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This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

Environmental Philosophy:

A Pragmatist Reconstruction
presented by

Michael W. Jankoviak

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

PhD degree in Philosophy

 

 

M75:
ichard T. Peterson

 

Major professor

Date April 29, 1993

 

MSU is an Afﬁrmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0- 12771

 

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PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
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MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution
c:\clrc\dnedmum3-o.|

ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A PRAGMATIC RECONSTRUCTION
By

Michael William Jankoviak

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy

1993

ABSTRACT
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A PRAGMATIC RECONSTRUCTION
By

Michael William Jankoviak

Much of environmental ethics fails to resolve the conﬂicts regarding environmental
issues. It interprets the philosophers’ task as having to establish the possibility of an
environmental ethic. This creates a gap between theory and practice. Philosophers
become entangled in theoretical difﬁculties while ignoring the concrete problems. This
dissertation addresses this failure of mainstream approaches.

This task is to determine why we have been unable to bring intelligence to bear
on actual environmental conﬂicts. Conﬂicts over environmental issues are one way we
experience the problem of modernity. It is one instance of our inability to select ends in
a rational manner. The question is why are we unable to bring intelligence to bear on
the practical choice of ends.

I begin by locating historical factors, emerging during the Enlightenment, which
gave rise to the predominance of conceptions of nature as a resource over environmentally
sensitive conceptions. I conclude that the development of human rationality has been
one—sided: while we have developed technical rationality, which deals with developing
means for achieving ends, we have not developed a rational method for determining
which ends are worth pursuing. Standards of normativity which human reason develops
for and by itself are lacking. This is the problem of modernity. Until this problem is

resolved, we cannot adequately deal with the conﬂicts over environmental issues, since

1;- _"y< ’

these involve the choice of ends.

To resolve the problem of modernity I appeal to the work of John Dewey and
Jiirgen Habermas. This approach advocates using a dialogically conceived practical
reason to develop solutions. It requires a public sphere as the medium for discursive
argumentation. The debate over ends will use Dewey’s logic of inquiry, his means/ends
evaluation, and Habermas’ discourse ethic. This democratic choice of ends entails that
environmental issues will be determined by norms validated in the public sphere, rather
than by political or business interests or by system imperatives whether perceived or real.
The approach developed here, while it makes use of theory, does not create a gap

between theory and practice as the mainstream approaches.

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my appreciation to the members of my dissertation committee
for their time and suggestions: Professors Martin Benjamin, Stephen L. Esquith, Donald
F. Koch, and Richard T. Peterson. Special thanks are extended to Professor Peterson for
chairing my committee, and for his help in giving structure to the few scant ideas I had
for this project. The many conversations we had helped immensely and prevented my
taking even more blind alleys than I did. His encouragement made the project go much
faster than I expected it would. Special thanks are also due to Professor Koch who
introduced me to and taught me what I know about Dewey’s work. This dissertation
would not have been possible without his patient manner and willingness to help me work
through those inevitable tough spots.

Dr. Bruce Omundson’s enthusiasm for environmental ethics was contagious as
well as helpful when I ﬁrst began studying this ﬁeld. Our conversations over those many
cups of coffee helped keep me from being too narrowly focused on my own peculiar
views of the issues.

Credit has to be given to two other important players in this project, since it has
deﬁned too large a part of our life together: my daughter Becky and my wife Kathy. In

spite of being but a child, Becky somehow understood that dad still cared about her even

though he spent more time working on his "PD story" than he spent playing with her.
Kathy’s healthy impatience with life served as motivation during those seemingly
unending dry spells. Her support and willingness to share in this prolonged state of
limbo known as graduate school are a debt which I look forward to repaying in our years

together yet to come.

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I
Introduction: Getting a handle on the Problem .................... 1
A. The Problems arising from the Relation between Human Society and
Nature .......................................... l
B. Current Approaches to Environmental Ethics and their Failure ........ 6
C. Re-thinking the Philosopher’s Problem ..................... IC
D. Confronting the Problem of Modernity ..................... 16
Chapter II
Survey of Approaches and their Limitations .................... 26
A. Introduction ..................................... 26
B. Individualistic Theories: Inherent Values of Individuals ........... 3]
1. Animal Liberation: Sentience ......................... 32
2. Animal Rights: Inherent Value ........................ 34
C. Holistic Theories: Inherent Value of Biotic Community ........... 44
1. Callicott and the Land Ethic .......................... 44
2. John Rodman: Ecological Sensibility ..................... 5‘7
3. Schweitzer: Reverence for Life ........................ 6]
5. Taylor: Respect for Nature .......................... 63
6. Hargrove: Nature and Positive Aesthetics ................. 5
D. Conclusion ...................................... 73
Chapter III
The Enlightenment Project & the Problem of Modernity ............. 7 E
A. Historical Background ............................... 78
1. Emancipation through Reason ......................... 7 9
2. The Failure to Complete the Project ..................... 8’7
B. Means Without Rationally Worked Out Ends ................. 92
1. Scientiﬁc Progress does not Imply Social Progress ............ 93
C. The Growth and Consequences of Technical Rationality ........... 9t
1. Weber’s Account of the Growth of Purposive-Instrumental Rationality 97
2. Heidegger’s Analysis of Modern Technology ................ 10C
3. Marcuse’s Criticism of Heidegger and Weber ............... 108
D. Conclusion ...................................... llt
Chapter IV
Dewey ’5 Contribution to Overcoming the Problem of Modernity ........ 125
A. Introduction ..................................... 125
B. The Relation of Dewey ’s Metaphysics to his Ethical Thought ....... 128

vi

1. New Conception of Experience ........................ 131
2. Existence as Precan'ous & Unstable ..................... 137
3. Situations & Inquiry .............................. 143
4. The Continuity of Moral and Factual Inquiry ............... 158
5. Repudiation of the Alleged Gulf Between Scientiﬁc Judgments & Moral
Judgments .................................... 161
C. Dewey’s Theory of Valuation ........................... 170
1. The Role of Desires in The Problematic Situation ............. 172
2. The Means/Ends Continuum .......................... 175
D. Dewey and the Problem of Modernity ..................... 179
E. A Problem with Dewey’s Instrumentalism ................... 183
Chapter V
Habermas’ Discourse Ethic .............................. 189
A. Introduction ..................................... 189
B. Habermas’ Non-foundational Universalism ................... 196
C. Putting Habermas and Dewey Together ..................... 204
1. Habermas’ Discourse Ethic and Dewey’s Theory of Valuation ..... 204
2. The Distinctiveness of Moral & Scientiﬁc Reason ............ 206
C. Conclusion ...................................... 210
Chapter VI
The Connection with Environmental Ethics ..................... 213
A. Introduction ..................................... 213
B. The Interpretative Reconstruction ........................ 215
C. The Public Sphere and the Limitation of the Discourse Ethic ........ 220
1. The Demise of the Public Sphere ....................... 222
2. The Potential for Protest ............................ 224
3. The Limitations of Abstract Moral Reasoning and Ecological Issues . . 226
D. Consideration of Aesthetic Concerns ...................... 229
1. The Experience of the Live Creature ..................... 231
2. The Aesthetic Quality of An Experience ................... 234
3. Consummatory Experiences and the Good Life .............. 236
Chapter VII
Conclusion ........................................ 247
A. Introduction ..................................... 247
B. Chapter Two ..................................... 248
C. Chapter Three .................................... 254
D. Chapter Four ..................................... 257
E. Chapter Five ..................................... 260
F. Chapter Six ..................................... 262
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................... 267

 

 

Chapter I
Introduction: Getting a handle on the Problem

A. The Problems arising from the Relation between Human Society and Nature

In dealing with a philosophical problem, deﬁnition of the problem is an obvious ﬁrst
step. Giving adequate articulation to the problem that philosophers are attempting to deal
with in the area of environmental ethics is itself an involved task. Attempting such an
articulation will be a main goal of this dissertation. I approach this task from a
pragmatist position. From this position I attempt an interpretive reconstruction of the
problems faced in environmental philosophy. This reconstruction is made for a pragmatic
reason: namely, to articulate these problems in a manner that clariﬁes how they are to
be resolved.

A reconstruction is needed, as will be more fully argued below, because the current
approaches in environmental ethics prove inadequate. In short for now, I claim that
debates concerning environmental issues are not simply due to our using the wrong moral
principles in making ethical judgments concerning nature. Rather the root of ecological
problems involve our inadequate conception of human rationality--in particular, practical-
moral rationality.

In response to this inadequacy, I will be trying to bring together the most general
kinds of issues that bear on the questions arising from environmental concerns, and
ultimately offering an illustration of the kind of rationality that could help in thinking

through these issues. In its broadest terms, this work can be understood as an attempt

 

 

2

to provide an account of rationality that is adequate for understanding ecological issues,
and for reconstructing our relationship with our natural environment.

We turn to philosophical theory in an attempt to resolve practical problems—-problems
which call for a more abstract level of reﬂection when reﬂection at the concrete level is
no longer adequate for the task. The conﬂicts involving environmental issues have
proven to be just this sort of problem. Since concrete problems are what give rise to
philosophical theory, looking at some of these problems, though they may be all too
familiar to some, may be the best place to start in getting a handle on the philosopher’s
problem. There is a diverse group of issues involved with these problems.

Concern for endangered species raises questions of whether non-human animals ought
to be granted rights in some sense. This question plays a role in the current debate
between environmentalists and the logging industry in the northwest. The
environmentalists are arguing for the ban of logging to protect the forests in which the
northern spotted owl nests. Whether they acknowledge it explicitly or not, the
environmentalists are claiming that the owl ought to be given moral consideration. On
the other hand, the logging industry is claiming that such a ban would be detrimental to
the local economy. Thus, they are claiming that there are certain system imperatives that
must be given precedence over the owl. In addition, the loggers claim that banning
logging would seriously threaten, and possibly destroy, their way of life.

The concern for global warming is a problem which does not directly involve concern
for non-human animals. Some characterize it as a problem that involves concern for

human life, both present and future generations. Others argue that the issue of global

3

warming goes beyond concern for human welfare. Here the claim is that the problem
ought to be dealt with because of the threat to the earth’s biosphere, and we need to be
morally concerned about the effects human society has on the biosphere. There is general
agreement on the causes of global warming-human activity in industrial countries is the
major cause. However, there is not agreement on the extent of the problem nor on what
ought to be done about it.

The depletion of natural resources--oil, various strategic metals, top soil, etc.-—can be
a mixed bag of concerns. It gives rise to economic concerns as well as concern for the
depleted resource itself. In other words, as the resource becomes more scarce, the price
paid will inevitably rise, thus generating concern in those dependent on the resource. But
others think there is a harm done to the depleted resource itself, or to the ecosystem
because of the loss of the resource in question.

The loss of beautiful landscapes due to development is another environmental concern.
This development may be in the form of residential or industrial expansion. Such loss
has led not only to concern over the loss of natural beauty in the immediate area under
development, but also for wilderness areas which are under protection against
development. There are growing threats to these wilderness areas as other natural
landscapes and resources become depleted; they are seen as potential reservoirs, or
stockpiles of resources, and demands to open up such areas to development are made with
ever increasing pressure. A closely related issue is the problem of overuse of our
National Parks and Wilderness Areas by those who enjoy outdoor recreation. Such

overuse has led some Wilderness Areas, such as the Sylvania Wilderness Tract in

 

4

Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, to require users to make reservations. In short, overuse has
forced us to begin rationing access to wilderness experiences.

Concern for inanimate natural entities has become a particularly interesting issue.
Environmental battles are fought over preserving natural landscapes, rock formations, and
rivers against development. The ﬁght over Hetch Hetchy Valley in the early years of this
century was one of the ﬁrst conﬂicts involving the development of a natural area. The
Sierra Club and its supporters lost that battle and the Hetch Hetchy Valley was dammed.
Since that time there have been numerous conﬂicts over the damming of rivers. The
environmentalists have used various arguments for not damming rivers: loss of natural
beauty, threats to endangered species (the snail darter), and the rights of the river to run
freely are among those arguments. The advocates for building the dams have primarily
cited economic concerns for arguments--cheap clean sources of power are appealing
reasons for a dam.

Power supply companies, however, are ﬁnding new arguments for damming rivers.
In Michigan, debate over dams has recently focused on the welfare of eagles. Consumers
Power Company holds licenses for 26 dams on various rivers in Michigan. A number
of these licenses expire in 1993. Some groups think this situation presents an opportunity
to review the environmental impact of the dams. One issue involves the fact that they
prevent Great Lakes ﬁsh from making their way upstream to spawn. Consequently, there
is a greater reliance on hatchery reared ﬁsh to restock the Great Lakes. Sportsﬁshermen
claim, moreover, that hatchery reared ﬁsh are not as durable as naturally spawned ﬁsh,

and also that disease and other problems in the hatchery make the hatchery reared ﬁsh

 

5

an unreliable source. Thus, ﬁshermen and the Michigan Charter Boat Association are
advocating requiring the utility company to build passageways around the dams to allow
the Great Lakes ﬁsh to pass upstream.

However, Consumers Power Company has argued that preventing the Great Lakes
ﬁsh from making their way upstream is currently an ecologically sound practice. The
power company points out that the dams have played a major role in the comeback of the
bald eagle population in inland areas of northern Michigan. The Great Lakes ﬁsh have
high levels of PCB and DDT contamination. And since a large portion of the eagles’ diet
consists of ﬁsh (some biologists estimate as high as 80%), there is good reason not to
allow passage of the ﬁsh around the dam. Of course, building such passages would cost
Consumers Power a fairly sizable amount of money, so they have economic concerns
here as well. But it is interesting to ﬁnd a utility company putting forth an argument
based on ecological concerns, and a number of wildlife biologists agree that allowing the
Great Lakes ﬁsh upstream passage would be detrimental to the inland eagle population.
They note that the inland eagle population has a much lower level of PCBs in tested eggs

than the birds which live along the shores of the Great Lakes.1

 

1 One could argue that this debate illustrates that dams are not a priori a bad thing.
Often times the fact that we cannot say a priori whether something will be good or bad
is overlooked in environmental debates. I will come back to this point later in discussion
of the adequacy of current approaches to environmental ethical theory.

 

6

B. Current Approaches to Environmental Ethics and their Failure

The list of problems mentioned here is by no means exhaustive. It is only meant to
illustrate some of the practical problems we face, and some of the concerns involved.
It also helps to illustrate the problematic situation to which the philosopher is responding.
This problematic situation can be characterized either in terms of an uncertainty about
how we ought to conduct our relations with our natural environment, or in terms of the
conﬂicts which arise between various groups concerning how this relationship ought to
be conducted. Questions we need to consider, then, are: How are we to respond to the
various issues that arise from these concrete, practical problems? What is the
philosopher’s role in these conﬂicts that emerge from the complex relationship between
human society and nature?

Typically, the current approach to these questions has been to develop an
environmental ethical theory. Such an ethical theory is expected to give guidance to the
practical relations between humans and their natural environment. It would give this
guidance by attempting to establish reasons for the granting of moral status to nonhuman
animals, inanimate natural entities, or ecosystems in general. However, the development
of such a theory inevitably confronts the question of the basis for an ethical concern for
nonhuman entities. When viewed in this light, the primary focus is the concern for
establishing a foundation for an environmental ethic. The issue posed, then, is the
question of the possibility of an environmental ethic. And to a large extent, philosophers

in the Anglo-American tradition have taken their task to be the need to show that such

7

an ethic is possible, and to establish which basis for ethical concern of nonhuman entities
is most adequate. The notions of rights, inherent value, positive aesthetic value, and
environmental sensibility are among the candidates put forth in response to the felt need
for a foundation for an environmental ethic.

Unfortunately, when the philosopher’s task is interpreted as the need to establish the
possibility of an environmental ethic, philosophers then take their eyes off the actual
concrete problems that emerge from the complex relationship between human society and
nature that gave rise to the philosopher’s task in the ﬁrst place. Their attention is
diverted to a set of theoretical problems in philosophy. This diversion of their attention
is unfortunate; it leads to a gap between theory and practice. This is not to say we
should discourage theory. There is a need, as I will show, to do theoretical work. But
this theoretical work must always keep one eye on the concrete problematic situation.
For it is the various factors in the problematic situation which will guide the construction
of hypotheses for resolution of the problem. And an hypothesis can only be tested for
success against the problem for which it is a proposed solution--does the hypothesis
resolve the problem?

I am not, however, advocating the philosopher as the one who can solve the concrete
problems single-handedly. Rather I follow John Dewey in thinking it is the philosopher’s
task to deﬁne and articulate the problem in such a way as to make the resolution of the
problematic situation possible. And to do this, one will engage in theory, but in a
manner that does not lose sight of the reason one has turned to theory in the ﬁrst place.

Most current approaches to environmental ethics see a need to address two basic

8

issues. First, the proposed ethic must address the issue of what sorts of things have
moral standing. And secondly, there must be some means of resolving conﬂicts which
will inevitably arise between the lives or welfare of all things, human or nonhuman,
claimed to have moral standing.2 These two points then serve as criteria for measuring
a successful theory. But while these criteria may seem sensible, they have directed the
philosopher’s attention toward the need to secure a basis for moral consideration of
nonhuman entities; arguments are given for there being a value or inherent worth of some
sort in nature. Debate then ensues over the nature of this value or worth. This is one
place where we ﬁnd the philosophers taking their eyes off the concrete problem which
leads to the gap between theory and practice.

More seriously, they commit what Dewey refers to as the philosophic fallacy:3 that
is, they transmute a conceptual ideal (rights, inherent value, aesthetic value, etc.) into an
antecedently existing reality. In other words, they conceptualize some characteristic,
which if reality had this characteristic, would resolve the problem they face, and then try
to give some philosophic argument showing reality actually has this characteristic. But
so long as they fail to give consideration to the actual existing conditions of the
problematic situation, their philosophic arguments will have no effect on the concrete

conﬂicts. In short, their conceptual ideal will be a resolution in contemplation only.

 

2 These criteria are put forth by Van De Veer and Pierce in the introduction to
People, Penguins and Plastic Trees (Belmount: Wadsworth, 1986), 16. Tom Regan
mentions similar criteria in his article, ”The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental
Ethic," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 19-21.

3 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 25-29.

9

Brief consideration of a conﬂict at the concrete level will illustrate the unproductive
character of an ethic which has as its goal the securing of a value in nature, be it an
inherent value or even a positive aesthetic value. That is to say, even if one were able
to show there is some type of value in nature, this does not resolve the practical
problems. Instead, what results is a clash of values, albeit values of different sorts:
namely, the value in nature on the one hand (inherent or aesthetic), and the value derived
from system imperatives (instrumental or economic) on the other. This is the classic
form environmental debate takes in the U.S. today. The clash between the
environmentalists advocating protection of the northern spotted owl and the logging
industry in the northwest is one example. Environmentalists claim the owl has a value
in and of itself, and this value clashes with an instrumental value derived from system
imperatives dependent on the smooth functioning of the local economy. Consequently,
in order to resolve this conﬂict of values, there needs to be further argument showing that
one of the values is in some sense "higher" and ought to take precedence.

The point here, however, is that rather than focusing on resolving the practical
problem, the philosopher’s attention has been diverted to dealing with the philosophical
problems in establishing the claim that nature does have some sort of value in itself. But
there is no real need for such an argument. That some people value nature is a de facto
claim, and as such needs no argument. Such an argument is believed necessary, though,
because philosophers want to make the prescriptive claim that people ought to value
nature. The problem, however, is not simply that people do or do not value nature.

Rather, the problem is that we do value nature, and at the same time value things which

10

involve the exploitation and destruction of nature-for example, the use of the individual
auto, jobs that depend on the exploitation of natural resources, etc. And so to simply
offer arguments for why we ought to value nature is inadequate. Such arguments merely
create a gap between theory and practice. Theoretical discussion has no real effect on
what goes on at the practical level. This situation is unsatisfactory, since it means we
have not been able to bring intelligence to bear on these practical problems. Again, I
suggest the reason for this situation is the way the mainstream theorists have formulated
the problem. What is needed, in short, is not some moral argument which attempts to
demonstrate that we have employed the wrong moral principles in making ethical
judgments concerning nature. Instead, we need a more adequate conception of the

problem.

C. Re—thinking the Philosopher’s Problem

In order to secure a more productive approach to resolving the concrete problems
involved with environmental concerns, I suggest we re-think the philosopher’s problem.
The task at hand, then, is to deﬁne the problematic situation (the conﬂict at the practical
level) from a philosophical perspective which will put it in terms that allow for its
resolution. I propose we view the conﬂicts emerging from the relationship between

human society and the natural environment as one manifestation of the problem of

11

modernity.4 The problem of modernity can be stated as the requirement of human reason
to come up with standards of normativity out of itself: that is, to derive these standards
without appeal to some external factor which serves as an indubitable foundation that
would legitimize those standards as absolute.’ This, in short, was the Enlightenment’s
goal. But the point here is this: If the conﬂicts emerging from the concern over the
relationship of humans and their natural environment are a manifestation of the problem
of modernity, then the problem of modernity cannot be ignored; it must be confronted
directly.

It may be helpful to state the problem of modernity in slightly different terms.
Horkheimer and Adorno deﬁned the Enlightenment as an attempt to distinguish and free
the individual consciousness from determination by natural forces characteristic of the
mythologies of western cultural traditions. While modern scientiﬁc rationality has had
success in this project--chieﬂy by securing efﬁcient means for achieving selected ends--we
have not had similar success in developing ways to select which ends we want to pursue.

As we will see in more detail in chapter three, the Enlightenment Project undermined

 

‘ The phrase, "the problem of modernity" is borrowed from David Rasmussen’s
book, Reading Habemzas (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 7-9. Rasmussen speaks
of the dilemma of modernity. However, Donald Koch has pointed out that this is not a
dilemma in the technical sense of dilemma. Thus, I will refer to it as the problem of
modernity. The problem and its origins will be discussed more completely in chapter
three.

5 The notion of an external factor will be discussed in chapter three. In brief for
now, the idea is that the search for such a standard amounts to a search for the
elimination of practical choice; but the attempt to eliminate practical choice is an attempt
to make a moral issue into a non-moral issue. For a discussion of this latter distinction
see section 2 of chapter four.

12

itself. It brought about a loss of conﬁdence and conviction in making evaluative
judgments. In its disenchantment of nature, modern rationality also decontextualized the
basic interpretive categories of Western societies. By interpretive categories are meant
the sources of cultural meaning and value preferences. The decontextualization occurred
when these interpretive categories were shown not to be eternal and universal as they
were held to be by the early modern thinkers. Notions of the good life, for example,
were shown to be historically and culturally conditioned. The undermining of these
categories was experienced as a loss of meaning and value. We ﬁnd this expressed by
TS. Eliot in his poem The Waste Land:

What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow

Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,

You cannot say, or guess, for you know only

A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,

And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief
Because they have lost their cultural context, our traditional meanings and values now
appear to us as merely "stony rubbish" or as "a heap of broken images. " At one time
reference to a tree had a fairly clear meaning; now students of literature puzzle over such
a reference. More signiﬁcantly for us, the undermining of this interpretive context has
eliminated many of our criteria for evaluative judgments. Thus, questions of ends
became problematic.

Stated in these terms, then, the Enlightenment Project remains incomplete. It remains

incomplete due to humanity’s failure to develop adequate means for selecting appropriate

ends which could replace those criteria that were lost during the Enlightenment period.

Humanity cannot attain emancipation so long as the ends humans pursue are determined

13

by factors external to human reason. However, if we could develop rational means for
selecting appropriate ends, it may then be possible to achieve the Enlightenment’s goal.
Put in other terms, the problem of modernity is a problem of rationality: modern
rationality was found to be inadequate in dealing with questions of ends. However, as
will be argued in this dissertation, this is a problem to which we can give a pragmatist
response.

The claim that the problem of modernity needs to be considered in order to address
ecological issues adequately may, to many, seem puzzling at best. Let me explain more
fully why I think it important. Philosophers have raised the question of the possibility
of an environmental ethic. This concern emerges, like all human concerns, from
historical circumstances. Understanding what is being asked for in an environmental
ethic, and why such an ethic is being sought, requires understanding these historical
circumstances.

There have been historical studies done in environmental ethics. Eugene Hargrove
and Roderick Nash, among others, have traced some of the historical roots in the
development of environmental sensibilities in America.‘ Aldo Leopold, John Muir, and
Henry David Thoreau are among the best known ﬁgures in America’s past who are
viewed as precursors of today’s environmental movement. But both Hargrove and Nash

point to cases even earlier than these popularly known ﬁgures which illustrate the

 

‘ Eugene Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1989), hereafter cited as Foundations. Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature: A
History of Environmental Ethics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989),
hereafter cited as Rights.

14

emergence of an ethical concern which goes beyond the human-human relation. John
Ray, an English botanist, writing in the late seventeenth century "became convinced that
the idea that the whole natural world existed only for people’s beneﬁt was an
unsupportable conceit" (Rights 20). And in America as early as 1793, concern for
nonhuman life forms was being voiced. Reverend Nicholas Collins, Nash reports, "asked
the American Philosophical Society to support the protection of little-known birds,
apparently on the verge of extinction" (Rights 36). In addition to these signs of
broadening ethical concerns, Hargrove places emphasis on the emergence of aesthetic
appreciation of nature as a signiﬁcant factor in the development of an environmental
attitude. Nature poetry and nature painting in early American history, as well as the
journals of naturalists, scientists, and explorers, illustrate Hargrove’s point.7

Though I do not want to go into a detailed discussion of this history of a broadening
ethical and aesthetic concern, since I think Hargrove and Nash do an adequate job, I do
have a comment to make concerning the relevance of this aspect of history in our western
tradition. My point is this: It may, indeed, be that attitudes recognizing environmental
values have arisen from a broadening of traditional ethics and aesthetic appreciation of
nature. But this point is moot if present day sensibilities have atrophied to a degree
where a majority of the population no longer recognize these values, nor understand their
origin. This point is especially relevant when we consider the fact that the lack of
environmental sensibilities has arisen from this same western tradition. Indeed, we ﬁnd

two strains of thought in ma tradition regarding the status of nature. To put it in perhaps

 

’ Foundations, especially chapters 3 and 4.

15

oversimpliﬁed terms, there are both a nature-as—resource attitude, and an environmentally
sensitive attitude in our tradition.“ The question, then, is why the one strain (the nature-
as-resource attitude) has predominated to such a degree that the other strain has, for the
most part, gone unheeded? And further, what can we do today to let the repressed
perspective on nature in our tradition be heard by more than the already converted?

These are, I suggest, some of the questions which philosophers need to consider in
addressing the practical conﬂicts over environmental issues. To answer these questions,
one needs to look more closely at the connection between the practical conﬂicts over
environmental issues and the problem of modernity. The reason this is so important is
that the factors which give rise to these conﬂicts have a history, a history that is already
connected to key developments of the Enlightenment period. We need to examine past
historical developments in human rationality. We need to do this not for its own sake,
but rather to ﬁnd the roots of current conceptions of the human-nature relationship that
are inadequate for thinking through the ecological issues we now face.

In considering the connection between environmental issues and the problem of
modernity, we ﬁnd ourselves still trying to answer the question of how to resolve morally
problematic situations without appeal to standards of normativity that are external to

human reason and serve as indubitable foundations. This problem is experienced in the

 

3 Though these labels may not be completely adequate, they do help to locate the
basic difference in two distinct attitudes which humans have taken regarding the natural
world. Nature-as-resource here signiﬁes the attitude which views nature primarily as a
stockpile of resources to be used (wisely or unwisely) for human beneﬁt. The
environmentally sensitive perspective signiﬁes an attitude which understands nature’s
worth as not merely limited to its value as resource.

 

 

16

practical conﬂicts which arise from the opposing views of nature’s worth and how it
should be treated. I suggest, then, that these practical conﬂicts are one way in which we
presently experience the problem of modernity. In other words, they are a problem of
human rationality and not just issues involving conﬂicting moral principles.

We can note how different this approach to environmental ethics is than the approach
which attempts to secure a basis for the moral status of nonhuman entities. However,
viewing the current practical environmental conﬂicts as manifestations of the problem of
modernity will, I submit, be a more fruitful approach. For if we can overcome the
problem of modernity, then we will have found a non—foundational way of approaching
morally problematic situations. But this does pose a serious philosophic task: we must
confront the problem of modernity in order to be able to adequately formulate the

problem manifested in current environmental debates.

D. Confronting the Problem of Modernity

In addition to the aspect of history pointed to by Hargrove and Nash, our present
historical situation also stands in the shadow of the Enlightenment Project. And to
adequately understand our situation today, the role of the Enlightenment Project in the
development of human rationality cannot be ignored. Both the attempt to achieve human
emancipation through the use of reason and the failed attempts to complete this project
need consideration.

Perhaps the most important achievement of the Enlightenment was humanity’s

17

development of modern scientiﬁc rationality. But while the Enlightenment successfully
made progress emancipating humans from dependence on nature’s fortunes in the
scientiﬁc realm, the project did not meet with success in the moral realm. In other
words, while modern science seemed a more stable physical existence, humanity’s
approach to resolving morally problematic situations remained basically unchanged for
a very fundamental reason: human rationality was unable to come up with standards of
normativity for and by itself. We need, then, to look at the Enlightenment Project and
determine why the development of scientiﬁc rationality was successful while a similar
progress in moral reasoning failed to occur. Indeed, in looking at the critiques of modern
scientiﬁc rationality offered by Heidegger and Marcuse, we ﬁnd that this development
itself played a key role in preventing progress in moral reasoning.9

The development of scientiﬁc rationality meant gradual progress in human ability to
devise efﬁcient means for attaining selected ends. This progress was not paralleled in
human practical rationality: that is, we did not succeed in developing ways for selecting
appropriate ends. Humanity needs this latter form of rationality in order for the
Enlightenment Project to be completed. Put another way, if we succeeded in developing
an intelligent manner by which we could choose the ends to pursue, we would then be
applying intelligence to our practical choices. And since the conﬂicts involving
environmental issues are conﬂicts of which ends we ought to pursue, developing this

aspect of human rationality is necessary to confront these conﬂicts adequately.

 

9 The development of modern scientiﬁc rationality and the problems this development
posed for progress in moral reasoning will be discussed in chapter three.

18
The need, then, is to fulﬁll the Enlightenment ideal. Doing so means directly

confronting the problem of modernity—-showing that it is possible to develop non-
foundational standards of normativity. In an attempt to do the preliminary work of
showing how one might approach the problem of modernity, I consider the pragmatism
of John Dewey. Dewey’s pragmatic response to the problem of modernity involves his
conception of the means/ends continuum. He reconstructs the way in which we conceive
of ends and the rationality appropriate for reﬂecting on the choice of ends. If we can
show how his thought overcomes the problem of modernity, it may be possible to make
use of his ideas in dealing with the problematic issues involved in the area of
environmental ethics, since this area is, as I have suggested, one current manifestation
of the problem of modernity.

At this point a summary of my interpretation of the philosopher’s task in the area of
environmental philosophy would be useful. First, I claim that environmental ethical
theories which propose to establish some basis for the moral status of non-human entities
prove to be inadequate. These approaches commit the philosophic fallacy and lead to a
gap between theory and practice. They become entangled in philosophical issues and lose
sight of the practical conﬂicts. Hence, these approaches do not allow for intelligence to
be brought to bear on the ecological issues currently confronting us. Moreover, conﬂicts
regarding environmental issues involve debates about rationality, not just debates over
appropriate moral principles. Approaches which neglect these debates about rationality
will not be adequate for fully resolving these environmental conﬂicts.

In light of these difﬁculties, I propose an alternative interpretation of the problematic

19

situation with which philosophers ought to concern themselves. The task of the
philosopher is not to issue speciﬁc resolutions to a particular problem; rather it is to
deﬁne the problem in such a way that it clariﬁes how the problem should be approached,
and if possible provide some means for dealing with the problem. In keeping to the
philosopher’s task, then, I do not attempt to establish reasons for granting moral
consideration to nature. Rather I suggest that the practical conﬂicts over environmental
issues be interpreted as one way in which we presently experience the problem of
modernity. In short, the practical conﬂicts over environmental issues are an instance of
our inability to select worthy ends in a rational manner; we are either uncertain which
end we should pursue, or there is a debate over which end is appropriate, and we have
inadequate means for resolving the uncertainty or the debates. If this is an adequate
interpretation of the problem, then what is required is a rational manner for selecting
worthy and appropriate ends.

This reconstruction of the problem clariﬁes what we need to resolve the problem. We
face a situation such that we are currently unable to bring intelligence adequately to bear
on conﬂicts involving ecological issues. We need an account of human reason that
provides us with a means for rationally reﬂecting on questions of ends. This, then, is the
problematic situation confronting the philosopher. It is a situation that requires abstract
theoretical reﬂection, but this reﬂection must be mindful of its purpose: namely, to
provide a means for applying intelligence to the concrete conﬂicts arising over ecological
issues. Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry, with its focus on the means/ends

continuum, in conjunction with Habermas’ discourse ethic, and consideration of certain

20

aesthetic concerns could provide such an account. This account would afford us a
democratic setting for a reasonable discussion regarding questions which have emerged
concerning how we ought to relate to our natural environment.

I begin in chapter two, then, with a critique of some representative proposals for an
environmental ethic. In addition to pointing out internal difﬁculties, I claim these
proposals fail to give practical guidance. They do not help to resolve the practical
conﬂicts which arise out of the complex relations between humans and the environment.
There are two fundamental reasons for this failure. First, since they commit the
philosophic fallacy, they eventually lead to a gap between theory and practice. Secondly,
since they fail to recognize conﬂicts concerning environmental issues as being debates
about rationality, they fail to deal with the core problem of these issues. For these
reasons, then, these approaches impede rather than promote the application of intelligence
to the concrete problems.

Chapter three is devoted to a discussion of the Enlightenment Project and the failure
to complete it. The focus will be on uncovering historical factors which have prevented
the project from being completed. I will also be looking at reasons for why the
environmentally sensitive attitude, which Hargrove and Nash point to, has been
overshadowed by the attitude which views nature primarily as a resource for human
beneﬁt. Understanding this development will shed light on how taking a primarily
economic view of the environment came to be a customary response when disagreements
arose over environmental concerns. Since the attitude which views nature primarily as

a resource forms the basis of one of the dominant interests in environmental debates,

21

gaining an understanding of the historical development of this attitude is quite relevant.

In brief, I follow Maclntyre’s claims regarding the undermining of the ancients’ moral
scheme that occurred when the modern thinkers rejected the ancients’ conception of
causation that relied on the occult-like powers of teleological ends. The rejection of
metaphysically determined ends brought about a certain emancipation for humans. But
this emancipation brought with it the demand for new standards for making evaluative
judgments. The need was for the development of normative standards which could be
validated through human reason alone. I also look at the development of human
rationality in our western tradition as it is discussed by such drinkers as Weber,
Heidegger and Marcuse. The conclusion is that the development of human rationality has
been one-sided: that is, while we have developed purposive-instrumental rationality,
which deals with developing efﬁcient means for attaining selected ends, we have not
developed a rational manner to determine which ends are worthy of pursuit. In other
words, there is a need to develop an adequate form of practical rationality. The main
point to be established in chapter three, then, is that the problems we face today involving
ecological issues are not simply the result of using the wrong moral principles in making
decisions concerning our treatment of nature, but rather the problem involves an
inadequate conception of human rationality.

In chapter four the emphasis shifts from doing critical work to providing a positive
program for meeting the concerns raised in the ﬁrst three chapters. It begins with an
excursus examining the relation of Dewey’s metaphysics and his ethical thought. This

excursus is necessary to fully understand the major claims made by Dewey regarding

22

ethical inquiry. Two key factors which will be examined are Dewey’s claims that the
starting point of moral inquiry is rooted in a disequilibrium of the agent and its
environment, and that moral inquiry is continuous with scientiﬁc inquiry-~they have the
same logical structure. Understanding just how Dewey’s ethical views are related to his
metaphysics will better allow us to understand how his approach to ethical inquiry will
help address the problem laid out in chapter three: that is, the problem of modern
rationality being inadequate for dealing with questions of ends. Focus then shifts to an
examination of Dewey’s notion of the means/ ends continuum. Dewey rejects the
distinction of means and ends as it is traditionally understood. According to Dewey, the
two cannot be separated except conceptually. Moreover, evaluation of ends is evaluation
of means, since the means just are the conditions which bring the end about. After
clarifying the means/ends continuum, I relate the connection of Dewey’s ethical thought
to the needed completion of the Enlightenment project. I show that his approach to
ethical inquiry offers a method for evaluating standards of normativity which human
reason generates by and for itself. In short for now, my claim is that Dewey’s
pragmatism shows us an aspect of human rationality which can be developed to serve our
practical need regarding the choice of appropriate ends. His work offers an alternative
to the narrowly conceived instrumentalism found in technical rationality as deveIOped in
our western tradition. I criticize Dewey, however, for not clarifying a needed social or
dialogical conception of practical rationality. His conception remains monological, and
as such it impedes the achievement of his view of a democratically formed society.

Chapter ﬁve brieﬂy examines the discourse ethic of Jiirgen Habermas. Habermas’

23

discourse ethic offers a dialogical conception of practical rationality which can push
Dewey’s broadly conceived instrumentalism out of its monological stance. This particular
combination of Dewey and Habermas offers a non-foundational position which is sensitive
to cultural inﬂuence, and yet avoids the dangers inherent in a contextualist position
because the discourse ethic supports a principle of universalization.

Thus far the focus has been on developing an account of practical rationality that
would adequately respond to the problem of modernity. The appeal to Dewey and
Habermas was intended to meet this need. Chapter six goes on to discuss how this
combined approach of Deweyan pragmatism and Habermasian discourse ethics will allow
us to confront environmental issues.

In brief outline, I show how the account of practical rationality derived from Dewey’s
thought and Habermas’ discourse ethic provides a rational process for the validation of
moral norms in a manner that responds to the problem of modernity. However, since the
discourse ethic deals only with the realm of moral norms, it is limited in the amount of
aid it can offer for reﬂecting on ecological issues. Many of these issues involve questions
of ends. Consequently, a response that is rooted solely in the realm of moral norms
would be inadequate, since questions of ends involve issues concerning conceptions of the
good life. As such they fall within the realm of the ethical.10

Because many ecological issues involve questions regarding value preferences and

ends, it would be helpful to be able to say something about what appropriate or

 

‘° This distinction between the moral and the ethical is crucial for Habermas. It is
discussed in chapter ﬁve (p. 201) and chapter six (p. 227).

24

acceptable conceptions of the good life might be like. This is important since value
preferences can only make sense within the historical context of a way of life. I claim
that consideration of some aesthetic concerns would help to ﬂesh out what is meant by
an acceptable conception of the good life. I appeal to aspects of Dewey’s aesthetic theory
to this end.

In summary, what is offered here is a conception of a rational process that answers
to the loss of conﬁdence and conviction regarding our ability to deal with questions of
ends in a rational manner. In other words, this rational process responds to the problem
of modernity; it allows human rationality to formulate standards of normativity for and
by itself. In addition, this rational process gives us a means to reﬂect on ecological
issues. Because it provides a rational means for the validation of moral norms, it offers
assurance that the moral aspects of ecological issues are not reduced to technical issues
to be relegated to technical experts. Moreover, since it provides a means to reﬂect on
appropriate conceptions of the good life, it offers some guidance for us to begin thinking
about value preferences, about questions of ends. Thus, this approach to ecological issues
links questions of moral norms and questions of ends. In short, the rational process
offered here for reconstructing the human-nature relationship is partly moral and partly
aesthetic. The combination of moral concerns and aesthetic concerns provides a response
to the need of a reconstructed conception of this relationship for which neither the moral
nor the aesthetic alone is adequate.

It is also important to note that since this approach does permit cultural variation in

how the human-nature relationship is conceived, it does not dictate a priori the concrete

 

 

25
content of this relationship. What this relationship will be has to be worked out by the

people involved in the debates over ecological issues. What is offered here is a rational
process for the construction of the human—nature relationship. But it is an ethic that only
works through the participation of the people actually involved in the conﬂicts over

environmental concerns.

Chapter H
Survey of Approaches and their Limitations

A. Introduction

The aim of the present chapter is to discuss some representative approaches to
environmental ethics. This discussion may seem to become overly involved in issues not
directly bearing on the project I have set for myself. However, I think it is worthwhile
to examine these issues; doing so illustrates my claim that these approaches lead to a gap
between theory and practice. By getting involved in this discussion, we can see just how
these thinkers have their attention diverted away from the practical conﬂicts that arise
from environmental concerns. That is to say, they become entangled in philosophical
issues that occur when thinkers attempt to provide a basis for ethical concerns beyond the
human-human relationship. In the attempt to overcome these philosophical problems the
practical conﬂicts are neglected.

It may seem that my criticism amounts to an anti-theory position. However, this is
not the case; if it were, my own position would be puzzling since I appeal to theory
myself. My position needs to be understood as only claiming that certain types of theory
are inadequate for approaching ecological issues. In particular, theories which lead to
dualisms and appeal to some foundationalist criterion for ethical judgments are being
criticized. Even though these types of theory are inadequate, we cannot say all theory
is inadequate. We still need to move to a theoretical position of some sort in order to

develop a framework which will provide an adequate perspective on the issues involved

26

27

in environmental conﬂicts such that these conﬂicts can be resolved.

The basic criticism of the approaches examined here is that they each attempt, in their
own way, to ﬁx a value in nature. The motivation for this move is understandable: it is
thought that if nature has a value in itself, there will be reason to respect that value and
to argue against the exploitation of nature. However, what invariably happens is that the
philosophers developing these theories become entangled in a number of philosophical
difﬁculties in arguing for this value. The primary difﬁculty is that they commit what
Dewey refers to as the philosophic fallacy. “ This fallacy involves the transmuting of
a conceptual ideal (rights, inherent value, aesthetic value, etc.) into an antecedently
existing reality. As we will see, however, this transmutation requires a good deal of
philosophic acrobatics. Two complementary problems result from this. First, the
philosophers lose sight of the concrete problems in the midst of their acrobatic
performance. Second, whatever solution they might provide turns out to be a solution
in contemplation only. In both cases, they create a gap between theory and practice, and
ignore the root of the problems in the inadequate conception of practical rationality. In
other words, philosophical theories which attempt to establish a value in nature have no
effect on the concrete conﬂicts. Whatever the result of the philosophical worrying, the
concrete problems remain. As we will see, another part of the problem lies in the fact
that there is an uncritically accepted dualism in the traditional framework out of which
these theories are generated: namely, a dualism between the human subject who is viewed

as metaphysically distinct from nature, which in turn is understood as an object that

 

“ This fallacy is discussed in chapter four (p. 140).

28

confronts the human subject. With these comments in mind, I want to examine several
representative theoretical approaches to environmental ethics which I ﬁnd inadequate.

There are several basic categories of environmental ethical theories, and they have
been variously characterize .‘2 I will adopt the individualistic versus the holistic
characterization, since these labels help point out what I take to be their essential
difference. Also I want to examine the exchange of criticism between these two groups,
since this exchange helps to further illustrate how their attention is diverted from the
concrete conﬂicts. The key difference between these two groups lies in who or what they
claim the locus of value to be. The individualistic position maintains that it is the
individual human or animal, while the holistic camp shifts the locus to the ecosystems as
a whole. In brief for now, we can characterize the feud as follows: the holistic thinkers
claim the individualistic camp does not go far enough in their extension of the circle of
moral considerability; the main return volley from the individualistic camp is a charge
of environmental fascism against the holistic thinkers.

Within the individualistic category there are two candidates I will consider which are
extensions of traditional approaches to ethical problems. They are the Animal Liberation
Movement of Peter Singer, and the Animal Rights advocates as represented by Tom

Regan. These two theories attempt to widen the circle of moral considerability. Singer

 

12

Callicott divides the various approaches into three categories. The category I
ignore here is the class of theories which are conceived as a type of applied ethics. This
approach is issue oriented, and often deals with technical matters in a legalistic manner.
For example, it might try to determine who is responsible for acid rain and how to justly
compensate those whose natural resources have been damaged. This is not the level at
which I wish to consider practical issues. (In Defense of the Land Ethic, pp. 2-5).

29

wants to use a utilitarian ethic to extend moral consideration to all sentient creatures.
Regan uses a deontological theory in attempt to extend rights to entities which have
inherent value.

I do not think all of those who advocate moral standing for animals are actually
putting forth an environmental ethic as such; however, I think they need to be discussed
since they could serve as a model for those who may want to extend their widening of
the moral circle even further. Peter Singer, as we will see, does not seem interested in
the problem of establishing a value of the environment beyond sentient creatures. ‘3
Thus, I think it somewhat dishonest to set him up as a target for the criticism of offering
a faulty environmental ethic. However, Tom Regan, who has done work on the animal
rights issue, does investigate the possibility of extending his rights-based theory to cover
natural entities.

The second category of approaches to be looked at will be those environmental
thinkers who are more concerned with trying to build a new ethical paradigm. These are
the Ecocentrists, and they are attempting to shift "the locus of intrinsic value from
individuals . . . to terrestrial nature--the ecosystems--as a whole. "1‘ Though I have

sympathy with their project, I criticize them for failing to achieve a genuinely new

 

‘3 Another reason I feel a discussion of Singer is warranted is due to a ripple effect

caused by his extension of moral consideration. This ripple effect has two aspects to it.
First, I think Singer had an effect on awakening the sensibilities of philosophers to the
claims of moral worth of nonhuman entities. The second and more important aspect is
that some ecocentric thinkers felt that Singer’s work was so inﬂuential that it would
overshadow current efforts to show the value of nonsentient, natural entities.

1‘ J. Baird Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: New York University
Press, 1989), 3. Hereafter cited in text as Land Ethic.

3O
paradigm. The problem I ﬁnd is a continued focus on attempting to construct some ﬁxed
value in nature. This value takes various forms, but regardless of its form, no appeal to
such a ﬁxed value will serve as an adequate basis for resolving practical conﬂicts. For
as mentioned earlier, it will only lead to a clash of different sorts of value: for example,
the inherent value of nature and the instrumental value derived from maintaining system
imperatives. Thus, even if the argument for such a ﬁxed value should be successful
(which I deny), it would not resolve the practical conﬂicts, since these conﬂicts are
conﬂicts of which value ought to be pursued.

The Land Ethic, which most ecocentrists support, is stated by Aldo Leopold as
follows: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. ”‘5 From this statement, we
can see that the ecocentric thinkers’ interest is in the whole biotic community rather than
the individual’s welfare.

Mark Sagoff has commented that the animal liberationists and the ecocentrists have
incompatible goals:

An environmentalist cannot be an animal liberationist; nor may animal
liberationists be environmentalists. The environmentalist would sacriﬁce the
welfare of the individual creatures to preserve the authenticity, integrity, and
complexity of the ecological systems. The liberationist must be willing to

sacriﬁce the authenticity, integrity, and complexity of the ecosystems for the
welfare of animals.“5

 

‘5 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press,
1949), 224-25. Hereafter cited in text as Sand County.

1‘ Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage,
Quick Divorce" Osgoode Hall law Journal 22 (1984): 8. Hereafter cited in text as Bad
Marriage.

31

This quotation points out a fundamental problem which arises when one tries to answer
the question: What sorts of things have moral standing?17 The animal liberationists and
the environmentalists are at odds because of the differing ways they answer this question.
We need now to take a closer look at why they answered the question as they did. We
will begin by looking at the animal liberationist position. Even though the animal
liberationist movement may be legitimate in its own right, it is severely limited as a
plausible environmental ethical theory. And as this is fairly obvious, I will not trot out

and rehearse all the objections that have been made against it.

B. Individualistic Theories: Inherent Values of Individuals

As intimated already, there are two different starting points for advocating the moral
status of animals. Although they have compatible goals, they nonetheless result in quite
different theories. The ﬁrst is represented by Peter Singer, and concerns a respect for
interests; it is based on a utilitarian account of what is morally permissible. The second
is represented by Tom Regan, and it is concerned with a respect for inherent value; it is
based on the view of moral agents being rights-holders. The motivation for a liberationist
to extend moral consideration to a wider circle of moral agents can be summed up by
saying that the neglect of such an extension amounts to speciesism, or human chauvinism:

that is, an unwarranted valuing of the human species as superior to other forms of life

 

‘7 Recall that being able to answer this question is seen as a necessary criterion for
an adequate environmental ethic.

32

to the extent that we do not need to be ethically concerned about how we treat them.

1. Animal Liberation: Sentience

If we consider Singer’s utilitarian account, we can see why he thinks the attitude of
human chauvinism is morally unacceptable. Singer makes the claim that, "If a being
suffers, there can be no moral justiﬁcation for refusing to take that suffering into
consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires
that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering . . . of any other being. "‘3
The question for Singer, then, is whether any beings other than humans have the capacity
to suffer. And if any do, then we are morally obligated to take their suffering into
consideration in our dealings with them. Singer uses sentience as the mark of being a
moral agent. That is to say, if a being is a sentient being, then that being has a claim to
moral consideration:

Suppose that we apply the test of imagining living the life of the weed I am about
to pull out of my garden. I then have to imagine living a life with no conscious
experience at all. Such a life is a complete blank; I would not in the least regret
the shortening of the subjectively barren form of existence. This test suggests,
therefore, that the life of a being that has no conscious experiences is of no

intrinsic value. " ‘9

This passage makes clear the limitation of a sentience based ethic: namely, if sentience

 

‘3 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2d ed. (New York: The New York Review of
Books, 1990), 8.

‘9 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
90.

33
is the mark of moral consideration, nonsentient natural entities deserve no moral
consideration. Thus, rare species of plants and ecosystems would have no moral standing
independent of the value they may have for the welfare of sentient beings. In other
words, the only reason one may have for protecting an ecosystem from destruction would
be the instrumental value that ecosystem might have for some sentient beings. The
shortcoming of this, however, is that the ecosystem may have little instrumental value,
or what value it may have could be outweighed by aggregating some other considerations.
It may, however, be thought that a sentience-based ethic may establish some moral
consideration which could be applied to the protection of endangered sentient species.
But Singer’s arguments seem not to apply in this regard either. That is to say, Singer
bases his claims for moral consideration on a being’s capacity to suffer, and it is the
individual animal which suffers, not the species. Thus, so long as the individuals of a
species are not suffering, there appears to be no justiﬁcation, on Singer’s view, to say
we have a duty to protect the species from extinction. Indeed, as Alastair Gunn notes in
the following passage, it may be permissible to eradicate an entire species:
A program to eradicate a species by painlessly sterilizing each member (placing
a contraceptive substance in the water holes they use, for instance) would cause
no direct suffering, and the introduction of an exotic species which would ﬁll the
vacant ecological niche could ensure the welfare of the predators and parasites
which depended on the now extinct species.20

Thus, if the only reason we are kept from developing a wilderness area is the presence

there of some rare sentient species, we could legitimately eliminate this inconvenience

 

2° Alastair Gunn, "Preserving Rare Species" in Earthbound: New Introductory
Essays in Environmental Ethics, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 1984), 307-
08. Hereafter cited in text as Rare Species.

34

through sterilization. And when the last of the species dies off, we would be able to
proceed with the development.

In sum, then, although Singer’s animal liberation movement has its legitimate areas
of concern, it is not a viable option as a possible basis for an environmental ethic. I have
pointed out two basic objections to using a sentience based utilitarian theory for an
environmental ethic. First, it is not possible to extend moral consideration to nonsentient
entities such as rare plants and ecosystems. Secondly, it is individualistic rather than
holistic in its outlook. Being individualistic, it is concerned only with the suffering of
the individual sentient creatures, which severely limits it as an approach for justifying the
protection of endangered species, since the species as such does not suffer. There are
further criticisms made of the animal liberation movement, but the objections I have
discussed are adequate to show it is not a plausible theory for an environmental ethic.21
In terms of the ﬁrst criterion for a plausible environmental ethic-~the criterion concerning

the sorts of things having moral standing-it is too restrictive.

2. Animal Rights: Inherent Value

As mentioned earlier, another starting point for advocating the moral standing of

animals is the interest for respect of inherent value. A main proponent of this position

 

2‘ For other criticisms of Singer see: Rodman’s "The Liberation of Nature? ",

Inquiry, 20 (1977): 83- 145, which gives a detailed critical discussion of Singer’s position;
also Sagoff’s ”Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick
Divorce," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 22 (1984): pp. 8 ff.

35

is Tom Regan. As with the animal liberationist position, Regan’s rights-based theory was
not initially conceived of as an environmental ethic. And as we shall see, it is susceptible
to some of the same criticisms as Singer’s position. However, it is necessary to examine
Regan’s rights-based theory since Regan himself suggests that ”the implications of the
successful development of a rights-based environmental ethic, one that made the case that
individual inanimate natural objects (e. g. , this redwood) have inherent value and a basic
moral right to treatment respectful of that value, should be welcomed by
environmentalists. "’2 Simply put, Regan seems convinced that once we can ﬁnd some
justiﬁcation for attributing rights to natural entities, we will have an adequate
environmental ethic which will legitimate claims for respect of the value of the
environment.

If we consider Regan’s rights-based theory in terms of the two criteria mentioned
earlier, we can say that the kinds of things which have moral standing are those things
which have inherent value. Furthermore, we will be able to attribute rights to those
things which now have moral standing, and appeal to these rights when conﬂicts arise.
But it must be noted that the granting of rights to a thing--a peat bog, say—~does not entail
that it will no longer be involved in conﬂicts, or have its rights overridden by rights of
some other entity. To believe this, is to misunderstand what it means to have rights.
The bog-~given that it can be said to have inherent value—-is simply assured that it will

receive equal consideration when conﬂicts do arise. Put another way, it will not

 

’2 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983), 362. Hereafter cited in text as Animal Rights.

36

automatically be assumed that a bog should be sacriﬁced to the interests of a developer
who wants to drain it. In short, Regan thinks to show that natural entities have rights
would be to show that the environment is to be respected. And Regan asks, ”is not that
what the more holistic, systems-minded environmentalists want? " (Animal Rights 363).
I suggest this is not enough; even if it were to succeed in showing we ought to respect
the environment, it does nothing to help resolve conﬂicts in an equitable manner.
Setting this last point aside for now, I want to examine Regan’s claims more closely
to see why his rights—based theory does not allow of the extension which he suggests can

be made.
a) Regan and Singer: The Drﬂerence

Regan’s motivation for extending the circle of moral agents is much the same as
Singer’s. Both start by considering "marginally human cases" and argue that these
marginal cases--the mentally retarded, for instance-«ought not to be exploited.23 In
justifying why the mentally retarded ought not to be exploited, certain marks of moral
worth are noted which many animals also possess. The argument is then made that if the
"marginally human cases" count as moral agents, then to not also count any animals who
possess the required characteristics amounts to no more than an inconsistent human
chauvinism.

The important difference between the positions of Singer and Regan lies in how each

 

2’ Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 48 ff.; Regan, All That Dwell Therein, p. 56.

37

justiﬁes the extension of moral worth to the nonhuman. Singer, as we have seen, bases
his claim on a utilitarian theory which takes the possession of sentience as the mark of
moral standing. Regan, however, thinks this is an inadequate theory:

One individual is killed and, as a consequence, optimal aggregate consequences

are obtained, all considered. The survivors reap the beneﬁts; the victim loses

everything. The situation must strike us as radically unfair, and yet, if the

consequences, including the side effects are optimiﬁc, the act utilitarian . . . must

concede that his position is powerless to lodge a moral complaint (Animal Rights

226).
What we must note here, however, is that the dispute is not so much with Singer’s choice
of the mark of moral standing as it is with Singer’s utilitarianism. Regan thinks the
utilitarian account does not give grounding to strong enough claims since only
consequences that maximize good play a role in what is morally justiﬁable, and the
possibility always exists that the appeal to consequences would support a primafacie evil.
Granted, Regan here only addresses act utilitarianism, but he thinks rule utilitarianism
reduces to act utilitarianism, and therefore, is susceptible to the same objections.” It
is this inadequacy of utilitarianism that motivates Regan to look for a ﬁrmer basis on
which to ground the extension of moral consideration to nonhuman entities.

Regan wants to attribute rights to animals on the basis of their having inherent value.

But there is an issue which arises at this point that will need to be discussed: namely,

Regan is more restrictive in his extension of the moral circle than Singer, but at the same

 

2‘ Regan discusses difﬁculties of the rule utilitarian version in, The case for Animal

Rights, 250 ff.

38

time he wants to be less restrictive.” Regan is more restrictive in that only those
animals which have inherent value can have rights attributed to them. He determines
whether a thing has inherent value by his subject-of-a-life criterion (this is discussed
below). But Regan wants to be less restrictive in that he wants the subject-of-a—life
criterion to only be a sufﬁcient condition for moral consideration whereas Singer makes
possession of sentience a necessary condition. Regan’s wanting it both ways, so to speak,
seems to stem from his desire for a ﬁrm foundation for the extension of rights, and his
wanting to keep inherent value in natural entities an open possibility. I want to bring this
issue up because it may seem that Regan is being inconsistent on this matter. However,
I suggest there need not be an inconsistency here at all; Regan could simply say that
animals and non-animals have inherent value for different reasons. And though it makes
for a more complex theory, this move would be consistent. Before more can be said on
this issue, however, we need to examine what Regan sees as constituting inherent value-—

at least for animals.

b) The Subject-of—a-Life Criterion for Inherent Value

As mentioned previously Regan claims only those animals who have an inherent value

can become rights-holders. The possession of inherent value is grounded by Regan’s

”subject-of-a-life criterion. " Individuals can be said to be a subject-of-a-life, and thereby

 

2‘ Johnson also discusses Regan’s criterion as being only a sufﬁcient condition,

”Treating the Dirt, " 342-43. And Callicott also points out that Regan is more restrictive
than Singer, In Defense of the land Ethic, 39-40.

39

possess inherent value, if they have beliefs and desires, perceptions, memory, and a sense
of the future among a list of other related characteristics" (Animal Rights 243). Now
Regan is well aware of the difﬁculty which arises when ones tries to determine in
individual cases whether the individual meets all the listed qualiﬁcations. And rather than
to attempt to draw the line in any speciﬁc place, he says, "the word animal will be used
to refer to mentally normal mammals of a year or more " (Animal Rights 78). And it can
be seen here how Regan is more restrictive than Singer: the class of sentient beings is
larger than the class of mammals of a year or more. We will return to this issue,
showing how Regan wants to be less restrictive, and suggest a possibility as to how he
could keep from being inconsistent. But ﬁrst I want to brieﬂy run through a criticism
of Regan’s position. I want to delay examining how Regan attempts to be less restrictive
than Singer because the intervening discussion will help to clarify how Regan avoids

inconsistency.

c) Objection to Regan ’s Position

Earlier I claimed that Regan’s position is susceptible to some of the same criticisms
as Singer’s. We can now brieﬂy say why. It has to do with the individualistic approach
which both positions take. Regan, like Singer, holds that it is the individual animal
which ought to be granted moral standing. Regan’s claim is that if an animal has
inherent value-—if it is the subject—of—a-life—-then it ought to be considered a rights—holder

and be respected and given proper treatment on that basis. We may think that, like

40
Singer’s position, the rights—based theory may not be of much help in protecting
endangered species. However, Regan claims his view is compatible with efforts to save
endangered species:
The rights view is not opposed to efforts to save endangered species. It only
insists that we be clear about the reasons for doing so. On the rights view, the
reason we ought to save the members of endangered species of animals is not
because the species is endangered but because the individual animals have valid
claims and thus rights against those who would destroy their natural habitat . . .
or who would make a living off . . . practices that unjustiﬁably override the rights
of these animals (Animal Rights 360).
Regan wants to emphasize the point that his view is compatible with the efforts to save
endangered species; however, he also wants to be clear that he does not think a species
deserves protection simply because it is endangered. He points out that such an
understanding " can foster a mentality that is antagonistic to the implications of the rights
View" (Animal Rights 360). Regan is concerned that people may come to think it is
permissible to harm animals so long as they are not endangered. This would obviously
be inconsistent with the rights view. If the species is protected because of the individuals
of that species being rights-holders, and they possess that right because of an inherent
value, then, for consistency’s sake, all animals which have inherent value will possess the
right and so ought to be protected--not just the members of endangered species. In short,
rights are granted on the basis of having inherent value, and the "mere size of the relative
population" of a species is morally insigniﬁcant (Animal Rights 360). Thus, we can note
a point of agreement here between Singer and Regan: namely, it is the individual which

is the primitive entity of moral worth; the value of the species is derived from the value

of the individual members. Neither recognize the species as such to have a moral

41

standing.

The more holistic minded environmental thinkers take issue with Regan on several
points. I will discuss two which are closely connected. First, the ecocentrists object to
the equality of the rights which Regan is willing to grant. The ecocentrists do not accept
the implications of Regan’s rhetorical question: "Were we to show the proper respect for
the rights of the individuals who made up the biotic community, would not the community
be preserved?" (Animal Rights 363). Both Callicott and Sagoff object to this on a factual
basis (Bad Marriage 26). Callicott points out that " if the right of an individual whitetail
deer to live unmolested were respected, the biotic community which they help to make
up would not be preserved" (Land Ethic 43). Furthermore, it is emphasized that nature
is not fair. Callicott is not saying here that since nature is not fair, we have no obligation
to be fair in our dealings with nature; rather, he seems to be claiming that since nature
does not treat all members of the biotic community fairly--for it could not function by
doing so—-it is wrong to attribute rights of equal weight to all members. We will discuss
in detail a bit later Callicott’s claim, but we now need to look at a second point of
objection against Regan.

The second criticism, then, is an objection to the fact that Regan can only see so far
as to grant rights to the class of mammals, and the ecocentrists think this is grossly
inadequate. If we recall the criteria for claiming a thing is the subject—of-a—life, we ﬁnd
they are qualities which belong to "mentally normal mammals of a year or more. "
Callicott criticizes this restriction in quite unambiguous terms: "What is biologically naive

in this indirect ethic for species conservation is Regan’s inattention to the fact that the

42

vast majority of endangered species are not comprised of rights-holding mammals. The
vast majority are plants and invertebrates" (Land Ethic 41). The criticism made, then,
is that Regan’s position is far too restrictive; Callicott wants an ethic which will recognize
value not tied to characteristics possessed only by certain privileged members of the biotic
community.

Although I see these as two criticisms—~(1) misconceived equality of rights in all
things possessing inherent value, and (2) the restriction of inherent value to mammals--as
being separate criticisms, Callicott runs them together in the examples he uses in
discussing Regan’s position. The reason I make it a point here to separate them as two
criticism is as follows: When Regan talks about extending the rights view even beyond
animals to natural objects, and thereby giving a tentative answer to the second of the
above criticisms, he may also be able to answer the ﬁrst as well. That is to say, if Regan
is going to extend rights to natural objects, he cannot do so on the same basis he uses to
grant rights to animals—-the criterion of being the subject-of—a-life. Thus, if he is able to
ﬁnd some other basis on which to claim natural objects have inherent value, it may well
be the case that there is not an equality of rights. In other words, since the basis for
recognizing inherent value will be different, there is a possibility that there could be a
morally relevant difference of the rights granted in each case. Should there be this
relevant difference, Regan could avoid the inconsistency mentioned earlier: namely, of
being more restrictive even than Singer, and yet wanting to be less restrictive, but all the
while using the same basis for granting rights--inherent value. However, as Regan has

not yet developed his theory to extend beyond animals, this is speculation. Put another

43

way, if it is not clear how natural entities could have inherent value, then it certainly
cannot be clear how they might be dissimilar in a morally relevant manner. Furthermore,
given what Regan has said about the equality of rights between rare and plentiful species,
it seems doubtful he would embrace any rights which were not on a par with all other
rights. And he indeed does reject the view that moral agents have inherent value in
varying degrees: "All moral agents are equal in inherent value, if moral agents have
inherent value" (Animal Rights 237).

Another objection against Regan’s view should also be mentioned. Recall that his
criterion of being a subject-of-a—life is met by mentally normal mammals of a year or
more. This qualiﬁcation leaves out a good many agents which, intuitively, most would
want to say ought to be shown respect--at least in the sense of not causing them
unwarranted harm. In particular, Regan’s criterion leaves out of consideration mentally
incompetent humans as well as all mammals under the age of one year. Are we to
assume things of this class have no inherent value and can be treated as we wish? Even
if Regan were to ﬁddle with the exact wording of this qualiﬁcation, we could imagine
some humans who, due to brain damage, would not be considered to be subjects-of-a-life
in Regan’s sense. And if being a rights-holder is all that keeps us from treating things
as we wish, it seems these brain damaged humans are available for whatever we pleased

to do with them.26

 

2‘ In a talk given at Michigan State University on October 18, 1991, Regan made
a similar criticism of Kant. Kant restricts moral consideration to rational beings, but this
raises the question about the severely mentally retarded: Are they rational, and thereby
to be given moral consideration? Because of his criticism of Kant, I ﬁnd it odd that
Regan does not see his own position as being susceptible of the same objection.

44
I have stressed the point that Regan wants to keep open the possibility for the rights
theory to be less restrictive in regard to what kinds of things may possess rights.
However, he admits he sees no way of overcoming the difﬁculty of grounding the claim
that natural entities can be rights-holders:
What is far from certain is how moral rights could be meaningfully attributed to
the collection of trees or the ecosystem. Since neither is an individual, it is
unclear how the notion of moral rights can be meaningfully applied (Animal
Rights 362).
We have looked at some of the difﬁculties which such a project faces. And I think
enough has been said at this point on the rights view. It was my aim here to merely
rehearse some of the objections made by the ecocentrists in order to bring out the contrast
between the rights-based theory and the ecocentric thinkers. Rehearsing these criticisms
also seems necessary since there is a strong tendency, especially in the U.S., to make an
appeal to the notion of a right when seeking the protection of some threatened entity. We
can recall the claims made by those protesting the damming of wild rivers; the claim was

that the river had a right to ﬂow freely. I would like now to turn and examine how the

ecocentrists attempt to develop an appropriate environmental ethic.

C. Holistic Theories: Inherent Value of Biotic Community

1. Callicott and the Land Ethic

We have seen that the moral extensionism of Singer and Regan are inadequate to use

as a basis for an environmental ethic. This inadequacy is due—-at least in part-~to these

45

positions being based on traditional theories which are individualistic. In contrast, the
ecocentrists want to take a holistic approach such that the biosphere is understood as an
interconnected system, or community. This entire community is claimed to have value,
and the individuals——sentient as well as nonsentient entities——have value which is derived
from their having a place in the community. But just how there is value in the ecosystem
is not understood in the same way by each ecocentric thinker. I will be looking at two
ecocentric views: namely, those of John Rodman and J. Baird Callicott. Both of these
thinkers support the Land Ethic as stated by Aldo Leopold: "A thing is right when it
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong

when it tends otherwise" (Sand County 224—25).

a) Environmental Fascism

I would like to begin the discussion of the land ethic by pointing out a criticism which
Regan levels against it: that is, the view proposed by the land ethic amounts to
environmental fascism (Animal Rights 362). Regan claims the implications of the land
ethic "include the clear prospect that the individual may be sacriﬁced for the greater
biotic good" (Animal Rights 361). Regan gives the example of a rare wild ﬂower which
offers more toward preserving the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community
than a specimen of the plentiful human species; it would be possible for a situation to
arise where a choice had to be made between the two. If the ﬂower were of greater

value, it would seem the choice to be made would be in the ﬂower’s favor. Regan

46
cannot accept such a view where an individual is sacriﬁced for the good of the whole:
"Individual rights are not to be outweighed by such considerations. . . . Environmental
fascism and the rights view are like oil and water: they don’t mix" (Animal Rights 362).

Callicott’s reply to the fascism charge is indirect. He does not attempt to show how
the land ethic view could directly rebut the charge. Indeed, he may even accept it, for
elsewhere he remarks on the land ethic permitting preferential considerations:

The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal worth to each and every member
of the biotic community; the moral worth of individuals (including, take note,
human individuals) is relative, to be assessed in accordance with the particular
relation of each to the collective entity which Leopold called ’land’ (Land Ethic
28).

Callicott deals with the fascism charge by bringing into question the rights view from
which the charge arises. That is to say, the charge stems from the equal moral worth
attributed to each individual by the rights view. Callicott accuses Regan of buying "into
the myth of the real existence of rights," and then of asking what sorts of thing they are.
Callicott claims Regan is confused by our use of the term ’rights’ and that Regan reiﬁes
the notion into something real which is possessed by certain beings much the same way
as shoes, teeth, feathers, and souls are possessed. However, Callicott claims, "to
construct a theory of moral rights from this point of view, is to attempt to discover the
true nature of rights and to identify the entities which naturally possess them." Callicott’s
discussion of this issue is rather brief, and it is not clear what he thinks rights are. He
does say, however, that rights "formulations are used to state claims" and that the notion

of "’moral rights’ is used to claim moral consideration-—for oneself or for other less

47

articulate beings. "27 Evidently, it is Callicott’s view that the claim for moral
consideration is primitive, and ’rights’ is simply the locution to express this claim;
however, ’right(s)’ as such is not an existent entity. And this is the mistake he sees
Regan making: that is, Regan takes the expression of a claim to moral consideration and
reiﬁes it into a real thing which can be possessed by certain beings--"mentally normal
mammals of a year or more. " As if this were not mistake enough, Callicott intimates,
Regan then tries to extend these rights to the individuals of the biotic community. The
problem inherent in such an attempt is summed up in the following:

But to attempt to safeguard the rights of each and every individual member of an

ecosystem would be to attempt to stop practically all trophic processes beyond

photosynthesis--and even then we would somehow have to deal ethically with the

individual life-threatening and hence rights violating competition among plants for

sunlight" (Land Ethic 43).

So what does this reply of Callicott’s amount to? It would seem that Callicott means
to say ’rights’ can be talked about where there are claims to be stated. To say there are
claims for moral consideration in ecosystems of the type Regan looks for--that is, where
each individual has a claim for moral consideration-~is absurd. Callicott can be
understood, then, as providing a reductio of the extension of rights to the individuals of
the biotic community. And if the individuals do not have rights, as Regan wants to
claim, then the charge of environmental fascism loses its force.

As the charge of fascism and Callicott’s reply are rather involved, the following is

a brief outline explaining the exchange. Callicott’s approach to environmental ethics is

holistic; it is the biotic community which has value. The individuals of the community

 

2’ All quotations in this paragraph are from Land Ethic, 42.

48

have value relative to their place in the community; this allows for preferential
consideration. Regan objects to this preferential consideration claiming it violates the
rights of the individuals of the community; it is no more than environmental fascism if
an individual is allowed to be sacriﬁced for the good of the community. Callicott replies
by pointing out that the charge of fascism only makes sense if the rights of the individual
are presupposed. However, if accepted, this presupposition leads to the absurd result that
plants are violating one another’s rights in the struggle for sunlight. Thus, the
presupposition that the individuals of the biotic community have rights must be rejected.
And once the rights of individuals are rejected, the fascism charge loses its basis.
Since this exchange regarding the fascism charge is crucial to both positions, I h0pe
the issue is clear. In the ﬁnal analysis, however, Regan’s claims are weak. The
difﬁculty is that he has provided no basis for claiming individuals (other than those which
qualify as subjects—of-a-life) of the biotic community have rights. As was pointed out
earlier, Regan admits that he sees no meaningful way to attribute rights to natural entities.
Without some basis to justify the inherent value of each individual, Regan, on his on
view, has no basis to extend rights to nonsentient entities. Thus, he has no real basis to
support the charge of fascism. And also, considering Callicott’s reductio, what sorts of
rights plants could be said to have, or what sorts of claims to moral consideration could

be made on their behalf, is not made clear.

49
b) What are the Standards of Integrity, Stability, and Beauty?

I would now like to discuss a criticism of the land ethic raised by Edward Johnson.
As we have seen, the land ethic holds there is a value in the biotic community, and
whether a thing is right or not is determined by the effect it has on the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the community. Johnson’s criticism is concerned with the determination
of the standards of the integrity, stability, and beauty. He states this criticism as follows:
The biotic community changes over time; the environment alters; forms of ﬂora
and fauna appear and disappear; deserts become oceans and oceans dry up, with
all the attendant metamorphoses. The crucial question is: why isn’t whatever
happens integral, stable, and beautiful? Any arrangement of parts will be just
what it is, and lasts as long as it does. The evolutionary foundations of ecology

seem to lead us to an impasse in ethical theory.”
The criticism, then, amounts to this: the land ethic is of little, if any, help when dealing
with the practical question of what ought to be done. The question can always be asked:
what is the integrity, stability, and beauty to be preserved?29 Darwin has shown that
ecosystems evolve. If they are not static, how is it possible, on the basis of the land ethic
alone, to determine what change, or evolution, ought to be allowed and which not?
Callicott remarks that, "Some bacteria . . . may be of greater value to the health or

economy of nature than dogs, and thus command more respect" (land Ethic p. 20 n. 20).

Johnson, however, objects by pointing out that "ecologies change over time, and the roles

 

2‘ Edward Johnson, "Animal Liberation Versus the Land Ethic, " Environmental
Ethics 3 (1981): 270. Hereafter cited in text as Versus Land Ethic.

’9 Attﬁeld gives a variation of this criticism in, The Ethics of Environmental

Concern, 158-59.

50

particular creatures play within the ecologies change. What moral reason is there to
prefer one arrangement to another?" (Versus Land Ethic 271). Johnson’s point is a good
one; the land ethic does seem to need something beyond itself to determine what changes
ought to be allowed and which not allowed.

Callicott does not address Johnson’s criticism directly. However, he does consider
the related question: "Why should one species be concerned about the threat of
destruction it poses to others? More to the point, why should we, Homo sapiens,
preserve and nurture those species yet surviving?" (Land Ethic 130). In answering these
questions, Callicott attempts to give an account of how it is possible for there to be
intrinsic value in nature. We need now, then, to look at his account of the intrinsic value
in nature, and try to see how he could answer Johnson’s charge.

Callicott is, however, well aware of the difﬁculty of accounting for intrinsic value in
nature in the face of the dichotomy between fact and value in the modern scientiﬁc world
view: "I concede that, from the point of view of scientiﬁc naturalism, the source of all
value is human consciousness, but it by no means follows that the locus of all value is
consciousness itself or a mode of consciousness itself like reason, pleasure, or
knowledge" (Land Ethic 133). Callicott is claiming, here, that there can be no value
without a valuer. In other words, from a purely objective point of view--setting aside the
question of whether such a point of view is possible--there is no more value in a newborn
child than there is in a hydrogen atom. But Callicott is willing to argue that the child
does have a certain value when considered from a subjective point of view. For example,

the child may grow up to be a surgeon. Thus, the child would have an instrumental

51
value to the patients it will treat. However, Callicott wants to go further than this and
claim there is an intrinsic value which the child has as well. But this intrinsic value is
not the same as the tradition’s notion of intrinsic value:
An intrinsically valuable thing on this reading is valuable for its own sake, for
itself, but is not valuable in itself, that is, completely independently of any
consciousness, since no value can, in principle, from the point of view of classical
moral science, be altogether independent of a valuing consciousness.”
The claim, then, is this: without some consciousness, there is no value, but given
consciousness, some things can be valued for themselves, and not merely as a means to
some further good.

Callicott wants to claim the biotic community can have intrinsic value--it can be
valued for itself. The account Callicott gives of intrinsic value in nature involves
combining Hume’s notion of moral sentiments with Darwin’s account of the origin and
evolution of morals: "the Humean—Darwinian natural history of morals does not regard
egoism as the only genuine and self-explanatory value. Selﬁshness and altruism are
equally primitive and both are explained by natural selection" (Land Ethic 149). Callicott
sees Hume’s account of moral sentiments as being expanded by Darwin, and then further
expanded by Leopold:

Hume . . . recognized a distinct sentiment which naturally resides in human
beings for the ’publick interest.’ Darwin recognizes affection not only for
’fellows’ but for ’family’ and ’tribe,’ that is, in general, for ’the good or welfare

of the community.’ Leopold says that his land ethic would require of Homo
sapiens ’respect for the [biotic] community as such’ (Land Ethic 151).

 

3° Land Ethic 133-34. In a later chapter Callicott makes a tripartite distinction
between intrinsic, inherent, and instrumental value (163 ff.). I discuss this distinction
below.

 

52
The biosphere has value, then, because human moral sentiment is able to recognize that
the biosphere can be valued for itself; we recognize this intrinsic value much the same
way we recognize the intrinsic value of other humans.
How does Callicott use this in response to Johnson’s criticism? Consider the
following statement:
Because the theory is humanly grounded, though not humanly centered, it does
not impel us toward some detached and impersonal axiological point. . . . this is
the biotic community of which we are a part, these are our companions in the
odyssey of evolution, and it is to them, not to any future complement that our
loyalties properly extend (Land Ethic 152, emphasis added).
Thus, we should, according to Callicott, preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of
the biotic community of which we are a part since it is this biotic community to which
we have the strongest moral sentiments. Granted, this is a bit more than Callicott says
himself; however, as mentioned earlier, Callicott does not directly answer Johnson’s
charge. I constructed this answer from what he does say, and it is at least consistent with
his position.
The adequacy of this reply is questionable. It may still be said that there is a problem
with attempting to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of something so dynamic

as a biotic community. It is not clear, then, that Callicott is able to fully answer

Johnson’s criticism. Thus, as a practical guide, this land ethic is somewhat vague at best.

53

c) Callicott ’s Distinction between Intrinsic, Inherent, and Instrumental Value

Above I noted that Callicott makes a tripartite distinction between intrinsic, inherent
and instrumental values. In this distinction, Callicott claims intrinsic value "is objective
and independent of all valuing consciousness" (Land Ethic 161). And as he accepts
Hume’s subjective axiology, he abandons talk of intrinsic value. Thus, for Callicott the
relevant distinction becomes that between inherent and instrumental value.

Callicott illustrates the distinction between inherent and instrumental value using the
example of a newborn infant. The infant, he claims, does have a certain instrumental
value: "one day it will ﬁll an empty chair in a classroom, perhaps serve in the armed
forces, or maybe even discover a cure for cancer." He also remarks that the "’little
bundle of joy’ . . . is the occasion of the valued psycho-spiritual experience for them [the
parents] " (Land Ethic 161). Callicott claims the psycho-spiritual experience would reduce
to instrumental value, since it serves to stimulate a valuable state of human consciousness.
However, he claims there is something more than mere instrumental value in the
newborn:

But it [the newborn] ’has’—-that is, there is conferred or projected upon it, by
those who value it for its own sake--something more than instrumental value, since
it is valued for itself as well as for the joy or other utility it affords them (Land
Ethic 161).
Callicott cites Hume’s account of social sentiments as the basis of the "something more "
for which the parents value the child. Callicott then goes on to trace a development of

Hume’s basic axiology through Darwin and to Leopold. That is to say, he tries to show

how Darwin gives an evolutionary account of the origins of Hume’s social sentiments,

54

and then argues that Leopold further extended these social sentiments to include the whole
of our biotic community.

However, this account of the "something more " is inadequate. While one may want
to accept Hume’s account of sentiment for fellow creatures, and Darwin’s evolutionary
account of such sentiment, it is a rather large leap to go from social sentiment to
sentiment for natural entities, or sentiment for the biotic community. Callicott, however,
worries little over this chasm. That which can become an object of these social
sentiments, he thinks, is open—ended:

There is more than just a little room for cultural determination of their [the social
sentiments’] objects. . . . Aldo Leopold masterfully played upon our open social
and moral sentiments by representing plants and animals, soils and water as
’fellow members’ of our maximally expanded ’biotic community.’ Hence, to
those who are ecologically well-informed, nonhuman natural entities are inherently
valuable--as putative members of one extended family or society. And nature as
a whole is inherently valuable--as the one great family or society to which we
belong as members or citizens (Land Ethic 162—63).
The ﬁrst thing which comes to mind after reading this account is the question: What
about those who fail to have these sentiments toward the environment--those who are not
"ecologically well-informed" who simply do not feel any sentiment of kinship with the
rest of the biotic community? And it should be added that this class of people is rather
large.

Callicott’s response to this objection is simply that there are those who do not have
such sentiments; these are the misﬁts of the biotic community:

There are, of course, occasional psychological sports of nature whose feelings are
deranged just as there are physical sports whose bodies are deformed. Hence,
radically eccentric value judgments may be said to be abnormal or even incorrect

in the same sense that we might say that someone’s radically curved spine is
abnormal or incorrect (Land Ethic 164).

55

This attempt to account for those who disagree, or do not ﬁnd inherent value in nature,
is a telling point against Callicott’s position. The large number of people today who
would have to be considered misﬁts of the biotic community, since they do not share the
same value judgments as the ecocentrists, bring this account into question. Since the
account is purely naturalistic, adverse biotic community sentiments count the same as pro
biotic community sentiments. Thus, there is no real criteria, according to this account,
for saying those who hold the one are correct while those who hold the other are misﬁts.
Put another way, it seems rather odd that a controversial minority view--that of the
ecocentrists-—should be assumed to be the correct moral view especially given Callicott’s
acceptance of Darwin’s evolutionary explanation of moral sentiments.

Callicott is aware of the problem of putting value in nature; he is aware that there can
be no value without a valuing consciousness. But even so, he claims there are things
which can be valued for themselves and not merely for their instrumental value. The
inherent value of a thing is projected upon it by a valuing consciousness. But there must
be some explanation of why some things rather than others are selected out to receive this
projected value. And here Callicott accepts Darwin’s evolutionary account for the
development of social sentiments:

No tribe . . . could hold together if murder, robbery, treachery, etc., were
common; consequently, such crimes within the limits of the same tribe "are
branded with everlasting infamy’; but excite no such sentiment beyond these limits
(Land Ethic 148—49).
Yet this is hardly an account of how something could have inherent value; rather, it
Seems to be completely instrumental. That is to say, the reason one does not murder or

rob is for the sake of holding the community together. Callicott seems to overlook this

56
point; nor does he notice it when he discusses Leopold’s adoption of Darwin’s account.
Leopold expands the community for which we feel moral sentiments to the entire biotic
community, and Callicott seems to think this is just ﬁne and all accounted for. But one
needs to ask here whether either Darwin or Leopold has provided an adequate account
of how our fellow humans, let alone natural entities, come to have inherent value. As
pointed out above, the most that has been accounted for so far is an instrumental value,
but nothing has been said that would support the claim of an inherent value. Thus,
Callicott’s approach is at bottom incomplete; his new "from the ground up paradigm" for
environmental ethics starts on the ﬁrst ﬂoor; he does not ultimately account for the
alleged inherent value of nature.
It should be noted that in a later chapter of his book, Callicott appeals to quantum
physics in order to establish the inherent value of nature. I believe this approach is
basically ﬂawed, so I will not discuss it in detail. I do, however, want to make a
comment on this attempt, since his appeal to quantum physics is a move away from the
subject/object dualism which is an underlying difﬁculty in the account of the
inherent/instrumental value distinction discussed above.
The following passage captures the basic idea of the appeal to quantum physics for
establishing a value in nature:
If quantum theory and ecology both imply in structurally similar ways in both the
physical and organic domains of nature the continuity of self and nature, and if
the self is intrinsically valuable, then nature is intrinsically valuable (Land Ethic
173).

We can see in this passage that Callicott is still attempting to show that nature has a

value, and that that value ought to be respected. But it is not clear that this move, even

57

if we should accept it, will be of much practical use. That is to say, if we now grant that
all of nature has value, it remains unclear just how this will help in resolving conﬂicts
which will still arise in the relationship of human society and their natural environment.
In other words, he has gone from a position in which there was no value in nature, to a
position where everything has value. But how this latter position is to help in making

ethical decisions concerning the environment still needs clariﬁcation.

2. John Rodman: Ecological Sensibility

Rodman’s position has certain similarities with that of Callicott. Whereas Callicott
appeals to Hume’s notion of moral sentiments, Rodman appeals to the notion of
sensibility which includes a "complex pattern of perceptions, attitudes, and judgments. "3‘
Rodman attempts to develop "a theory of value that recognizes intrinsic value in nature
without (hopefully) engaging in mere extensionism" (Ecological Consciousness 88). His
goal is to develop a sensibility in people which would make talk of rights and duties in
regard to the environment unnecessary under normal conditions. There are two aspects
of this theory of value which Rodman develops: ﬁrst, he argues that "one ought not to
treat with disrespect or use as a mere means anything that has a telos or ad of its own,"

and the second aspect "incorporates a cluster of value—giving characteristics that apply

both to natural entities and (even more) to natural systems" (Ecological Consciousness 88,

 

3‘ John Rodman, "Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered," in
Ethics and the Environment, ed. Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentince—Hall, 1983), 88. Hereafter cited in text as Ecological Consciousness.

58
90).

Rodman thinks that the fact that an entity, or natural system, has a telos is reason for
respectful treatment of that entity or system. To clarify what constitutes the having of
a telos, Rodman claims, "anything that is autonomous in the basic sense of having a
capacity for internal self—direction and self—regulation" has a telos or end of its own
(Ecological Consciousness 88). Thus, we could claim that not only humans, as Kant
held, but also animals, plants, and ecosystems have a telos since they all are self—directed
and self-regulated. Rodman makes it a point to emphasize that this view is not simply
another version of anthropocentric moral extensionism: that is to say, he maintains that
natural entities such as thistles, oak trees, and wombats have a unique telos of their own,
and that they are not simply viewed as having human—like qualities to a lesser degree.
The telos of the natural entities is there, and "it is as easy to see this in them as it is in
humans, if we but look."32

Rodman’s notion of "sensibility," then, is crucial. He relates how Leopold’s Sand
County Almanac is written in such a way as to awaken this sensibility in the reader, and
that the land ethic is not mentioned in Leopold’s book until after the reader has become
accustomed to thinking of animals and ecosystems as having goals and purposes of their
own. Now one rather obvious objection is simply that one may not have this sensibility
awakened. Put another way, it seems Rodman’s notion of "sensibility" is in some ways

similar to the traditional notion of "intuition." Yet intuition works only for those who

 

’2 Ecological Consciousness 89. This point is open to the obvious charge similar to
that made against moral intuitionism: that is, merely looking is not adequate, since not
everyone who looks at natural entities will agree about its telos or its moral worth.

59
seem to have it, and as is evidenced by numerous ethical disagreements, not everyone has
it. Thus, appeal to sensibility would seem to fare no better than the traditional appeal to
intuition in moral theory in generalf‘3
I want now to turn to another objection to the use of the notion of having a telos as

a basis for respect. This objection points out that viruses such as the AIDS and smallpox
virus have their own telé; they have a unique good of their own. Nonetheless, these
ought not to be respected if that implies not attempting to destroy the virus--at least when
it has infected a human. In other words, using the possession of a telos as the criterion
of value is claimed to be too broad; it allows things such as viruses to have value which
could lead some to argue for their protection. And, indeed, there has been a debate
concerning the smallpox virus:

Recently there was a vociferous debate among scientists about whether the

smallpox virus should be completely destroyed, or kept in cold storage in

laboratories. ’We are woefully ignorant about biology, ’ argued Dr. Lovejoy. .

. . ’If we destroy the smallpox virus, we may come to regret it.’ Dr. Bernard

Dixon . . . asserted: ’All arguments deployed by wildlife enthusiasts in their

efforts to protect endangered whales, turtles, and butterﬂies apply just as forcibly

to smallpox virus’ (Versus Land Ethic 273, n. 14).
Granted, these scientists are not arguing for the preservation of the virus on the sole basis
of its having a telos; however, it does point out that the anthropocentric values by which
we intuitively want to say the virus ought not to be protected are not accepted by all.

It may also be argued by ecocentrists that the virus contributes to the integrity and

Stability of the biotic community by attempting to hold down the ever-rising human

33 Part of the task in chapter two will be to uncover certain features in the
development of human rationality which worked to prevent the type of sensibility Rodman
and other deep ecologists advocate.

60
population. Someone like John Aspinall may welcome the virus as a true blessing:
The sanctity of human life is the most dangerous sophistry ever propagated by
philosophy. . . . Because if it means anything it means the in-sanctity of species
which are not human. . . . I would be very happy to see 3% billion humans
wiped from the face of the earth within the next 150 or 200 years and I am quite
prepared to go myself with this majority. . . . Even though you may be the
vanguard of the youth politik of the ’rights of animals,’ you are as redundant and
as unnecessary as are most other human beings, when you come to it.“
In sum, just how the value of the virus is understood seems to presuppose some other
system of value; the ecocentrists could view it as having a fairly high value while a more
traditional anthropocentric axiology would view the virus as having little, if any, value.
In short, it seems that objecting to the use of having a telos as a basis of respect by
pointing out viruses have a telos, and claiming these ought not be respected, may only
beg the question.

I mentioned above that Rodman had two aspects to his theory of value: the ﬁrst being
that of respect for those things having a telos, and the second incorporates a cluster of
valuing-giving characteristics. This cluster of value-giving characteristics, Rodman
thinks, can apply to natural entities as well as natural systems. These characteristics are
derived from Leopold’s land ethic, and include: "diversity, complexity, integrity,

harmony, stability, scarcity, etc” (Ecological Consciousness 90). As this has obvious

similarity to Callicott’s use of Leopold’s land ethic, the criticism which Johnson makes

 

3‘ John Aspinall as quoted by Johnson in "Animal Liberation Versus the Land
Ethic, " 272.

61

would apply to Rodman as well.” Thus, I will not spend time rehearsing the objection
here again. In the works I have read, Rodman does not mention the criticism, nor offer
much which could be used to rebut it. Consequently, I can say little here in his defense

since I think the objection to be rather telling against the ecocentric view.

3. Schweitzer: Reverence for Life

Some of those committed to the view that nonhuman entities deserve moral respect
have realized the practical difﬁculties involved in trying to live a lifestyle that accords
completely with this respect. We see an expression of this difﬁculty in Schweitzer’s
belief in a reverence for life. Schweitzer sees all living things as being worthy of
respect:
A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which
he is able to assist, and shrinks from injuring anything that lives. He does not ask
how far this or that life deserves one’s sympathy as being valuable, nor, beyond
that, whether and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life as such is sacred
to him.36

While this may seem to offer some basis for an ethic, Schweitzer himself realizes there

is an inherent difﬁculty with his view: "It remains a painful enigma how I am to live by

the rule of reverence for life in a world ruled by creative will which is at the same time

 

3’ Johnson does, in fact, apply this criticism to Rodman’s position in, "Treating the
Dirt, " in Earthbound, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 1984) 357.

3‘ Schweitzer as quoted by Johnson in "Treating the Dirt," 345—46.

62

destructive of will. "37 What Schweitzer is getting at here is the apparent contradiction
one confronts in an attempt to live by the reverence for life rule: that is to say, one
would want to treat all living things with respect, and yet, when a mosquito bites, it is
all too natural to swat. But even supposing we could bring ourselves not to swat the
mosquito, we still are destructive to some form of life or other in our daily activities, and
it would seem impossible not to be so to some extent. Schweitzer suggested a principle
by which to decide whether we are going too far beyond what is necessary in supplying
our needs: "Whenever I injure life of any kind, I must be quite clear as to whether this
is necessary or not. I ought never to pass the limits of the avoidable, even in apparently
insigniﬁcant cases" (Civilization and Ethics 137). Unfortunately, this principle gives little
practical guidance; it is too vague to offer much determinate guidance. Unless, therefore,
one is able to develop some means of deciding just what is and is not allowed, the
reverence for life principle is not a practical option for an environmental ethic.
Another shortcoming of Schweitzer’s view is that it says nothing about how we our
are to conduct ourselves in relation to ecosystems, and other inanimate natural entities.
Most environmentalist think there is need for consideration of this relationship as well as
our relationship with other life forms. Thus, despite the fact that Schweitzer wants to
include all living things in the moral sphere, his circle of moral consideration is not large

enough.

 

’7 Albert Schweitzer, Philosophy of Civilization: Civilization and Ethics (London:
A. & C. Black, 1923),136. Hereafter cited in text as Civilization and Ethics.

63

5 . Taylor: Respect for Nature

Paul Taylor develops a variation of Schweitzer’s reverence for life principle. Taylor
advocates a respect for nature which he claims "parallels the attitude of respect for
persons in human ethics. "3’ The respect for nature includes not only sentient and non—
sentient living things, but may also include natural systems; thus, it is more inclusive
even than Schweitzer’s position.

In justifying his claim, Taylor points out he does not hold that "such a belief system
can be proven to be true, either inductively or deductively" (Respect for Nature 205).
Taylor here is pointing out the fact that one cannot reason one’s way into a moral outlook
on nature by use of rational argumentation. Nonetheless, Taylor thinks some account can
be given for respecting nature. What he hopes to achieve is a "coherent, uniﬁed, and
rationally acceptable ’picture’ or ’map’ of a total world" (Respect for Nature 205). This
picture of a total world, Taylor thinks, would result in a belief system that could provide
for a biocentric outlook on nature. Adopting this biocentric outlook allows for natural
entities to be understood as having inherent worth:

It supports and makes intelligible the attitude in the sense that, when an
autonomous agent understands its moral relations to the natural world in terms of
this outlook, it recognizes the attitude of respect to be the only suitable or ﬁtting
attitude to take toward all wild forms of life in Earth’s biosphere. Living things
are now viewed as the appropriate objects of the attitude of respect and are

accordingly regarded as entities possessing inherent worth (Respect for Nature
206).

 

3‘ Paul Taylor, "The Ethics of Respect for Nature, " Environmental Ethics 3
(1981): 202. Hereafter cited in text as Respect for Nature.

64

And given we can respect the inherent worth of natural entities, we could accept a
commitment to a set of rules of duty towards natural entities as well as standards of good
character in respect of those duties.

We can note that Taylor here speaks of "inherent worth" and not "inherent value. "
I take this as an indication of his awareness of the problem with attributing inherent value
to natural entities. This is a shared problem for the ecocentric thinkers. We have seen
Callicott’s claim of nature having a value for itself. Similarly, Rodman claims there is
a cluster of value-giving characteristics in nature. And now we ﬁnd Taylor claiming
nature has an inherent worth that calls for respect.

Taylor’s approach, however, is slightly different. He bases it upon the notion of a
biotic outlook on nature, and this outlook is achieved in a negative manner. That is to
say, he begins by claiming humans are members of earth’s community of life. This by
itself is a safe enough claim, and is similar to the other ecocentric thinkers. Taylor then
points out that natural ecosystems are "a complex web of interconnected elements, with
the sound biological functioning of each being dependent on the sound biological
functioning of the others" (Respect for Nature 206). We can note how this is a variation
of Leopold’s land ethic which Callicott and Rodman support. Taylor also makes another
claim-—similar to Rodman--that an entity possessing a telos has value. Taylor states his
claim as follows: "Each individual organism is conceived of as a teleological center of
life, pursuing its own good in its own way" (Respect for Nature 207). Taylor then
maintains that these claims, taken together, show "the claim that humans by their very

nature are superior to other species is a groundless claim and . . . must be rejected as

65

nothing more than an irrational bias in our own favor" (Respect for Nature 207). As
mentioned above, we can note his negative approach to getting value into nature. He
tries to show that humans have no more value than any other component of the biotic
community. Once this is accomplished, it is then possible, Taylor seems to think, to
adopt a biocentric outlook on nature such that nature has inherent worth.

I ﬁnd two basic problems with Taylor’s view. First, he gives little account of what
constitutes this supposed inherent worth of nature. He just seems to say that it will come
given a belief system which could support it (Respect for Nature 205—06). The second
problem I ﬁnd is Taylor’s neglect of the difﬁculties involved with adopting the necessary
belief system. I am sympathetic to his project; however, it overlooks our contemporary
social and cultural situation. A full critique of this point would require an examination
of the claims made by Heidegger to the effect that the prevailing technological mode of
thinking in Western cultures stands in the way of us being able to adopt such a view as
Taylor suggests. This point would apply to Rodman’s desire for an ecological sensibility

as well. Such a critique will be discussed in chapter three.

6. Hargrove: Nature and Positive Aesthetics

Thus far I have not said much about attempts that appeal to natural beauty as a basis

for an environmental ethic. Eugene Hargrove does make such an appeal.39 He seeks

 

’9 Eugene Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1989). Hereafter cited in text as Foundations.

66

a foundation for preserving nature in what he refers to as positive aesthetics. However,
he admits that such considerations alone "will probably not . . . be universally accepted, "
and so to help support his aesthetic argument, he offers a version of an ontological
argument for environmental ethics (Foundations 185). I want to examine both his notion
of positive aesthetics and his ontological argument.

There is another reason for discussing Hargrove’s position. I ﬁnd an inherent
ambiguity in his ideas, an ambiguity which also arises in other deep ecologist writings.
Thus, it is worthwhile to critically discuss these ideas. To begin, the notion of a natural
process plays a rather crucial role in some of their claims. However, there is an
ambiguity in their discussion of what constitutes a natural process. There is a question
of just where the boundaries of natural and non—natural processes are to be drawn. This
becomes an issue when human activity is said to be unnatural or non—natural. The
problem is that there are times in Hargrove’s argument when humans are understood to
be part of natural processes, but at other times humans are viewed as the cause of
disrupting natural processes. This latter view suggests humans are outside of such natural
processes, but it is never made clear why humans should be considered unnatural. I will
come back to examine this issue in more detail after discussing Hargrove’s positive
aesthetics and his ontological argument for preserving the environment.

In outline form Hargrove’s argument for preserving the natural environment is as
follows: (1) We have a moral duty to preserve and promote the existence of good in the
world. (2) Natural beauty is a part of that good. (3) Natural beauty is contingent upon

the physical existence of natural objects. (4) Thus, we have a moral obligation to

 

67

preserve and promote the existence of natural objects. There is obvious reliance here on
arguments made by G.E. Moore regarding our moral obligations to preserve and promote
good in the world. However, I am not concerned with this aspect of the argument.
Rather I want to focus on the role positive aesthetics plays in what Hargrove calls his

ontological argument for preserving nature.

a) The Role of Positive Aesthetics in Hargrove’s Ontological Argument for the
Preservation of Nature

The fundamental claim behind positive aesthetics is that nature "is beautiful and has
no negative aesthetic qualities " (Foundations 177). Our initial response may well be to
scoff at this claim. After all, we have all seen unsightly mud holes, and most everyone
would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to truly say that there is much beauty in the dirt covered snow of
late winter and early spring. To the supporter of positive aesthetics, however, all is
beautiful, and "someone who ﬁnds ugliness in nature has simply failed to perceive nature
properly, has failed to ﬁnd appropriate standards by which to judge and appreciate it
aesthetically" (Foundations 177). So what are the standards which would allow us to
perceive mud holes and dirty snow as beautiful?

Hargrove’s approach to this question is somewhat unique, though eclectic as well.
He draws on theological arguments and appeals to elements of Sartre’s existential
thought. The focus then shifts from the creation of beautiful objects to the creation of
appropriate aesthetic standards (Foundations 181). Hargrove’s argument for nature’s

beauty parallels the argument for God’s creating moral standards rather than his following

68

some moral standard when he created the universe. That is to say, whatever
creates is beautiful because the standards of beauty are created by nature as we.‘
nature follows no plan or blueprint, there are no external standards by which it
measured.

Hargrove’s appeal to Sartrean claims concerning the essence of humans help:
his position. Sartre asserts that human existence precedes human essence. Thi:
that there is no eternal, unchanging essence of humanity of which each individua
is an instance. Instead, human essence is deﬁned by the activities humans en

through their existence. Existence comes ﬁrst, and only after humans have exi:

we say what human essence is.
Hargrove then simply applies this Sartrean claim to nature:
In Sartrean terms, nature is either an entity whose essence precedes its e:
or whose existence precedes its essence. If there is a God who created a
sustains the world . . . nature was created without a plan in advance,
existence precedes its essence. If there is no God . . . there is no one t
nature, producing the need, therefore, for nature to create itself, and sine
also does not plan its creations in advance, but instead blunders along thrt
mechanisms of unifornritariarrism and evolution, once again its existence I
its essence (Foundations 184).
One should not get side-tracked here by a concern about whether there is a God.
existence is actually irrelevant to Hargrove’s argument. The point seems to
because nature ’ s existence precedes its essence, there is no standard external to n:
which to judge nature’s goodness or its beauty. Thus Hargrove claims, "nature
its own standard of goodness and beauty, making ugliness impossible as a prt
nature’s own creative activity " (Foundations 184). As I mentioned earlier, Har

argument parallels the argument concerning God’s moral commands being moral

69

of necessity.

But I think there is something crucial that is lost in the transferal of this argument
from God’s creating moral goodness to nature’s creating beauty. That is to say, God by
deﬁnition is supposed to be omnipotent, omniscient, all—loving, and benevolent. Thus,
it was claimed that a being with such attributes could not create moral commands which
commanded one to do evil, nor create a universe that was not good. It was not that God
looked to some standard to determine what was to be morally good; rather, it was
because he was a being with all perfect attributes that his commands and creation were
morally good. Granted, God created and commanded indifferently, in the sense that he
was indifferent about any external standard, but the fact that his essence was inﬁnitely
perfect determined the goodness of his creation and commands. Nature, however, does
not have inﬁnitely perfect attributes; nature does create misﬁts and malformed entities——
some of which fail to survive. In short, Hargrove’s argument is lacking a crucial
premise. The point is, then, that there seems to be no basis to support the claim that
whatever nature creates is beautiful. We would have just as much basis to say that
whatever nature created was ugly and bad. One might be willing to grant Hargrove’s
point that nature creates indifferently, just as God was thought to have done, without
referring to some standard, but this does not imply that whatever nature creates is good
and beautiful.

One might claim that this objection misses the point. It seems to be saying there is
no basis on which to judge nature’s beauty. And the reply would be that there is such

a basis: namely, nature creates the standard by which it is to be judged. What nature

70

creates is beautiful because of nature’s creative indifference. But the objection is that this
argument is a non sequitur: that is, it simply does not follow from the indifference of
nature’s creative activity that the results of that activity will be beautiful. Again, the
reason God’s commands and creation were claimed to be morally good was not simply
that God created and commanded indifferently; rather this goodness is determined by
God’s inﬁnitely perfect essence. Nature, however, does not have such an inﬁnitely
perfect essence. Consequently, the basic claim of positive aesthetics--that nature has no

negative aesthetic qualities——begs the question.

b) Humanity ’s Place in Nature

I want to tum now to examine an issue that comes up in Hargrove’s discussion of
positive aesthetics, but which also arises in other environmental thinkers as well——
particularly in the writing of some deep ecologists. The issue can be variously stated.
It concerns whether humans are to be understood as a natural part of the environment,
or as unnatural and somehow outside of natural processes. My claim is that Hargrove’s
writing is inherently ambiguous on this point, and that this ambiguity serves to undermine
his claims.

There are several passages in which Hargrove seems to conceive of humans as non-
natural:

According to positive aesthetics, nature, to the degree that it is natural (that is,
unaffected by humans), is beautiful and has no negative aesthetic qualities.

Such transformations do not make nature more perfect, in the sense of better; they

71

just make it different, in the sense of more human, more civilized, less natural.
They are simply the replacement of a natural design with a less natural one.

Just as we want an art object to be original, the actual result of the artistic
process, we want the beauty of nature to be authentic, the result of natural
processes only.
When we admire nature, we also admire that history [that constitutes the essence
of nature]. When we interfere with nature . . . we create a break in that natural
history.“0
In each of these passages there is a sense in which humans and human activity is
understood as non-natural. Nature is deﬁned as that which is unaffected by humans, not
civilized by humans, the result of an authentic natural history, and human activity
interferes with these natural processes, breaking their natural history and affecting the
essence of nature. However, in other passages Hargrove claims that "humans are part
of nature" so that " it is impossible for nature and humanity to be completely alien to each
other" (Foundations 190). This latter claim is obviously true to anyone who gives it
thought. Humans are as much a part of nature as the northern spotted owl, poison ivy,
or the headwaters of the Yukon River. The question, then, becomes: what is the basis
for claiming that nature, to be truly natural, must be unaffected by human activity?
There is a sense in which we can talk legitimately about the difference between the
natural world and the civilized world. Thus, we can sensibly say that there is a
difference between the natural world as it exists in wilderness areas on the one hand, and

the civilized world as we experience it in the comfort of our homes, our favorite

restaurant, or in overcrowded shopping malls. But it remains unclear why this difference

 

‘° Each of these passages is from Foundations: the ﬁrst from p. 177, the second from
p- 189, the third and fourth from p. 195.

72

ought to be considered relevant as a basis for establishing a criterion for determining what
it means to preserve that which is "natural. " To be natural is, according to Hargrove,
to be "unaffected by human beings" (Foundations 177). However, if "humans are a part
of nature," it confuses the issue to say that to be natural, nature must be unaffected by
human beings. It would seem that human activity--given that humans are a part of
nature——would be no different than the activity of beavers. The beaver’s activity of
building dams is itself taken to be a natural process. Nevertheless, the beaver’s dam
obviously alters the course of the natural evolution of the river. When humans dam
rivers, however, it is not thought to be a natural process, but it is viewed as an unnatural
disruption in the history of the natural evolution of the river. If humans are a part of
nature, just as beavers are a part of nature, it is unclear why we are bothered by humans
damming a river but not bothered in the same way when beavers build their dams.

My point here is simply that the ambiguity concerning humanity’s place in nature
allows Hargrove to speak of unaffected natural processes as beautiful-—and therefore
worthy of preservation—-while never being entirely clear on what constitutes a natural
process. There is no clear boundary drawn between a natural and a non-natural process.
To simply say any process affected by human activity is non-natural will not do, since
humans are a part of nature. Humans evolved from natural processes, and interact with
their natural environment in numerous ways. Granted, human activity does alter the
course of natural processes. But the activity of beavers alters natural processes as well.
Thus, the appeal to the inﬂuence of human activity to determine the boundary between

the natural and the non—natural is arbitrary. But if there is no non—arbitrary boundary,

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then there is no basis-«given the acceptance of Hargrove’s claim that there are no negative
aesthetic qualities of nature--to prevent one from claiming that human activity also lacks
negative aesthetic qualities. Thus, whatever humans do, since they are a part of nature,
must be beautiful. And if this is the case, we then have cause to assert that all of
humanity’s creations—-including dammed rivers, nuclear power plants, toxic waste
disposal sites, as well as ﬁne art museums-~are beautiful, worthy of preservation, and
something to be proud of.

In sum, I ﬁnd two basic problems with Hargrove’s position. First, as I have shown,
the argument that alleges to establish the basic claim of positive aesthetics--that nature has
no negative aesthetic qualities—-begs the question. And secondly, the ambiguity regarding
humanity’s place in nature undermines Hargrove’s argument that attempts to use positive

aesthetics as a basis for claiming we ought to preserve that which is natural.

D. Conclusion

My purpose in this chapter has been to review some of the current approaches to
environmental ethics and the difﬁculties to which these approaches give rise. I wanted
to go into some detail in the criticisnrs of these theories to show they have problems when
considered on their own terms. But more importantly, I wanted to illustrate a problem
with the general method of these approaches. They each attempt, in their own way, to
secure some ﬁxed value in nature. And I wanted to illustrate what happens when

environmental issues are approached in the terms of these kinds of theory. That is to say,

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the concrete problems which gave rise to these theories are no longer the central issue.
We lost sight of those concrete problems when we became entangled in the various
philosophical issues confronted in the attempt to locate the appropriate foundation--rights,
inherent value, positive aesthetic value, etc.——for an environmental ethic. We will see in
chapter ﬁve that Dewey characterizes such a strategy as the philosophic fallacy: that is,
they transmute a conceptual ideal into an antecedently existing reality.

Recall that the reason for providing a foundation was to justify the extension of moral
considerability beyond human-human relations. The result of these approaches to the
conﬂicts over environmental concerns is evident in the difﬁculties pointed out in this
chapter. More signiﬁcant, however, is that they lead to a gap between theory and
practice. These theories have no effect on what happens at the practical level. Whatever
the result of the theoretical debate over attributing inherent value to elements of nature—-
should it ever be settled—the practical conﬂicts, such as that between the loggers and
environmentalists concerning the spotted owl, remains.

One point should be clear from this review of environmental ethical theories: they
have to contend with the fact that traditional ethical categories are homocentric. This
homocentricity of the traditional categories precludes readily attributing inherent value to
elements of nature. However, the manner in which these current theories attempt to
overcome this problem is itself within that same basic framework of traditional ethical
categories.

A fundamental problem lies in the fact that there is an inherent dualism in this

framework: that is, the human subject is viewed as metaphysically distinct from nature,

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which in turn, is understood as an object that confronts the human subject. Traditionally
the only value recognized in the relationship of human subjects and nature as object ha:
been human centered. This was evident in Regan’s view that only a subject-of-a—life ha:
inherent value. But even with Callicott, who wanted to develop a new paradigm, there
is evidence of this latent dualism. It shows up in his appeal to Hume’s notion of humar
sentiment as the source of ethical concern. That is to say, it is the human subject whe
projects values on other members of his society. Assuming Darwin and Leopold are
correct, these human subjects project value onto the natural objects confronting them ir
their environment.

This dualism shows up as well in Hargrove’s arguments. We can recall the ambiguity
in his account of the status of humans in nature: namely, it was ambiguous whether we
are to understand humans as a part of natural processes, or as unnatural beings tha
confront nature as an adversary. At the root of this ambiguity is the dualism of the
human subject and the natural objects that make up the furniture of the universe. Ane
this dualism, like all dualisms, has the problem of getting the two metaphysically distinc
realms back together once they have been separated. This problem manifests itself in tht
efforts at attributing value to nature. Values have traditionally (since the modern period
been understood as belonging to the cultural world of humans, and not to the physica
world. Granted, the ancients attributed value to the physical world; but this was because
of their physical and metaphysical views concerning the structure and Operation of the
world. As we will see in the next chapter, once modern scientiﬁc rationality emergee

on the scene and the ancient physical and metaphysical views were rejected, the natura

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world was disenchanted and shown to be void of such intrinsic value. Consequently,
when the current environmental etlricists attempt to attribute value to the natural
environmental, they are confronted with a tradition which denies this possibility.

In light of the separation of theory and practice, and the problems stemming from the
latent dualism of current approaches, there is a need to re-think the way we frame the
problem concerning environmental ethics. I suggest that asking the question whether an
environmental ethical theory is possible is not a fruitful way to begin the inquiry--at least
if this entails assuming the need to demonstrate that nature has some sort of inherent
value. We need to take, as the guiding principle of such an inquiry, the demand for
categories of analysis and interpretation which are instrumental in resolving the problem
faced. This demand for new or different categories of analysis and interpretation is
inherent in the fact that a problematic situation exists-—the loggers and environmentalists
are at odds with each other. The categories used in the current approaches, which were
reviewed in this chapter, are inadequate; they impede progress in dealing with the
problem. The need, then, is to develop categories that can be used to formulate
hypotheses that suggest ways of resolving the problem.

This is not to say that the task of the philosopher is to offer a particular solution to
the problem; rather the task is, by way of criticism, to reconstruct the existing categories
so as to change the characterization of the problem--to articulate the problematic situation
in terms which will allow hypotheses to be formulated. Furthermore, the subj ect/ object
dualism which underlies the existing categories needs to be reconsidered. I suggest that

an examination of the key aspects of the historical development of the rationality which

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brought us into the situation where environmental debates arise will be a fruitful way to
approach the reconstruction of the existing ethical categories. These developments have
their root in the Enlightenment Project and in the emergence of modern scientiﬁc
rationality. Thus, I want to turn in the next chapter to a discussion of the Enlightenment
Project and its failure. And I want to argue that the present practical conﬂicts involving
environmental issues are one way in which we currently experience the problem of

modernity.

 

Chapter III
The Enlightenment Project & the Problem of Modernity

A. Historical Background

I have mentioned that our historical situation today stands in the shadow of the
Enlightenment Period. By this I mean to say that the situation we ﬁnd ourselves in today
has the characteristics it does, at least in part, because of certain developments which
took place during the Enlightenment. And I have made the further claim that the
practical conﬂicts involving environmental issues today are one way in which we
experience the failure of humanity to fulﬁll the Enlightenment’s goal. In an attempt to
clarify the above claims, the present chapter will discuss several key aspects of the
Enlightenment Project, and the relevant ways in which the project remains unﬁnished.
In examining why the Enlightenment’s goal failed to be completely achieved, I will be
particularly interested in various historical factors that played a role in this failure. In
other words, I do not think the failure to fulﬁll the Enlightenment’s goal was due to any
underlying misconception in the project which created an inherent inconsistency or ﬂawed
the project in some fundamental manner; rather the failure resulted from certain
historically contingent developments. Bringing these historical factors to light will aide
us in understanding the roots of the conﬂicts that arise from environmental issues today.
Furthermore, I suggest that what was left unﬁnished of the Enlightenment’s goal remains
possible for us today to achieve, and doing so may open possibilities for understanding

how to bring about a more environmentally sound relationship between humans and

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nature. This latter issue will concern us in chapter six. I raise the point here merely to

help clarify the importance of covering the material of the current chapter.

1. Emancipation through Reason

The Enlightenment Project promoted the ideal of the rational autonomy of individuals.
The struggle of the Enlightenment was that of reason against all forms of ignorance,
superstition, and dogmatism. Kant expresses this ideal in the following terms:

Enlightenment is man ’s emergence ﬁom his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity
is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but
in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere
Aude! ’Have courage to use your own understanding! ’--that is the motto of
enlightenment.“
For Kant human intellectual immaturity extended to both the theoretical and moral
realms. In the theoretical realm, human thought was tied to traditional rationalism or to
traditional empiricism. Innate ideas directed the former, while the latter was guided by
sense impressions. In neither case was human reason autonomous. However, once
reason broke the bond of "nature’s leading-strings, " Kant believed the situation would be
quite different:
Reason . . . must approach nature to be taught by it. It must not, however, do

so in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses
to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions

‘1 Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in
Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphery (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1983), 41.

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he has himself formulated.“2
Reason itself would determine the bounds of knowledge by demonstrating what was and
what was not knowable. If reason could achieve this goal, human intellect would attain
maturity-—self—guidance in the theoretical realm.

Immaturity in the moral realm was, in some ways, more troublesome for Kant. In
their immaturity, people tend to be swayed by some external authority or by natural
desires; the usual culprits are religious dogmas, dubious metaphysical doctrines, and
cardinal human inclinations. Under the inﬂuence of these external authorities and
cardinal desires, humans are not autonomous beings. Referring to such inﬂuences on the
will, Kant says, "the relation of objective laws to a will not thoroughly good is
represented as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason
which the will does not necessarily follow because of its own nature."43 In short, the
will is not always self-determined, and the individual is not autonomous. However, if
humans could follow laws which they legislated for themselves, then they could, indeed,
be autonomous rational beings.

So far, then, we have seen Kant expressing the Enlightenment ideal of the rational
autonomy of the individual. We now need to say something concerning the broader
signiﬁcance of this ideal. Here we can speak in terms of the emancipation of humanity

from the absolute prescriptions of ecclesiastical authority, as well as from the grip of the

 

‘2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1965), B xiii.

‘3 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W.
Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 24.

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dominant ideas of ancient and medieval science and metaphysics: namely, the notions of
a closed, ﬁnite universe, and ﬁxed, eternal, and unchanging natural ends. As we will
see more clearly as we go along, one of the key developments of the Enlightenment was
the differentiation of various spheres of rationality. We have just noted two of them in
the discussion on Kant—-the theoretical and the moral. The third, of course, is the
aesthetic. This development is interpreted by Jiirgen Habermas as both a progressive
development over the pre-modern world and as the root of the problem of modernity--the
need for modernity to "create its normativity out of itself. "‘4 For while this
differentiation of spheres of rationality allowed the emergence of modern science, it also
meant the basis for morality would need to be reconstructed. Our task now is to see how
and why this happened.

Although the Enlightenment generally refers to the 18th century period, there were
representatives of the Enlightenment spirit to be found even earlier. One key ﬁgure was
Francis Bacon. Bacon, as Dewey characterizes him, is memorable because "breezes
blowing from a new world caught and ﬁlled his sails and stirred him to adventure in new

seas. "‘5 The feature of Bacon’s thought which Dewey takes to be of particular

 

4" J iirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, trans. Frederick
Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 7. Hereafter cited as Discourse on Modernity.

‘5 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, def. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957),
28. Hereafter cited as Reconstruction. The following discussion of Bacon is largely
based on Dewey’s comments regarding Bacon in chapter 2 of Reconstruction. We can
also note that Horkheimer and Adorno consider Bacon’s conception of knowledge as an
important factor in the development of the Enlightenment period, Dialectic of
Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company,
1991), 3 ff.

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signiﬁcance is his conception of knowledge as power. The importance of Bacon’s
conception of knowledge lies in the fact that it served as a basis for criticizing the body
of knowledge of his own day and also for advocating a more practically effective
conception. There were three categories of learning which Bacon criticized.

The ﬁrst category Bacon referred to as delicate learning. This type of learning was
mainly ornamental and decorative; it focused on the literary learning characteristic of the
Renaissance thinkers and their focus on the study of the classics. Bacon criticized this
type of learning for its remoteness from the practical concerns of the time.‘6 It was,
therefore, of little or no use in aiding humans in gaining control over the natural forces
which make human existence a threatening and laborious affair.

The second form of learning Bacon labeled as fantastic. Alchemy and astrology were
examples of this form of learning. While such learning gave the appearance of being
practical, in the sense that it purported to give control over natural occurrences, Bacon
saw it as merely a mockery of true knowledge. Such learning was nothing more than a
quasi-magical practice which led people astray.

The third form of learning was contentious learning. Dewey regards Bacon’s
discussion of contentious learning as the most important, since Bacon’s criticism of this
form constituted an attack on the ancient views of science and logic stemming from the

thought of Aristotle. Bacon saw this logic and science being used not to gain power over

 

‘6 It is important to note that the sense in which ’practical’ is used here refers to
technical application of knowledge in order to gain control over natural forces and events
for human beneﬁt. The import of realizing the sense of ’practical’ here lies in the fact
that this sense of ’practical’ differs from the sense of ’practical’ which refers to action-
orienting value systems. I discuss this point further below (p. 94).

 

83

nature, but rather to gain power over other people. We can think here of how the alleged
metaphysical hierarchy——the Great Chain of Being—was used to legitimate the social and
political hierarchy of the feudal period.

Bacon found another signiﬁcant problem with Aristotelian logic: namely, it was
merely a logic of argumentation, proof, and persuasion. And as such it was useless in
the discovery of new knowledge. The old logic was only good for teaching what was
already known; syllogistic logic was just the demonstration of previously achieved
knowledge; it was a logic of classiﬁcation of known facts. We can see this in
consideration of the classic syllogism:

All humans are mortal.

Socrates is human.

Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
The facts that all humans are mortal and that Socrates is human are facts already known;
the syllogism merely makes explicit what is already implicit. No new knowledge is
added.

Bacon, however, wanted a logic of discovery; he desired a logic geared toward future
accomplishments, not one primarily oriented toward past achievements. In addition, there
was another concern of Bacon’s at work in his desire for a new logic as well. Bacon saw
syllogistic logic as dulling the mind for discovery of new facts. Syllogistic logic dulled
the mind by accustoming the mind to think of things already known; such a dulled mind
would be ill prepared for discovery and investigation of new facts about nature’s secrets.

Thus, in Dewey’s estimate, Bacon is representative of an intellectual change which

was beginning to take place. In Bacon’s aphorism that " Knowledge is power, " and in his

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criticisms of the kind of learning of his period, we can detect a desire to make knowledge
technically applicable. Knowledge ought to be of beneﬁt to humans; it should in some
way make their lot an easier one. Although Bacon himself never was able to devise a
new logic of discovery, he is generally regarded as a prophet of the coming of a new
conception of science.

Indeed, there did emerge a new conception of science during the modern period. And
this emergence of modern scientiﬁc rationality brought about the de-sacralization of the
natural and social worlds. This disenchantment of the world freed humans from illusions
and self-deceptions concerning the structure of the world in which they lived. It was a
time when a new scientiﬁc rationality did struggle against the ignorance, superstition, and
dogmatism inherent in the old conceptions of science. There was, in short, emancipation
through reason.

In the wake of this emancipation came progress in the scientiﬁc understanding of how
the universe operated. One of the key factors that allowed this progress was the
modems’ rejection of the ancient notion of ﬁnal causes. The change in focus from ﬁxed
teleological ends, which were also ﬁnal causes, to the modern notion of causation,
enabled humans to gain more effective control over nature. Prior to this shift such
control was difﬁcult at best, and humans were much more dependent on the fortunes of
nature. I do not, of course, mean to imply that this happened suddenly. There was a
history of evolving technologies, and several technological discoveries such as the lens,

the compass, and gunpowder played a major role in furthering science. But so long as

people believed that the natural world operated in such a way as to develop towards

 

85

natural, ﬁxed ends, they also believed that they could not do much to change things.
You just cannot mess around with the divine or metaphysical plan, and must, therefore,
accept what nature offers when it offers it. However, if the notion of ﬁnal ends as a
metaphysical principle governing the development and change of natural kinds of objects
is given up, then the door is opened to the possibility of manipulating nature. That is to
say, observation, imagination, and experimental control can then come into play, since
the outcome is not already determined by some metaphysical ﬁnal cause.

Another way of expressing this shift in the understanding of how the natural world
operated is to use the analogy of a gigantic machine. During the Enlightenment, the
natural world was disenchanted; the mysterious, occult—like metaphysical causes were
removed from nature. A new conception of nature emerged. The various parts of the
world were understood as analogous to a series of pulleys, cogs, chains and levers all
pushing and pulling and interacting in various ways. Once nature is viewed in these more
mechanical terms, humans can begin to think about intervening in these pushing—pulling
interactions in order to manipulate nature for their own purposes. In other words,
experimenting to determine how these interactions might be guided in a direction
beneﬁcial for humans becomes a real possibility. Humans then could gain more effective
control over their own destiny. This was one form of emancipation gained by human
reason.

An important aspect of this development of scientiﬁc rationality, which is closely
related to the notion of manipulating nature, was the shift in focus from ends to

conditions. As long as people believed that ends were set by nature, or divine will, and

86

hence unchangeable, humans had to adapt themselves to the way they found nature to be.
But once humans discovered that they could choose an end which they wanted to attain,
and manipulate nature in ways to achieve this selected end or goal, then more attention
was given to the conditions which brought about that end. We can see here the practical
meaning of Bacon’s conception of knowledge as power.

As a simple example, we can consider developments in food preservation. Humans
had a certain desire or need; they found food plentiful during certain seasons of the year,
while scarce during other seasons. Faced with the problem of hunger during the off
seasons, people made use of the existing conditions to resolve the problem. If the excess
from the harvest season could be preserved, it could be used during the off season. Once
this end was selected, means for attaining it were sought. Attention to the conditions
which gave rise to food spoilage was needed: that is, humans needed to understand what
conditions are necessary for there to be spoilage, and then they could do something to
intervene to prevent those conditions from obtaining. Once people realized that food
spoilage is brought about by the existence of forms of bacteria, they were able to
manipulate the existing conditions in various ways to get rid of the bacteria—-heating the
food to kill the bacteria, or adding chemicals which prevent the growth of bacteria--
before storing the food.

The point again is that this focus on conditions which can be manipulated would not
gain widespread acceptance until the idea of ﬁxed, unchanging ends was rejected. Thus,
this rejection of ﬁxed ends was a signiﬁcant event in the Enlightenment period that aided

the development of modern scientiﬁc rationality. A key factor in this development was

87

the changed conception of causation. However, despite the fact that this changed
conception of causation allowed for the emergence of modern science, it also brought
about difﬁculties for moral theory. We need to turn now to a discussion of this latter

difﬁculty and its role in preventing the completion of the Enlightenment Project.

2. The Failure to Complete the Project

Earlier I stated that the problem of modernity involved the need for reason to develop
standards of normativity out of itself. And above we saw how modern science provided
a method for attaining a selected end: that is, if we have an end which we desire to
achieve, science provides a method for determining how to achieve that end by examining
the conditions under which that end appears. The example of food preservation
illustrated this. With this background in mind, consideration of the fact that the
Enlightenment thinkers rejected the notion of teleological ends will show why the task of
developing standards of normativity fell to human reason. As Dewey, Maclntyre, and
others have illustrated, morality prior to the Enlightenment period had been based on the
belief that humans had an end or essence." Actions which led to the fulﬁllment of this
end were morally right, while those that prevented this fulﬁllment were morally wrong.

Maclntyre’s discussion of the fundamental structure of the moral scheme is

 

‘7 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958),
especially chapters 3 and 10; Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960),
chapter 11; Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), chapters 3 and
7; Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981), chapters 5 and 6. Hereafter cited in text as Virtue.

88

particularly helpful here (Virtue 50 ff). The scheme has three basic elements. The ﬁrst
is the telos of human nature, or human nature as it could and should be. Second is
human nature as it happens to be. And third, there are the precepts or rules which, if
followed, will lead humans out of the state they happen to be in and into the state that
realizes their telos.

However, the Enlightenment thinkers’ rejection of teleological ends meant the ruin
of this moral scheme. Since the moral correctness of a particular act was determined on
the basis of its contribution to the fulﬁllment of human nature’s telos, it would no longer
be possible to judge the morality of that act——at least not by appeal to the telos of human
nature. Indeed, the precepts which guided the realization of human nature as it could be
lose their signiﬁcance, since their justiﬁcation was that they did lead to this realization.
With the meaning and legitimacy of these precepts brought into question, humans were
no longer bound to follow these precepts. But we can recall that Kant believed this is
just what the Enlightenment Project attempted to achieve--autonomy of the rational
individual.

With the rejection of a human telos came the emancipation of the individual from the
external authority of traditional morality whether it is conceived as divine law, natural
teleology, or some form of hierarchical authority that derived its legitimacy from
teleological ends. After the notion of a unique telos of human nature had been rejected,
the moral precepts that were alleged to lead one to the fulﬁllment of the human telos
were left unsupported. These precepts did, however, continue to carry the weight and

force of tradition and custom. Thus, they were not completely rejected at the practical

U-

89
level, but continued to have inﬂuence. Nonetheless, there came a need for some new
standard by which moral norms could be judged and legitimated. Indeed, this is just the
task taken up by Kant: that is, he wanted to show that we can derive moral precepts from
reason itself. If this could be demonstrated, then there could be emancipation in the
moral realm similar to that achieved in the theoretical realm.
Kant, however, remained under the inﬂuence of the ancient and medieval moral
scheme which he inherited. As we saw above, human essence, as the telos of moral
action, was a crucial element in this moral scheme, and it gave the scheme its teleological
structure. Kant believed it necessary to preserve this teleological structure. In his
introduction to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, Lewis White Beck notes the
teleological element in Kant’s ethics:
Man is considered in two roles in Kant’s ethics--man as the moral ideal and man
as an empirical character trying to achieve personality. Man in the ﬁrst role is
the archetype for man in the second role. Empirical man always has an obligation
to respect personality in the former sense, to serve and promote it. This
introduces a deﬁnitely teleological element into Kant’s otherwise formalistic
ethics."8

I do not mean to imply that there is something essentially wrong with a teleological moral

scheme as such; rather the problem lies in the particular content of Kant’s scheme.

In the second book of the second Critique Kant postulates the immortality of the
human soul in order to make the teleological scheme workable. Instead of a metaphysical

ﬁnal cause as in the ancient scheme, Kant had the will in perfect accord with the moral

law--this was his conception of human essence as it ought to be. However, only if the

 

4‘ Lewis White Beck, Introduction to Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel
Kant (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 40.

90
soul is immortal does attaining the highest good become possible:
But complete ﬁtness of the will to the moral law is holiness, which is a perfection
of which no rational being in the world of sense is at any time capable. But since
it is required as practically necessary, it can be found only in an endless progress
to that complete ﬁtness . . . . This inﬁnite progress is possible, however, only
under the presupposition of an inﬁnitely enduring existence and personality of the
same rational being; this is called the immortality of the soul.49
Without presupposing the immortal soul, it makes no sense to have moral imperatives
which require one to have a perfectly self—determined will. The principle of "ought
implies can" surfaces here: to claim a moral obligation, there must ﬁrst be the ability to
fulﬁll that obligation. Thus, for there to be the obligation for individuals to bring their
will into accord with the moral law, they must have the ability to do so. However, since
such perfection is not attainable under the conditions found in the phenomenal world,
Kant thought it necessary to postulate the immortality of the soul. With immortality came
the possibility to approach that perfect ﬁtness of will to moral law.

We need to question, however, whether Kant has truly shown that the actual existing
human individual who acts in the phenomenal world has been emancipated. Given the
need for an immortal soul, it seems that the existing individual’s moral life remains
dominated by the need to achieve some set teleological end. Granted, Kant claims this
end is a will that is self-determined. However, because of the postulation of an immortal
soul, this remains as mysterious and occult—like as the ancient and medieval notion of a

ﬁnal cause. Furthermore, it becomes unclear whether the will follows the principles of

reason because of its own nature. That is to say, to postulate the immortality of the soul,

 

‘9 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 225—26.

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is to speculate about the nature of the will--whether it is eternal. But the immortality of
the soul was postulated in order to maintain the teleological structure of the moral
scheme. Thus, Kant merely assumes-—and does so for tenuous reasons--his view of the
development of the will. As Maclntyre suggests, Kant may have been correct that
" morality did in the eighteenth century, as a matter of historical fact, presuppose
something very like the teleological scheme of God, freedom and happiness as the ﬁnal
crown of virtue which Kant propounds” (Virtue 56). But all would be different if the
soul were mortal. Consequently, we cannot be sure, according to Kant’s own account,
that the will which follows the categorical imperative and does its duty for duty’s sake,
is acting in accord with its own true nature, since the nature of the will is a postulate.
But without being assured of this point, we cannot say the will is autonomous. And so
even in Kant, who in many ways is the culminating thinker of the Enlightenment, the
goal of deriving standards of normativity from human reason alone is not fully achieved.
The project remains incomplete.

Thus far, then, we have seen that the Enlightenment Project was not completed.
Humanity did achieve a certain emancipation when modern science disenchanted the
world. And this emancipation led to progress in the sciences. What was needed to
complement science’s ability to achieve a selected end was a method for deciding just
which ends humanity ought to pursue. As stated already, to realize the autonomy of the
rational individual, choice concerning just which ends humans ought to pursue must have
its origin in human reasoning; however, this requires a standard of normativity which is

not dependent on some authority external to human reason. For so long as humanity fails

92

to develop a rational means for selecting ends, humans will not be truly emancipated.
They will not determine their own destiny, but will remain under the inﬂuence of one
sort of external authority or another. We can say, then, that the Enlightenment did not
succeed in emancipating humans from all external authorities.” Granted, it may have
shown that one species of external authority-«those based on metaphysical ends—-are not
legitimate, but it failed to supply a clear means for humanity to evaluate and select ends

for itself.

B- Means Without Rationally Worked Out Ends

There is an important point for us to keep in mind here. While moral philosophers
in various camps were struggling to answer the questions concerning which moral rules
ought to be followed and why, technical rationality continued to develop and improve its
methods for attaining selected ends. I suggest that, at least in part, the roots of the
current conﬂicts regarding environmental issues lie in this discrepancy between the
success achieved in the realm of scientiﬁc inquiry, and that in the realm of moral inquiry.
A bit more work is still needed, however, to make this point clear. Before turning to this
task, however, I want to point out that the origins of the above mentioned discrepancy

are evident in the utopian visions of Thomas More and Francis Bacon.

 

5° ’Extemal authority’ is here used in a Kantian sense: anything which would cause
the loss of autonomy such as metaphysical or religious dogmas, cardinal inclinations,
exclusive concern with an act’s consequences, etc. This is not to say such concerns
should never be given consideration, but exclusive focus on these concerns eliminates
autonomous choice for the moral agent.

93
1. Scientiﬁc Progress does not Imply Social Progress

In his book, The Domination of Nature, William Leiss notes that in More’s Utopia,
one of the primary objectives is the self—development of the individual as an outcome of
the increasing leisure time made available through the application of scientiﬁc knowledge.
Here we ﬁnd a sense of the moral progress of individuals serving as the "mediating link
between scientiﬁc progress and social progress. " In other words, there is something
additional to be gotten from scientiﬁc progress, in More’s view, than merely a more
secure and stable existence. Leiss notes, however, that More does not develop the notion
of this social progress, but seems to assume it. Supposedly, by having to devote less
time to taking care of the necessities of life, individuals will engage in activities which
will enhance their self-development and thereby bring about social progress as well.
Leiss further remarks that this element of social progress is "conspicuously absent in
[Bacon’s] New Atlantis." Bacon simply does not make much mention of this possible
beneﬁt of scientiﬁc progress, but seems to just take for granted that scientiﬁc progress
would entail social progress. Leiss sums up the contrast between the visions of Bacon
and More as follows:

What is at stake is the nature of the interaction between scientiﬁc progress and
social progress, the latter encompassing growth in physical well-being and the
capacity of individuals existing within the institutional framework of socialism to
enjoy freedom, to accept responsibility for common good, and to beneﬁt from the

absence of external compulsions. Thomas More offers us a glimpse of this
possibility--admittedly it is no more than that-—whereas Bacon does not?1

 

5‘ William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (New York: George Braziller, Inc. ,
1972), all quotations form Leiss’ book in this paragraph are from pages 69-70. Hereafter

94

As things turned out, the Enlightenment developed closer to Bacon’s view than to
More’s. This is not to say there was no social progress whatsoever derived from
scientiﬁc progress. But it is to say that social progress did not achieve the degree of
fulﬁllment which scientiﬁc progress accomplished.

We can appeal to the distinction which Habermas and others have made between the
practical and the technical to better articulate this point. Habermas, indeed, warns against
confusing technical capacity and practical capacity: "The capacity for control made
possible by the empirical sciences is not to be confused with the capacity for enlightened
action. "52 By ’technical capacity’ or ’technology’ Habermas means "scientiﬁcally
rationalized control of objectiﬁed processes. " And ’practical capacity’--which also falls
under the rubric of ’democracy’ for Habermas—-refers to "the institutionally secured forms
of general and public communication that deal with the practical question of how men can
and want to live under the objective conditions of their ever-expanding power of control"
(Technical Progress 57). The practical refers to action—orienting value systems while the
technical refers to purposive-instrumental action. We ﬁnd here, then, another way of
articulating the point that what goes on in the selection of the means for attaining a pre-
given end (the technical) differs signiﬁcantly from what goes on in selecting which ends
humans choose to pursue (the practical). The importance of this distinction lies in the

fact that "the scientiﬁc control of natural and social processes--in a word, technology——

 

cited in text as Domination.

‘2 Jiirgen Habermas, "Technical Progress and the Social Life—World," in Toward a
Rational Society, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 56. Hereafter
cited in text as Technical Progress.

95

does not release men from action. Just as before, conﬂicts must be decided, interests
realized, interpretations found . . ." (Technical Progress 56). In short, while humans
have managed to make progress in their technical capacity, this progress will not be
reasonably exploited to fully emancipate humanity unless we also make progress in our
practical capacity.

In connection with the above point, Leiss notes that the Enlightenment thinkers, and
in particular Bacon, made the questionable assumption that technical progress also meant
social progress: "In the inﬂuential intellectual tradition originating with Bacon it has been
assumed that mastery over nature considered as scientiﬁc-technological progress would
be ’automatically’ transformed into mastery over nature considered as social progress"
(Domination 140). Richard Bernstein also notes this point as it comes up in Condorcet’s
writings: "Condorcet never seriously questions that the sciences not only provide the
means for human perfectibility but also reveal the ends to be achieved. "’3 But since the
technical concerns the selection of means, and the practical concerns the selection of
ends, progress in the former does not necessarily entail progress in the latter. Hence,
Bacon’s assumption that technical progress entails social progress is questionable, since
there is no necessary entailment. Nonetheless, one can understand how, if it were
assumed that scientiﬁc-technological progress did entail social progress, the development
of human practical capacity may not become a major concern; focus may remain on

developing human technical capacity. In other words, given the Enlightenment thinkers’

 

‘3 Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 37.
Hereafter cited in text as Constellation.

96

assumption, one can understand their lack of concern for developing our practical

capacity.’4

C. The Growth and Consequences of Technical Rationality

I want to turn now to a discussion which is intended to shed further light on why
things turned out as they did with the resulting discrepancy between the successes in
scientiﬁc inquiry and those in moral inquiry. That is to say, I want to further develop
the point regarding the neglect of human practical capacity by considering what has been
referred to as the process of rationalization. By considering the process of rationalization,
we can gain a better insight on the relation of the development of modern scientiﬁc
rationality and the conﬂicts over environmental issues. This will also allow us to see the
sense in which I mean that our experience of conﬂicts over environmental issues today
is, indeed, one way in which we experience the problem of modernity. To this end,
examination of Max Weber’s account of the process of rationalization, Heidegger’s
analysis of modern technology, and also aspects of the Frankfurt School’s account of the
process of rationality, is relevant. Consideration of Weber is relevant, since, as Bernstein
notes, Weber is "at once an heir to the Enlightenment in his passionate commitment to
reason and the ’calling’ (Beruf) of science, and at the same time one of its harshest and

most devastating critics" (Constellation 35). Heidegger’s analysis of modern technology

 

5‘ This point refers mainly to the earlier Enlightenment thinkers. For when we come
to Kant, we ﬁnd he does acknowledge a need to distinguish between the technical
(hypothetical) and the practical (categorical).

97

has relevance here since it helps to illuminate how technological rationality has inﬂuenced
humans’ relationship with nature. And consideration of the Frankfurt School’s account
of the process of rationalization is relevant, since they attempt to overcome inadequacies

in Weber’s account.

1. Weber’s Account of the Growth of Purposive—Instrumental Rationality

In his discussion of Weber, Albrect Wellmer notes that the notion of rationalization
has several senses in Weber’s writings.” The ﬁrst is the narrow sense of rationalization
as purposive-instrumental rationality. We ﬁnd this form of rationality at work in
scientiﬁc and technological thought. It is the type of rationality which chooses the most
efﬁcient means for attaining an already given end. The second, extended sense of
rationalization refers to the imposing of structure or formalization on, say, an otherwise
inchoate set of beliefs. An example of this would be the codiﬁcation of acceptable moral
and social practices into formal laws. And ﬁnally, the third sense of rationalization in
Weber’s account refers to the disenchantment of the social and natural worlds. This sense
of rationalization can be seen in the effect modern science has on primitive beliefs about
spirits, demons, or gods which dwell in animals or other inanimate objects: that is,
science gives a rational account of natural forces rather than a mythical-magical account.

Weber uses this complex notion of rationality to analyze the transition from the pre-

 

5‘ Albrect Wellmer, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment, " in
Habermas and Modernity, ed. Richard Bernstein (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), 40-
41.

98

modem to modern world. He understands this transition as a process of rationalization.
The disenchantment of the world, due to the emergence of modern science, brings about
a growmg rationalization of the world in the sense of imposing structure and
systematization. The growth in bureaucratic social, economic, and political institutions
illustrates this point. These bureaucratic institutions operate in accordance with
purposive-instrumental rationality. That is to say, bureaucratic managers must ﬁnd the
most efﬁcient means of utilizing the available material, economic, and human resources
in order to accomplish given ends. With the growth of bureaucratic institutions, more
and more of our natural and social world is taken up in the process of rationalization.
If we follow Weber in his analysis of the process of rationalization, we come ﬁnally
to a rather paradoxical situation. According to Weber, the process of rationalization leads
to a situation in which humans become entrapped in an "iron cage" of reason. This is
paradoxical, since reason was to emancipate humanity. Scientiﬁc rationality did
disenchant the world, thus allowing the disillusionment of humans concerning the divine
or metaphysical sanctity of nature. Consequently, humans were no longer trying to live
in accord with social and moral norms based on these illusions regarding the structure of
the world. But humanity in the end, according to Weber, becomes entrapped by this
same scientiﬁc rationality. Thus for Weber, there is an inherent contradiction in the
Enlightenment project. We ﬁnd in Weber’s account a sense in which the process of

6

rationalization is a devolution because of its dehumanizing tendency.’ However, this

 

5‘ More details on the dehumanizing tendency of the process of rationalization are
given in the discussion of Marcuse (p. 111).

 

99

may be somewhat of an overstatement on Weber’s part. For it is not that rationalization
as such is problematic; rather, it is the particular historical process of rationalization as
it developed in our Western tradition that is problematic.

The job now is to gain a better understanding on why this process of rationalization
is problematic. To this end, I want to consider some aspects of Heidegger’s analysis of
modern technology. Heidegger’s analysis brings out the theme of instrumentality as it
emerged during the Enlightenment period. And since not much has been directly said
so far concerning how the process of rationalization of the world has inﬂuenced
humanity’s relationship with their natural environment, the theme of instrumentality is
quite relevant. For by bringing out the theme of instrumentality, Heidegger’s analysis
of modern technology clariﬁes certain aspects of the development of the scientiﬁc
rationality begun by the Enlightenment thinkers. And this in turn will illuminate just how
the nature-as—resource attitude came to have predominance over the more environmentally
sensitive attitude towards nature. Recall that the nature-as-resource attitude is
characterized by its instrumental view of nature as a stockpile of resources to be used for
human beneﬁt. The environmentally sensitive perspective, on the other hand, signiﬁes
an attitude which understands nature’s worth as going beyond its instrumental value as
resource. As I mentioned in chapter one, we do have these two opposing tendencies in
our attitudes toward nature in our western tradition. Eugene Hargrove and Roderick
Nash give a helpful discussion on the development of the environmentally sensitive
attitude. But they neglect the fact that this attitude has been overshadowed by an attitude

towards nature that derives from scientiﬁc rationality. Heidegger’s analysis of

 

100

technology, despite its saturation with jargon, does offer a useful formulation of the
development of modern technological thought which illuminates the predominance of the
theme of instrumentality behind the nature-as-resource attitude.

A second reason for considering Heidegger’s thought is that there are many who think
it may provide us with a workable environmental ethic. While I do think his work
provides useful insights, I do not ﬁnd much in the way of a workable ethic in
Heidegger’s writings. In short for now, I ﬁnd nothing in Heidegger’s admonishment that
we need to "listen to Being" and "let being be " that could be practically useful in making
decisions regarding the problems and conﬂicts which we currently face. His thought does
allow us to understand that there are different possibilities for how human society can
relate to its natural environment. However, it does not address itself to the question of
how to choose between these various possibilities. Yet this practical question is a crucial
factor in the environmental conﬂicts today. With that said, I want to turn to an

examination of Heidegger’s analysis of modern technological rationality.

2. Heidegger’s Analysis of Modern Technology

a) Key Concepts: Opening, Destining, Revealing, and Enframing

For Heidegger, technology is not adequately understood if conceived merely in terms

of means for securing some selected end. Though he does not deny that this conception

belongs to what technology is, Heidegger maintains that technology understood as

101

instrumentality is "obscure and groundless. "57 We will only be able to fully understand
technology if we conceive of technology as a way of revealing:

Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If

we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will

open itself to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth (Technology 294).
We need now to clarify just what Heidegger means by saying technology is a way of
revealing. To this end, I will attempt to suggest plausible interpretations of several key
concepts in Heidegger’s writings. The key terms to be examined are: revealing,
enfranring, destining, and opening. Though the interpretations presented here may not
be fully adequate, they will give us a working understanding of these terms, and allow
us to come to grips with Heidegger’s views on technology, and the relevance this view
has to understanding why a pro-environment attitude has been repressed in our western
tradition.

I would like to begin with the concept of ’opening. ’ Heidegger tells us, "To open
something means to make it light, free and open, e. g. , to make the forest free of trees
at one place. The free space thus originating is the clearing.“8 This notion of a
clearing or an opening is crucial in Heidegger’s thought, since it is within this opening
that everything which comes to presence has its presence: "The clearing is the open

region for everything that becomes present and absent" (End of Philosophy 384). Thus,

 

’7 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Martin
Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977),
290. Hereafter cited in text as Concerning Technology.

5’ Martin Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, " in Martin
Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977),
384. Hereafter cited in text as End of Philos0phy.

102

"opening" is a metaphor for that area wherein we encounter things of our world.

Another metaphor may help in understanding the notion of ’opening’ as well as help
in introducing the notion of ’destining. ’ When we begin a sentence, we open up a space
in which the sentence can be ﬁnished. That is to say, with the ﬁrst few words spoken,
there is an area opened up within which there are a number of possibilities for ﬁnishing
the sentence. This area is the opening within which the sentence will be brought to
presence by the speaker. Furthermore, there are certain ways of ﬁnishing the sentence
which are no longer possible given the way in which the sentence was begun; these
excluded ways of ﬁnishing it would result in something like a category mistake, or a
logical or grammatical error. These excluded ﬁnishings lie outside the opening. It is in
this sense that with the ﬁrst words spoken, the sentence is destined to be ﬁnished within
a certain bounded region-—within a certain opening.

As mentioned above, it is within this opening that we encounter the things of our
world. Heidegger refers to this encountering of things in our world as ’revealing.’
Revealing is Heidegger’s translation for the Greek term aletheia. Traditionally, aletheia
has been translated as ’truth. ’ Heidegger claims, however, that the notion of truth as "the
correspondence of knowledge with beings," or "as the certainty of the knowledge of
Being" is not adequate for thinking aletheia (End of Philosophy 388-89). Heidegger
insists on the need to think aletheia as unconcealment or revealing. His reason for this
is that truth as correspondence or certainty of knowledge is dependent on unconcealment
as opening; the opening is what ﬁrst makes possible evidence and certainty (End of

Philosophy 389).

103

We can understand Heidegger’s use of revealing, then, as an unconcealing or
uncovering of some entity within the opening. Metaphorically, one could think of an
artist pulling the cloth which covers her statue at an art show as an uncovering or
revealing. Heidegger would also say that the artist "revealed" the statue in her creating
it from the block of stone; the statue was brought forth into unconcealment in that open
region wherein we encounter the things of our world. The unconcealment of an entity
involves the signiﬁcance its presence has for human understanding. When an entity
comes to presence, it is understood as something; it is unconcealed in terms of the
signiﬁcance it has for humans.

We must now connect these terms with Heidegger’s thoughts on technology. And in
doing so we will reach an understanding of what Heidegger means by saying modern
technology "reveals the real as standing-reserve" (Concerning Technology 302).

As noted in the quotation in the opening of this section, technology, for Heidegger,
is a mode of revealing. But modern technology is a particular kind of revealing: "The
revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon,
in the sense of a challenging-forth" (Concerning Technology 297). Heidegger claims that
with the advent of modern technology, we ﬁnd nature set upon and challenged to yield
itself as resources at our disposal. The air, Heidegger says, is set upon to "yield
nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium . . . uranium is set upon to yield
atomic energy" (Concerning Technology 296). This kind of revealing or unconcealment
Heidegger designates as "enframing. " Enframing is a revealing which brings things to

presence only as standing-reserve (End of Philosophy 302). By standing-reserve,

 

104

Heidegger means that all of nature becomes a stockpile of resources which is at the
disposal of humans: "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately
on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for further ordering.
Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-
reserve" (Concerning Technology 298). What Heidegger is driving at here is the result
of the disenchantment of nature by scientiﬁc rationality. That is to say, the technology
that arose from scientiﬁc rationality views the world with blinders on; it can only see
nature in terms of how nature can be used. Similarly, enframing as the way of revealing
of modern technology, only uncovers nature as "the storehouse of standing energy
reserve" (Concerning Technology 302).

Thus, we ﬁnd that the opening in which things of our world are encountered is a very
limited opening-limited to understanding nature solely in terms of its instrumentality.
This opening is the world of modern technological thought, and it is our world today.
Our primary orientation to the things of our world is a technological-instrumental
orientation. We understand the things in our world in terms of how they can be used by
us. This is not to say that there are no other possible orientations. However, the
technological rationality is the rationality we have manifested in our social and political

institutions.

105

b) The Threat to Human Essence

Although I do not think Heidegger is completely unaware of the potential ecological
damage which could result from nature being manipulated by modern technology, he does
not discuss this aspect of the issue directly. Thus, one cannot simply "lift" an
environmental ethic from Heidegger’s writings. Instead, Heidegger is primarily
concerned with the threat modern technology presents to humanity:

As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but
exclusively as standing—reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing
but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a
precipitous fall, that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be
taken as standing reserve (Concerning Technology 308).
We can note that there is nothing said in the above quotation concerning a threat to the
physical existence of humans (nor of other life forms) as we would expect to ﬁnd in a
more contemporary essay on environmental ethics.

Heidegger’s concern focuses, then, on the threat which modern technology presents
to the essence of humanity: "The threat to man does not come in the ﬁrst instance from
the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already
afﬂicted man in his essence " (Concerning Technology 309). Modern technology
threatens the essence of humanity by the manner in which it brings humans into the
enframing mode of revealing so that humans are banished "into that kind of revealing that
is an ordering" (Concerning Technology 309). The point Heidegger is making is this:
Since they only encounter things within that enframing mode of revealing, humans will

only encounter things by challenging those things to yield something useful. And the way

106

of relating to the useful——a resource—-is to order it into a standing reserve. In this mode
of existing, humans become no more than the keepers of the warehouse of resources.
However, in taking up this warehouse keeping role, humans lose their true dignity as
humans: "This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment . . . of all coming
into presence on the earth" (Concerning Technology 313). This keeping watch over the
unconcealment refers to how things of the world are encountered by humanity. The
signiﬁcance of a thing’s presence, according to Heidegger, is dependent upon how it is
understood by humans. Thus humans have a certain dignity, in Heidegger’s View, which
other creatures lack; humans determine the meaning of a thing’s existence. But when we
limit that meaning to the thing’s usefulness for us and allow ourselves to be taken into
the enframing mode of revealing, we give up this dignity.

In spite of the fact that Heidegger’s thought may not be adequate to serve as a basis
for an environmental ethic, there is value in his analysis. I think his analysis helps
illustrate another side of that process of rationalization discussed by Weber. It illustrates
how the development of modern technology from scientiﬁc rationality blocks the
development of a pro-environment attitude; it gives us another way to understand the
process of rationalization that allows us to directly see the effects rationalization has had
on the relationship between humans and their natural environment. In other words, once
humans begin to understand nature only from within the enframing mode--to understand
nature merely as a standing-reserve of resources—-it effectively prevents the growth of
sensibilities for appreciating the aesthetic qualities of nature, or seeing natural entities as

possible recipients of ethical concern. Put another way, it blocks other possible ways of

107

relating to our natural environment. This is why I think those who appeal to
environmental sensibilities--Rodman and other deep ecologists--while they may be on the
right track, need to do much more work. For to merely advocate the development of
environmental sensibilities in the face of the historical process of rationalization that has
occurred since the Enlightenment ignores the root of the problem. Because the process
of rationalization, with its predominance of purposive-instrumental rationality, has
determined the character of the relationship of humans and nature, this aspect of the
relationship must be addressed. It is also important to keep in mind the success that
technology has brought about in terms of making human life easier. Obviously, modern
technology has been able to succeed in controlling and manipulating nature to the
apparent beneﬁt of humans. Thus, from the viewpoint of purposive-instrumental
rationality, promoting a relationship in which nature is understood merely as a resource
is a reasonable thing to do——at least from a short range view. Technology’s successes
serve to legitimate viewing nature merely as a standing-reserve of resources.

I take it as fairly obvious, then, that the gist of Heidegger’s analysis is correct.
Twentieth century humans do have a tendency to only view nature as a standing—reserve
of resources. Our primary orientation to our world is a technological one. We must ask,
however, whether this is the only orientation possible for us at the end of the twentieth
century. But to answer this question, we would need some standard of normativity not
dependent on some foundation external to human reason itself. Thus, we see here why
our experience of conﬂicts regarding environmental issues is one way in which we

experience the problem of modernity. And if we consider Weber’s claim regarding the

108

"iron cage" of reason or Heidegger’s claim that "human activity can never directly
counter this danger" that "everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of
standing-reserve," we get a rather pessimistic answer to whether the problem of
modernity can be resolved (Concerning Technology 315).

As a description of the situation in which we currently ﬁnd ourselves, the views of
Weber and Heidegger may seem appropriate. That is to say, for many, and quite
possibly for the majority today, the technological orientation is seen as the most
appropriate; indeed, so much so that many people remain unaware of any other.
However, not everyone agrees with this view. I want to turn now to a discussion of
someone who disagrees with this pessimistic conclusion--Herbert Marcuse. Although he
does accept aspects of their views, Marcuse criticizes both Weber and Heidegger
regarding their position on technological rationality. Thus, it is hoped that in Marcuse
we will ﬁnd an account of the development of technological rationality (the process of
rationalization) which will get beyond the dark side of the Enlightenment Project——some

way to move the project in a better direction than it has so far taken.

3. Marcuse’s Criticism of Heidegger and Weber

Marcuse was inﬂuenced by and agreed with certain aspects of Heidegger’s thought.
We will see, for example, that Marcuse, too, is concerned with the effect that the
dominance of technological rationality has on humans. He thinks it has a dehumanizing

effect. However, Marcuse objected to Heidegger’s move to the ontological level in

109

analyzing modern technology. The problem, according to Marcuse, lies in the ahistorical
approach of the analysis. Heidegger’s account, although concerned with the historicity
of the subject-—that is, concerned with the fact that human subjects exist as historical
beings—-nonetheless fails to confront the concrete material conditions of this historicity.
In other words, Heidegger does not give consideration to the concrete historical
conditions under which a particular existing human Dasein exists. Marcuse thinks it
necessary to consider these historical conditions, since these conditions play a role in the
determinations of actual existence.” Furthermore, because Marcuse does consider the
historical conditions, he is able to uncover the particular aspects of the development of
technological rationality which led to its dehumanizing effect. Awareness of these
concrete conditions of the development may suggest ways to overcome the negative
effects.

Marcuse also in large part agreed with Weber’s account of the process of
rationalization. However, he believed that Weber’s analysis was inadequate in the sense
that it seemed to allow for no positive way of changing the situation. That is to say, he
understood Weber as asserting that the rationalization of the world inevitably leads to the
"iron cage" of reason. Marcuse saw a concept of fate in Weber’s account that
"generalizes the blindness of a society which reproduces itself behind the back of

individuals, of a society in which the law of domination appears as objective

 

’9 For a fuller discussion on Marcuse’s criticism of Heidegger see his "Contributions
to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism," in Telos 4 (Fall 1969): 16-18.

110

technological law."60 The point here is that Marcuse believed there was no natural or
logical necessity to this fate: "This fate has become a fate and inasmuch as it has become
a fate it can also be abolished" (Negations 214—15).

The reason behind Marcuse’s claim that this "fate" can be abolished is that Weber
failed to note that his analysis had "fallen prey to the identiﬁcation of technical reason
with bourgeois capitalist reason" (N egations 223). Because of this identiﬁcation, Marcuse
can agree with much of Weber’s analysis, and yet still reject his paradoxical conclusion.
Weber’s mistake, according to Marcuse, was his failure to realize that the particular
development of technological rationality in western cultural is merely one possible form
which technological rationality could take. Marcuse notes that "technology is always a
historical—social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to
do with men and things" (Negations 224). Historically in our culture, according to
Marcuse, technological rationality did develop into a form of rationality that has become
a means of domination which has led to the loss of human autonomy regarding the choice
of individual and social ends. At the same time, however, this development contains no
element of necessity; it was historically contingent that it developed this way.
Examination of Marcuse’s views on the process of rationalization will help to clarify how
he reached this conclusion.

The process of rationalization, it must be remembered, allowed humans increased

control over their otherwise precarious and unstable relations with their natural

 

6° Herbert Marcuse, "Industrialization and Capitalism in Max Weber, " in Negations,
trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 214. Hereafter cited in text as
Negations.

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environment. In other words, it allowed for a more secure existence. Here we can again
recall the example of how developing better methods for food preservation removed an
aspect of the instability in human life. However, the particular development of this
rationalization process came in the form of bureaucratic institutions which operated
according to purposive-instrumental reason.

The claim made by Marcuse and others of the Frankfurt School regarding the results
of this rationalization process is that social relationships have become reiﬁed. That is to
say, they have become recognized as being things rather than intersubjective relationships.
As an example we can here think of the growth in the bureaucratic institution known as
agri—business. By agri—business I understand the corporate reorganization of farming.
We must admit that agri-business has given humans a more secure existence by providing
a relatively inexpensive and reliable food source. But at the same time, our relationship
with those who actually produce the food has become extremely abstract. Whereas
people previously either produced their own food or had personal relations with the
grocer or farmer, that relationship now has been reiﬁed into a mere commodity exchange.
Of course, this reiﬁcation helps meet a need: purposive-instrumental rationality, as was
mentioned, concerns the process of coordinating means for a given end. This process
works much easier when dealing with objects that have fairly well deﬁned limits——
something which subjects lack. Thus, purposive-instrumental rationality has the tendency
to reify social relationships in order to better manage them. From the stand-point of
efﬁciency, understanding the relationships between consumer and producer in abstract,

objectiﬁed terms leads to easier management of these relations than if they were

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understood as intersubjective relations.

Another example might help to clarify the point. We may experience the
uncomfortable feeling of an intersubjective relationship being objectiﬁed when we depend
on relatives or a close friend for childcare. As a parent and a worker that has a changing
schedule, you may have a changing need for childcare services. In this situation, there
is a tendency for the friend to become a mere employee to be on call when needed rather
than a friend. Your need is for childcare services, not an intersubjective relationship with
a friend. Thus, there is a tendency to relate to the person merely as an employee, since
this would be the most efﬁcient relationship for your purposes. And this is where we
ﬁnd purposive-instrumental rationality inadequate. It is not adequate nor appropriate in
these circumstances, since it tends to reify an intersubjective relationship in order to gain
efﬁciency.

This reiﬁcation process can also be felt whenever you are dealing with a bureaucracy
which requires you to ﬁll out a form listing the relevant data of your life. You feel a
sense of inadequacy in the form’s ability to actually represent your life. But this concern
is irrelevant to the functioning of the bureaucracy; for its purposes, the relevant social
relationship with you is in terms of the data listed on the form. Thus, there is no
intersubjective relationship possible, since your biography as a subject has been reduced

and objectiﬁed as data.61

 

‘1 Gabriel Marcel gives an extremely helpful analysis of the experience of this
reduction of a person’s biography to data on a dossier in his, The Mystery of Being, trans.
G.S. Fraser (Boston: University Press of America, 1978). See particularly volume I
Chapter II A Broken World.

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Furthermore, to resist this reiﬁcation--which is experienced as a reducing of your
biography to a few relevant facts--is to be irrational. As Marcuse notes, people must
pursue the maintenance of their lives in society. However, doing so requires that we act
rationally: that is, everyone must act "according to the standards which insure the
functioning of the apparatus and thereby the maintenance of their own life. "‘2 For the
individual conﬁ'onted with this process of reiﬁcation, acquiescing is the rational thing to
do. For, most likely, you are dealing with the bureaucracy for a particular reason; you
have some goal you want to achieve. Thus, to try to rebel against this reiﬁcation would
not be the most efﬁcient means of achieving your end.

We can see here the paradox of Weber’s ”iron cage " of reason. For the
Enlightenment thinkers reason was to emancipate humanity. But as the process of
rationalization that was to bring about this emancipation developed, it had a dehumanizing
effect; it reiﬁed human social relationships to the point where humans are forced to relate
to one another in terms of the data on their dossiers.

Our relationship with the animals raised for our food has also become reiﬁed and
abstract. For instance, when we choose a package of pork roast or veal from the meat
counter at the local supermarket, we give no thought to the how or where it came from--
it is a mere commodity item. Because this has become a matter of mere commodity

exchange, it is easy for us to neglect giving consideration to the morality of the treatment

 

‘2 Herbert Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology, " in The
Essential Frankﬁtrt School Reader, ed. A. Arato & E. Gebhardt (New York: Continuum
Publishing Company, 1982), 148. Hereafter cited in text as Social Implications. In a
footnote to page 141 , Marcuse explains that "the term ’apparatus’ denotes the institutions,
devices and organizations of industry in their prevailing social setting. "

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of the calves raised for veal. But when people raised their own animals for food, they
had to confront this issue more directly. Similar reiﬁcation takes place in our relationship
to wild animals and inanimate elements of our environment. The disruption to an
ecosystem caused by an interstate freeway often is only made apparent to us in the
moments surrounding that jarring thump as our speeding car runs over a scampering
raccoon in the night. During such moments, an awareness of the impact of human social
practices on the environment breaks to the surface; we directly confront one consequence
of our having cars and freeways—-a dead raccoon. But this awareness lasts only
momentarily. We quickly return to the abstract level of the relationship where that dead
raccoon is but an objectiﬁed datum which is outweighed by other factors in calculating
the feasibility of our use of the automobile and freeways.

At this point we can consider Marcuse’s criticism of Weber. Marcuse would agree
that the particular development of technological rationality in western society has led to
a situation in which individuals experience the dehumanizing effects of the process of
rationalization and the loss of autonomy:

The efﬁcient individual is the one whose performance is an action only insofar as
it is the proper reaction to the objective requirements of the apparatus, and his
liberty is conﬁned to the selection of the most adequate means for reaching a goal
which he did not set (Social Implications 144).
But this does not imply, in Marcuse’s view, that technical reason as such is at fault,
which seems to be Weber’s position. Rather, the social framework in which technical
reason developed must be recognized as the factor behind technology being used in such

a way that it is dehumanizing and repressive: "Is it still necessary to repeat that science

and technology are the great vehicles of liberation, and that it is only their use and

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restriction in the repressive society which makes them into vehicles of domination? "‘3
The following passage gives an example which illustrates a particular use of technology
that leads to this dehumanization and loss of autonomy:
Not the automobile is repressive, not the television set is repressive, not the
household gadgets are repressive, but the automobile, the television, the gadgets
which, produced in accordance with the requirements of proﬁtable exchange, have
become part and parcel of the people’s own existence, own ’actualization. ’ Thus
they have to buy part and parcel of their own existence on the market; this
existence is the realization of capital (Liberation 12).
That we now have to buy on the market what we are, and the fact that what is offered
on the market is determined, not by our own individual choice, but by market forces,
illustrates for Marcuse the fact that humans have not achieved the emancipation hoped for
by the Enlightenment thinkers.
But in spite of the current situation which technological rationality has brought about
in conjunction with western capitalist society, Marcuse believed that within a different
social framework technical reason could serve as the technique of liberation:
For freedom indeed depends largely on technical progress, on the advancement
of science. But this fact easily obscures the essential precondition: in order to
become vehicles of freedom, science and technology would have to change their
present direction and goals; they would have to be reconstructed in accord with
a new sensibility . . . . Then one could speak of a technology of liberation . . .
(Liberation 19).

We again ﬁnd here an acknowledgement that technical reason selects means for achieving

pre- given ends, but this does not address the practical issue of which ends to select. The

question, of course, is how to bring about an alternative framework, how to develop a

 

‘3 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 12.
Hereafter cited in text as Liberation.

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new sensibility which will allow for humans to be autonomous in their practical choices.
For if there are other possibilities, we may be able to create an alternative social
framework in which our social institutions offer more environmentally sound choices for
how we relate to our natural environment. These are issues to be dealt with in the next
three chapters. What needs to be done now in concluding the present chapter is to clarify
more explicitly how the process of rationalization is a signiﬁcant factor behind the

environmental conﬂicts which we currently experience.

D . Conclusion

In the discussion on Heidegger’s analysis of modern technology, it was noted that our
primary orientation to our world is a technological one. In large part, the successes in
achieving a more stable and secure existence has legitimized this orientation. Indeed, it
has legitimized it to the point, if Marcuse is correct, that it is seen as irrational to protest
against this orientation; protesters are viewed as not understanding the efﬁciency this
orientation provides for achieving set goals. The problem, however, concerns the issue
of who or what determines these goals.

Consideration again of the current debate between environmentalists and the logging
industry in the northwest illustrates the problem. There are those who argue for a
technological orientation to the environment there. They claim such an orientation
provides a better means for maintaining a smoothly functioning economy. The

opponents, of course, question this choice of ends; they claim that preservation of the

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spotted owl is a more worthy end than a healthy economy. We ﬁnd here a clash of
apparently incompatible ends. One side of the conﬂict exhibits what I earlier referred to
as an environmentally sensitive attitude, while the other side exhibits an attitude that
understands natures merely as a resource. The former could have their historical roots
in our tradition as Hargrove and Nash have attempted to show. The latter, however, also
have their roots in this same tradition, but have been inﬂuenced by the deveIOpment,
within this tradition, of technological rationality as the analyses of Heidegger, Weber, and
Marcuse attempt to illustrate. History shows, then, that while there may be evidence of
a pro-environment attitude in our tradition, its development has been stunted by the
process of rationalization. The widespread inﬂuence of technological rationality helped
dominate the thought guiding the practical orientation of humans toward the environment.
Thus, the debate is slanted in favor of those who advocate the conception of nature as
mere resource. Their choice of ends appears more rational given the standards of the
predominate technological orientation of our time. Nevertheless, if Marcuse is correct,
this is not a necessary state of affairs. However, until we confront the factors which
allowed the dominance of the pro-human attitude, there is little chance of matters
changing. At best we will be able to generate conﬂicts concerning the appropriate
attitude to guide our practical relations with the environment as in the debate between the
environmentalists and the loggers.

The side of the debate which views nature as mere resource, then, amounts to this:
The loggers claim that to view the forest merely as a resource makes the local economy

function smoothly, while being concerned for the spotted owl only puts loggers out of

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work. Therefore, there is no good reason for taking any other attitude toward nature.
Indeed, any other attitude would be irrational according to this standard.

Environmental thinkers have responded to this claim by offering various proposals
supporting an alternative attitude. The basis of these proposals appeal to such notions as
the rights of natural entities and wildlife, the inherent value of natural entities, the
positive aesthetic value of nature, and so on. We can view these proposals as hypotheses
set forth as ways to resolve the conﬂict. They can be understood as suggestions offered
as reasons for the opponents to agree with the pro-environmental attitude. As
experimental hypotheses, however, they have failed to resolve the debate. The loggers
continue to protest.

But what is it that the debate is about? It is not really about whether the logging
practices are efﬁcient means to promote the strength of the local economy. Nor is it
about whether banning logging is an efﬁcient means to protect the spotted-owl. The
conﬂict concerns the pre-given ends which each group tries to promote. The loggers take
a healthy economy as the end to promote, while the environmentalists advocate the
preservation of the owl. These ends then come into conﬂict. But as the discussion on
the Enlightenment Project and the ensuing process of rationalization intended to illustrate,
humanity has not developed an adequate way to resolve conﬂicts of ends; we have no
adequate means to select which ends we think are worthy of pursuit. We have developed
purposive~instrumental rationality; however, this type of rationality, at least so far, has
only served to select efﬁcient means for attaining a given end. It has not served for the

actual selection of the ends themselves.

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This illustrates once again the point that humanity has not yet been fully emancipated.
That is to say, until humans are able to conduct enlightened discussion regarding the
selection of ends which they choose as worthy of pursuit, they will be bound by some
external authority or other that determines the ends for them. This authority may well
be reason itself as Weber’s analysis of the process of rationalization suggests. Here
humans are bound by the authority of technical reason which has become objectiﬁed and
takes on a logic of its own. This results in the loss of choice, since choice is dictated by
this objectiﬁed logic.

As an example of this problem that illustrates a behavior impacting on the relation
between humans and nature, we can consider the use of the automobile in the U.S.
Aspects of our social, political, and economic institutions together with certain physical
features of our infrastructure are such that they often discourage the use of public
transportation or other alternatives to the automobile such as biking. That is to say,
inconvenient bus routes and schedules result in relatively few people using public
transportation. In turn, a lack of funding due to low use results in an inability to develop
more convenient routes and schedules. Also in many cities it is just plain dangerous to
try bicycling as an alternative due to the layout of streets and freeways, and the lack of
convenient bike routes. These factors encourage each individual to rely on their own
auto, and this behavior has well-documented negative effects on the environment.

This example admittedly only scratches the surface of a major environmental problem
with transportation. However, I use this example only to illustrate the point that in spite

of the apparent choice in alternative modes of transportation, features of our social

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institutions and infrastructure take this choice away from the individual in practical terms.
When it is a practical choice between a forty-ﬁve nrinute bus ride to work, which
involves two or three transfers, or a ten minute ride in your car, most people will
consider taking their car as the rational choice. In essence, the choice is made for you
by these external factors. It may well be true that there is no necessity in this choice.
Nonetheless, when applying the standards of the objectiﬁed logic, riding the bus appears
as an inefﬁcient means for attaining the goal of getting to work. And we must also note
that what lies behind our institutions and infrastructure being as they are, is purposive-
instrumental reason. They are developed in accord with standards of efﬁciency for
attaining pre—given ends.

When our institutions and infrastructure were laying out our streets and freeways, the
end-in-view was efﬁcient movement of the individual auto. The movement of bicycles
through the city was not a factor to be considered. But certain developments since that
time have brought the use of the auto as an individual means of transportation into
question--the large number of autos causing congestion, auto emissions adding to the
greenhouse effect, etc. These factors suggest to many that a re—evaluation of the end is
needed.

The difﬁculty is that we are uncertain, or disagree, about just how we should evaluate
this situation. The convenience of the individual auto is a value many do not wish to
give up, while others are unwilling to pay the cost of the problems generated by this use
of the auto.

Again, this is an admittedly inadequate account of the transportation problem, but it

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does illustrate a case where there is a lack of categories and instrumentalities for resolving
the problem. This lack renders unclear just how the choice of ends is to be rationally
debated.

It was, then, a particular historical development of human rationality which has
brought about the situation in which we ﬁnd ourselves answering to external forces rather
than freely making our own practical choices. But again, as Marcuse claims, there is no
necessity behind this particular development of human rationality. For Marcuse the
problem stems from the conjunction of technical reason and capitalist reason. However,
he also claims that it is historically contingent that technical reason became conjoined
with capitalist reason. What Marcuse ﬁnds problematic about this particular conjunction
is that there is no room for practical choice to develop, since, in large part, market forces
determine the goals or ends. Whether a given end is to be chosen depends heavily on the
economic feasibility of attaining it in terms of system imperatives. Thus, the choice of
whether to allow logging or to protect the spotted owl, whether to promote more efﬁcient
alternative modes of transportation or continued reliance on each individual’s private auto,
seems to need deciding on the basis of the feasibility of protecting the owl or seriously
developing genuine alternatives for transportation, and the cost this would have to the
economy. But to frame the issues in these terms seems inadequate. There are relevant
aspects of the situation which are not captured. The most important being human
autonomy regarding practical choice. Another aspect is the tendency towards
dehumanization discussed earlier.

What is needed is an alternative formulation of the environmental problems. This is

 

122

why I suggest we view these issues as manifestations of the problem of modernity. For
it really involves the question of which end to pursue, and what is needed is a way to
evaluate these ends without appeal to some absolute foundation which results in the loss
of human autonomy.64 In other words, we need to complete the Enlightenment Project
in a manner which takes into account an enlightened view of Enlightenment rationality.
We need a conception of rationality which is able, not only to see the process of
rationalization and its effect, but also one which realizes there are other possibilities for
human rationality that may yet be able to fulﬁll the Enlightenment’s hope. Put another
way, the problem is not simply that there has been a process of rationalization; rather it
is that this process has been one-sided. The process of rationalization has been dominated
by purposive-instrumental rationality. This is turn, brought about dehumanization
through the reiﬁcation of intersubjective relationships, and the loss of human autonomy
regarding practical choice. However, rectifying this one-sided development requires
directly confronting the problem of modernity--showing that it is possible for human
reason to develop standards of normativity which can be used in the selection of ends.
This chapter has been an attempt to give an interpretive account of the environmental
conﬂicts currently confronting us. This account suggests we understand these conﬂicts

as one manifestation of the lingering problem of modernity. It views these conﬂicts as

 

6‘ A word of caution is needed at this point. As stated here, it sounds as though
what needs to be done is to simply redirect our science and technology to other ends than
those currently pursued. This is partially correct, but it is too simple. When we come
to the discussion of Dewey’s thought, we ﬁnd him claiming that we need to construct
new ends as well. Ends are not something ready—made and simply waiting for the
appropriate means to attain them. This point is discussed more fully in the next chapter

(p. 180).

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questions concerning which ends humanity ought to pursue; the practical issue is a
question concerning how our behavior ought to be guided. Moreover, an attempt was
made to uncover some of the key historical developments that have brought us to the
point where we must seriously reﬂect on the question: How ought we to conceive of our
relationship to our natural environment? The predominant attitude towards the
environment has been one which views nature as merely a resource for human beneﬁt.
Granted, there have been signs of another attitude in our tradition-—an attitude which ﬁnds
nature to have a value beyond that of a mere resource. Concern with the health of the
biosphere--as evidenced with the growing concerns of global warming, loss of species,
ozone depletion, toxic wastes, etc.-—has brought the nature—as-resource attitude into
question. Many now ask whether this is the proper understanding of humanity’s
relationship with nature.

The aim of the present chapter, then, was to ﬁrst show that the particular development
of human rationality since the modern period, which was a selective development of
purposive—instrumental rationality, is largely responsible for the nature—as—resource attitude
gaining predominance. Secondly, the contingency of this selective development was
pointed out. That humanity should have focused primarily on the development of a form
of rationality which is proﬁcient at determining efﬁcient means for securing a given end
was not a necessary development. Nonetheless, this development is understandable: the
success this form of rationality has had in securing a more stable existence for humanity
has served to legitimate it as an appropriate way to orient ourselves to our world.

However, the virtually exclusive focus on purposive—instrumental rationality resulted in

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a neglect of other forms of rationality: in particular, the neglect of an evaluative,
judgmental rationality which is concerned with determination of the ends which humanity
ought to pursue. I

With the problem set in these terms, the need is to develop means for the rational
discussion and debate of ends. The next chapter will turn to this task. Examination of
Dewey’s views on ethical inquiry will be undertaken. Dewey’s views on ethical inquiry
is appropriate since he develops a non-foundationalist approach. This is in keeping, then,
with the need for reason to develop standards of normativity by and for itself, and will
allow for the autonomy of human reason in the choice of ends. But to fully understand
and appreciate his views, we must ﬁrst clarify the relation of Dewey’s metaphysics to his
ethical thought. Once this relation is understood, we can begin discussion on Dewey’s

ethical thought, and in particular, on what he says regarding the means/ ends continuum.

Chapter IV
Dewey’s Contribution to Overcoming the Problem of Modernity

A. Introduction.

The previous chapter has set us a speciﬁc task. The examination of the historical
factors in the development of human reason in the western tradition has shown that we
now have a fairly advanced form of purposive—instrumental rationality. This form of
rationality is efﬁcacious at working out the necessary means for achieving selected ends.
However, purposive-instrumental rationality, as traditionally understood, only deals with
technical matters; it does not concern the practical issue of the choice of ends. The result
is that human ends may be determined by factors beyond human reason. In addition to
the loss of autonomy, this has brought an element of dehumanization into our lives. The
conﬂicts concerning environmental issues are one area in which we currently experience
these effects of the predominance of purposive—instrumental rationality. Consequently,
the task is to determine if there is some aspect of human rationality that can be developed
which would serve our practical need regarding the choice of appropriate ends. Securing
this goal would then allow us to more adequately address the issues in the area of
environmental ethics.

I suggest the pragmatic approach to ethical inquiry, as developed by John Dewey, will
move us in the necessary direction. His pragmatism provides an alternative to the narrow
view of technical rationality. This claim may strike some as odd since Dewey’s approach

is instrumentalist. Thus, it may be thought that Dewey simply gives us more of the

125

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same. And in one sense he does. He does claim that the need in the twentieth century
is to apply the successful method of inquiry developed in the physical sciences to the
broader ﬁeld of human life.“ However, Dewey offers a richer understanding of
instrumental rationality. It is hoped, then, that Dewey’s instrumentalism may respond
to Marcuse’s point that "in order to become vehicles of freedom, science and technology
would have to change their present direction and goals; they would have to be
reconstructed in accord with a new sensibility. "6‘ In short, I suggest that Dewey’s
approach to ethical inquiry may provide the ﬁrst steps for achieving this new sensibility.
Once we achieve it, science and technology will become "something to be pursued not
in a technical and specialized way for what is called truth for its own sake, but with the
sense of its social bearing" (RIP 173).

The present chapter sets forth the ways in which Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry
moves the conception of purposive-instrumental rationality beyond that view of it as
merely suited for determining appropriate means for selected ends. Dewey’s notion of
the means/ends continuum shows that more is involved in this process than merely
constructing the appropriate means. Since his thought on this matter rejects the
traditional conception of means and ends, their relation, and the reasoning appropriate to
each, it will be best to begin with an excursus on the relation of Dewey’s metaphysics

and his ethical thought. Understanding this relation will help to clarify just how different

 

‘5 This theme appears in a number of Dewey’s writings. See especially the new
introduction to Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), and pp. 7 5-
76. Hereafter cited in text as RIP.

6" Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 19.

127

Dewey’s position is from the mainstream approach to ethical inquiry. Otherwise, it will
be difﬁcult to see how Dewey’s instrumentalism can be said to move the conception of
purposive-instrumental rationality beyond the view of it as merely suited for determining
means for selected ends.

This chapter begins, then, with an excursus on the relation of Dewey’s metaphysics
and his ethical thought. After clariﬁcation of this relation, I want to examine his unique
approach to ethical inquiry and the role his notion of the means/ ends continuum plays in
this inquiry.

Eventually, we will ﬁnd that Dewey’s account, by itself, is not fully adequate for
accomplishing our task. In particular, Dewey fails to fully articulate just what is involved
in the projection of ends-in—view. He claims that the end-in—view serves as an ideal in
the problematic situation. The ideal is that which would resolve the experienced
difﬁculty. However, what remains unclear is just who determines, and how they go
about deternrining, the criteria for judging the appropriateness of the ideal. In spite of
this difﬁculty, examination of Dewey’s thought remains helpful in pursuing our goal of
seeking a way to conduct rational choice of appropriate ends. The difﬁculty mentioned
above will be dealt with in the next chapter by appeal to Habermas’ discourse ethics.

Again, the task of this chapter is to develop tools for overcoming the problem of
modernity——tools that can later be used in reﬂection on environmental issues. To this end,
the present chapter attempts to do three things: First it will clarify the relation of
Dewey’s metaphysics to his ethical thought. Second, it will examine Dewey’s theory of

valuation, focusing on his notion of the means/ends continuum. And third, an

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inadequacy with Dewey’s approach will be examined.

B. The Relation of Dewey’s Metaphysics to his Ethical Thought

Dewey’s particular understanding of metaphysics allows us to avoid the creation of
a gap between theory and practice. It allows us to bring intelligence to bear on situations
that are morally problematic. Understanding the theory—practice relation is imperative for
adequate comprehension of the continuity Dewey sees in scientiﬁc and moral inquiry.
In addition, this understanding is crucial for fully appreciating Dewey’s position on
ethical inquiry.

It may strike some as odd, if not wrong-headed, to speak of Dewey’s metaphysics.
Hence, there may be some balking at the appearance of that term in the title of this
section. Such a response would be understandable, since a good deal of Dewey’s efforts
were spent trying to show that traditional metaphysical theories which attempt to give an
account of the ultimate nature of reality were fundamentally nrisconceived. Thus, I wish
to clarify right off the sense in which the term is being used. I intend the term in the
same sense in which Dewey used it. For Dewey metaphysics was simply "a statement
of the generic traits manifested by existences of all kinds without regard to their
differentiation into physical and mental" .67 Dewey rejected the outcomes of traditional

metaphysics, and perhaps he cannot be said to have metaphysical views in the traditional

 

‘7 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. ,
1958), 412. Hereafter cited in text as EN.

129

sense. Nonetheless, he does have a good deal to say regarding metaphysics in the sense
of concern with the generic traits of all existence.

With this qualiﬁcation out of the way, I want to brieﬂy mention Dewey’s view on the
task and purpose of philosophy. This will help clarify the appeal to Dewey’s thought for
furthering completion of the Enlightenment project. He claims, "Nothing but the best,
the richest and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man" (EN 412).
Achieving such an experience is the "common purpose of men," and Dewey further
claimed that "the contribution which philosophy can make to this common aim is
criticism" (EN 412). He realized, however, that difﬁculties will arise in the course of
pursuing this aim. Thus, in his view, philosophy as criticism has the task of clarifying
"men’s ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day. Its [philosophy’s] aim
is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conﬂicts" (RIP
26). Since a good deal of current strife and conﬂict is due to disagreements concerning
our relationship with our environment, critical reﬂection needs to be devoted to this area.
Thus, consideration of Dewey’s thought should be relevant, if his thought is as practically
oriented as he claimed. Dewey himself referred to metaphysics as a "ground—map of the
province of criticism" (EN 413). The purpose of this section is to become familiar with
this ground—map and the use Dewey made of it. I suggest that if Dewey has drawn a
clear map showing the relation of metaphysics and morality, the map may be of use in
"establishing base lines to be employed in more intricate triangulations" which will be
required in dealing with issues in environmental ethics (EN 413).

To understand his ground—map, it is crucial to recognize Dewey’s point of orientation:

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the live creature interacting with its environment. It is equally important to recognize
Dewey’s insistence on understanding this interaction as organic. I will begin my
discussion by examining Dewey’s reliance on a biological understanding of experience.
Because Dewey begins with this biological understanding of the life process, he comes
to drastically different views on the relation of metaphysics and morality than is
traditionally held. In short for now, Dewey claims the logical method of inquiry in each
of these areas has generically common features. Given this generic similarity, Dewey
also recognizes signiﬁcant differences which exist between these areas. In keeping with
his conviction of the organic unity of experience, however, Dewey does want to
emphasize the continuity.

Our task is to begin with Dewey’s account of experience. It will then be useful to
discuss his claim of the precariousness of existence. This is a signiﬁcant factor since the
precariousness of existence is what gives rise to problematic situations which require
inquiry for their resolution. Thus, discussion of what Dewey means by "situation" and
"inquiry" will be needed. And it will be in the discussion of the logical method of the
process of inquiry that we will begin to see why Dewey claims that inquiry concerning

the moral and that concerning the factual“ utilize the same logical method. Since

 

6“ There is a slight problem which arises with the use of ’factual’ in this context: that
is, formulating the distinction as one between the factual and the moral is not quite
correct. The reason is that even in moral inquiry there is attention given to the factual
conditions of the situation. Thus, the distinction may be better put in terms of the moral
and the scientiﬁc. Since Dewey himself characterizes it both ways in various places, it
is difﬁcult to stick with just one term or the other. And what further makes the use of
’factual’ a bit sticky is that the distinction referred to is, as I interpret it, merely a
conceptual distinction made for instrumental purposes in dealing with problematic
situations. At any rate, the reader should be aware that there may be a shifting between

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Dewey construes both as issuing from the fundamental biological conditions of the life
process, they have the same logical method. Let us begin, then, with a discussion of

Dewey’s conception of experience.

1. New Conception of Experience

The emergence of a psychology based on biology is, according to Dewey, an
important factor which allows for a new conception of experience. To see the latter, it

is ﬁrst necessary to brieﬂy say something about the old conception.

a) The Old Conception: Passive Reception of Impressions

The old conception of experience which Dewey has in mind is that based on the
psychology which dominated the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to this
view, there was a sharp distinction between the subject which had the experience and the
object experienced. The mental life of the subject began in the senses, conceived of as
gateways of knowledge regarding the external world, and except for "combining atomic
sensations, the mind was wholly passive and acquiescent in knowing" (RIP 84). Dewey
rejects this passive view of the organism which seems to stand about indifferently waiting

for the external world to impress itself on the senses (RIP 86).

 

the use of ’factual’ and ’scientiﬁc’, but both should be taken as contrasting with the
moral. And we should keep in mind that we are talking about judgment used in inquiry,
not the factual, the scientiﬁc or the moral as such.

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b) Dewey ’s Conception: Experience as Close Connection of Doing & Undergoing

To give an adequate account of experience, the organism, in Dewey’s view, needs to
be understood as actively engaged in an attempt to maintain itself in an equilibrium with
its environment: "Indeed, living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of
disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. "59 So viewed, then, experience must
include both what the organism does and suffers, how it acts and is acted upon. An
adequate account of experience "recognizes in its primary integrity no division between
act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality"
(EN 18). In another passage, Dewey puts forth rather strong conditions for what
constitutes experience:
The organism acts in accordance with its own structure . . . upon its
surroundings. As a consequence the changes produced in the environment react
upon the organism and its activities. The living creature undergoes, suffers, the
consequences of its own behavior. This close connection between doing and
suffering or undergoing fornrs what we call experience. Disconnected doing and
disconnected suffering are neither of them experiences (RIP 86).

Experience for Dewey, then, is constituted by a closely connected sequence of doing and

undergoing.

According to Dewey the life process follows a certain pattern. This pattern takes the
form of doings and undergoings. When we do something, we undergo something as a

consequence of this doing. An example of Dewey’s illustrates the point. When a stone

mason lifts a stone, he does something. In turn he undergoes "the weight, strain, texture

 

‘9 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (N ew York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1938), 27. Hereafter cited as Logic in the text.

 

133
of the surface of the thing lift " .7" And the properties undergone by the mason will

determine further doings: that is to say, the properties suffered by the mason will allow
him to determine if the stone is of the correct size, shape, and texture for his purpose.
And this "process continues until a mutual adaptation of the [function of] self and the
[function of] object emerges and that particular experience comes to a close" (AB 44).
This rhythmic pattern of doings and undergoings, Dewey thinks, is common to all
experience. However, he also clainrs there is something more to an experience than
merely this alternating pattern. There needs to be some relationship between the two:
" The action and consequence must be joined in perception. This relationship is what
gives meaning; to grasp it is the object of all intelligence" (AB 44). Experience, then,
is the grasping of the connection between a doing and an undergoing, or the realization
of the relation between what the organism has done and the resulting consequences that
action has for further action. So we ﬁnd in Dewey a much richer notion of experience
than we ﬁnd in accounts of experience based on the old conception which focuses on the
passive reception of sense impressions. As we will see later, this pattern of doing and

undergoing becomes an important element in Dewey’s notion of a process of inquiry.71

 

7° John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 1934), 44.
Hereafter cited as AB in the text.

7‘ Below (p. 153). I try to show the connection of Dewey’s notion of an
"imaginative rehearsal" with what is said regarding the perception of connection between
doing and undergoing.

134
c) No Subject/ Object Dualism

The rhythmic falling out of step and recovery, which constitutes the life process, may
seem to suggest a sharp distinction between the organism and its environment. But can
we sustain a sharp distinction without lapsing into a subject/object dualism? To avoid the
latter, the environment should not be thought of as a container of the organism which is
some sort of separate entity: "Human nature exists and operates in an environment. And
it is not ’in’ that environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight and

soil. It is of them, continuous with their energies . . . .72 Dewey does not deny the
possibility of making a distinction between the organism and environment; however, this
distinction would be a conceptual instrumentality and should not be reiﬁed as is the case
in traditional metaphysics. Making this conceptual distinction would be instrumental in
overcoming an encountered difﬁculty. Difﬁculties do not always arise from the
environment side; a difﬁculty may arise from the side of the organism such as happens

when we are hungry. Thus, making a sharp conceptual distinction in this case, would

be instrumental in locating the problematic to be overcome.73

 

7’ John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1922), 296.

73 In his Lectures on Ethics 1900-1901, Dewey also points out that one cannot say
a priori which side of the distinction is to be considered the stimulus and which the
response:

My point is that this relationship is a thoroughly shifting one. Whether the organism

or the environment is to be considered as dominating in the process of evolutionary

change depends entirely on the stage of the proceedings at which we are taking the

matter. From the standpoint of the environment as facilitating action the environment

is stimulus. From the standpoint of the environment as presenting an obstacle to any

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d) Senses no longer Gateways to Knowledge but are Stimuli to Action

If the agent is understood as something separate and independent from its world, as
the old view maintains, a host of epistemological problems will inevitably arise. These
problems are due to the conception of there being an ”inner" realm which is said to
represent the "outer" physical world. As mentioned, with this separation of the "inner"
from the "outer, " the senses become the avenue by which the "outer" is known. Once
the senses are taken to be gateways of knowledge of the "outer, " as both the Rationalists
and Empiricists maintained, there are questions regarding the reliability of the senses;
both schools accepted the fact that the senses are unreliable at times.

Dewey’s view of the senses as stimuli to action allows him to avoid becoming
entangled in the above mentioned epistemological issues. His basic claim regarding the
senses as they relate to epistemological concerns is that sensations "are not parts of any
knowledge, good or bad, superior or inferior, imperfect or complete" (RIP 89.) Dewey’s
example of the student engaged in her habit of note taking illustrates his point (The
following quotations regarding this example all come from Dewey’s discussion of it in
RIP 88-89). As long as the habit of writing is operating smoothly, the student is not

aware of the pressure of the pencil on the paper or on her hand. In these circumstances,

 

given mode of action . . . the environment is exercising the function of control (p.
367).
I take the point here to be that what can be considered the stimulus at one stage in the
process, may be considered a response from another stage; there is an evolution of sorts,
and not simply a static situation where the organism receives sensory stimuli from the
environment. The evolution mentioned here can be thought of in terms of the organism
learning what to make of certain aspects of its environment.

136

the sensation "operates merely as stimulus to ready and effective adjustment." However,
should the habit be disrupted because the pencil lead breaks or becomes too dull to
function properly, "there is a conscious shock, " and there is a "feeling of something the
matter, something gone wrong. "

One important point that should be emphasized here is the fact that the student was
engaged in an activity: namely, she was attempting to maintain an equilibrium with her
environment, which was the complex environment of the educational system. Effective
note taking is one means of maintaining an equilibrium in that environment.

This is a signiﬁcantly different account than one would have under the old view of
the agent as someone who passively receives sense impressions from external objects.
It can make sense of why the student was not aware of the pressure of the pencil on her
hand or the paper prior to the disruption of habit: the sensations at that point were, as
mentioned, "stimulus to ready and effective adjustment. " It is not clear what Locke, for
example, could say regarding this apparent unawareness. Why some sensations are
singled out as signiﬁcant and others are ignored, on the classic Empiricists’ view of the
senses, would take some effort to explain.

However, with the focus on the biological situation of the organism engaged in
actively attempting to maintain an equilibrium, the sensations can be understood as
"shocks of change, due to interruption of a prior adjustment, " and as "signals to

redirection of action. In the example of the student, the awareness of the sensation of

the pencil on the paper "marks a break in the prior routine of writing and the beginning

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of some other mode of action. "7" We have here, then, a quite different account of the
role of the senses as well as a different view of what knowledge is. The senses are
urgent rather than cognitive in nature (RIP 87). Knowledge becomes something
secondary and derived (RIP 87 ). More will be said about this changed conception of
knowledge later. We will see that it is the result of the process of inquiry, or more

precisely, of Dewey’s reconstruction of the traditional process of inquiry.

2. Existence as Precarious & Unstable

One signiﬁcant feature of existence is that it is precarious and unstable. What
Dewey means by this is that life is full of risks: " Man ﬁnds himself living in an aleatory
world; his existence involves, to put it baldly, a gamble. The world is a scene of risk;
it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable" (EN 41). We can see here an obvious
relation with Dewey’s notion of the life process as a rhythmic alternation of the organism
falling out of step and the reestablishment of harmony. That is to say, the reason the life
process has this rhythmic alternation is due to the fact that "the world of empirical things

includes the uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable and hazardous" (EN 42) .75

 

7‘ The preceding discussion on experience could have included discussion on
Dewey’s article, The Reﬂex Arc Concept in Psychology." I take Dewey to be covering
much of the same ground in that article as he is in the passages on which I have based
my discussion. My choice was inﬂuenced by the fact that Dewey’s discussion in the
"Reﬂex Arc" article was not quite so oriented toward his theme of philosophy as
criticism.

7‘ It is important to note that Dewey is referring here to the world of empirical
things. I take this to refer to what Dewey calls objects of "primary experience" as

138

a) Why Precariousness of Existence is Signiﬁcant

But one may ask, "Why should the precariousness of existence be taken as being
signiﬁcant?" Because precariousness is one of the factors which gave rise to philosophy:
" But it is submitted that just this predicament of the inextricable mixture of stability and
uncertainty gives rise to philosophy, and that it is reﬂected in all its recurrent problems
and issues " (EN 45-46). Still one may push the matter here and ask: Is this really any
different than what has been traditionally said regarding ours being a contingent world?
It is quite different. The difference can best be seen by considering how traditional
philosophies have dealt with the contingency of the world. They tended to create a
metaphysical dualism of one sort or another in which the contingent is less "real" or
merely an "appearance, " and true "reality" is that which is certain, stable, and eternally
unchanging (EN 53-54).

Dewey contends that this traditional stand on the contingency of the world is
misconstrued: "As against this common identiﬁcation of reality with what is sure, regular
and ﬁnished, experience in unsophisticated forms gives evidence of a different world and
points to a different metaphysics" (EN 47). In Dewey’s view, metaphysics should

recognize that the "incompleteness and precariousness is a trait that must be given footing

 

contrasted with the objects of "reﬂective inquiry": "The distinction is one between what
is experienced as the result of a minimum of incidental reﬂection and what is experienced
in consequence of continued and regulated inquiry" (EN 4). The reason it is important
to see Dewey as referring to the former rather than the latter in the quotation cited is that
the latter are predictable and controllable-it is reﬂective inquiry which transforms the
unpredictable and uncontrollable into that which is predictable and controllable.

139
of the same rank as the ﬁnished and ﬁxed" (EN 51). If philosophers set up a realm of

true "reality" which is superior to the precarious world we experience, philosophy tends

to become merely contemplative, but what is needed is practical reﬂection:
If knowing were habitually conceived of as active and operative, after the analogy
of experiment guided by hypothesis . . . it is not too much to say that the ﬁrst
effect would be to emancipate phiIOSOphy from all the epistemological puzzles
which now perplex it. For these all arise from a conception of the relation of
mind and world, subject and object, in knowing, which assumes that to know is
to seize upon what is already in existence (RIP 123) .7‘

In sum, it can be said that if the precarious and unstable is recognized as a genuine trait

of existence, intelligent reﬂection will be brought to bear on the difﬁculties of life.

Otherwise, knowing is limited to seizing upon antecedent existence.

b) Avoidance of Choice at the heart of the denial of the Real being Precarious

Since Dewey’s claim regarding the precariousness of existence is one of his central
claims, we would do well to try to say why traditional philosophy tended to deny
precariousness was a trait of true "reality. " This will involve us in a brief discussion of
another key concept in Dewey’s thought--choice.

In a rather arduous passage, Dewey connects choice with the denial of precariousness

as a trait of "reality":

 

7‘ We ﬁnd in this passage another tradition philosophical theme which Dewey
criticizes: namely, that the objects of knowledge for traditional philosophy are eternal,
unchanging truths which are thought to exist in the transcendent realm of true "reality":
"Degrees of knowledge and truth correspond with degrees of reality point by point. The
higher and more complete the Reality the truer and more important the knowledge that
refers to it" (RIP 108).

140

But choice and the reﬂective effort involved in it are themselves such contingent
events and so bound up with the precarious uncertainty of other events, that
philosophers have too readily assumed that metaphysics, and science of fact and
truth, are themselves wisdom, thinking thus to avoid the necessity of either
exercising or recognizing choice. The consequence is that conversion of
unavowed morals or wisdom into cosmology, and into a metaphysics of nature,
which was termed in the last chapter the philosophic fallacy. It supplies the
formula of the technique by which thinkers have relegated the uncertain and
unﬁnished to an invidious state of unreal being, while they have systematically
exalted the assured and complete to the rank of true Being (EN 52).77
I take Dewey to mean here that the denial of the precariousness of reality amounts to a
claim that natural events are independent of choice and endeavor. This denial, then,
allows the philosophers to avoid the burdensome responsibility involved with choice: "In
the classic philosophy, the ideal world is essentially a haven in which man ﬁnds rest from
the storms of life; it is an asylum in which he takes refuge from the troubles of existence
with the calm assurance that it alone is supremely real" (RIP 118). Although this
stratagem acknowledges the problematic situations which people face in life, it is not
instrumental in resolving these difﬁculties. Rather, philosophers have traditionally sought
to deal with the contingencies of the world by withdrawing to an ideal realm. The claim

that nature has inherent value is an example: The contingency experienced is a threat to

the individual’s experienced satisfaction in wilderness-—perhaps a favorite river is a

 

7’ The philosophic fallacy referred to is "the conversion of eventual functions into
antecedent existence" (EN 29). One example of this would be the claim that nature has
an inherent value. Here the philosophers take a conceptual ideal (the inherent value)
which is thought to answer some problem (serving as a justiﬁcation for the claim that
nature warrants moral consideration) and they transmute this conceptual ideal into an
antecedently existing reality: "Hence they transmute the imaginative perception of the
stably good object into a deﬁnition and description of true reality in contrast with lower
and specious existence, which, being precarious and incomplete, alone involves us in the
necessity of choice and active struggle" (EN 53).

proposed site for a hydroelectric dam. The traditionally-minded philosophers respond to
this problem by withdrawing to an ideal realm: that is, they claim the river has inherent
value apart from the contingencies which threaten it. The purpose of this assertion is to
remove the need for choice-in-action. Since in "reality" nature has inherent value, all
one needs to do is to remind those who threaten nature of this value. But this move is
no more than an attempt to ﬁnd "refuge from the troubles of existence" rather than to
confront those troubles through choice-in-action.

I mentioned above the burdensome responsibilities involved with choice in the face
of precariousness. Dewey thinks that traditionally minded philosophers have rejected the
demand for choice and instead created a dualism: ". . . ’reality’ becomes what we wish
existence to be, after we have analyzed its defects and decided upon what would remove
them . . . " (EN 54). Put another way, after it is acknowledged that our life is ﬁlled
with uncertainty and unstable goods, classic philosophers have searched in reﬂection for
goods which would be stable, and worthy of persistent and continued choice. However,
it is then that "they hesitate, and withdraw from the effort and struggle that choice
demands:--namely, from the effort to give it some such stability in observed existence as
it possesses in quality when thought of" (EN 53). In sum, they have tried to overcome
the instability through contemplation; they have reached, by means of thought alone, an
ideal world which is freed of unstable goods. But this approach makes no progress
towards removing the problems found in concrete life.

The effort and struggle Dewey refers to above is the effort required to reconstruct the
problematic situation in such a way as to lead to a uniﬁcation of the particulars of the

situation so that a harmony or equilibrium is reestablished between organism and

 

142

environment. This reconstruction may involve reconstructing the environment side, the
agent side, or both. If we consider a passage from Dewey’s 1900-1901 Lectures on
Ethics, we may understand why choice involves such effort and struggle:

The term ’choice’ is the name given to this uniﬁcation of the process of the self

in and through the process of the tension or conﬂict, the continual self—

identiﬁcation and self-deﬁnition of the self. It is the outcome of the process of

self—discovery or self-realization in some deﬁnite end or aim and the

corresponding attitude of action.78
Thus, the effort and struggle seem to be involved with this continual self-identiﬁcation
or self-realization; it is a struggle since one would never reach a ﬁnal resting place which
would be a true, ﬁxed ideal and solution once and for all.” The denial of the precarious
as an element of true reality may seem to be a solution which appears to secure the stable
and certain. However, this denial really only accomplishes the specious removal from
actual existence of "the very traits which generate philosophic reﬂection and give point
and bearing to its conclusion" (EN 53). We are left with a life in which we ﬁnd goods
to be uncertain, unstable, and precarious. If we follow the traditional method, we will
be able to escape the uncertainty in contemplation, but not in practical affairs. Those

philosophers who attempt to resolve conﬂicts over environmental issues by appeal to an

alleged inherent or aesthetic value of nature are guilty of just this charge. They attempt

 

7’ John Dewey, Lectures on Ethics, 1900—1901, ed. Donald Koch (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), 258. Hereafter cited in the text as LE.

7’ This particular passage concerning the self actually only concerns reconstruction
of the problematic situation on the subject side, and as such would refer to a distinctly
moral situation, and not to the reconstruction of a situation which would be characterized
as a factual problem. This distinction will be discussed more thoroughly below.
Nonetheless, I think the passage still expresses the effort which Dewey thinks is required
in the process of reconstruction of a problematic situation.

143

through reﬂection and contemplation to secure this value in nature. But these exercises
in reﬂection have little or no effect on action. Obviously, Dewey is interested in the
latter. So we need to turn to his approach for dealing with the precariousness of

existence.

3. Situations & Inquiry

Earlier, in the discussion concerning Dewey’s account of the senses being stimuli to
action, I mentioned the importance of realizing that the student was engaged in an activity
when her writing habit was disrupted. This realization amounts to understanding that the
student was involved in what Dewey refers to as a "situation. " We need to know, then,
exactly what Dewey means by a " situation, " and also what role inquiry plays in clarifying

indeterminate situations.

a) A Situation

To go directly at the matter, we can look at Dewey’s deﬁnition of a situation:
What is designated by the word "situation" is not a single object or event or set
of objects and events. For we never experience nor form judgments about objects
and events in isolation, but only in connection with a contextual whole. This
latter is what is called a "situation" (Logic 66).

If we again consider the student with the dull pencil, we can see that the judgment of the

lead being too dull did not occur in isolation; rather, it was made in the context of the

engagement in taking notes during a class. If the student was in another situation——say,

144

in making a sketch of some sort—-the pencil might not be dull, at least in a functional
sense, even though the physical shape of the lead is the same in both cases. The
situation, then, would include not just the singular object of analysis——the pencil--but the
entire activity of taking notes for a class which will later be used for study purposes.
Furthermore, if we consider other factors of this situation, we may see how they would
affect the judgment made. For example, if it is nearing the end of the lecture period, the
student may simply continue to write with the dull pencil, since sharpening it, or taking
time to secure another, would be more disruptive considering the class is almost over.
Or if it is only a short way into the lecture period when the disruption occurs, and the
student only has one other sharp pencil, she may try to go with the one she is using a bit
longer thinking that the second pencil will also dull before the end of lecture, and
therefore, a bit more usage is needed from the ﬁrst pencil. These are rather trivial
matters, but they do illustrate the relevance of considering the contextual whole--the
situation——rather than taking the matter in isolation.

In Experience and Nature, Dewey also uses the term "state of affairs" to refer to a
situation (EN 100—01). Speaking of a state of affairs Dewey says, its subject-matter is
"a diversiﬁed and more or less loosely interconnection of events, falling within
boundaries sufﬁciently deﬁnite to be capable of being approximately traced" (EN 101).
It is because we can so trace these boundaries that "every situation or ﬁeld of
consciousness is marked by initiation, direction or intent, and consequence or import"
(EN 101). In the particular passage from which these quotations are taken, Dewey is

attempting to distinguish natural ends from ends—in—view. What is helpful in these

145

passages with regards to clarifying Dewey’s notion of a situation is the remarks
concerning our ability to trace boundaries which mark off one situation or state of affairs
from another, and the dynamic nature of situations suggested by "initiation, direction or
intent, and consequence or import." That is, "a situation is a whole in virtue of its
immediately pervasive quality" (Logic 68).

A brief comment on what Dewey means by the notion of a "pervasive quality" may
help to make this more explicit. Here, "quality" does not mean something speciﬁc like
red, hard, or sweet (Logic 69). What he means by quality is better exempliﬁed by terms
like distressing, perplexing, or cheerful. These latter terms designate qualities which
"permeate and color all the objects and events that are involved in an experience, "
whereas a term like hard "designates a particular quality" peculiar to an object within a
total experience-say, for example, a rock (Logic 69) . We can consider Dewey’s
example of a painting which is said to have a certain quality to it; it may "have a Titian
or Rembrandt quality" (Logic 70). A painting, a movie, or a book may be said to have
an eerie quality about it. This pervasive eerie quality colors the more particular qualities
the painting, movie or book may have. In this sense "quality" is getting close to
something like "theme. " I would not go so far as to equate the two, since themes tend
to be pervasive over longer periods than a quality, but I think they have a quite similar
function: that is, just as a theme can organize otherwise disparate particulars, a situation’s
pervasive quality can give unity to the particular events or objects involved in that
situation.

To summarize our discussion of the features of a situation: It is possible to trace the

146

boundaries of a situation because each situation has its own pervasive quality. As such,
it has its beginning (initiation), a development (direction or intent), and an ending
(consequence or import). The situations we need to concern ourselves with at this point
are the situations in which the pervasive quality is an indeterminateness.

Before we get into discussion of indeterminateness, however, I want to make sure we
do not lose sight of the connection between this discussion of a situation and the prior
discussion of the life process as a rhythmic falling out of step and recovery of equilibrium
by the live creature. I think we can say that a situation could be one such occurrence of
a disequilibration and recovery of equilibrium. The beginning would be a state of
equilibrium--our student taking notes--and then a disruption occurs--the lead becomes too
dull. The student resolving the disruption by sharpening the pencil would be the
development of the situation, and the consequence would be the resumption of taking

notes.

b) The Indeterminate Situation

A situation in which the pervasive quality is indeterminate is one in which the person
in it does not know what to make of it. We can note, also, that the indeterminate is not
the same as the problematic:

The unsettled or indeterminate situation might have been called a problematic
situation. This name would have been, however, proleptic and anticipatory. The
indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected

to inquiry (Logic 107).

The indeterminate situation, then, appears to be logically prior to the problematic. What

147

Dewey seems to mean by indeterminate is a situation in which one ﬁnds uncertainty
regarding what needs to be done, but in which there is some sense or awareness that
something is the matter. There is a sense that a prior routine is no longer functioning
smoothly, but there is uncertainty about just what has gone wrong. The indeterminate
quality pervades the entire situation so that the particulars of the situation are without
deﬁnite sense. Speaking of indeterminate situations Dewey says: "There is nothing
intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the
necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they are
precognitive" (Logic 107) . In an indeterminate situation the person is at a loss for what

to do. The bafﬂement felt is what evokes inquiry.

c) Reﬂective Inquiry

As an initial deﬁnition of inquiry Dewey states:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation
into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to
convert the elements of the original situation into a uniﬁed whole (Logic 104-05).
Dewey discusses ﬁve stages of this transformation of the indeterminate situation into one
which is a uniﬁed whole: The ﬁrst is the existing indeterminate situation; second is the
institution of a problem; third is the determination of a problem-solution; fourth is
reasoning; and ﬁnally comes the operational character of facts-meanings (Logic 105-112).

Rather than devoting time to each of these stages, I want to focus on the early stages.

For it is in the early stages of the process in which the locating of the problem takes

 

148

place. And it is here that we will be able to begin to understand the relation of the moral
and the factual.

As already mentioned, reﬂective inquiry has a deﬁnite movement to it; it moves from
the indeﬁnite and confused towards unity and clear determination. In this process,
thinking must make use of conditions as they exist and reorganize them into a more
satisfactory state of affairs. Dewey gives an analogy which illustrates this point. He
compares thinking with the reﬁning of ore into useable tools. In both cases, we start
with a natural state of affairs, which we ﬁnd to be unsatisfactory for one reason or
another. In the case of reﬁning ore, use is made of "natural materials and energies, say
ﬁre and tools, to reﬁne, re—order, and shape other natural materials, say ore" (EN 67).
Similarly, Dewey claims that "thinking is a continuous process of temporal re—
organization within one and the same world of experienced things" (EN 67-68).
Thinking which moves in accordance with the pattern of the ﬁve stages mentioned above
is a logical process of inquiry. We will be able to see how this re-organization of the
existing conditions in accordance with a logical method can be brought about if we
examine Dewey’s notion of "ends—in—view. "

However, before directly discussing the logical method associated with the process
of inquiry, I want to brieﬂy address another issue which comes up at this point: namely,

the relation of the terms, "ends—in—view, ideals,’ and "stimuli."

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d) Ends-in-View, Ideals & Stimuli

The three concepts, ends—in—view, ideals, and stimuli, seem to refer to various aspects
of the same thing. Or perhaps it would be better to say they are terms for the same thing
viewed in different ways. I think I can establish this claim by consideration of several
passages in which Dewey discusses these terms. In his 1900-1901 Lectures on Ethics,
Dewey tells us, "the ideal must be the projection or anticipation of a uniﬁed experience
which contains in its unity what we have already presented to us in scattered and more
or less opposed forms" (L 59).80 In Experience and Nature, he says that "the terminal
outcome when anticipated . . . becomes an end—in—view, an aim, purpose, a prediction
usable as a plan in shaping the course of events" (101). In his article, "The Reﬂex Arc
Concept in Psychology," Dewey explains how he understands the relation of stimulus and
response: "The stimulus is that phase of the forming co-ordination which represents the
conditions which have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue . . . ".31 What I
want to note in each of these passages is the sense each gives of a plan or anticipation of
a uniﬁed situation. That is, in the passage on the ideal, we ﬁnd reference to a uniﬁed
experience; in the passage on ends—in—view, there is explicit mention of a plan useable for

shaping the course of events; and in the passage concerning stimulus, we ﬁnd mention

 

3° We can note how the ideal takes what is already present and uniﬁes it; this is what
was being said above regarding thought as beginning with existing conditions. Similarly,
in the passage concerning ends-in—view, there is reference being made to existing
conditions—-"shaping the course of events."

8‘ John Dewey, "The Reﬂex Arc Concept in Psychology" in John Dewey, The Early
Works, vol. 5 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), 109.

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of co—ordination which represents conditions that would bring successful issue. In each,
then, there is a common notion of what it would take to reestablish the harmony of the
situation, or transform the pervasive indeterminate quality into one which was
determinate.

I also said that each of these three concepts were dealing with the same thing from
different aspects. The notion of a stimulus seems to be dealing with it in a purely
psychological manner. While Dewey for the most part seems to use the terms ’ideal’ and
’end-in—view’ interchangeably, there is a passage in his 1900—1901 Lectures on Ethics, in
which he suggests one possible difference. ’Ideals’ seem to refer to that which is of
greater signiﬁcance to us; the more fundamental results in our life which give guidance
to our life as a whole. Choice of a career might be such an ideal if this is not understood
as a ﬁxed goal, but rather as a directive giving guidance to one’s life projects. ’Ends-in-
view’ seem to be narrower in scope than ideals: "We may conﬁne the term ’end’ or
’purpose’ or ’intention’ to the narrower, more localized sphere of results which we
anticipate or desire, and reserve the term ’ideal’ for the fundamental one" (LE 229-30).
Dewey goes on to say, however, that this use of the terms makes no difference in theory
or practice

if we simply bear in mind that it is a question of the increasing degree of
generalization as to the recognized place and value of any end or if we recognize
that the difference is not a ﬁxed one but that simply, under certain circumstances,
it is necessary to deﬁne our ends in terms of the self as a whole (LE 230).
I am not sure what signiﬁcance to place on Dewey using these three different terms. But
it does seem that what he may have had in mind was a reconstruction of the traditional

meanings of each of the terms: ends, ideals, and stimuli. In each case there is a dualism

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lurking behind the traditional meaning of the term, and Dewey did want to exorcise these
dualisms. My reason for spending time on this matter is that the following discussion
may make reference to these concepts, and I wanted to make it clear how I understand
the relation of these terms. With that issue out of the way, I want to turn to a discussion
of the early stages of the process of inquiry in order to see the logical method involved

in this process.

e) The Logical Method of Inquiry

When we are in an indeterminate situation and are at a loss for what to do, the ﬁrst
step needed is to "see that [the] situation requires inquiry" (Logic 107). This seems
obvious in some ways, but it is a crucial step. For it is here that the nature of the
problem is characterized, and this is signiﬁcant for furthering the inquiry: "The way in
which the problem is conceived decides what speciﬁc suggestions are entertained and
which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and
conceptual structures" (Logic 108).“2 Once it is realized that inquiry is needed, the
situation becomes problematic rather than merely indeterminate.

The second stage of inquiry involves formulation of hypotheses for solution of the

problem. Formulation of hypotheses consist of taking suggestions by the factual

 

‘2 Below in the section dealing with the difference Dewey recognizes between
scientiﬁc and moral inquiry, I try to show that it is at this stage when characterizing the
problem that the distinction between the factual and the moral is made; it is an
instrumental distinction which aids in dealing with the problem.

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conditions of the situation and forecasting possible solutions: " Observation of facts and
suggested meanings or ideas arise and develop in correspondence with each other" (Logic
109). In this process of transforming suggestions into ideas which represent the re-
organized situation, there is a transformation of the situation into one in which the person
knows what action to take next; the person is no longer at a loss for what to do. Thus,
we can see why Dewey construes knowledge as operative rather than contemplative: as
the result of the process of inquiry, knowledge is knowing what action is required to
reestablish the equilibrium that has been disrupted.

It should also be noted that in this process there is a tension set up between two
situations: the present problematic situation and the future resolved situation. However,
the exact content of the anticipated situation is not ﬁxed; it will evolve as the person ﬁlls
in the intermediary steps of bridging the gap between these two situations:

It [the ideal] is therefore ﬂexible. It has a function in the interaction and is
continually in process of modiﬁcation because of the interaction into which it
enters. That interaction, being simply the suggestion of the intermediary steps
and the interaction of those into our present attitude, continually changes the
intellectual content or the deﬁnition of the ideal (LE 229).

At this point it may be best to go through an example which would illustrate this
process, rather than to continue on with abstract discussion. We can again consider the
student who is taking notes. This student is engaged in an activity where her habit of
writing is operating smoothly, when she becomes aware of something being wrong; her
habit is no longer functioning properly, but she is not sure why. Here the student is in

an indeterminate situation; she is aware of something gone wrong, but unclear about what

the problem is. Then there is awareness of the need for inquiry, and at this point the

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situation becomes problematic. The student tries to locate the stimulus by observing the
facts of the situation. Taking suggestions from these facts, she is able to form the idea
of a situation where her writing habit again operates smoothly. This anticipated situation
sets up a tension between the current disrupted situation and the projected situation. This
projection serves as the ideal or end—in—view, which then brings about an imaginative
rehearsal of the intermediary steps required for the transformation. She may imagine
herself reaching into her book bag for her pencil sharpener, and sharpening the pencil.
But in the process of the imaginative rehearsal, she may also recall that her pencil
sharpener is not a very effective sharpener; it often breaks the lead, or leaves it with a
square end rather than a sharp point. Thus, this rehearsal inﬂuences the content of her
ideal, and she changes it slightly. She now imagines reaching into the pocket of her book
bag and taking a sharp pencil out and resuming her note taking. Thus, we can see how
the process of inquiry has led the student to knowledge of what action is needed to
reestablish the smooth operation of her habit—-how to reestablish the equilibrium with her
environment.

Understanding the logical method with which the process is carried out will be helpful
in getting clear on Dewey’s claim that moral inquiry has the same logical method.
Although we have pretty well said what this logical method is, and have given illustration
of it in the above example, explanation of one further element may prove helpful:
namely, Dewey’s conception of causality. Understanding his view of causality may help

in getting clear on just what takes place in imaginative rehearsal.

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ﬂ Dewey ’s Conception of Causality

At the heart of Dewey’s view of causality is his claim that "every existence is an
event" (EN 71). The reason this is important is that it gives a picture of reality as
dynamic rather than merely a collection of static entities. Dewey claims that every end
can be considered both as static and as dynamic. That is to say, an end as such is static;
it is the end or close of some event. However, Dewey also claims that "the thing which
is a close of one history is always the beginning of another, and in this capacity the thing
in question is transitive or dynamic " (EN 100). The point he seems to be making is that
while an event may come to a close, that is not the end in any but a relative sense. For
example, after the third out has been made in the ninth inning of a baseball game, the
game has ended (given, of course, the score is not tied). But while that third out marks
the end of the game, it also marks the beginning of the trip home for the fans. Thus,
Dewey says, "there is a history which is a succession of histories, and in which any event
is at once both beginning of one course and close of another; is both transitive and static"
(EN 100).

This notion of existence being a sequence of events which are both beginnings and
endings is the key to Dewey’s deﬁnition of causality: "causality is another name for the
sequential order itself" (EN 100). In other words, causality just is the sequential order
of the events which are history. Note how different this notion of causation is from any
of Aristotle’s four causes, or the mechanistic view of causation which dominated the

modern period. In the following passage we get a suggestion of what brought Dewey to

155
his unique view:
In the degree, however, in which the mind is weaned from partisan and ego-
centric interest, acknowledgement of nature as a scene of incessant beginnings and
endings, presents itself as the source of philosophic enlightenment. It enables
thought to apprehend causal mechanisms and temporal ﬁnalities as phases of the
same natural processes, instead of as competitors where the gain of one is the loss
of the other. Mechanism is the order involved in an historic occurrence, capable
of deﬁnition in terms of the order which various histories sustain to each other.
Thus it is the instrumentality of control of any particular termination since a
sequential order involves the last term (EN 98).
Hence, Dewey’s understanding of causality is instrumental; it allows us to understand
causality in such a way as to use the naturally occurring sequential order to control
situations.

To illustrate how this view of causality would be instrumental in controlling the
outcome of events, we can consider the history of an internal combustion engine as an
example of an event with a beginning and end. The beginning is the manufacturing of
the engine, and for the sake of the example, the end is that point when the rod and main
bearings become too worn for the engine to run properly. We naturally want this history
to be as long as possible; we might say that was our end—in-view. However, as the
engine is used, there is normal wear of the bearings. To achieve our end-in-view, we
need to ﬁnd some way to slow the rate of wear. By examining the cause—-the sequential
order of the occurrence of normal hearing wear——we ﬁnd that the bearings are lubricated
by the same oil which lubricates the cylinder walls. And this oil becomes contaminated
with the blow—by from the fuel combustion. So contaminated, the oil, in lubricating the

bearings, brings with it tiny particles which speed the wear of the bearings.

Understanding this sequential order of the bearing wear can help us in controlling the

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history of the engine so as to prolong its life: if we could manipulate that order in some
way so as to slow the rate of bearing wear, we would secure our end-in—view. One idea
suggested by the observed facts of the situation, would be preventing the particles
contaminating the oil from reaching the bearings; we could ﬁlter the oil before it goes
to the bearings, thus slowing the rate of bearing wear. And so we can see with this
example how Dewey’s view of causality as sequential order would be instrumental in
achieving our end-in-view: It is instrumental at that stage of inquiry when the person is
looking at the facts of the situation for suggestions of ideas which would remove the
tension between the existing situation of the engine’s bearings wearing rapidly, and the
anticipated situation of a slower rate of wear. In other words, it is instrumental in
helping us to imaginatively rehearse an alternative sequential order, one which is more
satisfying.

Before getting into the discussion of moral inquiry and its relation to factual inquiry,
I would like to brieﬂy say something regarding Dewey’s conception of the task of
philosophy. Having his notion of the task of philosophy in mind will help in
understanding the relation between factual inquiry and moral inquiry, since in both,

philosophy has the same general task.

g) Criticism as the Task of Philosophy

Dewey recognizes that there is a difference between immediate goods and goods of

reﬂection (EN 402). The former are objects in experience which we ﬁnd to be good.

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These are often different from the objects we consider good after critical reﬂection. As
a simple example, we may consider the drinking of a bottle of gin to be an immediate
good; it may bring about an immediate feeling we enjoy. However, after critically
reﬂecting on this immediate good, we may reevaluate it. Consideration of the after
affects of drinking, the consequences drinking has on job performance and so forth, may
lead us to conclude that despite the immediate feeling of enjoyment, drinking is not worth
it.
Dewey makes a similar distinction between beliefs de facto and beliefs de jure (EN
402). I may believe that someone stole my car keys when I ﬁrst discover them missing;
however, after critically reﬂecting upon the circumstances involved, I may discover a
hole in my pocket and come to a more warrantable belief that I lost the keys.
In both of the above cases we ﬁnd examples of what Dewey understands as the task
of philosophy--criticism:
The remarks are preparatory to presenting a conception of philosophy; namely,
that philosophy is inherently criticism . . . . First and immature experience is
content simply to enjoy. But a brief course in experience enforces reﬂection; it
requires but brief time to teach that some things sweet in the having are bitter in
after-taste and in what they lead to (EN 398).

The point of philosophy as criticism is to bring intelligence to bear on action. Dewey

was espousing this view as early as 1891:
Imagine a scene of ceaseless movements; needs, relations, institutions ever
moving on. In the midst of this scene appears an intelligence who identiﬁes
himself with the wonderful spectacle of action. He ﬁnds that its law is his law,
because he is only as a member sharing in its needs, constituted by its relations
and formed by its institutions. This intelligence would lmow this scene that he
may know himself. He puts forth his grasp, his Begrtﬁ [conception], and arrests

the movement. Taking the movement at a certain point and holding it there,
intelligence cuts a cross-section through it to see what it is like. It has now

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mastered the situation, the case "is" thus and so. Then intelligence removes its
brake, its abstracting hold, and the scene moves on. That to which intelligence
sees it moving is the "ought to be." The "ought to be" is the larger and fuller
activity into which it is the destiny and glory of the present fact to pass.

This, then, is the relation of moral theory and practice. Theory is the cross—
section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be;
practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action."3

This chapter has so far largely been an exposition on Dewey’s views of the generic
traits of existence which necessitate the critical reﬂection which is theory, and it has
discussed the logical method or process of inquiry which carries out this critical
reﬂection. The remaining task is to make explicit the continuity between factual and
moral inquiry as well as the distinction Dewey does recognize between them.

Understanding this continuity will better allow us to see just how Dewey thinks

intelligence can be brought to bear on situations which are morally problematic.

4. The Continuity of Moral and Factual Inquiry

So far, we have been discussing factual inquiry. Dewey claims that moral inquiry is
continuous with factual inquiry——continual in the sense of having the same logical method.
Examination of the following passage will help us see what is behind Dewey’s claim:

In becoming discriminately aware of the causal conditions of the object liked and
preferred, we become aware of its eventual operations. If in the case of esthetic
and moral goods, the causal conditions which reﬂection reveals as determinants
of the good object are found to lie within organic constitution in greater degree
than is the case with objects of [factual] belief, this ﬁnding is of enormous
importance for the technique of critical judgment. But it does not modify the

 

‘3 John Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice, " in John Dewey, The Early Works vol.
3 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), 95.

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logic which obtains in knowledge of the relationship of values and valuations to
each other . . . . All criticism worthy of the title is but another name for that
revealing discovery of conditions and consequences which enables liking, bias,
interest to express themselves in responsible and informed ways instead of
ignorantly and fatalistically (EN 430).
We have in this passage a statement suggesting there may be a difference between the
formation of the objects of factual beliefs and the formation of the objects of moral and
aesthetic value: that is, the moral and aesthetic may lie more within organic constitution
than the factual.“ However, Dewey explicitly states that despite this difference, the
logic is unaffected; there is the same logical method for attaining knowledge in the
factual, the moral and the aesthetic.
In the following passage, Dewey comments on the traditional view regarding the
relation of the factual, the moral, and the aesthetic:
Between these two realms, one of intellectual objects without value [the factual]
and the other of value-objects without intellect [the aesthetic], there is an
equivocal mid-country in which moral objects are placed, with rival claimants
striving to annex them either to the region of purely immediate goods . . . or to
that of purely rational objects. Hence the primary function of philosophy at
present is to make clear that there is no such difference as this division assumes
between science, morals, and esthetic appreciation (EN 406-07).
We have here an explicit statement by Dewey denying the division of these three areas.
What we need to do now is to point out exactly why he makes this claim.

Dewey’s account of the generic aspects of the biological process--his point of

orientation on his ground map--led him to this position. The rhythmic falling out of step

 

3‘ I try to articulate this difference more fully below in the discussion concerning the
relation of character as a logical condition in moral judgments with Dewey’s notion of
causality as sequential order of events. There we can better see how the object of moral
value is more within organic constitution, since one’s character becomes part of the
content of the object judged.

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and recovery of the live creature with its environment is what gives rise to the need for
inquiry. We have seen examples of this with regards to factual inquiry. In
Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey says:

A moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently

to overt action. The practical meaning of the situation--that is to say the action

needed to satisfy it-—is not self—evident. It has to be searched for. There are

conﬂicting desires and alternative apparent goods. What is needed is to ﬁnd the

right course of action, the right good (RIP 163-64).
In this passage we ﬁnd the same basic outline of a process of inquiry as we have seen in
a factual inquiry. We have seen--as in the example of the student taking notes-~how
disruptions in the equilibrium require a process of inquiry for their resolution. What we
need to realize is that in the interaction of agent and environment there arise not only
disruptions which call for inquiry of a factual nature, but also disruptions which require
moral inquiry. Both sorts of disruptions call for intelligent inquiry, and that inquiry will
have the same logical method. In both cases there will be the initial indeterminate
situation which will evoke inquiry, and in both, reﬂection will make use of conditions
as they exist--the sequential order of events. The person will look to these factual
conditions of the situation for suggestions of ideas in an attempt to project a situation in
which these conditions are reorganized in a more satisfying manner.

At this point one may think that Dewey has simply done away with the moral, and

has reduced all inquiry to factual inquiry. To a certain extent, this is correct. Dewey
does claim we need to look to the factual conditions of the situation--whether a purely

factual (scientiﬁc) or a moral situation--in order to be able to project an ideal. Moreover,

Dewey does talk about moral inquiry in the same terms as factual inquiry: that is, he

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speaks of the need for the proposing and testing of hypotheses in both. But it would be
incorrect to understand Dewey as attempting to reduce moral inquiry to a simple matter
of factual inquiry. Rather he wants to extend the successful method which was developed
for scientiﬁc inquiry to moral inquiry: "The need in morals is for speciﬁc methods of
inquiry and of contrivance: Methods of inquiry to locate difﬁculties and evils; methods
of contrivance to form plans to be used as working hypotheses in dealing with them"
(RIP 170). While Dewey thinks the logic of scientiﬁc inquiry and that of moral inquiry
is the same, he does recognize a difference between the scientiﬁc and the moral. Thus,
we now need to examine how Dewey distinguishes the moral from the scientiﬁc. But it
should be noted at the outset that this distinction seems to be a conceptual distinction
made for instrumental purposes in overcoming the problematic situation. It is during the
early stages of inquiry——when we characterize the nature of the problem-—that the
distinction between the moral and the scientiﬁc comes into play. With this in mind, I
want to turn to a discussion of the difference Dewey recognizes between moral judgments

and scientiﬁc judgments.

5. Repudiation of the Alleged Gulf Between Scientiﬁc Judgments & Moral
Judgments
In the article, "Logical Conditions of a Scientiﬁc Treatment of Morality," Dewey
discusses the continuity of scientiﬁc and moral inquiry. The overall claim in the article
is that we can apply the scientiﬁc method to moral judgments. However, Dewey realizes

that there are standing objections to this claim with which he must deal. These objections

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concern the alleged gulf between the scientiﬁc and the moral. Since we have already
gone over the continuity of the moral and the factual in the preceding section, there is no
need for repeating Dewey’s position. He covers some of the same ground, albeit in a
slightly different manner. Basically he argues that the objections made are based on the
following antinomy: "Scientiﬁc statements refer to generic conditions and relations, which
are therefore capable of complete and objective statement; ethical judgments refer to an
individual act which by its very nature transcends objective statement".” The ﬁrst part
of this article is devoted to illustrating that scientiﬁc judgments are, just as moral

judgments, concerned with the particular and with action.

a) Moral/Scientiﬁc Judgment Distinction as Instrumental

If scientiﬁc and moral judgments have the same logical method, why do we bother
with the distinction? As mentioned above, it is for instrumental purposes. Dewey
remarks that "the existence of a large and self-contained body of universal propositions,
is proof that as to some individual experiences we have already worked out methods of
regulating our reﬂective transactions with them, while for another phase of experience
this work remains to be done; i. e. , is the problem of current ethical science" (LC 10).
What he seems to be saying here is that we have on hand worked out means for dealing

with problems of large portions of experience-—the scientiﬁc or factual. However, we

 

“5 John Dewey, "Logical Conditions of a Scientiﬁc Treatment of Morality, " in John
Dewey, The Middle Works, vol. 3 (Carbondale: Southern University Press, 1977), 7.
Hereafter cited as LC in the text.

163

lack comparable means for dealing with problems which arise in another area of
experience--that which we refer to as the moral.

The distinction between the scientiﬁc and the moral gives us a way of characterizing
the general sort of problem we are facing. When we are in an indeterminate situation and
attempting to characterize the problem, one of the things we do is to ask whether it is a
factual problem or a moral problem. This aids us in determining how the problem is to
be dealt with. Suppose you receive a call from the ﬁiend who loaned you a sum of
money and he is asking about the repayment; it is past the time by which you had agreed
on having it repaid. Further, you think that you have already sent the payment. At ﬁrst
the situation is going to be indeterminate, and you will be uncertain on how to respond.
One requirement in characterizing the problem is to ascertain whether this is a moral
problem or a factual one. You need to know whether you actually sent the check, and
if so, whether it was delayed in the mail, or if it was not delayed, whether your friend
is lying about not receiving it. Just how the problem is to be resolved depends on how
the problem is to be characterized--whether it is a factual or moral problem. How the
problem is characterized is not arbitrary. Rather, it depends on certain facts of the case.
That is to say, if the check is lost or delayed in the mail, it would be a factual problem,
whereas if either your friend is lying or you have neglected to send the check, the
situation is a moral one. In the former case, we have the end-in-view set for us: we
need to secure a means for getting the check to our friend. In the latter case, however,
we have a moral choice facing us: either we need to deal with our ﬁiend’s lying, or with

our own attempt at deception. We can see here that quite different solutions will be

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required if it turns out to be a factual rather than a moral situation.

The point of the above example is to show the instrumental character of the distinction
between a moral problem and a factual problem. It is instrumental because once we are
able to characterize it as one or the other, we are clearer on the sort of end-in-view that

would serve to resolve it.

b) Character as Practical vs. Logical Condition

Dewey claims that with any judgment made there is some initial motivation to
undertake the judgment. In this motivation there is expression of character."5 However,
whose character it is does not matter for the judgment to be made; it could be anyone’s
character. For example, in the simple case of testing the acidity level of a sample of
water, it would not matter who the particular individual was that judged the color of the
litmus paper. In such a case, character is expressed only to the extent that a judgment
was made. Once the individual determines to judge truly--to be earnest in applying the
appropriate methods to the case at hand--character drops out. This is just to say that
character, in such a judgment, is a practical condition. Someone’s character has to be
present for there to be a judgment. But character does not become part of the logical
conditions; it is not a part of the content to be judged:

It [character] is part of the practical conditions of making a judgment; but is no

 

'6 Character for Dewey seems to be the collective of habits which an individual
responds with in various situations: "The term "character" denotes this complex
continuum of interactions [of habits] in its ofﬁce of inﬂuencing ﬁnal judgment" (LC 21).

165

part of the logical conditions, and hence is not called upon to enter into a content-
-a conscious objectiﬁcation in the judgment. To regard it as practical instead of
a logical condition means that while it is necessary to any judgment, the one act
of judgment in question requires it no more than any other (LC 21).
I think we can relate what Dewey says here with his views on causality to see how this
difference in the role of character works.

Recall that for Dewey causality is the sequential order of events. In the case of the
chemist who judges the acidity level of the water sample, we can see that her character
is involved in the sequential order: that is, her judgment regarding the litmus test was one
of the events. Hence, her character is there as a practical condition. Suppose the chemist
determines the sample to have a rather high acidity level. And suppose further that the
person who requested the test, asks whether the water would be suitable to be used in an
aquarium for a certain kind of ﬁsh. Now if the chemist does not actually know what ph
level would be appropriate, but assures the person that this water would be suitable, then
the chenrist’s character enters the sequential order as a logical as well as practical
condition. That is to say, her character enters the sequential order in such a manner that
it inﬂuences the outcome of events; her character enters in such a way that it manipulates
the following sequence of events. The outcome of the judgment constitutes a
determination of the chenrist’s character. In other words, the Chemist’s character
becomes part of the object to be judged. The object judged is not merely the suitability
of the water; rather, it includes the Chemist’s character. Since the chemist does not
actually know what the appropriate ph level should be, but gives advice anyway, she is

determining her character to be the sort that offers unwarranted advice. That is why we

would tend to say the chemist would be responsible should the person use the water, and

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as a result the ﬁsh die from the high acidity level.“7 The point here is that we can use
Dewey’s notion of causality as sequential order to give meaning to the difference between
character as a practical and as a logical condition.

A further connection can also be noted here: namely, that between Dewey’s
conception of experience as a close connection of doing and undergoing with character
being a logical condition of a moral judgment. If we consider the Chemist’s advice as a
doing, then we can say that as a result of this doing, her character undergoes the
consequences of becoming the kind of character who gives unwarranted advice. Thus,
we can see that there is connection between Dewey’s ground—map and his views on

morality .

c) Conclusion: Need for Development of Instrumentalities in Ethics

In his "Logical Conditions of a Scientiﬁc Treatment of Morality, " Dewey asserts that
scientists have a body of formulae which are instrumental in dealing with certain sorts of
problems which we encounter. Thus, when Jones spills battery acid on himself, he can
neutralize it by applying baking soda, since science tells him that an alkali will neutralize

acid. But we do not as yet have adequate instrumentalities for dealing with moral

 

“7 This example may seem to give the impression that this is a moral problem due
to a more or less arbitrary judgment on the Chemist’s part because she lacks the necessary
factual knowledge. It is a scientiﬁc or factual matter as to what ph level really is
appropriate for the ﬁsh. The point which makes this case a moral matter is that the
chemist made a judgment to give advice when she was not in a position to adequately do
so. And it is this judgment which determines her character as one who gives unwarranted
advice.

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problems. This theme appears in other of Dewey’s works as well: "Here, then, lies the
reconstructive work to be done by philosophy. It must undertake to do for the
development of inquiry into human affairs and hence into morals what the philosophers
of the last few centuries did for promotion of scientiﬁc inquiry in physical and
physiological conditions and aspects of human life " (RIP xxiii). This may seem as
though Dewey is suggesting that we need to come up with some algorithms for decision
making in ethical matters. However, this is not his intention. Even if we were to
develop instrumentalities for regulating our reﬂective transactions in the ethical area, their
availability would not entail that we would be able to simply come up with a technique
or procedure for decision making. The reason it is not possible to have some such
technique is because it is not possible to eliminate choice. We cannot say in any a priori
way what the ideal is for a given problem; the ideal has to be worked out, and this
involves choice. This was the mistake made in traditional philosophies which tried to
formulate ﬁxed ideals. For Dewey, however, ideals are, to begin with, limiting
concepts, and their content is worked out within these limits in interaction which takes
place during the process of inquiry (LE 229). The point is that when Dewey speaks of
the need for developing instrumentalities in morality, he does not mean some sort of set
decision procedure.

So what does Dewey mean by instrumentalities? If we look to what he says about the
instrumentalities of science, we may get some idea. He tells us that the ultimate
categories of all physical science, conceptions like units of space, time, mass, energy,

"deﬁne to us the limiting conditions under which judgments of this type do their work"

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(LC 24). These concepts help control the judgment; they do not necessitate a particular
judgment, but they regulate it.

When we look to the ethical realm for such instrumentalities, we ﬁnd them lacking:
Ethical discussion is full of such terms: the natural and the spiritual, the sensuous
and the ideal, the standard and the right, obligation and duty, freedom and
responsibility, are samples. The discussion and use of these terms suffer,
however, from a fundamental difﬁculty. The terms are generally taken as
somehow given ready—made and hence as independent and isolated things (LC 24).

So while we may seem to have comparable concepts in ethics as in science, the ethical
concepts do not function as limiting concepts, since they are isolated, thought of as ready—
made. An example would be the inherent value of nature propounded by some
environmentalists. This value is taken as something ready-made waiting to be discovered
by some form of intuition. As such it lacks practical effect on action, since it is an ideal
for contemplation only.

Dewey attempted to give reconstructions for some of our moral concepts; we have
seen how he argued for a new understanding of what an ideal is. In various sections of
his 1900—1901 Lectures on Ethics, he attempts to reconstruct other ethical concepts as
well: the good, the standard, obligation, responsibility, freedom, self. And his
reconstruction of these terms all seem to be focused, in one way or another, upon his
understanding of the generic traits of existence and their speciﬁc exempliﬁcation in the
human life process. Moral terms reﬂect the phases of inquiry called for by the rhythmic
life process that results from the precariousness of existence. The various moral terms

reﬂect the various phases of that process that call for reconstruction of character. We can

say, then, that Dewey must have kept in hand a copy of his ground—map as he ventured

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out into the uncharted (or wrongly charted) waters of morality.
Dewey makes an observation similar to that made by the Frankfurt school88 regarding
the one-sided development of human rationality:

. . we who have a powerful and perfected instrument in our hands, one which
is determining the quality of social changes, must ask ourselves what changes we
want to see achieved and what we want to see averted. We must, in short, plan
its social effects with the same care with which in the past we have planned its
physical operation and consequences. Till now we have employed science absent—
mindedly as far as its effects upon human beings are concerned. The present
situation with its extraordinary control of natural energies and its totally unplanned
and haphazard social economy is a dire demonstration of the folly of continuing
this course.“9

Dewey recognizes it is no longer possible to return to the days before we had science;
this is simple nostalgia that overlooks the hardships which science has eliminated.
Nonetheless, he does claim that science needs to be tempered by reconciling the attitudes
of practical science and a contemplative aesthetic appreciation of the world:
Without the former [practical science], man will be the sport and victim of natural
forces which he cannot use or control. Without the latter [aesthetic appreciation],
mankind might become a race of economic monsters, restlessly driving hard
bargains with nature and with one another, bored with leisure or capable of
putting it to use only in ostentatious display and extravagant dissipation (RIP 127).
Dewey not only believed that this reconciliation was possible, but once it happened, he
claimed, "Making a living economically speaking, will be at one with making a life that

is worth living" (RIP 211). The question, of course, is how to accomplish this

reconciliation. While Dewey thought such a goal was possible, he was also aware of the

 

"8 See the discussion of Marcuse in chapter three (p. 108).

‘9 John Dewey, "Science and Society," in Philosophy and Civilization (New York:
Minton, Balch & Co., 1931), 323.

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work needed to realize it. That work involves developing a fully mature science; a
science which is "fully impregnated with the consciousness of human value" (RIP 173).

We have seen in this chapter that Dewey believed that moral inquiry is continuous
with scientiﬁc inquiry. This continuity is at the heart of Dewey’s program for
reconciling the attitudes of practical science and contemplative aesthetic appreciation.
Examination of Dewey’s understanding of the means/ends continuum and the signiﬁcance
this has for moral inquiry will move us further in the direction which Dewey saw as
making this reconciliation possible. The following section, then, is devoted to examining

Dewey’s theory of valuation. Discussion of his aesthetic theory will come in chapter six.

C. Dewey’s Theory of Valuation

A key aspect of Dewey’s moral thought is his claim of continuity between scientiﬁc
and moral inquiry. In the last section we saw how both have the same logical structure,
while the role of character is signiﬁcantly different in the judgments pertaining to each.
This continuity allows, according to Dewey, for intelligence to be brought to bear on
morally problematic situations.

We must also keep in mind the primacy of the situation in Dewey’s thought. For it
is the pervasive quality of the situation--in particular, the pervasive quality of
indeterminateness—-that evokes inquiry. And it is within the problematic situation that the
distinction between the moral and the scientiﬁc is ﬁrst made. In addition, values

originate and have their meaning only within a situation. For Dewey there are no values

17 1

in general, no ends having value apart from valuation of the means by which they are
reached, and this is why he refers to his as a theory of valuation rather than a theory of
values:

Moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done. The fact that

something has to be done proves that there are deﬁciencies, evils in the existent

situation. . . . Consequently the good of the situation has to be discovered,

projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectiﬁed.

It cannot be intelligently injected into the situation from without (RIP 169) .9"
Goods that are good in general——that is, do not derive their worth from satisfying some
experienced lack or need-~are goods in contemplation only. And as such, these goods
will have no bearing on practice. Contemplation of the good or goods in general creates
a gap between theory and practice. If we want intelligence to guide action, we must
avoid creating such a gap.91

Our task now is to examine just how Dewey thinks the process of valuation works.

In the last section we saw how the process of inquiry must be placed within the context

of the morally problematic situation, if we are to understand Dewey’s rejection of

traditional theories that take for granted the divorce between means and ends.

 

9° For a detailed discussion of this point see Dewey’s, Theory of Valuation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1939), especially chapter 5. Also relevant is his "The
Construction of the Good, " which is chapter 10 in The Quest for Certainty (New York:
Capricorn Books, 1929).

9‘ Dewey discusses this point at length in his 1900-1901 Lectures on Ethics. See
especially pages 189-98.

172

l. The Role of Desires in The Problematic Situation

Because there are no goods in general, according to Dewey, but only a good for a
particular situation, desires have a relevant place in his theory of valuation. We need to
look at what this role is. When we begin to consider the disequilibrium and restoration
of equilibrium which take place in the resolution of problematic situations, we ﬁnd
exhibited need and satisfaction. Dewey ﬁnds relevance of these ideas with regard to
ethical theory. To see the relevance we must remember that for Dewey there are no
values in general, no supreme or absolute good. Previously this point was stated in terms
of Dewey having a theory of valuation not a theory of value. The process of satisfying
the experienced need is a process of valuation. Moreover, this process of valuation
involves desire:
Because valuations in the sense of prizing and caring for occur only when it is
necessary to bring something into existence which is lacking, or to conserve in
existence something which is menaced by outside conditions, valuation involves
desiring.92

In other words, we will desire that which satisﬁes the experienced lack or need.

Dewey makes another point regarding valuation: a valuation must involve a
productive effort on the part of the agent making the valuation. This effort distinguishes
desiring from mere wishing. In wishing there is no effort put forth to secure the object
wished for:

There is something lacking, and it would be gratifying if it were present, but there

 

’2 John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1939), 15. Hereafter cited as Valuation in text.

173

is either no energy expended to bring what is absent into existence or else, under
the given conditions, no expenditure of effort would bring it into existence--as
when the baby is said to cry for the moon . . . (Valuation 15).
For Dewey, then, desire just is the effort expended to bring about that which would fulﬁll
the need.
Further, without a lack, no desires can arise:
When we inquire into the actual emergence of desire and its object and the value-
property ascribed to the latter . . . it is plain as anything can be that desires arise
only when "there is something the matter," when there is some "trouble" in an
existing situation. When analyzed, this "something the matter" is found to spring
from the fact that there is something lacking, wanting, in the existing situation as
it stands, an absence which produces conﬂict in the elements that do exist. When
things are going completely smoothly, desires do not arise, and there is no
occasion to project ends—in-view, for "going smoothly" signiﬁes that there is no
need for effort and struggle. It sufﬁces to let things take their "natural" course.
There is no occasion to investigate what it would be better to have happen in the
future, and hence no projection of an end-object (Valuation 33).
We can note again the relation between Dewey’s ethical thought, his views on the generic
traits of existence, and his account of the rhythmic process of the live creature striving
to reestablish equilibrium after suffering a disruption of harmony. In this process we
encounter problematic situations which call for inquiry, desire, and valuation.
Furthermore, we can now begin to understand how the claim that viewing valuation in
terms of desiring allows us to apply intelligence to moral issues. The desired object is
a projection, forecast, predicted good or end—in-view which is believed to satisfy the
experienced lack. We make such projections through the use of intelligence. This is the
rational aspect of desiring: there will be a certain reasonableness about what is desired,

about what is projected as the goal of actual effort. The reasonableness is assured due

to the fact that the end—in—view can be objectively tested. We can empirically determine

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whether the end—in—view, when secured, actually satisﬁes the need:
A hypothetical possible solution, as an end—in—view, is used as a methodological
means to direct further observations and experiments. Either it performs the
function of resolution of a problem for the sake of which it is adopted and tried
or it does not. . . . Ends-in-view are appraised or valued as good or bad on the
ground of their serviceability in the direction of behavior dealing with states of
affairs found to be objectionable because of some lack or conﬂict in them. They
are appraised as ﬁt or unﬁt, proper or improper, right or wrong, on the ground
of their requiredness in accomplishing this end (Valuation 47).

We have, then, an empirical check to ensure the reasonableness of our projection of ends—

in-view, and this prevents them from becoming mere ﬂights of fancy.

At this point one may still be wondering about the difference between a problematic
situation concerning repair of one’s car and a problematic situation concerning whether
or not one ought to tell a lie; that is to say, the difference between a factually and a
morally problematic situation. After all, it seems from what has been said so far that
Dewey’s theory of valuation may well apply to the former but perhaps not to the latter.
Yet recall Dewey’s claim regarding the continuity between scientiﬁc and moral inquiry.
We have seen how the two aspects of inquiry share a common logic as different phases
in our response to a problematic situation. All inquiry begins with the problematic
situation. An end—in—view is projected as a solution to the experienced lack. We locate
the problem as a factual problem (means to an end) or a moral problem (involving the
determination of character). If the latter, we can project possible alternative selves into
the future, and test them out as means to the end of resolving the problematic situation.
Finally, a test can be made to determine the adequacy of a proposed end—in-view. The

hesitancy here is due to residual feelings that there really are things with inherent value,

or that there really is some absolute good. But if values are to have bearing on practice,

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they cannot exist in some ideal realm, or be values in contemplation only. They must
have their value in the resolution of problematic situations, and have their origin in the
existing conditions of the situation. To better understand how such values come to be,
we need to examine just what goes on in projecting an end-in—view. When we examine
what Dewey has to say concerning this issue, we will ﬁnd ourselves discussing the

means/ends continuum.

2. The Means/Ends Continuum

For Dewey an end is the means needed to achieve it. In other words, the means are
constituents of the end. Traditionally, however, means and ends were considered distinct.
Thus, many may ﬁnd Dewey’s claim here rather peculiar. Dewey does recognize cases
in which the two are separate; however, these cases lack intelligent projection of ends-in—
view:

Instead of there being anything strange or paradoxical in the existence of situations
in which means are constituents of the very end—objects they have helped to bring
into existence, such situations occur whenever behavior succeeds in intelligent
projection of ends-in—view that direct activity to resolution of the antecedent
trouble. . . . Means that do not become constituent elements of the very ends or
consequences they produce form what are called "necessary evils," their
"necessity" being relative to the existing state of knowledge and art. They are
comparable to scaffolding that had to be later torn down, but which were
necessary in erection of buildings until elevators were introduced. The latter
remained for use in the building erected and were employed as means of
transporting materials that in turn became an integral part of the building
(Valuation 49—50).

We ﬁnd here a contrast of situations in which the resolution is injected into the situation

from external conditions (such would be the case where an absolute good is called upon

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to settle an issue in dispute) and those situations which take existing conditions and
reorganize them into a more satisfactory state. In situations of the latter sort, we ﬁnd no
end-in—itself for which we must endure whatever means necessary to achieve it. This
view again goes back to Dewey’s conception of causality as the sequential order of
events. We saw how this idea worked earlier in the example of ﬁltering the oil in an
engine to achieve longer bearing life. The means for achieving this end—in-view
constitute the end, since the means just are the existing conditions which were
reorganized in order to bring about the end-in-view. The means become an integral part
of the end rather than something external that could be done away with once the end was
achieved.

The point to the foregoing discussion was to emphasize the fact that in intelligent
action, it is the existing conditions that are employed to resolve the problematic situation,
rather than injecting into this situation some external solution. The reason the latter is
inadequate concerns the fact that it would be a solution in contemplation only, and would
have no effect on practice. We can again think of the claim that nature has inherent
value as an example. This is an external solution injected into the problematic situation,
since it does not make use of the existing conditions. Moreover, we see how it fails to
have practical consequences: that is, in the dispute over preserving the spotted owl or to
continue logging, the claim that nature has inherent value has no practical consequences,
since the conﬂict remains unresolved even after this proposed resolution.

We can also approach the means/ends continuum in terms of how evaluation of the

one involves evaluation of the other. Here Dewey’s recounting of the Charles Lamb

177

story on the origin of roast pork is instructive.” The story tells of the accidental
discovery of roast pork when a building that housed pigs burned down. During their
search of the ruins, the owners touched the roasted pigs and burnt their ﬁngers. When
they impulsively put their ﬁngers in their mouths, they discovered the new taste and
found they enjoyed it. After this, they went about constructing new buildings, placing
pigs in them, and then setting ﬁre to the buildings. All of this in order to again enjoy
the ﬂavor of roast pork. What Dewey ﬁnds important in the story is that the absurdity
of the peoples’ actions shows that ends do not have their value independent of the means
required for achieving them. If the latter were the case, we would ﬁnd nothing absurd
about the story.

Moreover, we ﬁnd that "to pass from immediacy of enjoyment to something called
’intrinsic value’ is a leap for which there is no ground" (Valuation 41). In other words,
we ﬁnd that values, in order to have practical efﬁcacy, must derive their worth from the
fact that they satisfy some need or lack: "The value of enjoyment of an object as an
attained end is a value of something which in being an end, an outcome, stands in
relation to the means of which it is the consequence. Hence, if the object in question is
prized as an end or ’ﬁnal’ value, it is valued in this relation or as mediated" (Valuation
41). Here we come to the reciprocal evaluation of means and ends. Means have their
value insofar as they do, in fact, serve to attain an end-in-view. At the same time, the
end-in—view will be evaluated in terms of the means required to achieved it: that is to say,

we ask whether it is worth the effort required to achieve it. In the story of the roast

 

9’ Dewey recounts this story in Theory of Valuation on pages 40—41.

178

pork, we ﬁnd our reaction being that one of two things should happen: either more
efﬁcient means of attaining roast pork be found (if we like the pork so much), or if there
are no other alternative means available, we think the pork simply is not worth it, the
effort required is too great, and roast pork given up. In either case, we ﬁnd a reciprocal
evaluation taking place. The means and end are not distinct, but the means, in fact, are
evaluated as constitutive of the end.

We have seen two senses in which there is a continuity between means and ends.
First, in intelligent projections of ends-in—view, the means are constituent elements of the
end. The end just is the means required for its achievement. Or put in terms of Dewey’s
conception of causation, the effect (end) just is the sequential ordering (the means)
required to achieve it. Second, there is continuity found in the reciprocal evaluation of
means and ends. Because of this continuity and reciprocal evaluation of means and ends,
we can apply intelligence to the direction of action. We use intelligence in projecting
ends-in—view which answer to the need in the problematic situation. We can then
empirically test the reasonableness of these projections by observing whether they satisfy
the experienced need. Applying this experimental method of inquiry to moral matters is,
according to Dewey, the task of philosophy in the twentieth century; it is the needed
reconstruction of philosophy.“

Now that it has been clariﬁed just how intelligence can guide action, we need to show

how this can help overcome the problem of modernity. Thus, I want to turn now to a

 

9" Dewey discusses this point in a number of his writings. See especially
Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 75-76 and The Quest for Certainty, p. 273.

179

discussion of how Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy can be used as a response to the need

for standards of normativity which come from human reason.

D. Dewey and the Problem of Modernity

After attempting to establish the plausibility of interpreting the current conﬂicts in
environmental ethics as manifestations of the problem of modernity in chapter three, the
present chapter went into a rather long exposition on various themes in Dewey’s
pragmatic philosophy. The time has come to connect these two chapters, to show how
Dewey’s thought responds to the problem of modernity. The connection may not be clear
at present due to the fact that in discussing the problem of modernity I relied primarily
on thinkers from the Continental tradition. As may be expected, the terms in which those
thinkers cast the problem differ from the language used in the exposition of Dewey’s
thought. Despite the different jargon, Dewey’s reconstruction of the western philosophic
tradition can be used as a ﬁrst step in overcoming the problem of modernity. I will
attempt to illustrate how the excursus on Dewey relates to the problem as stated at the
end of chapter three.

In his own way, Dewey was directly concerned with the problem of modernity. He
was concerned with the need for standards of normativity which human reason generates
by and for itself. He was all too aware of the problems resulting from reason giving way
to superstition, ignorance, and dogmatism. He insisted on removing the gap between

theory and practice. It is only when this is done that humans have the possibility of

180

becoming autonomous. Only with the direct use of intelligence in determination of
choice-in-action can humans achieve the needed "reconstruction of the actual state of
human life toward order and toward other conditions of a fuller life than man has yet
enjoyed " (RIP xxxiv).

More is required, however, than merely redirecting our science and technology to
existing ends not yet pursued. Dewey claims that this latter position would be an
improvement over a mere attack on science and technology as the root of our woes.
Nonetheless, this position has serious ﬂaws:

It appears to assume that we already have in our possession, ready-made, so to
say, the morals that determine the ends for which the greatly enhanced store of
means should be used. The practical difﬁculty in the way of rendering radically
new " means " into servants of ends framed when the means at our disposal were
of a different kind is ignored (RIP xxxvii).
One problem, then, concerns the issue of applying new means to old ends. Dewey
questions the wisdom of doing this. Appeal to medical science as an example may help
clarify Dewey’s point. With advances in medical technology, it may be thought that we
would be able to cure many of the illnesses which have plagued humankind. This has
been an end for medical science in the past. However, as medical science enlarges our
understanding of these diseases, we ﬁnd more and more a focusing of these new medical
technologies on the prevention of these diseases rather than on their cure. In other
words, we ﬁnd the pursuit of a new end (prevention) rather than the continued attempt
at achieving old ends (cure of existing ills) with new means.

Consideration of Dewey’s understanding of the means/ ends continuum helps clarify

why the old ends have been replaced. The reciprocal evaluation of means and ends, in

181
particular, is helpful here. As an end, the prevention of disease now becomes possible
because our new technologies allow us to better understand the conditions which give rise
to them. Thus, prevention is evaluated as a more worthwhile end than ﬁnding a cure.
Admittedly, this may presuppose that prevention is to be chosen over cure. But it seems
unlikely that this would be a serious point of dispute. Be that as it may, the point here
is the import of the reciprocal evaluation of means and ends, and how this reciprocal
relationship allows for progress in the human condition.
Dewey notes another related problem with the view that we simply need to direct our

science and technology toward different ends (understood as ready-made):

But much more important . . . is the fact that it retains intact the divorce between

some things as means and mere means and other things as ends and only ends

because of their own essence or inherent nature. Thus in effect, though not in

intent, an issue which is serious enough to be moral is disastrously evaded (RIP

xxxviii).
Here we come to the heart of Dewey’s connection with the Enlightenment project. If
ends are taken as such because of their own inherent nature, then these ends are
determined by something beyond human reason itself. Humans, in accepting such ends
will, to varying degrees, lose their autonomy. They will ﬁnd themselves answering to
the alleged authority of these ends.

Dewey, however, advocates the " formation of new ends, ideals and standards to

which to attach our new means" (RIP xxxviii). These new ends would be formed in

response to existing conditions of problematic situations.” Only in this way can the

 

9’ It should be noted as well that these problematic situations will themselves often
be due to new advances in means. An example would be the problem of agricultural
runoff polluting rivers and lakes. These new means of pest and weed controls--our

182

pursuit and achievement of ends lead to amelioration of human woes.

One highly signiﬁcant aspect of Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry, then, lies in the
fact that it offers an intelligent way for humans to formulate ends-in-view. There are no
external authorities which dictate to human intelligence how it ought to conduct action.
Instead, human reason must choose how it will use the new developments in science and
technology, to what ends they will be employed. Commenting on the development of the
scientiﬁc method and the resulting developments in human industry Dewey remarked:

For a fulﬁllment which is consonant with their own, their proper, direction and

momentum of movement can be achieved only in terms of ends and standards so

distinctly human as to constitute a new moral order (RIP xxxix).
Dewey was involved with the problem of developing practical, workable standards of
normativity that were not dependent on an authority external to human reason. He
wanted to develop ideals, standards, and ends which derive their authority from human
intelligence, regarded as a response to the problematic, and which serve to improve the
human condition. The logic of his ethical inquiry, along with his views on the reciprocal
relationship of means and ends were aimed at securing this goal. His pragmatism
provides, then, an alternative to the narrowly conceived instrumentalism found in
technical rationality as developed in our western tradition. He offers us a way to expand
our understanding of purposive-instrumental rationality; his work suggests it may be

possible to use this more broadly conceived instrumentalism in the choice of ends.

It seems, then, that Dewey’s pragmatism may fulﬁll our goal as stated in the opening

 

pesticides and herbicides--as well as our use of chemical fertilizers have created a new
kind of problem for us.

183

of this chapter. That is, it seems he has shown us an aspect of human rationality which
can be developed to serve our practical need regarding the choice of appropriate ends.
His work suggests that what in the past has been thought of as purposive-instrumental
rationality was too narrowly conceived. His theory of valuation is an attempt to place
this form of rationality in a broader framework, and to claim for it the ability of
evaluating ends as well as means. But we must now ask if Dewey’s work adequately

articulates itself regarding this process of valuation.

E. A Problem with Dewey’s Instrumentalism

Granted, Dewey’s instrumentalism provides a framework within which human reason
can make use of normative standards independently from external authorities. However,
two crucial points remain unclear: First, who determines these normative standards, and
how? And second, how can we ensure that the inﬂuence of external authorities does not
make its way into this framework? Obviously, clariﬁcation of these questions is required.

The above questions arise at the point in Dewey’s process of valuation where we
project the ideal or end—in-view. The point can be stated thusly: how is the
appropriateness or validity of the projected end-in-view determined? Dewey claims there
is the possibility for empirically testing the adequacy of the end-in-view. That is to say,
we can simply check to see if the projected end-in-view has resolved the problem.
However, this does not answer the question of whether the resolution can be validated.

In other words, we need to ask if Dewey provides some means for determining the

184

validity of a resolution. This is crucial since there may be a number of ways to resolve
a conﬂict, and some of these may not be valid.

The following illustrates the problem: We can think of two people in the midst of
a moral conﬂict in which an ideal (resolution) is lacking. The need here is an end-in-
view which would resolve the conﬂict. The proposed test of adequacy for this end-in-
view, according to Dewey, is whether it resolves the conﬂict. We can imagine, however,
instances in which political force or manipulation of public opinion might be used by one
party to the conﬂict in attaining an end-in-view satisfactory to them but not acceptable
to the other party, but which is agreed to because of the political force or manipulation.
Here we have a resolution in the sense that the parties involved have given up the
conﬂict. But many tend to think that the process has run amuck at this point.

There appears to be a distinction, then, between a resolution of a problem, and a valid
resolution of a problem. The question is how to determine when a resolution is valid
without appealing to some a priori, absolute good, value, or ideal. Is there some way
to validate resolutions through human reason alone without appeal to some dubious
foundationalist principle? Is there something more to the distinction between the moral
and the factual that Dewey is overlooking?

I want to claim there is nothing more. However, Dewey does at this point fail to
clarify the full signiﬁcance of the difference between moral and factual judgments, and
he also fails to clarify a feature they share: namely, their dialogical nature. Full
clariﬁcation of these points will, I submit, indicate the direction to move in for

determining valid resolutions.

185

In moral judgments character comes into play, according to Dewey, as part of the
object being judged. In other words, there is a determination of what kind of person the
judging agent will become as a result of making the judgment. At the same time,
however, there seems to be another place in which character plays a role: namely, in the
selection of criteria used to make the above determination. Put another way, the judging
agent’s character manifests itself in deciding whether the determination of character is
appropriate or acceptable. Thus, not only does character become part of the object
judged, but it also does the judging-at least at that point when the choice is considered.
The question then becomes whether Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry has allowed for
this role of character to be adequately taken into account?

It may not yet be clear why this is even signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcance lies in the fact
that if it is the judging agent’s own character which determines the appropriateness of the
proposed end-in-view, it remains unclear how a consensus can be reached on whether the
end-in-view is, indeed, appropriate. For in Dewey’s account there has been no way to
safeguard against the biases and background beliefs of the judging agent from entering
into this determination and prejudicing the outcome. Granted, it may well be that the
empirical check of whether the proposed end-in-view actually resolves the problematic
situation will prevent some biases or prejudices from being acted on. That is, it may well
be that some blatantly biased ends-in-view simply will not resolve the problem. But there
may be times when they would: for example, when political force, manipulation, or
ideologies are at work.

There is another aspect of the moral/ factual distinction which is also important. Since

186

character becomes part of the object judged in moral matters, we cannot expect to once
and for all reach a consensus on moral norms and value preferences. Why? Because
where character is involved, there will always be changing needs and desires for which
a priori worked out norms prove to be inadequate. We can think here of how
developments in medical technology have given rise to new desires which previously
could not have been imagined. On the other hand, since character is not involved as part
of the logical conditions of a factual judgment as such, it is more likely that a priori laws
can be stated for which consensus is possible.” Realizing the signiﬁcance of this aspect
of the distinction is important since it allows us to resist the tendency to fall back on
absolutist principles--looking for that something more by which to distinguish the moral
and the factual--which might be thought to get us out of the current predicament. We
need not fall back on such absolutist ideals. Instead, we need to clarify what Dewey
mentions, but does not elaborate on, regarding the dialogical nature of human rationality.

I suggest that the objection against Dewey’s instrumentalism-that it fails to provide
adequate means for determining valid resolutions to moral problems--is due to the fact
that he depicts the process in monological terms. In other words, Dewey still has the
agent attempting to make the determination in isolation. And in this isolated state, it
becomes all too easy for the agent to fall back on customs and habits which may contain
inappropriate prejudices and biases hidden from the agent’s purview. Moreover, when

Dewey then focuses on the instrumentalist approach of the means/ends evaluation, these

 

9‘ There are, to be sure, debatable issues in the philosophy of science lurking here,
but they go well beyond the scope of this work.

 

187

prejudices and biases may be completely overlooked for what they are and subsequently
play a distorting role in this evaluation.

Our problem, then, becomes one of how to preserve those aspects of Dewey’s
approach to ethical inquiry that help to establish the relation between theory and practice,
while ﬁnding a way to uncover distorting factors which may be at work in the
means/ ends evaluation.

We can recall Dewey’s claim that "growth itself is the only moral ’end’ " (RIP 177).
And we can further note what he says regarding the moral meaning of democracy:

Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in
resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial
arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of
every member of society (RIP 186).
These statements suggest a certain vision for humanity which Dewey had. And there is
implied in this vision a certain universality, justice, or fairness. However, this notion of
universality seems to be missing from his theory of valuation. There is no provision for
ensuring against someone interpreting the validity of a particular projected end-in-view
as satisfactory when, in fact, it may not be universally just.

I suggest that Dewey’s account requires a social or dialogical conception of
rationality. Such a dialogical conception of reason would provide a means for uncovering
distorting factors in the means/ ends evaluation which a monological form might overlook.
It should be pointed out that not only does Dewey need a social or dialogical conception
of practical reason, but he himself seems to have wanted such a conception. The

following statements from Reconstruction in Philosophy illustrate this point:

Groupings for promoting the diversity of goods that men share have become the

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real social units. They occupy the place which traditional theory has claimed
either for mere isolated individuals or for the supreme and single political
organization. Pluralism is well ordained in present political practice and demands
a modiﬁcation of hierarchical and monistic theory (RIP 204).

Communication, sharing, joint participation are the only ways of universalizing
the moral law and end (RIP 206).

The genuinely modern has still to be brought into existence. The work of actual
production is not the task or responsibility of philosophy. That work can only be
done by the resolute, patient, co-operative activities of men and women of good
will, drawn from every useful calling, over an indeﬁnitely long period. There is
no absurd claim made that philosophers, scientists or any other one group form
a sacred priesthood to whom the work is entrusted (RIP xxxv).
My point here is that while Dewey may have recognized the import of the social or
communicative nature of practical reason, he did not offer any real clariﬁcation on this
aspect of human reason. However, its communicative nature is what needs emphasizing
and clariﬁcation, since this is what allows practical reason to confront the problems of
determining the validity of resolutions without appeal to dubious foundationalist claims
or complete reliance on socio-historical context. While this is a serious shortcoming with
Dewey’s theory of valuation, I do not believe it is so serious that we should disregard
Dewey ’s work all together. Instead, I propose to rectify the problem by appealing to the

work of Jiirgen Habermas. In particular, Habermas’ discourse ethics will be used to

provide an element of universalization which Dewey’s theory of valuation now lacks.

Chapter V
Habermas’ Discourse Ethic

A. Introduction

The last chapter ended with a criticism of Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry. I
want to rehearse this criticism and what is behind it since it is because of this criticism
that the appeal to Habermas is made. The charge was that Dewey’s depiction of
instrumentalism may not be a fully adequate articulation of what goes on in moral
reﬂection. In spite of the fact that Dewey offers a richer understanding of instrumental
rationality, his use of it in the moral sphere may blur an important distinction which
needs to be kept clear: namely, the distinction between instrumental-theoretical rationality
and practical-moral rationality. As noted in the last chapter, Dewey does recognize a
distinction between moral judgments and scientiﬁc or factual judgments. So it is not the
case that Dewey rejects the distinction wholesale. He does, however, reject the idea that
there is an ahistorical tripartite structure to human rationality:

The counterpart of this error, which isolates the subject-matter of intellect from
the scope of values and valuations, is a corresponding isolation of the subject-
matter of esthetic contemplation and immediate enjoyment from judgment.
Between these two realms, one of intellectual objects without value and the other
of value-objects without intellect, there is an equivocal mid-country in which
moral objects are placed, with rival claimants striving to annex them either to the
region of purely immediate goods (in this case termed pleasures) or to that of
purely rational objects. Hence the primary function of philosophy at present is
to make it clear that there is no such difference as this division assumes between

science, morals, and esthetic appreciation. All alike exhibit the difference
between immediate goods casually occurring and immediate goods which have

189

190
been reﬂectively determined by means of critical inquiry . ’7

I take Dewey’s position to be that while we can make a conceptual distinction between
the scientiﬁc, the moral, and the aesthetic, reifying this distinction would be a mistake.
It would be a mistake because in each of these areas we ﬁnd "the same duality and [they
each] present the same problem; that of embodying intelligence in action which shall
convert casual natural goods, whose causes and effects are unknown, into goods valid for
thought, right for conduct and cultivation for appreciation" (EN 407). In short, Dewey
would be more comfortable with saying there is a continuum rather than distinct spheres
of rationality.

Again I think it is necessary to emphasize Dewey’s reason for this claim: namely, if
the distinction becomes reiﬁed to the extent that we understand it as pointing to
ahistorical structures of human rationality, then we will be faced with the question of how
it is possible to bring intelligence to bear on practical choice. In The Quest for Certainty,
Dewey states his understanding of Kant’s motivation for the division of territory between
the scientiﬁc and the moral:

The point on the practical side that had to be protected at all hazards was that no
concrete and empirical material be permitted to inﬂuence ultimate moral realities--
since this would give natural science jurisdiction over them and bring them under
the sway of mechanical causality. On the cognitive side, the corresponding point
to be certiﬁed was restriction of natural science to a strictly phenomenal world.

For then there could be no encroachment of speciﬁc scientiﬁc conclusions upon
ultimate, that is ethico-religious, belief. 9“

 

’7 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 195 8), 406-
07. Hereafter cited in text as EN.

9‘ John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), 60.
Hereafter cited in text as Quest.

191

Given Dewey’s position on the process of valuation, one can understand why he would
reject such a separation. It would not allow for the reciprocal evaluation of means and
ends. For such reciprocal evaluation requires that empirical facts be appealed to in
making moral judgments. Hence, we can appreciate why Dewey favors understanding
the spheres of human rationality as a continuum.

We can also note the abstractness of Kant’s Categorical Imperative in connection with
Dewey’s reluctance to acknowledge an absolute distinction between scientiﬁc and
practical rationality. The charge is that the Categorical Imperative is so abstract that it
offers no real practical guidance.99 The abstractness creates a gap between theory and
practice which Dewey could not accept.

This background on Dewey’s resistance to the theoretical distinctiveness of
practical/moral reason enables us to better appreciate a shortcoming in his approach to
ethical inquiry. The problem I ﬁnd with Dewey’s approach lies in the emphasis he places
on instrumental rationality. Granted, I ﬁnd his argument for a richer understanding of
instrumental rationality plausible. However, the focus on the role of instrumental
rationality in moral reﬂection in his account tends to mask the role of practical
rationality. After all, there is, as he admits, a distinction between moral and factual
judgments. His recognition of this distinction does not imply that factual judgments
cannot play a role in moral judgments. On the contrary, for Dewey factual judgments

do play such a role. But Dewey’s account tends to lose sight of the full signiﬁcance of

 

9’ Richard Taylor develops this criticism of Kant’s categorical imperative in his Good
and Evil: A New Direction (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), 111—15.

192

the distinction between moral and factual judgments. His account tends to emphasize
instrumental rationality in such a manner that a problematic involvement of character--the
very factor which distinguishes the moral from the factual—~fails to receive adequate
treatment. The result is that the issue of the appropriateness of a projected end-in-view-—
understood as a hypothesis put forth to resolve a moral problem or conﬂict—-may be
judged without giving adequate consideration to the role of character.mo

Now if we recall Dewey’s vision for democracy, we can see why this would become
a problem. As noted in the previous chapter, Dewey understands the moral meaning of
democracy to involve a test for ensuring that all political institutions and industrial
arrangements contribute to the growth of every member of society. This vision implies
a universal concern for the well-being of all members of society. However, if it is
unclear how a consensus can be reached on appropriate ends-in-view, it also remains
unclear just how this vision can be achieved. In other words, whether the concerns of
all members will be given adequate consideration may well turn on just what biases or
prejudices happen to ﬁnd their way into the determination of the end-in-view.

Another way to put this point would be to say there is a need to ensure that the vision
which Dewey has for democracy can actually be put into practice. The question is
whether Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry can provide the means for attaining this
vision. I suggest that the emphasis he places on the role of a monological instrumental

rationality prevents his approach from fulﬁlling his goal. Dewey’s vision requires a

 

‘°° I want to stay with Dewey’s own characterization of a moral judgment at this
point in criticizing his account in order to better show that even in his own terms,
Dewey’s account may not be fully adequate.

193
social or dialogical conception of moral-practical rationality. A dialogical form of reason
would help uncover distorting factors in the means/ ends evaluation which a monological
form of reason might overlook.
In the present chapter I appeal to a discourse ethic as developed by Jiirgen Habermas
in order to overcome the above difﬁculty in Dewey’s position. In particular, Habermas’
notion of universalization and his dialogical view of practical rationality are examined in
order to determine whether they can help rectify the shortcoming found in Dewey’s
approach to ethical inquiry.
Perhaps it would be appropriate to mention a point regarding Habermas’ personal
background that relates to the issue of universalization. The point I have in mind
illustrates the motivation Habermas has for developing standards of normativity which
would have universal applicability. Habermas made the following comment during an
interview:
At the age of 15 or 16, I sat before the radio and experienced what was being
discussed before the N uremburg Tribunal; when others, instead of being struck
silent by the ghastliness, began to dispute the justice of the trial, procedural
questions, and questions of jurisdiction, there was that ﬁrst rupture, which still
gapes. Certainly it is only because I was still sensitive and easily offended that
I did not close myself to the fact of a collectively realized inhumanity in the same
measure as the majority of my elders. ‘°‘

This biographical note illustrates Habermas’ realization of the import, of the need, for

ensuring that all parties receive an equal hearing, that there be some way to enable all

interests to be voiced. And at the same time, we ﬁnd he had an awareness of how people

 

‘°‘ Jiirgen Habermas, "The Dialectics of Rationalization: An Interview with Jiirgen
Habermas," Telos, 45 (Fall, 1981), 7.

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can, in practice, easily allow themselves to become insensitive to this need. As Richard
Bernstein puts it, for Habermas "reason, freedom, and justice were not only theoretical
issues to be explored, but practical tasks to be achieved-practical tasks that demanded
passionate commitment. " 102 David Rasmussen also sees Habermas’ reaction to the
"Heidegger Affair" as exemplifying his desire to avoid the dangers of contextualism:
For him [Habermas] , Heidegger descended from the lofty heights of a kind of
mythic archaism into what must be seen as the most rank form of contextualism.
Precisely here, Habermas’ claims for moral universalism can be read as a kind of
testament of one who says, never again. ‘°’
This reaction by Habermas to the inability of the great philosophic tradition to uncover
the distortion of National Socialism illustrates his commitment to developing a universalist
position. He is unwilling to risk the dangers inherent in contextualism.

We must be clear, however, on just what Habermas’ universalism amounts to. His
position is misunderstood if interpreted as an attempt to create yet another
"metanarrative" intended to legitimate foundationalist claims. “’4 In other words,
Habermas’ theoretical work is not simply a contemporary version of the traditional
"search for the immutable and ultimate--that which is--without respect to the temporal or

spatial" (RIP xiii). Indeed, as we will see, Habermas’ universalism is concerned with the

temporal and the spatial, that is, with the concrete.

 

102 Richard Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 2.
“’3 David Rasmussen, Reading Habermas (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 104.
1°" Jean-Francois Lyotard, in his article, "The Postmodern Condition," in Aﬁer

Philosophy: End or Transformation ? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), criticizes Habermas
for offering such a metanarrative. See especially pp. 73-75 and 88-89.

195

Our task in the present chapter, then, will be to ﬁrst understand how Habermas’
position is a non-foundational universalism. We will then examine how this form of
universalism is supported by his discourse ethic. Finally, we will examine how
Habermas’ notion of universalism can bolster Dewey’s instrumentalism. The main intent
of this chapter, then, is to suggest that we can use Habermas’ discourse ethic as a
clariﬁcation of the dialogical nature of practical reason which Dewey’s account lacks.
In other words, I see Habermas’ discourse ethic as complementing Dewey’s approach to
ethical inquiry.

There is, however, another point which needs to be addressed in this eclectic move:
that is, Habermas remains rather close to Kant on the issue of the tripartite structure of
human reason, while Dewey, as we have seen, rejects Kant’s version of this division
between the scientiﬁc, the moral, and the aesthetic. Thus, we need to examine whether
this is a point on which Dewey and Habermas are irreconcilably at odds. I suggest it is
not.

Once the above points have been discussed and clariﬁed, the stage will be set for the
next chapter. We will then be in a more adequate position to approach the issues of
environmental ethics than we found was the case with the approaches examined in chapter

two of this dissertation.

196

B. Habermas’ Non-foundational Universalism

F oundationalist claims in philosophy have increasingly been brought into question.
Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty, and Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature are
two examples which criticize the foundationalist tendencies in western philosophy. A
foundationalist position claims that philosophy can, through some method, attain
immutable and ultimate truths regarding knowledge or morality. Since these ultimate
truths are understood as ahistorical, they are thought to have universal applicability. Now
because Habermas’ moral theory is universalistic, he has been criticized for attempting
to secure some version of foundationalism.105 What needs clariﬁcation, then, is that one
can hold a universalist position that is non-foundational.

I will use Habermas’ criticism of Kant’s version of the principle of universalization
as a starting point for discussing how Habermas avoids a foundationalist position. In
reference to Kant’s categorical imperative ("Act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"), Habermas
remarks:

Every single subject, in examining his maxims of action for their suitability as
principles of a universal legislation, must attribute these maxims to every other
subject as equally binding. . . . The moral laws are abstractly universal in the
same sense that, as they hold as universal for me, they must eo ipso be thought

of as holding for all rational beings. As a result, interaction under such laws
dissolves into the actions of solitary and self-sufﬁcient subjects, each of whom

 

‘°‘ Richard Rorty has made this criticism of Habermas. See his "Pragmatism,
Relativism, and Irrationalism, " in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1982), 173-74; and Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979), 380-81.

~—

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must act as though he were the sole existing consciousness; and yet each subject
can at the same time be certain that all his actions under moral laws are
necessarily and from the outset in harmony with the moral action of all possible

other subjects. ‘°‘
Habermas’ point here concerns Kant’s reliance on the reﬂection of the isolated subject.
If we view Kant’s principle of universalization as a procedural method for securing sound
moral judgments taken as ultimate moral truths, there remains a problem of how to attain
consensus on these truth claims. We can grant that Kant’s method may lead to consensus
on some matters. For example, we might ﬁnd it leads to consensus on the claim that
murder is wrong (assuming, of course, a prior consensus on the deﬁnition of murder).
However, if the starting point is the isolated subject attempting to attain logical
consistency in willing a maxim to be a universal law, then consensus may not be attained
in many cases. For logical consistency alone does not guarantee consensus. Thus, Kant
has not shown that his procedural method is adequate for attaining universal moral truths.
In contrast to Kant, Habermas rejects the monological frame of reference, and also
gives up any claim to ultimate and immutable moral truth claims. In place of
monological reﬂection, Habermas appeals to discursive argumentation among subjects to
secure universal moral norms. Thomas McCarthy views this shift as a procedural

reinterpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative: "The emphasis shifts from what each

can will without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to

 

1°" Jiirgen Habermas, " Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel’s Jena Philosophy
of Mind," in Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (London: Heinemann, 1974).

198

be a universal norm. " 1” For Habermas, "the principle of justiﬁcation of norms is no
longer the monologically applicable principle of generalizability but the communally
followed procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively. "1°“ Thus one
important difference between Kant and Habermas consists of who is involved in testing
the validity of norms being proposed. For Kant it is an isolated individual, while for
Habermas it is a community or common rational will.

It is also important to note that in practical discourse these norms are being tested,
not generated. Habermas explicitly rejects the claim that the discourse ethic can generate
justiﬁed norms:

Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justiﬁed norms but a
procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and
hypothetically considered for adoption. That means that practical discourses
depend on content brought to them from outside. “’9
The import of this point is that in spite of the fact that this is a formal procedure, it
remains closely tied to the concrete situation. The purpose of practical discourse is to
repair disrupted consensus. It does this by restoring intersubjective recognition of a
validity claim or by securing the acceptance of an alternative validity claim (MCCA 67).

The above point raises another signiﬁcant contrast between Kant and Habermas. This

contrast involves the role of interests and inclinations. For Kant, inclinations cannot play

 

‘°7 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 1978), 326.

1°“ Jiirgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 90.

1°" Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans.
Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber N icholsen (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990),
103. Hereafter cited in text as MCCA.

199

a role in the choice of maxims for action. For Habermas, however, a normative claim
is a claim " about alternative orderings for the satisfaction of interests. "“° Kant wanted
to prevent inclinations from inﬂuencing the choice of maxims in order to ensure the
autonomy of the will. He claimed that a will which acted on inclination was a will
determined by some external force. This position presupposes a psychology that separates
various faculties of the mind in such a way that the rational will is separate from the
faculty of emotion. Habermas, of course, is not burdened by this psychology. But if
interests and inclinations are allowed to play a role in generating norms, and logical
consistency is not the test for valid norms, then how does Habermas determine legitimate
normative claims? Habermas recognizes as legitimate only those norms "that meet (or
could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a
practical discourse " (MCCA, 66). Thus we can see that Habermas distinguishes between
how normative claims are generated and how they are legitimated. They are generated
in a concrete way of life "for the satisfaction of needs" (Recent Work 69). They are
legitimated through a "process of argumentation in which the individuals concerned
cooperate" (MCCA 67).

At this point some clariﬁcation of Habermas’ understanding of the notion of ’needs’
or ’interests’ is required. Stephen White points out that Habermas recognizes the cultural
variability involved with needs:

When [Habermas] discusses needs, his concern almost always is to draw attention

 

”° Habermas as quoted by Stephen White in, The Recent Work of Jiirgen Habermas
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 69. Hereafter cited in text as Recent
Work.

200

to the way in which the core values of a culture deeply structure what constitutes
a "need" within that culture. In fact, Habermas usually does not refer simply to
"needs" but rather to "need interpretations, " a locution which expresses their
cultural variability (Recent Work 70).
Accepting White’s interpretation, we can see that "needs" go well beyond merely
biological needs. Obviously, we could ﬁnd someone making a normative claim regarding
the satisfaction of hunger. This claim might take the form: "Society has a responsibility
to ensure that all citizens receive an adequate amount of food. " Moreover, we can
imagine how this could become a legitimate normative claim: that is, we can imagine this
claim meeting with the approval of all affected by it. Now if we consider Habermas’
further claim regarding need interpretations, we can imagine the above biological need
being given a culturally inﬂuenced interpretation: "Our society has a responsibility to
ensure that all citizens receive an adequate amount of rice. " And we can imagine how
this could be a legitimate normative claim in societies in which rice is a staple food. The
point here is that the second claim goes beyond being merely a claim concerning a
biological need; it gives a particular cultural interpretation to this need. Nonetheless, it
remains a legitimate claim, according to Habermas’ notion of universalization, so long
as it meets with the approval of all affected by it.

The signiﬁcance of this point regarding need interpretations is that we cannot once
and for all determine what the good society would be. For all voices must have a say
in determining what this is, and only through intersubjective argumentation is it possible
to begin to work it out:

Habermas is not presenting a claim about the needs and interests all would have

in the good society, and which anyone could discover if he/ she merely subjected
himself/herself to the rules of discourse. Such a universalistic claim about the

201

shape of the good society is always unwarranted, since it tries to settle once and

for all what must be left open, if the requirement of reciprocity is to take into
gigount voices which may not have been evident in any discourse (Recent Work

This implies that the practical discourses in which this discursive interaction occurs will
be inﬂuenced by the particular culture in which the discourse takes place. The import
of this point is that the concept of the good society is not static; rather it will evolve as
various voices are heard in the on-going discussion. In sum, if we were to set forth the
conditions for the good society a priori, we would freeze the concept of the good society
by cutting off the voices yet to be heard. However, doing so would violate Habermas’
principle of universalization. All that can legitimately be said a priori is that the good
society would be one in which all voices are given equal consideration. This is merely
a formal requirement, and as such does not deal with the particular historical content. I“
The fact that we cannot say a priori what the content of the good society would be

is related to Habermas’ insistence on the distinction between morality and ethical life.
The former concerns questions that "can in principle be decided rationally, i.e. , in terms
of justice or the generalizability of interests. " The latter present themselves "at the most
general level as issues of the good life (or self realization); they are accessible to rational
discussion only within the unproblematic horizon of a concrete historical form of life or

the conduct of an individual life" (MCCA 108).

The above distinction would also complement Dewey’s ethical thought. It could rule

 

1” In the next chapter I suggest a further formal requirement which is derived from
Dewey’s aesthetic theory. And again this will be a formal requirement and does not
concern the particular historical content.

 

202

out certain proposed ends-in—view which fail to meet the norms of justice or of
generalizability of interests. Questions concerning the good life or self—realization will
be culturally informed. However, Habermas retains his conviction that some culturally
informed notions of the good life would be unacceptable--in particular, those forms of
the good life which violate the norms of justice and the generalizability of interests. This
distinction between moral norms and ethical values is used by Habermas to overcome the
problem of contextualism. The formal universality which Habermas claims belongs to
moral theory provides a standard for criticizing notions of the good life which have
become corrupted. Without such a standard, Habermas fears the possibility that an ethics
might succumb to distortions of a potentially destructive cultural tradition. Again we can
see Habermas’ experience of National Socialism as a motivating factor behind this
concern. He realizes that the dangers inherent in contextualism are not merely an
academic concern, but a real historic possibility. If an ethic is based solely on an historic
form of life existing within a cultural tradition, there is a possibility that distortions in
that tradition may cause it to become corrupt. The moral/ ethical distinction will come
into play in the next chapter when we again look at the conﬂicts concerning
environmental issues.

We have seen how Habermas’ principle of universalization plays a key role in the
determination of legitimate normative claims. However, I have not shown how Habermas
justiﬁes his version of this principle. I do not intend to go into a detailed account of this
justiﬁcation, since it would detract from my overall goal. In brief, Habermas claims his

principle of universalization is already presupposed by agents engaging in competent

203

speech acts. Agents who engage in competent speech acts presuppose a reciprocal
accountability in the sense that they can demand justiﬁcation of their interlocutors’ claims
as well as be obligated to offer such justiﬁcation for their own claims. Habermas refers
to this supposition as a speech—act—immanent obligation. “2 The way this speech-act-
immanent obligation leads to the principle of universalization is summed up by White:
" And insofar as communicative action itself cannot be systematically avoided by an agent,
without throwing his rationality radically into doubt, this obligation would appear to be
one which is universally binding on all rational agents" (Recent Works 55). The reason
the validity of the principle of universalization is presupposed is that no communicatively
competent agent can reject this principle without falling into a performative
contradiction. “3 The need to avoid this performative contradiction requires a minimal
demand for universalization.

To brieﬂy sum up this section I want to reiterate the fact that Habermas’ position is
non-foundational; it does not attempt to secure immutable, ultimate truths which have no
regard for the temporal or spatial. Habermas does believe it is possible to secure
universal moral norms; however, these moral norms are formal, procedural guides which

are given content by concrete historical forms of life.

 

“2 Habermas discusses speech-act-immanent obligations in Communication and the
Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 63-65.

“3 For Habermas’ analysis of performative contradictions see Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990), 88—98.

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C . Putting Habermas and Dewey Together

Before clarifying the way in which Habermas complements Dewey, I want to reiterate
the key reason why I have chosen to discuss these particular thinkers: both try to
complete the Enlightenment Project. As I have noted earlier, the only hope of fulﬁlling
the Enlightenment ideal is by overcoming the problem of modernity. This problem can
be stated as the need for human reason to develop standards of normativity by and for
itself. (And to keep one eye on the larger project of this dissertation, it was claimed that
the problem of modernity needed to be overcome before environmental issues could be
adequately addressed.) In chapter four, I discussed the ways in which Dewey’s approach
to ethical inquiry could be used to overcome the problem of modernity. Habermas’
discourse ethic also responds to this problem. The discourse ethic answers the problem
of modernity by locating the standards of normativity in the rationality manifested in
discursive argumentation. Thus, the standards of normativity are determined, not by
metaphysical or religious dogma, not by superstition, not by ignorance, and not by

political authority; rather human reason determines these standards.

1. Habermas’ Discourse Ethic and Dewey’s Theory of Valuation

In the introduction to this chapter I noted that while Dewey recognized the import of

the social or communicative nature of practical reason, he does not offer clariﬁcation of

this. Habermas’ formal procedure for testing the legitimacy of normative claims offers

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us a dialogical account of practical reason. And this dialogical account could replace the
monologism in Dewey’s thought. Thus, instead of the isolated individual reﬂecting on
the means/ ends continuum when evaluating appropriate ends-in-view, this process of
valuation would take place through discursive argumentation.

I suggest that not only would the work of Habermas complement that of Dewey, but
that Dewey’s would also complement that of Habermas. Habermas’ dialogical account
of practical reason helps to ensure that prejudices and biases do not distort the choice of
appropriate ends-in-view. Because the discourse ethic supports a principle of
universalization, it offers a way for such prejudices and biases to be uncovered, and
prevented from corrupting the choice of ends—in-view. As Habermas correctly notes,
"nothing better prevents others from perspectivally distorting one’s own interests than
actual participation" in a cooperative process of argumentation (MCCA 67). At the
same time, Dewey’s notion of the reciprocal evaluation of means and ends, and his logic
of inquiry offers the interlocutors guidance in their process of argumentation. In other
words, these pragmatic approaches help to soften the abstractness of Habermas’ principle
of universalization. They can be used to give a more concrete sense to Habermas’
abstract discourse ethic. They suggest what might actually take place in a discursive
situation aimed at achieving understanding on normative standards. In sum, by combining
these aspects of Dewey and Habermas, we shift the procedure from the isolated individual
to the community of inquirers, and yet we are able to maintain a relatively concrete
meaning of discursive argumentation. This eclectic move offers a way to secure Dewey’s

vision for democracy. It would allow us a means to pursue the development of a society

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in which every member’s growth is taken seriously. It offers a way to derive standards
of normativity which have their origin in human reason, and yet it avoids the problems

of contextualism and foundationalism.

2. The Distinctiveness of Moral & Scientiﬁc Reason

Discussion of the distinctiveness of practical-moral reason is important at this point,
since part of the criticism of Dewey was based on the claim that he failed to adequately
clarify this aspect of human reason. Earlier I mentioned Dewey’s motivation for rejecting
any position which divided human reason into distinct realms: that is, if there were a
radical separation of different spheres of reason, then we are faced with the question of
how to bring intelligence to bear on matters of practical choice. Whether there are
distinct forms of human rationality becomes an issue here, since Dewey rejects this notion
while Habermas accepts a version of it. And if I am attempting to draw from both of
these thinkers, their apparent disagreement on this point may present a difﬁculty for my
project. What I will attempt to do is to show that while there may be some disagreement
on this issue, their respective positions are not incompatible. Furthermore, it may well
be the case that the terms used by Dewey in rejecting the distinction may be somewhat
misleading. In other words, one might be able to maintain Dewey’s concern and yet not
have to reject the distinction-—at least not a non-Kantian version of it.

We can begin by granting that if the distinction is understood as it is by Kant, then

Dewey’s rejection of it may have to stand. For according to Kant, each realm--the

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scientiﬁc, the moral, and the aesthetic-—has its own logic that can function independently:

[Kant] retained also the notion of an isolation of the two ﬁelds so complete that
there is no possible overlapping and hence no possibility of interference. If the
kingdoms of science and of righteousness nowhere touch, there can be no strife
between them. Indeed, Kant sought to arrange their relations or lack of relations
in such a way that there should be not merely non—interference but a pact of at
least benevolent neutrality (Quest 58).“"

Kant’s view obviously runs counter to Dewey’s claim that the logic of moral judgments
is the same as that of scientiﬁc judgments. The difference between the two, according
to Dewey, lies in the role of character, and not in a difference in logic.

Habermas’ position on this tripartite distinction seems to occupy a mid-ground
somewhere between Kant and Dewey. Habermas also rejects Kant’s ahistorical version
of the distinction.” But Habermas does accept an historical version of the distinction;
he agrees with Weber’s claim that the three "value spheres of culture" did emerge during
the modern period as a matter of historical fact:

Since the dawn of modernity in the eighteenth century, culture has generated those
structures of rationality that Max Weber and Emil Lask conceptualized as cultural
value spheres. . . .

Reason has split into three moments—-modern science; positive law and
posttraditional ethics; autonomous art and institutionalized art criticism—-but
philosophy had precious little to do with this disjunction. Ignorant of

sophisticated critiques of reason, the sons and daughters of modernity have
progressively learned to differentiate their cultural tradition in terms of these three

 

1“ It is worth mentioning that Kant was aware of the problem of having the various
spheres of rationality becoming isolated from each other. We can see this in his claim
about moral freedom as being symbolized in aesthetic beauty. This perhaps tenuous link
represents a version of mediation which does not soften the distinctiveness of the rational
processes of the different spheres.

“5 Jiirgen Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand—In and Interpreter," in Aﬁer Philosophy,
ed. Baynes, Bohman, and McCarthy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), 297-98.
Hereafter cited in text as Stand-In.

__

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aspects of rationality such that they deal with issues of truth, justice, and taste
discretely, never simultaneously (Stand-In 297-98).

If the claim regarding the distinction between the three spheres of human reason is a
descriptive historical claim, it may not be incompatible with Dewey’s position. For such
a claim is quite different from Kant’s complete separation of the scientiﬁc and the
practical which Dewey vehemently opposes. Indeed, if it could be argued that these three
spheres of cultural values emerged historically as a response to dealing with problematic
situations, then it is difﬁcult to see how Dewey could object. After all, his own
distinction between the scientiﬁc and the moral is a distinction made for such an
instrumental purpose. Furthermore, Habermas shares Dewey’s concern over the
problems which result from the loss of reason’s unity:
[T]hese eminent trends towards compartrnentalization, constituting as they do the
hallmark of modernity, can do very well without philosophical justiﬁcation. But
they do pose problems of mediation. First, how can reason, once it has been thus
sundered, go on being a unity on the level of culture? And second, how can
expert cultures, which are being pushed more and more to the level of rareﬁed,
esoteric forms, be made to stay in touch with everyday communication? (Stand—In
312).
Habermas’ concern here with the unity of reason is a recognition of the problem which
Dewey has pointed out with Kant’s position.

If we look at Habermas’ solution to the problem of the loss of unity, we ﬁnd it is
quite similar to what Dewey has claimed is an appropriate role for philosophy. Habermas
claims that rather than to serve as an usher showing the sciences their proper places in
the theater of knowledge, or as the highest judge in matters of validity claims,

philosophy’s role is that of a stand—in and mediator. As a stand-in, philosophy’s role

would be as a place holder for reconstructive sciences with a hypothetical status: that is,

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" empirical theories with strong universalistic claims. "“6 As a mediator, philosophy’s
role is no longer to serve as an arbiter, or as the highest judge, to settle issues of
privileged or unprivileged forms of knowledge. Rather philosophy is to be a mediator
to keep the lines of communication open between the specialized cultural spheres:
As far as philosophy is concerned, it might do well to refurbish its link with the
totality by taking on the role of interpreter on behalf of the lifeworld. It might
then be able to help set in motion the interplay between the cogrritive—
instrumental, moral—practical, and aesthetic-expressive dimensions that has come
to a standstill today, like a tangled mobile (Stand-In 313).
These changed roles of philosophy seem well matched to what Dewey has said on the task
of philosophy. Regarding the epistemological role that philosophy traditionally had,
Dewey remarks: "As to truth, then, philosophy has no pre-erninent status; it is a
recipient, not a donor " (EN 410). Thus, Dewey would agree with Habermas that
philosophy has no special status as an usher; it does not hold a special ofﬁce which
informs other sciences on the limits of knowledge. And Dewey, too, sees a mediating
role for philosophy:
Over-specialization and division of interests, occupations and goods create the
need for a generalized medium of intercommunication, of mutual criticism
through all-around translation from one separated region of experience into
another. Thus philosophy as a critical organ becomes in effect a messenger, a
liaison ofﬁcer, making reciprocally intelligible voices speaking provincial tongues,
and thereby enlarging as well as rectifying the meaning with which they are

charged (EN 410).

We ﬁnd here a marked similarity between Habermas and Dewey regarding the role of

 

“6 Stand-In, p. 310. Habermas distinguishes reconstructive science from ordinary
science by its characteristic tendency to combine empirical scientiﬁc understanding with
philosophical generalization and universalization. The work of Freud and Kohlberg are
examples of reconstructive science.

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philosophy. A large part of this role consists in reducing or eliminating the isolation of
the different realms of human rationality from one another in the evolution of human
reason into separate spheres. But to say one of philosophy’s roles is to reduce this
isolating effect is not to say that there is something inherently wrong with distinguishing
between the scientiﬁc, the moral, and the aesthetic. Properly understood this distinction
is legitimate. On pragmatic grounds there is good reason to make the distinction:
namely, it offers a way of characterizing problematic situations which would be

instrumental in working out their resolutions.

C. Conclusion

In conclusion, I suggest there is not such a gap between Habermas and Dewey as
might at ﬁrst appear on the issue of the tripartite distinction of human rationality. The
chief reason Dewey rejected the absolute separation of the spheres of human reason was
because of the resulting loss of unity and the question of bringing intelligence to bear on
practical problems. To avoid these difﬁculties, Dewey stated his criticism of Kant in
quite strong terms. But his statement of the criticism may have been somewhat
misleading in the sense that it may have seemed he was unwilling to recognize any
distinction whatsoever. As we have noted, however, Dewey does recognize a distinction
between the moral and the scientiﬁc. Furthermore, it is probable that Dewey would be
willing to accept the distinction if it were stated in terms of a description of an historical

emergence as a response designed to deal with problematic situations. The point here is

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that, in spite of Habermas’ open acceptance of the separation of the realms of human
reason, he understands this separation in terms not incompatible with Dewey’s position.
In other words, the problem that concerns Dewey can be acknowledged and dealt with
if we accept the distinction in Habermas’ terms. Furthermore, when we look at how
Habermas suggests that philosophy should deal with the loss of reason’s unity, we ﬁnd
a striking similarity with Dewey’s own recommendation. Hence, I ﬁnd nothing in this
apparent disagreement on the distinctiveness of moral/practical reason which would
present difﬁculty when attempting to join the forces of these two thinkers. But the fruits
that such an eclectic move offers are highly beneﬁcial in dealing with the problem of
modernity.

Conjoining Habermas and Dewey allows us to directly confront the problem of
modernity. Putting Dewey’s pragmatism together with Habermas’ discourse ethic offers
a way for human reason to derive standards of normativity by and for itself. With these
standards of normativity, we can respond to the issue of which ends we want to pursue
in a rational manner. However, the rationality used will not be a narrow purposive-
instrumental rationality; rather it will be a dialogically conceived practical rationality.
This practical rationality will make use of Dewey’s logic of inquiry and his means/ends
evaluation, but do so in the setting of a discursive interaction among a community of
subjects. Moreover, this combination overcomes the problem of modernity in a non-
foundational manner that also avoids the inherent dangers of contextualism. Habermas’
discourse ethic, since it supports a version of the principle of universalization, allows for

the uncovering of possible distorting factors that might otherwise inﬂuence the outcome

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of the means/ends evaluation which Dewey’s formulation alone might overlook.

We have ﬁnally reached the point where we can turn our attention back to
environmental issues. In the next chapter I want to lay out how the Habermas and
Dewey team will enable us to more adequately approach the issues facing us concerning

in the conﬂicts over the environment.

Chapter VI
The Connection with Environmental Ethics

A. Introduction

I have claimed that the philosopher’s task regarding ecological issues is not to resolve
particular concrete conﬂicts concerning these issues. Rather the problematic situation
facing the philosopher is our inability to bring intelligence adequately to bear on these
conﬂicts. The task of the philosopher is to articulate the problematic in terms which
allow for the application of intelligence to these conﬂicts. The interpretive reconstruction
offered in this dissertation is to understand the conﬂicts concerning ecological issues as
a manifestation of the problem of modernity: that is, to understand them as a problem
involving an inadequate conception of rationality. This pragmatic move changes the
nature of the problematic. It becomes an issue of providing an account of practical
rationality capable of developing standards of normativity. And the task of the last two
chapters has been to give such an account. In doing this I have drawn on Dewey’s
pragmatic approach to ethical inquiry and on aspects of Habermas’ discourse ethic. This
combination generates a conception of practical rationality that is non-foundational and
sensitive to cultural inﬂuence, while avoiding the dangers inherent in a contextualist
position. The present chapter will clarify how this account of practical rationality will
help in our reﬂection on ecological issues.

There are several concerns to be dealt with in the present chapter. First, I want to

review the reason for interpreting the problematic situation in environmental philosophy

213

214

as a manifestation of the problem of modernity—~that is, as a problem of rationality.
Doing this will also help to clarify which aspects of the overall project pertain to the
theoretical level and which pertain to practice at the concrete level.

Secondly, I want to show how Habermas’ discourse ethic allows us to deal with the
validation of moral norms in a manner that responds to the problem of modernity. This
is an important step in dealing with ecological issues at the theoretical level. However,
I point out that since Habermas sees the discourse ethic as dealing only in the realm of
moral norms, it is limited in the amount of aid it can offer in confronting ecological
issues. The reason for this is that many ecological issues concern questions of ends.
Thus, a response which is rooted solely in the realm of moral norms would be
inadequate. It would permit us to respond to issues involving questions of justice and
generalizable interests. Questions of ends, however, involve issues concerning
conceptions of the good life, and therefore, fall within the realm of the ethical.117

This brings us to the third issue for discussion. In order to say something regarding
appropriate conceptions of the good life, I want to consider some aesthetic concerns. To
this end, I will discuss aspects of Dewey’s aesthetic theory, and attempt to show how this

can complement Habermas’ discourse ethic in our theoretical reﬂection on environmental

 

”7 Here I am following Habermas’ distinction between the moral and the ethical.
The former concerns questions that "can in principle be decided rationally, i.e. , in terms
of justice or the generalizability of interests. " The latter present themselves "at the most
general level as issues of the good life or (self realization); they are accessible to rational
discussion only within the unproblematic horizon of a concrete historical form of life or
conduct of an individual life" (Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans.
C. Lenhardt & S. Weber Nicholsen [Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990], 108), hereafter
cited as MCCA in text.

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philosophy. Bringing in aesthetic concerns permits us to say something about those
aspects of ecological issues that fall within the realm of the ethical.

In sum the approach developed in this dissertation begins at the most general or
abstract level and works toward the concrete. In this manner, it attempts to avoid the gap

between theory and practice which the mainstream approaches create.

B. The Interpretative Reconstruction

This project began by criticizing current mainstream approaches in environmental
ethics. The chief objection was that these approaches lead to a gap between theory and
practice which prevents us from applying intelligence to the problems arising from
ecological issues. The core of the problem is the type of theoretical work these
approaches engage in. The problem for environmental philosophy had been interpreted
as the need to establish the moral considerability of nature. However, this interpretation
proved inadequate for dealing with concrete problems. At the root of this inadequacy lies
the fact that these approaches commit the philosophic fallacy: they transmute a conceptual
ideal (rights, inherent value, aesthetic value, etc.) into an antecedently existing reality
(see p. 140 for discussion of the philosophic fallacy). This leads to a gap between theory
and practice. In addition, because this interpretation tends to focus on the question of
which moral principle will be best suited for ethical judgments regarding nature, it fails
to recognize the conﬂicts concerning ecological issues as involving debates about

rationality. For these reasons, then, this mainstream interpretation impedes rather than

216

promotes the application of intelligence to these conﬂicts.

In light of this difﬁculty, this dissertation offers an alternative interpretation. This
alternative interpretation suggests we look at the historical development of human
rationality, since this is a key factor in how we conceive of our relationship with nature.

For theoretical work in environmental philosophy, ecological issues are best
understood as forcing us to re-think our conception of human rationality as it relates to
the formation of ideals. The reasoning behind this claim is that many of the conﬂicts
regarding ecological issues are debates concerning which ends are appropriate to pursue.
This is why I suggest we view these conﬂicts as one manifestation of the problem of
modernity. They involve questions of ends with which human rationality, as it developed
in our western tradition, has been ill—prepared to deal. The development of human
rationality in the modern period undermined the very goal it was to attain: namely, to
distinguish and free the individual consciousness from determination by natural forces
characteristic of the mythologies of western cultural traditions. When the natural world
was disenchanted, there was a loss of traditional orientations for dealing with evaluative
judgments. This loss left us with no rational means with which we could resolve
questions of ends. And so when we come to conﬂicts involving ends, such as we have
with ecological issues, we ﬁnd ourselves ill-prepared. In short, human rationality has
developed its purposive-instrumental capacity. It can successfully devise efﬁcient means
for attaining selected ends. But human reason needs to develop its practical-moral
capacity in a way that responds to the problem of modernity. It needs to develop

standards of normativity out of itself.

217

The point here is that conﬂicts involving environmental issues are not a special,
separate kind of moral or ethical problem. They are a consequence of a society primarily
organized by a narrowly conceived purposive-instrumental reason, and this has resulted
in practical conﬂicts involving the human relationship with nature. The historical
predominance of purposive-instrumental reason has created a society that conceives of
nature mainly as a standing reserve of resources. In addition, humans are understood as
being separate and apart from nature, above it, and gradually gaining mastery over it.
In the historical development of the human—nature relationship, humans learned that to
conceive of nature as a resource allowed them to devise methods for attaining a more
secure and stable existence. For example, it contributed to the development of more
efﬁcient agricultural practices. There is nothing inherently wrong with this conception
of nature. After all, humans just as other organisms, need to sustain themselves by
making use of their environment.

However, the discussion of Heidegger and Marcuse illustrated how the predominance
of purposive-instrumental reason caused a number of problems both in our social world
and in our natural environment. Moreover, because purposive—instrumental reason
focuses on developing efﬁcient means for attaining selected ends, it has inhibited growth
in the aesthetic and cultural appreciation of nature. Such appreciation is judged to be
superﬂuous according to the criteria of purposive-instrumental reason; or it is judged as
impeding the attainment of a smooth functioning system. Since our social institutions and
practices have primarily been developed according to the conception of nature as

resource, they also have this inhibiting effect. And because need interpretations, and

218

their corresponding identities, crystalize around social and cultural institutions, these
institutions will promote need interpretations and identities void of an ecological
orientation. Thus, even though there is nothing inherently wrong with the conception of
nature as merely a resource, there are ecological and social implications of that
conception which call for it to be re—thought. The crux of the matter is that the
conception of nature as mere resource--the conception predominant in our society today——
has led to the ravaging of both our social lifeworld systems and our ecosystems.

The destructive ecological implications are well documented, and in chapter three we
discussed the destructive social implications.118 Both of these destructive tendencies can
be attributed to the predominance of purposive-instrumental reason and its dehumanizing
effects. Examples of these effects are the reiﬁcation of social relations and the loss of
autonomy in identity formation. Reiﬁcation of social relations occurs when the criteria
of purposive-instrumental reason encourage people to relate with one another in terms of
the data on their dossiers. The effects of this reiﬁcation inﬂuence the human-nature
relationship as well.“9

Again, these effects are due to the one—sided development of human reason.
Moreover, the neglect of rational consideration of the ends which society pursues allows

those ends to be set by customs, dogmas, and often by the objectiﬁed logic of system

 

”3 For an account of the destructive ecological implications of our current manner
of relating to nature one can do no better than to refer to Albert Gore’s book, Earth in
the Balance (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).

“9 Examples showing how the human-nature relation has become reiﬁed and abstract
were also given in chapter three (p. 111).

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imperatives. These are not examples of intelligently reasoned choice. Rather, we find
here a need for critical reﬂection on practical reason. This reﬂection was supplied by
Heidegger and Marcuse among others, and it suggested the need for a new account of
practical-moral rationality. The appeal to Dewey and Habermas in chapters four and
ﬁve, was intended as a response to the need for this new account of practical—moral
rationality. This new account is better suited for dealing with questions of normative
standards, and does so in a manner that takes into consideration the problem of
modernity.

This interpretive reconstruction of the problem in environmental philosophy is a
pragmatic move. In other words, it was made for the pragmatic reason of articulating
the problematic situation in such a manner that makes its resolution possible through the
application of intelligence. By articulating the problematic situation in terms of the need
for a more adequate account of practical rationality, we are able to give a response to the
problem that does not become detached from the concrete situation that gave rise to it.
Pragmatism is also involved in the response to the reconstructed problem. The appeal
to Dewey’s reconstruction of instrumental reason and Habermas’ dialogical conception
of practical reason is a pragmatic attempt to reconstruct practical rationality in a manner
that will allow us to achieve an ecological orientation. This ecological orientation is
needed in order to critique our social institutions and practices, as well as to reconstruct
our conception of nature.

What we have accomplished so far, then, is a reconstruction of the problematic

situation facing the philosopher. We have shown that the inability to apply intelligence

220

to the practical conﬂicts regarding ecological issues is a problem of rationality and not
simply a matter of locating appropriate moral or ethical principles. In addition, we have
given a response to the reconstructed problematic: that is, we have provided an account
of practical rationality which responds to the problem of modernity. The task now is to
show more explicitly how this reconstructed account of practical rationality will help in
reﬂecting on ecological issues.

In the following sections I try to say something about what it would mean to follow
the rational process derived from Dewey and Habermas in reﬂecting on ecological issues.
It is important to note that I do not attempt to actually apply this process. I do not do
the actual critique of our social institutions and practices, and I do not offer a
reconstructed conception of nature. That is for the people actually involved in the
conﬂicts to do. In other words, I am following a basic tenet of Dewey’s pragmatism
which claims the philosopher cannot dictate a priori solutions to concrete problems. The
people involved in those conﬂicts must work out the solution. They must do the critique
and reconstruct the concept of nature. Nonetheless, we can say something more-- given
the account of practical rationality worked out here--about the reﬂection on ecological

issues.
C . The Public Sphere and the Limitation of the Discourse Ethic

Above I claimed we need to criticize our social institutions and practices, as well as

to reconstruct our conception of the human-nature relationship. Doing so requires the

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rehabilitation of the public sphere. The "public sphere " is Habermas’ term for "a domain
of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed."120 The public
sphere is the realm within which discussion and debate of matters of general interest takes
place. It is the realm where people "may assemble and unite freely, and express and
publicize their opinions freely" (PS 231). Obviously there can be public opinions formed
about a variety of topics. Thus, there could be many different public spheres. We can
distinguish, for example, a political public sphere from a literary one. The former would
emerge "when the public discussions concern objects connected with the practice of the
state" (PS 231).121 It may help to compare the function of the political public sphere
with the literary public sphere. We can understand the latter as the realm where people
can discuss, for example, the merits of a novel rather than accepting the opinions of
expert literary critics. The political public sphere has a similar function. It can serve as
the domain in which people debate the merits of issues concerning the practice of the
state. Indeed, one can see the need of such a public sphere in a democratic society. I
argue that a viable public sphere is a crucial element in dealing with ecological issues.
In short, the conception of practical reason derived from Dewey and Habermas requires

a public sphere; it requires a realm in which the community of inquirers can implement

 

’2" Jiirgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere,‘ in Jiirgen Habermas on Society and
Politics, ed. Steve Seidman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 231. Hereafter cited in text
as PS. Note that Dewey’s notion of a public is quite similar to Habermas’ conception
of a public sphere. See Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt
& Company, 1927).

‘2‘ Unless otherwise noted, I will use "public sphere" in the sense of political public
sphere.

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the needed debate and discussion on public matters-in particular on the validation of

acceptable moral norms.

1. The Demise of the Public Sphere

Reliance on the public sphere, however, has become problematic. In the historical
development of the modern welfare state, the political function of the public sphere has
been taken over by technical experts. Habermas, in his "Technology and Science as
’Ideology, ’ " analyzes how this occurred. In brief, the state now plays an interventionist
role in the otherwise private realm of capitalist business. Government has a new
orientation:

Insofar as government action is directed toward the economic system’s stability
and growth, politics now takes on a peculiarly negative character. For it is
oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks that
threaten the system: not, in other words, toward the realization of practical goals
but toward the solution of technical problems. 1”
We see this intervention in the federal government’s adjustment of the interest rate in
attempting to maintain an appropriate economic growth rate. The solution of such
technical problems as maintaining the appropriate interest rate does not depend on public
discussion. Indeed, public discussion would present difﬁculties for this new framework

in which government tasks are understood as technical tasks. Here we ﬁnd the devolution

of the public sphere:

 

‘22 Jiirgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as ’Ideology, ’ " in Toward a Rational
Society, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 102-03. Hereafter cited
in text as TSI.

223
It eliminates practical questions and therewith precludes discussion about the
adoption of standards; the latter could emerge only from a democratic decision-
making process. . . . Therefore the new politics of state interventionism requires
a depoliticization of the mass of the population. To the extent that practical
questions are eliminated, the public realm also loses its political function (TSI
103-04).
To the extent that the public sphere loses its political function, the masses are
depoliticized.

This depoliticization of the masses is legitimized by the successful performance of
technical tasks on the part of government. In other words, governmental policies are
explained and legitimated by showing them to be responses to system imperatives: if the
system is to remain functioning smoothly, the policies are necessary. This gets translated
to the masses who are depoliticized by this shift as follows: in order to maintain the
standard of living you now enjoy, it is imperative that these policies be put in place. In
a more concrete case, if you want to keep your jobs and the local economy functioning
smoothly, you will have to accept the possible extinction of the northern spotted owl.
Hence, we ﬁnd the elimination of the practical-moral aspects of such issues, and they are
effectively taken out of the hands of the public. There is no consideration of the issue
in practical-moral terms. Once the function of government action becomes technical
rather than practical, there "arises a perspective in which the development of the social
system seems to be determined by the logic of scientiﬁc-technical progress" (TSI 105).
The only real matter left to the public is: Which administrative technocrat is best able to
deal with the exigencies of maintaining the system? We see here another instance of the

ravaging of our social lifeworld system by the predominance of purposive-instrumental

reason .

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2. The Potential for Protest

There remain, however, certain aspects of social life which do not answer to the
promises of effective technical control. When conﬂicts arise in these areas, they are not
easily resolved by governmental compensations:

The issue is not primarily one of compensations that the welfare state can provide,
but of defending and restoring endangered ways of life. In short, the new
conﬂicts are not ignited by distribution problems but by questions having to do
with the grammar of forms of life.123
These conﬂicts arise, according to Habermas, in domains of cultural reproduction, social
integration, and socialization. These conﬂicts are not concerned with economic matters,
social security, or military security. These latter issues concern conﬂict potentials
focusing on the demands for a guaranteed minimum material standard for all citizens.
Finding means for satisfying these demands is a technical matter. However, the protest
potential in the domain of cultural reproduction involves such things as concern for
quality of life, equal rights, individual self—realization, participation, and human rights
(TCA II 392). These are practical and aesthetic, not technical issues, and as such they
are not concerns to be resolved by technical experts. They call for a form of reason that
goes beyond the instrumental-technical realm.

This dissertation began with several examples of conﬂicts involving environmental

issues. These examples illustrated concerns over the depletion of non-renewable

resources, pollution, overpopulation, and questions regarding our relations with other

 

”3 Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action vol. II, trans. Thomas
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 392. Hereafter cited in text as TCA II.

225
species. I agree with Habermas’ claim that such conﬂict areas present a potential for
protest in the domain of cultural reproduction (TCA II 392). These conﬂicts involve
concern for quality of life, self-realization, and identity formation. Although there are
technical matters involved, it is the practical and aesthetic consequences which give rise
to protest:
What sets off the protest is rather the tangible destruction of the urban
environment; the despoliation of the countryside through housing development,
industrialization, and pollution; the impairment of health through the ravages of
civilization, pharmaceutical side effects, and the like——that is, developments that
noticeably affect the organic foundations of the lifeworld and make us aware of
standards of livability, of inﬂexible limits to deprivation of sensual-aestlretic
background needs (TCA II 394).
The protest would be against the legitimacy of viewing these environmental conﬂicts
merely as technical matters. It would be a refusal to unquestioningly permit them to be
treated simply as technical issues to be resolved by experts. This is not to say there are
not technical aspects involved. However, the conﬂicts show that there are also practical
and aesthetic aspects.

The point here is that the predominance of purposive-instrumental reason has brought
about the demise of the public sphere. However, the protest potential referred to above
is a matter of historical conditions for cultivating a public sphere and the rationality
appropriate to a viable public sphere. So even though purposive-instrumental reason
caused the demise of the public sphere, it also planted the seed of the demand for its
revival.

The question we now need to address is: Just what work will the public sphere and

Habermas’ discourse ethic do for us in addressing ecological issues?

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3. The Limitations of Abstract Moral Reasoning and Ecological Issues

Habermas claims his discourse ethic is a rational procedure for the "discursive
redemption of normative claims to validity" (MCCA 103). Because it deals with abstract
moral norms-~with questions of justice and generalizable interests--the discourse ethic is
limited in its scope. Since humans live their lives within a particular socio—historical
situation, questions of valuation, which arise from within their particular situation, are
not accessible to reﬂection at the abstract level of reﬂection on moral norms:

Participants can distance themselves from norms and normative systems that have
been set off from the totality of social life only to the extent necessary to assume
a hypothetical attitude toward them. Individuals who have been socialized cannot
take a hypothetical attitude toward the form of life and the personal life history
that have shaped their own identity (MCCA 104).124
There is, then, a limited scope to the discourse ethic: "it covers only practical questions
that can be debated rationally, i.e. , those that hold out the prospect of consensus. It deals
not with value preferences but with the normative validity of norms of actions" (MCCA
104). We need to consider how this limitation affects our use of the discourse ethic in
dealing with ecological issues.

There are some ecological issues which involve questions of justice or generalizable

interests. With such issues, the discourse ethic would be helpful. So for example, the

discourse ethic could help in settling an issue such as that involved in concerns over the

use of nuclear power. The use of nuclear power involves questions of moral norms since

 

m Bernard Williams makes a similar point in his book, Ethics and the Limits of
Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). See especially his discussion
of John Rawls and RM. Hare in chapter ﬁve.

227

there are both questions of justice (Whose neighborhood will store the radio active
wastes?) and questions of generalizable interests (Does anyone want to risk a nuclear
accident?). In other words, the use of nuclear power is an issue that can be dealt with
at a higher level of abstraction or reﬂection because it involves questions of moral norms.
The point, here, is that some ecological issues can be addressed by the discourse ethic:
namely, issues involving questions of moral norms. The discourse ethic allows us to say,
then, that some ecologically destructive practices are wrong because they violate the
discursively validated moral norms.

However, other ecological issues, such as the preservation of endangered species or
ecosystems, involve questions of value preferences. Thus, it would be inadequate to have
a response to such an issue that was rooted in the moral realm. The reason here is that
value preferences only have meaning, or derive their meaning, from within an historical
way of life. They only make sense, in other words, according to a conception of the
good life. However, "ideas of the good life are not something we hold before us as an

,"

abstract ’ought as is required at the level of reﬂection on moral norms (MCCA 108).
Rather, conceptions of the good life "shape the identities of people and individuals in
such a way that they form an intrinsic part of culture or personality" (MCCA 108). In
order to take an abstract hypothetical attitude towards one’s own culture or identity, one
would have to stop being the particular person they are with the particular biases and
value preferences they have. But one cannot simply get out of one’s own skin. For this

reason, then, responses to issues involving value preferences need to be rooted in a

deﬁnition of the good life--that is, in the ethical realm.

228

The discourse ethic, however, does do some work for us here. Recall that Habermas’
principle of universalization maintains that for a normative truth claim to be valid, it must
be agreed to by all affected. This principle sets certain boundaries within which
acceptable resolutions to conﬂicts must fall. In addition, it sets similar limits for
reconstructing the conception of the human-nature relationship. For example, a proposed
conception which ignored completely the concerns of a group that would be adversely
affected, would not fall within the acceptable limits. Note that this does not imply that
the only acceptable proposals are those which do not adversely effect any of the parties
involved. For it may well be the case that there is no such conception of nature.m The
point, rather, is that all relevant concerns need to be considered. This is the key reason
for developing a dialogical conception of practical reason--it allows for such consideration
of all relevant concerns through discursive argumentation.

Habermas’ distinction between the moral and the ethical also permits various cultures
to construct different conceptions of the human-nature relationship. Because there are
only boundaries within which proposed conceptions of nature must fall, there is no one

speciﬁc conception which is correct. This allows for various cultures to work out

 

‘25 I can imagine, for instance, that there would be no acceptable conception of
nature which permitted unregulated use of ozone depleting CFC’s. Thus, any acceptable
conception would negatively effect the manufacturers of CFC’s. But we should not take
this to mean there is no acceptable conception of nature, or that an acceptable conception
of nature must please all parties involved. In this case, the manufacturers of CFC ’s have
the right, according to Habermas’ discourse ethic, to have their concerns heard.
However, there is no assurance that this particular concern or interest will be satisﬁed.
For the community of inquirers involved, in using Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry,
may conclude that the beneﬁts of using CFC’s do not warrant the damage such use
causes.

229

different conceptions of nature that would better suit their particular circumstances.
However, deﬁnitions of the good life from which conceptions of nature arise can only
include value preferences that are consistent with the norms validated by the discourse
ethic. We can say, then, that the discourse ethic is a minimalist ethic.

What has been said here must be understood as pertaining to the abstract level. It will
only become concrete through actual debate and discussion; the historical context of that
discussion will provide the concrete content. In other words, the people involved will
work out the actual substance of the concept of nature by making use of their historical
conditions. Through reconstructing the actual conditions they experience in the
problematic situation, they will give content to the human-nature relation. And here we
can again see how different societies may come up with quite different conceptions, since
they will be facing different historical circumstances. One might add, then, that in
addition to the formal limits set by Habermas’ principle of universalization, there are also
limits set by the historical circumstances. The point is, though, that only the former can

be known a priori. The latter requires empirical study.

D. Consideration of Aesthetic Concerns

We have seen that Habermas’ discourse ethic is limited in the aid it can offer for
dealing with ecological issues. For although it does suggest boundaries within which
acceptable conceptions of the good life must fall, and also addresses issues involving

moral concerns, it provides little help for dealing with conﬂicts concerning value

230

preferences. It would be helpful, then, if we could further delimit the concept of an
acceptable deﬁnition of the good life. Doing so would give further guidance in conﬂict
resolution and in reconstructing the human—nature relationship. But to do this in a
manner that avoids being dogmatically foundationalist, we need to ﬁnd some way of
developing internal standards--standards that arise from within the context of the good life
itself. Externally imposed standards would simply be dogmatic metaphysical principles
that have no clear connection to the historically situated deﬁnition of the good life. I
suggest that Dewey’s aesthetic theory offers such an internal standard.126

Dewey’s notion of a consummated experience-an experience with an aesthetic
quality--offers clariﬁcation of how the deﬁnition of the good life might, in part, be
ﬂeshed out. However, this is best understood as a formal limit for acceptable
conceptions of the good life. It cannot dictate the concrete content of any such concept,
nor dictate the solution to a particular conﬂict. Hence, this aesthetic aspect of the
rational process for achieving an ecological orientation, just as the moral aspect, allows
for cultural variation. Before saying more on how these aesthetic concerns help in
dealing with ecological issues, we need to clarify some basic features of Dewey’s
aesthetic theory. After this I will say something about the implications this view of

aesthetics has regarding conceptions of the good life.

 

”6 Dewey developed his aesthetic theory in his Art as Experience (New York:
Capricorn Books, 1934), hereafter cited as Art in the text.

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1. The Experience of the Live Creature

Dewey’s aesthetic theory begins with an examination of the generic features of the
experience of the live creature. This experience, Dewey tells us, is determined by the
essential conditions of life. The condition of life Dewey gives primary focus to is the
relation between the live creature and its environment: " The career and destiny of a living
being are bound up with its interchanges with its environment, not externally but in the
most intimate way " (Art 13). Dewey describes the life process as a continual adjustment
and readjustment of the live being to its environment. Life for Dewey "consists of phases
in which the organism falls out of step with the march of surrounding things and then
recovers unison with it--either through effort or by some happy chance" (Art 14). This
account is not so different in its broad general outline than an account given by a
biologist in an introductory paragraph on the senses of the wolf:

The wolf is one of the most intelligent of all wild creatures. It has the ability to
learn from experience. It is being pushed back not because it lacks intelligence,
but because it is smart enough to know that all hands are turned against it.
Therefore, it strives to keep away from the constant danger that man
represents. ‘27
This brief account of the wolf illustrates just what Dewey means by the notion of a
growing life. In a growing life, there is not merely a recovery by the organism; rather

there is an enrichment, or learning from the experienced resistance. As Dewey puts it:

"Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of

 

‘27 Leonard Lee Rue, Game Animals: A Field Book of North American Species, (New
York: Harper & Row, 1968), 104.

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energies of the organism with those of the conditions under which it lives" (Art 14). The
wolf achieved this more extensive balance of energies by taking certain measures:
namely, it removed itself from the problematic situation. In its interaction with its
environment, the wolf shows signs of intelligence of some degree in that it recognized
a problem, and also came up with some means of dealing with it.

But why the talk about wolves rather than humans? Dewey thinks that the key to
understanding the aesthetic experience lies in the very basic or generic experiences of the
live creature. The experience of the wolf illustrates what Dewey is attempting to get at
in talking about the life process in the ﬁrst place: namely, that there are certain rhythms
in life which give it unity. The rhythms are, of course, the falling out of step and the
recovery of equilibrium. The unity is the meaning the experience has for the live
creature. In the example of the wolf, the problem it encountered was the threat to its life
which humans present. It dealt with this problem by removing itself from human
presence. And the meaning, or unity of this experience is expressed in the way the wolf
will behave in the future-it will attempt to avoid contact with humans. There is here,
then, a rhythm of ordered change in the progression from an encountered difﬁculty to a
resolution. The action taken by the wolf illustrates what Dewey says in the following:
"In the process of living, attainment of a period of equilibrium is at the same time the
initiation of a new relation to the environment, one that brings with it potency of new
adjustments to be made through struggle" (Art 17). Thus, we can say that one of the key

features Dewey sees in the basic experience of the life process is a rhythm of ordered

change.”‘

We also need to take note of another of Dewey’s statements: "To grasp the source of
esthetic experience it is, therefore, necessary to have recourse to animal life below the
human scale" (Art 18). But why should this be necessary? The move to the level of the
animals below humans is an attempt to bring out a certain aspect of immediacy which
Dewey thinks is involved in a unitary experience. That is to say, it is quite evident in
the activity of the wolf hunting its prey that the wolf is fully presen --its whole being is
focused towards accomplishing its goal. Humans, on the other hand, often ﬁnd many of
their activities too routine, or boring, and their thoughts withdraw them from the
experience rendering the experience fragmentary; it lacks the complete unity exhibited
in the wolf’s hunt. Another way to express this lack of unity is to say that it is more
evident in the lower animals that the past and future are not so distinct from the present
as they are in human experience. The lower animals live more fully in the present
whereas humans are burdened with past regrets and anxious anticipation of the future (Art
18). Thus, the animal’s experience exhibits more unity. This notion of a unitary
experience is another key part of Dewey’s conception of the aesthetic quality. As Dewey
puts it, "Art celebrates with peculiar intensity the moments in which the past reénforces
the present and in which the future is a quickening of what now is" (Art 18). But we
should not make an unthinking leap here and conclude that Dewey is saying the lower

animals live a very artistic life. However, he does want to say that because "experience

 

”3 We ﬁnd here another variation on the process of inquiry as a response to a
problematic situation.

234

is the fulﬁllment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things,
it is art in germ" (Art 19). So we ﬁnd that whatever art is, it has roots in the life process
wherein there is rhythm and unity to be found.

We need now to examine how Dewey takes this germ of art and develops it into an
account of what it is for humans to have an experience--an experience which exhibits an

aesthetic quality.

2. The Aesthetic Quality of An Experience

In this section I want to make clear what Dewey is referring to when he talks about
an experience and point out why he thinks this involves the experience having an
aesthetic quality.

To begin, we can reiterate what was said in the last section about experience being
just that interaction between the live creature and its environment. It was pointed out
there that this interaction involves struggle and conﬂict resulting from the resistance
which things in the environment present to the creature. This encountered resistance
often results in many experiences which are begun, but never ﬁnished. In Dewey’s
words, "we start and then stop, not because the experience has reached the end for the
sake of which it was initiated but because of extraneous interruptions or of inner
lethargy" (Art 35). What we have in these cases is not an experience, but merely
fragments of things experienced.

The fragmentary experience contrasts with those experiences which are begun with

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an aim, and manage to achieve fulﬁllment upon reaching their goal. There are many
possible examples of such experiences. Dewey lists things as diverse as ﬁnishing a piece
of work with satisfactory results, a game played through, and even the eating of a meal
could qualify. The crucial features of an experience, then, are that it be initiated for a
purpose, and be carried through in such a manner that when the end is arrived at, there
is a consummation rather than a mere cessation.

A good example of an experience is the crafting of a paper. I say crafting rather than
mere writing to emphasize another aspect which Dewey claims an experience has:
namely, that an experience has no holes in it, or parts that do not quite ﬁt. Now in a
paper which is well written, we ﬁnd something begun with a deﬁnite purpose. And
further, if it is indeed well constructed, each part should answer a problem which arose
in the course of the paper, and answer it in such a way that it relates both to what has
gone before it and to what will follow. But most importantly, the end of the paper will
be a consummation towards which the paper has been developing.

We can sum up Dewey’s notion of an experience, then, by saying an experience has
certain key features: it has an internal integration and fulﬁllment reached through ordered
and organized movement, and as Dewey says, "its close is a consummation and not a
cessation" (Art 35). These features are what Dewey thinks characterize the aesthetic
quality. However, it must be pointed out here that the having of these features does not
make something a distinctively aesthetic experience. At this point all Dewey is saying
is that an experience is one which exhibits an aesthetic quality. We will not be concerned

with the uniquely aesthetic here. Rather it is this notion of the aesthetic quality of an

 

236

experience which will help us in deﬁning the concept of the good life.

3. Consummatory Experiences and the Good Life

To begin this section, I would like to make mention of another philosopher who has
some similarities with Dewey: Gabriel Marcel. The aspect of Marcel’s thought I want
to mention is his view on what constitutes the being of a human. Humans, according to
Marcel, are essentially unﬁnished. That is to say, Marcel thinks human essence is not
something given in a substantial form as was traditionally held in the view of humans as
rational animal. Instead, he claimed what humans are, what their being is, comes from
their experiences. Ideally, a person’s life would be like an opera where each part, like
each act, was connected to what came before and with what follows; where the full
meaning is consummated in the ﬁnal act; and with the ﬁnal note ﬁnished, the person
would die. Unfortunately, life is seldom lived as an opera. All too often life ends on
an unﬁnished note as it did for the young trumpeter of Krakow who was killed before he
could ﬁnish the ﬁnal note of the Heynal.” This is not to suggest life is all gloom and
doom, but simply that much of life is unconnected, or unﬁnished because we are
interrupted and unable to bring to consummation many of our experiences.

Dewey would agree, at least in part, with Marcel. In the following passage we can

 

‘29 The Trumpeter of Krakow, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966). This
children’s story illustrates Marcel’s point nicely. It is based on a thirteenth century
legend about a boy "whose courage and patriotism live on today in a certain trumpet—call,
a tune ’unﬁnished’ because, as he once blew it, the arrow of an invading Tartar pierced
his breast" (from the introduction).

237

hear in Dewey a note of accord with Marcel’s conviction of the unﬁnished nature of life’s
experiences: "No one experience has a chance to complete itself before something else
is entered upon so speedily. What is called experience becomes so dispersed and
miscellaneous as hardly to deserve the name" (Art 45). Dewey was well aware of how
unconducive to an inner harmony our world today can be. As we see him saying in the
above passage, we are constantly doing things; we no sooner begin one experience when
we ﬁnd ourself interrupted and another forcing itself upon us. But oddly enough, many
have come to view this as the way things should be. They try to cram as many
experiences into a day’s time as possible, " even though no one of them is more than a
ﬂitting and a sipping" (Art 45). What we have, then, is simply a series of fragments of
experiences, but often there is nothing that uniﬁes the series which results in it being
rather meaningless and lacking in order.

The live creature, however, needs a certain harmony and order in its life. Dewey was
aware of this need: "For only when an organism shares in the ordered relations of its
environment does it secure the stability essential to living" (Art 15). We saw in chapter
four that at the center of Dewey’s thought is the life process with its tensions and
struggles. These struggles cause a break in the continuity of experience. Dewey thinks
"inner harmony is attained only when, by some means, terms are made with the
environment" (Art 17). And it is here that we can see how his thought on aesthetics can
give us a better understanding of what an acceptable deﬁnition of the good life might be.
For Dewey, experience has an aesthetic quality when, in spite of struggle and conﬂict,

we achieve a sense of meaning in our otherwise inchoate experiences. Indeed, Dewey

 

238

saw art as a proof of the possibility of there being order and meaning in our world: "Art
is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on
the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action characteristic of the
live creature " (Art 25). This meaning would come, not from some source external to our
experience, but rather from an ordered and organized movement towards the
consummation of those experiences.

In closing this section I would like to emphasize the manner in which Dewey’s
aesthetic theory—-being based on the experience of the live creature--can help in deﬁning
the good life. His view on what constitutes the aesthetic quality in experience--unity,
ordered and organized movement toward consummation--suggests a formal conception of
the good life. The good life, whatever else it might consist of, ought to be such that the
experiences which constitute it have an aesthetic quality. In other words, the value
preferences which deﬁne a particular conception of the good life should promote that
aesthetic quality in more of people’s ordinary, everyday experiences. In sum, rather than
the events of our lives being just so many inchoate anecdotes, they should be a series of

interrelated short stories much in the way of James Joyce’s Dubliners.”°

We can see,
then, how this is a standard that is internal to the experiences themselves; it is not an
externally imposed criterion.

The previous section helps take us another step toward reconstructing our conception

of the human-nature relationship. It provides another piece of the framework within

 

13° For those unfamiliar with Dubliners, it is a collection of writings, each of which
is a short story in its own right, but which also can be understood as forming a novel
when taken together as a whole.

239

which this conception is to be worked out. However, it may not yet be clear how
Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience relates to issues in environmental ethics. I want
now to make the connection more explicit.

The conception of the human-nature relation--whatever the speciﬁc content turns out
to be——will bring with it certain social institutions. In other words, whatever conception
gets worked out, it will be associated with certain types of social institutions and
practices. The character of these institutions and practices is important, since they will
play a role in determining identity formation and need interpretations of citizens. Identity
formation crystallizes around social and cultural institutions. These institutions, if there
is credence in Dewey’s aesthetic theory, must be such that they do not promote the
formation of identities which will increasingly become frustrated. Put another way, we
can say that our current institutions and practices promote the formation of identities and
need interpretations that depend on the exploitation of nature. Encouraging reliance on
the individual auto, the use of disposable, non-reusable products, the overuse of
herbicides, pesticides, and chemical fertilizers are a but few examples. However, now
that our technology allows us to look further into the future, we can see that such need
interpretations, and the identities formed around these, are not sustainable. Thus, to
promote the formation of such need interpretations and identities makes little sense.
Doing so will only lead to crises. And here we come to the connection with Dewey’s
notion of the aesthetic quality of experience.

Dewey’s aesthetic theory suggests we should attempt to create a society in which

citizens can lead meaningful lives-—a society in which they can attain consummation of

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the experiences they undertake. Since these experiences, in large part, are determined
by their need interpretations, promoting need interpretations known to lead to eventual
crises would not be desirable. Instead, we should be attempting to establish social
institutions and practices which promote sustainable need interpretations and identities.
While such institutions would not guarantee everyone will attain consummation of their
experiences, they will promote rather than impede such experiences. In sum,
consideration of this aspect of aesthetics provides a formal limit for our reﬂection on
ecological issues: that is, questions regarding value preferences, and questions having to
do with the formation of value preferences, should be settled so as to promote rather than
impede people’s ability to achieve consummation of their life’s experiences.

We can refer back to an example discussed in chapter three that illustrates how our
current institutions frustrate attainment of consummated experiences. The example
involves the issue of transportation. We saw how our institutions and infrastructure often
discourages people from using more ecologically sound modes of transportation such as
buses and bicycles. Now if someone wanted to choose living a more ecologically sound
lifestyle, using buses or bicycling might well be a part of that lifestyle. However, our
institutions and infrastructure will impede that person from achieving their goal of living
a more ecologically sound life--they will not be able to achieve consummation of the
experiences which would constitute such a life. Consideration of aesthetic concerns,
then, allows us to critique our institutions, infrastructure and practices.

These aesthetic considerations could also be used in determining acceptable resolutions

to particular conﬂicts, and in reconstructing the concept of nature. They provide formal

241

limits within which acceptable resolutions and acceptable conceptions must fall.
However, we must also bear in mind that these aesthetic considerations must remain
consistent with the moral norms that are validated through discursive argumentation in
the public sphere.

In closing this chapter I want to review where we are in terms of the conﬂicts
regarding ecological issues. After all, it has been my criticism that the mainstream
approaches to environmental ethics fail in resolving these conﬂicts. The question is,
then, what does the approach taken in this dissertation offer in the way of resolving these
conﬂicts?

What is offered here is a conception of a rational process that answers to the loss of
conﬁdence and conviction regarding our ability to deal with questions of ends and
evaluative judgments in a rational manner. Put another way, this rational process answers
the problem of modernity; it allows human rationality to formulate standards of
normativity for and by itself. This process is partly moral and partly aesthetic. The
combination of moral and aesthetic concerns provides a response to the need of a
reconstructed conception of the human-nature relationship for which neither the moral nor
the aesthetic alone is adequate.

On the moral side, this rational process provides a dialogical means for the validation
of moral norms. Having a dialogical means for validating moral norms provides us with
a formal limit within which acceptable conceptions of the human-nature relationship can
be worked out. What is new about the way the discourse ethic establishes this formal

limit is that it is generated from within the context of a way of life, and validated through

242

the democratic participation of people in discursive argumentation. It is not an external
limit derived by philosophers from some metaphysical or moral principles and then
imposed on the people reconstructing the concept of nature. The formal limit, then, is
that the resolution of conflicts, and the reconstruction of the human-nature relationship,
must be consistent with the moral norms established by the discourse ethic.

In addition to providing a formal moral limit, the moral aspect of this rational process
can address some ecological issues directly. The example of the use of nuclear power,
as we saw earlier, is one such case. The point here is that certain ecological issues
involve questions of justice and generalizable interests. Such ecological issues permit of
treatment at the level of abstraction used with the discourse ethic. However, as
mentioned earlier, not all ecological issues permit of treatment at this level of abstraction.
Again the reason is that the source of some conﬂicts involve value preferences rooted in
historical ways of life. And the level of reﬂection used in the discourse ethic to validate
moral norms is inappropriate for reﬂection on questions of value preference.

The aesthetic aspect of the rational process complements the limitation of the moral
aspect. Consideration of aesthetic concerns, because these concerns are rooted in
experiences constituting historical ways of life, give us a means to reﬂect on conceptions
of the good life from which value preferences arise. Although these aesthetic concerns
do not provide us with solutions to particular conﬂicts involving value preferences, they
do provide formal limits within which acceptable solutions should fall. In addition, the
formal limits set by aesthetic considerations offer guidance for reconstructing the

conception of nature as well as our social institutions, infrastructures, and practices.

243

Like the limits set by the moral side of this rational process, the aesthetic limits are
not imposed by some external principle. Rather, these limits are derived from
characteristics of the experiences constituting historical ways of life.

This rational process, then, provides a means for reﬂecting on ecological issues that
works only by the democratic participation of the people involved in the conﬂicts, or
those concerned and affected by the reconstruction of our institutions, infrastructure, as
well as the conception of nature. Put another way, given the participatory and
historically rooted conception of rationality presented in this dissertation, there are limits
to what the theorists can say. The conception of reason itself dictates these limits. These
limits suggest that the philosopher cannot make a priori claims regarding the resolution
of all practical conﬂicts. They also suggest responsibilities facing democratic
communities. These communities have the responsibility to work out solutions within the
moral and aesthetic limits provided.

At this point one may still think that nothing has been done that really addresses the
practical conﬂicts involving ecological issues. It may seem that in spite of the criticism
of the mainstream theories for creating a gap between theory and practice, the work done
here is no better in terms of resolving a practical conﬂict. And it might be further
claimed that to say it is not the philOSOpher’s task to address a particular practical conﬂict
is just to set up a convenient slogan to hide behind-~to make it appear that the theoretical
work here does bear on practice while the practical conﬂicts go unchanged. To address
this concern I would like to consider how an actual conﬂict might be approached using

the conception of practical rationality presented in this dissertation. While I still maintain

 

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that a solution cannot be given a priori, something can be said about the kind of moves
to be made in working out a solution.

If we again consider the conﬂict over the northern spotted owl, we can get a sense
of how the work done here can be brought to bear on an actual conﬂict. The conﬂict
involves the environmentalists on one side claiming we need to stop cutting the old
growth forests of the northwestern states because the spotted owl requires such a habitat
to survive. Depending on the particular view of the environmentalist, there is another
premise involved that states the owl itself has some type of value that warrants its
preservation (some claim it is the owl itself that has an intrinsic value, or others claim
it is the ecosystem of which the owl is a part that has value, etc.). On the other side, we
ﬁnd the loggers claiming that these forests must be cut to provide jobs for the
communities of this region, and thereby keep the economy from being disrupted.
Without these jobs, their way of life is threatened. In essence the conﬂict is between
preserving the way of life of the loggers and preserving the spotted owl.

The ﬁrst thing to keep in mind is that whatever solution is proposed, it must be
consistent with the moral norms worked out through discursive argumentation, and also
fall within the formal limits set by aesthetic concerns. This suggests that a wholesale
rejection of either side of the conﬂict would not be acceptable. For example, simply
claiming that the logging must stop would be unacceptable, since it ignores the concerns
of the loggers, and therefore, violates Habermas’ principle of universalization.

Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry suggests that the next move is to reconstruct the

existing conditions of the situation in a manner that permits resolution of the conﬂict.

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In doing this, closer attention should be paid to what the loggers are claiming when they
say they want to preserve their way of life. What are the essential aspects of this way
of life? Is cutting down old growth forests essential to this way of life in the way that
the restriction on the use of the automobile is essential to the traditional Amish way of
life? I get the sense that what is important to the people in the communities of the
northwest states that rely on the logging industry is not so much whether they can cut
down trees, but rather that they can earn a decent income that would allow them to
maintain a rural lifestyle. Here we ﬁnd aesthetic concerns surfacing. The people of
these communities apparently ﬁnd their way of life meaningful, and now ﬁnd it
threatened. Any acceptable solution to the conﬂict must be such that it preserves the
meaningfulness of this way of life, or offers acceptable alternative means for these people
to lead a meaningful way of life. It just happens that cutting down trees has been a way
to earn an income in these communities. But if some alternative ways of earning an
income were possible, cutting down trees would not be such an issue of conﬂict with the
environmentalists. If this is the case, then we have given a reconstruction of the
problem: that is, rather than having a conﬂict of incompatible values (the value of the
owl versus the value of a smooth functioning economy) we now have a problem of a lack
of alternatives. Note that this latter problem is such that we can say what would resolve
it. It is a problem to which intelligence can be applied.

Viewing the problem as a lack of alternatives allows inquiry to proceed. Intelligence
can now be brought to bear in developing alternatives. Moreover, we also have criteria

for judging the acceptability of proposed alternatives: they would have to meet the formal

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moral and aesthetic requirements. What has been said here is not intended as a solution
to the conﬂict between the loggers and the environmentalists. In one sense no solution
was given. The above discussion is only a suggestion on how the conﬂict could be
approached using the account of practical rationality presented in this dissertation. It was
intended to illustrate that what was said at the theoretical level is not wholly cut off from
practical concerns, but can serve as tools for those engaged in working out solutions to
their practical problems.

In sum, as a response to the problems arising from the practical conﬂicts over
ecological issues, a rational process has been offered; it is one which ensures that the
practical-moral and aesthetic aspects of environmental issues are not eliminated or treated
merely as technical matters. The approach presented here offers citizens choice in how
they may understand their relation with their natural environment; it allows rational
autonomy in this choice. With this choice, however, comes a responsibility to construct

an adequate conception of this relation.

Chapter VII
Conclusion

A. Introduction

This dissertation offers a pragmatic response to the practical problems we currently
face regarding ecological issues. How is it pragmatic? Its pragmatism can best be seen
in contrast to the more traditional responses found in the literature of environmental
ethics. In particular, it can be seen in its interpretive reconstruction of the problematic
situation, in its refusal to see the problem as merely a situation in which we have made
use of the wrong moral principles in our interaction with nature. The problem facing the
philosopher begins with the practical conﬂicts involving ecological issues. We need to
resolve these conﬂicts in some manner. So far there is a basic agreement between the
approach of this dissertation and the more traditionally minded approaches. But here the
agreement stops. As a way to better understand how this approach differs from the more
traditional approaches, we can consider what Dewey says about the three ways of
idealizing the world:

There is idealization through purely intellectual and logical processes in which
reasoning alone attempts to prove that the world has characters that satisfy our
highest aspirations. There are, again, moments of intense emotional appreciation
when, through a happy conjunction of the state of the self and of the surrounding
world, the beauty and harmony of existence is disclosed in experiences which are
the immediate consummation of all for which we long. Then there is an

idealization through actions that are directed by thought, such as are manifested
in the works of ﬁne art and in all human relations perfected by loving care. ‘3‘

 

13‘ John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), 302.
247

248

Of the traditional approaches to environmental ethics, most follow some version of the
ﬁrst of these attempts of idealizing the world, and others follow the second. I have
followed the third, since it alone permits us to bring intelligence to bear on our current
problems.

In this concluding chapter I want to use the above three categories to help illustrate
the important ways in which this approach is different, and how, because of this
difference, it is better able to deal with the practical problems. I will do this by
summarizing each of the chapters, and showing the role each plays in my overall

argument.

B . Chapter Two

In the second chapter I consider some representative theories in environmental ethics.
These theories are in the Anglo-American tradition, and I discuss why these approaches
to ecological issues are problematic. Recall that the ﬁrst way to idealize the world is to
construct some logical argumentative theory that demonstrates its ideal quality.
Environmental philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition who argue for some type of
value in nature are engaged in this enterprise. In their attempt to respond to the practical
problems involving ecological concerns, they claim that humans need to give moral
consideration to nature. But here they run into a problem: namely, our traditional ethical
categories are homocentric. In other words, the only morally relevant values traditionally

recognized are human centered values. In the face of this tradition, claiming that nature

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in itself possesses a morally relevant value is problematic. The traditionally-minded
thinkers, in responding to this problem, have understood their task as the need to
establish the basis of a legitimate value of nature--of their idealization of nature-which
can then be appealed to in making prescriptive claims regarding our treatment of nature.
The strategy here seems plausible: they are trying to show that we ought to respect
nature, and not exploit or destroy it, because it has some value in itself. The problem,
however, is not a failure on our part to value nature. We do value nature. But we also
value other things that are destructive of nature. For example, we value acid free lakes
and rivers, but we also value electricity produced by coal powered generating plants
which contribute to acid rain. The basis of the conﬂict, then, is not that we fail to value
nature, but rather that we value two incompatible things: nature and practices which are
harmful to nature.

Following the more traditional approach of idealizing nature will not resolve this type
of practical conﬂict. Simply claiming nature possesses some sort of value in itself is
inadequate. For a further argument would be needed that established this value of nature
as being, in some sense, higher, and therefore taking precedence over the value of the
electricity. But the mainstream thinkers have not reached this point because they have
become entangled in philosophical difﬁculties involved in the attempt to establish the
value of nature. They never get back to the concrete problem.

One of the philosophical difﬁculties encountered involves what Dewey has called the
philosophic fallacy. The mainstreamers take a conceptual ideal--the value of nature in

itself--which they believe would resolve their problem, and they transpose this ideal into

 

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an antecedently existing reality. In short, they try to substantify an action. Some people
value nature. This is an action; it is something people do. The mainstreamers try to
reify this act by constructing logical arguments purporting to show that nature possesses
a value that we ought to respect. Here we ﬁnd their attempt at idealizing nature through
a purely intellectual and logical process. But this reiﬁcation is only a conceptual move,
and as such it only serves as a solution in contemplation.

The result of this move is the creation of a gap between theory and practice. In other
words, the claim that nature has a value in itself is supposed to resolve the practical
problems. We are supposed to respect nature because of the metaphysical claim that
nature possesses a value in itself. However, this approach prevents us from bringing
intelligence to bear on the practical conﬂicts. In this account, once the theoretical work
that shows nature possesses some value in itself is completed, intelligence has ﬁnished
its task. However, the practical conﬂicts remain in spite of this work of intelligence.

The problem at this point is that this approach relies on an inadequate conception of
human rationality. It still views human reason primarily in its purposive-instrumental
aspect; it uses reason to secure a means to an end. The means is the theory, and the end
is securing the value of nature. But notice, here, that this approach has reduced a
practical-moral issue to a technical issue. There is no rational deliberation over whether
valuing nature is a more appropriate end than pursuing activities which cause nature
harm. Instead, it sees the issue as a matter of securing effective means, and not as an
question of ends. By using reason only to construct a theory about an end--the value of

nature--reason remains cut off from practice. It is not allowed to be brought to bear on

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the practical issues. Again, the core problem here is the inadequate, one-sided view of
human reason as purposive-instrumental rationality. Moreover, this view of human
reason is kept in the background, and not explicitly acknowledged. The result is that it
appears as though these approaches are dealing with practical issues when, in fact, they
ignore the practical issues.

As we have seen, the approach in this dissertation avoids the above problem by
bringing into question the one-sidedness of this conception of human reason, and offers
a more adequate conceptionuone which recognizes the practical-moral and aesthetic
aspects of human rationality.

The second way of idealizing nature relies on the fact that there are moments when
we experience nature in such a way that there is a disclosure of beauty and harmony.
This way is an improvement over the ﬁrst, since it acknowledges that there is no need
to try to give an argument for something that occurs anyway. People do value nature;
they do experience its beauty and harmony. However, this way of idealizing nature is
also problematic. It is problematic because it is insecure and depends on fortune. Not
every experience of nature discloses beauty and harmony, nor do all people value nature
the same. The environmental philosophers who advocate developing an environmental
sensibility do not adequately consider the factors of twentieth century life which impede
the development of this sensibility. They fail to consider the historical development of
human rationality and the effect this development has on how we understand our world
today. In short, this way of idealizing nature ignores the other side of the conﬂict--the

reasons why humans exploit nature.

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One might argue that while not all the problems concerning ecological issues have
been resolved, there has been a growing awareness of the harmful impact which our
actions have on the environment. Even if one were generous and allowed the mainstream
philosophers to take some of the credit for this, there is a problem here. It has to do
with the lack of rational debate referred to above. There remains a dogmatic prejudice
in these approaches; it is their lack of rational deliberation of ends that betrays this
prejudice.

In the mainstream theories, reason has a speciﬁc task: namely, to establish some type
of value in nature. A practical result of this approach is that they gain nodding heads
from those already predisposed to valuing nature. However, it does little in the way of
addressing the concerns of those who are not so predisposed, or who are willing to value
ecologically unsound practices--for whatever reason--more than they value a healthy
environment. This situation encourages like-minded groups to rely on other means for
advancing their position. Rather than appealing to reason and discursive argumentation,
they rely on political force and manipulation of public opinion for changing our current
ecologically unsound practices. They do this because their underlying conception of
human rationality does not provide them with a means to rationally deliberate about the
issues.

Some may argue that so long as those unsound practices are changed, it matters little
what means were used to attain the change. Indeed, this is a version of a charge
frequently leveled against pragmatism. I maintain, however, that political force and

manipulation of public opinion are not acceptable means; they impede the rational

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democratic process for making practical decisions. Furthermore, the position developed
in this dissertation allows me to say why it is unacceptable. It is unacceptable because
it violates the basic premise of the discourse ethic: namely, that all relevant voices be
heard and be permitted to present their case for debate. In sum, the mainstream approach
has these difﬁculties because it fails to address the problem of the one-sided development
of human rationality, and the need for normative standards that can be developed and
legitimated through human reason alone. Because of this failure, it promotes a response
to the environmental problems that, while seeming to be rational, actually relies on non-
rational political force and manipulation of public opinion.

In addition, because the mainstream approaches fail to give an adequately rational
response to the problems, businesses and corporations may take advantage of this
situation. Many corporations develop public relations programs that present themselves
as engaging in ecologically sound practices when they are, in fact, far from being
ecologically sound. An example is the commercials we see that use scenes of applauding
wildlife cheering the use of double-hulled oil tankers. This scene may manipulate public
Opinion, but it also diverts attention away from the core problem—~the over consumption
of energy and the ecological costs of this practice. It tries to create an image of our
current practices as basically sound if we just add a few more safeguards. Another
example is the department store that promotes itself as being earth friendly when, in fact,
its shelves are full of environmentally unfriendly products wrapped in environmentally
unfriendly packaging. The point, here, is that the mainstream theories have no rational

perspective from which to critique these sorts of manipulative methods. Indeed, they

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must rely on such methods themselves, since they relegated to reason a task that is
completely cut off from practice.

The role of the second chapter, then, has been to uncover the difﬁculties and
inadequacies of the approaches to environmental ethics coming out of the Anglo-
American tradition. Examination of the nature of these theories shows there is a need for
the issues involved to be re—thought.

Given the problems facing the mainstream approaches, it becomes apparent that their
attempts at idealizing nature are inadequate. In light of their problems, I proposed we
attempt the third way of idealizing nature mentioned by Dewey: that is, through actions
that are directed by thought. After all, a chief criticism of the mainstream thinkers was
that they created a gap between theory and practice which prevented our bringing
intelligence to bear on the practical conﬂicts involving ecological issues. Indeed, this is
what I take to be the problematic situation facing the philosopher: how can human reason

be brought to bear on these practical problems?

C. Chapter Three

This interpretative reconstruction puts the problematic situation in quite different
terms, and at the same time, gives direction to the needed inquiry for resolving the
problem. In chapter three, I undertake an examination of the historical development of
human reason. The goal of this examination is to uncover the historical factors which

have inﬂuenced this development, and have led to the situation we ﬁnd ourselves in

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today: that is, in the position of being confronted with difﬁcult practical decisions but
without a rational way to make the necessary choices.

Following the work of Maclntyre and Dewey, I locate a problematic development in
human rationality. In its early stages, the thinkers of the Enlightenment period rejected
the ancients’ conception of causation that involved the occult-like powers of teleological
ends. The rejection of teleological ends as causative agents brought about signiﬁcant
advances in the sciences. These advances served to legitimate the development of
technological reason. But at the same time, the rejection of teleological ends destroyed
the three-part structure of the moral scheme of the ancient world: humans as they
happened to be, humans as they ought to be, and the moral precepts, which if followed,
would lead from the ﬁrst state to the second. This moral scheme depended on the notion
of a metaphysical human essence-—humans as they ought to be. But the rejection of
teleological ends undermined this moral scheme by bringing into question the notion of
a human essence. With the ancients’ moral scheme no longer valid, we have the problem
of modernity: the need for human reason to develop moral norms for and by itself. The
Enlightenment thinkers set as their goal the emancipation of humans from dogmatic
prejudice whether in the form of dubious metaphysical or religious principles, or
illegitimate political authorities. Hence, the qualiﬁcation that normative standards need
to be validated by human reason itself and not by some external force. The goal, then,
was to achieve the rational autonomy of the human individual.

However, the development of human rationality turned out to be one-sided. Humans

developed purposive-instrumental reason, which deals with developing efﬁcient means for

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attaining selected ends. While many believed that amelioration of human woes would be
attained by the use of technical reason, it was soon realized that the predominance of this
form of rationality brought about new problems. Many human problems were resolved,
and human existence did become less of a struggle. But Weber, Heidegger, and Marcuse
among others, show that the rationalization of the world did not bring human
emancipation. The basic problem involves the one-sided development of human reason.
Purposive-instrumental reason is well—suited for developing means for attaining selected
ends. However, to be fully emancipated, humans need a rational way of choosing the
ends they will pursue. The narrowly conceived instrumental rationality which was so
well developed in western society does not meet this need. Indeed, the predominance of
technical reason exacerbated the problems; it led to the ravaging of both our social
lifeworld systems and our ecosystems. It led to these problems because we had no
criteria by which to judge the appropriateness of ends. The only criteria technical reason
offered were those derived from system imperatives: Does the proposed end promote or
impede the smooth functioning of the system? The main problem here is that there is no
way to bring into question the system itself-—no way to question whether the system is
worthy of being sustained.

The main point of the third chapter, then, was to show that the problems we face
today involving ecological issues are not simply the result of using the wrong moral
principles in making decisions concerning our treatment of nature; rather the problem
involves an inadequate conception of human rationality. This means that we cannot

adequately deal with ecological issues until we ﬁrst resolve the problem of modernity.

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We have here, then, the problem for the philosopher to resolve. The philosopher’s task
is not to resolve some particular practical conﬂict concerning ecological issues. Rather
the philosopher must develop an account of human rationality which will enable the
pe0ple actually involved in these conflicts to work out a solution. This account of
rationality must, ﬁrst of all, respond to the problem of modernity; it must provide a

means for human reason to develop moral norms for and by itself.

D. Chapter Four

In chapter four I examined the pragmatism of John Dewey to begin working out a
more adequate conception of human rationality. I attempted to set forth the ways in
which Dewey’s approach to ethical inquiry moves the conception of purposive-
instrumental reason beyond the view of it as merely suited for determining appropriate
means for selected ends. Dewey’s understanding of the means/ ends continuum shows that
more is involved in this process than merely constructing appropriate means. Since
Dewey’s understanding of means and ends is quite different from the traditional
conception of them, it was necessary to review the basic elements of his metaphysics and
to understand how his metaphysics related to his ethical thought. His metaphysics shows
the rootedness of his ethical thought in the basic condition of the live creature struggling
to maintain an equilibrium with its environment.

In the discussion of Dewey’s theory of valuation, we saw two senses in which there

is a continuity between means and ends. First, in intelligent projection of ends-in-view,

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the means are constituent elements of the ends. Or put in terms of Dewey’s conception
of causation, the effect (end) just is the sequential ordering (the means) required to
achieve it. Second, there is continuity found in the reciprocal evaluation of means and
ends. This continuity and reciprocal evaluation of means and ends permits us to apply
intelligence to the direction of action. We use intelligence in projecting ends-in-view
which answer to the need or lack in the problematic situation. We can then empirically
test the reasonableness of these projections by observing whether they satisfy the
experienced need. Applying this experimental method of inquiry to moral matters is,
according to Dewey, the task of philosophy in the twentieth centtny.

The point so far is that Dewey’s pragmatism shows us what is wrong with the
narrowly conceived view of technical reason: it is traditionally understood as merely
being capable of devising means for achieving an end. But Dewey has shown that the
traditional conception of means and ends as being separate and isolated is problematic;
they are not isolated from one another, but rather, the means are constituent elements of
the ends. Because of this, the rationality used to reﬂect on means cannot be completely
distinct from that used to reﬂect on ends. But we have also seen that Dewey maintains
a distinction between moral judgments and scientiﬁc judgments. The crucial difference--
given the fact that these judgments have the same logical method--is in the different role
that character plays in each type of judgment. In moral judgments character is part of
the object being judged.

Dewey’s work provides a broader conception of human rationality. Moreover, it is

a conception which permits the development of criteria for evaluative judgments which

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go beyond the criteria derived from system imperatives as was the case with the
traditional conception of technical reason. In addition, his conception of human reason
also responds to the problem of modernity. His rejection of the notion of absolute goods,
and his demand that the solution to a problem utilize the existing conditions in the
problematic situation prevent dogmatic metaphysical or religious principles from
inﬂuencing the choice-in-action required in resolving the problem. Thus, it is human
intelligence and not some external authority which formulates our ends-in-view. Human
reason utilizes the existing conditions and projects an ideal or end-in-view that would
satisfy the existing need or lack. The adequacy of the end—in-view can then be
empirically tested: Does it resolve the problem?

At this point there arises a problem with Dewey’s. We need to ask: What is involved
in the projection of the end-in-view? Dewey tells us that the agent must reconstruct the
existing conditions, and do so in such a way that it resolves the problem. A frequent
charge against Dewey arises at this point: that is, there is nothing in Dewey’s account that
could serve to safeguard against prejudices and biases in the agent’s character from
affecting the content of the end-in-view. The usual response to this charge is that if the
problem is truly resolved, such prejudices will not be allowed, for if they were, other
parties would complain, and by so complaining, they keep the conﬂict alive. Thus, the
empirical test would not be met and the end—in-view which contained the prejudices
would be rejected. The worry remains, however, that there may be an unjust solution
proposed to which no one voices a complaint--that perhaps political force and

manipulation of public opinion may be used in attaining a resolution.

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I suggest there is a solution to this quandary that could satisfy those who object to this
aspect of pragmatism, and yet not make appeal to any dubious metaphysical or
foundationalist claims. The problem I ﬁnd is that Dewey did not clarify what is involved
in the projection of the end-in-view, so that it appears there is nothing to prevent the
agent from making this projection in isolation. But if this is the case, then it can easily
happen that the agent may fall back on customs and habits which may contain prejudices
and biases not appropriate for an acceptable resolution. However, there are passages in
Dewey’s works that suggest this projection would be a social matter. Unfortunately,

Dewey does not provide much clariﬁcation on this matter.

E. Chapter Five

The goal of chapter ﬁve is to show how Habermas’s discourse ethic can supply the
needed clariﬁcation of the dialogical or social aspect of rationality that Dewey’s account
lacks. Having a dialogical account is crucial, since it would provide the means for
uncovering prejudices that may remain hidden from the isolated agent’s purview. For
as Habermas claims, " nothing better prevents others from perspectivally distorting one’s
own interests than actual participation" in a cooperative process of argumentation. ‘32
Since the discourse ethic supports a principle of universalization, it provides a means for

criticizing the projection of ends-in-view, and thereby can prevent distorting factors from

 

"2 Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans.
Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber N icholsen (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990), 67.

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making their way into the content of the end-in-view.

It is important to properly understand that the universalism of Habermas’ discourse
ethic does not mean his is a foundationalist position. This fact is evident in the
comparison of Habermas and Kant. Kant’s principle of universalization is
foundationalist; it alleges to provide a method for attaining ultimate and immutable moral
truths. Any rational agent can use this method in complete isolation to determine what
the right course of action would be. Habermas, in contrast, gives up any claim to
ultimate and immutable moral truths. Rather than placing the emphasis on what each
individual can will without contradiction to be a universal law, Habermas emphasizes
what all can will to be a universal moral norm. The discourse ethic, then, provides a
rational procedure for redeeming normative validity claims through discursive
argumentation.

As mentioned, the goal of chapter ﬁve was to ﬁnd a way to supplement Dewey’s
approach to ethical inquiry--to provide a dialogical account of practical-moral rationality
to replace Dewey’s monological account. The discourse ethic does this, and this
combination of Deweyan pragmatism and the Habermasian discourse ethic supplies a
rational procedure for human reason to derive standards of normativity by and for itself.
Thus, we have here an account of rationality that responds to the problem of modernity
in a non-foundational manner and which avoids the dangers inherent in a contextualist

position.

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F. Chapter Six

With an account of practical rationality that responds to the problem of modernity,
the question is whether, and if so how, this account can be used to reﬂect on ecological
concerns. There are at least two things we need from the discourse ethic: First, we need
a rational means for resolving practical conﬂicts involving ecological issues, and second,
we need some guidance in the reconstruction of our conception of the human-nature
relationship. Since this account of rationality relies on discursive argumentation, there
ﬁrst is a need to encourage public debate of these issues. Hence, the need for a vital
public sphere as the realm in which this debate can take place.

However, even if we have a vital public sphere, the discourse ethic only provides the
means for validating moral norms. And since morality concerns only questions of justice
and universalizable interests, it alone is not fully adequate to deal with all of the issues
involving ecological concerns. For those issues that involve questions of justice-the
debate over the use of nuclear power is an example--the discourse ethic would be
adequate. And for other issues--those which depend on an historical context to be fully
understood--the discourse ethic provides formal moral limits within which conﬂicts must
be resolved. In other words, the resolution must be consistent with the moral norms that
have been validated in the public sphere through discursive argumentation.

As mentioned, not all ecological issues concern questions of justice or generalizable
interests. Issues such as the preservation of species or wilderness areas also involve

questions of value preferences. Attempting to deal with such concerns by use of the

 

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discourse ethic alone would be inadequate, since the discourse ethic is rooted in the moral
realm. It is inadequate because value preferences only have meaning from within an
historical way of life. They only make sense according to a given conception of the good
life. The reﬂection used with the discourse ethic is at a level of abstraction that is unable
to comprehend the imbeddedness of values in a social way of life; it requires individuals
to take a hypothetical attitude towards their own way of life. But this is not something
that is possible. One cannot both participate in the historical context which gives the
value preferences their meaning, and at the same time, take a hypothetical attitude toward
that way of life. To do so requires the individual to engage in two different levels of
reﬂection at the same time. So it appears that the discourse ethic is indeed limited in the
aid it can offer for reﬂecting on ecological concerns. It does allow us to resolve conﬂicts
involving questions of justice, and it provides formal moral limits for resolving other
sorts of conﬂicts and for reconstructions of the human-nature relationship.

While the discourse ethic provides the means to reﬂect on moral concerns, we still
need some means of dealing with concerns rooted in the ethical realm. I appeal to
Dewey’s aesthetics to show that we can say something about the historically rooted
conceptions of the good life. Dewey’s work shows that there are aesthetic concerns
involved with such conceptions, and consideration of these aesthetic matters can provide
a means for forming evaluative judgments.

Since there will be cultural and historical variance, we cannot say a priori what the
content of the good life would be. Nonetheless, we can say something in formal terms.

The good life should be such that those living it will ﬁnd their experiences meaningful.

264

Dewey’s notion of an experience which has an aesthetic quality helps us to ﬂesh out, at
least in part, what is meant by a meaningful experience. Experiences that have an
aesthetic quality are such that they have an ordered and organized movement to a
completion that is a consummation and not merely a cessation. Consideration of these
aspects of aesthetic issues provides us with a means for critiquing conceptions of the good
life.

Two key points should be emphasized: First, this is a formal limit on what counts as
a meaningful experience. Since it is a formal limit, it allows for cultural and historical
variance. Second, it is a standard derived from the characteristics of experience itself and
not an externally imposed standard. As such it avoids the problems of a foundationalist
position.

These aesthetic considerations tell us something about what constitutes the good life,
and do so without appealing to an external standard. We now have an account of
rationality that is much fuller than the traditional conception which emphasized only the
technical aspect. From the combination of Deweyan pragmatism and the Habermasian
discourse ethic, we are able to derive a rational process which answers to our loss of
rational standards for dealing with questions of ends and evaluative judgments. In other
words, this rational process overcomes the problem of modernity; it allows for human
reason to formulate standards of normativity for and by itself. This process is partly
moral and partly aesthetic. The moral side provides us with a means for validating moral
norms through discursive argumentation. The aesthetic side provides us with a means to

reﬂect on and critique conceptions of the good life from which value preferences arise.

265

We can use this rational process for reﬂecting on the difﬁculties we face concerning
ecological issues. This rational process provides a means for developing criteria that are
not predominated by technical considerations. Technical considerations will still play a
role in making decisions regarding ecological issues, but now they will be on an equal
footing with practical-moral and aesthetic concerns. However, this process requires the
people involved in the conﬂicts to work out their own solutions. Since ecological issues
concern us all, this requires a democratic process. The discourse ethic, because it
supports a principle of universalization that is democratic in nature, is particularly well
suited for use in the needed debate and discussion over ecological issues.

The people who will be debating these matters, if they make use of the rational
process developed in this dissertation, have the means necessary to work out solutions to
their problems. The moral aspect of the process can be used to settle those issues
involving questions of justice. It also sets formal moral limits for acceptable resolutions
to conﬂicts, and for reconstructing our conception of the human-nature relationship. This
limit is that the resolutions of conﬂicts and the reconstructed concept must be consistent
with the moral norms established by the discourse ethic. The aesthetic aspect also sets
certain formal limits. These limits tell us that whatever solutions are worked out, and
whatever conception of nature is worked out, they must not impede people from having
experiences with aesthetic qualities. In addition, the people involved in the public
debate/discussion can make use of Dewey’s ideas on ethical inquiry, as well as his theory
of valuation. These are tools which can be used in the process of working out the

solutions to their problems.

266

In sum, this dissertation identiﬁes a rational means to further the process of resolving
the conﬂicts involving ecological issues. It is important to note that neither philosophy
nor any other single discipline can give the answers to these problems. They can be
resolved only through a rational, democratic process. But that democratic process can
be aided with the account of human rationality presented in this dissertation. This
account provides a working model which the needed public discussion can follow. There
may be those who see this account as merely another homocentric position--a position
which claims that it is humans who project value onto a value-neutral world--and
therefore, that it relies on a problematic subj ectivist supposition. But the argument
presented does not need such a presupposition. It merely claims that public debate and

discussion is the only court where value judgments can be legitimately decided.

 

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