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
Catastrophic Fault Diagnosis in Dynamic Systems  
Using Bond Graph Methods

presented by

Tamar Yarom

has been accepted towards fulfillment  
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Mechanical Engineering

  
Major professor

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**CATASTROPHIC FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN DYNAMIC SYSTEMS  
USING BOND GRAPH METHODS**

**By**

**Tamar Yarom**

**A DISSERTATION**

**Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of**

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **CATASTROPHIC FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN DYNAMIC SYSTEMS USING BOND GRAPH METHODS**

**By**

**Tamar Yarom**

Detection and diagnosis of faults has become a critical issue in high performance engineering systems as well as in mass produced equipment. It is particularly helpful when the diagnosis can be made at the initial design level with respect to a prospective fault list. A number of powerful methods have been developed for aiding in the general fault analysis of designs. Catastrophic faults represent the limit case of complete local failure of connections or components. They result in the interruption of energy transfer between corresponding points in the system.

In this work the conventional approach to fault detection and diagnosis is extended by means of bond graph methods to a wide variety of engineering systems. Attention is focussed on catastrophic fault diagnosis. A catastrophic fault dictionary is generated from the system model based on topological properties of the bond graph. The dictionary is processed by existing methods to extract a catastrophic fault report to aid the engineer in performing a design analysis.

The proposed fault dictionary was found applicable for testability design.

An extension of the software for constructing the fault dictionary has been developed in order to use it as a design tool for various engineering applications.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## NOMENCLATURE

$D(l,m,n)$	- Fault dictionary array
$e(t)$	- effort variable
$P_{i,j}$	- Equivalent path from $U_i$ to $Y_j$
$f(t)$	- flow variable
$F_k$	- The $k$ th fault in the fault list
$l$	- Number of inputs
$m$	- Number of test nodes (outputs)
$n$	- Number of faults in the fault list
$P_{i,j}$	- Path from $U_i$ to $Y_j$
$P(t)$	- Power variable; $P(t)=e(t)*f(t)$
$S_{i,j}$	- Sensitivity of $Y_j$ with respect to $U_i$
$U_i$	- The $i$ th input of the system
$U_{ci}$	- The $i$ th constant input of the system
$Y_j$	- The $j$ th output of the system
$Y_{ssj}$	- The $j$ th steady-state output of the system

## ABBREVIATIONS

BG	- Bond Graph
BS	- Bond Structure
CI	- Constant Input
CF	- Catastrophic Failure
CFD	- Catastrophic Fault Dictionary
CEF	- Catastrophic Effort Failure
CFF	- Catastrophic Flow Failure
DFI	- Depth First Search
DFL	- Detectable Fault List
DFS	- Depth-First Search
EP	- Equivalent Path
FA	- "Father"
FD	- Fault Dictionary
FDD	- Fault Detection and Diagnosis
FL	- Fault List
FS	- Fault Source
FSE	- Fault Source of Effort
FSF	- Fault Source of Flow
IJ	- Identity Junction
JS	- Junction Structure
KCL	- Kirchhoff Current Law
KVL	- Kirchhoff Voltage Law
LSI	- Large-Scale Integration
MBG	- Modified Block Graph
PBG	- Proper Bond Graph

SAT - Simulation After Test  
SBT - Simulation Before Test  
SJ - Simple Junction  
SM - Sensitivity Matrix  
SSM - Structural Sensitivity Matrix  
SRU - Shop Replaceable Unit  
SUT - System Under Test  
TNM - Test-Node Matrix  
VLSI - Very-Large-Scale Integration

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Anticipating failures in engineering systems**

The proliferation of large engineering systems of ever-increasing complexity makes the detection and diagnosis of faults in them an important task. The early indication of incipient failures can help avoid major system breakdowns and catastrophes. Similarly, failure detection and isolation has become a critical issue in the operation of high-performance ships, submarines, airplanes, space vehicles, and structures, where safety, mission satisfaction, and significant material value are at stake. Quite recently, computerized diagnostic systems have been applied to such mass-produced consumer equipment as automobiles and household appliances.

From the very beginning of computerized testing, most practical systems have contained some form of failure detection and diagnosis. In the majority of these systems, the detection and diagnosis function is rather simple and is based on straight limit checking. The development of computational equipment and techniques has set the scene for the general application of more sophisticated and powerful methods.

### **1.2 Review of literature**

The problem of detecting changes in dynamical systems has received growing attention during the last twenty years, as can

be seen from the long list of survey papers and books written about it (Willisky, 1976; Duhamel, 1979; Mironovski, 1980; Iserman, 1984; Bandler, 1985; Basseville, 1988; Gertler, 1988; Ozawa, 1988). Most of the papers deal with the subject of fault location and estimation in circuits. The applications are mainly to analog circuits (Hochwald, 1979; Wu, 1982; Elcherif, 1983; Lin, 1982, 1985) and digital circuits (Williams, 1983; Markas 1990). Other papers give a generic approach to dynamic systems, and a few treat particular mechanical systems such as the automobile system (de Benito, 1988, 1989) and the space shuttle engine (Cikanek, 1987).

#### 1.2.1 Basic conceptual terminology

A *system fault* is to be understood as a deviation of a characteristic property which leads to an inability of the system to fulfill its intended purpose.

The fault diagnosis process includes three steps:

the *alarm*, *isolation*, and *estimation* of the fault. The *alarm* step is usually done by checking if measurable variables are within a certain tolerance of the normal value. If this check is not passed, this leads to a fault message. If necessary, this is followed by *fault isolation*, determining where the fault is located. The next step, the *fault estimation*, defines the type and extent of the fault. After the effect of the fault is known, a *decision* on the action to be taken can be made. Since the decision depends upon the system design, failure detection methods are limited to the diagnosis stage. Moreover, the problem which is mainly addressed is the fault location and identification, assuming

that the system has already been identified as faulty, i.e., a fault message has already been received.

Failures in a system could be *catastrophic (hard) failures* or *deviation (soft) failures*. Hard failures in circuits means that the faulty element produces either a short circuit or an open circuit. Soft failure in an element occurs when the faulty element deviates from its nominal value without reaching its extreme bounds (typically zero or infinity). Field data show that short circuits and open circuits account for about 70-80% of the faults in analog equipment (Hockwald, 1979).

#### 1.2.2 Fault detection methods

Several criteria have been used for categorizing fault detection techniques. The most popular one is categorization according to the stage in the testing process at which simulation of the tested system occurs. In particular, we have *simulation-before-test (SBT)* and *simulation-after-test (SAT)*.

##### 1.2.2.1 Simulation-before-test method

The SBT method (Lin, 1985), also called the fault dictionary method, is based upon pattern recognition. The first step in constructing the dictionary is *fault definition*, where the most likely and/or important faults are specified. This is a very critical aspect of this approach since only these faults can be identified and the number of faults defines the memory size needed for the algorithm. The system under test (SUT) is

then simulated for these hypothesized faulty cases, in order to develop sets of stimuli and responses which will be used to detect and isolate the faults. The *signatures* of the responses are stored in a dictionary for use in the on-line identification of faults. At the time of testing, the faulty SUT is excited by the same stimuli that are used in constructing the dictionary. The signatures are compared to the prestored signatures using an isolation criterion, and the actual failure is detected. Various types of inputs have been proposed for the fault dictionary method. These include constant (DC) inputs (Hockwald, 1979), sinusoidal (AC) inputs (Pahwa, 1982), and piecewise constant inputs (Schreiber, 1979). Unfortunately, most of these methods either are limited to linear networks or have not progressed beyond the feasibility stage of development. At present the constant input fault dictionary is the only one used in practice. Figure 1.1 (from Hockwald, 1979) presents a block diagram of a DC approach for the construction of a fault dictionary of an analog circuit.

In this work, a new approach to fault dictionary is proposed. Thus, it is necessary first to review in details the conventional approach. A numerical example (a modification of an example from Ozawa, 1988) is given to illustrate the procedure of constructing the fault dictionary and the notation. The system (circuit) is deliberately chosen to be simple so that all steps can be verified without the aid of a computer.




Figure 1.1: Block diagram of a DC approach for the construction of a fault dictionary of an analog circuit

**Example:** Figure 1.2 shows a circuit in its normal operating condition. Suppose that the prospective faults consist of R1 shorted, R2 open, R3 open and R4 shorted. The circuit contains two test-nodes which measure the voltage at points A and B. The test-node measurements are defined as  $V_A$  and  $V_B$  respectively.




Figure 1.2: A simple circuit example

The list of prospective faults is given in Table 1.1. Note that the nominal case is just one of the nominal case is just one of the circuit conditions and is listed as case 1 in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Definition of faults

<u>Fault</u>	<u>Description</u>
N	Nominal case
F1	R1 shorted
F2	R2 open
F3	R3 open
F4	R4 shorted



In this stage, a simulation program is used to determine the test-node measurements for each condition defined by the fault list. For our simple circuit VA and VB are calculated directly from the circuit description. The values are provided in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Fault dictionary defined by two test-nodes

Circuit condition	VA	VB
N	6.54	3.27
F1	12	6
F2	8	4
F3	9	0
F4	5.14	0

Table 1.2 defines the fault dictionary. Here each fault-signature consists of a vector containing VA and VB. When actual measurements of VA and VB are taken, the fault is identified by comparison to the fault dictionary. Usually a fault isolation algorithm is needed for identification (e.g., minimum sum of squared error, as in Hochwald).

In general, the nominal and fault circuits are simulated under more than one *input combination* in order to achieve adequate separation of faults. Each input combination is also called an *input vector*. For multi-input multi-test nodes the corresponding *fault signature* is a matrix, called the *fault page*. The fault-dictionary is, therefore, a three dimensional array which contains the *pages* for all prospective faults.

### **Simulation-before-test method in digital systems**

Fault dictionary, as a diagnosis method, is well known in combinatorial digital circuits (Vishnubhotla, 1980; Sugasaki, 1989; Markas 1990). Here several input sequences are applied to the network and the resultant outputs are then compared with a fault dictionary. Single stuck-type faults (faults in which one wire or gate are stuck at either 0 or 1) are usually identified in those dictionaries. Some researches have tried to extend the dictionary to multiple faults (Breuer, 1976).

#### **1.2.2.2 Simulation-after-test method**

The SAT approach (Wu, 1982; Salama, 1984) is most often used in analog circuits. In this approach, also called the claim-and-check method, the system is partitioned into subsets, where some subsets are assumed faulty and the rest are assumed fault free. This claim is then checked by the test data. If it is found to be true the faulty subset is partitioned again. The procedure is continued until the faulty element is detected.

#### **1.2.2.3 Summary**

It is reasonable to believe that a sound fault diagnosis strategy should incorporate both the SBT and SAT approaches. The fault dictionary is first used to locate hard failures. For some cases (for example analog circuits) this approach will be adequate. For the remaining cases of soft failures, we rely on the SAT approach or a combination of both approaches.

Although FDD has received much attention from researchers in the last twenty years, there are still many important issues to be studied. A short list is offered here: more effective and efficient fault isolation

algorithms including the selection of test nodes and stimuli design; FDD of shop replaceable units (SRU); and investigation of the nondeterministic aspects of fault diagnosis (statistical system parameters and inputs).

### 1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

The main goal of this dissertation is to develop a Catastrophic-Fault-Dictionary (CFD) of a dynamic system. Modeling of the system is done by bond graph techniques. Bond graph methods and graph algorithms are used to develop the CFD, while combinatorial methods are used to apply the CFD to an engineering problem. Several examples of using CFD for mechanical and electrical systems are provided as part of the dissertation. All the software needed for constructing a CFD for a specific system is given as well as subroutines for using this information as a design tool for engineering purposes.

The dissertation contains three main parts:

- Part I: Theory and development of the proposed approach for fault detection and diagnosis;
- Part II: Construction of the catastrophic fault dictionary;
- Part III: Application of the CFD as a design tool.

The first part, covered in chapters two and three, includes all the theory, definitions and theoretical foundations for fault modeling using bond graph techniques, sensitivity, and the principles of the proposed fault dictionary.

In the second part, described in chapter four, the actual CFD is constructed. Here the graphical presentation of a fault diagnosis problem, together with graph algorithms, are used in order to set up the CFD for a given system. This part also provides the computer program which constructs the CFD for a given system. Mechanical and electrical examples are included.

The third part, chapter five, develops the CFD as a "design for testability" tool. The problem of how to design your system such that it will be testable is addressed here, by using the CFD as the input for those questions. Typical fault diagnosis problems in engineering systems are solved. Algorithms provided in this part can be used as a design-for-testability tool for choosing test nodes location, input location and detection of specific faults in the system.

Chapter six summarizes the current approach and describes some additional problem areas. Certain research topics were found to be very suitable for the application of fault diagnosis using bond graph methods. Those are described in detail. Other topics are mentioned briefly as possible further research areas.

The software which has been developed during this research uses the data base defined in the ENPORT software (Rosenberg, 1987). Hence it could be imbedded into the ENPORT program. At this point of the research it can be used independently on a personal computer. Listing of the software is done in Appendix E.

## 2. FAILURE MODELING USING BOND GRAPHS

### 2.1 Bond graphs - a modeling tool

Modeling of a dynamic system can take various forms such as schematic diagrams, mathematical equations, block diagrams, signal-flow graphs or bond graphs. Bond graphs are concise pictorial system representations that are useful for systems analysis and equation formulation. The bond graph language was invented by Paynter in the early sixties. Its early methodology was developed and documented by Rosenberg and Karnopp (1983).

The advantages of bond graphs are many. First, they provide insight into the system by describing the flow of energy within the physical system. Second, they elegantly support energy transfer between different energy domains. Third, bond graph elements support nonlinear constitutive relationships involving multiple output variables. Fourth, they are easily adapted for systematic input to computers for simulation of the modeled dynamic system. Last, state equations which have physical meaning can be derived directly from the bond graph models.

Bond graphs have been used in a wide variety of applications for simulation, design and analysis of mechanical systems, vibration studies, networks, hydraulic circuits and chemical systems. They have also been used in thermodynamics, heat transfer and biomedical and medical physics. A successful effort has been made in this study to adapt bond graph techniques for detection of faults in various dynamic systems.

## 2.2 Potential advantages of bond graph techniques for fault detection and diagnosis (FDD)

FDD is done using various simulation methods and programs. Programs like INPICE (Jagdnik,1979), SYSCAPII (Hochwald,1979) and HAFDIC (Elcherif,1983) are common computer programs used for failure investigations. The bond graph technique, as a simulation tool, may provide some potential advantages for failure detection.

An important feature of a bond graph model, from a fault detection point of view, is its graphical presentation. Graphical methods have been previously used for FDD. Ozawa (1988) solved a failure detection problem of an electrical circuit by using two graphs, the voltage graph and the current graph, and applying KCL and KVL to each. A bond graph includes both circuit graphs in the definition of the junction structure. The graphical nature of the bond graph junction structure permits easy access to every junction of the model. Associated with those junctions are flows and efforts of the physical system. In practice we associate flows with 1-junctions and efforts with 0-junctions. In that sense we can say that zero and one junctions represent effort and flow variables, respectively. This property of the bond graph plays an important role in FDD, as will be shown later.

Another important feature of bond graphs is the variety of systems it can model. Most conventional methods of fault diagnosis are limited to a specific energy domain, for example, analog circuit fault detection. A fault detection and diagnosis method which uses bond graphs as a modeling

tool is more general and widely applicable to various engineering systems.

## 2.3 Catastrophic failures

### 2.3.1 Catastrophic failure modeling in bond graphs

**Definition:** A *Catastrophic Failure (CF)* in a bond graph is defined by a persistent zero power level on one of its bonds where the input set previously produced nonzero power.

Since the power equals effort times flow, ( $P = e * f$ ), zero power arises from one of the following conditions:

Catastrophic Flow Failure (CFF)  $f = 0$ .

Catastrophic Effort Failure (CEF)  $e = 0$ .

#### Definitions:

A *Catastrophic Flow Failure (CFF)* is a catastrophic failure in which the flow is identically zero.

A *Catastrophic Effort Failure (CEF)* is a catastrophic failure in which the effort is identically zero.

Consider the physical interpretation of CF in electrical, mechanical and hydraulic systems. By catastrophic failures in electrical systems we refer to open circuits and short circuits. As mentioned in the literature, 70-80% of faults in analog circuits are of this type. Since flow and effort are interpreted as current and voltage respectively, a CFF corresponds to an open circuit and a CEF corresponds to short circuit.

In mechanical systems flow means velocity (or relative velocity) and effort means force. Thus zero velocity (CFF) is interpreted as sticking of a component to ground (absolute velocity failure) or sticking of two components together (relative velocity failure). Zero force on a bond is interpreted as a disconnection between two elements of the system.

We refer to volume flow and pressure as flow and effort, respectively, in fluidpower systems. CFF is interpreted as zero volume flow, meaning complete blocking of the flow, while CEF is interpreted as a significant leakage in the system, for example, due to a ruptured line.

### 2.3.2 Fault Sources

Two types of catastrophic failures can occur in a system. A *component failure* is associated with the component parameter or function tending to zero or infinity. A *connection failure* describes a failure in the connection between two or more subsystems or components. The third type of failure, the *SRU failure*, is actually a combination of the other failures, i.e., it consists of all possible failures that can occur in a certain subsystem.

Modeling of a component failure can be done by two approaches. In the *parameter approach* we set the parameter or function of the faulty element to zero or infinity without changing the bond graph model. In the *fault source approach* we add to the model an external input that will constrain the system to behave in the faulty mode. In bond graph terms this means we add a source of zero flow (SF) to a 1-junction, or a source of zero



effort to a 0-junction, associated with the failure. The latter approach is adopted in the current study.

Modeling of a connection failure is done in the same way, by adding an external source to the simple junction which is associated with the failure.


**Definitions:**

A *Fault Source of Effort (FSE)* is a source of zero effort added to a 0-junction in order to define a catastrophic effort failure (CEF) associated with that junction.

A *Fault Source of Flow (FSF)* is a source of zero flow added to a 1-junction in order to define a catastrophic flow failure (CFF) associated with that junction.

For convenience in distinguishing fault sources from physical sources, their bonds will be drawn in dashed lines.

FSE  $\text{---} \underline{e} = 0 \text{---}$  

FSF  $\text{---} \underline{f} = 0 \text{---}$  

Let us illustrate the preceding ideas by an example. Refer to Figure 2.1. The longitudinal motion of a robotic arm can modeled by a set of masses, springs and dampers. For simplicity consider a schematic model as shown in Figure 2.1a, which contains three masses ( $m_1$ ,  $m_2$ ,  $m_3$ ), two springs ( $k_1$ ,  $k_2$ ), and two dampers ( $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ). An input force,  $F$ , is acting on one end and the velocity,  $V$ , is measured at the other end. The system bond graph is




Figure 2.1: Robotic arm: (a) Schematic diagram; (b) bond graph model; (c) modeling of a component failure; (d) modeling of a connection failure.

shown in Figure 2.1b. Suppose the mass  $m_2$  is stuck (i.e., the velocity of  $m_2$  is zero), which is a component failure. How do we model it in the bond graph? In the *parameter approach* we set the mass  $m_2$  to infinity which leaves the model graph unchanged. In the *fault source approach* we add a FSF to  $1M_2$  junction (Figure 2.1c).

A connection failure can be illustrated as follows:

Suppose mass  $m_2$  is disconnected from the left spring and damper, i.e., there is no force between the two subsystems. This connection failure can be modeled using the *fault source approach* by addition of a FSE to the 0-junction that describes this force (ORC1), as shown in Figure 2.1d. Note that the causality of the bond graph, shown by the short transverse strokes on each of the bonds is changed as the fault source is added to the system. Causality concepts, operations, and the standard causal assignment procedure are discussed in several references (e.g., Rosenberg and Karnopp, 1983), and will not be reviewed here. The causality change and its physical interpretation plays an important role in constructing the CFD as will be shown later.

### 2.3.3 Modeling considerations of connection failures


Connection failures are basically defined in a similar way as component failures. It is known that there may be different bond graphs that represent the same physical system in terms of equations implied. When the purpose of constructing the bond graph is fault detection the situation is different. Those equivalent graphs may represent different connections between components of the system. Thus, when modeling is done for fault

detection, special consideration should be made when constructing the graph. Here, not only the components and the connections should be presented in the graph, but also the subassemblies of the system. In order to be able to detect connection failures between subassemblies, each physical connection should be associated with a simple junction.



Let us illustrate this idea by an example. Figure 2.2a represents two masses connected by two springs and a damper. From the conventional modeling point of view, all four bond graphs shown in Figure 2.2b - 2.2e describe the same dynamic system. However, when connection failures are of concern, each bond graph defines a different assembly of the system, as shown in the schematic beside each bond graph. For example, a broken connection at point A can only be modeled by using the bond graph in Figure 2.2b. This is done by setting the effort  $e.1$  to zero. This failure can not be modeled in the other bond graphs since this variable does not exist there.

In order to construct an appropriate bond graph for a given system, one can use the macro mode approach (Rosenberg, 1986). The graph should be built in steps, starting from the top level assembly. In each step the macros (or subassemblies) are defined in detail. A demonstration of the procedure is shown in Figure 2.3. The bond graph is constructed in three steps, using MACRO1 and MACRO2 as subassemblies. Note that the connection forces at points A, B, and D, are defined explicitly by  $e.2$ ,  $e.3$  and  $e.10$  respectively. The fact that connection forces are defined as variables in the bond graph explicitly aids the modeling of connection failures, as



(a)





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(c)



(d)



(e)





Fig. 2.2: Modeling of connection failures







Fig. 2.3: Macro modeling

well as other design purposes, perhaps.

#### 2.4 Proper bond graph

Every flow and effort that appears in the bond graph can be treated as a candidate for failure. Therefore each flow and effort should be associated with a simple junction in order to define that failure in the fault source approach. We may need to augment our initial bond graph model such that it will satisfy this property.

##### Definitions:

A *proper bond graph (PBG)* is a bond graph in which every flow variable is associated with a 1-junction and every effort variable is associated with a 0-junction.

A *Bond Structure (BS)* contains a specific bond together with the two nodes adjacent to it.

A *Simple Junction (SJ)* is a 0-junction or a 1-junction (Rosenberg, 1979a).

An *Identity Junction (IJ)* is a simple junction that has degree equal to two and contains one inwardly-directed bond and one outwardly-directed bond.

The PBG is constructed by adding identity junctions to the original bond graph. Addition of identity junctions to a bond graph does not change the

behavior implied by the bond graph. The PBG and the original graph present the same physical system. The following algorithm will construct a proper bond graph from a given bond graph.

**An algorithm for constructing the PBG**

1. Scan all bonds (edges) of the graph and add identity junctions and edges according to Table 2.1. N1, N2 are any nodes except simple junctions.

Table 2.1: Insertions for constructing a proper bond graph

bond structure in a given bond graph	equivalent bond structure in the proper bond graph
0 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 0	0 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 1 $\xrightarrow{i_1}$ 0
0 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 1	unchanged
1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 0	unchanged
1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 1	1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 0 $\xrightarrow{i_1}$ 1
1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ N1	1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 0 $\xrightarrow{i_1}$ N1
0 $\xrightarrow{i}$ N1	0 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 1 $\xrightarrow{i_1}$ N1
N1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 1	N1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 0 $\xrightarrow{i_1}$ 1
N1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 0	N1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 1 $\xrightarrow{i_1}$ 0
N1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ N2	N1 $\xrightarrow{i}$ 0 $\xrightarrow{i_1}$ 1 $\xrightarrow{i_2}$ N2

Using the definitions of a proper bond graph, a catastrophic failure and a fault source, consider the following theorem.

**Theorem 2.1:** Every catastrophic failure in a multiport system can be modeled by addition of either a fault source of flow or a fault source of effort to the proper bond graph of the



system.

**Proof:** For the sake of brevity proofs are provided in APPENDIX A.

Thus, there is a group of simple junctions that are associated with a given list of faults. These junctions play a role in the graphical formulation of the failure detection problem.

## 2.5 Graphical presentation of FDD problem

As shown before, every prospective catastrophic failure ( $e=0$ ,  $f=0$ ) in a dynamic system is associated with a specific simple junction. The fault list which is provided by the designer, based on his/her experience, can be translated into a list of simple junctions named the *fault junctions*.

Physical inputs are represented in the bond graph by two types of sources: source of flow (SF) and source of effort (SE). The flow variable of a SF is associated with the 1-junction adjacent to it and the effort variable is associated with the 0-junction adjacent to it. These junctions will always appear in the proper bond graph and will be referred to as *input junctions*.

For this study we restrict ourselves to test node measurements (outputs) that are flows, efforts or a function of them. This restriction covers most practical systems, since voltage measurements commonly are used in electrical systems; force, velocity, acceleration and displacement are effort, flow, and functions of them in mechanical systems; and pressure (effort variable) is common as a measured signal in hydraulic systems.

Since every flow and effort is associated with a simple junction of the proper bond graph, we can refer to these nodes as *test-node junctions* or *output junctions*. Test-nodes/outputs will be used as synonyms throughout this work.

So far we realize that a FDD problem in a bond graph is associated with three special groups of simple junctions: the fault junctions, the input junctions and the test nodes junctions. Figure 2.4 illustrates that situation abstractly. One group of simple junctions represents the inputs and another group represents the output junctions. In the remaining junction structure we can find the junctions that are associated with the faults of the fault list. Note that there may be simple junctions in the graph that do not belong to any of the special groups above.

Test node measurements are actually signals extracted from simple junctions. In order to preserve the structure of the graph and the duality between inputs and outputs, test node measurements are represented by either a source of zero effort extracted from a 1-junction (where flow is measured) or a source of zero flow extracted from a 0-junction. Figure 2.5 shows the equivalency between these signals and sources.

By defining the input, fault and test node junctions we have transferred a failure detection problem into a graphical problem. Thus graphical methods are applicable for solving the problem, as will be developed in the subsequent chapters.




Figure 2.4: Abstract description of FDD problem in a bond graph model.




Figure 2.5: Equivalent representation of test-nodes measurements

### 3. THE CATASTROPHIC FAULT DICTIONARY

The conventional fault dictionary contains a "page" of information for every fault in the fault list. This data consists, usually, of the test-node measurements. We suggest a special type of sensitivity measure to be the entries of the dictionary. This dictionary can be directly derived from the graphical presentation. The special type of sensitivity, called *Structural Sensitivity* is defined in section 3.2. The procedure of deriving those entries from the graphical presentation is described in section 3.3 and following. It is first done for a tree graph and then expanded to a general connected graph. For the sake of continuity, proofs and minor cases are treated in appendices.

#### 3.1 System bond graph model

The requirements for the system bond graph model are:

- (1) The bond graph model contains only bonds (no signals allowed).
- (2) The bond graph model is a connected graph. If the graph is unconnected, every component can be treated individually.
- (3) The standard bond graph elements are:
  - C: generalized capacitance,
  - I: generalized inductance,
  - R: generalized resistance,
  - SE: effort source,
  - SF: flow source,
  - 0: zero junction,
  - 1: one junction,
  - TF: transformer, and

GY: gyrator.

C, I, and R elements can have any number of ports. Constitutive equations for the C, I, and R elements, linear or nonlinear, are functions only of the local port variables (and their appropriate integrals, for C and I). Source nodes (SE and SF) are functions of time only. TF and GY nodes have constant parameters.

### 3.2 The Structural Sensitivity Matrix (SSM)

Suppose a dynamic system contains  $l$  inputs and  $m$  outputs. Let  $U_i(t)$  be the  $i$ th input and  $Y_j(t)$  be the  $j$ th output of the system.  $Y_j(t)$  is defined for given inputs and initial conditions. Let us restrict ourselves to stable systems in which a constant input defines a unique constant steady-state output.

Let  $S_{ij}$  denote a sensitivity of the  $j^{\text{th}}$  output with respect to the  $i^{\text{th}}$  input, where there is a perturbation in a constant input and the steady state output is observed. The sensitivity,  $S_{ij}$ , is

$$S_{ij} = \frac{\Delta Y_{ssj}}{\Delta U_{ci}} \quad (3.1)$$

where  $\Delta U_{ci}$  is a constant perturbation in the  $i$ th input and  $\Delta Y_{ssj}$  is the resulted change in the  $j$ th steady-state output.

In the same way we can define a  $l \times m$  Sensitivity Matrix,  $SM$ , of the system as

$$SM = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\Delta Y_{ss1}}{\Delta U_{c1}} & \dots & \frac{\Delta Y_{ssm}}{\Delta U_{cl}} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \frac{\Delta Y_{ssj}}{\Delta U_{cl}} & \dots & \frac{\Delta Y_{ssm}}{\Delta U_{cl}} \end{bmatrix} \quad (3.2)$$

If the output  $Y_{ssj}$  does not depend on the input  $U_{cl}$ , then the entry  $S_{ij}$  in the sensitivity matrix is identically zero. Starting with the SM concept we define a *Structural Sensitivity Matrix, SSM*.

**Definition:** A *Structural Sensitivity Matrix, SSM*, is a sensitivity matrix whose entries are zero when  $S_{ij}$  is identically zero, and one otherwise.

From a practical point of view, every entry of the SM (and SSM) can be found by perturbing one input while holding the others fixed, and observing the resulting output. If a perturbation in  $U_{cl}$  does not change the output  $Y_{ssj}$ , then the corresponding entry to SSM is zero; otherwise it is one. Note that the initial conditions for both cases (original and perturbed) should be the same.

Some nonlinear systems may provide a zero entry in the SSM at a specific singular operating point. These situations should be avoided by determining the SSM entries at different operating points of the system.

A SSM whose all entries are one is a *full SSM*. Otherwise the matrix is *partial*.

### 3.3 Connection between graphical presentation and SSM

Consider a physical system with defined inputs, outputs (test-nodes measurements) and fault-list variables. We wish to derive the CFD for this system. Let us restrict ourselves to the following:

- (1) The system bond graph is a tree.
- (2) The SSM of the nominal system is full, i.e., every output is a function of every input.
- (3) The fault-list contains only single catastrophic faults (i.e., each fault corresponds to a single  $e=0$  or  $f=0$  statement).

In the following discussion we treat the bond graph as an undirected graph, since power orientation is not relevant.

Let  $P_{ij}$  denote a path from node  $i$  to node  $j$  in a bond graph that is a tree, where node  $i$  is an input junction node and node  $j$  is an output junction node. The path between any two nodes in a tree graph is unique. We express the path  $P_{ij}$  as the set of nodes between (and including)  $i$  and  $j$ .

The following theorem is essential in deriving the CFD.

**Theorem 3.1:**  $S_{ij}$  is identically zero if and only if there exists a catastrophic failure associated with a simple junction on  $P_{ij}$ .

Proof: Provided in APPENDIX A

Let us demonstrate the preceding theorem in a physical system. As an example consider the robotic arm shown in Figure 2.1. Here we have one input (force,  $F$ ) and one output (velocity,  $V$ ). The system satisfies all the preceding restrictions. Any catastrophic failure along the path from SE to LM3 is either a stuck mass (CFF associated with LM1, LM2 or LM3) or a connection failure between two masses (CEF associated with ORC1 or ORC2). Either type of failure will cause zero transmission of input force effect to the system downstream of the fault. Thus the sensitivity of  $V$  with respect to  $F$  will be identically zero. On the other hand, if a failure of a consisting stuck damper  $b_2$  occurs, which is a CFF associated with LRC2, two adjacent masses will be connected into one rigid body. This will cause a change in the sensitivity but will not make it identically zero.

### 3.4 Definition of CFD

As a result of Theorem 3.1, a zero entry in the SSM is an indication of the existence of a catastrophic fault. This is true when the system contains a full nominal SSM. Thus, we can use the SSM as a signature of a specific fault. Suppose we derive the SSM for every faulty system that contains a fault from the fault list. Then their collection forms the fault dictionary. For convenience, we put all these matrices in a three



dimensional array. The catastrophic dictionary is, therefore, a three dimensional boolean array. This array is referred to as the *CFD array*. Figure 3.1 shows this array symbolically, where each horizontal matrix in it is the SSM of a specific fault. Each SSM is referred to as a *page* of the dictionary. During testing the experimental SSM of the actual system is compared to these pages and the actual fault is defined.




Figure 3.1: CFD array

### 3.5 Construction of CFD for a tree bond graph

The CFD can be constructed directly from the bond graph of the system. Since the graph is a tree, every path  $P_{ij}$  is unique. The procedure of constructing the CFD consists of two main steps. In the first step the FDD problem is converted to the graphical representation. In the second step we use graph algorithms to find the paths from each input to each output. Each path is checked for existence of fault-junctions along it, and the corresponding entries are put in the CFD array. The software developed for this task, referred as the *CFD tree algorithm*, is described in detail in the next chapter. Figure 3.2 shows its flow diagram.

### 3.6 CFD for a general graph

Since most systems do not have a tree bond graph, we have to expand our method to a general bond graph. We still restrict ourselves to the following assumptions:

- (1) The system bond graph is a connected graph;
- (2) The SSM of the nominal system is full;
- (3) The fault-list contains only single catastrophic faults.

In a general connected graph  $P_{ij}$  is not unique. Our approach is to generate an equivalent graph which abstracts the relevant information and is a tree graph. Then the CFD tree algorithm can operate on it. To this end we introduce the *Modified-Block-Graph*, *MBG*.




Figure 3.2: Flow diagram of CFD tree algorithm

### 3.6.1 The Modified-Block-Graph

#### Definitions:

A *Modified-Block-Graph*,  $MBG(G)$ , of a connected graph  $G$  is a graph derived from  $G$  such that every block in  $G$  is defined by a node, and the cut nodes that connect the blocks remain in the modified block graph.

A *block node* is a node in  $MBG(G)$  which defines a block in  $G$ .

A *cut node* is a node whose removal from a connected graph (together with its adjacent edges) results in an unconnected graph.

$MBG(G)$  is a modification form of the *Block-Cut-vertex-graph*,  $BC(G)$ , which is known in graph theory (Chartrand and Lesniak, 1986). The only difference between the two lies in efficiency, since in our case we ignore the trivial blocks (blocks which contain one bond).  $MBG(G)$  and  $BC(G)$  have the same properties (proved in the above mentioned reference).

The interesting properties of  $MBG(G)$  are:

- (1) The  $MBG$  is a tree.
- (2) Any path from node  $S$  to node  $T$  in  $G$  contains the same cut nodes as the path from  $S$  to  $T$  in  $MBG(G)$ , where  $S$  and  $T$  are either defined in  $MBG(G)$  or captured in the block-nodes of  $MBG(G)$ .

The first property allows us to use the CFD algorithm developed for a tree graph, while the second helps us to convert paths from  $G$  to  $MBG(G)$ . An illustration of a graph  $G$  and its corresponding  $MBG$  is shown in Figure 3.3. Note that all the cut-nodes of  $G$  remain in  $MBG(G)$ , while the nodes that are inside a block disappear since the block is replaced by a block-node. A detailed procedure for constructing the  $MBG(G)$  is represented in APPENDIX B.

Determination of the blocks of a given graph is a known algorithm in graph theory. It is one of the applications of the Depth-First Search method, and is known as "The Depth-First Search for blocks algorithm" (Even, 1979; Gibbons, 1985). The subroutines that find the blocks and construct the modified-block-graph are described in detail in Chapter 4.

### 3.6.2 Detectable and undetectable faults

In a general connected graph  $G$  all the paths from  $U_i$  to  $Y_j$  are reduced to one *Equivalent Path*,  $EP_{ij}$ , in  $MBG(G)$ . This path is defined by  $U_i$  and  $Y_j$ , since  $MBG(G)$  is a tree.  $EP_{ij}$  represents the original paths. It contains all cut-nodes of  $P_{ij}$ , but it does not represent nodes that were inside the blocks.

#### Definitions:

A *detectable fault* is a fault whose existence in the system changes the SSM of the nominal system.

An *undetectable fault* is a fault whose existence in the system does not change the SSM of the nominal system.




Figure 3.3: Construction of the Modified-Block-Graph: (a) Original graph; (b) Definition of blocks; (c) MBG completed.

Faults associated with junctions that disappear through the process of converting the graph to the MBG are undetectable by the current approach since they do not change the SSM entries. From a graphical point of view it can be explained as the following: If a path from point S to point T in the MGB contains a block-node, there is no information about the path inside the block. For example, refer to Figure 3.3: point H is inside BLOCK2. A path from K to E may contain H (K-J-I-H-F-E) but there exists an alternative path that does not contain H (K-J-I-G-F-E). Cut points, on the other hand, like I or J, appear in both paths, thus they are contained in the equivalent path (Figure 3.3c, equivalent path defined by K-J-I-BLOCK2-F-E).

A fault may be undetectable for either of two reasons. Either its fault-junction disappears during the conversion of the graph to the MBG, or its fault-junction does not appear on any input-output path. The two types are defined as:

- (1) *Structurally undetectable fault*: this is a fault associated with a junction that disappears through the process of converting the graph into the MBG. Such faults can not be detected by the CFD approach. Fortunately, their appearance in engineering systems is rare.
- (2) *Undetectable fault*: fault whose junction does not appear on any path  $P_{ij}$ . A change in test-node locations can change their status. A discussion about this is presented in the design-for-testability chapter (Chapter 5).

Two examples are discussed next to give some insight into the detectability of faults. The mechanical system of Figure 3.4a contains a thick beam with two input forces,  $F_1$  and  $F_2$ . A small mass,  $m$ , is connected to the beam through a spring. The bond graph model, Figure 3.4b, contains two loops. The MBG is shown in Figure 3.4c. Since no simple junction has disappeared through the process of converting the graph into the block-graph, there are no structurally-undetected faults in the system. Note that the transformer nodes do not appear in the MBG. Nevertheless, no prospective faults were lost since they are associated with the simple junctions connected to those transformers. Suppose an accelerometer is located on the small mass, which means that the output junction is OD. Using  $F_1$  and  $F_2$  as inputs, we can observe that faults associated with 1T and 1R are undetectable since they do not appear on the path from the inputs to OD. A change of output location may convert those faults into detectable faults. Thus, faults associated with 1R and 1T are undetectable, but not structurally undetectable.

The network shown in Figure 3.5a (from Rosenberg and Karnopp, 1983) contains two inputs, a voltage source and a current source. Its bond graph is unicyclic. The corresponding MBG is shown in Figure 3.5c. Note that none of the junctions disappear during the transformation. Here, again, none of the faults is structurally-undetected. The detectability of the faults depends on the choice of test-node location.





Figure 3.4: MBG of a mechanical system: (a) schematic diagram; (b) bond graph model; (c) MBG.




Figure 3.5: MBG of a network: (a) schematic diagram;  
(b) bond graph model; (c) MBG.

The only loss of fault information when a proper-bond-graph is transformed to MBG is associated with simple junctions that do not appear in the MBG. In both examples the number of simple junctions did not change when the bond graph was converted into the MBG. This situation is very common to systems whose bond graph contains 1-port elements and 2-port transformers and gyrators. Thus most of the prospective faults in those systems are detectable. We note that the existence of loops (and therefore blocks) in the bond graph corresponds to multiple paths of energy in the system. Many common dynamic engineering systems, with the notable exception of electronic circuits and redundant mechanical structures, do not have many parallel energy paths. Therefore the number of structurally-undetectable faults in them typically is very small.

### 3.7 The partial SSM

So far we have dealt with a full SSM. Thus a zero entry in an experimental SSM was an indication of a fault. Most engineering systems satisfy that condition. But what if the nominal SSM contains zero entries? This is common to systems whose bond graph models are unconnected, but it occurs in connected bond graphs too. Actually, the entries of the nominal SSM can be derived directly from its bond graph representation. See details in APPENDIX C. In this section we provide a procedure for constructing the CFD for a given partial nominal SSM (i.e., the nominal system has a partial SSM whose zero locations are known).

### Construction of the fault dictionary for partial SSM

Suppose that the entry  $S_{ij}$  in a nominal SSM is zero. In this case any fault along  $EP_{ij}$  is undetectable. Moreover, a zero entry in an SSM is no longer an indication of a fault. For this case we need to add the nominal SSM to the dictionary. Since every SSM of a faulty system will contain those initial zero entries, the SSM of the nominal system will be added to each SSM. Mathematically it is computed as the following:

$$SSM_{F_1} = SSM_{F_1}' \oplus SSM_N \quad (3.3)$$

where

$SSM_N$  is the SSM of the nominal system;

$SSM_{F_1}'$  is the SSM of the faulty system, derived from the bond graph as shown before;

$SSM_{F_1}$  is the final page of the dictionary.

The addition property (  $\oplus$  ) of equation 3.3 is identical to the intersection operation in boolean algebra (Goodstein, 1964). Its truth table is

p	q	$p \oplus q$
0	0	0
0	1	0
1	0	0
1	1	1

After the CFD has been constructed, the experimental SSM is compared to the dictionary as before, but in this case the nominal SSM is also a page in the dictionary, usually defined as F0 (fault 0). A fault is

undetectable if its fault-page equals page F0, the nominal SSM.

### 3.8 Additional properties of CFD

#### 3.8.1 Ambiguity sets

Sometimes different faults contain the same SSM. They create an *ambiguity set* and are detected as a group. This phenomenon is well known in detection of faults in analog circuits (Lin, 1985) as well as in digital systems (Markas, 1990). If the unseparated faults are located in the same "Shop Replaceable Unit", further isolation may not be necessary. Otherwise, if unique detection is required, more or different test-nodes are needed. This topic is also discussed in the design chapter.

#### 3.8.2 Fault identification by dictionary lookup

As mentioned earlier, actual faults are identified by comparison of the actual SSM to all SSMs of the fault dictionary. In a conventional fault dictionary this is a time consuming process, since outputs are defined as real numbers. An attempt to reduce it into a an integer coded dictionary has been made by Lin (1985). One of the main advantages of the CFD is the easy lookup, due to its binary structure.

#### 3.8.3 Superposition

A multifault (i.e., the simultaneous occurrence of a set of single faults) is treated in conventional dictionaries as an independent fault. These dictionaries usually do not contain multifaults due to limitation of memory size. The binary structure of the CFD allows us to use superposition, i.e., the SSM of a fault defined by two or more faults from

the fault list is a combination (using the + operation as in section 3.7) of their SSMs. This fact allows us to detect multifaults without increasing the memory significantly.

### 3.9 Summary

The theoretical foundations for constructing the CFD were described. A procedure for deriving the CFD directly from the graphical representation of the FDD problem was presented for a tree bond graph. A general bond graph was treated in two steps. First, the graph is converted to a modified block graph which captures all the relevant information and is also a tree. Second, the CFD tree algorithm is applied to the MBG to obtain the CFD. Faults associated with junctions that disappear in the procedure of converting the original graph to the MBG are undetected faults. They are rare in practical engineering problems.

#### 4. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CATASTROPHIC FAULT DICTIONARY

##### 4.1 General description

A FORTRAN computer program called CFDIC (Catastrophic Fault Dictionary) has been developed to generate the fault dictionary. The program is based on the theoretical foundations described in Chapter 3. The current chapter describes the basic features of this program. The design applications of the CFDIC software are presented in the following chapter. CFDIC program can be run independently on a personal computer using FORTRAN-77 compiler. The software is described in detail in two appendices. APPENDIX D, the user manual of CFDIC, provides directions for installing and running CFDIC including a detailed example. APPENDIX E contains the listing and implementation notes of the program.

Figure 4.1 shows the main inputs and outputs of the program. The inputs are: (1) the model description, defined by its bond graph (i.e., node list and incidence list); (2) input, test-node and fault variables definitions, stored in a data file.




Figure 4.1: Overview of CFD

The program contains two main parts:

1. Conversion of the graph into a modified block-graph;
2. Construction of CFD of a tree (or a modified-block-graph).

The flow diagram of the program is shown in Figure 4.2. Before starting the operation of the main parts, the computer reads the system data and checks whether or not the graph is connected. Disconnected graphs are not accepted by this program; thus a message is provided about this to the user. Then inputs, test-node and fault variables are read and changed into input, test-node and fault junctions. If the original graph is already a tree, no extra step is needed and the tree-algorithm is activated. The tree algorithm is described in the preceding chapter. Please refer to Figure 3.2. Otherwise the graph is converted into the modified block graph. Then the tree algorithm is applied to this MBG and the fault dictionary is generated.

## 4.2 Inputs

### 4.2.1 Model description

Model structure is defined by its bond graph. The graph is introduced to the program by two lists: the node list and the incidence list. The node list defines the names of all nodes in the graph together with their type. The incidence list defines the bond names and their connection to the nodes.






Figure 4.2: The CFDIC main flowchart

#### 4.2.2 Input, test-node and fault variables

The special variables (i.e., input, test-node and fault variables) are defined in a data file called VAR.DAT. Input variables should be efforts or flows which are adjacent to a source node (SE, SF). A test-node variable can be any effort or flow that appears in the graph except an input variable. If there is no simple junction adjacent to the test-node variable, the program will automatically add the corresponding identity junction. Fault variables are defined by efforts or flows. For example, if a fault variable is e.i it means that it represents a catastrophic fault defined by  $e.i=0$ . Identity junctions are added to the model in the same way as for the test-node variables. The running OPTION will be discussed in Chapter 5.

#### 4.3 Special subroutines

The CFD program contains thirty one subroutines. Most of them are an integral part of the construction of the fault dictionary. Some subroutines are of more interest or can be used independently in other graphical applications. These subroutines are discussed here briefly. Implementation notes, the calling tree structure and the listing of all the subroutines in alphabetic order, are provided in APPENDIX E.

##### 4.3.1 Depth-First Search labeling (subroutine DFSLBL)

The *Depth-First Search (DFS)* is a well known systematic method of labeling vertices of a graph (Gibbons, 1985). Many graph algorithms are especially efficient when based on depth-first search labeling, for example, finding paths in a graph or finding blocks and strongly connected components. In

our program DFSLBL is used for three different applications. These are (1) to check if the graph is connected, (2) to find paths in the tree-graph, and (3) to find the blocks of the graph.

The input to the subroutine includes the graph description (node list and incidence list) and the starting node. The subroutine provides the  $DFI(v)$ , which is the *Depth-First Index* of every vertex  $v$ , and the "*father*" of  $v$ ,  $FA(v)$ , which defines the previsited vertex.

#### 4.3.2 Finding paths in a tree graph (subroutine PATHFN)

Finding a path is one of the direct application of the Depth-First Search algorithm. The subroutine finds the path (defined by a list of nodes) between two given nodes in a tree graph. The algorithm is executed after the graph has been labeled by DFSLBL. A path is defined directly by following the "*father*" of each node. It is known to be a very efficient algorithm (Even, 1979).

#### 4.3.3 Block finding (subroutine BLCKFND)

BLCKFND is executed after the graph has been labeled by DFSLBL. In this algorithm the graph is scanned and every block found is popped out from the subroutine. Blocks are defined as group of nodes. The algorithm uses the  $DFI$  and the  $FA$  of each node to find the blocks. BLCKFND uses two other subroutines, SSTACK and POPSTK, to execute the algorithm. SSTACK is used to store nodes that are in the same block. When the nodes in SSTACK define a block, the list is send to POPSTK. The procedure continues until all blocks are defined.

#### 4.3.4 Generating the modified block graph (subroutine BLCKGR)

Information about blocks, cut points and leaves (nodes of degree one) is captured in this subroutine. It processes all this data and converts it to a Modified Block Graph, which is stored in the place of the original graph. This information is made available to all other subroutines (through a common block) for generating the fault dictionary.

#### 4.3.5 Generating CFD for a tree graph (subroutine TREDIC)

Subroutine TREDIC derives the CFD for a tree bond graph. The tree is either the original graph or the modified block graph.

The subroutine contains the following steps:

- (1) Finding paths from an input to all test nodes;
- (2) Checking the existence of all faults, defined by fault list, on those paths and adding the corresponding entries (one or zero) to the CFD.

The algorithm is run for each input until the CFD is completed. Input to TREDIC includes the system description and lists of input, test-node, and fault junctions. The output is the corresponding CFD.

## 5. THE FAULT DICTIONARY AS A DESIGN TOOL

The fault dictionary is basically used for detecting failures by comparison of experimental data to the FD data. From an engineering point of view, the more important and interesting problem is in the design stage, which is known as "Design for Testability". The design for testability problem can be described in general as: the problem of finding, in a cost-effective way, the faulty component, module, or connections in a dynamic system (Williams, 1983). In practice, many design-for-testability problems dealt with reducing the number of test-nodes needed to detect given faults (Lin, 1982, 1985; Ozawa, 1988).

The special structure of the CFD as a three dimensional boolean array is very attractive for design-for-testability. Figure 5.1 shows the CFD abstractly, from different points of view. So far we are used to think about the CFD as a collection of fault pages, as shown in Figure 5.1a, but it can also be interpreted from a test-node point of view as a collection of test-node pages (Figure 5.1b) or input pages (Figure 5.1c). Each test-node page contains all the information about the specific test-node, and the same is true for an input page. Thus the information which is kept in the CFD can be generated in various ways for solving design problems.

Using this structure, the CFDIC software was extended to solve several design problems. In this chapter we present some typical applications and the software needed to solve them. A five degree-of-freedom ground vehicle model is used to illustrate the various design options. The design problems are imbedded in the CFDIC software and can be run under different options of the same program.




Figure 5.1: CFD representation from fault, test-node, and input point of view

## 5.1 Fault detection properties (CFDIC option 1)

### 5.1.1 Fault report

For given input, output and fault lists, the fault dictionary may provide additional information about the status of every fault in the system (i.e., whether the fault is uniquely detectable, undetectable and so on). CFDIC Option 1 provides this data in addition to the fault dictionary.

The message about each fault in the original fault-list is one of the three categories:

- (1) The fault is uniquely detected.
- (2) The fault is detected but creates an ambiguity set with other faults.  
In this case the list of all faults in that ambiguity set is provided.
- (3) The fault is undetectable by the current inputs and test nodes. A change in either test nodes or inputs is needed in order to detect this fault.

Percentage of detection (number of detected faults out of total number of faults) and unique detection is also provided. Option 1 of CFDIC provides the fault report. Inputs are the model description and input, output and fault variables.

### Example

Consider the five degree-of freedom vehicle model of Figure 5.2. In the figure  $m_1$  represents the mass of the seat and driver, which is supported by spring  $k_1$  and damper  $c_1$  that are attached to the main body of the vehicle. The masses of the main body of the vehicle, the wheels, and the




Figure 5.2: Five degree of freedom vehicle model

axles are  $m2$ ,  $m4$ , and  $m5$ , respectively. The main body of the vehicle is supported by springs  $k2$  and  $k3$  and the dampers  $c2$  and  $c3$ , which are attached to the axles. The parameters  $k4$ ,  $k5$ ,  $c4$ , and  $c5$  represent the stiffness and damping coefficients of the tires. The functions  $f1(t)$  and  $f2(t)$  represent vertical velocities of the front and the rear tire contact patch, respectively, due to undulations in the road surface on which the vehicle is traveling.

The bond graph of the system is shown in Figure 5.3. Here, SF1 and SF2 represent the input velocities of the front and rear tire contact patch,






Figure 5.3: Bond graph model of five-degree-of-freedom vehicle suspension system

the I-elements represent masses and inertia (IM4 represents  $m_4$ , etc.), C-elements define springs, and R-elements represent dampers. It is interesting to observe the modified block-graph of this system, shown in Figure 5.4. Note that the tree part of the graph remains unchanged while the loops were reduced to one node (block1). Model description, as an input file, is attached in APPENDIX F1.

#### Fault-list, test-nodes and inputs

Suppose a catastrophic fault list contains the faults defined in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Fault list

Fault	Fault variable	Description
F1	f.c2	Stuck suspension damper of front wheel
F2	e.3	suspension and body disconnected (front)
F3	e.k2	Broken suspension spring (front)
F4	e.2	wheel and suspension disconnected (rear)
F5	f.k5	Flat rear tire

In order to detect the faults, three accelerometers and one load-cell were located in the system. Test-node locations and measurements are described in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Test-node list

Test-node	Test-node variable	Location	Measurement
Y1	e.m4	Front wheel axle	Vertical acceleration
Y2	e.m2	Main body	Vertical acceleration
Y3	e.i1	Seat	Vertical acceleration
Y4	e.k2	Suspension	Spring force

Velocities of front and rear wheels were used as inputs of the system. Their description is shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Input list

Input	Input variable	Description
U1	f.s1	Vertical front wheel velocity
U2	f.s2	Vertical rear wheel velocity

#### Fault, test-nodes and input variables

Faults, test-nodes and input variables are defined as bond graph variables using the bond graph model shown in Figure 5.3. Table 5.1 shows the bond graph variables associated with each fault. Note that a fault is defined such that its variable is identically zero. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the test-node variables and the input variables respectively. Input, output and fault lists as an input file for the program are shown in APPENDIX F2.

#### Construction of CFD

Using the preceding algorithms, the CFD is constructed. The SSM for each fault are listed below for clarity.

SSM for F1:     1 1 1 0  
                  1 1 1 0

SSM for F2:     1 0 0 0  
                  0 1 1 0

SSM for F3:     1 1 1 0  
                  1 1 1 0

SSM for F4:     1 1 1 1  
                  0 0 0 0

SSM for F5:     1 1 1 1  
                  1 1 1 1




Figure 5.4: Modified-Block-graph of five-degree-of-freedom vehicle suspension system

The fault report for this (short) fault list, as provided by CFDIC option 1 is:

Table 5.4: Fault report

FAULT	DEFINED BY	DIAGNOSIS
F1	f.c2 =0	DETECTABLE, AMBIGUITY SET #1
F2	e.3 =0	DETECTABLE, UNIQUELY
F3	e.k2 =0	DETECTABLE, AMBIGUITY SET #1
F4	e.2 =0	DETECTABLE, UNIQUELY
F5	e.k5 =0	UNDETECTABLE

TOTAL DETECTION PERCENTAGE: 80.0%  
 UNIQUE DETECTION PERCENTAGE: 40.0%

AMBIGUITY SETS  
 \*\*\*\*\*

AMBIGUITY SET #1 CONTAINS:  
                   FAULT #1  
                   FAULT #3

### 5.1.2 Initial fault list

This option is a subset of the previous one. Here, inputs and outputs are given, and the user wishes to find the detectable fault list. A list of all faults that are detected by the given inputs and outputs is provided by the software. This can work as an initial fault list, since other faults are undetected by those inputs/outputs.

This problem is addressed by finding all fault junctions on the paths from

every input to every output. Option 1 of CFDIC provides a list of faults that are detected by known inputs and test-nodes. The input to this option includes the model description, and the lists of the known inputs and test-nodes.

The *detected faults* option may be helpful for the definition of the fault list, since it is the complete fault list detected by given inputs and test-nodes. This fault list can be used as an initial list from which the actual fault list is defined. The initial fault-list option is actually a default of option 1, i.e., whenever the fault list data is missing, the software provides the complete detected fault list.

#### **Example**

Let us assume that three accelerometers are already located in the suspension system (Figure 5.2) which measure the main body rotation, main body vertical acceleration and the seat vertical acceleration. Thus the output variables are e.j2, e.m2 and e.ii respectively. The input is the front wheel vertical velocity, f.sl. Which faults may be detected by these inputs-outputs? CFDIC option 1 (the default option) was run using this data and the following results were provided (direct copy of the printout).

Table 5.5: List of faults detected by the given inputs and test-nodes

FAULT	DEFINED BY	ASSOCIATED WITH S.J.	DIAGNOSIS
F1	e.j2 -0	*	DETECTABLE, A.S. #1
F2	f.j2 -0	1R	DETECTABLE, A.S. #1
F3	e.3 -0	0F1	DETECTABLE, A.S. #2
F4	f.3 -0	1Z4	DETECTABLE, A.S. #2
F5	e.1 -0	0F	DETECTABLE, A.S. #2
F6	e.m2 -0	*	DETECTABLE, A.S. #3
F7	f.m2 -0	1T	DETECTABLE, A.S. #3
F8	f.m2 -0	0D	DETECTABLE, A.S. #3

\* THE SJ ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAULT DO NOT APPEAR  
IN THE ORIGINAL GRAPH

#### ABBREVIATIONS:

S.J. - SIMPLE JUNCTIONS

A.S. - AMBIGUITY SET

#### AMBIGUITY SETS

\*\*\*\*\*

##### AMBIGUITY SET #1 CONTAINS:

FAULT #1

FAULT #2

##### AMBIGUITY SET #2 CONTAINS:

FAULT #3

FAULT #4

FAULT #5

##### AMBIGUITY SET #3 CONTAINS:

FAULT #6

FAULT #7

## 5.2 Test-node detectability characteristics (CFDIC Option 2)

The design of number and location of test-nodes, or choosing test-nodes in an efficient way, is the most important and most addressed problem in design-for-testability (Lin, 1985). Usually, an initial list of possible test-node locations with their cost is provided. We will address this problem in a simplified way, i.e., every test-node has the same installation complexity (defined as "cost"), every fault has the same importance (defined by "weight") and the inputs to the system are fixed. More complex problems can be considered from this approach modified suitably.

In the general case, the determination of a *minimum* set of test nodes to achieve the highest percentage (not always 100%) of fault detection is a very time consuming process for large systems. Lin (1985) suggested a more practical approach. For practical applications there is no need to obtain the *theoretical minimum* number of test nodes. Any *near-minimum* solution will serve our purpose if the solution is simple. In other words, a heuristic method might be more useful for solving practical problems. Our approach combines the CFD properties with the practical approach mentioned above.

The following algorithm should address the questions:

- (1) Which of the test-nodes (defined in the initial list) is unnecessary?
- (2) Which test-nodes are equivalent (i.e., provide the same information)?
- (3) Which test-node detects the maximum number of faults?



- (4) If the number of test-nodes is limited, which test-nodes should we choose in order to detect the maximum number of faults?

The first two questions can be directly answered by observing the CFD. Let us define a *Test-Node Matrix*, *TNM*, for test-node #jo as:

$$TNM(jo) = D(i,jo,k) \quad ( 5.1 )$$

where  $i=1, \dots, l$  ( $l$  is number of inputs);

$k=1, \dots, n$  ( $n$  is number of faults);

and  $D$  is the CFD array.

Fig. 5.1 shows this matrix abstractly. A test-node is unnecessary if all its entries are 1, which means that there is no prospective fault on any path from any input to this test-node. If two test-nodes have the same *TNM*, they are equivalent. Thus only one of these should be selected.

Question 3 is solved by processing the data of the *TNM* for each test-node.

Question 4 is addressed by the following heuristic procedure:

- Step 1: Select the test-node that has the largest number of detected faults.
- Step 2: Select next the test-node whose intersection with previously selected nodes will result in the largest number of detected faults.
- Step 3: Repeat step 2 till you reach  $m$  test-nodes.

If we describe the number of detected faults at each step as a function of the number of picked test-nodes, we get a useful design-for-testability tool to aid the user. All the described information is provided while

running Option 3 of the CFD software. The input consists of the system description, list of input variables, fault variables and initial (maximal) test-node list.

### Example

Suppose only one input, front wheel velocity, was used as an input. The fault list consists of the following variables:

```
f.5
e.6
e.11
e.16
f.4
e.k2
f.c2
f.3
f.15
f.12
```

The initial test-node list contains the following variables:

```
e.j2
e.m2
e.i1
f.k2
e.m5
e.k2
f.k3
e.c2
e.c4
```

All this input data is provided by the user; see details in APPENDIX F3.

### Results:

Below are the results, as provided by the software.

#### TEST-NODE REPORT

\*\*\*\*\*

#### LIST OF UNNECESSARY TEST-NODES

\*\*\*\*\*

TEST-NODE #10 (DEFINED BY e.c4 )

TEST-NODE EQUIVALENCE SETS  
\*\*\*\*\*

TEST-NODE EQUIVALENCE SET #1 CONTAINS:

TEST-NODE #4 (DEFINED BY f.k2 )

TEST-NODE #9 (DEFINED BY e.c2 )

DETECTABILITY OF TEST-NODES  
\*\*\*\*\*

-TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS: 10

-NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE TEST-NODES: 8

\* UNNECESSARY TEST-NODES WERE DELETED FROM THE LIST

\* AN EQUIVALENCE SET IS MARKED BY ITS FIRST T.N. VARIABLE

Table 5.6: Detectability of test-nodes

TEST-NODE NUMBER	TEST-NODE VARIABLE	NUMBER OF DETECTED FAULTS	NUMBER OF UNIQUELY DETECTED FAULTS
1	e.j2	3	0
2	e.m2	3	0
3	e.ii	3	0
4	f.k2	4	0
5	e.m5	4	0
6	e.k2	5	0
7	f.k3	3	0
8	e.c2	4	0

REDUCTION OF TEST-NODES  
\*\*\*\*\*

Table 5.7: Cumulative detectability of test-nodes

NUMBER OF T.N.	INCLUDING T.N. VARIABLES	TOTAL NUMBER OF D.F.	TOTAL NUMBER OF U.T.F.
1	e.k2	5	0
2	e.m5	7	0
3	e.ii	8	1
4	e.j2	9	2
5	e.m2	10	3
6	f.k2	10	4
7	f.k3	10	6
8	e.c2	10	6

ABBREVIATIONS:

T.N. - TEST-NODES

D.F. - DETECTED FAULTS

U.D.F. - UNIQUELY DETECTED FAULTS

Discussion:

Observing the results the designer can conclude the following:

- (1) e.c4 is useless as output for detecting the faults defined by the fault list.
- (2) Either f.k2 or e.c2 should be chosen as outputs. There is no need to choose both.
- (3) e.k2 is the "best" test-node variable as far as maximum detected faults are concerned (refer to Table 5.6).

Table 5.7, whose information is abstracted graphically in Fig. 5.5, provides a design tool for a limited number of test nodes. For example, if only four test-nodes are allowed, one can see from the graph that nine faults will be detected, two of them uniquely. From Table 5.7 we can find which test nodes should be chosen. For this example the first four variables, i.e., e.k2, e.m5, e.i1 and e.j2, are the optimal test-node variables.

In this option, the algorithm has been developed to detect maximum faults, ignoring uniqueness considerations. Other algorithms may be developed taking into account other design considerations, as specified by the designer of the system.

### 5.3 Summary

The chapter described two, out of many, families of design problems, that may be addressed by the CFD approach. These are the fault detection properties and the test-node detectability characteristics. The procedures needed to solve those problems are imbedded in CFDIC software. Figure 5.6 summarizes these design options of CFDIC software. Further design problems are left for future work (refer to Chapter 6).






Figure 5.5: Number of detected faults as a function of the number of test-nodes



Option 1: Fault detection properties of system design



Option 2: Test-node detectability characteristics

Fig. 5.6: Options of CFDIC software

## 6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK

### 6.1 Summary

A new approach to constructing the catastrophic fault dictionary for engineering systems was introduced and developed. The CFD is derived directly from the topological structure of the system and the resulting fault dictionary is a three-dimensional boolean array.

The procedure of deriving the CFD and addressing design problems contains three main steps. Please refer to Figure 6.1. Every step has a well defined input, output and associated mathematical tool. In step 1 bond graph methods convert the catastrophic fault diagnosis problem into a graphical one. In step 2 Graph algorithms are used to generate the CFD from the graphical presentation. The CFD, as an output of step 2 and an input of step 3, is then processed by boolean algebra methods to address testability-design engineering problems.

Comparison of CFD to a conventional fault dictionary is summarized in Table 6.1. The major advantage of the proposed approach is that it is derived directly from the model structure. The binary structure of the CFD is attractive due to the limited size of storage needed and the simple look up (when the CFD is compared to experimental data). It also allows one to detect multifault without increasing the dictionary size due to its superposition property. The CFD has been demonstrated to be a useful tool for testability design.






Figure 6.1: CFD procedure

Table 6.1: Comparison between conventional fault dictionary and CFD

Feature	Conventional FD	CFD
FD structure	three dimensional array	three dimensional array
FD entries	outputs, real numbers	structural sensitivities of outputs with respect to inputs, zeros or ones
Type of detected faults	catastrophic and/or soft, usually single	catastrophic, single and multiple
Ambiguity sets	defined by the designer	defined automatically by the computer
Advantages	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Straight forward</li> <li>2. Applicable for analog and digital systems</li> <li>3. Appropriate for hard and soft failures</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Derived directly from the bond graph model</li> <li>2. Most general, handles various types of systems</li> <li>3. easy look up - due to boolean structure</li> <li>4. based on system structure, parameter change does not change the dictionary</li> <li>5. Handles nonlinearities</li> <li>6. efficient in memory size</li> <li>7. handles multifaults easily</li> </ol>
Disadvantages	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. limited by memory size</li> <li>2. calculations needed to detect faults</li> <li>3. limited to piecewise linear functions (current version)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. handles catastrophic faults only</li> <li>2. efficiency depend on model structure</li> </ol>

The disadvantages of this method also lie in the structural procedure of constructing the CFD. At this stage of development faults are limited to catastrophic ones. The practical problem of identifying parameters that are drifted from nominal is not addressed.

## 6.2 Future work

Although the task of constructing a catastrophic fault dictionary has been completed, many additional areas of worthy research were found while performing this work. Described below are several topics considered as important for future studies.

### 6.2.1 Extension of the structural approach

#### 6.2.1.1 Non catastrophic faults

The current approach is limited to catastrophic faults only. Although those are critical in engineering systems, non-catastrophic failures are important too. It is suggested to extend the family of detectable faults by modeling non-catastrophic failures as catastrophic. Lin (1985) modeled a fixed change in a parameter value (resistance in an analog circuit) by a "fault switch" which is similar to our fault source. Since soft failures are actually changes in system parameters, they can be theoretically modeled as catastrophic failures. Figure 6.2 (from Lin, 1985) shows open circuit, shorted circuit and fixed change in a parameter value, modeled by switches. In practice, modeling of every soft failure this way is not reasonable. Nevertheless, some non-catastrophic faults may fall into this category. With some complication of the bond graph, which can be handled by the software, various types

of non-catastrophic failures may be detected by the structural approach.

Further investigation of those faults, their appearance in real systems and their diagnosis techniques is recommended.




Figure 6.2: Catastrophic failures represented by switches

#### 6.2.1.2 Multifaults

The superposition property, as described in section 3.7.3, has not seen use in this study. A further development of the software is needed to include this feature in the CFD. This property is very attractive to fault detection since there is no need to increase the memory size for including this feature.

### 6.2.2 Development of conventional fault dictionary using bond graph methods

As mentioned in the literature review, a conventional fault dictionary is constructed by running the nominal and faulty systems, obtaining the test nodes' output and comparing them. A program that accepts bond graph models and simulates their dynamic response is a logical basis for development an automated FD set up procedure. The ENPORT software is a suitable computational tool (Rosenberg 1987), in the process of designing an automated procedure for setting a FD.

A procedural diagram for the construction of a fault dictionary is shown in Figure 6.3. Once the bond graph model is built, one can define the list of failures (component failures and connection failures) which is translated into a list of faulty junctions. After inputs and output locations are defined, the computer runs the nominal and the set up of faulted simulations in order to construct the FD.

So far most of the fault dictionaries developed (Elcherif, 1983; Lin, 1985; Schreiber, 1979) dealt with nonlinear analog circuits, where the nonlinearities were assumed to be piecewise linear functions and the inputs were constant. Hochwald (1979) suggested to expand this dc approach to be able to cover also dynamic failures. This can be done by including small signal periodic stimuli. Under the assumption that both nominal and faulty models are stable at the point of interest, the proposed approach is to use two types of inputs : a constant input (CI) which will respond as a constant steady state output, and a small signal sinusoidal input, which will assure a periodic response (due to linearization) in order to




Figure 6.3: Automated structural fault dictionary set up

detect dynamic failures. No special assumptions should be made about the nonlinearities of the system.

Since modeling of catastrophic failures can be done in bond graph language and bond graph software can handle nonlinearities in a general system, a fault dictionary based on this technique will be suitable for a variety of dynamic systems. It should be noted that at present the CI fault dictionary is the only one that is used in practice, while others have not progressed beyond the feasibility study stage (Ozawa, 1988).

A detailed diagram for automated construction of a fault dictionary is given in Figure 6.4. It contains five major subroutines. Some of them are straightforward; others need some development.

#### 6.2.3 Further investigation of CFD as a design tool

The CFD has been found to be very attractive for testability-design. So far we have dealt with simplified design problems, in which all faults were equal in their importance and every test-node has the same price (i.e., complexity in installation). In practice this is not the case. The current approach may be extended to solve engineering problems by processing the data of the CFD array in a more complicated way. A complete design problem defined by the user may be solved by the software. By that we mean, for example, that the user defines the constraint of this design, such as: number of faults to be detected, importance of specific faults and price or weight for each test-node. The software should address this problem and provide the best design under the constraints. The binary




Figure 6.4: Detailed flow diagram of a conventional fault dictionary



data base of the CFD array is attractive for solving such problems due to the easy processing of this type of data.

#### 6.2.4 Development of SAT approach using bond graph techniques

As an alternative approach to the fault dictionary approach, which was widely discussed in this work, a number of researchers proposed the *Simulation-After-Test (SAT)* algorithms (Ozawa, 1988; Wu, 1984; Salama, 1982). This method, which is mostly used in analog circuits, are useful when hard or soft faults need to be located up to the level a specific replaceable subsystem. In this approach, as mentioned in the literature review, the system under test is decomposed into subnetworks using nodes at which outputs have been measured.

It is recommended to extend the SAT approach to various types of systems by using bond graph modeling. As shown in the fault-dictionary approach, output are usually associated with simple junctions. Thus the constitutive equations for those junctions can be used to check the consistency of the system. An efficient algorithm may be developed in order to isolate faulty replaceable units. The bond graph model can also be used for design purposes, i.e., based on the topology of the system, optimal test-nodes could be chosen to detect specific faulty units.

**Example:** The nominal circuit and its bond graph model are shown in Figure 6.5a and Figure 6.5b respectively. Nodes of decomposition are A, B, and E. Then each subcircuit consists of one element (Figure 6.5c). The faulty circuit is shown in Figure 6.5d. Resistor  $r_3$  is faulty and is now  $3\Omega$




Figure 6.5: Circuit fault detection by SAT approach

instead of its nominal value of  $1\Omega$ . The measured node voltages will be  $v_1=8V$ ,  $v_2=2V$ . Using these voltages and nominal value elements, we get  $i_1=4A$ ,  $i_2=2A$ ,  $i_3=6A$ , and  $i_4=2A$ .

The experimental data is then constrained on the nominal system by addition of sources of effort at points A and B (Figure 6.5e). The currents (flow variables) of these "artificial sources" are then observed. If the system is fault free, all those flows would be zero, since KCL is satisfied at each 0-junction. However, if a subsystem is faulty, KCL is not satisfied on its connections and a nonzero flow will be observed in the corresponding "artificial source". A nonzero current is associated with junctions OA and OB, thus the subsystem which lies between those junctions is faulty. For this case it is the resistor  $r_3$ .

#### 6.2.5 Failure detection of shop replaceable units

The development of sophisticated systems has increased both the importance of Shop-Replaceable-Units (SRU) and the demand of more efficient methods for detecting failures associated with those units. The development of macro-models (Vlach, 1983; Rosenberg, 1986) enables us to improve modeling of such systems. Two types of failures can occur in a SRU: a macro failure or a connection failure. The former is defined by any failure that occurs inside the SRU while the latter describes a failure that occurs in the connection between SRUs or between SRUs and other components. Faults inside an SRU do not have to be detected uniquely, which can result in the reduction of the number of test nodes.

In our opinion, failures inside a SRU can be handled better by the SAT approach while connection failures should be detected better by the fault dictionary (SBT) approach. Both approaches (or a combination of them) should be investigated in order to find efficient methods to detect SRU failures.

#### 6.2.6 Digital systems fault diagnosis

Although bond graphs were originally developed for physical dynamic systems (i.e., systems in which there is a power transmission within the system), the current approach of a boolean array as a fault dictionary is similar in principle to fault diagnosis approaches used in digital systems.

As a result of the development of LSI and VLSI, many researches are seeking for new approaches for detecting (in an efficient way) manufacturing faults. Common type of faults in digital systems are fixed faults. These faults remain in the system from the time they occur until they are replaced (Vishnubhotla, 1980). The most common ones occur when one or more wires are stuck at either 0 or 1 value.

A survey done on this subject (Williams and Parker, 1983) describes different diagnosis techniques and their applications for design-for-testability. Among the approaches mentioned there, as well as in other papers, two are close to our approach. These are the *digital fault dictionary* and the *cause-effect analysis*. The former approach, mentioned

in early papers (Kautz, 1968; Brown, 1975) is similar to the conventional fault dictionary used for analog circuits. In more recent papers an attempt is made to handle large scale systems by improving the simulation process (Markas, 1990) or by generating the dictionary automatically from the structural description of the system (Sugasaki, 1989), which has the same goal as our research. The *cause-effect analysis*, proposed by Breuer in 1976 and followed by Abramovici (1980), does not require a fault dictionary and it is not based on comparing the obtained response with the expected response. Effect-cause analysis directly processes the actual response of the system-under-test (SUT) to the applied test (the effect) to determine the possible fault situations (the causes) which can generate that response.

Several similarities can be found between fault diagnosis in digital systems and the current approach.

- (1) Both approaches focus on catastrophic faults where in digital systems those faults are defined as stuck-at faults.
- (2) Fault dictionary is defined by a boolean array.
- (3) Attempt is made to generate the dictionary on system structure, mainly by using the graphical representation of the system, and observing input-output paths.
- (4) Detectable, undetectable faults and ambiguity sets are defined in the same way.

The similarities between the fault diagnosis in digital system and the CFD approach suggest further investigation in combining the two methods.

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## A P P E N D I C S

## APPENDIX A: Theorems and proofs

**Theorem 2.1:** Every catastrophic failure in a multiport system can be modeled by addition of either a fault source of flow or a fault source of effort to the proper bond graph of the system.

**Proof:** (by construction) By the PBG definition every effort or flow variable is associated with a simple junction. On the other hand, catastrophic faults are defined by zero flow or zero effort, thus zero flow or effort can be constrained by adding a FS to its associated junction.

**Theorem 3.1:**  $S_{ij}$  is identically zero if and only if there exists a catastrophic failure associated with a simple junction on  $P_{ij}$ .

**Proof:**

→ (if) Suppose there exists a catastrophic fault in the system. We define two cases:

Case 1: A CFF associated with a 1-junction on  $P_{ij}$ .

Case 2: A CEF associated with a 0-junction on  $P_{ij}$ .

**Proof of case 1:** Please refer to Figure A.1. Let  $U_1$  be an input-junction and  $Y_1$  an output-junction, where  $1A$  is a 1-junction associated with the fault.  $1A$  is on a unique path from  $U_1$  to  $Y_1$ . Based on Theorem 2.1, modeling of the CFF associated with  $1A$  is done by adding a zero source of flow to this junction, as shown in Figure A.1a. The causality strokes are added to the graph in Figure A.1b. From causality considerations (Rosenberg and Karnopp, 1983), assuming the directions as shown in the figure, we get

$$f_1 - f_2 - \dots - f_n - f_s = 0 \quad (1)$$

and

$$e_s = e_1 + e_2 + \dots + e_n \quad (2)$$

Since  $e_s$  is the output of eq. 2 and it only appears in this equation, we can say that it is adjusted such that eq. 2 will always hold. This implies that  $e_n$  does not depend on  $e_1$ . Since there exists only one *causal path* between  $U_i$  and  $Y_j$ , the output associated with  $Y_j$  does not depend on the input associated with  $U_i$ , thus  $S_{ij}$  is identically zero.

**Proof of case 2:** Using the same arguments for a zero faulty junction OA (refer to Figure A.2) we obtain

$$e_1 - e_2 - \dots - e_n - e_s = 0 \quad (3)$$

and

$$f_s = f_1 + f_2 + \dots + f_n \quad (4)$$

which implies, in the same way, that  $S_{ij}$  is identically zero.

**<= (only if):** Let us assume that the only change that may occur in the nominal system is a catastrophic fault. Since there exists a zero entry in the SSM, and the only change allowed is a CF, then a FS has been added to some SJ of the system bond graph model. Define two cases:

Case 1: A FS has been added to a SJ on  $P_{ij}$ ;

Case 2: A FS has been added to a SJ outside  $P_{ij}$ .

If case 1 holds then  $S_{ij}$  is identically zero by the first part of the proof. If case 2 holds then there exist a causal path between  $U_i$  and  $Y_j$ , which implies that  $S_{ij}$  is not zero. Since  $S_{ij}$  is zero, only case 1 holds, i.e., there exists a CF on  $P_{ij}$ .




Figure A.1: A catastrophic flow fault modeling




Figure A.2: A catastrophic effort fault modeling

## APPENDIX B:

### Construction of a Modified-Block-Graph

The construction of the MBG of a connected graph  $G$  is done by the following steps:


Step 1: Expand the original graph by duplicating its cut nodes.

Step 2: Define all blocks of more than two nodes.

Step 3: Reduce each block into one node.

Step 4: Delete unneeded duplicate cut nodes.

The procedure is demonstrated on the graph shown in Figure B.1.



**Figure B.1: Modified-Block-Graph: (a) Original graph; (b) Duplication of cut nodes; (c) Definition of blocks; (d) Reduction of blocks to nodes; (e) MBG completed**

## APPENDIX C

### Derivation of the nominal Structural-Sensitivity-Matrix from system structure

The bond graph represents the system equations in a structured way. Since the Structural-Sensitivity-Matrix (SSM) is concerned only with the influence of the inputs on outputs, the bond graph augmented with causality is a useful tool for the determination of the SSM. The SSM of a nominal system can be derived from the causally augmented bond graph by a series of steps, described next.

First, the bond graph is converted into a *Structural-Influence-Graph (SIG)* that represents the input-output relationships in the system. Then graph algorithms are applied to the SIG to determine the entries of the SSM of the nominal system. Section C.1 defines the SIG and the procedure for constructing it. In Section C.2 the connection between the SIG and the SSM is described. The graph algorithm presented in Section C.3 provides the directed paths of the SIG. Section C.4 provides a detailed example of the whole procedure.

#### C.1 The Structural-Influence-Graph

The following procedure is used to construct the SIG from a given bond graph. The bond graph requirements are as defined in section 3.1. Please refer to Figure C.1.

**Step 1:** Define the bond graph model and assign causality using the Sequential Causal Assignment Procedure, SCAP (Rosenberg and Karnopp, 1983).






Figure C.1: Junction and element structures

**Step 2:** Write the input-output equations for each node of the graph. For C and I nodes ignore the state variables and use the condensed equation form indicated below. The equations for the standard bond graph nodes are:

$$\text{SE: } e_1 = \phi(t)$$

$$\text{SF: } f_1 = \phi(t)$$

$$\begin{aligned} 0: \quad & f_{n+1} = f_1 + f_2 + \dots + f_n \\ & e_1 = e_{n+1} \\ & \dots \\ & \dots \\ & e_n = e_{n+1} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 1: \quad & e_{n+1} = e_1 + e_2 + \dots + e_n \\ & f_1 = f_{n+1} \\ & \dots \\ & \dots \\ & f_n = f_{n+1} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{TF:} \quad \begin{array}{ll} f_1 = m_1 * f_2 & \text{or} \quad f_2 = m_2 * f_1 \\ e_2 = m_1 * e_1 & e_1 = m_2 * e_2 \end{array}$$

$$\text{GY:} \quad \begin{array}{ll} f_1 = r_1 * e_2 & \text{or} \quad e_2 = r_2 * f_1 \\ f_2 = r_1 * e_1 & e_1 = r_2 * f_2 \end{array}$$

$$\text{I:} \quad f_1 = \phi(e_1) \quad \text{or} \quad e_1 = \phi(f_1)$$

$$\text{I(multiport):} \quad \begin{array}{ll} f_i = \phi_i(e_1, \dots, e_n) & \text{or} \quad e_i = \phi_i(f_1, \dots, f_n) \\ i=1, \dots, n \end{array}$$

$$\text{C:} \quad e_1 = \phi(f_1) \quad \text{or} \quad f_1 = \phi(e_1)$$

$$\text{C(multiport):} \quad \begin{array}{ll} e_i = \phi_i(f_1, \dots, f_n) & \text{or} \quad f_i = \phi_i(e_1, \dots, e_n) \\ i=1, \dots, n \end{array}$$

$$\text{R:} \quad e_1 = \phi(f_1) \quad \text{or} \quad f_1 = \phi(e_1)$$

$$\text{R(multiport):} \quad \begin{array}{ll} e_i = \phi_i(f_1, \dots, f_n) & \text{or} \quad f_i = \phi_i(e_1, \dots, e_n) \\ i=1, \dots, n \end{array}$$

where  $\phi$  represents a general function. Note that the equations contain only effort and flow variables (and time for the source equations). Equations for C and I nodes are not written in the conventional way (using the state). The modification indicates our

need to keep track of the efforts and flows only. Since our concern is with which inputs define which outputs, no explicit equations are needed. It is sufficient to use the functional forms as written above.

Step 3: Construct the SIG from the system equations. In the SIG every equation is represented by a node. The node is labeled by its output variable (effort or flow) while the edges are labeled arbitrarily. Each edge arises from an input variable to an equation.

Step 4: Augment the SIG by adding nodes (and corresponding edges) that define the given outputs.

The SIG is a directed graph.

Remarks:

A SIG input-node is defined by a zero in-degree node, and a SIG output node is defined by a zero out-degree node. The input-nodes are defined directly by the bond graph, but some of them may be of no interest to the user (for example, weight). On the other hand, outputs (test-node locations) are specified by the user and added to the SIG as shown in step 4. Some outputs that already exist in the graph may be of no interest.

## C.2 Determination of the SSM from the SIG

The SIG contains each effort and flow of the bond graph as a node. Let  $U_1 \dots U_m$  be the input variables of the system and  $Y_1 \dots Y_n$  the output variables. Since inputs and outputs were restricted to efforts and flows, every input and output appear in the SIG as a node. The existence of a

directed path from a specific input to a specific output is an indication of an influence (or nonzero sensitivity) of that input on that output. With the aid of standard graph algorithms, we can determine the relationship between inputs and outputs. There are three possible cases:

- (a) There is no directed path from  $U_i$  to  $Y_j$ ;
- (b) There is a unique directed path from  $U_i$  to  $Y_j$ ;
- (c) There are more than one directed path from  $U_i$  to  $Y_j$ .

It can be shown mathematically that an addition of cycles along a path do not change the three basic cases (i.e., a unique directed path with a cycle is treated as a unique path, and a multi-path which contains cycles is treated as a multi-path).

Let us treat every case separately.

Case (a). Clearly  $S_{ij}=0$ .

Case (b). Provided  $\emptyset$  along  $P_{ij}$  obey the proper conditions defined below, then  $S_{ij}=1$ .

Proper conditions for  $\emptyset$ :

- (1) Continuous function for all its input variables;
- (2) Single-valued function for all its input variables;
- (3)  $\frac{\partial \emptyset}{\partial u_i}$  not identically zero for each input variables.

Case (c). In addition to the previous restrictions on  $\emptyset$  (Case b) the following assumption should be made: For the part of the path which are multiple (including cycles) there is no cancellation of input/output effect due to functional symmetry. Under these assumption case (c) is treated as case (b), i.e.,  $S_{ij}=1$ .

The case of multipath is more complicated since there may be cases of cancellation of sensitivity. Here, explicit system equations are needed to determine the SSM entries. For this study we assume that there is no cancellation of sensitivity due to the multipath. In this work single-path and multi-path are treated identically.

Our next goal is to determine if there exists a directed path from each input to each output in the given SIG. Graph algorithms, in particular the Depth-First-Search algorithm, is used for this task.

### C.3 The Depth-First-Search algorithm for finding the reachable nodes in a given digraph

The *Depth-First-Search (DFS)* is a well known systematic method of labeling vertices of a graph (Even, 1979; Gibbons, 1985). It is used for a variety of graph theory problems. In our application we use the DFS labeling in directed graph to find directed paths between two given vertices. Here we use the fact that when a digraph is subjected to the algorithm, the edges which are Tree-type form a spanning out-forest of the graph. That forest contains an out-tree ( $T'$ ) rooted at  $U_1$ , so that the only reachable outputs (nodes) are the ones that are included in this tree.

The following algorithm constructs  $T'$  from a given digraph  $G$ , therefore it provides the essential information about reachability of different outputs.

**Step 1:** Label the graph using the DFS algorithm starting in the node  $U_i$ . In the process of labeling define the edge type for each edge as either a tree edge or a non-tree edge.

**Step 2:** Delete all non-tree edges from the graph.

**Step 3:** If the resulting graph is connected go to Step 4; else delete all the components that do not contain  $U_i$ .

**Step 4:** Stop, the resulting graph ( $T'$ ) is an out-tree rooted at  $U_i$ .

The existence of a directed path from  $U_i$  to a specific output (defined by a node) is determined by Theorem C.1.


**Theorem C.1:** An output  $Y_j$  is reachable from  $U_i$  if and only if it is in  $T'$ .

By reachable we mean that there exists at least one directed path from  $U_i$  to  $Y_j$ . Under the assumption of no cancellation, single path and multi path can be treated in the same way.

The procedure of constructing the reachable-tree ( $T'$ ) is illustrated by the following example.

**Example:** The digraph shown in Figure C.2a is labeled by the DFS algorithm, starting from node A. The corresponding labels (defined as Depth-First-Index, DFI) are:

(a)



(b)




Figure C.2: An example illustrating an application of the DFS

Node	DFI
A	1
B	3
C	2
D	5
E	4
F	6
G	7
H	8
I	9

The edge-types are:

Edge	Type
a	T
b	T
c	NT
d	T
e	T
f	NT
g	T
h	NT
j	NT
k	NT
m	T
n	T

T - Tree edge  
NT - Non-tree edge

After deleting all the non-tree edges we are left with a out-forest which includes two out-trees, as shown in Figure C.2b. The out-tree that contains node A is T'. Thus the reachable nodes are B, C, D, E and F.

The procedure illustrated by this example does not distinguish between unique-path and multi-path. If further investigation is needed, all directed paths from the source to the target should be found. Algorithms that find all those paths exist in basic graph theory references (e.g., an algorithm based on Breadth-First-Search in Carre, 1979).



#### C.4 Example

A simple mechanical system, shown in Figure C.3a, consists of two masses,  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ , connected by two springs,  $k_1$  and  $k_2$ . The system bond graph model is provided in Figure C.3b. The system contains two inputs: a moving support, associated with SF1, and a constraint of velocity on the mass  $m_2$  (associated with SF2). For simplicity, gravity is ignored. The observed outputs are the velocity of  $m_2$ , and the force in the spring  $k_1$ . In bond graph term we define the inputs as  $f_1$  and  $f_4$ , and the outputs as  $f_6$  and  $e_2$ .

Sixteen equations are derived from the system bond graph.

$$\text{SF1: } f_1 = \phi_1(t)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{OA: } f_2 &= f_1 - f_3 \\ e_3 &= e_2 \\ e_1 &= e_2 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{1A: } e_4 &= e_5 + e_6 - e_3 \\ f_3 &= f_4 \\ f_5 &= f_4 \\ f_6 &= f_4 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{SF2: } f_4 = \phi_2(t)$$

$$\text{I1: } e_5 = \phi_3(f_5)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{OB: } f_7 &= f_6 - f_8 \\ e_6 &= e_7 \\ e_8 &= e_7 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{C1: } e_2 = \phi_4(f_2)$$

$$\text{C2: } e_7 = \phi_5(f_7)$$

$$\text{I2: } f_8 = \phi_6(e_8)$$

$\phi_i$  defined general functions, including integrals and derivatives.

The SIG, constructed from these equations is shown in Figure C.4.





Figure C.3: A mechanical system with two velocity inputs:  
(a) schematic diagram; (b) bond graph model.



**Figure C.4:** The Structural-Influence-Graph of the mechanical system of Figure C.3

Observing the graph we get:

- (1) There exists a unique directed path from  $f_1$  to  $e_2$ ;
- (2) There is no direct path from  $f_1$  to  $f_8$ ;
- (3) There exists a unique directed path from  $f_4$  to  $e_2$ .
- (4) There exists a directed path (including a cycle) from  $f_4$  to  $f_8$ ;

The corresponding SSM is, therefore:

$$SSM = \begin{bmatrix} S_{11} & S_{12} \\ S_{21} & S_{22} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $U = [u_1, u_2] = [f_1, f_4]$

and  $Y = [y_1, y_2] = [e_2, f_8]$

## APPENDIX D

### USER MANUAL FOR THE CFDIC PROGRAM

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June 20, 1990

#### 1. Introduction

This manual provides the information necessary to use program CFDIC (Catastrophic Fault Dictionary). The program is used to derive the catastrophic fault dictionary for a known system. The physical system is described using bond graph with linear or nonlinear constitutive elements. This program only derives the CFD for systems which satisfy two conditions; (1) their bond graph is a connected graph, (2) systems which are completely sensitive (i.e., every output of the system is a function of every input).

The program checks connectedness before starting any computations; a fault message is provided to the user when the system bond graph is not connected. The second condition is not checked by the software, since causality is needed for checking it (see details in APPENDIX C). It is assumed that the system is completely sensitive. The current version of this program at Michigan State is run on a personal computer using FORTRAN-77 compiler. This computer program was developed as a part of the doctoral work of the author.

The author assumes that the reader is familiar with the bond graph method and terminology.

## 2. Installation notes

This program was written in FORTRAN 77. To install this program, compile it and correct any syntax errors, link it and correct unsatisfied external references, and run it.

## 3. Bond graph requirements

3.1 The bond graph model contains only bonds (no signals allowed)

3.2 The bond graph model is a connected graph.

3.3. The standard bond graph elements are:

C: generalized capacitance,

I: generalized inertance,

R: generalized resistance,

SE: effort source,

SF: flow source,

0: zero junction,

1: one junction,

TF: transformer, and

GY: gyrator.

C, I, and R elements can have any number of ports. Constitutive equations for the C, I, and R elements, linear or nonlinear, are functions only of the local port variables (and their appropriate integrals, for C and I). Source (SE and SF) are function of time only. TF and GY elements have constant parameters.

#### 4. How to use the program

The normal processing procedure for Program CFDIC is as follows:

- 4.1 As the first step, the user must create a bond graph model of the particular physical system of interest.
- 4.2 The system data is provided to the program by a file called SYS.DAT which contains two lists: (1) node list, which contains nodes name and type, (2) incident list, which contains bonds name and type, and their connection to the nodes. This file can be created directly (by the software) when using ENPORT software, or directly by the user (practical only for small systems). The format of SYS.DAT should be exactly as defined in the example since the program is reading the data according to that format.
- 4.3 The input, output and fault variables are provided by a file name VAR.DAT which contains these variables in a list.
- 4.4 The program provides several running options. The options are specified by the user at the beginning of VAR.DAT file. The options are:
  - Option 0: Derivation of CFD, information is stored in an array, D.
  - Option 1: Fault report. In addition to the CFD (stored the same as in Option 0) the software provides information about each fault, if it is detected or undetected, and if detected uniquely or not. Option 1 has a default option as the following: if the fault list is not specified by the user, the software provides the complete list of the detected faults and treated it as a fault list.

Option 2: Test-node report. This option provides a design-for-testability tool. It reports about unnecessary test nodes, equivalence sets of test-nodes and detectability tables for each and cumulative test-nodes.

4.5 Output: The output, for each option is written into a file name A.DAT.



### 5. Example

Consider the circuit shown in Figure D.1a. It contains two inputs, a voltage source (SE) and a current source (SF). The bond graph of the circuit is defined in Figure D.1b. The system file (SYS.DAT) is:

HEADING

FILE

ELECSYS.ENP: ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT

SYSTEM GRAPH DESCRIPTION

NODE	TYPE
SF9	EFG
OB	EOG
1BC	E1G
OC	EOG
R6	ERG
C7	ECG
C5	ECG
1B	E1G
I4	EIG
OA	EOG
1SA	E1G
OD	EOG
C2	ECG
R3	ERG
1A	E1G
I1	EIG
SE	EEG

CONNECTOR	TYPE	FROM	TO
1	BE	1SA	I1
2	BE	1A	C2
3	BE	1A	OD
4	BE	1B	I4
5	BE	1BC	C5
6	BE	OC	R6
7	BE	OC	C7
8	BE	SE8	1SA
9	BE	SF9	OB
10	BE	OB	1BC
11	BE	1BC	OC
12	BE	1B	OB
13	BE	OA	1B
14	BE	OA	1A
15	BE	1SA	OA
16	BE	OD	R3





Figure D.1: Electrical circuit: (a) schematic diagram;  
(b) bond graph model.

System file is common to all running options, while the variable file has to be specified for each option.

#### Option 0

Suppose test nodes are located at points C and D, measuring the potential of those points. Fault list is defined by the following prospective faults:

Fault	Definition	Fault variable (-0)
F1	L4 open	f.4
F2	R3 open	f.3
F3	R3 shorted	e.3
F4	R6 open	f.6
F5	Point A shorted to ground	e.15
F6	Current source disconnected	f.9

Input data file for option 0 is:

OPTION  
0

INPUT VARIABLES  
e.8  
f.9

OUTPUT VARIABLES  
e.7  
e.3

FAULT VARIABLES  
f.4  
f.3  
e.3  
f.6  
e.15  
f.9

The print out results (beside the CFD stored in the array, D) from file A.DAT is:

FAULT DICTIONARY, DEFINED BY PAGES  
 \*\*\*\*\*

```

FOR FAULT DEFINED BY f.4  -0:
                        0  1
                        1  0

FOR FAULT DEFINED BY f.3  -0:
                        1  0
                        1  0

FOR FAULT DEFINED BY e.3  -0:
                        1  0
                        1  0

FOR FAULT DEFINED BY f.6  -0:
                        1  1
                        1  1

FOR FAULT DEFINED BY e.15 -0:
                        0  0
                        1  0

FOR FAULT DEFINED BY f.9  -0:
                        1  1
                        0  0
  
```

Fault pages print out is limited to two inputs and two outputs.

Option 1

Variable data file (VAR.DAT) is similar to the previous file:

OPTION  
1

INPUT VARIABLES  
e.8  
f.9

OUTPUT VARIABLES  
e.7  
e.3

FAULT VARIABLES  
f.4  
f.3  
e.3  
f.6  
e.15  
f.9

The results file (A.DAT):

# FAULT REPORT

\*\*\*\*\*

FAULT	DEFINED BY	DIAGNOSIS
F 1	f.4 -0	DETECTABLE, UNIQUELY
F 2	f.3 -0	DETECTABLE, AMBIGUITY SET # 1
F 3	e.6 -0	DETECTABLE, AMBIGUITY SET # 1
F 4	f.6 -0	UNDETECTABLE
F 5	e.15 -0	DETECTABLE, UNIQUELY
F 6	f.9 -0	DETECTABLE, UNIQUELY

TOTAL DETECTION PERCENTAGE: 83.3%

UNIQUE DETECTION PERCENTAGE: 50.0%

## AMBIGUITY SETS

\*\*\*\*\*

AMBIGUITY SET # 1 CONTAINS:

FAULT # 2

FAULT # 3

## Option 1 (default option)

In the default option, fault variables are missing in the VAR.DAT file, thus the software provides a list of all detected faults and their report.

Input file VAR.DAT:

## OPTION

1

## INPUT VARIABLES

e.8

## OUTPUT VARIABLES

e.7

e.3

The results file (A.DAT):

LIST OF FAULTS DETECTED BY  
THE GIVEN INPUTS AND OUTPUTS  
\*\*\*\*\*

FAULT	DEFINED BY	ASSOCIATED WITH S.J.	DIAGNOSIS
F 1	e.11 -0	OC	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 1
F 2	f.11 -0	1BC	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 1
F 3	e.10 -0	OB	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 1
F 4	f.12 -0	1B	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 1
F 5	e.13 -0	OA	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 2
F 6	f.15 -0	1SA	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 2
F 7	e.3 -0	OD	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 3
F 8	f.3 -0	1A	DETECTABLE, A.S. # 3

ABBREVIATIONS:

S.J. - SIMPLE JUNCTION

A.S. - AMBIGUITY SET

AMBIGUITY SETS

\*\*\*\*\*

AMBIGUITY SET # 1 CONTAINS:

FAULT # 1  
FAULT # 2  
FAULT # 3  
FAULT # 4

AMBIGUITY SET # 2 CONTAINS:

FAULT # 5  
FAULT # 6

AMBIGUITY SET # 3 CONTAINS:

FAULT # 7  
FAULT # 8

## Option 2

Variables data file (VAR.DAT):

OPTION

2

INPUT VARIABLES

e.8

OUTPUT VARIABLES

e.7

e.3

f.10

f.3

e.1

FAULT VARIABLES

f.4

f.3

e.3

f.6

e.15

f.9

Results file (A.DAT):

TEST-NODES REPORT

\*\*\*\*\*

LIST OF UNNECESSARY TEST-NODES

\*\*\*\*\*

TEST-NODE # 5 (DEFINED BY e.1 )

TEST-NODES EQUIVALENCE SETS

\*\*\*\*\*

TEST-NODE EQUIVALENCE SET # 1 CONTAINS:

TEST-NODE # 1 (DEFINED BY e.7 )

TEST-NODE # 2 (DEFINED BY f.10 )

DETECTABILITY OF TEST-NODES

\*\*\*\*\*

-TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS: 6

-NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE TEST-NODES: 3

\* UNNECESSARY TEST-NODES WERE DELETED FROM THE LIST

\* AN EQUIVALENCE SET IS MARKED BY ITS FIRST T.N. VARIABLE

TEST-NODE NUMBER	TEST-NODE VARIABLE	NUMBER OF DETECTED FAULTS	NUMBER OF UNIQUELY DETECTED FAULTS
1	e.7	2	0
2	e.3	3	0
3	f.3	2	0

REDUCTION OF TEST-NODES  
\*\*\*\*\*

NUMBER OF T.N.	INCLUDING T.N. VARIABLES	TOTAL NUMBER OF D.F.	TOTAL NUMBER OF U.D.F.
1	e.3	3	0
2	e.7	4	2
3	f.3	4	4

ABBREVIATIONS:

T.N. - TEST NODES  
D.F. - DETECTED FAULTS  
U.D.F. - UNIQUELY DETECTED FAULTS

The information of the last table (reduction of test-nodes) is described graphically in Figure D.2. This graph is not provided by the current software, but can be easily added to it.






Figure D.2: Number of detected faults as a function of number of test-nodes

## APPENDIX E: Implementation of the CFDIC PROGRAM

### E.1 Implementation notes

These implementation notes attend to assist a user of CFDIC, or one who wishes to develop this software further. It includes efficiency matters, limitations of the program and other relevant information concern the software.

1. **Input-junctions:** Based on the graphical presentation of the FDD problem (section 2.5), an input-junction should be a simple junction associated with an input variable. Two types of sources are allowed in bond graphs, a source of effort, SE, and a source of flow, SF. Hence, an input-junction is either a 0-junction adjacent to SE or a 1-junction adjacent to SF.

From efficiency point of view, we can define the input-junctions as the source-ports, SE or SF, without changing the basic principles of paths between inputs and outputs. This is true since the sources are always leaves (nodes of 1-degree), thus a path from SE or SF to any output contains the theoretical path with addition of the source port, which is never associated with a fault. Source ports are easy to find (by the software) from the input variable data (provided by the user), and no extra junctions need to be added to the graph.

2. **Partial proper bond graph:** Following the procedure shown in Fig. 3.2, the first step, after reading in the bond graph, is to convert it into the proper bond graph. This process is associated with addition of many identity-junctions, that may be defined later as out put junction or fault-junctions. Practically, many identity-junctions are later unused,

while increasing the memory size for no reason. In order to avoid this situation, Knowing the output variables and fault variables, which are provided by the user, identity-junctions are only added to the graph when needed, i.e., when they are defined as output-junctions or fault-junctions and they do not exist in the original graph (input-junctions are defined as the sources themselves).

The missing identity junctions do not change the paths from input to outputs, since, by definition, they are two-degree junctions. Two-degree junctions, added to a graph can only lengthen existing paths without changing their topology.

3. **Software limitation:** The current version of CFDIC, used by a PC is limited to the following:

- 100 nodes
- 100 bonds
- 20 inputs
- 20 test-nodes
- 20 faults


4. The bond graph is assumed to have no signals. A slight improvement of the reader would ignore signals when reading the input file.

5. Basic subroutines were written independently, such that they could be used for various applications. For example, the depth-first-search labeling (subroutine DFSLBL) is used for three purposes: checks connectedness of the graph, finds paths, and defines the blocks.

6. Unnecessary information is destroyed. After a block is defined and is changed into a block-node, the contents of that block is destroyed. If this software will extended to detect faults inside a block, this information should be kept in a separate file.

7. In the current software the MBG description, i.e., its node list and its incident list, are stored in the place as the original graph. Hence, after the MBG has been defined, including the corresponding input, output and fault junctions, the original graph no longer exists and the software relates to the MBG as the basic bond graph. This procedure should be change if the software is used also for other applications.

## E.2 Calling tree structure



**E.3 Listing**

```

PROGRAM MAIN
  CALL CFDIC
END

```

```

C----- CFDIC -----
      SUBROUTINE CFDIC
C
C---DESCRIPTION: CFDIC (CATASTROPHIC FAULT DICTIONARY) PROGRAM PROVIDES,
C                  BASICALLY, THE CFD FOR A GIVEN SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM IS DEFINED
C                  BY ITS BOND GRAPH MODEL. INPUTS AND TEST -NODE LOCATIONS ARE
C                  SPECIFIED BY THE USER, ALSO FAULT-LIST IS PROVIDED BY THE
C                  USER. THE CFD IS STORED IN AN ARRAY (D). DESIGN-FOR-
C                  TESTABILITY OPTIONS ARE INCLUDED IN THIS SUBROUTINE (SEE
C                  DETAILS IN INPUT/OUTPUT).
C
C---INPUTS: SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, FILE: SYS.DAT, DEFINED BY TWO LISTS:
C              1. NODE-LIST, CONTAINING NODE NAMES AND TYPES;
C              2. INCIDENT-LIST, CONTAINING BOND NAMES AND THEIR CONNECTIONS.
C
C              INPUT, OUTPUT AND FAULT VARIABLES, PROVIDED IN THREE LISTS IN
C              FILE: VAR.DAT.
C
C              INDX - SPECIFY RUNNING OPTION, SEE OUTPUT.
C
C---OUTPUTS: FOR INDX=0: * D - FAULT DICTIONARY ARRAY
C
C              FOR INDX=1: * D - FAULT DICTIONARY ARRAY
C                      * FAULT REPORT
C              default option: if fault list is not specified by the user
C                      the software provides the complete list of
C                      detected faults and the fault report.
C
C              FOR INDX=2: * TEST-NODE DETECTABILITY REPORT
C
C---LIMITATIONS: 100 NODES
C                  100 BONDS
C                  20 INPUTS
C                  20 TEST-NODES
C                  20 FAULTS
C
C---INTERNAL VARIABLES:
C
C      L      number of inputs
C      M      number of test-nodes
C      N      number of prospective faults
C      UV     input variables
C      TV     test-node variables
C      FV     fault variables
C      U      input ports
C      T      test-node junctions (SJ)
C      F      fault junctions (SJ)
C      DFI    Depth-First-Index, defined for each node
C      FA     "father" of each node, defined as the node number visited before
C      CUTP   list of cut points of the graph
C      D      catastrophic fault dictionary array
C
C---DECLARATIONS:
      CHARACTER*10 UV(20),TV(20),FV(20)
      CHARACTER*8  ELNAM(100),BDNAM(100),STACK(100),BLOCK(100)
      CHARACTER*8  U(20),T(20),F(20,2),CUTP(100),NODEB(100),BONDB(100)

```

```

      CHARACTER*8 NOTE(100),PATH(100)
      CHARACTER*4 NBXTP(100),NBXTPB(100),BDTP(100)
      CHARACTER*3 OPT(20)
      INTEGER IELSD(100,2),IELSBB(100,2),IBDPTR(100),IBDSEL(100)
      INTEGER D(20,20,20),DFI(100),FA(100),ICUT(100),CO
      COMMON INELS,INBDS,ELNAM,BDNAM,IBDPTR,IELSD,IBDSEL,NBXTP,BDTP
      COMMON/A/STACK,I0,DFI,FA
      COMMON/BLOCK/INODE,IBOND,NODEB,BONDB,IELSBB
      COMMON/BLGRPH/IBLCK,IEXTB,NEXT
      COMMON/C/CUTP,ICUT,IC,CO,I11
      COMMON/DD/D
      COMMON/INDEX/INDX
      COMMON/FNOTES/NOTE
      COMMON/V/ UV,TV,FV,L,M,N,U,T,F,OPT
C-----
      OPEN(8,FILE='A.DAT',STATUS='NEW')
C---Reads and stores system data
      WRITE(8,106)
1      CALL FREAD
C
C---Checks if the graph is connected
2      ICON=0
      CALL DFSLBL(ELNAM(1))
      DO 10 I=1,INELS
        IF (DFI(I).EQ.0) THEN
          WRITE (8,107)
          GOTO 99
        ENDIF
10     CONTINUE
C
C---Reads input, output, and fault-list variables
C      IF (INDX.EQ.2) INDX=3
3      CALL READVR
C
C---Finds input, output, and fault-list junctions associated with
C the input, output, and fault-list variables
4      WRITE (8,100)
      DO 15 I=1,L
        CALL INPUTJ(UV(I),U(I))
        WRITE (8,101) UV(I)
15     CONTINUE
      IF (INDX.EQ.2) WRITE (8,110)
      IF (INDX.NE.2) WRITE (8,102)
      NEXT=0
      IEXTB=0
      DO 20 J=1,M
        CALL TESTNJ(TV(J),T(J))
        WRITE (8,101) TV(J)
20     CONTINUE
      DO 85 I=1,INELS
        NOTE(I)=' '
85     CONTINUE
C
      IF (INDX.EQ.11) GOTO 5
      WRITE (8,103)
      DO 25 K=1,N
        CALL FAULTJ(FV(K),F(K,1),F(K,2),OPT(K))
        WRITE (8,101) FV(K)
25     CONTINUE
C

```



```

C---Checks if the graph is a tree
5   IF ((INELS-INBDS).EQ.1) GOTO 8
C
C---Determines the blocks of the graph
6   CALL BLCKFD(1)
C
C---Finds cut nodes of the graph
    I=0
    CO=0
11  I=I+1
    IF (I.EQ.IC+1) GOTO 12
    IF (ICUT(I).EQ.1) THEN
        CO=CO+1
        CUTP(CO)=CUTP(I)
    ENDIF
    GOTO 11
C
C--Creates block-graph
C
C---Initializes
12  INODE=0
    IBOND=0
    IBLCK=0
    DO 30 I=1,INELS
        NODEB(I)=' '
30  CONTINUE
    DO 35 I=1,INBDS
        BONDB(I)=' '
        IELSB(1,I)=0
        IELSB(2,I)=0
35  CONTINUE
C
C---Collects data for the block graph
C
C---Finds all nodes with degree one and put them on block graph
C   node list. add bonds that are adjacent to these nodes to
C   block graph.
    DO 70 I=1,INELS
        NEXTPB(I)='MBG '
        NN=IBDPTR(I+1)-IBDPTR(I)
        IF (NN.EQ.1) THEN
            INODE=INODE+1
            NODEB(INODE)=ELNAM(I)
            NEXTPB(INODE)=NEXTPB(I)
        ENDIF
70  CONTINUE
    I11=INODE
C
C---Adds all cut nodes to block-graph node list
    DO 90 I=INODE+1,INODE+CO
        NODEB(I)=CUTP(I-INODE)
        CALL NAMNO(CUTP(I-INODE),'N',JO)
        NEXTPB(I)=NEXTPB(JO)
90  CONTINUE
    INODE=INODE+CO
C
C---Adds block-graph nodes, bond list and incident list
    CALL BLCKFD(2)
C
C---Completes block-graph data base

```

```

      INELS=INODE
      INBDS=IBOND
      DO 45 I=1,INELS
        ELNAM(I)=NODEB(I)
        NBXTP(I)=NBXTPB(I)
45     CONTINUE
      DO 55 I=1,IBOND
        BDNAM(I)=BONDB(I)
        IELSD(I,1)=IELSBB(I,1)
        IELSD(I,2)=IELSBB(I,2)
55     CONTINUE
C
      IBDPTR(1)=1
      LBD=0
      DO 75 I=1,INELS
        IBDPTR(I+1)=IBDPTR(I)
        DO 65 J=1,INBDS
          IF (IELSD(J,1).EQ.I.OR.IELSD(J,2).EQ.I) THEN
            IBDPTR(I+1)=IBDPTR(I+1)+1
            LBD=LBD+1
            IBDSEL(LBD)=J
          ENDIF
65      CONTINUE
75     CONTINUE

C
      WRITE(8,109)
      IF (INDX.NE.11) GOTO 9
C
C---find the detected faults (only for default of option 1)
      WRITE (8,104)
      WRITE (8,105)
      DO 40 I=1,L
        CALL DFSLBL(U(I))
        DO 50 J=1,M
          CALL NAMNO(T(J),'N',JO)
          CALL PATHFND(JO,PATH,KO)
          CALL FLTLST(PATH,KO)
50      CONTINUE
40     CONTINUE
C
      DO 95 K=1,N
        CALL FAULTJ(FV(K),F(K,1),F(K,2),OPT(K))
95     CONTINUE
C
C---Finds the fault dictionary for a tree graph
      IF (INDX.EQ.0) WRITE (8,123)
      CALL TREDIC
C
C---Process Faults/Test-Nodes Report
      IF (INDX.EQ.0) GOTO 99
      IF (INDX.EQ.1.OR.INDX.EQ.11) CALL FAULT(D,0,ND,NI,INDX)
      IF (INDX.EQ.2) THEN
        CALL TNODE
        CALL RTNODE
      ENDIF
C
100    FORMAT(//,'  INPUT VARIABLES',/,3X,15('*'))
101    FORMAT(6X,A10)
102    FORMAT(/,'  OUTPUT VARIABLES',/,3X,16('*'))

```

```

103 FORMAT(/,' FAULT VARIABLES',/,3X,15('*'))
104 FORMAT(/,' LIST OF FAULTS, DETECTED BY')
105 FORMAT(' THE GIVEN INPUTS AND TEST NODES',/,1X,31('*'))
106 FORMAT(/,'1. D A T A',/,20('-'),/)
107 FORMAT(/,' THE GRAPH IS A DISCONNECTED GRAPH')
109 FORMAT(/,'2. R E S U L T S',/,20('-'),/)
110 FORMAT(/,' INITIAL TEST-NODE VARIABLES',/,3X,27('*'))
112 FORMAT(10X,A8)
121 FORMAT(1X,A8,5X,A8,5X,A8)
122 FORMAT(1X,A10,12X,A8)
123 FORMAT(/,' FAULT DICTIONARY, DEFINED BY PAGES',/,3X,34('*'))
124 FORMAT(/,' FAULT INFORMATION',/,18('*'))
99 CLOSE(8)
RETURN
END

```

[illegible]



C---DECLARATIONS:

```

integer IBDPTR(100),IELSBD(100,2),IBDSEL(100)
INTEGER DFI(100),DF,FA(100),P(100),ICUT(100),CO
character*8 BDNAM(100),ELNAM(100),STACK(100),BLOCK(100)
CHARACTER*8 BDNAML(100),CUTP(100)
common INELS,INBDS,ELNAM,BDNAM,IBDPTR,IELSBD,IBDSEL,NBXT
COMMON/A/ STACK,IO,DFI,FA
COMMON/B/BDNAML
COMMON/C/ CUTP,ICUT,IC,CO,I11
COMMON/P/IND

```

C\*\*\*\*\*

IND=INDEX

C---Put all edges on the unused list

```

1      DO 84 I=1,INBDS
84      BDNAML(I)=BDNAM(I)

```

C

C---Empty the stack and initialize

```

      DO 83 I=1,INELS
          STACK(I)=' '
          IF (INDEX.EQ.1) CUTP(I)=' '
          DFI(I)=0
          ICUT(I)=0
83      CONTINUE
          IO=0
          IC=0
          ID=0
          JO=1

```

C

```

2      ID=ID+1
          DFI(JO)=ID
          P(JO)=ID
          CALL SSTACK(ELNAM(JO))

```

C

```

3      CALL AJN(JO,J1)
          IF (J1.EQ.0) GOTO 5

```

C

```

4      IF (DFI(J1).NE.0) THEN
          P(JO)=MIN(P(JO),DFI(J1))
          GOTO 3
      ENDIF
      IF (DFI(J1).EQ.0) THEN
          FA(J1)=JO
          JO=J1
          GOTO 2
      ENDIF

```

C

```

5      IF (DFI(FA(JO)).EQ.1) GOTO 9

```

C

```

6      IF (P(JO).LT.DFI(FA(JO))) THEN
          P(FA(JO))=MIN(P(FA(JO)),P(JO))
          GOTO 8
      ENDIF

```

C

```

7      CALL POPSTK(ELNAM(JO),ELNAM(FA(JO)),KO,BLOCK)
8      JO=FA(JO)
          GOTO 3
9      CALL POPSTK(ELNAM(JO),ELNAM(FA(JO)),KO,BLOCK)
10     CALL AJN(1,J1)
          IF (J1.EQ.0) GOTO 99
          IF (J1.NE.0) THEN

```



[illegible]





[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

```
IF (ABS(DD(I,J)).EQ.1) GOTO 30
```

```

40      CONTINUE
        IN=1
        AM(KO)=ISET
        AM(K)=ISET
30      CONTINUE
        IF (IN.EQ.1) ISET=ISET+1
10      CONTINUE
        DO 50 K=1,N
          IF (AM(K).EQ.0) AM(K)=999
          IF (AM(K).EQ.111.AND.INDEX.NE.0) WRITE(8,103) K,FV(K)
          IF (AM(K).EQ.999) THEN
            IF (INDEX.EQ.1) WRITE(8,104) K,FV(K)
            IF (INDEX.EQ.11) WRITE(8,113) K,FV(K),F(K,1)
          ENDIF
          IF (AM(K).LT.100) THEN
            IF (INDEX.NE.0) WRITE(8,111)
            IF (INDEX.EQ.1) WRITE(8,105) K,FV(K),AM(K)
            IF (INDEX.EQ.11) THEN
              IF (F(K,1)(1:4).EQ.'EXTN') F(K,1)='*'
              WRITE(8,114) K,FV(K),F(K,1),AM(K)
            ENDIF
          ENDIF
50      CONTINUE
        IF (INDEX.NE.0) WRITE(8,101)
        ND=0
        NI=0
        DO 60 K=1,N
          IF(AM(K).EQ.999) NI=NI+1
          IF(AM(K).EQ.111) ND=ND+1
60      CONTINUE
        ND=N-ND
        IF (INDEX.EQ.1) THEN
          WRITE(8,106) ND*100./N
          WRITE(8,107) NI*100./N
        ENDIF
        IF (INDEX.EQ.11) THEN
          WRITE(8,116)
          WRITE(8,117)
          WRITE(8,118)
          WRITE(8,119)
        ENDIF
C
        IF (INDEX.NE.0) WRITE(8,108)
        DO 70 KO=1,N
          IF (AM(KO).LT.100) THEN
            IF (INDEX.NE.0) THEN
              WRITE(8,109) AM(KO)
              WRITE(8,110) KO
            ENDIF
          DO 80 K=KO+1,N
            IF(AM(K).EQ.AM(KO)) THEN
              IF (INDEX.NE.0) WRITE(8,110) K
              AM(K)=222
            ENDIF
          DO 80 K=KO+1,N
80      CONTINUE
        ENDIF
70      CONTINUE
C
100     FORMAT(/,'  FAULT REPORT'./,' *****'/)
101     FORMAT(LX,66('_'))

```

```

102 FORMAT(/,3X,' FAULT',9X,'DEFINED BY',8X,'DIAGNOSIS',/)
103 FORMAT(/,7X,'F',I2,9X,A6,'-0',8X,'UNDETECTABLE')
104 FORMAT(/,7X,'F',I2,9X,A6,'-0',8X,'DETECTABLE, UNIQUELY')
105 FORMAT(7X,'F',I2,9X,A6,'-0',8X,'DETECTABLE, AMBIGUITY SET #',I2)
106 FORMAT(/,' TOTAL DETECTION PERCENTAGE: ',F5.1,'%')
107 FORMAT(/,' UNIQUE DETECTION PERCENTAGE: ',F5.1,'%')
108 FORMAT(/,' AMBIGUITY SETS',/,3X,I4('*'))
109 FORMAT(/,' AMBIGUITY SET #',I2,' CONTAINS:')
110 FORMAT(30X,'FAULT #',I2)
111 FORMAT(' ')
112 FORMAT(/,' FAULT DEFINED ASSOCIATED DIAGNOSIS')
113 FORMAT(2X,' BY WITH S.J.',/)
114 FORMAT(/,3X,'F',I2,5X,A6,'-0',9X,A8,7X,'DETECTED, UNIQUELY')
115 FORMAT(3X,'F',I2,5X,A6,'-0',9X,A8,7X,'DETECTABLE, A.S. #',I2)
116 FORMAT(1X,'* THE S.J. ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAULT DOES NOT')
117 FORMAT(3X,'APPEAR IN THE ORIGINAL GRAPH')
118 FORMAT(/,' ABBREVIATIONS:',/, ' S.J. - SIMPLE JUNCTION')
119 FORMAT(2X,'A.S. - AMBIGUITY SET')
99 RETURN
END

```

[illegible]

```
C      SUBROUTINE FAULTJ(VAR,JCN1,JCN2,OPT)
C
C---DESCRIPTION: THIS SUBROUTINE DEFINES THE FAULT JUNCTION
C                FOR A GIVEN VARIABLE.
C
C---INPUT: VAR - VARIABLE NAME, ONLY FLOW OR EFFORT ALLOWED, WRITTEN
C              AS: e.BOND-NAME OR f.BOND-NAME
C
C---OUTPUT: JCN1 - THE FIRST (OR ONLY) FAULT-LIST JUNCTION NAME
C            JCN2 - THE SECOND FAULT-LIST JUNCTION NAME
C            OPT  - INDICATES THE EXISTENCE OF TWO ADJACENT
C                  ZERO-JUNCTIONS OR TWO ADJACENT 1-JUNCTIONS
```

```
C---DECLARATIONS:
      CHARACTER VAR*10,JCN1*8,JCN2*8
      CHARACTER*8  ELNAM(100),BDNAM(100),BOND,NNAM1,NNAM2,NOTE(100)
      CHARACTER*4  NBXTP(100)
      CHARACTER*3  OPT
      CHARACTER    TYP1,TYP2,V
      INTEGER IELSD(100,2),IBDPTR(100),IBDSEL(100)
      COMMON INELS,INBDS,ELNAM,BDNAM,IBDPTR,IELSD,IBDSEL,NBXTP
      COMMON/FNOTES/NOTE
```

**C\*\*\*\*\***

```
C---initializes
      OPT-'      '
      JCN1-'
      JCN2-'
      V=VAR(1:1)
      BOND=VAR(3:10)
```

```

C
C---Checks whether the bond appear on the graph
      CALL NAMNO(BOND, 'B', I)
      IF (I.EQ.0) THEN
        WRITE (8,100) BOND
        GOTO 99
      ENDIF

```

C



```
C      path defined by PATH.
C
C---INPUTS: PATH - a list of elements
C           INELS - number of elements in the graph (common)
C           F1 - the first element name which defines a fault
C           F2 - the second element which defines a fault, if
C                the fault is defined by one element - F2 will
C                be empty
C           KO - NUMBER OF NODES IN THE PATH
C           OPT - a special indication of existence of two
C                 adjacent junctions or junctions as faulty junctions.
C
C---OUTPUT: in - index which defines the existence of F on Path
C              if IN=0 then the fault (F1, F2) is on PATH
C              if IN=1 then the fault (F1, F2) is not on PATH
C
C---DECLARATIONS:
C          character*8 PATH(100),F1,F2
C          CHARACTER*3 OPT
C*****
C
C       IN=1
C       IN1=1
C       IN2=1
C       IF (OPT.EQ.' ') THEN
C         DO 10 I=1,KO
C           IF (F1.EQ.PATH(I)) IN=0
10        CONTINUE
C       ELSE
C         DO 20 I=1,KO
C           IF (F1.EQ.PATH(I)) IN1=0
C           IF (F2.EQ.PATH(I)) IN2=0
20        CONTINUE
C       IF (OPT.EQ.'AND') THEN
C         IF (IN1.EQ.0.AND.IN2.EQ.0) IN=0
C       ENDIF
C       IF (OPT.EQ.'OR ') THEN
C         IF (IN1.EQ.0.OR.IN2.EQ.0) IN=0
C       ENDIF
C     ENDF
C     RETURN
C     END
C
C>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> FLTLST <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
C
C       SUBROUTINE FLTLST(PATH,KO)
C
C---DESCRIPTION: THE SUBROUTINE COLLECTS THE DETECTABLE FAULTS
C               THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A GIVEN PATH (DEFINED
C               BY NODE LIST) AND STACK THEM.
C
C---INPUTS: SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (IN COMMON)
C           PATH - A PATH DEFINED BY NODE LIST
C           KO - PATH LENGTH (NUMBER OF NODES)
C
C---OUTPUTS: FAULT/S ASSOCIATED WITH A GIVEN PATH
C            (COLLECTED BY SUBROUTINE FSTACK)
C
C---DECLARATIONS:
C       INTEGER IDBPTR(100),IELSD(100,2),IBDSEL(100)
```



```

CHARACTER*10 VAR1,VAR2
CHARACTER*8 BDNAM(100),ELNAM(100),PATH(100),A,B,BOND
CHARACTER*4 NBXTP(100)
INTEGER IN(100)
COMMON INELS,INBDS,ELNAM,BDNAM,IBDPTR,IELSD,IBDSEL,NBXTP
C*****
INDEX=0
DO 10 K=1,K0-1
  IN(K)=0
  A=PATH(K)
  B=PATH(K+1)
  CALL NAMNO(A,'N',IO)
  CALL NAMNO(B,'N',JO)
  CALL BNDFND(IO,JO,BOND)
C
  IF (K.EQ.K0-1) THEN
    VAR1(3:10)=BOND
    IF (NBXTP(JO)(2:2).EQ.'E') VAR1(1:2)='f.'
    IF (NBXTP(JO)(2:2).EQ.'F') VAR1(1:2)='e.'
    CALL FSTACK(VAR1)
    GOTO 10
  ENDIF
C
  IF (K.EQ.1.AND.BOND(1:3).EQ.'EXT') THEN
    CALL NAMNO(A,'N',JO)
    NN=IBDPTR(JO+1)-IBDPTR(JO)
    DO 20 I=IBDPTR(JO),IBDPTR(JO)+NN-1
      BOND=BDNAM(IBDSEL(I))
      IF(BOND(1:3).EQ.'EXT') GOTO 20
      VAR1(3:10)=BOND
      IF (NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'0') VAR1(1:2)='e.'
      IF (NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'1') VAR1(1:2)='f.'
      CALL FSTACK(VAR1)
      GOTO 10
    CONTINUE
  ENDIF
20
  IF (BOND(1:3).EQ.'EXT') THEN
    IN(K)=1
    IF (K.GT.1.AND.IN(K-1).EQ.1) THEN
      IF (NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'0') WRITE(8,100) A
      IF (NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'1') WRITE(8,100) A
    ENDIF
    GOTO 10
  ENDIF
  IF (NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'T'.OR.NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'G') THEN
    INDEX=1
    GOTO 10
  ENDIF
  VAR1(1:2)='e.'
  VAR1(3:10)=BOND
  VAR2(1:2)='f.'
  VAR2(3:10)=BOND
  IF (INDEX.EQ.1) THEN
    IF (NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'0') CALL FSTACK(VAR2)
    IF (NBXTP(IO)(2:2).EQ.'1') CALL FSTACK(VAR1)
    INDEX=0
    GOTO 10
  ENDIF
  CALL FSTACK(VAR1)
  CALL FSTACK(VAR2)

```

[illegible]



[illegible]

```

IF (V.EQ.'f') THEN
  IF (TYP1.EQ.'F') THEN
    JCN=NNAM1
    GOTO 99
  ENDIF
  IF (TYP2.EQ.'F') THEN
    JCN=NNAM2
    GOTO 99
  ENDIF
ENDIF
WRITE(8,101) VAR
100 FORMAT(/,' BOND NAMED: ',A8,' DOES NOT EXIST ON THE GRAPH')
101 FORMAT(/,2X,A10,' IS NOT AN EXCEPTABLE INPUT VARIABLE')
99 RETURN
END

```

[illegible]

**SUBROUTINE NAME(TYPE,STRING)**

C  
C---DESCRIPTION: THE SUBROUTINE NAMES A BLOCK, AN EXTRA NODE OR AN  
C EXTRA BOND

**C---DECLARATIONS:**

CHARACTER TYPE, STRING\*8  
COMMON/BLGRPH/IBLCK,IEXTB,NEXT

**C\*\*\*\*\***

```

IF (TYPE.EQ.'N') THEN
  STRING(1:4)='BLCK'
  IBLCK=IBLCK+1
  WRITE(STRING(5:6),'(12.2)') IBLCK
ENDIF
IF (TYPE.EQ.'B') THEN
  STRING(1:4)='EXTB'
  IEXTB=IEXTB+1
  WRITE(STRING(5:6),'(12.2)') IEXTB
ENDIF
IF (TYPE.EQ.'O') THEN
  STRING(1:4)='EXTN'
  NEXT=NEXT+1
  WRITE(STRING(5:6),'(12.2)') NEXT
ENDIF
RETURN
END

```

[illegible]

SUBROUTINE NAMNO(NAME,NB,NO)

C  
C---DESCRIPTION: THE SUBROUTINE PROVIDES THE NODE/BOND NUMBER  
C (IN THE NODE/BOND LIST) FOR A GIVEN NAME

C---INPUTS: NAME - NODE/BOND NAME

**NB - DEFINED THE NEEDED INFORMATION:**

**NB-'N' -> NODE NUMBER REQUIRED**

**NB-'B' -> BOND NUMBER REQUIRED**

C---OUTPUT: NO - NODE/BOND NUMBER. IF NO=0, THE NODE/BOND IS  
C NOT ON THE LIST.

**C**

[illegible]

```

C---INPUT: NODE - NODE NAME, THE LAST ONE IN THE DEFINED BLOCK
C      NODE1 - THE NAME OF THE "FATHER" OF "NODE"
C      STACK - OLD STACK (STORED IN COMMON/A/)
C      IO - # OF NODES IN OLD STACK (STORED IN COMMON/A/)
C
C---OUTPUT: BLOCK - LIST OF NODES THAT ARE IN THE SAME BLOCK
C      KO - # OF NODES IN THE BLOCK
C      STACK - UP TO DATE STACK (STORED IN COMMON/A/)
C      IO - # OF NODES IN UP TO DATE STACK
C
C---DECLARATIONS:
      CHARACTER*8 STACK(100),BLOCK(100),NODE,NODE1
      INTEGER DFI(100),FA(100)
      COMMON/A/ STACK,IO,DFI,FA
      COMMON/P/INDEX
C*****
      K=0
      DO 10 I=1,IO
        IF (STACK(I).EQ.NODE) K=I
10     CONTINUE
        IF (K.EQ.0) GOTO 99
        DO 20 I=1,IO-K+1
          BLOCK(I)=STACK(I+K-1)
20     CONTINUE
        KO=IO-K+2
        BLOCK(KO)=NODE1
        IO=K-1
        IF (INDEX.EQ.1) CALL CUTPNT(KO,BLOCK)
        IF (INDEX.EQ.2) CALL BLCKGR(KO,BLOCK)
99     RETURN
      END
C
CFILE:READVR----- READVR -----
C
C---PURPOSE: READS THE INPUT, OUTPUT AND FAULT-LIST VARIABLES.
C      COUNTS NUMBER OF INPUTS, OUTPUTS AND FAULT VARIABLES.
C
CFOFH:READVR-----
      SUBROUTINE READVR
      CHARACTER*10 STRING*80,H*10,UV(20),TV(20),FV(20)
      CHARACTER*8 U(20),T(20),F(20,2)
      CHARACTER*3 OPT(20)
      COMMON/INDEX/INDX
      COMMON/V/UV,TV,FV,L,M,N,U,T,F,OPT
C
      OPEN(15,FILE='VAR.DAT',STATUS='OLD')
      L=0
      M=0
      N=0
C
10     READ(15,100) STRING
      IF (STRING(1:6).NE.'OPTION') GOTO 10
      READ(15,101) INDX
1     READ(15,100) STRING
      H=STRING(1:10)
      IF (H.NE.'INPUT VARI') GOTO 1
2     READ(15,100) STRING
      H=STRING(1:10)
      IF (H.EQ.'      ') GOTO 3
      L=L+1

```





**C**

**C**

**C**

C---DESCRIPTION: THIS SUBROUTINE ADDS NODES TO THE TOP OF THE STACK.

```
C ONLY IF THIS NODE DOES NOT EXIST THERE ALREADY.
```

```
C C
```

```
C---INPUT:  NODE - NODE NAME TO BE ADDED TO THE STACK  
C           STACK - OLD STACK (STORED IN COMMON/A/)  
C C
```

```
C---OUTPUT:  STACK - UP-TO-DATE STACK (STORED IN COMMON/A/)  
C            IO - # OF NODES IN THE UP TO DATE STACK (STORED IN COMMON/A/)  
C C
```

```
C---DECLARATIONS:  
          CHARACTER*8 STACK(100),NODE  
          INTEGER DFI(100),FA(100)  
          COMMON INELS,INBDS  
          COMMON/A/  STACK,IO,DFI,FA  
C*****  
          INDEX=0  
          IF (IO.EQ.0) GOTO 5  
          DO 10 I=1,IO  
             IF (STACK(I).EQ.NODE) INDEX=1  
10      CONTINUE  
5       IF (INDEX.EQ.0) THEN  
          IO=IO+1  
          STACK(IO)=NODE  
        ENDIF  
99      RETURN  
        END  
C C
```

```
C>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TESTNJ <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<  
C C
```

```
          SUBROUTINE TESTNJ(VAR,JCN)
```

```
C C
```

```
C---DESCRIPTION:  THIS SUBROUTINE DEFINES THE TEST-NODE (OUTPUT)  
C                JUNCTION FOR A GIVEN VARIABLE.  
C C
```

```
C---INPUT:  VAR - VARIABLE NAME, ONLY FLOW OR EFFORT ALLOWED, WRITTEN  
C            AS: e.BOND-NAME OR f.BOND-NAME  
C C
```

```
C---OUTPUT:  JCN - THE OUTPUT JUNCTION NAME (0-JUNCTION OR 1-JUNCTION)  
C C
```

```
C---DECLARATIONS:  
          CHARACTER*10 VAR  
          CHARACTER*8 ELNAM(100),BDNAM(100),BOND,NAM1,NAM2,JCN  
          CHARACTER*4 NBXTP(100)  
          CHARACTER TYP1,TYP2,V  
          INTEGER IELSD(100,2),IBDPTR(100),IBDSEL(100)  
          COMMON INELS,INBDS,ELNAM,BDNAM,IBDPTR,IELSD,IBDSEL,NBXTP  
C*****  
          JCN=''  
          V=VAR(1:1)  
          BOND=VAR(3:10)  
          CALL NAMNO(BOND,'B',I)  
          IF (I.EQ.0) THEN  
             WRITE (8,100) BOND  
             GOTO 99  
          ENDIF  
          IF (V.EQ.'e'.OR.V.EQ.'f') GOTO 1  
          WRITE (8,105) VAR  
          GOTO 99  
1         CALL CON(BOND,NAM1,NAM2,TYP1,TYP2)  
          IF (V.EQ.'e') THEN  
             IF (TYP1.EQ.'0') THEN
```



```

DO 20 I=1,L
DO 20 K=1,N
IF (D(I,J0,K).EQ.0) GOTO 2
20 CONTINUE
AT(J0)=111
GOTO 10
2 DO 30 J=J0+1,M
IF (AT(J).NE.0) GOTO 30
DO 40 I=1,L
DO 40 K=1,N
DD(I,K)=D(I,J,K)-D(I,J0,K)
IF (ABS(DD(I,K)).EQ.1) GOTO 30
40 CONTINUE
IN=1
AT(J0)=ISET
AT(J)=ISET
30 CONTINUE
IF (IN.EQ.1) ISET=ISET+1
10 CONTINUE
C
IN=0
DO 50 J0=1,M
IF (AT(J0).EQ.0) AT(J0)=999
IF (AT(J0).EQ.111) THEN
IN=IN+1
IF (IN.EQ.1) WRITE(8,101)
WRITE(8,104) J0,TV(J0)
ENDIF
50 CONTINUE
C
IN=0
DO 80 J0=1,M
IF (AT(J0).LT.100) THEN
IN=IN+1
IF (IN.EQ.1) WRITE(8,102)
WRITE(8,103) AT(J0)
WRITE(8,104) J0,TV(J0)
DO 70 J=J0+1,M
IF (AT(J).EQ.AT(J0)) THEN
WRITE(8,104) J,TV(J)
AT(J)=222
ENDIF
70 CONTINUE
ENDIF
80 CONTINUE
C
96 DO 95 J0=1,M
IF (AT(J0).EQ.111.OR.AT(J0).EQ.222) THEN
DO 88 J=J0,M-1
T(J)=T(J+1)
TV(J)=TV(J+1)
AT(J)=AT(J+1)
DO 88 I=1,L
DO 88 K=1,N
D(I,J,K)=D(I,J+1,K)
88 CONTINUE
M=M-1
GOTO 96
ENDIF
95 CONTINUE

```

```

100  FORMAT(///,3X,'TEST-NODES REPORT',/,3X,17('*'))
101  FORMAT(//,6X,'LIST OF UNNECESSARY TEST-NODES',/,6X,30('*'))
102  FORMAT(//,6X,'TEST-NODES EQUIVALENCE SETS',/,6X,27('*'))
103  FORMAT(/,9X,'TEST-NODE EQUIVALENCE SET #',I2,' CONTAINS:')
104  FORMAT(20X,'TEST-NODE #',I2,' (DEFINED BY ',A6,')')
99   RETURN

```

[illegible]

## SUBROUTINE TREDIC

```

C
C---DESCRIPTION: THE SUBROUTINE FINDS THE FAULT DICTIONARY (STORED
C                IN ARRAY D) FOR A TREE GRAPH. THE PROCEDURE CONTAINS
C                THE FOLLOWING STEPS:
C                1. LABEL THE GRAPH FOR EACH INPUT USING THE DFS
C                   ALGORITHM
C                2. FIND THE PATH FOR EACH INPUT-OUTPUT SET
C                3. CHECK WHETHER THE FAULTY JUNCTIONS (ONE BY ONE)
C                   EXIST ON THAT PATH AND PUT THE RELEVANT RESULTS
C                   IN THE FAULT DICTIONARY ARRAY, D.

```

C---INPUTS: SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (STORED IN COMMON).  
C INPUT, OUTPUT AND FAULTY JUNCTIONS (STORED IN COMMON/V/)

C---OUTPUT: D - CFD ARRAY (STORED IN COMMON/DD/)

**C---DECLARATIONS:**

```

CHARACTER*10 UV(20),TV(20),FV(20)
CHARACTER*8  ELNAM(100),BDNAM(100),PATH(100),STACK(100)
CHARACTER*8  U(20),T(20),F(20,2)
CHARACTER*4  NBXTP(100),BDTP(100)
CHARACTER*3  OPT(20)
INTEGER IELSD(100,2),IBDPTR(100),IBDSEL(100)
INTEGER D(20,20,20),DFI(100),FA(100)
COMMON INELS,INBDS,ELNAM,BDNAM,IBDPTR,IELSD,IBDSEL,NBXTP,BDTP
COMMON/A/STACK,IO,DFI,FA
COMMON/DD/D
COMMON/INDEX/ INDX
COMMON/V/ UV,TV,FV,L,M,N,U,T,F,OPT

```

```

C*****
      DO 40 I=1,L
        CALL DFSLBL(U(I))
        DO 50 J=1,M
          CALL NAMNO(T(J),'N',JO)
          CALL PATHFN(JO,PATH,KO)
          DO 60 K=1,N
            CALL FLTEXT(PATH,KO,F(K,1),F(K,2),OPT(K),D(I,J,K))
60      CONTINUE
50      CONTINUE
40      CONTINUE
      IF (INDX.GE.1) GOTO 99
      DO 70 K=1,N
        WRITE (8,105) FV(K)
        WRITE (8,106) D(1,1,K),D(1,2,K)
        WRITE (8,106) D(2,1,K),D(2,2,K)
70      CONTINUE
105     FORMAT(/,'      FOR FAULT DEFINED BY ',A5,'-0:')
106     FORMAT(38X,2(I3))
99      RETURN
      END

```

## APPENDIX F: Input files for five-degree-of-freedom suspension system

### F.1: System description

#### HEADING

##### FILE

CAR1.ENP

##### TITLE

CAR1.ENP: FIVE-DEGREE-OF-FREEDOM VEHICLE MODEL

#### SYSTEM GRAPH DESCRIPTION

NODE	TYPE	XLOC	YLOC
SF1	MFG	300.	400.
SF2	MFG	500.	400.
SE1	MEG	500.	300.
SE4	MEG	100.	-100.
SE5	MEG	100.	100.
OF1	MOG	700.	500.
1F1	M1G	700.	400.
RC2	MRG	700.	600.
CK2	MCG	500.	600.
OB1	MOG	800.	500.
1B1	M1G	900.	500.
1M1	M1G	800.	0.
RC3	MRG	150.	600.
CK3	MCG	0.	200.
TFF	MTG	-200.	100.
1R	M1G	50.	-100.
IJ2	MIG	400.	-200.
TBF	MTG	100.	-100.
1T	M1G	-50.	0.
IM2	MIG	800.	-200.
OD	MOG	-800.	-300.
1D	M1G	-550.	-300.
RC1	MRG	0.	0.
CK1	MCG	250.	300.
IM1	MIG	100.	100.
TFD	MTG	200.	400.
1Z4	M1G	100.	200.
IM4	MIG	0.	50.
1Z5	M1G	400.	600.
IM5	MIG	200.	100.
OF	MOG	300.	300.
1F	M1G	200.	-400.
CK4	MCG	-50.	-600.
RC4	MRG	-900.	-900.
OB	MOG	200.	750.
1B	M1G	700.	700.
CK5	MCG	500.	-600.
RC5	MRG	800.	600.

CONNECTOR	TYPE	FROM	TO	VERTICES
1	BM	OF	1Z4	
2	BM	OB	1Z5	
3	BM	1Z4	OF1	
4	BM	1Z5	OB1	
5	BM	OF1	1F1	
6	BM	OB1	1B1	
7	BM	OF1	TFF	
8	BR	TFF	1R	
9	BR	1R	TBF	
10	BM	TBF	OB1	
11	BM	OF1	1T	
12	BR	1R	TFD	
13	BM	TFD	OD	
14	BM	1T	OD	
15	BM	OB1	1T	
16	BM	OD	1D	
17	BM	OD	1M1	
s1	BM	SF1	OF	
s2	BM	SF2	OB	
f	BR	OF	1F	
ff	BM	OB	1B	
k4	BM	1F	CK4	
c4	BM	1F	RC4	
k5	BM	1B	CK5	
c5	BM	1B	RC5	
m4	BM	1Z4	IM4	
m5	BM	1Z5	IM5	
k2	BM	1F1	CK2	
c2	BM	1F1	RC2	
k3	BM	1B1	CK3	
c3	BM	1B1	RC3	
j2	BR	1R	IJ2	
m2	BM	1T	IM2	
i1	BM	1M1	IM1	
k1	BM	1D	CK1	
c1	BM	1D	RC1	
mg1	BM	SE1	1M1	
mg4	BM	SE4	1Z4	
mg5	BM	SE5	1Z5	

**F.2: Variable-list for option 1****OPTION**

1

**INPUT VARIABLES**

f.s1

f.s2

**OUTPUT VARIABLES**

e.m4

e.m2

e.i1

e.k2

**FAULT VARIABLES**

f.c2

e.3

e.k2

e.2

f.k5

**Variable-list for option 1 (default option)****OPTION**

1

**INPUT VARIABLES**

f.s1

**OUTPUT VARIABLES**

e.j2

e.m2

e.i1



**F.3: Variable-list for option 2**

OPTION

2

INPUT VARIABLES

f.s1

OUTPUT VARIABLES

e.j2

e.m2

e.i1

f.k2

e.m5

e.k2

f.k3

e.c2

e.c4

FAULT VARIABLES

f.5

e.6

e.11

e.16

f.4

e.k2

f.c2

f.3

f.15

f.12

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