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
NIETZSCHE'S "HOTHOUSE FOR STRANGE AND CHOICE PLANTS"

presented by

Michael J. Motta

has been accepted towards fulfillment  
of the requirements for

M.A. degree in Philosophy

  
Major professor

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NIETZSCHE'S "HOTHOUSE FOR STRANGE AND CHOICE PLANTS"

By

Michael J. Motta

A THESIS

Submitted to Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

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# ABSTRACT

NIETZSCHE'S "HOTHOUSE FOR STRANGE AND CHOICE PLANTS"

By

Michael J. Motta

Friedrich Nietzsche's relationship to political philosophy has been described in many different ways. Some argue that he is apolitical and others stress his anti-political statements. Of those who believe that Nietzsche is an important political philosopher, there are interpretations spanning the range from Right to Left and in between. This thesis argues that Nietzsche does forward a semblance of a political agenda and at least partially describes the type of human being he seeks. The purpose of the thesis is to augment new ways of thinking about both Nietzsche and Right Wing politics. Multifarious primary sources are employed in buttressing this position.

## DEDICATION

To My Family


## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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


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## I. INTRODUCTION



## I. INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of this paper is to encourage its readers to not only consider the values of humanity, but also our possibilities. To me, that is a proper purpose of the educational process.

I have chosen as a vehicle for this goal the study of Friedrich Nietzsche's most concrete recommendations for humanity which occur in the latest works. But why Nietzsche and why his prescriptive side?

First, there can be little doubt that Nietzsche is one of the foremost thinkers of the past two centuries and possibly of all time. Second, it seems as though there is widespread ignorance of the fact that there is something normative, though perhaps not dogmatic, in his writing. Third, those who recognize Nietzsche's seemingly harsh prescriptions tend to reject them summarily as if they are only the banterings of a lunatic and are utterly unworthy of consideration.

I have chosen some of Nietzsche's most cutting remarks. Part of the attraction of the hard core and unabridged Nietzsche is the fact that it is terribly unfashionable. Then, again, if diversity and toleration are to be the hallmarks of the contemporary university, the unfashionable should serve these ends well.

Two social institutions that tend to be ignored by reformatory discourse are slavery and eugenics. For lack of a better term, the word slavery is used by Nietzsche and I will be discussing it seriously. The problem is that slavery for Nietzsche doesn't necessarily mean cruelty or racism or anything like that; it simply reflects a stratum of society who may end up happier than the leisured class. They are the portion of mankind that makes higher individuals possible.

More implicit than explicit in Nietzsche's writings is the notion of eugenics. He sometimes refers to breeding directly, but for the most part, eugenics is couched in poetic and epigrammatic writing. An example of this occurs in a section of Zarathustra entitled, "On Child and Marriage", which is a form of intellectual birth control.

You are young and wish for a child and marriage. But I ask you: are you a man entitled to wish for a child? Are you the victorious one, the self-conquerer, the commander of your senses, the master of your virtues? This I ask you. Or is it the animal and need that speak out of your wish? Or loneliness? Or lack of peace with yourself?


Let your victory and your freedom long for a child. You shall bring living monuments to your victory and your liberation. You shall build over and beyond yourself, but first you must build yourself, perpendicular in body and soul. You shall not only reproduce yourself, but produce something higher. May the garden of marriage help you in that!  
(PN, p. 181)

By eugenics, Nietzsche does not mean that humans are to be systematically wiped out because of their race or something



else. He only means that we are to make the betterment of humanity, not its control, the goal. There is grooming involved, but this is based upon merits that are not derived from race, color, nor totally from birth. Furthermore, since there is class distinction, there will resulting mating of the high with the high and the masses with the masses, not necessarily governmentally enforced, but by association.

Now to proceed into a rough outline of the already rough outline that is Nietzsche's agenda for humanity.



## II. THE GREAT HUMAN BEING

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My ideas do not revolve around the degree of freedom that is granted to the one or to the other or to all, but around the degree of power that the one or the other should exercise over others or over all, and to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement, provides the basis for the emergence of a higher type. (WP, 859)

This is a statement of Nietzsche's goal for mankind: to produce its highest specimens. Social and political agendas are to be evaluated based on their tendencies toward this end. Universal freedom, liberty, equality, happiness, survival, gentleness and other such common desiderata pale in comparison to the full man and are generally considered to be hostile to the growth of the great human being. But this will be taken up later. For now, I just wish to establish the springboard of this essay: that Nietzsche makes major import of the idea that mankind ought to set its sights on the promotion of great individuals, even at the expense of many moral concerns. This seems to me to be an interpretation that is fairly uncontroversial as far as Nietzsche scholarship is concerned. Hence, I have chosen to spend little effort in support of this position. The controversy really starts at the point when we wonder about the characteristics of the bigger and better human and

especially when we debate the preconditions, both personal and societal, for his existence. It is with this view of the matter that I begin an exposition of some of the qualities of the great human being.

Nietzsche employs many different terms in labeling the man of his aims. Among those are the noble man, the overman, the higher type, philosopher of the future, free spirit, and highest man. While these kinds are sometimes granted differing characteristics, particularly the free spirit of Human, All Too Human, for the most part, they overlap. The main distinction that I wish to hold in this paper is that between the highest man and all of the other names. I believe that Nietzsche reserves a special role for the highest man, that role being to engage himself in grand legislation. This, too, will be discussed later.

Chronologically, from Zarathustra onwards, it is my impression that much of the change in terminology is due to a filling in process of the idea of the overman. In other words, discussions of the noble in Beyond Good and Evil and in The Will to Power are essentially means of clarifying what it is about the overman that makes him superior to others. By no means do I intend to suggest Nietzsche's replies to the rhetorical question, "What is noble?" constitute an exhaustive and exclusive set of criteria. They are rather rough guidelines and suggestions. The noble man need not possess all of the traits proffered, yet you may guarantee that an individual who consistently

contradicts them is not within the range of Nietzsche's description. So then, what is noble?

One of Nietzsche's earliest ponderings on the noble involves a statement of what the noble man is not. The type of human that Nietzsche seeks is not a university professor, even of philosophy. A philosopher is one who acts. His life and his philosophy are inextricably bound. Engagement is emphasized over idle contemplation. There is not the dichotomy that exists in philosophical laborers between academia on the one hand, and life on the other. This is a problem with which Sartre would later wrestle throughout much of his life.

The early essay entitled, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, hints at the pedantry involved in scholarly activity.

In an age which suffers from this universal education, to what an unnatural, artificial and in any case unworthy state must the most truthful of all sciences, the honest naked goddess philosophy, be reduced! . . . No one dares venture to fulfill the philosophical law in himself, no one lives philosophically with that simple loyalty that constrained a man of antiquity to bear himself as a Stoic wherever he was, whatever he did, once he had affirmed his loyalty to the Stoa. All modern philosophizing is political and official, limited by governments, churches, academies, customs, and the cowardice of men to the appearance of scholarship . . . if modern man had any courage or resolution at all, if he were not merely a subjective creature even in his enmities, he would banish philosophy; as it is, he contents himself with modestly concealing its nudity. One may think, write, print, speak, teach

philosophy -- to that point more or less everything is permitted; only in the realm of action, of so-called life, is it otherwise: there only one thing is ever permitted and everything else simply impossible: thus will historical culture have it. Are there still human beings, one then asks oneself, or perhaps only thinking-, writing- and speaking-machines?  
(UM, p. 85)

Another early essay, Schopenhauer as Educator, reaffirms the incompatibility of scholarship and nobility.

A scholar can never become a philosopher; for even Kant was unable to do so but, the inborn pressure of his genius notwithstanding, remained to the end as it were in a chrysalis stage. He who thinks that in saying this I am doing Kant an injustice does not know what a philosopher is, namely not merely a great thinker but also a real human being; and when did a scholar ever become a real human being?  
(UM, p. 181)

Harsh words, indeed, but anticipatory of the development of Nietzsche's conception of the great human being whose thoughts grow into deeds.

In his so-called middle period, often classified as positivistic, Nietzsche writes, Human All Too Human, subtitled, "A Book for Free Spirits". Here, he provides us with a skeleton of what is to come of his cherished type of man in later writings.

He is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant views of his age, would have been expected of him. He is the exception, the fettered spirits are the rule; the latter reproach him that his free principles either originate in a

desire to shock and offend or eventuate  
in free actions, that is to say in  
actions incompatible with sound morals.  
(HH, p. 225)

The aphorism from which this passage is extracted is entitled, "Free spirit a relative concept". Later writings show that if indeed the free spirit is a relative concept, it is a precondition for becoming noble. Since society is currently base, one must think and act differently in order to become a higher human. Because what it means in a specific case to act differently is dependent on the status quo, most of the attributes of the free spirit are relative. Contemporary usage of the phrase "free spirit" reflects some of the Nietzschean formulation insofar as today we intend that the free spirit is one who rejects convention and even opposes himself to it, often in shocking ways.

In 1882, four years after Human, All Too Human was published, the first four books of The Gay Science went into print. Aphorism 143, entitled, "The greatest advantage of polytheism" (noted by Walter Kaufmann as being Nietzsche's first usage of the term "overmen"), expands upon the idea of the free spirit. Nietzsche attributes to polytheism the role of initiating the creative and legislative impulses of strong egos into the world. A plurality of invented gods meant a plurality of norms. This passage from single norms to quarreling gods and demi-gods opened the way for man to justify individualism, and for those possessing them to unleash their radically personal instincts. Monotheism threatens to limit man with its disallowal of varying





natures. The likelihood of the advent of the free spirit had been slight until polytheism, and was set back again under Christianity. Now Nietzsche stands as the announcer of the death of God, and therefore the death of monotheism. There has become room for an even greater "free-spiriting and many-spiriting of man" than existed under polytheism. This is "the strength to create for ourselves our own new eyes" (GS, p. 143).

The human of Nietzsche's desire is greatly expanded upon with the advent of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is here, too, that the inequality of men is propounded. The overman is not just the new self of any old person, but rather the product of a long and many-generational labor. The section entitled "On the Three Metamorphoses" is key to understanding both the whole of the work and the continually more fecund development of Nietzsche's conception of the higher man. Employing the imagery of the camel, the lion, and the child as metaphors for the personal growth of the overman, Nietzsche proceeds into the main text of the book. "Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the lion, finally a child" (PH, p. 37). The spirit is a person of some initial potential to transform; very few natures would even be considered spirits. That the spirit should first become a camel or beast of burden is a necessity if he wishes to attain higher states of being. The camel is he who is humble and suffers much from the search for knowledge

and from just living among the rabble, and who undergoes this hardship on purpose. The spirit moves from camel to lion when loneliness and steadfastness have brought forth the terrifying wisdom that the responsibility for value creation lies within its sphere. The lion says "no" to the call to conform with preordained values. The nay-saying makes possible the creation of new values. The spirit now becomes child -- playful, energetic, innocent, and yes-saying to life. The child wins the world over by involving himself in its creation. I would suggest that the metamorphoses may also be looked at in terms of eras instead of just individuals; that is, one era is camel-like and preparatory for the lion era, which is, in turn, a precondition of the new values of the child era. At any rate, it seems clear that a basic framework of requisite strengths in the higher man is beginning to take shape in Nietzsche's thought by this time. Zarathustra is a grand work and to do full justice to its musings on overcoming and higher men would require the writing of a tome.

Beyond Good and Evil and The Will to Power comprise the most straightforward and fully-developed messages that Nietzsche has to deliver on the characteristics of the higher man. It is for these reasons that I choose to concentrate on those works. Conventional wisdom amongst Nietzsche scholars says that Beyond Good and Evil is a commentary on Zarathustra. In this book, one finds the noble contrasted with the common or the base. There is an

attempt to supersede the Christian-Platonic distinction between Good and Evil by initiating a language that contrasts a new good with bad. Noble acts proceed from higher men and vice versa, base acts proceed from bad men and vice versa.

What is noble and what base? "There is an instinct for rank which, more than anything else, is a sign of high rank: there is a delight in the nuance of reverence that allows us to infer noble origin and habits" (BW, p. 402). The instinct for rank is the intuition of the varying strengths and valuations of people. It is the admission of and celebration of inequality. The noble man lives in harmony with his instinct for forming his own rules. He is a master rather than a slave. The self-imposed hardness of the noble man, along with his nausea of the herd, often leads to his destruction or, worse yet, corruption. He is a tormented human. Nietzsche states, ". . . it almost determines the order of rank how profoundly human beings can suffer. . . ." and further in section 270 of Beyond Good and Evil, "Profound suffering makes noble; it separates" (BW, p. 410). So the capacity to suffer immensely, coupled with the actualization of that suffering, is a mark of nobility second only to the instinct for rank. One might conclude that the latter is often an outgrowth of the former.

Thus far then, the chronological sampling of some of Nietzsche's works has provided some hints and sketches of the kind of human that he would seek to cultivate. He is not a scholar, yet is still a rebel against established

norms. He is someone who would bear much harshness and nausea. The realization that he is personally responsible for value creation leads him to give birth to new values. He is a being of torment and an intuiter of order of rank. These are vague attributes and, even if one understands Nietzsche as a philosopher who is often purposefully general so as not to contradict his own distrust of dogma and his call for creativity, one might yet wonder what, if anything, he has concealed from his audience. There are numerous passages in which Nietzsche extols the virtues of silence. His private notebooks, however controversial and neglected they may be, are to my mind the fullest and most concrete expressions of much of Nietzsche's ultimate meaning. It is often argued that Nietzsche has no ultimate meaning, nor does he intend one. I agree with this to the extent that the thinker does exhort his students to reach beyond and even to deny him. But, wouldn't it be nice to increase one's knowledge of what one is supposed to supersede? And isn't it of some merit as an exercise in art history and psychology to attempt to penetrate past Nietzsche's surface teaching about self-overcoming in order to better understand how he himself created? To see what his "evils" were? One might take up a study of Nietzsche's life in order to answer these questions; he, of course, encourages us in that regard. I feel that an equally valid and overlapping enterprise involves study of his notes. His notebook sketches intended for a work which he became too mad to

produce are compiled under the title, The Will to Power.

I choose to refer to this work because of its merits of chronological position and its relative lucidity, as well as its forthrightness. "What is noble?" asks Nietzsche of himself. Here are some answers selected from a section of the notebooks.

Apparent frivolity in word, dress, bearing, through which a stoic severity and self-constraint protects itself against all immodest inquisitiveness.

Our doubt as to the communicability of the heart goes deep; solitude not as chosen but as given.

The conviction that one has duties only to one's equals, toward the others one acts as one thinks best: that justice can be hoped for (unfortunately not counted on) only inter pares.

Pleasure in princes and priests, because they preserve the belief in differences in human values even in the valuation of the past, at least symbolically and on the whole even actually.


Ability to keep silent: but not a word about that in the presence of listeners.

Disgust for the demagogic, for the "enlightenment," for "being cozy," for plebeian familiarity.

We esteem the good very little, as herd animals: we know that in the worst, most malignant, hardest men a priceless golden drop of goodness is often concealed, that outweighs all mere benevolence of milk souls.

We consider that a man of our kind is not refuted by his vices, nor by his follies. We know that we are hard to recognize, and that we have every reason to give ourselves foregrounds.  
(WP, p. 943)

By the end of this section, Nietzsche makes extensive usage of first person plural in speaking of the noble. He says "we" do this and that. Yes, Nietzsche probably did by



the end of his life identify himself with at least the rudiments of the higher man he so desperately sought. This, were it true, does not constitute a contradiction in his philosophy; rather it fits in quite nicely. There is nothing good or evil in itself. Even the good and bad are largely formed by the great individual to suit his own strengths. Thus, by his putting forth these properties and prerogatives of the noble human, Nietzsche in effect is attempting to carry out the work of the child, of the successor to the lion. His will to power is overflowing, if not in the form of societal legislation, at least in self-legislation. One might imagine Nietzsche treating the list almost as if it represented imperatives for his conduct. I say, almost because the difference between what we traditionally consider moral imperatives and what Nietzsche is doing, resides partially in the fact that Nietzsche acknowledges to himself that he has shaped his own law. Further, Nietzsche demonstrates his lack of fear for conflict between laws. The last statement in the list says that vice and folly do not make for the refutation of the noble person. Perhaps what is meant by vice and folly is precisely the disobeying of one rule as the result of following another. An example is the conflict between silence and writing. Nietzsche praises the ability to remain silent, yet he opts to publish. Not only then would one's personal laws reflect the artist, so also in the event of a collision of rules would one's choices in the matter bear an individualistic stamp.



Again, the laundry list of noble qualities is offered as an example of Nietzsche's own self-overcoming. It is not imperative that the higher man should adopt or possess all of these qualities. The essential elements are that the higher man is neither a herd animal nor an adherent to a pre-ordained religious or metaphysical system. The task becomes one of restructuring the social order so that the herd does not, with its religious and economic pressure, force every man, rich or poor, into living as an undeveloped being. A few must be allowed an encouraged to develop themselves, as this is Nietzsche's goal for mankind.





### III. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE TYPE

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#### A. Christian Morality

Nothing is more central to Nietzsche's philosophy than his brazen attack on Christianity. It is the popularization of Platonism, undertaken by Christianity, which constitutes the roots of nihilism in a denial of the worldly in favor of the otherworldly. Christianity does though contain the merit of having made man into a spiritual creature. It was this religion (in the West) that made the sublimation of instincts widespread and resulted in the sciences and higher arts. But, it is time to move on, God is dead and soon, too, may fall the moral superstructure. Nietzsche's task is to reveal the shortcomings of man as a Christian being, thereby hoping to provide the conditions for a better man. There is a danger that the death of God will not bring about these conditions, that Christianity will remain in its practical effects. Should this occur, the last man will inhabit the earth. The values of the last man are hostile to the advent of the high man in that equality and conformism resent the high. This resentment attacks the very core of the potentially great at the moment of birth and does not cease until the invaded party has been tamed or killed.

Type of my disciples. -- to those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities -- I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not -- that one endures.  
(WP, p. 910)

Nietzsche here speaks of contemporary society, which, although not yet productive of the last man, is heading in that direction. The harsh wishes for disciples will only come true if the individuals are in fact noble. It will be their disregard for present conditions which will help to fuel a countermovement.

The key aspect of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity is, for this paper, the leveling effect. The weak and the meek, the dull and the disadvantaged, are, according to current morality, to be pitied and raised up. The exceptional, on the other hand, are, at best, ignored. Many would find these statements hard to swallow. They might argue that the so-called elites still run the world selfishly. I think Nietzsche would agree that this is the case, yet the decisions of the elite are determined by the masses. Could anyone be elected to the school board who openly advocated cutting money to remedial education in order to hire special teachers for honors programs? Not in most areas of this country, if any.

Likely modern ways of dealing with exceptional individuals include: directing them to money, to practical



science, to "humanitarian" causes, or any other such narrow and predetermined usage. American society was supposedly founded on a framework of individualism, the problem is that entrepreneuring is about the only kind of individual activity that a life can revolve around. Two forces impinge here. The initially exceptional person is stripped of his chances at becoming a full personality by the near necessity of having to work a specialized job. Then, unable to express himself fully, he must soon either go mad or get involved with the herd, where his neurosis will be soothed. The life of the herd animal becomes the only possible life. To remain within the herd one must profess to herd values of equality, comfort, safety, ease, pity, and sociability, among other things. The aspirant is thus emasculated. This is one of the tragic results of Christian-informed modern society, though Christianity represents only one possible configuration of a herd morality. Whenever there is **ressentiment**, there is the danger of corruption.

The two major defects of Christianity with regard to production of the noble man are that it just doesn't want to produce the noble (even resents it) and that even when a certain measure of progress has been made by an individual, often without outside help, social forces work at breaking him.

#### B. The Highest Man as Instigator

If Christian morality is hostile to the development of the high man, what must be accomplished in order to

overthrow it or to lessen its detrimental effects? The answer to this question will be forthcoming from the "highest man," should he enter the scene by chance. There are at least two senses in which the highest man may be said to be higher than the "merely" high men. First, the highest man must be strong as Samson, for he will have to endure the adversity which flows from a society ill-suited to his temperament. Not only must he fight a tremendous battle, he must also become legislator and commander. The law that he invests must include provisions suitable for the growth of the high type. He must convince the political laborers of the grand nature of his laws so that those laws are executed and revered. He must not lower himself to the holding of an office, else distance from the rabble will elude him. In the final page of his notes, Nietzsche writes, "Order of rank: He who determines values and directs the will of millennia by giving direction to the highest natures is the highest man" (WP, p. 999). And then, "I believe I have guessed some of the things in the soul of the highest man; perhaps anyone who unriddles him must perish; but, whoever has seen him must help to make him possible" (WP, p. 1000).

It is then the task of the highest man to facilitate the production of great human beings and perhaps to give them some direction, though it is unclear what all that would entail. Maybe the highest man is to function partially as an example to future humans, to be the object of one of the functions of history promulgated in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.

That the great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a chain, that this chain unites mankind across the millennia like a range of human mountain peaks, that the summit of such a long-ago moment shall be for me still living, bright and great -- that is the fundamental idea of the faith in humanity which finds expression in the demand for a monumental history.  
(UM, p. 58)

From the same essay we find that "History belongs above all to the man of deeds and power, to him who fights a great fight, who needs models, teachers, comforters, and cannot find them among his contemporaries" (Ibid., p. 67).

Of course, any monumental aspect of the highest man is just a bonus compared with the actual legislations that he invokes. Moral support in itself will not be enough. A eugenics program of sorts must at least be initiated by the highest man. When I say "eugenics," I mean it in the sense of taking strides that will aid in the breeding of higher types. "A doctrine is needed powerful enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and destructive for the world weary" (WP, p. 862). Nietzsche recognizes, however, that it is likely, and to a certain extent desirable, that there will always be a herd. A major reason for Zarathustra's vertigo at the thought of eternal return is that even the vulgar must recur infinitely. Yet, it is acknowledged that without the low, there can be no high. "What I fight against: that an exceptional type should make war on the rule -- instead of grasping that the continued existence of the rule is the precondition for the

value of the exception" (WP, p. 894). In other words, rarity and excellence go hand in hand. There are the practical concerns of leisure time to be considered as well. Many must labor so that a few can have leisure. One of Nietzsche's favorite Latin words is *otium*. This term can be translated in several ways. For Nietzsche, it usually means the leisure to think about and discuss life and to engage oneself in art. It is the prerogative of the highest man to, at the very least, reestablish *otium* as a great value. There is a sense in which *otium* is to be valued for its own sake. Leisure is specifically human. It would constitute a re-animalization of mankind to allow leisure to be confiscated by proponents of equality. By "re-animalization," all that is meant is the loss of the ability to reflect on existence and thus to fail to go beyond the dictatorship of a hedonism of the moment. Leisure is also nearly a prerequisite for self-overcoming and creation. How can a person become a personality or otherwise an artist if that person is constantly subject to the "thou shalt's" of labor? Were Nietzsche to witness the current state of education and labor, he might claim to be witnessing a perverted reversal of the metamorphoses of life. Elementary school encourages personal creation in the children it teaches when they are not yet ripe to take full advantage of the freedom. Secondary school and college then prepare one for the dictates of workaday life. As soon as one becomes a little bit capable of taking full advantage of



leisure, it is carried away and not available again until retirement, at which time the years of slavishness have taken their toll and the retiree knows not what leisure is for. He feels guilt and boredom.

The highest man must instigate a value change so that mankind may again show some self-respect. Stagnation occurs when everyone lives to labor and labors to live. Even what exists of a leisure class today can only be called leisurely in the most vulgar sense. The highest man is the initiator of a radical shift in values from which a new political structure will follow.



#### IV. THE ROLE OF RULE

#### IV. THE ROLE OF RULE

##### A. The So-Called Tolerant Regime -- Its Defects

The claim of liberalism to allow any citizen to become whatever he or she wills is qualified by what is known as industry. The system of rewards is determined by "how hard one works." The Marxist unmasking of this hackneyed phrase is well documented in the literature. For the Marxist, there is not enough equality of opportunity. For Nietzsche, equality continues to increase at the expense of the higher types. I quote Werner Dannhauser:

The rule of low forms of life at the expense of higher forms is for Nietzsche the meaning of democracy. Democracy is mediocrity. There is no significant difference between democracy and socialism. Both democracy and socialism preach egalitarianism and both are the true heirs of Christianity and its slave morality. Christianity prepares the way for egalitarianism by holding all men to be equal in decisive respects; they have, in God, a common father; and they are all sinners.  
(HPP, p. 837)

The result of rule of the many or the vulgar is that vulgar values rule over all. Leisure of the best kind is not highly valued by the herd, to them it reeks of privilege. Liberalism allows one to attain many things, yet leisure can only be attained after one's energies have been spent on building up a large savings. This can take one into old age



and by then leisure is fruitless. This is one fault of liberalism, all are placed on near equal ground and expected to compete with each other. Supposedly, this kind of competition makes for the best production and the best way of life. The problem is that the so-called winners win by performing well in a game the rules of which are based upon herdish principles. Leisure becomes available to those who are least likely to make use of it. The capitalist workaholic simply cannot stop laboring. Leisure is to him, paradoxically, something to be avoided. The adage: "Idle hands are the devil's tools" is not out of style by any means.

The tolerant regime can afford toleration because it makes possible very little deviation. Petty politics are self-moderating. The mob relies upon the elite and vice versa. They work together.

In such circumstances, the center of gravity necessarily shifts to the mediocre: against the dominion of the mob and of the eccentric (both are usually united), mediocrity consolidates itself as the guarantee and bearer of the future. Thus emerges a new opponent for exceptional men -- or a new seduction. Provided they do not accommodate themselves to the mob and try to flatter the instincts of the "disinherited," they will have to be "mediocre" and "solid."  
(WP, p. 864)


By mediocrity, Nietzsche means something that paradoxically we might today call elite. The mob is not even mediocre. The initially exceptional are stunted and this results in a heap of people who are at the top of the corporate and

political ladders. The mediocre seem to be, for Nietzsche, contemporary entrepreneurial and/or religious conservatives. The exceptional who are not seduced by gold may become artists, criminals, or just plain loonies.

For Nietzsche, the declaration that all men reserve equal and inalienable rights is a particular misfortune of contemporary liberalism and socialism (two words for the same basic governing principles). "The modern European is characterized by two apparently opposite traits: individualism and the demand for equal rights; that I have at last come to understand" (WP, p. 783).

Of course, Nietzsche would reject the idea that rights are inalienable and even that they exist outside of human projects. The Bill of Rights is an example of the ignoble lie that results from the resentment of the many felt toward the few. Nonetheless, I feel that Nietzsche would think that such a document or an unwritten equivalent is a nearly inevitable outcome of the slave revolt in morals. A metaphysical foundation was deemed necessary if aristocracy was to be once and for all disposed of.

Nietzsche concludes that the conflict between equal rights and individualism does not exist insofar as the concept of individualism has been reshaped. Individualism has come to mean the idea that the individual in the abstract has some sphere of autonomy; that the individual opposes society not



as a person but only as an individual; he represents all individuals against the totality. That means: he instinctively posits himself as equal to all other individuals; what he gains in this struggle he gains for himself not as a person but as a representative of individuals against the totality.  
(WP, p. 784)

What Nietzsche has in mind is that the great personality should be encouraged. Individuality in this manner opposes itself to the approval of the masses rather than justifying itself on the ground that it is securing modest freedoms for all. No individual will attain greatness since this would imply that all individuals are not equal. A condition of recognized inequality is necessary in order to produce high human beings. Such is Nietzsche's critique of the merely tolerant regime.

B. The Regime That Wills The Great Human Being

From now on there will be more favorable preconditions for more comprehensible forms of dominion, whose like has never yet existed. And even this is not the most important thing; the possibility has been established for the production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a master race, the future "masters of the earth"; -- a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be made to endure for millennia -- a higher kind of man who, thanks to their superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a different meaning.  
(WP, p. 960)





Nietzsche is at his most optimistic in this passage. Or is it desperation? The transition from democracy to aristocracy seems to be almost inevitable according to the quote. We know better than that though. The last man, spoken of earlier, is one of Nietzsche's biggest worries. Regardless of the overconfident tone, the general themes of Nietzsche's political challenge to mankind are here sounded. The more willful individuals who have along with Nietzsche stared into the abyss are instructed to act as precursors to the demolition of democracy. They are to help create the conditions that will increase the probability that a grand legislator will appear.

I stated earlier that the highest man is to construct a regime friendly to great human beings. The problem is that the last quote indicates that Nietzsche's disciples are, in the midst of democratic rule, supposed to attempt to change things so that the grand legislator can come about. There is a pessimistic edge to the idea that the legislator can just spring up out of democracy. Thus, a three stage plan is presented. The first step being to establish preconditions for the highest man, the second step is for the highest man to legislate aristocratic values, the third step is for the children of the highest man to "make good" on their opportunity to become great human beings. The first step would appear to be the most difficult phase to understand in the concrete. I will only offer here that the hope is that with the help of philosophical artists, the

moral superstructure of Christianity is to begin to deteriorate. I wish to concentrate on the second stage, that of the legislation of the highest man. What would the regime that wills the existence of great human beings look like? What would be its basic structure?

We know that Nietzsche favors aristocracy. But what exactly is aristocracy? Let us refer to an expert in analyzing constitutions, Aristotle. For Aristotle, aristocracy means the rule of the few, as opposed to the many (democracy) or the one (monarchy). The most pure aristocracy is also the rule of the best or most just. In The Politics, there is much discussion of how the term aristocracy is employed, ranging from its perversion, oligarchy, to half-breed democratic admixtures. Yet, in Chapter VIII of Book IV, Aristotle states:

It is a general opinion that the essential criterion of aristocracy is the distribution of office according to merit: merit is its criterion, as wealth is the criterion of oligarchy, and free birth of democracy.  
(P, p. 175)

Of course, Aristotle has a well-developed plan for what constitutes merit in an individual. The closest thing to merit in Nietzsche's scheme is either being a higher human being or being capable of greatly contributing to its production. We thus have rule of the few meritorious beings.

Since Nietzsche does not believe in truth with a capital "T," when he speaks of rule he does not necessarily

mean holding office. The greater form of rule is rule over the culture, not for several years, but for several centuries. Recall the section above about the highest man. The office holders are to be determined based upon their abilities to advance the goals of a culture as set out by the grand legislative artist. They are to be micropoliticians while the grand legislator is a macropolitican.

There exist two key concepts in Nietzsche that I will use to justify the skeleton of social organization which follows: Those concepts are **ressentiment** and horizon.

Something has already been said concerning **ressentiment**, namely, that Christianity is an instance of the general inclination of the masses to revolt against the values of their superiors. It seems that for Nietzsche, the Christian response to paganism teaches us a lesson about the vulnerability of aristocracy to the **ressentiment** of the weak. If *otium* is to be preserved, **ressentiment** must be contained or preempted. The mediocre, which are really the lowly to Nietzsche, should be alienated from the higher humans to such a great extent that envy can scarcely arise. "Chief viewpoint: establish distances, but create no antitheses" (WP, p. 891). Further: "How should one wish to spoil mediocrity for the mediocre! As one will see, I do the opposite: every step away from it -- so I teach leads to immorality" (WP, p. 892). In other words, the higher are instructed to keep their mouths shut regarding their own



superiority. Don't antagonize the lower, don't compete with them, compete with self and equals. On the higher human: "Precisely because he is an exception, he has to take the rule under his protection, he has to keep the mediocre in good heart" (WP, 893).

The concept of horizon is complex, yet part of the idea is the maintenance of social structures. According to Werner Danhauser's understanding of Nietzsche, "Man's horizon is constituted by his fundamental set of assumptions about all things, by what he considers the absolute truth which he cannot question" (HPP, p. 831). The horizon is a countermeasure taken against the vertigo of flux.

And this is a universal law: a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only when bounded by a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same time too self-centered to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine away slowly or hasten to its timely end. (UT, p. 63).

This excerpt from the essay on history suggests strongly that Nietzsche does support stability to an extent. Most scholars agree that he is more interested in life-enhancement than he is in most anything else, skepticism included. In short, Nietzsche doesn't wish to fuel a new breed of human and a new aristocracy that lasts for only a brief span. Recall that the highest man is to shape man for millennia, not a week.

The vulnerability of past aristocracy, coupled with the call for some stability, serve as theoretical justification



for the forthcoming structural analysis of a Nietzschean society for the future. The more tangible support, however, resides in Nietzsche's last complete work, The Antichrist.

Section 57 of the aforementioned reveals some of the most structured and neglected aspects of Nietzsche's social thought.

The order of castes, the supreme, the dominant law, is merely the sanction of a natural order, a natural lawfulness of the first rank, over which no arbitrariness, no "modern idea" has any power. In every healthy society there are three types which condition each other and gravitate differently physiologically; each has its own hygiene, its own field of work, its own sense of perfection and mastery. Nature, not Manu, distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual ones, those who are pre-eminently strong in muscle and temperament, and those, the third type, who excel neither in one respect nor in the other, the mediocre ones -- the last as the great majority, the first as the elite.

(PN, p. 645)

This apparent appeal to nature certainly can be contrasted with Nietzschean themes of anti-essentialism and impermanence. I shan't be concerned with reconciliation here though, but only with the exposure of this line of thought. Suffice it to say that what is meant here by the term "nature" is problematic and it is not at all certain that there is much of a connection between Nietzsche's notion of nature and traditional theories of natural law and the state of nature.

Yet, regardless of what is intended by "nature," Nietzsche's dividing-up of mankind into three basic camps is





presented with a daring confidence. The distances separating the types appear vast enough that it is as if three distinct species are being described. The higher human does, indeed, make the lower seem like an ape in comparison.

Nietzsche provides us with a few details concerning the types. Besides what has already been proffered of the higher humans, which is repeated in this section of The Antichrist, Nietzsche says of them, "They rule not because they want to but because they are; they are not free to be second" (PN, p. 646). He continues on about the second class:

The second are the executive arm of the most spiritual, that which is closest to them and belongs to them, that which does everything gross in the work of ruling for them -- their retinue, their right hand, their best pupils.  
(Ibid.)

In contemporary terms, they are administrators and instructors.

The third and preponderant type of human is the economic base of the whole enterprise.

To be a public utility, a wheel, a function, for that one must be destined by nature; it is not society, it is the only kind of happiness of which the great majority are capable that makes intelligent machines of them. For the mediocre, to be mediocre is their happiness; mastery of one thing, specialization -- a natural instinct.  
(Ibid., pp. 646-647).

These are the bodies who provide the conditions, both material and spiritual, for the survival of the higher



beings. They preserve otium and distance. One might wonder, however, whether technology might not ultimately do away with the requirement that the underclass labor much. But that is a different question. The distancing must remain and a leisured lower class could conceivably come into conflict with a leisured upper class. This is perhaps something that scares Nietzsche about technology and socialism.

At any rate, the three supports for what I am about to say include **ressentiment** or the vulnerability of aristocratic rule, the physiological need of horizons, and the tripartite division of humanity.

I think, then, that we may add the highest man, the initial legislator, and say that there are four rough niches involved in the politics of the future. First, the founder of a people, then the higher humans who may be politicians but more likely are leisured philosophers (as opposed to today's philosophical laborers) and artists, then the executive arm of the prior two niches, and finally the masses who ensure distancing and maintain the material conditions necessary to free up the leisured class. It would be difficult to say what the ratios of numbers in each class would be. The technological level at the time and political stability would factor in highly.

I suspect that an order of rank within the ruling body is necessary. There would be philosophers at the top, occasionally giving the most general orders, and then



political laborers at the bottom who tend to practical politics. Nietzsche is not, however, explicit about this matter.

The roles of each of the classes, with the exception of the highest man, have yet to be fully discussed.

The vulgar masses are necessary for labor and for what Nietzsche calls the pathos of distance, which is part of being an aristocrat. Their function is to keep the leisured in leisure. They do this by performing tasks which they are kept happy with and which constitute the economic base of the aristocracy. Specific tasks are hard to imagine since they would be so dependent upon the level of technology attained. Why would the masses be content with their status? In other words, wherein lies the stability of the system?

Technology, provided that the environment isn't destroyed, could soon make it possible to meet the material needs of the masses handsomely and still support a leisured class. What must be accomplished is that the **ressentiment** which has toppled old aristocracies needs to be removed or at least reduced. This means that the values of the masses must differ from but not be antagonistic to those of the leisured. If the leisured value leisure and the masses value doing some work and having time to spare, and if they are fed and amused, **ressentiment** will be much less likely to rear its ugly head. Those amongst the masses who, because

of their intellects or other prowess, are likely to be capable of valuing solitude and leisure time without becoming bored can be moved into the leisure class if they choose. This is a further deterrent to **ressentiment** as children from the most common of families may be somehow identified as candidates for the leisure class and thus movement becomes possible. Likewise, is movement from leisure to masses possible. Since it is more a choice of individual preference and ability than it is the direct result of landed wealth (the leisured class are not capitalists), nepotism and oligarchy do not rule the day.

Essentially, the masses will be composed of people who are content with middle class life, while the leisured will be the malcontents. "Absolute conviction: that value feelings above and below are different; that countless experiences are lacking in those below; that between below and above misunderstanding is necessary" (WP, p. 994). Today, we often speak of misunderstanding as if it were the root of social conflict. Here, though, the suggestion seems to be that understanding is unnecessary for stability so long as the classes are not in competition with each other. Assuming basic physical needs are met, the different valuations reduce hostilities. One may read Dostoyevsky while another busies himself with collecting postage stamps. It's when all want to possess the most postage stamps that conflict starts.

Nietzsche's leisured class of potential and existing higher humans would not be so piggish as the practiced aristocracies of old insofar as the new aristocracy is based on drive and merit instead of heredity. Recall the suffering that goes along with being a higher human, and then see if the masses are really anxious to infiltrate the realm of the sufferers. In fact, the leisured might even be seen by the masses as the sick or afflicted -- possessed by some incommunicable disease.

Though Nietzsche advocates slavery, the only absolutely necessary aspect of a new slavery seems to be lack of suffrage. It is certainly feasible that the new slaves could be in a sense freer than the large portion of citizens under a liberal democracy. Again, technology built up by capitalism, could, once capitalism is overturned, lead to a vast reduction of labor and allow for more recreational time, and therefore more contentment, for the masses if they so choose. The small leisure class (how small I couldn't say -- one percent of the total population is probably a generous figure) would be a most motley crew. They would be artists in the broad sense of the word, possibly composed of, but not limited to, actors, poets, musicians, philosophers, leaders, perhaps even athletes and, most hopefully, well-rounded individuals and personalities who don't fit under any one category. These are the higher men and they are peers to one another though they are not






completely equal. Nietzsche, for instance, would rank the poet below the man who creates not poems, but his life. Values will vary among the higher men, with some preferring the cold and the hard, others the hot and liquid. Otium is the only constant. These humans are ends in themselves, thus, if they can be said to serve any purpose, it is to see what heights can be attained by humans.

The question of who becomes a leisured individual and who part of the masses is a problem that Nietzsche leaves for future generations to solve. The details of the selection process would have to be worked out by the leisured class and something of an intermediary group composed of teachers and administrators. Among factors to be considered would be precocity in many spheres such as intellect, artistic ability, energy, and other uncommon attributes. This much can be inferred from what has been discussed concerning the higher man. My argument about the containment of resentment, coupled with Nietzsche's disregard for oligarchy, suggests that the leisured are not necessarily descendants of the leisured, nor that members of the bottom two classes are necessarily descended from parents of the selfsame class. Those with a familial bent might just choose one of the lower classes, even though leisure is a possibility. All of this would be instrumental in containing **ressentiment** and thus making the aristocracy less vulnerable to destruction, though Nietzsche himself doesn't draw it all out for us.





As was stated, the intermediary group seemingly would be composed of teachers and administrators of politics and education. They are instrumental in nature and would contemplate how to best implement the wishes of the more politically inclined of the higher man. Their status would be that of glorified slaves.

## V. CONCLUSION



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The plan of this paper has been one of moving from basic Nietzschean pronouncements slowly into a creative analysis (Nietzsche made that phrase no longer oxymoronic) about the structure of a future aristocratic state. I have not tried to prove a theory, but only to present some of Nietzsche's more neglected material and attempt to show that there is a prescriptive component that is less ambiguous than the phrase "overcome the self." Besides the exercise in history of political philosophy, I have chosen this theme with a view to reopening a political dialogue spanning from the far right to the far left, instead of from contemporary dictatorships to Marxism.

I think that there is even a possibility of reconciling many of the goals of the Left with a new aristocracy that would value leisure more than production. The masses could end up in a better position than ever in history. All could have food, clothing, and shelter and more time of their own than now. Nietzsche might not care about these things on the surface, but, strategically, the contentment of the masses is a good idea. It is the need for horizon and the need to solve the problem of aristocratic vulnerability, along with the divisions suggested in The Antichrist that

lend support to the structure I have suggested. Of these groupings, Nietzsche declares:

In all this, to repeat, there is nothing arbitrary, nothing contrived; whatever is different is contrived -- contrived for the ruin of nature. The order of castes, the order of rank, merely formulates the highest law of life; the separation of the three types is necessary for the survival of society, to make possible the higher and the highest types.  
(PN, p. 646).

There has not been a society such as that proposed, therefore, empirical support is lacking. Past problems are diagnosed and then solutions are proposed based upon their theoretical potentials to solve.

I do not intend to submit that the right wing aspect of Nietzsche's thought is the most important aspect, but only that it might just be the most important aspect at this point in history when right wing has come to mean either fascist or religious. What I mean by right wing is basically the justification of society by its highest specimens instead of by liberal rights. It is nearly taken for granted that reform and the political left go hand in hand. As applied to Americans, the term "radical" is synonymous with the left. But, discontent with the status quo does not necessarily mean that the road to a brighter humanity is paved in equality and rights. After all, these are the words of the founders of our regime and they are supposedly derived from Christianity. Nietzsche is more radical than Marx in that he dispenses with rights and equality altogether. There is no God and therefore rights






are merely conventions to be accepted or rejected as conditions merit. The idea of equality is a most unnatural idea because one can look around even the most mediocre of states in order to find that the phrase "all men are created equal" is for Nietzsche the closest thing to a falsehood ever uttered.

The dissociation of Marx from Soviet Communism by scholars is no more worthy an enterprise than the dissociation of Nietzsche from the Third Reich. Both attempts are laudable. Neither of these political organizations is representative of the thinkers with which each is often still associated.

At this point in history, with the death of God at hand, the question comes to the fore: what should the goal of humanity be? If the goal is to create its higher types, then perhaps Nietzsche has the rudiments of an answer. If it is up to us to provide the details. If that goal be freedom, then he might have the answer as well. Freedom doesn't have to be the same for everyone. Freedom for the masses could mean happiness or contentment, while freedom for the higher types could mean otium. A symbiotic relationship is possible.



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