

AUDIENCE COMMITMENT AND SOURCE KNOWLEDGE
OF AUDIENCE AS DETERMINANTS OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF
ATTITUDE AND SELF PERCEPTION FOLLOWING
COUNTERATTITUDINAL ADVOCACY

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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

AUDIENCE COMMITMENT AND SOURCE KNOWLEDGE OF AUDIENCE
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SEQUENT CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND SELF PERCEPTION
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presented by

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The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of audience commitment and source knowledge of audience on attitude change and self perception following the writing of counterattitudinal essays.

Students enrolled in undergraduate communication courses at General Motors Institute were administered a pretest attitude questionnaire containing several issues considered to be salient for them. The issue producing the most skewed distribution on attitude intensity called for two years mandatory military service for all college students before being accepted by a college or university; thus it was chosen as the experimental issue. About two weeks after the pretest, experimental subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays under varying conditions of source knowledge of audience and audience commitment toward the issue. Post-encoding measures were then taken of each subject's attitude toward the issue and subject's self-image. The effectiveness of each manipulation was assessed by asking subjects to respond to questions designed to tap their perception of audience attitude and the probability that they would know members of the supposed audience. Subjects assigned to the Control group responded

to the pretest and posttest, but did not write the essay.

The knowledge of audience variable was dichotomized between the Known Audience and the Unknown Audience. Subjects in the Known condition were informed that their supposed audience would consist of students at General Motors Institute. The audience for the Unknown condition was to be students at Michigan State University. Audience commitment toward the topic in question was dichotomized into those who were strongly opposed and those who were undecided.

The major dependent variable, attitude change, was assessed by using pretest to posttest difference scores on four, seven-interval semantic differential-type scales. In addition to attitude change, salience changes were also measured.

Three hypotheses were tested in this experiment: First, that attitude change would be significantly greater for the Known Audience than for the Unknown; second, that attitude change would be significantly greater for the Uncommitted Audience than for the Opposed; third, that the greatest amount of change would be in the Known, Undecided condition and the least amount of change in the Unknown, Opposed condition.

The results failed to support any of the stated hypotheses. However, there was an inverse knowledge of audience effect, showing significantly greater attitude change for subjects in the Unknown condition.

This unexpected result was explained by the supposition that subjects encoding for the Known Audience perceived that message

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takeback would be possible if ever confronted by a member of the supposed audience. The possibility of message takeback reduced the arousal of cognitive dissonance thus militating against attitude change.

The results of this experiment were discussed within the framework of cognitive dissonance theory and included suggestions for future research using the counterattitudinal advocacy paradigm.

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DEDICATION

To
Suzanne

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of
Speech, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Experimental designs utilizing counterattitudinal advocacy are especially suited for testing consistency theories. This paradigm requires that the source encode a belief-discrepant message, thus becoming the receiver of his own communication. By using pre- and posttest attitude measures the researcher is able to measure the amount of persuasion the subjects have experienced. The basic assumption of this model is that the individual will persuade himself rather than being persuaded by another.

Festinger (1957) was one of the earliest proponents of the persuasive efficacy of counterattitudinal advocacy. According to him an individual will experience cognitive dissonance when he prepares a message which is counter to his true beliefs. In short, dissonance is aroused because the individual perceives the opposing cognitions (1) I believe X, and (2) I am advocating not X. In their classic "dull task" experiment Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) supported their contention of a dissonance effect. They asked subjects to tell a confederate that a dull task had been interesting to do. Subjects receiving \$1 as a reward for telling the confederate the task was interesting demonstrated significantly greater liking for the dull task than subjects who were given \$20 as incentive. Although this

study has since been attacked for several methodological weaknesses, it, none-the-less, fired the interest of many consistency theorists in the counterattitudinal paradigm as a viable technique for testing various aspects of dissonance theory.

More recent dissonance theorists such as Aronson (1968) and Collins (1968) have taken issue with Festinger's original assumption-- that the locus of arousal is found in the conflict between the cognitions "I believe X," and "I advocated not X." Aronson (1968) has refuted Festinger's earlier assumption:

In the experiments on counterattitudinal advocacy for example, I would suggest that it is incorrect to say that dissonance existed between the cognitions "I believe the task is dull," and "I told someone that the task was interesting". . . . What is dissonant is the cognition "I am a decent, truthful human being" and the cognition "I have misled a person; I have conned him into believing something which just isn't true: he thinks that I really believe it and I cannot set him straight because I probably won't see him again." (p. 24)

Carlsmith (1968) supports Aronson in his speculation as to the locus of dissonance arousal. He underscores the importance of the advocate's concern for his supposed audience, saying that "anytime a person makes some statement counter to his attitudes, and a listener (whose opinion is important to the speaker) is unaware of both the speaker's attitude and his motivation for speaking against these attitudes, dissonance will be aroused." (p. 806)

Summarizing the crux of the debate between the "early" and "late" dissonance interpretations, Collins (1968) questioned whether the discrepancies between what a person believes and what he says will actually be sufficient to produce dissonance arousal. Instead he

believes that a dissonant state may result from the individual feeling that his counter advocating was a moral or ethical transgression, or he may believe that his belief-discrepant message may cause some harmful consequences to the supposed audience. In short, the central issue of concern here is whether or not dissonance will be produced when an individual's self-image is threatened by the counterattitudinal act, or when he perceives that the act will cause aversive consequences to others.

If the loci of the arousal state are found in the perception of threatened self-image or possible aversive consequences, then it is proper to assume that such hypotheses may be tested empirically. Miller (1970) suggests:

To raise questions about the "late" dissonance interpretation does not detract from the value of attempting to specify precisely those situational factors which serve to heighten or lessen the dissonance experienced by a counterattitudinal advocate. (p. 9)

In "attempting to specify precisely those situational factors" the experimenter has manipulated two independent variables, audience attitude toward the topic and source knowledge of the audience, in hopes of identifying more accurately the source of dissonance arousal.

Review of Relevant Research

Audience Attitude Toward the Topic. Underlying the use of this variable is the assumption that if a supposed audience is perceived by the counterattitudinal encoder to be uncommitted on the issue in question, the encoder may assume his message will have greater influence than if the receiver is already committed. If such a

differential in audience commitment is perceived by an individual, it is reasonable to assume it may affect the degree of cognitive discomfort experienced after encoding a belief-discrepant message. In an experiment by Bodaken (1970) subjects reported a significantly greater amount of attitude change when preparing belief-discrepant essays for uncommitted receivers than for those who were committed favorably toward the message. This finding supports the theoretic expectation that the subject's fear of aversive consequences to his audience will create cognitive dissonance.

A study by Nel, Helmreich and Aronson (1969) supports the same view. They asked subjects to make a video recording advocating the legalization of marijuana to be shown to three supposed audience groups--those for the proposition, those against and those with no opinion. They reported a substantially greater amount of attitude change among subjects encoding for the uncommitted audience in the low incentive condition (fifty cents vs. \$5). Such a result confirmed the dissonance effect predicted by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959): when reward is low, dissonance will be maximal.

The preceding studies imply that when an audience is uncommitted or has no opinion on a particular issue, it is believed to be more vulnerable to persuasion. When this condition is perceived by the counterattitudinal communicator, dissonance should exist because of anxiety over aversive consequences to the receiver.

Another study illustrating the relevance of aversive consequences to dissonance arousal was done by Helmreich and Collins (1968). These experimenters manipulated financial reward and audience

commitment. Subjects were asked to give speeches based on arguments given them on note cards. Their speeches were then delivered in three conditions: no takeback video, takeback video, anonymous audio. The subjects in the no-takeback condition were not given an opportunity to clarify their true opinion on the video tape recording, while those in the takeback condition were allowed to explain after the speech their true beliefs and why they had recorded the counterattitudinal speech. Unlike the first two conditions, the anonymous audio speech was delivered without subjects declaring their identities. The levels of financial reward were either fifty cents or \$2.50. A dissonance effect (greater attitude change in the low reward condition) was reported for subjects in the no-takeback group. It can be reasoned that subjects in this group perceived that their belief-discrepant messages would be used to persuade others, perhaps having some aversive effect upon them. Such a cognition may have created greater dissonance in the no-takeback condition accounting for the greater reported attitude change. Not being able to clarify their true positions, no-takeback subjects were probably left with the feeling that the audience would continue to misperceive their true attitude on the issue in question. Compounding this cognition would be the feeling that the audience had not been "set straight" on the issue.

Related to the issue of aversive consequences is the question of self-concept. What happens to an individual's self-image when he perceives that his belief-discrepant message may have harmful effects upon his audience? Bramel (1968) believes that dissonance may result from fear of what others will think. He says:

The theoretical relevance of the self in this view of dissonance theory now becomes clearer . . . dissonance is a feeling of personal unworthiness (a type of anxiety) traceable to rejection of oneself by other people either in the present or in the past. Any information which implies that one is incompetent or immoral arouses dissonance. The reason dissonance is greatest when the person feels personally responsible for his behavior is that rejection by other people is usually greatest when they believe the person voluntarily acted in an inappropriate way. (p. 365)

Bramel suggests that dissonance may be aroused by anxiety over the disapproval of others for committing a belief-discrepant act that may be harmful. The present study assumes that such dissonance may also be aroused by the counterattitudinal advocate's own cognition that he is "incompetent or immoral." The belief-discrepant act may violate the individual's own self-concept to such a degree as to produce dissonance.

Source Knowledge of the Audience. This experimenter believes that if fear of aversive consequences to the audience or threatened self-image help to arouse dissonance, then it is logical to assume that the source's familiarity with the supposed audience may affect the amount of dissonance experienced. If, for instance, a counterattitudinal advocate believes that he knows or will be known by members of his audience, he may have greater concern lest they suffer harmful effects because of his influence. Also, having such a relationship with those in the audience may affect the advocate's self-concept. We may assume that the more familiar the source is with another individual, the more sensitive he will be to any act that he commits against that individual which is improper, immoral, or unethical. The guilt (dissonance) aroused by committing such an act

may be even more acute if the advocate is unable to explain to those in the audience his true opinions or the circumstances in which he advocated his belief-discrepant message.

If, however, the advocate perceives that it is quite improbable that he will know or be known by anyone in the supposed audience, he may tend to impersonalize the counterattitudinal act. He may tend to think less of his audience per se, because he believes it highly improbable that he will have to confront anyone in the unknown audience. In such a condition, the advocate should experience minimal dissonance.

Rationale and Hypotheses

Because this experimenter believes that the counterattitudinal advocate will generally experience greater dissonance and subsequent attitude change when his communication may threaten his self-image or cause potential harmful consequences to his audience, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H₁: Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for a known audience will report greater attitude change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an unknown audience.

Since previous studies indicate that dissonance will be maximal when the supposed audience is perceived to be uncommitted on the issue, the following prediction is made:

H₂: Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an uncommitted audience will demonstrate greater attitude

change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counter-attitudinal messages for a committed audience.

Considering the combined effects of both the commitment and familiarity variables, it is reasonable to assume:

H₃: Attitude change in the direction of the position advocated in the counterattitudinal message will be greatest when the communication is encoded for the known, uncommitted audience and attitude change will be least for the unknown, committed audience.

On the basis of Aronson's (1968) and Collin's (1968) speculation about the locus of dissonance, Hypothesis 1 is predicated on the belief that an encoder of a belief-discrepant message should experience greater dissonance with the known audience than with the unknown. His relative familiarity with the members of the audience should regulate the degree to which he perceives his message as having potential harmful consequences. Hypothesis 2 is based upon the same speculation. When the counterattitudinal advocate perceives that his supposed audience is uncommitted on the issue in question, dissonance and subsequent attitude change should be maximal. Hypothesis 3 assumes that the combination of the known, uncommitted audience should produce the greatest amount of dissonance and thus subjects should report more attitude change than in the other three cells. Subjects in the unknown, committed audience condition should experience the least amount of cognitive dissonance, subsequently reporting less attitude change than in any of the other three cells.

Chapter II

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Overview

A pretest of student attitudes was administered to Ss from classes in public speaking at General Motors Institute. Based upon the results of this test an issue was chosen for Ss to use in counter-attitudinal encoding. Ss were then randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. The Ss in the experimental groups wrote belief-discrepant essays for fifteen minutes under different conditions of audience commitment and familiarity. A posttest was administered to the experimental groups measuring attitude intensity and salience on the issue in question. The posttest also contained items designed to check for subject perception of audience attitude, and audience familiarity. Items were also included in the posttest to assess Ss' sensitivity to any potential harmful consequences which may have resulted from the belief-discrepant essay. Another posttest measure was used to measure the Ss' self-concept. Ss in the control group received the pretest and posttest instruments, but did not encode belief-discrepant messages.

Pretest

The students were induced to complete a questionnaire on the pretext that it was part of a statewide college survey of student

attitudes on various issues. (See Appendix A.) The pretest instrument was designed for two measures: (1) attitude direction and intensity for several relevant issues, and (2) attitude salience for the same issues.

In the measurement of attitude direction and intensity for the several issues, each issue was followed by four, seven-interval, semantic differential scales bounded by the adjectives good-bad, valuable-worthless, pleasant-unpleasant, and fair-unfair. These scales were drawn from the evaluative dimension of meaning as identified by Osgood, Tannenbaum, and Suci (1957). The issues were scored by summing across all four scales using one as low and seven as high. Salience was measured by using two seven-point semantic scales with important-unimportant and crucial-trivial as anchors. The issue which had the most skewed distribution and the highest salience was chosen as the topic for the counterattitudinal essays.

Independent Variables

The two independent variables manipulated in this experiment were audience attitude toward the topic and probable knowledge of the audience by the source.

Audience attitude. In manipulating this variable, half of the Ss were told that the audience who was to read their essays was already strongly opposed to the advocated position. The other half were told that their respective audience was undecided on the issue in question.

Source Knowledge of Audience. This variable refers to the degree of probability that the S perceives that he is known or may become known by those in the supposed audience. In the known condition, Ss were induced to believe that students in another class at General Motors Institute would read their essays. Those in the unknown condition were told that their essays would be read by students at Michigan State University. The supposition in using these inducements was that the probability of students at General Motors Institute ever knowing other students at that college was relatively high, while the probability of their ever knowing students at Michigan State was relatively low.

Induction and Posttest

Two weeks after the pretest had been administered, and the experimental issue had been determined, Ss were asked to write a counterattitudinal essay. These instructions were given to the Ss in the "opposed" conditions:

Michigan College Information Exchange Project

Psychology and communication faculty at Michigan State University, and seven other Michigan colleges are currently conducting a research project aimed at finding out what it takes to strengthen or change people's attitudes. What we do is to get from students some indication of their attitudes on certain issues and then, at some later date, we present them with certain arguments in the form of essays which are designed to get them to change or strengthen their attitudes.

Sometime ago questionnaires were administered to students at eight Michigan colleges asking them their attitudes toward two years of mandatory military service for all male college students before being accepted by a college or university. Analysis of the questionnaires indicates

that nearly all of these students are either undecided on or strongly opposed to this particular policy.

Because this is a communication course, we are interested in getting from students in this class the most persuasive arguments we can, supporting the policy that "all male college students should serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university."

THOSE WHO WILL READ YOUR ARGUMENTS

The individuals who will be reading and thinking about your particular arguments will be forty students at Michigan State University (GMI). These particular students at MSU (GMI) are strongly opposed to the policy in question. Because of their strong opposition to this policy, this group of students will probably not be very easily influenced by your arguments.

In short, you are being asked to write an essay that presents the most persuasive arguments favoring this proposition:

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

As you write keep your reading audience in mind. They are:

Forty students at Michigan State (GMI) who are strongly opposed to the above proposition.

You will now be given 15 minutes to complete your essay.

The following instructions were given to those Ss who were in the "undecided" condition:

Michigan College Information Exchange Project

Psychology and communication faculty at Michigan State University, and seven other Michigan colleges are currently conducting a research project aimed at finding out what it takes to strengthen or change people's attitudes. What we do is to get from students some indication of their attitudes on certain issues and then, at some later date, we present them with certain arguments in the form of essays which are designed to get them to change or strengthen their attitudes.

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THOSE WHO WILL READ YOUR ARGUMENTS

The individuals who will be reading and thinking about your particular arguments will be forty students at Michigan State University (GMI). These particular students at MSU (GMI) are undecided on the policy in question. Because of their indecision toward this policy, this group of students will probably be very easily influenced by your arguments.

In short, you are being asked to write an essay that presents the most persuasive arguments favoring this proposition:

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

As you write keep your reading audience in mind.
They are:

Forty students at Michigan State (GMI) who are undecided on the above proposition.

You will now be given 15 minutes to complete your essay.

Ss were asked to read their respective inducement messages.

The rationale for having the Ss read the inducement instead of having it read to them by the E, was to heighten the individual encoder's feeling that he would be responsible as an individual for any aversive consequences to the receivers. Heightened realization by the Ss that their collective messages would carry the weight of persuasion on the audience might have facilitated avoidance of responsibility for any possible aversive consequences.

After the Ss read the inducement, they were given paper on which to write their essays. In order to insure that all Ss committed themselves publicly to their counterattitudinal message, each S was instructed to put his name and student number on the paper before he began to write.

After the essays had been completed, a post-encoding questionnaire was distributed (see Appendix B). This instrument contained the same four semantic differential scales used in the pretest to measure attitudes toward the issue in question. Other measures in the posttest instrument were designed to assess the subjects' perception of audience familiarity and audience commitment on the issue. The posttest also tapped subject perception of possible harmful consequences to the audience resulting from the counterattitudinal message. In order to note any changes in the subject's self-concept as a result of his counterattitudinal act, five scales loading highly on the safety

dimension of credibility and five loading highly on the qualification dimension were included (Berlo, Lemert, Mertz, 1970). Control Ss were given a posttest questionnaire containing several issues among them the experimental issue with the same scales employed in the experimental conditions. (See Appendix C.)

Dependent Variables

Attitude change. The major dependent variable was the amount of attitude change measured by the difference between individual pre- and posttest scores on the issue in question.

Message content. A word count was made of essays to assess any significant differences between cells. It was hoped that this would be an index of any differential in effort between the four cells.

Self-image was measured by using ten semantic differential scales identified by Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz (1970). The instrument included five scales drawn from each of the two major factors of source credibility as reported in their study: Safety (trustworthiness) and Qualification. Each S evaluated himself on each of the following scales:

Safety (trustworthiness)--safe-unsafe, just-unjust,
kind-cruel, friendly-unfriendly, honest-dishonest.

Qualification--trained-untrained, experienced-
inexperienced, skilled-unskilled, qualified-
unqualified, informed-uninformed.

The rationale for making this measurement was based on the assumption that dissonance ought to affect the subject's own self-perception. If, for instance, he believed his belief-discrepant message might affect someone adversely, the dissonance thus aroused

might be reduced by lowering his own self-image as well as changing his attitude on the issue in question. Thus, lower self-image was expected in the group where dissonance was maximal.

Harmful Consequences. In order to assess whether Ss perceived that their belief-discrepant messages had harmful effects upon the supposed audience, the Ss were asked to respond to this statement: "My essay may have a harmful effect upon those who will be reading it." They responded on a five-interval Likert scale with Strongly Agree, Neither Agree Nor Disagree and Strongly Disagree as anchors.

Encoding Anxiety. In order to measure differences in anxiety among the groups, Ss were asked to respond on a five-interval Likert scale to this statement: "I felt anxious about preparing this message for my audience." The notion here was to see if high anxiety existed when dissonance was maximal.

Audience Commitment. The efficacy of this manipulation was determined by having Ss respond to this question: "Before you wrote your essay, how did you think the students who will be reading it felt toward the issue of mandatory armed service for all male college students?" Ss responded on a scale consisting of four alternatives: Favorable, Undecided, Opposed, and Don't Know.

Source Knowledge of Audience. The check of this manipulation was determined by having Ss respond to the following statement: "Some of the students in the classes who are to read my essay will know who I am." Ss responded on a seven-interval scale with Highly Probably, Neutral, and Highly Improbable as anchors.

Chapter III

RESULTS

Pretest

One hundred seventy-five students at General Motors Institute were randomly assigned to four experimental groups and one control group. To ensure that there were no significant differences between these five conditions, subjects' pretest attitude scores were used for a simple analysis of variance. The results of this test indicate that there were no significant differences (Table 1).

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of pre-test attitude scores for experimental and control groups.

Condition		Mean	Standard Deviation	
Known:	Opposed	7.69	3.44	
Known:	Undecided	7.73	3.43	
Unknown:	Opposed	8.00	3.59	
Unknown:	Undecided	7.78	3.66	
Control		7.57	3.17	

Source	SS	df	MS	F

Between	3.55	4	.89	< 1 n.s.
Within	2040.88	170	12.01	
Total	2044.43	174		

Experimental and Control Differences

In order to measure for differences between the experimental and control groups, a one-way analysis of variance on difference scores

was performed. Table 2 shows a significant F value indicating that there were differences among the five groups.

Table 2. Attitude scores, amount of change, and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental and control groups.

Condition		Pretest	Posttest	Change
Known:	Opposed	7.69	8.15	.46
Known:	Undecided	7.73	8.49	.76
Unknown:	Opposed	8.00	9.44	1.44
Unknown:	Undecided	7.78	11.59	3.81
Control		7.57	8.20	.63
Source		SS	df	MS
Between		273.67	4	68.42
Within		2199.45	170	12.94
Total		2473.12	174	

*p < .05

To identify precisely which cell(s) accounted for this effect, Scheffe's comparisons were performed, comparing each experimental condition with the control group. Table 3 indicates these comparisons and shows that only the Unknown: Undecided condition differed significantly from the Control group.

Table 3. Analysis of differences of attitude change scores between each experimental group and the control group.

Condition		Mean	Scheffe's t
Control		.63	
Known:	Opposed	.46	.20
Known:	Undecided	.76	.15
Unknown:	Opposed	1.44	.96
Unknown:	Undecided	3.81	3.71*

*p < .05

Manipulation Checks

Audience Attitude. In order to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of audience attitudes, subjects were asked to identify the attitude of their respective audience. Table 4 shows the numbers and percentages of correct and incorrect responses in the four conditions. In all, 88 percent of the subjects perceived their audience's attitude correctly, while 12 percent misperceived these attitudes. Although the Undecided conditions were 19 and 22 percent incorrect respectively, this induction was considered to be generally successful.

Table 4. Percentage and frequency of subjects correctly and incorrectly perceiving audience attitude.

Condition		Correct		Incorrect	
		%	(No.)	%	(No.)
Known:	Opposed	94	(33)	6	(2)
Known:	Undecided	78	(25)	22	(8)
Unknown:	Opposed	100	(36)	-	(-)
Unknown:	Undecided	81	(29)	19	(7)
Total		88	(123)	12	(17)

Audience Knowledge of Source. Subjects had been told that their supposed audience would be students at either Michigan State or General Motors Institute. It was supposed that the probability was greater that the GMI subjects would perceive themselves to be known by other GMI students than by the MSU students. To test for this perceived difference, subjects were asked to respond on a seven-point semantic scale. These scores were used in a two-way analysis of variance (Table 5). Since this analysis yielded a knowledge of source main effect ($F = 34.44$), it was assumed that this manipulation was

relatively successful. It should be noted, however, that while there was a significant difference between the Known and Unknown conditions, the mean for both groups was below the neutral position.

Table 5. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of knowledge of source ratings.*

Condition		Mean	Standard Deviation	
Known:	Opposed	3.83	2.17	
Known:	Undecided	3.27	1.71	
Unknown:	Opposed	1.77	1.31	
Unknown:	Undecided	1.92	1.44	

Source	SS	df	MS	F

Audience	.04	1	.04	< 1 n.s.
Knowledge of source	2.91	1	2.91	34.44**
Interaction	.12	1	.12	1.45 n.s.
Error	10.80	135	.08	
Total	<u>13.87</u>	<u>138</u>		

*Knowledge of source perception scores ranged from 1 (very improbable) to 7 (very probable)

**p < .05

Test of the Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1 and 2, which predicted main effects for audience attitude and audience knowledge of source, were tested by a two-way analysis of variance. Hypothesis 3 was not tested because its confirmation was predicated upon the confirmation of Hypotheses 1 and 2: neither of which was confirmed. Data used in testing these hypotheses were mean pretest to posttest attitude change scores. The significance level used for all tests in this study was .05.

Hypotheses 1 and 2. The first hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between audience knowledge of source and amount of encoder attitude change. Specifically, this hypothesis predicted that:

Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for a known audience will report greater attitude change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an unknown audience.

Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship between audience attitude and amount of encoder attitude change. This hypothesis stated that:

Persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for an uncommitted audience will demonstrate greater attitude change toward the direction of the position advocated than persons encoding counterattitudinal messages for a committed audience.

Table 6 indicates that there is only one main effect demonstrated.

Table 6. Attitude scores, amount of change, and analysis of variance of attitude change scores of experimental groups.

Condition		Pretest	Posttest	Change
Known:	Opposed	7.69	8.15	.46
Known:	Undecided	7.73	8.49	.76
Unknown:	Opposed	8.00	9.44	1.44
Unknown:	Undecided	7.78	11.59	3.81
Source		SS	df	MS
Audience		1.77	1	1.77
Knowledge of				2.26 n.s.
source		4.07	1	4.07
Interaction		1.06	1	1.06
Error		106.08	136	.78
Total		112.98	139	

*p < .05

Audience knowledge of source does have a significant effect, but in a direction opposite the prediction. Subjects in the Unknown conditions experienced greater attitude change than their Known condition counterparts. Change scores for an audience attitude effect were in the predicted direction, but the obtained F was not significant.

Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis predicted the cells having the least and greatest amounts of attitude change. It stated that:

Attitude change in the direction of the position advocated in the counterattitudinal message will be greatest when the communication is encoded for the known, uncommitted audience, and attitude change will be least for the unknown, committed audience.

Support for this prediction was dependent upon the directional confirmation of both Hypotheses 1 and 2. Because these were both not supported, Hypothesis 3 was, therefore, not confirmed in this experiment.

Supplementary Analyses

Besides using attitude change as a criterion measure, other measures were taken in the posttest. Salience was the only other pre- and posttest measure--all others were posttest only scores. These latter measures were: (1) subjects' anxiety, (2) subjects' evaluation of essay persuasiveness, (3) subjects' perception of subsequent harmful effects resulting from the essay, and (4) subjects' self-perception scores.

Anxiety. Subjects were asked in the posttest how much anxiety they experienced during encoding. These scores were tested in a two-way analysis of variance. As reported in Table 7, there was a

Table 7. Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of anxiety scores of experimental groups.*

Condition		Mean	Standard Deviation	
Known:	Opposed	2.00	1.24	
Known:	Undecided	2.76	1.37	
Unknown:	Opposed	2.14	1.08	
Unknown:	Undecided	2.47	1.19	

Source	SS	df	MS	F

Audience	.30	1	.30	6.79**
Knowledge of				
source	.01	1	.01	< 1 n.s.
Interaction	.05	1	.05	1.03 n.s.
Error	5.44	136	.04	
Total	<u>5.80</u>	<u>139</u>		

*Anxiety was measured on a 1 (least anxiety) to 5 (greatest anxiety) scale.

**p < .05

significant audience attitude effect. Those subjects writing essays for undecided readers experienced significantly greater anxiety than those writing for the opposed audience.

Persuasiveness. Subjects were asked to evaluate the persuasiveness of their essays. A two-way analysis of variance shown in Table 8 indicates that there was a significant audience attitude effect. Those subjects who wrote for undecided readers, believed their messages to be more persuasive than did those writing for readers who were opposed.

Table 8. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of persuasiveness scores of experimental groups.*

Conditions		Mean	Standard Deviation	
Known:	Opposed	3.14	1.53	
Known:	Undecided	4.21	1.55	
Unknown:	Opposed	3.75	1.50	
Unknown:	Undecided	4.22	1.27	

Source	SS	df	MS	F

Audience	.59	1	.59	9.43**
Knowledge of source	.10	1	.10	1.51 n.s.
Interaction	.09	1	.09	1.41 n.s.
Error	8.16	136	.06	
Total	8.94	139		

*Persuasiveness was measured on a 1 (very weak) to 7 (very strong) semantic scale.

**p < .05

Harmful Effects. Subjects were asked to evaluate the possible harmful effects their essays might have upon their respective audiences. Table 9 shows that there is a significant audience attitude effect. Subjects writing for the undecided audience believed that their essays would be more likely to have a harmful effect than did those who wrote for audiences opposed to the essay.

Table 9. Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of harmful effects scores of experimental groups.*

Conditions		Mean	Standard Deviation
Known:	Opposed	2.29	1.06
Known:	Undecided	2.73	.99
Unknown:	Opposed	2.08	1.04
Unknown:	Undecided	2.69	1.27

*Harmful effects were measured on a 1 (least effect) to 5 (greatest effect) scale.

Table 9 (contd)

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Audience	.28	1	.28	7.87*
Knowledge of source	.01	1	.01	< 1 n.s.
Interaction	.01	1	.01	< 1 n.s.
Error	5.44	136	.04	
Total	5.74	139		

*p < .05

Salience. Besides assessing attitude direction and intensity, attitude salience, or importance, was also measured. Table 10 reports the amount of salience change between the pre- and posttests.

Table 10. Means, standard deviations and analysis of variance of salience change scores of experimental groups.

Condition		Mean Change	Standard Deviation	
Known:	Opposed	-1.34	4.32	
Known:	Undecided	- .70	5.01	
Unknown:	Opposed	.08	4.34	
Unknown:	Undecided	- .19	5.42	
(Control)		(- .09)	(4.80)	
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Audience	.03	1	.03	< 1 n.s.
Knowledge of source	.93	1	.93	1.38 n.s.
Interaction	.21	1	.21	< 1 n.s.
Error	91.12	136	.67	
Total	92.29	139		

Although there is a slight indication of negative change for the known conditions, this change is not statistically significant.

Self-perception. During the posttest, subjects were asked to evaluate themselves on ten seven-point semantic differential scales designed to measure two dimensions of credibility--qualification, (ability) and trustworthiness (character). Table 11 shows an analysis of variance based on mean qualification scores. Though there is a slight interaction effect, it is not significant.

Table 11. Means, standard deviation, and analysis of variance of qualification scores of experimental groups.

Condition		Mean	Standard Deviation	
Known:	Opposed	24.97	5.27	
Known:	Undecided	25.85	3.80	
Unknown:	Opposed	27.08	4.45	
Unknown:	Undecided	25.42	4.20	
Source		SS	df	MS
Audience		.16	1	.16
Knowledge of source		.71	1	.71
Interaction		1.62	1	1.62
Error		80.24	136	.59
Total		82.73	139	

In Table 12 an analysis of variance of mean trustworthiness scores indicates no effect whatever.

Table 12. Means, standard deviation, and analysis of variance of trustworthiness scores of experimental groups.

Condition		Mean	Standard Deviation
Known:	Opposed	30.11	3.39
Known:	Undecided	30.42	3.19
Unknown:	Opposed	29.89	3.90
Unknown:	Undecided	29.56	3.75

Table 12 (contd)

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Audience	.260	1	.260	< 1 n.s.
Knowledge of source	.002	1	.002	< 1 n.s.
Interaction	.032	1	.032	< 1 n.s.
Error	51.544	136	.379	
Total	51.838	139		

Word count. To test for differences in the amount of subject effort among the experimental groups, an analysis of variance was performed using total word count scores. Table 13 indicates that there was no significant effect.

Table 13. Means, standard deviations, and analysis of variance of essay length.

Condition		Mean	Standard Deviation	
Known:	Opposed	171.91	51.01	
Known:	Undecided	163.61	49.66	
Unknown:	Opposed	172.72	40.57	
Unknown:	Undecided	181.00	54.38	
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Audience	.00	1	.00	< 1 n.s.
Knowledge of source	82.77	1	82.77	1.15 n.s.
Interaction	68.72	1	68.72	< 1 n.s.
Error	9524.27	134	72.12	
Total	9675.76	137		

Chapter IV

DISCUSSION

Although this experiment failed to demonstrate support for the three hypotheses, plausible reasons for non-confirmation can be found within the framework of dissonance theory. Despite this disappointment, the study has provided additional speculative evidence regarding the loci of dissonance arousal.

Failure to Confirm Hypothesis 1

This hypothesis predicted that dissonance and subsequent attitude change would be greater for the known audience condition. It was no small surprise when the inverse of this prediction emerged. After considering all aspects of the experimental procedure and the obtained results, however, possible explanations for this effect can be posited.

The most likely reason for the greater attitude change in the Unknown Audience condition is based on the Known Audience subjects' ability to "take back" their essays if they should ever be confronted by an acquaintance. This possibility finds support in the study by Helmreich and Collins (1968). Subjects in that study who were given an opportunity to take back their belief discrepant messages failed to demonstrate the dissonance effect, while those who were unable to to take back the message did experience dissonance.

Similar to this rationale is the one expressed by a student during debriefing for the present study. He said that if his friends were to read the essay, they would know that it did not express his true opinion. Thus subjects in the Known Audience conditions may have been unconcerned about the effects of their essays. When friends are familiar with your attitudes in general, there is little danger of your belief discrepant essay influencing them. For those in the Known conditions, affixing of signatures to the essay may have been insurance that the essays would not be taken seriously by the supposed audience.

Another possible reason for failure to obtain a knowledge of audience effect may be found in the joint measuring of attitude change and salience change at the same time. While subjects were given four scales on which to note attitude intensity change, they were at the same time given two scales on which to note change in salience. It is likely that these two measures worked against each other. Changing salience for some subjects may have been an alternate means of dissonance resolution, thus enabling them to maintain their previous attitude intensity and direction. Supporting this speculation is the somewhat greater, although not significant, negative salience changes recorded for the known audience than for the unknown. The opposite occurred for attitude change: greater positive change for the unknown audience than for the known.

Failure to Confirm Hypothesis 2

Even though the results of this effect were in the predicted

direction, the audience attitude hypothesis was not confirmed. Both Nel et al. (1969) and Bodaken (1970) reported significantly greater attitude change for those persons encoding for neutral audiences. In light of such strong theoretical support for an audience attitude effect, it was especially disappointing that it was not supported in this study.

One factor which may help to explain the failure to confirm the audience attitude effect is the possibility that subjects in the Known conditions believed that they could "take back" their essays, thus reducing dissonance in both the Known: Opposed and Known: Undecided groups. If subjects perceived the possibility for message "take back," the fear of aversive consequences to the supposed audience might have been reduced, thus militating against dissonance arousal and subsequent attitude change.

Despite the fact that the audience attitude effect did not reach statistical significance, it is especially provocative to note that subjects in the Undecided conditions reported that they had: (1) experienced significantly greater anxiety while encoding the belief-discrepant essays ($F_{1,136} = 6.79$), (2) believed their essays to be significantly more persuasive ($F_{1,136} = 9.43$) and (3) perceived that their essays would have more harmful effects upon their supposed audience ($F_{1,136} = 7.87$). These indices suggest that the psychological stresses were present for greater dissonance arousal in both of the Undecided Audience conditions, but the audience attitude effect for attitude change still was short of statistical significance.

The Locus of Dissonance Arousal

It was the hope of the experimenter to address in some meaningful way the issue regarding the locus of dissonance arousal in counterattitudinal advocacy. For it is by clarifying this issue that more reliable predictions may be made about the types of cognitive reorganizations that are likely to be made by individuals when confronted by inconsistent situations.

Aversive consequences. The debate can be restated, in essence, as existing between Festinger (1957), who believed dissonance was aroused when the individual realized the inconsistency between what he believed and what he said ("I believe X, but I advocate not X.") those recent dissonance theorists who see the inconsistency as existing between what an individual says and the possible harmful effects which may result from such statements. Aronson (1968) puts it this way:

In the experiments on counterattitudinal advocacy for example, I would suggest that it is incorrect to say that dissonance existed between the cognitions "I believe the task is dull [X]" and "I told someone the task was interesting [not X]." . . . What is dissonant is the cognition "I am a decent, truthful human being," and the cognition "I have misled a person; I have conned him into believing something which just isn't true: he thinks that I really believe it and I cannot set him straight because I probably won't see him again." (p. 24) (The brackets are mine.)

This view subscribes to the belief that dissonance arousal results from concern for the well-being of receivers of belief-discrepant messages. The present experiment lends support to this viewpoint. As noted above, subjects who encoded for the undecided audience believed that this audience would experience greater harmful effects as the result of

reading the counterattitudinal essays. Subjects also perceived that this audience would be more strongly influenced by the essays than would those who were "strongly opposed" to the issue in question--noted by the higher perceived persuasiveness of the essays for the undecided audience. Although the audience attitude effect for attitude change fell short of statistical significance, the above findings support the conclusion that source concern for aversive consequences to the receiver does assist in the arousal of cognitive dissonance. It could be reasonably argued, however, that the non-significance of the attitude effect places the above proposition on shaky footing. In light of this, one consideration should be offered. Whereas in the Nel et al. (1969) and Bodaken (1970) studies, the topics of "legalization of marijuana" and "required living on campus by all students" were used respectively, the topic here concerns a national policy of mandatory military service for all men before college. It is possible that the topic used in this experiment might have been perceived as being beyond the scope of direct harm to the supposed audience. Decisions to smoke marijuana or live for four years on a college campus are questions that may be decided by the audience in question. However, subjects may have perceived that the question of mandatory military service was beyond the decision-making parameters of those in the audience.

Threatened self-image. Another viewpoint regarding the locus of dissonance arousal has been expressed by Bramel (1968). His view is that dissonance is the result of threatened self-image. Expression of belief-discrepant opinions is dissonant with one's own self-

perceptions. He says:

. . . dissonance is a feeling of personal unworthiness (a type of anxiety) traceable to rejection of oneself by other people either in the present or in the past. Any information which implies that one is incompetent or immoral arouses dissonance. (p. 365)

Part of this speculation is supported by this experiment. Consistent with the belief that dissonance is traceable to "a type of anxiety," it was observed that subjects encoding for the undecided audience experienced significantly greater anxiety than did those encoding for the strongly opposed audience. The question, however, still remains as to whether or not such anxiety is equivalent to "personal unworthiness" and "traceable to rejection of oneself by other people" The greater anxiety consistent with an audience attitude effect could be attributable to causes other than feelings of personal unworthiness by the subjects. Such anxious feelings could have resulted from concern for aversive consequences to the receiver and not any sense of personal guilt.

The possibility that dissonance is aroused by threatened self-image is not supported by the findings of this experiment. There was no reported effect based upon self-perception scores on either the trustworthiness or qualification dimensions. There are, however, some possible explanations for the lack of significant differences among self-perception scores. One reason may be that self-image is too firmly rooted to be easily changed by committing a single act of counter-attitudinal advocacy. Another explanation could be that the Berlo et al. (1970) scales are not sensitive enough to detect any changes in self-perception. To the experimenter's knowledge this study is the first to

use these scales for self-evaluation, all others have been for the evaluation of other individuals or institutions. It is possible that subjects asked to evaluate themselves, experienced a type of defensive avoidance reaction. This may have accounted for generally higher scores in the experimental groups than were observed in the Control group.

Another possible explanation for not recording any differences in self-perception may be the time of self-evaluation. Since dissonance is a post-decisional phenomenon, it is reasonable to assume that threatened self-image is greater immediately after the decision has been made to encode a belief-discrepant message. Threatened self-image should be reduced after attitude change scores have been taken. In the posttest instrument, self-evaluation was the last item. By the time subjects reached this part of the questionnaire, dissonance may have been adequately resolved by means of attitude or salience change.

Implications for Future Research

The failure to confirm the hypothesis concerning the knowledge of audience variable probably resulted from no weakness in the theoretical suppositions, but rather from weaknesses of experimental design. Because of the takeback possibility inherent among subjects in the known audience conditions, subjects may not have experienced the dissonance necessary for attitude change. In a sense, this experiment has amounted to a replication of the takeback study of Helmreich and Collins (1968). Future studies should continue to investigate the

efficacy of the knowledge variable. However, the essential methodological factor is subjects' perceptions of probability of identification with the belief-discrepant message. As long as the encoder believes that the audience will identify him personally with the message, the pressure toward dissonance will be reduced. The present study has shown that some dissonance will be produced even when the audience is unknown to the source. This leads the experimenter to believe that he would have observed the predicted results had he not asked subjects to place their signatures on the essays. If it is assumed that dissonance is aroused through concern for aversive consequences, then it is reasonable to presume that the desired effect might emerge when the encoder's name is not on the belief-discrepant message. Omission of the name would lessen the possibility of a subsequent takeback.

Although the threatened self-image theory of dissonance arousal was not given any direct support in this experiment, the researcher believes that there are certain refinements in methodology that should be made when testing for threatened self-image. First, other instruments for self-evaluation ought to be tested. It is possible that the Berlo scales were not sensitive enough for self-examination. Second, the researcher ought to test for changes in self-image immediately after dissonance arousal and before other alternatives for resolution have been presented.

The issue regarding the locus of dissonance arousal is critical to the process of identifying and understanding those variables which stimulate cognitive reorganization in inconsistent situations.

Under this assumption the present study may be justified.

Summary

The major purpose of this study was to explore certain aspects of the issue regarding the locus of dissonance arousal in situations involving counterattitudinal advocacy. The center of concern was on the manipulation of audience attitude toward the counterattitudinal issue and encoder knowledge of the supposed audience. It was predicted that attitude change would be greater when subjects wrote essays for undecided receivers. It was further hypothesized that attitude change would be greater when subjects perceived a greater probability that the audience was known. The final hypothesis predicted that the greatest amount of attitude change would be for the Known, Undecided Audience, while the least change would be for the Unknown, Opposed Audience.

None of the stated hypotheses were confirmed in this experiment, although an inverse relationship was found between knowledge of audience and amount of attitude change. Greater attitude change was reported by subjects who encoded belief discrepant messages for the unknown audience. This effect was explained on the basis that subjects believed they would be able to take back their essays for the known audience, but not for the unknown. Subjects thus perceiving that message take back was possible were given an out which militated against dissonance arousal.

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APPENDIX A

PRETEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear GMI Student:

You are being asked to participate in a project that students in all accredited colleges in Michigan are helping with. It is an opinion survey concerning college student's attitudes toward a variety of issues. We hope you will be willing to help.

You might wonder why we are asking you to put your name and college on this form. Very simply we will be correlating these answers with other data available and will be doing this project again at GMI. If you participate now you will not be asked to again. All data is anonymous and will not be seen by anyone at GMI.

I have been asked to coordinate this project at GMI and am very grateful for your help.

Sincerely,

Michael Burgoon
Assistant Professor of Communication
Department of Communication
and Organizational Behavior

COLLEGE OPINION PROFILE

Name _____ Student Number _____

College _____ Class Time _____ Instructor _____

The purpose of this survey is to solicit the opinions of students on a variety of current issues--campus and national. On each of the following pages you will find a number of issues each followed by a series of descriptive scales. For example, here is an item like those you will see:

The United States should withdraw from the United Nations.

Bad _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Good

Your job is to place a check-mark (X) above the line that best indicates your judgment about the proposition. For example, if you feel that U. S. withdrawal should be very bad, you would check as follows:

Bad X :_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Good

If you feel that such a move (withdrawal would be quite bad, you should check as follows:

Bad _____: X :_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Good

If you feel neutral or indifferent about the proposition, or if you feel that the scale is irrelevant to the proposition, you would check as follows:

Bad _____:_____:_____: X :_____:_____:_____ Good

Remember: Never put more than one-check-mark on a single scale and be sure that each check is in the middle of the line, not on the boundaries.

ALL SCALES SHOULD BE CHECKED -- DO NOT OMIT ANY.

WORK RAPIDLY -- RECORD FIRST IMPRESSIONS -- DO NOT CHANGE MARKS.

The use and possession of marijuana should be legalized.

Trivial _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Crucial
 Good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Bad
 Worthless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Valuable
 Pleasant _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unpleasant
 Unfair _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Fair
 Important _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unimportant

Draft deferments should be eliminated for college students.

Good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Bad
 Unfair _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Fair
 Crucial _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Trivial
 Worthless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Valuable
 Pleasant _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unpleasant
 Unimportant _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Important

Black students should be advised to major in less rigorous curricula.

Unpleasant _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Pleasant
 Bad _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Good
 Important _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unimportant
 Fair _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unfair
 Valuable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Worthless
 Crucial _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Trivial

All students should be required to live on campus for at least two years of their college attendance.

Unimportant _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Important
 Valuable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Worthless
 Good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Bad
 Unfair _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Fair
 Pleasant _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unpleasant
 Trivial _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Crucial

All college male students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

Good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Bad
 Important _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unimportant
 Worthless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Valuable
 Crucial _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Trivial
 Unpleasant _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Pleasant
 Fair _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Unfair

APPENDIX B

POSTTEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

Name _____ Date _____

College _____ Class Time _____ Instructor _____

Now that you have written your essay, we would like to know how you feel toward the issue. PLEASE RESPOND ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SCALES.

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

- _____ Very Pleasant
- _____ Quite Pleasant
- _____ Slightly Pleasant
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Unpleasant
- _____ Quite Unpleasant
- _____ Very Unpleasant

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

- _____ Very Crucial
- _____ Quite Crucial
- _____ Slightly Crucial
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Trivial
- _____ Quite Trivial
- _____ Very Trivial

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

- _____ Very Good
- _____ Quite Good
- _____ Slightly Good
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Bad
- _____ Quite Bad
- _____ Very Bad

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

- Very Valuable
- Quite Valuable
- Slightly Valuable
- Neutral
- Slightly Worthless
- Quite Worthless
- Very Worthless

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

- Very Unfair
- Quite Unfair
- Slightly Unfair
- Neutral
- Slightly Fair
- Quite Fair
- Very Fair

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

- Very Important
- Quite Important
- Slightly Important
- Neutral
- Slightly Unimportant
- Quite Unimportant
- Very Unimportant

Before you wrote your essay, how did you think your reading audience felt toward the issue in question?

- They were favorable toward two years mandatory military service for male college students.
- They were undecided toward two years mandatory military service for male college students.

----- They were opposed to two years mandatory military service for male college students.

----- I don't know what their attitude was toward two years mandatory military service for male college students.

RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BY PLACING AN "X" ON THE LINE WHICH MOST NEARLY REPRESENTS YOUR FEELINGS.

Statement One

My essay may have a harmful effect upon those who will be reading it.

- Strongly Agree
- Mildly Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Mildly Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Statement Two

Some of the students who are to read my essay will know who I am.

- Highly Probable
- Quite Probable
- Slightly Probable
- Neutral
- Slightly Improbable
- Quite Improbable
- Highly Improbable

Statement Three

How do you evaluate the persuasive effectiveness of the essay you have just written?

- Very Strong
- Quite Strong
- Slightly Strong
- Neutral
- Slightly Weak
- Quite Weak
- Very Weak

Statement Four

I felt anxious about preparing this message for my reading audience.

- Strongly Agree
 ----- Mildly Agree
 ----- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
 ----- Mildly Disagree
 ----- Strongly Disagree

Statement Five

I will be able to explain my true beliefs to those who will be reading my essay.

- Strongly Agree
 ----- Mildly Agree
 ----- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
 ----- Mildly Disagree
 ----- Strongly Disagree

Statement Six

Please evaluate yourself on the following scales.

WORK RAPIDLY -- MARK EVERY SCALE -- RECORD FIRST IMPRESSIONS:

Safe	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Unsafe
Untrained	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Trained
Just	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Unjust
Inexperienced	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Experienced
Kind	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Cruel
Unskilled	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Skilled
Friendly	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Unfriendly
Unqualified	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Qualified
Honest	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Dishonest
Uninformed	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	Informed

Note: Re-check to be sure you have responded to every item in the questionnaire.

WHEN FINISHED, TURN QUESTIONNAIRE OVER AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

APPENDIX C

CONTROL POSTTEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

MICHIGAN COLLEGE INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROJECT*

Name _____ Date _____

College _____ Instructor _____ Class Time _____

Recently, the activities of college students across the country have provided a multitude of news stories for the mass media. Yet with all the publicity surrounding student revolt and unrest, little is really known about student attitudes toward a number of issues related to student life on our college campuses. On the following pages are several issues that are of concern to college students. Each issue is followed by a set of descriptive scales. We would like to have you place a check (✓) on the line that you think best indicates your opinion toward the issue. Each scale should be checked -- do not omit any.

*Sponsored by the Averell Foundation Attitude Study Fund.

The voting age should be lowered to 18 years.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	Very Good
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Important	Quite Important	Slightly Important	Neutral	Slightly Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Very Unimportant
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Slightly Unpleasant	Neutral	Slightly Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Very Pleasant
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Trivial	Quite Trivial	Slightly Trivial	Neutral	Slightly Crucial	Quite Crucial	Very Crucial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable

All male college students should be required to serve at least two years in the armed service before being accepted by a college or university.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Slightly Unpleasant	Neutral	Slightly Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Very Pleasant
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	Very Good
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Crucial	Quite Crucial	Slightly Crucial	Neutral	Slightly Trivial	Quite Trivial	Very Trivial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable	Neutral	Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	Very Worthless
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	Slightly Unfair	Neutral	Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	Very Fair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Important	Quite Important	Slightly Important	Neutral	Slightly Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Very Unimportant

Draft deferments should be eliminated for college students.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Trivial	Quite Trivial	Slightly Trivial	Neutral	Slightly Crucial	Quite Crucial	Very Crucial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	Very Bad
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Slightly Unimportant	Neutral	Slightly Important	Quite Important	Very Important
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Very Unpleasant

All students should be required to live on campus during their college attendance.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Important	Quite Important	Slightly Important	Neutral	Slightly Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Very Unimportant
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable	Neutral	Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	Very Worthless
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	Very Bad
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Trivial	Quite Trivial	Slightly Trivial	Neutral	Slightly Crucial	Quite Crucial	Very Crucial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	Slightly Unfair	Neutral	Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	Very Fair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Very Unpleasant

Military activity in South Viet Nam should be significantly increased.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Trivial	Quite Trivial	Slightly Trivial	Neutral	Slightly Crucial	Quite Crucial	Very Crucial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Slightly Unpleasant	Neutral	Slightly Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Very Pleasant
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	Very Good
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Important	Quite Important	Slightly Important	Neutral	Slightly Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Very Unimportant

Draft card burners should automatically be reclassified 1-A by their draft boards.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	Slightly Unfair	Neutral	Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	Very Fair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Important	Quite Important	Slightly Important	Neutral	Slightly Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Very Unimportant
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable	Neutral	Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	Very Worthless
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Trivial	Quite Trivial	Slightly Trivial	Neutral	Slightly Crucial	Quite Crucial	Very Crucial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	Very Bad
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Very Unpleasant

The college grading system should be abolished.

_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	Very Good
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Very Unpleasant
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Slightly Unimportant	Neutral	Slightly Important	Quite Important	Very Important
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Crucial	Quite Crucial	Slightly Crucial	Neutral	Slightly Trivial	Quite Trivial	Very Trivial

The United States should withdraw from the United Nations.

_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Slightly Unpleasant	Neutral	Slightly Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Very Pleasant
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Trivial	Quite Trivial	Slightly Trivial	Neutral	Slightly Crucial	Quite Crucial	Very Crucial
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	Very Good
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Valuable	Quite Valuable	Slightly Valuable	Neutral	Slightly Worthless	Quite Worthless	Very Worthless
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Important	Quite Important	Slightly Important	Neutral	Slightly Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Very Unimportant
_____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____	: _____
Very Unfair	Quite Unfair	Slightly Unfair	Neutral	Slightly Fair	Quite Fair	Very Fair

Presidential nominations should be based on a direct vote of the people.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Crucial	Quite Crucial	Slightly Crucial	Neutral	Slightly Trivial	Quite Trivial	Very Trivial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Good	Quite Good	Slightly Good	Neutral	Slightly Bad	Quite Bad	Very Bad
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Slightly Unimportant	Neutral	Slightly Important	Quite Important	Very Important
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Slightly Pleasant	Neutral	Slightly Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Very Unpleasant

All firearms should be licensed and registered.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Worthless	Quite Worthless	Slightly Worthless	Neutral	Slightly Valuable	Quite Valuable	Very Valuable
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Fair	Quite Fair	Slightly Fair	Neutral	Slightly Unfair	Quite Unfair	Very Unfair
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Crucial	Quite Crucial	Slightly Crucial	Neutral	Slightly Trivial	Quite Trivial	Very Trivial
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unpleasant	Quite Unpleasant	Slightly Unpleasant	Neutral	Slightly Pleasant	Quite Pleasant	Very Pleasant
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Bad	Quite Bad	Slightly Bad	Neutral	Slightly Good	Quite Good	Very Good
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Very Unimportant	Quite Unimportant	Slightly Unimportant	Neutral	Slightly Important	Quite Important	Very Important

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