Date illllllllllliilllllllHHlllllllli ”IIHIHIIHIUHIIHI 31293 00881 084 This is to certify that the thesis entitled THE CITIZEN GROUPS IN THE NUCLEAR POWER PROTEST MOVEMENT: A REASSESSMENT presented by Raymond Garcia has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for M.A. degree in Sociology HQ 7“. flé-[é’ Major professor 0-7 639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution LIBRARY Michlgan State Universlty PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. 1 DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE :31 {)2 6 “131‘ i% ._______. _ ”j 7 OJ , #J MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution chmip. 1 THE CITIZEN GROUPS IN THE NUCLEAR POWER PROTEST MOVEMENT: A REASSESSMENT BY Raymond Garcia A.THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Sociology 1993 Kevin Kelly, Advisor ABSTRACT THE CITIZEN GROUPS IN THE NUCLEAR POWER PROTEST MOVEMENT:.A REASSESSMENT BY Raymond Garcia The research on the nuclear power protest movement for the most part has focused on the mass movement phase of protest, while the earlier phases of the protest have not attracted nearly as much attention. This study makes a case for the reassessment of the nuclear power protest movement, in order to better understand the role played by the citizen protest groups. The research consists of two parts: an historical overview of the protest movement, and a case study of the Midland, Michigan protest. It is argued that the institutional hegemony practiced by the Federal Government and the nuclear industry must continue to be confronted, as it was originally challenged by citizen protest groups. For my mother, Maria Fernandez Garcia iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express sincere thanks to the chair of my committee, Kevin Kelly, and to Marilyn Aronoff and William Ewens. I would also like to recognize the respect and support to my friends and colleagues Susan Joel, Dan Frasier, and Mike Skladany. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION II. THE NUCLEAR POWER PROTEST MOVEMENT A. The First Phase B. The Second Phase C. The Third Phase D. Conclusion III. THE CASE STUDY: MIDLAND, MICHIGAN . Midland: Historical Overview . The Nuclear Power Plant . The Formation of the SVNSG U r) to w . The ASLB Construction Permit Hearing IV. CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY A. Books B. Journals/Magazines C. Newspapers/Documents/Interviews V 15 34 41 46 46 52 59 69 76 81 81 83 84 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The social institutional forces that have been behind the development and operation of the nuclear power program in the United States, the nuclear industry and the federal government ( as represented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), have not been able to successfully site a commercial nuclear power reactor since 1978. This fact indicates a considerable level of success on the part of the social movement that arose in the U.S. in protest of (or opposition to) the nuclear power program. The focus of this research is a retrospective analysis of the nuclear power protest movement and its contribution to the derailing of the nuclear power program. The methodological approach adopted in this study is designed to produce an historical sociological analysis of the nuclear power protest movement. This methodology is subdivided into two parts, focusing on an overview of the nuclear power protest movement, and on a case study of one nuclear power plant protest. The first part, the overview of the movement, is developed methodologically though a literature review of the sociological research on the nuclear power protest movement, in which the research is l 2 utilized to construct an historical analysis of the movement. The second part, the case study of a nuclear power plant protest, is developed though a multi-methodological approach. This case study is constructed though the use of: historical sociological analyses of the protest; the illustration and analysis of information contained within documents generated by the protest group studied, such as the group's constitution, their press releases, information booklets produced by the group, and letters to and from the group to federal agencies and corporations; periodical and newspaper accounts of the protest battle; and through the use of information obtained from interviews with selected members of the protest group. This methodological approach effectively creates the historical social context of the nuclear power protest movement, allowing for the analysis of the movement in retrospect. The grounding theoretical framework for the historical understanding of the nuclear power protest movement adopted in this study is Mitchell's (1981) analysis of the as having developed in three distinct phases: "elite quarrel"; citizen group protest; and direct action, or mass protest. While there was considerable overlapping of these phases, this framework captures the substantive differences in the protests as they took place in particular points in time and space, and within the context of the changing social relations of the period. An important grounding assumption underlying this study is that social institutional forms of 3 power, as embodied in this case by the nuclear industry and the ABC/NRC, are not proactively responsive to citizen demands for input in decision-making processes. The result is social institutional pressure for the achievement of political agendas with complete disregard for the opinion of the citizenry, a process referred to as "institutional hegemony". In 1976, sociologist Otis Dudley Duncan called on sociologists to focus more attention on issues related to nuclear power, and to become more involved in understanding and interpreting the nuclear power decision-making process (Duncan, 1978). The argument advanced in this research study is that social researchers need to reconsider the citizen protest group phase of the nuclear power protest movement to illustrate a more comprehensive understanding of why this movement was to a large degree a successful social change movement. This illustration will also contribute significantly to the understanding of the ongoing battle over nuclear power in the U.S., as well as contributing to the understanding of how institutional hegemony operates in the U.S., and the ways citizens have historically fought this process in the attempt to gain access to social power and decision-making processes. The rationale for this research study is an attempt to advance the sociological understanding of these important social issues and processes. CHAPTER II THE NUCLEAR POWER PROTEST MOVEMENT A.major social movement in the USA emerged in opposition to nuclear power in the wake of the post-World War Two development of nuclear power reactors for electricity production. It has evolved in three distinct phases (Mitchell, 1981:26): an initial opposition to the breakneck speed of development and promotion during the two decades after the war, which grew from within the scientific community engaged in the program, and was marked by an occasional public protest during the later years of this phase; a second phase of protest driven by the formation of local citizen protest groups en masse during the late 1960's and early 1970's, who raised questions about safety and environmental issues within evolving institutional contexts (i.e. regulatory agency hearings, courts, media outlets, etc.); and a third phase of protest that took shape in the mid-1970's, which was focused on large scale mass public protests, such as the protest activities surrounding the Seabrook (New Hampshire) and Diablo Canyon (California) nuclear power reactors. .A.THE FIRST PHASE The first stage of the nuclear power protest movement, referred to by Mitchell as an "elite quarrel" (Mitchell 1981), was characterized by internal disagreements within the scientific community over the proper path of development for nuclear power technology. This technology was an outgrowth of the atomic weapons program in the USA, which culminated in the use of atomic weapons against Japan near the end of World War Two. .As such, the nuclear power energy program was shrouded in a cloak of extreme secrecy, very much like the high security atmosphere that surrounded military-industrial research programs of the war years. The anti-communist political climate of the late 1940's and 1950's Cold War period created an atmosphere within which it was virtually impossible to publicly disagree with nuclear policy, because it was seen as such a crucial national security issue (Price, 1990:3). Dissenting scientists were denied security clearances and personally discredited. This period's climate of suspicion and secrecy was a significant contributing factor to the imperial mindset of the nuclear establishment, referred to as "The Cult of the Atom" by Union of Concerned Scientists economist Daniel Ford (Ford, 1982), and it foreshadowed the institutional resistance to the public's demand for input in the decision-making process that was soon to develop. Despite this repressive atmosphere, there was considerable opposition to the rush to develop nuclear power 6 for the production of electricity. The ABC (Atomic Energy Commission) was created in 1946 (The Atomic Energy Act of 1946). In July, 1947, the AEC received a report from the leading physicist of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer, that indicated the use of natural uranium as a direct source of fuel for nuclear power reactors did not seem hopeful, and the possibility of creating the necessary amounts of plutonium for this purpose was decades away (Ford, 1982:32-33). The ABC was under considerable pressure from the congressional committee responsible for the oversight of the nuclear power program, the JCAE (Joint Committee on Atomic Energy), to report progress on this program, as the sentiment in Congress was that "If we could mobilize to produce the Atomic Bomb in such a short period of time, then energy production should be no problem." The result of this pressure was conflicting reports from ABC commissioners on the progress of the program, with Commissioner Robert Bacher reporting in January, 1948, that "economical nuclear power might be available in perhaps as little as five years", and ABC Chairman David Lilienthal reporting that "atomic power is not just around the corner, nor around two corners” (Ford, 1982: 32-36). This difference of opinion was symptomatic of the split within the ranks of the scientists working on the project. The breakthrough in successful nuclear energy production came from the research on and the construction of a "pressurized water reactor" (PWR) by a combined military 7 and corporate research team. This project was headed by Navy Captain Hyman Rickover and organized by the Westinghouse Corporation, with a cooperative arrangement funded by the ABC (Ford, 1982: 35-40). By this time ABC Chairman Lilienthal had resigned his commission (in 1949), due to an unwillingness to sanction the "purely military development path" the ABC was pressured into taking (Novick, 1976:38-39). This path was seen as problematic within the scientific community due to its single-minded focus on progress toward producing energy from nuclear power without sufficient attention to important details, such as open discussion of methodological issues and safety concerns. The election of President Eisenhower and a Republican Party majority in Congress in 1952 led to the privatization of the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, which was codified into law with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Novick, 1976:40). There was much resistance within the political and scientific communities to the privatization of the nuclear energy program (Ford, 1982:40- 42), especially considering the huge public financial investment that had been made and/or committed to, which amounted to over $52 billion spent by the federal government on nuclear energy programs between 1939 and 1971 (Price, 1990:4). However, under the direction of Eisenhower appointee Lewis Strauss, a former Navy Admiral and investment banker appointed ABC Chairmen in 1952 (Novick, 1976:40), the ABC aggressively undertook the mission of 8 selling nuclear power to the country's utilities and engineering corporations. Several notable scientists spoke out against the desirability of a large scale energy program based on nuclear power as the program accelerated. James B. Conant raised the question of long-term waste issues, which was not considered by the JCAB as it shaped the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Ford, 1982:42-43). Nobel Prize laureate Hermann Mueller, who had warned of the risks of genetic mutations in populations exposed to industrial, medical, and military sources of radiation in his research in 1949, had a paper suppressed which he was going to give at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1955 (Lewis, 1972:57). Linus Pauling received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1962 for his work on the banning of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and he also spoke out against the escalating nuclear power program (Price, 1990:4), as did many other scientists who weren't as well known. As the program's control shifted more and more into the hands of the private sector, the federal government offered many incentives to the corporate world to jump-start the nuclear power industry. These incentives came in many forms, including: the congressional passage of the Price- Anderson.Act in 1957 that protected utilities from liability in the case of a nuclear accident; private access to government research facilities was granted; matching funds for power plant construction were appropriated in many 9 cases; and fuel enrichment services were supplied at cost (Nader and Abbotts, 1977:28). These incentives shielded the nuclear industry from the market forces that would have hindered the development of nuclear power as a source of energy, and distorted the true economic costs. Soon after taking office Chairman Strauss was moved to proclaim that electricity would soon be "too cheap to meter" (Nader and Abbotts, 1979:29). As evidenced by the continued growth in the costs associated with nuclear power, Strauss' Optimism has proven to be a grand illusion of the first order. The first civilian nuclear power plant was constructed in 1957 in Shippingport, Pennsylvania by the Duquesne Power Company, but it was owned by the federal government (Ford, 1982:40). Daniel Ford argued that it was a combination of the afore-mentioned government incentives and a fear of government ownership rooted in the ideology of capitalism that ultimately led to "... a reluctant industry investing its stockholders' money in yet another struggle to stem the tide of socialism.” (Ford, 1982:40) The nuclear power energy program gradually picked up steam in the 1960's, as more public and private corporations became involved in the nuclear industry, and more plants were constructed. By the early 1960's, the use of nuclear power had become institutionalized. In addition to the production of energy, nuclear power was being used for industrial measurement and leak detection, in hospitals, as the use of radioactive isotopes expanded, and for other so-called 10 "peaceful purposes." These additional uses for nuclear technology were used politically to legitimize the non— military nuclear program in the public's eye. Large amounts of literature began to appear on the country's bookshelves, speaking in glowing terms about the benefits of nuclear technology. Former ABC Chairmen Lilienthal was moved to comment: "Without judging the details of these undertakings, the important thing they show is how far scientists and administrators will go to try to establish a non-military use (for atomic power)" (Gyorgy, et al, 1979:13). Clearly the shadow of the USA's use of nuclear weapons on Japan in World War Two hung over the nuclear power program, and was a motivating force for the drive to successfully harness nuclear power for peaceful purposes (“Atoms For Peace" was the program's designated name). This period of "elite quarrel" also contained the precursors to what would become the second phase of nuclear power protest: citizen group protest. The early protests, however, were isolated and focused on somewhat narrow grounds. The first public protest of a nuclear power reactor was spearheaded by the UAW in 1956 over the proposed fast-breeder reactor that was to be constructed thirty miles south of Detroit at Lagoona Beach. The construction permit was issued by the ABC in spite of a report from the ABC's .Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) advising against the construction of the experimental reactor, due to insufficient proof that it could be "operated at this site 11 without public hazard" (Ford, 1982:56). This information was withheld from the JCAB. When this fact was discovered, some members of the JCAB were so outraged that they contacted the UAW and indicated their concerns, also alerting the UAW to the language of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which included the opportunity for public hearings on construction and operation permits for nuclear power plants (Mitchell, 1981:76-77). The UAW initiated the hearings in the interest of its membership, many of whom lived within fifty miles of the proposed experimental reactor's sits. These hearings were officially codified as a part of the permit process in 1957, but at the time a formal public request was necessary. After five years of hearings and court battles over jurisdiction and safety issues, the Supreme Court ruled in 1961 that the ABC had the discretionary power "as it saw fit" to approve the permit under the.Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Two Supreme court justices (Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas) vehemently dissented, arguing that "... once the ABC gave permission for plant construction the momentum would be so great that it would very likely be allowed to operate, in spite of unresolved safety questions." (Ford, 1982:57) By rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court majority granted the ABC and the nuclear industry the right to construct nuclear power plants without having to prove their safety in terms of design and operation, based on the momentum generated by the magnitude of the investment 12 involved in constructing a nuclear power plant, and on the faith in "science's" ability to ultimately resolve the unanswered safety questions. The ramifications of this decision were dramatic, as the power and control of the ABC and the nuclear industry over the nuclear power energy program was institutionally solidified. It also created the decisive vacuum that has allowed the issue of resolving the question of what to do with nuclear wastes to continue to fester to this very day (over thirty years later), without any resolution in sight. As far as the Lagoona Beach plant protest, ABC Chairmen Strauss noted that "This was the first indication that the private development of atomic power would be fought" (Strauss, 1962:324). .As far as the plant itself, it partially melted down five years later, after operating for a total of 378 hours and not producing any meaningful amount of electricity or plutonium, and was shutdown permanently in 1972 (Fuller, 1975). In 1962 the ABC published a set of criteria on the siting of nuclear reactors that had been several years in the making. Important passages from this document indicate a considerable amount of leeway within the rules for applicants who were "...free- and indeed encouraged- to demonstrate to the commission the applicability and significance of considerations other than those set forth in the guides" (Mazuzan, 1986:265). In other words, the industry should not be too concerned with meeting the siting criteria, because the regulations were evolving with the 13 rest of the nascent nuclear power industry. The changing of these criteria soon became an issue in the siting of a proposed reactor by the Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Consolidated Edison applied for a construction permit on December 10, 1962, to build a 750 megawatt nuclear power reactor as a part of a 1,090 megawatt electric power plant at a site in the Ravenswood section of Queens, New York, a half—mile from.Manhattan Island (Mazuzan, 1986:266). This proposed reactor met none of the ABC criteria for distance factors related to population density, but Consolidated Edison was determined to win approval for its construction. The plant would significantly reduce the costs of electricity production by eliminating the need for transmission of the electrical current over long distances from New York City. Citizens rapidly mobilized to protest the granting of a construction permit. This was the first citizen mobilization against a commercial nuclear power plant in the USA. Public hearings were held in which local politicians and local citizens, including a number of scientists, voiced concern about the safety of having a nuclear reactor in such a densely populated area. Consolidated Edison executives scoffed at the protest, the CBO even going so far as telling the JCAB that it was "rather silly" (Mazuzan, 1986:273). The turning point in the Ravenswood plant battle was reached when former AEC Chairmen Lilienthal referred to the 14 plant siting as "very risky business", telling the JCAB that he wouldn't live in Queens with a reactor nearby (Mazuzan, 1986:273-274). He was most concerned about the ABC's "salesmanship, propaganda, and over-zealousness" (Mitchell, 1981:76-77) in their rush to advance the nuclear power energy program by pushing the construction of reactors. Lilienthal's testimony to the JCAB provided the people protesting the construction permit with a large degree of credibility. Shortly thereafter, in the wake of bitter discussions and arguments within the ABC and the nuclear power industry, Consolidated Edison announced on January 3, 1964, the withdrawal of the construction permit application (Mazuzan, 1986:273-281). Thus, the first public protest of a commercial nuclear power reactor in the USA was successful. The Ravenswood protest embodied the "elite quarrel" initial phase of nuclear power protest, in the sense that the uncertainty of the scientists involved in the nuclear power energy program boiled over into public forums such as congressional hearings and media outlets for the first time. Scientists like former AEC Chairman Lilienthal were by no means opposed to nuclear power, but were opposed to the accelerated development path that was being pursued. However, in a number of ways, the Ravenswood battle was a portent of what would come with the second phase of protest: the formation of citizen protest groups; the combination of citizen activism with scientific information; the 15 paternalistic response by powerful social institutional forces (i.e. the nuclear industry, regulatory agencies) toward the concerns raised by citizens; and the battles over science, technology, and information. As such, this was a crucial transition period in the nuclear power protest movement. B.THE SECOND PHASE The stage was set for the second phase of the nuclear power protest movement, the citizen group phase, by the convergence of a number of social factors and motivational forces. As noted, many issues related to the generation of energy from nuclear power were beginning to be discussed in the public forum, as opposed to the behind-closed-doors discussions shrouded in cold war secrecy that had been the norm since the beginning of the nuclear power energy program. .A large volume of literature that was critical of the safety standards and measures utilized by the nuclear industry and the ABC was building up (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:11-12). Scientists such as John Gofman and.Arthur Tamplin, who had researched nuclear power for the ABC at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, and University of Pittsburgh radiological physicist Ernest Sternglass went public with extensive information about problems, inaccuracies, and outright lies about the safety of nuclear power (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974; Lewis, 1972; Gofman and Tamplin, 1979). Information had begun to appear 16 in mainstream media sources, in addition to research published in dis— cipline-centered journals and books. By the late 1960's, the issues surrounding nuclear power were being openly discussed in the public forum. Concurrent with these public considerations of the issues was an increase in the proposed sitings of nuclear power reactors. From the late 1950's to 1964 the average was two proposed nuclear power reactors a year. In 1965 five reactors were proposed. In 1966 the number was up to thirteen (mitchell, 1981:77), and in 1967 the AEC received applications for twenty-nine new reactors, while issuing construction permits for twenty-three reactors whose applications had been pending (Del Sesto, 1979:121). Thus, by the late 1960's it was also clear that the ABC's promotion of nuclear power was succeeding in dramatic fashion. Utility companies pointed to the considerable rise in consumer electricity consumption, which doubled between 1960 and 1970 (Gyorgy, et a1, 1979:17), as evidence for the need for more nuclear power reactors. They also projected an increase of 150% in electricity consumption by the year 2000 (Del Sesto, 1979:120). The tremendous rise in consumer demand for electricity was in large part fueled by utility companies' efforts to sell their product. For example, in 1969 utilities spent $323.8 million on sales and advertising of electricity (Lapp, 1971:18). The aggressive marketing of electricity as 17 "cheap and plentiful", combined with the explosion in the 1960's of the sale of consumer-oriented household products that operated on electricity, provided a clear justification in the ABC's and the nuclear industry's eyes of the need for more electrical production capacity. This, combined with the lingering belief in former ABC Chairman Strauss' statement that electricity from nuclear power would soon be "too cheap to meter" (Nader and Abbotts, 1977:29), further paved the path for the expansion of the nuclear power program. The explosion in construction permit requests brought the battle over nuclear power directly to the neighborhoods of millions of citizens, many of whom became activists on one side or another in this issue. By 1969, it was very rare for a planned nuclear power reactor siting to not be met with significant local resistance. Another significant force that contributed to the rise in nuclear power protest was the social activist spirit of the 1960's (Gitlin, 1987). This era saw the evolution of environmental concerns develop into a major political issue. The environmental debates of the 1960's in the USA led directly to the passage of the National Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (NEPA), and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Public consciousness of environmental issues was raised considerably, and the societal approach to the industrial development process and its effects on the environment were significantly scrutinized in the public forum for the first time in U.S. 18 history. The growth of the nuclear power energy program was publicly questioned within this context. Social institutions and their social roles and actions in general also came under scrutiny during this era of activism. In addition to the challenges to government and corporate actions, the societal faith in science and scientists as the source of social progress came into question, as controversies over technical issues became more pronounced. The idea that the scientific community was an impartial gatekeeper of knowledge was challenged (see for example Nelkin, 1971 and 1975; Lewis, 1972; Bbbin and Kasper, 1974; Keating, 1975, Mazur, 1975; Leahy and Mazur, 1978; Del Sesto, 1979; Ford, 1982; and Price, 1990). Citizen activists came to realize that scientists represent certain interests, which may not necessarily be the citizens' interests, instead of some abstract conception of progress and the greater social good. The nuclear industry and the federal government's regulatory agency, the ABC (later renamed the NRC-the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), came under fire for their paternalistic and somewhat patronizing approach to public concern over the nuclear power issues (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974; Ford, 1982; Price, 1990), just as they had during the Ravenswood protest in the early 1960's. This indicates that the nuclear industry and the ABC had not taken citizen concerns seriously and had not altered their approach to reflect the importance of citizen opinion. .A crucial result of this process was the 19 organization of citizen groups which formed around the goal of exerting more control over their lives and the direction their society was taking. An important example of the kind of social institutional force that was faced by citizen groups was the ABC and its dual role as promoter and regulator of nuclear power. This was clearly a conflict of interest on the part of the federal government, and was former ABC Chairman Lilienthal's biggest problem with the nuclear power energy program (Mitchell, 1981:76). By their own admission, agency officials understood the gravity of this conflictual situation, and attempted to maintain high levels of insulation between the promotional and regulatory staffs. However, in its attempts to balance these contradictory responsibilities, the ABC was inclined to grant construction permits for nuclear power reactors that had met the limited basic agency requirements, while presuming that any unresolved safety issues would be taken care of by the time the reactors were ready for operation (Walker, 1990:332). .As noted, the ABC's power to do this was upheld by the crucial 1961 Supreme court ruling on the ABC's jurisdiction. This clearly tipped the balance toward the nuclear industry and promotion, over safety and regulation. Ultimately, such ungrounded assumptions about this volatile technology was exploited most effectively in the battle over nuclear power reactors by the citizen group activists. Fear was also a significant motivating force in the 20 emergence of citizen group protest. In the words of Nader and Abbotts: "The shadow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki continued to linger as concern about plant safety grew" (Nader and Abbotts, 1977:27). The repercussions of the USA's usage of atomic weapons in World War Two, while somewhat latent during the early years of nuclear power research (although, as noted, it was certainly an issue for the federal government and the scientists involved in the project), were manifested in important ways within the citizens protest. The work of former ABC scientists Gofman and Tamplin that questioned the ABC's radiation standards for nuclear power reactors included important references to the reports of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission. These reports focused on the survivors of these bombings, and indicated significant rises in leukemia rates in the populations after exposure to low levels of radiation (Lewis, 1972:83-88). This raised many questions about AEC safety standards when considered. Concern was also growing about the disposal of nuclear waste, as more knowledge of the history of nuclear waste management became available. As previously illustrated, this was an issue the ABC presumed would be settled as the nuclear industry developed further scientific advances. Thus, the ABC had no concrete answers for the citizen groups when questioned about the issue. Citizens discovered ”...that bad judgement and management incompetence have often been masked by military and industrial secrecy," which 21 engendered much distrust of the ABC and the nuclear power industry (Zinberg, 1984:241). Such information intensified the fear in the population about nuclear power technology. By themselves, each of these factors were cause for great concern, but did not pose a threat to existing power structures. However, it was the convergence of all of these social forces, issues, and motivations which led to the emergence of an ideological belief system that served as an effective catalyst for the citizen protest groups' mobilization of protest. Del Sesto (1979:192-202) has isolated two ideological themes adopted by the citizen protest groups' leadership: a) Legacy to future generations; and b) Anti-centralism and political accountability. The legacy to future generations theme was based on the idea that future generations would benefit minimally from power consumption generated by contemporary nuclear power reactors, and yet would still be forced to bear the costs of the operation of such reactors. Subthemes within this ideological belief include: concerns about skyrocketing electricity consumption patterns; the dangers of the plutonium fuel cycle; nuclear waste disposal issues, concern about a future marred by the proliferation of nuclear technology (and consequently nuclear bombs) throughout the world; and a general skepticism toward science and the faith that problems associated with nuclear power would eventually be solved (Del Sesto, 1979:193-196). 22 The anti-centralization and political accountability theme focused on the citizen protest group opposition to highly centralized political and administrative social structures that tend to discriminate against citizen input into decision-making processes. Subthemes involved in this ideological belief include: a strong belief in participatory democracy at all levels of society; demands for due process rights and equality under the law, especially when it concerned actions taken in the public's name; political accountability for decisions made and actions taken by all parties; and an emphasis on de- centralized technological approaches to energy production, emphasizing alternatives to nuclear power and fossil fuel— based energy production (Del Sesto, 1979:198-202). For Del Sesto, the ideological beliefs of the citizen protest group leadership were very much rooted in the ideological beliefs on which the environmental movement was built (Del Sesto, 1979:193). Indeed, a study by Mazur of the National Intervenors (a nationally consolidated group of local citizen groups protesting the nuclear power program) leadership in 1973 showed/that fully two-thirds of them had been active in the environmental movement prior to their involvement in nuclear power protest (Mazur, 1975:68). However, Mazur also cautions against attributing causality to "one or two simple motives" (Mazur, 1975:68). Thus, while the ideological analysis explains crucial motivational aspects of the nuclear power protest movement at this state, 23 the localized nature of the battles over nuclear power plants introduced considerable subjective factors into the equation, such as community characteristics and regional influences. As the protest movement moved into the third (mass) stage, the ideological analysis became much more central (if not explanatory) to the understanding of protest motivation. Throughout the battles over nuclear power plants, pro- nuclear activists, nuclear industry spokespersons, and government regulatory agency personnel argued that the protestors were anti-technology, anti-progress, and overall negativists. Some researchers have suggested that a motivational force for protest was the "NIMBY syndrome" (Not In My Backyard), as far as power plants being placed in their communities (see for example Ebbin and Kasper, 1974; Mazur, 1975; Price, 1990). However, while its clear that some protest groups were solely focused on killing the proposed nuclear power reactors in any way possible, they were very much the exception and not the norm (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:193). The protesters were ultimately concerned with issues whose depth and scope reached far beyond their individual communities, despite the subjective factors that contributed to the mobilization of their protest. This point is underscored by the visionary arguments and strategies utilized to protest the nuclear power program in general. Thus, given the ideological belief framework utilized by the 24 citizen protest groups to mobilize protest and the wide- ranging scope of the implications of these beliefs, the citizen protest groups were fighting a national battle over nuclear power from their localized venues, a battle which created the context for the development of the third (mass) phase of nuclear power protest. The participants in the citizen protest groups tended to be from a middle class socio-economic background (Gyorgy et al, 1979:382). This point is illustrated by a number of characteristics of the protesters and the protests initiated, including: the location of the plants being protested, which were to be constructed away from huge population centers where lower class protest participation might have developed, and yet were close enough to include many suburban communities and peripheral cities with large middle class populations; the costs involved in mobilizing a protest, which reached well into the tens of thousands of dollars range (Gyorgy et al, 1979:382), and were primarily paid for by contributions from the protesters themselves; the time involved in developing a protest, which necessitated a considerable amount of flexibility in personal time management, which can be seen as a middle or upper class "luxury”; and the high levels of education the protesters had attained, many of whom were professionals of various types (Gyorgy et al, 1979:38), and tended to be very involved in community affairs (Mazur, 1984:99). Mazur has isolated a considerable amount of information 25 about the leadership of the citizen protest groups, as previously noted (Mazur, 1975; Leahy and Mazur, 1978; Mazur, 1984). The leaders tended to be middle-aged and middle class citizens, with high level of education (73% with at least a bachelors degree). 87% of them had experience in public issue activism, primarily locally, and they tended to be very active in liberal social movements. 70% had resided in their community for at least five years, most of whom were raising families. Over one-third of them were either retired men or housewives with grown children, while another one-third had occupations conducive to public advocacy activities (i.e. teachers, writers, graduate students, etc.). In addition, as noted by Gyorgy et al, a considerable amount of the local citizen protest group leaders were women (Gyorgy et al, 1979:382). The local citizen protest groups that came together were organized in ways consistent with the structural characteristics of other mass social movements (Leahy and Mazur, 1978:148). Frameworks were established with clear patterns of responsibility, conflict resolution procedures, tactical strategizing, and other decision-making mechanisms. Bylaws were established and officers were elected, with provisions established for group funding (usually in the form of membership contributions and dues). The generation of information through newsletters and press releases for public consumption and for the sharing of information with other groups protesting nuclear power were primary 26 organizational goals of the citizen protest groups. Overall there were a large number of issues, events, and motivations that led to the emergence of the second phase of the nuclear power protest movement. This phase ran from roughly the late 1960's to the mid-1970's, when the movement transformed into the third (mass) phase. The citizen protest groups' contestation of the path of the nuclear power program was in the reform tradition of social change, based on their utilization of the legal means of recourse within the society's pluralistic political tradition (Mitchell, 1981:82). The main role played by the citizen protest groups within this social institutional context was as intervenors in the permit hearing process conducted by the ABC for the proposed nuclear power plants. While Cook notes that the operators of the nuclear power plants often had to apply for as many as sixty licenses and permits from various local, state, and federal agencies (Cook, 1980:26), the two permits issued by the ABC for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants were the main focus of citizen protest group actions. .As previously noted, the public hearings over these permits were written into the law as an option for intervening citizens. The public hearings were subsequently mandated by Congress in 1957, as a way to ensure the safety of the plants and the public's knowledge of their safety. Though the mandated hearings for the operation permits were dropped in 1962 in order to expedite the licensing process, citizen rights to 27 petition for such a hearing were maintained (Del Sesto, 1979:117-119). The hearing process was heavily stacked against citizen participation in the decision-making stages. Ebbin and Kasper argue that while there was scrupulous attention paid to procedural due process rights, the citizen protest group participants were denied substantive due process rights, due to the composition, scope, and the inclinations of the ASLB hearing boards (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:245). The citizen input was limited by its placement in the procedural framework. They did not even have access to detailed information on the proposed reactors until the month before the hearings began. The ABC's recalcitrance in terms of citizen access to ABC reports and researchers was a huge impediment to citizen protest group input. Intervenors regularly petitioned for and were denied access to important information about the ACE findings. Much of the time spent at the hearings was focused on a "danse macabre" between the intervenors' lawyers, applicants' lawyers, and the hearing panel members over classified information. One citizen protest group lawyer was moved to comment in a letter to the ASLB chair: ”We cannot understand this series of events and are quite perplexed that the administrative process can so cavalierly operate to discourage (and even prohibit) public participation" (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:142). The process clearly reinforced the citizens' perceptions of 28 powerlessness in important decisions that will impact on their lives (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:252). It was apparent to them that there was tremendous momentum behind the siting of the nuclear power plants they were protesting, and the process presented seemingly insurmountable obstacles to their opposition. In the words of Keating (1975:59): "...the prehearing conferences between the ABC regulatory staff, the ACRS, and the applicant serve as the critical decision— making forum in the assessment of nuclear energy. The subsequent public hearings serve more as a showcase for unveiling and ratifying the results of prior, private negotiations. It should be quite obvious from this that anyone who intervenes in the public hearing for the purpose of persuading the ABC to deny or more strictly limit the reactor's license is going through a rather futile exercise." As a result, the public hearings for the construction and operation permits for nuclear power plants appeared for all intents and purposes to be a public reaffirmation ceremony for decisions that had already been made. In retrospect however, this analysis only presents a partial picture of the situation. As a federal administrative process subject to judicial review, public hearings on the granting of construction permits often became just the first stage in a protracted battle in the court system. As intervenors, the citizen protest groups took on the role of legal advocate to attain their goals. While this role was clearly not effective at the hearing stage, as previously illustrated, the citizen protest groups took their protest to succeedingly higher levels of the 29 federal judiciary. In Cook's words: "Legal advocacy is regarded as one of the non-traditional political tactics, a form of guerilla warfare in the interest group struggle" (Cook, 1980:107). The citizen protest groups' tenacity was fueled in large part by the impervious nature of the ABC and the nuclear industry, whose insistence that the citizens did not understand the technology and its implications, were anti-progress, and should not have a substantive voice in the decision-making process served to strengthen the resolve of the citizen protest groups to fight the battle to the last possible stage. The citizen protest groups marshalled their resources quite effectively to pursue this tactic. Financial resources were raised to hire effective lawyers to pursue their arguments. Cook argues that this opportunity for legal recourse was available to both sides in the struggle, but was only used effectively by the citizen protest groups (Cook, 1980:107). The result was a classic case of losing the battles but winning the war. The appeals of the judiciary were for the most part unsuccessful on their technical grounds. However, they took a very long time to wind their way through the system to their ultimate resolution. This caused delays in the timetables for the completion of the plants, often in excess of two or more years, thus raising the costs of the plants significantly. Sometimes the applicants were forced to construct other power plants, to satisfy the demand for the planned 30 electricity output, as was the case in Midland, Michigan (Cook, 1980:104). The result was that many utilities decided the costs associated with siting a nuclear power plant were much greater than the benefits, and thus in several cases decided against the future construction of nuclear power plants. So in the end, the effects of the litigation process had a deleterious effect on the nuclear power program, contributing to the achievement of citizen protest group goals to slow down the spread of nuclear power plants or to halt the program altogether. The citizen protest groups were also successful on a number of other levels as well. The protest of the Calvert Cliffs, Maryland plant led to a U.S. Court of Appeals ruling in 1971 that applied the NEPA rules on complete environmental impact statements to all nuclear power plants not yet on line (Nichols, 1987:179-189). This decision had a tremendous impact on the nuclear power program. The ABC was forced to consider all environmental aspects of the plants, not just the radiological issues that debate had been arbitrarily limited to. License applications for ninety-one prospective nuclear power plants were effected (Gyorgy, et al, 1979:20). This was an important milestone in the nuclear power protest movement, as it was in the environmental movement as well, because it was one of the first affirmations of the power of the NEPA as wielded by activist groups. Del Sesto argues that it put "teeth" in the political power of environmental activists and forced 31 the ABC to reconsider its role as the regulator of nuclear power, as the public's attention toward the nuclear power debates grew dramatically (Del Sesto, 1979: 157-159). Another citizen protest group success was the ABC's having been forced into holding national hearings on the adequacy of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) design for nuclear reactors. These hearings came about as a direct result of citizen protest group pressure, supplemented by national environmental groups' and public interest groups' assistance. Questions were raised by the citizen protest groups during permit hearings about reports that the ABC's tests of the ECCS at their Idaho laboratories had failed. Despite the reports of several ABC scientists that the ECCS tests had not sufficiently proven the safety of the system and that the agency's risk estimates had been based on questionable computer modeling techniques, the ABC approved the ECCS design, thus clearing the way for dozens of operating licenses for nuclear power plants (Ford, 1982:105- 109). This certification was to eliminate the issue from the hearing process, but the ABC soon realized that it faced many court battles, at each protest site, over the ECCS design and testing and their unwillingness to subject it to scrutinization. Therefore in January, 1972, the ABC was forced to convene a national ”rulemaking" hearing, which was an unprecedented public hearing on a national level about nuclear power safety. Sixty groups, including many citizen protest groups, 32 national environmental groups, and public interest groups, consolidated to challenge the ABC in the hearings (Ford, 1982:116). While the hearings did not ultimately change the ABC's ruling on the ECCS design, the effects of the hearing were dramatic. The internal controversy over the ECCS that the ABC had tried to squelch was made public, as thirty ABC scientists and engineers testified about flaws in the agency's approval of the design, and the March 12, 1972 New York Times headline read: "ABC Experts Share Doubts Over Reactor Safety" (Ford, 1982:126-127). The ABC spent the following twenty months worth of hearings attempting to justify their ruling, but the damage had been done. The citizen protest groups had cracked the facade of uniform institutional belief in the safety of the nuclear power program through the legal advocacy process, in a very public national forum. The ECCS hearings also resulted in the reorganization of the ABC staff (Ford, 1982:117), which was clearly an attempt to neutralize the internal critics within the agency. These actions further substantiated the citizen protest groups' argument about biased ABC scientific research that was geared toward the promotion of nuclear power, and not the safety and regulation of the program. These continued citizen protest group assaults on the ABC '3 integrity, backed up by more and more solid proof, further eroded the legitimacy of the ABC, the nuclear industry, and the nuclear power program, while enhancing the credibility 33 of the protesters (Mitchell, 1980:80). The citizen protest groups also forced the ABC to re- evaluate its safety standards, on such issues as the maximum allowable radiological exposure, thermal pollution, evacuation procedures, and many other environment-related issues (Gofman and Tamplin, 1979; Gendlin, 1971). In some cases, the agency and the nuclear industry entered into direct negotiations with the citizen protest groups over such issues. An example of this was the Consumers Power Palisades plant in South Haven, Michigan, where through "Effective citizen intervention... the power company agreed to reduce thermal and radioactive pollution to well below limits set in federal regulations" (Gendlin, 1971:53). These new standards soon became the precedent within the nuclear industry, and the citizen protest groups continued to successfully push their boundaries. In the Palisades case, the utility had agreed to install additional cooling towers, to reduce thermal pollution, at a cost of $15 million. This was one of the first examples that the citizens were going to be able to extract concessions from the nuclear industry, and influence the nuclear power program. These kind of successes illustrate the overall impact of the citizen protest groups on the program, despite the decided recalcitrance on the part of the nuclear industry and the AEC operating under the authority and in the name of the citizenry. By cracking the "Cult of the.Atom" (Ford, 1982) and weakening the legitimacy 34 of the program through their reform-oriented tactics, the citizen protest groups paved the way for the third phase of nuclear power protest, by systematically challenging the institutional hegemony that they had encountered at every stage in their attempt to gain input into the decision- making processes of the nuclear power program. C. THE THIRD PHASE The third phase of the nuclear power protest movement, the mass phase or direct action phase, emerged in the wake of the citizen protest group phase in the mid-1970's. This period was characterized by the heavy involvement of national environmental organizations, large-scale anti— nuclear marches and rallies, direct action groups utilizing civil disobedience tactics, and concentrated forms of anti- nuclear publicity, such as books, magazines, pamphlets, documentaries, movies, and other multiple media forms. This was in addition to the continued protest actions of the citizen protest groups. By this time the issues surrounding nuclear power had exploded into the public's consciousness, to the point where it was a major issue in the 1976 presidential election. With the nuclear power program still being advanced by the federal government and the nuclear industry as the answer to the USAFs energy problems, combined with the industry's failure to eliminate the many problems posed by the technology, and the ABC's (renamed the NRC) unwillingness to 35 resolve its inherent promotion/regulation conflict of interest, the battle lines were clearly drawn for the social struggle over nuclear power in the mid- to late-1970's in the USA. Similar to the two earlier phases of protest, several social forces and factors converged to produce the third phase of protest. Perhaps the most important force was the hardened sense of ideological resolve exhibited by protesters during this period. Mitchell (1981) contrasts the citizen protest groups, who mobilized protest within a reform tradition of social change, using legal means of intervention to challenge social institutional legitimacy and gain access to decision-making processes, with the direct action groups of the third phase of protest. To Mitchell, the direct action groups operated within the radical tradition of social change, with the nuclear power issue serving as a symbolic example of "American society's fundamental flaws" (Mitchell, 1981:82). As a result of the belief in this ideological framework, the nuclear power protest became the focal point of the citizen—activist battle with an immoral society, as opposed to a society taking the wrong path. On many ideological issues, the citizen protest groups and the direct action groups shared common ground, including beliefs in such things as the threat to future generations posed by nuclear power, the dangers of environmental destruction, concerns about health and safety, a fear of 36 overly-centralized social power, and so on. As Mitchell noted, it is really at the tactical level that the differences between these two different forms of nuclear power protest groups were realized. However, one significant ideological difference between these groups can be seen in their understanding and interpretation of the capitalist economic system. While both groups were inclined to link nuclear power to the nuclear weapons industry, the direct action groups were much more inclined to see the nuclear power program as a means to maximize industrial (private) profits (Ladd, et al, 1982; Pector, 1978). They tended to see the capital-intensive nature of nuclear technology, the highly stratified employment structure within the program, and the high level of taxpayer subsidization of the (private) profit-oriented nuclear industry (Ladd, et al, 1983:256). Generally these aspects of the nuclear power program were seen as examples of the corporate tendency to plunder the environment for (private) financial gains (Leahy and Mazur, 1978; Schnaiberg, 1980; Ladd, et al, 1983). Consequently, the challenging of the political economy of capitalism was a fundamental ideological belief of the direct action groups, with a "socialistic" alternative economic system the only possible solution (Ladd, et al, 1983:256). Mitchell isolated four reasons for the direct action groups' success in mobilizing radical activism (Mitchell, 1980:82-83), which are: a) the existence of the contested 37 nuclear power plants, which presented clear rallying points for protest; b) a focus on technology as the determining factor in social relations, which presented the elimination of nuclear power as the key to a better world with de- centralized energy systems (a simplistic yet compelling ideological belief); c) the multi-voiced nature of the protest groups, with disparate activist groups such as environmentalists, feminists, socialists, anarchists, pacifists, and other groups coming together based on their common belief in the threats posed by nuclear power, despite their decidedly different agendas; and d) the organizational form that many alliances assumed to advance the protest, which was based on "De-centralization, egalitarianism, and participatory democracy”, utilizing affinity groups and non— violent direct action, which many protesters found to be a "spiritual experience" (Mitchell, 1980:83). The ideological framework played a central role in the galvanization of the nuclear power protest movement into a mass social movement. The unification of activists with very different agendas brought a vital energy to the force of the protests (as well as bringing conflict to the protest groups). The shift in ideological beliefs and/or commitments also resulted in a shift in the protest movement from a citizen protest group-based attempt to influence the nuclear power program, to an all-out attempt to end the program completely, rooted in a radical belief in democracy. From then on, the movement can be seen for the most part as 38 an anti-nuclear social movement, as opposed to a protest (but not necessarily an anti-) movement. The success of the Clamshell Alliance was also an important factor in the escalation of the mass phase. Born in July, 1976, "The Clam” was organized to fight the Seabrook, New Hampshire nuclear power plant, and pioneered many of the direct action tactics that became popular with other protest groups. These tactics included picketing, holding vigils, rallies, and acts of civil disobedience, such as peacefully occupying the nuclear power plants en masse and refusing bail upon arrest. The occupation strategy was inspired by the 1975 occupation of a nuclear power plant in Wyhl, West Germany by 28,000 protesters, who stayed on the site for more than a year, which led to the cancellation of the plant (Downey, 1986:361). While the Clamshell Alliance did not encounter such immediate success, they did succeed in disrupting the state law enforcement system and proving their capacity as a unified social change agent (Downey, 1986:361). This success, along with the groups' tireless efforts at grass roots organizing, helped establish a widespread network of citizen activists across the country. Although the construction of the Seabrook plant was not halted, "The Clam” had inspired many groups across the country to form and operate along similar lines, thus further raising the stakes in the public battle over the nuclear power program. On one day (August 6, 1977), there were over 120 39 demonstrations, rallies, and occupations taking place across the country (Wasserman, 1979:84). The growth in grass roots organizing also was aided by an explosion in information resources available to would-be protest organizers. Hundreds of organizing manuals appeared during this period, many of them modeled on the community organizing strategies and ideas of Saul Alinsky (1971), and Myles Horton of the Highlander Center. Examples include: Power: .A Repossession Manual, by Greg Speeter; No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power, by Anna Gyorgy and Friends; and Grass Roots: An Anti-Nuclear Source Book, edited by Fred Wilcox, which includes essays on and guides to the following: -How to form a grass roots organization; -How to use civil disobedience to oppose nuclear power; —How to pass a transportation ban; -How to start a petition initiative; —How to start a letter writing campaign and a phone tree; -How to show the cross-country travels of radioactive isotopes; —How to detect low level radiation; -How to effectively attend symposiums; -How to oppose nuclear power with music; -How to use television and the press to oppose nuclear power; , -How to oppose nuclear power in the classroom; -How to challenge your local utility; -How to refute arguments for nuclear power; and -How to prevent the coming of Armageddon. The third phase of protest also marked the formal entrance of large national environmental and public interest groups into the battle. While some groups had been considerably involved in the second phase by providing resources and tactical support (i.e. Friends of the Earth, 40 The Union of Concerned Scientists), Price argues that the social movement was really born in 1974, with the call for a national moratorium on nuclear power by Ralph Nader, the Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth (Price, 1990:11). The ”Critical Mass '74” conference organized by Ralph Nader was the first national anti-nuclear conference in the USA, and it garnered tremendous publicity for the movement. As noted by Mitchell, however, the nuclear power protest movement's grass roots base was far too autonomous to take directions and leadership from national organizations and/or figures (Mitchell, 1980:80). This point illustrates the central role played by localized protest groups in the movement (both citizen protest groups and direct action groups), and suggests that Price and other researchers place too heavy an emphasis on the roles played by national organizations. The shifting political climate of the era also was an important factor. The Vietnam War had come to an end after years of protest, leading many activists to channel their activism toward the nuclear power issue. The Watergate scandal brought down a powerful president, and created a widespread lack of trust in the government. The oil price shocks of 1973 set off a world-wide recession and spurred domestic conversation efforts that threw into question the need for increased electricity production capacity (Nichols, 1987:175). The elections of 1976 brought the office President Jimmy Carter, who had run in part on a renewed sense of commitment to environmentalism, generating a sense 41 of hope in the hearts of activists across the country. These and other social forces of the era contributed to the rise of the third phase of protest. Although the research on the third phase of protest focuses primarily on the direct action groups and the mass protests, the concerned scientists of the first phase and the citizen protest groups of the second phase were still very much active in the movement, through local groups and national groups such as The Union of Concerned Scientists and National Intervenors. The third phase brought the movement to a higher and a broader level of citizen participation. The large protest marches and demonstrations attracted roughly as many men as women, and was composed of primarily young adults (83% were thirty-five or younger) with a high level of education (half had college degrees) and an overall liberal political outlook (85% self-described as liberals) (Scaminaci and Dunlap, 1986:273-275). One of the most striking points about the third phase of protest was that young people were mobilized to protest, leading to the conclusion that the nuclear power protest movement was a cross—generational social movement. CONCLUSION The suspension of nuclear power plant licensing and production in 1979, which has been maintained up to the present moment in time, and the cancellation of 108 reactors, which is more than were ever put on line (Price, 42 1990:103), indicates a considerable degree of success on the part of the nuclear power protest movement. Many researchers have suggested that the event which turned public opinion against the nuclear power program was the accident at the number two reactor of the Three Mile Island nuclear power facility on March 28, 1979 (see for example Sills, et al, 1981; Freudenburg and Baxter, 1984; Freudenburg and Baxter, 1985) and that this in turn rang the death knell for the nuclear power program. However, as argued by Geisler, et a1 (1980) and Walsh (1984), the anti— nuclear power attitudes in the USA had become broad-based and quite considerable prior to the accident at Three Mile Island and the subsequent publicity about this event. Walsh (1984:160-161) also goes on to argue that the accident had taken place after the nuclear power protest movement had matured, which suggests that the Three Mile Island accident was just the final straw in the country's turn against nuclear power. As a result, the nuclear power protest movement, as it developed over three phases, deserves considerable credit for halting the siting of nuclear power plants and severely damaging the nuclear power program. To attribute this to the accident at Three Mile Island and the surrounding public fear is rather like plucking an event out of history and attributing causality to it, without any sense of the historical context which led to the event. As far as the research on the nuclear power protest movement, the overwhelming majority of the work has focused 43 on the third phase of protest. Many researchers relegate the discussion of the citizen group phase to a brief introductory section for the mass phase. As a result, there are few illustrations of the crucial role played by the citizen protest groups in the evolution of the movement. This is also a somewhat decontextualized view of this social movement. To understand the movement as a whole, it is crucial that the historical context from which it emerged be sufficiently considered, as opposed to focusing almost exclusively on the most controversial and recent phase. This is especially important in the current era, where the NRC continues to discriminate against citizen input in the ongoing struggle over nuclear power issues (Sinclair, 1991; Curran, 1992). An example of an incomplete and misleading analysis of the citizen protest group phase is the work of Barkin (1979). He suggests that while these citizen protest groups helped to advance the cause of nuclear power safety, they failed to slow the spread of reactors significantly, and were stuck debating technical issues in courtrooms "largely removed from public attention" (Barkin, 1979:23). He goes on to argue that "The first significant protest against atomic power plants was the 1974 toppling ... of a nuclear plant weather observation tower by Samuel Lovejoy" (Barkin, 1979:23). This was an important event, contributing as it did to the formation of the Clamshell Alliance. Nevertheless, this summation of the legacy of citizen 44 protest groups (and the scientists of the first phase) fails to adequately credit these groups for advancing the nuclear power protest movement toward its ultimate success in halting the siting of nuclear power plants. The citizen protest groups challenged the institutional hegemony that was the driving force behind the largely unquestioned spread of nuclear power plants and the shift toward societal dependence on nuclear power. This challenge brought out into the open and helped develop the issues and ideologies that were mobilized to halt the siting of nuclear power plants through the de-legitimation of the nuclear power program. These citizen protest group challenges to the institutional hegemony of the federal government and the nuclear industry have been illustrated in this research study. To further illustrate the importance of these citizen protest groups within the nuclear protest movement, a historical sociological analysis will be undertaken, researching the operations of one such citizen protest group: the Saginaw Valley Nuclear Study Group. This group was the primary force behind the intervention in the siting of two nuclear power reactors in Midland, Michigan. The research questions that will guide this case study will include the following: Why and how was the group formed?; How did the group mobilize in the attempt to influence the plant siting?; What kind of social institutional and community responses did they generate?; and What levels of success and failure did they encounter? Analyzed within the 45 social and political context of the nuclear power protest movement, which has been established in this research study, the goal of this case study analysis is to contextualize the citizen protest group battle with the institutional hegemony of the nuclear industry and the ABC/NRC. By considering this phase of the movement in this light, a better understanding of the ultimate de-legitimation of the nuclear power program can be achieved, and the analysis of citizen protest group battles with forms of institutional hegemony in U.S. society can be further developed. CHAPTER III. CASE STUDY: MIDLAND, MICHIGAN A, MIDLAND: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The welfare of the city of Midland has historically been inexorably linked to the fortunes of the Dow Chemical Company. The Midland area was originally settled by fur traders, who set up trading posts at the intersection of the Tittabawassee and Chippewa rivers, in the 1820's (Yates, 1987:11). Midland grew as the region (including Saginaw and Bay City) became the center of a lumber boom in the 1850's, when massive amounts of white pine were harvested and sent by river eastward. From 1851 to 1897, twenty-five billion board feet of pine were shipped out of the region and used to construct buildings in an ever-expanding Eastern Seaboard region (Yates, 1987:27). The City of Midland was incorporated in 1887, and the 1890 U.S. Census put the Midland population at 2,488. However, the fortunes of Midland at this time were very much in decline, as the lumber boom that fueled its growth slowed to a trickle. With its white pine forests leveled, Midland had become a lumber town in decline (Whitehead, 1968:24). Herbert H. Dow arrived in Midland in 1890 with a plan to extract bromine from the vast underground brine deposits 46 47 located beneath the city (Whitehead, 1968:2-3). Dow formed the Midland Chemical Company, which in 1897 became the Dow Chemical Company, whose net worth by this time had risen to $250,000 (Whitehead, 1968:43). In the early 1900's Dow Chemical did battle with international bromide and bleach manufacturers, and emerged successful and considerably stronger. The success of Dow Chemical over this period led Dorothy Yates to argue that chemistry had rescued Midland (Yates, 1987:185). By 1915, Dow employment of workers in Midland had risen to 1,200, and the industrial boom fueled by U.S. involvement in World War One pushed employment levels up to 3,000 by the war's end (Whitehead, 1968:85,93). Though employment levels fell somewhat after the end of WW1, Dow Chemical maintained a very strong position in the market. They withstood two takeover attempts, and were well situated to deal with the economic downturn of the 1930's, which spawned the Great Depression. Midland was "... known as the town that never had a Depression" (Whitehead, 1968:12), as Dow employment levels remained steady around 2,000. Dow Chemical management also looked out for its employees, telling Midland banks that the company's resources were available to prevent foreclosure on any loans owed by employees (Whitehead, 1968:134). Not only was Midland insulated from the ravages of the Great Depression, but it continued to grow and prosper, as Dow Chemical employment levels soared to over 4,000 by 1938 (Whitehead, 1968:156). This growth was also mirrored in 48 tertiary sector expansion, in the production and service sector industries that supplied Dow Chemical and its employees with products and services. Dow continued to grow through the years of World War Two, supplying crucial chemicals, metals, and plastics to the Allied war effort. This wartime growth and the subsequent growth encouraged by the post-war economic boom led to national and international expansion, culminating in the development of Dow Chemical into one of the largest corporations in the world. A.number of joint ventures, including one with Corning Glass (Dow Corning, also centered in Midland), have integrated Dow into an expansive network of interlocking corporations that comprise the International Military Industrial Complex. However, through all of this expansion, the leadership of Dow Chemical has remained firmly committed to the welfare of the city of Midland. Right from the start Herbert H. Dow was committed to establishing Midland as an ideal community in which to raise a family. He sponsored many civic events, including company picnics open to all Midland citizens, regular city parades, homecoming festivities at the local high school, sunday school teaching programs, a local music society, and the creation of local parks and gardens (Mann, 1987:62). For the most part, the leaders of Dow Chemical tended to remain residents of Midland, as have their children and grandchildren. Mann suggests that these families "...have socialized and intermarried with other company founding 49 fathers' (families) in a fashion reminiscent of European royalty" (Mann, 1987:63). While this process has created highly stratified class distinctions in Midland, within the management levels at Dow and the workers at the factories and in the tertiary sectors, the community of Midland as a whole has benefitted significantly from this sense of commitment. The most tangible way in which the community has benefitted has been in the formation of private foundations to foster the development of Midland. The fifteen foundations formed by the so-called "first families of Midland" had a net worth of $750 million in 1987 (Mann, 1987:63), and have funded Midland facilities such as: 1) Grace A. Dow Memorial Library; 2) Midland Center For the.Arts; 3) Michigan Molecular Institute; 4) Dow Gardens; 5) Midland Community Center; 6) Midland Tennis Center; 7) Midland Hospital Center; - 8) Chippewa Nature Center. (Yates, 1987:246) These facilities are all equipped with state-of-the-art technology and are well maintained. In addition, the foundations have funded many other educational, religious, economic, cultural, and recreational facilities and groups, including city beautification projects, institutional programs, residential centers for the elderly, and treatment and research programs related to medical care. .A reflection of the attraction of Midland as a place of work and residence can be seen in the steady increases in 50 population over time: a) 1920-1930: 46.6% increase; b) 1930+1940: 28.5% increase; c) 1940-1950: 38.3% increase; d) 1950-1960: 94.5% increase; e) 1960-1970: 26.6% increase. (1970 U.S. Census) While part of this increase can be accounted for by the expansion of Midland's boundaries, the inescapable conclusion is that the growth of Midland has paralleled the growth of Dow Chemical. While Dow Chemical has been historically loyal to Midland, the Midland citizens have also been very loyal to Dow. In the words of a Midland resident who doesn't work for Dow Chemical: "Dow would have to go a long way to get into the bad graces of this town. It's like working for God-everyone thinks Dow's perfect. I've never seen any people so loyal to a company" (Mann, 1987:63). An unidentified former top Dow executive also sees the people of Midland as having a religious-like belief in Dow, with the goal of every Midland boy (sic) being to assume a place on the Dow Board of Directors (Mann, 1987:62). This sense of loyalty made it easy for residents to overlook the foul odors that emanated from the Dow Chemical facilities and the Tittabawassee River, which served as the outlet for the facilities' wastes. Midland was known as an area in which it was wise to roll up one's automobile windows when driving by. The snow regularly turned grey, but very few minded. In the words of Ned Brandt, Dow 51 Chemical Company Historian: "We loved the smell-it was the smell of money” (Mann, 1987:62). Dow finally neutralized the most noxious of the odors by the 1980's, but these attitudes reflect the feelings toward Dow that permeated Midland, a sense of satisfaction and trust rooted in economic and cultural stability. In the late 1960's, when the original proposal was made to build a nuclear power plant in Midland, it was very much a prosperous community. The 1970 census data illustrates a community that was much more affluent than the average community in Michigan. For example: the Midland unemployment rate was 2.9%, versus the Michigan average of 5.9%; the Midland median income was $13,428, versus the Michigan average of $11,032: the percentage of the workforce earning over $15,000 in Midland was 39.8%, versus the Michigan average of 26.7%; the percentage under the poverty level in Midland was 3.8%, versus the Michigan average of 7.3%; and the percentage of the workforce employed in industrial manufacturing in Midland was 46.9%, versus the Michigan average of 35.9% (1970 U.S. Census). The population of Midland is also highly educated. The percentage of residents over eighteen who had graduated from high school was 79.4% (1970 U.S. Census). The management of Dow Chemical proudly claims that Midland has more Ph.D's per capita than any other city in the USA (Mann, 1987:64). For the most part these Ph.D's are chemical engineers employed by Dow Chemical and Dow Corning. 52 This overall picture clearly had an impact on the’ willingness of the residents to consider taking a stand on issues that was contrary to the stand taken by Dow. At this time almost all of the Midland workforce was employed by either Dow Chemical, Dow Corning, or the tertiary sectors that supported these corporations and their employees. Dow's influence touched everything that happened in Midland, and was in many ways responsible for the economic and cultural prosperity that thrived in Midland. Thus, when Dow Chemical announced their involvement in a plan to construct a nuclear power plant in Midland, the citizens were inclined to support the venture in the belief that Dow Chemical knew what it was doing, and what was good for Dow Chemical was good for Midland. B. THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT The plan for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Midland was announced in a joint Dow Chemical-Consumers Power press conference on December 14, 1967. The plant was to consist of two nuclear reactors, one 855 megawatt reactor and one 527 megawatt reactor, and a process steam system capable of delivering four million pounds of steam to Dow Chemical, which was the largest user of process steam in the country (Cook, 1980:49). The plant was to be ready by 1975, at a cost of $349 Million. At the time of the announcement, Consumers Power was already engaged in the construction of an 800 megawatt nuclear power plan in South Haven, Michigan, 53 the so-called "Palisades Plant", as well as having already constructed a much smaller plant in Charlevoix, Michigan. In addition, Dow Chemical was the operator of the ABC's Rocky Flats, Colorado nuclear weapons plant. As such, Dow Chemical and Consumers Power were heavily involved in the mid-to-late 1960's expansion of the nuclear power program. Their role as major nuclear industry forces in the drive to advance the nuclear power program was a major factor in their decision to construct a nuclear power plant in Midland. The plant was to be located on the western shore of the Tittabawassee River, across the river from the Dow Chemical Midland Complex. The population of residents living within five miles of the plant was 41,000 and the anticipated 1980 population within fifty miles of the plant was over one million. The primary means of cooling the plant was to be an 880 acre cooling pond dug on the property by Consumers Power, with a supplementary cooling system designed to limit the temperature of the water entering the Tittabawassee River to within one degree fahrenheit of the river's temperature (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:59). Consumers Power spent thirteen months preparing the design and site of the plant, with Babcock and Wilcox Engineering contracted to provide the nuclear power reactors and Bechtel contracted to construct the plant. On January 13, 1969, Consumers Power applied to the ABC for a construction permit to build the Midland plant. 54 Soon after the permit application, Consumers power began a concentrated propaganda effort to show the positive sides of nuclear power to the Midland community (Interview, Mary Sinclair, 8-17-91). This effort was a multi-media campaign based around such message spreading techniques as newspaper ads, television commercials, public information forums, visits to local schools, and so on. The nuclear power plant received favorable local media coverage immediately, as glowing reports of the plant's usefulness and necessity appeared in such newspapers as the Midland Daily News and the Valley Journal, as well as on local television news and information shows. An example of this is a front page, column one article entitled "Nuclear Plant Called 'Greatest Investment in the History of the State'", which appeared in the Midland Daily News on June 26, 1969 (Herring, MDN, 6-27-69). The article details a series of addresses to an audience of 250 by Consumers Power executives and technicians, with an emphasis on the need for a nuclear power plant. The panel's emphasis on safety regulations which would "...eliminate all danger and risk from radiation seepage or accidental discharge of radioactive material" was also highlighted. The uniformly positive views of nuclear power presented to the citizens of Midland led several local people to question the issue, primarily through letters to the editors of local newspapers. The most diligent questioner of this rosy picture was Mary Sinclair, who was a free-lance 55 technical writer for Dow Chemical and had some experience with nuclear power issues. She had a degree in Chemistry from the College of St. Catherines in Minnesota and had originally come to Midland to work in Dow Chemical's research library (Garland, 1988:78). She had also spent some time in Washington D. C. working for the Library of Congress, where she handled many ABC documents on nuclear power. It was here that she was initially exposed to the controversial nature of nuclear power, especially the unresolved safety issues, and the pressing need for more research on safety as emphasized by the ABC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safeguards (ACRS) (Garland, 1988:78). The fact that the reactors planned for Midland were much bigger than the reactors with unresolved safety issues was of great concern to Mary Sinclair, as the "Scaling up" issues were some of the most controversial issues within the nuclear industry, and the problems and differences had clearly not been resolved yet. This question led to her initial round of letters to the Midland Daily News questioning the project (Sinclair interview, 8-17-91). To Mary Sinclair, the response to these letters was staggering. The community reaction was overtly hostile, as many citizens in Midland believed Dow Chemical needed the nuclear plant or would be forced to relocated, and Dow did nothing to discourage this rumor (in fact they encouraged it in many ways, and later as much as said this during the battles' most heated phase). Midland residents saw Mary 56 Sinclair's questioning as threatening, and responded by attacking her as a ”know-nothing housewife", with Midland Daily News editorials accusing her of stirring up "needless controversy" (Garland, 1988:79). The attempt to publicly intimidate her into silence further strengthened the resolve of Mary Sinclair to pursue the issue on freedom of speech grounds, in addition to her concerns about nuclear power safety and her belief in the obligations of a citizen to speak out on issues within the community (Sinclair interview, 8-17-91). The net result was that Mary Sinclair realized that Midland was a dogmatic company town, where questioning Dow was unacceptable, so she concentrated her efforts on learning as much as possible about nuclear power. Through her questioning of the safety of nuclear power, Mary Sinclair also discovered that there were many people in Midland and the surrounding community that shared her concerns (the pro-nuclear citizens were primarily residents of Midland, while the surrounding community, which included such places as Saginaw, Bay City, Sanford, Hemlock, and Mapleton were inclined to be more willing to question the venture). She received phone calls and letters from concerned fellow citizens wanting to know more about the issues (in addition to the many harassment calls), and many of them sent five or ten dollars to contribute to the cost of information collection and dispersal (Sinclair Interview, 8-17-91). This local interest in her research would later 57 provide some of the impetus for the formation of a citizen protest group, but at the time the public's cognizance of the issues was in its nascent stage, and many citizens turned to Mary Sinclair for information. Mary Sinclair focused her research at this stage on some of the historical nuclear power accidents and the questions surrounding the technology. Her focus included: the accident at Windscale, England in 1957; the Fermi fast breeder reactor meltdown south of Detroit in 1966; the ABC shutdown of experimental reactors and existing plants; the status of the Soviet Union's nuclear fission program; and the ABC's report to the President on underground nuclear power plants, which had been called for by prominent nuclear scientist Edward Teller, among others (Consumers Power letter, 12—3-69). Her research on these and other issues was sent to various government agencies and corporate offices, including the Governor's office, the Michigan Water Resources Council, the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission, the ABC and its officers, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives offices and staffs, and to Consumers Power. The less than satisfactory responses from these social institutional representatives further illustrated for her the crucial need for more critically oriented research on nuclear power (Sinclair Interview, 8- 17-91). 1970 was an important year in the battle over the nuclear power plant in Midland, as the opposing sides began 58 to clearly congeal. In May of 1970, Consumers Power applied to the ABC for a permit exemption to enable them to begin constructing the plant in lieu of a construction permit, which was approved by the ABC on July 30, 1970, based on the fact that the ABC was authorized by the law to do so (based on the crucial 1961 Supreme Court ruling), and the determination that it would have no bearing on the subsequent granting or denial of a construction permit for the plant (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:60-61). The construction of the plant thus began, exactly one week after Consumers Power had submitted its environmental statement to various state and local agencies for comment, indicating the high level of federal and corporate hegemony over the decisions made regarding the progress of the nuclear power program. On August 10, 1970, Mary Sinclair testified before the Michigan Water Resources Commission on the proposed nuclear power plant. She illustrated the "ABC's questionable attitude toward public health and safety", quoting many prominent scientists about the controversial nature of nuclear power plants and several aspects of their operation, and she concluded by warning about the threat of radiation and its irreversible damage to current and future generations (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:61). By this time the issue had boiled over into a heated public debate in Midland. Full page ads were regularly being taken out by Consumers Power, which purported to present the facts on nuclear power or ridiculed the questioners of the plant as 59 members of the "Flat Earth Society" (see for example Midland Daily News, 1-2-70, 6-21-70). Nuclear scientist and ABC critic, John Gofman, appeared in Midland on April 23, 1970, and called for an open debate on nuclear issues in any place where a nuclear plant would be sited. This led to many letters to the editor of the Midland Daily News that supported Gofman's stand, few of which were printed (Control of Press in CompanyfTown, SVNSG booklet). On the other hand, many editorials and letters critical of Gofman and in support of the plant were published. The editor even went so far as sending a letter to Mary Sinclair on February 4, 1970, telling her that she had been provided enough space for her opinions, and from now on would have to pay to have her opinions published (Letter from Norman Rumple, editor, Midland Daily News, to Mary Sinclair, 2-4-70). He also published a letter from Gofman critical of the coverage of his talk, and responded with a vicious attack on Gofman's credibility on the same page (MEN, 5-6-70). It was in this heavily politicized environment that the public discussion of the nuclear power plant took place. C. THE FORMATION OF THE SAGINAW VALLEY NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP There were several crucial factors that contributed significantly to the formation of a citizen protest group in Midland known as the Saginaw Valley Nuclear Study Group (SVNSG). One crucial factor was Mary Sinclair's attendance 60 at a balanced week-long conference on nuclear power in the fall of 1970, at SUNY-Albany, where all sides of the issue were presented (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). At this conference she added considerably to her already voluminous research and information about nuclear power. She also discovered that there were many other citizen activists concerned about nuclear power there, and she established many national contacts that would later prove important in terms of information sharing and protest strategizing. .After returning from this conference, she put together a large packet of technical information on controversial nuclear power issues and distributed it to twenty scientists in the Midland community. Not only did this information expand the parameters of debate in the community, but it also led directly to a second crucial factor in the formation of the SVNSG. This second crucial factor was the arrival of Dorothy Dow Arbury, the daughter of Dow Chemical founder Herbert H. Dow, at Mary Sinclair's door. She had somehow received a copy of the information packet and the questions surrounding nuclear power were very problematic in her view. She offered to pay for the distribution of information to the public on nuclear power issues, and contributed $25,000 to get the ball rolling (Sinclair interview, 2-14-92). This gave the group of nuclear power critics that had come together a tangible means for mobilizing their protests and organizing a citizen protest group in Midland. 61 A.third crucial factor was the very fact that a number of local residents had come together to confront the powerful institutional forces that were pushing the nuclear power plant, and were ready to mobilize when the pieces fell into place, in the fall of 1970. As previously noted, many area residents had contacted.Mary Sinclair, and were willing to support an effort to raise nuclear power issues within the public forum in Midland. A number of these residents stepped forward and contributed time and energy to the SVNSG. William Crozier, a Midland resident who participated in the formation of the SVNSG, noted that while there was a vocal contingent of residents who supported the plant and resented the efforts of the SVNSG, there was considerable silent support within the community for the protestors, from people who could or would not speak publicly against the nuclear power plant due to the overt intimidation tactics practiced by plant supporters (Interview, William Crozier, 2-14-92). A fourth crucial factor in the formation of the SVNSG was the arrival in Midland of Larry Bogart, the executive director of the National Committee to Stop Environmental Pollution, a coalition of sixty-six local anti-pollution groups. He was a high level chemical company executive who quit his job to devote his life to organizing the widespread citizen anger over the pollution of the eco-system (Sinclair interview, 2-14-92). She had met him at the SUNY-Albany conference and brought him to Midland to speak on the 62 issues, in a series of public forums organized by the nascent citizen protest group. However, Larry Bogart's lasting contribution to the Midland protest (and to the nuclear power protest movement in general) was his ability to organize protest groups. He outlined the plan for the formation of a nuclear power study group, modeled on the study group he had formed for the Indian Point (N.Y.) nuclear power protest. Being in Midland at this particular point in time (September, 1970) led Larry Bogart to become the key organizational consultant in the formation of the SVNSG. As a catalyst for citizen protest group organization, he was a crucial player in the development of the second phase of the nuclear power protest movement. A fifth crucial factor in the SVNSG formation was the impending arrival of the construction permit hearing, which was scheduled to begin on December 1, 1970. While Mary Sinclair and a few others had done considerable work in isolating issues for consideration by Midland area residents, this hearing was a formal institutional process that required a comprehensive and focused approach on the part of the would-be intervenors. Thus, as a result of the impending hearing date and the previously listed crucial factors, in addition to the three years of heavily politicized debate since the plant had been announced, the Saginaw Valley Nuclear Study Group was officially formed as a citizen protest group on October 6, 1970 (SVNSG Press Release, 10-6-70). 63 The motivations for the formation of the SVNSG were many. Several of their concerns about nuclear power fall under the rubric of Del Sesto's "concern for future generations" ideological framework (Del Sesto, 1979:193- 196). These concerns include: the implications for future generations from power consumption sources utilized by current generations; the dangers of the plutonium fuel cycle and the inadequate research into safety issues; the inability of researchers to resolve the nuclear waste problem; and the skepticism about the unbiased nature of science and scientists, especially considering that so many members of the SVNSG were themselves scientists. The SVNSG members also believed in the "anti-centralism and political accountability" ideological framework (Del Sesto, 1979:198- 202), as a means for articulating their concerns about the institutional hegemony that was pushing to expand the nuclear power program without concern for the opinions, desires, and support of the citizens. SVNSG members also were motivated by concern over issues such as the safety of their families, the lack of insurance coverage in case of an accident, the potential impacts on property values, and the willingness of Dow Chemical and Consumers Power to utilize any means to stifle discussion within the community about the plant (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-91; Crozier Interview, 2-14-92). .As illustrated in the SVNSG document entitled Proposal For Organization and Operation of the Saginaw Valley Nuclear 64 Study Group, the group's stated objectives were as follows: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) perform a complete survey of safety aspects of Midland nuclear plant; make the survey results available to and understandable by the public, through public meetings, speakers, publications, and the public record of the construction permit hearing; promote open public discussions of Midland nuclear plant safety aspects (specifically) and the expanding development of nuclear power (generally) in light of the need for a national energy policy and the long term implications of the present power plants; ensure the consideration of environmental factors in the siting of the Midland plant; examine the values that guide decision-making concerning safety and economics of nuclear power plants; allow Midland citizens to determine "Is nuclear power the best solution to the Midland air pollution problem? Do we have a choice? promote the search for clean power for now and the future; and encourage the solving of waste disposal problems of present nuclear power plants before allowing more to operate. The general policies for group operation included: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) group objectives must constantly be in focus; timing will be critical--phone calls, letters, notes, ideas or other "product of our imagination" must be acted upon without hesitation; superior communication means are needed for evaluation and distribution of efforts; focus on facts, not opinions, to be sincere and reliable; establish a flexible organizational structure with clearly delineated responsibilities and assignments; and mobilize efficient and professional actions to 65 support research, public information, and the hearing intervention. These stated goals and policies enabled the group to function efficiently toward meeting their goals, and led to a very well prepared intervention attempt, in spite of the ABC's and the nuclear industry's recalcitrance in terms of allowing the SVNSG access to important documents that were necessary for the prosecution of their intervention (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). The SVNSG hired the attorney that had handled the Palisades protest, Myron Cherry, to handle the prosecution of the intervention petition. Cherry's experience was very useful, and he was very adept at using the ABC's rules to advance the case of his clients, and as such was vital part of the intervention. The financial arrangements were handled through the Sierra Club and the Kalamazoo Nature Center (Audubon Society branch), to provide a tax shelter for the group as well as its contributors (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). The intervention process was quite costly, so the SVNSG was dependent upon continued contributions from members, Dorothy Dow.Arbury and their other local supporters, and from donations solicited from other groups to cover the cost of sharing information. One of the most important ways the SVNSG gained support was by sending letters to local civic groups and organizations outlining what the SVNSG was about and what kinds of informational forums and events the group was organizing 66 (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). The maintenance of contact with these local groups contributed greatly to the SVNSG's establishment and preservation of legitimacy within the community. The people that joined the SVNSG were primarily local scientists, housewives, students, and lawyers. Many of the participants were employed by Dow Chemical or Dow Corning, several of whom were essentially blackmailed into dropping out by the management of these corporations (Crozier Interview, 2-14-92). The tactics used to sanction employees participating in the protest included: the denial of merit raises and promotions; transfers to dead end jobs within the companies; the phase-outs of protest participants' positions, and subsequent demotions; and a general climate of harassment that was very stressful (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). A number of protesters flat out lost their jobs, and an attempt was made on the life of one protester. This climate of hatred and backlash contributed mightily to the destruction of the social fabric in a formerly tight-knit community (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). Clearly there was a tremendous price to pay for taking a principled stand, and many of the participants questioned whether they would be willing to pay such a price again, or in retrospect would have been willing to do so in the first place had they known about the costs involved (Crozier Interview, 2-14—92). During the days preceding the hearing the SVNSG had weekly meetings and frequent subcommittee meetings, in their 67 effort to pull together a comprehensive intervention petition. The weekly meetings were regularly attended by thirty to thirty-five people during this period (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). There was also a Dow Chemical spy with a tape recorder at every meeting (Crozier Interview, 2-14- 92). The group had a high level of talented leadership, consisting of members such as Mary Sinclair, Thomas Slykhouse, Kathy Bjerke, William Crozier, Robert Asperger, and Robert Philip, among others, and everybody that considered themselves to be a member of the group pitched in, in cooperative fashion, to make the SVNSG work (Sinclair Interview, 2-14-92). The SVNSG made efficient use of their resources to prepare and advance their case. Financial and human resources were utilized creatively to organize public information avenues such as: regular SVNSG meeting open to the public (and Dow spies); a regular SVNSG newsletter sent to local groups and media outlets, in addition to other local protest groups and national organizations; frequent public information forums presenting both sides of the issues, depending on whether or not Consumers Power would send a representative; regular press releases detailing SVNSG actions and findings, as well as pointing out the deceptions contained within the Consumers Power public relations campaign in favor of the plant; and perhaps most importantly, a number of authoritative collections of information on nuclear power issues, such as a 56 page 68 booklet detailing sources on nuclear power called Nuclear Power and Public Concern, and a 53 page booklet illustrating the biased nature of the newspaper coverage of the issues in Midland, titled Control of Press in Company Town Results in Whitewash of Critical Nuclear Plant Issues. The SVNSG was formed to present information to the public, and this they clearly did. An example of their approach to public forum information presentation as the combined SVNSG-Sierra Club meeting on 11-19-70, which was attended by many area residents. Four presentations were given by SVNSG members, each of which was followed by open discussions. The presenters were as follows: Dr. Thomas Slykhouse discussed the thermal effects of the proposed plant, pointing out that "no one really knows what the effects of the cooling pond will be "; (soon to be Dr.) Mary Sinclair talked about the planned radioactive releases into the water, the effects and results of which were also unknown, leading to the internal and external challenges to the AEC radiation standards, which she detailed; Dr. William Crozier discussed the planned radiation release to the air, indicating that there were several safer alternatives to the planned safety measures and technology that seemed to be much more promising in terms of safety; and Dr. Robert Asperger talked about the unresolved nuclear waste issues and the inherent dangers contained within this "ticking bomb" that the ABC had decided would be resolved sometime in the future (SVNSG press release, 11-20-70). Each of the 69 presenters was a scientist who had a background in complex chemical reactions. This kind of comprehensive approach to presenting information to the public in understandable ways also contributed greatly to the SVNSG's ability to establish and maintain legitimacy within the community, in spite of Consumers Power and Dow Chemical efforts to undermine their credibility. This sense of legitimacy sustained the SVNSG as it pursued the battle to higher levels. The next level was the construction permit hearing. D. THE ASLB CONSTRUCTION PERMIT HEARING The construction permit hearing that was set to begin in Midland on December 1, 1970, was the culmination of a long prelude. The plant had been planned for three years, and the public debate over the plant had been very acrimonious, as has been noted. The SVNSG was very much at a disadvantage in the hearing because they did not have access to the information on which the decisions would be based, and the ABC panels were unwilling to share the information with them, despite the clear legal ground on which to do so. Bbbin and Kasper argue that the hearings, as legal proceedings "designed by lawyers for lawyers," are not appropriate venues for the resolution of disagreements over "scientific truth" or nuclear safety, though that was the only realistic path of pursuit for citizen protest groups to gain influence in the decision-making process (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:255). As was previously noted, the 70 result was the extension of procedural due process rights to the citizen protest groups, but not substantive due process rights. The SVNSG's intervention in the hearing process began with the initial petition to intervene, which was filed on November 12, 1970. The SVNSG was one of seven groups petitioning to intervene. The others were: Citizens Committee For the Environmental Protection of Michigan; Sierra Club; United Auto Workers of America; Trout Unlimited; West Michigan Environmental Action Council, Inc., and the University of Michigan Environmental Law Society (Petition to Intervene, 11-12-70). The SVNSG did the work in assembling the petition to intervene, and the other groups signed on as co-intervenors (Sinclair interview, 2- 14-923). The petition was drafted over one intense weekend in Kalamazoo, as the leaders of the SVNSG met with their lawyer Myron Cherry and hammered out the petition in two eighteen hour days (Crozier Interview, 2-14-92). The groups contentions included the following: 1) there was insufficient knowledge or experience with pressurized water reactors of the size and type proposed for Midland; 2) the analysis of the maximum hypothetical accident was inadequate; 3) there was no proof that the emergency core cooling system would work as designed; 4) the possibility of hydrogen buildup and explosion was not considered; 5) the possibility of both reactors having maximum hypothetical explosions was not considered; 27) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 19) 71 the design of crucial safety systems was not finalized; there was no proof that equipment exposed to radiation could last forty years; the PSAR quality controls were insufficient; the possibility of chemical explosions at the Dow Chemical plant and their impacts was not considered; emergency plans and procedures for evacuating the surrounding population had not been developed; Consumers Power had not proven it was able to financially bear the cost of the $400 Million plant; Consumers Power had no experience in operating reactors of the proposed size; the design contractor, Babcock and Wilcox, had nothing but a history of failure in designing and fabricating nuclear reactors; Bechtel was unable to handle quality assurances at plants they build, as was shown by the Palisades record; radiation standards in force are inadequate and illegal; radiation standard do not: a) consider other radiation sources' impacts; b) consider accumulation of radiation over time; c) consider differential human tolerance; d) follow emissions through all possible paths; radiation standards are based on outdated scientific information; radiation monitoring system design is inadequate; and all environmental effects must be considered as stated in the NEPA, such as: a) the environmental impact statement must be completed on all aspects of the plant; b) alternatives to the plant must be considered. (Petition to Intervene, 11-12-70:9- 72 The petition goes on to challenge almost every aspect of the Consumers Power environmental report and the ACRS acceptance of it. The petition concludes by noting the petitioners' inability to access information on the plant, the reception of information after the petition filing deadline, the cost of obtaining ABC reports, and the lack of public access to an unrestricted copy of the PSAR, which was mandated by law. Overall, they warn that their lack of access to almost any of the information used to make decisions would guarantee the facts (Petition to Intervene, 11-12-70:28). Thus, the SVNSG made explicitly clear upfront what path they would pursue, which would be one that sought to enforce the law on citizen access to information from regulatory agencies operating in the citizens' name. The law was very clear on this point. Yet the ABC continually made rules and passed down interpretations that restricted the citizen protest groups' access to information. It was the old military-industrial secrecy, and the ABC was determined to maintain it. The ABC staunchly maintained the climate of extreme secrecy around the nuclear power program in the USA, and it blew up in their collective faces. The true success of citizen protest groups such as the SVNSG was in their dogged persistence in trying to hold the ABC and the nuclear industry accountable to the law. This led to the protracted court battles which undermined the nuclear power program's stability and let to its ultimate de-legitimation. The SVNSG petition went through numerous revisions as 73 the hearing went on. The hearing dragged on for two years, as numerous delays in the hearing resulted from the constant battle over citizen protest group access to documents related to the plant and the responses to their interrogatories (questions submitted for discovery purposes by the intervenors). Bbbin and Kasper illustrate quite effectively the battle over the Midland plant permit, as they attended the hearing as observers. They concluded that the hearing was so arcane and bogged down in legalese and procedural issues that the public was essentially denied a "meaningful forum for public participation" (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:272). They also concluded that there was no basis to the constant charges by pro-nuclear intervenors and citizen groups that the SVNSG was simply trying to delay the hearings in a war of attrition. They found the delays to be a result of the ABC's reticence in sharing information with the intervenors on a timely basis, in addition to the problems related to having part-time members (with other careers such as academics, technicians, etc.) adjudicated the hearing for the ASLB (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974:255-257). The delays became a central feature in the success of the SVNSG in advancing the nuclear power protest movement. As previously noted, it was a case of losing the battle but winning the war. The construction permit for the Midland plant was granted by the ASLB on December 15, 1972. The ASLB then rejected an appeal of the ruling on May 18, 1973 (Cook, 1980:60). During this time great damage had been 74 done to the project, as construction had been essentially suspended for three years and the costs of finishing it had skyrocketed. But there's more. The battle raged on as the permit was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington D.C. The court ruled on July 21, 1976 that the permit hearing would have to be reopened, based on an unclear ACRS report, a reevaluation of the impact of energy conservation, a reconsideration of Dow Chemical's need for the plant, and consideration of the issues involved in the disposal of nuclear waste (Cook, 1980:67). While this ruling was eventually overthrown by the Supreme Court on April 3, 1978, the damage had most certainly been done. The relationship between Dow Chemical and Consumers Power had deteriorated to the point that Consumers Power had to threaten to sue Dow to keep them from scrapping the whole deal and building their own new power plant. The delays and resulting cost escalations also led Consumers Power to cancel plans for a two reactor nuclear power plant at Quanticassee, northeast of Midland, as they determined the stakes had risen too high to continue their expansion of nuclear power-generated electricity. They lost most of their political support for nuclear power through these battles, and the rest of it was extinguished when they were finally forced to give up on the plant in Midland in 1984 because the construction was so poorly done that the plant was literally sinking into the uncompacted soil below 75 it, and the costs of completion by then had grown to over $5 Billion (as opposed to the original estimate of $349 Million). As a result, after seventeen years of battle and billions of dollars spent, there are no nuclear power plants operating in mid—Michigan. CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION While there is much more to the Midland nuclear power plant battle than has been illustrated here, a general understanding of the citizen group phase of the nuclear power protest movement can be gleaned from this case. This case clearly illustrates the process by which citizen protest groups came together and effectively exposed and exploited the contradictions in the U.S. nuclear power program, undermined the program's legitimacy, and advanced the social movement that contributed greatly to the halting of the siting of nuclear power plants in the U.S. The SVNSG effectively challenged the institutional hegemony that was pushing the nuclear power program, which in this case was embodied by Consumers Power, Dow Chemical, and the ABC/NRC. This challenge directly led to the cancellation of plans by Consumers Power to expand their nuclear power capacity further. The SVNSG also contributed significantly to advancing the citizen protest group phase of the nuclear power protest movement through their actions. This research study has illustrated many of the negative results of institutional hegemony that the SVNSG and other citizen protest groups confronted, including: the contradictions of the historic role of the ABC/NRC as both the promoter and 76 77 the regulator of the nuclear power program; the disregard for dealing with the environmental effects of siting a nuclear power plant by the ABC and the nuclear industry; the failure to adequately address the safety and waste disposal issues, including the suppression of evidence that questioned or contradicted safety projections and the viability of planned safety features; the questionable nature of the economic viability of nuclear power plants; and the insulation of government activities from the very citizens in whose name they operate, within a climate of secrecy and non—accountability. When the nuclear power protest movement is considered in historical perspective, it is clear that the citizen protest groups' actions were central to the ultimate success of the movement in contributing to the de-legitimation of the expansion of the nuclear power program. This is a period that needs to be fully reconstructed through historical sociological analysis, for a better understanding of the development of this social movement. The fact is that most of the research on this movement had focused on the third (direct action) phase. What this research study has illustrated is the need for the reconsideration of this movement in historical context. This not only needs to be done to set the record straight, but it also helps to contextualize the ongoing struggle by citizen groups with institutional forces to gain input into society's important decision-making processes. 78 When the ABC first realized that they had a huge political struggle on their hands, they responded in 1971 by trying to amend the Atomic Energy Act to: 1) limit public participation and intervention to one mandatory hearing early in the plant siting process; 2) eliminate citizen intervention in the construction permit granting process, unless there are clearly unresolved public health and safety issues; and 3) completely eliminate citizen group intervention in the operator license hearing (Rolph, 1979:116). The ABC's cavalier disregard for citizens' rights had hit an all time high (low?) at this point, as they tried legislatively to do what they had failed to do through recalcitrance and the stone-walling of legitimate citizen protest group requests. Even the decidedly pro- nuclear power JCAB couldn't go along with such a denial of basic citizens' rights. However, the political landscape in the U.S. has changed dramatically, as the effects of twelve years of social change rooted in the ideology of free-market capitalism and deregulation have come to fruition. In the case of nuclear power, the NRC has maintained their recalcitrant attitude toward citizen group participation, but has become much more effective at doing it and getting away with it in this political climate. Public opinion has remained steadfastly against the construction of more nuclear power plants, with polls in 1989 and 1990 showing 62%, 64%, and 57% opposed (Curran, 1992:37). Yet the NRC 79 continues to push for the construction of a new generation of nuclear power reactors, and "has responded to this crisis in public confidence, not by opening up its deliberations to public scrutiny, but by becoming more secretive and hostile to public participation" (Curran, 1992:37). Curran goes on to state: "...the Commission routinely violates public meeting requirements under the Government in the Sunshine Act; it has turned over to the industry and thereby hidden from public scrutiny many inspection and reporting functions that were formerly performed by the NRC staff; it has amended its procedural rules to erect formidable hurdles to citizen intervention in NRC licensing proceedings; and it has established a set of procedures by which licensees can contest and defeat "backfits" (recommended plant improvements) without any knowledge, let alone participation by the public. Finally, through its virtually guaranteed denials of requests for hearings and enforcement under section 2.206, the Commission has eviscerated effective public participation in the regulation of the 110 operating nuclear plants in the United States. These unjustifiable and undemocratic developments in nuclear safety regulation are utterly inconsistent with Congress' purposes in enacting the Atomic Energy Act." (Curran, 1992:37-38) This continued violation of the public trust by the nuclear industry and the NRC is an alarming example of institutional hegemony in action. By illustrating the battles citizen protest groups have fought with the nuclear industry and the federal regulatory agencies, researchers can contribute to an understanding of how the battles that were thought to be won years ago continue to rage on in very much the same manner, except the social institutional forces have become more crafty at stone-walling citizen group demands for participation in decision-making processes and 80 political accountability. With the significant level of citizens that call themselves environmentalists and are armchair activists (giving money to Greenpeace, buying "environmental" toilet paper, etc.), it is important that critical studies are done to illuminate the illusory nature of change in the social power relations of our society. One possible way in which this framework of interpreting citizen protest group challenges to institutional hegemony could be further developed would be to analyze these challenges within the context of Michel Foucault's methodological approach, outlining resistance strategies to social power relations through a genealogical tracing of historical developments (Foucault, 1977). However, the contribution of this research study has focused on making the case for the importance of a reassessment of the nuclear power protest movement in historical sociological context, which is clearly an important task. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS Alinsky, Saul, 1971. Rules For Radicals, New York: Random House. Cook, Constance E., 1980. Nuclear Power and Legal Advocacy, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Curran, Diane, 1992. The Public As Enemy: NRC Assaults on Public Participation in the Regulation of Operating Nuclear Power Plants, Boston: Union of Concerned Scientists. Del Sesto, Steven, 1979. Science, Politics, and Controversy: Civilian Nuclear Power in the U.S., 1946-1974, Boulder:Westview Press. Bbbin, Steven, and Kasper, Raphael, 1974. Citizen Groups and the Nuclear Power Controversy: Uses of Scientific and Technological Information, Cambridge, MA; MIT Press. Ford, Daniel, 1982. The Cult of the Atom, New York: Simon and Schuster. Foucault, Michel, 1977. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, New York: Pantheon Books. Freudenburg, William R., and Rosa, Eugene.A., (eds.),1984. Public Reactions to Nuclear Power: Are There Critical Masses?, Boulder, Co: Westview Press. Fuller, John G., 1975. We Almost Lost Detroit, New York: Readers Digest Press. Gitlin, Todd, 1987. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, Toronto: Bantam Books. Gofman, John W., and Tamplin, Arthur R., 1979. Poisoned Power, Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press. Gyorgy, Anna, and friends, 1979. No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power, Montreal: Black Rose Books. Lewis, Richard S., 1972. The Nuclear Power Rebellion, New York: Viking Press. 81 82 Mazur, Allan, 1984. in Freudenburg and Rosa, (eds.), pp. 97- 114. Nader, Ralph, and Abbotts, John, 1977. The Menace of Atomic Energy, New York: W.W. Norton. Nelkin, Dorothy, 1971. Nuclear Power and its Critics: The Cayuga Lake Controversy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell U. Press. Novick, Sheldon, 1976. The Electric War, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. Price, Jerome, 1990. The Anti-Nuclear Movement, Boston: Twayne Publishers. Rolph, Elizabeth S., 1979. Nuclear Power and the Public Safety, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Schnaiberg, Allan, 1980. The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity, New York: Oxford U. Press. Sills, David L., Wolf, C.P., and Shelanski, Vivien B., (eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sinclair, Mary P., 1991. The Role of Citizen Public Interest Groups in the Decision-Making Process of a Science Intensive Culture, Dissertation, University of Michigan. Speeter, Greg, 1978. Power: A Repossession Manual, Boston: University of Massachusetts Press. Strauss, Lewis L., 1962. Men and Decisions, New York: Doubleday. Wasserman, Harvey, 1979. Energy War, Westport, CT: L. Hill Publishers. Whitehead, Don, 1968. The Dow Story, New York: McGraw—Hill. Wilcox, Fred, (ed.), 1980. Grass Roots: An Anti-Nuke Source Book, Trumansburg, NY:The Crossing Press. Yates, Dorothy, 1987. Salt of the Earth: A History of Midland County, Midland MI: The Midland County HistoriCal Society. Zinberg, Dorothy S., 1984. in Freudenburg and Rosa, (eds.), pp.233-256. 83 B. JOURNALS/MAGAZINES Barkin, Steven, 1979. "Strategic, Tactical, and Organizational Dilemmas of the Protest Movement Against Nuclear Power." Social Problems, 27:1 (October, 1979): 19-37. Downey, Gary L., 1986. "Ideology and the Clamshell Identity: Organizational Dilemmas in the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement." Social Problems, 33:5 (June, 1986): 357-373. Duncan, Otis Dudley, 1978. "Sociologists Should Reconsider Nuclear Energy." Social Forces, 57:1 (September, 1978): 1-22. Freudenburg, William R., and Baxter, Rodney K., 1984. "Host Communities Attitudes Towards Nuclear Power Plants: A Reassessment." Social Science Quarterly, 65:4 (December, 1984),:1129—1136. 1985. ::wNuclear Reactions: Public Attitudes andPolicies Toward Nuclear Power." Policy Studies Review, 5:1 (August, 1985): 96-110. Garland, Anne, 1985. "Mary Sinclair." Ms., 13:1 (January, 1985); 64-66, 108—109. Geisler, Charles, Hattery, Michael, and Anderson, Peter, 1980. "The Rape of (Nuclear) Progress." 1980 Rural Sociological Society Meeting paper. Gendlin, Frances, 1971. "The Palisades Protest: A.Pattern of Citizen Intervention." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 27:11 (November, 1971): 53-56. Keating, William T., 1975. "Politics, Energy, and the Environment." American Behavioral Scientist, 19:1 (September/October, 1975): 37-74. Ladd, Anthony E., Hood, Thomas C., and VanLiere, Kent D., 1983. "Ideological Themes in the Anti-Nuclear Movement: Consensus and Diversity." Sociological Inquiry, 53:3 (August, 1983): 252-272. Lapp, Ralph, 1971. ”The Nuclear Power Controversy: Safety." The New Republic, 35:1 (January 23, 1971):15-21. Leahy, Peter, and Mazur, Allan, 1978. "A.Comparison of Movements Opposed to Nuclear Power, Floridation, and Abortion." Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, Volume 1, 1978: 143-154. 84 Mann, Thomas, 1987. "The Town of Dow." Business Week, 46:22 (April 7, 1987): 59-65. Mazur, Allan, 1975. "Opposition to Technical Innovation." Minerva, 13:2 (Spring, 1975): 58-81. Mazuzan, George T., 1986. "Very Risky Business: A.Power Reactor For New York City." Technology and Culture, 27:3 (August, 1986): 262-284. Mitchell, Robert C., 1981. "From Elite Quarrel to Mass Movement." Society, 18:5 (July/August, 1981): 76-84. Nelkin, Dorothy, 1975. "The Political Impact of Technical Expertise." Social Studies of Science, Volume 5 (1975): 35-54. Nichols, Elizabeth, 1987. "U.S. Nuclear Power and the Success of the American Anti-Nuclear Power Movement." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 32:2 (May, 1987): 167-190. Pector, Jeff, 1978. "The Nuclear Power Industry and the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement." Socialist Review, 8:1 (January, 1978): 9-35. Scaminaci, James, and Dunlap, Riley E., 1986. "No Nukes! .A Comparison of Participants in Two National Antinuclear Demonstrations." Sociological Inquiry, 53:3 (August, 1986): 272-282. Walker, Samuel J., 1990. "Reactor at Fault: The Bodega Bay Nuclear Power Plant Controversy, 1958-1964- A.Case Study in the Politics of Technology." Pacific Historical Review, 59:3 (August, 1990): 323-373. Walsh, Edward J., 1984. "Local Community Vs. National Industry: The TMI and Santa Barbara Protests Compared." International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 2:1 (March, 1984): 147-163. C. NEWSPAPERS/DOCUMENTS/INTERVIEWS Newspapers Herring, Betty, "Nuclear Plant Called 'Greatest Investment in the History of the State'." Midland Daily News, June 27, 1969. Advertisement, Midland Daily News, January 2, 1970. 85 Editorial, Midland Daily News, May 6, 1970. Advertisement, Midland Daily News, June 21, 1970. Documents 1890 U.S.Census 1970 U.S.Census Consumers Power letter to Mary Sinclair, dated December 3, 1969. Norman Rumple, editor of the Midland Daily News, letter to Mary Sinclair, dated February 4, 1970. SVNSG Documents Nuclear Power and Public Concern, SVNSG booklet. Proposal for Organization. Press release, October 6, 1970. Petition to Intervene, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Docket nos. 501329 and750-330, November 12, 1970. Press release, November 20, 1970. Control of Press in Company Town Results in Whitewash of Critical Nuclear Plant Issues, SVNSG booklet. -The access to documents in the Bentley Historical Museum and the State of Michigan Library is gratefully acknowledged. Interviews Mary Sinclair, August 17, 1991. Mary Sinclair, February 14, 1992. William Crozier, February 14, 1992. "‘ilililillllililES