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ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU HAVE FINGERS:
AN EXAMINATION OF MORAL REALISM AND
THE ANTI-REALIST ARGUMENTS OF GILBERT HARMAN

By

Charles Roderick Johnson

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Philosophy

1993

ABSTRACT

ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU HAVE FINGERS:
AN EXAMINATION OF MORAL REALISM AND
THE ANTI-REALIST ARGUMENTS OF GILBERT HARMAN

By

Charles Roderick Johnson

The focus of this thesis is to explore the possibility of constructing a moral realist
position that is viable in the face of the anti-realist arguments of Gilbert Harman. The
thesis itself is split into four chapters. In the first chapter moral realism is deﬁned and
the traditional versions of this position are presented. In the second chapter the ﬁrst of
Harman's arguments, dealing with the issue of motivation, is examined. At this time it is
also shown why motivation poses a problem for moral realism as it has been traditionally
construed. In the third chapter Harman's argument concerning explanatory potence or
relevence is treated in a similiar manner. In the fourth and ﬁnal chapter a more tenable
alternative to the traditional realist positions discussed is put forward, the choice of this
alternative being guided by the preceeding examination of Harman's anti-realist

arguments.

To my mother and father,
who taught me right from left
and right from wrong

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank those members of the Michigan State Philosophy
Department without whose assistance this work would not have been possible. These
persons are professors Richard Peterson, Stephen Esquith, Richard Hall, and Mark
Risjord. I am especially grateful to professor Risjord who distinguished himself by
wading through many early drafts of this paper. This was a task that I am sure was far
from enjoyable. I would also like to thank Mr. Gregory Dean Olson who was forced on
several occasions to read some of the more troublesome parts of this thesis. His
insightful comments and criticisms proved invaluable. Lastly, I am indebted to Mr. Dirk

P. Tischer whose technical knowledge was instrumental in creating this ﬁnal draft.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1
CHAPTERS
1. MORAL REALISM .......................................................... 3
Naturalism

Non-naturalism

2. OUGHT AND MOTIVATION ......................... . ............. 10
Some examples
Motivation and validity

Traditional realism replies

3. EXPLANATORY POTENCE ......................................... 22
Observation and best explanation
Some examples
A reply
Best explanation re-visited

Consequentialism

4. REVIEW AND RE-EVALUATION ................................. 38
A new approach
Rules
The derivation of (U)
The derivation itself
The objections

A last objection

CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 54

LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................... 56

INTRODUCTION

Gilbert Harman once wrote of his discovery that some of his students
were moral realists. Harman wrote that this discovery greatly surprised
him, in that he believed this position to be so obviously ﬂawed that he never
dreamed any of his pupils might actually hold it (Harman 1984:363-364).
Harman has worked hard to justify his belief concerning moral realism. He
has expended much time and effort constructing arguments against this
position. Principal among these are his arguments concerning the issues of
motivation and explanatory potence. The focus of this thesis is to explore the
possibility of constructing a realist position that is viable in the face of these
objections. Towards this end, traditional realist positions will be examined
in order to show why these objections are damaging to realism, and also in
order to learn what is to be avoided in constructing a realist position that is
to be tenable.

The structure of the argument for this thesis, then, is as follows. In the
ﬁrst chapter moral realism will be deﬁned. The typical or traditional
versions of this position will also be presented. In the second chapter the
ﬁrst of Harman's anti-realist arguments, dealing with the issue of
motivation, will be examined. It will also be shown why motivation poses a
problem for moral realism as it has been traditionally construed. In the third
chapter the idea of explanatory potence will be addressed, and once again the

shortcomings of traditional realism will be discussed. In the fourth and ﬁnal

2

chapter a re-evaluation of the idea of moral realism will take place. This re-
evaluation will be guided by the proceeding examination of Harman's anti-
realist arguments, and it is hoped that it will, at the very least, reveal a
glimpse as to what a tenable realist position would look like.

CHAPTER ONE
MORAL REALISM

A moral realist position makes two claims. First, it asserts that moral
norms have cognitive content, ie. that substantive conclusions can be reached
concerning their validity, and that as such moral norms are not, for instance,
mere expressions of the contingent states of the speakerl. Secondly, it
asserts that there are valid moral norms. Traditionally this idea of the
cognitive content of moral norms has been played out in terms of truth value.
Thus typically the cognitive aspect of moral realist positions has been based
in the capacity for moral norms, such as ‘one ought not to do Y', to be true or
false. With this basis, the issue of validity is then seen in terms of truth, a
valid moral norm on such accounts being one that is true. Moral realist
positions that fall within this traditional framework take three main forms:
consequentialist, intuitionalist, and supervenience accountsz.

Within all three of these forms of moral realism, due to their basing the
cognitive content of moral norms in truth value, normative claims are treated
much like descriptive claims3. Thus by grounding the cognitive content of
moral norms in truth value, these positions have been lead to consider what
moral norms correspond to in virtue of which they may be considered true.
There are two answers to this question dividing the traditional forms of
moral realism. The ﬁrst is the response of non-naturalism which argues that
rightness and wrongness are non-natural properties or entities, ie. properties

or entities that fall outside the domain of the natural or physical sciences.

4

On this view the truth of normative claims will involve their correspondence
to such non-natural aspects of the world. Supervenience and intuitionalist
accounts fall within this category. On the other hand there is the response of
naturalism, which argues that rightness and wrongness are amenable to, or
fall within, the domain of the natural sciences. On this view, then, the truth
of normative claims will involve their correspondence to aspects of the

natural world. Consequentialism falls within this latter category.

Non-naturalism

Of the non-naturalistic views, intuitionalism and supervenience theory
are similar in terms of their ontological commitments, but differ in terms of
their epistemology. Supervenience accounts argue that rightness and
wrongness are non-natural moral properties which supervene on physical
properties or conditions. These underlying conditions are sometimes called
the physical instantiation base, the basal conditions, or the subvenient
properties. The property that arises from, or supervenes on, these conditions
is usually called the supervenient property. What is argued on such accounts
is that there exists a relationship of dependence between the supervenient
property and its underlying basal conditions, such that the former cannot be
present in the absence of the latter. In conjunction with this idea of
dependence it is often claimed that the supervenient properties are multiply
realizable. This means that there is more than one basal condition that is
capable of realizing a given supervenient property.

The relationship between the supervenient property and its basal
conditions, then, can be seen as follows. Each basal condition or instantiation
base constitutes a sufﬁcient condition for its supervenient property, but none

on its own constitutes a necessary condition as well. A necessary condition

5

for the supervenient property could be generated only through a disjunction
of its basal conditions. Thus the supervenient property is dependent on its
basal conditions for its existence, but due to its multiple realizability it is
distinct or independent from any given one of them. In this sense the
supervenient property can be seen as irreducible to a given basal condition,
and hence as a novel ontological addition. Thus the moral property of
wrongness could have as some of its instantiation bases physical situations
exemplifying cases of lying, murder, etc,. Hence wrongness as a
supervenient property would be dependent on these physical situations in
order to emerge, but it would not be reducible to any one of them. It would
not make sense to say "wrongness is murder", meaning that it is identical to
situations exemplifying this action, for this would deny the other kinds of
actions or situations that are wrong. Such a statement would deny that
other situations, or instantiation bases, give rise to wrongness4.

Intuitionalism is the view that one can determine whether a certain
action or kind of action is right or wrong through a direct intuition of its
rightness or wrongness. Intuitionalism can be seen as having three forms, ie.
perceptual, dogmatic, and philosophical. The ﬁrst argues that only
judgments concerning the rightness or wrongness of particular actions may
be intuited, whereas the second expands this to include some general
propositions concerning kinds of actions. Philosophical intuitionalism, on the
other hand, holds that it is only these latter general propositions that may be
intuited. Regardless of the form that this view takes it holds that moral
concepts such as right and wrong are unique, simple, and indeﬁnable, and in
this sense non-natural for they are not amenable to any kind of naturalistic
or physicalistic analysis or deﬁnition.

On both intuitionalist and supervenience accounts, then, rightness and

6

wrongness are non-natural. For Supervenience theory these terms or
concepts refer to non-natural properties, and this is generally the case with
intuitionalism as well5. Thus both accounts are committed to postulating the
existence of non-natural properties in virtue of which something is right or
wrong. These moral properties are what normative claims correspond with
so that they may have truth value or cognitive content. Where these
accounts differ is in terms of how we gain knowledge of these moral
properties. Thus intuitionalism argues that we have direct access to these
properties via the faculty of intuition. Whereas on supervenience accounts
our knowledge of these properties would seem to stem from observation of

their basal conditions.

Naturalism

Consequentialist accounts, being naturalistic, have a different view of
rightness and wrongness. They argue that the rightness or wrongness of a
given action depends solely on the nature of its consequences. One species of
consequentialism is utilitarianism, which may be divided into two types, ie.
act or rule utilitarianism. With act utilitarianism one determines the
rightness or wrongness of a given action by assessing what consequences it
will have for the general welfare or happiness of everyone who will be
affected by it. Of a given set of possible actions open to an agent, the right
action is the one that will, on the whole, have the best consequences in terms
of the happiness of those concerned or affected. In rule utilitarianism one
does not determine the rightness or wrongness of actions on a particular or
individual basis, but rather attempts to construct a system of rules which
would govern general classes of actions. One attempts to construct rules of

conduct which would have the most beneﬁcial consequences for the welfare of

7

a given set of persons, usually all humanity, and then utilize these rules in
order to judge the rightness or wrongness of individual actions.
Consequentialism is a naturalistic view because what rightness and
wrongness refer to are the consequences of a given action in terms of the
happiness or welfare of persons. In principle it would seem that questions
concerning what contributes to our welfare or happiness would fall within
the realm of the natural sciences, which would include the medical sciences
and perhaps the social and psychological. Within consequentialism, then,
the truth value of a given moral norm, or its cognitive content, involves its
correspondence to features of the natural world. In this respect
consequentialism differs from intuitionalism and supervenience theory.
Thus all three treat normative claims like descriptive claims, in that these
claims have a truth value which arises from their correspondence with
features of the world. But consequentialism asserts that these features are
natural, whereas intuitionalism and supervenience theory argue that they

are non-natural or non-physical.

NOTES

1. Non-cognitivists deny that norms have cognitive content on the
grounds that the question as to a norm's validity can never be settled. Thus
A.J. Ayer contends the idea that norms lack cognitive content is evidenced by
the fact that we are incapable of arguing about their validity (Ayerz33-34).

2. For a more thorough account of the traditional deﬁnition of moral
realism see Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "The Many Moral Realisms" from

W, edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Cornell
University Press, 1988.

3. Habermas makes this point concerning the conﬂation of normative
and descriptive claims, when the cognitive content of the former is played out

in terms of truth value, in his article "Discourse Ethics", pp. 52-53.

4. What is interesting to note, is that moral theory plays the same role
on a supervenience account of moral properties, that psychological theory
does on such an account of mental properties. Moral theory speciﬁes the
types of interactions that the supervenient moral properties engage in, as
psychological theory does with its supervenient mental properties. Thus the
novel ontological status of the supervenient moral properties is supported not
only by their multiple realizability, but also by the idea that their causal

interactions are covered by a theory or science. For a more thorough account

9

of supervenience theory, especially as it pertains to the problem of downward
causation, see J aegwon Kim, "The N onreductivist's Troubles with Mental

Causation".

5. I say here "generally" because, as was indicated earlier, there is a
fairly wide diversity among intuitionalist theories. Thus there are some such
as Cudworth who have a view of rightness and wrongness where these
appear to be entities quite similar to Platonic forms. Thus he argues that
moral truth, like mathematical truth, "relates properly and primarily not to
sensible particulars, but to the intelligible and universal essences of things,
which are as immutable as the Eternal mind whose existence is inseparable
ﬁ-om theirs" (Sidgwick:171). Whereas Clarke is one who argues for the self-
evidence or intuitive obviousness of certain moral propositions or principles.
On his account, though, these principles seem to be intuitively evident
because of the "ﬁtness and unﬁtness" or rightness and wrongness, of the
relations that they cover (eg. relations between persons and circumstances, or
perhaps that between agent and act as Reid argues). In this sense, then,
rightness and wrongness appear to be properties of these relations. Lastly,
persons like Price seem to argue for a view of rightness and wrongness where

these are straightforwardly properties or qualities of actions. For more on

intuitionalist theory see Henry Sidgwick's WW.

CHAPTER TWO
OUGHT AND MOTIVATION

Moral norms express standards of behavior, they indicate how one
should or ought to behave. Such norms follow quite readily ﬁom moral
judgments concerning the rightness or wrongness of actions. Thus it follows
from the judgment that a given act is wrong that one ought not to commit the
act, or that it is wrong of one to do so. It would seem odd indeed to claim that
"murder is wrong", and yet assert that it is not the case that "one ought not to
murder". Gilbert Harman, in his article "Moral Relativism Defended",
identiﬁes a class of moral judgments which share the form of moral norms.
He terms these "inner moral judgments", and he views them as taking the
form ‘X was wrong or right to do, or have done Y' or ‘X ought or ought not do,
or have done Y'. It is due to their connection to motivational attitudes that
Harman characterizes these judgments as innerl. He argues that these
judgments are dependent for their sense or appropriateness on the
motivational attitudes of the person(s) involved in them (Harman 1975235).
In doing so he forges a link between the idea or concept of the moral "ought",
and motivations or reasons for action.

There is a use of "ought" distinct from the moral, in which the
connection to motivation or reasons for action is more obvious. This is the
rational or prudential "ought". We most often use this type of "ought" when
we make recommendations to persons about how they should conduct

themselves in order to further their own interests. Thus we might tell a

10

11

friend that "he ought to study for the big exam tomorrow", or that "he ought
not buy stock in IBM". In such instances we are informing persons about a
course of action that we believe would be prudent for them to follow. Implicit
in these "ought" statements is that the subject has motivation or reason to act
in the prescribed manner. The reasons or motivations here, though, are all
self-interested ones. Thus when pressed by our friend about why he should
study for the test or not buy IBM stock, we attempt to show him that these
actions are conducive to his own well being. Such a rational use of "ought"
would make no sense if we were unable to provide such motivations. Thus
without extensive explanation concerning reasons for action, it seems odd to
tell someone that he ought to lay his face on a hot frying pan. In this sense,
what Harman is arguing is that the moral use of "ought" is similar to the
rational in that both are connected to motivation or reasons for action. But
they are different in that with the moral use of "ought", persons are to ﬁnd
their motivations or reasons for action in what are the relevant moral

considerations, as opposed to the relevant prudential ones.

Some Examples

Just as I attempted to illustrate the connection between the rational
"ought" and motivation by showing how the use of this "ought" seems odd in
the absence of reasons for action. Harman likewise attempts to show the
connection between the moral use of "ought" and motivation, by showing how
judgments utilizing this ought, ie. inner moral judgments, seem strange
where motivation is lacking. In order to illustrate this point Harman uses a
number of examples. The ﬁrst involves outer space aliens landing on earth.
In terms of their attitude toward humans these aliens have no concern for

our lives or happiness. Upon landing they immediately set about wreaking

12

havoc and destruction in order to achieve their own ends or goals. Harman
argues that it should seem odd or strange for us to say that "the aliens are
wrong to do these destructive acts" or that "they ought not perform these
actions". This is because due to the attitude of the aliens concerning our lives
and happiness they have no reason to refrain from performing these
destructive acts. Thus their attitude toward humans rules out their being
motivated by the moral considerations, such as their actions causing us harm
or unhappiness, that would provide the basis for our making inner
judgments concerning them. Another example that Harman uses is that of
Hitler. He argues that it should once again seem odd or strange for us to say
that "Hitler was wrong to have ordered the extermination of the J ews" or
that "Hitler ought not to have done so". He believes that by the shear
enormity of Hitler's actions towards the Jews we can conclude that Hitler
could not have been motivated by the moral considerations on which we
would base such an inner judgment (Harman 197 5:34-35).

It may be difﬁcult to imagine how intelligent entities, such as Hitler and
the space aliens, could fail to be motivated, at least to some extent, by the
presence of human suffering. In light of this perhaps another example is in
order. Let us imagine, then, a case were an individual, call him Jones, is
visiting a foreign culture. Now in this culture the wearing of a red tie has
great moral signiﬁcance. In fact it is considered morally wrong of one to do
so. Now the reason for this is strange. The moral code of this culture is
religious based, ie. it ﬂows from the perceived commands of the local deity.
But this deity is recent, he was not recognized until television came to the
culture. Thus this culture perceived the technological marvel of TV. as being
magical and further took Porky Pig for a god. Thus the reason for the moral

signiﬁcance of red tie wearing ﬂows from what is thought to be a

13

commandment of Porky Pig2.

Jones is informed of all this, but due to his belief that Porky is just a
cartoon character he proceeds to wear red ties anyway. Upon seeing his
wearing of a red tie, members of the culture make inner moral judgments
concerning Jones. They say that "it is morally wrong of him to wear a red
tie", and that "he ought not to do so". I argue, in agreement with Harman,
that these judgments should appear strange or odd. This is because the
moral consideration that Jones is conﬁonted with provides him with no
motivation or reason to refrain from performing the act. Thus in this case
Jones seems beyond the pale, because his belief that Porky is a cartoon
character places him out of the motivational reach of what is the relevant
moral consideration, ie. that Porky commands "thou shall not wear red ties".
From a moral perspective, the idea that Porky forbids a given act provides
Jones with no motivation or reason for action. 7 Thus it seems odd or strange
for one to say that Jones ought not or should not wear a red tie, because what
is the relevant moral consideration in the case has for him no motivational
signiﬁcance, it provides him with no reason for action.

Once again the oddness that surfaces in these examples indicates the
connection that exists between our moral use of "ought", and motivation or
reason for action. Thus implicit in our use of this term, whether to indicate
conduct that is appropriate or inappropriate, is the idea that the subject to
which it is applied has sound reasons either to engage or refrain from
performing the speciﬁed act. That is why in the absence of such
motivationally compelling moral considerations the "ought" statement
appears odd or strange. This oddness probably comes across better in the
last example because few, if any of us, ﬁnd the commands of Porky Pig to be

signiﬁcant moral considerations. On the other hand, the earlier examples

14

are more difﬁcult because it is hard for us to imagine how one could not ﬁnd
human suffering as a moral consideration capable of providing at least some,
if not sufficient, reason for action. The idea, then, that the moral "ought" is
connected to motivation is evidenced by the fact that, like with the rational
"ought", its application seems odd or improper where reasons for action are

absent.

Motivation and Validity

After establishing a connection between "ought" and motivation Harman
goes on, in his article "Is There A Single True Morality", to examine the
ramiﬁcations of this linkage for the idea of universal or absolute moral
principles or norms. Such absolute norms are the proper product of a realist
position. This is because absolute moral norms are quite simply valid moral
norms, the assertion of the existence of which being one of the deﬁning
characteristics of moral realism. Thus Harman's analysis of such absolute or
valid norms involves the very foundation of moral realism itself.

An absolute or valid moral norm would apply to everyone. This can be
seen quite readily in traditional realism as such a valid norm would
constitute a truth. Given the connection between "ought" and motivation, it
follows that a valid norm would also have to supply everyone with motivation
or reason for action. Thus since the claim "X ought or ought not do, or have
done Y" was seen as implying that X has motivations or reasons for action
either to do, or not to do Y, an absolute moral norm, in that it applies to
everyone, implies that everyone has motivation or reason to comply with it.
Harman in fact argues that an absolute moral norm, such as "thou shall not
kill" or "one ought not to kill", would have to be capable of supplying
everyone with sufﬁcient reason (Harman 1984:370-371).

15

Harman goes about exploring this possibility of absolute or valid norms,
ie. the possibility that everyone may have sufﬁcient reason or motivation to
act in certain ways such that they ‘ought to do W' or ‘ought not to do Y', from
a naturalistic perspective, ie. from a perspective that is amenable to scientiﬁc
explanation. He begins by giving such a naturalistic account of sufﬁcient
reason. Harman argues that a person has sufﬁcient reason to do a thing if
and only if the person could be lead to do that thing through a process of
warranted reasoning. On this account, then, if after reasoning in a
warranted manner a person fails to do a thing, and this failure is not due to
some empirically veriﬁable defect in reasoning (such as inattention,
ignorance, irrationality, or weakness of will), then that person could not have
had sufﬁcient reason to do that thing3.

Harman goes on to argue that the moral realist believes that there exist
absolute or valid moral norms in the sense deﬁned. One such principle that
he identiﬁes as being so held by the realist is the general prohibition against
harming others. Now Harman claims that there exist persons such as
professional criminals who fail to abide by this norm, and that this failure is
not due to any empirically veriﬁable defect in their reasoning. Therefore he
concludes that the criminal could not have had sufﬁcient reason to follow this
norm, and thus it is not absolute or valid. Harman uses this example, then,
as an argument for the relativist, or anti-realist, claim that there does not
seem to exist any absolute or valid moral norms in the sense that everyone
has sufﬁcient reason for following them (Harman 1984:37 1-37 3).

Now there is an immediate difﬁculty with Harman's account of valid
moral norms. On his account it is impossible for a person to do something
wrong in the sense of being fully morally blameworthy or guilty. Thus if X
does not comply with a given norm then either 1) X did so without any defect

16

in his reasoning, and thus the norm did not supply him with sufﬁcient
reason or motivation, and hence it was invalid and did not obligate or apply
to him, or 2) X's failure to comply was due to some defect in reasoning
whereupon we would not see X as morally blameworthy in his action, or at
least we would argue that his guilt is mitigated.

In response to this objection, though, one could restructure Harman's
argument. Rather than supplying sufﬁcient reason or motivation, valid
moral norms would supply only some. Such a "weaker" version of Harman's
argument would avoid the above objection in that it would be possible for
persons to act morally wrong. Thus it would be possible for a person to
violate a norm without any defect in reasoning, and yet still have the norm
be valid and binding. Such a case would be one where the norm provided at
least some motivation, but not enough to override the motivation to not
comply. In this restructured form Harman still uncovers a deﬁnite problem
for a realist position, ie. how is it that a universal or valid norm can supply
everyone with at least some motivation or reason for compliance4? To show
why this question is problematic I would like now to attempt to answer it

using the traditional realist positions discussed earlier.

Traditional Realism Replies

Remember that traditional moral realism derives the cognitive content
of moral norms ﬁ'om truth value. This idea of the truth value of normative
statements gives rise to two types of realist positions, ie. the naturalistic and
the non-naturalistic. Of the latter variety we encountered two,
supervenience theory and intuitionalism. Remember that both of these
accounts postulated the existence of rightness and wrongness as non-natural

moral properties in virtue of which moral norms are true or valid. For both

17

of these positions it is these non-natural properties that will not only decide
the truth or validity of moral norms, but also provide the motivation when
these norms are valid. On these accounts, then, valid or universal norms
provide motivation or reason for action via the moral "facts" of rightness and
wrongness. Thus when asked why one ought not to murder, assuming this
norm is valid, the answer will be that it is because murder is wrong. It is the
wrongness of the act in question that would supply the motivation or reason
for action5.

This non-naturalistic response to the issue of motivation is problematic
in two respects. First, it is diﬁicult to understand how a non-natural or non-
physical property is to interact with physical entities. Thus it is hard to
imagine how something that is non-physical, ie. rightness and wrongness, is
to causally effect persons so as to motivate them to act in certain ways.
Secondly, any such causal interaction, where non-natural or non-physical
properties affect physical entities or properties, constitutes a violation of the
causal closure of the physical realm. What this means is that such
interaction disallows the possibility that physical events can be explained
wholly in physical terms. Thus if such causal interaction were present, any
physical event, if traced back far enough, could have an antecedent non-
physical cause. In this sense, then, physical events would not be explainable
strictly in terms of physics or the natural sciences. These two difﬁculties
make motivation very problematic for non-naturalism. On the one hand, the
causal interaction required for motivation seems unlikely or implausible. On
the other hand, the assumption that such interaction exists is very costly for
it effectively violates the causal closure of the physical realm, with this
posing difﬁculties for the explanation of physical events. These are the

classic problems found in Cartesian dualism6.

18

The question now is whether a naturalistic approach would fare better
in regards to the problem of motivation. Of the naturalistic versions of
traditional realism we encountered only one, that was consequentialism.
Now on a consequentialist account the truth or validity of a given norm
involves its correspondence to the physical circumstances or consequences of
the action that it covers. Thus the truth or validity of a norm prohibiting
killing, involves how the consequences of this action inﬂuence the well being
of those affected by it, on the whole or overall. This act would be wrong, and
the covering norm valid or true, if the consequences of this action were worse
than those of any of the possible alternatives7. Like the intuitionalist and
supervenience theorist, the consequentialist is going to argue that the
rightness or wrongness of the act in question is what motivates us to comply
with the covering norm. The difference, though, between consequentialism
and these other two realist positions, is that the account of motivation in this
case is much more plausible. Thus for the consequentialist the rightness or
wrongness of an action ﬂows ﬁ'om how its consequences will inﬂuence the
well being of all affected, including the agent. An act is found to be wrong,
then, if its attendant consequences are found to be the worst in terms of the
welfare of all concerned. Thus a person is motivated to follow the norm
prohibiting murder, because the wrongness of this act is an indication that
its consequences will negatively affect him. The motivation that
consequentialism appeals to, then, is self-interest.

Consequentialism does not escape the issue of motivation, though,
completely unscathed. The difﬁculty with consequentialism is that in
determining the consequences for all it must in some sense average them out.
Thus it must make some kind of general assessment of the consequences. A

given act, then, is wrong because its overall consequences are the worst in

19

terms of the welfare or happiness of those concerned, and yet this could be
true while one person among those affected actually beneﬁts ﬁ'om the act.
What is the motivation, then, for the one person who could beneﬁt to comply
with the norm? It could be argued that the person has some self-interested
concern in the welfare of others that should motivate him, but this would
have to be shown. An even more difﬁcult case would be an act which
produces consequences that are, on the whole or overall, the best in terms of
the welfare of everyone concerned, and yet for one of those affected it is
dreadful. How is this person motivated to comply with a norm that ﬂows
from this act's rightness? Though these are difﬁculties for consequentialism
in terms of motivation, it should be seen that they are of a different order or
severity than those of non-naturalism, and perhaps admitting of a plausible
solution. Thus with non-naturalism it appears questionable whether
motivation is possible at all. With consequentialism, a plausible account of
how motivation is possible in some instances has been provided. The
difﬁculty is that there seems to exist situations where this account fails, and

thus it needs to be expanded so as to incorporate these instances.

NOTES

1. Harman's terming such judgments "inner" moral judgments, seems to
involve the idea that they imply a sharing of motivational attitudes between
the judge, the judged, and any audience that may be listening. On Harman's
overall account he argues that such motivations can only be derived from
agreement. Since inner moral judgments imply that these motivational
attitudes are shared, they must be "inner" in the sense that they are made

ﬁom "within" the conﬁnes of a particular moral agreement or convention.

2. In Porky's defense I would like to indicate that he disapproves of his
deiﬁcation by this culture, and that what was perceived to be a command on

his part against red tie wearing was really the result of a bad translation.

3. There are difﬁculties inherent within this deﬁnition of sufﬁcient
reason for the naturalist. This is because the naturalist is forced to ﬁnd the
place, within the natural or empirical world, for all the evaluative terms used
within this deﬁnition. Thus hewould have to come up with additional
naturalistic explanations or deﬁnitions of a warranted reasoning process,
irrationality, weakness of will, etc,. I would like to thank my venerable co-
chair, Prof. Mark Risjord, for this criticism.

4. In this way Harman's argument is much like J .L. Mackie's argument
ﬁ'om queemess (Mackiez417-418). Thus Mackie argues that the idea of a

20

21

valid moral norm, or "fact", that is capable of motivating everyone appears
strange or queer. He wonders what such facts would look like and how they

would interact with us such that they could supply us with reason for action.

5. Price is one such intuitionalist when he insists that "right actions are
to be chosen because they are right" and that "an act loses its moral worth in

proportion as it is done from natural inclination" (Sidgwick:226).

6. It would seem that these difﬁculties could be avoided if it were
argued that what motivates persons is not the actual rightness or wrongness
of an act or situation, but rather the knowledge that a given act or situation
is right or wrong. Thus it could be argued that our reason is constituted such
that when we come to know that a given action is right or wrong, we ﬁnd
ourselves immediately provided by this knowledge with motivation either to
engage in, or refrain from, performing the act.‘ If this were the case it would
seem that rightness and wrongness would not have to causally intervene
with us in order to provide motivation. I would argue, though, that in fact
this account of motivation just pushes back the causal difﬁculties of non-
naturalism. Thus it would seem that how we come to have knowledge of the
presence of the non-natural moral properties would involve their causally

impinging upon us, such as through our sensory apparatus.

7. Here I am thinking of consequentialism in its rule utilitarian form.

CHAPTER THREE
EXPLANATORY POTEN CE

The traditional moral realist holds that there are moral facts. He makes
claims concerning the actual rightness or wrongness of certain actions or
situations, and it is from these claims that moral norms gain their truth
value and hence cognitive content. In W: Gilbert
Harman examines whether these claims concerning moral facts are justiﬁed.
The issue of justiﬁcation for him centers around the idea of explanatory
relevance or potence. Thus Harman argues that we are justiﬁed in our belief
in certain physical facts because they ﬁgure in the best explanations of our
observations. What Harman contends, though, is that moral facts have no
such explanatory relevance. He argues that these facts never ﬁgure in the
best explanation of any of our observations. In this sense he is arguing that
any belief in moral facts, in actual rightness or wrongness, would be

unjustiﬁed.

Observation and Best Explanation

Harman contends that observations are always "theory laden". This
means that what is observed depends, at least to some extent, on the
background theories that one holds. To change these theories, then, would be
to change one's observations (Harman 1977 :430). Speciﬁcally, Harman

claims that observation involves the formation of a belief or opinion as a

22

23

fairly direct result of viewing something. He argues that one can form such
an opinion only if one understands the relevant concepts involved, and these
concepts are what they are by virtue of their place in a theory or system of
beliefs (Harman 1977 :431). Thus "to see a child as a child is to employ,
consciously or unconsciously, a concept that is deﬁned by its place in a
framework of the stages of human life" (Harman 1977 :431). To change the
background theories employed in this observation would be to change the
place or role of this concept, and hence the concept itself. This would then
result in a change in the formation of one's beliefs or opinions, and thus in
one's observation (Harman 197 7 :431). For Harman, then, observation is the
formation of an opinion or judgment as a direct result of viewing a situation,
where this judgment formation is inﬂuenced by one's background theories
(Harman 1977 :431).

The idea of best explanation is equally complex. One criterion for
whether a given explanation is better than another is success. Thus of two
competing explanations, the better of the two is that which is more accurate
in terms of predicting and/or controlling the observational phenomenon to be
explained. Another criterion is that of simplicity. Thus of two explanations,
one will be better than another if it explains the observation in question
equally well, and yet is simpler or less complex. Now there is more than one
aspect to this idea of simplicity. An explanation could be simpler in terms of
its postulates, in terms of its concepts, or in terms of its ontology
(Lehrerzl82). Perhaps an example will make this criterion of simplicity more
clear.

It is argued that when I see an individual behaving in a manner such as
I would if I were in a particular mental state, the best explanation for that
individual's behavior is that he is in that state. Let us consider the following

24

case in order to illustrate this. As I am walking through town I come upon
Jones lying on the ground rocking back and forth, cradling his arm in his
hand, and moaning rather loudly. Upon further inspection of Jones I notice
that his arm seems damaged, in fact it looks as if a portion of bone is
extended out through the skin. Now one explanation of my observation of
J ones' behavior, ie. his moaning and his cradling of his arm, is that he is in
pain. I know that under similar conditions I too would be in pain. To see
why this explanation is best let us explore the alternative explanation
denying he is in pain. Such an explanation would ﬁrst have to explain why
Jones is behaving as he does if he is not in pain. Secondly, it would either
have to assume that others in a similar situation as Jones would experience
pain, and thus would have to explain why Jones does not, or it would have to
assume that no one experiences pain under such conditions, and then it
would have to explain why I do (Lehrer:160). Either way, the alternative
explanation seems to be much more complex. The explanation that Jones is
in pain is better because it is simpler. It seems simpler in terms of its
postulates, the alternative requires additional assumptions concerning why
others either do or do not experience pain under similar situations. And this
explanation seems simpler conceptually, thus the alternative in making
these additional assumptions must then explain how they cohere with other
observations, such as that of my own pain.

One has to be careful, though, with the criterion of simplicity. This is
because one could make a given explanation simpler merely by paring down
what it attempts to explain. We might, then, ﬁnd a given explanation of an
observation to be better, even if it is more complex than the alternative, if it
explains more than the alternative, ie. explains additional observations that

the alternative does not (Lehrer:171). We could imagine, for instance, our old

25

friend Jones being confronted by a chainsaw wielding maniac. But when the
maniac finally succeeds in cornering Jones, he is unable to get his chainsaw
started. Now one explanation of the observation of the chainsaw's failure to
start, is that J ones' guardian angel intervened in order to save him. Another
explanation, one put forward by mechanics, is that due to poor maintenance
the fuel line on the chainsaw has become clogged impeding the proper ﬂow of
gas into the combustion chamber, resulting in a failure of ignition. Now the
guardian angel explanation is simpler than the mechanical one, but we
would not want to assume that it is therefore best. Part of the reason that
the mechanical explanation is more complex, is that it involves assumptions
and conceptual apparatus that can be used to explain other of our
observations. This complexity of the mechanical explanation, then, allows it
to explain more, and in this sense makes it better. Thus it not only can
explain why the maniac's chainsaw doesn't work under the conditions
speciﬁed above, but also why it does work under other conditions. It can
explain things like why the chainsaw cuts faster when the throttle is pulled,
and most importantly, it can explain to the maniac how to return the
chainsaw to peak performance.

We have, then, a three tier criterion for the evaluation of competing
explanations. First, one evaluates the success of the explanations, the better
explanation being that which is more accurate in terms of predicting and/or
controlling the observational phenomenon to be explained. When conﬁ'onted
with explanations that are equally successful one then examines their
complexity, the better explanation being that which is simpler. But in
examining the simplicity of the explanations one must also pay attention to
how much they attempt to explain. Thus one may be willing to accept a more

complex explanation as being better than a simpler one if it is able to explain

26

morel.

Once again, Harman argues that we are justiﬁed in our belief in a
hypothesis or assumption only if it contributes to, or plays a role in, some of
our best explanations of what we observe (Harman 197 7:434). In addition he
wishes to argue that whereas our assumptions as to certain physical facts
fulﬁll this criterion of justiﬁcation, assumptions as to moral facts do not. In

order to illustrate this point Harman gives us two examples.

Some Examples

The ﬁrst is a case where a physicist is making an observation in order to
test a scientiﬁc theory. The physicist views a vapor trail in a cloud chamber,
immediately he has the thought "there goes a proton". Now this is an
observation, it is the formation of a belief as a direct result of viewing a
situation. It is also theory laden. Thus the physicist's ability to make this
observational judgment is at least partly dependent on his having certain
theoretical beliefs, such as those concerning the equipment or apparatus and
its relation to protons. Any explanation of the physicist's observation, then,
will have to appeal to the physicist being in a certain "psychological set" as a
result of the background theories that he holds. What Harman contends,
though, is that part of our best explanation of the physicist's observation will
also include the assumption that there actually was a proton going through
the cloud chamber. Thus he argues that the assumption of the physical fact
of the proton will form part of our best explanation of the observation, and
that as such this assumption is justiﬁed (Harman 197 7 :43 1-432). It is
claimed, then, that any competing explanation of the observation of the vapor
trail that does not include the assumption of the physical fact of the proton

will either be less successful, more complex, or leave more unexplained.

27

Harman then goes on to give us another example, this time of a moral
observation. A person views two children setting a cat on ﬁre and
immediately thinks "this is wrong". This is an observation, the formation of
a belief or opinion as a direct result of viewing a situation, and it is theory
laden. Thus, once again, part of our explanation of the observation will
involve reference to the observer being in a certain psychological set, ie.
having certain background theories such as moral theories specifying what it
means for a given act to be wrong. What Harman contends, though, is that
in the case of moral observations it is not necessary to assume any facts over
and above those of the psychological set of the observer in order to explain
the occurrence of the observation. Thus in the case of the children
incinerating the cat, Harman asserts that it is not necessary to assume any
moral facts, such as that igniting the cat was actually wrong. He claims that
such moral "facts" appear to be irrelevant in terms of explaining the
occurrence of the observation (Harman 1977 :431-432). What Harman is
claiming, then, is that the assumption of moral facts never plays a role in our
best explanation of our moral observations, and is therefore unjustiﬁed. The
criterion of best explanation in use here, I believe involves primarily the tiers
of success and simplicity. Part of Harman's contention, then, is that one can
explain our moral observations simply by appealing to the psychological set
of the observer, and that such an explanation will be as successful as any
appealing to moral facts. Therefore the explanation that does not appeal to
moral facts is better in that it is less complex in terms of its assumptions.
Perhaps this idea will become more apparent through the examination of an

account that attempts to show the explanatory relevance of moral facts.

28

A Reply

Nicholas Sturgeon, in his article "Moral Explanations", attempts to put
forward an account whereby moral facts have explanatory relevance or
potence. Sturgeon begins by ﬁrst explaining what he takes the charge of
explanatory irrelevance to be. He asserts that an assumption is irrelevant to
the explanation of a fact, in this case an observation, if the "fact would have
obtained, and we could have explained it just as well, even if the assumption
had been false" (Sturgeonz444). After deﬁning the problem in this manner,
Sturgeon then asks how we can go about determining whether a given
assumption is explanatorily irrelevant in terms of a given fact, speciﬁcally in
terms of our observations. Sturgeon argues that the relevance of a given
assumption cannot be tested in isolation. Thus he claims that "it is by now a
familiar point about scientiﬁc principles that they are completely devoid of
empirical implications when considered in isolation" (Sturgeonz439). He
contends that assumptions are able to have empirical implications or
observational consequences only when they are considered in conjunction
with a background of additional theoretical assumptions. This idea accords
rather readily with Harman's notion of observation being theory laden. Thus
Harman acknowledges, for instance, that part of the explanation of the
physicist's observation of the proton will involve his psychological set or
background theoretical assumptions. The physicist is able to recognize the
vapor trail as evidence of a proton because he holds certain background
theories, such as those concerning the relation between the cloud chamber
apparatus and atomic particles.

Given this account of how we test the explanatory relevance of
assumptions, Sturgeon goes on to ask the further question of whether

assumptions about moral facts, about the rightness or wrongness of certain

29

acts, are ever relevant to the explanation of our moral observations. Of
course Sturgeon argues that the answer to this question is dependent on the
background theories or assumptions that one holds. Sturgeon proceeds, then,
to test the relevance of moral facts with the background assumption that
they supervene on physical facts. Thus Sturgeon pursues this question from
the perspective of a supervenience account.

Now let's go back to the example of the children and the kitty cat in
order to construct Sturgeon's ensuing argument. Remember the example
went as follows: a person views children setting a cat ablaze and immediately
thinks "this is wrong". Remember as well that Harman contends that the
assumption that the observation was true, that igniting a cat actually is
wrong, is irrelevant to explaining the observation. Given Sturgeon's position
this argument as to relevance translates into the question, "would the
observation have obtained, and could we explain it equally well, even if the
assumption as to the actual wrongness of incinerating cats, was false".
Sturgeon contends that if one holds a supervenience view of moral facts the
answer to this question is most likely no (Sturgeonz444-445). Thus on a
supervenience account certain physical instantiation bases constitute
sufﬁcient conditions for the emergence of moral properties. The assumption,
then, is that the incineration of the cat is wrong because it constitutes one of
the instantiation bases of wrongness, for instance being a situation which
exempliﬁes a case of unnecessary cruelty. Now if it is false that the act in
question is actually wrong, then the circumstances of the act must be
changed such that it no longer constitutes one of the instantiation bases of
wrongness. Thus the situation must be changed so that it no longer
exempliﬁes a case of unnecessary cruelty. Depending on how extensive a

change of the physical circumstances of the situation that this would require,

30

and how attentive the observer is, it seems quite possible on such an account
that the same observation would not have been made if the assumption as to
the situation's actual wrongness had been false.

There seems something wrong, though, with Sturgeon's view of
explanatory relevance or potence. This is because it proves too much. Thus
on his account any property, such as that of being a witch, could become
explanatorily relevant simply through the background assumption of
supervenience (McCord227 3). And yet I think that most of us would like to
say that "witchness" does not have observational consequences, that it is not
a property with empirical implications, and is in this sense not pertinent to
our explanation of witch observations. Thus I believe that most persons
would agree that witch observations can be explained without having to
make the assumption of witch facts, ie. that there are witches. It seems in
this case that most persons would agree with Harman that such observations
can be explained simply by making assumptions concerning the psychological

set of the observer.

Best Explanation Re-visited

It should seem obvious that Sturgeon misjudged the angle of Harman's
attack. Thus Sturgeon did not address Harman's primary argument, which
is not that moral facts are irrelevant in the sense that it is impossible to
construct an account whereby they can have observational consequences.
Rather Harman argues for the explanatory irrelevance of such facts on the
grounds that they never form part of the best explanation of our
observations. Thus Harman, I believe, would agree that we could construct
theoretical accounts in which moral facts are involved in the explanation of

our observations. What he would deny, though, is that such accounts

31

constitute our best explanation of the phenomenon. But why does an account
such as Sturgeon's fail in terms of this explanatory criterion? Well ﬁrst, in
postulating the existence of moral properties such an account becomes more
complicated in terms of its assumptions and ontology. Secondly, in
attempting to explain how these moral facts connect to our observations, the
account adds even more to its assumptions and becomes more complicated
conceptually, as a conceptual framework must be constructed in order to
integrate the postulates. Thus Harman's contention is that such accounts
fail because our moral observations can be explained equally well with only
assumptions concerning our psychological set. The latter explanation thus
being better because it is less complex.

Can moral facts ever contribute to the best explanation of our
observations or experiences? Is traditional moral realism, with its assertion
of the existence of moral facts a hollow position? Perhaps Sturgeon is partly
right in arguing that the answer to this question is at least somewhat
dependent on the way we deﬁne these facts and their place in the world.
Thus, once again, it seems that supervenience accounts fail this explanatory
criterion because the connection of these facts to the world, to our
observations and experiences, appears extraneous and hence unnecessary.
On supervenience accounts the moral facts, the rightness or wrongness of the
situation, are something over and above the situation itself. On such views
rightness and wrongness are non-natural properties, and any account of
these properties will have to include not only additional assumptions about
their existence, but also elaborate conceptual frameworks to work out their
connection to the situation, and their connection to us. Hence any theoretical
explanation of an observation utilizing such an account will have to be

cumbersome. The same seems to hold true with intuitionalism, given that it

32

shares such a non-naturalistic approach with supervenience theoryz.

Consequentialism

Perhaps consequentialism will fare a little better. This is because with
consequentialism the rightness or wrongness of a situation is not something
additional over above the situation itself. Instead, these moral aspects of the
situation are its consequences. Thus it seems that on a consequentialist
account the determination of the rightness or wrongness of a situation
involves the examination of what should be just another of its observable
components. So, ﬁrst of all, consequentialism limits its own theoretical
baggage by having the moral aspects of a situation, its rightness or
wrongness, be ﬁrmly grounded in the situation itself. On this account these
aspects of the situation should be as readily observable as any other, they
involve merely the effects or consequences of the situation. Once again,
rightness or wrongness on this account, are not viewed as non-natural
entities or properties that have to be somehow connected to the situation, and
to us, via an elaborate network of theoretical assumptions3. Secondly,
consequentialism also has the advantage of giving a plausible account of how
we go about making moral judgments or observations such as "this is wrong"
or "this is right". Thus with consequentialism such observations stem from
our perception of the consequences or effects involved in the situation viewed.

Still the question remains, is it necessary to assume that a given act
actually is wrong, in order to explain the occurrence of an observation? Thus,
though a consequentialist account may seem initially plausible in explaining
our moral observations, is it ever necessary to assume the moral facts that it
puts forward? To make this idea clearer let us return once again to the

example of the kitty cat. When the person views this situation he makes the

33

observation "this is wrong". On a consequentialist account this observation
would be the result of the perception of how the consequences of the act
adversely affect the welfare or happiness of those involved, ie. the perception
of the suffering of the cat. Thus consequentialism gives us an initial
explanation of the observation, namely that the observation occurred because
the consequences of the act appeared unhappy. Now would the additional
assumption that igniting a cat actually is wrong, ever contribute to the
explanation of such moral observations? Is it the case that the
consequentialist assumptions concerning how we make moral judgments or
observations are enough, and that these could be neatly ﬁt under Harman's
category of assumptions concerning the observer's psychological set?

Well I would like to argue, as strange as it may seem, that the truth or
factualness of the claim "igniting a cat is wrong", could contribute to the
consequentialist explanation of our moral observations. Let us suppose that
everyone upon viewing alive cat being incinerated made the observation
"this is wrong". It seems that this aspect of our moral experience, this
agreement in our moral observations, could be explained via the above moral
fact. Thus the consequentialist could explain this universal moral
observation by arguing that what it means for the claim "cat burning is
wrong" to be true, is that on the whole, this act produces consequences that
are more damaging to the welfare or happiness of those concerned, than any
of the alternative actions open to the agent(s) involved. Given both this
moral fact, then, and the idea that our moral observations stem from our
perception of the consequences of the situation observed, this universal
observation is merely the result of persons correctly perceiving the act and its
effects4. It's merely the result of persons correctly perceiving that the act has

the most adverse consequences for the welfare of those involved. We may

34

even suppose that some persons don't make the appropriate judgment, and
that the observation is in fact not universal. Well if the consequentialist can
explain these observations on the basis of a misperception of the
consequences, then they would still contribute to his theory. Thus if the
consequentialist can point out some error in the observations, then such
observations would not undermine his theoretical explanation. In fact such
observations could be seen as supportive of consequentialism in that their
apparent conﬂict would be amenable to explanation via this theory5.
Though the consequentialist could give such an explanation of the
observation, would it be the best? Is it the case that this explanation
utilizing moral facts is better than any competitor, and that therefore its
assumption of such facts is justiﬁed? In reference to our moral observations
Harman seems to contend that explanations which utilize moral facts are
always unduly complex. He seems to argue that a psychological explanation,
one which appeals to the psychological set of the observer alone, is simpler
while being equally successful, and hence is better. According to Harman,
then, in order to be best the consequentialist explanation would have to
topple that of psychology. Whether or not this is possible I can't settle here,
but perhaps given Harman's strong claim concerning explanations utilizing
moral facts, it would be enough for present purposes to show that the
competition may be closer than he admits. It would seem that
consequentialism would be no more complex than any competing
psychological explanation in terms of ontological commitments, ie. both
would be naturalistic6. In terms of postulates and conceptual apparatus both
would most likely be close as well. Thus whereas consequentialism has to
develop the connection between consequences and rightness and wrongness

in order to explain this universal moral observation, the competing

35

psychological account would have to make assumptions concerning shared
sentiments, or something like this, in order to explain such widespread
agreement in judgment. I would like to argue, then, that it seems to be an
open question as to whether a psychological explanation would be better than
that of consequentialism, and that therefore the question as to the
explanatory potence of moral facts seems to be open as well. As such, until a
much more thorough examination of these competing positions take place, a
belief in a consequentialist account of moral facts may not be completely
unjustiﬁed.

The real problem with consequentialism seems to be that it often times
conﬂicts with our moral observations in such a way that these "mis-
observations" cannot be explained away. Thus we could think of a case
where cruelly beating an innocent child to death would produce, on the
whole, consequences that are more beneﬁcial in terms of the welfare of those
concerned than any of the alternative actionsopen to the agent(s) involved.
It seems that a consequentialist may be forced to conclude that this act is
right. Whereas it seems that our observations of it should be almost
overwhelmingly that it is wrong. It seems that in this case consequentialism
cannot explain such "mis-observations" away. This is because these
observations do not seem to be the result of a misperception of the
consequences of the action. Thus it would seem that the observation would
be made even in the face of recognizing that, overall, the consequences of this
act are the most beneﬁcial. So if a consequentialist account of moral facts
fails, I believe it is not due to the idea that on this account such facts have no
potential for explanatory potence or relevance. I believe that instead its

failure is due to its inability to account for all our moral observations.

 

 

 

 

NOTES

 

1. It should seem obvious by now that the evaluation of explanations is
certainly no easy matter. Thus, all other things being equal, which is the
better of two competing explanations, that which is simpler in terms of its
postulates, or that which is simpler in terms of its conceptual apparatus?
Even the issue of weighing simplicity against the breadth of an explanation
seems quite difﬁcult. On top of all this some put forward an additional
criterion for the evaluation of explanations, that of conservation. Thus of two
competing explanations, all other things being equal, the better of the two
will be that which conserves or preserves the most of what we already believe
(Lehrer:183). Fortunately, Harman seems to rely primarily on the ideas of
success and simplicity. Also he seems to believe that the competition
between explanations using moral facts, and those that don't, is not even
close. Thus it would seem that an in depth analysis or evaluation of the
explanations may not be necessary. Rather it is probably enough to just
show that the answer is not obvious, that the competition may be closer than
originally argued. For more on explanation see Gilbert Harman's "The
Inference To The Best Explanation" ( 1965) and "Knowledge, Inference, And
Explanation" (1968).

2. In a similar way it was shown that both intuitionalism and
supervenience theory share the same problems in terms of motivation due to

their non-naturalism. The intuitionalist, though, may attempt to avoid some

36

 

 

37

of these explanatory difficulties by utilizing his theory as a way of explaining
intuitive observations. In this sense he would not have to make additional
assumptions or construct complicated conceptual apparatus in order to give
his moral facts ramiﬁcations for our more "empirical" observations. Such an

explanatory position though seems somewhat circular.

3. Part of consequentialism's advantage in this area stems from its
ability to put forward a fairly plausible account of motivation as well. In this
sense it gives at least one unproblematic account of how moral facts "hook-

up" to us.

4. One could see this readily on an act utilitarian account where it is
found that, on the whole, this act has the most negative consequences for the
happiness or well being of everyone concerned, of any of the possible

alternative actions open to the agent(s) involved.

5. Thus McCord states that "the making of some observation 0 will
conﬁrm a theory T even if the observation is false as long as T explains why
the false observation was made". WE , footnote p.269.

6. This is of course assuming that the psychological account is not one
that is non-reductivist in the sense that it asserts the existence of non-
natural mental properties. In this case the psychological account would be

non-naturalistic, and hence more complex ontologically.

 

 

 

CHAPTER FOUR
REVIEW AND RE-EVALUATION

So far we have examined Harman's objections from motivation and
explanation, and seen how the traditional forms of moral realism fare in the
face of these. In terms of this latter idea it has been found that the non-
naturalistic approaches to moral realism do poorly. Thus it was seen that
motivation is extremely problematic for intuitionalism and supervenience
theory in that it seems to involve these positions in issues concerning
downward causation, or the violation of the causal closure of the physical
realm. Likewise it was seen that the non-natural moral facts postulated by
these positions appear to be explanatorily irrelevant, in that explanations
utilizing them become overly complex in comparison to their rivals, and
therefore do not constitute the best explanation of our moral observations.

As such the assumption of these non-natural moral facts was argued to be
unjustiﬁed.

On the naturalistic side, though, it was found that traditional moral
realism did much better. Thus it was seen that consequentialism was able to
put forward an account of motivation that, though it was not without
problems, was still quite viable. It was also found that on a consequentialist
account moral facts have at least the potential for explanatory potence. Thus
the issue as to whether a consequentialist account of moral facts constituted
the best explanation of our moral observations seemed to be an open one.

The problem found with consequentialism in this area, then, was not that its

38

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

39

assumption of moral facts appeared completely unjustiﬁed. It was rather that
it did not always square with our moral observations. Thus it was found that
a consequentialist account comes into conﬂict with some of our moral
observations.

Consequentialism is attractive, then, in that it appears to be resistant to
Harman's objections, and yet this position is troubling due to its conflict with
our observations. The existence of this conﬂict seems to bring with it two
immediate choices. We could accept consequentialism, due to its successes,
and adjust our conﬂicting observations accordingly, or we could hold tight to
our observations and consider the conﬂict to be a ﬂaw with consequentialist
theory. Perhaps before choosing we should be certain that these are the only
two alternatives open. Thus if a realist position could be found that was as
equally successful as consequentialism in terms of Harman's objections, and
yet accords better with our moral observations, then we would not be faced
with this dilemma of whether to abandon ourlobservations or our moral

theory.

A New Approach

It was argued that both naturalism and non-naturalism are responses
to the deﬁning of cognitive content and validity, by traditional moral realism,
in terms of truth value and truth respectively. Thus it was argued that these
broad types of traditional moral realism were the result of attempting to
reconcile claims concerning what is right and wrong with a correspondence
theory of truth. As both of these responses to the issue of truth value have
proven problematic, perhaps in searching for an alternative realist position it
may be best to avoid this issue completely.

In this regard an approach like that of J urgen Habermas seems to be an

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

40

interesting alternative. This is because he dispenses with deﬁning
normative validity in terms of truth, in favor of a Kantian account. Thus
Habermas, in keeping with Kant's insight into our basic moral beliefs, wishes
to deﬁne the validity of normative claims in terms of universality or
impartiality. He argues that valid norms have a general or impartial
character such that they could meet with the qualiﬁed assent of all who
would or could be affected (Habermas263-65). But unlike Kant, Habermas
contends that the process by which this aspect of moral norms is tested
cannot be conducted by the individual in isolation. This is because
individuals are at least to some extent prisoners of their own perspective, and
as such are limited as to how adeptly they can assume the perspectives of
others. It seems, then, given the limitations of the individual, that the only
way to accurately determine whether a given norm is valid or impartial, or
would meet with the assent of those who would or could be affected by its
observance, is to engage the perspectives of those concerned directly.
Habermas therefore argues for the testing of the impartiality and hence
validity of norms via discourse, as this seems to be a method that is

superiorly placed in this regard (Habermasz65).

Rules

Habermas argues that a discourse which purports to test the validity of
norms must be regulated. There must be rules to govern the discourse so as
to ensure that all perspectives truly are included. Thus, just as Kant
provided the individual with the categorical imperative as a regulative
principle so as to ensure that the process of validity testing was not tainted
by the individual's particular interests or inclinations. Habermas argues

that a discourse in which validity testing is to take place must likewise have

 

 

   

41

a regulative principle so as to make certain that no individual's particular
perspective overwhelms those of the others. Thus he argues that there must
be a bridging principle for the discourse, like Kant's categorical imperative,
that can bridge the gap between the individual's particular perspective and
one that is universal or impartial (Habermasz63). This principle he terms (U)

and it states the following requirement for a valid norm:

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known
alternative possibilities for regulation). (Habermasz65)

It is from this principle that Habermas derives the cognitive content of moral
norms as well. Thus in providing a clear requirement for valid moral norms,
this principle allows for the construction of discourses that can reach a
substantive conclusion on the subject of a given norm's validity
(Habermaszl20).

What is interesting to note here is that (U) also seems to give us an
insight into the conﬂict that arises between consequentialism and our moral
observations. Thus (U) pays attention to the agreeableness of consequences,
but from the perspectives of everyone affected. Thus going back to the case of
the beating of the child, the consequences of this act may have been on the
whole beneﬁcial, but from the perspective of the child they were
unacceptable. Thus our observation that this situation is not right or
permissible, stems from the idea that not all affected can accept the
consequences of the act. Thus our failure to ﬁnd the norm that would govern
this situation to be valid stems from the idea that it is not impartial, ie. that
not everyone affected can accept the consequences of its observance.

Consequentialism comes into conﬂict, then, because in assessing the

 

 

42

consequences of a situation it seeks to ﬁnd the average. It is this average or
overall estimation of the consequences that is to decide the question as to
whether the situation is right or permissible. Such an average, though, may
not agree with all the particular perspectives of those involved, and in this
sense may favor some perspectives over those of others. Given this
discussion, Habermas's account should look promising because it seems to be
able to explain the shortcomings of consequentialism in terms of our

observations.

The Derivation of (U)

Kant in his philosophy argued that there were various types or levels of
reason, and that they each had a specialized function. For Kant it was the
practical reason that dealt with the question of normative validity, and it was
ﬁ'om the practical reason itself that he derived the principle that was to
regulate the individual's response to this questionl. In a similar way
Habermas distinguishes between types or levels of discourse, all of which he
argues have a specialized function as well. It is on the level of discourse
where the goal is to reach rationally motivated agreement that he argues the
issue of normative validity is to be decided. And like Kant, Habermas
derives his regulative principle (U) from the very medium that it is designed
to govern. Thus Habermas contends that (U) is derivable from the
presuppositions of this level of discourse, which he terms the rhetorical level
of processes. Habermas Identiﬁes the following set of presuppositions at this

level:

(1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take
part in a discourse.

(2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

43

b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion
whatever into the discourse.
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.

(3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from
exercising his rights as laid down in ( 1) and (2). (Habermas289)

Habermas contends that these presuppositions can be shown to be inherent
in this level of discourse by a type of transcendental argument.

Essential to this argument is what Habermas terms a performative
contradiction. An example of such a contradiction would be an individual
attempting to refute Descartes' Cogito argument by putting forward the
claim "I do not exist (here and now)". This statement would place the
individual in a performative contradiction because in making it he also puts
forward a corresponding existential claim that could be expressed as "I exist
(here and now)" (Habermasz80). Thus the very fact that the individual in
question is able to assert a claim concerning his non-existence implies that
he exists, it implies that he has presence enough to engage in this activity.
In this sense his performance contradicts his claim, for his act of asserting
the claim denies its content. Given this idea of a performative contradiction,
then, Habermas contends that the presuppositions at the rhetorical level are
identiﬁed by the idea that since their being assumed or presupposed is
necessary for the very possibility of discourse aimed at rational agreement,
they cannot be derived deductively without circularity and they cannot be
denied without contradiction. This is why the argument for the
presuppositions can be properly viewed as transcendental (Habermas:86-95).

Let us consider how such an argument would work concerning the
presuppositions we have identiﬁed for discourse designed to reach rationally

motivated agreement. This, remember, is the level on which the testing of

 

 

 

44

normative validity claims is to take place. Consider, then, a case where
individuals enter into a discourse with others and manage to achieve
agreement on a particular norm, call it N. But let us further suppose that
agreement was only reached on N because a certain group of individuals
involved in the discourse silenced others who would not agree. Consider,
then, the following claim involving this example: "by silencing those who
would disagree, we managed to reach a rationally motivated agreement on
N". I think that it should be apparent that the actions or performance of the
persons involved in this discourse contradicts the content of the claim. Thus
it would seem that what it means to rationally agree to something, involves
the notion that the persons concerned are lead to the same conclusion on the
basis that they all ﬁnd it acceptable, though perhaps for different reasons.
The only force that we recognize as legitimate in a rational agreement is that
of the better argument. Thus an agreement based on coercion, based on
silencing those who would dissent, seems to violate the concept of rational
agreement. In this sense, then, such an "agreement" would seem to violate
the presuppositions of rational agreement, it would seem to violate what is
implicit or inherent in this activity (Habermas:91). This example involves
the violation of the third presupposition as it pertains to the second. It
constitutes evidence for the claim that these are presuppositions for discourse
aimed at rationally motivated agreement, on the grounds that it shows any
attempt to reach such an agreement while denying them, will involve one in
contradiction.

We have seen, then, how the idea of performative contradiction relates
to the identiﬁcation of presuppositions. What remains is to address the issue
of circularity. Thus it is argued that any attempt to derive the

presuppositions deductively will involve one in circular argument. In terms

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

45

of the presuppositions identiﬁed for discourse aimed at rationally motivated
agreement, I believe what is meant here is that these presuppositions are
inherent in the meaning of the activity. Thus the concept of a rationally
motivated agreement is composed of these presuppositions, and therefore any
attempt to derive them deductively from this concept will always be circular,
for it will always merely repeat what was already present in the concept
initiallyz. This idea of course connects up to the earlier discussion of
performative contradiction, in that since these presuppositions are at the
very heart of what it means to achieve rationally motivated agreement, any
attempt to utilize this concept while denying these presuppositions will

always be contradictory.

The Derivation Itself

Having provided an account of how the presuppositions are identiﬁed,
we seem to now be in a position to examine whether (U) is actually derivable
from them. Such a derivation is crucial because it gives (U) a ﬁrm
foundation or grounding. Thus if (U) can be shown to be derivable from the
presuppositions, then it will be shown to be implicit in the very process of
testing normative validity claims. This is because (U) will be shown to be
implicit in the discourse level on which such testing is to take place. One
way in which the derivability of (U) could be shown is by examining whether
it is possible to have a discourse based agreement on a norm fulﬁll all the
presuppositions and yet violate (U). In logical notation, with "P" standing for
the presuppositions and "U" standing for (U), such a case could be symbolized
as (P&-U).

One way in which to examine whether a case involving (P&-U) is

possible, is to explore the conditions under which a discourse based

 

 

 

 

46

agreement on a norm does not satisfy (U). Such an agreement does not
satisfy (U), if its the case that one or more of the persons who would or could
be affected by the norm cannot accept the consequences its general
observance is anticipated to have for everyone's interests. One way in which
an agreement such as this could occur, is if persons who would or could be
affected by the norm where excluded ﬁom the discourse, in which the
agreement took place, because they would not agree to the norm. Assuming
that these persons were competent actors and language users, this could not
be the case in a situation satisfying the conditions expressed by (P&-U). This
is because the ﬁrst presupposition, in conjunction with the third, forbids the
exclusion of persons from a discourse who have the competence to speak and
act3. Another way in which a case exemplifying -U could occur, is if persons
who would or could be affected by the norm, were silenced from voicing their
dissent in the discourse in which the agreement took place. This, though,
would also not seem to be the case in a situation satisfying (P&-U). This is
because the second presupposition, in conjunction with the third, forbids
preventing individuals from voicing their opinions. These would seem to be
the only ways in which a discourse based agreement on a norm would not
satisfy (U). As both of these are excluded from a situation in which P is
satisﬁed, I would conclude that it is not possible to have a case which
satisﬁes (P&-U). From -(P&-U) we can then conclude (P->U), which means
that (U) is indeed derivable ﬁom the presuppositions.

It could be objected that another way in which a discourse based
agreement would not satisfy (U), is if persons were misinformed as to the
consequences of the norm that was the subject of the agreement. Such an
agreement could conform to the presuppositions, thus no one need be

excluded or silenced, and yet seem to violate (U) on the grounds that if the

 

 

 

47

persons had known the actual consequences of the norm in question, they
would not have agreed to it. I would argue, though, that what (U) requires is
that agreement is reached given what is anticipated, or expected to be, the
norm's consequences. Thus (U) does not place on the agreement the
additional requirement that the participants have absolute knowledge of the
consequences and side effects of the norm. I would argue, then, that such a

case of misinformation does not constitute a situation satisfying (P&-U).

ism

The Objections

Now that Habermas's account of normative validity has been presented,

 

the next step is to examine how this program fares in the face of Harman's
objections from motivation and explanation. It seems that this account does
well in terms of explaining how valid norms motivate. This is because
Habermas establishes a connection between normative validity, and our
acceptance of the manner in which the norm affects the satisfaction of our
interests. Thus a valid norm is one that all affected can accept the
consequences its observance will be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of
everyone's interests. These consequences being preferred over those of

known alternatives (Habermas,p.65). A valid norm, then, motivates those

I

who will be affected by its observance on the grounds that they can accept its
consequences and actually prefer them over those of known alternatives.
Thus I would argue the fact that those affected can accept, and actually
prefer, the norm and its consequences, implies that they have at least some
motivation to comply with the norm. Remember overriding, or sufﬁcient
motivation, is not necessary. All that is required is that the norm be capable
of providing some. This is because, as was discussed earlier, if the

motivation provided was sufﬁcient, it wouldn't be possible for persons to do

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

48

anything wrong4.

But how does this account do in terms of the issue of explanatory
relevance? Well ﬁrst of all this account is able to give a plausible
explanation of how we make our moral observations. On this account a
person makes a given moral observation, such as "this is wrong" after
viewing two children igniting a cat, because he believes that what is involved
in this situation violates the content of a norm which he believes is valid.
This belief in the validity of the norm involves the idea that the person is
able to accept the consequences the observance of the norm is anticipated to
have. A person, then, makes a given moral observation because he accepts
the norm which covers the situation observed.

On this account, though, could moral facts ever play a role in the
explanation of our moral observations, and would such an explanation be the
best? This question is problematic given Habermas' account, because in
dispensing with deﬁning the cognitive content and validity of norms in terms
of truth, this account seems to lack moral facts in the sense that they were
encountered previously. Thus on Habermas' account there is nothing out
there in the world in virtue of which moral norms gain their truth value, and
which could be considered the moral "facts". It should be remembered,
though, that the issue of explanatory potence for Harman is one of
justiﬁcation. Habermas' position, though it may lack moral facts, retains the
idea of normative validity. Thus Harman's objection could be applied to
Habermas' account, in the sense that we could ask whether the belief in valid
norms could ever be justiﬁed by having such norms play a role in the best
explanation of our moral observations.

I would argue that such norms could play a role in the explanation of

our moral observations in the following way. We could imagine that

 

 

49

everyone when confronted with the incineration of a live cat made the moral
observation that it was wrong. Such a universal moral observation could be
explained by the idea that the norm covering the situation in question is
valid. Thus it could be explained by the idea that the norm is widely
accepted, ie. that everyone who would or could be affected by the norm's
observance accepts its consequences. But would this explanation be the best?
I believe that it would be.

Remember that Harman contends that the best explanation of our moral
observations is that which appeals to the psychological set of the observer
alone. Given this claim the attempt was made to construct an explanation of
our moral observations that made the assumption of moral facts, and yet was
better than the purely psychological explanation. It was found that perhaps
consequentialism could be a candidate in this regard, thus it was found to be
an open question whether consequentialism was a more complex explanation
than that appealing to just the psychological set. Habermas' explanation
seems no more complex than that of consequentialism. Thus
consequentialism does not appear to be simpler than Habermas' account in
terms of its ontology, postulates, or conceptual apparatus. Habermas'
explanation, though, does seems to be able to explain more, in that it is able
to give an account of why consequentialism conﬂicts with some of our moral
observations. In this sense, then, Habermas' account seems better than
consequentialism, because it is able to explain more while being no more
complex.

Does this mean, then, that Habermas' account usurps the position of
consequentialism? Does it now become an open question whether Habermas'
account is better than that appealing merely to the psychological set of the

observer? The answer is no. Remember that for Habermas the issue of

 

 

5O

normative validity pertains to whether persons are able to accept the norm in
question. This idea of acceptance is one an explanation utilizing merely the
psychological set of the observer is going to appeal to in some manner. Thus
the psychological set of the observer would involve not only his background
moral theories but the norms he accepts. Thus the account that Habermas
gives of our moral observations can ride comfortably on assumptions about
the psychological set of the observer alone. So if the best explanation of our
moral observations is the one that appeals to the psychological set of the
observer, then Habermas' explanation is best.

This does not mean that Habermas' account is relativized to the
observer. Thus Habermas gives an account of normative validity, an account
of the acceptance of norms, that provides an objective standard or procedure
for determining whether a given norm is valid. There is a criterion
independent of the acceptance of the lone individual, for settling the issue of
. whether a given norm is valid, and that is (U). On Habermas' account, then,
there can be valid moral norms, and the question of whether a given norm is
valid is an objective one. But the way in which valid norms explain our
observations on Habermas' account requires no assumptions beyond those of
the psychological set of the observer. This is because validity deals with the
issue of persons' acceptance of the norm, and as such does not necessitate

assumptions connecting this idea to some non-natural fact, etc,.

A Last Objection

It could be argued, though, that Habermas' account of how valid norms
could explain our moral observations is actually more complex than that put
forward by psychology. It was argued that Habermas' account of normative

validity could subsume itself under a psychological explanation of our moral

Y .

 

 

51

observations, in that his account of validity dispensed with moral facts in
favor of the idea of acceptance. The contention was that a psychological
explanation of our moral observations would rely on assumptions concerning
what norms the observer accepts, and that as such Habermas' account could
"ride comfortably" on such assumptions.

But doesn't Habermas' account have an additional concept that a
psychological explanation does not, ie. that of normative validity? Couldn't
our moral observations be explained equally well by just relying on the idea
of acceptance itself, without involving this additional concept? I would agree
that this concept of validity could be seen as making Habermas' explanation
slightly more complex than that of psychology, but I would argue that this
additional complexity is outweighed by the idea that this concept allows
Habermas' account to explain more. Thus the idea that a person believes a
given norm to be valid not only explains why, when presented with certain
situations, he makes the moral observations that he does. It also explains
why he expects that others would agree with his observations or judgments
and, under similar conditions, make the same judgments themselves. Thus a
person's belief that a given norm is valid not only involves the idea that the
person accepts the norm, but the additional idea that the person believes the
norm to be impartial or universalizable, and hence believes that all others
who would or could be affected by the norm accept it as well. It would seem
that a psychological explanation of our moral observations that did not have
this concept of normative validity would be unable to explain this expectation
that others will concur with our moral observations. As such Habermas'
account though slightly more complex, is better than a "purely" psychological
explanation in that, through possessing this concept of validity, it is able to

explain more.

 

NOTES

1. Thus Kant distinguishes between practical and pure reason, as well
as prudential reason and aesthetic judgment. He contends that the Law of
Autonomy or the categorical imperative, is a law or rule provided by the
practical reason itself. For a more thorough account of Kantian moral theory

see Sullivan's WW-

2. This would seem to follow from Habermas' assertion that the
presuppositions are "implicitly adopted and intuitively known", that they are
"the intuitive preunderstandings that every subject competent in speech and
action brings to a process of argumentation", and that they constitute "our

intuitive grasp of what argumentation is" (Habermasz89-92).

3. Of course it could be argued that a case satisfying (P&-U) could occur
if dissenting, non-competent language users or actors, were excluded from
the discourse. But such a case does not seem to be a clear violation of (U)
because it seems uncertain exactly what the dissent of such persons would

mean.

4. It would seem to be possible to ask how a valid norm would motivate
those who are not affected by its observance. I would argue, though, that
since these persons are completely unaffected by the norm, the issue of

compliance and hence motivation never arises. Thus there could be a valid

52

 

 

 

 

 

53

norm prohibiting everyone over six feet in height from chewing bubble gum.
Being that I am under six foot, not only am I not affected by the norm, but

the issue of my compliance never arises.

 

I"

_ﬁr sears .E'.‘ .11 '- ‘-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

The goal of this thesis was to put forward a realist position that would
be viable in light of the anti-realist arguments of Gilbert Harman. Toward
this end, Harman's objections were applied to traditional realist positions.
This application was to perform two functions. First, it was to indicate why
Harman's objections are damaging to moral realism, and secondly it was to
give guidance to the primary task of constructing a tenable realist position.
Of the non-naturalistic varieties of traditional moral realism that were
encountered, all did poorly in the face of Harman's objections. Though on the
naturalistic side consequentialism did much better, this position was still
found to be problematic due to its apparent conﬂict with our moral
observations. The common thread that ran through all these versions of
traditional realism was that they deﬁned the cognitive content and validity
of moral norms in terms of truth value. As all proved to be difﬁcult in one
respect or another, it was decided to explore the possibility of a realist
position that avoided this issue. It was at this point that the neo-Kantian
approach of J urgen Habermas was encountered.

Habermas was seen as deﬁning the validity of norms in terms of
impartiality or universality. The cognitive content of moral norms arose from
the creation of a standard which allowed for the possibility of reaching
substantive conclusions as to the subject of validity. This account put
forward a plausible response to Harman's objection from motivation, but

what was most interesting about Habermas' account was its response to the

54

 

 

 

55

issue of explanatory potence. Thus it was initially argued that by dispensing
with the idea of moral facts, Habermas' account was able to subsume itself
under a psychological explanation of our moral observations. In that
Harman contended that our moral observations were best explained
psychologically, this would have allowed Habermas' account to constitute
part of the best explanation. It was objected, though, that perhaps this
subsumption was not complete. Thus it was contended that the concept of
normative validity made Habermas' account more complex than its
psychological rival. This objection was resolved by showing that this concept,
though adding to the complexity of Habermas' account, also made it better by
allowing it to explain more.

In dispensing with moral facts, though, Habermas' account does not
dispense with objectivity. Thus this account retains objectivity by providing
an independent standard, in (U), by which the validity of moral norms may
be assessed. Surprisingly, this standard may be somewhat troubling. None
of the norms that we currently hold have been judged by this standard, and
hence the question as to their validity is an open one. It may turn out that
none of the norms we hold pass the test, that none are found to be valid, and
that this position will turn out to be an error theory. Thus it may turn out
that Habermas' position will fail the second requirement of moral realism, ie.
that there are valid moral norms. On the up side, though, even if this is the
case, since this position does not talk about validity in terms of truth, this
will not mean that the norms we hold are false. It will rather mean that they
are not impartial or universalizable, and in the process of learning this we

should at least come to know as well the range of their application.

 

 

 

 

 

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London: Cornell University Press.

Habermas Jurgen 1990 MW
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Harman, Gilbert. 1965. The Inference To The Best
Exvlanation Wm 74: 88- 95

1.968 Knowledge, Inference, And Explanation. The
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. 1975. "Moral Relativism Defended" in Em
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. 1977. "Moral Nihilism" in W, Supra.
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Edam, ed. Michael Krausz. N otre Dame: University of N otre
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