THED‘ Ill lllllllllllll» r This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Analyzing the International Direct Broadcast Satellites Debate: Origins, Decision-Making Factors and Social Concerns presented by Michel G. Elasmar has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Y Ph.D. Mass Media degree in" }//577éa7/}%7 ' ’fi"*~\ Major professor Datefl /é [//%,/Ju7 MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity lnsn'um'on 0712771 _ LIBRARY M'chlgan State University PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE 3W? 3. 4% ea .L. reign A??? i. T 1996‘ {V c:\clrc\dd.edue.pm3-D I ANALYZING THE INTERNATIONAL DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES DEBATE: ORIGINS, DECISION-MAKING FACTORS AND SOCIAL CONCERNS BY Michel G. Elasmar A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Mass Media Ph.D. Program 1993 ABSTRACT ANALYZING THE INTERNATIONAL DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES DEBATE: ORIGINS, DECISION-MAKING FACTORS AND SOCIAL CONCERNS BY Michel G. Elasmar In the 19603, the potential of satellites to communicate directly and simultaneously by sound and picture to individuals living in various parts of earth was perceived by some as possibly uniting the world. Others feared this technological breakthrough and exerted continual attempts to thwart any efforts at achieving consensus on its international utilization. In light of satellite-related technological breakthroughs, negotiations concerning international direct broadcast satellites took place within the confines of the United Nations and its related agencies. The last round of heated DBS negotiations resulted in the adoption of U.N. resolution 37/92 in 1982, which formulated guidelines for international DBS conduct. This study first investigates the origins of the DBS controversy and performs a regime-theory-based extraction of some key factors that led to the 1982 U.N. Resolution. After isolating the policy-makers’ key social concerns in relation to DBS, this study systematically assesses the results of social-scientific studies conducted regarding these key social concerns. A discussion ensues. This study finds that: 1) the perceived abilities of satellites and their anticipation had a stronger social impact than did their actual implementation; 2) U.N. Resolution 37/92 concluded several years of negotiations which diverted the international focus from that of achieving a collective global DBS system to that of putting significant hurdles in the face of any international DBS initiative; 3) key factors that affect the fate of a satellite regime attempt include: the forum in which the negotiations take place (including the number of negotiators, the specification of the negotiation orientation, the certainty of the power structure and the type of participation involved) and the results of a cost- benefit analysis for each of the negotiators; 4) the notion of DBS, as it evolved throughout the U.N. deliberations, has inherent characteristics that embody clear disadvantages for developing countries. These disadvantages negatively influenced the results of the cost/benefit analysis for a majority of the negotiating parties, and hence hindered the realization of a D88 regime of common interest; 5) a systematic analysis of social scientific studies about the effects of foreign TV concludes that the investigations were too sparse and too varied in approach and methodology, therefore preventing a solid conclusion from being drawn and making them of limited utility in a policy-making context. Nevertheless a speculation about the strength of effect is advanced. The impact of the 1982 U.N. resolution on the international diffusion of DBS is discussed and an agenda of research concerning international 088 is laid out. Copyright by MICHEL GEORGES ELASMAR 1993 To my late father, Georges Elasmar, to whom I owe my open philosophical and ideological orientation and who would have been so proud to attend my graduation. To my mother, Latifee Saliba Elasmar, whose firm confidence in me provided me with the self-esteem necessary to overcome life’s many turbulent periods. To my colleague and partner, Kazumi Hasegawa, whose emotional and intellectual support helped me overcome the many periods of despair that one encounters while going through graduate school. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the learning opportunities provided to me during my years of residence in the Mass Media Ph.D. Program at Michigan State University. The classes that I have taken and the professors with whom I had the opportunity to interact had their share of influence on my work. Needless to say, this dissertation would not have materialized without the full support of my dissertation committee. I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the committee chair Professor Todd Simon, whose continuous and meticulous feedback throughout the writing process was indispensable. I would also like to express my gratitude to the other members of my dissertation committee listed alphabetically: Professor Thomas Muth, Professor Michael Schechter and Professor Joseph Straubhaar. I was fortunate to interact extensively with each of my committee members and learn from their individual areas of expertise. I thank them for agreeing to serve on my committee and giving me of their time despite their busy schedules. This dissertation is a beginning and not an end. It provided me with the opportunity to develop a number of research agendas for the near and distant future. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables ........................................ xi-xiv List of Figures ........................................... xv I. Introduction ............................... . ......... 1-12 A. Study Overview .......... . ........................ 2-5 B. A brief definition of the technology ............. 6-8 C. The social backdrop of satellite policy- making in the united states during the 19605 ................................ 9-12 II. Tracking the Evolution of the DBS Debate ........... 13-53 A. The seeds of concerns about DBS--the 19605 ..... 15-19 1. The formation of the Working Group on DB8 .................. . .................... 17-18 \/2. Social and Cultural Concerns Related to DB8 ............................... 18-19 B. Growth and maturation of the DBS debate--the 1970s ............................................. 19-21 1. The 1971 WARC and Spillover ............... 21-23 2. UNESCO’s Declaration on Satellite Broadcasting .............................. 23-25 3. U.S. Preliminary DBS Experiments .......... 25-28 4. The main areas of regulation for international DBS ............. ..... ....... 28-32 5. U.S. advocates the sharing of DBS technology ................................ 32-38 6. Three controversial areas of regulation for DBS ........................ 38-39 7. WARC-1977 and DBS ......................... 39-43 C. The finale for international DBS - the 19805 ............................................ 43-46 D. U.N. decision-making about international direct broadcast by satellites ........................ 46-48 E. A concise chronology of the DBS debate and its dynamism ................................... 48-53 III. Assessing the Factors Leading to an International Satellite Regime of Common Aversion vs. Common Interest ............................................... 54-88 A. Defining ’regime' as a framework for analysis..54-57 B. A brief developmental history of INTELSAT ....................................... 57-63 C. Contrasting the common interest found in INTELSAT with the common aversion of the DBS regime effort .................................. 63-88 1. \zmm The forum as a factor influencing the outcome of the INTELSAT satellite regime attempt ............................ 65-70 The forum as a factor influencing the outcome of the DBS satellite regime attempt.... ........................ 70-75 The forum as a factor influencing the outcome of a satellite regime attempt. ............................. 75- 76 "Interest" as a factor influencing the outcome of a satellite regime attempt ......... . ......................... 76—77 Cost/benefit analysis for INTELSAT ........ 77-80 Cost/benefit analysis for DBS ............. 80-86 Factors influencing the outcome of a satellite regime attempt ................ 86-88 IV. The Impact of International Television: What Does the Research Say? ........................... 89-129 A. Method ......................................... 94-98 1. Study selection ........................... 95-96 2. Study summaries..... ............ . ......... 96-97 3. Analysis .................................. 97-98 B. Results ....................................... 98-129 1. Studies date of publication versus date of initiation ....................... 99-102 2. First author’s country affiliation .......... 102 3. Study sources ............................... 103 4. Theoretical orientation of studies ...... 103-104 5. Study samples.... ....................... 104-105 6. Mode of data collection ..................... 105 7. Design of studies.. ............. . ........... 106 viii E11 V. Conclusion and Implications for Future Research...130-150 8. Countries where studies were conducted .......................... .....106-107 9. Origin of foreign TV content investigated ............................ 107-108 10. Measurement of independent variables ......... . .................... 108—110 11. Types of dependent variables investigated ........................... 110-111 12. Authors’ department affiliations ....... 111-112 Summarizing strength of effect measures ...... 112—118 Observations about the empirical investigations reviewed ...................... 118-124 Suggestions stemming from the observations made about the foreign TV impact studies .......... 124-126 Conclusion about the empirical research on foreign TV program effects ................... 126-129 A. The current DBS regime and the diffusion of the related technology ......... . .......... 135-137 B. The current DBS regime and developing countries .................................... 137-140 C. The implications of the findings of this dissertation on future international DBS negotiations ................................. 140-150 Appendices ........................................... 151-204 Appendix A -- State—to-state broadcasting permitted by the plan of the 1977 WARC ....................................... 151 Appendix B -- Text formulated by the Working Group on draft principles on direct broadcasting satellite .................... 152 Appendix C -- Canada and Sweden: working paper (1979) ............................................. 153 Appendix D -- United States of America: working paper (1979) ................................ 154 Appendix E -- Belgium: working paper (1979) ......... 155 .- ix Appendix F -- United Kingdom: working paper (1980) .............................................. 156 Appendix G -- U.N. General Assembly: Principles governing the Use of States of artificial satellites for international direct television broadcasting (10 December 1982) ...... 157-160 Appendix H —- Excerpt from Congressional Record (House) ................. ...... ...................... 161 Appendix I -- Code book for foreign TV effects’ studies’ analysis ...................... 162—165 Appendix J -- Summary tables of foreign TV effect studies .................................. 166-204 References ........................................... 205-221 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Advantages and disadvantages of INTELSAT 2 Potential advantages and disadvantages of DBS 3 Year of study publication 4 Country of affiliation of first author 5 Type of publication 6 Primary theory of studies 7 Sample types of studies 8 Method of investigation 9 Study locations 10 Analyses by geographical area 11 Origin of foreign TV investigated 12 Exposure to foreign TV as an independent variable 13 Effects investigated 14 Departmental affiliation of authors 15 Foreign TV impact studies providing some type of strength of effects measure 16 Strength of effects measure for belief-based relationships 16 Strength of effects measure for belief-based relationships (continued) 17 Strength of effects measures for behavioral relationships 18 Strength of effects measures for cognitive relationships 19 Strength of effects measures for value—based relationships xi Page 78 82 100 102 103 104 105 105 106 107 108 109 111 111 113 114 115 116 116 117 (Most of the following table titles are those of studies summarized in Appendix J - a full reference for each original work is included within each table) Table Page Jla Images of life in America: the relationships of Korean adolescents’ U.S. television viewing and perceptions of American reality 166 Jlb Correlations between total amount of U.S. program viewing and perceptions of U.S. 167 J2 An examination of the relationship of United States television and Canadian identity 169 J3 In Canada’s centennial year, U.S. mass media explored 170 J4a Uses and effects of foreign television programming: a study of an American Armed Forces television in Korea 171 J4b Zero-order correlations between AFKN—TV viewing genres and various variables 172 J4b Relationships between AFKN-TV viewing and various variables 173 J5 Some effects of frontier television in a Canadian Eskimo community 174 J6 Satellite television and cultural replacement among Canadian Eskimos 175 J7 Effects of a decade of satellite television in the Canadian arctic 176 J8 Social reality in the Third World: the influence of American television on Venezuelan values 177 J9 Psychological impact of television among Algonkians of Central Canada 178 J10a Culture clash: impact of U.S. television in Korea 179 J10b» Partial correlation table for amount of AFKN viewing and attitudes 180 J11a. Satellite TV and dependency: an empirical approach 181 JJJI> Partial correlations between exposure to U.S. and Mexican TV and key variables 182 J12 Cultural diffusion: the role of U.S. TV in Iceland 183 J13a. Cross-national diffusion: the effects of Canadian TV on rural Minnesota viewers 184 J13b IPartial correlation table between viewing Canadian TV and... 185 J14a..Anglophone Canadian and American mass media: uses and effects of Quebecois adults 186 J14t> Correlation table between ’percentage of time spent viewing American television and key dependent variables 187 J15 U.S. programs on Australian television: the cultivation effect 188 J16 Foreign TV program viewing and dependency: a case study of U.S. television in Trinidad and Tobago 189 J17a. Foreign media and the desire to emigrate from Belize 190 J17b .Impact of communication sources on the desire to emigrate from Belize to the United States 191 J18 TV across the Canadian border: does it matter? 192 J19 American TV in the Philippines: a test of cultural impact 193 J20 American TV and social stereotypes of Americans in Taiwan and Mexico 194 J21a..American TV and social stereotypes of Americans in Thailand 195 xiii J21b J22 J23 J24 J25 J26 J27a J27b J28 Total viewing of U.S. programs as predictor of social stereotypes of Americans as viewed by students in Thailand The effects of United States television programs upon Canadian beliefs about legal procedures A study of the effects of American television programs on children in Formosa Foreign television entertainment programs viewing and cultural imperialism Images of life of America: the impact of American TV in Israel Television and attitudes toward foreign countries: a report on a survey of Scandinavian children Television and the value systems of Taiwan’s adolescents: a cultivation analysis Relationship between exposure to U.S. television and various variables in Taiwan Effects of foreign media use, government and traditional influences on Chinese women’s values xiv 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 LIST OF FIGURES Hierarchy of Decision-Making Concerning International DBS at the UN Figure 1 2 Dynamism 3 Dynamism 4 Dynamism 5 Dynamism 6 Dynamism 7 INTELSAT 8 Dynamism stage 9 Dynamism 10 A regime of DBS at the United Nations in 1969 of DBS at the United Nations in 1970 of DBS at the United Nations in 1973 of DBS at the United Nations in 1974 of DBS at the United Nations in 1981 Pathways Trend of the INTELSAT regime in its early of the DBS regime in its initial stage attempt process model 11 Impact of foreign TV - trend in studies conducted XV Page 47 48 49 51 52 53 62 70 75 87 101 CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION The possibility of beaming a satellite signal directly to individual households was discussed as both satellite transmission and reception technology were rapidly evolving. The discussion regarding international direct broadcast satellites (DBS) was subsequently transformed into a heated international controversy. From the time that international DBS negotiations began in the 19605, several relevant resolutions have been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. A sizeable body of literature about DBS has also been written. The last round of heated DBS negotiations, which ended in 1982, resulted in the adoption of U.N. resolution 37/92, titled: "Principles Governing the Use of States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting" (General Assembly, 1983). This resolution laid out a set of guidelines for international DBS conduct. The technological developments of the 19605, 19705 and 19805 enabled the technical feasibility of international DBS. Ten years following U.N. Resolution 32/92, however, these technological developments have not yet been implemented internationally as part of a global DBS system. Most of the studies found about international DBS are descriptive, some are highly rhetorical and a very few are analytical. None of the studies utilize related bodies of 2 knowledge from the social sciences. None, for example, has ever reviewed the relevant empirical literature to explore the validity of the fears of cross-cultural effects which were frequently echoed in many DBS articles. Past studies have mostly concentrated on the legality of cross-border satellite broadcasts often contrasting the before versus after of the 1982 resolution (see, for example, Ducharme, et a1., 1984; Larsen, 1984; The Georgetown Space Law Group, 1984; Bailey, 1985; Christol, 1985; Flaherty, 1985; Gorove, 1985; Paul, 1986; Adamson & Hsiung, 1988; Ruth, 1989; Fjordbak, 1990). A. STUDY OVERVIEW: In an effort to organize a study that addresses those areas found to have received inadequate coverage in past DBS research endeavors, the investigation undertaken here is formed of five sections. The general research question of this study is: Why didn’t the negotiations surrounding DBS result in an agreement which provides for collective usage of the technology? Chapter 2 traces back the earliest conceptualization of DBS in an international organization setting. The year 1962 was the year that the first transcontinental television linkup via satellite occurred. It is expected that most discussions about DBS will take place starting in the early 19605. Section one ends with 1982. The year 1982 is chosen as the end date for the first section since that date marked 3 the year of the U.N. resolution that has since determined the fate of international DBS. In this section, various U.N. documents are systematically examined for instances discussing the course of the DBS negotiations. The purpose of this examination is to answer a preliminary research question: How did the DBS controversy evolve over the years?. The object of this chapter is to provide a description of the progression of the DBS debate at the United Nations level and hence a background for the chapters to follow. Chapter 3 of this dissertation utilizes the information gathered during Chapter 2 to conduct an analysis the objective of which is to extract the factors that have influenced the outcome of the DBS negotiations. The analysis will be guided by an international relations theory especially suited for this type of investigation: regime theory. A regime is defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedure around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner, 1982, p. 185). Regime analysis is utilized here as a framework to explore the factors that lead to the convergence among international actors. Satellites were met with great hopes in the Western hemisphere. The prospects of this new technology and its perceived abilities had a sudden impact on American media, media consumers, Congress, and the White House. This impact 4 may have framed the atmospherics for the creation of international satellite regimes. International regimes range in complexity on a continuum between two extremes. They exist in various forms, have diverse scopes, and memberships‘. iHaas (1982) differentiates between two types of regimes: 1) regimes of common interest where actors agree to collaborate toward a common goal; and 2) regimes of common aversion where actors agree "on the outcome all wish to avoid" (p. 211). In view of the nature of the satellite medium (i.e., its ability to transcend national borders) its international location (i.e., in the Earth's outer-space) and the desires of its builders (i.e., mainly to facilitate commerce and trade), international negotiations seemed predestined. The main research question that Chapter 3 will address is: What are some key factors which account for the achievement of a satellite regime of common interest versus a satellite regime of common aversion? The convergence of interests between the United States and various other nations for the use of satellite technology in the 19605, which resulted in INTELSAT, will be contrasted with the convergence of interests that resulted in the avoidance of achieving a global DBS system. Ideally, the purpose of the analysis conducted in this chapter would be to generate a l (1989). For an extensive discussion on regimes, see Young 5 model that incorporates all the assessed factors and explains and predicts the outcome of the DBS negotiations as reflected in Chapter 2. The INTELSAT negotiations which were successful in achieving collective usage of satellite technology will be contrasted with those of DBS in order to extract the model’s components. The fourth chapter of this study is a systematic review of all the investigations relevant to the key social issues which have haunted those states fearful of international DBS and which contributed to the formulation of the principles articulated in the relevant 1982 General Assembly Resolution. Chapter 4 will systematically research the social science literature in an attempt to coalesce and summarize study findings. The main research questions here is: What does the body of social science research say about the social concerns raised by the international DBS policy- makers? Chapter 5 will highlight this dissertation’s key results and discuss the implications of these results for future research on DBS matters and on international negotiations about direct broadcast satellites. Before tracing back the evolution of the international direct broadcast satellite debate, the following paragraphs present a concise definition of communication satellites and DBS. 6 B. A BRIEF DEFINITION OF THE TECHNOLOGY: Communication satellites are used to wirelessly relay electronic signals between two or more points on Earth. The function of the communication satellite is to beam a signal from space over a defined geographical area. A simplified sketch of the process is as follows: A signal is first transmitted to the satellite from earth. The satellite receives the signal and then beams it back down over a large geographical area on earth. The size of the beam determines the area of coverage of the satellite. In order to perform its relay function, a communication satellite is first launched into a portion of space called the geostationary orbit. The geostationary orbit is located some 22,300 miles above the Equator. Once in the geostationary orbit, the satellite rotates at the same speed as the earth. This synchronism ensures continuous coverage by a satellite over the area of earth it is dedicated to serve and thus uninterrupted signal transmission. A distinction is often made between C-band and Ku-band satellites. The "band", in this context, refers to the frequency that the satellite uses to receive and transmit signals. C-band satellites use frequencies of four to six gigahertz (Ghz) while Ku-band satellites use eleven to fourteen Ghz. Older satellites are most often of the C-band type. C-band satellites typically transmit a weaker signal then those that are Ku-band. Earth stations or dishes are required to transmit and receive signals from a satellite. Most satellite dishes can only perform a receive-only function. Dishes that can transmit signals satellites are much more expensive than those that only receive signals from satellites. Transmit- dishes are usually confined to commercial and governmental uses. Dishes or earth stations come in different sizes. The larger earth stations are utilized to receive signals beamed from the lower-powered C-band satellites. Smaller dishes and antennas are used to capture the signals of more recent and more powerful Ku-band communication satellitesz. The achievement of the technological aspects of satellite communication prompted the formulation of specific national and international policies that charted its uses and development. The term direct broadcast satellite (DBS) refers to a specific type of satellite technology. A DBS shares most of the characteristics of the older communication satellites. A key difference is that DBS most often use Ku-band, a portion of the electronic spectrum less congested than C- band. DBS satellites are also more powerful than their predecessors, therefore requiring increasingly smaller earth 2 For an overview see Gross (1990). For more detailed and technical discussions see Jansky & Jeruchim (1987), Rainger et al. (1985), and Ha (1990). stations or dishesa DBS can carry television signals across borders and continents. The small antennas used for signal reception enable individual households to receive the satellite signals directly, hence the term direct broadcast satellites. The medium, in the case of DBS, promises to carry entertainment, educational and other types of programming targeting individual households. In the 19605, it was hoped by many that this type of programming will be internationally carried by satellites in order to achieve a positive social impact (i.e. world peace and understanding)“. This same perceived ability of DBS was seen by others as constituting a threat of cultural domination by those states that had a hardware (technical skills, equipment, etc...) and software (libraries of TV programs and other content) advantage over others. This latter perceived ability was brought to the center of a debate that dragged on through the 19705 and early 19805. As the geosynchronous communication satellites had their technological roots in the U.S., the following paragraphs describe the atmospherics that accompanied the advent of the technology in the United States. 3 See Rainger et al., (1985). 4 See Frenkel (1965) for a discussion of how some perceived satellite communications to be an essential tool of peace among the different inhabitants of Earth. 9 C. THE SOCIAL BACKDROP OF SATELLITE POLICY-MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 19608: The technology that enabled the bouncing of a television signal via satellite over an entire continent and/or between continents materialized with the launching of Telstar I in 1962 (see Witkin, 1962). In the early 19605, the satellite technological breakthrough, in itself, was a fascinating topic that the news media were eager to disseminate to their audiences. The ability to connect and show to the public, simultaneously and in real time, the European and the American continents, brought about a new vision of the world in the minds of many. The vast distances among continents now seemed smaller. The satellite appeared to be a tool of enlightenment for many, including policy-makers. The impression that the world was shrinking suddenly struck many members of the U.S. Congressfi The satellite was now a hope "to bring the peoples of the world closer together..[and] make the world a better place in which to live"fi Use of satellites was urged to broadcast "messages of peace and brotherhood all around the worldfl7. This novel 5 See the statement of Senator Wayne Morse before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly legislation printed in the Congressional Record (1962, April 2). 6 See Representative McIntire’s statement about the Telstar launch (Congressional Record, 1962, p. 13175). 7 See Representative Anfuso's statement (New York Times, 1961, May 24, p. 18). 10 perception of the world was also shared by the White House. For U.S. President Kennedy, the technology would "bring people closer together" (Public Papers, 1961, p. 406) and would "insure greater understanding among the peoples of the world" (Public Papers, 1962a, p. 553). For the electronic and print media industries, the advent of satellites was also associated with positive outcomes. David Sarnoff, the chairman of the board of RCA, held that satellites offered "a bright new promise for moving the world closer to civilized harmony"8. The New York Times believed that in terms of its potential for further shrinking the earth and letting the peoples of the world see and know one another better, the newest electronic marvel could have a global influence most impossible to estimate in advance (1961, August 6, p. 11). In fact, the perception of the world in the minds of many had been altered to the extent that some now perceived the entire terrestrial globe as a single town. Dr. Frahk Stanton, president of CBS News proposed that satellites be used to regularly broadcast "A Town Meeting of World" during which "the best informed men and women from all the participating nations would discuss a subject of worldwide interest and urgency" (New York Times, 1962, October 26, p. 63)9. 8 See Sarnoff’s address at the University of Detroit Convocation on April 5, 1961 printed in the Congressional Record (1961, April 27, p. 6822). 9 The "Town Meeting of the World" was in fact broadcast live on July 11, 1963, one year after the launch of Telstar I. A preliminary assessment of its impact said that it 11 The perceived ability of satellites to change the attitudes of nations toward one another was taken seriously not only by Congress, the White House and the media, but also by some members of the scientific community. Richard Frenkel, a practicing psychiatrist, wrote about the ability of satellites to achieve world peace by introducing the International-Self-Concept. Frenkel (1965) claimed that ....[s]atellite telecommunications will pave the way by removing prejudicial resistances to our feeling for the International-Self—Concept and freeing us from our inhibitions so necessary to promote the growth of our International-Self-Concept leading to peace through brotherhood (p. 126). The perceived abilities of satellites and anticipation of those abilities seem to have had a stronger social impact than did their actual implementation. Thirty years after the launch of Telstar I, one finds that the utopian View of the world and the hopes which accompanied the technological feasibility of worldwide instantaneous audio-visual communication remained confined to the 19605. Certain aspects of satellite communications got subsequently tangled in a web of international disputes which delayed their international diffusion. The following section reviews the evolution of a debate which surrounded a particular application of satellite technology: International direct broadcasting by satellite, "confirmed Dr. Staton’s hopes ... that a two-way hook-up of continents would dramatize the potential of international TV in helping unite peoples and countries" (New York Times, 1963, July 11, p. 5). 12 or the ability of one State to transmit audio-visual programs directly to individuals living in another State”. m There are nowadays numerous applications for satellite technology. Commercial uses include data transmission, voice communication, videoconferencing, meteorology and remote sensing for agricultural or other civilian uses. Military uses include strategic photography and other types of intelligence data gathering. This study does not address any of these applications. The investigation is solely focused on communication satellites used for the transmission of audio-visual programs directly to individuals living in independent states. CHAPTER II. TRACKING THE EVOLUTION OF THE DBS DEBATE The intrinsic international nature of satellites precipitated the United Nations’ interest in overseeing the regulation of the new technology. Special attention was given to the possibility of using satellites for broadcasting directly to individual households beyond the national borders of the transmitting country. While optimism regarding DBS reigned in the United States, a totally different reaction to the technology was conveyed by many country-members of the United Nations. For policy-makers the possibility of international DBS marked the first time in human history that audio-visual signals were to be transmitted from one country directly to individuals living in another country. The possibility of DBS must have certainly reminded policy-makers of another international broadcasting application: external short-wave radio. Governments utilized external short-wave radio services to transmit audio signals from within their borders to individuals living in other countries. The short-wave experience, however, was not an international application of broadcasting to be proud of“. Less than three decades earlier, external short-wave radio services were used in ” For a detailed history of the negotiations concerning international short wave radio, see Tomlinson, 1979. 13 14 Europe to disseminate Nazi propaganda”. After the end of World War II, the short wave radio services of the Soviet Union, China and United States were engaging in a fierce battle of ideologies”. By the time the notion of DBS surfaced, external radio services had multiplied in a disorderly fashion, causing heavy interference and noise on the air waves. Despite international regulatory attempts, in practice, jungle law applied to short-wave radio as the clearest signals were those of the world's super powers and the most economically prosperous and/or militarily dominant countries”. Policy—makers must have realized that if international DBS services were to evolve without international control, they were likely to mimic the experience of international short wave radio. Therefore, they attempted to anticipate the coming of DBS and influence its evolution. The following account is predominately drawn from primary United Nations documents to trace back the developments which led to the 1982 resolution concerning international DBS. The evolution of the DBS issue is traced by decade beginning with the 19605 and ending with the early n For a discussion of the use of radio for Nazi propaganda, see Kris, & White, 1944; Speier & Otis, 1944; Herma, 1944. ” For a discussion, see Materlanc et. a1, 1977. ” For a discussion of regulatory attempts, see Tomlinson, 1979. 15 19805. A. THE SEEDS OF CONCERNS ABOUT DBS -- THE 19608: Several years prior to achieving the first transatlantic television broadcast via satellite, numerous technological developments promised to let humans explore and utilize the earth’s outer space. The prospects of exploring what lies outside the Earth’s outer atmosphere prompted the United Nations to set up specialized committees to coordinate the States’ efforts in probing space and to resolve any differences among States regarding their rights and responsibilities. For this purpose, in 1958, U.N. resolution 1348 (XIII) established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (U.N. General Assembly, 1958). Four years after its creation, on March 29, 1962, COPUOS established a Legal Subcommittee (LS) in order to develop and recommend international legislation related to the use of outer space (Legal Sub-Committee, 1962). During the first session of the LS, and when direct broadcasting by satellite was still a remote possibility, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted proposals for consideration by the committee. The United states’ proposal was solely concerned with matters related to the liability for space vehicle accidents and the return of both space vehicles and personnel (see U.S., 1962a; 1962b). The Soviet proposal, however, contained a series of principles, one of which is 16 directly relevant to the ability to broadcast directly from space, although not clearly stated as such in the principle: 5. Scientific and technological advances shall be applied to outer space in the interests of a better understanding among nations and the promotion of broad international co-operation among States; the use of outer space for propagating war, national or racial hatred or enmity between nations shall be prohibited (USSR, 1962, p. 1). This principle hinted at what could be easily interpreted as broadcasting directly via artificial satellites. The following year, Brazil raised a similar issue during the COPUOS deliberations concerning the legal principles governing the activities of States in the exploration of outer space. The Brazilian delegate stated: The declaration should also incorporate a ban on the utilization of a communication system based on satellites for purposes of encouraging national, racial or class rivalries and a reference to some international scrutiny of global satellite communication (UN General Assembly, 1963, add. 1). During the next several years, however, the attention of the LS was solely focused on matters other than international DBS. Issues being vigorously debated included: 1) exploring the moon and other celestial bodies; 2) the assistance to and return of astronauts; and 3) the liability associated with space vehicles”. While the LS was heavily involved in the intricacies of space vehicle and launch liability vis-a-vis individual ” See the reports of the Legal Subcommittee from 1963 and until 1970 for the early concerns of the United Nations concerning activities in outer space. 17 countries, communication satellite technology was rapidly evolving“. By 1968, several geostationary communication satellites had been launched and had begun providing mainly telephone linkages among countries. 1. The formation of the Working Group on DB8: By 1968, the rapid growth in satellite communication technology prompted concern among some U.N. country-members about the lack of U.N. monitoring of the evolution of satellite communication and especially its likely international broadcast applications”. This prompted the U.N. General Assembly to request COPUOS to create a Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites (WG-DBS). The aim of this group was to study and report on the technical feasibility of communication by direct broadcast from satellites and the current and foreseeable developments in this field, including comparative user costs and other economic considerations, as well as the implications of such developments in the social, cultural, legal and other areas (WG-DBS, 1969a, p. 1). During its first session, the WG-DBS analyzed the technical feasibility of DBS. The resulting report forecast that community DBS systems would become available in the mid-19705 with individual household reception becoming “ In fact, several satellites had already been launched and an international organization was created to facilitate international satellite communication. INTELSAT will be discussed in a later section since it was not designed to provide direct broadcast satellite service. n U.N. country-members concerned included: Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and the USSR (see Signitzer, 1976). 18 feasible after 1985 (WG-DBS, 1969a). 2. Social and Cultural Concerns Related to DBS: The second session of the WG-DBS was devoted to discussing the social, cultural, legal and other concerns associated with this emerging mode of TV program delivery. In its report, the WG-DBS contended that while it believed that there could be some positive benefits from international DBS, such as greater flows of information and cultural programs between countries, some delegations felt that the content carried via international DBS could have some negative impacts. For example, "...it would be unsuitable to broadcast programmes which might hurt the national sentiments of the people of a country, even if the broadcast were not intended for them" (WG-DBS, 1969b, p. 7). The potential impact of political messages carried via DBS prompted some delegates to suggest the need for regulation. International DBS was said to be potentially capable of upsetting cultural, religious or social mores. The threat of harmful propaganda was also highlighted. Advertising-supported programming was said to possibly conflict with national legislation and trade practices (WG-DBS, 1969b). The WG-DBS report mentions several regulatory options advanced by delegates, including prohibiting a State from broadcasting to others without obtaining the other States’ prior consent (WG-DBS, 1969b). This second session of the 19 WG-DBS resulted in the first official U.N. report to address a number of concerns which would be at the center of the international DBS controversy in the 19705. B. GROWTH AND MATURATION OF THE DBS DEBATE -- THE 19708: In 1970, while the Legal Subcommittee (LS) of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was still refining the issues of space launch and mission liabilities”, the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites (WG-DBS) held its third session. During its meeting, the WG-DBS highlighted several potential benefits specific to DB8: ...the provision of sound and television broadcasting over vast areas, able to serve rural populations, to disseminate news and information, to extend the benefits of good teaching to all schools, to bring to adults continuing education and practical instruction in agriculture, family planning, health and community development, to provide vocational training and the means to broadcast major cultural and sporting events, where otherwise such services might not be economically or technically feasible (WG-DBS, 1970, p. 3). Counterweighing these potential advantages was a reiteration of the concerns voiced during the second WG-DBS session. These were the political, social and cultural impacts that DBS messages were predicted to have on individual receivers. In light of these concerns, numerous delegates strongly emphasized the need for legal principles that would guide m see the 1970 Legal Sub-Committee report for a series of proposals all relating to the liability for damage caused by the launching of objects into outer space (Legal Sub- Committee, 1970). 20 DBS practices. In fact, some delegations had already prepared a draft for a code of conduct. The Soviet Union presented a paper in which it outlined a set of principles for international DBS. The Soviet position emphasized the importance of State sovereignty with regards to DBS and reiterated the prior consent requirement for any State desiring to broadcast via satellite to another. Paragraph 7 of the Soviet paper reflected what appeared to be genuine Soviet fears of DBS impacts: 7. In the event of direct broadcasts transmitted by satellite to another country without the consent of its Government, that Government shall be entitled to use any available means to counteract such broadcasts (USSR, 1970, p. 27-28). It appears that the Soviet Union was not alone in fearing what was characterized as potential harm emanating from DBS. A Western country, France, had also prepared a set of principles for DB8. The French paper included a list of broadcast types that it advocated to prohibit. The broadcasts included: "...propaganda that incites the violation of human rights..., [and] programs tending to destroy civilizations, cultures, religions or traditions..." (France, 1970, p. 30). Cooperation between States and the form that such cooperation can take were also discussed”. Some delegates even advocated that cooperation would be facilitated if an w Five different forms of intergovernmental cooperation were discussed during the session: 1) Bilateral, 2) Subregional, 3) Regional, 4) Intercontinental, 5) Global. 21 international organization were created specifically for DBS service. Others, however, found that global cooperation would not be practical given the cultural, political and social differences between states and the resulting impossibility of achieving a consensus on program content. Cooperation was, nevertheless, said to be essential for the success of any cross-border DBS venture. Exploring ways of cooperating between States with regards to DBS was strongly encouraged (WG-DBS, 1970). 1. The 1971 WARC and Spillover: In 1971, the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee (LS) was still totally immersed with matters of space vehicle liability as a draft convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects was being finalized”. While the attention of the LS was on space vehicle matters, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) addressed the issue of international DBS during its 1971 World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications (WARC-ST). The conference submitted a set of revised definitions concerning DBS21 and allocated a set of m see the Legal Subcommittee report of 1971 for a detailed account of the LS activities during that year and the frustration that it experienced trying to draft the international liability convention for damage due to space objects (Legal Sub-Committee, 1971). m It defined broadcasting-satellite service as "A radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public". It also differentiated between two types of DBS services: "Individual reception: 22 frequency bands for this emerging technology. Its main contribution to the DBS debate, however, was its attention to what was termed "spillover". This expression refers to the transmissions received by areas adjacent to intended territories. The 1971 WARC-ST adopted a critical new regulation dealing with the radiation of satellites over foreign territory. Article 7 Paragraph 428A of the revised Radio Regulations declared: In devising the characteristics of a space station in the Broadcasting-Satellite Service, all technical means available shall be used to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the radiation over the territory of other countries unless an agreement has been previously reached with such countries (Final Acts, 1971, p. 5). The WG-DBS did not meet in 1971 or 1972 as it did not feel that there were enough new developments to justify another study of international DBS”. The year 1972, however, turned out to be full of developments. In 1972, after several years of work, the the reception of emissions from a space station in the broadcasting-satellite service by simple domestic installations and in particular those possessing small antennas"; "Community reception: the reception of emissions from a space station in the broadcasting-satellite service by receiving equipment, which in some cases may be complex and have antennae larger than those used for individual reception, and intended use - by a group of the general public at one location or - through a distribution system covering a limited area" (Final Acts, 1971). n One of the recommendations that the WG-DBS had forwarded to COPUOS was that the WG-DBS ought to reconvene again when more material related to international DBS became available. This meant that the WG-DBS was not going to meet every year and would stop meeting when the COPUOS feels that the WG-DBS has accomplished the mission for which it was created (see WG-DBS, 1970, section VIII). 23 Legal Subcommittee (LS) announced that a Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects was finally open for signature. In fact, by the time the LS met for its eleventh session, over 40 countries had already signed it. The LS now could turn its attention to other matters. During its 1972 meeting, item number 4 of its agenda dealt with international DBS, as the LS simply acknowledged the WG-DBS report of 1970. Given the space explorations of the time, however, the LS gave its full attention to pressing matters: the delegates’ desire to formulate agreements on the uses of the moon and the registration of objects launched into space for the exploration or use of outer space (Legal Sub-Committee, 1972). 2. UNESCO’s Declaration on Satellite Broadcasting: In 1972, yet another U.N. agency addressed the issue of international DBS. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted a Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange. UNESCO’s declaration stressed the sovereignty of States, the free flow of information, and the need for prior consent for DBS, in general, and for the transmission of advertising via DBS specifically (UNESCO, 1972). In 1972, the United Nations General Assembly, at the 24 request of the Soviet Union, passed resolution 2916 requesting the COPUOS to elaborate principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting with a view to concluding agreement or agreements (U.N. General Assembly, 1973, p. 14). In 1973, the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee (LS) considered papers submitted by numerous countries and formulated a draft convention on the registration of launched space objects. It further discussed the possibility of a moon treaty (Legal Subcommittee, 1973). Item 5 of its agenda dealt with international DBS. The LS this time reviewed a draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union in which a set of principles for the use of international DBS was outlined. In its proposal, the Soviet Union reiterated what had appeared in its paper submitted in 1970 to the WG-DBS and expanded it to include the concerns that France had voiced in its own paper submitted that same year. The prior consent requirement was again highlighted along with the prohibition of such broad content categories as: Broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, pornography, and the use of narcotics; [b]roadcasts undermining the foundations of the local civilization, culture, way or life, traditions or language (USSR, 1973, pp. 2-3). The Soviet Union’s proposal also restated the right of a State to "counteract television broadcasting [via satellite]...not only in its own territory but also in outer space and other areas beyond the limits of the national 25 jurisdiction of any State" (USSR, 1973, p. 3). 3. U.S. Preliminary DBS Experiments: While the USSR pressed for the adoption of stringent principles for the conduct of international DBS, technological advances were enhancing the possibility that DBS would soon materialize. The United States (U.S.) declared that it was planning to begin preliminary DBS experiments as early as 1974. The project in question consisted of transmitting educational programming via the ATS-F satellite to the Rocky Mountain States, the Appalachian areas and Alaska. In addition, the U.S. and India announced that, according to prior agreements between the two countries, the position of the ATS-F satellite would be modified to serve the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) in India. SITE was designed to demonstrate the value of satellite technology for the instruction of rural inhabitants and the promotion of national development in India. The United States and Canada also announced a joint project called Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) to explore the technology of high-powered satellites for DBS. CTS scheduled its first experimental satellite launch for 1975 (WG-DBS, 1973). With the sudden attention given to international DBS, the WG-DBS convened for a fourth session from June 11 to 22, 1973 and considered the request by the U.N. General Assembly 26 to develop principles for international DBS conduct. Delegates reaffirmed the need for international cooperation regarding DBS. The U.S. offered to make its ATS-F satellite available to interested countries and assist other countries in launching satellites for peaceful uses (WG-DBS, 1973). The Soviet Union submitted to the WG-DBS the same draft convention that it had proposed to the Legal Sub-Committee (see USSR, 1973). Some delegates suggested that the LS itself, rather than the WG-DBS, would be a more appropriate body to develop principles and guidelines for international DBS. At this stage, however, the negotiations were kept within the WG-DBS. In addition to the Soviet proposal, a joint Canadian/Swedish draft of principles was also submitted. Although this latter proposal did not specify DBS content guidelines, it was consistent with the Soviet proposal on the issue of prior consent”. In the case of unauthorized DBS transmissions, in contrast to the radical remedy proposed by the Soviet Union, the Canadian-Swedish paper proposed a resolution of any such conflict through "established procedures for the settlement of disputes such B The paper specified that "The right of consent... shall apply in those cases (a) where coverage of the territory of a foreign State entails radiation of the satellite signal beyond the limits considered technically unavoidable under the Radio Regulation of the [ITU] or (b) where notwithstanding the technical unavoidability of spill- over to the territory of a foreign State, the satellite broadcast is aimed specifically at an audience in that State within the area of spill-over (Canada & Sweden, 1973, p. 3). 27 as conciliation, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement (Canada & Sweden, 1973, p. 4). With two primary proposals at hand and a disagreement among the delegates over what to adopt from each, the WG-DBS decided to postpone making recommendations to the LS concerning the DBS principles until its meeting the following year. This postponement could be interpreted as either a lack of will on the part of the WG-DBS to take a firm stance on the issues or an inability to do so because of conflicting political interests within the group. By the time the WG-DBS met for its fifth session in March 1974, Japan had announced its intent to launch an experimental broadcast satellite by 1977. With a growing number of countries getting ready for DBS, the sense of urgency for the adoption of DBS principles grew amongst the proponents of regulation, led by the Soviet Union. During the WG-DBS meeting of 1974, several countries presented draft principles for the use of international DBS. The 1974 WG-DBS session clarified the stance of all parties regarding international DBS and substantiated the existence of a major rift vis-a-vis DBS regulation within most content areas. Sitting at one extreme was the Soviet Union advocating stringent guidelines, and at the other extreme was the United States upholding a deregulatory approach at the roots of which is the free flow of 28 information“. 4. The main areas of regulation for international DBS: The following will summarize the different points of view expressed regarding the main areas of regulation: "Purposes and Objectives": A majority of delegations agreed that international DBS should materialize if the free flow of information, state sovereignty and the right of States to preserve their culture are simultaneously respected. Some delegates disagreed with the free flow of information requirement, arguing that it should not be mandated. "State Responsibility": Some delegates chose to make the State bear the full responsibility of any DBS activities emanating from its own territories. Other delegates, however, argued that such a principle would be unacceptable for States where broadcasting is a private enterprise devoid of State control. "Spillover": Some delegates insisted that spillover ” Country members of COPUOS had different positions regarding the applicability of the free flow of information principle to DBS. Those that believed that it was fully applicable included: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States. Those that believed the principle to be partially applicable included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Sweden. There were many countries, however, who believed that the free flow principle was not applicable to international DBS. These countries were: Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR (see Signitzer, 1976). 29 should be tightly controlled and measures should be taken for punitive action against States which did not control it. Other delegates suggested that it would be necessary to develop standards for what would be considered avoidable versus unavoidable spillover in order to avert any future misunderstandings between States regarding this issue. "Illegality of Broadcasts": The view was expressed that any broadcasts via satellite conducted from one State to another without obtaining the latter’s permission should be construed as illegal. In such a case, the receiving State would be able to utilize the established procedures under international law to protest the broadcasts”. Some delegates, however, felt that State receivers of illegal broadcasts could also choose "the collective enforcement measures provided for in the United Nations Charter"26 as a ” With reference to the settlement of disputes, the standard international legal procedures are based upon Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations which states that parties in a dispute shall "... seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice" (United Nations, 1945). The essence of the article was adopted by the ITU Convention as Article 50 of the Nairobi Convention proposes three methods for dispute settlement: diplomatic channels, other agreed procedures or arbitration by the Convention (for a discussion, see Lyall, 1989). m It is assumed that the collective enforcement option refers to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter which addresses threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression via a series of measures outlined in articles 41 and 42. The measures of article 41 include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations". 30 recourse (WG-DBS, 1974, p. 18). The concept of illegality of broadcasts was attacked by other delegates who felt that broadcasts may be inadmissible but not illegal since it would be very hard to agree upon common objective standards to determine illegality of content. A program which depicts alcoholic beverage consumption, for example, may be construed illegal by a traditional Islamic government in country ’A’ since alcohol is prohibited by Islam. This same program, however, may be part of the daily television schedule in another country ’B’ where Islam is not prevalent. It would be virtually impossible to convince either country ’A’ that the program is legal or country ’B’ that the program is illegal since their national system of laws differ significantly. It may be easier to explain to both countries that the program is acceptable in one and not in the other because of cultural and religious differences between them. The rift between States was most apparent with regards to two specific areas: Prior Consent and Program Content. "Prior Consent": The majority of delegates stressed that a State should obtain other States’ permission prior to If the measures taken in Article 41 prove to be unsuccessful, then Article 42 proposes to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (United Nations, 1943). 31 broadcasting via satellite to the other States’ territories”. Other delegates, however, disagreed, saying that prior consent contradicted the notion of free flow of information and was inconsistent with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. "Program Content": Some delegates insisted on ” Specifically, those in favor of prior consent concerning DBS argued that the principle "is consistent with the recognized right of States to regulate their communications systems and to decide in light of social, political, economic, cultural or other considerations, the type of broadcasting services they require" (WG-DBS, 1974, p. 13). ” Those arguing against prior consent stated that: "(i) It would undermine and regressively depart from vital concepts of free flow of information and the freedom of exchange of ideas which are essential for better understanding among States and peoples.. (ii) It would grant each receiving State a power of veto which would be inconsistent with the provisions of article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (iii) It would distort and inhibit the realization of the full potential benefits from the technology of direct broadcast satellite; (iv) It would cause serious difficulties to a country’s domestic satellite broadcast system if it were to apply to broadcast spillover; (v) It would infringe upon the sovereign rights of States to maintain their domestic public media systems free from control or restriction imposed by other States; (vii) The ITU Convention and its Radio Regulations relate to technical aspects and co-ordination of future direct broadcast satellite systems, but not to the substance of any broadcast which might be carried (WG-DBS, 1974, p. 14-15). Among country members of COPUOS, those that argued for prior consent include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, sierra Leone, Sweden, and the USSR. Those who argued against prior consent included: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States (see Signitzer, 1976). 32 formulating specific content guidelines determining those categories of programs that would be prohibited (i.e., programs which corrupt the local civilization, culture, way of life, traditions or language). Others pointed out the difficulty of achieving an agreement on those categories. Still others completely rebuffed the idea of imposing content constraints on grounds that they do "infringe upon the sovereign rights of States to administer their domestic media system without content interference from other States" (WG-DBS, 1974, p. 17). 5. U.S. advocates the sharing of DBS technoloov: In 1974, a total of five working papers concerning DBS conduct principles were submitted to the WG-DBS. The Soviet Union and Canada—Sweden proposals presented the previous year were re-submitted after a slight modification of the wording, not the essence, of their content. In addition, that year the United States (U.S.) and Argentina submitted draft principles. In contrast to the Soviet proposal, the U.S. paper did not mention prior consent or clearly address the topic of program content. Paragraph 4 of the U.S. paper could be construed as addressing both program content and prior consent: DBS should "encourage and expand the free and open exchange of information and ideas while taking into account differences among cultures..." (U.S., 1974, p. 1). In paragraph 5 the U.S. insisted on each State’s right to ... carry out international direct television broadcasting by satellites and to share in benefits 33 derived from this activity. Such sharing should increasingly include, as practical difficulties are overcome, opportunities for access to the use of this technology for the purpose of sending as well as receiving broadcasts (U.S., 1974, p. 1). By specifying its own understanding of the verb "share", the U.S. addressed the concern of developing countries by suggesting that DBS technological developments would enable them not only to receive but also to transmit programs via this emerging mode of program delivery”. This paragraph seems to be hinting that, as DBS technology improves, those countries controlling it should make their installations available to countries that do not otherwise have access to it. The paragraph could also be interpreted as hinting at a collective DBS effort similar to other joint international ventures concerning satellite communications”. ” It is assumed that this paragraph aimed at easing the concerns of developing countries about their current inability to launch their own satellites and, therefore, reciprocate the developed countries’ transmissions via DBS. By 1974, developing countries had voiced their concerns over what they had termed as a one-way flow of news and programs from the developed countries to their territories. Using the UNESCO as their platform, they attempted to begin formulating a unified position on the role of international mass media in order to rectify what they termed as the one- way flow (see Nordenstreng & Varis, 1973). w By the time the DBS debate was taking place within the confines of the United Nations, outside this platform, lthe United States had successfully led numerous countries to agree upon collectively using satellite technology for the purpose of international communication between States but not direct-to-home. The birth and materialization of INTELSAT will be addressed in a later section of this dissertation. 34 On a regulatory continuum, at one extreme of which is the position of the Soviet Union, and on the other extreme that of the U.S., the Canada-Sweden paper is located in the moderate regulation area of the continuum. So far, though, the proposals put in the limelight by the WG-DBS had come from two developed countries and the era’s two super powers. The Argentine paper was the first submission by a developing nation to be clearly acknowledged. Argentina’s working paper had a moderate regulatory leaning. Paragraph 9, for example, specified that States were obligated to "abstain from any direct broadcast by satellite which is contrary to principles and standards which have been established or are to be established, or which are in any way prejudicial to the rights of States, the family and the individual" (p. 3). Paragraph 10 outlined broad guidelines about the obligations of broadcasting stations: "To respect the spirit of all peoples, their culture, their own history and their national development" (Argentina, 1974, p. 3). Paragraph 21 specified inadmissible broadcasts“, those which a State does not want to be broadcast over its territories or received by its population. According to the Argentine paper, "[e]very State and every transmitter shall refrain from making such broadcasts" (Argentina, 1974, p. 7). Argentina attempted to reach a compromise between the different points of view on the issues of spillover, prior “ Note the use of the term "inadmissible" instead of "illegal". The use of the latter term was a point of contention among the delegates during the DBS discussions. 35 consent and the free flow of information. Paragraph 13 attempts to reconcile the notion of free flow with that of national sovereignty and the adoption of DBS principles: The principle of freedom of information and free flow of communications is not incompatible with the adoption of additional principles designed to harmonize the rights of States and to protect the economic, social and cultural values of their peoples (Argentina, 1974, p. 4). The attempt in paragraph 13 is not very successful, as merely saying that the notions therein are not incompatible does not render them compatible. Paragraph 14, however, seemed to be a more successful attempt at compromising on spillover and prior consent simultaneously. Here, the Argentine paper differentiates between broadcasts by satellite intended for a foreign State versus those not intended. Then, the paper specifies that prior consent should be obtained for those broadcasts that are especially designed for a foreign audience. In this paragraph, Argentina puts to rest the concern that some other States had over the interpretation of avoidable versus unavoidable spillover as broadcasts that are especially designed for a foreign audience definitely fall within the avoidable spillover category. Despite its leaning toward slight regulation of international DBS practices, Argentina does not advocate content specifications. It acknowledges in paragraph 15 that content specification is unrealistic (Argentina, 1974). Unable to come up with recommendations that all 36 delegates would agree with, the WG-DBS forwarded all the working papers along with the content of discussions to the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee (LS). The LS met on 6 May 1974. Its main focus still centered on the development of a draft treaty about the use of the moon and a draft convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. This time, however, the issue of international DBS received significant attention. The LS first reviewed the 1974 WG-DBS report. After observing the differences that still existed concerning the list of principles, the LS established its own Working Group III to continue attempting to resolve these discrepancies. It was agreed that the international DBS principles would be included under five substance areas: "1) Applicability of international law; 2) Rights and benefits of States; 3) International cooperation; 4) State responsibility; and 5) Peaceful settlement of disputes." (Legal Subcommittee, 1974, Annex III, p. 1). With the five substance areas in mind, a list of international instruments relevant to international DBS regulation was submitted to the LS by Argentina, Austria, Belgium, F.R. Germany, Indonesia and Italy (see Argentina et al., 1974). A text of DBS principles drafted by Group III was included in the LS report. All portions that were the subject of disagreement, notably prior consent, were 37 bracketed32 (Legal Sub-Committee, 1974). The task of the Working Group over the next several years was to resolve the differences regarding the bracketed portions of the text. By the time the LS met in 1975, the draft Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space had been adopted by the General Assembly. The LS still needed to further elaborate its draft treaty on the moon and to draft more definite principles on international DBS conduct. For this last task, the LS set up Working Group II (WG-II) to continue what Working Group III had begun the previous year. WG-II received two new papers, one from Argentina and another from Canada and Sweden, plus other delegation input. WG-II utilized the modified papers and the various input to add nine new content areas to the draft principles, for a new total of fourteen. The new content areas were: Purposes and objectives; Consent and participation; Spill-over; Program content; Unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts; Duty and right to consult; Copyright, neighboring rights and protection of television signals; Notification to the United Nations system; and Disruption (Legal Sub-Committee, 1975). Two alternatives for some of the draft principles sections were included in the text while quite a few sentences were still bracketed. WG-II hoped that the delegates would agree on a common text for each substance area in the meetings to ” Brackets in official texts of the COPUOS and its committees indicate that the bracketed content is not agreed upon. 38 follow. In 1976, the LS re—established WG-II to further elaborate the principles on DBS use by States. WG—II met a dozen times to harmonize the different views of its delegates. The content areas being discussed now totalled twelve. Two substance areas were removed from the previous year: Spillover and Disruption. The elimination of these areas indicated the willingness of the different parties to become a little more flexible concerning the content of the draft principles. 6. Three controversial areas of regulation for DBS: During its deliberations, the delegates reached a compromise concerning nine of the principles being discussed. The ones on which agreement was not reached were: 1) consent and participation; 2) program content; and 3) unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts. Two alternatives still existed for the consent and participation principle. One mandated a sender country to seek the consent of a receiver country prior to broadcasting Via satellite to the latter country. The other alternative did not agree that a sender State should be required to seek prior consent but suggested that a sender State should consult with a receiver State. The program content and unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts principles were completely rejected by some delegates led by the U.S. Others, led by the Soviet Union, insisted on their inclusion as worded. 39 The program content principle outlined a set of broad broadcast categories that should not be broadcast: ...any material which is detrimental to the maintenance of international peace and security, which publicizes ideas of war, militarism, national and racial hatred, and enmity between peoples, which is aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of other States or which undermines the foundations of the local civilization, culture, way of life, traditions or ‘ language (Legal Sub-Committee, 1976, Annex II, p. 4). The unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts principle defines unlawful broadcasts as transmitted without the prior consent of a receiving State gag containing program content as described in the program content principle above. Inadmissible broadcasts are those deemed undesirable by a receiving State and identified as such to the sending State. The principle outlines that, as a recourse, a State receiving unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts can utilize standard international law procedures to stop the broadcasts (Legal Sub-Committee, 1976). 7. WARC-1977 and DBS: Before the LS met the next year, the International Telecommunication Union had completed its World Administrative Radio Conference of 1977 (WARC-1977). The main focus of that conference was to assign broadcast frequencies for individual states in such a way as to avoid interference between states (Final Acts, 1977). For that purpose, WARC-1977 assigned specific DBS frequencies for domestic use by states. Only a few countries were permitted to use their allotted frequencies to beam a signal 40 encompasses adjacent territories. The ITU gave its authorization after obtaining the agreement of the adjacent countries affected (see Appendix A). The WARC-77 specifications prompted the United Kingdom to prepare a working paper in which it suggested that the ITU frequency assignments made the prior consent principle no longer necessary. It stated that State-to-State broadcasting "without the agreement of the receiving country will not only be a breach of treaty obligations but... [in its opinion is] not a practical possibility" (United Kingdom, 1977, p. 4). The 1977 LS meeting concentrated on elaborating a draft treaty relating to the moon. The LS, however, re-established WG-II to further discuss the unresolved matters concerning the draft principles on international DBS usage by States. WG-II acknowledged the working paper submitted by the United Kingdom. WG-II attempted to harmonize the differences among the delegations regarding prior consent by modifying the header and content of the "Consent and participation" principle with another titled "Consultation and agreements between States". Two key changes were detected in the newly-titled principle: 1) the specification that the broadcast needs to be permissible according to the instruments of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); and 2) the replacement of "shall require the consent of" the receiving State (LS, 41 1976, p. 3) with "shall be based on appropriate agreements and/or arrangements between the broadcasting and receiving States" (LS, 1977, p. 3). The main area of contention that followed was whether mandating consultation and agreements between States for international DBS contradicted the notion of free flow of information. As is customary in the Working Group setting, the views expressed were radically divergent. Nevertheless, WG-II set out to tentatively propose a text for the newly- titled principle. The text was also heavily bracketed, indicating yet more hurdles to be overcome by WG-II. Resolving the differences among delegates regarding the "Consultation and agreements between states", "program content" and "unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts" turned out to be an uneasy task. In 1978, when WG-II was re- established by the LS to further elaborate the DBS principles, no progress was achieved. The meeting reached a deadlock, as some delegates still doubted whether these principles were necessary and others insisted on their inclusion (Legal Sub-Committee, 1978). No decisions were made by WG-II in 1978. The LS re-established WG-II in 1979. The disagreement still centered around the three principles that had brought about a stalemate in the debates in 1978. In order to find a solution to the impasse, several States submitted working 42 papers with alternative texts. A compromise for the principle titled "consultation and agreements between states" seemed to be on the horizon as alternatives were submitted for it and delegates were no longer advocating its complete exclusion. In contrast, however, fully divergent views were expressed concerning "program content" and unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts". Some delegates insisted on including these two principles, while others felt that they ought to be fully removed. Working papers with alternative texts for the "consultation and agreements between states" principle were submitted by Canada-Sweden (1979), the United States (1979), and Belgium (1979)”. The Canada-Sweden relevant wording was virtually identical to that included in the 1978 text of the draft principles as proposed by WG-II (see Appendix B for the 1978 text). The U.S. wording of the principle maintained that any consultations should be premised upon the free flow of information, but that a sender State should take into consideration the interests and concerns of the receiving State. Belgium proposed to fully alter the text and the heading, replacing it with "Agreements between States on the exchange of programs". Belgium’s new formulation emphasized collaboration and bilateral or collective usage of DBS for better exchanges. ” See Appendices C, D and E for the relevant portions of these papers. 43 The 1979 WG-II sessions did not succeed in resolving the differences among States concerning the three principles in question. C. THE FINALE FOR INTERNATIONAL DBS - THE 19805: During its 1980 meeting, the LS announced that its treaty concerning the moon, "Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies", had been completed and approved by the U.N. General Assembly. With one less treaty to negotiate, the LS could now give a larger portion of its attention to the issue of international DBS. The deadlock over the three principles, nevertheless, persisted during the 1980 meeting of WG-II. In addition to the alternatives mentioned earlier concerning the "Consultations and agreements between States" principle, two new papers were added. A working paper by Colombia (1980) concisely proposed that [a]ny State intending to make direct television broadcasts by means of artificial earth satellites which may be received in all or part of the territory of a foreign State shall conclude the appropriate arrangements and/or agreements with the receiving State (p- 1) - The United Kingdom paper (1980) simplified the original paragraphs proposed by the WG-II but did not alter their substance (see Appendix F). As the formulations of the different alternatives were progressively closer to one another, a solution to the deadlock seemed near. During the 1981 meeting of the LS, the international DBS debate continued about the same three principles within 44 WG-II. No further progress in the negotiations was attained. This year, however, some delegations proposed that a negotiating text be submitted as an attempt to conclude the development of draft principles on international DBS (Legal Sub-Committee, 1981). A negotiating text was indeed submitted as a working paper by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Niger and Venezuela (Argentina et al., 1981). Absent from the text were two of the controversial principles: Program content and unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts. The principle titled "Consultation and agreements between States" was drawn from the alternatives submitted the previous year to the WG-II. The tone of the wording was milder than originally desired by proponents of strict DBS regulation, notably the Soviet Union. Paragraph 1 now read: 1. A State which intends to establish or authorize the establishment of an international direct television broadcasting service shall without delay notify the proposed receiving State or States of such intention and shall promptly enter into consultation with any of those States which so requests (Argentina et al., 1981, p. 4). Paragraphs 2 and 3 heavily emphasized that any international DBS venture should closely adhere to the rules and instruments of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The issue of spillover was also put exclusively under the jurisdiction of the ITU. The ITU's radio regulations were to prescribe the technical parameters that 45 reduce the unintended radiation from a satellite. WG-II forwarded two versions of the DBS principles to the LS: 1) its own version, which still contained the "Program content" and "Unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts" principles and which still had the "Consultation and agreements between States" principle in brackets, and 2) the version included in the working paper by Argentina et al. (1981). The LS forwarded the two versions to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which in turn delivered them to the U.N. General Assembly. During its thirty-seventh session, on December 10, 1982, the U.N. General Assembly adopted34 the "Principles Governing the Use of States of Artificial Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting" as they appeared in the working paper by Argentina et a1. (1981) (see Appendix G). One hundred and eight nations voted for the 1982 Resolution while thirteen countries abstained; the United States opposed it. The adoption of resolution 37/92 marked the end of over a decade of negotiations and the end of a debate surrounding the use of an emerging technology. Resolution 37/92 also meant that a collective effort designed to maximize the potential benefits of this “ see U.N. General Assembly, 1983. The full text of resolution 37/92 appears in Appendix G of this dissertation. _ 46 technology by all States was no longer a workable option. The DBS negotiations and their outcome: 1) diverted the international focus from that of achieving a collective global DBS system to that of putting significant hurdles in the face of any international DBS initiative; and 2) complicated the possibility of achieving a universal convention on DBS, encouraging instead bilateral negotiations. D. U.N. DECISION-MAKING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL DIRECT BROADCAST BY SATELLITES: The preceding section traced the evolution of the international direct broadcast satellite controversy at the level of the United Nations. Policy-making procedures at the United Nations concerning DBS are illustrated in Figure 1. The process in Figure 1 begins at the level of the General Assembly (GA). The GA had originally asked the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to study the prospects for international DBS. The COPUOS in 1968 created the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites (WG-DBS) and gave it the responsibility to study the new technology. The WG-DBS was to submit its findings to the Legal Sub-Committee (LS) of the COPUOS. Between 1969 and 1974, the WG-DBS filed several reports. In 1974, the LS decided to form Working Group III, under its own umbrella, to continue the work of the WG-DBS. The following year, the 47 — GeneralAssembly l COPUOS Legal Sub-Commltlee ‘ I Working Groups Worklng Group III [1974] || (1975 -) on 03509594974) Hlerarchy ol Declslon-Maklng Concernlng Internatlona! DBS at the UN Figure 1 LS decided to designate Working Group II to continue the work of Working Group III. WG-II’s DBS negotiations progressed and led to the 1982 U.N. General Assembly resolution. The negotiations take place at the bottom of the hierarchy. Progress is reported to the next higher body which, in turn, forwards it upward until it reaches the top. If the progress is not satisfactory it is sent back downward for further elaboration. If the progress is acceptable, the General Assembly considers the outcome of the negotiations for possible adoption. The negotiations regarding DBS have led to what could 48 be characterized as an agreement to discourage or avoid international usage of satellites for direct broadcasting. Before analyzing the factors that have led to this agreement, the following concluding section summarizes the account of the evolution of the international DBS debate given earlier. It presents a chronology of some key stages of the controversy and the dynamism of the DBS negotiations throughout the years. E. A Concise Chronology of the DBS Debate and its Dynamism 1968 U.N. General Assembly requests that COPUOS creates a Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites "to study and report on the technical feasibility of communication by direct broadcast satellites and its current and foreseeable developments" (WG-DBS, 1969a, p.1). In its second session the WG-DBS addresses the social and cultural issues involved in DBS and the potential impact of messages on a receiving country’s audience. Z 1 um} 11 I ll ull B A C Dynmnsm ofDBS atthe Unued Nahons m1969 Figure 2 1970 49 Figure 2 illustrates the dynamism of the DBS issue in 1969. Country members (Z) of the General Assembly initiate a DBS inquiry at stage A. The focus of countries Z and their inclination seems to be neutral at this point. The inquiry could propel a collective move towards either stage B or stage C. Stage B being agreeing not to achieve collective usage of the technology while stage C being the opposite. The inquiry, at this point, could also lead to a state of inertia. Potential advantages of DBS are contrasted with its potential disadvantages. A few delegates, led by the Soviet Union, emphasize the need for principles to guide DBS practices. The full focus is on the disadvantages of DBS - Soviet Union submits position paper advocating prior consent and promotes the use of "all available means" in the case that a State transmits to another State without obtaining the latter’s consent prior to such transmission. France submits a paper which includes a list of broadcast content types that it believes should be prohibited. Z llllll ——h° llllllll B A C Dynamism ofDBS atlhe Unued Nanons In1970 Figure 3 1971 1972 1973 50 Figure 3 illustrates that the original initiation of the DBS inquiry triggered a pull by the Soviet Union toward stage B. The option to move toward stage C became completely ignored. ITU WARC-ST adopts Radio Regulations including Article 7 Paragraph 428A which specifies that "all technical means... should be used to reduce".. spillover in the case that prior consent is not obtained. UNESCO adopts its declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting in which it stresses State sovereignty, free flow of information and prior consent. U.N. General Assembly requests the COPUOS to formulate principles for the use of satellites for DBS. The Soviet Union submits a draft convention reiterating its 1970 position while taking into account the position of the French made that same year. U.S. declares its plans to begin preliminary DBS experiments as early as 1974 and announces its sharing of DBS technology with India. U.S. and Canada declare a joint venture to explore high powered satellites for DBS. U.S. offers to make its ATS-F satellites available to interested countries. Joint Canadian-Swedish paper is submitted stressing prior consent. 1974 51 Z Willi/Ill lll\\ B A C DynamBnmofDBS allhe Unned Nanons m1973 Figure 4 Figure 4 illustrates that by the time the United States reminded countries Z that option C still existed, many of those countries had already opted for a move toward option B led by the Soviet Union. Japan announces its intent to launch experimental DBS service by 1977. Papers are submitted by the Soviet Union, Canada/Sweden, U.S. and Argentina. U.S. paper hints at collective effort to share the technology. A text of DBS principles is drafted and printed in the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee report. 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 52 Z UBRII/l/l/l USA t\\\\ B A C Dynannsm ofDBS allhe UnHed Nauons m1974 Figure 5 In figure 5, as more countries (Z) progressively opted for a move toward option B, the United States changed the nature of option C making it a platform of no regulation as contrasted with option B. Papers are submitted by Canada/Sweden, and Argentina. ITU WARC 1977 assigns specific frequencies for satellite usage most of which are domestic. Three principles now are at the center of controversy: "Consultation and Agreements between States", "Program Content" and "Unlawful/inadmissible Broadcasts". Working papers are submitted by Canada/Sweden, U.S. and Belgium. Working paper submitted by Columbia. Negotiating text of the DBS principles is submitted as a working paper by Argentina and 11 other countries. Two of the controversial principles are absent from the text: "Program content" and "Unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts". But "Consultation and Agreements between States", the principle embodying the prior consent requirement, remains. U.N. General Assembly adopts draft of principles as submitted by Argentina and the 11 other countries that prepared the negotiating text the previous year. 53 Z xxx/1111 \\\\\\ B Dynamwm ofDBS atthe Unned Nauons m19m Figure 6 Figure 6 depicts the dynamism of the DBS regime when the move to stage B became formalized as most countries (Z) favored guidelines that expressed their common avoidance of DBS over no regulation. The idea of making collective usage of the technology for DBS became formally extinct. In the account given above, the negotiations led to an early shift in direction toward common avoidance concerning international DBS. The next chapter identifies an analytic framework and sets out to explore some of the factors that may have influenced the choice of U.N. country members concerning the usage of satellite for international direct broadcasting. CHAPTER III. ASSESSING THE FACTORS LEADING TO AN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE REGIME OF COMMON AVERSION VS. COMMON INTEREST A. DEFINING ’REGIME’ AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: The concept of ’international regime’ emerged in the 19705 as a new component in the theories of international relations (Puchala & Hopkins, 1982). An international regime is defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner, 1982, p. 185). International regimes range in complexity on a continuum between two extremes. They exist in various forms, have diverse scopes, and memberships”. Regimes are analyzed "either as outcomes to be explained or as social institutions mediating economic and political intercourse" (Lipson, 1982, p. 418). Regime analysis has covered such issue areas as marine fisheries and deep-seabed mining (Young, 1989), international nuclear technology transfer (Schiff, 1983), and balance of payments financing in international monetary relations (Cohen, 1982). The issue area of concern to this chapter is international usage of satellites. A regime here is analyzed as the outcome of international negotiations. The ” For an extensive discussion on regimes, see the Spring 1982 issue of International Organization (Krasner, 1982b). See also Young, 1989. 54 55 unit of analysis is the satellite regime attempt (RA). The following regime-related definitions are adopted: 1) a regime attempt (RA) is defined as the procedures that lead to the realization of a regime; 2) a regime is considered to be realized when the regime attempt (RA) results in a general agreement among the actors concerning the issue area at hand. Haas (1982) differentiates between two types of regimes: 1) regimes of common interest where actors agree to collaborate toward a common goal; and 2) regimes of common aversion where actors agree "on the outcome all wish to avoid" (p. 211). For a satellite regime attempt (RA), achieving a regime of common interest is defined as reaching an agreement that encourages the collective international usage of the technology. A regime of common aversion, is defined as reaching an agreement that discourages or inhibits the collective usage of the technology. An analogy could be built between regime analysis and traditional social scientific inquiry. The outcome of a regime attempt (RA) would be comparable to a dependent variable while the factors that influence the outcome of the RA would be comparable to independent variables. In this analogy, the regime attempt would be similar to an intricate process model involving causal links and aiming at explaining changes in the dependent variable. Chapter 2 of this dissertation has demonstrated that 56 over a decade of international DBS negotiations led to the adoption of guidelines that inhibit the collective international usage of the technology. With the definitions given above in mind, the adoption of the DBS guidelines by the U.N. General Assembly can now be characterized as marking the beginning of a regime of common aversion. The task of this chapter is to assess some factors that contributed to the outcome of the DBS regime attempt (RA). The DBS regime attempt historically documented in Chapter 2 presents one type of outcome: a regime of common aversion. In order to extract the factors that facilitate the outcome at hand, it is necessary to look at another regime attempt (RA) that has yielded a different outcome: a regime of common interest. In order to control for the issue area being negotiated, the alternate regime attempt is also chosen to deal with satellites. By contrasting two satellite regime attempts with two different outcomes, it is hoped that the extraction of factors that influence the outcome of both attempts will be more facilitated. Further, the factors extracted, as variables, would hence not be specific to one but to two satellite regime attempts. This enhances the factors’ validity. The satellite regime attempt which will be used as a contrast for DBS is INTELSAT. After having traced back the origins of the DBS debate in the previous chapter, the beginning of the present chapter provides a brief history of 57 INTELSAT. This chapter is not intended to be an original historical account of the development of INTELSAT. Instead, the brief overview presented is mostly drawn from the findings of several past studies based on primary historical documents. After the brief historical overview of INTELSAT, an attempt is made to extract the factors that have influenced the outcome of the INTELSAT versus the DBS negotiations. The main research question which this portion of the dissertation explores is: What are some key factors which influence the outcome of a satellite regime attempt and yield a regime of common aversion versus a regime of common interest? The convergence of interests between the United States and various other nations for the use of satellite technology in the 19605, which resulted in a collective effort embodied in INTELSAT, is contrasted with the convergence of interests among numerous countries that later accompanied DBS and resulted in a lack of international exploitation of the technology. B. A BRIEF DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF INTELSAT: While the materialization of satellite communications in the early 19605 was a source of utopian inspiration for many, it embodied an appealing business opportunity for numerous others. On the American continent, satellite development had been conducted under the umbrella of the U.S. government. This prevented the developers from 58 operating the satellite as a commercial entity. A drive for privatizing communication satellites ensued. After overcoming major obstacles in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, the Communications Satellite Act was signed into law in 1962 (see U.S. Statutes at Large, 1962; Colino, 1984). It was the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 which enabled the creation of COMSAT, a private commercial corporation with governmental supervision via the U.S. President, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the State Department and Congress (see Lyall, 1989). Upon signing the Satellite Act into law, President Kennedy stated that [t]he benefits which a satellite system should make possible within a few years will stem largely from a vastly increased capacity to exchange information cheaply and reliably with all parts of the world by telephone, telegraph, radio and television. The ultimate result will be to encourage and facilitate world trade, education, entertainment and many kinds of professional, political and personal discourse which are essential to healthy human relationships and international understanding (Public Papers, 1962b, p. 657). From the speech by President Kennedy, it can be deduced that the intention of the United States was manyfold, but chiefly the facilitation of trade and commerce. The nature of the activity enabled via satellite (i.e., exchanges of information, and facilitation of trade) and the advantage of the technology (i.e., the capacity to overcome tremendous ..l ’l 59 distances) necessitated the engagement of other nations in satellite communication. This essential component was clearly indicated in the Satellite Act. Section 102(a) stated that the United States intends to establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, ... a commercial communication satellite system ... which will serve the communication needs of the United States and other countries, and which will contribute to world peace (U.S. Statutes at Large, 1962). COMSAT was given the responsibility of building the envisioned global communication satellite system. Negotiations with other countries were destined. In fact, as early as 1962, representatives of the U.S. government began discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada. In the following year, additional meetings occurred between American officials and delegates of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT). The Europeans were especially interested in becoming partners with the U.S and to actively participate in the "design, production, establishment, management, and operation of the satellites" (Colino, 1984, p. 60). Those European countries interested in participating formed a single agency called the European Conference on Satellite Telecommunications (CETS) to represent them in the talks with the United States. The year 1964 witnessed the most serious efforts at establishing a global satellite system. Representatives from foreign ministries and telecommunications organizations 60 from the United States, Western Europe, Canada, and later Australia and Japan, met in Rome to formalize the foundation of the satellite system. At the time, these countries utilized a major proportion (85%) of the international telephone traffic (Colino, 1984). After six months of intense deliberations, on the 20th of August 1964, an agreement was ratified and a new international organization was founded. The "Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System" expressed a set of arrangements among the participating governments. On 4 June 1965 another agreement was ratified. It was titled "Special Agreement and Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration" and articulated the rights, duties and responsibilities of telecommunications organizations selected by the participating governments“. The founded International Telecommunications Satellite Organization was named INTELSAT on October 28, 196537. The objective of the Interim Arrangements was to "design, develop, construct, establish, maintain and operate the space segment of a single global commercial communications satellite system" (Colino, 1984, p. 61). It was understood that the Interim Arrangements would later be ” These entities representing individual governments in INTELSAT are known as signatories. ” For a detailed account of the negotiations, see Colino, 1984; Day, 1973. 61 replaced by more permanent agreements. The basic satellite system plan was, nevertheless, realized in several phases. The first INTELSAT satellite was launched into space on April 6, 1965. On January, 1967, INTELSAT II was placed into orbit”. A total of 14 countries had signed the Interim Agreements by 1965. The total number of countries jumped to 68 by the time a membership Plenipotentiary Conference met in Washington, D.C. in 1969. The Interim Arrangements were superseded by more definitive agreements ratified in 1973. In that same year, the total number of country members of INTELSAT reached 83 (Colino, 1984). As of July 1991, INTELSAT’S membership totalled 121 nations (PDL, 1991). The satellite system that INTELSAT operates today consists of thirteen geostationary satellites. These satellites link 172 geographical entities via 2,208 earth station-to-earth station pathways among 1,286 earth station antennas for a variety of voice, data and audio services (INTELSAT, 1991). The technological aspects of the global communication satellite network envisioned in the early 19605 have now materialized. The users, however, are still primarily national telecommunications entities, governments, news organizations and large businesses. It is still predominantly used for telephone and data communications. ” For a meticulous history of each INTELSAT satellite, see Podraczky & Pelton (1984). For a recent comparison table among satellites, see INTELSAT (1988). 62 Consumers have had no reason to access INTELSAT since the medium was designed to disseminate neither entertainment nor educational programs to the average citizen. INTELSAT has solely been operated as a business entity which does not have individual households as its target users. INTELSAT, nevertheless, has proven itself to be an international regime that works”. The mere fact that it is still in existence almost two decades after its foundation, plus the growth in its pathways that connect an increasingly larger number of geographical locales, are leading indicators of the regime’s success (see Figure 7). INTELSAT PATHWAYS TREND 2500 2000 1sou 1000‘ 1965 IBM] 1975 1980 1985 1990 Source: Intelsat, 1991 Figure 7 INTELSAT is not only an international satellite organization that works, it is also the only communication satellite ” The negotiations which led to the creation of INTELSAT were complex and intense at times. For a detailed account and analysis, see Day, 1973. 63 regime global in reach and membership that is in existence today. While diverse countries were eager to participate in INTELSAT, they were adamant in their refusal to allow the establishment of yet another collective effort that was an outgrowth of the early satellite experiments. The effort in question focuses on direct broadcast satellites or DBS. The next section of this chapter will contrast INTELSAT to DBS in an attempt to assess the similarities and differences of the two regimes and extract the facts that have resulted in the different outcome for each of the two regime attempts. C. CONTRASTING THE COMMON INTEREST FOUND IN INTELSAT WITH THE COMMON AVERSION OF THE DBS REGIME ATTEMPT: With the INTELSAT and DBS backgrounds in mind, the question now becomes: What are some key factors which account for the achievement of a satellite regime of common interest versus one of common aversion? More specifically, what are some principal factors which can explain the emergence of the INTELSAT and the failure of a collective DBS global system to materialize? Regime analysis is utilized in this chapter as a framework to explore the factors that lead to the convergence among actors. It is hypothesized that for a given regime attempt (RA), the outcome of the regime attempt would be a function of several factors (F) as follows: 64 RA=f(FTRA+F2RA+F3RA+....Ffigm) The assumptions made to facilitate the regime analysis performed in this chapter follow a realist tradition in the study of international politics“. According to Keohane (1989), classical realists make three assumptions in their analyses: 1. The state centric assumption: states are the most important actors in world politics; 2. The rationality assumption: world politics can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors, carefully calculating costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility; 3. The power assumption: states seek power (both the ability to influence others and resources that can be used to exercise influence); and they calculate their interests in terms of power, whether as end or as necessary means to a variety of ends (p. 40). One more assumption is added to the above: 4. The use of power assumption: states can utilize their power to influence the behavior of other states in order to maximize their own utility. The analysis in this chapter follows, to a great extent, the research program suggested by Keohane (1989): 1. When trying to explain a set of outcomes in world politics, always consider the hypothesis that the m For a discussion, see Waltz, 1959; Keohane, 1989. 65 outcomes reflect underlying power41 resources, without being limited to it; 2. When considering different patterns of outcomes in different relationships, or issue areas, entertain the hypothesis that power resources are differently distributed in these issue-areas...; 3. When considering how states define their self- interests, explore the effects of international structure on self—interests, as well as the effects of other international factors and of domestic structure. (p. 63). Given the assumptions made about world politics from a realist perspective, it follows that the theory adopted for analyzing the regime attempts at hand is rational-choice analysis. This theory assumes that international actors are, in general, rational utility-maximizers in that they display consistent tendencies to adjust to external changes in ways that are calculated to increase the expected value of outcomes to them (Keohane, 1989, p. 109). 1. The Forum as a Factor Influencing the Outcome of the INTELSAT Satellite Regime Attempt: When reviewing the backgrounds of the two regime attempts, the most basic observation concerns the forum in “ Power refers to "resources that can be used to induce other actors to do what they would not otherwise do, in accordance with the desire of the power-wielder" (Keohane, 1989, p. 54). Cline (1975) has come up with an operationalization of power which he terms perceived power: Pp=(C+E+M)x(S+W) where Pp is perceived power; C is the critical mass of population and territory; E is the economic capacity; M is the military capacity; S is the strategic purpose; and W is the will to pursue national strategies (Cline, 1975). 66 which the negotiations took place. For INTELSAT, the negotiations were first conducted on a bilateral basis. A scenario sketch is as follows: 1) The United States had a technology that it believed could facilitate international communication; 2) it chose the partners with whom it had interest to build the foundations of an international communication network; 3) these partners found it in their interest to participate; 4) the terms of partnership were worked out by a few partners so as the maximize the utility of all; 5) As the network was being built, and the venture proved a success, more partners joined on the terms already set by the few founders. It should be noted that all INTELSAT negotiations occurred outside the United Nations (U.N.) arena. In fact, there is a sizeable body of evidence to suggest that the U.N., as a forum of negotiation, was deliberately avoided. Despite early calls by some to involve the United Nations in any negotiations regarding an international satellite network”, others vehemently opposed any U.N. involvement. a See, for example, the New York Times editorial of June 1, 1961 which asked: "Should not this Nation set an example for future international cooperation in space by attempting to get worldwide cooperation, perhaps through the United Nations at the very beginning of such a global communications network?" (quoted in Congressional Record, June 13, 1961, p. 10230). For an example from Congress, see the statement of Congressman Ryan quoted in the August 22, 1961 edition of Congressional Record: "If we are to achieve a global [satellite] system, it will require unprecedented international cooperation. The United Nations should be invited to participate; and the possibility of operating the 67 The emphatic opposition to any U.N. involvement that prevailed in the U.S. Congress is best illustrated by the response of a member of the committee drafting the Satellite Communications bill to a concern raised by another Congressman regarding U.N. involvement: "I assure the gentleman under this bill the United Nations has nothing in the world to do with it" (Congressional Record, May 3, 1962, p. 7708)“. The forum, alone, is not perhaps by itself a significant factor that affects the outcome of a regime attempt. However, the inherent characteristics of one forum as contrasted with another’s make each forum more significant. The INTELSAT forum’s characteristics included: 1) a few initial selected negotiators; 2) a clearly specified a priori orientation toward a regime of common interest; 3) a pre-determined asymmetrical power hierarchy with the United States at the top; and 4) selective participation, or the various States’ ability to choose not to participate in the enterprise. The United States carefully selected the few initial partners. Originally, the U.S. sought the interest of the system under the United Nations auspices for the benefit of all nations should be considered" (Congressional Record, August 22, 1961, p. 16650). “ The entire conversation between the two Congressmen regarding the issue of U.N. involvement illustrates the attitude of Congress towards the U.N. much better. In fact, it is quite amusing. See Appendix H for a full transcript. 68 United Kingdom and Canada, two countries which have many similarities with the United States. In fact, even when the negotiations were more formalized, the initial partners were still those with close ideological, legal and cultural ties to the United States: Western European countries, Canada, Australia and Japan, a country which the U.S. had restructured after WWII. These few countries, which were rather closer in ideology to the United States than were others, established the fundamental framework which evolved into the global satellite system. In addition to the ideological similarity among the initial partners, there existed a priori determination of the project’s orientation. It was clearly specified that any negotiations would be targeted toward the achievement of an agreement to utilize satellite technology in a way that is mutually beneficial to all partners. The negotiators did not have the option to reverse the direction of the negotiations and gear them toward a regime of common aversion. Instead, they had the choice not to participate if the terms were not to their liking. In addition to the above, there was a pre-determined asymmetrical balance of power among them. The focus here is on the power of the United States as compared to the other partners. There are many reasons to believe that from the beginning it was clear that the United States enjoyed a position at the top of the state power hierarchy: The United 69 States 1) had played the central role for ending WWII some two decades earlier; 2) was one of two contemporary super powers in conflict; 3) was an unshakable pillar in the face of the perceived communist threat“; 4) was a champion of the democratic ideology which all initial partners subscribed to“; 5) had developed a satellite technology not achieved by any of its initial partners; and 6) was ready to share the technology for the establishment of a global satellite system. In the case of INTELSAT, the United States had a clear power advantage that it may have used to maintain the pace and direction of the negotiations46 (see Figure 8). “ The communist threat was perceived by both the United States and the partners it originally chose for the establishment of the global satellite system. If one were to rank order all countries involved in the original INTELSAT negotiations according to their anti-communist stance and ability to sustain their position, then the U.S. would top all others. A similar conclusion would be obtained if one were to compare each country along the components of Cline’s (1975) power formula given earlier. This means that the U.S. had an already established leadership position among the original INTELSAT partners. ” Most of the initial partners were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), therefore, highlighting their ideological close proximity. “ In fact, the U.S. power advantage was clearly utilized subsequently, as COMSAT, the U.S. signatory to INTELSAT, dominated this latter organization for several years. For a detailed account of COMSAT’s relationship to INTELSAT and the use of U.S. influence in that organization, see Kildow (1973). The consideration of U.S. power advantage and use of its influence to get the process moving is consistent with the theory of hemegonic stability or "the view that concentration of power in one dominant state facilitates the development of strong regimes" (Keohane, 1989, p. 101). 70 Figure 8 illustrates the move from point "A", the initial regime building stage, to point "C" the actual regime implementation stage for INTELSAT. The arrows represent the propelling forces and their respective directions in a non-U.N. forum. The Z depicts the original country members and their leaning. The main leading force in this diagram is the United States. The asymmetrical balance of power in favor of the U.S.A. and the other characteristics of the INTELSAT forum have contributed to an actual movement in the direction desired by the dominant power. Point "C" has materialized. Z \ \ \ \ lnItIaIIon or the USA INTELSAT negotiations —' 0mm0” nterest //’ //’ //’ z” A C Dynamism ofthelNTELSATregime m HS earw stage Figure 8 2. The Forum as a Factor Influencing the Outcome of the DBS Satellite Regime Attempt: In contrast with the INTELSAT negotiations, the forum for DBS was the United Nations and its related agencies. A 71 simplified scenario sketch for the DBS negotiations is as follows: 1) the General Assembly of the United Nations decides to study the feasibility of broadcasting by satellite; 2) both advantages and disadvantages are presented and discussed; 3) the Soviet Union takes the lead in focusing solely on the disadvantages; 4) the focusing on the disadvantages results in a shift toward building barriers in the face of DBS usage; 5) the option of achieving collective usage of the technology, which existed when the inquiry was initiated, now gets fully ignored; 6) countries join the Soviet effort, finding it in their interest to do so; 7) the debate drags on and eventually results in the adoption of guidelines that are far from encouraging a collective DBS project. The heated negotiations, in the case of DBS, occur entirely in the U.N. forum. Here again, perhaps, the forum itself may not be a significant factor in the outcome of the DBS regime attempt. The characteristics of the forum, however, may very well be. The characteristics of the United Nations forum included: 1) a large number of negotiators; 2) an uncertainty in regime-type orientation; 3) a less determined power hierarchy influenced by a vacillating power structure; 4) non-selective participation. By its very nature, the United Nations was designed to include a representative from each of the Earth’s 72 geographical locales called States47 (Bailey, 1964). Some 153 independent States were members of the United Nations in the 19705 (The World Almanac, 1991). This large group of States represented a variety of ideologies sometimes in conflict with one another. In the case of DBS, the outcome of the negotiations was likely to affect the U.N. members as a whole. All States, therefore, whether interested in DBS or not, had a vested stake in the negotiations and felt compelled to participate. From the beginning, the number of negotiators was large, as the participation of States was non-selective. In addition, in the case of DBS, there was a good deal of uncertainty associated with the direction of the negotiations. Here, the entire issue was initiated by an inquiry into the possibility of broadcasting directly via satellite. The outcome of the inquiry could result in a shift from a point of origin toward one of two extremes on a regime continuum with common interest located at one end and common aversion at the other end. Alternatively, the outcome of the inquiry could also result in a regression to the point of origin, which means no regime initiation at all. Unlike the INTELSAT forum, the orientation in the case of DBS was not only not predetermined but also very uncertain. " Both the International Telecommunication Union and the U.N. General Assembly give each country the right to a single vote. See Codding (1982), Haviland (1951). 73 The uncertainty was further accentuated by the fluctuating hierarchy of power inside the U.N, which often reflected the state of affairs among States outside the U.N. In the outside world two antagonistic super powers topped the power hierarchy. The Soviet Union provided a counterbalance for the United States. Each of the two super powers had its loyal followers. In addition to the devoted followers of the super powers were those countries which were officially non-aligned. To complicate matters, those non-aligned countries at times unofficially sided with either of the two super powers due to a plethora of factors including converging interests and superpower direct or indirect influence“. Because of the presence of two super powers, at times, the United Nations exhibited no clear power patterns in the “ It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the factors that influenced non-aligned countries to unofficially side with either of the two super powers. Factors may have varied and may have included military, economic, social or other types of assistance as well as direct power pressure. A super power, after all, was a vital source of economic aid for impoverished economies. It was also an attractive partner with whom to trade and a necessary ally in a world where collective security for a small country often meant intervention on its behalf by the super power it most closely associated with. Unofficial influence meant that country C’s vote against a super power in a given area of debate was not occurring in a vacuum as it was likely to influence other areas of interest between that super power and country C. In a world where the powerful most often rules, a retaliatory action on the part of a super power against a smaller country with whom it shares little interest (as in an embargo) constitutes a severe blow to the economic, social and political stability of that country. 74 sense that no single nation appeared to lead all others”. Instead, the two super powers unofficially struggled to get a power lead on one another. The struggle between two super powers, each pulling in an opposite direction, is potentially counterproductive as the decision-making process could be slowed and at times even halted. The power structure inside the U.N. did not clearly favor one of the super powers over the other (see Riggs, 1979). Beside this fact, the official U.N. setting embodied a one-state one- vote forum. In such a forum, the power of a single state, absent other factors, becomes substantially reduced. It is, however, likely to change with the nature of the topic being debated. With differing and conflicting agendas, the ability of a single state to take the initial lead and get the process moving in one’s favorable direction, by relying on influence alone, becomes much more complicated” (see Figure 9). Figure 9 illustrates the forces at work within the U.N. forum for the case of DBS. The orientation of the negotiations was uncertain as most countries (Z) were originally exploring the DBS issue without a clear leaning. ” See Miller, 1990, for a discussion of the emergence of bipolarity. See Sullivan, 1990, for estimates of power distribution. m This observation is also consistent with the theory of hemegonic stability which states that "fragmentation of power is associated with regime collapse" (Keohane, 1989, p. 101) . 75 Z llllllll [Common Aversion] —?——{ '"it'E‘ltAgSin DBS l—o—a [Common interest] liiiiyiii B A C Dynamism of the DBS Regime in its initial stage Figure 9 In relation to achieving a regime, the U.N. forum lent itself to either a shift from A to B or one from A to C or to a state of inertia. The dynamism of the DBS negotiations could be swayed with the addition of other factors which will be later discussed. 3. The Forum as a Factor Influencing the Outcomp of a Satellite Regime Attempt: In sum, when looking at the characteristics of the forums in which the INTELSAT and DBS regime attempts were discussed, one finds that the number of negotiators, the specification of the orientation, the certainty of the power structure, and the type of participation by the negotiators may be construed as significant characteristics of the forum 76 in which the satellite regime attempt takes place“. Therefore, the forum (FONJ as a determinant in the regime attempt outcome formula would, itself, be a factor of FORA=f(NRA+NORA+PSRA+TPRA) where N is the number of negotiators, NO the specification of the negotiation orientation, PS the certainty of the power structure and TP the type of participation”. Although the forum as discussed above may be a significant factor at the initial stage of a regime attempt, as the negotiations mature, another key factor becomes the interest of the different parties in the regime in question. 4. "Interest" as a Factor Influencing the Outcome of a Satellite Regime Attempt: It is particularly this factor which can influence the evolution of the negotiations as each party engages in a “ Each of these characteristics is a variable. n These components are not all the factors that may influence the forum. They have been identified as some key factors that are believed to influence the forum. As no single study is ever capable of exploring all the factors that influence the issue at hand, the task of exploring other factors is left to future research endeavors. The factors explored, nevertheless, do contribute to a theory with the forum as the unit of analysis. This theory states that several variables (the number of negotiators, the specification of the orientation, the certainty of the power structure and the type of participation by the negotiators) influence the forum in which the negotiations take place. This theory could be tested and further elaborated by conducting similar analyses for other issues of international decision-making. 77 cost/benefit analysis regarding the specific regime attempt”. The cost/benefit analysis emanates from the assumptions made earlier regarding the States’ continuous struggle to maximize their self-interest and their rational capacity to maximize their utility in a given situation. A possible cost/benefit analysis (CBWQ for one negotiating party, CBRA=f(BRA-CRA+ECB) where BRA and Cm are respectively the benefits and costs associated with the regime attempt in question and Em,the error associated with the cost/benefit analysis. The following will discuss the costs and benefits of both INTELSAT and DBS in an effort to contrast the two regime attempts. 5. stt/Benefit Analysis for INTELSAT: Table I presents a list of advantages and disadvantages that may have been taken into consideration by the initial and subsequent partners of the INTELSAT regime. Table I demonstrates that there were clear incentives for individual States to participate in the proposed global satellite venture. A review of the INTELSAT development chronology given earlier in this chapter (pp. 57-63) may be ” ’Interest’ explains why, during the DBS deliberations, such countries as Canada, Sweden, and France sided with the Soviet Union and not with their traditional ally, the United States. 78 useful at this point. Table 1 — Advantages of INTELSAT Disadvantages of INTELSAT Own shares in a unique Potentially lose international institution revenues due to transatlantic cable bypass Access a medium which Join the organization individual states could on the terms already neither build nor afford set by the founding to maintain states Control the content of the transmitted information at the public switch level Facilitate international communication, commerce and trade Eliminate the need for a sophisticated terrestrial cable infrastructure Utilize advanced technology not achieved at the national level except in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Early INTELSAT partners joined the organization since it provided an opportunity and a service that was non- existent anywhere else at the time. The INTELSAT capacity bridged both time and distance and enabled market-driven economies to expand their trade territories by facilitating telephone communications among businesses and financial 79 markets. The developing countries that joined in later found INTELSAT as their means to actively participate in the global economy since they could bypass their inadequate wire infrastructures and link up their key centers of trade with others. In addition to providing an enhanced and expanded means of instantaneous information exchange to businesses, governments could reap the financial benefits of owning shares in a profit-conscious one-of-a-kind enterprise. Since INTELSAT was primarily perceived to be a space bridge among individual countries’ telephone providers, governments could still have total control over incoming information since most did own and operate the gateway through which INTELSAT signals entered their territories: the telephone companies. Both old and new partners were taking part in a venture that they, on their own, could never achieve. This was their opportunity to benefit from someone else’s heavy investment in research and development. For states, therefore, the two paramount incentives were: 1) ownership and 2) control. The opportunity to own shares in the organization provided clear and tangible benefits. Ownership meant having a voice in the operations of the organization in addition to profit sharing. States not only controlled the information gateway leading to their territories , they also owned the earth stations utilized 80 for the reception of the INTELSAT satellite signals. States with heavy investment in transatlantic cable could potentially lose revenues due to the competition in international telephone connections that INTELSAT brought about. They also could have a modest impact upon the principles adopted prior to their joining the organization. In participating in the venture, states would not relinquish their control over the information disseminated. Picture, for example, a rough sketch of the communication process between person A in country X and person B in country Y. The message would be imparted from person A via country X’s wired telephone infrastructure. The message would pass several public switches until it is uplinked via satellite. At the receiving end, the message is downlinked by government Y’s controlled earth station, channelled via a set of government operated public switches and delivered to person B via the wired telephone infrastructure. The satellite transmission here is from a single point and the reception is by a single point. At many instances in the procedure, governments have the capability of blocking the message being disseminated. It would seem that, in the case of INTELSAT, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages of participating in the regime. 6. CostlBenefit Analysis for DBS: Table 2 presents a list of potential advantages and 81 disadvantages that have been raised by both proponents and opponents of DBS. The potential effects presented in Table 2 were central to the DBS debate and have played a key role in influencing individual state’s positions vis a vis DBS, therefore contributing to the outcome of the DBS regime attempt. In contrast to INTELSAT, DBS embodies several serious disadvantages for national government institutions. When looking at Table 2, the disadvantages seem to outweigh the advantages. With the evolution of the DBS controversy in the 19705, the idea of a cooperative effort concerning DBS became fully ignored. Instead, the issue became one of accepting or rejecting the principle which permits a State to broadcast directly to the citizens of other States using its own DBS system. Ownership incentives here are absent. Two clear disadvantages of international DBS are: 1) ownership imbalance and 2) lack of control. Instead of taking part in a global DBS system emanating from a cooperative effort among states, here each state is on its own. If it accepts the DBS principle, then it would have to find the means to broadcast via satellite. 82 Table 2 — Potential Advantaqee of DBS Potential Disadvantaqee of DBS Broadcast instantaneously and comprehensively to large portions of Earth Prevent government control over sources, quality and quantity of broadcast content Stimulate international co-operation and understanding by exposing national audiences to their neighbors on Earth Provide opportunities for foreign propaganda and other abuses Increase the number of entertainment channels available Threaten the national program production industry Disseminate news and information uncensored by national governments Take creative jobs away from local talent Create new markets and advertising revenues for national broadcasters Threaten the national legal infrastructure as related to broadcasting Generate new business opportunities from the sale of receiving apparatus Offend conservative countries and certain religious groups Create new manufacturing jobs for receiving apparatus Influence national cultures by introducing foreign norms and values Lose revenues due to piracy of programming intended to be distributed on a pay basis Violate consumer rights through misleading advertising messages 83 Obviously, the countries which already owned satellites capable of transmitting DBS signals were at a clear advantage over those that did not“. In addition, by accepting the DBS principle, governments relinquish most control over the information received by their citizens via satellite”. A rough sketch “ While most countries owned shares in INTELSAT, this organization’s satellites are not designed to beam signals to small home receivers. Membership in INTELSAT was unrelated to the capacity to transmit DBS signals. A separate satellite system was necessary to make DBS possible. ” The lack of control of a State over the information transmitted by satellite to its citizens is directly related to the notion of State sovereignty. A discussion devoted to the development and applicability of sovereignty to international communication is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, a brief definition and some thoughts about sovereignty will be presented. Throughout the years, sovereignty has come to acquire three meanings: 1) "absolute power in a state in domestic and international affairs"; 2) "a supreme authority within the political community" or state; and 3) "the power of a state to run its own foreign affairs... expressed as... independence" (Wyndham Place Trust, 1970, p. 24). States often cite Article 2 of the U.N. Charter as a guarantee of their sovereignty (see U.N, 1945). Although sovereignty could be considered to be, itself, a determining factor in the case of international DBS, the assumption made earlier about the state being a rational actor constantly attempting to maximize its own utility would refute such a consideration. A state, as a rational actor, would reject, on the basis of sovereignty, a proposal that would enable other states to transmit uncensored information flows to its own population when it knows that it is incapable of reciprocating the flow egg when it has no other significant vested interest that would prevent it from rejecting the proposal (e.g. a solid financial interest). Sovereignty, it is argued here, is factored in the costs of a cost/benefit analysis conducted by each State. If the benefits outweigh the costs sovereignty becomes less of an issue. If the costs outweigh the benefits then sovereignty is always a wild card that the State can play. A rational 84 of the DBS process between countries X and Y is illustrated as follows: country X uplinks audio and/or video programs on a satellite that includes country Y in its footprint. Any household in country Y equipped with a satellite receiver and antenna would be able to downlink the programs of country X, therefore bypassing any government control. The transmission here is from one point and the reception is by a multitude of points. The DBS procedure gives an automatic advantage not only to those countries that own or have the capacity to lease DBS satellites but also to those countries that are capable of producing content to disseminate via DBS. For INTELSAT, the content disseminated could simply be a telephone conversation. In such an instance, the production of content requires neither sophisticated equipment nor special talent. The producer is most often a single individual communicating a message to a single receiver. The costs of production are those associated with the costs of transmission and, to a certain extent, a portion of the investment in simple telephone equipment. Both developed and developing countries can easily produce such content. For DBS, the costs of production are extensive. The state would not blindly hang on to its sovereignty in relation to DBS without weighing other factors since a rational state realizes that sovereignty is an eroding concept in the twentieth century (For a discussion and evidence concerning the erosion of state sovereignty, see Herz, 1959; Scott, 1965; Herz, 1969; Sprout & Sprout, 1971; Ohmae, 1990; Schechter, 1991). 85 costs associated with the production of a half hour sitcom, for example, would respectively include pre-production costs (script writing, hiring a producer, a direction, talent, etc.), production costs (renting studio, equipment, crew, etc.) and post-production costs (editing, etc.). Those countries which dominate the production of television entertainment programming are much more ready for DBS than those countries that are still not self-sufficient in this field. It would be fair to argue that the former countries would also dominate DBS“. The characteristics of DBS, therefore, make the "production of content" an additional issue in the controversy. In terms of production of content, developing countries are at a clear disadvantage. In view of the attributes of DBS, it is conclusively not in the interest of restrictive or non-affluent governments to accept the DBS principle. In the case of DBS, the cost/benefit analysis outcome for each of the negotiating parties may have been a significant factor in their decision not to participate in a DBS regime. The “ The United States is one of the biggest exporters of television entertainment. Concurrently with the DBS debate, another controversy centered on what has been characterized as the "one.way flow" of entertainment programming from the U.S. to the Third World. While the costs of production were not a central point in the DBS negotiations, they were considered in the discussions surrounding the "one way flow" and what later came to be known as the New World Information Order (see Masmoudi, 1984; Varis & Nordenstreng, 1974). In view of the characteristics of DBS, however, it is almost certain that DBS implementation would have extended and intensified that controversy. 86 voting pattern of developing countries was consistent with the finding that the disadvantages of the notion of international DBS as it evolved in the U.N. do outweigh the advantages of this new technology. 7. Factore Influepeinq the Outcome of a Satellite Regime Attempt: In sum, by making the assumptions at the beginning of this section, a rational choice analysis contrasting the INTELSAT and DBS regime attempts suggests that among the significant factors influencing the success or failure of a satellite regime are the forum in which the negotiations are conducted and the results of a cost benefit analysis. Therefore, the outcome of a regime attempt (RA) N RA=F(FORA+ Z CBRA) cb=1 where FOw(is the forum in which the regime attempt gets negotiated, and the sum of CBmkis the summation of the cost/benefit analyses of every party in the negotiations”. A visual representation of the interplay of key variables that influence the outcome of a regime attempt is presented in Figure 10. The diagram illustrates a regime ” Here again, the factors are not all the factors that may influence the outcome of a satellite regime attempt, but are factors deemed important and extracted from the information reviewed in this study. The adequacy of this formula could be tested in future studies of international decision-making concerning other communication regimes. 87 attempt process model based upon the analysis performed in this chapter. It should be noted that the arrows do not necessarily signify directional causation. The analysis conducted earlier in this chapter, nevertheless, suggests that the process flows from the left to the right of the model. 0 Benefits Type of Partmipauon # of Negotiators Certainty of Power Structure A Regime Attempt Process Model Regime Attempt Regime Outcome Figure 10 Figure 10 predicts that a positive outcome for a regime attempt would be achieved in the case that the number of negotiators is small, the power structure among the 88 negotiators is certain, the participation of the negotiators is selective, and the regime’s benefits for each of the negotiators outweigh the regime costs. Since relationships among costs, benefits, type of participation, certainty of power structure and number of negotiators were not explored in this analysis, no arrows could be drawn among these constructs. This, of course, does not preclude the existence of relationships among the said constructs. As part of the cost/benefit analysis that was conducted concerning DBS were a set of concerns about the potential social effects that the direct broadcasts by satellite may have on the audience of a receiving country. The next chapter focuses on these social concerns and explores the social scientific literature concerning the cross-border impact of televised messages. CHAPTER IV. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TELEVISION: WHAT DOES THE RESEARCH SAY? The inquiry into the possibility of international direct broadcasting via satellite, which was initiated in the late 19605, resulted in several reports mentioned in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. In its second report, the Working Group on DB8 (WG-DBS) discussed the advantages versus disadvantages of the emerging technology. Included in its discussion were several concerns about the social impact of messages transmitted via DBS. The new technology was said to potentially influence the attitudes, behaviors, knowledge, culture, or other aspects of individuals attending to it. These concerns were echoed throughout the progress of the DBS negotiations and, as noted in Chapter 3, may have contributed to the emergence of a regime of common aversion for DBS. When speaking of the social effects of DBS, what is really meant is the impact of televised content transmitted from one country to another, or the influence of foreign television programs on a domestic audience. This chapter sets out to explore what social science research has been conducted about this topic and what conclusions, if any, can be made about the impact in question. The literature that this chapter chooses to summarize is that which approaches the topic of foreign TV effects 89 90 from a micro level of analysis. While reviewing the U.N. documents concerning the DBS debate, no reference to or acknowledgement of this body of literature were found. Examining it here would be the first time an attempt is made to link this type of research with international satellite policy. The unit of analysis in the studies reviewed is the individual and not the society. Since the individual is the smallest unit in a given society, foreign TV effect studies conducted about individuals can estimate the likely impact of foreign TV on the society in which the individuals are located. This assumes, of course, that the samples of individuals selected for analysis are representative of the population in a given society. Social scientific studies that investigate relationships between variables at the micro level of analysis tend not to characterize these relationships individually as cultural, political, economic, or social. Instead, they tend to identify each relationship separately in terms of its particular impact on the individual (cognitive, behavioral, attitudinal, etc...). Variable relationships, however, separate or combined, can subsequently be used to estimate the effect of the independent variable in question on more macro units such as the society, culture or economy. For example, a study that assesses the relationship between Brazilians’ exposure to 91 American TV and individuals’ consumption choice between Brazilian versus American products could be used to estimate the impact of American TV on the Brazilian economy. While the author's original effect would be characterized as behavioral by researchers interested in the micro level of analysis, it could also be considered as an economic effect by others interested in a more macro unit. The same reasoning would apply to a study that investigates the relationship between Canadians’ exposure to American TV and their satisfaction with their government. While this study may be characterized as attitudinal it does estimate the political impact of American TV on Canadians”. Since this study chose to look at the body of literature conducted at the micro level of analysis, it will be reporting the investigated relationships in terms of their particular effect on the individual (cognitive, attitudinal, behavioral, etc...). Later, an attempt will be made to identify which relationships estimate a social, cultural, political or economic impact. Ever since the possibility of broadcasting by television across national borders became an issue at the United Nations’ level, the topic of foreign television effects progressively began to receive considerable attention by academic researchers. Research endeavors about ” In both of these examples, it is assumed that the arrow of causality in the relationship is from television to the individual. 92 the topic could potentially contribute useful evidence for international policy-making. The belief that academicians must have engaged in scientific inquiries about the effects of foreign TV and the saliency of the topic in the early 19705 inspired some policy-makers to request a summary report of the findings of relevant investigations. The earliest attempt to summarize the literature concerning the cross-border effects of television was commissioned by UNESCO’s Division of Communication Research and Policies and published in 1976. The authors of the report set out to explore a primary research question: "What empirical findings exist about the effects of...[cross- cultural broadcasting’s]... cultural, linguistic, psychological or political effects?" (Contreras et al., 1976, p. 7). A comprehensive search for literature conducted by Contreras and his colleagues yielded mostly content analyses, media consumption studies, policy reviews, and critical essays about the cross-cultural effects of broadcasting. Even though these analyses were not the type the authors had hoped to find, for lack of alternatives, Contreras et a1. (1976) provided an overview of these studies and admitted that "there is little information that bears directly on the question that stimulated... [their] project" (Contreras, et al., 1976, p. 7). The researchers concluded that ...many authors are concerned about the patterns of international communication that exist, and have 93 acknowledged the lack of substantive research into the questions that these patterns evoke... [T]here has been a very limited research interest up to now... As the topic gets more definition, hopefully research designs will be devised and resources to back up those designs will be made available (p. 41). In 1992, sixteen years following the UNESCO report, one wonders whether the state of cross-border television effects research has changed. International DBS, after all, embodies cross-border TV, making the endeavor of updating the UNESCO report even more important for this dissertation. The main purpose of this chapter is to find and systematically summarize all empirical investigations assessing the impact of foreign television programs on individuals. The questions that this portion of this dissertation addresses are: Have empirical studies of the impact of foreign TV59 effects been conducted since the UNESCO report? If so then when, where and how were these studies conducted? Who conducted them? And what does all the empirical research60 conducted about the impact of cross-border ” The term "foreign TV" encompasses the term "cross- border TV" as any television signal that is transmitted from country A to country B is foreign to country B. The term "foreign TV" is used in this section of the dissertation since it also encompasses television content that arrives to country B from country A through channels other than direct transmission, such as program importation or home video releases. Since the effect of interest to policy-makers and to this study is that of the TV program’s origin regardless of its mode of transmission, the term "foreign TV" is used. "Foreign TV" is further defined in the method section. w "All" meaning both dated and recent studies. 94 television say? The following paragraphs present the methodology adopted to explore these research questions. Later, the findings of this endeavor are outlined. A. METHOD For the purpose of this study, a foreign television program is defined as television content which is a) produced in a country different than that in which it is shown regardless of how it arrived to the latter country (i.e. videotape, cable, importation, crossborder TV transmission, direct broadcast satellite, etc...) and b) originally designed for consumption by the audience of the country in which it was produced. The two criteria above were outlined in order to enable the distinction between studies relevant to the research questions posed above and others that fall under the umbrella of international television effects but do not relate to this study’s research questions. Examples of such studies are international comparative investigations of domestic television effects (e.g. comparative cultivation studies) and research about the impact of a message designed in country A especially to influence the audience of country B (i.e. propaganda and/or persuasion). In addition, this study defines a television impact as any detected change or difference in individuals at the 95 cognitive, attitudinal, affective, cultural or behavioral61 level of analysis, the cause of which is attributed to foreign television consumption. 1. Studv eelection: a) Only empirical62 studies exploring the impact of a given country A’s television programs on individuals in country B were selected. b) A study was selected for inclusion if at least one of its hypotheses or relationships satisfies requirement "B(a)" above. In the case that not all hypotheses or relationships satisfy requirement "B(a)" above, only the hypotheses or relationships that do were summarized. c) Both published and unpublished manuscripts, recent or dated, were sought. Electronic database and manual index searches were conducted to generate potential study leads“. In addition, letters were sent to numerous research institutions around the United States asking for unpublished “ The findings of studies conducted about the impact of foreign TV on consumer behavior, for example, would yield information about the likely economic impact of foreign TV on local versus imported products. a The term "empirical" in this context is defined as systematic observations based upon the method of science (as opposed to the other methods of knowing identified by Kerlinger, 1986) and utilizing statistical analytic methods. “ Database searches were performed using the Dialog information services. Databases searched were ERIC, PsycINFO, and Sociological Abstracts. The following indexes were manually searched: Current Contents in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Psychological Abstracts, and Sociological Abstracts. 96 manuscripts about the topic“. Copies of all studies found were then gathered and thoroughly read prior to summarizing. 2. Study summaries: All research manuscripts were summarized using a table format in order to 1) extract the relevant information from the numerous studies obtained and 2) enable cross-study comparisons, whenever such comparisons are possible. A primary table was used to summarize each study. Six different types of information were included in each table: a) Author Info. 8 Source Reference: The name of the study’s author(s) and his/her (their) departmental and university affiliation(s) were noted here whenever these were known. An American Psychological Association (APA) formatted reference for the source of the study was also included in this space. b) Setting Sample and Method: The city(ies) and country(ies) in which the study took place are noted here. The sample(s) used in the study as well as any descriptions of the sample(s) (mean age, gender breakdown, etc..) were also included. The study’s method (instrument, administration technique, analysis technique(s) used, etc...) was summarized in this space too. c) Theory: The theory that the study utilized, if any, “ Letters were sent to mass communication departments known to conduct research on international communication. The departments were identified and contacted by Professor J.D. Straubhaar on behalf of the author.. 97 prior to the formulation of hypotheses is noted here. d) Independent Variables: The independent variables, or those variables that are presumed to cause the effect, investigated in the study are noted here. Independent variables are included if they are directly relevant to the study according to requirement "1(a) and 1(b)" above. e) Dependent Variables: The dependent variables, or those variables that are presumed to embody the effect, investigated in the study are noted here. Dependent variables are included if they are directly relevant to the study according to requirements "1(a) and 1(b)" above. f) Findings and Conclusions: Study results, as relevant to the independent and dependent variables, are noted here. Strength of effect or other statistics are included whenever possible. In the case that the statistics reported by the original author are excessive but crucial to the understanding of the relationships summarized, these statistics are placed in separate secondary tables. Secondary tables are used especially when a large number of single statement dependent variables are reported along with their relevant statistics. Beside reporting findings in this space, the original author’s key conclusion(s) regarding the different relationships summarized also are included here whenever possible (conclusions only relevant to the relationships summarized in the table). 3. Analysis: 98 In order to describe the studies in a systematic manner, a code book was especially developed to fit the specific needs of the analysis“. The unit of analysis was "the study". Variables coded include: year of study, year of publication, author(s) country of affiliation, type of publication, type, location, primary theory, sample type, and method. After coding all studies, the data was entered into a computer and statistical software was used to generate descriptive tables. B. RESULTS: The comprehensive search for literature resulted in numerous articles that addressed the topic of cross-border TV effects. After a careful examination of the content of these articles, it was determined that the majority follow a mostly critical approach to the topic at hand (examples include Dizard, 1965; Day, 1975; Goldsen & Bibliowicz, 1976; Beltran, 1978a, 1978b; and Tracey, 1985). There were also numerous others that fit the category of international comparative TV effects (examples include Bouwman & Stappers, 1982; Hedinson & Winhahl, 1982; Morgan & Shanahan, 1992; and Straubhaar et al. 1992). As the literature was being collected, sorted and categorized, it became clear that quantitative studies looking at the effects of foreign television on individuals were indeed very rare. The titles of numerous foreign TV a See Appendix I for a copy of the code book. 99 articles found in the database searches had such titles as "The effects of...". However, these titles were misleading as their contents were later found to be normative, ideologically-based essays instead of rigorous quantitative analyses. This finding was disappointing to the author as the expectation based upon reading international communication textbooks is that this area of research has been more than adequately investigated and that relationships involving exposure to foreign television and various effects have been explored and elucidated. After reading all studies obtained, a total of 28 manuscripts was found to fit the basic criteria set at the start of this endeavor“. These were published over a number of years. Table 3 describes the number of studies published each year and its corresponding percentage of the total. 1. Studiee Date of Publication versue Date of Initiation: An examination of Table 3 reveals that very few studies were published in the 1960’s and that as the years have passed, more and more such studies have been conducted. “ Appendix J provides a summary table for each of the studies found to fit this study’s criteria. 100 Table 3 — YEAR OF PUBLICATION # 1967 .......................... 2 ............................ 7.1% 1976 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1977 .......................... 2 ............................ 7.1% 1978 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1979 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1980 .......................... 3 ............................ 10.7% 1981 .......................... 2 ............................ 7.1% 1982 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1984 .......................... 2 ............................ 7.1% 1985 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1986 .......................... 2 ............................ 7.1% 1987 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1988 .......................... 3 ............................ 10.7% 1989 .......................... 3 ............................ 10.7% 1990 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1991 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% 1992 .......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% Total cases ................... 28 ............................ 100% 101 Corresponding with this observation is Figure 11, which depicts the trend in initiating studies over the years“. The earliest empirical studies conducted about cross- border television effects took place in 1965. The 19705 saw a considerable jump in the number of studies initiated. The 19805 witnessed a moderate surge in the studies’ frequency and total in comparison to the 19705. Impact of Foreign TV Trendin Studies Conducted MU'HJDA manna \lU‘lLDA (00703—5 (130103—- LJNUDA Auto—- mum—- mum; \JQ‘D-s mum—- (auto—- COULD- AGDLDA meow; LAJCDLDA Acorn- Years Figure 11 The trend in Figure 11 suggests that the interest of researchers peaked in the late 19705 and lasted until the m A study’s date of publication is distinguished from its date of initiation since the latter refers to the time the data of the study was collected. Publication of a study can occur several years after its data was first collected and analyzed. 102 mid-19805. The fact remains, however, that only 28 empirical investigations were ever conducted despite the keen interest of policy-makers and academicians in the topic of cross-border television effects“. With 28 empirical studies at hand one wonders about the affiliation of those who did take the initiative to execute these investigations. 2. First author’s countrv affiliation: Table 4 above depicts that most of the studies’ first authors were affiliated with either the United States (67.9%) or Canada (21.4%) Table 4 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlllllllllllllllllllllll Comtry of affiliation of first author Canada ........................ 6 ............................ 21.4% Israel ........................ 1 ............................ 3.6% Norway ........................ 1 ............................ 3.6% USA ........................... 19 ............................ 67.9% Unspecified ................... 1 ............................ 3.6% Total cases ................... 28 ............................ 100% & Given the extensive critical literature on the topic of foreign TV effects, it was expected that much more than 28 quantitative studies would be found. Since it was not the objective of this study to count the number of empirical studies conducted, no such count is available. However, in the search for quantitative analyses, the author did encounter over 60 critical studies about the topic at hand. 103 3. Studv eourcee: The majority of these efforts (71.4%) were published in academic journals. Table 5 — Type of ptblication Convention paper .............. 1 ............................ 3.6% Doctoral dissertation ......... 4 ............................ 14.3% Journal Article ............... 20 ............................ 71.4% Masters Thesis ................ 2 ............................ 7.1% Other ......................... 1 ............................ 3.6% Total cases ................... 28 ............................ 100% Doctoral dissertations make up 14.3% of the total (see Table 5) 4. Theoretical orientation ofgetudiee: In terms of theoretical orientation, it is interesting to note that a considerable number of studies were not theory-driven. In fact, 32.1% of these studies did not identify a primary theory from which hypotheses were formulated”. The largest number (28.6%) of the investigations that were theory-based relied on Gerbner’s w This finding will be further discussed later in this chapter. 104 cultivation theory”. Table 6 presents the theories utilized in the empirical studies conducted and their corresponding frequencies and percentages. Table 6 — Pri-ary theory of studies Acculturation ................. 2 ............................ 7.1% Cultivation ................... 8 ............................ 28.6% Cultural Imperialism .......... 4 ............................ 14.3% Dependency .................... 2 ............................ 7.1% Modernization ................. 1 ............................ 3.6% Socialization ................. 1 ............................ 3.6% Social Learning ............... 1 ............................ 3.6% None clearly specified ........ 9 ............................ 32.1% Total cases ................... 28 ............................ 100% 5. Study Samples: The majority of the studies (60.7%) focused upon the effects of foreign TV on students“. Approximately a quarter of all studies were able to analyze samples drawn from a general population. A few investigations looked at the impact that foreign TV has on professionals (see Table m Cultivation is a term used by Gerbner and his colleagues to illustrate television’s contribution to the construction of social reality in the minds of individuals. For a recent discussion of cultivation, see Morgan & Signorielli (1990). n This may limit the generalizability of the findings to the general population since students may or may not be representative of the population at large. 105 7) . Table 7 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Sale Types of Stuiies Students ...................... 17 ............................ 60.7% Professionals ................. 2 ............................ 7.1% General Population ............ 7 ............................ 25.0% Combination Students-G. Pop... 2 ............................ 7.1% Total cases ................... 28 ............................ 100% 6. Mode of data collection: Most investigators (64.3%) relied on a self- administered survey method to collect data about individuals. Some preferred to conduct door-to-door personal interviews by themselves (e.g. Oliveira, 1986) or with a few trained assistants (e.g. Veii, 1988) or by hiring a marketing firm (e.g. Skinner, 1984). Table 8 presents the methods utilized in the studies and their associated frequencies. Table 8 lIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Method of Investigation Personal Interview ............ 9 ............................ 32.1% Self-administered ............. 18 ............................ 64.3% Mail survey ................... 1 ............................ 3.6% Total cases ................... 28 ............................ 100% 106 7. Design ofyetudies: Twenty-six of the studies (92.9%) chose a cross- sectional design, which means that the data was collected at one and no other particular point in time. The remaining two attempted to observe the effects of foreign TV on individuals over several years. 8. Countriee where studiee were conducted: The investigations took place in nineteen countries”. Table 9 depicts the countries in which studies were performed and the frequency of studies by country. Table 9 — Study Locations Australia ..................... Belize ........................ Native Canada ................. Non-Native Canada ............. China ......................... Denmark ....................... Finland ....................... Iceland ....................... Israel ........................ Korea ......................... Mexico ........................ Namibia ....................... Norway ........................ Philippines ................... Sweden ........................ Taiwan ........................ Thailand ...................... Trinidad ...................... USA Non-Native ................ Venezuela ..................... _a~_a_aw_a_a_a_a_au_aN.—n_a_am‘\~_a Table 10 breaks these countries into geographical areas. When observing the frequencies in Table 10, one n In Table 9 the reported frequencies exceed the number of publications since some studies investigated more than one country. 107 finds that North American audience members were studied most frequently, followed closely by East Asian audience members. European and Latin American audience members then follow. Only one study was performed in each of Oceania, Africa and the Near East. Table 10 — Analyses by Geographical Area Africa ....................... 1 East Asia .................... 9 Europe ....................... 6 Latin America ................ 5 Near East .................... 1 Northern America ............. 11 Oceania ...................... 1 9. Origin of foreign TV content investigated: In the studies summarized in this dissertation, the investigators analyzed the impact of foreign TV on a domestic audience. From where did the foreign TV content that is at the center of attention originate? Table 11 shows that most researchers were concerned with the impact of American television content. The second most investigated foreign TV impact was that of Canadian origin. Canadian TV is a special case, as the impact of its programming was most often assessed on audience members living inside the geographical boundaries of Canada. This observation, on the surface, makes Canadian TV programming domestic and not foreign to the audience members. However, 108 the Canadian TV content investigated was Euro-Canadian in origin and the studies were conducted on a native audience, living in remote villages, with a distinct culture, and who had, at the time the studies were conducted, limited contact with Euro—Canadians. The impact of Mexican TV was investigated in a single study. One of the research reports did not specify the origin of foreign TV but merely indicated that the TV content was not domestic. Table 11 IIIIIIIIIIIIIllIlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlllIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Origin of Foreign TV Investigated Canada ....................... 6 Mexico ....................... 1 United States ................ 22 Unspecified .................. 1 10. Measurement of independent variables: Out of a total of 28 studies, 9 (32%) did not measure individuals’ consumption of foreign TV (see Table 12). Some investigators simply measured individuals’ consumption of television in general, while others did not even bother to assess even that variable. The former assumed that, since foreign programming was carried on the domestic station, then an estimate of television exposure would yield an estimate of exposure to foreign programming. The latter assumed that if a leaning toward the United States on the part of audience members is detected, then this would 109 indicate the impact of American TV programs that are present in the domestic TV broadcast schedule. Table 12 Exposure to Foreign TV as an Independent Variable Measured ..................... 19 Assumed ...................... 9 The studies that did not measure individuals’ foreign TV consumption run a significant risk of confounding the impact of television with an endless number of other variables not assessed in the study but affecting individuals’ responses (attitudes, cognitions, behaviors, etc...). The remaining 19 investigations did provide some measure of individual consumption of foreign TV. The independent measure, however, was not consistent across studies. Researchers differed in their conceptualization of foreign TV exposure and varied in their concern with content specificity. Some investigators conceptualized exposure by assessing individuals’ watching particular foreign TV genres such as comedy, crime or drama on a domestic network (e.g. Pingree & Hawkins, 1981). Others conceptualized exposure as the number of hours tuning to a particular foreign TV network received domestically regardless of the genres that individuals watched (e.g. Kang & Morgan, 1988). Others 110 still conceptualized exposure as the frequency of watching specific foreign TV programs (not genres) on a domestic network (e.g. Tan & Suarchavarat, 1988). 11. Types of dependent variableeginveetiqateg: While the impact of foreign TV content was the main independent variable across all studies, there were diverse dependent variables. Investigators had different concerns with regards to what aspect of the individual the foreign TV content would be affecting. The different dependent variables were coded in five categories according to the following criteria: Affective: the dependent variable taps at an emotional construct, such as fear. Belief-centered: the dependent variable taps at a perception(s) or opinion(s), such as the perception of how wealthy Americans are. Behavioral: the dependent variable assesses individuals’ past action, such as past purchasing behavior. Cognitive: the dependent variable assesses factual knowledge or information, such as the name of the U.S. president. Value-based: the dependent variable assesses the respondent’s position on particular issues, such as the independence of women, relative to the position prevalent in their particular cultural setting. Table 13 demonstrates that the most frequent dependent variable was belief-based. Cognitive and value-based effects were almost equally frequent. Three dependent variables assessed the affective impact of foreign TV. Two dependent variables estimated the influence that foreign TV 111 content has on individuals’ behaviors. Table 13 — Effects Investigated (the dependent variables) Affective ..................... 3 Belief-based .................. 22 Behavioral .................... 2 Cognitive ..................... 9 Value-based ................... 7 12. Authors’ department affiliations: The various dependent variables suggest that the researchers had different concerns. This observation is further sustained when one traces the departmental affiliations of the studies’ authors. Table 14 _ Departlental Affiliation of Authors Anthropology .................. Communication ................. 1 Education ..................... Journalism .................... Language ...................... Mass Comm ..................... Speech Comm ................... Sociology ..................... Telecomm ...................... women's Studies ............... Unspecified ................... Not applicable ................ dmdwmdd—bNbfid Table 14 depicts that most researchers had a background 112 in Communication”. It should be noted, however, that from the information about the authors included in the studies, it is virtually impossible to distinguish those school where communication encompasses journalism, speech communication, mass communication and/or telecommunication. As a group, communication, journalism, speech communication, mass communication and telecommunication housed most of the foreign TV effect study authors. Sociology was the next most frequent departmental affiliation, followed by Education. In all, six distinct disciplines have demonstrated an interest in assessing the impact of foreign TV content. C. SUMMARIZING STRENGTH OF EFFECT MEASURES: The following section will attempt to provide a strength of effect summary for some of the relationships explored in these foreign TV effects investigations. The findings reported are drawn from those inquiries that report some type of strength of effectmeasures. These studies are listed in Table 15 then broken by effect type in Tables 16-19. The findings of belief-based relationships are first summarized, followed by those exploring a behavioral, cognitive and value-based effect. B The frequencies in Table 14 exceed the total number of publications since some studies had two or more authors affiliated with different departments. 113 Table 15 _ Foreign TV impact studies providing some type of strength of effects measure (ordered by publication date) Author and Year Country, sample size Origin of foreign TV and theory investigated Payne, 1978 U.S.A., N=414, No Canada theory Pingree & Hawkins, Australia, N=1280, U.S.A. 1981 Cultivation Payne & Caron, 1982 Canada, N=1128, No U.S.A. theory Skinner, 1984 Trinidad, N=401, U.S.A. Dependency Oliveira, 1986 Belize, N=96, U.S.A. Dependency Tan et. al., 1986 a) Taiwan, N=788; b) U.S.A. Mexico N=150; Social learning theory Tan et. al., 1987 Philippines, N=225, U.S.A. Enculturation Tan & Thailand, N=279, U.S.A. Suarchvarat1988 Cultivation Kang, 1988 Korea, N=226, U.S.A. Cultivation Zhao, 1989 China, N=1361, Media Foreign (country Imperialism unspecified) Choi, 1989 Korea, N=236, U.S.A. Cultivation Nu, 1989 Taiwan, N=1214, U.S.A. Cultivation Ahn, 1989 Korea, N=705, U.S.A. Cultivation Snyder et al., 1991 Belize, N=340, No U.S.A. theory Geiger, 1992 Venezuela, N=605, U.S.A. Cultivation Table 16 114 Strength of effects measure for belief-based relationships Author, year Relationship Effect obtained Payne, 1978 Impact of viewing Canadian TV on U.S. adults attitudes toward Canada partial correlations ranged between -.039 and -.126 Payne, 1978 Impact of viewing Canadian TV on U.S. adults attitudes toward U.S. partial correlations ranged between .002 and .198 Pingree & Hawkins, 1981 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Australian TV on children’s perceptions of the U.S.A. correlations ranged between .00 and.02 partial correlations ranged between -.01 and .09 Pingree & Hawkins, 1981 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Australian TV on children's perceptions of Australia correlations were .08 and .09 Payne, & Caron, 1982 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Canadian TV on individuals’ preference of U.S. vocalists, restaurants and accommodations correlations ranged between -.061 and -.168 Skinner, 1984 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Trinidad TV on individuals’ appreciation of, dependency and appeal toward the U.S. correlations ranged between .173 and .4776 From Table 16, one observes that several studies explored the impact of foreign TV on belief-based variables. Table 17 shows that, in comparison to the number of studies investigating belief-based variables, there were much fewer studies analyzing the impact of foreign TV on individuals’ behavior. 115 Table 16 (Continued) Strength of effects measure for belief-based relationships (continued) Author, year Relationship Effect obtained Skinner, 1984 Impact of viewing U.S. TV content in Trinidad and Tobago on adults’ appreciation of the U.S. correlation was .1730 Skinner, 1984 Impact of viewing U.S. TV content in Trinidad and Tobago on adults’ appeal toward the U.S. correlation was .4776 Tan et al. 1986 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Taiwan TV on individuals’ perceptions of Americans partial correlations ranged between -.179 and .083 Tan et al. 1986 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Mexican TV on students’ perceptions of Americans partial correlations ranged between -.233 and .159 Tan et al. 1987 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Philippines TV on students’ intention to visit the U.S. Beta was .262 Tan et al. 1988 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Thailand TV on students’ perceptions of Americans Betas ranged between .051 and .308 Tan et al. 1988 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Thailand TV on students’ intention to visit the U.S. Beta was .164 content on Korean TV on students’ perceptions of the U.S. Choi, 1989 Impact of viewing U.S. TV correlations ranged in Korea (via AFKN) on between individuals’ perceptions -.01 and .18 of the U.S. Nu, 1989 Impact of viewing U.S. correlations ranged content on Taiwan TV on between students’ perceptions of -.02 and .06 the U.S. Ahn, 1990 Impact of viewing U.S. correlations ranged between -.204 and .348 Snyder, 1991 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Belize TV on students’ desire to emigrate to the U.S. Logistic regression result: .30 Table 17 116 on Belize TV on individuals’ consumerism and purchasing of U.S. products Strength of effects measures for behavioral relationships Author, year Relationship Effect obtained Oliveira, 1986 Impact of viewing U.S. content partial correlations were .257 and .496 Oliveira, 1986 Impact of viewing U.S. content on Belize TV on individuals’ purchasing of Central American products partial correlation was -.397 Oliveira, 1986 Impact of viewing Mexican content on Belize TV on individuals’ purchasing of U.S. products partial correlation was -.311 Oliveira, 1986 Impact of viewing Mexican content on Belize TV on individuals’ purchasing of Central American products partial correlation was .270 Table 18 Strength of effects measures for cognitive relationships Author, year Relationship Effect obtained Payne, 1978 Impact of viewing Canadian TV on U.S. partial correlations ranged between .215 and .401 content on Canadian TV on individuals’ knowledge of foreign politicians adults’ knowledge of Canada Payne, 1978 Impact of viewing partial correlations ranged Canadian TV on U.S. between adults’ knowledge of -.021 and -.056 U.S. Payne, 1982 Impact of viewing U.S. correlation was .165 117 Tables 18 and 19 show that fewer cognitive and value- based relationships were explored by those researchers reporting strength of effect measures. Table 19 _ Strength of effects measures for value-based relationships Author, year Relationship Effect obtained Payne, 1978 Impact of viewing partial correlations ranged Canadian TV on U.S. between adults’ values .025 and .056 (no significance tests reported) Skinner, 1984 Impact of viewing U.S. correlation was .329 content on Trinidad TV on individuals’ adoption of U.S. values Tan et al., Impact of viewing U.S. Beta’s ranged between 1987 content on Philippines -.391 and .349 TV on students’ adoption of U.S. values Kang & Morgan, Impact of viewing U.S. partial correlations 1988 TV in Korea (via AFKN) ranged between on students’ adoption of -.18 and .33 American norms and values Zhao, 1989 Impact of viewing correlations ranged between foreign TV content on .04 and .28 individuals’ values Geiger, 1992 Impact of viewing U.S. correlation ranged between content on Venezuela TV -.05 and .15 on individuals’ value orientations The relationships in Tables 16-19 are presented as either cognitive, value-based, belief-based or behavioral. Upon qualitative evaluation of the individual relationships included in these tables, one finds the following correspondence: 1) The relationships that estimate the political/social 118 effects of foreign television programs are those labeled in this study ’belief-based’ and ’cognitive’ and found in Tables 16 and 18. 2) The relationships that estimate the cultural effects of foreign television programs are those labeled in this study ’value-based’ and found in Table 19. 3) The relationships that estimate the economic effects of foreign television programs are those labeled in this study ’behavioral’ and found in Table 17. Before addressing the ability to draw a general finding from the studies described above, the following will present a set of observations stemming from the extensive search for literature about the impact of foreign TV and subsequent readings and analyses of the relevant articles. These observations are meant as a constructive criticism of the studies as a whole and as an attempt to point out inadequacies in the body of literature which will hopefully be avoided in future similar endeavors. D. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEWED: There are twelve points that can be made about the body of literature systematically reviewed in this chapter: (a). There is a paucity in the number of empirical investigations conducted, contrasting with the genuine interest in the topic of foreign TV effects demonstrated by 119 policy-makers and critical academic researchers“. This scarcity is nevertheless understandable given the multitude of challenges and barriers that a researcher faces when attempting to conduct a study involving the collection of data from a foreign country (see for example, Vivoni-Remus et al. 1990). Due to such frustrating hurdles, the authors that did initiate the studies summarized in this chapter deserve to be commended. (b). A considerable number of investigators justified the need for their research and formulated their hypotheses by quoting from the findings of other authors about the impact of foreign TV. While there is normally nothing in this practice that draws criticism, the fact is that most of the studies quoted were very frequently not empirical in nature and not identified as non-empirical by the quoting authors. Instead, the quotes from non-empirical studies were utilized to bolster the quoting authors’ justification for his/her empirical study. Furthermore, this practice gives the impression that there exists an extensive body of empirical literature about the topic when this dissertation has found the body of literature to be scant. (c). A substantial portion of the investigations did not utilize a theory to justify the hypotheses or " Although no precise estimate of the number of critical studies is available, the author encountered more than 60 critical studies in his search for quantitative studies. 120 relationships to be tested. While not utilizing a theory appears to impact little on the study from a practical point of view, it nevertheless indicates a lack of direction and the absence of a research program that propels the entire body of literature concerning the effects of foreign TV. A lack of theory also wanes the respect that this particular line of research can earn among the social sciences, since a major aim of science is theory development (see Kerlinger, 1986). (d). Consistent with the observation concerning the lack of a specific research program is the inconsistency in the nature and measurement of the dependent variables assessed in the studies. Not only the dependent variable categories (i.e. attitudinal etc...) differed across studies, but the operationalization of these dependent variables was also discrepant. This complicates the ability to compare across studies for a similar effect. (e). Several of the investigators who opted for an empirical approach did not follow the standard reporting methods associated with this type of research. These studies did not give sufficient information about their methodology to evaluate the study’s approach. Furthermore, these studies failed to present enough information about the findings of their endeavors. While this could be blamed on editorial restrictions, it nevertheless impacts the ability to judge the adequacy and worth of the research. 121 (f). A substantial proportion of studies did not measure individuale; foreign TV consumption but did nevertheless draw a conclusion about the impact of foreign TV on their dependent variables. Relying on the observation that foreign TV programs do exist in the domestic broadcast schedule to assume that individuals do consume those programs is highly suspect. Furthermore, subsequently attributing the differences among individuals’ scores on the dependent variable to an independent variable never measured is a methodological flaw. (g). Several of the dependent measures utilized were "nominal" in scale. While such categorical measures may be adequate for describing variables, in most cases they are incapable of providing a standard measure of effect- strength, which is called for in this type of endeavor. (h). Studies that did use "ordinal" or higher order scales often failed to use more than one estimate for each construct. Others that did use several estimates failed to summarize the numerous individual items into a single index or a few indexes using such techniques as exploratory or confirmatory factor analyses. The use of individual items rather than indexes to obtain strength of effect measures does not yield any reliability estimates (such as Cronbach’s Alpha). Beside providing information about the reliability of a measure, reliability estimates are useful for correcting the error of measurement inherent in any such 122 research endeavor (see Hunter, 1990). (i). Several of the investigators who utilized nominal measures to generate frequencies and percentages subsequently utilized these simple tabulations to make inferences and draw strength of effect conclusions for their studies. Correlations can be extracted from certain results reported in percentage form” and subsequently strength of effect inferences can be made. However, in this case, inferences were often made by solely relying on percentages rather than more sophisticated statistical routines, a practice which weakens the study’s credibility. (j). The frequency of conducting studies in the countries listed in Table 9 is too low for the findings to be generalized to the audience of any of those particular countries. Furthermore, it would be highly inadequate to utilize the findings in the few countries where a very few studies took place to draw a definite conclusion about the impact of foreign TV. (k). The cultural heterogeneity of the various populations alone would inhibit formulating a conclusion from the scarce evidence available. For a generalization about foreign television, several comparable studies would ” As in a case where respondent scores on a dependent variable are reported in percentage form in a heavy viewer vs. light viewer table. These results would have to be converted to a correlation before being able to make a statement concerning the strength of the viewing effect on that dependent variable. 123 need to be conducted in each country. More than one study is required since each study could be considered a separate estimate and many estimates would yield more reliable results. Studies need to be conducted in each country for the sample of all studies to be representative of the world population. The use of students as units of analysis also limits the generalization of the findings to the larger audience“. (1). A total of twenty eight studies conducted over a period of almost three decades in nineteen different countries renders any definite cross-study conclusions about the general impact of foreign TV a practical impossibility. The observations made above suggest the need for improvements in the state of foreign-TV impact research in order for solid conclusions to be drawn in the future. The following suggestions describe an ideal situation which the author believes can be progressively achieved if enough researchers desire to obtain interpretable results concerning the effects of foreign TV on individuals. % The use of students as units of analysis is not a problem specific to this area of research but one shared by most other specialties in the social sciences. The author understands, however, that at times students are the only units of analysis available and believes that conducting an analysis of how imported television affects students is significantly better than not conducting an analysis at all. 124 E. SUGGESTIONS STEMMING FROM THE OBSERVATIONS MADE ABOUT THE FOREIGN TV IMPACT STUDIES: There is a pressing need for a detailed research program which a. outlines the inadequacies of past research; b. provides a database of published and unpublished empirical investigations of foreign TV impact; c. evaluates the empirical adequacy of theories utilized in current foreign-TV impact research (i.e. cultural imperialism, etc..); d. if need be, engage in theory building and development relying on the findings of past foreign-TV impact investigations that are deemed methodologically acceptable and current communication theories (mass media, interpersonal, etc...) and related areas of social- psychology and sociology; e. develops multiple standard independent measures of foreign TV consumption and control variables that are pre- tested in numerous languages; f. develops multiple standard dependent measures covering all areas of interest to researchers (i.e. attitudes, cognition, affect, behavior, etc...) and that are pre-tested in numerous languages; g. provides standard methods of analysis that yield strength of effect measures; h. provides standardized reporting of findings 125 techniques so that cross-study comparisons and cumulative findings across studies become possible; i. maintains a database of data sets collected about foreign TV effects for re-analysis and secondary analysis; j. maintains a database about formalities, contacts and procedures for obtaining permission to collect data in foreign countries; k. maintains a database of funding sources specifically interested in backing foreign TV effects research; 1. monitors the progress of foreign-TV impact research to suggest areas not yet investigated and provide a sense of direction and leadership to the contributors to the research program. With the data provided in this chapter at hand, one is tempted to try drawing a general conclusion based upon the study results. Such a conclusion will not be attempted here given the shortcomings of the literature cited earlier. Any conclusion based upon the data reported above will not be worth more than mere speculation". However, if speculation as a means of assessment is acceptable, then the following can be stated about the body " That is, if the attempt is not based upon a quantitative meta-analysis. A meta-analysis would statistically cumulate findings across studies by transforming the majority of results into correlations (see Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). A meta-analysis extracts an estimate based upon the available literature. A quantitative meta-analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this endeavor but will be performed in a future effort. 126 of literature examined in this chapter: The relationships between individuals’ exposure to foreign TV program and resulting attitudinal, cognitive, behavioral, or cultural effects, taken as a whole, appears to be weak. The relationships seem to vary in intensity according to audience type, effect type and geographical location. This assessment signifies that the bulk of studies reviewed in this investigation fails to support the fear of policy- makers that DBS content would have a strong social, political, and cultural effect on indigenous people. Given the shortcomings of the data highlighted earlier, however, the above assessment is mere speculation. This study’s author would rather be able to draw a solid conclusion. For that purpose, this dissertation calls for the consideration of the suggestions made earlier to establish a research program which would enable the drawing of a solid conclusion in the future. ' F. CONCLUSION ABOUT THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON FOREIGN TV PROGRAM EFFECTS: This chapter began by recalling the earliest attempt to survey the literature of foreign TV effects. The resulting 1976 report, which was commissioned by UNESCO, concluded that despite a genuine interest in the topic, there has been a very limited research interest up to now... As the topic gets more definition, hopefully research designs will be devised and resources to back up those designs will be made available ((Contreras, et al., 1976, p. 41). 127 In this chapter, a comprehensive search for literature (both dated and recent) about the topic of foreign TV was performed. This effort yielded numerous articles, 28 of which fit the criteria set out at the beginning of this endeavor to isolate those studies empirical in nature. The articles found were systematically described, summarized and analyzed in an effort to extract a conclusion. Those articles that reported strength of effect measures were later identified and tables presenting the relationships explored were constructed. From the tables, it appears that effect sizes differed according to the audience being studied, the geographical location of the study and the type of effect investigated (i.e. behavioral, etc...). Before attempting to draw a general conclusion, it was noted that the body of literature at hand suffered from several serious shortcomings that were outlined in a set of observations and that prevented the drawing of a general conclusion from the studies’ findings. The observations made about the articles resulted in the formulations of suggestions for the direction of future foreign TV effect studies. These suggestions were aimed at improving the predictive ability of future research by standardizing study instruments, methods and tools of analysis. Once the shortcomings were outlined, it was deemed that drawing a conclusion from these tables, beyond the simple w. 128 observations provided, was inappropriate given the problems cited earlier. It was speculated, nevertheless, that the relationship between watching foreign TV and any resulting cognitive, affective, behavioral, cultural or attitudinal impact appears to be weak. More research guided by an organized and well- delineated research program is definitely needed to enable the drawing of solid conclusions in the future. Sixteen years following the UNESCO report, one finds that studies have been conducted since 1976, but these studies are too sparse and too varied in approach and methodology, therefore still preventing a solid conclusion from being drawn. What is the applicability of this finding to the fear of impacts from international DBS content expressed by numerous countries during the DBS negotiations and factored in the cost/benefit analysis presented in Chapter III? The lack of a solid finding drawn from the above analysis limits the utility of this analysis in a policy-making context. However, from the above review of studies, there appears to be no evidence to support the claim that the foreign TV content which international DBS would carry has a strong impact on any aspect of the individual (i.e., cultural, behavioral, cognitive, attitudinal, or affective). To the extent that the relationships summarized estimate the cultural, social and political impact of 129 international DBS content, then the fears of policy-makers expressed during the DBS negotiations appear to be over exaggerated. CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The first chapter of this dissertation provided an overview of this study’s organization along with a brief definition of satellite communications and of DBS. Chapter one also provided a description of the social backdrop for satellite policy-making in the United States during the 19605. Chapter 2 traced back the earliest conceptualization of DBS in an international organization setting. Various relevant U.N. documents were systematically examined for instances specifically discussing DBS matters. The purpose of that examination was to answer a preliminary research question: How did the DBS controversy evolve over the years?. The object of that chapter was to provide a description of the progression of the DBS debate at the United Nations level and hence a background for the sections that were to follow. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the progress of the DBS negotiations resulted in a regime of common aversion for the international use of the technology that was affirmed by passing of U.N. Resolution 37/92. The 1982 resolution concluded several years of negotiations which had diverted the international focus from that of achieving a collective global DBS system to that of putting significant hurdles in the face of any international DBS initiative, therefore 130 131 suspending the prospects of achieving a truly global DBS service and delaying the diffusion of the technology. The 1982 principles reiterated the essence of the DBS controversy by incorporating and affirming two main contentions via what has been termed as prior consent: 1) the issue of state sovereignty -- control over unwanted program content and 2) the fears of content influences on indigenous cultures receiving the broadcasts. Ten years following U.N. Resolution 37/92, the technological developments of the 19605, 19705 and 19805 which enabled the technical feasibility of international DBS have not yet been sufficiently exploited. The shift toward the regime of common aversion was illustrated in Chapter 2 by systematically consulting the relevant U.N. documents from 1960 and until 1982. The end of Chapter 2 provided a concise chronology of the evolution of the DBS negotiations with an illustration of the dynamism of these negotiations at several stages of the process. The third chapter of the dissertation utilized the information gathered during the second chapter to conduct an analysis the objective of which was to extract some key factors that have influenced the outcome of the DBS negotiations. The analysis was guided by an international relations framework especially suited for this type of investigation: regime theory. The main research question that this section addressed 132 is: What are some key factors which account for the achievement of a satellite regime of common interest versus a satellite regime of common aversion? The convergence of interests between the United States and various other nations for the use of satellite technology in the 19605, which resulted in INTELSAT, was contrasted with the convergence of interests among numerous countries that resulted in the avoidance of achieving a global DBS system. In Chapter 3, a set of assumptions was made and an assessment of the key factors which influence the outcome of a satellite regime attempt followed. That Section concluded that key factors that affect the fate of a satellite regime attempt include: the forum in which the negotiations take place (including the number of negotiators, the specification of the negotiation orientation, the certainty of the power structure and the type of participation involved) and the results of a cost-benefit analysis for each of the negotiators. It was found that the notion of DBS as it had evolved throughout the U.N. negotiations had inherent characteristics that embody clear disadvantages for developing countries. These disadvantages have negatively influenced the results of the cost/benefit analysis for a majority of the negotiating parties, hence hindering the realization of a DBS regime of common interest. The analysis conducted in Chapter 3 generated a model 133 that incorporates all the assessed factors and explains and predicts the outcome of the DBS negotiations as reflected in Chapter 2. The INTELSAT negotiations, which were successful in achieving collective usage of satellite technology, were contrasted with those of DBS in order to extract the model’s components. The fourth chapter of this study was a systematic review of all the investigations relevant to the key social issues which have haunted those States fearful of international DBS and contributed to the formulation of the Principles articulated in the relevant 1982 General Assembly Resolution. Chapter 4 systematically researched the social science literature in an attempt to explore their validity. Research questions here included: What are some key social concerns raised by the international DBS policy-makers? What does the body of social science research say about these concerns? In Chapter 4, a comprehensive search for literature (both dated and recent) about the impact of foreign TV on individuals was performed. This effort yielded numerous articles, 28 of which fit the criteria set out at the beginning of this endeavor to isolate those studies empirical in nature. The articles found were systematically described, summarized and analyzed in an effort to extract a conclusion. Those articles that reported strength of effect measures were later identified and tables presenting the 134 relationships explored were constructed. From the tables provided, it appeared that effect sizes differed according to the audience being studied, the geographical location of the study and the type of effect investigated (i.e. attitudinal, etc...). It was found that the body of literature at hand suffered from several serious shortcomings that were outlined in a set of observations. These shortcomings prevented the drawing of a solid general conclusion from the studies’ findings. The observations made about the articles resulted in the formulations of suggestions for the direction of future foreign TV effect studies. These suggestions were aimed at improving the predictive ability of future research by standardizing study instruments, methods and tools of analysis. More research guided by an organized and well- delineated research program was deemed to be paramount to enable the drawing of conclusions in the future. Chapter 4 concluded that the studies found were too sparse and too varied in approach and methodology, therefore preventing a solid conclusion from being drawn and making them of limited utility in a policy-making context. It was speculated, however, that the relationship between watching foreign TV content and subsequent attitudinal, cognitive, behavioral, affective or cultural impacts appeared to be weak. It was also speculated that the studies reviewed did 135 not provide evidence to support the fears of policy-makers that the effect of foreign TV content on individuals is strong. In this fifth chapter of the dissertation, the implications of the above results on the future of DBS research and negotiations are explored. The discussion will address three issues of particular relevance: A) the impact of the current DBS regime on the diffusion of the technology; B) the impact of the current DBS regime on developing countries; and C) the resulting implications on future negotiations. The following discussion, however, is meant to be exploratory and not definitive, since an expanded analysis of each of the areas explored would require a separate comprehensive study. It is hoped, nevertheless, that this exploration will be a source of inspiration for future research on the topics addressed. A. THE CURRENT DBS REGIME AND THE DIFFUSION OF THE RELATED TECHNOLOGY : The 1982 U.N. resolution concerning the usage of international DBS affirmed the absence of a collective effort for the exploitation of the technology. With the absence of a global effort, one wonders whether any national or regional DBS projects have contributed to the diffusion of the technology. Since the United States and countries of Western Europe, in general, were thought of having a natural advantage vis-a-vis DBS, one can ask how has the technology r.7777 136 diffused in both the United States and Great Britain? Several analyses have been conducted about DBS diffusion in the U.S. and the U.K. (see, for example, Elasmar & Straubhaar, 1991; Hudson, 1990). These accounts relate the unsuccessful attempts by both the U.S. and U.K. at establishing domestic or regional DBS service beginning in the early 19805 and until the early 19905. Even though the technology is available and a few DBS systems are operational today in the U.S. and Europe, their level of penetration is very limited and their future uncertain”. The failure of domestic DBS systems to succeed in those countries where such attempts were deemed most likely to flourish, suggests that single countries and even regions may not be large enough for a domestic and/or regional DBS system to be economically viable. The current international DBS regime, which has erected barriers in the face of a collective DBS system and instead has promoted domestic ventures has, therefore, not proven to be successful in diffusing the related technologies neither domestically nor regionally. The questions that would need to be addressed in a future study are whether an international DBS system resulting from a collective global effort would enhance the n See, for example, Kelly (1990) and Kerver (1990) for the developments which led to a merger of two DBS providers in Great Britain in 1990. For the unfortunate outcome of a very recent and promising DBS venture in the U.S., see Telecons (1992). 137 diffusion and success of the related technologies and if so, then, which industrial economic structure would be most adequate for such a venture. B. THE CURRENT DBS REGIME AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: If developed countries have not profited from the current DBS regime one wonders whether developing countries have reaped any benefits. One key concern of developing countries throughout the DBS negotiations had been to control the flow of TV programming reaching their populations. International DBS was deemed inappropriate by these countries since they believed that they would not be able to reciprocate the flow of televised content entering their territories. Has the 1982 DBS regime been responsive to these concerns? This question can be addressed by considering the DBS regime from a short term versus long term perspective. In the short term, the principles adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1982 did prohibit unauthorized satellite broadcasts from one country to another country’s territories”. This prohibition seemed to address the concerns of the developing countries cited earlier. In the long term, however, one finds that the direction and outcome of the DBS negotiations is contrary to some key interests of developing countries. Most of these countries w Note that the 1982 U.N. resolution did not address the issue of country A’s TV programming entering to country B via video tapes, importation or other media. 138 are financially incapable of building and maintaining their own domestic DBS systems. The failure to orient the international DBS negotiations toward achieving a collective DBS effort based on equal access, in effect, prohibits developing countries from reciprocating any DBS flows entering their territories and not especially intended to be received by their populations. Unintended flows are becoming harder to monitor since 1) many countries have small geographical territories where overspills from neighboring areas are very likely and hard to prevent and 2) satellite reception equipment is getting smaller and more accessible. Let us take, for example, a small country like Lebanon that is financially incapable of starting and maintaining a domestic Direct Broadcast Satellite Service. The lack of a collective DBS enterprise prohibits Lebanon from ever transmitting programs via satellite directly to other countries. During the last few years, however, Lebanon has witnessed a diffusion of small satellite dishes that enable individuals, despite official prohibitions, to receive programming directly from such U.S. sources as CNN, and from European programmers such as Eurosport, TVS Europe, and the Super Channel“. Since the practice is not legally w These television sources are not necessarily intended to be broadcast to individual receivers and definitely not intended to be received by a Lebanese audience but are nevertheless available on satellites and can be received by individuals given the proper gear. 139 admitted, no official penetration estimates exist. However, the schedule of programs available via satellite from the networks cited earlier is now published on a weekly basis in the Lebanese version of TV Guide (see SatMag, 1992). While this may seem like an unexpected development, earlier studies about the diffusion of video cassette recorders in the Third World along with advances in satellite receiver technology, could have been used to predict such an unfolding. In the case of VCRs, as is today the case with satellite receivers, the size of the hardware and the wide availability of software rendered government prohibition of the technology quite impossible (see Boyd, Straubhaar, & Lent, 1989). Given the above account, it would seem that while in the short-term, the DBS regime established in 1982 seemed to benefit Developing Countries, in the long term it is turning out to be a barrier against their participation in the international TV flows via satellite. In fact, the fears they had voiced during the international DBS debates have now materialized and are further frustrated by their inability to reciprocate the flow. The choice of common aversion, as expressed in the international DBS negotiations, has, in fact, given dominant countries the opportunity to provide programming on their own terms to developing countries. Future studies should, therefore, focus on the 140 unofficial penetrations of satellite receivers in developing countries to determine whether the occurrence observed in Lebanon is indeed happening elsewhere“. C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF THIS DISSERTATION ON FUTURE INTERNATIONAL DBS NEGOTIATIONS: The findings of this dissertation and the exploration of related topics performed in this last section, taken as a whole, suggest that the current DBS regime may not be beneficial to any of the countries involved in the negotiations. In fact, if anything, it appears to have delayed the diffusion of the technologies associated with DBS nationally, regionally and internationally. While no concrete evidence exists to suggest that a collective DBS effort would have resulted in a different outcome, the experience of States with INTELSAT suggests that it may be time for a collective DBS effort to at least be considered. Given the questionable viability of domestic and regional DBS systems in developed countries, and given the trend in small satellite receiver proliferation in developing countries as illustrated in the case of Lebanon, it would appear that both developed and developing countries may have incentives to reconsider their current stance on international DBS. “ There is already some evidence that this occurrence is not unique to Lebanon as a recent paper has illustrated a similar experience by Tunisia. See Adhoum (1992) for a discussion of European DBS spillover into Tunisia. 141 The cited disadvantages of DBS vis-a-vis developing countries could for example be balanced by proposals beneficial to these countries. The ownership incentive, found to be effective in the INTELSAT regime could, for example, be utilized. Proposals could be submitted for the building of a global DBS network in which each of the negotiating parties could own shares and to which each party would have equal access. In fact, a proposal to build a global directly- accessible satellite network for telephone and data transfers has already been submitted for consideration by the international community. The project called Iridium proposes to launch a constellation of 66 low-earth-orbit mobile satellites to provide a dial tone directly to any subscriber equipped with a pocket-size telephone anywhere on earth. Iridium plans to cooperate with cellular telephone service providers to complement and not replace cellular telephony. Iridium proposes to provide a satellite- delivered dial tone in areas where no cellular service is available or in cellular service gap areas anywhere on Earth (Iridium, 1992). The cost of launching the system is estimated at $3.37 billion. Worldwide average per minute access charges are estimated at $3. Subscriber terminal cost is estimated to range between $200 to $2000 (Mobile Satellite News, 1993). Iridium-based telephone calls made from country A 142 directly to country B would bypass the public telephone switch controlled by the government of country A. This means that a country’s acceptance of Iridium would mean its acceptance of an inability to control the flows of information carried via the telephone connection. Despite this fact, during the International Telecommunication Union’s 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC- 92), over 100 countries voted to allocate the radio frequencies essential for Iridium to materialize (Iridium, 1993; Mobile Satellite News, 1992). Over 60 of those delegates who voted in favor of allocating the frequencies came from developing countries. What seems to be the incentive for these developing countries given the lack of control over information flows inherent in this enterprise? One ostensible feature of the project is ownership opportunities. Iridium is a consortium of international entities owned and operated by a mix of private and public entities (Iridium, 1992). In countries where telephony is still government owned and operated, governments would have an opportunity to directly benefit from the Iridium project by obtaining a share of the profit generated by this enterprise. Support for the Iridium project is evidence that the ownership incentive first implemented in INTELSAT can also work for a worldwide DBS system. Other incentives can take the form of cooperation between developed and developing countries in the realm of 143 content production for DBS. Although this may seem, at first, to be an unlikely possibility, there may be incentives for developed countries to cooperate with developing countries in the field of video production. Interestingly, these incentives stem from technological developments related to program delivery to individual homes in developed countries. The dramatic increase in the number of channels available to individual households in the United States, for example, is prompting programmers to search for different types of content to satisfy an increasingly fragmented audience (see Kerver 1991). As the number of channels further increases with the application of such technologies as video compression to traditional coaxial cable, or in the case that fiber optic cables, with tremendous channel capacity, are installed, there will surely be a shortage of programming materials (see Felker, 1990; Johnston, 1990; Carter, 1991). In order to satisfy the demand for programming, developed countries may find it appealing to co-produce, with developing countries, televised content which can be used by both partners. This same televised content could also be used for international DBS. The near future may hold positive promises for the issue of DBS content. As video production equipment gets smaller, cheaper and more widespread, production costs will decline. Perhaps then, the production of content would 144 become a less significant concern to developing countries. Other potential concerns, namely, those related to DBS programming copyright and other commercial matters could be worked out following the current European Economic Community efforts to find a solution to such matters (see Economic Community, 1990). In terms of traditional tensions between the world super powers, the recent break up of the Soviet Union has altered the traditional state of affairs. The Soviet Union had historically been a power which counterbalanced U.S. proposals, stalled the pace, and altered the direction of the DBS negotiations. In 1990, the Soviet Union dramatically modified its political and economic ideology to the extent of emulating a Western model. This fundamental restructuring also impacted the Soviet stance on transborder information flows and DBS. The contrast in the Soviet position regarding DBS is best illustrated by the following: In 1982, the U.S.S.R. threatened to destroy any communication satellite beaming an unwanted signal on its territories (Singleton, 1986). In January 1990, the USSR Council of Ministers announced the development of measures which, in addition to allowing individuals to subscribe to foreign publications, enabled Soviet citizens "to watch satellite-delivered programs from the U.S. and Western Europe" (Broadcasting, 1990a, p. 101). In early July 1991, the Soviet Union applied for membership 145 and became the 121st member of INTELSAT”. By December 1991, the Soviet Union had broken into independent republics83 and experts spoke of the ex-Soviet Union. These portentous developments need to be taken into consideration in a future study about international DBS. A future investigation may wish to explore the impact of these events on the factors highlighted in Chapter 3 of this study. Specifically, how the absence of the Soviet Union would alter the analysis and influence the outcome of an international satellite regime building attempt in a U.N. forum. Along with the easing of East-West tensions which have, in the past, contributed to difficulties in achieving agreements at the U.N. level, the pace of technological developments may create incentives for countries of the Third World to ease up their traditional stance on the free flow of information, which DBS had become a central ingredient of. With the advent of increasingly smaller satellite dishes, an unofficial rapid diffusion pattern similar to that which characterized the video cassette ” The Soviet Union had developed its own satellite system separately from INTELSAT and had founded INTERSPUTNIK, an organization similar to INTELSAT among countries of the Eastern Bloc. For a discussion of traditional broadcasting in the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc, see Howell (1989). For a report about the Soviet Union’s membership in INTELSAT, see PDL, (1991, July 29). u See Dorff (1992) for a chronology of events concerning developments in the ex-Soviet Union. 146 recorder (VCR) in the 1970s and 19805 may be on the horizon. With 12-inch flat-plate satellite antennas recently introduced in Japan, it probably will not be long before these will also be smuggled into and peddled in Third World countries to satisfy the consumers’ quest for satellite delivered entertainment. In relation to the audience demand for video programming, government policy is at apparent odds with consumer practices in most countries. In addition to traditional means of program delivery, advances in video compression and signal digitalization promise to deliver a video signal via telephone lines (Weber, 1992). This would mean that a new mode of video distribution is about to emerge. Video would become available anywhere a dial tone exists. While this type of service is not yet operational, research is currently underway to make it materialize (see Weber, 1992; Carnevale, 1992). Video compression uses a digital signal. With the digital encryption devices that were recently introduced, it will become impossible for anyone, including governments, to monitor the content of information transmission, whether video, audio or data, going through the public telephone switch (Levy, 1993). Governments could, of course, always cut off any transmission they desire regardless of their ability to monitor its content. As encryption technology becomes used by businesses as a standard trade protection practice, cutting off the connection would greatly disturb 147 the activities of businesses including those conducting multinational trade and contributing to the local economy. It would be virtually impossible for a government to discern which encrypted transmissions are business oriented vs. private in order to restrict only those that involve video transmissions for private consumption. Cutting off the connection is not only impractical, it may even not be useful as alternative routes for the transmission of digital information are increasingly becoming available worldwide. The Iridium project was mentioned earlier. Iridium will not only be capable of providing voice exchanges but is also capable of data transmissions (Iridium, 1992). This capacity means that compressed video in digital form could also be transmitted via Iridium to anywhere on earth. Another alternative route has recently been characterized as a global information super highway - the INTERNET (see Kroll, 1992; LaQuey, 1993). The INTERNET is a worldwide web of computers that is accessed by millions of users worldwide. It has traditionally been used to exchange data among research centers. During the last few years, however, the INTERNET has become increasingly accessible by owners of personal computers worldwide. The INTERNET today is accessible not only in North America, Europe and Japan, but in numerous developing countries including Brazil, Costa Rica, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Zimbabwe and others (see Kroll, 1992). The most common usage of the INTERNET has so 148 far been electronic mail exchanges. However, advances in digital compression are now permitting interactive radio shows on the INTERNET (Viles, 1993). Further advances are very likely to involve video transmission. The INTERNET embodies still another alternative mode of international video program delivery that makes it hard for governments to control. Technological advances are making even the most restrictive of governments realize that control over incoming and outgoing information in their territories is a notion of the past (Brown, 1989; LaQuey, 1993). In sum, the developments of the last few years may be inadvertently converging the interests of all parties to reconsider the current DBS regime and explore the possibility of achieving a collective DBS effort. It is hoped that this dissertation will inspire researchers interested in the topic at hand to further investigate the different facets of international DBS that were explored in this last section. It is also hoped that the fourth chapter of this dissertation has laid out a framework which will be used for the implementation of a research program that will yield satisfactory answers concerning the potential effects of foreign TV programs, such as those carried via DBS, on individuals. This dissertation will close with the recalling of some 149 enlightening thoughts by Jean d’Arcy“. D’Arcy was a founder of Eurovision, director of the Radio and Visual Services Division of the United Nations’ Office of Public Information and a member of the Twentieth Century Fund’s Task Force on International Satellite Communications. Regarding the international satellite dilemma, he wrote: Rarely has there been such an opportunity for the international community to foresee the coming of a major technological change. Rarely have so much work and energy been devoted .... Rarely, nevertheless, have the scientists and technicians remained so far ahead of the legislators. Such are the challenge and the paradox: The communication satellite will not reach its full development without an unprecedented degree of international cooperation on the part of governments. Yet this development demands concessions in precisely that area of national sovereignty which governments have guarded most jealously, and which they have been charged by their peoples to protect and defend. Politically, the choice is between statism and expansion, between the defense of apparently reasonable but soon-to-be-outmoded principles on the one hand and on the other a joint creative search by governments for such new principles and social structures as will permit the communications instrument to evolve (d’Arcy, 1970, p. 17). Jean d’Arcy wrote that passage in 1970. The state of negotiations regarding international DBS remained unchanged for the last twenty years. Perhaps, in the past, the international tensions between East and West negatively influenced the outcome of the UN DBS negotiations. With the Skatest developments in East-West relations, maybe the 19905 “ Interestingly, d’Arcy was also quoted in a 1976 m)TIESCO report titled: Toward Realistic Communication Policies (Lee, 1976). 150 will bring the needed change in the status quo, via a universal agreement on a collective and global DBS system. APPENDICES 151 APPENDIX A Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Sixteenth Session (14 March-8 April 1977). A/AC.105/196, Annex IV, p.5. State-To-State Broadcasting Permitted by the Plan of the 1977 WARC. Broadcasting State Receiving Stateg Denmark Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden Finland Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden Norway Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden Sweden Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden Iceland Iceland, Faroes Denmark Iceland, Faroes Vatican City Vatican City, Italy Tunisia Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya Syria Syria, Lebanon, Jordan Saudi Arabia Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman. 152 APPENDIX B Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Seventeenth Session (13 March-7 April 1978). A/AC.105/218. Text Formulated by the Working Group on Draft Principles on Direct Broadcasting Satellite. 1. [A direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State, which shall be established only when it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union, shall be based on appropriate agreements and/or arrangements between the broadcasting and receiving States or the broadcasting entities duly authorized by the respective States, in order to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries]. 2. [For that purpose a State which proposes to establish or authorize the establishment of a direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State shall without delay notify that State of such intention and shall promptly enter into consultations with that State if the latter so requests]. 3. [(a) No such agreements and/or arrangements shall be required with respect to the overspill of the radiation of the satellite signal within the limits established under the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union]. (b) No such agreements and/or arrangements or consultations shall be required with respect to the overspill of the radiation of the satellite signal within the limits established under the relevant instruments of the international Telecommunication Union.] [(c) Delete paragraph 3.] [(d) This principle shall not apply with respect to the overspill of the radiation of the satellite signal within the limits established under the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union.] 153 APPENDIX C Canada and Sweden: working paper (A/AC.105/C.2/L.117 of 15 February 1979. [Clean Text] Consultation and agreements between State§ 1. A direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State, which shall be established only when it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union, shall be based on appropriate agreements and/or arrangements between the broadcasting and receiving States or the broadcasting entities duly authorized by the respective States, in order to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries. 2. For that purpose a State which proposes to establish or authorize the establishment of a direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State shall without delay notify that State of such intention and shall promptly enter into consultations with that State if the latter so requests. 3. No such agreements and/or arrangements shall be required with respect to the overspill of the radiation of the satellite signal within the limits established under the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union 154 APPENDIX D United States of America: working paper. (A/AC.105.C.2/L.118 of 22 March 1979). Replace the present paragraphs 1 and 2 of the principle now entitled "Consultation and agreements between States" with the following: "A State which proposes to establish or authorize the establishment of an international direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically aimed at a foreign State should, without delay, notify that State of such intention and should promptly enter into consultations with that State if the latter so requests. The State which proposes to establish or authorize such a service should take into account and give due regard to the interests and concerns of the foreign State in regard to the interests and concerns of the foreign State in regard to the proposed service, as set forth in such consultations. Any such consultations should also be premised upon facilitating a free flow and a wider dissemination of information of all kinds and encouraging co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries." 155 APPENDIX E Belgium: working paper. (A/AC.105/C.2/L/119) 1979. Amendment calling for the replacement of the draft principle entitled "Consultation and agreements between States" in document A/AC.105/218, appendix to annex II, and document A/AC.105/C.2/L.117 by the following text: "Agreemente between States on the exchange of programmes "In order to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, (broadcasting and receiving) State may agree, bilaterally, or multilaterally, directly or through their duly authorized broadcasting entities, to lend each other or pool the direct television broadcasting facilities available to them under the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union, for the purpose of exchanging programmes for broadcasting to the public in their respective countries" . 156 APPENDIX F United Kingdom: working paper. (WG/DBS(1980)/WP.1). 1980 Coneultation and arrangement between Statee. 1. A Direct Television Broadcasting Service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State shall be established only in accordance with the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union, in order to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries. 2 For that purpose a State which proposes to establish or authorize the establishment of a Direct Television Broadcasting Service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State shall without delay notify that State of such intention and shall promptly enter into consultations with that State if the latter so requests. 3. With respect to the overspill of the radiation of the satellite signal the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union shall be exclusively applicable. 157 APPENDIX G U.N. General Assembly. (1983). Principles governing the Use of States of artificial satellites for international direct television broadcasting, 10 December 1982. Resolutions and Decieiong. Supplement #51 (A/37/51). New York: United Nations. 37/92 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting The General Assembly, Considering that several experiments of direct broadcasting by satellite have been carried out and that a number of direct broadcasting satellite systems are operational in some countries and may be commercialized in the very near future, Taking into consideration that the operation of international direct broadcast satellites will have significant international, political, economic, social and cultural implications, Believing that the establishment of principles for international direct television broadcasting will contribute to the strengthening of international co-operation in this field and further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Adopts the Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting set forth in the annex to the present resolution 100th plenary meeting 10 December 1982 158 ANNEX Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting A. PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES 1. Activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite should be carried out in a manner compatible with the sovereign rights of States, including the principle of non-intervention, as well as with the right of everyone to seek, receive and impart information and ideas as enshrined in the relevant United Nations instruments. 2. Such activities should promote the free dissemination and mutual exchange of information and knowledge in cultural and scientific fields, assist in educational, social and economic development, particularly in the developing countries, enhance the qualities of life of all peoples and provide recreation with due respect to the political and cultural integrity of States. 3. These activities should accordingly be carried out in a manner compatible with the development of mutual understanding and the strengthening of friendly relations and co-operation among all States and peoples in the interest of maintaining international peace and security. B. APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4. Activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite should be conducted in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Celestial Bodies, of 27 January 1967, the relevant provisions of the International Telecommunication Convention and its Radio Regulations and of international instruments relating to friendly relations and co-operation among States and to human rights. C. RIGHTS AND BENEFITS 5. Every State has an equal right to conduct activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite and to authorize such activities by persons and entities under its jurisdiction. All States and peoples are entitled to and should enjoy the benefits from such activities. Access to the technology in this field should be available to all States without discrimination on terms 159 mutually agreed by all concerned. D. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 6. Activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite should be based upon and encourage international co-operation. Such co-operation should be the subject of appropriate arrangements. Special consideration should be given to the needs of the developing countries in the use of international direct television broadcasting by satellite for the purpose of accelerating their national development. E. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 7. Any international dispute that may arise from activities covered by these principles should be settled through established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes agreed upon by the parties to the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. F. STATE RESPONSIBILITY 8. States should bear international responsibility for activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite carried out by them or under their jurisdiction and for the conformity of any such activities with the principles set forth in this document. 9. When international direct television broadcasting by satellite is carried out by an international intergovernmental organization, the responsibility referred to in paragraph 8 above should be borne both that organization and by the States participating in it. G. DUTY AND RIGHT TO CONSULT 10. Any broadcasting or receiving State within an international direct television broadcasting service established between them requested to do so by any other broadcasting or receiving State within the same service should promptly enter into consultations with the requesting State regarding its activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite, without prejudice to other consultations which these States may undertake with any other State on that subject. 160 H. COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 11. Without prejudice to the relevant provisions of international law, State should co-operate on a bilateral and multilateral basis for protection of copyright and neighbouring rights by means of appropriate agreements between the interested States or the competent legal entities acting under their jurisdiction. In such co- operation they should give special consideration to the interests of developing countries in the use of the direct television broadcasting for the purpose of accelerating their national development. I. NOTIFICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 12. In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space, State conducting or authorizing activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite should inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the greatest extent possible, of the nature of such activities. On receiving this information, the Secretary-General should disseminate it immediately and effectively to the relevant specialized agencies, as well as to the public and the international scientific community. J. CONSULTATIONS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN STATES 13. A State which intends to establish or authorize the establishment of an international direct television broadcasting satellite service shall without delay notify the proposed receiving State or States of such intention and shall promptly enter into consultation with any of those States which so requests. 14. An international direct television broadcasting satellite service shall only be established after the conditions set forth in paragraph 13 above have been met and on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements in conformity with the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union and in accordance with these principles. 15. With respect to the unavoidable overspill of the radiation of the satellite signal, the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union shall be exclusively applicable. 161 APPENDIX H Excerpted from Congressional Record --- House, May 3, 1962 p. 7708 Mr. Gross: ... I have read this bill quite carefully and I do not find any mention of the United Nations. Is the House about to approve a bill as international in scope as this one in which the United Nations has no jurisdiction? .. If not, I wonder how was it possible to get a bill to the House floor with the international implications of this one without any reference to the Tower of Babel, otherwise known as the United Nations. Mr. Harris: I am not sure that we can say the United Nations by name and letter would be included, but I refer the gentleman to page 25, paragraph 3. There might be a possibility that the gentleman could construe that the United Nations might get in under the curtain somewhere. Mr. Gross: What line of the bill on page 25? Mr. Harris: Starting in line 15, paragraph 3 provides: "In any case where the Secretary of State, after obtaining the advice as to technical feasibility, has advised that commercial communication to a particular foreign point by means of the communication satellite system should be established in the national interest". And so on. That is as near as I can think of that they get to it. Mr. Gross: I hope the gentleman is not serious about that, and I would hope that if he is we can somehow or other delay action until I can write an amendment to make sure none of the provisions is subject to the whim and caprice of the United Nations. Mr. Harris: I assure the gentleman under this bill the United Nations has nothing in the world to do with it. 162 APPENDIX I CODE BOOK FOR FOREIGN TV EFFECTS’ STUDIES’ ANALYSIS Card 1 Id (Id 1-3) Number of authors (authors 4) Year of publication (Year 5-8) Country of affiliation for first author (countryl 9) Country of affiliation of second author (country2 10) Country of affiliation of third author (country3 11) 1) Canada 2) Israel 3) Norway 4) Philippines 5) U.S.A 6) unspecified 9) not applicable Dept. of origin of first author (originl Dept. of origin of second author (origin2 Dept of origin of third author (origin3 1) Anthropology 2) Communication 3) Education 4) Journalism 5) Language, literature and communication 6) Mass communication 7) Speech communication 8) Sociology 9) Telecommunication 10) Women’s Studies 11) Unspecified 12) not applicable Type of publication (Pubtype 18) 1) Convention paper 2) Doctoral dissertation 3) Journal article 4) Master’s Thesis 5) Other 12-13) 14-15) 16-17) Study Type (Stutype 19) 1) Cross-sectional 2) Longitudinal Years of study year 1 (yearl 20-23) year 2 (year2 24-27) year 3 (year3 28-31) year 4 (year4 32-35) year 5 (year5 36-39) 163 (Enter year of 9999 for not applicable) Number of study locations Study location Study location Study location Study location Study location (locatel 40-41) (locate2 42-43) (locate3 44-45) (locate4 46-47) (locates 48-49) UlvaNH Year study conducted (conductl 50-53) Year study conducted (conduct2 54-57) Year study conducted (conduct3 58-61) Year study conducted (conduct4 62-65) Year study conducted (conduct5 66-69) (enter 9999 if not applicable) 1) Australia 2) Belize 3) Canada (Native Canadian) 4) Canada (Non-Native Canadian) 5) China 6) Denmark 7) Finland 8) Iceland 9) Israel 10) Korea 11) Mexico 12) Namibia 13) Norway 14) Philippines 15) Sweden 16) Taiwan 17) Thailand 18) Trinidad 19) U.S.A. (Native) 20) U.S.A. (Non-native) 164 21) Venezuela 22) Not applicable 23) Other Card 2 Primary Theory (Theory 1) 1) Acculturation 2) Cultivation 3) Cultural Imperialism 4) Dependency 5) Modernization 6) Socialization 7) Social Learning 8) None clearly specified 9) Other Sample type (Sample 2) 1) students 2) professionals 3) general population 4) combination students - general population 5) Other combination 6) Other Method of study (Method 3) 1) Experimental 2) Personal interview 3) Self-administered 4) Mail survey 5) Combination 6) Unspecified 7) Other Statistics reported Descriptive (Des 4) correlations (Cor 5) partial correlations (parcor 6) multiple regressions (reg 7) multidimensional scaling (mult 8) path analysis (path 9) analysis of variance (anova 10) exploratory factor analysis (factor 11) Chi-square (chi 12) t-tests (ttest 13) other (oth 14) ..wo .0.........0s>0E0.. 0.00..0 0.0.000E -0.-.0E.:.E 0:. .o E.00. 0:. 00.0.30 .0. on 0. .00000 .0: 0.0 >03.0 .c000.0 0:.t..... ..oo .0. 350.0000. :0..00.:3EE00 .0:0..0E0.:. :. 0.0.0500 .00....0 >:0E >0 0050.5 00 0:0..0 00 .0: 003 00:0.030 50:00.05 0:0E0 :0.0.>0.0. :o.0.0. .0 .000E. .03.000.00 0:.t..... .>.0.000 .m.D :. 00....0:.E .o 0:0..000.00 .>.0.000 .m.D :. 0... >__E0. .0 0:0..00050 .>.0.000 .m.D :. 0050.05.00. 000:0>00 .0 0:0..00050 .>.0.000 .m.3 .0 00:03...0 .0 0:0..00050 ..>.F c023. :0 0.50:0 >..E0. .m.3 m 0. 050093 .0 >0:0300.. .0 E30. o:.>>0.> E0.uo.0 :o.0.>0.0. >_.E0. .m.D .0 .:30E0 .0.0... ..>... :00.0v. :0 02,2... 02.00.00 .wj m 0. 050093 .0 >0:0300.. .0 E30. u:.>>0.> E0390 02.00.00 .m... .0 .:30E0 .30... .5... 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