THE UNITED STATES m KOREA: A RELUCTANT‘ * PARTICIPANT, 1945-1948 ' _» ‘ Dissertation for the DegreeofPh. D. jj MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY : ' MANDUK' CHUNG 1975 This is to certify that the thesis entitled The United States in Korea: A Reluctant Participant, 1945 - 1948 presented by Manduk Chung has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. , History degree 1n Major professor Date 10/8/75 0-7639 /" ‘\ t. :4) a~q.__ .MD ABSTRACT THE UNITED STATES IN KOREA: A RELUCTANT PARTICIPANT, 1945-1948 By Man duk Chung Toward the end of World War II, the United States decided to occupy a part of Korea which was to be liberated from Japanese occupation. Within four weeks following the Japanese capitulation, the United States found its army in occupation of Korea south of the 38th parallel line. During the subsequent three years South Korea was governed by the American Military Govern- ment. This dissertation aims to clarify some aspects of the nature of America's Korean policy during the postwar era of 1945 to 1948. The first is as to whether or not the United States policy toward Korea was based upon her national interests--political, economic, mili- tary. Was the American policy aimed at protecting one or all of these national interests in Korea? The second is whether or not the United States had a long-term policy in Korea, with definite goals. Was America's drift and fumbling in south Korea caused by its lack of Manduk Chung long-term policy or was it the result of America's mis- conception of the revolutionary aspiration of the Korean people in the postwar period? The third is regarding the basic objective of the American policy in Korea. Why did the United States remain in Korea for three years and what did she attempt to achieve there? Some major points of this study are: l. The united States had no positive national interests in Korea throughout the postwar period of 1945 to 1948. Its policy, accordingly, was not associated with either promoting or protecting its national inter- ests in Korea. 2. The United States did not feel it necessary to have a long-term policy in Korea until after the first Joint Commission in May, 1946. Lack of a long-term policy was the main cause of drift. 3. The American policy during this period was almost exclusively geared to curbing Russian advance in and around Korea, with a view to achieving a balance of power. 4. The basic objectives of the American policy were to achieve Korea's independence and disentangle the united States from Korea while not leaving it under the Soviet influence or domination. Achieving these objec- tives suffered limitations due to the cold war showdown between the two occupying powers. Manduk Chung 5. Mutual distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union was the decisive cause of per- petuation of the disastrous situation of Korea. Korea was from the beginning a cold war victim. THE UNITED STATES IN KOREA: A RELUCTANT PARTICIPANT, 1945-1948 By Manduk Chung A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements 'for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1975 To my wife Eunjo ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This writer wishes to express his hearty appre- ciation to those who have been constant sources of encouragement, insight, and guidance in writing this dissertation: To Dr. Paul A. Varg whose warm personality and profound understanding of the topic have kept me from going astray. Had it not been for his generous and tender care as the dissertation chairman, it would have definitely been impossible for this writer to finish his dissertation. To Dr. Warren 1. Cohen whose incisive analysis and interpretation of materials helped the writer to write with greater balance, and to Dr. Madison Kuhn and Dr. Walter E. Gourlay whose timely comments and suggestions broadened the writer's perception of his tOpic. If there is anything worth reading in this dissertation, it is the result of the guidance accorded to the writer by these members of his guidance committee. For the rest, the writer is entirely responsible. The writer is highly appreciative of the finan- cial assistance accorded to him by the State Department of the United States under the Fulbright-Hays program, without which he would certainly have missed the most unforgettable and productive period of his life. His iii thanks also go to those people at the National Archives and Records Service who rendered the writer a most generous help in locating the needed materials. Finally, he must mention the names of Eunjo, his wife, and Insook and Nury, his children,vdu)have continu- ously provided him with a refreshing spirit when he was tired and made him understand why he should be happy when he finished his degree. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. II. III. IV. VI. A STRANGE LAND IN FARrOFF ASIA: U.S.- KOREAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1945 . . Korea, a Prey to International Rivalry The Korean Government-in-Exile and the United States Korea and the United States During the War INITIAL INVOLVEMENT: A TEMPORARY BURDEN, AUGUST 1945-DECEMBER 1945 . . . From Tactical to Political Concern Politics of South Korea Communist Consolidation in North Korea INITIAL CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIET RUSSIA Internationalization of the Korean Questions Trusteeship Divides the Koreans U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Economic Conference FAILURE OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS . The First U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission After the Deadlock in Negotiation IN SEARCH OF LONG—TERM POLICIES Reappraisal of the Korean Situation Each Zone Going Its Own Way The Second U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission FROM DRIFT TO POLICY: DISENGAGEMENT . Korea Before the United Nations A Government for South Korea CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY . Page 60 114 165 211 267 312 321 CHAPTER I A STRANGE LAND IN FAR-OFF ASIA: U.S.- KOREAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1945 Due to its close cultural ties with China and its geographical isolation from.the major powers of the world, Korea had neither the opportunity nor the will to maintain relations with nations other than China before 1876. China's bitter experiences of encroachment by Western powers had long been known to the Koreans, and the fre- quent appearance of Western armed ships along the Korean coast in the late 18603 made them uneasy at the approach of Westerners. But the first real threat to the secluded life of Korea came not from the Western powers as had been anticipated by many Koreans but from Japan, a nation which was both fascinated and overwhelmed by the glittering Western technology. The treaty of 1876 estab- lishing diplomatic relations with Japan was a shocking experience for Korea after having shut itself off from the world for centuries. The Korean Kingdom had never been free from.the impact of political changes in China. The two nations had been officially linked through the peculiar channel of the 'tributary system.’1 The system was essentially an outgrowth of Confucian ethics, in which brotherly understanding and relation between the stronger and the weaker served as a means to keep a society or nations from falling into struggle and disorder. The conceptual peculiarities of this system, however, caused confusion and misunderstanding among the Westerners who were basically oriented to a domination-subservience type of international power relations, and who wanted to have their own way practiced in this part of the world. Japanese expansionism challenged the Korea-China relations based upon the tributary system. Korea was least experienced in the dynamics of modern international power relations. China, on the other hand, found it to its own interest to employ elements of both the tributary system and the modern Western system of international relations in her dealings with Korea. Korea's adherence to the old system while at the same time soliciting sym- pathy from big powers to recognize her as an independent nation affected the situation adversely and only enhanced 1For the tributary system.as practiced between Korea and China, see Hae—Jong Chbn, "China and Korea-~An Introduction to the Sino-Korean Relations," Bulletin of Ehe Korean Research Center, No. 29 (December, 1968), p. -15. the Japanese determination to get rid of any voice by the Chinese government in matters concerning Korea. When the Korean Kingdom was opened by the treaty of 1876, many Koreans hoped that there would be no more such treaties with other nations. But the implication of the treaty for the future of Korea began to reveal itself within six years; beginning from 1882, several nations imposed treaties of inequality upon Korea follow- ing the Japanese pattern. Some of them justified their action as a means to head off conflict between China and Japan. More of them simply looked forward to commercial relations. For Korea, however, the establishment of diplomatic relations brought neither an opportunity for economic improvement nor the maintenance of territorial integrity and political stability in a new setting of international relations. Korea.was just flung open to the world before appropriate measures were taken to pro- tect itself from imperialistic encroachment by the big powers. Many Korean intellectuals who saw no alternatives but to open their country had been deeply impressed by 2An example of Korean interpretation of the sys- tem.is shown in King Ko—jong's letter to President Arthur on the occasion of negotiating for a treaty. Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Korea, 1866—18877(New York, 1970), p. 4IT' Also, see the diangue between Hugh A. Dinsmore, Minister Resident to Seoul, and Yun-Shik Kim, the Foreign Minister of Korean Kingdom, ibid., p. 171. the wonders of Western technology, especially as applied to military weapons. They, however, were little impressed by the Western thought embodied in Christian teachings. Rather, they found it totally subversive of traditional Confucian values. They faced the dilemma of benefiting from Western technology and yet not falling victim to the Western ideas.3 The excitement, aspirations, and frustration after the 18703 were rather short-lived as the Koreans sensed the dynamics of the newly developing situation around Korea. By the turn of the century China had been suffering from '1oss of face' caused by Western intru- sion, coupled with internal turbulence that was peculiar to a dying dynasty. Japan, since the Meiji Restoration, had steadily and elatedly advanced toward westernization. The splendor of the industrial expansion it achieved was sufficient to impress the rest of the Asiatic nations. With this background, Japan moved swiftly toward having its particular interests in the Far East recognized by the Western powers. Great Britain chose not to dissuade Japan from assuming a predominant position around Korea because she hoped to have Japan check Russia's southward advance. 3For the responses by the Korean intellectual literati, see Kwang-Rin Lee, Hankuk Kaehwa-Sa Ybnku (Studies of the History of Korean EnlightenmenE7(Seoul, 1969). Japan would not stand in the way of British interests in China and in the Southwest Pacific. United States policy toward Korea until the time of the Russo-Japanese War revolved around the principle of upholding the sov- ereignty of Korea by refraining from taking sides with any power.4 Other European powers sided either with Russia or Japan but played very negligible roles in Korean affairs. Given this situation, the chance for confronta- tion between the two most ambitious empires for the predominance in Korea, Japan and Russia, grew almost unchecked. And unfortunately for Korea, neither of them was to prove friendly in the years to come. The Koreans were extremely sensitive and bitter toward the infringe- ment by the two equally expansionistic powers. Despite previous intermittent contacts with Korea, it was not until the 18803 that Russia had made its deep concern for Korea clear and posed itself as a main com- petitor in this area. Having set up Port Vladivostok in 1860 and having increased her influence in Manchuria, Russia now sought to lease a Korean island off the southern coast in 1882. The request was rejected by the Korean government, but the Russian move stimulated Great 4See Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations, Chaps. V and VI. Also, see Department of State, A Historical Sumr mary of United States-Korean Relations, 1854-1962 (Washington, 1962), p. 50f. Britain to brace up against Russia. Great Britain occupied the island in 1885 by surprise without even notifying the Korean government. The incident was not resolved until Russia was compelled to give assurance to the British government that she would not make any further demands for Korean territory. Russian pursuit of overland commercial rights ‘with Korea had continued with some results but she was always handicapped diplomatically until 1884 when she finally succeeded in concluding a treaty with Korea. As soon as the treaty was effective, Russia attempted to infiltrate the faction-stricken Korean Court. The Russian Minister to Korea, Karl Waeber, proved himself extremely competent in this type of business and increased his personal influence with the Korean Court to such an extent that the King even conducted secret negotiations with him. Though the negotiations were abandoned because of the mounting opposition within the Korean government, the doubt and distrust entertained by the King as late as in 1880 when he read the book, Chao-hsien ts'e-lfieh (Korea Strategy), seemed to have melted away.5 5Huang Tsun-hsien, Chao-hsien ts'e-lfieh (Korea Strategy). He advised being on guard against Russia by means of adopting a pro-Chinese policy, maintaining glose ties with Japan, and allying with the United tates. Waeber maneuvered successfully between fac- tional groups in the Korean government, the Korean Court, and the foreign representatives. For one thing, he impressed the German adviser to the Korean govern- ment, Van Moellendorf, so much that the latter advised the Korean government to undergo military reform under Russian assistance. The plan, however, met with oppo- sition from the Korean government and cost Moellendorf his position. Russian attempts to enhance their influ- ence in Korea were never forestalled, and on one occasion when Queen Min was murdered by the Japanese, the King took refuge in the Russian Legation and remained there until the following spring. This seeming rapprochement, amwng other things, emboldened Russia to seek a predominant place in Korea to the exclusion of Japan. Japan, in her effort to curb the ever-growing Russian influence in Korea, even proposed in 1896 to divide Korea into two spheres of influence along the 38th parallel, but it was cate- gorically rejected by Russia.6 The Russians desired to see Korea independent for the time being and objected to a premature division of Korea, for they thought that they would eventually be able to lay their hands on the whole country. Korea seemed within her grasp. As one 6William L. Langer, S. E. Gleason, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York, 1934), 1., p. 406. Russian put it: "The fate of Korea, as a future integral part of the Russian empire by force of geographical and political conditions, had been determined upon by us."7 The rapprochement between Russia and Korea, how- ever, was soon to be outdone by Japanese ascendancy in Korea, and the Russian efforts to retain even the north- ern half of Korea under its direct influence met with a fatal blow by the Japanese when the latter repaid Russia by rejecting her proposal of dividing Korea along the 39th parallel. A renewal of the proposal met with the same response in 1904, by which time Japan had entrenched itself firmly in Korea with British acquiescence and the sympathetic silence of the United States. The Russo- Japanese War was the final blow to the already tottering cause of Russia in Korea. One of the two foreign powers that had persistently pursued territorial gain in Korea thus disappeared from the scene, only to return four decades later. As many Koreans feared at the time, the treaty of 1876 facilitated Japan's economic exploitation of Korea to satisfy her needs for Korean rice and for a mar- ket for the Japanese goods. But Japan's new leadership that was molded through the Meiji Restoration and the prevalent ethos of Fukoku Kyohei, coupled with the 7Count Lamsdorf's memorandum, as quoted in ibid. fanatic sense of mission, all worked together to bring the historically isolated Japan a step closer to the Asian continent. The frenzied aspiration for a new Japan as envisaged in the process of speedy westerniza- tion drove the leadership to seek an alteration of relations in the Far East. Japan was ready to dispose of its 'splendid isolation' in Asia for a proud counter- export of westernization to other Asiatic nations.8 The corrupt and incompetent Korean government fell an easy prey to Japanese expansion. The military superiority of Japan over the two rivals, China and Russia, proved overwhelming, and her undisturbed exercise of coercive pressure upon the shaky Korean Kingdom culminated in the treaty of 1905 which proclaimed a de facto protectorate over Korea. Japan took charge of Korea's external as well as internal affairs. Finance and police had already been under Japanese control since 1904. Japan had finally estab- lished herself unrivaled in Korea by 1905. What is more, Japan had enjoyed the encouragement of two great powers of the time, Great Britain and the 8One of the undercurrents of Japan's continental policy was its psychological reaction against the outward dazzle of Western civilization. See zomura Yasunobu, "Dairiku Seisaku-ni Okeru Imeji-no Tenkan" (Changes of Image in Japan's Continental Policy) in Shinohara Hajime, Mitani Taichiro, ed., Kindai Nihon-no Seiji Shid6 (Political Guidance in Modern Japan) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 253-54. 10 United States, in substantiating her plan for predomi- nance in Korea in the face of the furious Opposition of the Korean people. Great Britain was in the course of negotiations with Japan for the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, and in August an agreement on a visibly quid pro guo basis was reached. According to the agree- ment, the British government accepted Japan's right to establish a protectorate in Korea in return for a Japanese pledge of cooperation in terms of British interests in India. One striking feature of the second Alliance agreement was the omission of any mention of Korea's independence and territorial integrity. This had been explicitly recognized in the first Alliance of 1902.9 Japan gained recognition of its right "to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem prOper and necessary" to safeguard and advance her "paramount political, military, and economic interests." American interest in Korea before the turn of the century had been largely to uphold Korea's sover- eignty'.as a.matter of principle by avoiding direct 9For the First Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Janu- ary 30, 1902, see Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Documents on the Origins of the War: 1898-1914, ed. By G. P. Gooch, Harold Temperley, II (London, 1927), pp. 115-120; for the Second Agreement of August 12, 1905, see ibid., IV (London, 1929), pp. 165-169. n s '1‘ Va v..§.\qu 51‘. .Qt\n“~u \v\.\\s:!AM§HV 11 involvement. American representatives in Korea, John B. Sill (1894-1897) and Horace N. Allen (1897-1905), were repeatedly warned by the Department of State to refrain 10 But from.participating directly in Korean politics. the diplomatic situation changed especially after 1898 when the united States obtained territory in the South- west Pacific. The acquisition of the Philippines made America a new Asiatic power, and her relations with Japan and Russia never allowed her to remain aloof from the impact of the diplomatic wars that were going on in and around Korea at that time. Furthermore, Theodore Roosevelt's aspiration for a balance of power in the Far East played a weighty role in American foreign policy. Fearful of Russia's threats to a balanced power relationship, he hoped Japan would serve as a bulwark against Russia. Korea was torn by a gigantic struggle between Japan and Russia for supremacy in Korea, and the Korean people were in no position to "11 ”strike one blow in their own defense. Roosevelt 10For the attitude of the State Department and its effect upon the Americans in Korea, see Henry S. Marks, The Failure of the United States to Maintain the Independence of Korea and the Effect of This Failure Upon Americans in Korea: From the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to the Russo-Japanese War 6f1190491905 (Florence State College, 1962), Chap. II. 11Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Collier Books ed}: New York, 1962), p. 280. at g: .-.,u use..\. 3.. 12 thought that it would offset Russian influence in the Far East if Japan would control Korea and have major influence in Manchuria while the Yangtze valley was left under the dominant influence of the Anglo-Americans. As early as in 1900, Roosevelt wrote to Speck von Stern- burg, then on the staff of the German Embassy in Washing- ton, that he would "1ike to see Japan have Korea," in the expectation that Japan "will be a check upon Russia."12 By 1905, Roosevelt was firmly convinced that the United States must not undertake responsibility for Korea and that the United States should "let Japan play our game."13 He greatly admired Japan's speedy imitation of Western culture and had little doubt that Japan would govern Korea efficiently and maintain an open door 14 Naturally, he strongly favored Japan's taking there. charge of Korea's external affairs as stipulated in the treaty of 1905. The United States thus became the first nation to recognize the destruction of Korean sov- ereignty which she was obligated to respect by solemn treaty of 1882. As Roosevelt elaborated later, it was 12 13Roosevelt's letter to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., dated February 10, 1904, as quoted in H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt--A Biography (New York, 1931), p. 375. 14 Ibid., p. 273. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 279. RDF‘ 0.3% nuS I‘- ‘ . ~d. \ 13 out of the question to suppose that "any other nation, 'with no interest of its own at stake, would do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for them- selves."15 The Taft Katsura memorandum of 1905 was not only the product of the prevalent trends of the American diplomatic concern in the Far East but also eloquently reflected the trends of secret diplomacy of the time. In the long and confidential discussion, Taft and Katsura branded Korea as the direct cause of the Russo- Japanese War and agreed that a complete solution of the peninsula question was "the logical consequence of the war." Taft remarked that in his personal opinion, "the establishment by the Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea . . . was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the East." Good understanding between the three govern- ments of Japan, the United States, and Great Britain was affirmed as the "only means for accomplishing . . . the general peace in the Far East."16 151bid., pp. 280-281. 16For the full text, see Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, July art , ; for someVbackground of the memorandum, see John G. Reid, ed., "Taft's Telegram to Root, July 29, 1905," Pacific Historical Review, IX, No. 1 (March, 1940), p. 14 Maintenance of a balance of power by carving out spheres of influence was the essence of this memorandum, and that was in a complete accord with what Roosevelt had been advocating. There was also a common factor in the attitudes of the United States and Great Britain in recognizing Japan's special interests in Korea. Japan, according to the Anglo-Japanese agreement, would abide by the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations.17 But this expectation was to prove unfounded before long. In fact, one of the reasons Japan wanted Korea was to get a firm base for a bolder advance into continental Asia, especially in Manchuria and the China mainland. Taking Korea was but an incipient step in the implementation of her design of continental policy. For Japan, Korea was virtually nothing if it was to be sepa- rated economically from.Manchuria and China. Russia was forced to recognize in the peace treaty of 1905 the "outstanding political, military, and economic interests of Japanese empire in Korea" and had to assure that she would on no occasion whatever inter- fere with Japanese implementation of guidance, protection, and supervision as Japan deemed necessary in Korea. In addition, the treaty placed a severe limitation on 17British Documents, IV, p. 165; also, see Beale, Theodore Roosevélt, p. 279. 3.-.. r J 15 18 The humiliating Russian interests in Manchuria. retreat of Russia from Korea and Manchuria, coupled with Anglo-American recognition of Japan's special inter- ests in the areas, gave Japan an entirely free hand in the northern Far East. Eclipse of United States' interest in Korea was furthered when she concluded a treaty with Japan in 1908 that abandoned extraterritorial jurisdiction over American citizens in Korea and agreed that sudh citizens were "to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Japanese court "19 Japan annexed Korea in 1910, which had been in Korea. a fait accompli for the United States. Upon receiving the note of the annexation treaty, Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson was only grateful for the Japanese assurance of retaining the existing tariff schedule in Korea for the next ten years in view of the great importance of the interests of the American citi- 20 In zens (not of the American government) in Korea. August, 1912, the Japanese government took up the ques- tion of the abolition of the foreign settlements in the treaty ports of Korea. In conjunction with other treaty 18Gaimusho', Nihon Gaik6 Nenpyfi Narabi Jfiyé Bunsho (Chronology of Japanese Diplomacy and Important Documents), 1840-1945, 1 (Tokyo, 1955), p. 245. 19 20 Dept; of State, Historical Summary, p. 55. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 16 powers, the United States had to consent to their aboli- tion, and foreign settlements came to an end in 1914.21 The international rivalry had not protected Korea's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Korea with its own culture and.way of life was forced out of its long seclusion and was eventually placed under the Japanese control with the approval of the world's major powers because she was weak internally and unfamiliar with the imperialistic maneuver of international power politics. The feeble aspiration of Korean intellectuals who dreamed of 'harmony between the Western technology and Oriental minds' ended in bitter disappointment. Strong popular resistance throughout Korea against Japa- nese transgression was crushed mercilessly by the Japanese.22 For the following three decades Korea suf- fered under Japanese occupation. Japan's militaristic control of Korea was invigorated following the formal annexation in 1910, and the Koreans were deprived of their most basic rights. Tens of thousands of Koreans with education and social 21 22For the resistance between 1905 and 1910 by the Korean Court, Press, foreign friends, and especially by the Righteous Army, see C. 1. Eugene Kim, Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and Politics of Imperialism,_1876-1910 (Berkeley, 1967), PP. 175-206. Ibid. 17 reputation had been apprehended for alleged anti- Japanese conspiracy. Economic and cultural strangulation caused bitter grievances among the Korean people, and many of them found their way to Manchuria and Siberia where they could organize themselves into a resistance force. I The first WOrld War pushed Korea further back into international oblivion. A general peace seemed to prevail in Korea during the War under Japanese guidance and hegemony. But when the war ended, popular feelings that had hitherto been forced underground came to the fore. In Korea the eruption of discontent and cries for justice came two months earlier than the May Fourth Move- ment in China. Korean leaders were especially drawn to the Wil- sonian principle of self-deternfination, hoping that Korea's case might receive new international consideration in the process of searching for a new postwar world order by the big powers. For a start, the Koreans resolved to send a delegation to Paris to present their case as soon as the peace conference convened, but to no avail. Only Dr. Kim,Kiusic barely managed to reach France but his mission got nowhere due mainly to Japanese manipulation and tO'a lesser degree the negative attitudes taken by other major powers. The diplomatic chagrin along with the already widespread dissatisfaction among the Koreans 18 who never condoned Japanese annexation of their country led to a mass demonstration on March 1, 1919. The Koreans proclaimed independence but lacked any effective means to compel Japan to abandon its claim over Korea. The thirty-three signers of the Proclamation of Independence were apprehended by the Japanese police and they surrendered voluntarily. The movement was carried out strictly on the basis of non-violence. But the demonstration ended in a brutal suppression by Japan. The Proclamation of Independence was "written in a lofty "23 and the mass demonstra- tone of the ancient prOphet, tion was aimed solely at making Korea's grievances known more explicitly to the Japanese and, more emphatically, to the world with the conviction that only international support would bring redress to the Korean people. The world, however, turned a deaf ear to the Korean appeals except on the level of personal observers and sympathetic presses,24'which were far from influ- ential in arousing world opinion. The united States was 23For the English translation of the Proclama- tion of Independence of Korea, see F. A. McKenzie, Korea's Fi ht for Freedom (AMS ed.: New York, 1970), pp. 247-258. 24For instances: ibid., Chaps. XV, XVIII; Los Angeles Times which editorialized the Korean case on April 6, I9I9, under the title "The Dignity of Life"; a response from a Japanese Christian leader Dr. Ishizaka, a summary of which appeared in R. S. Spencer's article in the Christian Advocate of New York, quoted by McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 311-313. l9 speechless in the face of Japanese charges that many Americans, especially the Christian missionaries in Korea, were affiliated with the mass demonstration.25 The United States failed to take notice of Korean appeals for sympathetic understanding. The Acting Secretary of State Polk instructed the American Ambassador to Japan on April 14 that the Consulate at Seoul "should be extremely careful not to encourage any belief that the United States will assist the Korean nationalists in carrying out their plans," and should not do anything which "may cause Japanese authorities to suspect Ameri- can government sympathize with Korean nationalist movement."26 A The leaders of the movement published a daily newspaper, the Independence News, regularly through March, April, and May, and at intervals thereafter, keeping the location of the press in secrecy. During the week of April 16-23, representatives of Korean people met secretly in Seoul and organized a Provisional Government. They drew up a provisional constitution,27 25Dept. of State, Historical Summary, p. 8; also, Dept. of State, Foreign Relations ofgthe united States (to be abridged to F.R.Ihereafter), 1919, II, pp. 458-459. 26 27The constitution provides for representative government. For the text translated into English, see MdKenzie, op. cit., pp. 304-305.‘ F.R., 1919, II, p. 462. 20 and elected Syngman Rhee, who was in the United States at that time, as the first President of the Republic. The government was reorganized and expanded in Shanghai to involve those who had been already engaged in resist- ance movements outside Korea. In the meantime, Kim, Kiusic was joined later by other Koreans and began to act as the official repre- sentative of the Korean Provisional Government. They stayed in Paris until 1920 and published Public Informa- tion (22 volumes in total) and Free Korea (10 volumes in total), both in French, with a view to supplying the foreign delegates to the Paris Conference with useful 28 The representa- information on the Korean situation. tive, aided by Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, a one-time English teacher dispatched by the United States government in the 18803 and since then a most persistent friend of Korea's cause, made every effort to have their cause favored by the united States delegation. For the Koreans of the time, the United States was the only nation in the world which could do something for the Korean people if only she had a will to do so. But the United States was simply not inclined to give any serious consideration to such a trifling matter 28A part of their activities with respect to public relations was disclosed recently. See Tong-A Ilbo (Tong-A Daily News), March 1, 1975, p. 5. 21 as Korea. The problems she encountered--postwar Euro- pean questions, recognition of the new Soviet government of Russia, tension between the President and the Senate in regard to the Versailles treaty, etc.--were legion. Korea had no place in the grand Wilsonian design of postwar peace for the Far East, a design that eventually accepted the fact of Japanese power. Thus, Korea's case went totally unnoticed either at the Paris Confer— ence or by any individual government, especially by the United States. The Korean Government-in-exile was engulfed with a welter of problems to resolve by itself. Cold response from the major powers, the endless postponement of independence, and particularly the factional division among the Koreans themselves--they exhibited an enor- mously complicated spectrum of ideological inclinations-- eroded grounds for hope, and tempers flared easily in frustration. The relations of the exiled government with the various armed resistance groups that-had been in existence in Manchuria, China, and Siberia were for the most part quite precarious. The factional struggle and acute difference of opinion ensuing therefrom were aggravated further by the impact of the Communist revo- lution in Russia and the various factions within the Chinese national government. Some favored close ties 22 with the Communists.29 Others wanted to work closely with particular factions in the Chinese government. Geographical separation of the leaders of the exiled government in China and the United States also contribu- ted to inflaming emotional conflict out of misunder- standing and jealousy. The different circumstances in which these leaders worked were a constant source of friction and disagreement in policy decision. Those in China were naturally under the Chinese influence which stressed use of arms as of utmost importance for quick and pal- pable results. Being closer geographically to their home country, they were under constant pressure to engage themselves in armed resistance against the Japa- nese. They did so with considerable success from time to time.30 Those in the United States, notably Syngman Rhee of the Korean Commission which was representing the exiled government in America, were doubtful of the effect of armed resistance which often succeeded but more often ended in mere terrorism. He argued that such violent measures would only strengthen the Japanese case 29For the Communist activities within the Korean Provisional Government, see Dae-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, I967), pp. 13- I5. 3°Ibid., pp. 8—9, 11-12. 23 for_ever-tighter controls and continuance of their 31 A graduate of Princeton police control over Korea. University and a student of Woodrow Wilson, Rhee had a great respect and admiration for Wilsonian idealism. Rhee sought recognition of his Government-in-exile by resorting to diplomatic measures. But it is undeniable that Rhee was also mindful that he must not lose his leadership to the heroic armed resistance in China and Siberia by fellow Koreans. Rhee concentrated on creating the strongest possible impression through securing friendly and per- vasive newspaper coverage. To attain this end, he also kept writing letters and petitions to the leaders of the United States government. Whenever an important inter- national conference was held, he never failed to attempt to present Korea's case and to draw the world's atten- tion to the justification of the independence of Korea as a vital factor for peace in the Far East. His effort received warm.but informal encouragement from many indi- viduals but was totally neglected by the leaders of major powers.32 His activities often caused those 31Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York, 1960), p. 151; also, Suh, KOrean Communist, p. 12. 32Rhee failed to get a passport to attend the Paris Peace Conference in 1919; he attempted to be received as an observer at the Washington Naval Con- ference in 1921, only to fail; in 1932 he managed to 24 'balanced gentlemen' in the official positions in and out of the United States to shun him. Rhee thought that he was doing his best to bring an end to the total neglect of Korea. The efforts to win recognition of Korean inde- pendence continued but without success. It was not until after the war broke out in the Pacific that the question again gained international attention. In a letter dated December 18, 1941, to Chang, Key-Young, Rhee's secretary, Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa reported that his discussion regarding the recognition of Korea as an independent political entity received a sympa- thetic response from the State Department, but since many Americans were still in Japan, the United States government could not take any step that would arouse 33 Even this was a great resentment among the Japanese. encouragement to the Koreans. On January 2, 1942, Rhee had chance to talk with Alger Hiss and Stanley Hornbeck at the State Department on the potential role of the Koreans in the Allied war effort, suggesting that recog- nition of the Korean Government-in-exile would greatly bolster Korean determination. Hiss reportedly responded be in Geneva where the League of Nations was discussing recent Japanese conduct in Manchuria, but returned without any official results. 33Oliver, S. Rhee, p. 176. (A Dr, 25 that there was little or nothing the United States could do because recognition of the Korean government would "offend the Soviet Union which had a great interest in north Asia" and would mean a solution in which "Soviet Russia is not represented.”34 Later, Rhee was notified flatly by Hornbeck that in the opinion of the State Department, he was wholly unknown inside Korea and that the Korean Provisional Government was no more than a self-constituted club with limited membership among a group of expatriates.35 This kind of distrust of Rhee and the Korean Pro- visional Government was not entirely unfounded. Rhee's moralistic background and his stubbornness in relation to the dissenters, whether Koreans or foreigners, pro- vided the main source of misunderstanding and conflict. His relentlessness in Opposing and condemning Communism went to such extremes that even many moderate-minded people were branded by him as Communists or Communist- sympathizers. To work with them even for a common cause was absolutely out of the question for him. President Roosevelt referred the Korean question to a meeting of the Pacific War Council in early 1942, where the question of granting recognition of the Korean Provisional Government was informally discussed. The 3“Ibid., p. 178. 351bid., p. 182. 26 meeting decided that any such action would be postponed until it might be more useful for arousing Korean oppo- sition to Japan.36 T. V. Soong, China's Foreign Min- ister, reperted at the subsequent meeting that the Koreans were too disunited to comprise any effective force, citing Rhee's stubbornness as the main cause of disunity.37 This low and unfavorable estimate of Rhee by Soong was to prove even more costly in 1945. Chiang Kai-shek instructed Soong at the San Francisco Confer- ence of the united Nations to see to it that Korea be given a seat at the Conference. Soong, however, disre- garded the instructions and took a passive, noncommittal attitude on the Korean issue despite the fact that the entire Chinese delegation, including the influential Bishop Paul Yu-Pin, favored Korea's admission to the Conference.38 A Chinese spokesman in San Francisco was quoted as saying that "since the Yalta Conference was one which did not include China, China is not in a position to 39 talk about the Korean questions." Soong also made the 36George ML McCune, Korea Today(Cambridge, Mass., 1950). p. 41. 37 38 39 Oliver, S. Rhee, pp. 195-196. 088 R&A, No. 129798 (May 21, 1945). Ibid. 27 point that the Korean Provisional Government had not been recognized by the Chinese Central Government, for which Rhee was quite bitter. Rhee complained that China "should not wait for the answer of the United States on 40 Soong, on May 22, invited the Koreans all questions." with the avowed purpose of drawing them together to sup- port a program of coalition for Korea but Rhee not only refused to attend the meeting but declared later that George McCune, the State Department specialist for Korea, and other State Department officials joined Soong in support of the coalitionists who were to Rhee tantamount to Communist-sympathizers.41 Nor was the Korean Provisional Government in 1942 an efficient and fully representative organization. Since its establishment, it was dependent upon the finan- cial support of Korean residents in China and sympathetic Chinese. It moved from place to place as the Chinese Central Government was forced to retreat. 'It finally settled in Chungking but the situation was far from ideal. Further removed and hopelessly separated from their mother country financially, politically, and geographically, its members seemed, as Hornbeck previ- ously put it, nothing but a 'self—constituted club' with a small number of followers. 40 41 Ibid. Oliver, S. Rhee, p. 199. 28 In correspondence in May 1942 exchanged with Mr. James H. R. Cromwell, the then President of the Korean-American Council, Secretary Hull made it clear that the United States would avoid taking action which ‘might, when the victory of the United Nations was achieved, "tend to deprive peoples now under Axis yoke of full freedom to choose and establish their own gov- "42 In other words, Hull did not wish to com- ernment. ‘mit the United States to recognizing the Korean Provisional Government because he did not consider it representative of the Korean people. This view persisted into 1945. Joseph W. Bal- lantine, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, unhesitantly branded the Korean leaders in the United States as "more interested in furthering their personal interest, with a great "predilection for personal publicity," even attempting 43 The chance "to maneuver the Department of State." for recognition of the Provisional Government was getting bleaker day by day even in 1945. It appeared more so because the Korean Government-in-exile was almost entirely 42Written in May, 1942. J. Kyuang Dunn, "Korea Seeks Recognition," Far Eastern Survey, XIII, No. 21 (October, 1944), p. I987 43Ballantine's conversation with Mr. Shao Yu-lin, Senior Secretary to Generalissimo Chiang, at Washington, on February 5, 1945, in F.R., 1945, V1, p. 1020. 29 contingent financially and politically on the Chinese government which had been treated by other Allied powers as-a 'third-class' ally. It had been repeatedly pointed out by responsi- ble persons that the Korean Government-in-exile did not fully represent the Korean people. But if Rhee's claim that his group enjoyed full support of the majority of the Koreans was groundless, American assertion that Rhee was wholly unknown inside Korea or that the government was no more than a self-constituted club among a group of expatriates was equally inaccurate. The American government knew better than any other nations that it was impossible for any free flow of person, finance, or any support between the Provisional Government and the Japanese-controlled Korea. Under the circumstances, it was almost impossible for the Korean government to be fully representative. The Americans had no understanding of the psy- chology of Korean politics in which person superseded institution. Whether or not the Korean Provisional Government was institutionally representative, or even whether or not there was an institution called the Korean Provisional Government was not vitally important for the Koreans. All they needed was the names of Syngman Rhee, Kim, Ku, or Ahn, Ch'ang-Ho. The Ameri- cans paid little attention to Korea's aspiration for 30 independence. It was something too much to ask of them when United States interest in Korea was minimal. Surface silence of the Koreans under the Japanese occu- pation was not the sign of their total submission, as a State Department official recollected later.44 Furthermore, the State Department seems to have failed to take into consideration the vital factor that the Korean Provisional Government, unlike those of Poland or France, had been in existence more than two decades, and that the energy it once possessed in its incipient stage may have faded away because of total neglect by the major powers of the world. Korean lead- ers had no knowledge that the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination was primarily for European countries and as such, there was almost no possibility that Korea's case would be received favorably by the major powers, including the United States. The two decades' experi- ence of the Korean Provisional Government taught that theirs was a vain dream, a completely lost cause which no nation would care about but the Koreans themselves. Amidst frustration and criticism, the Government- in-exile, however, continued to work as the symbol of 44Comments in a radio broadcast by J. C. Vin- cent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and Colonel B. E. Prescott, a former Civil Administrator of the U.S. Zone. Department of State Bulletin, XIV, No. 343 (Jan. 27, 1946), p. 105. 31 the restoration movement. The Cairo Declaration on Korea was a timely encouragement to reawaken the Koreans from resignation to reactivation. Early in 1944, the Korean National Provisional Assembly in Chungking attempted to revise the status of the so-called Korean Restoration Army, which, under the existing agreement with the Chinese Military Council, was wholly dependent on the Chinese Army with respect to military operation.45 As has been referred to, Korean armed resistance against Japan began in Manchuria and Siberia even before the independence movement of 1919. But the first major attempt to unite those scattered resistances into a more effective force was made in 1920, and resulted in the establishment of Taehan Tongrip Kundan (The Korean Independence Corps).46 Though many of the members were not Communists, they had to work with the Chita Soviet Government in Siberia. They purchased arms from the Czechoslovakian troops who were on their way home from Siberia, and were aided by the Korean Russians in negoti- ations with the Chita Government for its assistance to 45Military Intelligence Division, W.D.G.S. No. 65567 (March 8, 1944). 46Kfin-Shik Ch'ae, Mujang Tongnip Undong Pisa (Secret History of the Armed Independence Movement) (Seoul, 1948), pp. 100-105. Also, see Robert A. Scalapino, Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I (Berkeley, 1972), p. 32f; Suh, Korean Communist, p. 29f. 32 Korean resistance movement. But the factional strife among the Communists and the betrayal by the Chita Government finally cost the united resistance movement in 1921.47 Since then, there had never materialized any appreciable consolidation of armed resistance groups ‘mainly because of personal rivalries and ideological differences between the nationalists and Communists. The Korean Restoration Army came into being in 1941 without much autonomy granted by the Chinese government. A petition for more autonomy resulted only in lowering the status of the Army.48 The Korean National Assembly in Chungking resolved in 1944 to dispatch diplomatic delegations to America, England, and Soviet Russia to promote the interests of the Provisional Government. This action was interpreted by some members of the U.S. Embassy in Chungking as being motivated by a desire to transplant the Korean independence movement to more hospitable capitals and away from.Chungking where issues had often been colored by China's intra-party conflict.49 The 47Kfin-Shik Ch'ae, Pisa, p. 105; also, see Hong-Il Kim, "Chayushi Sapybn Chon-Hu” (Before and After the Free City Incident), Sasan -K e (The World of Thought), February, 1965, p. . 48oss R&A, No. 105263 (October 24, 1944). 49Military Intelligence Division, W.D.G.S. No. 65567 (March 8, 1944). 33 Assembly adopted a manifesto in which they reaffirmed the authority and prestige of the Korean Government-in-exile as the highest and central organization in Korea's bid for the restoration of independence, and made a renewed pledge not to let factional strife take any more toll in pursuing the common target of independence.50 Encouraged by the Cairo Declaration and bol- stered by the renewed determination for united efforts at the Provisional Assembly, the Provisional Government now proceeded to contact the Central Committee of the Kuomintang for recognition. The Twelfth Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomin- tang was in session in Chungking and the Korean Provi- sional Government presented to it a memorandum enunciating the reasons why the Korean government should be recognized officially. The main points set forth in the memorandum were: First, Korea held an important geographical and historical position in the war against Japan; second, all the United Nations should support Korea and consider her as an ally; and third, China should be the first to support the Korean independence movement and recognize the Provisional Government so 50033 R&A, No. 76561 (May 15, 1944), Enclosures no. 2 and no. 3. 34 as to strengthen her right to speak for all the oppressed peoples in Asia.51 Even though there is no evidence that this appeal had any effect on the Chinese government, the relations between it and the Korean Provisional Government seemed improved. The Chinese Government donated five million Chinese dollars to the Koreans to enable the Provisional Government to establish more effective contact with the 52 Korean homeland. The Chinese People's Political Council which had been divided among themselves in regard to the recognition of the Korean Government-in- exile now took up the matter again and proposed that the Koreans should be given recognition on certain 53 conditions. China was probably thinking of helping the Koreans to form a united front patterned after the French Liberation Committee.54 51For the full text of the memorandum, see 088 R&2£)No. 85672, enclosure to despatch No. 2639 (June 1, 9 . ’ 52 53The conditions were: (1) China recognizes the Korean Provisional Government after all the Allies have reached agreements on Korea; (2) the Korean Provisional Government must accept the former agreements between Korea and China (not disclosed); (3) establishment of a firm leadership in the Provisional Government. See ibid., p. 1. 54Ibid.; also, see the memorandum of conversa- tion between Ballantine and Shao Yu-lin, in F.R., 1945, V1, p. 1019. 033 R&A, Ne. 105263 (October 24, 1944), p. 2. 35 The Yalta Conference of February, 1945, obviously had a far-reaching impact upon the Koreans in Chungking. They seemed especially alarmed by the unfortunate posi- tion of the London Poles. On the occasion of forming a united front, they argued that if the Koreans had made no reasonable contribution to the war effort, and had made no substantial preparation for the national restora- tion, it would be truly childish to voice any discontent over the decision of the Cairo Conference in which Korea's independence was promised "in due course." "What the great . . . Crimea Conference had decided regarding Poland and Yugoslavia, they expressed fear- fully, "serves well as an iron-clad example of what will happen to the soon-to-be liberated Asiatic countries."55 At this time, the Korean Commission in Washington was making its last effort to obtain recognition of the Provisional Government. In a letter to Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew, Rhee gave friendly warnings that there had been repeated and unmistakable signs of danger that the Korean Communist army in Siberia might rush into Korea at an opportune moment and overrun the entire peninsula before the Korean Provisional Govern- ment could find a chance to return to Korea. He argued that this could naturally create a situation detrimental 55The Manifesto of the New Korean Democratic Party, in 088 R&A, No. 122652 (March 21, 1945), p. 2. 36 not only to Korea but also to the United States and China in the postwar era.56 Whether or not his assertion in the same letter that China was considering giving a de jure recognition to the Korean Provisional Government only if the United States followed suit was founded on truth, he seemed not very far from reflecting the general atmosphere of the 5 7 The Counselor Chinese Government on the question. at the Chinese Embassy in Washington Liu Chieh explained in a private talk with Joseph W. Ballantine that his government considered the Chungking Government of Korea as the "principal element" among the different Korean groups overseas and that it should be given official support not as a de jure government but as "represent- ing the heart of the Korean resistance movement in "58 China. It seems likely that the Chinese Government was moving toward making a commitment along that line had it not been for some unidentified reasons.59 But Grew instructed Ambassador Hurley in Chung- king to leave the question of recognition in abeyance 56F. R., 1945, VI, pp. 1022-1023. The letter was dated FeEruary 5, 1945. 57Letter to Ambassador Hurley from.the Acting Secretary of State, on February 20, 1945, in ibid., p. 1022. 581bid., p. 1021. 59Ibid., p. 1019. 37 for the present,60 and let it be known to Rhee that the Korean Provisional Government did not possess the quali- fication.requisite for obtaining recognition by the United States as a governing authority because it never had "administrative authority over any part of Korea" and was not "representing the Korean people today."61 'He defended the American position of avoiding any action that might after the war tend to compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and per- sonnel of the government which they may wish to estab- lish. Rhee's response to this was that the only possibility of "avoiding the ultimate conflict between the United States and the Soviet Republics after the war was to build up all the democratic, non-Communistic ele- ments wherever possible now."62 It is doubtful if there was at this late date any chance left for America to help build up democratic 63 elements among the Koreans. But it is disappointingly 6°1bid., p. 1023. 61His letter to Syngman Rhee, dated June 5, 1945, ibid., p. 1030. The same principle is enunciated in his Press Release of June 8, 1945. For the text, igggbept. of State Bulletin (June 10, 1945), pp. 1058- 62F.R., 1945, v1, p. 1023. 63Rhee and his group were not cooperative in forming a united front of democratic elements in Chung- king. OSS R&A, 122652 (March 21, 1945). P. 6. 38 true that the United States policy makers in early 1945 discounted the role that could be played by the Russian- trained Communist Koreans in deciding the postwar political status of Korea. The American leaders saw no reason to have 'Korean colleagues' because postwar Korea seemed unassociated with American national interest. They did not realize that the question of the Korean Provisional Government was assuming new significance, and.the issue was no longer a mere matter of legality or technicality. When this fundamental change of char- acter of the Korean question was brought to America's 64 the United States found attention in August 1945, itself in a mess as far as postwar Korean policy was concerned and had no alternatives but to stick to the hopeful prospect that the Korean question would be resolved in some way by being internationalized. As Soviet Russia entered the Pacific War, the Red Army swiftly overran Manchuria and north Korea. Two divisions of Korean Communists were brought in as a part of the Red Army and a new chapter of modern Korean history began in north Korea, while leaders of the Korean Provisional Government were 'allowed' to 64Sowang Cho's proposal to Hurley, dated August 14, 1945, in F.R., 1945, V1, p. 1036; also, a letter of the Provisional Government through Rhee to President Truman after the Potsdam Conference, in ibid., pp. 1036-1037. 39 return to Korea only in October strictly in a personal 65 capacity. The longest-lived government-in-exile in modern world history thus died out without being recog- nized by any government in theworld.66 The United States' lack of concern and national interests in Korea before 1945 perhaps finds its best expression in Truman's remarks that before American occupation forces landed in Korea in the late summer of 1945 there had been probably few Americans who had known or thought much about Korea other than that it was "a "67 strange land in far-off Asia. Missionary activities 65Ibid., p. 1058. In response to the Chinese Ambassador to the United States Dr. Wei Tao-ming's sug- gestion that the Korean Provisional Government might form the basis of an eventual Korean government, Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, said that the leaders of the Provisional Government would be helped to return to Korea as individuals but the future Korean government would have nothing to do with the Korean Provisional Government officially. 66China assisted the Korean Provisional Govern- ment but never recognized it officially. Besides the United States, Great Britain reaffirmed its non- recognition on April 9, 1945 (F.R., 1945, V1, p. 1026). It is not clear whether or not Lenin's financial assist- ance to the Korean Provisional Government in 1920 was accompanied by an official recognition. For the finan- cial assiStance, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I, p. 18f; Suh, Korean Communist, p. 14. France was the only nation that aIlowed its Embassy in China to maintain de facto relations with the Provi- sional Government (F.R., I945, V1, p. 1025). 67Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956), p. 316. 40 or change in the power situation in the Far East since 1910 had little impact upon America's idea of balance of power in terms of Korea. Korea had become to the United States an integral part of Japan's new order in Asia. Since then, no relations existed between Korea and the United States except a meaningless exchange of letters between Rhee and some officials in the Department of State. It was meaningless because Rhee was a victim of the factional strife among the Koreans overseas and the State Department officials were simply expressing Ameri- ca's indifference toward Korea. The situation changed little even after the Pacific War broke out, for there seemed no justifiable ground for America to reconsider its traditional policy of placing Korea under the influence of either Japan or China as a means to avoid international struggle in this area. The power vacuum that would come into being after the war was scarcely imagined by any Americans at this time. William Bullitt, among others, advised President Roosevelt in September 1941 that the United States should be more careful in dealing with Soviet Russia because "a Russian victory in the war might well mean one vast dictatorship extending from the Pacific to Western Europe," imperiling American interest "now covered by our Atlantic Doctrine and our Open Door 41 "68 But Roosevelt's response was that he Doctrine. simply did not think that Stalin was that kind of man. "If I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse obligg," he continued, "Stalin won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace."69 Given the situation, the Cairo Declaration regard- ing the independence of Korea was a surprise to the Koreans. The Korean Provisional Government responded to this rather unexpected promise of independence with an unqualified approval despite a cautious expression of 70 They well fear regarding the "in due course" phrase. remembered the bitter experience of 1919 when the doc- trine of self-determination was denied to the Koreans. They earnestly hoped that the Cairo Declaration would not fail to serve as the assurance that the principle of the Atlantic Charter would be applicable to Asia as well as to Europe. It was not known to the Koreans, however, that neither the United States nor Great Britain were taking 68William C. Bullitt, "How We WOn the War and Lost the Peace," Life, XXV (August 30, 1948), p. 91. 691bid., p. 94. 70Leaders of the Korean Provisional Government had a strong fear of Chinese intensions regarding the postwar position of Korea, as rumors were advanced that Korea would be placed under a Chinese mandate. F.R., 1943, III, p. 1096. F“ his‘ 42 the Korean question as seriously as the Koreans hoped. The Cairo Conference was the only major Allied confer- ence where China was represented, and the Korean question was given but a peripheral consideration in the process of general discussion of the Far Eastern situation which was mainly concerned with bolstering China's prestige as an Allied member. The revised American draft of the communiqué stated that the three powers were mindful of "the treacherous enslavement" of 71 But the phrase, per- the people of Korea by Japan. haps the first outspoken appraisal of the Korean situation by some Americans, was dropped from the final communique on British insistence. It was only after the Cairo Conference that the United States began more serious study of the future of Korea. According to a memorandum.of March 29, 1944, by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, the two main concerns regarding postwar Korea were the nature of the occupation and the limitation of American 72 In case occupation resulted in the responsibility. course of combat, the memorandum continued, a more serious consideration would have to be given to various political factors, such as the Allied members and Soviet 711bid., p. 403. 72PWC papers No. 125, dated March 29, 1944. F.R., 1944, V. PP. 1224-1228. 43 Russia if she entered the war, the Korean Provisional Government with its 1,000 trained troops, the Korean Communist Army in Yenan, the Korean resistance groups in Manchuria, and most significantly, the Korean troops trained in the Soviet Far Eastern Army with an estimated total of 35,000. To be sure, all of them would want to participate in combat in Korea with a view to having a voice in the future status of Korea. The paper stressed that even if the occupation was a result of Japanese capitulation, it would be most desirable to set up an inter-allied military government. As a means to implement this principle, the paper made a strong point that zonal military government must be avoided as far as possible and a combined civil affairs administration be established with all the participating countries bearing a joint responsibility. This last point related directly to the limitation of American involvement in Korea, and was more fully reiterated in 73 It another memorandum.prepared one month later. pointed out that not only the military occupation but the interim organization between the occupation and the full attainment of independence must also be inter- national in character, and ruled out any possibility of trusteeship by any one nation because internationalization 73ch papers No. 124a, ibid., pp. 1239-1242. 44 only would minimize the possible effort by individual countries to control Korean affairs and help adjust any possible rival claims. In no case, the paper concluded, should there be a mandate for the United States alone. The principle as enunciated in these study papers seemed sound and reasonable in view of the fact that it was extremely questionable for the United States to make any commitment beyond that line. But, as will become apparent later, Great Britain and China, each for dif- ferent reasons, had shown little interest in Korea, and the internationalization as hoped by the United States had ended up in a bilateralization between Russia and America. In fact, these study papers failed to envisage that the solution of Korean problems was less in the keeping of an international organization than in a "work- ing agreement" between the powers having special inter- 74 Nor did they cOnsider the ests in this area. possibility that the United States might turn out to be a partner of Soviet Russia in filling the postwar power vacuum in the Far East. The studies, however, had not progressed far enough to enable the State Department to make any recommendation for decision at the time of the 75 Yalta Conference. The only informal mention regarding 74Tyler Dennet, "In Due Course," Far Eastern Sur- ygy, XIV, No. 1 (January 17, 1945), p. 2. 75F.R., The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 358-36I. 45 Korea at Yalta was on the possible periods of trusteeship for Korea.76 The conferences, and German capitulation height- ened American concern for the political implications of the Russian advance in the Far East in case she joined the Pacific War, and attempts were made by the govern- ment to define the American political objectives in the postwar Far East. The need for obtaining assurance from Soviet Russia regarding the exact implementation of what had been agreed upon at Yalta, and the Soviet demands for occupation of part of the Japanese homeland were 77 With reference to Korea, given serious consideration. the United States seemed especially concerned with plac- ing Korea, with full consent of Russia, under the four- power trusteeship, as manifested in Joseph Grew's memorandum.of May, 1945.78 A careful comparison of the two study papers of early 1944 and Grew's memorandum a year later shows that the American concern in internationalizing Korean 76Ibid., p. 770. Roosevelt said it had taken about fifty years for the people of the Philippines to be prepared for self-government, and in the case of Korea it might be from twenty to thirty years. 77Hopkin's report on his meeting with Stalin on May 28, 1945, as quoted in R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), p. 904. 78Grew's memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy, Sorrestal, dated May 12, 1945. F.R., 1945, VII, pp. 869- 70. 46 problems had shifted from 'America's limited involve- ment in Korea in order to keep herself from taking full responsibility' to the 'involvement in order to curb Russian advance around Korea.’ This was an important turning point and was related to the general trend within the American government regarding Russia at that time. A Briefing Book Paper prepared for the American delegation to the Potsdam.Conference requested that the United States should obtain an agreement among the three powers-~with China's anticipated cooperation-~that they would jointly support whatever measures appeared best adapted to develop in Korea a strong, democratic, and independent nation, and obtain "at least Russian adher- ence to the Cairo declaration regarding Korea."79 The United States Government evidently began to see it very Anecessary to escalate and intensify the effort to bind Soviet Russia to agreements on Korea with a view to ward- ing off any extravagant demands Russia might make in the time to come.80 79F.R., The Conference of Berlin, 1945, I, pp. 310-311. .Also, see a Paper for the guidance of Harriman in talks with Stalin. A special emphasis is given on the structure and function of the international (four powers) organization to be set up in Korea. Ibid., pp. 882-883. 8OSome bases for American suspicion of Russian intentions may have included the following facts: (1) Russian interest in occupying Pusan of south Korea (F.R., The Conferences an: Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 257); (2) possible strong demands by the Soviet union 47 Along with the rising concern about possible political moves on the part of Soviet Russia, more spe- cific studies on the future of Korea were being made in the State Department. The main point was how to ensure a truly international control of postwar Korea where vari- 81 And ous political factors might be intermingled. it was finally narrowed down to some form of interim, international supervisory organization which would take care of Korea's administration either under the authority of the United Nations or independently of it.82 Since the ability of the Koreans to govern them- selves immediately after the liberation still appeared doubtful to the United States, it was recommended to adopt an interim administrative organization in which all four powers would take part jointly. By July 4, 1945, the prospect of a strong Russian position in the postwar Far East had been envisaged so clearly that the in postwar Korea (F.R., The Conference of Berlin, 1945, I, p. 313); (3) the Soviets may attempt to set up a "friendly government" in Korea as they had done in Eastern European countries (ibid., p. 927); (4) Russian concern in ascertaining whether or not the United States is interested in a joint Russo-American operation in Korea (ibid., 11, p. 351). 81F.R., 1945, v1, p. 556f. A report by the Aeting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, dated June 28, 1945. Part III, Chap. 111, A. 82BriefingBook Paper by the State Department, July 4, 1945. F.R., 1945, VII, pp. 311-312. 48 Department of State recommended to the President that there must be Soviet representation in the interim organization regardless of whether or not Russia entered the war against Japan. The Department expected that Russia would be making strong demands for a leading role in Korean affairs and advised that if the Russians made demands that would limit the other powers to only a nominal voice, the United States should designate Korea as a trust area and place it under the authority of the United Nations.83 Despite intensified concern and wariness about the expected Russian move in Korea, the United State government in July was still far from adopting a working policy regarding either the exact function of the interim international organization or its relationship with trusteeship. The possibility of bilateral military occu- pation of Korea was not seriously considered, as is manifested in a recommendation by the State Department. The recommendation suggested three stages for Korean administration: First, Allied military government to be 83F.R R., The Conference of Berlin, 1945, I, p. 313. China had already made it clear to the United States that no matter which army entered Korea, the possible military-civilian administration should be undertaken jointly by the three powers, China, the U.S., and Great Britain, and Soviet Russia if it had entered the war against Japan. See the conversation between Liu Chieh and Ballantine, February 17, 1945, F. R. 1945, V1, p. 1021. 49 established with the completion of military operations in Korea; second, interim international supervisory administration to succeed the Allied.mdlitary government and to function until such time as the Koreans were able to govern themselves; and third, a free and inde- pendent Korea implying that Korea should be completely free and independent following the termination of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea.84 But no clarification was made in the recommendation as to hOW'the interim administration and the four-power trusteeship were related. To add to the confusion, the President's Chief of Staff William Leahy recommended to President Truman that a four-power trusteeship be established right upon the defeat of Japan for so long a time as necessary for Korea to demonstrate its capacity to govern itself as a 85 free and independent sovereign state. A trusteeship for Korea by the four Allied powers independent of the united Nations was, as Stalin and Molotov put it, an unusual arrangement with no parallel" and the Russians 84F.R., The Conference of Berlin, 1945, I, p. 314. 85Ibid., pp. 314-315. Also, see Secretary of War Stimson's memorandum.for the President (July 16, 1945) which shows that he understood that an inter- national trusteeship was agreed upon for Korea right after the Japanese capitulation. Ibid., II, p. 631. 50 were worried about its implementation without first arriving at "a detailed understanding" among the four powers.86 Despite the agreement on trusteeship, the American government had no clear idea of concrete imple- mentation of trusteeship in the face of urgent military needs and the lack of detailed discussions with other Allied powers. This proved frightfully costly for the Koreans when the American troops came to Korea unpre- pared for a new situation caused by Japanese surrender that came unexpectedly earlier. The Koreans had not maintained a good relation- ship with the Japanese ever since the l7th century, and naturally, they were greatly delighted when the Pacific War broke out. Their confidence in American power was almost fanatic, and they were convinced that the war would end in the destruction of Japan, which meant an opportunity for Korea to regain independence. The Government-in-exile immediately presented a cabled declaration of intent to do everything it could to assist the United States in defeating the Japanese.87 No one, not even the Koreans themselves, however, would 86T. V. Soong's conversation with Stalin and Molotov on June 30, 1945, as reported to President Tru- men by Harriman. Truman, Years of Decisions (New York, 1955). p. 316. 87 Oliver, S. Rhee, p. 175. 51 have thought that they could make any quantitatively significant contribution, given the situation. The American government on its part never quite neglected the war potentiality of the Koreans. The former American Consul General in Seoul reported in August 1942 that the national spirit was always there among the Koreans and that it needed to be rekindled along practical lines.88 He, however, added cautiously that in view of Japanese suppression, any hasty uprising would only hurt the Koreans who had had no chance of being organized into revolutionary activities in Korea. In no case, he insisted, should the Koreans be made the "scapegoat of premature endeavors" as they were in 1919. A similar view was presented at the request of the State Department by Dr. Horace H. underwood, a renowned life- long Christian missionary in Korea. He was pessimistic concerning any effective hostile action by the Koreans in Korea but suggested that any well-sponsored and well- supported activity started from outside might have some chance of success in the light of anti-Japanese spirit among the Koreans.89 88033 R&A, No. 20862 (August 15, 1942).» Areport by Harold B. Quarton, the former American Consul General in Seoul, Korea, to the State Department. 89Ibid., Horace H. Underwood to Mr. Quarton, August 15, 1942. 52 As the war progressed, the Korean people were more opposed to their Japanese taskmasters and there always existed the possibility that if well handled there could be reborn a line of definite action looking to the establishment of national independence. But the question was whether an uprising was worth risking within Korea. Had not the armed resistance movements been driven out of Korea long ago? Given the situation, any chance of making a con- tribution to the Allied war effort had to be formed and nurtured outside Korea. In October, 1942, a Korean resi- dent in the United States, Ilhan New, published a small book entitled The Other Ally of the Orient, in which he made a strong and persuasive point that Koreans overseas, under the guidance of the Korean Provisional Government, must be given material means by the Allies to fight the Japanese in order that Korea could fulfill its share in the war.90 Following enunciation of the detailed plans of contribution the Koreans could make, the author empha- sized as the justifiable reasons for such material aids that "a people who have fought, suffered, and have won their own right to liberty would be better prepared" to set up a government of their own. They would "know the 90The text, together with critical notes by the Office of Strategic Services, is found in 088 R&A No. 35772 (May 8, l9 3). 53 price of freedom" and would more diligently apply them- selves to maintain it. If Korea's freedom came as the result of United Nations' victory in which the Korean Army had no great part, Korea would be grateful but the country would probably be occupied for a time at least by the conquering armies, which might even unintentionally deter the speedy rehabilitation of Korea. New was also worried that such military occupation would intensify rather than reduce a chance of power struggle around Korea. This book attracted the attention’ng came to Pydngyang in early September, PP- ‘ - 80 As soon as the Russians came to Korea, they disbanded by force the indigenous self-rule committees and replaced them with people's political committees 47 Many of those who came to dominated by Communists. control the committees were core members of the two Korean Communist divisions who had hitherto worked 48 The Soviets, thus, had a Korean behind the scene. core group of support trained and backed by them. The Americans in the south had neither such a supporting group nor well-defined programs in their zone. The south Koreans grew more impatient with America's lack of social and economic plans. Non-Communists were uneasy because they believed that the north Korean Communists and the Soviet occupation authorities were attempting to draw popular support by promising them far-reaching social and economic reforms. They felt that placing full trust in the American occupation authorities was unjustifiable unless the commander showed them clearly where Korea was going, which, unfortunately, was a matter quite impossible for General Hodge to do at that time due to lack of information. The gap between 47A confidential later dated September 26, 1945, from two Presbyterian pastors in Sinfiichu, Revs. Youn, Ha-Young, and Han, Kyung-Chik, to the Headquarters of the Allied Forces through an American chaplain, Lowe. OSS XL 26109. 48Ch'ang-Sun Kim, Y5ksa-ui Chfing-in (A Witness of History) (Seoul, 1956), p. 36. 81 the primary American mission which was basically 'tech- nical' and the political aspiration of the Korean people was getting wider. It was not only those non-Communist Koreans who were uneasy and frustrated; the Americans who were really concerned about Korea felt no less so. The political adviser in Japan, George Atcheson, for instance, saw it as strongly advisable for the State Department to con- sider the use of some progressive, popular and respected leaders, or small groups, to act as a nucleus of Korean politics. Even though giving open and offical support to any one leader or group or combination was contrary to past American thinking, "the present situation in Koreaf'he insisted, "fully warrants such a step."49 Unless positive actions in this line were taken, America's difficulties, he feared, would increase rather than decrease and would let the Russians have a fertile field to work on in the American zone. Attempts to negotiate with the Soviet Headquar- ters in an effort to mitigate the immediate hardships resulting from the zonal division were futile. The Rus- sians not only declined the proposal for negotiations but also instructed the Soviet liaison detachment in 49Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, October 15, 1945. F.R., 1945, VI, Pp. 1091-1092. 82 Seoul to withdraw and informed the American authorities that they would not accept an American detachment in 50 Thereupon, General Hodge recommended to Pangyang. the Joint Chiefs of Staff a contact on a higher level. Such contact, however, was never realized before the Conference of the Foreign Ministers in Mbscow in December. Confusion, dissatisfaction, and frustration were everywhere. The non-Communist Koreans thought that chances for independence were growing more remote and that no clear prospect of Korea's future was within sight. The inadequately prepared American authorities in Korea had often been sandwiched hopelessly between the Koreans of various political colors and frequently had been made scapegoats by their own government. The American Mili- tary Government, as Hodge confessed, was rapidly losing popularity and support among the Koreans. The united States government was increasingly worried about the fast deteriorating situation in Korea. By this time, the United States government realized that the General order No. 1 for occupying Japan which initially was to be applied to Korea mutatis mutandis had adversely affected the American position 50General Hodge's report to the JCS, October 11, 1945. Ibid., pp. 1071-1072. 83 there.51 Despite the directives, many Americans in the Military Government were uneasy because they felt that America's Korean policy had been "predicated solely on Russian cooperation with no planning beyond this "52 premise. It was even suggested that it might be more realistic to "by-pass trusteeship" and seek Russian guar- antees in establishing a Governing Commission.53 This uneasiness was confirmed by the Assistant Secretary of State John J. McCloy who visited Korea in November. McCloy was especially critical of John C. Vincent whose memorandum as the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to Colonel Russel R. Vittrup disclosed the grave misconception and confusion that existed in the State Department regarding Korea. Ignoring what had hitherto been experienced, analyzed, and recommended by the personnel on the spot, Vincent wrote to Hodge to refrain from giving support to particular Koreans or groups of Koreans because such action ”might complicate the political problems facing the Military Government" and "would encourage the Soviet commander to sponsor a similar group in his zone,‘ which would postpone a uni- fied Korea. He seemed quite unaware that the Soviets 51 52Political Adviser Langdon to the Secretary of State, Dec. 11, 1945. Ibid., p. 1141. 53 Ibid., p. 1041. Ibid. 84 had already begun supporting Communists and suppressed through them non-Communists dissenters long before. Furthermore, Vincent stated in the same memorandum that the trusteeship system would be under the United Nations Organization, which was not correct. The trusteeship was to be lodged in the four powers, according to the American plan.54 Against this unrealistic appraisal of the Korean situation, McCloy made a strong point that future Ameri- can policy for south Korea would have to take into con- sideration the irreversible fact that the Soviets had continuously refused to cooperate in solving the problem of a divided Korea in which there was absolutely no intercourse or cooperation between the two zones. A more realistic consideration had to be given to such factors as the seriousness of non-cooperation of the most pro-American rightists with the Military Government, the effect of north Korean Communist solidification upon south Korea, and the Soviet refusal of cooperation on the local level.55 This analysis at a high level in the American government had a point but came too late. By the eve of the Moscow Conference, the commander of the American 541bid., pp. 1113-1114. Memorandum of Nov. 7, 1945. 55John J. McCloy's letter to Atcheson, Nov. 13, 1945. Ibid., pp. 1123-1124. 85 occupation forces had grown so frustrated because of the long and costly drift in Korea that he even recom- mended "simultaneous withdrawal" of both Soviet and American troops from Korea, "leaving her to its own devices." This was seemingly an irresponsible alterna- tive after four months' artificial division of a country, having driven it into unsurmountable difficulties in its national life. But in Hodge's judgment it appeared in the American interest to put an end to the Korean policy that had "drifted to the edge of a political-economic abyss" than to continue the inaction that was making the American position in Korea more untenable and reducing further the already waning popularity of the Military 56 The confusion and drift since the end of Government. the war was unfortunate for the United States because Korea was, in George McCune's words, "proving to be [a] testing ground of American postwar policy."57 The American Military Government was doomed to failure. Poor preparation, manifold and unfamiliar duties to which it was not oriented, lack of competent personnel, non-cooperation of influential Koreans, the 56Hodge's letter to JCS, Dec. 16, 1945. Ibid., pp. 1144-148. 57McCune, "Occupation Politics in Korea." The author was in charge of Korean affairs in the Office of the Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department. 86 situation created by the 38th parallel, poor understand- ing of Korean background and their psychology, all contributed adversely to maintaining its prestige and efficacy, as one Military Government member reflected 58 More fundamentally, lack of a well-defined and later. clear policy took a fatal toll. Not only the Korean people but many Americans in Korea were affected by this confusion and drift. For many of them, Korea became known as "the end of the 1ine--a kind of Siberia for "59 And who was entitled to blame these American troops. soldiers who were isolated from the prevalent trends of demobilization at home and engulfed with bitter experi- ences in Korea, even not knowing why they were there? Political confusion in south Korea was also a product of what the Japanese authorities in Korea had done just before capitulation. On August 14, the Japa- nese Civil Governor Ryfi3akufiEndU decided to invite three most prominent Koreans to consult concerning the transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of order after Japanese surrender. The first of them, Song, Chin-WOO, rejected the offer on the ground that he saw no reason 58For more details, see Bertram D. Sarafan, "Milita Government: Korea," Far Eastern Survgy, XV, No. 23 Nov. 20, 1946), pp. 349-351. 59Richard E. Lauterbach, Danger From the East (New York, 1947), pp. 223-225. 87 to act for the Japanese when the legality of such a request by the defeated Japanese was questionable. To him, the Korean Government-in-exile was the only legiti- mate organization, if any, to assume the responsibility of helping the U.S. occupational forces in maintaining order in Korea. So, the assignment fell upon Y6, Un-Hyéng, who accepted it and with it began his colorful yet wavering political career. His supporters labeled him as a demo- cratic socialist, and excused him for his having closely associated with the Communists as an inevitable step to achieve a unified Korea. To his opponents, however, he appeared a mere opportunist who shifted between various spectra of political thought and groups but always hoping to achieve his personal ambition. Both views may have a certain measure of truth.60 Y6 moved swiftly and with the help of Ahn, Chae- Hong, established Kbnkuk Chunpi Wiwbn-Hoe (Preparatory Committee for Nation Building) on August 15. By the end of August, 1945, local branch committees had been report- edly organized in south and north Korea, and these posed as the main body for the future Korean government. Two days before the arrival of the American occupational 6OAbout Yo's political affiliation, see Scala- pino and Lee, Communism of Korea, Part I, pp. 233-235. 88 troops, the Committee proclaimed the inauguration of the Korean People's Republic. Names of the leaders of the Korean Provisional Government, who at that time were still thousands of miles from Korea, were included in the People's Congress. But the Republic was launched explicitly so as to assure the hegemony of the Committee in the future Korean government and to exclude other rightist groups. The Central Committee of the People's Republic was dominated numerically by the Communists although it was not so on the local level.61 In many cases, these local committees were controlled by the moderates who were well known and influential in their respective localities. But Communist tactics of infiltration and propaganda were soon effective and by late September, the local committees also came under the control of the Communists and, to a lesser degree, leftists.62 The majority of rightists boycotted the People's Republic from the beginning, and those rightists who took part in the initial stage of the Republic departed from it by the end of September. 61Il-de Pak, Namno-dangCh'ong Pipian (General Criticism of the South Korea La56r Party) (Seoul, 1948), p. 34, as quoted in Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., p. 239. 62Mead, Military Government, pp. 55-57. His description is on the situation in Chblla-Namdo Province. 89 Words such as rightist, leftist, moderate, Com- munist, revolutionary, and conservative, came into use as soon as Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism. They, however, carried a very loose definition and were used loosely. The only major dividing line was the extent of inclination toward the two social systems represented by the united States and Soviet Russia. The Communists endeavored to establish in Korea a social system patterned after that of the Soviet Union, while the rightists favored a Western democratic, capitalistic social system. These two groups represented the two extreme wings. Many leftists were not Communists. They did not necessarily desire to sovietize Korea and differed from the rightists in that they preferred revolutionary measures to overthrow the capitalistic social system. The moderates represented almost every spectrum of political thought in a mild way. The rightists strove in essence to conserve the capitalistic system, while the Communists and leftists were committed to destroying it through revolutionary means. The Communists and leftists, while disagreeing as to the correct relation- ship to Soviet Russia, were nevertheless united in most political controversies and in their political, social 90 and.economic programs. Nationalism was not the monopoly of any one of these groups.63 Before the war, the Japanese used to brand all anti-Japanese as Communists or pro-Communists. This was done to give the Koreans an impression that these Com- munists were breakers of law and order. Undeniably, Communists and leftists actively participated in what the Japanese called "Red bandits" guerrilla movements in Manchuria, but Japan in effect plantedzuiincorrect impression among the Korean people that the resistance was all Communist. When Korea was liberated, the Korean masses looked upon the resistance leaders as heroes.64 A handful of genuine Communists and leftists were quick to exploit the general emotional trends of the common people.65 They magnified what they had contributed to the liberation of their fatherland and strove to impress the masses that they were the only ones who deserved the leading role in a new Korea. Any argument that postwar Korea was "unmistakably . . . pointing . 63Chong-Tang Sa, pp. 75-146, 511-598. 64About the Communist partisans' activities, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Part 1, Chap. 111. 65Kolko and Kolko, Limits of Power, p. 277. The Kolkos say that the leftists controlled the resist- ance (as Japan alleged) and had a "mass base." This is incorrect, for the support by the Korean masses was given regardless of right or left as long as they were resistant. 91 toward a leftist government" was a purely superficial observation even though it can hardly be denied that there was a fertile soil for the Communists and left- ists.66 General Hodge was told not to give recognition to any Korean group as having governmental authority and to treat all parties impartially. The People's Republic refused to abandon its claim as a government. Therefore, Hodge declared on October 25 that the Mili- tary Government was the only government in Korea, and again in December warned sternly that activities of any political organization in any attempted operations as a government were to be treated as "unlawful" activities.67 But America's traditional attitude of withhold- ing recognition of any particular Korean leader or group was not the sole reason for denouncing the so- called People's Republic. The People's Republic, with the support of leftists and Communists, caused consider- able trouble from the point of view of the Americans. The trouble caused by them, under the guise of being the government, eclipsed other more pressing problems 66McCune, "Occupation Politics"; also, Richard J. H. Johnston, in the New York Times, Jan. 5, 1946, and Gordon Walker in Christian Sciénce MOnitor, Jan. 3, 1946. 67U.S. Military Government, Chukan Digest, No. 2 (Oct. 25, 1945), as quoted in McCune, Korea Today, p. 48. 92 68 General Hodge had been like economic hardships. receiving reports from non-Communist sources of north Korea, including the great right-wing nationalist leader, Cho, Man-Shik, about the danger of Communist activities in Korea and complained that "lack of clear- cut policy" and America's occupation policy of "ensuring freedom" were contributing to turn Korea into a "fertile land for Communism."69 In addition to the flow of personnel and funds from north Korea into the south, there was also evidence, according to the Military Government, that the Russian Consul General was assisting the Korean Communists in the People's Republic, working behind the scenes in apparent attempts to discredit the United States and its occupation policies in the eyes of the Koreans. The Military government's distrust of the People's Republic as a Communist-controlled organization was, thus, another important reason for not recognizing it, and such dis- trust was deepened undeniably by the rightists' attack 70 on the Republic. The State Department, however, 68A letter from MacArthur to the Department of War, Oct. 24, 1945, No. CA53789, CCS 381.21 Korea, Section 12. 69E;E;. 1945, VI. pp. 1145-1146. 7OHodge's letter to MacArthur, Oct. 12, 1945. Ibid., p. 1073. 93 was less pessimistic about Communist threats in south Korea.71 The vacuum that existed between Japanese sur- render and landing of the American occupation troops caused confusion among the Koreans. The People's Republic owed its existence almost entirely to this vacuum. It enjoyed every benefit of this vacuum: The endless aspiration of the Korean people for independ- ence after Japan's collapse; heightened emotional response to such a moving scene as freeing of political prisoners; virtually unrestricted participation in political and social movements with a feeling that at last they became the master of their own life; and above all, non-existence of central administrative authorities. As referred to in the foregoing chapter, the Korean Provisional Government that was established in 1919 in Shanghai, China, had never been warmly received by the United States. Upon Japanese capitulation, an advance group of the Government flew to Korea on Aug- ust 18 but was refused the right to land by the Japanese. Since then, there had been no official contact between the Provisional Government and the American Military Government. The Provisional Government was especially concerned over political activities in the Soviet zone. 7121-33..-. 1946. VIII. pp. 613-614. 94 1 Fear of Communist activities was further intensified by a broadcast of Pak, Yun-Kom, president of the Korean College in Yenan, in which he said that they aimed at setting up a government in Korea according to Communist 72 The Chinese Government also expressed concern ideals. over the reports that Soviet Russia was organizing or sponsoring Communistic governmental groups in the Soviet occupied zone. Chiang Kai-shek suggested that it would be advisable to fly members of the Korean Provisional Government to Korea, and that if the United States recog- nized the Korean Provisional Government, China would be glad to follow it.73 The leaders of the Provisional Government had to return to Korea on an individual basis long after the Communists were brought into north Korea by the Soviets. Syngman Rhee returned on October 16. Kim, 19; and other leaders returned on November 23, and others only on December 2. They made official statements that they returned home not as members of the Exiled-Government but as Korean citizens. Especially Kim, 10; made it clear in a press interview on November 24 that since there had been an American Military Government in south 72Pauley's letter to the Secretary of State, August 31, 1945. F.R., 1945, V1, p. 1042. The broad- cast was sometime Between August 15 and 31, 1945. 73Robertson, the Charge in China, to the Secretary of State, Sept. 25, 1945. Ibid., p. 1057. 95 Korea, the Korean Provisional Government would not assume 74 They soon began partici- the function of a government. pating in south Korean politics in an individual capacity. Thus, south Korea began its political life with two claimants for governmental authority: the American Military Government and the People's Republic. But as it became clear that the Military Government had no intention to accord recognition to the People's Republic, the leftists under Y5, Un-Hyong's leadership departed from the Republic on November 20 to form the Korean People's Party. In north Korea, there was no military government, and no surfacial political disorder accord- ing to reports of observers. Communist-controlled People's Committees established themselves firmly in that society as the ruling political power. In the incipient stage, the Military Government favored the rightists simply because they did not chal- lenge the authority of the Military Government. But as the situation deteriorated the rightists became more outspoken in their critical attitude toward the four powers and especially the United States. They were especially bitter about the partition of Korea by the 74Kim's press conference, Nov. 24, 1945, at Chuk-Ch'om.Chang residence. Haebang Ishim-nyon, Docu- ment Section (Seoul, 1965), p. 275. 96 big powers and the decision by them to place Korea under a joint trusteeship. They resented the way Korea was treated as a conquered enemy and asserted that with qualified foreign advisers, technicians, and appropri- ate material aid Koreans could bring their house into order. The idea of trusteeship was blasted as the result of vicious Japanese propaganda in which Korea had been depicted as unable to govern itself.7S Korean rightists envisaged rightly that the trusteeship would invariably divide up the Koreans and make unification impossible. They asserted that Article 73 of the United Nations Charter was intended for uncivilized colonial people while Korea was one of the most civilized nations in Asia. Political weakness could not be the reason to deny an immediate self- government. "Koreans are as capable of governing them- selves on their level as the Americans are . Naturally, they will have difficulties. But there is no reason to suppose that they will not run an honest or efficient government," observed a Christian missionary who had spent his whole life among the Korean people.76 75Address to the four Allied Powers by the United Central Council (Syngman Rhee, chairman), Nov. 4, 1945. F.R., 1945, VI, pp. 1110-1111. 76Edgar Snow, "We meet Russia in Korea," Satur- day Evening Post (March 30, 1946). P. 19. 97 Return of the leaders of the Exiled-Government seemed to have restored balance between the rightists and the leftists in south Korea. They persistently demanded withdrawal of the Red Army on the ground that it had been viciously hindering political and economic unification and freedom of communication within the Korean peninsula,77 thus making their anti-Communist attitude crystal clear. Their weakness, however, lay in that they were divided hopelessly among themselves. Hundreds of political parties and social organizations sprouted, each with high-sounding principles and exag- gerated claims as to membership. But whether Right or Left, they were miraculously united in denouncing trusteeship because trusteeship was for the Koreans tantamount to denying independence. The American government was slow to perceive the nature of Korean politics. lnzpersisted in adher- ing to the idea of trusteeship despite the clear fact that most Koreans were vehemently Opposed to it. It was still taking issue with the factional strife in Korean politics, but Hodge had made an important and essential point that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, ever to achieve unity until Koreans could see the present 38th parallel barrier removed. 77Resolution of the Korean Congress held on Nov. 4, 1945. F.R., 1945, VI, pp. 1115-1117. 98 "Every day of delay," he stressed, "fosters further and "78 Koreans were fully permanent division of the people. aware that under dual occupation, any talk of real freedom and independence was purely academic. As a Korean put it: "Best of all for us would be no occupation at all . . . . The next best thing would be the occupation by one power only--preferably American. But better Russia alone than our country torn in two."79 The American government failed to give due atten- tion to the sentiments of the Korean people. The Koreans were "impatient of spoon feeding, conscious of independ— "80 Only by taking these ence and eager to exercise it. conditions into serious consideration could the situ- ation be kept in hand, conflict avoided, and cooperation obtained. As the political adviser Langdon properly put it, "fulfillment of Korean aspirations as they feel them and not as we think they should be" was essential to the O O O 81 success of America's mi331on in Korea. 78Hodge's report to the JCS, Dec. 16, 1945. Ibid., p. 1145. 79Snow, op. cit., p. 18. Conversation with a siXty-year-old Mayor of Songdo City. 8OLangdon to the Secretary of State, Dec. 11, 1945. F.R., 1945, V1, p. 1140. 81Langdon to the Secretary of State, Dec. 14, 1945. Ibid., p. 1143. 99 No less a vital factor was America's indiffer- ence to the political psychology of the Korean people. Koreans had little tradition of struggle for civil rights, experiences in representative government or institutionalized politics which are some of the basic assumptions of a democratic society. Since they had lived as the same race, used the same language, had the same culture, and followed the same pattern of life, they were not oriented to the values of a pluralistic society, such as tolerance toward dissenters and solution of problems through negotiations, as practiced in Western society between different political, ethnic or cultural groups. In short, they had experienced no 82 This tradi- social pluralism in their long history. tion greatly discounted the significance of well-defined, well-functioning institutions in their political life. 'Person,’ and not 'institution, was always at the cen- ter of politics. America's hasty attempts to impose a Western political system upon the Koreans created more confusion than stability. The American Military Government failed to main- tain good relationships with either of the three main political groups: the Communists who challenged the 82For analysis of traditional Korean society, see David I. Steinberg, Korea: Nexus of East Asia (New York, 1968), p. 9f. 100 very existence of the Military Government under Russian influence, the leftists who were generally critical of the Military Government but had not ruled out the chance for compromise with it, and the rightists who generally supported the Military Government not because of its programs in Korea but because of their expectation that it would support them in their pro-American, pro-Western, and pro-capitalistic programs. The first impression the Red Army strove to cre- ate among the Koreans was that they were "the liberator." The Red Army received a hearty welcome because they were a member of'the Allies. With the American troops still hundreds of miles away the Red Army was in a most favor- able situation to usurp the glory that belonged to the other. So they became "the liberator."83 Russian presses were filled with triumphant stories of the Red Army in the Far East. Pravda editori- alized that "Dark days [are gone] . . . fresh breeze blows . . . [and] a new epoch is beginning in the Pacific."84 Even Secretary of State James Byrnes was 83Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democratic Peo- ple's Republic of Korea, Memorandum of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (Tokyo, 1962), p. 7. 84Pravda's editorial as quoted in Kennan's memo- randum to the Secretary of State, No. 3420, Oct. 1, 1945. State Department File, 740.00119 P.W./10-145. 101 compelled to witness the Soviet effort to offset any weakness in the Russian image as a victor. He was shown a Russian movie at the dinner party after the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers, which pictured "Japan's preparation for war as being directed only against Russia" and the scene of surrender ceremonies on the Missouri gave an impression that the war was "a pri- vate war between Russia andJapan."85 But the prestige and welcome was short-lived. General Ivan Chistyakov and his quarter million men pro- voked fear and resentment among the Koreans before long. They demanded a large supply of food. The discipline and moral standard of the army was low, as they were in Germany after the end of the war. Looting and raping were common. A Presbyterian Theological Seminary pro- fessor in W6nsan city wrote to Hodge that there was "no freedom," "no emancipation" in north Korea. The Russians stripped machines and shipped them to their country. Use of radio, correspondence, mail and press had been forbid- den since the Russian army landed in W5nsan on August 20. Travel without Russian approval was prohibited and the practice of Korean Communists in arresting and imprison- ing people without making specific charges horrified 85Byrnes, Speakinngrankly, p. 213. 102 innocent Koreans.86 A very similar situation was reported from Songdo by the Rev. Kwan-Shik Kim, the then Moderator of the United Church of Korea.87 Political development in north Korea was strongly influenced by Cho, Man-Shik, the most respected non- Communist leader who was well known for his commitment to nationalism in north Korea. He set out, upon Japa- nese capitulation, to organize a security maintenance committee for South Pyongan Province in which Pyongyang was located. It was reorganized into a Preparatory Com- mittee for Nation Building to keep pace with south Korea. All the north Korean provinces followed the example in organizing security maintenance committees. These security maintenance committees were forced to be reor- ganized into Communist-controlled "peOple's political committees" by the Russians. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko have asserted that the Russian troops in north Korea "accepted the revolutionary people's committee" and placed "most administrative func- tions in their hands" by August 25, and "encouraged them to proceed with their program of expropriating the 86A letter by Professor Lee, Kyu-Young, Septem- ber 27, 1945. OSS R&A XL 26109. 87A letter to General MacArthur, September 24, 1945, ibid. 103 88 But this property of the Japanese and collaborators." does not fit the facts. The Russian troops did not reach Pyongyang until August 24. As soon as they came, they took a hand behind the scenes in reorganizing the indigenous security maintenance committee in which non- Comm1mists far outnumbered the Communists. General Chistyakov, head of the Soviet 25th Army and the Supreme Commander in Korea, ordered Cho and other nationalists "to take directive from the Communist Party on matters "89 The popularity relating to the provincial government. of Communists was not comparable to that of Cho and other nationalist leaders, and the Soviet authorities, fully aware of this, were determined to strengthen the Commu- nist Party. The Soviet occupation authorities reorganized the various northern branches of the Seoul-based Prepara- tory Committee for Nation Building into so-called people's committees and thereby enhanced greatly the 90 Communist representation in those organizations. The Soviet authorities did not accept the indigenous com- mittees as they existed, as asserted by the Kolkos, but 88 89For details, see Yang—Chin O, Hana-fii Chungjbn (A.Witness) (Pusan, 1952), pp. 111-114. This witness coincides with the reports contained in OSS R&A XL 26109, September, 1945. . 90For example in Hwang-Hae Province; see Scala- pino and Lee, op. cit., p. 317. Kolko and Kolko, Limits of Power, pp. 279-280. 104 set out to reorganize the indigenous committees and then gave to these communized people's committees the admin- istrative function to the exclusion of non-Communists. Similar developments occurred in the city of Sinfiichu, where the leading people organized a self-rule council on the day after the Japanese surrender to maintain order. Then, a sudden change came about as the Russian troops entered the city on August 30. The com- manding officer ordered the council to disband and then reorganized it as a so-called People's Political Com- mittee, in which a small number of Communists were given the dominant role although there were proportionately very few native Communists in the city at that time. As soon as the Japanese were disarmed, the arms were given to the Communists. A few days later the Communist Party was publicly organized and set out to monopolize the radio station and newspapers, while the dissenting Social Democratic Party's existence was threatened.91 The Communist Party in north Korea was organized from the beginning as a body to assume power. In other words, they assumed power through the aid of the Soviet occupation authorities and not through revolution aided by mass mobilization. Many of these Communists had no 91OSS R&A XL 26109. Both reporters were the vice-chairmen of the Social Democratic Party at the time of report. 105 experience with the painstaking job of revolution. This explains why later the north Korean regime had to undergo "purification" and "purges." The first step of reorganizing the predominantly non-Communist security committee into a Communist-dominated peOple's committee was completed speedily. But their pOpularity among the general population was low. The Soviets and the Korean Communists now proceeded to another stage of consoli- dating their control over north Korea. On October 12, three official statements were 92 The proclaimed by the Soviet military authorities. first one was entitled "the proclamation of General Chistyakov," in which he reminded the Koreans of the suppression by the Japanese and emphasized the new hope brought to Koreans by the liberator. "The Red Army," he said, "provided Koreans with every condition to set out for free and creative efforts. Merchants, entrepreneurs and factory owners! Set out at once to reconstruct the factory that the Japanese destroyed!" The proclamation sounded as if free enterprise would be allowed in north Korea. The Russians understood that nothing was more alien to the Koreans than denying the 92Ch'ang-Sun Kim, Witness of History, pp. 21-33, translation is mine; also, see Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., p. 331. 106 right of personal property and attempted to give the impression that free enterprise would be allowed.93 A second statement was entitled "For what purpose did the Red Army come to your country?" This sought to offset the bad impression that the Red Army had created among the Koreans. It said that the great Red Army had never used its power in conquering other nations. "Soviet Russia," it stated, "had no ambition whatever of occupying other's territory." It specifically ruled out the possibility or intention that Soviet Russia would attempt to establish a Soviet system in Korea or acquire its territory. The third one was entitled an "Order of the Com- mander of the 25th Soviet Army in North Korea." This order required registration of all anti-Japanese parties and democratic organizations with the Russian authorities. All the officers and members of parties and organizations were required to report their family background up to the two preceding generations, together with each member's 94 Through these mea- biography since the age of eight. sures the Soviet authorities could effectuate a highly regimented, Communist-controlled society under Kim, Il- Sbng's leadership. An iron curtain had already fallen 93Ch'ang-Sun Kim, Witness, p. 23f. 94 Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., p. 332. 107 along the 38th parallel and all the coastal line of north Korea,95 and by the end of October they were well on their way to establishing a separate state of north Korea by organizing the Five-Province Administrative Bureau. Soviet tutelage was the decisive factor for a rapid consolidation of the Communists in north Korea. But another factor was those Koreans who had been indoc- trinated in Russia and who entered Korea as a part of the regular Soviet Army. Many of them had been trained as "able leaders both for military and political affairs' in postwar Korea.96 And the nucleus of that force was the so-called Kim, Il-Song Unit which had come into being just before the entry into Korea.97 By October those native Communists who had engaged in underground 95See the conversation between Kim, Ch'ang-Sun, and Kim, Yong-Su, a high-ranking administrator in the Romanenko Headquarters. Ch'ang-Sun Kim, Witness, p. 27. 96Chos'on Minchu—chui Inmin Konghwa-Kuk, Kwahak- Won, Yoksa Yonku-So (Institute of Historical Research, Academy of Science, Korean Democratic People's Republic), ed., Choan Kfindae Hyongmyéng Undong-Sa (History of Modern Korean Revolutionary Movement). Japanese trans- lation, by Shin Nippon Shuppan Sha (Tokyo, 1964), p. 424. 97For the falsified Kim, Il-Song Unit, see Ch'ang-Sun Kim, Witness, pp. 36-47. An interesting yet undocumented story of how Kim, Il-Song was related to the Russian Army during the Pacific war is given in Motoi Tamaki, Kin-nichisei-no Siso-to-Kodo (Thought and Behavior of Kim, Il-Song)_(Tokyo, 1968), pp. 45-46. 108 resistance within Korea enjoyed nominal leadership only. The last big and powerful group of Communists, the Yenan group, was also brought under Kim's control without much difficulty.98 In late 1944, the Koreans operating in the Eighth Route Army bases had been organized into the Korean Independence League, the Korean Volunteer Army, and the Korean Revolutionary Military and Political School. They had been engaged in the psychological warfare work 99 After the libera- of the Chinese Eighth Route Army. tion and the 30,000 Russian-trained Korean Communists had entered north Korea, this Yenan group belatedly made their way to Korea in early November. Their political leaders had already been in north Korea. The 2,000 Korean Volunteer Army, however, was completely manipula- ted by the Russian—trained Communists with direct inter- vention of General Bankowsky of the Soviet occupation army and on the first night in Korea they were disarmed and made defunct as a military group.100 98Kim, Il-Song's rise to power owes, among others, essentially to Soviet tutelage. See Scalapino and Lee, 0p. cit., p. 323f. The misjudgment, miscomprehension, and misinterpretation of the political development of liberated Korea on the part of old Communists also played an important role in Kim's rise. See Suh, Korean Commu- nist, p. 325. 99053 R&A 117112. Yenan Report #33 (Dec. 28, 1944). 100For details, see Ch'ang-Sun Kim, Witness, pp. 48-61. 109 According to occupation regulations, no armed forces were to enter Korea except Russian and American occupation troops. This was one of the reasons that the American occupation authorities did not permit the entry of the Korean Restoration Army of Chungking. The Yenan Volunteer Army was reportedly disarmed for the same reason. But more than 30,000 Korean Communist armed forces entered Korea under the disguise of Soviet regular army and set out quickly to take control of north Korean society with the open support of the Rus— sian authorities. As the Communists themselves admitted later, they were "favored from the beginning by the conditions created by the Russian occupation army” and set out to "establish a revolutionary democratic base in north Korea."101 In the meantime, frequent reports about the Soviet conduct in north Korea reached the American occu- pation authorities. An Australian representative to the survey team of American prisoners camps in north Korea observed that the Korean Communists were taking advantage of the advent of the Russians to further their own end. 101Chokuk T'ong-il Minchu-chui Choson Chung-ang Samgmu Wiwon-hoe, Sbnchon-kuk (Propaganda Bureau, Cen- tral Standing Committee of Democratic Front for National Unification), Minchu Konkuk-e isoso Puk-Choson Minchon-fii Y6k-hal (The Role of North Korean People's Front in Democratic Building of Fatherland) (Pyongyang, 1949), p. 1; also, Soryon-fin (Soviet Russia is.), pp. 7, 10. 110 "The excesses of the Russians," he remarked, ”were .bringing the Japanese and Koreans together for the first time in 40 years."102 Industrial stripping by the Soviets was done on a purely unilateral basis. There had been no agreement between the two occupation powers regarding reparations from Korea. Korea was not a defeated country, yet the 103 Russians helped themselves to reparations. General MacArthur was increasingly concerned over the develop- ments in north Korea and called for a strong represen- tation" to the Soviet government to "desist” from such 104 practices. This brought an instant reaction from the American government. President Truman decided to send 105 and W. A. Edward Pauley for a first-hand inspection, Harriman, at the request of Secretary Byrnes, made the representation of the case to Andrew Vyshinsky, asking the Soviet government whether it would authorize the Soviet commander in Korea to negotiate with General 102As quoted in the memorandum of Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, to Acheson, Under-Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1945. F.R., 1945, VI, pp. 1066-1067. 103Byrnes' memorandum to Harriman, Nov. 7, 1945, ibid., pp. 1112-1113; also, see Hodge's report to the State Department, ibid., pp. 1149-1150; also, OSS R&A, XL 26109 (215484-2; 215484-10). 10['Forrestal, diary entry for some day in early November, 1945, Diary, p. 107. 105Truman, Years of Decisions, p. 522. 111 Hodge or whether it desired that the problems be dis- 106 Hodge had long been cussed by the two governments. urging that since any collaboration with the Soviet occupation authoritiesseemed quite doubtful, negotiations at the highest level should be convened at once.107 The Soviets kept silence. Russia was probably content to ”concentrate on action, not on debate" until the question of Korea's future was raised by other powers. Their calculation seemed to solidify political consolida- tion in north Korea and politically penetrate as much as possible into south Korea so that by the time the issue of civilian administration was raised, the Soviet ground- work would have been solidly laid.108 The first official response came through the Supreme commander in Korea on November 18 and it was the exact repetition of what had already been said a month ago. Chistyakov was still asserting that the Red Army liberated Korea and that Russia had no intentions of territorial gain or establishment of Soviet system in Korea. There was no response to the questions raised by the American authorities. North Korean Communists 106Harriman's letter to the Secretary of State, Nov. 9, 1945. F.R., 1945, VI, p. 1119. 107Benninghoff's letter to the Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1945, ibid., p. 1066. 108Harriman's letter to the Secretary of State, Nov. 12, 1945, ibid., p. 1121. 112 alleged later that power plants and other important industries were destroyed by the Japanese and that it was Soviet Russia who helped rebuild them.109 Kim, Il-Song had replaced Cho, Man-Shik as the north Korean leader by January 1946, and Cho was placed under house arrest because he did not support the Mos- cow decision on trusteeship. The people of north Korea were forced by the Soviet authorities to declare their unconditional support for the Moscow declaration on 110 The central power of north Korean trusteeship. administration became vested in February in the so-called North Korea Temporary People's Committee, with Kim, Il-Song, as the chairman. It promulgated a land reform law on March 5. As referred to previously, some form of land redistribution was favored by the majority of Korean people. The difference between the rightists on the one hand and the Communists and leftists on the other was that the former preferred confiscation and redistri- bution of lands with compensation while the latter 109 \ 110Lauterbach, Danger, p. 124. For Soviets' attempt to cajole Cho into accepting trusteeship to no avail, see Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., pp. 338-340; also, Ch'ang-Sun Kim, Puk-han, pp. 70-73. Soran-fin (Soviet Russia is.), p. 13. 113 111 Unfortunately, advocated unconditional land reform. the reform was delayed in south Korea mainly because the Military Government held that land reform was to be done under the responsibility of a Korean government. The land reform in north Korea had a great psychological impact upon the south Koreans. But disillusionment made itself gradually mani- fest in north Korea as the peasants came to understand that they had received the right of possession for culti- vation only and not any prOperty title. Lack of property title was quite disillusioning to the prevalent aspira- tion of the Korean peasantry. Furthermore, despite the nominal cut in the tax rate, it was not infrequent that the cultivators had to pay more tax than ever because taxes were allocated on the basis of theoretical produc- 112 tion quotas. Taxes were paid in kind, often reaching as high as fifty percent of the total output.113 Thus, the land reform of north Korea, while badly needed, gave an impression of well—directed propaganda. 111See the political platforms of south Korean political parties, Chbnngang¥Sa, pp. 86-100; also, see the resolution of the Coalition Committee adopted on Oct. 7, 1946, Summation, USAMGIK, No. 13 (Oct., 1946), p. 16. 112David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and Far East (New Haven, 1948), pp. 289-291. 113Ch'61 Pak, Puk-Choson Noson Pip'an (Criticism of North Korean Lines) (Seoul, 1966), p. 56. CHAPTER III INITIAL CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIET RUSSIA America's concern in Korea was almost wholly in terms of Korea's place in keeping the peace and sta- bility of the Far East. Despite the worries and warnings expressed by the Americans on the spot, the United States government hoped to resolve the Korean questions through international cooperation. Having succeeded in stopping the Russian military advance at the 38th parallel, the American government looked to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers as presenting an opportunity to find the clues for the long-awaited political solution in Korea. Ill-preparation for the occupation and the sub- sequent drift had led to difficulties but America hoped that these could be overcome in the forthcoming Con- ference in Moscow. By the time of the Conference, partition of Korea had been so complete that there was virtually no communication between the two economically-dependent yet politically-separated zones. Emotional conflict coupled with political antagonism were already apparent between the two zones and any compromise on the level of the two occupational authorities seemed hopeless. 114 115 For the United States, internationalization of the Korean questions seemed the most inexpensive and face-saving way to relieve itself of the burden, and simultaneously, to prevent Russia's dominant influence in Korea. On the other hand, Soviet Russia, more confi- dent than ever in its Korean policy, saw any agreement including trusteeship as creating no great obstacle to the final victory in Korea. The two nations thus wanted some agreements on Korea but from different stances. Korea had already become a bilateral issue although the four powers could still claim the right to participate in making the final decisions. Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met at Moscow in December, 1945, to discuss the pending problems after the war, and reached an agreement on Korea in an effort to put an end to the divided military occupation and to restore inde- pendence to Korea as soon as practicable. The three Foreign Ministers agreed that since Korea had been under Japanese occupation for more than three decades, she needed some kind of aid and assistance to create the necessary conditions to develOp the country on democratic principles and to liquidate the disastrous remnants of Japanese colonialism. 1F.R., 1945, v1, pp. 1150-1151. But the right had never Been exercised on the four-power level. 116 Three steps were stipulated to implement the decision. The first step was to convene a conference "within a period of two weeks" between the two occupa- tional authorities to solve the urgent economic and administrative problems between the south and north. The second was that the two occupational authorities establish a Joint Commission and, upon consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations, help the Koreans to establish a Korean Provisional Gov- ernment. The last was to work out the measures to aid and assist the Korean Provisional Government including a four-power trusteeship. The first and second provisions coincided with the hopes of Koreans, but the third one, the trusteeship clause, was so subversive of their aspiration of attain- ing full independence that it evoked a storm of protest among them. From the moment agreement to establish the trusteeship was disclosed, not a day paSsed without mass protest, demonstrations, and sabotage.3 Trusteeship, which was translated into Korean Shint'akT'ong-Ch'i which literally means "to entrust sovereignty to others," was for the Koreans tantamount to denial of independence. 21bid. 3For details, see Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea (shortened to Summation, Japan and Korea, hereafter), published by General Head- quarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Nos. 1 through 5, October, 1945,1x3February, 1946. 117 The American authorities in south Korea attempted to silence the Korean protest by employing a liberal interpretation of the word as 'guidance' or 'assistance' but it proved futile because the Koreans thought that they were ready to run an independent nation in their own way. Compulsory assistance in the form of trustee— ship was thought unacceptable. The real problem facing Korea, south Koreans argued, was not a lack of guidance by big powers but the 38th parallel itself that paralyzed their national life in a most unnatural and disastrous way. Soviet Russia made no instant response to the trusteeship question. Initially, the idea of trusteeship for Korea was credited to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Anthony Eden, the then British Foreign Secretary, remarked in his Memoirs4 that President Roosevelt mentioned Korea and Indochina as areas for postwar trusteeship, at a meeting in March, 1943, between the PreSident and him- self. Eden did not like the idea of trusteeship5 per- haps because he "had to think of the British Empire system” in the postwar era.6 Two months later, 4Anthony Eden, Memoirs: The Reckoning (Boston, 1965), p. 438. 51bid., p. 595. 6Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II (New York, 1948), p. 1237. 118 Roosevelt reportedly told Eden that Korea would be placed under the trusteeship of China and other nations.7 At the Cairo and Teherean conferences, the trusteeship had been mentioned among the Allied leaders.8 Roosevelt seemed quite satisfied that Joseph Stalin had specifically agreed that the Koreans were not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a "40-year tutelage."9 However, exchange of opinion regarding the trusteeship on Korea seemed to have been quite informal at least for the United States, and no official reference or documents on the question of trusteeship existed until the time of the Yalta Conference, where Roosevelt told Stalin that he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship com— posed of a Soviet, an American, and a Chinese representa- tive, and that he felt the trusteeship might last from 20-30 years. Stalin was quoted as saying that "the shorter the trusteeship period the better," and that President Roosevelt's idea to forbid stationing of 7 8F.R., 1943 (Cairo and Teheran), p. 257 (with China); p. 864 (with Russia); also, Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 1309-1310. ”‘— 9 Ibid., p. 1596. F.R., 1943 (Cairo and Teheran), p. 869. 119 foreign troops in Korea other than the two occupation troops was acceptable.10 W. A. Harriman, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had remarked later to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that Stalin's first response at Yalta to Roosevelt's proposal of trusteeship for Korea was "why was there need of trusteeship if the Koreans could produce a satisfactory government?” Harriman thought that Stalin had in mind a Bolshevik or Soviet government.11 During the 1937-38 purge, hundreds of thousands of Koreans had been transferred from Siberia to Central Asia and many of them were made Russian citizens and later served in the Red Army. It was not a secret in early 1945 that more than 30,000 Korean Communists were serving in the Red Army during the war, ready to enter Korea at any prOpitious moment. Possibly, Stalin concurred in the trusteeship proposal at Yalta to avoid arousing the suspicions of the United States. In general, Soviet Russia did not go along with either the American or British conception of trusteeship. The Russians favored prompt independ- ence for Korea as late as the San Francisco Conference 101bid., 1945, VII, pp. 309-310. 11Forrestal, Diaries, p. 56. Entry for May 12, 1945. 120 12 They did not deny trusteeship pub- in May, 1945. licly, however. At a meeting with Soviet leaders in late May of 1945, Harry Hopkins brought up the question of trusteeship, saying that the period of trusteeship "might be 25 years, might be less, but it would certainly be five or ten." Stalin agreed to the principle of a four-power trusteeship at this meeting.13 This exchange of opinion and discussions, how- ever, did not proceed any further. Details of imple- mentation remained to be worked out. Harriman suggested to the State Department that before going to Potsdam, preparation should be made, in addition to other main topics, foraidetailed discussion of the character of the 14 But there proposed four-power trusteeship for Korea. was no formal discussion of this matter at Potsdam. Furthermore, the British government had not been even informed officially of the trusteeship plan even after Japanese capitulation.15 Conversations on trustee- ship had been largely on a private and informal basis, which implied that the Korean question had never been 12George Kennan, the then Charge in the Soviet Union, to the Secretary of State. F.R., 1946, VII, p. 619. l3 14 Ibid., 1945 (Conference of Berlin), 1, p. 47. Ibid., p. 234. 15Ibid., 1945, VI, pp. 1046-1047. Acheson's let- ter to Secretary Byrnes who was in London for the Foreign Ministers' Conference. 121 considered a serious matter deserving of official and close attention by the Allies. The question remained always peripheral. The United States government considered early establishment of an international trusteeship as the only way to terminate the social havoc caused by the artificial division of Korea, and was determined to push the plan against possible opposition by the 16 A recommendation by the State-War-Navy Coor- Koreans. dinating Committee stated that opposition by the Koreans should be offset by including in the trusteeship agreement such provisions as: the independence of Korea would be recognized only after a certain period of trusteeship; the states directly concerned pledge themselves to aCtively support in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the united Nations the admission of Korea to the United Nations Organization as soon as trusteeship terminated; and those states would help Korea to prepare for the final goal of a full independence.17 By the middle of November, the British government agreed to the trusteeship for Korea although the British were quite pessimistic about the practicability of a 16Appendix "B" to SWNCC 79/1 by State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the Far East, Oct. 22, 1945, ibid., p. 1093. 17Appendix "B" to SWNCC 101/l adopted on Oct. 24, 1945, ibid., pp. 1100-1101. 122 four-power trusteeship. They suggested that the more fundamental issue of the Russian participation in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission had to be fully clarified before the Korean question could be brought into proper perspective.18 Meanwhile, William Langdon, the political adviser to the American Military Government in Korea, was equally pessimistic about the feasibility of trusteeship. He argued that trusteeship was not suitable for Korea: morally unsuitable because Korea had been a distinct nation except for the preceding 35 years and had a high literacy, cultural and living standard judged by Asiatic and Middle Eastern standards; and impractical because Koreans would not accept it. The Military Government had been a disappointment to them and a four-power trusteeship after the unpopular Military Government was terminated would be intolerable for the literate elements of Korea. For these reasons he advised the State Depart- ment to drop the trusteeship plan and adopt a more 19 feasible one. The State Department, however, rejected the suggestion on the grounds that it was too late to 18Ambassador John Winant's conversation with J.C. Sterndale Bennett, Head, Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office, ibid., pp. 1124-1125. 19Langdon's letter to the Secretary of State. Langdon proposed a Governing Commission in place of trusteeship. Nov. 20, 1945. Ibid., pp. 1130-1133. 123 change the trusteeship plan which had been the American policy since the war and that it was most unlikely that Russia would agree to what Langdon proposed in place of trusteeship, especially at a time when discussion on Korea was expected to begin soon.20 A political adviser who worked among the Koreans had better opportunities of sensing and seeing the unmasked sentiment and the pressing problems of the Korean peOple, but the on-the—spot observer also tended to get lost in trivialities and to fail to see the larger picture. The Secretary of State had the advantage of : being more objective in analyzing and evaluating a par- ticular situation in the general frame of American foreign policy but was often blind to the real and immediate problems. In any event, trusteeship had become fixed American policy for Korea even though fierce Opposition by the Koreans seemed almost certain. "If [trusteeship] is imposed now or at any future time," Hodge warned, "it is believedpossible that the Korean peo- ple will actually and physically revolt."21 20Reply of the Secretary of State to Langdon, ibid., pp. 1137-1138. There was at least one more des- patch from the Military Government authorities to the State Department to abandon trusteeship for another form of cooperation after Langdon's proposal was rejected by the State Department. See Forrestal, Diaries, entry for Dec. 19, 1945, p. 125. 21Hodge's letter to JCS, Dec. 16, 1945. F.R., 1945, V1, p. 1146. 124 Ever since the principle of trusteeship was first advocated by Franklin Roosevelt, it had always been the United States that showed more positive interest in it until after the Moscow Conference of December, 1945. For several reasons, trusteeship was considered by Roosevelt and the policy makers of the United States vitally important for Korea. First, trusteeship seemed the proper step to lead the Korean people to attain a full independence because the Koreans, they thought, were not yet able to govern themselves. Second, trustee- ship was thought to be the most effective way to avoid international rivalries in Korea. Third, the growing Russian prestige and influence in Europe since 1943 and in the Far East, particularly after German capitulation in May, 1945, could not escape American attention. After the Potsdam conference, international rival- ries in Korea began to narrow down to Russo-American confrontation. An anticipated yet sudden entry of Soviet Russia into the Pacific War, the Japanese sur- render that came unexpectedly early, and the hasty occupation of Korea on a zonal basis, all made such confrontation inevitable. American emphasis on the internationalization, and more specifically, placing Korea under trusteeship was often understood in terms of Article 79 of the Charter of the United Nations.22 But 22SWNCC 101/4. Ibid., pp. 1096-1097. 125 there was also a growing awareness in the American government that stabilization of Korea through trustee- ship would achieve a balance of power between the two super nations in Korea.23 Increased Russian power and prestige in the postwar period was clearly envisioned by Franklin Roose- velt in 1944. According to Edgar Snow, Roosevelt, as a practical politician, saw the necessity of defining spheres of influence in making a workable peace. Roose- velt was ready to "accept the Russian giant as a great and dreadful neighbor with whom we have to learn to live 24 The essence of and share world power and authority." Cardinal Spellman's conversation with Roosevelt in late 1943 was not very far from conveying the latter's 25 But appraisal of the Russian power after the war. the two conversations were primarily in regard to Russia's increased role in postwar Europe; the Russo- American confrontation in Korea was entirely a product of new developments closely associated with the Cold War sentiment. 23Summation of United States Army Military Govern- EEPt Activities in Korea, No. 17, February—I947. (Short- ened to Summation, USAMGIK, hereafter.) 24Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (New York, 1958), pp. 343-344. His talks with RooseveIE in May, 1944. 25Robert E. Gannon, The Cardinal Spellman Story (New York, 1962), pp. 222-229. The conversation with the President on Sept. 3, 1943. 126 American demand for a balance of power in Korea vis-a-vis Soviet Russia grew stronger after the hasty occupation began. On the eve of the Moscow Conference, American's advocacy of trusteeship was so firm that some Americans both in Korea and Washington exhibited a favorable response to a Korean leftist leader's pr0posal on the divided trusteeship for each zone, that is, United States trusteeship for south Korea and Russian trustee- ship for north Korea under the United Nations. The divided trusteeship was to end mutually with the withdrawal of troops and invitation to the United Nations membership after five years, with free movement of persons and goods between the two zones in the meantime.26 In spite of the American determination to carry out the trusteeship plan and the enduring effects of the Moscow decisions on Korean politics, the Korean question at Moscow was nevertheless only a trivial one eclipsed greatly by bigger issues in other areas. As one of the chief negotiators of the American delegation to the Conference reportedly confessed later, "Korea was a very 26The proposal by H5, Hon, leader of the radical Korean People's Republic, and Langdon's concurrence to the idea. F.R., 1946, VII, pp. 606-607; also, see Forrestal, Diaries, entry for Dec. 19, 1945, p. 125. 127 minor problem at that time,”27 apart from the fact that the Moscow Conference was called at the request of Secretary Byrnes just "impulsively and without much preparation."28 The disclosure of the trusteeship clause was a bombshell to all Koreans, right or left. Excitement and furor were so high—pitched and universal that interven- tion of the American military police was necessary to protect vital installations in Seoul. The Chungking group, headed by Kim, Ku, took initiative to organize a nationwide Anti-Trusteeship Committee, and maintained that trusteeship conflicted with the desires of all Koreans who upheld national self-determination, that it was contrary to the assurance that Korea was to be free and independent given repeatedly by the American govern- ment during the war, that none of the three [gig] articles relating to the trusteeship contained in the United Nations Charter was applicable to Korea, and that any trusteeship for Korea would destroy peace in the Far 27Discussion on the U.S. Policy toward Korean Unification, comments by Dr. Soon Sung Cho, in Report on International Conference on the Problems of Korean Unifi- cation—(Korea University, Seoul, Korea, 1970), p. 198. 28 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 234. 128 East.29 American authorities feared "passive resistance, if not violent disorder, and a general strike by the "30 infuriated Koreans, for even a mere mention of the word "trusteeship" immediately precluded any "normal process of reasoning" on the part of the Koreans.31 Embarrassed by these reports, the Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, instructed General MacArthur to appease the Koreans by emphasizing that provision was being made for steps to integrate promptly the two zones, that provision for earlier establishment of a democratic provisional government would be taken, and that the trusteeship terms would be framed by the Joint Commission in consultation with the Korean Provi- sional Government which would be established soon.32 But these assurances fell far short of tranquilizing the inflamed sentiments of the Korean people. Korea's suspicion of trusteeship was justifiable. As the Chief Commissioner of the American delegation to the 29Hodge's report to MacArthur, Dec. 30, 1945. F. R. 1945, VI, p. 1154. For Article 79 and its back- ground, see Leland M. Goodrich, Charter of the United Nations (New York, 1969), p. 488f. 30An explanatory marginal note in the telegram CA 56471 (from MacArthur to Army Chief of Staff). F. R. 1945, V1, p. 1154, n. 69. 31Hodge's telegram to MacArthur, 311235 I, Dec. 31, 1945, ibid., p. 1155, n. 70. 32Eisenhower's telegram to MacArthur, Dec. 30, 1945, ibid.. PP. 1154-1155. 129 Joint US-USSR Commission, General A. E. Brown, stated later, the Moscow decision had no details of trusteeship and the exact manner in which it should be exercised. The details were not known to anyone even in February, 1947, because of the impasse in the Joint Commission over the principle of trusteeship, not to mention how to implement it. More important, the difference of the four-power trusteeship over Korea from the United Nations trusteeship system was not mentioned in the Moscow decision.33 At first, the Koreans, regardless of right or left, were fiercely Opposed to it. Then, in a matter of a week, the Communists and most of the leftists changed their attitude to supporting it, saying that trusteeship meant nothing but assistance.34 In fact, most of the Korean rightists erroneously believed that such vicious measures as trusteeship must have been proposed by Soviet Russia, until General Shtykov clarified the 35 fact. The Military Government was placed in an awk- ward position because the anti-trusteeship rightists now 33Summation,.USAMGIK, No. 17, Feb., 1947, pp. 20-21. 34Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I, pp. 278-279. 35 Shtykov's press interview as reported in CGUSAFIK to the War Dept., TFGBI 170, Jan. 27, 1946. CCS 383.21 Korea,Section No. 4. 130 intensified their suspicion of the American policy in Korea, thus paving the way for non-cooperation. Before the Moscow Conference, Sam-Yong Kim, a top-ranking Communist in south Korea responded to a report of the New York Times36 regarding the Allied plan of trusteeship for Korea with furor and blasted the trusteeship as a "shocking fact that stems from an erroneous perception of Korean realities and ignores the ."37 After the Moscow Conference, people's will the Communists were no less infuriated by the trustee- ship clause. A Communist ChosOn Inmin-PO charged, on December 29, that "traitors made trusteeship possible."38 This kind of criticism continued in the same vein until January 3, 1946. T'ae-Sik ChOng, a renowned Communist, reportedly said: "If it is true that trusteeship is to be imposed on Korea, we are absolutely opposed. Even if it were for five months, not to mention five years, we would 9'39 oppose trusteeship. Pak, Han-Yang, the leader of the 36 37Kim's statement as quoted in Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., p. 276. . 38As quoted in USAFIK Commanding General to the War Dept. TFGBI 157, Jan. 26, 1946, CCS 383.21 Korea,Sec- tion NO. 4. (All documents bearing the title CCS and cited in this dissertation are preserved at the Section of Military Records, the National Archives and Records Service.) 39 The New York Times, Oct. 21, 1945, p. 22. Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., p. 277. 131 Korean Communist Party made it known to General Hodge on January 1, 1946, that he and his party were totally 40 The Central Committee of opposed to the trusteeship. the Korean People's Republic, from which many of the leftist parties had departed by then, even offered to dissolve the Republic as a political group and join Kim, Ku's Chungking group in the fight against the trustee- ship.41 The excitement and furor of the Korean people were more than the United States anticipated. To add confusion to the already entangled political situation, Secretary Byrnes suggested in his radio report on the meeting of the Foreign Minister that trusteeship might be dispensed with in the process of consultation between the Joint Commission and the Korean Provisional Govern- ment.42 The Secretary was merely mentioning the basic attitude of the United States in dealing with interna- tional questions. Against its initial intent, however, this suggestion weakened the position of the American Military Government and General Hodge, in particular, 40As quoted in USAFIK Commanding General to the War Dept., TFGBI 157, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section No. 4. 41Ibid. Korean PeOple's Republic was dissolved as a governmental organization, but the name was used continuously as the title of a political party. 42Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 30, 1945, pp. 1035-1036. 132 who had been making a desperate effort to persuade the Koreans to accept the trusteeship.43 The trusteeship question began to assume a new connotation for both the United States and Soviet Russia. The United States immediately found itself being caught in the dilemma of adherence to the international agree- ment and to its traditional ideal of freedom. It was the United States that had tenaciously pursued trusteeship for Korea, but now she found it hard to push the plan against the free will of the Korean peOple. Never denouncing trusteeship openly, America now began to search for some kind of reconciliation between the two seemingly incompatible choices. Soviet Russia, which had been rather passive regarding the trusteeship issue, now changed its atti- tude to positively supporting it. Possibly, the Soviets saw in the trusteeship issue a chance to widen the gap between the American Military Government and the Korean rightists who were considered the main source of support to the former. Or, the Soviets may have felt that trusteeship was necessary for Korea until conditions for Communist revolution in that country were ripe. Simultaneously, the Korean Communists banned the term 43 p. 628 f. JCS 1483/27, Feb. 2, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, 133 Shin-t'ak T'ong-ch'i (trusteeship) after the about-face and adopted in its place a new term of Huw§3_(backing- up).44 The about-face of the Communists as will be treated in the next section, was one eloquent example of how the Korean Communists were responsive to Soviet Russia and how the latter was determined to take advan- tage Of the changing tide. Trusteeship which was pro- posed as a means of solving the Korean question through international cooperation now began to reveal the diffi- culties that lay ahead in the negotation. It was clearly envisaged that the trusteeship issue might develop into a cause of international conflict and non-cooperation contrary to the original intention. A citizen's rally against trusteeship was scheduled for January 3, at the initiative of Seoul City's People's Committee (Communist) and a Communist front group, the Committee on the Joint Struggle Against Facism. But the rally was skillfully manipulated by the Communists and was turned into one of supporting the Moscow decision, the essence of which was, Of course, 44Since the sudden about-face of the Communists, they strengthened their propaganda by equating "anti- trusteeship" with "anti-Moscow decision," which was far from correct. See Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., pp. 278- 279, and n. 65 on p. 279. 134 "trusteeship." This incident displayed what an extremely regimented and intensively indoctrinated individual or group could do, while in south Korea Hodge's desperate. efforts to bring the non-Communists together to support- ing the trusteeship were far from a success. According to Pak, Il-WOn, the then Chief of the Youth Department of the Korean Communist Party of KyOng—Ki Province, the party politburo was contacted immediately after the announcement of the Moscow deci- sions by Mr. A. I. Shabshin, Soviet Vice-Consul in Seoul. Pak, HOn-YOng, made a hasty, secret trip to PyOngyang. Upon returning to Seoul on January 2, Pak called an enlarged Central Committee meeting and there, he made the issue of trusteeship one of Party loyalty and a resolution to support the Moscow decision (trustee- 45 Thus the about-face was ready by ship) was adOpted. January 3 . Pak, the head of the Korean Communist Party, reportedly argued the next day that he would "not be adverse to one-power trusteeship by the Soviets follow- ing which Korea might well become a Soviet Fixed State."46 asll-Wén Pak, Nam-no Dang, p. 42, as quoted in Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., p. 277. 46Hodge's report to the War Department dated Jan. 4, 1946. TFGCI 190, Feb. 10, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section NO. 4. 135 The about-face by the Communists was denounced by the Tong-A Ilbo, a daily newspaper, as "an unpardonable action" because the Communists improperly used the citizens' excitement which had been opposing trustee- ship. The paper stated that the betrayal by the Commu- nists was closely tied with Sovet-supported pro- trusteeship demonstration north of the 38th parallel.47 Soviet Russia compelled the Korean Communists to change their mind, but the price they had to pay was high. The Korean Communists were, since the incident, never to enjoy the degree of support and sympathy they had in south Korea immediately following the liberation. And as it was made evident at the Economic Conference and the Russo-American Joint Commission in January and March, respectively, Soviet Russia was determined to compensate for the loss of prestige of the Communists by a counter-attack against the Korean rightists who were opposed fiercely to trusteeship. Trusteeship now became to the Soviets a matter of political prestige without which they could not command Korean support for the ultimate Communist revolution. Before the Communists changed their attitude on trusteeship, the rightists gradually soft-pedaled their opposition to it. Kim, 101 assured the people that 47Tong-A Ilbo (a daily newspaper), Jan. 6, 1946. 136 trusteeship could be avoided and suggested that there would be no active Opposition unless and until it was 48 He urged the Military Government employees imposed. to go back to work and asked for the return of peace and order. It is, therefore, easy to guess how outrageous it must have sounded to these rightists when Pak report- edly said that he would rather welcome one-power trusteeship by Russia. Seeing the seriousness of the havoc and disorder brought about by the division over the trusteeship issue, the major political parties began to search for some kind of political coalition. Representatives of four main political parties met on January 7 and adopted a communiqué in support of the "spirit and intent” of the Moscow Conference. It further stated that the trustee- ship question "should be resolved by a Korean government based upon a spirit of self-determination and independ- ence."49 But the extreme rightists were now suspicious 48Statement on Jan. 1, 1946. Summation, Japan and Korea, NO. 4, Jan., 1946, p. 282. 49Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., p. 280. The com- muniqué which was supported by the Korean Communist Party, the Korean People's Party (leftist), and the Korean Nationalist Party (center) specified that the trusteeship issue should be resolved by a Korean Govern- ment which would be established through the Joint Russo- American Commission. But the Soviet delegates at the Joint Commission insisted that the principle of trustee- ship must be resolved by the two delegations before the Korean Government was established and consulted with. 137 of even the spirit andixuxuu:of the Moscow decision on Korea, and withdrew their cooperation from coalition efforts. Then, a conference sponsored by the old Provi- sonal Government group was held in Seoul during January 20-24. The two main leftist parties, the Korean Communist Party and the People's Party, refused to cooperate, and coalition was balked again. Both the rightists and leftists were demanding a coalition that could come under their own control, which was not likely to occur. Aided by the trusteeship issue which proved incidentally a main asset for their cause, the rightists made the last gesture toward coalition by inviting all the major parties to a conference. The two major left- ist parties refused again to attend. The conference, which convened February 1, lasted several days and ended with the establishment of the Taehan Tong-nip Ch'oksOng- Hoe (Association for the Acceleration of the Independence of Korea). Syngman Rhee and Kim, 1&1 were chosen as the leaders of the Association. As a counter-measure to this rightists' coalition, the Communists and the leftists formed the Democratic National Front on February 15. The effort for a Right-Moderate-Left coalition, which the Military Government had been seeking after the trusteeship 138 controversy flared up, ended only in a sharp division between the rightists and leftists. In the meantime, the Russian-supported Commu- nists were solidifying their position in north Korea. In contrast to the confusion and the social disorder caused by the trusteeship controversy in south Korea, the Communist north appeared to be enjoying peace and order in a united support for trusteeship. The Soviets had reportedly organized popular demonstrations to sup- port trusteeship, and had placed the right-wing nationalist leader Cho, Man-Shik, in protective custody under Russian guard and forced his resignation from the party because of his refusal publicly to support the 50 All the peOple in north Korea had Moscow proposals. to support the Moscow decision unconditionally to get the passport without which they could not travel.51 The leadership of north Korea was taken officially by Kim, Il-SOng, with the establishment of the Temporary (Interim) People's Committee on February 8. The Com- mittee, they asserted, was organized to "prepare for the basic ground work for establishing a progressive 50Benninghoff's report to the Secretary of State, Jan. 23, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 616. 51Lauterbach, Danger, p. 124. 139 democratic nation abiding by the Moscow decisions.”52 At the same time, propaganda against south Korea was further intensified. Kim criticized the American Military Government of south Korea for having subjuga- ted the "sovereignty" of south Korea and having failed to implement such basic reforms as nationalization of 53 He declared that the capa- industry and land reform. bility of Korea to run a democratic nation had developed rapidly as was evidenced by the establishment of the Temporary People's Committee and the perfect implementa- 54 But he failed to present reason- tion of land reform. able explanations as to why four-power trusteeship was still essential and indispensable for Korea if Korea's capability for democracy had developed that much. Kim intentionally equated trusteeship with the Moscow decision itself and attacked the anti-trusteeship groups of south Korea for not abiding by the Moscow decision on Korea. He precluded any possibility of consultation with and participation of the anti- trusteeship groups in establishing the Korean Provisional Government to be formulated at the Joint Commission. He equated anti-trusteeship with anti-democracy and argued that only those who realized the "historical mission of 52Il-SOng Kim, ChosOn Minchu-Chui Inmin-Konghwakuk §urip-fii Kil (PyOngyang, 194773 P. 110} 53Ibid., p. 118. 541616., p. 36. 140 establishing a democratic Korea" should be allowed in the Korean Provisional Government. He then jumped to the conclusion that the correct understanding that ”the liberation of Korea was the gift of the democratic force under the Russian leadership" was the basis for the fulfillment of the historical mission imposed upon the Korean people, and that the Moscow decision was ”none but the product of historical necessity of the global victory of Soviet Russia."55 But again, Kim failed to explain reasonably why the Moscow decision which was made without regard for the wishes of the Korean representatives and without popular basis of the people concerned had such a binding force as to demand an absolute and unconditional obedi- ence by the Koreans if, as Kim asserted, Soviet Russia was "the liberator" and brought Korea's sovereignty back to its people. One thing, very clear at this point, is that Kim was desperate to exploit maximum Soviet support in strengthening his leadership over other Communists. Tass asserted that Russia tried to arrange for everything the Koreans had wanted before and at the Mos- cow Conference, and that she wanted to grant immediate independence to Korea but was thwarted by Americans who 55Ibid., pp. 36-38. 141 proposed a ten-year trusteeship.56 Kim, Il-SOng dis— torted the Tass dispatch and asserted that the United States proposed at the Moscow Conference to place Korea "more than ten years" under "military occupation."57 Communist attempts to throw south Korea into an uncontrollable disorder were further manifested when the Soviet authorities in north Korea announced on Febru- ary 12 that they had completed the north Korean branch of All Korean Central Government. In the local news- papers of south Korea appeared announcements by the Communists that since Koreans had a People's Government in north Korea and the Democratic National Front in south Korea, the problem of an Interim (Provisional) Korean Government as stipulated in the Moscow decision 58 North Korea was a simple get-together of the two. was going its own way solidly under Russian tutelage. Efforts to achieve political integration in south Korea failed. The difference between the two zones lay in that while north Korea enjoyed unanimity as it asserted, confusion and division were the trademark of 56Hodge's letter to JCS on the Russian prOpa- ganda as reported in Tass. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 628f; also, see Forrestal, Diaries, p. 135, entry for Feb. 15, 1946. 57 58Hodge's letter to the Secretary of State, cheived on Feb. 24, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, pp. 640- 2. Il-Song Kim, op. cit., p. 109. 142 south Korea. A Right-Moderate-Left coalition with the support of the Military Government resulted in the establishment of the Representative Democratic Council, composed of representatives of political parties includ- ing YO's leftist PeOple's Party, on February 14. Unlike the north Korea's People's Committee which was an administrative body, the Representative Democratic Council of south Korea was but an advisory body to the American Military Government. Most significantly, YO's People's Party agreed to join the Council. Y6, as a leading member of the Council, was scheduled to speak at the first meeting of the Council on February 14. But he failed to show up. Then, his party announced that it would withdraw from the Council, and the following day the party joined hands with the Communist Party to form the Democratic People's Front. There were rumors that the Communists were trying to terrorize YO for his approach to the right.59 The State Department instructed the Military Government to find strong, competent leaders who were not extremists of the right or left in the process of political integration. But Hodge reported that it was inevitable that the Military Government should include 59CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFGCG 291, Feb. 16, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section No. 5. 143 Syngman Rhee and Kim, Ku, the extreme right wing, if it were to succeed in its effort to create a consultative 60 Hodge found Rhee and body on the basis of coalition. Kim cooperative with his plan of coalition. In any event, the Representative Democratic Council was estab- lished as the result of the coalition movement, but it began more as a vehicle of the right, with twenty right- ists, four moderates, and four leftists. Setting up of the Representative Democratic Council signaled an important shift in America's basic attitude toward the politics of Korea--reconsideration of its traditional attitude of refraining from support- ing any particular group. Though the Representative Democratic Council was not quite satisfactory to the American authorities because of its overWhelming right- ist color, the Americans had no choice other than to accept it as the duly constituted consultative body.61 It was the first major political program of the Military Government in south Korea.62 The Council adOpted a resolution in which it pledged to serve and to cooperate in an advisory capacity 6OCGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFGCG 285, Feb. 15, 1946, ibid. 61090 337, Feb. 26, 1946, 008 383.21, Korea,Sec- tion No. 5; also, see F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 645. 62Before the official inauguration of the USAMGIK, the word "military government" was used to designate the units for the civilian affairs within the occupation army. 144 with the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, in his effort to prepare for an interim government of Korea, and to coordinate all their activities and devote their efforts to help improve conditions among the Korean peOple and to hasten thereby the realization of 63 The advisory capacity Korea's complete independence. of the Council was thus confirmed by the members. In preparation for the forthcoming Joint Russo- American Commission which was to consult democratic parites and social organizations of Korea, registration of political parties was ordered by the Military Govern- ment. Any group of "three or more persons associated for political activities in any form" was required to register as a political party.64 Both in north and south Korea, preparations for the upcoming economic conference and the Joint Commission meetings were on their way. Efforts to take maximum advantage out of these meetings were clear. In north Korea, Temporary People's Committee was organized entirely of Communists, and in the south, the rightist Representative Democratic Council and the left-Communist Democratic People's Front came into existence. 63Summation, Japan and Korea, No. 5, Feb., 1946, pp. 283-284. 64 Ibid., p. 282. 145 But the prospect of the Joint Commission was not bright. Anti-trusteeship sentiments among the non-Communists were still high, while Soviet propaganda, assisted by the Korean Communists both in north and south Korea, condemned these anti-trusteeship peOple fiercely. It became clearer that unless the outcome of the negotiations as stipulated in the Moscow decision was so made as to satisfy both pro- and anti-trusteeship groups, there would be no real solution of the Korean question. The Americans working in the Military Govern- ment and General Hodge were pessimistic about the success of the two important conferences, partly out of their own experiences of negotiations with the Soviets and partly because of their failure to change the minds of anti-trusteeship people. More important, the enduring results of the improvised bilateral occupation, the socio-economic division of Korean society, the lack of any cooperation between the two occupational authorities, and the furious trusteeship controversy had affected the con- flict between the two zones so adversely that success of negotiation seemed almost impossible unless one of the two retreated substantially from its position. This was unlikely to occur. The two zones had gone too far in their own way to retreat. Every move in the other zone was looked upon with suspicion and 146 condemnation. The first major negotiation was convened in this situation. The Russo-American Economic Conference was held in pursuance of the fourth paragraph of Section III of the Moscow communique. The first meeting was called on January 16, 1946, and continued for three weeks, ending on February 5. The two delegations had a total of fif- teen formal sessions to discuss, as stipulated by the Moscow decision, the urgent economic and administrative problems created by the partition of Korea. The American delegation was led by Major General A. V. Arnold and the Russian delegation by Colonel General T. F. Shtykov. Five months of economic and social separation between the agricultural south and industrial north had driven the Korean economy into an extraordinarily unbal- anced situation. Economic activities in both zones were limited seriously by the separation. Political and social unrest in south Korea added to the economic hard- ships. North Korean society was much better organized than in the south, and economic hardships were rela- tively less pressing there due to its high productivity 65 in both agriculture and industry. Unquestionably, both zones suffered acute economic difficulties due to 65 pp. 56-57. See tables 3 and 4 in McCune, Korea Today, 147 lack of needed materials--raw and manufactured--but by and large, the difficulties in the south far outweighed those in the north. Economic cooperation was badly needed. But another important aim of the economic conference was to reopen the two zones socially. Since the divided occu- pation had taken place, there had been virtually no social intercourse between the two zones on an official level. North Korea was placed under a total blackout as soon as the Russians occupied it. The only flow of Korean peOple from one zone to the other took place at risk of life. The agenda for the conference naturally gave weight to those tOpics through which the two zones might be reopened economically, including electric power and coal that were badly needed in the south and rice to the north. But the Soviet delegation categorically refused to include in the agenda discussion of free circulation of newspapers throughout Korea, combined radio network for the benefit of all parties on an equal basis, and a prOposed prohibition of removal of capital goods from Korea.66 The agenda agreed upon and the items rejected foreshadowed failure of the conference. What had been 66Hodge's report to the War Department, Jan. 18, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, pp. 611-612. 148 agreed upon were primarily questions in the field of material exchange between the two zones. The agenda items rejected by Soviet Russia were mainly those that would have brought the two zones into a "unified, whole national life." The discrepancy in the attitude of the two delegations became more apparent as the sessions continued. At the close of the conference on February 5, 1946, an official announcement was issued by the two delegations, which read in part: The Soviet and United States delegations . reached [agreement] on the following items: 1. Railroad, motor, and coastwise water- borne transportation; 2. Movement of Korean citizens between the two zones; 3. Exchange of mail between the two zones; 4. Radio broadcast- ing frequencies within Korea; and 5. the future coordination between the two commands in regard to economic and administrative matters. In addition to the above, the Soviet and the American delegations exchanged views regard- ing the exchange of goods, settlement 0 mutual account, and release of electric power. In view of the variety and extensiveness of the urgent problems to be settled, the final communiqué was a total disappointment to most Koreans. Whoever was responsible, the communiqué gave a strong impression to the Koreans that the conference was to be a perfunctory one and that the really urgent and vitally important problems were left out intentionally. The pressing 67Summation, Japan and Korea, NO. 5, Feb., 1946, p. 284; also, CINCAFPAC to the War Department ZA 17511, Feb. 15, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section No. 5. 149 difficulties of Korean society and the Korean people were eclipsed by the sharpened political confrontation of the Soviet Union and the United States. Basically, Soviet Russia was reluctant to open north Korea because it was clear that south Korea would suffer far more by the continuation of the division of the country. The United States was no less responsible for the meager outcome. George McCune, who had until recently been in charge of Korean affairs in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, charged that Korea was still ”looked upon as a step child in high government circles" in Washington at the time of the economic conference. "Even after five months of occupa- tion," he said, "there is as yet no move toward the Korean problem with the emphasis and care which it deserves.”68 General Hodge, who had been working in Korea for five months amidst the torrents of criticism, misunder- standing, and frustration, complained that since his arrival in Korea, he had found nothing in the attitude of the Russians to indicate that they had any thought of unifying the Korean nation while the Americans kept forces in Korea. He was so disappointed during the Economic Conference that he frankly admitted: "My best 68McCune, ”Occupation Politics. in Korea," p. 37. 150 guess now is that north and south will never be really united until the Russians are sure that the whole will be soundly communistic . . . . We are opposed by a strongly organized, ruthless political machinery designed to appeal to millions of Koreans."69 The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee moved quickly in the preparation for the up-coming Joint Com- mission, and while the Economic Conference was still in session it adopted on January 28 a Policy Paper for 70 It was made manifest in the Paper that the Korea. American government considered establishing an interim government as the most pressing task in Korea. The American government possibly thought that even if the Economic Conference failed, such baffling problems as the economic and administrative division of Korea could be resolved once and for all by setting up a Korean gov- ernment at the Joint Commission. The Paper overlooked that it was almost impossible to establish an interim Korean government unless some extensive social and economic exchanges had been realized first between the two zones. It had already been made clear at the Economic Conference by the Soviet's denunciation of those basic 69Hodge' 3 letter to JCS, JCS 1483/27, Feb. 2, 1946. F. R. 1946, VIII, p. 628f. 70 p. 623f. SWNCC 176/18, adopted on Jan. 28, 1946. Ibid., 151 measures to Open up the two zones that the Soviets would not permit a unified Korea except on the terms they preferred. General Hodge was outspokenly worried over the possible misconception of the Korean situation on the part of American policy makers. Upon receiving the SWNCC Policy Paper, he responded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that unless complete freedom of speech, press, and movement of Koreans within Korea had been accomplished first, the Joint Commission would be unable to freely consult Korean parties and leaders and to learn the desires of the Korean people regarding their government, which were the prerequisites stipulated in the Moscow communique.71 His judgment was that giving full con- sideration to these points with considerable vigor was more essential than any hasty joint consideration by the Joint Commission of the structure of the interim govern- ment. As a matter of fact, there was growing suspicion among the non-Communist Koreans that the United States ndght be outmaneuvered by the Russians to make conces- sions which would lead to the communization of all Korea. This uneasiness made its first appearance when 71Hodge's message to JCS, CA 57792, Feb. 2, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section No. 4; also, see F.R., 1946, VIII, pp. 632-633. 152 it was disclosed that it was not Soviet Russia but the United States that proposed trusteeship for Korea at the Moscow Conference. The uneasiness was bolstered after the economic conference ended ineffectively. The Ameri- cans on the spot feared that the inherent xenophobia might be rekindled among the Koreans. "Should the Koreans reach the conclusions that the United States talks big but acts little, not prepared to live up to its promise," the political adviser in Korea, H.M. Benninghoff, warned, "the Koreans will be at the mercy of Soviets' highly- organized steam-roller technique."72 Hodge was clearly mindful Of the growing dis- trust of the United States among the Koreans and felt it necessary to restore waning popularity of the Ameri- can occupation authorities by giving publicity to Russian intentions in Korea. In his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to previously, he strongly recommended that if the Soviet delegation in the Joint Commission displayed reluctance to come to agreement on the free flow of press, radio, and people between the two zones as the prerequisite to a successful realiza- tion of the Moscow decision, he would "discreetly make known to the Korean people . . . that the United States has from the beginning tried to break down barrier 72Benninghoff's letter to the Secretary of State, Feb. 9, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 631. 153 of 38th parallel but that USSR has failed to follow our lead."73 Hodge thought that such a disclosure would strengthen the American hand and might cause the Soviet delegation to accede to America's desires. It is highly doubtful if such a disclosure would have resulted in any significant change in the Russian attitude at the nego- tiation table. But Hodge's judgment was based upon his experiences in Korea and worth listening to as he con- cluded that "the more we open up the country and convince the people of our real aims, the greater will be the chances of achieving truly democratic rather than a Soviet directed communistic government."74 Communist prOpaganda had changed little in its basic character since the about-face on the trusteeship question. Closing their society ever tighter, the north Koreans were ready to respond to any proposal or decision made at the initiative of Soviet Russia at either the Economic Conference or the forthcoming Joint Commission. For them, it was a fait accompli that north and south Korea had developed themselves into two distinctively different and unbridgeable societies, and that the only alternative left was time integration of the two zones to their liking. 73 74 Supra, n. 74, Hodge's message to JCS. Ibid. 154 In south Korea, pessimism mounted day by day after the Moscow Conference. On January 19 when the Joint Economic Conference was started, the rightist Tong-A Daily of Seoul editorialized that despite the division of Korea and the Soviet's blackout of the northern part, Korea was one nation with its own history and culture, that every effort should be made by the two occupying powers to disentangle the knotty problems with an eye to establishing one, unified nation, and that unless the United States and Soviet Russia took the desires and aspiration of the Korean prople seriously in their negotiations, these efforts would surely fail.75 This illustrated the non-Communist Koreans' distrust of the Allied Power, which, as Hodge and Benninghoff pointed out, was almost universal.76 The most immediate stumbling block at the joint Economic Conference was the problem of sending rice to the north. The American delegates refused to promise to send rice even though they fully recognized that rice was the major food crop for the Koreans and that south Korea was the main rice-producing area. Actually, the Americans were unable to meet the Russian demand for rice. 7STong-A Ilbo (A Daily; rightist) as quoted in CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFGBI 164, Jan. 28, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section No. 4. 76 Supra, n. 72 (Benninghoff) and n. 71 (Hodge). 155 On the other hand, the Russians demanded payment for the electricity and other materials sent from north Korea to the south. One of many reasons why the Americans were unable to pay in rice was the practice of hoarding of rice among the Korean landlords and businessmen. To resolve the immediate shortage of rice, the occupation authorities seized all warehouses in October, 1945, to be followed by quick inventories and arrangement for 77 In the seized rice to be sent to the needy places. other words, the shortage of rice had already become acute even in south Korea by the time of the Joint Economic Conference. In January, rice was declared a critical item by General Notice No. 6 of the Military Government, with a price ceiling. But as soon as the Notice was declared, rice practically disappeared from the open market,78 and the black market prevailed. Among other reasons for the shortage of rice were the sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of Koreans into south Korea from Japan, Manchuria, north Korea, and other overseas areas, the change of economic pattern due to the partition of Korea into two, and the psychological reaction of the Korean people to the 77Summation, Japan and Korea, No. 1, September- October, 1945, p. 187, 78 Ibid., No. 4, January, 1946, p. 287. 156 postwar socio-economic situation. Especially, the second and third factors played a vital role in the Korean economy. Before liberation, south Korea shipped rice to north Korea and Japan. It produced more rice than needed for south Korea alone. But the export of rice was pos- sible only because other important food crops such as wheat, beans, corn, and millet were brought in from north Korea and Manchuria. South Korea produced, in 1944, 64 percent of all the rice and 91 percent of all the barley, while north Korea produced in the same year 58 percent of wheat, 71 percent of millet, 91 percent of corn, and 65 percent of soybeans.79 Now that the flow of these major food crOps between the north and south stopped completely, it was only natural that the capability of south Korea to export rice was sharply reduced. The economic pattern in terms of the flow of major food crops changed essentially. The population of south Korea in 1946 was 19.4 80 millions, while that of north Korea for the same year 79Table 3 in McCune, Korea Today, p. 56. 80HaepangIshim-nybn (Twenty Years Since the Liberation), Kirok-pTyOn (Part of Records) (Seoul, 1965), P. 114. No source is available for the population of South Korea for the year of 1945. 157 81 was 9.3 millions. South Korea's popualtion amounted to 67 percent of the total while it produced 74 percent of the rice.82 In 1945, a bumper rice crop was expected by the Military Government. The Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce of the Military Government estimated the 83 But rice production of the year at 15.9 million 85m. the real figure after the harvest dropped to 12.8 mil- lion SOm, a 19 percent decrease from the original 84 No statistics are available for north estimate. Korea for the year of 1945 but if it is assumed that the percentage of rice production was not very far from that of the year of 1946, and when other crops such as wheat, corn, millet, and beans are added, north and south Korea were almost on a par in the production of food crops in proportion to population. 81Central Statistical Board Under the State Plan- ning Commission of the D.P.R.K., Statistical Returns of National Economy of the Democratic People's Repfiblic of KoreaL 1946-1960 (PyOngyang, 196I), p. 161 82Calculated on the basis of the reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, as quoted in Hae an Ishim-nyOn, p. 124 (12 million sOm--roughly 3.07 million tons), and reports of Statistic§I_Returns by DPRK, p. 83 (1.05 million tons). Since the report of south Korea is shown in 35m that equals 4.9629 bushels (20 bushels = 1 short tonF—hnd that of north Korea is shown in tons (not clear whether in long or short ton), there could be some margin in the percentage. 83 p. 193. Summation, Japan and Korea, No. 3, Dec., 1945, 84Haepang-Ishim-nan, p. 124. 158 Nevertheless, at the Economic Conference, the Soviet delegation insisted on receiving rice. The presence of a quarter million of the Red Army in north Korea could have raised the demands for rice. They were dependent largely upon foods produced in Korea. It had been widely witnessed and reported by the Koreans that the Red Army affected the crop situation of north Korea adversely by such reckless actions as to feed to horses agricultural products such as rice, corn, and other crops, to cut the unripe rice in order to feed their horses, andtx>damage the rice fields in many 85 These damages could have been minor economi- places. cally. But the reports certainly had some psychological repercussion among the Korean people in north and south Korea. Significantly, these reports came from the major rice-producing areas in north Korea. In addition, there were reports that the Russians were taking rice and other crOps as well as other manufactured goods to their own country.86 85oss R&A, XL 26109, 215484-2, a report of Pro- fessor Kyu-Yong Lee, the Presbyterian Theological Seminary in WOnsan, north Korea; ibid., 215484-5, a report by Rev. Kwan-Sik Kim, the Moderator of the United Church of Korea, in Songdo (KaesOng). 86Ibid., 215484-5 and 215484-10, a report by Revs. Youn, Ha-Young anui Han, Kyung-Chik, both in Sinfiichu city. The city was the main railroad transpor- tation connection between Korea and the Southern Man- churian Railroad. 159 The Joint Economic Conference reached an impasse when the American occupation authorities found that they had no measures within their reach to supply the Russians with the requested amount of rice, despite south Korea's growing dependence on electricity, fuels, and other ' materials from north Korea. The Soviet delegation was quite unwilling to discuss economic cooperation unless there was some hope of getting rice. At this juncture the south Koreans manifested a strong psychological reaction. The south Koreans were experiencing a drastic shortage of electricity and coal. Despite the two-to- one ratio of population, more than 60 percent of the minimum requirement of electricity for south Korea had to come from north Korea.87 Shortage of coal was as serious as that of electricity. In October, 1945, south Korea faced a shortage of 150,000 tons of bituminous and 167,000 tons of anthracite coal a month. It was esti- mated that the local production of anthracite by Decem- ber 31, 1945, would not exceed 62,500 tons a month, compared with an estimated requirement of 230,000 tons 88 a month. In addition to the acute shortage of elec- tric power and coal, south Korea which was primarily an 87 88Summation, Japan and Korea, No. 1, September- October, 1945, p.189. Table 5 in Haepang_lshim-ny6n, p. 116. 160 agricultural area needed about 400,000 tons of fertili- zer annually, and almost all had to be supplied by north Korea.89 Prices of agricultural products which used to be supplied by north Korea had been soaring. For instance, the retail price for 1 IE]; (14.6 kilograms) of soybeans jumped from 45 wOn in August, 1945, to 300 wOn in May, 1946. For wheat flour, it soared from 130 wOn per 22 Kg. to 1,100 wOn, and for millet, from 66 wén per gal to 340 wOn.9O South Koreans naturally became fearful of the stoppage of trade between the north and south, and they turned totfluahoarding of daily commodities, including rice, as a way to ameliorate the resulting economic hardship until the new crops would be available in the fall. Collection of adequate supplies of rice to fur- nish the deficit areas still constituted the principal agricultural problem in the American zone, let alone shipping rice out to any country or place, including north Korea, even in February, 1946.91 Given this situation, the Russian demand for rice could not be met by the Americans, and the prospect 891bid., p. 187. 90Chosun Bank, Monthly Statistical Review, as quoted in McCune, Korea Today, p. 338, table 3. 91Summation, Japan and Korea, No. 1, September- October, 1945, p. 189. 161 of the Economic Conference rapidly deteriorated. But this economic problem, however real, was not the most disturbing factor that doomed the conference from the outset. From the adoption of the agenda through the final communique, the two delegations approached the issues regarding the urgent economic and administrative integration of the two zones from diametrically differ- ent positions. The American delegation adhered to the principle that Korea should be considered as "an economic, admin- istrative unit.” They strongly felt the desirability of removing the barrier of the 38th parallel on the justi- fiable ground that the primary objective of the line had already been achieved. In compliance with the desires of most of the non-Communist Koreans, the Ameri- can delegates strove to attain the goal of a unified national life by unifying such important facilities as transportation and public utilities. Unification of these basic facilities into a single administrative unit definitely outweighed any question at this point.92 By contrast, Soviet Russia desired negotiation strictly on the basis of the dual system that had existed since August, 145. To the Russians, the Economic 92Benninghoff's report on the Russo-American Economic Conference to the Secretary of State, Feb. 15, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 633f; also, see Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 222. 162 Conference was strictly a 'negotiation' between the two commands. Exchange of goods and coordination were con- sidered as a matter between the two adjoining yet sepa- rate zones Of military responsibility. They were adamant throughout against any discussion that would require them to give up any of the command prerogatives to a joint conference. They insisted that the exchange of goods must be on a quasi-barter basis between two dif- ferent zones. They were unwilling to cooperate unless 93 It soon became a balanced exchange was realized. evident to the American delegation that the Russians were sent to the conference with the instruction to get as much rice as possible from south Korea.94 Under the situation, the balance naturally tipped heavily toward north Korea as far as the value of the goods exchanged was concerned. This was intolerable for the Russians. They even said that if the Russian requests were not met by south Korea, they would have to 95 market the Korean goods elsewhere. There was no ques- tion that Russia definitely regarded Korea only in the 93CINCAFPAC to the War Department, TFGBI 169, Feb. 27, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section No. 4. 94Benninghoff's report, Feb. 15, 1946. F.R., 1946, VII, p. 633f. 95Russian statement at the eighth session, on Jan. 28. CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFBBI 173, Jan. 29, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea,Section No. 4. 163 light of "Russian Korea" and "American Korea" rather than "a Korean nation." Technical problems on the supply of materials, basic discrepancies in the approach of the two delega- tions to the problems of Korea, Russia's lack of interest in the conference unless rice could be obtained, Washing- ton's failure to accord Korea a high priority, the character of the conference itself as a preliminary meeting for the forthcoming Joint Commission, all worked adversely. The south Koreans were greatly disappointed in the outcome of the conference. Many of them quite erroneously believed that the meeting had been called to decide the trusteeship question and were disappointed on this account. General Hodge pleaded for patience and order on the part of Koreans by saying that he himself "got impatient with what appeared to be slow progress."96 The United States, which had occupied Korea with- out preparation, had no programs--political, social, economic--for Korea. The American occupation authorities were extremely aware of Russian entrenchment in north Korea and adopted an anti-Communist stance. The American Military Government was rejected by the Communists and many of the leftists, and did not enjoy full support of 96CGUSAFIK to the Information Section, the War Department, TFGCG 283, Feb. 12, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea. Section No. 4. 164 the rightists, either. The cold war confrontation between the two occupying powers only helped further splits among the Koreans. The first attempt at negoti- ation at the Economic Conference failed. Now the two governments looked to the Joint Commission, largely from different motives. America looked forward to ending its undesirable commitment to Korea as soon as practicable, and Russia appeared determined to strengthen its posi- tion in Korea by adhering to the Moscow decision, the heart of which was trusteeship. CHAPTER IV FAILURE OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS The outcome of the US-USSR Economic Conference that ended on February 5, 1946, was quite a disap- pointment to many of the Korean peOple, especially after the controversy over the trusteeship issue split the nation in a most disastrous way. The two occupation authorities now proceeded to preparing themselves for the scheduled political negotiation at the US-USSR Joint Commission. Though pessimism about the negotiation was high among the south Koreans, political parties of south Korea looked to the Joint Commission as a meet- ing where Korea's future would be decided and, as such, they lost no time in arming themselves to make their opinion and assertion heard and reflected in the final decision of the Commission. The rightists were generally supportive of the American Military Government and continued to criticize fiercely the idea of trusteeship under any circumstance. They demanded the abandonment of the 38th parallel as the indispensable prerequisite to enabling the Koreans to have a really representative government based upon popular will. However, inter-party rivalries, an 165 _ 166 inevitable consequence Of person-centered Korean poli- tics, prevented the rightists from taking a united action beyond the trusteeship issue. There had been reports that north Korea tightened its control over the people in every phase of political, economic, and cul- tural life through the People's Committee and Poan-Dae (Security Corps), but these reports could not bring together the divided rightists who were extremely anti- Communistf' The moderate, middle-of-the-roaders differed from the rightists only in that their opposition was milder and more mindful of the Military Government than the rightists. The leftists of south Korea were also making desperate efforts to marshal popular support to their cause. They were extremely critical of the Mili- tary Government and advocated immediate implementation of trusteeship along with the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government strictly in accordance with the Moscow decision. This coincided with the position taken by the Russians and the Communists of both north and south Korea. The American government, which was not fully prepared for the Economic Conference, moved exceptionally quickly in the preparation of the Joint Commission. A directive for the guidance of the American delegation at 1About the social regimentation in north Korea, see supra, Chapter 11, section 3. 167 the Joint Commission was adopted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as early as January 28, 1946.2 The directive, which was transmitted to General MacArthur on February 11, stressed that the American delegation at the Joint Commission must strive to have a Korean provisional government established before the Joint Commission took up the trusteeship issue. It further stipulated that the decisions reached at the Joint Commission were not final. They should be pre- sented to the four governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain for considera- tion before they were implemented. The Commission was to act for, and not in the place of, the four powers. Lastly, the directive called for finding measures to help and assist the Korean people to make political, economic, and social progress as an independent nation. But the directive stated clearly that the Commission might or might not recommend a trusteeship. An instruc- tion from the Operation and Planning Division of the War Department to General Hodge categorically stated that negotiation in connection with the proposed trusteeship was not the primary function of the Joint 2Enclosure to SWNCCC 176/18, "Political Policy for Korea," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VIII (Washington, 1971), p. 623f. 168 Commission.3 In short, the American government took the view that a trusteeship was not only the last step to be taken to help Korea but its form should be adapted to Korea's needs. This flexible approach to trusteeship existed even before the trusteeship controversy flared up among the Korean people in early 1946.4 In a press con- ference of January 25, 1946, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson reiterated that the trusteeship might be necessary, but if it was necessary, it should be for no longer than five years. More important, he said that the trusteeship for Korea was "not put forward as a concrete plan but as a suggestion as to the basis of discussion" at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers.5 General Hodge had been very suspicious of Russian intentions in Korea. As he saw it, little could be accomplished by the Joint Commission unless Russian propaganda was countered effectively by the United States and freedom of speech was restored throughout Korea. He contended that there had been nothing in the attitude of 30RD 091 Korea, War 96200, Feb. 6, 1946, to General Hodge, CCS 383.21 Korea, Section 4. 4Secretary Byrnes' radio report on the Moscow Conference, Dec. 30, 1945. 5The Department of State Bulletin, XIV, No. 344 (Feb. 3, 1946), p. 155. 169 the Russians to indicate that they had any thought of "unifying the Korean nation until the Russians were sure that the whole of Korea would be soundly commu- nistic."6 The American government was also worried about Russian propaganda activities and their impact upon the Koreans. It, therefore, instructed General Hodge to press as a matter of principle for agreement on freedom of speech, press, and travel of Koreans within Korea as soon as the Commission was opened. It was clear that America aimed at achieving its objectives without yield- ing to the Russians in matters of principle.7 The American delegation was advised to avoid giving the Russians excuses for breaking off the negoti- ations. For instance, the SWNCC directive stated that should the Russians not agree to the freedom of speech, press, and travel of Koreans, the American delegation should reserve their position in respect to these free- doms for final decision prior to the time the provisional Korean government began to function, press for initial agreement on travel by Commission members and their staffs throughout Korea to consult with Korean democratic 6Radio from General Hodge to General MacArthur, TFGCG 272, F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 629. 7SWNCC 176 series: telegram, Guidance for Ini- tial Meeting of Joint Commission on Korea, ibid., p. 644f. 170 parties and social organizations, and proceed to con- sider the structure of the provisional government. Thus, the United States faced the meeting of the Joint Commission with the basic attitude that final decisions on Korea were to be made only through ref- erence to the four powers, and that the decisions at the Commission should be made on the basis of a full repre— sentation of the Korean people.8 Although trusteeship was advisable for the Koreans, it, nevertheless, was a matter to be decided after consultation with the Koreans once they had established a provisional government. On March 20, 1946, the first meeting of the long- awaited Joint US-Soviet Commission met at the DOksu Palace in Seoul. This meeting was the first after the Japanese capitulation to discuss the overall problems of the present and future of Korea. At the opening session, General T. F. Shtykov, head of the Soviet delegation, read a statement which clarified the basic stance and policy of Soviet Russia in dealing with Korean ques- tions. He made the following important remarks: The Korean people had earned the right to independence and a free way of life; the future provisional Korean 8For the American concern in a fully representa- tive government for Korea, see paragraphs 4. d, and 4. e, of SWNCC 176/18, ibid., pp. 625-626; also, President Truman's message to the Congress, January 14, 1946, DSB, XIV, NO. 344, p. 139. 171 democratic government had to be created on the basis of all the "democratic parties and organizations support- ing the decisions of the Moscow Conference"; the Soviet Union had a keen interest in Korea "being a true demo- cratic and independent country friendly to the Soviet Union"; trusteeship corresponded with the fundamental interests of the Korean people; and People's Committees had been formed as an organ of democratic self- government.9 These remarks sounded embarrassing to the Ameri- can delegation whose approach so far to the Joint Com- mission had been largely based on a different interpretation of such terms as "democratic" or "reac- tionary," and suggested that the Commission faced difficulties. Shtykov made it clear that Russia con- sidered the Korean question in the context of her national security. He demanded that an independent Korea should be friendly to Russia. But the problem was that under the circumstances there was virtually no chance that an independent Korea could maintain friendly relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. The cold war confrontation between the two occupying powers had so developed in Korea that only a far-reaching compromise 9Statement by Colonel T. F. Shtykov at the open- ing session of the US-Soviet Joint Commission, March 20, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, pp. 652-654. 172 could have solved the Korean question. The Korean situation had so developed during the past seven months that if security needs were important to Soviet Russia, national prestige in the cold war showdown became impor- tant to the United States. Shtykov's statement that Korea must not be allowed to become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union did not impress the non-Communist Koreans. His remarks on the trusteeship issue left no choice to the Koreans and presented a challenge to the anti-trusteeship Koreans. They complained that the Russian assertion would place Korea in a conquered, and not in a liberated, status. They found it difficult to reconcile Russia's uncondi- tional adherence to the trusteeship clause with Shtykov's reference in the same statement that the Soviets upheld the principle of "self-determination and free existence of any nation." His criticism of the non—Communist Koreans as reactionaries and anti-democratic only con- tributed to deepening confusion concerning what was meant by the terms "democratic" and "reactionary." Shtykov further stated that a trusteeship would serve Korea's interests. It is not clear what he implied by "interests," but the expression provoked those Koreans who had been desperately opposing trustee- ship. Since the disclosure of the Moscow decisions, Opposition to the trusteeship had been the central ‘nWHu-fil—Hflflflllljjqu 173 political issue in south Korea. In north Korea, Soviet pressure caused the leadership to accept trusteeshp and 10 In blocked outspoken dissension among the people. the south, anti-trusteeship had become almost synonymous with anti-Communism. Naturally, Shtykov's demand that opponents of trusteeship be excluded from all consulta- tion with respect to the establishment of a Korean provisional government was received by the non-Communist Koreans as a device to get rid of them. The Russian aim of excluding the non-Communist Koreans from.Korea's future politics was made clear in Shtykov's assertion that the Communist-imposed People's Committee was the only true organ of self-government.11 From the outset, the discrepancy between the Russian stand on the trusteeship question and the Ameri- can view that trusteeship was no more than "a suggestion for discussion" stood in the way of agreement. The United States also demanded removal of existing restric- tions on free travel of Koreans and free circulation of information by radio, newspapers and public speeches prior to the formation of a provisional government.12 Any 10 . For more details, see supra, Chapter II, sec- tion 3. 11 . For more deta11s, see supra, Chapter 11, sec- tion 3. 12Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in Korea (to be shortened hereafter to CGUSAFIK) to the War Dept., DTG:21/1825 Z, Mar. 21, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Sectionfi 174 attempt to implement the Moscow decision while the nation was divided socially and economically impressed the non- Communist Koreans as futile. The Russians, on the other hand, held fast to the idea that the Joint Commission must not consult with those who had opposed the Moscow decision, even though these Koreans opposed only the trusteeship clause and not the Moscow decision itself. The Russians proposed to question the political platform of the parties and 13 They also organizations before they were consulted. demanded that the Joint Commission proceed without delay to prescribe the constituent form of the new Korean state and that the Commission write the basic document for the provisional Korean government.14 These Russian proposals led the American delegation to conclude that the Russians intended to select arbitrarily the per- sonnel of the provisional government and determine its structure after consulting only those parties and organizations to their liking. General Hodge reported to the War Department after the first meeting of the Com- mission that even though it was too early to be pessi- 'mistic, one could not but wonder whether the Soviets 13 14From CGUSAFIK to the War Department, DTG:21/1830, I, Mar. 21, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 5. Ibid. 'gflnlflfllllfld 175 "have any genuine desire to put an end to the present status quo in Korea.”15 In compliance with Ordinance No. 55 of the Military Government, 134 parties and organizations regis- tered in south Korea by the end of February, 1946.16 This was certainly not a desirable result and illustra- ted how the ordinary people were manipulated by a small number of politicians. Shtykov argued that many of these parties were not known to the Korean people and were not supported and participated in by the people. He demanded that only those parties officially recognized by the Russian and American commands be consulted.17 The American delegation, though embarrassed by the extraordinarily large number of parties, had no other choice but to recognize them Officially unless they were in violation of the regulation in Ordinance No. 55. undeniably, many of them consisted of hundreds and even tens of people. And unquestionably, it was hard for these small parties to act effectively, especially when consultation was becoming the central issue at the 15 16Summation, USAMGIK, No. 6 (March, 1946), p. 9. For the contents of Ordinance No. 55, see Summation, Japan and Korea, No. 5 (Feb., 1946), pp. 281-282. 17Report of the second meeting of the Commission by CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFURC 6, Mar. 24, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 5. Ibid. 176 Joint Commission. The organizational weakness of south Korea increased already existing difficulties. In north Korea, there were about thirty parties registered.18 The point, however, was that most of the parties were oriented toward Communism. NO party was free to ignore Soviet policies. There were nominally two non-Communist parties: Ch'Ong-U Dang (Young Friends of Ch'On-do-kyo Religion Party) and ChosOn Minju Dang (Korean Democratic Party). But the leaders of these non-Communist parties were being selected from Communist ranks. Party policies or actions had to be approved in advance by Communist authorities.19 After a week of meetings no progress had been made. It became more evident to the American delegation that to the Russians trusteeship was a "foregone conclu- sion to be settled even before the Provisional Korean Government was formed." It was equally clear that the Russians interpreted any non-Communist view as "undemo- "20 The representa- cratic, fascist, and pro-Japanese. tives of the Soviet Union sought to avoid all publicity concerning the procedures of the meeting. They defended 18 19 p. 340. 20CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFGCG 331, Mar. 26, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 5. Ibid. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I, 177 this position with the argument that the Koreans were 21 The interested in results and not in procedures. Communists and some leftists in south Korea faithfully echoed what the Russians asserted at the Commission. The American government took a firm position in the negotiations. America rejected any idea that dis- like of trusteeship should be made a criterion for excluding Korean individuals and organizations from consultation. "The final decision with regard to trustee- ship," the State Department contended, "rests neither with the Commission nor with Korea but with the four governments" in accordance with the Moscow Agreement.22 While America was prepared to accommodate its views on procedural matters to those of the Russians, it refused to compromise on the objective of estab- lishing a truly representative government for Korea. Heated debates continued on the issue of Korean representation at every meeting, with no avail. At the ninth meeting on April 5, for instance, Shtykov asserted that all the people in north Korea supported the Allies and the Moscow terms on Korea, implying that they were qualified for consultation. He then argued that in south Korea leaders who returned home after the 21See the documents of supra, n. 14 and n. 17. 22Secretary Byrnes to William Langdon, April 5, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 657. 178 liberation were without contact with the masses and therefore not qualified to be consulted with.23 It was repeatedly made clear by the Russians that support of the Moscow decision meant support of trusteeship. But this interpretation could not be accepted by the Americans who upheld Korea's right to free speech. They even insisted that final decision on trusteeship was in the strict sense "not the subject of the Joint US-Soviet . . "24 CommISs1on. A procedural compromise was proposed by the American delegation at the April 6th meeting. They pro- posed that parties and organizations to be consulted with must declare that they would cooperate with the Joint Commission. This American compromise was embodied finally in communiqué No. 5 issued on April 17, which demanded that all the parties and organizations that wanted to be consulted were required to declare in ‘written form their support of the "aims" of the Moscow decision on Korea to reestablish the country as an inde- pendent state and to abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in working out the basis of the future Korean 23CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFURC 18, April 8, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 5. 24Discussions at the eleventh meeting, CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFURC 20, April 9, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 5. 179 government.25 The National Society for the Rapid Realization of Independence, the largest amalgamation of the rightists of south Korea, adopted a message after communiqué NO. 5 was issued that it would COOperate with the efforts of the Joint Commission.26 As a result, the Joint Commission took on new life. But the basic question emanating from the trustee- ship issue remained unresolved. The declaration to be signed by the Koreans was supposed to support the aim of the Moscow decision, while what really mattered was the "method" of implementation. The central issue was put into the background for a while. More important, there existed a gap of interpretation between the two delegations regarding the act of signing the declaration. The Russians interpreted it as the sign of an outspoken support of the trusteeship clause. The Americans, how- ever, insisted that the act of signing assured the signers of the "privilege of expressing their views to the Commission either for or against trusteeship."27 This American intepretation was justifiable in the light of communiqué No. 6 signed by General A. V. Arnold éflui General T. F. Shtykov. The communiqué 25Commanding General, XXIV Corps to the War Department, TFURC 26, April 14, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 6; also, see Summationy USAMGIK, No. 7 (April, 1946). p. 15. 26Ibid., p. 14. 27 Ibid., p. 15. 180 stated emphatically that the purpose of the question- naires to be attached to the declaration was "to obtain for the Joint Commission a broad and clear under- standing of the opinions of the Korean people" and ”to give consideration to their advices and proposals on the question of the structure and principles of organization of the provisional Korean government."28 The Joint Commission reached an impasse as early as the beginning of April, as reported by the Associated Press. There was a rumor that the American government was planning to set up a Korean provisional government 29 The State Department and the in south Korea only. American authorities in Korea denied it instantly, but the prospects for an early conclusion of negotiation appeared gloomy. Both the Soviet and American delegations were unwilling to compromise on principle. Neither of them wanted to see the decisions of the Moscow Conference carried out in a way prejudicial to its own position in Korea. The American occupation authorities were getting more and more alarmed by the fact that the Communists and leftist parties in the two zones were closely 28 29CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFGCG 388, April 8, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 5. Ibid. 181 identified in their demands and activities. America's suspicion of Soviet tactics in Korea deepened.3O The American and Russian governments strove to take advantage of the seeming weakness of the other in Korea. The Americans, for intance, pressed the Soviet authorities to lift the black-out immediately and to allow complete freedom to the non-Communist groups in north Korea. The Russians, on the other hand, attacked the Americans for their relationship with the anti- trusteeship extreme rightists and for not abiding by 31 The Soviets already showed international agreements. that their major concern was the establishment of a friendly Korea and one amenable to working with them. The Americans were equally determined to prevent such a development. The United States wished to prevent Korea from becoming a center of international struggle and sought the creation of a Korean government which would prepare the way for an independent country not subject to domination by any outside power and presumably friendly to the United States. Neither the United States nor Soviet Russia, it became clear, would give up its control 30Department of State file, 740. 00119 PW/4- 1046, frOm Walter B. Smith to the Secretary of State, 1116, April 10,1946. 31State Department's circular letter, from the Secretary to certain diplomatic officers, April 23, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 661. 182 over half of Korea in exchange for a united Korea which might wind up in the opposite camp. The interests of the Korean people were not the major factor in their calculations. General Hodge, like other Americans who worked in the Commission, was quite disappointed by the devel- opments that had taken place. He was more and more convinced that the Korean Communists who opposed him had the support of the Soviets.32 He believed that there was little hope of having an effectively operative Korean central government so long as the two-nation occupation continued. He, therefore, resumed recommendation of withdrawal of both occupation troops from Korea. He doubted that even if a liberal democratic government was established in Korea, it would be allowed to function in north Korea as long as the Russian forces remained.33 The Department of State did not concur with Hodge's proposal. In spite of the difficulties of the Joint Commission, the Department did not wish to leave the impression that the United States was prepared to surrender its responsibility in Korea. The Korean . 32CGUSAFIK to the War Department, TFGCG 331, Mar. 26, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 5. 33Commanding General, XXIV Corps to the War Department, TFGCG 352, April 27,1946,CCS 383. 21, Korea, Section 6; also, see Langdon' 3 report to the SecreZary of State, May 8, 1946, F. R. ,1946, VIII, p 67 183 rightists, learning that America took a firm stand at the Commission, began to mollify their critical atti- tude toward the Military Government and supported in general the American effort at the Joint Commission. The view prevailed in the American government that there was no reason for the United States to retreat when its position in Korea was stronger than ever. The American delegation remained committed to establishing a provisional Korean government as fully representative as possible. They believed that more publicity about the Commission would strengthen the American position among the Koreans. They proposed to publish the questionnaires regarding the provisional charter and platform of the provisional government in order that the Korean parties and organizations would be able to make preliminary studies. The proposal was rejected by the Russian delegation on the ground that selection of parties and organizations to whom the Com- 35 mission sent out the questionnaires must come first. Deadlock was apparent. 340RD No. 370.5 TS, May 11, 1946, 005 383.21, Korea, Section 6. 35Commanding General, XXIV Corps to the Depart- ments of War and State, TFURC 37, May 4, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 6. 184 It became clear in early May that there could be no meeting of minds between the two delegations. As the meetings began to show signs of deadlock, each dele- gation endeavored to give the appearance of working hard and that the lack of progress was due to the other side. If the American delegation proposed, for instance, to study measures for helping and assisting the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean prople and measures of developing a democratic self-government and establishment of national independence of Korea, the Soviet delegation would propose in response the study of measures in fields of economic, internal and external trade, financial, training Korean personnel, national 36 It was evident that none of culture, justice, etc. these measures could be implemented effectively unless. the work of establishing a provisional Korean government made at least some progress. Even by May no progress had been made toward consulting the Korean representatives, the very first step for establishing a provisional government. The Americans worked on the hOpeful assumption that the Soviets would finally agree to consult all the democratic Korean parties because imposing conditions on 36An informal memorandum by the Soviet delega- tion, dated May 2. William Langdon's report to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 668. 185 consultation exceeded the authority of the delegation to the Joint Commission. Exclusion of those who voiced opposition to trusteeship was never warranted by the Moscow decision explicitly or implicitly. The American delegation upheld consistently the position that all parties or individuals were free to express their views on any political matter not affecting military security.37 As General Hodge emphasized, the Americans worked on the principle "not to defend any school of political thought, not to permit obstruction to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision, nor to defend views that trustee- ship may unduly delay Korea's independence."38 The United States held that it was impossible to deny the democratic parties and organizations the right guaranteed by the Moscow decision to participate in the formation of their own government solely because they had expressed honestly and openly their preference of immediate inde- pendence rather than a trusteeship. 37The American draft of press release on the adjournment of the Joint Commission, CGUSAFIK to Depart- ments of War and State, TFURC 40, May 7, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 6. 38Hodge's report on the Joint Commission to the Secretary of State, undated, received by the State Department on May 9, 1946, F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 667; also, see SummationyyUSAMGIK, No. 8 (May, 1946). p. 19. 186 On the other hand, the Russian delegation strove to make the trusteeship the 'meat' of the Moscow Con- ference. They insisted that there was no alternative to it, that opposition to it was subversive, and that the Koreans had no moral right to question the plans which 39 The Russians ruled their liberators had for them. that the groups of the Representative Democratic Council should be excluded from consultation,40 because Kim, Kiusic, the Acting Chairman of the Council and the leader of the moderate group, declared that the Council would cooperate with the work of the Joint Commission, with the understanding that after the formation of the pro- visional Korean government they would be able to express freely their opinion on political issues, including 41 opposition to trusteeship. The Soviets Openly stated on occasion that the Koreans were not ready for the Soviet form of democracy.42 Kim's statement can be considered as a reason- able concession. Since the demand of the Korean people for immediate independence was great and growing greater, 39Langdon's report to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, pp. 669-670. 40 41 42 Summation, USAMGIK, NO. 8 (May, 1946), p. 19. Ibid. Langdon's report, F.R., 1946, VII, pp. 669- 670. 187 the Korean rightists and moderates decided to postpone expression of their dislike of trusteeship until the more urgent job of establishing a provisional government was completed. The Russians now made it clear that they would not allow any expression of Opinion against trusteeship even after the establishment of a provisional government. In view of the Moscow decision in which the two delegations were required to cooperate with the provisional Korean government in matters of helping the Koreans, including trusteeship, this stubbornness dis- played by the Russians was a serious violation of the letter and spirit of the Moscow decision. Russian adamancy eventually served to weaken further the Soviet's position in south Korea. It was evident especially after communiqué No. 5 of April 17 and a negative reaction to it by the Soviet delegation later that the Joint Commission was going to fail. The American delegation found no reason to con- tinue fruitless discussions. On May 8, Shtykov told Hodge that he had orders from his superior commander to stop work with the Commission and to return north at once. This marked the end of negotiation. The United States looked forward to finding a way to disengage itself from south Korea without imperiling the independ- ence of the whole of Korea; the Soviet Union wanted to place the whole of Korea under its influence and to 188 exclude anti-Communist rightist groups from the political scene of Korea in the future; and the Koreans were anxious for an Opportunity to restore independence. None of these expectations were fulfilled. The confrontation between the United States and Soviet Russia deepened further. Americans associated with the Joint Commission condemned the Russians for delaying inten- tionally the work of the Joint Commission in order to exhaust American patience and bring about a decline of American interest in Korea. They likewise believed that the Soviets sought to increase local dissatisfaction with the division of the country.43 The Russians, in turn, charged the United States with instigating the Korean rightists to denounce the Moscow decisions.44 The American political adviser in Korea, William Langdon, sought to save the Commission by advising the State Department that the United States needed a more concrete proposal on the trusteeship question. He sug- gested that some kind of compromise had to be achieved on recognition that the Soviet government treated trus- teeship as something absolute and almost sacred, that the United States had from the beginning been the chief 43CGUSAFIK to Departments of war and State, May 24, 1946, CCS 383.21, Korea, Section 6. 44Izvestia's article, as quoted in the New York Times, May 16, I946. 189 proponent of trusteeship over Korea, and that Korea needed not only initial help and guidance but that the Koreans would likely be reconciled to a trusteeship when they saw the extent of authority enjoyed by the provi- 45 The desire to soft-pedal the sional government. trusteeship issue in the negotiations with Soviet Russia was gaining strength. WalterB. Smith, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, for instance, contended that the United States could achieve its objective of establishing a truly representative government in Korea by being more flexible on trusteeship.46 But the Military Governor Archer L. Lerch was pessimistic about Langdon's suggestion that the Koreans would readily be reconciled to trusteeship. "I do not believe it," he said. "If the Joint Commission announced establishment of the Provisional Government to be fol- lowed by two [pip] years of trusteeship," he continued, "47 More impor- "we should see much disaster and rioting. tant, nobody was clear about how much soft-pedaling was necessary to succeed in the negotiation and how to imple- ment it. There was no assurance that a truly representa- tive government could be established. If the United 45May 8, 1946, F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 670. 46Walter B. Smith to the Secretary of State, May 18, 1946, ibid., p. 680. 471bid., p. 675. 190 States did compromise, the question remained as to how much the Russians would compromise. The sense of con- frontation at the negotiation table had been such that any move toward a unilateral concession was tantamount to a unilateral loss of prestige and bankruptcy of policy. Thus, the first Joint US-Soviet Commission went sine die. Few people had a clear idea that the failure at the first main negotiation would result in immeasur- able cost in the months and years to come for Korea. In fact, the first Joint Commission proved later to be the first and the last sincere attempt to resolve the Korean questions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Afterwards, the two nations had strengthened their own positions, making any opportunity for compromise remoter still. Nor were the relations between the two nations improving in other areas of the world. The frustration, doubt, and impatience of the Koreans in the wake of the adjournment of the Joint Com- mission was almost explosive. The Korean rightists felt justified in their long-held doubt that there could be a compromise between the United States and Soviet Russia as long as Russia adhered to its definition of democracy. The Communists and most of the leftists of south Korea harshly denounced the position taken by the American delegation. In general, however, the non-Communists of 191 south Korea, as a sampling of public opinion reportedly indicated, had an awareness that the American position was in defense of the principle that the Koreans had the right to be heard in the formation of their own govern- ment.48 Understandably, this awareness was closely associated with a sense of despondency concerning the prospect of independence. The Koreans were tired of seeing conferences dragging indefinitely. Under the circumstances, the idea of a separate provisional government in south Korea crept into the scene. Despite denial, it was known that Syngman Rhee and his faction had favored some form of limited South Korean Assembly which might present Korea's case directly to the United Nations in case the Joint Commission broke 49 Colonel Preston Goodfellow, the down completely. adviser to General Hodge, was quoted as saying that if the Soviet delegation did not return to the Joint Commis- sion, the United States should go ahead with the job of "setting up a separate government in south Korea."50 The American government denied that it intended to set up a separate Korean government in south Korea. 48 49Langdon's report to the Secretary of State, June 16, 1946. F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 704. 50The New York Times, May 24, 1946, reported by Richard J. H. Johnston. Summation, USAMGIK, NO. 8 (May, 1946), p. 21. 192 Nor did the American Military Government consider a separate government for south Korea advisable under the 51 However, the concern of both the American situation. government and the Military Government over a representa- tive body which would assist the Military Government in matters of legislation and would assure the Koreans of more chance for the administrative work was bolstered undeniably after the impasse at the Joint Commission.52 One conceivable reason for this growing awareness was America's realization that the Russians had placed Koreans in office and were "making political capital out of the situation in [American] zone" where everything was done directly by the Military Government officials. The United States now felt it necessary to get off this spot as soon as possible in order to strengthen its position 53 further among the south Koreans. Despite the denial 51State Department file, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6-446, telegram TFGCG 397 from Seoul, June 4, 1946; also, see F.R., 1946, VIII, p. 690, n. 8. 52As reported by General John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of state for Occupied Areas, at a meeting held on May 2, 1946, F.R., 1946, VIII, pp. 681- 683; also, William Langdon and Charles Thayer, with Hodge's concurrence, to the Secretary of State, June 3, 1946, ibid., p. 690. 53A conversation at a meeting held on May 22, 1946, participated in by Secretary of State Byrnes, Sec- retary of War Patterson, Assistant Secretary of War Petersen, Assistant Secretary of Navy Sullivan accom- panied by Captain Dennison, General Hilldring, and Mr. H. F. Matthews, Acting State Department member to the SWNCC. F.R., 1946, VIII, pp. 681-682. 193 of the American authorities, the idea of more Korean participation in governing south Korea consistently found its expression in a separate provisional government. And this made the American government anxious not to give the impression to the Russians that it was going to break the frame of the Moscow Agreement for a unilateral action of setting up a separate Korean government in its own zone.54 In the Soviet zone, Communist control was inten- sified. The newspapers published in north Korea had shown no criticism of the Communist administration or of the Soviet policies being applied in north Korea. Using almost exclusively the title "democratic forces" in reference to itself, the Communist Party had assumed complete control of the economic, religious, and social life of North Korea, "drawing a political noose tighter" 55 about the nine million north Koreans. Only the Communist Party and many