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DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE [1.1, L 2/ “r ‘ B‘OII’J I “tilt; n O 181% w A “'1' :1 004 fl MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution cWMS-M INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON CHINA’S SATELLITE PROGRAM BY Rong Qiang Gu A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Telecommunication 1991 ABSTRACT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON CHINA'S SATELLITE PROGRAM BY Rong Qiang Gu This paper uses Mody's contextual analytic framework to reconstruct some of the major internal and external forces which influenced China's decision to initiate its independent satellite program and to explain how historical changes in the internal and external environment have brought about China's modification of its policies governing the satellite program. The paper highlights the centrality of national strategic considerations, namely, national security, prestige, and later, profit-making, in the decision making process. It argues that in examining and analyzing communication policies and/or communication technologies, it is necessary to place them against the interrelated and ever-changing domestic and international context. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author of the thesis wishes to thank Dr. Joseph Straubhaar, Dr. Bella Mody, and Dr. Thomas Muth for their invaluable comments and inspirational guidance, without which it is impossible for me to accomplish what I have accomplished thusfar. ii TABLE OF CONTENT Acknowledgements..........................................ii List of Figures...........................................iv CHAPTER I. LITERATURE REVIEW..............................l CHAPTER II. OBJECTIVES ..................................10 CHAPTER III. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS/ACTORS, PHASE ONEOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOO0.0.17 3.1 Space Program as ”Big Science": Prestige and war-preparedneSSO0.0.0..OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOI.0..0018 3.2 Domestic Context: Political and Financial Support and Nationalism0.00CO000......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO....26 CHAPTER IV. PHASE TWO: NEW FACTORS AND ACTORS............35 4.1 Satellite Technology in Civilian Sectors, Motivational Factors.................................38 4.2 Commercialization of ”Long March" Launching Services, Emergence of Foreign Factors.........................49 4.3 Space Station, National Ambition.....................57 Chapter V. CONCLUSIONSOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.00.00.0000000000062 APPENDIX A) Successful Chinese Satellite Launches & Missions, 1970-90..O...00......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.00.0000...0.067 B) Chinese Space Boosters...00.0.0.0...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.68 REFmENCESOOOOOO...0.000000000000000000000000000......0.0.69 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 Contextual Determinants and Contextual Consequences of National Communication Technology Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 FIGURE 2 Matrix of Illustrative Factors/Actors Influencing the Chinese Satellite Program Between 19608-708. . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 FIGURE 3 Matrix of Illustrative Factors/Actors Influencing the Chinese Satellite Program (1980-91). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 iv CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW Today a considerable number of Third World countries have adopted satellite technologies for development purposes. Some, including India, Brazil and China, have even developed their own space capabilities. While it makes sense in some ways to see this trend toward modernization as a single global process, one should not ignore the specificity of each individual country, especially with regard to how "development" is defined, why the satellite technology is adopted or developed and how it is applied. The thinking on information technologies in development must begin with development thinking itself. When the attention of communication scholars and economic planners was turned to Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 503 and 60s, the assumption was that if enough economic aid and technical assistance were provided, the developing world would follow the same pattern of industrial development that the west had followed. Influenced by Rostow's stages-of- growth model (1960) and Lerner's modernization paradigm (1958) policy makers and development administrators believed I 2 that industrialization of developing countries, coupled with the introduction of mass media, would result in higher GNP, a higher level of employment and media consumption, and, therefore, a higher standard of living and wider economic and political participation. It was also held that if the general population could only be exposed to information on new farming methods, birth control, nutrition, and so forth, innovations would be accepted, new behaviors would be adopted, and rapid social and economic advances would occur among both the urban and rural poor. In other words, development communication was conceptualized in the same ways that persuasive communication had been conceptualized within the value system of a western free market context ~- communication channels provide information which individuals act on in order to further their own self interests. With the assumption that the western model of modernization and development was universally appropriate and desirable, little consideration was given to preexisting values and beliefs, and the social and cultural milieu in which development was to take place. In the 1960s, Everett Rogers' more sophisticated diffusion of innovations model (1962) focused on rural communication transporting the American experience with the adoption of farming innovations to the Third World. The diffusion model, however, received criticism from Third World communication scholars and practitioners as being 3 linear in nature, posivistic in its approach and insensitive to social and cultural contexts. Rogers himself eventually became critical of the diffusion model, recognizing its failure to focus on the processual nature of communication, its pro-innovation bias, its western research biases, its disregard for political and ideological conditions, and its narrow psychological orientation (Rogers, 1976). Beltran (1976) is one of many constructive critics of the basic assumptions of diffusion communication research who have questioned whether communication itself can generate development regardless of social, economic, and political conditions. He expressed discontent with the application of "made-in-the-USA” type communication research to the different conditions of Latin America and other countries. The basic assumptions he questioned were: a.) that communication by itself can generate development, regardless of socio-economic and political conditions; b.) that increased production and consumption of goods and services constitute the essence of development, and that a fair distribution of income and opportunities will necessarily derive in due time; and, c.) that the key to increased productivity is technological innovation, regardless of whom it may benefit and whom it may harm (pp. 110-111). He asked, 4 If, in fact, communication (in this case, in the form of innovation diffusion) is such a powerful and autonomous force, why worry much about the nature of society? If development consists essentially of producing more and better products so that "everybody" can have them, why should one be concerned with overall social, economic, cultural, and political factors? If technology is so good by itself that it only needs to be communicated to other people in order to generate development, why indeed bother with any noncommunication variables? Finally, why should the prevailing social structure of Latin America require substantial modifications? (p.111) Beltran recommended directions for future communication research, such as an increased attention to studying mass media institutions and how they operate as part of a larger system. He emphasized the need to alter communication research orientations so as to contribute more directly to societal needs and at the same time fulfill its role in international intellectual advance. MW (Dissanayake, Ed., 1983), a series of papers raised questions regarding the subservience of the social sciences to natural sciences and reiterated the dissatisfaction with the traditional positivistic approach which puts a premium on objectivity, replicability, value freedom, and quantification but ignores the broader social, cultural and political milieus in which communication takes place. Dissanayake and Belton discussed what they called "critical approach" based on the Frankfurt School line of thinking. 5 They stated that the great strength of the Frankfurt School has been the relentless insistence on the need to understand human sciences in the greater context of living in a culture and its rejection of a context-free method on the grounds that such a method itself is a distortion of the contextual dialectic of the tacit whole and articulated parts on which rests scientific rationality. By way of conclusion, Dissanayake and Belton said that a non-positivistic, interpretive and critical approach to the study of communication may prove more productive in the Third World in that it is more in consonance with the social needs and the cultural presuppositions of people. In more recent years, there seems to exist a move toward an integration of theories and a historical[contextual/analytic framework (Buck, et al., 1983), a framework that addresses such fundamental questions confronting the Third World as power structures, social structures, indigenous belief systems and political ideologies -- factors related to the control of social and economic resources, wealth and decision making. This trend can be seen as an effort to search for adequacy of the theories and methods, with locally generated elements, and made pertinent to the concrete social reality, its processes and mutations (Nurula & Pearrce, 1990). Mody (1985, 1987) and Mody & Ferreira (1988) used a "contextual analysis" model to examine how political, economic, sociocultural and technological dimensions relate 6 to the diffusion of the satellite technology in Third World countries. Figure 1 illustrates the elements of communication systems forming the contextual framework. These elements include ownership, financing, management, professional values, training, hardware, software and beneficiaries. They are influenced by and have effects on the scientific-technical, socio-cultural, economic and political factors and actors that tend to operate on three levels: foreign, national and sub-national. Clearly an interpretive approach, this model recognizes the fact that communication research does not exist in a vacuum. The adoption, production, dissemination, and utilization of a communication technology is inextricably linked with the political, economic, socio-cultural and scientific-technical environment in which such actions take place. The model also recognizes that communication systems are not constant -- they change as the context changes. The studies led by Mody typically look at domestic broadcasting corporations, foreign equipment manufacturers, the national telecommunication equipment industry, and international banks as economic actors and factors; powerful domestic and foreign interest groups including the party in power, the nature of the state, and superpowers' politics in the political arena; international satellite research and development pioneers (e.g., NASA), foreign spacecraft manufacturers, domestic scientists and engineers, PTT's, and 7 private broadcasting interests as scientific-technical forces; and pressure from domestic elites seeking the newest technology, "nationalist" interest groups pushing for disassociation from the world business system, foreign universities and/or philanthropic foundations urging the use of the new technologies for education and development as cultural motivations. The dissection and analysis of roles of different actors and factors enable comparative analysis of the adoption and applications of satellite communication technologies by Third World countries and produces a more sophisticated argument that transcends unidimensional accusations and gross generalizations (Mody and Borrego, 1991). Mody and her associates highlighted the central role of national prestige, political power and economic privilege in decision making on communication. The consistent pattern in priority setting points to the potency of a country’s political structure and attitudes in influencing the adoption and development of a communication technology. Mody (1987) pointed out: Economics, political and cultural societal macro-level factors are often dismissed by communication scholars as extra-communication variables within the purview of the sociologist, political scientist and anthropologist in favor of the ideal "rational” efficiency and effectiveness criteria for the analysis of actual performance. The preference for the "rational" prescription has proven inadequate in explaining the reasons 8 behind the adoption of such an information technology as the satellite (pp. 151-152). The statement reiterates the importance of understanding the complexity and multidimensionality of the communicational phenomena and process because they operate within the complexity of the societal, political and cultural systems and processes, not in spite of them. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATIVE ILLUSTRATIVE CONTEXTUAL CAUSES CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL Foreign National Sub-national ELEMENTS OF SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION SOCIOCULTURAL Foreign SYSTEMS National -——-—- . Sub-national -—— -0wnership- -Financing- -Management- -———-‘-Professional- ECONOMIC ' ECONOMIC Foreign National ———- -Values- Sub-national -Training- -Hardware- POLITICAL —_J-—— -Software- —— POLITICAL Foreign -Beneficiaries- National Sub-national ------Feedback------ Figure 1 Contextual Determinants and Contextual Consequences of National Communication Technology Systems Source: Mody, (1985, 1987) CHAPTER 2 OBJECTIVES This paper uses Mody's contextual analytic framework to reconstruct some of the major internal and external forces which influenced China's decision to initiate its independent satellite program and to explain how historical changes in the internal and external environment have brought about China's modification of its policies governing the satellite program. This is done by artificially 'separating the program into two phases, with Phase I spanning 20 some years -- from 19608 to 1970s-- when national security and national prestige took on an importance unmatched by any other considerations, and Phase II, beginning early 19803, which saw significant policy changes in China marked by the effort to commercialize the multi-billion dollar satellite launch services on the Long March boosters and the emergence of satellite technology application in the civilian sectors. Specifically, the paper will examine the geopolitical situation, such as China's relations with the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, China's 10 11 domestic events and important actors closely associated with the satellite program, the historical and cultural legacy, nationalism and national defense, agenda-setting in science and technology, and several other factors which interacted with each other and combined to prompt China to join the world's space faring club. Using a historical/contextual approach, the paper aims to address the following research questions: 1. Why in China national security, military concerns, and prestige reasons dominate the decision making process, and why in China and, by analogy, in Third World countries, the introduction of satellite technology has more to do with political/geopolitical and cultural forces and less to do with technical efficiency and cost effectiveness than our research and policy usually acknowledge (Mody, 1985, 1987)? 2. In examining and analyzing communication policies, why is it necessary to place them against the interrelated and ever-changing domestic and international context? While Mody’s model provides a rather good general catalog of contextual forces, the studies led by Mody do not specifically touch on the national security aspect of the 12 satellite technology, which stands out in China's satellite program. Unlike India or Brazil where the satellite technology was initiated in close collaboration with foreign countries and the world organizations largely for civilian purposes, China's satellite program started as a military undertaking behind closed doors, its roots lie in the military missile programs of the Cold War era. As such, China's satellite program has its own characteristics quite distinct from those of other Third World countries. It would appear that not all the contextual factors listed by Mody are suitable for China, and due attention should be paid to the particularities and idiosyncrasies of the country. For instance, instead of adopting satellite technologies from either the Soviet Union or the United States, China chose a long and tortuous path to develop its own capabilities from scratch. Therefore it does not have the contractual and dependency relationships with foreign spacecraft manufacturers and launchers. The centralized nature of the satellite technology and its military orientation in China, in Phase One at least, prevented the subnational factors from playing the type of roles as was found in India and Mexico. The Central government in China assumed, and'still does to a large extent, the sole responsibility for funding and coordinating the program, and individual provinces did not participate in the decision making process. In India, Brazil and Mexico, however, the 13 decision making process is the outcome of constant negotiations and bargaining between and among various political parties, interest groups, advertisers, foreign enterprises and local industrial lobbyists. These subgroups play significant roles in shaping the policies governing the adoption, utilization and future development of the satellite technology (Mody, 1985; Mody & Borrego, 1990; McAnany & Nettleton, 1987). In China such entities were and have been more or less absent. Also, in China the economic argument is usually treated as of secondary importance compared to the larger and more pressing issues, such as national security. It was not until the early 19808 that China began to enter partnership with the outside world following Deng Xiao-ping's economic reform and "open to the outside world" policies. As more factors and actors enter into the picture, Mody's model becomes more pertinent, because it is now possible to look at how economics begin to tip the scale of the country's satellite program and how cooperative ventures with foreign countries in satellite-related projects affect China's space policies. Still major differences exist. While countries, such as Mexico, are concerned with their technological dependence on foreign software and hardware, China is taking steps to seek cooperation with foreign countries out of the realization that the country can benefit from the valuable experiences of other countries so that its own route to 14 success can be significantly shortened, saving time and financial resources (Tu, 1988). In spite of the differences, however, there are parallels to be drawn between China and the rest of the satellite using Third World countries, especially in terms of how priorities are subject to political power and political ideologies and how cultural factors, such as nationalism, enter the realm of policy making. And all can offer valuable lessons as to the strength and pitfalls of various approaches to space communication. In that regard, Mody's model does offer a useful parameter for comparisons and contrasts between Third World nations. In recent years China's space program has provoked increasing international attention following its decision to commercialize its Long March launch services and to make details of its operations and achievements available to outsiders. China is now recognized as a contender in space with tremendous potentials. This growing interest was reflected from mid 19808 onwards in a dramatic surge of articles on the subject. For instance, Aviation Week and Space Technology, The China Business Review and Space Policy carry up-to-date information about China's space activities. The major historical records on China’s space program come from two books: _gQntempQrary_gnina;§_§pagg_fififgrt (Zhang et a1, 1984) and Memoirs of Nie Rong-zen (Nie, 1984). Two western works also provide valuable insights into China's 15 political and military background. These are "China's Nuclear-Missile Program: Regional or Intercontinental?" (Hsieh, 1971) and thng_§gilg§_thg_figmb (Lewis and Xue, 1988). Bradley Hahn (1986), Vincent Kohler (1989) and Craig Covault (1985,1987) have done extensive interviews and research in more recent years. Hahn provides a comprehensive list of China's spacecraft launch statistics, including the perigee and apogee of the satellites, their international designations, weights, estimated life and date of decay, while Covault obtained first hand information through a trip to China with a 0.8. space team (p. 11). Kohler also toured space installations throughout China in 1987 (p.71) and filed stories from xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest of China near Burma. For the most part, the works by the above-mentioned three authors have been highly descriptive, focusing primarily on such things as the types of services on offer, payload capabilities, launch facilities, manufacturing infrastructure, latest space advances, etc. The aim of the present thesis is to go beyond a descriptive treatment by focusing on the whys and wherefores behind China's satellite program, and the internal and external dynamics and their relations to China's satellite policy and policy changes. Such an approach, it is hoped, will contribute to a better understanding of China's communication development policies and the decision-making 16 process. Historical documents, memoirs, articles and reports in newspapers and trade journals published both in China and the west not only provide important data but also serve as balance between differing views and ideologies. In addition, a telephone interview was conducted with the Great Wall Industry Corporation to obtain the latest information regarding China’s joint ventures and agreements with foreign countries. Because this paper adopts a historical[contextual/analytic perspective, major internal and external factors and actors are identified and their roles critiqued within the framework of a historical review of the Chinese satellite program. In other words, major events related to the satellite program are enumerated, preceding the discussion of motivations and rationales. The political and economic climate in China has changed often and wildly since the country's satellite program was founded. However, the program itself, along with the motivational forces, has remained relatively stable. It has consistently received support from the highest level of the Chinese government and spurred by the national desire to catch up with the technologically advanced nations. The emergence of the economic actors and factors in Phase Two should be seen as contributing to the evolutionary process of the Chinese satellite program, not as fundamental changes. CHAPTER 3 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS/ACTORS PHASE ONE (19608-708) China launched its first low earth orbit scientific satellite (PRC-1) on April 24, 1970, from Jiuquan, Gansu Province, in the northwestern part of the country. It might have seemed faintly ludicrous to the rest of the world that the satellite’s instrument payload was a transmitter that broadcast "The East Is Red," a song paying tribute to Chairman Mao Zedong, and announced the time as it passed over various parts of the world. But China, the backward land of mud roads and bare-footed farmers, had orbited a satellite all on its own, its payload heavier than the first Russian satellite and the first American satellite combined. PRC-1 was held both in China and the west as a milestone, signalling the country's entry into the exclusive space- faring and satellite using club. 17 18 3.1 Space Program as Big Science: Prestige and War- preparedness A number of factors and actors contributed to the success of the event. They are: China's need to prepare for national defense; the desire for political and cultural self-assertion and prestige in the international arena; and, finally, support from the highest level of the central government. As has been mentioned earlier, China's satellite program can be traced back to its military-oriented research and development. The space program got under way in 1958 shortly after the establishment of the State Scientific and Technological Commission. Premier Zhou Enlai was then designated to establish and direct a space program organization to include institutes, factories, and test facilities. Initial space program research and testing included sounding rockets and high-altitude balloons. These nonorbital launch vehicles probed the earth's upper atmosphere, measuring meteorological conditions, cosmic radiation, magnetic fields, and undertook instrumentation and space biological experiments. This initial effort provided considerable knowledge and experience in manufacturing modern rocket motors, instruments, and 19 ancillary equipment. Based on Nie's memoirs and other historical documents, Chen (1991) summarized some of the other major events and actors in this initial period as having influenced and encouraged the development of a strong space effort: * In January 1956 Chairman Mao Zedong called for a major national drive to upgrade China's scientific capabilities, signalling a willingness on the part of the leadership to support "big science" in China. * In February 1956 Dr Qian Xue-sen issued a proposal to the central government entitled "Proposal to Establish China's Defence Aviation Industry." Dr Qian had recently returned to the country from the USA, where he had been actively involved in the US army's missile program as a jet propulsion specialist. He was later to become the father of China's space program. * The establishment of the Fifth Academy of the Department of Defence. This military organization was given primary responsibility for developing China's space program. It served this function until 1964, when key elements of its role were transferred to the Ministry of the Seventh Machinery Industry. * Cooperation with the USSR to acquire Soviet missile 20 technology. In September 1957 a Chinese delegation visited the USSR to negotiate a cooperative agreement. On 15 October 1957 a bilateral agreement was signed in which the Soviets agreed to help the Chinese develop rocket technology. In 1958 the USSR pledged to help China build three R80 institutions that would focus on missile development. Two sample Soviet P-2 rockets were shipped over to China to provide the Chinese with a close look at operational missile technology. The decision to build short-medium-range rockets independently following the withdrawal of all Soviet technical assistance for China's missile program. In February 1961 the Fifth Academy decided that all attention should focus on developing independent capabilities to build short-medium-range missiles. China's first attempt to launch a missile on 21 March 1962 failed. The first successful launch occurred on 29 June 1964 and the first successful launch of a fully operational medium-range missile occurred on 26 December 1966. The commitment to producing satellites. After the Sputnik launch Dr Qian and his colleagues initiated a plan to develop satellite building and launching capabilities. Activities related to this plan were given the name "Mission 581." A major component 21 was the call to build three satellite and launch design institutes. The First Design Institute was established in August 1958. In November it was moved to Shanghai and renamed the Institute for Generator Design of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The Chinese leadership's commitment to developing satellite capabilities was demonstrated in Mao Zedong's 1958 declaration to the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party when he said: "We, too, must make artificial satellites." (pp. 117-118) The successful launch of PRC-1 gave rise to mammoth parades and celebrations in China. The political statement is a strong one, and the propaganda opportunities occasioned by the events were prominent: the Chinese press spoke profusely of China's enhanced international status and prestige and the power of the newly founded People's Republic in the struggle against the U.S. imperialism and the Soviet social imperialism and in the effort to forge human development in a safer environment (Hung, 1970: P.32). Harsch (1970) observed that although China was still a long way from reaching equality with Russia and the United States, the world had ceased to be a two-power world. He also emphasized how this event raised China's ability to influence its neighbors and how it changed the perceptions 22 of the small and underdeveloped countries which now looked up to China for leadership. However, China poured enormous resources into the satellite program not just for its symbolic and prestige values, it also had strong military implications. One would recall that shortly after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the U.S. fought the Korean War, which became a major factor responsible for setting relations between China and the U.S. in a state of enmity and mistrust. Regarded by China as a clear provocation aimed at the Chinese communist government, the war also contributed to the U.S. policy of "containing” the Chinese threat through a trade embargo and travel restrictions, as well as through military alliances with other Asian nations. Another side effect of the war was that Washington became more and more committed to Taiwan's defense, making the possibility of Chinese reunification more remote. Sino- American relations saw no improvement in the 19608. To the Chinese leadership, the U.S. threat was as imminent as it had been, especially as the U.S. became increasingly involved in the war with yet another Chinese neighbor -- Vietnam. On the Sino-Soviet side, strains in relations gradually began to emerge in the late 19508 over questions of ideology, security, and economic development. China was dissatisfied with the insufficient degree of support Moscow 23 showed for Beijing's recovery of Taiwan, Soviet neutrality during the 1959 tension on the Sino-Indian border, and Soviet reluctance to honor its agreement to provide nuclear weapons technology to China. In sum, the major ideological, military and economic reasons behind the Sino-Soviet split were essentially the same: for the Chinese leadership, the strong desire to achieve self-reliance and independence of action outweighed the benefits China received as Moscow's junior partner. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet advisors from China in 1960, the Sino-Soviet dispute escalated to include territorial issues, culminating in 1969 in bloody armed clashes along the border. A year earlier, in 1968, the Soviet Union had moved missiles near the Chinese border, and installed long-range missiles to which nuclear warheads presumably could be fitted (Christian §§1§5§§_Mgnitgn, April 29, 1970, p.2; p.4). It was against these circumstances, clouded by the growing fear of war with the U.S. on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, that Mao sounded the warning that the danger of a new world war existed and that people all the world over should be prepared (Mao, 1970). His call "We should produce artificial satellites too" should be regarded as a step toward mobilizing people in preparing for a possible war (Hsieh, 1971). Given the extreme tension China was experiencing, it is not surprising that following PRC-1 and 2, six reconnaissance satellites were launched in the 24 late 708, including two whose capsules were recovered (see Appendix A). Clearly, the Chinese satellites in the 708 did not, and were not meant to, produce any economic benefits. The primary motive was a geopolitical one. The satellites were used, more or less, as a sort of deterrence and, in a way, as a tranquilizer when the country was surrounded by hostile forces. The major objective was to make the world aware that China was a military power to be reckoned with (Harsch, 1970). For instance, what was the significance of China's first satellite in terms of ”war preparedness" or national security? Of course the satellite was experimental in nature, and did not have specific military missions. But as Hughes (1970), in reference to China’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles capabilities, pointed out, "It takes little expert knowledge to figure that if China can put a 380-pound satellite in orbit around the earth, they are advancing fast down the road to long-range rocketry." The new Kong Times (1970, April 26, p.1; p.2) directly pointed out the significant impact of the unspoken message behind PRC-1: China now had the capability of delivering atomic and hydrogen bombs to any point on the earth's surface. The paper went on to say, ”China may have chosen the satellite method of testing its rockets, thus scoring a more impressive technological feat than the test firing of a long range missile." (p. 2) 25 In view of the fact that China did not go out of its way to emphasize the peaceful uses of the space achievement (Hsieh, 1971), it was no surprise that North Korean leaders related the launching of China's first satellite directly to the strengthening and developing not only of China’s scientific technology but also of China's "defense capabilities" (Xin Hua News, 1970). The Committee of the Communist Party of Burma, which described China’s achievement as dealing a heavy blow to the U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism, also said, "It is a powerful check to the moves of these imperialists to carry out nuclear war threats and re-divide and dominate the world, and once again shatters their monopoly over nuclear weapons and rockets ..." (Xin Hua News, 1970). The Chinese foreign language news bulletin, Beijing Review (or Peking Review, as it was then called), itself carried an article connecting the development of nuclear weapons and space technology (Hung, 1970). Summarizing the global impact of China's achievements in space and other military technologies, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping put it in a subjunctive mood, "If China had not exploded atom and hydrogen bombs in the 19608 and launched satellites, it would not have been considered one of the three big powers and would not occupy such a position in the world. These things can mirror the capability of a 26 nation and symbolize a country’s vigor and prosperity" (W: 1990. 10-21) - 3.2 Domestic Context: Political and Financial Support; Nationalism and R 8 D Policies China’s isolationist posture in the international arena in the late 508 and throughout the 608 was matched by dogmatic and radical practices at home. The inception of China's space program coincided with the ill-fated "Great Leap Forward," 1958-61, an ambitious campaign designed to transform the country at one stroke into a developed nation. The emphasis of the campaign was placed on accelerated collectivization of agriculture, national self-reliance and self sufficiency, and mass mobilization based on political zeal rather than careful planning. The result of the campaign was a severe economic crisis that led to widespread famine between 1959-62. The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, started in 1966, landed China into another chaotic situation. Unlike the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution was primarily a political upheaval, and did not produce major changes in official economic policies or the basic economic model, but its disruptive influence was felt in almost every facet of social life in China. China was in a mess. Mao and his followers in the Central Committee well understood that some stability was in order. They needed a new and unifying rallying call. Now 27 that the country was unable to make_prfigress on the whole “W” ,omnw-u H... prim“ broad industrial front, the Chinese leadership dec1ded to wr—‘V i‘u.‘l—w——w—“' ‘H .u' ,‘r" ‘— —v— ''' V ww concentrate QnFaMfew specialspxgjectsvincluding the Mswfl'fi -w,,,... satellite technology (Worden et al, eds, 1988). In order to m I '6' :M nfiarn “Aw P“ boost the morale of the nation, Mao repeatedly made the ‘—‘ fifl-‘mvwf‘T‘W 3W, m ‘4 statement that China, with its vast territory and unmatched man-power, ought to make a greater contribution to humanity in fighting against all ”reactionaries" in the world and in forging human development (Mao, 1961-1976). As his congratulatory message for the successful launching of the country's first satellite indicates, Mao saw the satellite program as being able not only to help establish stability and order at home and to make contributions to the world but also to provide the country with a fresh source of L. nationalism (Mao, 1970), which leads us to one of the socio- cultural and psychological phenomenon related to the Chinese satellite program. Themghinsse nationalismflis intricately tied.up with its histo;ylangwgglture. China has a brilliant history of contributions tomggtggnomy, a science in which observations made by the country's astronomers more than a thousand years ago still provide important data. China's ancient inventions include, among various other things, gunpowder and rocketry. Even western authorities credit China with this 28 contribution to mankind, a8 is recorded in Spg§e_mragelL‘A Him: Most authorities believe the invention of rockets is tied inextricably to the discovery of black powder which served as the first rocket propellant. The best available evidence, including both early Chinese documents and the writings of some of the first Europeans who visited China, indicates the Chinese certainly were the first to use black powder and, therefore, probably the first to use rockets as well. (von Braun, 1985, p.22). The Chinese are proud_of their pastuglories, of which ._lllmnfilllelyeeilww.m-. the ancient inventions were a part. They also believe that these glories will be restored some day. As Worden et al (1988) pointed out, just as Chinese national pride has been a natural outgrowth of China's long and rich historical tradition, the nationalism of Chinese leaders also has derived from injustices China suffered in more recent history, in particular, China's domination by foreign powers from the nineteenth century until the end of World War Two. During this period, often referred to as "the century of shame and humiliation,” China had to sign unequal treaties and grant foreign powers special privileges of extra- territoriality whereby they could set up concessions and settlements and divide China into spheres of influence. The most debilitating and humiliating of all was Japan's invasion and occupation of China in late 19308 until 1945. The bitter recollection of China's suffering at the 29 hands of foreign powers was undoubtedly a source of the Chinese nationalistic sentiment that was transformed during the Cultural Revolution into extreme xenophobia. Unrealistic claims at the time could be heard everywhere in China that the country could catch up with and surpass the most developed countries in the west within a dozen years. The successful launching of the PRC-1 only strengthened the desire to play "catch up.” PRC-2, a geodetic satellite carrying two telemetry systems and powered by solar cells, was launched in 1971, only ten months after PRC-1. The speedy pace certainly did not please the U.S. or the Soviet Union. Perhaps the (:weightiest of the meaning is thgtwghingmgntered both nangma -.11833992 ffi?£$-’¢S§E% from..-9£tbs§ . 9f. ., the two superpowers; indeed, in spite of them. The Chinese press attributed the accomplishments in space to Chairman Mao's policy of.independence and self-re ce. Hung Yu's commentary particularly mentioned that "not one foreigner took part in the work, not one foreign specimen or foreign- made article was made use of" for the entire satellite project. His remarks were reminiscent of Premier Zhou En Lai's remarks on China's first detonation of a nuclear device: ”Have we not ... exploded an atom bomb? has not the label 'sick man of the East' fastened on us by westerners been flung off?" (Hsieh, 1971, p.92) Zhou was a strong supporter of the satellite program because he 30 cherished the strength and prestige it conferred upon China in the international community (Nie, 1984). In the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1968, ordinary workers in laboratories, factories and launch facilities emulated their colleagues in other industries and began criticizing and chastising their superiors. The scientists and engineers themselves split into rival camps and launched campaigns to discredit each other. Progress in the space program was on the verge of a grinding halt. Zhou was afraid that the huge investment in space would prove to be abortive, he consequently instituted special measures to protect it. He made numerous visits to the Ministry of Seventh Machinery Industry and space program sites and had the Ministry’s Committee of Military Administration identify scientists and engineers working in the space program so that they would receive special protection under a Martial Law imposed specifically within the Ministry (Nie, 1984). At the other end of the political spectrum the Gang of Four (Wang Hong-wen, Zhang Chun-qiao, Yao Wen-yuan and Jiang Qing), otherwise known as the Gang of Shanghai, were also enthusiastic backers of the space program because they viewed it as a symbol of their ability to carry out sophisticated undertakings and as a potential vehicle for self-glorification (Chen, 1991). In 1970, they supervised and were directly responsible for the building of the Shanghai Space Research and Production Base, which was 31 comprised of the Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering, the Shanghai Institute of Launch Vehicles and the Heavy Rocket Engine Test Station. The efforts of the Shanghai base duplicated existing efforts being carried out in Beijing. While Beijing focused on developing Long March launchers and East is Red satellites, the Shanghai group worked on developing what was called "Storm” launchers and their own variety of satellites. The efforts of the Shanghai group quickly paid off with the launch of the Storm-1 rocket in 1972. In the next few years, the Storm-1 launchers would put several satellites into orbit. The strong support offered by the leading figures in the Chinese government, no matter where they stood in the domestic political rivalry, enabled Dr. Qian and his colleagues to engage themselves in research activities, undisturbed by the general turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and the inadequate supply of practically everything in normal Chinese economic life. Admittedly the satellites did bring national pride and prestige, but one has to bear in mind the tremendous human cost that was involved, especially if one recalls the poverty, famine as well as the political turmoil associated with the period when the satellite program took off. Chiding the Chinese leaders for not paying attention to the needs of their people, Soviet writer, Krasnaya 2vezda, in an article on Chinese military strategies, pointed out that 32 resources in China had been allocated without any consideration to the overall national economy, and basic requirements for a modern industry (New_xQzK_11me§, April 27, 1970). Although 2vezda’s comment represented the Soviet polemics aimed at any of its "satellite" countries that had the guts to deviate from the bloc, it did point to the unique socio-cultural and psychological phenomenon in China in which economic interests could be sacrificed for what is called in China -- Zheng Chi -- which means ”to add glory or lustre to one's face,” or "to make a good showing” under adverse circumstances. The word ”Zheng Chi" applies specifically to underdogs, so if a child from a poor peasant family has achieved good scholastic scores upon graduating from a college, he makes a good example of "Zheng Chi." By the same token, if a poor nation, beset with external pressures and sanctions, can somehow survive and thrive based on its own resources and relying on its own strong will, it can also be said of having "Zheng Chi-ed." Significant achievements in space technology, including the successful retrieval of three satellites in the 708 (in 1975, 1976 and 1978 respectively, see Appendix A) and the simultaneous launching into predetermined orbit by a single carrier rocket a group of three spacephysics experimental satellites in 1981, stood in contrast with few successes in other fields. The variation in achievements reflected concentration, or, rather, over concentration, of resources 33 in what the leadership considered to be the "key institutions", or, ”strategically vital technologies." These nstitution and££§§§§316g239, unlike other industrial sectors, enjoy the latest in modern technology, the support Mr “W “Wm...“ sf WMM‘H‘M of a comprehensive tgégstrial com .31 a highly trained MM Mk’l'fiw '5'.” ," . ' contingent of scientific and technical 96} l and the W'.n“'o~kwvrw’: #WH.UH ,MMWJ? gvfil‘wm .7 “Hr ("a ”Wm M first priority in fundinq«(Hahn 1984). In studying these It Han-H“ "W institutions and technologies, one should not ignore the Chinese government's preoccupation with national security, self-determination and self-assertion, §§§.HQ$993»WSY of interpreting development.in terms 9; national power and ‘. '7‘ ~ I v.1». .. internationa l «8.23;;98... 9318929393 $3,898.18;stnatignel product and higher standard of living, 323,??? {Zheng Chi" .. ~ aha-Wm” 3"“ I“? ”W‘Mh fl“ faCtor as it relates to the self-concept of a,natian~and the W" In“ -Jafla‘ morale of its people. ‘é/fl/ M The following is a matrix (Figure 2) of illustrative factors/actors influencing the Chinese satellite program from the initial period through 19708. It highlights the cent“! r..¥-T9.l.8...9.fi.,.:r.ne-ksxfiigsrsswinyme Chin Aft-3% ,ngsxmsfi . Mao, Zhou and Gang of Four, and their strong political will W *mwfl.” %' v "’“" mm 4“" «#WML’WW v.4?)- ”Rn-f" 690'- to invest in this high cost technology _for national.de£ense “3‘10 3.“ "'v- W “W and for prestige even 3f~itwmfiflnt«mfikingmggemenggggnggnpmic M . 1‘ -wwhrfiam—u-f..- , . I sacrifices. . , ’l 34 Economic scientific] Pélitic\l/ Cultural Tephnologiqll Géopoli ical ‘cfl .* cooperative perceived ventures in threat from missile with superpowers; 3 USSR in late preparation 55' 503 for war i (1.11;;an \‘a——~—-""q'd. . ~ I a . ' . . .‘ ' . . J~' .0. r' ( National \N ....-«M ,’ Dept. of De- fence;Ministry of 7th Machi- nery Industry; national se- _Curity & de- fence; su- pport from "Zheng,Qi" factor; nationalism; China's.his- S . (nationél ’pflrwd.lf¥ Group of highest level toricalmcon- scientists led ie, Mao,2hou trihution to by Dr. Qian 8 ”Gang of 4'”!§§ketry' Shanghai as second base for space research Figure 2 Matrix of Illustrative Factors/Actors Influencing the Chinese Satellite Program Between l960s-70s CHAPTER 4 PHASE TWO: NEW FACTORS AND ACTORS After more than 20 years of development, China has attained an appreciable level of space technologygto say *4...- u.‘ urn-1W6“: “JM .4.’ ----- "I” W" ' 5‘3““ H 9" A 9".” ‘3 “1 MM” __,,.1 that it has made China' s presence felt in the world's space 0-.wa WM 'W 1‘. Viv“ " faring club as well as to think about the economic profits I I'MMWh-hruf to be gained_from_§hgwpg§§wig¥estment. For the first time “A. V—v—rww since the Communist Party came to power, profit-making as a concept began to be accepted as not incompatible with socialism. W from the previous high- pitched revolutionary rhetoric to more down-torearthgpragmatism is fwd-Lia; 3'4!“ I again brought about by_ a combination Wwaintgnnalwand MQM'TI HUM external fa_tg;s. On therexternal level,(China has normalized its Mfg—(WM-V W—M' ...;va ”New..- ~— “a relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. ...... wr- ln~ M- ”... flan-v, Wyn-r” , ....yr “use. —" >’,- s~ '. —-—r . 1.9,ch; It has also establishegagriendlymrelations with almost all but a few nations in the world. Such actions can be seen as part of the genera} thaw of the Cold War era. China can now conduct its £;;:1gn relations without the sense of overwhelming threat from one or other of the two superpowers. *2. I. _ ”A" 'FII' “an-0’“ gr .5. On the internal level, with the ascegt_of<§éngwxiao W 35 36 Ping o the top position in China, the country began to ufidergo sevegal econggigmrefonmoawhich,gggultegfiin significant increasesminlagricultmamaadwindmtviflwts W@”.w as well as in volume ggwggggignmgrade. In the meantime, the Chinese leadership has shown some viilingnssawggmgxggggwgpe definition of self-reliance to permit substantial imports, i .. 5.... mum;- /- "um-WW- .. foreign loans, investment, joint ventursfimwfindmnxanafias ——-— m-‘Awmmv'W' training of sc1enti§t§bapd,§ngineers including space “ix-“’2“ engineers and managerial personnel (Aviation Week and Space “ v-1’rw‘h 'W _ 9W Mwfiww Technology, March 10,1986. p. 141). ... . Notwithstanding problems such as inflation and official corruption that have led to popular discontent, achievements have been remarkable. The satellite program is “4“”, Hh'i‘P‘fl'v‘ 5141!! W‘ "W”, Y3!" I? m. -"‘ "- no exception. Specific changes in the satellite program center around the application of the satellitg_tgghgglggies (e.g., meteorolggy, remote sensing, broadcasting and telecomvfinifihtions) in the civilian sector and the .W IaJer—A’ “441‘ ’IJ-M‘E" fin; fl'fimm commercialization of the "Long March" launchingmservicegmgpr A- 1 4:117 eon-unlit": harm!" WNW? at... qua-53th.“, WWW ‘U‘c‘ QQQQ 2...— r profit. To be sure, geopoliti§s andNEEestigéPreasons are m. . --‘ still salient motivating factors, but so are economic v._——v reasons and, from the administrative point of view, national unity and cohesion, as we shall see. The fElE22$29.na1icyemoxesmsincemthaulaans show the major internal and external influences on the evolutionaof wfiuw.‘; luv-“Ii Vhdtfihnyan MW 9's?" in ggéflélfiwfifliellitewprogramwand.the gradual process toward a relatively more mature and balanced policy,-featuring both 37 was particularly “WMHM pronounced in sensitive high-tech areas like Wm” «Wmm (:Eelecommunications and computers here military needs Mmg‘qummflw‘tdf 2;: c:- uh usually had the first call on research andmdeuelopnent -.....n— ‘ “H M‘ ”it“ Afimm‘fi NE “D“ ‘I'l: "'wvv resources. (Eévernment policg>change§>andbegagmin earnest in early 1980s, they can be traced back to/f9:8) when China used Franco-German experimental satellite Symphon€§>to conduct transmissio// tests for telephone, television, facsimile and 5 , .—..._ "twat-ma ./ synchronization, as well as experimentingmgith ““6. A. r Hun-www any '5'. mm h teleconferencing. In 1982, an even wider transmission test MW ---. was conducted by using an Intelsat transponder. “chinafs first geosynchronous communications satellite_L§Tfl-;wags 9"“ Mnmég- YW‘». launched in 1984}, followed by four telecommunications and W" fl" “firm" ' MN ’4 ‘U broadcasting satellites launched in 198§4 1988) and I999 Mlli- ,wh'vu" A‘fl respectively (see Appendix A). These satellites, along with leased capacity on Intelsat, werE’cgpgb;g_gf_tran§mitting teievision and radio programs_frgmrggiiingwggwg$$~parts of the ”3129!:9'!9.-BE9X1€1§99-._E11%Quiltinginternatignal ‘rmfl‘v “dir- 4O telecommunications. Together, they lay down an initial technical base for practical’domestic uses f satellite communication. Intelsat has been instrumental in China’s effort to apply the satellite technology for communication purposes, as we shall see. In 1985, the Chinese government reorganized the China 'fl_flwwra Broadcast Satellite Corporation (CBCS), which was to be ‘pHflr" a» w" responsible for the construction and management of China' s communications and broadcasting satellite systems. In the ,. “...—um" same year the PLeasing for Transition program was initiated, in which transponders were leased or purchased ~wk' 40'9”“ .ar, from Intelsat, and other satellite owners as an interim ___,______,_. measure. This enabled China to establish its operational u—u—v— domestic satellite communications system step by step and achieve the objective of using satellite communications as ”.... its main means of transmission for communication and -A-— .«waw shah? “.m- Hm television broadcasting. W The first phase of 'Leasing for Transition:)was to use 4’“ M' 1 . .f’“\ Intelsat's transponders for a series of pilot experiments “W M Wm».~~..,-.«r1th...fl" a—«UW #uu an.“ H “w m and demonstrations, and to aid the construction of ground 4.“- :fi. MWJWH‘I clvr networks and the manufacture of equipment. The second phase .1,“ M» “WHHMM war-M" will rely mainly on communications satellites made and launched by China while using leased and purchased transponders as a complement, further expanding the uses of satellite communications andjgpeeding up the construction of mwmfiwx’ww u “bu *- fl’flrumu ..., ...,“ a; a terrestrial network. In the third phase, Chinese-made h Wfl--A-L' N‘ H ‘v'am'l'rm f 41 {“ high-capacity communications satellites will be launched to ”.J‘ MW“M;M‘w3m1kflWNJJflWIL form an operational domestic satellite communications system (wu, 1988). As the title of the program suggests the ultimate aim is to be self-reliant. This is in keeping with the overall strategic policy of technological autonomgé But the WWWJM‘W LW willingness on the part of the Chinese government to join in .prw'fl’v‘ a,‘ M4¢t~un>~wr P'Hu r ......‘m me~m AW ”-th w 4‘»? “New J “ WWW V'~‘)- ' cooperative ventures with the world community demonstrates v '4.‘,,‘. ”/‘n 41‘. alt-300‘” “M W awn-1”,; “H ‘3? u— _. I '44 Asa—“’3! . “‘51 ”MW“ V- «a l I a ...—a- its flexibility as compared with its previous "no contact" ”Gin“. z-r' cw ‘J‘awwt-ii WI“ ' , 3,)me W“ ”MMWMRM'H 'M."""*"'"'W""q posture. At this time of writing, China is in phase two WI". with a combined capacity of 11 C-band transponders, four of which have a bandwidth of 72 MHz each, and the remaining seven have a bandwidth of 36 MHz each. These transponders _ n.1,,v'w“ serve telephone, telegraph, facsimile, and VSAT (very small r WWW-p”, "WI“ wary H'VJ‘C’“ ya"1"1rn‘."51'.-"M‘" {m “'JWN'FWN-Y‘gfih‘w’ aperture terminal) communications of MPT (Ministry of Posts f. ‘ WWM‘ FEW-41‘! whl '9‘; h‘ynm _ 3.1 d. ‘W {Ma Q fi‘g‘$u~ “q“ ‘1’. 1”. be: .1“ and Telecommunications) end private satellite communications up. “4.41, hwll‘rr 3" J. ‘_”#M, a of Ministry of Oil, the State Meteorological Bureau, “I ”I. WW 1:" -|—- 'f—aI-a'fi'fibqgu'fi 1.4-9 w,’ " .4 ~ 1 Ministry of Coal, the Banking §ystems and the China ...,w , “mm-i" 'fl'fi'“ ...... in»..- 1 wk? 8““ Mun.- International Trust and Investment Corporation, geijing’s major investment and finance company. M ”‘4‘ It is interesting to note how theseCEndividual _ -1 3’,” -I'- ministrie§»an enterprises will become major actors in the “— next decade or so pushing theflgggligggigflMgfiwgemmunicatigaw satellites for dedicated data transmission and computer Aqwuwwmwxw;r.dm 9 su.nrvwmm1m.awfl'"‘ MW networks. However, while these institutiqnfimare,gngouraged maxim-v“ W . “A“ to contribute their share to the satellite program by r‘vw‘r' WI "1 ‘ 'l'rW'flR 91,4» (tr-’3‘?“ "' 41"5'W ‘Wmfi mm” ;‘¥m‘ “4'“; ”pf-(v " Emmy”? wv-w 42 providing extra sourcemgjgggggiggp they are_not there to dismantle the monopoly of the government over the hardware ”mam uwm- “van-"Mal Mr: ‘W "" “‘ ""‘“‘““-‘m" v. “H qv. Hun-rd; uu vu- AWW‘F’H "V“ " "'- and the software begause they themselves are either a branch ....)- I'W-w‘, .— N “’r .‘vw' of the government or state-owned. W ‘ Mmhuw‘V—M‘ JAM‘W",""”‘.I‘G* u“ n O. h k W Or» ‘ _. Meanwhile, China is taking steps to move into phase three. Renmin Ribao (1991) disclosed that a large-capacity 24-transponder communication satellite, "Dong Fang Hong 3," capable of covering all of China's land area and with a life expectancy of eight years is near completion. Feng Yun-z, an improved version of the first weather satellite, Feng Yun-l, is also in the making. China is using satellite distribution to carry the T. V. Maw/‘9'?“ "" ”“"”"’""M‘m row-w ”W“ ~M . .... ... .4- ..., ...-...:- I. .a. vrw‘ "T’V’Cr' - -fl- .1» University in addition to CCTV, the national telev1s1on 4‘*~’__p wgmwmmmmmwM,1 network. This is significant, because it is theéfirst afiflflflll effor€>made to reach the grassroots level. According to “—77- w 7*. mv—r‘IP‘Ufi-My 1.- MN M-WWWW“’ f, Zhou Yougao (1986), CCTV used to be transmitted via microwave to major cities, but apparently satellite reception is of higher quality. To reach remote areas, CCTV -‘- ...”... WrAv-bv—w rmr 1"”er previously had to recggghits;programs.and send Videgtqpes .by plane to local teleVISlon stations Min.rsgionswsuch.asmmibet M and X1n31ang in the western part of China where audience H .. '- dwm‘huflv" watched the programs three days late._ In southern Xinjiang, 1W -“ ’ fi—h with no civilian airports, programs were as much as 15 days late. Hudson (1990) commended China for its participation in Project SHARE (Satellites for Health and Rural Education), 43 .‘V‘l‘ sponsored by Intelsat between(1984-198§, as the first step in implementing a national TV Universi , which is now a well-established institution. The goal was to deliver university instruction to students at their workplace in unkind-ow y.¢‘.&)’l‘ .‘IL L‘ "m order to ease the critical shortage of places for qualified yawn“; J... .‘I ‘ ...... .p«+~u-1..or..,:.- who-Nw'z‘fl‘h'mfli at»... ...-war ~- students in China s universities. Courses were initially — __L._._‘Vvlfi. transmitted over the terrestrial network used for broadcast television, but much of the country was not covered by this system. N°Yf§9£§~§hin~5t99° TVRO (television receive-only) terminalsflhave been installed and the T.V. University has an estimated student body of more than one million. Li (1991) said transmission of television training courses, made “...,— “‘3 a; - “4,. 6 mmflmm mm possible by the satellites, had saved China about five ___-.-' wan-... #1:“me "4 billion yuan ($960 million) a year. What are the @otivating factor behind the move toward the application of satellite technology for communication purposes? National fi§§§;)and cohesion, egfifiEhic andqsfiéigtz cultural reasons, among other things, segmfltgwhaygmggmiggted the decision making process. M MMWV f “M\ \‘. dflUr -HI - «an China has a vast territory with varied tOPog??Ph¥1~§211 "Nu. ...m “_ per cent is mountainous land or desert. These eographic “MHHW-ahm sunk-- ‘n§ '“w It'l- conditions;have led to a very uneven distribution of flfivw‘ , ~— .r‘ " J. 'Enh— ua' OWN“ MM, flw—I-U'” population: the Han majority concentrates on the east coast __ -lr -mrli-.mrilnww"mi-~h while ethnic minorities are scattered around in the west, “WW 5 -- . WWW” N 'Wwf‘tk. nm'ahvus IGM‘Mr-fl- north and south along the border lines making up more than Mmr 31‘s" H“ “What‘mWrac-b upw. “It 1,. 5W 0 W “’“Nr ‘nW‘afide Jam» half of China' s land areas. As a result of long-standing ...: .nr' id M%m\ -' ”4"” "“‘ 44 fo’”“\ @c backwardness a geographic limitat1ohs, China' s Wham, “H“ wwwwwwwww MMMHW’” m“ terrestrial communications encountered almost insurmountable “_ flan-7“- ALM‘,‘ v _,. ......- ...:- ...-u “MM "‘“‘ """“"‘ " difficult1es, thus holding up social and economic uwv red-Mu, «WM—«ur— 1.... ”...-o development in the remote areas. For the same reason, the ‘II ”grown-film tun-M,‘ “‘4‘... ‘M\ Ill-A‘s. government had difficulty reaching the remote areas such as ... mxmmkvwh F' H4...-u-'v—r-'M'-I «1_\-rvxr-\1~Hm«&.nué~w..4 .... Tibet and xinjiang, which had seen eruptions of violence ———~ u». ”1'1 which was partly attributable to the diversity of ethnic groups and languages and the lack of communication. The‘ V‘“‘ n n «Na-run— ethnic minority regions are also most susceptible to the .... W‘A-ifi‘fiflhflMW-‘H'mh‘ ‘hh '- /u‘-" .- , HM... «v - -*‘h -I ."" " M'rr rr-m prua ”Hmmw—w -mu «Kw-fig Juli-m; “I“: "P- "‘9‘ "spillover" from foreign countries. Tibetan religious ”..., " “ nr . leader, Dalai Lama, who lives in India in exile, has never given up his effort to communicate with the secessionists in Tibet. National integrity is a perpetual problem that the .” “W (I'M “(I '_H ... n" p”; Chinese government must confront. ...... Fwy—— On the other hand;<:he economic reforms and the "opening to the outside world” polici>have given rise to a ____=.,-.._ —-- ffimwmmmmmv growing demand for information transmission. The demand is WmWWfi 2.14.45» 1 a... M 'w‘fi' “Huh-WM 6’” J“"“‘" - ’1‘... ' ‘T‘VR'W‘»,‘ W extremely acute in major coastal cities and_ "special _ rry ...)JL' A .‘ 1"- “... f-‘ )- economic zones" where commodity economy is well developed ,__ “mm! «"A’ " ’ I “'"Wm and international links are essential for trade and commerce. In the ten years between;1980-1990, there were 1’, N A... . five special Economic Zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai Shantpu, ... . ‘m’lh ._-n'1r . 4 H“ Krameh and Hainan, and l4 designated” open coast g1 gitggs including Sheflghai and Guangérou. These cities and regions Wfi$w Vii‘m 4,1...“ ”mum wu’ NA- ___L_~___ ......» have attracted more than 29,000 fore1gn-invested 3, .‘ffic. '4..- u w' 'm-pu-i’h‘ cflf‘fl“ N" "' “ ...-nay .mi‘l‘fwnw‘ enterprises, including solely foreign fund; , and Sino- ‘._‘,-_a7 1‘ w ' v. ' '~.- 45 foreign joint ventures or cooperative ventures with a total N\~‘fi_flwflflfl_fl__mflm,mmwvl__fl_11”--.-"1muu .11 - A _ 4_ investment close to U. 8. $19 billion (Rao, 1991). A study 4., _m\, Hm» WE‘L'MW --- If" v “v (EEIiIfi§:§§§1§g, 1989) shows that China' 3 use of .ngd.‘ -’.1 “‘3wa v-JC ‘WL’.W!Cn-Hulki telecommunications fac1lit1es per capita was 10 percent less m‘r' l1~’\l'"l'¢“-‘3 be» r "4 ...“. £323 the world's average per capita consumption. Serious A». flnwfiawilmvmnw ”u“; "H ‘L" L: w shortage of long distance telephone circuits has resulted in ”4-“; ¥ "" ‘ - - p—‘J—n“ 5.. MM a low call completion rate.‘:fack of momenfium in the VWW‘. on,“ :a-‘u "M m‘~—.JWM»~'-*TO 5m —— flag—flow.” construction of national transmission facilities on backbone fin" N“ ?_ 4'l‘wxm1rfl1.,xk _.._ - ‘ “Aye" '1"J_' ~ ”\n“ *‘\‘.‘-..‘4 " “"u "4 k: ‘ ‘Ol .- A‘h b h JV ‘ - routes has become a serious problem, leading to the hampered w . . “awn.“ w ,1”. g r' k" ‘ - - ‘ d‘ “A ‘q'afhcfjm h PL! 33 EN. 'fiv- T! n“;- :w integrative capability of telecommunications networks. An Qw‘ outdated and saturated communications network has become a -.1-.."—" '3... 1Wx_.rl'm"-“...‘r‘ Jwirmv‘trnh‘H " weak lifikphold1ng up China s goal of attracting foreign “Pr‘r'h‘ ‘ It investment and guadrupling the annual gross value of industrial and agricultural output by the end of the N century. ...-.. 1 » Realizing the seriousness of the problem, the central _7 . L—we 'W' H: ‘ -'" M 4’” -- 9,. q...“ -x- “H 1743.319; g\‘v'1-"""""- ”'0": government revised its policies placing posts and 19H- :fl.‘ téTecommun1cat1ons on an egual par with energy and ._"_,.,_‘¢Wu‘wm:-.'h -m-w“u ##171 \W mum Ewansportation in the nat1onal economy (Song, 1990). In 1 "- '.~L. 91"" .3”. -14. Id~\ -l‘ “" ‘A garch 19§9, the central government reiterated that -—-.,LM...ns-‘ *. fill ‘- If.“- telecommunications is one of the key sectors in the MMMW 1m Q. “Md 3‘ .4 ‘I. up“... 3:”? 4- 21-1 ”Wu-...... _‘- nu..4f‘l"vfl1-wmw 3‘ “I ‘ development of national economy and that efforts should be warm Mush-h ~ Mrs-“MW” run-a 1m.- ”a. . ‘1, “h w “flu,"tuwuflw'msusamwaHf W W'— focused on: <§1¢ growth of services such as local telephone, long- distance telephone and telex; MW"- " " ”Home. m ,_ 46 .//:\}construction of long-distance communications nwh' mm ...-“...“. CW ...- 1’... J's-dim. ‘fl—‘ua m ..‘o .d.: .m 4.- J. alum-a4 .p 0 facilities and telecommunications hubs; u A MW “MI-ah-AVMI—l smut-5W g”§‘)applicat1on of new and high technologies, following “cw-.4 “flaw. m-.. “-1", closely the latest developments of new technglggies 9K..- in information communications; ;**“)£égéar¢h and development of new technologies in communications; and ;;*x local production of advanced systems for SPC (Stored aw“. w... Program Controlled) exchanges, mobile telephone, an-MH-A‘w pol— ‘. microwave, fibre-optic and satellite communications systems (Song, 1991), I W‘WH_.. ‘ The(obvious advantages of the satellite ”mm instantaneous point-to-point and point-to-multipoint I" r“ «MAM “mm.- W? L”. i‘ n “‘H" -' ...... rm! communication irrespective of distance and terrain, coupled _M~LIA-IMV . . v. "W I" "uh" L.-.4..‘.IL...J~. gut-u ”JR-l MW. rm with the imperative need for information and communications -"fi 1W ”-mew a'o‘ .r- l r“ services to build a sense of national unity out of what is a “III-““Pmm-u i om“ 3 ‘. ”1- WWW“ VI. highly diverse mixture of cultures and nationalities and to ... nul A achieve economic development goals compelled China to opt flat-M ...: ...” u- ‘H. for communication satellites as well as other advanced “11‘... _ - ; ‘J -A- ..- ...41. lb Wdl' H‘H’ W”, ....“ , a“! .1, H“ A... 1' Ht“ 1.. commun1cat1on technologies such as fiberropticss(Song, “..., 1990). ‘é:hudsonijl990) argues that the communication satellite flag holds dramatic promise_ for developing_countries based on its "'Mh...“ MM”! ability to offer reliable communication -- both interactive ”uh—M‘.‘ _-., -..—7r" telecommunications and broadcast1ng -- to virtually every . Av“ H. 'M .J—I ., 1,..gP ’1‘ I.“ _. ..‘gm-h- 47 community, small or large. After listing half a dozen _,.._.-- ‘ ...W' -M-r" AEGSEE§§E§"bf the satellite technology in terms of economic growth as measured by gross domestic product and quality of life as indicated by the accessibility of education, health care, and other social services (p.168), Hudson went to great length to explain the importance ofihas\helped China to overcome thenbégrigggggf distance and diseconomisélgglzfinfihifi9u§E§EE§redxpopulation, W the two-way communication, as described by Hudson is, at best, limited. The system'efibapacifi331n China Mappeagg to be devoted primarily to television transmission, and, fie fl“ W) ..‘LWL. _‘ a, . Whmw‘fiv‘ .. " 'ephas1s dn television reflects impqgggggg_;hgnghin§§g vfi’RM " WM! imm-r, ....uwflim‘F-Hv government attaches to d1ssem1nating offigialminfiggmation WM MM, wa‘fiurfiw rather than facilitating the exchange of information among J, .5. x»! ‘ 3.1.3.. v t“ WW QMWW’P’WP‘FHWW um...» .‘w v.1 Wyn- Emmarw‘flh individuals and_org§nig%£$ghs,