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**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY EXECUTIVES'
PERCEPTION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THEIR AGENCIES**

presented by
Wen-Hsiung A. Hsieh

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**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY EXECUTIVES'
PERCEPTION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THEIR AGENCIES**

By

Wen-Hsiung A. Hsieh

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ABSTRACT

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY EXECUTIVES' PERCEPTION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THEIR AGENCIES

By

Wen-Hsiung A. Hsieh

Private security was considered as "private police" and as an adjunct to law enforcement. Owing to the recently pervasive trend of needs and growth of private security and cutback management of public resources, the relationships between private security and police agencies attract public attention.

The purpose of thesis is to examine the law enforcement, proprietary and contractual executives' perceptions of the relationships between their agencies. This was done by doing a secondary analysis of the survey data taken from the 1985 Hallcrest Report. The data was selected from a nationwide sample, which consisted of 384 (47%), 676 (30%) and 545 (12%) responses received from law enforcement, proprietary and contractual security executives respectively.

Chi-Square and Contingency-Coefficient tests were conducted to measure the association and strength of executives' perception and their answers. Overall, results indicate that there have fairly different perceptions and answers about their relationships between law enforcement and private security executives.

DEDICATED

To my wife, Dee

and

My parents

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**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY EXECUTIVES'
PERCEPTION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THEIR AGENCIES**

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND:

For years, the private security performances were rated fair-to-poor by public police officers. Many researchers have also expressed that private security is a mere adjunct to the criminal justice system (Kakalik and Wildhorn,1977). But, this might not be true in the mind of private security managers. Conversely, many of private security managers viewed the relationship quite differently and considered the criminal justice system as an adjunct to their own private system (Shearing and Stenning,1983:502). It is the attempt of this thesis to reveal some of the relationships between the executives' perception, recognition and their attitude toward the operation and performances of law enforcement and private security.

ISSUES ABOUT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY'S
RELATIONSHIP:

LEGAL ISSUE: The federal Trademark and Counterfeiting Act of 1984 authorized businesses expanded powers to protect their property and profits, including the right to conduct independent investigation, obtain search warrants, seize evidence, arrest suspects, and pursue private criminal justice prosecutions. It will evitably give the public police a new challenge and bring a change to the future. Will public and private initiatives forge links between themselves, so that they communicate and cooperate -- or will they fracture into two competing systems, antagonists battling for scarce dollars (Trojanowicz, 1989)?

FEAR-OF-CRIME ISSUE: There is a group of researchers who suggested that U.S. citizens and businesses have generally rejected the expectation that Criminal Justice authorities can successfully achieve their delegated responsibility of protecting life and property. And, these people have employed alternative measures in securing desired safety from criminal victimization (Klein, Luxenburg, and King, 1989).

DEMAND-SUPPLY ISSUE: Stewart (Nov., 1985) indicated that police confront problems of cutback management brought on by increasing demands and declining resources, just like other public administrators involved in the delivery of urban

services. One of the phenomenon is the greater public-private sector cooperation in securing and maintaining public safety.

Around the issues, we can see that the good or poor relationship of public police and private security will be influenced by the resources of the society. Most importantly, the attitude and perception of public police executives and private security managers toward each other might also influence whether there will be competitive or cooperative relationships between them.

HISTORY OF PRIVATE SECURITY:

There was a long history of private security forces in the United States even after the state sought to build up public protection through the establishment of public police forces in the 19th century; private interests continued to provide additional protection for themselves through private security (Spitzer and Scull,1977). During the middle of the nineteenth century, the private security companies expanded considerably in the United States, such as: Allan Pinkerton (began in 1855), Edwin Holmes (in 1858), Washington Perry Brink (in 1891), and William J. Burns (in 1909), with banks, railroads, and the U.S. Army as major clients.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE SECURITY:

Allan Pinkerton is considered the father of private security in the United States. In 1855, Pinkerton, a former Cook County, Illinois deputy sheriff, started the Pinkerton Detective Agency. The Pinkerton Agency was successful because public law enforcement agencies were unable to provide adequate protection and security to private citizens and private enterprises (Ricks, Tillett and VanMeter, 1988). Until 1924, when the FBI came into existence, public police forces were provided on a local basis only. Law enforcement beyond local political boundaries was consequently provided mainly by private security forces. Today, Pinkerton and other agencies are international in scope, and employ thousands of individuals in a variety of security services and activities.

THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE SECURITY:

World War II played a great role in stimulating the growth of the private security industry. Almost overnight, thousands of security personnel were employed in the protection of the nation's industries and working forces. In that period, the federal government required that contractors establish strict security measures to protect classified materials and defense secrets before national defense contracts would be awarded (Purpura, 1989).

Public and private police forces grew and evolved together. As public police forces began to develop the

capability of conducting investigations beyond local boundaries, private security forces shifted their role increasingly from investigative to guard services (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977). In recent years, owing to the increasing fear of crime in society and cutback management, public concern with the quality of the environment comes at a time when there is general recognition that police have moved away from their communities. A critical gap has developed between police services and the public's perception of need. The result is the market begins to look for substitution of alternatives (Steward, 1985).

The trend of growth in private security keeps increasing and has become more pervasive recently. In their research released in 1971, Kakalik and Wildhorn estimated the private security services cost \$2.5 billion in 1969 plus \$800 million more for security equipment; the compound annual growth rate of private security expenditures was approximately 11% during the 1963-1968 period.

Fourteen years later, estimates were released again in the Hallcrest Report. This report noted that annual expenditures for private security are estimated at \$22 billion, while \$14 billion is spent on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Total U.S. employment in private security is about 1.1 million, excluding federal security workers. The ratio of private security to public police is nearly 2:1, and this disparity is likely to grow

(Hallcrest Report, 1985). There are now almost twice as many people employed in private security as there are public police, and, the tendency is still increasing.

THE IMAGE OF PRIVATE SECURITY:

The stereotypical image on private guards and patrolmen, in particular, tends to that they are older, less educated, and more transient than the public police (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977). Their pay is lower,....The typical private guard is an aging white male, poorly educated, inadequately trained, and poorly paid.... some are a potential danger to the public, and, in fact, have been known to abuse their limited powers (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977).

On the other hand, the Hallcrest Report (1985) presents evidence that the private security industry has improved since the Rand and Justice Department task force reports were published. For instance, the typical security officer of today, is more likely to be younger (31 to 35 years of age) and more likely (50 percent) to have completed some college-level work.

Today, as Steward (1985) pointed out: Owing to cutback management the police priority is to responding to violent crimes or in-progress calls for robbery, murder, sexual assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and burglary. Other calls such as "cold" burglaries or larcenies receive a

deferred response.... and the public begin to search for alternatives. In public safety, this search has led to new options for citizens, both individual and corporate, and new challenges for public administrators (Steward,1985).

THE TERMS PRIVATE "POLICE" AND "SECURITY":

What is the definition of private security? This issue was discussed by several scholars in the last two decades at the perspective of private "police" or "policing" in comparison to the public police functions, (Shalloo,1933), (Becker,1974), (Draper,1978), and (Kakalik and Wildhorn,1977). They used the term "police" rather than "security" to interpret the functions of private security. Shearing and Stenning, and Cunningham and Taylor argued that this approach is inadequate and misperceptive of private security.

Shalloo (1933), in his book, 'Private Police', attempted to use purpose to define private "police". He stated that: the term 'police', connoting as it must delegation of power from the State or a creature of the State, implies a public character, just as "army" and "judge" connote public or State derivation.....the only satisfactory criterion of private police is purpose. For what purposes are they employed? If their employment is for the extra protection of private property, for which compensation is made by the employer, they

are private police in the sense used in his study (p.vii,viii).

The other classification of public and private "police" was made by Becker (1974) in terms of "sponsorship" and "services performed" as the basis of distinction. But, he also indicated that: we encounter too much overlapping of services performed and shifting of functions, all of which prevents any clear-cut conception of the services performed by either public or private police (p.443). He therefore stated: however, certain courses of analysis which can be pursued without the benefit of clear-cut definitions, but simply with notions of the concepts "public" and "private" police.

Draper (1978) suggested that: the word 'police' refers to the civil body charged with the task of maintaining public order. The 'police' to examine here differ in that, although they often perform functions similar to those of the police power, they are controlled by private enterprise working from a profit motive.In England, 'private police' is a term used mainly by those who are concerned to awaken the public to the potential threat to liberty and privacy. You will never hear a representative of the industry itself in this country talking in terms of 'private police' or 'private armies', and this approach is in reality the more accurate because, as we

shall see, the security guard and private detective generally have no more powers than the ordinary citizen and work within the confines of the law as it applies to you or me (p.8).

Kakalik and Wildhorn (1977) on this issue asserted that security forces may be categorized in several ways: by who employs them -- a public agency or a private business, institution, or individual; by the degree of police powers they possess; or by the functions they perform. One way of categorizing security services is by their objective or function. Broadly speaking, private security performs three classes of functions: information gathering (e.g., preemployment checks); maintaining order on and proper access to private property (e.g., guarding sporting events and industrial plants); and protection of persons and property by preventing and detecting crime, reducing losses to crime, and/or apprehending suspected criminals (e.g., guarding of homes and commercial, institutional) (p.8,9).

The others, such as Klein, Luxenburg and King (1989) used the term 'private policing industry' and 'informal social control' perspectives to analyze private security (p.366). Walsh and Donovan (1989) used 'private policing' to define private security and stated: public policing is a governmental function supported by tax revenues. Private policing, commonly referred to as private security, has had limited scholarly

analysis....the growth of private policing may be attributed in part to a demand for a preventive rather than a reactive approach to private policing, which in practice and philosophy is concerned with prevention and deterrence (p.187).

On the other hand, Shearing and Stenning (1983:493) suggested that: private security offers protection for both persons and property which is often more comprehensive than that provided by public police forces. They argued that viewing private security as an adjunct of public police by many sociologists, such as Becker(1974), Bunyan(1977), Kakalik and Wildhorn(1977) is inappropriate. Hence, Shearing and Stenning stated that: "Broadly followed the tradition and have treated private security as little more than a private adjunct to the public criminal justice system and assumed that private security is essentially a private form of public policing, and that it can be understood in the same way as the public police." They concluded that this approach to understanding private security is inadequate, it fails to account for some of the most important differences between private security and public police and, more importantly, between the contexts within which each operates (p.494). They pointed out: three characteristics of private security reveal its essential nature which are " non-specialized character, client-defined mandate and the character of the sanctions it employs."

The other group of researchers, Cunningham and Taylor (1985), also indicated in their Hallcrest Report that the term "private police" as used throughout the Rand report (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971) on private security has inaccurately characterized private security and become a source for misperceptions and stereotypes of private security that have undermined law enforcement and private security relationships over the past decade (p.167). They think and believe that: the varying emphasis placed on specific crime control functions is the primary distinction between private security and law enforcement. Within this context, the crime prevention effort simply becomes one of the many functions that support a specific organizational goal: to protect lives and property (p.167). Therefore, they urged that labeling private security the "private police" unfairly and incorrectly restricts the scope and invites comparisons from a police perspective rather than from the comprehensive framework of protective functions.

Bayley on the different point of view in the book Private Policing (1987) indicated that: In particular, "public" and "private" policing never wholly supplant one another. Indeed, the distinction itself becomes problematic in many circumstances. Public and private police institutions cooperate, sometimes interpenetrate, and often share modes of operation (p.6).

There was also an attempt to define the meaning of private security by the Task Force on Private Security in The Report of Private Security (1976:3). It explained that Private security has many meanings for many people. Colloquially, the term "private security" describes individual and organizational measures and efforts (as distinguished from public law enforcement agency efforts) that provide protection for persons and property. It also describes business enterprises that provide services and products to achieve this protection. A universally acceptable and explicit definition is difficult to construct because private security is not only identified with the performance of certain functions and activities of a public nature, but also encompasses many activities for the private sector (p.3). After their explanations of terms, the Task Force was defining private security as: "includes those self-employed individuals and privately funded business entities and organizations providing security-related services to specific clientele for a fee, for the individual or entity that retains or employs them, or for themselves, in order to protect their persons, private property, or interests from varied hazards" (p.4). Meanwhile, they also indicated that many security concerns and functions -- crime prevention and reduction and order maintenance -- are common to both the public and private sectors, but the degree of emphasis placed on these common

concerns and functions provides another distinguishing characteristic between the two. Private security focuses on the prevention and reduction of crime affecting private property. Public law enforcement primarily is concerned with order maintenance and criminal apprehension and enforces laws within a constitutionally and statutorily mandated criminal justice system (p.5,6). The terms defined by The Task Force on Private Security are fairly neutral on the meaning of private security.

Around the discussion private "police" (or "security") above; it would be appropriate to define private security from its protective functions or services in a narrow scope which emphasizes on the loss prevention in the whole crime control framework and having some overlapping crime prevention functions with law enforcement. It consists of three major programs: Physical Security; Information Security (including computer security, and proprietary information protection); and Personnel Security (including employee screening, security awareness and executive protection).

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY:

According to the concept of the Hallcrest Report on private security regarding specific crime control functions, the role of law enforcement on crime prevention and control

and the role of private security on assets protection and loss prevention seem to be appropriate.

Post and kingsbury (1977:17) visualize the relationship of law enforcement and private security roles as two slightly intersecting spheres of crime prevention (law enforcement) and loss prevention (private security). The Private Security Task Force (1976:6) also visualized the respective roles as overlapping spheres but with the shared functions of crime prevention, crime reduction, and order maintenance (In Hallcrest Report,1985:169). Holding this perspective, the role of private security is neither adjunct nor complement of law enforcement, but, a component of "network" of crime prevention and control "community".

CHAPTER II

THE ARGUMENTS AROUND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY

THE COMPLEMENTARY/SUPPLEMENTARY COMPONENTS ARGUMENT:

During the last decade, most literature reviewing the relationship between the law enforcement and private security looked upon private security as a complementary components of the public police in a shared goal of detecting and preventing crime, and the public police in a leading position over private security. Thus, the Rand Report stated that the public police have "primary responsibility for maintaining order, enforcing the laws, preventing crime, investigating crimes, and apprehending criminals," and the private security's role is the "prevention and detection of crime on private property and the gathering of information for private purposes." (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1972). But, the other viewpoint, held and reported by the Hallcrest Report in 1985, expressed that "the crime control function should be only one element in analyzing the relationship between private security and law enforcement."Therefore, "private security cannot automatically be assumed to complement law enforcement. Rather, each sector might better be viewed as one element in the range of choices available for the protection of life and

property."So, they suggested that: private security and law enforcement are parts of a larger "community service network" of protective resources. And, private security is primarily concerned with loss prevention, while law enforcement is primarily concerned with crime prevention, and the relationship between the two sectors has been graphically depicted as the congruence of two overlapping spheres." (Hallcrest Report: Executive Summary, 1985:41).

THE "JUNIOR" (ADJUNCT) PARTNER ARGUMENT:

The Hallcrest Report (1985) indicated that public police executives and officers were asked to rate the operating performance of private security. Overall, they gave private security a fair-to-poor rating in most areas. On the other hand, the proprietary security and contractual security managers gave themselves higher rating in their own operations, but gave their private security counterpart lower rating in their geographical area. Meanwhile, they also know law enforcement executives rated them in a negative image (p.44).

The other "adjoining" point of view saw the private security as an adjunct to the criminal justice system -- the so-called "junior partner" theory (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977). It implies that: (1) Private security is concerned only with minor cases, thereby freeing the public police to deal with more serious matters (Harrington, 1982). (2) The public

police direct the operations of private security. And, (3) Private security is by no means a "junior partner" to the public police in the resources it draws upon, such as mechanical hardware or information systems.

On the opposite viewpoint, Shearing and Stenning (1983) expressed that the "junior" theory distorts the relationship between the public police and private security which are: (1) The private security saw the criminal justice system as an adjunct to their own private systems, and reported invoking the former only when the latter were incapable of resolving problems in a way which suited their interests (Shearing and Stenning, 1983). (2) Private security dealt with serious property "crime" involving hundreds of thousands of dollars which they handled internally (Carson, 1981). (3) Because private security are usually the first to encounter a problem, they effectively direct the police by determining what will and what will not be brought to their attention (Black, 1980). And, (4) Private security not only frequently has access to sophisticated weapons and electronic surveillance systems, but is well equipped with standard security hardware including patrol cars and armored vehicles (Hougan, 1978; Scott & McPherson, 1971).

THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS ARGUMENT:

The interrelationship between public police and private security was discussed by several researchers. Most of the relationships described around them were more negative, misperception, and arrogant than positive, understanding and cooperation. The descriptions about the perception and interrelationships between them have been such as, mistrust, mirror image, and so forth.

PREJUDICE AND MISPERCEPTION:

Draper (1978), in the book, Private Police stated that: Among the various quarters of the police force there have always been widely differing views of the private security and detective professions. Ten years ago the attitude of most policemen was, at best, one of unwilling tolerance and, at worst, one of suspicion and mistrust. The situation with regard to private detectives has changed little. (p.155).... Any conflict that exists between private and public police seems, therefore, to occur in situations where their respective functions become blurred and confused. Confusion may arise, not only in relation to the activities of the two bodies, but also in relation to their physical appearance. Security companies and private detectives have always maintained that the last thing they want is to be confused in the minds of the public with regular policemen (p.163). The description above showed the prejudice, misperception

and confusion between law enforcement and private security.

REFLECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS:

On the other hand, O'Toole in the book, The Private Sector (1978), indicated that: Most of the private detectives he met had some kind of background in public law enforcement. They were retired police officers, military policemen, or intelligence agents. All seemed to have good current connections in official files and records not usually available to private citizens (p.xi)....He had thought of private security as the civilian fringe of public law enforcement, but he found that the two are more like mirror images of each other. If anything, the private police establishment may be a bit mightier than the public police. For example: There are about a million police officers in America; roughly half of them are private cops. The General Motors Corporation has a force of 4,200 plant guards. That's larger than the municipal police forces of all but five American cities (p.xii).

The same viewpoint was also mentioned by Becker (1974). He noted that there was a good amount of exchange of public agency information for private police agency equipment. Because the larger private police organizations are often extraordinarily well equipped, private police forces have been known to lend sophisticated investigative and surveillance equipment to public police agencies in exchange for access to

information available to public police forces.

COMPETITION AND INTERWEAVING:

The relationship between public police and private security in '80s is more competitive than interrelative. Tully, in the annual meeting of the international association of chief of police (1985, Reason), noted that private security services employ 50 percent more personnel than public law enforcement agencies. When citizens fail to get the police services they need, they are willing to go elsewhere. He said, people are reinventing government.

There was also research conducted by Walsh and Donovan (1989) on evaluation of the private security performance in Starrett City of New York, which showed that crime in Starrett City was significantly lower than the 77th police precinct of New York City and the residents in Starrett City have a lower degree of fear of crime. The authors concluded that " private security can be an effective crime prevention factor and ... a shift away from reliance on the services of public law enforcement has occurred." And, " The effectiveness of the private policing effort can be attributed to the department's style of policing."

There have been more reports published in the 80s which indicated the interweaving of public and private police power forms the basis for a massive surveillance apparatus. They

also showed law enforcement officers frequently work for privatized protective firms upon retirement from public service. The intermingling of ties between private firms and maintained contacts with their previous colleagues creates a vast information network which may leave crime control in the hands of a private army (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1987; Marx, 1987; O'Malley, 1988).

COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION:

Research conducted by Marx (1987:183) considered that there are obvious advantages in cooperation through hiring off-duty public police, entering into exchange relationships, or participating in cooperative investigations may benefit from the power of state agents to arrest, search, interrogate, carry weapons and use force and electronic surveillance, and gain access to otherwise protected information. Therefore, he concluded that there are some obvious advantages of public-private cooperation. As Tom Sawyer knew, that the fence gets painted can be more important than who actually paints it (p.189). Cole (1989) also mentioned that lack of communication between public and private organizations has resulted in botched investigations, destruction of evidence, and overzealousness, all to the detriment of crime control.

But, as Steward (1985) pointed out, no cooperative programs were reported by 67 percent of police chiefs responding to a National Institute of Justice survey;

virtually none even maintained a list of security directors in the area or firms offering security services.

PUBLIC OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM TOWARD PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY:

Most of the criticism came from the problems of "moonlighting" of public police officers, liability problems, making arrests, conducting searches and participating in undercover investigations. On the issue of moonlighting, Cole (1989) stated that: Public officials criticize private firms for hiring an estimated 150,000 police officers to provide security services in their off-duty hours. These police officers, they say, are "hired guns," inasmuch as they can carry weapons while other private security personnel may have difficulty in obtaining a license to do so.

Conflict of interest problems also arise when a police officer operates a private security firm as a sideline and when an officer wears a police uniform and badge while in private employment. Reiss (1988) expressed that until the 1950's, most departments prohibited any private off-duty employment that required officers to work in uniform for a private employer or to exercise police powers on that employer's behalf. This prohibition was grounded in concerns over conflict of interest and potential misuse of police authority to serve private at the expense of public ends. During the 60's and 70's, this concern remained along with

others about department image, officer injury, potential corruption, legal liability, and public perceptions and so forth.

The liability problem is the most controversial issue. Craig M. Beek (Dec, 1989. Security), corporate security direct for Deere and Co., Moline, Ill., and former head of the State Bureau of Investigations in Iowa, said, " If an officer in police uniform is carrying a weapon and it goes off while he's working for a private business, who is liable - the company he's working for or the city who hired him? " This viewpoint can typically represent those public officials' concern.

Around the arguments above, is the "junior partner" theory still having influence on law enforcement officer's attitude toward private security? Or, are the public police officers still not aware of the increasing trend of their counterpart? Or, do they tend to ignore the existence of these private security? This thesis would examine law enforcement and private security executives' perceptions on the operating relationships between themselves; on the contributions of private security in crime prevention; as well as on the conflict of interest of public police officers when they are hired and paid by private security industries. It is also an attempt to examine the degree of strength at the recognition of the executives related to these performances.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

DESIGN:

This thesis will be conducting secondary analysis based on the questionnaire data which was collected by Hallcrest Systems in 1985.

The purpose of statistical analysis is to examine the association of perception of Law Enforcement Executives (LEE), Private Security Managers (PSM) and Contractual Security Managers (CSM) toward the performance and contributions of private security, toward the conflict of interests of off-duty officers, as well as toward personnel interrelationships. And, the degree of strength of association will also be calculated.

SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION:

Because of the nature of secondary analysis in this thesis, the data collected by Hallcrest system is assumed to be reliable and valid. According to the description in the Hallcrest Report, the samples were collected from nationwide basis (Hallcrest Report, 1985:6). It was treated as a multi-stage sampling problem. First, surveys were distributed to law enforcement agencies, anticipating a representative sample by region and population group. Second, a cluster sampling

technique was applied in each population area by distributing surveys to a sample of proprietary and contractual security managers in zip code areas corresponding to the cities and counties of the law enforcement survey returns. This sampling approach assured that responses to common questions in all three survey instruments would be based upon knowledge, perception and opinions of the specific population of law enforcement and private security managers in that location, rather than upon generalized response to the larger universe of private security and law enforcement.

They, using mailing lists obtained from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), distributed 821 questionnaires to all law enforcement agencies in cities above 50,000 population and counties above 100,000 population, and to 100 cities under 50,000 population. They received responses from 384 law enforcement agencies which represents a 47% response and included replies from all 50 states. Responses were received from 259 municipal departments, 161 sheriff's departments, 17 county departments, 3 city-county consolidated departments, and 4 departments with no department type indicated. The surveys were typically completed by the chief, sheriff or top managers in their departments.

Meanwhile, they used stratified random samples to take from the American Society for Industry Security (ASIS) membership list of proprietary security managers by zip code

for each of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) and counties from which law enforcement survey returns were received. A total of 2,226 were mailed, responses were received from 676 security managers (30% response rate) whose aggregate business types were: commercial (33%), industrial (51%), and institutional (16%).

Similarly, from a population of over 12,000 firms, a stratified random sample was taken of 6,319 contractual security firms located in each of the SMSA's and counties using a mailing list compiled from nationwide listings from Yellow Page telephone directories. The total sample drawn from two mailings was 4,527 firms. Useable returns were then received from 545 contract security firms, representing a 12% response.

Since the data used here had been converted into percentages and rounded up at Hallcrest Report, it will be reversed back to frequencies and calculated for the following analysis.

MEASUREMENT:

The levels of measurement of the thesis will be nominal (the type of executives) and ordinal (their perceptions of relationship) levels through the end of research. The attitude scales from hypotheses I to VI are using the Likert scale categorized from "excellent", "poor" to "don't know" for their operating relationships; and categorized from "very

effective", "somewhat effective" to "don't know" for the contribution of private security. Hypotheses VII to XI will use hypothetical Guttman scale to measure the executives' attitude with "yes" and "no" answers.

The data of this thesis will be treated as quantitative forms and translated in numbers so that it can be calculated and manipulated in an acceptable form and easy to interpret. The main measure will be a Chi-Square test (X^2) and a Contingency - Coefficient test (C). The significance level of X^2 test will be set at $\alpha = .05$ level in order to show statistical significant relationship. At the same time, the C value will also be calculated to show degree of strength of the association.

This research is attempting to reveal executives' perception and attitude although not the behavior itself. The quantitative methods and statistical procedures should have the control for variables and sources of invalidity.

HYPOTHESES:

The following hypothesis test attempts to test how LEE, PSM and CSM rate their operating relationship and to show the degree of strength of the relationship.

HYPOTHESIS I: There will be no difference in executives' (LEE, PSM and CSM) perceptions as to how they perceive the operating relationship between law enforcement and private security personnel.

The data to be analyzed is nominal. The statistical tests here are Chi-Square and Contingency Coefficient (C). The significance level will be selected at $\alpha = .05$ level, and, if the Chi-Square value is beyond $\alpha = .05$ level, the null hypothesis will be rejected, and the relationship will be proved. The C value will also be calculated to show the degree of strength of association. This type of analysis will be done for each hypothesis in this study.

In this test, the LEE was asked the question: "How would you rate the operating relationships of your agency with private security personnel in your area?" (Hallcrest Report, 1985:299, Q.44). The question asked the PSM was: "How would you rate the operating relationships of your organization with area law enforcement personnel?" (p.307, Q.17). And, The CSM were asked question that: "How would you rate your firm's relationships with area law enforcement personnel?" (p.320, Q.11). The answers were categorized into "excellent, --, good, --, poor and don't know" six groups. The frequency data is presented in table 4.1 (see p.34).

HYPOTHESIS II: There is no difference in executives' perceptions about private security's overall contribution to crime prevention and control.

The data to be tested here is nominal. The question which was asked of LEE was: "In general, how would you rate the contribution of private security to crime prevention and control in your area?" (P.296, Q.22). The PSM was asked the question: "In general, how would you rate the contribution of your contribution of your security program to crime prevention and control?" (p.306, Q.12). And, the CSM was asked: "In general, how would you rate your firm's contribution to crime prevention and control for the typical clients you serve?" The answers were categorized into "very effective, somewhat effective, don't know." The frequency data is presented in Table 4.2 (see p.36).

HYPOTHESIS III: There is no difference between the executives' perceptions on private security's contribution at reduction the volume of crime.

This assumption is the second item of the previous question. The data to be tested is nominal, and the statistical methods selected again are Chi-Square and Contingency Coefficient.

The question asked of executives is the same as to the previous hypothesis, and the dependent variable is the "reduction in volume of crime". The answers have the same

category as hypothesis II. The frequency data is presented in Table 4.3 (see p.38).

HYPOTHESIS IV: There is no difference in the executives' perceptions regarding private security's contribution in reduction of direct dollar crime loss.

This hypothesis is the third item of the former question. The frequency data is presented in Table 4.4 (See p.39).

HYPOTHESIS V: There is no difference in the executives' perceptions regarding private security's contribution to the number of criminal suspects apprehended. The frequency data is presented in Table 4.5 (See p.40).

HYPOTHESIS VI: There is no difference in executives' perceptions regarding private security's contribution to the maintenance of order. The frequency data is presented in Table 4.6 (See p.41).

The conflict of interest issue concerning off-duty public police officers working in private security is a controversial one between law enforcement and private security executives. The LEE considered it as a liability to the department. But, on the private security managers' side, it is welcomed in some situations. The following hypotheses assume that LEE, PSM and CSM have the same perceptions at the conflict of interest

issue. This issue will be tested in accordance with the Hallcrest Report's survey questionnaire. The question asked executives was: "Under what conditions and when hired or paid by whom, will conflict of interest occur?" The question which was asked of LEE was: "Do you feel that off-duty employment in private security is a conflict of interest with the duties of a law enforcement officer?" (p.296, Q.19). The question asked of PSM was: "Do you feel that off-duty employment in private security is a conflict of interest with the duties of a law enforcement officer?" (p.310, Q.37). The CSM were asked: "Do you feel that off-duty employment in private security is a conflict of interest with the duties of a law enforcement officer?" (p.323, Q.33). The conflict of interest conditions were itemized: "when hired and paid directly by business", "when hired and paid directly by private security firm", "when hired and paid through law enforcement agency", "when hired through police union/association" as well as "when contracted by individual officers/deputies."

HYPOTHESIS VII: There is no difference in the executives' recognition of the occurrence of conflict of interest when off-duty police officers are hired and paid directly by general businesses.

The frequency data is presented in Table 4.7 (See p.43).

HYPOTHESIS VIII: There is no difference in the executives' recognition of the occurrence of conflict of interest when off-duty police officers are hired and paid directly by private security firms.

The frequency data is presented in Table 4.8 (see p.45).

HYPOTHESIS IX: There is no difference in the executives' recognition of the occurrence of conflict of interest when private security agencies temporarily hire off-duty police officers and paid them through the law enforcement agency.

The frequency data of hypothesis is presented in Table 4.9 (see p.46).

HYPOTHESIS X: There is no difference in the executives' recognition of the occurrence of conflict of interest when private security agencies temporarily hire off-duty police officers through police union/association.

The frequency data of hypothesis is presented in Table 4.10 (see p.47).

HYPOTHESIS XI: There is no difference in the executives' recognition of the occurrence of conflict of interest when off-duty police officers are contracted by individual officers or deputies.

The frequency data of hypothesis is presented in Table 4.11 (see p.49).

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

THE ANALYSIS OF OPERATING RELATIONSHIPS:

How do LEE, PSM and CSM rate personnel operating relationships with the other agency? Do they have the same or different perceptions toward their operating relationships?

The statistical result of hypothesis I in Table 4.1 shows the X^2 value is 586.94 (df = 10, $\alpha = .05$), which is far beyond the critical value 18.307 (df = 10, $\alpha = .05$ significance level) (Kachigan, 1986:570). Hypothesis I would be rejected in accordance with the data analysis. It shows there are different perceptions among the executives of concerning the operating relationships between each group personnel.

According to the Hallcrest Report's data, the mode of LEE is at the "good" category (38%, 146), and the PSM and CSM are in the "excellent" category (44%, 297; 45%, 245). It shows the disparity between executives has big difference. The C value here is .527 which shows the degree of association is fair (see Table 4.12 on p.49).

The result indicates that there is fairly different perceptions among the executives concerning of the operating relationships between each group personnel.

Table 4.1:
Executives rate the relationships between LE and PS

Rating the relationship	<u>Type of executive</u>				Total
		LEE	PSM	CSM	
Excellent	1	(2%) 8	(44%) 297	(45%) 245	550
	2	(7%) 27	(27%) 183	(22%) 120	330
Good	3	(38%) 146	(22%) 149	(7%) 38	333
	4	(25%) 96	(4%) 27	(7%) 38	161
Poor	5	(21%) 81	(2%) 14	(3%) 16	111
Don't-know	6	(7%) 27	(1%) 7	(1%) 5	39
Total		385	677	462	1524

df = 10, $\alpha = .05$, $X^2 = 586.94$, $C = .527$, Reject H_0 .

THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE SECURITY:

How do LEE, PSM and CSM rate the contribution of private security on crime prevention and control? Will they have the same or different perception and answers? The variables to be tested here are: (a) overall contribution on crime prevention and control, (b) reduction in volume of crime, (c) reduction in direct dollar crime loss, (d) number of criminal suspects apprehended, and, (e) maintenance of order. The categorized answers are: "very effective, somewhat effective, not effective, and, don't know."

(a) Overall contribution on crime prevention and control:

The X^2 value of hypothesis II test is 568.11 ($df = 6$, $\alpha = .05$) which is far beyond the critical value of 12.592 at $df = 6$, and $\alpha = .05$ significance level. Hypothesis II would be rejected in accordance with the analysis. It shows the executives' perception regarding of private security's overall contribution on crime prevention and control are different.

The data in Table 4.2 shows that most of LEE (253, 66%) think that the overall contribution of private security on crime prevention and control is "somewhat effective". Whereas, 331(49%), 387(71%) of PSM and CSM think that private security has "very effective" overall contribution on crime prevention and control. The C value here is .51 which shows the degree of difference is fair. The result indicates that there are

fairly different perceptions among the executives regarding the private security's overall contribution in crime prevention and control.

Table 4.2: Executives' perceptions of PS's overall contribution on crime prevention and control

Perception of PS's overall contribution	<u>Type of executive</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>LEE</u>	<u>PSM</u>	<u>CSM</u>	
Very effective	(3%)12	(49%)331	(71%)387	730
Somewhat effec	(66%)253	(47%)317	(22%)120	690
Not effective	(24%)92	(3%) 20	0	112
Don't know	(7%)27	(2%) 13	(6%) 33	73
Total	384	681	540	1605

$df = 6$, $\alpha = .05$, $X^2 = 568.11$, $C = .51$, Reject H_0 .

(b) Reduction in volume of crime:

The data in Table 4.3 shows that LEE strongly (47%, 180) think the contribution of private security at reduction in volume of crime is "somewhat effective". Compared to LEE, most of PSM (52%, 351) also think the contribution of private security at reduction in volume of crime is "somewhat effective" , but there are 261 (48%) of CSM think private security contribution in this matter is "very effective".

The X^2 value of this test is 417.64 ($df = 6$, $\alpha = .05$) which is far beyond the critical value of 12.592 at $df = 6$ and $\alpha = .05$ significance level. Hypothesis III would be rejected, and shown the different perception among executives regarding private security's contribution in reduction the volume of crime.

The C value here is .45 showing that the degree of difference of perceptions among executives are fair.

The result indicates that the executives have fairly different perceptions regarding the contribution of private security in the effectiveness in reduction the volume of crime.

**Table 4.3: Executives' perceptions of contribution of PS
in reduction in volume of crime.**

Reduction in volume of crime	<u>Type of executive</u>			Total
	LEE	PSM	CSM	
Very effective	(2%) 8	(36%) 243	(48%) 261	512
Somewhat effec	(47%) 180	(52%) 351	(36%) 196	727
Not effective	(38%) 146	(6%) 40	(5%) 27	213
Don't know	(13%) 50	(7%) 47	(12%) 65	162
Total	384	681	549	1614

df = 6, α = .05, X^2 = 417.64, C = .45, Reject Ho.

(c) Reduction in direct dollar crime loss:

The data in Table 4.4 shows the mode of the three: LEE is at "somewhat effective" category (58%, 222); PSM at "somewhat effective" category (48%, 324); and CSM at "very effective" category (52%, 283). There is somewhat of disparity between them.

The X^2 value of hypothesis IV test is 516.21 (df = 6, α = .05), which is far beyond the critical value of 12.592 at df = 6 and α = .05 significance level. Hypothesis IV would be rejected and it shows the executives' have different perception in this test. The C value here is .49 which shows

a fair difference among executives.

The result indicates that executives have fairly different perceptions in private security's contribution at the reduction in direct dollar crime loss.

Table 4.4: Executives' perceptions of contribution of PS in reduction in direct dollar crime loss.

Reduction in direction \$\$ crime loss	<u>Type of executive</u>			<u>Total</u>
	LEE	PSM	CSM	
Very effective	(3%) 12	(38%) 257	(52%) 283	552
Somewhat effec	(58%) 222	(48%) 324	(35%) 191	737
Not effective	(21%) 81	(5%) 34	(3%) 16	131
Don't know	(18%) 69	(9%) 61	(10%) 55	185
Total	384	676	545	1605

df = 6, $\alpha = .05$, $X^2 = 516.21$, C = .49, Reject Ho.

(d) Number of criminal suspects apprehended:

The data in Table 4.5 shows that the mode of LEE is 211 (55%) at the category "not effective", the PSM has 345 (51%) and the CSM has 218 (40%) at the "somewhat effective" category. The disparity in perceptions between the executives

is obviously shown in the data.

The X^2 value of this hypothesis test is 273.84 (df = 6, $\alpha = .05$) which is far beyond the critical value 12.592 (df = 6) at $\alpha = .05$ significance level. Hypothesis V would be rejected in accordance with the X^2 value. It shows the different perception among the executives.

The C value .38 indicates that it has slight difference in perception among the executives.

The result shows the executives have slightly different perception regarding to private security's contribution in the apprehension of criminal suspects.

**Table 4.5: Executives' perceptions of contribution of PS
in number of criminal suspects apprehended.**

No.criminal suspects apprehended	<u>Type of executive</u>			Total
	LEE	PSM	CSM	
Very effective	(2%) 8	(21%) 142	(20%) 109	259
Somewhat effec	(30%) 115	(51%) 345	(40%) 218	678
Not effective	(55%) 211	(16%) 108	(18%) 98	417
Don't know	(13%) 50	(12%) 81	(22%) 120	251
Total	384	676	545	1605

df = 6, $\alpha = .05$, $X^2 = 273.84$, C = .38, Reject Ho.

(e) Maintenance of order:

The data in Table 4.6 shows that many of LEE think the contribution of private security in the maintenance of order

is "somewhat effective" (161, 42%). Compared to LEE, most of PSM (365, 54%) and CSM (174, 32%) consider the contribution of private security in maintenance of order is "very effective". It shows a quite amount of disparity between the executives in their perceptions.

The X^2 value of hypothesis VI test is 538.44 (df = 6, α = .05) which is far beyond the critical value 12.592 (df= 6 at α = .05 significance level). Hypothesis VI would be rejected in accordance with the X^2 value. It shows the perception among the executives regarding private security's contribution in the maintenance of order is different.

The C value here is .501 which shows a fair difference among executives in this hypothesis test.

The result indicates that the executives have fairly different perception regarding private security's contribution in the maintenance of order.

Table 4.6: Executives' perceptions of contribution of PS in maintenance of order.

Maintenance of order	Type of executive			Total
	LEE	PSM	CSM	
Very effective	(4%)15	(54%)365	(32%)174	554
Somewhat effec	(42%)161	(35%)237	(29%)158	556
Not effective	(41%)157	(2%) 14	(10%)55	226
Don't know	(13%)50	(9%) 61	(29%)158	269
Total	383	677	545	1605

df = 6, α = .05, X^2 = 538.44, C = .501, Reject Ho.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF OFF-DUTY POLICE OFFICERS:

The conflict of interest issue of moonlighting public police officers hired by private security firms has raised a great deal of concerns among the executives. Public officers criticized private security industries are using public resources and "hiring guns". This section will test what and how different perception among executives regarding to the cause of conflict of interest of moonlighting public police officers when they are hired and paid by whom will occur and how strong the difference among executives.

The executives were asked the following questions that the off-duty public police officers in what conditions, such as "when hired and paid directly by business", "when hired and paid directly by PS firm", "when hired and paid thru LE agency", "when hired thru police union/- association", as well as "when contracted by individual officers/deputies", will the conflict of interest problems occur. These questions will be tested in below:

(a) The conflict of interest will occur when off-duty police officers are hired and paid directly by general businesses:

The data in Table 4.7 shows that 250 (65%) of LEE, 440

(66%) of PSM and 240 (44%) of CSM think when off-duty police officers are "hired and paid directly by business", there won't have problems of conflict of interest.

The χ^2 value of hypothesis VII test is 69.31 (df = 2, α = .05) which is beyond the critical value of 5.991 (df = 2) at α = .05 significance level. The hypothesis would be rejected in accordance with the value. It shows that the executives' recognition of the occurrence of conflict of interest when off-duty police officers are hired and paid by general business is different. The C value here is .20 which shows there only has slight difference among executives' recognition.

Namely, the data indicates there has only a slight difference among the executives' recognition regarding the occurrence of problems of conflict of interest, when off-duty police officers are hired and paid directly by general businesses.

Table 4.7: Executives' recognition of conflict of interest of officers hired and paid directly by business.

Hired & paid directly by business		Type of executive			Total
		LEE	PSM	CSM	
YES	1	(35%) 134	(34%) 230	(56%) 305	669
NO	2	(65%) 250	(66%) 446	(44%) 240	936
Total		384	676	545	1605

df = 2, α = .05, χ^2 = 69.31, C = .20, Reject Ho.

(b) The conflict of interest will occur when off-duty police officers are hired and paid by private security firms:

The data in Table 4.8 shows that 227 (59%) of LEE think the problems of conflict of interest will occur, when off-duty police officers are "hired and paid directly by private security firms", whereas, 406 (60%) of PSM and 337 (62%) of CSM think there is no conflict of interest problem in this condition.

The X^2 value in hypothesis VIII is 46.57 ($df = 2$, $\alpha = .05$) which is beyond the critical value of 5.991 ($df = 2$) at $\alpha = .05$ significance level. The hypothesis VIII would be rejected in accordance with the X^2 value. It shows the executives have different recognition in this test.

The C value here is .168, which shows the degree of recognition of difference among executives in this test is negligible.

The result indicates that: although the executives have different recognition of the occurrence of the conflict of interest when off-duty police officers are hired and paid directly by private security firms, the degree of recognition of difference among the executives is negligible.

Table 4.8:
Executives' recognition of conflict of interest of
officers hired and paid directly by PS firm.

Hired & paid directly by PS firm		Type of executive			Total
		LEE	PSM	CSM	
YES	1	(59%)227	(40%)270	(39%)212	709
NO	2	(41%)157	(60%)406	(62%)337	900
Total		384	676	549	1609

df = 2, α = .05, X^2 = 46.57, C = .168, Reject Ho.

(c) The conflict of interest will occur, when off-duty police officers are hired and paid through law enforcement agencies:

The data in Table 4.9 shows that 265 (69%) of LEE and 358 (53%) of PSM think there will be no conflict of interest when the off-duty police officers are "hired and paid through law enforcement agency". Whereas, 360 (66%) of CSM think the situation of conflict of interest will happen.

The X^2 of hypothesis IX test value is 114.00 (df = 2, α = .05) which is far beyond the critical value of 5.991 (df = 2) at α = .05 significance level. Hence, the hypothesis IX

would be rejected. It shows the executives have different recognition in this test. The C value of this hypothesis test here is .2575 which shows a slightly different recognition among the executives.

The result indicates that there has different recognition among the executives' recognition regarding the occurrence of conflict of interest when the off-duty police officers are hired and paid through law enforcement agencies, but it has only slight degree of difference among the executives in this matter.

Table 4.9: Executives' recognition of conflict of interest of officers hired and paid thru LE agency.

Hired & paid thru LE agency		<u>Type of executive</u>			<u>Total</u>
		<u>LEE</u>	<u>PSM</u>	<u>CSM</u>	
YES	1	(31%) 119	(47%) 318	(66%) 360	797
NO	2	(69%) 265	(53%) 358	(34%) 185	808
Total		384	676	545	1605

df = 2, α = .05, X^2 = 114.00, C = .257, Reject Ho.

(d) The conflict of interest will occur, when off-duty police officers are hired through police union/association:

The data in Table 4.10 shows that 207 (54%) of LEE, 379

(56%) of PSM and 382 (70%) of CSM think when off-duty police officers are "hired through police union/association" will have the conflict of interest problems. The executives have quite the same recognition in this matter.

The X^2 value of hypothesis X test here is 33.44 (df= 2, $\alpha = .05$) which is beyond the critical value of 5.991 (df = 2) at $\alpha = .05$ significance level. Therefore, the hypothesis X would be rejected. It shows the executives have different recognition in this test. The C value here is .14 which shows the difference of recognition among the executives in this test is negligible.

The result indicates that the executives have different recognition regarding the occurrence of the conflict of interest when off-duty police officers are hired through police union/association, but the degree of difference among executives is negligible.

Table 4.10: Executives' recognition of conflict of interest of officer hired thru police union/association.

Hired thru police union/ association		<u>Type of executive</u>			Total
		LEE	PSM	CSM	
YES	1	(54%) 207	(56%) 379	(70%) 382	968
NO	2	(46%) 177	(44%) 297	(30%) 163	637
Total		384	676	545	1605

df = 2, $\alpha = .05$, $X^2 = 33.44$, C = .14, Reject Ho.

(e) The conflict of interest will occur, when off-duty police officers are contracted by individual officers or deputies:

The data in Table 4.11 shows that 204 (53%) of LEE, 318 (47%) of PSM and 360 (66%) of CSM consider when off-duty police officers are contracted by individual officers/deputies, the problems of conflict of interest will occur.

The value X^2 of hypothesis XI test is 44.73 (df = 2, α = .05) which is beyond the critical value of 5.991 (df = 2) at the α = .05 significance level. Hypothesis XI would be rejected. It shows the executives have different recognition in this test. The C value here is .16 which shows the degree of difference among the executives in this test is negligible.

The result indicates the executives have different recognition regarding the occurrence of conflict of interest when off-duty police officers are contracted by individual officers/deputies, but the degree of difference is negligible.

**Table 4.11: Executives' recognition of conflict of interest
when contracted by individual officers/deputies.**

Contracted by individual officer/depu.		<u>Type of executive</u>			<u>Total</u>
		LEE	PSM	CSM	
YES	1	(53%) 204	(47%) 318	(66%) 360	882
NO	2	(47%) 180	(53%) 358	(34%) 185	723
Total		384	676	545	1605

df = 2, α = .05, X^2 = 44.73, C = .16, Reject Ho.

Table 4.12: Degree of strength of C

+	.80	--	+	1.00	Strong Dependent Relationships	
+	.60	--	+	.79	Moderate	"
+	.40	--	+	.59	Fair	"
+	.20	--	+	.39	Slight	"
+	.00	--	+	.19	Negligible	"

Sources: Note of the course of CJ 892, Michigan State U.

DISCUSSION:

Traditionally, the private security was considered as to an adjunct and a junior partner to the law enforcement. But, the data analysis in this thesis indicates that executives have fair-to-negligible difference in perception regarding to their operation relationships, the contribution of private security, as well as the conflict of interest in moonlighting police officers. All of tests show a certain degree of difference among executives. I would believe Shearing and Stenning's (1983) statement showing that the private security don't necessarily think they are junior partner of law enforcement.

Accordingly, in the analysis of rating personnel operating relationships between their agencies, the PSM and CSM are more willing to "believe" and to consider that their agencies have "excellent" relationships with law enforcement agencies within their area. On the contrary, only two percents of LEE consider that they have excellent relationships with their counterparts. According to the data, the X^2 and C value indicate there have fairly different perceptions among executives concerning the rating personnel operating relationship with other agencies. It is hard to tell who they think is their adjunct or supplementary part, or who they think are more superior than the others. But, from the

percentage distribution, it seems that the LEE gave more negative answers toward their operating relationships compared to PSM and CSM, and were more careless than the PSM and CSM in terms of taking into account the existence of their counterparts. We can fairly say that the private security executives do not consider they are adjunct of law enforcement agencies. And, the executives' status are also showing fairly dependent relationships related to their answers.

In the analysis of private security's contribution to crime prevention and control, the PSM and CSM are more willing to consider their "very effective" contribution in crime prevention and crime control than the LEE do; and, the law enforcement executives have more strong tendency than private security executives to think that the private security has only made "somewhat effective" or "not effective" contribution to crime prevention and crime control. Overall, there have fairly different perceptions among executives about the private security's contribution on crime prevention and control, and the executives' status showing the attitudes about the contribution of private security on crime prevention and control are also related.

The functions of private security were defined as more security-for-profit and more crime prevention for public in the past (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977). It is not surprising for the PSM and CSM on those answers showing their "very

effective" contribution on "crime prevention and control" if they consider the "crime" is to prevent property loss. But, on the LEE's point of view, the "crime" prevention and control might have different meaning, and this approach might have influence upon their perceptions about private security contribution on crime prevention and control.

Overall, in the consideration of private security's "overall contribution", "reduction in volume of crime", "reduction in direct dollar crime loss", and "maintenance of order", there have a fairly different perceptions among executives and about how they think the contribution of private security. But, in the consideration of "number of criminal suspects apprehended", it has only a slightly different perceptions among executives. Their attitudes on private security's contribution and their perception are related together in this matter.

Accordingly, PSM and CSM are more willing to show their confidence and positive images toward private security. On the other hand, the LEE is showing their suspicious attitude toward private security's effective performances to the contribution in the crime prevention and crime control. And, the private security executives are not necessarily viewing themselves as an adjunct to the law enforcement agencies.

On the analysis of the conflict of interest of moonlighting police officers, although it has different

recognition among the executives on this matter, but the degrees of difference are only slight to negligible in nature on all items that I test. Overall, the law enforcement and private security executives have quiet similar recognition about the occurrence of the conflict of interest when the moonlighting police officers are hired and paid by private security businesses or other features.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY:

Owing to the fear of crime and the suspicion of citizens toward law enforcement's ability to meet its responsibility of protecting life and property, there are more and more citizens looking for the private security as alternatives for protection. Meanwhile, the relationships between the law enforcement and private security industries were ambiguous and filled with misperception for the last two decades. They were thinking that the other is their adjunct or junior and there rarely had positive communication and cooperation between them. Unfortunately, these misperceptions and prejudices have had a very important influence upon the allocation of the resources in crime prevention and crime control in the criminal justice society. The purpose of this thesis is attempting to find out some perceptions' similarity or difference as well as the degree of association among the law enforcement and private security executives in order to understand their interrelations among their agencies.

A method of secondary analysis was used in this thesis. And the manipulating data is based on 1985 Hallcrest Report's

survey questionnaire. The samples were collected from nationwide bases and treated as a multi-stage sampling problem. There were 384 (47%) out of 821 law enforcement executives, 676 (33%) out of 2,226 private security executives and 545 (12%) out of 6,319 contractual security executives responses received. The main measurements of the thesis are Chi-Square (X^2) and Contingency-Coefficient test (C) in the attempt to reveal the direction and strength of relationships. The significance level is set at $\alpha = .05$ level. Overall, the results show that there have fair to negligible difference in perception among the law enforcement and private security executives which are related to their attitudes toward their operating relationships, the performances of private security, as well as the conflict of interest of moonlighting public police officers.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Although the relationships between law enforcement and private security are changing these days, we still have to put our energies into improving the communication and cooperation between them. The recommendations stated below are opinions of author in this matter.

First, the adequate definition of "private security"

should be redefined to accurately describe private security's roles in order to avoid misperceptions in comparison with the roles of law enforcement.

For the last two decades, the researchers basically used the "private police" or "private policing" in terms of the "private security", to interpret private security and its role in the criminal justice system. But, actually, the meaning of "police" does not necessarily explain the reality of "private security". If we treat private security in the light of law enforcement, we usually develop misleading perspectives of the traditional police images and roles. Thereafter, we are normally viewing private security's performances and their functions in the way that we expect law enforcement to do in the protection of life and property. Furthermore, there will statements made later "private security is abusing its authority" or "private security was less training" so forth.

Second, the appropriate functions of private security should be reconfigured in order to separate their functions from that of law enforcement, and to recognize private security's appropriate contribution in the criminal justice community.

The functions of the private security were treated by many researchers in the category of crime prevention and control. And, therefore, the apprehension of suspects,

criminal arrests and crime investigation seemed to be reasonably categorized as the functions of private security. Actually, the functions of private security are more appropriate to put into the category of loss prevention than crime prevention, and having the overlapping functions of crime prevention with the law enforcement.

Third, the criterion of evaluation of the performance of private security should be better developed in order to give private security a fair evaluation standard according to their functions in terms of their performance.

Most of the time, performance of private security was rated from fair to poor by public police officers and researchers. But, the overall contribution of the performance should be evaluated in accordance with their functions, goals, as well as whether they reach their goals or not. If they achieved their goals which were set in the beginning of private security being established, we can not ignore their reasonable and effective performances. For example, if we made a container to be used for a coffee cup, we definitely cannot expect the cup to have excellent values for use as a soup bowl. The same reason is true for the evaluation of private security, we also can not expect a subject which emphasized their functions on the loss prevention be held to the standard of crime prevention and vice versa.

Fourth, the private security should pursue the excellence of service quality in order to meet the requirement of citizens in the future.

As Lipman (1990) indicated, low private security industry standards, low wages, low-bid contracts, difficulty by private security to access criminal records of perspective employees, as well as variance among states in licensing and regulation of the private security industry are the five barriers to the excellence of private security industry. Private security has to put energies toward improving their quality and to get rid of the stereotypical image that public has possessed for a long period of time.

Fifth, full communication and the appropriate understanding and cooperation between law enforcement and private security should be improved in order to fulfill the protection functions in the criminal justice "community" and to have a full usage of the private security resources.

The coming century is a post industrial age and is also an informational world. Full communication and exchanging accurate information with law enforcement are the necessary components to achieve the mission of protecting life and property. The superior attitude of law enforcement is meaningless and is also not an appropriate manner in the criminal justice network.

CONCLUSION:

Today, the trend of development of private security is going on all over the world. There are more employees working in private security industry than officers employed by public law enforcement agencies. The resources of private security are also more affluent than law enforcement, especially, when the latter is facing the cutback management policy in the States. It is the time to reconsider the functions of crime prevention and crime control in the criminal justice system.

Long before the U.S. established a national police agency, the FBI, private security had already built up nationwide services, such as: Pinkerton, Holmes, Brink and Burns who had the railway agencies, the banks as well as governmental departments to be their customers. Up to now, these private security industries are still famous in international circles and are playing a leading role in the security field.

The image of private security compared to law enforcement has been plagued with low wages, less educated, high turnover, older ages and inadequate training. But, the Hallcrest Report indicated the industry has improved since the Rand Report was published.

Around the criticisms by public officials of the private security, the officials considered the conflict of interest of moonlighting police officers, liability issues of police departments, private security personnel making arrests,

conducting searches, and participating in undercover investigations of private security as priority problems between law enforcement and private security.

This thesis is an attempt to reveal the relationships and difference of perception among law enforcement and private security executive, and their attitudes toward their operating relationships, the private security contribution on crime prevention and crime control, as well as the conflict of interest of public police officers in moonlighting. The data analysis shows that there are fair to negligible difference in perceptions among the executives. It indicates that more fully communication and cooperation have to be input into improving the different perceptions and recognitions among the law enforcement and private security in the future.

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