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thesis entitled

PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE
PRACTICES: A DISCUSSION AND SOME’PROPOSALS

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presented by

Gilbert M. White

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©1983

GILBERT M. WHITE

All Rights Reserved

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PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE
PRACTICES: A DISCUSSION AND SOME PROPOSALS

BY

Gilbert M. White

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Multi-Disciplinary Program (MDP)
College of Social Science

1983

ABSTRACT

PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE
PRACTICES: A DISCUSSION AND SOME PROPOSALS

BY

Gilbert M. White

There are various problems associated with current
campaign finance practices at both the federal and state
levels of government. Because (If legislator self—interest
and the desire of interest groups to influence legislative
activity, the combinationcfifthese two factors--linked
together by campaign finance--are seen as posing problems.
These problems are viewed in terms of possible negative
affects on the agency relationship that binds legislators
to their constituents, in terms of possible harm to the
larger system of representative democracy, and in terms of
the potential for the misuse of public power. Protection
against these kinds of perceived problems involves offering
alternatives to, or controls on, current practices within

the campaign finance system.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

The Perspective on Legislators . . . . .

The Perspective on Organized Special
Interest Groups . . . . . . . . . . . .
Campaign Finance . . . . . . . . . . .
The Concern with Government Activity .

Summary: Legislators, Interest Groups,
and Campaign Finance . . . . . . . . .

THE MISUSE OF PUBLIC POWER . . . . . . . .

V SUMMARY: GUARDING AGAINST CAMPAIGN FINANCE
RELATED ABUSES OF PUBLIC POWER . . . . . .

Change Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . .
ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O

12
12
19
29

33

37

39

44
46

INTRODUCTION

In democratic systems of government power is
expected to reside in the hands of the governed. Govern-
mental actions are expected to reflect the will and
preferences of the electorate. Yet government activity
does not always appear to reflect such commonly held
assumptions or expectations of representative democracy.
Scott (1981:307), for example, notes that Michel's
(1949 trans.) central argument--that oligarchic tendencies,
operating to shift power from the majority and place it in
the hands of an elite minority, are built into the very
structure of oragnizational arrangements--is a thesis that
time has tended to confirm, with representative government
appearing to be no exception. Lowi (1979:59) observes that
a drainage of public authority (or power) is one of the
costs of interest-group liberalism. This drainage has
tended to result in "support-group constituencies" within
the organizationwxfgovernment and it involves "parceling
out policy-making power to the most interested parties"
which, in turn, tends to destroy political responsibility.
Similarly, in his discussion of the phenomenon known as
"clientelism", Davidson (1977:30-31) notes that within the

Congress the organizational manifestation of clientelism,

2

termed "cozy triangles" (i.e., ingrown arrangements in
various policy fields), is a phenomenon that is deeply
ingrained in the Congressional legislative processes.* He
observes that clientelism is often viewed as a problem, and
offers a normative assumption to guide his discussion which
states that:

public policy, even in its most specialized and

seemingly self-contained segments, is too

important to be delegated to the primary bene-

ficiaries or subjects of that policy . . . Yet

this is what frequently passes for representative

policy making.
He notes further that while such work units (committees and
subcommittees) perform essential legislative functions,
they are not little legislatures.

Rather, they distort the full range of societal

interests as articulated in the political

system or even as manifested in the parent

house.2

Obviously there are different ways of characterizing

government decision making that appears to reflect a dis-
regard for the system of representative democracy. It is
commonly recognized that certain factors may serve to

distort and/or negate the supposed democratic nature of the

political system. Two factors in particular are deserving

 

*Davidson unp.30-31) states that the prime locus of
clientele politics is found in the numerous committees and
subcommittees which comprise the Congress. Structurally
speaking, clientelism "is found in the horizontal linkages
among Congressional committees (or subcommittees), execu—
tive agencies, and relevant outside groups . . . The
organizational features of Congress--in particular, its
accessibility to outside influences, its weak central
leadership, its decentralization, its bargaining ethos, and
its norms of specialization and reciprocity--form an ideal
setting for the conduct of clientele politics."

3

of focus: the self-interests of legislators and the desire
of private sector organizations to influence government
activity in a manner favorable to themselves. The system
of campaign finance in this country serves to bring both of
these factors together in an often times mutually beneficial
way. One consequence of these factors coming together are
government actions that give the appearance of impropriety
or, at the least, disregard for those broader interests of
society that are enunciated within the system of represen-
tative democracy. To the extent that such actions seemingly
violate the spirit of the political system, and the agency
relationship arrangement therein, the propriety of various
legislative actions are called into question. In short, the
combination of legislator self—interest and interest group
desire to influence legislative activities commonly witness
charges of the misuse of public power. Of concern here are
why such actions might be construed as involving the misuse

of public power.

THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

Central to notions of representative democracy is
the agency relationship. This involves a situation in
which one actor (the principal) purchases the right to
direct another actor (the agent) to act in the principal's
interest. In other words, legislators serve as the agents
of their constituents, whom we can think of as a type of
"plural" principal. Similarly, agency heads within the
executive branch of government may be thought of as serving
as the agents for another plural principal--the legislature.
Agency bureaucrats, in turn, serve as the agents of agency
heads, who function as the principals of such bureaucrats.
Legislators, then, possess a dual role: they are the agents
of the constituents, and through the public powers
invested in them by their plural principals they themselves
function as principals in relation to the agency heads of
the executive branch. Yet legislators do not always act,
as reflected by their official behavior, with their prin-

cipal's wishes or best interests in mind. As Miller (1979)

 

*A noted ambiguity about American government con-
cerns to whom top agency officials are answerable--the
legislature or the chief executive. In practice this
matter is subject to variations in interpretation. For
simplicity's sake I assume here that such officials are
the agents of, and thus answerable to, the legislature.

5
notes in his review of Rose-Ackerman (1978):
one of the most salient features of the agency
relationship is its fragility. The agent has
his or her own interests, which do not disap-
pear when the principal purchases the agent's
time.3
The question that concerns us here is stated as follows:
Why might a legislator be inclined to disregard the agency
relationship? Put another way, why might a legislator allow

nonconstituents to influence various aspects of his or her

official behavior?

The Perspective on Legislators

 

Legislators have their own interests which do not
disappear when they are serving as the agents of their
plural principals (constituents). That this is so is one
of the factors that can serve to neutralize, distort, or
negatively affect a system of representative democracy.

In short, a legislator may consciously choose to not act

in a manner that reflects the interests of his or her
plural principal for reasons of self-interest. Of course

a legislator can sincerely and honestly disagree with the
desires of the constituency and act accordingly. It is
then up to the legislator to explain his or her actions and,
depending on the importance that the constituents attach

to such actions, they may or may not appoint the legislator
to act as their agent come the next election. In addition,
voter ignorance and apathy may serve to facilitate, or at
least not hinder, the occurrence of legislative behavior

that runs contrary to their wishes or interests. And if a

6

legislator is in a position to use selective incentives
(Miller, 1979:1553), their actual use by the legislator

to obtain voter support can produce a fundamental change

in the agency relationship, a reversal of the asymmetric
agency relationship that exists between the legislator and
his or her constituency. Beyond matters of honest disagree-
ment or voter ignorance and apathy, however, there are two
primary self-interests of legislators that can motivate
them to ignore or even act against the wishes and interests
of their constituents: reelection and income.

Rose-Ackerman (1978) in her study of government
corruption provides a useful elaboration on these self-
interests of legislators who, given to such concerns, may
be willing to trade some of their influence (or power),
while acting in an official capacity, with individuals or
organized interest groups who are in a position to at least
partially satisfy these self-interests. As concerns income,
there are restrictions which are both limiting and explicit
in seeking to control behavior that may arise from such
self-interest. A 1978 statement by the Congress on pro-
visions of House Codes of Conduct is a representative
illustration.* Financial disclosure requirements pro-
hibited these legislators from accepting any gifts

aggregating $100 or more in value in any one calendar year

 

*Poraamore detailed account of these provisions
refer to the Common Cause (1979) study, How Money Talks in

Congress. PP. 67-73.

7

from any lobbyist or lobbying organization, or from
foreign nationals or their agents: prohibited members from
converting campaign funds to personal use; prohibited any
member from earning income at a job outside Congress in
excess of 15 percent of his official salary;* prohibited
any member from accepting any honorarium of more than $750,
"honorarium" meaning a payment of money or anything of
value for an appearance, speech or article by a member.
Generally speaking, such prohibitions reflect concern by
the Congress of controlling income related self-interest
behavior by legislators that might appear as improper,**
although these prohibitions are subject to alteration from
time to time. The intent of these prohibitions is to
minimize the ability of member legislators from using their
public office for personal financial enrichment. In spite
of provisions like those mentioned above, a legislator can
still accept material benefits that are quite substantial
when their cost is added up--including such things as free
meals, trips, and tickets to entertainment events of
various kinds--from individuals and representatives of
organized interest groups seeking access to, or influence

over, a legislator who is in a position to satisfy some of

 

*The limit did not apply to unearned income—-i.e.,
dividends from stocks or bonds; income from a family con-
trolled business; trade in which the personal services of
the member did not generate a significant amount of income.

**i.e., giving the appearance of conflict of
interest.

8

their interests. From the perspective of the individual
legislator such benefits can be considered as a form of
self-interest related income. The nationally syndicated
journalist Jack Anderson frequently describes such exchanges
that give, at the least, the appearance of impropriety or
conflict of interest.* On the whole, however, the income
concerns of legislators are subject to restrictions that
greatly limit the ability of legislators to use their
position to satisfy their self-interest with income.

Concern with reelection presents a second major
type of self-interest on the part of legislators, and it
represents a primary focus of current discussion on the
misuse of public power by legislators. This self-interest
concern of legislators is a major source of activity that
can serve to witness a disregard for the wishes or interests
of a legislator's constituents. At the least, it may
involve activity that violates the spirit of the agency
relationship which ties legislator/agents to constituent/
plural principals. At the worst, criminal behavior may be
observed.

The concern with reelection is certainly under-
standable as the job security of the legislator is far from
secure. Electoral review of the job performance of House
members is every two years, of Senate members every six

years. In an occupation where it is increasingly

 

*The following column by Anderson is illustrative:
"Lobbyists roll out the red carpet" (United Feature
Syndicate, January 25, 1983).

9

expensive to secure this type of job, concern with campaign
finance has become the predominant concern of most members
of Congress, and it is an increasing concern of legislators
at the state level. Current campaign finance practices,
especially at the federal level of government, are seen
within the sc0pe of this paper as presenting a major source
of potential or actual misuse of public power by legis-
lators within government. Hopefully this will, for various
reasons, become clearer as I proceed.

The costs of running for office have been signifi-
cantly increasing with each election. According to reports
issued by the Federal Election Commission in late November
1982, campaign spending in the 1982 congressional races was
reported at $314 million, 37 percent (or $75 million)
higher than the $229 million reported for the 1980
elections.* This continues a trend that has been going on
since at least 1974. This development reflects the wide-
spread recognition by legislators (and potential.legislators
as well) that dollars means votes. Various studies have
documented this apparent correlation. For instance, a
study by a corruption commission in Massachusettes docu—

mented that money is a controlling factor in state political

 

*See Adam Clymer of the New York Times,."PAC
donations boost spending" in the Detroit Free Press
(January 19, 1983) p. lA. Additionally, it should be noted
that these figures do not include money spent on elections
that is known as "soft money". Only "hard money" is
reported to the FEC. For an elaborative discussion, see
Drew, Part I (Dec. 6), pp. 63-64.

10

campaigns. A graph that they prepared:

shows that the more money a candidate spends

relative to Opposing candidates, the higher

will be his or her percentage of the total

vote. A candidate who spends less than half

of the total funds expended in his or her

campaign is three times more likely to lose.4

There is no reason to believe that such a reality

has escaped recognition by those who run for federal
office. Indeed, two articles by Elizabeth Drew, entitled
"Politics and Money", that appeared in the December 6 and
13, 1982 issues of the New Yorker magazine offer ample
evidence as to how significant this concern of legislators
in Congress has become. Members of Congress, their aides,
party fundraisers, and others offer vivid testimony to the
increasingly overwhelming preoccupation of legislators with
campaign finance matters. She refers to this preoccupation
as the "fear factor" that governs congressional behavior,
and calls the chase for such money (pp. 146-7) "the
domestic equivalent of the arms race." In describing how
legislative behavior is influenced by the current campaign
finance system, Drew observes that:

(We) now have a system in which even the best-

intentioned politicians get caught up in either

actual or apparent conflicts of interest, in

which it is difficult to avoid in effect selling

votes for campaign contributions.5
The effects on legislation are described as two-fold: it
can prOpel bad legislation or paralyze legislation. In
terms of official behavior a legislator can be influenced

to vote a certain way on the floor of the House of Senate;

to vote a certain way in a committee or subcommittee; to

ll

block action in either type of committee unit; to vote a
certain way or refrain from voting on a certain amendment
in a subcommittee, so as to shape a piece of legislation
in a certain direction, and then cover one's tracks by
voting for approval of the legislation; or to delay a bill
until time runs out or load it up with amendments until it
collapses of its own weight.*

The important point is that the basic idea of our
democratic process--representative government-—is ques-
tionably served by such practices. Contrasted to this
basic ideal, one may reasonably suggest that current
campaign finance practices present a significant oppor-
tunity for the misuse of public power. In bemoaning this
state of affairs Drew (Dec. 6, p. 149) quotes Rep. Jim
Leach (R-Iowa) as saying we have "a breakdown of constitu-
tional democracy, which is supposed to be based upon
citizen access and constituency access." Senator Dale
Bumpers (D-Arkansas) observes that "(Money) is the number-
one political problem our country is facing. I know that
money distorts the democratic process." Drew herself
observes that "the role of money has delivered us into the
special-interest state," a condition that serves as Lowi's
(1979) point of focus in his discussion of interest—group
liberalism. The sentiments that are expressed above have
been echoed in similar ways by academics and journalists,

newspaper and magazine editorials, public interest groups,

 

*See Drew (Dec. 6), p. 134.

12

and political participants--among others-~across the
nation. Inevitably, discussion focuses on those sources of
campaign finance contributions that appear to pose conflict
of interest questions for legislators, in terms of repre-
senting their constituents interests and in terms of their
use of the public power that accompanies their office.
These sources of campaign funds are special interest

groups.

The Perspective on Organized

 

Special Interest Grgups

 

Campaign Finance
Organizations are affected by governmental activity
and thus interested in ways of ensuring that--at the least—-
government and its members are aware of their concerns. In
attempting to influence government they may go it alone or
band together with other organizations that have similar
interests.* They may hire lobbyists to represent their
interests at various levels of government. William Safire
defines the word lobby as follows:
(As) a verb, to attempt, as a private citizen
or group, to influence government decisions

and particularly legislative votes; as a noun,
a group organized for this purpose.

 

*Clinard and Yeager (1980: 53) note, for instance,
that corporate executives are inclined to think in terms
of their industry rather than in terms of individual firms,
and that a pattern of cooperation and mutual concern exists
in most industries.

13

Common Cause describes the functions of lobbyists as:
many and varied; to help Congress write the
bills wanted by the interests the lobbyists
represent; to organize campaigns to bring
public pressure to bear on Members of Congress
to pass these bills; and to do favors for
their legislative friends.7
Lobbying is, as Common Cause notes, a fundamental right
that is rooted in our Constitution.*

One arrangement that organizations use to protect
or advance their interests, one they have increasingly
turned to in attempting to lobby legislators, is known as
the political action committee (PAC). Business and indus—
try, unions, the learned professions, and other kinds of
organized interests have all seized upon this mechanism as
a means of lobbying for access or influence within the
legislative process. A primary purpose of PACs is the
raising and disbursing of campaign contributions to legis-
lators and other politiciansvnunmight be or are sympathetic
to their concerns. In an amazingly short period of time
PACs have become a significant source of campaign funds
for legislators caught in an increasingly expensive campaign
system. In 1974, for example, 608 special interest PACs
contributed $12.5 million to congressional candidates

according to Common Cause information obtained from the FEC

and the Congressional Research Service.** By the end of

 

*For instance, as concerns campaign finance, the
Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Valeo in essence equated
freedom of speech with the spending of money.

**See Common Cause magazine, August 1982, pp. 11—12.

14
the 1982 elections it was estimated that approximatelyh3,400

PACs had contributed $80 million to congressional campaigns
and $120 million to state and local contests.* Of the
$80 million spent in congressional campaigns, the top 20
PACs gave between an estimated one-fourth to one-third of
the total contributions.** Syndicated political analysis
columnists Jack Germond and Jules Whitcover report a New
York Times computer study that found 3,371 PACs contributed
35 percent of all the money raised in the November 1982
House elections for Congress, compared to 26 percent in
1976. They reported further that 17 of the 50 top recipi—
ents of PAC money to House candidates received more than
half of their total campaign money from PACs. Finally,
statistics indicate that most PAC contributions go to
incumbents. Clymer reports that 69 percent of PAC contri-
butions went to incumbents in the 1982 elections (all
levels of government), 18 percent to challengers, and
13 percent to open races.

The main point about all of this is that in a very
short time PACs have become a very significant source of

campaign contributions for legislators. And the figures

 

*See Detroit Free Press editorial, "PAC-MAN: The
1974 campaign finance reforms gave him too much influence",
November 29, 1982.

**See Adam Clymer of the New York Times, "PAC
donations boost spending", in the Detroit Free Press,
January 19, 1983, p. 1A. The estimate of the percentage of
the total reflects an unknown final total by Clymer when he
wrote the article.

15

mentioned above tell only a part of the whole story.
Campaign contributions that have to be reported under
federal campaign law to the FEC are known as "hard" money
contributions, and refer to individual or PAC contributions
raised by candidates and the national and state political
parties.* A 1979 change in federal election law governing
Presidential and congressional campaigns allowed the state
parties to raise funds for certain minor election activi-
ties (the purchase of pins, television advertising, bumper
stickers,enxh) and get-out-the-vote drives for Presidential
campaigns. The purposes that these funds are put to are
termed "party-building activities" and they have resulted
in a distinction within the meaning of campaign contribu—
tions. Money raised for party-building activities is known
as "soft" money.** This refers to funds not directly
contributed to federal elections, and its sources include
union dues, corporate-treasury funds, or individuals'
contributions beyond the legal limits. The limits on soft
money vary according to state laws governing its uses. The
national political parties and their committees have taken
over the responsibility for the raising and disbursing of

contributions for part-building activities in non-federal

 

*For a thorough discussion of the laws governing
the raising and use of hard money, see Drew (Part 1),
pp. 60-61.

**For a thorough discussion of the laws that apply
to soft money, who is interested and involved in raising
such money, the uses it is put to, and how the laws are
creatively abused, see Drew (Part 2), pp. 57-75.

16

elections. According to Drew, the intent behind the 1979
change in federal election law has been effectively vio-
lated, at least to the extent that federal elections can
and do benefit from the uses to which soft money is put.

She notes:

contributions of the size that were given to

the Nixon campaign of 1972 and that so shocked

the nation--and paved the way for public

financing of Presidential campaigns--can still

be made. And the contributions by corporations

which were illegal then can now be made

legally.8

All told, Drew reports that in the 1980 elections the

Republican party spent at least $39 million and its state

parties millions more in soft money, while the Democrats

raised about $1.3 million at the national level and two to

four million at the state level.* As a result of soft

money, large sums of contributions are raised at the

national level by the political parties and their commit-

tees and these are used as a way of infusing money raised

nationally into state elections and, through creative

interpretation of the 1979 change in the law, into congres-

sional campaigns as well. Soft money contributions are

unreported and Drew believes their use will probably grow.
The growing dependence of indfvidual legislators on

large contributions from organized interest groups and the

concern shown by the political parties with attracting

contributions from these groups involve a development that

 

*Drew's dollar figures come from interviews of
persons directly involved in the raising of soft money.

17

can be thought of as the nationalization of political
campaigns by the big interest groups.* The possible
effects that this money can have on the behavior of con-
gressional legislators operating within the legislative
system has been previously discussed. The effect on the
political parties is given meaning in Drew's (Dec. 6,

pp. 79-101) recounting of a "bidding war" between House
Democrats and the White House over the 1981 tax-cut bill.
This event involved legislation offering special tax
breaks, legislation in which a primary motivation of the
political participants was to raise campaign money from the
interest groups that stood to benefit. In a very real
sense this bidding war gave the appearance of putting
Congress and its legislation on the auction block, giving
tax breaks to organized interest groups in exchange for the
promise of attracting campaign contributions. With all the
concern shown by individual legislators and the political
parties for attracting large contributions from politically
active organized interest groups, and the apparent effects
that this can have on legislation within the legislative
process, one may reasonably wonder how such developments

do not--at the least--violate the spirit of the agency
relationship that underpins our system of representative

government.

 

*i.e., raising contributions on a national level
and disbursing it locally in state and congressional races
(Drew, part 1), p. 72.

18

The worry shown by those who are concerned with
such things as the public interest or the plural
principal's (constituents) interests are certainly under-
standable. Are the constituent's interests, for example,
well-served in a political system where legislators are
significantly indebted to sources of campaign finance that
are far removed the legislator's geographically defined
political district? Similarly, can legislators reach fair
and impartial decisions on matters before their committee
and subcommittee work units when they have received large
campaign contributions from the very interest groups that
are affected by such decision-making? Do the broader con-
cerns of society-~the public interest--receive fair
consideration in such situations? Questions of propriety,
of conflict of interest, and of potential or actual misuse
of public power are all understandably raised in discussing
the current system of campaign finance. There are ample
indications that such a system does not well-serve the
larger system of representative democracy. In order to
better understand why the larger political system may not
be well-served by current campaign finance practices we
have already discussed the self-interests of legislators in
relation to the fragility of the agency relationship. Of
equal concern are the motivations of interest groups who
regularly participate in campaign finance activities. The
question asked at this point is as follows: Why are

organized interest groups concerned with influencing the

l9

legislative processes of government through involvement in

the campaign finance system?

The Concern With Government Activity
In order to better understand the question posed

above it is useful to explore how organizations view
government as it appears in the environment in which they
operate. An organization's "task environment," as used by
Dill (1958:410), refers to all aspects of the environment
that are potentially relevant to goal setting and goal
attainment. Government is certainly--in this sense--to be
considered as a relevant aspect of most (if not all)
organizations' environments. As Scott notes, government
may affect transactions by organizations--and thus their
goal setting and goal attainment--in at least three major
ways.* First of all:

government helps to determine the overall context

of organizational action, defining what actions

are legal and which transactions will be supported

by law.9
Government, then, acts as a regulator of organizational
actions, and it may impose constraints and requirements on
organizations with the public's interests in mind. Some
examples include activities such as the raising of general
tax revenues; requiring the provision of various types of

insurance protection for workers and retired employees;

protecting society from "external costs" such as pollution;

 

*He notes further that the same ideas apply to
governmental actions at all levels of government.

20

protecting organizations from unfair competition (which
includes antitrust policy and laws): and protecting con-
sumers from their own ignorance as seen in such things as
food and drug laws and occupational licensure regulations.

The second manner in which government action may
affect organizations is by placing special constraints on
selected organizations or on selected activities of certain
organizations. This involves monitoring by governmental
regulatory bodies—-including legislative work units--which
focus on the quality of products or services provided by
organizations or on the transactions among organizations
that act as exchange partners and competitors. Both of
these first two main points concerning how government
affects the operations of organizations focus on government
as the source of general and specific regulations and
constraints.

The third major way in which government may affect
organizational actions is by acting as a provider of
resources. As Scott observes:

(Some) resource flows are indirect, coming in
the form of tax breaks or exemptions; others are
more direct, involving outright transfers of
funds in the form of subsidies or grants; and
still others involve the government's acting
not as an interested third party, but as a
direct participant in the transaction--as a
buyer of products or a client of services.10
Generally speaking, then, government from the per-

spective of organizations may be viewed as either a

regulator--in two distinct ways--or as a provider of

resources, which includes activities like tax breaks,

21

government subsidies, and government procurement of goods
and services from the private sector.

Government involvement in the affairs of
organizations from the private sector has in modern times
increased rapidly. As Scott notes:

the increasing scale and scope of governmental
activity encourages organizations of all types

to view public agencies as salient features of
their environments and as targets of cooptation.

11

To this general observation I would specify "legislatures"
in addition to "public agencies". Legislatures are the
source of policy, rule-making powers, and funds on which
these agencies rely, and it is commonly observed (Lowi,
1979; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Scott, 1981) that legis-
latures like the Congress have increasingly delegated
their power to such agencies. Such increased government
intervention into the affairs of the private sector is an
increasing source of concern for the interests that are
affected by these actions. Clinard and Yeager's (1980)
discussion of corporate crime serves to illustrate the
great range in corporate behavior, for instance, that
government is interested in monitoring and controlling.
They identify six main types of illegal corporate
behavior—-administrative, environmental, financial, labor,
manufacturing, and unfair trade practices. For'the corpo-
ration then, this increased intervention by government into

their affairs represents a challenge to the major corporate

task of developing means by which to reduce uncertainty and

22

and risk in business (Clinard and Yeager, p. 50). And
organizations do not passively await for such interven-
tion to occur.

The "resource dependence" model on organizational
connections with the environment (Aldrich and Pfeffer,
1976) recognizes that organizations are not passive actors
but are active in determining their own fates. The model
stresses the occurrence of adaptation processes:

Thus, rather than portraying organizations as
passive recipients of the actions of environments,
the resource dependence model views organizations
'as active, and capable of changing, as well as
responding to, the environment. Administrators
manage their environments as well as their organi-
zations, and the former activity may be as
important, if not more importanté than the latter.‘
(Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:83).1
Government activity is, then, a significant force in the
operating environments of many organizations. Modern
corporations, for instance, in seeking to manage their
environments and insure favorable outcomes, exercise
tremendous influence on government, employing both
legal and illegal means.
Such influence may be used to achieve many types
of benefits, from government contracts and
subsidies to favorable legislative and enforce-
ment outcomes.

There are various ways by which organizations seek
to influence government activity. The means that they
employ to achieve such ends can be generally described as

involving "bridging strategies" (Pfeffer and Salancik,

1978). These mechanisms forge connections between

23

organizations and their exchange partners or competitors.
According to Scott, bridging strategies:

may be viewed as a response to increasing

organizational interdependence. Such situations

occur when two or more organizations that are

differentiated from one another exchange

resources.14
In terms of the exchange of resources, government can be
viewed as either an exchange partner or a competitor. This
is because government affects organizational transactions
in two ways--acting as either a regulator or as a provider
of resources. Bridging strategies aimed at government can
be seen as a response by organizations to reduce the uncer-
tainty and risk that government activity may impose on
them or, conversely, as a means to promote certainty and
limit risk by using the power of government to their
advantage. The general thesis of Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978:43) on bridging strategies helps to explain how
organizations have reacted to contemporary government that
has become an increasingly significant force in the task
environments of their operations. As stated in Scott:

'(The) typical solution to problems of inter-

dependence and uncertainty involves increasing

coordination, which means increasing the mutual

control over each other's activities . . .'

Although all bridging strategies share this

feature, they are quite varied in the strength

of the coordinated links forged and the nature

of the connections.15

Scott identifies seven main types of bridging

strategies--bargaining, contracting, c00ptation, joint

ventures, mergers, associations, government connections,

24

and institutionalized linkages. Of particular interestimnxe
are government connections and cooptation. As to the first,
it has already been noted that government affects organi-
zational transactions by acting as either a regulator or as
a provider of resources. Organizations, then, may tend to
View government in terms of an exchange partner or in terms
of a competitor and actively seek to forge connections with
it. As for the second strategy, as government has increas-
ingly become involved in the affairs of private sector
organizations, for instance, one common response of such
organizations can be described in terms of this secondtuid-
ging strategy. Cooptation entails the incorporation of
representatives of external groups (in our case government)
into the decision-making or advisory structure of an organi-
zation. Selzink (1949) has argued that by c00pting external
representatives organizations in effect trade sovereignty
for support. It is also important to note (Scott, 1981:196)
that cooptation as a bridging mechanism provides a two-way
street with both influence and support flowing sometimes in
one direction, sometimes in the other, and more often, in
both. This implies a proactive side of cooptation.

This observation is illustrated in Clinard and
Yeager's (1980:53-57) discussion on the political influence
of corporations. They note the observation by Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978:216) which states that:

(Large) government virtually assures large inter-

vention on the part of (business) organizations
in political activity.

25

In other words, just as government has intervened in the
affairs of private sector organizations-—in terms of its
dual role of regulator and provider of resources--so may
these organizations seek to intervene in the affairs of
government. Bridging type strategies like government
connections and c00ptation arise and may be initiated by
either party. In the case of corporations seeking to
exert political influence in government, they may do so in
a variety of ways. For example, the appointment of corpo-
rate leaders to top positions inifluaexecutive branch of the
federal government is a common practice. Clinard and
Yeager state that:

(The) appointment of business executives to the

cabinet creates an ongoing, generally cohesive

group of corporate leaders and a corporate

climate of Opinion regardless of the various

areas of business represented.17
We have noted that public agencies are commonly viewed by
organizations as salient features of their environments and
thus as potential targets of c00ptation. Acxmmmnicomplaint
of contemporary students of bureaucratic politics is that
private special interests have so penetratedrnflfljt:agencies
that officials are incapable of acting in ways supportive
of the larger public interests (see Scott, 1981:311). This

occurs in part because government officials are vulnerable

to influences from such groups for many reasons.* The

 

*Such reasons include the following: relating to
organized interests on a regular basis; becoming dependent
on them for information, c00peration, political support,
and future employment (Scott, p. 311).

26

result is often what Scott (1981:311) describes as an
"overly cozy" relation between political bureaus and
private interests. It reflects what Clinard and Yeager
(1980:106) refer to as the so-called capture theory of
administrative agencies, where the supervised interests
infiltrate and eventually "capture" the agency. This is
widely perceived as a problem but it is noted that there is
an increasing belief that the problem is not so much
capture as it is inadequate representation of interests
other than those of the regulated parties. Clinard and
Yeager conclude that the number of obstacles that face regu-
latory agencies are fundamentally political in nature
(1980:109).

In addition to seeking to influence the executive
branch of government, organizations in managing their
environments to insure favorable outcomes seek to influence
the legislative branch of government. The reasons they may
seek to influence legislative activities are, as we have
seen, varied. For instance, a major source of corporate
concern stems from legislatures acting in the name of the
public interest. Such action may stem from what Clinard
and Yeager (1980:213-36) refer to as the failurecxfbusiness
ethics. This failure can involve such things as misrepre-
sentation in advertising, deceptive packaging, a lack of
social responsibility in television advertising, unsafe and
harmful products, worthless products, restricted product

development and built-in obsolescence, enVironmental

27

pollution, kickbacks and gifts, unethical influences on
government, unethical competitive practices, personal gain
for management and victimization of local communities. On
the other hand, however, organizations do not always view
government actions taken in the name of the public interest
as either necessary or justified. Clinard and Yeager's
(1980:68073) treatment of corporate defenses for law
violations is telling in this regard. Common defenses
include the following: (1) all legal measures proposed
constitute government interference with the free enterprise
system, (2) government regulations are unjustified because
the additional costs of regulations and bureaucratic pro-
cedures cut heavily into profits, (3) regulation is faulty
because most government regulations are incomprehensible
and too complex, (4) regulation is unnecessary because the
matters being regulated are unimportant, (5) thereitslittle
deliberate intent in corporate violations: many of them are
errors of omission rather than commission, and many are
mistakes, (6) other concerns in the same line of business
are violating the law, and if the government cannot prevent
this situation there is no reason why competing corporations
should not also benefit from illegal behavior, (7) although
it is true, as in price-fixing cases, for example, the
damage is so diffused among a large number of consumers
that individually there is little loss, (8) if there is no
increase in corporate profits a violation is not wrong,

(9) corporations are actually owned by the average citizen

28

so that the claims that big business can dominate American
society and violate the law with impunity are false, and
(10) violations are caused by economic necessity: they aim
to protect the value of stock, to insure an adequate
return for stockholders, and to protect the job security
of employees by insuring the financial stability of the
corporation.

Just as corporations are concerned with influencing
the legislative branch of government, so are other types of
interest groups--for instance, labor, trade, agriculture,
the learned professions, etc.--interested in influencing
government activities in manners that are favorable to
themselves. The individual legislator's self-interest with
reelection represents one avenue by which organizations are
able to influence legislative activity. They can provide
legislators with certain resources that they need, for
instance, information, cooperation and political support.
Of particular concern here is a fourth resource that legis-
lators need--campaign contributions. As we have noted in
our discussion of legislator self-interest, campaign
finance is a matter with which they appear to be increas-
ingly concerned. The current system of campaign finance-—
as seen at the federal level--represents one way for
special interest organizations to attempt to influence the
legislative activity of government. As Drew (Dec. 6,

pp. 55-56) notes, the candidates desperation for money and

29

the interests' desire to affect public policy provide a

mutual opportunity.

Summary: Legislators, Interest Groups,

 

and Campaign Finance

 

By being in a position to help satisfy the legis-
lator concern with campaign finance, special interest
groups are able to influence legislative activity with
which they are concerned. Legislators, as reflected in
their official behavior, have a variety of ways by which
they can show their gratitude to their special interest
contributors.* Interest groups tend to focus on those work
units of a 1egislature--the committees and subcommittees--
that can directly affect the task environments in which
they operate (Davidson 1977; Lowi 1979; Common Cause 1979).
Consequently, interest groups tend to channel their campaign
contributions to legislators who sit on those work units
that deal with matters of concern to the affected interests.
Millions of dollars in campaign contributions can be given
to legislators who sit on those work units that interest
groups consider to be the most important. Drew (Dec. 6)
has identified those work units in the Congress that appear
to attract the most in campaign contributions for their
members. In the House, Way and Means and Energy and

Commerce are the two committees that attract the most in

 

*These actions were discussed in the section on
legislators.

30

campaign contributions for their members.* In the Senate
it is the Finance Committee and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation that attract the most in cam-
paign finance funds for their members.

The work units of a legislature are where the
merits of proposed legislation are debated. In the current
system of campaign finance at the federal level of govern-
ment legislators can, and commonly do, accept campaign
contributions from the very interests that are affected by
the decisions that are made by the legislators when acting
in their committee roles. At the least this practice
poses the appearance of conflict of interest. That is,
can legislators impartially decide the merits of proposed
legislation when they are indebted to the affected inter-
ests for campaign contributions? Put another way, can
constituent interests or the public interest receive
proper and fair consideration in such circumstances? Drew
(Dec. 6, p. 127) points out a flaw in the argument of the
defenders of such practices. It assumes that there exists
a universe composed of the parties at interest, and that
when the parties at interest carve up the universe every-

one is served.

 

*It is reported, for instance, that the 42 members
of the House Energy and Commerce Committee collected an
average of $118,674 each in PAC contributions in the two-
year period before the November 1982 congressionaledection.
(See Otis Pike "PACs: Even saints have to pay campaign
bills" in the Detroit Free Press; May 4, 1983, p. 9A).

 

31

This paper assumes that legislators can impartially
reach decisions in situations that involve the appearance
of conflict of interest. Yet on the other hand, various
sources of information (Common Cause 1979, 1982; Drew
1982) indicate that the current system of campaign finance
can produce abuses in the use of public power. The defen-
ders of PAC contributions, for instance, argue that the
purpose of such giving is merely to gain access to key
legislators, not to exchange campaign contributions for
political influence. Yet the actual effect of such prac-
tices on legislative behavior renders this argument--access
versus influence-~superfluous. Members of Congress, their
aides, and various watchers of the Congress all give
testimony that political influence is, in fact, regularly
traded by congressional legislators for campaign contri-
butors from concerned interest groups that are in the
position to satisy such legislator self-interest.

The propriety of such actions are highly suspicious
and can often result in what can be considered as the
misuse of public power. The current system of campaign
finance holds significant potential for the misuse of
public power. Various sources of evidence give witness to
just such events. Such instances are considered as
involving the misuse of public power. It is misuse in the
sense that the agency relationship that supposedly guides
and controls the use of public power in this system of

representative democracy can come to be violated. Interest

32

groups that have little to do with a legislator's constit-
uents can come to direct the official behavior (or parts
of) of the legislator, operating, in effect, as a kind of
pseudo-principal. Such pseudo-agency relationships are
considered in the following section within the context of

discussion on political corruption.

THE MISUSE OF PUBLIC POWER

Given the apparent fragility of the agency relation-
ship in this representative democracy, the political system
is subject to frequent accusations, often times correct, of
public power being misused. There are areas of political
behavior where the propriety of individual actions are
questionable, yet these actions are unencumbered by legal-
istic criteria which define the behaviors as politically
corrupt. So it would appear with the federal system of
campaign finance and, presumably, with many state systems
as well. The federal criminal statute, for instance, makes
it a crime to give or promise, or to ask for or receive,
anything of value in exchange for any official act. In
spite of this law many people claim that, due to legisla-
tors' self-interest in campaign finance and organized
interest groups concern with government activity, the sys-
tem of campaign finance commonly witnesses exchanges of
public power (i.e., official behavior) for campaign contri-
butions. Beyond the matter of potential or actual criminal
wrongdoing is concern that the public interest in legisla-
tive activities may be harmed.

Proving criminal wrongdoing in accusations involv-

ing the sale of public power is difficult. A statement by

33

34

a commission investigating political corruption in public
construction in the state of Massachusetts is illustrative:

What is not said is what is important. No one

is so bald as to suggest if you do not contrib-

ute you will not do business with the state in

the future: that would constitute extortion.

No donor is so rude as to extract a promise for

state work in the future: that would be bribery.

Instead, there is the tacit understanding between

public servants and private professionals that

this is how business is done in Massachusetts.

A tough lawyer might argue that a certain state

of mind exists which implies felonious conduct,

but one doubts there are prosecutors wholgould

want to argue the case in Massachusetts.

Along a similar vein Clinard and Yeager's study of
corporate crime notes the significant influence of corporate
power on legislation and the difficulties involved in asses-
sing corporations some measure of "social responsibility" in
the name of the public interest. In this regard they
observe that:

(A) review of corporate violations and how they

are prosecuted and punished shows who controls

what in law enforcement in American society an 9

the extent to which this control is effective.
As to the criminal liability of corporate executives they
state that there is little risk of a criminal conviction or
prison sentence for illegal actions on behalf of the
corporation.

Peters and Welch (1978) note a further problem for
those who invoke the name of the public interest in attempt—
ing to prove the actual misuse of public power. They

observe that a definition of political corruption based on

notions of the public interest enables a politician to

35
justify almost any act by claiming that it is in the public
interest.

The difficulties involved in proving the actual
misuse of public power are perhaps reflective of the lack
of consensus in the debate as to just what does, or does
not, constitute political corruption. It is no easy matter
to say that the current system of campaign finance commonly
witnesses sale of public power which, under federal law,
constitutes political corruption. Proving intent, assessing
responsibility, and defining the action as politically cor-
rupt are all difficult.

While acknowledging some of the difficulties
involved in proving instances of political corruption, there
is support for expanding the definition of unacceptable or
corrupt behavior by legislators in relation to discussion of
the misuse of public power that is linked to the campaign
finance system. As Rose-Ackerman notes, the analysis of
third-party payments, in addition to those already defined
as illegal:

can often be easily extended to legal acfiévities
with similar public policy consequences.

Peters and Welch's (1978) discussion of definitions and
theory on political corruption identifies three approaches
to definitions of political corruption: definitions based
on legality, definitions based on the public interest, and
definitions based on public opinion. They emphasize caution

in choosing one particular definition over another.

36

In other words, definitions of corruption are

not mutually exclusive: elements of the public

interest and public opinion criteria are

embedded in legal norms which sanction certain

political behaviors as corrupt.
In recognizing the problems involved in defining certain
behaviors as politically corrupt and, in proving that such
acts have occurred; in recognizing the fragility of the
agency relationship in representative government--due to
legislator self-interest and the natural desire of organiza-
tions to influence government activity; and finally, in
recognizing that the system of campaign finance presents
significant opportunities for misuses of public power to
arise: What, one may ask, can be done to protect against

the misuse of public power that may arise as the result of

current campaign finance practices?

SUMMARY: GUARDING AGAINST CAMPAIGN FINANCE

RELATED ABUSES OF PUBLIC POWER

To begin with, this paper shares Davidson's (1977)

normative assumption that:

public policy, even in its most specialized and

seemingly self-contained segments, is too impor-

tant to be delegated to the primary beneficiaries

or subjects of that policy.2
This is not to say that private sector interest groups
should have their concerns given less than complete or fair
consideration in legislative decision making. It does
suggest, however, that the current system of campaign
finance poses a substantial risk to impartial, meaningful
consideration and action on behalf of the broader interests
of society. We know these broader interests by the often
times ambiguous name of the "public interest". Generally
speaking, the public interest in our present system of
financing federal elections may be stated as follows:

That the agency relationship in our system

representative democracy not be unfairly

coopted because of mutually advantageous

linkages involving legislator self-interest

and the desire of large, well-financed

private sector interest groups to influence

legislative decision making.
In addition, the opportunity to misuse public power is, as

various sources of information indicate, a real and present

37

38

danger. In particular, the public interest in various
areas Of government activity--such as environmental and
consumer protection, anti-trust policy, and efficient pro-
curement practices for goods and services obtained from
the private sector--may be subject to cooptation in spite
of clearly stated preferences to the contrary by the
unorganized electorate. Insuring that these concerns and
others like them are adequately represented in legislative
decision making is important, yet the current campaign
finance system presents a potential or actual source of
disruption to an already fragile agency relationship
between legislators and their constituents. As a conse-
quence, incidents commonly arise that give the appearance
of involving, to various degrees, the misuse of public
power.

The focus of this paper is not on specific inci-
dents involving the misuse of public power, but rather on
protecting the system of representation from the real
Opportunity that the system of campaign finance presents
for the misuse of public power in legislative decision
making activities. Public interest groups and others have
a valid concern, for instance, that the cooptation of
public power by large, well-financed interest groups,
utilizing the campaign finance system to advance their
interests, is not necessarily desirable. The Common Cause
concern with PACs is consistent in this regard. I do

believe, on the other hand, that within a discussion Of

39

representative democracy a case can be made, to some

extent, as to the value of having such groups participate

in the political system.* The following proposals for
change in campaign finance practices are offered with an

eye on limiting the opportunities for the misuse Of public
power and with a concern for protecting the agency relation-
ship that is central to the system of representative
democracy, while seeking at the same time to avoid unfair

or illegal infringement on the rights of interest groups

who wish to participate in the elections of the political

system.

Change Proposals

 

There are various proposals being debated that
approach the campaign finance system from different angles,
although common elements are to be found in some. NO one
proposal may be sufficient as there are various aspects of
campaign finance that need to be addressed. Some proposals
for federal campaign finance reform are as follows:

(1) One proposal looks at the role that indepen-
dent political committees play in elections. An area of
Opportunity for abuse cited by Drew, the prOposal would
place limits of the amount of money these committees can
spend on a candidate's behalf. First Amendment,consider-

ations (free speech equated with the right to spend money)

 

*See, for instance, Herbert Alexander, "The Case
For PACs" (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Council).

40

may render this proposal unconstitutional. Alternatives U3
limiting independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate
include giving free media response time or mailings to
candidates who have been attacked by committees; have
public financing pay for television response time equal to
the amount of independent expenditures; give matching
public funds equal to independent expenditures of $5,000
or more.

(2) Another type of proposal focuses specifically
on PAC contributions. Some would prefer placing limits on
the amount of PAC money a candidate may accept in each two
year election cycle, with $70,000 or $75,000 commonly cited
figures. Others would prefer to further cut the limit that
PACs can give to a candidate per two year election cycle,
from $10,000 ($5,000 primary, $5,000 general election) to
$5,000 ($2,500/$2,500).

(3) Other focus is specifically on the costliest
component of elections--political advertising. Suggestions
include a ban on the purchase of television air time that
would give candidates free air time instead, in 15 to 30
minute blocks (a goal is to improve the substance of
political messages); discounted radio and television time
or reduced-rate mailings for candidates; partial public
financing of broadcast time. A major goal of this type of
proposal is to reduce the need for campaign funds for

political advertising, and to give contenders a fair chance

41

to be heard without having to scramble to outspend their
Opponents for broadcasting.*

(4) Proposalsikn:bringing "soft money" under con—
trol are also advocated. These center on improving the
registration system (get-out-the-vote drives) or designing
a system where the parties play the major role in such
activities (i.e., rather than unions, the Chamber of
Commerce, etc.). Another proposal focuses on allowing the
parties to raise money for party-building activities in
both Presidential and congressional campaigns while
imposing limits and an effective reporting system.

(5) The most common type of proposal focuses on
the public financing of congressional elections. A variety
of components are put forth under this idea of public
financing for congressional candidates in the general
election. One idea is for a matching contribution system
similar to the Presidential primary system where the public
system matches individual contributions of up to $100. In
this regard, a House proposal would set a $90,000 total
limit on matching public funds. Proposals frequently call
for imposing spending limits, although the constitutional-
ity of such prOposals are questionable. Another idea calls
for allowing a higher individual contribution limit in
exchange for public financing. An idea for Senate races
would place a limit on the amount of PAC money a candidate

could accept while benefiting from public financing, with a

 

*Recall, for instance, that the vast bulk of PAC
contributions go to incumbents.

42

formula based on the state's pOpulation-—One bill sets
forth a range Of $75,000 to $500,000. A house proposal
would set a $75,000 PAC limit. Still another idea would
limit personal and immediate family spending to $20,000 per
two year election cycle for those who participate in the
public finance system. A final proposal pertains to those
campaigns where a candidate chooses not to accept public
financing but to spend large amounts of his or her own
money, or to exceed the spending limits. The spending
limits on the Opponent would be lifted and the Opponent
would receive double the amount in matching funds. As one
can see, there are a variety of concerns and/or ideas
expressed in proposals for public financing.

(6) To the proposals listed above I would add one
of my own. I would make it a conflict of interest for a
legislator sitting on a specific committee or subcommittee
to accept campaign contributions from interest groups that
are affected by the decision making activities of such
work units. In removing the financial connection between
legislator and interest group at this point in the legis-
lative process, the ability of legislators to impartially
consider legislation based on its merits may be improved.
At the least such a prohibition could help to remove the
taint of impropriety that arises from such commonly obser-
ved practices. In addition, such an arrangement can serve
to help protect against potential cooptation of the use of

public power--in situations where legislator self-interest

43

and large, influential private sector interest groups
unit in mutually beneficial ways, it is often at the
expense of a fair hearing for other considerations such
as the public's interest in a particular matter. An
arrangement like this does not hinder the ability of
interest groups to attempt to influence full floor votes
in either legislative chamber. And if such groups do not
feel they have adequate opportunity for access to the
work unit decision making activities of their concern,
then ways of ensuring adequate access should be sought,
short of allowing them to buy into such activities.

In conclusion, there are a number of reasons why
current campaign finance practices may be seen as less
than desirable--in terms of the potential for the misuse
of public power and in terms of the overall affects such
practices can have on the agency relationship and on the
larger system of representative democracy. In light of
such considerations, adjustments and alternatives to
current campaign finance practices appear to be not only

desirable, but warranted as well.

ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES

1Roger H. Davidson, "Breaking up those 'Cozy
Triangles': An Impossible Dream?" in Legislative Reform and
Public Policy, ed. by Susan Welch and John G. Peters (New
York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1977), p. 31.

2

 

 

Ibid., p. 32.

3Gary J. Miller, "The Economics Of Bribery" in the
Yale Law Review Journal, 88 (June 1979), p. 1551.

4The Special Commission Concerning State and County
Buildings, Final Report to the General Court of the Special
Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Vol. 1
(Boston: The Commonwealth of Massachusettes Office of the
Secretary Of State, 1980), p. 4-2.

5Elizabeth Drew, "Politics and Money" in the New
Yorker magazine (December 6, 1982), p. 148.

6William Safire, Safire's Political Dictionary in
"The Super Lobbyists" by Sandra McElwaine, Family Weekly
(January 30, 1983), p. 4.

7Common Cause, How Money Talks in Congress . . .
(Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 31.

 

 

 

8Drew (December 13, 1982), p. 64.

9W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural,

 

and Open Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1981), p. 199.

10

 

Ibid., p. 201.

llIbid., p. 311.

lzIbid., p. 116.

13Marshall B. Clinard and Peter C. Yeager, Corporate
Crime (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1980), p. 53.

14

 

Scott, p. 193.

44

45

lSIbid., p. 194.

16Clinard and Yeager, p. 53.

17Ibid., p. 56.

18The Special Commission . . ., p. 8.

19Clinard and Yeager, p. 21.

20Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in
Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1978),
p. 7.

 

 

21John G. Peters and Susan Welch, "Political
Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a
Theory, or . . ." in The American Political Science Review,
72 (1978), p. 975.

22

 

Davidson, p. 31.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Herbert E. The Case For PACs (Washington, D.C.:
Public Affairs Council).*

 

Clinard, Marshall B. and Yeager, Peter C. Corporate Crime
(New York: The Free Press, 1980).

 

Clymer, Adam. "PAC donations boost spending". Detroit
Free Press, 19 January, 1983.

 

Common Cause. How Money Talks in Congress: A Common Cause
Study of the Impact Of Money on Congressional
Decision—Making (Washington, D.C.: Common Cause,
1979).

 

 

 

Davidson, Roger H. "Breaking up those 'Cozy Triangles':
An Impossible Dream?" in Legislative Reform and
Public Policy, eds. Susan Welch and John G. Peters.
(New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1977).

 

 

Detroit Free Press. "PAC-MAN: The 1974 campaign finance
reforms gave him too much influence" (Detroit Free
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*Copyright date unknown.

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