U. S. INIGERIA: AN ANALYSIS (IF U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE NIGERIAIBIAFRA WAR. 1967-1970 a}: Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LEVI AIIALAZU NWACHUIIU 1973 This is to certify that the thesis entitled U.S./Nigeria: An Analysis of the U.S. Involvement in the Nigeria/Biafra War, 1967-70. presented by Levi A . Nwachuku has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. . H' 1: degree in 18 ory I Us). VIKI'DK'SLXQ L I ‘ ' \1\ IF/ Major professor Date October 2h, 1973. 07639 2‘ magma av '. NOAH & SUNS II, BIIIIK BINUEIIY I _I; LIBRARY amps I: SPRINGPOIILIICHI II “ ~: _ u BIL» A A I-v" 3?“ 33oz! :c’wj‘fii‘J-w" ‘3 I _ I: flirt-”IR Li 3” "’5. ’— 10 77 ‘,' ;; {Q . .'» - 1 7 -I ABSTRACT U.S./NIGERIA: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE NIGERIA/BIAFRA WAR 1967-1970 BY Levi Akalazu Nwachuku In 1967, the Nigerian federation disintegrated as a result of the secession of the former eastern region which declared itself the "Republic of Biafra" on May 30. Consequently, a civil war erupted. It lasted from July 6, 1967 to January 12, 1970. The conflict attracted world attention and many countries involved themselves in dif- ferent ways. Russia and Britain supplied arms to the Nigerian Federal Government; France expressed sympathy for the Biafran cause; Egypt supplied Nigeria with military pilots and Portugal served as a diplomatic service center for Biafra. While the majority of independent African nations supported Nigeria's territorial integrity, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia accorded Biafra diplomatic recognition. An attempt is made in this work to analyze the role of the United States in the Nigeria/Biafra War, esPecially Levi Akalazu Nwachuku to verify two popularly held notions: one, that the U.S. government took a neutral stance and two, that many parallels could be drawn between the Nigerian conflict and the nine- teenth century American Civil War. Since the war is a very recent event, some govern- ment documents which deal with the official attitude of the U.S. are not within the reach of scholars. It would be re- vealing, for instance, to know what transpired in the National Security Council meetings which were held to discuss the Nigerian problem. Also, private correspondences of the ambassadors (Elbert Matthews and later William Trueheart) to their superiors at the Department of State would shed greater light on an understanding of the official policy towards the Nigerian War. I relied heavily on congressional records and hear- ings, public statements of the presidents and government officials. Also interviews I had with some government officials and individuals whose organizations were involved in relief programs for Nigeria were very fruitful. The following major conclusions emerge from the research: despite its declared posture of neutrality, the U.S. government played a crucial role; it was not neutral. Its concern was the survival of Nigerian unity and thus during the war, it directed its policy towards that end. Though it was deeply disturbed by reports of starvation in Levi Akalazu Nwachuku the Biafran enclave, its efforts to send adequate relief to the starving people of Biafra was, more often than not, hampered by political considerations. There was a general reluctance among the American public to encourage an overt U.S. government intervention especially in the military aspect. The public feared that its government had already over extended itself in South East Asia. The involvement of the U.S. public in the Nigerian war was largely humanitarian. It cared very little about the right or wrong of the conflict. Essentially the policy of the United States government, eSpecially in the political aspect, followed the Russian and British patterns. They were committed to maintain the integ- rity of Nigeria as a united nation. However, the U.S. ex- ecuted its policy differently from the others. It shunned overt military assistance, but preferred to achieve its objec- tive by quiet diplomacy. The historical differences between Nigeria and the U.S. especially in their cultural and societal structure underline a major problem which makes an analogy between the civil wars of the two nations a fruitless effort. U.S./NIGERIA: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE NIGERIA/BIAFRA WAR 1967-1970 BY Levi Akalazu Nwachuku A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1973 @34ny TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Chapter I. II. III. INTRODUCTION CIVIL WARS: A THEORECTICAL ANALYSIS, SUDAN, ZAIRE AND NIGERIA, A CASE STUDY 0 O O O O O O O O I O O O O 0 Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The British Colonial Policy . . . Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Congo (Zaire) . . . . . . . . BACKGROUND TO THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR . . . The Hausa-Fulani . . . . . . . . . . . . The Yoruba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Ibo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The British and Nigerian Unity . . . . . Indigenous Reactions to the Unification The Collapse of Unity . . . . . . . . . The Action Group and the Western Region Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Treason Trial of Chief Obafemi Awolowo . . . . . . . . . . . The Census Crisis 1962— 63 . . . . . . . Lagos University Crisis 1965 . . . . . . Political Re- alignments and the Federal Elections of 1964 . . . . . Western Region Election, November 1965 . The Coup d'état, January 15, 1966 and the Subsequent Break Up of the Nigerian Federation . . . . . . . . . . NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1960-1970 . . . 1960-1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 14 18 23 24 30 34 39 48 51 52 55 60 63 67 69 71 76 76 Racial Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . Pan-Africanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . Britain and The Commonwealth . . . . . . The United States and The Western bloc . The U.S.S.R. and the Communist bloc . . . The First Republic: Concluding Remarks . Foreign Policy 1966-1970 . . . . . . . . Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pan-Africanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . Britain and the Commonwealth . .-. . . . The Communist bloc . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. THE POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR . . . . . . . . . Executive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . Nixon' s Response . . . . . . . . . . . . Congressional Response . . . . . . . . The Department of State and the Nigeria-Biafra Conflict . . . . . . . . The Public Posture . . . . . . . . . . . The Academicians . . . . . . . . . . . . V. UNITED STATES HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE NIGERIAN CONFLICT O . C O O O O C I C O O O The Human Tragedy of the War . . . . . . The U. S. Government . . . . . . . . . . Joint Church Aid (JCA) U. S. A. . . . . . . Church World Service (CWS) . . . . . . . Catholic Relief Services (CRS) . . . . . American Friends Service Committee and Mennonite Central Committee . . . . Ad hoc Organizations . . . . . . . . . The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) . . . . . . . . . . . . Activities in the Federal Areas . . . . . Activities in the Biafran Enclave . . . . Nigerian Reaction to U.S. Humanitarian Involvement . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI. NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR AND THE U.S. CIVIL WAR: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . The U.S. Civil War 1861-1865 . . . . . . iii 81 83 86 92 97 102 104 106 108 109 110 113 114 121 123 125 134 145 149 153 153 157 160 164 166 167 168 173 173 174 176 182 186 189 Sectional Differences . . . The Issue of Slavery . . . Nigeria-Biafra War . . . British Attitude Towards the Two Wars Character of the Rebellion The Confederate War . . . . Lessons of the Two Events . Conclusion . . . . . . . . VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . iv 191 192 195 203 206 209 210 213 214 219 10. LIST OF TABLES Northern Civil Service, lst June 1958 . . . Staff Position, University of Lagos 1964-65 Students' Position University of Lagos 1964-65 0 C O O O O O C O O O O C O O O O O The 1964 Federal Election Results . . . . . Pattern of Nigerian Import Trade with Commonwealth Countries, 1961-1966 . . . . . Pattern of Nigerian Export Trade with Commonwealth Countries, 1961-1966 . . . . . Nigeria's External Loans 1960-1962 . . . . Estimate of Food Production Deficit Within Biafra for 1969 . . . . . . . . . . Church World Service Contributions Catholic Relief Services Contributions to Relief Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 27 65 66 69 90 91 100 156 165 166 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION CIVIL WARS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS, SUDAN, ZAIRE AND NIGERIA, A CASE STUDY A civil war is an internal conflict1 which the peeple of a country fight amongst themselves generally within national boundaries. Most civil wars of this century have increasingly witnessed external involve- ments, which have proven crucial and decisive. Never- theless, the chief actors in a civil war are the pe0ple involved in internecine strife, and it is they who suffer or benefit. Civil wars are very much a part of human history. For thirty years (1618-1648) Germany was embroiled in a war in which the states fought one another. Between 1642-1649 England was involved in a war in which the royal forces (Cavaliers) lined up against the Parliamentary forces 1Martin Edmonds regards a civil war as a "specific and exceptional form of internal conflict, an intra- societal conflict," see "Civil War: A Taxonomy and Ty- pology" in Robin Higham, ed., Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century (Lexington, 1972), pp. 11-25. 1 (Roundheads). The United States, also, did not escape the frustrations of a civil war for she engaged in it from 1861 to 1865. In the present century, many nations have been tormented by civil war. It was a traumatic experience for Russia in 1917. Spain fought hers in 1936. Zaire's war, from 1960-1962, almost degenerated into an unmanage- able coflict, and Nigeria experienced the agony of a horrifying civil war from 1967-1970.2 In order to analyze and assess civil wars in their true historical perspective, it is important to examine each case in its own setting. The socio-economic and political-cultural background of a country largely deter- mines the causes, direction and focus of its internal strife. Because "secession" has been a common factor in many major civil wars, there is the urge to interpret the causes of civil wars in the context of secession. In this light, the American Civil War could be explained in terms of an attempt by the southern states to secede from the union; the Nigerian Civil War resulted from the creation of Biafra; and the Sudanese War was occasioned by the southern struggle to break away from northern political 2Other civil wars of this century include the Laotian, 1959-62; the Lebanese 1959-62; the Chinese, 1945- 49; and the Burmese, 1948-1954. domination. In the above context, a civil war could thus be interpreted as a struggle by a nation to combat centrifugal and particularistic forces which threaten its solidarity. Such an interpretation betrays a lack of historical understanding of factors which underlie specific cases of civil wars. As the Pakistani war in 1972 demon- strated, secession sometimes becomes the effect, and not the cause of a civil war. The theoretical analyses of civil wars in Africa based on the experiences of Nigeria, Zaire and Sudan will deal primarily with causation. In his discussion of the etiology of internal wars, Harry Eckstein stressed two factors, "preconditions" and "precipitants." He stated that "a precipitant is an event which actually occasions the war" while "the preconditions are those events which make it possible for precipitants to bring about political . 3 Violence." However, it is important to note that the precipitants of a civil war may not relate to the pre- conditions. In essence, it may not often be possible to tell the preconditions by analyzing the precipitants. This dilemma poses the need to study each set of factors independently of the other. 3Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War," History and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1964/65), p. 140. Also what Eckstein has called "preconditions" and "precipitants" can be reduced to such terms as "re- mote" and "immediate" causes. The remote causes can be traced to the totality of the history of the nation in- volved while the immediate causes would be spontaneous incidents which the political leadership can not contain. In analyzing the preconditions for a civil war in the three selected countries--Nigeria, Zaire and Sudan-- the following propositions are important: 1. Politico-cultural heterogeneity which results in the develOpment of nationalism within each cultural boundary. In this respect, the nation is victimized by micro- nationalisms which withdraw allegiance from the national consciousness. 2. Process of uneven development and pro- gress among different ethnic groups within the nation. The less developed and progres- sive group regards itself as dominated by the more progressive group and feels the urge to gain security by controlling its own political destiny. As in the case of Katanga, the more progressive group sometimes finds satisfaction in severing political ties with other groups that are less economically advantaged. 3. Policy of colonial masters. The desire of the colonial powers to create a nation from pluralistic societies, while erecting barriers which inhibit total integration of the different component groups. Nations that evolve in this fasion tend to endure only with the political presence of the colonial power. The causes of the civil wars in the three selected countries will be analyzed against the background of the three propo- sitions. Sudan Sudan is a large country comprising almost one 0 I 0 4 O I I I million square m1les. It has been v1ct1m1zed by chronic internal divisiveness which became more acute since in- dependence in 1956. The provinces of the southern 4See P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, From the Funj Sulfanate to the Present Day_(New York, 1961), p. 4. Sudan--Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile--maintain a political, economic and cultural outlook different from the north. The differences in the outlook of the two regions was molded primarily by the nature of their re- spective contacts with the outside world. Northern Sudan had for several thousand years been in almost continuous contact with Mediterranean,-and, to a greater degree, Middle Eastern peoples.5 The influx of Arab peOple into the region led to the creation of a large Arabicized and and Muslim population.6 Some critics consider the Northern Sudan to be more of an Arab than an African country.7 The South presents a different politico-cultural orientation, and the population is predominantly African. Its contact with the outside world began only during the middle of the nineteenth century.9 The swamp and sudd formed by the rivers that have run off the slopes of the Nile-Congo Divide greatly contributed to the relative 5See Mandour Eh Mahdi, A Short History of the Sudan (London, 1965), pp. 27-28. 61bid. 7See Voice of Southern Sudan, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1963), p. 1. 8Joseph Oduho and William Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan (London, 1963), pp. 9-10. 9Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Back- ground to Conflict (London, 1968), pp. 9-12. isolation of the Southern Sudan. The absence of geo- graphical barriers between it and its southern neighbors, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya, made for much easier communica- tion between it and the latter. Thus, Southern Sudan's development took an African focus. Politicized southerners stress their cultural differences in relation to their northern neighbors and emphasize their Africanity.10 That the Southern Sudan regarded itself as a separate politico-cultural entity is reflected in the speech of Aggrey Jaden at the Khartoum conference in 1965. The Sudan falls sharply into two distinct areas, both in geographical area, ethnic group and cultural systems. The Northern Sudan is oc- cupied by a hybrid Arab race who are united by their common language, common culture and common religion, and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and political interpretation . . . the people of the Southern Sudan . . . belong to the African ethnic group of East Africa, they do not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in origin, arrangements and basic systems but in all concernable purpose. With this real division, there are in fact two Sudans and the most important thing is that there can never be basis of unity between the two. There is nothing in common between the various sections of the community; no body of shared beliefs, no identity of interests . . . and above all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single com- munity . . . The two communities can never see face to face even in enforced assimilation. 10Voice of Southern Sudan, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 1-2. 11Round-Table Conference on the Southern Sudan, Khartoum, March 1965, speech by Aggrey Jaden (Sudan In- formation News Agency Documents, n.d.), p. 144. The south, convinced that they are a people set apart by virtue of historical and cultural factors, re- garded any form of unity under the influence of Northern 12 This southern View compels one Sudan as imperialism. to conclude that only the eradication of the political and cultural differences which exist between the two sections and the cultivation in both sections, especially in the south, of a spirit of belonging to the national institutions, can eliminate the threat of a civil upheaval. The schism created by the historical and cultural diversity of the country is aggravated by the uneven political and economic development of the two sections. The north's regular outside contacts gave it a considerable advantage over the south. The north maintains many com- mercial enterprises whereas the south depends largely on subsistence agriculture.13 The south has blamed this lag on the north, contending that the north encourages and sustains southern economic backwardness. Oliver Albino stated four instances in which the Arab North suppressed 12See "Southern Sudan To-day: A Test Case in Afro-Arab Cooperation," Voice of Southern Sudan, Vol. 1, No. 1, (April 1963). 13Beshir Mohamed Omer states that the south "lags behind_the north in this [economic] reSpectm" see The Southern Sudan, p. 4. I'I . ’- economic undertakings in the south.14 Southerners have argued that the north sees southern economic backwardness to its advantage for it enables them to exert political control over the south.15 This thinking contributed to the south's determination to demand an antonomous politcal existence. Southerners see in such a demand a guarantee for an existence that is free from northern political domination and economic eXploitation. Aggrey Jaden has stated that "only freedom can allay the Southern Sudanese 16 If there had been allegation of economic exploitation." an equal economic progress in both sections, the south would not have feared domination from the north. Joseph Garang, Minister of State for Southern Affairs, emphati- cally stated that "the cause of southern problem is the inequality which exists between the north and south by reason of an uneven economic, social, and cultural develop- ment."17 14Attempts to install the following four industries ‘were thwarted by Arab controlled northern government, and the industries were established in the north: Messrs. Bauxal and Co. for sugar production; a paper factory firm; a fish-canning plant; and a meat factory. See The Sudan: A Southern View (London, 1970), pp. 88-110. 15Ibid., p. 91. 16Khartoum Conference, p. 141. 17See "Regional Autonomy for the South: Speeches by Joseph U. Garang, Minister of State for Southern Affairs," A Revolution in Action, No. 2 (Khartoum, n.d.), p. 8. 10 The British Colonial Policy The Sudanese have felt that British policy largely created the problem of internal divisiveness in their country. The Sudan Ministry of Southern Affairs expressed this feeling when it said that "the root of the problem of the Southern Sudan can be found in the annals of yester- day's African colonial era."18 An examination of British policy in Sudan reveals that while it aspired to build a unified nation, Britain nevertheless encouraged measures which only served to inhibit progress towards the goal of national unity. In this regard, H. A. MacMichael's statement is instructive: The policy of the government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial and tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage, and beliefs.19 Briefly, some of the measures which inhibited rather than fostered progress toward unity were: Religious Policy: Christian missionaries were allowed to proselytize among the southerners, but their activities were prohibited lBIbid. I p. 2. 19See strictly confidential memorandum on southern policy, January 25, 1930 by Sir Harold MacMichael, Bahr el-Ghazal cs/I.C.I. in British Southern Policy in the Sudan (1965): p. l. 11 in the Muslim north or among the Muslims. This policy is borne out by Evelyn Baring Cromer's statement in a private letter to Lord Lansdowne. He said, "I have no objection to giving the missionaries a fair field amongst the black pagan population in the equational regions, but to let them loose at present amongst the . . . moslems of the Sudan would, in my Opinion, be little short of insane."20 Missionaries were influential in molding the develOpmental outlook of colonial societies. Thus the Southern Sudan developed along Christian lines while the north developed within a framework of Islamic tradition. This contrast was detrimental to the course of unity. Cultural differ- ences could have been attenuated if both sections were ex- posed to the same religious influences. Educational Measures: Missionary societies were responsible for providing education in the Southern provinces although the British government subsidized the schools.21 This was the pattern of educational develOpment in many British colonies. The flaw in regard to Sudan, as in Nigeria, was that Christian 20See Cromer to Lansdowne, March 9, 1900 (F.O. 633), Vol. 8/P.R.O. in Muddathir Abdel-Rahim, The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan 1899-I947 (Khartoum, 1968) l p0 5. 21See Annual Report of 1926 (Sudan No. 2, 1927) Introduced by Muddathir Abdel-Rahim, The Development Of British Policy, p. 16. 12 missionary educational activities were restricted to a particular section--those areas inhabited by non—Muslims. It would have served the cause of unity if the different peOples of Sudan were exposed to the same educational influence and at an equal pace. Evidently, the British government did not realize the importance of such a measure, for when in 1926, an Inspector of Southern Education was appointed, he was instructed to begin his assignment by first visiting Uganda "in order to study the methods adopted there, among a pOpulation somewhat similar" to those that inhabited the Southern Sudan.22 Thus, southern education took the orientation of its east African neighbors, whereas in the north education followed Islamic tradition. Arabic was the language of instruction in the northern schools and as Joseph Garang stated, "it became anathema to speak Arabic in southern towns" and "its teaching was prohibited."23 The problem of the different educational measures was aggravated by the southern feeling that theirs did not measure up to the 22See Command Paper No. 2991, 1927, p. 73. 23See A Revolution in Action, No. 2, n.d., p. 12. For the British attitude toward the use of Arabic language in the south, see Private Memorandum in CS/I.C.I., Jan. 25, 1930, from the Civil Secretary's Office to the Governors of Upper Nile, Oongalla and Bahr el-Ghazal provinces, repro- duced in British Southern Policy, the memorandum stated inter alia, thatIIthe restriction of Arabic is an essential feature of the general scheme . . ." 13 northern standard.24 It is in this context that Godfrey Morrison commented that "the educational backwardness of the south as compared to the north has had dire consequences, adding even at the present time to all the other points of division, and sharpening the superiority/inferiority syn- drome which seems still to lie at the heart of the southern problem."25 Administrative Policy: The administrative policy of Britain in Southern Sudan also helped to solidify the socio-cultural divisions between the north and south. For instance, the inhabitants of Darfur were allowed entry into Bahr el-Ghazal only by permits from the governors of the provinces involved.26 Also traders from Northern-Sudan were not permitted to establish their businesses in the Southern Sudan. Efforts were made to replace the northern traders in the southern provinces with locals.27 This policy of division was 24See Voice of Southern Sudan, Vol. I, 1964/64, pp. 7-8. 25Godfrey Morrison, The Southern Sudan and Eritrea: As ects of Wider African Problem, Report NO. 5, 11971), p. I0 26sec agreement between Governor Dupuis of Darfur and Governor Ingleson of Bahr el-Ghazal at Safaha on March 28, 1935 reproduced in British Southern Policy in the Sudan. p. 1. 27See letter B.G.P./SCR/l C/9 from Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal Province to the District Commissioners, June 10, 1930 in British Southern Policy in Sudan, p. 2. 14 instrumental in the promulgation of the "closed districts" 28 measure which took effect in 1922. This edict enabled the governors of the southern provinces to reserve their 29 It is, however, ironic provinces for the southerners. that the British government regarded this policy of "separation" as a "protective barrier which it had been necessary . . . to build up against exploitation by 30 In retrospect, it northern merchants and others." appears as if the policy did not, in fact, ban northern exploitation; the south consistently has argued that it has been exploited by the north. In this wise, the policy was a protective barrier against progress towards a united Sudan. Nigeria Nigeria is a socio-culturally heterogenous nation. Until 1963 when the mid-west region was created, Nigeria was administratively divided into regions corresponding to the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Ibo in the east and the Yoruba in the west. 28For details of the promulgation of "Closed district" measures see Laws of the Sudan (Sudan Government, 1941). PP. 132-143. 29 Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan, p. 42. 30‘Harold MacMichael, The Sudan (London, 1954)! p. 117. 15 Because of the cultural and historical differences among the ethnic groups, each region develOped in its own way. The three major political parties, the Northern PeOples Congress, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens and the Action Group, were ethnically-oriented. Each region developed its own local consciousness31 to the extent that each had the potential for nationhood. Given the above circumstances, Nigerians identi— fied more with their respective regions and less with the "concept" of Nigeria. Thus "Nigeria" as a nation was the creation of the colonial power which ruled over the different indigenous peoples. The amalgamation of the peoples, deSpite their ethnic differences and wishes,32 made Nigeria a potential target for a civil strife. The pattern of political and economic development in Nigeria stimulated internal instability. Before inde- pendence, the western and eastern regions were politically 33 Thus, the north saw more articulate than the north. independence in a different context from the east and west. While the latter regions felt that the former was slowing down progress towards independence, the north believed 31See Victor Olorunsola, "Nigerian Cultural National- ism," African Forum, III, No. I (Summer 1967), pp. 78-89. 2See Nigerian reactions to the amalgamation in Chapter II. 33 See Ahmadu Bello, My Life, (Cambridge, 1960), 16 that the southern regions would, by dint of their political soPhistication, dominate Nigeria after independence.34 Such thinking resulted in political competition among the regions rather than political harmony.* As in politics, economic progress was uneven among the regions, with the north lagging behind the east and west.35 The former felt a sense Of insecurity and believed that its survival was possible only if it were left to determine its own political destiny.v An integrated economic policy ensuring equal develOpment in all the regions could have helped the process of national integration. But policy failed to focus in this direction, and the result was regional/ethnic economic and political competition in which one region regarded the other as an alien competitor. John R. Harris and Mary P. Rowe noted that indigenous entrepre- neurial establishments were ethnically oriented, in which case, they served as a disintegrative force.36 *It turned out that the more populous north dominated Nigerian politically after the country's independence. 34This fear was well expressed by Ahmadu Bello, 351bid., p. 111. 36See "Entrepreneurial Attitudes and National Integration: The Nigerian Case," in Robert L. Melson and Howard Wolpe, eds.,Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism (East Lansing, 1971), pp. 145-163. 17 British colonial policy also provided a cause for a civil war in Nigeria. The country was a British device. Its endurance depended largely on how well British inte- grative measures worked. An examination of London's role indicates that its policies served British political and administrative interests at the expense of Nigerian unity. The regionalization of Nigeria fostered ethnic politics and thus helped to widen ethnic divisions in the country.37 Political parties had strong ethnic foci and competed with one another. If Britain had not encouraged political de- centralization, ethnic differences could have been sub- merged in a strong allegiance to the concept of a "Nigerian nation." The dilemma created by political decentralization became compounded by the fact that one region--the north-- was given the advantage of sending twice the number of representatives as the other two to the Federal Parliament. This had the adverse effect of tilting political power favorably to the north and creating a condition for sus- picion in the other regions. Also, the British policy of "indirect rule" con- tributed to the intensification of cultural divisions among the regions. That system encouraged the maintenance 37See for instance Richards' Constitution, 1946, which decentralized Nigeria. Reactions to it were negative. See AWO (Cambridge, 1960), p. 47; also Zik (Cambridge, 1960), p. 100. \ 18 of the traditional values of each ethnic group, especially the Hausa-Fulani, at the eXpense of the develOpment of national consciousness. If Britain had ruled directly and adOpted uniform administrative measures for all the regions, the different ethnic groups could have nurtured a sense of attachment and belonging to the Nigerian govern- ment. In light of this, the Nigerian colonial experience was the seed of her civil war. The seed flowered when Britain, the symbol of unity departed. The Congo (Zaire) Zaire's civil war, which culminated in Katanga's declared secession, was more the result of Congo's colonial experience than its pre-colonial historical background. The centrifugal forces which encouraged Katanga's secession were rooted in Belgium's colonial administration.38 In his desire to attract commercial and industrial enterprises to Katanga province, Leopold II adOpted measures which essentially gave provincial control to com- mercial and industrial companies. In 1891 Albert Thys and 38Contrary to this View, Philippa Schuyler contends that the Belgian government bears no responsibility for the Katanga secession. She argued that the Lunda and Bayeke tribesmen had nourished a historic desire to restore their ancient kingdom of Katanga to its previous greatness. See Who Killed the Congo (New York, 1962), pp. 207-208. Also SmiEH Hempstone argues that "ethnic, Linguistic, geographic, economic and political [factors] have conspired to create a feeling of separateness in Katanga." See Katanga Report (London, 1962), p. 32. 19 his company, the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et 1'industrie (CCCI), received from LeOpold II the right to organize the occupation and eXploitation of Katanga.39 In 1900, the CCCI transferred its re3ponsibility to the Comité Special du Katanga (CSK), formed by the Congo Free State and Compagnie du Katanga. For ten years (1900-1910) the CSK maintained the administration of Katanga. In this regard, Katanga was a quasi-independent state within the larger Congo state. Even when the Belgium government took over the administration of Katanga in 1910, it placed it in a privileged position. Katanga was administered by a vice-governor-general who could act independently from the capital at Boma.40 This autonomy and also the large influx of Europeans41 gave Katanga an identity and outlook different from the other provinces. The extent to which European settlers contributed to Katanga's secession is manifested in their reaction to any measure that would integrate Katanga politically with the other Congolese provinces. In 1920, 39Crawford Young, Politics in the Cogg: Decoloniza- tion and Independence (Princeton, 1965f, P. 2. 401bid. 41 In 1956, Katanga had 31 percent of the total European pOpulation of the Congo, see Rene Lemanchand, ”The Limits of Self-determination," p. 406. II .- a. 20 Europeans in Katanga attempted to remove the intermediate links between the Minister of Colonies and the Province of Katanga by suggesting that the Government General should be transferred from the Congo to Brussels. They also reacted negatively when in 1933, provincial vice- governors were stripped of their legislative powers in 42 Edouard favor of centralization under Leopoldville. Bustin argued that "the significance of this state of things hardly needs to be emphasized, and it has rightly been considered the deepest root of Katanga's separation."43 From an economic and political standpoint, the Eur0pean settlers made the idea of secession attractive.44 Having created a condition in which Katanga develOped economically and politically along different lines from the other provinces, the Belgian government held Congo together only by its political presence. Thus when the Belgians departed, Katanga saw an Opportunity to withdraw from the political union. In light of this, the responsibility for the civil upheaval in Congo falls heavily on the Belgian colonial policy. 42Jules-Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secessions (Madison, 1966), p. 9. 43'See Edouard Bustin, "The Congo,“ in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., Five African States, Resppnses to Diversity (Ithaca, 19637, p. 40. 44Rene Lemarchand, "The Limits of Self-determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession." ..\\ . ... 21 An examination of the forces that have produced conditions for civil upheaval in three selected countries-- Nigeria, Sudan and Zaire--poses a major historical question: To what extent should civil wars in independent African countries be attributed to indigenous factors, and to what degree are they traceable to colonial policies? In the analysis of the etiology of civil wars in some African countries much emphasis has been placed on tribalism.45 It is contended that the tribal orientation of many African nations produced centrifugal forces which are inimical to social and political harmony within those nations. Since civil wars hardly erupted during the colonial regimes, it could be plausibly argued that these governments contributed to the political stability which the colonies enjoyed. That civil wars began only after the departure of the colonial masters seems to buttress the above contention. However, an evaluation of the causes of civil wars, using the three countries as case studies, cmmpels one to conclude that colonial policy was a sig- ruficant, and perhaps the major cause of civil wars in independent African countries. 45See James S. Coleman, "The Problem of Political hungration in Emergent Africa," Western Political Quarterly, YdL 8, No. 1 (March, 1955), pp. 44-57; ImmanuelWEIIerstein, Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," figufrs d' Etudes Africaine, Vol. 2, No. 3 (October, 1960), 22 Tribal consciousness and ethnic allegiance which have undermined the stability and national cohesiveness of some African countries, Nigeria in particular, were strengthened by colonial policies. In Nigeria, for example, "indirect rule," which was not uniformly applied to all the major ethnic groups, produced a condition whereby each ethnic group re- 5ponded self-consciously to the colonial situation. The system was a failure among the Ibos in the east and to a lesser degree among the Yorubas in the west.46 Thus in the latter regions, Britain adOpted a policy of "direct rule," bringing its influence and culture to them. On this score, the eastern and western societies became a hybrid of British and indigenous cultures, while the northern society was scarcely permeated by British culture. Essentially what this policy did was to create a Nigerian society that is divided not by tribal differences, but by an uneven exposure to colonial influences. The impact of ethnic differences among the Nigerians was not a crucial factor in causing the civil war, but colonial legacies, the competitive economy, political parties, and competing religious beliefs (Islam and Christanity) placed the respective ethnic groups in an uneasy mood of "survival of the fittest." Under such cir— cumstances, a civil strife was bound to occur. 46See John Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster (Chicago, 1970), pp. 191-261. CHAPTER II BACKGROUND TO THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR Nigerians will always remember 1966 as the year in which the country's stability was tested and found wanting. Problems that have nagged it prior to, and after indepen- dence exploded into a tragedy that tore it into pieces for almost four years. Few crises in Africa could rival the magnitude of the Nigerian disaster. The misery incurred and the loss of human lives resulting from that conflict defy accurate analysis. The conflagration soon became an international concern. 'It will be a long time before one fully can understand the nature of international involve- ment. However, the war between Nigeria and Biafra made one point clear: diplomacy makes strange bed fellows. Nigeria is a country of many ethnic groups. Largest are the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west and the Ibo in the east, each of which takes continuing pride in its cultural and historical individuality. The 1 Ibo dispersed from Awka and Orlu, located in the 1G. I. Jones, The Trading States of Oil Rivers (London, 1963), p. 302 Okoi Arikpo has suggested a south- ward migration of the Ibos, but fails to designate an origin point. See Okoi Arikpo, The Development of Modern Nigeria (Baltimore, 1967), p. 17. 23 24 geographical area which the Ibo occupy today. There are, however, some Ibos, the Onitsha Ibo, in particular, who, because of some institutional similarities with Benin, argue that they originated in western Nigeria.2 The origin of the Ibo is still a matter of Speculation. For the present we shall have to maintain (until further research reveals otherwise) that the Ibo originated from their present homeland. The Hausa-Fulani To understand the forces which later led to the civil war in 1967, it is important to examine the socio-cultural and political differences among the three major ethnic groups. Organized hierarchically and feudalistically, the Hausa-Fulani comprise the major northern ethnic group. The Fulani have controlled the political and economic life of northern Nigeria since their conquest of HauSaland in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Their government is theocratic, based on Islamic traditions, with power held by sultans and emirs. Because of their Islamic religion and racial admixture, the Hausa-Fulani are inclined to look to North Africa and other Muslim areas for their affiliation.3 2Nnamdi Azikiwe, My Odyssey (London, 1970), pp. ii-ix. 3This had an impact in shaping Nigerian foreign policy. Efforts were made to develop fraternal ties with the Muslim countries. See J. S. Coleman, "The Foreign Policy of Nigeria," in Joseph E. Black (ed.) Forei n Policies in a World of Change (New York, 1963), pp. 383-383. 25 In order to retain their authority, the sultans and emirs have been reluctant to divorce politics from religion. In a theocratic polity, such as Hausa-Fulani society, the sultans and emirs who are Spiritual leaders wield authority.r It would thus be to their advantage to maintain the theocracy of the society. Their position was strengthened when the British introduced the system of "indirect rule" into Northern Nigeria at the turn of the twentieth century. This system recognized the authority of the spiritual leaders and made them Spokesmen of their peOple. On this score, the sultans and emirs had a double advantage of enhancing their authority from both the Islamic religious tradition and the British colonial power. The masses entrusted their fate to them and as a result failed to develOp political consciousness. Thus a majority of the Hausa-Fulani, in comparison with their counterparts in the other regions of Nigeria, remained politically under- developed. Since the colonizers recognized and accepted the position of the Hausa-Fulani rulers, the British political presence was tolerated. The late Premier of Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello, pointed to this fact in his auto- biography: "The handful Of British officers were in full control . . . it was the will of Allah that they should 26 be there; they were not evil men and their administration was not harsh."4 Ahmadu Bello saw the colonial masters as an instrument Of destiny and as representative of God's will.5 The psycholOgy of accepting foreign domination had developed among the Hausa in their traumatic experience with the Jihad. They, therefore, regarded British presence as either a replacement of their former overlords or as a continuation of foreign domination. In either case, it did not make any political difference to them. Two years after the eastern and western regions of Nigeria became internally self-governing in 1957, the Northern Region also achieved that status. Its reluctance to assume political responsibility could be understood in terms of its.fear of domination by the more modernized and politically articulate southerners. This fear made the northerners look upon the southerners as would-be colonizers who would likely replace the British. Gaskiya Ta fi Kwabo, a Northern weekly, expressed this fear editorially: . . . Southerners will take the places of the Europeans in the North. What is there to stop them? They look and see it thus at the present time.‘ There are Europeans but, undoubtedly, it is the Southerner who has the power in the North. They have control of the railway stations; of 4Ahmadu Bello, M Life (London, 1962), p. 2. For similar statements of praise or British rule in Northern Nigeria, see Ibid., p. 105. 51bid., p. 17. ll 27 the post Offices; of government hospitals . . . the majority employed in the Kadune Secretariate and in the Public Works Departments are all Southerners; in all the different departments of government it is the Southerner who has the power . . .6 However, a survey of the Northern Civil Service in 1958 indicates that though only few northerners occupied positions in the high administrative class, the bulk of the positions were filled nOt by southerners, but by European expatriates. TABLE 1 NORTHERN CIVIL SERVICE, lst JUNE 1958 ~—vv~ Northern‘ Southern Nigerians Nigerians Expatriates Superscale 5 - 195 + 17 Administrative and 69 23 + 3 612 + 400 Professional Executive and 237 + 8 261 + 7 124 + 341 Higher Technical Source: B. J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 220. Adapted from Northern House of Assembly Debates August 4, 1958 Cols. 731-732. The number after the "plus" symbol indicates the number of employees under contract. 'r 6An editorial published in Gaskiya Ta fi Kwabo, February 18, 1950, as quoted in James S1‘Coleman,Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, 1960), p. 362. 28 Building on the fears of southern domination, the northerners hOped thatBritish rule would continue, for it afforded them psychological protection against, what seemed to them, southern economic and political exploitation. They endorsed a longer period of political training as essential for their political survival.7 Thus, when Anthony Enahoro, a member of the Action Group party from western Nigeria, introduced a bill calling for self-government in 1956, the northerners Opposed it and suggested that the words "as soon as practicable" should be substituted for "1956."8 However, in the light of the reality of Nigerian politics, the northern fear of southern domination does not seem justifiable, for the northerners authoritatively exercised political power from the time Nigeria became sovereign until the collapse of the first Republic. They were aware of the great influence they wielded in Nigerian political scene. A northern member of Parliament eXpressed this knowledge when he said: The stand of the N.P.C. [Northern Peoples Congress], as I observe it and as published previously, is that the North has arrived and that the North has emerged triumphant and will 7Beiio, My Life, p. 111. 8Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (New York, 1966), p. 284. For a detailed account of EnEHoro's motion and Northern Reaction see Anthony Enahoro, Fu itive Offender; the story of a Political Prisoner (London, I965) pp. - o 29 continue to arrive. To be a bit more serious, I put it to our southern friends and brothers in the words of Caesar 'We came, we saw, we conquered.‘ That means that the North has arrived, has seen and has conquered.9 In 1949, the north's major political party, the Northern 10 Its political consciousness 11 Peoples Congress, convened. was a reaction to southern nationalism. The party's philosophy was primarily clannish12 and conservative, re- flecting an attitude of "the north for the northerners." A northern politician commented on the conservatism of the region's political machinery in his letter of resignation from government service. I resigned because I refuse to believe that this country is by necessity a prisoner of Anglo-Fulani autocracy or the unpOpular indirect system. I resigned because there is no freedom to criticize this most unjust and anachronistic and un-Islamic form of hollow institutions promul- gated by Lugard. I resigned because I fanatically share the view that the nature of administration, as they stand today, coupled with all'their too trumpeted 'fine tradition' are woefully hopeless in solving 9Alhaji Muhammadu Gawyarma, speech, March 23, 1964, Government, Nigeria, House of Representatives, Debates, C01. 683, (1964). 10Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1970). P. 93. 11Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 360. 12Membership was Open only to 'peOple of Northern Nigerian descent.‘ See "The Northern PeOples Congress" Constitution reproduced in B. J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, pp. 314-323. 30 our urgent educational, social, economic, 13 political and even religious problems . . . Margery Perham also noted the conservatism of the Northern Peoples Congress, in contrasting the political outlook of the party with a southern group, she said, "the N.C.N.C. [National Council of Nigerian Citizens] may well cry forward while the N.P.C. cries back!"14 The Yoruba The predominant ethnic group in the Western region are the Yoruba, whose institutional kingships maintained 15 Though his person as well as his political stability. office was venerated, the king did not possess unlimited power. His policies were subject to reviews by a council of elders, and it was possible to criticize him and even 16 Thus, in many ways, the to demand his resignation. monarch was a constitutional figurehead who primarily symbolized unity. l3Aminu Kano, "My Resignation," Daily Comet (Kano) (November 11, 1950), as quoted in C. S. Whitaker,'3r. "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 14 (1965), p. 9. 14Margery Perham, "A Prospect of Nigeria," The Listener (October 20, 1960), p. 667. For a descripEIve anaIysis of the N.P.C. structure see C. S. Whitaker, "Dys- rhythmic Process of Political Change," World Politics, Vol. xix (1967): PP. 190-217. 15There were occasions when the king was incapable of maintaining political order and civil wars broke out. See Robert Smith, Kingdoms of the Yoruba (London, 1969), pp. 133-189. 16Ibid., p. 113. 31 The Yoruba have a penchant for commercial city- life. 17 Notwithstanding their urban-mindedness, they seldom mix easily with foreigners, whom they feel have nothing to offer to them culturally. This xenOphobia has tended to shape and dictate their political goals. The Action Group, the major political party in Western Nigeria, founded in 1951, was an outgrowth of the Yoruba cultural organization, "Egbe Omo Oduduwa." The party's initial goal was to coordinate the activities of the different Yoruba groups and associations. From the start, Yoruba politics were Yoruba-oriented and western Nigeria centered. The party's adherents were mostly businessmen whose primary interest was in local politics because their business was locally rooted. Along with school teachers and lawyers, the party's membership represented, perhaps unconsciously, a political Club of the well-to-do and the elite. The masses were inclined to scorn nationalist polities as they felt that it was a means whereby ambitious young men could secure themselves well paid positions.18 17Robert Smith, Kingdoms of the Yoruba, p. 107. 18P. C. Lloyd, "The Development of Political Parties in Western Nigeria," American Political Science Review, Vol. 49 (1965), p. 698. 32 The Yoruba masses were seemingly apathetic towards in- volvement in nationalist aspirations.19 This apathy encouraged the tribal orientation of their politics and led to their demand for a Yoruba state. A clause in the constitution of Egbe Omo Oduduwa indicated this View: To accelerate the emergence of a virile modernized and efficient Yoruba state with its own individuality within the Federal State of Nigeria . . . [and] to unite the various clans and tribes in Yorubaland and generally create and actively foster the idea of a single nationalism throughout Yorubaland. 0 The demand by the Egbe Omo Oduduwa for a Yoruba national state was soon mellowed by the more nationalist- oriented Action Group members when they began to advocate a federation made up of internally autonomous states. The states were to be created on a linguistic and cultural basis. Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group's leader, made this position an issue in the constitutional conferences preceding Nigerian independence. He noted the many cul- tural groups and indicated his belief that a federation of the three existing regions would not safeguard the 19Ibid. 20Constitution of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Ijebu Ode, 1948), as quoted in J. 8. Coleman, "The Ibo and Yoruba Strands in Nigerian Nationalism," in Robert Nelson and Howard Wolfe (eds.) Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism (East Lansing,’1971), p. 82. 33 interest of the minor ethnic groups within the three regions.21 The implementation of Awolowo's political blueprint would have created a situation in which every linguistic group irrespective of its size, could have demanded a state for itself. Nevertheless, the Action Group were so committed to federalism that their political slogan in the 1951 election campaign was "unity through federation."22 Unlike the Northern PeOples Congress of the Hausa- Fulani, the Action Group felt less at home with British rule. However, the mass of the Yoruba had no dislike for the British Administrative officers, evidently because of their distrust for their local politicians.23 The party quickly found faults with the new Constitution of 1952 especially since it did not envisage the type of federalism which the party advocated.24 Unfortunately, the Yoruba, as exemplified by their political party, regarded the Ibos as rivals, not as comrades in the fight against colonial rule. To a great extent, the founding of the Action Group 21Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom (London, 1947): PP. 53—54. ‘ ‘ 22 Obafemi Awolowo, Ayg, p. 180. 23 p. 696. 24 P. C. Lloyd, American Political Science Review, Obafemi Awolowo, Awo, pp. 227-228, 232. It. 34 party was meant to counteract what some Yorubas felt to be the monopolistic influence of the Ibos in Nigerian 25 In this light, Yoruba suSpicion of the Ibo politics. and their belief that the Ibo threatened their economic and political progress made COOperation for a truly uni- fied Nigeria almost impossible. The Ibo The Ibo are the major ethnic group in what was formerly Eastern Nigeria. They are an agricultural people, with a segmentary political system and a social organiza- tion based primarily on kinship, lineage and age-group. In the absence of centralized authority,26 the Ibos have shown, through political democratization, a high regard for individualism and egalitarianism. Since they believe that one's personal achievement should determine his political, social and economic status and role in the society, the Ibos tend to be aggressive and emulative. This tendency was evident in their relationship with the British colonialists. The Ibos are very receptive to change and have evinced the ability to adapt to different 25Ibid., pp. 171-172, also Nelson and Wolfe, Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, p. 66. 26Lord W. M. H. Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories (London, 1950-1953), p. 155. ‘5 35 cultures and environment.27 Dense population in their homeland, combined with the desire for social and economic advancement, has greatly spurred Ibo mobility.28 Their respect for healthy competition, admiration for individual- ism and receptivity to change gave them an edge in progress over the other ethnic groups. The ubiquitousness of the Ibos in Nigeria allowed them a national orientation. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.), the major political party in eastern Nigeria, though dominated by the Ibos, was regarded as a national party by its founders. It was indeed, "the only nationwide political party in Nigeria up to 1955."29 After World-War II, the Ibos played a significant role in Nigerian politics. They Spoke out vehemently against colonialism. Their political role soon evoked suSpicion from the other ethnic groups, particularly the Yorubas, who saw Ibo political activities as a desire to dominate Nigeria.30 27Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Receptivity to Change," in W. S. Bascom and Melville J. Herskovits (eds.) Continuity and Change in African Cultures (Chicago, 1959), p. 130. 28Kenneth Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1855 (Oxford, 1956), p. 28. 29Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik, a selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe (London, I961), p. 315. 30 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 57. c4 36 A distinguishing feature of Ibo political awakening was its national posture. The N.C.N.C., which later be- came Ibo-based, was inaugurated in Lagos, a non-Ibo terri— tory. Membership in the party included different tribal unions and associations,31 though in its early period participants were largely southerners.32 By contrast, neither the N.P.C. nor the A.G. had any founding member who was from a different region, let alone a different tribe. The Ibo diSposition to Pan-Nigeria is attributable to their political culture. In the absence of a centralized monolithic Pan-Ibo structure, the Ibos were free to broaden their political activities beyond their ethnic boundary. Tribal allegiance which was characteristic of the Hausa- Fulani and the Yoruba was lacking among the Ibo. While the Action Group and the Northern Peoples Congress were resPectively an outgrowth of tribal organizations, the major Ibo political party (N.C.N.C.) encouraged all anti- colonial dissidents to join. The Ibo distaste for imposed authority made British rule repugnant to them. They felt that unified political action through a national political party well would serve the cause of nationalism and end British colonialism. 31Ibid. 32Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 265. ‘ '- m... a.- .- \ 37 The national orientation of the Ibos also can be explained in the light of their propensity to accommodate unity in diversity. DeSpite their different clans, the Ibos can unite politically and economically to achieve a communal goal. They regarded the overthrow of the colonial regime as a national goal which could be accomplished through united effort, irrespective of socio-cultural ethnic differences. It was, therefore, no surprise that the N.C.N.C. disagreed with Chief Bode Thomas, an N.C.N.C. member and a Yoruba, when, in 1947, he suggested that political parties be regionalized.33 After World War II, inter-tribal hatred grew intensely, especially in Lagos, and the political cohesive- ness which the Ibo and the N.C.N.C. had worked to establish and maintain began to erode. The disintegration was hastened and accomplished by the Richards Constitution of 1947, which regionalized Nigeria and made the major ethnic groups re- Sponsible for the political development of their respective 34 Professor Kenneth Dike pointed out geographical areas. the implication of that constitution for national unity when he stated that: * 33Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik, p. 322. 34Allan Burns, A History of Nigeria, 7th Edition (London, 1969), p. 251. 38 Undoubtedly the Richards Constitution is a dividing line in Nigerian constitutional development. Before it the keynote in Nigerian politics was unification towards a centralized state and the realization of a common nationality . . . but with the Richards Constitution this tendency towards unification was on the whole arrested. With the constitutionalization of regional and tribal politics, the Ibos began to organize themselves into unions, eSpecially in towns where they lived among other ethnic groups. The Pan-Ibo movement became es— sentially a defense mechanism against the hostile attitude 36 The Civil War made it possible of the other major tribes. to realize the intensity of anti-Ibo feeling in Nigeria. The war afforded other ethnic groups the Opportunity to express their dislike of the Ibo. The Ibo was readily identified with the desire to "colonize, cheat and dominate; lacking in human tolerance and possessing uncontrollable restraints."37 35Kenneth Dike, 100 Years of British Rule in Nigeria, 1851-1951 (Lagos, 1957), p. 43. 36For instance in 1953 there were disturbances in the north in which the northerners were pitted against the Ibos. See reports on the Kano Disburbances, 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th May, 1953 (Kaduna, Nigeria, 1953), p. 21, reproduced in J. S. Coleman, Ni eria, pp. 399-400. Coleman~ also stated that Ibos suffered giscrimination, especially in regard to housing in Lagos. These experiences inepired the Ibos to organize themselves into unions for their welfare. 37Samson O. O. Amali, Ibos and Their Fellow Nigerians (Ibadan, 1967). ea n...\. ,...\ 39 The Ibos understood the political mood as being anti-Ibo. They saw themselves as an Oppressed, unwanted and exploited people. Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo and the former President of the Nigerian Republic, once stated that the British had been out-Spoken in asserting that the Ibo was "the most hated in Nigeria." He felt that the discrimination against the Ibos and also their "victimization" were, perhaps, divinely ordained.38 Russell Warren Howe's remark in this regard is instructive. ". . . the Ibo characteristics of eloquence, ambition, ability to read and write, a gift for organization and personal charm have combined to make them both indispensable and disliked."39 Unfortunately, the dislike for the Ibo was expressed not only in Nigerian political life but also in its social and economic aspects. The British and Nigerian Unity Many factors contributed to the British occupation of Nigeria. There was the suSpicion that either France or Germany would acquire Nigeria if Britain remained aloof. Commercial interests in Britain agitated for British control of Nigeria. The slave trade and the British attempt to 38Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik, pp. 242-248 passim. 39Russell W. Howe, "Nigeria at War;" Editorial Research Reports, February 28, 1968, p. 160. .. '9‘ n.‘ 40 suppress it also facilitated the conquest of Nigeria. It has also been suggested that British occupation of Nigeria and other colonies in Africa was an accidental by-product of British attempt to safeguard the Nile.40 A past Governor of Nigeria added that "philanthrOpy was not the least of the influences that led us to take up the burden of ruling Nigeria."41 British occupation of Nigeria was not peaceful. The imperialists encountered resistance from some of the indigenous leaders, and had to resort to military sub- jugation. By 1900 Britain had been able, with a few ex- ceptions,42 to pacify the different peOples of Nigeria and to begin a reign that lasted until October 1960, when the peoples of Nigeria regained their sovereignty. At the time of British pacification, Nigeria was 43 inhabited by a geographical area, "an arbitrary bloc" heterogeneous tribes that had no cultural and political ties with one another. From this standpoint, Britain in- herited nations rather than a nation. In 1954, Alan Burns, a past colonial Governor, stated that 4OSee_Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism (New YorE, 1968). 41Alan Burns, A History of Nigeria, p. 306. 4th was not until 1903 that parts of Kano, Sokoto and Arochuku were pacified. 43Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (New York, 1966), p. 235. 41 There is.no Nigerian nation, no Nigerian language but more than 200 languages, and no Nigerian tradition. The very name of Nigeria was invented by the British to describe a country inhabited by‘a medley of formerly warring tribes with no common culture, and united only in so gar as they are governed by a single power. The British task, therefore, was to create a nation out of the nations. The creation of Nigeria was accomplished, if only theoretically, when, on the recommendation of Frederick Lugard, the north and the south were amalgamated in 1914. The compelling factors for the consolidation and the process of the administration of the unified regions raise some crucial points about the British contribution towards Nigerian unity. British administrative convenience largely influenced decision to amalgamate. It unified regional administrative functions and made the task of governing the different peOples less complicated. Britain was then able to use the economic resources of one region (the south) to subsidize the governmental operations in the other (the north). This transfer relieved the British treasury of excessive financial 45 drain. In this light, the amalgamation was not concerned 44Sir Alan Burns, "The Movement Towards Self- Government in British Colonial Territories," Optima, Vol. IV (June, 1954), p. 9. 45For the background of the amalgamation see A. H. M. Kirk- -Greene, Lu ard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria: A Documentary Record (London, 19687, also A. O. Anjorin, The Background to the Amalgamation of Nigeria," Odu, Vol. 3, (January, 1967). 42 with unifying the Nigerian peOples. Its goal was to achieve a coordinated and economically-efficient adminis- trative system. Margery Perham commented that Lugard's "task . . . was to unify administrations, not peoples."46 Since the over-riding interest was British, the Nigerian peoples were not consulted.47 This oversight, was per- haps the major tragic flaw in the episode. The political measures taken by the British after the amalgamation appear to have encouraged the maintenence of regionalism.48 As Kirk-Greene observed: "Lugard opted to retain the classic cleavage between the North and the South, a status quo which he felt to be sanctioned by cultural history and one that he knew and understood."49 In the experimental stages of the unification, it doubtlessly would have been beneficial to the cause of unity for the major ethnic groups to have been given the Opportunity fully to participate in a common political forum. A common political association for all the different groups would have cemented the bonds of unification and paved the way for inter-tribal and inter-regional understanding. 46MargeryPerham, Lugard: The Years of Authority 47Obafemi Awolowo, Awo, p. 207. 48Times, March 9, 1951, p. 306. 49Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria: A Documentary Record, p. 12. 43 Unfortunately the Constitution of 1923 did not create any provisions for northern participation in southern politics.50 This lack of political interaction made the north and south relate to each other primarily through Britain. To rectify the inadequacy of the 1923 constitution, the British government promulgated another constitution which took effect in 1947. They hoped that this constitution would ensure unity, despite the country's cultural diversity. Arthur Richards, then Governor of Nigeria, in recommending the constitution stated: The problem of Nigeria today is how to create a political system which is itself a present ad- vance and contains the living reSponsibility of further orderly advance in a system with which the diverse elements may progress at varying speeds, and amicably and smoothly, towards a more Closely integrated economic, social and political unity, without sacrificing the principles and ideals inherent in their divergent ways of life.51 Far from achieving this end, the constitution encouraged separate political develOpment among the major ethnic groups. It emphasized decentralization by which a large measure of political authority devolved on the regions. Nigerian nationalists quickly pointed out the inherent disunity embodied in the Richards Constitution. 50Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 196-198; Burns, Nigeria, pp. 243-244. 51 Cmd 6599: "PrOposals for the Review of the Constitution of Nigeria," March 5, 1945, reproduced in Times (March 6, 1945), p. 172. 44 The Richards Constitution divides the country into three zones which are bound to departmental- ize the political thinking of this country by means of the bloc vote. Whether Richards intends to or not, it is obvious that regions will now bend more towards Pakistanization than ever before, and our future generations will inherit this legacy that is born out of official SOphistry. If, therefore, there Spring forth schools of thought tomorrow making requests of a parochial nature which would ordinarily rend this country into a multiplicity of principalities, mow it down . . . as one of the crOps to be harvested from this curious constitution. As if to perpetuate separate regional identities, the British demonstrated no uniformity of political attitude toward the country's different regions.53 They seemed to be politically biased in favor of the northern region. At the Ibadan Constitutional Conference in 1950, the north demanded, on the basis of population, half the seats in the central legislature. It made this demand a condition for further participation in the constitutional 54 proceedings. The British granted the demand, though they realized the political implication of such a measure. When the west demanded that Lagos be made part of the western region, the British staunchly resisted the demand.55 52Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik, p. 100. Chief Obafemi Awolowo also commented that the Richards Constitution maintained the division of Nigeria, Awo, p. 47. 53John Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster (Chicago, 1970), pp. 177-178. 54Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria, 2nd Edition (London, 1964), p. 116. 55For the constitutional crisis see Ibid., pp. 184-188. 45 The other regions, however, were not in favor of annexing Lagos to the western region, and Britain thus may have acted on the wishes of the majority. Still, if Britain had respected southern feelings, it would not have con- ceded northern demands. Another aspect of British policy which hampered attempts at national unity was the power struggle between the northern administration in Kaduna and the central government in Lagos. Robert Heussler so concluded that "all through the 1920's there was bad blood between Lagos 56 Administrative competition only served and Kaduna." to ossify the individuality of the regions, quite possibly the intention of the northern officials. Sir Richmond Palmer, lieutenant governor from 1925 to 1930, felt that the cultural differences among the different regions "were real" and could not be prematurely eradicated by "a paper unity." Such a unity would make the Muslim north sub- servient to the "semi-EurOpeanized south." Administrators therefore were inclined to preserve the traditional values and systems of the different regions. Christian mission- aries and educators were scarcely allowed to practice in the north. Soon after independence, the north recognized 56RobertHeussler, The British in Northern Nigeria (New York, 1968), p. 56. 46 that it was educationally backward and blamed this re- tardation on the British.57 "58 The British system of "Indirect Rule (a system whereby the Colonialists governed the indigenous peOple through traditional or appointed chiefs) proved dysfunctional to Nigerian unity. The system aimed at preserving the tra- ditional institutions. AS Frederick Lugard, the advocate of "Indirect Rule," stated: I . . . continually emphasized the necessity of recognizing, as cardinal principle of British policy in dealing with natives, that institutions and methods in order to command success and pro- mote the happiness and welfare of the peOple must be deep rooted in their traditions and prejudices. Obviously in no Sphere of administration is this more essential than in that under discussion [Indirect Rule] . . .59 The policy of encouraging the develOpment and maintenance of regional socio-economic and political structures could have 57M. Mohammed Sarkin Bai, House of Representatives Debates, C01. 664 (April 2, 1962). 58For a general account of "Indirect Rule" in Nigeria, see Lord Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 5th Edition (London, 1965), pp. 94-97. W. R. Crocker, Ni eria: A Criti ue of British Colonial Administratign (London, I936), pp. 213-222. Ntieyong U. Akpan, Epitaph—to Indirect Rule: A Discourse on Local Government in Africa (LOndon,1956), pp. 26-30. Margery—Perham, Lugard} The Years of Authority, Chapters 22-24. 0. Ikime, "Reconsidering Indirect Rule: The Nigerian Example," Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. IV (December 1966), pp. 539-558. 59 Frederick Lugard, Dual Mandate, p. 211. 47 served a healthy purpose had the intent been to create autonomous political entities. The basic need nonetheless was to submerge particularistic developments in favor of a national institutional and ideological allegiance. In- direct Rule fell Short of this objective. Thus with the connivance of the colonial government, the north developed along traditional Islamic lines, with taints of feudalism, while the southern regions progressed along lines of their respective political and social cultures, but greatly in- fluenced by westernism. Ethnic interest took precedence over national consciousness, and members of one region saw the others as competitors rather than as citizens of the same country.60 Seen in proper perSpective, the policy of "Indirect Rule" polarized the country socially and politically. The north committed itself to building a politically homogeneous society capable, eventually, of dominating the entire country,61 whereas the southern regions concerned themselves with the over-throw of colonial government and with the 60Obafemi Awolowo, Awo, pp. 163-165; Awolowo em- phasized that southern residEHts in the north were obliged to confine their activities to the areas set aside for the abode of strangers. 61Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, p. 220. Bello also hinted on the anoient Fulani prOphecy of dipping the Koran in the Seas, Bello, My Life, p. 16. 48 establishment of a politically and economically unified 62 Indirect Rule strengthened the phenomena which nation. made Nigeria a nation of nations lacking national con- sciousness. The disastrous consequence of this situation was manifested when the British, who hitherto had repre- sented the national symbol of authority, transferred power to the peoples of Nigeria in 1960. Nigeria's history since then has largely been the story of a nation desperately in search of a national symbol of allegiance, a consensus leadership and a national ideology. National cohesiveness eluded the Nigerians when the colonial power left. Indigenous Reactions to the Unification The initial reSponse of a majority of the ethnic groups to Nigerian unification was negative. When the Lagos colony was united with the southern protectorate in 1906, there were apprehensions among the Yorubas who felt that the peoples united had different cultural background. They became even more disturbed when the large Yoruba populations in Ilorin and Jebba were made part of the northern provinces.63 Yoruba fears that unification would 62The nature of political unity was an issue in the pre-independence years. Awolowo advocated a federation of states created along ethnic and linguistic lines. Azikiwe called for a federation of eight states primarily based on ethnic considerations. 63A pp. 78-80. . O. Anjorin, "Background to Amalgamation," 49 create a Situation in which certain groups would be sub- jected to others was reflected in later years in the demand by Egbe Omo Oduduwa for a separate Yoruba state and in the advocacy of the Action Group party for a federation created along lines of ethnic particularisms. During the 1954 Constitutional Conference in Lagos, the Action Group demanded that the right of any region to secede should be stated in the constitution.64 Information on the reaction of Eastern Nigeria is obscure. One can infer from later political and economic develOpments, however, that the easterners endorsed the unification and regarded it as marking the birth of Nigeria.65 The easterners also were committed to seeing that the unifi- cation succeeded. It was not, therefore, surprising that the N.C.N.C. was elated when Oliver Littleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, warned the Action Group in 1953, that the British government would not tolerate any attempt at western region secession. 64CMD 8994 of 1953 quoted by Ezera, anstitutional Develgpments in Nigeria, p. 189. 65A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria, p. 27. 66Ezera, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria, pp. 186-188. 50 The amalgamation disturbed the northerners, who worried about its possible consequences on their traditional society and its "Islamic past."67 Ahmadu Bello, in his autobiography, best illustrated the reactions of the northerners to the amalgamation of the country. Obsessed by the southern demand for self-government in 1956, a demand which seemed premature to the northerners, Bello commented: The mistake of 1914 has come to light and I should like to go no further. I was referring to the amalgamation that took place in that year between the old independent governments of northern and southern Nigeria. 8 Still to emphasize northern dissatisfaction with the amalga- mation, Bello further stated: Lugard and his amalgamation were far from pOpular amongst us at that time. There were agitations in favor of secession; we should set up on our own; we should cease to have anything more to do with the southern peOple; we should take our own way. 69 Although it is hazardous to suggest might-have-beens in history, one is nonetheless tempted to conclude that had Britain consulted the peoples of Nigeria in regard to the amalgamation, its implementation should not have been effected when it was, Since support for it was very luke-warm in the 67See N.P.C. motto "One North, One People, Irrespec- tive of Religion, Rank or Tribe," as quoted in B. J. Dudley, Parties of Politics in Northern Nigeria, Appendix IV. 68Hello, My Life, p. 133. 69Ibid., p. 135. 51 west and totally absent in the north. The foregoing account of the British policy towards Nigerian unity leads to two conclusions. One, though the British paved the way for the eventual political unity of Nigeria, they encouraged inter- sectional rivalies. Mention already has been made of the administrative rivalry between the north and the south (Kaduna vs. Lagos). That rivalry between the British ad— ministrators filtered down to the indigenous ethnic groups and created a condition for inter-ethnic competition. Two, the reasons given by Lugard for the amalgamation70 compel one to attribute the unification of the country to a historical accident caused by the British desire to make their administration convenient and practicable. The Collapse of Unity The history of Nigeria from Independence in 1960 until 1970, when the Nigerian/Biafran War ended, impels one to conclude that the British freed a country which had far too little internal cohesion. While the British partly were responsible for the institutionalized regional- ization of the country,71 it must also be stated that their presence retarded the inevitable post-independence 7oKirk-Green, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria, pp. 224-246. 71Obafemi Arolowo argues that British policy maintained the divisiveness in the country. Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, p. 32. 52 political disintegration; it was barely seven years after their departure that the fragile unity collapsed. It is ironic, and also dismaying, that Britain was again the instrument that led the Nigerian peOples to a second experiment in unity. This phenomenon underscores a gloomy fact--the undying British influence in Nigeria. The Action Grou and the Western Region Cfisis The crises which brought about the collapse of unity did not follow on the heels of Nigerian independence in 1960; almost two years elapsed before they began to emerge. These two years of comparative political quietude presented the world with a vision of a stable power in Africa. The illusion was dispelled in 1962, when an intra- party dispute erupted in the Action Group Party. The Action Group became the Opposition party in the Federal Parliament after the 1959 elections. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who hitherto had been both the leader of the Action Group and the Premier of the western region, became the opposition leader in the Federal Parliament. Chief Samuel Akintola, the deputy-leader of the party, became the Premier of the region. Chief Akintola soon clashed with Awolowo and the young radicals of the party who advocated an ideology of "democratic socialism." The conflict led to an open split in the party hierarchy during the party's 53 annual meeting at Jos, on May 20, 1962. The charges which Akintola levied against Awolowo strongly suggest that the split was not so much over political ideology as over power. Akintola remarked that his greatest problem "had been the insatiable desire of Chief Awolowo to run the western govern- ment from outside."72 The open Split led to a decision by the western Regional House of Assembly to strip Akintola of his premier- ship. Sir Adesoji Aderemi, the Governor of the region, observed that Akintola had lost the confidence of the House members and, on their recommendation, dismissed him and appointed Alhaji Dawuda S. Adegbenro as the region's premier.73 Akintola refused to honor the governor's decision, and a political impasse developed. The Federal Government inter- vened, refused to uphold the governor's recommendation, declared a state of emergency, and suspended the region's sovereignty. Dr. Moses Majekodunmi, a Yoruba medical officer, was appointed administrator, with full powers to act for the Federal Government, and he remained in power for six months.74 The crisis was no longer left to the region for 72 . West Africa, May 26, 1962, p. 579. 73Ihid. 74 Frederick A. O. Schwartz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race--The Politics ofIIndependence (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 131-136. Walter Sohwartz, Ni eria (London, 1968), pp. 128-130. K. Ezera, ConstitutionaI Developments, ppl 270-273. 54 a solution. It took a national focus. The Federal Govern- ment's take-over of the western region had no precedent in the political history of the country. The fact that Lagos was controlled by two political parties hostile to the A.G. makes it difficult to see in the emergency declaration any- thing Short of an attempt to deal a shattering blow to an opposition party.75 The declaration of emergency afforded the Federal Government an Opportunity to appoint a commission under the chairmanship of G. B. A. Coker to inquire into the financial relationship between the Action Group and the statutory corporations of the western region. Akintola's charge that 545 million profit of the western region Marketing Board had almost been wholly exhausted at the time Awolowo left office76 may have contributed to the decision to set up the inquiry. After ninety-two sittings, the commission concluded that it saw "evidence of prudent and considered management and investment of public funds," but also dis- covered "reckless and indeed atrocious and criminal mis- management and diversion of public funds . . ."77 It would 75For details of the crisis see Richard Sklar, "The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo, 1960-65," in Gwendolen M. Carter ed., Politics in Africa: 7 Cases (New York, 1966), pp. 119- 165. 76West Africa, May 26, 1962, p. 579. 77Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry, Vol. I, 1963, p. 3, quoted by W. Schwartz, Nigeria, p. 138. 55 seem by its conclusion that the commission contradted itself in its findings. The Treason Trial of Chief Obafemi Awolowo The crisis in the western region was the fore- runner of a series of political uncertainties in Nigeria. While the Coker Commission was in progress, Chief Awolowo and some members of his party were charged with treasonable felony. To understand the background of the trial, it is pertinent to examine the implications of the nature of Nigerian politics. The ethnic and regional orientation of the country's political parties resulted in the absence of an organization that could command national followership. In order to form a national government, it was necessary to construct a coalition of any two regional political parties, as was the case when the N.P.C. (Northern) and the N.C.N.C. (Eastern) coalesced in 1960, or a broadly based government in which all the major parties_were represented. The latter alternative was tried after the 1964 federal elections. Since the political parties were ethnically based,. a coalition of any two was seen as a coalition of the ethnic groups. Thus_the first federal coalition government was seen in terms of Hausa-Fulani and Ibo domination of the Nigerian political scene. The political party that was not in power saw-itself and the region it represented as being II! 56 at the mercy of the ethnic groups in power. InSpired by the rewards of political power, each of the major political parties worked hard to gain control of the federal govern- ment. It is in light of the above that one has to analyze a planned coup d'état’ by Chief Awolowo and thirty other members of the A.G. Awolowo and his supporters had been frustrated by their failure to secure a place in the arena of Nigerian political power. They felt that they had been at the vanguard of the fight for the country's independence and were entitled to the honor of being the rightful rulers when the British departed. Chief Anthony Enahoro, one time Minister of Home Affairs in Western Nigeria and also a former opposition Spokesman on foreign affairs in the federal Parliament, eXpressed this feeling when he said: For myself, the quest of the "Holy Grail" of independence had occupied the greater part of my adult life. Now, in the moment of victOry, I would have loved to see the honours taken by those who had led the quest, but the Galahads and their companions-in—arms were on the Sidelines. The situation was without parallel anywhere. The midnight ceremony was a highly emotional occasion as Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa took his place at the floodlit flagpost. The stage effects were perfect. But there.was something missing from the central scene. Dr. Azikiwe should have been there, Chief Awolowo should have been there. But they, like myself, were 78 Spectators. Strange, the ways of Providence. 78 Enahoro, Fugitive Offender, p. 173. 57 It was Anthony Enahoro who, at the constitutional conference in London in 1953, suggested self-government for Nigeria in 1956. Excerpts from "Flashes of Inspiration," Awolowo's personal diary, further indicate Awolowo's and the A.G.‘s fond hopes. Drawing faith and inspiration from the words of Jesus Christ, "all things whatsoever ye pray believe that ye have them already and ye shall have them," Awolowo said: I will undoubtedly become Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria as of the forth-, coming federal elections [1959]. I can even make a picture in my mind of myself occupying the office of the Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria. I thank God Almighty in advance for granting me the object of my desire. ' . It will, however, be a distortion of motives if the attempt of Awolowo and his supporters to overthrow the federal government is seen solely in terms of a desire to gain power. He and his colleagues were more concerned with the imple- mentation of parliamentary democracy in Nigeria. Enahoro had emphasized their determination to make Nigeria "a beacon 80 They detested the of parliamentary democracy in Africa." feudal inclination of the Hausa-Fulani political ethos. Awolowo had said, "the fight now is a fight in which disguised 79Quoted by W. Schwarz, Nigeria, pp. 139-140. 8oEnahoro, Fugitive Offender, p. 173. 58 imperialism, Fulani feudalism and mushroom capitalism are welded together in an unholy alliance to continue the Oppression and exploitation of the common man."81 During the treason trial he further stated: Since 1957 I have fought as your lordship remarked with an established vigour against feudal system in the northern region and for its eradication. I have also fought to prevent the spread of this system to other parts of Nigeria. When Judge Sowemimo sentenced him to jail, Awolowo cautioned that his imprisonment reflected the undemocratic system of the Federal Government and warned that his sentence indi- cated that "the twilight on democracy might change into darkness."83 The fact that a feudalistically-oriented political party (the N.P.C.) would have a major share of the control of the Federal Government heightened the A.G.‘S frustration over its failure to control Lagos. Awolowo and his party would have been content with a liberal and democratic political party in control of the federal government, and they invited the N.C.N.C. (liberal and democratic) to join them in a coalition government. They indicated their desire to concede the Primeministership to the N.C.N.C. leader.84 81West Africa, January 5, 1963, p. 19. 82The Steryyof Treason Trial, (Yaba, n.d.), P. 22. 83Ibid. 84 See Enahoro, Fugitive Offender, p. 184; W. Schwarz, Nigeria, p. 145. 59 For lack of substantive evidence, it would be un- fair to suggest that Awolowo's projected attempt to seize power at the national level was British inSpired. Never- theless, an isolated episode in the Coker Commission of Inquiry places any claim to British neutrality in doubt. Chief Okorodudu, Queen's Counsel, who assisted in the Coker Commission, read a letter to the Commission which quoted Mr. Harold Macmillan as having said that "only Chief Awolowo, leader of the Action Group, and his former deputy chief Akintola could lead Nigeria as a stable, progressive 85 Patrick Dolan and Associates, a and liberal country." public relations firm, negotiating for Roy Thomson to buy shares in the Amalgamated Press of the A.G., is said to have written the letter to Awolowo, Akintola and Shonibare. Part of the letter read: In addition I know you will be happy to hear that in discussing the line up of the political parties and political leaders in Nigeria, Macmillan told Roy Thomson that he should back Awolowo and S. C. Akintola.86 The commission, however, did not examine the authenticity of the letter, but treated it with indifference. The treason trial and the imprisonment of Awolowo and the other defendents widened the political cleavage 85 West Africa, July 28, 1962, p. 831. 86Ibid. 60 between the western region and the others. The Action Group had suspected that the N.P.C./N.C.N.C. coalition government would seek to annihilate them by taking over the administra- tion of the western region and had contemplated pulling out of the federation if Lagos took such an action.87 The Census Crisis 1962—63 Q The census crisis shook the solidarity of the coalition government. The post-independence census was very important for the regions, especially because regional repre- sentation in the Federal Parliament was prOportional to the population. The north's political domination depended on its large pOpulation. The other regions felt that an ac- curate 1962 census would reject their large pOpulations and diminish the north's power in the central government. The census of 1953 may not have accurately enumerated the correct pOpulation of the southern regions. In the eastern region some of the people were afraid that they were being counted for tax purposes and thus avoided the census. Also some communities that engaged in illegal trade such as smuggling avoided census officers and were not counted. In the western region, boundary and chieftancy disputes created conditions whereby an accurate count was 87Enahoro, Fugitive Offender, pp. 167, 170-171 passim. 61 88 To the southern regions, the 1962 census not possible. was therefore very important. Besides its effect on the allocation of seats in the parliament, it would also guide the Federal Government in the distribution of regional economic and welfare programs. Walter Schwarz put it correctly when he said, "from the outset, the . . . [census] was submerged in politics, with politicians and tribal leaders out to win."89 Unfortunately, the census was a failure. The Federal Government did not publish the results, and there were allegations that the eastern and northern regions had inflated their figures. J. J. Warren, the Federal Census Officer, wrote the census off "as false and inflated."90 Had the 1962 census results been accepted, the north would have lost its numerical dominance, since it had 22.5 million peOple as against 23 million in the Southern Regions, in- cluding Lagos.91 Because of its political strength in the Federal Parliament, it is reasonable to suggest that the north was instrumental in the invalidation of the 1962 census. 88Federal Ministry of Information, POpulation_Census of the Western Region of Nigeria 1953. Lagos: The Govern- ment Statistician, 1956. Federal Ministry of Information, Population Census of the Eastern Region of Nigeria 1953. Lagos: ‘I953. I 89 W. Schwarz, Nigeria, p. 158. 901bid.,p. 159. 91Ibid. 62 The unity of the country-hung on balance by the census controversy. The political mood of the south was one of disenchantment, bordering on an inclination towards political separation from the north. Ezera described the mood: "Opinion in the south was rapidly and widely in- clining to the dangerous view that secession of the south from the north would be the only answer to a continued "92 A re-count undertaken in 1963 northern domination. gave the northerners numerical superiority over the other regions. The Eastern Region rejected the results. The census of 1963, like its predecessor, suffered from malpractice and corruption. The Federal Government did not ease the situation when it seemed to condon the corruption.93 One of the by-products of the census con- troversy was the weakening of the coalition between the N.P.C. and its junior partner, the N.C.N.C. leading to dissolution in 1964. It would seem that the situation afforded the northerners an Opportunity to see Ibos as foreigners who could be expelled from the north at the discretion of the northern government. In this regard, it is enlightening to read the remark made about the census' 92See Ezera, Constitutional Developments, pp. 281- 282. 93On April 17, 1972 I interviewed a former employee of the Census Office who was still employed by that office in 1963. I was surprised to learn that the Federal Govern- ment offered some of the employees money in order to cover up certain anomalies. 63 by a member of parliament from the eastern region and a reply to that_remark byga northern member of parliament: Since the publication of the preliminary figures [Census 1963] which the N.C.N.C. rejected, Nigerian unity seems to be in mortal peril. Northern minister of Land on behalf of his government promised to dispossess the Ibos of their property as well as the earlier threat to remove them from the service of that region.94 In reply the northern member of parliament said "it is no concern of this parliament what they do in the north, let them [Ibos] go home."95 The prime minister denied the truth of the remark made by the eastern parliamentarian.96 Lagos UniversitprriSiS 1965 That the gulf of ethnic animosity had been broadened by the census issue was manifested in the crisis which arose over the appointment of the vice-chancellor of Lagos Uni- 97 Dr. Eni Njoku, an Ibo, was appointed versity in 1965. vice chancellor of the University of Lagos in 1962 by the prime minister for an initial three year period, after 94House of Representatives, Debates, C01. 1418 (April 1, 1964). 95Ibid. 96 (1964). 97For descriptive analysis of the episode see Arthur Nwankwo and Samuel Fejika, Biafra: The Making of a Nation (New York, 1969), pp. 55-7I1 House of Representatives, Debates, Col. 1419 64 98 At the eXpiration of which he could be re-appointed. Dr. Njoku's first term of office, the provincial council of the university refused to re-appoint him, arguing that "a change was desirable in order to facilitate the smooth and harmonious running of the affairs of the university."99 The council recommended that Dr. S. O. Biobaku, a Yoruba, should be appointed. Many students, primarily Ibos, pro- tested against the non—reappointment of Dr. Njoku and the provisional council regarded the protest as a manifestation of fear by the Ibos that other ethnic groups in the country were out to supplant them every where. It is hard not to see an element of tribalism in this episode. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that although the university is located in an area which is geographically Yoruba, there were more easterners on the faculty and even in the student population, easterners were in greater prOportion. There may have been a desire by the Yoruba to place their own person at the head of the institution. That the crisis was tribally-oriented was reflected in a Speech made in parliament by J. O. Ede, a northern member. He said, "the sole cause of trouble in the university is the obstinacy of the Ibo man who is 98See Sections 6(2)(a) and 6(4) of the University of Lagos Act, 1962, reproduced in University of Legos--Change in Vice-Chapeellorship, an offiCial publication (Apapa, Nigeria: n.d.), p. 3. 99 Ibid., p. l. 65 fighting a life and death battle."lOO Such a statement was tragic in the light of the fact that members of parliament were looked upon as the guardians of the country's unity. Some of their statements only served to fan the flame of disunity. TABLE 2 STAFF POSITIONS, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS 1964-65 (excluding the Medical School) r==================l Nigerian Grade Expatriates East Others Total Professor l4 2 - 16 Associate Professor 3 - 2 5 Senior Lecturer 5 7 2 l4 Lecturer 4 16 11 31 Assistant Lecturer 7 3 6 16 Total 33 28 21 82 Source: The other senior members of staff, The University of Lagos, "The InSpired Crisis Over the Appointment of Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lagos, March 24, 1965," (Lagos, n.d.), p. 21. looSee Nigeria Parliament, House of Representatives Debates, April 23, 1965 col. 1320. 66 TABLE 3 STUDENTS' POSITION, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS 1964-65 (excluding the Medical School and evening students) . a a a ET8 m 8 O m FIN ”H 3 S H «4 H g m .u I u 4J u o a) m as '3 a :3 :3 z; 8% s 3 has m 3 z m z :zc) h. 9 Arts Year 1 - 13 8 ll - 2 3 37 Business Year 1 - 17 10 22 - - - 49 Year 2 - 12 ll 32 4 - - 59 Year 3 - 10 2 l4 3 - - 32 Engr. Year.l 1 l7 2 l7 2 - - 39 Law Year 1 - 4 4 l4 - 5 - 27 Year 2 - 7 3 18 - l - 29 Year 3 l 3 2 8 - - - 14 Science Prelim- inary - 15 3 9 3 - - 30 Year 1 1 10 2 9 - - - 22 Total 3 108 50 145 12 8 3 338 Source: Ibid., p. 22. 67 During all the crises, the federal government was unable to exert positive and fruitful influence. It seemed to have been overtaken by the rapid succession of events. The result was the widening of the credibility gap between it and the peOple. The workers became dis- illusioned, eSpecially over the failure to implement the recommendations of Morgan's commission on salary. Their disenchantment found expression in a general strike which followed soon after the census crisis. The labor unions blamed the plight of the workers on the policy of "economic conservatism" pursued by the "autocratic Northern Region and the Fulani tyranny of the N.P.C."101 Political Re-alignments and the FederaI Elections ofI954102 The rumblings of the workers' strike scarcely had died down when the 1964 federal elections plunged Nigeria into a conflict which polarized it into two hostile political 103 camps. Two major political parties replaced the former parties. The N.C.N.C. and its affiliates coalesced with 101William H. Friedland, "Paradoxes of African Trade Unionism: Organizational Chaos and Political Potential," Africa Repprt (June, 1965), pp. 6-13. 102For a descriptive account see W. Schwarz, Nigeria, pp. 164-190. John P. MacKintosh ed., Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston, 1966), especially Chapter XIII; Richard Harris, "Nigeria: Crisis and Compromise," Africa Report (March, 1965): PP- 25-31. ‘__—_- 103See West Africa, January 2, and 9, 1965. 68 the A.G. and its allies to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (U.P.G.A.). In response, the Northern Peoples Congress and its allies joined with Akintola's Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.) to form the Nigerian National Alliance (N.N.A.). The N.N.A. enjoyed strong support in the north, and the U.P.G.A. was southern based and supported. Both political parties looked to the federal election to test their national strength and pOpu- larity. The political atmosphere had been tense. The U.P.G.A. alleged that there were rumors of plans by the N.N.A. to harass their members and candidates during the campaign and election. In the west, the N.C.N.C. head- quarters in Ibadan were attacked, followed by the burning of A.G. cars and the damaging of the houses of prominent U.P.G.A. members, S. O. Osokoya and Chief Lanlehin.104 Against this background the U.P.G.A., therefore, decided 105 However, in spite of the to boycott the elections. decision to boycott, the elections were held. The N.N.A. won more seats since none of its candidates participated in the boycott. As the results of the elections showed, the decision of U.P.G.A. to boycott seemed unwise and wasteful. See Table 4 for election results. 104West African Pilot, May 24, 1964 reproduced by John P. MacEIntosh (ed.) Nigerian Government Politics, p. 577. 105 Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York, 1968), p. 164- 169. 69 TABLE 4 THE 1964 FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS (Total votes cast: approximately 4,000,000) Region Allocated N.N.A. U.P.G.A. Independents Seats Seats not filled no polling North 167 162 4 1 0 East 70 0 l9 0 51 West 57 38 18 l 0 Midwest 14 0 13 0 0* Lagos 4 0 0 1 3 Totals 312 200 54 3 54 *Unreported. Source: Richard Harris, "Nigeria: Crisis and Compromise," p. 30. To save the federation, the political leaders agreed to form a broadly based government in which the major political parties participated. However, one could also detect northern in- fluence in that broadly based government.106 Western RegionAglection, November, 1965lU7' The virus of political instability which had afflicted the federal government Spread to the western region and created an imapsse in that region's 1965 elections. The 106W. Schwarz, Nigeria, p. 175. 107Ibid., pp. 178-190. 70 drama of chaos reached a climax when the elections de- generated into a campaign to plead the cause of the Yoruba. The manifesto of the Nigerian National Democratic Party testifies to the feeling of alienation which had gripped the Yorubas. Since 1944 the people of western region have been feeling as if they did not belong to the federation of Nigeria. They have not been in a position to share the amenities and fruits of labour emanating from the Federal Government and which other parts of the country share and openly flaunt before their eyes. The election results gave victory to Akintola's N.N.D.P., al- though the results were contested by the U.P.G.A., led by Alhaji Adegbenro, on the grounds that the election was unfairly carried out. Allegations of election rigging were widely heard. Even E. E. Esua, the Federal Electoral Officer, ad- mitted that there were anomalies in the electoral process.109 With the refusal of Adegbenro to conceed defeat in the election, the western region was submerged in a state of "suspended revolution, 110 since political authority could no longer be located. The situation heralded the beginning of the final assault on the stability of the federal government. 108W. Schwarz, Nigeria, p. 179. 1°91bid., p. 127. 110 See Peter Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXVII (1962), p. 39. Amann states that a state of suspended revolution occurs when "there is the prolonged coexistence of two or more antagonistic governmental power centers which are unable and unwilling to eliminate each other." 71 The Coup d'état, January 15, I966 and the Subseguent Break gp of the Nigerian Federation111 The series of crises which began with the census controversy of 1962 and reached an anti-climax in the western region election of 1965 dramatized the inability of the federal government to run the country effectively. Popular suspicion of the government reached an unprecedented high. It was at this juncture that the army, intervened, to right the wrong of the government and purge the country of "cor- ruption, nepotism, internal strife and disunity."112 On January 15, 1966, a military coup ended the first Nigerian Republic, and the country faced a future of uncertainties. The coup claimed the lives of some of the country's political leaders whose influence had determined the shape of events in Nigeria's history since its independence. 111For detailed account see W. Schwarz, Ni eria; Arthur Nwankwo and Samuel Ifejika, Biafra; Wilton DiIIan, "Nigeria's Two Revolutions," Africa Re ort (March, 1966); Gally Brown Peterside, "Nigeria in Perspective," Ibid.; John de St. Jonre, The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria (Boston, 1972); Nigerian Crisis, 1966 (Enugu, I967), January 15, Before and After Nigerian Crisis4_l966, Vol. 7 (Enugu, 19677: 112See Major C. K. Nzeogwu's broadcast over Radio Kaduna at midday, January 15, 1966 reproduced in A. H. K.‘ Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, p. 125. 72 Public reaction to the military coup, particularly in the southern regions, was one of jubilation.113 The psychology of rising expectations gripped many Nigerians because they felt that the army, unpolluted by the corruption of politics, would be better able to lead the country into progress and stability. The maintenance of national unity seemed an important and necessary task for the military government, and it therefore issued Decree No. 34 which abolished the federal system in favor of a unitary one.114 However, a section of the country, the north, was not en- thusiastic about the decree and openly Opposed it.115 The negative reaction to the decree indicated that the military government had misread the mood of the nation that it Opted to govern. The January 15 coup turned out to be a prelude to Nigeria's disintegration. Barely seven months thereafter, a second coup took place on July 29, 1966. General J. T. U. Aguyi Ironsi, who had taken over the instrument of government 113The Problemgf Nigerian Unity (Enugu, 1966), p. 21; John de St. Jorre, The Brothers‘ War, p. 42; Wilton Dillan, "Nigeria's-Two Revqutions,"’Africa Report, pp. 9-12; W. Schwarz, Nigeria, p. 199. 114Federal Ministry of Information Press Release No. 610/1966, as quoted in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, pp. 174-177. 115See-broadcast by Military Governor of the north on May 29, 1966; also broadcast by Military Governor of the east over Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service on May 30, 1966. In particular, Major Hassau's address to the special meeting of the northern chiefs in Kaduna June 1, 1966. These broadcasts are reproduced in A. H. M. Kirk—Green, Crisis and Conflict, pp. 177-184. 73 after the overthrow of the first Republic, was brutally assassinated. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowan, a northerner, became the commanding officer of the Nigerian army and the Head of the Military Government. The July coup d'état was 116 a reaction of the northerners who, as a result of the first coup, had lost their political power at the center. ‘\ It was accompanied by the wanton massacre of Nigerians of 117 eastern origin, which the Military Government could not control and which resulted in the mass exodus of easterners 118 to their homeland. At this point, Nigerian unity suffered its greatest setback, and the head of the Military Government reflected the situation in his broadcast. I have now come to the most difficult part, or the most important part, of this statement. I am doing it conscious of the great disappoint- ment and heartbreak it will cause all true and sincere lovers of Nigeria and of Nigerian unity. . . . As a result of the recent events and the other previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and 116See Colin Legum, "The Tragedy in Nigeria," The Observer (October 16, 1966). 117Estimates of the easterners killed during May and September 1966 are between 10,000 and 50,000. See C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafra, Random Thoughts (New York, 1969), p. 17; Ojukwu, The Ahiara Declaration (Geneva, 1969), p. 5. "Program," Nigerian Crisis 1966, V01. 3, (Enugu, 1967); The Verbatim Report (Aburi, Ghana, 4-5 January, 1967), p. 30. 118Jonathan Kwitny states that "no reasonable man could have hOped to stop the exodus from the north after the events [massacre] there this summer (1966)." See KMitny, "Nigeria in Focus," The New Leader (January 16, 1967), p. 15. 74 sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time . . . suffice to say that, putting all considerations to the test-—political, economic, as well as social-—the base for unity is not there or is so badly rocked not only once but several times.119 t The statement was ominous for the cause of Nigerian unity, for subsequent developments appear to have been determined by sentiments of disunity. The pogrom which took place before and after the second coup d/état strained the relationship between the north and the east, and the inability of the Federal Military Government to stop the killings made the easterners fear that their general security could not be guaranteed by the Military Government. This fear was touched upon when Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, made the secession proclamation, saying, iflEEEI glig "aware that you [Easterners] can no longer be protected in your lives and in your property by a government based outside Eastern Nigeria . . . I do declare that all political ties between us and the Federal Republic of Nigeria are hereby totally dissolved."120 llth. Col. Gowan's broadcast on the assumption of office, August 1, 1966, quoted in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, p. 197. 120Declaration of Biafran Independence, made at Enugn on May 30, 1967 reproduced in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, pp. 451-452. 75 Thus six years after independence, the solidarity of Nigerian unity was tested and found wanting. A military coup d'état in January 1966, followed by a civil upheaval later in the year, created a situation which led to the disintegration of the country in 1967: on May 30 of that year, the Eastern Region seceded and declared itself the Republic of Biafra. To nullify the secession, Nigeria 121 declared war on July 6, 1967. Nonetheless, united Nigeria had ceased to exist, and for thirty months (July 6, 1967 to January 12, 1970) two states-~Biafra and Nigeria-—were at war with each other. To the Nigerians, this struggle was a war for unity, to preserve the federation.122 But to the Biafrans, it was a war for survival, to save a peOple from the throes of extermination.123 121See Gowon's address to the First Civilian Members of the Federal Executive Council on June 12, 1967. He said, "I have taken the irrevocable decision to crush Ojukwu's rebellion in order to re-united Nigerians residents in the three eastern states with their brothers and sisters in other parts of Nigeria," Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, pp. 453-454. 122See Gowon's address to the First Civilian Members of the Federal Executive Council, 12 June 1967, Ministry of Information Press Release No. 1295/1967, as quoted in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, pp. 453-455; Towards One Nigeria, Nos. I to IV (Lagos, I967); Rex Niven,—The War of Nigerian Unit 1967-1970 (London, 1967), especially the intro- duction, p. 53 "The Nigerian Impasse," Current History_ (May, 1969), p. 295, John H. Orick states that "although the idea of a unified Nigeria was attractive, few people really understood the point of restoring to the federation a re- calcitrant tribe with which relationship had always been uneasy." 123 See C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafra, Random Thoughts, p. 37. CHAPTER III NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1960-1970 1960-1965? One of the problems that confront new nations is the formulation of their foreign policy. They have dif- ficulty stopping themselves from seeing, and dealing with, the world outside their boundaries through their erst- while colonial masters. This problem is complicated when, consciously or not, some of the more advanced nations tend to relate to the develOping countries through former over- lords. Unfortunately, the advanced nations, as well as the former colonial masters, regard former dependencies as still within the metropoles' spheres of influence. In order to demonstrate sovereignty, African states- men have proclaimed 'non-alignment' as the cornerstone of their foreign policy. In this regard, Fred L. Hadsel correctly states that "non-alignment was one formulation of an overriding aspiration, that of preserving the independence II have divided this into two periods. The first period covers from independence in 1960 to the end of the First Republic in January 1966, the second, the policy of the Military Government up to 1970. 76 77 of the African nations . . . a call to judge foreign policy primarily on the basis of new found freedom."l Nevertheless, the persistence of colonial influences and the realities of international relations have made 'non-alignment' a declara- tion of principle rather than a practical goal. Nigeria, a quondam colony and a member of the world community, has not escaped the dilemma of formulating foreign policy in face of its colonial heritage and world pressures. In the formulation of its foreign policy towards Africa, Western EurOpe and the United States, the Commonwealth and the Communist bloc, certain factors have been decisively in- fluential. These are the nation's size, its comparatively peaceful and gradual transition to independence, its hetero- geneous society, its need for foreign aid and for internal development, the political and economic attitude of its neighbors and not the least, Nigeria's fear of being branded an imperialist stooge. lFred L. Hadsel, "Africa and the World: Non- alignment Reconsidered," The Annals, Vol. 372 (July 1967), reproduced in Irving Leonard Markovitz ed. African Politics and Society (New York, 1970), p. 434. But L. Gray Cowan has suggested that the refusal of African states to be identified with any-ideological camp results from their "realistic appraisal of their position as weak, new states in the international community," see L. Gray Cowan, "Political Determinants," in Vernon McKay ed., African Diplomacyi_ Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Poligy_(New York, I967), p. 132. 78 92.1.93 Nigeria's size and potential inclined it's rulers to think in terms of a leadership role in the continent.2 They felt that the other African nations would naturally look to Nigeria for such an assignment. Jaja Wachuku, former Foreign Minister, reflected this View when he said, ". . . Nigeria considers it her duty to instil confidence in the new African states."3 It was, therefore, a dis- appointment when Nigeria did not gain the prominence, at least in symbolic terms, in African affairs that would befit her size and potential. A member of parliament eXpressed this disappointment when he commented: After the Cairo conference [March 1961] it was reported by the Prime Minister that Nigeria had lost nothing. We lost the secretaryship; we lost the Headquarters and we initiated much of the actions about the O.A.U. and yet we have lost nothing.4 Though Nigeria felt that it was entitled to a leader- ship position in Africa, it did not want to take advantage of such a position and subvert other countries or impose its 2See Nigeria Parliament, House of Representatives Debates, April 5, 1960, Cols. 654-667. 3Jaja Wachuku, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy,‘ in Millan Maclure and Douglas Anglin eds. Africa: The Political Pattern (Toronto, 1961), p. 72. 4See House of Representatives Debates, September 24, 1964, Col. 2272. See also speech by F. C. Ogbalu, ibid., March 13, 1964, Col. 33. See also speech by U. U. EEO, ibid., March 23, 1964, Col. 675. 79 domination on them. Rather it evisaged its leadership role in terms of maintaining peace. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former President of Nigeria, stressed this View: In the arena of world politics, Nigeria should not seek to impose its leadership on Africa or elsewhere and it should not attempt to brow- beat the rest of Africa or force any nation to bend their knees in acknowledgement of the ex- istence of a colossus that it is. Rather a free Nigeria should dedicate itself to cooperate with Africa and the rest of the world towards 5 the maintenance of peace everywhere in the world. This non-aggressive posture was manifested in Nigeria's attitude towards the island of Fernando Po. Nigerians formed the bulk of the pOpulation of the island and there had been suggestions that Nigeria should annex it,6 but it refused and continued to respect the territorial and political integrity of the island. In light of its desire for peaceful relations with its neighbors, Nigeria became obsessed with any attempt by any African country to interfere with, or subvert, the territorial integrity of another. Nigeria's sour relation- ship with Ghana in the first half of the 1960's could be 5Nnamdi Azikiwe, "Nigeria in World Politics," Presence Africaine, Vols. 4/5, Nos. 32/33, 1960, p. 30, quoted by James S. Coleman, "The Foreign Policy of Nigeria," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson eds. Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York, 1963), pp. 400-402. For a similar statement see Prime Minister's speech to the U.N. General Assembly on October 8, 1960 in Nigeria Speaks (Ikeja, 1964), p. 67; Jaja Wachuku, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy," p. 71. 6See Speech by F. C. Ogbalu, House of Representatives Debates, March 27, 1962, Col. 314. 80 explained in this context. Ghana's harboring of Nigerians charged with treasonable felony was regarded by the Nigerian government as a subversive act.7 Unfortunately, the strained relationship has been attributed to rivalry between them.8 Notwithstanding its inclination towards a leader— ship role, Nigeria took a conservative posture in regard to colonialism in the continent. Though opposed to colonial- ism, it was cautious in advocating what would be considered a hasty transfer of power to former colonies. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the late Prime Minister, made this explicit when he said: Our belief in the fundamental rights of all African states to freedom and independence does not imply that independence be granted without regard to economic, sociological and political factors affecting the state con- cerned. Because it experienced many constitutional develOpments, and with calculated gradualism attained independence without any chaos attributable to political immaturity, Nigeria felt 7See House of Rgpresentatives Debates, April 21, 1965, Cols. 1128-1140 passim. - 8See W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Forei n Policy (Princeton, N.J., 1970), pp. 77-81; James S. CoIeman, "The Foreign Policy of Nigeria," John P. Mackintosh ed. Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston, 1966), p. 280. 9Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "Nigeria Looks Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41 (October 1962), p. 138. uh .Ih .. u u .‘h . n... — l\h ‘1- . 1 an! 9‘ H: b... k 81 that the achievement of independence required an appreciable period of political training.10 It also feared that "pre- mature" independence could engender ominous consequences 11 for a former colony. Guided by this thinking, Jaja Wachuku sponsored a motion in the United Nations which called for the total elimination of colonialism in Africa "by before and not later than December 1970."12 Anthony Enahoro, an opposition member in the federal parliament regarded such a stance as-a "gross betrayal of African Revolution."l3 Racial Discrimination Though Nigeria took a conservative and cautious stance about the elimination of colonial rule in Africa, its position in regard to racial discrimination was one of open attack. It was unequivocal in denouncing South Africa's "apartheid“ policy. Even before independence, Nigeria's parliament took steps against South Africa's racial policy by calling for an end to trade relations between the two countries.14 In his inaugural address as Nigeria's first loIbid. 11 Both Balewa and Wachuku pointed to the Congo debacle as the tragedy of premature independence. See House of Repre- sentatives Debates, April 17, 1961, Col. 1748 and November 20, 1961, C61. 3118. 12 Ibid., November 20, 1961, Cols. 3118-3120. 13See Anthony Enahoro's speech, Ibid., March 28, 1962, C01. 411. l4Ibid., April 5, 1960, C01. 667. 82 indigenous Governor-General, Nnamdi Azikiwe said, "we can- not concede that it is in our national interest to fraterize with such nations which practice race prejudice and we must not acquiesce in such an outrageous insult on the black race."15 It was in keeping with the above statement that, during the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London in March 1961, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa supported the move which ousted South Africa from membership in that organization.16 It should, however, be pointed out that Nigeria's approach to South Africa's racial attitude was moderate. Balewa indicated this preference by his fear that an unreasonable approach to the South African problem would "only make the condition of the black race [in South Africa] difficult."l7 Believing that there should be an avenue of communication between Nigeria and South Africa, Balewa would accept a request for an exchange of ambassadors and would not decline an invitation to visit 1SNnamdi Azikiwe, "ReSpect for Human Dignity," An address delivered on the occasion of his inauguration as the Governor-General of Nigeria, October 1, 1960 (Lagos, 1960), p. 15. 16See House of Representatives Debates, April 17, 1961, Col. 1748. 17 Col. 698. Prime Minister's speech, Ibid., April 5, 1960, 83 South Africa, for he saw in such connection an Opportunity to make that government change its racialist policy.18 Pap-Africanism19 Nigeria's enthusiasm for active participation in African affairs was indicated by a parliamentary motion calling for the establishment of a ministry of Pan-African Affairs.20 Though the motion did not pass, the attempt to create such a ministry demonstrated a desire to give Africa a special position. Nevertheless, Nigeria's stance in regard to Pan—Africanism did not reflect the lively interest which the afore-mentioned motion had embodied. Nigeria's posture was moderate, if not conservative, when compared with the stance taken by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Its moderate approach was largely influenced by its own historical experience. It has not been easy for it to forge unity from among the diverse peoples in its territorial confines. This experience made it feel diffident about the feasibility of effecting political unity on a continental 18See Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. Ni eria: The Tribe, The Nation, or the Race--The Politics of Independence (Cambridge, 1965), p. 217. 19Pan-Africanism in this context is defined as a movement for the political unification of the independent African states. It is the process of creating a united states of Africa. 20See Motion by Kalu Ezera and E. C. Akwiwu, House of Representatives Debates, April 19, 1960, Cols. 1432-1439. 84 level without a gradual and adequate preparation. Anthony Enahoro, a former member of the Nigerian Parliament, il- luminated the cautious approach, when in discussing Pan— Africanism he said: . . . I would like to impress on all of us the importance of Nigerian experiment . . . because I think that success in Nigeria may well point the way to peaceful development in other parts of Africa.21 In other words, Nigeria should build her political unity first before encouraging continental unification. Thus Pan—Africanism would be meaningfully and enthusiastically endorsed only when and if it had become practicable. Also Nigeria felt that it was visionary to think in terms of an all~African government that would entail the surrender of individual national sovereignty. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, referring to such idealism, said regarding Pan-Africanism, "we have thought it sensible to distinguish "22 And Nnamdi Azikiwe considered between ideals and reality. it "folly" to ask independent African nations to surrender their hard-earned sovereignty in the name of Pan-Africanism. He said: It will be capital folly to assume that hard- bargaining politicians . . . will . . . easily 21American Society of African Culture (ed.) Pan- Africanism Reconsidered (Berkeley, 1962), p. 72. 22Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. "Nigeria L°°ks Ahead," p. 137. 85 surrender.their newly-won political power in the interest of a political leviathan. It has not been possible in EurOpe or America and unless Africa is different from other continents the verdict of history on this score remains to be challenged and altered. 23 Refussing to endorse immediate political unification of the independent African states, Nigeria instead advocated "functional collaboration" as a practical step towards continental unity.24 It is significant that in favoring functional co- operation among the sovereign nations, Nigeria was guided by a policy of staunch disapproval of intervention in the internal affairs of other states. It felt that to ask any African state to surrender its sovereignty in order to achieve political unification was essentially an inter- ference with that country's political integrity. Thus to maintain the sanctity of the colonial boundaries, Nigeria associated itself only with projects that involved economic cooperation.25 23Nnamdi Azikiwe, "Nigeria in World Politics," Presence Africaine, Vols. 4/5 (1960—1961), p. 27. For a similar statement see Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's Speech Nigeria Speaks,~p. 68. 24See Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's address to the Con- ference of African and Malagasy Heads of State at Addis Ababa, on May 24, 1963 in Nigeria Speaks, pp. 154-164. See also his speech to the Lagos Conference of January 1961, Ibid., p. 112. 25For Nigeria's participation in economic COOperation with particular reference to West Africa see I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New African States 86 Britain and the Commonwealth Prior to independence, Britain was reSponsible for Nigeria's foreign policy. When it achieved independence, Nigeria decided to reconsider its relations with other nations from an independent posture. That decision was difficult to execute because the bond of relationship between Nigeria and Britain could not be easily loosened, let alone abolished. Nnamdi Azikiwe correctly stated that: We should reckon with our British connection and our unanimous desire to become fully- fledged members of the British Commonwealth . . . we should value our British connection as a pearl of great force because it has enabled us to pass through an apprenticeship in the art of the science of constitutional government. To Nigeria Britain was a father and its policy towards Britain was anything but unfriendly. Nigeria was inclined, on some occasions, to identify its interest with Britain, as manifested in the defense 27 agreement Signed by the two nations. The pact was abrogated two years after Nigeria attained independence. Pressure (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 134-136; 153-155. Also Adebayo Adedeji, "PrOSpects of Regional Economic Cooperation in West Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8 (1970), 26 pp. 23-24. 27See Federation of Nigeria, "Draft Defense Agreement," Sessional nger,No. 4, 1960. Nnamdi Azikiwe, "Nigeria in World Politics," 87 from the opposition party and university students compelled the government to annul the pact but its signature had signalled the nature of Nigeria's post independence relation with the erstwhile colonial master. Britain on its side made attempts to woo independent Nigeria to its ideological posture. When, on March 20, 1964, Sir Alec Douglas Home, then British Prime Minister, addressed the Nigerian Parliament, he deprecated the "evils" of com- munism and implicitly suggested that Nigeria, though un- aligned, should understand London's anti-communist stance. Part of this address read thus: So long as the challenge by the communists to our.way of life was there, the courtries of the Atlantic Community, Mr. President [Nnamdi Azikiwe], had no choice but to meet it, what- ever the cost you may think in wastage of man power and material wealth. And perhaps it is difficult sometimes for a country which rightly wishes to be unaligned to understand our problem . . . But India knows it now, and many a newly independent countries knows the meaning of subversion. The institutional and ideological attachment of Nigeria to Britain after independence threatened to negate the validity of its sovereignty. A member of Nigerian Parliament expressed this fear when he said: I feel ashamed, . . ., to see Nigerian soldiers wearing badges with inscriptions, 'Member of the Queen's Own Nigerian Regiment.’ One sees the 'Royal Nigerian Army,‘ the 'Royal Nigerian Navy' . . . We 28See House of Representatives Debates, March 20, 1964, Col. 485. 88 must not be a nation, there must also be something which must make us really proud of this nation. These royalties no matter how desirable, they make us appear small in the eyes 3f the world and in the comity of nations.2 There can be little doubt that the desire to escape the ever hovering shadow of British influence inSpired Nigeria to seek a republican status so that its foreign policy, would bear an impress of true sovereignty and originality. In its relationship with the Commonwealth Nigeria took a posture which seemed to vindicate its sovereignty. It was attracted to that organization not so much because of its colonial experience but because the nature of the Commonwealth appealed to it. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa stressed the point that the Commonwealth was a club of political equals, in which each member's sovereignty was respected.30 Thus membership, at least in political terms, would not imperil the integrity of the participator. Nigeria regarded the racial attitude of South Africa as indicative of that country's denial of the sovereignty of black African nations in the Commonwealth. 29See speech by Mbazulike Amechi, Ibid., March 28, 1962, Col. 405; see also Kalu Ezera's speech advocating abolition of foreign titles, ibid, January 9, 1964, Cols. 3282-3283. See also I. S. Onwucfiekwa's motion on renaming of monuments bearing colonial names, ibid., April 7, 1964, Cols. 1854-1858. 30See Prime Minister's Speech on Foreign Policy, ibid., August 20, 1960. 89 Abubakar Tafawa pointed out that "so long as one member Openly advocated racial discrimination it was impossible to accept that the Commonwealth was indeed an association of free and equal nations . . ."31 South Africa's member- ship, with its "apartheid" policy, challenged Nigeria's fundamental belief in the dignity of man32 and the political equality of sovereign nations. Thus, it was not only vocal in the denunciation of South Africa's racial policy but it also joined other members in the Commonwealth in a success- ful demand for that country's expulsion.33 Common colonial and political experience had fashioned the Commonwealth countries into an organization of sister nations. It becomes somehow difficult for member states to pursue meaningful independent policies in foreign affairs, especially in economic matters. In foreign trade, members generally favored Commonwealth markets, and a fair prOportion Of Nigeria's trade leaned towards the British and Commonwealth markets. As Tables 5 and 6 indicate, from 1961 to 1966 a little over 39 percent of Nigeria's average 31Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's Speech, House of Rep. Debates, April 17, 1961 quoted by Reuben Frodin, "Nigeria and the World Outside," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, W. African Series, Vol. IV (May 25,iI96I), p. 9. 32See Nnamdi Azikiwe, "ReSpect for Human Dignity." 33See Prime Minister's speech, House of Representa- tives Debates, April 17, 1961. 90 monthly imports were from the Commonwealth countries, and approximately 43 percent of her average monthly exports were received by the Commonwealth countries. These data do not seem to support any argument in favor of an economic influence largely determining Nigeria's affiliation with the Commonwealth. TABLE 5 PATTERN OF NIGERIAN IMPORT TRADE WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, 1961 TO 1966 (MONTHLY AVERAGE OR CALENDAR MONTHS IN L THOUSAND) Total Commonwealth Countries Period Monthly. U.K. Canada Hong Kong India Others Imports 1961 18,534 7,099 139 350 577 373 1962 16,917 6,152 225 362 425 196 1963 17,290 5,904 76 431 264 353 1964 21,143 6,556 151 388 346 441 1965 22,929 7,088 170 299 330 692 1966 21,365 6,359 260 151 264 709 Total* 119,178 39,158 1,022 1,982 2,206 2,765 *Approximately 39 percent. Source: Digest of Statistics, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1968),(Lagos, Nigeria: Federal Office of Statistics), p. 35. Ibid., Vol. 16, NO. l, 1967, p. 35. 91 TABLE 6 PATTERN OF NIGERIAN EXPORT TRADE WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, 1961-1966 (MONTHLY AVERAGE OR CALENDAR MONTHS IN L THOUSAND) Total Commonwealth Countries Period Foreign U.K. Canada Ghana Others Exports 1961 14,456 6,380 42 183 ' 130 1962 14,042 5,889 143 104 96 1963 15,808 6,184 156 208 134 1964 17.888 6,761 206 331 222 1965 22,355 8,485 208 164 125 1966 23,671 9,094 539 117 216 Total* 108,220 42,793 1,294 1,107 923 *Approximately 43 percent. Source: Digest of Statistics, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1968 (Lagos, Nigeria: Federal Office of Statistics 1968), p. 35, Ibid., Vol. 16, No. l, p. 37. In international issues, Nigeria rarely took positions which conflicted with those of the Commonwealth and Britain in particular. Though in the Congo crisis, many Commonwealth countries followed different lines of action,34 Nigeria's stance coincided with London's,35 which supported United 4The Congo crisis demonstrated a deep cleavage among the Commonwealth countries, eSpecially the African members. Though members agreed on U.N. mediation, Kwame Nkrumah ad- vocated U.N. mediation but through independent African states, see Africa Report (October 1968), p. 8. 35See Reuben Frodin, "Nigeria and the World Outside," p. 10. 92 Nations mediation. As expressed by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa: "we also believe that the Congolese people were right to appeal to the U.N.O. for help and advice in rebuilding their country rather than to turn to any individual power."36 Nigeria's reluctance to pursue a policy that might strain its relationship with Britain was very evident in the Rhodesian crisis. Though opposed to the manner in which Britain handled Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of Rhodesian independence in 1965, it was-unwilling to en- danger its friendly relation with Britain by severing diplomatic relations, as the Organization of African Unity 37 It is fair to conclude had called upon its members to do. that the attitude of the first Nigerian Republic towards Britain and the Commonwealth was greatly cordial, Often bordering on admiration and esteem. The United States and the Western bloc In stipulating the basic principles of Nigerian foreign relations, Abubakar Tafawe Balewa said,""we consider it wrong for the federal government to associate itself as "38 a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. Both 36See Prime Minister's Speech in Nigeria Speaks, p. 63. 37See-West Africa, December 18, 1965, p. 1427. 38SeePrime Minister's Foreign Policy Speech, House of Representatives Debates, August 20, 1960. 93 Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former president, and Jaja Wachuku, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, re-affirmed the policy of-non-alignment in many of their Speeches.39 Nevertheless, Nigeria's heavy leaning towards the United States and the Western bloc has belied the validity of this policy. Nigeria had been trained in the "democratic" system of Western Europe. It imbibed its capitalistic economic system and saw in it a true expression of individual economic freedom. In this wise it regarded socialism as a "canker- worm" which not only "destroys the economic fabric of the nation, but also brings about the complete subordination of individual freedom."40 Thus despite an avowed commitment to a policy of non-alignment, Nigeria's long association with Western institutions made the pull towards a pro- western bloc posture very difficult for it to resist. Dr. F. U. Okeke, a member of Nigerian Parliament, pointed out that: We cannot in a day or two, even in a matter of years, diSpel the principles which we have imbibed from democratic countries like Britain and Americas~ Certainly we are a 39See Nnamdi Azikiwe, "Nigeria in World Politics," pp. 19-30; see also "President Answers Questions Posed by Miss Barbara Hepburn of the U.S.A.," in Selected Foreign Policy Statements, 1960-1964 (Lagos, n.d.), pp. 99-101; see alsoinrei n POIicy statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Heuse of Representatives Debates, September 4, 1961. 40See Festus Okotie-Eboh, Budget Speech (Lagos, 1965), p. 3., 94 democracy if you ask which camp we belong to, we have been under democratic principles and institutions for over one hundred years . . . we do not know the ideology of Communism or totalitarianism yet or any other ideology. The one we have had is democratic principles which is pro-western attitude.41 Against this background, Nigeria made a mockery of "non-alignment" as the basis of its foreign policy. When the President in his opening Speech in Parliament said that "my government will continue to pursue our policy of non-alignment in the field of foreign relations,"42 a member of Parliament made the following remark: For a number of years we have been preaching this policy of non-alignment. It is my view that the time has come to define the limit of this policy. I say this because it seems we are 99.99 percent pro-west in our foreign policy.43 An opposition member in the parliament even expressed fears that the country's pro-western bloc stance would easily make it a "military appendage of the N.A.T.O."44 41House of Representatives Debates, April 14, 1962, quoted by Claude 8. Phillips, The Develgpment of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1964i, p. 103. 42See House of Representatives Debates, lst Session, Second Parliament, MarCh 24, 1965, Col. 2. 43See Speech by E. E. Inyang, House of Representa- tives Debates, March 25, 1965, Col. 85. 44See speech by J. S. Tarkar, Ibid., April 3, 1962, Col. 764. 95 Long before its independence, Nigeria had diplo- matic socio—economic, religious and educational relations with the western bloc countries. For instance, from 1957 to 1960, forty Nigerian diplomats were in training in the United States and in other Western EurOpean countries.45 For the academic year 1953/54 there were 276 Nigerians studying in the United States and in 1958 some 25 private United States agencies and foundations instituted an educa- tional exchange between the United States and Nigeria. In the same year there were 80 U.S. grantees exchanged under the International Educational Exchange Program in which 13 Americans and 67 Nigerians participated. Through the 1958 fiscal year, the U.S. made available $1.3 million for the Technical Cooperation program in Nigeria.46 As Nigeria approached its independence, the U.S. Opened a commercial bank, Bank of America,47 and through its De- velOpment Loan Fund, the U.S. government loaned L 1.1 m (approximately U.S. $3.08 m) to the Nigerian Railway Corp. 48 for reconstruction of rail lines between Enugu and Makurdi. 45Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York, 1963), p. 399. 46See International Education Exchange and Related Exchange of Persgns, Activities for Ghana, Region of Trans 0 ta Togoland, French Togoland and Nigeria (Washington, 1969), p. 77. 47Opened on August 2, 1960, see West Africa, July 9, 1960, p. 779. 48Ibid., October 29, 1960, p. 1235. I wk .a "I in ‘61 a .v av.\.. In; on. 96 One year after Nigerian independence the ten nations that gave it aid were all in the western bloc. TheSe were Britain, the U.S., West Germany, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Israel, Pakistan, Netherlands and Canada.49 In the first two years of its independence it received loans in the amount of B 20,115,000. These loans were from the U.K., Israel, the U.S. and International Bank for Reconstruction.50 Since financial assistance requires that goods be procured from the country giving the assistance,51 Nigerian imports, especially machinery and equipment, leaned_heavily towards the Western bloc. Douglas Anglin states that in 1962 about 70 percent of Nigerian imports came from Western Europe, the older Common- wealth and the U.S., while 90 percent of her exports went to those countries. In summing up, the First Nigerian Republic was enormously oriented towards the western bloc. The legacy of her colonial experience seems to have made such incli- nation inevitable. During her colonial days the doors to 49 House of Rep. Debates, November 20, 1961, p. 46 quoted by Claude 8. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 101. 50See House of Rep; Debates, April 2, 1962, Cols. 643-6440 51See Festus Okotie-Eboh, Budget Speech, p. 14. 2Douglas Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and Economic Alignment," p. 249. v CD“ -88 bot 7! — In- 'I i‘. Hm, I a“ ‘n N‘- a (3 .0- . . s‘.‘ :4 97 the Eastern and Communist bloc nations were virtually closed to her. The reality of the world it experienced was only that of the Western bloc countries; thus when independence dawned on it, Nigeria carried this legacy along to its nationhood, and could not help but see, at least initially, the world through Western eyes. The U.S.S.R. and the Communist’blOc When Nigeria attained independence, there were pressures on the government to broaden the country's Sphere of international relations to include the Communist bloc. For instance, one of the issues which occupied the attention of the "All-Nigerian PeOples Conference" organized by Kingsley O. Mbadiwe in 1961 was Nigeria's attitude towards the Communist bloc. In its recommendation, the Conference called upon the government to "desist from Communist witch- hunting which involved passport denial to Nigerians wishing to travel to East EurOpean countries and China, non-hiring of expatriate professors, lecturers and graduates from East European countries and banning of importation of literature from East European countries."53 When asked to Open embassies in Communist countries, the government complained that it had inadequate financial resources and lacked 53See Claude S. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Poligy, p. 58. 98 trained personnel.54 Only in 1962 was-the Nigerian pass~ port made "valid for travel to all parts of the world," including the communist countries.55 Nigeria also showed some reluctance in accepting scholarships from the Communist bloc. A member of parlia— ment suggested that since an American was in charge of the ministry responsible for scholarships, United States' scholarships were all taken, while it took two to three months to consider the ones from the socialist countries.56 In its economic relations Nigeria adopted a liberal policy, for it was willing to Open its doors to the communist bloc countries. This stance was indicated by Festus Okotie- Eboh, late Finance Minister, who a few months before Nigerian independence said, "our policy will be to promote multi- lateral trade over as wide an area as possible . . ."57 It was in this spirit that he led an economic mission to Moscow in 1961 to find ways of improving economic ties between 54House of Rep. Debates, April 10, 1964, Col. 1822. . 55Ibid., April 12, 1962, p. 10 and April 14, 1962, p. 28 quoted By Claude S. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Poliey, p. 104. 56See Emere's Speech, House of Rep. Debates, September 25, 1964, Col. 2383. 57See House of Rep. Debates, April 4, 1960, Cols. 581-582: but it has been suggested that Nigerian economic policy leaned favorably toward the Western bloc, and that her non-alignment was political only. See Douglas Anghn, “Political Non-alignment and Economic Alignment," 99 58 In the same year, Nigeria 59 Nigeria and the U.S.S.R. signed trade pacts with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. China also followed the examples of the East European countries in cultivating economic relations with Nigeria. In April 1961 a Chinese delegation visited Lagos to discuss possibilities of diplomatic relations, trade and cultural contacts. In June a Nigerian delegation 60 One might ask why Nigeria, despite returned the visit. its professed policy of non-alignment, waited for almost one year after independence before undertaking a meaning- ful economic and diplomatic relationship with the communist bloc countries. The following eXplanations would help to provide an answer: 1. Soon after its independence, the western bloc nations guaranteed loans and aid for Nigeria's internal development. It has earlier been stated that in the first two years of independence, Nigeria received loans in the amount of 5 20,115,000, all from countries in the western bloc, as Table 7 indicates. Under the circumstances, 58Harold D. Nelson et a1., Area Handbook for Nigeria (Washington, 1972), p. 262, see also Douglas Anglin, Nigeria's Political Non-Alignment, pp. 249—252. 59Harold D. 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