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NIETZSCHE'S "HOTHOUSE FOR STRANGE AND CHOICE PLANTS'I

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Michael J. Motta

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NIETZSCHE'S "HOTHOUSE FOR STRANGE AND CHOICE PLANTS"

BY

Michael J. Motta

A THESIS
Submitted to Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of '

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Philosophy

1991

 

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ABSTRACT

NIETZSCHE'S "HOTHOUSE FOR STRANGE AND CHOICE PLANTS"

BY

Michael J. Motta

Friedrich Nietzsche's relationship to political
philosophy has been described in many different ways. Some
argue that he is apolitical and others stress his anti-
political statements. Of those who believe that Nietzsche
is an important political philosopher, there are
interpretations spanning the range from Right to Left and in
between. This thesis argues that Nietzsche does forward a
semblance of a political agenda and at least partially
describes the type of human being he seeks. The purpose of
the thesis is to augment new ways of thinking about both
Nietzsche and Right Wing politics. Multifarious primary

sources are employed in buttressing this position.

 

DEDICATION

To My Family

iii

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Professors Herbert Garelick, Albert Cafagna,
and Folke Lindahl; the first for chairing my M.A. committee
and the others for assisting. I also thank Professor M.
Richard Zinman for his inspirational undergraduate
instruction.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction......................................
II. The Great Human Being.............................
III. Conditions For The Existence Of The Type..........
A. Christian Morality............................
B. The Highest Man As Instigator.................
IV. The Role Of Rule..................................
A. The So-called Tolerant Regime -- Its Defects..
B. The Regime That Wills The Great Human Being...
V. Conclusion........................................

BibliogathOOOOOOOO0......00.0.0.0...OOOOOOIOOOOOOOOO...

 

16

16

18

23

23

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39

42

 

 

I. INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of this paper is to encourage its
readers to not only consider the values of humanity, but
also our possibilities. To me, that is a proper purpose of
the educational process.

I have chosen as a vehicle for this goal the study of
Friedrich Nietzsche's most concrete recommendations for
humanity which occur in the latest works. But why Nietzsche
and why his prescriptive side?

First, there can be little doubt that Nietzsche is one
of the foremost thinkers of the past two centuries and
possibly of all time. Second, it seems as though there is
widespread ignorance of the fact that there is something
normative, though perhaps not dogmatic, in his writing.
Third, those who recognize Nietzsche's seemingly harsh
prescriptions tend to reject them summarily as if they are
only the banterings of a lunatic and are utterly unworthy of
consideration.

I have chosen some of Nietzsche's most cutting remarks.
Part of the attraction of the hard core and unabridged
Nietzsche is the fact that it is terribly unfashionable.
Then, again, if diversity and toleration are to be the
hallmarks of the contemporary university, the unfashionable

should serve these ends well.

 

2

Two social institutions that tend to be ignored by
reformative discourse are slavery and eugenics. For lack of
a better term, the word slavery is used by Nietzsche and I
will be discussing it seriously. The problem is that
slavery for Nietzsche doesn't necessarily mean cruelty or
racism or anything like that; it simply reflects a stratum
of society who may end up happier than the leisured class.
They are the portion of mankind that makes higher
individuals possible.
More implicit than explicit in Nietzsche's writings is
the notion of eugenics. He sometimes refers to breeding
directly, but for the most part, eugenics is couched in
poetic and epigrammatic writing. An example of this occurs
in a section of Zarathustra entitled, “On Child and
Marriage", which is a form of intellectual birth control.
You are young and wish for a child and
marriage. But I ask you: are you a man
entitled to wish for a child? Are you
the victorious one, the self—conquerer,
the commander of your senses, the master
of your virtues? This I ask you. Or is
it the animal and need that speak out of
your wish? Or loneliness? Or lack of
peace with yourself?
Let your victory and your freedom long
for a child. You shall bring living
monuments to your victory and your
liberation. You shall build over and
beyond yourself, but first you must build
yourself, perpendicular in body and soul.
You shall not only reproduce yourself,
but produce something higher. May the
garden of marriage help you in that!
(PN, p. 181)

By eugenics, Nietzsche does not mean that humans are to be

systematically wiped out because of their race or something

 

 

3

else. He only means that we are to make the betterment of
humanity, not its control, the goal. There is grooming
involved, but this is based upon merits that are not derived
from race, color, nor totally from birth. Furthermore,
since there is class distinction, there will resulting
mating of the high with the high and the masses with the
masses, not necessarily governmentally enforced, but by
association.

Now to proceed into a rough outline of the already

rough outline that is Nietzsche's agenda for humanity.

 

II. THE GREAT HUMAN BEING

 

II. THE GREAT HUMAN BEING

My ideas do not revolve around the degree
of freedom that is granted to the one or
to the other or to all, but around the
degree of power that the one or the other
should exercise over others or over all,
and to what extent a sacrifice of
freedom, even enslavement, provides the
basis for the emergence of a higher type.
(WP, 859)

This is a statement of Nietzsche's goal for mankind: to
produce its highest specimens. Social and political agendas
are to be evaluated based on their tendencies toward this
end. Universal freedom, liberty, equality, happiness,
survival, gentleness and other such common desiderata pale
in comparison to the full man and are generally considered
to be hostile to the growth of the great human being. But
this will be taken up later. For now, I just wish to
establish the springboard of this essay: that Nietzsche
makes major import of the idea that mankind ought to set its
sights on the promotion of great individuals, even at the
expense of many moral concerns. This seems to me to be an
interpretation that is fairly uncontroversial as far as
Nietzsche scholarship is concerned. Hence, I have chosen to
spend little effort in support of this position. The

controversy really starts at the point when we wonder about

the characteristics of the bigger and better human and

 

especially when we debate the preconditions, both personal

and societal, for his existence. It is with this view of
the matter that I begin an exposition of some of the
qualities of the great human being.

Nietzsche employs many different terms in labeling the
man of his aims. Among those are the noble man, the
overman, the higher type, philosopher of the future, free
spirit, and highest man. While these kinds are sometimes
granted differing characteristics, particularly the free

spirit of Human, All Too Human, for the most part, they

 

overlap. The main distinction that I wish to hold in this
paper is that between the highest man and all of the other
names. I believe that Nietzsche reserves a special role for
the highest man, that role being to engage himself in grand
legislation. This, too, will be discussed later.

Chronologically, from Zarathustra onwards, it is my

 

impression that much of the change in terminology is due to
a filling in process of the idea of the overman. In other

words, discussions of the noble in Beyond Good and Evil and

 

in The Will to Power are essentially means of clarifying

 

what it is about the overman that makes him superior to
others. By no means do I intend to suggest Nietzsche's
replies to the rhetorical question, "What is noble?"
constitute an exhaustive and exclusive set of criteria.

They are rather rough guidelines and suggestions. The noble
man need not possess all of the traits proffered, yet you

may guarantee that an individual who consistently

 

6

contradicts them is not within the range of Nietzsche's
description. So then, what is noble?

One of Nietzsche's earliest ponderings on the noble
involves a statement of what the noble man is not. The type
of human that Nietzsche seeks is not a university professor,
even of philosophy. A philosopher is one who acts. His
life and his philosophy are inextricably bound. Engagement
is emphasized over idle contemplation. There is not the
dichotomy that exists in philosophical laborers between
academia on the one hand, and life on the other. This is a
problem with which Sartre would later wrestle throughout
much of his life.

The early essay entitled, On the Uses and Disadvantages

 

of History for Life, hints at the pedantry involved in

 

scholarly activity.

In an age which suffers from this
universal education, to what an
unnatural, artificial and in any case
unworthy state must the most truthful of
all sciences, the honest naked goddess
philosophy, be reduced! . . . No one
dares venture to fulfill the
philosophical law in himself, no one
lives philosophically with that simple
loyalty that constrained a man of
antiquity to bear himself as a Stoic
wherever he was, whatever he did, once he
had affirmed his loyalty to the Stoa.
All modern philosophizing is political
and official, limited by governments,
churches, academies, customs, and the
cowardice of men to the appearance of
scholarship . . . if modern man had any
courage or resolution at all, if he were
not merely a subjective creature even in
his enmities, he would banish philosophy;
as it is, he contents himself with
modestly concealing its nudity. One may
think, write, print, speak, teach

 

 

 

 

 

7

philosophy -- to that point more or less
everything is permitted; only in the
realm of action, of so-called life, is it
otherwise: there only one thing is ever
permitted and everything else simply
impossible: thus will historical culture
have it. Are there still human beings,
one then asks oneself, or perhaps only
thinking-, writing— and speaking-
machines?

(UM, p. 85)

Another early essay, Schopenhauer as Educator,

 

reaffirms the incompatibility of scholarship and nobility.

A scholar can never become a philosopher;
for even Kant was unable to do so but,
the inborn pressure of his genius
notwithstanding, remained to the end as
it were in a Chrysalis stage. He who
thinks that in saying this I am doing
Kant an injustice does not know what a
philosopher is, namely not merely a great
thinker but also a real human being; and
when did a scholar ever become a real
human being?

(UM, p. 181)

Harsh words, indeed, but anticipatory of the development of
Nietzsche's conception of the great human being whose
thoughts grow into deeds.

In his so-called middle period, often classified as

positivistic, Nietzsche writes, Human All Too Human,

 

subtitled, "A Book for Free Spirits". Here, he provides us
with a skeleton of what is to come of his cherished type of
man in later writings.

He is called a free spirit who thinks
differently from what, on the basis of
his origin, environment, his class and
profession, or on the basis of the
dominant views of his age, would have
been expected of him. He is the
exception, the fettered spirits are the
rule; the latter reproach him that his
free principles either originate in a

 

 

8

desire to shock and offend or eventuate

in free actions, that is to say in

actions incompatible with sound morals.

(HH, p. 225)
The aphorism from which this passage is extracted is
entitled, "Free spirit a relative concept". Later writings
show that if indeed the free spirit is a relative concept,
it is a precondition for becoming noble. Since society is
currently base, one must think and act differently in order
to become a higher human. Because what it means in a
specific case to act differently is dependent on the status
quo, most of the attributes of the free spirit are relative.
Contemporary usage of the phrase "free spirit" reflects some
of the Nietzschean formulation insofar as today we intend
that the free spirit is one who rejects convention and even

opposes himself to it, often in shocking ways.

In 1882, four years after Human, All Too Human was

 

published, the first four books of The Gay Science went into

 

print. Aphorism 143, entitled, "The greatest advantage of
polytheism" (noted by Walter Kaufmann as being Nietzsche's
first usage of the term "overmen“), expands upon the idea of
the free spirit. Nietzsche attributes to polytheism the
role of initiating the creative and legislative impulses of
strong egos into the world. A plurality of invented gods
meant a plurality of norms. This passage from single norms
to quarreling gods and demi-gods opened the way for man to
justify individualism, and for those possessing them to
unleash their radically personal instincts. Monotheism

threatens to limit man with its disallowal of varying

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

natures. The likelihood of the advent of the free spirit

had been slight until polytheism, and was set back again
under Christianity. Now Nietzsche stands as the announcer
of the death of God, and therefore the death of monotheism.
There has become room for an even greater "free-spiriting
and many-spiriting of man" than existed under polytheism.
This is "the strength to create for ourselves our own new
eyes" (GS, p. 143).
The human of Nietzsche's desire is greatly expanded

upon with the advent of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is here,

 

too, that the inequality of men is propounded. The overman
is not just the new self of any old person, but rather the
product of a long and many-generational labor. The section
entitled "On the Three Metamorphoses" is key to
understanding both the whole of the work and the continually
more fecund development of Nietzsche's conception of the
higher man. Employing the imagery of the camel, the lion,
and the child as metaphors for the personal growth of the
overman, Nietzsche proceeds into the main text of the book.
"Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the
spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the lion,
finally a child" (PH, p. 37). The spirit is a person of
some initial potential to transform; very few natures would
even be considered spirits. That the spirit should first
become a camel or beast of burden is a necessity if he
wishes to attain higher states of being. The camel is he

who is humble and suffers much from the search for knowledge

 

   

10

and from just living among the rabble, and who undergoes
this hardship on purpose. The spirit moves from camel to
lion when loneliness and steadfastness have brought forth
the terrifying wisdom that the responsibility for value
creation lies within its sphere. The lion says "no" to the
call to conform with preordained values. The nay-saying
makes possible the creation of new values. The spirit now
becomes child -- playful, energetic, innocent, and
yes-saying to life. The child wins the world over by
involving himself in its creation. I would suggest that the
metamorphoses may also be looked at in terms of eras instead
of just individuals; that is, one era is camel-like and
preparatory for the lion era, which is, in turn, a
precondition of the new values of the child era. At any
rate, it seems clear that a basic framework of requisite
strengths in the higher man is beginning to take shape in

Nietzsche's thought by this time. Zarathustra is a grand

 

work and to do full justice to its musings on overcoming and
higher men would require the writing of a tome.

Beyond Good and Evil and The Will to Power comprise the

 

 

most straightforward and fully—developed messages that
Nietzsche has to deliver on the characteristics of the
higher man. It is for these reasons that I choose to
concentrate on those works. Conventional wisdom amongst

Nietzsche scholars says that Beyond Good and Evil is a

 

commentary on Zarathustra. In this book, one finds the

 

noble contrasted with the common or the base. There is an

 

 

ll

attempt to supersede the Christian-Platonic distinction
between Good and Evil by initiating a language that
contrasts a new good with bad. Noble acts proceed from
higher men and vice versa, base acts proceed form bad men
and vice versa.

What is noble and what base? "There is an instinct for
rank which, more than anything else, is a sign of high rank:
there is a delight in the nuance of reverence that allows us
to infer noble origin and habits" (BW, p. 402). The
instinct for rank is the intuition of the varying strengths
and valuations of people. It is the admission of and
celebration of inequality. The noble man lives in harmony
with his instinct for forming his own rules. He is a master
rather than a slave. The self—imposed hardness of the noble
man, along with his nausea of the herd, often leads to his
destruction or, worse yet, corruption. He is a tormented
human. Nietzsche states, ". . . it almost determines the
order of rank how profoundly human beings can suffer. . . ."

and further in section 270 of Beyond Good and Evil,

 

"Profound suffering makes noble; it separates” (BW, p. 410).
So the capacity to suffer immensely, coupled with the
actualization of that suffering, is a mark of nobility
second only to the instinct for rank. One might conclude
that the latter is often an outgrowth of the former.

Thus far then, the chronological sampling of some of
Nietzsche's works has provided some hints and sketches of
the kind of human that he would seek to cultivate. He is

not a scholar, yet is still a rebel against established

 

 

12

norms. He is someone who would bear much harshness and
nausea. The realization that he is personally responsible
for value creation leads him to give birth to new values.

He is a being of torment and an intuiter of order of rank.
These are vague attributes and, even if one understands
Nietzsche as a philosopher who is often purposefully general
so as not to contradict his own distrust of dogma and his
call for creativity, one might yet wonder what, if anything,
he has concealed from his audience. There are numerous
passages in which Nietzsche extols the virtues of silence.
His private notebooks, however controversial and neglected
they may be, are to my mind the fullest and most concrete
expressions of much of Nietzsche's ultimate meaning. It is
often argued that Nietzsche has no ultimate meaning, nor
does he intend one. I agree with this to the extent that
the thinker does exhort his students to reach beyond and
even to deny him. But, wouldn't it be nice to increase
one's knowledge of what one is supposed to supersede? And
isn't it of some merit as an exercise in art history and
psychology to attempt to penetrate past Nietzsche's surface
teaching about self-overcoming in order to better understand
how he himself created? To see what his "evils" were? One
might take up a study of Nietzsche's life in order to answer
these questions; he, of course, encourages us in that
regard. I feel that an equally valid and overlapping
enterprise involves study of his notes. His notebook

sketches intended for a work which he became too mad to

 

 

13

produce are compiled under the title, The Will to Power.

 

I choose to refer to this work because of its merits of
chronological position and its relative lucidity, as well as
its forthrightness. "What is noble?" asks Nietzsche of
himself. Here are some answers selected from a section of
the notebooks.

Apparent frivolity in word, dress,
bearing, through which a stoic severity
and self-constraint protects itself
against all immodest inquisitiveness.

Our doubt as to the communicability
of the heart goes deep; solitude not as
chosen but as given.

The conviction that one has duties
only to one's equals, toward the others
one acts as one thinks best: that justice
can be hoped for (unfortunately not
counted on) only inter pares.

Pleasure in princes and priests,
because they preserve the belief in
differences in human values even in the
valuation of the past, at least
symbolically and on the whole even
actually.

Ability to keep silent: but not a
word about that in the presence of
listeners.

Disgust for the demagogic, for the
"enlightenment," for "being cozy," for
plebeian familiarity.

We esteem the good very little, as
herd animals: we know that in the worst,
most malignant, hardest men a priceless
golden drop of goodness is often
concealed, that outweighs all mere
benevolence of milk souls.

We consider that a man of our kind is
not refuted by his vices, nor by his
follies. We know that we are hard to
recognize, and that we have every reason
to give ourselves foregrounds.

(WP, p. 943)

By the end of this section, Nietzsche makes extensive
usage of first person plural in speaking of the noble. He

says "we" do this and that. Yes, Nietzsche probably did by

 

14

the end of his life identify himself with at least the
rudiments of the higher man he so desperately sought. This,
were it true, does not constitute a contradiction in his
philosophy; rather it fits in quite nicely. There is
nothing good or evil in itself. Even the good and bad are
largely formed by the great individual to suit his own
strengths. Thus, by his putting forth these properties and
prerogatives of the noble human, Nietzsche in effect is
attempting to carry out the work of the child, of the
successor to the lion. His will to power is overflowing, if
not in the form of societal legislation, at least in self-
legislation. One might imagine Nietzsche treating the list
almost as if it represented imperatives for his conduct.

I say, almost because the difference between what we
traditionally consider moral imperatives and what Nietzsche
is doing, resides partially in the fact that Nietzsche
acknowledges to himself that he has shaped his own law.
Further, Nietzsche demonstrates his lack of fear for
conflict between laws. The last statement in the list says
that vice and folly do not make for the refutation of the
noble person. Perhaps what is meant by vice and folly is
precisely the disobeying of one rule as the result of
following another. An example is the conflict between
silence and writing. Nietzsche praises the ability to
remain silent, yet he opts to publish. Not only then would
one's personal laws reflect the artist, so also in the event
of a collision of rules would one's choices in the matter

bear an individualistic stamp.

 

15

Again, the laundry list of noble qualities is offered
as an example of Nietzsche's own self—overcoming. It is not
imperative that the higher man should adopt or possess all
of these qualities. The essential elements are that the
higher man is neither a herd animal nor an adherent to a
pre-ordained religious or metaphysical system. The task
becomes one of restructuring the social order so that the
herd does not, with its religious and economic pressure,
force every man, rich or poor, into living as an undeveloped
being. A few must be allowed an encouraged to develop

themselves, as this is Nietzsche's goal for mankind.

 

 

III. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE TYPE

 

 

III. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE TYPE

A. Christian Morality

 

Nothing is more central to Nietzsche's philosophy than
his brazen attack on Christianity. It is the popularization
of Platonism, undertaken by Christianity, which constitutes
the roots of nihilism in a denial of the worldly in favor of
the otherworldly. Christianity does though contain the
merit of having made man into a spiritual creature. It was
this religion (in the West) that made the sublimation of
instincts widespread and resulted in the sciences and higher
arts. But, it is time to move on, God is dead and soon,
too, may fall the moral superstructure. Nietzsche's task is
to reveal the shortcomings of man as a Christian being,
thereby hoping to provide the conditions for a better man.
There is a danger that the death of God will not bring about
these conditions, that Christianity will remain in its
practical effects. Should this occur, the last man will
inhabit the earth. The values of the last man are hostile
to the advent of the high man in that equality and
conformism resent the high. This resentment attacks the
very core of the potentially great at the moment of birth
and does not cease until the invaded party has been tamed or

killed.

16

 

 

 

 

17

Type of my disciples. -- to those human

beings who are of any concern to me I

wish suffering, desolation, sickness,

ill-treatment, indignities -- I wish that

they should not remain unfamiliar with

profound self-contempt, the torture of

mistrust, the wretchedness of the

vanquished: I have no pity for them,

because I wish them the only thing that

can prove today whether one is worth

anything or not -- that one endures.

(WP, p. 910)
Nietzsche here speaks of contemporary society, which,
although not yet productive of the last man, is heading in
that direction. The harsh wishes for disciples will only
come true if the individuals are in fact noble. It will be
their disregard for present conditions which will help to
fuel a countermovement.

The key aspect of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity

is, for this paper, the leveling effect. The weak and
the meek, the dull and the disadvantaged, are, according to
current morality, to be pitied and raised up. The
exceptional, on the other hand, are, at best, ignored. Many
would find these statements hard to swallow. They might
argue that the so-called elites still run the world
selfishly. I think Nietzsche would agree that this is the
case, yet the decisions of the elite are determined by the
masses. Could anyone be elected to the school board who
openly advocated cutting money to remedial education in
order to hire special teachers for honors programs? Not in
most areas of this country, if any.

Likely modern ways of dealing with exceptional

individuals include: directing them to money, to practical

   

 

 

 

 

 

18

science, to "humanitarian" causes, or any other such narrow
and predetermined usage. American society was supposedly
founded on a framework of individualism, the problem is that
entrepreneuring is about the only kind of individual
activity that a life can revolve around. Two forces impinge
here. The initially exceptional person is stripped of his
chances at becoming a full personality by the near necessity
of having to work a specialized job. Then, unable to
express himself fully, he must soon either go mad or get
involved with the herd, where his neurosis will be soothed.
The life of the herd animal becomes the only possible life.
To remain within the herd one must profess to herd values of
equality, comfort, safety, ease, pity, and sociability,
among other things. The aspirant is thus emasculated. This
is one of the tragic results of Christian-informed modern
society, though Christianity represents only one possible
configuration of a herd morality. Whenever there is
ressentiment, there is the danger of corruption.

The two major defects of Christianity with regard to
production of the noble man are that it just doesn't want to
produce the noble (even resents it) and that even when a
certain measure of progress has been made by an individual,
often without outside help, social forces work at breaking
him.

B, The Highest Man as Instigator

 

If Christian morality is hostile to the development of

the high man, what must be accomplished in order to

 

 

l9

overthrow it or to lessen its detrimental effects? The
answer to this question will be forthcoming from the
"highest man," should he enter the scene by chance. There
are at least two senses in which the highest man may be said
to be higher than the "merely" high men. First, the highest
man must be strong as Samson, for he will have to endure the
adversity which flows from a society ill-suited to his
temperament. Not only must he fight a tremendous battle, he
must also become legislator and commander. The law that he
invests must include provisions suitable for the growth of
the high type. He must convince the political laborers of
the grand nature of his laws so that those laws are executed
and revered. He must not lower himself to the holding of an
office, else distance from the rabble will elude him. In
the final page of his notes, Nietzsche writes, "Order of
rank: He who determines values and directs the will of
millennia by giving direction to the highest natures is the
highest man" (WP, p. 999). And then, "I believe I have
guessed some of the things in the soul of the highest man;
perhaps anyone who unriddles him must perish; but, whoever
has seen him must help to make him possible" (WP, p. 1000).

It is then the task of the highest man to facilitate
the production of great human beings and perhaps to give
them some direction, though it is unclear what all that
would entail. Maybe the highest man is to function.
partially as an example to future humans, to be the object
of one of the functions of history promulgated in On the

Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.

 

 

 

20

That the great moments in the struggle of

the human individual constitute a chain,

that this chain unites mankind across the

millennia like a range of human mountain

peaks, that the summit of such a long-ago

moment shall be for me still living,

bright and great -- that is the

fundamental idea of the faith in humanity

which finds expression in the demand for

a monumental history.

(UM, p. 58)
From the same essay we find that "History belongs above all
to the man of deeds and power, to him who fights a great
fight, who needs models, teachers, comforters, and cannot
find them among his contemporaries" (Ibid., p. 67).

Of course, any monumental aspect of the highest man

is just a bonus compared with the actual legislations that
he invokes. Moral support in itself will not be enough. A
eugenics program of sorts must at least be initiated by the
highest man. When I say "eugenics," I mean it in the sense
of taking strides that will aid in the breeding of higher
types. "A doctrine is needed powerful enough to work as a
breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and
destructive for the world weary" (WP, p. 862). Nietzsche
recognizes, however, that it is likely, and to a certain
extent desirable, that there will always be a herd. A major
reason for Zarathustra's vertigo at the thought of eternal
return is that even the vulgar must recur infinitely. Yet,
it is acknowledged that without the low, there can be no
high. "What I fight against: that an exceptional type

should make war on the rule -- instead of grasping that the

continued existence of the rule is the precondition for the

   

21

value of the exception" (WP, p. 894). In other words,
rarity and excellence go hand in hand. There are the
practical concerns of leisure time to be considered as well.
Many must labor so that a few can have leisure. One of
Nietzsche's favorite Latin words is otium. This term can be
translated in several ways. For Nietzsche, it usually means
the leisure to think about and discuss life and to engage
oneself in art. It is the prerogative of the highest man
to, at the very least, reestablish otium as a great value.
There is a sense in which otium is to be valued for its own
sake. Leisure is specifically human. It would constitute a
re—animalization of mankind to allow leisure to be
confiscated by proponents of equality. By
"re-animalization," all that is meant is the loss of the
ability to reflect on existence and thus to fail to go
beyond the dictatorship of a hedonism of the moment.

Leisure is also nearly a prerequisite for self-overcoming
and creation. How can a person become a personality or
otherwise an artist if that person is constantly subject to
the "thou shalt's" of labor? Were Nietzsche to witness the
current state of education and labor, he might claim to be
witnessing a perverted reversal of the metamorphoses of
life. Elementary school encourages personal creation in the
children it teaches when they are not yet ripe to take full
advantage of the freedom.. Secondary school and college then
prepare one for the dictates of workaday life. As soon as

one becomes a little bit capable of taking full advantage of

 

 

22

leisure, it is carried away and not available again until
retirement, at which time the years of slavishness have
taken their toll and the retiree knows not what leisure is
for. He feels guilt and boredom.

The highest man must instigate a value change so that
mankind may again show some self-respect. Stagnation occurs
when everyone lives to labor and labors to live. Even what
exists of a leisure class today can only be called leisurely
in the most vulgar sense. The highest man is the initiator
of a radical shift in values from which a new political

structure will follow.

   

IV. THE ROLE OF RULE

 

IV. THE ROLE OF RULE

A. The So-Called Tolerant Regime -- Its Defects
The claim of liberalism to allow any citizen to become

whatever he or she wills is qualified by what is known as
industry. The system of rewards is determined by "how hard
one works." The Marxist unmasking of this hackneyed phrase
is well documented in the literature. For the Marxist,
there is not enough equality of opportunity. For Nietzsche,
equality continues to increase at the expense of the higher
types. I quote Werner Dannhauser:

The rule of low forms of life at the

expense of higher forms is for Nietzsche

the meaning of democracy. Democracy is

mediocrity. There is no significant

difference between democracy and

socialism. Both democracy and socialism

preach egalitarianism and both are the

true heirs of Christianity and its slave

morality. Christianity prepares the way

for egalitarianism by holding all men to

be equal in decisive respects; they have,

in God, a common father; and they are all

sinners.

(HPP, p. 837)
The result of rule of the many or the vulgar is that vulgar
values rule over all. Leisure of the best kind is not
highly valued by the herd, to them it reeks of privilege.
Liberalism allows one to attain many things, yet leisure can
only be attained after one's energies have been spent on

building up a large savings. This can take one into old age

23

 

24

and by then leisure is fruitless. This is one fault of
liberalism, all are placed on near equal ground and expected
to compete with each other. Supposedly, this kind of
competition makes for the best production and the best way
of life. The problem is that the so-called winners win by
performing well in a game the rules of which are based upon
herdish principles. Leisure becomes available to those who
are least likely to make use of it. The capitalist
workaholic simply cannot stop laboring. Leisure is to him,
paradoxically, something to be avoided. The adage: "Idle
hands are the devil's tools" is not out of style by any
means.

The tolerant regime can afford toleration because it
makes possible very little deviation. Petty politics are
self-moderating. The mob relies upon the elite and vice
versa. They work together.

In such circumstances, the center of

gravity necessarily shifts to the

mediocre: against the dominion of the mob

and of the eccentric (both are usually

united), mediocrity consolidates itself

as the guarantee and bearer of the

future. Thus emerges a new opponent for

exceptional men -- or a new seduction.

Provided they do not accommodate

themselves to the mob and try to flatter

the instincts of the "disinherited," they

will have to be "mediocre" and "solid."

(WP, p. 864)
By mediocrity, Nietzsche means something that paradoxically
we might today call elite. The mob is not even mediocre.

The initially exceptional are stunted and this results in a

heap of people who are at the top of the corporate and

 

25

political ladders. The mediocre seem to be, for Nietzsche,
contemporary entrepreneurial and/or religious conservatives.
The exceptional who are not seduced by gold may become
artists, criminals, or just plain loonies.

For Nietzsche, the declaration that all men reserve
equal and inalienable rights is a particular misfortune of
contemporary liberalism and socialism (two words for the
same basic governing principles). "The modern European is
characterized by two apparently opposite traits:
individualism and the demand for equal rights; that I have
at last come to understand" (WP, p. 783).

Of course, Nietzsche would reject the idea that rights
are inalienable and even that they exist outside of human
projects. The Bill of Rights is an example of the ignoble
lie that results from the resentment of the many felt toward
the few. Nonetheless, I feel that Nietzsche would think
that such a document or an unwritten equivalent is a nearly
inevitable outcome of the slave revolt in morals. A
metaphysical foundation was deemed necessary if aristocracy
was to be once and for all disposed of.

Nietzsche concludes that the conflict between equal
rights and individualism does not exist insofar as the
concept of individualism has been reshaped. Individualism
has come to mean the idea that the individual in the
abstract has some sphere of autonomy; that the individual

opposes society not

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

26

as a person but only as an individual; he

represents all individuals against the

totality. That means: he instinctively

posits himself as equal to all other

individuals; what he gains in this

struggle he gains for himself not as a

person but as a representative of

individuals against the totality.

(WP, p. 784)
What Nietzsche has in mind is that the great personality
should be encouraged. Individuality in this manner opposes
itself to the approval of the masses rather than
justifying itself on the ground that it is securing modest
freedoms for all. No individual will attain greatness
since this would imply that all individuals are not equal.
A condition of recognized inequality is necessary in order
to produce high human beings. Such is Nietzsche's critique

of the merely tolerant regime.

B. The Regime That Wills The Great Human Being

 

From now on there will be more favorable
preconditions for more comprehensible
forms of dominion, whose like has never
yet existed. And even this is not the
most important thing; the possibility has
been established for the production of
international racial unions whose task
will be to rear a master race, the future
"masters of the earth"; -- a
new,tremendous aristocracy, based on the
severest self-legislation, in which the
will of philosophical men of power and
artist-tyrants will be made to endure for
millennia -- a higher kind of man who,
thanks to their superiority in will,
knowledge, riches, and influence, employ
democratic Europe as their most pliant
and supple instrument for getting hold of
the destinies of the earth, so as to work
as artists upon "man" himself. Enough:
the time is coming when politics will
have a different meaning.

(we, p. 960)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

27

Nietzsche is at his most optimistic in this passage.

Or is it desperation? The transition from democracy to
aristocracy seems to be almost inevitable according to the
quote. We know better than that though. The last man,
spoken of earlier, is one of Nietzsche‘s biggest worries.
Regardless of the overconfident tone, the general themes of
Nietzsche's political challenge to mankind are here sounded.
The more willful individuals who have along with Nietzsche
stared into the abyss are instructed to act as precursors to
the demolition of democracy. They are to help create the
conditions that will increase the probability that a grand
legislator will appear.

I stated earlier that the highest man is to construct a
regime friendly to great human beings. The problem is that
the last quote indicates that Nietzsche's disciples are, in
the midst of democratic rule, supposed to attempt to change
things so that the grand legislator can come about. There
is a pessimistic edge to the idea that the legislator can
just spring up out of democracy. Thus, a three stage plan
is presented. The first step being to establish
preconditions for the highest man, the second step is for
the highest man to legislate aristocratic values, the third
step is for the children of the highest man to "make good"
on their opportunity to become great human beings. The
first step would appear to be the most difficult phase to
understand in the concrete. I will only offer here that the

hope is that with the help of philosophical artists, the

   

28

moral superstructure of Christianity is to begin to
deteriorate. I wish to concentrate on the second stage,
that of the legislation of the highest man. What would the
regime that wills the existence of great human beings look
like? What would be its basic structure?

We know that Nietzsche favors aristocracy. But what
exactly is aristocracy? Let us refer to an expert in
analyzing constitutions, Aristotle. For Aristotle,
aristocracy means the rule of the few, as opposed to the
many (democracy) or the one (monarchy). The most pure
aristocracy is also the rule of the best or most just. In

The Politics, there is much discussion of how the term

 

aristocracy is employed, ranging from its perversion,
oligarchy, to half-breed democratic admixtures. Yet, in
Chapter VIII of Book IV, Aristotle states:

It is a general opinion that the

essential criterion of aristocracy is the

distribution of office according to

merit: merit is its criterion, as wealth

is the criterion of oligarchy, and free

birth of democracy.

(P, p. 175)
Of course, Aristotle has a well—developed plan for what
constitutes merit in an individual. The closest thing to
merit in Nietzsche's scheme is either being a higher human
being or being capable of greatly contributing to its
production. We thus have rule of the few meritorious
beings.

Since Nietzsche does not believe in truth with a

capital "T," when he speaks of rule he does not necessarily

 

 

 

29

mean holding office. The greater form of rule is rule over
the culture, not for several years, but for several
centuries. Recall the section above about the highest man.
The office holders are to be determined based upon their
abilities to advance the goals of a culture as set out by
the grand legislative artist. They are to be
micropoliticians while the grand legislator is a
macropolitican.

There exist two key concepts in Nietzsche that I will
use to justify the skeleton of social organization which
follows: Those concepts are ressentiment and horizon.

Something has already been said concerning
ressentiment, namely, that Christianity is an instance of
the general inclination of the masses to revolt against the
values of their superiors. It seems that for Nietzsche, the
Christian response to paganism teaches us a lesson about the
vulnerability of aristocracy to the ressentiment of the
weak. If otium is to be preserved, ressentiment must be
contained or preempted. The mediocre, which are really the
lowly to Nietzsche, should be alienated from the higher
humans to such a great extent that envy can scarcely arise.
"Chief viewpoint: establish distances, but create no
antitheses" (WP, p. 891). Further: "How should one wish to
spoil mediocrity for the mediocre! As one will see, I do
the opposite: every step away from it 7- so I teach leads to
immorality" (WP, p. 892). In other words, the higher are

instructed to keep their mouths shut regarding their own

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30
superiority. Don't antagonize the lower, don't compete with
them, compete with self and equals. On the higher human:
"Precisely because he is an exception, he has to take the
rule under his protection, he has to keep the mediocre in
good heart" (WP, 893).

The concept of horizon is complex, yet part of the idea
is the maintenance of social structures. According to
Werner Danhauser's understanding of Nietzsche, "Man's
horizon is constituted by his fundamental set of assumptions
about all things, by what he considers the absolute truth
which he cannot question" (HPP, p. 831). The horizon is a
countermeasure taken against the vertigo of flux.

And this is a universal law: a living

thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful

only when bounded by a horizon; if it is

incapable of drawing a horizon around

itself, and at the same time too self-

centered to enclose its own view within

that of another, it will pine away slowly

or hasten to its timely end.

(UT, p. 63).
This excerpt from the essay on history suggests strongly
that Nietzsche does support stability to an extent. Most
scholars agree that he is more interested in life-
enhancement than he is in most anything else, skepticism
included. In short, Nietzsche doesn't wish to fuel a new
breed of human and a new aristocracy that lasts for only a
brief span. Recall that the highest man is to shape man for
millennia, not a week.

The vulnerability of past aristocracy, coupled with the

call for some stability, serve as theoretical justification

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31

for the forthcoming structural analysis of a Nietzschean
society for the future. The more tangible support, however,

resides in Nietzsche's last complete work, The Antichrist.

 

Section 57 of the aforementioned reveals some of the
most structured and neglected aspects of Nietzsche's social
thought.

The order of castes, the supreme, the
dominant law, is merely the sanction of a
natural order, a natural lawfulness of
the first rank, over which no
arbitrariness, no "modern idea" has any
power. In every healthy society there
are three types which condition each
other and gravitate differently
physiologically; each has its own
hygiene, its own field of work, its own
sense of perfection and mastery. Nature,
not Manu, distinguishes the pre-eminently
spiritual ones, those who are
pre-eminently strong in muscle and
temperament, and those, the third type,
who excel neither in one respect nor in

the other, the mediocre ones -- the last
as the great majority, the first as the
elite.

(PN, p. 645)
This apparent appeal to nature certainly can be contrasted
with Nietzschean themes of anti-essentialism and
impermanence. I shan't be concerned with reconciliation
here though, but only with the exposure of this line of
thought. Suffice it to say that what is meant here by the
term "nature" is problematic and it is not at all certain
that there is much of a connection between Nietzsche's
notion of nature and traditional theories of natural law and
the state of nature.

Yet, regardless of what is intended by "nature,"

Nietzsche's dividing-up of mankind into three basic camps is

 

 

 

 

32

presented with a daring confidence. The distances
separating the types appear vast enough that it is as if
three distinct species are being described. The higher
human does, indeed, make the lower seem like an ape in
comparison.

Nietzsche provides us with a few details concerning the
types. Besides what has already been proffered of the
higher humans, which is repeated in this section of The

Antichrist, Nietzsche says of them, "They rule not because

 

they want to but because they are; they are not free to be
second" (PN, p. 646). He continues on about the second
class:

The second are the executive arm of the

most spiritual, that which is closest to

them and belongs to them, that which does
everything gross in the work of ruling

for them -- their retinue, their right
hand, their best pupils.
(Ibid.)

In contemporary terms, they are administrators and
instructors.

The third and preponderant type of human is the
economic base of the whole enterprise.

To be a public utility, a wheel, a
function, for that one must be destined
by nature; it is not society, it is the
only kind of happiness of which the great
majority are capable that makes
intelligent machines of them. For the
mediocre, to be mediocre is their
happiness; mastery of one thing,
specialization -- a natural instinct.
(Ibid., pp. 646-647).

These are the bodies who provide the conditions, both

material and spiritual, for the survival of the higher

 

 

 

 

 

 

33

beings. They preserve otium and distance. One might
wonder, however, whether technology might not ultimately do
away with the requirement that the underclass labor much.
But that is a different question. The distancing must
remain and a leisured lower class could conceivably come
into conflict with a leisured upper class. This is perhaps
something that scares Nietzsche about technology and
socialism.

At any rate, the three supports for what I am about to
say include ressentiment or the vulnerability of
aristocratic rule, the physiological need of horizons, and
the tripartite division of humanity.

I think, then, that we may add the highest man, the
initial legislator, and say that there are four rough niches
involved in the politics of the future. First, the founder
of a people, then the higher humans who may be politicians
but more likely are leisured philosophers (as opposed to
today's philosophical laborers) and artists, then the
executive arm of the prior two niches, and finally the
masses who ensure distancing and maintain the material
conditions necessary to free up the leisured class. It
would be difficult to say what the ratios of numbers in each
class would be. The technological level at the time and
political stability would factor in highly.

I suspect that an order of rank within the ruling body
is necessary. There would be philosophers at the top,

occasionally giving the most general orders, and then

 

 

 

 

 

 

34

political laborers at the bottom who tend to practical
politics. Nietzsche is not, however, explicit about this
matter.

The roles of each of the classes, with the exception of
the highest man, have yet to be fully discussed.

The vulgar masses are necessary for labor and for what
Nietzsche calls the pathos of distance, which is part of
being an aristocrat. Their function is to keep the leisured
in leisure. They do this by performing tasks which they are
kept happy with and which constitute the economic base of
the aristocracy. Specific tasks are hard to imagine since
they would be so dependent upon the level of technology
attained. Why would the masses be content with their
status? In other words, wherein lies the stability of the
system?

Technology, provided that the environment isn't
destroyed, could soon make it possible to meet the material
needs of the masses handsomely and still support a leisured
class. What must be accomplished is that the ressentiment
which has toppled old aristocracies needs to be removed or
at least reduced. This means that the values of the masses
must differ from but not be antagonistic to those of the
leisured. If the leisured value leisure and the masses
value doing some work and having time to spare, and if they
are fed and amused, ressentiment will be much less likely to

rear its ugly head. Those amongst the masses who, because

 

 

35

of their intellects or other prowess, are likely to be
capable of valuing solitude and leisure time without
becoming bored can be moved into the leisure class if they
choose. This is a further deterrent to ressentiment as
children from the most common of families may be somehow
identified as candidates for the leisure class and thus
movement becomes possible. Likewise, is movement from
leisure to masses possible. Since it is more a choice of
individual preference and ability than it is the direct
result of landed wealth (the leisured class are not
capitalists), nepotism and oligarchy do not rule the day.
Essentially, the masses will be composed of people who
are content with middle class life, while the leisured will
be the malcontents. "Absolute conviction: that value
feelings above and below are different; that countless
experiences are lacking in those below; that between below
and above misunderstanding is necessary" (WP, p. 994).
Today, we often speak of misunderstanding as if it were the
root of social conflict. Here, though, the suggestion seems
to be that understanding is unnecessary for stability so
long as the classes are not in competition with each other.
Assuming basic physical needs are met, the different
valuations reduce hostilities. One may read Dostoyevsky
while another busies himself with collecting postage stamps.
It's when all want to possess the most postage stamps that

conflict starts.

 

 

36

Nietzsche's leisured class of potential and existing
higher humans would not be so piggish as the practiced
aristocracies of old insofar as the new aristocracy is based
on drive and merit instead of heredity. Recall the
suffering that goes along with being a higher human, and
then see if the masses are really anxious to infiltrate the
realm of the sufferers. In fact, the leisured might even be
seen by the masses as the sick or afflicted -- possessed by
some incommunicable disease.

Though Nietzsche advocates slavery, the only absolutely
necessary aspect of a new slavery seems to be lack of
suffrage. It is certainly feasible that the new slaves
could be in a sense freer than the large portion of citizens
under a liberal democracy. Again, technology built up by
capitalism, could, once capitalism is overturned, lead to a
vast reduction of labor and allow for more recreational
time, and therefore more contentment, for the masses if they
so choose. The small leisure class (how small I couldn't
say -— one percent of the total population is probably a
generous figure) would be a most motley crew. They would be
artists in the broad sense of the word, possibly composed
of, but not limited to, actors, poets, musicians,
philosophers, leaders, perhaps even athletes and, most
hopefully, well-rounded individuals and personalities who
don't fit under any one category. These are the higher men

and they are peers to one another though they are not

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

37

completely equal. Nietzsche, for instance, would rank the
poet below the man who creates not poems, but his life.
Values will vary among the higher men, with some preferring
the cold and the hard, others the hot and liquid. Otium is
the only constant. These humans are ends in themselves,
thus, if they can be said to serve any purpose, it is to see
what heights can be attained by humans.

The question of who becomes a leisured individual and
who part of the masses is a problem that Nietzsche leaves
for future generations to solve. The details of the
selection process would have to be worked out by the
leisured class and something of an intermediary group
composed of teachers and administrators. Among factors to
be considered would be precocity in many spheres such as
intellect, artistic ability, energy, and other uncommon
attributes. This much can be inferred from what has been
discussed concerning the higher man. My argument about the
containment of resentment, coupled with Nietzsche's
disregard for oligarchy, suggests that the leisured are not
necessarily descendants of the leisured, nor that members of
the bottom two classes are necessarily descended from
parents of the selfsame class. Those with a familial bent
might just choose one of the lower classes, even though
leisure is a possibility. All of this would be instrumental
in containing ressentiment and thus making the aristocracy
less vulnerable to destruction, though Nietzsche himself

doesn't draw it all out for us.

 

 

 

 

 

As was
be composed
education.
contemplate

politically

 

38

stated, the intermediary group seemingly would
of teachers and administrators of politics and
They are instrumental in nature and would

how to best implement the wishes of the more

inclined of the higher man. Their status would

be that of glorified slaves.

 

-
-. {I'- - . “uh -. . us-
.- _ :- _ ‘1' . .
- .5... _ — A”
, '5". . 5 ‘.

     

V. CONCLUSION

3““ “"2" "Vi-H!mtfii£“£ I" , ‘45.“. " 3: 'f’. It s; u din-'- _ ‘ ,

 

 

 

 

V. CONCLUSION

The plan of this paper has been one of moving from
basic Nietzschean pronouncements slowly into a creative
analysis (Nietzsche made that phrase no longer oxymoronic)
about the structure of a future aristocratic state. I have
not tried to prove a theory, but only to present some of
Nietzsche's more neglected material and attempt to show that
there is a prescriptive component that is less ambiguous
than the phrase "overcome the self." Besides the exercise
in history of political philosophy, I have chosen this theme
with a View to reopening a political dialogue spanning from
the far right to the far left, instead of from contemporary
dictatorships to Marxism.

I think that there is even a possibility of reconciling
many of the goals of the Left with a new aristocracy that
would value leisure more than production. The masses could
end up in a better position than ever in history. All could
have food, clothing, and shelter and more time of their own
than now. Nietzsche might not care about these things on
the surface, but, strategically, the contentment of the
masses is a good idea. It is the need for horizon and the
need to solve the problem of aristocratic vulnerability,

along with the divisions suggested in The Antichrist that

 

39

 

lend support to the structure I have suggested. Of these

groupings, Nietzsche declares:

In all this, to repeat, there is nothing

arbitrary, nothing contrived; whatever is

different is contrived -- contrived for

the ruin of nature. The order of castes,

the order of rank, merely formulates the

highest law of life; the separation of

the three types is necessary for the

survival of society, to make possible the

higher and the highest types.

(PN, p. 646).
There has not been a society such as that proposed,
therefore, empirical support is lacking. Past problems are
diagnosed and then solutions are proposed based upon their
theoretical potentials to solve.

I do not intend to submit that the right wing aspect of
Nietzsche's thought is the most important aspect, but only
that it might just be the most important aspect at this
point in history when right wing has come to mean either
fascist or religious. What I mean by right wing is
basically the justification of society by its highest
specimens instead of by liberal rights. It is nearly taken
for granted that reform and the political left go hand in
hand. As applied to Americans, the term "radical" is
synonymous with the left. But, discontent with the status
quo does not necessarily mean that the road to a brighter
humanity is paved in equality and rights. After all, these
are the words of the founders of our regime and they are
supposedly derived from Christianity. Nietzsche is more

radical than Marx in that he dispenses with rights and

equality altogether. There is no God and therefore rights

 

 

 

41

are merely conventions to be accepted or rejected as
conditions merit. The idea of equality is a most unnatural
idea because one can look around even the most mediocre of
states in order to find that the phrase "all men are created
equal" is for Nietzsche the closest thing to a falsehood
ever uttered.

The dissociation of Marx from Soviet Communism by
scholars is no more worthy an enterprise than the
dissociation of Nietzsche from the Third Reich. Both
attempts are laudable. Neither of these political
organizations is representative of the thinkers with which
each is often still associated.

At this point in history, with the death of God at
hand, the question comes to the fore: what should the goal
of humanity be? If the goal is to create its higher types,
then perhaps Nietzsche has the rudiments of an answer. If
is up to us to provide the details. If that goal he
freedom, then he might have the answer as well. Freedom
doesn't have to be the same for everyone. Freedom for the
masses could mean happiness or contentment, while freedom
for the higher types could mean otium. A symbiotic

relationship is possible.

 

   

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

42

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle, The Politics, trans. and ed. by Ernest Barker
(Oxford 1958). (P)

 

Dannhauser, Werner, J., "Friedrich Nietzsche" in History of
Political Philosophy Chicago 1987). (HPP)

 

 

Translations

Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. and ed. with commentary
by Walter Kaufmann (New York 1968). (BW)

 

The Gay Science, trans. with commentary by Walter Kaufmann
(New York 1974). (GS)

 

Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Intro. by
Erich Heller (Cambridge 1986). (HH)

 

The Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann
(New York 1954). (PM)

 

Untimelngeditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Intro. by J.
P. Stern (Cambridge 1983). (UM)

 

The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J.
Hollingdale, with commentary (New York 1967). (WP)

 

 

cll- - " i ‘i 'I “
‘ . I ' I . III‘ . ,.

   

1.9 .‘u'.".‘_ -..\...._-..

 

 

 

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