Valuable Valuable Neutral Worthless Worthless Worthless Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Important Important Important Neutral Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Very 'Quite ' Slightly ' Slightly Quite Unfair Unfair Unfair Neutral Fair Fair Very Fair Form 5-36D 52 Presidential nominations should be based on a direct vote of the peOple. ' Quite ' Slightly Slightly Quite Very Crucial Crucial Crucial Neutral Trivial Trivial Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Fair Fair Fair Neutral Unfair Unfair Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Worthless Worthless Worthless Neutral Valuable Valuable Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Good Good Good Neutral Bad Bad Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Neutral Important Important Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Pleasant Pleasant Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant Unpleasant All firearms should be licensed and registered. Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Worthless Worthless Worthless Neutral Valuable Valuable Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Fair Fair Fair Neutral Unfair Unfair Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Crucial Crucial Crucial Neutral Trivial Trivial Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Unpleasant Unpleasant Unpleasant Neutral Pleasant Pleasant Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Very Bad Bad Bad Neutral Good Good Very Quite Slightly Slightly Quite Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Neutral Important Important MSU-11-7O Very Trivial Very Unfair Very Valuable Very Bad Very Important Very Unpleasant Very Valuable Very Unfair Very Trivial Very Pleasant Very Good Very Important zes "‘llfllllljllllllllllll'lllllljll