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ABSTRACT
STRESS IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATION:

A COMPARISON OF ROLE CONFLICT, AMBIGUITY, AND OVERLOAD
IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

By

Leticia Marcelo Smith

The process of modernization proceeds with varying degrees of
rapidity in different societies. Empirically, industrialization,
urbanization, centralization and bureaucratization are considered
as standard indicators of the process. It is widely assumed by social
scientists that the nations in Asia, Africa and South America which
now lag behind Western countries on the basis of these indicators will
have to catch up in order to survive. Although the developing nations
recognize the problems that modernization has created in the West,
and are in fact beginning to feel these problems themselves, they
realize that it has helped spread opportunities for the comfortable,
secure life most human beings desire.

This study focuses on the sub-process of bureaucratization and
on the price people find themselves paying in their efforts to obtain
the "good life". Specifically, it attempts to develop a theory to
account for differences in the primary sources of role stress and in
how bureaucrats respond to such stress in large formal organizations
in predominantly agrarian countries. The theory is expected to apply

in those countries which have a colonial background, a popularly

Leticia Marcelo Smith
elected and highly centralized government, and a multiplicity of ethnic
groups and regional allegiance. The Philippine case is taken to
illustrate the differences in the sources of stress and in the public
and the private bureaucracies. The differences stem from 1) historical
and cultural factors which have led to differential expectations of
clientele toward each of these organizations, and 2) the structure,
rules and sanction systems which are particular to each of these
classes of organizations.

Two bureaucracies were chosen for comparison on the basis of their
similarity in function and size. Both were in the insurance business,
but one was a public bureaucracy and the other was a private one.
Respondents from each organization were selected to ensure comparable
positions and functions across the two organizations, and were asked
to complete a questionnaire.

The data shows that although role ambiguity occurs in both organi-
zations, there are forms of role stress that are unique to each. In
the public one, role stress from non-legitimate expectations of clients,
friends and superiors occurs more frequently than any other kind of
stress. Members of the private bureaucracy complain about work overload,
the strictness with which their superiors apply the rules, and the
impersonality of their relationship with superiors. Coping strategy
differs in the two organizations mainly in that the public official is
more likely to pass on the responsibility for resolving conflicts to
superiors than is the private official. There is no evidence that
organizational socialization makes a difference in the job orientation
of the two classes of bureaucrats.

It must be emphasized that these findings are very tentative.

Leticia Marcelo Smith

The issues this study deals with are sensitive concerns in the bureau-
cracies of developing nations. A fuller research strategy will need
to use depth interviews of bureaucrats and their role senders, as well
as a thorough examination of the records and files of the organizations.

Much emotion clouds attempts at evaluating the potential of the
developing nations to institute the kinds of changes which they have
to make to ensure survival and to eliminate gross socio-economic
inequities within them. The literature abounds with morbid tales
of corruption, of the difficulties of developing labor commitment,
and of the overall hazards of particularism in developing countries.
As the respondents in this study indicated, there is enough painful
consciousness of the many sources of the problems of bureaucratic
efficiency and productivity in the public sector among the bureaucrats
themselves. The data also shows indirectly that if the power structure
and sanction system of the public bureaucracies were altered with the
use of the large private bureaucracy as a model, these problems would
be drastically cut down. Although the particularism of the larger
society potentially threatens bureaucratic function, the bureaucracy
itself can set up Safeguards against it and may even serve to educate

the public toward a more universalistic orientation.

STRESS IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATION
A COMPARISON OF ROLE CONFLICT, AMBIGUITY AND OVERLOAD
IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY

Leticia Marcelo Smith

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Sociology

1972

('4 Copyright by
LETICIA MARCEID SMITH
1972

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the members of my guidance committee,
Drs. William A. Faunce, Herbert H. Harp, Leonard Kasdan, and most

especially, my major professor Dr. Bo Anderson.

L. M. S.
May 1972

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

mmm O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O O 0

Filipino Kinship and System of Obligations . . . . . .

The Kinship System and the Larger Society . . . . . . .

Social Values and Organizational Participation . . . .

Social Stratification and Particularistic Behavior

Patronage System in the Public Bureaucracy . . .

Bureaucratic Rationality and Role Stress . . .

Sc0pe of the Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hypotheses O O O C O O O O O O I O O O O O O O

RESEARCHLITERATURE................

Comparative Bureaucracy . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Psychological Characteristics and Organizational
Socialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Role Stress in the Organizational Setting . . . .

RESEARCH DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- The Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Sample and the Process Of Generalization .
Research Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RESULTS 0 O O I O O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Summary and Interpretations of Findings . . . . . . . .

Problem Areasin the Two Bureaucracies . . . . . . . . .

iii

Page Number
m PmBIm O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

1
5
5
9
11
15
18
26
38
AD
52

52

60
68
75
79
83
8h
86

130
135

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary of Findings on Organizational Stress

APPENDH B O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

Questionnaire - Study of Philippine Organizations

iv

Page Number

14h
1h8

xvi

LIST OF TABLES

Page Number
Table 1 .y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Achievement Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated
by the Features They Look for in a Job

Table 2 O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O 89
Security Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by
the Features They Look for in a Job

TableBOOOOOopoooooooooooooooooooo 89
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the
Aspects of Their Job They Find Least Satisfying

Table A O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O %
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as IndiCated by the
Aspects of Their Job They Want to Change‘

Table 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by Their
Preference for Workmates Who are Skilled in Inter-
personal Relations

Table 6 O I O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 91
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by Their
Preference for Norkmates Who Have Expertise

Table 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the
Degree of Satisfaction They Think People Get From Their
Work as Compared With Other Activities; by Status

TableB........................ooo 9“-
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the
Degree of Satisfaction They Think People Get From
'Their Work; by Status

Table 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the
Degree of Satisfaction They Think People Get From
Their Work; by Sex

Page Number
Table 10 o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0.. o o o o o o o o o 0 Q 96
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the
Degree of Satisfaction They Think People Get From
Their Work as Compared With Other Activities; by Sex

Table 11 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0'. o o o 97
Highly Stressful Situations Focal Persons Deal With

Table 12 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 100
Focal Person Contact With Outsiders

Table 13 o o o o o o o o o 0'. o o o 0-. o o o o o o o o o o 101
How Often Focal Persons Feel in the Middle of the
Customers and the Company; by Status of the Focal
Person

Table 1h 0 O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O 0' O O O O O 0 101+
Focal Person "in the Middle" of Customers and Company

Table 1 5 O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C 0 101+
Focal Person "in the Middle" of Friends and Company

Table 1 6 O O O O O I O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 106
Focal Person Role Stress Work Quality Versus Work
Quantity ‘

Table 1 7 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O I O O O O O O 107
Role Stress Resulting from Requests Contrary to
Better Judgement of Focal Person

Table 18 A. O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O ' 108
Stressful Situations of Focal Person; Selected
Responses

Table 19 O O O O O I O O O . O O O O O O O I 0 ~ 0 O I O I O O O 113
Role Sender's Relation to Focal Person: Primariness
and Role Strain

Table 20 O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O C O I O O O O O O 1 1 h
Focal Person Distress from Nonscommunication of
Superior's Performance Evaluation

Table 21 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O 115
Job Definition as Perceived by Focal Person

Table 22 O O .. O O O O I O O O I O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O 1 1 6
Focal Person Distress at Unclear Job Scope and
Responsibilities‘

Table 23 O O O O ‘ O O O O C O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O 118

Focal Person Status Difference from Role Sender and
Occurrence of Perceived Difficult Expectations

v1

Page Number
Table 21‘ O O O O O O I O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 120
Focal Person and Role Sender Status Difference and
Frequency of Conflictual Job Expectations

Table 25.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Focal Person and Role Sender Status Difference and
Frequency of "Unfulfillable" Expectations which
may Displease Important Persons

Table 2 6 O O O O O O I O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I 1 23
Distress from Perceived Level of Workload

Table 27 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O 123

Distress from Expected Quality of Output Deterioration
as a Result of Overload

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Page Number
Figure 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
A Theoretical Model of Factors Involved in the ' ’
Adjustment to Role Conflict and Ambiguity.

Figure 2 O O O O O O O O O O O I O C O O O O O I O O O O O O 0 69
Partial.Model of Factors Involved in Conflict.

viii

THE PROBLEM

The purposes of this study are to determine 1) the differences in
the primary sources of role conflict and role stress, and 2) the differ-
ences in the responses to such conflict and stress by the members of
large private and public formal organizations of a predominantly agrarian
society, the Philippines. Using the Weberian model1 of the totally
rationalized organization as the criterion for bureaucratization, it is
assumed that the belief and normative systems of highly industrialized
societies are more consistent with bureaucratic norms than are such
systems in societies with a low level of industrial technology. The
degree of consistency between the larger culture and the bureaucratic

subculture affects the character of role conflict and role stress, and

 

1Weber's bureaucratic ideal type contains the following features:

(From Max.Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright

Mills, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 19h6, Chap. 8).

a. Each role and position has clearly defined duties and responsibilities.

b. All decisions are made on the basis of technological knowledge, not
personal considerations.

c. All activities are guided by formally prescribed rules and regulations.

d. All activities are recorded on written documents, which are preserved
in permanent files.

e. Relationships among role incumbents are judged solely on the basis of
proficiency, and discipline is impartially enforced.

f. Positions are filled on a contractual basis, with selection determined
by fixed criteria of merit (training and/or experience).

g. Role incumbents are judged solely on the basis of proficiency, and
discipline is impartially enforced.

h. An individual's work is his sole or primary occupation, and constitu-
tes a career with opportunities for advancement.

i. Individuals are given job security, in the form of fixed salaries,
tenure, and retirement pensions.

2
of the mechanisms members use to cope with such conflicts and stress in
the large formal organization. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
bureaucracy makes structural adjustments such that presumed sources of
threat to goal attainment (its members, its clientele, and/or outsiders
who want to influence decision-making in the organization) may be neu—
tralized. The specific positions, relationships between these positions,
the internal sanction system, and the channels of communication with
clients and/or other outsiders depend considerably on what the bureau-
cracy assumes its members, clients, and/or other outsiders are like.

The use of the western, Weberian legal-rational bureaucratic model
as the standard for evaluation of the evolving bureaucracies of the
Philippines and for that matter other transitional societies has not
only an academic but also an ideological significance. Theoretically,
all formal organizations are designed for the efficient attainment of
goals. However, pragmatically, official rules designed to guide the
activities of the organization are occasionally defeated by informal
norms and behavior evolved by its members. Furthermore, the official
rules and the goals become confused with each other in day-to-day
operations. The determination of intra- and extra-organizational condi-
tions which give rise to these variations from the model are of great
academic value. It not only gives insight on organizational behavior,
but also enables the exploration of individual and group sources and
consequences of such deviations.

Ideologically, the use of the Weberian bureaucratic model as the
guide for assessing transitional bureaucratic behavior rests on the
recognition that there are as yet no genuine organizational alternatives

to the model for societies which are attempting to improve their economic

3
situation in a reasonable amount of time.

Professionalization, in the sense of the development of skills to
enable members of a society to discharge their duties autonomously, with
collegial checks to ensure responsible and acceptable-if not superior-
performance of such duties, has limited potentials. It cannot be con-
sidered as a real alternative to bureaucratization of the organizations
of transitional societies, but rather as another means to ensure the
attainment of organizational goals. To take advantage of the potentials
of professionalization, the present highly centralized institutions of
the Philippine public sector first will have to be strengthened through
decentralization. Decentralization can give more of the participants
an experience of the exercise of legitimate authority and responsibility.
It can also free those who are formally responsible for planning the
direction of society and coordinating the activities designed to imple-
ment plans the opportunity to effectively carry out their tasks rather
than remain bogged down with endless routine and petty details.

Western bureaucracy has been criticized for its emphasis on effici—
ency over "human values". Some of the human values supposed to have
been sacrificed by Western bureaucracy are the emphases on the full
development of individual personality within the work situation, respect
for the worth of the individual irrespective of his present level of
productivity, and the willingness to shoulder the costs necessary to
ensure that differences in age, sex, physical strength, or physical
.features may not be obstacles to opportunity that the individual cannot
overcome.

The criticism has been misplaced, however. It is not "efficiency",

or thus attempt to rationalize the relationship between means and goals

A.
per se, which hinders the realization of "human values" goals. The
nature of the costs and benefits of bureaucratization depends on the
kind of goals an organization formulates for itself.

From this ideological viewpoint, the interest in the social psycho—
logical consequences of organizational role conflict, ambiguity, and
overload in a transitional society such as the Philippines is merely
part of an attempt to find out what costs a people find themselves paying
as they struggle towards obtaining a "good life", and how they evaluate

such costs with respect to the benefits they expect to receive.

THE THEORY

Most analysts of the Philippine political process seriously impli-
cate the family system in sustaining corruption and overall low level
of performance in the public bureaucracy. The family has also been
critized for discouraging individual initiative, hard work and risk-taking.
Sometimes, the virulence of the attacks leaves the impression that the
family is the cause of all the ills of Philippine society in general,
and of the way the political system operates in particular. The present
analysis of the Filipino kinship system will mainly attempt to show (1)
how kinship obligations affect the organizational behavior of public
and private officials, (2) the conditions under which kinship obligations
conflict with organizational obligations, and (3) the circumstances in
which the same kinship obligations do not interfere with organizational
responsibilities.

Interwoven with the analysis of the kinship system are the histo-
rical factors which have significantly influenced social structures and
the attitudes of bureaucratic clientele. The structure and sanction
systems of public and private complex organizations and their influence

on stress will also be discussed.
Filipino Kinship and System of Obligations

The Filipino way of reckoning kinship includes any identifiable

relative of either spouse. In other words, Filipinos have a bilateral

6

kinship system. Blood relationship is considered as a very special bond.
Kinsmen are expected to and do lend economic and moral support to each
other.

...the average Filipino considers it good, right and just that he
should go to his relatives in material need, and that he should

seek them out as allies in his disagreements with outsiders. Secur-
ity is sought not by independence so much as by interdependence.

Correlated with this interdependence is the group's acceptance of
responsibility for the actions of the individual member. Although
relatives may regret very much that matters have come to such a
pass, and may reserve to a later date their own punishment of the
troublemaking kinsman, they will ordinarily back him up in a dispute.
Family members find emotional and economic security within the kin-
ship system. Kinship bonds are sustained by the fulfillment of differ—
ential treatment of kin. Although many Filipino households consist only
of members of the nuclear family, the extended family maintains itself
as the functioning unit through the process of continuous inter-visiting
and mutual help. Ceremonial occasions such as weddings, funerals and

3

barrio fiestas are well attended even by relatives who live quite far

 

away. Affectional and economic bonds generally diminish markedly beyond
the second cousin level.

Christian Filipinos use the same term of address for the siblings
and for the cousins of one's parents: the local dialect's equivalent
of "Aunt" or "Uncle". The same forms of address are used toward the
grandparents, siblings of grandparents and cousins of grandparents: the
local dialect's version of "Grandfather" or "Grandmother". Reciprocally,

the children of one's siblings and of one's cousins are either "nephews"

 

2F. Lynch, "Philippine Values II: Social Acceptance," Philippine

Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 1962.
3

 

Local celebrations in honor of the town patron saint.

7

or "nieces". The grandchildren of one's siblings and cousins are one's
grandchildren too. Obedience and deference of the younger toward the
older is a very important rule.

Claims by relatives of their share of one's room, property and
services may be experienced by anyone within the kinship system, rich
or poor, young or old. Such claims are instituted through the spouse
who is blood kin. The kinsman who is in better financial and social
position than the rest has a greater burden in the exchange network.

He is obligated to make room for relatives who want to live with his
family. Relatives often ask for money or for a share of whatever pro-
perty he may have. The small entrepreneur is quite vulnerable because
he is usually the owner, the salesman, and the Serviceman. He must

give substantial discount to relatives. Sometimes relatives "ask" for
the goods instead of offering to pay for them. If the well-off person
is in a position to help relatives find jobs, he is expected to use his
power and influence to place them. If he is a professional, or has some
business service of his own, he is expected to provide his services for
free.

Rituals conferring kinship status help diffuse further the already
wide sphere of particularistic obligations. In the predominantly Catholic
Philippines, baptism and confirmation are the main occasions in which
children acquire godparents. Godparents are persons who consent to
accept the child "as their own" in the latter's ritual birth to the
church with an implicit promise to take care of the child on the premature
death of his parents. Often, the godparent in baptism is the same as the
godparent at confirmation. The godparent who actually sponsors the child

in baptism and/or confirmation is always of the same sex as the godchild.

8
If the godparent was unmarried at the time of ritual godparenthood, his/
her future spouse will also be considered as the godchild's ritual
sibling. The godchild has obligations of obedience and respect toward
godparents. Godparents on the other hand have obligations to help the
godchild when the latter solicits their help-moral, economic, or other.
While relatives are commonly asked to be godparents, friends are
also frequently asked. Occasionally, a family desirous of securing favors
or gaining prestige will ask a wealthy and powerful person to be a god-
parent to their child. There is a strong taboo against refusing such
requests. Refusal is generally considered as a curse on the child.
Few people are eager to shoulder the blame if some misfortune befalls
the child. The godparent-to-be also has something to gain from the
solicited relationship:
The (co-parenthood) relationship implies reciprocal obligations
between the two com adres, as well as between the child and god-
father. The usual pattern is for the godfather to help his compadre
and godson with little favors, such as recommendation for employ-
ment, and to help in their dealings with government; he in turn
receives small gifts or free labor services in election campaigns
and other political situations, and during occasions of need in his
household. Inasmuch as the relationship is Bermanent, both parties
become members of one large "ritual family"!
Another way of ritual extension of the kingroup is through wedding
ceremonies in which friends or prestigious members of the community
are asked to be godparents (wedding sponsors). As in the case of godparents
acquired through baptism and confirmation, the godchildren (the married
couple) have obligations of respect though not necessarily of obedience

to the godparents, acquired through the wedding ritual. Godparents are

expected to help the couple "get established" through a number of favors.

 

LO. D. Corpuz, The Philippines, N. J.: Prentice-Hall 1965, p. 8b.

9
Children of the godparents do not have special expectations toward the
godchildren, and vice versa. Relations with godparents, co-parents,
godchildren and ritual siblings generally carry fewer obligations and
expectations than relations with one's blood relatives. Affectional
ties with them are also weaker than those with blood relatives. How-
ever, obligations of mutual help with this group are stronger than
those toward ordinary friends, neighbors or townmates.

Failure to fulfill obligations toward a kinsman is likely to bring
censure from other relatives. The other relatives who have not them-
selves been offended directly have a stake in bringing the erring kinsman
in line. The failure of a member of the kingroup to take care of his
duties is a threat to the entire expectation network. If the offense is
ignored or taken lightly, then other relatives might freely unburden

themselves of their kinship obligations.

The Kinship System and the Larger Society

The extended Filipino family system has features in common with
most other extended family systems, particularly those of Catholic Latin
America in which the compadrazgo or ritual co-parenthood also operates.
At the same time, there are characteristics which appear to be unique
to the Filipino system. By definition, an extended family system
recognizes kinship ties beyond the family composed of the parents and
their blood or adopted children. Such a system is meaningful only inso-
far as kinship carries with it a set of expectations and obligations
directed toward kinsman. Mutual help in economic need, need for physical
defense, moral support in times of grief, sharing of prestige and

privilege, as well as help in childrearing are among them. However,

10

in contrast with the Western European and Northern American extended
family which has not interfered with the development of larger loyalties,
the Filipino family appears to have cultivated a fierce loyalty to its
members to the exclusion of concern over the welfare of the larger
collectivity embracing non-kinsmen.

Historically, the family has been the primary basis of most Filipino
social institutions. Local settlements, prior to the coming of the
colonizers, were kinship groups.

Characteristically, each community was a separate social, political
and economic entity, although informal connections between communi-
ties certainly existed, which were based upon patterns of inter-
community marriage and alliances against common enemies. Social
rather than geographical isolation divided even neighbouring commu-
nities, a principal cause being vendettas between families and
kingroups of different communities. Headtaking was associated with
these vendettas as shown by archaeological evidences.

Community life and social activities were organized on the basis of
kinship and common economic and ritual interests. As in the barrios
of today the pre-Spanish communities had weakly developed political
structures. Most individuals in the small communities were linked
with blood ties, marriage and ritual kinship, and it was these
factors plus shared residence, common interests and experiences,

and community level ritual obligations which defined the community
as a social unit--not political ties!5

The Spaniards brought these communities in the many islands of the
country under a single political structure. Instead of diminishing the
significance of kinship ties, the Spanish colonial government even
strengthened the social position of the Filipino family.

The failure of the Spanish regime to perform basic service functions
(security, education, welfare, and development), whereas, on the
other hand, it forcefully collected levies and assessments on the
people's property and labor, stamped on the people's mind an image
of government as a negative and burdensome social institution. This
image was re-enforced by the conspicuously inhibitory, and even
sometimes predatory, activities of the primary governmental agencies.

 

5R. B. Fox, "Prehistoric Foundations of Contemporary Filipino
Culture and Society," Comment, First Quarter, 1958.

‘1

hi

H\~

3

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u‘l

NJ

up. -.\ Kim

11

All of these factors combined to practically alienate and estrange
the government from the people.

This alienation of the people from the government meant also that
the people on the one hand and the government on the other did not
belong to the same community ('community', a sharing of many or all
things in common). This was no doubt accentuated by the fact that
the government was predominantly alien in personnel. Their welfare
neglected, their aspirations rebuffed, and their security threatened
by government, the people had no recourse but to look after their
own welfare and provide for their own security. To this end they

transferred their expectations to other social institutions, and
that which was most ready at hand was the family.6

Social Values and Organizational Participation

The set of values, beliefs and behavior which sustains the Filipino
family as a built-in social security and welfare system has its counter-
part in the larger social circle of friends. A complex system of reci-
procal obligations serves to widen the individual's private source of
security. By itself, adherence to some norm of reciprocity is not
unique to the Filipino people. Every society derives at least part of
its capacity for control from inculcating in its members the norm of
reciprocity: one helps those who have helped him, and one does not
harm those who have given benefits to him. What is perhaps unique in
the Philippine case-compared with the case of Western societies—is that
the system of reciprocal obligations has helped sustain a fragmented
social body within a supposedly unified political structure.

Societies of the Western world have gradually withdrawn reliance
on the intimate sphere of relatives and friends as the agency to take
care of individual needs. Laissez-faire ideology defining the negative

role of government vis-a—vis the individual is losing its earnest

 

6O. D. Corpuz, "The Cultural Foundations of Filipino Politics,"

fligppine Journal of Public Administration, vol. 1,, no. 1,, Oct. 1960,
1010- 297-310 (pp. BOA-3057-

12
adherents. Powerful checks at the governmental level have been found
necessary to regulate the activities of private individuals and groups
which work against collective interests. Along with this development
has been the increasing dependence on government to make sure that
disabilities acquired by birth into a deprived group would not per-
manently inhibit individuals from realizing their full potential.

In the Philippine case, what happens to the national collectivity
as an outcome of individual striving does not appear to be of serious
concern to most people. Judging from the actual behavior of private
citizens and government officials, no strong ideology linking the triple
spheres of the individual, the government, and the polity has developed.
If any ideology may be discerned from past and current socio-political
behavior of Filipinos, it is that the government exists for the indivi-
dual and not for the collectivity. With this view of the role of
government in relation to the individual, the good government is viewed
as the government most responsive to the individual. The greater the
good one can secure from government for oneself, relatives and friends,
the better that government is.

The Filipino system of utang na loob helps keep developments toward

a national collectivity orientation agonizingly slow. Utang na loob is

 

a Tagalog term which may loosely be translated as "debt of gratitude."
This debt is incurred within a rigid set of rules governing reciprocal
obligation. Goods or services another person presents, whether solicited
or unsolicited, on the part of the receiver an utang na loob toward the
giver. Theoretically, this utangina loob can never be fully repaid
although the recipient may on another occasion present the original

creditor with goods and services equivalent or greater in value than

13
what he received. Furthermore, the repayment itself creates utang na
loob toward the giver. The cycle of debt creation may be broken only
at the cost of being rejected by the person or group offering the gift.
There is thus no element of volition in the creation of "debt of grati-
tude."

Goods or services are solicited from those who have utang na loob
towards oneself, or from one who is perceived to have "surplus" and
thus have a "moral obligation" to share the surplus. The cycle of
utang na loob can be started with the presentation of an unsolicited
gift or service in anticipation of future returns. The receiver of
the unsolicited gift or service may or may not reject the gift, depend-
ing on what his position is within the giver's kinship or friendship
network. Although this type of gift-giving is usually a well-calculated
act in which the giver considers himself in such terms with the poten-
tial receiver that his offer will not be rejected, some mistakes do
occur. Kinsmen and friends cannot reject the gift without also signi-
fying that they reject their membership in the kinship or friendship
group. The rejection of the gift is taken as a rejection of membership.
If the person does not want to incur a "debt of gratitude", then he
does not want to belong. He who has rejected an unsolicited gift has
also denied his responsibility in a system providing social security.

The group in which utang na loob universally exists is the nuclear
family. Children are considered to owe their parents their life and they
are immediately indebted with utang na loob at birth. It is therefore
the solemn duty of children to try to repay their parents a debt that
can never fully be repaid. Beyond the nuclear family, one also incurs

debt of gratitude toward other relatives with whom one exchanges economic,

1h
moral, and other forms of support. Non—relatives can be used to get
benefits for oneself and one's kinsmen so that it becomes expedient

to create utang na loob in them too.

 

The strong norms against the rejection of an unsolicited gift-and
thus against the refusal to enter into the utang na loob trap within
the kinship and friendship groups-serve to perpetuate a system that
satisfies many if not most individual needs. At the same time, it
provides the parties involved a sense of active participation in the
satisfaction of their needs and thus a feeling that they deserve what
they obtained. The flow of goods and services is quite visible and

seemingly simple within the limited circle of utang na loob participants.

 

This visibility creates an illusion of control over events. Creation
of utang na loob appears to the participants a good way to secure their
investments of goods, services and/or skills.

The system of reciprocal obligations in its turn is supported by
the very high importance Filipinos attach to social acceptance. Smooth
inter-personal relations are sought through elaborate euphemisms, avoid-
ance of making criticisms, avoiding making overt signs of rejection,
and avoidance of directly refusing requests. The Filipino is quite
sensitive to personal affront, and criticism; refusal of his requests
is often taken as a rejection of his person. Failure to meet one's
utang na loob obligations is a legitimate ground for criticism, and
one avoids such criticisms by repaying the debt even at serious economic
cost to oneself or at the terrible discomfort of one's family. At the
same time that one secures goods and services for himself and his family
through debt creation, one also incurs the risk that the giver may some

day ask him for more than he is willing to give.

15

Social Stratification and Particularistic Behavior

The primarily agricultural Philippines is struggling toward economic
development through increasing the level of industrialization. In the
context of this struggle, a duality in the criteria used to determine
social status emerges. Ascribed characteristics—such as family backe
ground (and more broadly, one's affinity to powerful individuals or
families), and achieved characteristics such as academic achievement,
occupational achievement and community service-are strong criteria.
These two criteria overlap only partially. Although it is true that
good family background and personal connections are useful in getting
the other qualifications necessary to further one's position, the collec-
tive status-seeking activities of families enable individuals to rise
above their humble origins. For example, the oldest child is sent
through school often at tremendous sacrifice by the parents and by the
younger children. In turn, as soon as the oldest child is able to get
a job, he is expected to help the younger ones finish their own school-
ing and even secure a job for them. Other relatives, particulary those
who are "well off", are expected to pitch in to send a young kinsman off
to the city to attend school. To these members of the extended family,
such a help is not only an obligation, but also an investment, as was
noted earlier in the discussion of utang na loob.

Status—striving as a collective activity within the family is both
an asset and a liability to the individual. As an asset, collective
status-striving provides the individual with actual resources as well
as moral support in the attempt to rise beyond the status achieved by
his own parents. Also, while individual failure can mean failure of

the kinship network (which is counting on sharing the individual's

16
increment in prestige as well as his "surplus" wealth and acquired
talent), this burden is mitigated by the fact that other successful
members of the family can largely offset the failure of the individual.
As a liability, help from relatives obligates the individual in perpe-
tuity and sometimes forces him into moral compromises in his attempt
at repaying such obligations. Furthermore, relatives sometimes claim
their repayment prematurely-that is, before the individual finds himself
in a comfortable and secure enough position that he can exercise his
informal "prerogatives" in his job, as well as have enough material
"surplus" to give away without endangering his personal position econo-
mically and socially. He must exercise his prudence in stalling their
demands, and his talent in making his economic position appear worse
than it is without producing the same effect in the eyes of those with

whom he does not have utang na loob.

 

From the point of view of the individual, his position in an
organization becomes important in a variety of ways. Aside from the
intrinsic satisfaction in discharging his official functions, his
position also offers him opportunities for his own and his extended
family's status striving. Furthermore, it provides him with the means
by which to repay the debt of gratitude he had incurred to obtain the
qualifications and/or connections necessary to get his present job.
Much of this indebtedness occurs within the extended family. Non-
kinsmen, however, are often involved because relatives do secure the
help of non-kinsmen to advance the affairs of their own members.

In the processes of status-striving, and of repaying utang na loob,
the official behaves in particularistic ways. He gives priority to

familial needs and demands. The demands of the family may or may not be

17
contrary to what the organization needs to accomplish its ends. To
the extent that the official is predisposed to overlook or minimize
the relevance of aspects of personal demands on him by his family and
friends to organizational ends, he is likely to engage in particularistic
behavior contrary to these ends.

The Weberian legal-rational bureaucratic model operates on rules
impersonally applied to those who meet specified criteria. Officials
are expected to behave steadfastly according to the organization's
prescriptions, rather than to their personal predilections. In the
Weberian sense, "universalism", a major component of the bureaucratic
ethos, does not satisfy all the requirements of bureaucratic function-
ing. Universalistic values and behavior are only important insofar
as they lead to the congruence between official behavior and organiza—
tional goals. Empirically, universalism and particularism in organiza-
tional values and behavior do not comprise a true dichotomy, but rather
a value-and-behavior quality continuum. At one end of the continuum
lies universalism which emphasizes that rules are tools for organiza-
tional ends, and must be strictly applied in accordance with criteria
delineated in the rule system. Organizational rules answer questions
as to who, how and when. At the other end of the continuum lies
particularism, which gives priority to personal considerations over
organizational ends. Thus, particularism emphasizes that rules are
tools for the ends of the individual rather than of the organization.

There are at least two ways in which a bureaucracy may harbor
particularism. First, the incompleteness of organizational rules in
any bureaucracy requires that the official formulate ad hoc decisions

at some time or another. Organizational rules are necessarily incomplete

18
because those who formulate the rules cannot plan for every situation
that may arise. Secondly, the bureaucracy may institutionalize parti-
cularistic norms and behavior in certain areas of bureaucratic behavior,
and in specific actors of the hierarchical structure. The owners of
a family firm, for example, may be primarily oriented toward maintaining
managerial control rather than the expansion of profits. They may then
reserve the control positions to the members of the family, while they
maintain strict standards for the recruitment and promotion of outsiders
at the lower levels of the organization. In both of these ways in which
particularism may thrive in a bureaucracy, particularistic behavior may
be circumscribed by the general goals of the organization.

The self-seeking, status-striving official is more likely to find
built-in flexibility of organizational rules to his advantage. Parti—
cularistic prerogatives such as those which occur in family firms are
not likely to be found institutionalized in any other bureaucratic

organization.
Patronage System in the Public Bureaucracy

Earlier in this paper it was noted that the family has always
had a central position in Philippine community life. The coercive
and predatory character of the first political structure that brought
the scattered independent settlements under its rule further strengthened
the familial institution. Political participation of the "natives" was
Practically non-existent during the Spanish regime. The rulers were not
accountable to the governed.

The Americans, who crushed the hopes for the hard fought independence

the? Filipinos won from Spain, wielded what may be called a "firm,

19
benevolent hand". They began a mass-based public education system, and
after forty years of direct rule extended the franchise to all function-
ally literate adults in the country. During the last decade of formal
American rule, that is, during the Commonwealth period, the Philippine
government was run entirely by officials elected by the Filipinos.

Since neither the American government nor the Philippine Common—
wealth government firmly intervened to open up the elite opportunities
to the masses, the old elite structure remained. The mestizo economic
elite who were kept from political participation during the Spanish
regime immediately secured political power to themselves. With political
power, the economic elite was deeply entrenched in the power structure.
They busily used that double-edged power to institutionalize personal
political and economic prerogatives in the governmental system through
a highly centralized government, a wide variety of discretionary powers
and funds at the executive level, and "pork barrel" funds to legislators.

The allocation of discretionary power and funds serves as a mecha-
nism by which politicians secure the personal allegiance of their
constituents. It makes it difficult for the people to distinguish
between the role occupant as a person, and his position. Congressmen,
provincial governors and mayors, for example, are besieged with requests
from their constituents for help in sending a daughter to the "States",
contributions toward building a new church, donations to a beauty
contest, help in financing a new roof for a schoolhouse, and so forth.
Such requests are often granted through the use of "discretionary funds"
and of the "pork barrel". An extensive utang na loob network is developed
in this fashion, with the political allegiance from the constituents

and personal favors from the politician as the items of exchange.

20

As in any society with a large economic gap between the rich and
the poor, the cultural gap between such groups is also great. The
cultural gap virtually leaves the masses at the mercy of the bureaucrats
in their transactions with large organizations. The Filipinos work
through personal connections with the bureaucrat to disentangle the
intricacies of the bureaucracy.

Politicians and bureaucrats, therefore, have a stake in keeping the
bureaucracy complicated. The number of papers required for a trans-
action, the number of offices to deal with, the numerous fees that have
to be paid and stamps to be affixed to documents-all of these help
both the politician and the bureaucrat.7 When the politician or the
bureaucrat is so disposed-for example, at the request of a relative or
friend-he can cut the "red tape". In the lingo of the bureaucrat, the
term "red tape" refers to those procedures which may be avoided and
still get the transaction completed.

The patronage system by which appointive public offices are filled
has serious effects on the structure of public institutions. It is a
major factor in the rapid expansion of bureaucracies, for positions are
continually created to accomodate the never-ending demand for jobs

from relatives, compadres, comadres, godchildren, and friends. In 1959,

 

members of the majority party in the House of Representatives decided

to formalize the widely existent practice of the heads of government

 

7The poor transportation, telephone and mail services throughout
the land also contribute to the willingness of the public to let an
influential in the bureaucracy handle their transaction problems.
However, these factors are extra-bureaucratic, and are not dealt with
here.

21
bureaus to give priority to the recommendees of congressmen.8 The
decision came from the complaints by the disgruntled neophyte congress-
men. Bureau directors paid more attention to recommendations of the
senior congressmen than to the recommendations of the junior members
of Congress. The agreement, in effect, stated that half of all new
positions created under the 1959 budget were to be filled by the choices
of office of the President, and the other half by the proteges of the

congressmen who belonged to the majority party. A confidential letter

9

was sent to each bureau director. The letter read as follows:
June 26, 1959

Director..........
Bureau of.........

Dear Director...........:

Please be informed that an arrangement has been made between the
President and the members of Congress, through the Speaker of the
House, that 50 percent of the new positions in the budget for the
next fiscal year would be allocated to the members of Congress

on equal allotments of recommendees. For this purpose, the under-
signed has been appointed by the Speaker as Chairman of the Special
Committee to screen all the recommendees as would befit their
respective qualifications.

Because of this agreement, I would like to request your good office
to hold in abeyance appointments contemplated to be made until

the members of Congress, through the Speaker, have submitted the
list of recommendees for these new positions as per our arrange—
ment. Regarding recommendees of congressmen who have seen you
personally or made representations in behalf of their recommendees,
please inform them that by virtue of our arrangement here in
Congress by which we will distribute these new positions among

all Congressmen, you are not in a position to make appointments
until such time as the Speaker has submitted a list of recommendees
from the Congress. This is to be done in order to insure that

 

8The source of information on the agreement is "The 50-50 Agree-

ment", by G. A. Francisco, Jr. and R. P. de Guzman, in Patterns of
.pecision-Making; Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration,

ed. by R. P. de Guzman, Manila: U. P. Graduate School of Public Admini-
stration, 1963, pp. 93-120.

91bid., pp. 10hr105.

 

22

each Congreeman should have at least an equal share in the
recommendations.

Very sincerely yours,

(SGD.) SALIPADA PENDATUN
Congressman

Theoretically, the congressmen were to give recommendations, and the
bureau would make the final decision about hiring. The recommendees

were also supposed to have the needed qualifications for the positions.

However, as one bureau administrator put it:10

Yes, the plan would be all right if the congressmen are merely
going to recommend their proteges for the vacant positions in our
office. I think that the word recommend should be underlined. The
truth is that they practically ordered us during the caucus to
appoint their recommendees. I heard one congressman ask another:
'What if these people (meaning us) do not put in our recommendees?‘
The other congressman replied, 'Well, we still have two years of
our term left in Congress. If they do not cooperate with us, we
shall be seeing them again next year.' -

As a matter of fact, during the caucus only a few of the directors
spoke out. It's no use disagreeing with these politicians so we
chose to remain silent. One of the congressmen asked us why we
put their recommendees only in the low level positions in our
respective offices. One of us answered that we prefer to promote
those who are already experienced in our offices to the higher
levels so that they are already familiar with the job. To this,
one of the congressmen countered: "If what you need are men of
experience, I can easily provide you with men of even thirty years
of experience in the Bureau of ." Now, how can
that man fit into our office when he has not had the technical
training and experience needed for our kind of work? I ask you,
is this proper?

 

What is interesting about the above comments is that the administrator
perceived some kind of ominous threat from the congressmen who were not
about to see their recommendations lightly taken.

It not only the quality of the personnel which is affected by
the patronage system but the very structure of the organization itself.

Both the bureaucrat and the politician have vested interests in the

 

1oIbid., pp. 115—116.

23
expansion of the personnel of the organization. The politician sees in
every request for the creation of new positions the possibilities of
filling these with his proteges. If the requesting administrator had
been "accomodating" to the politician's proteges, then the politician
does not press too hard to determine whether there is a real need
for such positions or not.

As a result of the proliferation of personnel in the public bureau-
cracy, jobs are subdivided minutely. Organizational subunits are
created to accomodate patronage demands, and there is little effort
to simplify the organization's structure. Simplifying the organizational
structure would mean laying off personnel. More importantly, it would
mean that there would be fewer positions to fill with political and
bureaucratic proteges. It is not immediately possible to streamline
public bureaucracies because such a move would pierce the heart of the
patronage system.

Enormous personnel burdens also saddle the public bureaucracy with
duplication of activities among subunits. Duplication of activities
among subunits blur the jurisdictional boundaries between these subunits.
At the same time that boundaries of jurisdiction become ambiguous,
accountability diminishes. Since everyone seems to be responsible for
the accomplishment of a set of tasks, ultimately, no one is responsible
for it.

The problem that the patronage system brings to the organization
are recognized, both within and outside the bureaucracy. However,
despair and cynicism seem to prevail, as illustrated by the following

selections from a large government corporation's newsletter:

2h

Our GM (General Manager) is young only in age. He is mature and
firm as an executive. Not a politician, maybe he can say NO to
the politicians. And kick out their do-nothing proteges!

Some of our employees are always busy but not officially. To
them, the GSIS (Government Service Insurance System) is only a
resthouse or a workshop for personal interest. Or a supermarket
to sell everything under the sun.

Congestion is our continuous and continuing problem. It's a
vicious qycle from one set of VIPs to another-taking proteges

or creating sinecures. Never mind the GSIS!

We are so many and yet so few. So many because we are overstaffed.
So few because our workload piles up. The very reason why our
policyholders and the public gripe upon seeing us.

Perhaps a "realistic approach" to employees and their problems
can make them happy. Cannot we create positions of 'influence
peddler', 'kickback expert', 'tong adviser', 'casino consultant',
'wine concoisseur', 'fronton collector', 'racing agent', 'follow-
upper', 'percenter', 'vendor', 'caterer', 'jeweler', 'personal
driver', 'private messenger', ad infinitum?1l

There is also another way by which the patronage system breaks
down accountability within the organization which has only been hinted
at in the above excerpts. It should be noted that the patronage system
is indirectly institutionalized through the method by which government
bureaus and corporations hire and place personnel. Personnel hiring
and placement are done in a highly centralized fashion-that is, through
a personnel office. The lower level supervisors have no control over
the number or quality of the people they get to work with. Although
supervisors theoretically have a say in promotions and demotions, there
are limitations in this power as a means of control of employee behavior.

Employees have certain guarantees of automatic salary increases per
period of employment. The broad interpretation of civil service pro-

tection that is generally accepted makes it virtually impossible to

 

11R. s. Selda, "Hit or Miss?", GSIS Newsletter, May 1970, p. 8.

 

25
remove an employee who has passed the necessary civil service examination
and/or has acquired seniority in the service. Furthermore, "outsiders",
as well as insiders, can and do initiate promotion or revengeful firing
of employees without consulting the supervisor concerned.

Members of the public bureaucracy do recognize that at a formal
level, they are accountable for their behavior to their supervisors. But
this recognition is frequently dimmed by the fact that the supervisors
themselves have little to do and have little discretion in their jobs.
The supervisors do not have very much to account for in their behavior.
Very little is delegated to the supervisors by those at the top. The
supervisor, it is commonly thought, cannot be blamed for the poor per-
formance of his staff since he acquired it involuntarily. He cannot
be held accountable for the performance of activities the planning of
which he has little to say about. He has no way of guaranteeing that
his subordinates have good work habits, attitudes and capacities. He
has little say on how the work should be done because he is loaded with
underlings he must keep busy and who he cannot fire.

Loyalty, rather than accountability, is the more important guide
for member behavior. Loyalty may be directed toward the organization.
More often, however, it is directed toward particular individuals
outside or within the organization who may have an important say on
whether the member stays or not, and on his prospects for promotion
and job mobility. Loyalty also often takes the form of uncritical overt
behavior toward the "patron" or toward the organization, and devotion
of energy toward covering-up errors, even of deliberately corrupt

activities.

26

Bureaucratic Rationality and Role Stress

In a society with an economy changing from a predominantly agricul—
tural base toward a commercial and industrial one, the experience of
ambivalence in the application of historic particularistic guidelines
can be expected. The complex organizations which emerge are theoreti-
cally impersonal in character, and thus are in conflict with the inter-
personal values of the larger cultural milieu. Whether in fact formal
regulations prevail over the use of situational and personal criteria
of organizational members largely depends on the nature of the expecta-
tions of the organization on its personnel, and the way it enforces its
rules. The rest of the society can be educated to meet the Operating
requirements of the organization, as long as universalistic criteria
are not entirely alien to the larger society.

It is a mistake to look at any society as having a unified set of
attitudes toward the work world. There are priorities that people attach
to their many values and norms, to the principles and beliefs that guide
their conduct. No society which totally abhors the impersonal applica-
tion of rules can experience any significant economic growth. Even in
the public sector in the Philippines, there are sporadic attempts at
increasing efficiency by strict enforcement of bureaucratic rules. But
these attempts have largely been long-term failures because of inadequate
structural changes instituted, and the pernicious strength of the
patronage system.

Some observers of the political scene in modernizing societies look

27
at the utility of particularistic relations to development.12 They
argue that it is being unduly optimistic to expect that countries with
a highly familistic set of values could in fact operate a bureaucratic
system in which familial considerations are largely relegated a secondary
position relative to organizational goal attainment. Therefore, a more
realistic view should be to look at particularism as a value which must
be accomodated in the system if the system is to move. The kinship
network may be mobilized to satisfy the personnel and operating require-
ments of the organization. What difference doesit make how the right
person is recruited and the right activities are accomplished? This
of course is an argument new and exciting only to the social scientist.
The bureaucrat of modernizing societies has been saying this all along.
Unfortunately, this view of particularism has largely been used by the
bureaucrat and the politician as well to justify refusal to invent or
to implement measures to reduce the tenacity of the patronage system.
While the transitional, particularistic society may cherish the
security that a strong kinship system provides, such reliance on kinsmen
and friends paradoxically sustains a larger insecurity. This larger
insecurity comes from the knowledge that when the kinship and friend-
ship network fails to provide for one's needs, there is no institution
that one may turn to. The patronage system consistently succeeds in
paralyzing the potential effectiveness of those other institutions.
Corruption-the misuse of authority due to considerations of monetary
and non-monetary gain—is decried at all levels and segments of Philippine

society. The masses who are not in positions of power seem to think that

 

128. P. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption," in Corruption:

Readings in Comparative Analysis, ed. by A. J. Heidenheimer N. Y.;
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970, pp. h92-500.

 

28
corruption is the monopoly of government officials and politicians. They
view corruption as the official's use of public office for his own benefit
rather than for the public good. With this point of view, the role of
public pressure on the behavior of the individual official is largely
ignored. Public officials expose each other's corruption in the hope
that the public will find the other person more corrupt.

The more corrupt the public perceives the governmental system to be,
the stronger they press the bureaucrats to honor familial and friendship
demands. The public gains a sense of security by being able to make
claims to preferential treatment, and will use personal routes even when
the impersonal route may be faster.

In turn, the bureaucrat looks out for himself (the "self" includes
family and friends) because he believes he cannot rely on government to
get things done without personal interference. He expects others to be
engaged in self-seeking behavior, and to let the bureaucracy take care
of his needs is to let the odds go against him.

While governmental organizations are looked upon as "welfare"
organizations whose resources should be taken advantage of when possible,
the Filipino public has a different view of the private bureaucracy.
There is a general acceptance that the private sector is organized for
profit and that adherence to the universalistic ethic is important for
efficiency and thus for profitability. These beliefs are fostered by
the actual structure and operation of private bureaucracies. Merit,
achievement and efficiency are avowed bureaucratic values in the private
sector.

It is the growing realization of the difference between the public

and the private sectors-that is, between the public role and private

29
interest-which makes corruption in the public bureaucracy more visible.
The difference in the structures and the processes of the public versus
private bureaucracy, as well as the difference in the expectations of
the clientele, do make a difference in the nature of the pressures the
members experience. They also make a difference in the nature of the
expectations of the members regarding their relationship to the bureau-
cracy. The character of the relationship between the member and the
organization affects the frequency, intensity and other characteristics
of the pressures directed toward the individual member. In general,
it is expected that the coping mechanisms available to the bureaucrat
in the private organization will be different from the mechanisms
available to the bureaucrat in the public one.

The nature of role conflict within organizations, the amount of
stress experienced, and the mechanisms used to deal with such conflict
and stress depend upon 1) the degree of congruity between the normative
and value systems of the larger culture and that of the organizational
subculture, and 2) the degree of rationality of organizational structure
and functioning.

The private bureaucracy is not totally exempt from the pressures
generated by the kinship system and the related patronage system of the
larger society. However, several factors alleviate these pressures.
First, government agencies are more accessible to political influence.
Governmental functions are wide-ranging, and the system is quite
pervasive. The system even runs businesses. It is the largest employer
in the country. The politician is more certain of the influence he
can exert on government agencies than he is of the response he can get

from private enterprise. Unless he can claim special power in the passage

30
of laws regulating the activities of the enterprise or in the thorough
enforcement of such laws, he is on very shaky ground. He is unlikely
to test his influence where he can be rebuffed.

Secondly, there is an implicit understanding between the politician
and the businessman (who are frequently the same person) that such
attempts at bending regulations of private enterprise would ultimately
endanger efficiency and profitability. Though there is a bifurcation

of economic and political elites on an individual basis to a certain

 

extent, the Filipino elite is still largely a monolithic economic-politi—
cal elite on a familial basis. Certainly, the politician would not

want to be saddled with unwanted political proteges in his own business
enterprise!

Thirdly, although members of the upper echelons of both the public
and private bureaucracies may have relatives and friends who press for
jobs, it is easier for the private bureaucrat to say "No" to unqualified
or unneeded kinsmen and acquaintances. The qualifications needed for
jobs are more carefully described and fulfilled in the private sector.

Fourthly, the private bureaucracy incorporates structural and
procedural safeguards against unwanted pressure from outsiders. Struc-
turally, the direct exposure of members to the public is regulated
through institutionalized liaison positions regulating client-organization
relationships. Such liaison positions are well-defined and sustained
by the organization through a variety of rules that channel clients to
the occupants of these liaison positions. There are also formal liaison
positions within all Philippine governmental agencies. However, the
formal liaison positions are largely ignored by the members of the

organization and by its clientele. Evidently, the governmental

31
bureaucracy exercises little control over member behavior, and even
less over the conduct of its clientele. This informal, but actual
diffusion of liaison positions encourages client pressure at all levels
and sectors of the organization.

The greater strictness with which private organizations regulate
company-client transactions frustrates clients who expect particularistic
treatment. At the same time, they have the assurance that if they comply
with company regulations, they will have good service in return. There
is greater adherence to bureaucratic rules, and to the norm of "first-
come", "first—served". In the governmental agency, clients who do not
have the "proper connections" are oftentimes able to get the service
they need only when they press their case with either cash or vehemence,
if at all.

Lastly, the low level of undesirable client pressure comes as an
indirect benefit that the private organization derives from its univer-
salistic application of rules for hiring, firing, promotion, censure,
demotion, and other personnel procedures. To the extent that the members
trust that their performance will be evaluated in accordance with the
degree to which they contribute to organizational goals, and that the
rules of the organization should and will be followed, they do the job
without extra pressure from clients. Also, they are more likely to be
immune to pressures for special favors from relatives and friends. They
can tell those who ask for these favors that they are not allowed to
make personal follow-ups, or that the company's auditors unfailingly
find any erroneous processing of papers. In other words, they can
point to the rules and sanctions of the organization to protect them—

selves against client pressures.

32

Differential recruitment of personnel can also make a difference
in the stresses experienced by members of the two types of bureaucracy.
There is a possibility that the majority of those who apply for jobs in
public bureaucracies are more job security-oriented than achievement-
oriented, and that the converse is true to applicants for jobs in
private bureaucracies. Among bureaucracies of similar size and function,
jobs is private bureaucracies generally carry more prestige than jobs

13

in public ones. Holding a job in a large private office connotes
employee ability and potential for advancement on his own merit. Public
bureaucracies in the Philippines are notorious for their rigid tenure
and automatic promotion provisions. The government employee is usually
assured of some occasions of promotion and salary increments. Employees
of private organizations, whether unionized or not, do not have the
same kind of job security as government employees.

The large surplus of labor supply in both white collar and blue
collar job markets works against differential recruitment, however. It
forces people to apply for jobs where they can. In 1965, the Inter-

national Labor Office estimated unemployment at close to 10 percent of

the labor force. In addition, it was estimated that since 1960, about

 

13This assessment is largely based on my personal observation. Th3
Area Handbook for the Philippines (Wash., D. C.: The American University,
1969, p. 291,) states that government office is quite prestigious and is
sought after more than other jobs are for they offer better pay, fringe
benefits and security. There is no data offered to back up this assertion.
It is possible that economic prestige of public office is greater in the
eyes of most Filipinos than is the economic prestige of most private
offices. It is also possible that the achievement-based prestige of
private office referred to in the above text is more relevant and limited
to better educated Filipinos. Therefore, among those who at one time or
another are faced by the problem of choosing where to apply for a job,
the achievement-based prestige of the private office is at least as
important as economic considerations.

33

12 percent of the labor force held only part-time jobs. Employment
has been increasing at no more than 3 percent a year, while the number
of people entering the labor market has been increasing at a greater
rate. Unsuccessful job seekers numbered between 618,000 and 1,182,000
annually between 1956 and 1964.14

It is likely that differences in the job orientations of the members
of public versus private bureaucracies lie in the process of on-the-job
socialization. If the member knows that the organization evaluates
actions in accordance with contributions to organizational goals, he
will be more interested in performing his function than in following
rules to keep his job. This is an important way by which the organiza-
tion nourishes the achievement orientation of its members.

The private bureaucracy is also acknowledged to be cost-conscious.
It will try to do the job with minimum personnel. In the effort to cut
labor costs, the organization often loads its employees to the extent
that they feel the stress of the inability to get the job done for
lack of time. Furthermore, when there are conflicting intra-organization
expectations, the employee is expected to resolve such conflicts such
that the outcome will be best for the organization.

Authority figures in all institutions of Philippine society expect
deference from subordinates. The unequal relationship is very obvious
in the interaction between superior and subordinate within and outside
the institution in which the authority specifically applies. Neverthe-
less, in the private bureaucracy, there is no room for authority figures
who demand unquestioning deference, as frequently occurs in public

bureaucracies. An employee faced with conflicting expectations from

 

1“Area Handbook for the Philippines, p. 295.

 

3h
role senders of unequal status can not resolve the conflict in favor
of the one who is higher in the organizational ladder. He will eventu-
ally have to account for his own actions.

An organization which is perceived as being irrational-in which
merit and achievement do not play an important role in determining
individual careers-encourages security-orientation to the exclusion
of achievement-orientation. Evidently, not all members of the public
bureaucracy can significantly influence the organization. If the member
who is without influence resources realizes that his performance has
little relationship to his future on the job, and that he has little
chance of changing jobs because of stiff competition, the longer he
stays on the job the more ritualistic he becomes. His ritualism may
consist of punctuality and regularity in attendance, and unquestioning
adherence to rules irrespective of the ultimate consequences of such
rules for the adequate fulfillment of his function. He will find it
more important that he lggkg like he is performing a function than
actually performing it.

At the same time that the uninfluential member suffers from the
hopelessness of his job situation, he suffers less strain from conflict-
ing expectations of his intra—organizational role senders. He will
tend either not to perceive the conflict, or to depreciate the meaning
of such conflict to the function he is performing. He is also likely
to resolve the conflict in favor of the role sender who is higher in
authority because such manner of resolution relieves him of the need
to justify his action on grounds other than that of power.

One factor which encourages role conflict resolution with the weight

of power in the public bureaucracy is its highly centralized structure.

35
The decisions are made at the very top levels of the hierarchy, and
very little authority or responsibility is delegated. Ironically, the
reluctance of public bureaucracies to allow their members to exercise
their judgement in their jobs stemmed largely from the fear that because
Filipinos were inexperienced with bureaucratic participation they were
likely to make errors as well as be quite corruptible. The high level
of centralization was not and is not coupled with a parallel system of
adequate checks. Consequently, public officials have informally assumed
wide discretionary powers where they can, and the very character of the
centralized bureaucracy has made widespread corruption possible. At
the same time, the centralized structure discourages initiative, creati-
vity, and a sense of accountability for one's behavior.

The public official tends to define what he is responsible for
narrowly. He is quite rigid with respect to his job definition, that
is, with respect to what he gught to do as a good worker but not with
what he 232 do in his job. This rigidity of the individual officials
reinforces the rigidity of the public bureaucraqy's structure, the level
at which it sets its goals, and the kind of rules it formulates to
attain the goals at the stated levels.

Although the public bureaucracy is quite rigid in the ways mentioned
above, it is more flexible than the private bureaucracy in the orienta-
tion of rule implementation. The public bureaucracy-with its legacy of
particularism from the larger cultural context and institutional arrange-
ments which encourage client pressure—is quite flexible with respect to
the criteria by which the priority of the jobs is determined. Specifi-
cally, it is flexible as to 1) which client to satisfy first, and 2)

what demands of the client would be satisfied. Both (1) and (2) are

36
considered without regard to institutional profitability, or to the
fulfillment of institutional goals. While formal institutional norms
may demand that the public official act on client requests as they come,
and evaluate these requests on the basis of how they satisfy organiza-
tional rules, particularistic pressure from relatives and friends
supercedes these institutional demands. This flexibility enables the
members of the bureaucracy to reaffirm their familial and friendship
ties, strengthen and spread their spheres of influence. It provides
each member of the organization with a sense of importance and power
in dealing with individual cases. They are not mere "cogs in the
machine" when they follow up papers of relatives and friends. The
conflict between particularistic demands and the formal demands of the
organization is readily resolved in favor of the former.

Contrariwise, the flexibility within the private bureaucracy lies
primarily on the use of the criterion of organizational goal attainment
in the formulation and enforcement of rules. Since rules are recognized
as means to ends, then the private official may adjust the rules to the
situation within a recognized permissible range to satisfy the client
and to do a good job as well. The private bureaucracy may appear more
inflexible than the public ones because any given client has greater
chances of being able to "bend the rules" in the latter than in the
former. However, the client is more likely to get his legitimate demands
attended to quickly and on their own merits in the private than in the
public bureaucracy.

The flexibility of the private bureaucracy geared toward a rational-
ization of means to ends has important implications to the way the

private official reacts to role conflict. If he perceives that the

37
expectations of his superiors conflict with his own definition of company
procedures, or of how a good job should be done, he will suffer strain.
Such conflict upsets his version of the rationality of the organization.
At the same time, he is likely to resolve the conflict in terms of how
he should act to perform his function best. As was mentioned earlier
in this paper, performance in the private bureaucracy is evaluated on
the basis of its contribution to the goals of the organization. The
private official is not unduly agitated by client pressures to "bend
the rules" because there are institutionalized shockeabsorbing mechanisms
when these pressures occur. One of these institutionalized mechanisms
is the delineation of the Egggg of permissible ways of adjusting to
client demands. If client demand cannot be dealt with within this
range, the private official will reject this demand.

Public and private bureaucracies differ in ways which have signi-
ficant implications for the nature of role conflict, ambiguity, and
strain experienced by their members. The differences discussed
consist of 1) the degree of congruence between the normative and value
systems of the larger culture and those of the organizational subculture,
2) the nature of the general public's perception of the goals and the
means used by the organization to attain its goals, 3) the structural
provisions for control of member behavior, A) the structural accomoda-
tions for particularistic pressure, 5) the degree of adherence of the
organization to universalistic criteria in client—organization, member-
organization interaction, and 6) the sources of flexibility in organiza-
tional functioning. These factors not only influence the kind and
intensity of client pressure and of intraorganizational pressure. They

also provide the individual with an orientation to these pressures.

38
The total configuration of characteristics of the organization with
respect to factors (1) through (6) expose the member to different
sources of stress, predispose him to experience certain degrees of
strain and to the means by which he will attempt to deal with such

strain.
Scope of the Theory

The societies: The differences in the sources of and the responses
to role stress in the two types of bureaucracies dealt with here are
expected to be significantly accentuated in countries characterized
by 1) a majority of the work force employed in agriculture, 2) a
colonial background, 3) the achievement of independence after World
War II, A) a highly centralized form of government, 5) popularly elected
government officials, and 6) the multiplicity of ethnic groups and
regional allegiances.

Colonial background is an important limiting conditiOn in deter-
mining whether the bureaucratic developments in a society fall within the
realm of the present theory. It is significant in its impact on the
attitudes that the former colonized people retain regarding the nature
of government officials and civil servants. They consider government
bureaucrats as exploitative and that ascendance into these bureaucratic
positions inevitably corrupts.

It has been observed that despite the diversity in the specific
political and economic arrangements of their colonial regimes, the
political elite of the countries which won their independence after

World War II have tended to use similar strategies in their attempts at

39

facing the conditions brought about by independence.15 One of these
strategies was to establish a strong hierarchy of status in terms of
political power, specifically manifested in a highly centralized form
of government. The highly centralized form of government was a legacy
of colonial powers which the former colonies have found expedient to
take over and strengthen. There were also efforts to provide the
political elite a strong grip on the means to social mobility. This
control was exemplified by the power to create and staff positions in
the wide sphere of the governmental bureaucracy. As result, govern-
mental bureaucracy has been used as the major instrument for economic
and social mobility by the population at large.

A third development among the newly-independent countries is
the attempt at subjecting a large number of economic, professional
and cultural activities to political control. The regulations of
activities of economic, professional and cultural elites appears to
be an attempt to speed up the mobilization of the entire society
toward the end-states the political visionaries want. This has pre-
vented the independent evolution of non-political spheres. The present
theory does 293 hold in the former colonial countries in which the
political elite determines directly the nature of the activities in
non—political spheres. A differentiation of private and public bureau-
cracies obviously requires some degree of mutual autonomy between these
classes of organizations.

A predominantly agricultural labor sector has strong particularistic

values. It sets the tone of the larger society, even though the urban

 

15S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Develop-
ing Areas and New States," in Industrialization and Society, ed. by B. F.
Hoselitz and W. E. Moore, UNESCO, 1966, pp. 159-173.

 

to
region slowly spreads universalistic values.

When public officials are popularly elected, the political elite
depends to a certain extent upon the masses. Popular election also
opens up the possibility that political support is given by the masses
in exchange for direct personal returns. The multiplicity of ethnic
groups and of regional allegiances makes the use of "political connec-
tions" appear necessary in order to secure governmental services.

The bureaucracies: The differences in the sources and frequency of
role stress, in the intensity of role strain, and in the reactions of
the bureaucrat to stress and strain are expected to obtain among
bureaucracies with 100 or more employees. At this size, the private
bureaucracy would certainly have recruited members who are not kinsmen
of its owners. The public bureaucracy would also be significant
enough to service a large body of clients, and to be of interest to
politicians.

At a minimum, an organization must have the followinngggmgl char-
acteristics to fall in the universe of bureaucracies about which the
hypotheses of the theory are formulated: an explicit division of labor,
provision of tests to ensure the qualifications of a person to perform
his job, a clear structure of authority, and coordination of roles

directed toward the achievement of the goals of the collectivity.

Hypotheses

On the basis of the preceding analysis, specific statements regard-
ing the interrelationship of cultural, organizational and psychological
factors on the differences in the nature of organizational role stress

and mechanisms used to deal with such stress by private officials on

Al
the one hand, and public officials on the other may be made. The
following hypotheses assume that 1) there are classes of organizational
role stress which occur regardless of the particular cultural setting,
2) there are psychological traits which relate consistently to individual
response to specific types of role conflict across cultures, 3) there
are classes of organizational role conflict which are more common to
certain cultures than others, and A) there are within the same general
cultural setting differences in the sources of role stress as well as
in the psychological responses which occur among different classes of
complex organizations. The two classes of complex organizations dealt
with here are the private and the public bureaucracies.

The term rglg is defined in this paper as the set of expectations
regarding the behavior and values of the incumbent of a social position.
Such expectations may be held by others (role senders) or by the incum-
bent himself. The expectations of the incumbent, and the expectations
of role senders may not be consistent or compatible with each other.
Pressures consisting of inconsistent, incompatible, ambiguous, or
excessive expectations upon the focal person are what are referred to
as role stress, whose psychological consequence to the focal person is

role strain.

 

Role stress is more inclusive than role conflict since role conflict

 

does not include such other forms of stress as role overload and ambiggitv.

 

Role conflict refers to the presence of expectations, the fulfillment of

 

one or more of which make difficult or impossible the fulfillment of
the rest. When there is little time allowed the focal person to complete
the requirements of an expectation or set of expectations, he exper—

iences role overload.

 

AZ

Role ambiguity may stem from incomplete or poorly articulated

 

instructions as to what a job consists of or how it should be done.
It may also arise from role conflict especially when there are no
explicit organizational guidelines as to which expectations to give
priority to, and on what basis such priorities may be arrived at. A
low level of feedback on the focal person's performance from the role
senders consists another form of role ambiguity. In a sense, this
type of ambiguity refers to a situation in which the expectations as
to what is good and what is poor performance is not made. It applies

as well to those situations in which the focal person is not able to

determine the criteria of evaluation. The term focal person which has

 

been used several times earlier is the person who is the incumbent of

the role, the focal role, being analyzed.

H1.

H2.

H3.

 

The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of
the public official in that the former will emphasize achievement
goals while the latter will emphasize security goals.

 

The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of
the public official in that the former will emphasize egpertise as a
desirable characteristic of workmates, while the latter will empha-
size the need for workmates who are skilled in interpersonal

 

relations.

The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of
the public official in that the former will more likely consider
working as being a source of intrinsic satisfaction than will the
latter.

Hypotheses 1 to 3 are based on the assumption that public organiza-

tions recruit members largely on the basis of the powerful connections

of the applicants, demand very little member initiative and compliance,

delegate authority restrictively and use arbitrary means to promote

people within the organization. With these characteristics of their

organization, the members internalize what they experience and expect

that it is only realistic to emphasize security in this arbitrary world,

A3
to make sure that one's workmates will be useful in beating the system
at its own game of irrationality, and to expect little satisfaction
from the performance of a job.

A twin assumption upon which Hypotheses 1 to 3 are based is that
private organizations, in contrast with public ones, hire its members
largely on the basis of their competence, demand individual initiative
as well as compliance, delegate authority necessary for the job to
be done, and use achievement criteria in determining the fate of the
member in the organization. With incentives for achievement, rewards
for accomplishment and overall responsiveness of the organization to
the individual on his own merits, members of private organizations then
tend to value achievement potentials of the job, to look for expertise
which is crucial to get the job done well, and to expect that people
find satisfaction in doing their job.

HA. Role conflict arising from the inconsistency between the demands

of clients and the rules of the organization will be more frequent
in a public bureaucracy than in a private one.

H5. Clients who have a primary16 relationship with the focal person

are more frequent sources of strain than other clients in a public
bureaucracy compared to a private one.

In HA, it is asserted that role conflict of the type client vs.
organizational demands will be more frequent in a public bureaucracy
than in a private one because it is assumed that the clientele does
have a particularistic orientation toward the public bureaucracy, and

a universalistic orientation toward the private one. However, this does

not mean that the extent of the stress experienced by the officials

 

16The primary character of a relationship is measured on the follow-

ing scale, listed from the most primary to the least primary: members of
the nuclear family, relatives outside of the nuclear family, close friends,
casual acquaintances, and strangers.

Ah

depends on the frequency of such incidences. As hypothesized in H5,

the nature of the relationship between the client and the official

makes a difference in what he experiences. Because the public

organization is lax in its rule enforcement, and because of the nature
of the extended family system in the Philippines, it is expected that
the public official will feel a strong moral imperative to yield to

the demands of his close kinsmen. Toward strangers, he will feel the

need to apply universalistic criteria. The strangers in turn expect

particularistic treatment, and will try to pressure the official in a

variety of ways. On the other hand, the private official is more

agonized when the client who has demands in conflict with that of the
organization is a close relation because the cultural imperative to
yield to kinship demands is counteracted by strong organizational
sanctions against violation of rules. With strangers who most gen-
erally are oriented in a universalistic fashion to the private bureau-
cracy, the private official does not have moral obligations other than
getting the job done as the organization defines it.

H6. Role stress arising from demands of superiors contrary to organi-
zational rules will be more frequent than stress derived from strict
enforcement of such rules in a public bureaucracy compared to a
private one.

H6a. Role stress arising from strict enforcement of organizational rules
will be more frequent than stress derived from demands of superiors
contrary to such rules in a private bureaucracy compared to a
public one.

The types of demands by superiors which are referred to in H6 and

H6a are those expectations which may be judged by the focal person as

being both procedurally incorrect and "morally reprehensible". These

expectations belong to a category different from those expectations of

superiors which are procedurally incorrect but can not arouse the focal

A5

person's moral judgments. The latter type of expectations may even
be adopted among the official policies and procedures of the organi-
zation at a later time.

There are several sources of difference between the public and
private organizations in the extent of the audacity of superiors to
ask their subordinates to perform tasks which are contrary to organi-
zational rules. In the first place, there is a great deal of pressure
on persons with positions of power in the public bureaucracy to do
favors which require bending organizational rules for relatives, friends,
and politicians as well. A number of these public officials are
political proteges and are thus vulnerable to pressure to give special
favors to these politicians. Secondly, there are inadequate checks
within the public bureaucracy as to the extent to which the policies
and the regulations designed to carry out these policies are in fact
followed. Furthermore, even when public officials violate the rules
of the organization and abuse their official power, the most likely
punishment they would get is a public exposure of their "undesirable"
activities. They may also be "censured" by their superiors. Occasion-
ally, the public official suspected or shown by some investigation to
be "corrupt" may be removed from office. There is very little chance
that he would be prosecuted. It often appears that the removal of an
official from public office is more of an attempt of the party in power
to appease the general public rather than to improve public service.

The private bureaucracy—in which recruitment and promotions are
less politically influenced, and toward which clients have high expecta-
tions of performance-receives client pressure of a different kind. It

is not directed so much toward bending organizational rules but more

A6
toward getting things done quickly. Also, there are enough institu-
tional checks on member behavior, as well as certain sanctions (e.g.,
demotion, dismissal, legal prosecution) to discourage those who may
be tempted to use their position for personal ends.

The emphasis on efficiency in the private bureaucracy puts pressure
on superiors to get maximum performance out of their subordinates. They
are likely to make sure that subordinates come on time and to report to
work regularly, to discourage absenteeism, and to require a high level
of output. This can engender frequent stress on the subordinates. The
public bureaucracy is staffed largely on political considerations rather
than on the basis of enhancing the quality of service or of the profit-
ability of the organization. It cannot be expected to distress too
many of its members with work overload or with demands of peak performance.
H7. In the private bureaucaracy, the greater the status difference between

the focal person and the role sender in the organization, the greater

the role strain of the focal person in case of conflict between his
expectations of what his job should be and the expectations of the

role sender.

H7a. In a public bureaucracy, the more equal the role sender is to the
focal person, the greater the experienced role strain is.

In a highly arbitrary system such as the Philippine public bureau-
cracy, which at the same time is highly centralized, the focal person
can readily resolve conflict between unequal role senders in terms of
who has the greater power. It is the predictable reaction in a situa-
tion where accountability to persons is stronger than accountability
to the organization. When the conflict is between himself and an equal
in power, the prevailing value for smooth interpersonal relationship
in a particularistic setting becomes an important consideration. At
the same time, since formal power difference does not exist, the focal

person has to shoulder the burden of the outcome of his actions alone.

A7

The official of the private bureaucracy is more torn between status

considerations and what he believes must or can be done because he

is accountable for the outcome of his actions a lot more than his

counterpart in the public bureaucracy.

H8. In case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and
that of the organization, the more primary the relationship between
the focal person and the role sender, the lggg the strain experi-
enced by the focal person in a public bureaucracy.

H8a. In the case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and
that of the organization, the more primary the relationship between
the focal person and the role sender, the greater the strain
experienced by the focal person in the private bureaucracy.

Public officials are not totally unaware of, or callous toward
organizational demands. They selectively follow and enforce such demands,
however. With the ease by which the public official is able to follow
his personal whims, he sees that his costs vis—a-vis his job are low,
and his gains in terms of interpersonal relationships are high if he
gives in to the expectations of the person he likes. The less affection
he has toward the role sender, the more aware he becomes of organizational
expectations. In other words, as the relevance of primary relationships
recede into the background, the importance of organizational rules is
heightened.

The relationship between degree of primariness of relationship
and the extent of experienced role strain in case of conflict between
organizational rules and role sender expectations is ESE expected to be
a linear one. It is likely that when the role sender is actively dis-
liked by the focal person, the latter may easily dismiss the former's
expectations and thus experience no strain from having received such

communication.

The private official who is less able to follow his personal whims

48

due to organizational controls is more strained by illegitimate expecta-

tions of close friends than by similar expectations of others toward

whom he feels no affection. His interpersonal costs in a highly parti-

cularistic society is high if he refuses such expectations. Refusal

of the good friend is likely to make the friend feel he has "lost face".

However, the focal person's costs in terms of his job may at least

equal if not exceed the interpersonal gains if he gives in. If he

actively dislikes the role sender, it is expected that the private

official could readily ignore or refuse the role sender's illegitimate
expectations just as his counterpart in the public bureaucracy.

H9. Role ambiguity from unclear evaluation of the focal person's per-
formance by his superiors will be greater in intensity and frequency
in a public bureaucracy than in a private one.

H10. Role ambiguity arising from the indeterminacy of priority in the
intraorganizational demands on the focal person will be more
frequent in a private bureaucracy than in a public one.

H11. Role conflict and ambiguity stemming from the crossing of authority
lines will be less frequent in a private bureaucracy than in a
public one.

Generally, it may be expected that public bureaucracies offer more
areas of ambiguity from unclear expectations as to what an official
should do and may do than private ones. The difference in the extent
of ambiguity of this type between the two classes of organizations
lies in the differences in the nature of "flexibility" within these
organizations. Whereas the private bureaucracy carefully circumscribes
the activities of each member while giving them some freedom in decision-
making within certain guidelines, the public bureaucracy gives the public
official much unofficial lattitude by default, but officially restricts

areas of decision-making. Furthermore, since the public bureaucracy is

highly centralized in the fashion that the lower level members have

#9
little control of what happens to them in their jobs, the public
official is a lot more likely to have uncertainties as to what he
should be doing, or what he can do, on the job. The private bureaus
cracy is in general less highly centralized, and the private official
finds his job situation more controllable and predictable.

H9 deals specifically with role ambiguity arising from the fact
that the focal person gets very little feedback from his superiors
on the quality of his performance, and also on the implications of
such performance to his future on the job. In a highly political
climate generated by the patronage system in the public bureaucracy,
compounded by the civil service protection and seniority system, the
public official finds that his superiors are not compelled to evaluate
him honestly and openly. He does not really have a good estimate of
how much influence the nature of his performance has on his job pros-
pects either. The official in the private bureaucracy by contrast
gets constant feedback from his superiors who are held responsible
for the performance of the group. He knows what the implications of
his performance are to his promotion and salary increases because the
organization uses the information to control member behavior.

Geared toward efficiency, the private bureaucracy is more likely
to generate the specific type of role ambiguity described in H10. To
get maximum output from the focal person, the superior may give him
a workload such that he is overburdened. The urgency of most of these
jobs, and the difficulty of completing one before another comes in
mortifies the focal person who finds it difficult to know which job
to sacrifice and which to give priority. The same type of uncertainty

may not be expected of the officials of the public bureaucracy who are

50
in an organization which is overloaded with personnel and which demands
little from its members.

The difference between the public and private bureaucracies asserted
in H11 is based on the idea that there is more systematic delegation of
authority in the latter than in the former. This delegation of authority
in a systematic way enables the private bureaucracy to ensure accounta-
bility. The likelihood of encountering conflict-generating and ambiguity-
creating expectations from superiors who have little knowledge of the
focal person's responsibilities is high in the public bureaucracy. Any
superior may claim "accountability" for and authority over the actions
of the focal person and thus demand a variety of performances from him.

H12. In the private bureaucracy, there will be more strain from work
overload than in the public bureaucracy.

As mentioned earlier, the orientation of the private bureaucracy
toward efficiency leads superiors to try to get maximum performance out
of its members; that is, to get maximum output with the least monetary
cost to the organization by using as few personnel as possible to
accomplish the job. Uhder this condition, the private official is
likely to find his workload heavy and feel unjustly driven by his
superiors. The same problem is not to be expected to be of great
concern in the public bureaucracy which is not similarly oriented
toward accomplishment.

H13. The public official is more likely to resolve role conflict in
favor of those with whom he has strong primary relationship
and in favor of those who have the most power over his prospects
on the job than is the private official.

H13a. The private official is more likely to resolve role conflict in
favor of organizational requirements and in favor of job require-

ments over considerations of power and primariness of relationship
than is the public official.

51
H1A. In the public bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency on
the part of the subordinates to pass responsibility for resolving
conflict to the superior than in the private bureaucracy.
HlAa. In the private bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency
for the focal persons to attempt to resolve the conflicts by
themselves than will be the case in the public bureaucracy.
Hypotheses 11 to 12a are a follow-up of the assumptions involved
in H5, 7 and 7a. While H5, 7 and 7a deal with the extent of role stress
in different types of conflict situations as differentially experienced

by public and private officials, H13 to lAa deal with the coping mecha-

nisms that are available to the focal persons.

RESEARCH LITERATURE

Comparative Bureaucracy

Most studies of bureaucratic behavior in transitional societies
lend support to the idea that particularism and the patronage system
obstruct societal goal achievement and perpetuate the rigidity of the
stratification system by reserving social benefits for the elite.17
The contradiction between efficiency and the twin phenomena of parti-
cularism and patronage in bureaucratic behavior is a fundamental
assumption in the present paper's treatment of the social-psychological
effects of the interaction between cultural and organizational norms
and values. Much of the literature supporting this antagonistic
relationship between efficiency on the one hand, and particularism
on the other has largely been on public bureaucracies of developing

countries. It appears that when one takes the private enterprise

into consideration, a different relationship between particularism

 

17For the observatibn on the Philippines, see the following:

a) J. V. Abueva and R. P. de Guzman, eds., Foundations and
Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics, Manila: Bookmark, 1969.
b? O. D. Corpuz.

c Current Problems in Philippine Public Administration, Insti~
tute of Public Administration Pub. No. 11, Manila: Univ. of the Phil.,
195A. (Mimeo).

d) F. Heady, "The Philippine Administrative System-A Fusion
of East and West", in Toward the Comparative Study of Public Adminis-
tration ed. by W. J. Siffin, Bloomington: Dept. of Govt., Indiana
Univ., 1957, pp. 253-276.

e) E. O. Stene and others, Public Administration in the Philip-

ines, Institute of Public Administration No. 2, Manila: Univ. of the
Phil., 1955.

 

 

 

 

 

52

53

and efficiency emerges. The findings on this complex relationship
are discussed here to show that the concept of particularism has been
defined in many ways. Variations in the definition of particularism
largely account for the differences in research results.

The following classes of organizational behavior are described
in the literature as instances of partucularism: 1) when rules are
applied even though the criteria for the use of rules are not met,
2) when rules are not applied in situations which meet the criteria
for application, 3) when rules are formulated to attain organizational
goals in situations which are not covered by official rules, and A)
when personal criteria and organizational criteria are equally weighted
in the application of rules. In the case of (1) and (2), the behavior
is considered to be particularistic because the organizational member
assigned the task of implementing the rules uses criteria personally
important to him (e.g., kinship or friendship relations, prestige,
monetary profitability of the actual decision for the organization

member or for his family) instead of what is relevant to the successful

 

performance of organizational tasks. The classes of particularistic
behavior the present theory negatively relates to the level of bureau-
cratic efficiency are (1) and (2).

In the case of (3), the behavior is classified as particularistic
because the organizational member uses a rule or rules specific to
the situation which may not recur, or which may recur very infrequently
so that a formalization of the practice does not become necessary. The
last type of particularistic behavior qualifies because personally
relevant criteria is used glgpg with organizationally relevant criteria.

Clearly, each of these types of "particularism" could have different

54

implications for organizational efficiency and profitability. The
first two types appear to be most likely to undermine goal attainment,
while the last two types are most compatible with bureaucratic ends.

One of the very few studies which claim compatibility between
efficiency and particularism in the public bureaucracy is the one by
Greenberg.l8 In an intensive study of the Secretaria de Recursos
Hydraulicos (Ministry of Hydraulic Resources) of Mexico, he found
that this segment of the governmental bureaucracy had the "expected
features of formalism, role overlapping, personalism, patronage and
corruption and institutionalized bureaucratic politics" to some degree.
At the same time, he observed that such features were accompanied by
a high level of efficiency. The informal relationship between the
Ministry's procurement officer and the private suppliers allows
rather than hampers the completion of projects.‘

That the Ministry is efficient in spite of these manifestations

raises some serious questions for comparative public adminis-

tration. Perhaps it is necessary to re—think the definition

of effective administration in develOping countries like Mexico.

Are the merit system and complete honesty more important than

the rapid completion of needed public works? The merit system

and opposition to corruption are Western values, if the devel-

oping world can produce results, should not those results be

the major criteria for effectiveness?19

The use of results as the criteria for measuring effectiveness,
however, ignores the question of costs. Although personalism and
patronage may not hamper goal attainment (which does not mean that
such practices make goal attainment easier, or that they are superior

as instruments of efficiency to the impersonal, formal practices in

Western bureaucracies), it is very likely that the costs paid by the

 

13M. H. Greenberg, Bureaucracy and Develppment: A Mexican Case
Study, Mass., Heath, 1970.

191Greenberg, p. 138.

55
society are higher than they would have been if more impersonal rules
prevailed. Costs include both monetary costs and other costs which
may not be directly calculated monetarily. These "other costs" may
be the discouragement of people who have talent but who have little
political connection or who have no relatives well-placed in the
bureaucracy, the perpetuation of a stratification system whose benefits
accrue to a few, and the constant preoccupation of officials in
politicking, which diverts them from being sensitive to more generally
felt needs.

The study of Benedict of two-family firms in East Africa indicates
that, given the particularistic set of values and strong kinship
networks in transitional societies, perhaps the organizational structure
which takes advantage of such values and structures rather than neue
tralizes them can be effective for particular types of ventures, such
as commerce, industry and finance.20 Benedict qualifies that the family
firm organization is more important in the early stages of the growth
of the firm than in the later stages. The reasons he gave for placing
importance on the family firm in economic development are 1) the family
firm is better able to take risks in a developing and perhaps not very
stable economy, 2) it can make investments in the training of personnel
which can hardly be matched by private firms or by public sector
agencies, 3) it is better able to raise capital, and A) it provides
continuity and social security seldom matched by large private or

21

public enterprise. The family firm commands loyalty, can assume

trustworthiness of its members, is able to keep business secrets within

 

208. Benedict, "Family_Firms and Economic Develgpment," South—

western Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 2A, No. 1, Spring, 1968, pp. 1-19.

21Benedict, p. 2.

56
the firm, is assured that the expense of training its personnel (family
members) will ultimately benefit the firm, can muster the capital
resources of the kinship network at little or no interest, and provides
solidarity and a sense of personal security to its members. These
characteristics all add to the effectiveness of the family firm.
Benedict implicitly assumes that the family firm will selectively
recruit among the family members the most qualified for the position
and will only recruit those who are needed to complete the job. This
mode of recruitment not only ensures quality performance but also
ensures that the family firm will not turn into a relief organization
for unqualified relatives.22 In the young family firm then, patronage
and particularism within the kinship network are assets rather than

liabilities.23 Although Benedict's findings came from a sample of

 

22Geertz, (Peddlers and Princes: Social Change and Modernization in
Two Indonesian Towns, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) Observed
that family firms in Tabanan, a Balinese town, tended to be over-staffed
and to be timid in reinvesting because of pressures from kinsmen and
friends.

23Benedict recognizes that if a family firm is to grow, non-family
members must be brought into it. He gave several reasons for this: "In
the first place, sheer size means that there will not be enough family
members to perform all the necessary tasks. As the firm spreads geo-
graphically, this problem becomes more acute. Secondly, the need for
expertise and specialization of roles increases as the firm grows. The
family cannot provide enough experts . . . , and outside technicians or
other specialists must be employed. Thirdly, the need for the financing
of expansion involves the firm in extra-familial credit relationships
with banks and financing companies. These creditors, in a desire to
protect their investments, will insist on certain patterns of business
management and procedure which bring in outsiders. Fourthly, the firm
becomes involved with many other firms as suppliers and customers; busi-
ness arrangements will be entered into with such firms and may lead to
a more impersonal organization of the family itself. Fifthly, as the
firm becomes more successful, a number of family members may wish to
pursue their career in politics, the professions, or other businesses
and so are lost to the firm. Sixthly, over the course of generations,
the transactional patterns between family members alter. Cousins are not
as close as brothers, and even brothers in widely separated areas are
less close than they were in the parental household. The original joint
family breaks up, and new families evolve, bringing different sets of
values and different transactional patterns." (Benedict, pp. 1341A).

 

 

57
only two family firms, they give enough indication that under certain

conditions, patronage and particularism may not be inimical, but may

even be useful in organizational goal attainment. Daviszh

5

in his study
of Mexican enterprises, and Khalaf and Shwayri,2 in their examination
of Lebanese family firms also make similar observations.

Incidently, family conflicts, whether they are connected with
business matters or not, are likely to have more total effects on
organizational behavior (because of the difficulty in keeping the
problem between the specific family members involved) than similar
conflicts between organizational personnel who do not belong to the
same family. This qualifies, but does not negate, the general
validity of the findings from the studies noted above.

Enterprise among the overseas Chinese, particularly those in
Southeast Asia, evidences both the facilitating and limiting charac-
teristics of familism in the organization. Geertz indicates that
Balinese natives are awed by the austerity and efficiency of the
Chinese business firms in Tabanan.26 These firms are largely staffed
by family members. Among the immigrant vegetable farmers in Hong Kong's

New Territories, Topley observes that ancestral associations are a

source of financing business activities.27 Lineage members have first

 

245. M. Davis, Social Chapge in the Mexican Enterprise, Ph. D.
Thesis, Washington University, 1967.

255. Khalaf and E. Shwayri. "Family Firms and Industrial Develop—
ment: The Lebanese Case," Economic Development and Cultural Change.
vol. 15, 1966, pp. 59-69. Khalaf and Shwayri observe that Lebanese
firms "have not yet reached the size as to render the employment of
outsiders in managerial positions a question of real meaning." (p. 62).

26Geertz , p. 123 .

27M. Topley, "Capital, Saving and Credit among Indigenous Rice
Farmers and Immigrant Vegetable Farmers in Hong Kong's New Territories,"
Capita1175aving_and Credit in Peasant Societies, ed. by R. Fifth and
B. S. Yamey, Chicago: Aldine Publishing 00., 196A, pp. 157-186.

58

claim on the funds of the association, and sometimes, persons who are
quite often assumed to be kinsmen because of common family name are
not required to pay interest on the loans. T'ien found similar clan-
ship associations among the Chinese in Sarawak of the late 19A0's.28
Clansmen helped each other to immigrate from the homeland to Sarawak,
provided job apprenticeship-and of course ultimately a genuine occupa—
tion—in addition to helping each other put up capital for business
ventures.

Willmott notes some features of the overseas Chinese enterprise
which may be largely attributed to familial ownership, control and
29

participation. One of these features is the small size of the great
majority of the enterprises. In Semarang, the Indonesian town which
Willmott studied in the mid-1950's, most of the firms were so small
that the members of one family completely staffed the business. Among
the middle-sized and large concerns, diversity of lines of business

was a primary characteristic. There seemed to be a prevailing tendency
to stop the expansion of one line at a certain point, in order to enter
new fields. Willmott speculated that this diversity may be motivated
by at least two factors in addition to safeguarding the interests of the
firm against adversities which may be suffered by a single line of
business. The first is the desire to keep administrative units small
so the family can keep close control over each line. The other factor

is that such an administrative arrangement spreads family members

within the organization with the least amount of subservience to one

 

28Ju-k'and T'ien, The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Struc-

ture, London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1953-

2?D. E. Willmott, The Chinese in Semarang: A Changing Minority

Community in Indonesia, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960.

59
another. This structural arrangement can thus serve to keep family
friction at a minimum.

The structural response of the Chinese enterprise in Indonesia
to the possible interpersonal consequences of a family firm has not
helped the stability of a lot of these enterprises. Most of them
do not last more than three generations. There are many reasons for
this instability, of course. Not the least is the peculiarities of
the family owned and controlled enterprise. The assets of the enter-
prise are periodically divided among many heirs which means that the
heirs have to be convinced to leave all, or most of, their capital in
the business. If the heirs do not inherit the desire to continue
the enterprise, the enterprise dies with the founder. The very
successful firms in Indonesia have had to recognize from the beginning
of the venture the importance of skill beyond family connections.

Another study which cautions the student of comparative bureaur
cracy in interpreting the many studies which show the opposition
between particularism and organizational efficiency is the one by Katz
and Eisenstadt on the behavior of Israeli officials toward new immi-

grants.30

Katz and Eisenstadt observed how Israeli immigration officials
went out of their way and assumed the "teacher role" toward new immi-
_grants who could not fathom bureaucratic requirements. What emerges

from their analysis are 1) that particularism may be specifically

geared toward goal attainment, and 2) that other studies which show

Opposition between particularism and efficiency may be based upon

limited and biased instances of particularistic behavior. Alternatively,

 

30E. Katz, and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Some Sociological Observations

on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants", Adminis—
trative Science Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, June 1960, pp. 253-271.

60
their analysis also seems to indicate that the notion of universalism
in organizational behavior has been too narrowly defined and used, and
has become synonymous to rigidity in the application of rules.

In effect, overbureaucratization and debureaucratization represent
a disturbance in the relationship between an organization and its
environment that is not envisioned by the classical model of
bureaucracy. This model envisages the roles of both bureaucrat
and client as segregated to some extent from their other roles;
their roles are "specific" to the interaction setting and in this
bureaucratic setting it is irrelevant, for example, that both
bureaucrat and client belong to the same political club. How-
ever, even in an ideal-type bureaucracy a role is not completely
independent of other roles: some outside roles clearly may be,
or must be, considered. If an old man, obviously unable to

- wait his turn in a long queue, is given special attention by
a clerk, this is not a case of an irrelevant role relationship
being allowed incorrectly to impinge on the bureaucrat-client
relationship. In general, the classic model of bureaucracy
requires only that the bureaucratic organization not be directly
dependent on external forces for its manpower, its resources
or its motivation for carrying out its organizational tasks.31

The idea that particularism sometimes may be specifically geared
toward organizational goal attainment, and the idea that the univer-
salistic ethic has been mistakenly defined in terms of rigidity in
the application of organizational rules are not disputed here. What
is being asserted is that the greater allegiance of members to the
particularistic ethic over the universalistic one is likely to be

prejudicial to organizational efficiency.
Psychological Characteristics and Organizational Socialization

Every social organization develops norms to shape member behavior
in accordance with its values, and in the direction which will ensure
the attainment of its goals. There are, of course, situations in

which the rules get divorced from the goals, or even cases in which

 

31Katz and Eisenstadt, p. 256.

61
the assumed connection between the rules and the goals is erroneous.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that social organizations make explicit
efforts at socializing members to the organizational sub-culture.

Merton poses the challenge of understanding the interaction between

32

bureaucracy and personality in the following questions:

To what extent are particular personality types selected and
modified by the various bureaucracies (private enterprise,
public service, the quasi-legal political machine, religious
orders)? Inasmuch as ascendancy and submission are held to

be traits of personality, despite their variability in differ-
ent stimulus situations, do bureaucracies select personalities
of particularly submissive or ascendant tendencies? And since
various studies have shown that these traits can be modified,
does participation in bureaucratic office tend to increase
ascendant tendencies? Do various systems of recruitment (e.g.,
patronage, open competition involving specialized knowledge

or general mental capacity, practical experience) select differ-
ent personality types?33

Several researchers have accepted this challenge, particularly in the

3A

area of recruitment to the bureaucracy. 0f greater concern to the
present study, however, are research efforts which deal with the modi-
fication of member behavior within the organization. Argyris has

been constantly occupied with the pathological effects of membership

 

32R. K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,"
Social Forces, vol. 23, 19A5, pp. AO5-h15. (Also in Organizations
and Human Behavior, ed. by G. D. Bell, N. J., Prentice—Hall, 1967,
pp. 199-207.

33Merton, p. 205.

3“Among recent studies of recruitment to bureaucracy are:

a) R. Bendix, Higher Civil Servants in American Society,
Boulder: Univ. of Colorado Press, 19A9.

b) R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain,
London: Routledge and Paul, 1955.

c) D. Marvick, Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting,
Ann Arbor: Univ. of Mich. Press, 1954.

d) W. L. Warner, and J. C. Abegglen, Occupational Mobility
in American Business and Industry, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn.
Press, 1955.

 

 

62
in complex organizations to individual "actualization" or self—
fulfillment.35 His studies look at the effects of the organizational
climate both on the response of the individual to organizational
demands, and also on the individual's behavior not directly related
to his role in the organization. Argyris assumes that complex organi-
zations coerce individuals to become dependent, subordinate and sub-
missive. He further assumes that the conditions of dependence,
subordination and submissiveness are frustrating to the healthy human
being in the American culture. Individual adaptation to these frus-
trations occurs by one or a combination of the following activities:
1) leaving the situation, as through absenteeism and turnover, 2)
climbing the organizational ladder, 3) becoming defensive, as through
daydreaming, aggressiveness, nurturing grievances, regression, pro-
jecting feelings of low self worth, A) becoming apathetic toward the
organization and its formal goals, 5) creating informal groups to
sanction the defense reaction in (3) and (A), 6) formalizing the infor—
mal groups in the form of trade unions, 7) de-emphasizing in his own
mind the importance of self-growth and creativity and emphasizing the
importance of money and other material rewards, and 8) accepting any
or all of these adaptive ways as being proper for their lives outside

36

the organization. In other words, the poor creature forced into a
work environment in a complex organization which is unhealthy to the

personality does have a variety of mechanisms to cope with his conflict

 

35For example see his "Individual Actualization in Complex Organi-
zations", Mental Hygiene, vol. AA, no. 2, April 1960, pp. 226—277;
Human Problems in a Large Hospital, New Haven: Labor and Management
Center, Yale Univ., 1956; and Personality and Organizations, New York:
Harper and Row, 1957.

36C. Argyris, "Individual 2Actualizag30n in Co plex rganizations."
Mental Hbrgiene, vol. AA, no. April 19 pp.2 @277 p. 227).

 

63
situation.

Argyris tested his theory in a research project conducted in a
manufacturing plant.37 He compared the "mental health" of high-skilled
and low-skilled employees. The hypothesis was that since high-skilled
employees tend to have greater opportunities to express themselves in
their work than do low-skilled employees, the former group will behave

38 Some data showed that there

in more mature ways than the latter.
were in fact differences between the sense of self-worth, need for
affiliation, job attitudes and extra-organizational participation

in the predicted direction. On the other hand, there was also data
which showed no differences in the two groups in the very same dimen-
sions (need for affiliation and job attitudes) they were supposed to
differ in significantly.

What is interesting in Argyris' attempts to look at the human
pathologies brought about by membership in complex organization is
that he notes that one's position in the organizational structure also
easily influences the nature of coping to the mentally unhealthy
organizational conditions. His data in the study mentioned previously
do not support his contention, but the ideas upon which the research
is based are worth looking into.

Feldman and Moore emphasize the importance of labor force commit-

39

ment for continuous economic development. This commitment "involves

 

37Argyris, pp. 226-277.

38High-skilled employees should express less indifference, apathy,
dependence and submissiveness than low-skilled employees. Also, the high-
skilled employees should express greater sense of self-worth, self-
satisfaction and develop more lasting friendships than the low-skilled
employees.

39W. E. Moore and A. S. Feldman, eds., Labor Commitment and Social
Chapge in Developing Areas, Social Science Research Council, 1960.

6A
both performance and acceptance of the behaviors appropriate to an
industrial way of life". It therefore involves a unique orientation
to the world of work, and the internalization of organizational norms
which Argyris considered unhealthy to individual actualization.
Commitment, according to Feldman and Moore, is of practical conse-
quence to specific organizations as well as to an entire economy
because the committed worker needs less supervision, and tends to
perform in excess of the minimal organizational requirements. The
bahavior of the committed worker is also more predictable than the
worker who is largely driven by external sanctions. In crisis situ-
ations, the committed worker is more likely than the uncommitted
person to stick it out with the organization.

A big problem in the area of developing commitment is the set of
values and habit patterns derived from the various socializing agencies
of society which are inconsistent with the values and behavior patterns
needed in the industrial world. Gregory's Puerto Rican study cautions
that the industrial organization itself occasionally aggravates the
difficulties in developing a high level of aspirations and sense of

#0

commitment among its members. In this study, Gregory found that
there are at least two practices which tend to depress workers'
aspirations in some Puerto Rican industrial firms: the sharp limita-
tion of advancement opportunities within the organization by filling
the more skilled positions with new recruits, and the informal wage

structure which made little distinction between the content of differ-

ent jobs.

 

ADP. Gregory, "The Labor Market in Puerto Rico," in Feldman and

Moore, pp. 136-172.

65

When large-scale industry comes to a society without much experi-
ence with smaller—scale operations, the organization largely has to
depend upon the use of external sanctions to get the worker to do the
job. To industrial workers with repetitious jobs, who see little
distinction between his and others modes of performance, "achievement"
may have little relevance. Rewards and security may be more likely
to be their concern as they participate within the organization. The
industrial organization in the newly developing area is more likely
to successfully solicit acceptable behavior patterns rather than the
desired job commitment among the workers in the production line.

41 A2

Hammond and Dungo point to the complexity of the effects

of organizational rewards in different sectors of the organization.

At the risk of oversimplifying the nature of the work conditions in
the Niger Project which Hammond looks at, it may be said that the
attempts of management to induce greater production and deeper commit-
ment among the laborers through cash incentives has produced the very
opposite effect of discouraging commitment and speeding the departure
of the laborers for their home towns.

In Dungo's study, the fringe benefits the laborers of the Philip—
pine sugar refinery derive from the company, and the company's continu-
ing effort to assure that the factory community is a self—contained
one (with schools, a hospital, shopping facilities, banking and
financing facilities) have assured the company of stable presence

and performance by the workers. Dungo does not have any data on the

level of satisfaction of the laborers toward their jobs, but she was

 

hlP. B. Hammond, "Management in Economic Transition", in Feldman
and Moore, pp. 109-122.

AZN. G. Dungo, A Southern Industrial Complex, Diliman, Q. C.:
Community Development Research Council, Univ. of the Philippines, 1969.

66

indications that the laborer satisfaction with management-labor
relations is at least as high as that of the upper level members
of the organization.

Kilby has displaced some of the myths regarding the depressing
effects of African work attitudes on productivity!‘3 The results
of his study of three organizations in Nigeria-the Nigerian Ports
Authority, a privately owned soap factory and a rubber processing firm-
are revealing of the prejudice with which observers have looked at the
African scene. It now appears that where work conditions are good and
wages are high, labor commitment is also high. This level of commit-
ment is manifested in low rates of absenteeism and turnover as well
as in high productivity. Aronson buttresses Kilby's findings in a
study of Jamaican bauxite workers.hh

The study by Andrews of two business firms in Mexico comes closest
to the concerns of this paper.“5 Andrews suggests that the job orienta-
tion.of an organization's members depends not only on the orientation
that the member brings with him upon entry, but also on the nature of
the expectations of the organization itself. When the individual's
job orientation is congruent with that of the organization's own
orientation, the individual will advance (as measured by status,

promotions and raises) rapidly.

Andrews selected two firms with the help of an American industrial

 

43P. Kilby, "African Labor Reconsidered." Economic Journal, June
1961, PP- 273-2910

AAR. L. Aronson, "Labour Commitment Among Jamaican Bauxite Workers:
A Case Study," Social and Economic Studies, June 1961, pp. 156-182.

55.1. D. Andrews, "The Achievement Motive and Advancement in Two
Types of Organizations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
vol. 6, no. 2, 1967, pp. 163—168.

67

psychologist. Firm A was judged to be highly achievement oriented,
and Firm B was considered strongly oriented toward power relationships.
Firm A was apparently a successful manufacturing company and an Ameri—
can subsidiary. Most of its employees were Mexican except for the
president and a few others who were American. It was clear from the
policies and practices of the firm that talent and effort were rewarded.
This achievement orientation of the firm encouraged many employees to
do their best in their jobs. Firm B was an all-Mexican company. The
report does not state the class of business Firm B was in, but it does
state that all was not well with the company. Expectations were
arbitrary, and so was the deliverance of sanctions. This arbitrari-
ness, coupled with a peculiar sort of paternalism gave rise to inse-
curity, anxiety, and a concern for hanging on to one's job rather than
doing it well.“6

The subjects from each firm were all Mexican executives. Data
on the nAchievement and nPower of the subjects were derived from
content analysis of three TAT pictures. The variable of individual
success or advancement in the firm was measured by an estimate of
job—status level at the time of the study and by the number of pro-
motiOns and raises received in the four years prior to the time of
the study.

As predicted, the data showszisignificant positive relationship

between motive strength and the measures of success. Correlations are

 

uéAndrews noted that the head of Firm B considered all employees,

good or bad, as the responsibility of the company. There was also a
reluctance in this company to give criticism, albeit constructive or
to fire an incompetent person; yet, there was no hesitation in humili-
ating an executive in a meeting.

68

significantly positive between nAchievement and all the measures of
success in Firm A, and between nPower and all measures of success in
Firm B. What strongly underscores the differences between these two
firms is the finding that in three of five cases, the nondominant
motive is negatively correlated with measures of success.“7

Andrews interprets his findings to mean that although nAchievement
is important for business activity, business is not always achievement-

oriented nor is it attractive exclusively to high nAchievement indi-

viduals.
Role Stress in the Organizational Setting

The most extensive study of the nature of stress in organizations
was conducted by the Survcy Research Center and the Research for Group
Dynamics of the University of Michigan. Part of the findings of the
research project is reported by R. L. Kahn and others in Organizational
Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New York: Wiley, 1961.).

The researchers developed a paired research design for the study
of role conflict and ambiguity: 1) a design which involved an intensive
study of 53 focal persons and 381 role senders, and 2) a national survey
in which each of 725 respondents was treated as a focal person. In
the intensive study, all the seven panels of variables stipulated that
the factors involved in the theoretical model of the adjustment to
role conflict and ambiguity (Figure 1, p. 69) were measured. Data
were obtained separately from each focal person and each role sender.
Ikata about the organizations in which they were located were independ-

enltly obtained from official records and other sources. This study

 

A7The nondominant motive was achievement for Firm B and power
for Firm A.

69

Personality
factors

 

 

 

 
     
   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
     
    

,r. 8x
, I .
I , ‘\
V. . ‘ ,
Role senders * Focal person ]
Organizational-3- Role Role Ex ience Res nse
factors expectations pressures . par po _
'A A I II : III I IV‘
\ I 1'
\ I 2 I
\ 6 '7 9 I
\ 1 ,
\. 1.’
Interpersonal
relations
C
Figure 1

A Theoretical Model of Factors Involved in the Adjustment to
Role Conflict and Amibiguity. (Kahn and others, p. 30).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Role senders Focal reon
Role Role pressures 1 Experience: Response:
expectations on focal e.g., e.g.,
for focal person; degree tension withdrawal
person of conflict
I II 2 III IV}

 

 

 

  

  
     
   
   
 

Interpersonal
relations: trust
respect, liking;
communication;
power

Figure 2
Partial Model of Factors Involved)in Role Conflict.(Kahn and others,
P. 70 .

70
was followed by and matched to a national survey in which the major
measures were repeated, except that each respondent served as data
source for himself as a focal person and as informant about the
behavior of his role senders and the characteristics of his organization.

The origins and consequences of role conflict are summarized in
Figure 2 (p. 69). Contradictory role expectations (Box I) give rise
to opposing role pressures (role conflicts) which generally have the
following effects on the emotional experience (Box III) of the focal
person: intensified internal conflicts, increased tension associated
with the job and its various components, and decreased confidence in
superiors and in the organization as a whole. The strain experienced
by those in conflict situations leads to various coping responses-
social and psychological withdrawal (reduction in communication and
attributed influence) among them. The presence of conflict in one's
role tends to undermine relations with one's role senders, to produce
weakened bonds of trust, respect, and attraction (Arrow 9).

Most Of the conflict mentioned by the respondents involved persons
or groups outside the organization. Second most frequently mentioned
were conflicts involving superiors. Inter-role conflicts, such as
between the work role and the familial role came next. Role overload
and conflicts between the demands of the role and such personal
properties as needs, values, and abilities were also experienced by
the respondents.

The findings by Kahn and others which are relevant to the present
study are summarized in Appendix.A.

Kahn and others believe that the individual is limited in his

mode of resolving role conflict by his personality characteristics.

71

In other words, one can expect individuals to exhibit certain consist-
encies in coping style. It is to other theorists, however, that we
have to turn so that we may have an idea of what personality character-
istics may influence a focal person's decision of whom to yield to
when faced with conflicting expectations.

Gross, Mason and McEachern offer a scheme to predict the choice
an individual will make when faced with two conflicting expectations.“8
They assume that the focal person will judge an expectation as to
whether it is legitimate or illegitimate, and as to whether strong
negative sanctions will be applied for nonconformity or not. Further-
more, they assume that an individual has predispositions to give
primacy to one or another of these characteristics of the expectations
when faced with role conflict. There are persons who are oriented
toward the legitimacy aspect, that is, who emphasize the right of others
to hold the expectations role senders communicate to him, and at the
same time consider the sanctions that may follow nonconformity of
secondary importance. Persons with this orientation are described
as having a mgggl orientation to expectations. Those who give priority
to sanctions over the legitimacy dimension of expectations are charac-
terized as having an expedient orientation. A third class of persons
are those who do not differentially weight the legitimacy and sanction
dimensions, but instead act in accordance with what they perceive
is the "net balance" of the two. This third class of persons are

those who have a moral-expedient orientation. Any given focal person

 

has four alternative behaviors toward two conflicting expectations,

 

A8N. Gross, W. S. Mason, and A. W. McEachern, Explorations in

Role Analysis, N. Y.: Wiley, 1958.

 

 

72

which we will call expectation A and expectation B. He may 1) conform
to expection A, 2) conform to expectation B, 3) perform some compromise
behavior which represents an attempt to conform in part to both
expectations, or A) attempt to avoid conforming to either of the
expectations. His decision depends on his perception of the legiti-
macy and sanction dimensions of each expectation, and on his orienta-
tion to these dimensions.

A test of the above theory of role conflict resolution was done

#9

by Gross, Mason and McEachern. One hundred and five school super-

50

intendents were classified according to their orientation. Despite
the seemingly precarious basis upon which the orientation of super-
intendents was determined, the theory predicted accurately the behavior
chosen by the respondents in the four conflict situations presented

to them. The model provided 9f% correct predictions.

The literature reviewed above both qualifies and lends empirical
support to the theory set forth above. Some conclusions may be drawn
from the research literature discussed. First, there are situations
when particularistic norms and behavior are useful in the attainment
of organizational goals (Greenberg, 1970; Benedict, 1968; Davis, 1967;

Khalif and Shwayri, 1966; Katz and Eisenstadt, 1960). In transitional

 

A9G
50Each superintendent was asked to respond to a Superintendent
Performance Instrument. The instrument contained 37 items, each of
which described a behavior which may be required of the superintendent
as the administrator of the public schools. For each item the possible
responses were: "absolutely must", "preferably should", "may or may
not", "preferably should not", and "absolutely must not". The person
who typically responded "may or may not" was classified as having eyped-
ient orientation to expectations. One whose responses were mainly
"absolutely must" or "absolutely must not" was considered as having a
moral orientation. When the person showed neither of the previously
mentioned pattern of responses, he was described as moral-expedient.

ross, Mason and McEachern.

73
societies, impersonal sources of capital are limited, demand high
security, and impose high interest rates. Pooling the resources of
one's kin is a sure way of raising capital. The use of these resources
obligates the entrepreneur to patronize his relatives' business, but
relatives usually give liberal credit terms and charge little interest.
Another obligation the entrepreneur incurs is to provide employment
for his kin. If the society's technical knowledge is held by a few,
the entrepreneur may obtain needed technical expertise by employing
his relatives, so the obligation may not be deleterious to his organi-
zation. At least initially, particularistic norms and behavior can
help the family firm. Particularistic treatment within the organization,
in the early states of its development, also eases the impact on the
employees of the kind of regularity and predictability required by
formal participation in the organization. In the long run, however,
the pervasiveness of the patronage system in the management of the
organization is costly and hampers the achievement of the ends for
which the organization formally stands (Andrews, 1967; Corpuz, 1960;
Geertz, 1963; Heady, 1957; Jacobini and others, 1956; Stene and
others, 1955).

Second, within the same society, complex organizations may have
different criteria for what is good performance (Andrews, 1967). The
organization may reward its members mainly for their contribution to
efficiency and profitability. Alternatively, it may give promotions
for the ability to satisfy the power needs and to allay the anxieties
of the individuals in the upper rungs of the power hierarchy. The use
of sanctions is a powerful means of socializing members toward the

orientation of the organization. Achievement-oriented organizations

7A
are able to attain their formal goals more totally than power-
oriented ones.

Third, an organization may hasten or impede the development of
achievement orientation among its workers depending on the worker's
location in the organization (Argyris, 1960; Gregory, 1960), on how
the organization utilizes the values of the larger culture (Dungo,
1969; Hammond, 1960), and on the reward structure and conditions
of work (Aronson, 1961; Kilby, 1961).

The fourth and last conclusion we will draw is that organiza-
tional norms and structure, together with the nature of the job
orientation of the organization's members and the character of their
interpersonal relations affect the nature and consequences of role
conflict (Kahn and others, 196A). Unfortunately, there is no direct
data to show that clients become socialized to the norms of the organi-
zation such that even within the same culture, different organizations
may experience different demands with respect to particularistic
treatment from their clients. By definition, when clients' demands
on the focal person are contrary to the rules of the organization, the
situation is one of role conflict. It is one of the purpOses of the
present study to shed light on the effects of the interaction between
client demands and the rules of the organization on the character of
role conflict that the members experience, and on the coping mecha-

nisms they use.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the ideas contained in the foregoing theory, two large
Philippine organizations were chosen as the source of respondents
for the study. The two were selected because of similarity of func—
tion and age. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
established in 1939, is a government corporation. The Philippine
American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife), formally founded in
1947, is the largest privately owned insurance company in the Philip-

pines, and is owned by U. S. citizens.51

All employees of GSIS are
Filipino. Philamlife employees are also mostly Filipino, but the
chairman of the board, and 6 of the 17 top executives are American.
The company president is a Filipino. Both organizations have their
main office in Manila, and have branch offices all over the country.
GSIS has a monopoly on the sale of life insurance to government
employees in that all regularly-appointed employees must purchase[
life insurance and retirement benefits from it. Employees appointed
on a temporary basis and elective officials may opt to be covered by
GSIS insurance too. Some government employees do take additional
coverage from private companies. Philamlife itself has an institutional

insurance plan which is offered to public school teachers and members

of the Philippine army. An advantage that GSIS membership has over

 

51The United States Insurance Co. of New York which owned Philam-
life did business directly through its Manila sales office prior to 1947.
Presently, Philamlife is owned by C. V. Starr and Co., Inc. (Delaware).

75

76
being insured with private companies is that one can secure personal
and real estate loans at much lower interest rates than those charged
by financial institutions.

The respondents were selected to ensure comparable organizational
status and function in the two organizations. Organizational charts
and the description of the functions of the various offices were
examined for this purpose. If no written description of the functions
of the office was available, the department head had to be interviewed.
After the initial decision on which departments to draw respondents
from, all available job descriptions for the positions in these depart-
ments were obtained. It was then realized that comparability at the

52

position level was neither possible nor necessary. It was deemed
sufficient that at a functional level, the departments selected in
Philamlife taken together performed most of the functions of the
departments selected in GSIS.

In Philamlife, the following departments were chosen: Salary
Savings, Investment, Policyholders and Policy Issue. Salary Savings
sold group insurance plans to institutions, and took care of all the
processes involved in servicing these group plans. The Investment
department evaluated and administered real estate and collateral
loans. It purchased stocks and bonds as part of the company's
investment plan, and recorded dividends, gains, and losses from such
investments. Sale and rental of the real estate property of the
company, as well as collection of rent and installment payments were

also among Investment's functions.

 

52The difference in size between the two organizations, for example,
partially accounts for a difference in the division of functions. GSIS
had 3062 employees while Philamlife had 1129 as of June 1970.

77

Policy loans were handled_by the Policyholders department.
This department evaluated policy loan reinstatements and policy
loan requests, released loans to policyholders, and provided assist—
ance to policyholders and agents. (The employees designated as
"consultants" in this office helped settle- complaints of policy-
holders and agents, and worked to keep the termination of policy
contracts to a minimum.

Policy Issue prepared policy contracts, computed premiums and
sent out payment due notices to new policyholders.

In GSIS, the following departments were chosen: Real Estate,
Commercial and Industrial Loans, Policy and Salary Loans, and Pro-
duction. The Real Estate department evaluated and processed real
estate mortgage loan applications from members of GSIS (elected
officials of the Philippine government, current and retired govern-
ment employees). Commercial and industrial loans were handled by.
the Commercial and Industrial Loans Investment department. Among
the functions of this department were the evaluation of the different
aspects of equity and debt financing projects of GSIS, appraisal of
collaterals, and checking the credit standing and paying capacity of
applicants for commercial and industrial loans. Policy and salary
loan investments of GSIS were administered by Policy and Salary Loans
which evaluated loan applications, and took charge of billing, collect-
ing and recording these accounts. The preparation and issuance of
lnortgage redemption insurance, optional policies and reinsurance of
13ersons considered to be high risks took place in Production, which

61150 controlled activities pertaining to life and retirement premium

accounts .

78

One notable difference in the composition of positions between
the two organizations is that in Philamlife there were specific
positions designated to advise clients and agents and help solve
their grievances in each of the four departments mentioned previously.
GSIS had no such liaison positions as such in the departments from
which our sample was obtained.53 Another difference is that since
credit investigation and assessment of collaterals offered in loan
applications were handled by another company (a finance company)
for Philamlife, there were no credit investigators and appraisers
in the departments studied. GSIS on the other hand, had at least
96 credit investigators and appraisers as of June 1970. These are
positions which involve a high level of client contact.

A questionnaire (see Appendix B ) was drawn up on the basis of
the interview schedule used by Kahn and others.54 The questionnaire
consisted of both forced-choice and open-ended questions designed to
get information on the following areas: a) sources of role definition,
b) sources of role stress, c) frequency and extent of experienced
stress, d) mechanisms used or available to cope with various types
of role stress, e) effectiveness of various coping mechanisms, f)
nature of interpersonal relations between the focal person and his
role senders, g) nature of the power available to the role senders

to make focal persons comply to their expectations, h)effectiveness

 

53Both organizations had public relations offices. Philamlife's
ciealt mainly with publicity, advertising and promotions. The one for
C}SIS also performed these functions. In addition, the Member's
Ilssistance Information Department, its public relations office, was
61150 officially assigned the task of servicing particular client
needs and grievances.

5l"Kahn and others, pp. 415-454.

79
of various mechanisms for compliance, i) consequences of role stress,
j) organizational position of the focal person's role senders, k) types
of information on his job performance that focal person felt may
justifiably be withheld from his supervisors, 1) type of normative
orientation, m) job orientation, n) evaluation of superiors' role
performance, 0) job promotion, and p) length of employment in the
organization, occupancy of present job. The empirical data on our
theory are derived largely from the perceptual reports of the focal

person.
The Sample

As mentioned earlier, the respondents of this study were chosen
so that those from the public bureaucracy (GSIS) wOuld have similar
functions and organizational positions as thOse in the private bureaus
cracy (Philamlife). The positions were all white-collar. The number

of respondents in each organizational status is approximately as

follows:
GSIS Philamlife
Top Management 2 0
Middle Management 7 8
Second level supervisor 26 8
First level supervisor 13 13
Non-supervisory personnel 14 39
Total 62 68

Most of the respondents from GSIS were female (A0 females and 22 males),
while the reverse was true with Philamlife (7 females and 61 males).

The difference in the sex composition of the respondents from the two
organizations reflects differences in hiring practices, as well as

differences in allotment of jobs to the sexes. According to a reliable

80

source within GSIS, local union management was quite powerful, male-
dominated, and eager to hire the more-or-less politically passive
females into the organization to retain the supremacy of the union.
As a result, within the past 10 years, more females (most of whom
were former public school teachers) were hired by GSIS. 0n the other
hand, a reliable source in Philamlife said that the official personnel
policy gave preference to males, except for the positions of typist
and secretary, where males and females were equally qualified.

Ascertaining the names of the personnel of the departments in
GSIS turned out to be trickier than the same task in Philamlife. In
Philamlife the Personnel department had the complete list of personnel
as well as their accurate job titles. GSIS was not so orderly in
this matter. In GSIS, the official list used for budgetary purposes
had the names of personnel under the departments to which they were
"officially" assigned. The "official" job titles were also indicated.
However, at the bottom of the page of each list were numerous quali-
fications as to where the individuals listed were "actually" working.
As it became evident that the task of sorting out who was where was
going to be time-consuming, it was decided that each department head
be approached for a list of subordinates. The department heads were
quite cooperative, especially since they were presented with a written
permission from the Personnel Manager of GSIS stating that the research
may be conducted in the organization. Furthermore, the influence of
close kinsmen and friends of the researcher were also utilized in
getting their help.

The list provided by the department managers bore little semblance

to the list obtained from the Personnel department. The names of the

81
employees, as well as of their job titles (internally called "working
titles") were largely different. Apparently, a number of employees
of GSIS were appointed to positions for which they were not qualified
but which carried a bigger salary than the actual positions to which
they were assigned. For example, a person who was actually doing a
typist's job was in the official personnel list as a "technical aide".
As a technical aide, he was entitled to a bigger salary than that of
a typist. One wonders if the System could keep track of its employees
with dual assignments. Obviously, the dual assignment of titles to
personnel is part of the official workings of the organization. The
organization officially condones the practice of "padding" positions
of individuals, which in turn helps generate rumors that there are
individuals on the personnel list who only appear to collect their
salary, who put out no work for the System.

It is from the personnel list provided by the department managers
that the GSIS sample was finally drawn. The original intent was to
use all the members of the selected departments as respondents. How—
ever, this turned out to be impossible. In the first place, the rate
of absenteeism was quite high, and a number of people were on leave
for extended periods of time. Secondly, a number of the employees
had jobs which took them outside of the office building for most of
the day. These employees were mostly male, and most of them were not
available to answer the questionnaire, or even to take the time to
listen to an explanation of what the questionnaire was all about.
Lastly, a part of the potential respondents said they did not have
time to do it or registered some fear that the questionnaire may

be used against them. What the researcher attempted to do then was

82
to convince the largest possible number, in as many positions as
possible, that it was worth their while to fill out the questionnaire,
and that the results would be strictly confidential.

In Philamlife, the sheer bulk of the work of the employees made
it difficult to even get a chance to approach them. This was parti-
cularly true of those who had the position of "consultant". Though
we were able to give each of four of them a copy of the questionnaire,
no one turned his questionnaire in. The personnel manager of Philam-
life only provided an oral permission to distribute the questionnaire
during office hours. We deliberately withheld the information that
oral permission was officially given us, except when it seemed neces—
sary to convince the department managers that it was "officially safe"
for them to let us distribute questionnaires and talk to their employ-
ees. Nevertheless, a number of the employees still balked when we
approached them for fear that the results of the study may "leak"
to management.

Interestingly, there were quite a few Philamlife employees who
held jobs other than their full—time job in this company. This was
not at all true of the employees of the departments in GSIS used in
this study. Also, a number of the employees of Philamlife went to
night school, and the working students' ages ranged from approximately
18 to A5. Most of these working students dreamed of being "their own
boss" through the private practice of law and accounting. The working
students and most of those with extra jobs eliminated themselves from
the sample for they said they just did not have the time to complete
the questionnaire. Just as in GSIS, an effort was made to convince

as many Philamlife employees as possible to complete the questionnaire,

83
and to ensure that the sample represented a wide distribution of posi-
tions within the departments studied.

Employees who had worked less than a year with the organization
were eliminated from the sample because they were expected to experience
an unusually high level of role ambiguity and an extraordinarily low
level of role conflict because of sheer ignorance of roles and proce-
dures on the job. Furthermore, the length of stay on the job of the
selected respondents in both companies ranged from one year to almost

30 years. This range was wide enough.

The Sample and the Process of Generalization

The primary focus of this paper is the development of theory.

In this exploratory study, intense efforts were made to have a sample
representing an extensive range of positions in terms of organizational
hierarchy and function. No attempt was made to have a wide variety

of large bureaucracies represented. Since no data on comparative
organizational stress in developing societies has been reported to
date, it was deemed necessary to cover all of the forms of stress

dealt with in the present theory. The findings provide general
indicatiOns as to the degree of adequacy of the theory, as well as

the directions in which the theory may be developed.

The fact that the sample is small, and non-randomly selected to
include a broad range of roles and interaction possibilities, limits
the possibility of generalizing the results of this study. The utility
of the present data in making generalizations may be enhanced by
defining the unit of generalization as closely as possible to the

population from which the sample was drawn. On one level, the

84
population is that of organizations from which the two bureaucracies
were selected. It is the population of complex organizations with
100 or more employees, engaged in commercial and service activities
in the Philippines. On another level, the population is that of white
collar bureaucrats from complex organizations with 100 or more employees
engaged in commercial and service activities in the Philippines. The
theory itself covers a wider range of bureaucracies and societies, as

indicated in the statement of boundary conditions (pp. A3-A6).
Research Procedure

The initial questionnaire was reviewed by a Filipino graduate
student in sociology at the University of the Philippines. It was
then pretested in two Philippine organizations with comparable func—
tions: the Development Bank of the Philippines (public) and the
Republic Bank and Trust Company (private). Five persons of different
status levels from each organization filled out the questionnaire.

The ten respondents in the pretest said they had little trouble in
understanding the questions and the directions. Minor revisions

were made on the basis of this pretest. The questionnaire was written
in English.

One hundred and sixty-two questionnaires were distributed (7A at
GSIS and 88 at Philamlife), of which 130 were collected (62 from GSIS
and 68 from Philamlife). The respondents were approached individually
at work, and the questionnaire was explained to each of them. The
questionnaires were also collected from each of the respondents
personally.

Some interesting events happened in the process of data-gathering

85
in both GSIS and Philamlife. In GSIS, after the first week of question-
naire distribution, the new general manager (he had been in office
for about three months at the time) decided to limit the general
public's access to employees during office hours. Uniformed and
well-armed security officers guarded all the entrances and exits to
the building, and even the doorways in each floor of the building.
Hundreds of people were channeled to the Public Relations Office,
whose employees then screened the clients to determine who had "legi—
timate" needs to go to the other offices. The delays created by
the procedure of having to go through the Public Relations Office
made it virtually an impossible task to get hold of the potential
respondents who mainly did field work. These field workers reported
to the office for a few minutes in the morning, left, and then re-
ported only briefly if at all in the afternoon.)

In Philamlife, after the first week of questionnaire distribup
tion, talk began of an impending strike. Although the strike appeared
to have been averted, we thought it necessary to distribute the rest
of the questionnaires the second week, and attempt to get all the
questionnaires back during the third week. The growing insecurity

in the air made it difficult to attempt to enlarge the sample.

RESULTS

In the following report of the results of the study, when the
reported frequencies exceed the size of the sample, it means that
several responses were tabulated for each respondent.

H1. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that
of the public official in that the former will emphasize achieve-
mgpp goals while the latter will emphasize security goals.

The job orientation of the focal person is defined here in terms
of (1) what features of a job he considers to be "good", (2) what
features of a job he considers to be "bad", (3) what features of his
present job are most satisfying, (A) what featuresof his present
job are least satisfying, and (5) what aspects of his present job
should be changed.

All the items (questions A9, 50, 52, 53, 5A) which were used to
obtain information on (1) through (5) were open-ended. The responses
to questions A9, 50, 52 and 53 were categorized as follows:

1. Interpersonal orientation. This includes responses which
indicate presence or absence of "opportunity to relate with other
people", of "good relationship between supervisor and supervised"
and of the "service potential".

2. Achievement orientation. This includes responses which indi-
cate presence or absence of "potential to express creativity, inde-
pendence," "opportunity to learn from job", "opportunity to utilize
one's skills fully", and chance of having "authority commensurate with
responsibility".

86

87

3. Status and pleasure orientation. This includes responses

 

which indicate presence or absence of "variety" and "flexibility"
of the job, "possibility of promotion, advancement", "high demands
on output", opportunity to "travel and see places", "physical
strenuousness and health hazards".

A. Security and financial rewards orientation. Includes responses

 

which indicate presence or absence of "security" and of "good wages,
fringe benefits".

5. Legitimacy orientation. This includes responses which indicate
presence or absence of positive legal and informal sanctions on the
job as an "honest source of money", or of "moral risks on the job"
and of "pressures to go against organizational rules".

Categories (2) and (A) will be used in the succeeding analysis
for Hypothesis 1.

Responses to question 54 (which asked which aspects of his job
the focal person wanted to change) were also categorized under similar
headings as above, but the specific items included in each category
differed somewhat:

l. Interpersonal. This includes responses indicating that the
focal person did not want to "deal with demanding clients" or wanted
to "change present superiors".

2. Achievement. This includes responses which are specific
suggestions as to how or where the work situation and procedures
may be changed in order to get the job accomplished more efficiently.

3. Status and pleasure. This includes responses such as "monotony
of repetitive jobs", "doing clerical jobs", "low salary", "few fringe

benefits" and "slow promotion".

88

A. Legitimacy. This includes responses such as "having job
altered by superiors such that outcomes are against company regu—
lations", "favoritism in promotions salary increases, job assign—
ments", "doing personal favors for superiors", "having to do somebody
else's job", "political interference on the job".

As may be seen in Table 1, about the same percentage of responses
in GSIS (3A out of a total 253 responses, or 13%) and in Philamlife
(28 out of 23A, or 12%) indicated achievement-related features in
response to Question A9, "What do you look for in a job? What makes
a job a good one for you?" The rankrand-file of Philamlife appear

to be more achievement conscious in looking at a job than that of GSIS.

 

Table 1
Achievement Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated
by the Features They Look for in a Job

GSIS Philamlife
ii Li
Indicated 34 13 28 12
Not indicated 219 87 206 88
Total 253 100 234 100

 

In Table 2, out of a total of 102 responses from GSIS to question
A9, 26 or 25% said that the respondent looked for security, good wages
and fringe benefits in a job. In Philamlife, out of 9A, 20 of the

responses or 2l% pointed to security-related features of the job.

89

 

Table 2
Security Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated
by the Features They Look for in a Job

N
Indicated 26
Not indicated 76
Total 102

GSIS

25
75

100

Philamlife
N %
2O 21
74 79
94 100

 

Given an equal level of achievement orientation in the two

organizations, a slightly higher security orientation among GSIS

employees and a similarity in the greater emphasis on security

over achievement in both GSIS and Philamlife, the data does not support

Hypothesis 1.

 

Table 3
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated
by the Aspects of Their Job They Find Least Satisfying

GSIS

N .g
Interpersonal 3 5
Achievement 10 16
Status 18 29
Security 0 0
Legitimacy 8 13
None 9 14
No response 1A 23
Total 62 100

Philamlife
11—1
A 6
10 15
13 19

2 3

3 4
8 12
28 41

68 100

 

 

Table A
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated
by the Aspects of Their Job They Want to Change

GSIS Philamlife

N I'Zo N Jo
Interpersonal 1 2 1 1
Achievement 13 21 10 15
Status 5 8 1 1
Legitimacy 5 8 1 1
None 18 29 19 29
No response 20 32 36 53
Total 62 100 68 100

 

Achievement—related matters appear to be less of a problem in
Philamlife than in GSIS, as shown in Tables 3 and A. Table 3 reports
the responses to question 53, "What do you find least satisfying in
your job?" Table A lists the responses to question 54, "If you could
redesign your job as it would be most satisfying to you, what would
you like to have changed about it?"

The level of security on the job is not a source of dissatisfaction
in either organization. Although the employees in both organizations
declare that they look for possibilities of achievement and for security
in a job, it is likely that the Philamlife employee finds more achieve-
ment possibilities in his present job than the GSIS employee. An
indication of this may be the fewer responses indicating achievement-
related changes that the Philamlife employees seem to want compared
to the GSIS employees.

H2. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that
of the public official in that the former will emphasize expertise
as a desirable characteristic of workmates, while the latter will

emphasize the need for workmates who are skilled in interpersonal
relations.

91

Question A1 deals with the orientation of the official toward
his workmates. It asks, "What kind of people would you like as
workmates? What do you feel makes a person a good one to have around?"
The responses were categorized as follows:

1. Personality traits. This includes responses such as "honest"
and "self-respecting".

2. Interpersonal traits. This includes such responses which
indicate high capacity for smooth interpersonal relationship (e. g.,
"approachable", "cheerful", "patient", "considerate", "tactful",
"understanding", "cooperative").

3. Expertise and performance. This includes responses such as

"competent in his job", "responsible", "rules-oriented", "industrious".

 

Table 5
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by Their
Preference for Workmates Who are Skilled in Interpersonal Relations

 

GSIS Philamlife
N L20 N %
Mentioned A6 A9 A2 A8
Not mentioned 47 51 A6 52
Total 93 100 88 100
Table 6

Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated
by Their Preference for Workmates Who Have Expertise

GSIS Philamlife
N a! N dé
Mentioned 37 20 20 11
Not mentioned 147 80 156 89

Total 184 100 176 100

 

92
Tables 5 and 6 indicate no differences between the kinds of

traits of officemates who are skilled in smooth interpersonal relations

desired by GSIS and Philamlife employees. Out of 93 responses, A6 or

A9% indicated preference for officemates who are skilled in smooth

interpersonal relations in GSIS. In Philamlife, out of 88 responses,

A2 or A8% indicated the same preference.

Expertise appears to be less valued in both organizations than

are interpersonal skills. Out of 18A responses, 37 or 20% cited

expertise as the desired characteristic in an officemate in GSIS, and

in Philamlife, 20 or ll% of 176 responses made similar indications.

Perhaps expertise is more taken for granted in Philamlife.

Hypothesis 2 is not supported by the data.

H3. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that
of the public official in that the former will more likely consider
working as being the source of intrinsic satisfaction than will
the latter.

The hypothesis was tested by asking the respondents two questions.

One was question A7: "In general, how much satisfaction and pleasure

do you think other people get from the work they do?" The other,

question A8, was: "Compared with other things not connected with their
work—how much do you feel that they view their jobs as a real source of
satisfaction in life?" Responses to both questions ranged from "Very
much" to "None at all" on a five-point scale. The questions were asked
to solicit the respondent's own feelings about work indirectly so that
he would not feel very vulnerable. It was assumed that people project
their own attitudes in perceiving the attitudes of others, especially
of an ambiguously defined "others". Another implicit assumption behind

these questions was that there were alternatives or activities the

individual engaged in with which he could compare work in an occupation.

93

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95
Overall, more GSIS members perceive a higher level of satisfaction
from their work than is the case with Philamlife (Table 7). Of the
62 GSIS respondents, 69% replied "Very much" and "Considerable", 23%
said "Some" and "Very little", while only 3% said "Not at all" on
question A7. The corresponding distribution in Philamlife is ASA, 28%
and 0%. Much the same response distribution occurs in question A8

Tables 8 and 9).

 

Table 9
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the Degree of
Satisfaction They Think People Get From Their Work; by Sex
(Column percentage is indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

 

 

 

Degree of GSIS Philamlife All
Satisfaction Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Very much, 16 27 43 37 3 40 53 3O 83

considerable (73) (67) (69) (61) (43) (59) (64) (64) (64)
Some, very 4 10 14 13 2 15 17 12 29
little (18) (25) (22) (21) (29) (22) (20) (25) (22)
None at all - 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 2
- (2) (2) (2) - (1) (1) (2) (2)

No response 2 2 A 10 2 12 12 A 16
(9) (5) (7) (16) (28) (18) (15) (9) (12)

Total 22 A0 62 61 7 68 83 47 130

(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

 

96

 

Table 10
Job Orientation of Focal Personsas Indicated by the Degree of
Satisfaction They Think People Get From Their Work as Compared
With Other Activities; by Sex (Column percentage is
indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

 

 

Degree of GSIS Philamlife All
Satisfaction Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Very much, 16 27 43 3O 3 33 46 3O 76

considerable (73) (67) (69) (49) (43) (A8) (55) (6a) (58)
Some, very 4 10 14 18 1 19 22 11 33
little (18) (25) (23) (29) (14) (28) (26) (23) (25)
None at all - 2 2 - - - - 2 2
- (5) (3) - - - - (4) (1)

No response 2 1 3 13 3 16 15 A 19
(9) (2) (5) (21) (43) (23) (18) (8) (15)

Total 22 A0 62 61 7 68 83 47 130

(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

 

On both questions, there is no consistent pattern of association
between rank and perception of work as a source of intrinsic satisfaction
in GSIS (see Tables 7 and 8). There is some indication that females
view work less as a source of satisfaction compared to other activities
than do males in both GSIS and Philamlife (Tables 9 and 10).

The data fails to support Hypothesis 3.

H4. Role conflict arising from the inconsistency between demands of
clients and rules of the organization will be more frequent in a
public bureaucracy than in a private one.

Table 11 shows that of the highly stressful situations the respond-
ents reported they had to deal with, time pressure and inappropriate
expectations from clients were most frequently mentioned by GSIS

respondents. Description of highly stressful situations were solicited

through question 3: "What are the conditions or situations you have to

97
deal with that you think are particularly stressful or tension-inducing?"
To further illuminate the stressful situations the respondents
experienced, question 5 was asked: "What was the stressful situation
you had last?" This question yielded much the same responses as did

question 3.

 

Table 11
Highly Stressful Situations
Focal Persons Deal With

GSIS Philamlife
N a N
Time pressure 16 38 2 5
from clients
Inappropriate
expectations 7 17 2 5
from clients
Other 19 45 34 90
Total 42 100 38 100

 

Of 42 GSIS respondents who have specific situations in response to
question 3, 38% mentioned time pressure from clients, and 17% mentioned
inappropriate expectations from clients. In Philamlife, of 38 respondents
who gave specific situations in response to question 3, only 5% mentioned
time pressure from clients and 5% mentioned inappropriate expectations
from clients.

Time pressure from clients is included in the analysis of data
relevant to Hypothesis A because of the specific manifestations of this
pressure. In GSIS, the following classes of time pressure from clients
appear:

1. Pressure from mortgagors or borrowers without political backing

98
to give priority to their loans.

2. Pressure from customers who have political backing to give
priority to the completion of their requests.

3. Pressure from customers to release their checks before the
date the checks are due.

A. Pressure from politicians and other influential leaders them-
selves to process and release the policies of their constitue
ents during political campaign periods.

5. Pressure from fixers who expect special attention.

In Philamlife, it is not the actual presence of clients which apply
in the two cases (out of 38) who mentioned time pressure from clients
as particularly stress-inducing in response to question 3. It is the
feeling of being rushed by the realization that the clients needed to
have their papers completed by the respondent. In other words, while
in GSIS, the pressure felt was actually communicated by the clients
and by their representatives, in Philamlife, the pressure was largely
internally generated by an awareness of responsibility.

Inappropriate expectations from GSIS clients are of the following
variety:

1. Insistence of mortgagors or borrowers that the amount of money
approved be bigger than the "corresponding fair appraised values
of property" offered as collateral, or bigger than what the
employee calculated.

2. Miscellaneous requests from policyholders which the employee
considers to be against company policy, but which the employee
does not consider to be "morally wrong".

Philamlife clients, as mentioned by two respondents, insist on doing

99
things the way they want instead of following company regulations
(e.g., asking for a receipt for documents turned over to the employee
when it is not customary to provide such a receipt). These inappro-
priate expectations are of type (2) above.

It is not surprising that more GSIS employees reported pressures
from clients than did employees from Philamlife because the former
dealt more often with outsiders than the latter (Table 12). More than
51% of GSIS employees dealt with "outsiders" "rather often" or "nearly
all the time", 32% dealt with them "sometimes" or "rarely", while only
7% "never" dealt with outsiders. In comparison, 3l% of Philamlife
employees had contact with outsiders "rather often" and "nearly all
the time", 43% "sometimes" or "rarely", and 4% "never". Interestingly,
the rankrand-file members of GSIS were more exposed to outsiders than
the members of Philamlife of corresponding rank (57% of non-supervisory
personnel replied that they dealt with outsiders "rather often" and
"nearly all the time" as part of their job in GSIS, compared to 25%
in Philamlife).

The frequency of contact with outsiders appears to lead to a feeling
of "being in the middle" of the customers and the company in Philamlife,
but not in GSIS. Note that in Table 13, second-level supervisors of
Philamlife, among whom 50% dealt most frequently with outsiders, also
felt "in the middle" of customers and company "rather often" and "nearly
all the time". Ten percent of the rankrand-file, the level with the
least contact, had this feeling "rather often" and "nearly all the time".
In GSIS, 57% of the rank-and-file said they dealt with outsiders
"rather often" and "nearly all the time", but only 14% felt "in the

middle" of customer and company "rather often" and "nearly all the time".

100

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102

Among the second level supervisors, 54% of whom said they dealt with
outsiders "rather often" and "nearly all the time", 35% reported they
felt "in the middle" of customers and company "rather often" and "nearly
all the time".

The data supports H4 in that objective role conflict arising from
the inconsistency between the demands of clients and the rules of the
organization is in fact more frequent in GSIS than in Philamlife as
predicted. However, the psychological strain from this conflict does
not follow the same pattern.
H5. Clients who have a primary relationship with the focal person are

more frequent sources of strain than other clients in a public

bureaucracy compared to a private bureaucracy.55

Questions 2 and 3 were expected to yield information relevant to
these hypotheses. The first question asks: "Do you feel that your job
imposes some stress and pressure beyond that which most people experi-
ence?" Forced choices are: "Not at all", "Somewhat more than most",
"Quite a bit more than most", and "A great deal more than most". Responses
to question 2 were cross—tabulated with those responses to question 3
which asks, "What are the conditions or situations you have to deal with
that you think are particularly stressful or tension-inducing?"

Primariness, as stated earlier in this paper, refers to degrees of
kinship relationship in which a high level of primariness means close
blood, ritual kinship and friendship ties while a low level of primariness
means no blood kinship and friendship ties.

Although respondents could enumerate as many kinds of tension-inducing

situations as they felt were significant, the answers constituted a

 

55"Client" is defined here as one who does not belong to the organi-
zation, but who exerts job-related pressures for service from the focal
person.

103
single class per respondent (e.g., specific complaints about time pressure,
or about inappropriate expectations from clients or superiors). Only
one respondent mentioned a class of tension-inducing factors brought
about by pressure from friends. This one was a GSIS employee who said
he found it most stressful "when intimate friends ask me for a favor
beyond the scope of my power". NO respondent mentioned pressures from
the family pertinent to the job. The two big sources of conflicting
pressures were clients and superiors.

Question 3A asked the respondents how often they felt "in the
middle" of 1) their customers and the company, 2) their family and the
company, and 3) their non—customer friends outside the company, and the
company. It was assumed here that the respondent would recognize when
these groups would want things which could not be complied with. All
respondents answered that they were never bothered by the feeling of
being "in the middle" of their family and the company. In the cases of
customers and of friends, more GSIS employees registered feeling "in
the middle" of these parties and the company "rather often" or "nearly
all the time" than Philamlife employees (Tables 14 and 15). More
Philamlife employees (31 or Aét) infrequently ("sometimes" or "rarely")
felt in the middle of customers and company than GSIS employees (23 or
37%). The same is true with conflicts between friends and company:

19 (28%) of Philamlife employees answered "rarely" and "sometimes"

while 16 (36%) of GSIS employees made the same reply.

104

 

Table 14
Focal Person "in the Middle"
of Customers and Company

 

 

Frequency of Feeling GSIS Philamlife
in the Middle N 7. N 7.
Does not apply* 2 3 A 6
Never 9 15 7 10
Rarely, sometimes 23 37 31 A6
Rather often, nearly 21 34 12 18
all the time
No response 7 11 14 20
Total 62 100 68 100

 

* This refers to cases in which the respondents have had no
contact with clients on the job.

 

Table 15
Focal Person "in the Middle"
of Friends and Company

 

 

Frequency of Feeling GSIS! Philamlife
in the Middle N % N %

Does not apply 13 21 21 31

Never 2A 39 1A 21

Rarely, sometimes 16 26 19 28

Rather often, nearly 3 5 - -
all the time

No response 6 9 14 20

Total 62 100 68 100

 

105
It appears that there is greater occurrence of conflicting pressures
from friends and customers in GSIS than in Philamlife. This was pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 5. Pressures from customers are even more frequent
than pressures from friends. This can be expected considering the greater
number of customers a GSIS employee or Philamlife employee can deal with
compared to the number of persons they consider friends.

H6. Role stress arising from demands of superiors contrary to organiza-
tional rules will be more frequent than stress derived from strict
enforcement of such rules in a public bureaucracy compared to a
public one.

H6a. Role stress arising from strict enforcement of organizational rules
will be more frequent than stress derived from demands of superiors
contrary to such rules in a private bureaucracy compared to a
public one.

The three main sources of information on these two hypotheses are

1) question 3, which asks what situations the respondent had to deal

with in his job that were particularly stressful, 2) question 1—m,

which asks how often the respondent was bothered that the amount of

work he had to do may interfere with how well it got done, and 3)

question 1—n, which asks how often the respondent was bothered by the

feeling that he had to do things on the job that were against his better
judgement. QUestions l-m and 1-n have the forced-choice responses:

Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often and Nearly all the time. Question

3 is an open-ended question, and responses indicating time pressure from

superiors as particularly stressful are taken to mean experiences of

strict enforcement of rules. Those responses indicating that inappro-
priate expectations from superiors were the particularly stressful
experiences of the respondents are taken to mean experiences of demands

contrary to organizational rules.

Comparing the responses of GSIS members to question l-m with those

106
to question l-n (see Tables 16 and 17) it can be seen that time pressure
is less of a worry than pressure to do things on the job which are
against their better judgement. This finding is in the direction pre-
dicted by H6. Out of 62 respondents, 26 or A2% said that they were
"never" bothered by the thought that the amount of work they had to
do may interfere with how well it got done, while 36 or 58% said that
they were bothered "rarely" and "sometimes" and no one said he was
bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 16). Looking
at the figures as to how often the respondents were bothered by the
feeling that they had to do things on the job which were against their
better judgement, we see that 13 or 21% of the respondents were "never"
bothered, A5 or 73% were bothered "rarely" or "sometimes", while 3

or 4% were bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 17).

 

Table 16
Focal Person Role Stress
Work Quality Versus Work Quantity

 

Frequency of Stress GSIS Philamlife
N 7. N 2"
Never 26 A2 17 25
Rarely, sometimes 36 58 A5 66
Rather often, nearly - - 6 9
all the time

No response - - - -

Total 62 100 68 100

 

107

 

Table 17
Role Stress Resulting from
Requests Contrary to Better Judgement of Focal Person

 

 

Frequency of GSIS Philamlife
Role Stress N % N %
Never 13 21 27 39
Rarely, 45 73 37 54
sometimes
Rather often,
nearly all 3 4 4 7
the time
No response 1 2 - _
Total 62 100 68 100

 

In Philamlife slightly more respondents were bothered by time pressure
than were bothered by the pressure to do things on the job which were
against their better judgement. This is the result predicted in H6a.
Among 68 respondents, the breakdown of the responses to the question
as to how often the respondent was bothered by the thought that the amount
of work he had to do may interfere with how well it got done is as
follows: 17 or 25% said "never", A5 or 66% said "rarely" or "sometimes",

6 or 9% said "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 16). In.

comparison, the following is the distribution of the responses to the
question of how often the respondent was bothered by the thought that
he had to do things on the job that were against his better judgement:
27 or 39% said "never", 37 or 54% said "rarely" or "sometimes", and A
or p said "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 17).

Taking another test of Hypotheses 6 and 6a, Table 18 shows selected
responses to the question as to what highly stressful situations the

respondent had to deal with in his job.

108

 

Table 18
Stressful Situations of Focal Person;
Selected Responses

GSIS Philamlife
Time pressure A 6 23 BA
from superiors
Inappropriate
expectations 7 11 A 6
from superiors
Other 51 83 41 60
Total 62 100 68 100

 

Of the few who mentioned either time pressure or inappropriate
expectations as the particularly stressful situations they had to deal
with in their jobs, A or 6% cited time pressure from superiors and 7 or
11% mentioned inappropriate expectations from superiors in GSIS. While
there is virtually no difference in the two sources of role strain in
GSIS as judged from the responses to question 3, in Philamlife, there
is a marked preponderance of time pressure from superiors (23 or 34%
mentioned it) over inappropriate expectations from superiors (A or 6%
mentioned it) as a source of role strain.

Based on the above findings, it may be said that there are strong
indications that Hypotheses 6 and 6a are correct.

H7. In the private bureaucracy, the greater the status difference between
the focal person and the role sender in the organization, the greater
the role strain of the focal person in case of conflict between his
expectations of what his job should be and the expectations of the

role sender.

H7a. In a public bureaucracy, the more equal the role sender is to the
focal person the greater the experienced role conflict is.

There are five position status categories into which the focal persons

109
and the role senders they mentioned are classified:

Position 1: Top management (member of the board of directors,
president, vice-president, division manager, other
positions above the division manager level)

Position 2: Middle management (department manager, assistant
department manager, head of larger section, assistant
head of larger section, technical staff of top
management)

Position 3: Second level supervisor (section head of smaller
section, assistant head of smaller section)

Position 4: First level supervisor (head of unit, assistant head

of unit, senior members of unit if they have super-
visory responsibilities)

Position 5: Non-supervisory personnel (rankeand-file)

Respondents indicated the organizational position of the role senders,
while the positions of the respondents themselves were obtained from
personnel lists. To get a description of the status difference between
the focal person and the role sender, the position number of the former
was subtracted from the latter's. The resulting range of status differ—
ences arranged the role partners from -A in which the focal person is
lowest in position with respect to his role sender, to A in which the
focal person is highest in position with respect to his role sender.

The occasions of conflict of expectations between the role partners
exclusive to GSIS are when the role sender asks the respondent to do one
of the following: 1) alter the focal person's decisions on job-related
matters, especially those involving the outflow of money from the company
to a client, in order to please the superiors of the role sender, or 2)
process papers of friends and other clients known to the role sender which
do not have the necessary supporting documents or which have not gone
through the required procedures. In Philamlife, the unique occasions of

conflict are when the role sender asks the focal person to 1) do a job

110
which the focal person does not consider to be part of his responsibility,
i.e., a job the focal person considers to be somebody else's, or 2) do a
job in a way which the focal person deems unnecessary or out of the
ordinary.

The immediate supervisor is often seen by the GSIS complainants as a
"tool" of the higher-ups in undermining organizational rules. Also, role
senders who are seen as directly expecting behavior from the focal person
which the latter disagree with are at most two status positions higher
than the focal person. In Philamlife, the role sender may be as much
as three status positions higher than the focal person.

There are slight indications that Hypotheses 7 and 7a are in the
right direction. Respondents were asked in Question 31c, "To what
extent had being given orders, suggestions or requests by Person B
which are in conflict with your interpretation of company rules and/or
what you are supposed to do in your job bother you?" The responses to
this question are taken as the indication of the extent of the role
strain the focal person experienced. Of the 11 cases mentioned by GSIS
respondents, the two who were "not at all" bothered were one and two
status positions lower than the role senders, and the one who was "a
great deal" bothered was of the same status position as the role sender.
In Philamlife, of 14 cases, the one who mentioned he was "not at all"
bothered by the conflict of expectations has a status position equal
to his role sender. Of the respondents who said that they were "a little"
bothered, the distribution of status differences between the role sender

and the focal person is as follows:

111
Status Difference Frequency

Focal person 3 status positions 1
lower than role sender

Focal person 2 status positions 5
lower than role sender

Focal person equal in status 1
to role sender

Focal person 2 status positions 1
higher than role sender

The two who said that they were "quite a bit" bothered were 3 status
positions lower than the role sender, and the two who said they were
bothered "a great deal" were 3 and A status positions lower than the
role sender.

H8. In case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and that
of the organization, the more primary the relationship between the
focal person and the role sender, the less the strain experienced
by the focal person in a public bureaucracy.

H8a. In case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and that
of the organization, the more primary the relationship between the
focal person and the role sender, the greater the strain experienced
by the focal person in the private bureaucracy.

Respondents were asked to list the names, position and relationship
with 1) persons within the company whose work affected them or whose
work was affected by the respondent's performance, and 2) persons within
or outside the company who were important to them personally and with
whom they discussed their job. Question 31c asked the extent to which
the respondent was bothered by orders, requests and suggestions of each
role sender which were in conflict with the former's interpretation to
company rules and what he was supposed to do in his job. The responses
were placed on a five-point scale: "Not at all" (lowest level of role

strain), "A little", "Some", "Quite a bit", and "A great deal" (highest

level of role strain). The responses were then classified into three

112
levels of role conflict: 1) low ("not at all"), 2) medium ("a little",
"some") and 3) high-("quite a bit", "a great deal").

To measure "degree of primariness" of the relationShip between the
focal person and the role sender, question 16 asked the respOndent how
much he liked the role sender personally on an 8-point scale. The scale
ranged from "I dislike him" to "He's my best friend". Since the respond-
ents did not mention relatives in their list of role senders, it is not
possible to use degree of kinship relations as indicator of "primariness"
of relationship. Therefore, the level of primariness studied here is
an indicator of the degree of positive feeling the focal person has
toward the role sender. The responses were.classifed as follows
according to their degree of pOsitiveness: 1) low ("I dislike him",

"I don't like him"), 2) neutral ("I don't have much feeling for him

one way or the other"), and 3) high ("I like him fairly well and would
like to know him better", "He is a good friend of mine", "He's my best
friend"). Table 19 shows the relationship between the degree of primari—
ness and the degree of role strain experienced by the focal person.

In Philamlife, there was a fuller array of emotions toward the
role sender than there was in GSIS. Furthermore, in the few cases
mentioned the emotions toward the role sender seem to be stronger in
the Philamlife than in the GSIS case. In Philamlife, disliked persons
brought on a high level of strain. Although neutrally—evaluated role
senders are the most frequent sources of conflicting expectations in
GSIS, senders liked by the focal personalso sometimes provided such
expectations. The small number of conflicting expectations mentioned
with respect to specific role senders makes it impossible to control

for the "moral gravity" of the expectations.

113

 

Table 19
Role Sender's Relation to Focal Person:
Primariness and Role Strain

Degree of Primariness GSIS Philamlife
Degree of Role Strain
Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total

Low - - - - - 2 A 6
Neutral 1 5 l 7 - 3 - 3
High 1 2 - 3 1 4 - 5
Total 2 7 1 10 1 9 ’4 14

 

Considering the "moral gravity" of conflicting expectations men-
tioned by the GSIS respondents, taken outside the context of the present
theory it is surprising that the respondents did not feel greater role
strain. Only in one out of the ten cases did the respondent feel "quite
a bit" bothered.~ In Philamlife, the proportion of those reporting a high
level of role strain is high, considering the low level of "moral
gravity" of conflicting expectations mentioned.

H9. Role ambiguity from unclear evaluation of focal person's performance
by superiors will be greater in intensity and frequenCy in a public
bureaucracy than in a private one.

Date on Hypothesis 9 was obtained from the responses to question l-g
which asks how often the respondent was bothered by not knowing what
his superior thought of him or how he evaluated his performance. The
choices in question 1-g are on a 5-point scale, ranging from "Never"
to "Nearly all the time". In the analysis of the data, however, the
responses were divided into three categories: 1) "Never" (low), 2)
"Rarely" and "Sometimes" (medium) and 3) "Rather often" and "Nearly

all the time" (high) (Table 20).

11h

 

Table 20
Focal Person Distress from
Non-communication of Superior's Performance Evaluation

 

Frequency of Distress GSIS” Philamlife
N it N 20
Never (low level of 17 27 22 32
ambiguity)
Rarely, sometimes
(medium level of 38 61 35 52
ambiguity)
Rather often, nearly
all the time (high 3 5 - -
level of ambiguity)
No response A 7 - -
Total 62 100 68 100

 

There is a slightly higher percentage of employees who indicated

a m level of ambiguity in GSIS than in Philamlife (61% versus 52%)

and this finding is in the direction predicted by Hypothesis 9. However,

more Philamlife employees indicated a.high level of ambiguity than GSIS
employees (16% versus 5%). Interestingly, all the 11 Philamlife employees
who said they were bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (high
level of ambiguity) by not knowing how their supervisors evaluated them
were all rank-and-file employees. Overall, there were fewer employees in
both GSIS and Philamlife who registered a high level of ambiguity compared
to those who registered either low or medium level of ambiguity.

H10. Role ambiguity from the indeterminacy of priority in the organiza»
tional demands on the focal person will be more frequent in a private
bureaucracy than in a public one.

Two sets of responses are the bases of analysis for this hypothesis:

1) the responses to question 1-b which asks how often the respondent was

bothered by being unclear on the scope and responsibilities of his job,

115

and 2) the responses to question 35 which asks how clear the respondent
was about what he had to do on the job. To Question 1-b, these are the
categories of responses, indicating low, medium and high levels of
ambiguity respectively: 1) "Never", 2) "Rarely", and "Sometimes", and
3) "Rather often" and "Nearly all the time". (See Table 21). The
responses to question 35 were categorized as follows, indicating low,
medium, and high levels of ambiguity respectively: 1) "Very clear"

and "Quite clear on most things", 2) "Fairly clear", and 3) "Not too

clear" and "Not at all clear" (Table 22).

 

Table 21
Job Definition as Perceived
by Focal Person

Level of Clarity GSIS Philamlife

N 5&0 N %

Very clear, quite
clear on most

things (low 5h 88 L3 63
ambiguity)
Fairly clear A 6 1h 21

(medium ambiguity)
Not too clear, not

at all clear - - 1 1
(high ambiguity)
No response A 6 10 15

Total 62 100 68 100

 

116

 

Table 22
Focal Person Distress at Uncléar
Job Scope and Responsibilities

 

Frequency of Distress GSIS Philamlife
Li H

Never (low ambiguity) 30 L8 26 38

Rarely, sometimes 28 AS 3h 50

(medium ambiguity)
Rather often, nearly

all the time 3 5 8 12
(high‘ambiguity)
No response 1 2 - -
Total 62 100 68 100

 

In both response sets, Philamlife employees experience more
frequently and are bothered more often by ambiguity of job demands
than GSIS employees. Based on Table 21, in both companies the majority
of the employees (88% in Philamlife and 63% in GSIS) said they were
"very clear" or "quite clear on most things" that they have to do on
their job (low ambiguity). However, more Philamlife employees stated
they were only "fairly clear" on what they had to do on their job
(medium ambiguity) than GSIS employees (21% for Philamlife and 6% for
GSIS). Only one respondent (from Philamlife) indicated a high level
of ambiguity, saying that he was "not at all clear" as to what he had
to do in his job.

Table 22 amplifies Table 21. In GSIS, almost half (48%) of the
employees were "never" bothered by being unclear on the scope of
responsibilities of the job, while only 38% were as placid in Philamlife.
Exactly half of the Philamlife respondents, compared to hfifi of GSIS

employees, indicated a medium level of ambiguity, saying that they were

117

"rarely" or "sometimes" bothered by being unclear on this matter. High

ambiguity, indicated by answers saying that respondents were bothered

"rather often" or "nearly all the time", was registered by more Philam-

life employees (12%) than GSIS employees (5%).

On the whole, the data supports Hypothesis 10.

H11. Role conflict and ambiguity stemming from the crossing of authority
lines will be less frequent in a private bureaucracy than in a
public one.

As a rule, supervisors in either GSIS or Philamlife are no more
than two status positions higher than the people they directly supervise.
To get information on Hypothesis 11, it was necessary to measure the
organizational status difference between the focal person and the role
senders mentioned by him. A total of 250 role senders were described
by the 62 GSIS respondents while 219 were described by 68 Philamlife
respondents. The organizational status differences between the role
partners were obtained by subtracting the status position of the focal
person from the status position of the role sender. As indicated
earlier in this paper, the positions of respondents, as well as those
of the role senders they described, were classified into five categories,
each of which was assigned a numerical rank as follows:56
= Top management
Middle management
Second level supervisors

First level supervisors
Non—supervisory personnel

1
2
3
h
5

If the status difference was negative, the role sender had a higher
position than the focal person. If the status difference was positive,

the role sender had the lower position. It was then determined whether

 

56See p. 109 for a complete description of the status positions

118
the role sender communicated expectations which the focal person found
difficult in some way or other. The findings are shown in Table 23.
The figures important to Hypothesis 11 are those under columns indicating

-h and —3 status differences between role sender and focal person.

 

Table 23
Focal Person Status Difference from Role Sender
and Occurrence of Perceived Difficult Expectations

Frequency of Difficult Expectations

 

 

Status Difference GSIS Philamlife
-h h 22
.3 17 A?
-2 #0 5h
-1 76 31

O 71 5O
1 16 14
2 25 8
3 - 1
A 1 -
Total 250 227

 

In both GSIS and Philamlife, superiors three or four status
positions removed from the focal person are as likely as immediate
superiors to communicate difficult expectations. The most common
types of Philamlife difficulty are, in the order of frequency: 1)
disagreement between focal person and role sender on how a job should
be done, 2) role sender does not give enough time, 3) the performance
of the task asked for by the role sender will have adverse effects on
the focal person's relationship with others on the job, A) the perfor-
mance of the task asked for by the role sender will have adverse effects
on the focal person's subordinates or peers, and 5) the focal person
finds the job too complicated. In GSIS, the most common types of

difficulty listed in order of frequency of mention, are: 1) the task

119
the role sender expects the focal person to do is in conflict with
organizational rules and as such is "morally wrong", 2) the focal
person disagrees with the role sender on how the job should be done,
and 3) the job that the role sender wants done is too complicated.

Looking at the data in greater detail, we find that in certain
specific cases which lead to role conflict and ambiguity, superiors
in Philamlife are even more prone to jump across authority lines than
in GSIS.

Table 2A shows the frequency with which focal persons found role
senders' expectations to be in conflict with company rules or what
they have to do on the job. It also shows that Philamlife officials
have greater propensity than GSIS officials to bypass those beneath
them in the authority ladder and to give orders directly to subordinates.
In GSIS, of the 17 role senders who were three Status positions above
the focal person, 3 (18%) gave conflictual expectations only "rarely",
and 10 (59%) that the focal persons were sure "never" to have given
such expectations. In Philamlife, 20 (h3%) of L7 role senders who were
three status positions higher than the focal persons' "never" gave
conflictual expectations, 5 (10%) had these expectations "sometimes",
"nearly all the time".

For three GSIS role senders £23; status positions above the focal
person, one "never" gave conflictual expectations, and 2 gave them
"rarely". For Philamlife, out of 10 role senders, 7 "never" gave
conflictual expectations, 2 did "sometimes" and one communicated these
expectations "nearly all the time". A similar greater propensity to
bypass other superiors by Philamlife officials than GSIS officials is

shown in the figures in Table 25. This shows how often the role

120

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122

senders-of varying status difference from the focal person-communicated
expectations which could not be fulfilled without displeasing another
person important to the focal person's job.

In Philamlife none of the cases in which role senders bypassed
the focal person's immediate supervisors involved crossing departmental
lines. GSIS, more than half of the "bypasses" summarized in Table 2A
involved crossing departmental lines. Thus, although all the indica-
tions from the frequency of "bypasses" of immediate superiors of focal
persons do not support Hypothesis 11, the fact that GSIS "bypasses"
often involved crossing departmental lines while Philamlife cases
never did is an important nuance in the data.

H12. In the private bureaucracy, there will be more strain from work
overload than in the public bureaucracy.

Tables 26 and 27 do point to greater strain from work overload
in the private bureaucracy. Question 1-d was asked to find the extent
to which the feeling of too heavy a workload bothered the respondent.
The results are shown in Table 26. In GSIS, 37% replied "Never",

58% "Rarely" and "Sometimes", and 5% "Rather often" and "Nearly all
the time". In Philamlife, 27% said "Never", 60% "Rarely" and "Some-
times", and 13% "Rather often" and "Nearly all the time". While only
one GSIS employee specifically mentioned work overload as a tension-
inducing feature of the job in response to question 3, 9 Philamlife
employees complained about this aspect of their job.

Question 1-m was designed to solicit another dimension of role
strain arising from work overload: the extent to which the respondent
thought that the amount of work he had to do may interfere with how
well it gets done (Table 27). To this, among the GSIS employees, h2%

said they were "never" bothered, 58% indicated they were bothered

123
"rarely" and "sometimes", and no one said he was bothered "rather
often" or "nearly all the time". Among Philamlife employees, 25%
replied "never", 66% said they were bothered "rarely" and "sometimes",

and 9% "rather often" and "nearly all the time".

 

Table 26
Distress from Perceived
Level of Workload

 

Overload GSIS Philamlife
Perception Frequency, N '% N %
Never 23 37 18 27
Rarely, sometimes 36 58 Al 60
Rather often,

nearly all 3 5 9 13
the time
No response - - - -
Total 62 100 68 100

 

Table 27
Distress from Expected Quality of Output
Deterioration as a Result of Overload

 

GSIS Philamlife
Distress Frequency, N % N
Never 26 A2 17 25
Rarely, sometimes 36 58 AS 66
Rather often,
nearly all - - 6 9

the time

No response - - — -

Total 62 100 68 100

 

124

There are strong indications that Hypothesis 12 may be accepted.

H13. The public official is more likely to resolve role conflict in
favor of those with whom he has strong primary relationship and
in favor of those who have the most power over his prospects
on the job than is the private official.

H13a. The private official is more likely to resolve role conflict in
favor of organizational requirements and in favor of job require-
ments over considerations of power and primariness of relation-
ship than is the public official.

Operationally, the power of the role sender over the focal person
is defined in terms of the degree of importance that the focal person
attributes to the role sender in determining how he does his job.
Primary relationship, on the other hand, is defined by the direction
(positive, neutral or negative) and intensity of the feelings the
focal person has toward the role sender.

The classes of role conflicts common in GSIS differ from those
which occur in Philamlife. In GSIS, the conflict between the focal
person and intraorganizational role senders-who are "quite important"
and "extremely important" in determining how the former does his
job-occur when: 3

1. Superiors ask the focal person to recommend their unqualified

(or less-qualified-than—others) "favorites" for promotion; press
for approval of loan applications of people they know, who do
not have sufficient collateral; ask for increasing the appraised
value of property to be insured or which has been offered as
collateral; demand the processing of papers which have not

gone through required procedures or which lack supporting
documents.

2. Superiors ask focal person to do some task which he does not

consider to be part of his job.

125
Conflicts arising from (1) happen more frequently than those from (2).
In Philamlife, the most frequent conflicts between the focal person
and intraorganizational role senders who are "quite important" and
"extremely important" in determining how he does his job occur when:

1. Superiors insist on accomplishing tasks in ways the focal

person considers unsystematic, inadequate or unorthodox.

2. Superiors ask focal person to do some task which he does not

consider to be part of his job.
More conflicts from procedural disagreements between superiors and
the focal person such as those in (1) occur than the "unjust" assign-
ments of tasks as in (2).

In both Philamlife and GSIS, employees are about as likely to
fulfill the expectations of the role sender as they are to outrightly
refuse these expectations or to try to convince the role sender that
his expectations are not correct. This is true for role senders that
the focal person likes "fairly well", "a lot", "good friends" and
"best friends" as well as role senders who are "quite important" and
"extremely important" in determining how the focal person does his

job (Tables 28 and 29). The differences hypothesized are not upheld
by the data.

126

 

Table 28
Strategies when Role Senders Communicate Expectations
in Conflict with Focal Person's Interpretation of Company Rules;
by Degree of Liking for Role Sender

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GSIS Philamlife
Strategies of Degree of Liking of Focal Degree of Liking of Focal
Focal Person Person for Role Sender Person for Role Sender
Fairly Good Best Fairly Good Best
well friend friend well friend friend
Do what role 2 1 1 a - _
sender asked
Refuse role A - - 1 3 -
sender
Appeal to
higher 1 - - - 1 -
authority
Decide 1 - - - - 1
independently
Table 29

Strategies when Role Senders Communicate Expectations
in Conflict with Focal Person's Interpretation of Company Rules;
by Importance of Role Sender

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GSIS Philamlife
Strategies of Degree of Importance Degree of Importance
Focal Person of Role Sender of Role Sender
Not at all Quite Not at all Quite
important important important important
Do what role - h - -
sender asked
Refuse role - h 1 1
sender
Appeal to higher - 1 - 1
authority
Decide - 1 - 1

independently

 

127
Typical of the attitudes of GSIS employees who accede to expecta-
tions of their superiors which they acknowledge to be illegitimate
are those expressed in the following comments:
Because he is my boss, I'm bound to obey him. I have to follow
him and let no one sign the papers except he (sic). It was his
order and he has to answer for his actions if anything happens
in the future (note: i.e., if the administration finds out about
the superiors wrongdoing). (From an employee who has been asked
by a superior to give a policy contract to a third party and to

issue policy contracts without the necessary appointment papers
of the client.)

I develop an'I-don't-care' attitude. Anyway if worse comes to
worst I have their instructions to show (note: to protect the
employee). (From a credit analyst who has agreed to her
superiors' instructions to recommend orders of payment to
commercial clients in excess of what she considered justified

by the official guidelines.)

All of the GSIS employees who admitted yielding to illegitimate
demands of superiors noted that they had kept the pieces of paper
on which the superiors wrote the demands. Some even said that they
had their superiors write oral instructions down so that they would
"not be answerable for...violation of official rules." .It seems that
either the superiors were unaware of the reason the subordinate asked
for written versions of the instructions, or they were convinced that
no one who had real power and concern would find out about the
instructions.

No such protective mechanisms appear in any of the responses of
Philamlife employees. This may be expected since the kind of conflict
they faced on account of the demands of role senders did not have
the "moral" dimension the GSIS employees faced. A Philamlife employee
described his reaction to a superior's suggestions on office procedure:

"I do it on an experimental basis to see its merits."

It appears that the conflict between the rules of the company

128
and the expectations of role senders, as well as the conflict between
the role sender's expectations and the focal person's definition of
his job, do not involve a sacrifice of organizational requirements
in the case of Philamlife. Virtually all Philamlife respondents who
reported such conflicts did not indicate they felt that resolving the
conflict in favor of the role sender would have adverse effects on
the organization. This contrasts with GSIS employees who were pointedly
aware that their acquiescence was deleterious to the organization.
th. In the public bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency
on the part of the subordinates to pass responsibility for
resolving conflict to the superior than in the private bureau-
cracy.
tha. In the private bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency
for the focal persons to attempt to resolve the conflicts by
themselves than will be the case in the public bureaucracy.
Question A asked the respondents what they did when they experienced
stressful situations on the job. The following are the categories
of solution in the order of frequency of mention: 1) postpone doing
the task; take a break, 2) let the superior take the responsibility
as the focal person bows to the pressure, 3) confront the role sender
and tell him about the problem involved in his expectations, and h)
do the task and try to relax after office hours. In Philamlife,
time_pressure (mostly from superiors) was relieved as follows: 1)

postpone doing the task; take a break, and 2) talk to persons other

than the role sender about the problem (Table 30).

129

 

Table 30
Strategies to Ease Tension
During Stressful Situations

 

 

 

 

Time Pressure Legitimacy
Strategy Used Problems Problems
by Focal Person
GSIS Philamlife GSIS Philamlife
Confront role sender 2 - 1 -
Let superior handle it A - 5 -

Talk the problem over
with persons other - 2 - 1
than the role sender

Postpone doing the task; 6 10 3 3
take a break

Take off for a few days - - 3 —

Relax after office hours 1 - - 2

Total 11 12 ’ 12 6

 

The difference in the strategies seems greater in problems
involving questions of legitimacy (12 cases in GSIS and 6 cases in
Philamlife). As th and tha predict, more GSIS than Philamlife
employees mentioned letting the superior take the responsibility-as
they bow to the pressures-as a main strategy. In fact, none of the
Philamlife employees mentioned throwing back responsibility to superiors.
Philamlife employees are more likely to deliberately slow down perfor-
mance by taking a break during office hours. Three GSIS employees
mentioned taking off for a few days after the harrowing experiences
of giving in to non-legitimate demands of superiors. Two Philamlife
employees mentioned engaging in recreational activities after office

hours to relax after "fighting with the boss" over demands they

130

considered non-legitimate.

Summary and Interpretation of Findings

1.

There are no clear differences between the job orientation of GSIS
and Philamlife employees with respect to their work goals, the

charadteristics of workmates they desire, and the degree to which
they find work as an intrinsic source of work satisfaction, H1, H2

and H3 are not supported by the data.

2. While Objective role conflict arising from inconsistency of the

demands of clients with the rules of the organization is more
frequent in GSIS than in Philamlife, thepsychological stress from
this conflict does not follow the same pattern. In any given
occasion of objective role conflict of this variety, Philamlife
employees suffered greater role stress than GSIS employees. H4,
which deals with the frequency of occurrence of objective role
conflict, is supported by the data.

In GSIS, clients who have primary relationship with the focal person
are more likely to be sources of role stress than is true in Philam-
life. H5 is supported by the data.

In GSIS, role strain arising from the demands of superiors contrary
to organizational rules are more frequent than strain derived from
the strict enforcement of such rules. The situation is the reverse of
what obtains in Philamlife. H6 and H6a are supported by the data.
There are slight indications that the greater the status differ-
ence between the focal person and the role sender in GSIS, the
greater the role strain experienced by the focal person in case

of conflict between his expectations of what his job should be

and the expectations of the role sender. In Philamlife, it appears

10.

11.

12.

131
that the more equal the role sender is to the focal person, the

greater the experienced role conflict is. These findings are in

the direction predicted by H7 and H7a.

Concerning the relationship between the degree of primariness between
the focal person and the role sender, and the role strain experienced
by the focal person in case of conflict between the role sender's
expectations and that of the organization, the data is too sparse

to give any indication of the correctness of H8 and H8a.

The pattern of the differences between GSIS and Philamlife in the
frequency of occurrence of role ambiguity from unclear evaluation

of the focal person's performance by superiors is a complex one. It
seems that though more GSIS employees experience role ambiguity of
this sort, those in Philamlife who experience it are subject to it
more often. In general, the data supports H9.

As predicted by H10, role ambiguity arising from indeterminacy of
priority of intraorganizational demands on the focal person is more
frequent in Philamlife than in GSIS.

There is no support for the contention in H11 that role conflict stem-
ming from the crossing of authority lines will be less frequent in
Philamlife than in GSIS. In fact, it appears that Philamlife officials
have greater propensity for crossing authority lines and generating
role conflict along with it.

Role strain from work overload is more frequent in Philamlife than

in GSIS, as H12 predicts.

The influence of primariness and power in the resolution of role con-
flict does not differ in Philamlife and GSIS. H13 is not supported
by the data.

Focal persons in Philamlife are less likely to pass responsibility

132

for coping with role conflict on to superiors than are focal persons
in GSIS. This finding supports H14 and tha.

The theory presented in this paper concerns largely the unique
aspects of organizational stress stemming from differences in structural
characteristics of public and private bureaucracies, their operational
features, and the differential expectations of clients toward these or-
ganizations in a developing society. Much of the predictions based on
the theory appear fulfilled by the limited available data presented in
this paper.

The failure of the data to uphold the hypotheses which dealt with
the effects of differential socialization on the job orientation of the
focal persons may indicate the failure of the theory to give adequate
weight to 1) the influence of the overall economic insecurity in the
country, 2) the effects of differences in overall pay scale and fringe
benefits between the two organizations on work satisfaction, 3) the
interaction between a sense of achievement and role strain on work sat-
isfaction, and h) the strength of the influence of particularistic
culture in the chaice of characteristics of ideal workmates.

With the overall economic insecurity in the Philippines, both GSIS
and Philamlife employees bad job security uppermost in their minds. But
this could only partially account for the higher frequency of security-
related responses. A number of respondents also indicated interest in
possibilities of interpersonal contacts, variety and flexibility of the’
job and the high possibility of promotion in evaluating the features of
a good job. The pervaSiveness of the particularistic culture, along with
,the influence of economic insecurity, may thus have been underestimated.
in the theory. 3

A second source of difficulty of the present theory is the failure

133

to account for the differences in the wages and fringe benefits of
the organizations compared. When the respondents evaluated the satis-
faction other people derive from their work, the extent to which their
own economic security needs were satisfied may have been a strong
influence.‘ GSIS-whose members perceived that people obtained a higher
level of satisfaction from their work than did the members of Philam-
life-provides better wages and fringe benefits, plus greater job
security than Philamlife. Furthermore, no one in GSIS who stayed in
the organization for over five years retained the same job classifi-
cation. They all had positive changes in status in terms of either
promotion or salary increases, along with changes in job designations.
Philamlife provides a different picture. Out of a sample of 68, there
were four individuals whose job titles and actual work (clerk-typists)
changed very little except to designate job seniority and some salary
increment over a period of 12 to 22 years. These were individuals
hired in the earlier years of the organization who had little educa—
tion (they were high school graduates) and who remained with Philamlife
for the retirement benefits.

Another likely depressant of job satisfaction perceived by Philam-
life employees is the interaction between the sense of achievement
on the job and the role stress experienced. On the whole, the variety
of sources of role stress as well as its frequency of occurrence seems
to be greater in Philamlife than in GSIS.

The choice of characteristics of ideal workmates, which in both
Philamlife and GSIS meant the choice of skill in interpersonal relations
over expertise may primarily reflect the influence of the person-

oriented particularistic culture of the larger society. Although

13h

Philamlife employees may tend to value expertise in a workmate more
than GSIS members do, the traits such as cheerfulness, being coopera-
tive, patience, and tactfulness are perhaps helpful in reducing the
impact of impersonality of organizational structure and function.
Moreover, Philamlife employees may be more able to take the expertise
of workmates for granted. In GSIS, interpersonal traits may have the
added value of providing the focal person a sense of security in the
arbitrary world of the public bureaucracy.

A third area of weakness in the theory is the part which deals
with the influence of power relationship between the focal person
and the role sender. It is necessary to take into account the different
degrees of seriousness or "moral gravity" of the nature of conflict
between the expectations of the role sender and the rules of the
organization from the point of view of the focal person. Given the
same degree of "moral gravity" of the conflictual expectations, it is
expected that the predictions of H13 and H13a will hold. The public
official will be more likely to yield to the conflictual expectations
of those with whom he has strong primary relationship or of those
who have the most power over his job than is the private official.
Without taking account of the degree of "moral gravity" of conflictual
expectations, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of the similarity
in the extent of yielding or refusal of the focal persons in both GSIS
and Philamlife.

A fourth problematic aspect of the theory is the way in which it
underestimates the extent to which focal persons who have strong
kinship obligations, and who know the laxity in the enforcement of

organizational rules, will fail to perceive the conflictual nature of

135
kinship demands. This may account for the absence of any indications
that kinsmen are a source of role strain. Two GSIS employees did
volunteer to say that part of what they did on the job was to follow-up
papers of close relatives. They also said that they sometimes find
this task too frequently asked of them. However, their feelings were
not reflected by the data on how often they felt "in the middle" of
the company and their family. It should be noted that GSIS management
has a standing rule against the followdup of papers of favored

clients by employees.
Problem Areas in the Two Bureaucracies

There are distinct problem areas which have to be dealt with
for reasons unique to each of the bureaucracies studied. In GSIS,
the problem is the inability of the system to control member behavior,
utilize member talents, and maximize overall efficiency and profita-
bility of the organization. These aspects of the problem are mutually
dependent on each other. They continually encourage pressures from
clients which are directly applied to individual employees. Indirect
pressures also come from clients through superiors and co-employees
who channel the pressures to the "appropriate" persons.. The management
of GSIS, as well as the office of the President of the Philippines
have from time to time attempted to tighten control over member behavior,
as the following unedited memorandum (Exhibit 1) shows. Two super-
visors in GSIS commented that such efforts are usually pursued with
great vigor for a month or so. After that the effort dies down and

events return to "normal".

136

 

Exhibit 1
GSIS Memorandum

Republic of the Philippines
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
M a n i l a

June 27, 1967
OFFICE ORDER NO. 133-67

It has been observed that despite directives issued repeatedly not
only by this office but also by the Office of the President,
prohibiting personal follow-ups of official papers, many GSIS
employees have continued making unauthorized follow-ups.

The importance of strictly observing the aforesaid inhibition
cannot be over-stressed, especially in units of the System where
checks and highly valuable records and documents abound, which
may easily be pilfered by persons with evil designs. Furthermore,
the violators cause the disruption of operations and lowering of
production, as they distract their working co—employees and fail
to use their full official time in the accomplishment of their
assigned tasks. Infractions and/or violations hereof should,
therefore, be minimized if not stopped once and for all. Hence-
forth, the perpetrators will be dealt with administratively, as
may be warranted by the circumstances in each case.

It is reiterated also that the premises of the following units are
restricted:

a. Real Estate Department

b. Policy & Salary Loans Department
c. Mails and Communication Division
d. Claims Department

No one, except those who belong to said units, should be allowed
access thereto unless properly authorized in writing by his
Division Chief, Department Manager, or Assistant General Manager
in appropriate cases of extreme urgency.

In order to maintain a high level of discipline and office decorum,
and for purposes of controlling the movement of personnel, the
following prohibitions, rules and regulations, which have, here-
tofore been issued, are likewise reiterated for the guidance and
compliance of all concerned:

1. Loitering

Except for visits to the comfort rooms, every employee is
always expected to be at his work area. No loitering in
the corridors is allowed.

137

2. Loafing & Reading

 

Loafing or reading matters, newspapers, magazines, or books,
other than those relating to the business of the System
during office hours is strictly prohibited.

3. BuyingLSelling1 or Peddling

 

Buying and selling merchandise, like textiles, sweepstake
tickets, jewelries and other goods, during office hours
and within the office premises are not allowed.

A. Unnecessary Conversation

 

Employees should not engage in unnecessary conversation
or group discussion on matters not related to the business
of the office. Talking in loud tone of voice or making
unnecessary noise should be avoided.

5. Attending to personal matters

 

Attending to personal matters during office hours is
prohibited. Should it become necessary for an employee
to leave his work area or the System's premises for
personal reasons, he should first obtain the permission
of his immediate superior and the time spent should be
properly registered in his time card 0r record, the same
to be charged to his leave credit.

6. Taking of meals or snacks

Employees are only allowed to take their lunch or merienda
during lunch time (12:00-1:OO P.M.) or break periods (10:00-
10:15 A.M.) and (3:00-3:15 P.M.) except those who because

of the nature of their work, could not observe the pre-
scribed recess periods.

7. Hearing of office uniforms and name_plates

Employees are enjoined to wear the prescribed office uniforms
and name plates at all times within the premises of the GSIS.
For this purpose, henceforth, polo barong shall be one of
the prescribed uniforms for men.

In order to carry out effectively the foregoing rules and regula—
tions, there is hereby created a Visitorial Team composed of
Messrs. Federico M. Romero, Manager, PAAD: Domingo Garcia,
Manager, MAID: and Antonio Ancheta, President, GSISEA and/or
their authorized representatives.

The team shall take steps, perform such duties, and devote as
much time as are necessary therefore.

Managers of Departments especially those of the restricted areas

138

are hereby directed to designate a responsible employee (at least
with the rank of Section Chief) to list down the names of officials
and employees violating the above prohibitions within their
respective departments and to submit said list to the Manager,
PAAD, for appropriate administrative action.

Chiefs of section or unit supervisors shall see to it that the
above prohibitions, rules and regulations are observed or complied
with by their respective subordinates. They shall be equally
liable for such appropriate administrative action unless they

have taken the initiative of reporting such conduct or infractions
by their subordinates to their superiors or higher authorities.

Strict compliance herewith is enjoined.

(SGD.) B. M. DEL ROSARIO
General Manager

 

In 1954, a well-publicized reorganization of the GSIS commenced.
The President of the Philippines appointed a new General Manager,
Gregorio S. Licaros, who promptly initiated some.changes in the organi-
zation. At the outset, the new management increased the wages of
most employees and aimed at rapidly reaching the monthly minimum wage
the union was demanding. Wengert evaluated the initial effects of
the wage increase as follows:

The impact of these changes appears to have been registered

in the willingness of the staff to concentrate on cleaning

up the backlog accumulated over many years. Within six months

more than 97% of the old business had been disposed of and by

the end of the first year operations were largely current.55
Another wage increase in 1955 convinced GSIS employees that they work
fulltime during the hottest months of the summer, instead of the usual

5-hour workday during this period.

Other changes instituted by Licaros were better maintenance of the

 

55E. S. Wengert, "GSIS: Reflections on reform and reorganization."
Philippine Journal of Public Administration, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 1957,
pp. 46-67 (p- 51).

139
office building, the opening of lines of communication between himself
and the employees through public meetings, the creation of a "Reorgani—
zation Committee" to advise him on needed changes in policies and
procedures, and the establishment of the Information Service Center
(now called the Members Assistance and Information Department) to
interpret policyholder needs to GSIS and to explain GSIS to the policy-
holder and beneficiaries. No attempt to weed the incompetents or the
abusers from the system was made during the years of recorded "reor-
ganizing" activities of Licaros.

Through the Information Service Center, the GSIS sought to become
its own "broker". Through reports, memoranda and mass media advertise-
ments, GSIS warned policyholders not to utilize third parties to get
service. This act was declared to be specially grievous if they used
a relative as intermediary. The relative employed in GSIS who acted
as an intermediary was subject to "disciplinary action".

The long-term value of such efforts on the morale and overall
efficiency of the employees is questionable. As indicated by the
preceding 1967 memorandum, by the efforts of the GSIS management in
the summer of 1970 to minimize client-employee contacts during office
hours, and through other undesirable practices outlined in the 1967
memorandum, it appears that the organization keeps waging the same
battle over the years, without much change in the nature of the war.

GSIS members themselves are well aware of many of the sources of
the problems of their organization. Here are some of the insights
the respondents offered:

Investment policies oscillate whenever there is a change in
(national) administration.

The government has ordered the reorganization of all departments,

140

but chances are, nothing will be done about the duplication of
functions.

Policies and procedures should be strictly supplemented.
Job should be professionalized.

Lots of proposals never materialize.

The General Manager should be given a fixed tenure of office

and the members of the Board of Trustees should come from different
sectors comprising the membership of the System elevated to their
seats by election among members.

The future for us who are left behind in the Philippines is very
dark. No chances of improvement in this kind of administration-
all politics, and politics destroys the people and our nation.

I think no change in my job should be done but the System's
employees should be more aware of their obligations to serve
the members.

Absenteeism, loafing around during office hours must not be toler-
ated although management has been lax with the employees.

Red tape, and the unavoidable presence of favoritism especially
in terms of promotions (are the aspects of the job which I would
like to change). This matter of favoritism has been a bane of
most government offices and our office is no exception.

...be informed that making promotion and imposing disciplinary
action rests on the Council of Personnel Administration (and not
with the supervisor) to which (practice) I don't subscribe.

We have to completely overhaul our political set-up and values
as a people. As it is now politics bogs down all our hopes for
a better life.

Supervisors must not be too friendly with his or her subordinates.
Supervisors must desist from asking favors (especially personal
ones) from his men so that his men will respect him. They should
avoid promoting somebody whom they think is not qualified, but
who is a friend.

(Promotion through the merit system)...could be done if the
Management will only weed out the numerous undesirables, most
of whom are political proteges, who brag about their connections.

The inefficiency of some employees arise from the brazen ignor-
ance regarding office rules and regulations and office decorum.
This could be attributed to meddling of politicians in government
offices.

There obviously is some awareness on the part of the employees and

141
supervisors of GSIS that 1) there are serious problems in the system,
2) the roots of the problem are both external and internal to the
organization, and 3) there are internal changes that may be made to
alleviate the problem, but A) since the organization is part of a
more complex cultural and political network, the solutions to the
problems require drastic action which no one seems to want or have
the power to undertake.

In Philamlife, the problems are not problems of attaining and
maintaining efficiency, but are in the areas of adequacy of compensa-
tion of personnel, and the relationship between the management and
its employees. It was the impression of lower level employees that
there is a tremendous disparity between the compensation of the
non-supervisory and lower level supervisors on the one hand, and
middle and top management personnel on the other. Although it was
acknowledged that merit increases were given periodically, changes
in job title were not made with the same frequency as should have
been necessary or just under the circumstance. Apparently, these
merit increases were a miserly way of acknowledging good work. An
upgrading of job titles would usually mean a greater salary increase.
One of the middle management men commented on an attempt to get a
strike vote by the union: "They (the union members) are crazy. Com-
pared to other private companies, we have better wages and fringe
benefits. They just won a recent collective bargaining contract.

Now they want to re-negotiate even before the old contract has expired!"
Despite the attitude of management personnel toward wages and fringe
benefits, lower level employees were apparently dissatisfied with them.

There was some sentiment among lower-level supervisors (particularly

142

those who supervised fewer than 10 people) that the final say in the
hiring, promotion and salary increases of those working under them
should be theirs alone rather than by the "higher-ups". One of the
supervisors said that what bothered him most in his job was "handling
people not very well recognized by the company and not properly
compensated". What appears to be more serious (in its pervasiveness)
is the feeling of non-supervisory personnel that 1) supervisors do
not give "constructive" criticism, and 2) the rules of the organization
are enforced too strictly. The following comments by Philamlife
respondents reveal the nature of these problems:

Assistant Vice-President is cranky. Sees defects in everything.

(The stressful situations I have experienced are those in which)

I was afraid I could not cope with the job due to workload and

the strictness of my supervisor.

The aspect of my job I dislike most is the unmindful attitudes

of a higher supervisor to understand fully the nature, the job

and (my) personal condition.

The aspects of my job I dislike most are the volume of work,

being carefully watched by my immediate superior and others,

antagonistic attitudes of superiors and others and favoritism

by superiors (in approving leaves of absence, promotions).

Being constantly and openly watched (by supervisors) in your
work is something very annoying and disgusting.

No matter what you do or have done, mistakes or errors of the
people you supervise, are taken against you. The good things
are not remembered.

The aspects of my job I want changed are the unnecessary

intervention of my immediate superior and pestly co—employees,

and the strict enforcement of company regulations without

exception or consideration as if we are not human beings but

machines.

Two of the employees who had grievances about the slowness with
which they were being promoted, and about the unusually strict enforce-

ment of company regulations said that the employees' union may be a

143

tool to correct the grievances. Except for a brief attempt by the
union to convince its members to strike, no strong encounters between
management and the union were in the offing at the termination of
the information data-collecting process in Philamlife.

It appears that while GSIS has incorporated particularism of
the larger culture to the sacrifice of the utilization of the talents
and energies of its employees and of the overall efficiency of the
system, Philamlife has developed in the opposite direction. At least
from the point of view of its members, Philamlife sometimes tries
to get more out of its members than it pays them for, and superiors
sometimes totally ignore the "human" characteristics of those they
supervise in order to get the job done. The employees feel dissatis-
fied because although they recognize that Philamlife is better than
most companies, they believe that they should get better treatment

than they are receiving.

CONCLUSION

The class of role stress frequent in the public bureaucracy
differs qualitatively from that which occurs in the private one. Both
bureaucracies generate strain from ambiguity of expectations. However,
the public bureaucracy burdens its members with stress from relatives,
friends and other clients through unrestricted direct access, and
from superiors who communicate expectations contrary to official rules.
The private bureaucracy in its turn overloads members with work, and
appalls them with superiors whose primary drive is to get things done,
to the neglect of interpersonal values so important to the Filipino
people.

Role stress is, within limits, a normal concomittant of organiza-
tional processes. The nature and extent of stress in an organization
have implications for the health and happiness of its members, the
overall productivity of the organization, and the welfare of its clients.
If stress occurs with the frequency and intensity which threatens any
of these, steps have to be taken to reduce or eliminate the sources
of stress without risking the sacrifice of the rest of the dimensions
of concern. A program of change designed to alleviate role strain
has more far-reaching consequences for the public than for the private
bureaucracy in terms of'member welfare, organizational productivity
and client welfare. The conditions of stress in the public bureaucracy
are intimately related to the violation of the sense of justice of

144

145
its members who find appointments, promotions, salary increases and
job assignments to be irrational, to the low level of productivity in
the organization, and to the dissatisfaction of the clientele who
are either served unfairly or not promptly.

The evidence of member consciousness of where the problems of
the organization lie allows hope that efforts at change will have
support. Any effort at altering the stressful conditions has to deal
with vested interest groups consisting of clientele, politicians, and
organization members. 'Years of inertia also will have to be overcome.
Another problem is fears that the organization may turn around and
exploit its members.

A strategy of change within the network of public bureaucracies
in developing countries will have to be implemented on an organization-
by-organization basis. This means that a central plan, a timetable,
of the reconstruction of individual organizations will have to be
made. The plan would ensure that not more than two public organiza-
tions will undertake a major overhaul within a period of two years.
This will deliberately leave organizations which are "frozen" to
absorb the impact of the patronage system and the particularistic
demands of both their members and their clientele. In essence, this
program of reconstruction is a program of education of a highly
particularistic society through a timed sequence of restructuring of.
'its public bureaucracies.

An internal program of change in the large private bureaucracy
aimed specifically at the conditions which give rise to severe strain
will yield outcomes which are non—bureaucratic in character. These

outcomes are the satisfactiOn of the bureaucrat's needs for intimacy

11.6
with individuals he works with irrespective of formal rank, and a
provision for the cultivation of his sense of worth as a human being.
Unquestionably, there is always room for greater efficiency in the
private bureaucracy. This is true even of the top American corpora-
tions which are considered models of efficiency and productivity.
However, efforts toward a higher level of efficiency need do nothing
about the sources of role stress revealed here pplgsg the strain
produced takes a toll on productivity.

If developing nations would continue to support the expansion of
the private sector of the economy, the problem of work overload is of
minor concern to the larger society. To the extent that maximum
employee output contributes to client satisfaction, stimulates organi-
zational profitability, and enhances the survival chances of the society,
then work overload is "good". The problem of interpersonal relations
is a serious long-run concern if alienation between management and
lower bureaucrats is extensive in the private sphere. The developments
in the nature of management-labor relations in the large private
bureaucracy in the developing societies now may be expected to take
the direction of increasing alienation between the two groups, especially
as labor unions grow in power. The quality of mutual respect toward
each other as human beings does not grow spontaneously in the bureaucracy
along with increasing profitability. This means that the work situation
may become more of a psychological battleground than it is now.

There is enough range of variability in the nature of labor-
management relations in the private sphere that it is not fair to
generalize the problem of interpersonal relations from the formal

observation of one large organization to the rest of the private

147
organizations. Public bureaucracies, irrespective of size, are more
homogeneous on the criteria of the degrees of paternalism and
impersonality. It is more difficult, at the present level of inforb
mation, to assess the degree of seriousness of the problem of role
strain resulting from impersonality in private bureaucracies than to
evaluate the seriousness of high frequency of non-legitimate expecta-
tions from.families, friends, clients and superiors toward members _
of public bureaucracies.

The research strategy for exploring further the nature of role
stress in developing societies needs to utilize more intensive
interviewing. It is also important to gain more complete access
to the official and unofficial communications within the bureaucracies
studied.

1.

A.

5.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

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150

Moore, W. E. and A. S. Feldman, eds. Labor Commitment and Social
Change in DevelppinggAreas. Social Science Research Council, 1960.

Selda, R. S. "Hit or Miss?" GSIS Newsletter, May 1970, p. 8.

Stene, E. O. and others. Public Administration in the Philippines.
Institute of Public Administration Pub. No. 2, Manila: Univ. of
the Philippines, 1955.

Topley, M. "Capital, Saving and Credit among Indigenous Rice
Farmers and Immigrant Vegetable Farmers in Hong Kong's New
Territories." (In Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies,
ed. by R. Fifth and B. S. Yamey. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,
196A. pp. 157-186).

Warner, W. L. and J. C. Abegglen. Occupational.Mobility_in American
Business and Industry. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1955.

Weber, M. Max.Weber: Essays in Sociology. Trans. by H. H. Gerth
and C. Wright Mills. N. Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 19A6.

Wengert, E. S. "GSIS: Reflections on Reform and Reorganization."
Philippine Journal of Public Administration, vol. 1, no. 1,
Jan. 1957’ Pp. 11.6—67.

Willmott, D. E. The Chinese in Semarang: A Changing Minority
Community in Indonesia. N. 1.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1960.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Summary of Findings on Organizational Stressi

A. On organizational structure and processes in role stress

1. The more frequent the extra-organizational boundary contacts
by the focal person, the greater the amount of role conflict
and the higher the level of tension he experiences.

2. Occupational status is not significantly related to job satis-
faction, but is negatively correlated with stability of atti-
tudes towards one's job.11

3. The higher one's organizational status is, the greater is his
tension and job worries.iil

A. Organizational status is curvilinearly related to the frequency
of role conflict.iv

5. The closer the focal person is to his role senders in the organi-
zational structure, the greater the amount of role pressure they
exert on him.

6. The greater the functional dependence of the role sender on the
focal person, the greater the amount of role pressure they
exert on him.

 

1R. L. Kahn and others, 196A.

11' 111' ivThese findings are from the intensive study. Kahn and

others used separate indexes of status for the intensive study and for
the national survey. The index used for the intensive study consisted
of the following categories, listed from the highest to the lowest
status category: Professional, Technical: Managerial: Clerical, Sales:
Craftsmen, Foreman: Operatives; and Unskilled, Service. For the
national survey, the following categories, from.highest to lowest,
were used: Top Management; Middle Management: Second Level Supervisors:
and Foremen. The researchers devised separate measures for the two
studies because they found that the measure of occupational status
used for the national study did not discriminate between the focal
persons of the intensive study.

B. On

1.

C. On

1.

D. On

1.

3.

1.

the personal and organizational costs of conflict

The frequency of role conflict is directly related to the
intensity of the experienced conflict, and to the amount of

,job-related tensions.

The more intense the role conflict, the lower the trust, liking
and respect the focal person has for his role senders.~

The more intense the role conflict, the less the focal person
communicates with, and the less the power he attributes to his
role senders.

role ambiguity and its consequences

Feelings of futility and tension increase as the degree of role
ambiguity increases.

Job satisfaction and self-confidence decrease as the degree of

role ambiguity increases.

Trust decreases as role ambiguity increases.

Role ambiguity has no significant consequence to such inter-
personal factors as frequency of communication, with, and
respect and liking for one's role senders.

organizational norms and role conflict

A high degree of role conflict occurs more often when one' s
role senders score high on "rules orientation" than when they
score low on this orientation.

A high degree of role conflict occurs more often when one's
role senders score high on "closeness of supervision orienta-
tion" than when they score low on this orientation.

A high degree of role conflict occurs more often when one's
role senders score high on "universalism" than when they score
low on this trait.

power, influence and the role-sending process

The higher the status of the role sender compared to that of
the focal person, the greater is the farmer's directv as well'

as indirectVi power to take disciplinary action on the latter.

 

vDirect power is exerted by the role sender himself on the focal

person.

V1Indirect power is wielded by the role sender through the use of

a third person to apply the influence directly on the focal person.

xii

F.

4.

1.

he

7.

8.

The higher the status of the role sender compared to that of
the focal person, the more able the former is to coerce the
latter into compliance by threatening to transfer, dismiss,
or block salary increase or promotion.

The lower the status of the role sender compared to that of
the focal person, the more likely the former is to use the
threat to withhold aid, information or cooperation to coerce
the latter into compliance.

The role sender is more successful in eliciting required behavior
from the focal person when his power is based on legitimate,
reward, or coercive power rather than on expert, referent or

‘indirect power.

role relations and response to stress

A high degree of objective role conflict coupled with a high
frequency of communication with one's role senders results
in a very high intensity of experienced conflict.

Objective conflict leads to a high degree of experienced
ambiguity when communication rates are high but not when
they are low.

When the focal person experiences role conflict and communicates
with his role senders frequently, he is more likely to have a
drastic reduction in job satisfaction and an increase in feel-
ings of futility than when he has minimal communication._

High frequency of communication is associated with close inter-
personal bonds (trust, respect, and liking for one's role
senders).

Conflict leads to a reduction of communication whether func-
tional dependence of the role senders in the focal person is

‘high or low.

The frequency of communication is significantly higher in high
conflict—high dependence situations than in those typified
by high conflict-low dependence.

When role senders are highly dependent but impose little conflict,
the focal person copes well: when these dependent senders create
high degrees of conflict, his coping is much less successful.

When role senders are less dependent, the focal person is able
to cope successfully (using avoidance techniques) whether the
conflicts are strong or not.

Given high functional dependence, role conflicts lead to intense

inner conflict, dissatisfaction with the job, a general sense
of futility and weak affective interpersonal bonds.

xiii

10. High role conflict generated by powerful and dependent role
senders lead to job disenchantment and high degree of futility.

G. On job orientationVii and role conflict

1. At any given level of role conflict, the amount of tension
experienced by the status-oriented person is greater than that
experienced by the non-status oriented.

2. The status-oriented person is more likely to withdraw drastically
from affective interpersonal attachments than are non-status
oriented individuals as the degree of role conflict increases.

3. Security-oriented individuals are less likely to experience
increased tension as the degree of role conflict increases
than non-security oriented individuals.

A. Security-oriented individuals are less likely to withdraw from
affective interpersonal attachments as the degree of role
conflict increases than non-security oriented individuals.

 

ViiKahn and others classified job orientation into achievement
orientation and security orientation. Basically, the researchers agreed
with McClelland and others ("A Scoring Manual for the Achievement
Motive," in MOTIVES IN FANTASY, ACTION AND SOCIETY, ed. by J. Atkinson,
New York, van Nortrand, 1958, p. 181) definition of achievement oriens
tation in terms of the individual's emphasis on the pursuit of "success
in competition with a standard of excellence." However, they differ-
entiated two types of achievement-orientation: status orientation and
expertise orientation. The difference between status-oriented and
expertise-oriented individuals lies in the type of achievement goals
each pursues. Expertise goals are those involving the successful,
performance of challenging tasks or the exercise of valued skills.
Status goals are those involving eliciting favorable evaluations from
those who are in a strategic position to advance the individual's career.

xiv

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

Questionnaire
STUDY OF PHILIPPINE ORGANIZATIONS

1. All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things
in our work. Please indicate by a check mark ( ) under the
appropriate right hand column how frequently you.are bothered by
each of the things listed on the left. (Choices in right hand
columns, from left to right are: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather
often, Nearly all the time.)

a.

b.

Ce

d.

8.

f.

h.

1.

Feeling that you.have too little authority to carry out the
responsibilities assigned to you.

Being unclear on just what the scape and responsibilities of
your job are.

Not knowing what opportunities for advanCement or promotion
exist for you.

Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, one that you can't
possibly finish during an ordinary workday. .

Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting
demands of various people above you.

Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your job.

Not knowing what your supervisor thinks of you, how he evaluates
your performance. ,

The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out
your job.

Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals,

'people that you know.

Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the people you
work with.

Feeling unable to influence your immediate supervisor's decisions
and actions that affect you.

Not knowing just what the peeple you work with expect of you.

xvi

3.

5e.

m. Thinking that the amount of work:you have to do may interfere
with how well it gets done.

n. Feeling that you.have to do things on the job that are against
your better judgement..

0. Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your family life.

p. Feeling that your progress on the job is not what it should be
or could be.

q. Thinking that someone else may get the job above you, the one
you are directly in line for.

r. Feeling that you have too much responsibility and authority
delegated to you by your superiors.

Do you feel that your job imposes some stress and pressure beyond
that which most people experience? Please indicate your response
with a check mark ( ).

Not at all

A little bit more than most

Somewhat more than most

Quite a bit more than most

A great deal more than most

What are the conditions or situations you.have to deal with that
you think are particularly stressful or tensionrinducing?

When the tension is really pretty strong, what do you do to get it
out of your system?

How do you feel about the way it handles the problem?

What was the stressful situation you had last? 3

How did you feel about this when it came up?

What did you try to do about it?

What else did you think about trying to do?

How did it work out? Did the problem finally get solved to your
satisfaction?

What else might you try when this comes up again?
xvii

6a.
6b.

7.

9a.
10.

10a.

10b.

Have there been instances in the last year or so when the pressure
was so great that you felt you could not handle the situation?
Please indicate your answer with a check mark. ( ) (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to question 6:) Please give an example of such a situation.
(If "Yes" to question 6:) How did you resolve it?

How does each of the following help you know what you are supposed.
to do in your job? Please indicate your answer by a check mark ( )
on one of the right hand columns for each item on the left hand
column. (Not at all, A little, Some, Quite a bit, A great deal.)
Job Descriptions

Policy‘Statements

Memos

Other written documents (please specify)

Professional schooling or specialized training?

Professional, technical or business associations and organizations?
Other sources (please specify)

To what extent have you.heen able to define this job for yourself,
to carve out your own area of responsibility, to make major changes
in your activities, and the like? Please indicate your answer by a
check mark ( ).

Not at all

Very little

Somewhat

To a considerable extent

Completely

Please state the name of your immediate supervisor or the person
you report directly to: ‘

What is his position in the company?

Is there anyone else to whom you are directly responsible for your
activities? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to question 10:) Please state his name.

Are you s supervisor? Is there anyone who reports directly to you?
Yes, No

xviii

11.

11a.

12.

12a.

12b.

12c.

13

14.

Are there any other people you have to be concerned with either
because their work affects you or your work affects them? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to question 11:) Who are they? (Respondent indicates
the name and position of or his relationship to role sender.)

Are there any people within the company who are important to you
personally-with whom you.might discuss your work? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to question 12:) Who are they? (Respondent indicates
the name and position of or relationship to role sender.)

Anyone outside the company like that? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to question 12b:) Who are they? (Respondent indicates
the name and position of or his relationship to role sender.)

After answering questions 9 to 12¢, please go back to these
numbers and label each of the names you.mentioned with letters
of the alphabet. Label the first name you.mentioned as A, the
second name as B, the third as C, and so forth. Henceforth,
you will be referring to each person you listed by the alphabet
label. Please detach Page 5 after you have labeled each name.
This makes reference to these persons easy. However, please

keep Page 5 and turn it in along with the rest of the question—
naire. .

Question nos. 13-16 are about the persons you listed on Page 5
Please indicate with a check mark under each of the right hand
columns how important each person you listed on Page 5 is in
determining how you do your job. (Right hand columns indicate,
from left to right, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)

Not at all important
Not too important
Somewhat important
Quite important
Extremely important

How often do you talk with each one of them? (Right hand columns
indicate, from left to right, A, B, c, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)

Less often than a few times a month
A few times a month
About once a week

Several times a week

Once or twice a day
Several times a day
Almost constantly

15. Suppose you were having some difficulty in your job. To what extent
do you feel eaCh of these people would be willing to get out of
his way to help you if you asked for it? (Right hand columns
indicate, from left to right, A, B, c, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)
Not at all
To a very little extent
To some extent
To a considerable extent

To a very great extent

16. How do you like each of these peOple personally? (Right hand
columns indicate from left to right, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)

I dislike him

I don't like him very much

I don't have much feeling for him, one way or the other
I like him fairly well

I like him a lot and would like to know him better

He's a good friend of mine

He's my best friend

Questions About Person

Questions 17 to 35f are about your relationship with one of the
persons you listed in Page 5.

17. What are the reasons for getting together with him? What kinds of
things do you generally talk about?

18. Are there any things he needs to inform you about in order for you
to do a good job? (Yes, No)

18a. (If "Yes" to 18:) what are they?

19. When he tries to get you to do something, what sort of thing is it?

XX

20.

20a.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

26a.
27.

28.

288.

Is there anything else he might try to get you to do-—anything
that isn't ordinarily part of your job? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to 20:) What is it?

Does he ever try to get you to do things differently than you
usually d2 them?

(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

Does he ever try to get you to do things different than you are
suppgsed to do them?

(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

As far as you know, does he always let you know when he expects
or wants something from you, or does he keep these things to
himself?

(Always lets me know, Usually lets me know, Sometimes does,
Sometimes doesn't let me know, Usually does not let me know,
Never lets me know)

What does he usually do to try to get you to do these things?
What might he do to try to influence you to do them?

How difficult do you feel it usually is to do what he wants from
you:

(Very easy, Quite easy, Not too difficult, Quite difficult,
Extremely difficult)

(If "Extremely Difficult" or "Quite Difficult" to 26:) Why is that?
Do you feel that you know how satisfied he is with what you.do?

(I always know where I stand, I usually know where I stand, I
sometimes do and sometimes don't know where I stand, I am often
somewhat in the dark, I usually don't know where I stand)

Do you ever find it difficult to talk to (Person) about
anything? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to 28:) In what ways is it_difficult?
Which of the following strategies has (Person). tried to use

to make you.do something you.were reluctant to do? .Please check ~
( ) all the applicable items.

Ask a good friend to tell you to do it for (Person) .

Tell you that you do not have a choice but do it, with the
implication that your job will be prejudiced if you didn't

xxi

do what he asked you.to do.

Show in some way.that he feels insulted and/or hurt by your
reluctance to do the job.

Convince you that it is within his authority to ask:you to do it.

Provide you.with more information about the job which shows that
the job is worth doing, or that the job can be done with the
skills you have.

Let you know in some way that he will go out of his way to put

in a good word for you with management.

Tell you that the job is within the scope of your responsibility.

Other (please specify):

30a.

30b.

30c.

30d.

30e.

How often have you.found that the orders, requests and/or suggest-
ions of (Person) cannot be fulfilled without displeasing
another person important to your job?

(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

(If "Sometimes," "Rather Often," or "Nearly all the time" to 30:)
Please give an example of a situation in which you had encountered
such difficulty.

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30: )
What do you generally do when something like that happens?

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30:)
To what extent had being given such orders, suggestions or requests
by (Person) bothered you?

(Not at all, A little, Some, Quite a bit, A great deal)

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30: )
Do you believe such difficulty in fulfilling Person '3
expectations without displeasing an important person has adversely
affected your estimate as to the extent to which (Person) ‘

wOuld go out of his way to help you if you asked for his help?

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, very much)

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30:)
Do you believe such difficulty in fulfilling (Person) '8
expectations without displeasing an important person has adversely

affected the extent to which you respect his knowledge and judge-
ment?

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, Very much)
xxii

31.

31a.

31b.

31c.

31d.

31f.

32.

How often have you found that the orders, requests and suggestions
or (Person) were in conflict with your interpretation of
company rules and7or what you are supposed to do in your job?

(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:)
Please give an example of a situation in which you had encountered
such difficulty.

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:)
What do you generally do when something like that happens?

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:)
To what extent had being given orders, suggestions or requests by
(Person) which are in conflict with your interpretation
of company rules and/or what you are supposed to do in your job
bothered you?

(Not at all, A little, Sons, Quite a bit, A great deal)

(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:)
Do you believe that the occasions in which he gave you such orders,
requests and/or suggestions have adversely affected the extent to
which you respect his knowledge and judgement?

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, Very much)
(If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:)

Do you believe that the occasion in which he gave you such orders,
requests, and/or suggestions have adversely affected the extent to

. which you like (Person)

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, Very much)

What are the major activities in your job? (Some of’your activities
are probably more important to your job than others. After listing

‘ them, please rank all the items in the order of their importance on

33.

the left hand column. The most important activity should be ranked
as "1", the second most important activity as "2", and so on.)

How often during a day do you.have something to do as part of’your
job with each of the following groups of people? (Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time, Does not apply)

a. Your boss or other people over you.

b. People you.supervise, directly or indirectly

c. Others who work in your department but who are not under or over
you

d. Others in the same company, but not in your department

e. Outsiders who have business with the company, like salesman
or customer/clients

f. Other people in the company or outside of it

xxiii

34.

35.

36.

36a.

37.

38.

39.

Some jobs put people "in the middle" between two sets of people who
want different things. .In.your job, how often do you feel "in the
middle" of the following sets of people: (Doesn't apply, Never,
Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

a. Management and union

b. Customers and company

c. Your boss and your fellow workers

d. Your boss and the company

e. Your family and the company

f. Your friends outside the company who are not customers and
the company

g. Other (please specify):

Which of the following alternatives best represents how clear you
are about what you have to do on this job?

am very clear

am quite clear on most things
am fairly clear

am not too clear

am not at all clear

hihihihihl

In the past year, how often have you had someone who has a higher
position than yours in the company/office come to you, without
consulting your immediate supervisor, to ask you to do something
which required rearranging your work priorities? (Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

(If "Rarely", "Sometimes", "Rather often", "Nearly all the time"
to 36:) How much has this bothered you? (Not at all, A little,
Some, Quite a bit, A great deal)

Many positions in industry require that a person have not only
certain technical skills and experiences, but also certain per—
sonality characteristics or particular talents. Thinking of
your own job, what sort of personal characteristics do you feel
a person ought to have in order to do your job very well?

What sort of personal characteristics might lead one to do poorly
in that job? -

How do you feel you.rate as far as the qualities you.mentioned in
question 37 go? (Respondent rates himself on each of the qualities
on the following scale: Superior, Above average, Slightly below
average, Very poor)

Please indicate by a check:mark ( ) which of the following informa-
tion you believe somebody working in an office may justifiably
keep from his supervisor(s):

An error he made due to the incompetence, dishonesty, or slip by

an officemate.
An error somebody else made due to his unintentional slip in

xxiv

relaying information, computation, or checking of the necessary
data.

An error he made due_to lack of information or misunderstanding
of office policies with respect to that particular matter.

An unsuccessful attempt by a client of the company to bribe him.
An unsuccessful attempt by an officemate with whom he has frgguent
contact to speed up the processing of a client's papers in vio-
lation of company policy to process papers on a "first-come,
first-serve basis".

An unsuccessful attempt by an officemate with whom he has little
contact, but who has influence on his promotion or on how diffi-
.cult or easy his job would be, to speed up the processing of a
client's papers in violation of the company's policy to process
papers on a "first-come, first-serve basis".

A request by someone who has a higher position than he in the
company, but who is not his immediate supervisor, to make him

do a job which will very temporarily interfere with what he is
normally expected to be working on.

The fact that he has very little to do in his job and he is
bothered by it.

The fact that he does not feel competent to do the job that was
assigned to him.

The fact that he has little control over his subordinates because
of the way the company sets its policies.

The fact that his family problems are interfering with his per-
formance. '

The fact that his health has been failing and he is making hard
though successful attempts at fulfilling his job obligations.
The fact that his immediate supervisor makes him.do a lot of
things which the supervisor either never asks for again or never
uses.

The fact that his job only duplicates the work of somebody else
in the company. .

41. What kind of people would you like as workmates? What do you feel

A2.

43.

makes a person a good one to have around?

How well does your immediate supervisor know the jobs he supervises?

He knows very little about the jobs.
He doesn't know the jobs very well.
He knows the job fairly well.

He knows the jobs very well.

How much is your immediate supervisor interested in helping those
who work under him to get ahead in the company?

He doesn't want them to get ahead.

He doesn't care whether they get ahead or not.

He is glad to see them get ahead, but he doesn't help them much.
He helps them get ahead, if he gets a chance.

He goes out of his way to help them get ahead.

XXV

46.

47-

A8.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

Taking it all in all, how well would you say your immediate super-
visor does his job?

He does a poor job.

.He does a fair job.

He does a good job.
He does a very good job.
He does an excellent job.

How good would you say your immediate supervisor is at dealing with
the people he supervises?

He is poor at handling people.

He is not very good at dealing with people/does other things better.
He is fairly good at dealing with people. '

He is good at this-ebetter than most.

He is very good at this-it's his strongest point.

What happens when someone on your level makes a complaint about
something?

It's hardly ever taken care of.
It's often not taken care of.
It's usually taken care of.

It's almost always taken care of.

In general, how much satisfaction and pleasure do you think other
people get from the work they do?

(Very much, Considerable, Some, Very little, None at all)

Compared with other things people do—-things that are not connected
with their work-how much do you feel that they view their jobs as
a real source of satisfaction in life?

(Very much, Considerable, Some, Very little, Not at all)

What do you look. for in a job? What makes a job a good one for you?
What are some of the things that would make a job bad for'you?

How does your job compare with other jobs you know about?

(Much better than most, Slightly better than most, About the same

as other jobs, Slightly worse than most, A lot worse than most)

What aspects of your job do you find most satisfying?

What do you find least satisfying in your job?

54a.
54b.
54c.

54d.
55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

61.

If you could redesign your job as it would be most satisfying for
you, what would you like to have changed about it?

What would have to be done to bring about these changes?
What are the possibilities that these things could be done?
Have there been any attempts to make these changes in the past?

Is anything being done now along these lines?

When you were young, what did your family want you to be? Was
there any particular occupation they wanted you to go into?

Please think back to when you.were in high school. What kinds of
thoughts did you.have about what you wanted to be?

Why is that?

(If you changed your ideas as to what you indicated in question 56
you wanted to be:) What has led you to decide to go into your
present field instead of doing what you thought about doing
earlier?

To what extent do you feel you are realizing your ambitions in
your present work?

(Completely, A great deal, Quite a bit, Some, Little, Not at all)

How about your present plans? Do you think:you.might like to make
a change in jobs in the future? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to 60:) What kind of change would you like to make?

(If "Yes" to 60:) What do you think your chances are for making
that change?

(If "Yes" to 60:) What are you doing now that will help you make
that change?

(If "No" to 60:) Why is it that you.do not feel you want to make
a change of jobs in the future?

Do you think your wife/husband would like you to change to some
other job? (Yes, No, Not applicable)

xxvii

61a.

62.

63.

6h.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.
71-

(If "Yes" to 61:) Please elaborate on why your wife/husband would
like you to change to some other job.

In general, how would you sum up your present situation? How do
you feel about your future?

How long have you worked for ? years
months. A '

What did you do before working here?

Have you had promotions or has your responsibility increased in
some other way since you started working here? (Yes, No)

(If "Yes" to 65:) What promotions did you.have?

How long have you been in this present job? years
months. ‘

How well did you know what was expected of you when you first came
into_your present job?

(Very well, Pretty well, Not very well, Not at all well)

When you first came to your present Job, how or from whom.did
you learn what is expected of you.in this Job?

Are you.married? (Yes, No)

How many people were dependent upon.you for a major part of their
support last year?

xxviii

(FOR SUPERVISORS ONEY)

Down the left side of this page are a number of things a subordinate
of yours might.do. For each of the things listed on the left column,
please indicate whether you'd like him to do it or not to do it. The
headings at the top of each column on the right indicate the degree to
which you'd personally like to see him do it. Next to each things
listed, just check in the column that best expresses your feelings.
(Respondent indicates his feelings on the following scale: Strongly
prefer he not do it, Somewhat prefer he not do it, Doesn't matter to
me, Somewhat prefer he do it, Strongly prefer he do it.)

1. Accept judgement of higher-ups as final

2. Come up with new, original ideas for handling work

3. Try to make himself 160k good in the eyes of the higherhups
whenever possible

4. Spend time off the job with others in the company who have a much
higher position than his

5. Spend time off the job with others in the company who have a.much
lower position than his

6. Break company rules when he thinks it is in the company's best
interest

7. Report others who break company rules

8. Take an occasional day off just to relax

9. By-pass official channels when he wants something done in a hurry
10. Stick to the letter of company rules

11. Tell things to higherdups that might make him look bad

12. Take advantage of every opportunity for promotion

13. Carry out orders even if he thinks they are unsound

14. Withhold information from higherwups which puts a co-worker in a
bad light

15. Do favors for a friend contrary to company rules
16. Tell higherdups his frank opinion even if it will hurt them

17. Do the best he can, even if it makes a co—worker look bad by
comparison

18. Report to his superior any short-cuts he uses in his work

xxix

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
2h.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
31+.

36.

Defend his co-workers from criticism by their superiors
Spend most of his time in supervisory matters

Let those he supervises set their own workepace

Train men under him for better jobs

Be responsible for keeping up the morals of those under him
Try to cover up for the errors made by those under him

Take a personal interest in his men

Take sides with his men in any dispute with the company
Carry out orders his men don't like

Give special attention to friends in making the recommendations
for promotion

Accept full responsibility for the decisions of those under him
Consult with his men in making any decision which affects them
Keep an eye on the personal life of those under him

Withhold from his men information his own superiors don't want
passed on

Check frequently on the work of his men
Leave the men he supervises alone unless they want help
Keep men infonmed on what is happening in the company

Allow his men a great deal of say about the way they do their work

 

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