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This is to certify that the
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The Relation Between Judicial Due Process

Decisions in New York City Landlord Tenant
Court and Judicial Background Characteristics

presented by

Jerome Lester Reide

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THE RELATION BETWEEN JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS DECISIONS
IN NEW YORK CITY LANDLORD TENANT COURT AND
JUDICIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

BY

Jerome Lester Reide

DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science and Urban Studies
1991

——~

(r7-

Qr I , '
2 72'
I

I

ABSTRACT

THE RELATION BETWEEN JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS DECISIONS
IN NEW YORK CITY LANDLORD TENANT COURT AND
JUDICIAL-BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

BY

Jerome Lester Reide

Does the social class, race and gender of New York City's
Housing Court judges significantly explain the high rate of
eviction orders which they issue against minority women
tenants, most of whom are heads of households with children?
This question is the core of the inquiry.

Systematic random samples of judicial decisions in
Manhattan's Housing Court were drawn. The sample's time frame
begins in June 1987, which corresponds closely with data
collected by the A.C.L.U., the<City'Wide Task Force on Housing
Courts and the Fund for Modern Courts. To obtain a
representative cross-section of Housing Court judges, a list
of Civil Court judges elected between 1980 and 1985 were
identified and a random sample was drawn from the list.

There are three major dependent variables indicative of
Housing Court judicial decisions which we propose to analyze
and explain. They are whether a formal inquest hearing was
conducted to establish that notice was adequate before a

default eviction order is issued, whether both parties were .

represented by an attorney, and whether there was a lack of
judicial supervision when settlements were reached.

The explanatory variables are judge's gender, race, non-
family campaign contributions, type of previous legal concern,
national or state rank of law school and age cohort.

The major findings indicate female Housing Court judges
and judges 30-50 years old, conduct.more inquests, discontinue
more cases due to lack of representation and supervise more
settlements than male judges. As non-family campaign
contributions increase judges hold fewer inquests, and
discontinue fewer cases due to lack of representation than
those who do not receive this type of contribution.

Further, black Housing. Court judges conducted fewer
inquests and.were less likely to discontinue cases for lack of
representation than white judges. These variations in Housing
Court decisions are systematically related to judicial
background at the conventional .05 level and are corroborated
by probit coefficient estimates which substantiate this
model's predictive capacity, raise judicial reform questions

and invite additional research.

Copyright by
JEROME LESTER REIDE
1991

This dissertation is dedicated to the living legal legacy of
the late David K. Kadane, Rains Distinguished Professor of
Law Emeritus, Hofstra University School of Law, Founding
Director of the Community Legal Assistance Corporation, the
Hofstra Law School Neighborhood Law Office, which provides
legal services for clients with low income. Professor

Kadane was my mentor in the law, my advocate and my friend.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to my dissertation committee, Professor Charles
Press, who chaired the committee, Professor Joseph
Schlesinger, Professor Maxie C. Jackson, Jr., and Professor
James Marshall, for their guidance.

The assistance of Dean Joe T. Darden, and Chairman
Brian Silver, the faculty and support staff of the Political
Science Department and the Urban Affairs Programs is greatly
appreciated.

Special thanks for the years of friendship and
organizational support of R. David Addams, Esq., Ms. Gayle
P. King and my proofreader Ms. Karen D. Taylor-Lewis, The
Written Word.

Finally I would like to acknowledge my parents and
extended family who taught me the meaning of Micah 6:8
"He hath showed thee, 0 man, what is good; and what doth the
Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy,
and to walk humbly with thy God?"

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

LIST OF TABLES...0.0.00.0.0.000000COOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOVii

LIST OFABBREVIATIONS...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOViii

INTRODUflION.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.0.00... 1

WWI”.........................15

W.........20

RESMCH HYPOTHESISOO...eeeooeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee00000021

VARIABLES ANDWSWNTCOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0000000000000021

vi

vii

q! 1. 1 in n.i.;”! . , \ i ' Y. “1.. . i. ii, _, 00000030

SAMPLING PROCEDURESOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00... ..... 0.0.0....30

RELIABILITYOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO...0.0.0.0032

VALIDITYOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.00.00.000000033

DATA ANALYSISOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.00.0000033

LIMITATIONSOOOOOOOO000......0......0.00.00.00.000000000036

FELIMINARY TESTS.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.00... ..... 37

ADDITIONALTESTS AND FINDINGSCOOCOO00.000.000.0000000000101

Weeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeoeeeeeeeeeooell?

WOR FINDINGSOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.0.000000000117

IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM........................121

WRTHERRESWCHAGENDASOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.0.0000000124

ENDNOTESOOO00.0.00...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0.000000000126

viii

mm“ HOUSING COURT GmSSARYoooeeoeooooeeeeee0000000127

LIST OF REFERENCESOOCO0.0.0...O0.0.00.0...0.0.00.0000000136

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 PAGE
Judicial Due Process Decisions

And Judicial Background

Variables................. ......................... 38

Table 2
Motion denied no appearance either side
by gender of

judgeOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 39
Table 3

Motion denied no appearance either side

by race Of judgeOOOIOOOOOO00.00.0000... .......... .040
Table 4

Motion denied no appearance either side
by non-family campaign
contributions...00.0.00...O... ..... O. OOOOOOOOOOOOOO 41

Table 5

Motion denied no appearance either side

by type of judge's previous legal
concern.................................. ........ ..42

Table 6

Motion denied no appearance either side

by national or state rank of judge's law
school................................. ............ 43

Table 7
Motion denied no appearance either side
by judge's age

cahortCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ........ 44
Table 8

Motion denied no appearance movant

by judge's gender.......................... ..... ...46

ix

Table 9
Motion denied no appearance movant
by judge's

raCBOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOC......OOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOO0.....047

Table 10

Motion denied no appearance movant

by non-family campaign
contributions......................................48

Table 11

Motion denied no appearance movant

by type of judge's previous legal
concern................................. ........... 49

Table 12
Motion denied no appearance movant
by national or state rank of judge's law school....50

Table 13

Motion denied no appearance movant

by judge's age cohort....................... ..... ..51
Table 14

Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

by judge's gender.......................... ........ 53
Table 15

Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

by judge's race........................... ......... 54
Table 16

Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant
by non-family campaign
contributions......... ..... ..... ........... ... ..... 55

Table 17

Final judgment landlord no appearance Tenant

by type of judge's previous legal
concern............................................56

xi

Table 18

Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

by national or state rank of judge's law
school.................................. ........... 57

Table 19
Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant
by judge's age cohort..............................58

Table 20
Legal Representation for both parties
by judge's gender................... ........... ....60

Table 21
Legal Representation for both parties
by judge's gender...0.00.00.00.00...O.......0.0.0.061

Table 22
Legal Representation for both parties
by non-family campaign contributions...............62

Table 23
Legal Representation for both parties
by type of judge's previous legal concern.... ...... 63

Table 24

Legal Representation for both parties

by national or state rank of judge's law
school.................................. ........... 64

Table 25

Legal Representation for both parties

by judge's age

cohort........... ....... ................. .......... 65

Table 26
Mediation by judge's
genderOOOOOOOOO......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0000000000067

Table 27 .
Mediation by judge's gender........................68

xii

Table 28
Mediation by non-family campaign
contributions.......OOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.... ............ 69

Table 29
Mediation by type of judge's previous legal concern.7o

Table 30
Mediation by national or state rank of judge's law
SChOOIOO ..... O 0000000000 O ..... 00.0.0000000000000000071

Table 31

Mediation by judge's age

cohort.............. ...... ........... .............. 72
Table 32

Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

by judge's gender.................. ................ 74

Table 33
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by judge's raceOOOOOOOOOOOO.......OOOOOOO .......... 75

Table 34
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by non-family campaign contributions.. ............. 76

Table 35
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by type of judge's previous legal concern.. ........ 77

Table 36

Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

by national or state rank of judge's law
school................................... .......... 78

Table 37

Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

by judge's age
cohort...................................... ..... ..79

Table 38
Settled per stipulation by judge's
gender...‘0.00.0000...00.00.0000...0.00.00.00.0000081

xiii

Table 39
Settled per stipulation by judge's race.. .......... 82

Table 40
Settled per stipulation
by non-family campaign contribution ..... . .......... 83

Table 41

Settled per stipulation

by type of judge's previous legal
concern............. .......... .... ................. 84

Table 42
Settled per stipulation
by national or state rank of judge's law school....85

Table 43

Settled per stipulation

by judge's age

cohort................... ..... ........... .......... 86

Table 44
Unsupervised settlements
by judge's gender... ............................... 88

Table 45
Unsupervised settlements
by judge's race......... ....... . ................... 89

Table 46

Unsupervised settlements

by non-family campaign

contributions......... ................... . ......... 90

Table 47

Unsupervised settlements

by type of judge's previous legal
concern................................. ........... 91

Table 48

‘Unsupervised settlements

‘by'national or state rank of judge's law
school.................................... ......... 92

‘Table 49

Unsupervised settlements

by judge ' s age

cohort..................... ........... ..... ........ 93

xiv

Table 50
Inquest held before eviction order
by judge's gender......................... ........ .95

Table 51
Inquest held before eviction order
by judge's race....................................96

Table 52

Inquest held before eviction order

by non-family campaign

contribution............ .................... . ...... 97

Table 53

Inquest held before eviction order

by type of judge's previous legal
concern................................. ........ ...98

Table 54

Inquest held before eviction order

by national or state rank of judge's law
school.............................................99

Table 55

Inquest held before eviction order

by judge's age
cohort............h..................... ..... . ..... 100

TABLE 56

Legal Representation for both parties

minority male judge, white female
judge..............................................105

TABLE 57

Legal Representation for both parties

minority male judge, white male
judge..............................................106

TABLE 58

Legal Representation for both parties

white female judge, white male
judge..............................................107

TABLE 59

Unsupervised settlements, minority male judge,

white female

judge.................... ..... .............. ....... 109

TABLE 60
Unsupervised settlements, minority male judge,
White male jungOOOOO........OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOI.0.0.0110

TABLE 61
Unsupervised settlements, white female judge,
white male jud96000000000......OOOOO0.0.0.0.000....111

TABLE 62

Inquest held before eviction order,

minority male judge, white female
judge..............................................113

TABLE 63

Inquest held before eviction order,

minority male judge, white male
judge..............................................114

TABLE 64

Inquest held before eviction order,

white female judge, white male
judge..............................................115

List of Abbreviations

MDNAES Motion denied no appearance
either side.

FJLLNAT Final judgment landlord
no appearance tenant.

MED Mediation.

MPSPS Motion (granted or denied)
proceeding settled per
stipulation.

SET Settled.

MDNAM Motion denied no appearance
movant.

SPS Settled per stipulation.

INQUEST Inquest hearing held before
default eviction decision.

LGLREP Pooled data: MDAM, FJLLNAT,
MDNAES.

UNSUP Pooled data: MED, MPSPS,
SPS.

xvi

GENDER
JRACE
¢SONTRIB

(JONCERN

RANK
AGE

msIVAR'
WFJBIVARZ

marvan’

xvii

Gender of judge.
Race of judge.

Non-family campaign
contributions:(major, some,
none).

Type of previous legal
concern the judge practiced
with.

National or state rank of
judge's law school.

Age cohort: junior (30-50)
vs senior (61-70).

Dummy variable black male
Housing Court judge.

Dummy variable white female
Housing Court judge.

Dummy variable white male
Housing Court judge.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Norman Dorsen describes due process as a
guarantee which, "prevents government from imposing sanctions
against individuals without sufficiently fair judicial or
administrative procedures...Whatever the context, civil
liberties require that individual interests of liberty and
property not be sacrificed without a process that determines
facts and liability at hearings that are fairly established
and conducted." (Dorsen, 1986).

Judicial decisions in New York City's landlord tenant
court (the Housing Court of the New York City Civil Court),
are essentially procedural due process decisions. The
outcomes hinge on‘whether the tenants rights are respected.but
it does not always occur in practice. IProcedural due process
protection for litigants is mandated by the U.S. Constitution.

For due process to be a reality in the N.Y.C. Housing
Court three basic elements must occur. First, litigants must
be notified that there is a dispute which involves them. This
notification should tell them how they can respond and.exactly
where they can respond. Second the litigants should have a
day in court when there is an opportunity to be heard on the
merits and to defend against allegations. Finally, the
severity of the consequences of losing a landlord tenant

1

2

dispute require judges to maintain a high standard of justice.
That standard should weigh the litigant's private interest,
the government interest and the risk of error especially if
counsel is not present for one of the parties (usually the
tenant. Such a standard requires an orderly proceeding
adapted to the nature of the case and controversy. (Reide,
1987). These then are three elements of procedural due
process in Housing Part judicial decisions which we propose to
analyze (1) notice to the parties of the dispute, (2) an
opportunity for each to be heard and defend, and (3) an
orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case and
controversy to be decided. (Hansen, 1983).

When due process is not afforded to litigants, (i.e.,
landlords or tenants), their justice is denied. The judicial
result often is 72-hour notice of eviction, or a default
judgment, which if left unchallenged by the tenant often leads
to actual evictions and homelessness. (Wise, 1987). This
study limits itself to determining under what conditions
procedural due process occurs.

I

The Housing Part was created by the New York State
Legislature in 1972. The explicitly stated legislative intent
for the Housing Part reads,

[T]he court shall be devoted to actions and proceedings
involving the enforcement of state and local laws for the

establishment and maintenance of housing standards, including,
but not limited to, the multiple dwelling law and

the housing'maintenance»code, building code and health code of
the administrative code of the city of New York." (Judiciary
Law, NYCCAA s. 110 (a), 1972).

Essentially, landlord tenant courts are supposed to
resolve landlord tenant disputes and adjudicate the right to
occupancy of real property. As the statute indicates, the
preservation of New York City's housing stock by enforcement
of laws and codes is the underlying public policy which led to
the establishment of the landlord tenant court. The
preservation of housing stock and code enforcement are not
always issues in landlord tenant disputes, yet the court also
has this jurisdictional poweru ZMoreover, the vast majority of
proceedings initiated in landlord tenant court are not begun
to preserve housing stock, but rather are began by landlords
who seek to evict tenants for alleged violations of the
landlord tenant contractual relationship. (Reide, 7).

Tenants usually agree that the maintenance and
preservation of housing stock should be considered; a defense
often raised when landlords seek rent money or eviction. Yet
tenants rarely take the offensive in seeking better housing
and when they do the results are often disappointing. Court
officials estimate that only three»percent of the cases in.New
York's Housing court are initiated.by tenants who want repairs
and maintenance. (Reide, 7). Repairs are part of negotiated
stipulation agreements in approximately 40 percent of this

small number of cases and in only 53 percent of the stipulated

4

agreements are repairs actually made and only 16 percent of
the court orders provide rent abatements to tenants who have
lived in housing under unlawful conditions. (Robbins, 1986).
Thus in less than one percent of the cases is housing stock
improved or rent abatements upheld. Rather the issue in most
of the cases is the landlord's rights to collect rent or evict
undesirable tenants.

The pecuniary nature of this litigation has placed the
collection of rent and the eviction of tenants before the
stated legislative intent of housing stock preservation.

We here examine each of the elements of procedural due
process in greater detail. The determination as to whether a
tenant was given adequate notice that he or she was named as
a party in a civil law suit and was required to appear in
court on a specific day is a critical decision in the Housing
Part. (Reide, 9-13). Litigants are to receive notice by
"service," which is the specific method required by law to
deliver or send court papers to a party; which notifies him or
her that they are being sued and have the right to come to
court and defend their interests. (Reide, 61).

If a person is improperly served they may not know they
are supposed to appear in court. An undercover investigation
of 37 process servers led by New York Attorney General Robert
Abrams discovered that 95 percent of them engaged in "sewer
service,"

(i.e. they disposed of the court papers in the
sewer or garbage and then filed fraudulent affidavits in court

5

which stated that the papers were properly served). (Abrams
and Aponte, 1986).

Abrams estimates that 48,000 default judgments a year are
entered in New York City as a result of "sewer service." Thus
the number of times tenants appear in court is a rough measure
of whether papers are served. Housing part judges make
judicial decisions to enter default judgments, sometimes
without a hearing to ensure that the claims by the party who
is present (usually the landlord), can be established on the
record when the other party (usually the tenant), is not
present. (Reide, 59). These hearings are called inquests.
If an inquest is not held the landlord does not have to prove
his allegations with sworn testimony and other evidence. At
times inquests are held and at other times default judgements
are entered. without any proof to substantiate the landlords'
allegations.

Thus the presence or absence of an (INQUEST), notation,
in court records can be used as a better measure of whether
procedural due process occurs, since it indicates whether or
not the judge is concerned that tenants rights are upheld.

Our second element was whether the litigant had the
opportunity to be heard. Whether a litigant (usually a
tenant), actually has an opportunity to state his or her case
and offer defenses to the civil accusations depends on
knowledge of court proceedings or more appropriately legal
representation. (Reide, 13-22). Approximately 70 percent of

tenants are not represented in pre-trial conferences, (e.g.

6

the "motion part," of landlord tenant court). (Reide, 17).

The Access to Justice Project's observers also found more
than a two to one disparity in the frequency of landlords
represented by counsel, (67 percent) and tenants represented,
(33 percent). (Reide,17). When the tenant was not
represented only four percent of the cases observed lasted
more than fiveiminutes. When the landlord.was not represented
none of the observed cases lasted more than five minutes.
(Reide, 22). These findings corroborated the companion
report by the City Wide Task Force on Housing Court which
found 44 percent of pretrial conferences in front of a judge
lasted for five minutes. (Fox, 51). Without knowledge of the
rules of the New York Civil Court, the Housing Part rules, New
York State's evidentiary’ rules and. exceptions, plus 100
administrative directives, litigants who are unrepresented
have almost no real opportunity to be heard and to defend
themselves. (Reide, 17). Housing Part judges make judicial
decisions to evict, award rent, and issue default judgments
with frequently adverse outputs against litigants without
counsel. Thus a reasonable measure of being heard is
determining whether the tenant as well as the landlord had
legal counsel.

This determination is possible by analysis of decisions
where court records indicate "final judgement landlord no
appearance tenant, (FJLLNAT)." This notation indicates that

neither an attorney or a tenant appeared to represent the

7
tenant. Similarly, where the housing court record indicates
"motion denied no appearance either side," (MDNAES) this
indicates that neither party was represented. Yet another
indicator of an opportunity to be heard is the court record
notation 'Wu: appearance movant," (MDNAM), which indicates
that no attorney’ or landlord appeared to represent the
landlord. (LGLREP indicates pooled data for these measures).

The third element of procedural due process is the
orderliness and fairness of the court procedures. (Reide, 27-
34). Orderliness and fairness areiquestionable in the Housing
Part practice of stipulation agreement settlements which are
usually conducted in courtroom hallways.

This element is substantively significant in that there
is usually a lack of judicial supervision in the negotiation,
formation and drafting of these agreements. There is a
judicial decision involved however. The judge may send the
case to a mediator who oversees the agreement, the parties may
agree to let a mediator resolve the case, or the paries may
settle the case per stipulated agreement. In each situation
a judicial decision is involved.

In the sense that the judge leaves the supervision of
settlements to a mediator (who may be a court clerk), a
landlord's attorney or the parties themselves speaks to the
orderliness and fairness of the proceeding. The lack of
recording devices, transcripts and open court discussions

benefits the party who writes the agreement.

The agreements are usually written by landlord attorneys
and judges often do not ask if the agreement was understood by
both parties. (Reide, 29). The Access to Justice Project's
study found that. when. housing disputes ‘were settled. by
stipulated agreement, in approximately 45 percent of the
observed cases, the legal consequences of non-compliance with
the agreement were HOt explained by the judge. (Reide, 28).
In 27 percent of the observed cases, neither party was asked
if they understood what they had signed. Only one percent of
the landlords and.38 percent of the tenants were asked if they
understood the settlement agreement. (Reide,29).

Similarly, the City Wide Task Force on Housing study
indicates that in 43 percent.of the settlement cases observed,
judges did not ask both parties if they understood the
settlement terms. (Fox, 56). Thus, when a case is settled by
stipulated agreement there is a likelihood that the terms have
not been explained to the tenants more often than not. Court
record. notations that. cases ‘were "settled, (SET)," and
"settled per stipulation, (SPS)," are indicators of
orderliness and fairness.

Other court record notations denote that the landlord
tenant dispute was settled by stipulated agreement. These
include "motion granted proceeding settled as per stipulation,
(MGPSPS), motion denied proceeding settled per stipulation,

(MDPSPS), and motion granted as per stipulation, (MGPS).

9

Further, a similar yet procedurally distinguishable trial
part notation. "motion. pending suspend. trial," (MP8), is
similar to the motion part notations MGPSPS, MDPSPS and MGPS
listed above. Trials are a rarity in Housing Court. As
settlement by stipulated agreement occurs more frequently, the
similarity in these four notations is assumed to denote
"motion (granted or denied) proceeding settled per
stipulation, MPSPS. This approach minimizes the possibility
of variation in Housing Court notation by the court clerks.

Moreover, mediation, of the case by a mediator who is
employed by the court and acts in place of the judge to settle
cases is another indication of whether stipulations were
entered into in an orderly and fair fashion. The stipulation
agreements which the Access to Justice Project observed were
often negotiated and entered into off the record without full
explanation of their legal implications. (Reide, 26).
Further, the Citywide Task Force on Housing court study
indicates that settlement agreements which mediators supervise
required payment of rent in 88.1 percent of the cases. -(Fox,
61). In 70.4 percent of this type of agreed settlement the
rent must be paid immediately, while 72.2 percent of the
agreements were unconditional and required payment of rent
whether or not landlords made statutorily required repairs or
not. On this basis court notations of mediated settlements
(MED, M)" are also reasonable measures of orderliness and

fairness. (UNSUP is pooled data for these measures).

10

We thus have defined procedural due process by three

measures.
II

Our next question is to hypothesize under what
conditions procedural due process does or does not occur» The
measures are (A.) the background characteristics of Housing
Court judges, their gender, race, law school, prior type of
legal concern they practiced in, non-family (or personal)
campaign contributions, and age cohort (B) estimated
percentages of tenants' gender, race and the time spent in
front of the judge, and (C) whether the action was for non-
payment of rent, eviction or repairs.

The first measure is cogent as judges are the
authoritative decision makers in the Housing Court. The
background characteristics to be examined here reflect
research in the judicial sub-field of political science,
(Howard, 1981). The New YorK.City Housing Court issues 28,000
eviction orders a year. (Rubin, 1984). Some 60 percent of
N.Y.C.'s homeless are families. (Listener's Action for the
Homeless, 1985). These factors combined with the inordinate
percentages of women and minority litigants in the housing
courts imply questions as to the social economic status, race
and gender of the judges empowered to evict. (Baum,1986).

Research on the Civil Court of the City of New York
elections indicates that. Democratic jparty' endorsement is

critical as Democrats won some 97.6 percent of the elections.

11
(Fund for Modern Courts, 14). A Democratic primary election
was held in only 24 of the 85 elections. Absence of a primary
election.reduced.competitiveness and.left voters with only the
candidates chosen by Democratic party leaders. (Fund for
Modern Courts, 15).

The average amount of campaign money raised in a Civil
Court election grew from $12,500 in 1980 to $40,001 in 1985,
a 330 percent increase. (Fund for Modern Courts, 18-19).
More than one third of voters who turned out on election day
failed to cast a ballot for any Civil Court candidate (Fund
for Modern.Courts, 16-17). Ninety five percent of Civil Court
incumbents were reelected. (Fund for Modern Courts, 16-17).

Women and minorities are at a distinct disadvantage in
the Civil Court's judicial selection process. (Fund for Modern
Courts, 20-22).

The second set of estimated measures should help to
indicate the variation in treatment which tenants receive.
The majority of tenant litigants interviewed by the Access to
Justice Project were women (79 percent). Of all tenant
litigants interviewed by observers (European-Americans,
African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans were represented in
the population), 53 percent were African Americans. (Reide,
19).

A similar finding was made by the City Wide Task Force on
Housing Court. Eighty percent of tenant litigants in the

Housing Part were African-American or Hispanic, 66 percent

12
were women and 50 percent received some form of public
assistance. (Fox, 31-33). Half of all trials and 81 percent
of all cases in. pre-trial hearings lasted less than 15
minutes.- (Fox, 51). Due to the limited resources of the two
published studies which document the indicators here, the
measures will be estimates.

The third measure will allow us to assess the types of
Housing Court decisions. The Housing Court records will
provide a large and reliable data base on the type of case,
and the judges who decided them. Background characteristic
information on Housing Court judges is documented in a study
published by the Fund for Modern Courts (1986).

Data on tenants' gender, race and time spent in front of
the judge is not reflected in the official court records,
however the samples drawn.by court observers in the studies by
the City Wide Task Force on Housing Court (Fox, 1986), and the
Access to Justice Project of the A.C.L.U. (Reide, 1987),
provide a small data base to assess these measures.

III

Having examined the elements of procedural due process
and conditions under which it occurs we are now prepared to
test our major hypotheses. The three due process variables
and the Housing Court decisions can be tested for their
relationship to judicial background characteristics and
litigants' background characteristics.

A specific indicator, which speaks to whether or not the

13

Housing Court is carrying out the stated legislative intent of
housing stock preservation is, whether tenants are evicted.
We have no way of saying with certainty that the eviction
judgement was actually executed, (that is the tenant did not
bring an order to show cause within the required 72 hours to
prevent eviction), however we can determine that when the
court records indicate "INQUEST," that a formal hearing was
conducted an the landlord was required to prove his holdover
case against the tenant before the judge entered an eviction
order.

Court records of whether tenants win when they seek to
compel landlords to make necessary repairs are unavailable for
practical purposes. Less than three percent of cases in
Housing Court are commenced by tenants who seek repairs.

Evictions are an indicator of what the court is
frequently used for, regaining dominion and control over
property by landlords. The infrequency of court ordered
repairs indicates the lack of execution of the dominant public
policy, (preservation of housing stock) which is the
legislative intent and.primary function.of the Housing Court.

The inquiry'appears significant, in that, it‘will provide
a.model with which.the judicial backgrounds of judges in local
civil court jurisdictions can be operationalized with a view
toward discerning their relationship to judicial decisions.
Such a model will provide the analytical rubric for the

systematic analysis of judicial decisions in local courts.

14

On the basis of the systematic data analysis which the
model will provide, evaluation of local court policies and
practices may be conducted with a view toward enhancing access
to the judicial system.

Further, an adverse judicial decision in New York
City's landlord tenant court may lead to the output of an
eviction.order which frequently leaves an.entire New York City
family foraging in garbage cans for food, and living in
cardboard boxes on steamy manholes or subterranean life in the

subway system.

Chapter 1. LITERATURE SUMMARY

Companion studies of judicial decisions in the New York
City Housing Part have been.conducted.by the Access to Justice
Project, of the American Civil Liberties Union, (Reide 1987),
and the City Wide Task Force on Housing Court, (Fox 1986).
Research on the social characteristics of judges in the New
York City Civil Court elections has been published.by the Fund
for Modern Courts (1986). A synopsis of the judicial sub-
field in political science should help to differentiate this
inquiry from the extant body of knowledge on judicial
decisions before a summary of these studies (which speak
directly to the proposed inquiry).

The current state of the judicial sub-field within
political science has focused on appellate court alignments,
(Rohde and Spaeth, 1976), the U.S. Supreme Court, (Ignagni,
1990), (Dahl, 1958), judicial role Hconceptions, (Howard,
1981), background characteristics of federal court appointees
(Goldman, 1985), group dynamics on appellate panels, (Brenner,
1980), and the relationship of appellate court judges'
background characteristics and decisions, (Tate, 1981).

Research on trial courts tend to have concentrated on
criminal court issues such as plea bargaining, (Heumann,
1978), case management (Freely, 1979) and differential

sentencing, (Brererton and Casper, 1981, 1982).

15

16

Research on judicial decisions in civil litigation is
distinguishable from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which
involve a hierarchial appellate process before a majority or
a plurality of justices decides the controversy. (Rohde and
Spaeth, 1976). Clarity, in the distinction between civil and
criminal litigation (i.e. the latter usually involves
incarceration upon conviction of a crime), must also be
established. (Brererton and Casper, 1981, 1982).

Civil court research on judicial decisions has not
received the attention which appellate court and criminal
court decisions have. (Galanter, 1974). Areas of published
civil court research include the relationship of the courts to
other adjudicative bodies, (Sarat and Grossman, 1975), the
values allocated on the basis of facts and norms by civil
court (Wanner, 1974,1975), the utility of the courts to
redress grievances, (Miller and Sarat, 1980,1981) and the
selection of state court judges and special interests,
(Watson, Downing and Spiegel, 1967).

Lempert's (1989) examination of "informal procedure," in
Hawaiian public housing eviction board decisions is
distinguishable from the New York City Housing Part procedure
which is governed by Civil Court and Housing Part rules, New
York evidentiary rules and exceptions, as well as more than
100 administrative directives. The severity of the
consequences when an adverse judicial decision is rendered in

tropical Hawaii and temperate New York City is another

17
distinction.

In his subsequent discussion of longitudinal court docket
research over a thirty year period Lempert (1990) argued that
quantitative docket data must be placed in local perspective
(e.g., Hawaii), with qualitative contextual information.

What the literature underscores for this inquiry is the
limited number of judicial decision makers in a given U.S.
jurisdiction. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has nine
members and federal and state appellate court panels range
from seven to three.

When the decisions which this inquiry assesses were made
there were 20 sitting Housing Court judges for the five
counties of New York City which is approximately four Housing
Court judges per county. (Fox, 12). This inquiry will
analyze the decisions of three Manhattan Housing Court judges.

Unlike many of the databases discussed in the literature,
this inquiry's data base of judicial decisions is
comparatively large. For instance analysis of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions was possible on the basis of 92 cases decided
over 16 years. (Ignagni, 96). This inquiry will analyze
Manhattan Housing Court decisions on the basis of 1648 cases
decided over four months.

The related but distinguishable literature on judicial
decision research.does not fall squarely'on the N.Y.C. Housing
Part, which the Chief Judge of the New York State Court of

Appeals (the state's highest tribunal), described as

18
"reminiscent of a bazaar of Calcutta." (Wachtler, 1986). In
light of New York City's visibly acute homeless problem,
(N.Y.S. Department of Social Services, 1984), an analysis
which seeks to explain the influences on the judges of law and
fact in cases which may lead to eviction and homelessness
seems past due. (Cohen, 1979).

The companion studies of judicial decisions in the New
York City Housing Part Justice Evicted, (Reide,1987) , and F5113
Minute’Justice, (Fox, 1986) assessed judicial decisions in the
Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court.

The Access to Justice Project of the A.C.L.U., (Reide,
1987), focused on access to the landlord tenant court. It
examined four aspects of due process. Is the notice to
litigants reasonably executed to notify them of the issues,
how they should respond to protect their rights, and where
they should appear? Do litigants have an opportunity to be
heard in. Housing’ Court and. to adequately‘ present their
defenses and evidence? Is the proceeding an orderly, logical
progression which leads to the determination of legal issues
in light of the possible severity of an adverse decision in
Housing Court? Can litigants expeditiously appeal judicial
decisions when appeals are mandated by specific statutes?"
(Reide, x). The assumed due process practices of the Housing
Part were contrasted to the actual practices. "Sewer
service," the level of adequate assistance in the clerk's

office, an inadequate number of translators, the absence of

19
plain language instruction manuals, and the lack of appointed
counsel for tenants facing eviction were assessed. T h e
A.C.L.U. report corroborated the research conducted by the
City Wide Task Force on Housing Court, (Fox, 1986). Justice
Evicted focused primarily on due process, similarly 1333
Minute Justice assessed the function of the Housing Part in
light of the legislative intent for the court's formation and
the lack of legal representation for minorities who were
predominantly women. The time spent on cases, the frequency
of cases initiated for non-payment of rent, and hallway
settlements were also assessed.

Housing Part judges are New York City Civil Court judges.
Election of these judges between 1980 and 1985 was assessed in
The Illusion.of Democracy, (The Fund.for'Modern Courts, 1986).
This study documented the process of judicial selection, such
as voter participation, the role of political party
endorsements, opposition and competitiveness of the elections,
the impact of incumbency and campaign financing. It also
assessed judicial background. characteristics such. as the
gender, race, prior type of law practice, law school rank and

age of candidates for Civil Court.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL APPROACH AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Preliminary research indicates that while litigants,
attorneys, court clerks, process servers, and city marshals
play supportive roles in the Housing Court procedures, the
judges are the key players. They are the trier of fact and
arbiter of the law. They make the authoritative judicial
decisions and on this basis we assume they should be the
objects of research here. (Rotunda, Nowak & Young, 1986).

B. This raises questions as to how do individuals get
the authority to allocate the due process guarantees in the
Housing Court? ‘What is the process of selection? Do campaign
contributions, which are not from the candidates or their
families, provide donors with judicial access or special
consideration? .Are campaign contributions a quid.pro quo? Is
there real competition in the civil court elections? What
training is required of them and at what schools?

What are the socioeconomic background characteristics of
those who seek judicial office? ‘What is there race, age, sex?
Are they incumbents? Here, we assume that an analysis of
judicial backgrounds and the probable implications of their
similarities and diversity should facilitate legal prediction.
(Keown, 1980).

Specifically, which.background characteristics of judges

seem to explain eviction decisions?

20

21

C. The importance of the decisions which these judges
are selected.to make, implies a review'of what impact, if any,
their selection has on a litigant, before he or she is
deprived of a major property right. Here, judicial outputs,
public policy, the assumed definitions of Housing Court docket
notations and the acquisition of the power to make housing
court decisions, provides an opportunity to segment, quantify
and assess the dynamics of judicial decision and election in
a local civil court. (Jacob, 1968). The background
characteristics of tenants is also a measure which should help

interpret the primary findings of this inquiry. (Reide, 19).

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The central question may be posed in hypothetical form as,
whether judicial background characteristics, which include
election practices, are independent of due process for
litigants in N.Y.C. landlord tenant courts? (Fund for Modern
Courts, 1986).

VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT
Four major dependent variables will be assessed which
operationalize due process in N.Y.C.'s Housing Court. The
indicators are (1) whether an inquest was held before a
default eviction decision was made, (2) whether both parties
'had. lawyers in housing court cases, (3) whether both parties

had supervision. by a judge when cases were settled by

 

 

22

stipulated agreement. Additional dependent variables to be
assessed are (4) the specific decisions which will be pooled
to develop the major dependent variables, (5) the gender of
tenants in the Housing Court (6) the race of tenants in the
Housing court.

Notice, as further operationalized here, will examine
default judgments which result in eviction orders against
tenants when a formal inquest is recorded in the court
record. Notice is the primary indicator of due process. It
is the premise of the other two legs of due process, which
are, an opportunity to be heard and orderly proceeding.
Conduct of an inquest is a probative indicator of whether
reasonable notice was actually given. Moreover, without an
inquest the landlord.does not have to establish the factual or
evidentiary basis of his action against the tenant.

Whether both parties had legal representation indicates
another aspect of due process, an opportunity to be heard and
defend. A related ordinal measure of the orderliness and
fairness of the proceedings is whether landlords and tenants
have judicial supervision when they settle cases by stipulated
agreements.

One judicial output indicator is whether or not an
eviction decision was made? Another is the percentage of
tenants who sought to have the courts compel their landlords
to make repairs as this will facilitate the assessment of one

of the policy objectives of the court which the legislature

23

intended” The gender and race of tenants in the Housing Court
are other indicators along with the time litigants spent in
front of judges are dependent variables which may be imputed
from the observation data available. Court docket records do
not list the time spent on the case, however the observation
data does provide information on the length.of proceedings for
each type of proceeding in the’Housing Part. .Analysis of this
behavior will allow for classification of judicial decisions
according to whether they have a demonstrably adverse impact
on tenants.

. The independent variables for this inquiry operationalize
both the process of judicial selection and reflects the
judges' background characteristics. Campaign contributions,
which are not from.the candidates or non family members, is an
independent variable which raises several critical issues.
What is the mean amount of this type of contribution? How
much more is contributed when judges have competitors? Do
judges who received the»most of this type of contribution have
the least competition? If there is no real contest why do

Civil Court judges need campaign contributions? Incumbency is
another factor in judicial selection which seems related to
campaign contribution issues.

The public or private classification of the legal concern
(e.g., law firm, court or administrative agency), is a factor
in judicial background characteristics which seems related to

the process of judicial selection and judicial decisions.

24

Similarly, the literature indicates the national (which
teaches the operative common law in a majority of U.S.
jurisdictions), or state (which.concentrates on the common law
of one state e.g. New York) rank of the judges' law school
seems to have significant explanatory value. (Tate, 1981).

Gender and race impact on the process of judicial
selection and speaks to who is allowed to become a judge of
law and a trier of facts in the Civil Court. Conversely,
gender and race seem to impact on tenants in Housing Court.

The variation.in judicial output is the critical test for
judicial due process decisions here. Due process is all but
meaningless in. the Housing' Part without an attorney ‘to
represent litigants. If one side (usually the landlord), has
an attorney and the other does not unequal judicial treatment
is demonstrable, (Fox, 1986), and independently verifiable.
(Reide, 22).

The first set of hypotheses relate judicial due process
decisions and judicial backgrounds:
Ho: Judicial background characteristics, which include
election practices, are independent of due process for
litigants in N.Y.C. landlord tenant courts.

Thus:

Hla: Housing Court judges who receive campaign
contributions, which are not personal or family, issue more
default decisions to evict tenants without a formal inquest,

than those who do not receive this type of contribution.

25
(Fund For Modern Courts, 18).

Hlb: Housing Court judges who receive campaign
contributions, which are not personal or family, provide
tenants a greater opportunity to be heard and to defend,
defined as legal representation for both parties in landlord
tenant cases than those who do not receive this type of
contribution. (Fund For Modern Courts, 18).

ch: Housing Court judges who receive campaign
contributions, which are not personal or family, conduct more
orderly and fair Housing Court proceedings, defined as
judicial supervision for both parties when they settle cases
by stipulated agreements than those who do not receive this
type of contribution. (Reide, 28).

H2a: Housing Court judges who practiced in a public legal
concern before election, issued more default eviction
decisions to evict tenants without a formal inquest than those
who practiced in private concerns. (Goldman, 1985).

H2b: Housing Court judges who practiced in a public
legal concern before election, provide tenants a greater
opportunity to be heard and.to defend, defined as legal repre-
sentation for both.parties in landlord tenant cases than those
who practiced in private concerns. (Goldman, 1985).

H2c: Housing Court judges who practiced in a public
legal concern before election, conduct more orderly and fair
Housing Court proceedings, defined as judicial supervision for

both parties when they settle cases by stipulated agreement

26

than those who practiced in private concerns. (Reide, 28).

H3a: Housing Court judges whose law schools had a
national rank issue fewer default eviction decisions against
tenants without a formal inquest than those from law schools
with state ranks. (Kaye, 1980).

H3b: Housing Court judges whose law schools had a
national rank provide tenants a greater opportunity to be
heard and to defend, defined as legal representation for both
parties in eviction cases than those from law schools with
state ranks. (Kaye, 1980).

H3c: Housing Court judges whose law schools had a
national rank conduct more orderly and fair Housing Court
proceedings, defined as judicial supervision for both parties
when they settle cases by stipulated agreement than those from
law schools with state ranks. (Kaye, 1980).

H4a: Male Housing Court judges enter more default
judicial decisions which evict unrepresented tenants without
a formal inquest than female Housing Court judges. (Fund for
Modern Courts, 20-22).

H4b: Male Housing Court judges provide tenants a greater
opportunity to be heard and to defend, defined as legal
representation for both parties in landlord tenant cases than
female Housing Court judges. (Fund for Modern Courts, 20-

22).

27

H4c: Male Housing Court judges conduct more orderly and
fair Housing Court proceedings, defined as judicial
supervision for both parties when they settle cases by
stipulated agreement than female Housing Court judges. (Fund
for Modern Courts, 20-22).

H5a: White Housing Court judges enter more default
judicial decisions which evict unrepresented tenants without
a formal inquest than minority Housing Court judges. (Fund
for Modern Courts, 20-22).

HSb: White Housing Court judges provide tenants a
greater opportunity to be heard and to defend, defined as
legal representation.for both.parties in landlord tenant cases
than minority Housing Court judges. (Fund for Modern Courts,
20-22).

H5c: White Housing Court judges conduct more orderly and
fair Housing Court proceedings, defined as judicial
supervision for both parties when they settle cases by
stipulated agreement than minority Housing Court judges.
(Fund for Modern Courts, 20-22).

H6a: Senior Housing Court judges (defined as age 61-70)
enter more default judicial decisions which evict
unrepresented tenants without a formal inquest than junior
Housing Court judges(30-60). (Fund for Modern Courts, 20-22) .

H6b: Senior Housing Court judges (defined as age 61-70)
provide tenants a greater opportunity to be heard and to

defend, defined as legal representation for both parties in

28
landlord tenant cases than.junior'Housinngourt judges. (Fund
for Modern Courts, 20-22).

H6c: Senior Housing Court judges (defined as age 61-70)
Housing Court judges conduct more orderly and fair Housing
Court proceedings, defined as judicial supervision for both
parties when they settle cases by stipulated agreement than
junior Housing court judges. (Fund for Modern Courts, 20-22) .

The second set of hypotheses relate judicial due process

decisions and tenants backgrounds:

H7O: Tenants' background characteristics, are
independent of due process for litigants in N.Y.C. landlord
tenant courts.

Thus:

H7a: Male housing court tenants receive more default
judicial decisions which evict unrepresented tenants without
a formal inquest than female housing court tenants. (Fox 31-
33).

H7b: Male housing court tenants receive a greater
opportunity to be heard and to defend, defined as legal
representation for both parties in landlord tenant cases than
female housing court tenants. (Fox, 31-33).

H7c: Male housing court tenants receive more orderly and
fair Housing Court proceedings, defined as judicial
supervision for both parties when they settle cases by

stipulated agreement than female housing court tenants. (Fox

29
31-33).

H8a: White housing court tenants receive more default
judicial decisions which evict unrepresented tenants without
a formal inquest than.minority housing court tenants. (Reide,
19).

H8b: White housing court tenants receive a greater
opportunity to be heard and to defend, defined as legal
representation for both parties in landlord tenant cases than
minority housing court tenants. (Reide, l9).

H8c: White housing court tenants receive more orderly
and fair Housing Court proceedings, defined as judicial
supervision for both parties when they settle cases by
stipulated agreement than minority housing court tenants.
(Fund for Modern Courts, 20-22).

Empirical findings on these questions will allow for
inferences tot be drawn. on the implications of judicial
background characteristics on judicial decisions in the
Housing Part of the N.Y.C. Civil Courts. (Fund for Modern
Courts, 1986). The proposed research will increase clarity on
what factors seem to influence judicial outputs (and to what

degree). (Baum, 1983,1986).

Chapter 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

SAMPLING PROCEDURES

Systematic random samples of judicial decisions in one
Housing Part jurisdiction were drawn, (i.e. Manhattan).. The
time frame of the sample of judicial decisions will begin in
June 1987. This time period closely corresponds with the
large amount of data collected by the A.C.L.U. the City Wide
Task Force on Housing Courts and the Fund for Modern Courts.
To obtain a representative cross-section of Housing Part
judges, a list of Civil Court judges and candidates1 selected
between 1980 and 1985 were identified and a random sample was
drawn from the list. (Fund for Modern Courts, 55-78).

A random start and a sampling interval were established
after the percentage of the population elements to be included
in the sample (15 percent) was established. Consistency
between the population elements to be included in the sample
were calculated to insure a uniform sampling interval given
the finite number of judges (20) assigned to the Housing Part
of the New York City Civil Court.

That is every third court calendar record in the Housing
Court Clerk's office between June and October 1987. If the
record drawn was not a judge elected between 1980-1985 it was
replaced and another drawn until approximately 1500

observations (1648 in total) were drawn. Court election data

30

cc
Ci

P0

lar

and
Civ
Oct:
the

PrOC
COur‘

HFOx,

stiPUJ

31
(1980-1985), was gleaned from the records in the New York City
Board of Elections by researchers in the Fund for Modern
Courts study. This data were augmented with legal documents
and interviews of knowledgeable actors in.and.observers of New
York City politics and the Civil Court.

Estimates on the gender, and race of the tenants in
Housing Court was drawn from the two companion studies.
First, observation data on notice, an opportunity to be heard
and defend, and an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of
the case and controversy, (the three fundamental elements of
due process), in the Housing Part was gathered, classified,
quantified" and assessed by this researcher in his capacity as
coordinator of the Access to Justice Project of the American
Civil Liberties Union and published as an A.C.L.U. public
policy report entitled Justice: Evicted (Reide, 1987).

Approximately 100 court monitors (tenants as well as
landlords), observed 563 calendar call, motion calendar call,
and stipulation agreements, in the Housing Part of the N.Y.C.
Civil Court in Brooklyn, the Bronx and Manhattan from July to
October 1986. (Wise, 1987). These«decisions were observed as
the majority of landlord tenant cases are resolved in these
proceedings. (Reide, 26). The inquiry corroborated Housing
Court research of the City Wide Task Force on Housing Court.
(Fox, 17).

Next, observation data on the motion calendar call,

stipulation agreements and trial parts of the Housing Part was

32
collected in all New York City Housing Part Jurisdictions by
observers from the Citywide Task Force on Housing Court in
November 1983 and February 1984. (Fox, 16). Three thousand
cases were observed in this studyu Court files were Hexamined
in ten percent of the observed cases and Housing Part judges
were interviewed in the Fall of 1983.
RELIABILITY

The earliéffipublications on New York City Housing Court
decisions, (Fox, 1986), (Reide, 1987), provided a theoretical
basis for the legal importance of and type of judicial
decisions analyzed here. These confluent studies are the
major published analysis of the policies and practices of the
New York City Housing Court.

This inter-study reliability is underscored by
substantial agreement of findings on the questions of notice,
legal representation, lack of supervision of stipulation
agreements, types of lawsuits initiated, gender and race of
tenants in the Housing Court.

The Housing Court records from which this inquiry's
sample of judicial decisions were drawn are the official
dockets of the Manhattan Housing Court. The Chief Clerk's
office is the authoritative record keeper and depository of
Housing Court records.

The judicial background data was compiled by the Fund for
Modern Courts, a nonpartisan, nonprofit, statewide court

reform organization. The official records of the New York

33
City Board of Elections was the basis for their information on
Civil Court elections between 1980 and 1985. The background
characteristics which were operationalized as independent
variables are consistent with the characteristics discussed in
the judicial decision sub-field of the political science
discipline. (Hansen, 1983).
VALIDITY

Validity standards, outside of Housing Court judges who
make decisions in landlord tenant cases, were used to assess
the validity of the measurement devices of this inquiry.

They included the body of constitutional law on due
process (Rotunda, Newak and Young, 1986), and research in
federal judicial backgrounds (Goldman, 1985) . The suitability
of the definitions, categories and sub-categories seems
adequate on the basis of constitutional precedent and the

state Of the judicial decision sub-field.

DATA ANALYSIS

The quantification and segmentation of ordinal data on
the elements of the due process judgments and judicial
backgrounds allows association tests for judges' background
characteristics and on judicial decisions.

Quantification of the judcial decisions was achieved in
a binary manner. "When a particular due process decision was
made it was coded as "1," and a "0" was entered to reflect

missing information for the different types of due process

34
decisions which could have been made. This dichotomous coding
method was applied to MDNAES, FJLLNAT, MED, MPSPS, MDNAM, SPS,
and INQUEST. (The two pooled data dependent variables, LGLREP
and‘UNSUP also reflect this binary coding scheme). Thus, each
dependent variable could only have a value of "l," or "0".

Quantification of the judges' backgrounds did not require
dichotomous coding as the dependent variables did. The first
independent variable GENDER, was coded "l" for female and "2"
for male. RACE, was operationalized by coding black as "1,"
Hispaniczias "2," and white as "3".

Campaign contributions,_ which were not personal or
family, were segmented as "major", above the 1985 mean of
$40,001, "some," below the $40,001 mean and "none," for no
campaign contributions. Thus, the independent variable CONTRIB
was coded as, major "1", some "2," and none "3." The type of
legal concern in which the Housing Court judge practiced in
before selection to the bench was coded as, public "1," and
private "2."

The rank of the judge's law school3 was coded as national
"1" and state "2". The judge's age cohorts‘ were coded as 30
to 40, "1", 41-50, "2," 51 to 60 "3," and 61-70, "4."

The existence of the suspected ordinal association may be
measured initially with statistics such as, percentile, and
Chi-square. As the hypotheses are framed in a one directional
manner, (i.e. , "more than") , one tailed tests are appropriate.

Nonparametric statistical measures of correlation seem

7

35
appropriate to explain the suspected association here.

The contingency tables display the relationships among
the variables. The explanatory independent variables are
displayed in columns while the (observation) dependent
variables are shown in rows. The tables' cells show the
number and percentage of observations for all of the tested
combinations of variable relationships. The Chi-square test
of independence indicates whether a systematic relationship
between the variables in the row by column tables exists.

The observation data in this joint frequency format
qualifies for only one row, column and cell. "For tables with
more than a single degree of freedom, a minimum expected
frequency of five can be regarded as adequate, although when
there is only a single degree of freedom a minimum expected
frequency of ten is much safer." (Hays, 1981). This
conservative rule of thumb may be relaxed and smaller
frequencies permitted due to circumstances. The contingency
tables and Chi-square for the specific decisions by the
explanatory variables are displayed in Tables 4-45. These
statistics provide a basis for comparison with the contingency
tables based on pooled data displayed in Tables 46-57.

Further, on the basis of these measures a nonlinear
probability model (Aldrich and Nelson 1984), will be developed
which will allow another test of whether the independent
variables have a statistically significant effect on the

dependent variables.

7.

36

The proposed method of analysis will allow reasonable
inferences to be drawn on the suspected relationship between
judicial selection policies and the due process afforded
litigants. (Kaye, 1980). Comparison of judicial backgrounds
and the (probable implications of their similarities and
diversity should facilitate judicial decision prediction.
(Keown, 1980). The findings of the proposed inquiry should
allow an evaluation of our initial propositions. Findings of
statistical significance at the .05 level should illuminate
the underlying question whether due process is decided by
dispassionate judicial decisions based on law or the
socioeconomic biases of judges.

LIMITATIONS

Each of New York's five boroughs has a distinct housing
market and Manhattan, while representative, was chosen due to
the ready availability of the data and the earlier companion
studies. Housing Court record notation varies somewhat with
each court clerk. To eliminate any changes in court record
notations the major dependent variables were developed with
pooled data. These variables provide an unbiased estimate
with a smaller sampling error than a single sample value.

The absence of a high frequency of decisions of some
types is due to the nature of judicial decisions in Housing
Court. For instance postponements are the most common
decision and of the 1648 observations there were 807

postponements, nearly half of the observations.

37

This inquiry seeks to span the provinces of meaning in
jurisprudential science, the (local courts) judicial decision
sub-field in political science, demographic factors in
judicial backgrounds and the public administration notions of
judicial selection}. For this reason use of the glossaryfi is
essential for clarity.

PRELIMINARY TESTS

Table 1 demonstrates how the hypotheses line up. Each of
the independent variables was tested against each of the major
dependent variables. The minor dependent variables which are
based on estimates from the earlier Housing Court studies help
to explain the preliminary findings. On the basis of the
preliminary tests, more stringent tests of the data are
discussed in the next section. The extent to which Housing
Court decisions can be explained by judicial backgrounds is
analogous to a jig saw puzzle which requires patience and
attention to detail.

The joint frequency tables7Hand the Chi-square test for
significance are provided in Tables 2-56. Each dependent
variable is separately tested for association with each of the
six explanatory variables. (Discussion of the preliminary
tests results may be found after every set of six tables on a

separate page).

38

Table 1

Judicial Due Process Decisions
And Judicial Background Variables

 

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

 

Judge's Gender: Female vs.
Male

Default decision to
evict without formal
inquest.

 

Judge's Race: Black vs.
White

Legal representation
for both parties.

 

u

Non-family Campaign
Contributions:Major,
some, none.

Judicial supervision
of settlements.

 

 

Judge's Type of Previous
Legal Concern: Public,
private

Specific decisions
(i.e. MDNAM, SPS).

 

Judges Law School's Rank:
National, state

Tenant gender.

 

 

Judge's Age Cohort : Junior,
Senior

 

Tenant race .

 

 

}

39

Table 2
Motion denied no appearance either side
by gender of judge

 

 

 

GENDER
MDNAES COUNT FEMALE MALE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 776 849 1625
97.7 99.4 98.6
1 18 5 23
2.3 0.6 1.4

 

 

 

 

 

COLUMN 794 854 1648
TOTAL 48.2 51.8 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Motion denied no appearance either side

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 8.453951
Significant at .05

40

Table 3

Motion denied no appearance either side

MDNAES

COLUMN
TOTAL

by race of judge

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RACE
COUNT BLACK WHITE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 386 1239 1625
99.0 98.5 98.6
1 4 19 23
1.0 1.5 1.4
390 1258 1648
23.7 76.3 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Motion denied no appearance either side

Chi-square (l d.f.) = 8.453951
Significant at .05

7

41

Table 4
Motion denied no appearance either side
by non-family campaign contributions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONTRIB

MDNAES COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 463 386 776 1625

99.8 99.0 97.7 98.6

1 1 4 18.0 23

0.2 1.0 2.3 1.4

— ——.

COLUMN 464 390 794 1648

TOTAL 28.2 23.7 48.2 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Motion denied no appearance either side

#0

Chi-square (2 d.f.) = 9.464507
Significant at .05

J

42

Table 5
Motion denied no appearance either side
by type Of judge's previous legal concern

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCERN

MDNAES COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 1239 386 1625

98.5 99.0 98.6

1 19 4 23

_ 1.5 1.0 1.4

COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Motion denied no appearance either side

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 0.508223

43

Table 6
Motion denied no appearance either side
by national or state rank of judge's law school

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_ RANK— _
MDNAES COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 1239 386 1625

98.5 99.0 98.6

1 19 4 23

COLUMN 1258 390 1648

TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions

1 = Motion denied no appearance either side

Chi-square (1 d.f)= 0.508223

2

MDNAES

COLUMN
TOTAL

44

Table 7

Motion denied no appearance either side

by judge's age cohort

 

 

 

 

 

O = Other judicial decisions
1 = Motion denied no appearance either side

Chi-square (2 d.f) = 9.464507
Significant at .05

 

 

AGE

M

COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70

COL PCT

0 776 463 386

97.7 99.8 99.0

1 18 1 4

2.3 0.2 1.0

794 464 39

8.2 28.2 23

ROW
TOTAL

1625
98.6

23
1.4

1648
100.0

11

of

Sp
ne
ma
no

of

V1

. M.

7 ind;

Judges

45

Table 2 tests for a systematic relationship between the
dependent variable "motion denied no appearance either side,"
a.measure'of.representation.and judge's gender which indicates
a Chi-square value of 8.453951. Such a value would occur by
chance between .001 and .0001 for a one-tailed test. On this
basis we reject the null hypothesis that judicial background
characteristics are independent of due process decisions for
litigants in N.Y.C. Housing Courts at the conventional level
of p ( .05.

Judge's gender seems systematically related to this
specific due process decision in that the female judge seems
nearly four times as likely to make this decision than the
males. Table 3 shows a significant Chi-square value however
no appreciable differences between the percentage Of this type
of decision based on the judge's race.

The campaign contribution tests displayed in Table 4
indicate a monotonic array of steadily increasing decisions
from 0.2 percent to 2.3 percent. This indicates that as
campaign contributions decrease this type of decision
increases. The Chi-square value for this table is 9.464507
with the likelihood of a chance occurrence between .005 and
.0005.

Tables 5 and 6 show no statistical significance. Table
7 indicates that the proportion of these decisions made by

judges in the (30-50) cohort was twice that of judges (61-70).

MDNAM

46

Table 8

Motion denied no appearance movant
by judge's gender

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GENDER
__ J
COUNT COL FEMALE MALE
PCT
0 753 854
94.8 100.0
1 41 0
5.2 0.0
COLUMN 794 854
TOTAL 48.2 51.8

Other judicial decisions
Motion denied no appearance movant

HO

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 45.223332
Significant at .05

ROW
TOTAL

1607
97.5

41
2.5

1648
100.0

MDNAM

47

Table 9
Motion denied no appearance movant
by judge's race

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

’YEEL._.II.
COUNT BLACK WHITE
COL PCT
~ o 390 1217
100.0 96.7
1 o 41
0.0 3.3
——
COLUMN 390 1258
TOTAL 23.7 76.3

C
II II

Other judicial decisions
Motion denied no appearance movant

Chi-square (1 d.f.) =13.03494
Significant at .05

ROW
TOTAL

1607
97.5

41
2.5

1648
100.0

MDNAM

COLUMN
TOTAL

Ho

48

Table 10
Motion denied no appearance movant
by non-family campaign contributions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONTRIB
COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE
COL PCT
0 464 390 753
100.0 100.0 94.8
1 0 0 41
0.0 0.0 5.2
464 390 794
28.2 23.7 48.2

Other judicial decisions
Motion denied no appearance

Chi-quare (2 d.f.)= 45.223332

Significant at .05

ROW
TOTAL

1607
97.5

41
2.5

1648
100.0

movant

I

49

Table 11
Motion denied no appearance movant
by type of judge's previous legal concern

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

—— 7 ,
MDNAM COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1217 390 1607
96.7 100.0 97.5
1 41 0 41
3.3 0.0 2.5
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Motion denied no appearance movant

Chi-square (l.d.f) =13.034944
Significant at .05

50

Table 12
Motion denied no appearance movant
by national or state rank of judge's law school
RANK

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_——
MDNAM COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1217 390 1607
97.5
1 41 o 41
3.3 0.0 2.5
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

Other judicial decisions

0:
1 = Motion denied no appearance movant

Chi-square (1 d.f)=13.034944
Significant at .05

51

Table 13
Motion denied no appearance movant
by judge's age cohort
AGE

 

 

 

 

 

 

MDNAM COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70
COL PCT

o 753 464 390

94.8 100.0 100.0

1 41 0 o

5.2 0.0 0.0

 

COLUMN 794 464 390
TOTAL 48.2 28.2 23.7
0 = Other judicial decisions

1 = Motion denied no appearance movant

Chi-square (2 d.f)=45.223332
Significant at .05

ROW
TOTAL

1607
97.5

41
2.5

1648
100.0

ta
ch

86

th
OP.
He:
C6:
the
Tar

lan

diSt

52

Tables 8-13 tests another measure of representation
"motion denied no appearance movant." These tables
underscore the aforementioned caveat that Housing Court
notation varies somewhat from Clerk to clerk. Only one clerk
used this notation in the sample. For this reason the
significance of the Chi-square values for Tables 8-13 seem
artificially high. This data are useful to the analysis in
that it can be pooled with similar indicators to provide an
unbiased estimate with a smaller sampling error than a single
value. Pooled data are a viable alternative as what we seek
are indicators of due process decisions. The data in these
tables do provide measurable, quantifiable data on specific
due process decisions made by a Housing Court judge in the
sample.

Tables 8-13 when juxtaposed to Tables 2-7 demonstrates
their utility as indicators Of the due process concept.
Opportunity to be heard and to defend, (which is defined as
legal representation for both parties in landlord tenant
cases), is the due process concept here. Further utility of
these tables is demonstrated when they are compared with
Tables 14-19 which display the tests for "final judgment
landlord no appearance tenant". Motion denied no appearance
either side usually reflects decisions for the tenant, while
"final judgment landlord no appearance tenant" reflects
decisions for the landlord. Comparison of the frequency

distributions provides a basis for comparison.

FJLLNAT

53

Table 14

Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant
by judge's gender

...;
II II

 

 

 

 

GENDER
_
COUNT COL FEMALE MALE
PCT
0 766 854
96.5 100.0
1 28 0
3.5 0.0
COLUMN 794 845
TOTAL 48.2 51.8

 

 

Other judicial decisions
Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 30.636390
Significant at .05

 

ROW
TOTAL

1620
98.3

28
1.7

1648
100.0

FJLLNAT

o:

54

Table 15
Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant
by judge's race

 

 

 

 

 

 

RACE

COUNT BLACK WHITE
COL PCT

0 390 1230
100.0 97.8
1 0 28
0.0 2.2
COLUMN 390 1258
TOTAL 23.7 76.3

Other judicial decisions
Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

Chi-square (1 d.f.) =8.830478
Significant at .05

ROW
TOTAL

1620
98.3

28
1.7

1648
100.0

55

Table 16
Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant
by non-family campaign contributions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ROW
TOTAL

1620
98.3

28
1.7

1648
100.0

CONTRIB
FJLLNAT COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE
COL PCT
0 464 390 766
100.0 100.0 96.5
1 0 0 28
a 0.0 0.0 3.5
—
COLUMN 464 390 794
TOTAL 28.2 23.7 48.2
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

Chi-square (2 d.f.)=30.63639
Significant at .05

56

Table 17
Final judgment landlord no appearance Tenant
by type of judge's previous legal concern

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCERN
FJLLNAT COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1230 390 1620
97.8 100.0 98.3
1 28 0 28
2.2 0.0 1.7
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 8.830478

Significant at .05

57

Table 18

Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant
by national or state rank of judge's law school

FJLLNAT

COL PCT

RANK

COUNT NATIONAL STATE

 

0

1230
97.8

390
100.0

 

1

 

COLUMN
TOTAL

t-‘O
II n

 

28

 

1258
76.3

Chi-square (1 d.f) =
Significant at .05

0

2.2 0.0

390
23.7

Other judicial decisions
Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

8.830478

 

ROW
TOTAL

1620
98.3

28
1.7

1648

100.0

58

Table 19
Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant
by judge's age cohort

 

 

AGE
_*
FJLLNAT COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70 ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 766 464 390 1620
96.5 100.0 100.0 98.3
1 28 o o 28
3.5 0 0.0 1.7

 

 

 

 

 

COLUMN 794 464 390 1648
TOTAL 48.2 28.2 23.7 100.0

0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant

Chi-square (2 d.f)=30.636390
Significant at .05

59

Tables 14-19 display the tests Of "final judgment
landlord no appearance tenant" an indicator of Opportunity to
be heard and to defend, (defined as legal representation for
both parties in a landlord tenant proceeding).

In a manner similar to Tables 8-13 the notation seems to
have been used by only one of the Housing Court clerks. This
data are useful in that it is the corollary' of "motion denied
no appearance movant."

Final judgment landlord no appearance tenant is usually
a decision in favor of the landlord while motion denied no
appearance movant is a decision usually in favor of the
tenant. When Tables 14-19 are juxtaposed to Tables 8-13 they
reveal that judicial decisions were entered against both
landlords and tenants who failed to make their scheduled
appearances if only one side showed up. This helps interpret
Tables 2-7 which displays motion denied no appearance either
side.

The pooled data technique allows the indicators which
this data Offers to be combined and generate an unbiased
estimate with a comparatively small sampling error, which
corrects for variation in Housing Court notation. Tables 2-19
when pooled by addition of the variables, constitutes the
first major dependent variable legal representation for both
parties which is displayed in Tables 20-25 which speaks to

Opportunity to be heard and to defend.

60

Table 20
Legal Representation for both parties
by judge's gender

 

 

GENDER
fl
LGLREP COUNT FEMALE MALE ROW

COL PCT TOTAL
0 707 849 1556
89.0 99.4 94.4
1 87 5 92
11.0 0.6 5.6
——

 

 

 

 

COLUMN 794 854 1648
TOTAL 48.2 51.8 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Legal Representation for both parties

....
II II

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 83.972667
Significant at .05

61

Table 21
Legal Representation for both parties

by judge's gender

 

 

 

 

 

 

RACE
LGLREP COUNT BLACK WHITE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 386 1170 1556
99.0 93.0 94.4
1 4 88 92
1.0 7.0 5.6
COLUMN 390 1258 1648
TOTAL 23.7 76.3 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Legal Representation for both parties

Chi-square (1 d.f.) =20.127692
Significant at .05

62

Table 22
Legal Representation for both parties
by non-family campaign contributions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONTRIB .
LGLREP COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 463 386 707 1556
99.8 99.0 89.0 94.4
1 1 4 87 92
0.2 1.0 11.0 5.6
COLUMN 464 390 794 1648
TOTAL 28.2 23.7 48.2 100.0
0 Other judicial decisions

H
II II

Legal Representation for both parties

Chi-square (2 d.f.)= 84.23236510
Significant at .05

63

Table 23

Legal Representation for both parties
by type of judge's previous legal concern

LGLREP

CONCERN

COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE

COL PCT

 

0 1170 386
93.0 99.0

 

 

l 88 4

 

 

7.0 1.0

COLUMN 1258 390
TOTAL 76.3 23.7
0 Other judicial decisions

1

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 20.127692

 

ROW
TOTAL

1556
94.4

92
5.6

1648
100.0

Legal Representation for both parties

Significant at .05

64

Table 24
Legal Representation for both parties
by national or state rank of judge's law school

 

 

 

 

 

 

RANK
*
LGLREP COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1170 386 1556
93.0 99.0 94.4
1 88 4 92
7.0 1.0 5.6
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Legal Representation for both parties

Chi-square (l d.f) = 20.127692
Significant at .05

LGLREP

65

Table 25
Legal Representation for both parties
by judge's age cohort

 

 

 

COLUMN
TOTAL

o:
1:

Chi-square (2 d.f)
Significant at .05

 

 

794
48.2

464

 

AGE
COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70
COL PCT
0 707 463 386
89.0 99.8 99.0
1 87 1 4
11.0 0.2 1.0

390

28.2 23.7

Other judicial decisions
Legal Representation for both parties

= 84.236510

 

ROW
TOTAL

1556
94.4

92
5.6

1648
100.0

66

Tables 20-25 display tests Of "legal representation for

both parties." Table 20 shows female judges more likely to
issue decisions of this type. The Chi-square value is
83.972667. This large value indicates a high level

statistical relationship. Table 21 suggests white judges more
likely to issue these decisions, although the Chi-square value
is considerably less than judge's gender at 20.127692.
Similar Chi-square values are shown in Table 23 and Table 24
which display tests for the independent variables type of
judge's previous legal concern and national or state rank of
judge's law school. Judges who practice in public concerns
and those‘who attended nationally ranked law schools madermore
judicial decisions on this aspect of due process than those
who practiced in private concerns and attended state ranked
law schools.

Table 22 indicates a high level of significance with a
Chi-square value of 84.23236510 for non-family campaign
contributions. A similar test result for judge's age cohort
is indicated by Table 25 with a Chi-square value Of 84.236510.
The frequency distributions and levels Of significance are so
similar between Tables 23 and 24 and also Tables 22 and 25
that additional tests seem warranted to distinguish the
explanatory'variables and.to tell us more about the systematic
relationship which the data appears to indicate. The more
multinomial probability tests will provide further assessment

of these relationships in the next section.

67

 

 

 

Table 26
Mediation by judge's gender
GENDER
fl
MED COUNT COL FEMALE MALE ROW
PCT TOTAL
0 781 824 1605
98.4 96.5 97.4
1 13 30 43.5
1.6 3.5 2.6

 

 

 

COLUMN 794 .854 1648
TOTAL 48.2 51.8 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Mediation by judge's gender

HO

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 5.696039
Significant at .05

68

 

Table 27
Mediation by judge's gender
1:16.33
MED COUNT BLACK WHITE ROW

COL PCT TOTAL

0 373 1232 1605
9506 9709 9704

1 17 26 43

 

 

 

 

 

 

A 2.6
COLUMN 390 1258 1648
TOTAL 23.7 76.3 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Mediation by judge's gender

HO

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 6.155518
Significant at .05

69

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 28
Mediation by non-family campaign contributions
CONTRIB .
MED COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 451 373 781 1605
97.2 95.6 98.4 97.4
1 13 17 13 43
2.8 4.4 1.6 2.6
COLUMN 464 390 794 1648
TOTAL 28.2 23.7 48.2 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Mediation by judge's gender

Chi-square (2 d.f.)

Significant at .05

= 7.718185

70

 

 

Table 29
Mediation by type of judge's previous legal concern
CONCERN
MED COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1232 373 1605
97.9 95.6 9704
1 26 17 43
2.1 4.4 2.6
—_‘

 

 

 

 

 

COLUMN 1258 390 “1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

0
II II

Other judicial decisions
Mediation by judge's gender

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 6.155518
Significant at .05

71

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 30
Mediation by national or state rank of judge's law school

RANK

MED COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW

COL PCT TOTAL

0 1232 373 1605

97.9 95.6 97.4

1 26 17 43

2.1 4.4 2.6

COLUMN 1258 390 1648

TOTAL 76.3 23 .7 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Mediation by judge's gender

Ho

Chi square (1 d.f) = 6.155518
Significant at .05

72

Table 31
Mediation by judge's age cohort
AGE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F —_

MED COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70 ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 781 451 373 1605

98.4 97.2 95.6 97.4

1 13 13 17 43

1.6 2.8 4.4 2.6

COLUMN 794 464 390 1648

TOTAL 48.2 28.2 23.7 100.0

Chi-square (2 d.f)
Significant at .05

Other judicial decisions
Mediation by judge's gender

7.718185

73

Table 26 indicates a relationship between "mediation"
decisions and judge's gender. The male judges seem more
likely to make decisions to mediate. The Chi-square value of
5.696039 is significant at the .05 level.

Table 27 indicates that judge's race has explanatory
power for this variable with a Chi-square value Of 6.155518,
and black judges more likely to make mediation decisions.

Tables 29 and 30 display similar statistically
significant tests results for the previous type of practice
that the»Housing Court judg s were engaged.in.and the national
or state rank of their law school. Both variables seem to
generate similar distributions and systematic relationships.

Tables 28 and 31 show a Chi-square value of 7.718185 for
non-family campaign Contributions and the judge's age cohort.
Judge's who receive "some" non-family campaign contributions
and judges in the senior (61-70) age cohort seem more likely
to make mediation decisions. Both tables reflect an
association which speaks to our underlying concern here which
is whether the proceedings are orderly in light Of the nature
of the case and controversy.

The fact that court appointed mediators are not judges
(and rarely attorneys) along with the growth of mediation as
a method of dispute resolution in the Housing Courts
highlights the importance of this type of specific decision.
Combination of these indicators with similar measures into

pooled data seems warranted.

74

Table 32
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by judge's gender

 

 

 

 

 

 

GENDER

MPSPS COUNT COL FEMALE MALE ROW
PCT TOTAL

0 790 838 1628

99.5 98.1 98.8

1 4 16 20
AI 1 . 2

COLUMN 794 854 1648
TOTAL 48.2 5 .8 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

Ho

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 6.439303
Significant at .05

75

Table 33
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by judge's race
RACE

MPSPS COUNT BLACK WHITE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 380 1248 1628
97.4 99.2 98.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 10 1.0 20

2.6 0.8 1.2

COLUMN 390 1258 1648
TOTAL 23.7 76.3 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

I—‘C

Chi-square (l d.f.) = 7.772612
Significant at .05

76

Table 34
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by non-family campaign contributions
CONTRIB

MPSPS COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 458 380 790 1628
98.7 97.4 99.5 98.8

1 6 10 4 20
103 206 005 102

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

COLUMN 464 309 794 1648
TOTAL 28.2 23.7 48.2 100.0

0 = Other judicial decisions

1 = Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

Chi-square (2 d.f.) = 9.294560
Significant at .05

77

Table 35
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by type Of judge's previous legal concern

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCERN
MPSPS COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1248 380 1628
99.2 97.4 98.8
1. 10 10 20
0.8 2.6 1.2
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

H
II II

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 7.772612
Significant at .05

78

Table 36
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by national or state rank of judge's law school

 

 

 

 

 

 

RANK
—_
MPSPS COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW

COL PCT TOTAL
0 1248 380 1628
99.2 97.4 98.8
1 10 10 20
0.8 2.6 1.2
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

i-Io
II It

Chi-square (1 d.f) = 7.772612
Significant at .05

COLUMN
TOTAL

HO

MPSPS

Chi-square (2 d.f)
Significant at .05

7

9

Table 37
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation
by judge's age cohort
AGE

COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70

 

 

 

 

 

794

48.2 2

Other judicial decisions
Motion proceeding settled per stipulation

9.294560

464
8.2

 

COL PCT
0 790 458 380
99.5 98.7 97.4
1 4 6 10
0.5 1.3 2.6

390
23.7

 

ROW
TOTAL

1628
98.8

20
1.2

1648
100.0

80

Table 32 demonstrates that judge's gender is
systematically related to the judicial decision "motion
proceeding settled per stipulation" at the .05 level, with a
Chi-square value of 6.439303. Male judges are more likely to
issue these decisions.

Tables 33, 35, and 36 show an identical significant
relatiOHShip between "motion proceeding settled per
stipulation" and the explanatory variables judge's race, type
of judge's previous legal concern and national or state law
school rank.

Tables 34 and 37 show that non-family campaign
contribution and judge's age cohort are systematically related
at the .01 level, with Chi-square values of 9.294560 with two
degrees of freedom. Age cohort seems to have the most
explanatory power. The monotonic array implies that "motion
proceeding settled per stipulation" decisions increase as age
increases.

Tables 34 and 37 display similar frequency distributions
and an identical Chi-square value which raises the question
as to whether these results are a function Of judge's age
cohort or non-family campaign contributions.

Pooling Tables 32-37 with the mediation and settled per

stipulation data seems to be a logical intermediate test.

Settled per stipulation by judge's gender

SPS

81

Table 38

 

 

 

 

GENDER
—
COUNT COL FEMALE MALE

PCT
0 791 849
99.6 99.4
1 3 5
_ 0.4 0.6
COLUMN 794 854
TOTAL 48.2 51.8
0 = Other judicial decisions
1:

 

 

 

 

Chi-square (1 d.f.)

ROW
TOTAL

1640
99.5

8
0.5

1648
100.0

Settled per stipulation by judge's gender

= 0.367240

82

 

 

Table 39
Settled per stipulation by judge's race
RACE
SPS COUNT BLACK WHITE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 386 1254 1640
99.0 99.7 99.5
1 4 4 8
1.0 0.3 0.5

 

 

 

 

COLUMN 390 1258 1648
TOTAL 23.7 76.3 100.0

0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Settled per stipulation by judge's gender

Chi-square (l d.f.) = 3.086296

83

Table 40
Settled per stipulation by non-family campaign contribution
CONTRIB

SP5 COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE ROW

COL PCT TOTAL

0 463 386 791 1640
99.8 99.0 99.6 99.5

1 1 4 3 8
0.2 1.0 0.4 0.5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

COLUMN 464 390 794 1648
, TOTAL 28.2 23.7 48.2 100.0

0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Settled per stipulation by judge's gender

Chi-square (2 d.f.) = 3.246018

84

Table 41
Settled per stipulation
by type of judge's previous legal concern

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCERN

SPS COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 1254 386 1640

99.7 99.0 99.5

1 4 4 8

0.3 1.0? 0.5

COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Settled per stipulation by judge's gender

HO

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 3.086296

85

Table 42
Settled per stipulation
by national or state rank Of judge's law school

 

 

 

 

RANK
__—H
SP5 COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1254 386 1640
99.7 99.0 99.5
1 4 4 8
0.3 1.0 0.5
__

 

 

COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0
Other judicial decisions

0
II II

Settled per stipulation by judge's gender

Chi-square (l d.f) = 3.086296

 

86

Table 43
Settled per stipulation

by judge's age cohort

 

 

 

 

AGE
_ 4—
SP3 COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70
COL PCT
0 791 463 386
99.6 99.8 99.0
1 3 1 4
0.4 0.2 1.0
COLUMN 794 464 390
TOTAL 48.2 28.2 23.7
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Settled per stipulation by judge's gender

Chi-square (2 d.f)

 

 

 

 

= 3.246018

ROW
TOTAL

1640
99.5

0.5

1648
100.0

_ 87

The Tables 38-43 indicate that the relationships between
"settled per stipulation," and the independent variables, are
below the conventional level Of .05. The tests for judge's
age cohort and non-family campaign contributions in Tables 40
and 43 show Chi-square values of 3.246018 which is below the
.5 confidence level of 5.99147 with two degrees of freedom.

Judge's race, type of previous legal concern and law
school rank in Tables 39, 41 and 42 each indicate a Chi-square
value of 3.086296 These tests results are somewhat below the

.05 confidence level of 3.84146 with one degree of freedom.

While these tests do not meet the conventional confidence
level and have the lowest frequency Of the specific dependent
variables, the companion studies of New York's Housing Court
imply that the indicators of settlements will provide useful
information about judicial decisions.

The utility of these indicators can be enhanced by the
pooled data method. Tables 44-49 display the tests on the
lpooled data which combines Tables 26-43.

A major dependent variable "lack of judicial supervision
for settlements," based on the pooled data provides a more
reliable indicator of the orderliness and fairness of the

Housing Court proceedings, defined as judicial supervision for
both parties when a case is settled by a stipulated agreement,
than the separate indicators Of the specific due process

decisions displayed in Tables 26-43.

Table 44
Unsupervised settlements
by judge's gender

 

 

 

 

 

 

GENDER
#.

UNSUP COUNT COL FEMALE MALE ROW
PCT TOTAL

0 774 804 1578

97.5 94.1 95.8

1 20 50 70

2.5 5.9 4.2

COLUMN 794 854 1648
TOTAL 48.2 51.8 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Unsupervised settlements

Ho

Chi-square (l d.f.) = 11.257942
Significant at .05

 

89

Table 45
Unsupervised settlements
by judge's race

 

 

 

RACE
—*

UNSUP COUNT BLACK WHITE

COL PCT

0 360 1218

92 . 3 96 . 8

1 30 40

7 . 7 3 . 2

COLUMN
TOTAL

I-‘O

 

 

390

23.7

Chi-square (l d.f.)

1258
76.3

Other judicial decisions
Unsupervised settlements

 

ROW
TOTAL

1578
95.8

70
4.2

1648
100.0

= 3.086296

UNSUP

COLUMN
TOTAL

COL PCT

COUNT

90

Table 46
Unsupervised settlements
by non-family campaign contributions
CONTRIB

MAJOR

SOME

NONE

 

0

444
95.7

360
92.3

774
97.5

 

 

fl

 

20
4.3

 

464

30
7.7

20
2.5

 

390
28.2 23.7

794

48.2

0 = Other judicial decisions
1 8 Unsupervised settlements

Chi-square (2 d.f.) = 17.216919
Significant at .05

 

ROW
TOTAL

1578
95.8

70
4.2

1648

100.0

71‘! 22M “drier

7' u'v“.'i~-r

91

Table 47
Unsupervised settlements
by type of judge's previous legal concern

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCERN
UNSUP COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1218 369 1578
96.8 92.3 95.8
1 40; 30 70
302‘._____ 707 4.2
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Unsupervised settlements

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 14.906036
Significant at .05

92

Table 48
Unsupervised settlements
by national or state rank of judge's law school

 

 

 

 

 

 

#
UNSUP COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
0 1218 360 1578
96.8 92.3 95.8
1 40 30 70
3.2! 7.7 4.2
_
COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Unsupervised settlements

Chi-square (l d.f) = 14.906036

Significant at .05

UNSUP

COL PCT

93

Table 49
Unsupervised settlements
by judge's age cohort

AGE

COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70

 

0

774
97.5

444
95.7

360
92.3

 

 

1

COLUMN

TOTAL

0
1

Chi-square (2 d.f)

 

20

794

48.2

Significant at .05

20

 

464
28.2

Other judicial decisions
Unsupervised settlements

 

30

2.5 4.3 7.7

390
23.7

17.216919

 

ROW
TOTAL

1578
95.8

70
4.2

1648
100.0

94

Table 44 indicates that male judges seem twice as likely
to make decisions Of this type, which reflect a "lack Of
judicial supervision for settlements," as an indicator of
orderliness and fairness in Housing Court. The high Chi-
square values in Tables 44 and 46-49 demonstrate significant
systematic relationships at the conventional .05 level. The
Chi-square value Of 11.237942 shows a high level of
statistical significance. Table 45 indicates that judge's
race is not statistically significant at the conventional
level. Here the Chi-square value of 3.086296 is below the
3.84146 confidence level at one degree Of freedom.

Tables 46 and 49 show judges who receive "some" non-
family campaign contributions and judge's in the (61-70) age
cohort more likely to make decisions of this type with Chi-
square values of 17.216919 which is much higher than the
5.99147 required with two degrees of freedom. The tests do
not distinguish the variations in Tables 46 and 49 as
functions of non-family campaign contributions or judge's age.

Similarly, Tables 47 and 48 show judges, who previously
practiced in a private legal concern and attended state ranked
law schools more likely to make decisions which reflect a lack
of judicial supervision.of settlements. lHowever the tests are
not stringent enough to discern which independent variable has
the most explanatory power as their frequency distribution and

Chi-square values are identical.

95

Table 50
Inquest held before eviction order
by judge's gender

 

 

 

 

 

 

GENDER
——
INQUEST COUNT COL FEMALE MALE ROW
PCT TOTAL
0 770 847 1617
97.0 99.2 98.1
1 24 7 31

 

COLUMN 794 854 1648
TOTAL 48.2 51.8 100.0
0 Other judicial decisions

...;
II II

Inquest held before eviction order

Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 10.819122

96

Table 51
Inquest held before eviction order
by judge's race

RACE
——:——

INQUEST COUNT BLACK WHITE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 389 1228 1617
99.7 97.6 98.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 1 30 31
0.3 2.4 1.9
COLUMN 390 1258 1648
TOTAL 23.7 76.3 100.0
0 = Other judicial decisions
1 = Inquest held before eviction order

Chi-square (l d.f.) = 7.306470
Significant at .05

CONTRIB
INQUEST COUNT MAJOR SOME NONE
COL PCT
0 458 389 770
98.7 99.7 97.0
1 6 1 24
1.3 0.3 3.0
COLUMN 464 390 794
TOTAL 28.2 23.7 48.2

l-‘O

Chi-square (2 d.f.)=12.052988

97

Table 52

 

 

 

 

 

Significant at .05

Other judicial decisions
Inquest held before eviction order

 

 

Inquest held before eviction order
by non-family campaign contribution

ROW
TOTAL

1617
98.17

31
1.9

1648
100.0

98

Table 53
Inquest held before eviction order
by type of judge's previous legal concern

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCERN
INQUEST COUNT PUBLIC PRIVATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 1228 389 1617

97.6 99.7 98.1

1 30 1 31

2.4 0.3 1.9

COLUMN 1258 390 1648

TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Inquest held before eviction order

H
II II

Chi-square (l.d.f) = 7.306470
Significant at .05

99

Table 54
Inquest held before eviction order
by national or state rank of judge's law school

 

 

 

 

 

 

INQUEST COUNT NATIONAL STATE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

0 1228 389 1617

97.6 99.7 98.1

1 30 1 31

2.4 0.3 1.9

COLUMN 1258 390 1648
TOTAL 76.3 23.7 100.0

Other judicial decisions
Inquest held before eviction order

Ho

Chi-square (l d.f) = 7.306470
Significant at .05

INQUEST

100

Table 55
Inquest held before eviction order
by judge's age cohort

AGE

 

 

 

 

 

COLUMN
TOTAL

HO

 

3.0

794
48.2

 

1.3

464
28.2

Other judicial decisions
Inquest held before eviction order

Chi-square (2 d.f)-12.052988
Significant at .05

 

— _—
COUNT 30-40 41-50 61-70
COL PCT
0 770 458 389
97.0 98.7 99.7
1 24 6 1

 

390
23.7

 

ROW
TOTAL

1617
98.1

31
1.9

1648
100.0

101

Tables 50-55 reflect "inquest held before eviction order"
measures which are perhaps the clearest indicators of due
process decisions in this inquiry. Table 50 shows female
judges more likely to hold inquests with a Chi-square value of
10.819122. Table 52 shows white judges more likely to conduct
inquests with a Chi-square value of 7.306470.

Tables 52 and 55 shows judges who did not receive non-
family'campaignmcontributions and judges in the junior (30-40)
age cohort more likely to conduct inquests before issuing an
eviction order. Both of these tables have Chi-square values Of
12.052988 at two degrees of freedom. In like fashion Tables
53 and 54 have similar frequency distributions and Chi-square
values of 7.306470 and show judges who previously practice in
public firms and attended nationally ranked law schools hold
more inquests.

Due to the lack of ambiguity underlying due process
decision for this measure the intermediate test of pooling
this data with other specific decisions does not seem
warranted.

ADDITIONAL TESTS AND FINDINGS

On the basis of the preliminary and intermediate tests,
the new posture of the research problem is as follows.

The data set consists of 1648 observations of discrete

and finite judicial decision. Each observation consists of an

102
observed decision made in 1987 by a Manhattan Housing Court
Judge elected between 1980 and 1985.. The dependent variables
have been codified in a binary' manner to quantify the
qualitative nature of the judicial decisions.

Preliminary and intermediate tests indicate statistically
significant relationships between the judicial decision
dependent variables (legal representation for both parties,
lack of judicial supervision for settlements, and inquests
held before eviction orders), and the explanatory judicial
background attributes. To what extent can the latter
accurately predict the variation in the former?

Linear regression analysis is inappropriate as it
requires continuous dependent variables while the dependent
variables to be explained here are discrete. (Aldrich and
Nelson, 9). The non-linear probability model, probit is a
viable alternative as it requires discrete dependent variables
and several hundred.data points, (Daganzo, 82), which the data
set exceeds.

Probit also assumes that the binary dependent variables
are statistically independent, an absence of linear dependence
in the independent variables, no linear relation between
dependent and independent variables, and a random sample.

The data set is a stratified random sample which is
consistent with the assumption). The other assumption are met
and the probability of a judicial decision (the dependent

variable) may be assessed as a cumulative normal probability

 

103
function. This is the probability that a Housing Court judge
randomly elected between 1980 and 1985 made a due process
decision in the Housing Court.

To adjust for'thetsimilarities in the judge's demographic
attributes, dummy variables were developed, (legal
representation for both parties, lack of judicial supervision
for settlements, and inquests held before eviction orders),
and the explanatory judicial background attributes) so the
independent variable attributes could help predict the
variation. The likelihood of having observed the dependent
variable is "as large as possible." (Aldrich and Nelson, 50).
The probit estimates will provide a further test for
statistical significance between the dependent and independent
variables. When the t-statistic surpasses the critical value,
the estimated coefficient may be considered statistically
significant.

The correlation coefficient indicates perfect correlation
(+1), independence between the variables (0), and (-1) when
one variable increases in the exact proportion as the other
decreased. This approach should provide the rigorous tests
which the preliminary analysis indicate are needed for further
interpretation of the data. Three equations for each
dependent variable will test the effect of the independent
variables on the dependent variable with the highest possible
likelihood of having observed the dependent variable. The

effect that the independent variables have on each.other'will

104
also be displayed which addresses the questions which the
intermediate tests with the pooled data raised. With the
constant set at one the research problem may be modeled as,
LGLREP=¢1+81MUBIVAR1+BZWFJBIVAR2+E’
LGLREP=¢3+81PMJBIVAR1+B3WJBIVAR3+E
LGLREP=C3+BZWFJBIVAR3+83WIBIVAR3+E
WSUP=Q+BJMJBIVAR1+BZWFJBIVARZ+E'
WSUP+¢5+81WBIVAR1+B3WIVAR3+E’
WSUP=¢G+82WFJBIVAR3+83KMJBIVAR3+E
- - INQUEST=¢7 +81MMJBIVAR1 +Bzh’EJBIV21R2 +E

INQUEST=¢B+81MIVAR1+pammIVAR3+B
INDUESTsa,+BZWFJBIVAR3+B3WBIVAR3+E

The coefficients are expected to be positive and the
number of Observations for each estimate remains 1648. The
estimated coefficient, its significance, the standard error,
the convergence log likelihood, the constant and percent of
correctly predicted cases were computed with the Statistical
Software Tools program. The major dependent variables (legal
representation for both parties, lack of judicial supervision
for settlements, and inquests held before eviction orders)
were tested with the dummy variables for minority male judge,
white female judge and white male judge. The probit test
results are displayed in Tables 56-64. Test results for each
set of three dependent variable tests are discussed on the
page which follows them. The extent to which the model can
correctly predict Manhattan Housing Court decisions, what
variation the judicial background attributes seem to account
for and the significance of the estimated correlation

coefficient are discussed.

105

TABLE 56
Legal Representation for both parties
minorit male ud e, white female ud e

  
    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
constant -2.31593 0.18710 -12.37813
MMJBIVAR1 1.08767 0.19621 5.54331*;
WFJBIVAR2 -0.53495 0.36723 -l.45673
CONVERGENCE -303.85933
LOG LIKELIHOOD
PERCENT 94.41748
PREDICTED

. CQBREPTLY

 

MMJBIVAR: = Minority male judge dummy variable
WFJBIVAR = White female judge dummy variable

*Significant at .05

106

TABLE 57
Legal Representation for both parties
minorit male ud e, white male ud e

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR

constant -2.85089 0.31599 9.02206*
MMJBIVAR1 0.53495 0.36723 1.45673
WMJBIVAR3 1.62262 0.32147 5.04749* I
CONVERGENCE -303.85933 H
LOG LIKELIHOOD :
PERCENT 94.41748 ‘
PREDICTED

CORRECTLY

 

   

MMJBIVAR:
WMJBIVAR

 

*Significant at .05

Minority male judge dummy variable
White male judge dummy variable

107

TABLE 58
Legal Representation for both parties
white female judge, white male ud e

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
constant -l.22826 5.91063e-002 -20.78061
WFJBIVAR2 -1.08767 0.19621 -5.54331
WMJBIVAR3 -1.62262 0.32147 -5.04749
CONVERGENCE -303.85933
LOG LIKELIHOOD
PERCENT 94.41748
'PREDICTED
‘ CORRECTLY .r-
WFJBIVAR2 White female judge dummy variable

WMJBIVARI== White male judge dummy variable

108

What the three tables demonstrates is the difference of
judicial backgrounds reflected in the judicial decision
variation made on the measure "legal representaion for both
parties." This is a pooled data dependent variable which
indicates Opportunity to be heard and to defend. Tables 56-58
seem to substantiate the findings in Tables 20-25 of
systematic relationships.

With 1648 Observations a t-statistic of 1.96 is required
for two-tailed statistical significance at .05. Tables 56-58
Show that the model correctly predicts Housing Court decision
in 94.4 percent of the cases.

In Table 56 the estimated coefficient for minority male
judge of 1.08767 apparently does not have much effect despite
the above level t-statistic significance. White female judge
does not pass the significance test and indicates an estimate
which runs in the Opposite directions than minority male
judge.

Table 57 indicates white male judge is positively related
to minority male judge (however minority male judge does not
meet the .05 significance level, but. does meet the .01
significance level). Thus, white male judge seems to account
for 36 percent of the variance at .05)

Table 58 shows white female judge and white male judge
both yield negative correlation estimates which are

insignificant at the .05 level.

109

TABLE 59
Unsupervised settlements, minority male judge,

white female jud e

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
constant -l.71574 0.10298 -16.66074
MMJBIVAR1 0.28962 0.13910 2.08217*
WFJBIVAR2 -o.24097 0.13980 -1.72367
CONVERGENCE -281.58253
LOG LIKELIHOOD
PERCENT 95.75243
PREDICTED
CORRECTLY

MMJBIVAR} — Minority male judge dummy variable

WFJBIVAR? White female judge dummy variable

*Significant at .05

   

110

TABLE 60
Unsupervised settlements, minority male judge,

white ma1e_udoe

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MMJBIVAR: =
WMJBIVAR ==

 

*Significant at .05

White male judge dummy variable

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
constant -1.95672 9.45495e-002 - 20.69516
MMJBIVAR1 0.28962 0.13910 3.99019*
WMJBIVAR3 -0.24097 0.13980 1.72367
CONVERGENCE -281.5823
LOG LIKELIHOOD
PERCENT 95.75243
PREDICTED
CORRECTLY

Minority male judge dummy variable

 

 

111

TABLE 61
Unsupervised settlements, white female judge,

white male judge

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
constant -1.42612 9.35027e002 -15.25219
WFJBIVAR2 -0.53060 0.13298 -3.99019
WMJEIVAR3 -0.28962 0.13910 -2.08217
CONVERGENCE -281.58253
LOG LIKELIHOOD
PERCENT 95.75243
PREDICTED
CORRECTLY

WFJBIVAR:== White female judge dummy variable

WMJBIVAR. = White male judge dummy variable

 

 

 

112

The variation in the judicial decisions indicated here
reflects "lack of judicial supervision of settlement
agreements. " The variation seems to be systematically related
to the judicial background attributes codified in the dummy
variables.

Tables 59-60 indicate that the model correctly predicts
95.75 percent of the cases accurately. Minority male judge
indicates an effect of .28962 which is statistically
significant and an almost inverse effect of white female judge
at -.0.24097 (with a negative t-statistic below the
statistical significance threshold).

Table 60 shows minority male judge and white female judge
to be negatively related with statistical significance at the
.05 level for minority male judge at 0.1 for white female
judge.

The coefficients in Table 61 do not indicate statistical
significance yet both independent variables indicate negative
estimated coefficients with the white female judge estimate
nearly twice that of white male judge.

While it is possible to‘draw inferences on the basis of
the direction of the coefficients, since statistical
significance was not clearly achieved this does not seem
warranted or appropriate. What the three tables do show is
confirmation of the systematic relationships between judicial

decisions and the characteristics Tables 44-49 displayed.

[1

Inquest held before eviction order,

113

TABLE 62

minorit male ud e, white female ud e

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F
INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
constant -2.22830 0.15740 -l4.15667
MMJEIVAR1 -0.57045 0.35882 - 1.58979
WFJBIVAR2 0.35086 0.18069 1.94174**
CONVERGENCE -146.62493
LOG LIKELIHOOD
PERCENT 98.11893
PREDICTED
CORRECTLY

MMJBIVAR2== Minority male judge dummy variable

‘WFJBIVAR == White female judge dummy variable

**Significant at

.1

 

114

TABLE 63
Inquest held before eviction order,
minorit male ud e, white male ud e

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD . t-STATISTIC

VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
Iconstant -l.87744 8.870409e-002 -21.1564l
IIMMJEIVAR1 -0.92131 0.33444 -2.75476
IIWMJEIVAR3 -o.35086 0.18069 -1.94174

CONVERGENCE -146.62493

LOG LIKELIHOOD

PERCENT 98.11893

PREDICTED

CORRECTLY

 

   

MMJBIVAR:== Minority male judge dummy variable
WMJBIVAR. a White male judge dummy variable

115

TABLE 64
Inquest held before eviction order,
Whit? Eeeaie ud e, whitemaleude

  
   

       

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT ESTIMATED STANDARD t-STATISTIC
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR
constant -2.79875 0.32246 -8.67949
WFJBIVAR2 0.92131 0.33444 2.75476*
WMJBIVAR3 0.57045 0.35882 1.58979
CONVERGENCE -146.6249§‘
LOG LIKELIHOOD
PERCENT 98.11893
PREDICTED
CORRECTLY

WFJBIVAR? White female judge dummy variable

WMJBIVAR? White male judge dummy variable

*Significant at .05

116

In Tables 62-64, which measure "inquest held before
eviction order," 98.11893 percent of the cases were predicted
correctly. Table 62 indicates that minority male judge and
white female judge inquest decisions run in different
directions. Neither independent variable is significant at
.05, however white female judge shows a coefficient of .35086
at the 0.1 level. In Table 63 the significance level is not
met by either independent variable. Minority male judge
displays a coefficient of -0.92131 and white male judge a
coefficient of 0.35086.

Table 64 has a coefficient estimate of .92131 at the .05
level, (which may account for as much as 85 percent of the
variation in the decisions). White male judge has a
coefficient of .57045 without statistical significance of .05

or .01.

Chapter 4. CONCLUSIONS
MAJOR FINDINGS

The analytical focus of this inquiry'is the investigation
of the role of judicial background characteristics in
explaining judicial decision outputs and due process. The
premise of this inquiry is distinguishable from the
attitudinal approach. to judicial decisions. (Rohde and
Spaeth, 1976). The distinction is based on federal versus
local jurisdiction, court of last appeal versus street level
(Housing Court) and demographic versus attitudinal data.

The demographic attributes found in judicial backgrounds
seem more probative and measurable than attitudinal
indicators. Demographic attributes may be said to filter
judicial due process decisions. The doctrine of due process
is one of the most complex sets of legal concepts in the body
of U.S. constitutional law. Due process is central to the
judicial system, especially'when property rights as important
as adequate shelter for human beings is at stake.

The absence of shelter equals homelessness in the
vernacular and the significance of this social dysfunction in
the urban U.S. in general and New York City in particular
requires a careful examination of the empirical findings here.

Judicial background characteristics, which include

election practices, are systematically related to due process

117

118
for litigants in N.Y.C. landlord tenant courts.

Housing Court judges who receive campaign
contributions, which are not personal or family, issue more
default decisions to evict tenants without a formal inquest,
than those who do not receive this type of contribution.

Housing Court judges who receive campaign
contributions, which are not personal or family, provide
tenants less of an opportunity to be heard and to defend,
defined as legal representation for both parties in landlord
tenant cases than those who do not receive this type of
contribution.

Housing Court judges who receive "some" campaign
contributions, which are not personal or family, conduct more
orderly and fair Housing Court proceedings, defined as,
judicial supervision for both parties when they settle cases
by stipulated agreements than those‘who receive "none" of this
type of contribution and those who receive "major" campaign
contributions.

Housing Court judges who practiced in a public legal
concern before election, issued less default eviction
decisions to evict tenants without.a formal inquest than those
who practiced in private concerns.

Housing Court judges who practiced in a public legal
concern before election, provide tenants a greater opportunity
to be heard and.toldefend, defined as legal representation for

bOth.parties in landlord tenant cases than those‘who practiced

119
in private concerns.

Housing Court judges who practiced in a public legal
concern before election, conduct more orderly and fair Housing
Court proceedings, defined as judicial supervision for both
parties when they settle cases by stipulated agreement than
those who practiced in private concerns.

Housing Court judges whose law schools had a national
rank issue fewer default eviction decisions against tenants
without a formal inquest than those from law schools with
state ranks.

Housing Court judges whose law schools had a national
rank provide tenants a greater opportunity to be heard and to
defend, defined as legal representation for both parties in
eviction cases than those from law schools with state ranks.

Housing Court judges whose law schools had a national
rank conduct more orderly and fair Housing Court proceedings,
defined as judicial supervision for both parties when they
settle cases by stipulated agreement than those from law
schools with state ranks.

Male Housing Court judges enter more default judicial
decisions which evict unrepresented tenants without a formal
inquest than female Housing Court judges.

Female Housing Court judges provide tenants a greater
opportunity to be heard and to defend, defined as legal
representation for both parties in landlord tenant cases than

male Housing Court judges.

If

120

Female Housing Court judges conduct more orderly and
fair Housing Court proceedings, defined as judicial
supervision for both parties when they settle cases by
stipulated agreement than male Housing Court judges.

Black Housing Court judges enter more default judicial
decisions which evict unrepresented tenants without a formal
inquest than white Housing Court judges.

White Housing Court judges provide tenants a greater
opportunity to be heard and to defend, defined as legal
representation for both parties in landlord tenant cases than
black Housing Court judges.

Race is not statistically significant to explain orderly
and fair' Housing’ Court proceedings, defined as judicial
supervision for both parties when they settle cases by
stipulated agreement.

Senior Housing Court judges (defined as age 61-70)
enter more default judicial decisions which evict
unrepresented tenants without a formal inquest than junior
Housing Court judges (30-50).

Junior Housing Court judges (defined as age 30-50)
provide tenants a greater opportunity to be heard and to
defend, defined as legal representation for both parties in
landlord tenant cases than senior (61-70) Housing' Court
judges.

Junior Housing Court judges (defined as age 30-50)

Housing Court judges conduct more orderly and fair Housing

 

121
Court proceedings, defined as judicial supervision for both
parties when they settle cases by stipulated agreement than
senior (61-70) Housing court judges.
IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM

Gender, campaign contributions, and age cohort seem to
have significant explanatory power in Housing Court judical
decisions. Statistical significance at the conventional level
for most of the findings was establishedwwhich.underscores the
potential public policy utility of these findings. While it
would be an error to assume statistical significance is the
equivalent to substantive significance, the high Chi-square
values and the percentage of correct probit predictions seem
to call for further evalutation and public policy analysis of
the judicial selection process.

To the extent that the inquiry has demonstrated methods
of explaining and predicting judicial decisions in local
courts it has made a contribution to the judicial decision
sub-field and to public policy analysis.

The absence of reliable data on the race and sex of
tenants prevents tests of the same type as those performed
here on judicial backgrounds. (This information is not
recorded by the court and neither of the companion studies
recorded it).

These findings on judicial decisions and judicial
background may allow an inference that the secondary null

hypotheses that tenants' background characteristics are

122
independent of due proceSs for litigants in N.Y.C. Housing
Courts is false. To the extent that the gender and race of
judges accounts for some variation in judicial decisions, and
the majority of tenants in Housing Court are minority females,
a disparate impact seems highly probable as the companion
studies (Reide, 87) and (Fox, 86) have documented.

Further, as non-family campaign contributions increase,
decisions which indicate due process protection decrease. Of
the 38 Civil Court (Housing Court judges are Civil Court
judges) elections held between 1980 and 1985, there were ten
Democratic Party primaries and one Republican Party primary.
Each primary election winner faced general election
competition from opposing party candidates. Nine of the
Democratic Party candidates reported non-family campaign
contributions, one had two campaign committees "and both filed
a 'candidate' non-expenditure form, which indicates that less
than $1,000 was received or spent on the campaign." (Fund for
Modern Courts, 13).

Money received from.outside the candidates' families was
usually $500 to $1000 contributions from lawyers and lawyers
organizations. (Fund for Modern Courts, 55-78). Printing,
(i.e., stickers, handbills, posters), consultants,
photographers, direct mail services, ads, rallies, and monies
"transferred out" to Democratic Party clubhouses for
petitioning were the major expenses. Campaign expenditures

seem to support the Manhattan Democratic Party

7 .

 

123
units and those businesses which provide campaign services.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, (American Bar Association,
1978), forbids judicial candidates from soliciting or
accepting campaign funds themselves. They must establish
campaign committees to perform these functions. The Code also
requires that the names of campaign contributors should.not be
revealed to the candidate. "Some candidates for Civil Court
judge attend fundraisers for their campaign, bringing them
face to face with contributors or potential contributors."
(Fund for Modern Courts, 12).

Judges in the 30-50 (junior) age cohort seem ten times
more likely to discontinue cases without legal representation,
(Table 25) , than judges in the (senior) 61-70 age cohort.
They are nearly two times less likely to permit settlement
agreements which they do not supervise and ten times as likely
to conduct inquests than senior judges.

Cumulatively the major findings imply that judicial
decision in Housing Court may be an institutionalized process
with the political status quo, an "old boy network," and case
experience contributing to a tendency not to conduct inquests,
discontinue cases without legal representation or insist on
judicial supervision of settlements.

Judicial selection policies and practices which moderate
non-family campaign contributions and which recruit more women
and candidates 30-51 might impact positively on due process

judicial decisions in Housing Court.

I ,

 

124

FURTHER RESEARCH AGENDAS

While the systematic relationships between several of the
explanatory variables has been demonstrated, neither the
contingency tables or the probit estimates were stringent
enough to distinguish the functions of some of the explanatory
variables from each other.

For example, the contingency Tables 22 and 25 show
similar Chi-square values of 84.23236510 for non-family
campaign contributions and 84.236510 for judge's age cohort.
Further research would distinguish the judicial decision
outputs for "legal representation for both parties in landlord
tenant cases," as functions of non-family' campaign
contributions or judge's age cohort.

Tables 23 and 24 (type of judge's previous legal concern
and national or state rank of judge's law school), also could
be distingusihed by further research.

The systematic relationship of "lack of judicial
supervision for settlements," in Tables 46 and 49 with the
explanatory variables non-family campaign contributions and
judge's age cohort have the same Chi-square value which seems
to require further research to differentiate. The same may be
said of Tables 47 and 48, type of judge's previous legal

concern and national or state rank of judge's law school.

 

 

125

More stringent analytical tests also seem required to
discern whether "inquest held before eviction order,"
decisions are a function of non family campaign contributions
and judge's age cohort as in Tables 52 and 55. In like
fashion Tables 53 and 54 do not allow us to determine whether
type of judge's previous legal concern and national or state
rank of judge's law school has the most explanatory power.

The preliminary, intermediate and probit tests all
demonstrate variation of judicial decisions as systematically
related to judicial background. The findings of the tests
conducted here seem to substantiate the predictive capacity of

this model and invite additional research.

ENDNOTES

1. Candidates for Civil Court judge who are unsuccessful in
primary elections are at times appointed to fill Civil Court
vacancies on an interim basis by the Mayor. This provides them
with the advantage of incumbency in later elections and reinforces

party loyalty.
2. There were no Hispanic Housing Court judges in the sample.

3. National or state rank of lawschools is based on 1970 ranking
because, the judicial background data is from 1980-1985 and a
Housing Court judge has "to be a lawyer admitted to the Bar of the
State of New York for a minimum of ten years. (Fund for Modern
Courts, 11).

_

4. There were no Housing Court judges in the sample between the
ages of 51 to 60.

5. Housing Court judges are elected (or appointed by the Mayor
on an interim basis) as Civil Court judges. Tb run for Civil
Court a candidate must, be a lawyer admitted to practice in New
York State for ten years, be less than age 70.

The candidate must be a resident of New York City (but not
necessarily of the district or county the election is in), and
submit valid designating petitions, (5,000 signatures for
countywide elections and 1,500 or five percent of the enrolled
party members in the Municipal District for districtwide
elections). (Fund for Modern Courts, 11).

6. The Glossary which appears after the Conclusions is based on
the definitions in A Tenant's Guide to Manhattan Housinquourt,
(Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1990) and Justice
Evicted, (Reide, 58-62).

7. Each frequency table contains a key to the row values below it.
Table 2, for instance, indicates that in the row numbered "0", this
denotes that 0 = Other judicial decisons. The row numbered "1"
indicates l = Motion denied no appearance either side. The Chi-
square values (and degrees of freedom) are also noted for each
table. When the Chi-square value is significant at the
conventional .05 level, the statement "Significant at .05" appears
beneath the Chi-square value.

126

 

 

MANHATTAN HOUSING COURT GLOSSARY

ACCESS (AND PROVIDING ACCESS):

An agreement for the landlord to make repairs in the
tenant's apartment at a set time.
ADJOURNMENT:

A judicial decision to postpone a case.
ANSWER:

An oral or written reply which contains the defenses to
the landlord's charges. It should include reasons the tenant

believes that he or she should win instead of the landlord.

APPEARANCE:

Participating formally in a case, either by a written
notice or by actually showing up in court, in person (or
through appearance by an attorney).

APPLICATION:

A request to the court for relief (i.e a postponement).
When the court calendar (see Calendar Call) is read, people
who respond "Application" indicate that they request a
postponement.

ARGUMENT:

Debate on a motion by both parties in front of a Housing
Court judge.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (LEGAL FEES):

Financial charges added on to a judgement to pay for one

127

128
party's attorney.
BOND:

A surety, which promises to pay a sum of money, that the
landlord and the tenant will appear again if the case is
adjourned or for cancellation of an eviction order.

BY THE COURT:

A formal request that a case is heard by a Housing Court
-~judge instead of by a court appointed mediator (See Mediator).
CALENDAR CALL:

The in court reading of the list of cases on the calendar
for that day. Cases may be sent to smaller courtrooms if all
the parties are present, postponements granted, cases
dismissed and other judgements entered at this time.
CALENDAR PART:

The courtroom where the daily calendar call is read.
CLERK‘S OFFICE:

The Housing Court clerks' headquarters. Where paperwork
is processed and case files are kept. All legal papers in a
case must be filed in the clerk's office under a case index
number.

CONFERENCE:

An attempt to settle the case by the judge before trial.

 

129

CONSENT:
Agreement by both sides on an issue (i.e., an

postponement date).

DEFAULT JUDGEMENT:

If one party fails to come to court, the other side wins
by’ default. Once the default judgement is entered, a
judgement is issued against the absent party.

DEPOSIT:

Rent the Housing Court holds in escrow until a landlord
tenant dispute is resolved.
DISCONTINUE:

Termination of a case by the party who starts it, (e.g.
the landlord's motion to dismiss the case is granted).
DISPOSITION:

Final resolution of a landlord tenant case.

DISPOSSESS:

A Housing Court order for the tenant to appear in a
landlord tenant dispute. It is often confused with an
eviction order.

DSS:

New York City Department of Social Services. The N.Y.C.
agency responsible for providing transfer payments, human
services and commodities to recipients of social welfare

programs.

130
EVICTION:

Actual physical removal of a tenant and his or her
possessions from an apartment. To have legal effect evictions
must be ordered by the Housing Court and the tenant is
supposed to be given notice, an opportunity to be heard and
defend, and an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the
case and controversy.

HOLDOVER:

A Housing Court proceeding to evict the tenant.
Holdovers are not based on non-payment of rent. Non-payment
of rent cases are frequently converted into holdover
proceedings by landlords.

HPD:

New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development. The N.Y.C. agency responsible for inspecting
buildings, taking landlords to court, managing city-owned
buildings, taking tenants in city owned.buildings to court and
making emergency repairs.

INQUEST:

A formal hearing to establish the claims of the party
present in court (usually the landlord), before an eviction
order is entered against the absent party (usually the

tenant).

 

131
INSPECTION:

An inspection of the tenant's apartment by (HPD) to
determine whether it is up to code and whether court ordered
repairs have been made.

INTERPRETER:

A court appointed translator to assist Housing Court
litigants who do not speak fluent English.
JUDGMENT:

The final court order which ends a Housing Court case.
The judgment states which side‘wins and.other specifics (e.g.,
evictions, pay past due rent, make repairs).

LEASE:

The formal contractual agreement between a landlord and
a tenant which establishes rent payments.

LITIGANT:

Either side in a lawsuit, (i.e. a landlord or a tenant).
MEDIATION:

A proceeding which is not supervised by a judge to
negotiate a settlement of a landlord tenant dispute. The
proceedings are conducted by court appointed mediators who are
assigned to mediators at the Calendar Call.

MOTION:

A formal legal plea to a Housing Court judge which
requests specific action. The party who makes the motion is
called the "movant" or "moving party." Motions in Housing

Court are usually argued in the Motion Part.

 

132
MOVANT:

The party who makes the motion is called the "movant" or
"moving party."

NAIL, MAIL AND FILE:

The statute allows a copy of the notice and petition to
be attached to the door on the residence of the party, or by
mailing the petition to the respondent (i.e. the tenant), by
first class or certified mail. The notice or order to show
cause and petition along with a sworn and signed proof of
service must be filed with the Housing Court within three days
of mailing the papers or attaching them to the door.
NONCOMPLIANCE:

When a legal obligation is not fulfilled such as a
provision of a stipulated agreement or Housing Court order.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE:

A legal proceeding, (usually commenced by a tenant), to
prevent or postpone an eviction. The other party (i.e. the
landlord) is required to appear in court and give a reason
the court should not prevent or postpone the eviction.

PART:

A specific courtroom in the Housing Court, (i.e. Motion
Part).

PETITION:

A formal legal paper which begins a lawsuit (i.e. a non-
payment action or an eviction). The party who starts the

lawsuit is the petitioner or plaintiff, (usually the landlord) .

133

RECORDING DEVICE:

Tape recorders for making records and minutes of Housing
Court proceedings.

RENT ABATEMENT:

A rent reduction ordered by the court when the landlord
does not make repairs or provide services.
RENT CONTROL:

Rent regulation in New York City which fixes rent
increases for long term tenants and the terms and conditions
under which a landlord.may evict a tenant in a rent controlled
unit.

RENT STABILIZATION:

A rent regulation program in New York City similar to
rent control which fixes rent increases for long term tenants
and the terms and conditions under which a landlord may evict
a tenant in a rent controlled unit.

REPRESENTATION:

Legal advocacy for a tenant or'a landlord by an attorney.
Only an attorney can legally "represent" or "appear," for a
party before a judge.

RESERVE DECISION:

A formal notice by a Housing Court judge that his or her

decision on a case (or some aspect of it), will be made at a

later date.

 

 

134
RESPONDENT:

The party'who is being sued in Housing Court. The tenant
is the respondent in non payment and holdover cases.
SERVICE:

The specific method which the law requires to formally
deliver or mail court papers to a party (usually the tenant),
which indicates he or she must come to court and has the right
to defend against the charges. If the party is properly
notified then service is proper. If the manner of service is

improper, then improper service may be raised as a defense.

SETTLEMENT:

When both sides in a landlord tenant dispute reach an
agreement (almost always without judicial supervision).
Mediators also help parties reach agreements. A settlement in
Housing Court is supposed to be written, read and signed by
both parties (then the Housing Court judge).

STIPULATION:

A formal written settlement agreement (see settlement)
which is signed by both parties in a Housing Court case and
the judge. I
TRAVERSE:

A legal proceeding where the respondent (usually the
tenant) argues that he or she was improperly served court
papers. When improper service is raised as a defense a

traverse hearing is held.

 

 

135
TRIAL:

The formal legal proceeding where both parties present
evidence to a Housing Court judge who will decide a case which
they cannot settle. A written or taped record of the
proceedings should be made.

TRIAL PART:

A courtroom in the Housing Court for holding trials.
UNITS:

(Dwelling units, usually residential. They may be
apartments in a building or a single family building.

WAIVE:

Formally foregoing a legal right in a Housing Court

proceeding, (e.g. traverse waived).
WITHDRAW:
Withdrawal and discontinuance of a mOtion which requested

that a judge take a specific action.

 

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