'u. LA.- pg,‘ 0 L; ;. \ "' I’lulii V v, .. ‘1 - n ‘IL ' 1 ‘, Lgffh .. ,.. A i mufi' ‘ I: - , ”Ltd sf‘. -9 :3 .y~ c. ‘r ' "“3 .5..- ”1;“ A .": gawi v 'tfif‘fit’ “ W , W. ’ "th- §W.A.f‘.“w, ‘ W . .. W Li“ ~ 3‘45; 3v (v.2. n1'nr. J - , , . m-, A I, .r“. .ulv ,9 4‘ “(t-v . r6 = '5. ' r . *xfiv’gi _‘ ' . ‘ ”7m ‘ K ‘1 « » .1."“‘§' ' .- 5. . ‘ ., C’ ' “$352.; ‘ g n} rfiamufl ‘Kw 04L}. > ~ . l. #7 ‘0' , . 2‘ .' A “an 3 “"9““: ’ ‘ ' , '1 L g a . '4‘ u 7“. 'n QZXEEUR‘ {flu-“r. ‘ "W‘b‘" '3; * it“? Lu.‘ .- a‘. 1i. ‘1')“. 77.“ ‘- .&. *7 J ‘x 7m m v 'n awwmmwgm 'i§’;iu5t$§? r I, T ’ V: t. ’ v \fil‘t 'Vi ‘z‘. Tafl‘k-Twfifizyuf? may; 111*!!ng “mam; m1. . ”.9? ,. cm.- .314 .‘rvn Inf-I ‘ '. I at " ~~ 1 ‘1 4 "u gm 2:: mm" ,3 .rail W212: ' ‘ “11' “.5": '1 file ‘ 7 4 “1:.- ‘r. 0.1: ‘ - H 51A. . am a ‘. I‘D-IAAU-J‘ 1| . a um aura“;- ....,,....u ~ “k- )5“ «.1 . m, I‘M u.‘ 5.. 9.1x.» .. " 3‘1. “had . ~ ~ A“ . ugh-Jun .1 . ”A 04‘ ;~» ~ I-A k-rr I #1.. '1’ I" (V‘l ., _ '.l -' lo ”.1 .. .y, h'z. I:: an; 1;. A, .z. “a.“ .n. n y'- . ‘4 ; Ly... (I ..'- ”new . J ‘ ‘ I i - I] "".‘€‘:4.',!" . ”H“: L“, J :1le m uammes lTlllllillllllllllllll\‘llllll l 3 1293 00891 42 This is to certify that the dissertation entitled BR I TA I N CONFRONTS THE STAL IN REVOLUTION: THE METRO-VICKERS' TRIAL AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1933 presented by Gordon Wayne Morrell has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for mu. . 1990 History degree In (F‘ , J f L 4 5W I 5 Major professor Sept. 28, 1990 I)ate MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0- 12771 Fm “‘ “W LIBRARY Michigan State 1 University \_ fi‘ —— PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID F INES return on or betore date due. \x" DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE I I MSU Is An Afiirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution _ cAcImMpma—pd BRITAIN CONFRONTS THE STALIN REVOLUTION: THE METRO‘VICKERS' TRIAL AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1933 BY Gordon Wayne Morrell A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1990 ABSTRACT BRITAIN CONFRONTS THE STALIN REVOLUTION: THE METRO-VICKERS' TRIAL AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1933 BY Gordon Wayne Morrell When, in March 1933, the Soviet secret police (OGPU) arrested six British engineers employed by the Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company (MVEC) in the USSR it provoked a crisis that brought Anglo-Soviet relations to the brink of disaster and resurrected the specter of show trials and purges of the technical intelligentsia that had shaken Soviet society from 1928 to 1931. This study argues that the MVEC managed a profitable and easy collaborative relationship with the Soviet trade and electrical authorities over the years 1922- 1927, but that this situation deteriorated substantially from 1928-1931 as Soviet "bourgeois specialists," including some who worked closely with MVEC, were dealt severe blows during early years of the "Stalin revolution". By 1933, it appears that the OGPU were genuinely concerned about the continued presence of a well informed foreign company which had an apparent connection to the Industrial Intelligence Centre in Britain. It is unlikely that the British engineers were guilty of the charges of wrecking and sabotage that were brought against them, though the "confessions" of two British defendants and a number Soviets revealed numerous financial and personal indiscretions by the MVEC. Immediately after the arrests the National Government in Britain, on the advice of Embassy staff in Moscow and Foreign Office officials, moved quickly to defend the MVEC. In the face of a threatened British embargo, the Soviet leadership persisted with judicial proceedings which resulted in the show trial of April 1933. The trial was cleverly stage managed by the Public Prosecutor Andrei Vyshinskii, and marked an important step in his own career within the changing Soviet legal hierarchy. It was the format, scale, and organization of this trial that would be repeated in the Great Purge trials of 1937- 1938. The relatively mild verdicts rendered in the case reflected a Soviet recognition that an impasse with Britain at this time was something to be avoided and through the diplomacy of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, the Soviets quickly and successfully managed to defuse the crisis by July 1933. Copyright by Gordon Wayne Morrell 1990 I dedicate this work to the memory of my Mother Diane Morrell iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to begin by thanking my advisor, Dr. Donald Lammers, for his guidance and generous counsel over the course of my program. Dr. Lammers' insight into the complexities of my research, combined with his willingness to offer helpful editorial suggestions on the craft of writing served to enrich and substantially improve the end result of my labor. I also owe a great deal to the other members of my committee who have served as mentors in their various fields of expertise and as important critics of my research. Dr. Warren Cohen, Dr. John Coogan, Dr. Lewis Siegelbaum, and Dr. Gordon Stewart, offered a stimulating blend of perspectives and interests on research and teaching which enhanced my experience as a graduate student and apprentice-historian. It is hard for me to imagine surviving the vagaries of graduate student life without the support and friendship of a number of fellow graduate students (and their families) who offered consolation and advice when needed, and served as colleagues and soul-mates throughout my program. Finally, I want to thank my wife Kathy, who had to share in the uncertainties of graduate life and did so with the love, strength, and grace that make her so important to my life. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter page 1. Introduction: Perspectives and Sources ......... 1 2. From Collaboration to Crisis: British Engineers and Soviet Electrification, 1922-1933000000000000 ...... 0.0.0.000000000000025 3. The Politics of Crisis Diplomacy... ......... ..70 4. The Metro-Vickers' Show Trial .............. ..132 5. Crisis Contained ........................... ..210 6. Conclusion.. ....... . ......................... 253 APPENDICES A. Electrical Capacity of Production in the USSR.O...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO000.000.000.257 B. Soviet Foreign Trade, 1913-1940..............258 C. Soviet Trade With Gt. Britain, 1913-1940.....259 D. Soviet Foreign Trade: Commodities, 1913-1940.260 E. Soviet Gross Production: Industrial and Agricultural, 1913-194000000000000000 ........ 261 F. Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.262 G. Major Soviet Trading Partners, 1929-1934.....264 H. Location of Major MVEC Projects: General Map.265 Industrial Centre of European part of RSFSR..266 Moscow, Tula, and Ryazan Regions ..... . ....... 267 Leningrad and Northwest Region...............268 Industrial Centres of the Urals... ........... 269 Industrial Centres of the Donets Basin and Dnieper Region of the Ukraine........... ..... 270 BIBLIWMPHYOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ..... 00.271 vi Chapter I Introduction: Perspectives and Sources "Russian politics like opium, seems infallibly to provoke the most fantastic dreams and imaginings on the part of the people who study them." --E.A. Walker, British Embassy, Moscow 1931. When, in early March 1933, the economic section of the Soviet secret police (OGPU) arrested six British engineers employed by the Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company (MVEC) on technical assistance contracts in the USSR, it provoked a crisis that brought Anglo-Soviet relations to the brink of disaster and simultaneously resurrected the specter of the show trials and purges of the technical intelligentsia that had shaken Soviet society from 1928 to 1931. The affair erupted just as the First Five-Year Plan was giving way to a Second Biatletka, at a time when many in the Soviet populace were still straining to overcome the painful effects the winter of 1932 and the Ukrainian famine. The "Revolution from above", as these early years of Stalin's leadership are sometimes called, utilized massive and often violent campaigns to collectivize agriculture and emphasized a rapid tempo of development for heavy industry. While the Soviet "experiment" could boast of some triumphs, in the winter of 1933, there was still more than enough tragedy. On the face of it, a quarrel with Great Britain, a power 1 2 which had already shown itself quite capable of severing relations with the Soviet Union in 1927, only aggravated the position of the Soviet government in the international arena. The arrests had occurred on the heels of the British decision to act upon provisions in the Ottawa Agreements of 1932 and abandon the 1930 Anglo-Soviet trade agreement in favor of a new, more "equitable" trade arrangement with the Soviet Union.1 Over the course of this confrontation, the French and American governments, as well as British and American businessmen, made their concerns about the Soviet action known to both sides in the conflict. The difficulties with Britain that the arrests intensified were compounded by events in Germany which saw Hitler's Nazi Party rapidly and ruthlessly consolidate its hold on power. The USSR, already virtually isolated in an international system of "capitalist" powers, now found that Germany, the only major power with which the USSR had managed any genuine accord, was moving away from a relationship that had developed from the Rapallo agreements of 1922.2 Soviet diplomatic efforts over the subsequent months of the Metro-Vickers' Crisis were devoted to minimizing the effects of these developments. 1I. Drummond, "Empire Trade and Russian Trade: Economic Diplomacy in the Nineteen-Thirties," ganadian Journal of Economicisevue caeadienne d'Ecenomigee, 5, 1(1972): 35-47. 2J. Haslam, Soviee Foreign Policy, 1930-1933: The Impact of egg Qeegessien, (London: MacMillan Press, 1983), p. 6. 3 Explanations for the police action and the subsequent show trial of the British engineers and some of their Soviet associates, at the time and since, have sometimes recognized the dual nature of the crisis, but have tended to offer an analysis which focuses on either the international or domestic aspects of the affair. This study examines each of these dimensions and explores the connection between the international and domestic forces which produced and shaped the politics of the Metro-Vickers' affair. Given the understandable, if sometimes lamentable, manner in which historians tend to develop the specializations they practice, the study of the Metro-Vickers affair has typically followed one of two lines of inquiry. The earliest study, provided by Donald Lammers, placed the crisis within the context of Anglo-Soviet interstate relations and raised many of the key questions which have occupied scholars since.3 Lammers alluded to the importance of the Soviet domestic scene, but in the main pursued an analysis which revolved around the conflict between the two governments in the aftermath of the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, the economic and diplomatic levers exercised in the conflict, and the result of the test of strength, which was, 3D. Lammers, "The Engineers' Trial (Moscow 1933) and Anglo-Soviet Relations," South Atlaneic Quarterly 62, (1963): 256-267. See also the related article by D. Lammers, "The Second Labour Government and the Restoration of Relations with Soviet Russia (1929)," Bulletin 9: the IDSLIEBEQ of W 37. (May 1964): 60-72. 4 in Lammers' view a small, but significant victory for the British. The engineers were guilty, if such a term is applicable at all, of small "indiscretions" that were trumped up in the paranoia of Stalin's Russia, to be criminal acts. The most serious challenge to such a portrait of the international dimensions of the Metro-Vickers affair was offered by Gail Owen more than a decade later.4 Her analysis was more avowedly economic in nature and placed the arrest and trial of the British engineers in the context of Anglo- Soviet trade relations. By establishing the fact that the Soviets in practice came out ahead in bilateral trade relations after the Metro-Vickers' crisis, she argued that test of strength in the early months of 1933 was a carefully plotted Soviet strategy for wearing the British down on all fronts. Stalin held "all the cards" in such a contest, since he knew the USSR would need the British proportionately less in the coming months than the British needed the Soviets. For Owen what eventually occurred was deviously planned to happen. Moreover the case against the engineers was not a simple frame-up in Owen's view. The confessions of two of the men, coupled with their general conduct during the trial, created the impression that, "even under western law" their innocence was not nearly so apparent as the British 4G. Owen, "The Metro-Vickers Crisis: Anglo-Soviet Relations Between Trade Agreements, 1932-1934," Slavogie and East.§ur22san_3exisu. 44. 114 (1971): 92-112- would have liked.5 Owen also included an important domestic issue in her presentation--that of the OGPU's relationship with Stalin. In the aftermath of the case the OGPU was purged and Stalin's "creature" Akulov was promoted to Prosecutor of USSR-- allegedly the better to control the head of the secret police, Menzhinskii. This suggested to Owen that Stalin had initiated the investigation in order to provoke Menzhinskii's OGPU apparatus into committing errors which would justify Stalin's subsequent disciplinary action against the OGPU. This view conflicts with the explanation offered below primarily because of the absolute primacy given to Stalin's place from beginning to end. Undoubtedly it was the case that when Stalin wished to direct such affairs, he could, but it seems more consistent with the available evidence to argue that the OGPU initiated the arrests without consulting the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) and this lapse unexpectedly produced an international incident which prompted Stalin to discipline the OGPU at home. This also appears to be a rare instance where Maxim Litvinov's Narkomindel managed to convince Stalin that international, rather than domestic, issues deserved primary consideration. The most recent examination of these issues that concentrated mainly on their international dimension was 51bid., p. 100 n. so. 6 developed by Jonathan Haslam.6 By utilizing recent western and Soviet scholarship, Haslam's portrait suggests that the engineers were guilty of industrial espionage broadly defined, but that the British trade embargo and political leverage were successful in convincing the Soviets that the six British subjects should be expelled rather than imprisoned. Soviet isolation "was too high a price to pay" in the international setting of 1933.7 The second branch of scholarship that has dealt with the Metro-Vickers' trial has considered it primarily as a part of the domestic political scene in the early Stalin years which saw show trials and purges wrack the upper echelons of most sectors in society. This was particularly clear in Robert Conquest's, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, which characterized the trial of 1933 as preparation for Stalin's development of the grim machine which gripped Soviet society from 1936 to 1938 with the apparatus of night arrest, OGPU interrogation, "confessions" and the public show trial. That the key defendants among the engineers were British subjects, whose cause was taken up by the British Government, was a point to be noted in passing. Little about the trial, in Conquest's view, suggested that it was in any fundamental way unique. It was simply a pallid foreshadowing of the mass 6J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and gge Stgeggle for geliee§ive SeeugiEy, i933-1939 (London: MacMillan Press, 1984). 7Ibid., p. 19. 7 political violence that was to come later. With the increasing interest in the relationship between state and society in the Soviet Union during the interwar years has come a better understanding of the forces that were at work at various levels in Soviet society.8 In this context the work by Kendall Bailes and Hiroaki Kuromiya is important for the Metro-Vickers' case, since they place the trial not, as Conquest does, at the beginning of the Great Purges, but rather at the end of the assault on technical specialists which occurred primarily from 1928 to 1931.9 The Metro-Vickers' trial fits somewhat awkwardly into such an analysis since it is generally argued that by June 1931 such assaults had been largely curtailed by the Soviet leadership.10 The return to the arrests of engineers in the 8The sometimes painful debates over the merits and typologies of recent work on the history of the Soviet Union in the 19305 are replete with straw men (and women), but appear to demonstrate some willingness to rethink methods, evidence, and paradigms. See Russian Review 45 4(1986) and the second "round" of responses in Russian Review 46 4(1987). I have found it necessary to rely on contributors from all sides of the debate concerning the over-dichotomized formulations: Stalinism as "revolution from above or below", "social" versus "political" history, or the "totalitarian" model versus the "institutionalized-pluralism" model. 9K. Bailes, Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). A complete discussion of Bailes's position can be found in his dissertation: H. Kuromiya, Stelin's Indusezial Reyeigtieg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 10In addition to Bailes and Kuromiya, Sheila Fitzpatrick also suggests that the summer of 1931 saw an easing of the pressure on the technical intelligentsia. For a discussion of this point see Chapter One. 8 electrical industry in March 1933 was, for Bailes and Kuromiya, more of a reminder of politics past, than a grim foreshadowing of things to come.11 Here, too, little is made of the international implications of the case, but the relationship of the arrested "bourgeois" electrical engineers to the politics of Soviet industrial development is emphasized. From the above sketch of the major works which have addressed the international and domestic causes and effects of the Metro-Vickers affair, it seems clear that an approach that examines the relationship between these forces is needed. In what follows I have outlined the framework of my study and the main documentary sources which form its basis. It is a study in Anglo-Soviet relations broadly conceived to include the economic, political, judicial, and diplomatic dimensions of the Metro-Vickers' affair. When discussion of the particular types of evidence seems critical, I have included some commentary below. Historians are almost never satisfied with the nature and extent of their documentation, and in studies where the intelligence services from at least two countries are involved, the potential problems are even more complex. 11On this point Bailes and Kuromiya appear consistent With the approach of J. Arch Getty, Origine of ghe Greae eS° The oviet munist Part Reconsidered 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Getty insists that there were many types of "purges" of which the Great Eerror of 1936-1938 was a distinct and particularly grim Ype. 9 Chapter 2 examines the interaction of the British firm and its engineers with their Soviet associates and outlines the main features of this long-standing relationship that ran throughout most of the 1920s and extended beyond the difficulties of 1933. One key characteristic of the business relationship was that MVEC contracts with the Soviet electrification authorities continuously specified, at Soviet insistence, work employing the latest technology, implemented on a gigantic scale, in circumstances that were hitherto unique to the Soviet Union. A natural, if unwelcome consequence of such ambitious schemes was the periodic occurrence of problems associated with untried and sophisticated technology. Related to MVEC's willingness to undertake such risky ventures with the new Soviet regime was the British company's ability to utilize a small cadre of engineers who were, for a variety of reasons, well informed and generally confident about the potential of the Soviet Union and the operation of the First Five-Year Plan. These engineers were among those arrested on the night of 11 March 1933. A central feature of the Metro-Vickers show trial which shaped its ultimate outcome is that it was the only Soviet trial in which the main defendants were foreign subjects. The importance of this fact, that the British subjects could and did receive substantial political support from the British government, where Soviet defendants could not look 10 for such aid, is treated in Chapter 2. Though the highly publicized economic and political confrontation between the British and Soviet governments produced hard-feelings and mutual accusations, there is reason to believe that the ultimate resolution of the crisis gave some satisfaction to each heavily engaged power. Publicly the British claimed that their resolute, if somewhat high-handed manner, had prompted the Soviet authorities to release the British engineers in relatively short order. For their part, the Soviet Government could claim that justice and leniency were wedded in this instance, and that the apparent danger posed by the MVEC engineers was neatly dealt with by expulsion. Privately the British were happy to be done with a contest of wills which was waged, in the view of one senior Foreign Office official, Sir Robert Vansittart, over "pretty poor stuff."12 Observers at the time were sharply divided over the innocence or guilt of the British defendants who were charged with "wrecking", sabotage, and industrial espionage at the electrification projects to which they were assigned. Scholarly accounts since have also been unable to produce any final word on the merits of the Soviet charges although the most recent have argued that the engineers were guilty of espionage activity. I have tried to explore the limits of 12Vansittart note on Foreign Office Memo by Collier, F0 371/17273 N5329/1610/38, 9 JUIY 1933. 11 the available evidence in Chapter 2, and have gone beyond previously utilized circumstantial evidence to connect the MVEC engineers more directly to the activities of Britain's Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC). On the Soviet side, there is strong circumstantial evidence that the combination of publicly displayed British indignation and the efforts of the anglophile Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, combined to defuse a situation which led to the imposition of mutual trade embargoes and much ill-will at a time when Soviet foreign policy was seeking to ease tensions with France and the United States. Given the documentation available, it is only possible to suggest that while Stalin initially sanctioned the OGPU action against the British engineers, Litvinov ultimately managed to convince the Soviet leader that the international consequences of such action were too severe and that the Soviet judicial organs should adapt accordingly. Such an interpretation also makes it easier to understand why the show trial of the MVEC engineers was the only trial in this period which featured foreigners as the main defendants. The appearance of a conflict between the OGPU and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) in this instance also coincides with what is known more generally about the antagonism between these two branches of the Soviet government--an antagonism that would be played out 12 in the purge of the diplomatic corps later in the 19305.13 Chapter 4 examines the Metro-Vickers' show trial itself. Much of the case against the MVEC employees on the charges of "wrecking" or sabotage rests on "confessions" rendered under substantial duress, and while the behavior of some of the engineers during the trial left a bad impression, it remains hard to be convinced of the specifics of these charges. In the absence of documentation from OGPU files, only the contours of the case they believed they had against the British subjects are readily seen. The engineers' knowledge of the country, when combined with the difficulties inherent in the technology and the unusually cloSe working relationships the British engineers had with their Soviet colleagues, almost certainly gave some weight to concerns regarding "wrecking" and "sabotage" that in early 1933 were once again occupying those in the Soviet leadership. While the position taken here is that the British engineers were not guilty of such crimes, there was important circumstantial evidence that put the MVEC in the forefront of OGPU investigations and there may have been reasons for the Soviets to understate their concerns. That the engineers were treated leniently by the Soviet courts, all being expelled within three months of their trial, owed as much to the clash between Britain and the Soviet Union on the 13T. Uldricks, "The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs," Siavic Review 36, 2 (1977): 187-203. 13 international stage as it did to the particular merits of the case against the defendants. The fact that Soviet show trials were political, as well as judicial, affairs, could out both ways. In my discussion of the trial I have paid particular attention to the role the trial played in shaping the debate in the Soviet legal community at the time. Though there is no other study of the Metro-Vickers' trial that pursues this theme, I have drawn extensively from the work of Robert Sharlet, Peter Solomon, Piers Bierne, and especially Eugene Huskey to locate the Metro-Vickers' trial within the context of Stalinist judicial politics in the early 1930s.14 The position taken here is that legal "moderates" such as the Public Prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinskii, used the trial to promote their vision of a more professional and centralized legal structure against the aspirations of the legal- nihilists who were their rivals. Finally, Chapter 5 examines the international and domestic consequences of the Metro-Vickers' affair. The 14See E. Huskey, gussian Layyers and the Soviet State: The ingihs ang Qeveiopmenh o; hhe Soyiet Bag, i9i7-i239, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); E. Huskey, "Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order," Slavic Review, 46, 3/4(1987): 414-428; P. Solomon, "Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-1941," Sovieh Studies, 37, 3(1983): 305-329; R. Sharlet and P. Bierne, "In Search of Vyshinsky: The Paradox of Law and Terror," integnational Journal of the Sociology of Law, 12, (1984): 153-177; R. Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture," in R. Tucker, ed. Stalinism: Essays in Historical Ihhegpretation, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), pp. 155-179. 14 impact of the mutual trade embargoes which were put into effect after the trial is considered alongside the difficulties the Soviets were having with countries such as Japan, Germany, and the United States. The diplomatic efforts of Litvinov and the Narkomindel to bring the Anglo- Soviet conflict to an end are considered in light of these difficulties and an effort is made to assess the relative importance of economic, international and domestic considerations in the containment and resolution of the crisis. The consequences of the trial for the MVEC, its Soviet employees, and the Soviet domestic context in the years following the apparent resolution of the 1933 affair are also examined in the final chapter. Though the issue quickly disappeared from the front pages of the western press, the consequences for those tainted by association with the MVEC continued to have dangerous implications and, as a result, the Company substantially altered the way it did business in the USSR for the remainder of the 1930s. As is suggested in the comments above, research into the deliberations of the OGPU and the Soviet government in general on such issues is hampered by the lack of available documentary evidence. The published diplomatic correspondence, the various branches of the Soviet press, recent monographs by Soviet scholars on related themes of industrialization, memoir material, and the verbatim report 15 of the Metro-Vickers trial, all help to give provide the basis of the arguments made regarding Soviet behavior. I have tried to be very clear about lines of reasoning which are clearly circumstantial. The role of Stalin in the affair remains something of a mystery though here, too, I have attempted to outline the range of possibilities that coincide with what western scholars think they know about the nature of the Stalinist regime. On the British side, the available material is much more abundant although there remain serious gaps in the documentation of MVEC itself and the records of the British intelligence community that directed its attention to this case. The former defect will almost certainly never be overcome since, according the archivist of the General Electric Switchgear Company (as the current manifestation of the Manchester based subsidiary is now called), the firm's archive for MVEC no longer exists.15 Some important records of the company are to be found in the Foreign Office 371 files that pertain to the trial and a considerable body of MVEC contracts with the Soviet Union was sent to Anthony Eden just prior to his visit to the USSR in February 1935. It is likely that these may be the only copies outside the Soviet Union still extant. One hopes that in the next few years the Soviet archives pertaining to these subjects will 151 would like to thank Mr. N.D. Davies, Finance Director of GEC Switchgear Limited in Manchester, for his efforts to locate any remnants of the MVEC archive. 16 benefit from the winds of change in Gorbachev's USSR. Since the case did cause a substantial stir in Britain and other western countries, the press coverage of the arrests and trial is also a revealing source of information. Several prominent reporters who attended the trial in Moscow, including Eugene Lyons, Will Duranty and the young Ian Fleming, provided accounts of the proceedings in their press reports and in later books.16 In Britain, the press was divided about the economic and political dimensions of the Anglo-Soviet clash and one "News Chronicle" reporter, A. Cummings, published an entire book on what he considered the poor conduct of the British government.17 In general those papers on the liberal left, such as the "Manchester Guardian", were critical of the British government's high- handed behaviour, while equally predictably, "The Times", was supportive of the efforts of Whitehall. The whole affair revealed and reinforced the profound and often antagonistic feelings which only the Soviet Union could elicit in Britain. The issue of British intelligence gathering played an important role in the arrest of the engineers and there is oblique evidence in the correspondence of the Foreign Office 16E. Lyons, Assignment ih Utopia, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1937); W. Duranty, T Wzite es I Piease, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935): J. Pearson, The Life of Ten_£1ehihg, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1966); H. Zeiger, Teh Fiehing: The Spy Who Came in With the Gold, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965). 17A. Cummings, The Meeeey Trial, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1933). 17 that M15 took a direct interest in the case. The weeders at the Foreign Office, whether out of kindness or cruelty, have left a small, but discernible trail of Foreign Office minutes on MI5 documents--though the documents themselves are of course removed. One can only hope that their removal has served a better purpose than their inclusion in the archive might have done. While there are signposts here, there are precious few signs. There remains the voluminous collection of relevant documentation from the other branches of the British government. A combination of Cabinet papers, records from the Board of Trade and its related branch, the Department of Overseas Trade, and the Hansard debates from Parliament have been helpful in developing a sense of the overall response of the Government. Clearly the most important source of this type is the correspondence and minutes of the Foreign Office. As the crisis developed, the normal flow of information and commentary between the Foreign Office and its Moscow embassy increased substantially and the attention of the Northern Department officials was brought to bear on the Metro- Vickers' case. An especially important segment of this material was the depositions that the arrested engineers18 made to the Foreign Office officials following their release and expulsion from the Soviet Union. This material is 18The arrested engineers were Allan Monkhouse, Leslie Thornton, Charles Nordwall, Albert Gregory, John Cushny, and William MacDonald. For biographical profiles see Chapter 2. l8 supplemented and largely substantiated by the memoir account of the manager of MVEC operations in Moscow, Allan Monkhouse, Moseey, i911-1933, which was published in 1933. Previous studies of the case have not availed themselves of the material present in these depositions and have thereby been deprived of important material related to the interaction of the MVEC engineers with the Soviet context that enveloped them. While it is clear that the recollections of the arrested engineers after their arrest and sentencing were tendentiously shaped by the tribulations they had recently undergone, the corroborating detail regarding past events and persons makes these sources a rich store of information about the years leading up to the debacle of 1933. It also seems likely that their ability to produce detailed accounts of such experiences was "aided" by the rigorous interrogation of Soviet officials who directed such sessions by using Thornton's diary and notebooks as keys to their investigation. As with most post gectum accounts of potentially embarrassing or incriminating events there remains the possibility that those involved might consciously conceal or distort the critical facts. In the cases of the depositions of Thornton and MacDona1d19, which were produced three months 19Memo by William Strang, British Acting Counsellor in Moscow, includes depositions by William MacDonald in F0 371/17263 N5059/1610/38, 3 July 1933, and by Leslie Thornton 19 after their arrest, trial, and imprisonment, this concern is perhaps the greatest, but there are a number of reasons to believe that any conscious distortion of the events which led to their arrests was minimal. The first of these is that both men knew that the Foreign Office officials and MVEC officials had questioned the other four engineers on such events and since most of the important observations and episodes were shared by more than one engineer, Thornton and MacDonald, had they chosen to, could not misrepresent events without directly contradicting the testimony of the others. There is no evidence that either the Foreign Office officials or the directors of MVEC found any fundamental discrepancies in testimony of the six engineers. A further factor adding strength to this line of reasoning and making it unlikely that any devious strategy was mapped out by the engineers in concert is that the six engineers did not all work together as a group, but were usually scattered across the USSR at their various postings. in F0 371/17264 N5682/1610/38, 20 July 1933. [Hereinafter cited as MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933, or Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933.] The depositions of the other arrested engineers can be found in, Memo by Wylie, Interviews of Monkhouse, Cushny, Gregory, and Nordwall conducted at Bush House (MVEC headquarters) and the Foreign Office, PO 371/17272 N3487/1610/38, 9 May 1933. [Hereinafter cited as the Bush House Interviews, 9 May 1933.] Nordwall provided a separate installment later in May. See Richards (MVEC) to Collier (Foreign Office), PO 371/17272 N3904/160/38, 23 May 1933. One other MVEC engineer, Tearle, who was named in the trial, but not arrested, provided a statement to the Foreign Office after the trial. See Richards to Collier, F0 371/17272 N3993/1610/38, 26 May 1933. 20 Once the crisis enveloped them, conditions did not lend themselves to developing a strategy which would enable them to get their "story" straight if they thought it necessary to do so. They were kept apart while in prison, and in conversations with embassy staff during the diplomats' periodic visits to the Lubianka prison, they were prevented from raising issues relating to their arrest. Just prior to the trial it is possible that five of the six met together after all, but since MacDonald still was not released on bail it was impossible to produce a unified strategy for the trial. Those at liberty did confer at the British embassy in the days leading up to the trial, but by this time Thornton, at least, showed signs of depression and despondency and was generally reluctant to discuss what had happened. Since he and the imprisoned MacDonald were the only two who had signed damaging "confessions" which incriminated both British and Soviet citizens, such a state of mind is understandable.20 At the trial these two men repeatedly changed their position from admitting guilt to claiming innocence. The reasons for their actions will be discussed laterZI, but for now it is enough to point out that such shifts were greeted with great surprise by the other 20MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933; Bush House Interviews, 9 May 1933; Lord Strang, Home and Ahgeeg, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), pp. 92-93. 21See Chapter 4. 21 engineers and British officials.22 This strongly suggests that these two engineers felt it necessary to pursue their own strategy and, while British officials had made recommendations for the engineers' conduct during the trial, there was no generally agreed upon line of action in operation. Taken as a whole, such circumstances make the possibility of a carefully coordinated and sanitized cover-up exceedingly remote, if not impossible.23 In the case of Allan Monkhouse's memoir account, Moscow, i9ii-33, the considerations which apply to the depositions cited above hold true in at least as strong a measure. Monkhouse kept notes on various business transactions and, as the senior MVEC official in the Soviet Union, had access to Company records to reconstruct events in that country. He also selected material for his book from the articles he authored for the British press immediately following his expulsion from the Soviet Union. The conversations he had with British diplomats during the crisis, as recorded in the Foreign Office correspondence, are accurately reflected in his memoir account. Since Monkhouse was among the least threatened by the Soviet charges and his memoir account can be substantiated by the testimony of the British diplomatic 22See Monkhouse's testimony to Wylie in the Bush House Interviews, 9 May 1933. 23For a discussion of the possible connection of this issue to British industrial intelligence gathering see below, Chapter 3. 22 corps, there is little reason to believe he was deliberately trying to mislead readers in his account of the affair. At least as important as the conscious manipulation of past events are the subconscious or unspoken assumptions which are revealed in the testimony of these sources. Though there are uneven amounts of material available for all the MVEC personnel involved, it is possible to develop some outlines of individual and general features of their thinking about living and working in the Soviet Union. It must be said that Monkhouse's account of the Soviet "experiment" was very sympathetic even after his arrest and trial, and his continued interest in Soviet electrification after his expulsion suggests that one factor which motivated him was a keen interest in the innovative technological and economic strategy of the USSR in this period.24 Joan Hoff Wilson has raised this point concerning the technically oriented sponsors of American recognition of the Soviet Union--often engineers—-who were enthralled with the prospects of gigantic planned projects that were often on the cutting edge of technology.25 Certainly this characteristic 24See his responses to questioning by other electrical engineers on the future of Soviet electrification in Monkhouse, "Electrical Developments in the U.S.S.R." 25Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology and Economics: 9.3 Beiehiens with the Soviet Qnion, 1918-;933 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 118-119. An example of an American engineer's view of this issue is presented by Walter Rukeseyer, "Do Our Engineers in Russia Damage America?," Sezibhez's hagezihe 10, (November 1931): 521-524. 23 surfaces in MVEC employees in general and the accused engineers often stressed the purely practical nature of their work while many around them--sadly many of the company's own Soviet employees and their Soviet engineering colleagues--were paying a political price for their association with the British firm. There is, however, more in Monkhouse's view of the Soviet Union than mere excitement about electrification projects. Perhaps more than any of the other British engineers stationed there, Monkhouse, as the acting-manager of MVEC in Moscow, was not simply an engineer with technical skills, but also possessed qualities that made him comfortable in high-level contract negotiations as well as the formal engagements with leading Soviet officials that he attended as the MVEC representative. This contact with the upper levels of Soviet society was coupled with an extensive knowledge of, and concern for, the varied Soviet citizenry which Monkhouse knew from his wide travels throughout the country. However involuntary the role of the common citizen might be in the Soviet "experiment", Monkhouse thought that the Soviet Government would overcome the difficulties it faced.26 He was in a unique position to have access to the problems which faced both the state and society. Indeed, it would later be suggested that it was just such knowledge that 26Monkhouse, Moseey, p. 331. 24 made MVEC, in particular, a target for OGPU action.27 27strang to Collier, F.O. 371/17270 N2944/l610/38, 20 April 1933. Chapter 2 From Collaboration to Crisis: British Engineers and Soviet Electrification, 1922-1933 "Communism is Soviet Power and the Electrification of the whole country." V.I. Lenin, 1920. "We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we go under." I.V. Stalin, 1931. Though the recently formed (1919) Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company's (MVEC) participation in the Soviet experiment began in 1922, it used the knowledge and experience that its personnel had gained prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 to aid its new ventures. Some of its engineers had previously worked in Russia with British Westinghouse on major schemes such as the Moscow tramway, the Kolomna industrial works south of Moscow, and the Dynamo Works of Russian General Electric.1 Several of these men 1British Westinghouse was acquired by the British armaments company, Vickers, and combined with Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Company to form Metropolitan- Vickers Electrical Company in September 1919. Times (London), 19 September 1919. Also see J. Dummelow, i899-1942, (Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company Limited, 1949), p. 74 [Hereinafter cited as Dummelow, i899-1949]: A. Monkhouse, Moecew i9i1-i93 , (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1934), pp. 27-29 [Hereinafter cited as Monkhouse, Moscow]; A. Sutton, Western Technology end Soviet Economic Development, i9i7-i93g, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 199. [Hereinafter cited as Sutton, Western Technology..., 25 26 traveled widely in the country and consulted on projects in a variety of regions including Central Asia, Siberia, and the Ukraine. By the 19305 there was probably not a major industrial region of the country that at least one of them had not visited. It would eventually transpire that such intimate knowledge of the Soviet industrial sector was not necessarily a good thing, but for a relatively new company embarking on a technologically and politically risky relationship with the infant Bolshevik regime, such men were undoubtedly assets. This professional involvement and expertise was reinforced by the Russian family connections of the MVEC's European manager, A.A. Simon, and one of the senior engineers, Leslie Thornton. Thornton had been born in St. Petersburg and his father had owned a woolen mill in Moscow prior to the Revolution. As for Simon, a portion of his family continued to live in the Soviet Union and throughout the 19205 Simon had his employees deliver various goods to his sister-in-law in Moscow.2 The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 found Thornton, fellow engineer Allan Monkhouse, and a future manager of MVEC, C.S. Richards, all in Russia. Given their familiarity 7-9 0.] 2See Thornton's account in his debriefing statement: C.S. Richards to Foreign Office, PO 371/17274 N5681/1610/38, 20 July 1933. [Hereinafter cited as Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933.] 27 with Russia and their technical expertise, they were instructed by the British Embassy to remain in Russia and assist with work in the munitions industry. When the Tsarist government fell Richards and Thornton made their way to Murmansk where their general knowledge of the country was used by the British intelligence staff. Monkhouse was later to find that his technical tasks in the munition industry were to have unexpectedly profound political ramifications as well. In the spring of 1917 he was, "like most other foreigners in Moscow," commissioned by the Provisional Government to be a special constable in the militia. Apparently the Kerensky regime felt that foreigners who had a stake in the continuance of the Provisional Government's war policy were reliable allies. For a short time after the October Revolution Monkhouse remained connected with the munitions industry, but in December 1917 he was arrested by a Revolutionary Court on charges of wrecking. The wrecking of various munitions factories had indeed occurred though, as Monkhouse's memoirs later argued, such destruction was prompted by the fear of Germany's advancing army and not by a desire to destroy assets claimed by the revolutionary government. Characteristically the British technician also claimed that "wrecking activities of this nature are heart-rending to an engineer" and that he was not personally involved in the operation. Fortunately for Monkhouse when faced with these dire circumstances, his 28 proficiency in Russian served him well and he escaped execution by directing the Court to the records of munitions production in the safe of the Union of Zemstvos. The papers there apparently made clear the motives and circumstances behind the "wrecking.“3 After the Bolsheviks signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty British engineers were advised, at a meeting of the British Club in Moscow, that their continued presence in Russia no longer served British policy. In March 1918, Monkhouse secretly made his way with about sixty other British engineers to Vladivostok, and from there to Canada where he helped train Zionist battalions4 in Nova Scotia. When he returned to London with these battalions in July 1918 he was briefed by the War Office on the situation in Russia. It was at this point that Monkhouse was formally brought into the British army and, while stationed at Berkenstead Camp in the Officers Training Corps, he prepared a political summary for various "political authorities"5 on the fall of the Tsarist 3Monkhouse, Moscow, pp. 55-66. 4These battalions were recruited from the Russian Jewish community in New York and were to be trained primarily to fight in Palestine against the Turks. 5Monkhouse does not disclose who these groups were although the term "authorities" suggests that they were in some sense "governmental" groups, possibly in the intelligence services. The exerpts from this memorandum contain a narrative of the history of the Bolshevik party to 1918 that is generally informed but contains odd errors of the type that Lenin was in Switzerland in March 1918 [sic]. See Monkhouse, Moseow, pp. 85-90. 29 government and the competing political parties that were active in Russia at that time. Monkhouses's absence from Soviet Russia was short-lived. In 1919 he was posted to Archangel to act as an interpreter for British Military Intelligence and to assist a unit of the Royal Engineers Railway Operating Division. There he renewed his acquaintance not only with the war-torn country, but with C.S. Richards and some thirty of those same British engineers with whom Monkhouse had fled to Vladivostok. In addition to linguistic interpretation, Monkhouse was charged with rationing food to the civilian population of about 2,700 and maintaining the readiness of the armored train. His investigations into the needs of the local population brought him into contact with the local Menshevik leader, Lomonosov, a worker who greatly impressed Monkhouse with his willingness to lead by example. This close contact with Russians in the area earned him the reputation of being a Russo-phile. Under the circumstances I [Monkhouse] felt it my duty to allow this impression to remain, because unfortunately many of our Allied officers in the district had evidently been accustomed to dealing with Asiatic and dark races, and were inclined to treat our Russian Allies in the manner which they had previously adopted towards less enlightened peoples. When it became clear in July 1919, that the British forces would be withdrawing from Archangel, Monkhouse was asked to 6Ibid., p. 95. 30 help communicate the bad news to the "White" defenders of the region. From his evaluation of the leadership of the White forces in the Archangel area and his knowledge of the attitudes of the peasants and workers in the region, Monkhouse concluded that Kolchak's forces had little hope of retaining local control once the British left.7 C.S. Richards's activities in Russia during the Great War also had exciting moments which would later haunt the MVEC. In 1916 he was under orders from David Lloyd George (Minister of Munitions) to help out in the Russian munitions industry, in particular, to facilitate the transfer of munitions that were to come to Russia with Lord Kitchener on the Hempshipe. Early in 1918, with the Civil War now erupting in Russia, Richards was instructed by Lord Robert Cecil (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to obtain a sum of about one million rubles from the British Embassy in Petrograd and deliver it to General Iudenitch, commander of the White Russian forces in the Baltic. He travelled by sleigh and crossed through a "Red" frontier north of Sortavalla without a visa but on the strength of his British passport. Arriving in Petrograd just after all the Embassy staff had left, he found the Consular staff in charge of the Embassy. They refused to give him the money since they had not received the appropriate 7Monkhouse, Moseew, pp. 67, 82-107; and Dummelow, i899- ;952, p. 82. 31 instructions. He met with Iudenitch, but was told that it was too late for such measures in any case. After this unsuccessful mission, Richards was posted to Colonel Thornhill, head of Army Intelligence at Murmansk and from May 1918 to November 1919 he worked as an Army Intelligence Officer in both Murmansk and Archangel.8 When these parts of the careers of Richards and Monkhouse surfaced in 1933, the Foreign Office made much of the distinction between "Army Intelligence," in which both Richards and Monkhouse served, and the "Secret Service," which had never employed these men. The Soviet authorities were decidedly less convinced of the importance of such distinctions.9 Between 1919 and 1922 there was apparently no official contact between the new firm of MVEC and the Soviet Union. The Company's official account of its first approaches to the Bolshevik regime stresses the role of Richards and Simon. These men had a "wide and personal knowledge of the country and were confident of the stability of the new republic."10 They initiated a long series of contracts with the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (G.O.E.L.R.O)11 8Memorandum by Sir L. Oliphant, D.B.E.P., #409, 15 April 1933. 9See Chapter 4. 10Dummelow, i822-i94 , p. 82. 11Formed in 1921. Organizational changes in the early 19305 placed a good deal of control with a special section of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry known as "Glavenergo". See Monkhouse, "Electrical Developments in the U.S.S.R.," 32 for electrical machinery, technical training for Soviet engineers in Manchester, technical assistance, and the sale of patents that would total some L5,000,000 between the wars.12 Since the British goverment throughout the 1920's was reluctant to extend long-term credits to the Soviet government, MVEC had to arrange the financing for such contracts itself.13 MVEC's willingness to take risks with the Soviet Union was combined with the Soviets' interest in adopting the latest, and, in certain instances, untried designs the British company could produce. Dividends were gained on both sides in 1926 when a new MVEC generator in a Soviet plant set a world record for kilowatt output. Undoubtedly such success was a key reason for the firm being the only British enterprise to have an office at Electro-Import in Moscow at this time.14 As will be seen later, close proximity to Soviet authorities and the development and application of innovative technology in the Soviet context could create problems, too. Proceedings of the Institute of Electrical Engineers (London), 76, June (1935): 601. [Hereinafter cited as Monkhouse, "Electrical Developments in the U.S.S.R."]. 12Dummelow, 1899-i949, p. 82. 13The Second Labour Government did eventually extend long-term credit guarantees to the Soviet Union in 1931, but MVEC contracts were never underwritten by such governmental guarantee. 14Sutton, Eastern Teehhplegy,,,,i9i7-193Q, pp. 199. 33 Though the Soviet's First Five-Year Plan would feature the rapid development of mining, metallurgy, and machine building--often called the "American" industrial strategy-- rather than the chemical and electrical scheme preferred by Germany, between 1923 and 1933 the country's electrical capacity dramatically increased. During that ten-year period, 56 large electric power stations were constructed and 10 of these had capacities in excess of 100,000 kW. By 1930, about ninety-percent of these new Soviet electrification projects were fitted with imported boilers, turbines, and generators.15 Soviet reliance on imported machinery and equipment would ease substantially by 1934,16 but in these early years MVEC's role, particularly in the larger stations, made it the most important of the foreign firms which participated in these projects.17 It was the sole foreign contributor to the Moges (Moscow), Zuevka, Krasnyi Oktiabr' and Chelyabinsk stations and collaborated on the Shatura, Gorki, Shterovka, and Baku stations with Brown-Boveri, Siemens-Schukert, and AEG.18 153. Weitz, ed. Electrical ower Develo ment in the Hyfiyfiygy, (Moscow: INRA Publishing Society, 1936), pp. 100— 101. [Hereinafter cited as Weitz, Elechrical Power Qeyelopheht.,..] See Appendix A, "Electrical Capacity and Production in the U.S.S.R." 151bid. 17Monkhouse, "Electrical Developments in the U.S.S.R.," p. 601. For the location of most of the major projects in which MVEC participated see the series of maps in Appendix H. 18Sutton, W. p. 159. 34 The nature and extent of the British firm's involvement in Soviet electrification during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the First and Second Five-year plans raises the question of role of the foreign specialist in a changing and often politically charged Soviet context. It is important to develop a profile of the cadre that MVEC employed in the Soviet Union during the 19205 and early 19305. One of the striking features of the six men arrested in 1933 is that while all were British subjects, only two, MacDonald and Gregory, were born in England. The others were born in Russia (Thornton), New Zealand (Monkhouse), Germany (Nordwall), and South Africa (Cushny). From this it is reasonable to suggest that living and working in foreign environs was not a novel aspect of these engineers' lives. Indeed, all those born outside of the U.K. had a passable command of Russian. According to Thornton, he and Monkhouse could be mistaken for natives when outside of Moscow and Leningrad.19 There was a generational gap in the MVEC cadre as well. In 1933, the most senior of the men, acting-manager Monkhouse, chief engineer Thornton, and electrical engineer Gregory were aged 46, 45, and 47 respectively.20 All were 19Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 20The ages are given as of 1933. See the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. verbatim report, The Qese of N.P. Vihvitsky, 'V,h. Qussev, A.W. G;egory.,. Charged with Wrecking Activities et Eewe; Spahiohs in the Soviet Union, (Moscow: State Law Publishing House, 1933), pp. 6-11. [Hereinafter cited as 35 married and it is known that their families resided with them in the Soviet Union for short stints throughout this period.21 This may have added a sense of normalcy to their lives, but it was clearly difficult for some. For example, by 1933 Thornton's wife had returned the U.K. and it was universally reported by the other engineers that he had been in a state of nervousness and periodic depression for much of her absence.22 The other three younger men were all single when they came to the U.S.S.R., but Nordwall married a Ukrainian woman shortly after being posted there and was able to bring her to the U.K. after his expulsion.23 They were all more than ten years younger than the senior MVEC men.24 They were employed in the actual installation and erection of electrical equipment, work that was arguably more physically demanding than the work done by the senior men. Still, with less responsibility attached to their jobs and more free time generally, these three were more active in their personal The Qes .] 21Foreign Office Memo by Wylie of interviews conducted at Bush House (MVEC main office) with Monkhouse, Cushny, Gregory, and Nordwall, F0 371/17272 N3487/1610/38, 9 May 1933. [Hereinafter cited as the Bush House Interviews, 9 May 1933]; Monkhouse, Moscow, p. 110. 22Bush House Interviews, 9 May 1933. 23"Departed Britons in Poland," Observer 23 April 1933, p. 12. 24At the time of their arrests MacDonald was 29, Nordwall was 31, and Cushny was 34 years of age. 36 associations with Soviet citizens. Though the testimony of Soviet acquaintances during the trial most likely was exaggerated,25 even British officials recognized that MacDonald in particular was a very heavy drinker and was generally considered to have the "weakest character" of the lot. His choice of associates was often suspect and he seemed to draw to himself Soviet citizens who were very indiscreet when it came to criticizing their native land.26 The closest relationship MacDonald developed was with his housekeeper, Riabova, and her family. Given his near constant state of ill-health the appeal of her matronly attention was understandable. Unfortunately for both Riabova and her family, she and her two sons were arrested just prior to MacDonald himself. Such close connections to the MVEC engineers would ultimately have serious consequences indeed.27 In general MVEC adopted a posture that maintained a conspicuous distance between its employees and official representatives of Great Britain posted at the Moscow Embassy and the Leningrad Consulate. Though this policy was to prove ultimately risky, the firm evidently thought that they were best served by establishing close and friendly relationships 25For the reasons see Chapter 4. 26strang to Collier, F0 371/17270 N2944/1610/38, 20 April 1933. 27MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 37 with Soviet authorities and those Russians with whom they were to work as colleagues.28 This practice was extended to include the direct employment of Soviet nationals in offices of MVEC in Moscow and Leningrad. By 1930, it was found expedient for the firm's secretary, Anna Kutusova, to take up residence with Monkhouse and Thornton (and their families) at the company compound at Perlovskaia, just north of Moscow, along the Mytishchi railway line.29 While it is difficult to be certain about why such men were attracted to work in the Soviet Union, some motivational factors are clear. For the younger, less established engineers, there was the attraction of higher rates of pay and one-month leaves of absence. The MVEC contracts worked out by Monkhouse also included clauses outlining additional compensation for unduly harsh working conditions and a host of items that were to be supplied by the Soviet authorities to outfit the engineers.30 Certainly in the years of the Great Depression this would have been an attractive arrangement, especially for the more well-traveled of the 235trang to Collier, F0 371/17270 N2944/l610/38, 20 April 1933. 29Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 3°Chilston to Sir John Simon, F0 371/19468 N1024/1024/38, 23 February 1935. This file includes the Company's synopsis of MVEC contracts and copies of some of the contracts which Monkhouse negotiated in Moscow. It was part of a large dossier concerning MVEC affairs in the USSR sent on 20 March 1935, by MVEC Director, Sir Felix Pole, to Anthony Eden, just prior to the Lord Privy Seal's visit to Moscow. 38 engineers. For men such as Monkhouse, there were the additional rewards of working on the cutting edge of their industry in a society that claimed to work on the basis of rational, scientifically designed plans for economic development. Even though Monkhouse was well aware of the gap between the goals of such plans and their actual accomplishments, it was a stimulating situation for an engineer to be engaged in some of the largest electrification projects undertaken anywhere in the world at that time. It is apparent from the accounts of Thornton and Monkhouse, that their experience as foreign experts can be divided into two distinct periods. The first of these ran from 1924-1927 and was distinguished by the use of non- communist Russian experts in the immediate management of many industrial operations. Such experts, drawn largely from what Kendall Bailes has termed the "old specialists"31, had received their technical training prior to the Revolution and were professionally and socially at ease with the British contingent. Perhaps the most important of these men in the experience of MVEC were Professor Hugo Graftio and Aleksandr Vasile'vich Vinter. The former, an electrical engineer, headed the construction of the Volchovstroi hydroelectric station outside of Leningrad to which Monkhouse was assigned 31Bailes, e So ' U de ni nd St lin 122§;12;1, Part 2: The Old Specialist and the Power Structure, 1928-1931. 39 in 1926. He had been put in charge despite being a former Tsarist official and despite the fact that he had been arrested after the Revolution. As has been demonstrated elsewhere,32 such an accommodation with bourgeois specialists was a general feature of Soviet development until 1928. Monkhouse found the esppih ge eggpe and enthusiasm of the staff at Volchovstroi outstanding and, despite the cost overrun involved with the project, it "constituted a fine example of what could be accomplished in the U.S.S.R. under proper leadership and control."33 Graftio organized regular social evenings between the foreign specialists and their Soviet counterparts and established a professional collegiality between the two groups. Graftio's status suffered an eclipse because of the excessive cost of the Volchovstroi project and A.V. Vinter rose to the top ranks of the hydroelectric engineering management in the U.S.S.R. which culminated in his directorship of the gigantic Dneprostroi hydroelectric project.34 Vinter was in some respects atypical of the non- communist specialists. He was the son of a tradesman and had been expelled from Kiev University in 1901 for revolutionary 32Bailes, p. 51. 33Monkhouse, Mosegw, p. 142. 34A. Rassweiler, The gehepatioh of Power: A Histopy of lhhepzeepggi, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 64-65. [Hereinafter cited as Rassweiler, The Generation of Pew p.) 40 activity. Prior to the Great War he had become a Social Democrat. He later studied engineering at Petrograd University under the future Bolshevik diplomat, L. Krasin, and had subsequently married the Bolshevik's sister. It seems likely that Krasin's early membership on the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and his promotion of the newly formed Electrotechnical Council could only have strengthened Vinter's position in the industry. Alongside these formidable political connections he had a reputation as a problem solver and did not shy away from being held accountable for his decisions. At the time of his appointment to the Dneprostroi he was also rumored to be a friend of Rykov.35 Monkhouse's involvement with Vinter came earlier, in 1924, at the Shatura power station east of Moscow. His account exudes an excitement and pride that came from working on what Monkhouse called "the first fruits of Lenin's electrification scheme." Vinter's administrative methods were generally well respected by those who worked under him. In 1925, towards the end of the Shatura project, Vinter did run into difficulties, however, when he provoked a protest from the local Party officials who complained that party members were the first to be laid off as the work force to construct the station was reduced to the level necessary to operate it. It was widely held around Shatura that Vinter's 35Ibid., pp. 19, 66. 41 decision was supported by Trotsky and the matter was left in Vinter's hands.36 A further indication of Vinter's status with the authorities came during Thornton's interrogation. The British engineer had mentioned that Vinter had personally ordered switchgear equipment which had turned out to be faulty and was told by the interrogator Zhelesnikov not to mention Vinter's name again.37 Even at the height of the most important investigation of the electrification industry in the USSR, A.V. Vinter was untouchable. On several other occasions Monkhouse was deputed to escort around MVEC sites important figures such as Trotsky, who headed the Main Concessions Committee at the time. The British engineer was surprised by the revolutionary's interest in technical detail, but was reminded by Trotsky that he had studied engineering as a young man.38 Monkhouse also conducted the tours of the site for Krasin when he visited Shatura and this contact with the leading figures undoubtedly reflected MVEC's reputation and Monkhouse's own personal standing as a foreign expert in the electrification industry. Alongside Monkhouses's high-powered encounters with prominent Soviet politicians and engineers, the daily difficulties associated with the somewhat primitive living 351bid., p. 113. 37Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 38Monkhouse, hoscoy, p. 111. 42 conditions of his family and staff paled in significance. Monkhouse claimed that the long days and collegial circumstances made this an experience which helped form "the optimistic view which [he] always maintained as to the ultimate outcome of events in the U.S.S.R."39 Only the experience of his arrest and trial served to give him pause in this regard.40 In addition to associating with leading figures in the Soviet electrical industry, Monkhouse also maintained close contact with a number of the over 150 research institutes in Leningrad during this period. He met such famous figures as I. Pavlov and was part of a British delegation which presented the President of the Soviet Academy of Science, V. Karpinskii, with souvenirs of the Faraday Centenary. Overall he found the researchers and senior students to be very similar in education and calibre to those in Britain, but observed that the younger students were rather poorly prepared. This latter group tended to stress social and political work and it is from this group that the upcoming generation of "red specialists" would undoubtedly be drawn.41 It was consistent with the position of MVEC that when Anglo-Soviet relations plunged into the abyss in 1927, and formal ties were severed, the firm continued its activities 39Monkhouse, Moseow, pp. 108-112. 4°Ibid. 41Monkhouse, Moseow, pp. 142-143. 43 and landed new contracts. British officials were deeply troubled by Soviet policy in the Far East and India at this time and there were allegations that ARCOS, the Soviet trade agency in Britain, was engaged in activities incompatible with its trade status. On 26 May 1927, with Prime-Minister Stanley Baldwin, Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Home Secretary William Joynson-Hicks all quoting directly from intercepted Comintern telegrams, the Conservatives were able to make their case against Soviet meddling in British politics and thereby prepared the move to sever diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R which followed the next day. Still, such indiscreet revelations, while serving to muster a great deal of indignant bluster, seriously injured British interests when the debate "developed into an orgy of governmental indiscretion about secret intelligence for which there is no parallel in modern parliamentary history."42 The costs of this parliamentary drama were extremely high. By making public the actual text of Soviet documents, Baldwin's government compromised its most valuable Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6) which used the non-secret Government Code and Cypher School (GC & CS) and the Passport Control Office (PCO) as its cover. Very 42C. Andrews, 1 ' e 'n ' 'sh ntell C 't , (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp. 332- 333. 44 shortly after the ARCOS debacle, the British PCO in Helsinki, Commander Boyce, and the espionage network he managed were exposed by the OGPU[GPU43]. The British would never establish a PCO in the Soviet Union in the 1930's and it now appears that the the ill-advised disclosures in the Parliamentary debates of May 1927 contributed to Soviet infiltration of these services in subsequent years.44 Against this background of aggravated Anglo-Soviet relations, the willingness of MVEC to remain in the U.S.S.R. was, according to Monkhouse, interpreted by Soviet officials as a sign that certain British firms disagreed with the political mood at Whitehall.45 It is impossible to know what influence this might have had on Soviet decisions at the time, but it was after the diplomatic rupture that MVEC concluded a five-year contract with the Leningrad Machine Trust (Mashinostroi) to manufacture turbines on MVEC's design. The Trust's representatives had full access to the Company's British workshops, labs, and drawing offices as 43The GPU (State Political Administration) replaced the Vecheka in February 1922 and was raised to federal status in November 1923 as the OGPU (Unified State Political Administration). The acronyms were used interchangeably in the late 19205 and early 19305. The OGPU was unified with the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) in 1934. See A. Knight, e GB: olice d Po 'tics ' he Sov'et Uhien, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 323, appendix A. 44C. Andrews, See;eh_§e;yiee, pp. 332-333, 407. For a contrary and less convincing point of view see H. Flory, "The ARCOS Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927," Jeurnai gf Qghtemporapy Histepy 12, 4 (1977): 707-723. 45Monkhouse, Moscey, p. 226. 45 well as to all patents. Under the agreement the patent fee would be removed after the completion of the five-year contract. MVEC was to send engineers, mechanics, and technical personnel to train Soviet engineers and oversee the project.46 Over the years 1923-1933 MVEC's employed about 350 British subjects in the U.S.S.R. and, in addition to these, contracted many more Soviet employees for the firm in various capacities.47 During these years the Company also trained "large numbers of Russian engineers" at its Trafford Park works.48 With the Company's activities increasing during the early years of the First Five-Year Plan, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade offered MVEC the opportunity to open a technical consulting bureau in Moscow. This was a rare privilege as there were only three Continental firms and one American firm accorded equal treatment by the Commissariat. The arrangement was particularly useful in cases where innovative technology was being installed. Before this accommodation was reached all transactions had to be passed through the Soviet trade agency ARCOS in London before being finalized. This had often meant long delays, even over minor revisions in plans, and the British engineers were 46"Five Year Agreement between Leningrad Machine Trust and Metropolitan Vickers," The Timee (London) 18 March 1927. 47"The Moscow Trial, New Light on the Case of 1933," The Times (London), 22-25 May 1933. 48Dummelow, i§29-i949, p. 121. 46 pleased with flexibility shown in this instance. ARCOS continued to retain its right to confirm all agreements made through the Moscow bureau and its electrical department worked through the Electro-Import office in Moscow.49 Following the resumption of relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in 1929, Monkhouse found the Moscow bureau to be an aid to many other British firms who now made use of the MVEC office in Moscow to facilitate their own negotiations. Monkhouse understood the importance of reestablishing the "good name of British manufacturers, particularly amongst young Soviet engineers, and others who during the most active years of 1928-1929, had had their attention deliberately directed to Germany and America."50 The establishment of an office in Moscow51 required additional secretarial staff as well. After some difficult negotiations with the Commissariat of Foreign Trade that lasted for several months, it was agreed that MVEC could employ Soviet citizens. The cost for clerical workers was high by British standards with the Soviet salary at two hundred and fifty rubles per month (36 pounds at official 1933 rates) as compared to 12 pounds per month for a British 49Monkhouse, Meeeey, pp. 228-229. 5°Ibid., p. 230. 51MVEC had opened a small office in Leningrad in 1926 to assist its work at Mashinostroi. It served to coordinate the efforts of the local erection crews but was unsuitable as a central bureau. Chilston to Simon, F0 371/19468 N1024/1024/38, 1 March 1935. 47 clerk. Part of the salary to such employees could be paid in foreign currency "or its equivalent", a seemingly innocuous arrangement that would have grave and unforeseen consequences. Once the clerical staff issue had been resolved the officials at Electro-Import allowed MVEC to employ Soviet erectors in the field on comparable terms.52 It is clear that the afflicted condition of Anglo-Soviet relations in particular, and the "war scare"53 that swept Soviet society more generally put a serious strain on the interaction between the MVEC engineering corps and their Soviet colleagues in 1927. Such international stress undoubtedly exacerbated the tensions on the Soviet domestic scene which saw the major defeats of Trotsky and Zinoviev, and the deepening of the grain crisis that brought an end to the New Economic Policy.54 Thornton and Monkhouse came to understand later that the tide was rapidly shifting against both foreign and native "bourgeois" specialists. Prior to this there had been relatively few incidents which suggested OGPU interest in MVEC affairs. After the trial, Thornton recalled some vaguely threatening letters he 521bid., p. 232-233. 53See M. Reiman, The Birth of Staiinism, pp. 14-15; A. Meyer, "The War Scare of 1927," Soviet QDIODZUDIQD §evietigpe 5, 1 (1978): pp. 1-25; J. Sontag, "The Soviet War Scare of 1926-1927," Ruesieh Review 34, 1 (1975): 66-77. 54S. Fitzpatrick, "The Foreign Threat During the First Five Year Plan," Sovier Unioannion Sevietigpe 5, 1 (1978) p. 26. [Hereinafter cited as Fitzpatrick, "The Foreign Threat During the First Five Year Plan."] 48 received from a woman who had seen him on one of his visits to A. Simon's sister-in-law in Leningrad. Whether they were part of a blackmail scheme by their author who hoped that she, too, could receive foreign-made articles, or part of a secret-police harassment tactic meant to discourage such contacts, is very difficult to say. In any case, Thornton showed them to a Soviet colleague who warned him that the woman was undoubtedly an "agent." This did not apparently make much of an impression on Thornton, who chose to forget about the incident and ignored its implications at the time.55 Another instance involved a warning to Thornton from a former colleague at the Shatura Cable Works. N.P. Kushinsky told Thornton that the OGPU were trying to arrange for his return to Shatura in order to implicate him in the ongoing problems with "blowups" in the cable lines. According to Thornton's testimony later, the cables network still suffered from the abuses it took during the Great War and the general lack of maintenance that characterized Soviet projects at the time. After this he made a point of trying not to return to previous job sites because of such possibilities.56 Incidents of this type, while rare in the early years of MVEC involvement in the Soviet Union, now became part of the general political environment of the industrial sector in the 55Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 55Ibid. 49 country. From March 1928 until June 1931, Soviet industry was racked with the Shakhty affair, the Industrial Party Trial, and the Menshevik Trial. In each of these highly publicized trials, threats from foreign capitalists were said to be linked to the sabotage and wrecking of the First Five Year Plan's industrialization drive. What else, so the lessons of these trials taught, could explain the unfulfilled norms, accidents, and resistance to the Party's plan in the workers' paradise?57 According to Stalin, this demonstrated that economic sabotage as well as military attack was part of the capitalist arsenal against the Soviet Union. Soviet citizens were warned that class warfare may have been inspired from abroad, but it had allies within Soviet society. Both the "kulaks", who resisted collectivization of agriculture, and the "bourgeois specialists", who resisted higher socialist production norms, had to be defeated by increased Party vigilance and the application of Soviet justice.58 57Important discussions of these trials are found in R. Conquest. WNW. (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1968), Appendix F, "Earlier Soviet Trials"; Fitzpatrick, "The Foreign Threat During the First Five-Year Plan," pp. 26-35: K. Bailes, ec o o and S95i5tx_under_Lenin_and_§talin. Part 2: The Old Specialists and the Power Structure, 1928-1931. 531.V. Stalin, "O rabotakh aprel'skogo ob"edinennogo plenuma TsK i TsKK (April 1928)," in I.V. Stalin, Seehihehpie, XI, 54, and S. Fitzpatrick, "The Foreign Threat During the First Five Year Plan," pp. 27-28. For an important discussion of the impact such crises had on judicial practices see P. Solomon, "Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-1941," §oviet Studies 37, 3 (1985): 50 It was understandable, given these dangerous circumstances, that Soviet engineers altered their interaction with the British engineers during these years. Increasingly they refused to visit the flats of their foreign associates in Leningrad, although there were Soviet citizens from outside Leningrad who were apparently not yet aware of the risk. The firm was advised by the OGPU to meet with Soviet colleagues at the Europe Hotel for social occasions. Naturally this was to be at MVEC's expense. At the Engineers' Club in Leningrad, where the British engineers had previously been welcome guests, they were now outcasts. The membership had drastically changed by 1930 as the old intelligentsia was replaced by the "red expert."59 Business dealings with Soviet engineers and technical staff were also hampered since the uneasiness which "non-party engineers showed at being left alone with foreigners" made the inclusion of local Communist officials necessary for subsequent negotiations.6o Not surprisingly the number of engineers involved in production related jobs declined by as much as seventeen percent in this period. Such engineers apparently felt the combination of difficult working conditions, and very high production norms set on the basis 311. 59Monkhouse, Moscow, p. 145-146. Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 6oMonkhouse, Mpeeey, p. 147. 51 of political, rather than technical considerations, was serious obstacle to "success" as defined by the regime. The cost of failure in an industrial culture where being "red" might prove to be more helpful than being "expert" was too high for many.61 Housing for MVEC employees also became a problem around 1930. Thornton claimed that the decision to build the complex at Perlovskaia, located just outside of Moscow, was at least in part due to the fear of foreigners exhibited by Muscovites and the consequent difficulty in finding appropriate housing.62 The arrangements for the building of the MVEC compound, however, revealed a willingness, on the part of the local Soviet authorities, to accommodate the British firm that was in marked contrast to the situation in Moscow. Monkhouse obtained permission to get a forty-five year lease on a parcel of land and the local authorities required no special declaration on the part of this foreign gastroishik, or home builder. Though building supplies were in high demand in the Moscow area, payments in sterling ensured the availability of needed materials. The British firm also managed to coordinate their efforts with a group of peasants whom they knew from their other endeavors. These men 51$. Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution as Class War," in Quirprei Reyoiptioh in Ruseia, 1928-123i, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978: Midland Book Edition, 1984), edited by S. Fitzpatrick, p. 22. 62Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 52 traveled "some hundred miles" to do the work on a piecework basis. A final example of the free rein MVEC was allowed with this project came when they were permitted to tap a four-inch water main from the Moscow aqueduct and did so with their own crew.63 Evidently not all branches of the Soviet bureaucracy or society were "vigilant" when it came to monitoring the relations with MVEC. The basic trends that came to dominate MVEC's interaction with Soviet society became clearer in the wake of the Industrial Party Trial of November-December 1930. Monkhouse later claimed that "almost every Russian engineer who had been in any contact whatever with the British engineers of the Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company was subjected to interrogation by the OGPU and some thirty to forty of my own acquaintances were imprisoned."64 Thornton also recalled the importance of this episode and he included a list of forty-six former colleagues and MVEC Soviet employees who had been arrested during this period in his deposition to the Foreign Office after his release. At least one of these, G.I. Efremov, was executed after the Industrial Party Trial. Efremov had been employed as an erector by MVEC and had trained for six months at the Trafford Park works in Manchester. He was a very valuable man, but was "indiscreet" when criticizing Soviet 63Monkhouse, Moseow, pp. 233-235. 64Monkhouse, Moscow, p. 146. 53 authorities.65 It is not known if this was the extent of his criminal behaviour. These observations help substantiate the claims by Bailes that the number of engineers drawn into the police investigations numbered in the thousands.66 For those involved in industry during this period there could be little doubt that the "revolution from above" was crashing down on the heads of the technically trained specialists. Thornton apparently did not follow the Industrial Party Trial as it was unfolding although his attention was drawn to a portion of the published confession of the key defendant, Professor L. Ramzin.67 Ramzin "confessed" to being involved in a conspiracy with A. Simon of Vickers and a variety of other shadowy Englishmen including a "Sir Philip", a "Colonel" Lawrence, and a "Lord" Churchill. Thornton had made enquiries with the directors of his firm and found that Simon of MVEC (not Vickers)68 had indeed met with Ramzin in London 65Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 66Bailes, Technoiogy and Sociery Under Lenih end Staiin, p. 70 and chapter 4, "The Industrial Party Affair." 67See the Soviet published version of the trial in Andrew Rothstein, ed., Wreckers on Trial: A Record of the Trial pf rhe Ingustriai Rarty held ih Moseow, November- Decepher i230 (New York: Workers' Library Publishing, 1931.) 68The armament firm, Vickers, had held a controlling interest in MVEC, but controlling interest had been obtained by GEC in 1927. In 1928 F. Dudley Docker bought control of MVEC and the firm was incorporated under the "Associated Electrical Industries" rubric for British rationalization. Vickers did continue to hold stock in MVEC throughout these years. In subsequent years GEC once again assumed control and 54 and introduced the Soviet representative to Sir Philip Nash, the managing director of MVEC, and Sir Herbert Lawrence, a director of MVEC and a banker, with the hope of encouraging future business. Ramzin was an important figure in the Thermal Technical Institute at the time although his eclipse was at least partly related to his opposition to plans which were overly reliant on gigantic enterprises.69 As for "Lord" Churchill and his hopes for naval exercises in the Black Sea- -such errors in detail were further evidence that the whole confession "reeked" of OGPU "dictation." Moreover, the notion that Simon, who had initiated the Russian venture and to a certain extent staked his reputation on its success, would want to destabilize Soviet Russia was, Thornton thought, "absurd.”0 Despite what would later be seen as obvious danger signals, the engineers remained essentially oblivious to the potential problems they might face themselves. With some remorse Thornton later recalled: I had not the slightest idea that the G.P.U. contemplated any arrests. I had always been given to understand by my informants that no arrests or searches would ever be made as the Soviet Government were afraid of counter measures abroad. I realize now [July 1933] that this information was "put across". If I had understood the situation, which I entirely MVEC is now known as GEC Switchgear Ltd. 69K. Bailes, Teehhgiogy ahd Soeiety Mnder Lehin and fiLélin: Po 113- 7OThornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 55 misgauged, I think I could have got Mr. Cushny and the erectors....out of the country without prejudicing the Company's business here. Thornton's comments here reveal features of the engineers' thinking that help explain their errors in judgement. In several instances they were told by various Soviet citizens employed by MVEC that the OGPU had forced the unfortunate Russians to become informants. Invariably the response of Thornton and Monkhouse was to advise these people to tell the police whatever they needed to know. They later claimed that they had nothing to hide and seemed genuinely concerned that the Company not cause any more trouble for their Soviet employees if, for example, the MVEC engineers simply dismissed them. The engineers were also aware that one of the typists and their secretary had been "ordered" by the police to seduce Cushny, Monkhouse, and Thornton himself.72 In one instance, Monkhouse was followed by an attractive OGPU "blondinka" who made it clear that she was to pay rather close personal attention to the British engineer while he was traveling to and from Baku.73 It is still not clear why the MVEC personnel stationed in the Soviet Union waited until the actual detention of their Soviet personnel had begun before they decided to take Ibid 0 71Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 721bid. 73Monkhouse, Moscow, pp. 259-262. 56 up such issues with the management of the firm in the U.K. Up until that point (January 1933) they may have felt the individual incidents were too trivial or commonplace in the current Soviet context to be of consequence. Certainly they were aware of the periodic ehistki or Party "sweeps" that characterized the period and thought that their own troubles were part of that process.74 Yet complaints against such action could only injure MVEC business, or so Thornton feared, and the tactics of the OGPU did not appear to be directed specifically against MVEC in any case.75 Another feature of their thinking was the otherwise high opinion the senior men, Thornton and Monkhouse, had of the efficiency of the security forces of the USSR. Many foreign travelers76, including the British engineers, had had occasion to seek OGPU assistance and its reputation was therefore not simply one of a repressive force. Indeed, Monkhouse held that the OGPU intentionally spread fantastic rumors and tales of torture and punishment which apparently added credibility to its function in Soviet society.77 It 74William MacDonald, Deposition to the Foreign Office, FO 371/17273 N5059/1610/38, 3 July 1933. Hereinafter cited as MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 75Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 76See the account of the American asbestos engineer, Walter Rukeseyer, Werhipg fer the Soviets:An American Epgiheer ih Russie, (New York: Covici-Freide Publishers, 1932), p. 31. 77Monkhouse, Moseow, pp. 262-263. it 19 am CEn 0f 1 indu imle: 57 was also to difficult for them to fathom why a company with the reputation of long and faithful service to the Soviet Union should be the object of an attack now. Thornton observed: The G.P.U. would have acted before now if they had intended to do anything at all and not wait eight years, that is allowing us two years to incriminate ourselves. The mystery79 behind the OGPU action was increased by its alternating pattern. It has been suggested that the period from 1924-1927 was relatively free of interference while the rash of incidents after 1927 seemed to be part of a concerted policy of "specialist" harassment. In the aftermath of the Menshevik trial held in the spring of 1931, the mood in the country once again began to swing in favor of the industrial specialists and Thornton observed that OGPU interest in MVEC declined in the later part of 1931 and 1932.80 This is consistent with the position held by Bailes and others that Stalin had been won over by those in the Central Committee and the head of Vesenkha (Supreme Council of National Economy) G. Ordzhonikidze, to the view that the industrial sector had been secured by the series of investigations and trials that had recently been 78Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 79For a more detailed discussion of the possible rationale behind the Soviet secret police action see Chapter 3. 80Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 58 undertaken.81 Rravda announced in June 1931 that the "wrecking organizations had been smashed."82 The following month the head of the OGPU, V. Menzhinskii, published an article in Erevde dedicated to the fifth anniversary of the death of Dzerzhinskii, his predecessor. The OGPU chief echoed the new approach to technical specialists when he reminded readers that Dzerzhinskii had "used the G.P.U. to protect specialists from all kinds of oppression."83 To news of this type on August 20, 1931, the engineering journal, Ipzhehepernyi Trpd, proclaimed that "Specialist Baiting is outlawed!"84 This benign situation began to erode only in September 1932 when the firm's secretary, Anna Kutuzova, began to be periodically summoned by the OGPU. Other members of the MVEC staff were also questioned about the "living arrangements" at Perlovskaia and Kutuzova's relationship with the British engineers. Thornton knew that Kutuzova was reporting to the OGPU on the amount of torgsin rubles being spent by MVEC. 81K. Bailes, Technology and Society Under Lenin and Sreiih, pp. 150-151; H. Kuromiya, Sraiih's Tndustriel Revoluhioh, pp. 272-276; S. Fitzpatrick, "Ordzhonikidze's Takeover of Vesenkha: A Case Study in Soviet Bureaucratic Politics", Sovier Spudies 37, 2 (1985): 164-165. 828. Fitzpatrick, "The Foreign Threat During the First Five-Year Plan," p. 33. "Po-novomu robatat', po-novumu rukovodit'", P avda, 25 June 1931, p. 1. 83Quoted in H. Kuromiya, Stalih's Industrial Revolption, p. 276. 841bid. be Ina I'QI 59 These rubles were used for goods in restricted supply--a kind of official black market.35 That these events were only a foretaste of what was to come became all too apparent in January 1933 when a number of MVEC's Soviet employees suddenly disappeared. It certainly appears that MVEC found it difficult to see that that the winds of change were upon them. Early in January, at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Molotov, Secretary of the Central Committee and the Moscow Party organization L. Kaganovich, and People's Commissar for Heavy Industry G. Ordzhonikidze, had all come out with severe criticism of industrial managers.86 Stalin, speaking about the threat from the remnant of the "moribund" bourgeiosie, warned: These gentlemen are no longer able to launch a frontal assault against the Soviet regime. They and their classes made such attacks several times, but they were routed and dispersed. Hence, the only thing left them is to do mischief and harm to the workers, to the collective farmers, to the Soviet regime and to the Party. And they are doing as much mischief as they can, acting on the sly. They set fire to warehouses and wreck machines. They organize sabotage.87 The echo of Stalin's speech would be heard time and again in the Metro-Vickers' trial of April 1933 but, for now, the MVEC 85Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 86Kuromiya, §telin's Industrial Revolurion, pp. 292-293. 87Stalin, "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan," 7 January 1933, werrs, pp. 211-212. h: An pro rec, Riab and C bacon. bouSek 38 15‘16, 60 staff in the USSR was simply confused by the renewed interest Soviet authorities were showing in Company affairs. MVEC itself was the subject of an investigation by the Commissariat of Heavy Industry in January, but according to later testimony by Cushny, this failed to cause much concern since the Company's equipment passed this preliminary examination.88 In general, MVEC had confidence in its relation to those more involved in Soviet industry such as Ordzhonikidze, the Commissar of Heavy Industry, and the related bureaucratic interests of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. It was hard for either the MVEC Directors in London or Monkhouse and Thornton in the USSR to understand how any of these concerns could benefit from a crisis in Anglo-Soviet trade. The first disturbing sign that a crisis of unforeseen proportions was upon those associated with the Company was recognized on 6 January when MacDonald's housekeeper, Riabova, vanished. Despite inquiries with the local police and OGPU the young engineer could not find out what had become of her. When MacDonald informed Thornton of his housekeeper's disappearance, however, Thornton had little doubt that she had been arrested by the G.P.U. for some civil offense such as hoarding gold, insulting communists or anti- Soviet speeches. I did not think that it could 88See Cushny's account in the Times, 23 May 1933, pp. 15-16. 61 have any connection with us at the time.89 MacDonald's concern grew on 26 January, when he opened a letter from Riabova's daughter in search of some information about the missing woman and found that her two sons had also been arrested. It was now clear to MacDonald that this was no ordinary passport verification (proverRe), or ehistRa.9O Though in early January Thornton had not sensed any change in the temper of OGPU operations, it soon became evident that the net cast around MacDonald's household was similarly being drawn about the Perlovskaia compound. On 25 January, Kutuzova received a call at the MVEC bureau in Moscow from her estranged husband, who lived in Leningrad but was unexpectedly now in Moscow. She was reluctant to take the call, but did manage a very short conversation. About a half-hour after this she asked to leave to see her husband. This was a marked departure from the standing practice which had been instituted in 1932, a practice that made sure Kutuzova was escorted by another MVEC employee whenever she left the firm's bureau or compound. Once in the street, the folly of her action became clear as she was "literally dragged" into a Ford coupe waiting nearby and taken to the OGPU headquarters at the Lubianka prison. That evening Monkhouse decided that he had to break with 89Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 90MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 62 past practices and contact the MVEC office in London about the whole affair. He was later told that his call was instrumental in gaining the release of Kutuzova the following day.91 C.S. Richards, upon hearing of these disturbing developments, asked Monkhouse to return to London where he would arrange a meeting with the Soviet Trade Representative there, Ozerskii. When Monkhouse met with Richards and Ozerskii in London early in February, Ozerskii claimed that he had twice contacted Menzhinskii, and was told that "Kutuzova's arrest had been the work of a Department of the O.G.P.U. unknown to its chiefs." The OGPU had nothing against MVEC or any of its engineers and the matter was allowed to drop there.92 While Ozerskii's statement might appear to be little more than a ruse, there is important circumstantial evidence- -it is hardly likely anyone will ever see the secret police files--that the economic section of the OGPU was acting independently of other government institutions if not, as Ozerskii suggested, acting independently of overall OGPU direction. Monkhouse himself came to believe that Ozerskii had been intentionally misled by the OGPU after the British engineer had seen the way the secret police had reacted to his own account of the meeting with the Soviet Trade Representative. Beyond this it was almost certainly the case 91Monkhouse, Moscow, pp. 272-273. 921bid., pp. 274-275. 63 that when the axe finally fell on the British subjects themselves, Maxim Litvinov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, did not know about the impending Anglo-Soviet crisis.93 If such was the case, and this issue will be subsequently explored in some depth 94, it would be a marked departure from the only previous precedent, the Shakhty trial, in which German citizens were involved and the diplomatic apparatus headed by Litvinov's predecessor, Chicherin, was coordinated with the actions of the secret police.95 Further evidence that the Soviet trade organizations were not apprised of the impending action against the British MVEC can be found in the archives of Vickers, the armament company which had held a controlling interest in MVEC until 1928, and continued to hold its stock. From February 10 to 22, a Soviet trade mission of ARCOS officials and Red Army officers toured various Vickers works on what was the first military-technical mission to Vickers since the Revolution. According to General Noel Birch, a Vickers director, the Soviets were very keen to purchase the latest array of artillery and ballistic devices and were well informed about the "secret list" of items that the Department of Overseas 93Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1650/l6lO/38, 13 March 1933. 94See Chapter 3. 95See G. Hilger and A. Meyer, The Incompatible hiiies, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), pp. 217—218 and H. Dyck, The Soviet Union and Weihar Germany, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), pp. 129-130. 64 Trade recommended against selling the Red Army. Since MVEC and Vickers had a long standing, if diminishing connection, it seems unlikely that a coordinated Soviet attack on MVEC would have coincided with continued purchases from a closely related British company. This point is further strengthened when it is recognized that during the interrogation of the arrested engineers, Soviet authorities showed some confusion about the actual relationship of the former parent company Vickers, and MVEC. That such a problem developed was certainly understandable, since British officials themselves often used the short form "Vickers" when they were referring to MVEC. It seems likely, then, that the OGPU preferred to pursue its own investigations outside the realm of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, or the Narkomindel, and thereby produce a reir eeeehpii where MVEC was concerned. At about same time as Ozerskii was trying, perhaps quite honestly, to convince the MVEC management in London that no concerted effort was being mounted against the Company, Thornton went to the office of Electro-Import in Moscow through which MVEC arranged its affairs with the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. He met with A. N. Dolgov, a man who was associated with Vinter's work in the electrification industry and had been hitherto very helpful 65 when it came to employing Soviet personnel in MVEC work.96 When Thornton told him of the fate of Kutuzova, Dolgov "almost fainted." In a very agitated manner he claimed it was "criminal" to have Soviet citizens in foreign employ and that he was withdrawing his "support from our scheme of employing Russian erectors absolutely."97 This rapid reversal suggests that Electro-Import was not advised of the OGPU plans for MVEC either and that Dolgov was very much aware of the potential implications of these recent events. Dolgov was not seen in his office for the next three days and would later hold the distinction of being the only witness at the engineers' trial, aside from techniCal advisers, not to be charged with any crime despite the fact that Thornton had allegedly bribed him. He would be portrayed by defenders of the British engineers as an agent provocateur during the trial, and in contrast to his previous record of support and involvement with foreign firms, it appears that he had aided the OGPU for some time.98 Shortly after the arrests of the MVEC personnel Dolgov was demoted to his old job in the Central Department of Electro-Import, thereby removing him from responsibilities relating to the British firm. This 96A. Rassweiler, The thererioh of Rower, pp. 72-73 and Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 97Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 98See the British Acting-Counsellor, William Strang's, comment in his home end Ahroag, p. 97, and the discussion of Dolgov's testimony in Chapter 4, "The Metro-Vickers' Trial." 66 suggests that Dolgov may have been an unwilling agent in the service of the secret police.99 More was learned about the implications of Kutuzova's arrest when the unfortunate woman returned to the MVEC office in Moscow on the morning of 26 January. She was near hysteria and completely exhausted. Her hands were covered with ink and she told Monkhouse and Thornton that she was forced, under threats to her entire family, to write that we were engaged in spying and bribing and being in close contact with the Consulate and Embassy. She further said that she had been forced to write "disgustful" things in relation to myself [Thornton] and Mr. Monkhouse. Her interrogators tried to convince her that such testimony could never be used, but that it was useful to have when "bargaining" with the British. In what was almost certainly a reference to the impending end of the Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement, it had been suggested to her that the most dangerous time would be in April--the treaty was to lapse on 16 April--when "the Governments would quarrel."101 From the interrogation she had undergone throughout the entire evening, Kutuzova gained the impression that the OGPU had a near-complete knowledge of the MVEC men, their nick- 99Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 1°°Ibid. lolxbid. 67 names, characteristics, and weaknesses.102 This information was consistent with that gained by Monkhouse over the next two days which indicated that "a careful watch was being made of [his] own movements and those of several of our engineers."103 One Soviet erector, Oleinik, had disappeared after finishing his last assignment.104 As for MacDonald, he had been generously provided with a replacement for Riabova by the Soviet authorities he was assisting, but the new woman had an annoying habit of letting unknown visitors into his apartment. MacDonald also recalled after the trial that one Orlov, an engineer who had never shown much interest in the young Briton prior to Riabova's disappearance, now had become very friendly and had invited himself to MacDonald's several times. Further evidence of this type of informal surveillance occurred on 1 March, when MacDonald was at a party at the Astoriia hotel, and was, as usual, enjoying perhaps too much drink. He did not make it home that night and he received close attention from "several men" who were not friends, yet wanted to talk to him at great length. In response to a query by another MVEC engineer about the reason for his failure to appear at work on 2 March, MacDonald denied that he had been arrested that night, but admitted he "may have been under informal 1°21bid. 103Monkhouse, Moscow, p. 274. 104Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 68 examination."105 Over the next week the MVEC engineers were unaware of any new developments. As it turned out this was indeed the quiet before the storm. On 11 March 1933, the OGPU coordinated four raids at the premises of the MVEC engineers. John Cushny and MacDonald were picked up at Cushny's flat in Moscow where MacDonald was temporarily staying. At the Perlovskaia compound, Monkhouse and Thornton were interrupted during a business dinner by a large OGPU force of about eighty men. The premises was searched and they were presented with warrants for their arrest. It was soon learned that in Moscow the MVEC bureau office next to Electra-Import had also been searched. The MVEC office in Leningrad was also raided. In this instance however, the British clerk was left at liberty while four of the Soviet staff were detained.106 Charles Nordwall and Albert Gregory were picked up over the next few days, as were a number of Soviet erectors, among them Oleinik. It was now learned that he had been missing from his home in Poltava since 24 February. In short order these six British engineers and their Soviet associates found themselves under interrogation 105This account was provided by MacDonald in response to Tearle's account which asserted that MacDonald had been arrested March 1. See Richards to Collier, F0 371/17274 N5682/1610/38, 20 July 1933. 105ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1610/l610/38, 12 March 1933; Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1638/1610/38, 13 March 1933. 69 at the Lubianka prison in Moscow. Early the next day the first moves were made by MVEC to seek the support of the British Government. Two British employees of the firm, Buckell and Burke, who were at Perlovskaia the previous evening, had witnessed the arrests. Early the next day they urgently sought a meeting with the embassy staff in Moscow. The news of the Leningrad raid was quickly confirmed with the British Consul-General there, Bullard, and the Ambassador, Sir Esmond Ovey, was brought into the proceedings.107 Further aggravating the mood of the diplomats, who were rapidly to assume the role of defenders of the MVEC employees, was the announcement in Izvestiia that day that thirty-five Russians had been executed by the OGPU without trial for "wrecking" in the Ukraine under new powers that had been granted to the secret police.108 It was against this backdrop of increasing tensions and violence within the Soviet domestic domain that the Metro-Vickers' affair rapidly developed into a serious international crisis. 1°7Bullard to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1612/l610/38, 12 March 1933. 1°80vey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1649/l610/38, 13 IMarch 1933: The Times(London), "35 Shot Without Trial", 13 ‘March 1933, p. 14; S. Wolin and R. Slusser, The Soviet Secret Rpiiee, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 16. Chapter 3 The Politics of Crisis Diplomacy "I felt that nothing but absolute and earliest possible realisation by these people of their folly could prevent them from drifting into a position from which withdrawal would be still more difficult for them." --Sir Esmond Ovey, British Ambassador, Moscow 1933. "Concretely and practically the claims of the Ambassador in this case reduce themselves to a proposal for the exemption from Soviet jurisdiction of all British subjects granting them immunity for any crime or delinquency...as soon as his [Ovey's] government express a conviction of their innocence." --TASS 16 March 1933. While the turmoil of Soviet domestic politics was a key element in the difficulties that enveloped the MVEC engineers and encouraged their arrest, it soon became clear that the struggle over their fate would have a decidedly international dimension. The day after the arrests, the British Ambassador, Sir Esmond Ovey, relayed news of the OGPU action to the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart.1 With both the Prime Minister of the National Government, Ramsay MacDonald, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, it would be Ovey and Vansittart who would shape 1Fo 371/17265 Nl6ll/1610/38, 12 March 1933. 70 British policy in the initial weeks of the confrontation. From the beginning, Ovey's hard-line recommendations were meant to convince the Soviets of the damage to Anglo-Soviet relations that would be incurred if they insisted on a trial. Ovey also pressed the urgency of the situation on his own superiors in London. Vansittart was content in the early going to rely on his Ambassador in Moscow, the "man on the spot", but it gradually became apparent that less severe measures than those proposed by Ovey would be the course pursued by the British government. There was a certain irony in the fact that Ovey, a man who had hitherto been considered by Vansittart to be "an apostle of moderation"2, was faced with a situation which prompted him to advocate measures that would ultimately end his tenure in Moscow. Ovey had been sent to Moscow in 1929, as part of the Second Labour Government's attempt to normalize relations with the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the ARCOS raid of 1927 and the suspension of diplomatic relations that resulted from that episode. As the first British diplomat of ambassadorial rank to be posted to the U.S.S.R., he had been largely successful in minimizing the effects of the anti-Soviet campaigns that arose in Britain around the charges of dumping, religious persecution, the use of forced labour, and the like, and had shown a 2Memo by Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1850/1610/38, 19 March 1933. 72 sympathetically critical eye when evaluating the relative merits and promise of the Soviet experiment.3 During the early years of the First Five-Year Plan, Ovey came to believe that "the experiment in itself [was] one of the most far-reaching that has ever been undertaken."4 Moreover, the ideological component of Soviet policy was something which would gradually be considered as calmly as Mahometanism, not to be fought tooth and nail, but as a fact with which one must reckon, and against which one must defend oneself quietly and confidently.5 Ovey's professional estimation of the Soviet Union was reinforced by the relatively close contact the British diplomatic community had with the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, and his British-born wife, Ivy. The Soviet couple's relationship with British diplomats went back to pre-revolutionary days when Rex Leeper, a Foreign Office official, introduced them to one another in 1914 and later 3The best account of Labour's decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union is D. Lammers' article, "The Second Labour Government and the Restoration of Relations with Soviet Russia (1929)", Bulletin pf rhe Ihsriture pf Misrerical Reseerch 37 (May) 1964: 60-72. The only study examining Ovey's perceptions of the Soviet Union is G. Morrell, "Sir Esmond Ovey: Britain's First Ambassador to Soviet Russia, 1929-1933," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Waterloo, 1985. 4Ovey to Henderson, 3 June 1930, #88 in poepmenrs eh ' ' o 'c , 2nd Series, VII, 1929-1934, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957. [Hereinafter DIEIEIEII- 51bid. 73 served as the official witness at their wedding in 1917.6 Litvinova was particularly close to William Strang's wife, being treated as "family" in the British Counsellor's residence in Moscow. She moved freely in the diplomatic community during this period and was a part of the social set which sought refuge from the struggles of everyday life in the more cosmopolitan milieu of Moscow's foreign embassies.7 While it is difficult to assess the exact impact such personal familiarity had on the course of Anglo-Soviet relations, it doubtless came as a shock when Ovey's normally cordial relationship with Litvinov deteriorated completely in the heated exchanges which ensued over the arrests of the British engineers. Events in 1932 had already foreshadowed a dimunition of good-will in formal Anglo—Soviet relations. After the signing of the Ottawa Agreements with the Dominions of the Commonwealth in the summer of 1932, Britain was obliged to abandon the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 1930. This decision, prompted primarily by pressure from the Canadian wheat and timber lobby, was announced on 17 October 1932. From the British point of view, the decision was not meant to stop all trade with the Soviets, as the Canadians had hoped, but rather to renegotiate the terms of that trade. The 6A. Pope, Maxim Litvinoff, (New York: L. Fischer Press, 1947), p. 111. 7H. Von Herwarth, hgeihsr Tyo Evils, (New York: Rawson Wade Publishers, 1981), p. 53. 74 British were well aware that they needed continued Soviet purchases to service the considerable commercial credits that had been extended to the U.S.S.R. under the old trade agreement. In giving the required six months notice of their desire to terminate the 1930 trade agreement, the British also made clear their intention to open trade talks with representatives of the U.S.S.R. 3 The Soviets, if the number of anti-British articles in the Soviet press is any indication, were not at all pleased with the British decision. There were repeated accounts of "Riga Agency forgeries," "flood gates of anti-Soviet propaganda," and "English agents in U.S.S.R."9 Ovey found that the Narkomindel approved of this anti-English press campaign inasmuch as they justified appearance of such articles in 'Izvestiya' and would do nothing to stop them until apparently His Majesty's Government had abolished the liberty of the press in Great Britain. In Great Britain the press was free to attack everybody including the Government itself; here it was allowed only to attack foreigners. The temper of relations remained difficult throughout much of the remainder of 1932. Ovey repeatedly made representations in the "strongest terms possible" and he was concerned that 81. Drummond, "Empire Trade and Russian Trade: Economic Diplomacy in the Nineteen-Thirties," Qenadian Jeurhal of EeepemieszRevue eanediehne d'Eeonomigpe, 5, 1(1972): 40-42. 9See Ovey's report on the Soviet press, Ovey to Simon, D,R.E,R,, #178, 14 November 1932. 100vey to Simon, 2.3.2.2, #180, 14 November 1932. 75 his own personal position, "or that of any successor of mine who may be sent out here will be quite intolerable."11 It is generally thought that the Soviet leadership was engaged in serious internal disputes at this time and that Stalin was trying to win over the Central Committee to his view that Party "discipline", even when it involved members of the Politburo, should be enforced by the OGPU and not by the Party Central Control Commission. Opposition to Stalin, apparently led by Rudzutak, Kirov, Kuibishev and Ordzhonikidze, formed within the Politburo and this created a momentary paralysis at the summit of the Soviet leadership.12 By the end of November, however, the anti-British press campaign had subsided and, with the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, there were signs that a less aggravated relationship was possible. In one of his first meetings with Foreign Secretary Simon, Maisky came close to offering a retraction of the 11Ovey to Simon, D.B.F.P., #188, 21 November 1932. 12R. Conquest, The Grear Terrer, pp. 52-54; L. Schapiro, 's a o t ov'e ' n, (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 392-393. Much of the evidence about this apparent struggle came from Bukharin through the medium of the emigre Menshevik, Boris Nicolaevsky. In his excellent biography of Stalin, Robert H. McNeal points out that Bukharin, himself expelled from the Politburo in 1929, may not have been a reliable source for information about conversations among its members after his expulsion. In the midst of all these other difficulties Stalin's wife, Nadezhda, committed suicide 8 November 1932. According to McNeal, Stalin was badly shaken by her death and seems to have been convinced himself that it was indeed a suicide. See R. McNeal, prelih: Man ehd Reler, (New York: New York University Press, 1988), pp. 146, 164-65. 76 recent Tevestiia barrage. He told Simon that the offensive sentences should be seen as "conditional and hypothetical and should not be read as absolute assertions."13 Simon, apparently not easily convinced of the offered interpretation of the Soviet press, warned Maisky that any continuance of the attitudes presented over the past several weeks would jeopardize the manner in which trade talks were normally conducted between two "friendly nations." The British government required an apology if relations were to be returned to an agreeable footing and found it impossible to proceed to trade negotiations unless there was Soviet compliance with that request.14 Simon's rough handling of Maisky and Ovey's representations in Moscow were intended to impress upon the Soviets the fact that the British were quite willing to use the leverage of trade talks in this particular dispute. Maisky met with the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in early December, and the new Soviet Ambassador finally managed to bring an end to the affair which had beset him from the moment he had arrived in London. He told Vansittart that he had discussed the issue with the editor of szeeriie, who complained that he had been "misled" by one of his correspondents and that he was now willing to apologize 13Simon to Ovey, .B P , #193, 28 November 1932. 14Ibid. 77 for having published such inaccurate information.15 On the same day the Soviets announced their willingness to begin negotiations for a new trade settlement.16 Before a new agreement could be hammered out, the Metro-Vickers' crisis erupted. While there is little doubt that the events of 11 March 1933, took Ovey and his embassy staff by surprise, it must be borne in mind that they had almost no previous contact with the MVEC engineers in the Soviet Union.17 It was only after the two MVEC employees, Buckell and Burke, sought the aid of the embassy that Ovey was made aware of the crisis which rapidly developed into a full-blown confrontation. By relying on the account of Buckell and Burke, and with no clarification from Soviet sources or London, Ovey came to the conclusion that while there "may be insignificant douceurs, tipping or presents," there was no real substance for any criminal charges against the engineers.18 For the remainder of his tenure in Moscow the British Ambassador rigidly 15Simon to Ovey, .B . ., #200, 8 December 1932. 151bid. 17Gail Owen seems too harsh in her criticism of British officials who were not in contact with MVEC representatives as a matter of company policy. See G. Owen, "The Metro- Vickers Crisis...", p. 97. The Acting-Counsellor, William Strang, claimed later that he had met Thornton prior to the arrests, but had seen Monkhouse only once during a rare visit to the Embassy by a director of MVEC, C.S. Richards. See W. Strang, m nd 0 d, p. 79. 130vey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 N1611/1610/38, 12 March 1933. 78 defended this interpretation. Ovey's immediate concern was that the present conditions in the Soviet Union, which he Characterized as a "reign of terror", offered no grounds for confidence if the arrested engineers were not immediately released. The execution without trial of "wreckers and saboteurs" by the OGPU announced in the Soviet press the previous day undoubtedly heightened the Ambassador's anxiety. In such a situation Ovey had no compunction about recommending the threat of severing relations with the U.S.S.R. since the legal remedies of Soviet courts, and the "excessive zeal" of the police, were quite capable of the "trumping up of frivolous and fantastic accusations against a friendly and reputable British Company."19 The response from the Foreign Office in London similarly took the line that "any suggestions implicating them [the engineers] in any 'plot' or illegal activities will command no credence whatever here."20 Vansittart connected the pursuit of a new trade agreement with an early and satisfactory resolution of the entire matter. The trade talks that had been proceeding slowly since December 1932 were immediately suspended.21 He did not agree with Ovey, 19Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1702/1610/38, 12 March 1933. 20Vansittart to Ovey, F0 371/17265 N1610/1610/38, 13 March 1933. 21CA8 23/75, 18(33)2, 13 March 1933. 79 however, that the issue of the continuance of diplomatic relations arose at present. Ovey was ordered to find out what the exact nature of the charges was, where the arrested persons were being held, and whether it was possible to communicate with the detained MVEC engineers.22 Since these tasks had already been anticipated by Ovey--Strang had been sent to the Narkomindel that day--the British officials awaited a Soviet response. The British press took up the MVEC story the same day, with the Tipee placing news of the engineers' arrest alongside an article from its Riga correspondent on the recent OGPU executions.23 The following day a Reuter's report emphasized that the foreign circles in Moscow were at a loss to explain the OGPU attack on MVEC. Company officials released statements complaining that some mistake must have been made since it was MVEC policy to have nothing to do with political matters in the Soviet Union.24 In Moscow, Ovey was having difficulty getting anywhere with Litvinov and the Narkomindel officials. He thought it likely, and most students of the affair agree, that the diplomatic apparatus had been kept out of the decision to proceed with the arrests and Litvinov's "somewhat discourteous refusal to see me today, may conceivably be 22Ibid. 23Times (London), 13 March 1933, p. 14. 24Times (London), 14 March 1933, p. 14. 80 indication that serious political aspect is being considered."25 Ovey thought it unlikely that Litvinov could overturn the police action by appealing to Stalin on grounds of foreign policy. In the end this proved only partially correct, and a number of issues which will be treated below suggest that while Litvinov could not stop the investigation and trial from proceeding, he was able to make special arrangements for the British defendants before and during the trial. With Litvinov unavailable, Ovey took the opportunity to express the "British" position, as he saw it in any case, to Krestinskii, the First Deputy Commissar of the Narkomindel. The British ambassador pressed his view that public opinion was rapidly hardening in Britain and would be unable to understand why commercial negotiations should be pursued with the same authorities which arrest "well-known honourable British subjects on what could only be a criminal charge."26 Ovey told Krestinskii that he continued to hope that it would be found "a mistake had been made."27 Ovey's diplomatic foray takes on greater significance when it is noted that he embarked upon this course of action before receiving instructions from Vansittart on the 25Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1650/I610/38, 13 March 1933. 26Ovey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 N1649/l6lO/38, 13 March 1933. 271bid. 81 advisability of connecting the MVEC case to commercial relations or diplomatic relations. For the time being, Ovey thought he could anticipate instructions, and his conversation with Krestinskii bears this out. As the course of the diplomatic engagement went on, however, Ovey became increasingly frustrated with the unwillingness of his Government to go beyond economic sanctions and threaten the severance of diplomatic relations as well.28 Soviet silence on the reasons for the arrests was finally broken just after midnight on 14 March. The Deputy- department head in the Narkomindel, Guelfand, telephoned Strang with the official Soviet communique. It outlined the charges of criminal wrecking at various electrical enterprises in the USSR that were now to be brought against more than twenty Soviet citizens and the six British engineers. The Soviet diplomat also revealed that Monkhouse and Nordwall had been released and that arrangements were underway for Embassy personnel to visit the remaining British prisoners.29 The late hour of the call, and the accommodations included in the Soviet communique regarding the release of two engineers and early contact with the 28This is confirmed by William Strang's account in Home ahg thoed, p. 84 and by the discussion below. 290vey to Simon, F0 371/17265 N1658/1610/38, 14 March 1933. 82 Embassy staff for the others, suggests that the Narkomindel30 had been trying to get concessions that would ease the pressure of the situation. Since the order for the release of the two prisoners came from Menzhinskii, there is little doubt that the Metro-Vickers affair had now become an issue that was being dealt with at the highest levels.31 Given the lack of documentary evidence on the Soviet side it is hard to know exactly what they hoped to gain by the early release of Monkhouse and Nordwall. The investigating authorities may have genuinely felt these two to be less involved, although both were found guilty in the trial which followed. Conversely the OGPU might have thought that the two engineers would seek out other members of their "criminal" group and further expose the hostile "anti-Soviet wreckers". In any case, the immediate result of their release was that the two men went directly to the British embassy where the first in a series of discussions occurred which finally gave the diplomats in Moscow some first-hand information about the case. While there is no reason to question Stalin's overall primacy in the management of the Metro-Vickers' crisis, the exact nature of his role remains unclear. Shortly after the 30The same day the British embassy staff was told by the Narkomindel that Litvinov had made the arrangements for a visit with the remaining prisoners at the Lubianka prison. Ovey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 Nl704/1610/38 14 March 1933. 31Ovey to Simon, F0 371/17265 N1658/l610/38, 14 March 1933. 83 resolution of the affair the British learned from a "reliable source" that Stalin expressed to one of his chief colleagues (probably Kalinin or Voroshilov) his annoyance at having been brought to sanction the action in Metro-Vickers' case without having been warned by those whose duty it was to know of the risk of the serious repercussions on world opinion. The notion that the OGPU had pursued its investigation of the MVEC engineers on its own and, having found the makings of a "case", brought the evidence forward to Stalin without consulting with the Narkomindel is substantiated by other pieces of evidence that will be discussed below. The British were gaining additional insight into possible Soviet motives back in London from C.S. Richards, one of the directors of Metro-Vickers. He told Laurence Collier, the Head of the Northern Department at the Foreign Office, that it was likely the OGPU felt it was on to something since the breakdown of turbines, machines whose capacities could not be tested to the breaking point prior to their installation, was a problem poorly understood by the non-technically trained secret police. Several tragedies had already occurred, Richards explained. One "first class disaster" had seen the breakdown of turbines at an ”1118.11.21 # 502, Strang to Simon, 20 June 1933. It is hard to agree with Owen's contention that it was Stalin who had initiated events since she cites the same dispatch and does not explain how "sanction" can mean that Stalin "put them up to it." See G. Owen, "The Metro-Vickers Crisis...", p. 97. 84 installation in Kuznetsk which resulted in an explosion which blew the roof off one of the largest plants in the world.33 Such episodes, in his opinion, were largely the result of the "inefficiency of Russian workmen," and the problems were not limited to "Vickers" turbines but extended to other firms as well. Richards thought it possible that the OGPU, "in their self-confidence have acted without reference to Stalin." ,This hypothesis was lent some substance when he had picked up hints from Ozersky and Kahan, both of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, that they might try to get Stalin to prevail on the OGPU to drop the case. Richards himself was going to remind Ordzhonikidze, the Commissar of Heavy Industry and a Politburo member, of MVEC's outstanding contribution to Soviet electrification. The Metro-Vickers' director feared that contracts might go to Germany if the crisis became worse.34 While information about the charges against the engineers in Moscow became better known, at the Foreign Office questions continued to be raised about such issues as Thornton's alleged bribe to Dolgov, his opposite number in Electro-Import in Moscow. Richards wrote a "secret and confidential" letter to Collier which underscored the close relationship Dolgov had had with MVEC and Thornton in 33Foreign Office Minute by Collier, FO 371/17265 Nl801/1610/38, 14 March 1933. 34Ibid. 85 particular. When Thornton approached Richards about a "loan" to Dolgov, who needed the money for a deposit on a flat or house, Richards had agreed on the grounds that similar arrangements were made by MVEC for its own employees from time to time. The MVEC director claimed that the Company was always concerned about the potential problems of bribery and if "Dolgov had been in a position to influence orders in any way I would never have approved this transaction."35 It is difficult to see how Dolgov could remain unaffected by such treatment, and while one cannot establish any direct connection between the "loan" and Dolgov's behavior following the transaction, the decision to treat Dolgov as if he were an MVEC employee highlights the imprudent behavior of MVEC management at the time. Richards was also called upon to clarify MVEC's participation in the "International Price Arrangements Committee", a cartel-like structure formed in Germany in October 1930, which undertook to keep prices for machinery sold in the Soviet Union from falling to uneconomic levels. There was wide participation in this body by all the important firms from Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, the United States, Sweden, and Austria, as well as Great Britain.36 When queried by the Foreign Office about the 35Ricbards to Collier, FO 371/17265 N1802/l6lO/38, 21 March 1933. 35Ibid. 86 activities of the cartel, Richards claimed that he had warned the German companies that the number of participants was too large and that leaks were ever more likely. The Soviets, according to Richards, knew that all the important electrical companies that operated in the Soviet Union pooled information in the price arrangements committee, but it appears he had only a vague idea of exactly how much the Soviets knew about the full extent of the committee's activities.37 That Soviet intelligence did take an interest in the deliberations of these companies became evident during Monkhouse's pre-trial interrogation when he was shown "minutes" from a 1932 meeting where Richards reported on conditions in the Soviet Union.38 It now seems clear that the Soviet claim at the time, that companies associated with such cartels operated as part of the economic intelligence services of their respective countries, had some foundation, at least in the British case. By 1931 the British Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) had formed an Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC)39 which, under 37Foreign Office minute by Collier, F0 371/17265 N1827/l610/38, 17 March 1933. 38Foreign Office Minute by Collier, FO 371/17265 N1827/1610/38, 17 March 1933; Monkhouse to Richards, FO 371/17265 N1719/1610/38, 14 March 1933; J. Haslam, The Soviet thoh end rhe Strpggle for Collective Security in Eprope, 1233:12;_, (London: MacMillan Press, 1984), pp. 17-18. 39The records for the IIC remain effectively closed in the files of CAB 48. Jonathan Haslam and Weslie Wark have attempted to use what is available but have found it unrevealing. See J. Haslam, The Sevier ghion end the prruggle 87 the directorship of Major Desmond Morton, recruited British businessmen to collect economic intelligence particularly in countries, such as the Soviet Union, where British military attaches were absent. Morton, on the instructions of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, regularly passed his information on to his close friend and neighbor Winston Churchill.40 The head of the IIC also had the strong backing from the Secretary of the CID and Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey.41 Thus, despite the fact that the IIC did not get the serious attention of a cabinet minister until Sir Philip Cuncliffe- Lister became the Secretary of State for Air in 1935,42 the economic intelligence it collected found its way into both for Qollective Security in Europe, l933-1939, (London: MacMillan Press, 1934), p. 242, n. 54: W. Wark, "British Military and Economic Intelligence: Assessments of Nazi Germany before the Second World War," in C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Governmenrs and Threlligence Qommunities in the Tyentierh Century, (London: MacMillan Press, 1984), p. 264, n. 71. 4°It would be wrong to think that Morton's only role during Churchill's years "in the wilderness" was that of a purveyor of intelligence on Nazi Germany. Churchill also requested Morton's well-informed views on matters pertaining to British agents operating in the Soviet Union. See Churchill to Morton, 31 October 1930, Churchill papers 2/169, edited by M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. y Companion Barr 2 pecuments: The Wilderness Tears, l229-l233, (London: Heinemann, 1981), p. 216 and n. 1. 41Morton conveyed this information to Hankey's biographer, Steven Roskill. See Roskill's, Menkey; Men or e s V I 3 - , (London: Collins, 1974), p. 22 and n.6: R.W. Thompson, threhill_eng_Merren, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), pp. 20-21, 148. 42C. Andrew, c Se : akin of h r'tish en it , (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp. 355-6. 88 the formal and informal circles of the government. The place of MVEC in this formal and informal intelligence network has also been clarified in recent years. Vickers, the British armament company of which Metro-Vickers was a subsidiary for much of the 19205, is known to have had some of its employees act as SIS station chiefs. According to Andrew and Trebilcock, during this same period Richards routinely asked MVEC engineers resident in the Soviet Union for "general information" on the Soviet economy which was made available to the parent Vickers company as well. This information ranged from the "state of the harvest to the progress of heavy industry" and was "almost certainly" passed on to the IIC and SIS.43 Wesley Wark has argued that information collected by the IIC became part of the British Chiefs of Staff assessment of the Red Army threat to India's North-Western frontier in the late 19205 and contributed to an appraisal of Soviet military strength in 1934 which put it beneath that of the first-rate European powers.44 Although most of this type of "intelligence" would hardly qualify as "secret" outside the Soviet context, Thornton's deposition makes it clear that the MVEC engineers, 43Ibid., pp. 355-357, and ch. 11, n. 74, 75. 44 W. Wark, "British Military and Economic Intelligence: Assessments of Nazi Germany before the Second World War," p. 94: W. Wark, "British Military and Economic Intelligence on Nazi Germany," p. 234, quoted in Andrew, Sec t Se ' e, pp. 356-357. 89 at least by 1932, took special care when passing along such information. Thornton, Monkhouse and Cushny developed a rather crude code to transmit their assessment of the stability of Soviet society. Such reports, Thornton claimed, were found necessary because of the long-term credits which the Soviets had with the firm. Situation "A" signified a general decline in the economic stability of the regime over the past year -- situation "B" signified that the OGPU was increasing its activities around MVEC operations.45 These codes were used in communications with Richards in London, a fact which belied his consistent and disingenuous denials that he had never received any information at all from engineers in the field concerning the general situation of the Soviet Union.46 A less verifiable connection of MVEC to the IIC can be found in Thorton's bewilderment in his 1933 deposition about why the OGPU waited two years before moving in on the MVEC engineers--an interval which coincides with the formation of the IIC.47 Since the OGPU files are not open it is impossible to trace the connection, but Thornton's testimony after his release raises the possibility that the Soviets, too, found the "coincidence" problematic. 45Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 46Foreign Office Memorandum by Sir L. Oliphant, 11.1.1121. It 409, 15 April 1933. 47Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933 cited in Chapter 2, p. 57, n. 78. 90 Of course the possibility of an MVEC role in the gathering of economic "intelligence" in the USSR was not given much credence in the public discussion in Britain at the time. Rather, it was widely held that it was the OGPU which was the misguided provocateur of the crisis. In the week following the arrests, in a development that encouraged Ovey to hope that the OGPU might yet be forced to abandon the case, Soviet censorship of foreign press correspondents softened enough to allow transmission of opinions of the type that the "'OGPU had made an outrageous blunder', deleting only the word outrageous."48 Such reports found their way into a number of editorials in British papers such as the Obse , the Eeonomist, and the Timee and comparisons were quickly drawn between the MVEC arrests and the trials of 1928, 1929, and 1930. The Observer offered dour warnings to the Soviet government that the British people had an "instinct for underlying principles and a way of hardening unpleasantly against those who commit injustice upon British subjects."49 Moreover, since the engineers were "unquestionably innocent," the actions of the OGPU and Litvinov's inability to reply to questions about the case only served to inflame diplomatic and commercial relations.50 48Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1817/1610/38, 19 March 1933. 49ppeeryer, 19 March 1933, p.16. 5°Ibid., p. 17. 91 This view contrasted with that offered in the more "classically liberal" Eepnpmier which cautioned the British Government to keep its head over this "stupid incident" and not be stampeded into foolish action by anti-Soviet public opinion. What was needed was more trade with the Soviet Union, not a return to the mood of 1927.51 At the same time, during the annual meeting of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, groups such as the Manchester Chamber of Commerce were promoting the rapid negotiation of a trade agreement with the Soviet Government. The current "state of delay and uncertainty is having an adverse effect on Anglo- Russian trade," the association argued.52 The first press articles which speculated on the actual nature of the arrests and the plausibility of the Soviet charges were provided by a young recruit to the Reuters news agency, Ian Fleming. Using a Riga dateline which was picked up by a number of major papers in Britain, Fleming connected the MVEC arrests with recent troubles at the Dneprostroi hydro-electric project and speculated that the engineers were going to be accused of actions which resulted in the corrosion of the blades on the turbines.53 Fleming's account Slgconomist, 18 March 1933, pp. 575-76. szuanehester_§uardian. 14 March 1933. p- 13. 53See the articles carried in the Qheeryer, 19 March 1933, "Moscow's British Prisoners" p. 17 and the Timee, 20 March 1933, "Indignation at the B.B.C. Broadcast" p. 12. The best biographical sketches of Fleming's first encounters with the Soviet Union are by H. Zeiger, n e ' ° e o 92 received widespread attention when the BBC aired a broadcast based on Fleming's article, without consulting MVEC first, and almost immediately the young man, who would spend much of his later life in the world of Cold War fiction, was embroiled in a debate over the merits of his first report on the MVEC affair. MVEC naturally decried the report of corrosion as nothing short of fantastic and argued that it would take millions of gallons of acid or sand to produce the condition that Soviet sources now alleged afflicted the turbines.54 Fleming was now called upon to account for his story and did so in a memorandum to his editor, Rickatson-Hatt. In order to assess more accurately the Soviet allegations Fleming had consulted Gerald Coke of Industrial Steels Ltd., which was part of the Vickers combine, and Coke, who had direct information from Anthony Vickers on the Soviet charges, told Fleming that while the Soviet charges were indeed "fantastic" they were not "mechanically impossible." According to Fleming's biographer, Kreiger, Fleming's memo makes it clear that the Foreign Office had seen a draft of the article before it went to press as well. Rickatson-Hatt thought it significant that the Soviet news agency Tass, game in wirh the Gold, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965). pp- 38-58 and 3. Pearson. W (New York: MacGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 46-64. 54See the MVEC response in "Indigantion at B.B.C. broadcast", Timee, 20 March 1933, p. 12. 93 which normally disavowed Reuters coverage from Riga, had not issued any statement on Fleming's theory and this lent "colour to the supposition that the Soviet authorities may actually be bringing these charges against the British engineers."55 A couple of days after the acrimony over the arrests had erupted in the British press the Foreign Office received a private letter from one Denis McQueen Potter that addressed itself to the technical possibility of the corrosion of the turbines. McQueen Potter was the son of a stainless steel expert of Brown, Bayley's Steel Works in Sheffield, and his father had worked as a consultant for MVEC on a number of stainless steel turbines. Imploring Collier to keep his information very secret, McQueen Potter provided the Foreign Office with a technical summary of the problems such turbines encountered when operated at anything other than a very precise temperature. In such adverse conditions the stainless steel broke down as if the blades were made from bad steel or had been abused by acid. He knew from his father that even in Manchester, where one could reasonably expect the levels of technical skill and maintenance to be superior to those in the Soviet Union, numerous difficulties had plagued the blades of the turbines when these turbines were first put to the test. The description he had gleened from Fleming's article immediately brought to mind the many 55Kreiger, Tan £leming,.., p. 42. 94 problems his father had encountered at the Trafford Park works.56 The officials at the Foreign Office apparently raised such possibilities with MVEC but there is no record of anything resulting from such conversations. What is clear is that there were good reasons for MVEC at least to consider the possibility of problems with their equipment that might have been the result of British design as well as Soviet negligence. In contrast to the confident public disavowals by MVEC officials, there did appear to be some plausible technical grounds for the Soviet allegations which were never given full consideration in the discussions of the day. Since the Foreign Office knew of such possibilities and chose not to condition its recommendations accordingly, one can state that both the British government and MVEC thought it helpful to their cause to keep some important material from surfacing at the time. In the Commons strong statements of support for the British engineers and outrage against the Soviet Union heightened the tension of the situation. In response to Baldwin's assurances of 15 March, that the Soviet government had no grounds for its police action, Sir N. Grattan Doyle was prompted to call for the immediate release of the 56Denis McQueen Potter to Collier, F0 371/17266 N2077/1610/38, 23 March 1933. 95 engineers.57 By 19 March the contours of Labour's critique of the Government could be seen in its parliamentary leader's public address in Birmingham. Arguing that "Russia is a sovereign State, and those who go there must live under the laws that govern that State," George Lansbury insisted that "scare headlines" and the statements of Baldwin and the Dominions Secretary, J.H. Thomas, "will not help in the solution of a very difficult situation."58 Instead of prejudging the issue, Lansbury cautioned, the Government was best advised to work to secure the "fairest trial possible."59 As awareness about the Metro-Vickers affair was growing in Britain the pace of diplomatic efforts in Moscow quickened as well. Finally finding Litvinov available for discussion on 16 March, Ovey initiated the first of a series of conversations with the Soviet Commissar which resulted in the complete erosion of their formerly cordial relationship and ended with Ovey's recall to London for "consultation." Throughout the Ovey-Litvinov talks, the British Ambassador repeatedly pressed his instructions from the Foreign Office to their extreme, at times anticipating such instructions and even overstepping them in spirit if not in fact. 57 ' eb 5: use f Commons t es, Vol. 275, col. 1945, 15 March 1933. [Hereinafter cited as fl-Q: er. 5 s.,....] Ssuansbssfsr_§uargian. 20 March 1933. p. 9. 59Ibid. 96 From the outset Ovey pressured Litvinov for Soviet cooperation in defusing the crisis. Over the Commissar's objections the British Ambassador reiterated his concern over the summary executions and recently increased powers of the OGPU. Ovey claimed that the issue was not "one of sovereign rights but rather of whether the British public and His Majesty's Government could continue to consider Russia a country in which it was possible for an Englishman to live and trade with, or with which His Majesty's Government could maintain relations."60 Ovey suggested that public opinion and pressure from the Commons might bring "irresistible forces" to bear on the Government to break off relations with 60Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1760/1610/38, 16 March 1933. The only diplomatic papers available on the Metro-Vickers affair are the records of the Ovey-Litvinov conversations for this two week period. The Soviet records are found in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del SSSR, pokumenty Vneshnei Roliriki S§SR, vol. 16 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1970), "Soobshchenie sovetskoi pechati o besedakh Narodnovo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR M. M. Litvinova c Poslom Velikobritanii b SSSR Oviem, 16-28 Marta," pp. 233-240. These short excerpts are virtually verbatim the records released by the British in the Qeenmenrs pf British Foreign Policy, l219-l939 2nd series, vol. VII published in 1958. It is possible that the documentary records of the same events were recorded in the same way, but is clear that the Soviet records added little to the public record outside the Soviet Union and may simply be translations of the record made public by the British twelve years earlier. There are hopeful signs that, in the interests of Gorbachev's de-Stalinization campaign, new Soviet materials may become available as a result of the work of the Commission of the Central Committee's Politiburo that has been investigating the abuses associated with the Shakhty Trial of 1928 (Moscow Mews, No. 1, January 1990, p. 7.) In the meantime, due to the absence of anything approaching a full documentary record of the Soviet deliberations, the British record remains the main source for an examination of these discussions. 97 the Soviet Union.61 For his part, Litvinov insisted that Britain was making "too much noise" and was speaking in "too strong terms" about an issue which was an internal Soviet matter. Such pressure, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs added, would only strengthen Soviet resolve. Litvinov argued that there was a public opinion in the Soviet Union as well, and that if foreigners received preferential treatment the effect on such opinion would be "deplorable." To this Ovey retorted that "people were simply more terrorized than ever before by the fact that not only Russians but foreigners were now being arrested." The situation in Ovey's view was "fraught with danger."62 The same day Litvinov struck back in the IA§§ release cited earlier, claiming that Ovey's arguments "reduced themselves to a proposal for the exemption from Soviet jurisdiction of all British subjects granting them immunity for any crime or delinquency....as soon as his [Ovey's] government expressed a conviction of their innocence."63 The statement focused on Ovey, rather than the British Government, and initiated a largely successful attempt on Litvinov's part to paint the British Ambassador as a somewhat 61Ibid. 62Ibid. 63The TASS statement of 16 March 1933 was included in Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1804/1610/38, 18 March 1933. 98 "hysterical" diplomat acting beyond his instructions. For the remainder of his mission to Moscow Ovey's recommendations were tempered and toned down for public consumption and Cabinet deliberation by the Foreign Office, and Litvinov did his best to take advantage of Ovey's position. Ovey's dogged pursuit of Litvinov was part of his overall strategy to engage the Soviet Commissar more fully in the extrication of the engineers. Reflecting on his first meeting with Litvinov, Ovey reported to Vansittart that: my attitude was that of one who spoke rather in sorrow than in anger. This method is best in my opinion for dealing with this irritable and in some respects good natured boor....The author of non-aggression pacts and curator of foreign relations, although today he was forced to play the game, in his innermost heart disapproves, I feel, the orders which he has been given. Ovey believed, and the Narkomindel accommodations for the prisoners confirmed his viewpoint, that the largely Jewish "bourgeois" Narkomindel might prove to be useful "allies" for the British. Though the situation was not dangerous enough for these "rats yet to make a move to safety," few in the Narkomindel agreed with Stalin's recent course. Events over the next several days would add substance to the notion that Litvinov was in a position to soften the blows being dealt to Anglo-Soviet relations. Along with these reflections on the Soviet political 64Ovey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 N1778/16lO/38, 17 March 1933 . 99 scene, Ovey included a draft of a formula which he thought might provide a means to end the affair without a trial or further jeopardy to Anglo-Soviet relations. In rather high- handed language, which reflected his confidence that the Soviets might yet yield to pressure, Ovey's formula required that the prisoners be released immediately "in view of the fact that insufficient evidence has been found," and that, if such action were forthcoming on the part of the Soviets, His Majesty's Government would consider the incident closed. Any recurrence of a "similar incident," however, would be interpreted by Britain as a sign that the Soviet Government no longer attached any importance to continued friendly relations between the two countries.65 This last clause of} formula virtually assured that the Soviet authorities would reject it as a basis for dismissing the case--accepting it would mean any subsequent arrests of British subjects in the Soviet Union could be attacked along the lines that might be set by such a Metro-Vickers' precedent. Ovey's added a note to his formula requesting that no public reference should be made to the Soviet's intention to hold a trial because such publicity would make it very difficult for it to step down. This went some way to modify the features of "diktat" implied by his recommendations, but when the Soviets were presented with the formula it was dismissed in an all too predictable manner . 651bid. 100 Vansittart responded the same day to Ovey's formula, and his comments suggest that he was less optimistic than the British Ambassador in Moscow that the affair could be defused without a trial. The Permanent Under-Secretary authorized Ovey to present an amended formula to the Soviets in an effort to give them "one last chance" to close the incident. He cautioned that any mention of a Soviet apology in the British formula would make Britain's primary objective, the release of the prisoners, more difficult. He also emphasized to Ovey that, whenever possible, the Ambassador should stress the damage already done to Anglo-Soviet relations irrespective of the resolution of the affair now. It was here that Vansittart's pessimism66 was revealed most clearly since this last tactic offered little "reward" to the Soviets if they did release the prisoners. He also stressed that if the Soviets did not release the prisoners, then pressure should be applied to gain genuine legal assistance for them and, failing that, it had to be demonstrable that all possible efforts had been made to that end.67 Armed with Vansittart's authorization Ovey set about redrafting his formula, which he presented to Rubinin during 66Vansittart's recollection of his divergence with Ovey is mentioned in his memoir, The Mist Rreeession, (London, Hutchinson Press, 1958), p. 461, but understates Ovey's frustration with the "half-measures" recommended by the Foreign Office and adopted by the Cabinet. 67Vansittart to Ovey, F0 371/17265 Nl780/16lO/38, 17 March 1933. lOl breakfast on 18 March. Ovey stretched Vansittart's mandate when he included a clause requiring a Soviet expression of "sincere regret" to His Majesty's Government and the final version of the amended formula retained the provision that any further arrests of British subjects "on grounds proved by subsequent inquiry to be insufficient" would be interpreted by the British as a sign that the Soviet Union had an inadequate commitment to continued good relations. Since Rubinin was not authorized to respond to Ovey's formula, Ovey had to wait until he could meet with Litvinov to get an official reply.68 The tone and contents of the Ovey formula proved a concern to the Foreign Office as well as the Narkomindel. Sir Lancelot Oliphant, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, telephoned Ovey 18 March, as soon as he received a copy of the amended formula, and criticized the Ambassador for ignoring the Foreign Office warning against requiring a Soviet apology. While Oliphant's action is understandable, the means he chose might well have compromised Ovey's position in the Soviet eyes. It is very likely that such conversations were being monitored by Soviet authorities. Later on in the crisis the British took the precaution to speak in prearranged codes to guard against 68Ovey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 Nl798/1610/38, 18 March 1933. 102 such intercepts.69 Oliphant also contacted Vansittart about Ovey's personal diplomatic strategy and received the dejected reply that in any case, the "Russians appear to be in no mood for a formula."70 The next Ovey-Litvinov meeting took place on 19 March, despite Ovey's attempts to see the Commissar earlier. Ovey was surprised by the mild manner that Litvinov exhibited when faced with the latest version of the "formula." After listening carefully to Ovey, Litvinov took up his own claim that he had already done much to ease the situation, but that these efforts had been sabotaged by Baldwin's statement in the House, and by the language used by Vansittart and Ovey himself. On the issue of the prisoners' release, Litvinov replied that he could not be hopeful about such an occurrence. The case had just been passed to the Prosecutor's Department of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and this meant that the OGPU investigations were now complete. It was now up to the Prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinskii, to decide whether there was sufficient evidence for a trial; if there was not "sufficient evidence," then the release of the prisoners would become a 690vey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 Nl924/1610/38, 21 March 1933 includes the observation "You will see from my telegram No. 89 how, M. Litvinov, who was probably already aware of your views from my telephonic conversation with Sir L. Oliphant..." 70Sir Lancelot Oliphant to Ovey; Oliphant to Vansittart; Vansittart to Oliphant, FO 371/17265 N1798/1610/38, 18 March 1933. 103 possibility. Litvinov told Ovey that he was "totally unable to exercise influence on this incorruptible official." He was able to inform the British Ambassador that on Litvinov's own initiative arrangements had been made for an Embassy visit to the prisoners for that evening. He also asked Ovey to enquire about the possibility of MVEC posting bail for the prisoners. Such an arrangement would secure their release for the moment at least.71 Ovey interpreted the tone and substance of this exchange of views with Litvinov in the most optimistic terms. The arrangements Litvinov had made for another Embassy visit, the unprecedented possibility of posting bail for prisoners in a Soviet jail, the easing of press censorship on the arrests, and the fact that the OGPU had turned the proceedings over to the Public Prosecutor--who could now dismiss the case--added up, in Ovey's mind, to a window of opportunity for a successful end to the conflict. His recommendation to Vansittart was that "only a delicate but emphatic push" was now required to gain the immediate release of the engineers and that this push be given in London to the Soviet Ambassador, perhaps in the form of a hint, almost an "indiscretion voulue" of what was certainly coming to them should the prosecutor's "conscience" be considered as more important than the maintenance of 71Ovey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 N1816/1610/38, 19 March 1933. 104 relations.72 Not content to let matters rest with the Foreign Office without the benefit of his additional input, Ovey telegraphed a more detailed outline of what he considered an "emphatic push" later the same day. Prefacing his three- point plan with the observation that "any breach of relations to be followed perhaps in a few years by a second resumption would be undesirable and even undignified," Ovey insisted that continued relations with the Soviet Union had diminishing value unless a "radical change supervenes." His three recommendations included a warning to Maisky that unless the prisoners were released immediately, a trade embargo would begin after April 17,73 Soviet trade representatives would be asked to return home and no trade deal would thereafter be entertained. If, after a short interval, such a warning went unheeded by the Soviets, then Ovey argued that both he and the Soviet Ambassador should be asked to return to their respective countries. Finally, if ‘the above demonstrations of British will did not convince the Soviets to step down and they proceeded to hold a trial and find any British subject guilty, then all relations should be severed at once. Such a procedure, in Ovey's view, got ‘ 720vey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1817/1610/38, 19 March 1933 . 73The date the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement would formally expire. 105 progressively stronger and provided the Soviet Government with two separate occasions to yield before the final act of rupture.74 The key was to step up the measures being applied and press for full satisfaction, for the enemy are in full retreat. They have got to yield somewhere. The sooner the better. If we do not follow up the battle of Marne we may still drift into the trench warfare of long and humiliating inactivity.75 Ovey's proposal was not well received at the Foreign Office. Vansittart minuted that "Sir E. Ovey is going too far too fast" with the suggestion of his recall or diplomatic rupture. The Soviets could still retreat at this late date and it was still possible that the prisoners might be tried and acquitted. Anthony Eden, the Parliamentary Under- Secretary of State, agreed with Vansittart on the inadvisability of considering a threat to diplomatic relations and minuted that Ovey's remarks concerning the threat to Soviet trade were more valuable at this stage since it was trade that "the Soviets fear to lose."76 The notion that the Soviets were vulnerable to trade sanctions, despite its currency among British officials, was vastly overstated. While the foreign trade figures for the 74Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 Nl850/1610/38, 19 March 1933 . 750vey added these comments "after night's reflections." (Ovey to Vansittart, F0 371/17265 N1844/1610/38, 20 March 1933. 75Ibid. 106 Soviet Union confirm the view that Soviet purchases abroad were declining rapidly as the Second Five-Year Plan got underway, it was not the pressures on Soviet cash reserves that produced the trend. Rather, many sectors of Soviet heavy industry were now able to meet the needs of the centralized command economy which thereby diminished the need for foreign imports. It was this capacity that would produce a favorable Soviet trade balance for the first time since 1929.77 The First Five-Year Plan had set out to develop such a capability and, at terrific human costs, the fulfillment of much of the Plan had provided a substantial portion of the infrastructure necessary for modern industry. While Britain was not the only nation to assume that the Soviet industrial market was theirs to be exploited--many Americans also clung to the same erroneous conception--it is ironic that the weapon they hoped to wield in the MVEC crisis would miss its mark. Undoubtedly Ovey's calculations were based on the evidence of the 1931 and 1932, years which featured a declining growth rate in industry and an absolute decline in agriculture production.78 While Ovey could not have predicted future developments, these years turned out to 77See Appendix B, "Soviet Foreign Trade, 1913-1940", particularly the years 1930-1937, which demonstrate this trend. 78See Appendix E, "Soviet Gross Production". Michael Dohan has examined the impact of the world trade and credit situation on the First Five-Year Plan in "The Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky, 1927/28-1934," Slavic Review 34, 4(December 1976): 603-635. 107 be exceptionally bad and it is likely, as Owen suggests, that on this count the Soviets had more accurate information about the current state of their economy than did foreign analysts. Indeed the first news the Foreign Office received on Anglo- Soviet trade in the first quarter of 1933 came from Soviet press releases at the end of April.79 In this instance though British policy may have been a thoughtfully considered one, it nonetheless was based on an illusion. The Metro-Vickers' affair was thrust back into the public arena in Britain by Eden's address to the Commons on 20 March. With Ovey's recent dispatches in mind and a number of parliamentary questions to be answered, Eden provoked a heated debate in the House over concerns about the Soviet legal process with his announcement that British legal counsel could not represent the arrested engineers in a Soviet trial. Lansbury waded into the discussion but was shouted down and interrupted by Churchill, among others, when the senior statesman for Labour reminded fellow parliamentarians that Soviet legal counsel was not allowed in British courts either. Eden made sure to keep his responses as formulaic and general as possible. He recounted the general direction of Ovey's diplomacy in Moscow without making any specific reference to the possible levers that Ovey proposed. Most importantly, Eden made no reference to 79Owen, "The Metro-Vickers' Crisis....," p. 98; Strang to Simon, Q.R.F,R., #440, 22 April 1933; Strang to Simon, 2.8.2.2., #470, 30 April 1933. 108 any provisions for a trade embargo at this time. It was publicly admitted, however, that trade negotiations had been suspended.80 Ovey was relatively pleased with the way Eden's statement was drafted. The tone of Eden's explanations and Vansittart's permission to explain to Litvinov the British motive for not going public with the threat of an embargo retained the latitude for secret diplomacy that Ovey hoped would resolve the affair. On this basis Ovey instructed Strang, who was preparing for a meeting with Krestinskii, that the Commons' speech had "expressly omitted" such a reference in order that the Soviets might now have the chance to release the prisoners without appearing to bow to British pressure.81 Beyond this, however, Ovey found the entire situation "extremely disquieting" and was keen to underscore his view that the "half measures" to date had not achieved the end of securing the release of the prisoners. He felt unable to approach Litvinov again unless he was authorized to threaten to break off relations if the British were not given full satisfaction. If His Majesty's Government were forced to suffer the humiliation "of permitting Soviets to hold a trial of any kind whatever," his own position would be untenable 80Hi9i_pepr_§_er, 276, col. 17-20, 20 March 1933. 81Ovey to Vansittart, FO 371/17255 N 1924/1610/38, 21 March 1933. 109 and the Soviets would have gained an important victory.82 Since Ovey was aware that Vansittart was preparing a memo for an important Cabinet meeting on the subject of the MVEC affair, his very strong language was undoubtedly meant to energize the proceeding in London. Rather despondently he concluded his remarks by proposing his immediate recall if the Cabinet came to any other decisions than those which he had recommended.83 As Strang wrote in his memoir, Ovey's course "did not recommend itself to London."34 Vansittart's memo for the Cabinet meeting of 22 March outlined the political objections to Ovey's plan to threaten a breach of relations. Thus far, Vansittart counselled, His Majesty' Government had gained "considerable credit" for the firm and balanced character of its diplomacy. Vansittart also thought it possible that, even if a trial were held, the engineers might yet be released due to the economic pressure that would be applied against the Soviet state via an embargo. Staying with the current course was Vansittart's recommendation when the Cabinet met to discuss its options.85 82Ovey to Vansittart, FO 371/17265 N1924/l6lO/38, 21 March 1933. 831bid. 84Strang. H2m5_and_Abread. p- 84- 85Vansittart, Memo to Cabinet, CAB 23/75, 20(33)11, C.P. 78(33), 22 March 1933; Vansittart to Ovey, F0 371/17265 N1951/1610/38, 21 March 1933. 110 On 22 March Vansittart gave his views to the Cabinet which promoted a graduated response to a range of possible Soviet actions. In the "unlikely event" of the engineers being executed, Vansittart recommended breaking off all relations and bringing Ovey home. In the "still more unlikely event" of the prisoners being released before a trial, the British should "drive an even harder commercial bargain than we should otherwise have attempted." The most "probable event" was, in the Permanent Under-Secretary's opinion, that a trial would be held, that an adverse verdict would be pronounced, and that the release or light sentencing of some or all of the engineers would ensue. In such an instance, and indeed this was basically the scenario which would occur in April, Vansittart submitted that the British should refuse altogether to resume commercial negotiations.86 Vansittart was also concerned about the state of British public opinion. A Reuters's telephone message to Moscow intercepted by the British authorities gave the impression that interest in the current Anglo—Soviet conflict was waning in some quarters. Simon had "corrected" the impression by intervening with Sir R. Jones of Reuters and asked that the news from Moscow continue to be reported in the British press 86CAB 23/75, 20(33)ll, C.P. 78(33), 22 March 1933. 111 in fu11.37 In the Cabinet discussion which followed Simon took the view that any threat to diplomatic relations would be ineffective in the present instance and would set an awkward precedent for relations with other nations "where it was less applicable." On the issue of trade measures, however, it was decided that an embargo bill should be drafted and a committee comprised of MacDonald, Baldwin, and Simon were charged with that task. The President of the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, pointed out that he had already told companies to be slow in fulfilling their contracts with Soviet Russia. This economic irritant would now be increased with a decision to draft an imports prohibition bill.88 While the Cabinet deliberated on stepping up British pressure, Foreign Office legal advisers were examining the legal ramifications of imposing a trade embargo or severing diplomatic relations before the Soviet legal process had run its course. The Second Legal Adviser, William Bennett, cautioned that in terms of international law the Soviets had the right to present whatever evidence they had and only then could a British trade or diplomatic reprisal be justified. He also warned that premature action by Britain would set a bad precedent for reciprocal action when Soviet 87Ibid., and Q.B.R.P. # 266, Simon to Ovey. 22 March 1933, note 4. 88CA8 23/75, 21(33)1, 22 March 1933. 112 citizens were arrested in the United Kingdom by British authorities.89 The Third Legal Adviser, Gerald Fitzmaurice, concurred with Bennett's view of the legal situation. He admitted that while there might be good tactical reasons for threatening the Soviet government privately as to what would happen, that to, threaten that these things will happen (e.g., an embargo on Soviet goods or the rupture of diplomatic relations) if the prisoners are brought trial at all, and failing their immediate and unconditional release before the trial, will undoubtedly put us in the wrong technically.90 Fitzmaurice pointed out that questions were already being asked as to why similar action was not taken against Germany and, "though such cases may not be parallel, it is awkward."91 As events would evolve, the British Government managed to avoid public transgression of these tenets of international law, although the private pressure they applied violated the spirit, by arranging for an embargo to take effect from April 18--after the Soviet trial was held. Events in Moscow were lending more substance to the notion that the Narkomindel was doing its best to minimize the damage to Anglo-Soviet relations. After a second 89Foreign Office Minute by William Bennett (Second Legal Adviser), F0 371/17266, N2082/l6lO/38, 22 March 1933. 9°Fitzmaurice to Collier, F0 371/17266, 23 March 1933. 911bid. 113 consecutive postponement of a foreign policy communique there had come the announcement that Gregory Sokolnikov, the former Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, had been appointed to the Collegium of the Narkomindel. Ovey interpreted the move as another part of the Soviet strategy to impress upon circles in Britain who knew the former ambassador that someone who understood the British perspective was in a position of importance in the foreign policy establishment. In addition to these signals, there had been a "feeler" sent through the International News Services's paily Express correspondent in Moscow which raised the possibility of bail for the MVEC engineers if the British company were to approach the Public Prosecutor with an official request.92 Ovey believed that, taken together, the most recent Soviet moves were "signs of retreat." He strongly advised against any idea of pursuing the prospect of bail since in a country where no individual can leave without permission, the idea was a "farce." If the Soviets caught wind of any real interest in posting bail either by His Majesty's Government, MVEC itself, or through stories in the Press, they would be that much harder to deal with in Ovey's view.93 Though Ovey had serious reservations about discussing bail, MVEC officials in London felt obliged to explore the 920vey to Simon, F0 371/17265 N1976/l610/38, 22 March 1933. 930vey to Simon, F0 371/17265 Nl998/l610/38, 23 March 1933. 114 possibility. Richards met with Simon at the Foreign Office and reviewed Vyshinskii's recent offer94 of bail for Thornton at 25,000 rubles and bail for Cushny and Gregory at 15,000 rubles each.95 With Monkhouse and Nordwall already at liberty in Moscow, this would leave only the hapless William MacDonald and MVEC's Soviet employees in the Liubianka prison. Richards was anxious to avoid sanctioning the arrests and possible trial of MVEC employees and was told by the legal counsel at the Foreign Office that posting bail would not imply approval of Soviet proceedings. The Company also had reservations about posting bail for only some of the prisoners and wanted to get Ovey's opinion on the merits of offering bail for both British and Soviet employees of MVEC. Ovey had an opportunity to gauge the intent of Vyshinskii's offer when he visited the MVEC prisoners in the evening of 23 March and found the Public Prosecutor present at the Liubianka prison. It became apparent to Ovey that the offer of bail was by no means standard procedure in the Soviet Union--indeed Vyshinskii could not provide any specific details about previous offers of bail at all. The prisoners had not yet been advised of the specific charges 94This offer was made through Maisky to MVEC Director, Sir Felix Pole. Simon to Ovey, FO 371/17265 Nl998/1610/38, 23 March 1933. 95According to Strang in Home and hhroad, p. 85, these sums worked out to L2,650 and L1,590 at the official rate of exchange. 115 against them, but Vyshinskii explained to Ovey that the Soviet investigation would be complete within a day or two. The overall impression was that the offer was being made in this instance to "show that Soviet law differed in no essential respect from Western European law."96 On the basis of this conversation, Ovey telephoned Simon using a prearranged code, and reaffirmed his previous conviction that while posting bail did not imply approval of the arrests, suchaan act by MVEC would embolden the Soviet authorities. His opinion was forwarded to MVEC and it was at this point that the Company authorized Monkhouse to offer bail for all employees in prison, both British and Russian, on the understanding that this did not imply acceptance of the Soviet police action.97 Whatever hopes the British still entertained that the crisis might be defused without an public test of strength were dashed by a communique from Vyshinskii published in Teyeeriie the same day. Vyshinskii announced that a trial would be held early in April in an open session of the Supreme Court and the British accused, "as in the majority of other countries," would have to use defense counsel from the national legal bar. The MVEC employees and certain other 96Ovey to Simon, F0 371/17266 N2065/l6lO/38, 24 March 1933. 97Richards to Collier, F0 371/17266 N2054/l610/38, 24 March 1933 and enclosed telegram #32, Vansittart to Ovey, 24 March 1933. 116 Russian engineers would be charged under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9, and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. for the crimes of gathering secret information of State and Military importance, committing acts of diversion and wrecking, and offering or accepting bribes for the above crimes.98 Vyshinskii challenged any rumors of "third degree" methods and insisted that only those enemies who were trying adversely to affect the Soviet Union's relations with other countries could maintain such "absurd" opinions. The Public Prosecutor's comments concerning the British prisoners still held in Soviet custody revealed their unique status as foreigners: With regard to the further fate of the accused and in particular of the British engineers in the present case, it is already clear from course of investigation that possibility of a partial change of measures of prevention is not excluded. Possibility of liberation from custody on hail of three engineers whose examination is on the point of completion is not excluded.99 Despite this serious setback Ovey's view from Moscow remained that the Soviet authorities might yet be turned from their apparent course by British pressure. Though officials in the Narkomindel were informing the diplomatic community 98Ibid.; Verbatim Report of Supreme Court of the USSR, a o ... e ' W ckin ' ' the.§existlunien. pp- 72-73. 99szsstiia. 24 March 1933; Ovey to Simon, Fo 371/17266 N2053/1610/38, 24 March 1933. 117 that an embargo might cause some economic hardship they were certain the Soviet Union would gain prestige by "making haughty English who have humiliated us in the past swallow this trial." Such Soviet conviction had been encouraged, the British Ambassador pointed out, by the absence of an unequivocal public warning from His Majesty's Government and was furthered strengthened when MVEC showed interest in the idea of bail. Ovey now recommended an immediate declaration in the Commons which would threaten both an embargo and intimate a subsequent rupture of relations if the whole affair was not brought to a swift end.100 Ovey's insistence on a clear and strongly worded response to the Soviet announcement that there would be trial, particularly his repetition of his long-held view that the threat to diplomatic relations should become part of the British arsenal, was important because it implied that the more cautious approach favored by Vansittart and Simon was a misguided failure. While it is not clear what meaningful distinction Ovey thought existed in international law between an avowed respect for sovereign rights and a vehement refusal to endorse the exercise of those rights in light of Vyshinskii's announcement, Ovey once again insisted that the hard line was the only line. It fell to Vansittart to draft a memorandum for the Cabinet on the recent turn of events and Ovey's 1°°ovey to Simon, F0 371/17266 N2066/1610/38, 24 March 1933. 118 interpretation of the new situation. The Permanent Undersecretary noted Ovey's recommendation that a direct threat to commercial and diplomatic relations should now be made by Britain in a last attempt to prevent the trial altogether, but he once again argued that such a policy would be ill-advised at this juncture. Though an acquittal in a Soviet court would be "unprecedented", the proper course was to proceed without further delay to state publicly our intention to take action against Soviet imports....It seems undesirable to declare in Parliament that we will in fact take action in this if the prisoners are condemned, as this might be held by the Opposition to prejudge the question whether such evidence as may be produced at the trial may justify condemnation, and would make it more difficult for the Soviet Government to order an acquittal without undue loss of face. Vansittart's recommendations had the political advantage that, by avoiding a public statement which would connect the trade embargo to the outcome of the trial, the British Government could try to minimize the criticism voiced in certain sectors of the press and from Opposition politicians that they were meddling in the judicial process of a foreign power. At the same time it could be argued that resolute action had been taken. Vansittart still strongly objected to any threat to diplomatic relations--the most extreme of 1°1Memorandum by Vansittart, F0 371/17266 N2106/1810/38, 24 March 1933 which was discussed in Cabinet on 29 March 1933, CA823/75, 22(33)2. 119 Ovey's recommendations--but wanted to authorize Ovey to inform his hosts that any conviction whatsoever would result in the embargo taking place after 17 April.102 While British officials deliberated their options, the Soviet press, having announced that a trial would definitely be held, attacked the British position vigorously. levesriia carried articles that ridiculed the "arrogance" of the British imperialists who sought to treat the Soviet Union as a colonial possession by dismissing Soviet sovereign rights. There were also objections raised against the posture of MVEC regarding the posting of bail: The English firm finds it necessary to state that if they go bail, that in no way implies approval of a trial. "Who asked for the approval" the Izvestiya enquires, "and how is this necessary to a Soviet court?"103 Consistent with the belligerency of the Soviet press was the confidence exhibited by the Narkomindel's Press Department. Ovey reported that these Soviet officials were convinced that the British were now interested only in a fair trial and proper treatment of the prisoners. In a thinly disguised critique of the lack of support he had hitherto received from His Majesty's Government, Ovey speculated that the absence of a Commons declaration had further encouraged Soviet resolve but he advised that it was still possible 1ozIbid. 1°3lzve§tiie 26 March 1933; Ovey to Simon, F0 371/17266 N2102/1610/38, 26 March 1933. 120 "through a skilfully worded, yet unequivocal form of declaration, accompanied by exact definition of what alone will satisfy us, to dictate to Soviet government where and how this final surrender shall take place."104 Not only were Ovey's terms in this "diktat" extremely harsh and amazingly optimistic here, but his continued inability or unwillingness to concede that the Soviets had a "right" to hold a trial, as he had been informed previously by both British and Soviet officials, was striking indeed. It marked yet another instance in which recommendations emanating from the British Ambassador in Moscow differed markedly from policy as it was understood by those in London. On 28 March Ovey met with Litvinov. Though they did not realize it at the time, this was to be Ovey's final representation to the Soviet Government. The details of their final encounter reflect the substantial decline their relationship had undergone as a result of the MVEC affair. Ovey was armed with the strongest authorization he was to receive from London. The day before, Vansittart had told him that he was to inform Litvinov that embargo powers would be in place in time for the trial unless Ovey supplied "good news" in the meantime.105 Litvinov, equipped with his usual gruffness, told Ovey that the Public Prosecutor's evidence on 1°40vey to Simon, F0 371/17266 N2101/1610/38, 26 March 1933. 1°5Vansittart to Ovey, F0 371/17266 N210l/l6lO/38, 27 March 1933. 121 the engineers was thought to be "sufficient" to hold a trial. When confronted with Ovey's communication concerning a British embargo, Litvinov retorted, "you cannot employ such methods with U.S.S.R. as with Mexico." This last remark, which was reported in the Soviet press the same day, was a direct personal insult to Ovey who had been posted to Mexico prior to his tenure in Moscow. It brought the stormy session to an abrupt halt and convinced both Ovey and his superiors in London that his personal involvement in the MVEC affair should come to an end.106 The following day, Ovey was instructed to return to London "for consultation" and the Embassy was left under the capable direction of the Charge d' Affaires, William Strang.107 Litvinov's confrontational rebuttal of Ovey's communication and the public remonstrances against British policy to date in the MVEC case, strongly suggest that the Soviet authorities, while they had not initiated the arrest of the British engineers with a coordinated policy, had now arrived at one. The Cabinet met on 29 March, and adopted, without amendment, Vansittart's more moderate recommendations that focused on the trade embargo rather than diplomatic relations. In general it was thought that a trade embargo could not now prevent a trial, but that the extent of the 105ovey to Simon, F0 371/17266 N2140/l610/38, 28 March 1933. 1°7Simon to Ovey, F0 371/17266 N2204/1610/38, 29 March 1933. 122 enforcement of the powers to restrict Soviet exports to Britain might be directly connected to the treatment of the prisoners and the result of the trial. Runciman submitted a draft of a possible embargo bill and an accompanying commentary on the possible effects that such a bill might have on Britain and the Soviet Union.108 He highlighted the costs to consumers that would be incurred by restricting the entry of cheap Russian goods into Britain. The most heavily hit sectors would be those involved in the building industry, textiles. Such restrictions would also increase the costs of consumer goods such as furs and fish. Additional damage would be done to British creditors who had outstanding accounts with the Soviet Union. According to Runciman, these totalled, along with British Government credits, in the order of fifteen million pounds. The private creditors might have to be compensated once the bill was introduced and, without credits, it was likely that Soviet trade would go elsewhere. A British embargo also the raised the danger of Soviet retaliation. Though Soviet purchases in Britain were relatively small, certain industries, most notably the machine industries sector of which MVEC was a part, had found the growth in the Soviet market an important exception to the otherwise depressed condition of world trade. Runciman also warned that the Soviets might deliberately try to undercut 108Draft Russian Goods (Import Prohibition) Bill, C.P. 85(33) and C.P. 86(33) by Runciman were discussed by Cabinet on 29 March 1933, CAB 23/75, 22(33)2. 123 Britain in eastern European markets as an act of retaliation. The President of the Board of Trade tried to cast a promising light on the British strategy by reminding the Cabinet that it was unlikely that Soviet gold reserves could compensate, over the longer term, for the lack of the foreign exchange created by a British boycott. Runciman did raise the issue that Soviet imports were likely to decline over the next years in any case, but the discussion contained in the Cabinet conclusions did not resolve or even address the apparent contradiction that, if the Soviets needed fewer imports, they needed fewer exports markets to pay for the imports as well. With these reservations it was decided to proceed with the drafting of the Russian Goods (Import Prohibition) Bill.109 On April 3 the National Government revealed its intention to seek embargo powers against Soviet trade in the Commons.110 The urgency of the measure, MacDonald insisted, required that the Russian Import Prohibitions Bill should receive speedy passage within the next two days. Undoubtedly opposition Liberal and Labour opinion would have been resistant to such a rapid transaction on this subject in any case, but the vague justifications and unclear intent of the embargo powers quickly inflamed opposition opinion. Lansbury challenged the Government to justify why the 1°9Ibia. llofllg, neb, e 5., col. 1431-1437. 124 cooperation of the House should be forthcoming when it had not been apprised of all the facts of the case. Since neither the details of the proposed legislation nor the details of the correspondence and conversations that had taken place between Ovey and the Government were yet public, Lansbury recommended that a White Paper be provided before any legislation was considered. MacDonald's response to this and similar objections was not very reassuring to those who feared a hidden agenda which would see a long term anti-Soviet slant to British policy developing out of the specific measure now proposed. The Prime Minister refused to clarify the exact intent of the embargo bill and sought to portray the forthcoming bill as a simple enabling act without describing what, in fact, it would finally "enable." He lamely told the House that since the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was to expire by 17 April something had to be done in any case about trade relations, but this line of argument was both misleading and unconvincing. Both Lansbury and the leading Liberal critic Sir Herbert Samuel pursued MacDonald throughout the question period and in the midst of the debate the frustrated MacDonald demanded that what he had "announced must be accepted by the House of Commons."111 Given the overwhelming majority enjoyed by the National Government this claim was undoubtedly true, but in the heated climate of the Commons, 1111bid., col. 1436. 125 pointing out such a truth was indeed unwise. Those members of the Commons who were already predisposed to resist, now became still more indignant and those who were inclined to an anti-Soviet posture had their die-hard hopes raised even further.112 In the debates which were to come over the next couple of days, the Government had to endure a protracted if futile assault from the opposition members in an increasingly combative Commons. It was perhaps to alleviate some of the concerns voiced in the question period of April 3 that by April 5, the day of the second reading of the import prohibition bill, the House was provided with a White paper113 containing selected diplomatic correspondence that passed between Moscow and London. In a lengthy summary of the contents of the White paper and its bearing on the swift passage of the Bill,114 Foreign Secretary Simon drew a portrait of a totalitarian regime engaged in a reign of terror which had wrongly, but characteristically, drawn a "great British company" into its web of proletarian justice and third degree methods. He claimed that there was no direct or immediate connection between the Bill and the proceedings in Moscow, but that by passing the Bill at this time the Soviet state might yet come 112Lammers, "The Engineers' Trial...," p. 262. 113Command Paper 4286. 114n.e. peb. e s., 276, cols. 1767-1890. 126 to understand the "real gravity of the situation."115 It fell to Sir Stafford Cripps to launch the opposition of the Labour minority. In his view the very tendentious picture of events that Simon's commentary outlined and the incomplete set of documents provided in the White paper--they covered the affair only up to March 16--disclosed "no adequate ground for the demand made by His Majesty's Government for the liberation of the employees of the Metropolitan-Vickers Company at Moscow without trial."116 Moreover, the arguments put forth by the British Government did not, in Cripps's opinion, establish a credible case for the imposition of a trade embargo. Having attacked the evidence upon which the Government claims were made, Cripps set about developing a critique of the legal basis for the proposed "intervention" into Soviet domestic politics. While acknowledging that in such instances the Foreign Office had every right to be informed by the Soviet authorities of the ongoing judicial process, he argued, as had the legal counsel at the Foreign Office previously117, that international precedent demanded that no objection could rightly be raised until the local courts had made a final decision. Cripps cited three instances from international law which he maintained upheld his view. These 115Ibid., col. 1783. 116Ibid., col. 1784. 117See the views of Bennett and Fitzmaurice outlined above. 127 examples ranged from an eighteenth century letter of the Duke of Newcastle to the King of Prussia, and a letter by the United States's Secretary of State, Henry Clay, which discussed similar problems in South America dated 1828, to a citation from the eminent British Justice Sir Robert Phillimore's Q9mmentariss.2n.lntsrnatienal_Lau.118 which stated: The State to which the foreigner belongs may interfere for his protection when he has received positive maltreatment, or when he has been denied ordinary justice in the foreign country....The State must be satisfied that its citizen has exhausted the means of legal redress afforded by the tribunals of the country in which he has been injured....It is only after those propositions have been irrefragably proved that the State of a foreigner can demand reparation. A key element in Cripps's analysis of this aspect of international law was his judgment that once Britain had recognized the Soviet regime as the government of the U.S.S.R. the precept of international law, as outlined above, was operative. Given this "truth", Cripps went on to contend that no real facts had arisen to suggest that the 118Published in 1889. Sir Robert Phillimore was a Justice of the High Court of the Admiralty and is not to be confused with his son, Sir Walter George Frank Phillimore, who was also specialist in international law and Lord Justice of Appeal from 1913 to 1916. The latter served as British legal counsel at the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles and edited the third edition of his father's Rhillimere_e 1 f to .01: n.’ 9 ‘1 A e- 9 "a ‘ - d t1- Teashinssl_2911_IY. (1917)- 1193.9. pen, 5 5,, 276, cols. 1786-1789. 128 British engineers were not going to receive justice as it was meted out in the Soviet Union and hence, no rightful objection could be raised until the Soviet courts had arrived at a conclusion. On the contrary, it seemed to Cripps that the British engineers were receiving exceptionally good treatment since five of the six were already out on bail.120 There was no shortage of Conservative members who wished to refute Cripps's dissertation on the Metro-Vickers' affair. Throughout his speech he had been interrupted by angry shouts and objections. When Major Hills embarked on his rebuttal he did so on the same grounds as Cripps had chosen to base his case--that of international law. Quoting from a work by the widely known Cambridge scholar, Francis Oppenheim, Hills stressed that "corrupt administration of the law against natives is no excuse for the same against aliens, and no Government can cloak itself with the judgement of corrupt judges."121 Hills also returned to the source of Cripps's authority on international law, Phillimore, and drawing on a passage subsequent to that quoted by Cripps, countered that, "a plain violation of the substance of natural justice, e.g., 12°Ibid., cols. 1790-1798. 121Ibid., col. 1802. Oppenheim held the Whelwell Chair of International Law at Cambridge prior to the Great War and was the author of Internetienal_Lar__A_Treatise published in two volumes in 1905 and 1906. He was a regular consultant to the Foreign Office during these years and part of the ”positivist" school of international law which held that such laws were derived from custom and the "quasi-legislation" of international convention. 129 refusing to hear the party or to allow him to call witnesses, would amount to the same thing as an absolute denial of justice."122 It was here that the principal root of disagreement, aside from whatever political opportunism existed in the debates, was revealed. Conservative opinion did not accept that international recognition of the Soviet Union carried with it a recognition of the legitimacy of its domestic order. For them, international "equality" and hence, international law, did not really apply to the Soviet case since the very nature of Soviet political life precluded justice as that term was normally underStood by members of the comity of nations. Ironically, the Soviets themselves repeatedly argued that they were opposed to "bourgeois justice" as practiced by other states, but of course for citizens of the proletarian state this was a merit rather than flaw. For those on the British Left, however, it was easy to see that the Soviet Union was one of a number of political "experiments" that were operating in the troubled years of the Depression, but it was clear to them that it was not the worst of these given the fascist menace in Italy and Germany. If the National Government applied different standards to the Soviet Union than it did to fascist powers, it did so, in the view of its Labour critics, for political rather than humanitarian reasons. 122Ibid. 130 In the long debates of April 5 and 6, variations on these themes came through in bitter challenges and rebuttals over the proposed Russian Import Prohibitions Bill. In the event, nothing could be done to stop its passage, although the heat of the debate may have tempered the Government's resolve such that it promised to use the Bill only in connection with the case of the engineers and agreed to limit its powers to three months. At that time it would once again be subject to parliamentary approval.123 The passage of the Bill set the stage for an Anglo-Soviet confrontation in the event of a trial being held and any adverse verdict being rendered. The powers included in the Bill enabled action against about 80% of Soviet imports for three months beginning on April 18.124 By delaying the enactment of the prohibitions until after the trial would be completed the National Government technically avoided transgressing international law by "intervening" before the Soviet judicial process had run its course, but there could be little doubt that in passing the legislation before the trial was begun the British Government hoped to influence the tenor of the show trial which would begin April 12. Lammers has suggested that it was likely the "National government's response would have been more restrained had the 123n,e. pep. e s., 276, cols. 1933-2032, 6 April 1933. 124CA8 23/75, 27(33)1, 12 April 1933, Russian Goods (Import Prohibition) Act, C.P. 101(33). 131 incident occurred in any other country, even one under Fascist rule," and that the "ultimate objection is not that the National government was "discriminating" against Soviet Russia, but that it did not sufficiently "discriminate" against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy."125 It would be easier to accept such a verdict as a whole if it were not for the evidence against the engineers outlined above, particularly the role MVEC played with the IIC. On the basis of current evidence it is hard to maintain the image of a stalwart National Government rising to the defense of innocent victims of a communist-totalitarian regime who were guilty of no real "crimes", but had the misfortune of laboring for a spiteful regime in a deeply paranoid society. In this instance at least the Soviets appeared to have something to be "paranoid" about and the arrest of the British engineers was not a completely bogus, politically inspired frame-up. That the Soviet authorities could, and did, deem it necessary to turn the public show trial, which resulted from the MVEC arrests, into a Stalinist "morality play" replete with dubious "confessions" and transparent political "lessons" for the consumption of Soviet citizens, had much to do with the role of the judiciary and the place of the Metro-Vickers' trial in the development of Soviet political culture in the 19305. 125Lammers, "The Engineers' Trial...," p. 263. Nab. Chapter 4 The Metro-Vickers' Show Trial "On the whole intelligent opinion here holds: that (1) the sentences are lighter than expected; (2) there was some foundation for the Bolshevist case; and (3) that we mis-handled the case from the beginning." ---Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Diary entry 19 April, 1933. "The dictatorship of the proletariat is authority unlimited by any statutes whatever. But the dictatorship of the proletariat, creating its own laws, makes use of them, demands that they be observed, and punishes breaches of them. Dictatorship of the proletariat does not signify anarchy and disorder but, on the contrary, strict order and firm authority which operates upon strict principles." ---Andrei Vyshinskii, Public Prosecutor of the USSR, in The Law of the Soviet State (1938), p. 48. "Wherever the law exists, crime can be found." ---Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago The trial which the British Government had strained first to discourage, and then, with the passage of embargo enabling powers, to influence, took place April 12-19 as a special session of the Supreme Court of the USSR in the House of Trade Unions1 in Moscow. As drama of the trial unfolded 1Before the Revolution this building was known as the Hall of Columns or the Moscow Nobles' Club. 132 133 under the able direction of Andrei Vyshinskii, the Public Prosecutor of the Russian Republic (RSFSR)2, two dimensions of the Metro-Vickers' affair became increasingly evident. At the level of international politics the trial, amply covered by foreign reporters as well as the Soviet press, was an opportunity for the machinery of the Soviet Supreme Court to demonstrate to the world the measured and just response foreign spies and saboteurs would receive in the workers' state. In the end, the sentences would be light by standards of the day and Soviet justice could be portrayed, in this instance at least, as "generous". Explanations for Soviet behavior in the trial varied, and the British Government was quick to assert that the sentences rendered by the Soviet court were conditioned by the stern pressure exerted by the British diplomatic barrage and the threat of economic sanctions. While it would be wrong to ignore the force of this argument, the analysis offered below maintains that there were other factors, factors which were firmly rooted in the politics of Stalin's Russia, that were at work as well. In the realm of Soviet domestic politics the trial was significant for two reasons. In the short term, by summoning up renewed threats from saboteurs and wreckers the trial resurrected images from the earlier Shakhty and Industrial 2Vyshinskii would gain all-Union status in June 1933 as the Deputy Procurator under Akulov and in 1935 would be promoted to the Procurator-General post himself. 134 Party trials and restated the need for continued vigilance against the remaining contaminants of the bourgeois order which still sought to undermine the achievements of the five- year plans. Unlike any of the trials which had come before or would follow in the Great Purges of 1936-1938, the key defendants in the Metro-Vickers trial were foreigners3 and thus the threat from foreign powers could be made much more directly. It was in this sense that the trial could be used by the Soviet leadership as a mechanism to deflect criticism over the recent hardships suffered by the populace away from the regime and onto British machinations. More important for the development of Soviet society over the longer term, the trial also marked a decisive moment in the debates over what constituted "socialist legality" that had been waged during the cultural revolution of the late 19205 and early 19305. On one side of this debate were those radical jurists such as Pashukanis, Stuchka, and the RSFSR Commissar of Justice, Krylenko,4 who advocated the 3To be sure there were three Germans arrested at the time of the Shakhty trial of 1928, and one of them stood trial alongside the fifty Soviet mining engineers charged in the case. The central thrust of that case however, was on the unreliable nature of "bourgeois specialists" generally in relation to the construction of socialism. See K. Bailes, Teehnelegy and Society finger Lenin end Etelin, pp. 82-84. 4The most extensive discussion of the these debates is provided by Eugene Huskey in Russian Leyyers and rhe §oviet t s an eve ment o the Sov' e 7- l239,. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1986. ) Important contributions are made by R. Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture," in Robert Tucker, ed. Sheliniem; W. (New York: w.w. Norton & 135 merits of "revolutionary justice." At the core of Krylenko's radical analysis of law was a nihilist conviction that the socialist transition to communism could not be facilitated by new legal forms, but rather by the displacement of the "law" in favor of criminal "policy".5 A major step towards the "simplification" of law occurred in 1927, when the criminal code was revised, largely under Krylenko's direction, to contain thirty-two articles instead of the previous four hundred articles. This proposal by the Commissariat of Justice was opposed by members of the legal Academy, both on the grounds that prosecutors had too much of an advantage over defense counsel and that the law was "simplified" to such an extent that arbitrariness in judicial proceedings would be the result. The extent of the revisions which were considered, but not passed, by the Council of People's Commissars in 1929 to the code submitted by the Company, 1977), pp. 155-179; R. Sharlet and P. Beirne in "In Search of Vyshinsky: The Paradox of Law and Terror," lnternational Journal of the Sociology of Law, 12, (1984): 153-177; E. Huskey, "Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order," Slavic Review, 46, 3/4(1987): 414- 428; P. Solomon, "Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-1941," figvier Stndies, 37, 3(1983): 305-329; P. Solomon, "Soviet Criminal Justice and the Great Terror," sievie Reyien, 46, 3/4(1987): 391-413. It is important to recognize that these "radicals" did not always agree on the pace or focus of change, but they were generally united in their opposition to retaining aspects of the legal structure that were supported by Vyshinskii, and smacked of the "bourgeoisie." See Huskey's discussion of this point in uss n La ers and the ov'e Stats. P- 172- 5Sharlet and Bierne, "In Search of Vyshinskii," pp. 162- 163. 136 Commissariat of Justice can be seen in the change in status for the defense counsel. The 1927 code had suggested that "the defense was to be admitted as a rule by the discretion of the court." The 1929 draft "allowed the court to exclude the advocate only when the accused was caught red-handed or when the case was not especially complex."6 These deliberations produced a stalemate between the Justice Commissariat and Communist Academy which produced yet another draft code two years later. The new draft code, which now had one-hundred and thirty-four articles, rejected the formal division between "extraordinary" and "normal" criminal procedure--an arrangement that had been previously promoted by Krylenko which was seen by critics to give too much power to the Commissariat of Justice. Instead of this two-tiered system, the code would have "a unified procedural order that would be so flexible and elastic that it would enable the court to vary its approach to different criminal cases." In practice, the inability to secure a new code during this period, coupled with the desire of the Commissariat of Justice to engage in such radical experimentation, served to give the radicals an upper-hand in the changes which occurred in criminal procedure.7 Moreover, there was a strong 6Huskey, Rnssian Eeyyers eng rhe Soviet Erere, p. 169- 173. 7Ibid., p. 175-176. For example the codes of the Uzbeck and Turkmen republics of 1929 and 1932 respectively, closely resembled Krylenko's draft of 1927. Where simplified codes were not introduced, as in the RSFSR, Krylenko was able to 137 tendency to promote to the judicial bench the worker- yygyinhenrey, personnel who had no legal training, but were drawn from the proletariat and moved rapidly into positions of responsibility. It was these judges who had the power to decide if an advocate, who was usually drawn from the pre- revolutionary intelligentsia, could participate in the criminal proceedings. Class hatred was not simply a part of policy then, but also a part of procedure.8 These simplified measures, while useful during the early years of the First Five-Year Plan, when the drive for collectivization, rapid industrialization, and proletarianization could be served by a very flexible, political, and often localized version of "proletarian justice",9 it was difficult to rely on such measures as the foundation for the Stalinist regime's desire to achieve more centralized control and legitimacy.10 Opposition to the legal nihilist position came from advocates in the Soviet bar, such as Vyshinskii himself, who promoted a concept of a undermine the existing code by passing directives to the courts through the apparatus of the RSFSR Justice Commissariat. 8Ibid., p. 176-77. According to Huskey, in 1928 the percentage of worker-judges in the RSFSR was 34%. By 1932 that percentage had increased to just over 53%. 9P. Solomon, "Soviet Criminal Justice and the Great Terror," pp. 393-394; "Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-1941," p. 314. 10E. Huskey, "Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order," p. 416. 138 transitional socialist legality based on a professionally trained and effectively centralized legal apparatus. The key to Vyshinskii's approach was that legal forms and institutions, if properly imbued with perriinger--party- mindedness, would play an important role in the construction of socialism in the USSR during this intermediate phase of development.11 In Vyshinskii's view, the simplification of legal procedures which had typified the period 1928-1931, had resulted in a lack of central control over the administration of the legal decrees which had been issued from above. This meant that the law had been misinterpreted, or ignored by local authorities, and this had resulted in both arbitrary and abusive practices reminiscent of activities by a Party cadre that had been "dizzy with success" in other sectors of socialist construction as well.12 What was needed was more educated lawyers, including defense lawyers, and a legal- administrative structure that could and would respond effectively to the decisions of the Party leadership. In this type of socialist legal order, even the bourgeois tool of law could become the weapon of the proletariat. It now appears that the appeal of an ordered, systematic, centrally-controlled, legal apparatus advocated by Vyshinskii was increasingly attractive to the Stalinist 11Sharlet and Beirne, "In Search of vyshinskii," p. 166. 12F. Solomon, "Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-1941," p. 314. 139 leadership. It was certainly the case that by 1933 Vyshinskii was moving into the forefront of legal reform from his base in the Procuracy of the R.S.F.S.R and post of Deputy-Commissar of Justice of the Russian Republic.13 In the analysis of the Metro-Vickers' trial which is outlined below, this little-studied aspect of the victory of Vyshinskii's comparatively moderate conception of the rule of socialist law is confirmed. This can be seen in the prominent role given to Vyshinskii in the Metro-Vickers' trial itself as high ranking radicals such the Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR, Krylenko, were excluded from the proceedings. The moderate conduct of the professorial Vyshinskii, the relatively light sentencing by the Court, and the promotion of Vyshinskii in the newly created Procuracy of the USSR immediately after the resolution of the Metro-Vickers affair underscore the rise of the former Menshevik who would soon become the doyen of the Soviet legal community. In contrast to the recent proposition by Amy Knight that the OGPU was, by 1932, in total control of the state's punitive apparatus,14 the establishment of an All-Union Procuracy in June 1933, a body which was headed by a former moderate in the OGPU, I.A. Akulov, and seconded by 13E. Huskey, "Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order," p. 417. 14A. Knight, e GB‘ ' a 0 'ti 5 ' Soviet gnien, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 21. 140 Vyshinskii, makes it appear that the Party leadership wanted to create a rival legal apparatus to that of the OGPU. The little known Akulov15 had been promoted to deputy-chief in the OGPU for a short time in 1931, apparently at the expense of G. Iagoda, who also a deputy-chief in the secret police. The British diplomatic staff in Moscow associated his brief tenure with the curtailing of the more extreme activities of the OGPU after June 1931.16 By December 1931 however, he was displaced by Iagoda and it could not have been overlooked that Akulov's promotion within an enhanced Procuracy in 1933 was a deliberate attempt to position him in a parallel legal structure outside the apparatus of the OGPU.17 Certainly, when the Central Executive Committee announced the creation of the USSR Procuracy in Teyeeriie on 23 June, Strang relayed the view of the diplomatic community in Moscow which 15According to the Bo 'shaia Sov tska'a nts' o dia (Moskva, 1970), cols. 1068-1069, Ivan Alekseevich Akulov held the post of Prokuror of the USSR until 1935 when he was sent to work for the Ukrainian Party in the Donbass region. Like his rival Iagoda, Akulov was eventually arrested, and put on trial. He was exiled, presumably to a labor camp, and died in 1939. It was likely his final fate which kept him from receiving an entry in the 1950 edition of Stalin's "Big Encyclopedia." 15Strang to Simon, F0 371/17251 N5119/ll3/38, 26 June 1933. 17Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod have argued that this tactic of avoiding a reliance on one individual or institution for advice or policy was a general feature of Stalin's rule. It not only avoided "group think" but also could serve as a tool to divide and control. See J. Hough and M. Fainsod H2F_the_Sexietlflnion_i§_§9_erned. (Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 167. 141 saw the strengthening of the judiciary as an attempt to end the abuses of "revolutionary legality" that had resurfaced in OGPU actions throughout the first half of 1933.18 Such an interpretation is consistent with other "moderate" measures, such as the May 1933 directive signed by Stalin and Molotov, which ordered an end to the mass deportations in the countryside--a move which added some substance to the peasant's right to own private plots which had been recognized in 1932.19 If doubts remain about the position of favor that would rapidly be bestowed upon figures such as Vyshinskii, it might be remembered that it was Vyshinskii and Ulrich, the Prosecutor and Judge at the Metro- Vickers' trial, who presided over the Great Purge trials of 1936-1938 which saw the decimation of the Old Bolsheviks and former rivals in the OGPU and Commissariat of Justice as well as Krylenko and Iagoda himself. Given the appearance of these trends following the MVEC trial, the decision to hold a "show" trial was undoubtedly an a measure intended by the Soviet leadership to lay down the current legal policy in no uncertain terms. The Metro- Vickers' arrests and trial occurred on the heels the OGPU's 18Strang to Simon, F0 371/17251 N5119/113/38, 26 June 1933. 19See Jerry Hough's discussion of this "retreat" to "realism" in Mew rhe Sovier gnion ie geverned, pp. 164-165. 142 summary executions of 35 "enemies of the people".20 In contrast to such manifestations of revolutionary terror, the carefully staged setting of the MVEC courtroom, the lack of red proletarian banners in the court, the demeanor of Vyshinskii, the enhanced role of the defence counsel, particularly in the later stages of the trial, and the general tone of the well-rehearsed drama all served to emphasize that control from above, rather than proletarian justice from below, was now the order of the day. In the Metro-Vickers' trial there would be no venomous cries from Vyshinskii that the defendants should be "shot like dirty dogs"--that level of hostility would have to wait for the Great Purge trials and the destruction of Bukharin.21 While the international pressure brought to bear on the Soviet Union by Britain was an important influence on the trial and its aftermath, these domestic factors combined with the international tension to give the Metro-Vickers' trial its fundamental character. For the student of the Metro-Vickers' trial the existence of both Soviet and British documentary evidence provides a unique opportunity to explore the process of pre- 20See Ovey's reaction to the arrests of the MVEC engineers and the OGPU executions cited above. 21See Stephen Cohen's account of Bukharin's confrontation with Vyshinskii, an account which contrasts markedly and convincingly with that of Arthur Koestler's depictions of Rubashov in Darkness et Neon. S. Cohen, u nd he Bolshev k t' - o i ical Bio ra h TREE-1938, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 375- 380. 143 trial interrogation, the nature of the evidence and the role of the "confessions" used during the proceedings, and the tactics and strategy of examination applied by Vyshinskii during the trial, in order to assess the outcome and ultimate significance of this comparatively under analyzed Soviet show trial. In contrast to the other show trials of this period, where the defendants or "victims" were Soviet citizens who failed to leave a record of their experience-- usually because of immediate "liquidation" or imprisonment in labor camps--the depositions of the British engineers and the Foreign Office depositions, coupled with the eight-hundred page Soviet trial transcript, make it possible to reconstruct many facets of this event from the perspective of both the accused and accusers. At twelve o'clock noon, 12 April 1933, the first session of the Metro-Vickers trial convened.22 V.V. Ulrich presided as President of the court and was flanked by A.F. Kostiushko as secretary, and three members of the court who had special expertise in electrical engineering.23 The prosecution was 22The most detailed outline of the charges is found in the Soviet verbatim report of the subsequent trial, Supreme Court of the USSR, The gese er N.P. Vitvitsky.,.Charged with Mreehing_heriyiriee, (Moscow: State Law Publishing House, 1933). [Hereinafter cited as The Ease.) 23The three were L.K. Martens, Director of the Diesel Institute and Professor of the Chair of Internal Combustion Engines, G.A. Dmitriev, Manager of the Glavenergo Thermo- Electrical Planning Trust, and reserve member A.V. Zelikov, President of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of 144 handled in the main by the Public Prosecutor, Vyshinskii, who was assisted by G.K. Roginskii, the Assistant Prosecutor of the RSFSR. Consistent with the presence and background of the three additional technically-trained members of the court was the inclusion of a special panel of five engineering experts.24 These men would add detailed substantive technical grounds to the political grounds of the case that would be extracted from many of the defendants. Both the British and Soviet defendants were represented by members of the Collegium of Defense, who were generally docile, if not totally absent, from the course of the examination and testimony. Since Soviet trials of this type were meant to demonstrate, rather than to simply establish, the guilt of the defendants, the role of the defence counsel was largely relegated to attempts at minimizing the extent of the crime and pleading for a lenient sentence at the trial's conclusion. Related to this lack of a vigorous defense were the complaints raised by both Thornton and MacDonald who maintained that their "confessions" during the pre-trial Workers, Engineers and Technicians in the Electro-Technical Industry and Electrical Power Stations. 24The Commission included heating engineer G.P. Brailo, electrical engineer V.A. Golubtsov, turbine engineer M.F. Novikov, technological and electrical engineer B.N. Smirnov, turbine engineer A.N. Snedkov, and turbine engineer P.P. Ulatov. See The Qese, pp. 12-13. Allan Monkhouse knew three of these men and generally respected their technical training--he was at a loss to explain their testimony at the trial which ran counter to reason in his view. See Monkhouse, MQEEQH: pp- 297-298- 145 interrogation were partly encouraged by the "advice" they received from Braude and Smirnov, their respective counsels.25 The bulk of the first session was spent with the Secretary, Kostiukov, reading an indictment which fills over seventy typed pages in the verbatim report. The document outlined in exhaustive detail the prosecution's view of the criminal actions, anti-Soviet motivations, and international organization of the "wreckers" at the Zlatoust, Cheliabinsk, Zuevka, Ivanovo, MOSENERGO, and Baku power stations.26 It also made the fundamental character of the case clear by placing the Moscow office of MVEC and its British staff, at the center of this alleged "counter-revolutionary" cadre. The detail of the indictment, the inclusion of portions of the "confessions" that were extracted from MacDonald and Thornton and a number of their Soviet co-defendants, combined with the careful crafting of the script to give the necessary coherence to the prosecutor's case. The charges against the British engineers were now stated in full for the first time. William MacDonald was charged under articles 58-6, 58-7, and the wide ranging 25Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933; MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 26See the map in Appendix G, "Power Stations in the USSR." 146 powers of 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.27 The prosecution alleged that, acting under the orders of Thornton, MacDonald had instructed Gussev, Sokolov, Vasiliev "and others" to commit acts of wrecking and diversion at a number of power stations where he had worked. The twenty- nine year old MacDonald was also active, according to the prosecution, in the collection and gathering of secret information "of State and military importance" and had paid his Soviet accomplices various bribes totaling "about 10,000 rubles" to conceal defects in MVEC equipment and the effects of their anti-Soviet behavior. The case that Vyshinskii would build around MacDonald was buttressed not only by the confessions of numerous Soviet "accomplices", but by MacDonald's own confession. The nature of his confession and that of Thornton's will be discussed below, but it should be pointed out here that the first sensation of the trial came when MacDonald, partly on the advice of his Soviet counsel, Smirnov, entered the first plea of a British defendant--he pleaded guilty.28 Leslie Thornton faced charges under articles 58-6, 58- 7, 58-9, and 58-11. Though he proved to be a more awkward defendant during the trial than MacDonald, he too had "confessed" to portions of the charges and, as the most 27For extracts from Article 58 of the Criminal Code see Appendix F. 28The Cese, pp. 79-80. 147 senior of the MVEC men who had buckled during interrogation, he was portrayed as the chief operative in the counter- revolutionary group. Apart from this, attention was drawn to his place of birth, Leningrad (sic) and his socio-economic status--he was born, after all, the son of a "big manufacturer" in St. Petersburg. These "materialist" details made his leading role ever more plausible to a Soviet court. He, too, the indictment alleged, collected secret information and used his subordinates in MVEC and various other Soviet engineers to engage systematically in criminal activities meant to undermine the Soviet state. Like MacDonald, Thornton also allegedly paid Soviet citizens for their anti- Soviet services although the prosecution had not been able to ascertain the total amount of such "bribes."29 Ulrich, as the President of the court, was taken aback when Thornton entered a plea of "not guilty." The Soviet judge probed, "Not guilty on any count?"--Thornton: "No".30 This set the stage for a lengthy and instructive confrontation later in the trial that would find Vyshinskii pressing Thornton on all fronts to account for his "confession" and the confessions of others who substantiated his "guilt."31 Allan Monkhouse faced charges along exactly the same lines as Thornton but, despite the fact that he was the MVEC 291bid., pp. 82-83. 3°Ibid., p. 85. 311bid., pp. 126-127. 148 manager, was not assigned a major role by the prosecution during the trial. Unlike Thornton, Monkhouse had been able to withdraw the most damaging elements in his signed statements and throughout the trial he maintained a strong, combative disposition to the entire proceeding. Of the remaining three British defendants, John Cushny, and Charles Nordwall faced a similar range of charges of engaging in wrecking, espionage, and offering bribes to encourage criminal acts under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9, and 58-11. The two were clearly less central to the case in that they had not confessed and were portrayed more as pawns than instigators.32 Albert Gregory was the one British defendant who scarcely received any attention at all during the trial and was the only one of the six to be cleared of all charges. He had been in the Soviet Union less than a year and faced the single charge under articles 58-6 and 58-11 of collecting secret information.33 The weakness of the case against Gregory was clear since he had not confessed and no successful attempt was made to connect him to the confessions of any other defendants. As Vyshinskii concluded at the end of the trial: But when Thornton speaks about Gregory, I [Vyshinskii] must say that Thornton's bare statement, unsupported by any other facts, is 321bid., pp. 78, 80-81, p. 85. 33Ibid., p. 75. 149 insufficient to support the charge against Gregory. I think that a verdict of acquittal can be passed on Gregory.34 Gregory, Cushny, and Nordwall all pleaded not guilty. Of the Soviet defendants, the three who proved most vulnerable were V.A Gussev, L.A. Sukhoruchkin, and A.T. Lobanov. They were younger than the other Soviet defendants and had regular contact with MVEC engineers in the field. Gussev and Sukhoruchkin served as chiefs of the Zlatoust and First Moscow Power station respectively and all three were accused of acting on the instructions of, and taking bribes from the British engineers, MacDonald, Thornton, and Nordwall. The Soviet engineers were charged under articles 58-7, 58-9, and 58-11. All three pleaded guilty to the charges and would, in the end, receive the most severe sentence from the court--ten years deprivation of liberty with loss of rights for five years and confiscation of all their property.35 V.A. Sokolov, M.L. Kotliarevksii, and M.D. Krasheninnikov were also junior men in the electrical engineering field who were charged with concealing defects in newly installed equipment.‘ Sokolov, allegedly acting in concert with Gussev, was charged with wrecking a 1,400 h.p. engine at the Zlatoust station. Sokolov was also supposed to be involved in gathering secret information which was passed 34Ibid., p. 671. 35Ibid., pp. 74, 79, 81-82, 796-797. 150 through Gussev to MacDonald. For their anti-Soviet efforts, Sokolov and Kotliarevskii had apparently received 1,000 rubles, while Krasheninnikov's "bribe" amounted to 500 rubles.36 It was perhaps on this count that the former two ultimately received eight year sentences, while the poorer paid Krasheninnikov received a five year term.37 In addition to this more junior cadre, which ranged in age from 29 to 39, and which was far and away the most severely dealt with, was a group of four older men ranging in age from 50 to 59. While the eldest, N.G. Zorin, received a stiff eight year sentence, P.I. Oleinik, V.P. Lebedev, and I.I. Zivert, received considerably lighter sentences, with Zivert receiving no punishment for his "crimes" at all. What this suggests is that, to the extent that the trial was an attack on specialists in the electrical industry, it was not an attack on "old specialists" in particular and, to the extent that generational factors played a role at all, the opposite seems true. With the singular exception of Zorin, who had a great deal of responsibility for investigating the cause of breakdowns that occurred with foreign equipment as 36According to Strang's calculations the official rate of exchange at 9.4 rubles = 1 pound sterling. As will be seen however, the British engineers, like so many foreigners in the USSR then and since, availed themselves of the black market rates which were substantially more favorable to foreign currency. See Strang, Heme ene hproad, p. 85, n. 1. 371bid., p. 76-77, 83-84, 796-797. Sokolov was charged under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9, 58-11 of the criminal code. Krasheninnikov and Kotliarevskii were charged under articles 58-7 and 58-11. 151 chief turbine engineer at MOSENERGO and had allegedly failed to be sufficiently vigilant in this work, it was the senior men who were dealt with most leniently. This highlights the contrast between the MVEC trial and the earlier trials of 1928-1931 which were part of a cultural revolution against the "old specialists" trained prior to 1917. Neither does the trial appear to be an attack against "red specialists,"38 those rapidly promoted party members whose political views were often held to be more important than their technical expertise. None of the Soviet defendants was a party member, a fact that made it easier to portray some of them as remnants of "white" forces who had revealed their true colors by collaborating with British engineers in their wrecking activities. Vyshinskii did not fail to make the link between the former Whites and the fact that Monkhouse and Thornton had served with the British interventionist forces during the Russian Civil War. The key to the Prosecution's case against Soviet defendants appears to have been the relationship of the Soviet accused to the British accused. Those Soviets closest to MacDonald, and in positions of greater 38Kendall Bailes made this point in his unpublished dissertation which contains a short chapter on the MVEC trial. This chapter was not included in his Teehnelegy_eng ' e in a , perhaps because Bailes realized the major differences that underlay the show trial of 1933 and contrasted it with the earlier trials that formed the basis of his study. See K. Bailes, "Stalin and Revolution From Above: The Formation of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1928-1934," Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1971, p. 192. 152 responsibility at their respective works, were dealt with most severely. The lone woman in the trial was the MVEC secretary, Anna Kutuzova. Her role, according to the indictment, had been limited to "systematically" making money payments to Gussev and "other Russian engineers and technicians" on the orders of Thornton and other British engineers. Though it did not form part of the indictment, the fact that she lived with Thornton and Monkhouse had evidently been used as a lever during her interrogation, and as has been pointed out above,39 she had confessed to engaging in "disgustful" acts with Thornton and Monkhouse which could at any moment have become part of the public record. Charged under articles 58- 6, 58-7, 58-9, and 58-11, Kutuzova received a sentence of eighteen months' deprivation of liberty without loss of property.40 As will become clear below, her close relationship to the MVEC British personnel made her a very valuable "hostage" in the case and the pliability of Thornton, in particular, can partially be explained by his desire to avoid contradicting a terrorized Kutuzova.41 The case against this "counter-revolutionary" group was given additional coherence by the physical arrangements of 39See Chapter 2, "From Collaboration to Crisis." 4°The Case, pp. 77, 796-797. 41This was certainly the explanation given by Thornton in his deposition to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1933. 153 the courtroom. The six British engineers sat with the eleven Soviet defendants in the "dock" which was flanked by guards with bayonets at the ready.42 Thornton and MacDonald sat in the first row, but were separated by Zorin and Kutuzova. The other four British defendants were seated together in the last of the three rows and undoubtedly drew some solidarity from their close proximity to one another. It seems doubtful that presenting the defendants in this way was merely a matter of convenience. Taken individually, the defendants would not appear to be nearly the threat to the power of the Soviet state as they were when presented as collection of seventeen persons of varied ages, skills, and nationalities. This was something far more convincing to the audience of about four hundred who responded with appropriate concern throughout the trial as Vyshinskii played the confessions and testimony out to develop a portrait of collective anti-Soviet behavior and collective guilt. One Soviet defendant, N.P. Vitvitskii, though included in the indictment, was not present during the trial apparently because of an illness which was certified by a doctor of the Butyrskaia Prison.43 It is possible that his illness was the result of rough handling during his interrogation, but if such was the case, it would contrast with the treatment of the other prisoners who appeared in the 42Cummings, The Mescow Triel, see plate following p. 32. “Mes. p- 5- 154 courtroom neatly dressed and groomed and, while the psychological pressure of extended interrogation had produced visible strain, there was little physical evidence of "third- degree" methods. When asked by Vyshinskii about his treatment, Thornton confirmed that "third-degree" methods were not applied to secure his confession.44 It was just such revelations which aggravated the mood of some British officials at home who found it difficult to understand why these men had collapsed so easily.45 Insight into the relationship between the Prosecution, the Court and the Defence was provided at the end of the first afternoon session. It was Prosecutor Vyshinskii, not the President of the Court, Judge Ulrich, who provided an outline of the procedures to be followed during the remainder of the trial. The Defence had no objection to Vyshinskii's proposal for examination and the Court adopted the Prosecution's procedure as its own. All of this clearly suggests that this was Vyshinskii's show and he would be given his lead over the next week. That he did so with an intense professorial authority, and in this he was to be very much distinguished from the behavior exhibited in the 44Ibid., p. 128. 45See Vansittart's bitter remarks about the cowardice of MacDonald and Thornton in his minute to a Foreign Office Memo by Collier, F0 371/17273 N5329/1610/38, 9 July 1933. 155 periodic interventions by his "excitable" and "pugnacious"46 assistant Roginskii, served to enhance the Prosecution's case by presenting the complexities of the indictment with assurance and calm. Before beginning an analysis of the trial proceedings themselves, it is necessary to examine the parameters of the criminal charges under the infamous, even "draconian"47 Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.48 Enacted in 1926, this special section of the legal code was the center piece of the regime's attempt to simplify criminal law-- almost reducing it to criminal policy. In practice article 58 was applied in a manner that gave full vent to its inherently vague and ambiguous clauses. As the testimony in the MVEC trial would make clear, a "criminal" thought, word, or deed,49 was each sufficient individually to produce a guilty verdict in a Soviet court at the time. This came at a time when the Soviet definition of "criminality" included any intentional or even "accidental" act which could be depicted as damaging to the state. 46See the portrait of Roginskii in Cummings, The Mescow Triel, pp. 109-110. 47The term is from R. Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture," p. 164. 48For a "literary" assessment of the article 58 see A. Solzhenitsyn's The Gelag hrehipelage, Vel. T, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1974), pp. 60-67. 49This formulation is akin to the Christian doctrine of "sin" present, for example, in the Anglican Book of Common Prayer. 156 The specific nuances of the charges which faced the accused in the MVEC trial are instructive in this regard as well. Article 58-6 pertained to espionage, and, in view of the evidence produced above on the link between MVEC and the Industrial Intelligence Center, one might expect that the Prosecution would have produced substantial evidence which demonstrated the real threat posed by MVEC engineers who possessed a wide ranging knowledge of the Soviet Union and had passed such information on to British intelligence services. This did not happen at the trial and many observers felt that the real Soviet case was kept hidden from view.50 The most convincing reason for the absence of revelations about British intelligence gathering would seem to be that the Soviets, unlike their British counterparts during the ARCOS crisis of 1927, chose not to reveal how much they knew about British intelligence operations for fear of revealing how they had come to know. One might add here that to the extent that the Prosecution needed hard evidence to produce a conviction, it could and did rely on the numerous confessions to the charge of "information gathering" by Soviet defendants and those of MacDonald and Thornton to obtain the desired result. Throughout the trial those defendants who were charged under 58-6 were pressed to reveal what they knew about the 50See Eugene Lyons, Aseignmenr in Etopie, p. 365; W. Duranty, l Wrire as T Rleeee, pp. 323-324; A. Cummings, The Meeeoy Trial, p. 257. 157 types of industrial enterprises, the relative efficiency of such enterprises, the location of military factories, and the like. Virtually all transgressions under this article came from its last clause which dealt with "economic" intelligence which was not "an especially guarded State secret", but nonetheless, should not be transmitted to foreign powers. It was here that the basic dilemma for a private firm which operated in the Soviet Union was manifested since it was impossible for the Prosecution to allow the kind of separation between "private" and "public" spheres which is common in a liberal-"capitalist" society. This was made even more troublesome for the British engineers since it is possible, though in the cases of the senior men unlikely, that they knew nothing about the intelligence link between MVEC and the IIC. In the cases of MacDonald and Thornton, they both took the tack that, "Oh well, if you insist these things are spying, then theoretically I have been spying."51 This was an understandable, if very injurious reaction to the stress of interrogation, but it was from such beginnings that the case against the two was made. The most widespread charges levelled at the defendants as a group were those covered under articles 58-7 and 58-9, which together constituted the crimes of wrecking, sabotage, and diversion. The working definition of "wrecking" 51The quote is from MacDonald's Foreign Office deposition, but a similar explanation for his confession is offered by Thornton in his deposition as well. 158 (vreditel'stvo) that would be used time and again by Soviet interrogators and Vyshinskii was very broadly cast. A "wrecker" was anyone who by either commission or omission caused, or failed to prevent, damage to State property. Clearly in instances of deliberate acts taken to destroy a machine, motor, or turbine, cases of "wrecking" are much more simply understood in Western parlance as industrial sabotage. The OGPU investigation and the Commission of Experts that advised the Public Prosecutor claimed that there were a number of such cases that could not be "accidental" in nature. The more significant of these cases will be discussed later, though it is important to note here that the MVEC engineers and the British government most strenuously denied intentionally damaging or "wrecking" any Soviet machinery. For their part, Allan Monkhouse and Leslie Thornton claimed that as professional engineers, they were committed to the construction and maintenance of the electrical enterprises to which they were charged, and that "wrecking" ran against their nature.52 Over the course of the crisis, however, Strang, who headed the Embassy after Ambassador Ovey's recall, came to believe that in the Soviet electrical industry there 52See Monkhouse's discussion of his experience as a "wrecker" during the revolutionary turmoil of 1917, Chapter 2, "From Collaboration to Crisis." Thornton's attitude about the charges of wrecking can be gleaned from one of the rare moments he resisted the tendentious flow of the trial proceedings. See Thornton's cross-examination of Krasheninnikov, The Case, pp. 449-450. 159 "appeared to be a good deal of honest wrecking." This observation had been prompted in part by information from an anonymous member of the MVEC staff who claimed that wrecking had occurred at the Moscow electrical power station of MOGES. Such acts were prompted by the frustration of a working class that was overburdened with onerous production norms, Strang's informant had concluded.53 Similar claims have been made by foreigners who worked as emigre laborers in the USSR during years of the Great Depression. John Scott, an American who worked in the Soviet steel complex at Magnitogorsk, maintained that "wrecking" did occur and that such acts were often prompted by a desire for revenge against a regime that had, through its repression, created genuine anti-Soviet sentiment.54 Another American, Andrew Smith, worked as a factory inspector in the Electrozavod works in Moscow in the early 19305. Contrary to the view offered by Strang's informant and by Scott, Smith found that workers did "wreck" machinery at an alarming rate, but most often did so out of a desire to fulfill their production quota. In such instances the workers tended to improvise techniques and neglected simple maintenance procedures such as the regular oiling and cleaning of their machines. The result was the eventual 53Strang to Simon, F.o. 371/17251 N4720/113/38, 17 June 1933; Strang to Simon, F0 371/17251 N5516/113/38, 25 July 1933. 54 See John Scott, Eehind rhe Mrels, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973 [1942]), pp. 186-187. 160 breakdown of the machinery and even more time and money lost.55 In a trial such as the Metro-Vickers' trial, both Scott's and Smith's explanations for wrecking could be fused into one criminal act. The confessions of wrecking, diversion, and sabotage, given by men such as Gussev, Lobanov, Sukhoruchkin and Zorin, made a strong impression on some members of the audience at the trial and A. Cummings, the Mews Qhronicle reporter, became convinced that these men were true anti-Soviet criminals.56 As for the charges against the British defendants, these men were to be portrayed by the Prosecutor as the manipulators of the Soviet engineers, and hence avoided in the main the charge of carrying out the wrecking themselves. The crimes covered under article 58-11 pertained to "any type of organizational activity" which could be shown to have a connection to the perpetration of any of the other crimes under article 58. Alexander Solzhenitsyn has claimed, in his 55A. Smith, I Was a Eevier Werher, pp. 59-64. It is unlikely that this Andrew Smith was the same man that Thornton named in his confession of 13 March 1933 since the American Smith recounts numerous experiences on the subject of wrecking, but makes no mention whatsoever of the Metro- Vickers trial. It also appears that the American Smith was a' genuine fellow-traveller for a short time and not an employee of MVEC as were all 27 of the individuals named by Thornton. 56Cummings, The Moseey Triel, p. 181. Though the Mew Qhreniele had a "russo-phile" reputation, Cummings claimed that he had hitherto resisted the notion that saboteurs and wreckers were assaulting Soviet industrial enterprises and the State. 161 gnleg_hrehipelege, that this article was so broadly enforced that in practice no organization was even needed for the prosecution's case to be made.57 In the MVEC trial, article 58-11 was perhaps most important to the prosecution of the British engineers since it made it easier to pursue a line of questioning which drew the periodic visits of C.S. Richards and other MVEC personnel into a sinister international plot. This was particularly useful for Vyshinskii when he pressed Thornton on his confession of March 13 which named Richards and twenty-seven other British MVEC engineers as active agents directed by British intelligence.58 It was also the main hint during the trial that the Soviets had made the link themselves between the information gathered by MVEC men in the field and its eventual transmission to the Industrial Intelligence Center. For Vyshinskii's point to be made it was sufficient to remind the Court of Thornton's confession and then to minimize the engineer's attempts at repudiation. The Public Prosecutor was well armed with the necessary wit, sarcasm, and authority to succeed in the latter task once Thornton had provided the makings of a case against himself. Since the confessions of Thornton and MacDonald, and indeed, the use of "confessions" generally in show trials of this type were critical to the case made against the accused, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of 57Solzhenitsyn, The gnleg hrchipelege, Vol, l, p. 66. 581ns_cass. pp. 256-257. 162 this type of evidence and its usage in the MVEC case. From the account given of their interrogation in the Foreign Office depositions, and Allan Monkhouse's own memoir account of his experience, a number of features are clear. While no methods of the "third degree" were employed by the Soviet interrogators, the lengthy sessions of repeated questioning which included tiresome debates over precise wording that might appear harmless, and sometimes petty to a weary British engineer, but had very specific qualities in the minds of Soviet officials, took its toll on the accused. Even more stressful were the multiple "confrontations" that Thornton and MacDonald experienced. In such instances, a shabbily dressed Soviet associate such as Gussev was brought into the room and asked to report on "criminal" activities which invariably implicated one of the British engineers, in ' Gussev's case, MacDonald. The tendency of both Thornton and MacDonald was to think themselves in a more secure position than that of their Soviet co-defendants, and therefore they could not bring themselves to dispute the claims made by people who had clearly been threatened with great ills if they did not confess to depositions which were sometimes drafted by the Soviet authorities themselves.59 The net result of facing as many as sixty broken souls and wading through a similar number of written confessions from other 59This tactic of drafting the text for the accused was experienced by the British engineers as well. See Monkhouse, Meeeey, p. 282, 294-295. 163 accused was to make Thornton and MacDonald look for ways to bend, if not break, under the psychological pressure and physical exhaustion. Although threats to their own family members were not effective against the British defendants, the two-man teams of interrogators did make sure to warn MacDonald and Thornton of the consequences that would befall MacDonald's housekeeper, Riabova, and the MVEC secretary, Kutuzova, if 'the engineers did not cooperate. Thornton was warned that Kutuzova's testimony concerning the alleged intimacy of their living arrangements would be made public if he, at any time, repudiated his own confession. It is curious that no action was taken during the trial along these lines, but the threat served its purpose in any event by helping to gain a confession. It may be that a scene where Vyshinskii brow- beat a humiliated Kutuzova into making public statements on this subject was something the Soviet authorities wished to avoid at this juncture. Since they had her confession, why create a scene that might backfire with the foreign audience? The Soviet authorities were also adept at playing one British engineer off against another. MacDonald claimed he gave in once he was told--he was not shown a written confession--that Thornton had signed a statement. As MacDonald put it: I thought: "Well, Thornton has got something up his sleeve; so if he has done that, I can agree with it." So I said, "Since you have got all that, I 164 suppose it is so."60 Ironically, it was only after MacDonald had confessed and was then involved in a confrontation with Thornton the following day, that Thornton finally signed the first of two confessions.61 Given this scenario, it was understandable that relations between the two during the trial were decidedly cool. The growing awareness of the seriousness of the situation also contributed to the decline of their morale. Both men claimed in their depositions that they gradually came to fear for their own lives once the scope of the charges and the details of the case became clear to them. One of the factors that increased this sense of vulnerability and helplessness was the amount of information, sometimes dating back ten years, that the authorities trotted out when needed. This enhanced the sense that nothing had been missed, and that there was no way of avoiding the outcome that the interrogators wanted to see fulfilled.62 It was here that the long-standing practices of the close involvement of MVEC staff with their Soviet surroundings were shown to be very risky. Many of the people that MacDonald and Thornton faced in confrontations had 6oMacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 61Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933. 62Thornton, Foreign Office Deposition, 20 July 1933; MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 165 obviously been drawn into the OGPU net of informants many years earlier and could accurately report the whereabouts and contacts of the British engineers over the past several years. It is likely that the MVEC habit of giving gifts to special colleagues at Electro-Import, including Dolgov,63 supplementing the salaries of Soviet engineers when the Soviet authorities were late in paying them, or paying extra wages for excellent service,64 created jealousies and enemies as well as loyal friends. It must also be admitted that MacDonald, at least, was given to excessive drinking65 and, in his associations with Soviet citizens, was drawn to those men who openly criticized their government and thereby drew attention to themselves.66 As Strang observed after the trial had ended, "when in the company of foreigners the ordinary non-party Russian has an incurable habit of engaging in anti-Soviet talk."67 In such a working environment it must have been easy to recruit informants to 63In discussion with the Foreign Office prior to the trial, Richards was particularly fearful that this practice might well be "misunderstood." See Foreign Office minute by Fitzmaurice, FO 371/17266 N2094/1610/38, 25 March 1933. 64MacDonald admitted this during his interrogation and this practice appears generally consistent with MVEC policy towards their Soviet associates. See MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 6SStrang to Simon, F0 371/17267 N2289/1610/38, 2 April 1933. 66Bush House Interviews, 9 May, 1933. 67Foreign Office Memo by Strang, F0 371/17270 N2944/1610/38, 20 April 1933. 166 report on the activities of the foreigners. The impact of this whole process of interrogation and the resulting stages of initial resistance giving way to partial compliance, and then, after hours of strain and loss of hope, producing the final capitulation along the lines of the interrogators' demands was captured by Monkhouse in his memoir account of his own struggle with interrogator Belogorskii. Initially Monkhouse fought and clawed against the suggested wording of his statement. He sought to rewrite passages from Russian into English in a way that would both protect MVEC and would somehow satisfy his interrogator. For Belogorskii, patience was the key. After midnight I [Monkhouse] felt my nerve was going. I was dead tired....My lips twitched in a way they had never done before. It was a hard mental effort to resist writing exactly what Belogorski [sic] dictated, and, in any case....I wrote one or two paragraphs which I greatly regret having consented to write. Fortunately for Monkhouse he was able, after much argument, to convince Vyshinskii that these paragraphs could not be true and that he had written them under considerable strain.69 It is likely that Vyshinskii allowed the more damning passages to be withdrawn from Monkhouse's statement because the Prosecutor knew he had gained enough for his case from the still more pliable pair, Thornton and MacDonald. 68Monkhouse, Meeeey, pp. 282-283. 691bid. 167 The evening session of the opening day set the tone for the remainder of the trial. The President of the Court called the thirty-five year old Gussev to testify about his activities in the Kolchak army during the Civil War of 1918- 1921 and Vyshinskii had little difficulty demonstrating the long history of anti-Soviet sentiment which Gussev himself claimed had never wavered. After establishing this "motive," Vyshinskii led Gussev through his initial contact with MacDonald and the origins of his wrecking and espionage activities. At each juncture Gussev was precise about the dates and circumstances of his involvement with the British engineer. He also introduced MacDonald's apparent motive for wanting information about the industrial capabilities of the USSR. According to Gussev, both he and MacDonald believed that the Soviet Union did not need to develop its own machine building capability, but should rely on foreign suppliers for their needs. Moreover, Gussev also claimed that MacDonald was particularly interested in the Zlatoust Mechanical Works, where Gussev was employed, since part of the works was engaged in producing munitions. In short order then, Gussev's testimony introduced the theme that MVEC had an interest in keeping the USSR dependent on foreign machinery and that, at the root of the espionage activities of the group, was an interest in assessing the military production of the country. When Vyshinskii turned to query MacDonald about the 168 veracity of Gussev's testimony the MVEC engineer complied: Vyshinskii: Accused MacDonald. You hear the testimony of Gussev? Do you corroborate what he said regarding your acquaintance in 1929? MacDonald: Regarding our acquaintance, yes. Vyshinskii: You corroborate that during this time, from 1929 and on, your relations with Gussev were of friendship, of intimacy? MacDonald: From 1930 on. Vyshinskii: You did indeed ask Gussev to furnish you the information of which he spoke? MacDonald: Yes in my personal interests. Vyshinskii: Perhaps you will explain more exactly what you mean by your own interests? Did you ask Gussev for information on the power supply? MacDonald: I did. Vyshinskii: Military information? MacDonald: I did. Vyshinskii: This is all I wanted.70 From this point on Gussev's testimony provided an account of how he and Sokolov, inspired by MacDonald's instructions and encouraged by the "bribes" he offered the Russians of about 2,500 rubles, proceeded to sabotage engines, conveyors, and boilers at Zlatoust, with an eye to inhibiting the production of military goods. In this way Gussev provided ready answers for the numerous breakdowns that had occurred with machinery under his charge and, in at least the instance of the coal conveyor which fed the power plant, he insisted the witnesses. p- 98- 169 capacity of the station was undermined for a period of almost two years.'71 MacDonald was asked to confirm Gussev's account once again. While he disputed the story that he had helped plan the wrecking activities, adding only that he had been told of them after the fact,72 MacDonald did admit that he had given Gussev about 2,500 rubles. When pressed about where he came up with such a sum, MacDonald claimed that Thornton had arranged the payment through the Moscow office of MVEC.73 According to Allan Monkhouse, MacDonald and Thornton had traded on the black market in order to clear a number of MacDonald's debts and this was the real source of the funds. MacDonald had exaggerated the amount under the pressure of interrogation, Monkhouse maintained.74 The remainder of Gussev's examination was handled by Roginskii. He led Gussev through the organizational features of the wrecking operation and in the process drew MacDonald's housekeeper, Riabova, and her sons, into the case. This seemed to make an impression on the attitude of MacDonald, who had been told during his interrogation75 that his confession would make things easier for Riabova.' Now her 711bid., pp. 104-105. 721bid., p. 108. 73Ibid., p. 104. 74Bush House Interviews, 9 May 1933. 7sMacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 170 name was part of the public record of the trial and for the remainder of the session MacDonald was a much less manageable defendant. After he denied further aspects of Gussev's testimony, the session was abruptly adjourned. Strang's account of this, the first of two such adjournments, suggests that the Prosecution was rattled by the change in attitude and that this had created a "stir" in the courtroom.76 As will become clear below, the adjournment which occurred the following day after similar resistance from MacDonald and Thornton, had a definitely threatening tone. Upon resumption of the session, Roginskii asked Thornton to confirm a few trivial points in Gussev's testimony as to the time and place of their various meetings. Once again there were no quibbles from the British accused and it seems very likely that part of the strategy that was employed by the Prosecution was to get the MVEC engineers to agree to small points early on, and thereby build momentum for the more serious dimensions of the case that were to follow. After these small triumphs, Roginskii turned the examination of Thornton over to Vyshinskii. It was here that Thornton's plea of "not guilty", which he had entered earlier that day, was challenged by the Public Prosecutor. Vyshinskii asked Thornton to account for the portions of his confession that admitted guilt on grounds of spying. Vyshinskii was at his best when attacking with a mixture of 76Strang, Meme and hhroae, p. 100. 171 sarcasm and exaggerated politeness: Vyshinskii: Do you confirm this? Thornton: No. Vyshinskii: Why did you say it then? Thornton: I did not say that I was forced to say it. Vyshinskii: Then permit me to ask--did you say it? Thornton: Yes, I did. Vyshinskii: That is to say, what is written in the records is actually what you said? Thornton: Yes, that is what I said. Vyshinskii: Did you speak the truth or an untruth? Thornton: In this case it was an untruth. Vyshinskii: Do you usually speak the truth or not? Thornton: In this case I did not speak the truth, I was excited. Vyshinskii: That is to say, when you are excited you don't speak the truth. Thornton: Yes. Vyshinskii: You are not excited now? Thornton: No, I am not excited. Vyshinskii: That is to say, you are now speaking the truth? Thornton: Now I am speaking the truth. Vyshinskii: Why then did you write this and not something else? You said: "I think, it is right." You did not affirm, but you thought. I ask why, when you were excited, you thought precisely this and not something else? Were you forced to do it? Thornton: No. Vyshinskii: You said this voluntarily? 172 Thornton: Voluntarily. Vyshinskii: Perhaps some special methods were applied to you? Thornton: No. Vyshinskii: Were you tortured? Thornton: No. Vyshinskii: Third degree? Thornton: No. Vyshinskii: I have no more questions.77 In Strang's account of this confrontation he noted that Thornton found it easier to handle Vyshinskii when operating in English and making use of the court interpreter.78 At one point during Vyshinskii's questioning the interpreter disappeared and Thornton, despite his facility in Russian,79 appeared to lose confidence in his ability to offer a rebuttal to Vyshinskii. Despite this barrage by Vyshinskii, Thornton's nerve 77The.§e§e. pp. 127-128. 78The defendants were supposed to be free to use English or Russian in their testimony, but there was, from time to time, some confusion over the exact meaning of words which did not have precise equivalents. In the case of engineers such as Gregory, for example, he spoke virtually no Russian and had to rely on the interpreter throughout. 79Strang's depiction of Thornton as someone who struggled with Russian in the courtroom should be contrasted with the portrait offered earlier in this study which was based on Thornton and Monkhouse's own claims that they managed to communicate easily in the language. Perhaps speaking Russian when in the "dock" was a different matter from speaking the language in the field. See Strang, Home W. P- 100- 173 held up throughout the first day, the remainder of which was spent with the various defense counsels offering cautious rebuttals to specific details of the testimony of Gussev. Thornton's counsel, Braude, cast doubt on whether Thornton had ever actually talked to one of the alleged wrecking group, Vitvitskii, and this in turn hampered the Prosecution's claim, which was based on Gussev's testimony, that Vitvitskii was Thornton's main agent in the Cheliabinsk region. This was a particularly important tack to take since Vitvitskii was not present during the trial and yet was a central figure among the Russians in the alleged organization. If the Prosecution was able to use the testimony of someone who could not be cross-examined in person such as Vitvitskii, the Defense had to show some weakness in the written testimony itself. Braude also encouraged Thornton to specify the type of information that he had required from MacDonald and here Thornton insisted that it was limited to information necessary "so that, should there be a breakdown with a machine, we should have every opportunity of finding the cause."80 Similarly MacDonald's counsel, Smirnov, managed to provoke some awkwardness in Gussev's account when the Soviet counsel noted that all the breakdowns at Zlatoust came a year after MacDonald had left the area.81 Gussev also had 80Ibid., p. 142. 811bid., p. 132. 174 difficulty remembering how many installments and in what sums MacDonald had paid his alleged accomplices.82 Thus, after the damage caused by Gussev and vyshinskii, some ground was retaken on behalf of the British accused. The second day of the trial found the pattern outlined in the first sessions repeated. The President called another Soviet defendant, this time Sokolov, and he dutifully recalled his participation in Kolchak's army, noting that he had served in the very same regiment, the 22nd Zlatoust training company, as had Gussev. It was scarcely a surprise then, that Sokolov should end up as Gussev's assistant in the Zlatoust electrical department some ten years later fully equipped with the anti-Soviet attitudes that a defeated "white" would have. With this testimony acting as a foundation it was easy for Vyshinskii to make the link to MacDonald via Gussev.83 A portrait of the wrecking team gradually developed. Sokolov was then asked to recount the relationship that developed between Gussev, MacDonald, and himself, and he provided a picture of hard-drinking parties full of anti- Soviet toasts that were often enjoyed by the trio. Vyshinskii made sure to direct the Court's attention to Sokolov's written confession: The conversation was of an open anti-Soviet nature. 82Ibid., p. 134. 83Ihe_§ess. pp- 150-161- 175 Do you confirm this? Then: "Gussev gave a toast for the Five-Year Plan in Four... MacDonald corrected him: "For the Five-Year Plan in Ten Years." Moreover, he said again that the Soviet Union would not be able to free itself from foreign dependence anyhow...would not be able to manage the production of machines, etc."84 Sokolov testified that MacDonald did not simply provide variations on Soviet toasts to the Russian pair of engineers. He also advised them on how they could proceed to undermine the Zlatoust works in readiness for a possible foreign intervention. A necessary component of these criminal activities was intelligence gathering which, Sokolov claimed, went from him to Gussev to MacDonald.85 As he had done the previous day, Vyshinskii now turned to MacDonald to confirm the testimony of the Russian defendant. Vyshinskii began by reading MacDonald's statement of 2 April which read: I [MacDonald] confirm that in my conversation with Sokolov at the end of 1930 I have not given him definite instructions on wrecking of equipment but I told him that he and Gussev had to undertake the taking out of service of plant and that he (Sokolov) had to come to an understanding directly with Gussev. MacDonald immediately disputed the Prosecution's claim that he had told Sokolov to carry out wrecking activities and this resistance prompted Vyshinskii to ask MacDonald to account 84Ibid., p. 162. 851bid., p. 163-164. 351bid., p. 166. 176 for his confession. MacDonald recalled that the initial statement had been written in Russian by the interrogator and that after much badgering he had been compelled to translate the statement into English and sign it. This tactic was very likely used to get a handwritten version of what amounted to a dictated document. When pressed by Vyshinskii to account for why he signed the document, MacDonald asserted that the interrogator "did not allow me to do otherwise."87 He also claimed that he thought it better to challenge the legitimacy of his confession in an open court than to resist the pressure of his interrogators.88 One might also add that it was easier to confess earlier and hope to defend oneself later when under the psychological strain of interrogation. It was at this point that Vyshinskii found MacDonald's resolve to resist the claims of the Prosecution at its height. MacDonald told the Court that he wanted to change his plea to "not guilty" at this time. He also challenged the claim by Gussev that the money MacDonald had paid him was for wrecking activities. Instead, the British engineer now insisted that money was for the overtime wages of workmen employed in the erection of MVEC equipment.89 Vyshinskii, meeting with continued obstinacy from MacDonald, directed his questioning to Thornton. Various 871bid., p. 167. 88Ibid., p. 167. 891bid., p. 170. 177 passages in Thornton's deposition had implied that MacDonald and twenty-seven other MVEC employees were engaged in various types of intelligence gathering. When Vyshinskii asked Thornton to account for his testimony the Public Prosecutor met with opposition from Thornton as well: Thornton: I gave a plainly false deposition. Vyshinskii: We shall examine later whether it was false or not. Thornton: I sa that it was false. You can say what you like. It was clearly not Vyshinskii's finest hour and after a few more approaches to MacDonald and Thornton, the President of the Court decided that a recess of twenty minutes was needed.91 At this juncture the decisive blow was struck at MacDonald. MacDonald's subsequent deposition alleges that during this adjournment, he was taken aside and told that Riabova would be shot if he did not stick to his confession. From that point on, MacDonald offered no resistance to the Prosecution's case.92 Strang noted the contrast in MacDonald's behavior: Before the break, he had spoken firmly and confidently. After it, he spoke in a low, toneless voice, meekly confirming his original testimony. 9°Ibid., p. 176. 911bid., p. 178. 92MacDonald, Foreign Office Deposition, 3 July 1933. 93Strang. Hems_and_Abread. p- 102- 178 MacDonald might well have been a weak, naive and nervous individual,94 but he did summon up the courage to face an unknown fate at the hands of a Soviet Court in the hopes that his compliance might spare Riabova and her family. There was not a hint of bitterness towards his Russian associates in MacDonald's deposition concerning his fate and, following his release from prison, he asked the Foreign Office to seek permission for Riabova to come to stay with him in England.95 The main attention of Vyshinskii now shifted from MacDonald to Thornton. After watching his British associate give way to Vyshinskii's questions, Thornton apparently decided that he had to attack the testimony of MacDonald directly. At one juncture he not only denied MacDonald's testimony about alleged espionage activity but claimed that the whole idea "was an absolute lie."96 Thornton also was able to resist Vyshinskii's tendency to pursue a line of questioning and then change course just when Thornton was ready to clarify a point which was left intentionally 94These were the unflattering judgments rendered by the four British engineers who were not imprisoned after the trial. They were very disappointed in MacDonald's behavior and did not shy away from accounting for his plight as that which befalls weak men. See Bush House interviews, 9 May 1933. 95Richards'to Foreign Office, F0 371/17274 N5682/1610/38, 20 July 1933. There is no indication in the existing documents that an exit visa for Riabova was ever a serious possibility. 951111154255. p- 186- 179 ambiguous by the Prosecutor. One such example occurred when Vyshinskii asked about Thornton's interest in the general and local affairs at the Zlatoust works: Vyshinskii: Perhaps you were interested in the weak spots of the power station, from the point of view of breakdowns? Thornton: I was very much interested in this, but allow me to say why. Vyshinskii: We will clear that up later on. Thornton: That won't do. I want to finish what I have to say. Vyshinskii: Very well. Thornton: I had to know the weak spots so as to judge, if there should be a breakdown on the generator, what kind of switch-boards there were, the transformer lines and in general, what was the state of the internal wiring.97 Of course Vyshinskii was unwilling to leave matters rest on this technical level and he brought in the testimony of one mechanic, Marin, yet another witness who could not be cross- examined during the trial. Marin apparently had told the OGPU that he was paid by MVEC to fix small defects without advising the management at Zlatoust. Here Thornton did not dispute the payment of some 300 to 400 rubles for these repairs, "possibly without the knowledge of the management," but he insisted that this was not meant for diversion or wrecking. When asked to explain why he had given a written statement during his interrogation that the sum paid to Marin was in the order of 4000 rubles, Thornton responded that he 97Ibid., p. 190. 180 had hoped, just as MacDonald had hOped, to clear this matter up in court rather than resist during his interrogation.98 The bulk of the remainder of the morning session was spent with questions posed to Thornton by both the Prosecution and Defense counsel on the subject of the various "loans" that had been arranged for MacDonald. Evidently Thornton handled the MVEC accounts in Moscow with the black- market currency rate firmly in mind since he explained that he allowed the repayment of rubles exchanged at the official rate to be written off with black market rubles. In effect this meant that instead of a loan to MacDonald from the MVEC coffers of 2000 rubles costing MacDonald 200 pounds of his salary to repay, he could get the black market rate which reduced his cost to 66 pounds to repay the 2000 rubles as long as he handled the transaction through Thornton. While Thornton readily admitted this was "illegal" he claimed that it was simply a personal matter and had no relationship to MVEC policy.99 Given the earlier statements of Richards, the MVEC director, that MVEC often advanced money to its employees, it seems likely that here Thornton was stretching matters a bit himself. The Prosecution continued in the evening session of 13 April to develop a portrait of a wrecking organization inspired and funded through the offices of MVEC. Strang 98lbid., p. 191. 99Ibid., p. 218-222. 181 noted in his account of this session that the testimony which recounted the activities of Richards, Monkhouse, and Thornton, during the Russian Civil War, and the brief tenure of these future MVEC men as Russian experts in British Army intelligence, drew noticeable murmurs from the audience.100 Cummings also recalled the strong impression this line of questioning produced and concluded that Russians found it impossible to make the distinction between Army intelligence during war and peace-time intelligence gathering.101 Given the apparent involvement of MVEC with the IIC, however, it may simply be easier to make the distinction if your side benefits from such a distinction. In any case, the shape of the Prosecution's case was now assuming its full dimensions. At the heart of the intelligence charges against MVEC was Thornton's hand-written confession written on the second day of his confinement, 13 March 1933. The Soviet verbatim report provided a facsimile of the document that was read to the Court: All our spying operations on U.S.S.R. territory are directed by the British Intelligence Service, through their agent, C.S. Richards, who occupies the position of Managing Director of the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Export Company, Lt(Sipying operations on U.S.S.R. territory were directed by myself [Thornton] and Monkhouse, representatives of the above-mentioned British firm, who are contractors, by official agreements, to the Soviet Government, for the supply of 1°°Strnng. W. p- 102- 1°lcummin98. W151. p- 164- 182 turbines and electrical equipment and the furnishing of technical aid agreements. On the instructions of C.S. Richards given to me to this end, British personnel were gradually drawn into the spying organization after their arrival on U.S.S.R. territory and instructed as to the information required. During the whole period of our presence on U.S.S.R. territory, from the total of British staff employed, 27 men were engaged in spying operations. Of the above 15 men which included Monkhouse Waters Cox Nordwall Thornton Clark Teasle [Tearle] Shutters Burke Riddle MacDonald Annis, A. Annis, H. Shipley Pollitt were engaged in Economic and Political spying, also in the investigation of the defence and offence possibilities of the Soviet Union. The remaining 12 men who included the following Jule Gregory Jolley Smith, A. Cornell Fallows MacCracken Noel Richards, C.G. Charnock Cushny Whatmough were engaged in political and economic spying. On March 11, 1933 the following men were engaged in spying operations: Nordwall--economic, political, defence and offence investigation Gregory--economic and political Pollitt--economic, political, defence and offence investigation Whatmough--economic and political Riddle--economic, political, defence and offence investigation Thornton--economic, political, defence and offence investigation Monkhouse--economic, political, defence and offence 183 investigation Cushny--economic and political Facts above [about?] the spying activities of the above mentioned men who were under my direction, I shall give in a further protocol. To his credit Thornton parried the queries of Vyshinskii concerning this very damaging document with constant denials that it truly reflected the nature of MVEC interests and activities in the Soviet Union. Vyshinskii mocked Thornton's claim that what the engineer wrote was opposite to what he now said and the Prosecutor tried to cast doubt on Thornton's character by underscoring the disservice he did to MVEC and to the reputations of his colleagues by his confession.103 At best Vyshinskii was able to show that certain details in the written statement were very accurate while other, less convenient facts that pertained to criminal motive, were now contested by Thornton.104 All in all, Thornton managed to fend off the pressure well, but given the detail and intrinsic importance of his confession, his belated resistance could not entirely undo the damage that had been done to the MVEC engineers he had named. After a short intermission, the Defence counsel for Thornton, Braude, led the British accused through a series of 1°2The Qese, pp. 256-258 and facsimile enclosed following p. 256. 1°3Ibid., p. 258. 1°4Ibid., pp. 260-264. 184 questions which helped establish the climate of "moral pressure" that was exerted on Thornton to obtain his signature. Braude also attacked the Prosecution's claim that Thornton came from a wealthy industrial St. Petersburg family and pointed out that Thornton's father owned only a small part of the family business. When the October Revolution came Thornton himself lost about 20,000 Kerensky rubles--a trifling sum which the Defense maintained scarcely constituted a motive sufficient for the charges Thornton faced.105 Two remaining issues of importance were explored in the remainder of the evening session. The first involved the Defence counsel for Anna Kutuzova, Libson, asking Thornton about the sort of information that she was privy to in her post as Secretary and as a house-mate of Thornton and Monkhouse. It was important for Libson to cast doubt on Kutuzova's confession by having Thornton explain that she simply could not have known about the financial and organizational details that she had claimed to know about. The most grand of these was her statement that the MVEC office had received some 50,000 rubles from the British Embassy in Moscow.106 Vyshinskii could not let matters rest at that and tried to develop an argument that was based on 1°51bid., pp. 266-267. 1°6Ibid., pp. 272-273. The British had known about this element of Kutuzova's confession since her return from the Liubianka prison late in January. 185 Kutuzova's confession about her "intimate" living arrangement with Thornton. Kutuzova, apparently mortified at Vyshinskii's request to state publicly the details of this part of her confession, refused to answer the Prosecutor, and only barely managed to confirm her written statement.107 This was sufficient for Vyshinskii to imply that Kutuzova was more than a secretary living in the MVEC compound at Perlovka, and that as an intimate confidant of the MVEC engineers she was trusted with the information that formed the basis of her confession. The last major detail of the case to be raised before the close of testimony on 13 April was the issue of the "loan" to Dolgov, the manager of the Control Department at Electra-Import. When queried by Vyshinskii on this matter, Thornton proceeded to explain that the 3000 rubles was a loan, but it was not meant to be repaid. It was subsequently written off as an expense with the approval of Monkhouse and Richards. Naturally Vyshinskii wanted to know why a loan, which was not meant to be repaid, could possibly be given. When he turned to Monkhouse, the story changed slightly from that of a loan, to the 3000 rubles now being offered as a "present." Vyshinskii then directed the Court's attention to Monkhouse's pre-trial statement:108 1°7Ibid., pp. 281-282. 108Monkhouse claimed that Vyshinskii had actually written the statement in Russian and that Monkhouse had only signed it. 186 I presume that Thornton, when he gave Dolgov the money, allegedly as a loan, wanted in this way to secure Dolgov's favourable disposition to the firm in those cases when Dolgov, as the manager of the installation department, would be called upon to decide on disputes which occurred in connection with compensation claims for defects in the equipment which we are supplying. As was admitted by Richards back in London, this transaction was written off by MVEC as a business expense incurred because Dolgov had hitherto worked very closely with the British company--one might add, no wonder.110 At best the "present" offered to Dolgov, apparently for the purpose of his purchasing a new flat, was intended as a "bribe" for general goodwill on Dolgov's part, if not a payment for specific information or specific actions on his part. From the point of view of MVEC the amount was inconsequential. Kutuzova explained that the deficit was easily recovered by selling 250 Torgsin rubles for 3000 regular rubles at black market rates.111 The Court then adjourned but not before noting that Dolgov would be summoned as a witness the following day. He would be the only person physically to testify during the trial who was not one of the accused and it was for this reason that British officials considered him an egenr prevocateur. Dolgov's testimony on 14 April, ironically it was Good 109Ibid., p. 288. The statement was signed on 26 March. 110Richards to Collier, F0 371/17265 N1802/1610/38, 21 March 1933. 1111bid., p. 290. 187 Friday, did further damage to Thornton, Monkhouse, and MVEC management. The Soviet manager alleged that Thornton had first suggested that MVEC regularly helped out its employees with advances of salary and that Dolgov's own troubles might be alleviated in a similar manner. While Thornton challenged this statement, he could not get away from Dolgov's claim that Thornton had told him the 3000 rubles would be kept to himself and Monkhouse and that there was no need to specify any time limit for the "loan."112 Very damaging testimony was then drawn out of Monkhouse who confirmed that, in the British manager's view, Dolgov regarded the sum as a bribe and that MVEC came to regard it as a "present" to the Soviet manager.113 Monkhouse admitted that when the sum, which was given to Dolgov in July 1932, went unpaid for six months the whole transaction came to "smack of bribery."114 The Prosecution's case here was made easier by the fact that they had recovered some of Thornton's account books in their raid at the MVEC compound and records of the Dolgov "loan" were included in one of these books. It showed the sum being charged to Thornton in early July and then shifted to a "suspense account" towards the end of the month. It was only in December that Richards made the decision to use 250 llzrne Cese, pp. 298-300. 113Ibid., pp. 303-304. 114Ibid. 188 Torgsin rubles to balance the ledger.115 Another surprise awaited the British defendants when Dolgov and the Prosecution alleged that on the same day that Dolgov received the funds from Thornton, he turned the sum over to the OGPU and made a report of the transaction. Thus, one of the men whom MVEC relied upon for day-to-day information and cooperation and had indulged in the company's usual policy of friendly "indiscretion" was, from July 1932 until their arrests, part of a network of informants who were aiding the OGPU in their investigation of MVEC. The lead editorial on the trial carried the same day by the Commissariat of Heavy Industry's journal, Za lndustrializatsiiu, seemed to capture the impact of the damage done to MVEC thus far--it was entitled, "Facts are Stubborn Things."116 After the sensations of the Dolgov testimony, the remainder of the morning session saw Lobanov, Lebedev, and Kotliarevskii outline the scope of their wrecking activities and the role of various British engineers in their anti- Soviet machinations. When MacDonald's counsel, Smirnov, attacked the testimony of Kotliarevskii on the grounds that the British engineer was in England when the problems at Zuevka power station occurred, the President of the Court 1151bid., p. 306. 115Ee lnensrrialinatsiie carried a fairly full account of the trial throughout the week, often featuring the testimony and photographs from the proceedings as one of its leading stories. 189 pointed out that "a whole group of people were arrested in connection with this and are under preliminary investigation."117 This was the first sign during the trial that those defendants in the show trial were only a small portion of those caught up in the sweep of the electrical industry--a fact that was given additional substance when purges occurred in the Moscow power station system later in the summer of 1933.118 The evening session of 14 April continued to develop the portrait of Soviet engineers being bribed and instructed by Thornton, MacDonald, Nordwall and others not even named in the indictment. Nordwall resisted the charges made against him, but it was evident that most of the fight had gone out of Thornton, and MacDonald continued to respond as one who has been defeated. The most forthright challenge to the Prosecution's case came from an indignant Albert Gregory who insisted that he be allowed to read a prepared statement. He began by complaining that Zivert was "fouling" his reputation and went on to challenge the panel of engineering experts to find anything objectionable in his work record at the Dzerzhinka or Dneiprostroi projects where he supervised the erectors of three of the world's largest electrical 117Ibid., p. 327. 1185trang to Simon, F0 371/17251 N4720/l610/38, 17 June 1933 discussed the significance of the purge of personnel at MOGES I power station reported in Rehochnaie Meshye, "Lessons Have Not Been Learned," 9 June 1933. 190 switches in 48 days. Upon completion of his statement he thanked Ulrich for allowing him the floor.119 According to Cummings, the fiery Welshman stormed back to his seat "looking very much like he would like to hit something or someone very hard indeed."120 After Gregory's strong showing Ulrich decided to adjourn for twenty minutes! The final defendant called upon resumption was perhaps the most convincing "wrecker", Sukhoruchkin. His testimony was littered with connections to engineers tried in the famous "Industrial Party" trial121 and, in this way, linked the current OGPU action against the electrical industry to past crimes and criminals. Sukhoruchkin also managed to take credit for very major breakdowns, such as the Moscow blackout of 22 November 1932, as well as claiming numerous more petty wrecking projects as his own. Thornton gathered himself together enough to dispute Sukhoruchkin's allegation that the British engineer had paid him for and instructed him in the wrecking activities he had carried out. The follow-up questions from the Defense Counsel, Braude, served to confirm the tenuousness of Thornton's relationship to the Soviet engineer.122 The final full day of testimony began with a sharp 119Ibid., p. 399. 120Cummings, The Moscow Triel, p. 193. 121The Qeee, p. 414. 1221bid., pp. 423-424. 191 exchange between Monkhouse and Ulrich. According to Strang, Monkhouse had decided to spring a prepared statement denouncing the whole trial as a frame-up and had gained the assent of his colleagues on the matter.123 Ulrich tried to restrain him three times at the outset of the session, but Monkhouse managed to blurt out that "after the showing which Sukhoruchkin made last night, it is perfectly clear to me that this case is a frame-up against the Metro-Vickers, based on the evidence of terrorized prisoners."124 Ulrich assured Monkhouse that he would get a chance to make a closing statement later in the trial and only with great difficulty did he succeed in proceeding with the testimony of Krasheninnikov, Oleinik, and Zorin. During the testimony that followed, Cushny, and to a lesser extent, Thornton, disputed allegations of bribing and wrecking that were attributed to them by the Soviet accused in much the same manner that had occurred before. Cushny managed to prove that the breakdowns that had occurred at the Baku station where he and Oleinik worked together had not occurred with MVEC equipment. Moreover he pointed out that the boilers that did break down were brand new and of an innovative design--this suggested to him that the Soviet engineers charged with the operation of the new technology 123Stran9. Homs_and_Ahroad. p- 104. 124The Case, p. 427. 192 did not really understand the latest developments.125 The feature event of the evening session of 15 April was the examination of Monkhouse. After providing a biographical sketch which included references to his activities at Archangel during the Russian Civil War, Monkhouse was asked to detail the types of problems MVEC equipment had incurred in the Soviet Union. Monkhouse did not deny that defects, sometimes serious defects, had been present in MVEC equipment at various sites around the country. One source of the problem with MVEC turbines was that they were to be run at 2,000 work hours per annum for peak efficiency, but Soviet practice paid little attention to such requirements.126 For the most part Monkhouse fended off Vyshinskii's attempts to "interpret" the British manager's replies as the Prosecutor wanted to and Monkhouse took great exception to Vyshinskii's introduction of portions of his written statement which he had retracted prior to the trial's beginning.127 Vyshinskii claimed that he had allowed no such retraction and that he was not even present at such a meeting. Monkhouse was placated somewhat when it became clear that the testimony Vyshinskii wanted to recall was not that which Monkhouse feared most. Even so, Monkhouse's written statement asserted that he would not have bought the 1251bid., p. 477. 125Ibid., p. 527. 127Ibid., pp. 534-535. 193 latest MVEC machinery to fulfill the tasks intended by the Commissariat of Heavy Industry because of known defects in the systems.128 Monkhouse did not try to deny his or MVEC's knowledge of the defects, but excused this as something practiced by businessmen everywhere. He added, MVEC "did everything to satisfy the demands of our clients. We sent machines which we guaranteed and these machines we shall rebuild."129 At the end of the session Vyshinskii took care to demonstrate that Monkhouse's outburst in the morning, which claimed that he had been interrogated for 18 hours straight, was false. Monkhouse accepted the revision to a 12 hour total he now agreed had been endured in two separate sessions.130 As to the Timee editorial after the trial that to "most people the distinction between 19, 18, or even 12 hours of continuous examination will appear a distinction with hardly a difference," Monkhouse's own concern about the matter would appear to falsify such a view.131 In any event, this incident went some way to bolstering the legitimacy of the methods used in the pre-trial examination and undermined the impact of Monkhouse's indignant protest in the eyes of 128Ibid., pp. 535-537. 129Ibid., p. 536. 13°Ibid., pp. 564-565. 131Times, "The Moscow Trial: A New Survey," 22 May 1933, p. 16. 194 some observers.132 When views of the foreign diplomatic corps in Moscow turned to the negative impression made by the MVEC engineers, Monkhouse's admission was often cited as a particularly damaging one. Such behavior was "disgraceful and unworthy of Englishmen."133 The final submission of evidence took place 16 April in the form of ten questions submitted by Monkhouse to the Commission of Experts charged with assessing the technical aspects of the case. It is hard to know what Monkhouse hoped to achieve with these questions since he scarcely opposed the adverse answers each question was treated with by the Commission. In general, the Commission emphasized the possibility, if not certainty, that the breakdowns occurred along the lines of the Soviet testimony rendered in the case. In short, these breakdowns were not "accidental", but were politically motivated.134 Monkhouse chose only to point out that a lengthy technical dispute could be justified on a number of the Commission's conclusions but he did not want to pursue it at this juncture. Most probably Monkhouse thought there was little to lose by having the Commission pass judgment and if they came down against MVEC he could attack 132See Cummings's discussion of the uses and abuses of the interrogation methods in The Meeeow Trial, pp. 212-215. 133Strang to Simon, F0 371/17273 N5521/1610/38 18 July 1933. 134Ibid., pp. 577-583. 195 them, along with the whole orchestration of the trial, during his final statement. This left the floor open for the concluding remarks of the Public Prosecutor, Vyshinskii. His comments fill almost one hundred pages of the verbatim report as he brought the drama of this trial of "social scum" to its final climax. He heaped ridicule on most of the accused and once again demonstrated the Prosecution's conviction that these wreckers were agents of both MVEC and the British Secret Service. The Prosecutor defended Soviet judicial methods by quoting from a speech by Sir Stafford Cripps in the House of Commons who had recently complained about British justice holding prisoners without the benefit of knowing what the charges were to be, as in the Scottish Silks case.135 Here Vyshinskii understood that attack was the best defense and he brought out statements by the British accused and gave them a severe and sarcastic reworking. He portrayed the confessions of Thornton and Monkhouse as evidence which demonstrated that they knew that while living in the Soviet Union they were subject to Soviet law, and that they also knew they had transgressed the bounds of that law by being overzealous in the gathering of information.136 Vyshinskii asserted: This is exactly what Thornton says: in admitting that he was guilty of espionage, he says, he 135Ibid., p. 590. See 3,2. Deh, 5 s., # 276, cols. 1795- 1795, 1802-1805, 5 April 1933. 136Ibid., pp. 609-610. 196 thought that in this country spying information meant, not information having military State significance, as it is in actual fact, but all information including such information [gossip] as I have just spoken about. Why did he argue like that? Perhaps because he wanted to take advantage of the really fairly wide definition in this sphere of law of capitalist countries.137 By arguing in this way, Vyshinskii was responding to Thornton's attempt to discredit the charge of espionage by likening it to a charge of collecting common gossip. The Prosecutor instead maintained that Soviet law was very specific, and since MVEC engineers had admitted they were subject to the law, this meant they knew its specifics and therefore had confessed to the specifics--not to any broad interpretation of its meaning. The complaints by Monkhouse about long interrogations were dealt with by Vyshinskii by drawing attention to the written requests submitted by Litvinov in March which asked that the MVEC case be expedited as quickly as possible.138 Thus, it was out of courtesy, not out of vindictiveness, that the interrogators had worked long and hard to get to the heart of the case, Vyshinskii contended. In winding up his performance, Vyshinskii did not neglect to pay tribute to his leader: And from the lofty height of this scaffolding of our socialist construction, crowning with new and new victories the efforts, the creative labour and the enthusiasm of the proletariat of our Party 137Ibid., p. 611. 1331bid., p. 664. 197 under the leadership of the Central Committee, and of the leader of our Party, Comrade Stalin, of the proletariat which is marching along the heroic path of victory, the despicable crimes by which these insignificant, venal, corrupt, and treacherous people, who betrayed the socialist fatherland, and tried to hold up the victorious march of the socialist revolution, will appear still more insignificant, more shameful and more repulsive.139 The former Menshevik, Vyshinskii, had definitely found his calling as Prosecutor in Stalin's court. The responses of the various Defense counsels and final statements by the accused were all that remained in the trial before sentencing. Even Strang had to admit that the Soviet lawyers, "within their limits, did their best for their clients."140 One of the chief difficulties that arose for the defense, aside from the obvious political considerations that enveloped the case, was that in a trial with multiple accused, most of whom had incriminated one or another of their associates in the dock, it was impossible to argue that one defendant was innocent without further incriminating another defendant or group of defendants. This feature played an important role when Defense counsel defended Soviet accused by trying to demonstrate the transformation of character that had occurred once the Russian met the foreigner. At one juncture there was even some bickering between the Defence counsels about this tactic 139Ibid., p. 673. 14oStrang, Mome ene hhroad, pp. 108-109. 198 since some had to defend Russians and others the British accused. Libson took up this problem in response to Braude: For instance, we heard it said from the mouth of Braude that in defending the Russians my associates went to extremes, that we made it appear that these Englishmen had in some potent, mystical manner brought pressure to bear upon the Russians, in consequence of which they committed crimes....It is incorrect to term us Counsel for the Defence for the Russians. We Soviet Counsel are quite aware that Richards is not Mephistopheles, that Thornton is not Faust and that the Russian engineers are not Marguerites. Despite this disavowal by an advocate for a Russian accused, each set of defenders responsible for either the British or the Russian accused, had to "prosecute" the other group of defendants.142 Kaznacheev defended Gussev, for example, by underscoring the humble background of Gussev, who was the son of an engineer, and stressing that "the decisive role in transforming Gussev's anti-Soviet sentiments into active counter-revolutionary activity was played by these gentlemen [Thornton and MacDonald]."143 Kaznacheev could not get around Gussev's own confession that claimed the Russian engineer had volunteered for Kolchak's army, but at least Gussev had honestly confessed this counter-revolutionary behavior and, in any case, the son of an engineer could not 1411bid., pp. 765-766. 142See Libson's rebuttal to Braude on this point, The %, pp. 764-7650 14311195352. 1»- 678. 199 be a class enemy. Apparently Kaznacheev thought the sons of the technical-intelligentsia were necessarily allies of the proletariat.144 What is more, the Defense argued, in cases of wreckers such as Gussev, and Sokolov too, they were second rate wreckers at best, and therefore did not warrant the "supreme measure"--death by shooting.145 Of course if the Defense argued that some of the Russian wreckers were only second-rate, it had to acknowledge that there were individuals on trial who were first-rate criminals. For Kaznacheev, the most likely candidate for this dubious accolade was Oleinik. Oleinik had had a long involvement with foreign firms dating back to before the Revolution and had traveled to Manchester for training with MVEC. Vyshinskii had painted him in "repulsive colours," Kaznacheev admitted, and Oleinik himself had characterized his own crimes "pointedly and quite correctly." The only point Kaznacheev could raise in his defense was that Oleinik had become so much a part of the foreign firm that he could no longer distinguish the borderline "between the legal and permissible and the illegal and impermissible." He was, "without knowing it himself," an obedient "tool" of Thornton, his employer.146 As a defense, this was not much, but Kaznacheev hoped the Court could see fit to allow such men to 14"Ibid., pp. 677-678. 1451bid., pp. 680-681. 145Ibid., p. 681. 200 be rehabilitated after the lapse of some term in order that they could "join in that great work of constructing socialist society."147 For the most part, then, the strategy of defending the Russian accused amounted to an attempt to show that "active" anti-Soviet behavior, as opposed to a general anti-Soviet predisposition, took over only once contact with the British employees of MVEC had taken place. Anna Kutuzova's defence, presented by Libson, attacked the notion that this capable secretary, who was recommended to MVEC by the "untouchable" Professor Graftio, could scarcely avoid contact with the British staff and could in no way be connected to any particular act of wrecking.148 Libson maintained that it was MVEC that had proposed that Kutuzova should live at the company compound once living arrangements became hard to procure in Moscow. Finally, the Court was asked to consider the psychological strain that Kutuzova was under, and here Libson made sure to direct attention to what he called the "psychological condition peculiar to her as a woman," (whatever that means) as employee and friend of Thornton and Monkhouse.149 Her only crime, Libson argued, was that she failed to inform promptly on people to whom she was 147Ibid., p. 682. 1431bid., p. 771. 149Ibid., p. 772-773. 201 professionally and psychologically attached.150 Undertaking the defense of the British accused was, as Braude noted, a "far from simple task."151 Still the strategy used by the defence counsel for the British was, in general, more aggressively contentious of the nature of the "evidence" rendered in the testimony given during the trial and openly hostile to the notion that the Russian accused were simply pawns in the hands of conspiratorial foreigners. In his turn, Braude mocked the strategy of those advocates who defended the Russians. Comrade Judges, we in this country are living in an epoch of the sound materialist conception of human relationships. Idealist ravings about a powerful, all absorbing personality who subjects all who surround him to his own will, who forces all around him to carry out his desires, do not suit us; the mystical images of demons, of evil geniuses who seduce and tempt others, that were depicted in the speeches of the Defence, do not suit us....we know only sound, normal, human mutual relationships and it is on this plane of mutual relationships that I will try to define my assumptions concerning the charges against Thornton.15 Thornton's defence was made more demanding than most of the other British defendants because of his confession and the corroborating testimony of a number of the other accused. Braude attacked the case against Thornton by arguing that 15°Ibid., p. 774. 1511bid., p. 708. 152Ibid., p. 709-710. It was this speech by Braude which provoked Libson's response on behalf of the "Counsel for the Russians" cited above. 202 quantity is not the same as quality and boldly asserting that, such a combination of testimony by accomplices may be strong legal proof only if it is impossible to presuppose the presence of a common motive for giving such testimony, of a common psychological reason which, without a preliminary agreement on their parts would dictate their line of behavior. This struck at the heart of the whole series of "confessions" rendered in the trial and was one of the startling example of the latitude allowed in the defence of the MVEC accused. As to Thornton's signed statements, Braude asserted that Thornton's denial of almost all of his pre-trial confessions meant that he was only guilty of collecting "economic information." On this charge, Braude could see no way out for Thornton, but there was the mitigating circumstance that the legal boundaries in the USSR and elsewhere on such a Charge varied markedly and, in contrast to Vyshinskii's depiction of Thornton, Braude maintained the British engineer simply had failed to pay close enough attention to the local norms.154 Finally, the charge of bribing could be understood in the same way--in capitalist countries such payments were common. The "whole trouble is that the accused transferred these methods of capitalist economy to our country."155 This 153Ibid., p. 712. 154Ibid., pp. 717-719. 1551bid., pp. 718-719. 203 showed, in Braude's view, a "light-minded" approach to MVEC affairs in the Soviet Union. Such action constituted a crime, but a crime that could be understood more as a mistake than as an act designed to aid in the wrecking of the USSR.155 Of those foreigners accused of the most serious involvement in the anti-Soviet "organization," William MacDonald received perhaps the most moving defence. Smirnov took the Court through engineer's biographical profile recalling the childhood accident that left the ten-year old MacDonald lame and emphasizing that while MacDonald came from a society dominated by the bourgeoisie, he, himself, was from the working class. This tack, of course, pointed to the weakness of any argument against MacDonald based on his "class origins" and was built into a defence for MacDonald which stressed that he, unlike Thornton or Monkhouse, had little political knowledge or managerial abilities to utilize as instruments for any anti-Soviet behavior whatsoever. Rather the young, lame, politically naive engineer, MacDonald, came to the Soviet Union only to encounter "the terrible and ghastly image of Vassily Alexeyevitch Gussev."157 Thus, the roles were to be reversed in the defense of the British. How could these engineers teach anti-Soviet spirits such as Gussev, Sokolov, or Sukhoruchkin 155Ibid. 157Ibid., p. 700. 204 anything about "white-guardist" sentiment?158 This argument was used in the defence of all the British defendants except Gregory, who was to be cleared of all charges, but in these other cases more attention was paid to debunking the actual testimony raised against the British engineers. The testimony of Kutuzova was alleged to be inconsistent throughout and lacking in specifics.159 Testimony against Nordwall and Cushny reduced itself to the prosecution relying on the word of a "confessed" Russian wrecker against the word of a British engineer who had consistently claimed to be innocent.16o In the defense of Monkhouse, Kommodov had to deal with the issue of Monkhouse's participation in the Russian Civil War. This he said was a point that counted against the British engineer, though even here it was necessary to note that Monkhouse had refused to serve under Denikin.161 Despite this, Kommodov thought that in the intervening years from 1918, Monkhouse "may have changed his attitude."162 He observed that Monkhouse was, an intelligent man, a man with a broad outlook, [who] cannot have failed to see how the face of our land has changed during these years....He has seen 1581bid., p. 713. 159Ibid., pp. 715-716; 751, 758. 16°Ibid., pp. 724-725. 1611bid., p. 762. 1521bid., p. 761. 205 that where the muzhiks used to till the soil with wooden ploughs, tractors and mechanical ploughs are now in operation. Where formerly dugouts in which all those who produced all the wealth once lived like moles, palaces of labour and clubs now rlse. The British manager of MVEC, in Kommodov's view, one of a group of foreign specialists who are "working with no less enthusiasm than the whole country is working; they are sincere friends of the Soviet Union."164 Like Thornton, Monkhouse could not escape some responsibility for minor issues such as the Dolgov "bribe," but he was not an anti- Soviet wrecker bent on undermining the Soviet state.165 After the members of the Collegium of Defence finished with their final statements, each of the accused was given the opportunity for a final personal plea. All of the Russian accused quietly restated their guilt, and from the British defendants only Monkhouse thought it necessary to add to the final drama of the trial. He began by making a veiled comment that implied Vyshinskii was lying if he continued to insist that he had taken no part in Monkhouse's interrogation. The evidence from testimony such as Thornton's confession was not given "voluntarily" and the countervailing testimony of the other four British accused had such weight that such "confessions" as Thornton gave 163Ibid., p. 762. 164Ibid., p. 750. 165Ibid., pp. 751-752. 206 would not be accepted as real evidence in any "Court of Law."166 Monkhouse went on to insist that MVEC itself had a great interest in continued work in the USSR and had no interest whatsoever in "cutting our own throats" by engaging in "wrecking activities."157 Moreover, as engineers, the staff of MVEC could not bring themselves to destroy their own creations: Engineers, when they build works of this kind, they look upon them as their own children. And I know of no parents who would put a dagger into the heart of their own child. It was a fitting summation by a man who had spent twenty years working in Russia and the Soviet Union. The final session of the trial of the Metropolitan- Vickers engineers began in the twilight hours of April 18-19. A long statement of the findings of the Court was read which recounted the key points of the Prosecution's case and made it clear that the "aforesaid State employees of power stations were connected with the criminal activity of certain 1551bid., p. 780. 167Ibid. Monkhouse also alleged that the Soviets still owed MVEC about 15 million rubles (about 1.4 million pounds), an odd error, since Richards had told the Foreign Office in March that the outstanding balance was in the order of 30 thousand pounds. It may be that Monkhouse's figure was an estimate of the amount of business MVEC was hoping to gain by continued access to the Soviet market. See Foreign Office Minute by Collier, F0 371/17265 N1827/1610/38, 17 March 1933. 168Ibid., p. 781. 207 employees of the private British firm of Metropolitan- Vickers."169 Thornton was assigned the leading criminal role in the indictment against the British engineers. The Court also cited a decree by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of 14 March 1933 which stipulated that "State employees guilty of wrecking are regarded as traitors to their fatherland and must be held more strictly responsible than employees of private enterprises."170 This was the first real sign that the British would receive lighter sentences than the Russians in the dock. At this point the sentences were read out and it became clear that no one would receive the "supreme measure of social defence"--death by shooting. The explanation given for this act of generosity was that "the Court was guided by the fact that the criminal wrecking activities of the aforesaid convicted persons bore a local character and did not cause serious damage to the industrial power of the U.S.S.R."171 With this proviso the sentences were: 1. Gussev, Sukhoruchkin, and Lobanov--10 years. 2. Sokolov, Zorin, and Kotliarevskii-—8 years. 3. Krasheninnikov--5 years. 4. Lebedev--2 years, "in view of the fact that he was 17°Ibid., p. 796. 208 merely a tool of Lobanov."172 5. Thornton--3 years. 6. MacDonald--2 years, "in so far as he acted under the direct instigation of his immediate superior, Thornton, on the one hand, and in view of his frank confession." 7. Monkhouse and Nordwall--expulsion from the USSR for five years, "in so far as they did not take part in causing breakdowns." 8. Cushny--expulsion from the USSR for five years, "in view of the lapse of time since the crime...(1928)." 9. Oleinik--3 years, "taking into consideration the fact that he was subordinate to Thornton and that he was an employee of a private firm." 10. Kutuzova--18 months, "for the same reasons as above [Oleinik]."173 11. Zivert--no punishment, "taking into consideration that by the work he has done since 1931 he has proved that he has sincerely broken off all connections with the wreckers." 12. Gregory--acquitted7 "in view of the inadequacy of the evidence."1 4 The Court asked that Monkhouse, Nordwall, and Cushny to leave the USSR within three days time. Though the sentences were light, it had already been decided in London that if any prison terms were handed down the embargo, which had been provided for before the trial, 172Ibid. 173Ibid., p. 797. 174Ibid., p. 798. 209 would go into effect immediately. Since the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 1930 had officially been terminated on April 17, there were no legal impediments to the enactment of the embargo and it was duly authorized by the Privy Council 19 April 1933.175 The stage was thus set for the final confrontation of the Metro-Vickers' affair. 1'753ee Strang's account of this decision in Meme_end Abroad. P- 110- Chapter 5 Crisis Contained Soviet authorities seem to have fallen between two stools in fixing sentences on Russians and on English. On the one hand they have failed to satisfy His Majesty's Government. On the other they have disappointed their own partisans by leniency displayed. Audience at the trial was obviously disappointed that there were no death sentences and I gather that communist circles are mortified to lose golden opportunity to strike home at enemies of State. ---William Strang, Moscow, 20 April 1933.1 Recall, say, the pressure that was brought to bear upon us by Britain; the embargo on our exports, the attempt to interfere in our internal affairs and to use this as a probe--to test our power of resistance.... It is well known that a certain section of the British Conservatives cannot live without such sallies. And precisely because they are not accidental we must reckon that in the future, too, sallies will be made against the U.S.S.R., all sorts of menaces will be created, attempts will be undertaken to damage the U.S.S.R. ---Stalin, Report to the Seventh Party Congress, 26 January 1934. The completion of the show trial did not signify an end to the Metro-Vickers crisis, but instead clarified many of the issues at stake. For formal Anglo-Soviet relations, the verdict of the trial presented a challenge to the British Government to act on its threat of economic sanctions by swiftly bringing the pressures of a trade 1F0 371/17270 N2943/l610/38, 20 April 1933. 210 211 embargo to bear on the Soviet Union. For the MVEC it meant trying to maintain a significant and profitable business relationship, while at the same time assisting the efforts of His Majesty's Government to secure the release of the imprisoned engineers. On the Soviet side, as the crisis dragged on from April to July, it became increasingly clear that Litvinov and the Narkomindel would be busily engaged trying to minimize and defuse a difficult situation against the international backdrop of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the World Economic Conference in London,2 heightened American concerns about the recognition of USSR, and a Soviet domestic scene replete with continuing purges and Party ehierhi. During the course of the trial, the British Cabinet had debated the merits of various schemes pending the trial's outcome. Early on in the deliberations, Runciman suggested that a measure targeting the Russian Petroleum Products Co. (ROP) in Britain, a subsidiary of the Soviet oil agency, Neftsindikat, would "appear to inflict maximum disadvantage on Soviet Russia with a minimum disadvantage to ourselves."3 Vansittart argued that if the Soviet court acquitted all the British defendants, H.M.G. could not be justified taking any punitive action whatsoever. While the Permanent Under- Secretary agreed that the passing of light sentences would 2The Conference met from 12 June to 27 July 1933. 3CAB 23/75 27(33)1, C.P. 101(33), 12 April 1933. 212 merit the type of measure which Runciman had indicated in Cabinet, he maintained that heavy sentencing would warrant substantially more punishment than simply closing up ROP, which ran at a loss and was "basically a propaganda enterprise," anyway. In a memo the following day, Vansittart cautioned Simon that, "we should be an object of some derision not only in Russia but throughout the world if, out of all our labours, so ridiculous a mouse were born."4 The decisive steps were taken on 18 April, just prior to the final sentencing in Moscow, and were based on the accurate assessment of the Foreign Office that all British defendants but Gregory would be found guilty. While there was some sentiment voiced in the Cabinet meeting that day that, even if all defendants were acquitted, a strong embargo should be put into effect, the actual Import Prohibitions Act that was approved could not be empowered if all six British defendants were simply expelled from the USSR.5 The main targets of the embargo were oil and timber. Flax was not on the list for fear of encouraging the development of a native Soviet linen-industry and it was hoped the Russians would continue to export the raw material that was so essential for industry in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Taken as a whole, the embargo against Soviet 4Vansittart to Simon, F0 371/17268 N2782/1610/38, 13 April 1933. 5CAB 23/76 29(33)1, 18 April 1933. 213 exports to Britain covered roughly eighty percent of goods from the USSR.6 Consistent with the optimistic premise that had originally informed the British decision to seek embargo- enabling powers was the conviction that the USSR was decidedly vulnerable to economic sanctions. Simon told the Cabinet that Russian balances here are rapidly drawn on by Soviet Government to pay for purchases from other countries, especially Germany, and it is the view of my advisers that if the proclamation is sufficiently wide, it is very improbable that Soviet Russia could stand the strain for more than month.7 Moreover, British estimates of the balance of trade with the USSR made the Soviet market less and less valuable to British producers.8 The supplies that would be lost from refusing imports of Soviet goods, could easily be made up by increasing imports from Scandinavia, the Empire, and British- owned oil companies.9 As events would show, even this hope was not easily realized. Britain found its supply of timber seriously disrupted and businessmen who normally traded with 6Ibid. 71bid. 8Simon to Lord Hailsham, F0 800/288, 25 April 1933; Strang to Simon, F0 371/17270 N2987/l6lO/38, 22 April 1933. 9Ibid. 214 the USSR found that they suffered from the embargo as well.10 The signals coming from Moscow offered the British some initial confirmation of their assessment of the trade situation. Indications from the Soviet diplomatic corps pointed to a continuing rift between the Narkomindel and other branches of the Soviet Government. Strang related the view of one source: The wife of one of the People's Commissars told one of my colleagues two days ago that her husband had remarked to her 'I really cannot understand why the authorities have held this trial'. She said that other people in the same circles were saying the same thing. Her own view was that if the Soviet Government had wanted to 'Kick the British' they should have waited until they had substantial cause....Strength of our reaction has apparently surprised the authorities. Given the position taken, and the intimacy of the source, it is almost certain that the opinions expressed in this instance stemmed from Ivy Litvinova, the British-born wife of Maxim Litvinov. It was probably for this reason that Strang kept his source anonymous since he transmitted the message by telegram. Strang had also received word from Boris Steiger, a shadowy figure employed in the Commissariat of Education and attached to the Narkomindel, that he did not think the trial had produced the necessary evidence to warrant action against 10See the discussion in the Cabinet meeting and Runciman's complaints in CAB 23/76 43(33) 29 June 1933. 11Strang to Simon, F0 371/17270 N2984/1610/38, 23 April 1933. 215 Britain.12 Steiger was used by many foreign missions in the 19305, including the British, French13 and the American embassies, as a liaison with the Narkomindel and as an "independent channel of communication" with the Soviet leadership.14 While these sources indicate that those associated with the Soviet diplomatic corps were unhappy with the current state of Anglo-Soviet relations and were concerned about the added strain imposed by the British embargo, there are reasons to question the British assumption that they were bargaining for the release of Thornton and MacDonald from a position of strength. In the first instance, the Soviets immediately imposed their own counter-embargo on the remaining trade items which were left out of the British act. The Soviet decree was to remain in effect only as long as the 121bid. 13According to the French Charge d' Affaires, Payart, Steiger disappeared, along with so many Soviet diplomats, in the Great Purge of 1937. He wryly observed, "M. Staline reste maitre de la situation." Payart to Delbos, (Foreign Secretary), Eocumenrs piplometigne Erenceis, 2nd series, Vol. V, #301 17 April 1937, #331 24 April 1937. Also see the discussion by Jiri Hochman in The §oviet Unien end rhe 'l ect'v e ur 934- 93 , (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 128-129 and T. Uldricks, "The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs," Slevie Reviey, 36 2 (1977): 187-203. 14This according to George Kennan as he indicated to the political scientist, Jerry Hough. See Hough, Rey rhe §oviet Union is Governee, p. 167, n. 61. 216 British embargo was in force.15 This was not merely a token gesture, as Owen has argued,16 since the export of items that the British had deliberately left out of their own restrictions, such as flax, dropped markedly from the levels of 1932. It was only after another Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was negotiated in 1934, that export of such raw materials regained their earlier levels.17 More important for an assessment of the leverage available to the British in this apparent test of economic strength is an evaluation of the broader trends in Soviet trade. The British correctly assumed that Soviet exports normally helped the USSR pay for German goods and this trend increased in 1933.18 Trade figures show, however, that Soviet imports were declining sharply across the board19 and in absolute terms Britain, the United States, France and Germany were all hit hard from 1930 to 1935. While the 15lzvestiia, 22 April 1933 carried the text of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade's Decree on Trade with Great Britain of 21 April 1933. 16Owen, "The Metro-Vickers Crisis," p. 101. 17Based on data from Vneshan a Tor ov a SS za 1918- 1259 gg., p. 460. 18Note the disparities between the balance of trade figures for the major trading partners of the USSR in Appendix G. 19See Appendix B, in particular the change from 1931 to 1934. Similar trends appear in Appendix G as the amount of trade with all three major trading partners declining sharply. The discrepancy between the two sets of ruble totals from Appendix B to Appendix G occurs because the former uses 1950 ruble values and the latter uses 1936 values. 217 British were undoubtedly correct in reasoning that the British market was much more important to the USSR than the Soviet market was to Britain,20 it is hard to sustain the notion that the Soviets were critically reliant on the foreign exchange they generated from sales in the United Kingdom. Soviet exports were generally declining in this period, though not at nearly as fast a rate as imports,21 and they were shifting from a heavy reliance on the British market, which normally bought about twenty-five percent of Soviet goods, to other countries.22 Ironically, just when Britain sought to squeeze the USSR, the Soviet economy began to enjoy the first year of a four year run of a surplus in its balance of trade.23 Even if the USSR had lost the entire British market this would still have been the case. 20It should be noted that certain British industries were heavily reliant on the Soviet market for exports. In 1932 the USSR bought 84% of British machine tools sold abroad and 25% of British electrical equipment exported. See Strang to Simon, FO 371/17239 N3247/5/38, 30 April 1933. 21See Appendix B, "Soviet Foreign Trade, 1913-1940"; The Soviets also tried, not too successfully, to interest Italy and Poland in more extensive trade arrangements. See Strang to Vansittart, D,E.F,P,, #496, 22 May 1933, n. 3, especially minute by Shone, 1 June 1933. 22See Appendix G. While Soviet sales to its largest markets, Britain and Germany showed some decline in 1932- 1934, countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden showed short term increases. The Mongolian Republic's purchases of Soviet imports increased from 4.6% of the Soviet total in 1931 to 10.7% in 1934. See A. Baykov, peyier Foreign Trade, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), Table VII. 231bid. 218 Alexander Baykov has argued that after the massive purchases of the First Five-Year Plan, the Soviets were suffering from a shortage of foreign exchange by 1932, but has also pointed out that the Soviet economy could do without the level of imports it had required in the early years of the First Five- Year Plan.24 What this suggests is that by 1933, at a time when the world economy was suffering from the effects of the Great Depression more generally, the Soviet economy had gained a sufficient level of development, flexibility and self-reliance to withstand the pressures of a British embargo. This does not mean that the economic pressure exerted by the British embargo was not a factor in the Anglo- Soviet conflict, but it does make it necessary to look beyond economics for an explanation of the conflict's resolution. At the same time as the British Cabinet deliberated over its strategy in this Anglo-Soviet confrontation, the MVEC was reassessing its business ventures in the Soviet Union and trying to help extricate Thornton and MacDonald from the Soviet jail. It had evidently become apparent to the directors of MVEC that it was no longer possible to participate in Soviet industrial enterprises without the active support of the British Government. Sir Felix Pole directed the MVEC lawyer in Moscow, Robert Turner, to use the services of Acting-Counsellor Strang to begin negotiations for the release of the engineers. He told Turner to 24A. Baykov, SQViet foreign Trade. pp. 55-56, 59-60. 219 emphasize that MVEC had a strong interest in continuing to work in the USSR and that it would be very difficult to encourage engineers to work in that country if two of their colleagues remained in prison.25 The issue of how to continue work in the USSR was taken up at the Foreign Office on the strength of a lengthy memo by Strang which reviewed the history of MVEC practices in the Soviet context. Collier made the memo available to Pole and Richards, but the MVEC Directors showed little interest in adopting its main points. Strang had warned that The Metro-Vickers trial points [to] the pitiless moral which is important to all foreigners working in Russia and to the company in particular. This is that any foreigner working in Russia whose business brings him in contact with enterprises of national importance runs a grave risk of arrest, trial and sentence for espionage, bribery or wrecking if he establishes other than the barest business or professional relations with the Russians.... The company may well think it desirable to replace all these men with fresh men from England to serve in Russia for a short time only and with strict instructions to be most circumspect in his relations with Russians. Perhaps this is not practicable.26 While MVEC indicated an initial willingness to replace those engineers named in Thornton's confession, men such as 25Pole to Turner, Fo 371/17270 N2886/16lO/38, 19 April 1933. 26Strang to Simon, F0 371/17270 N2944/l6lO/38, 20 April 1933. 220 Buckell, Burke, and especially Tearle,27 were now, after the loss of the services of Monkhouse and Thornton, among the most experienced MVEC employees in the Soviet Union.28 For the time being, Richards ordered Buckell to continue to fulfill the minimum obligations of the technical assistance contract and noted that new "volunteers" would be sent to the USSR to assist in the work.29 Richards also asked the Foreign Office to consider pressuring Maisky for a guarantee of safe passage for MVEC personnel. As a sign of the new relationship that was developing between MVEC and the Foreign Office, Richards requested that all these communications be sent to the Moscow Embassy using a Foreign Office code.30 While MVEC dealt with these personnel problems it also sought to facilitate the release of Thornton and MacDonald. The Company sent Turner the text of an appeal to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR it had drafted on behalf of Thornton which admitted "serious mistakes" and conceded that he had engaged in the 27Foreign Office minute by Vyvyan, F0 371/18330 N4719/3114/38, 9 August 1934, which characterized Tearle as a "key" man. J. Vyvyan had been posted to the Moscow embassy as Third Secretary when the arrest and trial had occurred in 1933. As a consequence of his involvement at that time he was often relied upon at the Foreign Office for his view of MVEC affairs in the USSR. 28Richards to Collier, F0 371/17270 N3l9l/1610/38, 27 April 1933. 29Richards to Buckell via Collier, F0 371/17270 N3390/l610/38 4 May, 1933. 3°Ibid. 221 "collection of economic information."31 The appeal requested either the granting of a pardon, or the substitution of expulsion from the country for the sentence of three years deprivation of liberty which was now being served.32 At the Foreign Office, Collier was unhappy about the MVEC decision to admit any guilt whatsoever, but agreed with Strang that this was an "unofficial" matter to be handled between the prisoners and their counsels.33 In its final form Thornton's appeal petitioned that he had "unwittingly committed a number of actions which were regarded by the Court in its verdict as serious transgressions of Soviet laws."34 Evidently MVEC had decided that an obsequious approach would expedite matters more surely than a continuance of their previous Company policy which denied all wrong doing. Initially it did not appear that the Soviet authorities were interested in actively pursuing more measures against MVEC following the trial despite the fact that Thornton had named virtually all the remaining British MVEC employees ' still resident in the USSR in his "confession." The most convincing surmise on this count, which will receive more thorough treatment below, is that the British embargo had the 31Strang to Simon, F0 371/17270 N2842/1610/38, 20 April 1933. 32Ibid. 33lbid. 34Strang to Simon, F0 371/17270 N2980/16lO/38, 22 April 1933. 222 paradoxical effect of strengthening Litvinov's hand by demonstrating that the ineptly orchestrated OGPU foray into Anglo-Soviet relations had now proved to have a serious international cost. . Still, the trial did have a damaging effect on the ability of MVEC employees to interact with their Soviet associates. One British erector, Ball, was under consideration for an "Order of Lenin" prior to the trial, but the local authorities who were to nominate him had now thought such a move unwise.35 The treatment of Ball differed markedly from that of Leon Swazian, an American engineer who was awarded an Order of Lenin for his work at the Kharkov tractor plant. Swazian, when receiving his honor from the Presidium of the Central Committee on 19 April 1933, revealingly the last day of the Metro-Vickers' trial, did not fail to provide a gracious interpretation for his host's action: Whoever works well with the Soviet Union receives awards. Whoever obstructs the work, receives a trial.36 By contrast, the circumspect approach of local authorities to British electrical engineers was validated a month later when the major purge of the Moscow electrical development (MOGES) 35Strang to Simon, F0 371/17272 N3801/1610/38, 12 May 1933. 36"Russian-American Gets Order of Lenin for Work," Mey York_nerald;mrihune. 19 April 1933. p. 9- 223 took place. The Soviet press explained that such action was necessary since the "lessons had not been learned."37 The attention of the Soviet authorities was apparently now to be directed towards "cleansing" the electrical industry of "enemies of the state." The main difficulty MVEC faced in carrying out its work on the ground was a lingering suspicion, particularly in more provincial areas, that MVEC engineers were nothing but a source of trouble. Reports from engineers working in Novo- sibirsk, Sudenko, and Kuznetsk, all found the local populace hostile to MVEC's presence months after the Metro-Vickers affair had been defused.38 One engineer, Embleton, reported an unsettling tendency on the part of the local Russians to blame any problem on MVEC personnel or equipment.39 There is evidence that the trial did convince some Russians of the guilt of the British engineers. Bullard reported from the Leningrad Consulate on a conversation he had with a foreign student on the impact of the trial on public opinion: some of those that have least cause to accept OGPU evidence as valid nevertheless believe that the British accused were guilty, on the curious ground that if only Russians had been accused the case would have at once been dismissed as a put-up 37See Reheeheie_MeeMye, 9 June 1933 summarized in Strang to Simon, F0 371/17251 N4720/113/38, 17 June 1933. 38Coote (Moscow) to Collier, F0 371/17274 N8784/1610/38, 30 November 1933. 39Ibid., See report by Rapp (Leningrad Consulate). 224 job.... everyone also knows that foreign countries are all the time planning "intervention" in the affairs of the Soviet Union.40 Official Soviet propaganda about the fear of foreign invasion had obviously met with some success, even among groups of people who had suffered at the hands of the OGPU, Bullard concluded.41 An echo of this theme can also be found in the memoir account of A. Ciliga, a Yugoslav Comintern official imprisoned in the USSR in the early 19305 because of his involvement with the Left-opposition underground in Moscow. While in internal exile he met a technical student who was also imprisoned in the Ikurtsk region of Siberia following the Metro-Vickers' trial. The student claimed that the charges against MVEC were even more serious than the trial testimony had revealed. Ciliga observed that the student, who came from the new technical intelligentsia and was the "embodiment of 'Our Soviet Students' of the post- revolutionary era," insisted that the charges of wrecking were true. According to the student, The government, he thought, did not want too many revelations, and deliberately conducted it as a wreckers' case, whereas it was in fact a real conspiracy.... The conspiracy had apparently been exposed quite accidentally. One of the chief engineers of the 'Electric Combinat' in Moscow, a 4oMemo by Bullard, (Leningrad Consulate), FO 371/17260 N7159/639/38, 29 September 1933. 41Ibid. Bullard did not explain exactly which Russians had spoken to the foreign students. 225 leader of the plot, while taking some papers from the safe in his office, had inadvertently dropped a map of Moscow with the points to be blown up marked on it in front of the nose of a communist who happened to be there.42 The student was apparently a close relative of one of the principal accused43 and had tried to escape immediately after the first arrests had taken place. He was captured after six months of running from the authorities, having made his way to what he hoped would be a safe haven near Lake Baikal. Almost certainly his arrest was part of the purge in June 1933 of the MOGES works in Moscow noted above. Throughout the period of the mutual trade embargoes there was a considerable battle in the British and Soviet press over true character of the Metro-Vickers' crisis. The Soviets came out with a full-length English translation of the verbatim report in April, described by Strang as a 42A. Ciliga, The Russian Enigma, (London: Ink Links, 1979), p. 344. 43Understandably but unfortunately, Ciliga did not reveal the student's name. The story had a "happy" ending for the young man. A few days after he had told Ciliga about his view of the Metro-Vickers' affair, he picked up a job in the Political Education Department of the camp. When questioned about this apparent change in orientation he told Ciliga, "Well, it can't be helped. One has to look out for oneself." Ciliga remarked somewhat bitterly that this fellow was, "in his innermost thoughts contemptuous of the people and a worshipper of technique." See the account in Ciliga, Ths_Bussiah_Enigma. pp- 344-345- The three principal Soviet defendants accused of wrecking activities at the Moscow power station of MOGES I were Sukhoruchkin, Krasheninnikov, and Zorin. While it is always possible that the student was a egenr proveeeteur, if his story is accurate as far as his identity goes, he was likely related to one of these men. 226 "workmanlike production," which supplemented the already extensive coverage British readers had received in the daily press. Soviet readers were also assured in an Teyeeriie article by the eminent Leningrad academician, Ioffe, that Thornton was an agent of British military intelligence and that the working class of the USSR had to continue to guard against wreckers while seeking to improve their own technical skills.44 MVEC staff who knew Ioffe thought the whole tone of his article was "suggested to him" since it was out of keeping with his "style and ideas." They noted that the article was also published in the English-language paper Meeeey Mews in order to widen its international circulation and impact.45 It was characteristic of Soviet articles on the trial that the main focus of Ioffe's piece was on the validity of evidence gained from the "confessions" of the defendants and much was made that such facts were indeed facts. The Foreign Office took some solace from the Soviets need to base their continued assertions on the defendants' "confessions" since they thought evidence of this type was suspect in the eyes of much of the British public.46 For their part, the engineers who had been expelled 44Izyeeriie, 21 April 1933; Richards to Collier, FO 371/17273 N4481/1610/38, 12 June 1933. 45See comments by Richards and Bullard in Richards's letter to Collier of 12 June cited immediately above. 46Ibid.; Strang to Simon, F0 371/17273 N4274/16lO/38, 29 May 1933. 227 from Soviet territory were finding ready press coverage in Britain as well. Much was made by the press of their deliverance from the USSR and the course of their travels enroute to Britain was reported in major papers.47 Allan Monkhouse received sums in the order of five hundred pounds for his version of events from the Deily_Enpreee and the Timee.48 The Timee thought the whole affair important enough to devote a four-day serial running 22-25 May, under the heading "The Moscow Trial, A New Survey." This special series gave the engineers, in particular Monkhouse and Cushny, a venue to rebut the Soviet version of events. The tone of the editorial lead to the series captures their general purpose. "History must wait patiently and may wait long for some truthful explanation from the Soviet itself why this trial was ever undertaken," the Timee claimed. The arrests and trial were "groundless" and the paper hoped the testimony of Monkhouse and Cushny would make that clear.49 The Soviets were sufficiently concerned about the efforts of the liberated British engineers to chip away at the credibility of the trial to employ the propagandistic talents of the former oppositionist and Comintern official, 47See the gheeryer, "Deported Britons in Poland," 23 April 1933. 48Strang to Simon, FO 371/17270 N3123/1610/38, 26 April 1933; Richards to Collier, F0 371/17273 N4481/1610/38 12 June 1933. 49Timee, "The Moscow Trial: A New Survey," 22 May 1933, pp. 15-16. 228 Karl Radek. Radek summoned his considerable store of anti- British venom to attack the claims made in the Timee and argued in an article in Teyeeriie entitled, "Useless Attempts to Whitewash the Nigger," that he had found what he called "Monkhouse's law." According to Radek, Monkhouse's story became more and more courageous in direct proportion to the distance the British engineer was from the court. He also objected that the Timee was seeking to inflame anti-Soviet opinion just as the World Economic Conference in London was about to convene. It was obvious, Radek observed, that the publication of the Soviet verbatim report of the trial in English, and the very openness of the Soviet judicial procedure, had "settled like stones in the stomach of English imperialism" and it was this discomfort which had motivated the anti-Soviet barrage in the British press.50 On the same day Rreyge carried an article critical of the Timee coverage which placed the British paper in the role of Gogol's character, the Non-Commissioned Officer's wife, who beat herself but accused a Government official of the crime. Picking up on the main theme of the other articles on the Metro-Vickers' trial, greyee claimed the confessions submitted to the court were "facts" and therefore evidence.51 As this war of words between the Soviet press and the 5oleyeeriie, 29 May 1933, Strang to Simon, FO 371/17273 N4274/1610/38, 29 May 1933. 51£reyee, 29 May 1933, Strang to Simon, F0 371/17273 N4274/16lO/38, 29 May 1933. 229 Timee continued throughout May and June, British officials were divided over the merits of the public propagandistic campaigns. In Moscow, Strang thought that continued attacks on the merits of the Soviet case against the engineers served the interests of both MVEC and His Majesty's Government. Senior officials at the Foreign Office, more distant from the hue and cry of the Soviet press, and perhaps more interested in guiding Anglo-Soviet relations into quieter waters, were decidedly less convinced of the usefulness of continued public debate. Vansittart and Lancelot Oliphant (Assistant Under-Secretary of State), both opposed the release of a third White Paper on the crisis even after the engineers had been released.52 Oliphant had opined earlier that he wished the Timee serial "had never been written"53 and he now hoped that tensions would ease enough for trade negotiations to resume. While there were few hopeful signs to be found in the shrill discourse of the press, tentative steps were being taken by Litvinov to defuse the impasse through diplomacy. On 23 May the Soviet Commissar approached the British Government through an "unofficial channel" and let it be known that his Government wanted an end to the dispute and a 52See minutes by Collier, Vansittart, and Oliphant, F0 371/17273, N5329/1610/38 9 July 1933. 53Minute by Oliphant, F0 371/17273 N4481/l610/38, 12 June 1933. 230 cessation of trade hostilities.54 The Riga correspondent for the Timee had also caught wind of a leak by Narkomindel officials in Moscow, which appeared to confirm that the Soviets were interested in a deal.55 Periodically throughout May and June, Strang had received further hints from Steiger that "matters were developing smoothly" behind the scenes.56 It was hoped, Steiger said, that the "incident should be cleared up some time in June or early July".57 This timetable coincided with Litvinov's visit to the World Economic Conference in London and, in the end, would facilitate the release of Thornton and MacDonald. A number of factors, both international and domestic, appear to have been at work in the Soviet decision to approach the British. On the international front, the Soviets were concerned about the negative impact the Metro- Vickers affair was having on the possibilities of American recognition. The British themselves had taken some delight in reports from Ambassador Ronald Lindsay in Washington who noted that the flow of events in favor of recognition had been checked by the Metro-Vickers affair which, in the view of officials at the State Department, had greatly 54See note to minute by Collier, Q,E.E,R,, # 503, 22 June 1933. 55Timee, "Soviet and British Prisoners," 25 May 1933, p. 18. 56Strang to Simon, E.E.E,R,, # 500, 4 June 1933. 57Ibid. 231 strengthened the position of those who opposed recognition.58 Despite this difficulty and the continuing problem in the Far East with Japanese threats in Manchuria there were signs that Soviet diplomacy was having some success. While the British may have overestimated the significance of the renewal of the Berlin Treaty with Germany,59 it was true that relations with Italy, France and Poland had improved over the past year.60 The Soviet press echoed these moves towards wider participation in the international order. Early in May, Teyeeriie carried an article by Radek that somewhat awkwardly defended aspects of the Versailles treaty settlement as elements which could served to enhance stability in Eur0pe. Strang thought that this was yet another indication of the new trend in Soviet thinking. The most troublesome power for the USSR in Strang's estimation 58Lindsay to Simon, D.B.F.P., # 453, 25 April 1933. This theme also appears in the articles written by Duranty in the Mew Terh Times during this period. 59The renewal of the Berlin Treaty of 1926 meant a continuation of the Rapallo collaboration "at least on paper," between the two outcasts of the Versailles system-- Germany and the USSR. Adam Ulam suggests that the Soviets were not deceived by such reassurances from Hitler, but were hoping to delay his anti-Soviet agenda as long a possible. See A. Ulam, ' oe ' e : v e ° ' - , (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1974), pp. 194-195. 60Strang noted these "credits" in a report to Simon, .DIBIIIEI. # 495, 20 May 1933. In 1932 the Soviets signed non-aggression treaties with Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and France. 232 was Japan and it was to counter this eastern threat that Soviet diplomacy had moved in the direction of closer contact with the West.61 With these currents running through Soviet foreign policy in the summer of 1933 it made good sense to resolve the Anglo-Soviet dispute as part of a basic shift towards more cooperation in the international arena which was to become a hallmark of Litvinov's tenure as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. There were also signs that Soviet concerns about Germany were growing despite the renewal of the Berlin Treaty. The German Ambassador, Dirksen, had made his objections about Radek's article on the Versailles settlement known to Narkomindel officials and was particularly critical of the Soviet Union's apparent about-face on the merits of that treaty.62 Dirksen also complained about the recent treatment of "Reich citizens living in Russia," and pointed out to the Soviet Deputy-Commissar, Krestinskii, that such policies did nothing to assist those in Germany who did not wish to pursue an anti-Soviet line.63 Similar statements made at the World Economic Conference by the German Reich Minister of Economics, Food and 61Izvestiie, "On the Revision of the Versailles Treaty, 10 May 1933; Strang to Simon, Q,E,£,R,, # 497, 23 May 1933; Strang to Simon, Q,E.E,R,, # 500, 4 June 1933. 62Dirksen to Foreign Ministry. Document§_en_§srman Eereign_£eliey, Series C, Vol. I, [Hereinafter cited as e,e,z,2.] # 232, 14 May 1933. 63Ibid. 233 Agriculture, Dr. Hugenberg, stressed the coexistence of "independent national economies", flatly stated that Germany had no money for continued credits to debtor nations, and most seriously pointed to the need for German colonies and additional Lehenerenm. 64 Such pronouncements made a strong impression in Moscow. Izvesriie carried the text of the Soviet objection to Hugenberg's most disquieting remarks which underscored the contradiction between the renewal of the Berlin Treaty in May and these more recent German statements.65 The Narkomindel intermediary Steiger, who claimed to have knowledge of the instructions Litvinov had taken to London, told Strang that it was after this sounding from the Germans that a "definite impulse in favour of a settlement" of the Anglo-Soviet dispute had taken hold in Moscow. The Soviets had also been impressed by Simon's continuing public assurances66 that the embargo was to used as device to aid in the release of Thornton and MacDonald, Steiger added.57 It was against this international backdrop, then, that the negotiations for the release of Thornton and MacDonald 64Hugenberg released a statement to the press in London on 16 June 1933. p,§.£,2,, # 312, n. 2, 14 June 1933. GSIZYESIIiQ. 24 June 1933. See Degras, QeenmenL§_Qn §2_ist_zereisn_zeliex. pp- 22 23- 66See Simon's response to Parliamentary questions, 27 April 1933 in n,e, pep, § §,, 277, col. 264. 67Strang to Simon, F0 371/17273 N5526/1610/38, 18 July 1933. 234 took place in London during the last two weeks of June. Acting on his own initiative MVEC Director, Sir Felix Pole, met with Litvinov at the Soviet Embassy before the Foreign Office had made any similar arrangements.68 Undoubtedly recognizing that news of Pole's interview would find its way to the Foreign Office, Litvinov warned the MVEC Director of the damaging consequences to British trade which were incurred as a result of the 1927 Anglo-Soviet rupture. That disagreement had only strengthened Germany's hand in the Soviet market at Britain's expense.69 The private discussions proved very unsatisfactory from the perspective of the Foreign Office who thought Pole a poor negotiator, and the British officials soon decided that only direct official conversations could carry any weight with the Soviets. When Simon, accompanied by Colonel Colville, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade, finally met with Litvinov in London the impasse which had afflicted Anglo-Soviet relations for the past three months was rapidly resolved. An initial exchange of views on 26 June served to emphasize that both men preferred a quick solution to the affair. The main point of discussion in the first meeting between them revolved around Litvinov's suggestion that the prisoners might be released a few days 68Minute by Collier, F0 371/17273 N4591/16lO/38, 15 June 1933. Sir Felix Pole met with Litvinov on 15 June. 691bid. 235 after the expiration of the British embargo. The Soviet Commissar erroneously thought that this would come in mid- July, but due to the vagaries of the Parliamentary schedule,7o Simon insisted the bill would continue to have effect until October. Both men agreed that this was an unacceptable duration and agreed to meet in the next few days to seek another solution.71 The interval between meetings was sufficient time for Litvinov to come up with another measure to deal with the problem at hand. When the two met again on 28 June, Litvinov opened the_discussion with a request that the British embargo be lifted first and only then the Soviets would release the prisoners. As this offer was quickly refused by Simon, Litvinov abruptly changed course and suggested the plan of a "simultaneous" announcement of the end to embargoes which would be immediately followed by the release of the prisoners. Litvinov, who was apparently armed with the authority to pursue variations on such a scheme, told Simon that President Kalinin and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee were prepared to issue a pardon for Thornton and MacDonald just as soon as Britain could take the 70The three month limit of the British embargo meant three months of Parliamentary working days. Given the Easter recess and other holidays, the three month limit would extend into the summer recess and push the embargo into the autumn months. 7lsee Simon to Strang, E.B.E.P., # 504, 26 June 1933. 236 powers necessary to end the economic sanctions. Litvinov also made it clear that the Soviets hoped the resumption of trade negotiations could be part of the renewal of friendly relations. Both men agreed that they should continue to keep news of their talks from reaching the press and Simon assured Litvinov that he would say nothing of their proposed arrangement in the Commons.72 Simon did seek and obtain Cabinet approval for the scheme the following day. He emphasized that continued silence was important for the plan to work and told the Cabinet that on the weekend73 there would be a joint statement ending the British and Soviet embargoes. Simon stressed that the repeal of the British embargo did not necessarily influence any future decision about the resumption of trade talks. Runciman, noted that a number of British traders had been hurt by the embargo and that timber purchases had been hampered as well.74 That same evening Litvinov telephoned Simon to confirm the acceptance of their plan.75 In order to protect himself, Litvinov also asked Simon for a written assurance from the Foreign Secretary that the Import Prohibition Act would not be used for anything other than the release of the two 72Simon to Strang, e,e.z,2,, #505, 28 June 1933. 73The Cabinet meeting fell on Thursday. 74CAB 23/76 43(33), 29 June 1933. 75Simon to Strang, e.e,£,2., #510, 30 June 1933. 237 prisoners.76 This request serves to confirm that Litvinov had some latitude in the negotiations, but nonetheless thought it wise to have confirmation of points in the agreement where he may have had less precise authorization. Along similar lines the Commissar also asked that the negotiations between him and Simon not be seen as "constituting an agreement for record, but rather as interviews, in the course of which our respective Governments were prepared on certain conditions to take."77 It was always wise to remember who was boss in Moscow, especially when the vozhe' was Stalin! Litvinov and Simon managed to agree that a "free pardon" was not necessary for the release of the engineers and that if the sentences were simply commuted to expulsion, the deal would go through.78 The two engineers were finally released at about 11 p.m. on 1 July 1933. The events surrounding their liberation were not without a touch of "Soviet perversity"79 when the prison authorities held up the release because they lacked an 751bid. 77Ibid. 78Ibid. Saturday morning, 1 July, King George V met with the Privy Council to take the powers necessary to raise the trade ban. A short time later a brief communique to the press was issued by Simon which revealed the subject of the recent Anglo-Soviet talks but did not disclose the final solution. See the Timee, "Release From Russia," 3 July 1933, p. 14. 79See Lammers, "The Engineers' Trial...," p. 266. 238 apparently vital document. Strang, who was sent to secure the engineers, dealt with this obstruction by energetically trying to contact a number of Narkomindel officials and the Foreign Office. He stubbornly refused to leave and waited at the prison until the stir he had created worked to its desired effect. Some two hours after the scheduled time of release [9 p.m.], Sheinin, of the Procurator's Department, hurriedly informed Strang and the engineers that everything was in order--the mysterious missing document never did materialize.8o The decision to end the Anglo-Soviet dispute was explained to Soviet readers in Izveeriia. The commutation of Thornton's and MacDonald's sentence to expulsion for five years continued to protect the USSR against the harmful damage the pair might inflict, the Soviet paper claimed. The struggle forced on the USSR did not do serious injury to the Soviet Union and lzvestiia "graciously" noted that His Majesty's Government "acted very reasonably in deciding to end a struggle which could cause material damage to both countries but could never have ended in a victory for England."81 Of course the Soviets who had been imprisoned as a result of the Metro-Vickers trial did not fare as well as Thornton and MacDonald. Beyond the actual defendants in the 8°Strang to Simon, Q.B,E,P., # 519, 3 July 1933. 81Strang to Simon, F0 371/17273 N4898/1610/38, 3 July 1933. 239 trial, there were a number of Russians employed by MVEC who suffered badly as a result of their close relationship to the foreign firm. The Company's typists in the Moscow office, Bosovakaia and Kononchuk, were arrested and exiled to the Archangel region for three years. Zharov, the MVEC chauffeur received a similar sentence. Other office staff in Leningrad and Moscow were arrested and then released. Several had returned to work at MVEC since it was difficult for them to get employment anywhere else.82 Of the other Soviet citizens who were actually sentenced in the trial, only Anna Kutuzova's fate received any attention from MVEC or the British diplomatic corps. Such attention was scarcely avoidable since after serving fourteen months of her eighteen-month sentence she went directly to the MVEC compound at Perlovskaia.83 Prior to this the former MVEC secretary had been seen twice by MVEC accountants84 at the Butyrka prison and there was some speculation among company employees that she was now actually working in the prison.85 When Kutuzova was released she sought the 82Strang to Simon, FO 371/17273 N4211/1610/38, 29 May 1933 and Chancery (Moscow) to Northern Department, PO 371/17273 N5446/1610/38, 18 July 1933; Strang to Northern Department, F0 371/17273 N4298/1610/38, 2 June 1933. 83Charles (Moscow) to Collier, F0 371/18330 N3114/3114/38, 21 May 1934. 84The accountants were sent to pay for the cost of Kutuzova's defense counsel. 85Strang to Simon, F0 371/17273 N4211/l610/38, 29 May 1933. 240 assistance of Buckell and told him that she wanted to contact Thornton privately. This did not impress Collier at the Foreign Office, who commented that, "I do not suppose that Thornton would be very pleased to have Madame Kutuzova in England." He chose not to elaborate on the nature of the complications which might ensue if such an eventuality did come to pass.86 In the event, the proposed reunion never took place since the OGPU ordered Kutuzova to return to Leningrad and warned her that she should not seek employment from MVEC again.87 Beyond this rather sad tale of Kutuzova's "liberation," nothing else is known about her ultimate fate, or the fate of the other Soviet defendants who received lengthier sentences, in the trauma that followed in subsequent purges of the 19305. It has been noted throughout this study that assessing the relationship between the Soviet leadership, in particular Stalin's role, and the interests of the OGPU, Litvinov and the Narkomindel, and the Procuracy during the Metro-Vickers crisis remains problematic. At best, it is possible to give a "kremlinological" reading of the resolution of the crisis which provides some useful indications about the relative play of forces at work in the Soviet actions. The British diplomats in Moscow, who had a good deal of access to 86Charles to Collier, F0 371/18330 N3114/3114/38, 2 May 1934. 871bid. 241 officials of the Narkomindel, were continuously being told that the entire Metro-Vickers trial had been a blunder by the OGPU and that Stalin had been misinformed by the secret police who had acted without the advice of the Narkomindel.88 It has already been suggested89 that the subsequent promotion of Akulov and Vyshinskii to posts in a new All-Union Procuracy represented a defeat for Iagoda and the OGPU and this was certainly the interpretation that many in the foreign diplomatic community placed on the decision.90 Such administrative changes suggested that the Soviet leadership wanted to create another judicial apparatus to curb the recent excesses of the OGPU.91 Though it might well be a mistake to presume too much rationality in the events which afflicted Soviet society during the Great Purges, it should be noted that of the four men most closely associated with the rivalry within, and between, the judiciary and the OGPU at this time, Krylenko, Akulov, and Iagoda, would themselves be victims in the trials where Vyshinskii, the sole survivor 88Strang to Simon, E.B.E.R., # 502, 20 June 1933. 89See the discussion in Chapter 4, "The Metro-Vickers' Trial." 90This was also the view of the Lithuanian Minister, a man was said to have special contacts with persons in authority. Strang to Simon, F0 371/17251 N5127/113/38, 3 July 1933. 915trang to Simon, F0 371/17251 N5119/113/38, 10 July 1933; Minute by Walton, F0 371/18327 N2828/1189/38, 8 May 1934; Strang to Collier, Fo 371/17277 N5478/5478/38, 16 July 1933. 242 of the four, acted as Public Prosecutor. There is also the question of why MVEC was allowed to continue operating in the USSR after the arrests and trial if, as has been argued above, it seems likely that the Soviet authorities knew of the role the Company played in the supply of general information for the IIC.92 Apart from Vyshinskii's own closing statement at the trial, which oddly claimed the Company was not the real target of the OGPU investigation,93 there remains the possibility that the OGPU was told to monitor MVEC operations without disclosing the Soviet Union's own set of informants in British intelligence circles. The subsequent treatment of MVEC personnel in the USSR outlined below, offers support for the latter interpretation. While there is a regrettable lack of material available on the business activities of MVEC in the years after the trial, the new relationship established between the Company and His Majesty's Government makes it possible to trace some of the difficulties the foreign company faced when doing business in the USSR. MVEC sought the advice of the Foreign Office in the summer of 1934, when the Central Executive 92See discussion in Chapter 3. 93This caught the attention of the foreign press as well. See articles by Ralph Barnes, "Soviet Mercy for 6 Britons is Implied by Prosecutor," Mey_xerR_Rerele_Trihnne, 17 April 1933, p. 1; and Will Duranty, "Britons' Expulsion After Trial Held to be Likely," Mey_1erh;Timee, 17 April 1933, p. 9. 243 Committee refused to extend the work visa of the engineer, Pollitt. Pollitt had been named by Thornton in his "confession" and had worked in the Kuznetsk region from March 1932 to 1933. Like Nordwall, Pollitt had a wide circle of Soviet friends and had married a Soviet citizen. Recently he had taken surprisingly successful steps to get an exit visa for her. The Company was distressed at how "ominously prompt" arrangements were made to provide a visa for Pollitt's wife and was very concerned that Pollitt would not be allowed to return to the USSR once the couple had left the country. On the basis of advice from Britain's First Secretary in Moscow, E. Coote, Terence Shone at the Foreign Office recommended that if Pollitt returned at all, he should leave his wife in Britain.94 Early in June 1934, Pollitt and his wife left the USSR, but the Russian woman's Soviet citizenship had not as yet been revoked. The view held by Coote was that Pollitt was suffering from the aftermath of the trial, but it did not seem that anything major was underway against MVEC itself.95 From the standpoint of the Company, Pollitt was not a key man in the Soviet operations, but when both he and Tearle were refused work visas a month later, Richards and Buckell sought Foreign Office support for Tearle's visa. It will be 94Minutes by Coote (Moscow), Vyvyan and Shone, F0 371/18330 N3451/3114/38, 9 June 1934. 95Coote to Shone, F0 371/18330 N3725/3114/38, 19 June 1933. 244 remembered that Tearle, too, had been named by Thornton during the trial, and the refusal of both men made it awkward for MVEC properly to staff its projects. One additional factor that needed to be taken into account, which Vyvyan noted, was that the region of Kuznetsk was a particularly sensitive military area along the Volga and that this might account for the vigilance Soviet authorities now exhibited.96 In consultation with Foreign Office officials, Richards and Buckell decided to test the temper of the Soviet authorities by arguing that Tearle was an essential part of MVEC personnel in the USSR and was needed to aid in the work of a new man, Hoseson. Hoseson, who could not speak Russian, was about to be sent to the Soviet Union and MVEC argued that he could not be expected to manage his affairs in such a foreign venue without Tearle's assistance. This gambit was refused by Soviet authorities on the grounds that Hoseson was being sent to work on a electrical problem and Tearle was a mechanical, not electrical, engineer. There was no real technical reason therefore, why Tearle was "essential."97 Meeting with this rebuff, MVEC pursued an alternate and apparently successful course which was to have Burke, already resident in Moscow, accompany Hoseson to Kuznetsk. Vyvyan's view from the Foreign Office was that this was a "good 95Minute by Vyvyan, F0 371/18330 N47l9/3114/38, 9 July 1934. 971bid. 245 experiment" since continued Soviet obstinacy would be more evidence that MVEC was to be perpetually harassed by Soviet authorities.98 Consistent with these aggravations was the decline in Soviet orders from MVEC for equipment or technical expertise during this period. By February 1935, the Company was asked by Mashino-Import99 to close its Moscow bureau and sign all subsequent agreements in London.100 This blow to MVEC operations prompted Sir Felix Pole to request that Anthony Eden raise the issue during his upcoming visit to Moscow and the Foreign Office was provided with an extensive dossier on MVEC affairs in the USSR to facilitate such an intervention.101 Sir Lancelot Oliphant was not very optimistic about Eden's role in the venture and rightly observed that the Soviets would be "very sore" about his recent Berlin sojourn in any case. At best Eden's visit helped to allay Stalin's concerns over the recent Anglo- German conversations.102 There is no evidence at all that 981bid. 99Electro-Import was subsumed into Mashino-Import after 1932. 100Chilston to Simon, F0 371/19468 N1024/1024/38, 23 February 1933. 101Ibid., See letter by Sir Felix Pole to Vansittart, 20 March 1933. 102This is the view expressed in A. Peters, Eeen_er_rhe F e e 9 - , (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 91-94. For a similarly dismissive view of the importance of the Lord Privy Seal's diplomatic tour see, D. 246 Eden found time to make representations on behalf of the beleaguered British company even though the Foreign Office was increasingly concerned that another crisis might be pending.1°3 The information Pole delivered to British officials revealed important material about the state of MVEC's Soviet operations. The Leningrad office had already been closed down after the 1933 trial and Buckell had just been informed by Mashino-Import that the MVEC contract of February 1932, which ran through 1937 was to be cancelled as of May 1935.104 All these setbacks came at a time when the Company continued to train about twenty Soviet engineers at their Trafford Park works and employed as many as 1,000 men in Manchester.105 As discussions about MVEC's future in the USSR proceeded in London, Collier and Oliphant came to believe that the Company's directors were understating the possible dangers that were threatening MVEC personnel. The combination of unending hassles over visas, the rough handling of Kutuzova Carlton's, Antheny Egen: h Eiogrephy, (London: Allen Lane, 1981), pp. 62-63. 103Ibid. Eden arrived in the Soviet Union March 28, 1935. For his own version of a largely uneventful trip see Earl of Avon (Anthony Eden), Eeeing_rhe_piererere, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1962), pp. 160-182. 104Ibid., See Buckell to Richards, 16 February 1933. 105Ibid., Pole to Vansittart, 20 March 1933. See Times, "The Moscow Trial: A New Survey," 22 May 1933, p. 16. 247 upon her release, the closing down of the Moscow office, and the cancellation of the Leningrad technical agreement, taken together suggested to Collier that a serious "vendetta" was being directed at MVEC which emanated for the highest quarters in the USSR.106 After consulting with Vansittart, it was decided that Oliphant should take up MVEC's cause with Soviet Ambassador Maisky after Vansittart had had a chance to "wade in at him" on the issue of Comintern propaganda. When Oliphant finally did meet with Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador assured the British Assistant Under-Secretary that he would make inquiries in Moscow. Maisky noted in passing that Tearle's name was not "unfamiliar" to him and he now remembered that local authorities around Leningrad were particularly suspicious of the British engineer.107 These Soviet suspicions of engineers who were named by Thornton's "confession" did not run sufficiently deep to prevent Maisky from offering the British a deal for a visa exchange two weeks later. The Soviet Ambassador suggested that Tearle could receive permission to work in the USSR if Boris Kraievskii, the Chairman of Export-Les (Timber Export), would receive similar consideration in Britain.108 For years 1°5Collier to Vansittart, F0 371/19468 N27l6/1024/38, 23 May 1935. 1°7Memo by Oliphant, F0 371/19468 N2785/1024/38, 30 May 1935. 1°3Memo by Oliphant, F0 371/19468 N3016/1024/38, 15 June 1935. 248 the British had refused a visa for this Soviet gentleman, but a month later Simon received clearance from the Home Office to make such a deal. He authorized Passport Control to make the visa good for six months, noting that no purpose would be served by requesting the proviso that "subversive activities” were forbidden. Vansittart tried to quiet Ambassador Chilston's concerns over setting this type of precedent by insisting that the Soviets would "behave" in view of the "German danger."109 When Tearle finally did get permission to work in the USSR there was disagreement between MVEC and British officials in Moscow over the success of his ventures. Moscow Consul T. Rapp interviewed Tearle just prior his return to the U.K. after two months of travel in the USSR. Tearle related that local officials in the provinces did not receive him very well, an observation which the Foreign Office saw as confirmation that policies in Moscow often had limited application outside the capital.110 The fact that Soviet authorities were still obstructing MVEC personnel also prompted Collier to consult with MVEC Director, Richards, over the merits of threatening Kraievskii's visa status in retaliation for the treatment of Tearle. This did not appeal to Richards who put more stock in a recent visit from Soviet 109Memo by Simon and minute by Vansittart forwarded to Chilston, F0 371/19468 N3704/1024/38, 19 July 1935. 110Moscow Chancery to Foreign Office, F0 371/18468 N5536/1024/38, 21 October 1935. 249 trade officials in the U.K. which reassured MVEC of Soviet intentions to pursue the negotiations of new contracts.111 Thus, despite the concerns of the Foreign Office and its willingness to offer punitive measures in defense of MVEC personnel, the Company decided to forego any further confrontation at this juncture in the hopes that better times were ahead. MVEC determination to remain in the USSR was rewarded in 1936 with a sizable contract to build fourteen marine turbines valued at some 620,000 pounds.112 By the fall of 1937 however, a series of problems had arisen as a result of the dismissal of the Soviet engineers who had initially negotiated the deal with MVEC. Richards complained to Collier that after repeated attempts to convince the new Soviet inspectors at Trafford Park and Soviet engineers in Moscow of the soundness of the original design, MVEC was close to its wits' end. Not one of the Engineers who agreed with original specifications has now anything to do with the Contract and the new Engineers appear to consider that they have to justify the dismissal of their predecessors by upsetting most of the decisions 111Richards to Collier, 1 November 1935 and Collier to Charles (Moscow), 28 November 1935, F0 371/19468 N5700/1024/38. 112These were negotiated with Mashino-Import in December 1936 and January 1937. Edwards (Department of Overseas Trade) to Halford (Northern Department), FO 371/23681 N1740/92/38, 31 March 1939. 250 made by the latter.113 It is almost certain that the abrupt changes in the Soviet engineering corps were directly related to the politics of the Great Terror which shook Soviet society during these years. Men who were more less skilled, were needed The new demands made 1938 were, in the view of steel company in the U.K. material needed. At that Bogomolov instructed MVEC of the new specifications twelve. MVEC had already politically "reliable," if possibly on the MVEC project. by Soviet authorities in September MVEC, "technically wrong" and no was even willing to quote on the time Soviet trade representative D. to build four turbines on the basis and to stop work on the other worked for over a year on the basis of the initial specifications and the minimum expense to alter the design at this juncture would cost an additional 130,000 pounds.114 Richards told Collier that the Soviets had agreed to entertain an MVEC mission to Moscow in January 1939 to discuss these specifications. The Company was now approaching the Foreign Office in the hopes that something might be worked out in league with Department of Overseas Trade officials who were currently in Moscow for the negotiation of a new Anglo-Soviet trade agreement which was 113Richards to Collier, F0 371/23680 N92/92/38, 5 January 1939. 114Fdwards to Halford, F0 371/23681 Nl740/92/38, 31 March 1939. 251 now underway.115 With the help of British officials, visas were hurriedly obtained for the MVEC delegation116 which had a short but successful, preliminary discussion with Soviet Foreign Trade (Vneshtorg) officials in February.117 MVEC also sought and gained the intervention of Department of Overseas Trade representative, Hudson, who secured Mashino-Import assent to continue discussions in the near future. According to the new British Ambassador, William Seeds, the Politburo member and Commissar for Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, had agreed quickly to arrange for more visas for MVEC representatives to come to Moscow. Though Richards was more interested in having a fully authorized Soviet representative come to London, the Company recognized that this was a helpful step towards the resolution of the impasse.118 This final episode in MVEC-Soviet relations demonstrates once again that the British company had learned in the aftermath of the 1933 affair that it was best served, when dealing with the trade monopoly of the USSR and the vagaries 115Richards to Collier, F0 371/23680 N92/92/38, 5 January 1939. 116The members were I.R. Cox (MVEC Director), M.L. Guy (MVEC Director, Chief Turbine Engineer and Fellow of Royal Society), R.W. Bailey, (Head of Metallurgy at Trafford Park), and N. Elce (Assistant to H.L. Guy). 117Cox to Collier, F0 371/23681 N793/92/38, 13 February 1939. 118Seeds to Foreign Office and minute by Halford, F0 371/23681 N1627/92/38, 27 March 1939. 252 of Soviet domestic politics, by relying on the influence of Government officials to facilitate its business. It proved impossible for MVEC to escape the stigma of the 1933 trial, and while Soviet authorities sometimes encouraged business with MVEC, they constantly harassed those remaining men119 who formed the basis of MVEC's Russian cadre. Given this situation, it was much safer to make clear MVEC's close relationship with the Foreign Office and Board of Trade than to pretend such connections did not exist. 119Aside from the Directors Richards, Pole, and Cox who all took a strong interest in Metro-Vickers' Soviet contracts, Burke, Tearle and Pollitt seem to have succeeded Monkhouse and Thornton as the MVEC's "Russia hands." Chapter 6 Conclusions Few events in Anglo-Soviet relations of the interwar period demonstrate the problems and challenges posed by the Stalin "revolution" as clearly as does the Metro-Vickers' crisis of 1933. The crisis, though substantially a product of the domestic tensions which racked the Soviet Union during the late 19205 and early 19305, must also be seen as an event fundamentally shaped by the international conflict of which it was both a cause and effect. Both the international and domestic dimensions are vital for an understanding of the motives and substance of the arrests and the show trial which occurred in the spring of 1933, the Anglo-Soviet conflict which resulted from the action of the OGPU, and the containment and ultimate resolution of the crisis. Similarly, without an appreciation of the interplay between international relations and Soviet domestic politics it is impossible to comprehend the evolution of the relationship between the Metropolitan-Vickers Export Company, the Soviet authorities with whom the British company had to deal, and the Soviet citizens more closely attached to the MVEC. This study has argued that MVEC's interaction with the Soviet trade and electrical authorities and the general populace was transformed over the years 1922-1933 from a 253 254 relationship of stimulating and profitable collaboration to one characterized by guarded exchanges. There is good reason to believe that the main reason that MVEC was targeted by the Soviet authorities for a full judicial procedure was, in addition to its reputation as one of the best-informed foreign firms operating in the USSR, its apparent cooperation with the Industrial Intelligence Centre in Britain. That the IIC turned its attention away from the USSR towards Nazi Germany after 1933 may help explain why continued MVEC involvement in the Soviet Union, while never easy after the trial, was even permitted. Though mutual concerns about espionage were never far from the surface in Anglo-Soviet relations of this period, the extensive contact with Soviet citizens enjoyed by the British personnel of MVEC stationed in the USSR involved them, however unwillingly, in the changing politics of the technical-intelligentsia in Stalin's Russia. While it remains doubtful that any of the British defendants were actually engaged in acts of wrecking or sabotage, the number of personal indiscretions with Soviet associates, the use of business practices applicable in western-capitalist societies, but decidedly suspect in the "worker's paradise", and the unfortunate, if understandable, reaction of Thornton and MacDonald to Soviet interrogation and trial techniques combined to make the initial and absolute claims of innocence by the British Government premature. 255 Having said this, it is hard to see that the shrill reaction of Ovey, or Vansittart's more moderate policy of confrontation, which also failed in its attempt to prevent the trial, could have been better served by an alternative course. Very likely a trial would have been held involving MVEC operations in any case. The trial that was held, cleverly stage-managed by the Public Prosecutor, Vyshinskii, and the presiding Judge, Ulrich, reflected a keen Soviet awareness of the international import of the event and this almost certainly worked to the British defendants' benefit. The tone and verdict of the trial made Litvinov's task somewhat easier when he came to London in June, and the outcome was undoubtedly orchestrated, in part, to facilitate that end. Despite the serious nature of the conflict in 1933, which was heightened by the imposition of mutual trade embargoes, there would be no suspension of diplomatic relations between the world's two largest empires. In the midst of the Great Depression, with the challenges that Hitler and Japan now posed, the debacle of May 1927 would not be repeated. Finally, the trial was a very important step in the advancement of the career of Andrei Vyshinskii and hence, in the development of Soviet criminal policy in the 19305. At one level, the substance of the trial recalls the concerns of the earlier trials of 1928-1931, and marks the trial of 1933 as the high point of the electrification industry's purge. 256 For the Russians who were swept up in the wake of the Metro- Vickers' trial, there would be no "crisis contained." Moreover, for the long term history of jurisprudence in the USSR, the size, structure, tactics, and use of the judicial tandem of Vyshinskii and Ulrich in the trial make it the first instance where the formula that would be used to grim effect in the subsequent Great Purge trials of 1936-1938 was in evidence. APPENDICES Appendix A ec ica C c' d od ct o e .S R Year Generating gepacity o a le t ic t ut kilowatt % 1913 kilowatt/hrs. % of 1913 thousands millions 1913 1,098 100.0 1,945 100.0 1917 1,192 108.6 2,575 132.5 1921 1,228 112.0 520 26.7 1922 1,247 113.6 775 39.8 1923 1,279 116.5 1,146 59.0 1924 1,308 119.3 1,562 80.4 1925 1,397 127.3 2,925 150.3 1926 1,586 144.6 3,608 185.4 1927 1,698 155.0 4,205 216.0 1928 1,905 173.6 5,000 258.0 1929 2,296 209.0 6,224 320.0 1930 2,876 262.1 8,368 430.0 1931 3,972 362.0 10,687 555.0 1932 4,677 425.9 13,540 696.1 1933 5,583 508.5 16,360 842.0 1934 6,287 572.6 21,010 1,080.0 Source: B. Weitz, ed. Electrie Rower Development in the U.S.S.R., p. 24. Production of Rower Egpipment in the U.S.S,R. (measured by capacity) 1928 1935 Boilers (heating surface in 1,0005 of sq. m.) 87.9 228.2 Steam turbines (in thousands of kw.)......... 35.7 672.1 Hydraulic turbines (in thousands of kw.)..... 12.0 74.6 Generators (in thousands of kw.)............. 92.6 651.4 Transformers (in thousands of kva.).......... 403.2 3,454.0 A.C. motors (in thousands of kw.)....... ..... 258.6 1,590.0 ed. Electric Rower Development. in the Source: B. Weitz, U.S.S.R., p. 101. 257 Appendix B Soviet Foreign Trade, 1913-1940 (millions of rubles: constant 1950 rate and annual ruble rate) Year Exports Imports Balance 1950 | Annual 1950 | Annual 1950 | Annual 1913 5,298 1,520 4,792 1,375 +506 +145 1918 28 8 367 105 -339 -97 1921 70 20 734 211 -664 -191 1921/22 221 63 945 271 -724 -208 1922/23 467 134 518 149 -51 -15 1923/24 1,300 373 814 234 +486 +139 1924/25 2,014 578 2,521 723 -507 -145 1925/26 2,451 703 2,636 756 -185 -53 1926/27 2,812 807 2,487 714 +325 +93 1927/28 2,759 792 3,295 946 -536 -154 1928* 754 216 708 203 +46 +13 1929 3,219 924 3,069 881 +150 +43 1930 3,612 1,036 3,690 1,059 -78 -23 1931 2,827 811 3,851 1,105 -1,024 -294 1932 2,004 575 2,454 704 -450 -129 1933 1,727 496 1,214 348 +513 +148 1934 1,458 418 810 232 +648 +186 1935 1,281 367 841 241 +440 +126 1936 1,082 1,359 1,077 1,353 +5 +6 1937 1,312| 1,738 1,016 1,346 +296 +392 1938 1,012 1,353 1,090 1,444 -69 -91 1939 462 612 745 986 -283 -374 1940 1,066 1,412 1,091 1,446 -25 -34 Source: Yneehnxere_4nmaunuuaL_iEEBL_JEL_JEUEEEEAQ__991; Statisticheski' obzor, (Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1960), p. 13. Note that up until 1929 economic years ran from 1 October. The year 1928* signifies the trade figures from October to December 1928. 258 Appendix C Soviet Trade with Gt. Britain, 1913-1939 (millions of rubles at constant 1950 rate) Year Exports to Imports from Balance Ratio Britain| % Soviet Britain| % Soviet 1913 933 17.6 603 12.6 +330 1.5:1 1918 7 25.0 42 11.4 -35 .17:1 1921 33 47.0 215 29.3 -182 .15:1 1921/22 63 28.5 185 19.6 -122 .34:1 1922/23 101 21.6 130 25.1 -29 .78:1 1923/24 291 22.4 171 21.0 +120 1. :1 1924/25 674 33.5 386 15.3 +288 1.8:1 1925/26 769 31.4 451 17.1 +318 1.7:1 1926/27 769 27.3 352 14.1 +417 2.2:1 1927/28 543 19.7 166 5.0 +377 3.3:1 1928* 163 21.6 23 3.2 +140 7.1:1 1929 705 21.9 191 6.2 +514 3.7:1 1930 976 27.0 279 7.5 +697 3.5:1 1931 927 32.8 256 6.6 +671 3.6:1 1932 482 24.1 320 13.0 +162 1.5:1 1933 303 17.5 107 8.8 +196 1.8:1 1934 241 16.5 109 13.5 +132 2.2:1 1935 301 23.5 78 9.3 +223 3.8:1 1936 288 26.7 76 7.1 +212 3.8:1 1937 422 32.2 48 4.7 +374 8.8:1 1938 283 28.0 132 12.1 +151 2.1:1 1939 101 21.9 85 11.4 +16 1.2:1 Source: Based on esh a a or ov a SSR 9 8-1940 21. Note that up until 1929 the economic years ran from October 1” The year 1928* signifies the trade figures from October to December. The above balance and ratio figures do not take into account the re-export of goods that were exported from the Soviet Union to Britain. This almost certainly means that the balances and ratio are overstated in favor of a Soviet surplus since Soviet re-export percentages were very likely lower than Britain's. 259 Appendix D Soviet Foreign Trade: Commodities Year Exports Imports Grain Timber Oil Machinery M e a t 000,000 000 000 000,000 000 tons tons tons rubles tons 1913 9.182 7353.6 952.5 796.8 14.7 1921/22 .001 594.1 52.3 203.4 42.3 1922/23 .728 919.0 84.3 110.9 21.5 1923/24 2.576 2009.1 711.6 108.1 25.9 1924/25 .569 2086.6 1372.5 344.3 227.8 1925/26 2.016 1872.5 1473.5 542.1 38.1 1926/27 2.099 2429.1 2086.1 547.2 4.27 1927/28 0.289 2912.9 2782.8 788.0 3.66 1928* .001 1098.1 795.9 172.1 .001 1929 .178 5376.6 3858.6 923.3 .283 1930 4.764 7229.8 3713.0 1726.6 1.35 1931 5.056 5914.6 5224.5 2076.2 1.97 1932 1.727 5546.1 6117.7 1366.9 9.34 1933 1.684 6115.7 4930.1 521.9 6.09 1934 .769 6323.5 4315.2 202.9 9.59 1935 1.517 6605.8 3368.6 198.1 5.99 1936 .321 5888.4 2665.6 419.4 2.86 1937 1.277 4994.3 1929.3 278.5 2.87 1938 2.054 3151.7 1388.4 376.4 2.69 1939 .277 1715.6 474.2 288.3 2.47 1940 1.155 1006.9 874.3 353.6 5.57 Source: R. Clarke and D. Matko, Soviet Economic Facts. 1917-1281, (London: MacMillan Publishing, 1983), pp. 74, 77. 260 Appendix E Soviet Gross Production Industrial Agricultural Year Index 8 Increase Index % Increase 1913 100 ---- 100 ---- 1917 71 -29.0 88 -12.0 1921 31 -56.3 60 -22.8 1924 45 45.1 90 50.0 1925 73 62.2 112 24.4 1926 98 34.2 118 5.5 1927 111 13.3 121 2.5 1928 132 18.9 124 2.5 1929 158 19.7 121 -2.4 1930 193 22.2 117 -3.3 1931 233 20.7 114 -2.6 1932 267 14.6 107 -6.1 1933 281 5.2 101 -5.6 1934 335 19.2 106 5.0 1935 411 22.7 119 12.3 1936 529 28.7 109 -8.4 1937 588 11.2 134 22.9 1938 657 11.7 120 -10.5 1939 763 16.1 121 0.8 1940 852 11.7 141 16.5 Source: R. Clarke, Soviet Economic Eacts (1972), pp. 8-11. 261 Appendix F Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. Special Section 1. Counter-Revolutionary Crimes Art. 58 (vi). Espionage, i.e., the transmission, theft or collection, with a view to transmission to foreign States, counter- revolutionary organizations or private persons, of information accounted by reason of its contents an especially guarded State secret is punishable by: deprivation of liberty for a period of not less than three years, with the confiscation of all or part of property; in case, when espionage has caused, or might have caused, especially grievous consequences to the interests of the USSR the supreme measure of social defence-—death by shooting, or the declaration to be an enemy of the labouring masses and the deprivation of citizenship of the Union Republic and thereby of the USSR and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR for ever, and confiscation of property. The transmission, theft or collection with a view to transmission of economic information not constituting by virtue of its contents an especially guarded State secret but not intended for divulgence to the organizations or persons enumerated above, as the result of direct prohibition by law or by order of the heads of departments, establishments, or enterprises, either for recompense or gratis is punishable by: deprivation of liberty for a period not exceeding three years. Art.58 (vii) The undermining of State industry, transport, trade, monetary exchange or the credit system and also of the co- operative network, committed for counter-revolutionary purposes by means of making use to such ends of State establishments and enterprises, or by means of impeding their normal functioning, and also the utilization of State establishments and enterprises, or the impeding of their functioning in the interests of their former owners or of capitalist organizations interested in them is punishable by: 262 263 the measures of social defence, indicated in Article 58 (ii) of the present code: the supreme measure of social defence-—death by shooting, or declaration as an enemy of the labouring masses, and the confiscation of property and deprivation of citizenship of the Union Republic and thereby of the USSR, and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR for ever; in extenuating circumstances a reduction of sentence is permitted to deprivation of liberty for a period of not less than three years and the confiscation of all or part of the property. Art. 58 (ix) The destruction or damage, for counter-revolutionary purposes, by explosive, arson or other means, of railways or other means of transportation, of the means of public communication, of water conduits, or public stores and other constructions or of State or public property, is punishable by: the measures of social defense, indicated in Article 58 (ii) of the present code. Art. 58 (xi) Any type of organizational activity, directed towards the preparation or the commission of crimes provided for in the present chapter, and also participation in an organization formed for the preparation or the commission of one of the crimes provided for in this chapter, is punishable by: the measures of social defense, indicated in Article 58 (ii) of the present code. Art. 58 (xiv) Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e. deliberate nonfulfilment by anyone of duties laid down or the wilfully careless execution of those duties with a view to weakening the authority of the Government, the functioning of the State apparatus, entails: deprivation of liberty for period of not less than one year, with confiscation of all or part of his property; to be increased in especially grave circumstances, to the supreme measure of social defence--death by shooting with confiscation of property. Source: Juridical Publishing House, Moscow, 1949. translation by R. Conquest, The Great Terror, appendix G. Appendix G Major Soviet Trading Partners, 1929-1934 Year 3 of Soviet % of Soviet Balance/ USSR Exports Imports (m. rubles) 1929 Britain 21.9 [887.2] 6.2 [239.8] +647.4 Germany 23.3 [942.2] 22.1 [852.6] + 89.6 U.S.A. 4.6 [187.1] 20.1 [776.2] -589.1 1930 Britain 27.0 [1226.0] 7.6 [ 351.0] +875.0 Germany 19.8 [ 901.0] 23.7 [1098.6] -197.6 U.S.A. 3.9 [ 179.3] [1158.0] -978.7 1931 Britain 32.8 [1165.4] [ 321.4] +844.0 Germany 15.9 [ 566.5] [1798.6] -1234.1 U.S.A. 2.8 [ 99.4] [1007.0] -907.6 1932 Britain 24.1 [606.6] [ 402.6] +204.0 Germany 17.5 [440.2] [1435.3] —995.1 U.S.A. 3.0 [ 75.3] [ 138.7] -76.4 1933 Britain 17.6 [381.0] [134.0] +247.0 Germany 17.3 [375.6] [648.5] -272.9 U.S.A. 2.8 [ 61.2] [ 72.6] -11.4 1934 Britain 16.5 [303.0] [202.6] +100.4 Germany 23.5 [431.1] [125.0] +305.1 U.S.A. 3.4 [ 62.5] [ 78.3] —15.8 Source: Based on .A. Baykov's, Soviet. Foreign 'Trade, Table VII. F1gures in [] are based on 1936 ruble rate in millions of rubles as are the figures for the balance of trade. 264 Appendix H Location of Major MVEC Projects1 Ming.” Yarodav‘i n * Heat-power stations Hydro-elecuic stations Q Largest hydro-electric stations under construction Towns which in 1917 had electric stations _. .- with a capacity 0! more than 10.000 kw. 515:3; are underlined ' " 300 300 000 LAIAL A I 1The source for the following maps is N. Baransky's, Economic Geography of the U,§.S,3,, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956). 265 2 66 410 Arkhangelsk 42 to Leningradse .2 [‘05- V_, , Bui ‘5’ ’ ‘- . Gahch ., .z‘ ,0 i" /D l OKostroma 3‘ Yarostavi o / - \ .f'\ - J V0420 " Kirieshrn’a’ “k _ .1 ’ \ .-' V‘ ' ' Rostovl. "h ,, [Vichuga .1 -" \ Luge Ner ,» ‘ f’ D0 lvanovo 5\ ' r- 6;. /{ r Shu a I J.“ l.’.1 / g y I I g. .a. ' I_ / - Alexandrovi J ‘ '\ If \ & ~ 1, \ ' f o ’ w - . g ,, , \ 555A ’- A“) ‘/ ' . .... , ,r‘ A r ‘fi‘ :2-,- ’ MOSCOW .. find? , Mod. “.0 - O 4" d 7' ‘ fl " -.J .PSdonko‘u ‘ 3'34 K )Voskrc'senskw -Yeg0ryev>k' .:\ ‘ i. ‘- I/‘I'[ !\ " . r. \ \' "r. Kasnnov ’ Kulumna f. ans]? (0 Vynzmn Iu Minsk OBI! lu Smolensk (o Smolensk I mm 5 zran me 36 to Khar-oo 3820 Donets -asuu 1040 aronez H—I-hh—h—l The Industrial Centre of the European part of the R.S.F.S.R. (Moscow, Vladimir, Ivanovo, Yaroslavl. Kostroma, Ryazan and Tula regions). 267 to Lenin M36 to Kalyazin 38 to Yarosla-ul 40 . g’ -1 £2212 a l a 4 100km s '1 4 f l i) i k 0 g ‘- . 3%" Vladimir 6‘ 5:46 / lShcn lvante evk (Ir/yam 8 § l x / / / / N A; 56 g“ a \/M% / / /:: M0 c O 3 oogls I. > 49/9 unisevo . n -n OOrekhovo-Zuyevo : o H *@ ‘ S “ I .’: olslr O l u a (" féél'k 1111 to . _Sha ura . k S .-_/-nvé 53' ' Vos resensk O Y cry \v . . ‘ 2 g '\2 3 0K. .. . 2 [Wk 3V a51 U 1‘ .O\ k 0 \yor O 42: aluga _\ as 1ra Zara1\s-/ ii an 3 ' . o E 3‘ . Ni 5" - 5 U, . ‘8 asovo . g 8 .\'\\fi ula 3; :3: c o in. Sta 1n rsk \ \ 3 g . 0pm ‘ 54 c . , . a, edil v 'm ,5 ‘b‘variov 732 s\ \ ‘, 3 k, K - 3- “5 t . . , - § :1 \ u Q: Yang?» -. ‘ V): s - ‘ 0° ~ 36in K arko'v 38:0 Donets Basin 40 to Voronezlz zoSaratm/n Industrial centres and agricultural areas of Moscow, Tula and Ryazan regions. Abbreviations: K- -Kurovskoye, JI- Lyubertsy, sH-lfl- Pavlovsky Posad III Shcholkovo. Agricultural areas: 3- Elektro l—subur ban: 2—fiax and dairy farming: 3—grain and potato growing, dairy and beef farming; 4—forest exploitation and potato- growing. dairy farming and market- gardening on flood lands. The principal areas power stations. 5—sug ar- -beet. 6—makhorka tobacco. 7—large 268 Q o.- centres and agricultural areas of the southern part of the North-West. areas: l—suburban; 2—dairy farming. vegetable and potato r0wing:_3—_flax and dairy farming; 4—f0rest exploitation. animal husbandry and and cultlvation'. areas under flax (outside the flax-growing region); 6—large power stations. 269 'Knok 56 sevefouffls% ‘ @ Asbestos mining ’ . ') A K l ‘ ® Mining oi chromite: S I! Karpl * * Large power stations olikamsk .' * ' 4%, 50 0 501m Berezm‘lri \ hu- t—l—l—I—h—d f a \ 3: Kizel 7 Lobva '2 Gubakha > 5 Novaya L alya 9% 8813 4,1 t . figyanka. ‘ Krasn0uralsk usov01 . ' / 5 2‘ s /'~ 6% go We . Kush ' 1 ' y r V8 Nizhniaya alda ' o otov , ' bzhny Tag] segllréiamaya ”Alap yev 95% K _ .—:\/ 49,00 lrbit ungur ./ . I _ ngl Rezh 3 ./ :- Artemovsky 'é‘ . g r) at? Py ma A‘s-best ./\, .5 t‘ f ' ”you 315 Sverdlovsk mo,” \. ys Krasnouiim'sk mark] * amen Jam;- {"’5’ .L c Seversk'y ‘I‘ [.315 y \1 ./' K. a “’3, ti, VA 1r '\-’ .’ FA. , ‘ ‘ «734* ’5“ \ 'f" " p ' ‘ erkiiny Ufalei ” l l 2. .J .«Kasli ‘3‘ \3\° \\ Kyshtym 3 9. " M5355 Q” *Kofpeisk Yemalnzhelinsk K . fl/L ,. 58 60 Industrial centres in the mining and metallurgical areas of the Urals. 270 "” 34 36 38 40 1. L. ' ' r‘ " rem°nchug- 4' \_ fi~4 ’NJ \ . \w' .J \ 1% ..\.J ’9 ' ' l . w eprodzerzhmslr '0" wKramators pa”: =1 ._ ‘ ,- Omo‘o ‘ ' f. 7 . - .4 / KonstantinovkaO- 1;“ 1‘ DMPTOPGUOVS 1 .Krasnoarmeiskoye Gorlovka ' \ . / ~ .' snL Krivoi Ro'g . ON 1‘.“ .1 l‘ ‘ rozh _ .' Petrovskoye J ---~’-~./ 1 arganets (Isak p0 ya, -, Stallno I iko] [3. 5f (_ J, I .a Hha. I .. if 0) V". \. . 5T Rostov '6‘ Li's J) b/aganr 1 - ghdanov [ - * Large power stations \'>. .__.a 0 - 0 f ' . 50 0 50 100 km T10 ’ , A #1 1 1 38 Industrial centres of the Donets Basin and Dnieper Region. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Government Documents Great Britain Cabinet Minutas, 1929-;23;. London: Public Record Office, CAB 23. Qabinet MemorandaI ;929-193§. London: Public Record Office, CAB 24. Foreign Office, Documents an gritish Fateign Policy, 2nd Series, VII, 1929-1934. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957 . ............... , Gene al 't'cal o s onde ce° ussi 1224—;93 . Public Record Office, PO 371. ............... 7 'vt Colt’O’ O S e thu en son Sec e o a e o F ' W. Public Record Office, PO 800/280- 284. ------------- , 'v ' : s e ir ozn iu-n - e . . . . . -'., :_ .' 5 1221.215. PublicRecord office, FO 80910/284-2 ............... EIly§;§_g911att;9n§i_92123§2QBQEDQg—filr-meg I e Assist nt de se s W243 Public Record Office, PO 800/272-279. ’- .... - o A ;op-‘ 3‘_ ‘ L0 L15‘ ° - '-.Ed1ted by Kenneth Young. London: MacMillan Press, 1973. ' 2,117! :3 ".0: S' °,lLl"!_ ‘ ‘ ° 271 272 USSR Tbe_3ommunieL_12333333123311.1222:1233- Edited by Jane Degras. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Poletaev, V. ed. 5 o " ° - 93 ngtmanty_1_natat1aly. Moscow: Izdatel' stvo Nauka, 1970. Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del SSSR. £Q11t131_§§§3, Vol. 16. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1970. Ordzhonikidze, G. §§3£Li_i_332hio Vol 2. Moscow: Gosydarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1957. Reso ' ns c'sions th C u 'st ar e gaviat gnion, 1222-;253. Edited by R. McNeal. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974. 32xie3_32cumen3§_on_zoreign_zolicx- Edited by J- Degree- London, Oxford University Press, 1951-1953. Sov'- . -'- Po ' ' - ° -: ..c meits .1- 1 ia 5. Edited by X. Eudin and R. Slusser. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1967. O‘v. .0‘ . t ‘2 es aatweaa the 5:213: Ugign and E9231 gn ngats. Edited by L. Shapiro. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1955. Stalin, I. Wgtgs, Vols. 12 3 13. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955. Supreme Court of the USSR. Ina gasa 9: H32: Vityitagy. uss v W. e o ive G ' M.D. s en' ’ v . . ot a evsk S utusova s n V bed v v W. . o ald ouse . Nor wa P . 'n' . ru 'n 0 V o o ov' a d ' W ec 'n es . '0 ‘ . -t1-; 1 9‘ a ‘ 0! u232231_Anril_12:121_123_o Moscow= state Law Publishing House, 1933. V1'-!1 a 1 o 0- a. _ i V ,O- MfV0‘11 L9 32.. 0 ° 9- 1243113333153123estii_§bornik- Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1968. S}, . ; o oo ' .- '10 00 ° . - ,eSk.i 92333. Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1960. 273 WeitZ. B. MW- Moscow INRA Publishing Society, 1936. France - , Commission de publication de documents relatifs aux origins de la guerre 1939-1945, Second Series. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1972-1979. Germany 90 -11‘! on ‘ngg o -'.. . ' . - o. . - - 9 heir e c ° ' s V W. Washington. D 0.: United States Government Printing Office, 1953- 1959. United States 0 -'-'-1- ' -. a -_ I39 o1: ..- 8' 1e 59v lat Uniga. 1933-1232. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952. Private Papers Hexillg_§hamng1ain, University of Birmingham Library. 01111 0119:! 0! 'oq '0 ‘1 8: MW Edited by Martin Gilbert. London: Heinemann, 1981. gigga;§_Ltgt, Cambridge University Library 274 Newspapers and Journals Great Britain Ihe_Iime§(London) USSR v s 'a a us 'a 1 ts" Pravda United States Ihe_Ney_12:k_Iime§ Ihe_Neu_12rk_nerald_Iribune Memoirs Barmine. A. uem9ir§_2f_a_§221et_flinlgmat- London: Lovat Dickson Limited, 1938. Bohlen, C. flitngss to fiistozy, 1222-12fi2. New York: W.W. Norton Company Inc., 1973. Ciliga, A. Ing_Bg__1an_Enigmg. London: Ink Links, 1979. Originally published as Au_Eaxs_du_§rand_Mensgnge France, 1938. Cummings, A.J. In§_u9§ggg_111al. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1933. Dalton. H. Mem2irs1_Qal1_Bagk_¥e§terdax1_1§§l:1§11- London: F. Mueller, 1953. 275 Eden, A. (Earl of Avon). £§£ifl9_§h§_DiEL§§QI§- Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957. Fischer. L. MW New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1941. Hilger, G. and Meyer, A. c ° ° m - s - . New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953. Lyons, E. Aeeignnen;_1n_flnenie. New York: Harcourt, Bruce & Company, 1937. Maisky. I- W. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968. Maclean, F. Eee;e;n_ennreeenee. London: J. Cape, 1949. Monkhouse, A. neeeew, 1911-1233. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1933. Rukeseyer, W. "Do Our Engineers in Russia Damage America?". Sexenneze_uegezine 90, (November 1931): 521-524. ------------ . Wenking fie; Lne SeyieEe; An Anezieen Engineer 1n_3neeie. New York: Covici-Freide Publishers, 1932. Scott, J. Benine_§ne_g;ele. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973 (1942). Smith, A. I wee e Soviet Wezker. London: Robert Hale & Company, 1937. Strang, (Lord) W. flome end Abroed. London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1956. ---------------- . WW London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1962. Vansittart, (Lord) R. The Hie; Ezeeession. London: Hutchinson, 1958. Von Dirksen. H. W Eezeign_£eliey. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952. Von Herwart, H. Ageine§_Ine_£yile. With S.F. Starr. New York: Rawson Wade Publishers, 1981. 276 assendazx_agurges Andrew, C. "The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920' 3. Part I: From the Trade Negotiations to the Zinoviev Letter." HiéEQIiQél Journal. 20, 3 (1977). 673- 706. Se2ret_aer212e1_Ihe_naking_ef_the_nriti§h Intelligenge_92mmunitx London: W H- Heinemann. 1985. Andrew. 0. and D. Dilks. (edS-). The_uissing_nimensign1 0 ‘ lu‘l .10 I 0' e ouu I ‘ 1 9‘ h.‘1 'e_h gentnry. London: MacMillan Press, 1984. Bailes, K. o n ' de ' : ingins e: tne Teennieel Inte111gentsie, 1217-1951. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. --------- . "Stalin and Revolution From Above: The Formation of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1928-1934." Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1971. Baransky. N- E22n2m12_Qeegranhx_2f_§he_n1§1§181. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956. Baykov, A. ' a ° n ' ' e . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. Berman, H. o ' ' ' a e ' Qedee. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972. Biliankin. G. uais£21;Ien_xear§_5mbassader. London: Allen & Unwin, 1944. Bishop. D. Ihe_Adm1nistrati2n_2f_British_£ereign_nelatign§. Syracuse: Syracuse Universtity Press, 1961. Boadle, D. "The Formation of the Foreign Office Economic Relations Section, 1930-1937. " Histgr1§al_lgurnal. 20, 4(1977): 919-936. Carlton, D. n ' ' ' of c . New York: Humanities Press, 1970. ---------- . Anthenx.£den1_a_niegranh¥o London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1981. Carr. E- and DavieS. R- Eeundatigns_Qf_a_Planned_Esean21 122§;1222. Vol. 1. New York: MacMillan Press, 1969. 277 Clarke. R- fi2x1et_Egenomic_ra§t§1_1211:12§1- London: MacMillan Press, 1972. Clarke, R. and D. Hatko. c 7- . London: MacMillan Press, 1983. Coates, W- and Coates, z- A_Hi§L2IY_QI_AanQ:§QYi§£ Belee1en_. London: Lawrence & Wishart and Pilot Press, 1945. Cohen, S. ' ° - . New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. Conquest, R. ° ' Tn1rn1ee. London: MacMillan Press, 1973. ----------- . s' ' s ' - ' s 12;§;12;2, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. Craig. G- and Gilbert. F. eds. The_niplomat§1_1212:1212- Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. Daniels. R. The_£on§91ence_of_the_Eexolutipni_Qommunist Qpp2§1112n_in_§2!1et_32§sia- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Davies, R. O ens 've: 1 c v at on of S22ie1_Agricultp__1_1222:1219 London: MacMillan Press. 1980. Deacon. R. A_H1s12rx_2f_1he_Bu§§1an_§ecret_§erxiceo New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972. Deutscher. I. §LQliD;_A_£Qli§19§l_fliQQ£éE_¥- London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Dohan, M. "The Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky, 1927/28- 1934." Slex1e_3ey1en, 35, 4(1976): 603-635. Drummond, I. ”Empire Trade and Russian Trade: Economic Diplomacy in the Nineteen-Thirties." geneg1enn1enrnel_ef Ec2n2m1csABexue.21nad1enne_d_ficon_migue. 5. 1(1972): 35- 47. Dyck. H. fle1mar_Qermanx_1_S221e1_Bu_sia1_A_§tudx_in Q1nlenee1e_1ne§enil1§y. London: Chatto & Windus, 1966. Fainsod. N- Smolen§k_nnder_fipxiet_nule- London: MacMillan Press, 1958. Fischer. L. Ihe_Soxie1§_1n_flprld_Affairs- New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 278 ---------- . ' ' Wa . New York: Vintage Books, 1960. ---------- - uachines_and_uen_1n_anssia- New York: Jonathan Cape & Robert Ballou, 1932. Flory, H. "The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet RelationS. 1927 " l9urnal_Qf_§9nte_porarx_n1§toz¥ 12. 4 (1977): 707-723. Fitzpatrick. 8- ed- Qnltural_Bex2lut19n_1n_ansia1_1228212;1. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. .............. . "The Foreign Threat During the First Five Year Plan." S2x1e1.9212n1Un121_§221211gu_ 5.1 (1978): 26-35. -------------- . "Ordzhonikidze's Takeover Of Vesenkha: A Case Study in Soviet Bureaucratic Politics." Sey1et Stud1es 37, 2 (1985): 153-172. Getty, J. Qz1g1n§ e: ghe green Enzgee; Ine So v1e§ Qommunist o - 3 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, d1985. Gladkov, T. and M. Smirnov. nenen1nek11. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Molodaya Gvardiya, 1969. Gorodetsky, G. ° o- ov' e at'ons 1225-122 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Gorokhov, A. "Leninist Diplomacy: Principles and Traditions." International_Affairs (Moscow) 5 (1968): 38-44o Graham, L. e A e un'st Eezgy1_1221;12;2. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. Gruber, H. ' ' ' ' a ' nal Qommun1sm_in_the_Era_pf_§talinis_bscendancy- New York: Anchor Press, 1974. Haslam. J- S2xiet_E2re1gn_E2licY1_121Q212211_Ihe_1mpact_of the_Denzeee1en. London: MacMillan Press, 1983. ---------- Ihe_S2x1et_nn12n_and_the_S1ruggle_for_sollectixe Sesuritx.1n.Europei_121_:1212 London: MacMillan Press. 1984. F- Hinsley. Br1t1sh_Intell1gence_1n_the_§econd_florld_flari_lt§ . London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979. 279 Hoff Wilson, J. - . Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974. Hollander, P. ' : . New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Hough. J. and M- Fainsod. WW. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979. Huskey, E. "Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order." Slex1e_3ey1ey 46 3/4(1987): 414- 428. _________ . s . . . . s e . - 0 Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986. Jansen. Marc - WWW ' ' v ' w . Translated by Jean Sanders. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. Jones, B. ' ° tne_Sex1e;_nn1en. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977. Kahan, V. "The Communist International, 1919—1943: The Personnel of its Highest Bodies."1n;ezne;1ene1_3ex1en QI.§Q§1§1_H1_LQIY 21. 2 (1976)=151 185- Knight, A. e ° ' ' ° 5 ° ' ion. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990. Kuromiya . H- melimm EQIKEI§1_122§:1212- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. ----------- . "Edinonachalie and the Soviet Industrial Manager, 1928-1937." EQYi§£_§LBQi§§ 36, 2 (1984)?? Kuzmin, V. V ' 122§21211. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mysl', 1976. Lammers, D. "The Engineers' Trial (Moscow 1933) and Anglo- Soviet Relations." WW 62. (1963): 256-267. ---------- . ”Fascism, Communism and the Foreign Office, 1937- 1939." W 6. 3 (1971): 66- 86. 280 ---------- . "The Second Labour Government and the Restoration of Relations with Soviet Russia (1929)." Bellee1n_ef u e ' 37, (May 1964): 60-72. Langhourne. R. n1p12macx_and_1nte11igence_dur1ng_the_§ecpnd H9rld_Kar1_Essaxs_1n_Hpnpur_pf_Eifii_H1nslex. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Lal'ChUK, V. . . . . [- 1'... I..- 1 . 1 . '_ _ A. . ee ' ' ' '. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1975. Levyetsky, B. Ine usee ef IEIIQI: The Sov1e§ Segre; Eel1ee .1211;1219. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1972. Lewin, M. s ' s v' o ' gelleen1y1eee1en. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968. -------- - Ihe_Making_9f_the_S2x1et_§xstem1_fisssxs_in_the S2c1al_H1storx_of_1nterwar_zuss1a. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. -------- . E21it12al_undercurrents_1n.5221e1_E22n2m12_Debates. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. Manne, R. "The British Decision for Alliance with Russia." l2prnal_of_sontemporarx_flistorx 9. 3 (1974): 3-26- -------- . "The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement." Jonrnel ef Centemnoneny n1story 16, 4 (1981): 725-757. Mastny, V. Bussie'e BQQQ te gne Cele Wer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. McNeal, R. S§e11n1_nen_ene_3n1e;. New York: New York University Press, 1988. MedvedeV. R. Le1_H1st9rx_1ndgs1_The_origins_and_£gnseguencss ej_S;e11n1_n. Edited by Colleen Taylor and translated by David Joravsky and Georges Haupt. New York: Vintage Books, 1973 (1967). Medlicott. w. Br1t1sh_E9re1gn_E2lic2_§1nce_Yersailles_1212: 1251. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1968. Meyer, A. "The War Scare of 1927." Sey1e;_yn1enzflnign Soxietigue 5. 1 (1978): 1-25- 281 Middlemas, K. ' s ° s ' s . New York: Kennikat Press, 1947. Naylor. J. Lap9pr1§_lnternetignal_£olicx- London: Weidenfeld 8 Nicolson, 1969. Northedge. F- and Wells. A- Br1ts1n_and_§2_1et_92mmun1§m1_1he Inpee§_efi_e_3e_eln;1en. London: MacMillan Press, 1982. Owen, G. "The Metro-Vickers' Crisis: Anglo-Soviet Relations Between Trade Agreements, 1932-1934." v d ast European_Bexiew 44. 114 (1971): 92-112- Pearson, J. Ine_L1fie_efi_1en_£1en1ng. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1966. PeterS. A- Anth2n2_Eden_at_the_Foreign_gffice_1211:1218. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. Pope, A. uen1n_L1;y1nefifi. New York: L. Fischer Press, 1947. Raymond, P. "Conflict and Consensus in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1933-1939." unpublished Ph.D thesis, Penn. State University, 1979. Rassweiler. A- The_Qenerat12n_of.£2wer1.1he_flistorx_of Dnenneeene1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Reiman, M. ' '5 ° . of gne "Seeend Bevelnt1en". Translated from the German edition of 1979 by George Saunders. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987. Rigby, T. o u ' U 7- 12e1. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. Roskill. 8: Hanke21_Man_of_§ecrets1_Yol1_ll1_121221211- London: Collins, 1972. ---------- ° e s V 3 - . London: Collins, 1974. Sakharov, V. "G.K. Ordzhonikidze vo Glave Bor'by za Tekhnicheskii Progress (1930-1935 gg.)." yenzeey 1519311 [U.S.S.R.] 9 (1986): 81-91. SchapirO. L- Ihe_Qommnn1st_2artx_of_the_§oziet_union. New York: Random House, 1960. 282 Schinness, R. ”An Early Pilgrimage to Soviet Russia: Four Conservative MP's Challenge Tory Party Policy." Historical_lournal 18. 3 (1975): 623- 631- Sharlet, R. and P. Beirne. "In Search of Vyshinsky: The Paradox of Law and Terror." the_Sociologx_of_st 12. (1984): 153-177- Slusser, R. "The Role of the Foreign Ministry. " In Bnee1en Eere1gn_2e11ey edited by Ivo Lederer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Solomon, P. "Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-1941." Sexiet.§tudie§ 37, 3 (1983): 305- 329. ---------- . "Soviet Criminal Justice and the Great Terror." S1ey1e_3eg1en 46 3/4(1987): 391-413. Solzhenitsyn. A: Ihe_Qu1ag_Archipelsgo1_121§:12§§1_An ' ° ' ' . New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Sontag, J. "The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27." Ine_3nee1en 3eg1eg 34, 1 (1975): 66-77. Thompson, R. Church1ll_and_uorton- London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976. Tucker. R-. Stal1n1sm1_E§§ax§_1n_Hi_torical Ingennnegee1en. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1977. --------- . "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy." vi Bex1en 36, 4 (1977): 563-589. Ulam, A. 11.01‘ 0 (Q! 0‘ . -’ . .- .7-.! -. lflllzlfiél- New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. ------- . S§e11n3 The Men and H1§ Ene. New York: The Viking Press, 1973. Uldricks, T. "The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs." S1ex1e_3ey1eg 36, (1977): 187-203. ----------- Dipl2macx_1nQ_1de2l2gx1_Ihe_Qrigin__of_Soxiet Eene1gn_3e1_e1en_. Beverley Hills: Sage Publishers, 1979. 283 Two Volumes. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Agentstva Pechati Novosti, 1989. VolkhogonOV. D- kmmLingediiLPQlitigheskiLzonret .11Y1_Stalina Wark, W. 9‘ 1.1- ‘ 1‘11. ' ° 1 I i ‘ 1°. o. Sermeny1_1211_1212. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. Watt, D. °- 1., -s —1- °- 5~s- . -; ,1 .- oqu: 'on 0. ! ..- ’! ° 1 l‘ K‘! . Q ’0 South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. White. 8 WWW the_2ol1t12s_of_niplomacx1_1222:1221 New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980. Wolin, S. and R. Slusser. Ih§_§Q!i§L_§§QI§£_EQli£§- New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Zeiger. 11- W New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965. IV. LIBRGRIES MICHIGAN STATE UN 1|!11111111111111111 “1| I 1| 31293008 1 9 4222