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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

AUTONOMY AND CONTROL
IN THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER

presented by

w. Michael Cushion

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Masters degree in Sociology

1/ Vast/W:

Major profess!

Christopher Vanderpool
Date May 17, 1984

 

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AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN THE
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER

BY

W. Michael Cushion

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology
1984

© Copyright by
William Michael Cushion
1984

ABSTRACT

AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER

BY

W. Michael Cushion

This thesis is an examination of the air traffic control
occupation focusing on the amount of workplace autonomy held
by the controllers. Controller autonomy is placed in four
categories. 'Control Over Aircraft Movement' is the mastery
controllers' have over the airplanes and airspace with which
they deal. 'Control Over Position/Trainee! describes the
direction controllers give to the training and entry of new
controllers. 'Mental Control' outlines the degree of
attentiveness necessary to air traffic controlling.
'symbolic Control', portrays the independence controllers'
possess and how it is displayed through language. The
conclusion suggests that the controllers' conception of
their own control prompted their attempts to dominate the
workplace and this progression ended in the failed strike of
1982. The data is based on a combination of field
observations and the author's personal experiences as a

controller.

To my Mother, Frances, who has supported me many times in
many ways

11'

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In spite of my frequent feelings of solitude, this project
could not have been completed without the help of many
others. Principal acknowledgement must go to the air
traffic controllers who have allowed me into their work and
their lives. This thesis would not have been possible
without them. I would also like to thank the controllers
whom I have worked and lived with; all of them have been my

teachers.

I owe a debt of thanks to my guidance committee, which has
been behind me with support and encouragement: Barrie
Thorne, William Paunce, and my chairperson, ChristOpher
Vanderpool. I would also like to thank Marilyn Aronoff for
initiating me into field research methods as well as Bo
Anderson and Craig Harris who were available to toss around
ideas. I would also like to thank Dennis O'Flynn, David J.
Barone, Tracey Myers for helping me process all of these
words. Finally, I would like to send thanks to my friends

whose support was invaluable.

TTBLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION............................................... 1
METHODS........................o........................... 6
THE SETTING................................................ 8
THE DIVISION OF LABOR........................o.............13
CONTROL OVER AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT........o....................23
CONTROL OVER POSITION/TRAINEE..............................3fl
MENTAL CONTROL.............................................34
THE SYMBOLIC NATURE OF CONTROL.............................38
WHAT IS MISSING?...........................o...............4l
THE STRUGGLE FOR ADTONOMY..................................46
POSTSCRIPT.................................................51
REFERENCES.................................................55

HETHODOLWICAL APPmDIXOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOC0.0.00000000000058

iv

INTRODUCTION

He must go back soon to the radar room. There

were still several hours of his shift remainin ,

and-he had made a pact with himself to finish h 8

air traffic control duty for tonight....Anyway,

when the duty was done-his final obligation

finished-he would be free to go to the O'Hagan

Inn, where he had registered late this afternoon.

Once there, without wasting time, he would take

the forty Nembutal capsules-sixty grains in

all-which were in a drugstore pillbox in his

pocket.
This excerpt from Arthur Bailey's (1968: 188) novel, Airport
paints one picture of Air Traffic Control. Though his style
and intent are dramatic his book has accurately captured the
controller's responsibility and need for mental alertness.
This thesis will clarify and enlarge this portrait by
removing the job from the tension-filled
(every-page-is-a-moment-of-excitement) atmosphere and

placing it within the sociology of work.

Were it not for the strike of PATOO (Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization), the public might have
even less knowledge of the existence of Air Traffic Control
(ATC.) PATCO brought ATC into the headlines when their
August 1982 strike lead to the firing of thousands of
controllers and the Union's eventual decertification as the
controllers' bargaining agent. In spite of the notoriety

caused by the strike, the public gained little knowledge of

the ATC system, the tasks performed within the system or the

people who carry out those tasks. As Everett Hughes (1971)
has written,

'There are still many ways of working besides
those which fill the most spaces on the census
table...Part of the duty of even the news-telling
social scientist is to be the ethnologist of his
own time and place, illuminating the less obvious
aspects of his own culture."

Air Traffic Control is one of the ways of work of which
Hughes speaks. As the Hailey quote suggests, stress is the
most prominent job characteristic known to the public.
Stereotypes exist of a harried, nerve-racked person making
an exit from the darkened radar room just before their
Opportunity to allow a disaster to occur. More recently
controllers have been depicted as greedy, overpaid
bureaucrats who are yearning to fabricate a medical excuse
in order to collect an early pension. Like most
stereotypes, these are not accurate descriptions of all

controllers at all times. My purpose in this paper is to

bring to light the work and organization of the ATC tower.

The concept of control is central to the sociology of work
and organizations. Perrow (1979) relates managerial span of
control to the shape of the organizational hierarchy.
Kanter (1977) calls it the sphere of autonomy and directly
correlates it with personal efficacy within the firm.
Thompson (1967) defines one organizational objective as the
elimination of uncertainty through environmental and
internal control. In more microsociological terms others

have looked at the historical development of the division of

labor and struggle over control of the workplace(Eg.

Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 1979; Dawley, 1976).

Like those in other occupations, Air Traffic Controllers
seek autonomy over the conditions of their daily work. Much
of the autonomy they do have is embedded in the nature of
the task. The constant flow of rapidly moving aircraft and
the need for sometimes instantaneous decisions places the
ultimate responsibility upon the controller and eliminates
the possibility of a great deal of oversight and second
guessing. This leads to few levels of command within the
control tower and frees each person in the division of labor

from extensive outside interference.

Through the instructions they issue, controllers seek to
minimize uncertainty and risk within their work sector just
as organizations try to control their environment. The need
to know each aircraft's place in the airborne choreography
demands an unwavering mental control. The importance of
that mental control and its display become internalized in
the controllers and then becomes a part of non-work
interaction. This control is put into practice through a
command-centered language that leaves no doubt about the

controller's intentions.

I will draw out the independence the controller has
through an analogy to the craft occupations. Their use of
personal work techniques, individual decision making,

comprehensive knowledge of the Air Traffic Control (ATC)

system, and cumulative skill through a long training period
are part of the craft nature of the ATC task. The
controllers' regulation of the training process and
concomitant mastery over those who would join their ranks is
reminiscent of craftsmen of old and a part of their

autonomy.

In speaking of the police Manning (1978) states, "His most
meaningful standards of performance are the ideals of the
occupational culture." For the controller these ideals are
contained within the control he/she maintains over the
aircraft and the mental and symbolic control contained in
the job. Manning goes on to state, 'An occupational culture
also prompts the assumptions about everyday life that become
the basis for organizational strategies and tactics.“ I
will suggest that, for the controllers, the assumption of
workplace control led the controllers' union (PATCO) to
strike with the belief that they could shut down the ATC
system. They correctly judged the functional importance of
the ATC system to air travel and thus to commerce, however,
they misjudged the control they had over the system through

the representation of their union.

The description of the air traffic control occupation and
culture is based on a participant-observation study of two
ATC settings. The analytic categories are derived from
those data. However the controllers I studied were not

those who walked out on strike. This presents the problem

of not being certain that the controllers who struck were
led to do so because of their own sense of autonomy.

Further research into the negotiations of the strike and the
PATCO controllers attitudes toward it are needed to bridge

the gap between my data and conclusions.

The controllers' failure was due to the absence of total
autonomy. One of the critical missing elements was control
over the pace of work that is a traditional reserve of the
craftsman. Another crucial part of autonomy is the ability
to determine the number of peOple in the occupation. We
will see how important these two facets are to control of
the workplace and how the controllers' lack of them played a

large part in the failure of their work action.

METHODS

The bulk of this report is based on eight, two hour
periods of observation, five during the week and three on
the week ends. The observations covered the entire work day
from seven in the morning until six in the evening. The
only time that I did not sample was the evening period from
six until the tower closed at eleven. Along with these
observations (and the extensive fieldnotes they generated),
I conducted one formal interview of an hour and a half with
one of the trainees of the tower. I conducted another
shorter, less formal interview with a journeyman
controller. The result of this was 165 pages of field notes
that served as my data. That portion of the analysis not
taken from the observations at Skyways tower, is based on my
own personal experience as an air traffic controller in the
Air Force. I had the opportunity to return to the base at
which I was stationed to do some preliminary observations.
In the methodological appendix I describe the important part
those observations played in shaping me into a field

researcher and helping define the research problem.

I conducted all of my observations in the tower cab. I
was not invited and did not ask to go on breaks with the

controllers. However, I had complete freedom of movement

within the cab, so I had the ability to concentrate on
anything that drew my attention. I stayed close to the top
of the stairs and near the desk for the most part since I
wanted to remain as unobtrusive as possible. Since the
tower itself is designed to absorb excess noise, I was
unable to hear all the words that were spoken. I was also
at a loss due to the use of headsets by the controllers.

These are lightweight units that attach to the controller
behind the ear and have a rubber earpiece that fits into the
ear and a small boom that hovers in front of the
controller's mouth. This prevented me from hearing the
words of the pilots, but I could hear most of what was said
by the controllers. Being able to hear both sides of the
pilot/controller interaction would have added another
dimension to the analysis, but the lack of it does not take

anything away from it.

THE SETTING

The Air Traffic Control System is a vast network of people
and equipment stretching across the country. It includes
navigation equipment, weather advisory stations and en route
ATC centers which control air traffic as it flies between
the terminal towers which are the most ‘visible portion of
the network. Skyways Tower 1 services the capital of a
large Midwestern State. Its clientele include general
aviation aircraft servicing the industrial center of the
city, commercial aircraft, as well as student and other
pilots flying to maintain proficiency. Since the bulk of
the traffic is not commercial, the crowds in the terminal do
not correlate with the amount of traffic the controllers
deal with upstairs. I expected the airport of a capital
city to be larger and busier. As I wrote in my field notes
at the time :

The first thing that I noticed upon walking into
the Skyways terminal was that everyone looked
quite bored. The person in the gift shop was
standing around doing nothing, the people at the
electronic gun-detecting machine were also just

standing around, the shoe shine person was also
looking quite bored as he sat customer-less.

l. A pseudonym

Skyways Tower is designated a Level III tower, the middle of
five levels of complexity. Chicago O'Hare is a level V;
Fort Wayne Indiana, like Skyways, is a level III. This
rating is based on the number of takeoffs and landings that

occur at the facility.

An unassuming doorway near the ticket counter stands in
front of a set of double wide stairs that lead to the
tower. Along with the controllers, the tower houses airport
management and maintenance offices. After passing these
offices, the stairs end at a locked door. Next to the door
is a combination lock with a pad similar to a touch tone
phone. This is the entrance to the ATC portion of the tower
and those without the combination need to follow the
instruction card in order to enter. The instructions are to
identify one's self using the small intercom and then wait
until the controllers release the lock on the door. The
tower security illustrates the privacy the controllers need,
and the risk to the operation that public access would

provide.

Skyway tower is a combination Tower and Radar facility.
The Tower or Tower cab is the traditional glass 'fishbowl'
that is a familiar sight at most airports. After passing
through the locked door though, you are a floor below the
fishbowl and at the entrance to the TRACON or terminal radar
approach control. This room is approximately 50 feet by 30
feet and has an equipment console stretching across about 35

of those feet. The console contains five round radar scopes

10

that appear to be constantly turning. The console also
contains the telephones as well as the controls that adjust
the quality of the radar presentation. As you enter the
room you face a desk where the supervisor would sit if the
radar room were in use. Aside from this desk and the
controller's chairs, the console is the only object in the
room. This signifies the singular purpose of the room and

its inhabitants.

The TRACON, or radar room, is vacant because of an
insufficient amount of controllers. The entire operation is
conducted from the tower cab from the hours of seven in the
morning till eleven at night rather than twenty-four hours,
as it was before the strike. The FAA is still trying to
bring the complement of controllers up to the prestrike
level: hence training is an ongoing event. The staffing
shortage forces the controllers to work 'double backs'.
These are shifts designed so that the controllers get off
duty in the evening and have to return again the next
morning. This understaffing transforms time off into a

precious commodity.

After walking up the final set of stairs, you are in the
tower cab and treated to a sweeping panorama. The view
includes the large industrial plants of the city, the dome
of the Capitol building, and the broad flat wooded fields
surrounding the tower. The cab is approximately forty to

forty-five feet square. The walls stand about waist high

11

and, like the ceiling, are covered with acoustic tile to
suppress non-ATC noise. Above the tile wall are thick
double paned windows that reach up to the ceiling. This
glass is slanted toward the outside in order to give the

viewer an unobstructed view to the ground.

As in the TRACON, the work station and central piece of
furniture in the cab is the console. It stretches across
the front of the cab and faces the runways. Yet the front
of the tower for the controller is the back of the tower to
the traveler. I was constantly becoming disoriented when I
would look out the back of the tower and see the terminal's
parking lot. When in the role of a traveler, the front of
the airport is the entrance into the terminal, yet as a
controller, the aerodrome, where the action occurs, is the
front of the airport. The console fills the front of the
forty feet square cab and provides a comfortable amount of
room for the six people who often stand and work at it.
This affords them what Hall (1959: 298-299) would call a
neutral distance of 20 to 36 inches between one another.
The tower console, like that of the TRACON, contains the
radio equipment on which the controllers transmit
instructions and receive replies. Hanging from the ceiling
at either end of the console are two metal cylinders with
handles on them. These are the light guns that send out a
white, red or green beam of light and allow the controllers

to remain in control of the traffic situation in the event

12

of radio failure. This is one example of a contingency to

avert potential risks.

To the left of the console sits a table which holds the
computer terminal connecting the tower with the rest of the
air traffic system. Continuing in a counter-clockwise sweep
brings you to a water fountain and then a table which holds
the coffee pot and necessary accessories. In front of this
table is a desk which belongs to the supervisor on duty,
though it is not a territorial possession; many others also
sit there. The only other object of note in the cab is a
bookcase which contains the official ATC handbooks and other
aviation manuals. The setting has a businesslike and almost
cold feeling to it. The console and cabinets are steel and
there are few comforts. The room is designed for one
purpose, controlling air traffic. Aside from the drinking
fountain and the coffee pot, the only other diversion is a
portable radio which sits on the window ledge. It is
usually tuned to a middle-of-the-road music station and
adjusted to a volume that allows the controllers to listen

or not listen as they choose.

THE DIVISION OF LABOR

Hraverman (1964: 75) writes:
The division of labor in production begins with
the analysis of the labor process-that is to say,
the separation of the work of production into its
constituent elements.
What then, are the constituent elements of work in the

control tower? How do each of those elements fit together

to produce a smooth flow of air traffic?

Although this section is entitled the division of labor,
it will also outline the progression of training. Along
with providing brevity, I do this because the order in which
I outline the tasks in the tower is also the order in which
the trainees learn them. Trainees come to the tower from
the FAA academy in Oklahoma City with a basic knowledge of
aviation and the ATC system as well as classroom and
laboratory experience. This training gives them a knowledge
of the entire system, even those tasks which are not their
own. Although they have been controller trainees for

several months, when they leave the academy they have yet to

13

14

talk to a real airplane.2 After graduation from the academy
the trainee's are allowed to choose a work assignment within
the geographical region in which they were hired in the
order of their class ranking; those at the head of the

class get first choice of those available openings.

The first weeks at the academy are the controller
trainee's entry into the occupational culture. Aviation is
all around the trainee at Oklahoma City as the academy
adjoins the airport and is contained within an entire center
devoted to aviation training and research. Along with
learning about the ATC system, trainees realize that
everything that they say is going to be evaluated. This
begins the effort to attain and display maintain mental
control as every mistake and slip. of the tongue is
corrected. As trainees progress through their training,
being certified to work each successive position, they gain
more mental control, more control over the movements of the
aircraft and more ability to control those below in the

training program.

The starting point for all of the trainees, and the ending
point for many, is the flight data position. The person in
the flight data position links the tower to the rest of the

2. According to their way of speaking, the controllers do
not 'talk' to the pilots, but to the airplanes. This
impersonality may help the controller forget the notion that
there are people aboard the aircraft, making it more
controllable.

15

ATC system via the computer terminal which is the work area
for this position. It is the ending point for some trainees
who do not successfully complete the training. While I was
at Skyway I saw several people who had 'washed out' of
training and whose only task was to work the flight data
position. It was their ironic duty to have to train those
who would go on to successfully complete the training and
become journeymen controllers or Full Performance Level

(FPL) controllers.

The flight data position is the beginning of the journey
for both the departing aircraft and the trainee. For the
aircraft, it is the beginning when they contact the flight
data person to get necessary airport information. For the
trainee it means the start of the in-tower training that
might lead to becoming a controller. The duty of the flight
data person is to issue the computer generated flight data
to the aircraft. These data are displayed on a flight
progress strip which is an eight inch by one inch strip of
paper that contains the call sign (name) of the aircraft,
route of flight, altitude, and other identifying
information. In the event of radar failure, these strips
may be the sole means used to control the aircraft. The
flight data person reads this information to the aircraft as
written on the flight progress strip. The other major duty
of 'flight data' is to make a recorded broadcast of weather
and flight information that continuously plays over a

discrete radio frequency. The departing aircraft receives

16

all of this information while it is still parked at the
terminal. Because of this and the fact that flight data is
simply relaying information, this a non-control position.

That is, the flight data person is not in control of the

aircraft or its movements and thus not a controller.

Although the trainee may feel like a controller at the
academy in Oklahoma City, they lose this sense of expertise
upon arriving at their new facility. During one visit, I
noticed a face I had never seen before at flight data. The
simple, slow, and explicit instruction he was receiving
indicated that he was a new arrival. While he was working,
the tower secretary, who must have been one of the first
people to see him, came up and said to him, “See, you look
like a real controller.“ The trainee gave away his
inexperience by replying, “Good camouflage, eh?" The
headset he was wearing may have made him look like a
controller, but his lack of knowledge could not be hidden.
The non-control nature of the flight data position can also
be seen by its physical placement in the tower. It is not
set up at the console as the controller positions are and it
does not even face the runway since the flight data person

does not need to see the aircraft.

While working in any position, the new trainee is
constantly monitored by another who is certified in that
position. Both people will have headsets plugged into the

pair of dual headset jacks in the console in order to hear

17

all that is being said by the pilots. One of these jacks is
designated for the trainer and the other for the trainee.

The key difference between them is that the trainer's jack
has an override capability. Although both can transmit to
the aircraft, should they both attempt to transmit at the
same time, the trainee's transmission would not go out over
the air. This gives the trainer complete control over the
trainee in order to prevent the dissemination of untimely or

incorrect information.

From flight data the trainee moves to the ground control
position. This position, as well as the rest of the
positions in the tower is a control position since the
controllers in them are in command of the aircraft they are
talking to. The ground controller could be thought of as
the traffic c0p of the airfield. After the aircraft
receives its clearance from flight data, it must taxi out to
the runway in order to depart. The controller issues the
necessary instructions that allow the aircraft to taxi to
the runway with the assurance that it will not hit or be hit
by any other aircraft. While training in the ground control
position, the trainee also learns the flow and rhythm of
work in the tower. During one observation a trainee on
ground control was attempting to coordinate with the local
controller (whose position we will look at next). At the
time, the local controller was talking fairly continuously,
yet the trainee continued to speak to him, repeating the

request. Finally, the person monitoring him said, 'Don't

18

even bother (him) when he is busy.‘ One of the important
things that the trainee learned is that there are
priorities, the most important of which is the separation of
the aircraft. As one supervisor casually put it, “Just keep

them out of the same place and the same altitude."

After the aircraft taxies out to the active runway that it
will use to depart, it will then need to talk to the local
controller. This is the next position that the trainee will
learn. The ground control and local control work stations
are at opposite ends of the console. The ground control is
at the far left end next to the flight data position and
local control is at the far right side of the tower. The
local controller has control over the airspace within a five
mile radius around the tower as well as the runways
themselves. They have control in that their permission is
needed for an aircraft or vehicle to cross into that
territory. That permission is required even if the aircraft
is under the control of another controller. The same
applies to the ground controller's territory; if the local
controller wishes to have an aircraft under his/her control
cross one of the taxiways, they must have the ground

controller's permission.

The local controller clears the planes for takeoff and
landing. To clear planes to land it is necessary to set up
a landing sequence. That is, the local controller will
assume control of the aircraft at/around the five mile

boundary and fit it into the sequence of aircraft that are

19

already on approach to land. The local controller does this
using visual separation. Visual separation means that the
controller tells the aircraft its place in the sequence and
directs it to follow the aircraft ahead of it. This, as all
types of separation, requires constant monitoring to assure
that pilots are flying as directed. The local controller
needs to have knowledge of the aircraft and their
capabilities, knowledge of the traffic pattern and the rules
of separation in order to complete the task. Clearing the
aircraft for takeoff involves being able to allow the plane
to enter the runway and exit the landing traffic pattern
unobstructed and legally (safely) separated from the other

aircraft.

After the aircraft has taken off and flown to the five
mile reach of the local controller's airspace, it is handed
off to the departure controller. I mentioned earlier that
the TRACON was not staffed and the entire operation had been
moved to the tower cab. If the operation were not combined,
there might be several controllers handling the radar
portion of the aircraft's flight. One of the radar
controllers might handle the departure control function
separately. That is, that controller's task would be to
guide the aircraft to the edge of Skyway's airspace and hand
it off to the next facility. Another radar position might
be that of the arrival controller whose task would be to
assume control of the inbound aircraft as it reached the

boundary of Skyway's airspace and guide it to the local

controller's sector. At the time I observed, all of the
radar positions were collapsed into one, called approach
control. This division of labor gave the approach
controller more control over the aircraft, but also
increased the workload for this position. This position was
located in the center of the console. The assistant
position, described next, was located immediately to the
left of the approach controller.

After the trainee is certified to work local control
autonomously, they do not move immediately to approach
control, but to an interim position called assistant. The
person in this position does just that, assist the approach
controller. They do this by answering the landlines or
telephone that connects the Skyway approach controller to
the other facilities that hand off aircraft to and accept
the handoffs from Skyway. When it gets too busy trainees are
unable to work this position as it becomes necessary for an
PPL (full performance level controller) to take the position
which is then labelled the handoff position. This
distinction again illustrates the difference between a

control and non-control position.

A handoff is the act of transferring control of an
aircraft from one controller to another. While in the ATC
system, the aircraft must always be watched by a rated
(certified) controller. 80 when an aircraft moves from one

sector to another there must be an assurance that it is

21

properly identified and separated from other aircraft in the
receiving controller's airspace. It requires an FPL to make
this handoff and it is easy to see why, given the difficulty
of pinpointing one aircraft out of the apparently jumbled
picture on the radar scope. Aside from the aircraft
portrayed on the scope, there are the concentric circles or
'range marks“ that mark mileage from the center of the radar
display as well as clouds, precipitation and many stationary
'targets' that serve as reference markers. The big
difference between control and non-control lies in the
responsibility for separation of the aircraft from other
aircraft in the system. Only control positions have this
responsibility. The radar controller is able to make these
aircraft identifications and thus ensure their separation.

Training in the assistant position is a transition to the
approach control position. The trainee is able to become
familiar with the duties of the approach controller and
radar identification without the responsibility of aircraft
separation. After the person is certified at the approach
control position they are then a full fledged controller or

FPL and able to work all positions in the tower.

We see then that the links in the division of labor are
designed to produce the smooth flow of aircraft through
Skyways' airspace and to avoid any risk. Each position is
designed to handle a portion of the flight starting from the
aircraft's parking space on the ramp to the edge of Skyways'

area of control. The division of labor is designed to

22

provide a discrete manageable sector for each controller.

In slow times it is possible to combine the local and ground
control positions. In this case, the duties of each
position remain the same though they are under the command
of one person. Although there might be a difference in rank
between a trainee who is only certified at local control and
a fully rated controller (PPL) working ground control by
virtue of the latter's completion of training, this rank
difference has no bearing in the operation of the tower.

For instance, if the PPL ground controller needed to have
the aircraft under his/her control cross the runway
controlled by the local controller, he/she could not force
the local controller to rearrange the landing pattern to
facilitate this just on the basis of his/her non-trainee
status. Each position has an autonomous area of
responsibility. It is this autonomy that contributed to the

controllers' sense of overall job autonomy.

CONTROL OVER AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

Control over the aircraft's movements is the essence of
the controller's task. Any of the few tasks the controller
performs that are not the actual control of the aircraft's
movement, aid others to move aircraft. This could be
thought of as the craft of air traffic control as it bears
much similarity to the crafts of early industrialism. The
essential difference is, of course, that the controller is
not producing anything. Another obvious difference is that
ATC, by virtue of its youth, cannot be thought of as a
traditional occupation. However, if the orchestration of
the ever-changing kaleidoscope of airplanes in the sky could
be thought of as the controller's product, then the craft
designation holds to a fairly close degree. This analogy is
applicable since the airplanes in the sky are molded and
shaped as a carpenter would shape a block of wood into a
piece of furniture. The controller's job could probably be
likened to other tasks, but the craft comparison is useful
for bringing out the aspects of control the job possesses.

Blauner (1964: 43) has written:

23

24

The freedom to determine techniques of work, to
choose one's tools, and to vary the sequence of
operations, is part of the nature and traditions
of craftsmanship. Because each job is different
from previous jobs, problens continually arise
which require a craftsman to make decisions.
Traditional skill frequently involves the use of
judgement and initiative, aspects of a job which
gives the worker a feeling of control over his
environment.

What are the techniques and tools available to the
controller? The information contained in the ATC manual is
the main tool of the controller. This manual contains the
separation rules, the procedures for implementing them, and
the phraseologies for relaying their instructions. The
controller uses these tools along with the system of airways
that crisscross the country, to do the ATC tasks and make
order out of chaos. The separation rules are the minimum
vertical, longitudinal, and lateral distances that must be
kept between aircraft. For example, at 20,000 feet
airplanes must be separated longitudinally by 3 miles.

Within the local control pattern an aircraft must be off the
runway by the time another aircraft is cleared to land on
that runway. The controller's argot has been fine tuned in
order to eliminate any misunderstandings that may arise
through misinterpretation or scratchy and broken radio
transmissions. There is a specific phrase for nearly
everything the controller needs to say. These include the
specific words used to give takeoff clearances, traffic and
weather advisories as well as the words for coordinating

with the other facilities. For example, if the radar

controller wanted to tell an aircraft of the presence of

25

another aircraft he/she might say, '...traffic 3 o'clock
[from the position of the aircraft he/she is talking to], 2
miles, altitude and type aircraft unknown.‘ This tells the
aircraft that there is an unknown target that is 2 miles
away that the controller is not talking to. The statement
gives as much information about the position of the aircraft
as the controller has, in the most uncomplicated, concise

manner possible.

Although the rules are specific, the controllers also have
some degree of latitude. For instance, one rule requires
aircraft to be off the runway when another is cleared to
land. This can be overruled, if in the controller's
judgement, the aircraft will be off the runway by the time
the following aircraft has crossed the runway threshold.
This discretion gives controllers the latitude that takes
the job out of the realm of simply applying the rules and
gives it self-direction. Given any particular traffic
situation, there is no absolutely correct way to control the
aircraft. There are several ways to order the incoming
traffic and several ways to put the aircraft in any given

order that one may wish to place them.

An example of this could be seen when one FPL working

approach control was giving an aircraft a clearance for an

26

approach.3 He said, '67x cleared for visual approach
runway... and then hesitated before he designated the
landing runway.4 At that point the trainee working local
control interjected the off the air comment, '27 left'
intending that as his determination (or guess, perhaps) of
the landing runway. He was not required to say this, but
was trying to display his knowledge of the situation. His
prediction was incorrect as the FPL finished the
transmission by saying, '24', meaning runway 24. The trainee
then said, “You got that Cessna out there for runway 24."
meaning that there was an aircraft waiting to depart on
runway 24. At this the FPL said, 'I don't think there will
be a conflict.“ After the supervisor, who was casually
watching all of this said, "You got a good man on local
he'll work it out.“ The FPL monitoring the local control
trainee said, 'We'll just put him on [runway] 27' which is
what the trainee had intended in the first place. Either

runway would have worked.

3. In general terms an approach is what the pilot does to
set up the plane to land on the runway. A visual approach
is one where the pilot maintains visual contact with the
ground. There are also instrument and radar approaches
where the pilot uses onboard instruments or the controller
uses ground radar, respectively, to guide the aircraft to
the runway.

4. 12J is the call sign, or the name by which the aircraft
is identified. Civil aircraft usually have a call sign
consisting of five alphanumerics which, for the sake of
brevity of transmission can be shortened to three. 80,
5767x could become 67x. Cbmmercial aircraft are called by
their flight numbers such as American 650 or Clipper, for
Pan Am, 232.

27

One trainee I talked to spoke of the frustration that
sometimes occurs during training when several experienced
controllers each try to teach the trainee their own specific
technique. He said, “Each controller has their own
technique. One guy [trainer] says, 'You could have done
this and.you could have done this, but this is the way you
should have done it.’ Sometimes it seems you're being

pushed upon with their techniques.“

This freedom to determine techniques and vary the sequence
of operations that Blauner calls craftsmanship is similar to
what Kohn and Schooler (1983: 22) refer to as
self-direction. They define self-direction as the “use of
initiative, thought, and independent judgment.’ Initiative
is a necessary quality for the successful controller. One
newly rated controller expressed this sentiment by saying
that once he had overcome a feeling of being 'afraid to take
control' he became a more effective controller. He then
gave an example that showed that it was simply his own
choice, in many instances, as to who would be first in the
landing pattern. This discretion gives the controller
direct control over their environment. Controllers will
sometimes take short-cuts, violating minimum separation
standards in the interests of expediting traffic through the
system. This is done under conditions of confidence in

personal ability and control over the traffic situation.

Like other facets of craftsmanship, the skill of the air

traffic controller is cumulative. This can be seen in the

28

traffic controller is cumulative. This can be seen in the
increasing degree of trust that is given to the trainee as
their experience increases. After trainees are certified in
a position, they are allowed to work it alone: after working
that position for a specified number of hours they are
entrusted to monitor others in that position. 'In craft
industries, the foreman is often the oldest and most
experienced journeyman. He may be more respected, but he is
not basically different from the others.‘ (Blauner 1964:
110) This is certainly true of at least one the supervisors
that I saw at Skyways. After watching this supervisor work
alongside him, one trainee said, 'I'll be able to do that
when I'm as good as you.“ Another illustration of this
could be seen one day when the supervisor called in sick.

In this instance the most senior controller acted as the
'controller in charge' or CIC, standing in for the missing
supervisor. The cumulative nature of the 'skill is
exemplified in the long training period that controllers go
through. In certain en route centers5 this training can

last over two years.

A final facet of ATC that makes it akin to a craft is the
degree of knowledge practitioners have over the entire
system. They learn this overall knowledge at the Oklahoma
City academy. Tower controllers can be aware of an
aircraft's progression through the entire air traffic

5. The enroute center is part of the ATC system that
controls aircraft while they are flying between the towers'

29

system. And though not intimately familiar with the rules
for enroute air traffic control, tower controllers know the
basic workings of the enroute system. It is not unusual for
a controller to move from enroute to tower or vice versa.

An example of the use of total system knowledge occured one
morning while I was observing. A flight progress strip had
come out of the computer with a route of flight to the
destination differed from the controllers' conception of
what it should be. After the controllers received no
satisfaction from the queries they made of the computer,
they went to the bookshelf and plotted the route of flight
on the airway maps. The solution to the problem was
discovered through a combination of system knowledge and

on-site experience.

The combination of the ability to flex the rules and
manipulate the system through the use of technique,
cumulation of skill through a long training process and
total system knowledge give the air traffic controller a
craftsman-like skill.

CONTROL OVER POSITION/TRAINEE

I mentioned the independence the controller has over the
operations within each position in the division of labor.
We will now see how the controller puts craftsman-like skill
to work to maintain that independence. We will also see how
the controllers maintain mastery over the trainees they work

with and how trainees are on the receiving end.

Bach position has its designated area and phase of flight
to control. The local controller would not think of talking
to or interfering with aircraft on the taxiways nor would
he/she need to. The controller in charge of any position
has control, and responsibility, over the happenings in it,
free from anyone else's interference. One day while I was
observing, one of the trainees was given his certification
to work ground control. In a very low key transition the
supervisor said, 'There you go Phil: its all yours kid...Now
you've got your license to kill.‘ The message tells him
that there will no longer be anyone listening to and
checking everything he says and that his control
instructions will be his own. This statement not only
signifies the responsibility over the position, but draws
the line between the control position that he had just been

30

31

checked out on and the non-control position (flight data)
that he had been working by himself.

Control over the position and its workings is complete
when the newly rated person is allowed to monitor others in
that position. After the controller works the position
successfully for 30 hours, he/she is allowed to watch and
train others to do this task also. Although the trainee is
supposed to do the controlling while assigned to the
position, the monitor still has the ultimate
responsibility. This control means complete awareness of
all the goings on in the position and altering any movement
that does not comply with the controller's conception of

safety.

An example shows how the more experienced controller
leaves less to chance and exerts greater control. A
recently certified FPL was working the approach control
position with a supervisor to his left working the handoff
position. As the newly rated person stood up to go on a
break, the supervisor asked him of the whereabouts of one of
the aircraft. His reply was, 'I'm not talking to him.“ The
supervisor immediately told the local controller, 'We're not
talking l2J.‘ The trainee on local control, who had just
cleared the aircraft for takeoff, called the aircraft (who
should have then been talking to the approach controller) on
the radio and got no reply. After the trainee said nothing,
the FPL monitoring the trainee on local said to the

supervisor, 'No answer.‘ The difference between the

32

experienced and non-experienced persons in this incident is
that the newly rated person and the trainee were passive,
they did not tell the local controller that they were not in
contact with the aircraft, nor did they let the approach

controller know that they were not talking to the aircraft.

In this example the more experienced controllers initiated
the action necessary to establish contact with and control
over the aircraft. The supervisor established complete
direction over the entire choreography as soon as he sat
down at the position. The journeyman monitoring the trainee
at local took charge to convey the information the

supervisor needed to know.

So, as trainees progress to become rated controllers and
eventually trainers themselves, they move from a position of
being controlled to controlling others. When a trainee and
a rated controller are both working a position it is clear
that the rated controller is in control of the trainee.
Some controllers make this more clear than others, as
illustrated in this excerpt from my field notes:

Jim was at times quite harsh and did not seem to
move from his spot at Kim's left shoulder...As Kim
was giving control instructions to an aircraft, he
pointed to it in the Western sky. Jim immediately
[and emphatically] told him, 'Don't point, just
talk!’
Although the tone may be an artifact of the controller's
personality, there is no doubt of who holds control of the

training process. This control over the trainee is

symbolized through the override feature of the headsets. At

33

any point, the trainer can prevent the trainee's
transmission from going out over the air. I did not observe
this feature being used during my time at Skyways, though it

was used at times by the Air Force controllers.

The control over the trainee is more than symbolic. The
people the trainees are working with are the ones who will
determine whether they will progress to become fully rated
controllers or will be washed out of the program. This
gives the controllers control over who will be allowed to
join their ranks. Both trainers and trainees with whom I
talked were aware of this power. I mentioned before how the
controllers' autonomy 'in the position' gave him a sense of
total workplace control. Now we can see how the control the
journeyman has over the certification of trainees and the
length of training time gives the controller a sense of even

more direction over the ATC system.

MENTAL CONTROL

Mental control is central to the work of controllers. Air
Traffic Control is a mental task more than a physical one.
In fact, the most strenuous physical activity for the
controller may be walking up the stairs to the cab. The
controller's task is one of visually identifying, mentally
storing and ordering, and then vocally relaying that
ordering to those concerned. The last two of these
especially require great control since they require an
internal recreation and manipulation of the present picture
and creation of this mental pattern through ATC commands.
At any one time the controller may be talking to as many as
a dozen aircraft. This requires that the controller
maintain a knowledge of which aircraft is in which
geographical position, where it is going, and what it
intends to do. The controller must combine his/her
knowledge of the type of aircraft and its capabilities with
knowledge of the spacing requirements in order to determine

the sequence the aircraft will follow.

The work of controlling air traffic requires the ability
to do many things at once. As one supervisor told a
trainee, I'You gotta learn how to to talk and write and

listen at the same time.‘. The flight progress strips can

34

35

serve as an aid to memory, but they may become a hindrance
if the person looks at them and not the aircraft. With a
number of aircraft in the pattern it is not possible to rely
on anything but memory of the traffic picture. As a
controller may be writing information on the flight prOgress
strip, he/she may need to deliver some. instruction to an
aircraft while the voice of another is pouring into his/her
ear. When the traffic pace picks up, this skill becomes
imperative. As the same supervisor put it, “When you're

busy you won't have time for, 'Once upon a time..."

When they relinquish a position, a controller must give a
briefing to the oncoming controller. This briefing tells
which aircraft is where and what it is doing. Part of
mental control is an absolute assurance of this mental
picture of which aircraft is where. Any show of doubt in
the briefing is looked upon badly. As one controller was
giving a briefing he used the words, “I think.“ The
oncoming controller, a supervisor, immediately called him on
this display of uncertainty, saying, “What do you mean, 'you
think'?“ Later this same supervisor was monitoring a
trainee who was looking through the field glasses. The
supervisor asked, “Who you looking for?“ “lWC,“ the trainee
replied. “You see him?“ “Ya“, he said, pointing to the
South. That was definitely the wrong answer, since the
trainer replied, “Bullshit! You see that departure you just
cleared [for takeoff].“ In this instance the trainee's

mental control of 'the picture' was tested and he failed.

36

The mental control of air traffic control is akin to the
maintenance of expressive control which Goffman (1973: 52)
conceptualizes. Rather than define it directly, be sketches
the meaning of expressive control by showing how peeple fail
to maintain it; for example, when the “...performer acts in
such a way as to give the impression of too much or too
little concern with the interaction.“ His examples are when
people:

-stutter, forget lines, appear nervous, guilty
or self-conscious

- [have] inappropriate outbursts of laughter
anger or other affect which momentarily
incapacitate them as an interactant.

In the daily life of the tower, each one of these failures
to maintain expressive control may be taken as a failure of
the personal/mental control which goes with being an expert
controller. Some of these failures incapacitate the
controller directly. For example, one afternoon a trainee
on ground control was staring out the window toward the
runway. He might have been surveying the taxiways, but he
did not answer when the supervisor working local control
called out to him. The approach controller suggested, loud
enough for the trainee to hear, “Throw something at him.“
The local controller agreed, “Ya.“ This chiding was a gentle
reminder that he would not be able to withdraw from the
interaction after his certification. Other failures
indicated the less than complete confidence of trainees. I

heard more than one trainee-but never certified

37

controllers-engage in nervous laughter. A supervisor
commented to me that the trainee's nervous laughter,

'...makes me want to strangle him.“

In sum, mental control and its display is important, and
its presence or absence noted, because of its necessity to
the work of clearly and confidently communicating to
aircraft. Such displays of personal control show that
ability to others. I would often see someone make one of
these failures and just as quickly make some gesture to call
attention to the mistake by slapping themselves or the
console. Along with self-castigation, these gestures, by
journeyman and trainee alike, let others know that they have
realized their error and corrected it. The feeling of
autonomy that mental control gives the controller yields a
sense of personal efficacy. This sense of efficacy would
become the controllers' undoing in the struggle over control

of the workplace.

THE SYMBOLIC NATURE OF CONTROL

In an analysis of the occupation of policing, Manning
(1977) writes of the symbolic aspect of control. Although
he is referring to the police as social control agents,
there is a parallel to the Air Traffic Controller: workers
in both occupations have control of information. Police
manipulate a diverse set of symbols ranging from night
sticks to statistical data in order to control their
interactions and give the impression of control. Although
pilots may have some notion of what the ATC 'picture' is,
they do not have the entire symbolic representation that the
controller has. This puts the pilots in a position of trust
and dependence, upon which the controller's control relies.
Besides knowledge of the aircraft's whereabouts, the
controller also has knowledge of the necessary separation
rules that again put the pilot in a position of trust. This
knowledge of the rules and the skill to manipulate them are
symbols of controllers' mastery of the airways. This
control is also a symbol of the safety the controllers
provide the air traveling public. ATC has other symbolic

aspects as well.

The language of air traffic controllers embodies symbolic
control. Although the aircraft (and pilots) are the essence

38

39

of what the ATC task is all about, the controllers do not
interact with them but treat them as objects. In the early
stages of my own training I can remember one controller say
that he never thought of there being people aboard the
aircraft, but envisioned the aircraft as bricks or some
other inanimate objects flying through the air. It is
easier to control bricks than peOple. By referring to
aircraft as what they are doing or have done, controllers
further depersonalize the aircraft and make them easier to
control. For example, controllers refer to aircraft as,
“that departure“ or “the Opposite direction“ (meaning the
aircraft landing Opposite the flow of traffic). The phrase
“your control“ is used during the handoff of an aircraft
from one facility to another. Its expressed meaning- 'It
was mine and now it belongs to you'- signifies both control

and possession.

The language for referring to airspace also conveys a
sense of control. It is not uncommon for one controller to
ask another, 'Can I have 3000 feet?‘ meaning that the
controller wants to have that altitude under his/her
control. 80, controllers are in possession of the space and

have it to give and take away as they please or require.

Even the controllers' place of work symbolizes their
separateness and their control. The manifest reason for a
control tower is, of course, the increased visibility that
it provides. But it also stands as a symbol by placing the
controller in an exalted position. Each day they go to work

40

they step apart from the passengers and other airport
workers to gain a view, perspective and control of air
travel that others cannot have. Though the ticket agent and
baggage handlers are subject to inspection by those whom
they are serving, the controllers are locked away in the
tower allowing only those they choose to enter the sacred
domain. A group of student pilots came up to visit while I
was observing one afternoon. After they had been let into
the cab, the leader of the group told the supervisor that he
had received permission from the morning shift supervisor.

One of the FPLs cut in and said, “But did you get permission
from us?“ Although he was joking with the students, the
comment conveys the idea that the tower is a private place
under the controllers' control. These symbols present a
vision of the controllers as directors as well as guardians

of the air traffic system.

WHAT IS MISSING ?

With a craftlike autonomy over the work task, direct
control over those who would join their ranks, a symbolic
aspect of control in the job and the requirement of a great
deal of mental control it would seem that air traffic
controllers have a great deal of control over their work
environment. “Of these [components of control over the
immediate activity of work] the most important is control
over the pace of work.“ (Blauner 1964: 20) This is a
central dimension of control that air traffic controllers do

not have.

One supervisor described a somewhat consistent work
pattern revolving around the business day. The early
morning is taken up with a rush of exits and entries at the
start of the day followed by a midmorning lull which is in
turn followed by a pre-lunch rush to get settled for that
period. After lunch, traffic picks up for another couple of
hours followed by an indeterminate traffic period until
evening. Although he expressed confidence in this pattern,
the entire conversation was prompted by his surprise at the
slowness of the post-lunch afternoon period. More important
than the questionable consistency of the traffic flow,

however, is the fact that the flow, the pace of work is out

41

 

42

of the controllers' hands. He later described the amount of
work as “feast or famine“. Blauner states that workers who
regulate the work pace can usually control the degree of
pressure. Pressure is one of the most heralded facets of
air traffic control. Part of the stereotypical picture of
pressure is accurate; the controller is bound to the
position and to the externally induced pace of the traffic.
The fact that they are tied to the work station is not lost
on the controllers. One trainee wanted to walk away from
the position because the traffic load was not heavy enough
to be a challenge and an aid to his training. Each trainee
has a fixed allotment of hours that he/she is allowed to
train in the position; if he/she cannot successfully
complete training in this time, they are washed out. In
spite of this, the supervisor reminded the trainee that he
would not be able to leave the position after he became
certified.

Freedom of movement is also more likely to exist when
there is control of the work pace. By Blauner's standard,
the controllers have no freedom of movement; leaving for
thirty minutes would be impossible once a controller has sat
down at a position. The controllers' lack of freedom of
movement while assigned to the position is symbolized by the
headset cord which tethers them to the console. During one
morning's visit, the ground controller walked from the far
west side to the east side of the cab while still plugged in

in order to pull a road atlas from a drawer. This could be

43

seen as a meager attempt to initiate a small amount of
physical mobility. This is not to say that the controllers
do not get breaks. While I was at Skyways, there was a
constant rotation of peOple. Returning from a break meant
stepping into the same preordained work pace to relieve
another. The breaks were a respite from a ongoing process
rather than a chance to halt the work at will. Most of the
military controllers I observed were forced to eat at the

console.

A comparison between air traffic controllers and
physicians will illustrate the limits of the controllers'
autonomy. “Indeed the physician's freedom...has been taken
to be prototypical of professional freedom as such“
Freidson(l970: 33). Freidson has made it clear that the
physician's autonomy does not stand apart from the State but
by virtue of it. The controllers' embeddedness within the

government places limits on their autonomy in several ways.

“...[P]rofessional services usually can not be adequately
evaluated by the layman...“Goode (1960: 904) The
controllers' services are constantly open to evaluation by
the public by way of yearly published statistics on aviation
safety and findings of the National Transportation Safety
Board. The NTSB is the government agency that investigates
aircraft accidents and incidents. This board, along with
the FAA, is part of the Department of Transportation. FAA
regulations determine when the NTSB is called to investigate
possible infractions of the rules. Controllers and pilots

 

 

’I- v't'rl" .

44

alike are subject to those regulations. This is a sharp
contrast to physicians. Though “...the state has ultimate
authority in matters of licensing and prosecution of
practitioners, much of its authority has either been given
to the AMA or been based on the advice of the AMA“ Freidson
(1970: 33). This cannot be said of PATCO.

The licensing referred to in the above quote is also
embedded within the FAA bureaucracy rather than the
prerogative of the controllers. Though the controllers do
have some evaluative control over the trainees, they do not
have the broad ranging power to set evaluation criteria and
control the amount of controllers entering the academy as do
physicians. We saw the implications of this above when the
FAA revealed their power to 'rebuild the system'. This
phrase implies that the ATC system exists outside of the
PATCO members who struck against it. There is no AMA
without physicians. The power to hire new trainees is
contained within not only the FAA, but the Civil Service
System as well. Testing of potential trainees is also under

the direction of these two agencies.

A third significant difference between physicians and
controllers is that the former practice their trade on an
individual basis and the latter perform as a collectivity
within a larger social organization-- the Federal Aviation
Administration. A doctor who is released from a hospital or

clinic is, barring any legal reprisals, free and able to

45

practice wherever he/she can find clients to service. The
controller, on the other hand, has only one market within
which to sell his/her services. The limits of the
controllers autonomy is displayed by putting all of these
together.

' I 1| -.":-fl'_:l‘?-I\-.-1101

 

THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

During a period of expanding air travel in the 1960s,
increased pressure was put on the air traffic system. In
the late '60s and early '70s controllers began to resist the
increasing burden put upon them. In 1968, the Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) was formed as a
union separate from the Federal Employees Union. One of its
first acts was to institute what the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) called a slowdown. The controllers
denied this charge saying they were now handling traffic
according to minimum separation standards. “The officials
of the controllers said these regulations were consistently
being violated to keep pace with burgeoning traffic“ (New
York Times, 1968: 37). The argument continued during the
summer over whether or not it was a slowdown. In any case
it could be called a “...resistance [that] is more
conspiratorial...[in that] technicians work to rules,
sticking to the letter of the production manual and thereby
slowing work to the fraction of normal efficiency“ (Edwards
1979: 41). No matter what it was called, it was a struggle
for workplace control centered around the controllers' lack

of control of the work pace.

46

47

This maneuver had the desired effect of causing numerous
flight cancellations and delays of up to 8 hours. “...it is
an Open secret among those who work at Kennedy airport that
the controller's recent insistence on working strictly by
Federal safety regulations has contributed to traffic
pile-ups“ (New York Times 1968: 37). The controllers were
using technique as a weapon of control. As a PATCO
spokesman put it, “The controllers are rescheduling the
airlines“ (Ibid.). The controllers' stated purpose was to
increase the spacing of the aircraft in order to increase
the margin of safety by relieving overworked controllers
working excessive traffic with faulty equipment. The FAA's
concern was with the reduced output. They criticized the
controllers over a landing rate that went from 47 to 28 or

30/hr.

PATCO timed the slowdown to maximize its effectiveness.
Their first target was the summer vacation season. During
the same year, the union struck the Thanksgiving travel time
when it “announced reinforcement of its policy of strict 'by
the book' handling of planes“ (New York Times 1968b: 1).
“Under the looser policy [the controllers had slipped into
between July and November] too, controllers would
occasionally duck the rule spelling out the complex
departure route and give a pilot a direct short-cut heading
toward his assigned airway“ (Ibid). Here again technique

becomes a source of control. They called this effort,

 

48

“Operation Air Safety“ to reiterate its purpose and to
deflect criticism over traffic delays.

Between the time of the first slowdown and the end of the
year, several favorable changes were made. Although there
is no way to know for certain if the changes were the direct
result of the controller's action, they did coincide with
the controller's demands. Among them were regulation of the
airline schedules by the FAA, new equipment, a special
exemption of the Federal hiring freeze in order to hire new
controllers, and permission for the controllers to collect
full overtime pay. They received these system improvements
without having to suffer any disciplinary action. They

seemed very much able to dictate demands.

Two years later, the controllers used the Easter weekend
traffic rush to mount another attempt to control the
workplace. After advanced warning, the controllers staged a
'sick out' where 932 of the then 9000 controllers stayed
away from ‘work using accumulated sick leave. Again the
controllers caused delays of several hours and the
cancellation of several flights. Later that year they again
held a sick out and again caused long delays. Their demands
were similar to those of 1968: they wanted improved working
conditions and new equipment.

This time the FAA was not so docile. The 1968 slowdown
resulted in recognition of the controllers' importance and a
belief that there was not much to do but bargain lest the

controllers shut down the Nation's air traffic system. The

 

49

sick out produced a higher level of response, though. The
FAA removed all but emergency overtime pay. And although
threats of suspension and firing were made for those who
instigated the sick out, the courts tempered the FAA's
disciplinary action and few were affected. More
importantly, the FAA reported that it had learned how to

move airplanes with fewer controllers.

In spite of this FAA position, the controllers' action
might be considered a success. There was an improvement of
working conditions, although the FAA claimed that they
merely instituted with more urgency those changes already
planned. There was also a realignment of the existing air
route structure to provide for more efficient traffic flow
as well as 2600 new hirees in 1971. All of this would seem
to contradict the assertion made in the previous section
that the controllers have only limited control over the
workplace. However, a look at the 1982 strike reveals who

does control the air traffic system.

The controllers walked out with as much skill and
knowledge as they could muster hoping to demonstrate their
complete control of the air traffic system. They did not
realize the degree to which the FAA ultimately controlled
the pace of the system. The FAA demonstrated this by taking
dramatic control of the airline schedules in order to
minimize travel. They also instituted a reservation system

which required permission for each individual aircraft to

50

enter the system. This put a clamp on the large number of
general aviation, or non-commercial, aircraft flying in the
system. Skyways tower, where I observed, would have been
greatly affected by the cutback in general aviation since
the bulk of their traffic is non-commercial. All of this
allowed the system to ‘work with fewer controllers. The
Skyways controllers feel the effects today since the
reservation system is no longer in use and general aviation

travel has increased yet the system is still understaffed.

Another way in which the controllers' control was
superseded in the 1982 strike was in the control over the
trainees. The FAA brought in military controllers to help
fill some of the empty slots. This removed the FAA
controllers' direct control over who would join their
ranks. One military controller who was assigned to work at
another FAA tower spoke of the hostile attitude the FAA
controllers held toward the military replacements. He told
me that the facility chief frankly let him know that he was
not welcome there. For the remaining FAA controllers, the
military personnel represented out-group members. In
general, they represent the FAA's ability to control the
controllers' membership. This is also represented by the
large number of people the FAA then hired to fill the

vacancies.

POSTSCRIPT

The work actions instituted by the controllers in 1968 and
1970 seemed to indicate some degree of control over the
workplace. Their demands were met and they did not suffer a
large amount of retribution from the FAA. In the slowdown of
'68 the controllers used both their control over aircraft
movement and symbolic control to effect the changes. The
'70 sick out was an effort to use the symbolic control they
have by charging that the safety of the airways was being

threatened.

In going by the book in the first action, the controllers
stayed on the job and used the work rules and their own
controller technique to slow the pace of work. They handled
fewer flights per hour and gave themselves a greater margin
of safety. This was highlighted in a story of an
international flight inbound to Kennedy airport with a
failed radio, a NORDO as they are called. The increased
separation standards the controllers were using allowed them
to more easily avert any disaster that might be caused by an
incommunicado airliner entering the crowded metropolitan
airspace. This was an example of the manifest reason given
for the slowdown. The repercussions felt not only by the

traveling public in delayed flights, but by the airlines in

51

 

FLg‘l. «a _’_.-.AA'H'-§P

52

cancelled flights, displayed the control held by the

controllers.

The symbolic control of the controllers was revealed by
the education the public received about air traffic
control. In both instances the complexity of the air
traffic system and the controllers' role in it were brought
to light. In the controllers' first act of rebellion in
1968, both the public and the FAA recognized and bowed to
the controllers' control of the skills and information
necessary to keep the air traffic system running safely. In
1970 when the controllers stayed away from work and kept
their experts' system knowledge with them, they displayed
less control as shown by the increase in threats and action
against the controllers. The FAA also countered the
controllers' control of information with their own control

of the airway system.

By looking at the autonomy of the air traffic controllers
in terms of the four facets of control and by viewing the
labor disputes of the controllers as a test of their power,
I am not suggesting that this was the only factor
contributing to the events that occured. The presence of an
administration hostile to the controllers inspite of its
pre-election promise of reform of the air traffic control
system and the size of the striking contingent also played a
part in the failure of the strike. I am suggesting that the
controller's conception of themselves, their ability and

their place in the air traffic system contributed to their

 

53

sense of control of the workplace and played a part in
prompting them to walk out. As I indicated in the
introduction, a study of the controllers who did walk out on
strike is called for to be able to make the linkage between
the controllers' conception of their autonomy and their 1982

strike.

In retrospect, it is easy to see that each work action was
met with a successively greater response by the FAA. The
first reaction was capitulation, the second was threats and
preparation for a thorough response and the third work
action was met with the implementation of that response.
That response moderated the controller's control over
aircraft movement, their control over the trainees and their
symbolic control. Had the controllers been able to dictate
terms to the FAA, they might have been able to consolidate
their autonomy by divorcing themselves from the FAA. This
drastic action might have had the effect of establishing
PATCO as the regulatory authority overseeing air traffic in
the United States. However, at present, PATCO is a
non-entity. Had they recognized the limits of their
autonomy, all things being equal, they may have forseen the

actions that were to be taken against them.

Freidson's (1975: 89-90) study delineated three stances
physicians took toward their work. One of these was that of
the physician-craftsman whose “...focus was not on gain, or

on rules, but rather on the skillful and conscientious

 

54

performance of work as it is evaluated by fellow workers, or
the collegium....Discretion was a necessary and valued part
of work“ (Ibid.). Yet, “it is difficult to act like a
craftsman when there is no organized, supportive collegium
(Ibid.)“. His discussion highlights one of the problems of
evaluating the air traffic control occupation: it does not
fit into the old models (professional, craft) because of its
newness. ATC bears similarities to both models, yet fits
neither precisely. Although the particulars are different,
computer programming also provides the analytic challenge of
a new occupation with a new technology. These new
professions call for more study. Similar analyses could
bring to light the extent of autonomy this and other
occupations possess as well as the limits of that autonomy.

Field research lends itself to that task by enabling
sociologists to immerse themselves into the new occupations
and their social organization in order to reform the
previous conceptual models of the sociology of occupations

and professions.

REFERENCES

Braverman, Harry

1974 Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review
Press.

Blauner, Robert
1964 Alienation and Freedom. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Dawley, Alan

1976 Class and Community. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.

Edwards, Richard

1979 Contested Terrain. New York: Basic Books.

Freidson, Eliot
1970 Profession of Medicine. New York: Dodd,
Mead and Company.
Freidson, Eliot

1975 Doctoring Together. New York: Elsevier.

Geer, Blanche
1964 “First Days in the Field.“ Pp 322-344 in Phillip E.
Hammond [ed.] Sociologists At Work. New York:
Basic Books. '
Glaser, Barney G. and Strauss, Anselm L.
1967 The Discovery of Grounded Theory. New York: Aldine
Publishing Company.

55

56

Goffman, Erving
1973 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Woodstock,
New York: Overlook Press.
Goode, William J.
1960 “Encroachment, charlatanism, and the Emerging
Profession: Psychology, Sociology, and Medic ne.“
American Sociological Review 25: 902-914.
Hall, Edward T.
1959 The Silent Language. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday.
Hailey, Arthur

1968 Airport. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Hughes, Everett Cherrington
1958 Men and their Work. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

1971 The Sociological Eye. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

Johnson, John M.

1978 Doing Field Research. New York: Free Press.

Kanter, Rossabeth Moss
1977 Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic
Books. '
Kat-z, JaCk
1983 “A Theory of Qualitative Methodology: The Social
System of Analytic Fieldwork.“ Pp127-l48 in Robert M.
Emerson[ed.] Contemporary Field Research. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Rohn, Melvin L. and Schooler, Carmi

1983 Work and Personality. Norwood New Jersey: Ablex
Publishing Corporation.

57

Krause, Elliot A.
1971 The Sociology of Occupations. Boston: Little, Brown
and Company.
Lofland, John

1971 Analysing Social Life. Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth
Publishing Company.

1976 Doing Social Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Manning, Peter, K
1977 Police Work. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1978 “The Police: Mandate, Strategies, and Appearances.“
Pp7-31 In Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen [eds.]
Policing: A.View from the Streets.

New York Times

1968 “Delays Persist at Airports Here.“ The New York
Times. July 22: p37.

1968b “Big Airports Face Further Congestion Over Control
Rules.“ November 23: pl.
Perrow, Charles
1979 Complex Organizations. Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Foresman and Company.
Thompson, James D.

1967 Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill.

APPEN DI X

 

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

This thesis, as many projects, put the cart before the
horse. Although I was generally interested in the sociology
of work, I was first attracted to field work methods. I saw
it as a way of being a part of the social world that we are
supposed to be studying as well as just seeing it. Yet, who
would allow a neophyte sociologist to enter their workplace
in order to pursue his voyeurism-in-training? “First, the
achievement of successful entree is a precondition for doing
the research. Put simply, no entree, no research“ (Johnson
1978: 50). At the time, I was in contact with the supervisor
for whom I had worked in the Air Force. He was still
stationed at the A.F. base where we worked together as
controllers. After some coordination, he gained approval

for me to do my observations.

Before I left for the field I realized that I would need
more than the meager knowledge of field.work that I had
gained in the methods survey course I had taken. I began my
training by making dry runs in some local public places. It
was then that I realized the flood of impressions that cross
the unfocussed eye. After reading some field work
literature, I began to see that having categories was

extremely important.

58

59

Lofland (1971) presents a system that provided suggestions
for filing and cross filing data about and between units of
analysis. Some of the units are activities, participation
and relationships. He lays out these static units as a
micro to macroscopic sequence that can be encompassed within
a dynamic analysis. Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that
the categories will fall out of the data. I took both of
these ideas to heart in a seemingly incompatible manner by
going to the A.F. base with prelabeled folders for filing
the data that would fill the preselected activities,
settings and relationships that were going to inform my

observations and help my categories to 'fall out'.

I was going to the Air Force base with a sociological
question in mind though. I recalled the somewhat uneven mix
of air traffic controlling ability that I had encountered
among the controllers I had worked with and how it was not
necessarily related to military rank. If ability did not
directly correlate with rank, this would provide a perfect
opportunity to investigate the effects of status
inconsistency on controller relations since both ability to
control airplanes and military rank were both evaluation

systems valued by the controllers.

Once again though, I was faced with the problem of sensory
overload even though I was observing with a topic in mind.
The selective memory of my experiences as an A.F. air

traffic controller brought forth many instances of

 

60

evaluations of others that established the status ranking of
the controllers with. whom I worked. However I had compiled
those evaluations over many years of close association with
my fellow controllers. I not only did not know most of
these peOple, but even if I did, it was unlikely that they
would volunteer a catalogue of evaluations of their

colleagues for my benefit.

I began the observations anyway, waiting for something to
'fall out'. My first day was one of getting reacquainted
with a couple of people whom I had worked with during my
stay there five years before. I had spent all morning with
them before I had to go the restroom and then a funny thing
happened to me. I looked in the mirror. I had been in a
community of people with short hair and clean shaven faces.
It was then that my outsider status hit home in the form of

my non-uniform (hairy and bearded) appearance.

This realization is important for two reasons. The first
is that seeing the appearance standards that the military
controllers had to follow reminded me of all of the other
regulations in the military. This did not seem to mesh with
the idea of air traffic CONTROL, where the controller is in
command of the situation. At the time though, I continued
to think in terms of status inconsistency not realizing that
this was the category that had fallen into my lap. However,
the concept of the controllers' autonomy over their work

environment would reappear again and again.

61

I spent over two weeks at the Air Force Base, living in
the small town nearby. I observed nearly every day usually
scheduling my time to cut across two of the three shifts.
This time included all days of the week and all times of the
day except for the hours of 3am til 8am which I reserved for
sleeping. I was able to observe all of the crews assigned
to the tower and was able to spend time with some of them
away from the work environment. Lofland (1976: 10) speaks
of intimate familiarity as “...hav[ing] easy, detailed,
dense acquaintanceship with [a sector of social life] based
on free-flowing and prolonged immersion.“ Aside from its
importance to an empirical science, it is important for
being able to move from simply knowing about something to
truly knowing it. The first sudden reminder of my outsider
status told me that I was on my way to achieving intimate
familiarity.

Without knowing the controllers, I was acquainted with
them by association. Nearly every day brought some familiar
airplane or event that would give me cause to recall my own
days there. And though I cannot pretend that I made a
completely new cohort of friends in the three weeks I spent
there, the familiarity I did gain was reflected in the

regret I felt when I left.

After gaining this experience at the A.F. base, I sought
entry to a local ATC facility and looked into another side
of Air Traffic Control, that done by the Federal Aviation
Administration or FAA. The FAA oversees nearly all ATC in

62

the U.S. including that done by the A.F. which uses, for the

most part, the same rules and phraseology.

My time at Skyways consisted of eight, two hour
observations. Of those eight, five were during the week and
three were on the weekends. The observations covered the
entire work day from seven in the morning until six in the
evening. The only time that I did not sample was the
evening period from six until the tower closed at eleven.
Along with these observations, I conducted an interview of
an hour and a half with one of the trainees of the tower.
Aside from the interview, I did have one opportunity for a
brief visit away from the tower with one of the fully rated
controllers. The descriptions of the facility, operation
and people came from the Skyways data unless otherwise

noted.

Although most of the rules and procedures are the same for
both places, there was a vastly different tone of relations
in each facility. If the Air Force tower was amiable and
convivial, the FAA tower was businesslike and almost
somber. There are a number of possible reasons for this
difference among which are, the organizations (Air Force or
FAA) under which the towers operate, the rebuilding status
of the FAA, or simply the personalities of the people with
whom I interacted. Probably the most important reason was
the different nature of the traffic of the two facilities.

The Air Force traffic was sporadic, shifting from excitement

63

to boredom with the entry and exit of the fighter aircraft.

This allowed more time to establish a rapport *with the
controllers. In contrast, the FAA tower had a constant
amount of traffic that created a near constant need for
concentration that prevented anything but brief exchanges
between us. Many sentences were cut off in the middle and

not resumed.

I felt that I was closer to achieving intimate familiarity
at the Air Force tower than at the FAA. My relations in the
FAA tower were polite and amicable, if distant, most
probably because of the brief and infrequent nature of my
visits. Given the seriousness of the task, the mental
control required and the controllers' attitude toward it, I
do not believe that my presence had any affect on the
controllers' work performance or training. Any effort to
put up a deceptive front for my benefit would have detracted
from their own task- oriented concentration. However, the
question of my own reactivity within the setting certainly

remains.

The question arises partly from my final visit to Skyways
tower. As I said at the time, “...the tone of the morning
was entirely different ....more social than I had ever seen
it.“ The altered atmosphere took the form of increased
bantering between myself and the controllers and among
themselves, along with exchanges of more personal
information than had been revealed up to that time. This

change could have come from the low cloud ceiling and poor

 

64

visibility that probably kept some aircraft on the ground to
produce a slow traffic day. Another reason might have been
the lack of a supervisor on duty that day. A third reason,
though, might have been the social relations. As one FPL
said to me that day, certain people work together and are

able to get along better than others.

Although this doesn't point the finger of reactivity
toward myself, personally or as a researcher, it raises my
suspicions. If they are aware of tensions or personality
conflicts among themselves they might certainly wish to
submerge those during my visits. “If by their presence
analytic field researchers change the scenes in which they
participate, the data they take out are still about those
communities and organizations“ (Katz, 1983: 138). And if
they were on their 'good behavior' for me, they evidently

felt it was necessary.

During that final visit, one of the trainees asked me if I
was looking at teamwork. That issue had come up directly in
my interview and indirectly during at least one other visit
to the tower, though I did not realize it at the time. An
FAA or ATC newsletter had been up in the tower. It had an
article in it about a nearby tower whose rate of training
completions and training success was significantly higher
than Skyways's. One trainee, whose training had been
stapped, showed it to me and said in a somewhat sarcastic

tone, 'Now there is a tower that you should be studying.‘

 

65

If a lack of teamwork and its product, a lower rate of
people completing training is a sensitive topic, that might
influence the controllers' behavior. Yet if my presence in
the setting influenced the controllers to try and hide a
trainer/trainee relationship of domination, that indeed
would serve as additional data and give even greater
strength to the idea of the controllers' conception of their

own control.

The entire project has not only helped me learn to take a
field research project from the start to finish, but has
also allowed me to see the world with a sociological
imagination. The insider's knowledge that aided me in
gaining intimate familiarity was also a burden to overcome
in order to be able to see the social dynamics of the tower

rather than simply the controllers and the airplanes.