

STRESS IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATION  
A COMPARISON OF ROLE CONFLICT, AMBIGUITY AND OVERLOAD  
IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

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1972



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17. 10. 1955

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## ABSTRACT

### STRESS IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATION: A COMPARISON OF ROLE CONFLICT, AMBIGUITY, AND OVERLOAD IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

By

Leticia Marcelo Smith

The process of modernization proceeds with varying degrees of rapidity in different societies. Empirically, industrialization, urbanization, centralization and bureaucratization are considered as standard indicators of the process. It is widely assumed by social scientists that the nations in Asia, Africa and South America which now lag behind Western countries on the basis of these indicators will have to catch up in order to survive. Although the developing nations recognize the problems that modernization has created in the West, and are in fact beginning to feel these problems themselves, they realize that it has helped spread opportunities for the comfortable, secure life most human beings desire.

This study focuses on the sub-process of bureaucratization and on the price people find themselves paying in their efforts to obtain the "good life". Specifically, it attempts to develop a theory to account for differences in the primary sources of role stress and in how bureaucrats respond to such stress in large formal organizations in predominantly agrarian countries. The theory is expected to apply in those countries which have a colonial background, a popularly



elected and highly centralized government, and a multiplicity of ethnic groups and regional allegiance. The Philippine case is taken to illustrate the differences in the sources of stress and in the public and the private bureaucracies. The differences stem from 1) historical and cultural factors which have led to differential expectations of clientele toward each of these organizations, and 2) the structure, rules and sanction systems which are particular to each of these classes of organizations.

Two bureaucracies were chosen for comparison on the basis of their similarity in function and size. Both were in the insurance business, but one was a public bureaucracy and the other was a private one. Respondents from each organization were selected to ensure comparable positions and functions across the two organizations, and were asked to complete a questionnaire.

The data shows that although role ambiguity occurs in both organizations, there are forms of role stress that are unique to each. In the public one, role stress from non-legitimate expectations of clients, friends and superiors occurs more frequently than any other kind of stress. Members of the private bureaucracy complain about work overload, the strictness with which their superiors apply the rules, and the impersonality of their relationship with superiors. Coping strategy differs in the two organizations mainly in that the public official is more likely to pass on the responsibility for resolving conflicts to superiors than is the private official. There is no evidence that organizational socialization makes a difference in the job orientation of the two classes of bureaucrats.

It must be emphasized that these findings are very tentative.

The issues this study deals with are sensitive concerns in the bureaucracies of developing nations. A fuller research strategy will need to use depth interviews of bureaucrats and their role senders, as well as a thorough examination of the records and files of the organizations.

Much emotion clouds attempts at evaluating the potential of the developing nations to institute the kinds of changes which they have to make to ensure survival and to eliminate gross socio-economic inequities within them. The literature abounds with morbid tales of corruption, of the difficulties of developing labor commitment, and of the overall hazards of particularism in developing countries. As the respondents in this study indicated, there is enough painful consciousness of the many sources of the problems of bureaucratic efficiency and productivity in the public sector among the bureaucrats themselves. The data also shows indirectly that if the power structure and sanction system of the public bureaucracies were altered with the use of the large private bureaucracy as a model, these problems would be drastically cut down. Although the particularism of the larger society potentially threatens bureaucratic function, the bureaucracy itself can set up safeguards against it and may even serve to educate the public toward a more universalistic orientation.

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A THESIS

Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1972

675813

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1972

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my guidance committee, Drs. William A. Faunce, Herbert H. Karp, Leonard Kasdan, and most especially, my major professor Dr. Bo Anderson.

L. M. S.  
May 1972

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## THE PROBLEM

The purposes of this study are to determine 1) the differences in the primary sources of role conflict and role stress, and 2) the differences in the responses to such conflict and stress by the members of large private and public formal organizations of a predominantly agrarian society, the Philippines. Using the Weberian model<sup>1</sup> of the totally rationalized organization as the criterion for bureaucratization, it is assumed that the belief and normative systems of highly industrialized societies are more consistent with bureaucratic norms than are such systems in societies with a low level of industrial technology. The degree of consistency between the larger culture and the bureaucratic subculture affects the character of role conflict and role stress, and

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<sup>1</sup>Weber's bureaucratic ideal type contains the following features: (From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1946, Chap. 8).

- a. Each role and position has clearly defined duties and responsibilities.
- b. All decisions are made on the basis of technological knowledge, not personal considerations.
- c. All activities are guided by formally prescribed rules and regulations.
- d. All activities are recorded on written documents, which are preserved in permanent files.
- e. Relationships among role incumbents are judged solely on the basis of proficiency, and discipline is impartially enforced.
- f. Positions are filled on a contractual basis, with selection determined by fixed criteria of merit (training and/or experience).
- g. Role incumbents are judged solely on the basis of proficiency, and discipline is impartially enforced.
- h. An individual's work is his sole or primary occupation, and constitutes a career with opportunities for advancement.
- i. Individuals are given job security, in the form of fixed salaries, tenure, and retirement pensions.

of the mechanisms members use to cope with such conflicts and stress in the large formal organization. Furthermore, it is assumed that the bureaucracy makes structural adjustments such that presumed sources of threat to goal attainment (its members, its clientele, and/or outsiders who want to influence decision-making in the organization) may be neutralized. The specific positions, relationships between these positions, the internal sanction system, and the channels of communication with clients and/or other outsiders depend considerably on what the bureaucracy assumes its members, clients, and/or other outsiders are like.

The use of the western, Weberian legal-rational bureaucratic model as the standard for evaluation of the evolving bureaucracies of the Philippines and for that matter other transitional societies has not only an academic but also an ideological significance. Theoretically, all formal organizations are designed for the efficient attainment of goals. However, pragmatically, official rules designed to guide the activities of the organization are occasionally defeated by informal norms and behavior evolved by its members. Furthermore, the official rules and the goals become confused with each other in day-to-day operations. The determination of intra- and extra-organizational conditions which give rise to these variations from the model are of great academic value. It not only gives insight on organizational behavior, but also enables the exploration of individual and group sources and consequences of such deviations.

Ideologically, the use of the Weberian bureaucratic model as the guide for assessing transitional bureaucratic behavior rests on the recognition that there are as yet no genuine organizational alternatives to the model for societies which are attempting to improve their economic

situation in a reasonable amount of time.

Professionalization, in the sense of the development of skills to enable members of a society to discharge their duties autonomously, with collegial checks to ensure responsible and acceptable--if not superior--performance of such duties, has limited potentials. It cannot be considered as a real alternative to bureaucratization of the organizations of transitional societies, but rather as another means to ensure the attainment of organizational goals. To take advantage of the potentials of professionalization, the present highly centralized institutions of the Philippine public sector first will have to be strengthened through decentralization. Decentralization can give more of the participants an experience of the exercise of legitimate authority and responsibility. It can also free those who are formally responsible for planning the direction of society and coordinating the activities designed to implement plans the opportunity to effectively carry out their tasks rather than remain bogged down with endless routine and petty details.

Western bureaucracy has been criticized for its emphasis on efficiency over "human values". Some of the human values supposed to have been sacrificed by Western bureaucracy are the emphases on the full development of individual personality within the work situation, respect for the worth of the individual irrespective of his present level of productivity, and the willingness to shoulder the costs necessary to ensure that differences in age, sex, physical strength, or physical features may not be obstacles to opportunity that the individual cannot overcome.

The criticism has been misplaced, however. It is not "efficiency", or the attempt to rationalize the relationship between means and goals

per se, which hinders the realization of "human values" goals. The nature of the costs and benefits of bureaucratization depends on the kind of goals an organization formulates for itself.

From this ideological viewpoint, the interest in the social psychological consequences of organizational role conflict, ambiguity, and overload in a transitional society such as the Philippines is merely part of an attempt to find out what costs a people find themselves paying as they struggle towards obtaining a "good life", and how they evaluate such costs with respect to the benefits they expect to receive.

## THE THEORY

Most analysts of the Philippine political process seriously implicate the family system in sustaining corruption and overall low level of performance in the public bureaucracy. The family has also been criticized for discouraging individual initiative, hard work and risk-taking. Sometimes, the virulence of the attacks leaves the impression that the family is the cause of all the ills of Philippine society in general, and of the way the political system operates in particular. The present analysis of the Filipino kinship system will mainly attempt to show (1) how kinship obligations affect the organizational behavior of public and private officials, (2) the conditions under which kinship obligations conflict with organizational obligations, and (3) the circumstances in which the same kinship obligations do not interfere with organizational responsibilities.

Interwoven with the analysis of the kinship system are the historical factors which have significantly influenced social structures and the attitudes of bureaucratic clientele. The structure and sanction systems of public and private complex organizations and their influence on stress will also be discussed.

### Filipino Kinship and System of Obligations

The Filipino way of reckoning kinship includes any identifiable relative of either spouse. In other words, Filipinos have a bilateral



kinship system. Blood relationship is considered as a very special bond. Kinsmen are expected to and do lend economic and moral support to each other.

...the average Filipino considers it good, right and just that he should go to his relatives in material need, and that he should seek them out as allies in his disagreements with outsiders. Security is sought not by independence so much as by interdependence.

Correlated with this interdependence is the group's acceptance of responsibility for the actions of the individual member. Although relatives may regret very much that matters have come to such a pass, and may reserve to a later date their own punishment of the troublemaking kinsman, they will ordinarily back him up in a dispute.<sup>2</sup>

Family members find emotional and economic security within the kinship system. Kinship bonds are sustained by the fulfillment of differential treatment of kin. Although many Filipino households consist only of members of the nuclear family, the extended family maintains itself as the functioning unit through the process of continuous inter-visiting and mutual help. Ceremonial occasions such as weddings, funerals and barrio fiestas<sup>3</sup> are well attended even by relatives who live quite far away. Affectional and economic bonds generally diminish markedly beyond the second cousin level.

Christian Filipinos use the same term of address for the siblings and for the cousins of one's parents: the local dialect's equivalent of "Aunt" or "Uncle". The same forms of address are used toward the grandparents, siblings of grandparents and cousins of grandparents: the local dialect's version of "Grandfather" or "Grandmother". Reciprocally, the children of one's siblings and of one's cousins are either "nephews"

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<sup>2</sup>F. Lynch, "Philippine Values II: Social Acceptance," Philippine Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 1962.

<sup>3</sup>Local celebrations in honor of the town patron saint.

or "nieces". The grandchildren of one's siblings and cousins are one's grandchildren too. Obedience and deference of the younger toward the older is a very important rule.

Claims by relatives of their share of one's room, property and services may be experienced by anyone within the kinship system, rich or poor, young or old. Such claims are instituted through the spouse who is blood kin. The kinsman who is in better financial and social position than the rest has a greater burden in the exchange network. He is obligated to make room for relatives who want to live with his family. Relatives often ask for money or for a share of whatever property he may have. The small entrepreneur is quite vulnerable because he is usually the owner, the salesman, and the serviceman. He must give substantial discount to relatives. Sometimes relatives "ask" for the goods instead of offering to pay for them. If the well-off person is in a position to help relatives find jobs, he is expected to use his power and influence to place them. If he is a professional, or has some business service of his own, he is expected to provide his services for free.

Rituals conferring kinship status help diffuse further the already wide sphere of particularistic obligations. In the predominantly Catholic Philippines, baptism and confirmation are the main occasions in which children acquire godparents. Godparents are persons who consent to accept the child "as their own" in the latter's ritual birth to the church with an implicit promise to take care of the child on the premature death of his parents. Often, the godparent in baptism is the same as the godparent at confirmation. The godparent who actually sponsors the child in baptism and/or confirmation is always of the same sex as the godchild.

If the godparent was unmarried at the time of ritual godparenthood, his/her future spouse will also be considered as the godchild's ritual sibling. The godchild has obligations of obedience and respect toward godparents. Godparents on the other hand have obligations to help the godchild when the latter solicits their help—moral, economic, or other.

While relatives are commonly asked to be godparents, friends are also frequently asked. Occasionally, a family desirous of securing favors or gaining prestige will ask a wealthy and powerful person to be a godparent to their child. There is a strong taboo against refusing such requests. Refusal is generally considered as a curse on the child. Few people are eager to shoulder the blame if some misfortune befalls the child. The godparent-to-be also has something to gain from the solicited relationship:

The (co-parenthood) relationship implies reciprocal obligations between the two compadres, as well as between the child and godfather. The usual pattern is for the godfather to help his compadre and godson with little favors, such as recommendation for employment, and to help in their dealings with government; he in turn receives small gifts or free labor services in election campaigns and other political situations, and during occasions of need in his household. Inasmuch as the relationship is permanent, both parties become members of one large "ritual family"!<sup>4</sup>

Another way of ritual extension of the kingroup is through wedding ceremonies in which friends or prestigious members of the community are asked to be godparents (wedding sponsors). As in the case of godparents acquired through baptism and confirmation, the godchildren (the married couple) have obligations of respect though not necessarily of obedience to the godparents, acquired through the wedding ritual. Godparents are expected to help the couple "get established" through a number of favors.

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<sup>4</sup>O. D. Corpuz, The Philippines, N. J.: Prentice-Hall 1965, p. 84.

Children of the godparents do not have special expectations toward the godchildren, and vice versa. Relations with godparents, co-parents, godchildren and ritual siblings generally carry fewer obligations and expectations than relations with one's blood relatives. Affectional ties with them are also weaker than those with blood relatives. However, obligations of mutual help with this group are stronger than those toward ordinary friends, neighbors or townmates.

Failure to fulfill obligations toward a kinsman is likely to bring censure from other relatives. The other relatives who have not themselves been offended directly have a stake in bringing the erring kinsman in line. The failure of a member of the kingroup to take care of his duties is a threat to the entire expectation network. If the offense is ignored or taken lightly, then other relatives might freely unburden themselves of their kinship obligations.

#### The Kinship System and the Larger Society

The extended Filipino family system has features in common with most other extended family systems, particularly those of Catholic Latin America in which the compadrazgo or ritual co-parenthood also operates. At the same time, there are characteristics which appear to be unique to the Filipino system. By definition, an extended family system recognizes kinship ties beyond the family composed of the parents and their blood or adopted children. Such a system is meaningful only insofar as kinship carries with it a set of expectations and obligations directed toward kinsmen. Mutual help in economic need, need for physical defense, moral support in times of grief, sharing of prestige and privilege, as well as help in childrearing are among them. However,

in contrast with the Western European and Northern American extended family which has not interfered with the development of larger loyalties, the Filipino family appears to have cultivated a fierce loyalty to its members to the exclusion of concern over the welfare of the larger collectivity embracing non-kinsmen.

Historically, the family has been the primary basis of most Filipino social institutions. Local settlements, prior to the coming of the colonizers, were kinship groups.

Characteristically, each community was a separate social, political and economic entity, although informal connections between communities certainly existed, which were based upon patterns of inter-community marriage and alliances against common enemies. Social rather than geographical isolation divided even neighbouring communities, a principal cause being vendettas between families and kingroups of different communities. Headtaking was associated with these vendettas as shown by archaeological evidences.

Community life and social activities were organized on the basis of kinship and common economic and ritual interests. As in the barrios of today the pre-Spanish communities had weakly developed political structures. Most individuals in the small communities were linked with blood ties, marriage and ritual kinship, and it was these factors plus shared residence, common interests and experiences, and community level ritual obligations which defined the community as a social unit—not political ties!<sup>5</sup>

The Spaniards brought these communities in the many islands of the country under a single political structure. Instead of diminishing the significance of kinship ties, the Spanish colonial government even strengthened the social position of the Filipino family.

The failure of the Spanish regime to perform basic service functions (security, education, welfare, and development), whereas, on the other hand, it forcefully collected levies and assessments on the people's property and labor, stamped on the people's mind an image of government as a negative and burdensome social institution. This image was re-enforced by the conspicuously inhibitory, and even sometimes predatory, activities of the primary governmental agencies.

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<sup>5</sup>R. B. Fox, "Prehistoric Foundations of Contemporary Filipino Culture and Society," Comment, First Quarter, 1958.



All of these factors combined to practically alienate and estrange the government from the people.

This alienation of the people from the government meant also that the people on the one hand and the government on the other did not belong to the same community ('community', a sharing of many or all things in common). This was no doubt accentuated by the fact that the government was predominantly alien in personnel. Their welfare neglected, their aspirations rebuffed, and their security threatened by government, the people had no recourse but to look after their own welfare and provide for their own security. To this end they transferred their expectations to other social institutions, and that which was most ready at hand was the family.<sup>6</sup>

### Social Values and Organizational Participation

The set of values, beliefs and behavior which sustains the Filipino family as a built-in social security and welfare system has its counterpart in the larger social circle of friends. A complex system of reciprocal obligations serves to widen the individual's private source of security. By itself, adherence to some norm of reciprocity is not unique to the Filipino people. Every society derives at least part of its capacity for control from inculcating in its members the norm of reciprocity: one helps those who have helped him, and one does not harm those who have given benefits to him. What is perhaps unique in the Philippine case—compared with the case of Western societies—is that the system of reciprocal obligations has helped sustain a fragmented social body within a supposedly unified political structure.

Societies of the Western world have gradually withdrawn reliance on the intimate sphere of relatives and friends as the agency to take care of individual needs. Laissez-faire ideology defining the negative role of government vis-a-vis the individual is losing its earnest

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<sup>6</sup>O. D. Corpuz, "The Cultural Foundations of Filipino Politics," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, vol. 4, no. 4, Oct. 1960, pp. 297-310 (pp. 304-305).

adherents. Powerful checks at the governmental level have been found necessary to regulate the activities of private individuals and groups which work against collective interests. Along with this development has been the increasing dependence on government to make sure that disabilities acquired by birth into a deprived group would not permanently inhibit individuals from realizing their full potential.

In the Philippine case, what happens to the national collectivity as an outcome of individual striving does not appear to be of serious concern to most people. Judging from the actual behavior of private citizens and government officials, no strong ideology linking the triple spheres of the individual, the government, and the polity has developed. If any ideology may be discerned from past and current socio-political behavior of Filipinos, it is that the government exists for the individual and not for the collectivity. With this view of the role of government in relation to the individual, the good government is viewed as the government most responsive to the individual. The greater the good one can secure from government for oneself, relatives and friends, the better that government is.

The Filipino system of utang na loob helps keep developments toward a national collectivity orientation agonizingly slow. Utang na loob is a Tagalog term which may loosely be translated as "debt of gratitude." This debt is incurred within a rigid set of rules governing reciprocal obligation. Goods or services another person presents, whether solicited or unsolicited, on the part of the receiver an utang na loob toward the giver. Theoretically, this utang na loob can never be fully repaid although the recipient may on another occasion present the original creditor with goods and services equivalent or greater in value than



what he received. Furthermore, the repayment itself creates utang na loob toward the giver. The cycle of debt creation may be broken only at the cost of being rejected by the person or group offering the gift. There is thus no element of volition in the creation of "debt of gratitude."

Goods or services are solicited from those who have utang na loob towards oneself, or from one who is perceived to have "surplus" and thus have a "moral obligation" to share the surplus. The cycle of utang na loob can be started with the presentation of an unsolicited gift or service in anticipation of future returns. The receiver of the unsolicited gift or service may or may not reject the gift, depending on what his position is within the giver's kinship or friendship network. Although this type of gift-giving is usually a well-calculated act in which the giver considers himself in such terms with the potential receiver that his offer will not be rejected, some mistakes do occur. Kinsmen and friends cannot reject the gift without also signifying that they reject their membership in the kinship or friendship group. The rejection of the gift is taken as a rejection of membership. If the person does not want to incur a "debt of gratitude", then he does not want to belong. He who has rejected an unsolicited gift has also denied his responsibility in a system providing social security.

The group in which utang na loob universally exists is the nuclear family. Children are considered to owe their parents their life and they are immediately indebted with utang na loob at birth. It is therefore the solemn duty of children to try to repay their parents a debt that can never fully be repaid. Beyond the nuclear family, one also incurs debt of gratitude toward other relatives with whom one exchanges economic,

moral, and other forms of support. Non-relatives can be used to get benefits for oneself and one's kinsmen so that it becomes expedient to create utang na loob in them too.

The strong norms against the rejection of an unsolicited gift--and thus against the refusal to enter into the utang na loob trap within the kinship and friendship groups--serve to perpetuate a system that satisfies many if not most individual needs. At the same time, it provides the parties involved a sense of active participation in the satisfaction of their needs and thus a feeling that they deserve what they obtained. The flow of goods and services is quite visible and seemingly simple within the limited circle of utang na loob participants. This visibility creates an illusion of control over events. Creation of utang na loob appears to the participants a good way to secure their investments of goods, services and/or skills.

The system of reciprocal obligations in its turn is supported by the very high importance Filipinos attach to social acceptance. Smooth inter-personal relations are sought through elaborate euphemisms, avoidance of making criticisms, avoiding making overt signs of rejection, and avoidance of directly refusing requests. The Filipino is quite sensitive to personal affront, and criticism; refusal of his requests is often taken as a rejection of his person. Failure to meet one's utang na loob obligations is a legitimate ground for criticism, and one avoids such criticisms by repaying the debt even at serious economic cost to oneself or at the terrible discomfort of one's family. At the same time that one secures goods and services for himself and his family through debt creation, one also incurs the risk that the giver may some day ask him for more than he is willing to give.

## Social Stratification and Particularistic Behavior

The primarily agricultural Philippines is struggling toward economic development through increasing the level of industrialization. In the context of this struggle, a duality in the criteria used to determine social status emerges. Ascribed characteristics—such as family background (and more broadly, one's affinity to powerful individuals or families), and achieved characteristics such as academic achievement, occupational achievement and community service—are strong criteria. These two criteria overlap only partially. Although it is true that good family background and personal connections are useful in getting the other qualifications necessary to further one's position, the collective status-seeking activities of families enable individuals to rise above their humble origins. For example, the oldest child is sent through school often at tremendous sacrifice by the parents and by the younger children. In turn, as soon as the oldest child is able to get a job, he is expected to help the younger ones finish their own schooling and even secure a job for them. Other relatives, particularly those who are "well off", are expected to pitch in to send a young kinsman off to the city to attend school. To these members of the extended family, such a help is not only an obligation, but also an investment, as was noted earlier in the discussion of utang na loob.

Status-striving as a collective activity within the family is both an asset and a liability to the individual. As an asset, collective status-striving provides the individual with actual resources as well as moral support in the attempt to rise beyond the status achieved by his own parents. Also, while individual failure can mean failure of the kinship network (which is counting on sharing the individual's

increment in prestige as well as his "surplus" wealth and acquired talent), this burden is mitigated by the fact that other successful members of the family can largely offset the failure of the individual. As a liability, help from relatives obligates the individual in perpetuity and sometimes forces him into moral compromises in his attempt at repaying such obligations. Furthermore, relatives sometimes claim their repayment prematurely--that is, before the individual finds himself in a comfortable and secure enough position that he can exercise his informal "prerogatives" in his job, as well as have enough material "surplus" to give away without endangering his personal position economically and socially. He must exercise his prudence in stalling their demands, and his talent in making his economic position appear worse than it is without producing the same effect in the eyes of those with whom he does not have utang na loob.

From the point of view of the individual, his position in an organization becomes important in a variety of ways. Aside from the intrinsic satisfaction in discharging his official functions, his position also offers him opportunities for his own and his extended family's status striving. Furthermore, it provides him with the means by which to repay the debt of gratitude he had incurred to obtain the qualifications and/or connections necessary to get his present job. Much of this indebtedness occurs within the extended family. Non-kinsmen, however, are often involved because relatives do secure the help of non-kinsmen to advance the affairs of their own members.

In the processes of status-striving, and of repaying utang na loob, the official behaves in particularistic ways. He gives priority to familial needs and demands. The demands of the family may or may not be

contrary to what the organization needs to accomplish its ends. To the extent that the official is predisposed to overlook or minimize the relevance of aspects of personal demands on him by his family and friends to organizational ends, he is likely to engage in particularistic behavior contrary to these ends.

The Weberian legal-rational bureaucratic model operates on rules impersonally applied to those who meet specified criteria. Officials are expected to behave steadfastly according to the organization's prescriptions, rather than to their personal predilections. In the Weberian sense, "universalism", a major component of the bureaucratic ethos, does not satisfy all the requirements of bureaucratic functioning. Universalistic values and behavior are only important insofar as they lead to the congruence between official behavior and organizational goals. Empirically, universalism and particularism in organizational values and behavior do not comprise a true dichotomy, but rather a value-and-behavior quality continuum. At one end of the continuum lies universalism which emphasizes that rules are tools for organizational ends, and must be strictly applied in accordance with criteria delineated in the rule system. Organizational rules answer questions as to who, how and when. At the other end of the continuum lies particularism, which gives priority to personal considerations over organizational ends. Thus, particularism emphasizes that rules are tools for the ends of the individual rather than of the organization.

There are at least two ways in which a bureaucracy may harbor particularism. First, the incompleteness of organizational rules in any bureaucracy requires that the official formulate ad hoc decisions at some time or another. Organizational rules are necessarily incomplete

because those who formulate the rules cannot plan for every situation that may arise. Secondly, the bureaucracy may institutionalize particularistic norms and behavior in certain areas of bureaucratic behavior, and in specific actors of the hierarchical structure. The owners of a family firm, for example, may be primarily oriented toward maintaining managerial control rather than the expansion of profits. They may then reserve the control positions to the members of the family, while they maintain strict standards for the recruitment and promotion of outsiders at the lower levels of the organization. In both of these ways in which particularism may thrive in a bureaucracy, particularistic behavior may be circumscribed by the general goals of the organization.

The self-seeking, status-striving official is more likely to find built-in flexibility of organizational rules to his advantage. Particularistic prerogatives such as those which occur in family firms are not likely to be found institutionalized in any other bureaucratic organization.

#### Patronage System in the Public Bureaucracy

Earlier in this paper it was noted that the family has always had a central position in Philippine community life. The coercive and predatory character of the first political structure that brought the scattered independent settlements under its rule further strengthened the familial institution. Political participation of the "natives" was practically non-existent during the Spanish regime. The rulers were not accountable to the governed.

The Americans, who crushed the hopes for the hard fought independence the Filipinos won from Spain, wielded what may be called a "firm,

benevolent hand". They began a mass-based public education system, and after forty years of direct rule extended the franchise to all functionally literate adults in the country. During the last decade of formal American rule, that is, during the Commonwealth period, the Philippine government was run entirely by officials elected by the Filipinos.

Since neither the American government nor the Philippine Commonwealth government firmly intervened to open up the elite opportunities to the masses, the old elite structure remained. The mestizo economic elite who were kept from political participation during the Spanish regime immediately secured political power to themselves. With political power, the economic elite was deeply entrenched in the power structure. They busily used that double-edged power to institutionalize personal political and economic prerogatives in the governmental system through a highly centralized government, a wide variety of discretionary powers and funds at the executive level, and "pork barrel" funds to legislators.

The allocation of discretionary power and funds serves as a mechanism by which politicians secure the personal allegiance of their constituents. It makes it difficult for the people to distinguish between the role occupant as a person, and his position. Congressmen, provincial governors and mayors, for example, are besieged with requests from their constituents for help in sending a daughter to the "States", contributions toward building a new church, donations to a beauty contest, help in financing a new roof for a schoolhouse, and so forth. Such requests are often granted through the use of "discretionary funds" and of the "pork barrel". An extensive utang na loob network is developed in this fashion, with the political allegiance from the constituents and personal favors from the politician as the items of exchange.

As in any society with a large economic gap between the rich and the poor, the cultural gap between such groups is also great. The cultural gap virtually leaves the masses at the mercy of the bureaucrats in their transactions with large organizations. The Filipinos work through personal connections with the bureaucrat to disentangle the intricacies of the bureaucracy.

Politicians and bureaucrats, therefore, have a stake in keeping the bureaucracy complicated. The number of papers required for a transaction, the number of offices to deal with, the numerous fees that have to be paid and stamps to be affixed to documents—all of these help both the politician and the bureaucrat.<sup>7</sup> When the politician or the bureaucrat is so disposed—for example, at the request of a relative or friend—he can cut the "red tape". In the lingo of the bureaucrat, the term "red tape" refers to those procedures which may be avoided and still get the transaction completed.

The patronage system by which appointive public offices are filled has serious effects on the structure of public institutions. It is a major factor in the rapid expansion of bureaucracies, for positions are continually created to accomodate the never-ending demand for jobs from relatives, compadres, comadres, godchildren, and friends. In 1959, members of the majority party in the House of Representatives decided to formalize the widely existent practice of the heads of government

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<sup>7</sup>The poor transportation, telephone and mail services throughout the land also contribute to the willingness of the public to let an influential in the bureaucracy handle their transaction problems. However, these factors are extra-bureaucratic, and are not dealt with here.



bureaus to give priority to the recommendees of congressmen.<sup>8</sup> The decision came from the complaints by the disgruntled neophyte congressmen. Bureau directors paid more attention to recommendations of the senior congressmen than to the recommendations of the junior members of Congress. The agreement, in effect, stated that half of all new positions created under the 1959 budget were to be filled by the choices of office of the President, and the other half by the proteges of the congressmen who belonged to the majority party. A confidential letter was sent to each bureau director. The letter read as follows:<sup>9</sup>

June 26, 1959

Director.....  
Bureau of.....

Dear Director.....:

Please be informed that an arrangement has been made between the President and the members of Congress, through the Speaker of the House, that 50 percent of the new positions in the budget for the next fiscal year would be allocated to the members of Congress on equal allotments of recommendees. For this purpose, the undersigned has been appointed by the Speaker as Chairman of the Special Committee to screen all the recommendees as would befit their respective qualifications.

Because of this agreement, I would like to request your good office to hold in abeyance appointments contemplated to be made until the members of Congress, through the Speaker, have submitted the list of recommendees for these new positions as per our arrangement. Regarding recommendees of congressmen who have seen you personally or made representations in behalf of their recommendees, please inform them that by virtue of our arrangement here in Congress by which we will distribute these new positions among all Congressmen, you are not in a position to make appointments until such time as the Speaker has submitted a list of recommendees from the Congress. This is to be done in order to insure that

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<sup>8</sup>The source of information on the agreement is "The 50-50 Agreement", by G. A. Francisco, Jr. and R. P. de Guzman, in Patterns of Decision-Making; Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration, ed. by R. P. de Guzman, Manila: U. P. Graduate School of Public Administration, 1963, pp. 93-120.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 104-105.

each Congressman should have at least an equal share in the recommendations.

Very sincerely yours,

(SGD.) SALIPADA PENDATUN  
Congressman

Theoretically, the congressmen were to give recommendations, and the bureau would make the final decision about hiring. The recommendees were also supposed to have the needed qualifications for the positions. However, as one bureau administrator put it:<sup>10</sup>

Yes, the plan would be all right if the congressmen are merely going to recommend their proteges for the vacant positions in our office. I think that the word recommend should be underlined. The truth is that they practically ordered us during the caucus to appoint their recommendees. I heard one congressman ask another: 'What if these people (meaning us) do not put in our recommendees?' The other congressman replied, 'Well, we still have two years of our term left in Congress. If they do not cooperate with us, we shall be seeing them again next year.'

As a matter of fact, during the caucus only a few of the directors spoke out. It's no use disagreeing with these politicians so we chose to remain silent. One of the congressmen asked us why we put their recommendees only in the low level positions in our respective offices. One of us answered that we prefer to promote those who are already experienced in our offices to the higher levels so that they are already familiar with the job. To this, one of the congressmen countered: "If what you need are men of experience, I can easily provide you with men of even thirty years of experience in the Bureau of \_\_\_\_\_." Now, how can that man fit into our office when he has not had the technical training and experience needed for our kind of work? I ask you, is this proper?

What is interesting about the above comments is that the administrator perceived some kind of ominous threat from the congressmen who were not about to see their recommendations lightly taken.

It not only the quality of the personnel which is affected by the patronage system but the very structure of the organization itself. Both the bureaucrat and the politician have vested interests in the

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 115-116.

expansion of the personnel of the organization. The politician sees in every request for the creation of new positions the possibilities of filling these with his proteges. If the requesting administrator had been "accomodating" to the politician's proteges, then the politician does not press too hard to determine whether there is a real need for such positions or not.

As a result of the proliferation of personnel in the public bureaucracy, jobs are subdivided minutely. Organizational subunits are created to accomodate patronage demands, and there is little effort to simplify the organization's structure. Simplifying the organizational structure would mean laying off personnel. More importantly, it would mean that there would be fewer positions to fill with political and bureaucratic proteges. It is not immediately possible to streamline public bureaucracies because such a move would pierce the heart of the patronage system.

Enormous personnel burdens also saddle the public bureaucracy with duplication of activities among subunits. Duplication of activities among subunits blur the jurisdictional boundaries between these subunits. At the same time that boundaries of jurisdiction become ambiguous, accountability diminishes. Since everyone seems to be responsible for the accomplishment of a set of tasks, ultimately, no one is responsible for it.

The problem that the patronage system brings to the organization are recognized, both within and outside the bureaucracy. However, despair and cynicism seem to prevail, as illustrated by the following selections from a large government corporation's newsletter:

.....

Our GM (General Manager) is young only in age. He is mature and firm as an executive. Not a politician, maybe he can say NO to the politicians. And kick out their do-nothing proteges!

.....

Some of our employees are always busy but not officially. To them, the GSIS (Government Service Insurance System) is only a resthouse or a workshop for personal interest. Or a supermarket to sell everything under the sun.

.....

Congestion is our continuous and continuing problem. It's a vicious cycle from one set of VIPs to another-taking proteges or creating sinecures. Never mind the GSIS!

.....

We are so many and yet so few. So many because we are overstaffed. So few because our workload piles up. The very reason why our policyholders and the public gripe upon seeing us.

.....

Perhaps a "realistic approach" to employees and their problems can make them happy. Cannot we create positions of 'influence peddler', 'kickback expert', 'tong adviser', 'casino consultant', 'wine connoisseur', 'fronton collector', 'racing agent', 'follow-upper', 'percenter', 'vendor', 'caterer', 'jeweler', 'personal driver', 'private messenger', ad infinitum?<sup>11</sup>

There is also another way by which the patronage system breaks down accountability within the organization which has only been hinted at in the above excerpts. It should be noted that the patronage system is indirectly institutionalized through the method by which government bureaus and corporations hire and place personnel. Personnel hiring and placement are done in a highly centralized fashion--that is, through a personnel office. The lower level supervisors have no control over the number or quality of the people they get to work with. Although supervisors theoretically have a say in promotions and demotions, there are limitations in this power as a means of control of employee behavior. Employees have certain guarantees of automatic salary increases per period of employment. The broad interpretation of civil service protection that is generally accepted makes it virtually impossible to

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<sup>11</sup>R. S. Selda, "Hit or Miss?", GSIS Newsletter, May 1970, p. 8.

remove an employee who has passed the necessary civil service examination and/or has acquired seniority in the service. Furthermore, "outsiders", as well as insiders, can and do initiate promotion or revengeful firing of employees without consulting the supervisor concerned.

Members of the public bureaucracy do recognize that at a formal level, they are accountable for their behavior to their supervisors. But this recognition is frequently dimmed by the fact that the supervisors themselves have little to do and have little discretion in their jobs. The supervisors do not have very much to account for in their behavior. Very little is delegated to the supervisors by those at the top. The supervisor, it is commonly thought, cannot be blamed for the poor performance of his staff since he acquired it involuntarily. He cannot be held accountable for the performance of activities the planning of which he has little to say about. He has no way of guaranteeing that his subordinates have good work habits, attitudes and capacities. He has little say on how the work should be done because he is loaded with underlings he must keep busy and who he cannot fire.

Loyalty, rather than accountability, is the more important guide for member behavior. Loyalty may be directed toward the organization. More often, however, it is directed toward particular individuals outside or within the organization who may have an important say on whether the member stays or not, and on his prospects for promotion and job mobility. Loyalty also often takes the form of uncritical overt behavior toward the "patron" or toward the organization, and devotion of energy toward covering-up errors, even of deliberately corrupt activities.

## Bureaucratic Rationality and Role Stress

In a society with an economy changing from a predominantly agricultural base toward a commercial and industrial one, the experience of ambivalence in the application of historic particularistic guidelines can be expected. The complex organizations which emerge are theoretically impersonal in character, and thus are in conflict with the interpersonal values of the larger cultural milieu. Whether in fact formal regulations prevail over the use of situational and personal criteria of organizational members largely depends on the nature of the expectations of the organization on its personnel, and the way it enforces its rules. The rest of the society can be educated to meet the operating requirements of the organization, as long as universalistic criteria are not entirely alien to the larger society.

It is a mistake to look at any society as having a unified set of attitudes toward the work world. There are priorities that people attach to their many values and norms, to the principles and beliefs that guide their conduct. No society which totally abhors the impersonal application of rules can experience any significant economic growth. Even in the public sector in the Philippines, there are sporadic attempts at increasing efficiency by strict enforcement of bureaucratic rules. But these attempts have largely been long-term failures because of inadequate structural changes instituted, and the pernicious strength of the patronage system.

Some observers of the political scene in modernizing societies look

at the utility of particularistic relations to development.<sup>12</sup> They argue that it is being unduly optimistic to expect that countries with a highly familistic set of values could in fact operate a bureaucratic system in which familial considerations are largely relegated a secondary position relative to organizational goal attainment. Therefore, a more realistic view should be to look at particularism as a value which must be accommodated in the system if the system is to move. The kinship network may be mobilized to satisfy the personnel and operating requirements of the organization. What difference does it make how the right person is recruited and the right activities are accomplished? This of course is an argument new and exciting only to the social scientist. The bureaucrat of modernizing societies has been saying this all along. Unfortunately, this view of particularism has largely been used by the bureaucrat and the politician as well to justify refusal to invent or to implement measures to reduce the tenacity of the patronage system.

While the transitional, particularistic society may cherish the security that a strong kinship system provides, such reliance on kinsmen and friends paradoxically sustains a larger insecurity. This larger insecurity comes from the knowledge that when the kinship and friendship network fails to provide for one's needs, there is no institution that one may turn to. The patronage system consistently succeeds in paralyzing the potential effectiveness of those other institutions.

Corruption--the misuse of authority due to considerations of monetary and non-monetary gain--is decried at all levels and segments of Philippine society. The masses who are not in positions of power seem to think that

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<sup>12</sup>S. P. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption," in Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, ed. by A. J. Heidenheimer N. Y.; Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970, pp. 492-500.

corruption is the monopoly of government officials and politicians. They view corruption as the official's use of public office for his own benefit rather than for the public good. With this point of view, the role of public pressure on the behavior of the individual official is largely ignored. Public officials expose each other's corruption in the hope that the public will find the other person more corrupt.

The more corrupt the public perceives the governmental system to be, the stronger they press the bureaucrats to honor familial and friendship demands. The public gains a sense of security by being able to make claims to preferential treatment, and will use personal routes even when the impersonal route may be faster.

In turn, the bureaucrat looks out for himself (the "self" includes family and friends) because he believes he cannot rely on government to get things done without personal interference. He expects others to be engaged in self-seeking behavior, and to let the bureaucracy take care of his needs is to let the odds go against him.

While governmental organizations are looked upon as "welfare" organizations whose resources should be taken advantage of when possible, the Filipino public has a different view of the private bureaucracy. There is a general acceptance that the private sector is organized for profit and that adherence to the universalistic ethic is important for efficiency and thus for profitability. These beliefs are fostered by the actual structure and operation of private bureaucracies. Merit, achievement and efficiency are avowed bureaucratic values in the private sector.

It is the growing realization of the difference between the public and the private sectors—that is, between the public role and private



interest—which makes corruption in the public bureaucracy more visible. The difference in the structures and the processes of the public versus private bureaucracy, as well as the difference in the expectations of the clientele, do make a difference in the nature of the pressures the members experience. They also make a difference in the nature of the expectations of the members regarding their relationship to the bureaucracy. The character of the relationship between the member and the organization affects the frequency, intensity and other characteristics of the pressures directed toward the individual member. In general, it is expected that the coping mechanisms available to the bureaucrat in the private organization will be different from the mechanisms available to the bureaucrat in the public one.

The nature of role conflict within organizations, the amount of stress experienced, and the mechanisms used to deal with such conflict and stress depend upon 1) the degree of congruity between the normative and value systems of the larger culture and that of the organizational subculture, and 2) the degree of rationality of organizational structure and functioning.

The private bureaucracy is not totally exempt from the pressures generated by the kinship system and the related patronage system of the larger society. However, several factors alleviate these pressures. First, government agencies are more accessible to political influence. Governmental functions are wide-ranging, and the system is quite pervasive. The system even runs businesses. It is the largest employer in the country. The politician is more certain of the influence he can exert on government agencies than he is of the response he can get from private enterprise. Unless he can claim special power in the passage

of laws regulating the activities of the enterprise or in the thorough enforcement of such laws, he is on very shaky ground. He is unlikely to test his influence where he can be rebuffed.

Secondly, there is an implicit understanding between the politician and the businessman (who are frequently the same person) that such attempts at bending regulations of private enterprise would ultimately endanger efficiency and profitability. Though there is a bifurcation of economic and political elites on an individual basis to a certain extent, the Filipino elite is still largely a monolithic economic-political elite on a familial basis. Certainly, the politician would not want to be saddled with unwanted political proteges in his own business enterprise!

Thirdly, although members of the upper echelons of both the public and private bureaucracies may have relatives and friends who press for jobs, it is easier for the private bureaucrat to say "No" to unqualified or unneeded kinsmen and acquaintances. The qualifications needed for jobs are more carefully described and fulfilled in the private sector.

Fourthly, the private bureaucracy incorporates structural and procedural safeguards against unwanted pressure from outsiders. Structurally, the direct exposure of members to the public is regulated through institutionalized liaison positions regulating client-organization relationships. Such liaison positions are well-defined and sustained by the organization through a variety of rules that channel clients to the occupants of these liaison positions. There are also formal liaison positions within all Philippine governmental agencies. However, the formal liaison positions are largely ignored by the members of the organization and by its clientele. Evidently, the governmental

bureaucracy exercises little control over member behavior, and even less over the conduct of its clientele. This informal, but actual diffusion of liaison positions encourages client pressure at all levels and sectors of the organization.

The greater strictness with which private organizations regulate company-client transactions frustrates clients who expect particularistic treatment. At the same time, they have the assurance that if they comply with company regulations, they will have good service in return. There is greater adherence to bureaucratic rules, and to the norm of "first-come", "first-served". In the governmental agency, clients who do not have the "proper connections" are oftentimes able to get the service they need only when they press their case with either cash or vehemence, if at all.

Lastly, the low level of undesirable client pressure comes as an indirect benefit that the private organization derives from its universalistic application of rules for hiring, firing, promotion, censure, demotion, and other personnel procedures. To the extent that the members trust that their performance will be evaluated in accordance with the degree to which they contribute to organizational goals, and that the rules of the organization should and will be followed, they do the job without extra pressure from clients. Also, they are more likely to be immune to pressures for special favors from relatives and friends. They can tell those who ask for these favors that they are not allowed to make personal follow-ups, or that the company's auditors unfailingly find any erroneous processing of papers. In other words, they can point to the rules and sanctions of the organization to protect themselves against client pressures.

Differential recruitment of personnel can also make a difference in the stresses experienced by members of the two types of bureaucracy. There is a possibility that the majority of those who apply for jobs in public bureaucracies are more job security-oriented than achievement-oriented, and that the converse is true to applicants for jobs in private bureaucracies. Among bureaucracies of similar size and function, jobs in private bureaucracies generally carry more prestige than jobs in public ones.<sup>13</sup> Holding a job in a large private office connotes employee ability and potential for advancement on his own merit. Public bureaucracies in the Philippines are notorious for their rigid tenure and automatic promotion provisions. The government employee is usually assured of some occasions of promotion and salary increments. Employees of private organizations, whether unionized or not, do not have the same kind of job security as government employees.

The large surplus of labor supply in both white collar and blue collar job markets works against differential recruitment, however. It forces people to apply for jobs where they can. In 1965, the International Labor Office estimated unemployment at close to 10 percent of the labor force. In addition, it was estimated that since 1960, about

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<sup>13</sup>This assessment is largely based on my personal observation. The Area Handbook for the Philippines (Wash., D. C.: The American University, 1969, p. 294) states that government office is quite prestigious and is sought after more than other jobs are for they offer better pay, fringe benefits and security. There is no data offered to back up this assertion. It is possible that economic prestige of public office is greater in the eyes of most Filipinos than is the economic prestige of most private offices. It is also possible that the achievement-based prestige of private office referred to in the above text is more relevant and limited to better educated Filipinos. Therefore, among those who at one time or another are faced by the problem of choosing where to apply for a job, the achievement-based prestige of the private office is at least as important as economic considerations.

12 percent of the labor force held only part-time jobs. Employment has been increasing at no more than 3 percent a year, while the number of people entering the labor market has been increasing at a greater rate. Unsuccessful job seekers numbered between 618,000 and 1,182,000 annually between 1956 and 1964.<sup>14</sup>

It is likely that differences in the job orientations of the members of public versus private bureaucracies lie in the process of on-the-job socialization. If the member knows that the organization evaluates actions in accordance with contributions to organizational goals, he will be more interested in performing his function than in following rules to keep his job. This is an important way by which the organization nourishes the achievement orientation of its members.

The private bureaucracy is also acknowledged to be cost-conscious. It will try to do the job with minimum personnel. In the effort to cut labor costs, the organization often loads its employees to the extent that they feel the stress of the inability to get the job done for lack of time. Furthermore, when there are conflicting intra-organization expectations, the employee is expected to resolve such conflicts such that the outcome will be best for the organization.

Authority figures in all institutions of Philippine society expect deference from subordinates. The unequal relationship is very obvious in the interaction between superior and subordinate within and outside the institution in which the authority specifically applies. Nevertheless, in the private bureaucracy, there is no room for authority figures who demand unquestioning deference, as frequently occurs in public bureaucracies. An employee faced with conflicting expectations from

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<sup>14</sup>Area Handbook for the Philippines, p. 295.

role senders of unequal status can not resolve the conflict in favor of the one who is higher in the organizational ladder. He will eventually have to account for his own actions.

An organization which is perceived as being irrational—in which merit and achievement do not play an important role in determining individual careers—encourages security-orientation to the exclusion of achievement-orientation. Evidently, not all members of the public bureaucracy can significantly influence the organization. If the member who is without influence resources realizes that his performance has little relationship to his future on the job, and that he has little chance of changing jobs because of stiff competition, the longer he stays on the job the more ritualistic he becomes. His ritualism may consist of punctuality and regularity in attendance, and unquestioning adherence to rules irrespective of the ultimate consequences of such rules for the adequate fulfillment of his function. He will find it more important that he looks like he is performing a function than actually performing it.

At the same time that the uninfluential member suffers from the hopelessness of his job situation, he suffers less strain from conflicting expectations of his intra-organizational role senders. He will tend either not to perceive the conflict, or to depreciate the meaning of such conflict to the function he is performing. He is also likely to resolve the conflict in favor of the role sender who is higher in authority because such manner of resolution relieves him of the need to justify his action on grounds other than that of power.

One factor which encourages role conflict resolution with the weight of power in the public bureaucracy is its highly centralized structure.

The decisions are made at the very top levels of the hierarchy, and very little authority or responsibility is delegated. Ironically, the reluctance of public bureaucracies to allow their members to exercise their judgement in their jobs stemmed largely from the fear that because Filipinos were inexperienced with bureaucratic participation they were likely to make errors as well as be quite corruptible. The high level of centralization was not and is not coupled with a parallel system of adequate checks. Consequently, public officials have informally assumed wide discretionary powers where they can, and the very character of the centralized bureaucracy has made widespread corruption possible. At the same time, the centralized structure discourages initiative, creativity, and a sense of accountability for one's behavior.

The public official tends to define what he is responsible for narrowly. He is quite rigid with respect to his job definition, that is, with respect to what he ought to do as a good worker but not with what he can do in his job. This rigidity of the individual officials reinforces the rigidity of the public bureaucracy's structure, the level at which it sets its goals, and the kind of rules it formulates to attain the goals at the stated levels.

Although the public bureaucracy is quite rigid in the ways mentioned above, it is more flexible than the private bureaucracy in the orientation of rule implementation. The public bureaucracy—with its legacy of particularism from the larger cultural context and institutional arrangements which encourage client pressure—is quite flexible with respect to the criteria by which the priority of the jobs is determined. Specifically, it is flexible as to 1) which client to satisfy first, and 2) what demands of the client would be satisfied. Both (1) and (2) are

considered without regard to institutional profitability, or to the fulfillment of institutional goals. While formal institutional norms may demand that the public official act on client requests as they come, and evaluate these requests on the basis of how they satisfy organizational rules, particularistic pressure from relatives and friends supercedes these institutional demands. This flexibility enables the members of the bureaucracy to reaffirm their familial and friendship ties, strengthen and spread their spheres of influence. It provides each member of the organization with a sense of importance and power in dealing with individual cases. They are not mere "cogs in the machine" when they follow up papers of relatives and friends. The conflict between particularistic demands and the formal demands of the organization is readily resolved in favor of the former.

Contrariwise, the flexibility within the private bureaucracy lies primarily on the use of the criterion of organizational goal attainment in the formulation and enforcement of rules. Since rules are recognized as means to ends, then the private official may adjust the rules to the situation within a recognized permissible range to satisfy the client and to do a good job as well. The private bureaucracy may appear more inflexible than the public ones because any given client has greater chances of being able to "bend the rules" in the latter than in the former. However, the client is more likely to get his legitimate demands attended to quickly and on their own merits in the private than in the public bureaucracy.

The flexibility of the private bureaucracy geared toward a rationalization of means to ends has important implications to the way the private official reacts to role conflict. If he perceives that the



expectations of his superiors conflict with his own definition of company procedures, or of how a good job should be done, he will suffer strain. Such conflict upsets his version of the rationality of the organization. At the same time, he is likely to resolve the conflict in terms of how he should act to perform his function best. As was mentioned earlier in this paper, performance in the private bureaucracy is evaluated on the basis of its contribution to the goals of the organization. The private official is not unduly agitated by client pressures to "bend the rules" because there are institutionalized shock-absorbing mechanisms when these pressures occur. One of these institutionalized mechanisms is the delineation of the range of permissible ways of adjusting to client demands. If client demand cannot be dealt with within this range, the private official will reject this demand.

Public and private bureaucracies differ in ways which have significant implications for the nature of role conflict, ambiguity, and strain experienced by their members. The differences discussed consist of 1) the degree of congruence between the normative and value systems of the larger culture and those of the organizational subculture, 2) the nature of the general public's perception of the goals and the means used by the organization to attain its goals, 3) the structural provisions for control of member behavior, 4) the structural accommodations for particularistic pressure, 5) the degree of adherence of the organization to universalistic criteria in client-organization, member-organization interaction, and 6) the sources of flexibility in organizational functioning. These factors not only influence the kind and intensity of client pressure and of intraorganizational pressure. They also provide the individual with an orientation to these pressures.

The total configuration of characteristics of the organization with respect to factors (1) through (6) expose the member to different sources of stress, predispose him to experience certain degrees of strain and to the means by which he will attempt to deal with such strain.

#### Scope of the Theory

The societies: The differences in the sources of and the responses to role stress in the two types of bureaucracies dealt with here are expected to be significantly accentuated in countries characterized by 1) a majority of the work force employed in agriculture, 2) a colonial background, 3) the achievement of independence after World War II, 4) a highly centralized form of government, 5) popularly elected government officials, and 6) the multiplicity of ethnic groups and regional allegiances.

Colonial background is an important limiting condition in determining whether the bureaucratic developments in a society fall within the realm of the present theory. It is significant in its impact on the attitudes that the former colonized people retain regarding the nature of government officials and civil servants. They consider government bureaucrats as exploitative and that ascendance into these bureaucratic positions inevitably corrupts.

It has been observed that despite the diversity in the specific political and economic arrangements of their colonial regimes, the political elite of the countries which won their independence after World War II have tended to use similar strategies in their attempts at

facing the conditions brought about by independence.<sup>15</sup> One of these strategies was to establish a strong hierarchy of status in terms of political power, specifically manifested in a highly centralized form of government. The highly centralized form of government was a legacy of colonial powers which the former colonies have found expedient to take over and strengthen. There were also efforts to provide the political elite a strong grip on the means to social mobility. This control was exemplified by the power to create and staff positions in the wide sphere of the governmental bureaucracy. As result, governmental bureaucracy has been used as the major instrument for economic and social mobility by the population at large.

A third development among the newly-independent countries is the attempt at subjecting a large number of economic, professional and cultural activities to political control. The regulations of activities of economic, professional and cultural elites appears to be an attempt to speed up the mobilization of the entire society toward the end-states the political visionaries want. This has prevented the independent evolution of non-political spheres. The present theory does not hold in the former colonial countries in which the political elite determines directly the nature of the activities in non-political spheres. A differentiation of private and public bureaucracies obviously requires some degree of mutual autonomy between these classes of organizations.

A predominantly agricultural labor sector has strong particularistic values. It sets the tone of the larger society, even though the urban

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<sup>15</sup>S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," in Industrialization and Society, ed. by B. F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore, UNESCO, 1966, pp. 159-173.

region slowly spreads universalistic values.

When public officials are popularly elected, the political elite depends to a certain extent upon the masses. Popular election also opens up the possibility that political support is given by the masses in exchange for direct personal returns. The multiplicity of ethnic groups and of regional allegiances makes the use of "political connections" appear necessary in order to secure governmental services.

The bureaucracies: The differences in the sources and frequency of role stress, in the intensity of role strain, and in the reactions of the bureaucrat to stress and strain are expected to obtain among bureaucracies with 100 or more employees. At this size, the private bureaucracy would certainly have recruited members who are not kinsmen of its owners. The public bureaucracy would also be significant enough to service a large body of clients, and to be of interest to politicians.

At a minimum, an organization must have the following formal characteristics to fall in the universe of bureaucracies about which the hypotheses of the theory are formulated: an explicit division of labor, provision of tests to ensure the qualifications of a person to perform his job, a clear structure of authority, and coordination of roles directed toward the achievement of the goals of the collectivity.

#### Hypotheses

On the basis of the preceding analysis, specific statements regarding the interrelationship of cultural, organizational and psychological factors on the differences in the nature of organizational role stress and mechanisms used to deal with such stress by private officials on

the one hand, and public officials on the other may be made. The following hypotheses assume that 1) there are classes of organizational role stress which occur regardless of the particular cultural setting, 2) there are psychological traits which relate consistently to individual response to specific types of role conflict across cultures, 3) there are classes of organizational role conflict which are more common to certain cultures than others, and 4) there are within the same general cultural setting differences in the sources of role stress as well as in the psychological responses which occur among different classes of complex organizations. The two classes of complex organizations dealt with here are the private and the public bureaucracies.

The term role is defined in this paper as the set of expectations regarding the behavior and values of the incumbent of a social position. Such expectations may be held by others (role senders) or by the incumbent himself. The expectations of the incumbent, and the expectations of role senders may not be consistent or compatible with each other. Pressures consisting of inconsistent, incompatible, ambiguous, or excessive expectations upon the focal person are what are referred to as role stress, whose psychological consequence to the focal person is role strain.

Role stress is more inclusive than role conflict since role conflict does not include such other forms of stress as role overload and ambiguity. Role conflict refers to the presence of expectations, the fulfillment of one or more of which make difficult or impossible the fulfillment of the rest. When there is little time allowed the focal person to complete the requirements of an expectation or set of expectations, he experiences role overload.

Role ambiguity may stem from incomplete or poorly articulated instructions as to what a job consists of or how it should be done. It may also arise from role conflict especially when there are no explicit organizational guidelines as to which expectations to give priority to, and on what basis such priorities may be arrived at. A low level of feedback on the focal person's performance from the role senders consists another form of role ambiguity. In a sense, this type of ambiguity refers to a situation in which the expectations as to what is good and what is poor performance is not made. It applies as well to those situations in which the focal person is not able to determine the criteria of evaluation. The term focal person which has been used several times earlier is the person who is the incumbent of the role, the focal role, being analyzed.

- H1. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of the public official in that the former will emphasize achievement goals while the latter will emphasize security goals.
- H2. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of the public official in that the former will emphasize expertise as a desirable characteristic of workmates, while the latter will emphasize the need for workmates who are skilled in interpersonal relations.
- H3. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of the public official in that the former will more likely consider working as being a source of intrinsic satisfaction than will the latter.

Hypotheses 1 to 3 are based on the assumption that public organizations recruit members largely on the basis of the powerful connections of the applicants, demand very little member initiative and compliance, delegate authority restrictively and use arbitrary means to promote people within the organization. With these characteristics of their organization, the members internalize what they experience and expect that it is only realistic to emphasize security in this arbitrary world,

to make sure that one's workmates will be useful in beating the system at its own game of irrationality, and to expect little satisfaction from the performance of a job.

A twin assumption upon which Hypotheses 1 to 3 are based is that private organizations, in contrast with public ones, hire its members largely on the basis of their competence, demand individual initiative as well as compliance, delegate authority necessary for the job to be done, and use achievement criteria in determining the fate of the member in the organization. With incentives for achievement, rewards for accomplishment and overall responsiveness of the organization to the individual on his own merits, members of private organizations then tend to value achievement potentials of the job, to look for expertise which is crucial to get the job done well, and to expect that people find satisfaction in doing their job.

- H4. Role conflict arising from the inconsistency between the demands of clients and the rules of the organization will be more frequent in a public bureaucracy than in a private one.
- H5. Clients who have a primary<sup>16</sup> relationship with the focal person are more frequent sources of strain than other clients in a public bureaucracy compared to a private one.

In H4, it is asserted that role conflict of the type client vs. organizational demands will be more frequent in a public bureaucracy than in a private one because it is assumed that the clientele does have a particularistic orientation toward the public bureaucracy, and a universalistic orientation toward the private one. However, this does not mean that the extent of the stress experienced by the officials

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<sup>16</sup>The primary character of a relationship is measured on the following scale, listed from the most primary to the least primary: members of the nuclear family, relatives outside of the nuclear family, close friends, casual acquaintances, and strangers.

depends on the frequency of such incidences. As hypothesized in H5, the nature of the relationship between the client and the official makes a difference in what he experiences. Because the public organization is lax in its rule enforcement, and because of the nature of the extended family system in the Philippines, it is expected that the public official will feel a strong moral imperative to yield to the demands of his close kinsmen. Toward strangers, he will feel the need to apply universalistic criteria. The strangers in turn expect particularistic treatment, and will try to pressure the official in a variety of ways. On the other hand, the private official is more agonized when the client who has demands in conflict with that of the organization is a close relation because the cultural imperative to yield to kinship demands is counteracted by strong organizational sanctions against violation of rules. With strangers who most generally are oriented in a universalistic fashion to the private bureaucracy, the private official does not have moral obligations other than getting the job done as the organization defines it.

- H6. Role stress arising from demands of superiors contrary to organizational rules will be more frequent than stress derived from strict enforcement of such rules in a public bureaucracy compared to a private one.
- H6a. Role stress arising from strict enforcement of organizational rules will be more frequent than stress derived from demands of superiors contrary to such rules in a private bureaucracy compared to a public one.

The types of demands by superiors which are referred to in H6 and H6a are those expectations which may be judged by the focal person as being both procedurally incorrect and "morally reprehensible". These expectations belong to a category different from those expectations of superiors which are procedurally incorrect but can not arouse the focal



person's moral judgments. The latter type of expectations may even be adopted among the official policies and procedures of the organization at a later time.

There are several sources of difference between the public and private organizations in the extent of the audacity of superiors to ask their subordinates to perform tasks which are contrary to organizational rules. In the first place, there is a great deal of pressure on persons with positions of power in the public bureaucracy to do favors which require bending organizational rules for relatives, friends, and politicians as well. A number of these public officials are political proteges and are thus vulnerable to pressure to give special favors to these politicians. Secondly, there are inadequate checks within the public bureaucracy as to the extent to which the policies and the regulations designed to carry out these policies are in fact followed. Furthermore, even when public officials violate the rules of the organization and abuse their official power, the most likely punishment they would get is a public exposure of their "undesirable" activities. They may also be "censured" by their superiors. Occasionally, the public official suspected or shown by some investigation to be "corrupt" may be removed from office. There is very little chance that he would be prosecuted. It often appears that the removal of an official from public office is more of an attempt of the party in power to appease the general public rather than to improve public service.

The private bureaucracy—in which recruitment and promotions are less politically influenced, and toward which clients have high expectations of performance—receives client pressure of a different kind. It is not directed so much toward bending organizational rules but more

toward getting things done quickly. Also, there are enough institutional checks on member behavior, as well as certain sanctions (e.g., demotion, dismissal, legal prosecution) to discourage those who may be tempted to use their position for personal ends.

The emphasis on efficiency in the private bureaucracy puts pressure on superiors to get maximum performance out of their subordinates. They are likely to make sure that subordinates come on time and to report to work regularly, to discourage absenteeism, and to require a high level of output. This can engender frequent stress on the subordinates. The public bureaucracy is staffed largely on political considerations rather than on the basis of enhancing the quality of service or of the profitability of the organization. It cannot be expected to distress too many of its members with work overload or with demands of peak performance.

H7. In the private bureaucracy, the greater the status difference between the focal person and the role sender in the organization, the greater the role strain of the focal person in case of conflict between his expectations of what his job should be and the expectations of the role sender.

H7a. In a public bureaucracy, the more equal the role sender is to the focal person, the greater the experienced role strain is.

In a highly arbitrary system such as the Philippine public bureaucracy, which at the same time is highly centralized, the focal person can readily resolve conflict between unequal role senders in terms of who has the greater power. It is the predictable reaction in a situation where accountability to persons is stronger than accountability to the organization. When the conflict is between himself and an equal in power, the prevailing value for smooth interpersonal relationship in a particularistic setting becomes an important consideration. At the same time, since formal power difference does not exist, the focal person has to shoulder the burden of the outcome of his actions alone.

The official of the private bureaucracy is more torn between status considerations and what he believes must or can be done because he is accountable for the outcome of his actions a lot more than his counterpart in the public bureaucracy.

H8. In case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and that of the organization, the more primary the relationship between the focal person and the role sender, the less the strain experienced by the focal person in a public bureaucracy.

H8a. In the case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and that of the organization, the more primary the relationship between the focal person and the role sender, the greater the strain experienced by the focal person in the private bureaucracy.

Public officials are not totally unaware of, or callous toward organizational demands. They selectively follow and enforce such demands, however. With the ease by which the public official is able to follow his personal whims, he sees that his costs vis-a-vis his job are low, and his gains in terms of interpersonal relationships are high if he gives in to the expectations of the person he likes. The less affection he has toward the role sender, the more aware he becomes of organizational expectations. In other words, as the relevance of primary relationships recede into the background, the importance of organizational rules is heightened.

The relationship between degree of primariness of relationship and the extent of experienced role strain in case of conflict between organizational rules and role sender expectations is not expected to be a linear one. It is likely that when the role sender is actively disliked by the focal person, the latter may easily dismiss the former's expectations and thus experience no strain from having received such communication.

The private official who is less able to follow his personal whims

due to organizational controls is more strained by illegitimate expectations of close friends than by similar expectations of others toward whom he feels no affection. His interpersonal costs in a highly particularistic society is high if he refuses such expectations. Refusal of the good friend is likely to make the friend feel he has "lost face". However, the focal person's costs in terms of his job may at least equal if not exceed the interpersonal gains if he gives in. If he actively dislikes the role sender, it is expected that the private official could readily ignore or refuse the role sender's illegitimate expectations just as his counterpart in the public bureaucracy.

- H9. Role ambiguity from unclear evaluation of the focal person's performance by his superiors will be greater in intensity and frequency in a public bureaucracy than in a private one.
- H10. Role ambiguity arising from the indeterminacy of priority in the intraorganizational demands on the focal person will be more frequent in a private bureaucracy than in a public one.
- H11. Role conflict and ambiguity stemming from the crossing of authority lines will be less frequent in a private bureaucracy than in a public one.

Generally, it may be expected that public bureaucracies offer more areas of ambiguity from unclear expectations as to what an official should do and may do than private ones. The difference in the extent of ambiguity of this type between the two classes of organizations lies in the differences in the nature of "flexibility" within these organizations. Whereas the private bureaucracy carefully circumscribes the activities of each member while giving them some freedom in decision-making within certain guidelines, the public bureaucracy gives the public official much unofficial latitude by default, but officially restricts areas of decision-making. Furthermore, since the public bureaucracy is highly centralized in the fashion that the lower level members have

little control of what happens to them in their jobs, the public official is a lot more likely to have uncertainties as to what he should be doing, or what he can do, on the job. The private bureaucracy is in general less highly centralized, and the private official finds his job situation more controllable and predictable.

H9 deals specifically with role ambiguity arising from the fact that the focal person gets very little feedback from his superiors on the quality of his performance, and also on the implications of such performance to his future on the job. In a highly political climate generated by the patronage system in the public bureaucracy, compounded by the civil service protection and seniority system, the public official finds that his superiors are not compelled to evaluate him honestly and openly. He does not really have a good estimate of how much influence the nature of his performance has on his job prospects either. The official in the private bureaucracy by contrast gets constant feedback from his superiors who are held responsible for the performance of the group. He knows what the implications of his performance are to his promotion and salary increases because the organization uses the information to control member behavior.

Geared toward efficiency, the private bureaucracy is more likely to generate the specific type of role ambiguity described in H10. To get maximum output from the focal person, the superior may give him a workload such that he is overburdened. The urgency of most of these jobs, and the difficulty of completing one before another comes in mortifies the focal person who finds it difficult to know which job to sacrifice and which to give priority. The same type of uncertainty may not be expected of the officials of the public bureaucracy who are

in an organization which is overloaded with personnel and which demands little from its members.

The difference between the public and private bureaucracies asserted in H11 is based on the idea that there is more systematic delegation of authority in the latter than in the former. This delegation of authority in a systematic way enables the private bureaucracy to ensure accountability. The likelihood of encountering conflict-generating and ambiguity-creating expectations from superiors who have little knowledge of the focal person's responsibilities is high in the public bureaucracy. Any superior may claim "accountability" for and authority over the actions of the focal person and thus demand a variety of performances from him.

H12. In the private bureaucracy, there will be more strain from work overload than in the public bureaucracy.

As mentioned earlier, the orientation of the private bureaucracy toward efficiency leads superiors to try to get maximum performance out of its members; that is, to get maximum output with the least monetary cost to the organization by using as few personnel as possible to accomplish the job. Under this condition, the private official is likely to find his workload heavy and feel unjustly driven by his superiors. The same problem is not to be expected to be of great concern in the public bureaucracy which is not similarly oriented toward accomplishment.

H13. The public official is more likely to resolve role conflict in favor of those with whom he has strong primary relationship and in favor of those who have the most power over his prospects on the job than is the private official.

H13a. The private official is more likely to resolve role conflict in favor of organizational requirements and in favor of job requirements over considerations of power and primariness of relationship than is the public official.

- H14. In the public bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency on the part of the subordinates to pass responsibility for resolving conflict to the superior than in the private bureaucracy.
- H14a. In the private bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency for the focal persons to attempt to resolve the conflicts by themselves than will be the case in the public bureaucracy.

Hypotheses 11 to 12a are a follow-up of the assumptions involved in H5, 7 and 7a. While H5, 7 and 7a deal with the extent of role stress in different types of conflict situations as differentially experienced by public and private officials, H13 to 14a deal with the coping mechanisms that are available to the focal persons.

## RESEARCH LITERATURE

### Comparative Bureaucracy

Most studies of bureaucratic behavior in transitional societies lend support to the idea that particularism and the patronage system obstruct societal goal achievement and perpetuate the rigidity of the stratification system by reserving social benefits for the elite.<sup>17</sup> The contradiction between efficiency and the twin phenomena of particularism and patronage in bureaucratic behavior is a fundamental assumption in the present paper's treatment of the social-psychological effects of the interaction between cultural and organizational norms and values. Much of the literature supporting this antagonistic relationship between efficiency on the one hand, and particularism on the other has largely been on public bureaucracies of developing countries. It appears that when one takes the private enterprise into consideration, a different relationship between particularism

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<sup>17</sup>For the observation on the Philippines, see the following:

a) J. V. Abueva and R. P. de Guzman, eds., Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics, Manila: Bookmark, 1969.

b) O. D. Corpuz.

c) Current Problems in Philippine Public Administration, Institute of Public Administration Pub. No. 11, Manila: Univ. of the Phil., 1954. (Mimeo).

d) F. Heady, "The Philippine Administrative System—A Fusion of East and West", in Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration ed. by W. J. Siffin, Bloomington: Dept. of Govt., Indiana Univ., 1957, pp. 253-276.

e) E. O. Stene and others, Public Administration in the Philippines, Institute of Public Administration No. 2, Manila: Univ. of the Phil., 1955.



and efficiency emerges. The findings on this complex relationship are discussed here to show that the concept of particularism has been defined in many ways. Variations in the definition of particularism largely account for the differences in research results.

The following classes of organizational behavior are described in the literature as instances of particularism: 1) when rules are applied even though the criteria for the use of rules are not met, 2) when rules are not applied in situations which meet the criteria for application, 3) when rules are formulated to attain organizational goals in situations which are not covered by official rules, and 4) when personal criteria and organizational criteria are equally weighted in the application of rules. In the case of (1) and (2), the behavior is considered to be particularistic because the organizational member assigned the task of implementing the rules uses criteria personally important to him (e.g., kinship or friendship relations, prestige, monetary profitability of the actual decision for the organization member or for his family) instead of what is relevant to the successful performance of organizational tasks. The classes of particularistic behavior the present theory negatively relates to the level of bureaucratic efficiency are (1) and (2).

In the case of (3), the behavior is classified as particularistic because the organizational member uses a rule or rules specific to the situation which may not recur, or which may recur very infrequently so that a formalization of the practice does not become necessary. The last type of particularistic behavior qualifies because personally relevant criteria is used along with organizationally relevant criteria. Clearly, each of these types of "particularism" could have different

implications for organizational efficiency and profitability. The first two types appear to be most likely to undermine goal attainment, while the last two types are most compatible with bureaucratic ends.

One of the very few studies which claim compatibility between efficiency and particularism in the public bureaucracy is the one by Greenberg.<sup>18</sup> In an intensive study of the Secretaria de Recursos Hydraulicos (Ministry of Hydraulic Resources) of Mexico, he found that this segment of the governmental bureaucracy had the "expected features of formalism, role overlapping, personalism, patronage and corruption and institutionalized bureaucratic politics" to some degree. At the same time, he observed that such features were accompanied by a high level of efficiency. The informal relationship between the Ministry's procurement officer and the private suppliers allows rather than hampers the completion of projects.

That the Ministry is efficient in spite of these manifestations raises some serious questions for comparative public administration. Perhaps it is necessary to re-think the definition of effective administration in developing countries like Mexico. Are the merit system and complete honesty more important than the rapid completion of needed public works? The merit system and opposition to corruption are Western values; if the developing world can produce results, should not those results be the major criteria for effectiveness?<sup>19</sup>

The use of results as the criteria for measuring effectiveness, however, ignores the question of costs. Although personalism and patronage may not hamper goal attainment (which does not mean that such practices make goal attainment easier, or that they are superior as instruments of efficiency to the impersonal, formal practices in Western bureaucracies), it is very likely that the costs paid by the

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<sup>18</sup> M. H. Greenberg, Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study, Mass., Heath, 1970.

<sup>19</sup> Greenberg, p. 138.

society are higher than they would have been if more impersonal rules prevailed. Costs include both monetary costs and other costs which may not be directly calculated monetarily. These "other costs" may be the discouragement of people who have talent but who have little political connection or who have no relatives well-placed in the bureaucracy, the perpetuation of a stratification system whose benefits accrue to a few, and the constant preoccupation of officials in politicking, which diverts them from being sensitive to more generally felt needs.

The study of Benedict of two-family firms in East Africa indicates that, given the particularistic set of values and strong kinship networks in transitional societies, perhaps the organizational structure which takes advantage of such values and structures rather than neutralizes them can be effective for particular types of ventures, such as commerce, industry and finance.<sup>20</sup> Benedict qualifies that the family firm organization is more important in the early stages of the growth of the firm than in the later stages. The reasons he gave for placing importance on the family firm in economic development are 1) the family firm is better able to take risks in a developing and perhaps not very stable economy, 2) it can make investments in the training of personnel which can hardly be matched by private firms or by public sector agencies, 3) it is better able to raise capital, and 4) it provides continuity and social security seldom matched by large private or public enterprise.<sup>21</sup> The family firm commands loyalty, can assume trustworthiness of its members, is able to keep business secrets within

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<sup>20</sup>B. Benedict, "Family Firms and Economic Development," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring, 1968, pp. 1-19.

<sup>21</sup>Benedict, p. 2.

the firm, is assured that the expense of training its personnel (family members) will ultimately benefit the firm, can muster the capital resources of the kinship network at little or no interest, and provides solidarity and a sense of personal security to its members. These characteristics all add to the effectiveness of the family firm. Benedict implicitly assumes that the family firm will selectively recruit among the family members the most qualified for the position and will only recruit those who are needed to complete the job. This mode of recruitment not only ensures quality performance but also ensures that the family firm will not turn into a relief organization for unqualified relatives.<sup>22</sup> In the young family firm then, patronage and particularism within the kinship network are assets rather than liabilities.<sup>23</sup> Although Benedict's findings came from a sample of

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<sup>22</sup>Geertz, (Peddlers and Princes: Social Change and Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) Observed that family firms in Tabanan, a Balinese town, tended to be over-staffed and to be timid in reinvesting because of pressures from kinsmen and friends.

<sup>23</sup>Benedict recognizes that if a family firm is to grow, non-family members must be brought into it. He gave several reasons for this: "In the first place, sheer size means that there will not be enough family members to perform all the necessary tasks. As the firm spreads geographically, this problem becomes more acute. Secondly, the need for expertise and specialization of roles increases as the firm grows. The family cannot provide enough experts . . . , and outside technicians or other specialists must be employed. Thirdly, the need for the financing of expansion involves the firm in extra-familial credit relationships with banks and financing companies. These creditors, in a desire to protect their investments, will insist on certain patterns of business management and procedure which bring in outsiders. Fourthly, the firm becomes involved with many other firms as suppliers and customers; business arrangements will be entered into with such firms and may lead to a more impersonal organization of the family itself. Fifthly, as the firm becomes more successful, a number of family members may wish to pursue their career in politics, the professions, or other businesses and so are lost to the firm. Sixthly, over the course of generations, the transactional patterns between family members alter. Cousins are not as close as brothers, and even brothers in widely separated areas are less close than they were in the parental household. The original joint family breaks up, and new families evolve, bringing different sets of values and different transactional patterns." (Benedict, pp. 13-14).

only two family firms, they give enough indication that under certain conditions, patronage and particularism may not be inimical, but may even be useful in organizational goal attainment. Davis<sup>24</sup> in his study of Mexican enterprises, and Khalaf and Shwayri,<sup>25</sup> in their examination of Lebanese family firms also make similar observations.

Incidentally, family conflicts, whether they are connected with business matters or not, are likely to have more total effects on organizational behavior (because of the difficulty in keeping the problem between the specific family members involved) than similar conflicts between organizational personnel who do not belong to the same family. This qualifies, but does not negate, the general validity of the findings from the studies noted above.

Enterprise among the overseas Chinese, particularly those in Southeast Asia, evidences both the facilitating and limiting characteristics of familism in the organization. Geertz indicates that Balinese natives are awed by the austerity and efficiency of the Chinese business firms in Tabanan.<sup>26</sup> These firms are largely staffed by family members. Among the immigrant vegetable farmers in Hong Kong's New Territories, Topley observes that ancestral associations are a source of financing business activities.<sup>27</sup> Lineage members have first

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<sup>24</sup>S. M. Davis, Social Change in the Mexican Enterprise, Ph. D. Thesis, Washington University, 1967.

<sup>25</sup>S. Khalaf and E. Shwayri, "Family Firms and Industrial Development: The Lebanese Case," Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 15, 1966, pp. 59-69. Khalaf and Shwayri observe that Lebanese firms "have not yet reached the size as to render the employment of outsiders in managerial positions a question of real meaning." (p. 62).

<sup>26</sup>Geertz, p. 123.

<sup>27</sup>M. Topley, "Capital, Saving and Credit among Indigenous Rice Farmers and Immigrant Vegetable Farmers in Hong Kong's New Territories," Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies, ed. by R. Fifth and B. S. Yamey, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964, pp. 157-186.

claim on the funds of the association, and sometimes, persons who are quite often assumed to be kinsmen because of common family name are not required to pay interest on the loans. T'ien found similar clan-ship associations among the Chinese in Sarawak of the late 1940's.<sup>28</sup> Clansmen helped each other to immigrate from the homeland to Sarawak, provided job apprenticeship-and of course ultimately a genuine occupation-in addition to helping each other put up capital for business ventures.

Willmott notes some features of the overseas Chinese enterprise which may be largely attributed to familial ownership, control and participation.<sup>29</sup> One of these features is the small size of the great majority of the enterprises. In Semarang, the Indonesian town which Willmott studied in the mid-1950's, most of the firms were so small that the members of one family completely staffed the business. Among the middle-sized and large concerns, diversity of lines of business was a primary characteristic. There seemed to be a prevailing tendency to stop the expansion of one line at a certain point, in order to enter new fields. Willmott speculated that this diversity may be motivated by at least two factors in addition to safeguarding the interests of the firm against adversities which may be suffered by a single line of business. The first is the desire to keep administrative units small so the family can keep close control over each line. The other factor is that such an administrative arrangement spreads family members within the organization with the least amount of subservience to one

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<sup>28</sup> Ju-k'and T'ien, The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure, London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1953.

<sup>29</sup> D. E. Willmott, The Chinese in Semarang: A Changing Minority Community in Indonesia, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960.

another. This structural arrangement can thus serve to keep family friction at a minimum.

The structural response of the Chinese enterprise in Indonesia to the possible interpersonal consequences of a family firm has not helped the stability of a lot of these enterprises. Most of them do not last more than three generations. There are many reasons for this instability, of course. Not the least is the peculiarities of the family owned and controlled enterprise. The assets of the enterprise are periodically divided among many heirs which means that the heirs have to be convinced to leave all, or most of, their capital in the business. If the heirs do not inherit the desire to continue the enterprise, the enterprise dies with the founder. The very successful firms in Indonesia have had to recognize from the beginning of the venture the importance of skill beyond family connections.

Another study which cautions the student of comparative bureaucracy in interpreting the many studies which show the opposition between particularism and organizational efficiency is the one by Katz and Eisenstadt on the behavior of Israeli officials toward new immigrants.<sup>30</sup> Katz and Eisenstadt observed how Israeli immigration officials went out of their way and assumed the "teacher role" toward new immigrants who could not fathom bureaucratic requirements. What emerges from their analysis are 1) that particularism may be specifically geared toward goal attainment, and 2) that other studies which show opposition between particularism and efficiency may be based upon limited and biased instances of particularistic behavior. Alternatively,

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<sup>30</sup> E. Katz, and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants", Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, June 1960, pp. 253-271.

their analysis also seems to indicate that the notion of universalism in organizational behavior has been too narrowly defined and used, and has become synonymous to rigidity in the application of rules.

In effect, overbureaucratization and debureaucratization represent a disturbance in the relationship between an organization and its environment that is not envisioned by the classical model of bureaucracy. This model envisages the roles of both bureaucrat and client as segregated to some extent from their other roles; their roles are "specific" to the interaction setting and in this bureaucratic setting it is irrelevant, for example, that both bureaucrat and client belong to the same political club. However, even in an ideal-type bureaucracy a role is not completely independent of other roles; some outside roles clearly may be, or must be, considered. If an old man, obviously unable to wait his turn in a long queue, is given special attention by a clerk, this is not a case of an irrelevant role relationship being allowed incorrectly to impinge on the bureaucrat-client relationship. In general, the classic model of bureaucracy requires only that the bureaucratic organization not be directly dependent on external forces for its manpower, its resources, or its motivation for carrying out its organizational tasks.<sup>31</sup>

The idea that particularism sometimes may be specifically geared toward organizational goal attainment, and the idea that the universalistic ethic has been mistakenly defined in terms of rigidity in the application of organizational rules are not disputed here. What is being asserted is that the greater allegiance of members to the particularistic ethic over the universalistic one is likely to be prejudicial to organizational efficiency.

#### Psychological Characteristics and Organizational Socialization

Every social organization develops norms to shape member behavior in accordance with its values, and in the direction which will ensure the attainment of its goals. There are, of course, situations in which the rules get divorced from the goals, or even cases in which

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<sup>31</sup>Katz and Eisenstadt, p. 256.



the assumed connection between the rules and the goals is erroneous. Nevertheless, the fact remains that social organizations make explicit efforts at socializing members to the organizational sub-culture. Merton poses the challenge of understanding the interaction between bureaucracy and personality in the following questions:<sup>32</sup>

To what extent are particular personality types selected and modified by the various bureaucracies (private enterprise, public service, the quasi-legal political machine, religious orders)? Inasmuch as ascendancy and submission are held to be traits of personality, despite their variability in different stimulus situations, do bureaucracies select personalities of particularly submissive or ascendant tendencies? And since various studies have shown that these traits can be modified, does participation in bureaucratic office tend to increase ascendant tendencies? Do various systems of recruitment (e.g., patronage, open competition involving specialized knowledge or general mental capacity, practical experience) select different personality types?<sup>33</sup>

Several researchers have accepted this challenge, particularly in the area of recruitment to the bureaucracy.<sup>34</sup> Of greater concern to the present study, however, are research efforts which deal with the modification of member behavior within the organization. Argyris has been constantly occupied with the pathological effects of membership

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<sup>32</sup>R. K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," Social Forces, vol. 23, 1945, pp. 405-415. (Also in Organizations and Human Behavior, ed. by G. D. Bell, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 199-207.

<sup>33</sup>Merton, p. 205.

<sup>34</sup>Among recent studies of recruitment to bureaucracy are:  
 a) R. Bendix, Higher Civil Servants in American Society, Boulder: Univ. of Colorado Press, 1949.  
 b) R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, London: Routledge and Paul, 1955.  
 c) D. Marvick, Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting, Ann Arbor: Univ. of Mich. Press, 1954.  
 d) W. L. Warner, and J. C. Abegglen, Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1955.

in complex organizations to individual "actualization" or self-fulfillment.<sup>35</sup> His studies look at the effects of the organizational climate both on the response of the individual to organizational demands, and also on the individual's behavior not directly related to his role in the organization. Argyris assumes that complex organizations coerce individuals to become dependent, subordinate and submissive. He further assumes that the conditions of dependence, subordination and submissiveness are frustrating to the healthy human being in the American culture. Individual adaptation to these frustrations occurs by one or a combination of the following activities: 1) leaving the situation, as through absenteeism and turnover, 2) climbing the organizational ladder, 3) becoming defensive, as through daydreaming, aggressiveness, nurturing grievances, regression, projecting feelings of low self worth, 4) becoming apathetic toward the organization and its formal goals, 5) creating informal groups to sanction the defense reaction in (3) and (4), 6) formalizing the informal groups in the form of trade unions, 7) de-emphasizing in his own mind the importance of self-growth and creativity and emphasizing the importance of money and other material rewards, and 8) accepting any or all of these adaptive ways as being proper for their lives outside the organization.<sup>36</sup> In other words, the poor creature forced into a work environment in a complex organization which is unhealthy to the personality does have a variety of mechanisms to cope with his conflict

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<sup>35</sup>For example see his "Individual Actualization in Complex Organizations", Mental Hygiene, vol. 44, no. 2, April 1960, pp. 226-277; Human Problems in a Large Hospital, New Haven: Labor and Management Center, Yale Univ., 1956; and Personality and Organizations, New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

<sup>36</sup>C. Argyris, "Individual Actualization in Complex Organizations." Mental Hygiene, vol. 44, no. 2, April 1960, pp. 226-277 (p. 227).

situation.

Argyris tested his theory in a research project conducted in a manufacturing plant.<sup>37</sup> He compared the "mental health" of high-skilled and low-skilled employees. The hypothesis was that since high-skilled employees tend to have greater opportunities to express themselves in their work than do low-skilled employees, the former group will behave in more mature ways than the latter.<sup>38</sup> Some data showed that there were in fact differences between the sense of self-worth, need for affiliation, job attitudes and extra-organizational participation in the predicted direction. On the other hand, there was also data which showed no differences in the two groups in the very same dimensions (need for affiliation and job attitudes) they were supposed to differ in significantly.

What is interesting in Argyris' attempts to look at the human pathologies brought about by membership in complex organization is that he notes that one's position in the organizational structure also easily influences the nature of coping to the mentally unhealthy organizational conditions. His data in the study mentioned previously do not support his contention, but the ideas upon which the research is based are worth looking into.

Feldman and Moore emphasize the importance of labor force commitment for continuous economic development.<sup>39</sup> This commitment "involves

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<sup>37</sup>Argyris, pp. 226-277.

<sup>38</sup>High-skilled employees should express less indifference, apathy, dependence and submissiveness than low-skilled employees. Also, the high-skilled employees should express greater sense of self-worth, self-satisfaction and develop more lasting friendships than the low-skilled employees.

<sup>39</sup>W. E. Moore and A. S. Feldman, eds., Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, Social Science Research Council, 1960.

both performance and acceptance of the behaviors appropriate to an industrial way of life". It therefore involves a unique orientation to the world of work, and the internalization of organizational norms which Argyris considered unhealthy to individual actualization. Commitment, according to Feldman and Moore, is of practical consequence to specific organizations as well as to an entire economy because the committed worker needs less supervision, and tends to perform in excess of the minimal organizational requirements. The behavior of the committed worker is also more predictable than the worker who is largely driven by external sanctions. In crisis situations, the committed worker is more likely than the uncommitted person to stick it out with the organization.

A big problem in the area of developing commitment is the set of values and habit patterns derived from the various socializing agencies of society which are inconsistent with the values and behavior patterns needed in the industrial world. Gregory's Puerto Rican study cautions that the industrial organization itself occasionally aggravates the difficulties in developing a high level of aspirations and sense of commitment among its members.<sup>40</sup> In this study, Gregory found that there are at least two practices which tend to depress workers' aspirations in some Puerto Rican industrial firms: the sharp limitation of advancement opportunities within the organization by filling the more skilled positions with new recruits, and the informal wage structure which made little distinction between the content of different jobs.

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<sup>40</sup>P. Gregory, "The Labor Market in Puerto Rico," in Feldman and Moore, pp. 136-172.

When large-scale industry comes to a society without much experience with smaller-scale operations, the organization largely has to depend upon the use of external sanctions to get the worker to do the job. To industrial workers with repetitious jobs, who see little distinction between his and others modes of performance, "achievement" may have little relevance. Rewards and security may be more likely to be their concern as they participate within the organization. The industrial organization in the newly developing area is more likely to successfully solicit acceptable behavior patterns rather than the desired job commitment among the workers in the production line.

Hammond<sup>41</sup> and Dungo<sup>42</sup> point to the complexity of the effects of organizational rewards in different sectors of the organization. At the risk of oversimplifying the nature of the work conditions in the Niger Project which Hammond looks at, it may be said that the attempts of management to induce greater production and deeper commitment among the laborers through cash incentives has produced the very opposite effect of discouraging commitment and speeding the departure of the laborers for their home towns.

In Dungo's study, the fringe benefits the laborers of the Philippine sugar refinery derive from the company, and the company's continuing effort to assure that the factory community is a self-contained one (with schools, a hospital, shopping facilities, banking and financing facilities) have assured the company of stable presence and performance by the workers. Dungo does not have any data on the level of satisfaction of the laborers toward their jobs, but she was

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<sup>41</sup>P. B. Hammond, "Management in Economic Transition", in Feldman and Moore, pp. 109-122.

<sup>42</sup>N. G. Dungo, A Southern Industrial Complex, Diliman, Q. C.: Community Development Research Council, Univ. of the Philippines, 1969.

indications that the laborer satisfaction with management-labor relations is at least as high as that of the upper level members of the organization.

Kilby has displaced some of the myths regarding the depressing effects of African work attitudes on productivity.<sup>43</sup> The results of his study of three organizations in Nigeria--the Nigerian Ports Authority, a privately owned soap factory and a rubber processing firm--are revealing of the prejudice with which observers have looked at the African scene. It now appears that where work conditions are good and wages are high, labor commitment is also high. This level of commitment is manifested in low rates of absenteeism and turnover as well as in high productivity. Aronson buttresses Kilby's findings in a study of Jamaican bauxite workers.<sup>44</sup>

The study by Andrews of two business firms in Mexico comes closest to the concerns of this paper.<sup>45</sup> Andrews suggests that the job orientation of an organization's members depends not only on the orientation that the member brings with him upon entry, but also on the nature of the expectations of the organization itself. When the individual's job orientation is congruent with that of the organization's own orientation, the individual will advance (as measured by status, promotions and raises) rapidly.

Andrews selected two firms with the help of an American industrial

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<sup>43</sup>P. Kilby, "African Labor Reconsidered." Economic Journal, June 1961, pp. 273-291.

<sup>44</sup>R. L. Aronson, "Labour Commitment Among Jamaican Bauxite Workers: A Case Study," Social and Economic Studies, June 1961, pp. 156-182.

<sup>45</sup>J. D. Andrews, "The Achievement Motive and Advancement in Two Types of Organizations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 6, no. 2, 1967, pp. 163-168.

psychologist. Firm A was judged to be highly achievement oriented, and Firm B was considered strongly oriented toward power relationships. Firm A was apparently a successful manufacturing company and an American subsidiary. Most of its employees were Mexican except for the president and a few others who were American. It was clear from the policies and practices of the firm that talent and effort were rewarded. This achievement orientation of the firm encouraged many employees to do their best in their jobs. Firm B was an all-Mexican company. The report does not state the class of business Firm B was in, but it does state that all was not well with the company. Expectations were arbitrary, and so was the deliverance of sanctions. This arbitrariness, coupled with a peculiar sort of paternalism gave rise to insecurity, anxiety, and a concern for hanging on to one's job rather than doing it well.<sup>46</sup>

The subjects from each firm were all Mexican executives. Data on the nAchievement and nPower of the subjects were derived from content analysis of three TAT pictures. The variable of individual success or advancement in the firm was measured by an estimate of job-status level at the time of the study and by the number of promotions and raises received in the four years prior to the time of the study.

As predicted, the data shows a significant positive relationship between motive strength and the measures of success. Correlations are

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<sup>46</sup> Andrews noted that the head of Firm B considered all employees, good or bad, as the responsibility of the company. There was also a reluctance in this company to give criticism, albeit constructive or to fire an incompetent person; yet, there was no hesitation in humiliating an executive in a meeting.

significantly positive between nAchievement and all the measures of success in Firm A, and between nPower and all measures of success in Firm B. What strongly underscores the differences between these two firms is the finding that in three of five cases, the nondominant motive is negatively correlated with measures of success.<sup>47</sup>

Andrews interprets his findings to mean that although nAchievement is important for business activity, business is not always achievement-oriented nor is it attractive exclusively to high nAchievement individuals.

#### Role Stress in the Organizational Setting

The most extensive study of the nature of stress in organizations was conducted by the Survey Research Center and the Research for Group Dynamics of the University of Michigan. Part of the findings of the research project is reported by R. L. Kahn and others in Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New York: Wiley, 1964).

The researchers developed a paired research design for the study of role conflict and ambiguity: 1) a design which involved an intensive study of 53 focal persons and 381 role senders, and 2) a national survey in which each of 725 respondents was treated as a focal person. In the intensive study, all the seven panels of variables stipulated that the factors involved in the theoretical model of the adjustment to role conflict and ambiguity (Figure 1, p. 69) were measured. Data were obtained separately from each focal person and each role sender. Data about the organizations in which they were located were independently obtained from official records and other sources. This study

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<sup>47</sup>The nondominant motive was achievement for Firm B and power for Firm A.






Figure 1

A Theoretical Model of Factors Involved in the Adjustment to Role Conflict and Ambiguity. (Kahn and others, p. 30).




Figure 2

Partial Model of Factors Involved in Role Conflict. (Kahn and others, p. 70).

was followed by and matched to a national survey in which the major measures were repeated, except that each respondent served as data source for himself as a focal person and as informant about the behavior of his role senders and the characteristics of his organization.

The origins and consequences of role conflict are summarized in Figure 2 (p. 69). Contradictory role expectations (Box I) give rise to opposing role pressures (role conflicts) which generally have the following effects on the emotional experience (Box III) of the focal person: intensified internal conflicts, increased tension associated with the job and its various components, and decreased confidence in superiors and in the organization as a whole. The strain experienced by those in conflict situations leads to various coping responses--social and psychological withdrawal (reduction in communication and attributed influence) among them. The presence of conflict in one's role tends to undermine relations with one's role senders, to produce weakened bonds of trust, respect, and attraction (Arrow 9).

Most of the conflict mentioned by the respondents involved persons or groups outside the organization. Second most frequently mentioned were conflicts involving superiors. Inter-role conflicts, such as between the work role and the familial role came next. Role overload and conflicts between the demands of the role and such personal properties as needs, values, and abilities were also experienced by the respondents.

The findings by Kahn and others which are relevant to the present study are summarized in Appendix A.

Kahn and others believe that the individual is limited in his mode of resolving role conflict by his personality characteristics.

In other words, one can expect individuals to exhibit certain consistencies in coping style. It is to other theorists, however, that we have to turn so that we may have an idea of what personality characteristics may influence a focal person's decision of whom to yield to when faced with conflicting expectations.

Gross, Mason and McEachern offer a scheme to predict the choice an individual will make when faced with two conflicting expectations.<sup>48</sup> They assume that the focal person will judge an expectation as to whether it is legitimate or illegitimate, and as to whether strong negative sanctions will be applied for nonconformity or not. Furthermore, they assume that an individual has predispositions to give primacy to one or another of these characteristics of the expectations when faced with role conflict. There are persons who are oriented toward the legitimacy aspect, that is, who emphasize the right of others to hold the expectations role senders communicate to him, and at the same time consider the sanctions that may follow nonconformity of secondary importance. Persons with this orientation are described as having a moral orientation to expectations. Those who give priority to sanctions over the legitimacy dimension of expectations are characterized as having an expedient orientation. A third class of persons are those who do not differentially weight the legitimacy and sanction dimensions, but instead act in accordance with what they perceive is the "net balance" of the two. This third class of persons are those who have a moral-expedient orientation. Any given focal person has four alternative behaviors toward two conflicting expectations,

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<sup>48</sup>N. Gross, W. S. Mason, and A. W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis, N. Y.: Wiley, 1958.

which we will call expectation A and expectation B. He may 1) conform to expectation A, 2) conform to expectation B, 3) perform some compromise behavior which represents an attempt to conform in part to both expectations, or 4) attempt to avoid conforming to either of the expectations. His decision depends on his perception of the legitimacy and sanction dimensions of each expectation, and on his orientation to these dimensions.

A test of the above theory of role conflict resolution was done by Gross, Mason and McEachern.<sup>49</sup> One hundred and five school superintendents were classified according to their orientation.<sup>50</sup> Despite the seemingly precarious basis upon which the orientation of superintendents was determined, the theory predicted accurately the behavior chosen by the respondents in the four conflict situations presented to them. The model provided 91% correct predictions.

The literature reviewed above both qualifies and lends empirical support to the theory set forth above. Some conclusions may be drawn from the research literature discussed. First, there are situations when particularistic norms and behavior are useful in the attainment of organizational goals (Greenberg, 1970; Benedict, 1968; Davis, 1967; Khalif and Shwayri, 1966; Katz and Eisenstadt, 1960). In transitional

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<sup>49</sup>Gross, Mason and McEachern.

<sup>50</sup>Each superintendent was asked to respond to a Superintendent Performance Instrument. The instrument contained 37 items, each of which described a behavior which may be required of the superintendent as the administrator of the public schools. For each item the possible responses were: "absolutely must", "preferably should", "may or may not", "preferably should not", and "absolutely must not". The person who typically responded "may or may not" was classified as having expedient orientation to expectations. One whose responses were mainly "absolutely must" or "absolutely must not" was considered as having a moral orientation. When the person showed neither of the previously mentioned pattern of responses, he was described as moral-expedient.

societies, impersonal sources of capital are limited, demand high security, and impose high interest rates. Pooling the resources of one's kin is a sure way of raising capital. The use of these resources obligates the entrepreneur to patronize his relatives' business, but relatives usually give liberal credit terms and charge little interest. Another obligation the entrepreneur incurs is to provide employment for his kin. If the society's technical knowledge is held by a few, the entrepreneur may obtain needed technical expertise by employing his relatives, so the obligation may not be deleterious to his organization. At least initially, particularistic norms and behavior can help the family firm. Particularistic treatment within the organization, in the early states of its development, also eases the impact on the employees of the kind of regularity and predictability required by formal participation in the organization. In the long run, however, the pervasiveness of the patronage system in the management of the organization is costly and hampers the achievement of the ends for which the organization formally stands (Andrews, 1967; Corpuz, 1960; Geertz, 1963; Heady, 1957; Jacobini and others, 1956; Stene and others, 1955).

Second, within the same society, complex organizations may have different criteria for what is good performance (Andrews, 1967). The organization may reward its members mainly for their contribution to efficiency and profitability. Alternatively, it may give promotions for the ability to satisfy the power needs and to allay the anxieties of the individuals in the upper rungs of the power hierarchy. The use of sanctions is a powerful means of socializing members toward the orientation of the organization. Achievement-oriented organizations

are able to attain their formal goals more totally than power-oriented ones.

Third, an organization may hasten or impede the development of achievement orientation among its workers depending on the worker's location in the organization (Argyris, 1960; Gregory, 1960), on how the organization utilizes the values of the larger culture (Dungo, 1969; Hammond, 1960), and on the reward structure and conditions of work (Aronson, 1961; Kilby, 1961).

The fourth and last conclusion we will draw is that organizational norms and structure, together with the nature of the job orientation of the organization's members and the character of their interpersonal relations affect the nature and consequences of role conflict (Kahn and others, 1964). Unfortunately, there is no direct data to show that clients become socialized to the norms of the organization such that even within the same culture, different organizations may experience different demands with respect to particularistic treatment from their clients. By definition, when clients' demands on the focal person are contrary to the rules of the organization, the situation is one of role conflict. It is one of the purposes of the present study to shed light on the effects of the interaction between client demands and the rules of the organization on the character of role conflict that the members experience, and on the coping mechanisms they use.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the ideas contained in the foregoing theory, two large Philippine organizations were chosen as the source of respondents for the study. The two were selected because of similarity of function and age. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), established in 1939, is a government corporation. The Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife), formally founded in 1947, is the largest privately owned insurance company in the Philippines, and is owned by U. S. citizens.<sup>51</sup> All employees of GSIS are Filipino. Philamlife employees are also mostly Filipino, but the chairman of the board, and 6 of the 17 top executives are American. The company president is a Filipino. Both organizations have their main office in Manila, and have branch offices all over the country.

GSIS has a monopoly on the sale of life insurance to government employees in that all regularly-appointed employees must purchase life insurance and retirement benefits from it. Employees appointed on a temporary basis and elective officials may opt to be covered by GSIS insurance too. Some government employees do take additional coverage from private companies. Philamlife itself has an institutional insurance plan which is offered to public school teachers and members of the Philippine army. An advantage that GSIS membership has over

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<sup>51</sup>The United States Insurance Co. of New York which owned Philamlife did business directly through its Manila sales office prior to 1947. Presently, Philamlife is owned by C. V. Starr and Co., Inc. (Delaware).

being insured with private companies is that one can secure personal and real estate loans at much lower interest rates than those charged by financial institutions.

The respondents were selected to ensure comparable organizational status and function in the two organizations. Organizational charts and the description of the functions of the various offices were examined for this purpose. If no written description of the functions of the office was available, the department head had to be interviewed. After the initial decision on which departments to draw respondents from, all available job descriptions for the positions in these departments were obtained. It was then realized that comparability at the position level was neither possible nor necessary.<sup>52</sup> It was deemed sufficient that at a functional level, the departments selected in Philamlife taken together performed most of the functions of the departments selected in GSIS.

In Philamlife, the following departments were chosen: Salary Savings, Investment, Policyholders and Policy Issue. Salary Savings sold group insurance plans to institutions, and took care of all the processes involved in servicing these group plans. The Investment department evaluated and administered real estate and collateral loans. It purchased stocks and bonds as part of the company's investment plan, and recorded dividends, gains, and losses from such investments. Sale and rental of the real estate property of the company, as well as collection of rent and installment payments were also among Investment's functions.

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<sup>52</sup>The difference in size between the two organizations, for example, partially accounts for a difference in the division of functions. GSIS had 3062 employees while Philamlife had 1129 as of June 1970.



Policy loans were handled by the Policyholders department. This department evaluated policy loan reinstatements and policy loan requests, released loans to policyholders, and provided assistance to policyholders and agents. The employees designated as "consultants" in this office helped settle complaints of policyholders and agents, and worked to keep the termination of policy contracts to a minimum.

Policy Issue prepared policy contracts, computed premiums and sent out payment due notices to new policyholders.

In GSIS, the following departments were chosen: Real Estate, Commercial and Industrial Loans, Policy and Salary Loans, and Production. The Real Estate department evaluated and processed real estate mortgage loan applications from members of GSIS (elected officials of the Philippine government, current and retired government employees). Commercial and industrial loans were handled by the Commercial and Industrial Loans Investment department. Among the functions of this department were the evaluation of the different aspects of equity and debt financing projects of GSIS, appraisal of collaterals, and checking the credit standing and paying capacity of applicants for commercial and industrial loans. Policy and salary loan investments of GSIS were administered by Policy and Salary Loans which evaluated loan applications, and took charge of billing, collecting and recording these accounts. The preparation and issuance of mortgage redemption insurance, optional policies and reinsurance of persons considered to be high risks took place in Production, which also controlled activities pertaining to life and retirement premium accounts.

One notable difference in the composition of positions between the two organizations is that in Philamlife there were specific positions designated to advise clients and agents and help solve their grievances in each of the four departments mentioned previously. GSIS had no such liaison positions as such in the departments from which our sample was obtained.<sup>53</sup> Another difference is that since credit investigation and assessment of collaterals offered in loan applications were handled by another company (a finance company) for Philamlife, there were no credit investigators and appraisers in the departments studied. GSIS on the other hand, had at least 96 credit investigators and appraisers as of June 1970. These are positions which involve a high level of client contact.

A questionnaire (see Appendix B ) was drawn up on the basis of the interview schedule used by Kahn and others.<sup>54</sup> The questionnaire consisted of both forced-choice and open-ended questions designed to get information on the following areas: a) sources of role definition, b) sources of role stress, c) frequency and extent of experienced stress, d) mechanisms used or available to cope with various types of role stress, e) effectiveness of various coping mechanisms, f) nature of interpersonal relations between the focal person and his role senders, g) nature of the power available to the role senders to make focal persons comply to their expectations, h) effectiveness

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<sup>53</sup> Both organizations had public relations offices. Philamlife's dealt mainly with publicity, advertising and promotions. The one for GSIS also performed these functions. In addition, the Member's Assistance Information Department, its public relations office, was also officially assigned the task of servicing particular client needs and grievances.

<sup>54</sup> Kahn and others, pp. 415-454.

of various mechanisms for compliance, i) consequences of role stress, j) organizational position of the focal person's role senders, k) types of information on his job performance that focal person felt may justifiably be withheld from his supervisors, l) type of normative orientation, m) job orientation, n) evaluation of superiors' role performance, o) job promotion, and p) length of employment in the organization, occupancy of present job. The empirical data on our theory are derived largely from the perceptual reports of the focal person.

#### The Sample

As mentioned earlier, the respondents of this study were chosen so that those from the public bureaucracy (GSIS) would have similar functions and organizational positions as those in the private bureaucracy (Philamlife). The positions were all white-collar. The number of respondents in each organizational status is approximately as follows:

	GSIS	Philamlife
Top Management	2	0
Middle Management	7	8
Second level supervisor	26	8
First level supervisor	13	13
Non-supervisory personnel	14	39
Total	62	68

Most of the respondents from GSIS were female (40 females and 22 males), while the reverse was true with Philamlife (7 females and 61 males). The difference in the sex composition of the respondents from the two organizations reflects differences in hiring practices, as well as differences in allotment of jobs to the sexes. According to a reliable

source within GSIS, local union management was quite powerful, male-dominated, and eager to hire the more-or-less politically passive females into the organization to retain the supremacy of the union. As a result, within the past 10 years, more females (most of whom were former public school teachers) were hired by GSIS. On the other hand, a reliable source in Philamlife said that the official personnel policy gave preference to males, except for the positions of typist and secretary, where males and females were equally qualified.

Ascertaining the names of the personnel of the departments in GSIS turned out to be trickier than the same task in Philamlife. In Philamlife the Personnel department had the complete list of personnel as well as their accurate job titles. GSIS was not so orderly in this matter. In GSIS, the official list used for budgetary purposes had the names of personnel under the departments to which they were "officially" assigned. The "official" job titles were also indicated. However, at the bottom of the page of each list were numerous qualifications as to where the individuals listed were "actually" working. As it became evident that the task of sorting out who was where was going to be time-consuming, it was decided that each department head be approached for a list of subordinates. The department heads were quite cooperative, especially since they were presented with a written permission from the Personnel Manager of GSIS stating that the research may be conducted in the organization. Furthermore, the influence of close kinsmen and friends of the researcher were also utilized in getting their help.

The list provided by the department managers bore little semblance to the list obtained from the Personnel department. The names of the

employees, as well as of their job titles (internally called "working titles") were largely different. Apparently, a number of employees of GSIS were appointed to positions for which they were not qualified but which carried a bigger salary than the actual positions to which they were assigned. For example, a person who was actually doing a typist's job was in the official personnel list as a "technical aide". As a technical aide, he was entitled to a bigger salary than that of a typist. One wonders if the System could keep track of its employees with dual assignments. Obviously, the dual assignment of titles to personnel is part of the official workings of the organization. The organization officially condones the practice of "padding" positions of individuals, which in turn helps generate rumors that there are individuals on the personnel list who only appear to collect their salary, who put out no work for the System.

It is from the personnel list provided by the department managers that the GSIS sample was finally drawn. The original intent was to use all the members of the selected departments as respondents. However, this turned out to be impossible. In the first place, the rate of absenteeism was quite high, and a number of people were on leave for extended periods of time. Secondly, a number of the employees had jobs which took them outside of the office building for most of the day. These employees were mostly male, and most of them were not available to answer the questionnaire, or even to take the time to listen to an explanation of what the questionnaire was all about. Lastly, a part of the potential respondents said they did not have time to do it or registered some fear that the questionnaire may be used against them. What the researcher attempted to do then was

to convince the largest possible number, in as many positions as possible, that it was worth their while to fill out the questionnaire, and that the results would be strictly confidential.

In Philamlife, the sheer bulk of the work of the employees made it difficult to even get a chance to approach them. This was particularly true of those who had the position of "consultant". Though we were able to give each of four of them a copy of the questionnaire, no one turned his questionnaire in. The personnel manager of Philamlife only provided an oral permission to distribute the questionnaire during office hours. We deliberately withheld the information that oral permission was officially given us, except when it seemed necessary to convince the department managers that it was "officially safe" for them to let us distribute questionnaires and talk to their employees. Nevertheless, a number of the employees still balked when we approached them for fear that the results of the study may "leak" to management.

Interestingly, there were quite a few Philamlife employees who held jobs other than their full-time job in this company. This was not at all true of the employees of the departments in GSIS used in this study. Also, a number of the employees of Philamlife went to night school, and the working students' ages ranged from approximately 18 to 45. Most of these working students dreamed of being "their own boss" through the private practice of law and accounting. The working students and most of those with extra jobs eliminated themselves from the sample for they said they just did not have the time to complete the questionnaire. Just as in GSIS, an effort was made to convince as many Philamlife employees as possible to complete the questionnaire,

and to ensure that the sample represented a wide distribution of positions within the departments studied.

Employees who had worked less than a year with the organization were eliminated from the sample because they were expected to experience an unusually high level of role ambiguity and an extraordinarily low level of role conflict because of sheer ignorance of roles and procedures on the job. Furthermore, the length of stay on the job of the selected respondents in both companies ranged from one year to almost 30 years. This range was wide enough.

#### The Sample and the Process of Generalization

The primary focus of this paper is the development of theory. In this exploratory study, intense efforts were made to have a sample representing an extensive range of positions in terms of organizational hierarchy and function. No attempt was made to have a wide variety of large bureaucracies represented. Since no data on comparative organizational stress in developing societies has been reported to date, it was deemed necessary to cover all of the forms of stress dealt with in the present theory. The findings provide general indications as to the degree of adequacy of the theory, as well as the directions in which the theory may be developed.

The fact that the sample is small, and non-randomly selected to include a broad range of roles and interaction possibilities, limits the possibility of generalizing the results of this study. The utility of the present data in making generalizations may be enhanced by defining the unit of generalization as closely as possible to the population from which the sample was drawn. On one level, the

population is that of organizations from which the two bureaucracies were selected. It is the population of complex organizations with 100 or more employees, engaged in commercial and service activities in the Philippines. On another level, the population is that of white collar bureaucrats from complex organizations with 100 or more employees engaged in commercial and service activities in the Philippines. The theory itself covers a wider range of bureaucracies and societies, as indicated in the statement of boundary conditions (pp. 43-46).

#### Research Procedure

The initial questionnaire was reviewed by a Filipino graduate student in sociology at the University of the Philippines. It was then pretested in two Philippine organizations with comparable functions: the Development Bank of the Philippines (public) and the Republic Bank and Trust Company (private). Five persons of different status levels from each organization filled out the questionnaire. The ten respondents in the pretest said they had little trouble in understanding the questions and the directions. Minor revisions were made on the basis of this pretest. The questionnaire was written in English.

One hundred and sixty-two questionnaires were distributed (74 at GSIS and 88 at Philamlife), of which 130 were collected (62 from GSIS and 68 from Philamlife). The respondents were approached individually at work, and the questionnaire was explained to each of them. The questionnaires were also collected from each of the respondents personally.

Some interesting events happened in the process of data-gathering



in both GSIS and Philamlife. In GSIS, after the first week of questionnaire distribution, the new general manager (he had been in office for about three months at the time) decided to limit the general public's access to employees during office hours. Uniformed and well-armed security officers guarded all the entrances and exits to the building, and even the doorways in each floor of the building. Hundreds of people were channeled to the Public Relations Office, whose employees then screened the clients to determine who had "legitimate" needs to go to the other offices. The delays created by the procedure of having to go through the Public Relations Office made it virtually an impossible task to get hold of the potential respondents who mainly did field work. These field workers reported to the office for a few minutes in the morning, left, and then reported only briefly if at all in the afternoon.

In Philamlife, after the first week of questionnaire distribution, talk began of an impending strike. Although the strike appeared to have been averted, we thought it necessary to distribute the rest of the questionnaires the second week, and attempt to get all the questionnaires back during the third week. The growing insecurity in the air made it difficult to attempt to enlarge the sample.

## RESULTS

In the following report of the results of the study, when the reported frequencies exceed the size of the sample, it means that several responses were tabulated for each respondent.

H1. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of the public official in that the former will emphasize achievement goals while the latter will emphasize security goals.

The job orientation of the focal person is defined here in terms of (1) what features of a job he considers to be "good", (2) what features of a job he considers to be "bad", (3) what features of his present job are most satisfying, (4) what features of his present job are least satisfying, and (5) what aspects of his present job should be changed.

All the items (questions 49, 50, 52, 53, 54) which were used to obtain information on (1) through (5) were open-ended. The responses to questions 49, 50, 52 and 53 were categorized as follows:

1. Interpersonal orientation. This includes responses which indicate presence or absence of "opportunity to relate with other people", of "good relationship between supervisor and supervised" and of the "service potential".

2. Achievement orientation. This includes responses which indicate presence or absence of "potential to express creativity, independence," "opportunity to learn from job", "opportunity to utilize one's skills fully", and chance of having "authority commensurate with responsibility".

3. Status and pleasure orientation. This includes responses which indicate presence or absence of "variety" and "flexibility" of the job, "possibility of promotion, advancement", "high demands on output", opportunity to "travel and see places", "physical strenuousness and health hazards".

4. Security and financial rewards orientation. Includes responses which indicate presence or absence of "security" and of "good wages, fringe benefits".

5. Legitimacy orientation. This includes responses which indicate presence or absence of positive legal and informal sanctions on the job as an "honest source of money", or of "moral risks on the job" and of "pressures to go against organizational rules".

Categories (2) and (4) will be used in the succeeding analysis for Hypothesis 1.

Responses to question 54 (which asked which aspects of his job the focal person wanted to change) were also categorized under similar headings as above, but the specific items included in each category differed somewhat:

1. Interpersonal. This includes responses indicating that the focal person did not want to "deal with demanding clients" or wanted to "change present superiors".

2. Achievement. This includes responses which are specific suggestions as to how or where the work situation and procedures may be changed in order to get the job accomplished more efficiently.

3. Status and pleasure. This includes responses such as "monotony of repetitive jobs", "doing clerical jobs", "low salary", "few fringe benefits" and "slow promotion".

4. Legitimacy. This includes responses such as "having job altered by superiors such that outcomes are against company regulations", "favoritism in promotions salary increases, job assignments", "doing personal favors for superiors", "having to do somebody else's job", "political interference on the job".

As may be seen in Table 1, about the same percentage of responses in GSIS (34 out of a total 253 responses, or 13%) and in Philamlife (28 out of 234, or 12%) indicated achievement-related features in response to Question 49, "What do you look for in a job? What makes a job a good one for you?" The rank-and-file of Philamlife appear to be more achievement conscious in looking at a job than that of GSIS.

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Table 1  
Achievement Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated  
by the Features They Look for in a Job

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Indicated	34	13	28	12
Not indicated	219	87	206	88
Total	253	100	234	100

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In Table 2, out of a total of 102 responses from GSIS to question 49, 26 or 25% said that the respondent looked for security, good wages and fringe benefits in a job. In Philamlife, out of 94, 20 of the responses or 21% pointed to security-related features of the job.

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Table 2  
Security Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated  
by the Features They Look for in a Job

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Indicated	26	25	20	21
Not indicated	76	75	74	79
Total	102	100	94	100

---

Given an equal level of achievement orientation in the two organizations, a slightly higher security orientation among GSIS employees and a similarity in the greater emphasis on security over achievement in both GSIS and Philamlife, the data does not support Hypothesis 1.

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Table 3  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated  
by the Aspects of Their Job They Find Least Satisfying

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Interpersonal	3	5	4	6
Achievement	10	16	10	15
Status	18	29	13	19
Security	0	0	2	3
Legitimacy	8	13	3	4
None	9	14	8	12
No response	14	23	28	41
Total	62	100	68	100

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Table 4  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated  
by the Aspects of Their Job They Want to Change

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	N	%	N	%
Interpersonal	1	2	1	1
Achievement	13	21	10	15
Status	5	8	1	1
Legitimacy	5	8	1	1
None	18	29	19	29
No response	20	32	36	53
Total	62	100	68	100

Achievement-related matters appear to be less of a problem in Philamlife than in GSIS, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 reports the responses to question 53, "What do you find least satisfying in your job?" Table 4 lists the responses to question 54, "If you could redesign your job as it would be most satisfying to you, what would you like to have changed about it?"

The level of security on the job is not a source of dissatisfaction in either organization. Although the employees in both organizations declare that they look for possibilities of achievement and for security in a job, it is likely that the Philamlife employee finds more achievement possibilities in his present job than the GSIS employee. An indication of this may be the fewer responses indicating achievement-related changes that the Philamlife employees seem to want compared to the GSIS employees.

H2. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of the public official in that the former will emphasize expertise as a desirable characteristic of workmates, while the latter will emphasize the need for workmates who are skilled in interpersonal relations.

Question 41 deals with the orientation of the official toward his workmates. It asks, "What kind of people would you like as workmates? What do you feel makes a person a good one to have around?" The responses were categorized as follows:

1. Personality traits. This includes responses such as "honest" and "self-respecting".

2. Interpersonal traits. This includes such responses which indicate high capacity for smooth interpersonal relationship (e. g., "approachable", "cheerful", "patient", "considerate", "tactful", "understanding", "cooperative").

3. Expertise and performance. This includes responses such as "competent in his job", "responsible", "rules-oriented", "industrious".

Table 5  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by Their  
Preference for Workmates Who are Skilled in Interpersonal Relations

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Mentioned	46	49	42	48
Not mentioned	47	51	46	52
Total	93	100	88	100

Table 6  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated  
by Their Preference for Workmates Who Have Expertise

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Mentioned	37	20	20	11
Not mentioned	147	80	156	89
Total	184	100	176	100

Tables 5 and 6 indicate no differences between the kinds of traits of officemates who are skilled in smooth interpersonal relations desired by GSIS and Philamlife employees. Out of 93 responses, 46 or 49% indicated preference for officemates who are skilled in smooth interpersonal relations in GSIS. In Philamlife, out of 88 responses, 42 or 48% indicated the same preference.

Expertise appears to be less valued in both organizations than are interpersonal skills. Out of 184 responses, 37 or 20% cited expertise as the desired characteristic in an officemate in GSIS, and in Philamlife, 20 or 11% of 176 responses made similar indications. Perhaps expertise is more taken for granted in Philamlife.

Hypothesis 2 is not supported by the data.

H3. The job orientation of the private official will differ from that of the public official in that the former will more likely consider working as being the source of intrinsic satisfaction than will the latter.

The hypothesis was tested by asking the respondents two questions. One was question 47: "In general, how much satisfaction and pleasure do you think other people get from the work they do?" The other, question 48, was: "Compared with other things not connected with their work-how much do you feel that they view their jobs as a real source of satisfaction in life?" Responses to both questions ranged from "Very much" to "None at all" on a five-point scale. The questions were asked to solicit the respondent's own feelings about work indirectly so that he would not feel very vulnerable. It was assumed that people project their own attitudes in perceiving the attitudes of others, especially of an ambiguously defined "others". Another implicit assumption behind these questions was that there were alternatives or activities the individual engaged in with which he could compare work in an occupation.



Table 7  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the Degree of Satisfaction They  
Think People Get From Their Work as Compared With Other Activities; by  
Status (Column percentage is indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

Degree of Satisfaction	GSIS						Philamlife					
	Status of Focal Person*						Status of Focal Person*					
	1	2	3	4	5	Total	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Very much, considerable	1	5	19	6	12	43	-	5	5	5	18	33
	(50)	(71)	(73)	(46)	(86)	(69)	-	(62)	(62)	(42)	(45)	(48)
Some, very little	-	2	4	7	1	14	-	1	2	4	12	19
	-	(29)	(15)	(54)	(7)	(23)	-	(12)	(25)	(33)	(30)	(28)
None at all	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	(8)	-	-	(3)	-	-	-	-	-	-
No response	1	-	1	-	1	3	-	2	1	3	10	16
	(50)	-	(4)	-	(7)	(5)	-	(25)	(12)	(25)	(25)	(23)
Total	2	7	26	13	14	62	-	8	8	12	40	68
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	-	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

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\* 1 = Top management  
2 = Middle management  
3 = Second level supervisor  
4 = First level supervisor  
5 = Non-supervisory personnel

Table 8  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the Degree of Satisfaction  
They Think People Get From Their Work; by Status  
(Column percentage is indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

<u>Degree of Satisfaction</u>	GSIS						Philamlife					
	<u>Status of Focal Person*</u>						<u>Status of Focal Person*</u>					
	1	2	3	4	5	Total	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Very much, considerable	1 (50)	4 (57)	19 (73)	7 (54)	12 (86)	43 (69)	-	4 (50)	7 (87)	9 (75)	20 (50)	40 (59)
Some, very little	-	3 (43)	5 (19)	6 (46)	-	14 (23)	-	2 (25)	1 (12)	-	12 (30)	15 (22)
None at all	-	-	1 (4)	-	-	1 (2)	-	-	-	-	1 (2)	1 (1)
No response	1 (50)	-	1 (4)	-	2 (14)	4 (6)	-	2 (25)	-	3 (25)	7 (17)	12 (18)
Total	2 (100)	7 (100)	26 (100)	13 (100)	14 (100)	62 (100)	-	8 (100)	8 (100)	12 (100)	40 (100)	68 (100)

---

\* 1 = Top management  
2 = Middle management  
3 = Second level supervisor

4 = First level supervisor  
5 = Non-supervisory personnel

Overall, more GSIS members perceive a higher level of satisfaction from their work than is the case with Philamlife (Table 7). Of the 62 GSIS respondents, 69% replied "Very much" and "Considerable", 23% said "Some" and "Very little", while only 3% said "Not at all" on question 47. The corresponding distribution in Philamlife is 48%, 28% and 0%. Much the same response distribution occurs in question 48 (Tables 8 and 9).

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Table 9  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the Degree of  
Satisfaction They Think People Get From Their Work; by Sex  
(Column percentage is indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

<u>Degree of Satisfaction</u>	<u>GSIS</u>			<u>Philamlife</u>			<u>All</u>		
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Very much, considerable	16 (73)	27 (67)	43 (69)	37 (61)	3 (43)	40 (59)	53 (64)	30 (64)	83 (64)
Some, very little	4 (18)	10 (25)	14 (22)	13 (21)	2 (29)	15 (22)	17 (20)	12 (25)	29 (22)
None at all	- -	1 (2)	1 (2)	1 (2)	- -	1 (1)	1 (1)	1 (2)	2 (2)
No response	2 (9)	2 (5)	4 (7)	10 (16)	2 (28)	12 (18)	12 (15)	4 (9)	16 (12)
Total	22 (100)	40 (100)	62 (100)	61 (100)	7 (100)	68 (100)	83 (100)	47 (100)	130 (100)

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Table 10  
Job Orientation of Focal Persons as Indicated by the Degree of  
Satisfaction They Think People Get From Their Work as Compared  
With Other Activities; by Sex (Column percentage is  
indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

<u>Degree of Satisfaction</u>	<u>GSIS</u>			<u>Philamlife</u>			<u>All</u>		
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Very much, considerable	16 (73)	27 (67)	43 (69)	30 (49)	3 (43)	33 (48)	46 (55)	30 (64)	76 (58)
Some, very little	4 (18)	10 (25)	14 (23)	18 (29)	1 (14)	19 (28)	22 (26)	11 (23)	33 (25)
None at all	- -	2 (5)	2 (3)	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 (4)	2 (1)
No response	2 (9)	1 (2)	3 (5)	13 (21)	3 (43)	16 (23)	15 (18)	4 (8)	19 (15)
Total	22 (100)	40 (100)	62 (100)	61 (100)	7 (100)	68 (100)	83 (100)	47 (100)	130 (100)

On both questions, there is no consistent pattern of association between rank and perception of work as a source of intrinsic satisfaction in GSIS (see Tables 7 and 8). There is some indication that females view work less as a source of satisfaction compared to other activities than do males in both GSIS and Philamlife (Tables 9 and 10).

The data fails to support Hypothesis 3.

H4. Role conflict arising from the inconsistency between demands of clients and rules of the organization will be more frequent in a public bureaucracy than in a private one.

Table 11 shows that of the highly stressful situations the respondents reported they had to deal with, time pressure and inappropriate expectations from clients were most frequently mentioned by GSIS respondents. Description of highly stressful situations were solicited through question 3: "What are the conditions or situations you have to

deal with that you think are particularly stressful or tension-inducing?"

To further illuminate the stressful situations the respondents experienced, question 5 was asked: "What was the stressful situation you had last?" This question yielded much the same responses as did question 3.

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Table 11  
Highly Stressful Situations  
Focal Persons Deal With

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Time pressure from clients	16	38	2	5
Inappropriate expectations from clients	7	17	2	5
Other	19	45	34	90
Total	42	100	38	100

---

Of 42 GSIS respondents who have specific situations in response to question 3, 38% mentioned time pressure from clients, and 17% mentioned inappropriate expectations from clients. In Philamlife, of 38 respondents who gave specific situations in response to question 3, only 5% mentioned time pressure from clients and 5% mentioned inappropriate expectations from clients.

Time pressure from clients is included in the analysis of data relevant to Hypothesis 4 because of the specific manifestations of this pressure. In GSIS, the following classes of time pressure from clients appear:

1. Pressure from mortgagors or borrowers without political backing

to give priority to their loans.

2. Pressure from customers who have political backing to give priority to the completion of their requests.
3. Pressure from customers to release their checks before the date the checks are due.
4. Pressure from politicians and other influential leaders themselves to process and release the policies of their constituents during political campaign periods.
5. Pressure from fixers who expect special attention.

In Philamlife, it is not the actual presence of clients which apply in the two cases (out of 38) who mentioned time pressure from clients as particularly stress-inducing in response to question 3. It is the feeling of being rushed by the realization that the clients needed to have their papers completed by the respondent. In other words, while in GSIS, the pressure felt was actually communicated by the clients and by their representatives, in Philamlife, the pressure was largely internally generated by an awareness of responsibility.

Inappropriate expectations from GSIS clients are of the following variety:

1. Insistence of mortgagors or borrowers that the amount of money approved be bigger than the "corresponding fair appraised values of property" offered as collateral, or bigger than what the employee calculated.
2. Miscellaneous requests from policyholders which the employee considers to be against company policy, but which the employee does not consider to be "morally wrong".

Philamlife clients, as mentioned by two respondents, insist on doing

things the way they want instead of following company regulations (e.g., asking for a receipt for documents turned over to the employee when it is not customary to provide such a receipt). These inappropriate expectations are of type (2) above.

It is not surprising that more GSIS employees reported pressures from clients than did employees from Philamlife because the former dealt more often with outsiders than the latter (Table 12). More than 51% of GSIS employees dealt with "outsiders" "rather often" or "nearly all the time", 32% dealt with them "sometimes" or "rarely", while only 7% "never" dealt with outsiders. In comparison, 31% of Philamlife employees had contact with outsiders "rather often" and "nearly all the time", 43% "sometimes" or "rarely", and 4% "never". Interestingly, the rank-and-file members of GSIS were more exposed to outsiders than the members of Philamlife of corresponding rank (57% of non-supervisory personnel replied that they dealt with outsiders "rather often" and "nearly all the time" as part of their job in GSIS, compared to 25% in Philamlife).

The frequency of contact with outsiders appears to lead to a feeling of "being in the middle" of the customers and the company in Philamlife, but not in GSIS. Note that in Table 13, second-level supervisors of Philamlife, among whom 50% dealt most frequently with outsiders, also felt "in the middle" of customers and company "rather often" and "nearly all the time". Ten percent of the rank-and-file, the level with the least contact, had this feeling "rather often" and "nearly all the time". In GSIS, 57% of the rank-and-file said they dealt with outsiders "rather often" and "nearly all the time", but only 14% felt "in the middle" of customer and company "rather often" and "nearly all the time".

Table 12  
Focal Person Contact With Outsiders  
(Column percentage is indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

<u>Frequency of Contact</u>	GSIS						Philamlife					
	<u>Status of Focal Person*</u>						<u>Status of Focal Person*</u>					
	1	2	3	4	5	Total	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Never	-	-	3 (11)	1 (8)	-	4 (7)	-	-	-	-	3 (7)	3 (4)
Rarely, sometimes	-	3 (43)	8 (31)	5 (38)	4 (29)	20 (32)	-	3 (37)	4 (50)	4 (33)	18 (45)	29 (43)
Rather often, nearly all the time	1 (50)	3 (43)	14 (54)	6 (46)	8 (57)	32 (52)	-	3 (37)	4 (50)	3 (25)	11 (28)	21 (31)
Does not apply	-	1 (14)	-	1 (8)	-	2 (3)	-	-	-	2 (17)	2 (5)	4 (6)
No response	1 (50)	-	1 (4)	-	2 (14)	4 (6)	-	2 (26)	-	3 (25)	6 (15)	11 (16)
Total	2 (100)	7 (100)	26 (100)	13 (100)	14 (100)	62 (100)	-	8 (100)	8 (100)	12 (100)	54 (100)	68 (100)

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\*1 = Top management  
 2 = Middle management  
 3 = Second level supervisor  
 4 = First level supervisor  
 5 = Non-supervisory personnel



Table 13  
How Often Focal Persons Feel in the Middle of the Customers and  
the Company; by Status of the Focal Person.  
(Column percentage indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

Frequency of Feeling in the Middle of Customers and Company	GSIS						Philamlife					
	Status of the Focal Person*						Status of the Focal Person*					
	1	2	3	4	5	Total	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Does not apply**	-	-	2 (8)	-	-	2 (3)	-	-	-	-	4 (10)	4 (6)
Never	-	-	4 (14)	2 (15)	3 (21)	9 (15)	-	-	-	3 (25)	4 (10)	7 (10)
Rarely, sometimes	1 (50)	3 (43)	9 (35)	5 (39)	5 (36)	23 (37)	-	4 (50)	4 (50)	3 (25)	20 (50)	31 (46)
Rather often, nearly all the time	-	4 (57)	9 (35)	6 (46)	2 (14)	21 (34)	-	2 (25)	4 (50)	2 (17)	4 (10)	12 (18)
No response	1 (50)	-	2 (8)	-	4 (29)	7 (11)	-	2 (25)	-	4 (33)	8 (20)	14 (20)
Total	2 (100)	7 (100)	26 (100)	13 (100)	14 (100)	62 (100)	-	8 (100)	8 (100)	12 (100)	40 (100)	68 (100)

\* 1 = Top management  
2 = Middle management  
3 = Second level supervisor  
4 = First level supervisor  
5 = Non-supervisory personnel

\*\*Refers to cases in which  
the respondents have had no  
contact with clients on the  
job.

Among the second level supervisors, 54% of whom said they dealt with outsiders "rather often" and "nearly all the time", 35% reported they felt "in the middle" of customers and company "rather often" and "nearly all the time".

The data supports H4 in that objective role conflict arising from the inconsistency between the demands of clients and the rules of the organization is in fact more frequent in GSIS than in Philamlife as predicted. However, the psychological strain from this conflict does not follow the same pattern.

H5. Clients who have a primary relationship with the focal person are more frequent sources of strain than other clients in a public bureaucracy compared to a private bureaucracy.<sup>55</sup>

Questions 2 and 3 were expected to yield information relevant to these hypotheses. The first question asks: "Do you feel that your job imposes some stress and pressure beyond that which most people experience?" Forced choices are: "Not at all", "Somewhat more than most", "Quite a bit more than most", and "A great deal more than most". Responses to question 2 were cross-tabulated with those responses to question 3 which asks, "What are the conditions or situations you have to deal with that you think are particularly stressful or tension-inducing?"

Primariness, as stated earlier in this paper, refers to degrees of kinship relationship in which a high level of primariness means close blood, ritual kinship and friendship ties while a low level of primariness means no blood kinship and friendship ties.

Although respondents could enumerate as many kinds of tension-inducing situations as they felt were significant, the answers constituted a

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<sup>55</sup>"Client" is defined here as one who does not belong to the organization, but who exerts job-related pressures for service from the focal person.

single class per respondent (e.g., specific complaints about time pressure, or about inappropriate expectations from clients or superiors). Only one respondent mentioned a class of tension-inducing factors brought about by pressure from friends. This one was a GSIS employee who said he found it most stressful "when intimate friends ask me for a favor beyond the scope of my power". No respondent mentioned pressures from the family pertinent to the job. The two big sources of conflicting pressures were clients and superiors.

Question 34 asked the respondents how often they felt "in the middle" of 1) their customers and the company, 2) their family and the company, and 3) their non-customer friends outside the company, and the company. It was assumed here that the respondent would recognize when these groups would want things which could not be complied with. All respondents answered that they were never bothered by the feeling of being "in the middle" of their family and the company. In the cases of customers and of friends, more GSIS employees registered feeling "in the middle" of these parties and the company "rather often" or "nearly all the time" than Philamlife employees (Tables 14 and 15). More Philamlife employees (31 or 46%) infrequently ("sometimes" or "rarely") felt in the middle of customers and company than GSIS employees (23 or 37%). The same is true with conflicts between friends and company: 19 (28%) of Philamlife employees answered "rarely" and "sometimes" while 16 (36%) of GSIS employees made the same reply.

Table 14  
Focal Person "in the Middle"  
of Customers and Company

<u>Frequency of Feeling in the Middle</u>	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Does not apply*	2	3	4	6
Never	9	15	7	10
Rarely, sometimes	23	37	31	46
Rather often, nearly all the time	21	34	12	18
No response	7	11	14	20
Total	62	100	68	100

\* This refers to cases in which the respondents have had no contact with clients on the job.

Table 15  
Focal Person "in the Middle"  
of Friends and Company

<u>Frequency of Feeling in the Middle</u>	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Does not apply	13	21	21	31
Never	24	39	14	21
Rarely, sometimes	16	26	19	28
Rather often, nearly all the time	3	5	-	-
No response	6	9	14	20
Total	62	100	68	100

It appears that there is greater occurrence of conflicting pressures from friends and customers in GSIS than in Philamlife. This was predicted by Hypothesis 5. Pressures from customers are even more frequent than pressures from friends. This can be expected considering the greater number of customers a GSIS employee or Philamlife employee can deal with compared to the number of persons they consider friends.

H6. Role stress arising from demands of superiors contrary to organizational rules will be more frequent than stress derived from strict enforcement of such rules in a public bureaucracy compared to a public one.

H6a. Role stress arising from strict enforcement of organizational rules will be more frequent than stress derived from demands of superiors contrary to such rules in a private bureaucracy compared to a public one.

The three main sources of information on these two hypotheses are 1) question 3, which asks what situations the respondent had to deal with in his job that were particularly stressful, 2) question 1-m, which asks how often the respondent was bothered that the amount of work he had to do may interfere with how well it got done, and 3) question 1-n, which asks how often the respondent was bothered by the feeling that he had to do things on the job that were against his better judgement. Questions 1-m and 1-n have the forced-choice responses: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often and Nearly all the time. Question 3 is an open-ended question, and responses indicating time pressure from superiors as particularly stressful are taken to mean experiences of strict enforcement of rules. Those responses indicating that inappropriate expectations from superiors were the particularly stressful experiences of the respondents are taken to mean experiences of demands contrary to organizational rules.

Comparing the responses of GSIS members to question 1-m with those

to question 1-n (see Tables 16 and 17) it can be seen that time pressure is less of a worry than pressure to do things on the job which are against their better judgement. This finding is in the direction predicted by H6. Out of 62 respondents, 26 or 42% said that they were "never" bothered by the thought that the amount of work they had to do may interfere with how well it got done, while 36 or 58% said that they were bothered "rarely" and "sometimes" and no one said he was bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 16). Looking at the figures as to how often the respondents were bothered by the feeling that they had to do things on the job which were against their better judgement, we see that 13 or 21% of the respondents were "never" bothered, 45 or 73% were bothered "rarely" or "sometimes", while 3 or 4% were bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 17).

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Table 16  
Focal Person Role Stress  
Work Quality Versus Work Quantity

<u>Frequency of Stress</u>	<u>GSIS</u>		<u>Philamlife</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Never	26	42	17	25
Rarely, sometimes	36	58	45	66
Rather often, nearly all the time	-	-	6	9
No response	-	-	-	-
Total	62	100	68	100

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Table 17  
Role Stress Resulting from  
Requests Contrary to Better Judgement of Focal Person

<u>Frequency of Role Stress</u>	<u>GSIS</u>		<u>Philamlife</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Never	13	21	27	39
Rarely, sometimes	45	73	37	54
Rather often, nearly all the time	3	4	4	7
No response	1	2	-	-
Total	62	100	68	100

In Philamlife slightly more respondents were bothered by time pressure than were bothered by the pressure to do things on the job which were against their better judgement. This is the result predicted in H6a. Among 68 respondents, the breakdown of the responses to the question as to how often the respondent was bothered by the thought that the amount of work he had to do may interfere with how well it got done is as follows: 17 or 25% said "never", 45 or 66% said "rarely" or "sometimes", 6 or 9% said "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 16). In comparison, the following is the distribution of the responses to the question of how often the respondent was bothered by the thought that he had to do things on the job that were against his better judgement: 27 or 39% said "never", 37 or 54% said "rarely" or "sometimes", and 4 or 7% said "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (Table 17).

Taking another test of Hypotheses 6 and 6a, Table 18 shows selected responses to the question as to what highly stressful situations the respondent had to deal with in his job.

Table 18  
Stressful Situations of Focal Person;  
Selected Responses

	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Time pressure from superiors	4	6	23	34
Inappropriate expectations from superiors	7	11	4	6
Other	51	83	41	60
Total	62	100	68	100

Of the few who mentioned either time pressure or inappropriate expectations as the particularly stressful situations they had to deal with in their jobs, 4 or 6% cited time pressure from superiors and 7 or 11% mentioned inappropriate expectations from superiors in GSIS. While there is virtually no difference in the two sources of role strain in GSIS as judged from the responses to question 3, in Philamlife, there is a marked preponderance of time pressure from superiors (23 or 34% mentioned it) over inappropriate expectations from superiors (4 or 6% mentioned it) as a source of role strain.

Based on the above findings, it may be said that there are strong indications that Hypotheses 6 and 6a are correct.

- H7. In the private bureaucracy, the greater the status difference between the focal person and the role sender in the organization, the greater the role strain of the focal person in case of conflict between his expectations of what his job should be and the expectations of the role sender.
- H7a. In a public bureaucracy, the more equal the role sender is to the focal person the greater the experienced role conflict is.

There are five position status categories into which the focal persons



and the role senders they mentioned are classified:

- Position 1: Top management (member of the board of directors, president, vice-president, division manager, other positions above the division manager level)
- Position 2: Middle management (department manager, assistant department manager, head of larger section, assistant head of larger section, technical staff of top management)
- Position 3: Second level supervisor (section head of smaller section, assistant head of smaller section)
- Position 4: First level supervisor (head of unit, assistant head of unit, senior members of unit if they have supervisory responsibilities)
- Position 5: Non-supervisory personnel (rank-and-file)

Respondents indicated the organizational position of the role senders, while the positions of the respondents themselves were obtained from personnel lists. To get a description of the status difference between the focal person and the role sender, the position number of the former was subtracted from the latter's. The resulting range of status differences arranged the role partners from -4 in which the focal person is lowest in position with respect to his role sender, to 4 in which the focal person is highest in position with respect to his role sender.

The occasions of conflict of expectations between the role partners exclusive to GSIS are when the role sender asks the respondent to do one of the following: 1) alter the focal person's decisions on job-related matters, especially those involving the outflow of money from the company to a client, in order to please the superiors of the role sender, or 2) process papers of friends and other clients known to the role sender which do not have the necessary supporting documents or which have not gone through the required procedures. In Philamlife, the unique occasions of conflict are when the role sender asks the focal person to 1) do a job

which the focal person does not consider to be part of his responsibility, i.e., a job the focal person considers to be somebody else's, or 2) do a job in a way which the focal person deems unnecessary or out of the ordinary.

The immediate supervisor is often seen by the GSIS complainants as a "tool" of the higher-ups in undermining organizational rules. Also, role senders who are seen as directly expecting behavior from the focal person which the latter disagree with are at most two status positions higher than the focal person. In Philamlife, the role sender may be as much as three status positions higher than the focal person.

There are slight indications that Hypotheses 7 and 7a are in the right direction. Respondents were asked in Question 31c, "To what extent had being given orders, suggestions or requests by Person B which are in conflict with your interpretation of company rules and/or what you are supposed to do in your job bother you?" The responses to this question are taken as the indication of the extent of the role strain the focal person experienced. Of the 11 cases mentioned by GSIS respondents, the two who were "not at all" bothered were one and two status positions lower than the role senders, and the one who was "a great deal" bothered was of the same status position as the role sender. In Philamlife, of 14 cases, the one who mentioned he was "not at all" bothered by the conflict of expectations has a status position equal to his role sender. Of the respondents who said that they were "a little" bothered, the distribution of status differences between the role sender and the focal person is as follows:

Status Difference	Frequency
Focal person 3 status positions lower than role sender	1
Focal person 2 status positions lower than role sender	5
Focal person equal in status to role sender	1
Focal person 2 status positions higher than role sender	1

The two who said that they were "quite a bit" bothered were 3 status positions lower than the role sender, and the two who said they were bothered "a great deal" were 3 and 4 status positions lower than the role sender.

H8. In case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and that of the organization, the more primary the relationship between the focal person and the role sender, the less the strain experienced by the focal person in a public bureaucracy.

H8a. In case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and that of the organization, the more primary the relationship between the focal person and the role sender, the greater the strain experienced by the focal person in the private bureaucracy.

Respondents were asked to list the names, position and relationship with 1) persons within the company whose work affected them or whose work was affected by the respondent's performance, and 2) persons within or outside the company who were important to them personally and with whom they discussed their job. Question 31c asked the extent to which the respondent was bothered by orders, requests and suggestions of each role sender which were in conflict with the former's interpretation to company rules and what he was supposed to do in his job. The responses were placed on a five-point scale: "Not at all" (lowest level of role strain), "A little", "Some", "Quite a bit", and "A great deal" (highest level of role strain). The responses were then classified into three

levels of role conflict: 1) low ("not at all"), 2) medium ("a little", "some") and 3) high ("quite a bit", "a great deal").

To measure "degree of primariness" of the relationship between the focal person and the role sender, question 16 asked the respondent how much he liked the role sender personally on an 8-point scale. The scale ranged from "I dislike him" to "He's my best friend". Since the respondents did not mention relatives in their list of role senders, it is not possible to use degree of kinship relations as indicator of "primariness" of relationship. Therefore, the level of primariness studied here is an indicator of the degree of positive feeling the focal person has toward the role sender. The responses were classified as follows according to their degree of positiveness: 1) low ("I dislike him", "I don't like him"), 2) neutral ("I don't have much feeling for him one way or the other"), and 3) high ("I like him fairly well and would like to know him better", "He is a good friend of mine", "He's my best friend"). Table 19 shows the relationship between the degree of primariness and the degree of role strain experienced by the focal person.

In Philamlife, there was a fuller array of emotions toward the role sender than there was in GSIS. Furthermore, in the few cases mentioned the emotions toward the role sender seem to be stronger in the Philamlife than in the GSIS case. In Philamlife, disliked persons brought on a high level of strain. Although neutrally-evaluated role senders are the most frequent sources of conflicting expectations in GSIS, senders liked by the focal person also sometimes provided such expectations. The small number of conflicting expectations mentioned with respect to specific role senders makes it impossible to control for the "moral gravity" of the expectations.

Table 19  
Role Sender's Relation to Focal Person:  
Primariness and Role Strain

<u>Degree of Primariness</u>	<u>GSIS</u>				<u>Philamlife</u>			
	<u>Degree of Role Strain</u>				<u>Degree of Role Strain</u>			
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Total</u>
Low	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	6
Neutral	1	5	1	7	-	3	-	3
High	1	2	-	3	1	4	-	5
Total	2	7	1	10	1	9	4	14

Considering the "moral gravity" of conflicting expectations mentioned by the GSIS respondents, taken outside the context of the present theory it is surprising that the respondents did not feel greater role strain. Only in one out of the ten cases did the respondent feel "quite a bit" bothered. In Philamlife, the proportion of those reporting a high level of role strain is high, considering the low level of "moral gravity" of conflicting expectations mentioned.

H9. Role ambiguity from unclear evaluation of focal person's performance by superiors will be greater in intensity and frequency in a public bureaucracy than in a private one.

Data on Hypothesis 9 was obtained from the responses to question 1-g which asks how often the respondent was bothered by not knowing what his superior thought of him or how he evaluated his performance. The choices in question 1-g are on a 5-point scale, ranging from "Never" to "Nearly all the time". In the analysis of the data, however, the responses were divided into three categories: 1) "Never" (low), 2) "Rarely" and "Sometimes" (medium) and 3) "Rather often" and "Nearly all the time" (high) (Table 20).

Table 20  
Focal Person Distress from  
Non-communication of Superior's Performance Evaluation

<u>Frequency of Distress</u>	<u>GSIS</u>		<u>Philamlife</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Never (low level of ambiguity)	17	27	22	32
Rarely, sometimes (medium level of ambiguity)	38	61	35	52
Rather often, nearly all the time (high level of ambiguity)	3	5	-	-
No response	4	7	-	-
Total	62	100	68	100

There is a slightly higher percentage of employees who indicated a medium level of ambiguity in GSIS than in Philamlife (61% versus 52%) and this finding is in the direction predicted by Hypothesis 9. However, more Philamlife employees indicated a high level of ambiguity than GSIS employees (16% versus 5%). Interestingly, all the 11 Philamlife employees who said they were bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time" (high level of ambiguity) by not knowing how their supervisors evaluated them were all rank-and-file employees. Overall, there were fewer employees in both GSIS and Philamlife who registered a high level of ambiguity compared to those who registered either low or medium level of ambiguity.

H10. Role ambiguity from the indeterminacy of priority in the organizational demands on the focal person will be more frequent in a private bureaucracy than in a public one.

Two sets of responses are the bases of analysis for this hypothesis:

- 1) the responses to question 1-b which asks how often the respondent was bothered by being unclear on the scope and responsibilities of his job,

and 2) the responses to question 35 which asks how clear the respondent was about what he had to do on the job. To Question 1-b, these are the categories of responses, indicating low, medium and high levels of ambiguity respectively: 1) "Never", 2) "Rarely", and "Sometimes", and 3) "Rather often" and "Nearly all the time". (See Table 21). The responses to question 35 were categorized as follows, indicating low, medium, and high levels of ambiguity respectively: 1) "Very clear" and "Quite clear on most things", 2) "Fairly clear", and 3) "Not too clear" and "Not at all clear" (Table 22).

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Table 21  
Job Definition as Perceived  
by Focal Person

<u>Level of Clarity</u>	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Very clear, quite clear on most things (low ambiguity)	54	88	43	63
Fairly clear (medium ambiguity)	4	6	14	21
Not too clear, not at all clear (high ambiguity)	-	-	1	1
No response	4	6	10	15
Total	62	100	68	100

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Table 22  
Focal Person Distress at Unclear  
Job Scope and Responsibilities

<u>Frequency of Distress</u>	<u>GSIS</u>		<u>Philamlife</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Never (low ambiguity)	30	48	26	38
Rarely, sometimes (medium ambiguity)	28	45	34	50
Rather often, nearly all the time (high ambiguity)	3	5	8	12
No response	1	2	-	-
Total	62	100	68	100

In both response sets, Philamlife employees experience more frequently and are bothered more often by ambiguity of job demands than GSIS employees. Based on Table 21, in both companies the majority of the employees (88% in Philamlife and 63% in GSIS) said they were "very clear" or "quite clear on most things" that they have to do on their job (low ambiguity). However, more Philamlife employees stated they were only "fairly clear" on what they had to do on their job (medium ambiguity) than GSIS employees (21% for Philamlife and 6% for GSIS). Only one respondent (from Philamlife) indicated a high level of ambiguity, saying that he was "not at all clear" as to what he had to do in his job.

Table 22 amplifies Table 21. In GSIS, almost half (48%) of the employees were "never" bothered by being unclear on the scope of responsibilities of the job, while only 38% were as placid in Philamlife. Exactly half of the Philamlife respondents, compared to 45% of GSIS employees, indicated a medium level of ambiguity, saying that they were



"rarely" or "sometimes" bothered by being unclear on this matter. High ambiguity, indicated by answers saying that respondents were bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time", was registered by more Philamlife employees (12%) than GSIS employees (5%).

On the whole, the data supports Hypothesis 10.

H11. Role conflict and ambiguity stemming from the crossing of authority lines will be less frequent in a private bureaucracy than in a public one.

As a rule, supervisors in either GSIS or Philamlife are no more than two status positions higher than the people they directly supervise. To get information on Hypothesis 11, it was necessary to measure the organizational status difference between the focal person and the role senders mentioned by him. A total of 250 role senders were described by the 62 GSIS respondents while 219 were described by 68 Philamlife respondents. The organizational status differences between the role partners were obtained by subtracting the status position of the focal person from the status position of the role sender. As indicated earlier in this paper, the positions of respondents, as well as those of the role senders they described, were classified into five categories, each of which was assigned a numerical rank as follows:<sup>56</sup>

- 1 = Top management
- 2 = Middle management
- 3 = Second level supervisors
- 4 = First level supervisors
- 5 = Non-supervisory personnel

If the status difference was negative, the role sender had a higher position than the focal person. If the status difference was positive, the role sender had the lower position. It was then determined whether

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<sup>56</sup>See p. 109 for a complete description of the status positions

the role sender communicated expectations which the focal person found difficult in some way or other. The findings are shown in Table 23. The figures important to Hypothesis 11 are those under columns indicating -4 and -3 status differences between role sender and focal person.

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Table 23  
Focal Person Status Difference from Role Sender  
and Occurrence of Perceived Difficult Expectations

<u>Status Difference</u>	<u>Frequency of Difficult Expectations</u>	
	<u>GSIS</u>	<u>Philamlife</u>
-4	4	22
-3	17	47
-2	40	54
-1	76	31
0	71	50
1	16	14
2	25	8
3	-	1
4	1	-
Total	250	227

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In both GSIS and Philamlife, superiors three or four status positions removed from the focal person are as likely as immediate superiors to communicate difficult expectations. The most common types of Philamlife difficulty are, in the order of frequency: 1) disagreement between focal person and role sender on how a job should be done, 2) role sender does not give enough time, 3) the performance of the task asked for by the role sender will have adverse effects on the focal person's relationship with others on the job, 4) the performance of the task asked for by the role sender will have adverse effects on the focal person's subordinates or peers, and 5) the focal person finds the job too complicated. In GSIS, the most common types of difficulty listed in order of frequency of mention, are: 1) the task

the role sender expects the focal person to do is in conflict with organizational rules and as such is "morally wrong", 2) the focal person disagrees with the role sender on how the job should be done, and 3) the job that the role sender wants done is too complicated.

Looking at the data in greater detail, we find that in certain specific cases which lead to role conflict and ambiguity, superiors in Philamlife are even more prone to jump across authority lines than in GSIS.

Table 24 shows the frequency with which focal persons found role senders' expectations to be in conflict with company rules or what they have to do on the job. It also shows that Philamlife officials have greater propensity than GSIS officials to bypass those beneath them in the authority ladder and to give orders directly to subordinates. In GSIS, of the 17 role senders who were three status positions above the focal person, 3 (18%) gave conflictual expectations only "rarely", and 10 (59%) that the focal persons were sure "never" to have given such expectations. In Philamlife, 20 (43%) of 47 role senders who were three status positions higher than the focal persons' "never" gave conflictual expectations, 5 (10%) had these expectations "sometimes", "nearly all the time".

For three GSIS role senders four status positions above the focal person, one "never" gave conflictual expectations, and 2 gave them "rarely". For Philamlife, out of 10 role senders, 7 "never" gave conflictual expectations, 2 did "sometimes" and one communicated these expectations "nearly all the time". A similar greater propensity to bypass other superiors by Philamlife officials than GSIS officials is shown in the figures in Table 25. This shows how often the role

Table 24  
Focal Person and Role Sender Status Difference  
and Frequency of Confictual Job Expectations  
(Column percentage is indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

Frequency of Occurrence, Confictual Expectations	GSIS										Philamlife									
	Status Difference					Status Difference					Status Difference					Status Difference				
	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	Total	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	Total
Never	1 (25)	10 (59)	18 (45)	28 (37)	27 (38)	5 (31)	8 (32)	-	-	97 (39)	7 (32)	20 (43)	21 (39)	7 (23)	14 (28)	3 (22)	2 (24)	-	-	74 (32)
Rarely	2 (50)	2 (12)	7 (18)	20 (26)	21 (30)	3 (19)	4 (16)	-	-	59 (24)	2 (9)	8 (17)	10 (19)	14 (45)	12 (24)	3 (22)	1 (13)	-	-	50 (22)
Sometimes	-	-	2 (5)	7 (9)	3 (4)	-	-	-	-	12 (5)	-	3 (6)	5 (9)	1 (3)	3 (6)	-	1 (13)	-	-	13 (6)
Rather often	-	-	-	2 (3)	-	-	-	-	-	2 (1)	-	1 (2)	1 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 (1)
Nearly all the time	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (4)	1 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 (1)
No response	1 (25)	5 (29)	13 (32)	19 (25)	20 (28)	8 (50)	13 (52)	-	1 (100)	79 (32)	12 (55)	14 (30)	17 (31)	9 (29)	21 (42)	8 (56)	4 (50)	1 (100)	-	86 (38)
Total	4 (100)	17 (100)	40 (100)	76 (100)	71 (100)	16 (100)	25 (100)	-	1 (100)	249 (100)	22 (100)	47 (100)	54 (100)	31 (100)	50 (100)	14 (100)	8 (100)	1 (100)	-	227 (100)

Table 25  
Focal Person and Role Sender Status Difference and Frequency  
of "Unfulfillable" Expectations which may Displease Important Persons  
(Column percentage is indicated in parentheses in each cell.)

Frequency of Occurrence Conflictual Expectations	GSIS										Philamlife									
	Status Difference										Status Difference									
	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	Total	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	Total
Never	1 (25)	10 (59)	21 (53)	40 (53)	38 (54)	9 (56)	11 (44)	-	-	130 (52)	8 (36)	19 (41)	26 (48)	8 (26)	21 (42)	5 (36)	1 (12)	-	-	88 (39)
Rarely	2 (50)	3 (18)	8 (20)	17 (22)	17 (24)	2 (13)	5 (20)	-	-	54 (22)	5 (23)	10 (21)	15 (28)	18 (58)	13 (26)	2 (14)	3 (37)	-	-	66 (29)
Sometimes	-	-	1 (2)	5 (7)	3 (4)	-	-	-	-	9 (4)	1 (5)	8 (17)	2 (4)	-	1 (2)	-	-	-	-	12 (5)
Rather often	-	-	-	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	-	-	1 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)
Nearly all the time	-	-	-	1 (1)	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	2 (1)	-	1 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)
No response	1 (25)	4 (23)	10 (25)	12 (16)	12 (17)	5 (31)	9 (36)	-	-	53 (20)	8 (36)	9 (19)	10 (18)	5 (16)	15 (30)	7 (50)	4 (50)	1 (100)	-	59 (26)
Total	4 (100)	17 (100)	40 (100)	76 (100)	71 (100)	16 (100)	25 (100)	-	-	249 (100)	22 (100)	47 (100)	54 (100)	31 (100)	50 (100)	14 (100)	8 (100)	1 (100)	-	227 (100)

senders--of varying status difference from the focal person--communicated expectations which could not be fulfilled without displeasing another person important to the focal person's job.

In Philamlife none of the cases in which role senders bypassed the focal person's immediate supervisors involved crossing departmental lines. GSIS, more than half of the "bypasses" summarized in Table 24 involved crossing departmental lines. Thus, although all the indications from the frequency of "bypasses" of immediate superiors of focal persons do not support Hypothesis 11, the fact that GSIS "bypasses" often involved crossing departmental lines while Philamlife cases never did is an important nuance in the data.

H12. In the private bureaucracy, there will be more strain from work overload than in the public bureaucracy.

Tables 26 and 27 do point to greater strain from work overload in the private bureaucracy. Question 1-d was asked to find the extent to which the feeling of too heavy a workload bothered the respondent. The results are shown in Table 26. In GSIS, 37% replied "Never", 58% "Rarely" and "Sometimes", and 5% "Rather often" and "Nearly all the time". In Philamlife, 27% said "Never", 60% "Rarely" and "Sometimes", and 13% "Rather often" and "Nearly all the time". While only one GSIS employee specifically mentioned work overload as a tension-inducing feature of the job in response to question 3, 9 Philamlife employees complained about this aspect of their job.

Question 1-m was designed to solicit another dimension of role strain arising from work overload: the extent to which the respondent thought that the amount of work he had to do may interfere with how well it gets done (Table 27). To this, among the GSIS employees, 42% said they were "never" bothered, 58% indicated they were bothered

"rarely" and "sometimes", and no one said he was bothered "rather often" or "nearly all the time". Among Philamlife employees, 25% replied "never", 66% said they were bothered "rarely" and "sometimes", and 9% "rather often" and "nearly all the time".

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Table 26  
Distress from Perceived  
Level of Workload

<u>Overload</u> <u>Perception Frequency</u>	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Never	23	37	18	27
Rarely, sometimes	36	58	41	60
Rather often, nearly all the time	3	5	9	13
No response	-	-	-	-
Total	62	100	68	100

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Table 27  
Distress from Expected Quality of Output  
Deterioration as a Result of Overload

<u>Distress Frequency</u>	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Never	26	42	17	25
Rarely, sometimes	36	58	45	66
Rather often, nearly all the time	-	-	6	9
No response	-	-	-	-
Total	62	100	68	100

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There are strong indications that Hypothesis 12 may be accepted.

- H13. The public official is more likely to resolve role conflict in favor of those with whom he has strong primary relationship and in favor of those who have the most power over his prospects on the job than is the private official.
- H13a. The private official is more likely to resolve role conflict in favor of organizational requirements and in favor of job requirements over considerations of power and primariness of relationship than is the public official.

Operationally, the power of the role sender over the focal person is defined in terms of the degree of importance that the focal person attributes to the role sender in determining how he does his job. Primary relationship, on the other hand, is defined by the direction (positive, neutral or negative) and intensity of the feelings the focal person has toward the role sender.

The classes of role conflicts common in GSIS differ from those which occur in Philamlife. In GSIS, the conflict between the focal person and intraorganizational role senders—who are "quite important" and "extremely important" in determining how the former does his job—occur when:

1. Superiors ask the focal person to recommend their unqualified (or less-qualified-than-others) "favorites" for promotion; press for approval of loan applications of people they know, who do not have sufficient collateral; ask for increasing the appraised value of property to be insured or which has been offered as collateral; demand the processing of papers which have not gone through required procedures or which lack supporting documents.
2. Superiors ask focal person to do some task which he does not consider to be part of his job.



Conflicts arising from (1) happen more frequently than those from (2). In Philamlife, the most frequent conflicts between the focal person and intraorganizational role senders who are "quite important" and "extremely important" in determining how he does his job occur when:

1. Superiors insist on accomplishing tasks in ways the focal person considers unsystematic, inadequate or unorthodox.
2. Superiors ask focal person to do some task which he does not consider to be part of his job.

More conflicts from procedural disagreements between superiors and the focal person such as those in (1) occur than the "unjust" assignments of tasks as in (2).

In both Philamlife and GSIS, employees are about as likely to fulfill the expectations of the role sender as they are to outrightly refuse these expectations or to try to convince the role sender that his expectations are not correct. This is true for role senders that the focal person likes "fairly well", "a lot", "good friends" and "best friends" as well as role senders who are "quite important" and "extremely important" in determining how the focal person does his job (Tables 28 and 29). The differences hypothesized are not upheld by the data.

Table 28  
Strategies when Role Senders Communicate Expectations  
in Conflict with Focal Person's Interpretation of Company Rules;  
by Degree of Liking for Role Sender

<u>Strategies of Focal Person</u>	GSIS			Philamlife		
	<u>Degree of Liking of Focal Person for Role Sender</u>			<u>Degree of Liking of Focal Person for Role Sender</u>		
	<u>Fairly well</u>	<u>Good friend</u>	<u>Best friend</u>	<u>Fairly well</u>	<u>Good friend</u>	<u>Best friend</u>
Do what role sender asked	2	1	1	4	-	-
Refuse role sender	4	-	-	1	3	-
Appeal to higher authority	1	-	-	-	1	-
Decide independently	1	-	-	-	-	1

Table 29  
Strategies when Role Senders Communicate Expectations  
in Conflict with Focal Person's Interpretation of Company Rules;  
by Importance of Role Sender

<u>Strategies of Focal Person</u>	GSIS		Philamlife	
	<u>Degree of Importance of Role Sender</u>		<u>Degree of Importance of Role Sender</u>	
	<u>Not at all important</u>	<u>Quite important</u>	<u>Not at all important</u>	<u>Quite important</u>
Do what role sender asked	-	4	-	-
Refuse role sender	-	4	1	1
Appeal to higher authority	-	1	-	1
Decide independently	-	1	-	1

Typical of the attitudes of GSIS employees who accede to expectations of their superiors which they acknowledge to be illegitimate are those expressed in the following comments:

Because he is my boss, I'm bound to obey him. I have to follow him and let no one sign the papers except he (sic). It was his order and he has to answer for his actions if anything happens in the future (note: i.e., if the administration finds out about the superiors wrongdoing). (From an employee who has been asked by a superior to give a policy contract to a third party and to issue policy contracts without the necessary appointment papers of the client.)

I develop an 'I-don't-care' attitude. Anyway if worse comes to worst I have their instructions to show (note: to protect the employee). (From a credit analyst who has agreed to her superiors' instructions to recommend orders of payment to commercial clients in excess of what she considered justified by the official guidelines.)

All of the GSIS employees who admitted yielding to illegitimate demands of superiors noted that they had kept the pieces of paper on which the superiors wrote the demands. Some even said that they had their superiors write oral instructions down so that they would "not be answerable for...violation of official rules." It seems that either the superiors were unaware of the reason the subordinate asked for written versions of the instructions, or they were convinced that no one who had real power and concern would find out about the instructions.

No such protective mechanisms appear in any of the responses of Philamlife employees. This may be expected since the kind of conflict they faced on account of the demands of role senders did not have the "moral" dimension the GSIS employees faced. A Philamlife employee described his reaction to a superior's suggestions on office procedure: "I do it on an experimental basis to see its merits."

It appears that the conflict between the rules of the company

and the expectations of role senders, as well as the conflict between the role sender's expectations and the focal person's definition of his job, do not involve a sacrifice of organizational requirements in the case of Philamlife. Virtually all Philamlife respondents who reported such conflicts did not indicate they felt that resolving the conflict in favor of the role sender would have adverse effects on the organization. This contrasts with GSIS employees who were pointedly aware that their acquiescence was deleterious to the organization.

H14. In the public bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency on the part of the subordinates to pass responsibility for resolving conflict to the superior than in the private bureaucracy.

H14a. In the private bureaucracy, there will be a greater tendency for the focal persons to attempt to resolve the conflicts by themselves than will be the case in the public bureaucracy.

Question 4 asked the respondents what they did when they experienced stressful situations on the job. The following are the categories of solution in the order of frequency of mention: 1) postpone doing the task; take a break, 2) let the superior take the responsibility as the focal person bows to the pressure, 3) confront the role sender and tell him about the problem involved in his expectations, and 4) do the task and try to relax after office hours. In Philamlife, time pressure (mostly from superiors) was relieved as follows: 1) postpone doing the task; take a break, and 2) talk to persons other than the role sender about the problem (Table 30).

Table 30  
Strategies to Ease Tension  
During Stressful Situations

<u>Strategy Used by Focal Person</u>	<u>Time Pressure Problems</u>		<u>Legitimacy Problems</u>	
	<u>GSIS</u>	<u>Philamlife</u>	<u>GSIS</u>	<u>Philamlife</u>
Confront role sender	2	-	1	-
Let superior handle it	4	-	5	-
Talk the problem over with persons other than the role sender	-	2	-	1
Postpone doing the task; take a break	6	10	3	3
Take off for a few days	-	-	3	-
Relax after office hours	1	-	-	2
Total	11	12	12	6

The difference in the strategies seems greater in problems involving questions of legitimacy (12 cases in GSIS and 6 cases in Philamlife). As H14 and H14a predict, more GSIS than Philamlife employees mentioned letting the superior take the responsibility-as they bow to the pressures-as a main strategy. In fact, none of the Philamlife employees mentioned throwing back responsibility to superiors. Philamlife employees are more likely to deliberately slow down performance by taking a break during office hours. Three GSIS employees mentioned taking off for a few days after the harrowing experiences of giving in to non-legitimate demands of superiors. Two Philamlife employees mentioned engaging in recreational activities after office hours to relax after "fighting with the boss" over demands they

considered non-legitimate.

#### Summary and Interpretation of Findings

1. There are no clear differences between the job orientation of GSIS and Philamlife employees with respect to their work goals, the characteristics of workmates they desire, and the degree to which they find work as an intrinsic source of work satisfaction, H1, H2 and H3 are not supported by the data.
2. While objective role conflict arising from inconsistency of the demands of clients with the rules of the organization is more frequent in GSIS than in Philamlife, the psychological stress from this conflict does not follow the same pattern. In any given occasion of objective role conflict of this variety, Philamlife employees suffered greater role stress than GSIS employees. H4, which deals with the frequency of occurrence of objective role conflict, is supported by the data.
3. In GSIS, clients who have primary relationship with the focal person are more likely to be sources of role stress than is true in Philamlife. H5 is supported by the data.
4. In GSIS, role strain arising from the demands of superiors contrary to organizational rules are more frequent than strain derived from the strict enforcement of such rules. The situation is the reverse of what obtains in Philamlife. H6 and H6a are supported by the data.
5. There are slight indications that the greater the status difference between the focal person and the role sender in GSIS, the greater the role strain experienced by the focal person in case of conflict between his expectations of what his job should be and the expectations of the role sender. In Philamlife, it appears

that the more equal the role sender is to the focal person, the greater the experienced role conflict is. These findings are in the direction predicted by H7 and H7a.

6. Concerning the relationship between the degree of primariness between the focal person and the role sender, and the role strain experienced by the focal person in case of conflict between the role sender's expectations and that of the organization, the data is too sparse to give any indication of the correctness of H8 and H8a.
7. The pattern of the differences between GSIS and Philamlife in the frequency of occurrence of role ambiguity from unclear evaluation of the focal person's performance by superiors is a complex one. It seems that though more GSIS employees experience role ambiguity of this sort, those in Philamlife who experience it are subject to it more often. In general, the data supports H9.
8. As predicted by H10, role ambiguity arising from indeterminacy of priority of intraorganizational demands on the focal person is more frequent in Philamlife than in GSIS.
9. There is no support for the contention in H11 that role conflict stemming from the crossing of authority lines will be less frequent in Philamlife than in GSIS. In fact, it appears that Philamlife officials have greater propensity for crossing authority lines and generating role conflict along with it.
10. Role strain from work overload is more frequent in Philamlife than in GSIS, as H12 predicts.
11. The influence of primariness and power in the resolution of role conflict does not differ in Philamlife and GSIS. H13 is not supported by the data.
12. Focal persons in Philamlife are less likely to pass responsibility

for coping with role conflict on to superiors than are focal persons in GSIS. This finding supports H14 and H14a.

The theory presented in this paper concerns largely the unique aspects of organizational stress stemming from differences in structural characteristics of public and private bureaucracies, their operational features, and the differential expectations of clients toward these organizations in a developing society. Much of the predictions based on the theory appear fulfilled by the limited available data presented in this paper.

The failure of the data to uphold the hypotheses which dealt with the effects of differential socialization on the job orientation of the focal persons may indicate the failure of the theory to give adequate weight to 1) the influence of the overall economic insecurity in the country, 2) the effects of differences in overall pay scale and fringe benefits between the two organizations on work satisfaction, 3) the interaction between a sense of achievement and role strain on work satisfaction, and 4) the strength of the influence of particularistic culture in the choice of characteristics of ideal workmates.

With the overall economic insecurity in the Philippines, both GSIS and Philamlife employees had job security uppermost in their minds. But this could only partially account for the higher frequency of security-related responses. A number of respondents also indicated interest in possibilities of interpersonal contacts, variety and flexibility of the job and the high possibility of promotion in evaluating the features of a good job. The pervasiveness of the particularistic culture, along with the influence of economic insecurity, may thus have been underestimated in the theory.

A second source of difficulty of the present theory is the failure



to account for the differences in the wages and fringe benefits of the organizations compared. When the respondents evaluated the satisfaction other people derive from their work, the extent to which their own economic security needs were satisfied may have been a strong influence. GSIS-whose members perceived that people obtained a higher level of satisfaction from their work than did the members of Philamlife-provides better wages and fringe benefits, plus greater job security than Philamlife. Furthermore, no one in GSIS who stayed in the organization for over five years retained the same job classification. They all had positive changes in status in terms of either promotion or salary increases, along with changes in job designations. Philamlife provides a different picture. Out of a sample of 68, there were four individuals whose job titles and actual work (clerk-typists) changed very little except to designate job seniority and some salary increment over a period of 12 to 22 years. These were individuals hired in the earlier years of the organization who had little education (they were high school graduates) and who remained with Philamlife for the retirement benefits.

Another likely depressant of job satisfaction perceived by Philamlife employees is the interaction between the sense of achievement on the job and the role stress experienced. On the whole, the variety of sources of role stress as well as its frequency of occurrence seems to be greater in Philamlife than in GSIS.

The choice of characteristics of ideal workmates, which in both Philamlife and GSIS meant the choice of skill in interpersonal relations over expertise may primarily reflect the influence of the person-oriented particularistic culture of the larger society. Although

Philamlife employees may tend to value expertise in a workmate more than GSIS members do, the traits such as cheerfulness, being cooperative, patience, and tactfulness are perhaps helpful in reducing the impact of impersonality of organizational structure and function. Moreover, Philamlife employees may be more able to take the expertise of workmates for granted. In GSIS, interpersonal traits may have the added value of providing the focal person a sense of security in the arbitrary world of the public bureaucracy.

A third area of weakness in the theory is the part which deals with the influence of power relationship between the focal person and the role sender. It is necessary to take into account the different degrees of seriousness or "moral gravity" of the nature of conflict between the expectations of the role sender and the rules of the organization from the point of view of the focal person. Given the same degree of "moral gravity" of the conflictual expectations, it is expected that the predictions of H13 and H13a will hold. The public official will be more likely to yield to the conflictual expectations of those with whom he has strong primary relationship or of those who have the most power over his job than is the private official. Without taking account of the degree of "moral gravity" of conflictual expectations, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of the similarity in the extent of yielding or refusal of the focal persons in both GSIS and Philamlife.

A fourth problematic aspect of the theory is the way in which it underestimates the extent to which focal persons who have strong kinship obligations, and who know the laxity in the enforcement of organizational rules, will fail to perceive the conflictual nature of

kinship demands. This may account for the absence of any indications that kinsmen are a source of role strain. Two GSIS employees did volunteer to say that part of what they did on the job was to follow-up papers of close relatives. They also said that they sometimes find this task too frequently asked of them. However, their feelings were not reflected by the data on how often they felt "in the middle" of the company and their family. It should be noted that GSIS management has a standing rule against the follow-up of papers of favored clients by employees.

#### Problem Areas in the Two Bureaucracies

There are distinct problem areas which have to be dealt with for reasons unique to each of the bureaucracies studied. In GSIS, the problem is the inability of the system to control member behavior, utilize member talents, and maximize overall efficiency and profitability of the organization. These aspects of the problem are mutually dependent on each other. They continually encourage pressures from clients which are directly applied to individual employees. Indirect pressures also come from clients through superiors and co-employees who channel the pressures to the "appropriate" persons. The management of GSIS, as well as the office of the President of the Philippines have from time to time attempted to tighten control over member behavior, as the following unedited memorandum (Exhibit 1) shows. Two supervisors in GSIS commented that such efforts are usually pursued with great vigor for a month or so. After that the effort dies down and events return to "normal".

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Exhibit 1  
GSIS Memorandum

Republic of the Philippines  
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM  
M a n i l a

June 27, 1967

OFFICE ORDER NO. 133-67

It has been observed that despite directives issued repeatedly not only by this office but also by the Office of the President, prohibiting personal follow-ups of official papers, many GSIS employees have continued making unauthorized follow-ups.

The importance of strictly observing the aforesaid inhibition cannot be over-stressed, especially in units of the System where checks and highly valuable records and documents abound, which may easily be pilfered by persons with evil designs. Furthermore, the violators cause the disruption of operations and lowering of production, as they distract their working co-employees and fail to use their full official time in the accomplishment of their assigned tasks. Infractions and/or violations hereof should, therefore, be minimized if not stopped once and for all. Henceforth, the perpetrators will be dealt with administratively, as may be warranted by the circumstances in each case.

It is reiterated also that the premises of the following units are restricted:

- a. Real Estate Department
- b. Policy & Salary Loans Department
- c. Mails and Communication Division
- d. Claims Department

No one, except those who belong to said units, should be allowed access thereto unless properly authorized in writing by his Division Chief, Department Manager, or Assistant General Manager in appropriate cases of extreme urgency.

In order to maintain a high level of discipline and office decorum, and for purposes of controlling the movement of personnel, the following prohibitions, rules and regulations, which have, heretofore been issued, are likewise reiterated for the guidance and compliance of all concerned:

1. Loitering

Except for visits to the comfort rooms, every employee is always expected to be at his work area. No loitering in the corridors is allowed.

2. Loafing & Reading

Loafing or reading matters, newspapers, magazines, or books, other than those relating to the business of the System during office hours is strictly prohibited.

3. Buying, Selling, or Peddling

Buying and selling merchandise, like textiles, sweepstake tickets, jewelries and other goods, during office hours and within the office premises are not allowed.

4. Unnecessary Conversation

Employees should not engage in unnecessary conversation or group discussion on matters not related to the business of the office. Talking in loud tone of voice or making unnecessary noise should be avoided.

5. Attending to personal matters

Attending to personal matters during office hours is prohibited. Should it become necessary for an employee to leave his work area or the System's premises for personal reasons, he should first obtain the permission of his immediate superior and the time spent should be properly registered in his time card or record, the same to be charged to his leave credit.

6. Taking of meals or snacks

Employees are only allowed to take their lunch or merienda during lunch time (12:00-1:00 P.M.) or break periods (10:00-10:15 A.M.) and (3:00-3:15 P.M.) except those who because of the nature of their work, could not observe the prescribed recess periods.

7. Wearing of office uniforms and name plates

Employees are enjoined to wear the prescribed office uniforms and name plates at all times within the premises of the GSIS. For this purpose, henceforth, polo barong shall be one of the prescribed uniforms for men.

In order to carry out effectively the foregoing rules and regulations, there is hereby created a Visitorial Team composed of Messrs. Federico M. Romero, Manager, PAAD; Domingo Garcia, Manager, MAID; and Antonio Ancheta, President, GSISEA and/or their authorized representatives.

The team shall take steps, perform such duties, and devote as much time as are necessary therefore.

Managers of Departments especially those of the restricted areas

are hereby directed to designate a responsible employee (at least with the rank of Section Chief) to list down the names of officials and employees violating the above prohibitions within their respective departments and to submit said list to the Manager, PAAD, for appropriate administrative action.

Chiefs of section or unit supervisors shall see to it that the above prohibitions, rules and regulations are observed or complied with by their respective subordinates. They shall be equally liable for such appropriate administrative action unless they have taken the initiative of reporting such conduct or infractions by their subordinates to their superiors or higher authorities.

Strict compliance herewith is enjoined.

(SGD.) B. M. DEL ROSARIO  
General Manager

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In 1954, a well-publicized reorganization of the GSIS commenced. The President of the Philippines appointed a new General Manager, Gregorio S. Licaros, who promptly initiated some changes in the organization. At the outset, the new management increased the wages of most employees and aimed at rapidly reaching the monthly minimum wage the union was demanding. Wengert evaluated the initial effects of the wage increase as follows:

The impact of these changes appears to have been registered in the willingness of the staff to concentrate on cleaning up the backlog accumulated over many years. Within six months more than 97% of the old business had been disposed of and by the end of the first year operations were largely current.<sup>55</sup>

Another wage increase in 1955 convinced GSIS employees that they work fulltime during the hottest months of the summer, instead of the usual 5-hour workday during this period.

Other changes instituted by Licaros were better maintenance of the

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<sup>55</sup>E. S. Wengert, "GSIS: Reflections on reform and reorganization." Philippine Journal of Public Administration, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 1957, pp. 46-67 (p. 51).

office building, the opening of lines of communication between himself and the employees through public meetings, the creation of a "Reorganization Committee" to advise him on needed changes in policies and procedures, and the establishment of the Information Service Center (now called the Members Assistance and Information Department) to interpret policyholder needs to GSIS and to explain GSIS to the policyholder and beneficiaries. No attempt to weed the incompetents or the abusers from the system was made during the years of recorded "reorganizing" activities of Licaros.

Through the Information Service Center, the GSIS sought to become its own "broker". Through reports, memoranda and mass media advertisements, GSIS warned policyholders not to utilize third parties to get service. This act was declared to be specially grievous if they used a relative as intermediary. The relative employed in GSIS who acted as an intermediary was subject to "disciplinary action".

The long-term value of such efforts on the morale and overall efficiency of the employees is questionable. As indicated by the preceding 1967 memorandum, by the efforts of the GSIS management in the summer of 1970 to minimize client-employee contacts during office hours, and through other undesirable practices outlined in the 1967 memorandum, it appears that the organization keeps waging the same battle over the years, without much change in the nature of the war.

GSIS members themselves are well aware of many of the sources of the problems of their organization. Here are some of the insights the respondents offered:

Investment policies oscillate whenever there is a change in (national) administration.

The government has ordered the reorganization of all departments,

but chances are, nothing will be done about the duplication of functions.

Policies and procedures should be strictly supplemented.  
Job should be professionalized.

Lots of proposals never materialize.

The General Manager should be given a fixed tenure of office and the members of the Board of Trustees should come from different sectors comprising the membership of the System elevated to their seats by election among members.

The future for us who are left behind in the Philippines is very dark. No chances of improvement in this kind of administration--all politics, and politics destroys the people and our nation.

I think no change in my job should be done but the System's employees should be more aware of their obligations to serve the members.

Absenteeism, loafing around during office hours must not be tolerated although management has been lax with the employees.

Red tape, and the unavoidable presence of favoritism especially in terms of promotions (are the aspects of the job which I would like to change). This matter of favoritism has been a bane of most government offices and our office is no exception.

...be informed that making promotion and imposing disciplinary action rests on the Council of Personnel Administration (and not with the supervisor) to which (practice) I don't subscribe.

We have to completely overhaul our political set-up and values as a people. As it is now politics bogs down all our hopes for a better life.

Supervisors must not be too friendly with his or her subordinates. Supervisors must desist from asking favors (especially personal ones) from his men so that his men will respect him. They should avoid promoting somebody whom they think is not qualified, but who is a friend.

(Promotion through the merit system)...could be done if the Management will only weed out the numerous undesirables, most of whom are political proteges, who brag about their connections.

The inefficiency of some employees arise from the brazen ignorance regarding office rules and regulations and office decorum. This could be attributed to meddling of politicians in government offices.

There obviously is some awareness on the part of the employees and



supervisors of GSIS that 1) there are serious problems in the system, 2) the roots of the problem are both external and internal to the organization, and 3) there are internal changes that may be made to alleviate the problem, but 4) since the organization is part of a more complex cultural and political network, the solutions to the problems require drastic action which no one seems to want or have the power to undertake.

In Philamlife, the problems are not problems of attaining and maintaining efficiency, but are in the areas of adequacy of compensation of personnel, and the relationship between the management and its employees. It was the impression of lower level employees that there is a tremendous disparity between the compensation of the non-supervisory and lower level supervisors on the one hand, and middle and top management personnel on the other. Although it was acknowledged that merit increases were given periodically, changes in job title were not made with the same frequency as should have been necessary or just under the circumstance. Apparently, these merit increases were a miserly way of acknowledging good work. An upgrading of job titles would usually mean a greater salary increase. One of the middle management men commented on an attempt to get a strike vote by the union: "They (the union members) are crazy. Compared to other private companies, we have better wages and fringe benefits. They just won a recent collective bargaining contract. Now they want to re-negotiate even before the old contract has expired!" Despite the attitude of management personnel toward wages and fringe benefits, lower level employees were apparently dissatisfied with them.

There was some sentiment among lower-level supervisors (particularly

those who supervised fewer than 10 people) that the final say in the hiring, promotion and salary increases of those working under them should be theirs alone rather than by the "higher-ups". One of the supervisors said that what bothered him most in his job was "handling people not very well recognized by the company and not properly compensated". What appears to be more serious (in its pervasiveness) is the feeling of non-supervisory personnel that 1) supervisors do not give "constructive" criticism, and 2) the rules of the organization are enforced too strictly. The following comments by Philamlife respondents reveal the nature of these problems:

Assistant Vice-President is cranky. Sees defects in everything.

(The stressful situations I have experienced are those in which) I was afraid I could not cope with the job due to workload and the strictness of my supervisor.

The aspect of my job I dislike most is the unmindful attitudes of a higher supervisor to understand fully the nature, the job and (my) personal condition.

The aspects of my job I dislike most are the volume of work, being carefully watched by my immediate superior and others, antagonistic attitudes of superiors and others and favoritism by superiors (in approving leaves of absence, promotions).

Being constantly and openly watched (by supervisors) in your work is something very annoying and disgusting.

No matter what you do or have done, mistakes or errors of the people you supervise, are taken against you. The good things are not remembered.

The aspects of my job I want changed are the unnecessary intervention of my immediate superior and pestly co-employees, and the strict enforcement of company regulations without exception or consideration as if we are not human beings but machines.

Two of the employees who had grievances about the slowness with which they were being promoted, and about the unusually strict enforcement of company regulations said that the employees' union may be a

tool to correct the grievances. Except for a brief attempt by the union to convince its members to strike, no strong encounters between management and the union were in the offing at the termination of the information data-collecting process in Philamlife.

It appears that while GSIS has incorporated particularism of the larger culture to the sacrifice of the utilization of the talents and energies of its employees and of the overall efficiency of the system, Philamlife has developed in the opposite direction. At least from the point of view of its members, Philamlife sometimes tries to get more out of its members than it pays them for, and superiors sometimes totally ignore the "human" characteristics of those they supervise in order to get the job done. The employees feel dissatisfied because although they recognize that Philamlife is better than most companies, they believe that they should get better treatment than they are receiving.

## CONCLUSION

The class of role stress frequent in the public bureaucracy differs qualitatively from that which occurs in the private one. Both bureaucracies generate strain from ambiguity of expectations. However, the public bureaucracy burdens its members with stress from relatives, friends and other clients through unrestricted direct access, and from superiors who communicate expectations contrary to official rules. The private bureaucracy in its turn overloads members with work, and appalls them with superiors whose primary drive is to get things done, to the neglect of interpersonal values so important to the Filipino people.

Role stress is, within limits, a normal concomitant of organizational processes. The nature and extent of stress in an organization have implications for the health and happiness of its members, the overall productivity of the organization, and the welfare of its clients. If stress occurs with the frequency and intensity which threatens any of these, steps have to be taken to reduce or eliminate the sources of stress without risking the sacrifice of the rest of the dimensions of concern. A program of change designed to alleviate role strain has more far-reaching consequences for the public than for the private bureaucracy in terms of member welfare, organizational productivity and client welfare. The conditions of stress in the public bureaucracy are intimately related to the violation of the sense of justice of

its members who find appointments, promotions, salary increases and job assignments to be irrational, to the low level of productivity in the organization, and to the dissatisfaction of the clientele who are either served unfairly or not promptly.

The evidence of member consciousness of where the problems of the organization lie allows hope that efforts at change will have support. Any effort at altering the stressful conditions has to deal with vested interest groups consisting of clientele, politicians, and organization members. Years of inertia also will have to be overcome. Another problem is fears that the organization may turn around and exploit its members.

A strategy of change within the network of public bureaucracies in developing countries will have to be implemented on an organization-by-organization basis. This means that a central plan, a timetable, of the reconstruction of individual organizations will have to be made. The plan would ensure that not more than two public organizations will undertake a major overhaul within a period of two years. This will deliberately leave organizations which are "frozen" to absorb the impact of the patronage system and the particularistic demands of both their members and their clientele. In essence, this program of reconstruction is a program of education of a highly particularistic society through a timed sequence of restructuring of its public bureaucracies.

An internal program of change in the large private bureaucracy aimed specifically at the conditions which give rise to severe strain will yield outcomes which are non-bureaucratic in character. These outcomes are the satisfaction of the bureaucrat's needs for intimacy

with individuals he works with irrespective of formal rank, and a provision for the cultivation of his sense of worth as a human being. Unquestionably, there is always room for greater efficiency in the private bureaucracy. This is true even of the top American corporations which are considered models of efficiency and productivity. However, efforts toward a higher level of efficiency need do nothing about the sources of role stress revealed here unless the strain produced takes a toll on productivity.

If developing nations would continue to support the expansion of the private sector of the economy, the problem of work overload is of minor concern to the larger society. To the extent that maximum employee output contributes to client satisfaction, stimulates organizational profitability, and enhances the survival chances of the society, then work overload is "good". The problem of interpersonal relations is a serious long-run concern if alienation between management and lower bureaucrats is extensive in the private sphere. The developments in the nature of management-labor relations in the large private bureaucracy in the developing societies now may be expected to take the direction of increasing alienation between the two groups, especially as labor unions grow in power. The quality of mutual respect toward each other as human beings does not grow spontaneously in the bureaucracy along with increasing profitability. This means that the work situation may become more of a psychological battleground than it is now.

There is enough range of variability in the nature of labor-management relations in the private sphere that it is not fair to generalize the problem of interpersonal relations from the formal observation of one large organization to the rest of the private

organizations. Public bureaucracies, irrespective of size, are more homogeneous on the criteria of the degrees of paternalism and impersonality. It is more difficult, at the present level of information, to assess the degree of seriousness of the problem of role strain resulting from impersonality in private bureaucracies than to evaluate the seriousness of high frequency of non-legitimate expectations from families, friends, clients and superiors toward members of public bureaucracies.

The research strategy for exploring further the nature of role stress in developing societies needs to utilize more intensive interviewing. It is also important to gain more complete access to the official and unofficial communications within the bureaucracies studied.

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## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

### Summary of Findings on Organizational Stress<sup>i</sup>

#### A. On organizational structure and processes in role stress

1. The more frequent the extra-organizational boundary contacts by the focal person, the greater the amount of role conflict and the higher the level of tension he experiences.
2. Occupational status is not significantly related to job satisfaction, but is negatively correlated with stability of attitudes towards one's job.<sup>ii</sup>
3. The higher one's organizational status is, the greater is his tension and job worries.<sup>iii</sup>
4. Organizational status is curvilinearly related to the frequency of role conflict.<sup>iv</sup>
5. The closer the focal person is to his role senders in the organizational structure, the greater the amount of role pressure they exert on him.
6. The greater the functional dependence of the role sender on the focal person, the greater the amount of role pressure they exert on him.

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<sup>i</sup>R. L. Kahn and others, 1964.

<sup>ii, iii, iv</sup>These findings are from the intensive study. Kahn and others used separate indexes of status for the intensive study and for the national survey. The index used for the intensive study consisted of the following categories, listed from the highest to the lowest status category: Professional, Technical; Managerial; Clerical, Sales; Craftsmen, Foremen; Operatives; and Unskilled, Service. For the national survey, the following categories, from highest to lowest, were used: Top Management; Middle Management; Second Level Supervisors; and Foremen. The researchers devised separate measures for the two studies because they found that the measure of occupational status used for the national study did not discriminate between the focal persons of the intensive study.

B. On the personal and organizational costs of conflict

1. The frequency of role conflict is directly related to the intensity of the experienced conflict, and to the amount of job-related tensions.
2. The more intense the role conflict, the lower the trust, liking and respect the focal person has for his role senders.
3. The more intense the role conflict, the less the focal person communicates with, and the less the power he attributes to his role senders.

C. On role ambiguity and its consequences

1. Feelings of futility and tension increase as the degree of role ambiguity increases.
2. Job satisfaction and self-confidence decrease as the degree of role ambiguity increases.
3. Trust decreases as role ambiguity increases.
4. Role ambiguity has no significant consequence to such interpersonal factors as frequency of communication, with, and respect and liking for one's role senders.

D. On organizational norms and role conflict

1. A high degree of role conflict occurs more often when one's role senders score high on "rules orientation" than when they score low on this orientation.
2. A high degree of role conflict occurs more often when one's role senders score high on "closeness of supervision orientation" than when they score low on this orientation.
3. A high degree of role conflict occurs more often when one's role senders score high on "universalism" than when they score low on this trait.

E. On power, influence and the role-sending process

1. The higher the status of the role sender compared to that of the focal person, the greater is the former's direct<sup>v</sup> as well as indirect<sup>vi</sup> power to take disciplinary action on the latter.

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<sup>v</sup>Direct power is exerted by the role sender himself on the focal person.

<sup>vi</sup>Indirect power is wielded by the role sender through the use of a third person to apply the influence directly on the focal person.

2. The higher the status of the role sender compared to that of the focal person, the more able the former is to coerce the latter into compliance by threatening to transfer, dismiss, or block salary increase or promotion.
3. The lower the status of the role sender compared to that of the focal person, the more likely the former is to use the threat to withhold aid, information or cooperation to coerce the latter into compliance.
4. The role sender is more successful in eliciting required behavior from the focal person when his power is based on legitimate, reward, or coercive power rather than on expert, referent or indirect power.

F. On role relations and response to stress

1. A high degree of objective role conflict coupled with a high frequency of communication with one's role senders results in a very high intensity of experienced conflict.
2. Objective conflict leads to a high degree of experienced ambiguity when communication rates are high but not when they are low.
3. When the focal person experiences role conflict and communicates with his role senders frequently, he is more likely to have a drastic reduction in job satisfaction and an increase in feelings of futility than when he has minimal communication.
4. High frequency of communication is associated with close interpersonal bonds (trust, respect, and liking for one's role senders).
5. Conflict leads to a reduction of communication whether functional dependence of the role senders in the focal person is high or low.
6. The frequency of communication is significantly higher in high conflict-high dependence situations than in those typified by high conflict-low dependence.
7. When role senders are highly dependent but impose little conflict, the focal person copes well; when these dependent senders create high degrees of conflict, his coping is much less successful.
8. When role senders are less dependent, the focal person is able to cope successfully (using avoidance techniques) whether the conflicts are strong or not.
9. Given high functional dependence, role conflicts lead to intense inner conflict, dissatisfaction with the job, a general sense of futility and weak affective interpersonal bonds.

10. High role conflict generated by powerful and dependent role senders lead to job disenchantment and high degree of futility.

G. On job orientation<sup>vii</sup> and role conflict

1. At any given level of role conflict, the amount of tension experienced by the status-oriented person is greater than that experienced by the non-status oriented.
2. The status-oriented person is more likely to withdraw drastically from affective interpersonal attachments than are non-status oriented individuals as the degree of role conflict increases.
3. Security-oriented individuals are less likely to experience increased tension as the degree of role conflict increases than non-security oriented individuals.
4. Security-oriented individuals are less likely to withdraw from affective interpersonal attachments as the degree of role conflict increases than non-security oriented individuals.

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<sup>vii</sup>Kahn and others classified job orientation into achievement orientation and security orientation. Basically, the researchers agreed with McClelland and others ("A Scoring Manual for the Achievement Motive," in MOTIVES IN FANTASY, ACTION AND SOCIETY, ed. by J. Atkinson, New York, Van Norstrand, 1958, p. 181) definition of achievement orientation in terms of the individual's emphasis on the pursuit of "success in competition with a standard of excellence." However, they differentiated two types of achievement-orientation: status orientation and expertise orientation. The difference between status-oriented and expertise-oriented individuals lies in the type of achievement goals each pursues. Expertise goals are those involving the successful performance of challenging tasks or the exercise of valued skills. Status goals are those involving eliciting favorable evaluations from those who are in a strategic position to advance the individual's career.



## **APPENDIX B**

## APPENDIX B

### Questionnaire STUDY OF PHILIPPINE ORGANIZATIONS

1. All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things in our work. Please indicate by a check mark ( ) under the appropriate right hand column how frequently you are bothered by each of the things listed on the left. (Choices in right hand columns, from left to right are: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time.)
  - a. Feeling that you have too little authority to carry out the responsibilities assigned to you.
  - b. Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of your job are.
  - c. Not knowing what opportunities for advancement or promotion exist for you.
  - d. Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, one that you can't possibly finish during an ordinary workday.
  - e. Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting demands of various people above you.
  - f. Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your job.
  - g. Not knowing what your supervisor thinks of you, how he evaluates your performance.
  - h. The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out your job.
  - i. Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals, people that you know.
  - j. Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the people you work with.
  - k. Feeling unable to influence your immediate supervisor's decisions and actions that affect you.
  - l. Not knowing just what the people you work with expect of you.

- m. Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may interfere with how well it gets done.
  - n. Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are against your better judgement.
  - o. Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your family life.
  - p. Feeling that your progress on the job is not what it should be or could be.
  - q. Thinking that someone else may get the job above you, the one you are directly in line for.
  - r. Feeling that you have too much responsibility and authority delegated to you by your superiors.
2. Do you feel that your job imposes some stress and pressure beyond that which most people experience? Please indicate your response with a check mark ( ).

Not at all

A little bit more than most

Somewhat more than most

Quite a bit more than most

A great deal more than most

3. What are the conditions or situations you have to deal with that you think are particularly stressful or tension-inducing?
4. When the tension is really pretty strong, what do you do to get it out of your system?
- 4a. How do you feel about the way it handles the problem?
5. What was the stressful situation you had last?
- 5a. How did you feel about this when it came up?
- 5b. What did you try to do about it?
- 5c. What else did you think about trying to do?
- 5d. How did it work out? Did the problem finally get solved to your satisfaction?
- 5e. What else might you try when this comes up again?

6. Have there been instances in the last year or so when the pressure was so great that you felt you could not handle the situation? Please indicate your answer with a check mark. ( ) (Yes, No)
- 6a. (If "Yes" to question 6:) Please give an example of such a situation.
- 6b. (If "Yes" to question 6:) How did you resolve it?
7. How does each of the following help you know what you are supposed to do in your job? Please indicate your answer by a check mark ( ) on one of the right hand columns for each item on the left hand column. (Not at all, A little, Some, Quite a bit, A great deal.)

Job Descriptions

Policy Statements

Memos

Other written documents (please specify)

Professional schooling or specialized training?

Professional, technical or business associations and organizations?

Other sources (please specify)

8. To what extent have you been able to define this job for yourself, to carve out your own area of responsibility, to make major changes in your activities, and the like? Please indicate your answer by a check mark ( ).

Not at all

Very little

Somewhat

To a considerable extent

Completely

9. Please state the name of your immediate supervisor or the person you report directly to:
- 9a. What is his position in the company?
10. Is there anyone else to whom you are directly responsible for your activities? (Yes, No)
- 10a. (If "Yes" to question 10:) Please state his name.
- 10b. Are you a supervisor? Is there anyone who reports directly to you? (Yes, No)

11. Are there any other people you have to be concerned with either because their work affects you or your work affects them? (Yes, No)
- 11a. (If "Yes" to question 11:) Who are they? (Respondent indicates the name and position of or his relationship to role sender.)
12. Are there any people within the company who are important to you personally—with whom you might discuss your work? (Yes, No)
- 12a. (If "Yes" to question 12:) Who are they? (Respondent indicates the name and position of or relationship to role sender.)
- 12b. Anyone outside the company like that? (Yes, No)
- 12c. (If "Yes" to question 12b:) Who are they? (Respondent indicates the name and position of or his relationship to role sender.)

After answering questions 9 to 12c, please go back to these numbers and label each of the names you mentioned with letters of the alphabet. Label the first name you mentioned as A, the second name as B, the third as C, and so forth. Henceforth, you will be referring to each person you listed by the alphabet label. Please detach Page 5 after you have labeled each name. This makes reference to these persons easy. However, please keep Page 5 and turn it in along with the rest of the questionnaire.

Question nos. 13-16 are about the persons you listed on Page 5

13. Please indicate with a check mark under each of the right hand columns how important each person you listed on Page 5 is in determining how you do your job. (Right hand columns indicate, from left to right, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)
 

Not at all important

Not too important

Somewhat important

Quite important

Extremely important
14. How often do you talk with each one of them? (Right hand columns indicate, from left to right, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)
 

Less often than a few times a month

A few times a month

About once a week

Several times a week

Once or twice a day

Several times a day

Almost constantly

15. Suppose you were having some difficulty in your job. To what extent do you feel each of these people would be willing to get out of his way to help you if you asked for it? (Right hand columns indicate, from left to right, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)

Not at all

To a very little extent

To some extent

To a considerable extent

To a very great extent

16. How do you like each of these people personally? (Right hand columns indicate from left to right, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J.)

I dislike him

I don't like him very much

I don't have much feeling for him, one way or the other

I like him fairly well

I like him a lot and would like to know him better

He's a good friend of mine

He's my best friend

#### Questions About Person \_\_\_\_\_

Questions 17 to 35f are about your relationship with one of the persons you listed in Page 5.

17. What are the reasons for getting together with him? What kinds of things do you generally talk about?
18. Are there any things he needs to inform you about in order for you to do a good job? (Yes, No)
- 18a. (If "Yes" to 18:) What are they?
19. When he tries to get you to do something, what sort of thing is it?

20. Is there anything else he might try to get you to do—anything that isn't ordinarily part of your job? (Yes, No)
- 20a. (If "Yes" to 20:) What is it?
21. Does he ever try to get you to do things differently than you usually do them?
- (Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)
22. Does he ever try to get you to do things different than you are supposed to do them?
- (Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)
23. As far as you know, does he always let you know when he expects or wants something from you, or does he keep these things to himself?
- (Always lets me know, Usually lets me know, Sometimes does, Sometimes doesn't let me know, Usually does not let me know, Never lets me know)
24. What does he usually do to try to get you to do these things?
25. What might he do to try to influence you to do them?
26. How difficult do you feel it usually is to do what he wants from you:
- (Very easy, Quite easy, Not too difficult, Quite difficult, Extremely difficult)
- 26a. (If "Extremely Difficult" or "Quite Difficult" to 26:) Why is that?
27. Do you feel that you know how satisfied he is with what you do?
- (I always know where I stand, I usually know where I stand, I sometimes do and sometimes don't know where I stand, I am often somewhat in the dark, I usually don't know where I stand)
28. Do you ever find it difficult to talk to (Person) \_\_\_\_\_ about anything? (Yes, No)
- 28a. (If "Yes" to 28:) In what ways is it difficult?
29. Which of the following strategies has (Person) \_\_\_\_\_ tried to use to make you do something you were reluctant to do? Please check ( ) all the applicable items.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ask a good friend to tell you to do it for (Person) \_\_\_\_\_.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Tell you that you do not have a choice but do it, with the implication that your job will be prejudiced if you didn't

do what he asked you to do.

\_\_\_\_\_ Show in some way that he feels insulted and/or hurt by your reluctance to do the job.

\_\_\_\_\_ Convince you that it is within his authority to ask you to do it.

\_\_\_\_\_ Provide you with more information about the job which shows that the job is worth doing, or that the job can be done with the skills you have.

\_\_\_\_\_ Let you know in some way that he will go out of his way to put in a good word for you with management.

\_\_\_\_\_ Tell you that the job is within the scope of your responsibility.

\_\_\_\_\_ Other (please specify):

30. How often have you found that the orders, requests and/or suggestions of (Person) \_\_\_\_\_ cannot be fulfilled without displeasing another person important to your job?

(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

30a. (If "Sometimes," "Rather Often," or "Nearly all the time" to 30:) Please give an example of a situation in which you had encountered such difficulty.

30b. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30:) What do you generally do when something like that happens?

30c. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30:) To what extent had being given such orders, suggestions or requests by (Person) \_\_\_\_\_ bothered you?

(Not at all, A little, Some, Quite a bit, A great deal)

30d. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30:) Do you believe such difficulty in fulfilling Person \_\_\_\_\_'s expectations without displeasing an important person has adversely affected your estimate as to the extent to which (Person) \_\_\_\_\_ would go out of his way to help you if you asked for his help?

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, Very much)

30e. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 30:) Do you believe such difficulty in fulfilling (Person) \_\_\_\_\_'s expectations without displeasing an important person has adversely affected the extent to which you respect his knowledge and judgment?

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, Very much)



31. How often have you found that the orders, requests and suggestions or (Person) \_\_\_\_\_ were in conflict with your interpretation of company rules and/or what you are supposed to do in your job?

(Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)

- 31a. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:) Please give an example of a situation in which you had encountered such difficulty.

- 31b. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:) What do you generally do when something like that happens?

- 31c. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:) To what extent had being given orders, suggestions or requests by (Person) \_\_\_\_\_ which are in conflict with your interpretation of company rules and/or what you are supposed to do in your job bothered you?

(Not at all, A little, Some, Quite a bit, A great deal)

- 31d. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:) Do you believe that the occasions in which he gave you such orders, requests and/or suggestions have adversely affected the extent to which you respect his knowledge and judgement?

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, Very much)

- 31f. (If "Sometimes", "Rather often", or "Nearly all the time" to 31:) Do you believe that the occasion in which he gave you such orders, requests, and/or suggestions have adversely affected the extent to which you like (Person) \_\_\_\_\_?

(Not at all, Not so much, Somewhat, Very much)

32. What are the major activities in your job? (Some of your activities are probably more important to your job than others. After listing them, please rank all the items in the order of their importance on the left hand column. The most important activity should be ranked as "1", the second most important activity as "2", and so on.)

33. How often during a day do you have something to do as part of your job with each of the following groups of people? (Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time, Does not apply)

- a. Your boss or other people over you.
- b. People you supervise, directly or indirectly
- c. Others who work in your department but who are not under or over you
- d. Others in the same company, but not in your department
- e. Outsiders who have business with the company, like salesman or customer/clients
- f. Other people in the company or outside of it

34. Some jobs put people "in the middle" between two sets of people who want different things. In your job, how often do you feel "in the middle" of the following sets of people: (Doesn't apply, Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)
- a. Management and union
  - b. Customers and company
  - c. Your boss and your fellow workers
  - d. Your boss and the company
  - e. Your family and the company
  - f. Your friends outside the company who are not customers and the company
  - g. Other (please specify):
35. Which of the following alternatives best represents how clear you are about what you have to do on this job?
- I am very clear
  - I am quite clear on most things
  - I am fairly clear
  - I am not too clear
  - I am not at all clear
36. In the past year, how often have you had someone who has a higher position than yours in the company/office come to you, without consulting your immediate supervisor, to ask you to do something which required rearranging your work priorities? (Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Rather often, Nearly all the time)
- 36a. (If "Rarely", "Sometimes", "Rather often", "Nearly all the time" to 36:) How much has this bothered you? (Not at all, A little, Some, Quite a bit, A great deal)
37. Many positions in industry require that a person have not only certain technical skills and experiences, but also certain personality characteristics or particular talents. Thinking of your own job, what sort of personal characteristics do you feel a person ought to have in order to do your job very well?
38. What sort of personal characteristics might lead one to do poorly in that job?
39. How do you feel you rate as far as the qualities you mentioned in question 37 go? (Respondent rates himself on each of the qualities on the following scale: Superior, Above average, Slightly below average, Very poor)
40. Please indicate by a check mark ( ) which of the following information you believe somebody working in an office may justifiably keep from his supervisor(s):

\_\_\_\_\_ An error he made due to the incompetence, dishonesty, or slip by an officemate.

\_\_\_\_\_ An error somebody else made due to his unintentional slip in

- \_\_\_\_\_ relaying information, computation, or checking of the necessary data.
- \_\_\_\_\_ An error he made due to lack of information or misunderstanding of office policies with respect to that particular matter.
- \_\_\_\_\_ An unsuccessful attempt by a client of the company to bribe him.
- \_\_\_\_\_ An unsuccessful attempt by an officemate with whom he has frequent contact to speed up the processing of a client's papers in violation of company policy to process papers on a "first-come, first-serve basis".
- \_\_\_\_\_ An unsuccessful attempt by an officemate with whom he has little contact, but who has influence on his promotion or on how difficult or easy his job would be, to speed up the processing of a client's papers in violation of the company's policy to process papers on a "first-come, first-serve basis".
- \_\_\_\_\_ A request by someone who has a higher position than he in the company, but who is not his immediate supervisor, to make him do a job which will very temporarily interfere with what he is normally expected to be working on.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The fact that he has very little to do in his job and he is bothered by it.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The fact that he does not feel competent to do the job that was assigned to him.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The fact that he has little control over his subordinates because of the way the company sets its policies.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The fact that his family problems are interfering with his performance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The fact that his health has been failing and he is making hard though successful attempts at fulfilling his job obligations.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The fact that his immediate supervisor makes him do a lot of things which the supervisor either never asks for again or never uses.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The fact that his job only duplicates the work of somebody else in the company.

41. What kind of people would you like as workmates? What do you feel makes a person a good one to have around?

42. How well does your immediate supervisor know the jobs he supervises?

- He knows very little about the jobs.
- He doesn't know the jobs very well.
- He knows the job fairly well.
- He knows the jobs very well.

43. How much is your immediate supervisor interested in helping those who work under him to get ahead in the company?

- He doesn't want them to get ahead.
- He doesn't care whether they get ahead or not.
- He is glad to see them get ahead, but he doesn't help them much.
- He helps them get ahead, if he gets a chance.
- He goes out of his way to help them get ahead.

44. Taking it all in all, how well would you say your immediate supervisor does his job?

He does a poor job.

He does a fair job.

He does a good job.

He does a very good job.

He does an excellent job.

45. How good would you say your immediate supervisor is at dealing with the people he supervises?

He is poor at handling people.

He is not very good at dealing with people/does other things better.

He is fairly good at dealing with people.

He is good at this—better than most.

He is very good at this—it's his strongest point.

46. What happens when someone on your level makes a complaint about something?

It's hardly ever taken care of.

It's often not taken care of.

It's usually taken care of.

It's almost always taken care of.

47. In general, how much satisfaction and pleasure do you think other people get from the work they do?

(Very much, Considerable, Some, Very little, None at all)

48. Compared with other things people do—things that are not connected with their work—how much do you feel that they view their jobs as a real source of satisfaction in life?

(Very much, Considerable, Some, Very little, Not at all)

49. What do you look for in a job? What makes a job a good one for you?

50. What are some of the things that would make a job bad for you?

51. How does your job compare with other jobs you know about?

(Much better than most, Slightly better than most, About the same as other jobs, Slightly worse than most, A lot worse than most)

52. What aspects of your job do you find most satisfying?

53. What do you find least satisfying in your job?

54. If you could redesign your job as it would be most satisfying for you, what would you like to have changed about it?
- 54a. What would have to be done to bring about these changes?
- 54b. What are the possibilities that these things could be done?
- 54c. Have there been any attempts to make these changes in the past?
- 54d. Is anything being done now along these lines?
55. When you were young, what did your family want you to be? Was there any particular occupation they wanted you to go into?
56. Please think back to when you were in high school. What kinds of thoughts did you have about what you wanted to be?
57. Why is that?
58. (If you changed your ideas as to what you indicated in question 56 you wanted to be:) What has led you to decide to go into your present field instead of doing what you thought about doing earlier?
59. To what extent do you feel you are realizing your ambitions in your present work?
- (Completely, A great deal, Quite a bit, Some, Little, Not at all)
60. How about your present plans? Do you think you might like to make a change in jobs in the future? (Yes, No)
- 60a. (If "Yes" to 60:) What kind of change would you like to make?
- 60b. (If "Yes" to 60:) What do you think your chances are for making that change?
- 60c. (If "Yes" to 60:) What are you doing now that will help you make that change?
- 60d. (If "No" to 60:) Why is it that you do not feel you want to make a change of jobs in the future?
61. Do you think your wife/husband would like you to change to some other job? (Yes, No, Not applicable)

- 61a. (If "Yes" to 61:) Please elaborate on why your wife/husband would like you to change to some other job.
62. In general, how would you sum up your present situation? How do you feel about your future?
63. How long have you worked for \_\_\_\_\_? \_\_\_\_\_years  
\_\_\_\_\_months.
64. What did you do before working here?
65. Have you had promotions or has your responsibility increased in some other way since you started working here? (Yes, No)
66. (If "Yes" to 65:) What promotions did you have?
67. How long have you been in this present job? \_\_\_\_\_years  
\_\_\_\_\_months.
68. How well did you know what was expected of you when you first came into your present job?
- (Very well, Pretty well, Not very well, Not at all well)
69. When you first came to your present job, how or from whom did you learn what is expected of you in this job?
70. Are you married? (Yes, No)
71. How many people were dependent upon you for a major part of their support last year?

(FOR SUPERVISORS ONLY)

Down the left side of this page are a number of things a subordinate of yours might do. For each of the things listed on the left column, please indicate whether you'd like him to do it or not to do it. The headings at the top of each column on the right indicate the degree to which you'd personally like to see him do it. Next to each things listed, just check in the column that best expresses your feelings. (Respondent indicates his feelings on the following scale: Strongly prefer he not do it, Somewhat prefer he not do it, Doesn't matter to me, Somewhat prefer he do it, Strongly prefer he do it.)

1. Accept judgement of higher-ups as final
2. Come up with new, original ideas for handling work
3. Try to make himself look good in the eyes of the higher-ups whenever possible
4. Spend time off the job with others in the company who have a much higher position than his
5. Spend time off the job with others in the company who have a much lower position than his
6. Break company rules when he thinks it is in the company's best interest
7. Report others who break company rules
8. Take an occasional day off just to relax
9. By-pass official channels when he wants something done in a hurry
10. Stick to the letter of company rules
11. Tell things to higher-ups that might make him look bad
12. Take advantage of every opportunity for promotion
13. Carry out orders even if he thinks they are unsound
14. Withhold information from higher-ups which puts a co-worker in a bad light
15. Do favors for a friend contrary to company rules
16. Tell higher-ups his frank opinion even if it will hurt them
17. Do the best he can, even if it makes a co-worker look bad by comparison
18. Report to his superior any short-cuts he uses in his work

19. Defend his co-workers from criticism by their superiors
20. Spend most of his time in supervisory matters
21. Let those he supervises set their own work-pace
22. Train men under him for better jobs
23. Be responsible for keeping up the morals of those under him
24. Try to cover up for the errors made by those under him
25. Take a personal interest in his men
26. Take sides with his men in any dispute with the company
27. Carry out orders his men don't like
28. Give special attention to friends in making the recommendations for promotion
29. Accept full responsibility for the decisions of those under him
30. Consult with his men in making any decision which affects them
31. Keep an eye on the personal life of those under him
32. Withhold from his men information his own superiors don't want passed on
33. Check frequently on the work of his men
34. Leave the men he supervises alone unless they want help
35. Keep men informed on what is happening in the company
36. Allow his men a great deal of say about the way they do their work



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