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This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled
Managing the Nation's Waters Without Washington:

The Interstate Compact Experience

presented by

James Perry Hill

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Doctor Oilhjlflsmhydegree in W1 ence

Date 1% x/ 1/“ ya

Harold S aeth
M41 23,1996

 

 

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MANAGING THE NATION'S WATERS WITHOUT WASHINGTON:

THE INTERSTATE COMPACT EXPERIENCE

BY
JAMES PERRY HILL

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1992

$ 7,3

6/2

ABSTRACT

MANAGING THE NATION'S WATERS WITHOUT WASHINGTON:
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT EXPERIENCE

BY
James Perry Hill

The growing regional imbalance in water supplies has
raised political tensions between water "surplus" states and
water "shortage" states over control of surface and
groundwater supplies. The result has been a growing fear
among water surplus regions like the Great Lakes that
pressure on Congress from politically powerful water storage
states may result in eventual federal preemption of this

traditional state management function.

In light of the regional character of most water
resources and the collective action problems this fact
raises, numerous regional efforts have been attempted by
states. The most powerful device available from a legal
standpoint to ensure that water resources policy or policies
reflect regional variation while avoiding wholesale federal
Preemption is the interstate compact. However, studies of
interstate compact commissions are dated and largely

descriptive.

Accordingly, a new theoretical effectiveness model is
developed in this dissertation. Then, the model is applied
to the entire population of interstate water compact

Commissions, utilizing a nationwide survey of all interstate

water compact commissions as well as objective data obtained
from legal and historical documents associated with each

compact.

Seven general hypotheses of what constitutes an
effective interstate compact commission, drawn from the
compact literature, are tested to determine whether or not
they conform with the findings of the new effectiveness
model. The model's explanatory power is further tested by
applying it to three comprehensive interstate water compact

case studies.

The dissertation concludes that the interstate compact
commission can be an effective mechanism for regional water
management and potentially for other regional resources as

well.

Copyright by
JAMES PERRY HILL
1992

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To complete this dissertation required more of my family
than I had ever anticipated. Without the sacrifices and
strong support of my wife Kathy, this dissertation could not
have been concluded. The understanding and love of my
children Tricia and Jamie and the joy of my young daughter

Alyson also sustained me in this effort.

I also wish to acknowledge the efforts of my
dissertation committee: Professor Harold Spaeth, who
chaired my committee and offered me invaluable sage advice:
Professor Brian Humes, whose support and guidance helped me
frame this dissertation; Professor Carol Weissert, whose
excellent insights brought focus and clarity to my writing:
and Professor Charles Press, whose knowledge of federalism

helped me develop the regional framework for this study.

I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the
Political Science staff of Michigan State University,
especially Karen Albrecht who guided me through the maze of
the Ph.D. requirements and kept me on course. And of course
I extend my gratitude to the many department faculty members
who helped prepare me for this undertaking.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER I. FEDERALISH AND WATER POLICY IN THE U.S.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Historical Overview of U.S. Water Policy . . .
Tension and Gridlock in U.S. Water Policy:
Congress, the Courts, and the States . . . .

Federalism Under Fire: The Regional Solution .

CHAPTER II. REGIONAL APPROACHES TO U.S. WATER POLICY

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Regionalism in a Federal System . . . . . . .
Defining the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alternative Forms of Regional Action . . . . .
CHAPTER III. THE HISTORY OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Defining an Interstate Compact . . . . . . . .

The Legal and Political Nature of the
Interstate Compact . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Critical Analysis of the Interstate Compact .

To Compact or not to)Compact: The Pros and Cons

Compact Commissions and Regional Water Ranagement

ii

vi

17

22

25
26
29

32

42

46

51
54
63

76

CHAPTER IV. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AS A CONSTRUCT
FOR ASSESSING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Problems in Utilizing Organizational
Effectiveness as a Dependent Variable . . . . . . 85
An Effectiveness Approach for Evaluating Interstate
Compact Water Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
CHAPTER V. EFFECTIVE INTERSTATE COHPACTS: MODEL
APPLICATION AND VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A Theoretical Model for Identifying Effective
Interstate Compacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
The Validity of Compact Effectiveness
Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Hypotheses of What Constitutes An Effective Interstate
Water Compact: An Assessment . . . . . . . . . 152
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
CHAPTER VI. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A TALE OF THREE
COHPACTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Three Interstate Water Compacts: Comparisons
and Contrasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Federal Representation and Compact Effectiveness . 187
Communication, Compacts, and Constituencies . . . 190
Compact Commissions and Major Elite
Constituency Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

canalusion O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 199

CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. WATER POLICY . . . 201

APPENDIX

0 O O O O O . v11
BIBLIOGRAPHY

....xxxiii

iv

Table
Table

Table

Table

Table
Table
Table

Table

Table

Table

Table
Table
Table
Table

10

11

12

13

14

LIST OF TABLES

Unequal Access
Alternative Forms of Regional Cooperation

The Historical Search for Organizational
Effectiveness

Commonly Used Models of Organizational
Effectiveness

Indices of Organizational Effectiveness
Interstate Water Compact

Goal Model:
Effectiveness

Interstate Water Compact

Systems Resource Model:
Compact Resources

Interstate Water

Strategic Constituency Model:
Interstate Water Compact State Evaluation

Summary Table: Overall Effectiveness
Ranking of Interstate Water Compacts

Final Ranking Compact
Compact Types
Drainage Basin Areas of Interstate Compact

Numbers of State Members in Interstate Water
Compacts

36

88

99
104

117

123

127

130

135

139

145

168

169

Figure
Figure

Figure

Figure

LIST OF FIGURES

Legal Doctrines for Surface Waters

Growth in Compacts and Federal
Regulatory Agencies

A Decade-by-Decade Comparison of
Major Regulatory Adaptions

The Delaware, Great Lakes and
California-Nevada River Basins

vi

12

61

62

182

CHAPTER I

FEDERALISM AND WATER POLICY IN THE U.S.

W

In a decade when the United States went to war over the
issue of control over the world's strategic Middle East oil
supply, it would seem to make little economic sense that
national concern anywhere near approaching that of oil would
occur over control of the nation's supplies of water, one of
the world's cheapest commodities (Anderson, 1991). Indeed,
in light of the relative per capita water surplus of water
in the U.S. compared to countries in the Middle East (See
Table 1), it would seem on the surface that water policy
would be an unlikely candidate for a divisive national
debate.

Yet, U.S. journals continue to use the words "crisis"
and "water wars""to describe the problems associated with
the nation's supply of fresh water, a commodity that
Anderson (1991:10) refers to as the new "white oil”. Tubbs

(1983:920) predicts that the water crisis of the 1990's will

 

‘ See "Water Crisis in the 90's". Ing_Natignal_lgu:nal,
August 17, 1985: p. 28 and "First Volleys of New Water Wars"

H1§1_N£E§_§nfi_flQIlQ_B§EQI§p May 30: 19933 P- 20)-
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3
rival the oil crisis the U.S. experienced in the 1970's.
Perhaps, U.S. Senator David Durenberger put into perspective
this seeming contradiction in the U.S. between
the economics and the reality of water resource management
when he observed: ”Water is a political, not an economic,
commodity.” (Griffin, 1987:277)

The uniqueness of U.S. "hydropolitics" is attributable
in part to several factors: (1) there are three sovereigns
asserting authority over water suppliesz: (2) there has
never been an affirmative U.S. national water policy to
ensure equity and uniformity in the use and control of the
nation's water, a fact which has led to excessive watershed
parochialism and extraordinary federal subsidies of regional
water projects: and (3) there is a tremendous regional
imbalance in the fresh water supply among the various
regions of the U.S., a situation aggravated by a declining
quality in the existing fresh water resources.

These factors, coupled with the fact that water is not
bound by political boundaries and is a classic public good
subject to collective action problems, have resulted in what
Jamail, McCain, and Ullery (1978:53) have described as a
U.S. water policy arena that is:

"extremely fragmented, with a multitude of diffuse
interests pressing their demands from within as well as

 

2 See A. Dan Tarlock (1987) where he argues that
federal, state and Indian reserved rights create three
sovereigns who must be consulted in interstate water rights
decisions.

4

without the decision-making system."
This fragmentation of water resources control has

created a confusing and highly conflictual situation that
Congress has been unwilling to rectify by national
legislation. The result has been a growing imbalance in the
water quality and quantity of U.S. water supplies, for all
intents and purposes leaving the states to their own devices
to fend off water diversion. Individual state attempts to
protect their water supplies have only exacerbated regional
water imbalances, and diversion threats to water surplus
regions such as the Great Lakes basin have further
heightened water supply tensions. As Cole-Misch (1986:87)
summarized the situation:

”The need in the future for water throughout the U.S.

portends a conflict both national in scope and horrific

in intensity. The groundwork has been laid for a

fierce, divisive battle between the "haves" and the

"have-nots", and history shows that it is the "have-

nots" who are likely to win. If the decision is left

up to the federal government and the courts, those who
have the water in this country will lose their
exclusive right to that resource -- and the cost of
diverting water to drier climates will not be an
effective obstacle.”

What options are available to water ”surplus" regions
such as the Great Lakes basin in order to avoid Cole-Misch's
dire prediction? Stewart (in Price,l982) argues that there
is a reluctance by Congress to resolve such water conflicts,
and the federal courts more recently have retreated from

their active involvement in equitably apportioning water.

However, Tubbs (1983:942) warns that as the supply of

5
western water continues to decline, the federal government
will be forced to develop some kind of national water policy
unless a nonfederal alternative can be developed.

States in water surplus regions such as the Great Lakes
which are facing declining populations and consequently
diminishing political power cannot expect a favorable water
policy in a U.S. Congress increasingly dominated by water
shortage states of the South and West. Nor is reliance on
the uncertainty of court decisions a desirable alternative.

In the first three chapters that follow, this study
will explore the various nonfederal options available for
equitably and effectively filling this need for a more
equitable U.S, water policy, options Elazar (1962:162) terms
”federalism without Washington". Subsequent chapters will
develop a model for evaluating the effectiveness of a
constitutionally-recognized interstate compact commission in
handling the unique regional water supply issues in the U.S.
federal system.

More specifically, this study will begin with a brief
background of U.S. water policies, exploring the specific
problems and barriers that now exist in modifying existing
water policies. A discussion of the peculiar hydropolitics
associated with U.S. water issues and the accompanying
political tensions that have arisen under our federal system
will serve as a backdrop for this focus on nonfederal

solutions.

6

Chapter II of this study will explore the various sub-
national alternatives to the development of a uniform
federal water policy, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
of each option as a viable alternative to a federally
imposed water policy. Then, attention will be focused upon
the interstate compact as the premier binding legal
instrument for developing a regional water policy based upon
watershed rather than state political boundaries.

Chapter III will provide an extensive exploration of the
practical and theoretical strengths and weaknesses of the
interstate compact commission as a nonfederal, institutional
alternative for developing an effective water policy in the
United States.

Utilizing the principles of organizational theory
relevant to the study of regional public organizations,
Chapter IV will then review the relevant theoretical
literature and examine various theories as to what
constitutes an effective organization from the perspectives
of various schools of organizational theory. In light of
the controversy surrounding what constitutes an effective
organization from an organizational theory standpoint, this
study then will define and construct a theoretically
justifiable methodology for identifying what is an effective
interstate commission.

Chapter V will include an analysis of common
structural, legal, and political variables associated with

the existing interstate water compact commissions deemed

7
"effective". These variables were isolated and defined
utilizing historical accounts, legal studies and the
legislative histories of each of the compacts (objective
effectiveness measures), as well utilizing the responses
from a 1991 nationwide survey of interstate compact
commissions developed for this study (a subjective
effectiveness measure).

Three case studies of interstate water compacts then
will be used in Chapter VI as a further test of the validity
of the variables identified in this study. The compact
commissions examined were chosen because of the varying
geographical location, their differing size, and their
relative effectiveness ranking. Thus, the Delaware River
Basin Compact Commission (DRBC) (deemed a relatively
effective commission in this study), the Great Lakes
Commission (also deemed a relatively ineffective commission
in this study, although more marginal than the DRBC), and
the California-Nevada Commission (deemed as ineffective
because of its failure to achieve Congressional approval)
were selected for this study.

Chapter VII summarizes the findings and significance of
this study. It also attempts to frame this issue of
interstate water compact effectiveness into the larger
context of the need for future research into the
effectiveness of regional governance.

The study of interstate water compacts per se may seem

to be a specialized and relatively small part of the

8
political reality of the U.S. federal system. However, the
potential for these commissions to effectively resolve
impending water wars while preserving some semblance of
state authority warrants this attention. Furthermore, if
this study also can help in the identification of guidelines
for the development of effective regional organizations in
general in a federal system that formally provides no room
for a regional sovereign, then this study will have made a
significant contribution to the study of cooperative

federalism as well.

W

In light of growing regional imbalances in water
supplies, the current focus of U.S. government attention on
water resource issues has shifted from one of water
development to one of better management of existing
supplies, including environmental quality issues.3 (see
generally Schmandt, Smerdon, and Clarkson, 1988). Indeed,
shifts in emphases of government attention towards
significant policy issues have been a hallmark of the U.S.

federal system.‘ Richard Stewart (Price, 1982) describes

 

3 Environmental protection issues have become the focus
of more and more federal involvement, with the states
largely relegated to an implementation role in such areas as
air and water quality. The issue of water quantity,
however, is still an area of considerable state involvement
and hence the focus of this study.

‘ See generally Downs, "The Life Cycle of Bureaus” in
(1967), pp. 5-23. Down's theory in part
discusses the effects of age upon bureaus in terms of their

9
the historic operation of the federal system as a
dialectical process, alternating between surges of
centralization and decentralization.

However, to truly appreciate the obstacles facing
attempts to better manage the nation's water resources of
the 0.8, a basic understanding of the historical and legal
bases for state and federal involvement in the water arena
is provided. This background will highlight the subsequent

political constraints that limit water policy options.

EIQ:12QQ_EQL§I_291121_12_LDE_H1§1

With the exception of overriding federal navigational
rights, U.S. water policy in general prior to the twentieth
century vested primary responsibility for control of water
resources to the individual states. This state dominance
resulted more from federal deference to state water laws
than to any specific legal doctrine, for in theory the
federal government has the power to apportion interstate
streams subject only to limitations of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Tarlock,
1987::637). Individual states, in turn, relied upon either
English riparian rights or prior appropriation doctrines as
the primary methods for allocating surface water resources

while groundwater was assumed to be owned by the individual

 

attention to policy issues and overall agency performance.

10

5 The doctrine of riparian rights, whereby only

states.
owners of tracts of land contiguous with the water's edge
are entitled to use of the water, has evolved mainly in the
Eastern U.S. Today, a riparian's use of the water is
subject to numerous statutory and court case exceptions,
including the requirement of "reasonable use" of the water
to protect against abuse of water resources by upstream
riparians to other downstream riparians. However, riparian
rights doctrine is based upon protecting the water rights of
all landowners abutting a body of water.

The doctrine of prior appropriation, on the other hand,
places no legal significance on the users proximity to a
water course. It is based on the assumption that first in
time (in terms of water usage) is first in right, without
concern for other water users (Stephenson, 1982:655) and is
primarily a Western U.S. phenomenon. While this doctrine
has been modified in many states through a permit system to
review beneficial uses as well as to determine priority
uses, it is a much harsher doctrine than the riparian rights
system.

A third system, called a hybrid doctrine, developed in
states like California, Kansas, and Nebraska. As Getches
(1990) explains, this doctrine initially recognized riparian
rights but later converted to a system of appropriation
while still preserving existing riparian rights.

 

5 See Goldfarb (1990) and Tarlock (1987) for more
detailed descriptions of these two doctrines.

11

As a result of these divergent state water doctrines,
the U.S. has in essence evolved into three distinct
geographical water regions (See Figure 1), This factor alone
is a significant barrier and disincentive for developing a
uniform national water policy, although it could be a
unifying factor in many regional solutions As long as water
supplies did not outstrip demand, this patchwork quilt of

individual state water policies was sufficient for the U.S.
E9Et:12QQ_Eater_£olis¥_in_the_nla.

After the turn of the century, however, federal
involvement in water quantity issues began to change,
especially in the Western U.S. The reason for this change
can be traced to at least three factors: (1) increased
state demands upon a fixed and limited supply of fresh water
as a result of growing state populations‘: (2) an increase
in the number of conflicting state claims on interstate
waters in the West (Murray, 1984:500) in a region where the
federal government also owns a significant portion of the

land7 and has a significant interest the resolution of

 

6 It is estimated that 40% of U.S. territory (primarily
the Western states) receives only 13% of its rain (Elliot,
1991:30).

7 The federal government owns 79% of Nevada, 61% of
Idaho, 60% of Utah, 52% of Oregon, 47% of Wyoming, 45% of
California, 45% of Arizona, 33% of New Mexico, 30% of
Colorado, and 30% of Montana (Will, 1991).

12

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13
interstate water supply issues8 and (3) Congressional
willingness to actively participate in and finance large
scale water development projects, in part because of
confidence by many in Congress in the ability of federal
technical experts to answer water resource questions (Light
and Wodraska, 1990:597) and in part because of the favorable
political pork barrel benefits it provided individual
Congressmen.

However, then as today, the appropriate role in terms
of federal involvement in water policy issues has been
puzzling, with the federal government described by Light and
Wodraska (1990:597) as "floundering to define its mission
and role." In the pre-New Deal era, beginning with the
unsuccessful efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt to
coordinate federal and state water policies for river basins
through an Inland Waterways Commission (Light and Wodraska,
1990:594), the federal government sought piecemeal
participation in water policy development.’ Federal court
decisions involving these efforts in general seemed to
suggest that this limited foray into water allocation was a

prudent course for the federal government. However, the New

 

' Absent U.S. involvement, water issues were generally
handled by the federal courts on an ad hoc and increasingly
unsatisfactory manner. (See Stephenson, 1982:656)

9 For example, Congress passed the Reclamation Act of
1902, 43 USC sec. 371 et seq., the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1909, 35 Stat. 815, and the Flood Control Act of 1917, 33
USC sec. 702 et seq. See Caldwell (1947) for a concise
overview of federal historical involvement in water issues.

14
Deal brought a new and increased federal involvement, both
in the creation of the TVA and a new federal commitment to
the conservation era and the idea of multiple purpose river
basin development (Tarlock, 1987:637). Executive branch
efforts in the 1930's established a National Resource
Committee and a National Resource Planning Board (Light and
Wodraska, 1990:594). Meanwhile, Congressional efforts began
with the passage of the Flood Control Act of 1936 (Rhodes,
1981:2). Thus, legislative and executive branches pursued
parallel yet uncoordinated efforts that significantly
increased federal intervention in the water arena.

However, growing public dissatisfaction with federal
efforts in water resources development led to attempts by
Congress beginning in the late 1940's to develop a more
cooperative water resources policy with the states in order
to improve management and coordinate federal and state
efforts in this area (Caldwell, 1948:238). Attempts to
develop a cooperative federal-state water resources policy
culminated in the passage of the Water Resource Planning Act
of 1965. Outside of federal efforts in the pollution

control arena”, this Act represented the high watermark in

 

w Federal water pollution efforts attained dominant
status in terms of federal regulation and expenditures in
the 1970's with the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 and
Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972. Federal involvement in
water resource development, especially in the West, declined
as federal resources were diverted to other areas of the
economy. The decline of the federal pork barrel for water
resources was vividly demonstrated by President Carter's
veto of a number of federal water resource projects, which
until then had been seen as the sacred cows of their

15
federal water policy participation, creating five federal
river basin commissions to encourage intergovernmental

coordination in federal water policies.11

Withdraw

The declining fiscal state of the nation's economy in
the late 1970's and early 1980's brought to a head the issue
of federal intervention in water policy issues, confronting
Presidents and Congress with the new reality of federal
water policy. It had become increasingly apparent that the
federal government was unable to continue to fund expensive
water development projects in the West, a prime source of
political pork barrel politics for Western Congressman.
Thus, Congressional enthusiasm for federal water policy
intervention in state water issues waned. As Schmant,
Smerdon, and Clarkson (1988:28) noted:

"In contrast to its former active participation in

water development projects, the federal government is

leaving it up to the states to develop their own plans
and provide most of the necessary financial support."

In addition, the federal government was deterred from

new dam building because there were few suitable rivers left

 

powerful Senators and Congressmen sponsors.

" The Commissions established under the Water
Resources Planning Act of 1965 (42 USC sec. 1962 et. seq.)
were abolished by executive order in 1981. It should be
noted that these commissions were not created by compact but
rather by federal legislation. Furthermore, their purpose
to coordinate water resources planning was accomplished by
federal funding rather than by regulation.

16
and “a phalanx of environmentalists guards those that are."
(U.S. News and World Report, 1988:20). Thus, recent efforts
by Congress and the Bush Administration to push for regional
solutions that give states more flexibility to find
solutions to water issues represent a retreat from the
national focus of New Deal water policy but not a solution
to the overall regional imbalance problem.

However, today there is still considerable Western
state reliance on federal water development projects.
According to a Report to the Great Lakes Governors (1983:4),
30% of the population of Western states depend upon a water
supply that is over a hundred miles away and involves over
150 separate interbasin transfers. As Tarlock 1987:637)
observed, a lack of federal involvement in a water
allocation problem of this increasing magnitude forces the
states to fight among themselves over how shared streams are
to be divided, leaving them with the options of informal
agreements, equitable apportionment by the courts,
interstate compacts, or in some instances abiding by the
terms of international treaties with Canada and Mexico.

As several writers have noted, ”with the federal
government withdrawing from water resource management, the
question is how effective are the states in taking the
initiative and addressing this issue?" (Schmandt, Smerdon,
and Clarkson, 1988:13). If the solutions chosen by the
states are not satisfactory, political pressure will

increase to return to and even increase federal intervention

17
in the water policy arena with the accompanying impact that
this policy change will have on federal-state relations.

12W
W

While the history of Congressional intervention in
water policy has been an uneven one, Congressional
involvement in the area of interstate water allocation has

not. With few exceptions12

, Congress has been reluctant to
become involved in interstate water allocation disputes
between states.

The reasons for this Congressional hesitancy to
intervene are both political and structural. From a
political standpoint, with the decreasing federal ability to
fund politically popular water development projects, there
is little political incentive for members to take a
leadership role in this controversial arena (Light and
Wodraska, 1990). Any water policy proposal reaching a
deficit-ridden Congress is likely to generate only unpopular
federal regulations and unfunded mandates.

Furthermore, interstate diversions are far more likely
to foster politically balanced, state versus state

opposition. As Abrams (1983:622) summarizes the political

situation, ”Rough parity of power exists between rival

 

u The Supreme Court in Azizgng_y‘_gglifig1ni§ 373 U.S.
546 (1963) ruled that Congress had in effect apportioned the

Colorado River waters when it authorized the Boulder Canyon
Project Act (43 USC sec.617).

18
states, a parity that has no parallel in the intrastate
context." Members of Congress not directly affected by the
interstate water conflict have little to gain in terms of
political capital by attempting to resolve these extremely
divisive state against state conflicts.

A structural perspective would also explain the
Congressional reluctance to intervene. The federal-state
water management structure is as uncoordinated as it is
large. There are 18 federal agencies in 7 departments and
seven independent agencies with some type of water
management responsibilities. In addition, there are 25
separate water programs with 70 separate appropriation
accounts, 23 committees and subcommittees in Congress with
water policy responsibilities, 200 federal rules and
regulations concerning water management issues, and over
100,000 entities engaged in some aspect of water management
at the state and local level (Light and Wodraska, 1990:479).

According to a recent study by the Interstate
Conference on water policy (1990:1) this sprawling and
uncoordinated structure has created a "water decision
gridlock” problem in the U.S. Symptomatic of this gridlock
are (1) turf battles among the various bureaucrats involved
in water management issues, (2) agency inertia and strict
adherence to agency missions accompanied by an unwillingness
to change standard operating procedures in order to reflect
a problemshed perspective to water issues, (3) redundancy in

hierarchical reviews, and (4) a lack of finality in

19
decision-making (Interstate Conference on Water Policy,
1990:1).

Furthermore, there would be little political capital in
being a champion of economy, efficiency, and even-handedness
by attempting to break this gridlock (Light and Wodraska,
1990:478), and philosophically at this time there would not
be much support for a federally dominated water policy in
this multiple interest arena.

With all of the fiscal, political, and structural
barriers to effective water policy and the political risks
that federal intervention in interstate water policy raises,
it would appear that the Congressional preference would be
for new regulations to be implemented by the states (Murray,
1984:514). Recent executive branch decisions would also
seem to support this idea of decentralizing federal water
policy. Both the Reagan and Bush Administrations have
embraced a watershed rather than political boundary model
for a federally supported national water policy program.13

However, a number of events in the courts and Congress
in recent years have raised fears among states that U.S.
federalism may be entering another era of centralization
with a decided impact on water policy. Signs of this new
centralization tendency can be found in recent decisions

handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court striking down hundreds

 

a See Davis (1991:739) on the Bush Administration's
plans to seek regional solutions to handle entire ecosystems
and Moore (1986:4) on the Reagan Administration's emphasis
on watershed planning.

20
of state and local laws, which have strengthened overall
national authority in general. Congress also has been
active in recent years in asserting its authority over
states and local governments, enacting 190 statutes
preempting state and local authority between 1969 and
1939 . “

Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions enhancing the power
of Congress over otherwise traditional state functions have
only served to heighten tensions between the states and the
federal government. Gage (1990:163) argues that after the
Garcia and Bake; cases“, states will now be treated "like
special interest groups just like any other special interest
and must seek redress in the political process.”

In particular there is a growing concern about the
timing of the Court's decisions strengthening the hand of
Congress at the very time Congress may be forced to
unilaterally intervene politically to resolve increasingly
divisive water policy disputes (Gage, 1990:163). Unless the
states undertake effective approaches to handle growing

regional water supply problems, federal intervention may

 

“ Over our nation's 200 year history, Congress has
enacted a total of 354 statues explicitly preempting state
and local authority. Thus the 190 statutes enacted between
1969-1989 represent over half of all the preemptive statutes
enacted in our nation's history but represent only 10% of
our constitutional history (Hawkins, 1990:10).

‘5 See W and
, where the court ruled that Congress
itself, not the Tenth Amendment, is the only check on
utilizing the federal commerce clause power to regulate the
states.

21
indeed be required. Specific concern over federal
intervention in water allocation and policy issues has
arisen because of a series of recent federal court cases
that have held that water is an item of interstate commerce
and thus subject to Congressional regulation whether it is
surface water“ or groundwater". Thus, Murray (1984:510)
concludes that as an article of commerce, water would be
subject to Congress' commerce clause power whether it is
transferred in intrastate or interstate commerce, a major
shift in power away from traditional views of water as
primarily a state issue.

With the Court's decision in fipgznggg signalling a
decline of the theory of state ownership of water resources
(Wilder, 1984:473) and the evolution of the Court's earlier
declared Winter's doctrine18 that has given Native American
tribes the ability to asset claims to vast quantities of
diminishing Western water sources (Tarlock, 1987:633), the
stage appears to be set for water shortage states to press
their water allocation beyond state boundaries. The Courts

are not the ideal institution to resolve these matters.

 

“ W 385 U-S- 35 (1966) per curiam.
aff'g 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex 1966)

" Waste 458 U.S. 941 (1982), where the
court found a significant federal interest in conservation
as well as in fair allocation of diminishing water
resources.

‘3 In W 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Court

recognized a new source of water rights for Indian tribes,
creating federal reserved rights for the benefit of Indian
reservations.

22
They traditionally have been uneasy and reluctant to
adjudicate interstate water controversies for two basic
reasons: (1) because of the vague standards available to the
court to resolve these controversies (Peck, 1982:198), and
(2) because allocation of water is a political and social as
well as a legal issue, one which they are ill-equipped to
address (Tader, 1986:278).

However, Hawkins (1990:11) argues that the Court's
decisions in Garcia and Bake; have converted the primary
limits on national power with respect to state and local
authority from constitutional limits to political ones. The
result, Hawkins (1990:12) concludes, is that Congressional
actions will be "checked only by voters and the political
muscle of state and local government in the national
political process". His conclusion is not a very comforting
one for a water "surplus" region like the Great Lakes Basin,
which is facing declining political strength in a Congress
increasingly dominated by the fast-growing water shortage

states of the South and West.

W

The current fiscal constraints on the national
government, due to ballooning federal deficits, present a
mixed blessing for states concerned about increased federal
intervention in state water policies.

On one hand, federal fiscal difficulties present new

opportunities for states to retain a significant amount of

23

control over the state water supply and allocation matters.
With the demise in 1981 of the Water Resources Council and
the River Basin Commissions formed under the Water Resources
Act of 1965, Light and Wodraska (1990:594) observed that "no
alternative mechanism has emerged for overseeing
intergovernmental and interagency issues dealing with
national water policy". Indeed, fiscal constraints are
nudging state and federal agencies closer together as they
become more dependent upon each other for support. The new
fiscal realities of U.S. federalism means a new role for the
federal government, at least for the time being.

Stanfield (1985:1885) describes this new role as

follows:

While the federal government is integrally involved in
the new institutional relationships, its role is
changing from the holder of the purse strings and
dictator of all the rules to influential participant in
the joint decision-making.

On the other hand these fiscal constraints have fueled
Western demands for alternative water sources to replace
declining federally-funded water development projects. As

Lindsey (1985:10) concluded,

As a result of Congress' unwillingness to finance
ambitious reclamation projects, many water specialists
expect water-rich states, mostly in the northwestern
tier, to come under growing pressure to share their
water with other states that need it for urbanization
and agriculture.

24

The fear is not that there will be a dramatic federal
take-over of intrastate and interstate water policy. As
Lawrence Tribe (in Heron, 1985:24) noted:

Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the

states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is any

danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions -- in
the prospect that Congress will nibble away state
sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially
nothing is left but a gutted shell.

However, this concern over a continuing decline in
state authority is a very real one if the states are to
remain active participants in water policy issues. The
solution seems to lie in the states finding regional
mechanisms to handle water issues beyond individual state
political boundaries.

Indeed, such a course would be consistent with the
earlier mentioned interest of Congress and the Bush
Administration to find solutions encompassing the entire
watershed, rather than individual state water policy. It is

the issue of analyzing effective regional alternatives to

which this study will focus its attention in Chapter II.

CHAPTER II

REGIONAL APPROACHES TO U.S. WATER POLICY

W

Over sixty years ago, two eminent legal scholars argued
that regional thinking was not only theoretically valuable
but also politically invaluable for realizing national
goals. Frankfurter and Landis (1925:729) concluded:

We must not deny ourselves new or unfamiliar modes in

realizing our national ideals. Our regions are

realities. Political thinking must respond to these
realities. Instead of leading to parochialism, it will
bring a fresh ferment of political thought whereby
national aims may be achieved through various forms of
political adjustments.

Today, the need for some form of regional governance is
even more apparent, spurred by international interest in
transboundary frontiers, a rise in ecological understanding
and awareness, a decline in the federal presence in water
issues, and a growing need for states to address their
problems in their natural context (Foster, 1987:36).
Accordingly, this chapter will explore the various regional

alternatives to federal action, focusing on those aspects of

regionalism dealing with interstate relations.

25

26
The chapter will first explore the basic problem of
defining a region. Then, regional options and their
suitability for handling interstate water resource issues
are analyzed. Finally the chapter will examine the
usefulness of these alternatives as compared to the

interstate compact.

3W

David Nice (1984:494) once described interstate
relations as "something of a twilight zone in the field of
intergovernmental relations", and the regional organizations
that developed in the U.S. were described disparagingly by
Martha Derthick (1974:20) as "excrescences on the
Constitutional system."

Oran Young (1989:4), analogizing from an international
perspective, provides the additional criticism of regional
organizations: namely that "...simply introducing
organizational arrangements in the absence of social
conditions required to sustain cooperation is not sufficient
to solve collective action problems in any human society."
Although many natural resource problems including water do
not fit neatly within the political boundaries of a state,
to assume that any regional organization would be better
than the federal alternative would be a serious error.

Studies have shown that regional agencies that are

centrally planned by the federal government and dependent

27
upon the government carrot are unlikely to succeed.19
Similarly, a regional organization administering an
arbitrary boundary that obscures the true dimensions of a
region is also fraught with difficulties (Foster, 1987:28).

Yet, despite these criticisms, there has been a
significant resurgence of regionalism in recent years”
that requires further examination.

This regional resurgence is particularly noteworthy
because of the rather formidable barriers that the U.S.
federal system has erected to such "new" units of
governance:

1. The U.S. Constitution formally recognizes only two
units of government -- the federal government and
state governments. Attempts by the federal
government to create new regional organizations
raise the problem of diminishing individual state
power over resources within their respective
jurisdictions. Furthermore, attempts by states to
create interstate arrangements raise the potential
problem of Congressional preemption

(Bradshaw, 1988:124).

 

‘w See generally the conclusions of Derthick (1974) on
centralization leading to weak and ineffectual regional
organizations and Foster (1987) on the perils of federal
funding dependency.

:m See generally Keon Chi's 1990 article entitled
”Interstate Cooperation: Resurgence of Multi-state
Regionalism".

28

2. Regional organizations have in the past been
perceived unfavorably both by political actors in
the federal system and by the public as a whole.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (1972:163) noted that state and federal
bureaucracies perceive these organizations as
potential competitors, legislators see them as
another new mouth to feed, and the public sees
them as another layer of regulatory burden whose
costs oftentimes seem to outweigh their benefits.

3. Regional or decentralized management of a
collective good such as water in a multi-state
system presents an additional classic collective
action problem. Traditional federal theory
presupposes that a centralized coercive authority
is required to overcome such a collective action

problem.21

 

a However, contemporary game theory suggests
decentralized cooperation is possible under certain
circumstances. (See generally, "to Form a More Perfect
Union? Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation"
Harvard Law Review (1989) for a more thorough discussion of
the game theory issue. For example, Chi (1990:59) points to
several positive incentives for state cooperation, including
the gradual devolution of federal responsibilities due to a
decline in federal funding in the water arena, the
developing mutual interest of states in better planning and
communication over diminishing common water resources, and
the general desire to improve state management and programs
in light of U.S. Supreme Court equitable apportionment
decisions. Chi (1990:62) also points to several advantages
of state cooperation, including pooling the states'
expertise, experiences, and resources as well as raising
policy issues more effectively and enhancing state
visibility in Washington and overseas.

29
The federal barrier problem is exacerbated by
difficulties in defining the appropriate scope of a regional
organization in the U.S. federal system. It is this problem
of region definition that is the topic of the next section
of this chapter, followed by an analysis of the
appropriateness of various categories of interstate

cooperation for handling regional water policy management.

W

Bradshaw (1988:29), noting historically the various
ways regions have been defined]22 succinctly presents the
basic problem of defining a region: "there is no agreement
on a set of accepted regional divisions within the nation's
borders". In fact he further notes that regions have come
to be defined in such a variety and combination of different
criteria that regions "defy precise and consistent
definition" (1988:29).

For example, different combinations of criteria
(watershed, local and state boundaries, etc.) in the past
been used to define the physical boundaries of a particular
region, making use of comparative data analysis which are
based upon differing definitions of regional difficulty.

The initial problem of this study is how best to define

a region for purposes of water resource management. To

 

22 For example, regions have been defined by the
natural environment, cultural background, geographical
regions, economic-political systems and different
combinations of the above criteria.

30
overcome the problems of defining a region previously
outlined this task, it is useful not only to examine current
regional arrangements but also to explore on a broader basis
what theoretically and historically precipitates regional
action. Bradshaw (1988:8), using the Confederacy, federal
regional commissions, and Frostbelt regional efforts as
examples, notes that in each of those cases "a regional
consciousness led to the organization of interests and to
coordinated political action in a variety of ways".

Thus, we begin defining a region by first defining the
general philosophical foundations of an ideology called
regionalism. Bradshaw (1988:8) provides a clear exposition
of the regionalism ideology:

(Regionalism) involves the belief that a regional

solution may be found for social, economic, or

political problems, and often results from a community
of interest or embattled position in time of economic
hardship or political stress.

Foster (1987:19) argues that symbolic politics plays an
important role in the development of regional consciousness,
and that ”a program built around (the political symbol of) a
prominent resource or issue is often the essence of
successful regional action". Obviously, a river or lake
basis provides such a political symbol and also coincides
with what bioregionalists would call a natural region or
watershed. Watersheds, argues one geographer (Berg,

1985:2), provide a solid operational basis for organizing

 

31
and managing relations between humans and their local
environment.

In addition, the growing threat of federal
intervention in state water policy issues provides the
catalyst for embattled states to develop a regional
consciousness towards a clearly defined watershed as a
response to this federal threat. King (1957:355) further
argues that most water basins of any consequence normally
encompass several states, but states have a common interest
in opposing a federal solution because:

Since the various watersheds of the country have varied

problems, each somewhat peculiar to the region, the

paramount responsibility for regulating the proper use
of water rests with the states of the respective
regions.

Although there may be some physical basin overlap from
an adjacent watershed when using drainage basin or watershed
as the basis for defining an effective regional water
resource management, many writers concerned about the issue
of regionalism agree that the drainage basin of a lake or
river is the ideal vehicle for handling the peculiar
regional issues inherent in water resource planning (see
generally Martin, 1960: Derthick, 1974: and Wilkinson,
1988). Furthermore, past and current federal legislation
such as the Clean Water Act encouraged such "problemshed"
management (Reinumagi, 1986), as has the growth of regional-

based interest groups who have pressed for the formal

32
institutionalism of public policy on a regional basis
(Bradshaw, 1988:3).

Thus, the basin would appear to be the best
geographical unit for water management and for developing
the necessary regional consciousness for handling the
problems raised by the interstate nature of most major water
resources in the U.S. How best to convert this regional
unit into a politically viable entity capable of approaching
water problems in a comprehensive, coordinated and regional
matter (see Ingram, 1973:10) is the subject of the next

section of this chapter.

MW

Martha Derthick (1974) argues in general that no
specific approach to regional coordination is superior to
the others and that the best results that have been achieved
regionally are those that are ad hoc in nature. Derthick
(1974:226) further argues that pragmatism is the best policy
in forming a regional organization, claiming its creation to
be a:

fortuitous coming together of opportunity, leadership,

and political backing so that it becomes possible to go

against the institutional grain and create a genuinely
new form.

However, Derthick's general assessment of regional
cooperation and organizational development is not

necessarily applicable to the matter of interstate water

33
resources management for several reasons. First, although
no two river basins or lakes are physically alike and
generally do not share the same stages of political and
economic development on a state by state basis, such
geographical regions do share comparable pollution and
diversion problems within the regions. They also have
access to similar organization and administrative machinery
within the federal system to resolve them. Thus, despite
Derthick's uniqueness argument, this common problem base
presents the opportunity for developing a common regional
mechanism applicable (with some variations, depending upon
the function addressed) to most major water basins.

Second, U.S. water basins, though founded under
different state legal schemes (riparian rights, for example)
all share similar historical roots in terms of state control
of water resources and a shared fear of federal preemption
of these rights. Thus, a common fear of federal
intervention provides the basis for unified rather than ad
hoc attempts by the states to preserve state control over
water resources by improving the effectiveness of the
regional mechanisms chosen, contrary to Derthick's ad hoc
action assumption.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Spgrha§g_y,
W23 has put a premium on efficient state water

 

2" The W decision declared groundwater an
article of interstate commerce and therefore subject to
Congressional regulation under the Interstate Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, for states to

34
management practices. It also highlighted the need for
states to discover and replicate water management practices
that pass Court scrutiny and thus do not violate the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This decision
thus makes it likely that future regional efforts will
become more uniform rather than ad hoc in nature.

Third, the nature of interstate conflict makes it more
likely that intensive state cooperative efforts rather than
fortuitous events will result in the creation of regional
water institutions and policies. As Leach and Redding note,

No interstate issue has been more productive of

prolonged quarrels and bitter hostility than the use of

the water of interstate streams, especially among the

arid western state, where water is so precious a

commodity.

Thus, there is growing recognition among states within
well-defined regional river and lake basins that unilateral
water management efforts are both politically and
practically unwise“: What regional forms of cooperation

and organization are available to improve regional water

management without Washington? A partial but representative

 

continue to regulate their water resources, the Court
provided guidelines for acceptable state restrictions to
limit the interstate transfer of water. Accordingly,
adherence to these general guidelines rather than ad hoc
state economic parochialism is likely to be the result of
this decision.

2"The growing political power of the water shortage
states makes it increasingly unlikely that upstream water
surplus states would be able to hoard unused water
indefinitely.

35
list of the various regional options available for
interstate cooperation is provided on Table 2. An
examination of these regional options from a private, state,
and federal focus is the thrust of the remainder of this

chapter.

W

As states and the federal government (not regions) are
the entities recognized by law, it would seem that any
regional structural solution would have to involve at least
one of these governmental entities (Ingram,1973:12) for
purposes of legal and/or political legitimacy.25 Thus,
options listed in Table 2 that have a private party focus
would suffer from this infirmity, along with the problem
that private associations, committees, and conferences are
generally neither comprehensive in terms of regional
representation nor do they have the legal ability to induce
action.

Similarly, private party options that focus on
individual party mediation, arbitration, or litigation lack
the comprehensive coverage and the degree of participation
generally necessary for developing a regional consensus. In

addition, the resulting ad hoc nature of such mechanisms

 

25'For example, the Council of Great Lakes Governors,
despite its high political profile, needs the involvement of
the respective state legislatures of the basin in order to
implement legislation and of the Great Lakes Commission for
technical support in order to realize the Council's publicly
announced goals.

36
Table 2

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

PRIVATE PARTY FOCUS:

1.

5.

Interlocking structure of institutions and professional
associations (e.g. National Governors' Association,
Council of State Governments.

Participation and membership in national and
international conferences and seminars.

Private negotiations and mediation.

Private lawsuit by citizens of two or more different
states.

Ad hoc private committees on regional matters.

STATE GOVERNMENT FOCUS:

1.

5.

6.

7.

Uniform state laws and legislation.
Reciprocal state legislation.

Uniform administrative agency policies, rules and
regulations.

Mutual recognition and acceptance of findings of fact
by state agencies on issues of common interest.

Exchange of state reports, regulations, and rules.
Fusion of various state administrative agencies through
cooperative joint sessions and action to deal with the
legally separable parts of a single common interest.

Uniform and harmonious state court decisions.

FEDERAL AND FEDERAL-STATE FOCUS:

1.

Interstate compact
Basin federal-state interagency committees

Federally created and funded planning commissions (e.g.
river basin commissions)

Federal grants in aid stimulating regional
organizational development.

Federal public corporation (e.g. TVA)

37
Oftentimes leads neither to long-term stability nor to

flexibility in meeting changing conditions.

State_§92ernment_fesus

If private party options are often too limited for
handling the divisive regional nature of interstate water
disputes, an individual state focus also has difficulties,
especially from the standpoint of disregarding a broad
regional consciousness approach in favor of a more parochial
state emphasis. Thursby (1953:142) argues that efforts by
states to utilize uniform laws, regulations, and judicial
policies (See Table II.I) will not work in controversial
fields such as water policy. The reason, King (1957:376)
explains, is that because of the unique nature of different
watersheds, efforts are needed to promote a diversity of
approach. Uniform laws and policies treat such diversity as
an evil.

Thursby (1953:142) further points to the fact that
there is no guarantee that a state will adhere to these
laws/policies for any given period of time if its own self-
interest lies in pursuing state instead of regional
objectives. Similarly uniform rules do not guarantee
uniformity of enforcement by all the states, nor is there
any certainty that all the affected states in the region
(watershed or basin) will adopt such laws/policies. There
also is no one institution in the state government focus

alternative whose self-interest would lie in a regional or

38
national perspective that would override more parochial
state perspectives.

Furthermore, even the concept of fusion of state
agencies through joint sessions on regional matters still
falls short of basic need for a unified administrative body
to carry out regional actions (King, 1957:376). A distinct
regional organization structure is generally needed to
ensure continuing cooperative and administrative action by
the states and to induce action by all the states. Without
federal or regional agency inducement or some legal
obligation, it is expected that regional cooperation, either
by uniformity, reciprocity, or informal joint cooperation
will end as soon as state self-interests are threatened. As
Martin (1960:3) concludes, an overwhelming majority of
existing state government are unequal to the tasks of water

resource administration on more than a limited local basis.

W

The third approach, federal and joint federal-state
efforts, can ensure a broader perspective and increased
capabilities by the tapping of federal resources. However,
not all of the options in this category are positive from a
state perspective. For example, the public corporation
option (e.g. the TVA) effectively excludes state
participation and thus is contrary to the concept of shared
sovereignty. It is interesting to note that, although the

TVA is often referred to as an abstract organizational model

39
to be replicated, it has never been copied
(Barton, 1961:121). Furthermore, state government advocates
argue that it is more efficient for state control than
federal control since states have a greater interest in the
outcome and are more sensitive to regional rather than
national needs.

Similarly, the option of using federal grants
administered by federal river basin commissions or federal-
state interagency committees has resulted in an
overdependence on the federal government for its existence.
Not only can regional efforts wither away when federal funds
dry up, but the regional organizations themselves can be
eliminated swiftly by Congress or even by executive order
(like the federal river basin commissions in 1981).

In short, all of the federal - state focus options in
Table 2 except the interstate compact suffer from an
overreliance on federal government political and/or resource
support. According to the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (l972:8), federally created and
dominated organizations other than compacts are particularly
disadvantaged. They exist in a federal bureaucracy
environment hostile to regional entities which do not fit in
a political system organized on political rather than
regional lines. Their existence is thus perilous and not
one that is within the control of the states in a region.

Edwin H. Clark, senior associate of the Conservation

40
Foundation (Stanfield, 1985:1878) succinctly summarized the
U.S. water resources problem:

The nation's water problems to a large extent are

institutional and political. To solve them we will

need to develop better institutions because we are not
going to get more water.

Scholars (such as Frankfurter and Landis) and
organizational studies (such as the U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1981, and the Federal Water Resources Council, 1967)
reach the same conclusion. They point to the interstate
compact is the most effective legal institution to handle
water resources. As Zimmerman and Wendell (1976:123)
described the interstate compact:

It is the only legal tool we have to create a single

joint instrumentality of several jurisdictions,

operating under a common delegation of powers and
governed by common law.

If indeed the interstate compact administered by a
commission is the preferred regional approach to handle
water issues, why has it not received more recognition as a
viable regional entity? One reason is that there is a
considerable diversity of opinion in the literature as to
the relative effectiveness of the over 170 interstate
compacts in existence. Perhaps the various structural and
functional differences in interstate compacts has led to
this confusing picture of what these commissions are.

Chapter III will explore formal studies of interstate

compact commissions in general and the views of various

41
scholars on their effectiveness as regional institutions.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the compact's
past, present, and future usefulness in handling the

divisive issue of regional water resources management.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND REGIONAL MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S.

AN HISTORICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

W

Kevin Heron (1985) summarized the case for using an
interstate compact commission rather than other regional
options for managing divisive interstate issues. Heron
argued (1985:68) that despite the existence of other
interstate cooperative devices (reciprocal laws,
administrative agreements, and state-federal commissions),
the interstate compact has the advantage of being both a
contract and a statute, making it "the most forceful and
binding method for states to resolve concerns and
controversies among themselves." The compact commission,
utilized to administer the compact agreement, has
simultaneously emerged in management oriented compacts in
order to "make available the necessary governance structure
for true regional resource management" (Sax and Abrams,

l991:733).“’ Although today there are numerous compacts

 

2‘S’Before 1920, there were no interstate commissions
established by compact: and, in light of the limited use to
which the compacts have been put, there was no need as well

42

43
without separate commissions, including some in the area of
water resources, it is the unique compact commission
structure that emerges from a compact agreement that offers
new possibilities for regional management. The compacts
with interstate commissions tend to be more elaborate (Leach
and Sugg, 1969:15) and thus are the ones that are of special
interest in this study.

The positive endorsement of federal-interstate compacts
by the National Water Commission (1973:13) as the "preferred
institutional arrangement for water resources planning and
management of multi-state regions” as well as by the U.S.
General Accounting Office (1981) in the area of river basin
management makes it a promising new structure to explore.

An additional advantage of this new compact commission
structure is that it makes it less likely that the Congress

will pass subsequent preemptive legislation in the compact's

 

(Hardy, 1982:49). Instead, the heads of the state agencies
of each of the compacting states were used to handle the
administrative details of the compact.

However, the compact instrument was expanded in later
years to include broader, functional fields with increased
duties that required continuous monitoring and
administration. More and more parties became involved in
water resources issues (e.g. Indian tribes, the federal
government, international agencies, and large numbers of
states). Natural resource issues also became more divisive
and technologically complex.

It became apparent that use of individual state agencies
was insufficient in many cases for promoting regional
approaches. For example, in the water arena, the Colorado
River Compact in the early 1920's was formed without the
benefit of a separate commission and has been mired in
controversy and litigation. But the Upper Colorado River
Compact formed almost three decades later created a compact
commission that has stayed relatively free of litigation and
controversy.

44
jurisdiction (Briggett, 1991:763), and has, in the words of
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(1972:156) "the potential to produce a much closer
coordination of federal and state law and administration
than any other formal legal device."

To avoid the pitfalls of past descriptive compact
literature, this study will not attempt to assess the
overall effectiveness of a "generic" interstate compact by
lumping together interstate compacts covering a myriad of
problems. Such an approach in the aggregate would be like
mixing apples and oranges. Instead, the focus will be on
how well the interstate compact has performed in one
specific area and arena -- regional water resources
management.

Furthermore, it would make little sense to compare a
compact with only an informal commission established to
study an issue of national implication like education with a
more sophisticated compact commission focused upon a
specific issue such as river management. The focus of this
study is not how a generic compact commission operates in
the vaguely defined arena of intergovernmental relations,
but rather how effective a specific type of compact
commission is in handling a particular regional issue such
as water resources. Even at this level, the focus will
later be refined in terms of looking at the various
functional types of water compacts, including water

allocation compacts, single purpose water pollution control

45
compacts, and planning and flood control compacts (Chapman
1985:27).

This study, while initially examining interstate
compacts with and without commission organizational
structures, will focus in this and subsequent chapters on
the utility of the compact commission as an effective
regional institutional alternative to federal preemption in
the area of water resource management.”

Chapter III will begin by defining the legal and
political nature of the interstate compact in its historical
context. Then a review of the literature assessing its
appropriateness for regional administration will be
undertaken. After this review, there will be a section
analyzing the political and theoretical advantages and
disadvantages of the compact, followed by a section
analyzing the compact commission itself and the types of

commission structure that have been utilized.

 

27'This focus on compact commissions as administrative
bodies with multi-state responsibilities is particularly
significant because they are indeed a unique entity in the
field of public administration. They are, as Carver
(l982:n-13) indicates sui generis in that they are not
agencies of the federal government within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedures Act, and are perceived by the
courts to be regional legislators. Thus, Leach and Sugg
(1969:3) conclude that compact commissions ”constitute an
identifiable species of public administration within the
federal system”.

Compacts to be excluded are those that do not create
specific commissions because the problem meant to be
resolved required a one-time decision (e.g. state
boundaries), and those whose responsibilities are only
periodic joint meetings of state agency heads who oversee a
budget or merely monitor actions (e.g. the Belle Fourche and
Snake River compacts).

46

Finally, after an overview of the interstate compact
experience in managing water resources, this chapter will
present the thesis that an interstate compact commission can
be an effective regional method for regional water
management and the development of a regional consciousness
in water resource decisions. In Chapter IV, a theoretical
effectiveness model will be devised from an organizational
theory perspective in order to operationalize the dependent
variable loosely defined as "effectivness". Then national
survey data and individual and general interstate compact
studies will be used to identify which compacts are
considered to be effective according to model

specifications.

WW

Paul Hardy (1982:2) defines an interstate compact as
"an agreement between two or more states, entered into for
the purpose of dealing with a problem that transcends state
lines.” He concludes that, of all interstate cooperative
options, the interstate compact is "the most binding legal
arrangement possible between two or more states". The
compact is specifically provided for in the U.S.

Constitution”, which requires that an interstate compact

 

2’ U.S. Constitution Art. 1, sec. 10, cl. 3 provides
that ”No State shall, without the consent of Congress...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power....". It is also protected by the
Contract Clause (Art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1) from impairment:
and, if a dispute between two States over the compact

47
receive Congressional consent. Ladd (1981:257) considers
the compact to be a treaty between two sovereigns, with
Congressional consent of the compact restoring to the states
the power to enact this treaty-like arrangement.

The interstate compact is a strange relic in terms of
its Constitutional status. On the one hand, it is
noteworthy currently as the only provision in the U.S.
Constitution that provides for formal cooperation among
states (Hardy, 1982:2). Indeed, Elazar (1986:xi) notes that
the root word "federal" in the U.S. system of federalism
comes from the Latin word for covenant, implying that
federalism is best conceived as the end product of a compact
or covenant that unites separate parties in a partnership
for common endeavors without merging them.

On the other hand, Robert Steinbaum (1975:110)
describes the interstate compact as a ”centaur" of
legislation -- half state and half federal law -- making
placement of the compact within the federal system difficult
but not impossible. Although there is general agreement of
what are the classic indicia of a compactnfl the variety of
uses and forms which interstate compacts have assumed have

made the compact commissions "administrative orphans" in the

 

arises, original jurisdiction to resolve the dispute rests
with the U.S. Supreme Court (Art. III, Sec. 2, cl. 1).

8’ Schoolman (1986:819) indicates that the classic
indicia of a compact agreement are (1) a joint agreement (2)
state statutes conditioned on action by the other states (3)
an absence of ability to unilaterally modify or repeal the
agreement, and (4) a reciprocal regional limitation.

48
national and state administrative structure. (Curlin,
1972:339)

To better understand the twentieth century emergence
and growth of the compact "relic" as a powerful force in
regional issues (particularly in the area of water
resources), an understanding of its historical development
is required. The early history of the interstate compact
has been a long and uneventful political and legal event in
U.S. history. Marion Ridgeway (1971:vii) describes its
emergence in the modern U.S. system of federalism as
follows:

Modelling it on the long-held principle of

international law that sovereign states should have

the means to resolve joint matters of mutual concern
administratively, without engaging the full government
in its full operations if not absolutely needed, the

Founding Fathers included the Compact Clause (in the

U.S. Constitution) almost as a matter of course, with

little discussion and almost no debate.

Indeed, its roots pre-date the U.S. Constitution,
previously having been included in the Articles of
Confederation. According to the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (1972:207), it is the oldest
form of multi-state cooperation in the U.S., with the first
compact pre-dating the U.S. Constitution by six years.

Yet, the early use of interstate compact was only for
settling matters of limited controversy and not to shape and

administer complicated and intricate problems that had a

far-reaching impact in terms of state social and economic

49
issues (Ridgeway, 1971:vii). Congressional consent was
required to prevent conspiracies by a few states against the
rest of the nation, actions that might endanger the Union.

From 1787 to 1920, a total of 36 interstate compacts
were created. Almost all of them were used exclusively for
settling boundary disputes between states (Hardy, 1982:4).
Advancing technology and a growing population brought
problems that demanded more sophisticated governmental
action. A need arose to handle issues that transcended
state boundaries. The 1920's brought the creation of the
first interstate government agency (the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey) and the first use of a compact to
settle a regional problem (the Colorado River Compact).

The Depression and New Deal programs in the 1930's
brought new changes in the use of the interstate compact.
At the same time that the U.S. Supreme Court was repeatedly
declaring unconstitutional a variety of New Deal measures
that attempted to cope with the depression, it was
recommending the use of the interstate compact as a
substitute for federal action (Leach and Redding, 1969:10).
Accordingly, the period of 1920-1940 saw the creation of 20
new compacts, some of which focused on national issues open
to all states and not just those geographically contiguous
states (Hardy 1982:4).

The period between 1940 and the early 1970's saw a
tremendous burst of interstate compact activity. The

compact was trumpeted by the states as a device with an

50
almost unlimited number of uses and as an effective
alternative to federal action. Over 100 compacts were formed
(almost twice as many as had been established in the first
167 years of U.S. history). The average state belongs to
about 20 different compacts (Nice, 1987:70).:so

However, the pace of new compact creation began to
slacken in the late 1970's. Regional enthusiasts such as
Hardy (1982) and Heron (1985) argue that the decline was
merely a shift in focus from developing new compacts to
additional states joining existing compacts and making
needed revisions in existing compact arrangements. However,
others such as Nice (1984:505) suggest a more negative
reason for the decline: namely, that it was a response to
the “disappointment hypothesis”. This hypothesis suggests
that the decline reflected public and state disappointment
with the results of existing interstate compacts as well as
an unsettled intergovernmental relations environment in the
1970's.

Whatever the reason for the decrease in compact
creation, it should be noted that the number of new compacts
formed in the 1970's still exceeded the pre-1930's era
numbers, and in 1980 Congress legislatively encouraged the
creation of a number of new interstate compacts to handle

the issue of low-level radioactive waste disposal. Thus,

 

1” It should be noted that water pollution compacts
were formed primarily in the East while water allocation
compacts were generally found in the West in terms of
regional variations of water compacts.

51
the growth in compact formation, according to Ridgeway
(1971:293), "needs closer observation by students of
American Government and the public at large” in this
”somewhat legally undefined and politically uncharted area
of our constitutional system." So while the continued
existence of the compact as a means of regional management
is not in doubt”, questions remain about how effective
the interstate compact and commissions created by the
compact have been in handling such a wide variety of issues
with so many different combinations of state interests.
Thus, our attention will now turn to the legal and political
strengths of the interstate compact commission, in order to
begin an assessment of how well suited they are for regional

management functions.
9'— :03. e10 '0 a \r. e ‘ 0' 9‘ r ; = -. ‘ 00.9:

Marion Ridgeway (1971:6) argues that the key legal
advantage of an interstate compact, is that it is "essential
to any nonfederal interstate undertaking of a formal and
binding nature". Herbert Naujoks (1952:231) points to its
political nature, indicating that the federal constitution
forbids states from making treaties but permits compacts.

It is Congress that decides whether a state agreement is a

permissible compact or an impermissible treaty when it

 

n According to Heron (1985:1), there were 176
interstate compacts in existence as of 1980, not counting
the new low-level radioactive waste compacts formed in the
mid-1980's.

52
consents or withholds consent. Thus, both the political and
legal aspects of the compact require examination.

Interstate compacts approved by Congress, according to
the law of the union doctrine, are given the force and
effect of federal law and questions about the compact raise
a federal question for federal court resolution
(Briggett,1991:761). The U.S. Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over disputes between two or more states and is
the final arbiter in interstate compact cases (Ladd,
1981:279). Thus, by moving interpretation of the compact to
the federal level, the compact transcends parochial state
interpretations.

Furthermore, according to the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (1972:207), its existence binds
every branch of state government involved in the compact,
and the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution protects
the compact from state impairment. If the federal
government not only consents to but also joins the compact
(creating a federal-interstate compact that will be
discussed later in this chapter), the compact binds the
federal executive agencies as well, although overall federal
supremacy is retained.

The interstate compact always takes precedence over
subsequent and prior state statutory law, preventing states
from unilaterally amending or repealing the compact. It
thus provides a permanence and stability that state

uniformity and reciprocal laws cannot provide and creates

53
what Hardy (1982:3) calls "the most binding and effective
means of achieving legal cooperation between the states."

It should be noted that the legal advantages of the
interstate compact should not be overstated. There are
political limits to what states may agree to (determined by
whether or not Congress consents to the proposed compact)
and constitutional limits as well. Clyde (1982:542) notes
that by ratifying an interstate compact, Congress has not
surrendered any of its federal interests. The Constitution,
for example, prohibits Congress from delegating its supreme
authority to regulate commerce. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme
Court has ruled that Congressional consent does not prevent
Congress from undercutting a compact through ordinary
legislation (Yale:l966:8), although Congress cannot
substantively change the language of the compact itself
without danger of negating the agreement among the states
(Zimmermann and Wendell, 1976:26).

The politics of Congressional consent also affects the
nature of the compact. The compact must meet the political
tests outlined by past U.S. Supreme Court cases32 The need
for Congressional consent is determined by whether or not in

the eyes of the Court the compact impermissibly enhances

 

32 For example in
Tax_ggmmi_§ign (1978) the court developed a two part test
for determining whether or not the compact impermissibly
enhanced state power: (1) did it authorize states to act in
areas where they could not exercise authority in the absence
of the compact and (2) was any delegation of sovereign power
of the states delegated to the compact commission. (See
Hardy, 1982:14)

54

state power. The compact can also be affected by the kinds
of restrictions Congress places on its consentfi33

In summary, there are a number of political and legal
advantages to having state cooperation formalized into a
binding compact. However, there are conflicting views in
the interstate compact literature as to whether or not the
legally binding nature of the compact is enough to ensure

its effectivness, a subject to which we shall now turn.

W

A number of descriptive studies of interstate compacts
have been developed since 1937. These studies can be divided
into two categories: Category 1 studies which generally
focus upon the interstate compact as a legal and political
instrument, and Category 2 studies which focus upon case
studies of particular compacts either by geographic region
or an analysis of a single compact.

The most notable studies in Category 1 have been
compiled by such authors as Hardy (1982), Zimmermann and
Wendell (1976), Muys (1976), Derthick (1974), Leach and Sugg
(1969), Barton (1961), King (1958), Vawter (1954), Thursby
(1953), Dimock and Benson (1937). In addition, numerous law
review articles by such scholars as Frankfurter and Landis

(1925) and political science articles by such writers as

 

1” For example, Congress waited 13 years before
approving the Great Lakes Compact, forcing the states to
modify their agreement to exclude Canadian provinces as
members of the Great Lakes Commission.

55
Nice (1987) and Welch and Clark (1973) have focused the
general usefulness and political impact of the compact in
the U.S. federal system.

Interstate compact studies with a more case study focus
(Category 2) were written by Ridgeway (1971), Voight (1972),
Martin (1960), Leach (1957), and Jackson and Pisoni (1973).
A review of the case study literature in the area of
interstate compacts also indicates a considerable number of
law review and political science articles which focus upon
the enactment process and problems associated with specific
interstate compacts. A comprehensive compilation of those
articles relating to interstate water compacts can be found
in the bibliography of the present study.

A common problem associated with both categories of
compact studies is the lack of a systematic evaluation as to
how well the interstate compact is working. For example,
Category 1 studies such as those by Hardy (1982) and
Zimmermann and Wendell (1976), while important in terms of a
comprehensive overview of interstate compacts, basically
are historical summaries of arguments and problems raised by
previous scholars. Studies by Barton, (1961), Vawter
(1954), Thursby (1953), Dimock and Benson (1937) focus upon
the political issues that compacts of all kinds raise
without specifying particular criteria for evaluating
current compacts or developing model compacts. They are
also dated and not reflective of the more recent experiences

and new developments in interstate compact operation. The

56
Muys (1973) study with its legal focus has similar
deficiencies.

The Category 1 studies by Derthick (1974), Leach and
Sugg (1969), and King (1954) are somewhat more useful
studies of the interstate compact for several reasons. For
example, Derthick (1974) provides a methodical examination
of the political problems inherent in attempting to impose a
compact solution in a federal system. Her criticisms of the
viability of a compact are formidable but equally applicable
to almost any regional entity that has been proposed rather
than being a specific evaluation of the necessary conditions
or variables associated with effective and ineffective
compacts. The study of the administration of interstate
compacts by Leach and Sugg (1969) also is a useful
descriptive summary of the problems associated with
administering an interstate compact. However, it is not
only dated and also does not attempt to assess
systematically either the theoretical or empirical variables
associated with an effective compact.

The King (1958) study is a descriptive assessment of
the Department of Interior's legal and historical
compilation of materials on interstate water compacts in the
U.S. though 1956. In attempting to describe common
characteristics of interstate water compact based upon
government compiled legal and historical data, King's study
provides a useful starting point in attempts to assess

variables affecting compact effectiveness. Unfortunately,

57
his study did not attempt to go beyond describing some of
the common objective characteristics of interstate water
compacts.

Category 2 studies are useful complements to the
general compact studies previously reviewed. They add
compact specificity to the broad generalizations about a
variety of types of compact covering a broad range of
subject matters made in many Category 1 studies. Yet these
studies generally have been composed in isolation and not
linked to the general issue of what makes a compact
effective.

Thus, while the literature on interstate compact
studies is fairly extensive, it is not particularly useful
in determining whether or not and under what conditions an
interstate compact can be an effective alternative to an
otherwise national solution. A representative sample of
views of a variety of interstate compact scholars provided
in the proceeding paragraph demonstrates the diversity of
opinion over its relative usefulness in handling regional
problems.

Dimock and Benson (1937) in one of the earliest studies
of the interstate compact completed, described the
interstate compact in political terms:

As a matter of political theory... the compact is an

ideal compromise with the doctrinal pattern of the

Constitution. It offers a technique for satisfying

certain generally shared social ambitions without

distorting the federal structure of multiple
sovereignty.

58

Zimmermann and Wendell (1976) were equally supportive
of the compact, arguing that:

No other device known to our federal experience can

provide the single legal pattern effective on all

levels and for all types of government that is possible
under the interstate compact.

The interstate compact has been advocated as " a major
device for smoothing the rough edges of the federal system
in practice..." (Martin, 1961:139), " ... a very versatile
and desirable instrument in the settlement of controversies
between states, and as a means of securing cooperation among
states” (Naujoks, 1952:246), an instrument that should be
actively exploited to solve mutual interstate problems
(Ridgeway, 1971:16), and as a means of breaking through
jurisdictional and program barriers in order to integrate
programs on a federal interstate basis without the need to
amend the Constitution or strain its interpretationfi“

Findings by U.S. Government agencies and regional
organizations in general also have been supportive of the
interstate compact, including the U.S. General Accounting
Office (1981) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(1971f”. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental

 

“’ See generally the ngk_gf_th§_fitatgs articles on
the interstate compact found in the annual edition beginning
in 1950-51. Numerous writers including Zimmermann and
Wendell (1976) have presented these arguments.

1” The EPA recognized that interstate compacts for
water pollution purposes "have already demonstrated their
usefulness, and ... have the potential for playing a more

59

Relations (1972:217) found the compact to be I'a most useful
device in the solution of problems shared by more than one
state", and the Domestic Policy Council (1986:68) also
encouraged interstate compact formation.

However, not all the reviews of the interstate compact
have been positive. Marion Ridgeway (1971:viii) raised a
question about the impact of the compact on federalism that
was shared by a number of individuals during the heyday of
compact formation: namely,

Is it a tool to subvert established government or

is it a constitutional doorway to the modern federalism

of an adaptable kind which so many have been seeking?

A number of the earlier federalist writers feared it
might become a subversive tool. However, this fear has
dissipated in light of what Edward Hamilton (see Weissert,
1981:125) termed "the abysmal history of interstate
compacts." Carver (1982:N-2), a compact critic declared
that the compact has had "its day in the sun" and will
survive only ”as a gesture of goodwill by a dominating
federal government."

Certainly the previously mentioned decline since the
mid-1970's in the number of compacts formed gives some
initial credibility to the criticisms of Hamilton and

Carver. In addition, the rosy predictions of Leach

 

important role" (Muys, 1971:316) although it was concerned
about dilatory actions or inadequate resource commitment to
the compact commissions.

6O
(1973:236) that in the near future compacts will become a
major device "for the administration of multi-state
functions and activities" do not seem to have been borne
out, especially when one looks not only at the growth of the
number of federal agencies in comparison to compact
formation (see Figure 2) but also the number of federal
regulations adopted in the 1970's (see Figure 3).

Proponents of the interstate compact continue to stress
the theoretical potential for interstate compacts to become
interstitial bridges in the U.S. federal system and, as
Leach and Sugg note:

They (compacts) permit the states to take continuing

cooperative action in fields where they cannot act

effectively or do not wish to act alone, fields which
might fall by default to the federal power if not
occupied through the initiative of the states.

Yet the continued growth of federal agencies and
regulations noted in Figures 2 and 3 raises some doubts. So
too do the problems that have arisen in the administration
of some existing compacts, most notably the new low level
radioactive waste compacts formed in the early 1980's.:36
The overriding question is whether or not the interstate

compact can be anything more than a quaint relic to be used

 

3‘5'For example, Michigan's reluctance to comply with
the regional compact commission's decision to establish a
Michigan site for depositing regional low-level radioactive
waste has resulted in action by the compact to expel
Michigan and a court case by Michigan challenging the
validity of the federal law authorizing the creation of
regional waste sites.

guunacn or courpcrs: AGENCIES

61

GROWTH IN COMPACTS AND FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

SU-
00 __
40..
no -
20 -
"'l
. 1020-29 1030-39 1040-40 1000-00 teaoLieee - 1070-00

Sources: Council of State Governments, Directory of Federal Agencies,. and SPO data
base Silerplatter.

'uote: Darkened bars indicate new compact: and white bars indicate new regulatory.agencies.

)' trouna 2

62

 

A Decade-by-Decade Comparison of
Major Regulatory Adoptions '

'd-e-ze-a-e-e‘.‘
3.888s
lllilj

.saeaeesaeaaaaas'asaé‘a
I

Numberoillalorneguleiorysmm

 

   

 

 

 

    

1900-09 1910-10 1020-1929 1830—89 11140-40 1950-59
Decades

1000-09 1910-

Somoemenieriorihe «American efFederei
American M1801).p.13.w.‘m mmummmummu

 

 

FIGURE3

63
only for the limited purposes to which it historically
served prior to 1920?

To answer this question, the specific criticisms of the
interstate compact as a regional irrelevancy and the
responses to these criticisms are presented in the next part
of this chapter. As the reader will discover, just as
proponents of interstate compacts have been criticized for
their unsystematic approach to the role and impact of
compacts in the U.S. federal system, compact critics have
also been guilty of engaging in either (1) the overstatement
of the negative aspects of compacts in general without
adequate documentation or (2) blanket criticism of compacts
on the basis of a very small number of negative compact
cases. Indeed, there is some question as to whether or not
compact critics have been systematic in their criticisms as

well.

T9_99mnast_9r_n9t_t9_Q9mDast;__1he_2res_and_99ns

1. criticism: The interstate compact's usefulness is
limited primarily to those problems that require permanent
solutions and require little or no administration (Thursby,
1953:147).

This criticism suggests that permanent actions such as
boundary disputes and a contractual (as opposed to a
commission administered) allocation of water resources are
more likely to be handled successfully than those regional

actions that require continuous monitoring and/or are

64
characterized by conflict. The basis for this criticism is
the long and relatively noncontroversial history of compacts
used for making permanent settlements between states
compared to the relatively short experience of using compact
commissions to administer continuing conflicts. The
inability of the Colorado and the Pecos River compacts to
stem continued litigation over these rivers and the
inability of the controversial California-Nevada compact to
obtain Congressional consent are pointed to by critics as

the types of problems that compacts cannot handle.

Bccpcncc: Of all the regional options available to the
states, the interstate compact is the most binding legal
instrument and therefore best suited as an alternative to
federal or court intervention for resolving divisive
regional disputes (Zimmermann and Wendell, 1976:14). The
advent of administrative bodies such as the compact
commissiony'and in the 1960's the federal-interstate
compact commission changed this picture. The commissions in
some compacts were granted the authority to perform more
sophisticated administrative functions (e.g. the Port
Authority of New York which is widely hailed as a successful

regional compact commission), unlike earlier compacts which

 

3'7'The federal interstate compact was a compact that
included the federal government as a voting member and
participant in the compact. Previously, the federal
government served only as an advisory role and did not sign
the compact agreement.

65
were more contract overseers rather than regulatory policy
makers.

The most elaborate form of compact, the federal
interstate compact in which the federal government is a
signatory and an active participant, is still relatively
new. Thus, it is difficult to make historical comparisons
to older boundary dispute compacts. However, a 1981 U.S.
General Accounting Office report indicated that these
commissions in the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basins
were performing reasonably well. Sax and Abrams (1991:734)
cite the establishment of the Delaware River Basin Compact
Commission as a leading example of how the commissions
"...make available the necessary governance structure for
true regional resource management”.

The compact also blocks the federal government from
directly altering the text of the compact by legislation
(Vawter, l954:8): and in the area of water resources, there
has not been a situation where Congress has modified an
equitable apportionment of water established by compact
(Carver, 1982:n-22). Thus the compact offers stability
unattainable by other state initiated regional efforts, a

stability necessary to handle divisive regional issues.

Anciycic: Overall the criticism of the compact as a
device not suitable for conflictual or multi-purpose
regional management is overstated. The Delaware River Basin

Commission and the Port Authority of New York are examples

66
of compact commissions that have performed well according to
objective observers.

In addition, the lack of long term institutional
experience with compact commissions and the formal
membership of the federal government into some compacts
indicate that caution must be exercised in a broad-brushed
criticism of compact in general. Indeed, there appear to be
some regional issues where some types of compacts may be
more effective than others. Thus a general assessment of
compacts may overlook their usefulness in particular areas

such as natural resource management.

2. criricicm: Another weakness of the interstate compact
is that, in areas such as pollution control, it is often
tailored to meet the lowest common denominator acceptable to
the negotiating states (Moss, 1968:263): thus, preventing
more effective direct federal intervention (Zimmermann and
Wendell, 1976:103). In turn, state interests are a product
of private interests. Thus, a compact is perceived as a
"contrivance of economic groups with special interests in
the resources involved" which they seek to protect and
advance in a compact (Barton, 1961:174).

The crux of this criticism rests upon the argument that
compacts are not responsive to the general regional
population they are designed to serve but rather are "highly
responsive to select, specialized interests of an

exceedingly narrow kind" (Ridgeway, 1971:296). Barton

67
(1961:57) argues further that the compact is merely a
"compromise between national action and inaction" and
acceptance of a compact ”may provide a tool for groups
subject to regulation to play the nation and the states
against each other in order to retain control in their own
hands" In short, the concern is that the compact eventually
will be captured by private interests with a strong, vested
interest in the resource to the detriment of the region as a

whole.

Bccccncc: Proponents argue that the capture concern is
more of a theoretical concern than an actual problem.
Briggett (1991:753) argues that a compact can actually be
more responsive to the community than federal actions since
state commissioners in many compacts are appointed by the
governor and thus make decisions more narrowly tailored to
regional needs than generalized federal policy decisions.

Contrary to the parochial interest argument, Thursby
(1953:149) argues that aside from federal or federal-state
action, compacts are "the only element which is subjected to
scrutiny in light of broad public policy by a representative
body of the whole nation" (through the Congressional consent
process).

In response to the point that private interests will
unduly intrude upon compact policy-making, Briggett
(1991:767) responds that the compact actually excludes from

compact decisions those unproductive peripheral interests

68
that exist on the national level that otherwise would hinder
effective regional action. Accordingly, Briggett argues
that the compact correctly gives a proportionately larger
voice to those states with special concerns about a regional

issue they would have if there were national controls.

M31251:

operation of a compact seems likely to be a function of the

Whether or not capture is a concern in a

overall degree of public interest or consciousness in the
regional issue or resource for which the compact was
developed. Thus, it is very likely that the most directly
affected private interests will play an active role in a
compact, but their respective influences would seem to
depend upon the extent of the countervailing interests of
other public individuals and organizations. Thus, some
compacts lacking this regional consciousness may indeed
become "captured", but this is a criticism that is equally
applicable to almost any level of government regulatory
activity.

3. criricicm: A number of writers including King (1958),
Hardy (1982), Vawter (1955), and Thursby (1953) point to the
problem that compacts are too inflexible to adjust to
changing conditions, and thus have limited utility.

Thursby (1953:136) called the compact a ”clumsy and
futile substitute for effective national action".
Legislation is seen as a more flexible and timely

alternative in light of a rapidly changing environment.

69
Compact provisions limiting commission authority to specific
areas and cumbersome rules for amending a charter including
unanimity voting requirements all point to a rigid and
status quo oriented approach to new regional issues that

emerge after the compact is approved.

W: Contrary to the argument of inflexibility”,
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(1972:137) points to the fact that a compact can adjust the
inflexibilities of political and administrative boundaries
so that regional tasks can be performed on a functional
basis. Furthermore, as there are no set rules for how a
compact should operate or a compact commission can perform,
it is up to the compacting parties to determine how flexible
they want the compact instrument or commission to be. As
will be demonstrated in Chapter V, there are a variety of
functions that compacts can perform.

As to the criticism that legislation would be more
efficient and timely in response to change, it should be
noted that a compact is like a contract, based on mutual
consent, while legislation operates on the basis of a simple
majority. While legislation may be easier to enact than
compact changes, there is a real question as to whether or

not it is desirable for a majority to force its will on the

 

1” There are advantages to inflexibility as well, as
they provide a sense of stability and finality to issues
that otherwise might be continually subject to attack by
either party.

70
minority when dealing with an issue of mutual regional

concern (Vawter, 1954:2).

Anciycic: Certainly there are disadvantages to having
a detailed, inflexible compact agreement when major changes
in a regional issue require more contemporary reaction.
However, the flexibility of a compact depends upon the
wishes of the compacting parties. It may be desirable in
some instances to leave no discretion to a compact
commission because of the extremely divisive nature of the
regional issue which is the subject of the compact.
However, it is the parties' decision in each compact setting
to establish how much flexibility or discretion they want to
include in the compact. It would therefore be premature to
brand the compact device in general as inflexible, although
a number of earlier compacts do indeed suffer from this

self-inflicted malady.

4.521.111.9191:
time a compact is approved by the member states of the

Compacts take too long to ratify. By the

compact and consented to by Congress, it can take an average
of 4 to 8 years (Hardy, 1982:20).

Recognizing that it took 13 years before the Great
Lakes Basin Compact was finally consented to by Congress and
the fact that Congress acts on a two year cycle instead of
the 4 to 8 year average cycle for a compact, delay is
certainly a valid criticism if the compact is to handle a

variety of pressing issues such as pollution control. This

71
time delay problem, if it is representative of how long it
takes to approve all compacts, makes a strong case for the
proposition that the compact is too cumbersome a process for
handling divisive regional issues which demand more

immediate pubic attention.

Bccccncc: The basis of this argument rests upon the
historical delay that occurred at the state level when
compacts were first negotiated by pro-compact negotiating
commissions prior to legislative and executive approval.
Since that time, this inner layer of state bureaucracy has
been eliminated, reducing the time needed for state
ratification. In addition, Congressional consent has been
interpreted by the Court as being given by implied consent
in some compact situations, and the relatively rapid
Congressional approval of low-level radioactive waste
compact in the 1980's indicates that timely Congressional
approval is not an insurmountable barrier.

As to the general reason for delay in ratifying
controversial compacts, Muys (1973:317) explains:

Most delays appear to have been caused by specific

policy controversies which are not unique to the use of

the compact mechanism, but also plague efforts at
problem-solving through interagency committees, river
basin planning commissions, and Congressional
legislation.

Furthermore, Maloney (1975:33) argues that regional

planning should move more slowly if the thinking of the

72
people is to change and advance, thus assuring greater

permanence in the decision itself.

Anciycic: Overall, the delay argument seems to be more
a function of past historical practices that have since been
modified and the divisive nature of the issue proposed to be
handled by each compact. Since legislation and litigation
are also delayed by the controversial nature of the regional
issue and since there is some benefit to be derived from
approaching resolution of the regional issue in a more
deliberate manner to ensure that solution is acceptable (at
least for the moment), the delay argument does not appear to
disqualify the compact as a useful regional management

device.

5. criticicm: Compacts and compact commissions lack the
enforcement powers and administrative structure necessary to
resolve the collective action nature of regional decisions
(King, 1958 and Martin, Birkhead, Burkhead, and Munger,
1960).

It is often argued that collective action problems can
only be resolved by adequate enforcement powers, something
that many interstate compact commissions lack. Just as the
states fear the federal government and its bureaucracy, they
are leery of creating a regional body with similar authority
to intervene. Thus, compact commissions do little or

nothing to promote regional actions that are not favored by

73
all of the compacting states, and very little is done that

changes the status quo based on individual state interests.

Bccccncc: The argument that compact commissions cannot
be effective unless they are vested with strong enforcement
powers is a common assumption among compact critics, but it
overlooks the peculiar political nature of compact and the
benefits of regional cooperation that the compact
facilitates which are unrelated to presence or absence of a
compact's command and control power.

As a general rule, states seeking to avoid the
diminution of their sovereign powers to the national
government would be just as reluctant to create a regional
entity with similar preemptive powers. The reason for this
reluctance, argues Barton (1961:163) is that states want
joint state action, not regional action. Thus, as Gross
(1990:162) concludes, the compact commission must remain
subordinate instrument of the authorizing states or it will
cease to exist. COOperation, not coercion, is the key to
compact action.

In terms of the usefulness of interstate compacts
without strong enforcement powers for handling the
collective action problems associated with regional
decision-making, a Harvard Law review note (1989:849)
suggests that the compact commission reduces informational
and transaction costs in order to facilitate better

interstate cooperation. The repetitive interactions are

74
important for strengthening informal cooperative federalism
through decentralized reciprocity.

Furthermore, Welch and Clark (1973:483-484) argue that
the compact, as one component of a broader span of
suprastate political action and interstate cooperation, is
significant beyond the surface impact that critics cite.
They argue that compacts (even those without formal
enforcement powers) promote increased regional and national
linkages, an influx of new ideas and modes of behavior from
outside the state, and may encourage later cooperative
attempts on an even broader national scale.

Thus, although much can be made about the lack of
enforcement powers in many (but not all) compact
commissions, the new cooperative state linkages a compact
creates on regional issues may in the long run be more
advantageous than attempting to coerce a state into a
regional plan that is contrary to the state's perceived
self-interest. A routinized regional relationship over time
may be as influential over time as an enforcement power.
Similarly, the existence of a regional compact commission
can also create a new forum for handling regional issues and

thus affect individual state actions.

thcr_criricicmc: There are other criticism of the
compact. External criticisms include the fact that states,
not the real geographic region, are the reality of the

compact and thus state peculiarism and self-interest

75
remains. However, until states are eliminated from our
federal system by court decisions or constitutional
amendment, they are indeed the political reality of
subnational governance and by necessity are an integral part
of any regional solution. Internal criticisms relate to
compact resource constraints (mediocre staff or insufficient
budget resources), regional overlap (a possibility in some
natural resource areas but not an insurmountable problem),
and the inability of a compact to handle divisive regional
issues without resort to litigation (a problem in some cases
like the Colorado River but not in others such as the

Delaware River).

Despite its shortcomings, however, the interstate
compact seems to offer some compelling reasons for use in

regional management. The major reasons include:

1. Helping to preserve the vitality and potency of
the states and avoiding the transfer of more state
functions to an already overburdened federal
government (Thursby, 1953:143).

2. Maximizing state cooperation by bridging
jurisdictional barriers and promoting
intergovernmental relations (Vawter, 1955:4), thus
providing the necessary interstitional bridges to
permit states to develop regional administration
perspectives (Zimmermann and Wendell, 1976:108).

3. Permitting the development of a single pattern of
law with national consent, although still allowing
states to vary their enabling laws to fit their
particular situations (unlike uniform and
reciprocal laws that may become inflexible and
contrary to an individual state's interests).

4. Permitting the evolution of consensual state
solutions: thus, allowing a gradual change in

76
otherwise state-oriented thinking of decision-
makers in order to effect a long-lasting regional
solution (Vawter, 1955:1705).
The long-lasting advantage of the compact, which
includes the ability to create a commission to handle the

administrative aspects of more complicated compacts, is the

subject of the next section of this chapter.

 

From the preceding discussion and a review of the
literature, there is considerable support among regional and
water resources experts for the proposition that the
interstate compact is the preferred instrument for managing
regional water resources issues. To reiterate Zimmermann
and Wendell's (1976:50) conclusion, " no other device known
to our federal experience can provide the single legal
pattern effective on all levels and for all types of
government that is possible under the interstate compact."
Furthermore, as Vawter (1955), Zimmermann (1951), and Muys
(1976) have pointed out, the compact is particularly well-
suited to water resource management such as rivers because
it allows the tailoring of governance to fit the distinctive
aspects of each river system. As Jerome Muys (1976:318)
summarized the findings of his thorough legal study of
mechanisms to handle interstate waters:

With respect to interstate water, the search has also

been for a mechanism to provide a regional perspective
to the development and implementation of a

77

comprehensive plan. The interstate compact always has

provided a theoretical means for achieving those two

objectives...

It further appears that some form of compact commission
is a necessary ingredient of a compact if the administration
of anything but the most simple water allocation decision is
required. Certainly the issue of water allocation in water
scarce regions is a difficult, controversial, and time-
consuming process no matter what instrument is used
(Zimmermann and Wendell, 1976:54), and compact commissions
are useful devices for encouraging a continuing dialogue
leading to cooperation and mutually beneficial results
rather than conflictual litigation or divisive coerced
results by federal intervention. As Muys 1976:315) points
out:

the more successful the states have been in hobbling

compact agencies in order to protect their sovereign

prerogatives, the more likely it has become that
regional water problems will be dealt with by federal
programs wholly superseding state and local authority.

Dirck (1978), Muys, (1976) and others concur that there
are really only two other options for handling divisive
interstate water disputes: equitable apportionment by the

U.S. Supreme Court39 and Congressional apportionment“.

 

3" Equitable apportionment was first employed by the
Court in Arizcng_yc_cgii1crnia 259 U.S. 419 (1922).

4w Congressional apportionment was interpreted by the
U. 8. Supreme Court to have occurred when Congress enacted
the Boulder Canyon Project Act 45 Stat 1057 (1928). The
court decided that Congress had created its own scheme of

78

Neither of these options offers much hope for preserving a
state role in regional water resources issues. As noted
earlier in this study, the federal courts have not been kind
to state regulation of water (e.g. the Sccrhacc case),
making such regulation vulnerable to dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny. Similarly, as we have noted previously, a
Congressional decision favors the politically powerful have-
not states, only promoting more conflict and reducing the
likelihood of more equitable state cooperative solutions.

However, it should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
has shown its distaste for interstate water disputes that
are heard under the Court's original jurisdictional
authority (Simms, Rolfs, and Spronk, 1988:23-3) and
frequently has cited the superiority of the interstate
compact method over judicial resolution (Zimmermann, 1976:54
and Ladd, l981:274).“ Nelson (1984:323) goes so far to
say that "both the Court and commentators are apparently
unanimous in their preference for the use of interstate
compacts to allocate interstate waters.” Furthermore,
considering the static and sporadic nature of Court
equitable apportionment decision, Brooks and Fogleman
(1985:959) conclude that the solutions achieved by compact

negotiations "have surpassed those attained by litigation."

 

apportioning water by the act.

“ The Supreme Court as recently as 1983 reiterated
that the compact would be a more useful device for handling

such disputes in chcc_yc_3cw_ncxicc 462 U.S. 554 (1983).

79

In essence when a compact is approved by Congress, a
more cooperative and consensual form of equitable
apportionment of water can occur without the uncertainty and
problems inherent in Court decisions (Carver, 1982:N-1). The
compact also "authorizes the states to retain the compacted
water in perpetuity and ficcrhccc is inapplicable" (Rodgers,
1986:373). Furthermore, when a compact approved by Congress
has been challenged on Constitutional grounds, unlike in
state regulation cases, the courts have upheld the compacts
(Murray, 1984:506). Frankfurter and Landis (1925:701) note
however that a compact commission is also necessary,
indicating that for river issues an:

”agreement among the affected States and the United

States, with an administrative agency for continuous

study and continuing action, is the legal institution

alone adequate and adapted to the task."

In terms of Congressional water apportionment, although
it has only occurred once in U.S. history (see footnote 40),
the threat of Congressional preemption of state laws
continues to grow as water shortages increase and the
political power of water surplus state in the Northeast and
Midwest decline. The solution to this threat, says Nelson
(1984:328) is:

If states properly regulate the nation's water

resources, Congress will not be compelled to alter its

long standing tradition of deference to state water
resource management.

80

Besides, federal agencies feel a moral obligation to
stay within the limits of an interstate river compact which
Congress has approved, even if it is not one in which the
federal government is a signatory and funding agent, i.e. a
federal-interstate compact (Goslin (1976:432). Thus
compacts provide the same stability as federal statutes but,
again, in a manner that is both more consensual and likely
more equitable among the affected states.

In the following two paragraphs, Muys (1976:310) aptly
summarizes the Congressional and Court alternatives to the
interstate compact:

It would seem preferable for the affected states to

determine their own water destiny by agreement, rather

than to have it decided by a Congressional majority
which may have little interest in the problems peculiar
to a region, or whose votes may be influenced by
political considerations wholly unrelated to the merits
of a particular basin's water problems.

It is apparent that the determination of a state's

equitable share in the waters of an interstate basin is

fraught with complex factual, legal, policy, and
political consideration, and the Supreme Court has
pointedly commented on several occasions that the
difficulty of the task makes it one peculiarly
appropriate for resolution by interstate agreement if
at all possible.

Volkman (1987:836), citing the Court's approval of the
Northwest Power Act in the Seattle Master Builders case“,

notes that the opinion “makes clear that federal dominance

is not constitutionally ordained, and new forms of river

 

‘2 786 F.2d. 1359 (1987)

81
basin governance are possible in which regional agencies set
strategic policies for federal agencies."

Certainly, the opportunity exists for the interstate
compact commission to play a major role in regional water
resource management. As Goslin (1976:438) concludes:

As the ultimate limit of the use of available water

resources is approaching, it is hoped that interstate

water compacts may prove to be effective devices in
aiding members of society to live together and make the
most of what remains.

Goslin states both the hope and the difficulty of using
interstate water compact commissions to "effectively” manage
diminishing water resources. It is the thesis of this study
that some form of interstate compact can indeed be an
effective alternative to federal intervention. However,
there has been no systematic evaluation of what makes an
interstate compact effective and therefore no definitive
means of knowing whether or not the compact commission will
ever achieve this recognition.

Part of the problem with trying to determine the
effectiveness of an interstate water compact is defining
what is meant by effectiveness. Chapter IV will address the
issue of defining from an organizational theory perspective
how effectiveness can be measured for an interstate compact,
constructing a model specifically designed for this "sui
generis" form of public administration. Chapter V will then

82
attempt to identify the distinguishing variables associated
with these "effective” compacts from which a compact

effectiveness ranking can be derived.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AS A CONSTRUCT

FOR ASSESSING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

10119011912190

A major drawback to embracing the interstate compact as
an effective regional alternative to federal intervention is
the general lack of consensus as to an evaluative framework
for measuring organizational effectiveness (OE), a problem
common in most organizational theory-based research.
Although there is almost no theory-based effectiveness
research in the interstate compact literature, some
descriptive effectivness studies from works by Derthick,
Leach, Vawter, King and others previously reviewed have been
cited both in support of and in opposition to the general
feeling that the compact is an effective instrument of
regional governance.

Unfortunately, most of the conclusions reached in these
studies suffer from such deficiencies as (1) being based
upon isolated case studies (e.g. Leach), (2) essentially
unsupported ad hoc generalizations drawn from the study of a

few successful or unsuccessful activities of small number of

83

84
compacts (e.g. Derthick), or (3) being overly broad and
relatively simplistic descriptive evaluations which lump
together compacts of all types regardless of the varying and
diverse amounts of regional activity and compact resources
and structure (e.g. Vawter and Weldon).

This study will undertake an approach to interstate
compact effectiveness that differs significantly from the
above mentioned studies and from sampling techniques used in
political science studies. Rather than randomly sampling a
wide range of the over 170 interstate compacts in the U.S.
and treating all such compacts as similar in nature and
structure (a fallacy described in the previous chapter),
this study will focus on the entire population of interstate
compacts used to handle interstate water problems and seek
to determine how effective they have been in handling
regional water resources issues.

Utilizing a theoretical approach to the study of
interstate water compacts which incorporates relevant
aspects of organizational theory studies of effectiveness,
this chapter will develop a general model that will be used
to identify "effective" interstate water compact
commissions. In Chapter V, this approach will be used to
identify specific ” effective" interstate water compact
commissions through the use of a nationwide survey of all of
the U.S. interstate water compact directors and state water
compact commissioners. Specific descriptive "theories" and

assumptions of effective interstate water compacts from

85
compact literature also will be explored to determine their
congruence with the theoretical approach of compact
effectivness developed in this chapter.

Thus, this chapter is intended to serve two important
functions. First, it will begin with a review of the
history and problems associated with using organizational
effectiveness as a dependent variable in measuring
organizational performance. It will highlight the inherent
difficulties in organizational effectiveness research and
thus the likely reason for a lack of systematic evaluation
of interstate compact commission effectiveness in the
compact literature.

Secondly, a theoretically-based organizational
effectiveness model based upon the most recent research in
the effectiveness field will be developed specifically for
evaluating all of the interstate water compact commissions
in the U.S. This model will be constructed not only with an
eye towards a theoretically defensible method of assessing
the usefulness of water compacts for regional management
purposes, but also for possible future use in evaluating

numerous other forms of interstate compacts.

Kim Cameron (1986:540) placed the construct of
organizational effectiveness (OE) at center stage in

organizational science by declaring, ”Empirically,

86
effectiveness is generally the ultimate dependent variable
in research on organizations." The problem, as Paul Goodman
(1977:3) notes, is that in the current organizational theory
literature there is a lack of knowledge as to the construct
validity of the concept of organizational effectiveness.

More specific problems in organizational effectiveness
literature are highlighted by Hitt (1988:29) and Goodman and
Pennings (1977:3), who review the progression of
organizational theorists who have been unable to reach a
consensus on the definition of OE. Warren Beemis (in
Goodman and Pennings, 1977:237) describes effectiveness in
an organizational context as a portmanteau word: that is, it
carries a great many things in no particular order and does
so in a way that conceals them from view.

Cameron and Whetten (1983:1,275) also point out the
lack of agreement as to how to assess organizational
effectiveness properly, describing past attempts to define
and measure OE as "fragmented" and "isomorphic" leading to
"conceptual disarray" and "methodological ambiguity" in the
OE field.

The root of the problem in developing a consensual
construct, definition, and measurement of OE in
organizational theory literature seems to be a failure to
develop a coherent theory of OE. Is there a theoretical
objective to describing an organization as effective or is

it a deliberately undefinable term used loosely to express a

87
writer's personal preferences in organizational models?
This study assumes there is such a theoretical objective.

Certainly the search for definition and measurement of
organizational effectiveness has been a source of
considerable interest in the organizational theory field.
Lewin and Minton (1986) provide a good review of the
twentieth century search for OE, which is presented on
Table 3. From the one best model of thinking by scientific
management to the population ecology model, the search for
OE has been both wide-ranging and intensive. However, as
Lewin and Minton (1986:515) point out, no strong, general
theories of organizational effectiveness have emerged. This
vacuum in OE theory has "nurtured ad-hoc, atheoretical, and
noncumulative empirical studies of organizational
effectivness".

Another problem in the OE field is the failure by many
theorists and practitioners to recognize the unique
sociopolitical nature of OE studies. As Richard Scott
(1987,33?) notes, the criteria used for evaluating
organizational effectiveness cannot be created by some
objective, apolitical process but rather from normative
models that are as varied as they are controversial. Many
OE models are based on the preferences and values of the
evaluator without specifying construct boundaries, a much
different basis than that used in other social science

constructs (Cameron and Whetten, 1983,269).

88

TABLE 3

The Historical Search for Organimtional Effectiveness

 

 

Mangement Orientation 8: Effectiveness Philosophy Typical Efiectivness
Representative Thinker(s) Highlights Attributes

Scientific Management Time and motion studies; Production maximization,
Frederick Taylor (1911) importance of standards, cost minimization

Principles Of
Management
Henri Fayol (1916/1625)

Human Relations
Elton Mayo
(1933)

Decision Making &
Information Management
Herbert Simon (1947)

Soda-technical
EL Tris: and KW.
Bamforth (1951)

planning, control, and
cooperation; functional
organimtion; ”one best
way".

First "complete"inductive
management theory;
based on rules or
"principle’s; views
management as a
teachableskill.

Importance of emotional
factors; sociological
concept of group
endeavor; satisfied
workers are productive
workers; need for
managerial diagnostic

andinterpersonalskills

Efiectiveness subject to
bounded retionality;
input/output efficiency
l: r i t e r i o n ;
hmctional'mation based
on subsidiary objectives.

Joint resolution of social
and technical
organizational demands;
social 'systems view of
organizations; enterprise
as open systems.

technical excellence;
optimal utilization of
resources; task

specialintion.

Division of work; clear
authority and discipline;
unity of command and
direction; order. equity.
stability, and initiative;
esprit dc corps.

Productivity through
employee satisfaction;
satisfaction through
attention to workers’

physical and emotional
needs.

Resource savings through
rational development of
goals; efficiency of
information processing.

‘Degree of
'social/tcchnological "fit“

congruence of internal
processes.

Strategic Management
and Design
Alfred Chandler (1962)

Human Resources
Douglas McGrcgor
Rensis Likert
(1961, I967)

Contingency Theory
P.R. Lawrence and
J.W.-Lorsch (1967)

Population Ecology
M.T. Harman and
J. Freeman (1977)

89

TABLE 3 (cont'd)

Structure follows strategy;
vertical and horizontal
integration, and
rationalization of resource
utilization.

Importance of
organizational needs vs.
organizational demands;
power equalization;
participative management
concurrent satisfaction of
competing demands;
"productive workers are
satisfied workers”.

Organization design based
on environmental factors;
"best way" contingent on
a variety of conditions
and situations.

Relative unimportance of
m a n a g e m e n t ;
environmental
determinism; survival a
function of life cycle, luck,
strategy, and structure.

Structure/strategy
congruence, manifested as
organizational growth,
competitive attainment,
environmental control
and flele'bility/adaptation.

Employee satisfaction,
productivity; cohesion,
loyalty, open
communication.

Differention error,
integration error
organization/environment
”fit”, ability to implement
change in a timely
m a n n e r ,
leadership/contingency
"fit”.

Survival.

90

TABLE 3 (cont'd)

 

Practitioner Contributions

 

Chester Barnard (1938) Organizations as
Cooperative systems. Internal equilibrium and
adjustments to external
conditions; executive
action and example
. (managerial leadership).
AlfredP.Sloan(1963) Decentralized
administration, Efficiency through
centralized review and economy of scale;
control; multidivisional divisional return on
structure. investment (ROI);
attainment of objectives
(original MBO).
Robert Townsend (1970)
Debureaucratization, Profitability; staff
support for local accessibility; simple
entrepreneurship. structure, simple rules;

lack of meaningless (non

productive). "peaks”.

Thomas Peters and

Robert Waterman (1983) P e.r f o r m a n c e o n Bias for action, closeness
structure, strategy, to the customer;
systems,skills,style,and autonomy and
shared values (7"-S entrepreneurship; hands-
Framework"). on, value-driven

philosophy; stick to the
knitting; simple form,
jean staff; simultaneous
loose-tight properties.

Source: Arie Y. Lenin and John Minton, "Determining Organizational Effectiveness:
Another Look, and an Agenda for Research“. 32 Management Science 514 (May, 1986).

91

Thus, before one can begin identifying which interstate
water compacts are effective, resolution of the problems
identified in the organizational effectiveness must be
attempted. In terms of developing a specific approach for
measuring CE for use in this study, it first must be made
clear how to define OE. Stephen Robbins (1990:77) provides
a broad but useful definition of OE that will be utilized in
this study:

"the degree to which an organization attains its short-

(ends) and long—term (means) goals, the selection of

which reflects strategic constituencies, the self-

interest of the evaluator, and the life stage of the
organization.

The theoretical objective of this study of OE, as
Robbins has defined it (with perhaps the deletion of the
life stage aspect), is to identify variables associated with
various theoretical approaches to CE that enhance a regional
organiZation's effectiveness in carrying out its goals.
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that these variables (when
utilized in the effectiveness model developed for compact
effectiveness studies) are useful in identifying effective
organizations in the general area of regional organizations
as well as for specific evaluations of interstate water
compact commissions, if the construct space of OE is
carefully defined. It is this issue of carefully defining
the construct space of CE that is the next step in this

study.

92

Because of the ambiguity surrounding the assessment of
the interstate compact, a sui generis form of regional
governance, the organizational effectiveness construct
boundaries will be circumscribed utilizing the seven
guidelines devised by Cameron (1986:93). Using these
guidelines to define more specifically the construct space
of effectiveness in this study will also provide a standard
guide for the development of comparative assessments of
other regional organizations in the future. The guidelines
and the responses in terms of this study are provided as

follows:

1. From whose perspective is effectiveness being judged?
Bespense: Traditionally, state water resources were
primarily a matter of state concern. This study examines
the ability of states to solve their regional water
resources problems without wholesale federal intervention by
use of interstate water compacts. Thus, effectiveness is
being judged from the perspective of the states rather than
a federal or national public opinion perspective. From a
state political perspective, it is assumed that states are
able to manage regional water resources more effectively
through interstate compacts than they could individually or

through federal management.

2. On what domains of activity is the judgment focused?
Beseegse: This study is focused upon how well interstate

compacts have handled interstate water quantity and quality

93
issues, primarily water allocation issues since federal
involvement in the pollution area has increased dramatically
since 1940. Particularly, the study will focus upon how
well the water resource allocation decisions have been

handled by water compacts with formal commission structures.

3. What level of analysis is used?

Bespense: The organizational level rather than the
intraorganizational (internal component) level of analysis
was the focus of this study (Goodman and Pennings, 1983:247)
in terms of comparing the varying degrees of effectiveness
as defined in the forthcoming model among the various types
of interstate water compact commissions. In some respects
the level of analysis is also extraorganizational (broader
than a single organization) in nature because there is also
an analysis of how the compact contributes to regional well-

being overall.

4. What is the purpose of the assessment?

Bespense: This study is intended to provide the first
theoretically defined effectiveness evaluation of interstate
water compacts to identify which compacts are effectively
managing regional water resources and what characteristics
seem to be associated only with the effective interstate
water compacts identified by this approach. It is
hypothesized that some form of interstate water compact
commission may be an effective alternative to individual

state or federal preemptive alternatives. A methodologi-

94
cally sound organizational effectiveness approach of
identifying such compacts provided by this study will reduce
confusion in terms of OE evaluation and contribute to the
improvement and/or additional growth of the interstate
compact commission as a device for regional water management
and potentially other problems that transcend state

political boundaries.

5. What is the time frame employed?
BEEDQDEE

advent of the first water compact in 1922. However, since

The time frame for this study begins with the

most compacts are of more recent origin, much of the focus
of the national survey utilized in this study and
historical, legal and political research will be on more
recent changes that have occurred in the compact,
particularly since the 1980's when the number of new

compacts dramatically declined (See Figure 2).

6. What type of data are sought?

Besnense: Generally, subjective evaluations of compact
performance by compact members and directors as well as more
objective indicators drawn from political, legal, and
historical research into interstate water compacts will be
used to determine what variables are indicative of an
effective interstate water compact.

7. What is the referent against which effectiveness is
being judged?

95
Bespense: This study will utilize a comparative referent,
utilizing the entire population of interstate water compact
commissions as the basis for determining which among them
have been more effective in managing regional water
resources to the satisfaction of the compacting states and

their respective interest groups.

Common effectiveness evaluation problems related to the
development of an OE model which are applicable to
evaluating interstate water compacts have been summarized by
Cameron (1986,87) and include:

1. Overgeneralization to dissimilar organizations or
subunits.

2. Overreliance on single indicators and ignoring
relationships among multiple indicators.

3. Underspecified models and ignoring the time frame of
criterion variables.

4. Inadequate identification of indicators of
effectiveness.

To avoid the overgeneralization problem, this study is
not only limited to interstate compact organizations but
even further limited to a subunit of those organizations
related to water resources management. As has been
indicated in the previous chapter, there is such a variety
of interstate water compact commissions that an attempt to
combine them with the wide variety of other interstate
compact organizations would unnecessarily blur the

distinctive features of these compact subunits. Indeed,

96
these water compacts will be further defined according to
function in Chapter V.
To avoid the overreliance on single indicators problem,
this study will utilize a number of indicators representing
several applicable organizational theory approaches to

effectiveness"3

, such as goal attainment, systems and
strategic constituencies approaches (Cameron, 1986, 542 and
Robbins, 1990, 77). This multiple effectiveness models
approach is necessary in order to reflect the distinct
aspects of public administration associated with interstate
compact commissions (Carver, 1982:n-13). It also is useful
in understanding and further mapping a more specific
construct space for organizational effectiveness. (Cameron
and Whetten, 1983:269).

The underspecified OE model problem is addressed by
including regionally oriented variables in addition to those
associated with each of the organizational theory approaches
previously listed. As Cameron and Whetten (1983:262)
conclude, a measuring device must be as complex as the
phenomenon it is seeking to measure, so multiple indicators
of effectiveness are essential. The time factor is somewhat
controlled from the standpoint of the relative

contemporaneousness of the compacts (all have been formed

since 1922): the fact that all the compacts have had at

 

‘“ As Lewin and Minton (1986:523) point out, "No one
approach to effectiveness is inherently superior to another
due to multiple conceptions of organizations, unbounded
construct space, and an absence of consensual criteria."

97
least a decade of experience so that there is a track record
to examine, and that the survey of all of the commissions
was conducted over a recent and a relatively short (4 month)
period of time.

The final concern was the inadequacy in identifying
indicators of effectiveness. The general indicators of
effectiveness identified in this chapter are more
specifically explored in the following chapter, which draws
upon the works of general organizational effectiveness
theorists as well as testing the hypotheses of political and
legal scholars of the interstate compact in order to define
specific indicators of an effective compact. In addition,
data from government reports and evaluations of interstate
compacts, subjective evaluations of interstate compact
commissioners and directors by recent nationwide survey
instruments, and compact litigation analysis have been
utilized to identify more thoroughly the nature of these
indicators and to assess their usefulness as likely
indicators of commission effectivness. The results of this

indicator analysis are provided in Chapter V.

This section of the study will define a theoretical
approach for evaluating the effectiveness of an interstate
compact in managing regional water resources. (Van deVen and

Ferry, 1980:300). It will be followed in the next chapter

98

by a section which will utilize this theoretical
effectivness approach to identify ”effective" interstate
water compacts from an organizational theory perspective.

Because of the multidimensional nature of the
effectiveness construct for interstate water compacts, no
one single approach to measuring compact effectiveness is
satisfactory. Instead, there must be a multiple theoretical
approach to an interstate water compact's effectiveness. A
list of the most commonly used models of organizational
effectiveness is presented in Table 4. Among these models
or approaches, three seem most applicable for studying
interstate water compact commission effectiveness“:

1. The goal model

2. The system-resource model

3. The strategic constituencies model

 

‘“’The other five models of OE were not chosen for the
following reasons:

1.Internal processes model: this model focuses on the
internal harmony of the compact rather than its external
comity, the focus of this study. Furthermore, many compacts
are administratively well run internally but have no impact
on the more important issues of regional decision-making or
policy-making which an effective regional institution must
be able to address.

2. Competing values model: this model is difficult to
quantify in light of the variety of compacts and
constituency interests, though it would be useful for an
indepth focus of a particular compact case study.

3. Legitimacy model: Survival of a compact is not
necessarily effectiveness in the case of some compacts, as
there are dormant compacts that have merely survived on
paper.

4. Fault-driven and high-performing systems model: As there
are faults or flaws in all varieties of compacts, it is
better to define criteria and determine relative
effectiveness rather than make model compact comparisons.

99

TABLE 4

Commonly Used Models of Organimtionai Efl’ectiveness

 

 

Model Definition When Useful
AnOrganizationis Themodelismost preferred
effective to the when...
extent that ..
Goal Model lt accomplishes it Goals are clear, consensual,
stated goals. time-bormd, measurable.
System-Resource It acquires needed resources. A clear connection exist
between input and
performance.
lntemal Processes It has an absence of internal A clear connection exist
Model strain with smooth internal between organhational
frmetioning. process and performance.
Strategic All strategic constituencies Constituencies have power-
Constituencies Model are at least minimally ful influence on the
satisfied. organization, and it has
to respond to demands.
Competing Values The emphasis on criteria in The organintion is unclear
Model' the four different quadrant about its own criteria, or
meet constituency preferences. change in criteria over
time are of interest.
Legitimacy Model lt survives as a result of The survival or decline and
engaging in legitimate demise among organizations
activity. is of interest.
Fault-Driven Model It has an absence of fault Criteria of effectiveness
or trait of ineffectiveness. are unclear, or strategies

High Performing
Systems Model

it is judged excellent relative
to other similar organtations.

for improvement are needed.

Comparisons among similar
organizations are desired.

 

Adapted From: K. S. Cameron, 'The efiectiveness of inefiectiveness,’ In B. M. Staw and L Omnmings,
WhWM,VoL6,JAIPress,Greenwich,Cf, 1984.276.

100
A brief discussion of these models and their
application to the compact effectiveness approach being

developed in this study is provided in the paragraphs below.

§9§1_MQ§§l

The goal model or more specifically the goal attainment
model is the most widely used criterion for measuring
effectiveness. Its focus is appraising organizations in
terms of accomplishment of ends rather than the means of
attaining them. It assumes that organizations are
deliberate, rational, goal-seeking entities. It also
requires that the ultimate goals be identified and well
defined, not be too numerous as to be unmanageable, there is
a general consensus on the goals, and there is measurable
progress towards these goals (Robbins,1990:53).

In many respects, the goal model is one useful approach
for measuring compact effectiveness, as the compacts have a
finite number of legally defined goals in the compact
instrument developed by a consensus among the compacting
states. All of the interstate water compacts have been
operation for over a decade so there is an historical basis
for assessing how well the compact commissions have

performed their statutory goals.

101

filfiiflflfi:§§§9§l§§.fl9§§l

However, the goal model's emphasis on ends overlooks
the need of a compact to acquire the means to accomplish
there goals, and that is why the systems resource model and
its indicator(s) are needed to reflect the effectiveness of
a state-dependent compact commission. Without the
independent means of raising revenues, the compact
commission is totally dependent upon state and sometimes
federal funding. Thus, the sufficiency of funding of a
compact commission will have a significant impact on how
well it performs its statutory goals. State support of a
compact is also a good indicator of the compacting states'
assessments of the commission's effectivness in terms of
doing what the states cannot do for themselves.

In this system resource model, effective organizations
are "those that receive greater resource inputs from their
environment” (Molnar and Rogers, 1976:403). In public
agencies this criteria also is useful if output is vague or
tough to define by allowing the substitution of input for

output measures.

WW

Both of these approaches do not seem to adequately take
into account the preferences of relevant external
constituents, and in interstate compacts the constituents'

judgements (i.e the individual states and the interests they

102
represent) are at the heart of an organization's legitimacy
(Zammuto, 1982:17). As Lorsch and Horse (in Lewin and
Hinton, 1986:516) concluded, an effective organization is
one that has a high degree of congruence between its
internal and external environments.

Thus, a third model utilized in this compact
effectiveness approach will be the strategic constituencies
model. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:524) define this model as
an external measure of how well an organization is meeting
the varying demands of various interest groups, as well as
the usefulness of what is being done and the resources that
are being consumed. This model assumes that an organization
is a political arena where vested interests compete for
control over resources, and the organization responds to the
demands of those constituents upon whom it depends for its
continued existence (Robbins, 1990:63). It expands the
scope of evaluation of an organization to include the goals
of those powerful external constituencies (Scott, 1987:322)
and thus differs from the ends and means approaches of the
first two models by expanding the evaluation scope of an
organization.

In a sense, the theoretical approach devised in this
study for measuring compact commission effectivness is a
type of contingent organization design (see Cameron,
1986:515). Rather than seeking a universal, overarching
theory of effectiveness, this study seeks to develop a model

for determining the relative effectiveness of similar

103
interstate water compact commissions. Nonetheless, the
approach of this study incorporates the assumptions of the
three different OE models just identified in order to better
reflect the multiple criteria by which a compact commission
must be measured. In addition, in this chapter we will also
identify theoretical indices appropriate for defining this
multi-model approach. Operationalizing these indices in
order to assess the effectiveness of each of these models is
an even more difficult yet essential aspect of this approach
that we will explore in Chapter V.

For purposes of continuity and comparability, indices
to be used for this compact effectiveness approach were
derived from the most commonly used indicators in past
organizational effectiveness studies. A list of 30 such
indices summarized by John Campbell (1974) is listed on
Table 5. From this list, four indices were deemed
appropriate for measuring compact effectiveness from the
perspective of the three models previously identified.

Those indices were:

1. Overall effectiveness

2. Goal consensus

3. Utilization of Environment

4. Evaluations by External Entities

Two additional indicators of effectiveness aimed at

focusing this study on uniquely regional policy"5 actions

 

‘“ Policy actions (attaining final objectives) are not
to be confused with routine administrative actions (timely
reporting) upon which some effectiveness evaluations

10.

11.

12.

14.

15.

16.

17.

104

TABL E 5
INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

John P. (hmpbell (1974)

Oman Efl‘xtivatess. The general evaluation that takes into account as many criteria facets as possible.
It is visually measured by combining archival performance records or by obtaining overall ratings or
judgments from persons thought to be knowledgeable about the organintion.

Mctivity. Usually defined as the quantity or volume of the major product or service that the
organization provides. it can be measured at three levels: individual, group, and total organimtion via
either archival records or ratings, or both.

Eflicr’atcy. A ratio that reflects a comparison of some aspect of unit performance to the costs incurred
for that performance.

Profit. The amount of revenue from sales left after all costs and obligations are met. Percent return on
inVestment or percent return on total sales are sometimes used as alternative definitions.

Quality. The quality of the primary service or product provided by the organization may take many
operational forms, which are largely determined by the kind of product or service provided by the
organintion. They are too numerous to mention here.

Accidarts. The frequency of on-thejob accidents resulting in lost time. Campbell and others (1974)
found only two examples of accident rates being used as a measure of organizational effectiveness.
Growth. Represented by an increase in such variables as total manpower, plant capacity, asset, sales,
profits, market share, and number of innovations. It implies a comparison of an organization’s present
state with its own past state.

Abrartect'sm. The usual definition stipulates uneasuscd absences, but even within this constraint there
are a number of alternative definitions (for example, total time absence versus frequency of occurrence).
Turnover. Some measure of the relative number of voluntary terminations, which is almost always
assessedviaarchival records. Thqyieldasurprisingnumberofvariationsand fewstudies usedirectly
comparable measures.

Job Satisfaction. Has been conceptualized in many ways (for example, see Wanous and Lawler, 1972) but
the modal view might define it u the individual’s satisfaction with the amount of various job outcomes
he or she is receiving. Whether a particular amount of some outcome (for emmpie, promotional
opportunities) is 'satisiying' is in time a function of the importance of that outcome to the individual and
the equity comparisons the individual makes with others.

Motivation. In general, the strength of the predisposition of an individual to engage in goal-directed
action or activity on the job. it is not a feeling of relative satisfaction with various job outcomes but is
more akin to a readiness or willingness to work at accomplishing the job’s goals. As an organizational
index, it must be summed across people.

Morale. it is often difficult to define or even understand how organizational theorists and researchers are
using this concept. The modal definition seems to view morale as a group phenomenon involving extra
effort, goal communaiity, commitment, and feelings of belonging. Groups have some degree of morale,
whereas individuals have some degree of motivation (and satisfaction). _

Control. The degree of, and distribution of, management control that exists within an organintion for
influencing and directing the behavior of organization members.

Carjlia/Cohesiat Defined at the cohesion end by an organization in which the members like one
another, work well together, communimte fully and openly, and coordinate their work efforts. At the
other end lies the organization with verbal and physical clashes, poor coordination, and ineffective
communication. ‘ '

Heribilitdeaptation (Adaptation/innovation). Refers to the ability of an organization to change its
standard operating procedures in response to environmental changes. Many people have written about
this dimension, but relatively few have made attempts to measure it.

Planning and Goal Setting. The degree to which an organization systematically plans its future steps and
engages in explicit goal-setting behavior.

GoalConsatsus. Distinct from actualcommitmenttotheorganization’sgoals,consensusreferstothe
degreetowhichanindividuaispemeivethesamegoalsfortheorganization

18.

19.

21.

ES

35353333

105

TABLE 5 (cont'd)

Internalizatim ofOrguniztuianalGoals. Refers to the acceptance ofthe organintion’s goals. it includes
their belief that the organization’s goals are right and proper. it is not the extent to which goals are clear
or agreed upon by the organintion members (goal clarity and goal consensus respectively).

Role and Noun Congruence. The degree to which the members of an organization are in agreement on
such thing as desirable supervisory attitudes, performance expectations, morale, role requirements, and
so on.

Managerial Interpersonal Skins. The level of skill with which managers deal with superiors, subordinates,
and peers in terms of giving support, facilitating constructive interaction, and generating enthusiasm for
meeting goat and achiwing excellent performance. it includes such things as consideration, employee
centeredness, and so on.

Managerial TaskSkills. ,Theoveralllevelofskillswithwhichtheorganimtion‘s managers, commanding
officers, or group leaders perform work-centered tasks, tasks centered on work to be done, and not the
skins employed when interacting with other organizational members.

Information Management and Conrmunt'catiat. Completeness, emciency, and accuracy in analysis and
distribution of information critical to organintional efi‘ectiveness.

Readiness. An overall judgment concerning the probability that the organization could successfully
perform some specified task if asked to do so. Work on measuring this variable has been largely confined
to military setting.

UfiwmfiarquhWhnmwML TherxmmtuiumkhImerugmmnfimnsmmeBEMyimwnwt‘wflhit
environment and acquires scarce and valued resources newssary to its effective operation.

Evaluations by External Entities. Evaluations of the organintion, or unit, by the individuals and
organintiom in its environment with which it interacts. Loyalty to, confidence in. and support given the
organization by such groups as suppliers, customers, stockholders, enforcement agencies, and the general
public would fall under this label.

Stabilint Themainwmnceofsnuamemnctiomandraourcammughfimeandmorepuficutfly,
through periort of stress.

Value ofHuntan Resumes. A composite criterion that refers to the total value or total worth of the
individual members, in an accounting or balance sheet sense, to the organintion.

Participation and Shared Influence. The degree to which individuals in the organintion participate in
making the decisions that directly affect them.

Training and Development Emphasis. The amount of effort the organintion devotes to developing it
human resources.

AchievementEmphasls. Ananalogtotheindividual need for achievement referringtothe degreetowhich
theorganization appearstoplaceahighvalueonachieving majornewgoals.

106

rather than private organizational or (state or federal)
governmental actions were also added. Their inclusion
forces a serious, specific appraisal of what Martha Derthick
(1974:188) termed the ultimate goal of a regional
organization: development of a regional consciousness in a
federal system.

5. State assessments of the actual regional impact of

commission actions by the compacting states.
6. Identification of specific actions taken by the

compacting states to implement regional commission
goals.

W

Overall effectiveness is a very general subjective
indicator for assessing the effectiveness of an
organization. The problems in assessing organizations
according to this portmanteau use of the word effectiveness
limit the value of assessing individual aspects of an
organization's effectiveness. Overall effectiveness
collectively measures the goals achieved (goals model) and
the usefulness of the goals (system-resource model). For a
multidimensional organization such as a compact commission,
such an overall measure can be a useful preliminary
subjective assessment on how a compact is performing.
However, this broad assessment does not adequately

distinguish the more specific domains of interest involved

 

mistakenly rely. See Carter (1988:372) on administrative
versus policy effectivness.

107
in compact activity. Thus, more specific indices also will
be necessary. For this study, the overall effectiveness
indicator will be addressed from both the compact director
(internal) and state commissioner (external) perspectives.
(See MW section for an
explanation of the state external perspective

classification.)

seal_£eneeneue

The use of goal consensus is a particularly useful
indicator of the goal attainment model in multi-member
regional organizations such as interstate compacts. Robbins
(1990:56) argues that consensus is impossible unless there
is something tangible around which it can occur. A common
watershed makes such a consensus a possibility.

However, one of the greatest obstacles to goal
attainment is the lack of consensus, a common problem within
many compacts which were initially formed by state consensus
and operate on the same basis. A lack of goal consensus can
be a factor that hinders compact effectiveness. Thus, this
indicator will compare (1) how effective the state compact
commissioners believe the commission had been in terms of
achieving its legislative goals and (2) how effective the
compact director/chair believes the commission has been in
terms of meetings the commission's goal, and (3) the degree
of consensus among state commissioners as to the legislative

goals of the compact. National survey data of these goal

108
priorities will be used for goal model assessments of

compact effectiveness.

WW

Utilization of environment is a third general indicator
of compact effectiveness. From a systems-resource model
perspective, it measures the success of an organization in
acquiring scarce resources for operation. From a more
specific compact perspective, the amount and rate of state
resources committed to a compact over time is important not
only for helping a compact perform regional functions but
also as an indication of the significance and relative
effectiveness of a compact in performing activities that
individual states cannot duplicate. Thus, resource
acquisition data will be used as the indicator of the
systems-resource model assessment of a compact commission's

effectiveness.

ExaluatieuLExternaLEntities

The fourth indicator, evaluations by external entities,
is useful from the strategic constituencies model
perspective. Lawrence and Lorsch (in Michelman, 1978:42)
argue that having large numbers of knowledgeable outsiders
rate the performance of an organization with which they have
close, day to day interactions provides a useful

reputational effectiveness measure.

109

Yet, as useful as these four general indicators are in
terms of providing a common organization theory based method
of measuring organizational effectiveness, they do not fully
measure the effectiveness of an interstate compact and its
regional focus. The effectiveness of an interstate compact
commission is to be measured not only by the quantity and
quality of its actions, but also by whether or not these
actions have concretely contributed to a regional approach
for resolving interstate water problems facing the
compacting states. Thus, the fifth and sixth indicators

need to be considered.

W

The fact that the more elaborate compact commissions
are operated by an independent director and staff makes the
effectiveness evaluations of the individual state
representatives in terms of compact goals and
accomplishments an important indicator of how effective the
commission has been in meeting each state's interstate water
resource needs. State commissioners' primary interests and
responsibilities rest within their respective states rather
than with the interests of the compact commission. Thus,
their effectiveness assessments of the compact commission
and identification of state actions taken consistent with
compact goals provide a valuable external perspective and

will be drawn from national survey data that assess state

110
commissioner goal priorities and overall state effectiveness
assessments of the compact.“

Martha Derthick (1974:188) suggested that an effective
regional organization should be judged by how successful it
has been in maintaining a regional orientation towards water
resources, fostering a regional consciousness among the
states involved, and in aggregating interests and
articulating distinctive regional goals. Indeed, seeking a
regional orientation towards water resources in a federal
system that recognizes only state and federal government
political units is the difficult but nonetheless ultimate
task of all effective interstate water compacts.

As Muys (1976:318) points out, in terms of seeking a
mechanism to provide a regional perspective for interstate
water issues, "The interstate compact always has provided a
theoretical means for achieving (this purpose)."

To summarize, the compact effectiveness approach we
have developed for use in this study has its roots in the
extensive writings of organizational theorists in the area

of organizational effectiveness. It is a multidimensional

 

‘“’The state of New York, for example, rather than
seeing its compact membership from a regional perspective,
has had conflicting state interests in at least two major
compacts. It has voted to block any water diversions as a
member of the Great Lakes compact (concern that their
hydroelectric power needs will be hurt by any diversion of
water) and has refused to pay its full share of compact
costs of the Delaware River Basin Compact in part because of
its desire to divert more water from the Delaware than the
U.S. Supreme Court currently allows.(See Appendix E for the
DRBC budget history).

111
approach that draws upon three separate organizational
effectiveness models in order to reflect the unique external
dependencies of compact commission as well as its
distinctive legal and political internal mandates and
resource needs. A compact commission's effectiveness will
be measured through the eyes of these three models by the
use of four generally well-recognized organizational theory
based indices: overall effectiveness, goal consensus,
utilization of environment, and evaluation by external
entities. Furthermore, because of the regional orientation
of water compact commissions, two additional specific
indices have been devised to assess compact effectiveness:
(5) identifiable state actions taken in accordance with
compact goals and (6) regional impact assessments of the
compact by the states.

A major controversy in the development of a theoretical
approach for assessing effectivness of any organization
including an interstate compacts is determining the
usefulness of a multivariate approach to OE. Campbell (in
Goodman and Pennings, 1977:45) argues that on the basis of
previous research, such an approach is counterproductive.

He argues that it is neither physically nor economically
possible to use a multivariate approach that will yield
useful information because of degrees of freedom problems as
well as the uneven definitions used in archival or objective
measures, resulting in "strange looking correlations between

variables".

112

However, the unique nature of interstate compact
organizations makes use of multiple criteria imperative.
After all, interstate compacts have multiple constituents
and multiple domains"'(See Hitt, 1988:32,35) and thus
require a multiple set of effectiveness measures.

The approach of this study will be to construct an OE
model, utilizing the six indicators previously identified as
appropriate for this compact effectiveness study in order to
develop a comparative ranking of the effectiveness of U.S
water compact commissions.

In the following chapter, this compact effectiveness
approach is further operationalized into specific variables,
utilizing data drawn from a national survey conducted
exclusively for use in this study, The purpose of the first
section of Chapter V will be to identify specifically the
most effective and least effective compact commissions on
the basis of the aforementioned criteria. Then, after
identification of the commissions assessed as effective
according to the approach devised in this chapter, the
latter sections of Chapter V will explore specific
hypotheses of compact effectivness utilizing this more

carefully defined compact effectiveness model.

 

‘H'Domain is used in this situation to indicate a major
sphere of importance to an organization.

CHAPTER V

EFFECTIVE INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS:

MODEL APPLICATION AND VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION

W

The thesis of Chapter IV was that due to the unique
regional character of interstate compacts, compact
effectiveness measurement requires the combined use of three
organizational effectivness (OE) models. Subsequently, six
organizational effectiveness indices associated with these
three models were identified, defined, and incorporated into
a broader theoretical model that more completely assesses
the effectiveness of interstate compact commissions. Thus,
a distinct OE model reflecting all three models was
developed for evaluating interstate compacts.

The purpose of this chapter is to operationalize and
apply this new OE model to the entire population of 0.8
interstate water compact commissions and identify the
relative effectiveness of each of these commissions. To do
so, hypotheses of what constitutes an effective interstate
water compact drawn from the literature and from the

findings of the national survey will be tested utilizing

113

114
this model. The specific objectives of the two sections of
this chapter are as follows:

Section one will operationalize the six indices
associated with this new OE model and then apply the model
to the 19 interstate water compact commissions which are the
focus of this study. The result of this section will be the
development of a rank ordered effectiveness list of those
compacts with a separate commission structure, the first
time such a ranking and comprehensive comparison of these
compacts has been undertaken.

Section two will then initially test the external
validity of the compact effectiveness measures and further
classify the water compacts studied according to their
specific functions. Then, major hypotheses that legal and
political scholars have advanced as characteristic of
effective interstate water compacts are identified and
analyzed utilizing the OE model developed in this study. It
is the first time that these hypotheses have been tested
from a comparative theoretical perspective.

Seven compact effectiveness hypotheses from the field
have been identified for the purposes of this study:

1. An effective interstate compact must have coercive
authority to force state compliance with compact
goals. (Not supported by this study.)

2. The origins of an effective compact can be traced
to either a federal initiative or a crisis that

precipitated the development of a compact. (Not
supported by this study.)

115

3. Formal participation of the federal government in
the administration of an interstate compact is
essential for an effective compact. (Supported
for pollution compacts only.)

4. Compact commissions with one state veto voting
powers are ineffective. (Not supported by this
study.)

5. Effective compacts have a high degree of
communication among its member states. (Some
support in this study.)

6. Compacts with elite constituencies are more likely
to have a high degree of effectiveness than those
without such groups. (Some support in this
study.)

7. The size or flexibility of a compact affects its
effectiveness. (No support for geographical size,

number of states, or flexibility criteria utilized
in this study.)

The data upon which section one of this chapter is
primarily based are drawn from a national survey instrument
developed specifically for this study. The survey was sent
to the compact directors/chairs and state commissioners of
all 27 interstate water compacts which had an identifiable
commiss ion structure . ‘°

The compact commission list was developed from

information obtained from the Council of State Governments,

 

‘“ Because of their lack of a formal commission
structure, the following interstate water compacts were not
included in this study: Belle Fourche River Compact (1943),
the Colorado River Compact (1922), the Snake River Compact
(1949), the Upper Niobrara Basin Compact (1969), and the
Merrimack River Compact. In addition, due to the extremely
limited commission structure of the La Plata, South Platte,
Republican, Costilla Creek, Red River and Big Blue compacts
plus the incomplete director responses from the Rio Grande
and Wheeling Creek compacts, these responses were not
tabulated in the text tables though survey responses are
provided in Appendix D.

116
and was updated and corrected to represent the current state
commissioners with the assistance of the commission
directors/chairs of the surveyed compacts (See Appendix A
for complete description of compact population). A copy of
each survey instrument sent to the directors (See Appendix B
for list of directors/chairs) and to the state commissioners
is included in Appendix C of this study. A summary of the
survey responses is provided in Appendix D.

The response rates to this survey were 100% of all
compact commissions with existing directors/chairs and 65%
of the 232 state commissioners. A summary the respondents
who were surveyed is included in Table 6. The high rate of
participation in both the director and commissioner phases
of this survey makes it a valuable tool from which to
discern the effectiveness of the compact from both the
external (state commissioners' views) and internal (compact
director) perspectives.

Section two, which describes and analyzes compact
effectiveness hypotheses, will also utilize historical,
political, and legislative data: court cases: and data from
the previously mentioned survey to test these hypotheses.
Following an external validity test of the section's
findings, the ranking of effective interstate water compacts
provided in section one will be the primary basis for
determining what interstate compact theories are consistent

with the findings of the OE model operationalized.

117

TABLE 6

Interstate Inter Conpeot survey Dertioipetion

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

couaacr Director/Chair rotegt.::eponeee D:r:§o:;::1on
Arkansas River Chair 6 4 66*
Ark-Okleehrk River Chair 0 5 63!
Dear River Manager 10 0 cos
Canadian River Chair 5 3 60t
Connecticut River Chair 10 6 60‘
Castillo Creek None 2 2 100!
Delaware River Director 9 6 as:
«3.1.... :Laxu Director 31 17 est
Interstate Ban. Director 14 5 36‘
Kan-Okla Ark River Chair 7 3 438
Big Blue River none 2 2 1008
Elliott River Chair 3 2 672
La Plate Non- 2 2 1002
NEIIPCC Director 29 17 59%
Ohio River Director 25 16 64‘
Pecos River Chair 2 2 100%
Potomac River Director 16 7 44‘
Red River none 6 6 75%
Republican River None 3 3 100‘
Rio Grande Chair 4 3 75‘
Sabine River Chair/Sec s 4 80%
8. Platte Nont' 2 2 1004
Susquehanna River Director 10 6 50%
Themes Chair 5 '2 40%
Upper Colorado Riv Director_ 5 4 not
Wheeling Creek Chair 3 5 s s 75:
Yellowstone River Chair 3 2 672
Intel. 232 181 68‘

118
Chapter VI will apply the general effectiveness
findings of Chapter V in the more specific context of three
comprehensive case studies of existing and failed interstate
water compacts. This chapter will thus provide an
additional test of the findings of the OE model from a

contextual perspective.

SECTION 1
WWW
Interstate_flater_§2mnest
It is time to put the compact effectiveness model
generally described in Chapter IV into a formula. The OE

model proposed in this study can be described symbolically

as follows:

OE = G + SR + SC

where:
OE = organizational effectiveness of an interstate
compact
G a the goal model
SR = the system-resource model
SC = the strategic constituencies model
The_§921_n9de1

The goal model (G) aspect of this OE theory is measured
by two internal variables: overall effectiveness (OVED) and
regional impact (RID) assessments by the commission

directors, or

G =ovg+aro

119

The internal indicator of overall effectiveness (OVE)
is operationalized into a variable that measures the compact
director/chair's overall assessment according to survey
responses as to how effectively the commission is meeting
its official goals (OVED) .

The regional impact (RI) of a commission is
operationalized into a variable that measures the ability of
the director (RID) to identify actions that the commission
has taken that further its regional goals defined in the

compact (an internal measure used for the goal model).
W].

The systems-resource model (SR) aspect of this OE model
is measured by two resource variables: overall level of
funding assessment by the director (F3) and individual state
contributions as identified the state commissioners (173)”,

or

SR = F -+ F

Thus, the utilization of the environment indicator is
operationalized into two variables that measure the
director's assessment as to the adequacy of funding of the

compact (F3) and the degree of burden sharing in terms of

 

‘” Exact budget figures were not available for all
compacts so the survey respondents' perceptions of state
resource commitments were used in lieu of these figures.

120

funding the commission priorities among the state commission

members (F3).
W

The strategic constituencies model (SR) aspect of this
0E theory is measured by four external variables: the
overall effectiveness assessment by state commissioners
(0E3) , the regional impact assessment by the state
commissioners (RIS), the state actions identified by state
commissioners (8A3) and goal consensus in terms of the
extent of agreement of commission goal priorities among

state commissioners (GCS) , or
so = ova:s + RIs + Sills + cos

1. The evaluations by external entities indicator is
operationalized into a variable that measures the
overall assessment of the compact from a state

commissioner perspective (OVES) 5°.

2. The state actions taken to further the commission's
regional goals indicator is operationalized into a
variable that measures the extent to which state

commissioners are able to identify specific state laws

 

5° See footnote 46 on page 110 in Chapter IV for a
discussion as to why state commissioners who primarily
represent their own state's political interests are properly
considered external to the compact commission because of
their state accountability status.

121

or regulations that implement commission regional

policy (SA‘) .

3. The goal consensus indicator is operationalized into a
variable that measures the degree of consensus among
state commissioners as to the number one priority of
the compact according to the goals identified in the

compact instrument (GCS) .

4. The regional impact indicator is operationalized into
the state commissioners' (RIs) external assessment of
the commission's impact on regional water policy in

their respective states.

As explained in Chapter IV, since all three of these
organizational effectiveness models measure a distinct yet
essential dimension of the interstate compact commission
(internal, resource, and external), each model is weighted
equally for purposes of this study.

Substituting these variables for the three goal models
and their indicators which were included in the OE theory
presented at the beginning of the chapter and averaging the
variables representing each of the models to ensure equal

weight, the theory is represented symbolically as follows:

OE = ovra:,,+ruo + Boa-r, + ovriz$+ru$+srts+ecs

 

 

2 2 4

122
fiee1_me§e1: Using the goal model equation aspect of this
general formula, this equation would now symbolically be

represented as:

c = OVEo-l-RID

 

2

The responses of the commission directors/chairs to the
following question were used to quantify the OVED variable:
"How effective has the commission been in achieving the
purposes you have identified and ranked in Question
10?” (Question 10 asked for a ranking of the official
goals of the compact).
The responses provided in the question were weighted as
follows:
Very effective = 1
Somewhat effective = 2
Somewhat ineffective = 3
Very ineffective - 4
Thus, the lower the score, the more effective the compact
was perceived by the director/chair. A summary of the
responses and ratings are included in column 1 of Table 7.
The responses of the directors/chairs to the following
question were used to quantify the RID variable:
”What are the two or three most important actions the
commission has taken in the last ten years in

furtherance of these purposes?” (Referring again to the
ranking of official compact purposes in Question 10)

123

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 7
GOAL [0081.
Interstate Inter Compact Effectiveness
overall Effectiveness Regional Impact Raw Average
COMPACT (0.) (RID) Score Score
Arkansas River 1 3 4 2
Ark-Okla-Ark River 2 2 4 2
Bear River 2 1 3 1.5
Canadian River 2 4 6 3
Connecticut River 2 1 3 1.5
Costilla- Creek (ll/A) iii/M (NIB) (WM
Delaware River 1 1 2 1
Great Lakes 1 2 3 1.5
Interstate Sen. 1 1 2 1
Kan-Okla Ark River 1 3 4 2
Big Blue River (ll/A) ("/31 ("IN ("IN
Klamath River 1 2 3 1.5
La Plata (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A)
NEIWPCC 2 1 3 1.5
Ohio River 1 1 2 1
Pecos River 4 3 7 3.5
Potomac River 1 1 2 1!
Red River No director/chr No director/chr No director
Republican River (ll/A) (Ii/3) (N/M (W3)
Rio Grande ** 1 4 5 2. 5
Sabine River _1.5* 2 3.5 1.75
8. Plattc (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A)
Susquehanna River 2 _1 3 1.5
Thames 1 3 4 2
Upper Colorado Riv 2' 2 4 2
Wheeling Creek ** 1 2 - 3 1.5
Yellowstone River 2 1 3 1.5
Average 1.61 1.84 3.43 1.72

*Rated as “effective“ “I Not in computed averages -incomplete responses.

124
Since this response is an internal evaluation of
overall goal attainment question, it is included in the goal
model and is quantified as follows:

1 = provided more than one policy51 action taken by
the commission which is associated with the
commission's ranked goals.

2 = provided one policy action taken by the commission
associated with the commission's ranked goals.

3 8 provided only administrative actions associated
with the commission's ranked goals.

4 = provided neither an administrative nor a policy
action associated with the commission's ranked
goals.

Column 2 of Table 7 summarizes the regional impact
variable and column three provides an average score for each
of these two variables associated with the goal model. The
average or mean score for the goal model was 1.72. Eight

compact commissions scored below this mean score:

Upper Colorado River compact
Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River compact
Sabine River compact

Pecos River compact

Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River compact
Thames River compact

Arkansas River compact

Canadian River compact

 

n Refer to note 45 by Neil Carter on the significance
of an administrative versus a policy action taken by an
organization. Carter argues that there is a significant
difference between administrative efficiency (error rates
and timeliness) and policy efficiency (obtaining the
organization's final objective). The difference between a
policy action and an administrative one in this study is
whether or not the action related to internal management
(administrative) or required or resulted in external (state)
act on.

125

§y§§3m_3gsgnzg§_ugg§1: Using the systems-resource model
equation of the general theory of CE, the equation would now

be represented as:

The responses of the commission directors/chairs to the

following question were used to quantify the F3'variable:
”Over the past ten years, describe the level of state
contributions to the commission's budget (in actual
dollars)"

The summary responses (exact wording of the responses

choices are provided in the appendix) provided from this

question were weighted as follows:

funding increased significantly or slightly”-
funding did not change

funding decreased slightly, decreases by one state
not offset by other state contributions

4 a funding decreased significantly, decreases in
contributions by more than one state not offset by
other state contributions.

UDNFJ
I

Thus, the lower the score, the more adequately funded

the compact commission was from the overall perspective of

 

52 The reason for combining these two categories is to
obtain an indication of whether or not the state has
increased resources. The expectation is that an net
increase in resources is a positive indication regardless of
the size. Besides, a large increase in funding may be due
to only one state's contribution, which does not necessarily
indicate approval among all compact members.

126
the director/chair. A summary of the response and rankings
are included in column 1 of Table 8.

The responses of the state commissioners to the
following question were used to quantify the F§'variab1e:

”Over the past ten years, describe the approximate

level of your state's contributions to this

commission's budget (in dollars).”

This funding variable from the state commissioner's
perspective is included so that a better picture of
individual state funding burdens is provided. It is
conceivable that a compact commission may be adequately
funded from an overall perspective but that state support
may be declining among one or more states, indicating
perhaps a lack of interest or support for the regional
nature of the commission's actions by some state commission
members.” It is thus a useful individual indicator of

external resource support among the compact members.

 

53 The overall responses by the directors may not
reflect situations where the funding level of the compact
has increased yet the relative burdens in financing the
commission are unequally borne by only a few of the states
in the compact. For example, New York is a member of almost
40 compacts, yet it has reduced its contributions to some
commissions like the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC)
because of its concern over the actions of that commission.
Since other members of the DRBC the commission have
significantly increased their contributions, this regional
division would not be reflected in the director's overall
funding assessment. Thus, individual state contribution
assessments by the state commissioners provide an important
additional measure of the external resource support of a
commission. (See Appendix E for the DRBC budget breakdown on
a state contributions).

127

TABLE 8
systems-Resource Iodel
Interstate Iater Compact Resources

overall runding Individual Itate Raw Average
COIPACT Adequacy ' funding Score Score

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Arkansas River 1 3 . 4 2.0
Ark-Okla-Ark River 2 4 6 3.0
Bear River 3 2 5 2.5
Canadian River 2 2 4 2.0
Connecticut River 2 2 4 2.0
Castillo Creek ~ (N/A) 1 - --
Delaware River 1 3 4 2.0
Great Lakes - 1 3 4 2.0
Interstate San. 4 4 B 4.0
Ran-Okla Ark River 2 1 3 1.5
Big Blue River (N/A) 1 - --
Klanhtb River 2 2 4 2.0
La Plata (N/A) 1 .. --
NBIWPCC 2 3 5 2.5
Ohio River 1 1 2 1.0
Pecos River 1.5* 1 2.5 1.25
Potomac River 1 2 3 1.5
Red River None-no director 3 - --
Republican River (N/A) 1 - --
Rio Grande (Not provided) 1 - --
Sabine River 1 _ 1 2 1.0
s. Platte (N/A) 2 -- --
Susquehanna River 1 2 3 1.5
Thames 2 'j' 2' 4 2.0
Upper Colorado Riv 1 1 2 1.0
Wheeling Creek (Not provided) 2 - --
Yellowstone River 1 1 2 1.0
Average 1.“ 2.0 3.1 1.80

*0efined as “adequate“ by director“

128
The responses to the choices in the question were

weighted as follows:

1 a all respondents indicated that state contributions
had increased slightly or significantly.“’

2 = all respondents indicated that state contributions

had increased slightly or significantly or did

not change.

one or more respondents indicated that state

contributions had decreased slightly.

4 = one or more respondents indicated that state
contributions had decreased significantly.

u
II

The lower score in this ranking indicates higher
overall state support in terms of compact funding. Column 2
in Table 8 summarizes the quantification of this variable
and column 3 indicates the average score for the systems-
resource model aspect of the theoretical GB model. The
average or mean score of the systems-resources model was
1.88. Eleven interstate water commissions scored below this

mean 800138 3

Delaware River Basin compact
Great Lakes compact

Bear River compact

Connecticut River compact
Klamath River compact

NEIWPCC

Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River compact
Interstate Sanitation Commission
Thames River compact

Arkansas River compact

Canadian River compact

 

s"Because complete budget figures were neither uniform
not uniformly available, the state commissioner survey
responses were used as a construct of state financial
support.

129

WWW: Using the strategic
constituencies model aspect of the theoretical model, this

equation would be symbolically represented as:

so = OVES+RIS+SA:+GCS

 

4

The responses of the state commissioners to the following

question was used to quantify the OVE:s variable:

"How effective do you, as the state representative,
believe this commission has been in achieving the
purposes you have identified and ranked in question 5?"
(Question 5 asked for the state commissioners' rankings
of the compacts goals).

The responses provided in the question were weighted as

follows:

very effective
somewhat effective
somewhat ineffective
very ineffective

#0280!"

Thus, a lower score indicated a higher degree of overall
commission effectiveness as perceived by the state
commissioners. A summary of the responses and ratings are
included in column 1 of Table 9.
The responses to the state commissioner to the
following question were used to quantify the RI$ variable:
”What has been the impact of actions and/or

recommendations made by this commission on the

development of a regional water policy approach by your
state."

130
TABLE 9

strategic Constituency chel
Interstate later Compact ltate lvaluation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

overall Regional ltate eeei lav

CCIPAC! nffectiveaess Impact Activity Consensus score Average
Arkansas River 2.75 ‘2.33 2.0 2.0 9.03 2.27
Ark-Okla-Ark River 2.00 1.25 2.0 2.0 7.25 1.31
Bear River 1.33 1.36 1.0 2.0 6.24 1.56
Canadian River 1.33 1.33 3.0 2.0 7.66 1.92
Connecticut River 1.33 1.75 4.0 2.0 9.53 2.4
Costilla Creek 3 1.00 2.00 1.0 1.0 5.00 1.25
fielaware River 1.25 1.33 1.0 2.0 6.03 1.52
Great Lakes 1.31 1.31 2.0 2.0 7.62 1.91
Interstate san. 1.30 2.25 2.0 3.0 9.05 2.26
Ran-Okla Ark River 1.67 1.67 2.0 1.0 6.34 1.59
Big Blue River 5 1.00 1.00 1.0 1.0 4.0 1
Klaaatb River 2.00 2.00 4.0 2.0 10.0 2.5
La Plata t 1.00 3.00 1.0 1.0 6.0 1.5
33133:: 1.67 1.79 2.0 3.0 3.46 2.12
Ohio River 1.53 1.73 2.0 3.0 3.26 2.07
Pecos River 1.50 1.50 1.0 1.0 5.0 1.25
Potomac River 1.43 1.29 1.0 1.0 4.72 1.13
Red River 3 1.40 1.33 1.0 2.0 6.23 1.56
Republican River 3 2.30 3.33 2.0 1.0 3.63 2.16
313 Grande 3 1.00 1.67 2.0 1.0 5.67 1.42
Sabine River 1.25 '2.00 3.0 2.0 3.25 2.06
3. Platte t 2.00 3.00 2.0 2.0 9.0 2.25
Susquehanna River 1.60 2.00 2.0 2.0 7.6 1.9
Thames 1.50 2.00 4.0 1.0 3.5 2.06
Upper Colorado Riv 1.75 1.50 1.0 2.0 6.25 1.56
wheeling Creek 3 1.30 2.20 4.0 1.0 9.0 2.25
Yellowstone River 3.00 3.00 1.0 :2.0 9.0 2.25
Average 1.74 1.83 2.1 1.95 7.64 1.904

3 Responses not included in averages due to lack of overall survey response

131
The responses of the state commissioners were weighted as
follows with the lower score indicating a more positive
impact (see appendix for exact wording of response choices):
significantly positive impact
marginally positive impact

marginally negative impact
significantly negative impact

hUNP
lllllll

A summary of the responses and ratings are included in
column 2 of Table 9.

The responses of the state commissioners to the
following question were used to quantify the SAs*variable:

"If possible, please identify three important

legislative or regulatory actions your state has taken

in the last ten years in furtherance of (or in
opposition to) the compact commission's purposes you

have identified in question 5."

The responses of the state commissioners were weighted
in terms of the percentage of respondents who could identify
specific state regulation or legislation associated with
commission purposes. The state commissioners who represent
their state on the commission must inform the state as to
what actions it must take in order to implement commission
goals. Thus, the assumption in this variable is that the
fewer the number of state commissioners who can identify
specific state actions, the less likely that all of the

member states will have actually taken concrete steps to

realize the regional goals of the compact.

132
The weightfi'given to the aggregate responses of the

state commissioners of each compact were as follows:

1 a more than 75% of the respondents can identify such

actions

2 = 50% to 75% of the respondents can identify such
actions

3 = 25% to 49% of the respondents can identify such
actions

4 a less than 25 % of the respondents can identify

such actions.

Thus, the lower score indicates a higher percentage of
respondents who can identify state actions to implement
commission purposes. A summary of these findings is
included in column 3 of Table 9.

Finally, the responses of the state commissioners to
the following question were used to quantify the CC8
variable:

”Below is a list of official purposes of the compact on
which you serve, derived from the Congressional

 

55'The percentages chosen appear to be somewhat
arbitrary (that is the difference between 75% and 76%
identification may seen to be inconsequential. However, in
a small (four member) compact commission, if one of the four
state commissioners cannot identify a state action (75%),
that is a significant regional difference in terms of
compact unity. On the other hand, in commissions where
states have several commissioners such as the Great Lakes
Commission and the NEIWPCC, if one of the state
commissioners cannot identify a state action while another
can (a likely scenario where commission responsibilities are
divided), a response rate of less than 100% is not as
statistically significant because of the larger number of
respondents. Still, as the percentage of respondents
decreases even in large commissions, the probability that no
state action has been taken by one or more states increases.
The percentages chosen were meant to encompass differences
in terms of state action identification among both single
membership and multiple membership in the compacts studied.

133

enabling statute. Please rank these purposes in terms

of what you believe are the commission's priorities,

with 1 being the top priority."

There may be some overlap in terms of the official
purposes of the compact, and it is possible that in some
cases the official purposes of the compact may be vaguely
worded. However, it is assumed for this study that the
farther apart the members are in terms of what they believe
is the number one goal of the compact, the less likely they
will positively assess the commission's actions because of
goal conflict .56

The degree of goal consensus among state commissioners
will be weightedfl'as follows:

1 a more than 75% agree upon the number one goal of

the commission.

2 - 50% to 75% agree upon the number one goal of the

commission.

3 - 25% to 49% agree upon the number one goal of the
commission.

 

5‘ Certainly, the results of the survey indicate that even
in vaguely worded, multiple goal compacts, the members of some
commissions show' great 'unanimity in. terms of“ what. they
perceive as the commission's number 1 goal. Thus commission
size or vagueness in compact wording does not seem to be an
obstacle to achieving compact goal consensus. Indeed, the fact
that vagueness allows a variety of goals to be undertaken on
a priority basis indicates that commissions without goal
consensus on at least their number 1 priority may be more
prone to inaction due to dysfunctional goal conflict.

57'F'or reasons similar to those offered in the previous
footnote, the percentages used to assess goal consensus are
provided in order to reflect the relative importance of
dissent among small, single-member and large, multi-member
compact commissions. For purposes of uniformity as well,
the percentages are identical to those used in the state
action variable.

134

4 = less than 25% agree upon the number one goal of

the commission.

Thus, the lower the score, the more goal consensus
there is among the state commissioners and the greater the
likelihood that the commission will be seen as effective by
the state respondents. A summary of these responses is
included in column 4 of Table 9, along with an overall
average rating of the compacts based on these four variables
representing the strategic constituencies model.

The overall average or mean of the strategic
constituencies model was 1.90. Eleven interstate water
compact commissions scored below this mean score:

Ohio River Sanitation Commission

Yellowstone River Commission

Great Lakes Commission

Sabine River Commission

Connecticut River Commission

Klamath River Commission

NEIWPCC

Interstate Sanitation Commission

Thames River commission

Arkansas River commission

Canadian River commission

Table 10 summarizes the variable ratings of all three
models for all 27 interstate water compacts (including those
without a formal commission structure). It also provides a
ranking of each compact commission in terms of effectiveness
as measured by the OE model presented in Chapter IV and
represented symbolically in the equation provided at the

beginning of this chapter.

135
TABLE 10

Summary Table
overall Rffectivsness Ranking of Interstate Rater Compacts

System Strategic

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CCIIACT Goal Resource: Constituencies. Total Rank
Arkansas River 2 2 ' 2.3 6.3 16
Ark-OKIAHArk River 2 3 1.8 6.8 17
Bear River 1.5 2.5 1.6 5.6 10
Canadian River 3 2 1.9 6.9 18
Connecticut River 1.5 2 2.4 5.9 11
Costilla Creek - - 1.3 - --
Delaware River 1 2 1.5 4.5 3
Great Lakes 1.5 2 1.9 5.4 9
Interstate San. 1 4 2.3 7.3 19
Kan-Okla Ark River 2 1.5 1.6 5.1 8
Big Blue River - - 1 - --
Rlamath River 1.5 2 2.5 6 12
La Plata - - 1.5 - --
NBIWPCC 1.5 2.5 2.1 6.1 13(+)
Ohio River 1 1.0 2.1 4.1 2
Pecos River 3.5 _ 1.3 1.3 6.1 13(+)
Potomac River 1 1.5 1.2 3.7 1
Red River - - 1.6 - --
Republican River - - 2.2 - --
Rio Grande 2.5 - 1.4 - --
Sabine River 1.8 ‘1' 2.1 4.9 6(+)
3. Platte - - 2.3 - --
Susquehanna River 1.5 1.5 1.9 4.9 6(+)
Thames 2.0 2 2.1 6.1 13(+)
Upper Colorado Riv 2 1' 1.6 4.6 4
Wheeling Creek 1.5 - 2.3 - -
Yellowstone River 1.5 1 2.3 4.8 5
Average 1.75 1.33 1.33 5.5

*Rounded to first digit

136

The reader will note that eight compacts were not
ranked.58 However, the initial data provided in Table 9
does tend to support an earlier assertion by many compact
proponents and opponents that many of these single-purpose
compacts (water allocation compacts for example) are
comparatively very effective in terms of handling specific
regional duties such as one-time water allocation
problems.”’ The problem lies in the limited scope of their
responsibility for promoting regional action in other
regional watershed issues.

This section thus concludes with the development of a
comparative effectiveness ranking of the interstate water
compact commission population listed below. For purposes of
identifying effective versus ineffective interstate water
compact commissions, we initially shall use the overall
average score of the compacts drawn from Table 10, which
summarizes and ranks the interstate water compacts according

to the equation:

 

5" Those not ranked included those that lacked a formal
commission structure (characterized by periodic meetings of
state officials, generally for technical engineering
purposes) and a director was either not provided for in the
compact or the commission position was vacant (the latter
applies to the Red River Commission). The Wheeling Creek
and Rio Grande Commissions were not ranked because funding
data were missing.

59 See the average scores on Table 5.4 for the
commissions that lack a director/chair: namely the Costilla
Creek, Big Blue, La Plata. However, notice the scores for
the Republican and South Platte indicate that being a single
purpose compact by itself does not ensure effectiveness.

137

or: -- OVED+RID + 1702.3: + ov1izs+lus+szuxs+scs

 

 

2 2 4

An effective interstate water compact as identified by
the OE model developed in this study will be characterized
as one that has a lower overall mean score equal to or lower
than the average compact score (5.5). Thus the more
effective compacts in order of overall mean effectiveness

would include:

1. Potomac River

2. Ohio River

3. Delaware River

4. Upper Colorado River

5. Yellowstone River

6. Sabine River (tied)

7. Susquehanna River (tied)

8. Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River
9. The Great Lakes

A relatively ineffective interstate water compact as
identified by our OE theory as one that has a total score
that is higher than the average compact (5.5). Thus, the
relatively less effective compacts in order of their overall

scores are as follows:

10. Bear River

11. Connecticut River

12. Klamath River

13. Pecos River (tied)

l4. Thames River (tied)

15. NEIWPCC (tied)

16. Arkansas River

17. Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River
18. Canadian River

19. Interstate Sanitation Commission

138

However, this ranking does not reflect how well each
commission met the individual criteria for each of the three
models (goal, system-resources and strategic constituencies)
used to develop the OE model of this study. The assumption
behind the OE model developed for this study was that each
of these models measures a distinct yet essential
effectiveness dimension: thus, all models are weighted
equally. Accordingly, how relatively effective the
commissions are depends not only on their scoring at or
below the overall mean for all three models, but also on how
well each compact satisfies the effectiveness criteria for
each of the three models."’0

For purposes of consistency and in order to facilitate
comparison to the overall mean rankings, the mean score of
each of the three models is used as a further basis for
determining the relative effectiveness of each commission.
Table 11 summarizes this further refinement of interstate
water compact commission effectiveness.

For purposes of definition, compacts are ranked in
Table 11 according to the following criteria:

1. An effective water compact commission is one that

scored below the mean score for each of the three

models, as well as scoring below the overall mean
for all three models.

 

5" As standard deviation would not be useful for
comparative purposes due to the limited population of some
compacts, this focus on individual model means as well as
the overall mean provides an alternative means of
establishing score disparities and the identifying outlier
scores.

139

TABLE 11

 

 

 

overall At or below At or below At or below
lean (8.9) .Iean (1.72) :;:: (1.88) ':::st(1i90)
lasing Glllllt Score/Rank Seal chel eae- a e c
Aesourse Constituencies
Effective Potomac 3.7/(1) Yes (1.0) Yes (1.5) Yes (1.18)
Susque- 4.9/(8) Yes (1.9) Yes (1.8) Yes (1.90)
bane
Relatively Ohio 4.1/(2) Yes (1.0) Yes (1.0) .lo (2.07)
Effective Delaware 4.5/(3) Yes (1.0) Re (2.0) Yes (1.52)
Upper 4.6/(4) lo (2.0) Yes (1.0) Yes (1.56)
Colorado .
Yellow- 4.8/(5) Yes (1.5) Yes (1.0) - lo (2.25)
stone
kansae- 5.1/(8) Re (2.0) Yes (1.5) Yes (1.59)
Oklahoma
Sabine 4.9/(6) lo (1.75) Yes (1.0) lo (2.06)
Great 5.4/(9) Yes (1.5) Io (2.0) lo (1.91)
Lakes
Relatively Bear 5.6/(10) Yes (1.5) Do (2.5) Yes (1.56)
ineffect- Pecos 6.1/(13) Bo (3.5) Yes (1.25) Yes (1.25)
vs

 

 

 

 

 

ineffect- Eonnect- 8.9/(11) Yes (1.5) Do (2.0) He (2.4)
ve out ' '
‘xlamatb 6.0/(12) Yes (1.5) In (2.0) Ho (2.5)
HEIUPCC 6.1/(15) Yes (1.5) So (2.5) lo (2.12) '
Arkansas- 6.8/(17) Re (2.0) lo (3.0) Yes (1.81
Oklahoma
ISC 7.3/(19) Yes (1.0) No (4.0) He (2.26)
Thames 6.1/(14) Re (2.0) Re (2.0) lo (2.06)
Arkansas 6.3/(16) No (2.0) No (2.0) lo (2.27)
Canadian 6.9/(18) . No (3.0) Do (2.0) lo (1.92)

 

4.

140

A relatively effective water compact commission is
one that scored below the mean score for fewer
than all three individual models as well as
scoring below the overall mean for all three
models.

A relatively ineffective water compact commission
is one that scored below the mean score for two of
the three individual models but scored above the
overall mean for all three models.

An ineffective water compact commission is one

that scored below the mean score for fewer than
two of the three individual models61 and scored

above the overall mean for all thee models.

Thus, the 19 interstate water compact commissions will

be ranked accordingly:

Wiggins

1.
2.

Potomac River
Susquehanna River

WW

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ohio River Sanitation

Delaware River basin

Upper Colorado River
Yellowstone River
Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River
Sabine River*

Great Lakes*

* Indicates were below the overall mean but only below the
mean of one of the three individual models.

 

“ The assumption behind this relative effectiveness
differentiation is that the greater the number of individual
effectiveness models that a commission exceeds the mean
score, the more likely there is not just one but multiple
problems (internal, resource, and external) with the compact
that are hindering its effectiveness.

141

WM

10. Bear River
11. Pecos River

111W

12. Connecticut River

13. Klamath River

14. NEIWPCC

15. Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River

16. Interstate Sanitation

l7. Thames River

18. Arkansas River

19. Canadian River

This information will form the basis for testing the
theories about what constitutes an effective interstate

water compact, the substance of section 2 of this chapter.

SECTION 2

n - - F —- - 4. ‘ —
3 - e e eue. - -.--, 0-. . e,

The list of interstate water compacts in the previous
section identified as effective and relatively ineffective
according to the OE model for interstate compacts requires
an initial external validity analysis. Do the "effective"
or "relatively effective" compacts theoretically identified:
(1) meet the minimum requirements for forming a compact
(i.e. to avoid court litigation, the only politically
realistic alternative formal mechanism for interstate water
disputes) and (2) have characteristics that clearly
differentiate them from compacts identified as relatively
ineffective? (i.e. are they arbitrary or nonquantifiable

differences). If the OE model is to be useful for

142
identifying effective compacts, it must be able to meet

these two threshold requirements.

Wage
To answer the initial litigation avoidance purpose of a

compact, an examination of state versus state litigation
before the U.S. Supreme Court under its original
jurisdiction power was undertaken through the use of the
LEXIS legal research data base. If a compact is effective,
at a minimum there should be no post compact litigation
among state compact members. The presence of such U.S.
Supreme Court litigation after compact ratification would
indicate that the compact is not an effective alternative
mechanism for resolving interstate water disputes.

Girardot (1989:157) highlights the growing importance
of compacts as an alternative to litigation, pointing to
recent and projected future drought problems. Compacts must
provide a coherent scheme for resolving such disputes
quickly and easily. Otherwise they will be futile devices,
and court litigation will become the dominant avenue for
water dispute resolution.

A review of the U.S. Supreme Court cases decided after
the ratification of each of the compacts rated "effective"
or "relatively effective" did not reveal any instances of

state versus state interstate water compact litigation,

143
indicating initial support for the compact effectiveness
rankings provided by the theoretical model“.

Wm:
Beyond meeting this minimum litigation avoidance

standard, effective compacts should have identifiable
characteristics that distinguish them from the relatively
ineffective compacts. Otherwise, the differences in
effectiveness could be arbitrary or at best not useful in
terms of isolating specific factors that make compacts

effective.

 

‘“ However, several relatively ineffective compacts did
experience such litigation, including federal litigation
over the Canadian River, Pecos River, and Arkansas River
compacts.

In addition three important non original jurisdiction
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court involving effective
interstate water compacts require comment. In Qy§;_x;_fiim§,
341 U.S. 22 (1951), the Ohio River compact (ORSANCO) was the
subject of a funding dispute by West Virginia. However, the
issue in this case was more of a test of the scope and
validity of compacts as legally enforceable instruments
rather than a challenge to the effectiveness of ORSANCO.

The result of this case clarified the superior legal scope
of the compact over state legislation by virtue of the
impairment of contract provision of the U.S. Constitution.

The more recent WW
Biyg;_§agin_§9mpagt case, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986) was more
specifically aimed at the power of that commission to bar
new interstate water diversions. This case highlighted the
limited status quo nature of this compact and will be
discussed further in the context of the comparative nature
of interstate water compacts. However, the outcome of this
case again actually strengthened the power of a compact by
upholding its power to bar interstate water diversions.

The City gt nilw wgukgg y, Illinois case, 451 U. S. 304
(1981) dealt with pollution of Lake Michigan by Chicago.
Although the suit dealt with a Great Lakes issue, it did not
involve the Great Lakes Commission (GLC) because pollution
is not a priority issue under this compact. The limited
nature of the GLC in the area of pollution control is one of
the issues that will be explored further in Chapter VI.

144

In order to begin such a comparative analysis, it is
necessary to group these compacts into functional categories
that permit a meaningful comparative framework for analysis.
Otherwise, comparing the characteristics of a compact with a
wide variety of functions (e.g. the Delaware River Basin
Compact - multipurpose) with a compact of a very limited
scope (e.g. the Thames River Compact-flood control) would
yield broad and rather meaningless distinctions from an
ef fect ivness standpoint . ‘3

In Table 12 all of the compacts commissions included in
this study were divided into four functional categories as
defined by Jerome Huys from his 1971 major legal study of
interstate compacts (1976:312) for standardization purposes.
The compacts in this study were then divided as follows in
terms of their effectiveness for each of the four Huys
categories in order to comparatively distinguish them:

1. Water allocation compacts

2. Pollution control compacts

3. Planning and flood control compacts
4. Comprehensive compacts

W
The first category, water allocation compacts, consists
of four "relatively effective" compacts and six

”ineffective" or "relatively ineffective compacts. The

 

‘9 That is, both could be considered effective in terms
of their official purposes, yet totally different in terms of
structure, operation, and results. It would create an apples
and oranges result from a comparative standpoint.

145

TABLE 12

Compact Types

Effective or Relatively Effective Compacts *

 

 

 

 

Pater Allocation Pollution Control Planning 8 Plood Comprehensive
Upper Colorado (5) Potomac (1) Great Lakes (9) Delaware (4)
Yellowstone (6) Ohio (3) Susquehanna (2)
'8abine (8)

Kansas-Okla (7)

 

 

 

 

Relatively Ineffective or Ineffective Compacts

 

 

 

‘later Allocation Pollution Control Planning 6 Plood Comprehensive
Bear (10) me (14) Connecticut (12)
Klamath (13) 13c (16) Thames (17)
Pecos (11)

 

Arkansas (18)

 

Ark-Okla (15)

 

Canadian (19)

 

 

 

 

* Rankings (in parentheses) are based upon final rankings in Table 5.6.

146

”relatively effective" compacts all share the characteristic
of having a limited purpose (e.g. one-time water
allocation). All but the Yellowstone compact have not faced
significant internal problems nor have they faced external
challenges in terms of litigation or state noncompliance.

The ineffective compacts in this category were also
limited in nature but, according to national survey
responses to the weaknesses of the compact, suffered either
from: (1) internal conflict Arkansas River (attorneys
dominate), Arkansas-Oklahoma River (water agency members
dominate), Pecos River (continual tie votes), Canadian River
(state vetoes) and Bear River (personal interests
dominate):“’or (2) inability to enforce laws leading to
states breaking rules (Canadian River), litigation (Arkansas
and Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River Compacts, Pecos River,
and Canadian River), or a general lack of authority to
handle additional pollution responsibilities (Klamath).

Further examination of the survey responses reveals
that the Sabine River compact was rated relatively effective
because it has not yet faced difficult water apportionment
decisions. Similarly, the Yellowstone River compact was
rated relatively effective not because of it structure as

much as the limited geographical impact of the compact and

 

“’The relatively ineffective compacts seem to lack
consensus among member states and thus have been hobbled by
litigation or internal conflict, according to survey and
LEXIS data.

147
its protection of existing state water rights from outside
diversion. The Kansas-Oklahoma River compact was considered
more effective than its counterparts on the Arkansas River
(The Arkansas River and Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River
compacts) because it is a less controversial conservation
storage versus water flow compact, and accordingly has not
faced U.S. Supreme Court original jurisdiction litigation
like the latter two. Thus, it would appear that, at least
in the eyes of the state compact representatives, the
Yellowstone, Sabine, and Kansas-Oklahoma compacts are
appropriately identified as "relatively effective" by the
survey data because they protect overall or general state
interests without injecting conflicting regional issues.
However, as a model for accomplishing more controversial
water allocation decisions on a regional basis, the higher
ranked Upper Colorado River Compact offers more useful
distinctions.

The Upper Colorado River compact, according to survey

respondents has the added advantages of:

1. having representatives who have a direct line to
the governors,

2. no single state veto problems,

3. promoting of regional economic development by
forming the compact in order to acquire federal
financing of the Colorado River Storage Project of
1956, and

4. having developed a significant public relations

campaign to promote regional interests in the
basin.

148

Thus, in addition to protection of state water
interests that other effective water allocation compacts
offer, the Upper Colorado River Compact offers regional
benefits beyond what the states could acquire. The fact
that the lower Colorado River, governed by a non-commission
compact formed in 1922 and fraught with litigation and
controversy, has fared poorly in comparison to this compact
indicates that the Upper Colorado River Compact presents a
possible interstate water compact model in the area of water
allocation and justifies its high effectiveness ranking in

this category.

W

This second category identifies one ”effective” and one
"relatively effective" pollution control compact, as well as
two "relatively ineffective” ones. The primary distinctions
between the effective and ineffective compact ratings
according to survey respondents are (1) the strong feeling
of inadequacy in terms of the funding in the advisory
NEIWPCC and enforcement empowered Interstate Sanitation
Commission (ISC)‘5 and (2) the internal commission

conflicts (i.e. New England Interstate Water Pollution

 

‘5 Although the response rate of the ISC to the survey
was below 50%, there is some indication that the current
funding and political problems it faces is due to a larger
problem reflected in the state of one ISC respondent that,
"The compact enacted in 1935 has as its prime mission
regulating approaches to pollution abatement. Since that
time state and federal environmental agencies have assumed
comprehensive regulatory responsibilities rendering the role
inappropriate for the ISC."

149
Control Commission (NEIWPCC) responses indicate that
commission is totally run by state agency commissioners as
opposed to non-agency commissioners, and ISC respondents
indicate that an extensive amount of time is taken to
negotiate politically sensitive compact issues).

The advisory Potomac River Compact Commission is a
noteworthy example of an effective pollution control
compact. Although it lacks the enforcement powers of the
ISC, its reputation for technical competence and its heavy
emphasis on education and persuasion through public
relations and information transfer have made it an effective
regional voice for pollution control. The Ohio River Valley
Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) rated "relatively
effective" also is noted for its ability to include interest
groups in its industry action committee structure and, in
conjunction with a strong communications program, it too has
been able to promote a more regional approach to Ohio River
pollution without frequent resort to its enforcement powers.

Thus, the reputations of the Potomac and ORSANCO
compacts for competence and persuasion seem to distinguish
them according to an effectiveness perspective from the
NEIWPCC and the ISC, which seem to suffer from resource and
external credibility problems. Certainly, the current
funding problems in the "ineffective" compacts is reflected
in this credibility problem, although this is not to say
that both the NEIWPCC and ISC have not been very effective

in the past in meeting pollution problems in their area.

150
A lesson for model compact consideration from this
category is the importance of reputation and education

characteristics in improving compact effectivness.

BMW}.

This category includes only three compacts that
provided sufficient information to utilize the OE model
developed in this study.“’ Only the Great Lakes Commission
(GLC) was deemed "relatively effective", although its
overall score was very close to the average cut-off for
effectiveness and had the lowest overall ranking among all
compacted rated as "effective".

The major legal difference between the GLC and the
Thames and Connecticut River compacts was the more limited
compact purposes of the latter two, which were mainly
confined to the equitable distribution of financial burdens
incidental to flood control. The GLC, though advisory in
nature, has a much broader scope in terms of water
development issues.

The GLC's communication links with the vast number of
interest groups concerned about the Great Lakes is another
distinguishing characteristic that makes it more visible and
likely creates a more positive image than the more limited
and rather obscure Thames and Connecticut River commissions.

Although the GLC does not have the authority to force

 

“’Wheeling Creek financial data was mpt available in
order to permit its use in the OE model equation.

151
decisions upon the diverse interests in the Great Lakes, it
does provide a regional forum for wide-ranging interest
group discussions, another distinctive feature that would

help explain its "relatively effective" rating.

W
The fourth category of compacts includes only two

compacts: the Susquehanna and Delaware River compacts. As
these compacts were both rated as "effective" and
"relatively effective" respectively, the only issue to
explore at this point is why two very similar and somewhat
contiguous and somewhat contemporaneous compacts received
different effectiveness ratings.

The major difference seems to be the circumstances
under which the two compacts were initiated. The Delaware
was formed in response to Supreme Court litigation and
hurricane disaster which created a sense of urgency that
helped bond state compact members in terms of compact
purposes. The Susquehanna compact was modeled after the
Delaware compact without the significant previous
controversy of the DRBC and thus had fewer obstacles to
overcome. As federal interstate compacts, both compacts
have the unique characteristic of formal federal
participation in compact commission administration and
funding.

In summary, the equation presented in Chapter IV
provides identifiable characteristics that distinguish

152
effective from relatively ineffective compacts. The results
are generally consistent with the descriptive findings of
Jerome Muys (1976:312-313) based on a 1971 study of
interstate water compact funded by the National Water
commission. His findings on three of the categories used in
this study were as follows:

1. the federal-interstate compact had an impressive
record of accomplishment (consistent with the
model findings)

2. Water allocation compacts have been generally
adequate given their relatively modest objectives
(supported somewhat by the fact that 40% of these
compacts were identified as "relatively
effective").

3. Flood control and planning compacts "now largely
appear to be dead letters.” (with the possible
exception of the GLC, this conclusion also seems
to be supported by the findings of this study).

Thus, identifying compacts as ”effective” or

"relatively effective" according to the OE model developed
in this study in order to test hypotheses of water compact
effectiveness propounded by political and legal scholars
appears theoretically justifiable. The issue of what
hypotheses are consistent with the effective compacts

findings of this section is the subject of the next portion
of this section.

 

A review of the literature provides a variety of

hypotheses as to what constitutes an effective interstate

153
water compact. For the most part, these hypotheses have
been based upon limited empirical findings and have not been
subject to a theoretically based and comprehensive
evaluation which has been undertaken in this study.

A number of general and untested compact effectiveness
hypotheses, summarized earlier in this chapter, have been
identified and defined. These hypotheses are tested in
order to determine whether or not they are consistent with
compact effectiveness findings of this study.

1. A common hypothesis by regional scholars in both
the legal and political science disciplines is
that an interstate compact must have adequate
enforcement authority to ensure that the states
comply with the regional nature of compact goals
(e.g. King, 1958:414: Curlin, 1972:342: Florence,
1985: 438: and Weston,1989:30). According to the
findings of the Council of State Governments and
the legal authority vested in the commissions by
compacts approved by Congress, the Interstate
Sanitation Commission, Ohio River, the Upper
Colorado River, Delaware River, and Susquehanna
River would be considered compacts with adequate
enforcement power. ‘7

However, one of these enforcement empowered compacts,
the Interstate Sanitation Commission (ISC), was ranked as
ineffective according to the OE model. While the low
response rate from the national survey that was the basis
for the ISC's low effectivness rating might have influenced

this ranking somewhat, analysis earlier in this section

 

“'For a list of criteria defining what is coercive
power, see King (1958:411). Essential in this list is the
ability of a compact to enforce its own rules in court
without relying on court action by the respective states.

154
indicates that the ISC in the past few years has had
difficulty gaining the funding and the overall support from
some of its state members, justifying a relatively
ineffective rating.

It also should be noted that five compacts that lacked
enforcement power (Potomac, Yellowstone, Sabine, Kansas-
Oklahoma, and Great Lakes compacts) nevertheless were
deemed effective or relatively effective according to the
same OE model (See Table 11). Thus, the OE model findings
would indicate that the presence of enforcement power is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
establishment of an effective interstate water compact.

One explanation for the existence of effective compacts
without coercive powers may lie in the respect that these
compacts have generated among state members. Leach and Sugg
argued, on the basis of the Interstate Oil Compact, that
compact effectiveness lies in the quality of the compact
commissions recommendations and its ability to persuade the
state members by education to accept these recommendations.

Another explanation is that commissions do not need
coercive power if they have established a close working
relationship with their state members. Leach and Sugg
(1969:43) argue that "the development of coordination and
cooperation is much more important than the exercise of
restraint (negative controls)."

In comparing the Potomac River compact (deemed

advisory, yet ranked as the most effective in our OE model)

155
with the Ohio River Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) compact
(an enforcement empowered compact identified as "relatively
effective" according to the OE model), Leach and Sugg argue
that education and public relations work is the real key to
successful cooperation. Citing a study on the need for
empowering the Interstate Commission of the Potomac River
Basin, Leach and Sugg (1969:92) provide the following quote,
except for the moral effect of interstate action against a
polluter, very little of real value would come out of
investing Ohio-type compact power in the Potomac Commission.
Leach and Sugg (1969:187) point out that ORSANCO's power
lies mainly in education and persuasion rather than
compulsion to win adherence to its pollution standards.
This issue will be explored further in the communications
hypotheses.

Hichelman (1978:231) perhaps puts this issue of
compliance into perspective when he observed that the key to
understanding public bureaucracies lies in analyzing their
abilities to institutionalize, that is to obtain compliance
(by whatever means) for their decisions in their task
environments. In other words, the OE model would support
the conclusion that enforcement power is one way but not the
only way an organization such as an interstate compact may
be effective in terms of achieving regional goals and
regional consciousness.

Furthermore, as Glendening and Reeves (1984:282)

conclude, even with enforcement power, the "paucity of

156
financing has hampered their (compact commissions')
effectiveness in planning and mobilizing support for
interstate action."

2. A second hypothesis deals with the origins of an

interstate compact. Barton (1961:174) and Martin,
Birkhead, Burkhead (1960:332) assert that the
federal government has been the moving force in
most significant basin developments in America“.
Barton (1961:171) specifically argues that the
national government is an essential party to
induce the states to agree upon a compact. The
argument follows that the origins of effective
interstate water compacts can be traced to federal
government involvement. Otherwise there would be
no politically powerful force to convince the
states to join together to resolve this collective
action water resource problem.

A test this hypothesis is to identify an "effective" or
"relatively effective" interstate water compact that
developed without direct federal promotion (i.e. beyond the
traditional Congressional consent legislation which is
required of all interstate compacts.

In the water allocation category, the impetus for the
Upper Colorado River Compact was anticipation of the
federally funded Colorado River Storage Project (Jamail,
McCain, and Ullery, 1978:50 and Goslin, 1976:424). The
Canadian River compact was also created by the desire for

the federally funded Canadian River Project (Vawter,

1954:24) and the Arkansas River Compact was created to

 

‘3 Schoolman (1986:819, 825) argues to the contrary
that as compacts become devised by Congress, states are
robbed of their traditional role in negotiating and drafting
a treaty, making the product more of a regional council than
a compact.

157
obtain construction of the John Martin Dam. However, the
latter two compacts were rated "ineffective" by the OE
model.

Furthermore, the impetus for the "relatively effective"
Sabine River Compact, according to Elliot (1986:1263), was
not federal but local competing claims to the river's waters
by water users in both states. Thus, the federal origins of
a compact appear to be neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for effectivness in the water allocation category

Similarly, there was a lack of federal involvement in
the origins of two other categories of compacts: the
Planning and Flood and Comprehensive categories. Neither the
nonfederal origins of the Great Lakes Compact nor the state
initiative basis for both the Delaware and Susquehanna River
Compacts (GAO, 1981:27 and Derthick, 1974:73) (all of which
were rated "effective" or "relatively effective”) would
indicate that federal promotion is not a significant
indicator of compact effectiveness.

Indeed, in the planning and flood category, the federal
legislative link to the origins of the Connecticut,
Merrimack, and Thames compacts, which have been rated
"ineffective", also would indicate that there is no direct
connection between effectiveness and federal origins of

interstate water compacts.“

 

‘9 As Leuchenburg (1972:250) points our, ”the
interstate compact was not a device chosen by state
governments which, on their own initiative, were developing
the resources of the Connecticut Valley, but was hit upon as

158

In the category of effective pollution control
compacts, the origins of the Potomac River compact can be
traced to White House and Congressional influence (Moss,
1968:264) and the National Resources Committee
recommendations of the late 1930's (Vawter, 1955:1693-94).
Moreover, although the origins of ORSANCO can be traced to
local pollution concerns, Cleary (1967:6) credits the
National Resources Board70 as the major impetus for the
realization of ORSANCO. However similar ties can be made to
the National Resources Committee and the formation of the
”ineffective” ISC and the NEIWPCC.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(1972:160) argues to the contrary that the initiatives for
all pollution control compacts were primarily at the state
level and that no compacts came into existence because of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the Federal Water
Quality Act. In light of the existence of "ineffective"
water pollution compacts, whether you accept the argument
that pollution compacts were a response to federal or state

initiatives, there does not appear to be a direct link

 

a means to prevent such developments by the federal
government.” Thus, it should not be surprising to find that
the Connecticut River compact was not rated effective by the
OE model.

It should also be noted that these three compacts
(Thames, Connecticut, and Merrimack) along with Wheeling
Creek, emerged from the federal Flood Control Act of 1936
(Chapman, 1985:28).

I" President Franklin Roosevelt created this council of
cabinet officers in 1933 to explore opportunities for state-
established regional agencies.

159

between federal origins of a compact and its effectiveness
in the pollution control category as well.’1

A related compact origins hypothesis is that compacts
are formed in response to an economic or environmental
crisis. Advocates of this hypothesis point to compact
formation in the Delaware River (Hurricane Diane) and Ohio
River (drought, population, and industrialization pressures)
to support their position. However, the impetus for several
other ”effective" and "relatively effective" compacts was in
anticipation of future events rather than in response to a
crisis, notably the Susquehanna, Sabine, and Great Lakes
compacts. Voight, for example, points out the non-crisis
atmosphere in which the Susquehanna River Basin Compact in
his early comprehensive study of the Susquehanna River:

It may be said that the Susquehanna was certainly in as

favorable a condition as any major stream in the U.S.,

in the sense that there was still time for forward

thinking, time in which to plan for both development
and conservation.

3. A third hypothesis among regional scholars is the
need for formal participation of the federal
government in the administration of an interstate
water compacts (e.g. Dimock and Benson, 1937:18
and Grad, 1963:18). The rationale for this
argument is that compacts draw strength from
federal infusions of authority, federal resources
(expertise, policy information, or finances become

 

n However, it could be argued more generally that the
compacts were formed out of either fear of federal
intervention or because of the inattention by the federal
government to a watershed's problems. This argument, if
supported by further research in the area of compact
origins, could support the federal origins argument in a
more general manner.

160
available to the commission), and the federal
government becomes morally committed to carry out
its water resource programs in accordance with the
compact plan. In the case of the federal-
interstate compacts, Grad (1963:849) points out
that federal involvement creates strong moral and
political claims on all future Congresses, even it
they are not judicially enforceable.

Proponents of this view point to the success of the
Upper Colorado River Compact with its federal representation
versus the continued turmoil that the earlier 1922 Colorado
River Compact continues to experience without federal
representation (Hundley, 1975:335). Indeed, it has been
argued indirectly that the reason why the recent low-level
radioactive waste compacts are experiencing problems is
because there is no federal representation on these compacts
(Condon, 1990:36).

However, not all types of the compacts identified as
"effective" or "relatively effective" according to the OE
model (Table 11) have federal representation. The one
notable exception, the Great Lakes Commission, which is the
only compact rated "relatively effective” in the planning
and flood category that does not have federal
representation. Because of the unique nature of the Great
Lakes Commission (GLC), it will be analyzed in more detail
in Chapter VI in order to explore this and its other unique
features. However, it should be noted that several compacts
in the water allocation category which are identified as

"ineffective” or "relatively ineffective" also have federal

representation, including the Arkansas River, the Arkansas-

161
Oklahoma River, Bear, Canadian River, Klamath River, and
Pecos River compacts. Thus, although all effective compacts
except for the Great Lakes Commission include the presence
of a federal representative, this representation alone is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for ensuring
an effective interstate water compact in the water
allocation and planning and flood categories.

It should be noted, however, that the presence of
federal representation on the Potomac and ORSANCO compacts
and absence of such representation on the relatively
ineffective ISC and NEIWPCC compacts does provide a clear
distinction among the pollution control compacts studied.
This is a noteworthy difference considering the significant
federal involvement in interstate pollution issues since
1970.72

4. A fourth general hypothesis deals with how the

voting structure of a compact affects its
effectiveness. Specifically, it is hypothesized

 

‘n It could be argued that the reason for the earlier
positive evaluations of the NEIWPCC and ISC (by Leach and
Sugg, 1969:91,184; Vawter, 1955:1712; Maloney, 1975:43;
Zimmerman and Wendell, 1976:92: and Martin, Birkhead and
Burkhead, 1960:132) was the relatively minimal federal
presence in the pollution area. As the federal government
intervention in water pollution control increased, the need
and thus the effectiveness of these interstate compacts
without federal involvement decreased. Why should states
deal with two entities (the federal government and either
the ISC and NEIWPCC) when the federal government
requirements are often overriding in terms of compliance.
On the other hand, it could be argued that interstate
pollution control compacts such as ORSANCO and the Potomac
River already have federal representations so the member
states have a mechanism by which a regional water policy can
be developed in conjunction with the federal government.

162
that a unanimous vote requirement creates a one
state veto situation leading to gridlock when the
commission is confronted with controversial
issues. (King, 1957:411: and Simms, Rolfs, and
Spronk, 1988:23-11). More specifically, Vawter
(1954:21) argues that effective organizations
should be designed to meet serious conflicts and
crisis, and a one state veto hampers the
commission's ability to respond to such
situations. Wanschneider (1984:1062) highlights
the dilemma of the veto versus majority rule:
One is therefore choosing either to confirm the
rights of the current (status quo) rights holder
to block change (unanimity), or one gives the
right to a majority to impose change on a
minority, and thereby confiscate property."

Certainly there are examples of "relatively
ineffective" or "ineffective" compacts that have unanimity
voting requirements, such as the Canadian and Pecos River
compacts. Nonetheless, if this hypothesis is correct, one
would assume that none of the effective commissions
identified by the OE model would utilize unanimous or one
state veto provisions in their decision-making.

An examination of the compact instruments of all of the
"effective" or "relatively effective" compacts indicates
that the Potomac River, Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River, and
ORSANCO compacts all have some form of state veto. Thus,
the presence of a one state veto does not necessarily hamper
compact effectiveness. Indeed, responses from the Great
Lakes Commission indicate that they work by consensus

despite the power to act on a majority rule basis.

163
5. A fifth hypothesis by Michelman (1978:55) and
Price (1968) is that an organization is more
effective when it has a high degree of
communication among its members.

To test this hypothesis in the area of interstate water
compacts, two sources of communication data are used: the
amount of public information the commission issues annually
and the frequency of contact between the commission and its
state commissioners. If the hypothesis is valid, compacts
determined to be effective by the OE model should have more
publications and more commission contact with state

representatives than those judged to be relatively

ineffective.

From the Weiss
and_An§hgrit1g§ issued by the American Library Association
(Sulzer and Palen, 1986), "effective" or "relatively
effective” organizations that publish (in addition to annual
reports or technical reports) either public information or
newsletters and journals include:

1. Great Lakes Commission

2. Delaware River Basin Commission

3. Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin

4. Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

5. Susquehanna River Basin Commission

6. Upper Colorado River Basin Commission

Missing from this list are the following ”relatively

effective" water allocation compacts: the Yellowstone,

Sabine, and Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River compacts.

164

In addition, a “relatively ineffective" and an
"ineffective" commission also made the high level of
publications category:

7 . the NEIWPCC

8. the Pecos River.

From the standpoint of meetings/contacts with the
commission, national survey responses from the state
commissioners indicate the following compact commissioners
have contact with the commission at least once a month (in
order of frequency):

1. Upper Colorado River

2. Delaware

3. Susquehanna River

4. Bear River

5. Interstate Sanitation Commission (ISC)

6. Great Lakes

7. Ohio River

8. Arkansas River

9. Potomac River

This list again indicates that several water allocation
compacts rated "relatively effective", namely the
Yellowstone, Sabine, and Kansas-Oklahoma compacts, did not
achieve a high level of communication in terms of
publications as well. Three "relatively ineffective" or
"ineffective" compacts (Bear River, ISC, and Arkansas River)
also scored high on the commission contacts list.

From these data, we cannot conclude that communication

is either a necessary or sufficient condition for general

commission effectivness. However, it is noteworthy that in

165
three of the four categories of compacts (the water
allocation compact category being the exception), compacts
deemed effective according to the OE model also had high
levels of communication.

6. A sixth hypothesis, also derived from Price (1968)
and Michelman (1978:124), is that organizations
with a major elite constituency are more likely to
have a high degree of effectiveness than those
without such groups. The explanation for this
proposition in the context of compact effectivness
theory is that without such support, the compact
would be unable to achieve the regional
support its needs as a interstate organization.

In a nationwide survey of compact directors and state
commissioners, the respondents, after ranking the interest
groups in terms of their "political ability to influence the
achievement of this compact commission's goals", were asked
to identify ”a specific interest group whose views would be
representative of that general class of interest groups."

It is noteworthy that all of the respondents of
compacts rated effective were able to identify such interest
groups, but at least 9 compacts either not rated or rated
"ineffective" or "relatively ineffective" were not able to
identify one such group. (See Appendix D) Thus, we can not
reject the hypothesis that interest group identification may
influence the effectiveness of an interstate water
commission, although it is not a sufficient condition for
compact effectiveness.

It is also of interest that all of the directors/chairs

of those compacts rated "effective" or "relatively

166
effective" (with the exception of the Yellowstone and
Susquehanna) were able to identify formal mechanisms for
interest group participation (joint meetings, functional
advisory committees, and committee participation).

Only four of the ten compacts rated relatively
ineffective could specifically identify a specific
mechanism. One observation that could be drawn from these
data is that agencies that are open to interest group
participation in general are more likely to be effective
than those who are not. However, the fact that the
Yellowstone and Susquehanna have no such specific mechanisms
makes any inference from this finding highly speculative."

7. A seventh general hypothesis relates to the

geographic size and flexibility of an interstate
water compact. In terms of scope, Martin
(1960:131) argues that adequate geographical reach
is essential for an effective interstate water

compact, which includes the need to include all
affected members of the watershed included in the

compact.
Despite this rather apparent requirement, one compact
rated ”relatively effective", the Great Lakes Compact, lacks

even this essential feature, as Congress deleted the

 

'” The idea of a compact serving the interests of an
elite interest group has negative implications in terms of
overall effectiveness, however. Parsons and Mathews
(1990:359) argue that water elites in California and Arizona
practice gate-keeping in terms of permitting non-elite
groups from participating. As Helen Ingram (in Goldfarb,
1988:100) warns, "To be viable, that is to survive, regional
agencies have had to tailor their actions to build support.
Support-building actions then compromise their ability to
approach water and other resource problems in a
comprehensive, coordinated, regional manner."

167
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec from the compact.
As noted earlier, this is another of the unique aspects of
the Great Lakes Commission which will be explored in
Chapter VI.

However, a related issue is whether or not a compact
can be too big geographically to gain regional consensus.
Table 13 lists the drainage areas of a number of the basin
areas governed by interstate compact. Geographical size
does not appear to be a distinguishing factor, as
"relatively effective" compacts range from as small as
Sabine River drainage basin (3,465 square miles) to as large
as the Great Lakes Basin drainage area (250,000 square
miles). Number of state members (See Table 14) also does
not seem to be a factor in terms of compact effectiveness in
light of the large number of states included in the Great
Lakes Commission.

In terms of the flexibility of the compact, Simms,
Role, and Spronk (1988:23-11) argue that compacts are
generally unable to adapt to changing circumstances and thus
may be rendered ineffective. Certainly, that was an
allegation raised in the state commissioner survey responses
against the "ineffective" ISC, despite the fact that it
gained additional authority over air and water in 1969
Zimmerman and Wendell, 1976:93).

However, of the compacts King (1958:417) identified as
inflexible (i.e. those with duties defined with either

mathematically certainty allowing very little leeway for

168

TABLE 13

Drainage Basin Areas of Interstate Compacts
(in square miles)

Arkansas River
Arkansas River Basin
Arkansas River Basin
Bear River

Big Blue River
Canadian River
Colorado River Basin
Costilla Creek
Delaware River
Klamath River

La Plata

Ohio River

Pecos River

Potomac River

Red River
Republican River
Rio Grande River
Sabine River

South Platte River
Susquehanna River
Yellowstone River

18,915 (below John Martin Reservoir, Colorado)
96,674 (Near Muskagee, Oklahoma)
150,482 (Van Buren, Arkansas)
2,447
3,280
47,576
111,800
152
12,765
3,920
331
155,000
19,540
14,670
60,613
14,526
14,300
4,842

23,193 ’

27,500 a
69,103

Source: Simms, Rolf and Spronk

169

TABLE 14

Number of State Members in Interstate Water Compacts

Compact Number of States

Water allocation:
Arkansas River
Arkansas-Oklahoma River
Kansas-Oklahoma River“
Bear River

Big Blue River

Canadian River

Costilla Creek

Klamath River

La Plata River

Pecos River

Red River

Republican River

Rio Grande River
Sabine River‘

Upper Colorado River‘
Yellowstone River"

WMNUWWNNNNWNWNNN

Water Pollution:

Ohio River"

NEIWPCC

Interstate Sanitation Com.
Potomac River“

MWQW

Flood and Flaming:
Connecticut River
Thames River
Wheeling Creek
Great Lakes"

WNN&

Comprehensive:
Delaware River‘ '
Susquehanna River‘ .‘

03-h

* Effective compacts according to OE model

170
handling problems not contemplated), three compacts were
identified as "effective" or "relatively effective“ by the
OE model (the Potomac River, Sabine River, and Yellowstone
River). The Potomac and Sabine Rivers have since been
amended by acts of Congress in 1970 and 1977 respectively,
and the Yellowstone River Compact was strengthened by a U.S.
Supreme Court Decision in the Intak§_fla§§;_ggmpgny case
previously discussed{" Thus, the argument that an
inflexible compact cannot be effective does not seem
supported by evidence that Congressional or Court action75
can increase flexibility and scope of interstate water
compacts and thus enhance their effectiveness. Rather, it
provides support for Leach's (1961:678) contrary argument
that (even an inflexible) interstate compact is an advance

over narrowly structured state authorities because compacts

 

'n A review of formal Congressional actions since 1922
when the first interstate water compacts were approved
(utilizing the Government Monthly catalogue from 1900-1976)
and the GPO Silverplatter 1976-1991)indicates that four
other compacts have also been amended by Congress: the Bear
River (P.L. 96-189, 1980), the Wheeling Creek (P.L. 98-420,
1984), the Delaware River (P.L. 98-490, 1984), and the
Susquehanna River (P.L. 99-468, 1986). Indeed, these
actions plus the amendments to the Potomac and Sabine River
compacts would seem contrary to the earlier prediction of
Ridgeway (197l:ix) that once Congressional consent was
granted, too frequently the compact receive no further
attention.

5 However, not all court action is positive in terms
of compact effectiveness. Crossland (1988:852) argues that
in the case of the (relatively ineffective) Pecos River
compact, court construction in this litigation ridden
compact has actually made the compact more rigid than it was
designed to be.

171
can grow and change in response to changing needs, if the
states membership so chooses."

Foster (1987:34) provides a related hypothesis in terms
of compact flexibility by stating that political leadership
is required to achieve effective, transboundary progress.
Thus, it can be hypothesized in the transboundary water
resource area that each of the interstate compacts deemed
effective or "relatively effective" by the OE model should
be able to identify a specific political leader associated
with it.

To test this hypothesis, the commissioners of all the
interstate water compacts were surveyed and asked to
identify “a key state or national political figure who is
closely associated and actively involved in (the) compact
and its activities.” (See Appendix D) It is predicted that
if this hypothesis is correct, every compact identified as
effective should have a key political figure to assist in
either assisting the compact with national resources or
providing the support for Congressional approval of needed

additions to compact authority.

 

ln’Indeed, the state members have chosen the role of
the Sabine and Yellowstone compacts to remain primarily a
means of preserving the existing water situation with some
limited exceptions to be decided on a case by case basis
rather than the development of a new pattern for these river
basins (Leach and Sugg, 1969:100). Thus, this is the
regional water policy choice of the states and thus meets
their current needs. It does not rule out further changes
as issues of federal and Native people's water claims enter
into the water allocation decision-making.

172

Of the 9 compacts identified by the OE model in
Table 11 as ”effective" or "relatively effective", only four
compacts were identified by state commission members as
having close ties to a key state or federal political
figure: the Delaware River, Great Lakes, Potomac River, and
Ohio River compacts. Thus, there does not appear to be
empirical support from the national survey to support this
political figure hypothesis.

Qanclneicn

Certainly, these hypotheses do not exhaust the possible
qualitative causes of compact ineffectiveness or perhaps
future causes of compact ineffectiveness. For example,
Goldfarb (1980:97) argues that a major deficiency in
American water resource planning is its fragmentation.
Issues of Indian rights and federal reserved rights are
absent from many Western water allocation compacts, and the
future impact of these rights on water allocation could
significantly affect future water allocation disputes. The
growth of environmentalism since the 1970's is another event
that has put an additional wrinkle in water allocation and
planning decisions of older compacts and also could alter
how effectively states can manage water resources
effectively in the future.

The key to compact effectiveness as measured in this
Chapter boils down to whether or not the states have

accepted the compact commissions as the means for addressing

173

regional watershed matters rather than acting individually.
(Leach and Sugg, 1969:225). For, as Barton (1961:179) has
pointed out, state commissioners interests and
responsibilities lie with their respective states and not
with the compact agency. This state acceptance requirement,
according to Weston (1989:30):

Takes time and political will to create attitudes and

institutions which will allow joint sovereignty of
states over common natural resources.

Furthermore, Leach (1961:678) argues that states:

create interstate agencies which do not obligate them

to embark at once upon a specific enterprise or

enterprises, but which nevertheless enable them to do
so if need be.

This chapter has attempted to clarify the importance of
evaluating the effectiveness of interstate compacts in
resolving regional water issues from the state's perspective
and not from a national regulatory perspective. As such,
the interstate water compact commissions are not all the
same, as they were created to perform varying tasks. The
classification of these compacts into the four categories
identified was necessary to permit a comparative evaluation
of these four types of compact administration. It can be
concluded that some compacts can be very limited in nature
yet be judged effective by their state members precisely

because they have resolved the limited or specific nature of

the water resource controversy. (However, they are not

174
necessarily effective from the standpoint of overall
regional governance.)

Certainly, the validity of a number of untested but
commonly-held hypotheses of compact effectiveness have not
been supported by the OE model. The contrary conclusions
that may be drawn from the model findings may surprise water
resource experts. Most notable is the lack of support for
the hypotheses that effective interstate compacts:

(1) must have coercive enforcement power

(2) must have federal origins,

(3) do not have state veto voting provisions, and

(4) have to be flexible in their original compact

instrument

Less surprising perhaps is the lack of the support for
the hypothesis that the physical size of the compact or the
number of states in a compact affects its effectiveness.
This issue will be further explored in Chapter VI when a
more comprehensive review of the Great Lakes and two other
compacts will be undertaken.

Evidence that would suggest support for hypotheses
relating to the importance of federal representation in
compacts (particularly pollution control compacts) and the
importance of high levels of communication between the
commission and its constituencies are noteworthy findings as
well of this chapter. In addition, evidence suggesting that
compact effectiveness may be associated with the degree of

support by elite water resource interest groups and

recognition of the ability of even inflexible compacts to

175
become effective by external means are important findings as
well.

In summary, the OE model identified in Chapter IV and
operationalized and applied in this chapter provides a new
perspective for evaluating compact commissions for what
states want them to do. The next Chapter will explore the
interstate water compact from three specific case study
perspectives to further test this model from a comparative
perspective, as well as to evaluate how well these compacts
have achieved national as well as regional water resource

objectives.

CHAPTER VI

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A TALE OF THREE COMPACTS

Introduction

Thus far, this study has determined that four of the
seven general hypotheses of interstate compact commission
effectiveness identified in the literature are not supported
by the organizational effectiveness (OE) model developed in
Chapters IV and V. This information by itself is
significant from the standpoint of refocusing effectiveness
studies away from those four hypotheses and the variables
associated with them. However, these findings paint only a
general picture of which compact effectiveness variables are
supportable: namely, some degree of formal federal
government representation in the compact (with the exception
of the Great Lakes Commission), extensive communication
between the commission and its constituencies (in all
categories but the water allocation category of interstate
compacts), and the support of commission activities by one
or more elite water resource interest groups in the region.

These general lessons, as Hardy (1960:107) points out,
can only find further proof through specific applications of
these three hypotheses. Thus, this chapter will apply the

general findings of the three compact effectiveness

176

177

hypotheses supported by the OE model to three interstate

water compacts: the Delaware River Basin Commission, the

Great Lakes Commission, and the California-Nevada Interstate

compact.

The reasons for choosing these three particular

compacts to further test the Chapter V findings are twofold:

1.

Each of the compacts represents a different type
of compact and a different relative ranking of
compact effectiveness for comparative evaluation
and generalization purposes:

a. the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC)
was ranked relatively high among all compacts
in terms of effectiveness according to the OE
model and thus more closely approaches the
”ideal" type of commission from an
effectiveness standpoint:

b. the Great Lakes Commission (GLC) was barely
above the cutoff level between "relatively
effective" and "relatively ineffective”
compacts, making it a marginally effective
compact. It is worthy of examination in
light of its significant physical and
structural differences with the DRBC and
because it is the lone deviation from the
federal government representation hypothesis:
and

c. the California-Nevada compact failed to
receive Congressional approval after fifteen
years of operation at the state level, making
it an obvious contrasting example of an
ineffective commission as compared to the
DRBC and the GLC.

Comprehensive case studies of each of these
compacts were available to permit analysis of
these three compacts from a more contextual basis
than previously examined. Thus, more specific
application of the three general effectiveness
hypotheses can be undertaken to determine how well
these hypotheses comport to the realities of
interstate water resource management.

178

There are potential criticisms to the case study
application approach of this chapter. Some regional
theorists, for example, argue that attempts to apply general
principles to different regional settings are doomed to
failure. Ostrom (1970), for example, argues that the unique
hydrologic characteristics of the Great Lakes makes
traditional approaches to development of river basin
authorities difficult to apply. Donahue (l987:5) further
argues that "no single institutional form is indisputably
capable of accommodating all the Great Lakes management
needs in and of itself."

This argument that regional instrumentalities are
unique is a powerful one from a microenvironmental
perspective. However, as Martin (l960:5) points from a
macroenvironmental perspective, all water resource regions
face the same central problems of water quantity and water
quality. Finding the common ground from the latter
perspective makes the search for general effectiveness
variables more attainable and useful, without letting
regional differences unnecessarily cloud the larger
effectiveness picture.

Other theorists such as Helen Ingram (1973) argue that
the politics of water is not a traditional subject that
raises the level of regional cohesiveness (and
consciousness) but is purely local politics. Therefore, she
argues, it is not possible to find compact effectiveness

factors that are generalizable beyond a particular region.

179

However, this argument assumes that establishment of a
regional entity such as a compact is meant to be the
immediate solution to regional conflict. It ignores the
overriding value of the compact commission as the major
vehicle for advancing regional consciousness, a necessary
precondition for structuring regional solutions (Weston,
1989:30). Whether or not regional consciousness is actually
achieved can only be determined over a period of time, with
the regional organization facilitating the regional working
relationships necessary to achieve regional objectives.

Thus, this study of variables that affect compact
commission effectiveness rises above the peculiarities of
local water politics. It offers a means for improving the
effectiveness of the commission and thus strengthening the
structure through which regional water management objectives
can be achieved.

Donahue (1985:4) summarizes the importance of the
regional institutional aspect of this argument in the
context of the Great Lakes basin:

a thorough understanding of those (existing)

institutional arrangements, as well as the political

influences associated with them, is a requisite and
perhaps dominant component of any analysis of Great

Lakes water resource problems.

Accordingly, after a brief description of the three
compacts to be examined, this chapter will focus upon the

hypotheses of federal involvement, compact communications,

and level of interest group support in the context of the

180

compact commissions developed in Chapter V -- compacts which

have varying degrees of effectiveness."'

 

"'It should be noted that the marginal effectiveness
rating of the GLC according to the OE model developed is
supported by two other recent comprehensive surveys of the
GLC conducted by Donahue (1987) and Harans, Bulkley,
Anambutr, Fan, and Mackenzie (1988). Donahue (1987:230)
concludes that attitudes by states and Canadian provinces
characterize the GLC as predominantly marginal or
inadequate. The Marans et. al. survey (1988:53) concluded,
in terms of protecting water quality, that the regional
institutions were the least effective unit of government.

The reason for the overall more negative perception
of GLC effectiveness than the OE model rating found in these
two surveys can be attributed to the fact that there were
Canadian survey participants (and Canada was specifically
excluded from participation in the compact by Congress). In
addition, the fact that Great Lakes water pollution is
largely an issue of federal action and one which the GLC
does not significantly participate in might also explain the
Marans survey findings. In light of the wide range of other
activities in which the GLC is authorized to participate,
ranging from navigation to lake level stabilization and
recreation issues, the Marans survey was testing only one
aspect of GLC authority.

Certainly, there are mixed findings on GLC
effectiveness by experts on Great Lakes issues. Donahue
(1987:122) concludes after an exhaustive list of the
strengths and weaknesses of the GLC that the feeling that
current Great Lakes institutions are largely inadequate for
basin management is a "rather subjective yet pervasive
conclusion." Yet, in conjunction with the Council of Great
Lakes Governors, a private, nonprofit organization which
includes six of the eight governors of the basin, four of
the eight Great Lakes states have passed legislation to
handle basin water diversion issues, indicating some
positive regional action resulting from the Council and the
GLC.

Thus, the rather mixed effectiveness rating of the GLC
is understandable in light of these varying subjective
assessments of a very broad compact.

181

.. - a - - . . ‘. . .» -. ~ — . . ‘ ‘
, v ’ O ‘0 I' o _ 1" _ .- o! ’ 0‘ ‘

At first blush, the Delaware, Great Lakes, and
California-Nevada compacts are so geographically dissimilar
as to defy comparison (See Figure 4). The Great Lakes
Basin, at 295,000 square miles, is 23 times the size of the
Delaware Basin and even larger than the basin area of the
California-Nevada compact. It is comprised of eight states
and two Canadian provinces versus four states in the
Delaware Basin and two states in the California-Nevada
compact. The enormous size of the Great Lakes Basin
overshadows the combined total quantity of water in all of
the 27 compacts studied in this project, as it comprises 95%
of the U.S. supply of fresh surface water. Only the Great
Lakes has an international component (Canada) and, as a
'flood and planning compact has, according to the National
Water Commission (1973:421), "perhaps the most limited
(authority) in the water resources field."

By contrast, the Delaware River Basin is a federal-
interstate compact that drains an area of only 13,000 square
miles but 20 million people rely on it for their water
supply. The Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) has
developed a basin-wide management plan and has the federal
government as a voting and financially contributing member
of the commission, unlike the other two compacts.

The California-Nevada compact is a water allocation

compact that encompasses a diverse interstate water region

182

Nee. ..N ...-3 5.0.3.5 .335
c name: .830 933(3230 6.: use varieties

 

Z.m<m mm¥<4 P<m¢mv m2...

183

DELAWARE RIVER BASIN
N 1? W ,1“ Y o R K;

      
    
 

PENNSYLVANIA

   

I
I :.\
l -_' ..
._ .-"

flf/wz/x'o'
flees/t

MARYLAND

FIGURE 4 (cont'd)

184

California-Nevada Compact Drainage Basin

 

 

 

 

LAKE Tim. MEI RIVER, w RIVER,
AND WALKER RIVER ARIA

 

 

FIGURE 4 (cont'd)

185
that includes Lake Tahoe and the Truckee, Carson and Walker
Rivers. Its purpose was to seek recognition of existing
uses and more importantly to divide up the surplus waters
among the two states. Thus, it is a water allocation
compact rather than advisory planning compact (GLC) or a
federal interstate compact which can develop regional
management plans (DRBC).

Unlike DRBC that successfully achieved federal
participation and the Great Lakes that did not seek formal
federal participation, the California-Nevada compact invited
but was unable to achieve federal approval of a compact with
federal membership. It was officially declared dead by its
key sponsor (retiring U.S. Senator Paul Laxalt) in 1986
when, after 16 years of negotiation, the U.S. Senate
included amendments in its consent legislation which were
unacceptable to Nevada" .

Despite these contrasting geographic and compact
purposes, there are some striking similarities among these
compacts. All three compacts were preceded by extensive
court litigation. Jackson and Pisoni (1973) highlight the
continuing litigation among the various interests in
California and Nevada, and the desire among the water

interests in the two states to obtain more certainty in

 

'n The amendments reserved federal and Indian water
rights in a manner unacceptable to Nevada and contrary to
the specific provisions of the compact ratified by the two
states in 1971.

186
light of litigation threats to existing water rights by
federal and Native American water claims.

Similarly, as Ridgeway (1971:139) describes the history
of the Great Lakes, "there is no more litigated, conflict-
ridden, fought-over water region in all of the U.S. than
that of the Great Lakes." The number of Supreme Court cases
among Great Lakes states attests to this fact." The
Delaware River Basin has had two major U.S. Supreme Court
decisions concerning water diversion to New York City in
1931 and 1954.

Indeed, a major motivation for each of the three
compacts can be traced to a desire to avoid the prolonged
and unpredictable results of litigation. Furthermore, both
the Delaware and Great Lakes water levels are currently
controlled by continuing U.S. Supreme Court decrees.

Another similarity among the three compacts was the
nature of the self-interest that motivated a compact
approach in each case. The DRBC initially was formed to
settle existing water disputes (GAO, 1981:28), as was the
California-Nevada compact (along with dividing up surplus
water). The states of the Great Lakes had a somewhat similar
motivation, dominated by a fear of interstate water
diversions out of the basin (Fredrichs and Easter,

1990:562).

 

'" For example Wisconsln_xl_lllinais 281 0-8. 179

(1930). New_xork_xl_lllinais 274 U-S- 488 (1927). and eight
other U.S. Supreme Court cases have been decided by the U.S.

Supreme Court between 1922 and 1941 (Barton, 1961:119).

187

Furthermore, all three compacts were opposed at their
inception by a powerful constituency. The Great Lakes
compact was opposed initially by the New York Power
Authority, the California-Nevada compact by native peoples
and several federal government agencies, and the DRBC to
this day by New York state because of New York City's desire
to tap Delaware River water for increased diversion purposes
(GAO, 1981:17).

In many ways the comparisons in approach and the
contrasts in physical aspects offer a good opportunity to
test the nationwide applicability of the three general
hypotheses and their relationship with compact
effectiveness. It is these three hypotheses upon which this

chapter will now focus.

 

Perhaps the most significant issue for determining more
specifically how federal representation on an interstate
water compact affects its effectiveness lies in applying
this hypothesis to the GLC. The DRBC is a federal-
interstate compact rated as "relatively effective" by the OE
model, an earlier GAO (1981) study, and a study by a former
DRBC commissioner (Weston, 1989). As the federal government
is a voting member of the DRBC, its participation is
consistent with the hypothesis that federal representation

is necessary for an effective compact.

188

Similarly, the inability of the California-Nevada
compact commission to receive federal approval and thus be
authorized as an interstate compact is also an indication of
the need for federal representation in order to create an
effective commission. Although the federal government
helped negotiate the 1971 compact, the fact that it refused
to endorse a formal interstate compact that bound the U.S.
to allocations of water between the two states” also
supports the federal representation hypothesis.

However, the GLC was the only interstate water compact
ranked as a "relatively effective" compact (albeit
marginally so) by the OE model, yet it had no formal federal
representation. The GLC was the sole exception to the
federal representation hypothesis. Indeed, the National
Water Commission (1973:153) recommended that federal
government presence in the Great Lakes region be increased
through the formation of a federal-interstate compact,

indicating that increased effectiveness was expected from

 

3° Indeed, every administration since the compact's
formation has opposed its approval. Although Senator Laxalt
and then Governor Reagan supported the compact, when Reagan
became President he opposed its approval despite the fact
that Laxalt, perhaps the President's closest friend in the
U.S. Senate, made it his top legislative priority, putting
it on the "fast track" for Senate action (New York Times,
September 2, 1986).

Failure to gain Congressional consent was fatal to
the compact because the U.S. owns or controls most of the
storage and diversion facilities in the basin area. Failure
of the federal government to be bound by the state water
allocation agreement would nullify the reason for the
compact. The states relied upon the hope that if the
federal government consented to the compact, it would live
up to its terms as it did in the Klamath River compact.

189

more formal federal government representation. Thus, a case
analysis of the GLC was utilized to explain this anomaly.

Case studies by Donahue (1987) and the International
Joint Commission (1989) were examined to determine the
degree of federal involvement in the GLC. Two reasons may
explain the GLC's effectiveness rating despite its lack of
formal federal representation.

First, there is already a significant federal role in
the Great Lakes outside of the GLC. As Donahue (1987:77)
points out, the federal role in the Great Lakes is the
predominant role in the basin due to its binational nature.
Although its funding support has declined by 28% between
1980-89, Washington funding for basic research, monitoring,
and enforcement programs to restore and protect the Great
Lakes has been a reality for two decades despite the lack of
federal representation on the GLC. Thus, with or without
formal representation on the GLC, the federal government is
a significant actor in all Great Lakes water issues.

Secondly, the GLC sees the federal government as the
focus of its lobbying effort and has an on-going informal
relationship with the federal government, including informal
liaison with MARAD, the EPA, the Corps of Engineers, NOAA,
the Seaway Development Corporation, and the Soil
Conservation Service (Report to the Advisory Committee,
1985:13). Thus, although formal representation is lacking,
the fact that the federal government still plays a

significant, informal role in GLC activities indicates the

190
importance of the informal federal presence in the basin and
helps explain the GLC compact effectiveness rating despite
its lack of formal federal representation.

Undoubtedly, formal federal representation would better
facilitate formal working relationships and create a higher
level of federal-state interaction by virtue of Presidential
appointment of a federal representative. However, the fact
remains that federal representation (albeit at the informal
level) is an important factor in the GLC and in the basin as
a whole, as was case in the other compacts that were deemed
effective by the OE model.

In summary, it would appear that the federal
representation hypothesis is perhaps stated too narrowly as
it only encompass formal federal representation. The GLC
experience would indicate that a significant informal
federal presence in a basin can also influence a commission
and thus impact upon its effectiveness. Thus, an
examination of other interstate water compacts as to the
extent of the federal presence in a basin (both formal and
informal) might better refine the federal representation

hypothesis and its impact on compact effectiveness.

W

A second effectiveness hypothesis that was supported by
the OE model in all but one of the interstate water compact
categories (the exception was in water allocation compacts)

was the relationship between the amount of communication

191
between compact commissions and their constituencies. The
hypothesis predicted that the greater these communication
links were, the more effective the commissions would become.
The general rationale for this hypothesis is that
communication increases regional understanding and
cooperation, leading to less parochial state decision-
making.

It is obvious that for those water allocation compacts
whose primary function is technical and who are severely
restricted in the compact instrument to specified amounts of
water, frequent communication would not likely have the same
positive impact as it would in compacts which have a great
deal of discretion or broad planning powers that require
continual review.

However, the fact that all of the compacts rated as
effective by the OE model in the other three compact
categories had significant degrees of contact with their
constituencies deserves further examination from the
perspective of these three case studies to determine more
specifically the basis for this relationship.

According to the national survey of compact directors
conducted for this project, the director of the GLC
indicated that 2 formal meetings and 3-5 executive meetings
were held each year. The director of the DRBC, which was
rated higher in the effectiveness ranking than the GLC,
indicated an average of 10-12 formal meetings a year. By

contrast, the California-Nevada which was to a have a

192
federal representative was never formally approved by
Congress so no clear channels of communication were
discernible.

Upon closer examination case study examination, the
difference in terms of the degree of communication between
the DRBC and the GLC is not just in the number of contacts
each commission has had with its constituency. There are
also major differences in the level at which these
commission-constituency contacts are made (by high or low
level representatives of the compact and the constituencies)
and the representative/comprehensive nature of
constituencies which are in contact with the commission
(i.e. were all of the major interest groups accorded the
same access/input to influence the commission's decision-
making?)

Although the GLC relies heavily on the communication
function to pursue its advisory mandate, primarily through
the sharing of information it has collected among the
region's state members as well as coordinating state
positions (Report to the Advisory Committee, 1985:24), it
reports primarily to lower-level staff commission
representatives of the states and not to the governors or
their senior advisors. Thus, there is a lack of key

gubernatorial participation81 and consequently a

 

m The Governors instead have formed the Council of
Great Lakes Governors as the private forum for utilizing the
persuasive powers of their respective offices.

193
intervening layer of bureaucracy that may hinder the
transfer of GLC recommendations and information to the
higher state policy levels. As Donahue, Executive Director
of the GLC, wrote in 1984:

For almost three decades, the Great Lakes Commission

has provided an open forum for bringing the Great Lakes

states together on various issues of common interest.

The states have yet to use the compact to its full

potential -- not due to any flaw in its provisions, but

by administrative choice.

Despite these limitations, several Great Lakes
observers have noted a more cooperative spirit has developed
in the region, though there remains institutional resistance
to joint management efforts [Hamline, 1987:304 (note 63)].

The DRBC, on the other hand, has had significant
participation by high level state employees and governors
and thus has established a stronger and more direct link to
state policy makers. (See responses in Appendix D.)

Secondly, the GLC has attempted generally to include
some of its numerous elite interest groups in joint meetings
and joint projects, as well as membership in two committees:
the natural resources and transportation and economic
development committees (Great Lakes Commission Staff,
1982:2). The DRBC has more formally placed elite interest
groups in functional advisory committees directly related to
their interests in the Delaware River, assuring full

interest group representation -- including the federal

government -- on DRBC management actions.

194

Future research from additional case study analyses
might produce even more specific communication differences
between the various interstate compacts, perhaps leading to
a more quantifiable linkage between communication and
compact effectiveness. In any event it appears that the
communication variable is one that can be more specifically
defined after additional case study research.

The negative consequences of failure to communicate
fully with all constituencies can be found in the
California-Nevada compact case study. Though it was
developed after consulting with the federal government and
Indian tribes prior to compact ratification, the compact
drafters did not allow the Indian tribes or the federal
government to vote on compact ratification, nor were the
substantive objections of these two key constituencies
adequately addressed in the compact the two states ratified.

The result was a perception on the part of the Indians
and federal government that their interests were not
adequately represented in the final compact, ultimately
leading to the failure of Congress to approve this compact.
Furthermore, as Jackson and Pisoni (1973) point out, the
compact from the start was merely a collection of special
water interest groups who did not seek anything more than
protecting their specific interests. The unapproved
commission was not envisioned as a communication channel to
all interested parties in order to plan the overall

development of the region.

195

Accordingly, case study analysis would indicate that
the communication hypothesis is a supportable but perhaps
overly broad umbrella overshadowing at least two more
specific communication issues, the level of the contacts
between the commission and the constituencies, and how well
the elite constituencies are represented in commission
contacts. These two variables offer future opportunities
for research into the communication hypotheses and how it

affects compact effectiveness.

0 O O R
.1'9'. “11-11 .,°!_‘ {IQ 9'. ' , ‘ 'l,‘ -‘i 7-..?"

All three compacts studied in this chapter share a
common tie in terms of interest group diversity. Ih£_§I§é§
.mk‘f - .- os . a -_;_ --- e6 - 2 O .1 , 1 ,-;~, for
example, lists over 1300 Great Lakes-related organizations.
The DRBC report completed in 1959 (Martin, 1960:32) lists
156 citizen associations related to the Delaware River.

Although the number of interest groups associated with
the California-Nevada compact were fewer because of its
smaller size and more limited state composition, their
impact is not any less powerful. As late as the 1960's the
compact was dominated by special interests who treated the
water in the basin as a commodity to sell to tourists or to
tap for irrigation. (Jackson and Pisoni, 1973:50). Elite
interest groups interested in the California-Nevada compact
included power, irrigation, agriculture and Tahoe property

owner interests.

196

All three compacts thus have had identifiable elite
interests groups associated with and to some degree support
them. Yet the California-Nevada compact failed to obtain
Congressional approval and thus is properly labeled
ineffective. How does the failure of the California-Nevada
compact fit the dictates of the hypothesis supported by the
OE model that an effective compact has at least one major
elite constituency supporting it?

After a review of case studies of each of these three
compacts, two factors related to this elite constituency
support hypothesis emerge that might explain this
discrepancy in the California-Nevada compact:

(l) the basis for elite interest group support of a

commission, and

(2) whether the elite interest group acts as an

internal or external part of the commission
structure.

First, what is the basis for elite interest groups
supporting a compact commission over litigation or less
structured regional or state alternatives? In the case of
the GLC, the impetus of the compact was the desire to
regulate and restrict access to Great Lakes water.

The support for the GLC and the creation of additional
regional institutions like the Council of Great Lakes
Governors to resist Court orders that might permit diversion
of water out of the basin appears to have outweighed

specific major interest group concerns about encouragement

197
of regionally focused programs related to water quality and
quantity.

With no enforcement authority, the creation of regional
organizations such as the GLC could provide beneficial
technical information to make the case against out of basin
water diversions without harming specific interests.
Besides, the wide variety of special interest groups and the
widely divergent notions of the Great Lakes physical and
political environments in what Donahue (1985:13) calls the
competitive ”special interest milieu" of the region makes
the compact a convenient forum for reconciling these
competing uses. The conflicts in the Great Lakes basin are
both economic (ports, international trade, and tourism) and
regional (Western versus Eastern Great Lakes issues)

Similarly, the DRBC was formed because of a series of
court cases which allowed increased diversions to New York
City, the damage caused by two hurricanes in the mid 1950's,
and a prolonged drought in the 1960's. These events made it
incumbent upon the Delaware basin states to try to resolve
their differences created by natural crises through a
binding compact that both promotes regional planning and
reduces the uncertainty of litigation and natural disasters
through basin water projects. In this situation as well,
the compact commission serves a purpose beyond which the
states could otherwise achieve individually. Thus, elite
interest groups would have a vested interest in maintaining

the commission. Only the interests of New York state seem to

198
diverge from the DRBC, as evidenced by their reduced
contributions to the compact. However, New York remains a
partner in the compact.

The California-Nevada compact commission has no such
usefulness since its purpose is limited to specifically
dividing up surplus waters and allocating them to the two
states, a contract function that does not require a
commission to perform. The only value of the compact beyond
this fact is to bind the federal government to the state
allocation agreed upon in the compact, again a function that
does not require administration and thus would not attract
elite group support to the commission either during or after
the Congressional ratification process.

The other issue is whether elite interest groups are an
internal or external part of the commission decision-making
process. By virtue of functional advisory committees (DRBC)
or joint meetings (GLC), the elite interest groups of these
two effective compact commissions are an integral part of
the internal operation of the commission. The California-
Nevada compact does not provide for such internal
representation and indeed actually has kept a key interest
group out of the formal compact process altogether (Indian
tribes).

These insights into elite interest group support of
compact commissions offer interesting future research
possibilities in further testing of the elite interest group

support hypothesis. In any event, this case study approach

199
to the hypothesis highlights the overall value of contextual

application to the general theory of compact effectiveness.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the three hypotheses which
were generally supported by the OE model developed in
Chapters IV and V. The purpose of this chapter was to
utilize well-researched case studies of selected and
distinctive interstate water compact commissions to further
refine the variables associated with compact effectiveness.

The chapter highlights the value of viewing compact
commissions from both a broad, comparative basis as well as
from a more contextual case study basis. Just as compact
commissions vary by region, so does the contextual basis
more specifically modify but not undermine the general
hypotheses related to compact commission effectiveness.

The findings that compact effectiveness can be affected
by both formal and informal federal representation explains
the Great Lakes superficial deviation from that hypothesis.

The fact that the compact-constituency communication
variable is not just a function of the number of such
contacts but may also be a function of the level of
communication channels as well as the representative nature
of the interest groups which are in direct contact with the
commission is another valuable fact gained by this case

study application.

200

The underpinnings of the elite interest group support
and its impact on compact commission effectiveness is more
fully understood after case study analysis within the
context of (1) the specific reasons for major interest group
support of the commission and (2) the internal versus
external elite interest group involvement in the commission.

In short, this limited case study application has
provided new insights into some of the apparent
inconsistencies between the OE model findings and actual
compact operation without contradicting the OE model
findings in the earlier chapters. It has also uncovered new
areas of research to further refine the OE model presented.
As such the case studies have provided a new avenue to
further the study of compact effectiveness variables.

Chapter VII, the concluding chapter, will summarize the
overall finding of this project as well as offer some
observations as to the usefulness of using the compact

approach in lieu of developing a national water policy.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR

U.S. WATER POLICY

The politics of water resource control promises to
continue to be an increasingly divisive issue due to the
growing regional imbalance of water supplies in the U.S.
Furthermore, the legal and historical roots of state control
of water described in the first two chapters of this paper
will continue to be significant and perhaps even impossible
obstacles to the development of a truly national approach to
water policy unless catastrophic conditions dictate national
intervention.

Needless to say the pitfalls of leaving water resource
management solely to the states has become obvious in light
of the interstate nature of much of the U.S. surface water.
Furthermore, recent court decisions have confirmed that
state control of water resources is indeed a legal fiction,
and the courts have continued to impose controversial
equitable apportionment settlements upon states when
regional institutions such as formal interstate compacts
have not otherwise been developed.

In an attempt to avoid court and/or Congressional

intervention in water resource policy, states have turned to

201

202
regional institutions as a means to fill the void between
state and national controls of water and to preclude further
court intervention. These institutions offer a means to
break the gridlock in water policy that now exists as state
governments seek to retain some control over their
increasing scarce or threatened water resources.

There, of course, remains a tension between regional
institutions and their state and federal competitors, as the
U.S. system of federalism neither recognizes regional
institutions nor offers incentives for their development.
However, the emergence of a regional alternative to
Congressional or court interference is preferable for the
states, as the decision-making remains in the hands of the
state representatives of the region and not in the hands of
national policy makers.

Of all the regional institutions in existence, the most
powerful formal institution is the interstate compact.
Although sometimes maligned as lacking political
accountability and unduly dilatory in decision-making
(Barton, 1961:173), Chapter III highlights the positive role
they can and do play in handling very divisive issues,
offering the stability and legal standing necessary to
address the highly conflictual issue of control of scarce
water resources which no other regional institution can
provide. This Chapter and the accompanying bibliography
provide a thorough analysis of interstate compact literature

for future research.

203

Interstate compact management is not unique to the
water resources field, but there has never been a systematic
evaluation of its overall usefulness as an instrument of
regional management. The unique external and internal
aspects of an interstate compact commission have discouraged
such an evaluations.

Until this study, there also was no theoretical
framework for assessing compact effectiveness, leading to
many limited, subjective, and largely descriptive
assessments of the compact commissions. Many of these past
evaluations were based upon a fundamental misconception of
the nature and purpose of an interstate compact commission.
Instead of the compact being viewed and evaluated as an
extension of state interests, evaluators have
inappropriately measured compact commission effectiveness in
terms of its ability to make and enforce independent
decisions in opposition to state interests.

In order to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness
of the compact commission for regional water resources
management, there is a need in the literature to clarify the
issue of how to measure compact effectiveness and how to
identify variables that affect commission effectiveness.
Therefore, for the first time, a new organizational
effectiveness model -- incorporating three basic
organizational theory models, developed to be reflective of
the unique nature of interstate compacts, and constructed so

as to be useful for evaluating the entire U.S. population of

204
interstate water compact commissions -- was developed in
Chapter IV. Appropriate indices of these three OE models
were identified from organizational theory literature and
applied to the new OE compact commission model.

In Chapter V, these indices were operationalized into
variables that were incorporated into this new OE model in
order to rate compact commission effectiveness. It is the
first time that such a ranking has been attempted.

Using this list of effective compact commissions
derived from the application of the new OE model to the
interstate water compacts, general theories of what makes an
effective compact were extracted from the compact literature
and were tested to determine which of these theories were
supported by the new OE model. The findings of this stage
of the study (in Chapter V) were somewhat surprising, as
four of the seven commonly held hypotheses of what is
necessary for the existence of an effective interstate
compact were not supported by the effectiveness model
developed in this study. Those general hypotheses that did
receive some support from the OE model were:

1. There appears to a positive relationship between
compact effectiveness and the formal participation
of the federal government in the administration of
the compact, at least in the area of pollution
control compacts.

2. There appears to be a positive relationship

between the level of communication among member
states of the compact and compact effectiveness.

205

There appears to be a positive relationship
between the identification of elite constituencies
associated with a compact commission and the
commission's effectiveness.

However four hypotheses were not supported by the new

OE compact model, namely:

1.

The hypothesized positive relationship between
compact effectiveness and the existence of
adequate enforcement power in the compact
commission was not supported by the new OE model.

The hypothesized positive relationship between the
federal or crisis origins of a compact and its
effectiveness was not supported by the new OE
model.

The hypothesized negative relationship between the
existence of a one state veto in a compact and the
compact's effectiveness was not supported by the
new OE model.

The hypothesized negative relationship between the
large size or inflexible nature of a compact and
its effectiveness was not supported by the new OE
model.

Subsequent external validity checks on the model did not

indicate an apparent error in the construction of the model.

Thus, the lack of support for several commonly-held but

untested hypotheses about compact effectiveness, especially

the lack of support for the proposition that effective

interstate compacts must have adequate enforcement powers

(widely believed to be one of the main reasons why advisory

compacts could never be effective regional managers of

206
scarce resources), requires that negative perceptions about
the interstate water compact commission be reconsidered.

As many compact experts have alluded to but failed to
emphasize in their studies, few states want a powerful and
autonomous, enforcement empowered regional entity that
further diminishes their sovereign powers. The national
government can perform that role quite nicely. Rather they
merely want such entities merely to do what the states
cannot do individually, preferably by state consensus rather
than brute force. Autonomy and enforcement power may not
necessarily be desirable if individual state support for
such actions is lacking.

What conclusions can we draw from this initial testing
of the compact effectiveness hypotheses that were drawn from
the literature? Perhaps there is a link between the
preliminary findings of this study and the assertion raised
by Leach and Sugg (1969:225) that the key to compact
effectiveness boils down to whether or not a state has
accepted the compact commission as the primary means for
addressing regional watershed matters rather than acting
individually: thus, perceiving the commission as an
extension of itself.

Applying this Leach and Sugg's state extension concept
to the seven compact effectiveness hypotheses previously
tested, the findings of the OE model are generally
consistent with this concept. For the four compact

effectiveness hypotheses from the literature that were not

207

supported by the OE model, the state extension explanation

would be as follows:

1.

Adequate enforcement power is not necessary for
compact effectiveness, for if states accept the
compact as an extension of itself, enforcement
powers are not necessary in order to obtain state
compliance.

Federal origins or crises are not essential for
forming a compact, as it may be in the best
interests of the state to form a compact
commission to handle problems outside state
boundaries in order to get the necessary out-of-
state cooperation.

A one state veto is not a hindrance to compact
commission effectiveness, for if the commission is
seen by each state as an extension of itself, a
state veto is unlikely to be necessary.

The size of the compact commission and
inflexibility of the compact do not effect its
effectiveness, as the compact is only as large or
as inflexible as the states want it to be in light
of their needs for regional administration.

The hypotheses supported by the OE model can also be

explained under the state extension concept. For example:

1.

The finding that federal support of and
participation in a compact commission positively
affects the commission's effectiveness is
consistent with the state extension concept, as
the federal presence provides both a carrot and
the necessary legal authority that would permit
and encourage interstate as opposed to unilateral
regional water management efforts.

The state extension concept also would be
consistent with the new OE model's finding that
the effectiveness of a compact is positively
affected by well developed communications linkage
between the commission and the state
constituencies in the basin. The regularization
of communication across state lines would make the
compact commission as familiar a forum for
addressing an regional water issues as utilizing

208

state water agencies, making more likely the
translation of intrastate political desires into
interstate realities . ’2

3. The state extension concept would also be
consistent with the new OE model's support for the
proposition that commissions need to develop
external support among major elite interest groups
concerned in the region, as these groups can
sustain the commission in times of crisis and
develop regional bonds of support both within and
beyond state boundaries. In so doing, these
groups also contribute to state acceptance of the

political legitimacy and relevancy of compact
commissions as an extension of itself.

Thus, these initial findings of the OE model shed some
light on the reality of compact commission effectiveness.
However, as this is a new area of theoretical exploration in
the public administration field, the hypotheses supported by
the OE model require more specificity. Chapter VI,
utilizing case studies, presents a further attempt to
explore the three hypotheses supported by the OE model. The

relatively small population of interstate water compacts

makes the case study analysis approach a fruitful present

 

‘2 For example, in 1986 when Congress granted the
governors of the Great Lakes (and not the GLC) a veto power
over any diversion of water outside of the Great Lakes
basin, it left it to the governors to devise a mechanism to
implement this power. Two such diversions have since
confronted the governors (in Lowell, Indiana and Pleasant
Prairie, Wisconsin). This bare veto power without an
institutional means to implement it has led to a rather
unsatisfactory basis for resolving these disputes: more on
the basis of raw state political power than regional
consensus. Unfortunately, rather than using the GLC as a
structure for resolving these diversion issues, the
governors have convened conferences that lack the
institutional framework that an interstate compact
commission might offer. Otherwise, for mediation purposes,
the compact commissions offer an ideal mechanism for
addressing such regional issues.

209
and future approach for studying interstate water compact
management.
From the case study approach, we gain the following
refinement of the three hypotheses supported by the new OE

model: namely,

(1) that both formal and_1nfgrmg1 federal
representation on a compact commission can be a
positive factor in a compact commission's
effectiveness. The Great Lakes Commission
exception to this hypothesis, initially identified
in Chapter V, can be explained by recognizing that
compact effectiveness is impacted by informal as
well as formal federal participation in a compact
commission,

(2) that it is the organizational level of
communication contact and the representative
nature of interest groups in direct contact with
the commission and not just the quantity of
contacts that affect compact commission
effectiveness, an area ripe for further
quantitative research, and

(3) that it not enough to know that elite interest
group identification and support of a compact
commission impacts the commission's
effectiveness. It is also necessary to know the
specific reasons for a group's support, as well as
whether or not the elite group is an internal or
external participant in the commission.

A concluding note on this study concerns how this
interstate compact approach can enhance national interests
in developing equitable management and apportionment of the
nation's increasingly scarce water resources.

Developing an effective interstate water compact
commission is an important step in promoting a regional

versus state approach to water resource issues. A regional

perspective could provide the means for articulating a more

210
equitable and broader perspective to water management issue:
thus, reducing the likelihood of intrabasin water wars and
enhancing state capabilities for handling interstate water
issues without encountering Commerce Clause problems or
increasing the proliferation of sometimes counterproductive
U.S. Supreme Court litigation.

Secondly, the compact as a product of multi-state and
federal legislation slows the political momentum for
precipitous Congressional water diversion actions that might
otherwise override state interests in a basin (Report to the
Great Lakes Governors, 1983:57) The regional unity achieved
over time by an effective compact would encourage a
bargaining situation where the state members of a compact,
by reason of their membership in a regional commission,
would be in a much better position to force the federal
government to take into account regional needs. Thus, the
political numbers game in Congress between the haves and
have-not states would be more balanced, forcing a compromise
that should better reflect the interests of both sides.

If a national water policy is to be developed, it will
need state support and not just raw enforcement power in
order to be effective. The interstate compact approach is
an intermediate means of tackling an issue that Congress has
so far refused to directly confront. However, as the
population of water shortage regions in the West continues

to grow, so does that region's political strength in

211

Congress and consequently their ability to acquire new
sources of water by legislative fiat if not negotiation.

Before the issue of control of water resources becomes
state versus state, the issue should be addressed in a forum
that transcends traditional state political boundaries. The
interstate compact commission approach begins that process
and provides a forum and a legal structure within which the
regional realities of water resource management and water

politics can be addressed.

APPENDIX A

(Source: The Council of State Governments)

APPENDIX A

WATER APPORTIONMENT

ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN COMPACT OF 1970
(ARKANSAS-OKLAHOMA)

Apportions the waters oi the Arkansas River Basin,
creates the Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River Com-
pact Commission to administer the apportionment
agreement. encourages pollution abatement programs.
and iaellitates cooperation lor total development and
management 01 water resources in the river basin. Corn-
mlsaion advises a loo-member citizens organization
known as the Arkhoma Association.

Member Slates and Statutory Citations:
Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Sec. 21-2101 (1871)
Oklahoma: 82 Okla. Stat. 1871. See. 1421 (1871)
Congress: 87 Stat. 588 (1873)

Additional lnlormalion:
Date 01 Organization: 1870

Number 01 members: 7. 3 trom each state and one
lederal representative.

Method 01 Selection: Commissioners are appointed by

the governor 0i each state and subject to consent 01 the
state senate.

ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT OF 1949

Apportions the waters ol the Arkansas River and
establlshes an administration as the supervising agen-
cy.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Colorado: 0.8.5. 73. Art. 88:37-88-101 (1849)
Kansas: Gen. Stat. Ann. 1884. See. 823-520 (1848)
Congress: 83 Stat. 145-152 (1848)

Additional Date:

Date 01 Organization: 1849

Number 01 members: 7

Method 01 selection: Three commissioners lrom each
member state appointed by the governor oi each state.
and one commissioner. representing the lederal govern-
ment. appointed by the president.

Number oi employees: None

ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT OF 1905
(KANSAS-OKLAHOMA)

Apportions the waters ol the Arkansas River Basin.
establishes a commission to administer the agreement.

and encourages further pollution-abatement programs
in this river basin.

Member States and Statutory Citations.-
Kansas: K.S.A. 80-1801. 823-528 (1888)
Oklahoma: 82 0.8. 1871. Sec. 1401 (1885)
Congress: P.L. 788. 881h Congress (1988)

Additional Dale:

Date 01 Organization: 1967

Number 01 members: 8

Method 01 selection: The governors 01 Kansas and
Oklahoma appoint three commissioners. The lederal

commissioner is appointed by the president. but he has
no voting power.

Number 01 employees: 1

BEAR RIVER COMPACT

Apportions the waters ol the Bear River and establishes
a commission to administer the compact among ldaho.
Utah. and Wyoming. Amended in 1880 to increase the
storage allowance and establish a depletion level 01
28.000 acre ieet annually. Also allocated new blocks 01
water ior luture development in Idaho and Utah.

Member Slates and Statutory Citations:

Idaho: Idaho Code 1847 (1881 Supp). Sec. 42-3402 (1855)
Utah: Utah Code Ann. 1853 (1881 Suppl. Sec. 7318-2
(1855)

Wyoming: Wyoming Stat. 1857. Sec. 41-486 (1857)
Congress: 72 Stat. 38 (1858)

Additional Date:

Date 01 Organization: 1858

Number 01 members: 10

Method 01 selection: Three commissioners lrom each
member state appointed by the governor 01 each state.
and one commissioner. representing the lederal govern-
ment. appointed by the president.

Number 01 employees: Work 01 commission periormed
by the 0.8. Geological Survey at Logan. Utah. under

cooperative agreement. and by state employees. as
necessary.

BIG BLUE RIVER COMPACT

Establishes a commission to promote interstate comlty
and equitable apportionment ol waters in the river
basin. to promote orderly development 01 water
resources. and to continue active water pollution abate-
ment programs in the party states. Provisions oi the

compact are administered by existing agencies In
signatory states.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Kansas: Laws of 1971. Ch. 332. Sec. 1 (1871)
Nebraska: Laws 01 1871. L8. 809 (1871)
Congress: 82nd Congress. 88 Stat. 183 (1871)

Additional Dale:

Date 01 Organization: 1872

Number ol members: 5

Method 01 selection: Each state has one ex-olilclo
member. The governor 01 each state appoints an ad-
visory member. and the president appoints a lederAI
representative.

Number 01 employees: None

212

CANADIAN RIVER COMPACT

Establishes a commission to allocate and apportion
waters oi the Canadian River in New Mexico. Oklahoma.
and Texas. and to periorm all iunctions required by the
compact either independently or in cooperation with ap-
propriate government agencies and to make and
transmit annual reports to the governors and to the
president on the commission's activities tor the
preceding year.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

New Mexico: N.M.s. (1853 Ann.). Sec. 75-34-3. note
(1851)

Oklahoma: 82 Okla. Stat. 1851. Sec. 526.1 (1851)

Texas: Vernon's Tex. Civil Stat. 1858. Art. 7466h (1851)
Congress: 64 Stat. 83 (1850); 66 Stat. 74 (1852)

Additional Data:

Data oi Organization: 1852

Number oi members: 4

Method oi selection: One commissioner appointed by
the governor oi each state. and one commissioner.

representing the lederal government. appointed by the
president.

Number oi employees: ane

COSTILLA CREEK COMPACT

Apportions the waters oi Costiiia Creek in Colorado and
New Mexico and creates the necessary administrative
structure. in 1863 both states and Congress approved an
amendment periecting iurther utililzation oi the in-
terstate waters.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

Colorado: Col. Rev. Stat. 1873, Art. 6823768401 (1845)
New Mexico: 1845 Laws oi N.M.. p. 74 (1845)
Congress: 60 Stat. 246 (1846); 77 Stat. 350 (1863)

Additional Data:
A Datr- oi Organization: 1845
Number oi members: 2
Method oi selection: One commissioner appointed by
the governor oi each state.
Number oi employees: 1

KLAMATH RIVER COMPACT

1
Establishes a commission to promote comprehensive
development. conservation. and control oi the
resources oi the Klamath River and to ioster interstate
comity between Calliornia and Oregon.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

Caiiiornla: Calli. Water Code. Sec. 5800. et seq. (1857)
Oregon: O.R.S. 1858. Sec. 542.610 (1857)

Congress: 68 Stat. 613 (1855); 71 Stat. 487 (1857)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1857

Number of members: 3

Method oi selection: One commissioner trom each
member state (Caiiiornla: director oi the Department oi
Water Resources; Oregon: state engineer serving as ex-
oiiiclo representative of the State Water Resources
Board). and one commissioner. representing the lederal
government. appointed by the president.

Number oi employees: 0

'213

LA PLATA RIVER COMPACT

Apportions the waters at the La Plata River between Col-
orado and New Mexico. and creates a )oint commission
to administer the compact.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Colorado: C.R.S. 1873. Art. 63:37-63-101 (1823)
New Mexico: NM. Stat. 2853. Sec. 75-34-3 (1823)
Congress: 43 Stat. 786 (1825)

Additional Data:

Date oi Organization: 1827

Number oi members: 2

Method oi selection: State engineers lrom each member
state. (Colorado state engineer is appointed by the
director oi the Department oi Natural Resources. New
Mexico appointment is by the governor.)

Number oi employees: None

PECOS RIVER COMPACT

Establishes a commission to administer provisions tor
storage. division. and use oi the waters oi the Pecos
River in New Mexico and Texas.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

New Mexico: N.M.S. 1853 Ann.. Sec. 75-34-3 (1848)
Texas: Vernon‘s Tex. Civ. Stat. 1856. Art. 7468i (1848)
Congress: 63 Stat. 158 (1848)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1848

Number oi members: 3

Method oi selection: One commissioner appointed by
the governor oi each member state. and one commis-
sioner. representing the lederal government. appointed
by the president.

Number oi employees: 3

RED RIVER COMPACT

Congress. in 1855. granted consent to Arkansas. Loui-
siana. Oklahoma. and Texas to negotiate a compact pro-
viding ior an equitable apportionment among them oi
the waters oi the Red River and its tributaries (68 Stat.
654). Final consent is contingent upon mutual accep-
tance by the party states oi the compact's terms.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Arkansas: Act 201 ct 1878

Louisiana: Act 71. 1878 Regular Session
Oklahoma: no citation available
Congress: P.L. 86-564

REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT

Establishes an agency to provide tor the most eiiiclent
use oi the waters oi the Republican River Basin ior
multiple purposes and to provide tor an equitable divi-
sion oi those waters among the party states. Provisions
oi the com pact are administered by existing agencies oi
signatory states. .

Member States and Statutory citations:
Colorado: C.R.S. 1873. Art. 67:37-67-101 (1843)
Kansas: K.S.A. 1964, Sec. 82a-518 (1843)
Nebraska: N.R.s. 1943. Vol. 2A. p. 741 (1843)
Congress: P.L. 60. 78th Congress (1943)

Additional Data:

Date oi Organization: 1858

Number oi members: 3

Method oi selection: Provided by statute
Number oi employees: None

RIO GRANDE INTERSTATE COMPACT

Establishes the Rio Grande interstate Compact Com-
mission to administer the compact and to apportion the
_waters oi the Rio Grande River between Colorado. New
Mexico. and Texas.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

Colorado: C.R.S. 73. Art. 66:37-66-101 (1838)

New Mexico: Stat. Ann. 1953. Sac. 75-34-3 (1839)
Texas: Vernon's Rev. Stat. 1854. Art. 7466e-1 (1839)
Congress: 53 Stat. 785 (1938)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1838

Number oi members: 4

Method oi selection: One commissioner apointed by the

governor oi each signatory state and one lederal
representative.

Number oi employees: None
SABINE RIVER COMPACT

Establishes a commission to apportion the waters oi
the Sabine River and to plan. develop. and conserve the
water resources oi the river basin in Louisiana and
Texas.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. 38:2329. et seq. (1854)
Texas: Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. 1958. Art. 7466i (1853)
Congress: 65 Stat. 736 (1851): 68 Stat. 680 (1854)

Additional Date.-

Date oi Organization: 1953

Number oi members: 5

Method oi selection: Two commissioners appointed by
the governor oi each member state. and one commis-
sioner. representing the lederal government. appointed
by the president.

Number oi employees: None

SOUTH PLATTE RIVER COMPACT

Establishes a commission to apportion the waters oi
the South Platte River between Colorado and Nebraska.

Member States and Statutory Citations.-

Colorado: C.R.S. 1973. Art. 65:37-65-101 (1925)
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. 1864. Vol. 2A. p. 733 (1823)
Congress: 44 Stat. 185 (1826)

2414

Additional Iniormaiion:

Date oi Organization: 1826

Number oi members: 2

Method oi selection: Governor appoints one commis-
sioner irom each member state.

Number oi employees: None

UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN COMPACT

Establishes a commission to administer apportionment
oi the waters oi the Upper Colorado River Basin System
and to promote agricultural and industrial development.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Arizona: A.R.S. 1856. Sec. 45-581 (1848)
Colorado: C.R.S. 1873. Art. 62:37-62-101 (1848)
New Mexico: NM. Stat. 1853. Sec. 75-34-3 (1948)
Utah: Utah Code Ann.. Sec. 7313-9 (1949)
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. 1957. Sec. 41-507 (1949)
Congress: 63 Stat. 31 (1848)

Additional Data:

Date oi Organization: 1849

Number oi members: 5

Method oi selection: One commissioner appointed by
the governor oi each member state and one commis-
sioner. representing the lederal government. appointed
by the president.

Number oi employees: 5

YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT

Establishes a commission to apportion the waters oi
the Yellowstone River among Montana. North Dakota.
and Wyoming.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

Montana: Mont. Rev. Code 1847. Ch. 8. Sec. 88-903 (1951)
North Dakota: ND. Cent. Code. Ch. 61-23 (1951)
Wyoming: Wyo. Slat.. Sec. 71-2901 (1851)

Congress: 63 Stat. 152 (1849); 65 Stat. 663 (1951)

Additional Data:

Data at Organization: 1852

Number oi members: 3

Method at selection: One commissioner appointed by
the governor oi each member state. and one commis-
sioner. representing the lederal government. appointed
by the director oi the U. 8. Geological Survey.

Number oi employees: None

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

NEW ENGLAND INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL COMPACT

Establishes a commission to coordinate the water pollu-
tion control activities oi the signatory states as they per-
tain to the water: oi the compact area. Other activities
include the assurance oi water qualilty planning and
standards in the compact area. improving groundwater
program coordination and distributing public oriented
iniormaiion addressing current environmental issues.

215

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Connecticut: Public Act No. 203 (1847)

Maine: Ch. 450. Public Laws (1855)
Massachusetts: Acts oi 1847. Ch. 421 (1947)
New Hampshire: Laws oi 1851. Ch. 180 (1851)
New York: N.Y. Laws oi 1848. Ch. 764 (1848)
Rhode island: P.L. 1847. Ch. 1838 8 1801 (1847)
Vermont: Acts oi 1849. No. 148 (1848)
Congress: P.L. 80-282 (1847)

Additional Date:
Date oi Organization: 1847
Number oi members: 35

Method at selection: Five commissioners irorn each
member state appointed in the manner each state
selects.

Number oi employees: 11

OHIO RIVER VALLEY WATER SANITATION COMPACT

Establishes a commission tor the purpose oi maintain-
ing waters in the river basin in a satisiactory sanitary
condition available tor sate use by public and private
agencies and to maintain tish and aquatic llie tor recrea-
tional usage.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
iiiinois: l.R.S.. Ch. 111 02. Sec. 117

lndlana: l-louse Enrolled Act. No. 337 (1838)
Kentucky: Ch. 150. Acts 1840. Reg. Sees. (1840)
New York: Laws oi 1838. Ch. 845 (1838)

Ohio: Amended 8.8. 33. Reg. Sass. (1838)
Pennsylvania: 32 PS. 816.1-7

Virginia: Ch. 117. Acts oi Gen. Assembly (1848)
Congress: P.L. 76-739 (1840)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1848

Number oi members: 27

Method ot selection: Three commissioners appointed
by the governor oi each state. and three commissioners.
representing the lederal government. appointed by the
president.

Number oi employees: 23

POTOMAC VALLEY COMPACT

Establishes a commission to preserve water quality and
to conserve water and related land resources oi the
Potomac River Basin. It should not be coniused with the
Potomac River Basin Compact which tailed to become
operational alter 10 years oi vigorous promotion. in 1878
the Commission created the Cooperative Water Supply
Operations on the Potomac (CO-OP). which provides
water usage iorecasts and coordinates water manage-
ment oi the Upper Potomac reservoirs and local
Washington metro reservoirs. '

Member States and Statutory Citations: -
Maryland: Ch. 320 Net. Res. Art.. Sec. 6-301 (1838
Pennsylvania: 32 P.5.741-43

Virginia: House Bill 406 (1870)

West Virginia: W.V. Code. Act 10. Ch. 29 (1961)
Dist. oi Col.: D.C. Code 1873. Supp. iV-1877 (1840)
Congress: 54 Stat. 748 (1840): 84 Stat. 856 (1870)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1841. authority amended 1870
Number oi members: 18

Method oi selection: Three commissioners irom each
signatory state appointed by the governor oi each state.
three commissioners appointed by the mayor oi the
District oi Columbia, and three commissioners.
representing the lederal government. appointed by the
president

Number oi employees: 13

TRI-STATE SANITATION COMPACT

Establishes a commission in the )oint boundary area oi
Connecticut. New Jersey. and New York to promote and
enhance water quality standards. More recently. the
commission has served as the coordinating and plan-
ning agency tor air quality control within the tri-state
boundary area.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

' Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.. Sec. 2555 (1841)

New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann.. Sec. 32:18-1 (1835)
New York: McK's. E.C.L.. Sec. 21.0501 (1836)
Congress: Public Res. 62. 74th Cong. (1835)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1836

Number oi members: 15

Method oi selection: Five commissioners irom eecn
member state appointed by the governor and oonilrrned
by the senate.

Number oi ernpioyees: 22

WATER RESOURCES AND FLOOD
CONTROL

CONNECTICUT RIVER VALLEY FLOOD CONTROL
COMPACT

Establishes a commission to provide tor iinancial reim-
bursement by downstream states ior economic losses
to political subdivisions in which iiood control reser-
voirs are located. Commissioners have exercised more
responsibility recently in keeping abreast oi activities
along the river which aliect iiood control.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

mascucut: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1853 Supp). Sec. 1476c
Massachusetts: Acts oi 1851. Ch. 682 (1851)

New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 487 (1851)
Vermont: Vt. Laws 1851. Act No. 244 (1851)

Congress: 87 Stat. 45 (1853)

Additional Data:

Date oi Organization: 1853

Number oi members: 12

Method oi selection: Three commissioners appointed
by the governor oi .each state. Two oi the
Massachusetts commissioners serve as exoiiicio
members.

Number oi employees: 1

GREAT LAKES BASIN COMPACT

Establishes an advisory and recommendatory commis-
sion to the states on regional water resources matters.

including comprehensive water use. economic develop-
ment. and maintenance oi high-quality environment.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
lilinois: l.R.s.. Ch. 127. Sec. 182.1 et seq.
lndlana: Ch. 220. Laws oi 1855. RB. 216 (1855)
Michigan: Act No. 28. PA 1855 (1855)
Minnesota: Laws oi Minn. 1955. Act. No. 28 (1855)
' New York: Laws oi 1960. on. 643 (1980)
Ohio: Amended i-i.B. 415. 105th Gen. Assembly (1963)
Pennsylvania: 32 P.S. 617.1-6
Wisconsin: Ch. 275. Laws oi 1855
Congress: 82 Stat. 414 (1888)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1855

Number oi members: 38

Method oi selection: Three to live commissioners
selected in such manner as each state determines by
law.

Number oi employees: 8

THAMES RIVER FLOOD CONTROL COMPACT

Establishes a commission to administer the compact
and promotes the cooperation in iiood control and in the
use oi water resources oi the Thames River Basin.

Member States and Statutory Citations:

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. 1858. Sec. 25-101 (1857)
Massachusetts: Ch. 818. Acts oi 1857 (1857)
Congress: 72 Stat. 384 (1858)

Additional Data:

Data oi Organization: 1858

Number oi members: 6

Method oi selection: Three commissioners irom Con-
necticut appointed by the governor. in Massachusetts.
the governor appoints one member and two ex-oiiiclo
members.

Number oi employees: None

WHEELING CREEK WATERSHED PROTECTION AND
FLOOD PREVENTION COMPACT

Establishes a commission tor the purpose oi ad-
ministering programs ot iiood control and preservation
oi natural resources and recreational iacllitles in the
Wheeling Creek watershed.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Pennsylvania: 32 PS. 818.1-3

West Virginia: W. Va. Code. Art. 1F. Ch. 28 (1867)
Congress: 81 Stat. 553(1887) '

216

Additional Data:

Data oi Organization: 1867

Number oi members: 10

Method oi selection: Five commissioners appointed in
accordance with the laws oi each state.

Number oi employees: 1

COMPREHENSIVE

DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMPACT

Establishes a commission as a regional multipurpose
water resources agency. The United States is a party to
the compact. as well as having granted congressional
consent to the agreement among states.

Member States and Statutory Citations:
Delaware: 53 Del. Laws. Ch. 71 (1881)
New Jersey: Laws oi 1981. Ch. 13 (1881)
New York: Laws oi 1861. Ch. 148 (1881)
Pennsylvania: 32 PS. 8115.101
Congress: 75 Stat. 888 (1881)

Additional Data:

Data oi Organization: 1881

Number oi members: 5

Method oi selection: Govemora oi the signatory states
serve as ex-oiiiclo members: one commissioner.
representing the lederal government. is appointed by
the president. Each has a lull-power voting alternate.
Number oi employees: 44

SUSOUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMPACT

Establishes a iederai-lnterstate administrative agency
to engage in comprehensive planning. development.
and management oi water and related resources oi the
Susquehanna River Basin. The Commission has recent-
ly promulgated regulations regarding consumptive uses
oi water. groundwater withdrawals and water conserva-

223. The U.S. government is a lull member oi the com-

Member States and Statutory Citations:

Maryland: Ch. 381. Net. Res. Art.. Sec. 8-301 (1887)
New York: N.Y. Acts oi 1887. Ch. 785 (1887)
Pennsylvania: 32 P.S. 620.1-6

U.S.: P.L. 81-575. 84th Congress (1888)

Additional Date:

Date oi Organization: 1870

Number oi members: 4

Method oi selection: Members consist oi governors oi
the signatory states. ex-oiiicio and one commissioner is
to be appointed by the president oi the United States to
serve during his term oi oiiice.

Number oi employees: 26

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

 

Compact Directors and Chairs

Last Name: Vicory, Jr.

First Name: Alan H.

Title: Executive Director

Address: 49 E. Fourth St.

City: Cincinnati

State: OH

Zip: 45202

Commission: Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Comm.

Last Name: Poltak

First Name: Ronald F.

Title: Executive Director
Address: 85 Merrimac St.

City: Boston

State: MA

Zip: 02114

Commission: NEIWPCC

Last Name: Zeni

First Name: LE.

Title: Executive Director

Address: 6110 Executive Blvd. Suite 300
City: Rockviilc

State: MD

Zip: 20852-2391

Commission: Potomac River Basin

Last Name: Biclo

First Name: Robert I.

Title: Executive Director

Address: 1721 North Front St.

City: Harrisburg

State: PA

Zip: 17102-2391

Commission: Susquehanna River Basin Comm.

Last Name: Cook

First Name: Wayne

Title: Executive Director

Address: 355 S. Fourth East Street

City: Salt Lake City

State: UT

Zip: 84111

Commission: Upper Colorado Rit'rer Comm.

217

218

Compact Directors and Chairs

Last Name: Hansler

First Name: Gerald M.

Title: Executive Director

Address: PO. Box 7360

City: West Trenton

State: NJ

Zip: 08628

Commission: Delaware River Basin Comm.

Last Name: Horak

First Name: William F.

Title: Chairman

Address: 821 E. Interstate Ave.

City: Bismarck

State: ND

Zip: 58501

Commission: Yellowstone River Compact Comm.

Last Name: Furrh, Jr.

First Name: James B.

Title: Chairman ,

Address: 1212 Capitol Towers

City: Jackson

State: MS

Zip: 39021

Commission: Sabine River Compact Admin.

Last Name: Michenleider

First Name: Robert A.

Title: Chairman

Address:

City: Picrmont

State: NH

Zip: 03779

Commission: Connecticut River Valley Flood Control

Last Name: Hale

First Name: William E.

Title: Chairman

Address: 7208 Carriage Road, NE.

City: Albuquerque

State: NM

Zip: 87109

Commission: Pecos River Commission

219

Compact Directors and Chairs

Last Name: Vigneault
First Name: J.J.
Title: Chairman
Address: Mineral Management Service
Rm. 4253, 18 & C
City: Washington, DC.
Zip: 20240
Commission: Arkansas/Oklahoma Arkansas River Compact Comm.

Last Name: Thornbrugh

First Name: Paul E.

Title: Chairman

Address: 11435 E. 5th St.

City: Tulsa

State: OK

Zip: 74128

Commission: Kansas/Oklahoma Arkansas River Comm.

Last Name: Kuonen

First Name: Neil

Title: Chairman

Address: 6600 Washburn Way

City: Klamath Falls

State: OR

Zip: 97603

Commission: ' Klamath River Compact Comm.

Last name: Spielvogel

First Name: Chester R.

Title: Chairman

Address: 113 Clemence Hill Rd.

City: Southbridge

State: MA

Zip: 01550

Commission: Thames River Valley Flood Control

Last Name: Barnett

First Name: Jack A.

Title: Engineer-Manager

Address: 106 W. 500 South, Suite 101

City: Bountiful

State: UT

Zip: 84010

Commission: Bear River Commission

220

Compact Directors and Chairs

Last Name: Hershey

First Name: Joe.

Title: Chairman

Address: Star Route, Box 708

City: Texline

State: TX

Zip: 79087

Commission: Canadian River Compact

Last Name: Cooley

First Name: Frank

Title: Chairman

Address: PO. Box 98

City: Meeker

State: CO

Zip: 81541

Commission: Arkansas River Compact Admin.

Last Name: Ham

First Name: Arlene

Title: Chairman

Address: 116 Crestridge

City: Rapid City

State: SD

Zip: 57701

Commission: Rio Grande

Last Name: Donahue

First Name: Mike

Title: Executive Director

Address: Argue ll Bldg, 400 Fourth St.

City: Ann Arbor

State: MI

Zip: 48103-4816

Commission: Great Lakes Commission

Last Name: Lane

First Name: John

Title: Director

Address: 50 Haddaie Ave.

City: Wheeling

State: W. VA

Zip: 26003

Commission: Wheeling Creek Watershed

221

Compact Directors and Chairs

Last name: Mytelka

First Name: Alan

Title: Executive Director

Address: 311 W. 43rd St.

City: New York

State: NY

Zip: 10036

Commission: Interstate Sanitation Comm.

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

Respondent‘s Name

 

COMPACT DIRECTOR/CHAIRMAN QUESTIONNAIRE
Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River Basin Compact

1. How often are formal meetings held with the state representatives of the compact?

meetings per year

2. Over the past ten years, describe the level of state contributions to the commission’s
budget (in actual dollars)?
Circle one of the following:

a. increased significantly (at a faster rate than the rate of inflation).

b. increased slightly (increase was not sufficient to keep up with the rate of inflation)

c. did not change

(1. decreased slightly (decrease in contributions by one of the states not offset by other
state contributions)

e. decreased significantly (decrease in contributions by more than one state member not
offset by other state contributions).

Comments:

 

3. Does the commission primarily rely upon annual appropriations by its members for
funding, or does it primarily rely on longer term (multi-year) sources of funding (such as
bonds, long term grants, etc.)? Circle one of the following:

a. Annual appropriations b. Multi-ycar funding

Comments:

 

4. Are you aware of any pending interstate litigation involving the water resources within the
jurisdiction of your commission?

a Yes b. No

If yes, which states?

 

Comments:

 

222

223

5. Are there other regional institutions whose authority over the water resources overlaps
with the jurisdiction of your compact commission?

a. Yes b. No

If yes. please identify.

 

Comments:

 

6. Approximately what percentage of your time as compact director/chairman is spent in the
following areas?

a. Internal commission administration
b. Informational activity for public and state consumption
c. Consulting and/or negotiating with state representatives or officials on regional and

state water resources legislation consistent with the commission’s goals.

Comments:

 

7. Below is a list of 10 general classes of interest groups that may be concerned with the
actions of your commission. Please rank them on a scale of l to 10 in terms of their
political ability to affect the achievement of your compact commission’s goals (1 being most
important and 10 being least important. (Your individual ranking will be kept confidential)

Environmental

Electric Power
Transportation

Commercial and industrial
Shoreline owners/riparian
Recreational

Commercial fishing

_ Agriculture

_ Native people

_ Local governments/agencies

8. For each of the classes of interest groups that you ranked as 1, 2 and 3 in the previous
question, please identify a specific interest group whose views would be representative of
that general class of interest groups.

 

 

 

224

9. Describe what formal or informal mechanism exists for the commission to receive input
from the three interest groups you identified in the previous question.

 

 

10. Below is a list of official purposes of the compact derived from the Congressional statute.
Please rank these purposes in terms of your commission's priorities , with number 1 being
the top priority. (Please make each ranking distinct, i.e. no ties)

_ Equitable apportionment of Arkansas River Basin waters
_ Maintain an active pollution abatement program
_ Facilitate cooperation between the Arkansas and Oklahoma water administration

agencies in the total development and management of the Arkansas River Basin water
resources.

Promote interstate comity between the two states.

Comments on the phrasing of these goals?

 

 

 

11. Would you say the purposes of the agency have changed since the compact was first
formed? Yes No (circle one)

If yes, explain why

 

 

12. What are the two or three most important actions the commission has taken in the last
ten years in furtherance of these purposes?

1.

2.

 

 

225

13. How effective has the commission been in achieving the purposes you have identified
and ranked in questions 10. (circle one)

Very effective Somewhat effective
Somewhat ineffective Very ineffective

Please explain the basis for your overall effectiveness ranking:

 

 

14. What is the greatest strength of your compact commission?

 

 

15. What is the greatest weakness of your compact commission?

 

 

226

Respondent’s Name

 

COMPACT COMMISSIONER QUESTIONNAIRE (12 questions)
Re: Delaware River Basin Commission

The following questions solely relate to your membership on the Delaware River Basin
Commission. ‘

1. Approximately how often are you in contact with commission staff and/or the compact
commission members from other states to discuss issues involving this compact? (Circle one)

1. Once a year 3. Once a month 5. Once a week 7. Other
2. Twice a year 4. Twice a month 6. More than once a week

2. Over the past ten years, describe the approximate level of your state’s contributions to this
commission’s budget (in dollars). If you are a federal representative, please indicate the level
of federal contributions, if any. (Circle one)

a. increased significantly (at a faster rate than the rate of inflation).

b. increased slightly (increase was not sufficient to keep up with the rate of inflation)
c. did not change

d. decreased slightly
e. decreased significantly

Comments:

 

3. Are you aware of any pending interstate litigation which involves the water resources
within the jurisdiction of this commission? (Circle one)

1 Yes 2. No

If yes, please briefly identify the parties in the case:

 

4. Is there a key state or national political figure who is closely associated and actively
involved in this compact commission and its activities?

1. Yes 2. No

If yes, please identify

(Questions continued on reverse side of this sheet)

227

5. Below is a list of official purposes of the compact on which you serve, derived front the
Congressional enabling statute. Please rank these purposes in terms of what you believe are

the commission's priorities, with number I being the top priority. (Please make eaclt ranking
distinct, i.e. no ties)

Promote interstate comity and remove all present and future controversies regarding the
Delaware River waters.

Make secure and protect present developments within the states.

Provide for cooperative planning and action with the parties to the water resources.
Encourage conservation, utilization and development of water resources.
Provide management and control of the water resources.

Comments on the phrasing of these goals Or any additional goals and ranking?

 

 

6. How effective do you, as the state (or federal, if applicable) representative, believe this

commission has been in achieving the purposes you have identified and ranked in question
5. (Circle one)

1. Very effective 2. Somewhat effective
3. Somewhat ineffective 4. Very ineffective

Please explain the basis for your overall effectiveness ranking:

 

 

228

7. What has been the impact of actions and/or recommendations made by this compact
commission on the development of a regional water policy approach by your state?
(Circle one)

1. Has had a significantly positive impact on the development of a regional approach to
water policies in your state.

2. Has had a marginally positive impact on the development of a regional approach to
water policies in your state

3. Has had no impact on the development of a regional approach to water policies in
your state.

4. Has had a marginally negative impact on the development of a regional approach to
water policies in your state.

5. Has had a significantly negative impact on the development of a regional approach to
water policies in your state.

6. Not applicable

Comments:

 

8. If possible, please identify three important legislative or regulatory actions your state has
taken in the last ten years in furtherance of (or in opposition to) the compact commission's

purposes you have identified in question 5. (If you are a federal representative, please
indicate federal actions, if any).

1.

 

2.

 

S"

 

9. Below is a list of 10 general classes of interest groups that may be concerned with the
actions of this commission. Please rank them on a scale of I through 10 in terms of their
political ability to influence the achievement of this compact commission’s goals (with a
ranking of I being the most important, 2 being the next most important, and 10 being the
least important. (Your individual ranking will be kept confidential)

Environmental

Electric Power

Transportation

Commercial and industrial

Shoreline owners/riparian

Recreational"

Commercial fishing

_ Agriculture

_ Native people

_ Local governments/agencies
(Questions continued on the reverse side of this sheet)

229

‘ O I
10. For each of the classes of interest groups that you ranked as 1, 2, 3 and 4 m the previous

question, please identify a specific interest group whose views would be representative of
that general class of interest groups.

Rank 1.

 

Rank 2.

 

Rank 3.

 

Rank 4

 

11. What is the greatest strength of this compact commission?

 

 

12. What is the greatest weakness of this compact commission?

 

 

Do you want a copy of the results of this survey? Yes No

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

“tin 1s

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“tics 2: “tin 3:14
minim uetiml Janet-Level ”dim
W per veer A of state Litieetien
(fer-t eeetim) contribution.

m Digger-Tam Di rfarggg ”3%.. ’f 23::
Ark-nee liver 2 15 H - r Yee Vee
Ark-Okle-Ark liver 1 5 o - Vee tee
leer liver 2 22 - '0' lo Io
Mien liver 1 1 0 0 Yes Yee
eutecticut liver 4 6 0 0 lo Io
Ceetille Creek - 4 1 t - -
Deleuere liver 10°12 52 O t In Yee
Greet Lekee 2 18 H 0 lo Io
interstate 8m. 4 20 -- -- Yee Io
urn-out. Ark liver 1 5 0 0 Yes Io
lie Blue River - 2 1 t - Io
Kluth liver 1 12 0 0 lo Io
Le Plete - 1 1 + - Io
It!” 4 10 0 0 lo Io
mic liver 3 17 + 4 Ito Io
m liver 1 24 t (ed N” Io Yee
Peta: liver 4 12 t '0 Io In
Red River - 7 1 0 - Io
Realistic-i liver - 2 1 t - Io
lie Brunt 2 18 1 + - Yee
wine liver 2 2 t + Io lo
8. Matt. - 1 1 0 - Io
W liver 4 23 9 '0 Ito Io
Til-es 1 1 _ 0 0 lie tie
Inner Celererb Riv 2-3 52 H 0 lo . tle
lnelim Creek 1 12 1 0 lie lo
Yelleatene liver 2 9 + + Vee Io

 

 

 

 

‘++-sianifimtiweue.+-inmdishfly.0-no¢hms=.
--deueeseslightly,--decreasesignifimt1y

230

231

nastiest 4 (State)

h-etim 3 (Dir)

antics 5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

key Political Couission findiru (State 2 Cir)
Fiona-e1 Regional inst.
overly?
mm C Gov. level Ana-l Rulti-yesr
Arkansas River 2 state X lo
Ark-Okls-Ark River 0 - X Ito
leer River 0 - X lo
Canadian River 0 X lo
Comeetiout River 0 X Yes - (Corps of
Emineers)
Coetills Creek 0 - - -
Delausre River 4 2 state Yes - (Del Valley
2 federal X Ree. Plamim)
Crest Lakes 4 1 state Yes
3 federal X
interstate 8n. 1 state X Yes
Xn-dtla Ark River 0 X Yes
lie Blue River 0 - - - tto
leth River 0 (interest Yes
on finding
La Plate 0 - - - -
ilEliPCC 0 X lo Ito
drio River 1 federal X lo tto
Pecos River 1 federal X Ito Io
Potoose River 2 federal X Yes - (Metro Hash
coo
Red River 0 - - «-
Reptbliean River 0 - - -
Rio Crsrlie 0 - - -
Sabine River 0 X Yes (Sabine River
Authority
8. Platte 0 - - -
Susquehanna River 0 X lo
Tbnee 0 (interest Yes (Corps of
or finding Engineers)
Upper Colorado Riv 0 X Yes (Colo Salinity
Control Form)
theelinp Creek 3 2 federal - - -
1 state
Yelloustone River 0 X tto

 

 

 

 

232

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Question 6 Croatia: 5 (State) autism 6 (State)
(Director) Ill 10 (Director) Ill tastier 13
X of ties Official purpose (Director)
spent on of oomsct" Co-ission
ttedisn State] effectiveness--
MAC! tnterl.ltnfo|Policy Director Agree? State tted.IDir.
Arkansas River 70 3D Ito - w
Ark-Dkla-Ark River 90 10 lo «0 +
Deer River 50 25 25 lo ++ +
Canadian River 95 2 3 Yea + +
Comectiout River 10 4D 50 Yes 4 e
Costilla Creek - - - - H
Delaware River 60 15 5 Ito 4» 4+
Great Lakes 25 50 25 Ito + «H
interstate Can. 20 10 20 Yes + ++
Kan-Okla Ark River 90 5 S - + +0-

 

Dio Blue River

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Xl-sth River 5 5 5 Yes + «H-
La Plata - - - - ”

IElll’CC 20 20 60 Yes 0 e

(No River 60 20 5 Ito ++ ++
Pecos River 100 tto . -.
Potoasc River 46 4D 4 Yes ++ ++
Red River - - . - ,

Repiblican River - - - . .

Rio Grande - - - Yes ++ +4»
Sabine River 60 20 Ito ++ +

S. Platte - - - Io +

Warns River 65 10 5 Ito + +

The-es - - - . .. ”
Upper Colorado Riv 20 5 75 Ito + +

Itselim Creek - - - - 4+ ....
Yellowstone River 80 :‘20 - - ‘ - +

 

 

 

 

1. SDX of ties seeking fed. and state finds

2. Itork only as needed

3. N I effective, + I soeeidrat effective, - - soaeuiat effective,
-- I ineffective

233

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

hastiat 7 hastiat 12 mastic!
(Director) (Director) 7
ad 9 (state) at) 8 (state) (state)
91 type of Regional Actions Regional
interest Drota taken iaasct of
affecting by emission] co'ission'
coasission stats?
(oedian) Type? indaitifYI (aediai
moan Director State DirectorIState Act score)
Arkaaas River Agric Agric Acain Yes e
Ark-Dkla-Ark River Local Dov Local Dov Achin Yes ++
Dear River Agric Agric Policy Yea +
Canadian River Envir Co-ercial - Ito +4»
Cormticut River Envir Envir Policy Ito +
Coetilla Creek - Agric - Yes 4»
Delaware River Local Dov Local Dov Policy Yes 4-
Drest Lakes Envir Envir Policy Yes «9
interstate Sat. Local Gov Local Gov Policy Yes +
Kan-(Iris Ark River Local Dov Local Gov - Yea +
Dig Blue River - Agric - Yes ++
Xlnsth River Agric Agric - Ito +
La Plats - Agric - Yes 0
IIEiiPCC Local Dov Local Dov Policy Yes 4
(Mo River Local Gov Envir Policy Yea «
Pecos River Local Dov Local Dov Atain Yes +
Potoasc River Local Dov Local Dov Policy Yes ++
Red River _ Local Dov - Yes ++
Reptblicai River _ Agric - Yes 0
Rio Creme Envir Agric - Yes 0
Sabine River Conercial Cowarcisl Main Ito #-
S. Platte - Agric - Yes 0
Staqahans River Electrical Electrical Policy Yes +
ihues 7 Recreation Envi r Achi n Ito +
Upper Colorado Riv Envir' Agric Policy Yes ++
IAteelim Creek IIatives Local Dov Adsin ~' Ito 0
Yellowstone River Itatives Agric Policy Yes 0

 

 

 

 

 

 

* significantly positive 8 H
aarginally positive a +

noirpsctto

nrginslly negative I -
simificantly negative I --

career
Arkalsas River
Ark-Dkls-Ark River
Dear River
Catadiat River
Caaacticut River
Coetilla Creek
Delaware River
Crest Lek.
interstate 8.1.
Xen-Dkla Ark River

234

aaetiat 9 (Director)
For-l ad Inter-l Rec-ti- for

inteneetDrapiraaa

Auaal asetim

Driefime ad aaetims

throtdt state consct “are

m

marterly aaetim attentance

Ptblic besrim, advisory co-ittees, conferences
Joint aeetims ad Joint projects

infernal counication

farm state agency roe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dig Dita River --

Xluth River Public aeetiru

La Plats --

IEiiPCC Co-ission weetims ad with staff

mic River Advisory couittees ad uderwrites travel costs
for sue grota

Pecos River Itone

Pete-c River Piblic aaetim ad co-ittee astership

Red River --

Replalicai River --

Rio Grande --

Sfiine River ihrotdt Sabine River authorities

S. Platte --

Staaaha'ns River Couission asetings ad hearings

ill-es IIone

 

(per Colorado Riv
llieelim Creek

Yellowstone River

 

Foraal ad infernal aestinge

Aaaal nesting attadancs

235

hastiaa 14 6 15 (Director) ad 11 ad 12 (State)
Stratus an... of enact c-ieaiat

 

 

Ctl'ACl’ Director Stet.
Arkaisas River Strauth - Diality of reps Stradth - .I. ttsrtin reservoir
ltaakrass - can't stop litigation Iteeknese - attorneys duinsts natims,
lack of coneaata
Ark-Dkts-Ark River Strauth - “are Straath - attic for-ta
-notenotdtpowar itaekraas-eachofconeaaia,duirated

by tater agatcies

 

 

Issr River Strength - precision of cowact Strauth - siqticity, aality of cedars
Usabaes - aicertainty of futtre tIeakraes - varied state A personal ints.
depletion
Canadian River Strength - inaniaity of action Strauth - sints, keep X.II. free water
ileskrass - uraniaity of action Heeklasa

- can't stop state rule break".

 

Caviacticut River

no friction m
“are

state agaicy odor
selection

Strauth -

tax allocation, EPA
represartation
advisory, maria probl-

 

Coetilla Creek

mication
shinistrative coats

 

 

 

Delaware River Strauth - stale -lority vote Strauth - ree:tved conflicts, gooatitl,
eta f
Iteskrass - beast contributions tIeskIaes - mi“. delays, education
c
Great Lakes Straath - credibility Strauth - mity, forta, staff, research
rqartation
itesioass-tacksbindim tIesIoase-mpower,nofedetwort,
authority Calada, port dainstion
interstate Sat. Strenth - citizen caissiora Strenth - regional perspective, diatoms
coord
tIesIuass - too effective, Ileakraes - no lower pri-ry pollution
as offici reattator, too aah political

mission negot

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Xan-Dkla Ark River Strauth - coordination with Stronth - siaste
state

liesknass - that ad staff iteskrase - cai't stop overdevetopait

Sig Blue River ------ Strmth - narrow
tIaskrass - no futta-e planim

Xlnth River Straath - stats cooperation Strauth - forta

tteskness-fedrephasnovote itesknesa-tieitedsuthority
La Plata ----- Stronth - workirg relationships

tteskrasa -
XEIIPCC Struth - technical guidaice Straath - infer-tion, coord., work
2 assist ‘ III/EPA
tteskrass-finarcss- lteakraes-ftsdim,doabyagancy,no
, legal authority
(Iris River Strenth - bring ints together Stradth ° visible, staff, can,
coord with fed
Daemon-resources iisakness-enfstds,reeou-cee,atow
til-raver
Pecos River Strenth - anal ptblic Straath - aechsnical
activities, review
Iteskrieu - lawsuit, lack of ideas itsskrieu - tie votes

 

236

(hastiaa 14 D 15 (Director) ad 11 ad 12 (State) (contirued)
Strauths S ”asses of Cmct c-iesiat

Director

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Potoaac River Strength staff, confidence in Strength coord, forta, staff, coop
9'99"
Ueakness finances, Ueskness rep, lack of auth,
participation coneultatt statta
Red River Stremth none Stradth work together, couissioners
weakness no presidential chair weakness btabet, consenua, few
mpt. aeetings
Republican River ----- Stradth specific allocations, ad
co-issioner rets.
tIeakness vague purpose, lack auth.
Rio Grande Strength - mication Stronth - mication
Ueaknsss ptbtic aeetims weakness inflexible ad not future
oriented
Sabine River Stradth knowlewe of basis Strength no problem yet
Iteaknesa no pressim issues IIeakness lack of state int, tiaited
accomtsbitity
S. Platte ----- Stradth self-executirg
tieakness stain powers, favors Colo.
Susquehanna River Stradth legal powers Stradth forta, reg power,
lieakness fudim weakness poor state rels, fading,
no priority conseneia
ihaes Stremth - realistic Strength - reps froa state snvi agenciu
1 lteakness tax, staff
Upper Colorado Riv Strength unity ad effective Strength direct lid: to governors,
coord
weakness closure difficult Usakness liaitad purpose, slow
sooetiaes
Ilieelirg Creek Strength cospleted project Strength coop S flood control
itsekneea caused political death weakness politicians
of politicians
Yellowstone River Strength willim to take on Strength infoml, suit
battles
Uaaknesa aost water has pre- Heakness crisis mgeaent, not

 

comsct authority

 

resolve interp cpsstions
qastions

 

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E

 

0v N0.H¢0.hflm h0.¢hn.vnm m0.wou.ndm n.4fih.nm v.h0h.nm mN.v0h.nm

 

 

 

237

 

 

 

 

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0m nh.on0.a 00.vmh m0.vN0.H no.0mfl m.hvfl 0.NON
om nm.0wv.n 0H.0H0 mn.nv0 mh.ovfl n.0nN n.0vN
0m N.hdv.d n.00m b.0H0 m.NnN 0.anN 0.01m
Hm 0.00m.d H.00h m.n00 0.0NN m.mnN 0.mMN
an m.h~n.u 0.Nvm m.m0h 0.00N m.mNN 0.0m"
hm mh.0mn.a n.00m mN.Nhh mh.0NN m.mNN 0.0nN
mo 0.00H.H 0.~Hv 0.5mh 0.5HN 0.MNN 0.mNN .
0v N.H00.n h.mmo m.mnh mb.NnN 0.0HN mh.NNN .
vv h.v¢0.d N.N00.H m.NNO m.NON 0.0aN 0.0uN 0.00N
nm n.uom.d 0.nnh m.hN0 .rm.>0~ 0.04N 0.0AN 0.00s
Ah h.vn0.~ h.aaN 0.mflh 0.00s 0.00N 0.00m 0.mNH
av 0.0mv.H n.0nh m.Nnh m.hon 0.00m 0.008 0.mNH
an 0.vmh.n w.ahu.d 0.mhm 0.0m» 0.0md 0.0md 0.mNd
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Aoamntflhauv

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIQQBAEHX

Abrams, Robert H. 'Interbasin Transfer in a Riparian
Jurisdiction." fl1111;m_§_flg1y_Lgy_3g11gy 24.(1983): 591-623.

Advisory Committee. Stud2_eI_ths_3e1at19nshin_nstxeen

a; a g _e ' .‘: a 1 go : ..e a; _w.) 3,-
Commissioni_zinal_asnert Lexington. KY: state Research
Associates, 27 Nov. 1985.

Anderson, Ewan. ”White Oil.” Qggg:aph1931_flgggzing Feb.
1991: 10-13.

Baldwin, Pamela. "Legal Issues Related to Division of
Water from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi River.” :35

nggrt_§g_ggngrg§§. Library of Congress. 31 Aug. 1988.

Barton, Weldon V.

Interstate_Cemnasts_in_the_zelitieal
Process. North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press,
1961. '

Bates, Karl L. "Water Diversion from the Great Lakes."
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