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THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPANESE RELIGIONS, VALUES, AND IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN

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ABSTRACT

**THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPANESE RELIGIONS, VALUES,
AND IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN**

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This thesis examines how religion influenced economic development in Japan, a relationship Max Weber explored for the West in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Robert N. Bellah's classic study of the same question, *Tokugawa Religion*, is thoroughly analyzed examining its historical contexts in the late 1950s: modernization theory, Talcott Parsons, and Japanese Studies in the U. S. The thesis establishes a major limitation of Bellah's study, his narrow focus on "functions" of Confucianism, Shinto, and Buddhism, but also appreciates the continuing significance of his work today. Going beyond functionalist analysis, Michio Morishima's *Why Has Japan Succeeded?* is used to explain how religions and values were created and used by Japanese rulers and elites. Thus, economic development actually involved state manipulation of religion. The dark side of Japanese capitalism is revealed by demonstrating that ideals of harmonious society and corrective power were deeply related to elite ideology.

To My Parents

Tadakazu and Ayako Fukase

who raised their daughter with intellectual and

spiritual inspiration and love

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INTRODUCTION

Research Objectives

Max Weber published *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in 1904 to explain how the Protestant ethic influenced economic development in the modern West.[1] Given the rapid success of industrialization in modern Japan, it is interesting to ask whether religion influenced economic development in Japan also. Actually, Robert N. Bellah published *Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Preindustrial Japan* in 1957 to show that there was a functional analogue to Weber's Protestant ethic in Japanese religion.[2] The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between Japanese traditional culture especially focusing on religions, values, and ideology and economic development in Japan, setting Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* at the center of our arguments.

Since Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* focuses on only functions of religions and values, another important aspect, manipulation of religions and values, will be pointed out through criticisms of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*. The aspect of manipulation of religions and values will be thoroughly examined drawing upon significant ideas from Bellah's later

work, criticisms of *Tokugawa Religion*, and another study which also analyzes relationship between religion and economic development in Japan based on Weber's *Protestant Ethic*, *Why Has Japan 'Succeeded'?: Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos* by Michio Morishima.[3]

It is necessary to make clear here that religion is focused upon insofar as it is close to the core of the social value system. Religion is important in relation to society when it influences the social value system. In other words, religion, philosophy or theology for its own sake are not the problems in this thesis. It is also important to make clear that this thesis focuses on the idea that culture, including religions, values, and ideologies, influences the economic conditions and systems of a society, and therefore, its economic development as well. It does not necessarily mean that the opposite directional influence, the influence of the economic sphere over the cultural sphere, is denied. In other words, this thesis fully supports two-way influences between the former and the latter. However, the central problem of this thesis limits its scope to the influence of the cultural upon the economic.

This thesis is intended to promote mutual understanding between Japan and the U. S. Thus, the second objective is to evaluate Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* from the perspective of how this work contributed to better understanding between the two countries, and to demonstrate its current significance. To this end, the different academic contexts for Bellah's book

in Japan and the U. S. will be carefully explained in chapter 5. That chapter shall be meaningful for people who are interested in a comparative study of academic situations between two countries.

Methodology

The research problem of examining the relationship between Japanese religions and values, and economic development will be discussed through locating, analyzing, and criticizing Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*. Chapter 2 discusses the historical contexts of the book: first, modernization theory; second, Talcott Parsons; and third, Japanese studies in the U.S.. Chapter 3 examines the basic foundation of the book: first, Bellah's research topic drawn from Weber's *Protestant Ethic*; second, his use of Parsons' theoretical scheme; and third, definitions of key concepts. Chapter 4 explains Bellah's core analyses in *Tokugawa Religion*: first, the Japanese value system and Japanese religion; second, the relationship between religion and the political system; and third, the relationship between religion and the economic system. The first part of chapter 5 demonstrates how Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* reflects American social science at the late 1950s, particularly, modernization theory and Parsonian sociology. Then, the thesis examines the different academic contexts of the U. S. and Japan, and shows how Bellah's book reflects the tenor of Japanese studies in the U. S. at that time.

The next part of the chapter 5 probably represents the special contribution of this thesis since the data analyzed was drawn from written work in the Japanese language and was collected through documentary research in Japan. The research was conducted in June and July in 1992 at the libraries of Hokkaido University and Hokusei Gakuen University in Sapporo, Japan. The purpose of the research was to study impact and influence of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* upon Japanese academics and locate evaluations of the book by Japanese scholars. The literature survey included volumes of *Shakaigaku Hyoron* (Japanese Sociological Review), an official journal of the Japan Sociological Society, between 1955 and 1990, and volumes of *Soshioroji* (Sociology) between 1983 and 1989. In order to understand how Morishima, who is the Sir John Hicks professor at the London School of Economics, is viewed in the field of Economics in Japan, volumes of *Keizai Hyoron* (Economic Review) between 1980 and 1991 were reviewed.[4] Related books and articles were identified through library searches at Hokkaido University and Hokusei Gakuen University. Because of limited time and resources, the research was not exhaustive. However, I believe that the most representative, relevant works were covered by this research. For example, the searches located a book review, "Bellah's Tokugawa Religion" by Masao Maruyama, which Bellah himself identified as "the longest and most serious book review I (Bellah) have ever received" (Bellah 1985: xiii), and two books by the translators of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* from English into

Japanese, who, therefore, were probably at the center of Japanese scholars who were especially interested in Bellah's book: *Nihon no Shukyo no Shakaiteki Yakuwari* (Social Roles of Japanese Religion) by Ichiro Hori and *Nihon no Seishinkozo Jyosetsu: Shukyo to Seiji ni okeru Kodo to Kachi* (An Introduction to Japanese Spiritual Structure: Actions and Values in Religion and Politics) by Akira Ikeda.

Based on the data drawn through the research above, Bellah's impact and influence upon Japanese scholars, and their evaluations of him will be discussed in the next part of chapter 5. At the end of chapter 5, questionable points in Bellah's work identified in criticisms by Maruyama will be examined from the perspective of Bellah's latter work of evolutionary theory. Here, the issue of manipulation of religion will be raised. Chapter 6 examines *Why has Japan Succeeded?* by Morishima, a work which considers not only the functions of religion but also the manipulation of religion, will be analyzed. Chapter 7 will identify assumptions or ideas shared by Bellah and Morishima, and determine in what sense Morishima's work can be considered as an alternative to Bellah's. Then, a final analysis of the relationship between Japanese culture and economic development will performed through comparing and combining the ideas of both Bellah and Morishima.

As a text, the first paperback edition in 1985, *Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan*, is used. In this text, the subtitle was changed from "The Values of Pre-

Industrial Japan" to "The Cultural roots of Modern Japan."[5] Since an "Introduction to the Paperback Edition" is added, the text provides Bellah's reflection in 1985 on his original edition of *Tokugawa Religion* published in 1957.

Chapter II

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BELLAH'S *TOKUGAWA RELIGION*

Modernization Theory

It is a significant task to locate the historical context in which a book is written. *Tokugawa Religion* clearly reflects some characteristics of American Social Science in the 1950s. The historical context will be established by examining three distinctive perspectives: first, modernization theory, second, Talcott Parsons, a leading figure in both modernization theory and the functionalist school which dominated American sociology from the 1940s until the 1960s, and third, Japanese studies in the United States.

Modernization theory is definitely a critical part of the context for *Tokugawa Religion*. However, a comprehensive study of modernization theory obviously lies outside the scope of this thesis. Only characteristics of modernization theory which are necessary and significant for examining the book will be discussed here.

In order to identify significant implications of modernization theory, a good place to start is Wilbert E. Moore, a leading modernization theorist:

> What is involved in modernization is a "total" transformation of traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the "advanced," economical prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World (Moore 1963: 89).

Bellah himself recalls the atmosphere in American social science at that time when the book was originally written:

> It was the heyday of modernization theory. Modernization theory, especially in the United States, was a kind of late child of the enlightenment faith in progress. Modernization was the process that produces all the good things: democracy, abundance--in short, a good society. Like ours. I'm afraid that was a major implication of the whole idea. America and a handful of other "advanced industrial societies" were, if not already good societies, so clearly headed in that direction that they made clear the end to which all the other societies, as they modernized, were tending (Bellah 1985: xii).

The above quotations from Moore and Bellah reveal two important implications of modernization theory: first, an optimistic belief in progress; and second, Euro-American centric bias implicitly or explicitly implying Westernization of the world.

We will return to these two tendencies when we assess the impact of modernization theory on *Tokugawa Religion*.

Talcott Parsons

Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* grew out of the doctoral dissertation which he presented to the Department of Far Eastern Languages and sociology at Harvard University in 1955. The following quotation captures the influence of Talcott Parsons on American sociology at that time:

> Within the general context of sociological orthodoxy at the time, normally referred to as *structural-functionalism*, Parsons reigned supreme (Hamilton 1983: 28).

Describing the position of Talcott Parsons and Harvard

University in American sociology more specifically, "Harvard University was the center of American sociology until the mid 1960s, largely because of Parsons" (ibid.:28).

As was previously discussed, *Tokugawa Religion* is based on Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of the Capitalism*. However, at the same time, we should note that Talcott Parsons was one of Bellah's thesis advisors and provided "the theoretical framework within which the thesis was largely carried out" (Bellah 1985: ix). Bellah was greatly influenced by Parsons, who had his own interpretation of Weber. Therefore, it is crucial to understand some important ideas and tendencies of Parsons so that we can evaluate related aspects of *Tokugawa Religion*.

First, some characteristics of Parsons' thought and methodology will be discussed especially focusing on distinct differences between Weber and Parsons. Then, Parsons' general theory will be explained briefly.

Parsons' view of modern society was quite different from Weber: Weber was pessimistic whereas Parsons "was essentially optimistic about the nature of modernity" (Holton & Bryson 1986: 21). For Weber, modern "capitalism, through its bureaucratic mechanisms, opposes 'spiritual freedom'" (Wearne 1989: 55). On the other hand, Parsons questions whether it is possible that capitalism might again be made to serve 'spiritual' aims. Here, it is clear that modern capitalism for Persons does not necessarily oppose 'spiritual freedom.' Upon reflection in 1985, Bellah wrote:

> ...Parsons had created an optimistic Weber. For Parsons the process of modernization, understood as Weber understood it as a process of rationalization, did not, as Weber believed, lead relentlessly to an iron cage. For Parsons the normal course of rationalization leads to a good society (Bellah 1985: xii).

In this way, the optimistic tendency of Parsons, a leading modernization theorist, should be recognized here as the first distinct characteristic of Parsons being obviously different from Weber's pessimism.

Methodology is another area in which Parsons departed from Weber. Weber analyzed religions comparatively in the global scale, and investigated the historical conditions for the development and change of economic institutions in modern society. Parsons, on the other hand, "consistently declared himself to be devoted to the creation of general analytic theory." Therefore, he devoted himself to elaborate "a wide range of conceptual schemes designed to conform to his analytical realist strategy of theory construction" (Hamilton 1983: 130). His theory was obviously intended to be as universally applicable. Parsons interpreted Weber as also having attempted to construct a consistent and unified system of concepts to analyze social phenomena as he himself tried to achieve. However, it is important to stress that this interpretation of Weber is problematic.

Let us consider how their approaches actually differ on this point. Weber's "rational approach was a *scientific* concern for the problems of modern society" (Wearne 1989: 53). According to Wearne, Weber extended his research over the

whole of human history; however, his analytical concentration was fixed up on neither a single line of development nor a single analytical theory implying that the world would be lead on that single line of development. Instead,

> Weber's approach was global-historical, locating capitalism as a primary characteristic of Western society comparable to the leading aspects of other cultures at other times, in other places (ibid.: 54).

Indeed, unlike Parsons', his methodological approach was different from the one which aimed to construct a general universal theory. Examining Weber's ideal-type concept specifically, it was true that it "was an instrument of analysis," but, "it also had historical connotations" (ibid: 55).

As was described before, Parsons attempted to construct a general theory. Then, for Parsons, theory should be a tool to interpret societies. Actually, his general theory was not built on empirical evidences but based on a generous use of analogies, mostly those from biology and economics. The crucial question of whether the analogies are appropriate or not was paid little attention:

> Parsons had far too much confidence that his analogies were appropriate. He used them as though they provided evidence of the abstractions he wanted to explain and thereby seemed to avoid explaining the empirical phenomena to which his theory was addressed (Lackey 1987: 162).

Therefore, Parsons' theory was not based on the empirical approach of creating a theory: "collecting observations and then arriving at a theory as a result of the observations"

(ibid.: 12). Instead, Parsons' approach was an abstract one:

> ...Parsons demonstrated his preference for abstract theory. By abstract theory, he meant that certain attributes of an object are abstracted or selected for study in accordance with a theory's concepts (ibid.: 12).

In this way, the approaches of Weber and Parsons were distinctly different. In short, Weber would be identified as a economic historian (Nelson 1974), and Parsons as an abstract theorist. Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* will be compared to these characteristics of Parsons in the chapter 5 when we evaluate the book.

Finally, let us briefly examine the so-called AGIL framework which Parsons continuously worked with and refined. Parsons made a definitive statement of a general theory of social action and developed a voluntaristic theory of social action opposed to positivism, utilitarianism, and reductionism in *The Structure of Social Action* in 1937. He then entered upon a new phase:

> It contains Parsons's movement away from the confines of social action theory in the direction of structural-functionalism, towards the elaboration of a more general 'theory of action' containing the crucial concepts of 'system' and 'system needs.' The books comprise the key works of this phase: *The social System*, 1951, and *Toward a General Theory of Action*, also 1951, and a book written collaboratively with Neil Smelser, *Economy and Society* (1956) (Hamilton 1983: 19).

During this phase, the AGIL scheme made its first appearance in *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* in 1953, which was in collaboration with Robert Bales and Edward Shils. AGIL stands for Adaption, Goal-Attainment, Integration, and

Latency. The scheme was fully developed in *Economy and Society*. It is the AGIL scheme as developed in these two books that Bellah worked into the framework of *Tokugawa Religion*. A fuller explanation of this scheme will be presented during our examination of *Tokugawa Religion* in the next chapter.

Japanese Studies in the U. S.

The circumstance and trend of Japanese studies in the United States is a basic context of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*. According to *Japanese History: New Dimensions of Approach and Understanding* by John Whitney Hall, the availability of academic studies of Japan in English was limited prior to World War II.[1] However, during "the 1940's and 1950's a great deal happened to alter this picture:

> Starting in the 1920's the beginning of professional academic interest in Japanese studies were observable in the courses in Japanese language offered at Harvard, Columbia, and California universities, in the growing library collections of Japanese materials at these institutions and at the Library of Congress, and in the policy of support for training and research given by some of the major foundations. By 1940, a number of professionally trained American historians of Japan such as R. K. and E. O. Reischauer, and Hung Borton, had begun to publish. The Pacific war provided a sudden stimulus to the study of Japanese language and things Japanese, so that by 1945 a large reservoir of Americans with language competence had been created (Hall 1961: 7).

Interest in Japanese studies also grew after World War II:

> New centers for training in Japanese language and related subjects were developed at Yale, Columbia,

> Michigan, Washington, California, Stanford, and a number of other universities. Japanese books in American libraries jumped in numbers from about 90,000 volumes in 1940 to 586,000 volumes in 1950 and 840,000 volumes in 1958 (ibid: 7).

This postwar trend toward Japanese studies was strongly related with U. S. policy of helping less developed countries "rightly" modernize in order to prevent the spread of communism. Since Japan was the only non-Western country that had achieved industrialization by herself in the later part of the nineteenth century, Japan became an ideal subject for the West to study for constructing a general development scheme for underdeveloped countries. Consequently, American scholars in general tended to identify Japan as a nation in the broader context of East Asia, and be interested in making comparisons to other East Asian countries.

There were two different perspectives on the sources of development of Japan according to Shoda.[2] One approach is to emphasize unique and traditional characteristics of Japan which are different from the West, and to recognize them as driving forces behind Japan's development. An alternative approach shaped by Marx's dialectical scheme of world history focuses on common characteristics between Japan and the West, and identifies them as the driving forces for development. Following this approach, therefore, unique characteristics of Japan are identified as rather distorted parts different from the Western model of normal development. Concerning interpretation of the Restoration of 1868 and the Meiji Period particularly, the former perspective recognizes the nature of

this historical change as a reform within the *samurai* class still maintaining traditional values. On the contrary, the later perspective mainly emphasizes anti-governmental spirit or activities like peasant uprisings as the main force for change.

In the post war era, the focus on "unique and traditional characteristics" was obviously the trend of Japanese studies in the U. S.. Since the aim of studying Japan was oriented to finding some characteristics in Japan which worked positively for her development, not surprisingly, an approach focusing on the success of Japanese development rather than its "distorted characters" became the trend of Japanese studies.

The trend of Japanese studies in the U.S. is clearly a basic context of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*. Actually, the Harvard Yenching Institute, from which Bellah collected data and received some financial supports, was and still is one of the central institutions for East Asian and Japanese Studies in the United States.[3] In sum, *Tokugawa Religion* should be identified as one of the most representative Japanese studies in the U. S. at that time: Bellah worked at Harvard with a mainstream framework, which focused on and appreciated unique and traditional characteristics of Japan.

Chapter III

FRAMEWORK OF *TOKUGAWA RELIGION*

Weberian Approach: *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

In this chapter the framework, core concepts, and definitions of keyword of *Tokugawa Religion* will be discussed. First, let us make Bellah's research topic in the book clear. Influenced by Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, in which Weber analyzes "the relation of religion to the development of modern society, especially the modern economy," Bellah's investigation is focused on whether there was "a functional analogue to the Protestant ethic in Japanese religion" (Bellah 1985: 2-3). What he means by a functional analogue is:

> (we) shall attempt to understand as clearly as possible what Japanese religion actually meant to ordinary people, and we shall pay particular attention to any elements which might be connected with the rise of a modern industrial society (ibid.: 3).

Having identified his topic, it is important to explain the methodological framework that he used in the book next.

Parsonian Analytical Framework and Definition of Modern Industrial Society

Though it was explained that Bellah started by raising questions based on Weber's *Protestant Ethic*, the book was also

directly influenced by Talcott Parsons. First of all, Bellah uses Parsons' AGIL theory to analyze the Japanese value system.[1] Explaining this scheme, there are four main functional sub-systems of the social system: 1) economy, 2) polity, 3) motivational or cultural system, and 4) integrative or institutional system. Each of the four sub-systems has its own values: economic values, political values, cultural values, and integrative values. Each of the values are characterized by two pattern variables, one variable of universalism or particularism, and another variable of performance (achievement) or quality(ascription): it means that economic values are characterized by universalism and performance, political values by particularism and performance, cultural values by universalism and quality, and integrative values by particularism and quality. Also, following Parsons' scheme, Bellah categorizes the four major subsystems of social system in terms of the four dimensions of action: 1) adaptive dimension, 2) goal-attainment dimension, 3) latency dimension, and 4) integrative dimension. Therefore, the central concern of economy is adaptation, that of polity is goal attainment, that of motivational or cultural system is latency, and that of integrative or institutional system is integration. Based on this framework, Bellah develops his argument.

Next, it is important to pay attention to how Bellah defines two key-words, "a modern industrial society" and "religion". Examining "a modern industrial society" first, it

would be fair to judge that he directly uses Parsons' notions. Although many of Bellah's concepts begin as derivatives of Weber, for example, rationalization of means, Bellah's own elaborations tend to follow Parsons.

By "a modern industrial society," Bellah means "a society characterized by the great importance of the economy in the social system and of economic values in the value system." Referring to "economic values" specifically, he argues those values "above all characterized the process of the rationalization of means" (Bellah 1985: 3). He explains the word, "the rationalization of means," as below:

> In the process of rationalizing means, or what may equally well be called instrumental action, the ends of action are for the moment taken for granted. The only problem is how to achieve a given end with the greatest degree of efficiency and the least expenditure of energy. This involves above all adapting to the situational exigencies, for if there were no obstacles in the way of attaining a goal there would be no problem of means (ibid.:3).

Here, Bellah's notion of the rationalization of means is drawn from Weber. Then, according to the AGIL scheme, he also argues that "economic values" are characterized by "universalism" and "performance," two of the "pattern variables" and that they define the adaptive process or dimension. In this way, his definition of "a modern industrial society" is based on Parsons' framework of the AGIL scheme.

It is important to understand how Bellah contrasts Japanese society and American society following the AGIL

scheme. He analyzes that the U.S. is characterized by a primacy of economic values: the U.S. is, therefore, a typical case of a modern industrial society. On the other hand, he states that "Japan is characterized by a primacy of political values, the polity takes precedence over the economy" (ibid.: 5). According to Parsons' scheme, formally,

> ...political values are characterized by the pattern variables of performance and particularism. The central concern is with collective goals (rather than with productivity) and loyalty is a primary virtue. Controlling and being controlled are more important than "doing" and power is more important than wealth (ibid.: 5).

Although Bellah asserts that political values are primary in Japan, he recognizes Japan as a modern industrial society, also. He argues that a society could be a modern industrial society even if the society is characterized by the primacy of some other value complex insofar as "economic values have a very high secondary importance". He states that though "the type case of a modern industrial society...is characterized by a primacy of economic values..., this is not a necessity" (Bellah 1985: 4). Indeed, he believes that Japan developed from a non-industrial to an industrial society as one of the following cases:

> It is possible...that an industrial society may develop without a shift in basic values, but rather through a process in which economic values become very important in certain spheres and the economy as a whole reaches a certain level of differentiation where it can develop freely and rationally with only minimal restrictions (ibid.:5).

Definition of Religion by Paul Tillich and Max Weber

We will turn next to examine Bellah's definition of "religion." He defines religion as man's attitudes and actions with respect to his ultimate concern following Paul Tillich.[2] This ultimate concern has to do with two kinds of ultimate things, namely, ultimate values and ultimate frustration. Ultimate values are what are ultimately valuable and meaningful. On the other hand, ultimate frustrations are the ultimate threats to value and meaning. Ultimate frustrations are inherent in the human situation, but which are not manageable or morally meaningful. For example, death is the type case.

Identifying functions of religion, Bellah asserts that:

> (the first major function is) to provide a meaningful set of ultimate values on which the morality of a society can be based. Such values when institutionalized can be spoken as the central values of a society (Bellah 1985: 6).

On the other hand,

> (the second major function is) to provide an adequate explanation for these ultimate frustrations so that the individual or group which has undergone them can accept them without having core values render meaningless, and can carry on life in society in the face of these frustrations. This is done through some form of assertion that can overcome the ultimate frustrations (ibid.: 6-7).

The idea of religious symbols could be explained well using the idea of ultimate concern. Religious symbols are the "objects" of ultimate concern, namely, sources of ultimate values and ultimate frustrations: they are denoted as the

"sacred" or "divine." Considering religious action, it could be summarized that "religious action is any action directed toward the sacred and divine" (ibid.: 7).

It is also necessary to clarify one more key notion, the idea of rationalization of religion, which is originally drawn from Weber, before moving on to discuss how he conceptualizes the relationship between an industrial society and religion.[3] Rationalization of religion refers to the development of the religion from primitive to historic types:

> In primitive or "magical" religions the conception of the divine tends to be extremely diffuse. It is symbolized in terms of a pervasive force or power which inheres in many objects or in terms of a complex conglomeration of gods, spirits and demons. The diffuse concept of the divine permeates daily life (ibid.: 7).

The effect of this tendency is that "a very high percentage of acts in social life are of a sacred or semi-sacred nature." Therefore, performing such acts incorrectly would not only be morally wrong, but also be sacrilegious. Consequently, "religion undoubtedly contributes to the stereotyping and rigidity of life in traditionalistic societies" (ibid.: 7).

On the other hand, historic religions (what are often called "world religions") are explained this way:

> ...the concept of the divine which they hold is usually more abstract, in one sense, more simple, and less diffuse than that of the primitive religions. The divine is seen in terms of a relatively few simple qualities which hold in all situations, it is seen as more radically "other" and its entanglements with the world are drastically reduced (ibid.: 7).

What Bellah explained here was to borrow Weber's famous

phrase, "freeing the world of magic." Religious actions were simplified and made less situational. These rationalizing tendencies of religion are greatly important because they work to change people's attitudes and actions. Bellah argues that these rationalized religions may "lead to a rationalization of behavior" by "substituting...certain general non-situational maxims of ethical action" (ibid.: 8).

Bellah clearly explains why rationalization of religion is crucial for freedom from traditionalism in "Epilogue: Religion and Progress in Modern Asia" in 1968. The essay's argument about institutions and individuals is worth mentioning. With regard to institutions, he argues:

> In the historic religions, particular religious roles and structures tend to crystallize, so that there is at least partial differentiation of a church or religious institution. Such a religious institution may provide a point of view from which other social institutions may be criticized or altered, may outlive any particular society, or may exist in several societies at once, possibilities that are available in only the most limited way at early stages (Bellah 1968: 177).

For the individual,

> the historic religions provide the possibility of personal thought and action independent of the traditional social nexus to a quite unprecedented extent. A new consciousness of the self defined in relation to the divine takes shape at this stage (ibid.: 177).

The quotations above clearly make the point that rationalization of religions, from primitive to historic religions, decisively contributes to freeing people from traditionalism.

Let us finally move to examine Bellah's argument as to

why the rationalization of religion is the key to the development of modern industrial societies:

> The processes both of economic rationalization and of political rationalization require a considerable degree of freedom from traditionalism before they can begin to have an effect in leading to the development of industrial society. Virtually the only way this freedom can be attained is through the re-definition of the sacred, so that values and motivation favorable to the rationalizing processes will be legitimized and traditionalistic restrictions overcome (Bellah 1985: 8).

Based on the idea above, he tries to show that the rationalizing tendencies in Japanese religion contributed to political and economic rationalization. The reason not only economic rationalization but also political rationalization are important for Japanese development is because in Japan the polity still takes precedence over the economy. Actually, he sees political rationalization as a mediating process to economic rationalization.

Chapter IV

BELLAH'S ANALYSIS IN *TOKUGAWA RELIGION*

The Japanese Value System and "Japanese Religion"

Bellah argues that the central values in Japan are political values appropriate to the goal attainment dimension of the social system. It implies that the combination of two pattern variables, particularism over universalism, and performance over quality, are emphasized in Japanese society. First, Japanese particularism is characterized by the importance of the collectivity of which one is a member, and of one's particularistic relation to it. It "is indicated by the enormous symbolic importance of the head of the collectivity, whether this would be family head, feudal lord, or emperor" (Bellah 1985: 13). Therefore, particularism in Japan is symbolized as people's loyalty to their head, not as loyalty to a person but rather as that to a status, of the collectivity.

Next, explaining performance, it means in Japan that the "concern is primarily with system *goal* rather than system *maintenance*" (ibid.:14). It implies that status itself does not validate until people who have the status perform in the service of the system goal. Consequently, combining these two pattern variables, particularism and performance, Bellah concludes that loyalty to a particularistic head with active service and performance actually appeared as a concrete

expression of Japanese values.

It is necessary to examine how Bellah analyzes the relationship between the primary political values appropriate to goal attainment and the social values appropriate to the other three dimensions in Japan. His conclusion is stated simply: economic values, integrative values, and cultural values are almost entirely subordinated to political values. In other words, adaptation, integration, and latency, are subordinated to the goal attainment dimension.

First, economic values are subordinate to political values, because economic behaviors, the central concern of which is adaptation, are highly valued only when they are in pursuing the collectivity's goal. Economic values, which are normally characterized by universalism and performance, are highly limited in Japan by the variables, particularism and performance, which characterize political values. Economic behaviors should be "particularistic," because if they are done not for particularistic lords but for somebody else, they may be judged "selfish," and as a result, valueless. In "general, work itself is not a value, but rather work as an expression of selfless devotion to the collective goal is valued" (ibid. 15). In short, they are valued only when they are seen as furthering the "collectivity's goal" symbolized by their head's goal.

Second, Bellah explains why integrative values tend to be subordinate to political values. It is true that the "emphasis on harmony, on the maintenance of the collectivity

seemingly for its own sake is so great." However, Bellah argues:

> It would seem, though, that the dominant pattern exhibited the primacy of goal values. Appeals to loyalty to the head of the collectivity and to pre-eminent system goals could override concern for harmony and motivate the breaking through of old social forms, the disruption of old collectivities, and the abandonment of old forms of prescribed behaviors (ibid.: 16).

He points out placing goal-attainment over integration "contributed to the dynamism and the ability for fairly rapid social change without disruption of the central values." Then, he concludes that holding this possibility "differentiates Japan from societies in which system-maintenance-integrative values have primacy and are ends in themselves" (ibid: 16).

He picks China as an example of societies which are characterized by the primacy of integrative values. Since comparison between Japan and China will take up an important part of the argument in chapter 6, it is worth paying attention to Bellah's understanding of Chinese society briefly here. According to him, Chinese society "is more concerned with system maintenance than with, for example, goal attainment or adaptation: more with solidarity than with power or wealth" (ibid.: 188). In terms of pattern valuables, it means particularism over universalism and quality over performance:

> This implies with respect to human relations that one is more concerned with particularistic ties, of which kinship is the type case but which may include common local origin, etc., than with

> universalistic attributes. It also implies that one is more concerned with qualities than performance, in Chinese terms, with "virtue" rather than deeds (Bellah 1985: 128-189).

In concrete terms,

> ...the Chinese saw the problem of system maintenance in terms of a determinate set of human relations that only needed to be kept in a state of mutual adjustment for a harmonious and balanced social system to result (ibid.: 189).

In sum, he concludes that an "adjusted equilibrium was indeed the ideal of Chinese society" (ibid.: 189).

Bellah also argues that the difference in value systems between Japan and China influenced the dramatic difference of social development between the two countries. Bellah points out that:

> ...they both have a strong emphasis on political and integrative values, on loyalty and filial piety, but that there is a difference with respect to primacy of stress. Thus the difference in social consequences is seen not in terms of the presence or absence of certain key values, but entirely in terms of the way in which values are organized (ibid.:192).

Departing from discussing about China, let us move back to the argument about the relationship between political values and other values. Bellah points out that cultural values contain exceptional values. According to him, cultural values are distinguished into two types: one type is subordinate to primary, goal attainment values, and another type is not, which can be seen as an exception. The strong value on learning, study or scholarship (*gakumon*) is an example of the first type of cultural values: a "truly learned man will be a truly loyal and filial man" and "learning should

eventuate in practice." Religion is also identified in this group: "there is a tendency to fuse the religious end and the secular end, religious values and the secular goal-attainment values" (ibid.: 16).

On the other hand, another group of cultural values are not subordinate to the central values. Bellah calls them the aesthetic-emotional values: those "values center not on collective goals but on private experience," and "define an area of individual expression and enjoyment". For example, they might be "in the aesthetic appreciation of nature or art, in the delicate ritual of the tea ceremony, in the vicarious thrills of the theater, in the refined eroticism of the gay quarters, or in sentimental and effusive human relationships of love or friendship" (ibid.:1: 17). Since those values always poses a certain threat to the central value system, Bellah argues that they are restricted to rather well defined areas.

Next, we will discuss Bellah's characterization of "Japanese religion":

> Especially by Tokugawa times so much borrowing had occurred between the various major religions that one can abstract out certain elements which are nearly universal and label these "Japanese religion" (ibid.: 59).

Bellah explains the relationship between various religions in Japan:

> In the national and family religions all the great traditions were represented and almost inseparably fused. Confucianism and Shinto had borrowed Buddhist metaphysics and psychology; Buddhism and Shinto had borrowed much of Confucian ethics; and

> Confucianism and Buddhism had been rather thoroughly Japanized (ibid.: 59).

The word, "Japanized," warrants closer examination: what does the term really mean? The term actually implies an important aspect of Japanese religion. However, Bellah does not explain the meaning of the word, which would show that he does not take this aspect seriously. This tendency will be discussed in chapter 5 as the biggest weakness of his argument.

Turning to consider Japanese religion from the viewpoint of the degree of rationalization, the following quotation clearly expresses Bellah's attitude:

> In Japan almost every religion and sect has both aspects (of primitive and salvation religions). While remembering that they are interwoven with magical and traditionalistic elements, it is the rationalizing tendencies with which we will be most concerned (ibid.: 8).

What Bellah emphasizes above is that he pays attention only to the aspects of Japanese religion which have a tendency of rationalization. In other words, he ignores aspects which have a tendency of primitive religion, because this aspect, he argues, does not foster modernization. The problem of this partial focus of Bellah on Japanese religion will be also pointed out as another weakness of his argument in chapter 5.

Bellah begins his argument by explaining the old religious system which had already existed before the beginning of the Tokugawa period. According to him, there had been already two basic conceptions of the divine in Japanese religion:

> The first of these is that of a superordinate

> entity who dispenses nurturance, care, and love.... This category shades off imperceptibly into political superiors and parents, both of whom are treated as in part, at least, sacred.
>
> The second basic conception...might be described as the ground of being or the inner essence of reality (Bellah 1985: 61).

These two basic conceptions "are both to be found in almost every sect and they were not felt to be in any way mutually exclusive (ibid.: 61).

The main types of religious actions can be referenced to these two basic categories of the divine. The action related to the first conception of the divine is as follows:

> Action with respect to deity as a benevolent superordinate gets us at once into the theory of *on* (blessing). Deity in some form dispenses blessings (*on*) and it is the obligation of the recipient to make return for these blessing (*hoon*). Religious action, then, is the various forms this *hoon* may take (ibid.: 70).

Indeed, as Bellah discusses, there is enough "evidence from various periods and various religious sects and movements as to the great importance of *on* and *hoon* in Japanese religious thinking" (ibid.: 72-73). A critical point related to *on* and *hoon* is that "the theory of *on* holds for superordinates within the social system, such as parents or political superiors, in exactly the same terms as it holds for entities above the social system, gods or Buddha, etc" (ibid.: 73). The implication from this will be also discussed in chapter 5.

The action related to the second category of the divine is "that which seeks to attain unity with the divine conceived as the "Great Ultimate,"..., or whatever the term may be." There are two ways to attain this unity. One way is "through

private religious exercises or experiences, through withdrawal from the world" (ibid.: 74). Since this way had only limited influence among the upper classes in Japan, Bellah focuses on another way of attaining the unity which is more common to ordinary people.

Another way is "through accumulation of ethical acts or "works of love," through participation in the world rather than withdrawal from it." Theoretically speaking, Bellah argues that "this approach seems to be an attempt to attain unity through the destruction of self as an ethical entity, by destroying division between self and other,...,in a word by destroying self*ishness* (ibid. 74). According to him, this way of attaining the unity with divine had a fairly broad and general influence on people among all classes. The idea of moral self-cultivation, being seen as a religious action of this second subtype, was frequently seen both in Confucianism and Shinto sects. An important implication is that both of these main types of religious activities call for rigorous activities in this world.

Now, let us move to see what kind of worldly activities were actually drawn from these theories of religious actions and became quite common in the Tokugawa Period. According to Bellah, religious actions primarily took the form of ethical actions of fulfilling one's obligation in the world whether they are *hoon*, which is the first type of religious actions, or moral self-cultivation, which is the second type. Importantly, what is the most stressed by both religious

actions is obligation to political superiors and obligation to family in this world: it was understood as the temporal fulfillment of more ultimate obligations to an entity above the social system like God.

A good example of activities in this world, obligation to political superiors and obligation to family, is filial piety (*ko*). Religious and ethical actions are obviously fused in this case also: in order to unify with the universe, which is a religious motivation, filial piety, an ethical action in this world, is understood as the best means. Importantly, this "theory" of filial piety has its origin in a family religion, ancestor worship. It continued to be virtually universal in Tokugawa Japan also. People were told, forget "not the shielding love shown for ages by your ancestors. My parents for generations are my family Gods, they are the Gods of my house" (Bellah 1985: 80).[1] Then, ancestor worship contains the following idea: father "and mother are our family Gods, they are our Gods, child of man take greatest care and worship them" (ibid.: 82).[2] As these quotations show, if one's ancestors and parents are Gods, it is indeed natural for them that filial piety (*ko*) should become the best means of attaining union with the universe.

It is important to realize that the theory of filial piety is also based on the idea of *on* and *hoon*. Therefore, everybody has an obligation to their ancestors and parents. As for the relationship between filial piety and loyalty, they do not compete with each other: rather, the former reinforces

the later in Japan. In the last analysis, filial piety actually means loyalty, because "when a father opposes the sovereign, dutiful children desert their parents and follow the sovereign" and this "is filial piety at its highest" (Bellah 1985: 82).[3]

Bellah summarizes the relationship between Japanese religion and the Japanese value system:

> We have seen how the two types of religious action...have come to reinforce the central values of achievement and particularism. They establish the particularistic relation to superiors as sacred and insist on a high level of performance of obligations to them as necessary for religious justification or salvation (ibid.: 82).

He points out that religion reinforced a strong motivational commitment to the institutional values of Japanese society. Put in the most formal terms,

> ...religion reinforced the input of pattern conformity from the motivational system into the institutional system (ibid.: 83).

Finally, it is important to consider how religions cope with problems in societies. Bellah argues that for a society which is in a situation of strain, the old metaphysics or the old source of power will be inadequate in the new situation. As a result, one of the following will happen: 1) new religious institutions will develop, which channel the flow of religious motivation in a new direction, 2) anomie and higher levels of tension will occur if new religious institutions do not develop, or 3) the old religious system will be strengthened. In this case:

Religious efforts to maintain the pattern and

> manage tension may become more intense and systematic, and more motivation may be channeled into some of the nonreligious subsystems, rather than less (ibid.: 60).

In the Tokugawa period each class, *samurai* (warriors), farmers, artisans, and merchants, had developed different kinds of problems. To borrow Bellah's words, "the various segments of society were subjected to somewhat diverse forms of strain" (ibid.: 83). He argues that the third type of religious reaction characterized the Tokugawa situation:

> Broadly stated, each main class had a status ethic, a form of the central value system especially adapted to its situation. The religious and ethical movements...both codified and formalized these status ethics, and introduced new and dynamic elements into them. The main direction of these new movements was not to introduce new values or weaken the old but to propagate stronger and more intense forms of the old values (ibid.: 83-84).

In the next part of this chapter, we will examine how "Japanese religion" actually influenced other social systems during the Tokugawa era.

The Relationship Between Religion and the Political System

Here, our discussion of the relationship between religion and political rationalization will focus on three important features of the Tokugawa period: 1) *bushido* (the way of the warriors), 2) *sonno* (revere the emperor) movement, and 3) *kokutai* (national polity) movement. In order to explain *Bushido*, it is necessary to briefly discuss classes of the Tokugawa Period. There was a legal and hereditary class system dividing people into four classes: warriors (*samurai*),

farmers, artisans, and merchants. The first had the highest prestige, and the last had the lowest. The status ethic of the *samurai* class is *bushido*, which was gradually formed between 1156 and 1600 and fully exercised during the Tokugawa period. *Bushi* or *samurai* embodied the central values of Japan, and the ethic of *bushido* became a large part of the national ethic not only in the Tokugawa period but also in the modern period of Japan.

To examine the actual practice of *bushido* which obviously contains a religious aspect, Bellah uses the following quotation from the *Hagakure*, an epitome of *bushido* in the fief of *Nabeshima*:

> Whenever we may be..., any time or anywhere, our duty is to guard the interest of our Load. This is the duty of every *Nabeshima* man. This is the backbone of our faith, unchanging and eternally true.
>
> Never in my life have I placed mine own thoughts above those of my Lord and master. Nor will I do otherwise in all the days of my life. Even when I die I return to life seven times to guard my Lord's house, we have sworn to do four things: namely: -
>
> (1) We will be second to none in performance of our duty.
> (2) We will make ourselves useful to our Load.
> (3) We will be dutiful to our parent.
> (4) We will attain greatness in charity (ibid.: 91).[4]

Also, a strong feeling of gratitude is pointed out as the background of this entire obligation to the Lord:

> When you realize how for generations your family has served for the house of his lordship; when you remember how those who have gone before you served, and how those who are to come after you are to serve; you will be moved to a deep sense of gratitude. For you, there should be no thought but of service for the one who has claim on your grateful heart (ibid.: 92).[5]

What is apparent in these quotations is that such intense expression of *bushido* is closely related with two main religious orientations. Without being associated with the first religious conception of gratitude and the second religious conception of unity with the divine, such a thorough selfless attitude of loyalty would be hard to explain.

The attitude toward death, a key feature of *bushido*, is a good example of demonstrating this relationship. "Death in the service of one's lord was considered the most appropriate end for a *samurai*" (Bellah 1985: 93): "Every morning make up thy mind how to die. Every evening freshen thy mind in the thought of death" (ibid.: 91).[6] It is clear that this attitude toward death is also deeply related with the second religious conception of the unity with the divine: being determined to die, the self is eliminated, and people can be unified with the divine.

Having discussed religious aspects of *bushido*, Bellah develops his argument that the moral qualities "are delivered from and rationalized by this religious orientation" (ibid.: 93). He analyzes two key features of *bushido*, first, attitudes of economy and diligence, and second, high regard for learning, to explain this relationship. According to him,

> Economy or frugality is the obligation to reduce individual consumption to a minimum and diligence is its obverse, the obligation to increase one's contribution to the lord's service to the maximum (ibid: 95).

Explaining the high regard for learning, *gakumon*, Bellah points out that "learning is not for its own sake" but it "has

as its aim the cultivation of self and the control of others" (ibid: 96). Indeed, obligation to political superiors, originating from religious actions in this world, are obvious in the morality of *samurai*.

Before describing Bellah's conclusion, it is necessary to indicate whom *bushido* actually influenced:

> Though the *samurai* might best embody the ethical code which bears their name, it was by no means restricted to that class.... Actually all the evidence available about popular sects and ethical movements indicates that they taught a virtually identical ethic (ibid.: 98).

Finally, Bellah draws two significant conclusions. First, *bushido* did indeed embody the Japanese central value system, which was characterized by the primacy of political values, the values of performance and particularism, in other words, the primacy of goal-attainment. Second, it was shown that *bushido* was constructed by strengthening the old religious system, and, therefore, that religion contributed to reinforcing the central value system and rationalizing political values:

> they (people) were at one with *Bushido* in being "ethically activist" and "inner worldly ascetic." Such an ethic clearly reinforced the tendency to political rationalization in all classes... (ibid.:98).

We will now turn to describe the notion of *sonno* (revere the emperor) which rose in the Tokugawa period, though its roots could be found deep in history. This idea was indeed widespread in every movement, especially near the end of the period. The *Kokugaku* (literally, national studies) School

represents its most ardent advocates and propagandists. In the seventeenth century, the *Kokugaku* School had its start in a revived interest in Japanese history, literature, and religion with political implication from the beginning. One characteristic was extreme rejection of China. Another characteristic was emphasizing the superiority of Japan over all other countries and justifying her glory by her unbroken line of emperors. Naturally, the native religion, Shinto, was greatly emphasized. Both Buddhism and Confucianism were rejected as the cause of corruption. The writings of Motoori Norinaga strongly linked Shinto to the emperor:

> The eternal endurance of the dynasty of the *Mikado* (the emperor's family) is a complete proof that the "way" called *kami no michi* or Shinto infinitely surpasses the systems of all other countries (ibid.: 101).[7]

Simply speaking, the *Kokugaku* School believed in the ancient myths as contained especially in *Kojiki* (*Record of Ancient Things*). But if *Kokugaku* wished to return to the world of myths, how could it have contributed to religious rationalization? Bellah explains how *Kokugaku* actually did contribute to religious rationalization:

> It (*Kokugaku* movement) had a clear religious goal which could be realized on this earth: the restoration of the emperor to actual sovereignty and purging of Japan of all corrupt influences.... The effect of accepting the *Kokugaku* message, then, would be to make men revere the emperor above all else and hope for or work for his restoration. Such a simple and effective message with its clear implications for action is...religiously rational (ibid.: 102).

With rationalization of religion, Bellah argues that

rationalization of the polity also occurred:

> ...the political implications of the *Kokugaku* doctrine were the establishment of a strong centralized monarchy toward which every Japanese owed absolute allegiance and the destruction of the shogunate or any other power which stood between sovereign and people (Bellah 1985: 102).

As a result, Bellah concludes that an enormous extension and rationalization of power was achieved by *Kokugaku* movement.

The third significant feature during the Tokugawa period was the rise of the idea of *kokutai* (literally national body), a new politico-religious concept of the state. The idea was formulated by the *Mito* School, and was widespread among people of all classes. Under direction of Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1628 - 1700), the *Dainihonshi* (literally, great Japanese history), started to be written. Being different from *Kokugaku*, "it was not agitational production." However, its careful scholarship describing the time when the emperor ruled directly helped to undermine the legitimacy of the shogunate, and promoted a rise in sentiments favoring a return to the days when the emperor was not secluded but really ruled. According to Hammitzsh's explanation,

> ...the high regard for the emperor when linked to this identification of loyalty and filial piety has some very interesting implications for the concept of the state. God, emperor, lord and father tend to be made into equivalents. The whole nation is a single family (ibid.: 103).[8]

What the passage makes clear at once is that the idea of *kokutai* is a concept of the state which apparently contains religious, political, and familistic ideas merged together.

Examining carefully the *kokutai* idea, it is closely

related to the two types of the divine. First, since the emperor is seen as a benevolent superordinate, "the emperor becomes the center of the national religion and the obligation to make return for his benevolence takes precedence over all other obligations" (ibid.: 104). Second, since the emperor and the God (*kami*) are identified, the emperor's will is God's will. Therefore, people can unify with God if they unify their will with the emperor's will. In such a way, religious actions appear to be identical with political actions in the *kokutai* idea.

Finally, Bellah concludes the following about the influence of the idea of *kokutai*:

> The desire to make *kokutai* a living reality tends to put the goal-attainment dimension foremost. It acts to motivate a strong drive toward certain ends, at first the Restoration, then as it becomes a large part of the modern nationalistic ideology of Japan, toward building a strong country and finally toward imperialism (ibid.: 105).

In this way, religious actions in accord with the *kokutai* idea greatly contributed to rationalization of the polity which strongly emphasizes the goal-attainment dimension.

The Relationship between Religion and the Economic System

Having made clear that Bellah argues that religious ideas greatly effected political rationalization, the next step is to discuss how he explains the effects of religion and the political ethic upon economic rationalization in Japan. The first topic is economic policy in the Tokugawa period. Economic policy was based on two bodies of thoughts: Confucian

theory and *bushido*.

First, the "Confucian thinkers see a direct relation between economic well-being and morality," and also, they encourage "the political importance of economic life" (Bellah 1985: 108). Confucian economic policy was designed to ensure political stability by maintaining a balanced system: "Production is in order to attain sufficiency and economy is to see that sufficiency is not upset" (Bellah 1985: 110). Therefore, the policy encourages production and discourage consumption. Kaibara Ekiken wrote that:

> If the ruler wants to govern his people with benevolence, he should practice economy. There are limits to the productive capacity of land and so, if the ruler is given to luxurious and spendthrift habits, the resources at his command will soon be exhausted (ibid.: 109).[9]

In this way, the policy encouraged economy not only to people who were ruled but also for feudal rulers, the *samurai* class itself.

Second, let us describe the effects of *bushido* on economic rationalization. As has already been pointed out, *bushido* strongly emphasized diligence and economy as a means of goal attainment for the lord, which of course contributed to economic rationalization. According to Bellah, though "the *samurai* in the Tokugawa Period were not...directly involved in the economy" (ibid.: 110), the *samurai* economic ethic is significant mainly for two reasons. First of all, the economic ethic of the ruling class greatly effected the economically active merchant class. Second, the members of

the *samurai* class itself took leading roles in business and industry in the *Meiji* Period.

Based on Confucian thinking and *bushido*, the government's economic policy encouraged both production and economy. The government used a system of *gonin-gumi* (five family group) to control people down to the lowest level. Families were organized into companies of five families each in a village. The five family group was responsible to the government for the behavior of individuals. Principles promoted encouragement of production, admonitions to "work hard, not neglect one's business, not waste time, etc." For the encouragement of economy, the "*gonin-gumi* regulations admonished strictly against amusements, luxuries, sports or gambling" (ibid.: 111). In this way, the government policy of diligence in production and economy in expenditures efficiently penetrated to the level of common people.

Considering the Japanese analogue of a "calling," Bellah points out that, in "a fairly orthodox version of the Confucian theory of social development" (ibid.: 113), "an organic or functional theory of society " can be seen: what "is presented is a system in which each part is necessary to the others and indeed its justification is based on the functions it performs for the others" (ibid.: 114). Developing out of the theory above, the notion of *shokubun* (literally, occupation) implied that the occupation was part of society, therefore, one's occupation was the fulfillment of what one owed to society. Also, he points out that there was

another term, *tenshoku*, which literally meant "heavenly occupation," and it would be translated into a "calling." In this pure Confucian thinking, "the implication is that this calling is a fixed and definite duty which demarcates each class and functional group in society" (ibid.: 115).

Then, Bellah argues that these two rather static views of occupation based on a fairly orthodox version of Confucianism were transformed in Japan. Although based on Confucian theory, the Japanese concept of occupation developed in an unique way as it was being fused with the concept of the obligation to make a return for limitless *on* (blessing). In other words, occupations were also seen "as a means of fulfilling one's endless obligations to one's superiors." Here, Bellah emphasizes that the special stress is laid on goal-attainment values rather than system-maintenance values. According to Bellah, the "idea of a social organism and of the necessity of harmony between its parts is maintained, but all the parts are seen as subordinate to a single end" (ibid.: 116) in Japan. In sum, Bellah characterizes the relationship as "the penetration of the economy by political values":

> ...to the extent that the result was the encouragement of production, the encouragement of economy, and the development of a dynamic concept of the calling, this penetration must be seen as having a strongly favorable effect on economic rationalization (ibid.: 117).

Having established the economic policy of the Tokugawa Period, it is important to know the concrete economic ethic of the merchant class who actually did business in that era. The

merchant house rules *kakun* (literally, house's rules), whose practice was copied from the *samurai* class, is relevant here. All *kakun* generally stressed diligence and economy, which were understood as being related to *on* (blessings) and *hoon* (repayment of blessings). Obedience to all laws and notices from the government as a return for the blessing from one's country was obviously emphasized, and doing so was seen as *tenshoku* (calling). This shows that the economic policy strongly influenced the ethic of the merchant class strongly. Bellah concludes that this aspect of the merchants' ethic expresses the great importance of political values influenced by religion for economic rationalization.

Another important aspect of the merchants' ethic was based on ancient worship, which was described earlier in this chapter. In religious thought, the house itself was seen as a sacred entity, and demanded the gratitude and service of all members. Labor in the family business was almost a sacred obligation which was a requital for the favor of the ancestors. Since the family was "semisacred," one "must not injure the reputation of the house or let the business decline as this would bring shame on the ancestors" (Bellah 1985: 125). As a result, "lazy, extravagant or dishonest behavior was condemned largely because it was an abrogation of family obligation," and also, high universalistic standards of honesty, quality and credit were reinforced for the reputation of the "sacred" family. Though this family system might have worked for just system-maintenance values depending on the

total social situation, Bellah believes that this system powerfully worked for goal-attainment values, and acted as powerful motivating factor in the direction of economic rationalization in the Tokugawa Period. This aspect of the merchant ethic shows the importance of the religious family system influenced by ancient worship for economic rationalization.

In the end, it should be mentioned that a different kind of religious influence on economic rationalization existed: here, the intermediate importance of the polity and political values was lacking. The *Jodo Shinshu* is the most important example. "The *Jodo Shinshu* was widely disseminated among the common people of Japan, both farmers and towndwellers" (ibid.: 117). Though it also stressed *on* and *hoon*, the obligations were directly to *Amida* (the Buddha Amitabha) rather than to one's feudal load, a superior in this world. In this sense, Bellah argues that the *Jodo Shinshu* was "the closest Japanese analogue to Western Protestantism and its ethic was most similar to the Protestant ethic" (ibid.: 122). However, *Jodo Shinshu* only partly effects merchant ethics, because "*Shin* was only one of many influences on the moral life of the merchant classes", and also because "even among devout *Shin* believers, other elements played an important part in their ethical thinking" (ibid.: 122).

The following sums up Bellah's assessment of the points discussed in this part of the chapter:

...I (Bellah) have tried to show the influence of

> religion on the economy both directly and through the religiously influenced ideas of the polity and the family. I have tried to define an economic ethic characterized by strong inner-worldly asceticism and an analogue to the concept of the calling through which labor becomes a "sacred obligation" which is rooted in these religious, political and familistic ideas" (ibid. 131).

Conclusion of Bellah

Before we move to the next chapter, it is important to summarize Bellah's conclusions in *Tokugawa Religion*. His first conclusion is that "a strong polity and dominant political values in Japan were distinctly favorable to the rise of industrial society" (Bellah: 1985). He explains that since Japan faced industrialism as an existent fact and only the government had been able to marshal the requisite capital, the strength of the polity and political values were crucial.

As the second conclusion, he argues that:

> religion played an important role in the process of political and economic rationalization in Japan through maintaining and intensifying commitment to the central values, supplying motivation and legitimation for certain necessary political innovations and reinforcing an ethic of inner-worldly asceticism which stressed diligence and economy. That it may also have played an important part in the formation for the central values which were favorable to industrialization is at least a strong possibility (ibid.: 194).

Focusing on relationship between religion and polity specifically, he emphasizes that "religion played a major role in political rationalization by emphasizing certain overriding religio-political commitments." According to him, this religio-political commitment was crucial for a major

historical change, namely, the Restoration of 1868. It functioned in "supplying motivation and legitimation for the Restoration of the emperor," even though "this Restoration involved breaking with many loyalties and customs of the past" (ibid.: 195).

Importantly, he points out that this "trend was clothed in nativistic and fundamentalist garb as is so often the case when religious movements are seeking to legitimize social change":

> Just as the Protestant Reformation proclaimed, "Back to the Bible"..., so the Shinto Revival movement proclaimed "Back to the *Kojiki*" (ibid.: 195).

He farther remarks on the case of the West:

> That powerful religious motivation is often an important factor in major political change is also indicated by the close association of Protestantism and democracy in the West.... (ibid.: 195).

Therefore, Bellah does not claim any special differences in the role of religion in historical changes in Japan and in the West.

Finally, Bellah concludes that the ethic of inner-worldly asceticism and the idea of a calling existed in Japan and that such an ethic was profoundly favorable to economic rationalization in Japan just as Weber made clear in his study of Protestantism in the West.

Chapter V

APPRECIATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF *TOKUGAWA RELIGION*

Within the Historical Context: Modernization Theory

In chapter 2, it was explained that *Tokugawa Religion* was written in the heyday of modernization theory. In this section, how modernization theory is reflected in the book will be examined from several directions.

First, consider the following quotation from Bellah's "Introduction to the Paperback Edition" in 1985:

> I (Bellah) had assumed that the economy is the critical sphere in modernization and that anything that contributed to freeing the economy from traditionalistic restraints and allowing it to develop in accordance with its own laws was positive for modernization. I assumed that economic development was not only an intrinsic good but that the other benefits of modernization flowed more or less certainly from it (Bellah 1985: xiv).

Such comments clearly show that *Tokugawa Religion* was written within the framework of modernization theory, and also that Bellah did not question modernization theory itself.

It is useful to analyze his work with regard to two key characteristics of modernization theory: first, an optimistic belief in progress, and second, an Euro-American centric bias. Starting from the optimistic belief in progress, he apparently focuses mostly on the economic sphere, and assumes that economic development is all good. In other words, his argument only focuses on positive aspects of Japan's economic success and ignores the price of it.

On the other hand, he pays little attention to development of spheres other than the economy. As Maruyama Masao argues, "economic development did not necessarily correlate with political democratization or ethical universalism" (ibid.: xiv), which Maruyama thinks important for modernizing Japan.[1] It is true that Bellah analyzes religious rationalization in Japan, however, it would be more precise to say that Bellah tries to find religious characteristics in Japan which contribute to economic rationalization rather than analyzing religious rationalization for its own sake. Therefore, he overlooks some crucial characteristics of religion and modernization in Japan. We will discuss what he misses and also Maruyama's argument thoroughly in the latter part of this chapter. Turning the discussion back to Bellah's inattention to other spheres, he assumes that development of other spheres will come sooner or later with no need for special investigation.

Given these simplistic and optimistic assumptions, it is fair to conclude that he entirely shares the first tendency of modernization theory, an optimistic belief in progress. Importantly, Bellah himself wrote in 1985 that the greatest flaws of the book originated in a weakness of the modernization theory framework:

> I (Bellah) failed to see that the endless accumulation of wealth and power does not lead to the good society but undermines the conditions necessary for any viable society at all. I suffered myself from the displacement of ends by means, or the attempt to make means into ends, which is the very source of the pathology of

modernization (Bellah 1985: xviii).

The quotation suggests that he now criticizes his own optimistic understanding of modernity at that time.

Now, we will move to examine the book from the perspective of the second key tendency of modernization theory, namely, Euro-American centric bias. First of all, his methodology can be characterized as trying to find the same characteristics and functions of the Protestant Ethic in Japan so as to argue that they produced economic development in Japan in the same way that they worked in the West. This deductive way of investigation may tend to focus on only those characteristics researchers expect to find when they start. Thus, researchers may have a tendency to overlook characteristics which they did not expect to find. In Bellah's case, he could successfully show that inner-worldly asceticism and the idea of a calling existed in the ethics of Tokugawa, Japan. However, since he could find the same characteristics as the Protestant Ethic in Japan, he seems to assume that what happened in the West also happened in Japan. Consequently, he neglects to examine characteristics of Japanese economic development, which the West did not experience.

The root of Bellah's limitation, it could be argued, is his picture of the linear evolution of mankind, which, of course, implicitly places the West as advanced, other counties less advanced, and expects others to follow the West. In this sense, Bellah's work shares the second key characteristic of

modernization theory, Euro-American centric bias. In addition, I would argue that this bias prevents him from investigating more adequately the nature of Japanese economic development which is different from the West. What Bellah overlooks will be identified when we examine criticisms of Bellah by Maruyama in the later part of this chapter.

The main theories which challenge modernization theory are dependency theory and world system theory. Dependency theory points out the exploitative nature of international relation of dominance and subjugation. Liberal world system theory primarily concerns the global limits of post-war trends of world economic growth, and Marxist world system theory highlights inevitable social conflict.[2] *Tokugawa Religion* neither investigates nor offers solutions to the key questions of these theories. In the sense also, the book is squarely located within the boundary of modernization theory.

In sum, Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* clearly lies within the framework of modernization theory as revealed in Bellah's own statement, from comparison with two key characteristics of modernization theory, and from comparison with alternative theories which challenge it. *Tokugawa Religion* reflects the limitations of the time in American sociology.

Within the Historical Context: Talcott Parsons

Parsons' supreme position in American sociology from the 1940s until the 1960s and some key characteristics of his thought were explained in chapter 2. This chapter will

examine the main criticisms of Parsons, which gradually emerged from the late 1950s. Since the book drew heavily from Parsons' framework, it is highly likely that criticisms of Parsons' scheme suggest weaknesses of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* also. Then, *Tokugawa Religion* will be examined with reference to key characteristics of Parsons, namely, his optimism and methodology. Finally, how Bellah's application of Parsons' AGIL scheme influences his book will be discussed.

In the late 1950s, American sociology's unquestioned support for Parsons began to erode:

> ...from the late 1950s onwards a number of critiques of structural-functionalism in general, and of Parsonian systems theory in particular, began to appear and to gain support (Hamilton 1983: 48).

Though critiques actually came from a number of different positions, fundamental criticisms made by radical sociologists and conflict theorists, most importantly, by C. Wright Mills, Alvin W. Gouldner, and Ralf Dahrendorf, provide crucial standpoints to understand weaknesses in Parson's theory, and, therefore, to critically examine Bellah's book.[3] Two problems are prominent in Parsons' work: first, an overly abstract analysis, and second, neglecting power and conflict.

From the perspective of the conflict model, the problem of structural functional theory in general is identified in an article, "Out of Utopia," by Ralf Dahrendorf:

> Structural-functional theory...introduces many kinds of assumptions, concepts, and models for the sole purpose of describing a social system that has never existed and is not likely ever to come into being (Dahrendorf 1968: 118).

Targeting Parsons' work in particular, he criticizes Parsons method as the "double emphasis on the articulation of purely formal conceptual frameworks and on the social system as the beginning and end of sociological analysis" (ibid.: 120-121). Parsons' system theory "displays but a minimal concern with riddles of experience" (ibid.: 121).

Second, Alvin W. Gouldner points out Parsons' problem of neglecting issues of power and conflict in *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. According to him, Parsons "never clarifies his assumptions concerning the power balance conductive to a stable social system" (Gouldner 1970: 242). Parsons overlooks the facts that "extensive power differences among the system's members" surely exist in reality, and where "notable disparities in power exist, the stronger is enabled to coerce the weaker" (ibid.:242). Gouldner points out that "this potentiality for system-disruption is inherent in the nature of such a power *difference*" (ibid.: 243). This clearly suggests the existence of conflicts within a society and possibilities of change.

From the point of view of the conflict model, Dahrendorf also questions Parsons' equilibrium model of societies. According to the conflict model, not "the presence but the absence of conflict is surprising and abnormal." Therefore, he argues that "if we find a society or social organization that displays no evidence of conflict," "we have good reason to be suspicious." Importantly, he also points out that conflict is not necessarily violent and uncontrolled, and,

instead, that it "can be...suppressed, regulated, channeled, and controlled." In sum,

> ...societies and social organizations are held together not by consensus but by constraint, not by universal agreement but by the coercion of some by others. It may be useful for some purposes to speak of the "value system" of a society, but in the conflict model such characteristic values are ruling rather than common, enforced rather than accepted....(Dahrendorf 1968: 127).

Before we start evaluating Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*, it is useful to consider the concept of multiple reality. The following quotation from Dahrendorf suggests such a concept, and, consequently, the attitude that sociologists should cultivate to investigate reality:

> As far as I (Dahrendorf) can see, we need both models (structural-functional model and conflict model) for the explanation of sociological problems. Indeed, it may well be that society, in a philosophical sense, has two faces of equal reality: one of stability, harmony, and consensus, and one of change, conflict, and constraint (ibid.: 128)

Having identified the concept of multiple reality, let us turn to analyze *Tokugawa Religion* with regard to Parsons'three characteristic weaknesses: 1) optimism about modernity, 2) methodology of an overly abstract analysis, and 3) treatment of power and conflict. Discussing Parsons' optimistic view of the nature of modernity first, it is clear by now that the optimistic tendency is not a special characteristic of Parsons' but is a general one of modernization theorists. Since it has already been shown that Bellah also shares this optimistic tendency, we will avoid repetitive explanations about this matter, and move to the methodology of the book.

It is useful to analyze the method of the book by paying special attention to the first weakness of Parsons' general theory. As described, the weakness is overabstraction and a deductive method of analysis that neglects empirical investigation. We might ask if Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* is also an overly abstract analysis because he uses Parsons' AGIL scheme. In actual fact, it would be fair to judge that this book is constructed using abundant and carefully analyzed empirical data. In this sense, Bellah's method is similar to that of Weber as outlined in chapter 3.

In order to understand why Bellah does not share Parsons' overabstraction and lack of empirical data, it is crucial to remember that the book was written as a doctoral dissertation for a joint degree in the Departments of Sociology and Far Eastern Languages. More concretely:

> This training is reflected in the study in the combination of a theoretical approach derived from sociology with the methods of historical research developed by the humanistic discipline whose special concern is with Far Eastern civilization (Bellah 1985: ix).

The quotation suggests that, fortunately, the discipline of the Far Eastern Languages required him to do careful empirical researches. This probably prevented him from just performing the kind of abstract analysis popular at that time in the field of sociology.

Bellah also seems to have avoided the kind of selection bias that one might expect of a deductive study performed in the manner of Parsons. When we examine *Tokugawa Religion* from

this standpoint, it is crucial to realize that Bellah had already started collecting and studying data a few years ahead of the time he became aware of and decided to use Parsons' "new" AGIL scheme.[4] In other words, Bellah's data was already collected, and then, he chose a framework to analyze the data. Therefore, it would be reasonable to judge that since he was not conscious of Parsons' scheme during data collection, Bellah conducted his researches without having a bias of trying to find particular characteristics which follow Parsons' scheme.

In conclusion, his method started with careful investigation of empirical data, and then, conceptualized the findings using Parsons' AGIL scheme in the end. Bellah's methodology could be judged as a good combination of the methods of Weber and Parsons. However, the possible problem is, as was suggested before, that Bellah is not free from the problem of deductive analysis in that he started from and had been conscious of Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* throughout his research. The implication of this fact will be analyzed in the latter part of this chapter.

Finally, let us analyze how the application of Parsons' AGIL framework positively and/or negatively influences *Tokugawa Religion*. Bellah himself addresses the issue in a later essay, "Research Chronicle: *Tokugawa Religion*:"

> It is my (Bellah's) impression, in which most of my Japanese readers concur, that the main contribution of *Tokugawa Religion* was in ways of conceptualizing and not in uncovering facts. Though some things, particularly about Shingaku, were not generally

> known in the West, there is almost nothing in the way of factual information which is not only known but also, I would say, embarrassingly obvious to Japanese scholars in the field. Yet the book has received considerable notice in Japan, and in 1962 it appeared in Japanese translation (Hammond 1964: 158).[5]

Since the book was originally written in English, we are able to assess the contribution of the book to both Japanese scholars and to English readers. As Bellah states above, Japanese scholars appreciated that the book could conceptualize, highlight, and explain essential characteristics of Japanese culture. Indeed, Japanese scholars already knew the factual information but were impressed nonetheless since they had never analyzed the facts in the way Bellah did. In sum, the application of Parsons' scheme was crucially significant for the high evaluation of the book in Japan. For Western scholars, the appearance of the factual information in English was a basic contribution. According to Bellah, the writing about Shingaku in particular is still the most comprehensive in English even today.[6]

Parsons' scheme did influence the success of the book, especially, in Japan. In order to understand the reason the scheme works positively in the book, it is necessary to discuss the scheme as a tool for analyzing societies. First, this scheme could well explain a society which has little diversity in race, ethnicity, language, and culture, thus, avoiding the need for complexities of explanation. Edwin O. Reischauer describes Japanese society as an extremely homogeneous society. The Japanese are of the same race and

ethnicity, having only a limited number of exceptions in the population, and share the same language, history, and culture during their long history in the world.[7] Therefore, Parsons' general theory in Bellah's work efficiently explains such a homogeneous society as Japan.

Parsons' scheme is most applicable to conditions of stability, harmony, and consensus in a society. Bellah characterizes Japan in the Tokugawa Period as approaching such a state of affairs:

> It is distinguished perhaps most strikingly from the periods which proceeded and followed it by its peaceful character and its relative isolation from the outside world (Bellah 1985: 11).

Bellah also argues that a consensus on government policy based on the Japanese value system penetrated to all classes of people, and that society was relatively harmoniously governed by the feudal lords. Indeed, understanding the period in this way, it is understandable that the scheme could explain such a society well. In sum, Bellah's application of Parson's scheme is appropriate and meaningful because the society was relatively static, harmonious and had a common consensus among the whole population at least on the surface. Since questioning whether Bellah's understanding of the Tokugawa society in this way itself is appropriate or not is a different level of argument, we will consider it in more detail later.

Having discussed the positive influence of Parsons' scheme on the book, let us examine whether this book shares

Parsons' weaknesses in overlooking power and conflict. The first topic to be consider is how Bellah analyzes power in Japan. As was explained before, he keenly identifies how the Japanese central value system contributed to rationalization of the polity, in other words, collecting its power. Then, he explains:

> With respect to the problems of modernization and industrialization it is clear that such intensive controlling powers of the political system and the disciplined response of the people to them were a major advantage (ibid.: 55-56)

Here, he analyzes the problem of power only from the perspective of function toward the end of modernization. From this perspective, it is true that strong powers could be identified as advantageous.

However, if we examine the same multiple reality not from the perspective of function but from the perspective of power relations, we may question who formulated, enforced, and ruled the Japanese value system and for whose interests. Bellah does not raise these kinds of questions at all and pays little attention to explaining the nature of power. Rather, he only focuses on the function of power for modernization by taking the Japanese value system as given. Bellah thus shares Parsons' weakness in neglecting power. The later part of this chapter will consider how Bellah's argument could be differently interpreted if we are fully concerned about power.

Second, how does Bellah identify conflicts in the book, first, on the level of the personality system, and second, on the level of the social system? Examining tension on the

individual level, he keenly identifies existence of considerable anxiety in the personality of the Japanese people:

> ...a society which requires such high commitment to system goals and is so intensely concerned with individual performance with respect to these goals, should generate a high degree of tension in the personality systems of its members (ibid.: 37).

In order to manage "such widespread tensions," he argues that "there must be socially patterned and institutionalized ways of handling them" (ibid.: 37). Thus, the Japanese needed an "area of refuge from the demands of society":

> It is in this context that the development of the gay quarters is to be understood. They offered areas of refuge in which tension could be released through sensual indulgence in wine and women or through vicarious participation in the theater (ibid.: 39).

Having understood Bellah's analysis of a high degree of tension in the personality system, it is necessary to return to Bellah's argument about the relationship between Japanese religion and the central value system. As was previously stated, he argues that rationalization of religion reinforced the Japanese value system, namely, the primacy of goal-attainment which is characterized by particularism and performance. When we compare both of his arguments above, first, the argument about tensions, and then, about the relationship between Japanese religion and the value system, we find a contradiction between the two arguments.

It is necessary to consider, in general, the relationship among values, activities supported by the values, and tensions

in individuals in order to explain the contradiction between Bellah's two arguments. If values are purely reinforced by individuals' own religious beliefs, activities based upon these values would not be ultimately the cause of tensions in the individuals. On the other hand, if values are reinforced not by individuals own beliefs but rather by other individuals, activities based on the values might contradict their own will, and thus, would create tensions in the individuals. If, as Bellah argues, the central value system was reinforced by individuals' true religious beliefs, that is, rationalization of religion, the activities based on the values, for example, being loyal to their particular lord, would not ultimately generate tensions in the individuals. However, Bellah also argues that a high degree of tension was widespread among the Japanese people who acted in accord with the central value system. It is clear that these arguments are inconsistent.

In this way, although Bellah successfully points out the existence of a conflict in the personality system, it is clear that this argument was inconsistent with his other argument. It is therefore necessary to investigate where this contradiction comes from. We question whether the values really originated in the free belief of individuals and suspect maybe they were reinforced by other individuals. Since this topic will be thoroughly discussed in the latter part of this chapter, let us turn from the level of individual conflicts to the level of social conflicts.

To investigate how Bellah sees social conflicts in the Tokugawa Period, we will begin by considering his interpretation of the Restoration with which the new Meiji government brought many kinds of changes. As was previously stated, he does not ignore strains in the various segments of society, *samurai*, farmers, artisans, and merchants especially at the end of the Tokugawa Period. However, according to him, strains were "in part due to the growing differentiation and complexity of the society itself" (Bellah 1985: 60). But when he identifies the crucial actors of the Restoration, he does not argue that farmers, merchants, nor artisans played an active role in the change at all, because he understands that "they were oriented to receiving directions from the rulers, to whom they relegated policy-determining functions (ibid.: 185). Who does he identify as leading the nation in breaking new ground? According to him, "it was the lower *samurai* more than any other group which was responsible for the Restoration" (ibid.: 45). The following quotation well expresses the kinds of problems they had under the old regime:

> They had a legitimized status as rulers vis-a-vis the common people but they had very little else which committed them in any rigid sense to the old system. They had no land and not even adequate stipends. On the other hand, their actual power and responsibility in the administration of government was considerable, so much so that their rewards were quite incommensurate with their performances (ibid.: 45).

Importantly, he further points out:

> ...both the Restoration and the subsequent modernization of Japan must be seen first in political terms and only secondarily in economic

terms (ibid.: 185).

Bellah argues that neither farmers, artisans, merchants, nor the lower *samurai* class attacked the central value system. On the contrary, the main actor of the Restoration, the lower *samurai* class, intensified their values in the pursuit of changes. The following quotation is useful:

> Their attack on the shogunate was phrased in terms that it was not living up to the value system, and their devotion to the emperor represented an intensification rather than a weakening of their attachment to the central values (ibid.: 25).

In this way, Bellah explains that the conflicts that lead to the Restoration are not found in classes in the Marxist sense but within the *samurai* class, between the upper and the lower *samurai*, mainly over shifting power from one group to another.

The framework which Bellah uses for the book is, from the beginning, constructed to focus on solidarity, harmony, and consensus. It is not surprising that Bellah does not take conflicts in the social structure and changes from the bottom to be primary factors of the Restoration. How shall we evaluate his interpretation?

It is necessary to remember the argument about multiple reality by Dahrendorf: there are two different aspects of the same reality. Supporting his idea, there could be also two different interpretations of the *Tokugawa* Period. If we agree that harmony is more important than conflicts in Japanese society at that time, Bellah's choice of the framework should be identified as a strength in his work. On the other hand, if we insist that conflicts in the social structure are more

crucial, his choice should be identified as a weakness. Today, the interpretation of the Restoration, whether it was like Bellah suggests, or, rather close to revolution in the Marxist sense, still remains controversial. The latter interpretation holds sway among Japanese scholars.[8] Therefore, identifying his choice of framework as a strength or weakness in *Tokugawa Religion* is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Within the Historical Context: Japanese Studies in the U.S. and Japanese Academics in Japan

This part of the chapter discusses reactions of Japanese scholars to *Tokugawa Religion*. First, we will clarify and compare some significant characteristics of Japanese academics in general, Japanese studies of religion in particular, and Japanese studies in the U. S.. Then, the impact of the book on Japanese scholars will be discussed.

Mataji Miyamoto points out two interesting tendencies of Japanese scholars in comparison to American scholars in the 1960s in his book, *America no Nihon-Kenkyu* (Japanese Studies in America).[9] Japanese scholars tended to view Japanese modern history negatively and to emphasize contradictions and distortions. On the other hand, he argues that the Americans were likely to treat the same history of Japan positively, focusing on the significant roles Japanese leaders played in her modernization. This approach was obviously related to the American vision of modernizing underdeveloped countries.

Second, from the viewpoint of methods, he argues that Japanese scholars tended to treat factual information carefully and in detail but failed to define the scheme of analysis, concepts, and hypotheses as clearly as their American counterparts usually do. Therefore, he points out that Americans' work often times stimulate Japanese academics because of the different approach and methods of analysis.

To explain studies of religion in the 1960s in Japan specifically, *Gendai Kokka ni okeru Shukyo to Seiji* (Religion and Politics in Modern States) by Hisashi Aizawa is useful.[10] Aizawa argues that, first of all, Japanese academics tended to show little interests in religion as a subject of serious scientific investigation. The strong influence of Marxism, which identified religion negatively and as less important for societies led Japanese scholars to have little interest in religion. As for Western religion in particular, he argues that the ideology of "Japanese spirit and Western technology" fostered a lack of interest in the Western spirit including Western religion.

As a second point, Aizawa discusses the influence of specialization on Japanese academics. Each field limited the scope of studies to within its own area. There were only a limited number of works which purposely dealt with more than one field and centrally analyzed relationships among fields. Therefore, studies of religion by Japanese scholars had usually discussed religion as a sole subject, and had rarely examined relationships between religion and other areas such

as politics, economy, philosophy, laws, sciences, and so on.

Understanding this particular context of Japanese academics, let us now turn to discuss the significance of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*. Commenting an impact of the book on Japanese academics, Masao Maruyama notes:

> There are not many books lying around which can shake us out of our inertia. Of the many American research works on Japan...Bellah's book, more than any in a long time, has aroused my appetite and my fighting spirit (Maruyama 1958: 116).

Though he does not agree with all of Bellah's arguments, the quotation above clearly shows how strong the impact of the book was on Japanese intellectuals. Why did the book have such a strong impact? First, as described in chapter 2, American scholars have a tendency to treat Japan as a nation in the broad context of East Asia. Therefore, they often study Japanese society as a whole, and make a comparison to other East Asian countries. Considering Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*, the book also shares this general tendency: he studies Japanese society as a whole and often compares Japan to China. Second, he analyzes religion within the context of Japanese society as a whole in relationship to religion and other social institutions such as polity or economy.

As was previously stated, the factual information in the book was neither new nor sensational to Japanese academics. Given the specialization of Japanese orthodox academics in addition, we should conclude that strong impact of Bellah's book stemmed from the new way that he identified the subject, religion, within the context of Japanese society as a whole

and in relationship to other social institutions. He integrated this material through an adaptation of Parsons' theoretical scheme, which itself was also new and drew special attentions in Japan at that time. Thus, Bellah's adaptation of Parsons' conceptual framework contributed greatly to the success of the book. Also, understanding the dominance of Marxism among Japanese scholars at that time, it is possible that Bellah's book was seen as unique and challenging for them because it did not follow their approach.

What kind of influence did the book exert on works of Japanese scholars? My own research mainly examined two kinds of evidence.[11] First, there were reviews and critiques which directly responded to Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* itself. "*Bellah "Tokugawa Jidai no Shukyo"*" (*Bellah's Tokugawa Religion*) by Masao Maruyama, and, "*Robert N. Bellah no Shingakukan: R. N. Bellah "Tokugawa Religion" ni tsuite*" (Robert N. Bellah's view of *Shingaku*: About R. N. Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*) by Yasukazu Takenaka are good examples of this group[12]. Second, authors were stimulated by Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* to write their own works. Those works often adopted some characteristics of the book, for example, the functionalist approach, choosing subjects beyond a sole area and analyzing relationships within the context of society as a whole, and so on. *Nihon no Shukyo no Shakaiteki Yakuwari* (Social Roles of Japanese Religion) by Ichiro Hori is a good example of this group.[13] According to Hori, Bellah's book influenced him to take set upon a new path of religious study

with regard to problems, method of analysis, and social roles. As another example, Akira Ikeda wrote *Nihon no Seishinkozo Josetsu: Shukyo to Seiji ni okeru Kodo to Kachi* (An Introduction to Japanese Spiritual Structure: Actions and Values in Religion and Politics) in 1967.[14] He also states that Bellah's analysis of the Japanese value system stimulated him to study the topic. His book reexamines the Japanese value system: under the influence of Maruyama's criticism, it goes beyond Bellah's argument, and draws directly upon Weber.

Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* also seems to have become part of the basic literature on the subject of *Jodo-Shin Shu*, which Bellah identifies as "the closest Japanese analogue to Western Protestantism" (Bellah 1985: 122).[15]

After examining the influence of the book, we conclude that *Tokugawa Religion*'s contribution to Japanese academics should not be underestimated. The book is usually mentioned in books which summarize the main works in the field of Japanese Studies.[16] Also, the book is often quoted by scholars in various fields and still has importance more than thirty years after it was first published.[17]

Criticisms by Masao Maruyama

The most important criticism of Bellah's book is "Review of *Tokugawa Religion*," by Masao Maruyama. Maruyama's article raises two significant questions. First, Maruyama raises an essential criticism against Bellah's only paying attention to the rationalizing tendency in Japanese religion and ignoring

the magical tendency in it. According to Maruyama, Japanese religion still keeps its magical nature. Therefore, he argues it is an important task to thoroughly examine what the magical characteristic means instead of just saying as Bellah does that "it is the rationalizing tendencies with which we will be most concerned" (Bellah 1985: 8).

If Bellah analyzes only the rationalizing tendency and neglects the magical tendencies, what kind of problems does this partial investigation create in his work? Bellah uses the word, rationalization of religion. However, what does rationalization of religion really mean if Japanese religion still has both magical and rationalizing characteristics, in other words, if the rationalizing tendency has not been as central to Japanese religion as it was to Protestantism?

Maruyama's second key argument is that Japanese people's attitudes are compartmentalized: they depend on the place and the situation. As a strength of Bellah's work, he points out Bellah's astute recognition of the aesthetic-emotional values, which were distinctly compartmentalized and restricted to a certain institutional area as exceptions to the central values of Japan.

However, Maruyama argues that Bellah fails to examine what this compartmentalization really means. According to Maruyama, this compartmentalizing characteristic raises a possibility that people could engage in two totally different activities based on opposite values depending on the situation. If we compare this characteristic to the attitudes

of Protestants, the difference between Japanese religion and Protestantism is obvious. Since the fulfillment of worldly duties is the only way to live that is acceptable to God, it is unacceptable to neglect worldly duties under any circumstances. In other words, it is impermissible for people to change their attitudes depending on the place, the situation, and so on. Therefore, Maruyama argues that the coexistence of conflicting values in the same individual and the possibility of changing his/her behavior depending on the situation should be emphasized as a peculiar characteristic of Japanese tradition, and should be investigated to understand the very nature of Japanese religion.

In 1985, Bellah wrote that "Maruyama's criticism was merely carping" about things which "were neither adequately dealt with in *Tokugawa Religion* nor in the modernization theory of the 1950s from which it drew" (Bellah 1985: xiv). As Bellah points out, he had "assumed that the economy is the crucial sphere in modernization," and had stated that the purpose of the book was to particularly analyze characteristics of Japanese religion which contributed to her modernization. He did not pay attention to the other magical aspects of Japanese religion, which may have had distorting consequences. The book should therefore not be criticized for that reason. From the beginning, indeed, he clearly limits his focus of analysis to the contributions of religion according to modernization theory.

However, Bellah also wrote in 1985 that "the greatest

weakness of the book has nothing to do with Japan but with a weakness in the modernization theory I (Bellah) was using" (ibid.: xviii). The limitations of modernization theory were previously discussed in this thesis. Therefore, even if Maruyama's criticism, as Bellah argues, is irrelevant in the sense that he does not recognize the assumptions and realms of analysis that Bellah clearly states, once we attempt to investigate the relationship between Japanese religion and the modernization of Japan beyond the framework of modernization theory, Maruyama's criticism becomes crucial. Maruyama's criticism is indeed useful because the center of his argument is a suggestion to investigate the nature of Japanese religion in itself without limiting the focus to its contributions to economic success. Therefore, we will examine the nature of Japanese religion and its relation to the modernization of Japan going beyond the framework of modernization theory through examining two questions that Maruyama raises; first, the problem of rationalization of religion, and second, the problem of compartmentalization.

Reexamination of Bellah's "Rationalization of Religion" in Japan: Bellah's Later Work of Evolutionary Theory

In the late 1950s criticisms of Parsons' general theory gradually emerged. Probably recognizing these criticisms, in the 1960s Bellah's works focused on evolutionary theory rather than Parsons' structural-functionalist scheme paralleling Parsons' shift toward an evolutionary model. One of Bellah's

works during this period, "The Religious Situation in the Far East," originally published in 1962, goes beyond the framework of Parsons' general scheme, and is most helpful in investigating the two questions that Maruyama raises.

Interestingly, this article identifies Japanese religion, both in Tokugawa and modern Japan, as having progressed less than Protestantism in the West, based on the idea that religions progress into more rationalized forms in Weber's sense. Focusing on the idea of the cosmological myth, by which he means "that set of symbolizations in which nature, society, and self are seen as fused in a more or less compact unity" (Bellah 1968: 101), he argues that breaking the cosmological myth could be viewed as one level of religious progress. According to him,

> The cosmological myth was broken first in the West in the Mosaic revelation at Sinai, which proclaimed the radical transcendence of God. In the symbolization of the radical transcendence of God, a sharp differentiation between God and world and between self and society occurs for the first time, giving rise to the possibility of a new kind of universalism and individualism. In the cosmological myth these differentiations tend to be blurred. Society is viewed as an integral part of eternal being and the individual has no place to stand from which to judge it (Bellah 1991: 101).

Considering Japan, he argues that "Japan began their modern experience still living in the power of cosmological symbolization" (ibid.: 102). From the view point of the cosmological myth, Japanese religion and that of the West are clearly in different stages.

Let us now turn to the first problem of rationalization

of religion posed by Maruyama. Having understood the analysis of religious progress from the perspective of cosmological myth, it should be clear by now that rationalization of religion in Japan has not gone as far as in the West. As Maruyama points out, the magical tendency is also still at the center of Japanese religion. Therefore, Bellah's argument in *Tokugawa Religion* that rationalizing tendencies of Japanese religion functioned in the way Protestantism did in the West is inaccurate. Since Japanese religion has rationalized less than Protestantism, it does not function in the way rationalized religion, Protestantism, does.

However, at the same time, Bellah's argument that religious factors played such an important role in the economic success of Japan, in other words, the argument that "rationalization of religion" influenced rationalization of economy through rationalization of polity, is also a keen analysis of economic development in Japan. If so, the final question is how what Bellah calls "rationalization of religion" could be more precisely identified. I argue that what Bellah identified as "rationalization of religion" would be more appropriately recognized as "manipulation of religion" in the case of Japan.

The significant point here is that we should identify the difference between "rationalization of religion," which allows individuals to have personal beliefs and actions independent of the traditional ways of thinking, and "manipulation of religion," which would, on the other hand, work to force

people to believe in certain values which are convenient for the rulers. As was explained in chapter 4, superordinates such as parents, political superiors, etc., within the social system hold religious status as gods in Japan. Japanese religion can therefore prevent people from criticizing or resisting superordinates within the social system. Therefore, I argue that it would be a more adequate understanding that Japanese religion was, and, actually, still is being effectively used by Japanese rulers to realize, first, the Restoration, next, militarism, and finally, industrialization of Japan in order to draw sacrifices from people and hide the real nature of their oppression and exploitation.

In this way, if we have a critical perspective on power relations, questioning who formulated, enforced, and ruled the Japanese value system based on Japanese religion, the same phenomenon that Bellah explains as "rationalization of religion" in *Tokugawa Religion* could be understood as "manipulation of religion." Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out that Bellah's analysis of a high degree of tension in the personality system was inconsistent with his argument that Japanese values were drawn from rationalized religion. Viewing "rationalization of religion" as, in fact, "manipulation of religion" leads us to see these values as shrewdly enforced rather than rationalized. The existence of a high degree of tension is not inconsistent with this understanding, and explains the existence of conflict between individual desire in the personality system and the values

that are compelled by rulers in the social system.

Bellah wrote "Epilogue: Religion and Progress in Modern Asia" in 1968. The essay shows that Bellah himself had already recognized and emphasized the manipulative nature of Japanese religion by that time. He indeed shows his deep understanding in using the idea of neotraditionalism. As a good summary explanation of how Japanese elites cleverly manipulated Japanese religion, it is useful to quote from the essay:

> Neotraditionalism has been often adopted by traditional elite groups in noncolonial Asian societies as an ideology designed to keep change to a minimum and defend the *status quo* as far as possible. Neotraditionalism has, however, in at least one striking case, Japan, been used by the elite of a noncolonial nation to provide the ideological basis for sweeping social innovation.... The ideology of the emperor system, with its heavy doses of Confucianism and Shinto symbolism crystallizing in the 1890s....was simply a statement of the values to which the ruling elite was committed, decked out in the symbolism most readily understood by the Japanese masses. In the name of this ideology, seeping technological change and social reorganization could be carried out, but these changes amounted only to a rationalization of means (Bellah 1968: 212).

Let us now investigate why Japanese religion allows individual persons to compartmentalize their activities and to change their attitudes depending on the place and the situation. The answer to this question also can be found in the progress of religion. Considering Christianity in the modern West, people have values based on their own rational belief in the radical transcendence of God. Therefore, people's behavior would be consistent, because they have to

stand in front of God individually, and judge their behavior apart from anything on the earth. For example, at least ideally, Protestants would work hard based on the idea of a calling and would live within inner-worldly asceticism no matter where they go and no matter what situations they are in, because their behavior is decided by constant individual communication with God.

On the other hand, since Japanese religion does not break with the cosmological myth, self, nation, society, and gods are rather integrated and are not necessarily rational all the time. Since there is no absolute God which rationally and consistently rules people's behavior, it is understandable that Japanese religion could leave room for people to do things which are irrational to the central values if society allows. In this way, people could hold conflicting values and could create situations for the practice of such values.

Akira Ikeda wrote an article "Political Values in Japanese Religion: A Criticism of Robert N. Bellah's Political Values" in 1967. His viewpoint helps one understand the two problems raised by Maruyama. Ikeda criticizes Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* using Weber's notions of four types of social action.[18] Bellah says that Japanese religion is characterized by political values, particularism and performance, as compared to economic values in Protestantism, universalism and performance. Therefore, although Bellah distinguishes particularism of the Japanese religious values from universalism of the Protestant values, he does not

distinguish different natures of performance by which each religious values are characterized. However, Ikeda points out that there is a significant difference between the nature of performances motivated by Japanese religion and by Protestantism.

Ikeda analyzes the values of Japanese religion from the perspective of Weber's four types of social actions,[19] and argues that since Japanese religion reinforces the performance to reciprocate blessings to their particular lords, these actions are "instrumentally rational." However, since these actions are not determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake, that is, work itself is not a value till it is performed for a particular lord, and are only means to indicate loyalty to a particular lord, he argues that "such actions are not value-rational" (Ikeda 1967: 59).

On the other hand, Ikeda points out that if we analyze Protestantism using the concepts of Weber, "actions which are produced by Protestantism, the life of inner-world asceticism, are both instrumental rational and value-rational" (ibid. 60). Indeed, following the concepts of Weber, Puritans' worldly attitudes are instrumentally rational because the only way of living acceptably to God is thought to be "solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world. That was his calling" (Weber 1990: 80). Their attitudes are also value-rational because "the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life" (ibid. 53) is

thought of as "an absolute end in itself, a calling" (ibid: 62).

Ikeda concludes that the differences between the values of Japanese religion and Protestantism include not only the difference between particularism and universalism but also the difference in the nature of performance, the former only instrumental rational, and the latter a combination of instrumental rational and value-rational.

If we examine the nature of Japanese religion combining the argument of progress of religion by Bellah and the argument of instrumental rational and value-rational by Ikeda, both of which originated from the ideas of Weber, we realize that each argument complement the other. According to Weber, only when the rationalization of the world had gone so far as to eliminate magic as a means to salvation, could the accumulation of money to add to the glory of God on earth have become an absolute end itself. In other words, labor itself has become a value, and therefore, labor also has become value-rational.

Because Japanese religion has not broken with the cosmological myth, the idea that a life of good works as an end in itself, has not developed. In other words, such an activity is not value-rational yet. The problem of compartmentalization can now be explained as well. Since activities are not yet systematically unified nor has work become value-rational, people in Japan do not have to work all the time and can pursue aesthetic-emotional values depending

on the situation as long as they perform their obligation to their particular lords, in other words, as long as they fulfill instrumentally rational values.

Having analyzed the nature of Japanese religion in this way, Bellah's two weaknesses, first, his confusion between rationalization of religion and manipulation of religion, and second, his failure to thoroughly investigate the problem of compartmentalization, seem to be drawn from the same source. Bellah emphasizes inner-worldly asceticism and the idea of a calling as aspects of the rationalization of religion, which fostered modernization of the West. His arguments implies that rationalization of religion equivalent to what happened in the West also happened in Japan, and that rationalized religion functioned in Japan as Protestantism did in the West.

However, Bellah's mistake is obvious here: Even if rationalization of religion actually brought these outcomes in the West, it is not necessarily true that the same outcomes in another society are caused by the rationalization of religion. Indeed, the same outcomes could have been created by the manipulation of religion, which, I believe, actually happened in Japan.

Tokugawa Religion's flaws are deeply rooted in the weaknesses of modernization theory; first, in the optimistic belief in progress focusing too much on the economic sphere, and second, in the Euro-American centric bias, which leads to a model of linear development of the world. Bellah shows a deeper understanding of Japanese religion after departing from

modernization theory.

This chapter evaluated contributions of *Tokugawa Religion* within its historical context, and weaknesses of the work through examining criticisms by Maruyama from the perspective of evolutionary theory and Weber's four types of social actions. In conclusion, we explained the stage of Japanese religion within the framework of progress of religion, and then considered the manipulative nature of Japanese religion.

Since Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* was limited mainly by the framework of modernization theory, the next chapter will examine a critical analysis of Japanese religion, *Why Has Japan "Succeeded'?: Western Technology and Japanese Ethos* by Micho Morishima, going beyond the framework of modernization theory. It was pointed out in chapter 4 that though Bellah argues that Confucianism and Buddhism had been "Japanized," he fails to explain what he means by the term. Morishima's study explains the implication of that word.

Chapter VI

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: MORISHIMA'S *WHY HAS JAPAN 'SUCCEEDED'?: WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE JAPANESE ETHOS*

The Backgrounds and Framework of the Book

In this chapter, we will examine a book, *Why has Japan 'Succeeded'?: Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos*, written in 1982 by an economist, Michio Morishima. We will first sketch Morishima's academic background.

Morishima graduated from University of Kyoto, Japan, in 1946, majoring economics, became a professor of University of Osaka, and relocated to Britain in 1969. He is currently the Sir John Hicks professor of Economics at the London School of Economics. He has published many books in English in the area of mathematical economics such as *Theory of Economic Growth* (Morishima 1969), *Marx's Economics: A dual Theory of Value and Growth* (Morishima 1973), and so on.[1] Sociology is, therefore, not his academic area. However, Morishima has noted that ever "since my (Morishima's) days as a high school student I have been interested in history and sociology (Morishima 1984: xi). In the area of social science however, he has many publications in Japanese language such as *Igirisu to Nihon* (England and Japan), *Thatcher Jidai no Igirisu* (England under Thatcher's Era), and *Seijika no Jyoken* (Requirements for Politicians).[2]

Why Has Japan Succeeded? was first written in Japanese,

and later translated into English. He states that he has "written in English only in the field of mathematical economics, where so much is expressed with mathematical formulas" (Morishima 1984: viii). As the above backgrounds suggests, *Why has Japan Succeeded?* was not written within the discipline of sociology, particularly, not within that of Western sociology.[3] However, the book is quite relevant for our purpose. First, Morishima, like Bellah, investigates how an ethos based on Japanese religion influenced economic development in Japan as Weber investigated the relationship in the West in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of the Capitalism*. Second, though Morishima's style is descriptive as is that of most Japanese scholars, it provides the concrete data to explain the nature of Japanese religions and the process of manipulation. Therefore, it is possible and useful to understand and reconceptualize the data that he provides following the discipline of sociology in this thesis. The book is one of the best alternatives to Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*.

Morishima's Analysis

The first part of this chapter will discuss (1) Morishima's argument about Japanese religion, including Confucianism, Shintoism, and Buddhism, (2) his argument about dual structures in the Japanese polity: the relationship between the Imperial Family and real rulers, and (3) his analysis of the relationship between the Japanese ethos based

on religion and economic development.

First, we will discuss Morishima's argument about Japanese religion, Confucianism, Shintoism, and Buddhism, and their relation to Japanese ideology. Two points are most significant in his argument. The first is that "Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism all came to Japan (from China via Korea) almost simultaneously in about the sixth century" (Morishima 1984: 20), and original versions of all three religions were transformed into Japanese versions, namely, Japanized Buddhism, Japanized Confucianism, and Japanized Taoism, Shinto, when they were introduced to Japan. The second point is that all of them were introduced by Japanese rulers and elites and modified in the interests of rulers and elites. To borrow Morishima's words, if "some elements of the Chinese philosophy were found to be unsuitable or undesirable, they were either entirely rejected or drastically revised" (ibid.: 23).

How was each religion from China reinterpreted in Japan? According to Morishima, Confucianism in China "had established itself as the philosophy of the government, ...bureaucrats and ruling class," before it came to Japan, and it "was intellectual in that it kept ghosts and spirits at what it called a respectful distance" (ibid.: 35). In short, it was not magical but rational. Morishima explains the most important Confucian virtues in China:

> Confucius regarded benevolence (*jen*), justice (*i*), ceremony(*li*), knowledge (*chih*) and faith (*hsin*) as among the most important virtues, but believed that

> of these it was benevolence which was the virtue which must be at the heart of humanity (ibid.: 3).

In Japan, the government also adopted the philosophy of Confucianism. However, Morishima points out that the most important Confucian virtues in Japan are indeed different from those in China. He picks up *The Imperial Injunction to Soldiers and Sailors* issued in 1882 as a good example of Japanized Confucianism:

> In the document five of the Confucian virtues were emphasised-loyalty, ceremony, bravery, faith and frugality; no special consideration was given to benevolence, the central virtue in China (ibid.: 6).

According to him, this characteristic of neglecting benevolence is also found in documents of ancient Japan, "in Shotoku Taishi's Seventeen-Article constitution of 604, which was written very much under the influence of Confucianism" (ibid: 6). Then, he summarizes characteristics which are peculiar to Japanese Confucianism:

> ...this relative neglect of benevolence does not date only from the Meiji period; it is something which goes back a very long way. In Japan it was loyalty rather than benevolence which came to be considered the most important virtue, and this became more and more the case as Japan approached the modern period (ibid.: 6).

Significantly, the meaning of loyalty in Japan is also different from that in China. In China, loyalty "implied sincerity vis-a-vis one's own conscience, i.e. an absence of pretensions or selfishness from the heart." Therefore, "loyalty was a virtue which existed in relation to oneself" (ibid: 4). However, in Japan, "its normal meaning was

essentially a sincerity that aimed at total devotion to one's lord, i.e., service to one's lord to the point of sacrificing oneself" (ibid: 7).

In the end, it would be also important not to overlook one more significant characteristic of Japanese Confucianism. Morishima points out that "Chinese Confucianism is...humanistic, whereas Japanese confucianism is remarkably nationalistic" (ibid. 15). According to him,

> Since the cultural disparity which existed between China and Japan was probably at its greatest in the fifth and sixth centuries, when Japan first became aware of the existence of China and was still herself very much at a barbaric stage, defensive nationalism for the sake of survival was a salient feature of Japanese Confucianism from very early on (ibid.: 16).

In conclusion, the peculiar and significant characteristics of Japanese Confucianism are, first, that it strongly emphasizes loyalty to lords, and second, that it is nationalistic rather than humanistic. It is obvious how the Japanese rulers changed the original Chinese version of Confucianism into the Japanese version, and how this new loyalty centered version was useful and preferable for the Japanese rulers.

Let us move to analyze Morishima's understanding of Taoism originated by Lao-tsu, and its relation to Shinto in Japan. Taoism in China, Morishima explains, "was mystical and shamanist, believing in and relying on magic" and it "became more and more anti-government and remained a heterodoxy for most of the time." "Its main supporters were peasants in

villages and illiterates in town" (Morishima 1984: 35).

In Japan, according to Morishima, "Taoism could not become established as an independent religion on the Japanese islands," however, he argues that it turned into Shinto in Japan:

> In fact, Taoism (which was sometimes called 'Suntaoism' in ancient China) was manifested as Shintoism in Japan; we may consider Shintoism as a disguised version of Taoism. Indigenous religious beliefs and imported Taoist ones fused together in about the sixth century and cannot now be separated (Morishima 1984: 36).

In sum, he argues that one "may think of Shintoism either as a Japanised version of Taoism or as a combination of Taoism and primitive shintoism" (ibid. 36). Since Shinto is usually considered to be truly indigenous to Japan, it should be judged that his idea above is different from the orthodox way of understanding Shinto.

Morishima analyzes the creation of Shinto from the perspective of political reason:

> Although evidence is sparse, some historians claim that Shotoku Taishi coined the name 'Tenno (Heavenly Emperor) for the Japanese emperor where before the title had been 'O-kimi' (Great King). The change had far-reaching results; it implied that the Emperor was no longer a king, but was a Manifest God (ara-hito-gami) and was thus identified with God. There could consequently be no possibility of conflict between God and Emperor and hence no revolution was admissible. The imperial throne was thus provided with divine right and established on a firm foundation (ibid.: 23-24).

In this way, Morishima points out that though "the belief in the Emperor's quasi-divine character as the Manifest God and the philosophy of the Heavenly Emperor were derived in part

from the traditional indigenous cult" (ibid.: 33), the creation of this religious belief can be also understood for political reasons, first, as "an ideological buttress against the Chinese theory of revolution" (ibid.: 34), and second, as the eternal divine right for the imperial family and for establishing an unbroken Imperial line.

Having explained the relationship between Taoism in China and Shinto in Japan and characteristics of both, Morishima emphasizes differences between them. Summarizing Chinese Taoism first:

> (Taoism) advocated in China that a person should retire from public life and live in seclusion, tranquillity and parsimony so as to attain the aim of ageless youth and immortality in the pursuit of earthly happiness (ibid.: 39).

Analyzing Shinto in Japan next:

> ...Shintoists esteem self-sacrifice for the good of the Emperor rather than the pursuit of youth and longevity; they consider the eternity of the country but not the prolongation of an individual's life of the greatest importance... (ibid.: 39).

It is now significant to compare characteristics of both religions by especially focusing on the kinds of activities each produces. Taoism emphasizes activities by individuals for themselves, but Shintoism emphasizes individuals' sacrifice for the Emperor.

In addition, it is important to compare each religion's influence upon the institutions of the state. Since Taoism leads people to draw back from public life, its influence on the state is small. On the other hand, Shintoism is the very source of national spirit throughout Japanese history.

According to Morishima:

> In every national crisis, the Emperor prayed to his ancestor, the Sun-goddess Amaterasu, and turned to her for help. Luckily for Japan, during both of the Mongolian Invasions a typhoon hit the enemy's fleet and most of their ships were sunk. It was therefore called a kamikaze (a wind sent by God). Even during the Second World War, the Japanese prayed at Shinto shrines for another kamikaze. War tactics and strategies were not seriously reviewed with a cool critical eye, and the self-sacrifice of lives was fanatically supported (ibid.: 38-39).

In this way, from ancient to modern times, the same mystical and religious spirit has been used to inspire nationalism and mobilize people to work for the nation. It indeed worked well. Surprisingly, this mentality continued to prevail even after World War II, as "when the Korean War broke out and the special procurement boom started both businessmen and politicians were delighted, and claimed that 'the kamikaze (divine wind) has at last begun to blow in our favour" (ibid. 164). As the examples above shows, such an ideology which can arouse the spirit of nationalism in people is indeed "irrational, magical and incantatory" (ibid. 38).

In sum, two important points were explained: first, Chinese Taoism, a religion for the individual, was changed into Shinto, a religion for rulers, by Japanese rulers, and second, Shinto was and still is useful to make people devote themselves to the interests of the state by promoting nationalism among them.

It is now time to discuss characteristics of Buddhism in Japan as compared to China. In the seventh century, Buddhism was introduced into Japan and the Japanese government started

to promote it in order to adopt Chinese culture. The relationship between Japanese Buddhism and Shintoism was important:

> When Buddhism became influential in the government, Taoism, which had already established itself in the form of Shintoism as the religion of the Imperial family, was re-interpreted from the Buddhist point of view. the Gods of Shintoism were considered as manifestations of the Buddha and his distinguished disciples; Shintoism itself was regarded simply as a branch of Buddhism (Morishima 1984.: 40).

At the same time, however, Morishima continues, Buddhism was being re-formulated from the Shintoist point of view also:

> Buddhism..., after it infiltrated the government, was Japanised by admitting the 'Divine Land' doctrine which states that Japan is the country of the 'Divine Land' in which the Manifest God reigns and should therefore be eternal as heaven and earth.... In national crises such as the Mongolian Invasions and the Second World War, Buddhist temples, like Shinto shrine, held devotional services to pray for the enemy's surrender (ibid.: 40-41).

In sum, he argues that unless Buddhists "recognised this first principle of Japan, no Buddhist sect could be publicly approved" (ibid.: 41). Chinese Buddhism, which originated in India, was thus also transformed into a Japanese version which was preferable and useful for Japanese rulers. In Morishima's words, "Buddhism was utilised as a means of maintaining rule over the people" (ibid. 43).

In conclusion, Morishima argues that a flexible combination of these Japanese religions, Japanized Confucianism, Japanized Taoism, and Japanized Buddhism, have been serving Japanese ideology throughout her history:

> The Japanese enriched their spiritual lives by

> changing the relative emphasis of their heterogeneous religions (or ethical doctrines). They emphasised the Shinto elements in times of national crisis and the Confucian elements after drastic changes in their political regime. In so doing, they acquired an ideological driving force for solving the problems with which their country has been confronted (ibid.: 19).

Having examined Japanese religion's influenced upon ideology, it is important to note which religion is supported by what kinds of people. The secularization of Confucianism and Japanese chivalry is also noteworthy. Morishima explains that Confucianism was adopted as the ethical system for the official life of the elite and supported by the government as an orthodoxy. Buddhism and Shintoism, the two main heterodoxies, were embraced by the people and the court respectively.

It would be more precise to argue that ordinary people believed both in Buddhism and Shintoism as the following quotation shows:

> In Japan, Shintoism is a religion primarily for the imperial family, although it has infiltrated the general population through various events such as village festivals, harvest festivals, and marriage, ground breaking and frame raising ceremonies. Thus, as in China, Japan adopted...Taoism (or its Japanese version, Shintoism) as the religion of the imperial family and the populace (Morishima 1988: 39).

Second, let us briefly discuss, what Morishima calls, the secularization of Confucianism and Japanese chivalry. According to Morishima, in the late Tokugawa period,

> Gradually Confucian ethics ceased to be a monopoly of the samurai class. Farmers and tradesmen were also called upon to be loyal to their bosses and faithful to their friends and customers.... They

> (tenant farmers, shop-boys and servants) were soon taught that they should devote themselves to their masters in the same way as the samurai did to their lords. The 'secularisation' of *bushido* (that is, samurai ethics) had started (ibid. 50).

And in the Meiji period,

> This (the secularization of Confucianism and Japanese chivalry)...accelerated as the Meiji government spread Confucianism, which had not yet become generally popular among ordinary people in the Tokugawa era, by means of compulsory education (ibid.: 17).

In sum, the virtues of Japanese Confucianism, especially focusing on the concept of loyalty, became more and more apparent in the late Tokugawa period, and became "the national ideology rather than the ideology of only the government and elite" during the Meiji era (ibid.: 17).

Before we move to examine Morishima's analysis of the relationship between Japanese ideology and her economic development, it is necessary to mention the historical fact of dual structures in the polity of Japan. In order to understand this political dualism, the gap between the Emperor's nominal status as the ultimate ruler of Japan and his real political power needs to be explained:

> Over more than a thousand years, from the Taika Reform to the Meiji Revolution, Emperors were controlled by Kanpaku (the chief advisers to the emperor), Shogun (the commanders-in-chief of the expeditionary force against the barbarians) or Hoo (the retired emperors in holy orders) who were the real rulers of the country; the Emperor's political power was only nominal (ibid.: 34).

In short, the Emperor himself had no actual political power most of the time throughout the Japanese history except for a hundred years after the Taika Reform (671-770) and about sixty

years after the Godaigo Emperor (1331-1392).

It is important to look into the real roles and power of both of the Emperor and the real political rulers in more detail. Considering the status of Emperor first, in the Seventeenth-Constitution,

> Shotoku Taishi guarded the *Tenno* system from all danger of revolution by making the concession that the Emperor should be politically neutral (Morishima 1984: 26).

Since then, "the position of Emperor became sacred," but since his position was politically neutral, it "was not in effect one of political importance." (ibid: 32).

Therefore, according to Morishima, for politically ambitious nobles, warriors, priests and so on,

> the imperial throne was not considered worth the trouble of getting hold of, especially given that one ran the risk of bringing on oneself dishonour as a traitor if one did capture it (ibid.: 32).

Since the status of the Emperor does not really mean anything politically, the real rulers chose to exercise their political power by controlling the Emperor rather seek the status itself. As a result, they chose to formally serve the Emperor, actually controlling him from behind, or, at least not rebelling against him.

The Emperor's status in the sphere of spirit, religion, and ideology, that "of the Manifest God," " kept the line of sovereigns unbroken" (ibid.: 34) throughout Japanese history, even though enormous changes occurred in the sphere of polity.

The dual structures and the unbroken line of the divine Emperor as a sacred entity explains why the Japanese ethos,

especially its central idea of loyalty to the lord, has remained unbroken throughout her history. On the other hand, actual political rulers as well as political structures were drastically changed, for example, from the rule of Tokugawa Bakufu to that of the Meiji government, and so on. Therefore, one might think that the ideal of being loyal to their lords and sacrificing themselves has not actually been practiced, since lords, the political rulers, have changed. However, if one knows that the absolute lord in the sphere of ethos and ideology is not the rulers who have actual power in the sphere of polity but the sacred Emperor, whose sovereign line has never been broken, it is clear why the old ethos and ideology has been able to survive in spite of drastic changes in the political sphere.

Morishima presents the most interesting illustration of the ability of the old ethos and ideology to survive through the various changes brought to Japan:

> ...there is a surprising continuity between the Seventeen-Article Constitution of Shotoku Taishi (604) and the present post-war Constitution (1946) as far as the position and political role of the Emperor is concerned (ibid.: 35).

Under the present Constitution, the Emperor is the symbol of the Japanese people and is still dealing with all kinds of symbolic state's non-religious ceremonies, while holding no real political power. However, since the Imperial family is allowed to believe in their "private" religion, Shintoism, the Emperor still plays an important role in the center of Shintoism. Even the Allied Forces Headquarters, the real

ruler in the immediate postwar period, decided to use and preserve the Emperor system for their own interests in order to prevent the nation from breaking into total chaos.

With the World War II defeat, it is true that Japan tried to adopt the new ideology of individualism, liberalism, and internationalism from the West and the old ideology was of course drastically weakened compared to the pre-War period. However, it is also true that the new ideology is not really deeply rooted among the Japanese people yet. To borrow Morishima's words,

> Most Japanese today do not accept the conventional 'land of gods' doctrine in its entirety. But they have not discovered an alternative. This leaves an emotional vacuum in the 'Japanese spirit with Western ability' set-up; unless the means of filling this cavity is found, the possibility of future ominous developments remains (ibid.: 54).

Therefore, in the bottom of their heart, the Japanese people are still more or less preserving a magical, religious, irrational ethos from ancient times, which centers around the Imperial Family.

Finally, it is time to examine how Morishima analyzes the relationship between the Japanese ethos and economic development in the modern period, from the Meiji Restoration until 1975. As space is limited, it is impossible to fully examine his argument here. Therefore, first, the English capitalist economy and the Japanese capitalist economy will be compared to make the point clear that the latter is different from the former. Then, the Japanese capitalist spirit, as influenced by Japanese religion, and its relation to economic

development will be examined.

Morishima starts his discussion with Weber's study, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He argues that there are two prerequisites for modern capitalism: first, a religion that encourages frugal lives among people, and second, a certain kind of capitalist and worker. From the perspective of these two prerequisites, he compares the development of modern capitalism in England to that in Japan. Before we start examining the two prerequisites in both countries, it is necessary to make the following point clear: in England, capitalist society was born by pressures from within, but in Japan, the Tokugawa regime was broken down as a result of foreign pressure and the new government itself played an important role in building capitalist society. Making that point clear, it is easier to understand the different development of capitalism in the two counties.

Analyzing the first prerequisite in the case of England, Morishima explains that the life style of inner-worldly asceticism was lead by the individual's religious belief in the idea of a calling. On the other hand, in the case of Japan, frugality among ordinary people was a result of the secularization of Japanese Confucianism and chivalry through the ideology of the government.

Comparing the two countries from the perspective of the second prerequisite, the existence of a certain kind of capitalist and worker was achieved as a result of Protestant belief in England. The capitalist "was the possessor of an

earnest faith, and who controlled huge wealth, but nevertheless contented himself with a life of extreme simplicity, striving to accumulate capital" (Morishima 1984: 84), and for the workers "labour must...be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling."[4]

On the other hand, when Japan tried to create a modern capitalist society pressured by the West, there were no capitalists within her society as described above. However, if capitalists are necessary for the development of modern capitalism, how could she have developed a capitalist society? Morishima explains that since there were no capitalists in Japan, "the government itself was forced to construct modern factories" (ibid.: 85-86). However, before very long, the government had to sell the modern factories off at cheap prices because of various kinds of troubles. As a result, Morishima explains, "the men who had purchased these modern factories from the government very cheaply had, at one step, become large capitalists" (ibid.: 86)). Also, workers who were loyal to their lords, in other words, who worked hard sacrificing themselves for lords, were created by the secularization of Japanese Confucianism and chivalry. As a conclusion, Morishima argues that one of the prerequisites for capitalism, the existence of powerful capitalists and workers who work without limitation, had been fulfilled in Japan as well.

Having explained different ways of achieving the two-prerequisites, Morishima makes two important points clear.

First, he argues that the capitalist spirits created by Protestantism on the one hand, and Japanese Confucianism on the other hand, are not the same. Second, he argues that, since the Japanese capitalist spirit is different from the Western capitalist spirit, and since capitalists in Japan have a different nature because they depend on and are loyal to the government, the capitalist economy in Japan is also different from a free enterprise economy in the West.

Then, what is the nature of capitalist economy in Japan? To explain it, one must clarify Japanese Confucianism again:

> Confucianism in Japan stresses (1) loyalty to the state (or lord), (2) filial piety to one's parents, (3) faith towards friends, and (4) respect towards one's elders (ibid.: 86).

Therefore, the Japanese capitalist spirit is drawn from a religion, Japanese Confucianism, which copes with and justifies the existing rulers. As a result, capitalism in Japan became state capitalism, "an economy guided by and driven by bureaucrats" (ibid.: 87).

It is true that since the state economy in Japan functioned efficiently, Japan achieved rapid economic development. Therefore, if we examine how the Japanese state economy was influenced by Japanese Confucianism, it would explain the relationship between the Japanese ethos and economic development. Since space is limited, important features of the state economy and its relationship to Japanese Confucianism pointed to by Morishima will be only briefly explained here.

First of all, the institution of state economy itself is heavily influenced by Japanese Confucianism: people follow the government policies or plans since it is the Confucian virtue to follow and support the rulers' decisions. Dual structures of economy created by the government policy is a good example:

> In an economy and society of this kind those industries which are designated as strategic for the country are carefully protected and fostered, but those industries which are deemed by the government to have no prospects for development in the future receive absolutely no help from the government (ibid.: 192).

Importantly, according to Morishima, not only people who belong to the former sector but also people who belong to the later sector do not normally complain. "Those who had not been chosen were, as it were, 'resigned to their lot'" (ibid. 98).

This sort of strong industrial policy on the part of the government is called "a formula for cooperation between the state and the people" or "a formula for cooperation between government, industrialists and financiers" (ibid.: 192). Morishima points out that this "cooperation," including people who are forced to work in unprivileged circumstances, is deeply related to Confucian education. He argues that this kind of economic system led by strong government policies would not be accepted in England or America, where capitalists are individualistic and demand freedom from government controls. Such demands are, in fact, deeply rooted in Christianity.

As another important feature of state capitalism,

Morishima explains how the Japanese management style is influenced and supported by Japanese Confucianism. According to him, the seniority wage structure, the lifetime employment system, a less distinct division between manual workers and non-manual workers, and so on are directly or indirectly based on the Japanese Confucian virtues of loyalty to their lords, the companies.

The seniority wage system was started to prevent regular employees from moving one company to another. This system emphasizes that a spirit of loyalty to the company is the most important factor; the longer people express their loyalty the more they should be rewarded, based on Japanese Confucian values. In addition, if companies have to use older workers under the lifetime employment system:

> ...then it would have to use them in a non-manual labour capacity; so it was the norm...for workers who had been engaged in manual labour to end up either in non-manual work or in the middle or lower grades of management.... There was considerable movement between the two groups (Morishima 1984: 107).

As a result, "there was no clear division between the manual workers and the non-manual workers" (ibid. 107).

In conclusion, he shows, first, that Japanese Confucianism influenced the Japanese spirit of capitalism, and then, that this spirit deeply influenced state capitalism in Japan, and is still efficient to maintain it.

Although Morishima emphasizes the role of Japanese Confucianism in economic development, he also points out that Shinto, by promoting nationalism, and Buddhism, by supporting

the existing regime, also helped state economic development in Japan. As a result, Japan functionally developed her economy rapidly and successfully. However, Morishima also describes some negative aspects at the same time. We will discuss negative aspects in the next part of this chapter.

State Manipulation of Religion

In this section, Morishima's arguments will be examined focusing on the manipulation of religion. Summarizing his book, he argues that there are basically three types of religions: the first type of religion is the one "which serves to justify the ruling forces;" the second type is the rational religion whose objective is to assist either the ruled or the individual;" and the third type is "the mystical religion whose objective is to assist the individual" (Morishima 1984: 194).

From the perspective of the categories above, he says that Chinese Confucianism, Japanese Confucianism, Shintoism, and Japanese Buddhism belong to the first type; Protestantism belongs to the second type; and Chinese Taoism belongs to the third type. Then, he argues that the different types of religions would create different kinds of ideology. Since all of Japan's religions were transformed into the first type of religion by Japanese rulers and elites, the ideology which was created by them justifies and supports the existing regime.

Moreover, he argues that if the ideologies of countries which are influenced by different types of religions are

different, the economic systems influenced by these different ideologies would also be different. Since Japanese ideology is different from that of the West, derived from Protestantism, the second type of religion, he argues that the Japanese economic system, a state capitalist economy, would be also different from the economic system of the West, a free enterprise capitalist economy.

Morishima states that in actual fact "the theme of the book...was not 'why has Japan succeeded?'". He explains that the goal is to construct an analysis which is not based on the assumptions of orthodox economics in order to explain economic developments which cannot be explained by existing economic theory. Orthodox economics is based on assumptions such as "the individual always acts in a rational manner and that individuals constitute a civic society." In the case of the Western countries, these assumptions had been more or less realized when industrialization began. On the other hand, when the Japanese began to build a modern state in the 1870s, the society was not close to meeting these assumptions. However, "Japan was eventually able to succeed in...building an economy along the lines of...Western European countries" (ibid.: 202). Morishima therefore argues that:

> For that reason any elucidation of the process of Japan's economic development which acknowledges that the basic economic assumptions mentioned above are not fulfilled, is at least likely to help us gain some perspectives on the ways in which an economy operates (ibid. 202).

In this way, if the existing economic analysis based on

the Western model is not able to fully explain Japanese economic development, he argues that it would be necessary to construct economic analysis which could explain non-Western economic developments.

In sum, he writes that he tried to "develop some fundamental construct for analyzing non-European type economies" (Morishima 1984: 203) based on "the sphere of comparative analyses of national ethos - the sphere of study which may be called 'ethology'":

> ...in that it makes clear the connection between individuals' acting in different ways as a result of different national temperaments and different modes of economic development resulting from this. Max Weber's famous comparative sociological analyses of world religion are notable examples of the 'ethological' study (ibid.: 203).

In other words, his book is a case study to explain economic development in Japan based on the idea that economic conditions are influenced by each country's religion, ethos, and ideology within the framework of ethology, and to contribute toward construction of a non-European economic analysis.

Morishima comments that most reviews of his book have not identified its real purpose. He writes that if "they have been blinded by the somewhat sensational title, then I myself must bear at least part of the responsibility for that" (ibid. 202). Indeed, this book is based on the Marshall Lecture at Cambridge University and the title of the Marshall Lectures was "Economy and Ideology," which clearly shows that the theme of the book was the one identified above.

It is clear that Morishima's objective was to contribute to the analysis of non-European type economies, and not to tell "the success story of Japan." In fact, he pays attention to historical mechanisms and consequences whether they are positive or negative. Since his critical analyses provide good historical and empirical data for our examination of elite manipulation through religions in Japan, we will now analyze his argument with this theme in mind.

The mechanism of elite manipulation of religions can be summarized as following. First of all, we begin with the fact that Chinese religions were transformed into Japanese religions. Here, I would argue that Chinese religions were obviously manipulated by Japanese rulers and elites. Second, it was also explained that rulers and elites used Japanese religions to create a Japanese ideology which justified and supported themselves. Third, since the Japanese ideology itself was created for Japanese rulers and elites, their use of the ideology to achieve certain aims means conversely that the aims were achieved by manipulating the ideology. Moreover, since results were achieved by manipulating the ideology, I would argue that sacrifices or constraints were imposed on the ruled or ordinary people for the purpose of achieving elite aims.

Let us briefly examine the process of Japanese economic development. First, we will make clear the aims of the rulers: in the period from the Meiji Restoration to World War I, the aim of rulers was "to build a strong state" with

Western Technology, using Western countries as a model; in the period between World War I and World II, their aim was "to build a strong Army"; in the period soon after the World War II, their aim was "to rebuild Japan," but soon after in 1948, the aim became "to rebuild Japan with a strong economy." During this whole period of time, economic development has been indirectly or directly the primary concern. According to Morishima's explanation of the high growth of G.N.P. rate between 1868 and 1945:

> This economic growth was certainly not achieved through using the mechanism of free operation of the economy; it was the result of the government or the military, with their loyal following of capitalists, manipulating and influencing the economy in order to realise national aim (ibid.: 96-97).

He argues that this characteristic of government control over the economy has always been the case in Japan, though there has been a difference in the degree of government control, ranging a highly controlled economy during war time to administrative guidance by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry today. In this way, economic development has been achieved in order to achieve the nation's aims, namely, the rulers' aims, by manipulating the institution of state economy as a means.

Let us examine sacrifices and constraint entailed in the process of economic development under the state economy. At the structural level, we must examine the dualism carefully again. Since the government "selects certain strategic industries and strengthens them through sacrificing others,

> ...industries which are deemed by the government to have no prospects for development in the future receive absolutely no help from the government, receive no capital and are forced to fight for themselves (Morishima 1984: 192).

If we analyze this from the perspective of Confucian virtues, it is indeed possible to claim that all people are cooperative with no contradictions since they have Confucian virtues of loyalty and harmony.

However, if we analyze the situations of those who sacrifice themselves from another perspective, we would realize that they do have to be cooperative because they have no choice as long as they try to keep Confucian virtues. He argues that this kind of industrial policy certainly requires sacrifices from certain kinds of people and identifies who is actually forced to be "resigned to their lot."

First, just after the Meiji Restoration, "the ones who suffered were the farmers.... The farmers endured their role and suffered heavy exploitation." However, since "it was impossible to achieve the development of the country merely on the basis of an unrestricted exploitation of agriculture and unlimited sacrifice by farmers," Japan found an alternative source in people in China and Korea before very long:

> Japan had established a firm foothold in Manchuria.... Furthermore, in 1910 Japan annexed Korea. Japan had thus become a colonial empire, and gained vast new areas for exploitation. The people of Korea were compelled to cooperate without much benefit.... Both in Korea and in Taiwan the racial discrimination which was carried on was harsh (ibid.: 100).

This fashion of exploitation worked fairly smoothly at least

until 1920.

In order to identify who was exploited in the state economy after World War II, it is necessary to explain the dual composition of the labor market. According to Morishima, there is a "market for loyalty" and a "mercenary market":

> ...market for loyalty is made available just once to every individual; if at any time subsequently the lifetime employment decided here for any reason ends in disaster then a worker has no alternative but to look for a new employer on the second, mercenary market. The wages which are decided on this second market are appreciably lower than the wages in the large enterprises decided on the first market (ibid.: 118).

Since large enterprises recruit only "loyal workers" in the first market, but, on the other hand, the medium and small enterprises hire a large number of "mercenary workers," consequently, Morishima argues, "a considerable wage difference, and a difference in social status exists between large and medium/small enterprises." Therefore, after the World War II period, workers in the second market, in other words, workers at small and medium size enterprises, are the ones who are more or less exploited.

In short, it is possible to argue that people who share virtues of loyalty and harmony can cooperate so that the state economy in Japan has been successful. However, if we examine the structure of state economy from a different perspective, the system has been maintained by exploiting certain groups of people, farmers, Chinese and Korean people, or workers at small and medium size enterprises.

Therefore, workers in big companies who belong to the

first labor sector are not exploited in the existing structure. However, it is important to recognize that they are, on the other hand, oppressed by the dual economic structures, because they have only one opportunity for choosing their companies, the time just after graduating from universities, and have no freedom to change companies as long as they want to stay in the first labor sector. According to Morishima, labor in big companies in the first labor sector bears very strong resemblances to "slavery labor," a concept John Hicks developed in *A Theory of Economic History*.[5]

Second, analyzing the Japanese state capitalist economy at the level of each company, workers are exploited and oppressed in their everyday-life under the Japanese management style in which loyalty to the company is expected of each worker. Morishima explains how Japanese big companies limit freedom of individuals:

> ...in Japan even now an individual can choose a company only once in a lifetime (assuming it's a large company), and the hobby club that he belongs to will be the one organised by the company; similarly for the school. The company is not just a profit-making organisation; it is a complete society in itself, and frequently it is so all-embracing that all the activities of the daily lives of company's employees can take place within the company framework. Because the company is so huge that it swallows the whole life of its employees and because an individual cannot change his company, he does not have the freedom to reconstruct his own life (Morishima 1984: 120).

In sum, religion has been manipulated throughout Japanese history. More recently also, for economic development, current forms of this ideology requires sacrifices and

constraints among the ruled and ordinary people as expressed within the Japanese state economy and the Japanese management style. In the next chapter, we will compare the arguments of Bellah in *Tokugawa Religion* and that of Morishima in *Why Has Japan 'Succeeded'?*.

Chapter VII

COMPARISON BETWEEN BELLAH AND MORISHIMA: FUNCTIONALIST AND CRITICAL APPROACHES

The Same Foundation for Analysis

Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* and Morishima's *Why Has Japan Succeeded?* were analyzed independently in the former chapters, but in this chapter, the works will be compared on the subject they share: the relationships among religion, values, ideology, and economic development in Japan.

Morishima's work was examined in this thesis because he analyzes not only function but also manipulation; thus he provides an alternative approach to Bellah's functionalism. However, *Tokugawa Religion* and *Why Has Japan Succeeded?* also share the same foundation in many ways. First of all, both Bellah and Morishima have the same notion that culture, religions, values, and ideologies influence the economic sphere. Therefore, both of them try to study the relationship between culture and economic development for the case of Japan in the way Weber does in the case of the West in *Protestant Ethic*.

Second, their understanding of the most significant event for modern Japan, the Meiji Restoration, is almost identical. They identify the Meiji Restoration as a political restoration by Japanese elites, the lower class samurai in Bellah's terms and the intelligentsia in Morishima's terms, rather than as an

eruption from economic inconsistencies. Though both name them by different terms, the group of people they point to as the central actors of the restoration is actually the same. The nature of the restoration could be summarized as restoration by elites among elites in Bellah's analysis, or as restoration by elites for elites in Morishima's analysis. As mentioned before, there is another understanding of the Meiji Restoration, which recognizes it as a revolution by people for people emphasizing frequent peasants' uprisings in the later Tokugawa period, following a Marxist understanding of world history. Comparing analyses of Bellah and Morishima to this Marxist understanding, it would be fair to judge that Bellah and Morishima use the same foundation in explaining the Meiji Restoration.

Third, both of them identify the state as the central force for Japanese economic development. Bellah sees political rationalization as necessary for Japan to achieve her economic rationalization, and Morishima argues that the state leadership was crucial for her economic development.

In sum, even though Morishima's work was treated as an alternative approach to Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*, they share understandings of the most important historical event for modern Japan, the Meiji Restoration, and of the most central characteristic of Japanese economic development, leadership by the state.

Morishima's work is an alternative not in the sense that he stands on a different foundation for understanding the

history of Japan but in the sense that he has critical eyes when he looks at almost the same scenario as Bellah. Remembering the idea of multiple realities from Dahrendorf, Bellah and Morishima analyze the same coin, the same scenario of Japanese modern history, but they focus on different aspects of the scenario: Bellah only on function and Morishima on both function and manipulation. Morishima does not examine a different coin, for example, a Marxist coin, a different scenario. Morishima supplements Bellah by offering a critical analysis to explain the other side of the same coin.

Morishima's work could also be identified as a supplement to Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* from the perspective of periodization. Bellah's work basically covers only the Tokugawa period. Morishima's study covers Japanese history from the seventh century until around 1975. The following quotation from the conclusion of *Tokugawa Religion* indicates what Bellah himself thought he left out in his book:

> ...two major aspects of the problem of the relation between religion and the rise of industrial society in Japan have had to be left out. The first of these is a historical study of the formation of what we have called the central value system, which we believe to have existed in its essentials at least by the beginning of the Tokugawa Period. The second is analysis of the modern period, especially Meiji, with respect to the way in which the values and motivations we have been discussing actually did contribute to the rise of an industrial society (Bellah 1985: 178).

Thus, Morishima's work can be identified as a supplement to *Tokugawa Religion* in the sense that his work analyses Japanese history prior to, during, and after the period which Bellah

studies.

Discussion

It is time for us to summarize the relationship between Japanese religion and economic development combining the studies of Bellah and Morishima.[1] First, we can now identify characteristics of Japanese religion prior to the Tokugawa period. Since Bellah does not cover the Pre-Tokugawa period, Japanese religion is taken for granted in his study. As was mentioned previously, even though he uses the word, "Japanized," he does not explain what this word implies. On the other hand, because Morishima covers the creation of Japanese religion, he explains what the term "Japanized" means. Morishima explains that Japanese religions were the result of modification of Chinese religions. In other words, Chinese religions were transformed, namely, "Japanized," by the Japanese rulers and elites. This fact should be recognized as one of the most important characteristics of Japanese religions because it obviously implies that they were modified in the way the rulers and elites wanted for their interests. Therefore, the "manipulation of religions" was found at the creation of Japanese religions.

Second, though Bellah takes "the Japanese value system" as given, it is significant to recognize from Morishima's analysis that the Japanese value system was also created and used by rulers and elites to support their interests. Therefore what Bellah calls "the Japanese value system" is

actually, in Morishima's words, "the Japanese ideology." The Japanese values which Bellah identifies result not simply from people's consensus but are cleverly created and manipulated by rulers. As a conclusion, this aspect of "manipulation of religions" is present at the creation of the Japanese value system also. In this way, Morishima's work gives us an understanding of key relationships among Japanese religions, Japanese values, and Japanese ideology, which Bellah's work cannot provide.

Third, concerning the period that both Bellah and Morishima study, the Tokugawa Period, although Bellah argues that "rationalization of polity" was achieved through "rationalization of religion," it would be more appropriate to say that "rationalization of polity" was achieved through an ideology by "manipulating religions" during the Tokugawa era.

Fourth, Bellah's argument that "rationalization of economy" was achieved through "rationalization of polity" is important. One could also say that rationalization of the economy was, to use Morishima's words, a result brought by Japanese ideology: the ideology effectively worked in the sphere of economy to make people effectively controlled in the way the rulers expected. In Bellah's words, it was brought by "persuasion of economic policy," and, to borrow Morishima's words, "the secularization of Japanese Confucianism and chivalry" by the rulers. As a conclusion, "rationalization of economy" was achieved directly or indirectly by "manipulation of religions" often times having "rationalization of polity"

as an intermediator.

Fifth, Bellah's analysis shows that the attitude of inner-worldly asceticism among ordinary people and the idea of a calling existed by the end of Tokugawa period. Morishima also emphasizes that the existence of frugal life among people is crucial for the development of capitalist society. In this way, both of them say the existence of the Japanese ethic is significant. However, Bellah does not study how the ethic actually worked in modern Japan. He assumes that the ethic would have worked in the same way as the Protestant ethic worked in the West. On the other hand, Morishima claims that since the nature of Japanese religion is different from the nature of Protestantism, the capitalist society shaped by Japanese religion is different from the capitalist society shaped by Protestantism. Japanese capitalist society is not the same as free enterprise capitalism in the West.

Sixth, moving to summarize a period that Bellah's work does not cover, the period after the Meiji Restoration, it is probably true that the attitude of inner-worldly asceticism and the idea of a calling influenced economic development in Japan as Bellah suggests. In Bellah's words, the Japanese ethic, or, to use Morishima's words, Japanese ideology, functioned successfully for her economic development. However, it is also important to recognize from Morishima's study that the ideology was manipulated to create the economic systems existing today, for example, the institutions of state economy, the Japanese management style and so on. Therefore,

they, in fact, function efficiently for economic development, but they, at the same time, are constraining. Bellah's analysis of high levels of tension in the personality actually fits this understanding. Morishima points out that the freedom of individuals is extremely limited under the systems of state economy and the Japanese management style.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

The aims of this thesis may be summarized as follows: first, to study the relationship between Japanese traditional culture, mainly, religions, values, and ideology, and economic development in Japan; second, to evaluate the importance of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion;* and third, to assess the importance of studying this topic today.

Japanese religion and its relation to economic development was analyzed through examination of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion,* adding some significant ideas from Bellah's later work, criticisms of the book, and Morishima's *Why Has Japan 'Succeeded'?* Summarizing characteristics of Japanese religion first, it was pointed out that 1) Japanese religions, Shinto, Japanese Confucianism, and Japanese Buddhism, are not as rationalized as Protestantism in terms of adherence to the cosmological myth, and 2) Japanese religions were introduced to Japan by the Japanese rulers and elites to justify and support their rule.

Second, summarizing characteristics of the Japanese value system, 1) according to Japanese values, people should be loyal to their particular lords and give active service and performance; the Japanese value particularism over universalism, which also means nationalism rather than internationalism, and 2) the Japanese value system was created

by manipulating Japanese religions, therefore, it should be called an ideology.

Third, rationalization of the polity during the Tokugawa period was achieved through *Bushido*, the *Kokugaku* movement, and the *Kokutai* movement which manipulated religions and reenforced the reigning ideology.

Fourth, rationalization of the economy was achieved directly or indirectly by manipulation of religion often times having rationalization of polity as an intermediator by the end of the Tokugawa period.

Fifth, the attitude of inner-worldly asceticism and the idea of a calling, characteristics of the Protestant ethic, were found among ordinary Japanese people by the end of Tokugawa era. However, it is a mistake to assume that Japanese religions played the same role in economic development in Japan as Protestantism did in the West as Bellah argued in *Tokugawa Religion*. Japanese religion justifies and supports rulers, while Protestantism ideally assists the ruled or the individual. It was a misinterpretation, therefore, to think that finding the characteristics of the Protestant ethic in Japan meant religion influenced the economic sphere in the same way as in the West. We also established the different circumstances in the West and Japan at the start of industrialization: industrialization was forced by power from within in the former case, and from outside in the latter case.

As a conclusion, it was explained that since Japanese

religion and ideology justified and supported rulers, the Japanese ethic which was created using religion and ideology also justified and supported rulers. Therefore, rulers achieved their primary aim, the economic development of Japan, by manipulating the ethic. In other words, economic development in Japan was achieved because it was the rulers' aim. Therefore, although the Japanese ethic, the attitude of inner-worldly asceticism and the idea of calling, promoted successful Japanese economic development, the Japanese ethic did not work to create the Western type of capitalist economy.

Sixth, the institution of state economy and the Japanese management style were examined so as to identify characteristics of the Japanese capitalist system. It was shown how they were influenced by so called Japanese values, actually an ideology, and, therefore, how they constrained the freedom of individuals within the system.

The second aim of the thesis was to evaluate the significance of Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion* today. The book represents one of the best efforts to conceptualize, analyze, and highlight characteristics of Japanese culture focusing on religion and values in relation to her economic success. Our historical background established that just after World War II many of the brightest American students focused on Japanese studies, like Bellah. Since the approaches of Western scholars were different from those of the Japanese scholars, which were mainly descriptive, their works deepened understanding of Japan. In this sense, *Tokugawa Religion* is

a work which represents a fruitful time for Japanese studies in America.

From the perspective of promoting international understanding, the work was one of the rare works on Japan which was prepared for Western readers. In explaining the values of Japan and the U.S., Bellah applies an analytical model which can identify the most significant difference in values of each country simply and clearly: Japan emphasizes political values, in other words, particularism over universalism, and the U. S. emphasizes economic values, in other words, universalism over particularism. This elegant analysis helps people to simply and keenly conceptualize, highlight and compare the values of each country without great difficulty or confusion. The book, therefore, fosters understanding between the two nations. In this sense, Bellah's work should be evaluated favorably as compared to descriptive works.

Weaknesses of the book are that it only focuses on the function of Japanese religion and values for her economic development within the framework of modernization theory, and that it does not critically analyze power relations including relationship among religion, values, ideology, manipulation, and constraint. However, the book is also important to critically understand Japanese traditional culture, because the same key characteristics that Bellah highlights, for example, being loyal to the particular lord and sacrificing oneself to attain the collective's goal, bring not only

economic development but also restrictions of people's freedom and rights. Since the book offers a clear description of this essential characteristic of Japanese culture, the book is significant for critical analysis of Japanese culture also.

Why is it important to recognize crucial characteristics of traditional Japanese culture and their relations to the economic sphere today? Traditional Japanese values enforce loyalty to particularistic lords; they are particularistic rather than universalistic and nationalistic rather than internationalist; and they justify and support rulers. These characteristics helped Japan achieve rapid development, but they also helped preserve injustice and limit freedom within the society.

It is important for the Japanese people to identify the negative characteristics of Japanese culture. Since these cultural characteristics have been around for such a long time, they had indeed got used to accepting these characteristics without even questioning them. However, it is important that workers realize that the moral code and the existing systems involve exploitation and oppression, whether they belong to large or small companies, and that they will be exploited and oppressed as long as they keep believing in so called Japanese values without question, since these values are an ideology created and controlled by rulers and elites. Since exploitation and oppression are often achieved through the existing system without clear opposition, and since these cultural characteristics also have positive aspects, it is

probably hard for the most ordinary Japanese to realize that the moral code and the existing systems are exploitative and oppressive in nature. Actually, they often appreciate these values instead of questioning them. However, it is important to recognize the key nature of Japanese culture and its relation to economic systems as explained in this thesis so that the Japanese may at least start trying to improve the defective aspect of their values and the existing systems.

Since Japan has economically developed so rapidly and successfully, other countries like the U. S. have attempted to learn from some of Japanese economic institutions such as the strong tie between the government and capitalists, the Japanese management style and so on since the early 1980s. Therefore, it would be meaningful for people outside of Japan to have a clear picture of Japanese culture and its role as a mechanism influencing institutions in the economic sphere. First of all, if it is understood that religion, values, and ideology have influenced the economy in Japan, people would question whether it is possible to construct an economic system without the cultural characteristics which are necessary for the system. For example, they would question whether it is possible for the U. S. to adopt only some economic institutions of Japan while continuing to have such different values from Japan.

Moreover, even if we assume that some alternative institutions might be adopted in the West, we have to remember that in order to adopt the institution, the ethic which

supports and maintains the institution may also possibly be introduced. Then, it is significant not to forget that the ethic which supports economic institutions in Japan justifies and supports rulers, and also the institutions themselves legitimize and preserve injustice. If so, the adaptation of Japanese economic institutions could become a source of a new possibility to legitimize injustice, limit the rights of workers and create other forms of exploitation and oppression at the workplace, and become an alternative strategy for management to increase the efficiency of business. In other words, counties which adopt an economic institution from Japan may adopt an economically efficient institution, but they may also adopt the injustice belonging to the system.

Traditional Japanese culture, especially the key characteristics of the traditional culture which were identified in this thesis, were argued to be relatively unchanged till today. But the realm of economic activities has changed and is no longer on a national scale. Especially since the 1980s, the economy of Japan is becoming more and more international not only in the sense of the material exchanges like money or products but also in the sense of human interactions. Japanese companies had to open factories abroad as a solution of the imbalance of international trade. At the same time pressure from foreign countries to open the domestic market are becoming more and more severe. Today is the era of global economy and Japan inevitably has to be a part of the global economic system.

However, Japanese culture, including religion, values, and ideology which created and supported Japanese economic institutions, still has characteristics of particularism and nationalism which justify and support Japanese rulers. This ideology does not support universalistic justice. We have to question today whether the same old values and ideology are still appropriate even for economic success in Japan. Particularism and nationalism which imply that Japan is the center of the world and the Emperor the absolute Lord would not be believed nor accepted by foreign workers, businesspersons, or politicians. It would be simply impossible to force people in other countries to accept such values or economic institutions which preserve those values.

It seems necessary for Japan to transform the old values and economic systems into universalistic and internationalistic ones in order to survive in the global economy in the future. It is ironical to draw such a conclusion at the end of this thesis since this thesis mainly focuses on explaining the opposite direction of influence: how cultural factors affected the economic development of Japan in the past. It suggests complicated two-way influences between culture and economy.

There are theoretically two directions for Japan to follow. The first direction is to transform the old values into new universalistic values in order for Japan to fit into the global economic system. If she fails to transform or, even, from the beginning, does not try to transform her

values, the second direction is to try to maintain or even reinforce the old values and ideology, and to change her peaceful economic strategy after World War II into a different type of economic expansions. The latter direction might bring another destructive result, since Japanese religion, especially Shinto elements, motivate people's activities in mystical and irrational ways. Since Japan looks highly modernized and socially democratized, people might overlook the possibility that a destructive direction is still open. In this sense, it remains significant to analyze Japan's traditional culture today.

The work which is left to do in this thesis and which we should work on as the next step includes empirical studies at macro and micro levels. At micro level, for example, we might study Japanese companies which opened their transplants in the U. S.: What kind of frictions or resistances are related with cultural differences? How are they actually dealing with these problems? Do they try to indoctrinate workers in particularistic values from Japan, or do they try to transform their culture at the workplace into a universalistic one? Which companies attempting to transplant their culture or transform their culture are successful and which are failing in the U. S.?

At the macro level of studies, it will be always necessary to have empirical studies to check whether Japanese rulers are using, either implicitly or explicitly, Japanese religion to create a new ideology or reinforce the old one so

as to achieve their aims.[1] It should be the task of social scientists to fully understand the mechanism of manipulation of religion in Japan from past experiences, and warn people if any new attempts are found, usually in ultranationalism or the rightist ideas, to blind and manipulate people.

Nationalism could arise again in Japan given today's international economic instability and trade tensions. However, nationalism can be particularly disruptive in the age of the global economy. Therefore, mutual understanding among nations seems to be more important than ever.

I hope that this thesis will promote U. S. understanding of Japan by providing a good foundation to appropriately judge, appreciate, and criticize Japan, and modestly contribute to keeping a friendly relationship between the two nations.

NOTES

Chapter I

1. Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, his best-known work, was first published in 1904. In this thesis, the following text in English is used: Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1990).

2. Robert N. Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion The Values of Pre-industrial Japan* was first published in 1957.

3. Michio Morishima, *Why Has Japan 'Succeeded': The Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos* was first published in 1982.

4. *Shakaigaku Hyoron* (Japanese Sociological Review) (Tokyo: Japan Sociological Society, 1955-1990). *Soshioroji* (Sociology) (Tokyo: Shakaigaku Kenkyukai, 1983-1989). *Keizai Hyoron* (Economics Review) (Tokyo: Nihon-hyoron-sha, 1980-1991).

5. The first paperback edition was published in 1985. The subtitle was changed from "The Values of Pre-industrial Japan" to "The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan."

Chapter II

1. John Whitney Hall, *Japanese History: New Dimensions of Approach and Understanding* (Washington D. C.: A Service of the American Historical Association, 1961), pp. 2-7.

2. Kenichiro Shoda, "*America ni okeru Nihon-kindaika no Kenkyu: Sono Doko to Mondaiten*" (Studies of Japanese Modernization in America: The Trends and Points at Issue), in *America no Nihon Kenkyu* (Japanese Studies in America) (Tokyo: Toyo-Keizai-Shinpo-Sha, 1970), pp. 103-107.

3. Mataji Miyamoto, "*Gairon: America no Nihonshi-Gaku*" (An Introduction: Japanese History in America) in Mataji Miyamoto ed., *America no Nihon-Kenku* (Japanese Studies in America) (Tokyo: Toyo-Keizai-Shinpo-Sha, 1970), pp. 23-24.

Chapter III

1. According to Bellah, Figure 1 is a paradigm showing the interrelations of most of the technical terms used in his study.

2. Though Bellah does not especially identify which book, it seems that he uses the following book by Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 197.

3. Though Bellah does not especially identify which book, the following books are on his bibliography: Max Weber, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and D. Martindale, *Ancient Judaism* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), p.484, Max Weber, trans. and ed. by G. G. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.490,

Max Weber, ed. by M. Rheinstein, trans. by E. Shils and M. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 363, Max Weber, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth, *The Religion of China* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951), p.308, and Max Weber, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. by Talcott Parsons *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 436.

Chapter IV

1. R. J. Kirby, quoted by Bellah, " Ancestral Worship in Japan," in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 38* (Tokyo: Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 1910), p.238.
2. *ibid.*, p.246.
3. N. R. M. Ehara, quoted by Bellah, *The Awakening to the Truth of Kaimokusho*, by Nichiren (Tokyo: International Buddhist Society, 1941), p. 61.
4. Tamotsu Iwado, quoted by Bellah, "*'Hagakure Bushido'* or the Book of the Warrior," in *Cultural Nippon*, 7,3 (1939), p. 39.
5. *ibid.*, p. 55.
6. *ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
7. Earnest Satow, quoted by Bellah, "The Revival of Pure Shin-tau," in Appendix in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 3* (Tokyo: Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 1874), p. 188.
8. Horst Hammizsch, quoted by Bellah, *Die Mito-Schule* (Tokyo: *Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Natur-und Volkerkunde Ostasiens*, 1939), p. 50.
9. Eijiro Honjo, quoted by Bellah, "Economic Ideas in *Tokugawa* Days," in *Kyoto University Economic Review*, vol. 13,1 (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 1938), p.5.

Chapter V

1. Masao Maruyama, "*Bellah "Tokugawa Jidai no Shukyo*" (Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*) in *Kokka Gakkai Zashi* (Journal of the Association of Political Social Sciences), vol. 72, no. 4 (Tokyo, 1958), pp.95-116.
2. Michael Mann, ed. *The International Encyclopedia of Sociology* (New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984). pp. 89-90, pp. 244-245, and pp. 433-434.
3. See the following books by C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), Alvin W. Gouldner, *The coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc, 1970), and Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia," in *Essays in the Theory of Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).
4. Robert N. Bellah, "Research Chronicle: *Tokugawa Religion*," ed. by Phillip E. Hammond, in *Sociologists at Work* (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 157-159.

5. *ibid.*, p. 158.

6. Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. xx-xxi.

7. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, Inc., 1992), pp. 395-396.

8. Mataji Miyamoto, ed. by Mataji Miyamoto in *America no Nihon Kenkyu* (Japanese Studies in America) (Tokyo: Toyo-Keizai-Shinpo-Sha, 1970), pp. 76-79.

9. *ibid.*, pp. 76-79.

10. Hisashi Aizawa, *Gendai Kokka ni okeru Shukyo to Seiji* (Religion and Politics in Modern States) (Tokyo: Koso-Shobo, 1969).

11. The research was done by Fumiko Fukase at the Library of Hokkaido University and Hokusei-Gakuen University in Sapporo, Japan in June and July, 1992. See the section of methodology for farther information.

12. Yasukazu Takenaka, "*Robert N. Bellah no Shingaku-Kan: R. N. Bellah's "Tokugawa Religion" ni tsuite*" (Robert N. Bellah's View of Shingaku: About R. N. Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*), in Mataji Miyamoto ed., *America no Nihon Kenkyu* (Japanese Studies in America) (Tokyo: Toyo-Keizai-Shinpo-Sha, 1970), pp. 151-170.

13. Ichoro Hori, *Nihon no Shukyo no Shakaiteki Yakuwari* (Social Roles of Japanese Religion) (Tokyo: Mirai-sha, 1973).

14. Akira Ikeda, *Nihon no Seishin-Kozo Josetsu: Shukyo to Seiji ni okeru Kodo to Kachi* (An Introduction to Japanese Spiritual Structure: Actions and Values in Religion and Politics) (Tokyo: Koso-Shobo, 1967).

15. The following works are good example, Makoto Ogasawara, *Nihon no Kindaika to Jodo-Shin Shu: Max Weber teki Mondai-Ishiki oyobi Bunseki-Shikaku tono kanren deno ni, san no Mondai ni tsuite* (Japanese Modernization and *Jodo-Shin Shu*), in *Reviews of Sociology* (Tokyo: Japanese Sociological Association, 1881), pp.57-71, Tatsukichi Mori, "*Nihon no Kindai-ka to Shin Shu*" (Japanese Modernization and Shin Shu) in *The Journal of Economic Studies of Ryukyu University* (Kyoto: Society of Economics of Ryukyu University, 1968), or Kenich Suzuki, *Nihon no Kindai-ka to "On" no Shiso* (Japanese Modernization and Spirits of "On") (Kyoto: Horitsu-Bunka-Sha, 1964).

16. John Whitney Hall, *Japanese History: New Dimensions of Approach and Understanding* (Washington D. C.: A Service of the American historical Association, 1961).

17. *Social Sciences Citation Index: Guide and Lists of Source Publications* (Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Information, Inc., 1966-1992).

18. Akira Ikeda, "*Nihon-Shukyo ni okeru Seiji-Kachi: Robert N. Bellah no Seiji-Kachiron Hihan*" (Political Values in Japanese Religion: A Criticism of Robert N. Bellah's Political Values), in *Nihon no Seishinkozo Josetsu: Shukyo to Seiji ni okiru Kodo to Kachi* (An Introduction to Japanese Spiritual

Structure: Actions and Values in Religion and Politics) (Tokyo: Koso-shobo, 1967).

19. Max Weber, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive sociology* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 24-25.

Chapter VI

1. His main publications in English are as follow: *Equilibrium, Stability, and Growth: A Multi-Sectoral Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), *Theory of Economic Growth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), *The Working of Economic Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), *Marx's Economics: A Dual Theory of Value and Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), *The Economic Theory of Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), *The Economics of Industrial Society* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), *Ricardo's Economics: A General Equilibrium Theory of Distribution and Growth* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), and *Capital and Credit: A New Formulation of General Equilibrium Theory* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

2. His main publications in Japanese language in the area of social science are as follow: *Igirisu to Nihon: Sono Kyoiku to Keizai* (England and Japan: Their Educational Systems and Economies) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), *Zoku Igirisu to Nihon: Sono Kokuminsei to Shakai* (A Sequel to England and Japan: Their National Characters and Societies) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), *Thatcher Jidai no Igirisu: Sono Seiji, Keizai, Kyoiku* (England under Thatcher's Era: Its Politics, Economy, and Educational Systems) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), and *Seijika no Jyoken: Igirisu, EC, Nihon* (Requirements for Politicians: England, EC, and Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991). In many of these books, he brings Weber's ideas into his arguments. Since Weber was introduced to Japan not by Parsons but directly from Germany, Morishima's understanding of Weber is not particularly influenced by Parsons' interpretation of Weber.

3. The fact that the book was not written following the discipline of Western sociology seems to create difficulty for making Western readers understand what Morishima really wants to explain without confusion. For example, Winston Davis criticizes Morishima's book in his book, *Japanese Religion and Society: Paradigms of Structure and Change* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), claiming that "Morishima's book is difficult to evaluate since it is written in the genre of Japan theory" (ibid. 128), or that in "most cases, I (Davis) find no way to evaluate Morishima's claims at all" (ibid. 134). Morishima has claimed that the main aim of his book has been often misinterpreted as a telling of the success story of Japan, although his real aim was to construct a non-Western type of economic analysis. The source of this

misunderstanding also seems to be more or less originated from different disciplines of writing in the West and Japan.

Chapter VII

1. Figure 2 shows a summary of comparison between Bellah and Morishima.

Chapter VIII

1. For example, a study such as *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor* (New York: New York University Press, 1988) by Kiyoko Takeda is significant.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX



The Four Dimensions:

A: Adaptation
G: Goal Attainment
I: Integration
L: Latency

Figure 1. FUNCTIONAL SUB-SYSTEMS OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM



Figure 2. SUMMARY OF COMPARISON BETWEEN BELLAH AND MORISHIMA

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